Woodrow Wilson: The First World War and Modern Internationalism [1 ed.] 0367543346, 9780367543341

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Woodrow Wilson

This volume contributes to the Routledge Seminar Studies history series by providing a concise narrative overview of the ideas and foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson. It focuses on Wilson’s response to the First World War and his efforts to formulate a new international system, while also outlining Wilson’s policies toward different parts of the world. The book shows how Wilson shaped the direction of the 20th century in areas such as global governance, nationalism, decolonization, and international relations theory. In doing so, the book introduces the reader to the many debates over Wilsonian foreign policy. With a target audience of college undergraduates and non-experts, readers will gain a better understanding of Wilson’s vision for the world, his administration’s approaches to foreign policy, particularly during the First World War, and the global impact of his program. Michael R. Cude is Associate Professor of History at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas, where he is also coordinator for the Global Scholars program.

Introduction to the Series

History is the narrative constructed by historians from traces left by the past. Historical enquiry is often driven by contemporary issues and, in consequence, historical narratives are constantly reconsidered, reconstructed and reshaped. The fact that different historians have different perspectives on issues means that there is often controversy and no universally agreed version of past events. Seminar Studies was designed to bridge the gap between current research and debate, and the broad, popular general surveys that often date rapidly. The volumes in the series are written by historians who are not only familiar with the latest research and current debates concerning their topic, but who have themselves contributed to our understanding of the subject. The books are intended to provide the reader with a clear introduction to a major topic in history. They provide both a narrative of events and a critical analysis of contemporary interpretations. They include the kinds of tools generally omitted from specialist monographs: a chronology of events, a glossary of terms and brief biographies of ‘who’s who’. They also include bibliographical essays in order to guide students to the literature on various aspects of the subject. Students and teachers alike will find that the selection of documents will stimulate the discussion and offer insight into the raw materials used by historians in their attempt to understand the past.

Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel Series Editors

Woodrow Wilson The First World War and Modern Internationalism

Michael R. Cude

Designed cover image: Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) standing before battle scene announcing League of Nations. H. Armstrong Roberts / ClassicStock / Alamy Stock Photo. First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Michael R. Cude The right of Michael R. Cude to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Cude, Michael, author. Title: Woodrow Wilson: the First World War and modern internationalism / Michael R. Cude. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2023. | Series: Seminar studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023001022 (print) | LCCN 2023001023 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367543365 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367543341 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003088813 (ebook) | ISBN 9781000904253 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781000904260 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Wilson, Woodrow, 1856–1924. | World War, 1914–1918—United States. | World War, 1914–1918—Diplomatic history. | United States—Politics and government—1913–1921. | United States—Foreign relations—1913–1921. | Internationalism. Classification: LCC E767 .C94 2023 (print) | LCC E767 (ebook) | DDC 973.91/3092—dc23/eng/20230127 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023001022 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023001023 ISBN: 978-0-367-54336-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-54334-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-08881-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813 Typeset in Sabon LT Pro by codeMantra

To Robert and Nancy Cude for their support

Contents

Chronologyix Who’s Who xiii Acknowledgementsxxv   1 Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy

1

  2 Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy

13

  3 Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I

30

  4 Wilsonian Reform and World War I

47

  5 Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles

67

  6 The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy

101

  7 Documents

115

Glossary147 157 Guide to Further Reading Index169

Chronology

28 December 1856 Woodrow Wilson born in Staunton, Virginia, United States 1902–1910 President of Princeton University 1911–1913 34th governor of New Jersey, United States 5 November 1912 Woodrow Wilson elected 28th president of the United States February 1913 Victoriano Huerta takes power in Mexico by military coup 4 March 1913 Wilson begins first term as president of the United States 2 May 1913 Wilson recognizes the Republic of China 21 April 1914  U.S. occupies Veracruz, Mexico after the Tampico Crisis May–June 1914 Niagara Falls Conference to negotiate end of U.S. occupation of Veracruz 15 July 1914 Huerta resigns, Venustiano Carranza takes power in Mexico Outbreak of the First World War in Europe 28 July 1914 23 November 1914 U.S. ends occupation of Veracruz Sinking of the RMS Lusitania 7 May 1915 8 June 1915 William Jennings Bryan resigns as Secretary of State, replaced by Robert Lansing U.S. begins military intervention in Haiti, ends in 1934 28 July 1915 18 September 1915 Arabic Pledge by Germany to restrict use of submarines 19 October 1915 U.S. recognizes Carranza’s government in Mexico 6 January 1916 Wilson proposes Pan American Treaty in Washington D.C. 22 February 1916 U.S. and Britain agree to the House-Gray Memorandum 9 March 1916 Pancho Villa raid on Columbus, New Mexico, U.S. 14 March 1916 U.S. begins the Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa 4 May 1916 Sussex Pledge by Germany to restrict use of submarines

x Chronology 7 May 1916 U.S. begins intervention in Dominican Republic, ends in 1924 7 November 1916 Wilson elected for second term as president of the United States 18 December 1916 Wilson releases general peace note to combatants in World War I 17 January 1917 Germany sends the Zimmerman telegram 22 January 1917 Wilson gives his “peace without victory” speech 31 January 1917 Germany declares unrestricted submarine warfare 3 February 1917 United States breaks relations with Germany 7 February 1917 U.S. ends the Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa 19 February 1917  Britain exposes the Zimmerman telegram to the United States 8–16 March 1917 Russian Revolution begins, Tsar Nicholas abdicates, replaced by the provisional government 2 April 1917 United States declares war on Germany, joining World War I 1 August 1917 Pope Benedict XV releases peace note 7 November 1917 Bolsheviks seize control in Russia, establishing the Soviet Union 7 December 1917 United States declares war on Austria-Hungary 15 December 1917 Armistice completed between Germany and Russia 8 January 1918 Wilson releases his Fourteen Points 20 February 1918 Austrian Emperor Karl I letter to Wilson to discuss peace 3 March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed between Germany and Russia July 1918 Wilson commits U.S. troops to intervention in Northern Russia and Siberia 6 October 1918 Wilson receives first peace note from Germany, correspondence begins Austria-Hungary offers peace to Wilson 7 October 1918 Wilson rejects Austria-Hungary’s offer for separate 19 October 1918  peace 5 November 1918 U.S. midterm elections, Republicans win control of the Senate 9 November 1918 German Government resigns, the Kaiser abdicates 11 November 1918  Germany accepts the armistice, ending the combat phase of World War I 12 November 1918 U.S. recognizes Czechoslovakia 13 December 1918 Wilson arrives in Europe 12 January 1919  Paris Peace Conference begins at the Palace of Versailles 22 January 1919 U.S. recognizes Poland

Chronology  xi 7 February 1919 U.S. recognizes Yugoslavia 14 February 1919 Wilson presents the draft League of Nations Covenant to the Council of Ten 24 February 1919 Wilson returns to the United States 3 March 1919 Henry Cabot Lodge releases the “Round Robin Petition,” criticizing the draft League Covenant 3 March 1919 Wilson arrives again in France 10 April 1919 German delegation called to Paris Peace Conference 28 April 1919 League of Nations Covenant formalized by the Council of Four 23 June 1919 Germany agrees to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles 28 June 1919 The Treaty of Versailles is signed in Paris 8 July 1919 Wilson returns to the United States 19 August 1919 Wilson testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of treaty ratification 3 September 1919 Wilson begins tour across the United States to defend the treaty 25 September 1919 Wilson abandons his tour due to poor health 2 October 1919 Wilson suffers debilitating stroke 19 November 1919 Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles fails in the U.S. Senate 13 February 1920 Robert Lansing resigns as Secretary of State 19 March 1920 Second attempt at ratification of the Treaty of Versailles fails in the U.S. Senate 1 April 1920 Remaining U.S. forces withdraw from the intervention in Russia 2 November 1920 Republican Warren G. Harding wins the U.S. presidency running on a “return to normalcy” 10 December 1920 Wilson wins the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize 4 March 1921 Wilson’s presidency ends 3 February 1924 Woodrow Wilson dies due to ill-health

Who’s Who

Baden, Maximilian von (1867–1929) – German nobleman appointed chancellor in 1918. Granted the task to negotiate an armistice, he corresponded with Woodrow Wilson in October of that year for a German surrender based on the Fourteen Points. He resigned upon completion of the armistice. Baker, Newton D. (1871–1937) – Progressive politician and Democratic mayor of Cleveland, Ohio until joining Wilson’s cabinet as Secretary of War in 1916. Served in this role through World War I. Balfour, Arthur (1848–1930) – British Conservative politician and nobleman. Served as prime minister from 1902 to 1905 but took the role of foreign minister in 1916 through the end of World War I. Namesake of the Balfour Declaration supporting the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. British delegate at Versailles. Benedict XV (1854–1922) – Catholic Pope during World War I. He unsuccessfully attempted to mediate peace between the Entente and Central Powers. Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948) – Czech politician and member of the Czechoslovak National Council during World War I. Later served as foreign minister of Czechoslovakia and led his country’s delegation at Versailles. Bernstorff, Johann Heinrich von (1862–1939) – German diplomat who served as its ambassador to the United States from 1908 to 1917. He favored Wilson’s mediation efforts to end World War I and strove to keep the United States neutral during the conflict. Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von (1856–1921) – German chancellor from 1909 to 1917. A proponent of reaching peace terms, he cultivated Woodrow Wilson’s efforts at mediation until he was forced to resign by the German military high command due to his opposition to military escalation. Bliss, Tasker H. (1853–1930) – Chief of Staff of the United States Army during World War I, he served as a diplomat and Woodrow Wilson’s primary military adviser at Versailles.

xiv  Who’s Who Borah, William (1865–1940) – Republican senator from Idaho from 1906 to 1940. A firm supporter of U.S. neutrality in foreign policy, he became the leader of the “irreconcilables” during the treaty fight. Borah opposed the U.S. ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in any form, as he believed it would lead the United States into future wars. Bourgeois, Léon (1851–1925) – French prime minister from 1895–1896, he served as a French delegate to Versailles where he supported the creation of the League of Nations on the League Commission. Brandeis, Louis D. (1856–1941) – U.S. Supreme Court Justice appointed by Woodrow Wilson in 1916. A supporter of the Zionist movement, he advised Wilson on foreign policy matters related to the Jewish people and shaped Wilson’s tacit support for Zionism. Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ulrich von (1869–1928) – German diplomat who served as its foreign minister for seven months, leading its delegation during the Versailles conference. He opposed the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, favoring an agreement based more on the Fourteen Points. He resigned in protest before signing of the treaty. Bryan, William Jennings (1860–1925) – A three-time Democratic candidate for the U.S. presidency, he served as Woodrow Wilson’s first Secretary of State, embracing Wilson’s vision for liberal internationalism. A supporter of U.S. neutrality during World War I, he resigned in protest in June 1915 in the aftermath of the sinking of the Lusitania, after Wilson refused to criticize the British blockade along with Wilson’s condemnation of German submarine warfare. Bullitt, William C. (1891–1967) – American journalist and diplomat. A supporter of Wilsonian liberal internationalism, he became an adviser to the U.S. delegation at Versailles. He led the Bullitt mission to the Soviet Union where he negotiated a deal with Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin for western mediation of an end to the Russian Civil War, which Wilson rejected. He became one of the most vocal critics of the Treaty of Versailles after its completion. Carranza, Venustiano (1859–1920) – Mexican governor of the state of Coahuila from 1911 to 1913, he opposed the military coup by Victoriano Huerta and became the leader of the Constitutionalist faction in the Mexican Revolution. He led the overthrow of Huerta and became the elected president of Mexico in 1917. Cecil, Robert (1864–1958) – British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, he served as a British delegate to Versailles where he supported the creation of the League of Nations on the League Commission. Despite frustrations with Wilson’s leadership in the League’s creation, he remained a firm supporter of the League until its dissolution after World War II.

Who’s Who  xv Clemenceau, Georges (1841–1929) – French prime minister from 1906 to 1909 and again from 1917 until 1920, leading its delegation at the Paris Peace Conference while presiding as conference Chairman. A supporter of traditional European realpolitik, and a treaty that significantly weakened Germany, he regularly clashed with Wilson at Versailles over their different perspectives on the future of Europe. He worked with the American president as part of the Council of Four that determined much of the final terms of the treaty. Crane, Charles R. (1858–1939) – American businessman and significant contributor to Wilson’s election campaigns. With many interests and contacts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, he adopted many diplomatic assignments at Wilson’s behest, including the Root mission to Russia and the Crane-King Commission to the Middle East, while also attending the Versailles conference. Wilson appointed him U.S. ambassador to China in 1920. Czernin, Ottokar (1872–1932) – Austro-Hungarian diplomat and politician who served as its foreign minister from 1916 to 1918. He tried to cultivate Woodrow Wilson’s efforts at peace based on the Fourteen Points until he was forced to resign after the Sixtus Affair that exposed attempted AustroHungarian peace negotiations with France. Dmowski, Roman (1864–1939) – Polish politician and leader of the Polish National Committee. He led the efforts to gain support among the Entente for a recreated Poland. Despite being restricted from a key role in post-war Poland, due to a rivalry with Polish head of state Józef Piłsudski, he served as a Polish delegate to Versailles. He maintained a tense relationship with Wilson, despite Wilson’s support for Polish statehood. Dodge, Cleveland H. (1860–1926) – Businessmen and friend of Woodrow Wilson. He supported many philanthropic organizations in the Middle East, notably the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief during World War I. He advised Wilson on Middle Eastern policy and played a key role in convincing Wilson not to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Dubois, W. E. B. (1868–1963) – African American author and civil rights activist. One of the founders of the NAACP, he edited its journal The Crisis. He traveled to Paris during the Peace Conference as a journalist and participated there in the first Pan-African Congress. His efforts to pressure Wilson to address African American civil rights were unsuccessful. Ebert, Friedrich (1871–1925) – Leader of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. During the shift to a German republic after World War I, he arose as the new chancellor and president. He advocated for a treaty based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, based on his country’s shift toward democracy. Despite significant pressure, he consented to signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

xvi  Who’s Who Faisal I (1885–1933) – Prince Amir of the Hejaz, he led efforts for the creation of an independent, unified Arab state in the Middle East during World War I. He led the Arab delegation to Versailles and, collaborating with the British, tried to convince Wilson to embrace his vision. He briefly established himself as King of Syria before becoming King for the British mandate of Iraq. Foch, Ferdinand (1851–1929) – French General who became Supreme Allied Commander in the latter stages of World War I. He organized the military terms of the armistice and led the effort to apply harsh military restrictions on Germany after the war, including a French occupation of the Rhineland and Saarland. Garrison, Lindley Miller (1864–1932) – Wilson’s first Secretary of War. He clashed with Wilson, desiring a more aggressive military posture toward Mexico. He resigned in protest in February 1916 after Wilson opposed his plan to expand the standing U.S. military. Grey, Edward (1863–1945) – Foreign Secretary for Great Britain until the fall of the Asquith government in late 1916. He broadly embraced Wilson’s ideas for reform, particularly the League of Nations, and hoped to expand U.S. support for the Entente. He built a friendship with Wilson’s adviser Edward House and the two developed the House-Grey Memorandum, a plan to pressure Germany to embrace peace talks or otherwise draw the United States into the war in support of the Entente. Herron, George D. (1862–1925) – Congregationalist pastor and theologian, he embraced Wilson’s international reforms. He promoted an aggressive U.S. stance in support of the Entente and became an unofficial diplomat and intelligence analyst for Wilson based out of Geneva, Switzerland. He helped convince Wilson to embrace the breakup of Austria-Hungary in favor of new nation states in East Central Europe. Hoover, Herbert (1874–1964) – American engineer and philanthropist, he led the American food program, designed to help people suffering in war torn areas. His program started in Belgium, but it expanded by the war’s end to cover most of Europe as the American Relief Administration, feeding millions. He attended Versailles as an adviser to Wilson on economics and food relief, although he came to criticize the treaty as being too harsh on Germany. He was later elected as the 31st American president in 1928. House, Edward M. (1858–1938) – A Texas businessman and political adviser, he befriended Wilson while working for Wilson’s presidential election campaign. He became Wilson’s closest adviser on foreign affairs and his personal diplomatic representative in Europe, despite holding no formal position in government. He led Wilson’s peace efforts in Europe, although he promoted a more pro-Allied stance than Wilson’s initial goals for neutrality. Upon U.S. entry into World War I, he played a key advisory

Who’s Who  xvii role, notably helping draft the Fourteen Points. He later served as Wilson’s chief adviser on the American delegation at Versailles, including as Wilson’s stand-in when the president was away. The two had a falling out at Paris based on policy disagreements, notably House’s greater willingness to compromise with the other Allies. Huerta, Victoriano (1854–1916) – Mexican general who led a military coup to seize power in February 1913, sparking revolutionary uprisings against his rule. Wilson greatly disliked Huerta and hoped to see him removed from power in favor of a Mexican democracy. Wilson pressured Huerta’s regime by denying it recognition and used the Tampico Crisis to seize the port city of Vera Cruz to instigate Huerta’s overthrow. Huerta resigned from power in February 1914 after his forces suffered military defeat to the Constitutionalists. Hughes, Billy (1862–1952) – Australian prime minister for most of World War I and the leader of its delegation to Versailles. He had sharp disagreements with Wilson at Paris, criticizing the American president’s plans for the League of Nations, while Wilson resisted Hughes’s aggressive stance in support of colonialism. Hughes, Charles Evans (1862–1948) – A former governor of New York and Supreme Court Justice, he became Wilson’s Republican opponent in the 1916 presidential election. Despite his defeat, Hughes remained an influential voice in American politics and worked to bridge a compromise between Democrats and Republicans in support of the League of Nations. Wilson nevertheless turned down suggestions to invite him as a delegate to Versailles. He later served as Secretary of State and Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Ishii, Kikujirō (1866–1945) – Japanese diplomat who briefly served as its foreign minister in 1915–1916. He led a special diplomatic mission to the United States in 1917 and 1918 and subsequently became Japanese ambassador to the United States. He negotiated the Lansing-Ishii agreement with U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, an attempt to ease tensions over each country’s role and influence in China. He served on Japan’s delegation to Versailles. Karl I (1887–1922) – Emperor of Austria-Hungary, taking power in 1916. He embraced reforms to grant greater regional autonomy to ethnic minority regions in the Empire. His government attempted to cultivate talks with Wilson to bring peace on the terms of the Fourteen Points, while maintaining the empire. His monarchy ended with the breakup of AustriaHungary in 1918. Kolchak, Alexander (1874–1920) – Russian admiral and leader of the Russian anti-Communist forces during the Russian Civil War. Despite receiving

xviii  Who’s Who materials from the Entente, including the United States, his organization was defeated by the Bolsheviks. Koo, V. K. Wellington (1888–1985) – Chinese diplomat and politician, and friend of Woodrow Wilson. He served on the Chinese delegation at Versailles and embraced Wilson’s vision for a world led by the League of Nations. He looked to rescind the terms of the Twenty-One Demands between China and Japan and regain Chinese control over Shandong Province. The Chinese delegation refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles when it achieved neither result. Lansing, Robert (1864–1928) – An international lawyer and diplomat, he became Wilson’s second Secretary of State in 1915. While he advised Wilson during the war, and served as a delegate for the United States at Versailles, their relationship deteriorated as Wilson regularly disregarded his advice. Lansing eventually resigned in protest in February 1920 and became a public critic of the president’s decisions at Versailles. Lenin, Vladimir (1870–1924) – Leader of the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution and subsequent founder and head of the Soviet Union. Often seen as a rival for Wilson’s vision of the world, the two leaders teased cooperation during intermittent diplomatic correspondence. By the end of his presidency, Wilson became a firm critic of Lenin and Communism for pursuing undemocratic methods when consolidating power. Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974) – American journalist and commentator on foreign policy, and part of the initial Inquiry team founded by Edward House to advise the president. Wilson regularly read his writings and embraced his suggestions as the basis for the Fourteen Points. He later criticized Wilson’s decisions at Versailles and became a leading “realist” critic of Wilsonian philosophy in foreign policy. Lloyd George, David (1881–1938) – Leader of the British Liberal Party, he served as munitions minister until becoming prime minister in December 1916. Leading his country in the latter part of World War I, he worked to shift American neutrality to support for the Entente. He led Britain’s delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and worked with Wilson as part of the Council of Four that determined much of the final terms of the treaty. He worked cooperatively with Wilson, tacitly accepting the Fourteen Points except where he believed they clashed with British interests, notably opposing Wilson’s appeal for freedom of the seas. Lodge, Henry Cabot (1850–1924) – Republican senator from Massachusetts and Senate Majority Leader and Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during Wilson’s second term. A devout Atlanticist, he consistently criticized Wilson for being weak toward Germany. He opposed the League of Nations as designed to infringe on U.S. sovereignty, and he lead the “strong reservationists” during the treaty fight over ratification. When Wilson refused to meet his demands for alterations to the treaty, he facilitated the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles in the U.S. Senate.

Who’s Who  xix Makino, Nobuaki (1861–1949) – Member of the Japanese ruling council, and foreign minister from 1913 to 1914, who led Japan’s delegation to Versailles. Committed to gaining recognition of Japan’s wartime treaties with China, notably the Twenty-One Demands, he agreed to join the League of Nations to gain Wilson’s consent to the former goal as well as temporary Japanese control over Shandong Province. He also pressured Wilson with calls for a racial equality amendment in the League Covenant. Malinov, Aleksandar (1867–1938) – Bulgarian prime minister late in World War II, he attempted to organize a peace on Wilsonian terms. His efforts failed, despite some late support from the United States, when the Bulgarian Army collapsed on the Salonika Front. Marie of Romania (1875–1938) – Romanian queen, married to King Ferdinand I, who served as a delegate for her country at Versailles. She strove for international recognition of Greater Romania, unifying the Romanian speaking regions into a single country by absorbing territories previously controlled by Austria-Hungary and Russia. Wilson disliked her personally and implicitly opposed her objectives, but Romania achieved its territorial objectives due to support from the other Allies. Masaryk, Tomáš G. (1850–1937) – Czech professor and politician, he led the founding of the Czechoslovak National Council and became the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic after the war. He traveled to the United States in 1918 and built a relationship with President Wilson, advising the American president on Russia while cultivating support for his country. Wilson came to support the creation of Czechoslovakia and perceived the Czech leadership as the most trustworthy of the new countries in East Central Europe. McAdoo, William G. (1863–1941) – American lawyer and official who served as Wilson’s Treasury Secretary until 1918. He was also Wilson’s son-in-law. He led Wilson’s international economic policy, particularly expanding economic relationships with Latin America and overseeing American financial support for the Entente war effort. He is credited by some as establishing the United States as the world’s leading financial power. Morgenthau Sr., Henry – U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire until 1916, he influenced Wilson’s interest in the Armenian Genocide, and continued to advise Wilson on Middle Eastern affairs through his presidency. He helped found the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief and during the Paris Peace Conference he led a fact-finding mission to Poland to report on the treatment of Jewish populations there. Moton, Robert Russa (1867–1940) – African American civil rights activist and president of the Tuskegee Institute. He travelled to Paris on the invitation of President Wilson to meet with Black soldiers. While there, he attended the Pan-African Congress.

xx  Who’s Who Nubar, Boghos (1851–1930) – Armenian businessman and philanthropist from Egypt who served as head of the Armenian National Delegation at Versailles. While he corresponded with Wilson in Paris, and the American president actively considered an Armenian Mandate led by the United States, Armenian populations remained divided among other countries, particularly Turkey and the Soviet Union. Orlando, Vittorio E. (1860–1952) – Italian prime minister starting in 1917, he led his country’s delegation at Versailles as part of the Council of Four that determined much of the final terms of the treaty. Committed to annexing territories in the Adriatic and Aegean, he clashed with President Wilson who perceived the Italian leaders as rapacious and unworthy of extended territorial gains. Despite some compromises, a dispute over the port city of Fiume/Rijeka, claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia, eventually caused him to walk out of the conference in protest. Paderewski, Ignacy Jan (1881–1938) – Polish pianist and diplomat, he developed a close relationship with both Wilson and Edward House while living in the United States during World War I. He played a central role in convincing Wilson to embrace the re-creation of Poland as part of his Fourteen Points. He later became the first prime minister and foreign minister of the Polish Republic and represented his country as a delegate at Paris. Pašić, Nikola (1845–1926) – Serbian politician who served as its prime minister during World War I. While in exile in Corfu during the war, he played a role in the Corfu Declaration of 1917 that established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia. He led the Yugoslav delegation at Versailles, gaining recognition for the new country. He helped cultivate support from Wilson in his country’s disputes with Italy over territories along the Adriatic. Pershing, John J. (1860–1948) – American general who led the punitive expedition into Mexico against Pancho Villa, and subsequently commanded the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during World War I. He established the United States as an “associated power,” with separate command from the other Allies, although he cooperated closely with them in wartime operations. For his service, he received the highest rank in the U.S. military, General of the Armies of the United States. Roosevelt, Theodore (1858 –1919) – American Republican politician who served as the 26th president of the United States. Defeated by Wilson in the 1912 elections, he became a staunch critic of Wilson’s foreign policy. A committed Atlanticist, he opposed neutrality in favor of strong support for the Entente. He became Wilson’s leading “preparedness” critic, calling for a U.S. military buildup prior to U.S. entry into World War I. He consistently criticized Wilson for being weak toward Germany until his death in 1919.

Who’s Who  xxi Root, Elihu (1845–1937) – He served as U.S. Secretary of War and then Secretary of State between 1899 to 1905, and later as a senator from New York. He led the Root mission to Russia in 1917 to build connections with the provisional government and encourage it to stay in the war. A respected Republican voice on foreign policy, he supported the creation of the League of Nations, but Wilson turned down suggestions to invite him as a delegate to Versailles. Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950) – South African general who served as his country’s prime minister during the post-war period and led its delegation to Versailles. A supporter of Wilson’s ideas, he worked closely with the American president to draft the League of Nations charter. His contributions shaped key parts of the document, notably the mandate system to address former German and Ottoman colonies. Sonnino, Sidney (1847–1922) – Italian politician, serving as its prime minister briefly on two occasions, and as its foreign minister during World War I. As a member of his country’s delegation to Versailles, he took a hardline stance, refusing to compromise on most of Italy’s territorial claims in the Adriatic and Aegean. He became one of Wilson’s most pronounced critics at Paris, joining the Italian delegation when it walked out of the conference in protest. Spring-Rice, Cecil (1859–1918) – British diplomat and their ambassador to the United States from 1912 to 1918. Attempted to end U.S. neutrality in support for Britain’s war effort. Taft, William Howard (1857–1930) – American Republican politician who served as the 27th president of the United States, defeated by Wilson in the 1912 elections. Taft refrained from public criticism of his rival and supported elements of his foreign policy as the President of the League to Enforce Peace, an organization that helped shaped Wilson’s ideas for the League of Nations. A respected Republican voice on foreign policy, Wilson turned down suggestions to invite him as a delegate to Versailles. Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940) – Bolshevik War Commissar from 1918 through 1925. He led the Soviet delegation that completed the Treaty of BrestLitovsk. He cultivated a mixed diplomacy with the western Entente, at times welcoming talks for cooperation while at others being oppositional, notably his decision to release the pre-war secret treaties to condemn Entente motives in the war. Trotter, William Monroe (1872–1934) – African American journalist and civil rights advocate. A pronounced critic of Wilson’s treatment of segregation, he travelled to Paris to campaign for civil rights at the Peace Conference. Prevented by Wilson from attending officially, he criticized Wilson as a journalist from outside of the official proceedings.

xxii  Who’s Who Tumulty, Joseph P. (1879–1954) – Wilson’s personal secretary during his presidency. With close access to the president, he served as a functional adviser, but clashed with Wilson’s second wife Edith. He was one of few people able to access Wilson after his stroke in 1919 and helped cover up the extent of his symptoms. Venizelos, Eleftherios (1864–1936) – Greek prime minister during World War I. Leading his country’s delegation at Versailles, he built a friendly relationship with Wilson who favored his country’s territorial claims against Italy at the conference, notably the island of Smyrna. Villa, Francisco “Pancho” (1878–1923) – Mexican general and revolutionary leader during the Mexican Revolution. Initially part of the Constitutionalists, and the leader Wilson found most trustworthy, a dispute with Carranza led Villa to form a competing faction. Defeated militarily by Carranza, he organized a raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March 1916 to provoke a U.S. invasion, which he hoped would disrupt Constitutionalist authority. While he survived the U.S. Punitive Expedition, he was eventually assassinated by the Mexican government in 1923. White, Henry (1850–1927) – U.S. diplomat who served as ambassador to France for the Theodore Roosevelt administration. Wilson chose him as the only Republican member of the U.S. delegation at Versailles. While he played only a minor role until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, he led the U.S. delegation in Paris during the treaty negotiations for the other Central Powers. He returned to the United States in late 1919 and attempted to mediate a compromise in the treaty fight. Wilhelm II (1859–1941) – Emperor of Germany during World War I, until abdicating in 1918 to meet his country’s terms in the armistice to reform to a democratic government. His treatment was a point of contention at Versailles, with Wilson disagreeing with the other Allies on holding him to trail for war crimes. Wilson ultimately accepted criminal trials for the Kaiser, although Wilhelm retired to the Netherlands, which did not extradite him. Wilson, Edith Galt (1872–1961) – Woodrow Wilson’s second wife, married during his presidency in 1915. She maintained the most consistent access to Wilson during the war and served as an informal adviser. She played an important role in shaping Wilson’s relationships, particularly challenging the influence of key advisers such as House and Tumulty. She controlled access to Wilson after his stroke and led the cover-up of his condition. Wilson, Woodrow (1856 –1924) – American professor and politician, he served as the 28th president of the United States. A theorist of American government, he was the only academic scholar to take the role of president. He was important for establishing progressive models of expanded

Who’s Who  xxiii federal government power, including a stronger presidency. He developed an approach to foreign policy, later identified as Wilsonianism, based on active U.S. involvement in international politics, with the goal of establishing a more peaceful, integrated, and democratic world. Wiseman, William (1885–1962) – British businessman and intelligence agent in the United States during World War I. He built a close relationship to Edward House and gained access to Wilson as an intermediary for the British government. He attempted to end U.S. neutrality in support for Britain’s war effort. Zaghloul, Saad (1859–1927) – Egyptian politician and revolutionary leader of the Wafd party. He appealed for Egyptian independence at Versailles. Despite efforts to cultivate Wilson’s support, the American president kept his distance in the name of appeasing Great Britain. Zimmermann, Arthur (1864–1940) – German politician who briefly served as its foreign minister in 1916–1917. He is the namesake of the Zimmermann telegram, an appeal to Mexico to invade the United States to keep it out of the war in Europe. The intercept and exposure of the telegram by British intelligence helped lead the United States to join World War I and provoked Zimmermann’s resignation.

Acknowledgements

I owe heartfelt thanks to my students who helped on this book, including Madison Young, Andrew Ward, Paulo Rubiano, J. D. Corbett, and Joseph Harben, as well as the librarians at Schreiner Logan Library, including Sarah Sides, Lisa McCormick, and Ylanda Copeland. I must thank Allison Sambucini, Emily Irvine, Kimberley Smith, Edward Gibbons, Carolyn Dodds, and Gordon Martel and the other editors at Routledge for helping me through the publishing process. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the History department and Humanities division at Schreiner University for their general support, along with many others on campus. Above all, I owe enormous thanks to Simona and Ian for their ongoing patience and encouragement.

1 Woodrow Wilson Background and Philosophy

One of my students drove home a sense of frustration when considering the many texts examining U.S. President Woodrow Wilson: “Wilson goes on forever…” The quantity of materials surprises many students, as Wilson does not have the same popular cache of other important Presidents of the United States of America such as George Washington or Abraham Lincoln, or even Wilson’s contemporary, Theodore Roosevelt. Nevertheless, Wilson left a notable legacy. He was significant, along with Roosevelt, for establishing the modern progressive presidency. Wilson was also extremely influential in international affairs. His ideas and actions played a central role in the decisive moment at the end of World War I that set the stage for much of the rest of the century, from World War II to the Cold War, and developments from nationalism to anticolonialism. Additionally, he is the only major American political figure to have an approach to international affairs widely named for him in Wilsonianism. Wilson is widely debated among historians and political scientists. Arguably, no other president has had such polarized views between those scholars who revere and despise Wilson. Some scholars see his vision for the world as an ideal never met. Others see Wilson as an avatar of the wrong approach, his ideas found wanting in practice, or as a disingenuous hypocrite who failed the values he espoused. For some students of Wilson, he transcended traditional foreign policy to promote a better vision for the world. For others, Wilson was an unwitting dupe exploited by those more in tune with the cutthroat realm of international politics. These dichotomies of interpretation have come about because Wilson is something of an enigma. On one hand, Wilson was a prolific writer and espoused his ideas in well-regarded public speeches. He also maintained ample private records that are broadly accessible. Nevertheless, Wilson was prone to soaring rhetoric, applying abstract ideas and terminology. He was also regularly vague about his true ideas, sometimes as political negotiating strategy and other times because he was still conceptualizing his foreign policy approach. To further muddy the waters, Wilson’s decisions and private discussions often contradicted with his stated ideals. Given these vagaries, many of his contemporaries interpreted his ideals to fit whatever they hoped or DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-1

2  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy feared. These interpretations often became identified with Wilson in ways that may not have aligned with his actual beliefs. Scholars in some respects continue this practice as they try to decipher Wilson’s ideas historically. Core to these debates is whether Wilson’s ideas have merit. For example, could Wilson’s program have prevented World War II had it been implemented the way Wilson hoped? In contrast, would the post-World War I world have been better had Wilson not gotten so heavily involved? As counterfactual questions, we will never know for sure, and scholars will continue debating. Fundamentally, the reader will be left to decide on their own the merits of Wilson and Wilsonianism. The intent of the text is to provide a synthesis of the history and historiography of Wilson’s foreign policy and the debates surrounding it. The hope is to do so in a digestible form for non-experts. How do we define Wilsonian internationalism? While there is some consensus on the surface, there is a high degree of divergence among scholars about what to emphasize. Wilson never provided a concrete statement of his philosophy of foreign policy. This requires scholars to piece one together using Wilson’s public and private writings, speeches, correspondence, and actions. Accordingly, Wilson was not always transparent, cohesive, or consistent, often making decisions related to specific circumstances rather than systemwide matters. Even where Wilson was systematic in his thinking, such as in conceptualizing his League of Nations, his ideas are bound up with the particularities of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where the League was formally established. Scholars who have defined Wilsonianism as a tradition of international relations thus face the question of whether the later Wilsonianism reflects Wilson’s ideas or if it is a projection of ideas onto Wilson. Many political scientists have framed Wilsonianism as the core of the liberal or idealist tradition in U.S. foreign policy. Most present it as a general promotion of world democracy. Walter Russel Mead, for example, places Wilson as one of his four traditions of U.S. foreign policy. He argues the values of “self-determination, democratic government, collective security, international law, and a league of nations still guide international politics today.” Linking Wilsonianism to 19th century British liberals and to American missionary movements of the same era, he shows it as universalist in its outlook, assuming common human rights and values that can better everyone. Mead then links the idea to American national interest. By making the world more like the United States, and more democratic, the world will become more cooperative. Adam Quinn presents Wilsonianism as a reframing on a global scale of American mentalities of hemispheric separation and the purity of American democracy. Through international institutions, Wilson wanted to prevent the United States, or any other country, from getting sucked into a conflict due to power politics. John Ikenberry places the cornerstone of Wilsonianism as the idea that democratic states are more peaceful, while autocratic states are prone to war. He conceptualizes it as an international cooperation of democratic states, free trade and economic modernization,

Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy  3 international law, collective security, belief in progress, and American leadership of the world. Tony Smith makes a similar argument but defines economics as the essential part of the Wilsonian order. Both Ikenberry and Smith are careful to show that Wilson did not fit the more formalized, later Wilsonianism attributed to him, although his ideas provided the genesis for the philosophy. They note differences such as that Wilson did not look to turn countries into democracies, although Wilson hoped that democracy would be the natural result of development. While there are differences around the margins of these views, such as the necessity of U.S. power to maintain a Wilsonian system, a world order based on liberal principles remains the common definition of Wilsonianism.1 Historians generally have shown more restraint in defining Wilsonianism in a broader framework. David Fromkin, for example, argues that Wilson was not driven by fixed principles. Wilson decided what he wanted to do, usually on narrow personal grounds, and then conceptualized principles to justify his decisions. His proposed system was based less on justice and cooperation, but instead more cynically to bind the European powers to U.S. decision-making. Frank Ninkovich gives Wilson more credit, as having a set of values based on promoting ordered liberty internationally, but he argues that Wilson’s approach was so bound up with the particulars of Wilson’s time, place, and personality that it cannot be replicated. Historians are also diverse in in their arguments. Some scholars show Wilson as attempting to bring more cooperation into the world system. For Arthur S. Link, Wilsonianism was less a grand theory and more simply an application of morality into foreign policy. The United States was simply to serve as an example of a functioning, multicultural democracy. Cara Lea Burnidge argues that Wilson thought the best thing for the world was the application of a Christian ethic of service as exampled by U.S. democracy. Ultimately Wilson’s goal was creating a system where nations used their power in the service of other nations instead of in competition. For Whittle Johnson, Wilson believed in world institutions to guide nations toward common interests instead of the petty special interests of individual countries. For Trygve Throntveit, this was collective security offered through a League of Nations that functioned like an international democracy, with each country having an equal voice in a collaborative system. John Milton Cooper, Jr. and other scholars argue that Wilson did not lead a crusade to impose democracy. While Wilson felt the United States should serve as a symbol for other countries, Wilson believed that democracy could only come through an organic process that fit the culture of a nation. What was most important was a government legitimized and supported by the people who live under it. International organizations would serve to protect this popular sovereignty while changing international relations through cooperative interaction. Other historians have argued more cynically that Wilson’s goals were about political power. Lloyd Ambrosius argues that Wilson was projecting an American nationalism that saw itself as separate from, and not corrupted

4  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy by, the old world. It was about perceived American civilization defeating barbarism, with the League as a vehicle for U.S. hegemony. Robert Tucker accredits Wilson’s moralistic view as genuine, particularly his goal to prevent war, but based on the idea that only the United States could be fully trusted to serve a leadership role. The League of Nations was designed to be the vehicle for change by institutionalizing an American order without requiring direct U.S. action. John A. Thompson similarly argues that Wilson conceptualized a Monroe Doctrine for the world, to provide defense to countries from outside aggression. Collective security would encourage voluntary cooperation, so the United States would not get drawn into too many foreign engagements.2 There are many more scholars who have considered Wilsonianism beyond these examples. Which of these views of Wilson and Wilsonianism is more correct? Ultimately, there is some truth to all of them, and much remains left to interpretation. This book will provide many of these interpretations while outlining the history of Wilson’s foreign policy. Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born on 28 December 1856 in Staunton, Virginia. Wilson was born in a Presbyterian manse, with a minister for a father, and his family on both sides had a legacy of ministers, academics, and lawyers. Wilson grew up in the U.S. South in Columbus, Georgia and Wilmington, North Carolina, following his father’s career. The Wilsons were not native southerners, but Woodrow’s father, Thomas Wilson, followed the southern Presbyterian Church after secession in the United States Civil War. Except for his undergraduate education at Princeton, Wilson spent the first 27 years of his life in the South. Accordingly, he was a lifelong Democrat politically. Woodrow Wilson prioritized his American identity over a southern one, but he nonetheless maintained a southern paternalist view on race. While his family was never rich, they were culturally part of the gentleman class and Wilson always felt comfortable in that environment. Woodrow Wilson struggled academically as a boy, unable to read with fluency until he was eleven, perhaps due to dyslexia, but overcame these struggles. Wilson took many ideals and convictions from his father, including a passion for politics and history. From an early age, he was devoutly pious in his Church attendance, avoided work on Sundays, and remained committed to prayer and study of the Bible. Throughout his life, Wilson testified to the strength he gained from his faith. Wilson had no desire to become a minister, however, choosing an academic career instead. While he kept his academic work and politics relatively secular, his faith guided his sense of right and wrong as a politician. He also conceptualized good and bad people based on his understanding of Christianity, and his faith shaped his speaking style and rhetoric. After drifting a bit in his early attempts at college, Wilson attended and received his bachelor’s degree from the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University) in 1879. In college his hobbies included organizing and participating in debate societies, and he regularly practiced extemporaneous speaking.

Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy  5 He was also an institutionalist, forming or adopting organizations and developing formal constitutions for them. He started admiring 19th century British Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone as a teenager and developed aspirations to become a politician. In 1883, he quit a short-lived law career in Atlanta, Georgia to pursue graduate studies in history and political science at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. Johns Hopkins was then a new school and a pioneer of the German model of higher education in the United States. Wilson came to see the traditional path from law to government as diminishing American political culture, and he joined academia hoping to become a politician of a higher purpose, coming from the ranks of scholars. Receiving his PhD in 1886, Wilson served in a few teaching roles before returning to his alma mater at Princeton where he quickly rose from professor to college president in 1902. Wilson succeeded in raising Princeton’s academic rigor, which allowed it to break into the top ranks of American universities. Wilson desired to make Princeton a center for American and world leaders, and followed the Oxbridge model, with students engaged with residential tutors along with their professors. He wanted to admit people representing different parts of the United States and mold them into a common identity. He faced resistance, however, when he tried to put social clubs under administrative authority. This move drew the ire of students and alumni, in what became known as the “quad fight,” and ultimately facilitated his departure to politics. He came to perceive his defeat here as a sign that money had too much power and needed to be reined in by government.3 Wilson’s presidency of Princeton helped him to build connections and gain a reputation as a potential candidate for higher office. Although bolstered by the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, he embraced the progressive movement after winning election as governor of New Jersey in 1910. He governed during his single term from 1911 to 1913 as a fighter of machine politics and corruption. The Democrats had full control over government during his tenure, and he took leadership of the party to drive the legislative agenda. His reforms included elected primaries, anti-corruption measures, and the creation of a regulatory public utilities board. Wilson used his governorship as a steppingstone to the American presidency. He won the Democratic nomination for the presidential election of 1912, and in the general election benefitted from a divided Republican field when former President Theodore Roosevelt ran as a third-party candidate against the Republican Party nominee, and sitting president, William Howard Taft. Wilson ran on a platform of the “New Freedom,” promoting ideas that were standard for progressives of the era, including support for presidential primaries, direct election of senators, and new labor regulations to promote better working conditions. Like other progressives, Wilson wanted a stronger federal government. While it is unknown how he would have fared in a traditional two-party election, the divided Republican electorate assured his victory on 5 November 1912.

6  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy Embracing the modern role of the presidency as a leader on legislation, Wilson took charge of the federal Democratic Party to shepherd bills through Congress. With the Democrats holding majorities in both houses for his first six years in office, Wilson hewed to a partisan approach, embracing democratic majoritarianism over compromise. The Federal Reserve Act was arguably his most significant domestic achievement. It established the Federal Reserve Bank system, giving the government a hand in financial systems with powers to set interest rates and regulations while serving as the bank of last resort. He also established the Federal Trade Commission to prevent monopolistic activity, which also guaranteed legal rights for labor unions and cooperatives. Wilson also supported several labor reforms, including the Adamson Act, mandating an eight-hour workday for railroad workers. Wilson had received more votes from African Americans than any Democrat before him, but disappointed them when he then segregated the federal bureaucracy. While he rhetorically supported civil rights, he believed African Americans were not ready for self-government and maintained a fear that integration would lead to conflict. He otherwise mostly just seemed to ignore the situation of African Americans.4 Upon taking office, Wilson maintained firm ideas about political leadership. He believed that the best quality of people, morally and intellectually, were not running for office. At Princeton, he conceptualized the university as a tool to create capable statesmen, and he blamed a perceived loss of this element on the influence of Germanic social science in U.S. higher education. In his view, provincialism was the biggest concern, and he looked to create American statesmen both national and international in their outlook. Wilson’s dual emphasis on nationalism and internationalism continued into his foreign policy, but also served as a contradiction he had to work around. Wilson was also skeptical about democracy, perceiving it as functioning well only in societies with historically engrained habits of self-­government, and his writings implied sharp restraints on popular opinion. The average person was too burdened by his or her own personal affairs to think deeply about all matters of state. What was needed were capable leaders to take this burden, hear their constituents’ needs, and guide them in the right direction. Leaders of great oratory would then educate the populace on the right direction. Within this vein, Wilson discouraged political revolutions as disruptive and potentially harmful. Many scholars use this view to suggest Wilson was a gradualist reformer and a believer of orderly progress in the vein of the English parliamentarian and philosopher Edmund Burke, whose writings Wilson admired. Milan Babik argues in contrast that Wilson saw the public and private as entwined and was thus open to radical change if done in an orderly process. Wilson’s application of leadership is a point of much more historiographical contention than his theories. Scholars who favor Wilson present him as leader who found practical ways to implement bold ideas and who galvanized people through great oratory. He was also a serious thinker, absorbing issues and viewpoints and considering his options seriously before making what he perceived as the right choice. Cooper, for example, argues that Wilson’s deep

Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy  7 study of politics is what made him so effective in practice. In contrast, critics highlight that Wilson tended to be stubborn in his beliefs and rued compromise. He assumed he was right and often overlooked contrary arguments. He expected his friends to share his exact views and morals and dismissed those who did not. This has been a particular criticism of his diplomacy. He seized control of the process, developed his own policy down to writing much of his own diplomatic correspondence, and neglected people in his administration with real experience in the field. In this respect, a common motif occurred in Wilson’s career. When he could pursue actions with limited resistance, he charged forward with bold action. When he faced resistance, where compromise was needed, he often walked into high stakes gridlock.5 Wilson is often attributed, along with Theodore Roosevelt, with establishing the modern U.S. presidency. Wilson’s PhD dissertation on the U.S. Congress criticized the body for being chaotic and marred by factional competition. He revered the presidency as the true source of power and progress in the U.S. government. Wilson disliked the U.S. separation of powers as preventing effective action by marginalizing the chief executive. Wilson defined the president as the interpreter of the people’s will and saw the ideal Congress as one that followed the president’s lead. He revered the British Parliament as the more capable, and reactive, form of government, given its closer connection between the executive and the legislative. Wilson admired British parliamentarians such as Burke and Gladstone, and the essayist Walter Bagehot, as the models for his political philosophy. While it was not within his power to reform the Constitution, he brought practical changes including a return to speaking directly to Congress, doing so more than any president in history. He also used his political party as a vehicle for his legislative agenda, comparable to the parliamentary model. Wilson fit firmly in the progressive era view that the U.S. government could use its power to bring reform domestically and internationally. His book The State promoted a type of managed, non-revolutionary reform, where administrators in a growing federal bureaucracy act as representatives of the society through leadership and enforcement of values. Wilson, though, was not a technocrat in that he thought elite experts should work with the public to define the best approaches to problems, rather than pursuing action based on scientific study.6 Gauging Woodrow Wilson’s philosophy on foreign policy as he began his presidency is a bit more of a challenge, given his limited writings on the topic. Wilson’s biography is also marked by a dearth of international experience. He had rarely travelled, except to Britain, although he read many works of West European scholarship. A committed Anglophile, he especially engaged with British history, literature, and culture from a young age. His senior thesis at Princeton was titled “Our Kinship with England,” and he regularly referred to the unity of the English-speaking peoples. While he was proud of his Scots Irish heritage, and visited Glasgow as his first overseas trip, he fell in love with England during his visit in 1896, especially Oxford and Cambridge, and wrote gushingly about wanting to move there. He returned to England twice,

8  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy vacationing there while recovering from a stroke, and in 1903 he had a twoweek trip through France, Switzerland, and Italy as a tourist. This was his only travel beyond Britain until attending the Versailles conference in 1919. Wilson’s scholarship on government and U.S. history maintained a comparative element, although it reflected a rather reductive view of the world beyond Western Europe. He also taught a course on international law at Princeton. Thomas Knock argues that Wilson had established his general framework for international relations in these lectures, based on an interaction of nations leading to a common law of peoples and moral principles. While Knock commends Wilson’s knowledge of the world, other scholars argue it was largely superficial. By the late 1800s, U.S. leaders and intellectuals became engaged in serious debates over imperialism. Wilson weighed in somewhat. He firmly asserted that foreign affairs were the domain of the presidency and praised his later rival Theodore Roosevelt for expanding executive power in this direction. Otherwise, Wilson’s view on imperialism was influenced by his adherence to historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis that linked American expansion to the spread of democracy. In his History of the American People ­Wilson praised the United States for having succeeded as a multicultural society through a mission led by everyday people to advance democracy rooted in Anglo-Saxon traditions. Wilson expressed in his writings that the United States needed to be involved in the world, but he showed little depth about how it should do so. He showed a dislike of U.S. aggression abroad, for example criticizing the U.S.-Mexican war of 1845 as a predatory grab for territory. Wilson, in contrast, praised the Spanish-American War of 1898 for its expansion of presidential power and supported colonialism in the Philippines as a vehicle for Americans to pursue patriotic service as a guiding force in the world. He also believed that the United States should offer service to humanity and export its values before its economics. While he supported overseas trade, economics should represent a system of fair play and not be exploitative. He supported traditional U.S. programs such as the Monroe Doctrine and opendoor economic policy, under the assumption of a moral application. In an essay in 1901, Wilson argued that there were new, radical forces at work and the U.S. had to be prepared to establish its place among the great powers to defend liberty and democracy. A new imperial power such as Germany might try to assert itself in the Americas. While Wilson did not flesh out most of these ideas, they do illustrate the genesis of his later international program. As Wilson moved toward the presidency, his view on foreign policy became increasingly influenced by the progressive movement. Many of the ideas linked to him would begin with progressive, liberal, and socialist thinkers in the United States and Britain in the late 1800s. Wilson particularly took ideas from “pragmatists” such as William James, John Dewey, Herbert Croly, and Walter Lippman, who saw World War I as an opportunity to reform the world. Wilson avidly read these American writers, while also adapting pre-existing British ideas of liberal internationalism. Wilson started

Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy  9 conceptualizing an idea of a world federation in 1887 and in the early 1900s joined the American Peace Society to promote peaceful mediation of international conflicts. Wilson wanted countries to give up sovereignty in the name of the common good and to accept stability and justice over spoils of victory. Reform had to come through “common council,” meaning mutual embrace of the common good. Wilson did not make clear, however, what defined the common good, a nebulous concept which meant different things to different people. By the time of his presidency, Wilson did develop some core answers. He wanted to make international relations more transparent and encourage democratic governments over “despotic” regimes.7 While historians have combed over his pre-presidency statements and writings, the reality is that Wilson did not prioritize international relations even when he started his run for the presidency. Wilson himself acknowledged this fact upon taking office in 1913, noting “it would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs.” His comments on foreign policy accordingly did not illustrate deep thought about particularities of the world. He had some key principles such as that foreign policy should be centralized in the presidency, the United States should be a moral example, driven by principles of justice, liberty and goodwill, and traditional policies such as the Monroe Doctrine should reflect these values. Otherwise, Wilson functionally crafted his foreign policy on the job. Historians are divided on how to interpret Wilson’s lack of concrete foreign policy experience. Link provided the most positive interpretation. While Wilson was not fully in tune with the particularities of events and systems overseas, his deeply studied understanding of government and politics was easily transferable to the international realm. Wilson established policies that were consistent and firmly grounded in his general philosophes. Scholars such as Cooper and Tucker give similar appraisals, arguing that Wilson was levelheaded, committed to learning on the job, and adapted to hard lessons along the way. He was highly qualified to do so, given his intelligence and ability to find solutions to complicated issues. His lack of formal training facilitated his ability to innovate. Critics suggest, in contrast, that Wilson’s lack of background made him unprepared for the role thrust upon him. It resulted in an approach with internal contradictions and it undermined his goals for internationalism with a policy rooted in American nationalism.8 An additional area of debate is the impact of Wilson’s faith on his foreign policy. Wilson was transparent in his personal faith as well as his commitment to the Presbyterian tradition of his upbringing. He also strove to live a Christian life in his personal morality and behavior. Did Wilson’s devout Christianity shape his foreign policy? Like much about Woodrow Wilson, there are polarized views on this topic. Cooper shows Wilson as functionally a secular figure in his politics. Wilson was deeply religious personally, but he did not use the power of his office to promote adherence to the faith. Wilson did not believe humans could imitate

10  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy God, all they could do was read scripture and do their best to carry out God’s will. To the extent that his religious faith played a role in his decision to go to war, for example, it caused him anguish, and led him to pray for forgiveness. Throntveit notes how Wilson’s personal faith motivated him to strive for a higher good, but he was not deterministic. He simply tried to make the best decisions based on his moral principles. The greatest influence of Wilson’s Presbyterian faith was that he believed in covenants to guide human relations, which shaped his idea for a League of Nations. John M. Mulder also attributes Wilson’s moralistic rhetoric to his faith but argues that Wilson saw faith as something to transform individuals to be better people who could then shape the world through their service. He disliked the church being mobilized for politics. Of these scholars, Link gives the most credit to Wilson’s faith, arguing that it drove him to make sure he was meeting ethical moral and spiritual purpose in all his decisions and actions on foreign policy, and it shaped his emphasis on human rights. Wilson saw democracy as the most humane and Christian form of government and believed that it provided the best opportunity for individuals to live a pious life. Accordingly, America would serve mankind by exampling these values, rather than using government power to proselytize the faith.9 On the other side of the debate, Milan Babik presents Wilson’s political goals as a secular means to Christian ends. He illustrates Wilson’s reading, rhetoric, and his correspondence with writers such as the Christian Socialist pastor George Herron who hoped to use Christian teachings to guide social reform. After Wilson made Herron a delegate to the U.S. legation in Bern, Herron frame the World War into terms of Biblical good and evil, and praised Wilson as a Biblical savior, receiving plaudits from Wilson. Babik suggests Wilson believed democracy was necessary for salvation, and this mentality motivated him to spread democracy internationally. Malcom D. Magee is more restrained, but argues that Wilson fit into the progressive social gospel paradigm of a united church and state bringing about domestic and international reform. He examples Wilson’s promotion of missionaries in China to help spread democracy there. Cara Lea Burnidge takes this idea further. She argues that Wilson wanted a “civic morality” that matched the Christian one, and he equated serving people through government as Christian service to fulfill God’s will. Wilson expected government to pursue actions of a Christian character and assumed greater faith would arise as a result. She illustrates that Wilson essentially saw U.S. diplomacy in the framework of a missionary. The United States could set an example by doing good internationally. Wilson, for example, supported the Underwood Tariff Act in 1913, a non-religious act, as “having served our fellow man.” By pursuing good works, people abroad would look to follow the American model. Likewise, Wilson conceptualized nations being judged like individuals in the international arena. They could bring about good works or evil ones and should be judged accordingly.10

Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy  11 Notes 1 For examples of scholars defining a tradition of Wilsonianism, see: Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002), 132–173. Adam Quinn, US foreign policy in context: National ideology from the founder to the Bush doctrine (London: Routledge, 2011), 24–25, 111–113. G. John Ikenberry, “Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism,” in The crisis of American foreign policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century, eds. G. John Ikenberry, et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1–24. Tony Smith, Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and its Crisis Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 6–22, 60–64. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 36–37. Robert E. Osgood, “Woodrow Wilson, Collective Security, and the Lessons of History,” in The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Earl Latham (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) 187–198. 2 For many examples of historians defining Wilsonianism, see: David Fromkin, “What Is Wilsonianism?” World Policy Journal, 11, 1 (Spring 1994): 100–111. Frank A. Ninkovich, “Wilsonianism after the Cold War,” in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace, ed. John Milton Cooper, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 299–326. Arthur Stanley Link, “‘Wilson the Diplomatist’ in Retrospect,” in The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson, and Other Essays (Nashville, Tenn: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971), 72–87. Cara Lea Burnidge, A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017). Whittle Johnson, “Reflections on Wilson and the Problems of World Peace,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913–1921, ed. Arthur Stanley Link (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 190–231. Trygve Throntveit, Power without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018). John Milton Cooper, Jr. “A Scholar and His Ghosts: Woodrow Wilson as Historian in the White House,” in Historian in Chief: How Presidents Interpret the Past to Shape the Future, eds. Seth Cotlar & Richard J. Ellis (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2019), 142–160. Thomas J. Knock, “‘Playing for a Hundred Years Hence’: Woodrow Wilson’s Internationalism and his Would-be Heirs,” in The crisis of American foreign policy, 25–52. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 43–93. Amos Perlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 30–32. Robert W. Tucker, “The Triumph of Wilsonianism?” World Policy Journal, 10, 4 (1993): 83–99. John A. Thompson, “Wilsonianism: The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept,” International Affairs, 86, 1 (2010): 27–47. 3 For more on Wilson’s upbringing, education, and time at Princeton, see: James Axtell, “The Educational Vision of Woodrow Wilson,” in The Educational Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: From College to Nation, ed. James Axtell (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 9–48. Maynard W. Barksdale, Woodrow Wilson: Princeton to the Presidency (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). John M. Mulder, Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978). 4 For more detailed accounts of Wilson’s personal history and his domestic political career there are many good biographies. For examples, see: Arthur Stanley Link, Wilson. 5 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947–1965). Kendrick

12  Woodrow Wilson: Background and Philosophy A. Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992). John Milton Cooper, Jr. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Vintage Books, 2011). John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London: Routledge, 2013). A. Scott Berg, Wilson (Thorndike Press, 2014). Patricia O’Toole, The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World he Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019). 5 For more on Wilson’s views on leadership and democracy, see: Adam R. Nelson, “Woodrow Wilson on Liberal Education for Statesmanship, 1890–1910,” in Educational Legacy, 49–73. Mark R. Nemec, “The Unappreciated Legacy: Wilson, Princeton, and the Ideal of the American State,” in Educational Legacy, 185–206. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 15–42. Milan Babik, Statecraft and Salvation: Wilsonian Liberal Internationalism as Secularized Eschatology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2013). Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 3–11. Arthur S. Link, “Wilson the Diplomatist,” in Philosophy and Policies, 147–164. 6 For more on Wilson’s view of the presidency, see: Throntveit, Power without Victory, 48–84. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 43–62. Cooper, “A Scholar and His Ghosts,” in Historian, 142–160. John Milton Cooper, Jr. “Politics and Wilson’s Academic Career,” in Educational Legacy, 169–184. Trygve Throntveit, “The Higher Education of Woodrow Wilson: Politics as Social Inquiry,” in Educational Legacy, 207–243. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 15–42. 7 For more on Wilson’s early foreign policy philosophies, see: Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26–93. Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 187–1910 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 162–169. Robert W. Tucker, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy,’” World Policy Journal, 21, 2 (2004): 92–107. Thomas J. Knock, To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3–14. Throntveit, Power without Victory, 1–84. Smith, Why Wilson matters, 130–143. Clements, Presidency, 115–117. Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, World Stateman (Boston: Twayne, 1987), 124–125. Link, “Wilson the Diplomatist,” in Philosophy and Policies, 147–164. W. Bruce Leslie “Dreaming Spires in New Jersey: Anglophilia in Wilson’s Princeton,” in Educational Legacy, 97–121. David Clinton, “Wilsonianism and the sweep of American foreign policy history,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, 4 (Dec 2018): 362–376. 8 For examples of debates on Wilson’s foreign policy experience, see: Link, “Wilson the Diplomatist,” in Philosophy and Policies, 147–164. Cooper. Woodrow Wilson, 3–11. Tucker, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy,’” 92–107. Clinton, “Wilsonianism and the sweep,” 26–93. 9 For scholars suggesting a more limited connection between Wilson’s religious faith to his foreign policy, see: Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 3–11. Throntveit, Power without Victory, 48–84. John M. Mulder, “‘A Gospel of Order’: Woodrow Wilson’s Religion and Politics,” in The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1991), 223–247. Link, “Wilson the Diplomatist,” in Philosophy and Policies, 147–164. Thorsen, Political Thought, 162–169 10 For scholars arguing that Wilson’s faith defined his foreign policy, see: Milan Babik, “George D. Herron and the Eschatological Foundations of Woodrow Wilson’s Foreign Policy, 1917–1919,” Diplomatic History, 35, 5 (2011): 837–857. Malcom D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-based Foreign Policy (Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2008), 4–28. Burnidge, Peaceful Conquest.

2 Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy

Once taking office as president, Woodrow Wilson started establishing his foreign policy. Wilson did so while maintaining few formal advisers. Wilson took ideas from many people, including diplomats, scholars, missionaries, and friends, most of whom came and went. There were only few figures who maintained a consistent access to the president as foreign policy advisers. The most essential figure to Wilson’s foreign policy was “Colonel” Edward House. House was a wealthy businessman who had succeeded as a political advisor in Texas before joining Wilson’s 1912 presidential election campaign. House befriended Wilson and aided Wilson on foreign policy, despite having no official position. House was unassuming in person but worked behind the scenes to guide policy and became identified as Wilson’s “silent partner,” despite his love of socializing compared to the more insular Wilson. House had only slightly more international experience than Wilson but came to believe that international affairs was the culmination of his career. House played an important role for Wilson building relationships with diplomats and foreign officials while serving as Wilson’s personal representative in Europe and Washington D.C. House’s passive, agreeable demeanor led Wilson to believe they thought along similar lines. Wilson often allowed House to speak on his behalf with no intermediaries. Wilson saw him, however, as a practical counselor and a lesser intellect. House, like Wilson, is a figure of much historiographical debate. For some historians, he was the “realist” in the administration working to maintain a power balance in Europe. For others, he was a diligent aid, helping achieve Wilson’s idealistic ends. Some historians see House as the brains behind the Wilson administration, others see a hack who overrated his own skills in diplomacy. One biographer, Charles Neu, describes House as amateurish in foreign affairs, making reactionary decisions based on his socializing with European leaders rather than developing concrete, systematic policies. Cooper presents House as a cipher who happily stood in Wilson’s shadow, although House subtly tried to manipulate the president. Lloyd Gardner presents the two as playing off one another, with House controlling access to information coming from Europe and Wilson just using his adviser to validate his own ideas. These debates extend into House and Wilson’s personal relationship. DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-2

14  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy House in some histories can be a dutiful friend of Wilson, while in others he was a Machiavellian schemer who undermined Wilson’s accomplishments. These criticisms reflect House taking some liberties as a diplomat abroad, as well as regular miscommunications between the two. Neu also suggests that personality conflicts with Wilson’s second wife, Edith Galt Wilson, led Wilson and House to grow more distant. The two eventually had a falling out by the end of Wilson’s presidency.1 The traditional branch for managing United States diplomacy was the Department of State, with many past Secretaries of State driving U.S. foreign policy. Wilson in contrast distrusted and marginalized the State Department. The U.S. diplomatic corps was already sparsely staffed compared to its contemporaries in Europe, and Wilson marginalized it further. Wilson originally planned to appoint nonpartisan, distinguished figures to ambassadorships but shifted to inexperienced donors. He gave them little instruction or direction. Wilson gave his Secretaries of State free reign to manage the day-to-day affairs of the department but kept them at arm’s length in shaping policy. Wilson’s first Secretary of State was William Jennings Bryan. Bryan was a powerful figure in the Democratic party, as a three-time presidential nominee. Wilson chose Bryan as a political appointment to appease the agrarian, populist wing of the party. Bryan had more experience overseas than Wilson, completing a world speaking tour from 1903 to 1906. Bryan was also driven by ideals of Christian moralism, including not allowing alcohol at State Department functions, to the great dismay of many international dignitaries. This mentality also drove Bryan to advance pacifism, such as establishing “cooling-off agreements” between countries that sought impartial investigation of disputes before countries resorted to war. He also espoused anti-imperialism. While Wilson and Bryan generally got along personally, and had similar ideas, Wilson did not respect Bryan intellectually. Accordingly, Wilson developed his own policy, and Bryan eventually resigned from the administration in protest over Wilson’s approach to World War I. Robert Lansing replaced Bryan as Secretary of State and held the position until the final year of Wilson’s presidency. Lansing was widely experienced in foreign affairs. An expert on international law, he had a distinguished career in the U.S. government as a diplomat and lawyer. While serving as State Department Legal Counselor, Lansing received the promotion to Secretary of State as the culmination of a dedicated career to the field. It is notable that Wilson did not want to appoint Lansing but did so mostly because he saw Lansing as a pliant “yes man.” Wilson disliked lawyers as a profession and saw Lansing as a second-rate mind. The historiographical divides over Lansing are like those of House. Some historians present him as capable and experienced, while others see him as a rote thinker, as well as dishonest. Wilson himself had the latter view of his Secretary of State by the time Lansing resigned in 1920.2 Wilson also received intermittent advice from other cabinet members related to foreign affairs. His private secretary Joseph Tumulty had consistent

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  15 access and served as a regular sounding board for Wilson. Wilson’s second wife, Edith, additionally had the most access to the president and served as his most consistent personal supporter. Many scholars have shown how Edith became another unofficial adviser and was particularly important for shaping Wilson’s personal relationships.3 When considering Wilson’s early foreign policy, Wilson did not philosophically prioritize economics. One exception was expanding trade and lowering tariff barriers. Wilson got wayward Democrats in line to pass the Revenue Act of 1913 that reduced tariffs, pairing it with the first federal income tax to mitigate lost revenue. Wilson later advocated the creation of a merchant marine, and in 1916 he established the Shipping Board as a first step, a ­government-owned corporation to operate a merchant fleet. The cotton crisis spurred by the British Blockade during World War I helped drive Wilson’s broader belief in open access to the seas for all countries. Wilson and Lansing also later opposed efforts by their allies to entrench economic nationalism in the post-war order. For Wilson, the rapid U.S. economic growth, becoming the world’s largest economy, meant that the United States needed to be more active internationally. Wilson fit this economic policy into his larger worldview by arguing that U.S. trade had to be guided by fair play and moral purpose and not by economic domination. He promoted reciprocal trade that benefited recipient countries, not just the United States. Wilson likewise suggested that he would only make economic agreements with leaders who respected law, international or domestic. For example, Wilson perceived Mexico as a jewel of resources, but a country unable to utilize them due to political instability exploited by outsiders, including European and U.S. businesses. Wilson later refused to support the U.S. oil and mining companies in Mexico for meddling in domestic Mexican politics. In Costa Rica, Wilson refused to recognize a new government that had come to power in a military coup backed by the United Fruit Company. Wilson accordingly criticized the Dollar Diplomacy of his predecessor, William Howard Taft, as infringing on the sovereignty of China and Latin America. He withdrew from an international loan consortium that would allow U.S. bankers to work in China, because he saw it as a potential vehicle for misuse. This decision backfired, as the organization survived, only with less scrupulous people in charge. Fitting the progressive era vision of bureaucratic expertise serving the public good, Wilson saw the U.S. federal government as the best arbiter of international economic behavior. He allowed his agencies to organize policies abroad, in what historian Emily Rosenberg refers to as the “promotional state.” The Federal Reserve Act, for example, allowed national banks to establish foreign branches and it guided U.S. banks and firms toward overseas investments. Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield enlarged the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, placed commercial attaches in leading centers of the world, and expanded the number of special agents gathering economic data. Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo championed

16  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy a Pan-American financial conference, held in Washington in May 1915, at which he sought uniform financial laws and practices. The War Trade Board, established in 1917, collected information to prep the U.S. for the post-war world, and its Statistical Division provided the government with its first comprehensive data on world economic conditions. Wilson also recruited the American Federation of Labor, led by Samuel Gompers, to pursue international cooperation of Labor Unions in the name of reform, while discouraging more radical labor organization. Wilson ended up supporting a kind of Dollar Diplomacy, as he and his cabinet worked with American banks to allow for loans to foreign countries, regularize currency convertibility, and encourage governments to tax in ways that did not inhibit trade. This approach expanded U.S. trade in Latin America. By the end of Wilson’s terms in office, Latin American imports of U.S. goods had tripled and U.S. investment there had doubled.4 Many historians argue that Wilson’s economic policy was a case of rhetoric over reality. In Robert Tucker’s view, Wilson’s promise to put human rights over property rights in foreign policy was a campaign slogan to criticize Dollar Diplomacy with no substance to back it up. Emily Rosenberg likewise argues that Wilson’s policies were effectively a continuation of an expansionistic Dollar Diplomacy glossed over with idealistic rhetoric.5 The topic of imperialism is another area where Wilsonian rhetoric and the Wilsonian actions diverge explicitly. Wilson’s policy toward the U.S. colony in the Philippines, annexed from Spain in the Spanish-American war of 1898, provides one example. Wilson had nominally supported Filipino independence, and Bryan became the major supporter of this goal. The Jones Act of 1916 reorganized the Filipino government as a form more comparable to the U.S. government and promised to work toward independence. Wilson rhetorically supported the bill as a managed transition to democracy. Nevertheless, he saw the bill’s guarantee of independence in four years as poor timing and edited the terms so that final approval rested with the president. Congress also removed part of the plan to make the upper house of the Philippine legislature fully Filipino. Later, at the Versailles conference in 1919, Wilson used the Philippines to promote the League of Nations, arguing that Washington could give it independence under League guidance. The Philippines eventually received independence in 1945. Interpretations on this topic are, again, divided. Throntveit argues that while the bill did not assure independence, it made steps in that direction and gave Filipinos more direct roles in governance. According to Rosenberg, the vagueness of the bill suggests that Wilson had no intent to follow through. According to Karine Walther, Wilson reduced the act because he saw the Filipinos as racially inferior, and Wilson also established an administration there that discriminated against religious minorities.6 In many respects, the ideals of Wilsonianism took shape in his early statements of philosophy toward Latin America. Central and South America since the wars of independence in the 1800s had seen a mixed bag of governmental

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  17 and economic outcomes, with an international economic program generally based upon exporting natural resources, mostly to the United States and Western Europe. By the time of Wilson’s presidency, the ABC countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, had achieved political and economic stability. Many other countries, however, struggled. In response, the U.S. presidents preceding Wilson had normalized United States economic and military intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. Wilson’s first official statement on foreign affairs on 11 March 1913 suggested a change in this dynamic. Wilson stressed U.S. friendship with Latin American republics, and he declared an end to the conquest and seizure of territory there. He insisted instead on a constitutional rule of law to legitimize governments in the region. Wilson hoped the United States could provide the people of Latin America democratic guidance and he sought to improve the country’s reputation through Pan-American activities. During an address at Mobile, Alabama on 27 October 1913, Wilson promised that the United States sought no territorial conquest in Latin America and he warned against other foreign interests threatening Latin American sovereignty. The Wilson administration, accordingly, pursued greater integration of the countries of the Americas. Wilson facilitated Bryan’s effort to establish cooling-off agreements, which received support from many Latin American countries. He also allowed Bryan to negotiate a deal with Colombia where the United States would apologize and pay $25 million for its backing of Panamanian secession under Roosevelt. This effort fell through due to domestic opposition in Congress. Wilson later promoted a Panama Canal open to all countries upon its official opening on 15 August 1914. A follow-up Jones Act of 1917 for Puerto Rico established a new government there modeled on the U.S. government, including an elected Resident Commissioner to represent the island in the U.S. Congress. It also granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship. Wilson also cultivated the ABC countries as partners, appointing full ambassadors to Argentina and Chile, previously only established for Brazil. Prompted by House, Wilson proposed a Pan-American Treaty on 6 January 1916, at the Second Pan-American Scientific Conference in Washington, D.C. The goal was to create a collective security arrangement to guarantee ­political independence, territorial integrity, and republican government among American countries. Along with creating regional integration, the Pan-­American treaty was an attempt to shift the Monroe Doctrine from a unilateral U.S. policy into a more multilateral system of collective security. While Wilson pursued active diplomacy, and he drafted a covenant, Latin American ­nations moved with hesitancy. Brazil was open to the plan, but Chile and Argentina rejected the program, fearful that the body would disrupt territorial claims against their neighbors, while also fearing U.S. dominance of the organization. Wilson’s use of military intervention in Mexico in turn made him appear untrustworthy. When Brazil proposed a new version of the treaty with extensive loopholes, Wilson called off discussions to focus on Europe. The Wilson administration’s Pan-American efforts also included attempts at economic

18  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy integration. Bryan and Redfield organized a Latin American trade conference on 10 September 1914, and McAdoo followed up on 24 May 1915 with the Pan-American Financial Conference. Lansing in turn worked with Henry P. Fletcher, ambassador to Chile and then Mexico, to form an American Economic League to challenge European economic involvement in Latin America. With United States entry into World War I, Wilson took the rhetoric of Pan-Americanism and turned it international, while also making Latin America a tertiary component of his now European-focused program. Accordingly, Wilson’s program achieved its expansion of U.S. economic connections in Latin America, but without a multinational guiding organization.7 These more idealistic efforts contrast with Wilson’s decision to maintain practices of his predecessors that he claimed to oppose. The Wilson administration continued U.S. involvement to maintain favorable governments in Central America and the Caribbean, such as Cuba and Honduras. Wilson initially encouraged governments in the Americas that were more democratic, stable, and respectful of human rights. Wilson expressed opposition to any government in the region taking power by an insurrection, refusing recognition of Federico Tinoco after he became president of Costa Rico following a coup in January 1917. Increasingly, Wilson came to see political instability in the region as susceptible to European intervention, potentially cutting off important assets such as the Panama Canal. Wilson thus came to intervene in the region more than any president before him. The U.S. made a deal with the government of Adolfo Diaz in Nicaragua that put Nicaraguan foreign policy under U.S. oversight. Wilson kept a contingent of Marines there to maintain Diaz’s government. Washington later helped Emiliano Chamorro Vargas take power in unopposed elections in 1916, after he had served as minister to the United States. The BryanChamorro treaty gave the United States sole rights to build any canal in Nicaragua, designed to prevent a rival to the Panama Canal. Panama was already a protectorate, with the United States having legal right to intervene there without permission. United States oversight of the Panamanian government protected U.S. property holdings and enforced elections there. The Dominican Republic and Haiti were the other prominent examples of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean under Wilson. Both countries had seen regular political collapses, coups, and financial breakdowns over the previous century. In 1907, the Roosevelt administration arranged with the Dominican government for the United States to take control of its financial and commercial system to help it escape debt problems. By 1912, a rebellion flared up against the Dominican government. Wilson threatened intervention, calling for a cessation of violence by all side in the name of free and fair elections. He offered the services of U.S. observers to help assure this outcome. The issue cooled down temporarily with Juan Isidro Jimenez elected as president following U.S. pressure on acting President José Bordas not to consolidate power. The United States maintained financial oversight, requiring the Dominican government to submit state finances, public works, and

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  19 administrative and military appointments for U.S. approval. Growing anger at U.S. involvement contributed to a revival of political upheaval, culminating in a revolt led by Desiderio Arias that captured the capital of Santo Domingo on 1 May 1916. Utilizing the Convention of 1907 as justification, the United States put the Dominican Republic under martial law indefinitely and landed Marines in the name of bringing stability. Protest against the occupation and a guerilla resistance eventually pressured the formulation of the “Wilson Plan” in December 1920, outlining a gradual withdrawal. The occupation lasted until 1924. The U.S. involvement in Haiti also began under Wilson’s predecessors, with economic intervention to help manage its government finances and stabilize its debt in the name of facilitating political stability. Wilson and Bryan sent a commission to its capital of Port-au-Prince to install free elections, but it returned a failure, and rumors spread that France and Germany were competing to purchase a harbor in Môle-Saint-Nicolas for a naval base. The assassination of U.S.-backed Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam by an angry mob, after he had executed over 200 prisoners, was the final straw. Wilson ordered a U.S. invasion and occupation on 28 July 1915, in the name of establishing a constitutional government. The Treaty on 16 September 1915 gave the United States full control of Haiti’s government and finances, essentially making it a protectorate. The occupation of Haiti lasted for 20 years, not ending until 1934.8 Wilson’s interventions in Latin America are an area that receives close to universal criticism from historians. Scholars are consistent that Wilson showed no real knowledge of Latin America and broadly showed little interest in the region, except for Mexico and his Pan-American plan. For critics like Mark Gilderhus, Wilson’s rhetoric and institution building was less about idealism and more about expanding American economic interests in the region. Gilderhus argues that Wilson’s real goals were to maintain the U.S. sphere of influence over the region, to have access to raw materials, and to prevent political chaos that undermined economic pursuits. He equates it as a reimagining of the Monroe Doctrine, designed mostly to reduce European influence rather than boost Latin American interests or sovereignty. Robert Hannigen argues that Wilson did not actually believe in spreading democracy, seeing other peoples in the Americas as not ready for it, and the strategic need to control access to the canal zone was Wilson’s only real motivation. While Wilson saw the ABC countries as developing, he believed other countries needed tutelage and oversight. Micah Wright makes this case exampling Panama arguing that a domineering “missionary” approach led to hostility against the United States in the Americas. Interventions thus became one of Wilson’s contradictions. Wilson’s stated ideals were to help other societies help themselves toward better government, but he could never reconcile how to get the less developed to accept “good men” as leaders without intervention, nor organize independent economics without U.S. help. Scholars such as Ambrosius and Thorsen suggest that these contradictions show how

20  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy Wilson was more concerned about how these policies affected the image and status of the United States than he was about their impact on the people being colonized.9 Wilson, however, did not perceive U.S. interventions as imperialism, but rather as attempts at social uplift. Wilson saw these interventions as against corrupt governments, and claimed to be helping the people of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere by providing stability, protection, and access to the rights and advantages they had been denied. There are a few scholars who treat Wilson’s Pan-American objectives as honest in spirit, even if his actual policy did not live up to his rhetoric. Cooper, for example, challenges the wholly negative view. He presents Wilson as serious in his promotion for friendlier relations with Latin America, and consistent in his refusal to cooperate with corrupt or violent leaders. Samuel Flagg Bemis presents Wilson’s policy in Latin America as blundering and unsuccessful but argues that Wilson should still be commended for setting up the concepts of the later good neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt.10 Wilson’s policy toward Mexico illustrates these broader contradictions. Mexico, like much of Latin America, had experienced regular political instability since its independence from Spain in the 1800s. Porfirio Diaz led an authoritarian regime for 35 years that saw him promote foreign investment to help develop the Mexican economy. United States businesses held more assets in Mexico than all other countries combined, at roughly $1.5 billion, including significant assets in the railroad and oil industries. When Francisco Madero challenged Diaz to the presidency in 1911, the Mexican Revolution began. Diaz resigned and fled to Spain, conceding to Madero. While Madero wanted to end the dictatorship, the revolutionaries divided into factions based on socioeconomic status, race, and political ideology. With continued instability, General Victoriano Huerta led a military coup to seize power in February 1913, killing Madero. Revolutionary factions immediately took up arms against Huerta. U.S.-Mexican relations had remained tense since the U.S. victory, and seizure of territory, in the 1830s U.S.-Mexican war. In turn, one of the driving mentalities of the Mexican Revolution was the belief that Mexico could not modernize because of foreign influence. When the Mexican Revolution began, Taft decided to support any government that might bring stability and that would not target American interests. The “Ten Tragic Days” of the Huerta coup happened three weeks before Wilson took office in early 1913. Mexico was immediately Wilson’s top foreign policy priority. Wilson’s cabinet remained divided on the issue, with Bryan favoring mediation while Edward House and Secretary of War Lindley Miller Garrison urged for intervention. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, who had secretly supported the coup, pushed Wilson to recognize Huerta. Wilson leaned towards Bryan, deciding that military intervention should be a last resort. Nevertheless, Wilson saw Huerta as cruel, illegitimate, and as being propped up by European business interests. Wilson refused recognition of Huerta’s

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  21 rule. Wilson nonetheless also disliked the revolutionaries, who he perceived as agitators pursuing illegal means to power. Accordingly, he implemented a general arms embargo against Mexico. Wilson also refused to favor U.S. citizens or businesses in Mexico, a shift from his predecessors. He proclaimed support for the people of Mexico choosing their own leader. In his speech to Congress on 27 August 1913, Wilson appealed for stability in Mexico to give a fair shot to the Mexican people and to protect the Americans living there. He criticized European influence. Wilson then proffered a deal to Mexico City where Washington would offer Huerta official recognition in exchange for elections in which Huerta would not be a candidate. By refusing recognition, Wilson influenced other American countries to follow suit. Through his Pan-American program, Wilson hoped to pressure Huerta’s resignation. Huerta did not respond to this pressure and dissolved the Mexican Congress in October. Meanwhile, the Constitutionalist faction in Mexico, led by Venustiano Carranza and Francisco “Pancho” Villa, requested the right to buy arms from the United States. They otherwise eschewed U.S. involvement or advice and refused to negotiate with Huerta. Their agent in Washington, Louis Cabrera, helped convince Wilson to favor their organization. Additionally, Wilson sent journalist William Bayard Hale to Mexico, who encouraged him to support the rebels after meeting with them. Meanwhile, President Wilson fired Henry Lane Wilson for pro-Huerta sentiment, and his new ambassador, John Lind, took a carrot and stick approach, promising loans for Huerta’s cooperation with elections, with U.S. intervention as the alternative. Wilson gradually shifted his goal from mediation to supporting the Constitutionalists. In January 1914, Wilson lifted the arms embargo for the Constitutionalists. Meanwhile, military successes by Huerta combined with the splinter of Villa from the Constitutionalists led Wilson to consider intervention. The opportunity arose when Mexican authorities mistakenly arrested U.S. sailors in the port city of Tampico while they were on a routine resupply. While the Mexican government released them quickly, Huerta refused Wilson’s demand for a formal, ceremonial apology for the Tampico Crisis. Despite warnings from Bryan and Carranza that intervention would not be well received, Wilson ordered the U.S. Navy to capture the port city of Veracruz on 19 April 1914. Wilson claimed this move was done to defend U.S. honor, but it also occurred after he received word of a German ship bringing munitions to Huerta. Wilson hoped for a silent neutrality from Carranza, although he did not consult with the Mexican leader. The American troops faced staunch resistance from Huerta’s forces, and the Constitutionalists also condemned the intervention. Veracruz shook Wilson, given the 219 dead, including 19 Americans, as did the Constitutionalists’ criticism. With U.S. forces bunkered down there and rising anti-Americanism in Mexico, Wilson needed an “out.” He rejected calls to expand the intervention but hoped to use the situation to dispose of Huerta without further escalation. Wilson accepted mediation by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile at the Niagara Falls

22  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy Conference from May–June 1914. Wilson called for the removal of Huerta from power, replacement with a provisional government acceptable to all sides, and a general ceasefire. Carranza refused to discuss internal Mexican affairs with foreign powers, and rejected any compromise with Huerta, scuttling the deal. Meanwhile, the Constitutionalists began having military success. Facing potential defeat, Huerta fled Mexico in July, conceding authority to Carranza. Wilson used the opportunity to withdraw American troops, claiming responsibility for Huerta’s resignation. Nominally Wilson achieved his goal with the departure of Huerta, but he had hoped to see a stable democracy arise. He remained exasperated by the ongoing Revolution. While he sympathized with the revolutionaries’ complaints about the Mexican government, he broadly did not respond to the socioeconomic or racial factors driving the Mexican Revolution. Nonetheless, influenced by reports from Hale, he came to believe that large landowners were preventing change in Mexico, and their power had to be broken to bring elections. Carranza, in turn, desired a relationship of equals, with the promise that the United States would stay out of Mexico’s affairs. Wilson came to resent Carranza. He disliked the Constitutionalists’ desire to win militarily before holding elections, he resented Carranza’s public criticisms of the United States, and he believed Carranza was only out for personal power. Accordingly, Wilson maintained his prior policy, withholding recognition of Carranza’s government until the holding of elections. Wilson began to favor Pancho Villa, although he still did not like Villa’s use of violence. American diplomats met with Emiliano Zapata, leader of the radical Agrarian faction in the Revolution, but they saw him as too parochial and not interested in protecting U.S. citizens in Mexico. Not thrilled with any option, Wilson encouraged the Mexican factions simply to pursue civil behavior and to unite behind democratic elections. Wilson threatened intervention if they did not, but the Mexican leaders called his bluff. Robert Lansing, now Secretary of State, led a series of diplomatic conferences with six Latin American nations in 1915 to negotiate a compromise, but Carranza rebuffed them. With World War I ongoing, Wilson’s focus shifted. Meanwhile, Carranza’s military success continued against his rivals, and he consolidated power. Pushed by Lansing, the United States recognized Carranza’s government on 19 October 1915, hoping Mexico would become less of a distraction. This effort at normalization became tested when Pancho Villa ordered a raid on Columbus, New Mexico on 9 March 1916. The attack targeted Camp Furlong before hitting the village, and killed eighteen people, including eight soldiers. Villa hoped to draw the United States into a war with Mexico that might break Carranza’s hold on power. The raid did not turn out well for Villa. He lost 67 men, and the United States pressured Carranza to consent to the U.S. Punitive Expedition into Mexico to capture Villa. Frustrated about having to break his policy, Wilson decided national honor required him to respond. Rumors of German support for Villa helped convince him. General John J. Pershing commanded the expedition with instructions to

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  23 capture Villa and depart. The expedition crushed the group that had carried out the raid, but Villa avoided capture. While the Wilson administration presented the move as a partnership with Carranza, anti-American sentiment grew, leading to clashes with Mexican citizens. At Parral, U.S. forces engaged with Constitutionalist troops, and Carranza made a public demand for U.S. withdrawal. Despite pressure to raise the stakes, the United States and Mexico established a mediation commission. It met for eight months, hung up on issues such as a lack of guaranteed protections for U.S. citizens in Mexico and permission for the U.S. to intervene in Mexico in the case of future raids. Facing rising tensions with Germany, Wilson acquiesced to Carranza and began withdrawal in January 1917. The conflict legitimized Carranza, whereas U.S. focus shifted to Europe. Carranza’s forces inflicted a decisive defeat against Villa in early 1917 and the Mexican government eventually killed him in 1923. Wilson continued to distrust Carranza. After Carranza organized a new constitutional government and won elections to become Mexican president in 1917, Wilson still maintained the arms embargo, which stalled Carranza’s military victory. Nevertheless, Wilson accepted relative stability there, versus achieving his ideal vision. The Wilson administration protested the new Mexican Constitution because it gave subsoil ownership only to Mexican citizens, challenging the ownership rights of foreign oil companies. This issue sparked a diplomatic spat, but Wilson continued to reject calls to intervene. Carranza in turn played all sides, promoting hostility to the oil companies while also asking for loans to support his reforms. The Wilson administration organized a loan agreement in return for protections for U.S. companies, although Carranza ultimately rejected it. When Carranza did not enforce the subsoil law, U.S.-Mexican relations normalized. Carranza was killed during a coup led by his former general Álvaro Obregón after Carranza tried to rig the 1920 elections. Obregón stabilized the government, effectively ending the Mexican Revolution. Wilson refused recognition of Obregón’s government, despite recommendations by his advisers to do so.11 U.S.-Mexican relations is the area of Wilson’s foreign policy that receives the most attention from scholars outside of World War I. It is notable that Wilson himself thought his Mexican policy was successful. He had shown restraint, promoting diplomacy and limiting intervention, resulting in a more democratic government that had stabilized relations with the United States. A few scholars support this view. Lucas Frank argues that Wilson promoted Mexican self-determination against pressure to be more imperialistic. He argues that Wilson’s intervention in Veracruz was not done for economic reasons, but to advance democracy and defend U.S. honor. He could have easily supported a pro-American dictator in Huerta, but instead promoted democracy and left that process to Mexican leaders. Cooper also commends Wilson for embracing prudence, and Clements argues that Wilson solidified U.S. strategic and economic interests in Mexico, while otherwise allowing Mexicans to determine their own future.12

24  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy The most common criticism is that Wilson acted in Mexico without a firm understanding of the Mexican people for whom he claimed to act, resulting in counterproductive policies. Friedrich Katz’s interpretation is that the United States was competing with Britain over economic influence in Mexico, particularly the oil industry, and that this guided Wilson’s policy. He dismisses Wilson’s idealistic rhetoric as driven by embrace of a “white man’s burden” and the Monroe Doctrine versus a real interest in the Mexican people. Laura Garcés makes a similar argument concerning Wilson’s fear of German encroachment in Mexico. Linda Hall and Don Coerver in turn suggest Wilson pursued the Punitive Expedition more to silence domestic critics of his military preparedness. Other scholars condemn Wilson for worsening U.S.-Mexican relations, not solving any of the core issues between the two countries, and for consolidating a legacy of bitterness in Mexico that lasted through the 20th century.13 Another historiographical trend has been to show Mexico as a precursor for Wilson’s policies in World War I. Tucker, for example, emphasizes how Wilson’s framework of limited intervention, national self-determination, hostility toward authoritarian leaders, and appealing to the people of a country were all established in his Mexico policy. He also notes Wilson’s contradictions when applying these philosophies to real-world challenges. Throntveit claims that Wilson learned from this experience that if the United States acted unilaterally, it would not have the same moral authority as working multilaterally. Benbow suggests that Wilson’s offers of mediation fit his ideals for orderly debate and consensus-building, but his rhetoric only fanned the flames of Mexican nationalism against the United States. For Magee, Mexico represented how Wilson never learned the limits of his ability to shape world realities.14 East Asia was the other area of the world where the Wilson administration was active early in his presidency. U.S. involvement in Asia since the late 1800s had been driven by goals to expand trade and support the work of Christian missionaries. By Wilson’s presidency, American foreign policy had been caught between debates about whether to prioritize better relations with China or Japan, often at the expense of the other. China was a historical power with enormous potential but had been undermined by political and economic instability. The European powers and Japan meanwhile had forced a sphere of influence system in China that asserted their economic dominance over different regions. China remained nominally independent, in part due to U.S. pressure to keep China an “open door” for all countries. Japan, in contrast, was a country on the rise. Having gone through rapid modernization during the Meiji Restoration in the late 1800s, Japan now competed as a world power. Many Japanese leaders sought to challenge the Europeans and the United States as the dominant powers in Asia. Wilson was predisposed to favor China, having connections to former students at Princeton from China and to American missionaries active in China. Providing feedback, they regularly portrayed China as longing for Westernization. Wilson, as well as Bryan, saw the spread of cultural values, including

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  25 Christianity, as fundamental to the development of democratic institutions in China. Wilson appointed Paul S. Reinch, a political scientist knowledgeable about East Asia, as his ambassador. The overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the formation of the Republic of China in the 1911 Revolution sparked Wilson’s hopes. He praised the event as a sign of the Chinese people developing a modern democratic consciousness, while expressing his support to the initial Chinese president, Sun Yat-sen. When the Republic quickly fell into political instability, Wilson chose to support Yuan Shi-kai who established himself as a functional dictator. Wilson made the United States the first country to recognize the new government and promoted its stabilization to discourage the Europeans from extracting concessions in exchange for recognition. Wilson was generally against the economic spheres of influence in China, but fully supported the open-door policy. Wilson withdrew the United States from the China Consortium, a multinational financial organization to coordinate lending to the Chinese government, because he saw it as potentially violating Chinese sovereignty. He later reversed this policy, joining a new Consortium in 1918, after the group moved on without Washington. Wilson decided a U.S. presence was needed to moderate the Consortium’s actions. Wilson pushed American banks to invest in China but did not offer U.S. government loans. Once World War I broke out, Bryan and Lansing produced a document that proposed keeping China a neutral territory, but they did not release it after Japan entered the war. Afterwards, Wilson generally ceded East Asian affairs to Lansing, who had experience in the region. Meanwhile, Japanese leaders feared that Chinese instability would lead to greater European and U.S. influence and responded by expanding Japan’s control over the resource-rich region of Manchuria. Wilson came to perceive the Japanese government as untrustworthy, and complicit in trying to divide China. Wilson also did not see Japan as a capable world power. Japanese leaders generally perceived the open door as an attempt to limit Japan’s influence. Along with their respective roles in China causing tension, anti-Japanese laws in California denied economic rights to Japanese immigrants, notably restricting property ownership. Although Wilson generally opposed Asian immigration to the United States, believing they could not be assimilated, he quietly intervened to discourage similar laws in response to complaints from Tokyo. The outbreak of World War I provided Japan an opening. Japan entered the war in 1914 in the name of restoring Shandong province to China and upholding its alliance with Great Britain. It quickly seized the German lease in Shandong, claimed during the 1898 “scramble for concessions” in China, as well as Germany’s island colonies in the Pacific, the Marshall and Caroline Islands. Wilson opposed Japanese intervention, which he saw as an opportunistic land grab. Japan claimed this was a temporary occupation, however, and Wilson did not formally protest the interventions. Japan then used its control over Shandong to leverage its authority in Northern China, giving it an advanced economic control comparable to the Europeans in other parts of

26  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy China. It also pressured China to agree to the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, promising to return Shandong in return for Chinese acquiescence. China appealed to Washington for support, backed by Reinsch. While pressure from Washington and London got Tokyo to lower its demands, it did not stop the treaty outright. To avoid a conflict with Japan, Beijing agreed to the terms. Tokyo and Beijing agreed to several more treaties recognizing Japanese economic rights over the next few years. In response, the Wilson administration raised the scale of complaints. The growing frustration between the two governments motivated a Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in September 1917, led by Viscount Ishii Kikujirō. This diplomacy resulted in the LansingIshii Agreement. In this text, Washington recognized a Japanese special interest in East Asia in return for Tokyo’s acknowledgement of the open door and an independent China. The document gave Japan legitimacy to its economic claims in Shandong, although it did not concede the territory to Japan outright. Both sides felt the agreement had validated their perspective. Japan accordingly advanced the terms of the wartime treaties with China and the United States continued to protest. Accordingly, officials in both Washington and Tokyo perceived their counterparts as not respecting the deal, sowing further mistrust. Critics of Wilson’s early policy in East Asia largely show Wilson as engaged with imperial competition. Levin, for example, defined Wilson’s policy toward China as a combination of nationalism, capitalism, and missionary zeal. Many critics paint Wilson as limited in knowledge about Asia and that he pursued a policy not acknowledging Asian perspectives. East Asia is also the region where scholars show Wilson most explicitly applying geopolitics. Roy Watson Curry shows Wilson as flexible in methods, driven by expanding American interests in China. Tien-yi Li argues that Wilson’s policy showed a move toward unilateralism, in opposition to the other powers in Asia, but that it was largely ineffective. Kawamura paints U.S. relations with Japan as a geopolitical struggle between two countries with similar ambitions. Japan was eager to normalize its place as a world power and become the regional leader. The United States was trying to marginalize the other powers there in the name of promoting an independent China with close ties to the United States. She argues that the Wilson administration soured U.S.-Japanese relations to a point where neither trusted the other again. Notably, while Wilson was discouraging the power politics of Europe, the United States was actively engaging in a balance of power approach in East Asia. It is unclear whether Wilson was conscious of this contradiction.15 Notes 1 For more on House, see: Charles E. Neu, Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). Chares Seymour, “The Role of Colonel House in Wilson’s Diplomacy,” in Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective, ed. Edward H. Buehrig (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 11–33.

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  27 Charles E. Neu, “Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: The Early Years, 1911– 1915,” in The Wilson Era, 248–278. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 192–207. J. W. Schulte Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 101–108. Lloyd C. Gardner, “The United States, the German Peril and a Revolutionary World: The Inconsistencies of World Order and National Self-Determination,” in Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900–1924, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1993), 263–280. 2 For more on Wilson’s Secretaries of State, see: Michael A. Kazin, Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2006), 229– 236. Daniel Malloy Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1980). Knock, To End all Wars, 15–20. Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson, 101–108. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 192–207. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 70–80. Link, “‘Wilson the Diplomatist’ in Retrospect,” 72–87. 3 For more on Wilson’s advisers broadly, see: Charles E. Neu, The Wilson Circle: President Woodrow Wilson and His Advisers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022). Douglas B. Craig, Progressives at War: William G. McAdoo and Newton D. Baker, 1863–1941 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). Cooper, Woodrow Wilson. 4 For more on Wilsonian economic policy, see: Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American dream: American economic and cultural expansion, 1890–1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 63–86. Emily S. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 61–80. Emily S. Rosenberg, “Progressive internationalism and Reformed Capitalism,” in Reconsidering, 255–259. Elizabeth McKillen, Making the World Safe for Workers: Labor, the Left, and Wilsonian Internationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013). N. Gordon Levin, Jr. “The Ideology of Wilsonian Liberalism,” in Causes and Consequences of World War I, ed. John Milton Cooper (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 72–78. Ashley Dodsworth, “‘Freedom of the seas’: Woodrow Wilson and natural resources,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, 4 (Dec 2018): 408–442. Robert Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson: Beliefs and Behavior (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 59–63. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 65–79, 88–89. Magee, What the World Should Be, 54–55. Clements, Presidency, 93–113. 5 For criticisms of Wilson’s economic policies, see: Tucker, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy,’” 92–107. Rosenberg, Spreading, 63–86. Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (2014): 852–863. Emily S. Rosenberg, “Progressive internationalism,” in Reconsidering, 255–259. Michael Patrick Cullinane & Alex Goodall, The Open Door Era, United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 1–72. Mark T. Gilderhus, “Revolution, War, and Expansion: Woodrow Wilson in Latin America,” in Reconsidering, 165–188. 6 For more on Wilson and the Philippines, see: Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I,” 852–863. Throntveit, Power, 85–121. Karine Walther, Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2015), 234, 271–272. 7 For more on general U.S.-Latin American relations under Wilson, see: Mark T. Gilderhus, Pan American visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913–1921 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986). Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.–Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 38–54. Gilderhus, “Revolution, War, and Expansion,” in Reconsidering, 165–188. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 237–252. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, 124–128.

28  Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy 8 For more on U.S. interventions in the Americas, see: Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984). Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), 75–112. Lars Schoultz, In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin Americans (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2020), 42–84. Micah Wright, “Unilateral Pan–Americanism: Wilsonianism and the American Occupation of Chiriquí, 1918–1920,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26, 1 (Mar 2015): 46–64. Robert E. Hannigan, The Great War and American foreign policy, 1914–24 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 79–92. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 82–93. Throntveit, Power, 8–121. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, 116–146. 9 For critics of Wilson’s interventions in the Americas, see: Gilderhus, “Revolution, War, and Expansion,” in Reconsidering, 165–188. Hannigan, Great War, 79–92. Wright, “Unilateral Pan–Americanism,” 46–64. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Imperialism and Revolution: Wilsonian Dilemmas,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, 337– 348. Thorsen, Political Thought, 169–181. Calder, Impact of Intervention. Schoultz, In Their Own Best Interest, 58–69. Calhoun, Power and Principle, 69–118. 10 For more positive interpretations of Wilson and Latin America, see: Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 209–212, 237–252. Samuel Flagg Bemis, “Woodrow Wilson and Latin America,” in Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective, 105–140. Clements, Presidency, 93–113. 11 Among many works on U.S.-Mexican relations under Wilson, see: Mark Benbow, Leading them to the promised land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1915 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2010). Fredrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985). Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: Norton, 1967). Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 1821–1973: Conflict and Coexistence (New York: Wiley, 1974), 122–157. Lucas N. Frank, “Playing with Fire: Woodrow Wilson, Self-Determination, Democracy, and Revolution in Mexico,” The Historian, 76, 1 (2014): 71–96. K.A. Clements, “Woodrow Wilson’s Mexican Policy 1913–1915,” Diplomatic History, 4, 2 (1980): 113–136. Lloyd C. Gardner, “Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913–1921, ed. Arthur Stanley Link (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 3–48. Peter V. N. Henderson, “Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta, and the Recognition Issue in Mexico,” Americas, 41, 2 (Oct 1984): 151–176. Louis G. Kahle, “Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 38, 3 (Aug 1958): 353–372. Laura Garcés, “The German Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico, 1917,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, 281–314. Linda Hall & Don Coerver, “Woodrow Wilson, Public Opinion, and the Punitive Expedition,” New Mexico Historical Review, 72, 2 (April 1997): 171–94. 12 For praise of Wilson’s Mexico policy, see: Frank, “Playing with Fire,” 71–96. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 237–252, 318–328. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, 124–132. Clements, “Woodrow Wilson’s Mexican Policy,” 113–136. Smith, Why Wilson Matters, 65–94. 13 For examples of critics of Wilson’s Mexico policies, see: Quirk, An Affair of Honor. Katz, Secret War. Garcés, “The German Challenge,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, 281–314. Hall & Coerver, “Woodrow Wilson, Public Opinion,” 171–94. Gardner, “Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 3–48. Gilderhus, “Revolution, War, and Expansion,” in Reconsidering, 165–188. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 122–157.

Early Wilsonian Foreign Policy  29 14 Tucker, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy,’” 92–107. Throntveit, Power, 151–187. Benbow, Leading them to the promised land. Magee, What the World Should Be, 64. 15 For more on Wilson’s policies in East Asia, see: Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China policy, 1913–1917 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969). Roy Watson Curry, Woodrow Wilson and the Far Eastern Policy, 1913–1921 (New York, Octagon Books, 1968). Harold M. Vinacke, “Woodrow Wilson’s Far Eastern Policy,” in Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective, 61–104. Noriko Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-U.S. Relations During World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), 1–61. Levin, “Ideology of Wilsonian Liberalism,” in Causes and Consequences, 72–78. Hannigan, Great War, 79–92. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, 132–146.

3 Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I

With the outbreak of the First World War in Europe on 28 July 1914, Americans were largely caught off guard. The war had built over the previous decades of European great power rivalry and resentment linked to the expansion of Germany as the dominant continental country. The assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand sparked the invasion of Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, followed by a chain reaction of alliances. The war pitted the Western Entente Powers, including Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, against the Central Powers led by Germany, but also including Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. By Wilson’s presidency, the United States was firmly established as an economic power, but it had no military or strategic power comparable to the Europeans. America was, however, in no immediate danger, and the general mentality in the United States was to remain detached from what became a deadlocked conflict with casualties in the millions. This mentality, embraced by Wilson, reflected a traditional U.S. policy to remain neutral in European power politics. There was widespread interest in the war, but the U.S. population consisted of diverse nationalities, including immigrants from all sides of the conflict, and there were concerns of a divided populace. Wilson reflected this fear in his State of the Union address on 7 December 1915. He warned against immigrants turning the United States into a “hotbed of European passion,” and he called for the U.S. people to be loyal to America. Wilson, meanwhile, was preoccupied with the death of his wife Ellen, which made an embrace of neutrality personally apt. In his statement to the press on 18 August 1914, he declared that the United States must be “neutral in fact as well in name” and “impartial and thought as well as action.” Wilson in general saw the war as business as usual for European power politics, and particularly targeted things like secret treaties, arms buildup, and territorial expansion as key causes. He also prioritized that the conflict should not infringe upon U.S. neutrality. While neutrality was mostly a consensus, there was still debate among politicians and intellectuals. Pacifists wanted to stay uninvolved and not take sides. Liberal internationalists hoped to engage diplomatically to bring peace and use the moment to implement reforms to DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-3

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  31 prevent future conflicts. Atlanticists, in contrast, wanted Washington to favor Entente victory, even if it stayed out of the war. Most of Wilson’s foreign policy advisers were Atlanticists, with Bryan being the pacifist exception. Wilson embraced liberal internationalism. Wilson sympathized with the pacifists, but believed activist change was needed to prevent a future war. He was, however, vague about what this would entail beyond a promotion of neutral rights. U.S. policy was to gain acceptance of the Declaration of London of 1909, an unratified international agreement on laws of the sea, including rights of neutrality and clear processes for implementing blockades. Bryan appealed to all parties in the conflict to accept its terms, but neither side followed through. Accordingly, Wilson framed neutrality as a moral stance, to keep the United States untainted in order to be a fair mediator. Behind the scenes, however, Wilson favored the Entente. Improving U.S.-British relations was a policy he embraced upon taking office. He also felt a Europe dominated by Germany would be a disaster and potentially threaten the Americas. Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium in turn enhanced its image as the aggressor in the war, and “atrocity stories” about German violence against civilians, funneled to the U.S. media by the British government, encouraged this mentality. To begin his attempts to negotiate peace, Wilson allowed House to visit Europe in his name. During House’s visit in early 1914, designed to build relationships, he met with the German Kaiser Wilhelm II and other upper-level German officials in Berlin. He left highly critical of German national pride. While in London, he met Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and other British officials, and particularly befriended British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. The two developed a close relationship, and Grey welcomed potential mediation. Grey also proffered the idea of the U.S. sponsoring an international body to keep peace. Otherwise, none of the European officials took House’s offers for mediation seriously. The war broke out not long after he returned to the United States. The main result of the visit was that the pro-British House started coordinating his diplomacy with his friends in London. Wilson also had Bryan draft a proposal for mediation based on each side offering its terms for peace. The Europeans rejected this offer. With Germany bunkered in the trenches in Northern France and advancing in the East, the Entente refused to submit in the weaker diplomatic position, while Germany hoped to hold out for a more convincing victory. When House returned to Europe in February 1915, he found both sides unwilling to consider peace without a clear victory. Meanwhile, Wilson found it essential that the United States play a humanitarian role. His administration supported non-governmental aide organizations, such as the American Red Cross, and the Belgian food relief program led by American engineer and businessman Herbert Hoover. At its peak, the food program fed nine million people a day. The U.S. government supported these organizations through publicity and diplomatically facilitating their

32  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I efforts. Despite being neutral in concept, most of this aide went to Western Europe, as the British blockade of the Central Powers stopped even humanitarian goods. For example, the Rockefeller foundation formed an International Commission for Relief in Poland, with cooperation from the German government, but Russia and Britain did not allow access of material goods they believed would supply the war effort.1 As the war ground into gridlock and attrition, the United States economy became a concern for both sides. Before the war, 77% of U.S. exports, roughly $900 million a year, went to belligerents, topped by Britain and then Germany. The outbreak of war saw major economic impact, with exports of munitions and agriculture helping America rebound from an economic recession. Accordingly, Wilson embraced trade as part of his neutrality program, presenting neutrality rights on the seas as a matter of honor and prestige. Wilson, in contrast, initially prohibited loans to belligerent countries. By 1915, Wilson relented, approving lines of credit to the Entente. Additionally, financier J.P. Morgan bankrolled over $3 billion worth of goods through loans to the Allies. The Entente war effort became dependent on American finance. While Wilson’s neutrality was theoretically open to trade and investment with the Central Powers, the British blockade, and the cutting of Atlantic telegram cables, made this difficult. Wilson did not push the issue. Bryan vocally opposed this approach as unfair and argued that it would help end the war if the United States witheld any economic support. Despite early sympathies, Wilson followed the advice of Treasury Secretary McAdoo and the rest of his cabinet who supported broad economic support for the Entente. Wilson came to believe that the warring parties would become economically dependent on the United States, and that would allow him to push a more integrated economic order.2 Wilson faced criticism about his approach. Pacifists opposed the United States facilitating the war economically, progressives were fearful the war would distract from domestic reform, and socialists condemned the war as beneficial to big business. Former President Theodore Roosevelt, and other Republican foreign policy leaders and businessmen, argued that Wilson’s policy was too weak. Pro-Entente, they argued for “preparedness,” against possible German aggression. This debate shaped a divide in the U.S. Congress, with figures such as Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge siding with preparedness and Idaho Senator William Borah embracing neutrality. Wilson tried to accommodate elements of both sides, maintaining neutrality with a limited preparedness program, which he argued would make the United States appear a more serious power to pressure international reform.3 As the war developed, Bryan found himself a lonely voice in the administration. Bryan pushed Wilson to make an aggressive statement blaming all the parties for the war and to challenge the British blockade. Despite U.S. neutrality, the British blockade restricted American trade with Germany, banned several American companies for doing so, and regularly boarded and hassled U.S. merchant ships. From the British perspective, World War I was total war and all goods potentially contributed to the war effort, so prohibitions to

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  33 contraband also expanded to agriculture. This approach caused significant tension with the United States. When Britain implemented the order in council of 20 August 1914 implementing this policy, Lansing wrote an aggressive legal protest. Nonetheless, House, consulting with British Ambassador to Washington Cecil Spring-Rice, toned down the letter, omitting claimed infractions and warnings. Wilson released the House version in December, believing he had to take a stand, but he did not want to alienate Britain from accepting his peace terms. To mitigate American criticism, the British government established a petition system for seizures and started paying indemnities for U.S. goods seized. For example, when London reversed course on an agreement not to label cotton contraband, it agreed to purchase all seized cotton at market price to ease American complaints. While Wilson faced some pressure to push the issue, especially from shipping companies, he restrained his legal team from challenging the legality of the blockade. He instead issued complaints about individual seizures without challenging the blockade wholistically. These mild protests offered no threat of retaliation. Meanwhile the devoutly pro-British U.S. ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, avoided raising the issue. Wilson did not think pressing the issue would be worth the hassle of a potential dispute with Britain. Wilson was also not interested in upending the American economic apple cart, as Britain became more dependent on U.S. goods and finances. The mild U.S. response also encouraged the Entente to brush aside Wilson’s efforts at mediation. When German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmerman expressed openness to American mediation, the British rejected the idea as disingenuous. Wilson accepted the British assertion without dispute. Meanwhile, Germany responded to the blockade with U-boats (submarines), engaging military as well as Entente merchant vessels supplying the war effort. The vulnerability of submarines to surface fire required the German Navy to break the international custom of allowing the evacuation of civilian passengers before sinking. German officials felt this approach was justified given the British blockade and commitment to total war. When establishing this policy, German leaders assumed the United States was going to favor the Entente, but they hoped not to provoke Washington. German propaganda operations in the United States highlighted the blockade’s infringement of neutrality and its contribution to starvation in Germany. Its navy adopted a policy of avoiding American ships, engaging U.S. merchant ships only 20 times during this period, mostly without causing harm. German diplomats also pursued outreach, embracing U.S. mediation on a peace deal. These efforts did not convince Wilson. He perceived the use of submarines as a uniquely dishonorable form of warfare and the German targeting of civilian vessels enhanced this sentiment. Wilson saw the British blockade, even if problematic, as within historical custom. When Germany declared the waters surrounding Britain a war zone to deter neutrals shipping there, Wilson protested the move. He, nonetheless, also proclaimed neutrality, citing U.S. complaints against Britain as a sign of equal treatment.

34  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I Meanwhile, Britain responded to the U-boat threat by arming merchant vessels, utilizing neutral flags as cover, and using passenger ships to transport munitions to France. In February 1915, Berlin released a warning that it would sink ships with neutral flags in the war zone in response to British tactics. Wilson responded with a stern letter warning them against this approach, while later sending Britain a tamer letter about the use of neutral flags as cover. Wilson then attempted a deal to end German submarine attacks in return for Britain allowing the transport of foodstuffs to Germany. This offer received no traction after Berlin demanded the materials be expanded beyond food. Wilson did not press the offer further. When Lansing proposed a modus vivendi for Britain to stop arming merchant ships in return for Germany not firing on merchant vessels, Wilson shot down the idea. The issue became urgent for the United States when Germany sank the RMS Lusitania on 7 May 1915 off the coast of Ireland. A British passenger ship, the Lusitania was carrying munitions, but also passengers, including American tourists. The death of 128 Americans on board sparked a furor in the United States. German leaders felt the sinking was justified given the munitions, although this charge was denied by the British. Additionally, Berlin had sent a warning to potential passengers while the Lusitania was at port in New York City. This “murder on the high seas,” provoked a broad shift in United States public opinion against Germany, egged on by British propaganda such as the Bryce Report highlighting German atrocities. Preparedness critics demanded a U.S. declaration of war, while Wilson’s advisers such as House and Lansing urged the breaking of relations, a first step to war. Bryan desperately tried to highlight the British use of civilian passengers as a shield for munition transports to balance the criticism. President Wilson was caught between anger to avenge America’s honor and his goals for neutrality, but he chose to stay the course. He responded with a speech in Philadelphia on 10 May where he proclaimed that, as a symbol of peace, America was “too proud to fight.” It did not need to prove its justness by turning to conflict. Despite criticism that he was soft, he proceeded with a diplomatic response. In a note on 13 May, Wilson demanded that Germany apologize in full, make reparations, and guarantee the safety of Americans travelling in the future. Wilson called for the end of “dishonorable” submarine warfare and threatened to break diplomatic relations if Germany did not halt the targeting of civilian vessels. He insisted that Americans, as neutrals in the conflict, had a right to travel freely on the seas and not be under threat of attack. While a firm criticism, this note was also an offer for the German government to make amends. Wilson rejected, however, Bryan’s appeal to include a joint complaint about the blockade and to institute a ban of U.S. citizens entering the war zone. Wilson’s demands created an ambiguity. Wilson was correct that Germany was breaking norms by sinking civilian vessels without warning. He was not correct that U.S. citizens riding on belligerent vessels were guaranteed rights of neutrality, a claim that no other country made. Wilson declared the situation as dealing with “principles of humanity” and thus superseding normal

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  35 international law. Wilson in turn stalled attempts in Congress to limit U.S. citizens travelling on foreign vessels, arguing that foreign policy was the president’s prerogative. Britain responded by implementing a complete embargo, diverting all ships to Allied ports, claiming it was justified by German illegal acts. This approach broke a “continuous voyage” law that said a blockade could not stop neutral ships on a direct voyage unless they were carrying munitions. Bryan continued to protest, but Wilson rebutted that criticizing Britain would make the United States appear weak against the threat. Bryan resigned in protest in early June, removing Wilson’s strongest voice favoring neutrality. Lansing, who replaced him as Secretary of State, proved more pragmatic and pro-Entente. As Washington opened negotiations with Berlin, Wilson tamed his response somewhat to concede a use of submarines under the normal practices of international law. German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg responded slowly and tediously to U.S. correspondence figuring the issue would die down. The German Navy also restrained its use of U-boats. Berlin promised not to attack American or neutral ships, although it said nothing about Allied vessels, and did not apologize given the facts of the situation. Berlin felt British actions justified their approach, and complained that America was not neutral by accepting the blockade while selling Britain munitions. Wilson replied that Britain was harming property while Germany was taking American lives. Wilson’s third and final note of 21 July argued that neutral rights were absolute and not conditioned based on the behavior of other belligerents. The note did legitimize the use of submarines in military context. Meanwhile, Edward House and German Ambassador to Washington Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff attempted to negotiate a deal. Bernstorff, however, had trouble meeting the terms of his own government and Wilson resented the ambassador’s arguments that the United States was economically favoring the Entente. Reconciliation almost disintegrated when a German U-boat mistakenly sank the SS Arabic on 19 August 1915, a British passenger vessel travelling to the United States. With three Americans killed, Wilson threatened to break relations, but Berlin responded with the “Arabic Pledge,” promising to allow deboarding before sinking civilian vessels. Wilson expressed his contentment. After the Arabic Pledge, the U.S. finally sent a mild protest to Britain for its role in the issue. When on 24 March 1916 a German U-boat torpedoed the British SS Sussex, injuring four Americans, Wilson revived his protests. Berlin responded with the “Sussex Pledge,” reaffirming the Arabic policy and committing not to target civilian passenger vessels, with the caveat that Germany had the right to restart submarine attacks if the blockade remained in effect. Wilson rebuffed them and demanded they uphold the agreement without conditions. Berlin conceded to appease U.S. sensibilities. Germany’s concessions left Wilson feeling vindicated that he had solved this crisis while maintaining neutrality. Despite the escalation of tensions, Wilson continued his general peace initiatives. House visited Europe again in February 1915 with vague instructions

36  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I to work with both sides to facilitate an agreement based on disarmament, a League of Nations, and freedom of the seas. House’s diplomacy by this stage transparently favored the Entente. He coordinated his efforts with British officials, who otherwise knew much of his intent as British intelligence spied on his correspondence. London refused to budge on issues such as the blockade, and House never really pushed back. House also framed Wilson’s idealism to end militarism and territorial conquest as goals to defeat Germany. House conceptualized peace proposals premised on coaxing in Germany based on mutual disarmament, while the United States quietly set terms favorable to the Allies. British officials never took House’s offers seriously. While some officials liked Wilson’s ideas for reform, the British were generally content with U.S. neutrality that favored them economically. House never prioritized a relationship with France, but he met with French diplomat Jules Cambon in Paris where he predicted the United States would soon enter the war. French leaders also rejected a U.S.-led mediation effort at this time. Accordingly, when visiting Berlin, German leaders brushed off House’s offers, which included indemnities premised on Germany having lost the war. After Bethmann Hollweg expressed a desire to negotiate, House concluded that Germany was close to defeat, but militarists in the government were refusing to compromise. House guided Wilson to a more deliberately pro-Allied stance, arguing that neutrality would inhibit Wilson’s ability to set terms for peace. Wilson responded only vaguely in written correspondence to House’s ideas, which House took for support. House’s relationship with Edward Grey, who sympathized with much of Wilson’s reforms, was particularly important in this context. For example, Grey proffered the idea of a League of Nations to enforce the peace that perked Wilson’s interest. Wilson allowed House to provide a positive reply, although Wilson expressed no interest in being involved in territorial settlements. House nonetheless discussed territorial settlement consistently while meeting with Allied leaders, consolidating many ideas that later took effect after the war. After the submarine crisis, House came to believe that if the United States threatened war, it would force Germany to peace talks. With Wilson’s approval, he took the idea to Grey. Grey was skeptical and proposed patience, believing the Allies would soon turn the tide. Nevertheless, their discussions saw them conceptualize the idea for a U.S. mediation proposal timed for either a possible Allied defeat or a decisive Allied advantage. This resulted in the 22 February 1916 House-Gray Memorandum. This document established a plan where, upon Allied prompting, the United States would call for a peace conference. If accepted, Washington would mediate peace terms favorable to the Entente. The only specifics were that Belgium would be restored, Alsace Lorraine would be returned to France, and Russia would receive an outlet to the Mediterranean. Germany would be placated with concessions outside of Europe. Other Allies, such as Italy and Japan, were not mentioned. If Germany refused, the United States would declare war, blaming Germany for intransigence. Despite being contrary to Wilson’s

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  37 neutrality policy, and his criticism of secret agreements, the president praised the text, only adding the word “probably” into the line about U.S. intervention. House was proud of this result, seeing it as a way for the United States to either lead mediation or enter the war and set terms through victory. The Entente never took the offer seriously. It was based on the Allies calling on the United States, which London intended to keep just as an insurance policy if the war went badly for them. It also dissuaded fear of Washington challenging the blockade, as House dropped initial general appeals for disarmament and freedom of the seas from these terms. It is notable that during Wilson and House’s peace effort, both the Central Powers and Entente independently appealed to vague support for Wilson’s ideals, but also insisted on terms that the other side would never accept. This sentiment reflected the relative status quo of the war, with Germany entrenched in Northern France and advancing in the east. The situation shows that Wilson’s diplomatic efforts really amounted to little but posturing. Wilson might have utilized economic pressure to get the Entente to the peace table, but he was unwilling to take this approach. Late 1916 saw the highest tension between the United States and Great Britain. A British crackdown on Irish nationalist protests during the Easter Rising, including the execution of diplomat Roger Casement for treason, spurred anger among Irish Americans, a major Democratic Party constituency. Wilson requested from London a more lenient policy, including clemency for Casement. When London then created a prohibitive blacklist of businesses suspected of trading with the Central Powers, Wilson was livid. He had Lansing submit a strongly critical note against this “dishonorable behavior,” threatening economic sanctions and a ban on British ships docking in American ports. Ultimately, London let the issues linger until U.S. anger towards Germany obfuscated the issue.4 Despite the relative quiet by the end of 1916, Wilson faced increased pressure from liberal internationalists and preparedness critics. Liberal internationalists increasingly saw military involvement as necessary to advance their goals for international reform. Despite criticism from pacifists, Wilson embraced a “reasonable preparedness,” for the United States to be ready to defend itself and have a bigger role in the world. Secretary of War Garrison resigned, wanting a more aggressive move, and Wilson replaced him with the mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, Newton D. Baker. Previously a pacifist, Baker now supported military buildup to keep America out of the war. After going on tour to promote this idea, Wilson got the National Defense Act of 1916 passed in June, implementing reforms to federalize the National Guard, while the follow-up Navy Bill of 1916 in August commissioned the building of new ships and expanded U.S. naval reserves. These bills did not prepare the United States for war, as that was not their intent, but they were a step in that direction.5 When Wilson ran for re-election in the presidential election of 1916 versus pro-Allied Republican opponent Charles Evans Hughes, he emphasized the continuation of neutrality, praising how he had kept the United States out

38  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I of war. He also emphasized his belief that the United States should lead the effort to end the war. America was affected by the world, whether it wanted to be or not, and international reform could be a grand project to establish America’s place as a world power. Wilson argued that the United States needed to push a “community of power” instead of a balance of power, and treat all nations as equal partners, whether large or small. Preparedness critics hit him for not doing enough, while pacifists criticized him for aggressive “militarization.” Wilson won narrowly in November, establishing his second term as president. Stabilized by his re-election, Wilson prioritized his plan for international reform. Wilson began to consolidate his ideas for collective security through an international organization, advancing the ideas of liberal internationalist writers. Wilson and other supporters conceptualized this idea as a way for the United States to engage with the world without the fear of being sucked into conflict, balancing the ideals of liberal internationalism with the U.S. traditional appeal to neutrality. Wilson later framed this idea as making the world “safe for democracy.” He accordingly argued that collective security would help bring arms reductions, because countries would feel more secure, and mediation would prevent conflicts before they arose. While Wilson believed the destruction of the war would make the world receptive, he questioned whether this idea depended on democratic governments. Germany was the issue. Some supporters felt Germany should be engaged as a fair partner, to promote reforms there through participation, while others felt German militarism would corrupt such efforts. While Wilson at times rhetorically praised the universality of the former view, in practice he came believe the latter, negative view. Wilson’s critics, in turn, remained skeptical. Supporters of traditional neutrality saw it as power politics by other means, while Atlanticists desired a system built more like a military alliance of democracies and wanted it guided by traditional international law in a world court. Many Republican foreign policy leaders, such as William Howard Taft and former Secretary of State Elihu Root, had established their own agenda for an international body, called the League to Enforce Peace. Despite differences in conceptualization, Wilson cultivated their support. In a speech to the organization in May 1916, Wilson made his first major appeal for a worldwide mediating body to oversee international law and diplomacy. He also emphasized values such as disarmament and open access to seas for all countries. Wilson hoped this speech would be the first step to galvanize support for a peace conference, as each side would come to see him as a fair mediator. Despite a positive press response globally, the warring governments refused to consider talks without a clear victory. With the massive offensives of 1916 still ongoing at Verdun and the Somme, both sides felt a military breakthrough was imminent. British Munitions Minister David Lloyd George, for example, dismissed mediation efforts as a plan to help Germany. Lloyd George became the new prime minister with the fall of the Asquith government in December 1916.

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  39 Wilson and House were, nonetheless, optimistic after the military gridlock continued on the Western Front. Wilson imagined his government holding talks at the Hague and allowing the two sides to hash out the terms while America facilitated compromise by including a reform program for the world as part of the terms. A lack of compliance by the warring parties inhibited this plan. The new British government was less receptive to accepting U.S. mediation, and House’s key ally Grey was no longer in office, replaced by Arthur Balfour as foreign minister. In Germany, while key officials such as Bethmann Hollwegg and Bernstorff were open to U.S. mediation, the German military leadership and conservative officials wanted to push for a complete military victory. The German military agreed to give Bethmann Hollwegg the chance for peace, but they vowed to act more aggressively if that failed. In December 1916, Berlin released a formal note offering to establish a peace conference. Wilson increasingly became impatient with the British, and British wartime finances came close to the edge when the U.S. Federal Reserve Board restricted short-term Allied bonds as high risk. By this point, 40% of British war spending was on U.S. goods. Balfour and others in the cabinet considered accepting U.S. mediation, although Lloyd George remained opposed. London assigned Sir William Wiseman, a British intelligence agent in New York City who had befriended House, to open unofficial back-channel discussions about peace. Meanwhile, Ambassador Bernstorff diligently attempted peace terms for Germany. He met with House regularly and offered terms including the restoration of Belgium, while embracing Wilson’s program. When he met Wilson, Bernstorff emphasized that America had to respect German pride not to look weak, and he warned that a return to unrestricted submarine warfare would be possible without a viable peace offer. Bernstorff’s efforts were undermined by House, who passed on information from Bernstorff to Wiseman. House in turn insisted on more formal verification from Berlin, which Bernstorff was unable to provide. House, accordingly, dismissed German peace proposals as disingenuous. On 18 December 1916, in response to Germany’s previous offer, Wilson released a general peace note asking all sides to announce their demands, with the hope that it would allow him to find a common ground. His appeal, which praised a common interest in a more peaceful world order built around a League of Nations, implied that all sides were responsible for the bloodshed. This sentiment sparked anger in London, Paris, and Berlin, each of whom saw the enemy as responsible. The French refused any peace discussions while Germany was still in a strong position. A warning by Lansing to the press that Washington might declare war if its rights were not respected spurred additional distrust, especially in Germany. Wilson almost fired Lansing in anger, but he restrained himself after House defended the Secretary of State. Lansing formally retracted the statement as in error. When Berlin rejected the call, saying that terms could be provided at a conference, the Entente responded proposing hardline terms premised on German defeat, including extensive territorial concessions and the breakup of Austria-Hungary

40  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I and the Ottoman Empire. The Germans finally released their own terms, also demanding expansive territorial concessions. Wilson was pleased that the warring powers had provided terms, but their demands exasperated him. Accordingly, on 22 January 1917, Wilson gave his famous peace without victory speech. He appealed for no side winning the war and for equitable treatment in the peace. He called for a “community of power,” rather than a balance of power, and he promoted equal status for nations large or small, governments with powers derived from consent of the governed, freedom of the seas, and the reduction of armaments. Wilson felt his message would illustrate his true neutrality. House openly opposed the use of such rhetoric, warning Wilson that it would anger the Entente, and disadvantage them in peace talks. Wilson claimed that his message was not for governments, but for the people of Europe to pressure their governments. Wilson had hoped that all sides would accept this offer of neutral accommodation in the face of so much death and destruction. Instead, both sides had suffered greatly in the war and their governments did not want to see their sacrifices go to waste. They increasingly saw the United States as an outsider trying to enforce its own agenda, rather than serving as an honest mediator. Both House and Lansing attempted to assure London and Paris that Wilson still favored the Entente, despite his rhetoric. Despite a general anger in London, Wiseman acted as if the response to the speech was positive, presumably upon instructions from Balfour not to create animosity that might diminish U.S. financial support. Paris likewise refrained from their initial reaction to criticize the statement. In Berlin, the militarist wing in the government gave up on peace proposals, assuming Wilson would continue favoring the Entente. After the speech, and its lack of response, Wilson become firmer in demanding only mediation based on the terms of peace without victory. The irony of this period is that there were individuals in government on both sides of the conflict eager to facilitate peace talks. While they offered no guarantees, Wilson still gave little serious consideration to cultivating these opportunities. To an extent, Wilson was too busy attempting grand gestures to be bothered with the nuts and bolts of practical diplomacy. Austria-­ Hungary offers a key example. Wilson had soured on Vienna early in the war, expelling its ambassador, Konstantin Dumba, after a Hungarian American immigrant conceptualized a strike in U.S. munitions factories in protest of the U.S. favoring the Allies. The sinking of the Ancona by a German submarine travelling under an Austrian flag, killing nine Americans on the Italian vessel, exacerbated tensions. Vienna formally apologized for both incidents and paid the United States an indemnity. When Emperor Franz Joseph I died in November 1916, his grandnephew Karl I, along with Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin, appealed for resolution of the war on a status quo ante bellum (state existing before the war). Vienna also pushed Berlin toward U.S. mediation, praising the peace without victory speech. Czernin engaged with Lansing, but Wilson dismissed Austria as subservient to Germany without deeply considering this avenue.6

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  41 Remaining attempts at peace faltered on 31 January 1917 when Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare, including against neutral ships, in a zone surrounding Western Europe. Kaiser Wilhelm II granted the German military an effective rubber stamp on this issue, feeling that Wilson and the Entente had provided them no serious consideration to their peace outreach. With victory close on the Eastern Front, they felt the risk of angering the United States was worth the potential to break the deadlock in the west. Berlin assumed that Washington would never be truly neutral but gambled that it would nevertheless remain out of the war. In retrospect this was a mistake, but the war of attrition had taken a toll and German leaders feared the U.S. economy would keep the Entente afloat either way. Breaking this economic access became the imperative. Wilson immediately broke relations with Germany and expelled Bernstorff in the name of U.S. honor. This moment affirmed his predilection that a German victory would be devastating for the United States and the world. Wilson remained clear, however, that this decision did not guarantee war, despite calls from his cabinet to do so. He feared that if Washington broke neutrality, there would be no truly disinterested party to mediate the war. Bethmann Hollwegg made a desperate appeal for peace based on moderate terms, including restoring Belgium, departing France, an independent Poland, mutual economic and financial exchanges, and a conference based on Wilson’s terms for international reform. Wilson and House disregarded the offer out of hand as a trick. Austria-Hungary had opposed the German decision, and their intended new ambassador to Washington, Adam Tarnowski, criticized the decision in his initial meeting with Lansing. Wilson never officially received Tarnowski and Vienna’s decision to support its ally publicly ended formal relations. In his initial speech, Wilson called the declaration reckless, but affirmed that he would only consider war if Germany followed with “overt acts” against the United States. Initially, the threat caused U.S. merchants to avoid the Atlantic, facilitating no major incidents. By March, Germany started sinking U.S. merchant vessels, although sank only ten American ships before the U.S. entry into World War I. Wilson’s main response was to consider arming U.S. merchant fleets, although this idea bogged down in Congress. Wilson later implemented the idea as an executive order, claiming his prerogative as Commander in Chief of the military. A second event, though, raised the stakes. In February, the United States became aware of the Zimmerman telegram, a note to the government of Mexico suggesting an alliance with Germany and Japan against the United States, promising a return of territories lost by Mexico in the 1845 U.S.Mexican War. Arthur Zimmerman had become the new German foreign minister in November 1916, due to a stronger relationship with the German militarist faction. His note, sent in January 1917, was something of an afterthought. It reflected an effort to test any possible route to mitigate United States entry into the war. It hoped to exploit the genuine tensions between the United States and Mexico, as well as Japan, inspired by vague requests

42  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I for military aid from Mexico City. The note was originally intended to be delivered to Washington D.C. by U-boat and then coded and forwarded to Mexico City. The Foreign Office instead sent it along with routine correspondence via American diplomatic cables, which Washington had offered to maintain communication after Britain cut the German lines. British naval intelligence, led by William Reginald Hall, discovered the message, having tapped the American cables. London initially sat on the information, afraid of exposing their spying, but decided to release it when Wilson did not initially move to war. Wilson never knew the source, as London utilized a copy intercepted in Mexico. The telegram proved a failed gambit. The Mexican government never took the alliance offer seriously, and the Japanese likewise showed no interest. Both governments denied ever receiving the note, and Mexico remained neutral through the war. The discovery of the telegram, however, egged on Wilson’s past belief that Germany was covertly causing trouble in Mexico. In Washington, the telegram gave ammunition to interventionists in the administration and Congress, while pacifists ignored it or treated it as a British trick. Zimmerman publicly owned up to the letter, defending it as a political necessity should the United States declare war. While traditionally seen as the final provocation for war, recent scholars have downplayed the significance of the Zimmerman telegram. While it was another infringement against America’s honor, Wilson was still not committed to war. At his second inaugural address on 5 March, Wilson still appealed for U.S. neutrality in the name of peaceful reform. The telegraph did, however, seem to validate Wilson’s previous assumption that peacemakers like Bernstorff and Czernin were disingenuous. Austro-Hungarian officials continued their appeals for a general peace conference, but they balked at Wilson’s demand that they renounce their ally completely to receive a hearing. Wilson finally began steps to war when he received word of German submarines sinking American ships in the Atlantic. He began coordinating with the British Navy, while mustering his military. Wilson largely remained in isolation when making his final decision. His cabinet all supported war, but Wilson begrudged the certain loss of life and feared for the consequences of war on the United States. He toyed with an idea of an alliance of neutrals to form a common defense and to pressure for peace. Wilson ultimately concluded that for the United States to shape the peace, it had to be a belligerent. He could no longer risk a German victory that might upend his proposed reforms, and he believed the United States could potentially restrain the Entente as an ally. Wilson called Congress to a special session on 2 April 1917, where he requested that body to declare war on Germany. Treating this call for war as a reluctant decision, Wilson argued that Germany’s consistent infringement on U.S. honor and it rights of neutrality demanded it. Wilson argued, however, that the war was not simply about victory for America’s new allies. For Wilson, the death and destruction had to mean something greater than victory. This was a war against dictatorships, to make the world

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  43 safe for democracy, and for lasting peace. Quoting Martin Luther, his final line, “God helping her, she can do no other,” implied that America would be committing a collective sin in warfare but in the hopes of securing a better world. Pacifists in Congress, such as Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, tried to stall the vote, but the declaration of war passed on 6 April 1917, with 82 to 6 in the Senate and 373 to 50 in the House of Representatives in favor.7 Wilson’s neutrality policy, and its later abandonment, became a topic of sharp historical debate.8 The positive view of Wilson’s approach, developed by scholars such as Arthur Link, shows Wilson as strategically sound in his approach. Neutrality was the correct call early in the war and allowed Wilson to make genuine efforts to promote peace. Wilson likewise maintained neutrality against significant pressure for war, until German aggression made his peace program untenable. These scholars generally also credit Wilson’s motives as genuine, driven by prestige, honor, morality, and a desire to be a neutral arbiter, dismissing claims of economic or other hidden motives. For example, Knock and Throntveit each suggest that Wilson’s adherence to neutrality was proof of his principles. Cooper additionally argues that Wilson was driven by the desire to follow the will of the American people, while trying to guide them. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig particularly challenge the view that the United States favored Britain, noting the real tensions caused by the blockade.9 Critics of Wilson’s approach to neutrality take a variety of angles. Most of them target Wilson’s implicit bias in favor of the Entente. Wilson showed little nuance when demanding compliance with moral principles from Germany, while he was nothing but nuanced on the British blockade and its consequences, such as major food shortages and starvation. Wilson made real threats regarding German submarines while making only vapid complaints to Britain. Wilson espoused a rhetoric of neutral peace, but functionally encouraged Entente victory. Ross Kennedy, for example, argues that despite Wilson’s claimed opposition to a balance of power system, his policy was built on containing German power. While Wilson’s rhetoric made war in and of itself the enemy to be defeated, he equated war to German militarism. Tucker in contrast suggests that Wilson was genuine in his neutrality, but Tucker criticizes Wilson’s approach as functionally leading the United States to war by withholding his real economic leverage on the Entente while being uncompromising to Germany. By conceding to the blockade, and not accepting peace appeals from Berlin and Vienna, Wilson left Germany with few options other than the use of submarines. By making the unrealistic demand that Germany had to protect Americans traveling on belligerent ships, Germany then had no room to maneuver. Once Germany called his bluff, his credibility demanded war. Other critics have argued that economics drove Wilson’s approach. Floyd, for example, suggests that Wilson had dual goals of neutrality and utilizing the war to benefit the U.S. economy, and the latter goal undermined the former. Challenging the British blockade would have been necessary to force

44  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I neutrality, but it would have harmed U.S. exports. U.S. loans prolonged the war by helping the Entente sustain their war economies. Larsen suggests U.S. economic pressure would have cracked British resolve, but Wilson either did not realize this possibility or was willfully ignorant. Wilson could have pressured peace terms, but he passed up the opportunity. Many of these critics, such as Justus Donecke and Philip Zelikow, suggest that Wilson was broadly ignorant of the granular issues driving the continuation of the war. Wilson was so myopic in reorganizing the world in his vision, that he overlooked real opportunities to pressure peace. Wilson also made the United States seem less credible by putting his own desires at the center of peace mediation, rather than the issues of the warring powers.10 The role of Wilson’s advisers is another source of debate. Tucker, for example, blames Wilson’s issues navigating neutrality on his lack of effective advisers, while ignoring the ones he did have. He credits Lansing’s legal knowledge as helping navigate the submarine crisis and he commends House’s ­relationship-building with European diplomats as being more realistic toward meeting European desires to achieve results. Larsen similarly argues that, at least toward the British, House was a good, flexible diplomat. Other scholars present Wilson’s advisers as generally loyal and upholding his mission. Doenecke and Floyd each blame Wilson’s advisers for failed policies. Doenecke, for example, argues that Bryan was incapable, House inexperienced and mischievous, and Lansing disloyal. He suggests Wilson mostly listened to advisers who flattered him and did not challenge his ideas, and he presents Edith Wilson and House as the most guilty parties in this respect. Zelikow argues that House and Wilson, along with being inexperienced, had poor communication, working in different ways for different goals while believing themselves to be on the same page. Cooper in turn criticizes House, and especially Lansing, as working at cross purposes from Wilson forcing the president into isolation and to turn to Edith for his major decisions.11 Notes 1 For more on U.S. humanitarian aid during World War I, see: Clotilde Druelle-Korn, Feeding Occupied France during World War I: Herbert Hoover and the Blockade (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Jeffrey B. Miller, Yanks Behind the Lines: How the Commission for Relief in Belgium Saved Millions from Starvation during World War I (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020). Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914–1917 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988). Julia Irwin, “Taming Total War: Great War–Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 763–775. M.B. Biskupski, “The Diplomacy of Wartime Relief: The United States and Poland, 1914–1918,” Diplomatic History, 19, 3 (Summer 1995): 431–51. 2 For more on early U.S. neutrality, see: Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security (Kent, OH, Kent University State Press, 2009), 1–24. Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Charlottesville:

Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I  45 University of Virginia Press, 2007), 1–107. Throntveit, Power, 122–150. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 237–252, 262–270. Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 141–145. Michael S. Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road to the Great War, 1914–1917,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 801–812. James D. Startt, Woodrow Wilson, the Great War, and the Fourth Estate (College Station, Tx: Texas A&M University Press, 2017), 13–39. Neu, “Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House,” in The Wilson Era, 248–278. 3 For more on the preparedness versus neutrality debates, see: Michael Kazin, War against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2018). Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 107–122. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 65–79. Knock, To End all Wars, 48–122. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 114–132. John Milton Cooper, Jr., “The Shock of Recognition: The Impact of World War I on America,” Virginia Quarterly Review, 76, 4 (Autumn 2000): 567–584. Andrew Preston, “To Make the World Saved: American Religion and the Great War,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 813–825 4 For more on the debates and diplomacy of 1915 and 1916, see: Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 88–173. Philip Zelikow, The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916–1917 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2021), 1–48. M. Ryan Floyd, Abandoning American Neutrality: Woodrow Wilson and the beginning of the Great War, August 1914–December 1915 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7–188. Daniel Larsen, Plotting for Peace: American Peacemakers, British Codebreakers, and Britain at War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2021), 21–103. Justin Quinn Olmstead, The United States’ Entry into the First World War: The Role of British and German Diplomacy (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2018), 40–130. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 1–24, 65–90. Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, 157–216. R. Carlisle, Sovereignty at Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into World War One (Gainesville: Florida University Press, 2011), 1–36. Chad R. Fulwider, German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2016). 5 For more on the Wilson’s preparedness program, see: George C. Herring, Jr. “James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy,” Journal of Southern History, 30, 4 (Nov 1964): 383–404. Michael S. Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road to the Great War, 1914–1917,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 801–812. Throntveit, Power, 151–187. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 307–318. 6 For more on Wilson’s peace attempts in 1916 and 1917, see: Zelikow, Road Less Traveled, 48–232. Larsen, Plotting for Peace, 126–279. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 80–103. Knock, To End all Wars, 70–122. Throntveit, Power, 151–242. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 174–187. 7 For more on the final stages of American entry into World War I, see: Thomas Boghardt, The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry Into World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012). Carlisle, Sovereignty at Sea, 37–166. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 188–214. Larsen, Plotting for Peace, 285–306. Zelikow, Road Less Traveled, 233–260. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 363–389. Olmstead, United States’ Entry, 131–160. Václav Horčička “Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the United States’ Entrance into the First World War,” The International History Review, 34, 2 (2012): 245–269. 8 For a summary of early debates, see: Daniel M. Smith, “National Interest and American Intervention, 1917: An Historiographical Appraisal,” in Causes and Consequences, 48–70.

46  Wilsonian Neutrality in World War I 9 For defenders of Wilson’s neutrality policy, see: Arthur Stanley Link, “Wilson and the ordeal of neutrality,” & “Woodrow Wilson and Peace Moves,” in Higher Realism, 88–109. Knock, To End all Wars, 70–122. Throntveit, Power, 213–242. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 262–318. Richard F. Hamilton, & Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004), 202–224. Olmstead, United States’ Entry, 131–160. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 96–140. Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, 560–677. Dawley, Changing the World, 121–132. Ashley Cox, “A man for all seasons: Woodrow Wilson, transatlantic relations and the war against militarism,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, 4 (Dec 2018): 389–407. Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1971). Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). 10 For criticism of Wilson’s neutrality policy, see: Kennedy, The Will to Believe. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War. Floyd, Abandoning American Neutrality. Larsen, Plotting for Peace, 285–306. Justus D. Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2011). Zelikow, Road Less Traveled. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 59–91. Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden Too Great to Bear (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 3–104. Hannigan, Great War, 30–53. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, “The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900–1917,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, 33–68. Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson, 132–224. 11 For competing views on Wilson’s advisers, see: Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War. Larsen, Plotting for Peace, 285–306. Olmstead, United States’ Entry, 131–160. May, The World War. Floyd, Abandoning American Neutrality. Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War. Zelikow, Road Less Traveled. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 262–318.

4 Wilsonian Reform and World War I

Wilson led the United States into World War I in April 1917. In his war declaration, Wilson defined the U.S. role as making the world safe for democracy against German tyranny. The United States would lead a Monroe Doctrine for the world, helping protect smaller countries from abuse by the powerful. Wilson framed the war, however, as against the German government and not the German people, who Wilson promised to treat fairly if they purged their autocratic government. Wilson shifted from peace without victory to treating Germany as an oppressive aggressor. Nevertheless, upon receiving the pre-war alliance treaties from Arthur Balfour, Wilson declared that the United States would not support spoils of conquest. He appealed for the people of Europe to embrace reform instead of revanchism. To advance this effort, Wilson established the Committee of Public Information (CPI). The CPI translated and mass-produced favorable articles, posters, photographs, films, and Wilson’s speeches for foreign presses. The agency’s head, former newspaperman George Creel, called it “the Gospel of Americanism,” as the CPI publicized the American way of life as much as American war aims. As part of the western Entente, Wilson defined the United States as an “associated power” rather than an Allied power, conceptually pursuing an independent diplomacy and limited military integration. General John J. Pershing commanded the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). His goal was to fight alongside the Entente, while accepting assignments from Supreme Allied Command led by French Marshall Ferdinand Foch, but to resist direct integration with Allied units. The goal was to play a decisive role in Allied military victory and position the United States to shape the direction of the peace terms. In contrast, the Allies pressured Pershing for full integration of United States operations to relieve exhausted troops on the front. They also hoped to limit U.S. claims to have turned the tide, as the Johnny-come-lately into the war. Ultimately, this status did not prevent cooperation. Pershing had to compromise with Allied operations because he was dependent on the Europeans for logistics and weaponry. Half of all U.S. troops traveled to France on British vessels and the AEF then depended on French weapons, as the shipping of new U.S. supplies was slow and costly versus using European models. House attended the Inter Allied Conference in Paris on 29 November DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-4

48  Wilsonian Reform and World War I 1917 where he agreed to the creation of a Supreme War Council to unify command on the Western Front. General Tasker Bliss served as the United States military representative on this body. The United States was not prepared for mobilization when the first American troops arrived in France in June 1917. It was almost a year before the United States military participated in combat and it was not widely involved on the front until the final months of the war. By August 1918, U.S. soldiers helped defeat the final German spring offensives on the Western Front at battles such as Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood. The United States Navy also helped establish a convoy system that mitigated the submarine threat in the Atlantic. Overall, about four million Americans served during WWI, although only two million arrived in Europe. The United States broke the stalemate on the Western Front. With extensive atrophy on both sides, the United States economy and additional manpower broke the war of attrition. Germany could no longer match the Entente. The Entente implemented their final counter offensives in September 1918, including the first U.S. offensive operation in the war at the St. Mihiel salient south of Verdun. This final offensive ended the stalemate, and Allied troops moved steadily toward the German border.1 Now in the war, Wilson recognized the need for more advisers with knowledge of the world. While he maintained his existing governmental team, he commissioned House to form the Inquiry, a collection of scholars, public intellectuals, and regional experts to get him up to speed with issues around the globe. Some historians argue that its members provided valuable insight, while critics argue that their advice was often biased and parochial, or beyond their expertise. Members of the Inquiry would, nonetheless, advise Wilson through the Paris Peace Conference and shape his views on key issues. Wilson was initially vague about his peace program, as a strategic move not to show his cards too early, but also to avoid friction with his allies. Several events drove Wilson to formalize his program, including failed Allied offensives on the Western and Italian Fronts in late 1917. Meanwhile, Germany advanced steadily on the Eastern Front, and the 1917 October Revolution in Russia started the final stages of that campaign. Wilson increasingly felt optimistic that the United States would be the central reason for an Allied victory and he would be able to guide the terms of the peace. Support among European liberals and leftists made him confident of popular backing of his goals. The other major influence was competing international agendas. On 1 August 1917, Pope Benedict XV called for a fair peace based on the current status quo ante, with territorial disputes addressed via plebiscite. The Central Powers embraced the Pope’s call for peace, and claimed the Allies were the ones resisting compromise. Wilson saw the Pope’s appeal as a challenge to his leadership as the central peacemaker. He released a tactful note praising the sentiment, but he rejected the Pope’s terms as unrealistic for a lasting peace, given that the proposal left the current German government in power. Only a system of democratic governments would prevent another war.

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  49 The Bolshevik seizure of power during the October Revolution in Russia offered the next challenge. Eager to exit the war, the Bolsheviks opened negotiations with Berlin at Brest-Litovsk in December 1917. The potential freeing of German troops from the east caused the Entente significant concern. Wilson implemented a widespread CPI campaign in Russia, pushing the Russian people and the Bolsheviks not to surrender. The war, however, was highly unpopular in Russia, and these appeals largely fell on deaf ears outside of the anti-Bolshevik resistance. Meanwhile, eager to stoke problems for the rest of Europe, Bolshevik leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky condemned the war as one for imperial expansion. Trotsky released copies of the pre-war treaties to illustrate the backroom deals for territory, and Lenin appealed to national self-determination to stoke nationalist fervor and anticolonial revolts. The Bolsheviks dismissed Wilson’s rhetoric, claiming the United States entered the war for new markets, not for reform. Wilson covered for his allies, dismissing the pre-war treaties as no longer relevant. Meanwhile, he dismissed the Bolsheviks as patsies for imperial Germany. By January 1918, Wilson decided he needed a formal proposal if he was going to maintain credibility and offer a more peaceful alternative to Bolshevik revolution. As he worked with the Inquiry to develop ideas, David Lloyd George preempted him in a speech at the Trade Union Conference in London on 5 January 1918. Lloyd George called for democratic governance, open treaties, fair treatment of the German people, national self-determination, security for the small nations of the world, and the creation of an international peace organization. Wilson was happy about the common vision but frustrated at Lloyd George hijacking his plan. Wilson almost chose not to make his own appeal. He concluded, however, that a reform program would only be credible if it came from the United States, given its separation from the power politics of Europe. Wilson finally provided specifics on 8 January 1918 in a speech outlining his Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points began as suggestions from the Inquiry, with most written by Walter Lippmann. Wilson met with House on 4 January to hash out his own version. As House put it, in one evening they had achieved “remaking the map of the world.” They consulted only with the Serbian diplomat Milenko Vesnić, for advice on the Balkans, and Wilson kept the final version secret from everyone other than Edith until he introduced it to Congress. Wilson affirmed the goal of his program as “the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.” More specifically, it was a list of reforms to prevent a future war. The plan established concrete support for his allies, while also intending to restrain their ambitions for territory. The Fourteen Points included eight specific territorial or political issues Wilson felt were at the root of the war, plus six core principles he felt were needed to maintain peace. Wilson ordered the points by priority. His first point, calling for open diplomacy and public treaties, maintained his criticism

50  Wilsonian Reform and World War I of secret treaties as a symbol of competition and conflict. His second and third points, espousing freedom of the seas and an open and fair system of trade respectively, addressed the issues that had drawn the United States into the war. Wilson also believed that lowering economic barriers would mitigate competition and build friendly ties between countries. Wilson did not see this as complete freedom, however, putting regulation of the oceans in the hand of the League of Nations. His fourth point on arms reductions looked to prevent such a brutal war from happening again, perceiving weapons as encouraging conflict. Wilson put the League of Nations at point fourteen to illustrate its importance. An established concept of liberal and progressive thinkers, Wilson perceived the League as a vehicle to enforce the other points and to address any other future issues. It was the only imperative point. The League “must” be completed. Wilson framed the organization as a “community of power,” rather than a “balance of power,” and as a “peace among equals.” He hoped to bind its member nations to common, peaceful practices, such as conflict mediation. The League would also offer collective security, binding the member nations to discourage aggressor nations from challenging the greater community. Wilson believed that international conflict would gradually fade as countries saw the benefits of membership. Wilson remained vague on the particulars of the League, however, believing that the idea would be debated and diminished if developed too early in the conflict. The remaining points addressed issues related to the war, based on Inquiry suggestions. These points included maintaining Russia’s territorial sanctity (point six), the restoration of Belgium (point seven), the return of AlsaceLorraine to France (point eight), the adjustment of Italian borders (point nine), and the adjustment of borders in the Balkan peninsula (point eleven). The restoration of Belgium, a neutral country invaded by Germany during Berlin’s offensive against France, had driven much early hostility against the Germans. The other points conceded territorial claims to the Entente. Wilson believed that these territorial revisions would make his allies more amenable to his program. Wilson defined such territorial expansion limitedly, adhering closely to nationality, and done through peaceful negotiation. He offered the Russian people territorial sanctity and respect for a government of their own choosing, to counter the Brest-Litovsk terms ceding ample territory to Germany. Wilson hoped to show the Russian people the benefits, and fair treatment, offered by the west to encourage them to stay in the war. The remaining points fit into the general category of national self-­ determination. Wilson intended this section to limit the threat posed by ­nationalism that had sparked the war in the Balkans. Wilson’s intent, ­however, remains contentious. Wilson himself did not use the term national self-determination in the Fourteen Points, although Europeans used the term widely during the war. Wilson distinctly promoted the security of small nations, as well as their right to national sovereignty without the threat of outside interference. Wilson firmly expressed this sentiment in his points on

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  51 Belgium and Russia. He also reflected this mentality in his calls for the German people to choose their own government, unlike the imperial government he saw as forced upon them. Where the issue gets murky is Wilson’s support for the creation of new nation states. Wilson’s only clear statement in support of a nation state is point thirteen, his call for the recreation of an independent Poland. While point twelve affirmed the right for a Turkish nation state, this point, as well as point ten on Austria-Hungary and point eleven on the Balkans, vaguely called for fair treatment of national groups in those areas and their right to “autonomous development,” without naming nationalities. While Wilson clearly believed that ethnic minority groups in East Central Europe should not be dominated by the Central Powers, his program was vague on the form. Should the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires be broken up or pressured to a more federalized system? What new states should be created? The fourteen points left this open to interpretation. The other category open for dispute was point five, which called for an adjustment of colonial claims, with colonial populations given a voice on these adjustments. Wilson’s statement was again vague. It did not clarify particular colonies nor what their status should be. Wilson clearly believed Germany should lose its colonies. He did not specify, however, what should happen to them. Was independence on the table? Were the colonies of the Entente to be treated the same way? Rhetorically, Wilson sometimes suggested colonialism was an oppressive force. Other times, he presented colonial empires as beneficial so long as the colonizers led moral governments that treated the colonial peoples fairly. Beyond being statements of principle, his Fourteen Points remained deliberately vague. What did Wilson hope to achieve? He certainly wanted to create a guideline for peace and set the terms for his desired leadership. Wilson believed that if the international system provided a sense of security and fair treatment, territorial conquest and other causes of war would end. He also intended to answer the criticisms of the Bolsheviks. Under his program, the old order was no longer the goal. He also tangentially hoped to convince the Bolsheviks, or at least the Russian people, that his program merited staying in the war. He finally hoped to provoke Germany to accept peace through terms fair to all sides. If the German people did not embrace his call, it would be a sign that they were irredeemable. While the Fourteen Points shaped Wilson’s approach to the peace, his program would not have the effect he intended. Progressives, liberals, and socialists internationally praised the speech. The Entente leaders publicly expressed support, but quietly brushed off Wilson’s ambitions. Lenin commended the speech, and had it distributed throughout Russia, but the Soviet Union and Germany completed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, ending the war on the Eastern Front. While Berlin generally dismissed the appeal, Wilson’s program swayed German liberals and socialists, who took Wilson at his word of fair treatment. They pushed their government to accept Wilson’s terms for peace. Nevertheless, his points said nothing specific about

52  Wilsonian Reform and World War I Germany’s treatment, and by implication presented it as the guilty party in the conflict. Wilson’s ambiguities on national self-determination and colonialism provoked a mixed response. Some leaders feared Wilson was showing too much restraint, while others across the globe conceptualized plans for greater independence and freedom after the war.2 The application of the Fourteen Points received some clarity through Wilson’s treatment of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire. U.S. diplomats engaged with Austro-Hungarian officials in response to Vienna’s ongoing efforts for peace. Wilson’s approach to Austria-Hungary nonetheless vacillated. Upon U.S. entry, Wilson did seem open to the idea of drawing Vienna away from Berlin, while encouraging reforms to accommodate Austria-Hungary’s national minorities. On the other hand, Wilson treated Vienna as a pawn of Germany, not meriting serious independent consideration. Vienna in turn remained committed to a peace in tandem with Berlin, because German command of the Austrian military meant that a separate peace proposal was not feasible. Ottokar Czernin, however, saw Wilson optimistically. The Austrian foreign minister felt that moves toward autonomy advanced by the new government of Emperor Karl I met Wilson’s appeal for fair treatment of minorities. He also hoped Wilson’s program might provide him a vehicle to coax Berlin toward peace. Czernin communicated with Lansing, and there is some evidence that he made initial headway. The main inhibitors to such terms were each side’s respective allies, with Berlin committed to victory and the Entente, notably Italy, Serbia, and Romania, entrenched on their desire for territorial expansion at Austria-Hungary’s expense. Lansing promised Vienna that the United States would not declare war on them. Washington’s issues had mostly been with Germany and it had no desire to engage troops beyond the Western Front. Wilson changed his mind, however, based on his conclusion that the empire was a vassal of Germany. The United States declared war on Austria-Hungary on 7 December 1917. This was predominantly a symbolic and legal move, as U.S. soldiers did not engage in combat against the empire. By January 1918, Wilson’s stance on the breakup of Austria-Hungary was still not clear. Wilson’s speech requesting war against Austria-Hungary asserted that the United States acted in the name of helping minorities. He also declared, however, that it was not U.S. policy to “rearrange” AustriaHungary. Wilson seemed to have hoped such an appeal might push Vienna to a separate peace. It did not. The Fourteen Points seemed to suggest, using the word autonomy rather than independence, that reforms to accommodate national minorities within the empire was his goal. The terms did include, however, cessation of some of their territory to Allied nations. Supporters of the dissolution of the empire, such as Czech leader Tomáš Masaryk, praised the declaration of war but criticized Wilson’s tepid support for independence. Czernin in turn criticized the characterization of Vienna as a vassal of Germany, as well as the poaching of their territory, but he praised the promise to respect their sovereignty. Ultimately, Czernin embraced Wilson’s program as

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  53 a vehicle to a fair peace that would protect the empire. National activists in contrast perceived Wilson as supporting their goals and began agitating more aggressively for independence. A flurry of diplomatic activity took place between Austria-Hungary and the Entente during early 1918. For example, Austrian professor and liberal internationalist Heinrich Lammasch and George D. Herron discussed possible terms for peace. While such discussions had questionable viability, President Wilson read and considered the proposals. Notably, in Wilson’s 11 February 1918 four principles speech, he praised Czernin as being an honest broker and commended the idea of autonomy in Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, Wilson asserted that “self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action.” The speech otherwise reaffirmed that “well-defined national aspirations” should be respected in a way that would not provoke further war. Emperor Karl I responded to this speech with a secret letter to Wilson on 20 February, sent via Spain. He praised Wilson’s ideas and offered to start negotiations toward a general peace based on both sides renouncing their territorial conquests, although he supported the creation of Poland and the restoration of Belgium. He said nothing of national minorities. Wilson chafed at these requests, as did Balfour when consulted by Washington. In his response, Wilson rejected secret talks and then asked for clarity. Czernin responded, promising no territorial annexations on their part and none against them, but offered domestic autonomy for minority populations. Events killed these discussions. The completion of Brest-Litovsk established less urgency for peace among the Central Powers. In April, Czernin gave a defiant speech that praised Wilson’s idea for a universal peace, but also heavily criticized the French. In response, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau released a letter illustrating Czernin’s attempts to negotiate a separate peace with the Allies. Responding to anger from Berlin, Czernin resigned, and Karl withdrew from peace negotiations. The threat of dismemberment of the empire left Vienna few options other than to stick it out for victory. Wilson’s position also hardened. On 6 April, Wilson declared that only “force, force to the utmost” would bring peace.3 Wilson had firmer views on the Ottoman Empire. He perceived it as an archaic country, abusive to ethnic and religious minorities, and simply a vassal of Germany. He often referred to it as the “hornets’ nest,” the antithesis of the American melting pot. Missionaries shaped Wilson’s perspective, notably Charles R. Crane, who was Wilson’s top donor, and Cleveland Dodge, a close friend from academia, both of whom founded schools in the Middle East. Wilson expected the empire to disappear soon, and an early draft of the peace without victory speech even included removing Turkey from Europe in the name of open access to the Dardanelles and Bosporus straights. Istanbul’s violence against its Armenian population was a particular point of issue for the Wilson administration. In the name of eliminating a nationalist rebellion, the Ottoman military forcibly relocated over a million Armenians from their homelands south of the Caucus mountains. Over a million Armenians died in

54  Wilsonian Reform and World War I this campaign. Dodge formed the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) in 1915, and it raised more than $100 million over its 15year duration. The U.S. State Department formally condemned the genocide, and it became a primary justification for figures such as House and Lansing to promote the breakup of the empire. In response, Istanbul facilitated the U.S. humanitarian programs to discourage hostile American sentiment. Despite his sympathy for the Armenians, Wilson did not acknowledge an attempted Republic of Armenia, declared on 28 May 1918 from formerly Russian territories. While Istanbul and Washington broke relations, the two countries avoided war. Dodge and other missionaries petitioned Wilson to maintain this status quo, and Wilson convinced Congress not to declared war by arguing that American missionaries were helping Christians in the empire. Wilson did not want this effort disrupted for unclear military goals. Istanbul remained, however, at war with his allies. While Wilson chafed somewhat at Entente plans to divide up Ottoman territories, his Fourteen Points took a middle road by supporting an independent Turkey, but also autonomy for its minorities and international oversight of the Turkish straits. When Balfour visited Washington D.C. in late April 1917, he tried to bargain the internationalization of Istanbul for acceptance of the Allied treaties, but Wilson refused consideration until the peace conference. The British used Wilson’s reluctance to declare war against the Ottoman Empire to argue that the United States would not have a voice in the terms for the Middle East.4 Bulgaria, the final member of the Central Powers, never broke relations with Washington. Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov prioritized good relations with the United States, hoping to avoid unfair treatment after the war, and Bulgarian officials promoted Wilson’s program as the road to peace. The American Board Mission, which organized missionary and educational efforts in Bulgaria, convinced Wilson, who had a request for declaration of war ready, to see Bulgaria as just a hapless victim of German manipulation. Washington maintained normal relations with Sofia. Otherwise, Wilson showed minimal interest in Bulgaria. The Fourteen Points included Bulgaria in its vague appeal for fair borders in the Balkans. Washington was more ambiguous on the post-war treatment of Macedonia, but generally favored Serbian claims there. The vagueness of Wilson’s program though gave hope to Bulgarian leaders. When Aleksander Malinov took over as prime minister in 1918, he proposed a peace based on the territorial boundaries of the First Balkan War. Paris and London approved of this idea, as did House, but Wilson dismissed the proposal as an insult.5 During the war, national self-determination became something of a buzzword, as the Entente, the Central Powers, and the Bolsheviks all tried to stir up national revolutions among their enemies, to sow disorder or to justify the seizure of territory. All three groups, for example, formally supported the recreation of Poland. Wilson’s view was inconsistent. He vacillated between support for small nations and keeping open the possibility of a separate peace

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  55 with the Central Powers. His peace without victory speech had expressed support for Poland, but not much else. Wilson showed little knowledge of other national movements at this time. Lansing came to embrace the creation of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia after receiving reports on the nationality questions from Robert Putney, Chief of the Near Eastern Division in the State Department. He was more tepid on other movements. George Herron also became a vocal advocate for national independence movements and advocated to Wilson on their behalf. Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech, however, caused the national movements both trepidation and jubilation due to its vague statements for “autonomous development.” At this stage, Wilson wanted to weaken German power, and seemed to support the national movements as a means of doing so. In contrast, he feared their legitimacy, as well as their economic and strategic viability. The emphasis placed on national self-determination at Brest-Litovsk, including for Poland, Ukraine, and Finland, put the Western Allies on the defensive and helped galvanize their embrace of national independence movements. Vienna’s decision to reaffirm its alliance with Germany after the Spa Conference between the two emperors in May 1918 further bolstered support for the reorganization of East Central Europe. The independence movements redoubled their efforts. The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Rome in April established a common goal for the breakup of AustriaHungary, and by May, London and Paris were considering recognizing exile governments. Lansing made it official State Department policy to support an independent Poland, Bohemia, a South Slav State, as well as Romanian and Italian territorial claims. Lansing made his case to Wilson, who consented to a formal note on 29 May praising the Rome Congress. Wilson, nonetheless, remained quiet. He wanted to wait until the war’s end before committing to these movements, and he became concerned about appeals for independence spreading to nationalities he was unwilling to support. To convince the president, George Creel organized a convention for oppressed nationalities at Carnegie Hall in New York City, led by Masaryk and Polish activist and renowned pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski. They formed a Mid-European Democratic Union, and later met with Wilson to promote their common cause. Wilson began to sway in support of their goals. Wilson was particularly fond of the creation of Poland. As one of the battlegrounds of the war, Poland drew interest from the United States as a humanitarian crisis. Herbert Hoover campaigned to extend the food program to Poland, although the British blockade prevented its implementation. Wilson and the U.S. Senate declared a National Day of Aid for Poland on New Year’s Day 1916. While the Polish national movement was divided by ideology and approach, the Polish National Committee led by Roman Dmowski embraced the Entente and sent Paderewski to the United States to promote their cause. Paderewski arranged a meeting with House, and subsequently Wilson. The pianist convinced Wilson that the partition of Poland in the late 1700s showed the injustice of the old-world politics that Wilson

56  Wilsonian Reform and World War I wanted to change. The president promised Paderewski in 1916 the “miracle” of Poland’s revival. A memorandum written by Paderewski served as the basis of the Polish section of the peace without victory speech. The Allies, to appease Russia, initially rejected the idea, but came to embrace it after the Central Powers promised an independent Poland. By November of that year, Washington recognized the Polish National Committee in Paris as an official cobelligerent of the Allies. Wilson, however, still showed restraint. While the Fourteen Points expressed support for Poland’s recreation, it offered no specifics and by Wilson’s final draft had downgraded Poland from a goal that “must” be achieved to one that “should” happen. Wilson likewise began to chafe at Polish appeals for territorial boundaries that included Lithuania and much of Ukraine and Belarus. For Wilson, Poland became a symbol to show support for “small nations,” but he was not interested in offering a blank check to Polish leaders for their territorial aspirations. Washington would not fully recognize Polish independence until 22 January 1919. Wilson initially showed less support for the Czechoslovak movement. It started as a Czech movement for independence from Austria, however, its leaders such as professors Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, expanded their objectives to include the Slovaks in Northern Hungary, represented by astronomer Milan Štefánik. At the begging of the war, Wilson had little conception of the Czechs, and even less of the Slovaks. The Czech organization benefitted from Masaryk’s personal connections made as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago, including Congressman Adolph J. Sabath and Charles Crane. A broader interest in Washington was slow in coming however. When Štefánik visited the United States in 1917 and failed to get an audience at the White House, he came to see Wilson as unreliable. The movement’s leaders were also left cold by the ambiguity of the Fourteen Points. Masaryk chose to visit the United States in 1918 and struggled to gain an audience. Eventually, Crane intervened to facilitate meetings for Masaryk with Lansing, House, and Wilson in June. The president had been inspired by accounts of Czechoslovak Legions fighting to escape Russia after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and Wilson came to value Masaryk’s input on U.S. policy on Russia. In subsequent meetings, Masaryk convinced Wilson that the Czechs maintained a democratic political culture. Eventually, Wilson agreed to recognize the Czechoslovak National Council as a belligerent, and on 3 September Washington recognized Masaryk’s exile movement as a government. While this recognition did not guarantee any territorial claims, Washington expressed no concern about minority groups such as the Sudeten Germans or Slovaks. By the end of the war, Czechoslovakia seemed the new country Wilson favored the most. Of the potential new countries, Yugoslavia received the least favor from Wilson. While both House and Lansing embraced the Yugoslav movement, Wilson was skeptical about the capabilities of the South Slavs for self-­ government, and he feared violence among competing groups in the ­Balkans. The conflicting concepts of a greater Serbia versus a multinational state

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  57 including other South Slavs such as the Croats, Slovenes, and Montenegrins exacerbated this mentality. Organizations such as the South Slav National Council in America gradually won over Wilson by emphasizing national cooperation as the goal for the South Slavs. The Corfu Declaration of 20 July 1917, organized by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and President of the Yugoslav Committee Ante Trumbić, promised cooperation in the creation of a unified state. The U.S. State Department sent diplomat H. Percival Dodge to Corfu to facilitate this cooperation. Nonetheless, Washington rejected the formation of a formal Yugoslav mission, accepting only a Serbian one since it was an existing state. When writing the Fourteen Points, Wilson felt the least confident about his statement on the Balkans. Accordingly, Wilson had House consult with Milenko Radomar Vesnić, head of the Serbian War Mission in Washington. When the Serbian criticized the document’s vagueness, House and Wilson brushed him off and made no changes. After the speech, Pašić received Wilson’s consent to release a statement confirming the U.S. president’s support for South Slav national aspirations. Italy’s position on Yugoslavia also became a point of controversy, as Rome demanded territories in the Eastern Adriatic claimed by the Yugoslavs. The nationalities congress in Rome included a symbolic cooperation between Italy and the South Slavs, which helped convince Lansing to embrace Yugoslavia’s creation. Lansing convinced Wilson to do the same in a June 1918 memorandum, while supporting Yugoslav territorial claims in the Adriatic over Italy’s demands. Continued debates among the South Slavs over the structure of Yugoslavia, however, delayed U.S. formal recognition, which did not occur until 7 F ­ ebruary 1919. Romania also struggled to gain Wilson’s favor. Romania already existed as a country but had aspirations to unify the Romanian-speaking populations divided between Bessarabia in Russia and Transylvania in Hungary. It joined the war in support of the Entente but suffered invasion by Germany after Russian military failures left Bucharest isolated. Romania agreed to a peace treaty with Germany in May 1918, but reentered at the very end of the war. Appeals for a loan by Romanian King Ferdinand I saw Wilson express sympathy while dismissing material support. Lansing, meanwhile, refused an official visit by Queen Marie. When Lansing received an unexpected delegation of Romanians from Transylvania in June 1917, led by Vasile Stoica, he dismissed their appeals. When the delegation met with Baker to request recruitment of a Transylvanian legion, the Secretary of War rejected them. British and French appeals to support Romania later swayed Lansing. He met with Stoica again, but the Secretary of State wanted clear evidence of support for unification from Transylvania before committing U.S. policy. Lansing eventually considered a loan, but Wilson shot down the idea. After Germany pressured Romania into the Treaty of Bucharest, Wilson released a statement that the United States supported Romania in general and would defend its integrity as an independent country. The note said nothing about Romanian territorial demands.6

58  Wilsonian Reform and World War I For East Asia, the Wilson administration maintained the goal of restraining Japan. Washington encouraged Beijing to break relations with Germany, but not to declare war, concerned about instability in China. Chinese Premier Duan Qirui chose to declare war in August 1917, under Japanese guidance. Tokyo provided significant loans that helped Duan and President Li stabilize their government against an attempted insurrection by General Zhang Xun. China in turn agreed to allow Japanese occupation of Shandong province. Wilson opposed this move and his protest only heightened Japanese concerns of Washington meddling in its relations with China. The Ishii mission promised cooperation in the war, and Lansing and House came to believe an accommodation with Tokyo was possible. Wilson never trusted Japanese leaders, however, and rejected all proposals but the subsequent Lansing-Ishii Agreement. The agreement presented U.S.-Japanese cooperation against Germany, but each government affirmed a different interpretation. Washington declared the Japanese role in China as simply economic, while Tokyo emphasized both economic and political involvement. Beijing refused to accept the document, as China was not a party to its creation. Chinese leaders came to be skeptical about U.S. support.7 World War I blended U.S. foreign relations with the domestic sphere through the consolidation of the home front. Washington placed obligations on citizens to sacrifice by working more, eating less, espousing patriotism, among many other expectations. Presented as patriotic duty, the state interjected itself into people’s daily lives, whether schools, churches, or the grocery store. While many progressives praised the implementation of government regulations, conservatives expressed anxiety about this expansion of federal power. Pacifists in turn condemned the war from the left, and the “forced volunteerism” it inspired. The Wilson administration responded to dissent through the Espionage (1917) and Sedition (1918) Acts, laws making it illegal to interfere with recruitment and training for the military or the selling of bonds. Wilson’s administration used these laws to seize mail deemed offensive and implemented punishments from fines up to $10,000 to imprisonment for up to 20 years for criticizing the war effort. Vigilantism was also common, with groups and individuals targeting people with violence for not cooperating with war campaigns. While Wilson rhetorically criticized vigilantism, he did little to stop it. Many scholars have shown how Wilson’s acceptance of these behaviors alienated many of his past domestic allies and gave ammunition to proponents of a “return to normalcy” after the war.8 The war also effected immigrant communities in the United States. Wilson had been untrustworthy of immigrants early in his political career. He saw “hyphenates,” those identifying as an ethnic-American, as people who put their ethnic interests ahead of the American national interest. His History of the American People, for example, highly criticized Asian and newer European immigrants compared to prior generations. When he ran for president, however, he cultivated immigrant votes, praising their decision to join the United States. The war created an opportunity for the Wilson administration

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  59 to promote the ideal that U.S. society could function better if everyone maintained a common identity. The draft, for example, became a tool to integrate people of different backgrounds into common service. Before the war, both the Entente and the Central Powers cultivated American ethnic communities to promote their agenda. In response, the CPI encouraged the lessening of national identity by new immigrants, while building hostility against the enemy, through its campaign of “100% Americanism.” On the one hand, this was a campaign to encourage pride in being an American. The CPI was in turn hostile to those with backgrounds from the Central Powers. It banned German symbols, and art, and demanded that German names be expunged from general society. Many German American institutions, such as German-language publications, faded away. In turn, nationality groups went out of their way to prove loyalty, working with the CPI to hold parades and create propaganda. Wilson did not speak out against these efforts directed again U.S. citizens of German heritage. Wilson’s administration also stoked fears of Germans and Irish committing sabotage to help the Central Powers. Wilson’s war speech, for example, openly condemned immigrants identifying as anything other than American. On the other hand, this became an opportunity for other immigrant groups to try and shape the direction of their country of ethnic origin. The breakup of Austria-Hungary was driven in part by widespread support from groups overseas, including U.S. immigrant communities. The Wilsonian moment allowed immigrant organizations from Entente nations to promote their ethnic heritage, while not being challenged for their loyalty. Polish Americans, for example, contributed money and volunteers toward the national movement. The immigrant populations from Austria-Hungary also played a role in normalizing popular understanding and support for their new countries. In some cases, such as the Slovaks, they directly shaped outcomes. To convince Wilson that the Slovaks had embraced unity with the Czechs, Masaryk organized a tour of Slovak communities resulting in the Pittsburgh Agreement with the Slovak League of America. This document, which promised Slovak autonomy, became a symbol of Slovak nationalism that strained Czech-Slovak relations through World War II. However, internal divisions within ethnic communities limited their influence. For example, debates on the proper makeup and organization of Yugoslavia were as divisive in the United States as they were in the Balkans. Polish Americans divided into competing organizations based on political affiliation. Jewish organizations were also divided into Zionist and non-Zionist factions. One area where immigrant communities certainly had little influence was on Wilson. In general, Wilson disliked ethnic groups trying to shape U.S. policy in the war. The exceptions were usually linked to individuals close to Wilson. He was, for example, influenced in part by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Rabbi Stephen Wise to condemn anti-Semitism and support Zionism. He treated other groups as hostile to his goals. He criticized Irish appeals for independence as unreasonable and harming British

60  Wilsonian Reform and World War I relations, despite their being a core Democratic constituency and having the support of Wilson’s personal secretary Joseph Tumulty. Other groups, such as Italian Americans, pushed the territorial claims of their ethnic homeland, but did not sway Wilson. Neither did groups such as Hungarian Americans who hoped to sway Wilson to treat Hungary fairly in the name of a Hungarian democracy. The politics of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States played a major role in Japanese diplomacy. The Japanese government pushed for fairer treatment and often used it as a wedge to promote its larger international goals. Wilson late in his presidency condemned the hyphen as a “dagger” in the back of the United States.9 By mid-1918, after Germany’s successes at Brest-Litovsk and its spring offensives in the west, Wilson began to call for “decisive victory.” Germany in its current form had to be destroyed for the peace that he wanted, and he increasingly promoted the League of Nations as a tool of collective security to restrain Germany. Wilson also embraced the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. In his Third Liberty Loan speech on 6 April in Baltimore, he argued that Germany was trying to build an empire with no place for “self-determination of nations.” By late 1918, Entente counteroffensives would finally push back the German front in France and Belgium, while the Ottomans retreated from the Middle East, and Austria-Hungary collapsed on the Balkan and Italian fronts. The German population was on its last legs psychologically and materially. Berlin turned to the United States in early October, conceding the right for Wilson to define the armistice based on the Fourteen Points, while rejecting the punitive demands of the British and French. While this was a positive development for Wilson, issues remained. Fundamentally, the other Allies rejected the idea of Wilson setting the terms. Wilson believed his allies’ avarice would discourage Germany to stop fighting and would diminish his reform program, but he needed their support. To build favor, House and the Inquiry produced a clarification on the Fourteen Points that presented items such as the colonial adjustments as only applying to the Central Powers. In contrast, he had McAdoo drag his feet on loans and rejected British appeals to restrain U.S. Naval buildup to illustrate American influence over the war. Wilson was also under pressure from his cabinet, the Senate, and popular opinion to be hard on the Germans. The Senate demanded that only full surrender with an agreement for reparations and indemnities would be acceptable. Wilson in turn did not trust the German government. Wilson rejected Berlin’s initial overtures when they did not repudiate Brest-Litovsk. Additionally, he conditioned that he would only trust the German government if it implemented democratic reforms. Meanwhile, on 14 September, Vienna sent overtures for a separate peace. Wilson flatly rejected this offer, despite his past openness to such an outcome. Internally, the empire moved fully toward regional autonomy, to pacify the independence movements and to validate point ten of the Fourteen Points. Vienna sent another peace note to Wilson on 7 October. Wilson initially

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  61 remained non-responsive, but his advisers and the leaders of the national movements pressured him to reject the Austrian appeal. Wilson concluded that the proposed new states in the region would be more reliable allies. Wilson formally rejected Austria-Hungary’s peace offer on 19 October, declaring that the United States was honor bound to support the independence movements. When Austro-Hungarian forces collapsed on the Italian Front, the empire agreed to the 3 November 1918 Armistice of Villa Giusti. On 5 November, Wilson made his first formal statement affirming support for the new nation states. He dismissed the idea that Austria might join Germany, because this would be seen as a reward. While he tacitly supported Hungarian independence, he saw the Hungarians as complicit in the war and favored claims against them by the other nationalities. Meanwhile, Malinov in Bulgaria hoped to surrender under the Wilsonian terms. Wilson and Lansing both pressured the Entente to reject a separate peace settlement with Bulgaria and instead wait for the general peace conference to address Bulgarian concerns. The Bulgarian war effort faltered, however, and Washington was not part of the 29 September 1918 Armistice of Salonica. Wilson did not respond to Ottoman appeals for a U.S.-led separate peace, and the war ended in the Middle East with the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918. For Wilson, the support for new countries was not a blank check. In a discussion with William Wiseman, the president affirmed that he could only listen to the independence movements that he had already recognized. A few advisers offered warnings, notably a report by Lippmann and Cobb that argued that the empires had been a source of stability and that future conflict was a likelihood. Wilson concluded, however, that the new order would be workable, based on the capabilities of the leaders he had supported and because he felt the League of Nations would keep the peace. Wilson also rejected appeals to intervene militarily to support stabilization. In his armistice speech, Wilson only called for economic aid for the new countries.10 On 6 October 1918, Wilson received a note from Prince Maximilian von Baden, a peace advocate whom Kaiser Wilhelm had appointed chancellor with the mission of arranging an armistice based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Berlin now accepted Wilson’s claims to be disinterested and to want fair terms. They also assumed that an “open door” economically would be good compared to what the other Entente members wanted, and that Germany could work effectively within a League of Nations. Berlin was prepared to concede its disputed territories in the west but believed Germany should keep its eastern gains won under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. They hoped to entice Wilson by implementing reforms to make their government more democratic, like he had requested. Wilson, however, wanted Brest-Litovsk fully repudiated, felt Germany should face some form of reparations, and wanted to limit German involvement in the early League. Despite pressure to keep fighting, Wilson responded to the feelers, not wanting to pass up a chance to end the war and to set the terms of the peace. Wilson responded to Baden insisting all troops had to be evacuated from invaded territory and he

62  Wilsonian Reform and World War I questioned their intent. His hope was to test the veracity of their proposals and make sure the Allies maintained the military high ground before demanding terms. German leaders responded favorably. They expressed openness to Wilson’s request that they move from occupied territory, in the west at least. They wanted, however, their own protections from Entente avarice. In the meantime, the allied Supreme War Council drafted a punitive Armistice, with little input from Wilson, believing that the American president wanted to deny them true victory. It included more aggressive terms such as the occupation of territories in the Rhineland. Angered at this direction, Wilson sent House to Paris to serve as his personal representative, although he again provided his adviser limited instructions. House arrived in Europe on 27 October, with the main goals to get the allies to moderate their demands and to accept the Fourteen Points, especially the League of Nations. Otherwise, House interpreted that he was to support national self-termination in territorial disputes, and that Germany should restructure its government and lose its colonies. Other major issues should be saved for the peace conference. Wilson was optimistic that the Allies were so war weary they would comply with his terms. He also agreed with their desire to punish Germany, just not excessively. Wilson, for example, supported reparations, but wanted them limited to repairing war-torn areas. Wilson’s second note to Berlin on 12 October accordingly took a more aggressive tone. The terms of the armistice would be left to the judgment of the Allied militaries, and Germany could only show its trustworthiness if it instituted democratic reforms. This letter sparked anger in Berlin, perceived as terms “bent on Germany’s destruction.” Von Baden decided to release one more feeler after quiet outreach to U.S. diplomats led him to accept that some short-term concessions to Wilson would pay off in the long run. They offered to halt submarine warfare in return for shipments of foodstuffs and emphasized already implemented reforms that weakened military power in the government and moved toward elections. Wilson remained nonplussed by German appeals to maintain territory in the east and for the Kaiser remain in power. German leaders remained confused about what, exactly, Wilson was demanding, but they correctly perceived Wilson’s desire for the complete removal of the Kaiser and the military leadership. After a tensely debated cabinet meeting, on 23 October, Wilson released a third note to Berlin affirming that “not peace negotiations, but surrender” was the only acceptable condition. Finally, on 7 November German General Paul von Hindenburg reached out to Marshall Foch to arrange an armistice. They came to believe surrender was the only option to stave off revolution and put their faith in Wilson to assure fair treatment. Ultimately, Wilson convinced his allies to accept the terms of the Fourteen Points in the armistice, in return for a German agreement to accept reparation payments and to depose the Kaiser for a democratic government. The Inquiry memorandum explaining the Fourteen Points defined the terms for the Allies and Germany. Wilson claimed, however, that this document was

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  63 not official, and simply a guideline. House faced pushback from the Allies. The British rejected freedom of the seas and the French did not see the League of Nations as a priority. Wilson had House threaten to walk out of talks and begin a naval buildup, although London and Paris called his bluff. Given its shorter military involvement in the war, the U.S. was not positioned to make every demand. Ultimately, the Allies accepted the Fourteen Points in general, including tacit support for a League. In return, Wilson agreed to accept Foch’s military terms, which Wilson initially thought were too severe, and allowed the British to define freedom of the seas at the later conference. The military terms required Germany to give up large numbers of weapons, including their entire battle fleet, and allow Allied occupation of the bridgeheads over the Rhine to assure no reassumption of combat during the peace talks. This put Germany completely at the mercy of the Allies. House convinced Wilson that ending the war was more important than expecting perfect compliance. Wilson assumed the peace conference would be more critical than the armistice and prioritized his political goals over military ones. While understandable in the short term, these conditions weakened Wilson’s ability to mollify harsh terms later, as Germany was no longer a threat. Wilson justified American troops remaining in Germany as protection against French revanchism. In the first week of November, revolution spread across Germany. Max von Baden resigned, and the Kaiser abdicated on 9 November. A new provisional government led by socialist leader Friedrich Ebert took over. The Germans accepted the armistice on 11 November 1918 (Armistice Day), ending the combat phase of the war. In his armistice speech to Congress, Wilson vowed that the Allies would assure the defeated Central Powers a fair place among the nations of the world and would ease their security concerns. He also hoped to expedite humanitarian relief to stave off support for radicalism throughout the continent. He encouraged patience, fairness, and generosity. He also jumped the gun, proclaiming, “everything for which America fought has been accomplished.”11 For historians favorable toward Wilson, the end of the war was the president’s highest moment. Alan Dawley, for example, presents 1918 as America defining the world stage with Wilson the leader of a new order. Thompson interprets the Fourteen Points as a practical accommodation that coaxed Germany in its defeat and appeased the demands of the Entente in favor of reform. Cooper presents Wilson’s wartime presidency as “walking a fine line between military resolve and generous peace terms,” helping shorten the war, and becoming a symbol of change in the international arena. Cooper argues that the accommodation to Germany was the real Wilson, although his effort was undermined by House pushing a harder line. Armistice Day was thus Wilson’s “greatest triumph and his greatest tragedy.” Other scholars argue similarly, suggesting Wilson balanced his ideals with the needs of victory, got both sides to accept the Fourteen Points, and saved lives. A few scholars offer praise with more explicit caveats. Throntveit, for example, praises the Fourteen Points as a program that was both transformative

64  Wilsonian Reform and World War I and practical. He counters, however, that Wilson proved too vague when making these appeals. Wilson’s support for national self-determination, for example, was pragmatic and restrained, but the president did not make that clear enough, and lost the narrative to more aggressive ethnic nationalism. Klaus Schwabe similarly presents Wilson’s hardline stance, balanced with the carrot of his reforms, as leading Germany to concession. He shows Wilson as genuinely supportive of fair terms for Germany, but he blames Wilson’s lack of clarity as leading to harsher elements that undermined his goals. Each of these scholars illustrate how Wilson overlooked the importance of the military terms. The hardships of war gave Wilson leverage to set the political terms of the armistice. Once that pressure was gone, Wilson was left to rely on the merits of his ideas and his persuasive abilities. This was not enough.12 Critics of Wilson’s wartime approach, such as Striner and Kennedy, focus on his vagaries and inconsistencies. His terms did not provide enough specifics and reflected Wilson’s lack of knowledge about the issues he espoused. Wilson also regularly contradicted himself. He praised collective security while vowing unilateral U.S. action as an associated power. He praised common council while making decisions like the Fourteen Points with only House. Striner adds how Wilson did not effectively use economic leverage against his allies. Levin similarly suggests that Wilson, despite criticizing traditional power politics, utilized them widely during the war. Other critics argue that German leaders mistakenly trusted Wilson to remain unbiased. Kennedy shows Wilson as becoming so hardened and hostile to Germany that he never really would have given them a fair shake. Wilson praised the German people, but always acted like they were subservient. He wanted the Germans to choose their own government, so long as it was not one of which he disapproved. Wilson was not more forceful against the military terms of the armistice because he agreed with the Allies that Germany needed punishing.13 Notes 1 For more on U.S. military diplomacy and the U.S. military role in World War I, see: Calhoun, Power and Principle, 157–179. Michael Adas, “Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 700–712. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1998). William N. Still, Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007). Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 2 For more on Wilson’s wartime approach and the Fourteen Points, see: Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy (New York, St. Martin’s, 1994), 28–52. Robert Zieger, America’s Great War (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 153–185. Betty Miller Unterberger, “The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective,” Presidential Studies

Wilsonian Reform and World War I  65 Quarterly, 26, 4 (Fall 1996): 926–941. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 416–424. Throntveit, Power, 213–271. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 104–132. Knock, To End all Wars, 123–166. Dawley, Changing the World, 181–187. Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson, 251–258. Arthur Walworth, America’s Moment: 1918, American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977). Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace,1917–1919 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976). Gregg Wolper, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain,” Diplomatic History, 17, 1 (Winter 1993): 17–34. Rosenberg, Spreading the American dream, 63–86. 3 For more on peace efforts between the United States and Austria-Hungary, see: Victor S. Mamatey, United States and East Central Europe, 1914–1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University, 1957), 40–232. Larry Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020), 56–100. Nicole M. Phelps, U.S.Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 219–257. Horčička “Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare,” 245–269. Larsen, Plotting for Peace, 285–306. 4 For more on U.S.-Turkish relations during the war, and Armenia, see: Nevzat Uyanik, Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: Britain, America, and the Armenian Question (London: Routledge, 2016), 1–72. Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924 (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1965), 49–85. Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe, 15–26. Andrew Patrick, “Woodrow Wilson, the Ottomans, and World War I,” Diplomatic History, 42, 5 (Nov 2018): 886–910. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 253–261. John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900–1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 102–109. Jay M. Winter, America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Simon Payaslian, United States Policy Toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 158–191. 5 For more on the U.S. and Bulgaria, see: Petko M. Petkov, The United States and Bulgaria in World War I (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991), 1–83. Victor S. Mamatey, “The United States and Bulgaria in World War I,” American Slavic and East European Review, 12, 2 (April 1953): 233–257. 6 For more on the U.S. response to nationality movements for East Central Europe during the war, see: Mamatey, United States and East Central Europe, 72–317. Magda Ádám, “Woodrow Wilson and the Successor States: An American Plan for a New Central Europe,” in The Versailles System and Central Europe, ed. Magda Ádám (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004). Borislav Chernev, “The Brest-Litovsk Moment: Self-Determination Discourse in Eastern Europe before Wilsonianism,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22, 3 (Sep 2011): 369–387. Louis L. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the rebirth of Poland, 1914–1920 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 26–110. Mieczysław Biskupski, “The Wilsonian View of Poland: Idealism and Geopolitical Traditionalism,” in Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives, ed. John S. Micgiel (New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1995), 123–145. Christopher G. Salisbury, “For Your Freedom and Ours: The Polish Question in Wilson’s Peace Initiatives, 1916–1917,” Australian Journal of Politics & History, 49, 4 (Dec 2003): 481–500. Betty Miller Unterberger, “President Wilson, Professor Masaryk, and the Birth of Czechoslovakia,” Kosmas, 17, 2 (Spring 2006): 1–19. George Josef Svoboda, “Wilson and Masaryk: The Origin and Background of their

66  Wilsonian Reform and World War I Diplomacy,” Czechoslovak and Central European Journal 8, ½ (Summer/Winter 1989): 54–67. Dragoljub R Živojinović, America, Italy, and the birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919) (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1972), 131–158. 7 Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific, 61–106. Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 7–32. Curry, Woodrow Wilson, 315–319. 8 For more on Wilson and the U.S. home front and pacifist movements, see: David M. Kennedy, Over here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 45–92. Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Michael Kazin, War against war: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918 (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2018). Knock, To End all Wars, 123–166. Throntveit, Power, 213–271. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 93–101. 9 For more on Wilson and immigrants during World War I, see: Hans P. Voight, The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot: American Presidents and the Immigrant, 1897– 1933 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 94–154. Joseph P. O’Grady, ed. The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1967). Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 117–123. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the rebirth of Poland, 46–66. Michael Cude, “Wilsonian National Selfdetermination and the Slovak Question during the Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918–1921,” Diplomatic History, 40, 1 (Jan 2016): 155–180. Kristofer Allerfeldt, “Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 15, 3 (Sep 2004), 545–572. 10 For more on the peace terms with the other Central Powers, see: Mamatey, United States and East Central Europe, 318–345. Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations, 257–281. Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe, 71–100. Petkov, United States and Bulgaria, 72–83. Unterberger, “President Wilson, Professor Masaryk,” 1–19. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 108–109. 11 For more on the final peace terms with Germany, see: Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918–1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 1–117. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 425–453. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 129–162. Klaus Schwabe, “U.S. Secret War Diplomacy, Intelligence, and the Coming of the German Revolution in 1918” Diplomatic History, 16, 2 (April 1992): 175–200. 12 For examples of praise of Wilson’s wartime diplomacy, see: Dawley, Changing the World, 181–187. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 160–187. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 416–453. Zieger, America’s Great War, 46–56. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 101–119. Knock, To End all Wars, 123–166. Throntveit, Power, 213–271. Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, 81–117. 13 For critics of Wilson’s wartime diplomacy, see: Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 129–172. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 104–162. Norman Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics; America’s Response to War and Revolution (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 13–49. Calhoun, Power and Principle, 157–184. Adas, “Ambivalent Ally,” 700–712 Mamatey, United States and East Central Europe, 318–345. Gelfand, The Inquiry, 134– 135, 330–331. Živojinović, America, Italy, and the Birth of Yugoslavia, 11–177.

5 Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles

World War I ended as the most destructive war in history at the time, resulting in roughly 40 million casualties and 17 million dead overall. Much of Europe was in tatters, between the destruction in war-torn areas, economies in need of rebuilding, massive wartime debt, rising nationalist conflicts, and the threat of potential revolution. The decisions that followed would set the stage for the 20th century world. In the United States, the final year of the war led to hard fought midterm elections in November 1918. Despite not being up for election, Wilson decided to make the midterms a referendum on his leadership, believing he needed a Democratic Senate to succeed in his peace goals. The Republicans criticized Wilson’s expansion of executive power during the war and criticized his peace efforts as soft on Germany. They would take both houses of Congress, including a commanding lead in the Senate. With a war weary American public, Wilson in retrospect made a mistake turning the election into a referendum on his peace program. Wilson correctly bemoaned that this result would diminish his credibility in peace negotiations since he was still bound by Senate approval of treaties. Meanwhile, Senate majority leader Henry Cabot Lodge would become Wilson’s most prominent critic. The negotiations on peace terms for World War I began at the Palace of Versailles in Paris on 12 January 1919. Wilson decided to attend the peace conference personally, along with the other heads of government. Perceiving his Fourteen Points as the only hope for a peaceful world order, Wilson wanted to put matters into his own hands. This was a long-term commitment, keeping Wilson away for almost six months, the first sitting American president to leave the country. Many fellow Democrats and advisers, such as House and Lansing, discouraged him from attending, given the potential toll on his presidency. Wilson believed, however, that he did not have advisors capable or trustworthy enough to serve in his place. When the other Entente leaders offered similar advice for him not to attend, Wilson felt validated, believing his allies intended to exploit his absence. He would instead lead the world to necessary reform.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-5

68  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles Wilson brought only his immediate foreign policy and military cabinet to serve on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, with academic experts and personal staff in support roles. He neglected to bring any Senators and, bitter about the midterms, refused high-profile Republicans. While prominent Republicans such as William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes sympathized with many of his goals, he only included Henry White, a career diplomat with no political stature. Wilson excused this decision with the claim that Republicans would sow dissention and try to overshadow him. By going it alone, he angered both his enemies and allies in Congress. Republicans correctly perceived the move as a partisan act. In response, Republican leaders undermined him from afar, supporting the British and French view of the peace. Wilson perceived the conference as a Manichaean battle. The old European international order had proven bankrupt, and it was up to the United States to shape the new direction of the world. He intended to exploit European exhaustion and bankruptcy, along with popular support for his goals, to pressure his vision into acceptance. Wilson was ready to withdraw the United States from the conference if his allies did not relent. His allies, in contrast, wanted to conclude the war, mitigate its costs through reparations and territorial concessions, and prevent Germany from becoming a future threat. Punishing Germany was where Wilson’s views most aligned with his allies. Wilson initially warned his allies, however, that an excessive punishment would only breed vengeance and weaken the chances for future peace. Wilson believed that the League of Nations was the most important step to prevent a future war. Wilson spent his trip across the Atlantic on the George Washington studying for his big moment. Telegraphic reports from House prepped him on allied ambitions, while geographer Isaiah Bowman and other scholars tutored him on the ethnic and political geography of Europe. During this crash course, Wilson began to learn the complexities of the new Europe he was building, such as the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia that he had not otherwise considered. This moment also gave his delegation a chance to learn about his goals, given his past ambiguities. Wilson presented himself as the only truly disinterested leader and saw himself as representing the people of the world. He suggested that the League of Nations would be a gradual project, starting as an international Monroe Doctrine to protect the territorial integrity of weak countries. Wilson also expressed concern that the people of the world were placing too much unrealistic faith in him, and that they were bound to be disappointed. Old habits die hard, however, and Wilson diminished his advisers over the course of the conference, especially when they disagreed with him. For example, when Robert Lansing suggested that Wilson make the League of Nations a lower priority, Wilson removed him from any decision-making. Lansing’s account of this treatment suggested that the president dismissed his ideas

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  69 without any real consideration, just to belittle him. Wilson appointed retired General Tasker Bliss as his sole military advisor, marginalizing Pershing over disagreements on military terms. The Inquiry organized a mass academic effort to support Wilson, sending over 150 scholars around the globe who produced over 3,000 reports. While Wilson sometimes turned to his academic experts for knowledge or technical questions, Wilson limited their input on policy. Edward House’s role at the conference was significant. Wilson consulted daily with House, and House led the U.S. delegation when Wilson was away. While House generally supported Wilson’s goals, House felt Wilson’s idealism was inhibiting practical compromises. This tension led Wilson to turn against House’s advice as the conference wore on. They spoke for the last time while in Paris. Upon arriving in Europe in December 1918, Wilson knew he would face resistance from Allied leaders, but, preempted by Creel’s propaganda machine, he received massive, jubilant crowds as he travelled through France, Britain, and Italy. In Paris, an estimated two million Parisians came out to see him. His apparent calls for self-determination for oppressed nations made him a hero all over the world. Emboldened, Wilson openly criticized militarism, imperialism, and the balance of power, and he praised the adoring crowds as changing the world. Wilson claimed not to let the reverence he received go to his head, but in correspondence with Edith he bragged about how the people of Europe supported him and not their own leaders. In contrast, Entente leaders remained exasperated with the American president for not acknowledging their sacrifices and for acting like everyone would acquiesce to his goals. This was particularly true of the French, who wanted to punish Germany, compensate their suffering, and reduce Germany as a future threat. They nonetheless humored Wilson, and were willing to accept the League, because they wanted the United States to help support their economic and security needs. British leaders mixed support on common ideals with fear of U.S. potential naval dominance. The Allies did agree on some early terms such as keeping Germany and Russia out of the conference. The big four leaders of France, Britain, Italy, and the United States met daily in Paris and built a workable relationship. The relationship of Wilson and Georges Clemenceau was civil but combative. In an early speech, Clemenceau praised the balance of power and dismissed Wilson as an idealist. The U.S. president in turn accused the French of preventing peace. Clemenceau at one point complained that negotiating with Wilson was like trying to negotiate with Jesus Christ. Wilson complained that Clemenceau was too old to accept new ideas. The British under Lloyd George were more sympathetic to Wilson’s Fourteen Points but wanted to uphold their pre-war agreements. When Wilson met Lloyd George in London, the prime minister agreed to let Wilson make the League the priority, which he hoped would ease pressure on disagreements such as naval power and colonization. Wilson came to see Lloyd George and the British as the most trustworthy partner. Overall, the

70  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles leaders regularly feuded, dismissed each other’s demands, threatened to back out, and leaked to the press, but they managed to get the work done and built a certain degree of comradery. Wilson’s initial plan to use debt holdings to pressure his goals did not bear fruit, as the president refused to offer debt forgiveness, wanting repayment. Ultimately, the threat of Allied non-repayment neutralized this U.S. leverage. Wilson’s plan to go over the heads of European leaders by appealing to their publics also did not work out. While liberals and leftists supported Wilson internationally, the European leaders insisted, correctly, that their people more broadly wanted hard terms against Germany. In December 1918, Lloyd George’s coalition won a landslide electoral victory and Clemenceau won a resounding vote of confidence in France’s Chamber of Deputies, in contrast to Wilson’s midterm defeat. When Wilson tried to limit their territorial concessions, people across Europe turned against him. Finally, the assumption that the U.S. might return to its tradition of staying out of European politics was an effective rhetorical counter to Wilson’s claim of American leadership. As the conference developed, certain ideals fell by the wayside. Wilson did not prioritize matters that were not part of his Fourteen Points, and even goals he favored lost his attention. For example, Hoover wanted to bring the food program to Germany and the other Central Powers but faced resistance from the Allies, who were hesitant about rescinding the blockade. Hoover felt Wilson did not back him enough, although London eventually relented. Hoover’s food campaign fed millions of people in 32 countries. Wilson’s call for open diplomacy also ended at Paris with restrictions on the press to avoid public controversy. The actual conference proved organizationally complicated. It featured 27 official delegations, excluding Germany and Russia, organized 50 commissions on different issues, and held over 2,000 meetings. Meanwhile, the Peace Conference attracted all manner of activists, from national and anticolonial leaders to organized labor and women’s rights groups. Accordingly, focus was a problem, with sessions addressing issues without consistency, causing Wilson regular frustration. The conference started with the Council of Ten as the primary executive committee, including the Japanese with the European powers, and sat the foreign ministers along with the heads of government. Wilson nominated Clemenceau as conference chairman to show his respects to France’s leadership during the war. By its conclusion, however, the major negotiations were handled by the Council of Four, made up of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando. In the name of efficiency, these discussions mostly remained closed, and they decided most of the terms. The League of Nations was undoubtedly Wilson’s top priority, but he had remained vague on the details beyond it being a body of nations with equal status among them. Meanwhile, other reformers produced ideas, such as the Phillimore Report, a British-led concept of a League built as a vehicle for

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  71 great power management, and the idea from the League to Enforce Peace of a legally based system. Wilson adopted some of their ideas as he conceptualized his own plan, but he designed his League to be more democratic in structure, with equal status among nations, and he prioritized the League’s role as guaranteeing territorial integrity, political independence, and disarmament. Wilson eliminated an international court, wanting the body to be political in scope rather than judicial. At Paris, Wilson worked with Robert Cecil, British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, and South African delegate Jan Christian Smuts. He also had support from French politician Léon Bourgeois, who promoted a League more like a security alliance. Smuts produced his own draft closer to Wilson’s conception, and Wilson implemented many of Smuts’s ideas in his own text, notably a framework for colonial mandates. This First Paris Draft included a bicameral system with an executive council led by the big four Allies for resolving disputes and enforcing penalties. A larger assembly of nations of equal status would address other issues. Wilson later added labor rights, protections for national and religious minorities, and declarations against secret treaties in a Second Paris Draft. Bliss advised Wilson on security concerns, and this draft established Article X on collective security. It also added statements to respect existing governments to limit criticisms about infringements on sovereignty. In the conference’s first week, the Council of Ten established a League Commission headed by Wilson and stacked with his allies, including House, Cecil, Smuts, and Bourgeois. The Allied leaders conceded the matter to Wilson to soften his other demands. The Commission met ten times in early February to hash out the formal Covenant of the League of Nations. International lawyers Cecil J. B. Hurst from Britain and David Hunter Miller from the United States produced the formal draft, although Wilson touched it up extensively to reflect his core ideas. This process did not win Wilson many friends. Lansing, bemoaning the Charter’s neglect of international law, developed ideas for a court of arbitration. Wilson condemned this idea as allowing lawyers to ruin the Covenant. On collective security, Cecil wanted to drop the guarantee of member states from external aggression. Wilson conceded, affirming military action would remain voluntary. Wilson otherwise feigned acceptance of British ideas and dismissed many of them in the name of the smaller nations. Cecil found Wilson pompous, controlling, and dismissive of his input. Bourgeois appealed for the League to have its own army, but Wilson dismissed the idea as unrealistic compared to member nations supplying military force. The Japanese proposed an article on racial equality, which Wilson removed. The committee also decided not to let minorities within countries appeal directly to the League, fearing it would become unmanageable. Within two weeks, on 14 February, Wilson presented the Covenant to the Council of Ten. Wilson was happy with the document, which he believed would set the new direction of world politics. The League as intended was a council of nations to decide on common actions, rather than a world government

72  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles writing laws. It intended to guide proper behavior through mediation, with mandatory cooling off periods for disputes until the League came to a fair resolution. It then had a system of collective security against countries that did not comply, based on economic sanctions with military action as a last resort. Wilson assumed that the collective world teaming up against a rouge state would deter injurious behavior. In turn, countries would embrace the League to avoid collective ostracism and get assurances of peace and security. Other parts of the Covenant called for cooperation on labor standards, preventing drug trafficking, promoting public health, and maintaining free communications and commerce. It also required all countries to register treaties with the League to make them public. Wilson did not get everything he wanted. His guarantees for religious freedom were dropped with the racial equality amendment. For Wilson, however, the Covenant was not complete. It would become a living document that could be adapted for circumstance and address lingering issues.1 After two months in Europe, Wilson returned home for ten days to complete his domestic obligations. In Washington, Wilson called congressional leaders to the White House, where he praised the work thus far achieved. Congressional Republicans, however, took issue with the Covenant potentially infringing on U.S. sovereignty, through mandatory action or by interference in U.S. domestic affairs. They also feared it would eliminate the Monroe Doctrine. Wilson argued that the League was simply a system to bring order, and he dismissed their main criticisms as already protected in the draft. He noted that the United States would give up some sovereignty, but this would be reasonable and necessary for the good of the world. He also requested for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold off discussions until the treaty was complete. As the head of the committee, Lodge proceeded to ignore him. Both Wilson and the Republicans claimed after the meeting that the other side had disrespected their ideas. During these two weeks, Wilson increasingly turned to apocalyptic rhetoric, predicting a return of German dominance without his reforms. On 3 March, Lodge released a “Round Robin Petition” criticizing Wilson’s decisions at the conference. It declared that the Senate would not accept the current version of the Covenant, affirming the Senate’s power to ratify treaties. Wilson defiantly scoffed at the notion that the Senate would stall peace. He condemned his critics of ignorance about the world. Nonetheless, Wilson committed to changes to the draft to appease Republican concerns, such as the opportunity for a two-year withdrawal notice for compulsory arbitration and a clearer statement removing domestic issues from League authority. Wilson, however, refused changes to Article X which stated that all members had to “preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.” The British and French used the carveout validating the Monroe Doctrine to get tradeoffs, including U.S. naval reductions and an occupation of the Rhineland. For Wilson, these moves solved the Republican complaints.

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  73 The conference approved the definitive version of the League Covenant on 28 April and placed it as the treaty’s first 26 articles. When Wilson returned to Paris, the cheering crowds were gone. House met Wilson at the docks and overviewed the work done in his absence. In the name of compromise and expediency, House had made agreements, including one on French occupation of the Rhineland, which Wilson opposed, ideas for intervention in Russia, which Wilson opposed, and discussions to put the League of Nations into effect immediately, separating it from the treaty, which Wilson vehemently opposed. Wilson accused House of having been tricked and “given away everything.” He immediately demanded that the conference return the League front and center. Wilson continued to work with House, but the president increasingly ceased accepting House’s advice. Edith Wilson egged on this mentality behind the scenes. At its worst moments, Wilson started to think about his old friend conspiratorially, believing that French spies had infiltrated House’s staff.2 Wilson saw the League of Nations as his most important achievement and sacrificed political capital for it early in the conference. Historians favorable to Wilson affirm this view. Cooper, for example praises the League as “a remarkable achievement, and the lion’s share of the credit belonged to Wilson.” The result vindicated Wilson’s decision to go in person and prioritize his own leadership. Other supporters present the League as a revolution in international politics. It offered a flexible, evolving forum for international discussion to address world issues. While Wilson made compromises to get it accepted, he did so pragmatically and received the majority of what he wanted from the body. The favorable accounts are not without some criticisms. Several scholars note how the League Charter still had ample loopholes, such as requiring unanimity in the body for many actions. Others argue that it depended on American power to be effective.3 Critics are less charitable. Ambrosius challenges the idea that Wilson revolutionized foreign policy with the League. He argues that Wilson designed the body as a cover for the American tradition of separation from European power politics. Wilson also never conceptualized what would happen if member states did not respond when a power challenged the body. Wilson just assumed they would. Kennedy argues that the League had so many carveouts that it was a toothless organization. Many critics also note how the European powers saw it as just another body for power politics. In this way, it reflected the contents of the broader treaty of Versailles instead of the other way around. Other scholars suggest the body was not truly international in scope, reflecting an extension of great power dominance.4 The Russian Revolution was a major issue in the background of the conference. When it broke out in February 1917, Wilson cheered the overthrow of the Tsar with a note commending the Russian people and quickly recognized the provisional government. He hoped to encourage a constitutional democracy and keep Russia in the war. Reticent to offer financial support, however, Wilson sent a diplomatic mission led by Elihu Root in April to

74  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles consider financing for projects such as improvements on the Trans-Siberian Railway. After experiencing the political instability there, the Root mission departed having only started a minimal information campaign. The situation changed drastically when the Bolshevik party, led by Vladimir Lenin, organized the 1917 October Revolution to overthrow the provisional government and create the new Soviet Union. While domestically committed to a Communist system of government and society, Lenin and the Bolsheviks condemned World War I as a war of imperialism and published the pre-war treaties as evidence. Wilson initially maintained a neutral view of the Bolsheviks. He expected their rule to end quickly and did not take seriously a Russian pullout from the war. Following the lead of London and Paris, House and Lansing promoted military intervention in Russia to support anti-Bolshevik forces in the ongoing Russian Civil War. Wilson in contrast demurred. Official U.S. policy was to wait and see, providing neither recognition nor opposition to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks’ decision to dissolve the Russian Constituent Assembly in January 1918 and then complete the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918, changed Wilson’s position. In public appeals to the Russian people, Wilson expressed sympathy with the issues that had led to the revolution, but he argued that gradual social reform was the solution, not violent revolution. In the Fourteen Points speech, Wilson condemned the negotiations of BrestLitovsk as a sign of German avarice, but implicitly praised Bolshevik calls for diplomatic transparency and national self-determination. When Lenin praised the Fourteen Points, Wilson wrote to Moscow promising aid and to respect their freedom if they rejected Brest-Litovsk. The Soviet leadership dismissed his appeals. In the announcement of peace terms, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky mocked the Entente’s claims to represent national self-determination while oppressing their colonies. Wilson had the CPI organize a mass propaganda effort in support of the anti-Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, London and Paris conceptualized intervention in Russia to reopen the Eastern Front. Their plans evolved into supporting the ­anti-Bolshevik coalition, the Whites, while utilizing Czechoslovak legions stuck in Russia. Wilson refused intervention without explicit request from the Russian people, believing it would turn them against his program. He also saw it as a distraction from the main war effort. By summer, Wilson finally caved to a limited intervention in the Arctic cities of Archangel and Murmansk and in Vladivostok on the Pacific, under the argument that their ports and arms depots were vulnerable to German capture. The fate of the Czechoslovak legions in Russia also swayed Wilson. After receiving permission from Moscow to depart via the Trans-Siberian Railway, the legions got into a fight with departing Hungarian soldiers and then engaged against Bolshevik forces. The Czechs seized the railway and began to fight their way out. Wilson agreed to intervention to help them escape. Wilson nonetheless insisted on a limited intervention, with no involvement in Russian politics. An initial agreement by Trotsky to cooperate with limited interventions

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  75 provided the consent Wilson wanted. Trotsky later changed his mind and condemned the intervention. In July 1918, France, Britain, the United States, and Japan landed troops, including 5,000 American soldiers in the North and another 8,000 in Vladivostok. Wilson almost immediately regretted the decision, with his allies expanding operations to support anti-Bolshevik forces and utilizing the Czechs to seize territory. Japan also intervened with more troops than agreed upon and extended their intervention territorially. Wilson consistently protested these expansions, but the Allied troops remained even after World War I ended. Washington shifted its main objective to protecting access to the railroads, which functionally supported the Whites in Siberia. The United States later provided loans and surplus materials, mostly food, to White forces, and shared intelligence, on the condition of a White embrace of democracy. Wilson, however, refused recognition or combat operations. American forces did, however, fight skirmishes with Bolshevik partisans along the railway. The decision to intervene did not have a clear benefit for the United States. Wilson maintained a limited operation and did not threaten Bolshevik control over the country. Communist forces used the intervention to justify violence, including sacking the Entente embassies and trying to stoke revolutions worldwide. The leader of anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, in turn condemned the United States when it did not expand the intervention. Kolchak’s organization was corrupt, using Allied aid for its own material benefit, and was abusive toward civilians. At Paris, Wilson hoped to find a solution. Wilson remained consistent in his statements of friendship with the Russian people, and he felt food aid and labor reform would solve the social issues there. He wanted Russian representation at the conference, but only after mediation between the Whites and Reds. While the French and Italian leadership wanted to isolate the Bolsheviks, Lloyd George sided with Wilson. As a compromise, the Council of Ten agreed to send a Wilson-drafted letter offering mediation at a neutral site, Prinkipo Island near Istanbul. The Bolsheviks accepted the offer, while promising to pay Russia’s debt, not promote revolutionary activity, and to protect foreign enterprises in Russia in return for recognition and material aid. They refused, however, to halt military action. The Whites refused participation entirely. Wilson later dismissed the Bolshevik appeal as duplicitous. Figures such as Marshall Foch and British War Minister Winston Churchill offered plans for an expanded intervention, but Wilson consistently rejected the idea. To buy time, Wilson promoted a fact-finding mission to Russia in March 1919, led by American diplomat William C. Bullitt. Bullitt took the opportunity to negotiate with Lenin, and he returned with an offer where the Allies would withdraw their troops and end the blockade of Russia. In return, the Soviets would accept prior debts and participate in a peace mediation. House backed the idea, but Wilson brushed it aside. Wilson’s decision was likely influenced by continued French opposition, frustration at the insurrection in Hungary by Bolshevik leader Bela Kun and increasing domestic

76  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles anti-Communism in the United States. House and Hoover developed a plan to send humanitarian food aid directly to the Russian people, but politics on both sides mucked up the program. After the blockade ended in January 1920, Hoover finally organized a humanitarian mission into the Soviet Union that helped end a famine there. In April 1920, U.S. forces departed Russia, following the last Czech departures. Wilson would later present the Bolsheviks as a negative example of the future if the world did not put the League of Nations into practice.5 Wilson’s policy toward Russia has received particular attention from historians. Those who favor Wilson’s approach largely commend his restraint. Although Wilson was frustrated by events there, he did not want the western powers intervening to shape the direction. The Russian people would have to determine their own fate. While Wilson conceded to intervention in the name of Allied politics, he did so prudently. Betty Miller Unterberger, for example, argues that Wilson’s policy toward Russia was consistent with his stance on self-determination, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and ­anti-imperialism. He tried to accommodate a peace in Russia, but his allies prevented it. Margaret McMillian likewise illustrates how Wilson supported the territorial sanctity of Russia, including opposing Ukrainian and Baltic independence. Several scholars also argue that Wilson was nominally sympathetic to the goals of the Bolsheviks, although he opposed their violent methods and concessions to Germany.6 Critics of Wilson’s Russia policy take a variety of directions. One common critique is that Wilson was ignorant of the situation in Russia beyond abstract stereotypes. Wilson just imagined that the Russian people were cheering him on behind the scenes. Other criticisms divide between those who felt Wilson did too much and those who suggest he did too little. Historians of the former often focus on the practical outcomes. Carl Richard, for example, presents the interventions as lacking a clear mission and egging on violence. On the other side, Donald Davis and Eugene Trani argue that Wilson’s restraint prevented U.S. options that could have shaped the events in Russia for the better. They suggest the Bolsheviks may have stayed in the war if recognized and given massive aid, neither of which Wilson accepted. Wilson was intellectually rigid and did not care enough about Russia to give it alternative thoughts. Some of the critics, such as George Schild, argue that Wilson’s motivation was great power competition, to restrain Germany and then his own allies, notably Japan. David Foglesong in turn presents Wilson as a hypocrite, promoting moral and transparent diplomacy, but pursuing the opposite in Russia through military intervention and covert operations. Others paint the picture of a personal rivalry with Lenin. Wilson disliked the Bolsheviks because they challenged his vision of himself as the leader of the world.7 The reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe culminated at Paris. The conference formalized the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, along with the reduction of German, Bulgarian, and Russian territory. Countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states of

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  77 Lithuanian, Latvia, and Estonia would appear on the map, while other states, Italy, Romania, and Serbia expanded, the latter as part of a united Yugoslavia. Sorting through the new region created something of a morass, as all the delegations had their own maps and statistics. Competing claims abounded, with some based on ethnicity or linguistics and others on historical territories or strategic and economic needs. Sorting between competing claims became a Sisyphean task for the decision makers at the conference. Geography and maps became the lifeline for decision-making, but hardly reflected the ethnic and cultural complexity on the ground. Meanwhile, national leaders from across the region appealed to Wilson, often in person, as a friend and savior. The larger nationalities presented themselves as developed leaders set to guide lesser nationalities, such as the Czechs uplifting the Slovaks and the Polish leading the Lithuanians, while smaller groups presented themselves as oppressed and needing liberation. The response among the key decision makers varied. Archibald Carey Coolidge, leading the U.S.-Eastern Europe division, warned that nationality should guide the new borders or else the new states risked imploding like a mini Austria-Hungary. More strategically minded leaders, such as Clemenceau, focused on creating more powerful states to defend against future German or Soviet aggression. Wilson had a mixed view. On one hand, Wilson expressed anger at national leaders using national self-determination to justify pre-war treaty claims. On the other, he argued that nationality should be the primary justification for territorial expansion. Leaders who convinced Wilson that their nations represented political and economic modernization held his ear. He often determined the merits of these claims based on his personal liking of the leader more than their factual credibility. Accordingly, Wilson supported national self-determination only for a select group. Wilson assumed that the good leaders would guide the region and the League of Nations would solve the lingering issues of national minorities. Wilson’s approach to Italy illustrates these trends. Italy’s goals for the war rubbed Wilson the wrong way. Rome joined the Entente seeking territorial expansion in the Adriatic, including the regions of Trentino, Trieste, Istria, and the Dalmatian coastline, territories at the time in Austria-Hungary. Rome claimed these territories based on nationality, history, and economic and strategic necessity, and saw the 1915 Treaty of London as sacrosanct in its guarantee on these claims. Wilson in turn saw Italian goals as exploitative poaching of territory and favored Yugoslavia’s claims along the Adriatic based on nationality and that country’s strategic and economic needs. The debates between Rome and Washington took shape with the Fourteen Points, which expressed support for Italy, but only for Southern Tyrol and Trieste. Wilson began to argue that ethnicity should be the basis for meeting Italian claims, and it was up to Italian leaders to be reasonable. Italian Prime Minister Orlando and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino believed Wilson wanted to make an example of them and diverged with the American president on

78  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles collective security. When Lansing tried to convince Wilson to accommodate, the president dismissed the Italians as reflecting the old order. House, in contrast, used the armistice negotiations to mitigate the issue, accepting Italian reservations on point nine in return for their support on the broader program. House also consented to Italian occupation of contested regions. These deals greased the wheels of the armistice, but they created problems down the line. By the time of the conference, Italy became the country where Wilson put the most energy to defend his stated values. He felt optimistic after his visit to Rome saw large crowds greet him. Wilson tried to sell Orlando on conceding the disputed claims with Yugoslavia in the name of a cooperative world order, especially of the port of Fiume, now called Rijeka. Wilson vowed that the League would assure Italy’s security. Wilson perceived this move as fair and disinterested, but he hardened his position when word leaked of Italian troops clashing with South Slav forces and preventing the delivery of U.S. food aid to the region. The Italian leaders came to see Wilson’s efforts as biased and a denial of the sacrifices Italy had made during the war. Sonnino expressed his frustration, complaining that Wilson had compromised his principles elsewhere, but was using Italy to “recover [his] virginity at our expense.” Wilson conceded the Austrian regions to Italy with extended territory, in exchange for Orlando’s acceptance of the League of Nations. Wilson stuck to his guns on the Fiume/Rijeka question for Yugoslavia’s strategic and economic needs, despite its Italian-majority population. House attempted compromise, but neither Orlando nor Wilson budged. Wilson offered making Fiume a neutral, international port, but the Italian leaders did not concede. Orlando relented on Dalmatia instead, but Wilson dug in his heels. When Wilson appealed directly to the Italian people, the Italian delegation walked out of the conference. Crowds cheered Orlando when he returned home. This moment exposed how much belief in the president’s support of national aspirations, not his support for international ones, guided much of Wilson’s popular support in Europe. Washington ultimately held up a $25 million credit to Rome, which forced the Italian leaders’ return. The issue remained unresolved in the Treaty of Versailles. The British and French later conceded to many Italian demands, while a revolt in Fiume led by Italian poet Gabriele D’Annunzio motivated Italy to occupy the city in 1920, formally annexing it in 1924. On the other end of this debate, the United States was the first major power to recognize Yugoslavia in Feb 1919. Wilson, though, expressed frustration about the complicated mix of loyalties and identities in the Balkans. He supported a united South Slav state, formally the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, essentially because it created a semblance of order in the region. He did not engage with debates within the Yugoslav delegation over a centralized, Serbian-led political system, versus a federalized model with greater regional autonomy for national minorities. While Wilson listened to appeals against the creation of Yugoslavia, such as one from King Nicholas of Montenegro whose country was about to be absorbed, Wilson remained publicly noncommittal. Yugoslav leaders praised Wilson for his

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  79 defense of their claims in the Adriatic, but it is hard to say that Wilson passionately supported the country. Wilson in contrast found the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos charming and honest, thanks to Venizelos’s regular praise of the League of Nations. While he found some Greek claims too ambitious, Wilson supported their goals in the Eastern Mediterranean to prevent Italian claims there, including a Greek military intervention on the Anatolian port of Smyrna. In contrast to Italy, Poland had seen consistent support from Washington. Wilson had promised a Polish state, although without guidelines except access to the sea. Ignacy Jan Paderewski, now representing his new government at Paris as prime minister, relied on his friendship with Wilson and House. Internally, Polish leaders were divided on the goals and political structure of their new country, but Chief of State Józef Piłsudski embraced Paderewski as a condition of support from the Hoover mission. Wilson became frustrated by reports of domestic instability in Poland, followed by competing Polish factions arriving at Paris. He found Paderewski’s territorial claims based on the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth exaggerated. Ukraine, disputed between the Soviets, Russian Whites, Poland, and a variety of regional independence movements, was the core issue. When the French-backed Polish Blue Army led by Józef Haller seized Eastern Galicia, Wilson perceived this move as old world power politics. Wilson came to find the Poles “cranky,” and increasingly saw his friend Paderewski as a dismissible figure. He concluded simply that the conference should decide on Polish borders, consisting of only Polish-majority territories, without Warsaw’s consent. While the eastern border started Wilson’s frustration, it received comparatively sparse debate compared to Poland’s western border with Germany. The conference debated the assignment of German-Polish territories broadly, but the port city of Danzig, modern-day Gdansk, became the core issue. While Lansing, House, and the Inquiry favored granting the city to Poland for strategic access to its port, Wilson resisted due to the city’s G ­ erman-majority population. Wilson sided with Lloyd George in suggesting a fair mix of Polish and German minorities in each state against House and Clemenceau favoring Poland. On the Danzig/Gdansk question, Wilson became the leading supporter of a free state accessible to both Poland and Germany. Wilson’s idea for a Danzig free state won out and, after plebiscites, the border regions were divided between the two countries. When Warsaw later appealed for American support in its war with the Soviet Union over the disputed territories in the east, Wilson instead criticized Warsaw for provoking the war. Ultimately, Poland staved off invasion and the two countries formalized the border in 1921. The Czechs offered a distinct contrast. The Germans of the Sudetenland, set to become part of Czechoslovakia, came to Wilson’s attention, and while he expressed frustration with Tomáš Masaryk for not informing him, he quickly put aside his complaints. Wilson supported most of the Czech claims for territory, under the assumption that the Czech leaders such as Masaryk

80  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles and Edvard Beneš were dependable in establishing a democratic government. When Slovak leader Andrej Hlinka led a delegation to Paris to push for guarantees of Slovak autonomy in the country, Wilson rebuffed their efforts to meet with him. The place of the Slovaks was in turn treated as a fait accompli. While Wilson expressed favor for Polish ethnic claims on the disputed region of Teschen, the conference never broadly considered the issue and Teschen went to Czechoslovakia based on historical and economic claims. Romania, which saw the Russian Revolution decimate its war plans, perceived the Wilsonian vision as a potential lifeline. Wilson, however, maintained little interest in Romania. Queen Marie charmed some American delegates, notably House, but Wilson found her superficial and unserious, especially after she showed up late to a dinner party. Wilson also found Romanian territorial claims to be a sign that Romania was a “rapacious” country. Despite Wilson, Romania had firm support from France and Britain from the pre-war treaties, and received most of its territorial goals, notably receiving the Romanian-majority regions of Transylvania from Hungary and Bessarabia from Russia. Wilson mostly ignored other nationality groups from Europe. The attempted Ukrainian People’s Republic, led by Symon Petliura, sent a representative to meet with Wilson in Paris but Wilson did not recognize Ukrainian independence. He treated the Baltic states as still part of Russia, or as part of Poland in the case of Lithuania. Ireland caused Wilson the most headaches. Irish Americans threatened to resist the League if Wilson opposed Irish independence, and the U.S. Senate voted symbolically to promote Irish representation at Paris. Wilson refused to comply, arguing the need to maintain friendship with Britain. To facilitate compromise, Wilson sponsored a delegation of Irish Americans led by Frank P. Walsh to go to Ireland and then Paris, but regretted the decision when Walsh joined independence protests in Ireland and provoked a firestorm in the British press. Afterwards, Wilson maintained a general dismissal of the issue. Irish revolutionaries in turn organized a political uprising pressuring Britain to concede Irish independence in 1922. One group that Wilson did heed while in Paris was East European Jews. The American Jewish Committee sent representatives to Paris, led by lawyer Louis Marshall, and while Wilson dismissed appeals for an autonomous Jewish state in Eastern Europe, their concerns about fair treatment in the region provided Wilson ammunition to promote minority rights as part of the new order there. The Committee of Four mandated minority protections in all the new countries, guaranteeing cultural rights and fair treatment, with specific protections included for Jews. The Polish and other delegations opposed this move as infringing on their sovereignty. Paderewski appealed to Poland’s history of tolerance to religious minorities, while Prime Minister of Romania Ion I. C. Brătianu did not hesitate to point out how this policy did not apply to Western Europe or the United States, despite their treatment of colonial peoples and African Americans respectively. A commission to Poland led by

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  81 Henry Morgenthau Sr. discovered incidents of anti-Semitism but reported no widespread violence. With conflict breaking out across the region, however, the report did not sway Wilson. The treaty included the minority protections in East Central Europe, although the League never enforced them. The states on the losing side, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany, saw ample territorial reductions, leaving segments of their populations as minorities in the new countries. Wilson showed little sympathy. The conference vacillated on whether to recognize the new Austrian Republic and how to treat the Hapsburg emperor, Karl, in exile in Sweden. Wilson expressed tepid support for Austria joining Germany based on national self-determination, but he embraced delaying that decision. Wilson received protests from Tyrolian Germans about being sent to Italy, and a group of Germans from Slovenia asked the United States to annex them so they would not become part of Yugoslavia. Wilson dismissed their appeals. He did support a plebiscite for the region of Carinthia, disputed between Austria and Yugoslavia. Austria remained a small, independent country after the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in September 1919. President Mihaly Karolyi of Hungary effused Wilson with praise and offered domestic autonomy for minority populations in a democratic government. Any slim chance of Wilson limiting their territorial losses ended when the Bela Kun Revolution overthrew Karolyi’s government in March. Romania and Czechoslovakia then disposed of the Communist revolutionary after he invaded their countries. Over 3.5 million Hungarians ended up outside of Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920. Despite support from some in the U.S. delegation, notably Henry White, Bulgaria saw the same fate. Lansing made a case for Southern Dobrudja remaining with Bulgaria on ethnic grounds and Western Thrace for port access, but the other allies ceded these territories to Romania and Greece respectively in the Treaty of Neuilly in November 1919. The historical memory of Wilson in Europe proved highly polarized. The new countries, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, built monuments to honor him. For the losing powers, he was a hypocritical villain. He angered many others with his indifference. As he departed France, a group of leaders presented him a thank you letter for his support for small nations. Only Venizelos, Beneš, Nikola Pašić, Armenian leader Boghos Nubar Pasha, and Zionist leader Nohom Sokolov signed it. The historiographical divides reflect the same mentalities. Several historians conclude that the U.S. president took a balanced, realistic approach to European nationalities, even if the result was not perfect. Larry Wolff calls the new Europe Wilson’s most enduring legacy, given that the organization of the region maintained into the present. While much of Wilson’s sentiment was based on “mental mapping” of a region he had never visited, Wilson tried to balance claims as reasonably as possible. Lundgreen-Nielsen makes a similar case, suggesting that Wilson wanted to be sympathetic to Poland but remained consistent in his opposition against territorial claims and nationalism. Živojinović argues that Wilson took the right stance by standing up to

82  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles Italy, in the name of fair treatment to Yugoslavia, while still offering Rome fair terms. The opposite view is of Wilson, driven by a lack of knowledge, facilitating a more unstable situation that led to future conflict. The denial of a voice to the Central Powers is a core complaint, leading to a dividing of the spoils rather than a fair reorganization based on Wilson’s claimed values. Biskupski makes a similar argument regarding Poland, suggesting that Wilson prioritized the sanctity of Russia over Poland, driven by a belief that Russia was a budding democracy. Wilson wanted the new states to be small, limited, and dependent on the great powers.8 In East Asia, the Russian Revolution spurred more posturing between the United States and Japan. Wilson opposed intervention in part due to a fear that Japan would exploit the situation to seize territory, and he committed troops to Vladivostok partly because he believed that Japan would intervene alone. Tokyo feared that Washington would do the same. When the two governments agreed on a joint intervention, Tokyo expected its military to receive command of the operation, as a sign of regional status, while Washington wanted a joint command. Ultimately, their troops operated independently. When Japan engaged over 70,000 soldiers, Wilson felt Tokyo had misled him. Japan used the situation to expand a military presence into the Russian zone of Northern Manchuria, controlling access to Chinese markets via the Chinese Eastern Railway. The two sides came to distrust each other even more. At Paris, The United States became caught between the goals of China and Japan. Wilson’s speeches were in wide circulation in China due to an extensive CPI campaign. Beijing put its faith in Wilson, and its delegation led by foreign minister Lu Zhengxiang had many connections to the United States, notably V. K. Wellington Koo who had a friendly relationship with Wilson. They demanded that the German leases, notably Shandong, be returned in the name of national self-determination, and assumed Wilson would assure this result. Wilson in turn promised that the U.S. delegation would help China but warned Koo that Chinese ambitions were too high. He nonetheless promised to promote the end of the spheres of influence system in China, to dispute Japanese claims, and to protect the open door there. Japanese officials in turn believed that Wilson wanted to limit their status as a world power, and criticized Washington as being motivated by its own economic goals and racial animosity. Baron Nobuaki Makino, part of Japan’s ruling council, led the Japanese delegation. Makino surprised Wilson with the wartime treaties with China, which he used to justify Japan’s claims. Makino rejected the idea of Shandong becoming a League mandate but he promised to return it to China eventually, so long as the conference upheld the economic terms of the wartime treaties. The Chinese argued that these agreements were done under duress and rejected attempts at compromise. Wilson was stuck between the pragmatic move of accommodating Japan, which he distrusted, and the idealistic goal of helping China. The other powers sided with Japan, and House argued that accommodating Japan was best

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  83 for regional stability. Lansing and the American academic advisers generally favored China, and they warned of potential war if Japan was not constrained. Officially, Wilson professed neutrality on the issue. Accordingly, the U.S. delegation advised their Chinese counterparts not to make the first statement on Shandong. Koo ignored this advice in a speech in January. His speech was well received, but the issue was not addressed again until April. The Japanese delegation threatened to withdraw if their previous treaties were not honored at Paris. Wilson attempted to mediate the issue personally. He requested that Japan revise the wartime treaties to give more assurance of support, while the Japanese delegation used the League of Nations to pressure U.S. concessions. To appease Wilson, Japan joined the League, backed off their demands for a racial equality clause, and accepted the return of Shandong after three years. In return, Wilson supported their continued economic rights in Shandong and affirmed Japan’s leadership role for Asia in the League, including mandates for the Pacific Islands seized from Germany. The Council of Four, with Wilson’s support, put these terms into the treaty. Wilson explained to the Chinese delegates that he could not upend the agreements China had made with Japan and that he feared Japan would be left unrestrained in Asia if it did not join the League. The League could solve China’s issues with Japan once it went into operation. Koo and other Chinese officials expressed their sense of betrayal and the May Fourth Movement, a series of student-led protests, exploded across China. The Chinese delegation refused to sign the treaty. Wilson’s justification for caving on this issue illustrates how much he prioritized the League of Nations more than anything else. For Lansing, and other supporters of China, this decision became the defining moment of Wilson betraying his principles. China later signed the Treaty of Saint Germain to end its involvement in the war. At the Washington Conference of 1921, Japan returned Shandong to China, fulfilling their agreement. Tokyo had most desired recognition of their status as a power and economic concessions in China, and while they received the latter, Japanese leaders felt the western nations had disrespected them on the former. After the treaty, Wilson received widespread criticism for not supporting China, and the Bolsheviks used the issue to spread their own ideology into China. Some historians have embraced this criticism, such as Stephen Craft, who concludes that the United States supported China only to the extent that it maintained U.S. interests. Kawamura, writing on the Japanese perspective, in turn presents Wilson as lacking knowledge and consideration for regional conditions in East Asia, which the Japanese delegation exploited to force his concessions in Japan’s favor. Bruce Elleman argues against this view. He suggests that Wilson pursued a good faith effort and got key concessions out of Japan, notably the temporary occupation of Shandong. The Chinese delegation scapegoated Wilson to cover its own failures. Other Wilson defenders add that he made the compromise in the name of higher principles of order and peace in East Asia.9

84  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles For the many world nations under colonialism, Wilson’s fifth point calling for colonial adjustments was a potential lifeline to independence. Anticolonial leaders, armed with Wilson’s rhetoric, came to Paris hoping to receive the U.S. president’s backing. Instead, the colonial order survived. Only Germany lost its colonies, and these colonies, along with former Ottoman territories, became mandates theoretically run by the League, but in practice run by the British and French. The treaty formed the modern Middle East, divided between the French and British, while Britain and South Africa assumed Tanzania in East Africa and Namibia in Southern Africa, and France received Cameroon and Togo in West Africa. Japan claimed Germany’s Pacific colonies north of the equator, while Australia and New Zealand took islands south of the equator. These debates and discussions included no Pacific Islanders or Africans from the German colonies. The conference also refused consideration of existing Entente colonies. Wilson at times expressed anticolonial sentiment but made it clear that he found most colonial peoples unready for independence. The League of Nation mandates were his way of splitting the difference. His original concept intended mandates to prepare undeveloped countries for self-governance, as an alternative to direct colonization, which Wilson saw as exploitative. Wilson considered territories holding votes on what country would manage them, and for smaller, more neutral states like Sweden to take on that role. His allies quickly brushed aside this idea. France and Britain were not initially pleased with the concept, but Smuts seized the opportunity to define mandates more like colonies, with only vague terms for eventual independence. While Wilson criticized Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes’s aggressive calls for the Pacific Islands, he only marginally questioned the terms of the mandates under British and French authority. In Wilson’s view, Washington would still have a voice in their future status through the League, and the League could change their management or grant them independence at any time, unlike a direct colony. Wilson’s main contribution was to create a hierarchy of mandates based on their perceived readiness for self-government. He also implemented terms of behavior for the managing states, notably protections for religious practice, and provisions preventing slavery and arms and drug trafficking. Wilson also opposed the racial equality clause proposed by Japan for the Covenant. Wilson’s true stance here is obscure, but officially he suggested that the Charter already implied such goals. The delegates from the British dominions, especially Hughes, took a hardline stance against it, fearing its potential impact on colonial authority. Wilson remained quiet, content to let them muddy the waters on the issue. The Japanese, with support from the smaller states on the League committee, demanded a vote. This vote passed, with eleven in support to eight abstaining, with Wilson joining the latter. Wilson, chairing the committee, pulled rank and dismissed the clause as too controversial and requiring a unanimous vote. He argued that a highlighting of racial differences would only cause conflict.

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  85 Much like the other Central Powers, the Turkish leadership put their faith in Wilson. A Turkish Wilsonian Principles League in Istanbul, led by reformers such as novelist and humanitarian Halide Edib, appealed for a multinational state under the guidance of American advisers. Turkish General Mustafa Kamal Ataturk rejected the idea as he led a campaign to create a modern Turkish nation state. Wilson in turn ignored them. The United States was only an adviser in the treaty with Turkey, due to not being at war with it, but Wilson was open to ending the Ottoman Empire. He maintained support for a Turkish nation state in his Fourteen Points, and vaguely promoted autonomy for Arabs and Armenians. When the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid blamed the war on Germany and appealed for support during a speech in June, Wilson dismissed him as trying to abrogate responsibility. The British and French, meanwhile, had completed the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, agreeing to divide the Middle East. On 30 January 1919, the Council of Ten drafted a resolution to separate Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia from Turkey as mandates. London and Paris remained at odds about the exact borders, and other independence movements made their case, such as the movement for a unified Arab state led by Sharif Hussein, king of Hejaz in Western Saudi Arabia. Wilson resented the British-French bickering, seeing it as old-world diplomacy. British and French imperialists worried about Washington challenging their place in the region. They framed their claims as within Wilson’s principles through the support of Middle Eastern leaders who backed their leadership. Arab leaders divided broadly on what route to take, whether a unified state or regional states and whether to embrace European influence or complete independence. Syria became the major flashpoint. At Paris, Prince Amir Faisal of the Hejaz positioned himself to become the ruler of Syria, where he had led Arab forces in close cooperation with the British. He disliked the French, fearing they would limit independence, based on their treatment of Algeria. Faisal’s appeals convinced Wilson to distrust a French-backed Syrian delegation. Faisal returned to Syria and quickly organized a “General Syrian Congress” to pass declarations of independence. Wilson sent a fact-finding commission to the Middle East led by Henry Churchill King and Charles Crane in April. The commission validated the appeals to break up the Ottoman Empire and emphasized an anti-French sentiment in Syria. It also warned that European claims about boundaries did not line up with reality and there was a substantial risk of violence breaking out in the region. Nevertheless, with no way to assert his will, Wilson conceded to British and French compromises. In Council of Four discussions in May, Wilson vacillated on whether the United States should join the region with mandates over Istanbul and Armenia. While British military and colonial leaders opposed this move, Lloyd George hoped the offer would get Wilson’s agreement to their division of the region. Wilson considered making Istanbul an international, open-door city, and he communicated with Boghos Nubar about an Armenian state under American protection, as a humanitarian enterprise. He feared, however, the United

86  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles States would look “imperialistic,” and he did not want it distracting from his broader goals. He consented to take the ideas to Senate before committing. The Zionist movement pushing for a Jewish state also gained Wilson’s favor. The Zionists had received a boost with the Balfour Declaration in November 1917, where the British government expressed support for a Jewish homeland in the Ottoman province of Palestine, and they subsequently campaigned for Palestine as a British mandate. While American Jewry divided on the question, supporters of the idea close to Wilson, such as Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Rabbi Stephen Weis, shaped the president’s view. Wilson feared, however, committing the United States to any policy that might provoke further claims for independence. Likewise, Wilson assumed concern about the Arab Palestinians, who at the time were a firm majority of the province, and whose place was bound up in the broader debates of the Arabic world. The King-Crane commission reported on potential conflict in the region, should the powers agree to a Jewish state. Supporters countered that a Jewish state would reflect national self-determination because it would become the home for worldwide Jewry. Wilson took up the Zionist cause more explicitly after Paris, but he maintained little sway when the other Allies agreed to the British mandate there. North Africa, in contrast, was already divided among the Allies, and Wilson did not consider North African appeals. Egyptian activists, for example, cheered Wilson as Saad Zaghloul and the Wafd party led the 1919 Revolution looking for an end to the British protectorate. While Wilson briefly considered supporting a defined, gradual plan for Egyptian independence, he withdrew the idea to appease British complaints, and he refused to meet with Zaghloul. The Egyptian Revolution ultimately pressured independence from Britain in 1922. The formal decisions on the Middle East occurred in the August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. The British and French divided the region as mandates, with minimal input from the United States. Washington did not respond to complaints from regional leaders over the decisions made there. The last Ottoman government agreed to Sèvres, but Ataturk led a successful war to maintain control over Anatolia, and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923 replaced the prior treaty. After his return to the United States, Wilson remained an advocate of adopting Armenia as a mandate. Even late in his presidency in 1920, he submitted a proposed Armenian-Turkish border revision that came to be known as the Wilson Award. Turkey and the Soviet Union reconsolidated control over their respective parts of Armenia. Peoples from other Allied colonies appealed to Wilson for support to no avail. The most famous example was Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, who lead a delegation to Paris seeking independence from French Indochina, only to see Wilson rebuff his appeals. India was another example, with leaders of the Indian National Congress turning to Wilson for support, such as Lala Lajpat Rai, who travelled to the United States and advocated for Indian Independence. Wilson ignored their appeals. Undersecretary of State for India,

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  87 Satyendra Sinha, and Maharaja Ganga Singh officially represented India as part of the British war cabinet, with the only major matter considered being India’s admittance into the League of Nations, the only colony allowed this status. Korea, then a Japanese colony, had an anticolonial leadership with many connections to the United States. Syngman Rhee, who ran the Korean government in exile, had studied at Princeton and knew Wilson personally. Faith in Wilson helped spur the March First Movement against Japanese rule. Unable to form their own delegation, Kim Kyu-sik represented Korea at Paris as part of the Chinese delegation. With China his higher priority, Wilson brushed aside Korean appeals. The Filipino independence movement likewise did not receive representation at the conference. While some of these organizations accepted Wilson’s excuse that the League would later address them, they quickly soured on that body’s inaction.10 African anticolonialism received a similar response as the rest of the world but is notable in that it became bound with U.S. civil rights for African Americans through Pan-African programs. Several scholars have linked Wilson’s views on race domestically to his foreign policy, with ample criticism. Many African Americans served in World War I hoping for fair treatment, but this hopefulness turned to disenchantment when Wilson made no effort to challenge segregation and discrimination in the U.S. military or in U.S. government agencies. African Americans also found themselves targets of disloyalty accusations, and Wilson did little to mitigate mistreatment. Race riots broke out with regularity during World War I and its aftermath. The war, nonetheless, helped broaden the international experience of many African Americans, encouraging a growth of Pan-African approaches to civil rights. Civil rights groups, including the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the National Urban League, petitioned for representation on the U.S. delegation, hoping to have Black civil rights addressed at the conference. Other organizations, such as National Equal Rights League led by William Monroe Trotter, wanted a separate delegation to hold the United States accountable to its stated values. Trotter promoted a “15th point” at Paris promising to end racial discrimination. The Wilson administration sponsored the travel of Tuskegee Institute President Robert Russa Moton to Paris for the purpose of speaking with Black soldiers. Moton maintained his promise not to ruffle the feathers of the administration. The Wilson administration prohibited the travel of other civil rights advocates, such as Trotter, who instead traveled independently and pressured Wilson through the French press. The other prominent Black civil rights advocate to travel to Paris was W. E. B. Dubois, representing The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as a journalist. In France, Dubois visited Black soldiers, and exposed how their units consistently faced poor treatment, including menial roles and non-recognition of the achievements of distinguished units. Dubois also hoped to use the moment to advance his goal of building a Pan-African organization that could promote Black civil rights in the international arena.

88  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles Dubois hoped the liberation of the German African colonies would provide a steppingstone to prove Africans’ ability for self-determination. He conceptualized a plan for a united West African nation built from the former German colonies, with hope that it could expand to include other colonies over time. Dubois and Moton attended the Pan-African Congress, where they organized with Black leaders from Africa and the Caribbean, including the Senegalese leader Blaise Diagne, chosen as the organization’s first president. Representatives from both Haiti and the Dominican Republic attended and called for the end of the U.S. military occupations. The representatives divided on approach, however. The French delegates such as Diagne tried to get better recognition within the French system, rather than outright independence, in contrast to DuBois and Haitian diplomat Dantes Bellegarde’s more transnational, anticolonial goals. Historian Sarah Claire Dunstan argues that most of the conference attendees were also elitist in mindset, presenting African peoples as needing uplift from cultivated Blacks from France, the United States, and elsewhere to gain their independence. The congress released a declaration that promoted fair treatment of peoples in Africa but did not explicitly frame this support as outside of the colonial framework. The PanAfrican movement continued after Paris and became more explicitly anticolonial over time. While Pan-Africanism remained popular among many Black intellectuals in the United States, other American civil rights leaders came to see it as a distraction to direct issues at home. Wilson, in turn, did not pay heed to the Pan-African Congress. Dubois sent copies of its declaration to House and George Louis Beer, Wilson’s colonial expert, but it is unlikely Wilson himself ever saw it. House had a polite meeting with Dubois at Paris, but Wilson kept his distance. Wilson was more interested at Paris of the rights of small nations in the international arena than he was about the rights of minorities within existing governments. Despite his insistence on minority protections among the new states of Eastern Europe, he rejected the implementation of the racial equality clause in the League Charter, and he did nothing at Paris in support of African American civil rights.11 The United States’ entry into World War I had an immediate effect on its Latin American relations. The Wilson administration’s suspicions about German activities in Latin America, which the Zimmermann telegram exacerbated, continued into the war. While Germany did have diplomatic and economic engagement in Latin America, the Wilson administration’s fears inflated its extent. Additionally, the German U-boat offensive put similar pressures on Latin American governments with transatlantic shipping to respond, such as Brazil. Ultimately, eight countries declared war for the Entente, including Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, and most of the Central American countries, while three countries broke relations with Germany. Commonly, the countries of the Americas looked to benefit from the war through trade, and those that declared war hoped that the United States would reward them for their symbolic commitment. Only Brazil had an extended military involvement.

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  89 Although Wilson’s Pan-American program had primed his plans at Versailles, Wilson increasingly lost interest in the region. He worked to stabilize the situation with Mexico and maintained his interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, but he paid little concern to the region at Paris. Latin American diplomats criticized the validation of the Monroe Doctrine in the League Charter, but they were not influential enough to prevent it. They did, nonetheless, support the League of Nations as a general concept. On the contrary, Dominican President Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal traveled to Versailles in 1919 to plead for an end to the U.S. occupation, backed by other Latin American leaders. The U.S. and European leaders rebuffed the appeal. Tensions remained with Mexico into 1920 over the treatment of property owned by U.S. citizens, but Wilson opposed calls for intervention. Wilson’s final Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, devoted his brief time on the job to fostering goodwill with Latin America, although the status quo remained by the end of Wilson’s presidency.12 Wilson’s approach toward colonialism is a point of heightened criticism, reflecting the sentiment of many anticolonial leaders who felt Wilson had betrayed his promises. Wolff, for example, argues that Wilson’s view of the Ottoman Empire was stuck in the Victorian era, driven by ethnic stereotypes. Ambrosius expands this criticism worldwide, suggesting that Wilson embraced a “global color line,” and only really cared about white, European peoples. Uyanik adds that while Wilson had some interest in the region, notably a genuine favor for Armenia, he got caught up in old world diplomacy during the Ottoman breakup. The idea of the British outwitting Wilson is common among critics of his Middle East policy.13 Not all scholars are as sharply critical of Wilson in this respect. Manela, for example, argues that Wilson’s failures were more a reflection of unrealistic expectations of the anticolonial leaders, who projected their hopes onto Wilson. Nonetheless, Wilson is important for galvanizing, albeit unintentionally, anticolonial movements that would eventually succeed after World War II. Evans is more directly positive, arguing that Wilson positioned the mandates to limit the powers of the managing states, such as not allowing direct annexation and including guarantees that the peoples in the mandates had a voice in their administration. This reflects a common view among supporters that Wilson at least restrained colonialism and put forward a path for gradual decolonization through the mandate idea.14 Among all these issues, the fate of Germany remained the priority of the conference. Entering the conference, Wilson had hoped to punish Germany but then integrate it into his new system. Significant tension between the U.S. and French delegations prevented this outcome. The German government, now a Social Democrat-led coalition under Friedrich Ebert, organized its program to support Wilson’s vision, and took for granted Wilson’s claim to be a disinterested arbiter. They did not recognize how his program conceptualized Germany as a defeated enemy needing to be punished. Wilson

90  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles tentatively embraced the Ebert government and pushed for the opening of food aid, especially after the German Communist insurrection in January. Berlin in response promoted a republican Germany standing with the United States as partners in the League of Nations. Wilson declined their appeals for bilateral talks, however, accepting negotiations only in concert with the other Allies. Wilson also never fully trusted the government’s viability and insisted upon new elections to validate democracy. Wilson’s advisers had different views. His economic advisers generally feared harsh reparations would ruin the Germany economy and cause political instability, while his territorial experts broadly favored Allied territorial claims against Germany. As the Peace Conference began, the Allies convinced Wilson and House to accept a “preliminary” conference to discuss plans, followed by a second phase of “open diplomacy” with Germany involved. The Americans believed they could hash out terms quickly and then bring in the Germans for essential matters. Instead, the first phase became the main negotiations, with the German delegation only allowed to participate in the final signing of the treaty, with minimal input on the contents. Wilson, along with Lloyd George, initially pushed back against French demands to seize territory deep across the Rhine river. They also limited Polish claims in the east. Wilson also opposed aggressive reparation demands made by his allies. On the other hand, Wilson refused the return of German colonies and wanted to restrict German entry into the League of Nations until after an extended period of penance. The period after Wilson’s return from the United States was the most intense, with terms of the German treaty not finished until early May. Wilson’s treatment of German borders was mixed. He rejected Austrian annexation to Germany, while favoring claims of Austria’s neighbors for German-speaking territories such as the Southern Tyrol and the Sudetenland. On the other hand, he upheld limits on Polish claims against Germany. The tensest dispute was over the Rhineland in western Germany, which France wanted separated. Wilson split from House over this issue, as his advisor wanted to accommodate the French to coax milder reparations. While Wilson supported the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, he supported nothing further. Clemenceau insisted that a large buffer zone was necessary for French security, but Wilson thought this outcome would only spur German resentment and promote future conflict. At one point, Clemenceau accused Wilson of being pro-German and stormed out in anger. Wilson condemned the French leader as an old dog chasing its own tail, and Wilson threatened to pull out of the conference himself. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George complained that sitting between them was like being stuck between Jesus and Napoleon. Gradually, they reached a compromise. French cooperation with the League of Nations bought them goodwill from Wilson, and House mediated between the two leaders. Wilson rejected dubious French historical claims on the Saarland, but accepted, in the name of reparations, French control over the region’s coal mines for 15 years. Wilson and Lloyd George also agreed to a demilitarization of the Rhineland with a 15-year occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads,

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  91 while rejecting French appeals for an independent Rhine state. Wilson saw this setup as a just outcome. Even though it temporarily infringed on the self-determination of the people in the Rhineland and Saarland, it did not permanently concede the region to France, while also creating a security buffer. The reparations question marked the other sharp divide, as the Allies wanted Germany to pay the entire cost of the war. Wilson pushed for reparations solely to cover war-torn areas in Belgium and Northern France. The Allies rebutted that the United States had profited heavily from the war and should not set these terms. To counter, the American delegation accepted no reparations for itself, except for the Allied repayment of wartime loans. Notably, Wilson did not use U.S. debt holdings to pressure lighter reparation terms. Britain owed the United States $4.7 billion, and France owed it $4 billion, and the British were eager to deal in this respect. Wilson, though, assumed absolving Allied debt would be unpopular at home. The question of what Germany could afford to pay was also a core question. The U.S. team pushed a lower and fixed total number. Germany signed the armistice on this understanding. Wilson also demanded a reparations committee to oversee the process, with the ability to revise terms based on economic conditions. Lloyd George emphasized the domestic pressure in Britain for high reparations, and Smuts produced a compromise of including payments for separation allowances and pensions for the families of war dead along with rebuilding costs for war-torn regions. In April, Wilson got sick with a cold, and House in his stead embraced this compromise, along with an agreement to allow a military response to a deliberate refusal of payments. Wilson accepted these terms, because of the creation of an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission to manage the process. He believed the United States, given its economic weight, would have a powerful role in this body to assure a fair reparations system. The Allies delayed setting the final amount until tensions cooled, but the numbers settled on 132 billion gold marks, roughly equivalent to $34 billion or £6.5 billion. A few other issues arose, such as culpability for the war. By the conference, Wilson fully agreed with his allies that Germany held primary responsibility. Article 231 of the treaty, the war guilt clause, reflected this mentality. It required Germany to accept blame for the war to justify its punishments. This statement of guilt arose as part of Wilson’s reparations compromise, as he promoted language about moral accountability, a favorite topic of his, while trying to diminish the legal claims for Germany to pay for the entire war. It instead became a symbol for many Germans of the unfairness of the treaty. They saw the Entente as equally responsible for the conditions leading to war. Wilson in turn opposed war crimes trials for Germany’s wartime leaders, such as the Kaiser, because he felt it would create a scapegoat. German society needed to be held to a collective responsibility. As put by historian Klaus Schwabe, the new government “did not prevent him from burdening the new Germany with the sins of the old.” Wilson accepted criminal trials for the Kaiser, although Wilhelm retired to the Netherlands which did not

92  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles extradite him. Wilson held the same mentality for the League of Nations. He decided Germany should agree to the Covenant as part of the treaty, but it faced harder terms for entry, requiring a two-thirds vote of League members rather than a simple majority, and only after its government had proved itself trustworthy. While a general reduction of armaments had been a core component of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the treaty reduced the ideal to just another punishment for Germany. Wilson disliked Marshall Foch, who he thought was using this situation simply to give France more power. Wilson and Bliss promoted linking voluntary disarmament with positive economic concessions for Germany, such as lifting the blockade, but they saw firm resistance from the Allies. The United States was limited by its refusal to participate in enforcement, wanting to depart from Europe militarily. Wilson agreed to the 100,000 personnel limits, as well as the elimination of the German Air Force, Navy, and general staff, overseen by the League of Nations. Wilson made significant concessions on his Fourteen Points during this phase. Britain feared the United States outpacing their navy, since they could not keep up economically. Neither side wanted to sour relations, however, and in exchange for British acceptance of the League and Monroe Doctrine, Wilson agreed to remain below parity with the British Navy. Meanwhile, Clemenceau refused to accept the League as his sole security guarantee and feared that his allies would return to historical norms of detachment from the continent. Wilson in contrast opposed the formal alliances he felt helped lead to the war. Diplomat Philip Kerr, Andre Tardieu, and House developed a compromise where Washington and London agreed to a security alliance against future German aggression in exchange for French agreement to the more limited occupation of the Rhineland and Saarland. Britain tied its treaty to acceptance by Washington, so it would not end up supporting France alone, and Wilson made sure they defined the alliance as under League jurisdiction for symbolic reasons. The plan also benefitted France because it saved them the financial burden of an extended occupation. The agreement required no permanent action by the United States, only to come to France’s aid if an issue arose. Although Wilson agreed to the alliance, he hoped a League guarantee of security would come to supersede it. The final step at Paris was to finalize the treaty terms with Germany. The German foreign minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau led its delegation. Brockdorff was willing to accept some punishment, for example he accepted reparations for territories occupied by Germany during the war, and he felt his country had met Wilson’s demands by reforming to a republic and accepting disarmament in the armistice. Germany was also eager to join the League of Nations. In contrast, Brockdorff opposed the idea of sole German war guilt, and he expected the maintaining of German-speaking territories as part of Germany, with disputed areas determined by plebiscites. Likewise, he thought Germany should keep its colonies but was willing to accept League oversight of them. Along with taking Wilson’s word about fair treatment,

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  93 Brockdorff felt that strategically Washington would want to keep a balance against British dominance and promote containment of the Soviet Union. The German delegation quickly became disenchanted. They had relied on Wilson upholding the Fourteen Points as promised in the armistice and saw instead a punitive treaty. U.S. diplomat Ellis Dresel visited Berlin to prime the later conference, and German leadership attempted a compromise through him. While Wilson read some of their correspondence to the Council of Four, the group did not give Berlin’s appeals much consideration. When German leaders tried to coax Wilson’s interest by promoting their own ideas for the League, including a world parliament, Wilson only resented the idea of Germany trying to step on his turf. The German delegation concluded that their embrace of Wilson had achieved nothing. On 10 April, the Allies formally called the German dignitaries to Paris. This call became an ultimatum when Berlin requested to see the treaty before their arrival. Wilson feared the Germans would take a hard line and was prepared to negotiate. Brockdorff in turn hoped that if he stalled, the Allies would become open to actual negotiations. In his opening defense, Brockdorff accepted Germany’s contribution to the war, but blamed the war on failures of the system for which all were responsible. He called for fair terms based on the Fourteen Points. Wilson quickly decided on a personal dislike of Brockdorff. Wilson condemned the speech as “tactless,” and dismissed the Germans as “a really stupid people. They always do the wrong thing.” Wilson particularly resented the German rejection of war guilt, despite Wilson having promoted the idea of shared blame before the war. The German delegates finally saw the treaty and perceived it as a pillaging done in the name of justice. They found it incomprehensible that Wilson would agree to a program that negated all his stated principles, no less his claim to open diplomacy. Wilson’s mentality shifted noticeably. Wilson supported the treaty to the point of claiming it fully met the values of the Fourteen Points. It was no matter to him whether Germany liked the terms. Wilson’s anger only grew when the Germans condemned articles that the Americans had already negotiated down, such as the Saarland terms, even though the Germans had no way of knowing the backroom deals. By using Wilson’s own quotes to criticize the terms, they implicitly suggested Wilson was a hypocrite. Wilson rejected their appeals. He assumed that the Peace Conference had negotiated a fair treaty and the Germans should just be grateful. Given this reaction, the Allies came to assume Germany would never sign the treaty. This possibility led to the “June rebellion,” a last-minute appeal by Lloyd George to soften the treaty. Wilson now stood in lockstep with Clemenceau in rejecting this idea. The German counter offer focused on preventing losses that could not be recouped, such as territory, while offering to accept high reparations, believing the pain could be spread out and revised later. They hoped to keep Germany as an economic power, but one involved in a more integrated world order, like Wilson presumably wanted. Lansing, Bliss, Hoover, and other American delegates found these terms reasonable and

94  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles applauded the opportunity. Wilson refused to budge. He eventually eased up to say he would negotiate small matters in the text, but only on the economic terms. He refused on territory and refused to allow Germany early entry into the League. The Council of Four released a revised version of the treaty based on the German appeal, but it changed none of the substance. Brockdorff wanted to refuse the treaty and fight off the invasion, but others in Berlin conceded to their fate. On 16 June, the Council gave the Germans a three-day ultimatum, written by Wilson, to accept the terms. The German government, and Brockdorff, resigned in protest, but President Ebert was able to form a new coalition. On 23 June, Berlin agreed to sign the treaty, noting that it was being forced upon them by threat of “overwhelming force” and that it was an “outrageous injustice.” Wilson praised the treaty as just, and appropriately hard on Germany. In a reversal of his previous claims honoring the German people, he declared that “nations are responsible…they shall no longer be able to avoid the consequences of the crimes of their governments.”15 How do we account for this more uncompromising shift in Wilson’s temperament? In the final weeks of the conference, Wilson fell ill with a cold or flu, likely from the stress and a possible stroke. Afterwards, he was irritable, conspiratorial, struggled with memory, and even rearranged his study by colors representing each of the big four powers. Additionally, while waiting for the final signing, he visited Belgium and saw the wartime destruction first-hand, which hardened his hostility toward Germany. The parties formally signed the treaty on 28 June 1919, on the anniversary of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. As the delegates departed the ceremony, a crowd swamped them and almost knocked Wilson into a fountain. Many people at the time probably wished this had happened. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau expressed liking Wilson more by the end of the conference. In their final in-person exchange, Clemenceau bemoaned “losing one of the best friends I ever had.” Wilson left Paris feeling optimistic they had made the best treaty possible, because of the creation of the League of Nations. In his view, whatever concessions he made at the conference he could later revise at the League. When Wilson left Paris the night after the signing, only a small crowd watched him depart. Despite Wilson’s positive outlook, widespread frustration over the treaty arose almost immediately. Many of Wilson’s advisers felt alienated and ignored and disliked many aspects of the treaty. Hoover was among those who condemned it. Bullitt was also critical. House felt that the treaty showed the United States being out-maneuvered. Lansing thought it validated his concerns about Wilson as a negotiator, calling it unrealistic and harsh. Many British delegates felt the same way, especially British Liberals who had put their faith into Wilson, such as Cecil and economist John Maynard Keynes. Both excoriated the treaty and Wilson. A popular view grew in the United States and Britain that the treaty had been unfair. The common French view, in contrast, was that the treaty was too weak. When asked about the criticism,

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  95 Wilson emphasized that he cut the best deals he could. While the treaty was rough on Germany, Berlin had done “unpardonable wrongs.” Popular outrage exploded among the former Central Powers, perceived as being made a scapegoat and unduly punished, and jaundiced in their misplaced faith in Wilson. This resentment festered through the interwar period and evolved into the “stabbed in the back” narrative in Germany, blaming their own government for conceding. The failure of a broader application of national self-determination caused riots across the globe, particularly in the colonial world. In China, for example, the May Fourth moment aroused a new anticolonial sentiment and galvanized radical groups such as the Chinese Communist Party. Japan signed the treaty, but popular anger there promoted the idea of having been disrespected. The breakup of the empires in East Central Europe saw a growth of nationalist movements. Countries in the region immediately began plans to amend territorial disagreements from the terms set at Paris, including wars between Greece and Turkey and between Poland and the Soviet Union. African Americans did not see the end of segregation, and experienced a heightened period of racial violence immediately after the war. The Wilsonian Moment blew up in broken hopes. Before his departure from France, Wilson told Edith that he felt it was a just treaty, because no one was happy.16 The Versailles conference holds a prominent place in the historiography on Wilson, given its role in setting the stage for many key issues of the 20th century. It is not surprising that the myriad of complaints about the Treaty of Versailles after its signing continued in later historiographical debates. One such critique has emphasized how Wilson’s policies were unrealistic, driven by Wilson’s limited knowledge of the world, and that hardened and practiced European leaders had swindled him. Abstract ideals could not overpower economic necessities, power politics, and the restraints of democratic governance. Scholars such as Arthur Walworth suggest it resulted in a treaty that was neither accommodating enough to bring Germany into a peaceful order nor harsh enough to enforce Allied will, and just left a muddled mess that would not be resolved until World War II. Ambrosius shows Wilson as blending isolationist and internationalist thought to project his image of America onto the world. The world, however, is a complicated place and Wilson’s image never fit reality except as a vehicle for U.S. hegemony. While MacMillan commends Wilson’s ideas, she presents him as intransigent, with an innate ability to twist his decisions into moral rights. This mentality allowed him to push great achievements, but it also led him to ignore facts that did not fit his worldview. Other scholars suggest that the reality of the situation simply did not allow Wilson the full application of his values, given the need to compromise with his allies and his lack of leverage. Thomas Bailey argued that Wilson had noble ideas and achieved key goals. Wilson was, however, tactically mistaken by putting his hopes in the League, never conceptualizing that the body would not function as he intended. Schwabe shows Wilson as honest in his attempt

96  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles to apply idealistic reforms, but his major priorities forced Wilson to sacrifice much of the rest of his program. A common refrain among scholars was that Wilson raised false expectations that he either could not achieve or was not interested in achieving. Another prominent narrative is of Wilson turning against his principles. Wilson entered Versailles promoting idealism that would change the world for the better. He exited just another player of the old diplomacy and power politics. Dawley describes Wilson as having shifted at the conference from “new world order” to simply “order.” The early decision to exclude Germany and the other Central Powers undercut most of Wilson’s credibility to push for a true “peace without victory.” The final major criticism was that Wilson was disingenuous from the beginning. He had ulterior motives for which his idealism was just a glossy cover. Levin, for example, suggested that nonrevolutionary liberalism and Allied unity against Germany grounded Wilsonian policies. Wilson never wanted to revolutionize the world, he simply wanted to advance his ideology and U.S. interests. Within this sentiment was a desire to neutralize the Soviet Union and revolutionary socialism. Hannigan and Saunders each similarly suggest that Wilson just wanted an order led by U.S. power. As Saunders put it, Wilson became “a nineteenth-century imperialist with an inner core of eighteenth-century virtue.” Schwabe adds that Wilson did not fight more for a fairer treaty, because he genuinely believed Germany needed to be punished. Wilson was transparent on this matter, but German leaders saw the Wilson they wanted to see. Kennedy makes a comparable argument, suggesting that the final treaty, including the League, reflected more of an alliance to keep Germany suppressed than it did the new, cooperative order Wilson wanted. By alienating and isolating Germany, it undercut Wilson’s goal to have a truly integrative and cooperative world. It is likely fair to say that Wilson perceived the treaty as just, because it did not punish Germany as much as it could have.17 Several historians, in contrast, praise Wilson at Versailles. Historians such as Thompson and Kurt Wimer argue that Wilson was a realist about what he could achieve, but that Wilson was thinking on a higher level than the petty disputes engaged by the other delegates. Tony Smith argues that while Wilson made mistakes, his influence led to a treaty that put morality at the center of world affairs. It also allowed Germany the opportunity to remain a power that could later rejoin the world system. Throntveit in turn argues that Wilson made deals where he needed, held firm on principles in other areas, but shifted the direction of international relations, such as mitigating excessive territorial spoils. Cooper presents Wilson as creating processes, from the League broadly to the mandates for colonialism and the reparations commission, that provided the world opportunities to address future issues peacefully. Defenders of Wilson are consistent in the idea that the treaty did not solve all the world’s issues, but that Wilson never thought it would. It was unrealistic expectations of outside observers that created the unfulfilled hopes. They also consistently blame the governments post-treaty for failing to live up to the system set up there.18

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  97 Notes 1 For more on the creation of the League of Nations, see: Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 460–475. Knock, To End all Wars, 194–226. Throntveit, Power, 272–297. Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers, 83–97. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 51–64. Herbert G. Nicholas, “Woodrow Wilson and Collective Security,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 174–189. Zieger, America’s Great War, 153–185. Anna Su, “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the International Law of Religious Freedom,” Journal of the History of International Law, 15, 2 (2013): 235–267. 2 For more on Wilson during the early peace conference, see: Margaret O. MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 3–62, 143–154. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 460–475. Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), 1–5. Knock, To End all Wars, 167– 249. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 127–167. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 188–218. Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 1–68. Jonathan M. Nielson, American historians in War and Peace: Patriotism, Diplomacy, and the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). Charlie Laderman, “The Ordeal of Paris: Herbert Hoover, Woodrow Wilson, and the Search for Peace,” in Historian in Chief: How Presidents Interpret the Past to Shape the Future, eds. Seth Cotlar & Richard J. Ellis (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2019), 161–183. Edward E. Parsons, “Some International Implications of the 1918 Roosevelt Lodge Campaign Against Wilson and a Democratic Congress,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29, 1 (Winter 1989): 141–157. 3 For praise of Wilson’s creation of the League, see: Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 460–475. Leonard V. Smith, Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 9–13. Throntveit, Power, 272–297. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 83–97. Knock, To End all Wars, 194–226. Kurt Wimer, “Woodrow Wilson and World Order,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 146–173. Nicholas, “Woodrow Wilson and Collective Security,” 174– 189. Tillman, Anglo-American, 101–102. 4 For critics of the League, see: Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 51–64. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 182–227. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 135–147. Burnidge, Peaceful Conquest, 77–105. Ken Millen-Penn, “Democratic Control, Public Opinion, and League Diplomacy,” World Affairs, 157, 4 (Spring 1995): 207–218. Hatsue Shinohara, “International Law and World War I,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 880–893. Thomas Bailey, “Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace,” in Wilson at Versailles, ed. Theodore P. Greene (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957), 56–69. N. Gordon Levin, Jr. “Woodrow Wilson and World Politics,” in Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference, eds. Norman Gordon Levin & Theodore P. Greene (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972), 93–117 5 For more on Wilson and Russia, see: Donald E. Davis & Eugene P. Trani, The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2002). Carl J. Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson’s Siberian Disaster (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012). David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). Georg Schild, Between Ideology and realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1921 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). Betty Miller Unterberger, “Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 49–104. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 74–236.

98  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles 6 For historians more sympathetic to Wilson’s approach to Russia, see: Unterberger, “Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 49–104. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 74–82. Calhoun, Power and Principle, 174–249. Mamatey, United States and East Central Europe, 233–317. Inga Floto, “Woodrow Wilson: War Aims, Peace Strategy, and the European Left,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 127–146. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 482–505. 7 For Critics of Wilson’s Russia policy, see: Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia. Davis & Trani, The First Cold War. Eugene P. Trani & Donald E. Davis, “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the Cold War: A Hundred Years Later and Still Relevant,” World Affairs, 180, 4 (Dec 2017): 25–46. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism. Schild, Between Ideology and realpolitik. Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific, 107–132. Lloyd C. Gardner, “The Geopolitics of Revolution,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 737–750. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 74–236. David Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 84–101. Erez Manela, “Wilson and Lenin,” Diplomatic History, 42, 4 (Sep 2018): 521–524. Daniel M. Smith, “The Struggle For and Enduring Peace,” in Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference, 3–30. Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson, 300–309. 8 For more on Wilson and broader Europe at the conference, see: Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe, 100–248. Živojinović, America, Italy, and the Birth of Yugoslavia, 11–177. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the rebirth of Poland, 94–139. Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918–1919 (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1979). Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 105–126. Cude, “Wilsonian National Self-determination,” 155–180. Thaddeus V. Gromada, “Woodrow Wilson and Self Determination for Spisz and Orawa,” in Wilsonian East Central Europe, 25–39. George Cristian Maior, “The United States and Romania in 1918: President Wilson’s Strategic Vision and American Support for the Rebirth of Europe,” Kosmas, New Series 1, 2 (2019): 40–47. Carole Fink, “The Paris Peace Conference and the Question of Minority Rights,” Peace & Change, 21, 3 (July 1996): 273–288. Peter Pastor, “The Hungarian Critique of Wilsonianism,” in Wilsonian East Central Europe, 1–6. Petkov, United States and Bulgaria, 84– 141. Mamatey, “United States and Bulgaria,” 233–257. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 122–140, 207–259, 279–302, 351–365 Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers, 40–63, 468–484. 9 For more on Wilson and East Asia at Paris, see: Elleman, Wilson and China. Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific, 107–152. Allerfeldt, “Wilsonian Pragmatism?” 545–572. Curry, Woodrow Wilson, 319–322. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 460–475. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 328–344. Manela, Wilsonian Moment, 99– 118. Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia. Unterberger, “Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 49–104. 10 For more on the United States and the colonial world, see: Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey. Uyanik, Dismantling the Ottoman Empire, 87–178. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 110–123. Winter, America and the Armenian Genocide, 107–143. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 283–450. Perin Gurel, The Limits of Westernization: A Cultural History of America in Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 19–49. Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe, 26–55.

Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles  99 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Matthew F. Jacobs, “World War I: A War (and Peace?) for the Middle East,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 776–785. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 158–191. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 307–328, 344– 446. Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire,” 852–863. 11 For more on Wilson, African Americans, and Pan-Africanism, see: Sarah Claire Dunstan, “Conflicts of Interest: The 1919 Pan-African Congress and the Wilsonian Moment,” Callalo, 39, 1 (Winter 2016): 133–150. Chad Louis Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). Ellis, Mark, Race, War, and Surveillance: African Americans and the United States Government during World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). John Milton Cooper Jr., “American Sphinx - Woodrow Wilson and Race” & Manning Marable, “W. E. B. Dubois, Woodrow Wilson, and the Dilemma of Democracy and Race in the Progressive Era,” in Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson: The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, eds. John Milton Cooper & Thomas J. Knock (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010). Peter Duignan & Lewis H. Gann, The United States and Africa: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 266–314. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 63–93. 12 For more on Wilson and Latin America at Versailles, see: Gilderhus, The Second Century, 53–58. Gilderhus, “Revolution, War, and Expansion,” in Reconsidering, 165–188. Garcés, “The German Challenge,” in Confrontation and Cooperation, 281–314. Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire,” 852–863. 13 For Critics of Wilson’s policies on colonialism, see: Wolff, Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe, 26–55. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 63–93, 158–191. Uyanik, Dismantling the Ottoman Empire, 87–178. Winter, America and the Armenian Genocide, 107–143. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 283–450. Gurel, Limits of Westernization, 19–49. Patrick, “Woodrow Wilson, the Ottomans,” 886–910. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 236–251. 14 For those more sympathetic to Wilson’s policies on colonialism, see: Manela, Wilsonian Moment. Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 110–123. Su, “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins,” 235–267. Knock, To End all Wars, 210–226. Hannigan, Great War, 202–229. 15 For more on Wilson, Germany, and the final stages of the conference, see: Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, 118–391. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 461–475. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 482–505. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 149–187. Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers, 255–276. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 65–90. Tillman, Anglo-American, 364–408. William R. Keylor, “The Rise and Demise of the Franco-American Guarantee Pact,” in The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919, ed. William R Keylor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 96–105. 16 For more on the early reactions to the Treaty of Versailles, see: MacMillan, Paris 1919, 487–492. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 482–505. Manela, Wilsonian Moment, 137–214. David Reynolds, The Long Shadow: The Legacies of the Great War in the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014). Klaus Schwabe, “World War I and the Rise of Hitler,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sep 2014): 864–879. Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism. Robert Gerwarth & Erez Manela,

100  Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sep 2014):786–800. 17 For criticisms of Wilson at Paris, see: Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9–14. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 65–73. MacMillan, Paris 1919, 143–154. Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 196–205. Babik, Statecraft and Salvation, 175–207. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, 182–227. Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany. Dawley, Changing the World, 237–248. Magee, “Woodrow Wilson, Wilsonianism,” 29–38. Thomas Andrew Bailey, Wilson and the Peacemakers (New York: Macmillan, 1947). Theodore P. Greene, “Introduction,” in Wilson at Versailles, ed. Theodore P. Greene (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957), v–x. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson. Hannigan, Great War, 290–295. Inga Floto, “Woodrow Wilson: War Aims, Peace Strategy, and the European Left,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 127–146. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics. 18 For praise of Wilson at Versailles, see: Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 188–252. Kurt Wimer, “Woodrow Wilson and World Order,” in Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 146–173. Smith, Sovereignty. Smith, “The Struggle For and Enduring Peace,” in Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference, 3–30. Throntveit, Power, 272–297. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 482–505. Tillman, Anglo-American. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, 197–224. Arthur S. Link, “Wilson and the Liberal Peace Program,” in Causes and Consequences.

6 The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy

Wilson departed Paris exhausted, but ready to start his new order guided by the League of Nations. All that remained was to follow his constitutional duty for ratification of the treaty by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Despite knowing he had compromised some of his original goals, he felt the wind at his back. Wilson faced a rude awakening upon his arrival home. Away for almost six months, his refusal to communicate his dealings angered his enemies in Congress and frustrated his allies. Meanwhile, the Senate Republicans led by Henry Cabot Lodge consolidated in opposition. Those backing Lodge were unilateralists, opposing components of the treaty that they felt infringed upon American freedom of action and national sovereignty. They desired a more traditional alliance with Britain and France and did not want the League superseding everything. The treaty, minus the League Covenant, in some respects reflected their vision as much as Wilson’s ideas. Many of Wilson’s progressive allies in turn felt that the president had betrayed them through too many compromises. The League was too restricted, dominated by the European powers, and they condemned the alliance with France as old world diplomacy. Additionally, a group called the irreconcilables arose. They were a mix of isolationists and pacifists who thought Wilson had betrayed his promise of neutrality. Led by Senator William Borah from Idaho, the irreconcilables claimed that the treaty would lead to the domination of the United States by foreign interests, particularly the British, and get it drawn into future wars. Many immigrant activists, notably Irish Americans, German Americans, and Italian Americans, held demonstrations against what they perceived as an unfair treaty, and supporters of China condemned the Shandong decision as a betrayal. Domestic issues distracted many other Americans, including a heat wave, a threatened national railroad strike, a summer of race riots, and the ongoing Red Scare against Communist infiltration of American society. Wilson remained firm in his belief that the treaty, and the League especially, would be effective. While he could mostly rely on Democrats in the Senate, he still had to convince the Republican majority. A central hiccup to accommodation was that Lodge and Wilson disliked one another personally and the two had disagreed on foreign policy throughout Wilson’s presidency. That DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-6

102  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy the major wedge between them was the League of Nations, Wilson’s most cherished component, made compromise especially difficult. Lodge stacked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with opponents of the League in response to Wilson not including Republicans on the conference delegation. Article X, which outlined the means of collective security by guaranteeing political independence and territorial integrity of members against external aggression, became the focus of dispute. Lodge and those aligned with him did not like the vague, indefinite commitment, and they disliked that the League could potentially allow a president to commit the United States to military action without congressional approval. They were willing to accept the treaty, but insisted upon amendments, including no obligation to war, a right to withdraw from the League at any time, and an exclusion of domestic affairs from League jurisdiction. They also wanted financial support for the organization and compliance with disarmament and economic boycotts to be voluntary. Wilson defiantly dismissed these complaints. His speech to the Senate presented the treaty as changing the world through American ideals and he warned that the Senate would “break the heart of the world” if it did not ratify the document. The subsequent push for ratification became known as the treaty fight. To ratify the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson needed a two-thirds majority, or 64 votes. He had the support of most Democrats out of party loyalty, with only 4 defections out of 46. There were 14 irreconcilables, a mix of Republicans and Democrats, who were automatic “no” votes and hoped to muck up the process. The Republicans held 50 seats but were divided between mild and strong reservationists. Lodge as Senate Majority Leader led the strong reservationists. The mild reservationists mostly supported the treaty, but they wanted a few guarantees of American ability to refuse League actions that might harm the United States, particularly Article X. They hoped Wilson would accept limited changes to gain their support to hit the magic number for ratification. While Wilson initially made some rhetorical concessions, as tensions mounted he turned against even limited changes. Increasingly going all-or-nothing, Wilson condemned opposing Senators as parochial know-nothings. Wilson expected the American people to embrace him and to pressure the Senate to ratify. By binding the League Covenant with the treaty, he had hoped to force the Republicans to submit so as not to kill the entire agreement. Before bringing the treaty to the Foreign Relations Committee, Wilson attempted individual meetings with amenable Republicans, but he did not change any minds. In response, Lodge had the committee stall. He pursued tactics such as reading aloud the entire 268 pages of the treaty and holding detailed hearings to allow critics to issue their complaints, including William Monroe Trotter on racial equality and Irish Americans angry at the denial of Irish independence. Lansing’s testimony shed light that he had no real role in the treaty. This admission stirred hostility on issues where Lansing disagreed with Wilson, such as the treatment of Shandong. Controversy arose when

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  103 William C. Bullitt testified and condemned the treaty as betraying the Fourteen Points to support British and French imperialism. Bullitt dismissed the League as useless and gave evidence that Lansing felt the same way. Wilson wanted to fire Lansing immediately, and Lansing wanted to resign, but Wilson declined this move to avoid the controversy. Despite many prominent people speaking up for the treaty, such as William Howard Taft, labor union leader Samuel Gompers, and Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell, Wilson felt obligated to testify personally. Wilson held firm to Article X as the backbone of the Covenant. He claimed that it did not legally bind the United States but was only a moral obligation for the sake of peaceful resolution of conflict. He expressed willingness for a separate document of reservations, so long as it did not change the terms required by the Europeans. Overall, Wilson’s testimony did not change minds in the Senate. Unwilling to make concessions, Wilson decided to use public opinion to pressure Republicans, feeling he had the American people’s support. His allies organized widespread propaganda, while the Lodge Republicans and the irreconcilables did the same. Wilson decided he could push the issue over the hump with a tour of the country. Wilson’s close advisers tried to convince him to work toward compromise, but Wilson believed that for the sake of the world, he could not relent. Wilson’s western tour took him 10,000 miles, starting in Columbus, Ohio, giving 42 speeches in 21 days along with other general appearances. On this campaign, Wilson presented his opposition as ignorant of the means to prevent another war. He affirmed that Article X would mostly use economic and diplomatic sanctions rather than military intervention. Wilson played up patriotism and support for the troops while promoting the treaty as a “thoroughly American document.” This was America’s moment to become a great power rather than keep its “hand on the door.” Wilson condemned isolationism as promoting a German resurgence, and while in California, he claimed that countless American youth would be killed in another war if the Senate did not ratify the treaty. The trip did not achieve its goal of pressuring Senators to change their minds. Some became more hostile after Wilson visited their states and dismissed their concerns with insults against their intelligence and character. Upon reaching California, Wilson started experiencing continuous migraines. On 25 September in Pueblo, Colorado, Wilson’s doctor Cary T. Grayson convinced the president to return to Washington D.C. Wilson then suffered a massive stroke, which paralyzed and blinded him on his left side. The president bunkered down in the White House, shielded by his wife Edith, Tumulty, and Grayson, who covered up his condition to avoid potential demands for his resignation. Wilson remained partially paralyzed for the rest of his life, and although he retained a clear mind, he fatigued quickly. Mrs. Wilson controlled access to him, and Tumulty wrote his public statements. Wilson clung bitterly to the presidency, even refusing to allow Vice-President Thomas Marshall to act in his stead until he recovered. His cabinet otherwise did not see him, he received no new ambassadors, and bills lingered without

104  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy signing. The cabinet held things together by maintaining steady routines. Edith Wilson got her husband’s thoughts on matters and helped him sign documents when possible. She kept all bad news from him, including letters from Edward House offering advice. Without Wilson leading the charge, nor working toward compromise, the treaty failed to gain traction. By September, after two months of delay, the Foreign Relations Committee released the treaty to the Senate for confirmation. The committee’s report recommended 45 amendments and 4 reservations to make it acceptable for passage. The Democrat minority called for no amendments, suggesting it would nullify the terms. Porter McCumber of North Dakota, siding with the mild reservationists, made his own report calling for compromise. The subsequent debates poured over the treaty, with 128 speeches and 89 votes on modifications. Senate Democrats ultimately wanted to compromise, but they did not want to undermine Wilson. They could not access him to attempt to gain his consent. By November, all the amendments were voted down due to support from 12 mild reservationists who argued that amendments would require renegotiation with the other countries. Lodge followed with a new batch of 14 reservations, including a right for the United States to withdraw from the League at any time and no binding commitment for military support under Article X. Accordingly, the United States had “no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any country,” except by approval of Congress. The Lodge reservations made U.S. participation in the League optional, on a caseby-case basis. The Senate Democrats waited for Wilson’s feedback. When the Democratic Senate Chairman Gilbert Hitchcock finally visited the White House, he found Wilson intransigent. The president warned that he would veto the ratification if not passed as written. From his bed, Wilson continued to insist the American people stood with him, and even boasted that the 1920 elections would provide a referendum in support of his position. He even threatened to run for office again. Both sides thus treated these terms apocalyptically. The opposition claimed that they were saving America, while Wilson and his supporters believed the reservations would doom the world to another world war. The irreconcilables egged on the gridlock. By this point, public opinion seemed to support compromise through the Lodge reservations. Wilson secretly floated four reservations while considering compromise, but changed his mind, telling his supporters in a letter to demand a vote with no reservations. This stance eliminated any hope of convincing Republicans wanting mild reservations. The vote took place on 19 November 1919. Partisanship ruled the day, with Democrats mostly supporting pro-Wilson positions and Republicans mostly opposing. The Democrats committed to following Wilson’s orders, and the moderate Republicans were angry about the Democrats’ all-or-­ nothing approach. The first vote for the treaty with reservations fell 39 to 55, with the Democrats and irreconcilables voting against it. A vote on the treaty as received fell 38 to 53 with Republicans and irreconcilables voting against

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  105 it. The Republicans rejected Hitchcock’s attempt to put forward his own reservations on a party split 41 to 50. Lodge refused any other votes, blaming the Democrats for a refusal to compromise. Resignation set in on both sides. Among the world powers, there was a mix of disappointment and anger. The French government found the reservations all acceptable, as did the British leadership, except for a reservation limiting the representation of British colonies. Germany tried to use the outcome to kill the treaty, noting that they had only accepted it under the terms set by the United States. Accounts suggest that Wilson responded to the defeat with defiance. In January 1920, with the other powers set to exchange their formal ratification of the treaty in Paris, Wilson made a final appeal to put the treaty up for a referendum. Wilson’s health gradually improved, but he refused to budge on the issue. He also lashed out against many people. When Wilson heard that Lansing had held informal cabinet meetings without him, the president claimed his Secretary of State was trying to oust him. Lansing finally resigned in exasperation. Wilson also sent an angry letter to the Allies over the Fiume question, accusing them of going behind his back and betraying the values of the treaty. He threatened to back out of the treaty if this was not addressed. He also criticized the French as militaristic to claim the need for Article X to restrain them. A final attempt at compromise later that year saw eight of the Lodge reservations accepted by both sides, although Article X continued to cause deadlock. Wilson refused to accept any of these reservations if passed, calling them worthless and un-American, and he vowed to fight the issue in the next elections. The Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles for the final time on 19 March 1920. Twenty-one Democrats supported the reservations this time, but it still fell seven votes short due to Wilson’s continued intransigence. The Senate never again considered the treaty. The United States instead completed separate treaties ending the war and never joined the League of Nations. While an American presence did not guarantee anything, its absence arguably contributed to that organization’s longer-term failure. Wilson’s response was to condemn the Senate as having “shamed us in the eyes of the world.” Wilson remained a lame-duck president. By summer, he was healthy enough to hold some meetings. He still promoted an Armenia mandate for the United States, although the Senate rejected the idea. The Republican convention in turn produced a platform on the treaty that excoriated Wilsonianism, while producing a vague alternative. Republican presidential nominee Warren G. Harding opposed the United States joining the League, although he promoted a vague internationalism. Wilson in turn released feelers about his own nomination for a third term. The Democratic convention promoted Wilson and the treaty, but party leadership prevented his candidacy. Its nominee, Governor of Ohio James Cox, ran independently of Wilson but supported the League of Nations. Neither side prioritized foreign policy in the general election, and Harding won convincingly while the Republicans made

106  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy significant gains in Congress. Wilson received the 1919 Nobel Peace prize for his creation of the League, but otherwise accepted a quiet retirement. Wilson never relented from his all-or-nothing stance on the treaty. He died on 3 February 1924.1 Despite the failure of ratification, there are some historians who still commend Wilson’s final stage. Cooper, for example, praises the moment as featuring some of the most impressive thought and debate of any issue in the history of U.S. foreign relations. The decision was to shape the future of America’s role in the world, and each side was genuine and intelligent in its belief, including the irreconcilables. Cooper suggests that the parties were close to compromise, but Wilson held responsibility for preventing this result. Cooper blames Wilson’s health. Wilson’s intransigence was inconsistent with his past behavior, and a healthy Wilson likely would have compromised. Wilson was right, however, that the treaty offered the best hope for the world. Knock in turn suggests that Wilson was a victim of his own success. Wilson’s achievements caused the Republicans to distrust the treaty, and Wilson made the matter worse by not including them at Paris. Wilson’s other mistake was to compromise his own goals to appease the Republicans as well as the European leaders, turning his back on progressives. The Republicans refused to recognize that Wilson had accommodated their ideas at Paris, and they killed the treaty just to deny Wilson a victory. Throntveit makes a similar argument, suggesting that Wilson was right on the merits, although Throntveit puts more burden on Wilson as abandoning pragmatism by refusing reasonable compromises with Republicans.2 Thomas Baily, despite believing that Wilson’s vision was correct, condemns the entire treaty fight as a debacle of intransigence, pettiness, and partisan posturing, and he argues that Wilson compounded the problem. Bailey analogizes how Wilson gave up the entire loaf of bread to avoid the same loaf with a “Republican wrapper” around it. In the process, Wilson eliminated the goal he found most sacrosanct, the League of Nations. Ambrosius places Wilson’s refusal to compromise more on his character than his health. He argues that Wilson and Lodge had honest disagreements that were reconcilable, but Wilson refused to accept anyone challenging his leadership, had a long history of partisanship, and refused to concede to anyone he perceived below himself intellectually. He was ready to refuse compromise from the moment he left Paris. Dawley similarly suggests that Wilson forgot that he was not the head of Parliament and still had a duty to his Congress. He expected Congress just to fall in line. Walworth argues that the treaty fight proved that Wilson was not actually an idealist, but a petty politician insistent that he was right.3 Wilson’s influence lingered, for good or ill. The final year of Wilson’s presidency diminished his image in the public memory. As word leaked about his stroke, along with accounts from his scorned advisers such as Lansing, many came to see Wilson as uncompromising and unrealistic. Keynes excoriated the conference and presented Wilson as naïve and a hypocrite. Harding and

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  107 his successor Calvin Coolidge presented their presidencies as a “return to normalcy,” based on the idea that traditional American life and politics had been disrupted by the Wilson administration and a step back was needed. Nevertheless, Wilson’s ideas on global governance survived. The League of Nations only functioned until World War II, but the creation of the later United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations revived Wilson’s vision. The League of Nation’s charter also inspired concepts of international rights, such as the later Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While likely not his intent, Wilson also galvanized ideas such as national ­self-determination and anticolonialism that shaped the later 20th century. Wilson also changed U.S. foreign policy, breaking from the emphasis on neutrality and detachment to take an active approach in foreign affairs. Wilsonianism remains one of the guiding philosophies of U.S. foreign policy, and except for a brief interlude in the 1930s, the United States remained more engaged internationally after Wilson. Despite their criticisms, the Republicans of the 1920s maintained elements of Wilsonianism, although less sweeping in scope. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, for example, organized the Washington Naval Conference to advance naval arms reductions. His successor Frank Kellogg later helped organize the Kellogg Briand Pact, a general effort to avoid war, although without a binding security arrangement. The 1930s led to renewed criticism of Wilson. Wilson was either a hypocrite secretly favoring the British or Wall Street, or a hapless idealist manipulated by corrupt advisers and European leaders. Congressional actions such as the Nye Committee and the Neutrality Acts attempted to prevent a repeat of the events that led the United States into World War I. This mentality changed as the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman administrations attempted to revive elements of Wilsonianism, while learning from Wilson’s mistakes. The creation of the United Nations is a case in point. Washington again led the effort to create an international body to maintain peace, but this time engaged Republicans in the process and established the Security Council with a permanent United States veto to assuage fears of the organization harming U.S. sovereignty. Much like Wilson had put forward the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission as an international economic body, Roosevelt and Truman advanced international economic organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. With this revival, a narrative of Wilson as an unheeded prophet took off. Roosevelt’s Office of War Information hired Darryl Zanuck to make the movie Wilson, that suggested World War II could have been avoided had people listened to Wilson. This narrative in turn provoked a “realist” response that condemned him as an idealist who failed because he did not accept pragmatic realities. Many scholars have also attempted to show Wilson’s legacy beyond World War II. For example, some scholars argue that the Cold War was ­Wilsonian in its promotion of U.S. values abroad with collective security bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the end of the Cold War, many scholars presented the 1990s and early 2000s as the

108  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy apex of Wilsonian internationalism. Both the William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations became attached to the label in different ways, given the primacy of international organizations, the active use of U.S. power, and an emphasis on human rights and military intervention during their presidencies. Some scholars, such as Knock and Throntveit, criticize these eras as not truly Wilsonian due to their emphasis on American power and intervention, rather than collective systems based upon equality of nations. Cooper similarly argues that Franklin Roosevelt pursued a system reflecting Theodore Roosevelt’s great power nationalism more than Wilson’s internationalism. Other scholars, such as Ambrosius and Tony Smith, rebut that American great power centrality and willingness to pursue intervention were precisely Wilsonian. The continuation of these arguments nonetheless illustrates the impact of the Wilsonian memory.4 When considering the historiographical debates over Wilsonianism in its totality, the early interpretations were defined by high hopes and aggressive opposition. Many of Wilson’s supporters, such as his co-writer of the League Covenant Jan Smuts, told the story of a well-meaning reformer undermined by avarice of the old order. By World War II, this perspective evolved into the story of a man before his time. On the other end, Wilson’s critics from the treaty fight set the stage for the “revisionist” interpretation that saw America’s entry into World War I as a mistake. Other opponents presented Wilson as well-meaning, but naïve, or, more harshly, as an unrealistic ideolog. His onetime ally, Walter Lippmann, became a proponent of the latter idea, and set the stage for the post-World War II realistic critique such as by Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan that saw Wilsonianism as antithetical to a foreign policy based on strategic interests. Keynes in turn became the exemplar of the spurned progressive narrative. Progressives had put their faith in Wilson, and he betrayed his values at Paris. In this way, Wilson became a figure of irony, the man who strove above all to prevent another world war and instead helped set the stage for that result. The argument of the spurned progressive evolved into the New Left critique of the 1960s, such as from N. Gordon Levin, that Wilson was never really a progressive and was only out to promote U.S. economic interests and imperialism and to oppose socialism. The pro-Wilson charge gained new life with Arthur S. Link, who countered the realistic critique by arguing that Wilson not only promoted higher values but did so with a higher strategic mind. He met the world of power politics on its own terms and manipulated it toward more noble reforms.5 Link became the doyen of modern scholarship on Wilson as editor of Wilson’s published papers and lead the positive interpretation of Wilsonian foreign policy. He defined realism as not simply about strategy and military power. Wilson recognized higher values and was realistic in his approach to bring change to the international system. Only someone with a firm grounding would have been able to keep America neutral as Wilson did, make the shift to war, and then lead serious efforts to reform the system. Wilson’s

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  109 compromises at Paris show his understanding that he had to work within the realities of Allied politics for gradual reform. Link also implicitly dismissed the New Left critique, presenting Wilson as genuine in his Christian conception of politics, driven by moral rather than material concerns. Link did note that Wilson’s personal tendencies, such as excessive rhetoric and neglect of the more mundane matters, led to his greatest difficulties. Wilson was not really a failure, though, because he galvanized a new direction in foreign policy that has survived into the present. Link’s interpretation shaped many future historians of Wilson. A. Scott Berg’s biography is the most unabashedly pro-Wilson. He presents Wilson as the scholar-president balanced by a humble religious faith. The most prolific scholar on Wilson since Link, John Milton Cooper Jr., provides similar praise of Wilson’s intellectual merits and affirms Wilson’s motivation to improve the world as genuine. Cooper shows Wilson’s ideals as practical while rallying the world to higher reform. His greatest triumph was shortening World War I, saving untold lives. Wilson in turn worked through hard compromises to give the world a chance at a new direction. That the world did not follow through as Wilson intended reflected the decisions of later leaders to abandon Wilson’s efforts. Throntveit likewise treats Wilson as a flexible figure who modified his approach to fit the circumstances, a reflection of political and philosophical pragmatism. Wilson should still be credited with inspiring a world effort for greater democracy, justice, and cooperation. He was radical in pushing the United States and the world to follow higher principles, but practical in creating a global system of governance. The claims of Wilson trying to enforce a universalist vision based on American democracy are more of a caricature than the real Wilson. The failure of Wilson’s vision was a tragedy, but its failure was not inevitable. It was never given a chance. Smith notes how Wilson set the stage for the “American century,” a system of world democracies working cooperatively under U.S. leadership that has led to a more stable system within the democratic world. Walter Russel Mead argues that it is modern Europe that has most followed the Wilsonian vision through its system of nation states cooperating through international governance, such as the European Union.6 In contrast, the realist critique perceives Wilson as a stubborn, naïve idealist who misunderstood the nature of foreign policy. In their view, Wilson was a figure so wound up in his convictions, faith, and ideology, he overlooked the unpleasant realities of political life. The British and French, more experienced and knowledgeable, exploited Wilson’s ignorance, getting the United States into the war and favoring their goals at Paris. As William L. Langer put it, “surely the American experience at Paris demonstrated to the hilt the need for deep knowledge as a prerequisite of effective leadership in international affairs.” Richard Hofstadter argued that Wilson’s defining character trait was his pride and arrogance, refusing to reconcile how his ideas were not working. Of more recent scholars, Lloyd Ambrosius is the most prolific realist critic of Wilson. Ambrosius argues that Wilson became trapped between his own ideals and the reality that other leaders refused to behave in the way that

110  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy he wanted. “If foreign leaders disagreed, as they frequently did, he attributed this disagreement to their failure to represent the true interests of their own nations.” Wilson expected other nations to fall in line behind the U.S. vanguard, and therefore “combined both universalism and unilateralism.” In this way, Wilson was a promoter of American hegemony, and his ideals just reframed American nationalism and American exceptionalism as internationalism. Other scholars criticize Wilson’s personal characteristics, temperament, or his religious faith. Wilson embraced a salvationist mentality that perceived his personal beliefs as morality, and he spoke on behalf of peoples of the world with only limited knowledge of what those people believed or desired. Striner for example argues that Wilson’s good traits “drowned too often in naïve and narcissistic fantasy.” Babik frames Wilson’s ideas as “secularized eschatology” looking for utopian perfection and trying to force Wilson’s vision of America on the world. David Fromkin argues that Wilson excelled at taking petty disputes and turning them into questions of high biblical morality. Wilson used principles to cover for what were his personal preferences. For example, his refusal to compromise was often based less on his commitment to principles and more on his personal dislike of individual people, from Huerta to Lodge.7 Criticism from the New Left often challenges Wilson’s idealistic motives as a veiled attempt at American imperialism. N. Gordon Levin established this mentality as, “an effort to construct a stable world order of liberal-capitalist internationalism…safe from both the threat of imperialism on the right and the danger of revolution on the left.” Wilson intended to champion American nationalism while serving as a spokesman for internationalism. He suggests Wilson failed because he got sucked into the old balance of power and was unable transcended it. The New Left critique, like the other interpretations, continues to have influence. Emily Rosenberg frames Wilson as a part of a U.S. tradition of economic imperialism driven by its ambitions as an imperial power. Joan Hoff criticizes the Wilsonian tradition as using the rhetoric of morality as cover for imposing American values on the world for economic domination. Wilson, while claiming moral superiority, was a paternalist looking to care for the misguided “children” of the world. Tooze argues that Wilson wanted to create an open world order to allow the United States to dominate using economic and ideological soft power.8 Other scholars have revived the narrative of frustrated progressives. While these scholars generally praise Wilsonianism as espoused in Wilson’s rhetoric, they criticize Wilson’s implementation. Thomas Knock, for example, attributes Wilson’s failures at home and abroad to abandoning the liberal and socialist internationalists who backed him. Erez Manela similarly presents Wilson as in an ideological struggle with Lenin over the new direction of the world. This was a battle Wilson won in the short term, but when Wilson proved to be uninterested in advancing anticolonialism, much of the world turned toward the Leninist model. Thomas Fleming presents Wilson’s principles as upholding justice and fair treatment in rhetoric, while proving

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  111 revanchist in practice, such as the war guilt clause. Wilson supported freedom of the seas, but then complied with the British blockade. He promoted self-determination, but then left large numbers of Germans and Hungarians as minorities in new nation states. He ultimately reduces Wilsonianism to “an oratorical device, not a well-though-out philosophy,” and argues that Wilson took political positions first and rationalized them later. Wilson could have upheld true neutrality, and guided a more neutral peace, but Wilson chose otherwise.9 A few scholars have attempted to split the difference between a view of Wilson as an idealist versus a proponent of power politics. Thompson argues that scholars cannot really criticize one commonly packaged “Wilsonianism.” It was a mixed bag of policies based on Wilson’s response to varying issues that can be judged as good or bad independently. Perlmutter argues that Wilson was one of America’s first “Machiavellian presidents.” He was idealistic, but also used force and power politics. Wilson failed because he was unable to break fully the U.S. tradition of non-intervention in foreign affairs in a way necessary to shape the new direction. Kennedy’s overarching interpretation of Wilson was inconsistency, promoting power politics while pretending otherwise. Frank Ninkovich makes a similar case, suggesting that Wilson’s legacy is less as an idealist and based more on challenging other modern ideologies. For Wilson, World War I was a struggle against Prussian militarism. A similar mentality framed American mentalities against Nazism and Communism. Tucker contrarily suggests that Wilson was not necessarily wrong in his goals for reforming the world, but that Wilson never really grasped that the world would not simply mold to his vision without the use of American power. Wilson could have worked within a balance of power system as a stopgap toward the one he was building, but Wilson refused.10 Which of these interpretations is correct? It will be up to the reader to decide. The core challenge is determining what part of Wilson reflected the authentic Wilsonianism. Do we focus on Wilson’s rhetoric and stated ideals or on his actions? We can follow Wilson’s rhetoric on neutrality, shared blame, and peace without victory and get one Wilson, or examine his complicity with the British blockade and his commitment to defeat and punish Germany and come to different conclusions. How do we judge Wilson’s mixed record implementing the Fourteen Points? Wilson, along with the other leaders, implemented a program at Versailles that maintained colonialism, despite Wilson’s rhetoric before the conference. Does this result show that Wilson did not really support decolonization, or does it reflect a necessary compromise to make gradual steps in that direction? Is Wilson the fair-minded compromiser that he perceived himself as at Paris, or the petty, dismissive partisan of the treaty fight? These complications illustrate why Wilson has proven such an enigma, and a topic of such polarized debate. One can choose any moment during his presidency and potentially get a different Wilson, as he changed his perspectives regularly from his early foreign policy through to the treaty fight. Additionally, because the Versailles Conference and subsequent treaty fight

112  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy blew up his plans, the world never saw his plan in action, for good or ill. This leaves us only with counterfactuals to determine their viability. Love him or hate him, scholars can find evidence for the version of Wilson they prefer. Perhaps the situation reflects how Wilson was never deeply involved in international affairs before his presidency and did not rely on advisers who were. While highly intelligent and educated, Wilson was a figure whose life was somewhat parochial in the international context. His academic career focused on the United States while not branching internationally much further than England. While Wilson tried to give himself a crash course on the world during his presidency, this was like a student staying up all night before the big exam. He absorbed quite a bit, but the depth of his understanding of the world remains in question. In some ways, Wilson was building his policies and philosophies as he went along. Since he was often reactive, his stated philosophies sometimes proved contradictory to his actions. He wanted to leave the Mexican government to the Mexican people, except to create pressure for the overthrow of Huerta. He wanted U.S. neutrality, but he conceded to the British blockade that favored the Entente. He promoted peace without victory, but he wanted to punish and contain Germany. Given these inconsistencies, perhaps we should detach Wilson from Wilsonianism. Liberal internationalism existed before Wilson and continues after him. While Wilson became a major proponent of its ideas, perhaps he need not be the paragon for whom the philosophical tradition is named. How should we think of Wilson otherwise? We will certainly keep on debating. Notes 1 For more on the treaty fight, see: John Milton Cooper, Breaking the heart of the world Woodrow Wilson and the fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition. Thomas Andrew Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the great betrayal (New York: Macmillan, 1945). Knock, To End all Wars, 246–270. John Milton Cooper Jr. “Fools Errand or Finest Hour? Woodrow Wilson’s Speaking Tour in September 1919,” in The Wilson Era, 198–220. William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Ralph A. Stone, The Irreconcilables: The fight against the League of Nations (New York: Norton, 1973). Clinton Condra, “Nationhood and neighbourhood: the Lodge-Wilson quarrel and the question of progress” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, 4 (Dec 2018): 377–388. Startt, Woodrow Wilson, the Great War, and the Fourth Estate, 293–322. 2 For those more sympathetic to Wilson during the treaty fight, see: Cooper, Breaking the heart of the world. Knock, To End all Wars, 246–270. Throntveit, Power, 272–297. Edward E. Parsons, “Some International Implications of the 1918 Roosevelt Lodge Campaign Against Wilson and a Democratic Congress,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29, 1 (Winter 1989): 141–157. 3 For critics of Wilson during the treaty fight, see: Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the great betrayal. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, Preface, ix–xiii. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 137–144. Dawley, Changing the World, 487–492. Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers, 557–562. MacMillan,

The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy  113 Paris 1919, 143–154. H. W. Brands, “Woodrow Wilson and the Irony of Fate,” Diplomatic History, 28, 4 (Sep 2004): 503–512. 4 For more on the memory and influence of Wilson, see: John Milton Cooper, “The World War and American Memory,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sep 2014): 727–736. Cooper, Breaking the heart of the world, 283–411. Ikenberry, “Introduction,” & Knock, “‘Playing for a Hundred Years Hence’” in The crisis of American foreign policy, 1–52. Ninkovich, “Wilsonianism after the Cold War,” in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson, 299–326. Steven Trout, On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American Remembrance, 1919–1941 (Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press, 2010). Michael G. Carew, The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938–1942 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014). Matthew C. Price, The Wilsonian persuasion in American foreign policy (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007). Ronald J. Pestritto, “What America Owes to Woodrow Wilson,” Society, 43, 1 (Nov/Dec 2005): 57–66. Fromkin, “What Is Wilsonianism?” 100– 111. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 230–254. Smith, Why Wilson matters, 130–143. Clinton, “Wilsonianism and the sweep,” 26–93. Thompson, “Wilsonianism,” 27–47. Quinn, US foreign policy in context, 154–168. Hatsue Shinohara, “International Law and World War I,” Diplomatic History, 38, 4 (Sept 2014): 880–893. Su, “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins,” 235–267. 5 For a more on the early historiography on Wilson, see: John Milton Cooper, “Preface,” in Causes and Consequences, 3–11. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 1–14. Justus D. Doenecke. “American Diplomacy, Politics, Military Strategy, and Opinion-Making, 1914–18: Recent Research and Fresh Assignments,” The Historian, 80, 3 (Fall 2018): 509–532. 6 For scholars generally favorable toward Wilson, see: “The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson,” in The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson, and Other Essays (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971), 127–139. Link, “Wilson the Diplomatist,” in Philosophy, 147–164. Link, “‘Wilson the Diplomatist’ in Retrospect,” in Higher Realism, 72–87. A. Scott Berg, Wilson (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 9–11. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 3–11. Throntveit, Power, 1–18, 298–309. Mead, Special Providence, 132–173. Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century,” Diplomatic History, 23, 2, (Spring 1999): 173–188. Clements, Woodrow Wilson, Introduction, xi–xii. Saunders, In Search of Woodrow Wilson, 59–63. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, 1–14. Smith, Why Wilson Matters, 147–181. 7 For examples of realist, and other similar critiques of Wilson, see: William L. Langer, “Woodrow Wilson: His Education in World Affairs,” in The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Earl Latham (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 165–174. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 238–277. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 1–47, 125–134, 145–155. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 1–25, 135–137. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Democracy, Peace, and World Order,” in Reconsidering, 225–252. Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 3–30, 239–241. Babik, Statecraft and Salvation, 1–22, 221–23. Fromkin, “What Is Wilsonianism?” 100–111. Patricia O’Toole, The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019), Author’s note, xv–xviii. Magee, What the World Should Be, 2, 114. John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the politics of morality (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956). 8 For the “New Left” critique of Wilson, see: Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, 1–10. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries, 62–93. Joan Hoff, A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: Dreams of

114  The Treaty Fight and the Wilsonian Legacy Perfectibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Adam Tooze, The Deluge: the Great War, America and the remaking of the global order, 1916–1931 (New York: Penguin Books, 2015). 9 For the progressive critique of Wilson, see: Knock, To End all Wars. Manela, Wilsonian Moment. Thomas J. Fleming, The illusion of victory: America in World War I (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 10 For scholars who argue Wilson was more of a proponent of power politics, see: Thompson, “Wilsonianism,” 27–47. Perlmutter, Making the World, 33–38. Kennedy, The Will to Believe. Frank A. Ninkovich. The Wilsonian century: U.S. foreign policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Tucker, “Triumph of Wilsonianism?” 83–99.

7 Documents

Wilson on Democracy, 5 December 18911 Of course we think first of our own great nation, with its variety within unity; and it is our natural disposition to take it as our standard type of democracy on the grand scale. This, indeed, is also the disposition of the world at large. For our polity is in every way a child of the modern world. Here, upon a new continent, in an open and free arena, have the forces of the modern world deployed, maneuvered, contested, won victories and suffered defeats; and the older nations, looking anxiously on, have sought to read their own fates in the moving features of the great spectacle…And yet the new life is so much broader than the old, and so much richer! It grows, too, so much more unified in character. The old world of the Chaldee and the Mede and the Persian, of the Jew, the Greek, and the Roman, was a world quicked, alarmed, made various by national forces. Nation was contrasted with nation by features of sharp individuality. Each stood for a separate and characteristic influence. But in us these old forces once distinguishable are all combined and made universal: the old differentiation is gone. Ours is a day, not of national so much as of international and common forces. There is everywhere a free interchange of ideas, a wide community of intellectual and moral standards; there are common means of knowledge; there is quick intercourse and a general familiarity with the ends of the earth. No nation any longer lives apart; it is sharp give and take between the peoples of the world. Each contributes to the others’ cultures; each shares the science and the civilization of all the rest. Their laws, their philosophy, their comforts, their education, their armaments and discipline, their manners even, and their sports, they have in common. How greatly do the correspondences now outnumber the contrasts in the lives of nations. Wilson on the Spanish-American War, 1 August 18982 We did not enter upon a war of conquest. We had neither dreamed of nor desired victories at the ends of the earth and the spoils of war had not entered in our calculations. It was for us a war begun without calculations, upon an DOI: 10.4324/9781003088813-7

116 Documents impulse of humane indignation and pity, —because we saw at our very doors a government unmindful of justice or of mercy, contemptuous in its every practice of the principles we professed to live for, oppressive and yet not efficient or fit to rule, spoiling men and thwarting the very bounties of nature in fair islands which it had pillaged and not used. Its character seemed of a sudden revealed to us, by an act of assassination. We did not know, we could hardly believe, that its authoritative masters had ordered or done the mad and brutal thing that wrecked our battleship and sent her unsuspecting crew unwarned out of the world; but we did know of what sort the men were to whom Spain was wont to entrust power in Cuba. …The world into which they have brought us is a very modern world. It is not like any other the nations have lived in. In it civilization has become aggressive, and we are made aware that choices are about to be made as vital as those which determined the settlement and control of North America. The question is not, shall the vital nations of Europe take possession of the territories of those which are less vital and divide the kingdoms of Africa and Asia? The question is now, which nations shall possess the world? England, Russia, Germany, France, these are the rivals in the new spoliation…Of a sudden we stand in the midst of these. What ought we do? It is not simply a question of expediency: the question of expediency is itself infinitely hard to settle. It is a question also of moral obligation. America and the World, 12 February 19093 We have come out upon a stage of international responsibility from which we cannot retire. That responsibility is not the responsibility of showing the world the way to material success, because the world knows the way to material success without our suggestion. Germany knows some of the ways of material success, for example, a great deal better than we do. Germany does not need to be drawn into the tutelage of America to learn how to make money, but every nation of the world needs to be drawn into the tutelage of America to learn how to spend money for the liberty of mankind; and in proportion as we discover the means for translating our material force into moral force shall we recover the traditions and the glories of American history. America was born by an impulse of intellectual and spiritual freedom, and America has lost her aristocracy in the company of nations if she forgets how to translate her power into the terms of intellectual and spiritual liberty. A New Latin-American Policy, 27 October 19134 We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. It is a very perilous thing to determine

Documents  117 the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions. Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests—that, ladies and gentlemen, is the issue which we now have to face. I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity. I say this, not with a single thought that anyone will gainsay it, but merely to fix in our consciousness what our real relationship with the rest of America is. It is the relationship of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty. We know that that is the soil out of which the best enterprise springs. We know that this is a cause which we are making in common with our neighbors, because we have had to make it for ourselves. Message to Congress on the Tampico Crisis, 20 April 19135 The manifest danger of such a situation was that such offenses might grow from bad to worse until something happened of so gross and intolerable a sort as to lead directly and inevitably to armed conflict. It was necessary that the apologies of General Huerta and his representatives should go much further, that they should be such as to attract the attention of the whole population to their significance, and such as to impress upon General Huerta himself the necessity of seeing to it that no further occasion for explanations and professed regrets should arise. …This Government can, I earnestly hope, in no circumstances be forced into war with the people of Mexico. Mexico is torn by civil strife. If we are to accept the tests of its own constitution, it has no government. General Huerta has set his power up in the City of Mexico, such as it is, without right and by methods for which there can be no justification. Only part of the country is under his control. If armed conflict should unhappily come as a result of his attitude of personal resentment toward this Government, we should be fighting only General Huerta and those who adhere to him and give him their support, and our object would be only to restore to the people of the distracted Republic the opportunity to set up again their own laws and their own government. But I earnestly hope that war is not now in question. I believe that I speak for the American people when I say that we do not desire to control in any degree the affairs of our sister Republic. Our feeling for the people of Mexico

118 Documents is one of deep and genuine friendship, and everything that we have so far done or refrained from doing has proceeded from our desire to help them, not to hinder or embarrass them. We would not wish even to exercise the good offices of friendship without their welcome and consent. The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right. The present situation need have none of the grave implications of interference if we deal with it promptly, firmly, and wisely. Wilson Declares Neutrality, 4 August 19146 Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. …The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action. Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend. I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought, as well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another. House on Carranza, 30 August 19147 We went into the Mexican situation carefully and agreed that Villa is the only man of force now in sight in Mexico. We are afraid Carranza is not equal to the situation. He [Wilson] is letting Carranza know that he will not

Documents  119 be recognized unless he maintains himself as he should, and non-recognition means failure. Too Proud to Fight, 10 May 19158 You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes. My urgent advice to you would be, not only always to think first of America, but always, also, to think first of humanity. You do not love humanity if you seek to divide humanity into jealous camps. Humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, by justice, not by jealousy and hatred… America was created to unite mankind by those passions which lift and not by the passions which separate and debase. We came to America, either ourselves or in the persons of our ancestors, to better the ideals of men, to make them see finer things than they had seen before, to get rid of the things that divide and to make sure of the things that unite. It was but an historical accident no doubt that this great country was called the “United States”; yet I am very thankful that it has that word “United” in its title, and the man who seeks to divide man from man, group from group, interest from interest in this great Union is striking at its very heart. …Americans must have a consciousness different from the consciousness of every other nation in the world. I am not saying this with even the slightest thought of criticism of other nations… The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right. On Rights to Travel in Times of War, 24 February 19169 You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war… …For my own part, I can not consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be

120 Documents a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile. It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world. On the Sussex Affair, 19 April 191610 One of the latest and most shocking instances of this method of warfare was that of the destruction of the French cross-channel steamer Sussex. It must stand forth, as the sinking of the steamer Lusitania did, as so singularly tragical and unjustifiable as to constitute a truly terrible example of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels have for the past twelvemonth been conducting it…Recent events make the conclusion inevitable that it is only one instance, even though it be one of the most extreme and distressing instances, of the spirit and method of warfare which the Imperial German Government has mistakenly adopted, and which from the first exposed that Government to the reproach of thrusting all neutral rights aside in pursuit of its immediate objects. A Non-Partisan Address, 26 October 191611 I venture to say that America is the only country that understands the other countries of the world. Men of our own citizenship can interpret for us all the countries of the world, and the problem that we are engaged in now is seeing that that power of sympathy unites us instead of divides us. I am going to illustrate it by something which need have no touch of passion in it. You know the feeling of this nation towards those unorganized people who have no political standing in Europe, like the Armenians, like the people of Poland—like all those peoples who seem caught between the forces of this terrible struggle and seem likely to be crushed almost out of existence. Why, there come into my office in Washington men of these bloods, who say to me, “Mr. President, we are not trying to draw this government into taking sides in any way, but people of our own blood, people whom we love, are dying of mere neglect and starvation. Can you not find some way by which we can help them?” And the chords of the heart are torn by the appeal, because we know that the cordon of arms, the jealousy of nations, surrounds these people with a fence

Documents  121 of steel, and that we cannot carry food in, though we carry it in hands that have no preference among the combatants but mean only to express the very fundamental feelings of the human heart. We are a great nation, a powerful nation; we could crush some other nations if we chose. But our heart goes out to these helpless people who are being crushed and whom we would like to save. America does not believe in the rights of small nations merely because they are small, does not believe in the rights of small nations merely because we are big and they are helpless and the big ought not to impose upon the helpless. But we believe in them because, when we think of the sufferings of mankind, we forget where political boundaries lie, and say, “These people are of the flesh and blood of mankind, and America is made up out of the peoples of the world.” What a fine future of distinction and glory is open for a people who, by instinctive sympathy, can interpret and stand for the rights of men everywhere! Peace Without Victory, 22 January 191712 It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might, in all that it was and did, show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it. That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. …The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power but a community power; not organized rivalries but an organized, common peace. … it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon the

122 Documents vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. …The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power. For Declaration of War, 2 April 191713 While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are… Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. …But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, -for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal

Documents  123 dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our Eves and our fortunes, every thing that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. This is a People’s War, 14 June 191714 We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under its mastery or fling itself free. The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller states, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. … Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? Peace. peace, peace has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the advantage…Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the German Government would be willing to accept… It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand. The Fourteen Points Speech, 8 January 191815 I II

Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole

124 Documents or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. III The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. IV Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. V A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. VI The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. VII Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. VIII All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. IX A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. X The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development. XI Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic

Documents  125 independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. XII The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. XIII An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. XIV A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace- loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, —the new world in which we now live, — instead of a place of mastery. The Four Principles Speech, 11 February 191816 Count Czernin’s reply which is directed chiefly to my own address on the 8th of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Governments. …We cannot have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual

126 Documents understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it, because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns. …After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these: First—That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential, justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent. Second—That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that, Third—Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States; and, Fourth—That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world. Sympathy For the Russian People, 11 March 191817 May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia? Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life. Open Diplomacy, 12 March 191818 I take it for granted that you [Lansing] feel as l do, that this is no time to act as the resolution prescribes, and certainly when l pronounced for open

Documents  127 diplomacy I meant not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreement of any sort should he entered into and that all international relations, when fixed, should he open, aboveboard, and explicit. Third Liberty Loan Address, 6 April 191819 We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. …It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered—answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice, but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will. …Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a program our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it. That program once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world—a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden underfoot and disregarded and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind! On Russian Intervention, 16 July 191820 It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and

128 Documents that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence. Fourth Liberty Loan Address, 27 September 191821 We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honour and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot “come to terms” with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement. [On the league of nations] First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned; Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all; Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations. Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Documents  129 Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms. Message to Austria-Hungary, 18 October 191822 I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following reply: “The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the eighth of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following: “X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. “Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and AustroHungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom. “The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere ‘autonomy’ of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not the, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the AustroHungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.” Peace Note to Germany, 23 October 191823 He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. …The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards

130 Documents must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Armistice Speech to Congress, 11 November 191824 For with the fall of the ancient Governments, which rested like an incubus on the people of the Central Empires, has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form, but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves, With what Governments and of what sort are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements besides our own is it to rest? Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered now or at once. But the moral is not that there is little hope of an early answer that will suffice. It is only that we must be patient and helpful and mindful above all of the great hope and confidence that lie at the heart of what is taking place. Excesses accomplish nothing. Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant recent proof of that. Disorder

Documents  131 immediately defeats itself. If excesses should occur, if disorder should for a time raise its head, a sober second thought will follow and a day of constructive action, if we help and do not hinder. The present and all that it holds belong to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their Governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness. The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government aid who are now coming at last into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with their initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbours and of their former masters, and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last. On Anglo-American Friendship, 28 December 191825 But since I am on my feet I cannot refrain, as no American or Englishman could, from saying a word of felicitation upon the splendid achievement by which your country and mine have just vindicated the courage of free peoples armed in defense of their freedom, and demonstrated not only that liberty and efficiency can function together, but that great democracies can impose such discipline upon themselves as to turn out a war machine that will outmatch the murderous devices of autocracy. In other words, we have not only made the world safe for democracy, but we have done a greater thing, for we have proven that democracy is safe for the world. But now, at last, on land and sea, English and American forces have fought so close together, that the colors of their flags were merged into one banner of the free. Heretofore, the tie that bound us was one language. Hereafter, we shall be one race. All of us must and do hope that this is the last of wars, and that from the waste and ashes of its fields will rise, Phoenix-like, a great covenant of mankind to compose the differences and enforce peace throughout the world.

132 Documents Henry Cabot Lodge Criticizes the League of Nations, 28 February 191926 In this draft prepared for a constitution of a league of nations, which is now before the world, there is hardly a clause about the interpretation of which men do not already differ. As it stands there is serious danger that the very nations which sign the constitution of the league will quarrel about the meaning of the various articles before a twelvemonth has passed. It seems to have been very hastily drafted, and the result is crudeness and looseness of expression, unintentional, I hope. There are certainly many doubtful passages and open questions obvious in the articles which can not be settled by individual inference, but which must be made so clear and so distinct that we may all understand the exact meaning of the instrument to which we are asked to set our hands. The language of these articles does not appear to me to have the precision and unmistakable character which a constitution, a treaty, or a law ought to present. …We abandon entirely by the proposed constitution the policy laid down by Washington in his Farewell Address and the Monroe doctrine. It is worse than idle, it is not honest, to evade or deny this fact, and every fair-minded supporter of this draft plan for a league admits it… When we went to war with Germany we made no treaties with the nations engaged in the war against the German Government. The President was so careful in this direction that he did not permit himself ever to refer to the nations by whose side we fought as “allies,” but always as “nations associated with us in the war.” The attitude recommended by Washington was scrupulously maintained even under the pressure of the great conflict. Now, in the twinkling of an eye, while passion and emotion reign, the Washington policy is to be entirely laid aside and we are to enter upon a permanent and indissoluble alliance. That which we refuse to do in war we are to do in peace, deliberately, coolly, and with no war exigency. Wilson to the Italian Delegation, 14 April 191927 There is no question to which I have given more careful or anxious thought than I have given to this, because in common with all my colleagues it is my earnest desire to see the utmost justice done to Italy. Throughout my consideration of it, however, I have felt that there was one matter in which I had no choice and could wish to have none. I felt bound to square every conclusion that I should reach as accurately as possible with the fourteen principles of peace… …Personally, I am quite willing that Italy should be accorded along the whole length of her northern frontier and wherever she comes into contact with Austrian territory all that was accorded her in the so-called Pact of London, but I am of the clear opinion that the Pact of London can no longer apply to the settlement of her eastern boundaries.

Documents  133 The line drawn in the Pact of London was conceived for the purpose of establishing an absolutely adequate frontier of safety for Italy against any possible hostility or aggression on the part of Austria-Hungary. But AustriaHungary no longer exists. These eastern frontiers will touch countries stripped of the military and naval power of Austria, set up in entire independence of Austria, and organized for the purpose of satisfying legitimate national aspirations, and created States not hostile to the new European, order, but arising out of it, interested in its maintenance, dependent upon the cultivation of friendships, and bound to a common policy of peace and accommodation by the covenants of the League of Nations. …Fiume is by situation and by all the circumstances of its development not an Italian but an international port, serving the countries to the east and north of the Gulf of Fiume. Just because it is an international port and cannot with justice be subordinated to any one sovereignty it is my clear judgment that it should enjoy a very considerable degree of genuine autonomy and that, while it should be included no doubt within the customs system of the new Jugo-Slav State, it should nevertheless be left free in its own interest and in the interest of the States lying about it to devote itself to the service of the commerce which naturally and inevitably seeks an outlet or inlet at its port. Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, 21 April 191928 Lloyd George: That is a fine document, which will be useful if the Italian ministers end by going home and taking back to their compatriots only part of what the Treaty of London promised them. Wilson: I think this statement will also respond to the necessities of the circumstances if the Italians reject our proposals. Lloyd George: In fact, the document could produce a useful impression in Italy, but only after a certain period of time. For the moment, we need expect only madness. Wilson: The Italians cannot accuse the United States of being an interested party. Lloyd George: No, but of taking the side of the Yugoslavs against them. Wilson: Our tenet is that the Slavs have the same right to independence and to national unity as the Italians themselves. Lloyd George: Yes, but if a word must be said for the Italians, the Slavs must admit that Italy’s sacrifices contributed much to their own liberation, and that did not prevent the Croatians from fighting against us to the end. Except for the Czechoslovaks, the Slavs of Austria played a rather questionable role. Wilson: It is difficult for the rest of us, free peoples, to understand the state of mind of races which have been oppressed and held under terror for a long time.

134 Documents Lloyd George: Despite so many persecutions and capital sentences, the Czechs had another attitude. Wilson: Bohemia had a more independent position in the Empire. It is necessary to understand the situation of populations humbled little by little by oppression. Lloyd George: How did the Poles of Austria fight? Clemenceau: I really do not know. Wilson: About the Poles, I must tell you that I received a report from General Bliss, which indicates that they intend to send General Haller’s army to Lemberg. This is contrary to our plans. Should we not inform M. Paderewski that, having accepted in principle the conclusion of a cease fire and an armistice, he must stop hostilities and not permit General Haller’s troops to be sent to Lemberg, nor used to relieve other troops, who would receive that same order? If our agents are not listened to, we could, if necessary, threaten to stop the victualing. On the Shandong Settlement, 30 April 191929 The Japanese-Chinese matter has been settled in a way which seems to me as satisfactory as could be got out of the tangle of treaties in which China herself was involved, and it is important that the exact facts should be known… In the treaty all the rights at Kiauchau and in Shantung Province belonging to Germany are to be transferred without reservation to Japan, but Japan voluntarily engages, in answer to questions put in conference, that it will be her immediate policy “to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao…” It was understood in addition that in as much as the sovereign rights receded to China were to be unqualified, all Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula should be withdrawn at the earliest possible time. Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are possessed by one or two other great powers and are only too common in China, and the whole future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and political independence. I find a general disposition to look with favor upon the proposal that at an early date through the mediation of the League of Nations all extraordinary foreign rights in China and all spheres of influence should be abrogated by the common consent of all the nations concerned. I regard the assurances given by Japan as very satisfactory in view of the complicated circumstances. Discussing Minority Protections in East Central Europe, 1 May 191930 PRESIDENT WILSON said it had been brought to his attention that the Jews were somewhat inhospitably regarded in Poland. In Roumania also they

Documents  135 depended only on statutory rights. While we could not deal with Roumania, we could deal with their position in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Certain safeguards had been suggested to him. He then read the following two clauses, one of which he had drafted himself, while the other had been prepared by a United States legal draftsman: 1 The State of ______ covenants and agrees that it will accord to all racial or national minorities within its jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, alike in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of its people. 2 The State of ______ covenants and agrees that it will not prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals, and that no person within its jurisdiction shall be molested in life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adherence to any such creed, religion or belief. …MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Paderewski had made to him a very able defence of the attitude of Poland towards the Jews, and had pointed out that the Jews had themselves to blame to a considerable extent. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the reason the Jews had caused trouble was because in those countries they were not really welcome citizens. They did not care for any country where they were badly treated. In the United States of America, Great Britain or France, those questions did not arise. They were only disloyal in countries where they were not treated properly. MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Jews were very good citizens in their countries. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in Poland he understood the Jews were really more efficient men of business than the Poles. M. CLEMENCEAU said that in Poland a Pole who wanted to carry out any transaction—for example, to buy a horse—would send for a Jew. Comparing Germans and Slavs, 6 June 191931 What makes the Slav less formidable than the German is that he has not attained the same degree of organization. The German is a perfect cog in a powerful machine. Moreover, an entire generation had prepared him for the present war. Men of my age, who, in their youth, had attended German universities, having returned to Germany a little before the war, came back frightened by the systematic education which had deformed the German mind. History, philosophy, political economy had been fashioned to serve German ambitions. Germany has a more complete system of education than any other country; if Russia was capable of doing as much, she would be irresistible. But in many respects she is backward.

136 Documents Presenting the Treaty for Ratification, 10 July 191932 The united power of free nations must put a stop to aggression, and the world must be given peace. If there was not the will or the intelligence to accomplish that now, there must be another and a final war and the world must be swept clean of every power that could renew the terror. The League of Nations was not merely an instrument to adjust and remedy old wrongs under a new treaty of peace; it was the only hope for mankind. Again and again had the demon of war been cast out of the house of the peoples and the house swept clean by a treaty of peace; only to prepare a time when he would enter in again with spirits worse than himself. The house must now be given a tenant who could hold it against all such. Convenient, indeed indispensable, as statesmen found the newly planned League of Nations to be for the execution of present plans of peace and reparation, they saw it in a new aspect before their work was finished. They saw it as the main object of the peace, as the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they did not dare to disappoint. Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world? …It was our duty to go in, if we were indeed the champions of liberty and of right. We answered to the call of duty in a way so spirited, so utterly without thought of what we spent of blood or treasure, so effective, so worthy of the admiration of true men everywhere, so wrought out of the stuff of all that was heroic, that the whole world saw at last, in the flesh, in noble action, a great ideal asserted and vindicated, by a nation they had deemed material and now found to be compact of the spiritual forces that must free men of every nation from every unworthy bondage. It is thus that a new role and a new responsibility have come to this great nation that we honor and which we would all wish to lift to yet higher levels of service and achievement. The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else. Debates over Mandates, 8 August 191833 It would be helpful if you would send to Polk instructions to the effect that our commission should draft a mandate otherwise the Ottoman Empire will be divided and distributed without any previous agreement as to the general principles under which it shall be administered and the whole mandatory conception will receive a severe blow which public opinion will hardly forgive. With regard to B and C, I informed the commission of your approval and Milner said that Lloyd George likewise approved. The Italian delegate was asked to secure the formal approval of his government and I believe this

Documents  137 is merely a matter of form. The French Government as you know made a reservation regarding B mandate in order that they might secure the right to use armed forces raised in the mandated territories for the defense of France. The Commission was unanimously against the French delegation but their reservation is still maintained and Balfour has been asked to talk with Clemenceau and have it waived. The Japanese delegation likewise reserved in mandate C the right of free immigration and settlement in all mandated territories. This of course has raised serious objections from the British on behalf of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa and the Commission has supported these objections. Whether the Japanese will insist upon reservation is still uncertain but if they should the issue will have to be determined by the Supreme Council now sitting in Paris. The Commission by its terms of recurs was likewise asked to hear and report on Belgian and Portuguese claims in Africa. You will remember that the Conference allocated German East Africa to Great Britain under mandate and Belgium claimed a part of this territory. It was decided that our Commission should resolve the dispute. The British and Belgian Governments came to an agreement by which Belgium was to receive roughly one twentieth of the territory but practically one half of the population under mandate. Because the two principal interested powers had reached this agreement and because the Belgians were in possession and had materially contributed to the campaign against the Germans in East Africa the Commission felt under obligation to accept this division. Though I am personally disturbed at the thought of three million five hundred thousand natives going under the Belgian control I did not feel justified in objecting to the arrangement reached by the powers chiefly concerned. Wilson’s Frustration with His Allies, 20 August 191934 Today at my daily conference with the President we were discussing the rapacity of Roumania, the apparent weakening of Clemenceau at the Paris Council toward the defiant attitude of the Roumanians in Hungary, and the deep concern of Masaryk that the Arch-duke Joseph was accepted by the Roumanians as the head of the Hungarian Government. The President said that Roumania’s conduct was insufferable, that he had for that Government a feeling of contempt and indignation, and that he considered Roumania the most despicable of the Balkan nations. He added that the Roumanians had a German king, that the Arch-duke was German, that his success might induce Austria to turn to the Hapsbergs again, and that these combining with the Germans might again raise the standard of Pan-Germanism. He said with considerable heat: “When I see such conduct as this, when I learn of the secret treaty of Great Britain with Persia, when I find Italy and Greece arranging between themselves as to the division of western Asia Minor, and when I think of the greed and utter selfishness of it all, I am almost

138 Documents inclined to refuse to permit this country to be a member of the League of Nations when it is composed of such intriguers and robbers. I am disposed to throw up the whole business and get out.” This is the third time that the President has said to me that the present conduct of the nations makes him consider withdrawing from the League, though he never before spoke so emphatically…“Foreign affairs certainly cause a man to be profane,” he commented. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 August 191935 Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles of the covenant of the league of nations; and I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained. You will recall that when I had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and with the Committee of the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last the questions now most frequently asked about the League of Nations were all canvassed with a view to their immediate clarification. The covenant of the league was then in its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe doctrine; that it was not expressly provided that the league should have no authority to act or to express a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to withdraw from the league was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. On my return to Paris all these matters were taken up again by the commission on the League of Nations and every suggestion of the United States was accepted. …Article X is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the covenant as a whole. The council of the league can only “advise upon” the means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a party to the policy or action in question, her own affirmative vote in the council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous vote of the council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the council is only advice in any case. Each Government is free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of our Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was made to question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, undertake under article 10 to “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league,” and that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. But it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law.

Documents  139 Article X seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole covenant. Without it the league would be hardly more than an influential debating society. Wilson Defends the Treaty, 5 September 191936 The politics of the world, the policy of mankind, the concert of the methods by which the world is to be bettered, that concert of will and of action which will make every nation a nobler instrument of Divine Providence—that is world politics. …That brings me, my fellow citizens, to the guarantee of this whole thing. We said that we were going to fight this war for the purpose of seeing to it that the mothers and sisters and fathers of this land, and the sweethearts and wives, did not have to send their lads over on the other side of the sea to fight any more, and so we took part in an arrangement by which justice was to be secured throughout the world. The rest of the world, partly at our suggestion, said “Yes” and said it gladly; said “Yes, we will go into the partnership to see that justice is maintained;” and then I come home and hear some gentlemen say, “But will we?” Are we interested in justice? The treaty of peace, as I have just said to you, is based upon the protection of the weak against the strong, and there is only one force that can protect the weak against the strong, and that is the universal concert of the strength of mankind. That is the league of nations. But I beg that you will not conceive of the league of nations as a combination of the world for war, for that is exactly what it is not. It is a combination of the world for arbitration and discussion. And notice the sanction. Any member of the league which breaks these promises with regard to arbitration or discussion is to be deemed thereby to have committed an act of war against the other members of the league; not merely to have done an immoral thing, but by refusing to obey those processes to have committed an act of war and put itself out of court. …That other system was based upon the principle that no strong power need respect the territorial integrity or the political independence of any weak power. I need not confine the phraseology to that. It was based upon the principle that no power is obliged to respect the territorial integrity or the political independence of any other power if it has the force necessary to disregard it. So that Article X cuts at the very heart, and is the only instrument that will cut to the very heart, of the old system. Ray Stannard Baker on Wilson, 191937 It was he who was always the driver, the initiator, at Paris: he worked longer hours, had more appointments, granted himself less recreation, than any other man, high or low, at the Peace Conference. For he was the central figure there. Everything headed up in him.

140 Documents Practically all of the meetings of the Council of Four were held in his study in the Place des États-Unis. This was the true Capitol of the Peace Conference; here all the important questions were decided. Everyone who came to Paris upon any mission whatsoever, aimed first of all at seeing the President. Representatives of the little, down-trodden nationalities of the earth—from eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa—thought if they could only get at the President, explain their pathetic ambitions, confess their troubles to him, all would be well. I remember vividly one such delegation which symbolized the instinctive trust of the smaller nations in America, and their hope in Wilson’s leadership. I came into the office one morning and found two as extraordinary figures as ever came to Paris. They were Polish peasants clad in their own home-spun natural wool, red-embroidered, with Cossack caps of shaggy black fur…one of them had heard in his mountain home that the American President who was at Paris had said that people should be free, should have a right to determine how and by whom they were to be governed. He wanted to be in Poland, not in Czecho-Slovakia, and so he had set out to walk to Paris to tell the President so. …I think that no one who was in Paris will ever forget the way in which the people of the little oppressed nations of the world turned to America for leadership or staked their passionate hope upon the principles of justice laid down by President Wilson. And it now appears that there are those in America who would shake off every claim to such leadership because it involves new duties and responsibilities! Well, the President saw and heard scores of such foreign delegations; he received patiently the representatives of many organizations of working men, business men, journalists, women; he saw groups of Jews, Irish, Armenians, Poles, and I don’t know how many others; he laboured day after day with the disputatious experts of all the delegations; he attended innumerable committee meetings. Robert Lansing on Wilson, 192138 Whatever the cause of the President’s attitude toward the opinions which I expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were at variance—and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension of my reasons for giving them—the result was that he was disposed to give them little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated by opposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did not like to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, of course, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President’s feelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meeting criticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly be interpreted in any other way. There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that, after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached a decision,

Documents  141 his judgment was right or at least better than that of any adviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturally have caused him to feel impatient with anyone who attempted to controvert his decisions and would tend to make him believe that improper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative, which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament of Mr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personality would hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many who believed it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of my intimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference I feel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rare occasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, while he seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States in December, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justify the presumption of selfassurance which it would be necessary to adopt if the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the better explanation. Walter Lippmann on Wilson, 191939 There is one chance, and a somewhat slim one, that the purposes which Wilson has voiced can, if honestly applied, open an orderly road to revival and freedom. I call it a slim chance, because moral fervor can easily lose itself in a world where needs are stark and scruples few. Many who have supported Mr. Wilson and still support him in all loyalty, know that his ideas have never had the precision and downrightness which characterizes both the Reaction and the Revolution. Those who have said “We demand this territory” have known just exactly what they wanted, as have those who say “We demand the complete overthrow of existing governments.” But the Wilson movement is an effort to temper the policies of existing governments in order to justify their existence. That is an immensely difficult thing to do, requiring the most persistent education, and the shrewdest use of opportunities…I think especially of the discomforting remark made to me by the diplomatic agent of one of the smaller nations shortly before the President arrived in Paris: “If he knows exactly what he wants, he can get it. Does he know? He has an ideal; but has he a program?” This much is certain. From the day of America’s entrance into the war to the day of the armistice, the chance to lead Europe to a liberal reconstruction was completely in the hands of the President. With the end of the war, as my Italian friend remarked, this chance diminished, and the winter in Paris has been spent wrangling over points that could have been settled with marvelous ease at any time during the course of the war. But only those who feed on prejudice, and those who wish to see failure at Paris, can do anything now but pray anxiously that they will still be settled, and that the peace which emerges from the secrecy of Paris will represent the faith that has been proclaimed to all the world.

142 Documents John Maynard Keynes on Wilson, 191940 When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequaled in history. His bold and measured words carried to the peoples of Europe above and beyond the voices of their own politicians. The enemy peoples trusted him to carry out the compact he had made with them; and the Allied peoples acknowledged him not as a victor only but almost as a prophet. In addition to this moral influence the realities of power were in his hands. The American armies were at the height of their numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was in complete dependence on the food supplies of the United States; and financially she was even more absolutely at their mercy. …The disillusion was so complete that some of those who had trusted most hardly dared speak of it. Could it be true? they asked of those who returned from Paris. Was the Treaty really as bad as it seemed? What had happened to the President? What weakness or what misfortune had led to so extraordinary, so unlooked-for a betrayal? Yet the causes were very ordinary and human. The President was not a hero or a prophet; he was not even a philosopher; but a generously intentioned man, with many of the weaknesses of other human beings, and lacking that dominating intellectual equipment which would have been necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders whom a tremendous clash of forces and personalities had brought to the top as triumphant masters in the swift game of give and take, face to face in council—a game of which he had no experience at all. …The Old World was tough in wickedness anyhow; the Old World’s heart of stone might blunt the sharpest blade of the bravest knight errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a cavern where the swift and glittering blade was in the hands of the adversary. Armistice Day Celebration, 11 November 192341 Three times former President Wilson broke down with emotion as he addressed the third Armistice Day pilgrimage that greeted him this afternoon at his S Street home. But, visibly suffering physical pain and bent with four years of illness, the great war President showed that his spirit was unbowed when, at the close of a two minutes’ speech, he declared he “was not one of those who have the least anxiety about the triumph of the principles” he had stood for. “I have seen fools resist Providence before,” he said, “and I have seen their destruction, as will come upon these again—utter destruction and contempt. That we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns.” The gathering, the largest since his friends and admirers started the annual visits to the war President, was greatly touched as the few faltering words fell from the lips of the ex-President. Fully 20,000 persons, many of them devout League of Nations adherents, sought the Wilson home, and at least 5,000, including disabled war veterans, stood before its portals…

Documents  143 Notes 1 “Democracy,” 5 Dec 1891, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 7, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 346–348. 2 “What Ought We to Do?” 1 August 1898, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 10, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 574–576. 3 “After-Dinner Remarks in New York to the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick,” 12 February 1909, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 19, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 107. 4 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 3, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 64–69. 5 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 3, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 99–102. 6 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 3, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 151–156. 7 “House Diaries,” 30 August 1914, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 30, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 461–464. 8 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 3, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 318–322. 9 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 4, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 122–124. 10 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 4, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 153–159. 11 “A Non-Partisan Address in Cincinnati,” 26 October 1916, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 38, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 538–540. 12 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, Vol. 4, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970), 407–414. 13 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 6–16. 14 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 60–67. 15 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 155–162. 16 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 177–184. 17 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 191. 18 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 192.

144 Documents 19 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 198–202. 20 “Wilson to Polk,” 16 July 1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 48, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 640–643. 21 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 253–261. 22 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 281–282. 23 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 283–285. 24 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 294–302. 25 “Remarks at a Stag Dinner,” 28 December 1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 64, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 490–492. 26 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 228–261 27 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 460–463. 28 “Hankey’s and Mantoux’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four,” 21 April 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 57, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 548–549. 29 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 474–475. 30 “The Peace with Austria & Hungary,” 1 May 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 58, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 283–285. 31 “Mantoux’s Notes at a Meeting of the Council of Four,” 6 June 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 60, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 214–216. 32 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 537–552. 33 “Wilson to Lansing,” 8 August 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (PWW), Vol. 62, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 187–189. 34 “Lansing Memo,” 20 August 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 62, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 428–429. 35 Woodrow Wilson, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, Vol. 5, eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd (New York: Harper & Brothers/ Kraus Reprint, 1970), 574–580. 36 “Luncheon Address to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce,” 5 September 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 61, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 434. 37 Ray Stannard Baker, What Wilson did at Paris, 1919 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1920), 6–8.

Documents  145 38 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 11–12. 39 Walter Lippmann, The Political Scene: An Essay on the Victory of 1918 (New York: Henry Holt, 1919), introduction, xi–xii 40 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: MacMillan, 1919), 35–38. 41 “News Report,” 11 November 1923, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 68, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 467–470.

Glossary

100% Americanism  U.S. campaign during World War I to pressure citizens, especially those from immigrant backgrounds, to place their sole loyalty to the United States. ABC countries  Term used to reference the Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which worked with the United States on PanAmerican programs. American Board Mission  Reformed Protestant international mission organization that influenced the U.S. decision not to declare war on Bulgaria. American Commission to Negotiate Peace  The official name of the U.S. delegation at the Versailles conference in Paris. American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR)  Organization formed by Americans such as Henry Morgenthau and Cleveland Dodge during World War I to provide humanitarian aid to Armenians and other minority populations persecuted in the Ottoman Empire. Arabic Pledge  Pledge made by the German government to the United States after the sinking of the SS Arabic in 1915 that agreed to allow deboarding before sinking civilian vessels. Armistice Day  On 11 November 1918, Germany agreed to the Entente terms of surrender, ending the combat stage of World War I. Article X  The tenth article of the League of Nations Charter and Treaty of Versailles, which stated that all members had to “preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.” It became the main point of contention during the Senate treaty fight. Associated power  The concept that the United States was a different Allied power, pursuing an independent diplomacy and limited military integration with the rest of the Entente. Atlanticists  Americans, such as Theodore Roosevelt, that promoted a more aggressive U.S. foreign policy in support of the Entente prior to U.S. entry into the war. They criticized Wilson’s approach to neutrality. British blockade  Naval blockade orchestrated by the British to prevent German access to Atlantic trade networks. It became a point of controversy

148 Glossary for the United States by restricting U.S. trade access to the Central Powers during its period of neutrality while seizing claimed contraband from U.S. merchants. Central Powers  Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria fighting against the Entente during World War I. China Consortium  A multinational financial organization to coordinate international lending to the Chinese government. Wilson initially rejected U.S. involvement, but later joined in 1918. Colonialism/Imperialism  Term for the system of overseas colonies held by the European powers, the United States and Japan by World War I. Most of the world outside of the Americas and Europe were under colonial control. Collective security  A central concept of Wilsonianism. Its premise was for the collective body of the League of Nations to team up against aggressor states. The hope was that the potential consequences of collective action would deter bad behavior and facilitate peace. Committee of Public Information (CPI)  The U.S. government propaganda organization formed during World War I, led by George Creel. During World War I and the Peace Conference, it organized widespread public diplomacy promoting Wilson’s vision for the world. Congress of Oppressed Nationalities  Meeting held in Rome in April 1918 by representatives of national minorities in Austria-Hungary to establish a common goal for the breakup of that empire in the name of national self-determination. Congress of the United States of America  The legislative branch of the United States federal government, served by elected officials in the two parts of the Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Constitutionalists  Political organization in the Mexican Revolution led by Venustiano Carranza that overthrew the dictatorship of Victoriano Huerta in 1914 and established control over the Mexican government, with the goal of forming a constitutional republic. Cooling-off agreements  Concept promoted by Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan for agreements between countries to refrain from rash, aggressive actions when conflicts arise, with the hope that this approach would facilitate peace mediation instead of war. Council of Ten/Council of Four  The central decision-making body at the Versailles conference, it initially began as a body of ten countries, attended by both the heads of government and foreign ministers. By the end of the conference, it had reduced to the Council of Four, including only the heads of government of France, Britain, the United States, and Italy. Covenant of the League of Nations  The founding document outlining the core structure, purpose, and function of the League. Developed by Woodrow Wilson and close allies at Paris, it served as the first 26 articles of the Treaty of Versailles.

Glossary  149 Czechoslovak Legions  The military force of the Czechoslovak National Council. A large portion of their forces became trapped in the Soviet Union after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and gained widespread public interest as they fought their way across Russia along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and later supported the Entente intervention there. Supporting the legions became Wilson’s main justification for joining the military intervention in Russia. Czechoslovak National Council  The exile organization led by Tomáš Masaryk that used the war to break from Austria-Hungary and form the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Danzig/Gdansk Question  A port city on the Baltic coast at the time part of Germany but claimed by Poland to have access to a major port, despite its majority German population. A point of significant debate at Versailles, Wilson supported the creation of a “free city,” with open access to the port by both Poland and Germany. The treaty implemented Wilson’s plan. Democratic Party  One of the two major political parties in the United States and the political affiliation of Woodrow Wilson. Dollar Diplomacy  Foreign policy program coined by the administration of William Howard Taft focused on expanding U.S. economic influence overseas. Wilson criticized this program in the abstract, although he largely maintained its practices, supporting expanded international trade and finances for U.S. companies. Entente Powers  Alliance including France, Britain, Russia, the United States, Italy, and several other countries that opposed the Central Powers during World War I. Fiume/Rijeka Question  A port city on the Adriatic coast, part of AustriaHungary until the end of the war, but claimed by both Yugoslavia, to have access to a major port, and Italy, due to its Italian majority population. A point of significant debate at Versailles, Wilson supported the creation of a “free city,” with open access to the port by both Yugoslavia and Italy. While the Allies officially agreed to this plan, Italy occupied the city in 1920. Food relief  Program led by Herbert Hoover to bring food aide to populations in war-torn areas. It started with Commission for Relief in Belgium but expanded by the war’s end to cover most of Europe as the American Relief Administration. It fed millions of people utilizing both U.S. government funds and private donations. Fourteen Points  Woodrow Wilson’s plan to reform the international order, released in a speech on 8 January 1918. It included eight specific territorial or political issues Wilson felt were at the root of the war, plus six core principles he felt were needed to maintain peace, such as the creation of a League of Nations. Freedom of the seas  Concept embraced by Wilson for countries to have unfettered access to international waterways guided by international law.

150 Glossary House-Gray Memorandum  Plan conceptualized by Wilson adviser Edward House and British Foreign Secretary Edward Gray on 22 February 1916. It established that, upon Allied prompting, the United States would call for a peace conference. If accepted, Washington would mediate peace terms favorable to the Entente. If Germany refused, the United States would declare war on Germany. It was never implemented. Inquiry  A collection of scholars, public intellectuals, and regional experts commissioned by Edward House to provide President Wilson knowledge about issues around the globe. Intervention in Russia  The limited military engagement by the Entente into Russia in 1918. Premised on protecting key military assets from German capture, the intervention lasted until 1920, providing military supplies to the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War. The United States participated, sending troops to the arctic ports of Archangel and Murmansk and Vladivostok on the Pacific Interventions in Latin America  Under Wilson, the United States pursued regular military engagements into Latin American countries, such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in the name of bringing political and economic stability. Irreconcilables  A group of senators, a mix of Democrats and Republicans, who refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles even with modifications. Led by William Borah, they were guided by a mix of pacificism and belief in the traditional U.S. philosophy to stay uninvolved in European power politics. Jones Acts of 1916 & 1917  Two laws of the same name that granted more local control to the Philippines and Puerto Rico respectively. The laws intended to shift the two countries toward greater autonomy from direct U.S. colonial control. King-Crane Commission  A fact-finding commission sent by Wilson to the Middle East led by Henry Churchill King and Charles Crane in April 1919. The commission validated appeals to break up the Ottoman Empire, but it warned that there was a high risk of violence breaking out in the region. Lansing-Ishii Agreement  A U.S.-Japanese agreement negotiated by Japanese Ambassador Ishii Kikujirō and U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing. In addition to an agreement to cooperate in World War I, Washington recognized a Japanese special interest in East Asia in return for Tokyo’s acknowledgement of the open-door policy and an independent China. League Commission  The council of delegates chaired by Woodrow Wilson that developed the League of Nations Charter during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. League of Nations  The Fourteenth of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Wilson’s biggest priority during the Paris Peace Conference. Established in the Treaty of Versailles, it was an international body that lasted until

Glossary  151 World War II. With the countries of the world sending representatives to serve in the organization, its intent was to bind member nations to common, peaceful practices, such as conflict mediation, and to offer collective security against aggressor nations. Liberal internationalism  A philosophy of international relations originating in the 19th century premised on organizing the international system based on liberal democratic values and international law, in contrast to traditional power politics. The guiding philosophy of Woodrow Wilson, the term is often used interchangeably with the term Wilsonianism. Lodge reservations  A list of fourteen reservations forwarded by U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as conditions for ratification of the Versailles Treaty during the treaty fight. They made U.S. participation in League of Nations actions voluntary and only with approval by the U.S. Congress. Wilson refused to accept these conditions as terms for ratification. Lusitania  A British passenger ship sunk by a German submarine on 7 May 1915 off the coast of Ireland. It was carrying munitions, but also passengers. The death of 128 Americans on board provoked a shift in United States public opinion against Germany. Mandates  Term used to describe the new status of former German and Ottoman colonies in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific. Officially under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, these countries were managed by the Entente powers, functionally remaining as colonies. Mexican Revolution  Political conflict over control of the Mexican government from 1910 to 1920. It began with the overthrow of the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz and ended with the consolidation of power of the Constitutionalists and the seizure of power by General Álvaro Obregón. It established the modern-day Constitution of Mexico in 1917, the first constitution in the world to outline social rights along with political ones. Midterm elections of 1918  U.S. Congressional elections held in November 1918. Despite not being up for election, Wilson decided to make the midterms a referendum on his leadership, believing he needed a Democratic Senate to succeed in his peace goals. Instead, the Republicans captured both houses of Congress, including a commanding lead in the Senate. Minority protections in East Central Europe  The Treaty of Versailles mandated minority protections in the countries of East Central Europe, guaranteeing cultural rights and fair treatment, with specific protections included for Jews. The delegations from the region opposed this move as infringing on their sovereignty. Placed under League of Nations oversight, the requirements were never enforced. Monroe Doctrine  American foreign policy idea conceptualized in 1823 and still considered a central tenant by World War I. It proclaimed U.S. leadership of the broader Americas and vowed to prevent new European colonization in the Western hemisphere. Leaders from other American counties often perceived it as an excuse for U.S. hegemony.

152 Glossary Nationalism/national-self-determination  Political philosophy originating in the 19th century that argued for governments explicitly linked to national culture, as defined by common language, historical traditions, and religion. A popular concept by World War I, it shaped the political organization of East Central Europe in the name of creating nation states in place of the pre-war multinational empires. It was popularly perceived as a key component of Wilsonianism, despite not being a priority of Wilson himself. Neutrality  Wilson’s original policy for the United States to remain independent from the warring countries during World War I. Based on the traditional U.S. detachment from European power politics, it is often mislabeled as “isolationism.” Wilson still maintained an active foreign policy, trading with the warring powers and attempting to mediate a peace agreement. U.S. neutrality ended with its entry into the war in 1917. Niagara Falls Conference  Effort by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to negotiate an end of the U.S. occupation of Veracruz and prevent an expanded war between the U.S. and Mexico. Held at Niagara Falls, Canada from May-June 1914. Open-door economic policy  A U.S. foreign policy tradition of promoting liberal economic systems internationally, such as greater economic integration and freer trade. The term was defined by the “open door notes” of 1899 and 1900, where the U.S. made deals to keep China an open door economically for the United States and prevent its complete colonization. Pacifism  A general philosophy in international affairs to eschew from warfare and implement peaceful mechanisms to prevent its future outbreak. A popular movement among some U.S. progressives in the era of World War I. Pan-Americanism/Pan-American Treaty  A concept of fostering greater integration politically and economically among the countries of the Americas through inter-American organizations. Wilson proposed a Pan-American Treaty on 6 January 1916 to create a collective security arrangement to guarantee political independence, territorial integrity, and republican government among American countries. Disagreements between the U.S. and the ABC countries prevented its implementation. Pan-African Congress  A meeting in Paris in 1919 of Black leaders from Africa, the Americas, and Europe to foster cooperation in the goals of decolonization and civil rights. This meeting served as the first of eight subsequent meetings through the 20th century to the present. Paris Peace Conference at Versailles (1919)  International meeting held in Paris, France to set the final terms for the end of World War I. It started in January 1919, with the Treaty of Versailles completed in June of that year, ending the war with Germany. Subsequent negotiations established treaties for the other Central Powers, concluding with the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey in 1923.

Glossary  153 Peace without victory  Concept declared as U.S. policy by Wilson in a speech on 22 January 1917. It appealed for no side winning the war and for a community of power rather than a balance of power. Wilson felt his message would illustrate his true neutrality, but both sides in the conflict instead took umbrage at the idea. Polish National Committee  The exile organization led by Roman Dmowski that used the war to build support from the Entente for the re-creation of a Polish Republic in 1918, reversing the partition of Poland between Austria, Russia, and Prussia done in the 18th century. Preparedness  Foreign policy concept promoted by Theodore Roosevelt and others during the period of U.S. neutrality that argued the U.S. should be better prepared against possible foreign aggression, notably by expanding its military. Presidential election of 1912  Woodrow Wilson won his first term as president of the United States after the Republican field is divided between sitting President William Howard Taft and former President Theodore Roosevelt, who ran a as third party. Presidential election of 1916  Woodrow Wilson won his second term as president of the United States against Republican nominee Charles Evans Hughes. Wilson runs on a platform of “he kept us out of war.” President of the United States of America  Chief executive of the United States federal government and Commander in Chief of the U.S. military, elected by U.S. voters every four years. Presbyterian Church  Protestant Church of the Reformed, Calvinist tradition founded in Scotland by John Knox in the 16th century and brought to the United States by Scottish immigrants. It was the denomination of Woodrow Wilson, whose father was a Presbyterian minister. Princeton University  American university in Princeton, New Jersey, founded in 1746. Wilson, an alumnus and professor of government there, became its thirteenth president from 1902 to 1910. Progressive era/movement  A political and social movement in the early 20th century United States that included calls for a more powerful, active federal government engaged in social and economic affairs as well as political. Wilson was a leading proponent of this direction, such as his appeals for a stronger U.S. presidency. Punitive Expedition  Military expedition by the United States into northern Mexico in 1916 with the goal of capturing Pancho Villa. Led by General John. J. Pershing, it clashed with Villa’s forces as well as Constitutionalist armies. It departed from Mexico in February 1917, following the U.S. breaking of relations with Germany, having failed in its principal goal. Racial equality amendment  Text proposed by the Japanese delegation for the League of Nations Charter that would make racial equality a stated goal of that organization. Wilson prevented its inclusion in the final version of the charter.

154 Glossary Ratification by U.S. Senate  All treaties signed by the United States must be ratified by two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate to take effect. A failure to reach this threshold caused the Treaty of Versailles to fail ratification for the United States, despite Wilson’s signature on the document. Reparations  Yearly payments required by Germany to the victorious Entente powers to compensate for their losses during World War I. It totaled 132 billion gold marks, as outlined by the Treaty of Versailles. Republican Party  One of the two major political parties in the United States and the political opposition to Woodrow Wilson. Reservationists  Term for Republicans in the U.S. Senate open to ratifying the Treaty of Versailles with reservations against certain terms. The mild reservationists wanted minor guarantees of American ability to refuse League actions that might harm the United States, particularly Article X. Strong reservationists had the same concerns but wanted stronger terms against U.S. participation in League activities. Return to normalcy  The stated program of Warren G. Harding’s presidential election in 1920, premised on returning to a traditional approach to government, reversing the Wilsonian program. Rhineland/Saarland  Regions on the western end of Germany, along the Rhine and Saar rivers, occupied by the Entente militaries after the armistice. The duration of the occupation became a source of controversy at the Versailles conference. Round Robin Petition  Document released by Henry Cabot Lodge on 3 March 1919 criticizing Wilson’s decisions at the Paris Peace Conference and declaring that the Senate would not accept the current version of the League of Nations Covenant. It pressured Wilson to request changes to the Covenant, such as adding a statement of protection for the Monroe Doctrine. Russian Revolution  The political uprising starting in March 1917 that removed the Tsar from power in Russia, replaced by a democratic Provisional Government. It was followed by the Bolshevik Revolution in November of that year, overthrowing the Provisional Government, and establishing the Communist Soviet Union. It resulted in the withdrawal of Russia from World War I. Security Alliance, U.S.-France-Britain  A military alliance established during the Versailles conference, in which Britain and the United States agreed to support France against future German aggression in exchange for French agreement to a more limited occupation of the Rhineland and Saarland. Left unratified by the U.S. Senate, it never took effect. Senate Foreign Relations Committee  The Senatorial Committee dealing with U.S. Foreign relations, it determines which issues reach the floor of the full Senate for consideration. Headed by Henry Cabot Lodge during the treaty fight, it hosted testimonies from figures involved with the Treaty of Versailles, including President Wilson.

Glossary  155 Shandong province  Region in Northeastern China held as a German concession, with functional German economic control, prior to World War I. Captured by Japan during the war, it became a source of significant controversy at Versailles as Japan wanted to maintain it as a concession, while China wanted it returned to Chinese authority. Wilson received significant criticism for consenting to temporary Japanese control of the province in return for Japan joining the League of Nations. Supreme War Council  Established in the late stages of the World War II, headed by French General Ferdinand Foch, it became the top oversight body of joint Entente military operations. Sussex Pledge  Pledge made by the German government to the United States after the sinking of the SS Sussex in 1916, that reaffirmed the Arabic pledge and committed not to target civilian passenger vessels, with the caveat that Germany had the right to restart submarine attacks if the blockade remained in effect. Tampico Crisis  Event sparked when Mexican officials arrested U.S. sailors in the port city of Tampico on 19 April 1914 while there were on a routine resupply. While the Mexican government released them quickly, Mexican leader Huerta refused Wilson’s demand for a formal, ceremonial apology, leading Wilson to order the capture of the port city of Veracruz. Treaty fight  Term used to describe the debate between Wilson and his opposition, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in the U.S. Senate. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk  Completed on 3 March 1918, this treaty ended the war on Eastern Front between Germany and Russia, while ceding the western regions of the former Russian Empire, such as the Baltics, to German control. Treaty of London (1915)  Treaty between the Entente powers and Italy that consented to extensive territorial concessions to Italy, mostly from Austria-Hungary, in return for Italy joining the war in support of the Entente. Twenty-One Demands (1915)  Agreement made between Japan and China during World War I that granted Japan widespread economic concessions in China, including Japanese control of Shandong, in return for Japan’s defeat of German forces in Shandong. It caused extensive popular animosity against Japan in China. U-boats  German word for submarines. They became a point of controversy during World War I because of the sinking of civilian vessels. Unrestricted submarine warfare  Policy announced by Germany in January 1917 that its navy would sink any ships aiding the Entente war effort in a zone surrounding Western Europe, including neutral ships. Berlin implemented this approach as a part of a broader offensive push to break the deadlock on the Western Front.

156 Glossary War guilt clause  Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, it required Germany to accept blame for the war to justify its punishments. It became a source of anger in Germany as a symbol of perceived unfair treatment in the treaty. Wilsonianism  Term used to describe the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson. Based on Wilson’s ideas for promoting a world order based on liberal democratic principles, many scholars now consider it a core tradition in U.S. foreign policy. Western tour  During the treaty fight, Wilson embarked on a tour to build popular support to pressure the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Started on 3 September 1919, Wilson covered 8,000 miles in 22 days until he had to end the tour early due to ill-health. It culminated in a significant stroke that left Wilson partially paralyzed. Yugoslav movement  Campaign during World War I to unify the South Slav populations of the Balkan Peninsula. Formalized with the Corfu Declaration of 20 July 1917, it achieved the creation of the new state of Yugoslavia after World War I, made from several territories previously part of the independent Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and territories previously controlled by Austria-Hungary such as Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zimmerman telegram  A diplomatic note sent by German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to the government of Mexico suggesting an alliance against the United States, while promising a return of territories lost by Mexico in the 1845 U.S.-Mexican War. Its discovery and release to the United States by British intelligence contributed to the U.S. decision to declare war on Germany.

Guide to Further Reading

Biography, background, and general surveys For general biographies on Woodrow Wilson that cover his foreign policy in the context of his broader life and presidency, see: Berg, A. Scott. Wilson. London: Simon & Schuster, 2014. Clements, Kendrick A. The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Clements, Kendrick. Woodrow Wilson, World Stateman. Boston: Twayne, 1987. Cooper, John Milton Jr. “A Scholar and His Ghosts: Woodrow Wilson as Historian in the White House.” In Historian in Chief: How Presidents Interpret the Past to Shape the Future, eds. Seth Cotlar & Richard J. Ellis, 142–160. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2019. Cooper, John Milton, and Thomas J. Knock, eds. Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson: The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010. Cooper, John Milton Jr. The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983. Cooper, John Milton Jr. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York: Vintage Books, 2011. Kennedy, Ross A., ed. A Companion to Woodrow Wilson. New York: Wiley & Sons, 2013. Link, Arthur Stanley, The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link. Eds. John Milton Cooper Jr. & Charles E. Neu. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1991. Link, Arthur Stanley. Wilson. 5 Vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947–1965. Nordholt, J. W. Schulte. Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. O’Toole, Patricia. The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc, 2019. Thompson, John A. Woodrow Wilson. London: Routledge, 2013. For scholarship on Wilson’s foreign policy in general, see: Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Blum, John Morton. Woodrow Wilson and the politics of morality. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956. Brands, H. W. “Woodrow Wilson and the Irony of Fate.” Diplomatic History, 28, no. 4 (2004): 503–512.

158  Guide to Further Reading Buehrig, Edward H. Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1955. Calhoun, Frederick S. Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986. Cooper, John Milton Jr., ed. Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008. Gelfand, Lawrence E. “When Ideals Confront Self-Interest: Wilsonian Foreign Policy.” Diplomatic History, 18, no. 1 (1994): 125–134. Knock, Thomas J. To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019. Latham, Earl. The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Link, Arthur Stanley, ed. Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913–1921. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Ninkovich, Frank A. Global Dawn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. New York: Russel Publishing, 1965. Saunders, Robert. In Search of Woodrow Wilson: Beliefs and Behavior. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Thorsen, Niels Aage. The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875–1910. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Throntveit, Trygve. Power Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018. Winter, J. M. Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.

For works addressing Wilson’s foreign policy ideas and experience before his presidency, see: Axtell, James. The Educational Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: From College to Nation. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2012. Bragdon, Henry Wilkinson. Woodrow Wilson: the Academic Years. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1967. Maynard, W. Barksdale. Woodrow Wilson: Princeton to the Presidency. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Mulder, John M. Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

For scholarship addressing Wilson’s religious faith and its influence on his foreign policy, see: Babik, Milan. “George D. Herron and the Eschatological Foundations of Woodrow Wilson’s Foreign Policy, 1917–1919.” Diplomatic History, 35, no. 5 (2011): 837–857. Babik, Milan. Statecraft and Salvation: Wilsonian Liberal Internationalism as Secularized Eschatology. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013. Burnidge, Cara Lea. A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017. Magee, Malcom D. What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008.

Guide to Further Reading  159 Magee, Malcom D. “Woodrow Wilson, Wilsonianism, and the Idealism of Faith.” Review of Faith & International Affairs, 9, no. 4 (2011): 29–38.

For works considering Wilson’s international economic policies, see: Dodsworth, Ashley. “‘Freedom of the Seas’: Woodrow Wilson and Natural Resources.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, no. 4 (December 2018): 408–421. McKillen, Elizabeth. Making the World Safe for Workers: Labor, the Left, and Wilsonian Internationalism. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013. Rosenberg, Emily S. Financial Missionaries to the World. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.

For studies of Wilson’s foreign policy cabinet and advisers, see: Craig, Douglas B. Progressives at War: William G. McAdoo and Newton D. Baker, 1863–1941. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. George, Alexander L. and Juliette L. George Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York: Dover Publication, 1982. Hodgson, Godfrey. Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Kazin, Michael. A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2006. Neu, Charles E. Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Neu, Charles E. The Wilson Circle: President Woodrow Wilson and His Advisers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022.

For published collections of primary sources about Wilson and Wilsonianism, see: DiNunzio, Mario R., ed. Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President. New York: New York University Press, 2006. Link, Arthur Stanley, ed. The papers of Woodrow Wilson. 69 Vols. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–1994. Pestritto, Ronald J., ed. Woodrow Wilson: the Essential Political Writings. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. Scott, James Brown, ed. President Wilson’s Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers. Charleston, SC: BiblioLife, 2009. Wilson, Woodrow. The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 6 Vols. Eds. Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd. New York: Harper & Brothers/Kraus Reprint, 1970.

Wilson’s foreign policy before the war, World War I neutrality, and the U.S. shift to war For scholarship on Wilson’s policy toward Latin America broadly, see: Calder, Bruce J. The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1984.

160  Guide to Further Reading Gilderhus, Mark T. Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913–1921. Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1986. Gilderhus, Mark T. The Second Century: U.S.–Latin American Relations Since 1889. Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. Schoultz, Lars. In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin Americans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020. Wright, Micah. “Unilateral Pan–Americanism: Wilsonianism and the American Occupation of Chiriquí, 1918–1920.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26 no. 1 (2015): 46–64.

For scholarship on Wilson’s policy toward Mexico, see: Benbow, Mark. Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1915. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2010. Clements, K. A. “Woodrow Wilson’s Mexican Policy 1913–1915.” Diplomatic History, 4, no. 2 (1980): 113–36. Frank, Lucas N. “Playing with Fire: Woodrow Wilson, Self-Determination, Democracy, and Revolution in Mexico.” The Historian, 76, no. 1 (2014): 71–96. Hall, Linda, and Don Coerver. “Woodrow Wilson, Public Opinion, and the Punitive Expedition.” New Mexico Historical Review, 72, no. 2 (April 1997): 171–194. Henderson, Peter. “Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta, and the Recognition Issue in Mexico,” Americas, 41, no. 2 (October 1984): 151–176. Kahle, Louis G. “Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 38, no. 3 (1958): 353–372. Katz, Fredrich. The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Quirk, Robert E. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the occupation of Veracruz. New York: Norton, 1967. Schmitt, Karl M. Mexico and the United States, 1821–1973: Conflict and Coexistence. New York, Wiley & Sons, 1974. Tucker, Robert W. “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy’” World Policy Journal, 21 no. 2 (2004): 92–107.

For more works on Wilson’s policy of neutrality at the start of World War I, see: Devlin, Patrick. Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Floyd, Ryan M. Abandoning American Neutrality: Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War, August 1914–December 1915. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Fulwider, Chad R. German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 2016. Herring, Jr., George C. “James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy.” Journal of Southern History, 30, no. 4 (Nov 1964): 383–404. Kazin, Michael. War Against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2018.

Guide to Further Reading  161 Larsen, Daniel. Plotting for Peace American Peacemakers, British Codebreakers, and Britain at War, 1914–1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. May, Ernest R. The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1967. Smith, Daniel Malloy. Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914–1917. Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1980. Tucker, Robert W. Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007. Zelikow, Philip. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916–1917. New York: PublicAffairs, Hatchette Book Group, 2021.

For scholarship on Wilson’s decision to enter World War I, see: Boghardt, Thomas. The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry Into World War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012. Carlisle, Rodney. Sovereignty at Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into World War I. Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press, 2011. Cooper, John Milton Jr. “The Shock of Recognition: The Impact of World War I on America.” Virginia Quarterly Review, 16, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 567–584. Cox, Ashley. “A Man for All Seasons: Woodrow Wilson, Transatlantic Relations and the War Against Militarism.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, no. 4 (December 2018): 389–407. Doenecke, Justus D. Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2011. Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1971. Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for War, 1914–1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Horčička, Václav. “Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the United States’ Entrance into the First World War.” The International History Review, 34, no. 2 (2012): 245–269. Neiberg, Michael S. “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road to the Great War, 1914–1917.” Diplomatic History, 38 no. 4 (2014): 801–812. Neiberg, Michael S. The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Tan, Tienkai Lincoln. The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson Concerning the World War, 1914–1917. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1928.

For studies of American humanitarian efforts during World War I, see: Druelle-Korn, Clotilde. Feeding Occupied France during World War I: Herbert Hoover and the Blockade. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Irwin, Julia. Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Irwin, Julia. “Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 763–775.

162  Guide to Further Reading Miller, Jeffrey B. Yanks Behind the Lines: How the Commission for Relief in Belgium Saved Millions from Starvation during World War I. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020. Nash, George H. The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies, 1917–1918. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996. Nash, George H. The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914–1917. New York: W. W. Norton, 1988.

Wilson’s wartime policy For scholarship on Wilson’s goals and applied foreign policy during the war, see: Dawley, Alan. Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Doenecke, Justus D. “American Diplomacy, Politics, Military Strategy, and OpinionMaking, 1914–18: Recent Research and Fresh Assignments.” Historian, 80, no. 3 (Fall 2018): 509–532. Esposito, David M. The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. Fleming, Thomas J. The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Hannigan, Robert E. The Great War and American Foreign Policy, 1914–24. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. Herman, Arthur. 1917: Lenin, Wilson, and the Birth of the New World Disorder. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2017. Kennedy, Ross. The Will to Believe Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security. Ann Arbor, MI: Kent State University Press, 2014. Levin, Norman Gordon. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Link, Arthur Stanley, ed. The Impact of World War I. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Preston, Andrew. “To Make the World Saved: American Religion and the Great War.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 813–825. Striner, Richard. Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden Too Great to Bear. Lanham, NC: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. Tooze, J. Adam. The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931. New York: Penguin Books, 2015. Walworth, Arthur. America’s Moment: 1918, American Diplomacy at the End of World War I New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. Wolper, Gregg. “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain.” Diplomatic History, 17, no. 1 (1993): 17–34. Zeiler, Thomas W., David Ekblad, & Benjamin C. Montoya, eds. Beyond 1917: The United States and the Global Legacies of the Great War. New York: Oxford University Press. 2017. Zieger, Robert. America’s Great War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Guide to Further Reading  163 For studies of the U.S. military involvement in World War I, see: Adas, Michael. “Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 700–712. Coffman, Edward M. The War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1998. Grotelueschen, Mark E. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Still, William N. Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007.

For studies on Wilson and exile independence movements from Central and Eastern Europe, see: Biskupski, M.B. “The Diplomacy of Wartime Relief: The United States and Poland, 1914–1918.” Diplomatic History, 19, no. 3 (1995): 431–51. Chernev, Borislav. “The Brest-Litovsk Moment: Self-Determination Discourse in Eastern Europe before Wilsonianism.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22, no. 3 (September 2011): 369–387. Mamatey, Victor S. United States and East Central Europe, 1914–1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda. Princeton: Princeton University, 1957. Phelps, Nicole M. U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Salisbury, Christopher G. “For Your Freedom and Ours: The Polish Question in Wilson’s Peace Initiatives, 1916–1917.” Australian Journal of Politics & History, 49, no. 4 (2003): 481–500. Unterberger, Betty Miller. “President Wilson, Professor Masaryk, and the Birth of Czechoslovakia.” Kosmas, 17, no. 2 (2006): 1–19. Winter, J. M. America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

For studies on Wilson’s wartime approach toward immigration, ethnic groups, and domestic politics, see: Capozzola, Christopher. Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Ellis, Mark. Race, War, and Surveillance: African Americans and the United States Government during World War I. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Kennedy, David M. Over here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. O’Grady, Joseph P., ed. The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s Peace Policies. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 1967. Parsons, Edward E. “Some International Implications of the 1918 Roosevelt Lodge Campaign Against Wilson and a Democratic Congress.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 19, no.1 (1989): 141–157.

164  Guide to Further Reading Startt, James D. Woodrow Wilson, the Great War, and the Fourth Estate. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2017. Voight, Hans P. The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot: American Presidents and the Immigrant, 1897–1933. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004. Williams, Chad Louis. Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

Wilson and the Russian Revolution For studies on Wilson’s policy toward Russia and the Russian Revolution, see: Davis, Donald E, and Eugene P. Trani. The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 2002. Foglesong, David S. America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Gardner, Lloyd C. “The Geopolitics of Revolution.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. (2014): 737–750. Manela, Erez. “Wilson and Lenin.” Diplomatic History, 42, no. 4 (2018): 521–524. Richard, Carl J. When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson’s Siberian Disaster. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. Schild, Georg. Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1921. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995. Trani, Eugene P. and Davis Donald E. “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the Cold War: A Hundred Years Later and Still Relevant,” World Affairs, 180, no. 4 (2017): 25–46.

Wilson and the Versailles conference For studies on Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference in general, see: Bailey, Thomas Andrew. Wilson and the peacemakers. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Dockrill M. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989. Gelfand, Lawrence E. The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1976. Greene, Theodore P. Wilson at Versailles. Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957. Heater, Derek. National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Keylor, William R, ed. The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998. Laderman, Charlie. “The Ordeal of Paris: Herbert Hoover, Woodrow Wilson, and the Search for Peace.” In Historian in Chief: How Presidents Interpret the Past to Shape the Future, eds. Seth Cotlar and Richard J. Ellis, 161–183. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2019. Levin, Norman Gordon and Theodore P. Greene. Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972. MacMillan, Margaret O. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random House, 2002.

Guide to Further Reading  165 Nielson, Jonathan M. American Historians in War and Peace: Patriotism, Diplomacy, and the Paris Peace Conference 1919. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co., 1994. Scott, James Brown and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Economics and History. The Paris Peace Conference, History and Documents. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Smith, Leonard V. Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Su, Anna. “Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the International Law of Religious Freedom.” Journal of the History of International Law, 15, no. 2 (2013): 235–267. Throntveit, Trygve. “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination,” Diplomatic History, 35, no. 3 (2011): 445–481. Unterberger, Betty Miller. “The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26, no. 4 (1996): 926–941. Walworth, Arthur. Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. New York: W. W. Norton, 1986.

For scholarship on Wilson and East Asia from before World War I through the Versailles conference, see: Craft, Stephen G. “John Bassett Moore, Robert Lansing, and the Shandong Question.” Pacific Historical Review, 66, no. 4 (May 1997): 231. Curry, Roy Watson. Woodrow Wilson and the Far Eastern Policy, 1913–1921. New York: Octagon Books, 1968. Elleman, Bruce A. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2015. Kawamura, Noriko. Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-U.S. Relations During World War I. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000. Li, Tien-yi. Woodrow Wilson’s China policy, 1913–1917. New York: Octagon Books, 1969.

For scholarship on Wilson’s approach to Europe at Versailles, see: Ádám, Magda. “Woodrow Wilson and the Successor States: An American Plan for a New Central Europe.” In The Versailles System and Central Europe, ed. Magda Ádám. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004. Cude, Michael. “Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during the Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918–1921.” Diplomatic History, 40, no. 1 (2016): 155–180. Fink, Carole. “The Paris Peace Conference and the Question of Minority Rights.” Peace & Change, 21, no. 3 (July 1996): 273. Gerson, Louis L. Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914–1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups on Foreign Origin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953. Lundgreen-Nielsen, Kay. The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918–1919. Alison Burch-Johansen, Trans. Odense, Denmark: Odense. University Press, 1979.

166  Guide to Further Reading Maior, George Cristian. “The United States and Romania in 1918: President Wilson’s Strategic Vision and American Support for the Rebirth of Europe.” Kosmas New Series, 2, no. 1 (2019): 40–47. Mamatey, Victor S. “The United States and Bulgaria in World War I.” American Slavic and East European Review, 12, no. 2 (1953): 233–257. Micgiel, John S. Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives. New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1995. Petkov, Petko M. The United States and Bulgaria in World War I. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991. Roshwald, Aviel. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East 1914–1923. New York: Routledge, 2001. Schwabe, Klaus. Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918–1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. Tillman, Seth P. Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961. Wolff, Larry. Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020. Živojinović, Dragoljub R. America, Italy, and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919). New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

For works on Wilson’s policies toward the Middle East, Africa, and the colonial world at Versailles, see: Allerfeldt, Kristofer. “Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 15, no. 3 (September 2004): 545–572. DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900–1939. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Duignan, Peter, and Lewis H. Gann. The United States and Africa: A History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Dunstan, Sarah Claire. “Conflicts of Interest: The 1919 Pan-African Congress and the Wilsonian Moment.” Callaloo, 39, no. 1 (2016): 133–150. Evans, Laurence. United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. Gerwarth, Robert and Erez Manela, “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 786–800. Jacobs, Matthew F. “World War I: A War (and Peace?) for the Middle East.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 776–785. Manela, Erez. The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Patrick, Andrew. “Woodrow Wilson, the Ottomans, and World War I.” Diplomatic History, 42, no. 5 (2018): 886–910. Payaslian, Simon. United States Policy Toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Guide to Further Reading  167 Rosenberg, Emily S. “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 852–863. Uyanik, Nevzat. Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: Britain, America, and the Armenian Question. London: Routledge, 2016. Walther, Karine. Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821– 1921. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2015.

The treaty fight For studies of the debates in the United States over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, see: Allerfeldt, Kristofer. Beyond the Huddled Masses: American Immigration and the Treaty of Versailles. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Allerfeldt, Kristofer. “Rejecting the United States of the World: The Consequences of Woodrow Wilson’s New Diplomacy on the 1921 Immigration Act.” European Journal of American Culture, 26, no. 3 (2007): 145–165. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Bailey, Thomas Andrew. Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Condra, Clinton. “Nationhood and Neighborhood: The Lodge-Wilson Quarrel and the Question of Progress.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, no. 4 (December 2018): 377–388. Cooper, John Milton Jr. Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Stone, Ralph A. The Irreconcilables the Fight Against the League of Nations. New York: Norton, 1973. Widenor, William C. Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

The Wilsonian legacy For scholarship on Wilson’s legacy and the foreign policy tradition of Wilsonianism, see: Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 125–134. Buehrig, Edward H. Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957. Carew, Michael G. The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938–1942. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. Clinton, David. “Wilsonianism and the Sweep of American Foreign Policy History.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16, no. 4 (December 2018): 362–376. Cooper, John Milton Jr. “The World War and American Memory.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 727–736. Fromkin, David. “What Is Wilsonianism?” World Policy Journal, 11, no. 1 (1994): 100–111.

168  Guide to Further Reading Hoff, Joan. A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: Dreams of Perfectibility. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. Hugh-Jones, E. M. Woodrow Wilson and American Liberalism. London: English Universities Press, 1947. Ikenberry, G John. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009. Iriye, Akira. “Historiographic Impact of the Great War.” Diplomatic History, 38, no. 4 (2014): 751–762. Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Routledge, 2002. Milne, David. Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017. Ninkovich, Frank A. The Wilsonian century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Perlmutter, Amos. Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pestritto, Ronald J. “What America Owes to Woodrow Wilson.” Society, 43, no. 1 (2005): 57–66. Price, Matthew C. The Wilsonian Persuasion in American Foreign Policy. Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007. Quinn, Adam. US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine. London: Routledge, 2011. Schwabe, Klaus. “World War I and the Rise of Hitler.” Diplomatic History, 38 no. 4 (2014): 864–879. Smith, Tony. “Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century.” Diplomatic History, 23, no. 2 (1999): 173–188. Smith, Tony. Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and its Crisis Today, Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2019. Thompson, John A. “Wilsonianism: The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept.” International Affairs, 86, no. 1 (2010): 27–47. Trout, Steven. On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American Remembrance, 1919–1941. Tuscaloosa, AL: University Alabama Press, 2010. Tucker, Robert W. “The Triumph of Wilsonianism?” World Policy Journal, 10 no. 4 (1993): 83–99. Winter, J. M. The Legacy of the Great War: Ninety Years On. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 2009. Winter, J. M. Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.

Index

100% Americanism campaign 59 1911 Revolution (China) 25 Adamson Act 6 African Americans 6, 87–88, 95 Alsace-Lorraine 36, 50, 90, 124 Ambrosius, Lloyd E. 3–4, 19–20, 73, 89, 95, 106, 108, 109–110 American Board Mission 54 American Commission to Negotiate Peace 68 American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) 54 American exceptionalism 110 American Expeditionary Force (AEF) 47 American Federation of Labor 16 American Jewish Committee 80 American nationalism 3–4, 9, 110 American Peace Society 9 American Red Cross 31 anti-Bolsheviks 49, 74, 75 anticolonialism 49, 84, 87, 88, 89, 95, 107, 110 anti-Semitism 59, 81 Arabic Pledge 35 Argentina 17, 19, 21 Arias, Desiderio 18 Armenia 54, 85, 86, 105 Armenian genocide 53–54 Armistice Day 63, 142 Armistice of Mudros (1918) 61 Armistice of Salonica (1918) 61 Armistice of Villa Giusti (1918) 61 Article X (Covenant of the League of Nations) 71, 72, 102, 103, 104, 105, 138, 139 Asquith, Herbert 31 associated power, United States as 47, 64

Ataturk, Mustafa Kamal 85, 86 Atlanticists 31, 38 Austria 81, 90 Austria-Hungary 32, 40, 41, 42, 52–53, 124; breakup of 39, 52, 55, 59, 60, 76; immigrant populations from 59; peace offer of 60–61; United States’ declaration of war against 52; Wilson’s message to 129 Babik, Milan 6, 10, 110 Baden, Maximilian von 61, 62, 63 Bagehot, Walter 7 Bailey, Thomas A. 95, 106 Baker, Newton D. 37 Baker, Ray Stannard 139–140 Balfour, Arthur 39, 40, 47, 53, 54, 137 Balfour Declaration (1917) 86 banks 15, 16, 25 Beer, George Louis 88 Belgium 137; food relief program 31; German invasion of 31; restoration of 36, 39, 50, 53, 124 Bellegarde, Dantes 88 Bemis, Samuel Flagg 20 Benbow, Mark 24 Benedict XV, Pope 48 Beneš, Edvard 56, 80, 81 Berg, A. Scott 109 Bernstorff, Johann Heinrich von 35, 39, 41, 42 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von 35, 36, 39, 41 Biskupski, M. B. 82 Bliss, Tasker 48, 69, 71, 92, 93, 134 Bolsheviks 49, 51, 54, 74, 75–76, 83 Borah, William 32, 101

170 Index Bordas, José 18 Bourgeois, Léon 71 Bowman, Isaiah 68 Brandeis, Louis 59, 86 Brătianu, Ion I. C. 80 Brazil 17, 19, 21, 88 Britain 32–34, 84, 91, 92; embargo 35; and Fourteen Points 63; independence of Egypt from 86; intervention in Russia 74, 75; and Palestine 86; and Paris Peace Conference 69, 71, 72, 78, 80; Parliament 7; and peace initiatives of United States 36, 38, 39–40; petition system for seizures 33; and racial equality amendment 84; relations with United States 31, 33, 37; security alliance 71, 92; Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) 85; and Treaty of Versailles (1920) 105; war spending 39 British Blockade 15, 32–33, 43–44, 55, 111, 112 Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ulrich von 92–93, 94 Bryan–Chamorro Treaty 18 Bryan, William Jennings 18, 20, 21, 24–25; and Wilson’s neutrality during World War I 31, 32, 34, 35, 44; and Wilson 14, 16, 17 Bryce Report 34 Bulgaria 52, 54, 61, 81 Bullitt, William C. 75, 94, 102–103 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 15 Burke, Edmund 6, 7 Burnidge, Cara Lea 3, 10 Bush, George W. 108 Cabrera, Louis 21 Cambon, Jules 36 Carranza, Venustiano 21, 22, 23, 118–119 Casement, Roger 37 Cecil, Robert 71, 94 Central Powers 32, 53, 55, 59; British Blockade 32–33, 43; denial of voice to 82; food aid program to 70; and peace call of Pope Benedict XV 48; and Poland 56; and Treaty of Versailles 95; and United States peace initiatives 36, 37, 39–40; see also AustriaHungary; Germany

Chamorro Vargas, Emiliano 18 Chile 17, 18, 19, 21 China 15, 58, 82–83, 134; and foreign policy, Wilson’s 24–26; May Fourth Movement 83, 95; Shandong province 25, 26, 58, 82, 83, 101, 134; Twenty-One Demands (1915) 26 China Consortium 25 Christianity 3, 4, 9, 10, 14, 24, 25, 109 Churchill, Winston 75 civil rights 6, 87–88 Clemenceau, Georges 53, 69, 70, 77, 90, 92, 93, 94, 134, 137 Clements, Kendrick 23 Clinton, William J. 107–108 Cobb, Frank I. 61 Coerver, Don 24 Colby, Bainbridge 89 Cold War 107 collective security 3, 4, 17, 38, 50, 60, 64, 71, 72, 77, 102, 107 Colombia 17 colonial claims, adjustment of 51, 60, 84, 124 colonialism 8, 51, 52, 89, 95, 96, 111 Committee of Public Information (CPI) 47, 49, 59, 74, 82 common council 9, 64 community of power 38, 40, 50, 121 Congress of Oppressed Nationalities 55 Constitutionalists 21, 22, 23 Constitution of Mexico 23 Coolidge, Archibald Carey 77 Coolidge, Calvin 106–107 cooling-off agreements 14, 17 Cooper, John Milton, Jr. 3, 6–7, 9, 13, 20, 23, 43, 44, 63, 73, 96, 106, 108, 109 Corfu Declaration (1917) 57 Costa Rica 15, 18 Council of Four 70, 83, 85, 93, 94, 133–134, 140 Council of Ten 70, 71, 75, 85 Covenant of the League of Nations 71– 73, 84, 89, 92, 102, 103, 106 Cox, James 105 Craft, Stephen 83 Crane, Charles R. 53, 56, 85, 86 Creel, George 47, 55, 69 Croly, Herbert 8 Cuba 88 Curry, Roy Watson 26 Czechoslovakia 56, 76, 79–80, 81, 135 Czechoslovak Legions 56, 74

Index  171 Czechoslovak National Council 56, 129 Czernin, Ottokar 40, 42, 52–53, 125 D’Annunzio, Gabriele 78 Danzig/Gdansk question 79 Davis, Donald 76 Dawley, Alan 63, 96, 106 Declaration of London of 1909 31 democracy 38, 47, 109, 131; and Christianity 3, 10; democratic government in Germany 48, 51, 61, 62, 90; and Mexico 23; and Russia 73, 75; United States 2, 3, 8, 10, 109; and Wilsonianism 2, 3; Wilson’s views of 6, 10, 115 Democratic Party 5, 6, 14 Democrats 5, 6, 15, 67, 101, 102, 104, 105 Department of State 14, 54, 57 Dewey, John 8 Diagne, Blaise 88 Diaz, Adolfo 18 Diaz, Porfirio 20 disarmament 36, 37, 38, 50, 92, 102, 107, 124 Dmowski, Roman 55 Dodge, Cleveland 53, 54 Dodge, H. Percival 57 Doenecke, Justus 44 dollar diplomacy 15, 16 Dominican Republic 18–19, 20 Dresel, Ellis 93 Duan Qirui 58 Dubois, W. E. B. 87 Dumba, Konstantin 40 Dunstan, Sarah Claire 88 Easter Rising 37 East European Jews 80 Ebert, Friedrich 63, 89, 90, 94 economic nationalism 15 economic policies 8, 15–16 Edib, Halide 85 Egyptian Revolution (1919) 86 Elleman, Bruce 83 Entente Powers 32, 42, 47, 48, 59, 60, 74; armistice draft of 62; and Austria-Hungary, diplomatic activity between 53; colonies 86–87; debt to United States 91; leaders, and Paris Peace Conference 69; merchant vessels 33; and negotiations of Bolsheviks with Germany 49; and Poland 55, 56; provision

of loans to 32, 44; territorial claims to 50; and United States peace initiatives 36, 37, 39–40; Wilson’s implicit bias in favor of 43; see also Britain; Central Powers; France; United States Espionage Act (1917) 58 Estonia 77 Faisal, Amir 85 Federal Reserve Act 6, 15 Federal Reserve Bank system 6 Federal Reserve Board 39 Federal Trade Commission 6 Ferdinand I, King 57 Ferdinand, Franz 32, 94 Ferid, Damad 85 Fiume/Rijeka question 78, 105, 133 Fleming, Thomas 110–111 Fletcher, Henry P. 18 Floyd, Ryan M. 43, 44 Foch, Ferdinand 47, 62, 63, 75, 92 Foglesong, David 76 food relief program 31, 55, 70, 76, 78, 90 foreign policy, Wilson’s 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8–9, 13–26, 87, 108, 111; advisers 13–15; and Bryan 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24–25, 31; China 24–26; dollar diplomacy 15, 16; economic policies 15–16; and House 13–14, 17, 20; impact of religious faith on 9; imperialism 16–17; Japan 24, 25–26; and Lansing 14, 15, 18, 22, 25; Latin America 16–20, 116–117; and League of Nations 73; Mexico 20–24; Pan-Americanism 17–18, 20, 21, 89; and progressive movement 8; Russia 76; and Tumulty 14–15; see also Wilsonianism Fourteen Points 49–52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62–64, 67, 74, 77, 85, 92, 93, 103, 111, 123–126 France 19, 36, 39, 63, 80, 84, 91, 92, 101, 124; and borders of Germany 90–91; intervention in Russia 74, 75; Paris Peace Conference 69; security alliance 71, 92; Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) 85; and Treaty of Versailles (1920) 105 Frank, Lucas 23 Franz Joseph I 40

172 Index freedom of the seas 36, 37, 38, 50, 63, 111, 123 Fromkin, David 3, 110 Garcés, Laura 24 Gardner, Lloyd 13 Garrison, Lindley Miller 20, 37 German Americans 59, 101 Germany 8, 19, 60, 81, 105; activities in Latin America 88; armistice (11 November 1918) 63; and armistice draft of Supreme War Council 62; armistice proposal 61–62; and Austria-Hungary 41, 52, 55; borders 90–91; colonial adjustments 84; culpability for World War I 91–92; democratic government in 48, 51, 61, 62, 90; disarmament 36, 92; food aid program to 70, 90; and foreign policy, Wilson’s towards Mexico 21, 22, 23, 24; and Fourteen Points 51, 61; and military terms of armistice 63, 64; negotiations of Bolsheviks with 49; and Paris Peace Conference 81, 89–94; and peace initiatives of United States 33, 36, 37, 39–40; punishment for 68, 69, 91, 92; reparations 91; response to British Blockade 33; sinking of RMS Lusitania 34; sinking of SS Ancona 40; sinking of SS Arabic 35; sinking of SS Sussex 35, 120; sinking of U.S. ships 41, 42; submarine warfare 33–34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 62, 120; terms of Treaty of Versailles 92–94; United States’ declaration of war against 42–43, 122–123; unrestricted submarine warfare 41; in World War I 25, 26, 31, 33–34, 35, 36–37, 38, 39–42, 43, 47; Zimmermann telegram 41–42, 88 Gilderhus, Mark 19 Gladstone, William 5, 7 Gompers, Samuel 16, 103 Grayson, Cary T. 103 Greece 81, 95, 137 Grey, Edward 31, 36, 39 Haiti 18, 19, 20, 88 Hale, William Bayard 21, 22 Haller, Józef 79, 134

Hall, Linda 24 Hall, William Reginald 42 Hamilton, Richard F. 43 Hannigan, Robert E. 19, 96 Harding, Warren G. 105 Henriquez y Carvajal, Francisco 89 Herron, George 10, 53, 55 Herwig, Holger H. 43 Hindenburg, Paul von 62 History of the American People (Wilson) 8, 58 Hitchcock, Gilbert 104–105 Hlinka, Andrej 80 Ho Chi Minh 86 Hoff, Joan 110 Hofstadter, Richard 109 Hoover, Herbert 31, 55, 70, 76, 79, 93, 94 House, Edward 13–14, 17, 20, 67, 74, 75, 76, 88, 94; on Carranza 118–119; and German armistice 62, 63; Inquiry 48; and national movements 54, 55, 56, 57; and Wilson’s neutrality during World War I 31, 33, 34, 35–36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44; and Paris Peace Conference 68, 69, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 82, 90, 91, 92 House-Gray Memorandum (1916) 36 Huerta, Victoriano 20–22, 23, 112, 117 Hughes, Billy 84 Hughes, Charles Evans 37, 68, 107 Hungarian Americans 60 Hungary 75, 80, 81 Hurst, Cecil J. B. 71 Hussein, Sharif 85 Ikenberry, John 2, 3 immigrants 32, 58–60, 101 imperialism 8, 16–17, 49, 74, 103, 108, 110 independence: of colonies 84, 86–87; Egyptian 86; Filipino 16; Irish 59–60, 80, 102; movements 55, 56, 60, 61, 79, 80, 85; Polish 56, 125; political, of League members 71, 72, 102, 104, 125, 134, 138, 139 India 86–87 Inquiry 48, 49, 50, 60, 62, 69, 79 Inter Allied Conference (1917) 47–48 Inter-Allied Reparations Commission 91, 107 International Commission for Relief in Poland 32

Index  173 internationalism 9, 105, 110; liberal 8, 31, 38, 112; Wilsonian 2, 6, 95, 107, 108 International Monetary Fund 107 Ireland 80 Irish Americans 59–60, 80, 101, 102 irreconcilables 101, 103, 104 Ishii, Kikujirō 26, 58 Italian Americans 60, 101 Italy 77–78, 81, 124; delegation 78, 132–133; Paris Peace Conference 69; and Yugoslavia 57, 82 James, William 8 Japan 58, 60, 71, 76, 82–83, 134; and foreign policy, Wilson’s 24, 25–26; intervention in Russia 75, 82; racial equality amendment 71, 72, 83, 84, 88; Twenty-One Demands (1915) 26; and World War I 25 Jews 59, 80, 86, 134–135 Jimenez, Juan Isidro 18 Johnson, Whittle 3 Jones Act of 1916 16 Jones Act of 1917 17 J.P. Morgan 32 Karl I, Emperor 40, 52, 81 Karolyi, Mihaly 81 Katz, Friedrich 24 Kawamura, Noriko 26, 83 Kellogg Briand Pact 107 Kellogg, Frank 107 Kennan, George F. 108 Kennedy, Ross A. 43, 64, 73, 96, 111 Kerr, Philip 92 Keynes, John Maynard 94, 106, 108, 142 Kim Kyu-sik 87 King-Crane Commission 86 King, Henry Churchill 85, 86 Knock, Thomas J. 8, 43, 106, 108, 110 Kolchak, Alexander 75 Koo, V. K. Wellington 82, 83 Korea 87 Kun, Bela 75, 81 labor unions 6, 16 La Follette, Robert 43 Lammasch, Heinrich 53 Langer, William L. 109 Lansing-Ishii Agreement 26, 58 Lansing, Robert 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 61, 67, 68–69, 74, 94; and

Austria-Hungary 52; and national movements 55, 56, 57; and Wilson’s neutrality during World War I 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44; and Ottoman Empire 54; and Paris Peace Conference 71, 78, 79, 83, 93; and Treaty of Versailles (1920) 102, 103, 105; on Wilson 140–141 Larsen, Daniel 44 Latin America 15, 16–17, 88–89; foreign policy, Wilson’s 116– 117; intervention of United States in 17–21; political instability in 18; see also Mexico Latvia 77 League Commission 71 League of Nations 2, 3, 4, 10, 16, 36, 39, 50, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68, 69, 70–72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 93, 101–102, 105, 106, 128, 134, 139; Covenant 71–73, 84, 89, 92, 102, 103, 107; German entry into 90, 94; India’s admittance into 87; Lodge’s criticism of 132; mandates 84–87, 89, 136–137; security alliance 71, 92 League to Enforce Peace 38, 71 Lenin, Vladimir 49, 51, 74, 75, 76, 110 Levin, Norman Gordon 26, 64, 96, 108, 110 liberal internationalism 8, 31, 38, 112 liberal internationalists 30–31, 37, 53 Lind, John 21 Link, Arthur Stanley 3, 9, 10, 43, 108–109 Lippmann, Walter 8, 49, 61, 108, 141 Lithuania 77 Li Yuanhong 58 Lloyd George, David 38, 39, 49, 69, 70, 75, 79, 85, 90, 91, 93, 94, 133–134, 136 Lodge, Henry Cabot 32, 67, 72, 101–102, 103, 105, 106, 132 Lowell, A. Lawrence 103 Lundgreen-Nielsen, Kay 81 Luther, Martin 43 Lu Zhengxiang 82 MacMillian, Margaret 76, 95 Madero, Francisco 20 Magee, Malcom D. 10, 24 Makino, Nobuaki 82 Malinov, Aleksander 54, 61

174 Index mandates (League of Nations) 84–87, 89, 136–137 Manela, Erez 89, 110 March First Movement 87 Marie, Queen 57, 80 Marshall, Louis 80 Marshall, Thomas 103 Masaryk, Tomáš 52, 55, 56, 59, 79, 137 May Fourth Movement 83, 95 McAdoo, William G. 15–16, 18, 32, 60 McCumber, Porter 104 Mead, Walter Russel 2, 109 Mexican Revolution 20–21, 22 Mexico 15, 17, 18, 89, 112; arms embargo of United States against 21, 23; Constitutionalists 21, 22, 23; foreign investment in 20; and foreign policy, Wilson’s 20–24; political instability of 20; Punitive Expedition 22–23, 24; Tampico crisis 21, 117–118; Ten Tragic Days 20; United States occupation of Veracruz 21, 23; Zimmermann telegram 41–42, 88 Middle East 85, 86, 89 Miller, David Hunter 71, 136 missionaries, Christian 2, 10, 24, 53, 54 Monroe Doctrine 4, 8, 9, 17, 19, 24, 47, 68, 72, 89, 92, 138 Montenegro 124 Morgenthau, Hans J. 108 Morgenthau, Henry, Sr. 81 Moton, Robert Russa 87, 88 Mulder, John M. 10 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The 87 National Defense Act of 1916 37 National Equal Rights League 87 nationalism: American 3–4, 9, 110; economic 15; great power 108; Irish 37; Mexican 24; movements, in East Central Europe 95; Slovak 59; Wilsonian 6 nationality: groups 59, 80; and territorial claims 77 national minorities 52, 53, 54, 56, 71, 77, 78, 134–135 national movements 54–57, 59 national self-determination 49, 50, 52, 53, 54–55, 60, 62, 64, 69, 74, 77, 81, 82, 86, 91, 95, 107, 111, 127

National Urban League 87 Navy Bill of 1916 37 Neu, Charles 13 Neutrality Acts 107 neutrality, Wilson’s during World War I 32–31, 118; and British Blockade 32–33, 43–44; and Bryan 31, 32, 34, 35, 44; critics of 43–44; Declaration of London of 1909 31; declaration of war against Germany 42–43; demands to Germany 34, 43; and economy of United States 32; and Grey 31, 36, 39; and House 31, 33, 34, 35–36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44; House-Gray Memorandum (1916) 36; humanitarian role of United States 31–32; international reform 37, 38, 41; and Lansing 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44; and loans to Entente Powers 32, 44; mediation 31, 33, 36–37, 38–39, 40; negotiations with Germany 35; peace initiatives 35–37, 38, 39–40; peace without victory speech 40; positive view of 43; presidential election (1916) 37–38; submarine warfare 33–34, 35, 39, 40, 41; U.S.-British relations 31; and Zimmermann telegram 41–42 New Left 108, 109, 110 new states 51, 61, 77, 82, 85, 88, 111 Niagara Falls Conference 21–22 Nicaragua 18 Nicholas of Montenegro 78 Ninkovich, Frank 3, 111 North Africa 86 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 107 Nubar Pasha, Boghos 81, 85–86 Nye Committee 107 Obregón, Álvaro 23 October Revolution (1917) 48, 49, 74 open diplomacy 49, 70, 90, 93, 123, 126–127 open-door economic policy 8, 9, 24, 25, 26, 61, 82 Orlando, Vittorio 70, 77, 78 Ottoman Empire 52, 53–54, 61, 84, 85, 125, 136; breakup of 40, 60, 76, 85, 89; Treaty of Sèvres (1920) 86

Index  175 pacifism 14 pacifists 32, 32, 37, 38, 42, 43, 58, 101 Pact of London see Treaty of London (1915) Paderewski, Ignacy Jan 55–56, 79, 80, 134 Page, Walter Hines 33 Palestine 86 Pan-African Congress 88 Pan-Africanism 87–88 Panama 19 Panama Canal 17, 18 Pan-American Financial Conference (1915) 18 Pan-Americanism 17–18, 20, 21, 89 Pan-American Treaty proposal (1916) 17 Paris Peace Conference 2, 48, 67–70, 108–109, 111, 140; Allied colonies 86–87; American Commission to Negotiate Peace 68; Austria 81; Black civil rights 87–88; Bulgaria 81; China 82–83; colonialism 89; Council of Four 70, 83, 85, 93, 94, 133–134, 140; Council of Ten 70, 71, 75, 85; Covenant of the League of Nations 71–73, 84, 89; culpability for the war 91–92; Czechoslovakia 79–80; disarmament 92; East European Jews 80; and Germany 89–94; Hungary 81; Italy 77–78; Japan 82–83; Latin America 88–89; League of Nations 68, 69, 70–72, 73, 89; mandates 84–87, 89, 136–137; Poland 79; reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe 76–77; reparations 90, 91; Romania 80; Russia 73–76, 82; Treaty of Versailles 91, 92–95; Ukrainian People’s Republic 80; Yugoslavia 78–79 Pašić, Nikola 57, 81 peace without victory speech 40, 53, 55, 56, 121–122 Perlmutter, Amos 111 Pershing, John J. 22–23, 47, 69 Petliura, Symon 80 Philippines 8, 16, 87 Phillimore Report 70–71 Piłsudski, Józef 79 Pittsburgh Agreement 59

Poland 51, 53, 54, 55, 76, 79, 80–81, 82, 95, 125, 134 Polish Americans 59 Polish National Committee 55, 56 political independence of League members 71, 72, 102, 104, 125, 134, 138, 139 power politics 2, 38, 79, 96, 108; European 26, 32, 49, 73; Wilson’s 111 preparedness 32, 34, 37 Presbyterian Church 4 Princeton University 5, 6 progressive era/progressive movement 5, 7, 8, 15 progressives 32, 51, 58, 101, 108, 110 promotional state 15 Puerto Rico 17 Punitive Expedition 22–23, 24 Putney, Robert 55 Quinn, Adam 2 racial equality amendment (Covenant of the League of Nations) 71, 72, 83, 84, 88 Radoslavov, Vasil 54 Rai, Lala Lajpat 86 Redfield, William C. 15, 18 reform, Wilson’s during World War I 47; armistice draft of Supreme War Council 62; AustriaHungary 52–53, 60–61; and Bolsheviks 49; Bulgaria 54, 61; China 58; Committee of Public Information (CPI) 47, 49, 59, 74, 82; Czechoslovakia 56; forced volunteerism 58; Fourteen Points 49–52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62–64; German armistice proposal 61–62; and House 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 62; immigrant communities 58–60; Inquiry 48, 49, 50, 60, 62; Japan 58; and Lansing 52, 54, 55, 56, 61; military terms of armistice 63, 64; national movements 54–57, 59; Ottoman Empire 53–54, 61; Paris Peace Conference 48; Poland 55–56; Romania 57; support for new nation states 61; Yugoslavia 56–57 Reinch, Paul S. 25 religious faith, Wilson’s 4, 9–10

176 Index religious minorities 16, 53, 71, 80 reparations 60, 62, 68, 90, 91, 92, 93, 136 Republican Party 5 Republicans 38, 67, 107; and Covenant of the League of Nations 72; and Paris Peace Conference 68; and Treaty of Versailles 101, 102, 103, 104–105, 106 reservationists 102, 104 return to normalcy 58, 106–107 Revenue Act of 1913 15 Rhee, Syngman 87 Rhineland 62, 72, 73, 90–91, 92 Richard, Carl 76 RMS Lusitania, sinking of 34 Rockefeller foundation 32 Romania 57, 77, 80, 81, 124, 134–135, 137 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 20, 107, 108 Roosevelt, Theodore 1, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 32, 108 Root, Elihu 38, 73–74 Rosenberg, Emily 15, 16, 110 Round Robin Petition 72 Russia 32, 36, 56, 80, 124, 126; intervention in 73, 74–75, 76, 82, 127–128; October Revolution (1917) 48, 49; territorial sanctity of 50, 76, 82 Russian Civil War 74 Russian Constituent Assembly 74 Russian Revolution 73–75, 82 Saarland 90, 91, 92 Sabath, Adolph J. 56 Sam, Vilbrun Guillaume 19 Saunders, Robert 96 Schild, George 76 Schwabe, Klaus 64, 91, 95–96 secret treaties 50, 71, 137 security alliance, U.S.-France-Britain 71, 92 Sedition Act (1918) 58 separation of powers 7 Serbia 32, 56, 57, 77, 124 Shandong province (China) 25, 26, 58, 82, 83, 101, 134 Shipping Board 15 Singh, Ganga 87 Sinha, Satyendra 87 Slavs 56, 57, 78, 135 Slovak League of America 59

Slovaks 56, 59, 77, 80 Slovenia 81 small nations, security of 47, 49, 50–51, 54, 56, 81 Smith, Tony 3, 96, 108, 109 Smuts, Jan Christian 71, 84, 91, 108 Sokolov, Nohom 81 Sonnino, Sidney 77, 78 South Slav National Council 57 South Slavs 56–57, 78 sovereignty 9, 71, 124, 125, 134; Chinese 15, 25; Latin American 15, 17; popular 3; United States 72, 107 Soviet Union 51, 74, 75, 76, 79, 86, 93, 95, 96; see also Russia Spanish-American War of 1898 8, 16, 115–116 Spring-Rice, Cecil 33 SS Ancona, sinking of 40 SS Arabic, sinking of 35 SS Sussex, sinking of 35, 120 State, The (Wilson) 7 Štefánik, Milan 56 Stoica, Vasile 57 Striner, Richard 64, 110 submarine warfare 33–34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 62, 88, 120 Sudetenland 79 Sun Yat-sen 25 Supreme War Council 48, 62 Sussex Pledge 35 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) 85 Syria 85 Taft, William Howard 5, 15, 20, 38, 68, 103 Tampico crisis 21, 117–118 Tardieu, Andre 92 Tarnowski, Adam 41 Ten Tragic Days 20 territorial concessions 39, 40, 68, 70 territorial expansion 32, 50, 52, 77 territorial integrity of League members 68, 71, 72, 102, 104, 125, 134, 138, 139 Thompson, John A. 4, 63, 96, 111 Thorsen, Niels Aage 19–20 Throntveit, Trygve 3, 10, 16, 24, 43, 63–64, 96, 106, 108, 109 Tien-yi Li 26 Tinoco, Federico 18 Tooze, Adam 110

Index  177 trade 24, 50, 124; British Blockade 32–33, 43–44; expansion 15, 16; and Wilson’s neutrality during World War I 32; reciprocal 15; War Trade Board 16 Trani, Eugene 76 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) 51, 53, 56, 60, 61, 74 Treaty of Bucharest 57 Treaty of Lausanne (1923) 86 Treaty of London (1915) 77, 132–133 Treaty of Neuilly (1919) 81 Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) 81, 83 Treaty of Sèvres (1920) 86 Treaty of Trianon (1920) 81 Treaty of Versailles (1920) 78, 91, 92– 94; compromise 102, 103, 104, 105, 106; criticisms of 94–95; Foreign Relations Committee report 104; and Fourteen Points 103; irreconcilables 101, 103, 104; ratification of 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 136; ratification vote in U.S. Senate 104–105; reservationists 102, 104; reservations 104–105; response of world powers to 105; treaty fight 102, 106, 111–112; western tour, Wilson’s 103; Wilson’s defense of 139 Trotsky, Leon 49, 74–75 Trotter, William Monroe 87, 102 Truman, Harry 107 Trumbić, Ante 57 Tucker, Robert 4, 9, 16, 43, 111 Tumulty, Joseph 14–15, 60, 103 Turkey 53, 54, 85, 86, 95, 125; see also Ottoman Empire Turner, Frederick Jackson 8 Twenty-One Demands (1915) 26 U-boats 33–34, 35, 88 Ukraine 76, 79 Ukrainian People’s Republic 80 Underwood Tariff Act 10 United Fruit Company 15 United Nations 107 United Nations Security Council 107 United States 32, 119; American exceptionalism 110; American nationalism 3–4, 9, 110; as an associated power 47, 64;

Anglo-American friendship 131; anti-Japanese sentiment in 60; assets in Mexico 20; civil rights for African Americans 87–88; declaration of war against Austria-Hungary 52; declaration of war against Germany 42–43, 122–123; democracy 2, 3, 8, 10, 109; dependence on Allies for logistics and weaponry 47; economic growth of 15; economy, and World War I 32, 43; federal government 5, 15; humanitarian role in World War I 31–32; imperialism 8, 110; intervention in Latin America 17–21; intervention in Russia 74–75, 127–128; midterm elections (1918) 67; occupation of Haiti 19; occupation of Veracruz 21, 23; overseas investments of 15, 16; peace offer of Austria-Hungary to 60– 61; presidential election (1912) 5; presidential election (1916) 37–38; Punitive Expedition 22–23, 24; relations with Britain 31, 33, 37; security alliance 71, 92; ships, sinking by Germany 41, 42; and sinking of RMS Lusitania 34; Wilson on 8, 116; see also Mexico United States Navy 48 United States Office of War Information 107 Universal Negro Improvement Association 87 unrestricted submarine warfare 41 Unterberger, Betty Miller 76 U.S. Congress 7, 16, 32, 35, 42, 49 U.S.-Mexican war of 1845 8, 41 U.S. Senate 55, 60, 67, 80, 101, 102; failure of ratification of Treaty of Versailles 104–105, 106; Wilson’s testimony in 103 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 72, 102, 104, 138–139 Uyanik, Nevzat 89 Venizelos, Eleftherios 79, 81 Vesnić, Milenko Radomar 49, 57 Vietnam 86

178 Index vigilantism 58 Villa, Francisco “Pancho” 21, 22, 23, 118 Walsh, Frank P. 80 Walther, Karine 16 Walworth, Arthur 95, 106 war guilt clause (Treaty of Versailles) 91, 92, 111 War Trade Board 16 Washington Naval Conference 107 Weis, Stephen 86 White, Henry 68, 81 Whites (Russian Revolution) 74, 75 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 31, 41, 61, 91–92 Wilson (movie) 107 Wilson Award 86 Wilson, Edith Galt 14, 15, 44, 69, 73, 95, 104 Wilson, Ellen 32 Wilson, Henry Lane 20, 21 Wilsonianism 1, 2–4, 16, 105, 107–109, 111 Wilson Plan 18 Wilson, Thomas (Wilson’s father) 4 Wilson, Thomas Woodrow 1, 2, 3, 4, 9–10, 95–96, 111–112, 133– 134; 1919 Nobel Peace prize for 105–106; advisers of 13–15, 44, 48, 61, 67, 68–69, 90, 94, 103; on America 116, 119; on Anglo-American friendship 131; armistice speech to Congress 130–131; Baker on 139–140; call for decisive victory 60; and Clemenceau 69; comparison of Germans and Slavs 135; criticisms of 1, 7, 9, 19, 24, 26, 32, 43–44, 64, 67, 72, 76, 81, 83, 89, 93, 95, 96, 106, 107, 109–111; on declaration of war against Germany 122–123; defense of Treaty of Versailles 139; on democracy 6, 10, 115; and Department of State 14; dichotomies of interpretation about 1–2; diplomacy of 7; early life of 4; education of 4–5; family background of 4; foreign policy of 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8–9, 13–26, 87, 108, 111, 116–117; Fourteen Points speech 123–126; Fourth Liberty Loan speech 128–129; frustration with his allies 137–138; as governor of New

Jersey 5; health issues of 103; historians 109; idealism of 13, 18, 24, 36, 69, 82, 96, 107, 109, 110, 111; ideas about political leadership 6; on intervention in Russia 127–128; and Italian delegation 132–133; Keynes on 142; Lansing on 140–141; leadership of 6–7; legacy of 1, 107–108, 111; Lippman on 141; message to Austria-Hungary 129; message to Congress on Tampico crisis 117–118; and midterm elections (1918) 67; on minority protections in East and Central Europe 134–135; and modern presidency 7; moralistic view of 4; neutrality in World War I 32–44, 118; nonpartisan address of 120–121; on open diplomacy 126–127; and Paris Peace Conference 67–96; peace note to Germany 129–130; peace without victory speech 40, 53, 55, 56, 121–122; power politics of 111; presenting Treaty of Versailles for ratification 136; presidency, final years of 106; presidency in Princeton University 5; and presidential election (1912) 5; and presidential election (1916) 37–38; realist critique of 109– 110; reform, and World War I 47–64; religious faith of 4, 9–10; rhetoric of 1, 4, 10, 16, 18, 19, 24, 40, 43, 110, 111; on right to travel in times of war 119–120; on Shandong settlement 134; on sinking of SS Sussex 120; on Spanish-American War of 1898 115–116; sympathy for Russian people 126; testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee 138–139; Third Liberty Loan speech 60, 127; Too Proud to Fight speech 119; values of 3; views on England 7–8; views on imperialism 8; western tour of 103; on World War I 123 Wimer, Kurt 96 Wiseman, William 39, 40, 61 Wise, Stephen 59 Wolff, Larry 81, 89 World Bank 107

Index  179 World War I 1, 2, 8, 18, 22, 32, 67, 109; Armistice of Mudros (1918) 61; Armistice of Salonica (1918) 61; Armistice of Villa Giusti (1918) 61; assassination of Ferdinand 32; British Blockade 15, 32–33, 43–44, 55, 111, 112; and foreign policy, Wilson’s 18, 22, 24, 25; German armistice (11 November 1918) 63; and immigrant communities 58–60; and Japan 25; preparedness 32, 34, 37; submarine warfare 33–34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 62, 88, 120; United States as an associated power in 47, 64; and Wilsonian reform 47–64; Wilson’s neutrality 32–44; see

also Paris Peace Conference; Treaty of Versailles (1920) World War II 2, 59, 107, 108 Wright, Micah 19 Yuan Shi-kai 25 Yugoslavia 56–57, 59, 77, 78–79, 81, 82 Yugoslav movement 56 Zaghloul, Saad 86 Zanuck, Darryl 107 Zapata, Emiliano 22 Zelikow, Philip 44 Zhang Xun 58 Zimmermann, Arthur 33, 41, 42 Zimmermann telegram 41–42, 88 Zionism 59, 86 Živojinović, Dragoljub R. 81–82