Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Political Alliance and the Formation of Deliberative Civil Society 3030702316, 9783030702311

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Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran Political Alliance and the Formation of Deliberative Civil Society Samira Ghoreishi

Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Samira Ghoreishi

Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran Political Alliance and the Formation of Deliberative Civil Society

Samira Ghoreishi Auckland, New Zealand

ISBN 978-3-030-70231-1    ISBN 978-3-030-70232-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my mother, Hormat Sadat Ziaian, the first feminist in my life and my son, Bardia Bayat Moghadam.

Acknowledgments

My research has been guided by many people, and I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude and thanks to everyone here. First, I would like to acknowledge the great contribution of my research participants many of whom I have learned so much from. I owe my deepest gratitude to my lead PhD supervisor Katherine Smits and co-­supervisor Thomas Gregory. They have guided me through my PhD journey through their respectful guidance, critical engagement, and insightful advice. My sincere thanks goes to my family. My great appreciation and thanks goes to the one and only true shining star and the first feminist in my life: my mother, for her love and unconditional emotional and financial support. She has been a source of inspiration and encouragement. Also, I must mention the inspiration from my other family members, including my father Seyyed-Abdollah Ghoreishi whose memory gets me through my challenging days. Thanks to all for love and your unconditional support. My deep gratitude and thanks go to my loving, encouraging, and patient husband, Davood Bayat-Moghadam. And I must also express my love and thanks to my son, together he and Davood always cheer me up no matter what challenges the day brings. Much love and appreciation to you all.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 Why Is This Research Important?   6 The Scholarly Context   8 Research Methodology  16 Research Theory and Conceptualization  17 Research Method and the Scope of the Study  20 Method of Analysis  22 Research Limitations  23 References  26 2 Theoretical Framework 35 A Habermasian Model of Deliberative Engagement in the Public Sphere  36 The Public Sphere and Rationalization  36 Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action  38 Habermas’ Theory of Discourse Ethics  40 Applying Habermas Model of the Public Sphere to Diverse Societies: Limitations and Solutions?  43 What Are ‘Counterpublics’?  44 The Quality of Relations Among Counterpublics  48 Applying Habermas Model of Public Sphere in Non-­secular Societies: Limitations and Solutions?  50

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Habermas’ Ideas on Religion and Secularism  51 Redefinition of the Secular from a Historicized Approach  54 Conclusion  56 References  59 3 Women and Media: A Deliberative Engagement 63 Media Landscape in Iran  65 Women, Media, and the Rise of Diverse Voices  68 Development of Deliberations Through the Press  78 Zanan Magazine After the 1997 Reformist Movement  82 Re-launching ‘Zanan’ After Six Years  87 Public Activism and Development of Deliberations Through Cinema  90 Conclusion  94 References  96 4 Women and Civil Society Activism105 The Rise of Women’s Activism Through NGOs 106 Development of Women’s Civil Society Activism 108 One Million Signatures Campaign: A Promising Start for Promoting Cooperation Through Dialogue 112 2006 ‘22 Khordad Gathering’ (12 June 2006 Gathering)112 The Birth of ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ 115 Women’s Civil Society Activism in the Present Society 120 Conclusion 130 References 132 5 Women’s Parliamentary and Extra (Outside)-Parliamentary Activism135 Women in Cabinet, Parliament, and Parliament Elections 136 Women’s Parliamentary Activism After 1997 Reformist Movement 137 Strategic Shift in Women’s Parliamentary Activism: A Move Toward Deliberative Cooperation and Coalitions 142 Women and City and Local Councils 146 Women’s Activism and Presidential Elections 148

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Women’s Activism in the Shadow of the Green Movement: A Momentous Deliberative Cooperation 151 The Rise of the Green Movement: A Green Wave of Hope 154 Conclusion 163 References 165 6 Conclusion171 References 186 Index189

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2

Karroubi’s Campaign’s Flyer-2009 Presidential Election The Bill of Citizens’ Rights-2009 Presidential Election

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

With the emergence of the Islamic movement in 1979 and the resulting dominance of the new Islamic discourse, the future seemed bleak for women’s rights and equality in Iran. The clerical elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) asserted that women and men must have different roles and functions in Islamic society. Accordingly, the mandated gender roles resulted in different (read: unequal) legal rights in Iran (Akbarzadeh and MacQueen 2008: 33). One consequence of the Islamic revolution was the establishment of an ideologically patriarchal constitution. Under the new laws that were established immediately after the Islamic revolution, the wearing of the hijab became compulsory for women (Stewart 2009; Matin and Mohajer 2010), men were given the right to get a divorce without any reason while it is almost impossible for women to initiate a divorce, and women must also get written permission from a male relative in order to travel (Stewart 2009; Kar 2001b). Additionally, soon after the revolution, the 1967 Family Protection Law1 was abolished, eliminating limitations on polygamy and reducing the minimum age for marriage (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2008: 184; Nakanishi 1998). Nonetheless, after the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) and the dominance of a development-oriented government under the presidency of Akbar 1  1967 Family Protection Law supported women on many issues. As an example, it gave women the right to initiate divorce, increased the child custody rights, and limited polygamy (An-Na’im 2002: 94).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_1

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Hashemi Rafsanjani2 (1989–1997), women demonstrated that they had not abandoned their struggles for equality and justice and they showed an active presence in public life (Najmabadi 1998). Sixteen years after the Islamic revolution, feminists, both secular and Islamic, started to open possibilities for the cultivation of different types of feminisms including secular feminism (Najmabadi 1998). The emergence of new women’s journals affirmed the reconfiguration of Islam, revolution, and feminism in the context of post-revolutionary Iran (Najmabadi 1998). Despite the resurgence in feminist politics, certain tensions between the different groups began to emerge after the mid-1990s. Islamic feminists, for example, argued that women’s public gatherings have been unproductive, while secular feminists insisted on holding public gatherings3 in order to preserve women’s public presence (Barlow 2012). Nevertheless, there have been times when secular and Islamic feminists have worked together under a common strategic umbrella. On 27 August 2006, for example, the first instance of practical cooperation between secular feminists and Islamic feminists occurred with the One Million Signatures Campaign4 (see Chap. 4) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012). The campaign was a response to the state’s repression of women’s public gatherings and the discriminatory gender policies and laws. The different segments of the feminist population, encompassing those who were secular-­ oriented and religious-oriented, and women’s rights activists, together established this campaign to collect one million signatures in support of law reform in Iran. Although the campaign was suppressed and did not succeed in collecting one million signatures, it was successful in terms of publicizing the legal issues and gender inequalities which exist in the constitution of IRI. However, after the emergence of feminist solidarity with the One Million Signatures Campaign, certain divisions between 2  Rafsanjani was the most influential Iranian politician especially in the early years of the Islamic Revolution. Rafsanjani’s government had a strong belief in decentralization and development with an emphasis on economic development (The First Development Plan 1989; The Second Development Plan 1994). 3  The response to these gatherings, which were mostly held by secular feminists, was violent state repression. The women’s demonstrations were broken up by the police and most of the feminist activists were arrested and received prison sentences. 4  The main aim of this campaign was to eliminate all discriminatory laws against women in Iran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010; Barlow 2012). The strategy of the campaign was to engage in face-to-face dialogue in order to increase citizen’s awareness of their rights. The campaign aimed to be the voice of those silent women, whose everyday life has been affected by discriminatory laws (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010).

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the feminists re-emerged. In addition to disagreeing about strategy, the two groups argued over issues, such as, whether to forge connections with political parties and politicians or to keep away from the field of politics; whether to pursue reforms in a way which is compatible with the values of the Islamic revolution or to seek reforms that refuted revolutionary doctrine. Three years after the Campaign ended, both the secular and the Islamic feminists found another ray of hope in the 2009 presidential election and restarted their activities. The story of the 2009 presidential election is identified with the ‘Green Movement’5 (see Chap. 5) (Dabashi 2011; Haghighatjoo 2016; Harris 2012; Jahanbegloo and Soroush 2010; Payrow Shabani 2010; Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010). The Green Movement is characterized as a pluralist movement (Harris 2012; Jahanbegloo and Soroush 2010; Payrow Shabani 2010) whose key components were women (Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010) who were from different backgrounds and who espoused different forms of feminism. In addition to the feminists and the women’s rights activists, diverse social groups were involved in this movement including ethnic groups, religious minorities, conservative political groups,6 religious-oriented reformists,7 and secular reformists. For the first time, this movement enabled Iranian feminists and women’s rights activists managed to powerfully connect to a broad range of social groups throughout society. Those who observe this movement recognize the role of Iranian feminists since it gave women hope, encouraged them again to be active social agents and it mobilized those women who held a strong belief in justice, equality, and reform. Nevertheless, in regard to the consensus and the solidarity that the feminist groups had created with other social groups and individuals within the Green Movement, unfortunately, they were not able to maintain it. As a student who actively followed, observed, and at times, participated in different events, gatherings, and campaigns in Iran (2002–2010), I would insist that the experience of the Green Movement was quite different from all of the other previous cooperations and coalitions. The social-­ political atmosphere during the 2009 presidential election and the 5  The Green Movement resulted in a kind of military coup d’etat, brutal suppression and the house arrest of Zahra Rahnavard and Mir-Hossein Mousavi. 6  ‘Conservative political groups’ refers to the supporters of Hashemi Rafsanjani. 7  Religious-oriented reformists encompasses those women and men who support reform as revised continuation of the line of Islamic revolution.

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significant presence and role of the different feminist groups and women’s rights activists in mobilizing diverse Iranian women and some other social groups was unprecedented based on the history of the post-revolutionary Iran. As an active citizen during the Green Movement, I could see a big wave of hope for change and reform among the diverse social groups and individuals, particularly among the women. In my opinion, this consensus and cooperation among the diverse groups of women was different from the consensus within the One Million Signatures Campaign since I believed that women had the experiences and knowledge they acquired during the Campaign and the women’s movement and they had become more mature. The unprecedented consensus among the diverse groups and individuals related to the significant role of women, and the non-­ violent political struggles before and after the 2009 Presidential election is and will always be part of the collective memory of my generation. However, during the aftermath of the election, the state repression, the end of the pluralist consensus, and the emergence of disagreements in terms of strategies and approaches to the civil and political struggles were a shock as well as a hint to me. Even though I left Iran in 2010, I could not stop thinking about the ways that the Iranian feminist movement has persisted and can carry on in the future according to its potential despite the obstacles. In Sweden, I met one of the main establishers of the One Million Signatures Campaign hoping to achieve an accurate understanding of the main challenges that the Iranian women’s movement has faced. Following this meeting, I began to ask myself why this consensus as well as others that had been established, including the consensus within the Green Movement, did not continue. The discussion above outlines the context for this research. My interest in this research project arises from the fact that despite the distinctions among diverse women’s rights groups and activists, and the differences among the various social groups, such as, the religious and ethnic minorities, these diverse factions at times have made moves toward solidarity. The short life of this consensus in addition to others has motivated me to investigate the links between the women’s rights advocate groups/individuals and different social groups, and the women’s activism’s potential to help to form a critical civil society working toward reform in IRI. Considering this background, the core research question of this study is as follows:

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• To what extent can the women’s rights groups and activists in the IRI address the interests of women, while also engaging with the diverse social groups, to help facilitate the formation of a civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes toward reform in the country? To answer this question, it is important to explore the following subquestions: I. How has women’s activism emerged in the theocratic system of post-revolutionary Iran? II. In what areas of the public sphere have women developed activism? III. What groups and individuals are involved in women’s pub lic activism? The present study contributes to and advances the existing scholarship on the women’s activism in the Middle East, particularly in Iran, in several ways. First, the existing scholarship in the field of Iranian women’s activism is more method-driven and descriptive-analytical and less concerned about constructing theoretical investigation: it mainly describes the character of the different feminist groups/feminist approaches; it explains the existing legal issues women face in post-revolutionary Iran; it explains gender, state policies, and social changes; and it provides a thick description of the women’s movement, campaigns, and the ordinary women’s everyday resistance (H.  Afshar 1998; Afary 2009; Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Badran 2005; Barlow 2012; Bayat 2002, 2007, 2010; Bayat-­ Moghadam 2018; Ghorashi 1996; Moghadam 2002, 2003a, b; Moghissi 1994; Osanloo 2013; Paidar 1995; Sameh 2010; Sedghi 2007; Shahidian 2002). In response to this gap in the literature, the present study will propose a new interpretation of women’s activism, by working with a Habermasian deliberative theoretical framework. The scholarly significance of this research is that it provides the theoretical grounds for the analysis of a critical deliberative civil society working for reform in IRI. The present study adds to that part of the literature by showing how a Habermasian deliberative model can be applied to analyze civil society activism in a non-secular society like Iran. Second, the study will provide a comprehensive analysis of the political and social role of women’s rights groups and activists in organizing around women’s interests and social justice and equality issues, in participating in

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the formation of a deliberative civil society, and in partnering with various social groups in the IRI toward the formation of a critical civil society.8. In other words, this study aims to bring to light the potential of the Iranian women’s rights groups and individuals to engage in civil society and to work toward deliberative reform in post-revolutionary Iran—a potential that is excluded from mainstream scholarship rather than merely provide a description of the situation and re-explain the existing issues and barriers to the deliberative process. The practical/ethical goal of the research is to provide the scholarly and theoretical grounding for the formation of a powerful critical civil society to support deliberative reform in IRI.

Why Is This Research Important? First, the research presents a feminist re-reading of Habermas’ theory and applies this Habermaisan model of public sphere to understand, analyze, and argue about women’s activism in a non-secular and non-democratic society like Iran. The Habermasian framework for the analysis of and argument about women’s activism is the main contribution of this study to the existing scholarly context. This Habermasian theoretical approach makes this work different from some existing studies on Iranian women’s activism based on social movement theories and resistance theory (Bayat 2010; Bayat-Moghadam 2018; Mahdi 2004; Moghadam 2003a, 2005; Jalaeipour 2003). Through applying social movement theories or resistance theory, the existing literature mainly examines women’s activism based on their (hidden) individual forms of resistance or based on their (visible) collective actions and the formation of collective identity. While this book has benefited from this valuable group of literature, it applies a Habermasian theoretical approach to better understand and analyze the complexities of women’s activism in Iran. The Habermasian framework helps to introduce a different interpretation of women’s activism, to go beyond the dichotomy of normal activism or social movements and everyday forms of resistance, and to consider women’s activism more broadly. Additionally, since there is a complicated normative content in the language of Habermas, the book does not only provide a description and analysis of women’s activism through the Habermasian lens, but this 8  A critical civil society is defined here as a civil society capable of engaging in a deliberative process toward reform in Iran.

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theoretical lens also helps to send messages to the readers of the book about what women and other social groups can learn from their practices or can do. (For more details on the existing literature that have been beneficial to this study, please see the next section ‘The Scholarly Context’). Second, following the inclusive approach to the women’s activism in Iran, it is worth emphasizing that the study is particularly about women as it relates to their public sphere activism, including organized and unorganized activism, and relations and associations with broader social groups toward facilitating the formation of deliberative civil society. The book does not aim to examine a single ‘women’s movement’ or ‘feminist movement’ in Iran. Third, the research broadens the scholarly focus beyond the exclusively theological (re-interpretation of Islam) and legal (discriminatory laws in the Islamic Constitution) issues the current literature addresses. In doing so, this study assesses the capacity for the women’s activism to facilitate the formation of deliberative civil society through collaboration with diverse societal groups. As it relates to the contents of Women’s journals, such as, Zanan, feminists’ interviews and speeches, and much of the academic literature, show that the dominant debates within the women’s movement are mainly based on the theological, and legal and political issues that affect Iranian women’s lives after the Islamic Revolution (H. Afshar 1996a, b; Azam Zanganeh 2006; Kar 1994a, b, 1997b, 2001b, 2010; Najmabadi 1998; Nakanishi 1998; Neshat 1983; Osanloo 2013; Tohidi 1991). I argue here that focusing exclusively on the legal and theological discussions has in large part created an intellectual feminist discourse that resonates only with those who are in the elite class and those in the intellectual class. This study will thus make space for a theory and an inclusive approach to women’s activism in the IRI that can link the women’s rights groups, individuals, and activists from a diverse social and ideological background together toward the formation of a pluralist public sphere. Fourth, in contrast with some of the feminist studies on Iranian women’s rights in post-revolutionary Iran that highlight the oppressive state power or the emergence of fundamentalist/political Islam as an obstacle (Mir-Hosseini 1999; Moallem 2005; Moghissi 1999; Najmabadi 1998; Tohidi 1991), the present work focuses on the positive capacities of women’s activism in the context of Iran. Hence, this study is important and significant since it undertakes to broaden the mainstream scholarly view on and an analysis of the Iranian women’s activism. The book challenges the scholarly perspectives that have given too much attention to state

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power and underestimated the potential of women’s rights groups and social activists. Accordingly, I do not explore my research questions using an oppressor-oppressed paradigm, since this approach does not take into account the ability of the oppressed to engender meaningful social change. Instead, I intend to concentrate on the capacity of the Iranian women’s rights groups and activists to make connections with the diverse social groups by citing their common concerns to engage in the process of creating the formation of civil society in Iran. In fact, despite different crackdowns and the challenge of securitization, social activism, and women’s activism, in particular, is continuing in the context of IRI. Thus, while I acknowledge the chilling effects of repressive power on social and political activism in IRI, the main focus of the study is on the ongoing women’s public activism in this particular securitized context. Fifth, in pursuit of an inclusive approach to women’s activism, the study considers both women’s rights groups and activists, and a number of diverse social groups, such as, religious minorities, as important civil society actors. This contrasts with civil society studies in the Middle East that focus only on female actors (Krause 2008, 2012) or Iranian studies that pay attention mainly to male actors in the process of contemporary social-­ political transformations (Abrahamian 1982; Esposito 1990). The final significance of this study is in challenging various scholars who argue that Islamic Middle Eastern countries can never establish a sustainable civil society (Lewis 2003; McDonald 2006; Roy 1996), including those who exclude the possibility of communication and consensus between feminist groups and the other diverse social groups toward creating the formation of civil society (Krause 2008, 2012). The book will challenge these studies by focusing on the formation of civil society through the deliberative process in the IRI.

The Scholarly Context As mentioned, in regard to a comprehensive study on women’s activism and civil society in Iran involving the construction of a theoretical ground, it does not exist. Hence, this current research is distinctive within a scholarly context. Nevertheless, considering the historical origins of feminism in the Middle East, there is a wide range of texts to consider. The first group can be categorized as the early works (the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century) that are concerned with the status of women in Muslim societies. Some of this early literature was

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written by well-known scholars from a theological perspective, or it is based on Islamic legal process, to clarify the status of women in Islam generally, and in the Quran. Such works include, for example, those of Sheikh Mohammad Abdou9 (1849–1905) and Qasim Amin10 (1865–1908) (Amı ̄n 2000; Kurzman 2002). Another set of such early writings, produced by famous Muslim feminists is based on observations and personal experiences from a feminist perspective. Examples of this include the speeches of Bahithat al-Badiya (1886–1918) (Badran and Cooke 1990), the writings of Nawal al-Sadaawi (born1931) (El-Saadawi 1982, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2002) and the works of Naila Minai based on the existing literature, interviews, and her experiences (Minai 1981). The second group of scholarly texts includes some literature which has focused on a feminist interpretation of the Quran (Barlas 2002; Mernissi 1987, 1991; Wadud 1999). Following the feminist discourse in Muslim Middle Eastern countries, and after the emergence of Islamic feminism in the 1990s, some scholarly works have investigated feminism, Islam, fundamentalism and Islamic feminism, in general. These works scrutinize Islamic feminism as a discourse alongside the other existing feminist discourses, especially secular feminism, in some cases with particular attention to the relationship of these discourses in terms of social, political, and economic transformations (Badran 2001, 2005, 2009; Badran and Cooke 1990; Barlas 2008; Elsadda et  al. 2010; Kandiyoti 1988, 1991, 1996, Moghadam 1987, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2002, 2003b, 2005; Moghissi 1999; Riham 2011; Seedat 2013; Yamani 1996). Third, a range of work has been conducted from a legal perspective, mostly to uncover the gender-discriminatory laws that affect the economic, social, and political status of women in the IRI (Kar 1994c, 1997a, 1999a, b, 2000, 2001a) or to reveal the extent to which feminist activism could affect change in the constitution in Iran (Osanloo 2013). These three groups of literature provide a great source of historical, legal, and theological information related to the rights of women in Muslim majority countries. However, I argue here that focusing 9  Sheikh Mohammad Abdou is a liberal reformer, Egyptian religious figure, and one of the main founding fathers of Islamic Modernism. 10  Qasim Amin has been the secular jurist, and one of the main founders of Egyptian National movement and his books are still considered as first works on feminism in the Arab world.

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exclusively on the legal and theological discussions has in large part created an elitist intellectual feminist discourse. This study will make space for theory and an inclusive approach to women’s activism in Iran. The fourth body of literature, concerning the feminist movement in the IRI specifically, mostly includes studies written after the 1990s and the emergence of Islamic feminism. Some of these studies that are based on Zanan magazine celebrate the emergence of Islamic feminism as feminism which is capable of working with secular feminism and moving toward reform in the IRI (Moghadam 2002; Najmabadi 1997, 1998). The majority of this literature has examined the context of post-revolutionary Iran, to explain the status of women alongside the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, Islamization, and the Islamic constitution. The majority of studies in this group has attempted to clarify what Islamic feminism follows theoretically and methodologically; what the main differences are among the various Iranian feminist groups-specifically Islamic and secular feminism; and what the relationship is between the Iranian feminists and Islamic fundamentalists (H. Afshar 1993, 1998; F. Ahmadi 2006; Badran 2009; Ghorashi 1996; Moghadam 2002; Moghissi 1994, 1998, 1999; Najmabadi 1997, 1998; Paidar 1995; Tohidi 1991). This study acknowledges the existence of different Iranian feminist groups, particularly Islamic and secular, and understands the differences among feminist groups. However, as mentioned, the focal point of the work is on ‘women’s activism’ rather than Islamic and secular feminism and their differences. The research assumption is that exclusively considering Islamic and secular feminist groups in leadership positions and providing a detailed discussion of their differences would resonate only with those who are in the elite class and those in the intellectual class. This is in contrast with the inclusive approach of the study. Additionally, as there are many debates around Islamic and secular feminism in the context of Iran, and a large body of literature has extensively considered the relations and differences between these two feminist discourses, the present study will avoid a detailed discussion of different feminist groups in Iran. It is also worth mentioning that mapping the world (‘Iranian women’s activism’ in this research context) into dichotomies limits the possibilities we can consider in the way toward achieving justice (Ackerly and True 2010: 26–27). Accordingly, the book will focus on the ongoing story of women’s activism across these differences. The study will be about women as it relates to their public sphere activism and their relations and associations with broader social groups toward facilitating the formation of

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deliberative civil society. It will not be a study particularly about those who call themselves feminist, including secular and religious, or those who are usually identified under these labels; rather, the study will consider women’s activism more broadly. Fifth, there is very little if any literature that can be found about civil society and women in the Middle East. The significant work in this literature includes case studies on UAE (Krause 2008), Egypt (Krause 2012) and Turkey (Caha 2013); a study that considers sociology of space in Iran (Shahrokni 2020); as well as short and valuable articles on gender and civil society in the Middle East more generally (Al-Ali 2003; Gheytanchi 2001; Moghadam 2003a). Among the existing case studies, Krause’s case studies of the UAE and Egypt are valuable resources because of the Islamic context of the cases. By highlighting certain particular indigenous women’s actions and the role of women in the uprisings in 2011, Krause challenges several critical conclusions in the literature about Islamic societies. This includes challenging the claims that Islam and Shari’a law are barriers to the formation of civil society; that Islam has failed to embrace modernity; that Muslim social movements are a return to pre-modern and early Islamic values; and that there is a lack of women’s political agency and political society in the Middle East because of the patriarchal and oppressive political systems (Lewis 2003; McDonald 2006; Roy 1996). Nevertheless, the UAE case study (Krause 2008), which mainly considers the role of women’s networks and gatherings in connection with the formation of civil society fails to take into account or mention a women’s movement or its relationship with the existing intersectional groups in UAE society. Similarly, despite demonstrating the influence of both the secular and Islamic organizations on the formation of civil society in Egypt, Krause (2012) does not consider the role of Islamic and secular feminist groups as social and political players that contribute to this process. In addition, Krause’s study of Egypt does not pay enough attention to the relationship between women’s groups and other social groups within the society. It concentrates on women’s activism, focusing especially on the networking that occurred among the private women’s organizations during the uprising of 2011. Regarding the short articles on women and civil society in the Middle East, Moghadam’s article “Engendering Citizenship, Feminizing Civil Society” (Moghadam 2003a) is mainly a descriptive work on the strategies the women employed to ‘feminize’ civil society in the region. Even though the author insists on the vital importance of developing a civil society,

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however, unfortunately, fails to propose any alternative means of carrying this out, and highlights the political and religious barriers within the state institutions that do not support the development of a civil society. The second article, “Civil Society in Iran: Politics of Motherhood and the Public Sphere” (Gheytanchi 2001), mostly based on an analysis of Zanan magazine, considers Iranian women’s struggles for the translation of their particular needs as mothers in the family into the discourse of civil society. The article argues that the public sphere has existed since the 1979 Islamic revolution and it includes an analysis of the ways women have struggled to include themselves in civil society. Nevertheless, the author does not comprehensively analyze the public sphere, which has excluded a majority of the women, for example, secular women or a majority of the minority groups. Gheytanchi bases her analysis on the separation between the non-­ civil and civil spheres however this study does not take this approach. The article considers the Iranian women’s movement through an oppressor-­ oppressed and resistance paradigm and examines the civil society from a narrow perspective confined to the role of periodicals. By contrast, the current study will avoid applying an oppressor-oppressed paradigm, or analyze civil society based on one indicator, such as women’s periodicals. In addition, the present study on the analysis of Iranian civil society will discuss the period from 2001 to the present. Gheytanchi’s article overlooks the leading role of Iranian women in terms of the formation of critical civil society and does not investigate the social and political role of women’s rights groups in the public sphere of the IRI. In contrast, the present study aims to bring to light the potential of Iranian women’s rights groups and activists in terms of facilitating the formation of a sustainable civil society within which women and intersectional groups are able to actively cooperate and engage in deliberative processes toward reform in the IRI. The third article on civil society and women in the Middle East, “Gender and Civil Society in the Middle East” (Al-Ali 2003), offers the valuable warning that we should avoid generalizations about gender and civil society in the region due to the existence of diverse traditions, economic and political conditions, and cultural practices. This work is mainly about the women’s actions through NGOs and voluntary organizations and it highlights the oppressive laws that have confined the activities of women. In regards to the book entitled ‘Women in Place: the Politics of Gender Segregation in Iran’ (Shahrokni 2020), the study is mainly about the sociology of space. The author describes and analyzes how despite the gender

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segregation policies and the state’s attempt to regulate women’s bodies, Iranian women’s access to the public sphere has been expanded. It is a valuable work that focuses on Iranian women’s everyday life and women’s potentials for making changes in society. The book can be considered as a great study on gender, state, and sociopolitical analysis. Shahrokni (2020) helps the readers to better understand the sociopolitical changes that happen in a religious context like Iran and provides a valuable description of women’s public activism in specific places like gender-segregated buses, women-only parks, or stadiums where women are banned to attend men’s soccer matches. However, the book does not comprehensively consider women’s activism in some other public spheres, including media or parliamentary and extra-parliamentary spheres that will be considered in this study. The book does not consider the relationship between women with some other social groups and individuals. The book does not aim to analyze how women’s everyday life and practices can/could facilitate the formation of a sustainable critical civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes of reform in the country. It seems that the author mainly aims to provide a descriptive-analytical work about women’s access to some particular public spheres under the shadow of the politics of gender segregation. So, the author is less concerned about the construction and application of a particular theoretical foundation for the analysis of and argument about women’s public sphere activism and civil society in Iran. While this study has been greatly inspired by many of the literature in the fifth group, it tries to address gaps and contribute to the existing knowledge by applying a feminist Habermasian theoretical foundation for analysis of and argument about Iranian women’s public sphere activism and its relationship with other social groups and activists aiming to show how this activism can/could facilitate the formation of a deliberative civil society in a non-secular context like Iran. In general, it is important to note that the existing literature on gender and civil society in Muslim Middle Eastern countries has mostly considered women’s actions through one specific indicator, either women’s NGOs, women’s private organizations and everyday actions, or women’s periodicals. It has not, however, analyzed the development of relationships between the women’s rights activists and groups, and some other social groups in these societies as a means of building a powerful critical civil society. The sixth area of scholarship I have identified, concerning the relationship between the feminist discourses and the other social groups in the IRI

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consists of only one comprehensive work, written by Nayaereh Tohidi (2009). Tohidi, a prominent Iranian feminist writes about the status of ethnic and religious minorities in the political situation of IRI. Along with the literature mentioned, on gender and civil society in some Muslim Middle Eastern countries, Tohidi’s exceptional work does not particularly consider the links between the women’s rights activists and groups and some social groups like ethnic and religious minorities. Even so, Tohidi’s research is evidence that the rights of minority groups are a concern for some Iranian feminists. Notwithstanding the lack of a comprehensive analysis of Iranian women’s activism and its relationships with some other social groups in the Middle East, the literature identified above is a valuable academic resource because it challenges the orientalist arguments on civil society and women in Muslim societies. Most of the existing scholarly literature on women and civil society in this region are descriptive works that focus on women’s actions and strategies toward feminizing the civil society. What is lacking is a critical analysis of the relationships between the different women’s rights groups/activists, and networks and their relationships with intersectional groups regarding the formation of civil society. The existing literature is a good source of information on the theological and historical origins of feminism in the Islamic context of the Middle East. The scholarly literature helps readers gain a comprehensive understanding of the different feminist discourses in the Middle East and particularly the IRI.  Yet, the scholarly work on feminism in IRI is more descriptive and less analytical. While it offers a clear picture of features of different feminist articulations and achievements (H.  Afshar 1998; F. Ahmadi 2006; Badran 2005; Bayat 2010; Ghorashi 1996; Moghadam 2001; Moghissi 1994; Najmabadi 1997; Osanloo 2013; Tohidi 1991), unfortunately, it fails to give a clear picture of the failures, issues, and problems which are important to investigate. As such, based on a review of the literature, it is usually limited to the status of women after the Islamic revolution that is based on an accurate analysis of the new Islamic constitution (Stewart 2009; Kar 1999a, b, 2001a, b; Mir-Hosseini 1998, 1999; Moghissi 1994; Najmabadi 1998; Nakanishi 1998). Furthermore, the analysis is confined to subjects, such as, what those in the feminist movement have done since the revolution; what this movement achieved, sometimes by citing statistics; and how the state has reacted to this movement including women’s activism and suppressed it (Bayat 2010; Barlow 2012; Moghadam 2002, 2003a; Najmabadi 1998; Osanloo

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2013; Tohidi 1991). For instance, two works on feminist activism in IRI, written by Arezoo Osanloo (2013) and Rebecca L. Barlow (2012), provide a clear understanding of the current situation of feminists and their advocacy of legal reforms in the IRI. However, these works have failed to adopt a critical, problem-driven approach to highlight the problems in the women’s movement, particularly the theoretical issues, in order to provide a basis for improving the movement. Investigating and responding to the problems and issues facing the women’s movement in IRI will provide a better and more practical and theoretical future for the movement. It is also worth mentioning that most of the existing-mentioned-­ scholarly works are conducted either from a historical (Badran 2001, 2005, 2009; Badran and Cooke 1990), sociological (Gheytanchi 2001; Moghadam 1987, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2003a, b; Shahrokni 2020; Tohidi 1998, 2002, 2009), or developmental perspective (Kandiyoti 1988, 1991). Thus, it is not easy to find a work based on a political science perspective. Although there are only limited works, which address the defects of the feminist discourses in the Middle East and particularly the feminist movement in the IRI (Ghorashi 1996; Moghadam 2001, 2002, 2003a; Tohidi 2011), they are mostly confined to general descriptive works that do not propose possible solutions. Concerning the issue of civil society and women, as mentioned, there is also a limited number of works, mostly about the importance of global civil society, the global state of women’s rights, the interplay between the local and the global factors, women’s networks, collective actions and transnational feminist networks (Krause 2008; Moghadam 2000, 2003a, 2005; Tohidi 2002, 2003). In only a few cases, this literature briefly, and in general terms, points to the formation of civil society as a necessary condition of democracy and women’s emancipation, and then it highlights the religious and political barriers to the formation of civil society in the IRI (Moghadam 2003a). In addition, some scholars have either exaggerated the achievements of the feminist movement in the IRI or they have underestimated the importance of the basic differences among the different women’s rights groups. Most of the scholars celebrate the occasional cooperation between the Islamic and the secular feminist groups without adapting a critical problem-driven approach. The latter is necessary to identify the issues and provide a foundation for a sustainable, long-­ term consensus and cooperation between them, and between these two main wings of feminism and the other diverse social groups working toward deliberative social reform.

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Consequently, although there is almost no work on women’s rights groups and activists in the Middle East and their relationships with other social groups toward the formation of a deliberative civil society, in some sections, this research is partly inspired by Badran’s works on Islamic and secular feminism (Badran 2005, 2009), Bayat’s works on social activism and politics in the Iranian society (Bayat 2010, 2013), Moghadam’s works on different feminist discourses in the IRI (Moghadam 2001, 2002), Moghadam’s work on the importance of civil society in the Middle East and particularly in the IRI (Moghadam 2003a), and Nayereh Tohidi’s writings, concerning the right of minority groups and regarding the idea of intersectionality (Tohidi 2002, 2009). The most important gap that this research will fill is highlighting the lack of scholarly literature on women’s activism in the IRI and its relationship with other social groups working toward the formation of a deliberative civil society.

Research Methodology Here I adopt Harding’s definition of methodology as a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed (Harding 1987: 2–3). The methodology that the present research will follow is a form of feminist methodology. “For feminists, it is a moral and political rather than a scientific discussion that has served as the paradigm of rational discourse” (Harding 1987: 12; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 15). Since there is more than one moral and political position within feminism, there have always been contested debates on feminist methodology. Although methodology is usually considered as a particular set of methods or way of doing research, a feminist methodology is not a series of particular methods or guidelines for research, like a protocol (Ackerly and True 2010: 6). A feminist project is understood as ‘feminist’ by its research question, by the theoretical basis of the project and by following a feminist research ethic throughout the research process rather than by any particular method (s) applied or specific normative commitments (Ackerly and True 2010: 6–7). The feminist research ethic followed in this study refers to a commitment to pay particular attention to marginalization, silences, absences, interconnections, and a sensitivity to ‘situatedness’ (Ackerly and True 2010: 22–23).

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The feminist methodology followed by this study is first, based on the fact that a female researcher will study women and their activism. Second, the methodology of the research is identified as feminist since it is shaped by a feminist version/feminist re-reading of the existing (traditional) theories, and it is grounded in women’s activism and experience (Harding 1987: 3; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002:16). Third, the current research can be considered as feminist since it aims to contribute knowledge that might be useful for the reformation/transformation of gendered injustice and subordination within society as a form of social change (Burns and Walker 2005; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 147). In other words, it is feminist research because it can help facilitate the ways toward social change by following a feminist approach to the theory (Burns and Walker 2005: 66). Fourth, the researcher will follow the aim of enabling diverse women’s voices and experiences to be heard (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 15). The researcher seeks to produce knowledge of social life, social activism and collective public action in this research that are reasonable according to the evidence and telling some truth (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 15–16). Research Theory and Conceptualization The theory, that is proposed and followed in this research, will shape the main research question on women’s rights activists and groups and how they can address the interests of women while engaging with other social groups to facilitate the formation of deliberative civil society. The theory can help the researcher to conceptualize and explain the different aspects of social life and women’s activism and their interconnections (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002). The choice of theory is tightly related to the researcher’s ontological assumptions (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 151). The main ontological assumptions that have affected the choice of theory in the current research are: (1) citizens have the capacity to communicate regardless of their self-interests; (2) the (feminist) subject is situated in the (specific historical) context while it is capable of challenging this situatedness. According to these two main ontological assumptions and considering the specific historical context of Iran, the research bases its theoretical framework for the analysis of, and the argument about, civil society and the women’s activism mainly on a Habermasian deliberative foundation (Chap. 2). Habermas’ thought is not unfamiliar to scholars and even some

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clerics in the IRI due to his visit to the country in 2002 (Shaffer 2006). It is argued that Khatami’s proposal for ‘dialogue among civilizations’ (Petito 2004; United Nations 2000) and his acknowledgment of the concept of dialogue and civil society were derived from his reading of Habermas (Shaffer 2006). Furthermore, considering the contemporary political history of the IRI, it is credible to conclude that the reformists are inclined to seek a consensus based on communication because it would probably be more sustainable than a consensus as a result of a provisional hegemony (Mouffe 2000: 104). Iranians experienced the latter during the 1979 Islamic revolution. In terms of reaching a consensus, it has been an unsuccessful experience, having turned into an exclusive and oppressive Islamic system (Dabashi 2011). The Islamic revolution’s model of consensus through hegemony is associated with the elimination of diversity within society; the suppression of differences; political oppression; and finally, the formation of a biased, engineered consensus. Accordingly, the current research presupposes that consensus through hegemony can be contrasted and viewed with the acceptance of difference and receptivity toward others. Within the non-democratic, heterogeneous context of the IRI, the consensus through communication, acceptance of diversity, and receptivity toward others would be a necessary ground for the formation of a civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes for democratic reform. Thus, I will draw on Habermasian theory since it is a fundamental framework for deliberative democracy and civil society, and it can help the researcher to analyze what has happened/is happening in Iran. In addition, from a feminist perspective, I will also draw on some other theories, including counterpublics, to extend the research theoretical framework, and to develop a normative argument about what can and should happen. In fact, since there is a complicated normative content in the language of Habermas, while I am analyzing women’s activism through the Habermasian lens, simultaneously, this theoretical lens helps me to send messages to my readers about what women and other social groups can learn from their practices or can do. These action-oriented messages are implicit in the normative dimension of Habermasian model that emphasizes non-violent action, the importance of flexibility, forbearance, communicative management of conflicts, a reflexive attitude regarding their claims, and self-assessment (see Chap. 2 for more details). So, I would like to emphasize here that this normative aspect of the present research is completely different from a prescriptive dimension or a series of policy recommendations.

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In the context of this study, civil society’s institutional core encompasses those non-governmental and non-economic connections, networks, (voluntary) associations, and organizations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere (Habermas 1996: 367). In the context of the study, discussions on the civil society and public sphere do not refer to one formal overarching public sphere; rather, there is an emphasis on the multiplicity of publics where private persons come together as a public—as a critical force within the society (see Chap. 2 for details). The book emphasizes the importance of a society within which we can see active citizens, collective work/people-centered work, and different public spaces that engage various citizens in deliberative processes. In the context of this study and within its theoretical framework, activism can be of any kind of activity ranging from individual to collective action, encompassing different types of activity ranging from apparently political activities to pre-figurative political activities, from visibly public social activities in the actual world to cyber-public social activities on cyberspace. What is essential regarding these multiple forms of activism is that they reinforce and enhance communicative structures within the public sphere and in a proceduralist model bring about social change. In general, a social movement must be able to bring social change in a country. So, although this work will not be a particular study on Iranian social movements, the Habermasian theoretical-analytical lens applied in this study can create a new paradigm for future studies on the analysis and critique of Iranian social movements, in particular, the women’s movement. Furthermore, it is worth explaining that the research approach to the role of NGOs is tightly connected to the research view to civil society and the public sphere, as explained earlier. It means that the book insists that NGOs alongside or at times in collaboration with other non-­governmental, non-economic associations, organizations, and networks can play an important role in preserving the communicative structures of the public sphere. In the context of this research, there is an emphasis on the plurality of publics that have been formed in response to marginalization, ignorance, exclusion, injustice, or inequality from the wider (dominant) public. So, NGOs, where individuals come together as a public, can help their members to articulate their oppositional interpretations of their needs and interests or can be spaces that engage different groups of people in deliberative processes. The book shows that NGOs can raise social issues that have been usually ignored within the wider dominant public. NGOs can play a vital role in promoting dialogue, deliberation, the culture of

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deliberative cooperation, and culture of tolerance and compromise in society. NGOs can play a role in developing public conversation and the formation of public opinion. Additionally, the study understands that NGOs at times in communicative interaction, cooperation, and consensus with some other (counter) publics can affect the process of decision making. However, regarding civil society organizations, I would like to acknowledge that finding these forms of organizations in a context like Iran is very difficult or more difficult than identifying them in a democratic country. For example, I am sensitive to the fact that in Iran there are semi-NGOs that I prefer to call them only ‘GO’ since they are state-sponsored organizations working under the label of NGO (see Chap. 4). In the context of IRI, there is not enough support of real (independent) NGOs in different fields, such as women’s rights, human rights, environment, and so on; in fact, there are many policies and obstacles which restrict the activism of these forms of civil society organizations. Accordingly, throughout the book, I will emphasize ‘Independent’ NGOs. Regarding research interviews with members of NGOs, I am acquainted with some important independent organizations and their main members because of years of living in Iran as an active citizen, and a political science student concerned about women’s rights, and children’s rights. So, I can confidently say that participants in this research have no membership in any governmental or state-sponsored organization. I am aware of specific nuances regarding civil society organizations in Iran, and for this reason, I have been careful to find members of publics that in my research framework considered as counter-publics/oppositional forces. Following from research theory, research conceptualization, and research ontology, it is now essential to clarify the research method and method of analysis. Research Method and the Scope of the Study A research method refers to the techniques and ways of gathering evidence, and procedures used for exploring the social reality (Harding 1987: 2; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002: 11). To some degree, the choice of research methods is determined according to the case of a study that is scrutinizing the Iranian women’s activism and the civil society as in the present research. It must be noted that the scope of the study can also affect the way of proceeding in gathering the data and evidence. Hence,

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first, the scope of the study must be defined by a specific period and particular forms of activity. In examining the role of Iranian women’s activism in building a deliberative civil society, the book limits the scope of the research to Iranian women’s activism between 1979 and early 2017 with a particular focus on this form of activism after 1997. This specific time limitation has been selected based on different reasons. First, despite the domination of a theocratic system after 1979, Iranian women’s activism has played an important role in contemporary Iran’s political evolution. Second, the present study pays particular attention to women’s activism after 1997 at the time the reformist movement emerged with the main slogan of the development of civil society. Third, the study will consider women’s activism in Iran’s public sphere by early 2017 because Iran has been located in the tension-prone area of the Middle East and its social, political, and economic conditions are rapidly and unexpectedly fluctuating. Alongside this time limitation, the present study is limited to the women’s and civil society activism while acknowledging the repressive nature of the existing political system. As mentioned, in the scholarly context, most of the existing literature has considered the effect of the Islamic system on women in Iran, and this is not the focus of this study. Despite the establishment of a patriarchal constitution, from the early years of the revolution, different women’s groups have resisted and used any aperture in the system to enter the public sphere. A year after the revolution, many women entered into the public arena as nurses, doctors, lawyers, and so forth, during the IranIraq war (1980–1988) as well as martyrs’ wives who raised their oppositional voices against the discriminatory law of guardianship11 (Kar and Hoodfar 1996; Kar 2001b). In fact, despite the patriarchal constitution, certain traditionally gendered spheres remained open to women and offered opportunities. As an example, since the early years of the revolution, women, including women from traditional and religious families, have played a prominent role in the field of education (Afzali and Hoodfar 2007: 43; Ebadi 1998: 44; Hoodfar 2010: 489) and health (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Hoodfar 1996, 2009, 2010). After entering into the public domain as students, teachers, or health volunteers, Iranian women gradually developed their public participation and 11  Fathers of war martyrs became the guardian of the martyrs’ children and also received childcare payments from the Martyr Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid) (Kar and Hoodfar 1996; Kar 2001b: 180).

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deliberative engagement in the public sphere through a multilevel and contextual activism. Accordingly, the case/object of the present study is particularly women as it relates to their public sphere activism toward facilitating the formation of deliberative civil society. Following from this, the study is bounded to the activity of groups and individuals inside Iran, specifically in three fields: women’s activism in the media (see Chap. 3), civil society activism (see Chap. 4), and parliamentary and extra (outside)-parliamentary activism (see Chap. 5). This research presents a study of Iranian women’s activism to show how Iranian women’s activism has developed and operated within a particular ‘political field,’ which is revolutionary and theocratic. The study aims to develop a richer understanding of Iranian women’s activism by working within a deliberative theoretical framework. Through this study, the research describes women’s public activism and their achievements, and challenges by using different methods of gathering data and evidence, and different ways of analysis, including semi-structured interviews, observations, personal communications, online resources, publications, newspapers, journals, and analysis of journals’ and newspapers’ contents, images, documentaries/movies, and so forth, though not an in-depth-text/content/documentary analysis. Method of Analysis As mentioned, the commitment of the feminist methodology of the present research and the importance of this study is to make a space for a theory that can advance the practices of women’s rights groups, activists, and some other social groups to move together toward the formation of a public sphere that is capable of engaging in certain deliberative processes of reform and justice. The theory proposed/used will guide a discussion of the findings, and an analysis of the collected data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1283). This form of analysis is identified as a form of ‘directed content analysis’ and the main aim is to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1281). The directed approach to content analysis will be constructive for the current study since further description can benefit the theoretical framework that is proposed for the research. The main strength of a directed approach to content analysis is that the existing/proposed theory can be supported or/and extended (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1283). Although

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this method of analysis is mostly used for the data that can be coded, it is not necessarily limited to this form of data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). For instance, the directed approach to content analysis can be used to analyze data that has been collected through interviews with a focus on the content of the transcripts (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Therefore, this study will use the directed approach for the analysis of the contents of journals, newspapers, speeches, movies/documentaries, statements, images, interviews, personal communications, and so forth. Considering the limitations of neatly applying the directed content analysis to the present research, I will apply a revised version of this method of analysis in line with the research methodology, the research subject and questions, and the scope of the research. According to this revised directed approach to the content analysis, first, the researcher will identify the key concepts, variables, and practices as initial (supporting) data/evidence; second, by using the theoretical research framework, the researcher will provide a new interpretation, description, and analysis of those concepts and practices (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). In the study, I apply a form of directed content analysis to gather the evidence regarding the interconnections and cooperation among various women’s rights groups, and between these groups and some other social groups, and the potential of Iranian women’s activism to help form a deliberative, critical civil society, with the aim to support or even extend the research theoretical framework. Accordingly, while the research has been benefited from a wide range of literature on women’s movement and the variety of campaigns, following the theoretical aims and the research method of analysis, I draw more on some specific literature-selected literature—that can help to better elaborate on Habermasian concepts and show how the Habermasian deliberative model can be applied to analyze a critical deliberative civil society in a non-secular country like Iran.

Research Limitations The first limitation refers to the content analysis of the women’s journals and magazines because it was not easy to access all of the magazines and issues published until early 2017. During the fieldwork, I could hardly find ways to go to the library of Planning and Budget organization to read some of the women’s magazines, particularly Zanan. Even in the library, I could not find the issues of Zanan that were published between 2005 and 2008 since, during this

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period, the dominant government of Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) had abolished the Planning and Budget Organization. Also, to have access to issues of Zanan-e-Emrouz published between 2016 and 2018, I did not have a chance to easily order them from overseas; so, I asked family members to purchase and post some of them to me. Hence, as mentioned previously, the analysis will be selective and will focus in particular on the Zanan magazine, as the most important women’s magazine in the IRI. As an example, the study will selectively employ an analysis of particular issues of Zanan that were published between 1992 and 2008 and new issues that were published between 2014 and 2017 under the new name, Zanan-e Emrouz. The second limitation is the lack of literature on the lived experiences of women’s rights activists and the present situation of the civil society in Iran. Likewise, there is not enough literature and documents about the significant movements and campaigns during the recent decades in Iran, such as the 2009 Green Movement, the One Million Signatures Campaign, and other campaigns related to the women’s activism. To address this limitation, the research will rely on interviews, personal observations, personal communications, personal experiences over the years of living in Iran or traveling to Iran, and a personal collection of old newspapers. It is worth reiterating that the research cannot merely rely on interviews due to the securitized atmosphere in the country. In 2016 during my travels to Iran for the fieldwork, the political atmosphere was even worse than I expected it would be. There was a securitized atmosphere, and this situation negatively affected the process of data collection and interviews while I carried out the fieldwork. It was not at all easy to reach the interviewees; it was incredibly risky to make a connection with intersectional groups, in particular, religious/ethnic/LGBT minorities. Despite security pressures on minority groups and women’s rights groups, at times, Iranian women’s rights activists have worked with members of these groups both in the field of media activism and civil society activism (see Chaps. 3 and 4 for more details). Additionally, from time to time, some of the feminists and women’s rights activists have supported the members of minority groups. A good example is the women’s rights activists campaigning to free Roya Tolooyee, the Kurdish feminist, from prison (see Chap. 4). However, as mentioned, due to severe securitized atmosphere in 2016, it was not possible to easily identify and interview people from intersectional groups for the primary research. The security

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pressure on minority groups has negatively affected the research process to the extent that the study could not substantially be engaged with intersectionality. Nevertheless, the research emphasizes ‘difference’ as a necessary resource for a deliberative politics and acknowledges the existence of intersectional forms of difference and injustice in a heterogeneous society like Iran. In fact, the study acknowledges intersectional difference, and will point to it when it is relevant in discussing women’s activism. Furthermore, due to the securitized atmosphere, it was not an easy task to build trust and convince people to participate in the research. Even though many social activists and ordinary people were eager to participate in the research to share their experiences, only some of them agreed to participate in an individual interview and permit recording the interview. Thus, the third limitation had to do with the securitized atmosphere and the political situation in Iran in general at the time I was collecting the data for this research. In terms of the security issues, the first strategy that I followed was to meet some of the prominent activists within the NGOs personally and then, get the contact details of others to continue the formal interviews, or informal personal communications later on from New Zealand through ‘imo’ or ‘Skype.’ Since building trust was not easy, the second strategy has to do with relying on personal communications and observations by going out within the society, creating networks and forging friendships, attending different gatherings, workshops, visiting specific galleries, bookshops, restaurants, cafes, and so on. These personal observations and communications were so constructive and valuable for this research to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the present society of Iran. Nevertheless, the political situation in Iran has not yet changed, and it has even gotten worse than it was in 2016. So, considering the ethical aspects of the research, the names of the interviewees, even those who are prominent, and the names of the organizations and places will remain anonymous in the book. Table 1 is the list of interviewees who agreed to participate in an individual formal interview and permit recording the interview: The fourth limitation refers to the time and funding restrictions that caused a difficult situation to continue the study up to 2019–2020. Since it was hard to keep the study updated until today, the current research could not comprehensively describe and analyze Iranian women’s cyber-­ activism in today’s society. However, throughout the work, I have explained the role of cyber-counterpublics and briefly provided some examples of cyber-activism.

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Table 1  List of interviewees Code Basic Identity

Data Collection Methods

01

Interview-Iran

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Activist/University Lecturer/Artist/ethnic minority/25–35 years old Activist/NGO manager/ Middle age Activist/senior member in NGO/Middle age Activist/senior member in NGO/Middle age Male Activist/NGO manager/Middle age Male Activist/Charitable organization/ 25–35 years old Activist/Social Worker/former-official/Middle age Activist/Scholar/Psychologist/Middle age Exiled Activist/Middle age

Interview-Iran Interview-Iran Interview-Iran Interview-Iran Interview-Iran Interview-imo app Interview-imo app Interview-imo app

Considering the women’s cyber-activism as an important subject of study on Iranian women’s activism, in 2017–2018, I finished an article about ‘My Stealthy Freedom FaceBook Page’ analyzing this form of cyber-­ activism through applying theory of counterpublics and cyber-­ counterpublics. The article presented in 2017 New Zealand Political Studies Association Conference (Ghoreishi 2017). Following my interest in studying current Iranian women’s cyber-­ activism, in Mid-2020, I started a new research on women’s online activism and the development of the public sphere and deliberative processes of democratization in non-secular societies. However, it is a self-funded research, and so, it is slowly moving forward. It is worth insisting that the women’s cyber-activism in today’s Iran is an important subject of study that could be/must be explored by future studies from different political and sociological approaches.

References Abbasi-Shavazi, M., & McDonald. (2008). Family Change in Iran: Religion, Revolution and the state. In W. A. Rukmalie Jayakody & A. Thornton (Eds.), International Family Change: Ideational Perspectives (pp. 177–199). Taylor & Francis Group. Abrahamian, E. (1982). Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press. Ackerly, B., & True, J. (2010). Doing Feminist Research in Political & Social Science. Palgrave Macmillan. Afary, J. (2009). Sexual Politics in Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press.

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Afshar, H. (1993). Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities and Struggles for Liberation. Palgrave Macmillan Limited. Afshar, H. (1996a). Islam and Feminism: An Analysis of Political Strategies. In M.  Yamani (Ed.), Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives (pp. 197–216). Ithaca Press. Afshar, H. (1996b). Women and Politics in the Third World. Routledge. Afshar, H. (1998). Islam and Feminism: An Iranian Case-Study. St.Martin’s Press. Afzali, N., & Hoodfar, H. (2007). Zanan, rahkarhay-e boomi va ebtekarat-e fardi [Women, Indigenous Approaches and Individual Creativities]. Zanan, 16(147), 42–49. Ahmadi, F. (2006). Islamic Feminism in Iran: Feminism in a New Islamic Context. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion. https://doi.org/10.2979/ FSR.2006.22.2.33. Ahmadi-Khorasani, N. (2010). Iranian Women’s One Million Signatures Campaign for Equality: The Inside Story. Women’s Learning Partnership. Ahmadi-Khorasani, N. (2013). Bahar-e-Jonbesh-e Zanan [The Spring of Iranian Women’s Movement]. Tehran: Moalef. Akbarzadeh, S., & MacQueen, B. (2008). Islam and Human Rights in Practice: Perspectives Across the Ummah. Routledge. Al-Ali, N. (2003). Gender and Civil Society in the Middle East. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(2), 216–232. Amı ̄n, Q. (2000). The Liberation of Women: And, The New Woman : Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism. American University Cairo Press. An-Na’im, A. (2002). Islamic Family Law in A Changing World: A Global Resource Book. Zed Books. Azam Zanganeh, L. (2006). My Sister, Guard Your Veil; My Brother, Guard Your Eyes: Uncensored Iranian Voices. Beacon Press. Badran, M. (2001). Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism. Journal of Women’s History, 13(1), 47–52. Badran, M. (2005). Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 1(1), 6–28. Badran, M. (2009). Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 7(2), 114–117. Badran, M., & Cooke, M. (1990). Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing. Indiana University Press. Barlas, A. (2002). Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an. University of Texas Press. Barlas, A. (2008). Engaging Islamic Feminism: Provincializing Feminism as a Master Narrative. In A. Kynsilehto (Ed.), Islamic Feminism: Current Perspectives (pp. 15–25). Tampere Peace Research Institute. Barlow, R.  L. (2012). Women’s Human Rights and the Muslim Question: Iran’s One Million Signatures Campaign. Melbourne University Press.

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Bayat, A. (2002). Activism and Social Development in the Middle East. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 34(1), 1–28. Bayat, A. (2007). A Women’s Non-Movement: What It Means to Be a Woman Activist in an Islamic State. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27(1), 160–172. Bayat, A. (2010). Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Amsterdam University Press. Bayat, A. (2013). The Making of Post-Islamist Iran. In Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam (pp. 35–71). Oxford University Press. Bayat-Moghadam, D. (2018). From Resistance to Social Movement: The Women’s Movement in Iran. The University of Auckland. Retrieved from https:// researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-­docs/rights.htm. Burns, D., & Walker, M. (2005). Feminist Methodologies. In B.  Somekh & C.  Lewin (Eds.), Research Methods in the Social Sciences (pp.  66–74). Sage Publications. Caha, O. (2013). Women and Civil Society in Turkey: Women’s Movements in a Muslim Society. Ashgate. Dabashi, H. (2011). The Green Movement in Iran. Transaction Publishers. Ebadi, S. (1998). Sahm-e-zanan-e-Irani az Enghelab-e-Eslami [Iranian Women’s Share from the Islamic Revolution]. Jame-e-Salem, 33, 40–44. El-Saadawi, N. (1982). The Hidden Face of Eve. Beacon Press. El-Saadawi, N. (1983). Woman at Point Zero. Zed Books. El-Saadawi, N. (1985). God Dies by the Nile. Zed Books. El-Saadawi, N. (1988). The Fall of the Imam. Saqi Books. El-Saadawi, N. (1989). She Has No Place in Paradise. Minerva. El-Saadawi, N. (1994). Two Women in One. Women In Translation. El-Saadawi, N. (1997). The Nawal El Saadawi Reader. Zed Books. El-Saadawi, N. (2001). Memoirs of a Woman Doctor. City Lights Publishers. El-Saadawi, N. (2002). Walking Through Fire: A Life of Nawal El Saadawi. Zed Books. Elsadda, H., Moghissi, H., Cooke, M., & Valassopoulos, A. (2010). Dialogue Section: Arab Feminist Research and Activism: Bridging the Gap Between the Theoretical and the Practical. Feminist Theory, 11(2), 121–127. https://doi. org/10.1177/1464700110366803. Esposito, J. (1990). The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. University Press of Florida. Gheytanchi, E. (2001). Civil Society in Iran: Politics of Motherhood and the Public Sphere. International Sociology, 16(4), 557–576. Ghorashi, H. (1996). Iranian Islamic and Secular Feminists—Allies or Enemies?. Series: Middle East Research Associates. Ghoreishi, S. (2017). My Stealthy Freedom Facebook Page: An Opportunity for the Current Women’s Movement in Iran?. Researchgate. Retrieved from h t t p s : / / w w w. r e s e a r c h g a t e . n e t / p u b l i c a t i o n / 3 3 8 1 9 8 0 2 7 _ M y _

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Stealthy_Freedom_Facebook_Page_An_Opportunity_for_the_current_women’s_movement_in_Iran. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press. Haghighatjoo, F. (2016). The Green Movement and Political Change in Iran. In D. Brumberg & F. Farhi (Eds.), Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation (pp. 224–250). Indiana University Press. Harding, S. G. (1987). Feminism and Methodology: Social Science issues. Indiana University Press. Harris, K. (2012). The Brokered Exuberance of the Middle Class: An Ethnographic Analysis of Iran’s 2009 Green Movement. Mobilization, 17(4), 435–455. Hoodfar, H. (1996). Bargaining with Fundamentalism: Women and the Politics of Population Control in Iran. Reproductive Health Matters, 4(8), 30–40. Hoodfar, H. (2009). Activism Under the Radar: Volunteer Women Health Workers in Iran. Middle East Research and Information Project, 250, 56–60. Hoodfar, H. (2010). Health as a Context for Social and Gender Activism: Female Volunteer Healtrh Workers in Iran. Population and Development Review, 36(3), 487–510. Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. https://doi. org/10.1177/1049732305276687. Jahanbegloo, R., & Soroush, A. (2010). Iran on the Edge. NPQ, Spring, 30–34. Jalaeipour, M. (2003). Hamelan- e bi- neshan [Carriers Without Identification]. Zanan, 105, 6. Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with Patriarchy. Gender and Society, 2(3), 274–290. Kandiyoti, D. (1991). Women, Islam and the State. Temple University Press. Kandiyoti, D. (1996). Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. Kar, M. (1994a). Hoghoogh-e-seeyasee zan dar Iran az Bahman 57 ta emrooz [Women’s Political Rights in Iran Since February 1979 Up Until Today]. Zanan, 3(20). Kar, M. (1994b). Moshavereh-ye-ghazayee zanan: forsatee deegar ama na be bahaneye eestayee [Legal Counseling for Women: Another Opportunity But Not in the Name of Stability]. Zanan, 3(17), 54–58. Kar, M. (1994c). Zanan dar bazar-e-kar-e- Iran [Women in the Labor Market of Iran]. Tehran: Roshangaran. Kar, M. (1997a). Hoghoogh-e-seeyasee zanan dar Iran [Women’s Political Rights in Iran]. Tehran: Roshangaran. Kar, M. (1997b). Shoroot-e zemn-e aghd [Terms of Marriage Contract]. Zanan, 6(38), 18.

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Kar, M. (1999a). Rafe tabeez az zanan: motaleh tatbighi Konvanseeyon-e-Rafe Hame Ashkal-e Tabeez alayheh Zanan ba ghavanin-e-dakhelie Iran [Elimination of Gender Discrimination: A Comparison of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women]. Tehran: Qatreh. Kar, M. (1999b). Sakhtar-e-hoghooghee khanevadeh dar Iran [Legal Structure of the Family System in Iran]. Tehran: Roshangaran. Kar, M. (2000). Khoshoonat alayhe zanan dar Iran [Violence Against Women in Iran]. Tehran: Roshangaran. Kar, M. (2001a). Mosharekat-e-seeyasee zanan dar Iran: mavaneh va emkanat [Women’s Participation in Politics: Obstacles and Possibilities]. Tehran: Roshangaran. Kar, M. (2001b). Women’s Strategies in Iran from the 1979 Revolution to 1999. In N. Bayes, Jane, & Tohidi (Eds.), Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts (pp. 177–203). Palgrave. Kar, M. (2010). Reformist Islam versus Radical Islam in Iran. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 4, 1–13. Kar, M., & Hoodfar, H. (1996). Women and Personal Status Law in Iran: An Interview with Mehrangiz Kar. Middle East Report, 198, 36–38. Krause, W. (2008). Women in Civil Society: The State, Islamism, and Networks in the UAE. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Krause, W. (2012). Civil Society and Women Activists in the Middle East: Islamic and Secular Organizations. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. Kurzman, C. (2002). Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook. Oxford University Press. Lewis, B. (2003). The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New  York: Modern Library. Mahdi, A. A. (2004). The Iranian Women’s Movement: A Century Long Struggle. The Muslim World, 94, 427–448. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar. org/877f/b8919401e559b846a98beb513b0fe2bd5d3e.pdf. Matin, M., & Mohajer, N. (2010). Kheezesh-e Zanan dar Esfand 1357 [Iranian Women’s Uprising March 8th 1979 Vol.I,II]. Noghteh Book. McDonald, K. (2006). Global Movements: Action and Culture. Blackwell Publishing. Mernissi, F. (1987). Beyond the Veil, Revised Edition: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society (2nd ed.). Indiana University Press. Mernissi, F. (1991). Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Inquiry. Kali for Women. Minai, N. (1981). Women in Islam: Tradition and Transition in the Middle East. Seaview Books. Mir-Hosseini, Z. (1998). Rethinking gender: Discussions with Ulama in Iran. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 7(13), 45–59.

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CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework

One of the major aims of this study is to examine how different women’s rights groups and activists can address the interests of women while engaging with other social groups and actors to facilitate the formation of a critical civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes of democratic reform in a diverse society. Since the study is mainly concerned about deliberation and cooperation among different social groups toward the formation of civil society, I plan to provide a theoretical foundation for the formation of a pluralist-deliberative civil society with reference to discourse ethics and deliberative politics. I will draw substantially here on the work of Jurgen Habermas; and from a feminist approach, I will supplement his work by drawing on some other theories, including the ideas of Nancy Fraser, Talal Asad, and others. First of all, this chapter will focus on the key relevant Habermasian concepts including the theory of the public sphere and rationalization, communicative action, and his discourse ethics and deliberative politics. Second, in the two sections that follow, this chapter will consider the application of the Habermasian model in pluralist, diverse, multi-layered, and non-secular societies. In fact, the chapter aims to investigate to which extent and how the formation of a Habermasian critical deliberative civil society can be capable of engaging in democratic reform and how this can be possible in a diverse, stratified, and non-secular context such as that in Iran? What are the obstacles? And how can we deal with these limitations? © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_2

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A Habermasian Model of Deliberative Engagement in the Public Sphere To talk about the deliberative engagement of various social groups in the public sphere, it is important to understand the Habermasian deliberative and communicative model. Habermas has always been concerned about critical dialogue within the public sphere, and his idea of deliberative democracy has strong roots in his theory of communicative action. Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics is a fundamental text for the theories on deliberative democracy and the public sphere. So, in the following, I will focus on three of the main Habermasian concepts including the public sphere, communicative action, and discourse ethics. The Public Sphere and Rationalization In his first work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas argues that the public sphere itself is a particular domain, the public domain versus the private (Habermas 1991: 2). Although Habermas started his work with a sharp distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere, this distinction gradually becomes blurred in his later works. In his work Between Facts and Norms, Habermas points to the fact that the public and the private sphere rely on each other. He explains how social issues echo in the private spheres, refine and feed reactions in an amplified form to the public sphere (Habermas 1996: 367). To demonstrate this close connection between the private and the public sphere, from a historical viewpoint, he argues that the “modern bourgeois public sphere developed in the European societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the sphere of private persons [ who ] come together as a public” (Habermas 1996: 366). In fact, for Habermas, to have a strong public sphere, it is necessary to have both a strong private sphere and a strong civil society (Crawford 2009). He believes that today, civil society’s institutional core encompasses “those nongovernmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere” (Habermas 1996: 366). The center of civil society includes a chain of associations that “institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres” (Habermas 1996: 367). Habermas also pays attention to different forms of exclusion in the public sphere. His concern arises from the privileged status of some

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specific groups over others that is the consequence of liberal policies. For example, in regard to the status of women, Habermas writes “what is meant to promote the equal status of women in general often benefits only one category of (already privileged) women at the cost of another category” (Habermas 1996: 423). He insists on the equal status or the suspension of hierarchies and the “mutual recognition of all as ‘full’ members of the political community” (Habermas 2004: 10). Addressing the issue of exclusion, Habermas claims that considering the political as the domain of decision and conflict in pluralist democratic theory (Dahl 1956, 2005) has produced a theory of political elites (Habermas 1996: 332). This theory of political elites has “reduced the role of the democratic process to a plebiscite between competing leaderships teams” (Habermas 1996: 332). He questions how a politics that is mainly managed by elites can also address the interests of non-elites (Habermas 1996). Hence, Habermas calls for an ‘open and active dialogue’ which means that competing points of view on defining the scope of rights and needs should be open to public discussion; and competition over the interpretation of needs and rights cannot be exclusively represented by political elites (Habermas 1996). Habermas’ concern with equality and inclusion in the structure of the public sphere is strongly connected to his idea of rationality. Habermas’ model of the public sphere is a proceduralist paradigm with a focus on the processes of communicative rationality. Habermas differentiates between instrumental reason1 and communicative reason (Habermas 1984). Although he accepts that instrumental rationality has pathological consequences, Habermas believes that the public and free use of reason in the bourgeois public sphere could develop a critical public consciousness (McIvor 2015: 1560). Communicative reason “refers neither to a subject that preserves itself in relating to objects through representation and action, nor to a self-maintaining system that separates itself from an environment, but to a symbolically structured lifeworld that is constituted in the interpretive accomplishments of its members and only reproduced through communication” (Habermas 1984: 398). Habermas’ argument is that the possibility of a public within which there is mutual understanding through communicative reason (non-­ dominating/non-instrumental reason) is necessary for the practice of 1  Instrumental reason aims at exercising control over the nature (Habermas 1984) or domination (McIvor 2015).

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critique (McIvor 2015). Since he is concerned with inclusion, he also explains that the possibility of mutual understanding through communicative reason constitutes the background for the existing plurality of those who face one another (Habermas 1992). In other words, the unity of reason can only “remain perceptible in the plurality of its voices” (Habermas 1992: 117). Relying upon the theory of communicative rationality, Habermas aims to elaborate the complicated normative content in language and communication which implies not only that we understand the meaning of speech acts, but also that mutual understanding is produced between participants in communication regarding the facts, norms, and also the experiences (Habermas 1986: 108). Through his idea of rationality, Habermas tries to show the internal relationship between the theory of rationality and social theory and to display the rationality implications related to the sociological concepts that affect our current actions in order to finally demonstrate the necessity of a theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984). Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action Habermas develops his idea of communicative action on the basis of different validity claims. He believes that while we engage in a speech act, we raise the following validity claims aimed at intersubjective recognition: uttering something understandably; giving (the hearer) something to understand; making himself thereby understandable; and coming to an understanding with another person (Habermas 1979: 2, 1996: 18). It means that the speaker should choose an understandable expression aiming to communicate a true proposition (truth) (Habermas 1979). In order to reach understanding, the speaker should express his or her aims truthfully and choose an utterance which is right so that the speaker and the hearer can understand each other and agree with one another in the utterance according to a recognized normative background (rightness and truthfulness) (Habermas 1979: 2–3,137). The main aim of communication is to reach an agreement that can be achieved through the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another (Habermas 1979: 3). For Habermas what is important is the model of action that is oriented toward reaching understanding. This model of action should clearly identify the preconditions of an agreement that is reached communicatively (Habermas 1990: 134). Reaching an agreement is a mechanism for

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coordinating actions (Habermas 1990). Communicative action highlights the communicative aspect required to achieve a shared interpretation of the situation or of reaching a consensus (Habermas 1990). Communicative action can be understood as a circular process in which the actor, on the one hand, is an initiator who masters situations through actions; on the other hand, this actor is a product of the traditions surrounding her (Habermas 1990: 135). On the one hand, the actor faces a problem which should be solved by the actor’s own actions and efforts. On the other hand, the actor also has the support of a lifeworld which both forms the context for the process of mutual understanding and an action situation, and provides resources, including cultural background assumptions, for the interpretive process2 (Habermas 1990: 135–136). From the first step, communicative actions simultaneously are located within the horizon of shared, unproblematic beliefs, and they are nourished by these resources of the always already familiar (Habermas 1996: 22). Thus, the agreement which is the goal of the attempts to reach an understanding through communicative action depends simultaneously on intersubjectively shared propositional knowledge, on normative accord, and on mutual trust (Habermas 1990: 136). Even so, the important point is that social interactions are different in terms of whether they are cooperative or conflicting. We cannot talk about communicative action unless all of those concerned social actors want to reach agreement on their plans of action and commit themselves to follow their aims only based on the condition of agreement (Habermas 1990). In other words, the degree of cooperation is determined by the interest positions of all of the involved actors (Habermas 1990: 134). Therefore, the question arises as to what would be happening if the participants in communicative action face conflict, particularly if they face conflicting interests? Habermas’ answer is that if actors face conflict, they have two choices: breaking off communication or shifting to strategic action (Habermas 1979: 4, 1990, 1996: 21 26). In this regard, Habermas (1996) provides us with the ‘bargaining’ mechanism. Bargaining, as a strategic action, includes a negotiated agreement in order to balance the conflicting interests (Habermas 1996: 166). Bargaining is an efficient concept which can help explain cooperation and is thus central to the normative project of constructing a deliberative civil 2  Through interpretive process those participating in communication engage as they struggle to meet the need for agreement in the action situation (Habermas 1990: 136).

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society. More importantly, this negotiated compromise can be accepted by different actors and parties for different reasons (Habermas 1996: 166). This kind of bargaining does not generate an ideal inclusive consensus in which all of the actors are included because as Habermas writes, there is ‘no inclusion without exclusion,’ (Habermas 2004: 6–7). Habermas (1996: 166–167) argues that the bargaining processes are adjusted if the social power relations cannot be neutral; and it is first necessary for only the particular interests to be involved. All in all, the participants and the parties, the believers and the non-believers, accept bargaining if they understand that compromises will supply a more favourable arrangement for all; provide conditions for a better agreement rather than no agreement whatsoever; furnish an arrangement which excludes free riders;3 and accommodate an arrangement to exclude the parties that tend to exploit the cooperation (Habermas 1996). So, bargaining as a negotiated compromise in Habermas’ theory would be beneficial if a common political culture, commonalities among diverse groups, and deliberation are not sufficient to communicatively manage the dissonances within the diverse groups. This component of Habermas’ theory will be helpful for the analysis of civil society deliberations among the competing social groups. Additionally, the Habermasian term bargaining may help to make arguments about the formation of a deliberative civil society based on the constructive role of the conflicts. Habermas’ discussions about disagreements and bargaining as a strategic action have been tightly connected to his theory of discourse ethics that insists on non-violent and non-coercive action and undistorted and un-manipulated communication. In the part that follows, I will elaborate further on this theory. Habermas’ Theory of Discourse Ethics Discourse ethics refers to a reflexive or self-conscious communicative action (Crawford 2009: 192; Habermas 1990). By entering into the discourse, participants will continue their communication in a reflexive manner aiming to fix a consensus which has been disrupted (Habermas 1990: 67). Discourse ethics assumes a high level of moral development (Crawford 2009: 193). It is not a procedure for building substantive orientations;

3

 The term ‘Free riders’ refers to those who are not willing to cooperate.

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rather, discourse ethics is a procedure for testing the validity of norms (Habermas 1990: 103/122). For Habermas, valid moral norms are not transcendental. Rather, they are located in a contextual historical community, and they are valid for those who are affected by them (Habermas 1990, 1998). Moral norms should be able to order the rationally motivated recognition of all subjects capable of speech and action beyond the historical and cultural bounds of any specific context (Habermas 2001: 32). These norms are contextual since they should be located in a peculiar community to be implicit for those who are involved in reciprocal relations. It is supposed that all participants in argumentation recognize the validity of norms on the basis of good reasons since valid norms deserve intersubjective recognition (Habermas 1990: 65, 1996: 103). Argumentation guarantees that in a specific context, all those affected are included and can freely and equally play a role in a cooperative effort for truth where there is no coercive force except the force of better arguments (Habermas 1990: 67/198, 1996: 103, 2001: 33, 2005: 384). In fact, to consider a practice as argumentation, four essential presuppositions are required including publicity and inclusion of all those affected, equal rights to engage in practice, exclusion of deception, and the absence of interfering pressures (Habermas 2001: 34, 2005: 384). Hence, from Habermas’ view, rational discourse is considered as a communicative process that urges all participants to get involved in public affairs, practice inter-subjectively by all involved (Habermas 1990: 198). Habermas is also concerned about the dispositions of participants in practices of argumentation. In Habermas’ discourse theory, all those possibly affected are required to have a reflexive attitude regarding their own claims, and to have a strong will to seriously take the counterarguments of others into account, and to be honest (Habermas 1990, 1994a, 1996, 2001, 2005). To view something from a moral point of view one of the most important principles is the impartiality of judgment (Habermas 1990, 2001). The impartiality of judgment is a principle which limits all concerned participants to adopt the perspectives of all others (Habermas 1990: 65). In other words, one should not consider one’s understanding as a standard through which to universalize a mode of action. Instead one should also test the generalizability of one’s worldview from the perspective of all of the other participants (Habermas 1994a: 175). A moral point of view also requires a form of self-assessment. Habermas argues that a moral point of view helps us “to grasp generalizable interests in common;

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an ethical decision to adopt a conscious plan of life first puts a person or group in the proper frame of mind to appropriate critically their own life history, or identity-constituting traditions, in the light of an authentic life project” (Habermas 1994a: 175–176). From this point of view, there is no room for dogmatic and rigid worldviews since a discourse can hold its problem-solving force only if deliberations and communications are practiced in the light of a reflexive and post-traditional transmission of culture (Habermas 1996: 324–325). Accordingly, decentering of one’s own perspective, being willing to accept that one’s religious beliefs are not universally shared, and realizing that limiting rigid and dogmatic worldviews give rise to post-traditional, post-religious, or secular procedures for affirming moral and ethical norms (Habermas 1996: 324–325, 2001: 36; McIvor 2015: 1564). Thus, it follows that deliberation operates on a network of regulated processes, from arguing to bargaining; and it changes over a wide range of aspects, from a pragmatic discourse to ethical and moral discourses (Habermas 1994b: 6, 2005: 387). The success of political deliberation relies on different procedures and conditions of communication (Habermas 1994b). Habermas’ discourse theory is a proceduralist model of democracy within which public reason has been firmly fixed in both social processes and institutions (Michelbach 2014). It operates on “the higher-level intersubjectivity of communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere” (Habermas 1994b: 8). From this perspective, democratic will-formation relies upon providing the informal public opinions to develop in structures of an unsubverted political public sphere (Habermas 1996: 308). It means that deliberative politics work at the interaction between democratically institutionalized will-formation and informal opinion formation (Habermas 1996: 308). In general, Habermas’ deliberative politics can serve various aims in practice: forming influential and useful opinions in the public sphere, forming informed votes on competing political stances among citizens, generating rational and practical decisions on legal programs in parliament, creating reasonable solutions for legal conflicts, or making possible reasonable choice and productive implementation of policies within the administration (Habermas 2005: 388). Despite this empirical approach to Habermas’ deliberative model of democracy, what I understand is that the application of his theory is, however, confined to the existence of an egalitarian and formal public sphere. So, the question becomes how can

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Habermas’ model of the public sphere and political deliberation be applied to non-secular and diverse societies where a democratic and pluralist framework that is guaranteed by the state in which they operate does not exist?

Applying Habermas Model of the Public Sphere to Diverse Societies: Limitations and Solutions? For Habermas (1996), an egalitarian public sphere where social hierarchies are eliminated or suspended is a determining presupposition for the success of political deliberation and consensus. While Habermas has called for the suspension of hierarchies, the relationship between publicity and status is much more complicated than he claims (Fraser 1990, 1997). Habermas is arguing that hierarchies and inequalities must be suspended in order for deliberation to take place. Then, we might ask the question: since exclusions and inequalities can be manifested in other ways according to the intersectional forms of oppression, is the suspension of hierarchies possible in the actual situation? Although Habermas (1996) mentions the exclusionary aspects of the bourgeois public sphere, such as, the exclusion of women, he still fails to recognize and examine other competing public spheres which are simultaneously functioning (Asen and Brouwer 2001; Fraser 1990, 1997). So, it is argued that a pure Habermasian model of the public sphere cannot easily be applied to very diverse and stratified societies. With respect to these critiques on Habermas’ work, some scholars have focused on the issue of the multiplicity of public spheres based on this claim that we can no longer talk about only one single comprehensive and formal public sphere as Habermas argues. Benhabib (1996: 73–74) believes that “an anonymous public conversation” develops through the “interlocking net of multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations.” She claims that a public sphere of “mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation” is essential for the model of deliberative democracy (Benhabib 1996: 74). Gerard Hauser (1998: 21) addresses the idea of a single overarching public sphere and argues that the public sphere is constructed by nested arenas with a connected structure. To deal with the complexities of the public sphere in diverse societies, Geoff Eley (1990: 1) also believes that the only way is to extend Habermas’ idea towards the

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“wider public domain, where the authority is not only constituted as rational and legitimate, but where its terms may also be contested and modified by society’s subaltern groups.” Eley concludes that it makes sense to consider the public sphere “ as the structured setting where cultural and ideological contest and negotiation among a variety of publics takes place” (Eley 1990: 11). Fraser (1990: 69, 1997: 83–84) also believes that if we follow the idea of a single, comprehensive public sphere, it will result in filtering diverse norms through a single lens. She claims that the idea of a multi-cultural and diverse society would be possible only if we assume the idea of a multiplicity of publics (Fraser 1990, 1997). Accordingly, some scholars have articulated the term ‘counterpublics’ in order to assert the plurality of public spheres and to identify the alternative competing publics (Felski 1989; Fraser 1990, 1997). In the following, I will elaborate on the term ‘counterpublics’ to examine how this idea of counterpublics can deal with the limitations of the Habermasian model of the public sphere in diverse societies. What Are ‘Counterpublics’? With the rise of the new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars postulated the rise of counterpublic spheres, as critical oppositional forces within the society (Felski 1989: 166). Members of subordinated groups, including women, gays, lesbians, or people of color, have articulated alternative publics as a response to their exclusion from the dominant public sphere (Fraser 1990, 1997). Even in the absence of formal exclusions, subordinated groups make alternative publics since sometimes they do not find the right voice to explain their issues, or when they find the right voice, they are not heard (Fraser 1990: 64, 1997: 78). Fraser identifies these alternative publics as subaltern counterpublics which refer to “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses” (Fraser 1990: 67, 1997: 81). These counterdiscourses help the members of subordinated groups to articulate “oppositional interpretations of their needs, interests, and identities” (Fraser 1990: 67, 1997: 81). Additionally, counterpublics help the expansion of a discursive space of argumentations which is very constructive for diverse societies (Fraser 1990, 1997). From a slightly different perspective, the counterpublic spheres are considered as oppositional communities that are in contrast with the homogenizing logic of the global culture of mass communication that

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they defined in terms of racial or ethnic identity or sexual preferences (Felski 1989: 166–167). These counterpublic spheres articulate their needs and values which have been ignored by the dominant ‘culture industry’ (Felski 1989: 166). Additionally, since these oppositional sites are multiple and heterogeneous, they can be unified only by a common concern (Felski 1989: 166). Felski points to the feminist counterpublic sphere and asserts that the women’s movement has offered one of the best examples of a counterpublic (Felski 1989: 166). She believes that the experience of discrimination and subordination is the most important motif that gives rise to a self-consciously oppositional identity. Both Felski and Fraser (Felski 1989: 168; Fraser 1990: 68, 1997: 82) mention that the counterpublics within diverse societies have a dual function. For Felski, a feminist counterpublic has an internal function, that is generating a gender-specific identity based on a community and solidarity among women, and an external function, that aims to address the whole society and challenge the structures of authority (Felski 1989). From a different view, Fraser (1990: 68, 1997: 82) claims that while on the one hand, counterpublics act as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment, on the other hand, they work as training grounds for agitational activities directed toward the wider public. For Fraser, the emancipatory potential of these counterpublics relies upon this dualistic function. As a response to the exclusion, some social actors decide to withdraw and make their own group to have a safer space for their arguments about their issues which have usually been considered as private. They re-group in order to be more powerful to externally act and challenge the structures of authority through their political and social activities. In fact, even though they withdraw, they are still public and they speak in public about the different issues which have always been excluded from the public. They struggle against oppression, inequality, and exclusion by redefining that which had previously been considered as ‘private,’ non-political and non-public issues, as matters of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power (Benhabib 1992: 100). According to the nature of current social movements within which cyberspace has a significant role, alongside counterpublics we can also talk about ‘cyber-counterpublics’. If it is argued that in response to the oppression and inequalities counterpublics are re-grouped to safely discuss their issues and then externally act and address the oppressive structures and policies, we can argue that sometimes due to the severe political situation these counterpublics are built in cyberspace since it is safer. Through

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cyberspace, the cyber-counterpublics, particularly in authoritarian/non-­ democratic countries, can safely have open discussions about social and political issues as well as reaching out to more people. The best examples of these cyber-counterpublics are those that were active in cyberspace during the Arab Spring and the Green movement 2009  in Iran. In some authoritarian countries where the government is sensitive to different oppositional re-groupings, we witness the rise of cyber-counterpublics similar to the different feminist cyber-counterpublics that struggle for women’s rights, human rights, and democratization in Islamic non-­ democratic countries through cyberspace.4 Similar to counterpublics, cyber-counterpublics also have a dualistic character in that they act as spaces of withdrawal and re-groupment and function as spaces for training that enable the members to disturb the existing oppressive structures of the authority. Another important point regarding counterpublics in non-democratic and authoritarian countries refers to their activities. I argue in this study that the external function of these counterpublics is not necessarily through explicit political actions. Rather, according to the case of recent movements in non-democratic countries, it is credible to say that counterpublics address the dominant publics and the oppressive structures of authority either through apparent political activities or prefiguratively political activities. Under the authoritarian conditions, adopting a prefigurative approach can help social groups and actors to articulate a new space within the existing structures by developing a network of cyber-­ counterpublics and counterpublics to deliberatively set justice and reformation in motion. It is an approach which follows a future ideal society (different from the existing one) instead of focusing on short-term outcomes. In this sense, by applying the term ‘prefigurative political activities,’ this study sets forth that a wide range of struggles that are not necessarily and obviously political even though they target the existing political and social structures to create an ideal society at the end. From this point of view, counterpublics, which adopt prefigurative political activities within an authoritative context, function like cracks on the existing surface that tend to extend and at the end, invalidate the dominant oppressive power. In other words, these counterpublics which function through the ‘method of the crack’ are examples of ‘prefigurative politics,’ 4  Online Iranian feminist campaigns and pages like ‘Stealthy Freedom,’ ‘Feminist School,’ and ‘Change For Equality’ are good examples of these feminist cyber-counterpublics.

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the idea that the struggle for a different society must create that society through its forms of struggle (Holloway 2010: 45; Van de Sande 2013). So, it follows that the form and function of counterpublics rely on the political and social specificities of each context. To reside in a non-­ democratic country, they can change from counterpublics to cyber-­ counterpublics; or their obvious political act can change into a prefigurative political act. From this perspective, the term ‘counterpublics’ in this study will address a wide range of groups that have formed as a response to oppression, exclusion, and inequalities, including small/big, informal/formal gatherings in public places, such as, cafés, restaurants, or streets (counterpublics as in the space of appearance); informal gatherings in private places in homes; formal gatherings within communities and parliament committees; campaigns; informal/formal NGOs; magazines (e.g. women’s magazines); conferences; academic gatherings; ceremonies (such as, religious ceremonies); and gatherings and communities in cyberspace that I will call ‘cyber-counterpublics’ (pages/groups/online newspapers/online roundtables, networks, etc.). On the one hand, these counterpublics are considered as ‘counter’ because they struggle against exclusions, inequalities, and unjust advantages and rights enjoyed by those in the dominant social groups (the wider public). On the other hand, these counterpublics are identified as ‘public’ since their members can, however, understand themselves as part of a potentially wider public (Fraser 1990: 67, 1997: 82), they raise heated discussions in public about issues which have previously been considered as ‘private,’ and they critically address the structures of the dominant wider public. Since these counterpublics or cyber-­ counterpublics appeared as a response to exclusions, inequalities, and oppressions within dominant publics, they can extend the discursive space (Fraser 1990, 1997). They can widen the discursive space because of the (supposed) inter-public discursive interaction among those in the competing public (Fraser 1990, 1997). Fraser (1990, 1997) concludes that such an idea of a plurality of publics is more compatible with the idea of participatory parity than the Habermasian model of a single, overarching public sphere. However, the important questions that remain here are: how can the theory of a plurality of (competing) publics and contestation among them help to facilitate the deliberative engagement in public sphere in the actual situation? What kind of relationship should exist among these counterpublics to bring their emancipatory potential into action? In the following part, I will examine the quality of the relationship among the

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counterpublics and how the idea of a multiplicity of publics (counterpublics) can facilitate the formation of a civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes toward reform in a diverse society. The Quality of Relations Among Counterpublics To talk about the role of counterpublics in the formation of a deliberative civil society capable of engaging in democratic reform, it is necessary to consider the relation between counterpublics and the state, and the nature of counterpublics. In regard to the relationship between civil society and the state, contrary to Habermas, Fraser (1990, 1997) believes that we should not clearly separate civil society from the state because this separation contributes to a weak public sphere. A weak public sphere means that its deliberative practices have only been limited to the formation of public opinion without any power of decision-making (Fraser 1990, 1997). Fraser (1990: 76, 1997: 92) claims that any concept of the public sphere that assumes a separation between civil society and the state cannot conceive of the forms of self-management, interpublic coordination, and political accountability. Considering the different ideas about the relationship between the state and civil society alongside the feminists’ experiences, particularly in Muslim societies, regarding the reformation of (Shari’a) law in favor of women’s rights, I argue that there is not necessarily a separation and severe contestation between the counterpublics and the legislature. Rather, we can imagine the counterpublics, for example, within the parliament. Different committees within the parliament of a country can be considered as counterpublics as far as they represent the rights of those who are excluded from the dominant public or those whose voices are not heard within the dominant public. As an instance, the committee of a particular ethnic/religious minority group or the committee of women within a national parliament5 can be considered as counterpublics that work from within the legislature and in relation with other parallel counterpublics which stand on the level of civil society. They can act as counterpublics if 5  As an instance, we might mention the role of reformist female MPs in the sixth Parliament in the Islamic Republic of Iran that “it is considered as the most important parliament for the Iranian women’s movement since the 1979 Islamic Revolution” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 332). In this parliament, reformist women could pose important issues regarding women’s rights, such as, the issue of joining the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women.

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these committees allow counterpublic perspectives to enter the public and the legislature. In general, counterpublics that work from within the society can play a significant role in the formation of influential public opinions, and at the same time, they can bring these opinions into the process of decision-making through those counterpublics that are inside the legislature structure. Accordingly, it is credible to argue that we can assume there are strong counterpublics if we do not sharply separate counterpublics from the legislature. However, to have strong counterpublics with a constructive role in the formation of a civil society capable of engaging in the deliberative process of democratic reform, the relationship between counterpublics and the legislature would not be enough even though it is necessary. Counterpublics are not articulated necessarily for the purpose of widening the discursive space. Rather they can sometimes be articulated as separatist identity groups without any interest in establishing relationships with others in counterpublics. These counterpublics are established against the dominant public that excludes or ignores their identities so that through these counterpublics they aim to preserve their identity and follow their very own group interests. It is obvious that these forms of counterpublics cannot help facilitate the formation of a deliberative civil society. Since the main research concern is the formation of a deliberative civil society in a diverse society, the study will take the view that counterpublics are different groups that represent different discourses and address various forms of inequalities as topics for deliberation within the wider society. If we understand counterpublics in this sense, to have deliberation and communication in the society, there would be no need for a suspension of differences, or a suspension of hierarchies as Habermas claims. Rather, in this sense, the differences and inequalities are considered as resources for communication and deliberation. We can consider ‘difference’ as “a necessary resource for a discussion-­ based politics in which participants aim to cooperate, reach understanding, and do justice” (Young 1997: 385). And while counterpublics may represent different discourses, including a discourse of women’s rights, the discourse of LGBT rights, the discourse of children’s rights, the discourse of human rights, the discourse of empowerment, and so on, what they have in common is the aim to cooperate and struggle against injustice, inequality, and exclusion in society. Since different forms of injustice have been intertwined with each other, counterpublics which are established against injustice in society are required to interact with each other if

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they aim to address the different aspects of injustice. Therefore, if we understand counterpublics as groups which represent different discourses with an inclusionary manner and address different forms of injustice, we can assume that the idea of counterpublics can expand the discursive space and facilitate the formation of a deliberative civil society. Considering counterpublics as publics in which private persons come together in order to address inequalities as topics for deliberation as well as assuming no sharp separation between counterpublics and the state, will help us think about strong counterpublics which can facilitate the formation of a critical civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes of democratic reform in a diverse society. These strong counterpublics are compatible with Habermas’ deliberative politics that empirically serve a variety of aims (Habermas 2005) ranging from forming influential opinions in the public sphere to generating practical and constructive decisions in parliament or within the administration. The ideas of counterpublics and cyber-counterpublics may help the research to apply a Habermasian model of deliberative engagement in the public sphere to non-democratic, stratified, and diverse societies. Nevertheless, the application of a Habermasian deliberative civil society still faces a particular challenge within non-secular societies because it is the assumption of Habermas’ model of a deliberative civil society that takes into account a secular world view that is necessary to engage in deliberation. In the following section, I will examine how a Habermasian model of the public sphere can be applied to a non-secular society.

Applying Habermas Model of Public Sphere in Non-­secular Societies: Limitations and Solutions? Despite the western-secular orientation of his work, recently, Habermas has developed a different view on the position of religion in the public sphere. To consider the role of religion, he draws on a post-secular approach, and in his more recent work, he proposes two important concepts: ‘religious tolerance’ and a ‘complementary learning process.’ In the following section, I will examine Habermas’ recent views on religion to clarify how his idea of the public sphere can be applied to a religious context. What are limitations of Habermas’ idea of religion and post-­ secularism? And how can we deal with these limitations to facilitate the application of Habermasian deliberative politics to a non-secular society?

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Habermas’ Ideas on Religion and Secularism In his recent work, Habermas criticizes the traditional secularization thesis that excludes religion from the public sphere. He argues that there is no longer any ground for the secularist claim that religion will vanish in the world because of the acceleration of modernization (Habermas 2009). Habermas also argues that religion is not necessarily against democracy, freedom, or human rights (Habermas 2006b). He cites Martin Luther King and the US Civil Rights Movement to demonstrate that sometimes religious roots could have an impressive role in terms of motivating many social movements in both the United States and European countries6 (Habermas 2006b). Furthermore, Habermas points to the unique power of religious traditions regarding the articulation of moral intuitions that have the potential to “make religious speech into a serious vehicle for possible truth contents” (Habermas 2008: 131). Accordingly, he suggests post-secularism as an alternative. Habermas explains that a post-secular society refers to a society which has “adjusted to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment” (Habermas 2006a: 258, b, 2009). From this perspective, the consciousness of citizens in a post-secular society indicates “a normative insight that has consequences for how believing and unbelieving citizens interact with one another politically” (Habermas 2006a). Regarding the regulation of the conflict between believing and unbelieving citizens, Habermas insists on religious tolerance (Habermas 2004). To enable the coexistence of different life forms as equals, it is necessary that all those involved take mutual toleration across boundaries and divisions as citizens of one and the same political community (Habermas 2004). What seems problematic here is the implication of the term tolerance since the toleration of a belief assumes that we may not agree with that belief. If we appreciate that belief or if we are indifferent to it, toleration will never be required. In this sense, the toleration of one’s belief is not necessarily equivalent to the recognition of one’s status and the affirmation of one’s right to be ideologically free (Asad 2006). This might be the reason that Talal Asad (2006) or Wendy Brown (2006) claim that there are defects and contradictions associated with the liberal conception of tolerance. Moreover, Habermas’ mutual toleration across divisions implies 6  Even in a non-Western society, such as Iran, religious roots could effectively mobilize people in very early forms of NGOs in Iran, called ‘Heyat’ (religious gatherings), that encourage collective actions and promote a culture of cooperation in the society (Bahar 2004).

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a kind of temporary suspension or even ignorance of the differences and inequalities. Then, the central questions become to what extent this suspension of differences will be effective/efficient and can serve as a powerful solution to facilitate the coexistence of religious and non-religious communities in a diverse society? And isn’t this form of the suspending of distinctions in opposition to the normative dimensions of a pluralist and deliberative model of the public sphere? It is credible to contend that while religious toleration is necessary it is not sufficient to make a democratic deliberative civil society, a place where citizens can effectively interact with one another as equals. Habermas has developed his ideas on the relationship between the religious and the secular-liberal by proposing a ‘complementary learning process’(Habermas 2006a, b, 2008, 2009). Religious citizens are expected to adopt epistemic attitudes toward the secular environment, and justify and translate their political opinions from the vocabulary of a particular religious community into a general language that is accessible to people of other faiths, and to nonbelievers (Habermas 2006a, b, 2008). It is worth mentioning that this requirement of translation is a cooperative task (Habermas 2006b, 2008). Nonbelievers or secular citizens are also expected to adopt a self-reflexive manner and a self-critical assessment of the limits of a secularist thesis and modernization (Habermas 2006a, b, 2008). This act of adaptation and the cooperative translation is a complementary learning process which is different from the political advantage of mere tolerance (Habermas 2006b). In fact, both sides, believers, and non-­ believers/religious and secular, should undergo an interpretation of the relationship between faith and knowledge from its own perspective to enable them to live together in a self-reflective manner (Habermas 2009). If religious and secular understand this complementary learning process, they will take each other’s contributions to controversial themes in the public sphere seriously since even the religious utterances may have truth contents that are worth proposed in a secular discourse (Habermas 2006a, 2009). Although Habermas tries to consider the role of religion in the public sphere through his contributions to post-secularism, the main issue is that the concept of ‘post-secularism’ is mainly designed for liberal societies that are already secularized. Despite the problematic issues around the term ‘post-secularism,’ Habermas’ recent views on religion and its role in some social movements would be useful for non-liberal and non-secular societies wherein the religious, and secular have political interaction with one

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another. Particularly, Habermas’ idea of religious tolerance alongside his idea of the complementary learning process could be helpful in terms of regulating the conflicts between the religious and the secular in a religious and non-democratic society. Nevertheless, a problematic point remains that is Habermas’ assumption regarding the necessity to have a secular point of view in order to engage in deliberation. Habermas gives priority to a secular language and reason in terms of the official language of the state in the field of decision-making, for example, in parliament (Habermas 2008). Furthermore, Habermas’ ideas of post-secularism are still based on an epistemic distinction between secular reason and religious thought (Taylor 2011: 49–50). Taylor criticizes this epistemic break between the secular and the religious and argues that there is no reasonable ground to single out religion as something strange and threatening against nonreligious, secular, or atheist views (Taylor 2011). Accordingly, Taylor calls for a redefinition of secularism so that a secular state will be no longer be conceived as a barrier to religion (Taylor 2011). A secular regime will be no longer defined exclusively based on its relationship to religion either. Rather, through a redefinition of secularism, a secular state will be understood as a good faith attempt to shape its institutional arrangements to secure the most important principles of equality and liberty, and maximize these particular fundamental aims between the basic beliefs rather than to remain faithful to a holy tradition (Taylor 2011). Taylor’s idea of the redefinition of secularism and his attention to the issue of diversity could be very inspiring for the current study since it needs to deal with the conflicts between the religious and the secular in a diverse and religious society where secularism is defined as opposed to religion. Despite this influential component of Taylor’s approach to the religious and the secular, it could be challenging to apply his idea to the context of a non-liberal society. Taylor takes for granted the existence of three main principles and goals which are basically ideals for a liberal state. Taylor celebrates the ideals of a liberal state as his starting point toward redefining secularism while the starting point can formulate different ideals in another (different) society (Bilgrami 2014). So, it is credible to say that, despite his aim to radically redefine secularism, Taylor has not succeeded to make a fundamental change in the meaning of secularism. This might refer to Taylor’s underestimation of the nuances of the diverse historicized contexts where secularism has emerged and is defined. Accordingly, it could be practical for the current study to draw upon Taylor’s idea of the redefinition of secularism from a historical approach.

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It is an approach which investigates the formation of ‘secular’ as a differently located concept in time and space (Asad 2003). Redefinition of the Secular from a Historicized Approach Asad (2003: 183) contends that neither the supporters nor the critics of the secularization thesis pay enough attention to the concept of ‘the secular,’ which emerged historically in a particular way and was assigned specific practical tasks. He argues that the secular is a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledge, and sensibilities in modern life (Asad 2003). Hence, Asad believes that it is important to investigate the way of conceptualization of the secular in each particular context since the different forms of action resulted from a different conceptualization (Asad et al. 2009). By insisting on the conjunction of the geographical and historical conditions, Asad (2003) as a case study, works on the reconfiguration of the law and the formation of the secular in the particular context of Egypt. He tries to show how a reform of the Shari’a and a redefinition of Islamic traditions, and conceptual changes could make ‘secularism’ thinkable in a particular context (Asad 2003). The process of reform of Shari’a law and the re-definition of Islamic religious traditions has already started in some Islamic countries by religious intellectuals who aim to re-define some of the Islamic laws, particularly those related to women’s rights, by means of Ijtihad (independent interpretation and investigation of Islamic sources7). Regarding the re-­ definition of religious norms and rules in the Islamic context of Iran, Asef Bayat (2013) considers not only the Iranian intellectual movements, he also pays attention to social movements and the everyday practices of those in the young Iranian generation, including the students and women. He characterizes these social and intellectual movements as ‘Post-Islamist’ movements that aim to replace the place of religion in society or re-define religion to be compatible with the values of freedom or human rights (Bayat 2013). The concept of post-Islamism points to the rise of an inclusive (reformist) version of Islam in Iran and the current religious toleration among those in the young Iranian generation. It also underlines a social change which is happening in this context. For example, Bayat claims that even though most of these young people still have some 7  Muhammad Abduh and some of his followers believe that through Ijtihad Islam and its legal system can be adopted to today’s modern requirements (Asad 2003; Kurzman 2002).

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r­ eligious belief or religious feelings, their Islam has little impact on their everyday practices; so, it cannot stop them drinking alcohol, dating, or having a loose hijab (Bayat 2013: 40). The idea of post-Islamism can help to explain the ongoing social change in a non-secular, non-democratic, and diverse society, such as, Iran, or to some extent analyze the function of the religious, intellectual movement and the feminist movement in this context. Nevertheless, Bayat’s focal point is on the everyday practices of people while the main concentration of the current study is on (religious and secular) people’s social actions and the ways in which they can deliberate and interact with one another. Furthermore, post-Islamism highlights a re-definition and reformation of religion in today’s Iranian society which implies a unilateral translation of religious language while the Habermasian framework discussed above argues that the task of translation and re-­definition should be bilateral. In his work on post-Islamist Iran (2013), Bayat celebrates moving away from religious ideology and toward the secular beliefs or values without adopting a problem-driven approach to highlight the fundamental issues regarding deliberation and cooperation between religious and secular in practice. This view can be considered as a form of value judgment inherent in this post-Islamic approach that it would be incompatible with the principle of impartiality of judgment (Habermas 1990, 1994a) in Habermas’ discourse ethics. In fact, the point of critique is that this idea about postIslamist by celebrating the dilution of religious ideology in today’s Iran implies that the secular belief is superior. So, I argue that a mere postIslamic approach cannot provide the appropriate ground for a sustainable communicative arrangement between religious and secular citizens who want to cooperate with one another and work toward the formation of a deliberative civil society. To provide the ground for Habermasian deliberative politics, and communication and bargaining between religious and secular citizens, in addition to Habermas’ idea of ‘religious tolerance’ and ‘complementary learning process,’ this work will draw on a historical approach to the idea of secularism. From this historicized approach and through re-reading the idea of the redefinition of secularism (Taylor 2011), I contend that an analysis of the development of the secular according to historical and socio-political conditions is necessary. This analysis of the development of the secular in a specific religious context, such as, in Iran may reveal that a combination of socio-political and historical circumstances have conceptualized the secular in a particular way versus the religious circumstances.

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Furthermore, a historical and contextual consideration by way of the conceptualization of the secular will open up the possibility for a re-­definition/ re-fashioning of the secular to provide proper social ground for a communicative arrangement between the secular and the religious in a particular historical context.

Conclusion To provide a theoretical foundation for the analysis, discussion of, and argument about civil society deliberation in a diverse and non-secular society, the chapter clarifies the Habermasian model of deliberative engagement in the public sphere through an examination of his three essential concepts, specifically, the public sphere, the theory of communicative action, and discourse ethics. The main argument is that both the normative dimension of Habermas’ idea and his concept of ‘bargaining’ could be useful for this work to analyze and argue about the ways feminist groups can address the interests of women while cooperating with other social groups and actors toward the formation of a deliberative civil society. For Habermas, the deliberation moves forward on a network of regulated processes, from arguing to bargaining; and it changes over a wide range of aspects, from pragmatic discourse to ethical and moral discourses. However, Habermas’ public sphere is a single comprehensive one that might be incompatible with the pluralist nature of heterogeneous and diverse societies. Considering this limitation, the chapter has applied the idea of ‘counterpublics’. To address the issue of Habermas’ single, comprehensive public sphere, I drew on the concept of ‘counterpublics’ to assert the important existence of diverse publics in heterogeneous and stratified societies. These different publics are invented by subordinated groups in a stratified society to deliberate about their common issues. In addition to the concept of counterpublics, I have applied the term ‘cyber-counterpublics’ to identify those counterpublics that are located in cyberspace to remain safe in non-­ democratic and authoritarian countries. The chapter considers these counterpublics as inclusionary publics that address the differences and the different forms of inequalities as topics for deliberation aiming to do justice. Assuming an interactive relationship among these counterpublics can facilitate the formation of a Habermasian model of a pluralist-deliberative civil society in diverse (non-democratic) societies. Nevertheless, to apply a pluralist-deliberative model of the public sphere to a non-secular

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(religious) society, it might be challenging to communicatively manage the relationship between the religious and the secular. Applying a Habermasian framework to non-secular societies could be challenging due to the assumption of the necessity of a secular world view for engaging in deliberation that is an essential aspect of Habermas’ model of a deliberative society. To investigate how the Habermasian model of deliberative engagement in the public sphere can be applied to a non-secular society, I examined some recent works of Habermas on the position of religion in the secular societies. From a post-secular approach, he acknowledges the persistence of religion in the secular countries and mentions the constructive role that religion can/could play within the social movements. Habermas also proposes two important ideas, specifically, religious tolerance, and a complementary learning process. His ideas about religion and its role in the public sphere could be very useful for diverse societies where religious and secular interact/could interact with each other. However, the problematic aspect of his idea is that he still gives priority to the secular reason. So, the study considered the role of religion from another perspective, called ‘post-Islamic.’ Since this approach highlights the ongoing reformation of religion in the Islamic society of Iran, the post-Islamic approach could be beneficial for the study as it relates to the analysis of the ongoing social changes in Iranian society today. Even so, this approach is not sufficient to communicatively manage the relationship between the religious and the secular in a non-secular society moving toward the formation of a deliberative civil society. The post-Islamic approach mainly focuses on a unilateral translation of the religious language. This focal point implies that the post-Islamic approach also makes a distinction between religious reason and thought and secular reason. Accordingly, by applying the idea of the re-definition of secularism from a historical approach, alongside the ongoing reformation process of religion, this study asserts the importance of the re-fashioning of the secular according to historical, and socio-political specificities in each particular historical context. The present study argues that the re-fashioning of the secular provides a suitable foundation for the communicative arrangement between the religious and the secular, and thus, it can facilitate the formation of a Habermasian model of a pluralist-­ deliberative civil society in a non-secular context. Thus, addressing the issues of Habermas’ secular approach and Habermas’ single, overarching public sphere, the current study reviewed

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Habermas’ work from a critical and woman-centered approach in order to theorize a pluralist-deliberative civil society. The pluralist-deliberative public sphere in this Habermasian framework does not require the elimination of conflict/s. We can take for granted that the pluralism of competing world views and conflicting life ideals is the central feature of modern societies. Accordingly, a pluralist-­deliberative idea of the public sphere emphasizes the productive aspect of conflict/s and the importance of bargaining, as a negotiated compromise, in relation to a consensus on the (contested) norms of civic conduct and interaction (Habermas 1996). Furthermore, based on a pluralist-deliberative approach to the public sphere, there is not only one official public, there are also different counterpublics/cyber-counterpublics. From this perspective, there is a pluralist context with multiple counterpublics within which the participants who have diverse perspectives deliberate and negotiate about the contested norms of civic interaction. This pluralist aspect of the pluralist-­deliberative model is also compatible with the present study’s approach that emphasizes interaction among the diverse social categorizations. Additionally, the theory does not require an ideal full inclusive consensus, because there is no inclusion without exclusion (Habermas 2004). The consensus is among those religious, non-religious, or secular participants who are willing to cooperate based on reciprocity, forbearance, mutual toleration, and a complementary learning process since this compromise will provide the conditions for all of them to follow their own ends. The normative dimensions of this revised Habermasian approach will provide the conditions of moral respect and reciprocity upon which the subject who is situated within a particular context—a situated self— can select her (or his) actions, join other publics, and co-operate and interact with others while exercising a moral autonomy and self-reflexivity. In the meantime, the re-definition of the secular and the conceptual changes based on a historicized approach to the idea of secularism will provide more appropriate ground for the religious and the secular to interact with one another in a specific religious context, for example, the IRI. Thus, this form of the pluralist-deliberative public sphere based on the communicative management of conflicts might help the diverse (religious and secular) public and individuals from within or outside to move toward the formation of a collective will, cooperation, and consensus without jeopardizing the pluralism. However, some important questions still remain: how can these ideas about the deliberative engagement in the public sphere, the

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counterpublics, the communicative management of conflicts, the re-­ definition of the secular, religious toleration, and the complementary learning processes be applied to a theocratic state? Can a Habermasian pluralist-deliberative public sphere be applied to any form of a theocratic state? Should we consider the social, political, and structural nuances within a different theocratic state before applying this theoretical framework? The fundamental question here is: can this feminist re-reading of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere be relevant as it relates to the revolutionary theocratic state of Iran, which encompasses the contradictory features of Islamism and Republicanism? Despite Iran’s theocratic political system, social movements have brought about social change in the country during recent decades. I will consider the relevance between this revised Habermasian theoretical framework and the theocratic-­ revolutionary Iran in the following three chapters on women’s activism in the media (Chap. 3), civil society (Chap. 4), and the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary sphere (Chap. 5).

References Ahmadi-Khorasani, N. (2013). Bahar-e-Jonbesh-e Zanan (The Spring of Iranian Women’s Movement). Tehran: Moalef. Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford University Press. Asad, T. (2006). Responses. In D.  S. Charles Hirschkind (Ed.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (pp.  206–241). Stanford University Press. Asad, T., Brown, W., Butler, J., & Mahmood, S. (2009). Is critique secular?Blasphemy,Injury,and Free Speech. The University of California, Berkeley. Asen, R., & Brouwer, D. C. (2001). Introduction: Reconfigurations of the Public Sphere. In R.  Asen & D.  C. Brouwer (Eds.), Counterpublics and the State (pp. 1–35). State University of New York Press. Bahar, R. (2004). Sazmanha-ye-mardom nahad ya heyat (Non-Governmental Organisations or Heyat). Shargh News Paper, p. 12. Bayat, A. (2013). The Making of Post-Islamist Iran. In Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam (pp. 35–71). Oxford University Press. Benhabib, S. (1992). Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary. Ethics: Polity Press. Benhabib, S. (1996). Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (pp. 67–95). Princeton University Press.

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Bilgrami, A. (2014). Secularism: Its Content and Context. Journal of Social Philosophy, 45(1), 25–48. Brown, W. (2006). Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton University Press. Crawford, N. C. (2009). Jurgen Habermas. In J. Edkins & N. Vaughan-Williams (Eds.), Critical Theorists and International Relations (pp.  187–198). Routledge. Dahl, R. A. (1956). A Preface to Democratic Theory. University of Chicago Press. Dahl, R. A. (2005). Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale University Press. Eley, G. (1990). Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Ninteenth Century. CSST Working Papers University of Michigan. Retrieved from https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51184/ 417.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Felski, R. (1989). Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change. Harvard University Press. Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. Social Text, (25/26), 56–80. https://doi. org/10.2307/466240 Fraser, N. (1997). Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition. Routledge. Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the Evolution of Society. In Contemporary Sociology (T.  McCarthy, Trans.). https://doi. org/10.2307/2067761 Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1986). Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jurgen Habermas. Verso. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Habermas, J. (1991). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (T. Burger, Trans.). Minerva. Habermas, J. (1992). Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (W. M. Hohengarten, Trans.). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Habermas, J. (1994a). Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1994b). Three Normative Models of Democracy. Constellations, I(I), 1–10. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1998). The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. MIT Press.

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Habermas, J. (2001). From Kant’s “Ideas” of Pure Reason to the “Idealizing” Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized “Use of Reason.”. In W.  Rehg & J.  Bohman (Eds.), Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: The Transformation of Critical Theory (pp. 11–41). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Habermas, J. (2004). Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights. Philosophy, 79(01), 5–18. Habermas, J. (2005). Concluding Comments on Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics. Acta Politica, 40, 384–392. https://doi.org/10.1057/ palgrave.ap.5500119. Habermas, J. (2006a). On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion. In H. de Vries & L.  E. Sullivan (Eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World (pp. 251–261). Fordham University Press. Habermas, J. (2006b). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1), 1–26. Habermas, J. (2008). Between Naturalism and Religion. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2009). What is Meant by a “Post-Secular Society”?A Discussion on Islam in Europe. In Habermas, Jürgen (Ed.), Europe: The Faltering Project (C. Cronin, Trans., pp. 59–77). Polity Press. Hauser, G.  A. (1998). Civil Society and the Principle of the Public Sphere. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 31, 19–40. Holloway, J. (2010). Crack Capitalism. Pluto Press. Kurzman, C. (2002). Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook. Oxford University Press. McIvor, D. W. (2015). Habermas, Jurgen (1929–). In M. T. Gibbons (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (pp. 1557–1571). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Michelbach, P. A. (2014). Deliberative Democracy. In M. T. Gibbons, D. H. Coole, E.  Ellis, & K.  Ferguson (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (pp. 842–850). Wiley-Blackwell. Taylor, C. (2011). Why We Need a Radical Redefination of Secularism. In J. Butler, J.  Habermas, & C.  Taylor (Eds.), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (pp. 34–56). Columbia University Press. Van de Sande, M. (2013). The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square-An Alternative Perspective on the 2011 Revolutions. Res Publica, 19(3), 223–239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-­013-­9215-­9. Young, I. M. (1997). Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication. In J.  Bohman & W.  Rehg (Eds.), Deliberative Democracy (pp.  383–406). MIT Press.

CHAPTER 3

Women and Media: A Deliberative Engagement

By considering women’s activism in media, this chapter aims to show the gradual progression of women’s deliberative engagement, and their attempt to reach understanding through communicative action (Habermas 1990). Then, in Chap. 4, the analysis and discussion about women’s civil society activism will show how the understanding that has been reached over the years through communicative action has resulted in deliberative cooperation and consensus among diverse feminist groups and women’s rights activists at times (Habermas 1990, 1996). Chapter 5 includes an analysis and discussion about women’s deliberative cooperation and consensus in the field of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary aiming to indicate the “communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere” (Habermas 1994: 8). The focus of this chapter is on women in the media, because after the Islamic revolution media become a male-dominated sphere and in particular, even though journalism was considered a male-dominated profession, since the mid-1990s women have entered this field in greater numbers (Farhadpour 2012). The significant presence of women journalists since the mid-1990s has had an influence on the dynamic nature of the democratic movement including the women’s movement (Farhadpour 2012: 91). To have a comprehensive understanding of the specificities of the women’s movement in today’s Iran, it is essential to study women’s activism in the media and in particular, in women’s media (Farhadpour 2012). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_3

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Regarding women’s activism in media, the focal point of this chapter includes an analysis of the women’s press, mainly Zanan which is a magazine that was renamed in 2014 to Zanan-e-Emrouz. Two main factors make this magazine significant in Iran and the wider Muslim context (Mir-­ Hosseini 1996). First, in 1992, Zanan appeared to have an independent voice, without any connection to the state or any political party and without subordinating women’s issues to a political project (Farhadpour 2012; Mir-Hosseini 1996: 158). Second, among the scholarly feminist literature in the context of Islam, and Shari’a-based writings, Zanan holds a different approach to women, feminism, and Islam. Zanan does not see any contradiction between struggling for women’s rights and remaining a good Muslim and does not have any problem drawing on different feminist sources, including Western ideas, to argue for women’s rights and propose a new reading of Shari’a texts (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 159). Zanan’s feminist approach is unique because despite some other journals in Iran and much Islamic apologetic literature, this magazine “neither attempts to cover up nor to rationalize the gender inequalities that are embedded in many aspects of Shari’a law, but argues that they can all be addressed within the context of the shari’a itself” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 159). Nevertheless, Zanan’s discourse is different from other Muslim feminist discourses since this magazine does not simply put its feminist position within Islam; rather, Zanan works from within the Islamic structure of an Islamic Republic (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 159). This factor has resulted in an interesting fact that in the IRI “those espousing Zanan’s brand of feminism enjoy legitimacy and argue from inside the Islamic discourse” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 159). By examining women’s activism in the field of Media, particularly women’s press, this chapter will attempt to show how despite the domination of a patriarchal system and the controlling policies regarding the social-political activities within society, many women have remained active and have challenged the structural and representational forms of injustice. This chapter will identify women’s groups and individuals who are working in the domain of media toward reformation and equality in Iran. Finally, by applying the study’s Habermasian theoretical framework, the chapter aims to show how women in media have initiated a public sphere through their deliberative practices and their engagement in public across boundaries and divisions. The chapter will analyze women’s media activism since the 1990s in order to show the beginning of a Habermasian

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deliberative engagement among diverse groups of women, including religious and secular. Before starting the discussion on women’s activism, I will briefly explain the media landscape in post-revolutionary Iran.

Media Landscape in Iran In the aftermath of the revolution, the elimination of all signs of the monarchy through the ‘cleansing’ (pak-sazi) of Iran’s national broadcasting body, National Iranian Radio and Television followed in the project of the ‘Islamisation’ of the society (Semati 2008: 5). The culture became ideological in post-revolutionary Iran, and officials claimed that they wanted to produce a religious art/culture to guarantee the religious beliefs of the people (Pazzooki and Tajik 2009: 5). According to the new Islamic constitution, issuing the appointment, dismissal, and accepting the resignation of the head of the mass media of the Islamic Republic of Iran became the exclusive right and responsibility of the supreme leader (Article 110) (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979). It means the national broadcasting organization, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), came under the control of the supreme leader and his conservative allies and therefore it reflected the views aligned with the ideology and policy of the office of the supreme leader (Semati 2008: 5–6). In this state-controlled national broadcasting context, other media, particularly print media, could provide a space for alternative views although the state-controlled broadcasting organization has always had its own printed press, for example, its own monthly magazine, Soroush (Khiabany 2010: 101; Semati 2008: 5). Even so, it does not mean that the other media, including the press, can work easily and freely without any control or obstacle. Rather, these media are controlled and monitored by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG). The role that this ministry is required to play is in following the project of the Islamisation of the society in IRI. The controlling role of this ministry implies that the culture in IRI has been completely state-ized and ideological (Pazzooki and Tajik 2009). In a critique of this state-ized culture, Pazzooki (Pazzooki and Tajik 2009: 5) says a “couple of years ago when Habermas came to Iran, he asked ‘what does the Ministry of Culture and Guidance mean?’ Because for Habermas, the term ‘guidance’ was not apprehensible and he wanted to know from where this guidance/guiding is coming.” Naficy (2012) also criticizes the role of the Ministry of the Culture and Islamic

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Guidance and the Islamisation process in the field of cinema. He quoted one prominent Iranian actress, Fakhri Khorvash, who said that “some government minders from the MCIG attended the filming to ensure that no ‘unethical’ conduct occurred on the set” (Naficy 2012: 112). The unethical conduct encompasses a wide range of actions and behavior, including immoral/illegal/inappropriate physical contact between the cast and crew, shenanigans, joking, improper veiling, women’s smoking, and so forth (Naficy 2012: 112–113). In general, the supreme leader and his conservative allies and officials in the MCIG, in different degrees, act as censorship authorities to ensure the media, including the press and cinema, media productions and the process of these productions are all in accordance with Islamic criteria (Khiabany 2010; Naficy 2012; Semati 2008). Moreover, the head of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) is appointed by the head of the government. Accordingly, the condition and function of the Iranian media, except the National Broadcasting, rely heavily on the type of the dominant administration in each political period. For example, once Khatami, later known as the spiritual leader of the reformist movement, was appointed as the Minister of the MCIG under the domination of development-oriented government of Rafsanjani, (1983–1992), some open policies were introduced by easing certain restrictions on film-makers, novelists, and the press (Khiabany 2010: 102). During this time, in 1992, Shahla Sherkat, who was known as the Islamic feminist, was able to get the license for Zanan magazine, even though 16 years later, within the same Islamic state system but a different government, during the domination of fundamentalist-populist government of Ahmadinejad, Zanan magazine was shut down. The example of Zanan magazine sets forth and helps to clarify the dependency of the Iranian media on the type of government, and simultaneously, shows how women were able to seize a window of opportunity that was open to them. More opportunities opened in the field of media during the domination of the reformist government of Khatami (1997–2005) to the extent that some people refer to this era as the golden period for media, press, and cinema. In just one year (1998–1999), the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance licensed 168 new publications, including seven daily newspapers 27 weeklies, 59 monthlies, 53 quarterlies, and two annual publications (Khiabany 2010: 129; Semati 2008: 23). Regarding cinema during the domination of the reformist government, Naficy (2012: 127) talks about the “cycle of social-problem films” wherein the directors used

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forced veiling and many other discriminatory laws that were imposed on women as a form of critique of the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, conservatives have never simply left the media sphere even during the times the media, including the press, was under the control of a reformist minister (1983–1992) or the reformist government (1997–2005). During these periods, the state and its conservative elements within the judiciary imposed lots of pressure and closed many newspapers or journals (Semati 2008: 6). For instance, in 1992–1993, Khatami, as the Minister of the Culture and Islamic Guidance, resigned under heavy criticism from conservatives for being too soft; or during the reformist government, more than a hundred newspapers with a reformist approach were closed by the conservatives within the judiciary (Khiabany 2010; Semati 2008). It is worth mentioning that according to Article 110, issuing appointments, dismissals, and accepting the resignation of the highest position of the Judiciary is also the absolute right and responsibility of the supreme leader (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979). This indicates how the supreme leader and his conservative allies were able to keep control even of other media in Iran, not only the National Television and Radio. In general, since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic state has tried to control the media in different ways, including restricting private ownership in all aspects of Iran’s communication system, or by controlling the media through legal and non-legal legislations and press law, and so on (Khiabany 2010: 139). Considering this structure and context within which the Iranian media operates, a quick look at the constitution of the IRI regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press highlights the contradictions within this theocratic system. According to Article 23 “investigation into one’s ideas is forbidden. No one can be subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion” (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979). Then, Article 24 addresses the print media and mentions that “publications and the press are free to discuss issues unless such is deemed harmful to the principles of Islam or the rights of the public…” (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979). “Investigating political and press offenses is conducted openly in the courts of the Ministry of Justice before a jury. The manner and conditions of jury selection and their authorities and the definition of political offenses are defined by the law on the basis of Islamic criteria” (Article 168). Regarding the mass media, Article 175 explains “Freedom of expression and [the] dissemination of ideas must be granted through the mass media of the Islamic

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Republic of Iran, with due observance of Islamic criteria and the welfare of the country” (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979). As we can see here, the IRI has conditionally acknowledged the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. All of these rights and freedoms are restricted based on specific conditions of ‘compatibility with the Islamic criteria’ or ‘the rights/welfare of the public’ without any clarification and definition of ‘what are Islamic criteria?’, ‘who are the public?’, ‘what is public in IRI and what is private?’ and so on. Then, in any case of the offense, it is the absolute authority of the judiciary system to investigate since the head of the judiciary system is appointed by the supreme leader. Obviously, these blurred borders and limitations have left enough space for the Islamic state to maneuver against its opponents and critics. The state takes advantage of these vague rules and limitations to both discredit critiques on the IRI and show a legitimate state that recognizes different forms of citizenship rights, and suppresses oppositional voices and views under the label of political/civil/press offense within the constitutional framework. Nevertheless, what is worth emphasizing here is that these gaps within the political and legal context have also left spaces for different social groups, individuals, and oppositions to enter the field of media, move toward their own aims, struggle for their rights, raise their issues, and challenge the system. In the following section, I will discuss women’s media activism within the complex theocratic system of Iran.

Women, Media, and the Rise of Diverse Voices Although it has never been easy for women to have a public platform since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, many have always tried to find gaps in the iron wall of the patriarchy to enter public life and communicate about common issues in public. One of these apertures has been the media, including press, film, and documentaries. Women’s activism in the media can be traced back to a group of conformist women groups during the Iran-Iraq war. For example, Payam-e Hajar belonged to the Society of Islamic Revolution Women of Iran (Babran 2003) and was the voice of the religious-nationalist opposition or the voice of the first generation of the Islamic Republic’s women activists, who had become disillusioned by Islamic Republic’s gender policies from the early years of the revolution (Mir-Hosseini 2002: 101). The editor of Payam-e Hajar was Azam Taleghani, a religious-nationalist who was one

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of the four women deputies in the first parliament after the Islamic revolution. Payam-e Hajar covered the opinion of some groups of religious intellectuals (Ardalan 1999) to assert that through a reinterpretation of Islamic law, appropriate changes could occur according to the times and new realities in the field of women’s rights without leaving behind the Islamic principles (Kar 2001: 187). In general, through the media a group of conformist women could start challenging injustices, bargaining for women’s rights and status by applying a specific religious language; hence, they could smooth the path for other groups of women to enter this field. Gradually, in the following years, this form of activism has developed in other media sectors and non-conformist actors have gotten involved, including secular women’s rights activists as well as a group of reformist male intellectuals and activists. In the 1990s, some women’s magazines emerged that represented the voice of some other specific groups of women, for example, Neda, or a particular top-down approach to women’s rights—a form of “promoting feminism-from-above”—for example, Farzaneh1 (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 161, 2002: 113). Contrary to these kinds of women’s press, in the 1990s, Zanan magazine appeared that represented diverse voices of women. As mentioned previously, Zanan magazine opened in 1992. Between 1992 and 1997, 34 issues of Zanan were published and almost all of the content of all issues encompassed different fields related to women, including women’s news, thoughts in the field (academic thoughts in the area of women’s rights and feminism), art, cinema, literature, law, and science and health. By covering a wide range of subjects related to women, Zanan addressed diverse groups of women. Accordingly, Zanan emerged as a platform for a number of diverse groups of women in society. In the first 34 issues, Zanan allocated certain parts of the magazine to general subjects, for example, cooking, health and exercise, and art. These efforts helped Zanan to address a great number of ordinary women even those who were not very familiar with or not interested in feminism and women’s rights. In fact, Zanan started communication and engagement with a particular group of women through the subjects of cooking and 1  ‘Neda’ was a journal dependent to the Women’s Society of Islamic Republic (Jameeyat-ezanan-e-Jomhooree-e Islami) (Babran 2003: 180) that raised the voice of women of the power elite that want a share for themselves in politics (Mir-Hosseini 2002: 104). ‘Farzaneh’ is another example that stressed the important role of the government in the field of women’s rights and gender planning in its first issues (Ardalan 2000; Babran 2003: 205; Farhadpour 2012).

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baking, making art handcrafts at home, wellbeing, fitness and beauty, and so on. Furthermore, most of the first 34 issues of Zanan included an interview/report that was conducted to address the everyday problems of women in society. This represented another strategy of the magazine to be connected to the body of the society instead of only representing a specific group of women who were engaged with primarily intellectual concerns. For example, in issue 20, Zanan published interviews with women who are the secretaries at the doctors’ offices (Khakzad 1994). The interviews aims to investigate why the secretary of doctors’ offices are considered as a specific profession for women despite the very low salary (Khakzad 1994: 2). It has also been pointed out that the magazine covers this matter since many women in this field believe that they have been ignored (Khakzad 1994). However, one of the best examples of Zanan magazine’s deliberative engagement with ordinary people in the first 34 issues is an interview on the subject of ‘Why women put black cloths/hijab on?’ (Poorzand 1995). The magazine includes interviews of people from different ages, educational backgrounds, employed and not-employed, religious and non-­ religious, and men and women. In fact, the magazine provides different groups of people the chance to voice their diverse ideas on this subject. The interviewer asks a housewife: “what color do you like to wear?” the woman answers: “I do not like to wear bright/light colors”; then, the interviewer asks: “why?” and she says: “It is not appropriate for my age. However, I like to see people in society wearing bright /light colors. Unfortunately, using the bright/light colors became very low in the society…it refers to the society’s mental sorrow… due to social judgment, people (read: women) cannot fight against this sorrow”. Finally, the interviewer asks: “are you religious?” and her answer is: “yes, but I do not think that in our religion (Islam) there is any ban on wearing varied (light and dark) colors” (Poorzand 1995: 4–5). Another interviewee is an 11-year-­ old girl who likes red and likes to see the light/bright colors in the society. The interviewer asks her: “Have you ever been overseas?…Were you more comfortable there or in Iran?…Did you have hijab outside Iran?”; she answers: “I have been in Japan and I was more comfortable because it was ok (not flashy) in Japan to wear any color, but, here even a normal color like yellow is very flashy!…I am from a religious family, and I had hijab in Japan, but, even my hijab was not something flashy in Japan!” (Poorzand 1995: 5–6). It is interesting that men who are involved in this interview had worn bright/light colors, like white and orange, and most of the

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women wore dark colors even while believing that black is the sign of depression and sadness. Thus, the magazine smartly raises a very common everyday issue of women in the society, that is, the style of clothing after the Islamic revolution, in a very indirect way addressing the subject of the compulsory Islamic hijab. The Islamic hijab after the revolution has been politicized, and accordingly, talking about this subject is somehow the red line of the state. However, through a communicative engagement with the society, Zanan magazine in issue 22 tries to highlight the issue of women’s style of clothing, probably, aiming to smooth the path for more critical deliberations on this subject in the future. The interview implies that wearing black for women is not optional in the society. One of the interviewees who is a teacher says: “Dark colors are common in society and mainly women wear these colors since it is a decision based on compulsion…!” (Poorzand 1995: 7). Regarding the issue of the style of clothing, the interview also targets social norms that have been mainly articulated by religious beliefs. In other words, the interview emphasizes another issue in post-revolutionary Iran which is the interpretation of religion (Islam) and the relationship between religion and the style of clothing and the life of the people. It explains “ … the dominated interpretation of the religion (read: Islam) is that religion and sadness are interwoven; accordingly, there is less/no tolerance for happiness…this interpretation of religion resulted in avoiding fun, vitality, and happiness, and choosing happy colours in the society…” (Poorzand 1995: 7). This interview is just one of the tens of conversations with people in the society Zanan conducted in the first 34 issues. My reason for selecting this example is that the interview simultaneously displays diversity in the society of Iran, women’s struggle in the field of media to challenge the gender-discriminatory social norms and rules, and women’s attempt in this journal to initiate a deliberative and communicative engagement in the society. Through media, Zanan magazine, in this case, women’s rights activists and feminists from different social and political background gathered as a public to open discussions about social and political issues, reach out to people within the society, and initiate a communicative action aiming to reach a better understanding of women’s issues, or to reach a shared interpretation of the situation and status of women in the society. From this point of view, this group of women in media acts in the form of a counterpublic since they speak in public about the different issues which have always been excluded from the public; such as women’s style of clothing and their issues.

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Alongside their engagement with ordinary people and raising the voice of ordinary women in the society, Zanan magazine became a platform for intellectuals, academics, elites, and feminist filmmakers, to voice their diverse ideas. For example, in issue 30, the magazine targets Iranian women’s issues in the field of sport through covering the ideas of female athletes, male and female officials who are responsible for the decision-making processes, and male sports reporters who appear on national TV. Despite the dominant conservative political atmosphere, in this issue, Zanan simultaneously initiates a deliberative engagement around a controversial subject related to women’s rights and criticizes politicizing/ideologizing the topic of women’s sport in Iran. Shahla Sherkat, the editor of the magazine, argues “It cannot be said (read: accepted) that women’s sport is possible only with Islamic hijab, and do not provide any appropriate facilities regarding this matter. Or (It cannot be accepted) when the sport and hijab can come together, different individuals and groups (from different political/ ideological approaches) start theorizing about women’s hijab, women’s sport, and women’s issue, and finally, suppress any movement” (Sherkat 1996). These two examples of Zanan magazine reporting on the hijab/style of clothing and sport are convincing enough to show that in post-­ revolutionary Iran, discriminatory laws and policies and the patriarchal interpretation of religion (Islam) are tightly connected to the issue of women’s rights. For this reason, Zanan started extensively addressing gender discriminatory laws and the interpretations of Islam from both legal and theological perspectives. From the Habermasian deliberative theoretical approach, I argue that the legal and religious discussions in Zanan mainly follow two aims: smoothing the path for deliberation, dialogue and bargaining with the state and ulama (those who are influential in the system), and increasing social awareness and the formation of public opinion hoping to initiate reforms in the field of women’s rights. From a legal perspective, Zanan mostly has covered the ideas of a secular feminist lawyer, Mehrangiz Kar. In issue 3, the magazine gives a detailed report of Kar’s new book ‘Fereshteha-ye—Edalat va Pareh-haye Doozakh’ (The Angels of Justice and Fragments of the Hell) that considers women’s rights in ancient Iran, in the pre-Revolution era, and the post-revolution era (Zanan 1992). The report focuses on post-revolutionary Iran and women’s rights issues mainly in the family, such as divorce and child custody (Zanan 1992). In issue 9, Mehrangiz kar (1992: 43) addresses two problematic articles of the civil law (1133 and 1130) that have caused a

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lack of balance in families. These two Articles related to divorce law have negatively affected the situation of women, particularly those who face domestic violence. Kar (1992) also critically analyzes ‘the amendment of divorce law’ approved on 19 November 1992. She argues that even though it is a compromising step forward from the Islamic state, there are still many problems in this law that should be solved, such as, the ambiguity in the words that can be a significant obstacle (Kar 1992: 43–46). In issue 32, Mehrangiz Kar provides young women with crucial legal information regarding their rights on Mahriyeh (dowry) and asks young women to be more aware of their financial rights in their lives (Kar 1997). In general, Zanan magazine became a platform for a secular feminist lawyer, for example, Kar, to challenge the legal system and the gender-­ discriminatory constitution of Iran, increase social awareness about women’s and children’s rights, and accordingly, generate discussions and deliberations around these subjects among elites and ordinary people. Furthermore, it is very important to this research that although the editor of Zanan, Shahla Sherkat, and most of the main members of the magazine are identified as Islamic feminists, a secular woman, such as, Kar, has found this magazine a more appropriate space to share her ideas rather than attending in some secular spaces, such as, overseas conferences, for instance. In Zanan issue 20, Kar mentions her experience attending a conference on ‘women and politics’ in Los Angeles, invited by ‘Iranian Women Research Foundation.’ Kar explains that she had not been able to present her work ‘Analysing the role of women’s political presence since 11 February 1979’ since some Iranian expatriates disrupted the conference and started chanting slogans (Kar 1994: 18). For this reason, Kar decided to publish her article in Zanan, issue 20. This example displays the capacity of social groups, particularly women, inside Iran to co-operate, communicate and deliberate around social and political issues despite their diverse ideological and political perspectives. Kar celebrates the inclusive strategy of Zanan magazine and says: “The unique accomplishment of Zanan is that it has been able to bring modernized religious women together with secular non-conformist women” (Kar 2001: 189). Another good example of this communicative and inclusive capacity is Mehrangiz Kar’s meeting with Shahla Sherkat, an Islamic feminist, and Saeedzadeh, a reformist cleric, to talk about their work and cooperation with Zanan magazine following their somewhat common aims, in particular, their struggle for equality and justice (Kar 2001). In the meeting, Saeedzadeh suggests Kar remove or amend some parts of her article to be publishable

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as well as to prevent being charged with blasphemy (Kar 2001: 193). Kar accepted her suggestions to do these amendments because she believes that “it was a historic moment bringing together people like me (secular) with people from a more conformist faction of the society” (Kar 2001: 193–194). Despite their diverse ideological and political perspectives, they gather in one monthly magazine for women to communicate, deliberate, and collaborate since it can “benefit women and the women’s movement” (Kar 2001: 194). This quotation and the example of deliberation demonstrates Habermasian communicative action and bargaining, that includes different actors as participants who understand that compromises and deliberations will supply a more favorable arrangement for all of them. In the context of this study, this is a negotiated and future-oriented compromise accepted by different individuals for different reasons. This is not a case of a strategic compromise being formed to deal with an urgent situation. In this particular case, the compromise has been initiated by an Islamic feminist (read comformist woman) who has enjoyed privileged status after the Islamic Revolution. To struggle against inequality and for women’s rights in the society, Shahla Sherkat has adopted an inclusive and dialogical approach aiming to initiate a compromise with different groups of intellectuals and activists to help all of them to both follow their own interest and their common interets. From a theological perspective, Saeedzadeh, sometimes under the female pseudonym, Mina Yadegar Azadi, through his article in Zanan, provided powerful fiqh-based (jurisprudential) reasoning in support of women’s rights in Islamic law (Saeedzadeh 1993, 1994, 1997; Yadegar-­ Azadee 1992a, b). While a feminist lawyer, such as Kar, from a legal perspective, critically addresses the discriminatory laws in the Islamic constitution of Iran, Saeedzadeh and some other clerics and male-­ intellectuals, have started criticizing the gender discriminatory laws and policies by referencing Islamic resources. For example, in issue 8, Saeedzadeh writes about ‘Ijtihad and Women’s Authority.’ Saeedzadeh explains the ideas of those ulama (clerics) who deny the right of women to decree (Fatwa2), aiming to consider issues around Iranian women’s rights based on logic and reasoning (Yadegar-Azadee 1992b). The right to 2  If there is no scripture regarding a subject/question, an Islamic scholar/ a qualified jurist, can do the interpretation and make a decision/decree. The right to make a decision/to make a fatwa is usually considered the absolute right of men among ulama/clerics, particularly in Iran.

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decree/propose Fatwa is very critical for women who are struggling for their rights in most of the Islamic countries since (male) Islamic jurists/ clerics/ usually reject women’s demands for any change in the law by using their—exclusive—rights of Ijtihad.3 In Iran, as an example, usually Fuqaha (Islamic jurists) in the Guardian Council reject legal amendments regarding women’s rights under the title of ‘not compatible with Islam’, based on their specific interpretation of Islam. In another article, issue 9, Saeedzadeh critically analyzes the book on the subject of women’s rights in Islam, written by Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, a prominent conservative Islamic scholar (Saeedzadeh 1993). He mentions that his main aim for the analysis and critique of this work is to open the way for deliberation, debate, and dialogue about women’s issues and women’s role in different fields from diverse perspectives (Saeedzadeh 1993: 29). In Zanan issue 20, Saeedzadeh replies to the head of Judiciary’s4 critiques regarding an article in the magazine ‘Based on which law, covering the cost of treating women’s severe diseases is not the responsibility of spouses?’ In this work, Saeedzadeh appreciates that the head of the judiciary has given attention to women’s issues and Zanan magazine and looks upon that as a promising sign (Saeedzadeh 1994: 44). Saeedzadeh mentions that reading Zanan magazine’s articles demonstrates that the head of the judiciary, as a cleric, has believed that there are women with academic backgrounds who have the power of analysis and reasoning (Saeedzadeh 1994: 44). Nevertheless, addressing the head of the judiciary’s critique, Saeedzadeh comprehensively, based on fiqh, debates the right of women to get support from their spouse when they face severe diseases (Saeedzadeh 1994). In another reformist magazine, Iran-e-Farda, Saeedzadeh also argues to follow the idealistic values of the religion as well as to deal with social issues, since it is necessary to provide new plans based on human experience and logic within the framework of time, place, and the date (Saeedzadeh 1998). Reformist clerics, such as, Saeedzadeh, and philosophers, such as, Mojtahed Shabestari5 insist upon the individual right of the believer as an  Interpretation of Islamic sources.  Since the Islamic Revolution, all heads of judiciary system have been clerics. According to the constitution, the head of the judiciary is elected by the supreme leader. 5  From a theoretical aspect and based on hermeneutic tradition, Mohammad MojtahedShabestari, a prominent Iranian philosopher, criticizes the exclusive rights of a specific group of clerics for ijtihad and the interpretation of Islamic sources, an interpretation that is mainly patriarchal. So, he considers “the individual believer as an interpreter of the revelation” and accordingly, he “challenges the ruling orthodoxy” in Iran (Habermas 2002). 3 4

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interpreter (Habermas 2002), and have contributed a lot to the current Iranian women’s activism since the movement struggles for women’s rights from within the Islamic discourse of the IRI and follow the idea of interpreting Islamic sources in favor of women’s rights. In fact, Iranian women’s rights activism after the Islamic revolution is tightly connected to the ideas of this group of male intellectuals. Another prominent philosopher is Abdolkarim Soroush who has supported the idea of gender equality within the Islamic framework. In issue 59, Zanan publishes the interview with Soroush regarding women’s rights. In this interview, Soroush argues that the “social orders and rules mentioned in Shari’a are temporary although our fuqaha (Islamic Jurists) disagree with this idea and believe that what shari’a says is eternal” (Soroush 2000: 33). Therefore, he concludes that all orders about women in Islam should be considered as accidental (Arazi) rules, which are temporary and the result of the special time and place, (Soroush 2000, 2002) and simultaneously, they must be demystified (Soroush 2000). Generally, according to the specificities of the time, Zanan, has started a deliberative engagement with reformist intellectuals who can be of assistance to Iranian women’s rights activism by their strong theoretical and theological logic and reasoning. It is credible to say that Islamic feminists in Zanan realized that a deliberative engagement with this group of intellectuals and gaining their theoretical and theological support was necessary to smooth the path for communication and more deliberation about women’s rights in the Islamic context of Iran. An intellectual, such as, Soroush, was a supporter of the Islamic Revolution and is usually considered as the main theoretician of the revolution and cultural revolution. However, similar to some Islamic feminists and religious women’s rights activists, gradually after the revolution, he also became disillusioned by the unjust policies of the new regime, including the gender policies. This discussion on the engagement of diverse intellectuals with some Islamic feminists and women’s rights activists displays the idea that despite their different ideologies, they have had a common concern, that is the inequalities and unjust rules and policies in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This relationship between Zanan magazine and the different intellectuals, including the clerics, lawyers, and philosophers, is important for the current study for three reasons. First, it shows how the feminists and women’s rights activists at this magazine act as a counterpublic that challenge the dominant (oppressive) public, and struggle against different forms of exclusion and injustice through convincing theological and legal

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reasoning. By reference to these reformist intellectual ideas, Zanan could decentralize the domain of the interpretation of the Qur’an by the clergies in Iran (Najmabadi 1998). Additionally, having the support of these ideas could increase Iranian women’s rights activists’ bargaining power and confidence so that they could start powerfully replying to the harsh and patriarchal critiques of the contents of a women’s magazine such as Zanan. For example, in issue 9, Shahla Sherkat replies to the critique of Ayatollah Azari Ghomi (a conservative cleric), the editor of Resalat Newspaper, on the Zanan’s article about women’s judgment in family disputes and a story called ‘Zan’ in issues 6, 7, and 4. Sherkat addresses Resalat Newspaper and says “all legal arguments and reasonings in these writings had been based on right Islamic sources, acceptable among Fuqaha (Islamic jurists); and the critiques of the Resalat Newspaper clearly show that this magazine is against women’s individual and social activities while Islam gives this right to them…believe me; the time for any movement or any person that does not follow any reason and logical analysis has already passed…” (Sherkat 1992: 16). The second reason to emphasize the engagement of different groups of intellectuals with Zanan magazine and feminists and activists is that it demonstrates the inclusive strategy of Zanan magazine that raises diverse voices, including secular and religious. Third, it shows how Iranian women’s rights activists, through the press, could start discussions around social issues and in fact, encourage deliberative practices regarding socialpolitical issues or critiques of deliberative practices that can facilitate the way towards the formation of a deliberative public sphere. Additionally, by acting in the form of a counterpublic, women’s rights activists and feminists in this magazine could expand a discursive space of argumentations which is very constructive for diverse societies. In the following years, more intellectuals, thinkers, feminists, activists, and journalists became involved in Zanan magazine, and gradually this form of individual deliberative engagement with feminists, mainly Islamic feminists at Zanan, developed into a collective engagement in the form of roundtables, unions, similar to ‘the union of women publishers’ (see Chap. 4), or they replied to one another’s articles in different magazine and journals, including Zanan. The next section will discuss this development of the deliberations through the press in Iranian society.

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Development of Deliberations Through the Press As mentioned, Zanan magazine became one of the specific women’s journals that could raise diverse voices in Iranian society by covering a wide range of subjects, from cooking and beauty to legal and theological topics. In fact, the magazine addressed more audiences than other women’s magazines that represented the voice of specific groups. For this reason, this magazine played an important role in mobilizing women in the 1997 Presidential election (see Chap. 5) by depicting Khatami, as a reformist candidate who supports women’s rights, justice, equality, and civil society versus Nategh Nouri, as a conservative candidate who did not support the discourse of women’s rights and equality (Zanan 1997a: 2–5, b: 5). The overwhelming victory of the reformist candidate, Mohammad Khatami, in 1997, initiated a new era in the political history of Iran that was known as the ‘Dovvom-Khordad (Second Khordad) Movement’ with the slogan of civil society. It was a significant movement because of its role in developing civil society in the IRI (Beehner 2007). The leader of the reformist movement, Mohammad Khatami, proposed a ‘dialogue among civilizations’ (United Nations 2000). Drawing on the idea of Jahanbegloo (Jahanbegloo 2003), intellectuals, such as Khatami, Soroush, and Mojtahed-Shabestari (mentioned earlier), are usually considered as ‘dialogic intellectuals’ since they insist on the importance of plurality, tolerance, dialogue, and civil society. Khatami started to emphasize the importance of civil society, social-political evolution, and women’s empowerment in the IRI. Furthermore, Second Khordad is identified as an emancipatory movement “articulated by the press” (Kazemi 2005: 21). The dialogic intellectuals, mainly non-religious, could enter the public sphere through their specific intellectual magazines, such as, Goftegoo, Keeyan, Negah-e-No, and Arghanoon (Jahanbegloo 2003: 125–126). Iranian intellectuals, those from different ideological backgrounds, including religious and secular, could also propose their ideas and discuss their concerns in a public forum in some other social and political press, including Adeeneh, Farhang-e-Tose, Andeesheh-e-Jameh, Iran-e-Farda, and Jame-­ e-­Salem. This group of the press promoted deliberation on social-political issues by organizing different round tables and group discussions. For example, this group of the press mainly focused on different subjects around ‘civil society’ from a variety of different perspectives, including ‘civil society and our expectations’ (Adeeneh 1997), ‘civil society in Iran’ (Farhang-e-Tose 1998a), ‘A Way Towards Civil Society’, written by a

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famous (secular) women’s rights activist (Ahmadi-Khorasani 1998), ‘civil society and women’ (Pouyan 1998; Farhang-e-Tose 1998b), civil society and the Islamic Judiciary, written by a famous (secular) feminist lawyer (Ebadi 1997), civil society and the pressure groups (known as Ansar-eHezbollah) (Zibakalam 1998), ‘religious civil society’ (Mardeeha 1997), and so on. It is worth considering that this group of the intellectual journals started co-operating with some prominent women’s activists and feminists, such as, Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani and Shirin Ebadi (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 1998, 1999; Ebadi et al. 1997; Ebadi 1998). The reformist period which took place between 1997 and 2005, is considered as the golden period for the press, and it included the women’s press. According to the statistics, among the published press in 1996, 27 magazines had female editors, and this number increased to 38 female editors in 1997, 50  in 1998, 56  in 1999, and 61  in 2000 (Babran 2003: 214). Moreover, in 2000, the number of women publishers increased to 525 which represented a 93 percent increase in comparison with this figure in 1997 (Kadivar 2005: 132). During the reformist period, women had a significant presence in the management and publishing fields so that it made appropriate ground for establishing different women’s organizations and unions, such as, the union of women publishers (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013; Babran 2003). In the field of the women’s press, more women’s journals and newspapers emerged, each representing the voice of different groups of women throughout society. As an example, in 1998, Zan, as a women’s newspaper, established and represented the discourse of Islamic feminism even though it was from a different perspective compared with the Islamic feminists in Zanan (Ahmadi-Khorasani 1999; Babran 2003; Esfandiari 2004; Farhadpour 2012). While Islamic feminists in Zan had a (conservative) pragmatist approach6 to the issue of women’s rights in Iran, the feminists at Zanan, as mentioned in the last section, followed a reformist approach. While Zanan was headed by an independent religious feminist without any connection with the power, Zan was headed by Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Akbar Hashemi, the most prominent Iranian politician during this period. Nevertheless, Faezeh entered the field of women’s sport, and she aimed to institute constructive reforms in favor of women in this area. Additionally, she was able to enter the fifth parliament in the first round of 6  From this approach, for the subsistence of the Islamic state, it is necessary to relatively respond to women’s needs instead of suppressing the reformist groups.

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elections as the second elected MP from Tehran that was a great success generally for women in the male-dominated field of politics in Iran (for more details on women and parliament see Chap. 5). After the fifth parliament election, although she had never accepted interview requests, she accepted Shahla Sherkat’s invitation. In issue 28 Zanan, she shared her life stories and challenges that she has been facing within the patriarchal society of Iran as an active woman in society and as the daughter of a powerful politician (Sherkat and Hashemi 1996). This interview shows that despite the different approaches, there is not any conflict between two women’s magazines, Zanan and Zan, rather there is a kind of attempt to intersubjectively share knowledge and trust with the mutual aim to reach an understanding of the situation (Habermas 1979, 1990). In other words, the interview can show the inclusive strategy of the different groups of women who are struggling for a common aim, that of justice and equality in Iran. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the pragmatist-conservative approach of Faezeh Hashemi gradually changed into a more reformist perspective. She adopted a more critical view of the function of the system in social and political fields. It is credible to claim that similar to some other religious women or some male-intellectuals, Faezeh also became disillusioned by the unjust policies and the suppressive strategies in the Islamic Republic of Iran. During recent years, she has publically showed her support of minority groups, for instance, by visiting a Baha’I female prisoner, Fariba Kamalabadi, during her temporary leave (BBC Persian 2016; Iran Press Watch 2016). Considering the harsh and suppressive policies of the Islamic state and its security service related to the Baha’I community, Faezeh’s meeting, as the daughter of one of the most influential politicians in Iran, was both a challenge to the system and a great risk for Faezeh and her family. Taghi Rahmani, a religious-nationalist activist, believes that “Faezeh’s behaviour is avant-garde though this taboo (having good relations, communications with the Baha’i community) had been already broken after Ayatollah Montazeri (influential reformist cleric) announced his idea about the Baha’I people” (BBC Persian 2016). Accordingly, it was not surprising that Faezeh received harsh responses from the system and even her father did not support her act in support of the Baha’I community (BBC Persian 2016; Dahbashi 2016). For the current study, this shift in the approach of some of the main supporters of the Islamic revolution, who gradually became some of the main critics of the system by applying a reformist approach, is important, because it depicts

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the process of the development of the reformist discourse in the society of Iran, a reformist discourse that promotes compromise, dialogue, and civil society, as mentioned previously. Additionally, it shows how the Islamic Republic political and social pressures and limitations on women in society, gradually and unexpectedly, could motivate diverse groups of women, including religious/non-religious/secular to work together for their common interests. While Zan and Zanan followed the Islamic feminist discourses in general, during this period, Jens-e-Dovvom (Second Sex) and Fasl-e-Zanan (Women’s Season) appeared as two women’s journals in the form of a book that represented mainly the voice of secular women’s rights activists throughout society. These two feminist journals are distinctive since they published a wide range of feminist writings that included sensitive subjects related to women’s issues, for example, the story of the compulsory hijab, or the story of women political prisoners alongside reporting all women’s gatherings and events, such as, the 8 March gathering (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2001; Ardalan 2001; Ashoorineeya 2003; Hajebi-Tabrizi 2001). Furthermore, in these two journals, we can see the good relationship between the editors and the feminists from minority groups. For instance, Fasl-e-Zanan published an article written by the Iranian-Kurdish feminist, Roya Tolooyee, as an Iranian-Kurdish feminist (Tolooyee 2005). The emergence of these journals refers to the unique Iranian media landscape in the IRI, described at the beginning of the chapter. During the different political periods, social groups and individuals, including women, both religious and secular, have entered the field of the press by seizing opportunities and taking advantage of the Constitution’s Articles that insisted on the freedom of the press and freedom of speech. However, it did not mean that they could easily work without any obstacles; rather, the state and its conservative elements within the judiciary system through different ways tried to place the reformist/feminist/secular press under the pressure and once they had the opportunity, they closed these journals and newspapers. The key point is that despite these state pressures and repressive policies, the women in the media, religious and secular, kept moving on toward their aims and they seized any little opportunity to raise women’s issues and increase awareness.

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Zanan Magazine After the 1997 Reformist Movement After 1997, Zanan started more extensively covering the ideas of clerical intellectuals, such as, Eshkevari (Yousefi-Eshkevari 2000) and Saeedzadeh (Saeedzadeh 1997), and the Iranian philosopher, Soroush (2000). Additionally, Zanan became the main venue for dialogue among academic Iranian women’s rights advocates from inside and outside the country, and from different perspectives by publishing their work (Motiee 1997, 1998; Shahidian 1998; Tohidi 1997, 2000). One of the best examples is Motiee’s and Shahidian’s work that deliberate on the subject of feminism in Iran and through their articles, they replied to each other’s ideas. In issue 40, Motiee addresses the critiques of his work published in Zanan, issue 39 and 40, written by Nooshin Ahmadi Khorasani, (secular) women’s rights activist from inside Iran, and Hamed Shahidian, a scholar from outside the country. Motiee believes that the discussion about women’s issues can help us to achieve a better understanding of this subject (Motiee 1998). While Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani targets Motiee’s article ‘Feminism in Iran; In Search of an Indigenous Approach’ and his critique on Iranian feminists’ emphasis on the official employment of women, Motiee criticizes Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani’s approach to women’s employment (Motiee 1997). Motiee critically mentions “Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani supports women’s employment from a superficial liberalist approach” (Motiee 1998: 39). Then, by insisting on the cultural, indigenous, and social specificities of a specific context (Iran), he emphasizes the importance of women’s occupation at home and their motherhood role (Motiee 1997, 1998). Motiee argues that “through these family roles or traditional identity, women could affect male power domains and demonstrate that they are not oppressed victims” (Motiee 1998: 44). From this point of view, Motiee also addresses Shahidian’s critiques of his work. Motiee’s claims that the problematic point in Shahidian’s ideas is that he separates the public and private domains (Motiee 1998). Motiee continues explaining that based on this “duality logic,” Shahidian has a negative view on women’s menage role in the private sphere of their homes since he believes that this role resulted in “exclusion of women from the public domain (male-dominated spheres)” (Motiee 1998: 42). In support of his ideas on the role of women in the family and at home, in his article, Motiee concludes that the “family institution (private sphere) in Iran is still a powerful institution; and finally, there is a mutual relation between public and

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private sphere” (Motiee 1998: 42). This discussion continues in Zanan; and Shahidian, in his article ‘Feminism in Iran: In Search of What?’ (Shahidian 1998), addresses all these critiques mentioned by Motiee. Shahidian appreciates Zanan magazine for publishing articles on the issues and aims of the women’s movement and believes that these deliberations can generate a deeper understanding of feminism and feminist critique (Shahidian 1998). He also mentions that Motiee’s insistence on the important economic and social role of women in a family institution is right (Shahidian 1998). Nevertheless, Shahidian claims that “in this way of considering the value of women’s work at home, Motiee has ignored the function of family institution and housekeeping in the patriarchal system; and accordingly, he has protected the patriarchal system from the target of women’s struggles” (Shahidian 1998: 36). After 1997, Zanan extended the boundaries of its deliberation by engaging some reformist activists and public intellectuals. One of the strategies of Zanan was organizing different roundtables about women’s rights and needs in Iran (Farahi et al. 1997; Tavassoli et al. 1997; Ebadi et al. 1997). Through these roundtables, Zanan aims to analyze women’s issues from diverse aspects, including the cultural, religious, social, economic, and political dimensions. At one of these roundtables, as an example, Homa Zanjanizadeh believes that “women’s issues are not about unequal rights of women; rather it is about men’s domination and how through this domination they have institutionalized these inequalities”(Tavassoli et al. 1997). In response to Zanjanizadeh, Tavassoli claims that “discriminations and distinctions in the status of men and women in Iran refer both to the cultural and political barriers, and the problems and obstacles in the philosophy/school of thinking of women themselves” (Tavassoli et al. 1997). The third point of view in this roundtable presented by Nasrin Mossafa that women’s issues in Iran are the consequences of the political, legal, economic, and cultural issues and they are intertwined (Tavassoli et al. 1997). Another good example of these roundtables is a discussion among Ebadi (secular feminist lawyer), Alavitabar (researcher), and Motiee (Sociologist) in that they mainly discuss the ideology of feminism in Iran and the status of women in the legal system of the country. The discussions that took place at this roundtable are interesting since the participants have very different approaches to women’s rights and the related issues in Iran. While Ebadi believes that women’s issues in Iran mainly refer to the dominate patriarchal thinking in the legal system, Motiee, as

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mentioned before in this chapter, insists on the family institution and claims the most important issue is the rights of women in the family (Ebadi et al. 1997). The last example is the roundtable with the participation of another secular feminist lawyer (Mehrangiz Kar), reformist journalist (Abbas Abdi) and a researcher in politics (Farideh Farahi). This roundtable is another example of the development of deliberations through the venue of Zanan. In this roundtable, while Kar and Farrahi mainly consider women’s issues from a legal aspect and insist that we cannot ignore the existence of women’s issues in Iran, Abdi emphasizes that women as citizens have issues, not as a specific sex and argues that women’s main issues are same as men’s issues in Iran (Farahi et al. 1997). The Zanan roundtables and discussions are important to the current study for three main reasons. First, the dialogue that occurs through the articles and at the roundtables show how a specific group of Iranian feminists (usually identified as Islamic feminists) through the press could initiate a process of Habermasian deliberative engagement, and develop conversations within the Iranian society. Second, these discussions on women’s issues and feminism in Iran in the late 1990s display how Iranian women’s rights activists and feminists through the press could begin to challenge the patriarchy, injustice, and inequalities. Third, these examples of roundtables and deliberations are convincing evidence of the Iranian women’s rights activists’ deliberative engagement with diverse groups of activists and intellectuals. After 1997, Zanan could help connect the discourse of women’s rights to the dominant discourse of reformations since ‘civil society,’ ‘reformation,’ and ‘justice’ were common concepts and concerns. This magazine understood the intersection between the reformation project and the various demands of the different social groups, including the women, in the society. Additionally, Zanan, magazine became a space that facilitated the mutual understanding between those who participate in communication regarding facts, norms, and experiences (Habermas 1986: 108). Accordingly, this magazine could play a crucial role in providing the appropriate grounds for cooperation among feminist elites, activists, lawyers, and reformist intellectuals, and political activists. In sum, these roundtables are great examples of Habermasian communicative action, highlighting the communicative aspect required to achieve a shared interpretation of the situation and issues aiming to reach an agreement, a negotiated compromise, or a consensus. The deliberative engagement among the diverse groups of women’s rights activists and feminists, cleric/non-cleric/religious/non-religious

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intellectuals, and reformists originated at the 2000 Berlin Conference. In April 2000, some prominent intellectuals, including those who were religious, religious-nationalist and secular, along with some prominent reformists and activists, attended the Berlin Conference titled ‘Iran after the election’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Mir-hosseini and Tapper 2006; Pak-Shiraz 2008). The participants included a secular feminist (Mehrangiz Kar), a students’ representative (Reza Afshari), the director of Iran-e-­ Farda and a prominent member of nationalist-Religious alliance (Ezzatollah Sahabi), an Islamic feminist and editor of Zanan (Shahla Sherkat), a women’s rights activist and the establisher of ‘the Union of Women Publishers’ (Shahla Lahiji), a prominent dissident of secular intellectuals and writers (Dollatabadi, Changiz Pahlevan, and Kazem Kardavani) and even one member of the reformist clergy, Yousef Eshkevari (Mir-­ hosseini and Tapper 2006: 37). It was a great moment in the political history of post-revolutionary Iran wherein different groups, including activists, feminists, reformists, intellectuals, from different backgrounds gathered to talk about the future of reforms in Iran, including reforms in the field of women’s rights. However, the conference was disrupted by two exiled Iranian opposition groups. Accordingly, as it turned out, the conference became a talking point and a good excuse for the hardliners (conservatives) in Iran to suppress the Iranian intellectuals, reformists and activists for two main reasons: “disruptions by naked men and women (from exiled opposition groups), and the outspokenness of some of the panellists from Iran (Mir-­ hosseini and Tapper 2006: 37). After the conference, many of the participants were arrested, including Mehrangiz Kar, Shahla Lahiji, and Eshkevari who was charged with apostasy. The Berlin Conference negatively affected both the women’s rights activism and the reformist movement in Iran. Since two secular feminists were arrested and some other feminists, in particular, the Islamic feminists at Zanan, could not support them properly under the glare of the security atmosphere, so the conference could provide an opportunity to a minority group of secular reformers to intensify their critiques of secular feminists, such as, Kar who co-operated with the Islamic reformists (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Keddie 2000; Moghissi 1999). Nevertheless, despite the negative effects of the Berlin Conference, Iranian women’s activists and feminists continued their activities and they continued to co-operate in different areas, including in the women’s press, sometimes with a very reformist attitude and language and sometimes they were very conservative. In fact, the 1997 reformist movement had

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already given a boost to the press and reformist groups, including women’s rights advocates. For this reason, the public activism, deliberation, and participation through the press could not be completely and easily suppressed after the Berlin conference. For example, Zanan magazine continued to serve as a platform for a number of diverse voices despite the different difficulties, political pressures and the fact that the magazine had lost some of its main writers. With the domination of the populist-fundamentalist government of Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), after 16 years, the government shut Zanan down. Women’s rights activists, feminists, and reformists could hardly find space for public activism, deliberation, and a place to maneuver their efforts toward democratic reformation. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the 1997 reformist movement was similar to a referendum that would allow the majority of people to have their say and cast their vote to show their support for democracy, reformation and the formation of civil society. It meant that the emancipatory reformist movement had strong roots in the society that the new populist government could not easily remove. Similarly, it was not going to be easy to suppress the women’s activism since, under the domination of the reformist movement, it continued to publicize the discourse of women’s rights. Regarding the power of Iranian feminists and activists in the field press, in 2008, the New  York Times wrote an article about President Ahmadinejad and his hard-line allies explaining that they were scared of their own citizens, particularly those who give Iranian people a voice, for example, Zanan magazine (The New York Times 2008). Thus, women’s rights activists and feminists, who had already experienced working under the strict security atmosphere, even during the reformist period, knew that on certain occasions, it was necessary to strategically move according to the specific political atmosphere of the time. In fact, as counterpublics—critical oppositional forces-, women’s rights activists understood that the function of their activism relies on the political and social specificities of the context within which they act. In other words, to keep moving forwards, women’s rights activists understood the necessity of following a multilevel activism. Instead of simply staying silent, the women’s rights’ advocates concentrated on their commonalities, and this approach led to great cooperation among the secular and religious groups within ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ as an instance (see Chap. 4). Moreover, the securitized atmosphere under the domination of the populist government unpredictably caused a number of diverse

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women’s groups, activists, feminist elites and those who worked mostly in the press, to get closer to those throughout society by developing their activities in NGOs (see Chap. 4). In the context of this study, it can be said that under the securitized atmosphere, women’s rights activists found the necessity of following a ‘prefigurative politics’ in this sense that they can still be active and struggle against injustice, inequality, and exclusion but not through apparently political activities (see Chap. 4 for more details).

Re-launching ‘Zanan’ After Six Years In 2014 under the domination of the moderate government of Hasan Rohani (2013–ongoing), at the time that Zanan was re-launched by Shahla Sherkat under the name of Zanan-e-Emrooz, the positive effects of this engagement for the greater good with those throughout the society can be considered. While in the most of the old issues of Zanan, the main concentration is on legal and intellectual discussions about the rights of women and the interpretation of women’s rights in Islam and fiqh, in Zanan-e Emrouz, the main attention is focused on the everyday issues and interests of women. By reading and comparing the different issues of these two journals, it is understood that the ideas and discussions in Zanan-e Emrouz, are more concrete and are related to the everyday life of women. While in Zanan magazine, we have various articles written by different (male) intellectuals about the re-interpretation of the Qur’an with an intellectual language, in Zanan-e Emrouz, we read an interview with a female interpreter of the Qur’an who introduces modern interpretations of Qur’an in private/home-based meetings with a more common language (Mobalegh and Gorji 2016). Zanan-e Emrouz provides an interesting report on the issue of training in women’s religious ceremonies and meetings (Dolati 2016). Zanan-e Emrouz, with a more common language, provides various reports to show what is going on in today’s society of Iran and discusses the issues and challenges women face on the ground on an ongoing basis. For example, it reports about the phenomenon of acid-attacks on women (this happened in Isfahan) (Baniyaghoob and Ghayeb 2014; Ghaniyan 2014); the issue of single women who want to adopt a child from the Behzisti organization (State Welfare Organization of Iran) (Rajabi 2017); the issue of homeless women who sleep in cardboard boxes and face various health issues including AIDS and addiction (Ghoddossi 2016); the issues of women in different economic sectors, including those driving as taxi-drivers (Sattaree 2016), carpentry

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(M.  Ahmadi 2016), animal husbandry (Hosseinzadeh 2014), knitting (Mohammadi 2014), and so forth. These reports have been carried out through informal fieldwork, and face-to-face interviews and discussions with women within the society from different social classes and backgrounds. Additionally, from a problem-­solving approach, most of the reports on the social and economic issues of women in society have engaged some officials, mainly female officials, and scholars to discuss and analyze these issues, and present some possible initial solutions. For example, regarding the situation of homeless women, Zanan-e Emrouz also involves some scholars to discuss this social issue from a sociological and an economic perspective. While a female scholar in sociology analyzes the issue of homeless women and poverty by applying two key concepts of ‘exclusion’ and ‘citizenship,’ the male scholar considers this issue from an economic perspective and based on a discussion about the general issue of poverty and unemployment in society (Ghoddossi 2016). To provide a comprehensive report and analysis of the issue of homeless women, the magazine also interviews Fatemeh Daneshvar, chairman of the Social Committee of Tehran City Council and director of the Mehr Affarin Charity Organization, to discuss the situation of the children of these women. Furthermore, these reports are convincing evidence that shows Zanan-e Emrouz’s focal point is women’s everyday practices in the society and the potential of this form of activism to make changes in favor of Iranian women in the society. The most recent example is Zanan-e Emrouz’s report on the atmosphere of the society before the Persian New Year (Norouz) aiming to show how the public sphere significantly became feminized during this time of the year (Hashemi 2018). The magazine describes the considerable presence of women in society and simultaneously highlights women’s issues through face-to-face interviews with various women. For example, while the report celebrates the public presence of women who play musical instruments in streets of the city, it points out the issue of the obstacles and bans on women’s activity in the field of music (Hashemi 2018: 7 & 10–11). And while reporting on the presence of women who stand in stalls in busy areas of the city and sell their handicrafts, homemade foods, and so on; the report helps raise women’s voices regarding the way that certain social issues and judgments created obstacles for them related to their career (Hashemi 2018: 7). As an example, one of the interviewees says that “some men have suggested accepting a temporary marriage (Siqeh) because they think that we need money!”

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(Hashemi 2018: 7). Following on from this fieldwork/interview-based report, Saremi in Zanan-e Emrouz analyzes the obstacles and possibilities of the presence of women in the city’s public spaces (2018). In this chapter, the writer argues that cities are not gender-neutral and public spaces are important in determining social gender formations (Saremi 2018: 24). The main point of the chapter is that despite the existence of gender inequality in access to public spaces, women, particularly many of those from the lower and middle classes, could use the everyday accessible city public spaces, such as local parks and subway, for their public activities, for example, their economic activities (Saremi 2018). The author believes that this form of women’s activism could facilitate the formation of cooperative social relations and collective philanthropic activities (Saremi 2018: 26). These are just a few selected examples from the report in Zanan-e Emrouz that were conducted based on discussions, interviews, and deliberative engagement with diverse groups of people that due to our word limit cannot be discussed here. However, the main point for the current research is that these reports and articles show the attempt of Iranian feminists and activists in Zanan-e Emrouz to develop their communicative engagement with diverse groups of women within the society. Generally, in comparison with the issues Zanan addressed, Zanan-e Emrouz pays more attention to the social and economical everyday life of Iranian women and their matters, including their employment/unemployment and social-political participation, and did not concentrate as much on the legal and religious-intellectual fields. This comparison does not aim to show which journal is better; rather it aims to demonstrate how this group of Iranian feminists adapted and moved forward with the requirements of the time. It shows that this group of feminists, who are known as Islamic feminists, have a flexible approach to the issue of women’s rights in Iran. This is since about twenty years ago, while as a foundation, a re-configuration of women’s rights, Islam, fiqh, and feminism was required, whereas today these Iranian feminists are able to go into the society, address everyday women’s demands and issues, and concentrate on the potential of women’s everyday practices and presence in the public sphere. It is important to note that this approach shift is parallel to the recent statement of the women’s movement for raising women’s demands for the 2017 presidential Elections (Radio Zamaneh 2017; News Gooya 2017) (see Chap. 5).

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Alongside women’s activism in the press and the prominent role of women in the development of deliberations through this medium, a group of women have entered the field of cinema after the Islamic revolution.

Public Activism and Development of Deliberations Through Cinema After the Islamic revolution, women gradually started playing significant roles both behind and in front of the cameras since their active participation in the revolution and their adaptation to the revolutionary Islamist rules created a new role for them (Naficy 2012: 94). As Mehrangiz Kar describes “the revolution produces a ‘paradox’ in the lives of women. On the one hand, because of their wide participation in it, women gained social agency by persuading religious leaders to legitimize female participation in the social and political process.” “On the other hand, due to the dominant patriarchal and religious attitudes and legislation, women continued to be treated as ‘second class citizens’” (Naficy 2012: 93–94). It is also interesting to point out that this paradox in women’s lives after the revolution shows itself in the sphere of cinema. While the veil, as an instance, was imposed by the Islamic patriarchal state aiming to push women back to the private sphere of their homes, in particular, the secular/non-conformist women, a group of filmmakers accepted this anti-modern Islamic rule and powerfully entered the modern sphere of cinema. Despite the imposition of discriminatory Islamic rules and the code of conduct for women, as Naficy (2012: 94) says “more women directed feature movies in the first decade after the revolution than in all of the preceding eight decades of filmmaking combined, and this in a theocratic and patriarchal society highly suspicious of the corrupting influence of cinema on women and of women in cinema.” According to Naficy (2012: 94), women significantly penetrated into the public sphere of cinema, and by the late 2000s, over a dozen women directed movies and many documentaries, short movies, and animations. The presence of women in cinema and the movies directed by women in the IRI is considerable since most of them produced art-cinema films, no woman directed a populist Islamic film, and just a small group of them made popular commercial movies (Donmez-Colin 2004; Naficy 2012: 94). Nonetheless, most of the popular movies made by women in cinema have adopted a feminist, women-sensitive approach (Tahmineh Milani can serve as an

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example of Iranian women who made some popular movies from a feminist approach by addressing women’s legal and social issues) (Donmez-­ Colin 2004). Generally, since the 1990s, women could develop their public activism in the male-dominated sphere of cinema in Iran and generate discussion by adopting a critical and feminist approach in cinema (Donmez-Colin 2004). Even though the controlling policies remained the same, some independent film-makers could find a way to bypass some of the controlling policies; how and through which kind of language to address the social issues; and how to apply the state-ordered amendments to both be on the safe side and to produce their films. For example, since cinema is considered as a public space, according to the rules of the Islamic state, a woman cannot be displayed in a film without the Islamic hijab even at home since that is considered as a private space. Most of the reformists and feminist directors follow this rule of the state through different ways even though they do not agree with the basis of such an anti-modern policy-­ forced veiling. For example, some directors required the actress to wear a wig in their films, nonetheless, it would be under specific conditions and need permission from the censorship authorities (Naficy 2012). Another example, in Kakadu (1996), Tahmineh Milani, a secular and feminist director, selected a pre-puberty actress since according to the Islamic laws pre-puberty girls (usually considered girls by the age 9) are not required to cover their hair; however, even under this condition, the censorship authorities told Milani that the girl is old enough to cover her hair (Naficy 2012: 113). Despite having been negatively affected by the rules of the state and censorship, as best examples, two prominent (feminist and secular) filmmakers, Tahmineh Milani and Rakhshan Banietemad, have struggled to address the various aspects of children and women’s issues in the society of Iran (Donmez-Colin 2004). They have attempted to represent the voice of social groups that have usually been marginalized in the society. For example, in 1990, Milani in her work ‘Bache-haye-Talagh’ (Children of Divorce), addresses the feelings and issues of a teenage/young girl whose parents got divorced. In 1990–1991, her film ‘Afsaneh Aah’ is about the life of a widow in the patriarchal society of Iran. Later in 2003, Milani in her film ‘Vakonesh Panjom’ (The Fifth Reaction) directly criticizes the discriminatory laws in Iran regarding child custody and guardianship. In 2006, Milani addressed the issue of family dispute and divorce in her film ‘Cease Fire.’ Additionally, Milani has directed specific attention to

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domestic violence. Her most recent film ‘Mali va Rahhay-e Narafteash’ (2016–2017) (Mali and her Untaken Paths) imparts/brings out in the open the issue of domestic violence. Although the movie trailer was banned on National TV, this film received a warm welcome from audiences and critics (Tahminehmilani Instagram page; Cinemadaily Instagram page/Telegram Channel). Some conferences, inside/outside the country with or without the presence of Tahmineh Milani, were held to discuss and analyze the film and women’s issues from a sociological, legal, psychological, and social pathology perspective (Tahminehmilani Instagram page). In ‘Cine Iran Fest,’ the movie was awarded the first prize for the best film from the point of view of the audiences. Furthermore, Rakhshan Banietemad, who has entered the post-­ revolutionary Iran’s cinema since the mid-1980s mainly with documentaries, for example, the ‘Employment of Rural Migrants in City’ (1986), addresses social issues from a feminist and woman-centered approach in her work. Banietemad usually chooses the characters of her film from ‘underprivileged’ social groups and considers their issues from a feminist sociological perspective while maintaining a critical view of the function of the police and other legal institutions (Mostaghim 1992: 16–17). In 1998, Banietemad in ‘Banooy-e-Ordibehsht’ (The May Lady) tells the story of a middle-aged female film-maker and her relationship with her teenage/young son. In her film, Banietemad considers women’s emotional and psychological complexities from the perspective that involves a new horizon, a feminist point of view. She also addresses the issue of the ‘dichotomy of educational/training atmosphere of youth’ in Iran (E.  Khaksar 1998e). Receiving different awards for the film ‘The May Lady’ in the sixteenth film festival (1998), Banietemad became known as ‘the lady of Iranian cinema,’ Zanan magazine reported (E.  Khaksar 1998e). Later, in 2001, Banietemad produced another great film ‘Zir-e-­ Poost-e-Shahr’ (Under the Skin of the City) that is about the life of a labor woman and her various social issues. At the end of this film, the woman participates in a street interview conducted by the national TV on the subject of the Fifth Parliamentary election. The labor woman tells the interviewer that “I wish you could record what is in my heart”; this dialogue implies that this social group has been marginalized by the state and politicians and furthermore, they do have a platform to be heard in society. The feminist cinema has tried to represent the voice of some marginalized groups in Iran (Donmez-Colin 2004). Additionally, this feminist approach in the Iranian cinema could both challenge the gender

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discriminatory laws and the patriarchal culture, and increase social awareness in the society (Donmez-Colin 2004). Due to the critical role that cinema plays in the field of women’s rights in Iran, Zanan magazine, as a famous women’s magazine, in every issue covered the news of cinema, film festivals, female directors, and actresses. Despite the close ideological/Islamic political-social atmosphere, through cinema, the Iranian feminist and reformist filmmakers have generated deliberations among the different groups of audiences and critics, with diverse ideological and political backgrounds, on the subject of women’s rights and issues, children’s rights, and the rights and issues of some of the other social groups. Discussions in film festivals/roundtables/gatherings and TV programmes, even programmes in the conservative National TV (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjXRwR3c8vg, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4Bw5hFJNILs, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-­ yqmAIJONJ8, https://tamasha.com/v/RY5ae, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=ry4HhNiNGxA, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=iON4dB1eyXI), analysis, critique, and discussions of films and women in cinema in Iranian journals, particularly Zanan and Zanan-e-­ Emrouz magazine (A.  Afshar 2017; Arta and Gheydi 2017; Arta and Zareyee 2017; Badi 2018; Habibi and Behzadi 2017; Habibi 2017a, b, 2018; A. Khaksar 1998a, b, c, 1999a; E. Khaksar 1995, 1996, d, e, 1999b; Mohammad-Kashi 1999a, b; Molooki 2017a, b; Zanan 1995; Sadr 2017; Taerpoor 2000; Tavazoyee 2017), and most importantly people’s communications and discussions outside cinemas after watching these movies (Personal Observations and Communications) are all evidence that displays how feminist and reformist cinema in Iran can generate deliberations on diverse social issues, including women’s rights, issues, and needs. By critical responding to exclusions, discrimination, inequalities, and injustice within the dominant public, this feminist cinema could expand the discursive space of a deliberative civil society. Not only have these two filmmakers committed themselves to address the gender discriminatory laws and raise the voice of marginalized social groups within the society, they have also always been great supporters of Iranian women’s rights activism and movement. For example, both filmmakers are among the initial signers of the One Million Signatures Campaign, a Campaign for Equality (see Chap. 4) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 103). Another good example is Banietemad’s cooperation with the women’s rights movement in 2009 by producing a documentary to raise women’s demands during the presidential election (see Chap. 5 on the Parliamentary and Extra-Parliamentary

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Activism). Alongside female filmmakers, some Iranian male directors have also supported the Iranian women’s rights movement and they have addressed the women’s rights issues. The best example is Jafar Panahi’s film ‘Offside’ in 2006 that addresses women’s rights to go to the stadium to watch soccer matches. Panahi is another initial signer of the One Million Signatures Campaign, a Campaign for Equality (see Chap. 4) (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2010: 103). Accordingly, this group of feminist/reformist filmmakers gradually became active members in the women’s rights movement in Iran. It is credible to claim that first, the feminist and reformist approach in the Iranian cinema could publicize the discourse of women’s rights by raising various women’s issues in the society, and accordingly, generating discussions on these subjects. Even though women’s rights activists and feminists in gatherings, events, roundtables, journal, and so on, have somehow limited and particular audiences, the feminist and reformist directors reach a wider audience of people with diverse backgrounds according to the nature of cinema. Therefore, my second claim in this section is that while some reformist and feminist filmmakers join and support the Iranian women’s rights movement, they can also increase awareness and ensure people know about the women’s rights activism and movement since it involves the needs and demands of those in society, and accordingly, they can facilitate the connection between those in society in general, and those in the women’s movement.

Conclusion The chapter concentrates on women’s activism in the media, particularly in the women’s press, since in the early years of the Islamic revolution it shows the gradual development of women’s public activism through the media and the emergence of a great number of diverse voices in this field. The chapter considers how women through the media could raise their diverse voices, challenge the patriarchal structures and cry out for justice, and gradually develop deliberations in the society that call for change. By analyzing women’s activism in media, the chapter shows the start of Habermasian deliberations, communicative engagements, and at times negotiated compromises among different groups of women’s rights activists, including religious/conformist and secular/non-conformist. The chapter shows the development of these deliberations and deliberative engagements as well as explaining how women’s rights activists through

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media activism were able to expand the discursive space of argumentations that can help facilitate the formation of a critical deliberative civil society. This process of development of deliberations related to women’s activism highlights women’s communicative approach based on their exclusion from the public since the Islamic revolution. While women’s activism in the media after the revolution began by those conformist/moderate religious women, later on, the media became a space for diverse groups of women to get together as a public, deliberate over the social-political issues, and co-operate in pursuit of their common interests, such as equality, fairness, justice, and so forth. Accordingly, the chapter uncovers the heterogeneous articulation of the women’s rights movement in the IRI. It shows how women’s activism in the media involves various groups and individuals. In fact, the chapter brings the constant deliberative engagement of women into the light to demonstrate the way, despite the theocratic and patriarchal context of the IRI, women were able to initiate a proto-deliberative public sphere (see Chap. 2 on Pluralist-Deliberative Public Sphere). I argue that the Iranian women’s press became a particular domain where “private persons come together as a public” (Habermas 1996: 366). The press for women to act in the public domain made certain that through their participation, critique, and through their struggle for civil rights they would create a path and a way forward to institute the necessary changes. The reformist women’s press, such as, Zanan, and its inclusive approach to provide a platform to different activists and intellectuals to discuss their ideas, by organizing roundtables, by publishing diverse articles and at times responding to each other’s articles, depicts a Habermasian model of the public sphere where all concerned citizens with a plurality of voices engage in the processes of communicative action and deliberate about their social issues to reach a mutual understanding of their issues, circumstances and situations (Habermas 1990). So, it is credible to say that this group of the press through which diverse groups, secular and religious, deliberate and work with each other, points to the development of religious tolerance (Habermas 2004) in the context of IRI as well. However, as mentioned, the press that represents the reformist, feminist, and women’s rights discourses has always been under pressure as a result of the security system of the IRI. For this reason, to keep the women’s movement alive, women have found strategic action is called for. One of these strategic actions is to remain active in different public domains, particularly in NGOs, instead of limiting the scope of their activities merely

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to the press. Zahra Shojaee says that the women’s NGOs are important civil society institutions that can affect the function of different social and political sectors (Shahrokni 1999). In the next chapter, that is mainly based on the fieldwork, I will describe women’s public activism in NGOs, associations, communities, and in some spontaneous public activities, specifically at art galleries, cafes, and bookshops and this has received the least attention in the literature despite the critical role it plays in promoting the culture of dialogue, cooperation, and tolerance in today’s society in Iran.

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CHAPTER 4

Women and Civil Society Activism

To demonstrate the gradual development of women’s public participation, deliberative engagement, and cooperation in the public sphere through multilevel activism, the focus of this chapter is on women and civil society activism. While Chap. 3 focused on women’s deliberative engagement through the media, this chapter concentrates on the cooperation among the diverse groups of women mainly based on women’s activism in NGOs and communities. In this chapter, the first section will explain the rise of activism through NGOs. The second section will discuss the process of the development of women’s civil society activism. The third section will consider the case of the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ as the most important campaign within the women’s movement and as an instance of deliberative cooperation. The fourth section will provide a clear picture of women’s civil society activism in the present society of Iran based on three months fieldwork in Iran. This chapter aims to show how despite the restrictions on social activism in Iran, women’s civil society activism toward equality and justice emerged, developed, and it is still advancing in different sectors. I explain how through diverse forms of social activism women have been deliberatively engaged with different social groups in society. The chapter aims to demonstrate how a Habermasian model of deliberation, communication, and cooperation (Habermas 1990, 1996) among multiple publics (Felski 1989; Fraser 1990, 1997) is moving slowly within the existing society of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_4

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Iran. So, the chapter aims to display how women’s social activism could facilitate the formation of consensus and cooperation among diverse social groups.

The Rise of Women’s Activism Through NGOs The rise of Iranian women’s NGOs since the 1979 Islamic revolution cannot be considered without explaining the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women and its effects in the civil society. This is not to say that women’s NGOs emerged only after this conference, nevertheless, the conference played a significant role in developments in the field of NGOs in Iran. In 1992, a special office for women’s affairs, the ‘Office for the Coordination of Women NGOs of the Islamic Republic,’ was established in President Rafsanjani’s office (1989–1997). This office was responsible for the formation of a national committee to select and send some Iranian NGOs to the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and finally, fifteen Iranian NGOs could attend the conference (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 57; Zanan 1995: 7). Although the presence of Iranian NGOs in the 1995 Beijing conference was limited to some specific NGOs (mostly Tehran-based, government-financial-supported, or government-­ organized NGOs), this conference was important in terms of the role it played in the field of women’s rights after the Islamic revolution (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017; Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). On a global scale, the presence of Muslim women and the attendance of many women’s organizations from Muslim countries at the Beijing Conference had two important messages for both the radical Muslim women and the radical secular feminists. A prominent Iranian women’s rights activist argues “The Beijing conference in 1995 demonstrated that feminism is not counter to Islam. Also, it showed that one could be Muslim and at the same time be egalitarian and a supporter of women’s rights” (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). However, one of the important problems regarding this conference was that the United Nations gave the budget for the NGOs and civil society to the states (Afzali and Hoodfar 2007). Since the state and the government at that time in Iran did not consider human rights and democracy as the main indicators of development, they viewed the international budget for NGOs and civil society as something political (Afzali and Hoodfar 2007). This means that the United Nations Budget is not easily given to NGOs in Iran, and different factors, including whether it was state-sponsored or

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independent, the field of work of NGOs, the type of the dominant government, and so on, can negatively affect the process of the allocation of the International budget to the NGOs. Generally, from the point of view of the hardliners in Iran, if any (independent) NGOs or organizations were to receive international funding, their activities were usually condemned by the state under the label of attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic (Afzali and Hoodfar 2007: 46). Nevertheless, despite the restricted policies in support of (independent) women’s NGOs during the time the conservative government of Rafsanjani (1989–1997) dominated the political scene, by searching for and finding blind spots and adopting a contextual strategy, women started establishing some independent NGOs. Due to the sensitivity of the conservative government as it related to the issue of women’s rights, women set up NGOs in other fields, such as children’s rights. Since Iran had already joined the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child,’ there was a space (a kind of blind/hidden spot) within the dominant public for women to generate their public activism, it was a space for women’s self-representation within an ideological and patriarchal context. As a result, the ‘Association for the Protection of Children’s Rights’ was established by those who had a strong belief in gender equality and were concerned about women’s issues in Iran (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016-Tehran). Later, during the reformist period, many NGOs in the field of women’s rights and children’s rights emerged from within this association (Interviewee 03, 10 October 2016-Tehran). Another example is the establishment of the ‘Population against Environmental Pollution’ in 1993 by Mahlagha Malahee (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 68). Most of the women’s rights advocates, who previously promoted public gatherings referred to as ‘women’s circles,’ became active in this NGO (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 68). So, although after the Islamic revolution some NGOs emerged with the leading role of more conformist women or women of the power elite-­ NGOs who could attend the Beijing Conference, it did not remain restricted to this group of women. Rather, through resistance, persistence, and strategic action, the non-conformist women gradually gathered and began their civil society activism. This form of women’s activism was able to significantly develop after the 1997 reformist movement. In fact, the rise of the reformist movement offered women’s civil society activism a considerable boost.

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Development of Women’s Civil Society Activism Since May 1997 it was 21 million Iranian citizens, including 11 million women who voted for the reformist candidate whose main slogan was the development of civil society, and various non-governmental organizations began to emerge (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2002). According to the statistics, while 55 women’s NGOs were active in 1996, this number increased to 800 women’s NGOs in 2007 (Nejad-Bahram 2014). The majority of NGOs in Iran have been established by women (46.2%), the board members of 32.7 percent of these NGOs encompasses both women and men, and men have only established 21.1 percent of the organizations (Nejad-­ Bahram 2014). After the domination of the reformist government, the first women’s gathering formed in ‘The Union of Women Publishers.’ It was a civil/ union society that could gather women from different groups, including religious and secular in the field of publishing (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). After negotiation with some officials in the cultural sectors of the country, this union could hold a book exhibition of women publishers at ‘Farhangsara-e-Andisheh’ (Andisheh Cultural Centre) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Later, to celebrate 8 March women’s day, this union organized a big exhibition and invited active women’s NGOs. In this exhibition, 46 women publishers gathered, different roundtables and speeches related to women’s issues were arranged, and women’s press and NGOs introduced (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Despite organizing various meetings, seminars, or exhibitions in Tehran and other cities of Iran or different Parks, after the 2000 Berlin Conference (explained in Chap. 3), this union could not easily continue its work. Nonetheless, in 2000, from within the union of women publishers, ‘Markaz Farhangi Zanan’ (Women’s Cultural Center), considered the first independent secular women’s NGO, emerged (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). This example shows that despite the suppressive policies of the system foisted upon women’s rights activists, feminists, and reformists after the 2000 Berlin Conference, the women continued their activism even though it was in a different way and under a different name and organization. During the three years between 2000 and 2003, the Women’s Cultural Centre organized various gatherings, seminars, speeches, workshops, and so on, all related to women’s rights and issues in Iran, according to one of the main members (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). As an instance, some important public activities within this center included:

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• Collecting signatures for joining the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (6 March 2001) • A seminar about Afghan women and loneliness (7 September 2001) • Helping the arrangement of the celebration of International Women’s Day in different provinces (March 2001) • A seminar on problems and issues of women laborers held in Nezami Ganjavi Park (5 May 2002) • Workshops on defining violence against women held in the municipality theater center in zone 6 of Tehran (2 January 2003) • Iranian women’s protest meeting in Laleh Park (8 March 2003) • Three days of workshops on domestic and sexual violence held in Nezami Ganjavi Park (August 2003) that facilitated the formation of a six-month campaign against violence, Calls to join the campaign ‘women and men against violence until 8 March’1 (August 2003– February 2004) • Launching the website of the women’s cultural center (Fall 2003) • Gathering and celebration for Shirin Ebadi’s Nobel Peace Prize (10/14 October 2003) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Markaz Farhangee-­e-Zanan n.d.). In the gathering to honor Iran’s ambassador of peace, Shirin Ebadi, more than 150 persons attended who were from very diverse ideological and political backgrounds (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 155). This gathering was a pluralistic space with the presence of diverse groups with diverse ideological and political backgrounds, including politicians, female MPs, publishers, journalists, activists, artists, translators, and so forth (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 155). The great experience of such a pluralist gathering motivated the Women Cultural Centre to continue this way. Since women’s activists and feminists had always had a close connection with NGOs in the field of children’s rights, one of these NGOs let the women’s cultural center use its office to hold another gathering encompassing the diverse women’s groups (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Finally, in 2003, they invited the different groups and individuals and from within this gathering ‘Jam-e-Hamandishi-e-Zanan,’ and literally translated ‘Women’s Thought 1  The cross-boundary collective action within “the campaign of women and men against violence until 8th March” later became a model for “One Million Signatures Campaign” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 134).

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Consensus,’ emerged, which is considered one of the first pluralist coalitions within the women’s movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). This discussion of cooperation, gatherings, and engagement among diverse groups through the organizing role of a secular NGO is convincing evidence of the religious tolerance (Habermas 2004) among reformist women’s rights activists and feminists throughout Iranian society. Also, the women’s activities and cooperation that were organized by the Women Cultural Centre are a great example of women’s deliberative engagement in the society in Iran. Various workshops, such as workshops on violence against women, and seminars held by women’s NGOs in different cities, and in public places, for example, in parks or cultural centers, were mainly based on open discussions (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). Accordingly, these forms of civil society activism led by women’s NGOs played an important role in the formation of public opinion and the promotion of the discourse of women’s rights in the society. In other words, the deliberative practices of some women’s NGOs working in the form of counterpublics (critical oppositional forces) helped the formation of public opinion (Fraser 1990, 1997) about women’s rights issues. Finally, the rise of ‘Jam-e-Hamandishi-e-Zanan,’ as a pluralist coalition from within the gatherings and activities of one women’s NGO, brings to light the capacity of women in terms of their efforts to develop a pluralist-deliberative public sphere. In May 2004, Women’s Thought Consensus organized its first protest gathering to counter the national TV series that promotes patriarchal and anti-women clichés and arrangements like polygamy (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Diverse women’s organizations and associations attended this gathering, including ‘The Women’s Cultural Center,’ ‘The Association of Iranian Women Journalists,’ Iranian Women Website, Zanan magazine, ‘The Centre of Women of the Time,’ Badjens Website, ‘Roshdeeye Educational and Research Institute,’ ‘Women’s Independent Centre,’ ‘The Centre of Internship of NGOs,’ ‘The Centre of Young New-Thinkers of Civil Society,’ Farzaneh magazine, Hengameh Shahidi Website, and ‘The Association of Young Journalists’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 161–162). After this first gathering, the ‘Women’s Thought Consensus’ organized four more collective protest actions in 2004 including the following: • Protest against the threat and Shutdown of NGOs

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• Open letter to the president to allocate places for NGOs’ meetings • Statement of protest to the elimination of the notion ‘gender justice’ from the Developing Plan of the country • Statement of protest to the threat of NGOs and the detaining of Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh and Fereshteh Ghazi (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 169). In fact, after six more meetings in 2004 and organizing five protest actions, threats and arrests at the end of 2004 heavily shocked this consensus of women. Nevertheless, they continued their struggles to counter the political pressures. For instance, in 2005, the most important actions of this women’s consensus include the following: • Publishing the statement in protest of the ban on women entering a stadium to watch a football match • 22 Khordad (12 June 2005) gathering in front of Tehran University in protest the violation of women’s rights in the Constitution • Campaigning to free Roya Tolooyee (Kurdish feminist activist) from prison • Campaigning in protest to the filtering of the word of ‘women’ on the Internet (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 198). One week before the 22 Khordad gathering, women’s rights activists and feminists went to Sanandaj to present a workshop about ‘the Convention of Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ and they invited Kurdish women’s groups to join the women’s gathering in Tehran (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). Interviewee 09, as one of the main members of women’s movement and main organizer of the workshop in Sanandaj, capital of Kurdistan province in Iran, explained that “on 12 June 2005 one bus of Kurdish women from Sanandaj joined the gathering and it was a great moment of cooperation among the various group of women” (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). Since the Kurdish women had supported the women’s gathering in Tehran, some of activists and feminists returned to Sanandaj to protest against Roya Tolooyee’s detention (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). The 12 June 2005 (22 Khordad) gathering was a historical moment in the Iranian women’s rights movement to the extent that Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani describes this day as the “Solidarity Day of Iranian Women” (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 208). Nevertheless, this gathering was the last women’s

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gathering before the domination of the populist-fundamentalist government of Ahmadinejad (3 August 2005–3 August 2013). Despite the political pressure after 2005, the women formed four more pluralist coalitions up until 2017 including the following: • One Million Signatures Campaign in 2006 • Campaign against Stoning in 2007—a campaign led by women in Iran that could be successful in revealing the existence of this form of execution in Iran even while officials are denying it (Amini 2008; Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017) • Coalition against the family bill in 2008 (see Chap. 5) • Coalition for raising women’s demands in the 2009 Presidential Election (see Chap. 5) • ‘Women’s Thought Consensus’ to raise women’s demands in the 2013 Presidential Election (see Chap. 5) • Women’s Coalition and Statement in 2017 Presidential Election (see Chap. 5). In general, ‘Women Thought Consensus’ has been one of the most influential women’s coalitions that could provide the appropriate grounds for more diverse coalitions up until then in society in Iran. To clearly show the development of women’s deliberative engagement with diverse social groups in society and their cooperation and consensus, in the following, I will discuss the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign,’ since it is considered as the most important campaign of the women’s rights movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 138).

One Million Signatures Campaign: A Promising Start for Promoting Cooperation Through Dialogue The formation of the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ traced back to the 12 June 2006 (22 Khordad) gathering of women in ‘Haft-e-Teer’ square in Tehran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012). 2006 ‘22 Khordad Gathering’ (12 June 2006 Gathering) To hold the second 22 Khordad gathering in 2006, ‘Women’s Thought Consensus’ organized a meeting in the office of ‘the network of

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environmental (non-governmental) organizations’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). At this meeting, they decided to find the ‘common points of action’ by holding different workshops. Finally, after detailed discussions, dialogues, and collecting the opinions of all participants in the workshops, ‘changing discriminatory laws’ was accepted as the common aim by all of the actors involved (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 205). Most of the members in ‘Women’s Thought Consensus’ suggested that it be similar to the 12 June 2005 where the different groups of women and individuals organized a non-violent demonstration on 12 June 2006 to celebrate ‘The Solidarity Day of Iranian Women.’ Nevertheless, there was some disagreement about holding a gathering under the name of celebrating ‘the solidarity day of Iranian women.’ A group of women rejected this name because they believed that it could become a replacement for the 8th March International Women’s Day (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013); some believed that it is very similar to 2nd Khordad (the day and symbol of reformist movement) and for this reason celebrating 22 Khordad can be a form of conspiracy that could weaken the women’s movement (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013); finally, for a group of religious-oriented women, the national day of Iranian women was the birth of Fatima (daughter of Prophet Mohammad). However, from a kind of post-colonial perspective, most of the members of the ‘Women’s Thought Consensus’ tried to add the day of 22 Khordad to the calendar of Iranian women’s struggles even though it did not belong to ‘religious women’ or ‘Secular women’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). For this reason, Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani in Nameh magazine wrote: “ For women’s movement 2005 was the year of small and big collective actions from which the solidarity day of 22 Khordad emerged that we can celebrate this day alongside celebrating 8th March and the birth of Fatima—This day can be titled as ‘ National Day’ of Iranian women…” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 208). In addition to disagreements on the name of the 22 Khordad gathering, some groups and individuals disagreed about holding a gathering due to the dominant security atmosphere in the country and the strict limitations on all of the forms of public activism after the domination of the Ahmadinejad government (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Finally, all of the concerned actors decided that in the case of organizing any gathering, the women’s statements should be published/distributed under the name of ‘individuals’ not ‘Women’s Thought Consensus.’ Accordingly, those who did not agree to have a public gathering on 12 June 2006 left the ‘Women’ Thought Consensus’ meeting and dialogues and deliberations regarding

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the 22 Khordad gathering and it was continued by the presence of those who agreed on holding the gathering (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). According to the political atmosphere, they decided to take one step back and demand a change be made in the discriminatory laws, in general, instead of demanding a change in the specific articles of the constitution. Additionally, the general subject of ‘changing discriminatory laws’ had the support of more women and activists within the women’s movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). The women in the ‘Women’s Cultural Centre’ put the list of discriminatory laws on the ‘Zanestan’ website (it was also a kind of survey for readers). Later, this group of women edited a legal and learning handout titled “The Impact of Laws on Women’s Life” (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013). They started distributing the legal handout and the statement and call for the 22 Khordad gathering among women and men in public places, including streets and shopping centers, with the help of many volunteers. The signatures on the statement increased every day. While there were 350 signatures that were on the statement of 22 Khordad gathering in 2005, despite the dominant securitized atmosphere in 2006, the signatures on the statement became about 2000 within a short period (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 211). However, as the day of gathering approached, the atmosphere became more securitized and more people, especially those who signed the statement, were summoned, threatened, or arrested. Despite this political atmosphere, on 12 June 2006, a group of women and some men, including some members of Daftar Tahkim Vahdat (Iranian Student Organization), went to Haft-e-Teer square, gathered in a park close to the square, and started singing the song of “Ey Zan, Ey Hozoor-e-Zendegee, Be Sar Reseed Zaman-e-Bandegee…” (Hey Woman, Hey the presence of life, the Time is Over for the Servitude…). Nevertheless, they were violently attacked by a considerable number of male and female police officers, and security forces (in plain clothes). Despite the sad end of the 22 Khordad gathering in 2006 and the unprecedented violent suppression of the different groups of women, individuals, and activists, this gathering with 2000 initial signatures on its statement gave the women’s rights activists enough confidence to continue their struggle against the discriminatory laws. Accordingly, the 22 Khordad gathering in 2006 facilitated the emergence of the most important campaign of the women’s movement ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ that is identified by one central goal: the elimination of all discriminatory laws against women in Iran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012).

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The Birth of ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ The experiences acquired within the ‘6 months Campaign of Women and Men against Violence until 8th March’ (2003–2004) and the ‘22 Khordad gathering’ (2005 and 2006) alongside the readings and discussions about the successful experience of the one million signatures campaign of the Moroccan women, provided appropriate grounds for the rise of the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ in 2006 (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Between 12 June 2006 and 27 August 2006, many meetings with the participation of diverse groups and individuals were organized to be sure that the campaign addressed the ideas and demands of the different social groups. Some of these participants included women’s groups; the best instances are the ‘Women Cultural Centre,’ ‘Iranian Women Club,’ and the ‘Women Commission of Tahkim Vahdat Office’(Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). In addition to the women’s groups, some individuals attended these consulting meetings, for example, some members of the ‘Association/ Community of Volunteer Activists’; some famous female intellectuals, such as Simin Behbahani (poet), Shirin Ebadi (lawyer), Shahla Lahigi (publisher); and some representatives from the different groups of women’s rights activists in Tabriz, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Gorgan, such as Maryam Bahreman from Shiraz, Faranak Fareed from Tabriz, and Fatemeh Nejati and Iman Mozafari from Gorgan (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). According to Parvin Ardalan, one of the main establishers of the campaign, by reflecting on the various experiences of the previous gatherings and campaigns, the women’s rights activists and feminists “…learned that in order to achieve non-violent activism, collaboration with other groups and the synchronization of demands and methodologies would strengthen the women’s movement” (Barlow 2012: 127). At last, the result of the deliberations among the diverse groups and individuals produced the three main documents of the campaign (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013). These included the following: (1) a petition for legal change; (2) a plan that briefly identified the main goals and methods of the campaign; (3) a pamphlet, titled “The Effect of Laws on Women’s Lives” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 5–6). These three documents were meant to reflect the shared understandings of a large cross-section of those in the current women’s movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 6). Finally, on 27 August 2006, the gathering of signatures started with the aim to reach at least a million people (or about one out of every seventy Iranians) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012).

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Regarding collecting the signatures, face-to-face and door-to-door were the main methods that were applied by the campaign (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012). In fact, “to promote a gradual reform, the campaign seeks to change the unjust laws through the method of face-to-face interaction with people on sidewalks, in factories, hair salons, and sports arenas, as well as in family or religious gatherings and through door-to-door signature-collection drives” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 41). Soon, public places that women used in their everyday routines became sites for discussing laws and how these laws are affecting women’s life (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010; an alleyway-to-alleyway section of the Change for Equality website). These methods of face-to-face interaction and door-to-door signature-collection provided a great opportunity for activists within the campaign to achieve a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of women’s everyday concerns, demands, and needs (Barlow 2012: 139). In line with the demands for sustainable reform in Iran, the campaign members insisted that “all changes must be community and needs driven, and reflective of the desires and demands of society at large” (Barlow 2012: 139). While after the Islamic revolution women could hardly find a platform and raise their demands, by taking the campaign into the streets they could start getting back their share of the public sphere in Iran. Furthermore, through this form of non-violent and non-­ revolutionary activism, the Iranian women’s rights movement could introduce a model of civil solidarity despite the diversity within the society, and show how people can “do democracy in the streets and squares, from the bottom up” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 42). Additionally, the campaign regularly organized different workshops in Tehran and some other cities, particularly for the purpose of training volunteers (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010; Barlow 2012). By drawing diverse groups of women on board and distributing the decision-making power among the members, the campaign could help the decentralization of the leadership within the women’s rights movement in Iran (Barlow 2012: 136). One of the main establishers of the campaign claimed in 2013 that one of the most important features that distinguished the One Million Signatures Campaign among the Iranian women’s movement’s struggles had to do with its horizontal relationships and process (Personal Communication, 13 May 2013–Malmo-Sweden). These methodologies and strategies of action enabled the campaign to build connections with those throughout society and to address the needs and desires of a wide group of women. Accordingly, the campaign could receive significant

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support from diverse groups, including secular and religious, women and men, young and old, and so on (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010, 2013; Barlow 2012). Even a quick look at the list of initial signers and supporters of the campaign can display the diversity within the campaign (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 103–104 & 111–112). Interestingly, the campaign was supported by some clerics in Iran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010; Barlow 2012). For example, in 2007, Ayatollah Mousavi Tabrizi confirmed the legitimacy of the campaign and supported its goal for removing the discriminatory laws stating that “We have many laws that address women’s status…which have to be reformed to meet the needs of citizens” (Barlow 2012: 143). In fact, as Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani mentions, the spontaneity and flexibility of the nonviolent street politics helped the campaign to build a bridge between the people and the groups easier and quicker and this enabled the women’s movement to gradually become even a more powerful force for social change in Iran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 42). Therefore, despite the disagreements among the activists on holding the 22 Khordad gathering in 2006 and the state violent suppression that took place after this gathering, many activists and feminists were able to articulate an unprecedented consensus and forge a unique campaign in support of reforming discriminatory laws in Iran. The consensus within the One Million Signatures Campaign was unprecedented because many diverse groups of women and men from different generations and social and ideological backgrounds were involved. Despite the existence of their differences, the campaign gave rise to an open and pluralistic consensus. From within the campaign, as Nooshin Ahmadi-Khorasani claims, a new young generation of activists emerged that despite the constant state pressures on them, they kept moving forward to help the movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 51). Furthermore, the steadily increase of male members in the campaign, and the emergence of the phenomenon of Iranian male feminists within society were new successes for the women’s movement (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010). For example, only in Tehran, of the 370 volunteers who participated in the workshops, fifty were men; or of the eighty-six people who joined the campaign in the following quarter, sixteen were men (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 51–52). While for decades the activism for legal change was limited to a circle of legal scholars or in organizations, within which there was a form of a hierarchical model, and a group of scholars and experts at the top, in terms of the horizontal relationships, the street politics, and the civil society activism in the campaign brought a big change to the activism in the women’s rights movement

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(Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010). The One Million Signatures campaign provided opportunities for ordinary people, mainly younger and lower-­ income women, to participate in the movement to change the discriminatory laws (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 47). The consensus within the campaign was unique because women’s rights activism demonstrates that it is possible to have a consensus despite the disagreements and ideological or factional differences. For the first time in the society of Iran, the concerned social actors decided to focus on their shared problems, to accord their plans of action, and commit themselves to follow their aims based on the condition of an agreement that is better than no agreement (Habermas 1990, 1996). This meant that the women’s rights activists and feminists who were involved in the campaign understood that there is no absolute consensus and it is not necessary to struggle to achieve a social change and reform. As Nooshin Ahmadi-­ Khorasani argues “For the first time, the aim of social activism is the orienting of the activists themselves around their demands rather than around a particular ideology or specific identity” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 54). Nevertheless, despite the great cooperation, consensus, and activism in the different cities of Iran, gradually, the campaign started to break down. Following the story of the campaign in 2013, I asked one of the main founders of the campaign what had happened to it? I found that state power put most of the main members and activists of the campaign under pressure, controlled their telephone conversations and even investigated their email to find other activists, including volunteers and ordinary people who had signed the petition (Personal communication, 13 May 2013, Malmo-Sweden). Accordingly, activists gradually got disconnected from each other and the state was able to violently suppress the campaign. However, the silence of the campaign does not necessarily mean that it was not successful. The procedural goal to achieve cooperation among the diverse social activists, the diversity, inclusiveness, promoting the deliberation and communication through the face-to-face interaction and door-­ to-­ door signature collecting, raising the awareness, cultural-building, publicizing the gender discriminatory laws, the emergence of a new generation of activists and male feminists, the birth of online activism through various women’s websites, mainly the Change for Equality website, are all significant positive outcomes of the One Million Signatures Campaign. In fact, according to the theocratic context of Iran, the way and the process that Iranian social activists passed through the campaign and experiences and outcomes that they achieved are more important than the one single

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and final result of the women’s civil society activism in Iran. The emergence of consensus among the diverse groups and individuals within the campaign after the 2006 disagreements and controversies on holding the 22 Khordad gathering and violent state suppression, displays the possibility of guiding the lines of disagreements and conflicts into the way of deliberation, communication, and cooperation. It is credible to say the One Million Signatures Campaign was a promising start for promoting cooperation through dialogue within the society of Iran. This process of development of the women’s civil society activism from the Beijing conference to the establishment of NGOs to look after the environment and children’s rights before 1997, and then after 1997, from the Union of Women Publishers to the formation of the ‘Women Thought Consensus’ and the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign,’ displays the multilevel and contextual activism of the women. In the process, the women’s rights activists and feminists learned how to be flexible and navigate the political realities and they learned how to choose the tactics and strategies to move forward in terms of their civil society action. This process also shows the constant but gradual deliberative engagement of the women in the society. By considering this process, it is credible to argue that women’s gradual deliberative engagement is capable of facilitating the formation of a deliberative pluralist public sphere across political-ideological boundaries. This is a capability of the women’s movement that has not received enough attention in the academic literature (see Chap. 5). However, as mentioned in different parts of this chapter, it has never been easy for women’s groups to advocate in public for women’s rights/ human rights under the theocratic system of Iran. This situation has worsened in different political periods, particularly during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the experience of the 22 Khordad gathering, One Million Signatures Campaign, and the aftermath of the 2009 Presidential Election (see Chap. 5). The political atmosphere in Iran has been securitized since the 2009 election. This means that there is very little chance for social groups, including women, to raise their democratic and emancipatory demands in a public forum. For this reason, it is credible to say that through a contextual strategy, a kind of tactical flexibility, and a form of prefigurative politics (see Chap. 2 on ‘prefigurative politics’ and ‘the method of the crack’) (Holloway 2010; van de Sande 2013), a majority of women have entered or preserved their activism through various NGOs, communities, and associations in a broad range of different social fields,

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other than women’s rights. In the following part, I will consider this form of women’s civil society activism with a focus on the present society.

Women’s Civil Society Activism in the Present Society About three months after the election, in September 1997, the Association for the Protection of Children’s Rights played a crucial role in publicizing a legal case about child abuse by a father and a stepmother (Known as Arian Golshani’s case) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Following the call of this Association, many women’s activists and feminists attended Arian’s funeral, and Shirin Ebadi delivered a short speech about the guardianship law. This funeral became the first women’s (public) protest action against the discriminatory law of guardianship that gives the right only to the father of the child (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Even now, many women’s rights activists are active within NGOs that work in the field of children’s rights. During my fieldwork in Iran, I found that those who previously were the members of the Association for Protection of Children’s rights had established different NGOs in this field.2 While specific women’s rights NGOs, such as the Women’s Cultural Centre (Markaz Farhangee-e- Zanan), as previously mentioned, follow an emancipatory movement approach in regard to women’s rights and human rights, these independent organizations mostly follow an empowerment approach. Since the empowerment of women that has been mentioned in the Development Plan of the country, these NGOs or associations are able to carry out their work easier within the society. In fact, within the existing dominant theocratic context, women have been able to identify the gaps, articulate a new space for public activism, and move toward reform. Since the target groups of these independent organizations include people throughout the masses of society, they can help feminists and activists of the women’s movement to recruit new members, promote the discourse of gender equality, and be connected to the body of society. In the following section, I will show how various NGOs have branched off from one organization and developed within society. Mainly based on the 2  There are many active NGOs in the field of children’s rights in Iran. However, some of them are related to the governmental sectors or receive governmental budgets, such as, some NGOs within the Tehran municipality. For this reason, this study has focused on totally independent NGOs or grassroots support organizations and unions.

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fieldwork, I will briefly explain the structure, philosophy, and function of some of the active NGOs3 and how they contribute to society as well as discuss the critical complementary role they play in today’s civil society of Iran. The work they do is carried out by women who are active in their communities in art galleries, bookshops, cafes, and so on. One of these NGOs that is active currently, was established in 1999, is mainly concerned about child labor in Iran (children who work in streets selling different items, including hosiery, chewing gum, and so on). They have educational and cultural classes for the children to help them in their education as well as making them aware of their rights in society (Interviewee 04, 8 October 2016-Iran). The interesting class in this NGO was ‘free talk classes’ that let children (usually age 8 to 18) communicate about their issues and concerns (Personal Observation 2016, Iran). Many people from different fields with different ideologies and backgrounds, religious/non-religious, men/women, work together in this NGO including social workers, activists, psychologists, doctors (similar to doctors without borders), and university teachers. One of them who was a Baluchi4 university teacher told me: “In this NGO we do not pay attention to ideological differences; and I, as a Baluchi, have never had any ideological conflict with others who work here” (Interviewee 01, 2 October 2016-­ Iran). Another person in this NGO said, “We work beyond the law. We do not separate girls and boys in classes. We had a teacher from the LGBT community who worked here as a volunteer. We do not teach Qur’an here because sometimes we might have non-Muslim kids…” (Interviewee 04, 8 October 2016-Iran). This NGO has different branches across the country, for example, in Sistan and Baluchistan, which is one of the most marginalized provinces in Iran (Interviewee 01, 2 October 2016-Iran). Additionally, they have very good communication with different NGOs in Afghanistan since most of the children in their organization are illegal Afghan immigrants who cannot easily enter schools in Iran and do not have even identity cards (Personal Communications, October 2016-Iran; Interviewee 01, 2 October 2016-Iran). Alongside following a communicative, cross-ideological, and cross-­ ethnic approach, most of the present active NGOs in the field of children’s rights follow an intersectional approach. Most of these NGOs have  For confidentiality reasons, I have chosen to keep the NGOs anonymous.  An Iranian ethnic group that lives in Sistan and Baluchistan province. The majority of Baluchi people are Sunni and they have their own ethnic language. 3 4

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connected the issue of children to family and the situation of mothers at home. According to my observation, you can barely find an NGO in the field of children’s rights that has not entered the field of women’s empowerment (Personal Observation and Communication, August–October 2016-Iran). One of the interviewees explained that “we found that the mothers of vulnerable children are a potential inside the private sphere of homes. So, we decided to bring them out of the space of the home and make them active in public through education, training, and awareness about their civil rights” (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016-Iran). As mentioned, these children are mainly from very low-income social classes who have been subordinated in the society of Iran. By covering the issues, demands, and desires of these subordinated social groups, these NGOs are addressing the structures of subordination in Iran, targeting a form of structural injustice. Many child laborers are from Afghan illegal immigrant families and, as such, the state has denied them their basic rights, such as access to education. This is according to the sensitivity of the state on any subject related to women’s rights or Afghan immigrants. By addressing the issues and rights of these social groups, these NGOs are also targeting the political practices that ignore the issue of these social groups, targeting a form of political injustice. Due to the existence of some discriminatory clichés, stereotypes, and traditions regarding women, in general, and Afghan people, in particular, within Iranian society, these NGOs also target those unjust representations of specific social groups that lead to violence against them. Conversely, there are some NGOs working in the field of women’s empowerment while addressing the rights of children of their target groups. For example, one of these NGOs has been established by a previous member of the Association for Protection of Children’s rights and is managed by a man. The NGO has different educational, cultural, and training classes for women in impoverished areas aiming to bring these women into the society as active citizens (Interviewee 05, 8 October 2016, Iran). By empowering women from very traditional and needy families and bringing them to the public, this NGO believes that they are working in parallel with NGOs in the field of children’s rights and child laboring. The NGO provides day-care services for children and some educational classes for older ones as well as decreasing the risk of a child laboring within the family by empowering and training the mothers. The Board members of this NGO are from diverse ideological backgrounds, and according to the treaty of the organization, they should never ask about

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the religion or even the political attachments of those who enter the NGO (Interviewee 05 and Interviewee 06, 8 October 2016, Iran). The manager said, “I do believe that ideological/religious backgrounds have barely caused conflict in the field of social activism within (independent) NGOs in Iran” (Interviewee 05, 8 October 2016, Iran). In fact, most of the Iranian independent NGOs and women’s organizations have gradually found that they do not have to eliminate differences to communicate and work together. Instead, they just decided to focus on shared pains, problems, and aims, in the case of NGOs working to make a better, safer, and more equal society is a common aim. This inclusive approach makes these NGOs important to this study on civil society in Iran since they are promoting a deliberative and democratic culture from within the society. Considering the current active NGOs (in the field of women and children’s rights) is necessary for this study due to the function of these NGOs within civil society. During my fieldwork, I found that what makes these NGOs capable of developing a deliberative civil society is the connection and deliberations among them to the extent that they could form a network of publics (Benhabib 1996; Fraser 1990, 1997) despite the system’s security ban on networking. For example, they have a space, called Shabake (network on virtual space), through which most of these NGOs communicate about their work, the issues they face, and their strategies to deal with obstacles, mainly political (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016, Iran). Some of these NGOs have also friendly gatherings at the private space of homes, called Jonbeshe Ghormeh Sabzi Khoroon (The movement of eating Ghormeh Sabzi (Iranian dish)), through which they communicate and deliberate about their concerns related to children and women’s rights, and share their experiences (Interviewee 03, 10 October 2016, Iran). The interviewee explained, “definitely, different NGOs in the field of children’s rights or women’s rights have different strategies or philosophies, but what is important is that through gatherings and communications we could learn from each other” (Interviewee 03, 10 October 2016, Iran). This reflects the Habermasian concept of ‘complementary learning process’ (Habermas 2006a, b, 2008, 2009) that is important for the formation of a deliberative civil society in a diverse context. While I was conducting an interview in the office of one of these NGOs in the field of children’s rights, I was able to meet some of the members of another NGO, working in the field of child laboring (Personal Observation, October 2016). Additionally, it was interesting to see that a group of male activists in the ‘labour syndicate’ has provided the office building for this

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NGO (Personal Observation and Communication, October 2016). Before leaving the office, the manager provided me with a list of contact information of many activists and feminists to help me in this project. Conducting face-to-face, telephone, and Skype interviews with this group of activists has revealed that although these social activists no longer work together within one NGO, they have established different NGOs and there is a good connection and cooperation among them. We see here convincing evidence of networking and cooperation among different social groups and activists within the present society of Iran. It is credible to claim that there is a chain of social activists with a leading role of women in Iran who are struggling for equality and justice from within the society through non-violent, deliberative, and co-operative tactics. One of the managers of these NGOs said, “We have rooted in the society and connected to the body of society through our organizations and our communicative strategies. For this reason, the government cannot easily destroy us. A social movement towards democracy and equality should not have a leader. Rather, those women and children who become empowered in these NGOs will lead this emancipatory movement …” (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016, Iran). This quotation uncovers that through various forms of activism, which are not necessarily political—a form of prefigurative politics-, many of the NGOs that are currently active could target the existing unjust political and social structures in Iran. Another important finding regarding NGOs in Iran is the connection between the activists within the society and groups or the individuals who are working in the field of formal politics. In fact, it became more evident to me that the line between women’s activism in the field of informal politics and formal politics is very blurred. This situation can result from different issues, such as, the intersection between the women’s rights discourse in society and the reformist discourse in politics, women’s constant bargaining with the system in pursuit of women’s rights and equality, and the necessity to generate practical decisions in support of women’s rights. My interview with the establisher and manager of another NGO in the field of women’s empowerment can clarify this situation. She was also a previous member of the Association for Protection of Children’s rights with 20 years’ experience in the field of NGOs. In 2005, while most of the officials in governmental organizations, including Behzisti (The State Welfare Organization of Iran), were reformist, as a well experienced social worker, she was invited to run an organization in support of women who have an addiction (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand).

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She believes that “it was a good step forward for women’s rights in Iran since most of the Muslim countries do not enter this field because usually women’s addiction is connected to the issue of prostitution” (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2016, imo, New Zealand). Like most of the NGOs that I found in Iran, she also mentioned that they started their work from local parks in very poor areas in Tehran and gradually developed their work (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). The interesting point is that although this organization was established according to the request of Behzisti, the establisher and social workers soon realized the necessity of bargaining with the police in these poor areas to make their work easier. Regarding this matter, she said, “In the first meeting with the Police in one of these poor areas in Tehran, they denied the existence of women’s addiction and prostitution. Nevertheless, through different meetings and negotiations, I was able to convince them that our work will help you to have a safe neighbourhood and it will show a good picture of the local police in public” (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). Through about nine years working, there was a great cooperation among those in this organization, and the Ministry of Health, Municipality, and the local NGOs (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). However, after the domination of the fundamentalist government of Ahmadinejad, it was not easy for this organization to continue its work in a great cooperation with different governmental sectors. Finally, in 2012–2013, this social worker established her NGO in the field of women’s addiction and prostitution based on the approach of women’s empowerment. She said, “I found that it is not enough to control women’s addiction particularly to reduce the risk of HIV. For this reason, in this NGO we focus on supporting women to stop using drugs and be aware of their abilities and their rights” (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). Due to her longtime work experience in the field of NGOs, the manager of this NGO has a very strong connection with different groups, including female politicians, such as, Shahindokht Molaverdi, some female members of the Tehran city council, board members of various NGOs in the field of children’s rights, some feminist academics and feminists working in the field of press, and so on. For this reason, she was supported by diverse groups of women to be a candidate from Tehran in the 2017 City and Local Councils Elections. She believes that “all these groups are working very well in their particular field and we need to be active in various domains in the public sphere although politicians and

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those who are working in the political domain are very conservative since they are worried to be removed from this area” (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). Regarding the inclusive and cross-boundary approach of this NGO, despite the sensitivity of the security system on LGBT rights, I asked Interview 07, as a well-known social worker, about the strategy of her NGO regarding this social group. She said, “At times I have supported people from the LGBT group since they are seriously marginalized; additionally, still NGOs in this field cannot work formally and easily in the public” (Interviewee 07, 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). Nevertheless, she mentioned about her work at Behzisti and the support of Behzisti from some of the LGBT groups, particularly during the reformist period. However, in an interview with a female doctor and university teacher, who has exclusively worked with this group and had cooperation with Behzisti, I found that the Islamic Republic has decided to support only transgender groups (Interviewee 08, 11 November 2016, imo, New Zealand). This doctor said, “It is still a very good step forward for LGBT rights. Nonetheless, we shouldn’t forget that the reason that the system has decided to help transgender individuals occasionally is that they want them to be ‘woman’ or ‘man’ through sex reassignment surgery” (Interviewee 08, 11 November 2016, imo New Zealand). “They cannot accept a man, who has a female style of clothing and makeup, walks in the society without a scarf! The system has accepted the surgery for these cases although they have not yet understood the issue of lesbians and gays in Iran” (Interviewee 08, 11 November 2016, imo, New Zealand). “Even the society, particularly religious people, yet cannot easily accept it” (Interviewee 08, 11 November 2016, imo, New Zealand). Despite all these political and social obstacles to the equality and the rights of LGBT groups in Iran, during the reformist period, I could attend their gatherings in one of the famous cafes in the North of Tehran. During the 2016 fieldwork, I decided to check if they still have these meetings. I could again attend one of these gatherings, which were usually held once a week, again in a café in Tehran. They just gather and talk about their everyday experiences and their issues without any political approach (Personal Observation and Communication, September 2016, Iran, Tehran). Through the discussions and interviews, I realized that there are still some underground NGOs in this field, although unfortunately, no one could connect me with them. It was a convincing sign that they are not very active due to the security atmosphere and the sensitivity of the

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security system as it relates to LGBT groups. One of the women’s activists in an NGO in the field of children’s rights told me, “during the reformist period some active NGOs in the field of LGBT rights could be established, but, just like many women’s NGOs, they were also suppressed during the populist-fundamentalist government of Ahmadinejad” (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016, Iran). However, again just like many women’s activists, they did not precisely stop struggling for equality and for the rights of LGBT groups. Instead, they have changed the space of their public activism to cyberspace through different websites and blogs, such as, 6rang.org, an Iranian Lesbian and Transgender Network, or the blog of Arsham Parsi. Similar to other social groups, including women, this group has also realized the necessity of contextual activism, strategic and tactical flexibility. In other words, most of the social groups in the current society of Iran have found the necessity to articulate new spaces for activism within the existing structures. Due to the strict limitations on civil society activism after the domination of Ahmadinejad’s government, cyberspace gradually became a new space for social activism among activists and feminists. Although some of the women’s rights activists have remained active within the society through NGOs for children’s rights, or the environment, under the political pressures, particularly under Ahmadinejad’s government, women’s rights activists and feminists also increased their public activism in cyberspace. A website and Facebook page such as ‘Feminist school’ (http://www.feministschool.com/english/) has played a key role in connecting different activists, facilitating women’s coalitions, and provided information and news about women inside Iran while there has been political pressure on social activists. Another example, as mentioned earlier, is the ‘Change for Equality’ website (http://changeforequality-­ca. org/) that provided information mainly about the one million signatures campaign. Another instance is the Tavana website (https://tavaana.org/ en) that provides a wide range of information and news regarding various social activities and struggles for justice and equality in today’s society in Iran. The Tavana website also provides various online courses, including courses about LGBT rights and women’s rights. The strategy to remain active, but on cyberspace under political pressures is followed by some other social groups as well, including the Bahai and Sunni groups, for example, through the Bahai World News Service (http://news.persian-­ bahai.org/) and Sunni News (http://www.sunni-­news.com/fa/). The political pressure and security approach to religious minority groups,

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particularly the Bahai group, is worse than all of the other marginalized groups. For this reason, it is not easy to find a long-term, official, and constant coalition and cooperation among the social activists with these religious/ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, women’s rights activists and feminists have at times supported these groups or even worked with feminists from religious/ethnic minority groups (Kurdish feminists) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). One of the great examples is the gathering of a group of women’s rights activists, mainly secular, in front of the prison in Sanandaj in support of Roya Tolooyee, the Kurdish Sunni activist, who was arrested by security forces in 2005 (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017, imo, New Zealand). The second example is the support of a famous (reformist/feminist/religious) political figure, such as, Faezeh Hashemi of the female Bahai prisoner (BBC Persian 2016). The third example is Narges Mohammadi’s meeting in 2014 with the Sunni cleric, Molavi Abdolhamid, to give him the special prize of Defenders of Human Rights Centre in Iran (Berehmandi 2014). Despite the security pressure, the existence of pages and websites in cyberspace that all struggle for equality, justice, and democracy in Iran can be considered as a multiplicity of cyber-­ counterpublics (see Chap. 2 on ‘Counterpublics and Cyber-­ counterpublics’). Through these cyber-counterpublics, various social groups can still keep their movement alive and continue their open discussions about the social and political issues under the severe political situation. In today’s society of Iran, by following a form of prefigurative and street politics, social groups have articulated some other new spaces for activism. Cafes, art galleries, and bookshops are becoming a significant space of appearance, deliberation, and activism for different social groups, particularly for women. Most of the gatherings and activities in these places are organized through social media. I went to some cafes managed by women who organized gatherings for ‘Reading Literary (Classic) Plays’ or ‘Reading and Discussing Books’ (Personal Observation, August– September 2016, Iran). Additionally, it was interesting to see bookshops and private publishers in Tehran that hold different ‘reading book gatherings’ or assemblies around the subject of ‘the other,’ ‘Sexuality, Nationality, and Otherness,’ or ‘Tolerance and Dialogue’ through shows and critique of movies or discussions (Personal Observation, Summer 2016-Iran). More interesting was the popularity of these meetings among the young generation and the social, ideological, cultural, and gender diversity among the attendees in these meetings (Personal Observation, summer

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2016, Iran). Art galleries are another great space of appearance and activism among various social groups, including women. I had the chance to visit some of the art galleries managed by a group of women who specifically support young female artists (Personal Observation, August– September 2016, Iran). It was a great opportunity to attend a performance by young theatre students in one of these art galleries about ‘Domestic Violence’ or the other one in the same gallery about ‘Cultural Stereotypes and the Violence against Women’ (Personal Observation, September 2016, Iran). However, one the best moments throughout this fieldwork was the day that I was invited by one of the art galleries to attend an art exhibition of the handcrafts made by child laborers under the support of one of the NGOs that I had visited before. It was convincing evidence to believe that social groups and individual social actors, mainly women, in today’s Iran are eagerly inclined to cooperation despite their different political or ideological approaches. Although the majority of women involved in these art galleries were from the young generation with a secular perspective and modern style of clothing, I saw how eagerly they worked with middle-age secular and religious women, senior members of some (independent) children’s rights and women’s rights NGOs (Personal Observation, Summer 2016, Iran). Besides women’s activism and cooperation in the NGOs, associations, art galleries, cafes, and bookshops, the role of some of the women’s communities inside the current society of Iran must also be mentioned. These communities are established by individual women from very diverse backgrounds who like taking a share in building a healthier society. One of them that supports women, single women who are head of the household, in rural areas, through convincing some private schools to buy the eco-friendly hand-made book bags these women have made so that they can both help to empower these women and help to save the environment (Personal Observation, September 2016-Iran). Another community supported Baluchi women in one of the most marginalized areas in Iran by organizing home-based exhibitions of their hand-made crafts in big cities including Tehran (Personal Observation, summer 2016-Iran). The function of these small communities is different from private charity work by a group of Iranian women that is a part of the Iranian culture and tradition. These communities have an empowerment approach for social groups and their issues in Iran, and for this reason, they can be considered as small independent groups that work parallel to current active NGOs in the field of women’s rights, children’s rights, and the environment.

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Conclusion This survey of women’s activist groups in civil society in Iran today shows that in spite of the suppressive policies, social activists have not left the space of public activism working toward democracy, equality, and justice. The political pressures in different periods could not separate these activists from each other or stop them from civic activism through NGOs and other independent organizations. Instead, as Nooshin AhmadiKhorasani (2013) mentions, political pressures motivated social groups, particularly women, to promote more cooperation by concentrating on their commonalities and shared interests. Despite the controversies, women’s rights activists and feminists did not try to suppress disagreements and eliminate differences. Rather they procedurally learned to manage disagreements and conflicts to open the lines for communication. Despite their differences and disagreements, all those possibly affected, adopted a reflexive attitude regarding their own claims, and they have the will to take the arguments of each other into account aiming to communicate to reach a shared interpretation of the situation and build a cooperation that can benefit all those involved (Habermas 1990, 1994, 1996, 2005). They gradually learned to respect their differences while based on a complementary learning process cooperating toward their shared aims and interests. Despite the state pressures, with the leading role of women, NGOs have been propagated under different names according to the various contextual specificities in an interlocking network to the extent that we can talk about the multiplicity of public arenas where individuals come together as a public. By looking at the function of NGOs representing a discourse of empowerment, it is credible to claim that on the one hand, these NGOs work as a space of regroupment, and on the other hand, they work as training grounds for agitation activities directed toward the wider public (Fraser 1990: 68; 1997: 82). Following strategic and tactical flexibility, social actors and groups within the society of Iran have changed their modes of activism according to the specificities of each particular period. By changing their tactics related to their civil struggle while preserving their communicative and non-violent approach, the scale of their activism has been largely extended. By articulating new spaces for activism within the existing structures and shifting their activism to different sectors, women’s rights activists and feminists find they are engaged with diverse social groups and individuals. The best example that could display the openness, diversity, inclusiveness,

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and tactical flexibility within the women’s movement is the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign. Despite the authoritarian conditions, by adopting prefigurative politics, different groups of women and individual social actors could articulate a new space of activism and start this campaign within the existing structures by developing a network of cyber-­ counterpublics and counterpublics to deliberatively do reformation. It is credible to say that despite the existence of a powerful security force that can negatively affect the ‘trust’ among social groups and individuals or the ban on networking, even though a proto-Habermasian model of deliberation and communication among a multiplicity of publics is moving slowly it constantly moving within the current society in Iran. Furthermore, one of the main arguments of current activists inside Iran, mainly in NGOs, is that while children, women, and other individuals of marginalized social groups become empowered through gaining awareness of their rights and capabilities, training, and educating, they will start questioning the system’s discriminatory/unjust policies and actions to have a better life (Personal Communications, July–October 2016, Iran). For this reason, most of the interviewees believed that the emancipatory social movement struggling toward democracy and equality in Iran does not need one leader; rather, this is an encroachment movement that is known as a ‘quiet encroachment’ in the academic literature (Bayat 2010: 14). All in all, considering the formation of a multiplicity of counterpublics in different spaces, including in cyberspace, this study argues that in today’s society of Iran, (anonymous) public conversation is developing through an interlocking net of different forms of associations, formal/ informal gatherings, networks, communities and organizations that is essential for the formation of a deliberative democracy (Benhabib 1996: 73–74). Through multilevel and contextual activism and by adopting a pre-figurative politics, women can address different forms of injustice and target the existing social and political structures. However, as briefly mentioned before, in a complementary manner, at times, a group of women has entered the field of politics aiming to generate practical decisions in support of women’s rights. In the following chapter, I will explain women’s parliamentary and extra-(outside-) parliamentary activism through a concentration on activism in the city and local councils, in parliament, and in presidential elections.

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Fraser, N. (1997). Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition. Routledge. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Habermas, J. (1994). Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2004). Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights. Philosophy, 79(01), 5–18. Habermas, J. (2005). Concluding Comments on Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics. Acta Politica, 40, 384–392. https://doi.org/10.1057/ palgrave.ap.5500119. Habermas, J. (2006a). On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion. In H. de Vries & L.  E. Sullivan (Eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World (pp. 251–261). Fordham University Press. Habermas, J. (2006b). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1), 1–26. Habermas, J. (2008). Between Naturalism and Religion. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2009). What is Meant by a “Post-Secular Society”?A Discussion on Islam in Europe. In Europe: The Faltering Project (C.  C. Habermas, Jürgen, Trans. pp. 59–77). Polity Press. Holloway, J. (2010). Crack Capitalism. Pluto Press. Markaz Farhangee-e-Zanan. (n.d.). Markaz Farhangee-e-Zanan: deedgah-ha va ravesh-ha (Women’s Cultural Centres: ideas and approaches). Markaz Farhangee-e-Zanan. Retrived October 02, 2017, from http://www.iftribune. es/WCC.htm Nejad-Bahram, Z. (2014). Zanan va faaleeyat-ha-ye sazman-ha-ye mardom nahad (Women and non-governmental organizations’ activities). Iranzanan. Retrived September 21, 2017, from http://www.iranzanan.com/cultural/cat-­67/ 005425.php Van de Sande, M. (2013). The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square-An Alternative Perspective on the 2011 Revolutions. Res Publica, 19(3), 223–239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-­013-­9215-­9. Zanan. (1995). Tadarok-e chaharomin konferans-e jahani-e zanan (Preparations for the fourth world conference on women). Zanan, 4(24), 6–11.

CHAPTER 5

Women’s Parliamentary and Extra (Outside)Parliamentary Activism

Chapter 4’s focal point is on women’s deliberative engagement through media. Chapter 5’s focus is on women’s deliberative cooperation and the consensus within the society through NGOs and communities. This chapter concentrates on inside-parliamentary and outside-parliamentary activism, and women’s deliberative engagement, cooperation, and consensus in the field of politics. The chapter aims to show how the deliberative approach of women’s rights groups and activists constitutes the grounds for a deliberative politics in the future in Iran. In this chapter, the focus of the first section is on women’s activism during parliamentary elections and in parliament. The section’s focal point refers to the research assumption that a strong public sphere is a sphere where its deliberative practices include both the formation of public opinion and the power of decision making (Fraser 1990, 1997). Hence, considering that women’s parliamentary activism is essential to this study, it is necessary to explore it, to see how women can/could enter this field and affect the process of decision making in Iran. The second section explains women’s activism through the city and local councils. A study of women’s activism in the city and local councils is important because of the role of city councils in building a sustainable civil society. The third section will briefly explain women’s activism during the presidential elections. This section on politics and presidential elections helps the study to explain how women, through their deliberative activism, could enter and affect © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_5

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presidential elections in a theocratic system, since without it women cannot even be in a position to run as a presidential candidate. Firstly, this chapter affirms that despite the theocratic system and the male-dominated sphere of politics in Iran, many women have been active in the public political sphere since the early years of the revolution. Secondly, the chapter identifies which women’s groups have entered the area of politics, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, in Iran. Thirdly, the chapter aims to show how women’s activism in the media and in civil society can/could be connected to the activism on the part of women inside parliament and outside parliament. Finally, by analyzing the Green Movement in 2009, as a case study, the chapter plans to lay the groundwork to show how the women’s deliberative engagement, cooperation, and consensus in the Iranian public sphere can/could facilitate the practice of deliberative democracy and the formation of deliberative civil society within the existing theocratic structure of Iran.

Women in Cabinet, Parliament, and Parliament Elections Women’s participation in the 1979 Islamic revolution made Iranian women confident enough to enter the political sphere, and challenge the very male-dominated public sphere in Iran. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged women “to participate in politics as part of their religious duties” (Nejadbahram 2012: 75). For this reason, although the Islamic regime had suppressed all oppositional groups and elites, including the left and secular, in the early years of the revolution, some religious women were able to enter the male-dominated sphere of politics in Iran. For example, four women entered the first Islamic Majlis (parliament), played an active role in different debates regarding women’s rights, and became spokespersons standing up for Iranian women, not only for the specific group of religious women (Esfandiari 2004). Although the first female MPs had very little if any experience in the field of women’s rights, from the early years of the establishment of the new regime, they committed themselves in the struggle for women’s rights in different areas, including education, economy, and equality in the law (Esfandiari 2004). In fact, participation in the revolution and political public sphere alongside women’s legal issues in the patriarchal context of the Islamic regime, gradually, made these religious

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women more conscious and concerned regarding the necessity for a change in people’s thinking, both in the laws and in traditions, in favor of women’s rights (Hoodfar 1996; Keddie 2000; Keddie and Richard 2006). In the following years, the number of women deputies increased, for instance, nine women were elected to the fourth Majlis (1992–1996) (Esfandiari 2004; Keddie 2000). Additionally, women began to play a more significant role in the political system by entering the cabinet. For example, during the post-war period (1989–1997), a particular office for women’s affairs was established in President Rafsanjani’s office, and Shahla Habibi was appointed as the first advisor to the president on women’s affairs (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013; Esfandiari 2004). This bureau for women’s affairs was responsible for the formation of the National Committee of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 that was significant for various developments in women’s activism through the NGOs in Iran (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). (For more details on Beijing Conference see Chap. 4). However, it was the 1997 Presidential election that provided women with more political opportunities, and the women successfully seized this opportunity. Women’s Parliamentary Activism After 1997 Reformist Movement After the 1997 reformist movement, women were able to achieve better opportunities to have a public presence and to participate in the field of parliament and outside parliament. The reformist government worked with the fifth and sixth parliament so that in comparison with the previous years, the number of female MPs increased to fourteen in the fifth Majlis (1996–2000), and thirteen in the sixth Majlis (2000–2004) (Dokoohaki 2000). According to Zanan’s report-issue 27, for the fifth parliamentary election, 305 women registered as candidates and most of them were from the big cities in Iran, for example, Tehran, Esfahan, and Tabriz (Zanan 1995: 5). Finally, on 8 March 1996, 179 women throughout the country competed with 2751 men for 270 parliamentary seats (Zanan 1996: 3). According to Zanan magazine, the interesting point regarding this period of parliamentary elections was the presence of women in the top ranks of elected MPs in big cities, including Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Hamadan, Shiraz, and Mashhad (Zanan 1996: 3). The fact that Faezeh Hashemi, known as an Islamic feminist and a reformist political figure/elite, could enter the fifth parliament in the first round of the election as the second

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elected MP from Tehran represented a great success for women in the field of politics. It was a success for women not only because a woman entered the parliament in the first round; it was also because Faezeh Hashemi had a good resume in her role calling for women’s rights, particularly in the field of women’s sports. In her interview with Shahla Sherkat in Zanan, she mentioned the low number of women in higher management positions as one of the main women’s issues, and she was also criticizing the policies of national television since they always showed women as housekeepers (Sherkat and Hashemi 1996: 13 & 17). In Zanan magazine, Kar, a secular feminist lawyer, (1996) insisted that the success of some women in the first round of the parliament election demonstrated that the Iranian people have reconsidered their old and traditional beliefs about women, and they have discarded the superstitious belief about the lack of competency of women in political management. In the fifth parliament, the draft for the establishment of the Women’s Commission for Youth and Families approved that its aim was to address women’s problems in the courts and their legal issues (Ebrahimi 1997). The establishment of the Women’s Commission was a success for women in parliament since according to Zanan’s report, the draft for the establishment of the Women’s Commission had been rejected three times in the fourth parliament on the pretext of having many commissions in parliament and it was said that women’s issues could be raised in one of the existing commissions (Ebrahimi 1997). The justification of the opponents in the fourth parliament opposed to the establishment of the Women’s Commission implies that the dominant discourse in the fourth parliament did not give a priority to women’s issues. Zanan in issue 32 (1997), critically mentions “Some MPs with a traditional approach are totally against the presence of women in the society. They reject any draft for addressing women’s issues while without women’s vote these MPs could not even enter the parliament” (Ebrahimi 1997: 2). Accordingly, the presence of more women MPs, who have women’s rights concerns, in the fifth parliament could challenge this traditional male-dominated discourse and draw public political attention to the women’s issues by establishing a special commission for women. This commission was able to play the role of a counterpublic within the male-dominated parliament since the members of the commission aimed to act as critical oppositional forces, and raise the demands and concerns of a group of women whose voices have been usually ignored within the dominant public. In the following, I will explain on the role of this commission as a counterpublic.

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Additionally, the draft for the establishment of the Women’s Commission could initiate dialogue and deliberations around the subject of women within the Islamic parliament. One good example is the dialogues and arguments that took place regarding the name of the commission, among the male and female MPs. For example, Enayatollah Torang, an MP from Amol, suggested to eliminate the word ‘women,’ and argued that the ‘Commission for Families’ was a better name (Ebrahimi 1997). In this regard, he continues and warns other MPs, particularly female MPs, that for political propaganda reasons, we should not go beyond Islam/Islamic laws (Ebrahimi 1997: 2). In response, some of the women addressed this traditional view and asked: is including the word ‘women’ in the name of this commission counter to Islam and Islamic laws? Or is considering women’s issues considered political propaganda and movement against Islamic laws? (Ebrahimi 1997). Another example is arguments on the structure of the members of this commission. While female MPs, such as, Faezeh Hashemi, insisted that at least half of the commission’s members must be women, a group of male MPs, for example, Abbas Abbasi from Bandar Abbas, argued that this condition must be eliminated (Ebrahimi 1997). Despite these arguments, through constant communication, women could take on board the majority of MPs from different political/ ideological backgrounds, even some primary opponents of this draft, and accordingly, they were able to achieve enough votes for the establishment of the Women’s Commission for Youth and Families (Ebrahimi 1997). This commission had four main priorities: (1) considering women’s legal issues, including guardianship of children, Mahriyeh,1 divorce, re-­marriage, and so forth; (2) women’s social issues and some social bans against women, such as a ban on leaving the country without husband’s permission; (3) addressing cultural traditions that are against women’s rights, particularly in specific areas in the country and among some ethnic and religious minorities, such as underage and forced marriage; and (4) women’s economic issues, such as women’s employment and retirement (Ebrahimi 1997: 3). As mentioned, since this Women’s Commission represents the rights of those who are excluded from the dominant public, or those whose voice is ignored and overlooked within the dominant public, this commission 1  In most of the literature and dictionaries Mahriyeh has been translated as dowry though is slightly different from the dowry culture which is experienced in some other countries, for example, in India.

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can be considered as a counterpublic within the parliament, a critical oppositional force within the parliament (Felski 1989; Fraser 1990, 1997). For example, while female MPs between 1989 and 1996 were somehow successful in reforming some family laws regarding divorce and marriage, in the fifth parliament, this commission could push for further legal amendments to make a new family code in support of women’s rights (Koolaee 2012). I consider this commission as a counterpublic since through gathering, raising, and discussing diverse opinions around women and their rights in the male-dominated atmosphere of the parliament, it could shift the parliamentary dialogue in favor of women. The commission depicts a form of counterpublic because some members of a specific (subordinated) social group come together as a public, as an oppositional force to articulate oppositional interpretations of their needs and interests (Felski 1989; Fraser 1990: 67, 1997: 81). The establishment of a women’s commission that discusses women’s rights shows how, despite the revolutionary patriarchal context of Iran, a group of women could enter the male-dominated public political sphere of the parliament and initiate deliberations around the subject of women. Arguments and deliberations around the structure and name of this commission shows how this group of women could challenge the dominant traditional and patriarchal approach in the parliament that had even a problem with the term ‘woman’. A group of women could shift the parliamentary dialogue by entering the patriarchal parliament, forming a commission for women, raising women’s issues and demands, and pushing for legal reforms in favor of women. This form of counterpublic within the parliament could play a complementary role alongside the practices of women’s rights activists and feminists in the broader society since at that time their struggles inside the society were mainly focused on women’s legal issues and legal reforms in support of women. In this sense, the activities taking place in society toward women’s rights can help the formation of influential opinions in the public sphere, simultaneously, the activities of some women MPs in the form of counterpublic can generate practical and constructive decisions in parliament; this is a kind of deliberative politics that empirically can serve a variety of aims. This unique situation happened in the context of post-revolutionary Iran where ideological and patriarchal pressures on women have motivated a diverse group of women, including religious and secular, activist and elite/politician, and so on, to work together toward their rights (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). In this context, despite their differences and disagreements, at times, while opportunities

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opened to women, the Iranian women’s movement, encompassing different groups and individuals, has sent a group of women to the parliament to discuss and protect women’s rights (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). The best example for such a counterpublic within the parliament that works alongside women’s activists and feminists within society is the role of reformist MPs in the sixth parliament. In the sixth parliament, reformists were in the majority, even though the number of female MPs decreased (Dokoohaki 2000; Koolaee 2012). Most of the elected female MPs in the sixth parliament believed that the decrease in the number of female MPs referred to the political issues and the lack of political parties’ support of female candidates (Dokoohaki 2000). Kadivar argues that political parties and groups placed the minimum number of women on their list of candidates just to have an acceptable political appearance (an empty political gesture) (Dokoohaki 2000: 4). However, Fatemeh Haghighatjoo claims that the number of female MPs is not important; rather it is important that all these eleven MPs who were elected committed themselves to defend women’s rights in the parliament (Dokoohaki 2000: 3). In this reformist parliament, for the first time, three female MPs attended the parliament with a Manto (overcoat) instead of the chador, which is the usual acceptable Islamic style of clothing for female MPs in the Islamic Republic (Ebrahimi 2000b). For the first time, a female MP, Jamileh Kadivar, as the second elected MPs in Tehran, was nominated for the parliament deputy-speaker position (Ebrahimi 2000b). These are just two examples of how reformist female MPs challenged the patriarchal Islamic parliament once they entered this political public sphere. Additionally, in the sixth parliament, women set up the women’s faction of the parliament (Koolaee 2012) that was more independent from the structure/body of the parliament compared with the Women’s Commission in the fifth parliament. In fact, this faction can be considered as a women’s caucus, and considering the membership structure, aims, and function of this women’s caucus, in the current research, it can be considered as a counterpublic within the parliament as well. In the sixth parliament, female MPs managed to reform some of the articles of the civil law that were opposed to women’s rights through communications and strategic actions. Although they could be successful regarding the amendment of the laws on women’s education2 or the 2  They could remove obstacles to women studying abroad with a government scholarship (Koolaee 2012: 142).

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custody of children,3 some of the other laws in their package of reforms were rejected by the Shoraye Negahban (The Guardian Council) (Koolaee 2012: 142). However, to play an influential role in the process of decision making for women’s rights, the women’s caucus in the sixth parliament did not limit its work merely to activism within the parliament. Female reformist MPs had different meetings with the Women’s Participation Centre in the Presidential Office under the administration of Shojaee related to women’s empowerment and the allocation of a specific budget for NGOs to address women’s issues (Ebrahimi 2000a). Simultaneously, the women’s caucus made a good connection with a number of diverse groups of scholars, lawyers, and judges within society to have a better understanding of women’s legal issues (Ebrahimi 2000a). This example of the women’s caucus in the parliament and its relations with some state organizations and civil society groups brings me to the subject of the quality of relations between counterpublics and the state that is determining in the formation of a deliberative civil society capable of engaging in democratic reform. This example shows how despite the non-democratic context of Iran, we can identify a connection between the civil society and the state leading to a powerful public sphere. Deliberative practices in this sphere encompass both the formation of public opinion and power of decision making. Furthermore, this form of women’s parliamentary activism through deliberation, dialogue, argument, and bargaining/strategic action that is not limited only to activities inside parliament, shows the blurred border between women’s parliamentary activism and their outside-­ parliamentary activism in the theocratic revolutionary context of Iran. Strategic Shift in Women’s Parliamentary Activism: A Move Toward Deliberative Cooperation and Coalitions Women’s parliamentary activism that discusses and protects women’s rights and pushes for legal reforms in support of Iranian women through deliberative practices did not remain the same. For the seventh and eight parliament elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many reformist candidates, so, the conservatives in these two parliaments who formed the majority had a very different approach to women’s role in society (Koolaee 3  The new reforms on the custody of children entitled women to have the custody of boys and girls up to seven years of age (previously women could have the custody of boys up to two years old) (Koolaee 2012: 142).

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2012). The most controversial issue in the parliament had to do with the new family law bill (2007–2008), particularly Articles 22 23, and 25 of the bill. Article 22 proposed that it is was no longer required to register siqeh (temporary marriage) and this meant that there would be no legal and financial protection for women in these marriages and even for the children born into these marriages (Osanloo 2013). Article 23 enabled men to marry a second wife without permission from the first wife (Koolaee 2012; Osanloo 2013). Article 25 also placed limitations for women in regard to determining their Mahrieh, such as, a tax on the mahrieh (Koolaee 2012: 149; Osanloo 2013: 126). In fact, in the case of legal reforms in the sixth parliament and the rejection of some of the legal reforms and in the case of the new family bill in the seventh and eighths parliament due to the rejection of reformist candidates showed the Guardian Council in the theocratic system of Iran was an obstacle to social reforms. Nevertheless, in response to the Guardian Council’s intervention, by following a strategic and context-based action, the women’s rights activists and feminists shifted their parliamentary activism to a different level, challenging the legal structure and affecting the parliamentary decision-­ making process through activism from the outside. They started focusing more on their commonalities and less on their differences; and accordingly, in response to the new family bill in the seventh and eighths parliaments, activists, and feminists showed their opposition in public and they could form cooperation, compromise, consensus, and build campaigns. Through media activism, Zanan magazine widely covered the diverse ideas of those opposed to the new conservative family bill, including the idea of a clergy, Mohsen Kadivar (Shakerhosseini 2007). Even some conservative female MPs, such as Monireh Nobakht and Rafat Bayat, were against this bill, particularly Article 23 (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 264–265). Through civil society activism, different independent groups within the women’s movement also objected to the new family bill, mostly through their four main websites: Zanestan, Kanoon-e-Zanan-e-Irani, Tagheer baray-e barabaree, and meydan-e zanan (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). Accordingly, despite their diverse ideological and political approaches, the common concern about the new family bill gave rise to ‘the coalition of women’s movement’s groups against the family bill,’ encompassing twelve primary groups (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 277). After publishing the statement of the coalition, thirty other groups also joined this coalition (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 278). To stop the bill from

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passing or to eliminate the controversial articles of the bill, those who were involved in the coalition started applying different approaches and strategies, including meetings, discussions, deliberations, bargaining, convincing, and lobbying strategies. On the level of the formation of the opinions, one of the activities of this coalition was distributing brochures across the country wherein they explained the problems with the new family bill and how it could negatively affect women’s rights in straightforward language (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013). On the level of parliamentary decision making, different women’s groups involved in the coalition started meeting their MPs from their cities, including small and big cities, to convince them not to vote for this bill (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). At the same time, since the Guardian Council always rejected legal reforms in support of women under the excuse of ‘incompatibility with Islam,’ the women’s rights activists and groups met and argued with Ulama (clerics) to explain that the rejection of controversial articles was not against Shari’a, aiming to achieve their support (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). This coalition against the new family bill not only strengthened the cooperation among the different women’s groups, but it also encouraged different political groups and figures to cooperate on this matter (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 279). The women’s response to the obstacle of the Guardian Councils’s intervention and the dominant traditional-patriarchal view in the parliament opened up a new space for women’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism, where women’s activism in the media, civil society, and parliamentary spheres connect to each other. Although women’s rights advocates could not enter the seventh and eighth parliament, common concerns about the conservative family bill motivated diverse groups of women, feminists, activists, and reformists, to form a coalition to affect the process of decision making in the parliament in favor of women. At last, the elimination of some problematic articles of the bill was a partial victory for women’s movement. Those who were involved in this coalition and cooperation, religious and non-religious, exercised mutual toleration across boundaries and divisions as citizens of a political community (Habermas 2004: 18). Additionally, the pluralist coalition under the domination of populist-fundamentalist government was a great democratic experience for all reformist groups and individuals to believe in the power of a deliberative public versus a theocratic state. Jilla Baniyaghoob says: “This coalition taught me that despite [our] differences we can work together towards a common aim … through this coalition, those who are

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active in political parties and groups, accepted that they are learning from the women’s movement” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 292). In other words, this coalition displays the idea of exercising mutual toleration and adopting a complementary learning process among the diverse social groups. Nasim Sarabandi, the representative of the women’s commission in ‘Office for the Consolidation of Unity’ (Daftar Tahkim Vahdat-a student union) also explained: “This coalition and the Iranian women’s movement gave us new ideas that we will apply… in the student movement” (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 292). In fact, this coalition displays that the exercise of mutual toleration and the complementary learning process (Habermas 2004, 2006a, b, 2008, 2009) among the diverse social groups in the Iranian society, that toleration and the complementary learning process are two essential factors to exercise in a deliberative democracy. Furthermore, regarding the family bill law proposed in the seventh and the eighth parliament, different groups, particularly women’s rights activists, through communicative and non-violent action were able to achieve a shared interpretation of the situation and reach a consensus (Habermas 1990). Later, in 2015, another great example of women’s cooperation and coalition building in the field of women’s parliamentary/extra-­ parliamentary activism happened during the 10th parliament election. Women from various ideological and political backgrounds formed ‘The campaign of Changing the Male Face of the Parliament’ aiming to enter more Female MPs who could advance women’s rights in the parliament (Naji 2015). On 27 October 2015, various groups of women, including scholars, elites, and activists, with different ideological backgrounds, religious and non-religious, gathered in the office of Rooshangaran and Women’s Studies Publication to present their plan for the 10th parliament election and to announce the formation of the campaign of ‘Changing the Male Face of the Parliament’ (Sherdoost 2015). Finally, seventeen female MPs, most of them reformists, entered the parliament, and it was a great sign of hope for the women’s movement to believe in its potential for making more changes. One of the prominent women’s rights activists argues that “The important point regarding this campaign is that women showed that in reaction to various legal obstacles, they have decided to be active and challenge this system instead of being passive citizens” (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). Although it was a partial success for women’s movement, this campaign again showed how the different groups of women were able to work together toward a common aim. This

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campaign showed again how women’s activism in civil society and media has been connected to women’s parliamentary, extra-parliamentary activism at times. Despite the diversities and the existing theocratic system, all of the concerned women’s rights activists and feminists accorded their plans of action and committed themselves to follow their aims based on the condition of compromise. Nevertheless, women’s activism in this parliament is not yet comparable to the function of the women’s commission and women’s caucus in the fifth and sixth parliament. Considering the current situation in Iran and the existing obstacles, such as, the Guardian Council, it is credible to say that women’s activism in the parliamentary/ decision-making field moves constantly, if slowly and more through lobbying, campaigning, communicating, bargaining, or by entering in local politics through City and Local Councils. In the following section, I will consider women’s activism in the city and local councils, as another form of women’s activism in the Iranian public political sphere.

Women and City and Local Councils Although the establishment of the city and local councils has been emphasized by Article 7, 100, and 101 of the Constitution, for the first time, the reformist government held the local election in 1998. Younesi, the Minister of Intelligence in the reformist government, concluded: “Councils are the school of de-segregation of women and minority groups” (Younesi 2015: 16). The establishment of city councils was a strategy to reduce the gap between the government and the society and accordingly, for developing a civil society which was the slogan of the reformist government. Councils are “only political organs for people who belonged to no party” (Arendt 1963: 267). Councils promote direct participation of all citizens in public affairs and help to generate democracy through sharing diverse opinions (Arendt 1963). City and Local Councils in Iran can become a great space for women and minority groups to participate in the public affairs of the country. Although in Iran, councils have become a mix of party and non-party, through this form of local politics, women can still follow their communicative approach, and the discourse of justice and women’s rights in the field of the public political sphere, in parallel to their activism in the area of media and civil society. Fortunately, since the late 1990s, women have been able to identify the city and local council elections as a blind spot/gap within the dominant

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structure and create a new space for their self-representation and activism in the sphere of politics. In the first local elections, in 109 cities, 114 women were elected in the top ranks (Kadivar 2005). Through three local elections from 1998 until 2006, more than 7000 women registered as candidates and more than 2000 women have been elected in elections (Nejadbahram 2012: 86). In 2017, the presence of women in City and Local Council Elections was very significant, particularly in the rural areas (https://youtu.be/JES4DsONCS4). For example, according to Zanan-­ e-­Emrouz report, from one small village, Afzal Abad, ten women (and only one man) registered as a candidate for local council elections and all of them were encouraged by their female mayor, Maryam Ahmadzahi, who promotes women’s education and employment in this area (Shirafkan 2017b). According to the report of Zanan-e-Emrouz, in the fifth City and Local Council Elections in 2017, 6743 women in cities, and 11,142 women in rural areas, participated as candidates, that surprisingly shows that women in villages are ahead of women in cities (Ghanbarpoor 2017: 13). Regarding Tehran’s city council, which is very important, the qualification of 18 prominent women’s rights activist and feminist and female reformists were approved to enter the election (Eghtesad News 2017). In 2017 for the first time in the history of Tehran’s city council, six women, mainly reformists, were able to enter the council by the people’s votes (Nejati 2017). For this study, it is mainly considerable that despite the existence of legal obstacles to women’s political participation, women have been able to take advantage of any opportunity to enter the field of politics to raise their demands and gain more bargaining power hoping to generate practical decisions in support of women. By entering the area of local politics through city councils, women can both enhance their power of bargaining with the patriarchal system, get closer to the citizenry and understand better the real existing demands of the society through the exchange of opinions. City and local councils can be a sphere for ordinary women to follow up and follow through on their demands as well. The last but not the least point is that Iranian women’s entrance to the city and local councils is a form of a passing strategy to stop the patriarchal and theocratic system from bypassing them from the field of politics where they are not even allowed to be run as a presidential candidate. However, even this discriminatory law on banning women from presidential candidacy has not been successful in eliminating women from the presidential elections.

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In the following section, I will shortly discuss the presence and activism of Iranian women in presidential elections. Then, I will mainly focus on the 2009 presidential election.

Women’s Activism and Presidential Elections In 1997, women played a crucial role in the overwhelming victory of the reformist candidate, Mohammad Khatami, with 11 million votes out of about 21 million votes cast (Total: 20088338) (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2002: 173; Donya-e-Sokhan 1997: 9). Having the support of 20 million out of 29 million Iranian voters or 69/1% (Donya-e-Sokhan 1997: 9), Khatami became the most popular politician (leader) after the death of the charismatic leader of the revolution, Khomeini. Accordingly, the overwhelming victory of reformists on 23 May 1997 initiated a new era in the political history of post-revolutionary Iran, known as the 2nd of Khordad (reformist) Movement. It is argued that the 1997 presidential election was not an ‘election’ rather it was a ‘referendum’ (Salehyar 1997: 17). Since the key message of the reformist candidate during election campaigns was ‘building civil society’ (Ebadi 1997: 17), it is credible to claim that in 1997, around 21 million Iranian citizens, mainly women, voted to support ‘civil society’ and they raised their demands for reform. However, in 1997, women’s political participation was mainly based on individual action. In 2005, although the women’s movement experienced rapid growth during the eight years domination of the reformist groups, women just decided to take advantage of the open political atmosphere during the election period to be seen and heard more in public. In 2009, for the first time, the Iranian women’s movement, as an independent movement, encompassing various groups and actors, with a non-violent approach to civil struggles, and an accurate plan, aiming to achieve common interests, had a significant presence and participation in the election. Women’s rights activists and feminists formed ‘the women’s movement coalition for raising women’s demand in the election’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). This coalition became a model for other movements, for example, the student’s movement in the 2009 presidential election (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013). In particular, the ‘demand-driven’ discourse (literally translated)/the rights discourse inherent in the Iranian women’s movement spread and became the dominant discourse in the political atmosphere of the 2009 election. In 2009, there was a paradigm shift, which allowed women, who had been the audience of previous elections ‘as

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voters,’ to become active participants. In fact, for the first time, the Iranian women’s movement as an independent movement entered the election and was able to change the dominant discourse in the political atmosphere (for more details on the 2009 Presidential Election, see the section on the Green Movement in this chapter). In the 2013 election, where Rouhani was elected as the president, women again formed a coalition to raise their demands in the election and they had meetings with a representative of Rouhani as a moderate candidate. In 2017, again women organized different meetings to raise women’s demands in the atmosphere of the election and the outcome of these meetings was the “Iranian women’s movement activists’ statement” that addresses three areas: women’s employment, legal reformation, and women’s participation (Radio Zamaneh 2017; News Gooya 2017). Considering the existing dominant patriarchal discourse that is inclined to exclude women from the formal politics, these meetings between the women and the reformist or moderate candidates during Presidential Elections shows that a majority of activists and feminists within the women’s movement decided to ‘shift to strategic action’ instead of ‘breaking off communications’ (Habermas 1979, 1990, 1996). In response to the exclusion and discrimination, instead of applying revolutionary strategies—strategies that are not reformist and not procedural—on occasions, women have preferred ‘bargaining,’ as a strategic action (Habermas 1996). Most of the women’s rights activists and feminists have found the necessity to create deliberative engagement in the politics during presidential elections. Considering the social and political background of those who attended these meetings, it is also revealed that the women’s movement could successfully be connected to reformist female politicians or women who are considered power elites and get their support in this way despite their different ideological approaches (see next section on the Green Movement). This cooperation and this form of bargaining with male elites is convincing evidence to show that women’s rights groups and activists in Iran are inclined to undertake the communicative management of conflicts. Overall, in 2009 2013, and in 2017, one of the central debates among the candidates was about the status of women, women in economic, social and political fields and women’s rights, in general. Although it is not very helpful that every four years, for about three months, there are open public discussions, even on conservative national TV, about the issue of women’s rights, so it demonstrates that women could successfully affect the

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political atmosphere during the elections. During the six presidential elections since 1997, women have been able to challenge the dominant discourse in the political atmosphere of the election and shift the dialogue in favor of women and/or reshape conversation in such a way to ensure women’s voices are not ignored or overlooked. Following from this, while the women have been able to powerfully affect the public sphere of politics by utilizing their strategies and feminine power, even so, they still face various legal obstacles to formal political participation, and the ban on women from being president, according to Article 115 remains the same. Nevertheless, in resistance to Article 115, in the 1997 Presidential Election, for the first time, Azam Taleghani, the daughter of Ayatollah Taleghani who was usually identified as a religious/Islamic women’s rights activist, announced that she herself would stand as a candidate. Her candidacy was a severe challenge to the Guardian Council, which is responsible for confirming the qualifications of the candidates for the presidency (“Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, English Text,” n.d., Article 110). In her interview with Zanan, Taleghani mentioned that it is not important for her to be president; instead, it is mainly important to solve the issue of the ambiguity of the term ‘rejal’ in Article 115, which has prevented half of the population of Iran (women) from being able to run for the office of the presidency (Shahrokni and Taleghani 1997: 6–7). In fact, the legal issues around the term ‘rejal’ have negatively affected the status of women in all other higher administrative positions within the cabinet (government) (Kar 1994). In 2001, 2005, 2009 and in 2017, Taleghani continued to stand as a candidate as a form of protest to Article 115 (Kadivar 2012; Shirafkan 2017a). In the following years, some other women, including ordinary citizens, from very diverse ideological and social backgrounds accompanied Taleghani; eighty-nine women in 2005 (M.  Shojaee 2013), forty-two women in 2009 (Kadivar 2012) and one hundred and thirty-seven women in 2017 (Ghazi 2017) registered as candidates, as a form of protest. Although this resistance to Article 115 was initiated by the individual action of an Islamic women’s rights activist and somehow a female elite, it gave rise to a form of collective action against the discriminatory laws that aim to eliminate women from the public sphere, particularly from the public political sphere. This form of the Iranian women’s collective activism during the presidential elections flourished in the 2009 Presidential Election with the story of the Green Movement.

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In the following section, I will discuss and analyze the role of women in the 2009 Presidential Election and the rise of the Green Movement, as a case study. Women’s Activism in the Shadow of the Green Movement: A Momentous Deliberative Cooperation To analyze the Green Movement, it is essential to describe the political, social, and economic atmosphere before and during the 2009 Presidential Election. During the four-year domination of the populist-fundamentalist government of Ahmadinejad (2005–2009), not only did the country face economic recession due to Iran’s radical nuclear policies and accordingly, economic sanctions against the country, it was also the social and political situation that was in a severe crisis due to the repressive policies of the government. On 1 June 2009, 80 economic scholars and experts announced that although “we have raised the economic issues and proposed appropriate reformist economic plans to the ninth government to be able to deal with the situation, our voices have been always ignored in this government” (Kalam-e-Sabz 2009a: 13). Furthermore, the ninth government had radical and fundamentalist policies regarding the rights of women, gender, and religious minorities, the status of art, cinema, and literature in the country. As an example, the head of the ninth government, Mahmood Ahmadinejad claimed that “in Iran, we do not have homosexuals!” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUE0tukdr4c). This means that the ninth government did not have any reform plan to consider the rights of gender minorities, rather the head of the government denied the identity and the existence of a minority group that includes citizens of the country. Regarding the rights of women, the ninth government had very repressive policies targeting women’s NGOs, and the government did not have any plan to reform the rights of women. Instead, Ahmadinejad’s administration changed the name of ‘the Women’s Participation Centre’ to ‘the Centre for Women and Family Affairs’ that indicates “the trend to re-­ emphasize the important status of women as mothers and wives” (Osanloo 2013: 135). Additionally, as I mentioned in the parliamentary section, the seventh and eighth parliament tried to pass a new family bill that was very

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discriminatory as it relates to the basic rights of women. In general, the government tried hard to eliminate women from the public sphere particularly from the formal field of politics. Zahra Shojaee, known as Islamic feminist and the Former Head of the Centre for Women’s Participation, in an interview with Kalam-e-Sabz newspaper, claims that the ninth government sent women back to the private sphere of homes (Shojaee 2009: 5). She continues her critiques of the ninth government policies regarding the rights of women that “Government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may not know that undertaking activities in the area of women requires a systematically organized body of knowledge and that Women’s Studies today is mature in terms of an academic field around the world. I felt like a piece of myself was missing at the time I learned that the books that we had published during the last eight years in the Women’s Participation Centre had all been destroyed. It is not because they destroyed part of our studies, it is because of their rigidity and dogmatism and their effort to destroy books when they are addressed by others and cannot respond to them. The response to the thought must be the thought… ” (Shojaee 2009: 5). Shirin Ebadi, the secular feminist lawyer, also mentions that the ninth government harshly limited Iranian women; and points to the repressive policies of the system against women, particularly the One Million Signatures Campaign in 2006 (see Chap. 4) (Ebadi 2009: 5). All in all, the repressive policies of the ninth government targeting different social groups could significantly weaken civil society in Iran. In an interview with the Seda-ye-Edalat Newspaper, Sohrab Razzaghi says: “Civil society is a human capital which has been reduced during these recent four years” (Razzaghi and Yousefi 2009: 4). In the lead-up to the tenth Presidential Election, diverse social groups began to search for a solution and think about a social change. However, as an observer, I heard and read about some people who argued that as a response to this situation, people must boycott the election; some believed that people must vote between bad and worse and a boycott without any alternative would not be constructive. As a result, a couple of months before the election, there was not any specific coalition among the diverse groups. Even among those who believed that people should vote, there was no consensus on a particular person to select as a candidate, even for them. In such a disappointing and uncertain atmosphere, in January– February 2009, a group of women’s rights activists in the ‘Feminist School’ initiated looking for an opportunity to rebuild the women’s movement that had weakened due to the repressive policies for the past four

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years. Accordingly, in March 2009, on the pretext of celebrating 8th March the International Women’s Day, a group of women was invited to Lahigi- feminist publisher-office (Roshangaran and Women’s Studies Publishing) to deliberate and communicate on the subject of women and the upcoming presidential elections (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013). In this gathering, most of the attendees (except Parvin Ardalan, one of the main establishers of the One Million Signatures Campaign) supported the idea of ‘the formation of [a]women’s coalition for raising women’s demands in the 2009 presidential election’ (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 351). Hence, the primary core of the coalition formed, and the attendees decided to continue their meetings with representatives from diverse groups to make a statement for raising women’s demands in the 2009 presidential elections. To expand the effect of the women’s coalition on the election, the primary group in the coalition decided to invite diverse groups, particularly the women’s faction in the student movement and the Tahkim Vahdat Office (Iranian Student Organization), women from religious minorities, housewives, female artists, journalists, employees, teachers, and so forth (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 352). Gradually, all of these diverse groups came together and formed a pluralist gathering that was unprecedented in women’s movement struggles until that time. The diversity of the women’s coalition can easily be seen by a quick look at the list of attendees at the second meeting. Some of the activists and feminists who attended the second meeting of the women’s coalition include Shahla Lahigi (—secular-­ feminist publisher—Roshangaran Publishing), Rakhshan Banietemad (— secular-feminist filmmaker), Fatemeh Rakeyee (—religious/Islamist—from women’s commission in Mosharekat—participation—party), Firoozeh Saber (from entrepreneur women), Minoo Mortazee (from Religious-­ Nationalist), Shahindokht Mollaverdi (—known as religious feminist— from Assembly of reformist women), Azam Taleghani (known as Islamic feminist who registered for presidential candidacy), Fereshteh Osanloo (from transport/bus driving syndicate/union), Farzaneh Taheri (translator), Ameneh Shirafkan (from women’s faction in Tahkim Vahdat- student organization), Farangis Mazdapoor (from Zoroastrian Women’s Association), Jila Shareeyatpanah (Quranic Scholar), Parvin Bakhteeyar Nejad (Journalist), Nooshin Ahmadi Khorasani and Mansoureh Shojaee (known as a secular women’s rights activist—from the Feminist School), Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh and Shadi Sadr (known as a secular feminist—from Meydan-e-Zanan—website), Anaheed Aabad (from Armenian

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Women), Azeeta Sharaf-jahan (from the Association of Female Painters), and so on (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2013: 352). In the following meeting more activists and feminists, including a famous secular lawyer, Nasrin Sotoodeh, and a prominent activist, Narges Mohammadi, joined this pluralist coalition of women to raise women’s demands in the 2009 presidential elections. This (short) list of attendees in the second meeting of the women’s coalition not only discloses the pluralistic nature of the coalition, it also reveals the intersectional approach of the women’s movement that aims to address women’s needs and demands as well as the demands of some of the other social groups, including students, worker unions, and religious/ ethnic minorities. While women’s rights activists and feminists were trying to broaden their coalition to raise women’s demands and somehow start a kind of bargaining with the system in favor of women’s rights reformation, a wave of hope created in the society, hoping that Khatami, the spiritual leader of the reformist movement, entered the election. However, Khatami did not enter the election as a candidate; instead, in April 2009, he supported Mir-­ Hossein Mousavi, the last Prime Minister of Iran (1981–1989), artist and architect, who was far from the field of formal politics for many years (Khatami 2009). Khatami explained that he did not enter the election to demonstrate that the wave of hope in society does not refer to a specific person (Khatami), and it is not just a passion or emotional excitement in the society; instead, people are aware, and they deliberatively and consciously follow a specific way of change (Khatami 2009). Finally, Khatami announced Mousavi, as the reformist candidate in the 2009 presidential election by giving him a green sash and this announcement significantly strengthened the wave of hope for change in the society (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjSlv1Nc9JI; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHow0TaG3Qg). Accordingly, the Green Movement took its name from this ‘green sash.’ The Rise of the Green Movement: A Green Wave of Hope After April 2009, the green wave of hope for change strengthened the coalition among the diverse social groups. Notably, the candidacy of Mousavi was great news for the Iranian women’s movement since his wife,

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Zahra Rahnavard,4 was a famous Islamic feminist with a great resume participating in the struggle for women’s rights in Iran. This means that after April 2009, the women’s movement could make its pluralist coalition even broader to the extent that women became the main influential actors during the presidential campaigns. Despite some primary disagreements on the aims of the coalition and the content of the statement of the women’s coalition, finally, on 30 April 2009, the statement of ‘The Coalition of the Iranian Women’s Movement for Voicing their Demands in the Election’ was published and signed by diverse groups and individuals from different ideological and political backgrounds (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 171–175). The statement asserted that “we neither support any specific candidate nor interfere with the rights of citizens to participate or reject the elections” (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 171). In fact, this part of the statement, the structure of the women’s diverse coalition, and the women’s strategy for the formation of the consensus shows that the women’s movement was not looking for an ideal full inclusive consensus. Instead, the Iranian women’s movement aimed to form a consensus among those religious, non-religious, or secular participants who are willing to cooperate based on reciprocity, forbearance, mutual toleration, and a complementary learning process since the compromise within that specific historical-political context could provide the conditions for all of the participants to follow their ends. The coalition, signed by diverse groups and individuals, aimed: (1) to divert the dominant state-machismo discourse toward a more conciliatory tone in order to address the needs of civil society, especially women’s demands; (2) to attract the attention of the authorities to their responsibilities to the public, especially the most underprivileged and marginalized sectors; (3) to notify the presidential candidates that if they require the votes of women, students, teachers, and other social groups, the candidates’ platforms must address their needs and demands; (4) to show that even under harshest social and political conditions it is possible to be an effective and responsible citizen and press for a better and just society; (5) to achieve these goals, we women must prove that we have the ability and the courage to seek all peaceful and civil avenues (Ahmadi-Khorasani 2010: 171–172). 4  Zahra Rahnavard was the president of Al-Zahra University, the first woman who got such a position in the Islamic Republic (Esfandiari 2004; Shahidian 2002). Additionally, she was the political advisor to President Khatami.

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Following these goals with a peaceful and communicative approach, women organized different gatherings and meetings through which individuals, including ordinary women, activists, elites, politicians, entrepreneurs, actresses, artists, and others, from diverse ideological and political backgrounds, discuss their issues and demands. The best example to show this diversity and deliberation among the different social groups, particularly the women, is the documentary made by the feminist filmmaker, Rakhshan Banietemad ‘We are half of the Population of Iran’ (http:// www.iran-­emrooz.net/index.php/news1/18141/). The documentary shows how diverse groups and individuals from very different ideological and political backgrounds come together to raise the voice of marginalized social groups, particularly women. Banietemad mentions that one of her main aims for creating this documentary was to show, despite all of the differences, ideologically or politically, there are some commonalities between religious, non-religious, and secular women; and these commonalities show that women’s demands arise from within the body of the society (Ghasemfar and Banietemad 2010). She continues that her documentary aims to present the organized form of women’s demands to be followed even later by diverse women’s rights activists and groups (Ghasemfar and Banietemad 2010). In general, through the pluralist coalition, meetings and gatherings, and through the media and producing a documentary, women could significantly affect the 2009 presidential elections. The best examples to show the influence of the women’s coalition on the election campaigns were the significant presence and mobilization of women in campaigns, campaigns’ speech contents, flyers, and posters distributed in society. Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of the reformist candidate, as an Islamic feminist, seized every opportunity to talk about the rights of women. As an example, she criticized the repressive policies of the system directed at women regarding the law of the compulsory hijab (Eekeedar and Rahnavard 2009). It was the first time in the Islamic Republic that Iranians could see the wife of a presidential candidate since she is working next to her husband during the campaigns, as a first lady. As an observer and participant during election campaigns, I heard a lot from many women that they will vote for the reformist candidate because they believe in the eligibility and ability of Rahnavard, known as an academic, activist, and Islamic feminist, to make changes in favor of women’s rights in Iran. Her husband, Mousavi, announced his support of women’s rights in one

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of his speeches that “discriminatory laws against women must be ­reformed/considered” (Kalam-e-Sabz 2009b: 16). On 30 May 2009, Kalame-e-Sabz newspaper quoted from a French news agency that “Rahnavard became the new star in the politics of Iran” (Kalam-e-Sabz 2009c: 16). Another example to show the influence of women and the women’s coalition and its statement on the discourse of the 2009 presidential election involved the poster and flyers some of the candidates distributed. Mehdi Karroubi, the candidate from the Etemad-Melli Party, who worked with/supported reformists in the 2009 election, announced his support of ethnic/religious minorities; and probably, for this reason, he got the support of 80 Kurdish scholars during the election (Etemad-e-Melli 2009a: 4; Tabatabayee 2009: 3). Karroubi’s campaign distributed lots of flyers in support of women’s rights and in favor of reforming the gender discriminatory laws as well. Figure 5.1 shows one of these flyers that I collected in 2009 in Tehran with a title of ‘the end of humiliation, discrimination, and insult’: In the same manner as Karroubi’s campaign, Mousavi’s campaign also distributed many flyers, posters, and brochures in support of women as well as a draft of ‘the bill of citizen’s rights’ that mainly insisted on the rights of women, students, minorities, artists, teachers, and in general, the prevention of (ideologically and politically) violations, and the development of the civil society. Figure 5.2 is a part of the brochure that I collected during one of Mousavi’s campaigns in 2009: Considering the main aims mentioned in the statement of the women’s coalition, alongside these speeches, slogans, flyers, and brochures outlining the plan of the candidates demonstrates the way in which the women were able to affect the 2009 presidential election with feminine power, shift the dialogues, and challenge and almost change the dominant discourse in favor of women, social groups, and their needs and demands. The women’s coalition, on the one hand, and the powerful and influential entry of an Islamic feminist and activist to the presidential election, on the other hand, both together helped women’s rights activists and feminists to connect the discourse of women’s rights to the reformist discourse. In the 2009 presidential election, for the first time, feminists and activists

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Fig. 5.1  Karroubi’s Campaign’s Flyer-2009 Presidential Election

associated themselves to the broader social groups and they were also able to orchestrate a broader consensus on civil rights’ reformation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, not only a consensus among reformist feminists on women’s rights reformation, similar to the consensus within the One Million Signatures Campaign, particularly on the reformation of gender discriminatory laws (see Chap. 4). By addressing the rights of diverse social groups and insisting on civil and non-violent struggles in the

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Fig. 5.2  The Bill of Citizens’ Rights-2009 Presidential Election

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statement of the women’s coalition, it is credible to say that the Green Movement during the 2009 presidential election was able to synthesize two essential features from the Iranian reformist feminist movement: non-­ violent dissent, and rising above ideological and ethnic diversities. However, this unprecedented coalition among the diverse social groups and the green wave of the hope for change ended in a mass protest against the tampered result of the election. As a result, although it was born during the election campaign, the Green Movement is usually identified as a movement against the tampered outcome of the 2009 election. Regarding this matter, it is credible to say that after announcing the result of the election, the existing Green Movement erupted and significantly displayed a power that was not predicted by the system. It is worth mentioning that it was not a shock for the society or even the presidential candidates, particularly Karroubi and Mousavi, to hear a very different result, different from the one the official opinion polls showed before the election. As evidence, on 8th June 2009, Mousavi and Karroubi’s campaign officers wrote a letter to the Guardian Council and expressed their concern about widespread election fraud (Seda-Ye-Edalat 2009: 1). Even so, the eruption of the Green Movement was a shock to the system. For this reason, the reaction of the Islamic state was unprecedented violent suppression. They started beating people up, arresting them, and even shooting at the people who were protesting against the result of the election (https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxlLnxvkknM, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=AdK35ZkbdIc). The main slogan of the people was ‘Where is my vote?’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUjWKEanmFw; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYhbEnCN-­co) that indicates the awareness of the Iranian society of their basic citizenship rights, an awareness and belief in social change that Khatami had mentioned at the beginning of the 2009 election at the time Mousavid announced as the reformist candidate. The most interesting aspects of these protests after the election are again the significant presence of women, diversity, and non-violent and civil dissent. As an observer and participant, I cannot neglect the considerable presence of women and diversity among protesters. I can remember walking next to a cleric with his family in one of the demonstrations after the election in Haft-e-Teer square. Despite imposing restrictions and limitations on journalists and national and foreign news agencies, there are many videos of the Iranian Green Movement that are convincing evidence of the eye-catching participation of women. This was the first time that

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women became as the main active and influential social actors in the presidential elections who were not just voting. Instead, women could shift the dialogue and challenge the dominant discourse with feminine power and through a non-violent struggle for their rights. Iranian women played a crucial role through their great cooperation and participation in the 2009 presidential election to the extent that the symbol of the Green Movement became a young woman, Neda Agha Soltan, a student twenty-­six years old who participated in a peaceful demonstration in Tehran, bleeding to death with a single bullet in her heart (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ Ev3YPqQ_b8). Her image depicts both the “victimization of Iranian women and their courage, agency, and self-determination in writing their own history” (Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010: 78) in a very inclusive, peaceful, and non-violent way. Despite the violent repressive reaction of the system to the protestors, people organized a ‘Silence Movement’ as a way to protest. It was one of the biggest demonstrations during recent decades in the Islamic republic in Tehran, it was estimated that over one million of the population participated (Etemad-e-Melli 2009b: 1). In fact, diverse social groups and activists in the Green Movement resisted to apply violence as a means of protest and continued their non-violent protest to make their voices heard (Payrow Shabani 2010: 148). In these demonstrations after the 2009 election, there was no desire to seize power. Instead, there was a desire for justice and a demand for truth (Payrow Shabani 2010: 148). Despite the securitized atmosphere and the repressive policies, women’s rights activists and feminists did not choose to break off communication, they decided to shift to another strategic action. Accordingly, after the 2009 election, diverse groups of women gathered again to discuss and deliberate on the status and the future of the women’s movement under the shadow of the Green Movement. Despite the repressive policies, the women’s rights activists and feminists joined in solidarity with the Green Movement and formed ‘the Green Coalition of Women’s Movement’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXc9kZlwdfA; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ6p185WI5E). The women’s movement’s cross-cultural/ideological/political approach can be easily seen in the structure of these gatherings and in the meetings after the election. Diverse groups of women and individuals, religious, non-religious, and secular, with different social backgrounds, such as, a mother, as an ordinary woman who lost her son during the green demonstrations, Nooshin Ahmadi Khorasani, as a secular activist, or

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Zahra Rahnavard as an (Islamic/religious) elite, all gathered together to reach an agreement through reciprocal understanding, mutual trust, and shared knowledge. All concerned actors gathered to communicate and deliberate, aiming to reach a common interpretation of their situation to accord their plans of action. One of the prominent feminist activists told me “we gathered in Zahra Rahnavard’s office regarding the formation of the Green Coalition of Women’s Movement and this gathering was a great surprise for me, since around one table I could see very different women, from ultra-religious to ultra-secular, from social activists to an active elite/ politician, who gathered to work together towards reformations” (Interviewee 09, 27 January 2017). Nevertheless, the story of the Green Movement, the Women’s Coalition, and the Green Coalition of Women’s Movement resulted in a severe suppression of opposition groups, activists, and finally, the house arrest of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi, the house arrest has been continuing up until now in 2018 and it is still a controversial topic throughout society and even among officials, including some MPs. However, although the Green Movement has been violently suppressed and consensus within the movement could not be maintained, it showed that the Islamic republic’s body politic has been invaded by women’s power and the public political sphere has been influenced by three features of the Iranian women’s movement, non-violent dissent, communication and bargaining, and diversity. Additionally, from the view of the Islamic state, it might seem that the Green Movement has been removed from the public sphere, except, the reality on the ground is different. The reality is that the Green Movement has become an active underground movement or a kind of potentially active volcano that at times erupts and shows its power. The best examples of this form of an eruption of the movement are the women’s coalitions and the movements in 2013 and even later in the 2017 presidential elections. For example, in the 2013 election where Rouhani was elected as the president, the Green Movement may not have revealed itself in the same manner as before, yet its demands and aspirations inherited from the women’s movement remained the same, remained visible to the Iranian leaders, and remained capable of influencing the balance of political forces inside the country (Haghighatjoo 2016: 224). Even in 2017, since the political atmosphere of the election is still under the shadow of the Green Movement and the demands of the women’s movement, there was competition among the candidates to show who is a better supporter of women’s rights and civil society. In 2017, again women

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organized different meetings to raise women’s demands in the atmosphere of the Election, and the outcome of these meetings was the “Iranian women’s movement activists’ statement” with 180 signatures addressing three areas, women’s employment, legal reformation, and women’s participation (News Gooya 2017). Thus, despite the repressive policies, particularly against women’s rights activists and feminists after the 2009 presidential election, the Iranian women’s movement has kept following its inclusive, communicative, and non-violent approach within the political public sphere rather than breaking off communication. Different pluralist coalitions of the Iranian women’s movement during the last three presidential elections display how believing and unbelieving citizens interact with one another politically.

Conclusion The discussion on women’s activism in the field of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary in Iran shows that despite the theocratic system and male-dominated sphere of politics in Iran, a group of women could take advantage of the republican aspect of the system, and enter the field of the political public sphere since the early years of the revolution. By analyzing the structure, strategies, and statements of women’s movement’s pluralist coalitions and women’s parliamentary activism, the chapter shows how women’s activism in the media, civil society, and parliamentary, and extra-parliamentary fields is intertwined together and it is difficult to draw a clear border between these arenas in relation to women’s activism. The women’s coalition to counter the new Family Bill in the seventh and eighth parliaments (2007–2008) and the women’s campaign to change and bring balance to the male-face of the parliaments are good examples to show that this form of Iranian women’s multi-dimensional activism has initiated a non-violent and deliberative approach in the field of the political struggles in Iran. This deliberative multi-dimensional activism in the field, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, aiming to affect the process of decision making in Iran indicates the “communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere” (Habermas 1994: 8). The membership, structure, and the statements of these coalitions, particularly the statement of the Women’s Coalition in the 2009 election, are also convincing evidence to show women’s rights activists and feminists trying to address the interests of women while engaging with diverse social

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groups. Moreover, the pluralist nature of these coalitions show the dialogic interaction between the religious and the secular and highlights how, despite the revolutionary theocratic system, a group of people inside the society have started practicing ‘religious tolerance,’ ‘complementary learning process,’ and a form of deliberative democracy. It is credible to claim that the two contradictory features of ‘Islamism’ and ‘republicanism’ of this unique theocratic system have left spaces for social and political activism, and many women could spot this gap and show how a revised form of the Habermasian deliberative perspective can be relevant even to this non-democratic and non-secular political system. The women’s movement, including all diverse, involved groups, seized this opportunity to promote its deliberative approach and facilitate the formation of a deliberative pluralist public sphere through building diverse coalitions, campaigns, and consensus. The pluralist coalitions during the presidential elections, as some examples, show the emergence of a dialogic approach to religion that is more compatible with the norms and values of democracy and human rights. This form of cross-ideological coalitions not only shows the democratic practice of a Habermasian ‘complementary learning process’ and ‘religious tolerance,’ it also shines a light on the gradual process of the redefinition of both terms of the religious and the secular in the present society of Iran. To describe the present society of Iran, Asef Bayat (2013) applies the term ‘post-Islamist’ that indicates the re-definition of the religion in a way to be compatible with the values of freedom. Omid Payrow Shabani (2010: 144–145) argues that “the recent history in Iran has offered an occasion for the development away from a dogmatic religious consciousness and toward a more tolerant one.” Furthermore, these pluralist coalitions and deliberations display the development or gradual re-fashioning of the secular according to the specific socio-political circumstances in the historical context of Iran. These pluralist consensuses highlight the conceptualization of the secular in a dialogic way with religion, in a way that the secular is compatible with the existence of the religious communities and commitments. Accordingly, it become clear how the different forms of action resulted from the different conceptualizations (Asad et al. 2009). Therefore, I argue that inside today’s society of Iran, we can hardly see an epistemic break between the secular and the religious within the women’s movement; and the secular can no longer be defined versus the religious, and the religious can no longer be defined exclusively based on its

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relation to the secular. In these pluralist consensuses, none of the participants were forced to use a specific religious or secular language to take part in the consensus and engage in deliberations. Instead, there was a dialogic interaction between the religious and secular aiming to reach an agreement and compromise, that supplies a more favorable arrangement for all to follow their aim at the end, this is a kind of strategic action, includes a negotiated agreement to balance the conflicting interests (Habermas 1996: 166). It can be argued that the pluralist cooperation and coalitions initiated by the Iranian feminist movement since the late 1990s to the early 2000s have facilitated the co-existence of the secular-­ religious in a kind of dialogic secular-religious society, neither in a pure Habermasian post-secular society nor a pure post-Islamist society as Asef Bayat (2013) describes. Additionally, the Iranian feminist movement has facilitated the formation of the pluralist deliberative public sphere without eliminating the differences by addressing the interests of women as well as by engaging with diverse social groups in different coalitions, mainly the 2009 Women’s coalition. Through the last three presidential elections, the women’s movement has promoted its culture of inclusiveness, mutual toleration, communications, deliberations, coalition building, non-violent dissent, and diversity, in the public political sphere of Iran. This deliberative approach of the women’s movement in the area of parliamentary and extra (outside)-parliamentary activism displays the grounds to think that a sort of deliberative politics could be encouraged and fostered in the future. Additionally, this deliberative approach has facilitated the ground for the formation of a deliberative public sphere within the existing non-democratic, theocratic structure of the system in Iran. In the next chapter (Chap. 6: Conclusion), by applying the research pluralist-deliberative theoretical framework we consider the linkage among the three forms of women’s activism, discussed in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5, and we will address the research questions posed at the beginning of the book.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Despite the establishment of an ideologically patriarchal constitution after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, there is a vibrant feminist movement within Iran. Since the 1990s, a feminist resurgence in post-revolutionary Iran has been affirmed by the establishment of women’s NGOs and the emergence of new women’s journals. These women’s journals and women’s NGOs revealed the reconfiguration of Islam, revolution, and feminism in the context of post-revolutionary Iran (Najmabadi 1998) despite the existence of an assumption within academia amongst some feminists that there is no compatibility between Islam and feminism (Mojab 1995, 2001; Shahidian 2002). This assumption within academia implies that the religious differences/divides are insurmountable while in the context of post-­ revolutionary Iran, women’s rights groups, feminists, and activists, religious and secular, have at times worked together. Despite their religious differences and periodic disagreements, at times, the different feminist groups have worked together under a common strategic umbrella. There are two significant instances of cooperation and consensus between the diverse feminist groups and the women’s rights activists that occurred. We can point out the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ in 2006, and the 2009 presidential election within the ‘Green Movement.’ In considering this context, both as observer and participant, from an epistemological perspective, I wondered why these coalitions did not continue. Could it have been because of their conflicting ideologies and interests, or could it have been because they could not manage the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8_6

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differences and the dissonance between the diverse groups? Whatever the reason, the coalitions and cooperation among the diverse groups and feminist discourses did not carry on at the same pace. As a result of these questions arising from the brief moments of consensus, I began to investigate the extent to which women’s rights groups and activists in the IRI have been able to address the interests of women. They did this in the past while they were engaging with diverse social groups, to help facilitate the formation of a civil society, as they engaged in deliberative processes to institute necessary reforms. By re-reading Habermas’ work from a critical, and woman-centered approach, this study has provided women’s rights groups and some other social groups with a theoretical foundation to help facilitate reaching a long-term consensus on building a pluralist-deliberative civil society capable of engaging in the processes of democratic reform in Post-revolutionary Iran. Theorizing a pluralist-deliberative public sphere for heterogeneous societies, such as, in Iran, has been the main scholarly and practical contribution of this study. Chapter 2 of this book has theorized a pluralist-deliberative public sphere with reference to deliberative politics. By examining Habermas’ three main concepts, including the public sphere, communicative action, and discourse ethics, the research has clarified the Habermasian model of deliberative engagement in the public sphere. I have argued that both the normative dimension of Habermas’ idea and his concept of ‘bargaining’ is useful to analyze and argue about the ways through which feminist groups can address the interests of women while cooperating with other social groups and actors toward the formation of a deliberative civil society. Bargaining, as a strategic action, includes a negotiated agreement to balance the conflicting interests (Habermas 1996: 166). By applying the Habermasian theoretical framework, in Chap. 3, I have argued that women’s media activism has initiated a proto-deliberative public sphere. In Chap. 4, regarding women’s civil society activism, I have contended that a proto-Habermasian model of deliberation, communication, and cooperation among a multiplicity of publics is moving slowly but constantly. In this chapter, I provided a detailed analysis of the One Million Signatures Campaign arguing that the campaign has been a promising start for promoting cooperation through dialogue within the society. Applying a Habermasian theoretical framework for the analysis of and argument about civil society in Iran allows us to view the Campaign from a new and constructive perspective. This is one of the reasons that I have claimed in the book that the research’s theoretical framework can open up

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a new paradigm and interpretation of women’s activism in Iran. In Chap. 5 on women’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism, I have argued that the deliberative approach and practice of women’s rights groups and activists have displayed the grounds to think that a form of deliberative politics can be fostered in the future in Iran. To clarify this argument, I have provided a detailed analysis of the Green Movement, characterized as a pluralist movement whose key components were women from different social and political backgrounds. Thus, by applying the Habermasian theoretical framework, developed in Chap. 2, throughout the other three chapters (Chaps. 3, 4, and 5), I have tried to demonstrate that the deliberative, non-violent, and inclusive approach of women’s rights activism and movement has facilitated the ground for the formation of a pluralist-deliberative public sphere within the existing non-democratic structure of the system. The Iranian women’s activism in the media, particularly in the women’s press, as an instance, shows how despite the patriarchal system and the controlling policies and censorship in this field, many women have entered this public sphere and challenged the structural and representational forms of injustice. Although women’s activism in the media in IRI can be traced back to a specific group of conformist women, this field has not remained limited to this group. Later, in the mid to late 1990s, a different group of women entered this field. The most important women’s magazine, Zanan, initiated a deliberative engagement with a diverse group of women. Various comprehensive interviews with ordinary women and men within society regarding diverse social issues, including the style of clothing (Poorzand 1995), women’s employment issues, low salary rates, workplace issues, and job chances and choices in Iran (M.  Ahmadi 2016; Hosseinzadeh 2014; Khakzad 1994) are some examples of Iranian feminists’ attempt to deliberatively engage with the society. Furthermore, although the establishers of Zanan magazine are considered as Islamic feminists, the cooperation of this magazine with a secular lawyer, Kar, and some other secular Iranian academics inside and outside Iran are instances of Iranian feminists’ deliberative engagement across boundaries. Later, within this magazine, different roundtables with attendees from very different ideological backgrounds, secular, religious, men, women, show how some Iranian feminists through the press started deliberative engagement across divisions, hoping to balance conflicting interests so that they could reach a common understanding of the situation, women’s needs, justice, and reformations. This common

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understanding of the women’s important demands, justice, and reforms help different social groups and individual actors to move towards reformations in the country, while still allowing each group or person to follow its/his/her interest/aim at the end. The analysis of women’s activism in the media (Chap. 3) in this research has uncovered the gradual development of women’s public activism through the media and the emergence of diverse voices, particularly through women’s press. This form of gradual development of women’s activism in the field of media indicates Iranian women’s communicative approach to their exclusion. The Iranian women’s media activism explained and analyzed in this study has brought the constant deliberative engagement of women and the heterogeneous articulation of the Iranian women’s movement into the light to demonstrate how despite the theocratic context of Iran women have initiated a proto-deliberative public sphere. The diversity of groups that deliberated and worked with each other in a women’s magazine, such as, Zanan, highlights and informs the gradual development of religious tolerance (Habermas 2004) in the context of IRI as well. Although women’s journals have received enough attention in most of the literature on feminism and women in Iran, Chap. 3 on women’s media activism has broadened the existing scholarly analysis by applying a deliberative framework and approach. This deliberative engagement through the media gradually developed into deliberative cooperation among the diverse social groups and individuals through women’s civil society activism (Chap. 4). Despite the restricted policies in support of (independent/not state-supported) women’s NGOs, the establishment of different NGOs by the leading role of women helped diverse groups of women’s rights activists and feminists to develop their deliberative engagement with various (marginalized/vulnerable) social groups, for example, women, children, Afghan child laborers, and so forth. Considering the structure of these NGOs, including the religious and secular, their cross-cultural and cross-ideological approach, and their activities, organizing different workshops, gatherings, and events in collaboration with some other women’s organizations and unions, for example, the Union of Woman Publishers, reveals the capacity of Iranian feminists to develop a deliberative engagement and cooperation with the diverse social groups in the Iranian civil society. Later, from within these women’s NGOs and their collaborations, different pluralist coalitions have emerged. For instance, through the organizing role of a secular NGO, ‘Markaz Farhangi Zanan’ (Women’s Cultural Centre), different groups of

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women and individual social actors gathered, communicated, and formed ‘Jam-e-Hamandishi-e-Zanan,’ (Women’s Thought Consensus), which is considered as one of the first pluralist coalitions within the women’s movement. Despite their different ideological backgrounds, and the occasional disagreements on tactics of movement, such as, whether to have a public gathering or not, somehow the conflicting interests did not break off communication among the women’s groups, the feminists, and the activists. Rather, some women’s rights groups and actors shifted to strategic action, including a negotiated agreement that was able to balance the conflicts and dissonances and supply a more favorable arrangement for all to follow their aims (Habermas 1996). This form of negotiated compromise does not generate an ideal inclusive consensus. Instead, it provides the involved groups and individuals a ground for a better agreement and furnishes an arrangement that excludes those who are not willing to cooperate. The deliberative engagement and cooperation through civil society activism flourished with the birth of the ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’ within which women’s rights activists and groups significantly developed their discussions on women’s rights issues and their engagement with the body of the society through face-to-face interactions and door-to-door signature collecting. Additionally, the campaign gave a boost to women’s deliberative cooperation and pluralist coalition by bringing together diverse groups of women, feminists, social activists, reformists, including religious, secular, men and women from diverse social, ideological backgrounds and generations, under a common strategic umbrella. The deliberation among diverse involved groups, and individuals in the campaign resulted in three main documents—a statement that is considered as evidence of a negotiated agreement on their main goals and methods toward achieving legal change and reform. The research analysis of the Iranian women’s civil society activism (Chap. 4) has argued that in spite of the suppressive policies, the social activists have not left the space of public activism toward equality, justice, and reform. Instead, political pressures motivated the social groups and activists, particularly the women, to promote more cooperation through concentrating on their commonalities and shared interests. Despite the periodic disputes and debates, the women’s rights activists and feminists have never tried to suppress their disagreements and differences. Instead, they procedurally learned to manage the conflicts and make lines for communication and to work to form better agreements than no agreement whatsoever, to enable all of the participants to follow their aims.

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The deliberative cooperation and the formation of the pluralist-­ deliberative consensus based on strategic action among the feminists and women’s rights activists and other social groups has significantly emerged through women’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism (Chap. 5). The women’s coalitions during the different presidential elections aiming to raise women’s demands and push for reforms in favor of civil rights, justice and equality are some good examples of the deliberative-pluralist consensus through the women’s parliamentary, extra-parliamentary activism. Through the presidential elections, a group of women entered the field of politics, shifted dialogues, and promoted a non-violent, communicative, and cross-ideological/ethnic/political approach in the male-­ dominated political atmosphere of Iran. Through adopting a non-violent, deliberative and inclusive approach, the Iranian women’s movement has entered the field of politics, and gradually, become a model for other social movements, or somehow become the heart of the Iranian democratic movement. Another good example is the women’s campaign in 2015 aiming to change the male face of the parliament by sending more woman MPs who represent the discourse of women’s rights and reformations. Although the participants within these coalitions and the campaign were from very different social-political and ideological backgrounds, they accepted working together under a negotiated agreement since this form of agreement was better than no agreement whatsoever and doing so provided all with more favorable conditions to follow their aim at the end (Habermas 1996). By analyzing Iranian women’s parliamentary/extra-parliamentary activism (Chap. 5), this study reveals how the paradoxical combination of ‘Republican’ and ‘Islamic’ features of the political system in Iran has left opportunities for different social groups, including women, to enter the public sphere of politics, affect the decision-making processes, shift dialogues, and challenge the dominant discourses. I have argued that in response to the state exclusion of women from the politics, women have not left this sphere and have not broken off the lines of communication; instead, they spotted the blind spots (gaps) and shifted to strategic actions and negotiated compromises. Additionally, it has been insisted that these examples of women’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism have highlighted that, in Iran, the communication processes flow through both the parliament bodies (at times) and the informal networks of the public sphere (Habermas 1994: 8).

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However, considering the contextual specificities of the society of Iran, as a heterogeneous society with a non-democratic/authoritarian system, it would be problematic to neatly apply Habermas’ work to analyze and argue about the public sphere in Iran. Habermas considers that a single comprehensive public sphere cannot be compatible with the pluralist nature of heterogeneous societies. Addressing this issue, I have applied the concept of ‘counterpublics’ to highlight the important existence of diverse publics in a heterogeneous society, such as, in Iran. Different subordinated groups in a stratified society invent diverse publics to enable them to deliberate about their common issues. In Chap. 4, I have argued that within the present society of Iran there are a multiplicity of counterpublics invented by different (marginalized) social groups and actors. This encompasses a broad scope, from NGOs that publically/underground represent the voice of children or women, and women’s rights and human rights’ campaigns, to informal yet regular gatherings of LGBT persons in a particular café in Tehran and the gathering of young artists in an art gallery for performances about violence against women; from formal labor unions and oppositional political gatherings to informal community gatherings and intellectual circles. They are considered counterpublics in the society of Iran since some social groups and social actors, whose voices are ignored or overlooked, come together, discuss their issues, criticize structural, political, and representational injustices, and accordingly, challenge the existing theocratic system. I consider these gatherings, groups, unions, and so forth, as counterpublics since they serve as critical oppositional forces within the society of Iran that pose a different—oppositional—interpretation of their demands, needs, interests, and identities (Fraser 1990: 67, 1997: 81). This means that the study rejects any form of homogeneity and asserts that there is diversity within these counterpublics, and individuals come together as a counterpublic because they have certain common concerns and share some social-political issues. Alongside the concept of ‘counterpublic,’ I used the term ‘cyber-­ counterpublics’ to identify those counterpublics that are invented in cyberspace. Considering the contextual specificities in Iran, I have applied this term to acknowledge the existence of multiple publics in cyberspace that act as oppositional and critical forces within the actual society of Iran. The securitized atmosphere that gets worse in some specific political periods could not/cannot stop social groups, including women, struggling for justice and equality; rather, they have formed counrterpublics in

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cyberspace that are less able to be policed than meetings and gatherings on streets and in other public places in autocratic Iran. The best examples of these cyber-counterpublics are the different feminist websites and pages, such as, a feminist school, or various websites and pages and blogs that represent the rights of religious and gender minorities in Iran. On these pages and websites, social actors with diverse social-political and ideological backgrounds communicate about their issues and at times, they organize demonstrations and events in various locations to publically and in the actual everyday world challenge inequalities and injustices. The existence of these cyber-counterpublics is important to me since it demonstrates that the suspension of hierarchies and differences is not necessary for deliberations as Habermas claims. Instead, reciprocal understanding, mutual respect, and shared interpretation/ knowledge of the situation are required. The emancipatory nature of these counterpublics relies on their dual function within the diversity of society, including their internal and external functions. For instance, a feminist counterpublic has an internal function, which is re-groupment and gathering a gender-specific identity based on a common concern or shared knowledge among women, and simultaneously, an external function, which aims to address society as a whole and challenge the structures of authority by working as a training ground. A good example is the Iranian NGO, Women’s Cultural Centre, wherein diverse women gathered together, those who have common concerns relating to their rights in Iran under Women’ Thought Consensus. On the one hand, this NGO acted as a space of regroupment and provided a space for a group of women to communicate and deliberate about their issues, to propose an oppositional interpretation of their needs and interests, and in general, to raise their voices about their concerns that have always been ignored by the system. On the other hand, through organizing different workshops and seminars, this feminist counterpublic serve as a training ground for activities directed toward the wider public (Fraser 1990, 1997). In Chap. 4 of the book, I argue that these counterpublics can facilitate the formation of a Habermasian deliberative-pluralist public sphere since they address inequalities as topics for deliberation aiming to do justice, and there is an interactive relationship among them. For instance, discrimination against an Afghan Sunni woman who lives in Iran, has a child, and is financially underprivileged is a common concern among counterpublics that represent the voices of migrants, religious minorities, women, and children. For this reason, in the present society of Iran, we can see

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interactive relations among NGOs and communities as an instance that aims to address different forms of injustices (Personal Communications, Interviews, and Observations, summer 2016, Iran). From this point of view, counterpublics are different groups that represent different discourses and address various forms of inequalities as topics for deliberation within the broader society. The study has argued that if we understand counterpublics/cyber-counterpublics in this way, there would be no need for the suspension of differences. Instead, ‘difference’ is considered as a resource for discussion, cooperation, and understanding to do justice. In this sense, counterpublics/cyber-counterpublics can represent different discourses, including the discourse of women’s rights, the discourse of human rights, the discourse of children’s rights, the discourse of LGBT rights, the discourse of empowerment, and so forth, since what they have in common is the aim to cooperate and struggle against different forms of injustice, inequality, and exclusion in society. Hence, this study contends that counterpublics may address the structures of subordination (structural injustice/exclusion); some of them may target political practices that ignore/overlook the issue of some social groups (political injustice/exclusion); and some of these counterpublics may address the distinct narratives that result in violence against some social groups (representational injustice/exclusion). Since different forms of exclusions, including structural, political, and representational, interact with each other (Crenshaw 1993: 114–117), counterpublics that are formed against injustice/exclusion in a society are also required to interact with each other if they aim to target injustice in different aspects and do justice at the end. Nevertheless, considering the authoritarian and non-democratic context of Iran within which repressive policies are applied against emancipatory social activities, the questions arises as: how can counterpublics interact with each other to address the various injustices within this context? What will the function of these counterpublics be in such non-­ democratic structures? Will the function of the counterpublics be limited merely to the spaces of regroupment, the formation of a kind of collective identity, and to internal-communication and deliberation? How can it have an external function to challenge the structures of authority? Regarding this matter, I have argued that the external function of these counterpublics is not necessarily through explicit political actions. Instead, counterpublics can address the dominant public and the oppressive structures of authority either through apparently political activities or prefiguratively via political activities. For example, as it has been possible, a group

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of (feminist/reformist) women have entered the parliament or have formed a campaign, such as, the One Million Signatures protest march, to target the patriarchal legal system through an explicit political-legal activity. However, under a securitized atmosphere, particularly between 2005 and 2009, the domination of the populist-fundamentalist administration of Ahmadinejad, the women adopted a prefigurative approach, extended their activism in NGOs and communities, and so on and accordingly developed a network of counterpublics both in the actual and in the virtual context without apparently posing their opposition and critiques of the dominant theocratic public. Through this approach, the women were following a future ideal society (different from the existing one) based on a belief in the importance of civil society in advancing equality, instead of focusing on short-term outcomes, for example, changing the discriminatory laws within a specific determined period. I contend that adopting this approach demonstrates how women’s rights activists and feminists within Iranian society have changed their mode of activism according to the contextual specificities of each particular period. This means that the Iranian women’s rights activists and feminists have followed a strategic and tactical flexibility regarding their public activism in a theocratic system instead of easily leaving the public sphere while facing state repression. In other words, Iranian activists and feminists follow a kind of pre-figurative politics by articulating new spaces for activism within the existing structures and shifting their activism to different sectors (Holloway 2010; van de Sande 2013). The term ‘prefigurative political activities,’ applied in this study, covers a wide range of activities and struggles that are not apparently political, yet, on a long-term basis, they address the existing political and social structures aiming to form an ideal—read different—society. According to this definition, for instance, empowerment programs that are offered by some NGOs in Iran, such as, training workshops and different classes for increasing literacy and awareness, can also be considered as prefigurative political activities. Participants, who are mainly from marginalized social groups, gradually become empowered through the recognition of their rights and capacities, and then, they will start addressing the dominant public and question the system and its discriminatory structure. Probably, for this reason, at times NGOs have difficulties with the security forces of the IRI even regarding the organization of educational workshops, particularly the workshops on the legal rights of women (Interviewee 02, 10 October 2016, Iran; Interviewee 03, 10 October 2016, Iran; Interviewee

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04, 08 October 2016, Iran; Interviewee 07 21 January 2017, imo, New Zealand; Personal Observations and Communications, July–October 2016, Iran). All in all, the study argues that adopting a prefigurative approach can help social groups to articulate a new space within the existing structures by developing a network of cyber-counterpublics and counterpublics to call out for justice and reformation deliberatively. By applying these conceptions of counter-public and pre-figurative politics, throughout the work, I have argued that in the current society of Iran, there are multiple parallel publics with various modes of activism in different civil society areas that facilitate the ground for communication to develop through a net of different forms of associations and gatherings. I have argued that when some of the press or women’s NGOs are shut down by the system, and when activists are arrested within the non-­ democratic context of Iran, under what is at times a severe securitized atmosphere, it can make problems and obstacles for women’s rights activism and movement, but these restrictions cannot stop the movement. Women’s activism cannot be easily stopped since at the same time, there are some other groups, acting in the form of counterpublic/cyber-­ counterpublic in other civil society fields that are moving forward with a different mode of activism. From this point of view, women’s civil society activism functions like cracks on the existing surface that tend to gradually extend and at the end, delegitimize the dominant oppressive power. This is a procedural model for the formation of a critical civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes towards reform in the country, not a project focused on short-term outcomes, but rather a deliberative public sphere as a proceduralist paradigm with a focus on communication. However, the non-secular and religious society of Iran is another contextual nuance that must be considered regarding the implementation of a Habermasian inspired model of the public sphere in this country. In Chap. 2, I argued that Habermas’ work could not neatly be applied to a religious/non-secular context due to the secular bias inherent in his theory of discourse ethics and deliberative politics. Regarding this matter, this study has used two recent Habermasian concepts, ‘religious tolerance’ and the ‘complementary learning process’ alongside asserting the importance of re-fashioning the religious and the secular according to socio-political specificities in each particular historical context. The study contends that religious tolerance, a complementary learning process, and the refashioning/re-defining of the religious and the secular are required to provide suitable grounds for the communicative arrangement between the

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religious and the secular to facilitate the formation of a Habermasian deliberative-pluralist civil society in a non-secular context. The Habermasian concepts of ‘religious tolerance’ and ‘complementary learning processes’ (Habermas 2004, 2006a, b, 2008, 2009) are detected in different women’s deliberative engagements, cooperation, and coalitions. A good example is the women’s coalition to speak up against the new family bill (2007–2008) (Chap. 5) within which diverse groups of women’s rights activists and feminists, involved in three fields of media/ press, civil society, and parliamentary/extra-parliamentary activism, work together under a common strategic umbrella. Those who were involved in this coalition and cooperation, religious and secular/non-religious, were able to exercise mutual (religious) toleration across divisions and boundaries as citizens of the same political community (Habermas 2004). Different groups and individuals, including those who are religious and those who are secular, women and men, ordinary citizens, activists, elites, and politicians and so on, could work together and form the coalition with the leading role of women. For this reason, it is claimed that through the coalition against the family bill, those who were active in political parties and groups, accepted that they are learning from the women’s movement (Ahmadi-­ Khorasani 2013: 292). I also argue that such a pluralist coalition displays the exercise of mutual toleration and a complementary learning process among the diverse social groups. Later, religious tolerance and the complementary learning process emerged more significantly within the women’s movement coalition during the 2009 presidential election and resulted in the Green Movement—a movement against the allegedly fraudulent result of the election (Chap. 5). The deliberative-pluralist coalition of the Iranian women’s movement in the 2009 election not only showed how Habermasian religious toleration and the complementary learning process are relevant in the context of Iran it also displayed a great instance of a pluralist coalition based on a compromised agreement, as a strategic action. I have asserted that despite the differences and the existence of a revolutionary, ideological, and patriarchal system, the Green Movement, as an example, illustrates how the majority of people within Iranian society have started practicing (religious) tolerance, the complementary learning process, and a form of deliberative politics. The study argues that women’s coalitions can and could promote the Iranian women’s movement’s communicative, non-violent, and cross-­ ideological/political approach in the society to the extent that this

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movement became a model for other Iranian social movements and is located at the heart of democratic movement. Additionally, regarding the cultivation of (religious) toleration and the learning process, based on the fieldwork, Chap. 4 of the study demonstrates the important role of NGOs, and the women’s spontaneous activities within communities, associations, art galleries, cafes, bookshops, and so forth in society in Iran. Women’s spontaneous public activities within the present society of Iran have received the least attention in the literature despite their crucial role in promoting a culture of dialogue, and tolerance in society. Regarding the practice of religious tolerance within the women’s rights movement, Shahla Sherkat, the Islamic feminists and editor of Zanan magazine, says: “we should tolerate and respect each other’s convictions. Even though we do not share the same philosophy, belief and thought, we can and should work together” (Rostami-Povey 2012: 29). This quote alongside different examples of deliberations and cooperation among religious/conformist and secular/non-conformist groups and activists, explained throughout the study, implies that many women’s rights activists follow a form of Habermasian communicative approach and a complementary learning process that is not simply learning from each other. Rather, they follow a process of cooperative translation—adapting a general language and translating ideas into this general language that is accessible to people of other faiths aiming to communicatively reach understanding, to reach a shared interpretation of issues and concerns, and to reach a negotiated compromise and deliberative cooperation. All in all, the aim of this study has been to investigate to which extent Iranian women’s rights groups and activists are able to address the interests of women while engaging with other social groups to facilitate the formation of a civil society capable of engaging in deliberative processes towards reform in the country. The present study theorizes a Habermasian model of an intersectional deliberative-pluralist public sphere that aims to be applied to non-secular, non-democratic, and heterogeneous contexts, such as in Iran. The deliberative civil society in this Habermasian framework does not require the elimination of conflicts or the suspension of differences. This pluralist-deliberative idea of the public sphere emphasizes the productive aspect of conflicts and the importance of bargaining, as a negotiated compromise, about a consensus on the (contested) norms of civic conduct and interaction. From the pluralist-deliberative approach to the public sphere, there is not only one official public, but there are also

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different counterpublics/cyber-counterpublics within which the negotiation and deliberation among the participants with diverse perspectives can exist. Furthermore, since the theory does not require an ideal full inclusive consensus; instead, the consensus is among those religious, non-religious, or secular participants who are willing to cooperate based on reciprocity, forbearance, mutual toleration, and a complementary learning process since this compromise will provide the conditions for all of them to follow their goals. The normative dimensions of this revised Habermasian approach provide the conditions for moral respect and reciprocity upon which the subject who is situated within a particular context—a situated self—can select her or his actions, join others in the public sphere, and co-­ operate and interact with others while exercising moral autonomy and self-reflexivity. In the meantime, the re-definition of the secular and conceptual changes based on a historicized approach will provide more appropriate grounds for the religious and the secular to interact with one another in a specific religious context. Throughout the three chapters that analyze the Iranian women’s media activism (see Chap. 3), the civil society activism (Chap. 4), and the parliamentary/extra-parliamentary activism (see Chap. 5), this study shows how a pluralist-deliberative theoretical framework of the public sphere can be relevant to the theocratic, revolutionary Iran. I asserted that despite a rapidly deteriorating political climate that negatively affected a substantial trust in NGOs sector, and between social groups and individuals, a proto-­ Habermasian model of deliberation, communication, and cooperation among a multiplicity of those in the public is moving constantly, even if it is slow and gradual. By considering women’s activism in different spaces, including in cyber-space, and the formation of multiple counterpublics, this research claims that in the present society of Iran, public conversation is developing through an interlocking net of different forms of associations, formal/informal gatherings, networks, communities, and organizations that are essential for the formation of a deliberative democracy. Through changing the modes of activism according to the contextual specificities and by following a pre-figurative politics, women have remained active in the civil society, they have addressed the different forms of discrimination and injustices, and they have targeted the existing social and political structures. Through three analytical chapters on Iranian women’s activism, this study explains how, despite the revolutionary theocratic system, women’s activism has emerged and gradually developed in

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the public sphere of Iran. The explanation and analysis of women’s activism displays the involvement of diverse groups and individuals in the present women’s rights activism and movement in Iran to the extent that we cannot simply draw a clear border between those actors who are involved, in terms of being religious or secular. This study clarifies the diversity within the women’s rights movement and shows how despite this diversity, women have initiated and promoted a communicative, non-violent, and deliberative approach in both the social and political sphere of Iran. Through explaining the formation of different women’s coalitions, the building of consensus, and promoting campaigns with the participation of diverse groups and individuals, this study demonstrates the potential of the Iranian women’s movement to facilitate the formation of a pluralist civil society capable of engaging in the deliberative processes that lead to reforms in the IRI that have been already brought into action. However, at the time of writing this conclusion, Iran is undergoing an economic, political, and social crisis and under the international pressures this situation has worsened amidst the securitized atmosphere in the country. There is no doubt that the securitized atmosphere negatively affects the function of Iranian social movements wherein people have to struggle to achieve their basic human rights, that of equality, justice, and democracy. This study acknowledges that the existing securitized atmosphere and the repressive state policies can decrease the speed of development of this pluralist-deliberative movement initiated by the women’s activism. Nevertheless, the repressive policies cannot permanently stop the activities of civil society. The women’s rights movement rooted in the society and would keep moving forward slowly to pursue their feminist goals and challenge the status quo. Through changing the strategies and modes of activism according to the contextual specificities of each particular period, the deliberative-pluralist movement, encompassing diverse social groups, would keep moving slowly and make cracks on the existing surface that tend to extend and at the end, invalidate the dominant power. That’s why the Habermasian model of the research’ theoretical framework is valid for the analysis of and normative argument about the Iranian civil society and social movements. I would claim that the pluralist-deliberative public sphere, presented in this study, has created a new paradigm for future studies on the analysis and critique of Iranian social movements, in particular, the women’s movement. Furthermore, the study’s pluralist-­ deliberative theoretical framework has opened the way for future studies on the forms of the conceptualization of ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ in

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a particular historical context, possibly similar to Iran and the re-­fashioning of these concepts in a way that will promote and expand the deliberations and dialogues in both society in general and in political institutions among powerful elites.

References Ahmadi, M. (2016). Gozareshi az kargah-e najjaree-e Mandani: ma najjarim na khanoom mohandes [A Report of Mandani Carpentry Workshop: We Are Carpenter Not Engineer]. Zanan-e Emrouz, 3(19), 11–13. Ahmadi-Khorasani, N. (2013). Bahar-e-Jonbesh-e Zanan [The Spring of Iranian Women’s Movement]. Tehran: Moalef. Crenshaw, K. (1993). Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and Live Crew. In K. W. C. Mari, J. Matsuda, C. R. Lawrence III, & R. Delgado (Eds.), Words That Wound (pp. 111–132). Westview Press. Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. Duke University Press, 25/26, 56–80. Fraser, N. (1997). Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition. Routledge. Habermas, J. (1994). Three Normative Models of Democracy. Constellations, I(I), 1–10. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2004). Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights. Philosophy, 79(01), 5–18. Habermas, J. (2006a). On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion. In H. de Vries & L.  E. Sullivan (Eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (pp. 251–261). Fordham University Press. Habermas, J. (2006b). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1), 1–26. Habermas, J. (2008). Between Naturalism and Religion. Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2009). What is Meant by a “Post-Secular Society”?A Discussion on Islam in Europe. In T. C. C. Habermas & Jürgen (Eds.), Europe: The Faltering Project (pp. 59–77). Polity Press. Holloway, J. (2010). Crack Capitalism. Pluto Press. Hosseinzadeh, M. (2014). Zanan-e motekhases dar damparvari: az in entekhab khoshhalim [Female Specialists in Animal Husbandry: We Are Happy About Our Decision]. Zanan-e Emrouz, 1(1), 8–13. Khakzad, A. (1994). Chera zanan monshi-e matab mishavand? [Why Do Women Become Secretary of Doctor Offices?]. Zanan, 3(20), 2–11.

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Mojab, S. (1995). Islamic Feminism: Alternative or Contradiction. Fireweed:A Feminist Quarterly of Writing, Politics, Art and Culture, 47, 18–25. Mojab, S. (2001). Theorizing the Politics of’Islamic Feminism’. Feminist Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141778011007015. Najmabadi, A. (1998). Feminism in an Islamic Republic: Yeras of Hardship, Years of Growth. In J. L. E. Y. Y. Haddad (Ed.), Islam, Gender, and Social Change (pp. 59–85). Oxford University Press. Poorzand, L. (1995). Khanoom, chera seeyah mipoosheed? [Why Do You Wear Black, Ladies?]. Zanan, 3(22), 4–17. Rostami-Povey, E. (2012). The Women’s Movement in its Historical Context. In E.  Rostami-Povey (Ed.), Women, Power, and Politics in 21st Century Iran (pp. 17–35). Routledge. Shahidian, H. (2002). Women in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women’s Movement. London: Greenwood Press. Van de Sande, M. (2013). The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square-An Alternative Perspective on the 2011 Revolutions. Res Publica, 19(3), 223–239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-­013-­9215-­9.

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 22 Khordad gathering (June 2005), women, 111, 112 2000 Berlin Conference, 85, 108 2009 presidential election, 3, 148, 153, 154, 157, 161, 163, 171, 182 A Activism parliamentary (extraparliamentary, media, civil society), 90–94, 105–131, 135–165 women (public, deliberative), 4–11, 13–26, 59, 63–65, 68, 69, 76, 85, 86, 88–91, 93–96, 105–108, 110, 113, 115–120, 123, 124, 127–131, 135–137, 142–148, 150, 163–165, 172–176, 180–182, 184, 185

Afghanistan, 121 Ahmadi-Khorasani, Nooshin (2010, 2013), 2, 2n4, 5, 21, 48n5, 79, 81, 82, 85, 93, 94, 106–118, 109n1, 120, 128, 137, 140, 141, 143–145, 148, 153–155, 182 Andisheh Cultural Centre, 108 Asad, Talal, 35, 51, 54, 54n7, 164 Association for the Protection of Children’s Rights, 107 The Association of Iranian Women Journalists, 110 B Bargaining (compromise, negotiation/negotiative), 39, 40, 42, 55, 56, 58, 69, 72, 74, 77, 124, 125, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 154, 162, 172, 183

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ghoreishi, Women’s Activism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70232-8

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INDEX

Barlow, Rebecca, 2, 2n4, 5, 14, 15, 112, 114–117 Bayat, Asef, v, vii, 5, 6, 14, 16, 54, 55, 131, 143, 164, 165 Behzisti (State Welfare Organization), 87, 124–126 Benhabib, Seyla, 43, 45, 123, 131 C ‘The campaign of Changing the Male Face of the Parliament,’ 145 Campaigns, women, 3, 5, 23, 24, 46n4, 47, 115, 143, 148, 155–157, 164, 177, 185 ‘The Centre of Young New-Thinkers of Civil Society,’ 110 Change for Equality (women activism, cyberspace), 2n4, 116, 118, 127 Civil society, 4–8, 6n8, 11, 13–24, 35, 36, 39–40, 48–50, 52, 55–59, 63, 78, 81, 84, 86, 93, 95, 96, 105–108, 110, 117, 119–121, 123, 127, 130, 135, 136, 142–144, 146, 148, 152, 155, 157, 162, 163, 172, 174, 175, 180–185 Coalitions pluralism, 3, 110, 112, 127, 142–146, 162–165, 171, 172, 174–176, 182, 185 women movement, 112, 155, 161–163; groups against the family bill, 143 Commission for Families, 139 Communicative action, 35, 36, 38–40, 56, 63, 71, 74, 84, 95, 172 Complementary learning process, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 123, 130, 145, 155, 164, 181–184 Consensus, 3, 4, 8, 15, 18, 20, 39, 40, 43, 58, 63, 84, 106, 111, 112,

117, 118, 135, 136, 143, 145, 152, 155, 158, 162, 164, 165, 171, 172, 175, 176, 183–185 Council (city, local), 75, 88, 142–144, 146, 147, 150, 160 Counterpublic, public sphere, 44, 45 Cyber-counterpublics, 25, 26, 45–47, 46n4, 50, 56, 58, 128, 131, 177, 179, 181, 184 D Deliberative civil society, 13, 23, 35, 40, 49, 50, 57, 123, 136, 142, 172, 183 E Engagement, deliberative, vii, 22, 36, 47, 50, 56–58, 63–65, 69–72, 76, 77, 84, 87, 89, 95, 105, 110, 112, 119, 135, 136, 149, 172–175 F Feminists (secular, Islamic), 2, 2n3, 3, 7, 9, 10, 14–16, 24, 48, 71, 73, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84–86, 89, 94, 106, 108–111, 115, 117–120, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 153, 154, 157, 158, 161, 163, 171, 173–176, 180, 182, 183 Fraser, Nancy, 35, 43–45, 47, 48, 105, 110, 123, 130, 135, 140, 177, 178 G Green Movement, 3

 INDEX 

H Habermas, Jurgen, 6, 17–19, 35–59, 37n1, 39n2, 63, 65, 75n5, 76, 80, 84, 95, 105, 110, 118, 123, 130, 144, 145, 149, 163, 165, 172, 174–178, 181, 182 Holloway, John, 47, 119, 180 I Inclusion, 37, 38, 40, 41, 58 Interaction (communicative, cooperation), 20, 42, 47, 58, 116, 118, 164, 165, 183 K Khatami, Mohammad, 18, 66, 67, 78, 148, 154, 155n4, 160 Koolaee, Elaheh (2012), 140–143, 141n2, 142n3 Kurdistan, Sanandaj, 111 L Labour syndicate, 123 LGBT (rights, groups), 24, 49, 121, 126, 127, 177, 179 M Mehr Affarin Charity Organization, 88 Method of the crack, 46, 119 Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG), 65, 66 Ministry of Health, 125 Minorities (ethnic, religious), 3, 4, 8, 14, 24, 139, 151, 153, 154, 157, 178 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, 7, 14, 64, 68, 69, 69n1 Moghadam, Valentine, v, vii, 5, 6, 9–11, 14–16

191

Movement, Dovvom-Khordad (Second Khordad), 3, 4, 24, 51, 78, 82–87, 136–142, 148–163, 171, 173, 182 Municipality, 125 Mutual recognition, 37 Mutual toleration, 51, 58, 144, 155, 165, 182, 184 N Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 12, 13, 19, 20, 25, 47, 51n6, 87, 95, 96, 105–111, 119–127, 120n2, 121n3, 129–131, 135, 137, 142, 151, 171, 174, 177, 179–181, 183, 184 O Office for the Consolidation of Unity, 145 One Million Signatures Campaign, 2, 4, 24, 86, 93, 105, 109n1, 112–120, 131, 152, 153, 158, 171, 172, 175 P Population against Environmental Pollution, 107 Post-secularism, 50–52 Prefigurative, politics, 46, 47, 87, 119, 124, 128, 131, 180, 181 Public sphere (pluralist, deliberative), 5–7, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 26, 35–37, 42–44, 47, 48, 50–52, 56–59, 63, 64, 77, 78, 88–90, 95, 105, 110, 116, 119, 125, 135, 136, 140–142, 150, 152, 162–165, 172–174, 176–178, 180, 181, 183–185

192 

INDEX

R Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 1–2 Redefinition of secularism, 53, 55 Roshdeeye Educational and Research Institute, 110 S Shabake (women network, cyberspace), 123 Sherkat, Shahla, 66, 72–74, 77, 80, 85, 87, 138, 183 Shoraye Negahban (The Guardian Council), Iran judiciary, 142 Sistan and Baluchistan province, Iran, 121, 121n4 Solidarity, women diversity, 2–4, 45, 113, 116, 161 U ‘The union of women publishers,’ 77, 79, 108 W Women’s Commission, 138, 139, 141 Women’s Cultural Center, NGO, 108, 110

Women’s Faction of the Parliament, 141 Women’s Independent Centre, 110 Women’s rights, 1–8, 12–17, 20, 22–24, 35, 46, 48, 48n5, 49, 54, 63, 64, 69, 69n1, 71, 72, 74–79, 81–87, 89, 93–95, 106–108, 110–112, 114–120, 122–125, 127–131, 135–147, 149, 150, 152–158, 161–163, 171–177, 179–183, 185 Women’s Thought Consensus, NGO, 109–110, 112, 113, 175 Z Zanan (women’s magazine), 7, 10, 12, 23, 24, 64, 66, 69–90, 92, 93, 95, 108–110, 120, 137, 138, 143, 147, 150, 153, 173–175, 183 Zanan-e-Emrouz (women’s magazine), 24, 64, 93, 147