William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt: Comparative Starting Points and Triggering of Insurgencies 0367623595, 9780367623593

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WILLIAM THE SILENT AND THE DUTCH REVOLT COMPARATIVE STARTING POINTS AND TRIGGERING OF INSURGENCIES Nick Ridley

William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt

William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt examines the first stages of the Dutch struggle against Spanish rule during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The book analyses the causes of growing discontent in the Neth­ erlands and the various stages of the revolt, focusing on the key tipping points where discontent and violent upheaval escalated to become a national struggle for independence. The book also provides comparative analyses of insurgencies in the modern era and examines how popular discontent throughout history has often developed into struggles for full independ­ ence. The book is a key resource for scholars and students of early modern European history, as well as those interested in the history of revolts. Nick Ridley is a Visiting Lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University. He formerly worked as an intelligence analyst at the UK Metropolitan Police and at Europol. He has taught international relations and antiterrorist stud­ ies at several European universities and lectured on antiterrorist courses at the NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism.

Routledge Research in Early Modern History

The Scramble for Italy Continuity and Change in the Italian Wars, 1494–1559 Idan Sherer Artistic and Political Patronage in Early Stuart England The Career of William Herbert, Third Earl of Pembroke, 1580–1630 Brian O’Farrell Bringing the People Back In State Building from Below in the Nordic Countries ca. 1500–1800 Edited by Knut Dørum, Mats Hallenberg and Kimmo Katajala Negotiating Exclusion in Early Modern England, 1550–1800 Edited by Naomi Pullin and Kathryn Woods Islamic Thought through Protestant Eyes Mehmet Karabela The Execution of Admiral John Byng as a Microhistory of Eighteenth-Century Britain Joseph J. Krulder Diplomatic Cultures at the Ottoman Court, c.1500–1630 Edited by Tracey A. Sowerby and Christopher Markiewicz William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt Comparative Starting Points and Triggering of Insurgencies Nick Ridley

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William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt Comparative Starting Points and Triggering of Insurgencies Nick Ridley

First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Nick Ridley The right of Nick Ridley to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ridley, Nicholas, author. Title: William the Silent and the Dutch revolt : comparative starting points and triggering of insurgencies / Nick Ridley. Description: First edition. | New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge research in early modern history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021001221 (print) | LCCN 2021001222 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367623593 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003109082 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: William I, Prince of Orange, 1533–1584. | Netherlands—History—Eighty Years’ War, 1568–1648. | Insurgency—History. | Netherlands—History—Autonomy and independence movements. | Netherlands—Kings and rulers—Biography. Classification: LCC DH188.W7 R53 2021 (print) | LCC DH188.W7 (ebook) | DDC 949.2/03—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001221 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001222 ISBN: 978-0-367-62359-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-62361-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10908-2 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra

‘An enthralling historical account of a successful revolt against a powerful empire, and then trenchant analysis of how revolts and insurgencies are triggered which reveals important lessons learned for those studying and fighting insurgency and terrorism’. Patrick Sookhdeo, Honorary Professor and Research Associate in the Department of Religion Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa. ‘Extremely valuable reading for all students studying terrorism, insurgency and international affairs’. Juul Gooren, Senior Lecturer, The Hague University of Applied Social Sciences, The Netherlands.

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group http://taylora ndfra ncis.com

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction

ix 1

PART I

The Netherlands and the Empire 1 Charles V and Philip II

3 5

PART II

William the Silent and the Revolt

17

2 Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt

19

3 Alva

31

4 Diplomatic glove covers military fist – but neither have finances

44

5 Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

55

6 Unscrupulous audacity of a condottiere with the wily patience of a Jesuit

82

7 “Ayez pitie de ce pauvre peuple”

91

8 Aftermath

102

PART III

Other Revolts and Insurgencies

115

9 Late twentieth- and twenty-first-century insurgencies

117

viii Contents PART IV

William the Silent and the forging of a nation

171

10 Revolt becomes a national insurgency

173

11 William the Silent – summary and achievement

180

Appendix I: The financial state of Spain Appendix II: Requesens, the diplomat and his attempts at reconciliation Bibliography and works consulted Index

189 193 195 199

Acknowledgements 

The author has taken guidance from the works of historians mentioned in the Introduction. However, the author, as with his previous works on the Dutch Revolt, is particularly grateful for, and acknowledges the works and guidance of, the specialist in early modern Dutch history, Professor Martin Prak of the University of Utrecht and of the modern doyenne of the Dutch Revolt, Professor Judith Pollman of the University of Leiden. The author wishes to thank the staff of the Netherlands National Library in The Hague and the Netherlands National Archives in The Hague for their assistance, valuable assistance which was given with unfailing cour­ tesy, friendliness, and efficiency. Most importantly, and as with his previous books, the author owes a large debt of gratitude for the translations, for the preliminary proof read­ ings, and for the advice, constant support, and patience of Ingrid.

Introduction 

This book has a twofold purpose. First, it is an account of William the Silent leading the Dutch Republic. Second, it makes comparisons and anal­ yses of the starting points and the triggering of nationalist insurgences. The principal subject of the book, William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, was a remarkable individual during a period of intense struggle in which a remarkable people finally gained their full independence. The struggle for independence lasted for over three generations and is known to history as the Eighty Years’ War. At its end, the Dutch Republic was officially ac­ knowledged as a sovereign and independent nation state by Spain, which, although declining, was still an empire. The seven northern provinces of the Spanish Netherlands had successfully revolted and had won their in­ dependence from one of the greatest European powers of the era. As part of this struggle, William led the initial period of the Revolt, and, by his tenacity, determination, political skills, and conciliatory nature, he forged a nation. This nation, encompassing the seven northern provinces of the sixteenth-century Netherlands, was to survive the attempts of Spain and her empire to quell the independence struggle. The Dutch Republic rose, and in the following century Dutch become a significant European power. There has been and is much scholarship by eminent historians of this period and of the long event of the Dutch struggle. Some historians have designated it the “Eighty Years’ War”. The author has drawn upon, taken guidance from, and is grateful for the works of these eminent scholars and historians, the works of C.V. Wedgwood and of Peiter Geyl, as well as those of the more modern works of Geoffrey Parker and his extensive scholarship on Spain, on Europe, and on the Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth century, the extensive works of Professor Martin Rady and his specialist works on the Hapsburgs, and the monumental works of Jonathan Israel and those of Arnaud van Cruyningen, of Theo van Deusen, of Professor Martin Prak of the University of Utrecht, and of Professor Judith Pollman of the University of Leiden. My previous books, Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt: Comparative Insurgences, and Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Republic – Comparative Insurgencies, took the Revolt from

2

Introduction

the crisis point for the Dutch of the assassination of William the Silent to the point in 1648 when the Dutch Republic emerged, fully independent and a major European power. This book, William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Starting Points and Triggering Insurgencies, may be regarded as a companion volume and part of a trilogy with the other two books, or as a stand-alone work in its own right depending upon reader preference. Also this book differs from both Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt: Comparative Insurgences and Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Republic – Comparative Insurgencies. The last two went on to analyse the factors of success and/or the failure of later insur­ gences. This book, William the Silent and the Dutch Revolt-comparative starting points and triggering insurgencies covers the start of the Dutch Revolt, and how discontent, violent disturbances escalated into a conflict of a nation struggling to gain independence. Accordingly the book will ana­ lyse in the case of the Dutch Revolt, and later revolts two questions, namely, a b

At what stage, or which event(s) did violent unrest and disturbances turn into a national insurgency with the objective of independence? Were there at any stage opportunities by the government of the possess­ ing power or country for a rapprochement or compromise, and so avoid the violent unrest becoming a national insurgency for independence?

It is the author’s sincere hope that in these analyses there may be, possibly, some lessons learned which may be of benefit to governments and authori­ ties dealing with nationalist insurgency and terrorist. Overall, this book is a modest contribution to the knowledge of insur­ gencies and revolts and of its principal subject, William the Silent. As such, the book acknowledges and adds to the tributes to both him and the Dutch people for their determination and achievement in their successful revolt that resulted in their gaining their independence.

Part I 

The Netherlands and the Empire

1

Charles V and Philip II

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, most of the differing provinces of the Netherlands formed part of the Duchy of Burgundy. Burgundy origi­ nally was a feudal duchy giving fealty and homage to the King of France – John II (John the Good, defeated at the battle of Poitiers in 1356 by the English during the Hundred Years War) – who had two sons. His eldest, the Dauphin, was his heir; the second son, Philip, was enforced as the Duke of Burgundy. Philip married Margaret – the Countess of Flanders – and more territory was acquired by the duchy. Philip’s son, John, to become known as “John the Fearless”, married Margaret, the Countess of Holland, and further expanded the territory of the duchy. Under John the Fearless and later dukes, the duchy became increasingly independent from the royal French control and became a European power to be reckoned with by the other European powers. The successor to John, Duke Philip the Good, implemented a form of centralised administration in the 1430s. The States-General were formed, a central forum drawn from the representatives of the differing states, or representative bodies from the differing territories of Burgundy. There was a Central Accounting Office, centralising the finances of the duchy, with a Treasurer and a general auditor. Also, an order was created, open to worthy nobles of Burgundy – the Order of the Golden Fleece. However, the territories of Burgundy were separate and at times had shifting boundaries. The territories comprising the duchy were located from the northern part of the Low Countries, the north-western part of the Holy Roman Empire, north-eastern France, Franche-Comté on the imperial– French border, and down the Rhone Valley. The last ruler of the duchy, Charles the Rash, overreached himself in ambition and attempted alliances. Burgundy, as a separate power, fell in 1477 after a final battle with France. France under Louis XI, by building up military forces and by shrewd alli­ ances, had slowly but surely worked towards the destruction of Burgundy. After 1477, the Burgundian territories were carved up between France and the Holy Roman Empire. Most of the provinces of the Netherlands fell un­ der the Empire in varying forms of subjugation.

6

The Netherlands and the Empire

Under the Hapsburg Emperor Maximilian, the provinces of Friesland and Groningen were brought into the imperial rule during the period from 1500 to 1515, although substantial resistance and anti-imperial tradition and active resistance continued in the north by the time the Duke Charles, the future Emperor Charles V, became ruler of all the Netherlands, offi­ cially so proclaimed at Leuven in the province of Brabant in January 1515. Charles became the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1519 after an election in which he had been confronted by several rival candidates from various European powers. To ensure his electoral victory, he had to bear substantial election expenses, including bribes, to the various electors of the Empire and, in so doing, heavily dependent on loans from the Ger­ man banking family, the Fuggers. Servicing the debt and being beholden to foreign financiers was to be a regular occurrence for the Hapsburg rul­ ers of both Spain and the Empire. Constantly short of funds for both ser­ vicing current debts and needing more loans, the comparatively wealthy Netherlands provinces were to be looked to, through the States-General, as sources of revenues to alleviate the dire financial situation. Fortunately, for the Netherlands, the Regent from 1550 to 1555 – Mary of Hungary and Charles’ sister – was far more in touch and empathised with the Neth­ erlands than the imperial advisors, or even Charles himself. In the early 1540s, the government of the Netherlands tried to impose a general income tax. It was met with a united opposition from the different states of the provinces. In early 1543, the government, led by Mary, sensibly withdrew the proposed income tax. The province of Tournai moved towards compro ­ mise with a grant of 12,000 florins, raised by its own provincial authorities and officials. Other provinces followed with similar grants by late 1544, having been given the rights to raise their own revenues. It was a win-win; Mary and the government gained some revenues, and the sovereignty and rights of the provincial states were protected and recognised. However, the wars of the Emperor Charles V in the late 1540s and early 1550s voraciously consumed monies, and more revenues were needed. The Netherlands government was called upon to provide large sums. Most of these were for wars and policies outside the Netherlands and not directly benefitting the Netherlands, a fact which the differing states all noted and resented. By the time Charles V abdicated his position as the Holy Roman Emperor and ceased ruling all his territories in 1555, the Netherlands gov­ ernment had a deficit of 7 million livres.1 The States-General consisted of delegates from the individual provincial states. The provincial states differed in their composition of delegates. In the States of Holland, it was formed by delegates from six major towns together with a small number of nobles, who sat in the Knights Chamber. The Flanders States were formed from delegates from the principal cities, Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, and a group of nobles from a country district. The States of Brabant and the States of Artois had delegates from towns, no­ bility, and lower rural classes, but the delegates from the towns had the

Charles V and Philip II

7

predominant vote. In Gelderland (originally not part of the States-General but a province of the Netherlands) in the north, there were four differing assemblies, known as the four quarters. Irrespective of their composition, however, the delegates from the provincial states to the States-General were strictly mandated by their states and were on a tight rein. Any differences or any unanticipated or major proposals on future policy that came to light during the States-General, the delegates had to refer back, even physically return to and consult with, their respective provincial states. Also the pro ­ vincial states themselves consisted delegates from the towns and areas of the province, also on an equally tight rein, and delegates in the provincial states had also to refer back and consult with the towns they represented The result was many delays in completing legislation, and, for the ruler, it meant delays in the granting of taxes and revenues. During one assembly in 1476, the representative of the Duke of Burgundy, his Chancellor, in exasperation humorously inquired if the States-General delegates were in­ structed by their states as to how many times and the amounts they were allowed to drink during their journey. 2 The remark was ill-received. The provinces, through their states, were fiercely protective of their autonomy and rights and privileges. Under Charles V, the various diverse component parts of the Netherlands were more centralised. In 1523, a conflict in the Friesland area ended with the province of Friesland acknowledging the overlordship of the Emperor. Its subjugation was achieved with the assistance of the province of Holland. In 1528, the province of Utrecht was annexed, and Charles deliberately maintained it as a separate entity from that of Holland, which had designs on annexing it for itself. 3 The province of Overijssel also came within the imperial jurisdiction in the same year, and it was followed by the province of Gelderland (with its semiautonomous quarters) in 1543.Then in June 1548, the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire met at Augsburg. At that meeting they agreed to Charles’ urging that the Hapsburg Netherlands territories be recognised as one entity but as a separate administrative unit that is still part of the Holy Roman Empire (part of the Burgundian Circle) yet remain autonomous under the direct rule of the Hapsburgs. Four months later, the Diet agreed to the “Pragmatic Sanction” whereby on the death of Charles V the Netherlands territories as a single entity would pass to his successors, and all the territories therein would be under the central institutions. These central institutions for all the Netherlands were based in Brussels where a Council of State sat, deciding overall policies, a Council of Finance, and the Hof or Supreme Court, deliberating in Mechelen. The individual provinces retained the powers of raising troops and levying taxes and conducting justice in the provincial Hof but still had in many cases differing laws and customs. The provincial states sat in each province, extremely conscious and jealous of their privileges and functions. However, each province since 1549 had the right, which invariably they exercised, to send delegates to represent the province in the Netherlands States-General.

8

The Netherlands and the Empire

The provinces, including Flanders and Artois which had not been part the Empire, were taken in to become a part of the Burgundian Circle of the Holy Roman Empire. These provinces become known as “the seventeen provinces” and were to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Reichskam­ mergericht, or imperial supreme court, and the authority of the imperial Diet. However, they paid their taxes directly to the Emperor and were liable to participate in the defence of the Empire if it was threatened by foreign powers and provide military resources and men to the Emperor when re­ quired and financed. The latter amount was to be twice as much as that provided by the individual electors. If the external danger was to the south­ east from the Turks, then the finances provided would amount to three times as much as that provided by the individual elector.4 Charles V was preoccupied at the beginning of his reign as Emperor with affairs in Spain, but in the 1530s he returned to the Netherlands. He was based at Mechelen, his beloved and adopted capital of the Netherlands provinces. Under Charles V, the Netherlands became a more homogene­ ous entity, more centralised, and more under the control of the Hapsburg. These developments were accepted because they proved beneficial and effi­ cient, and also because of an general affinity of the Netherlands’ populace with Charles V who, as the Holy Roman Emperor, cultivated this and pub ­ licly identified his respect and particular affinity for the Netherlands. The Holy Roman Empire was itself an extremely hybrid collection of terri­ tories and jurisdictions, and the status of “the seventeen provinces” was just one example of the large but loose confederative structure that was to be a major part of Europe from early Mediaeval times to the late eighteenth cen­ tury. The “seventeen provinces”, even after the Burgundian Treaty of 1548, still had significant differences and enjoyed differing privileges. One histo­ rian states the confederative relationship between the Netherlands provinces and the Empire as the provinces “…were in theory a part of the Holy Roman Empire, a quaint political fiction of which no one took any practical notice”.5 At last one other historian, while not denying the looseness of the con­ nection, emphasises the strong tie with – and the sovereignty of – the Haps­ burgs over these provinces of the Netherlands and as such their being part of the Empire in certain aspects.6 It was into this collection of provinces, themselves part of a loose confed­ eration of the Holy Roman Empire, that William of Nassau, future Prince of Orange and who became known as William the Silent, was born and grew up. William was born in 1533; he was the eldest son of a noble of the Holy Roman Empire, William, the Count of Nassau-Dillenburg. William, the Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, was himself a younger son, and the bulk of family estates in the Netherlands was in the hands of the older brother, Henry. Young William enjoyed a pleasant if quiet existence on the Dil­ lenburg estates. The town of Dillenburg stood east of the Rhine about 80 kilometres south-east of Cologne.

Charles V and Philip II

9

During the Reformation in the early 1530s, his father William changed his religion, adopting the Lutheran faith for himself, his family, and for all churches within his estates and holdings. He did this in a moderate way, with a certain degree of tact and toleration to those who wished to per­ sonally remain Catholic so his conversion passed off peacefully, as did the fortunes of the county of Nassau-Dillenburg. Thanks to the father William keeping a low profile and remaining politically neutral, the county suffered little impact during the turbulent years of the Reformation. In this comparatively peaceful environment on the estates of Dillenburg, the young William the Silent grew up, enjoying the idyllic and genteel child­ hood, and undertook education and training that befit his position as the eldest son of a minor noble. William’s uncle Henry, as we have seen was the elder brother of Count William and possessed the bulk of the estates of the county of NassauDillenburg. Henry had been a boyhood friend of the young Charles, the future Emperor Charles V. Henry had married into yet more noble land, having wed a daughter of the French noble house of Chalons, whose hold­ ings included the princedom of Orange, a small principality entirely within the Kingdom of France, but technically sovereign and independent. Henry by this marriage also gained many minor baronies each one owning a small estate. Henry’s possessions, including the principality of Orange, passed to his son Rene, cousin of the young William the Silent. Rene was 15 years older than William. On the encouragement – in reality an imperial command of the Emperor Charles V Rene, at a comparatively young age, Rene made a will stipulating that the beneficiary of all his lands and titles would be his young cousin William. The elder count William was still alive. Charles V’s motives for ordering Rene to make such a will was to ensure that in the event of Rene dying unexpectedly, his large and numerous lands would not go by default to the elder count William, a Lutheran. By contrast, these lands going to the young William would be a minor difficulty; the religion of a child heir could easily be corralled by suitable (Catholic) tutors and mentors, and eventually be altered. Rene dutifully made the will in accord­ ance with the Emperor Charles V’s wishes and promptly forgot about it. He had plenty of noble life in front of him, and when the time came a realistic will to bequeath all to his future heirs would be made. Rene matured, be­ came a loyal courtier at the Emperor’s court, ruled his estates and served as a soldier, commanding troops in the imperial armies. During the course of one invasion by imperial troops into France, the French fort of Saint-Dizier was besieged. The fort put up a staunch defence and held out until the end of war remaining in French hands. A peace ac­ cord eventually was signed between the Empire and France; the French defenders stood down and the imperial troops departed. However, they left behind many dead, including Rene, who in July 1544 had been shot by a defender’s musket bullet while standing in siege lines before St Didier.

10

The Netherlands and the Empire

William, at the age of 11, had come into an inheritance as holder of the Princedom of Orange, a large part of the province of Brabant, part of the provinces of Flanders and Luxembourg, holdings in Franche-Comté which were valued at over 150,000 livres in revenue every year, and 50 small bar­ onies, as well as his original county of Nassau-Dillenburg. This meant an end to the comparatively idyllic upbringing of young Wil­ liam, the eldest son of a small landholding noble. With his new possessions and titles, he was a significant ruler in the Netherlands and the Empire. This necessitated him joining the imperial court in the Netherlands and be ­ coming a courtier and commander in a form of service to the Emperor. He renounced his original small inheritance from his father Count William in favour of his brother John, who became John of Nassau. William assumed his new titles and joined the imperial court at Brussels. The young William had the Emperor as a mild father-figure, and court life and education were different from that of Dillenburg but not unpleasant. His formal education was taught to him by a ‘safe’ tutor. However fond the Emperor’s court may have become of young William, his lands were large and potentially powerful, and it was necessary to ensure that his upbringing would result in him being on the right side, the holy side, of the Catholic– Lutheran divide. The tutor was Jerome Perronet, son of the distinguished minister of Charles V, Nicholas Perronet, and the younger brother of Antoine de Perronet, the Bishop of Arras. William may have enjoyed the tutoring of Jerome de Perronet, but in the future he was to have a different reaction to the impact of the activities of Antoine de Perronet, the Bishop of Arras. As William grew up to his late teens and learned the true religion and was schooled in etiquette, statecraft, and diplomacy, the Emperor Charles permitted that he was at consultative meetings and valued his opinions. When Charles, ever busy, ever facing down threats to the Empire, was not present in the Netherlands, his Regent Mary of Hungary took the reins of government, and she too valued William’s company. Mary of Hungary was an authoritarian Regent, but overall she governed the Netherlands wisely and with degrees of tolerance; William’s natural perceptiveness and toler­ ant disposition led him to see and learn further the values of wise govern­ ance from Margaret of Hungary. During this period, William was at court, taking up one or two tradi­ tional ceremonial duties for several years. Then, in 1551, he gave up the purely ceremonial duties, having acquired more onerous duties, including the responsibility for arranging certain official celebrations, and being ap ­ pointed military commander of several units in the imperial armies. As well as being present at Brussels, he made the official seat of his estates at Breda where, when not at Brussels, he lived in a large comfortable residence. He gave frequent hospitality to his relatives, including his father. Also his younger brother Louis, thanks to William’s influence, gained a command in the imperial army and gained military experience and training that would be invaluable to him later.

Charles V and Philip II

11

William occasionally was entrusted with diplomatic missions to various parts of the Holy Roman Empire. Throughout the first half of the sixteenth century, the Empire and France engaged in several periods of conflict. Also during this period, the Reformation had caused rifts and conflicts among the various states within the Empire. The Protestant since the 1530s had formed a defensive alliance, the Schmalkaldic League, against any attempt by the Empire to re-impose Catholicism. During the late 1540s and early 1550s, the Emperor Charles V had forces fighting some of these states, time and again making a compromise for peace, only to renew fighting again. In October 1555, the Emperor Charles V abdicated his crown. He was exhausted by governing and fighting for the Empire on several fronts and wished some rest in the remaining of years of his life. He had made long and careful preparations in order that, as far as possible, the Hapsburg pos­ sessions would remain secure. The German and Austrian lands remained intact under various archdukes, forming a solid bloc in central and south Germany and Austria, and the archduke Ferdinand assumed the title of Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor. Spain and its overseas possessions, the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Naples, and the Duchy of Milan were to be ruled by Charles’ son Philip (who was already King of Naples). On 25 October 1555, before the assembled States-General at Brussels, with foreign ambassadors attending, the Emperor Charles V formally abdicated. William, ever the loyal and dutiful courtier, assisted Charles to his chair, where Charles delivered a long and emotional speech of abdication. Other speeches followed, including that of Philip, now King of Spain, and the ruler of the Netherlands as well as Naples. When Philip’s turn came to speak, he stated in a halting voice that he found great difficulty speaking French and that the Bishop of Arras would read his speech on his behalf. William and Philip had first met in 1549, and there developed some awk­ wardness, if not animosity. William, thanks to his elevation to estates and new titles, and his upbringing had taken it all in his stride and he had gained in confidence – a quiet confidence combined with natural efficiency and courtesy. Philip, on the other hand, was conscious of and affected by the burden of his duties as King of Naples and as the future King of Spain. He was extremely studious and an intellectual, who was completely de­ voted to the Catholic faith and earnest and dedicated in fulfilling all official duties. However, he was lacking in confidence and at times tongue-tied. He had strength in determination to carry through decisions, however dif­ ficult, but this was later to became a fatal obstinacy and was to cloud his judgement in “cognitive rigidity”.7 William continued his military duties and commanded a unit of imperial troops in France, where the Valois-Hapsburg war between France and the Empire and Spain continued. In August 1557, his unit was engaged at the small town of St Quentin in Picardy, where imperial troops were besieg­ ing the town. An attempt by the French commander to relieve the town was decisively defeated, with the French commander being killed and the

12 The Netherlands and the Empire French forces sustaining heavy losses. This imperial victory brought the war to an end. The French were war-weary, and Philip also wished for peace, and responded positively to King Henry II of France when the latter sued for peace. Some of the first unofficial approaches for peace were made through a French prisoner, a senior officer held in honorary confinement at William’s residence at Breda, to William who acted as go-between. Of­ ficial peace talks between the two sides were held at the chateau of CateauCambrésis, in the north-east of France, situated in the modern French de­ partment of Nord. William was one of the official imperial delegates to the peace talks. His fellow imperial delegates were the Duke of Alva, an elderly and experienced soldier who was fanatically loyal to the Catholic faith, and the Bishop of Arras – Jean Perronet. Finally, in 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis ended a series of wars over a 60-year period between France on the one side and the Empire and Spain on the other. Apart from agreeing to end hostilities and restoring peace, the detailed terms were comparatively minor. There were small fron­ tier alterations in favour of Spain, guarantees by both sides to future peace, and a dynastic marriage commitment, with the eldest daughter of Henry II of France to marry Philip II of Spain (he had recently been bereaved with the death of his wife Mary, Queen of England). There was a common sen­ timent that any threat posed by France to the Empire and Spain and vice versa had diminished and that a greater if more intangible common threat was growing in Europe. This greater threat was that posed by the Reforma­ tion. During the peace negotiations conducted by the various small groups and subcommittees, delegates and officials from both sides discussed and put forward proposals to deal with this threat. On the Spanish side, Alva, supported by the Bishop of Arras, proposed an extreme joint policy of re ­ pression by France and Spain which involved armed forces. Alva had been careful to table such proposals only at sittings and sessions when William was not present; he sensed, rightly, that William did not share his fanatical approach. This possible joint French-Spanish armed intervention against heretic centres and communities was communicated from the peace con­ ference to the rulers of France and Spain and received enthusiastically by both rulers. The final terms of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis were concluded by April 1559, and both sides sent hostages to each other’s territory while the terms were fully ratified and started to be implemented. The hostages were not hostages in the normal sense, but distinguished guests at the courts of the two monarchs, and formally and warmly welcomed. The Spanish– imperial hostages sent to Paris were the Duke of Alva, Count Egmont, a soldier of the Netherlands with a distinguished record of imperial service as military commander, and William. These three ‘hostages’ in Paris, far from being held in honorary captivity, were invitees and participants of the lengthy festivities celebrating the peace. No doubt such festivities also served to impress the three of the splendours of Henry II’s reign. Inevitably

Charles V and Philip II

13

dialogue and conversations at these functions covered the political situation, both sides making subtle diplomatic points to ‘their’ respective ‘hostages’. The Reformation, as we have seen, preoccupied most rulers in Europe, and for Henry II of France it had forced itself to his attention. Disturbances caused by the heretic Lutheran faith and the dangerous forces of Calvinism had broken out in several parts of France. Even here in Paris, in the very Parlement, a distinguished French jurist and representative, Ann du Bourg had openly attacked the French royal policy of suppressing the Reformed beliefs and had openly admitted his support for Calvinism. Ann du Bourg had been arrested, tried, and was currently in prison under sentence of death (though still managing to write, compile, and issue defences of the heretical beliefs). His case had attracted attention across Europe, with the Elector Palatine (himself a declared Calvinist) appealing to King Henry II to remit the death sentence on such a distinguished legal scholar and allow du Bourg to be exiled to his Elector’s domains.8 Heavily preoccupied with the apparent growth of the Reformation heresy, Henry II spoke at length to one of the hostages. In this lengthy conversa­ tion, he was effusive in his praise of Alva’s proposal, made at the CateauCambrésis peace negotiations, of joint French–Spanish countermeasures to stem the rise of the heresies. Henry II continued further, expressing his full support for such Franco-Spanish armed intervention and Alva’s proposal that it target one of the main centres of the heresy, the Netherlands. Henry II unwittingly – and disastrously – had unburdened himself to the wrong hostage. For it was to William that he had confided. William listened, no doubt with surprise and was stupefied, but, as Wil­ liam the Silent (the Dutch original word for Silent translates as taciturn or discreet), he gave nothing away. He continued the conversation with a few noncommittal pleasantries and gentle hints of approval that encouraged the King to continue and go further. But here was policy of targeting of the Netherlands clearly stated by French King Henry II, stated from one of those most powerful who authorised it, and clearly Henry was under the impression that William already knew about it and was of those instigating it. It is unclear whether Henry II later indicated to Alva that he had revealed the plans to William. Probably not, as he had no reason – certainly not from William’s reactions during the conversation – to suppose that he had made an error in so confiding, and within weeks of the conversation he was dead. During the peace celebrations, tournaments were organised, and, Henry II, a devotee of jousting, insisted on continuing in the lists when he was fatigued, and, in one joust his opponent’s lance struck his helmet, causing splinters to enter the eye. Despite the best efforts of doctors, he died a short time after. His successor Charles IX failed to effectively hold the inter­ nal situation in France, and France slipped into internal religious conflicts which were to last for several decades. However, Spain under Philip, now powerful in Europe, was implacable in fanatically opposing any religious toleration.

14

The Netherlands and the Empire

For William, the conversation with Henry II had made Charles V’s in­ creasing anti-heresy measures, Philip’s hostility towards him, and Philip’s fanatical upholding of the Catholic faith all fall into place. He was now fully aware of what faced the Netherlands and would be totally on guard when it came to relations with both Philip and Spain. In May 1558, the States-General agreed to a Nine Years Subsidy worth 800,000 livres a year. Any shortfall or uncollected taxes committed to by the States-General of 1556 would be subsumed in this massive new tax agreement. The collection and dispersal of the revenues would be under the supervision of an appointed Superintendent of Finance, the Antwerp banker Antoon van Stralen. In January 1559, the Nine Years Subsidy was fully ratified by the States-General. Philip agreed to the terms, but throughout the following months appeared to be tardy and unwilling on carrying out the withdrawal of Spanish troops. It became apparent from his various ambivalent pro­ nouncements that he intended that three regiments of tercios would remain in the Netherlands. On learning of this, the States-General in June 1559 formally made a pronouncement that dispersal of the collected revenues would be conditional on total withdrawal of all Spanish troops. At this Philip conceded the total troop withdrawal. In mid-1559, a crisis occurred in the Mediterranean. Spain had been at war with Turkey since 1551, and a military disaster threatened in North Africa. It was felt the presence of the King of Spain in Madrid was urgently needed. In July 1559, he left Brussels, and, in August 1559, he took sail at Vlissingen for Spain. Philip II left the Netherlands for Spain. He was not to return and, indeed, was never again to return to the Netherlands. As the situation worsened and escalated into revolts, his absence would be taken as another indication of, at best indifference, but fully willing to take their taxes and, at worst, maintaining hostility towards the Netherlands people. This was in contrast to the Emperor Charles V who spent time in the Netherlands, and even made his imperial capital the city of Mechelen. Charles had heeded of Eras­ mus’ advice to him in his early years, that “… nothing so alienates the affec­ tions of the people’s for the ruler to take pleasure in living abroad, for they seem to be neglected by him whom they wish to be the most important”.9 Philip was clearly unaware of this advice. As for the Netherlands in mat­ ters of both religion and government, he had made significant changes and arrangements to be put into effect in his absence.

Notes 1 H Koenigsberger Monarchies, States-General and Parliaments – The Nether­ lands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries p 163 2 H Koenigsberger Estates and Revolution Chapter 4 States – General of the Netherlands p 130

Charles V and Philip II

15

3 J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise Greatness and Fall p 59 4 K Brandi The Emperor Charles V, p 582. In fairness to Philip II, the admoni­ tion of “taking pleasure” in being abroad scarcely applied. Once he had arrived in Spain, he never gained any rest from the tasks and challenges of ruling the Spanish Empire; see D MacCulloch Reformation – Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700 pp 417–421, and G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II. None­ theless, his absence from being in the Netherlands counted against him among the populace 5 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 34 6 PH Wilson The Holy Roman Empire – A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (p 228) summarises the Treaty of Burgundy as securing the autonomy of Bur­ gundy, that is, the 17 Netherlands provinces – “but on Hapsburg terms” 7 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 43 8 The Elector’s appeal, and that of others, were refused. Henry II and his suc­ cessor refused to remit the sentence, and on 23 December 1559, du Bourg was publicly hanged and his hanging body was burnt publicly 9 JR Hale Renaissance Europe p 83

Part II 

William the Silent and the Revolt

2

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt

King Philip II left the Netherlands in August 1559, but he left behind care ­ ful arrangements for its government, arrangements which, it was intended, would ensure that his valuable Spanish Hapsburg would be in secure hands. His niece Margaret of Parma was Regent. Loyal to Spain, she would prove to be capable – though underestimated by Philip and his more ultraadvisors – with no sympathy for rebellious elements but nonetheless in touch with the needs of the populace, conscious and understanding of some of their grievances. As usual, Margaret was served and advised by three councils – the Council of State with its offshoots, the Council of Finance and the Privy Council, the latter dealing with judicial matters. The Council of State was comprised of the important nobles of the Netherlands and provincial Stadhouders. However, a senior member of all three was to be Antoine de Perrenot – the Bishop of Arras and future Cardinal Granvelle. De Perrenot was the son of Nicholas de Perrenot, a distinguished minister of the Emperor Charles V and, as we have seen, brother of Jerome who had been a tutor to William. Antoine de Perrenot, the Cardinal Granvelle, was loyal, able, and domineering. Also, Philip had put in place other advisors, including Tomas de Armenteros as “confidential secretary” to Margaret, the Count de Berlaymont, Stadhouder of Namur, and a third individual, a financial official based in Antwerp to monitor financial affairs. These individuals would be in close contact with Granvelle and report directly to him and to Philip back in Spain. Such arrangements meant that there was a de facto inner council which, while loyal and fully respectful to Margaret, under Granvelle’s leadership would supplant the Council of State. Within two years of Philip’s leaving the Netherlands, there was a radical reorganisation of the church in the province. At the time of the abdication of Charles V, there were four bishoprics for the whole of the Netherlands, yet the population over the previous five decades had increased and now stood at over 3 million, making it a country of comparatively dense pop­ ulation within Europe. In mid-1559, the Pope in agreement with Philip, authorised the creation of 14 new bishoprics throughout the Netherlands, with the ecclesiastical primacy of these resting in the new archbishopric of Mechelen. The reorganisation was a sensible measure, given that the

20 William the Silent and the Revolt current allocation and structure of the bishoprics were still based upon the era of the expansion of Christianity some centuries ago. Reorganisation was needed to meet the spiritual needs of the expanding population. How­ ever, the reorganisation was carried out in strict secrecy. Also, there were two other highly controversial aspects of this reorganisation. The first controversial aspect was that 10 of the 14 new bishoprics would be combined with their respective local abbey. The new bishop would be­ come the abbot of the local abbey – with the accompanying additional rev­ enue. Apart from upsetting members and abbots of the affected abbeys, this had also upset many of the nobility. Many of the sons of the nobility, by mutual arrangement with the local abbey, entered the clergy and were ‘placed’ in the upper hierarchy of the abbeys, ensuring the sons fulfilled a vocation and were earning for themselves. Now such entrance to the clergy and appointments would be the decision of the new bishop, uninfluenced and indifferent to any local ‘arrangements’. The second controversial aspect was that each newly appointed bishop would have two canons who would act as inquisitors and act with powers of inquisition. Since 1522, Charles V had introduced the inquisition into the Netherlands, and, in 1545, he expanded this by establishing regional inquisitions. Five years later, Charles decreed that the inquisitors were imperial officials with accompanying pow­ ers. However, local magistrates and officials in the Netherlands, although unsympathetic to outright heresy, managed to temper and ameliorate the activities of the inquisition and ensure that only the most extreme, blatant, and vociferous heretics suffered. Now Spanish-approved inquisitors who, with full powers, would be present in all the new bishoprics, acting with the full approval of the newly appointed bishops. Indeed, the new bishops of Roermond and Middelburg were professional inquisitors, specifically chosen for their anti-Protestant fervour.1 These two aspects, the combining of abbeys with bishoprics and the accompanying inquisitors, caused great unease among the Netherlands nobility. William, although repelled by the second aspect, was not surprised; his conversation with the King of France some years ago forewarned of the trend. Full details of the new reorganisation were apparent in March and in Au­ gust 1561 when the papal letters authorised the new bishops. It came to light that the primate of the Netherlands, the new archbishop of Mechelen (and ab­ bot of the wealthy abbey of Affligem), was none other than Antoine Perrenot – the Bishop of Arras and Cardinal Granvelle. In fairness to Granvelle, while he was one of the principal beneficiaries of the reorganisation, he himself had no part in the planning or in the finalised details of the reorganisation.2 However, Granvelle was now in effect the head of both the ecclesiastical and secular government of the Netherlands. The arrangements concerning the governance of the Netherlands and the reorganisation of the bishoprics, both of which had ensured the rise to power of Granvelle, caused much consternation among the nobles in the Netherlands. That he was the son of a distinguished imperial servant of

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt 21 Charles V, and he himself possessed a distinguished record of imperial pub ­ lic service, counted for little among the Netherlands nobility. One historian has laid out it starkly: the nobles decided “…that they could not play second fiddle to a jumped-up civil servant from Franche Compte”. 3 Among these resentful nobles was Count Egmont, a distinguished sol­ dier and courtier, fellow “hostage” with William and Alva at the CateauCambrésis negotiations. Egmont had served Spain well when commanding the Spanish troops to victory over the French at Gravelines in 1558. Egmont gave vent to concern over Philip’s arrangements. He was particularly against Spanish troops remaining, and he was also angry about the furtiveness and secrecy with which the new bishoprics had been advanced and saw in this the dangerous rise of Cardinal Granvelle. Another in resentful opposition was Count Hoorn, a commander of Philip’s personal bodyguards. Hoorn had departed the Netherlands with Philip in 1559, but after two years at Madrid where he felt his advice and counsel were ignored, and after speak­ ing out directly to Philip against the new bishoprics, he sought leave to return to the Netherlands. Philip instantly granted his request. Back in the Netherlands he attacked Cardinal Granvelle whom he saw as the instigator of the changes in both governance and ecclesiastical matters. Both Hoorn and Egmont were to prove themselves loyal and valuable members of Mar­ garet’s councils. But Granvelle had made enemies of them; Granvelle was a senior member of these very councils. If Granvelle had made enemies of nobles like Hoorn and Egmont, Wil­ liam too had made an enemy of Granvelle at the same time. The back­ ground to this rested in the Emperor Charles V’s attempts and wars to check the rise of Protestantism within the Empire. An important component part of the Empire was Saxony, divided be­ tween the Albertine branch of the family under Maurits of Saxony and the Ernestine branch of the family under first Frederick the Wise (who had protected Martin Luther when he was causing such a momentous upheaval) and, after Frederick the Wise, John Frederick I. The Ernestine branch was the more powerful as they were one of the imperial electors. During the var­ ious wars, Philip of Hesse and John Frederick I were part of the powerful Schmalkaldic League dedicated to the defence of Protestantism. Charles V and the imperial armies, supported by Maurits of Saxony, who had been promised the electoral title for his support, were finally victorious at the battle of Muehlberg, where the Schmalkaldic League was defeated and finally broken. Philip of Hesse and John Frederick I were taken pris­ oners and had made abject surrender to Charles V for mercy, which was granted. Charles V was then able to impose the Peace of Augsburg in 1548, ensuring a form of religious peace and toleration for Lutheranism if the ruler of a state was himself Lutheran under the principle “cuius religious, eius religio”. Maurits however had further plans. Throughout 1551, Mau­ rits was in touch with enemies of Charles V, and in 1552, he made a Treaty of Chambord, with King Henry II of France. By this treaty, he agreed to

22 William the Silent and the Revolt supply Henry with arms and troops in a war against Charles V in return for being handed over captured cities. The initial campaign went well, and Charles V was caught off guard and Henry gained victories. After a few months, Maurits decided to stop while he was winning and reneged on his alliance with Henry and secretly negotiated with the Archduke Ferdinand, Charles V’s brother, for him to return to an alliance with the imperialists. Ferdinand agreed, and Charles V agreed. Some months later, peace be­ tween the Empire and France was made at the Treaty of Passau. Maurits remained the elector and retained some of his latest conquests and died in possession of these. He was recognised as a loyal subject within the Empire, but his manipulative and near treasonable behaviour made him little liked and trusted at the imperial court. Less than a decade later, William, now at the court at Brussels, decided on marriage. Despite inheriting vast estates, he was also troubled with in­ herited debts; thus, marriage and a dowry would be extremely welcome. He chose as his fiancé Anna of Saxony. He formally informed Philip II in early 1560 of his intention to marry Anna. William’s fiancé Anna was the daughter of Maurits, the Elector of Sax­ ony. When it became known that William intended to marry the daugh­ ter of the treacherous Maurits of Saxony, who had so blatantly betrayed Charles V in 1552 threatening all the latter’s efforts to finally restore reli­ gious peace in Europe, there was quiet consternation at the Brussels court. There were attempts to dissuade him from marrying Anna by Granvelle, who unequivocally pleaded against such a marriage. Philip II in Madrid hoped that William could be dissuaded, and when he learnt that William was determined to marry Anna, wrote to Margaret a letter, stating, “…I don’t see how the Prince could think of marrying the daughter of the man who did this to his Majesty, now in glory, that the Duke Maurits did”.4 Margaret and Granvelle together confronted William and made him aware of the contents of Philip’s letter and the King’s feelings. William re­ fused to change his mind. He was made to feel uncomfortable when he was at the court. The proposed marriage was discussed at the Council of State, a humiliation for William, having his private life the subject of official scru­ tiny. But William was determined, and, in August 1561, he married Anna at Dresden in Saxony. He gained happiness at being married, financially benefitted from the dowry, but his position and status at the court was ruined. Philip increased his suspicion and hostility, and William had made an enemy of Granvelle. Opposition to the new bishoprics was quick and violent, 5 particularly in Antwerp where the magistrates, supported by the population, gave vent to their feelings against the inquisition. Nobles and clergy in the Nether­ lands united in their opposition. At Hertogenbosch, the new bishop was obstructed by several abbots in the region and by the provincial Estates of Brabant. Throughout the provinces of Overijssel, Friesland, and Groningen,

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt 23 there was an organised campaign to obstruct the placement of the new bishops which successfully delayed their installation for some years. Faced with mounting opposition, Margaret of Parma was forced to delay the installation of some of the new bishops, and in June 1562 she con­ vened a small gathering of nobility who were members of the Knights of the Golden Fleece. Knighthood of the Golden Fleece was a traditional honour dating back to Burgundian times, bestowed on nobles who were deemed particularly loyal. Margaret, in summoning these nobles, assumed she could obtain loyal support and good advice. The Knights, duly assembled, advised her to send one of their members to Madrid to explain the true situation to King Philip II and to call the States-General. Count Hoorn’s brother, Montigny, was authorised and set out for Madrid. During the controversy and furore of the reorganisation of the bishop ­ rics, Granvelle was writing to Philip II, updating him, but in doing so he repeatedly pointed out that William and his associates among the nobility were recruiting and forming their own political cohort in opposition to the reorganisation, and, more subtly, Granvelle insinuated William and his associates’ disloyalty to the Holy Catholic Church.6 Given Philip’s already jaundiced view of William, he readily believed such news, and his hostility and alarm regarding William increased. Montigny returned in December 1562 bearing messages and reassur­ ances of sincere goodwill from King Phillip II, but nothing more specific. Granvelle remained in place and prominent on the council. After giving some time and waiting in vain for the King’s reassurances to turn into pos­ itive action, in March 1563, William, Count Hoorn, and Count Egmont wrote a strong letter. The letter formally demanded the recall of Granvelle from the Netherlands. There was no response, and Granvelle continued to sit on Margaret’s council. Then in July, William led a deputation of nobles and delivered a de facto ultimatum to Margaret, demanding that Granvelle leave the Netherlands, otherwise they could not guarantee peace and good order in the Netherlands. Meanwhile, the States of Brabant met and issued a refusal to grant any further monies or distribute revenues until Cardinal Granvelle had left the Netherlands. Margaret, alarmed, turned to William and offered to authorise and send another deputation to Spain to remon­ strate with the King and make Philip II aware of the gravity of the situation; William declined this offer, stating that there would be no point. William, Count Egmont, and Count Hoorn then resigned as coun­ cil members. Margaret despatched an urgent report and letter to Philip II pleading for the immediate recall of Cardinal Granvelle. By this time, Granvelle himself declared to Margaret that he was willing to absent him­ self for a temporary period. The disturbances did not abate, and manifes­ tations of violence continued. In December 1563, William was present at a public banquet at which several members of the States of Brabant were present. There William declared that there should be no further worries or

24

William the Silent and the Revolt

concerns as, in a tone of grim humour, he reported that Granvelle himself was going to solve the problem by cutting off his own head. Given the level of popular anger, Margaret was alarmed by William heavy-handed joke – in her eyes it was a stark pronouncement from some­ one who usually offered moderate and restrained counsel, and she feared for Granvelle’s personal safety. She decided Granvelle had to leave. Her de­ cision was supported by Philip II, and it was suggested that Granvelle stand down “for personal reasons”. On 12 March 1564, Granvelle applied for leave to visit aged relatives, which was immediately granted. The following week William, Count Egmont, and Count Hoorn resumed their places at Margaret’s council. So Granvelle went, gently and discreetly, although his departure was cer­ tainly noted. William and the States-General did not disguise their hap ­ piness at his departure, and William wrote to his brother that he hoped Granvelle would go so far away that he never would return.7 However, Granvelle was no doctrinaire incompetent. He continued to serve his master, the King of Spain, well. Moving to Rome, in the late 1570, he was one of the three delegates of Spain in Rome for the tortuous ne ­ gotiations that led – finally – to the formation of The Holy League. This was an alliance of Venice, the Papacy, and Spain formed to check the ad­ vance of the Turkish thrusts into Europe. During these negotiations, it was Granvelle who was constantly alert to Venice’s devious diplomacy and its attempts to make a separate peace accord with the Turks. The League fi­ nalised, budgets and expenses were decided between the three powers, and a joint fleet was fitted out, which, in 1572, defeated the Turkish fleet at the historic battle of Lepanto. Granvelle from his various postings in Rome and elsewhere continued to observe the unfolding events and proffer advice to King Philip II concerning the Netherlands. The religious reorganisation of the bishoprics and Granvelle was not the only issue. Granvelle had departed, but the repressive policy against heresy remained. The Reformation had impacted upon the Netherlands and Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines, and more extreme Anabaptist creeds had taken root in several parts of the Netherlands. An inquisi­ torial system authorised by the Pope and fully supported by Charles V had been set up in 1522; however, enforcement of anti-heresy laws had been light with a few prosecutions pursued. The inquisitorial system had been expanded, given extra resources, and granted more powers of inves ­ tigation in the 1540s, and its activity increased between the 1550s and 1560s. Prosecutions, fines, confiscations, and executions by burning had dramatically increased, causing resentment and discontent among wide sections of populations. There were open demonstrations in favour of heresy and heretics. Hostile demonstrations occurred when individuals were condemned for heresy, and even the condemned heretics were res ­ cued by mobs from execution escorts and from jails in which they were being held.

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt 25 Against this rising tide, it was decided that Egmont, of Margaret’s coun­ cil, should travel to Spain and plead for a relaxation of heresy laws. Egmont did so in February 1565. In Spain, he was treated courteously by Philip who gave Egmont some assurances there would be revision and relaxation. Egmont returned to the Netherlands in April 1565 and reported this to the nobles, including William of Orange, Hoorn, and Brederode. In fact, Egmont had been completely deceived. Philip II had had no intention of relaxing any policies; he planned further repression. While at one of his retreats in the forests near Segovia, he issued orders to Margaret. A month after Egmont returned and reported the good news, the first set of these orders came from Madrid to Margaret and her council. These stated that Anabaptist heretics who had repented had nonetheless to be executed. In October 1565, instruction letters arrived to Margaret which gave further details of the policy to be followed. The orders stated that there was to be no change in any policies, that the powers of the council remained, and that the heresy laws remained as they were and were to be enforced. In December 1565, the lesser nobles of the Netherlands sent a petition signed by 400 of them, soon to become known as “the confederates”, and which was submitted directly to Margaret advocating a certain level of leniency and toleration of the authorities in dealing with heresy. While the more important nobles such as William, Egmont, and Hoorn did not sign the petition they sympathised and supported it. William of Orange asked to be relieved of his position in the council. Egmont was incensed by what he, justifiably, viewed as Philip deceiving him while he was in dialogue with him in Spain; the first set of orders from the Segovia Woods were dated three days after he, Egmont, had left, suit­ ably reassured, to return to the Netherlands.8 Egmont now gave the frank advice to Margaret that the Segovia Woods orders against heretics were unenforceable. Hoorn also gave this advice. Indeed, image-breaking, soon to escalate into the “iconoclast fury”, and violent disturbances had been ongoing for the previous three months in the areas around Valenciennes, Bruges, Mons, and Antwerp. In early 1566, William hosted a gathering of nobility at Breda. Among those present were his brother, Louis of Nassau, Egmont, Hoorn, Brederode, and the Count of Culembourg. The extremists like Brederode and Louis tried to persuade William that nothing but force would persuade Philip to change his policy and that Philip was about to deploy troops to enforce his policies and to counter this they needed to strike first. Louis suggested raising an army. William totally rejected both the advice and the suggested action and would have nothing to do with what he regarded – rightly – as treason. He did not trust Philip but would do nothing treasonable until Philip’s actions forced him in that direction. In April 1566, the confederates presented Margaret with another doc­ ument, “the Request”. The tones and statements indicated the utter loy­ alty of the signatories but denounced the activities of the Inquisition in

26

William the Silent and the Revolt

the Netherlands and appealed that the practices in the Netherlands cease. Before she had time to respond Berlaymont, one of the ultra-loyal nobles in attendance tried to create Margaret’s resistance by crying out a sneer­ ing reference to the petitioners – “What, Madam, surely not afraid of the Beggars”. However Margaret, open minded, and anxious to resolve the overall situation, accepted the “Request”. She issued a set of instructions to magistrates, the “Moderation”, ordering them to act with leniency and pragmatism against heretics. It was also agreed in council that a moderate conciliatory individual Montigny would make a visit to Spain to update and convince Philip to adopt a more lenient approach to heresy and Prot­ estantism in general. Montigny departed in mid-April for what was to be his second mission to Spain. In a form of defiant response to Berlaymont’s sneer, the term “Beggars” thereafter was adopted, in a sense of mocking and pride by opponents of Philip’s policies. There were now evolving five differing sections or groups of nobility re­ garding the situation in the Netherlands. At one extreme, there were the “confederates”, such as Louis of Nassau, Count Coulembourg, Philip Marnix de St Aldegonde,9 and Brederode, if not outright Calvinist then sympa­ thetic to the Reformed faiths and who held that the King of Spain had to be forced into changing his policies and that armed resistance to the Spanish was needed. Then there was a smaller group of “confederates” who, though disturbed by the intense anti-heresy policies of the King and the increasing authoritarianism emanating from Spain, were still fundamentally loyal to the King, would not countenance armed rebellion, and were equally dis­ turbed by the violent disturbances of the populace. Then there were the grander nobles such as William, Hoorn, and the loyal and honest Egmont, who, though opposed to the King of Spain’s current policies, were hoping to resolve the situation by dialogue and consultation. This group of William and his associates were loyal to Margaret of Parma and collaborated with her in her efforts to quell the popular violent disturbances and outbreaks of Calvinism. Then there were the important nobles such as Berlaymont and the Duke of Aerschot, utterly loyal to Margaret and the King of Spain but whose remedy for the violence was firm repression. Finally, there were the Spanish in Spain, led by King Philip himself, determined to enforce the anti-heresy laws to the full. They were disturbed by news of the violent disturbances but were even more disturbed by what appeared to Philip that Margaret and some of her nobles – including the suspicious William of Orange – were making compromises and countenancing petitions and other forms of opposition to Madrid. Calvinist services continued to be held openly, in large public congrega­ tions in Flanders, Hainault, Brabant, Holland, and Zeeland. The Calvinists organised a formal hierarchy setting up “consisteries” as the organisation of their base in Antwerp and secretly sent word to Geneva for more pastors. Meetings were held in the open, with armed guards in attendance. Wil­ liam had not the slightest doubt that Montigny’s mission to Spain would

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt 27 achieve nothing. William, Hoorn, and Egmont threatened resignation from the council but were prevailed upon to remain until Montigny returned and the results of his mission could be evaluated. Meanwhile, Brederode and some of his followers, having left Brussels, made for Antwerp and had stormed the town council meeting and de­ manded official authorisation to hold services in public. When they were refused, they stormed out, and meetings in the area were held in defiance with as many as 2,000–3,000 members attending such meetings. In July 1566, a reply from Spain was received by Margaret in response to the Re­ quest. This gave some limited concessions, but by now this was too little too late. The “iconoclastic fury” or sacking of churches, smashing the Holy images and carrying off plunder, was occurring in areas around Ypres, Menin, Middelburg, Brielle, and Antwerp. The destruction also hit indi­ vidual towns in the north, including Groningen, Amsterdam, and Utrecht. In some areas, the militia or schutters stood idly by and refused to act against the rioters. Faced with these rising levels of violence, in August 1566, Margaret is­ sued the Accord. This was a proclamation issued from Brussels which lifted indefinitely the ban on Protestant preaching and committed her and her council to reconsider the religious policy in the Netherlands and appealed to the rioters to cease disturbances and vandalising places of worship and that those who were discontented would be allowed in the future to build churches of their own. The Accord consisted of remarkably large conces­ sions to the Calvinists, but it was a pragmatic decision and, frankly, prom­ ises issued in bad faith. In the words of an eminent historian who covered in detail Margaret’s policy and motives – “The Accord was issued in pure perfidious. She never intended it to be anything but a quick way out of an impasse”.10 William came together with representatives from Antwerp and brokered and implemented the Accord. In doing this, he exercised his initiative and gave more concessions and leeway for Protestant worship than the Accord contained. Hoorn did the same with representatives from Tournai. Egmont advocated compromise in several towns, but he also intervened when vio ­ lence occurred and executed some of the rioters. William, Egmont, Hoorn, and the larger nobles were by now in an impossible position, committed to suppressing violent iconoclasts, but wishing to implement religious tolera­ tion to Protestants. In faraway Madrid, Philip had been receiving reports with increasing disquiet. The disturbances angered him, and the concessions made by those governing in the Netherlands alarmed him. By late 1566, Philip and his ministers in Spain were determined on robust action. The decision was made to send the Duke of Alva and Spanish troops. He had already identi­ fied Egmont, Hoorn, and, inevitably in Philip’s eyes, the perfidious William of Orange, as the instigators of the disturbances. These three were now marked men.

28

William the Silent and the Revolt

Meanwhile in the Netherlands the extreme uprising had begun, with groups of Calvinists supported by and led by the Calvinist nobles such as Brederode and Louis of Nassau. Egmont, loyal to the government, refused to join and refused point-blank to raise troops against Spain and retired to his estates; Hoorn also refused and retired to his estates. William remained undecided, alarmed by the excesses of the iconoclastic mobs. Two armies of rebels materialised. These were, in the north-west under Louis of Nas­ sau, backed by forces from German Protestants and mercenaries, and in the south supported by French Huguenot forces. Individual towns such as Tournai and Valenciennes declared for the Revolt and made ready for siege. Margaret acted with speed and vigour. She and her commanders raised troops and levies from the many towns still loyal and declared the towns and populaces of Tournai and Valenciennes guilty of treason unless they surrendered and accepted a royal garrison. Forces were deployed and be­ sieged these towns. Calvinist forces moved to relieve Tournai, plundering and destroying churches and villages as they went. They were defeated at an engagement at Wattrelos, just north of Lille, and then when they tried to obtain access to the town of Lannoy, the town population refused them entry. Outside Lannoy, the Calvinist forces were completely defeated by Margaret’s forces. These two victories halted the Revolt. Margaret had been ruthless in suppressing Tournai. Tournai was occupied by troops. Cal­ vinists were suppressed, and there was rigorous application of all previous rules and regulations that the magistrates had hitherto failed to enforce, especially those of education and booksellers. Soldiers were billeted in pri­ vate homes. However, Margaret restrained the troop commanders from ex­ cessive force in hunting down suspects as “…such vigour in Tournai would encourage greater resistance elsewhere”.11 She realised the limitations of collective guilt and refused to allow pun­ ishment to be made or degenerate to general persecution. Still some towns defied the government, and Brederode was muster­ ing rebel forces in Brabant and around Antwerp. Margaret’s government troops advanced upon them. Significantly, a large contingent of these government forces had been raised by Egmont, fully loyal to the govern­ ment of Brussels. Also, William of Orange intervened to stop a Calvin­ ist force being raised in Antwerp. The rebels’ main base in Flanders was attacked by government forces and completely defeated. Some Calvinist leaders, including the nobles who had sided with them, were killed (but not Brederode who survived to rebel another day). The town of Valenci­ ennes surrendered and submitted to Margaret and Brussels. The town of Maastricht expelled the Calvinist clergy and rebellious councillors and declared itself loyal in March 1567. In April 1567, the Calvinist rebels in Hertogenbosch fled, and, at the end of this month, Antwerp accepted a garrison of government troops. Apart from some pockets of resistance and groups of rebels who laid low, the Revolt had been effectively suppressed. It had been suppressed due to prompt action by Margaret’s government

Violent disturbances escalate to Revolt 29 at Brussels and the loyalty of most of the nobles, including William of Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn. Margaret of Parma had proven herself fully capable of decisive action. In Aalst, she had sanctioned troops being sent and apprehending – and stran­ gling in public – a Calvinist preacher who was inciting the crowds. She sup­ ported firm action in Furnes, facing down the Calvinists who threatened to bring in 15,000 of their own forces. Haarlem, Leiden, Brielle, and Delft had all appeared to be heading towards insurrection, yet eventually pacified themselves and arranged a rapprochement with the Brussels government. By a combination of quick action and restraint, she had managed to restore peaceful rule. On 27 April 1567, Margaret sent a letter to Philip II of Spain stating that the disturbances had been effectively suppressed and no Span­ ish troops were needed. It was too late. Philip II, fanatically sincere in his Catholicism and the Catholic mission of the Spanish Empire, was incensed at the outbreaks of Calvinism at the iconoclasm. He was alarmed at the policies of com­ promise by the Brussels government and was convinced of the complic­ ity of the Netherlands nobles, especially William of Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn. Philip was unable to differentiate between the varying loyalties among the nobles. For Philip II, the value and strategic importance of the Netherlands within the Spanish Empire was vital and there must be no risk of its loyalty to Spain. Alva, implacable, was on his way with 8,000 Spanish troops based in Milan to make sure that any further revolt would be impossible. Margaret in Brussels was trying to maintain a balanced policy. She wrote to Alva while he was en route for the Netherlands, advising and requesting that he show mercy for the Netherlands, while at the same time she was writing to the commanders of the troops occupying Tour­ nai, giving them extra powers to infringe citizens and liberties in order to maintain stability. Her writing was in vain. The ideal situation for re­ stored order in the Netherlands for Alva would be, in his words, “…that every individual has the feeling that one fine night or morning the house will fall in on him”.12 Alva and his forces made for the Netherlands via the Spanish Road of Milan, up through the Valtelline passes and following the Rhine, arriving in the Netherlands on 3 August 1567 and into Brussels on 22 August 1567. Brussels, Ghent, and other towns in Brabant and Flanders were garrisoned with Spanish troops. These troops were billeted, quartered, and fed, with no payments to the populations. The government forces which had been raised by Margaret and the loyal nobles were stood down and disbanded. The disbanded Brussels government troops, even those loyal veteran units who had served for years, were not paid.13 Alva presented his credentials to Margaret and effectively took power. Direct rule from Madrid, through Alva, was to be the way the Spanish Netherlands were governed. And ruthless repression was to be the policy.

30

William the Silent and the Revolt

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13

J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall p 143 P Geyl History of the Dutch-Speaking Peoples 1555–1648 p 75 H Koenigsberger Politicians and Virtuosi – Essay in Early Modern History p 102 Papiers d’ Etat vi 169–170, cited in J Morley The Rise of the Dutch Republic p 156 P Geyl History of the Dutch-Speaking Peoples 1555–1648 p 74 and G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 47 H Koenigsberger Monarchies, States-Generals and Parliaments – The Nether­ lands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries p 207 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 58 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 65 Philip Marnix, Lord of St Aldegonde, a minor noble holding a lordship in Flanders and a staunch Calvinist, was to be one of William’s most loyal and able supporters. Historians have referred to him in several ways – as “Philip Marnix”, “Philip Marnix de St Aldegonde”, “Sainte Aldegonde”, “de St Alde­ gonde”. The author, perhaps pedestrianly but for absolute clarity for the reader, uses the name “Marnix St Aldegonde” CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 88 CR Steen A Chronicle of Conflict – Tournai 1559–1567 pp 127–129 H Kamen The Duke of Alba p 92, cited in M Rady The Hapsburgs-the Rise and Fall of a World Power p 93 CR Stein Margaret of Parma – A Life p 278

3

Alva 

Alva, as effective governor of the Netherlands, intensified enforcing Span­ ish rule with the anti-heresy laws. Egmont, Hoorn, and William of Orange were summoned by Alva to Brussels to confer with him. William, cautious and mistrustful, avoided going; Hoorn travelled and attended, and Egmont, ever trusting and confident in his loyalty to Spain, made himself available. Within days of his arrival in Brussels, Alva quietly made preparations to set up a tribunal to investigate and identify and punish all rebels. The existence and the remit of this tribunal – the Council of the Troubles – was kept secret for a period in order not to alert or alarm the perceived ringleaders of the recent troubles. It was set up in secret, but when it was activated the whole of the Netherlands was to become all too aware or its activities and pur­ pose. Officially named the Council of the Troubles, it became infamously known as the ‘Council of Blood’. Margaret of Parma, realising the exact nature of the new regime, resigned on 8 September 1567. The following day, Egmont and Hoorn were arrested and placed in custody in Ghent. Back in Spain, on 19 September 1567, Montigny, still on his conciliatory mission in Spain, was arrested and conveyed to custody in Simancas. Alva’s mind-set in his task of quelling the Revolt is epitomised in two of his communications. In establishing the ‘Council of Blood’ he loyally wrote to Philip II in which he stated, “lawyers are only accustomed to pass sen­ tence on a crime being proved – that will never do here”,1 and in a letter of 1571 to the city authorities in Delft he was to order, I understand that you are holding a certain Commer Euwotsj from Briel…. If he continues to be stubborn in his heresy you shall burn him alive; strike out his tongue with a hot ire on prior to his leaving the prison to deny him opportunity to speak out against our Catholic faith. 2 In formulating policy for dealing with heretics and rebels, moderation was not part of Alva’s vocabulary. Torture, or being “put to the question”, was used extensively to extract confessions and to implicate and locate others. Egmont’s principal servant was tortured, and statements as to his master’s

32

William the Silent and the Revolt

“treason” were obtained. Egmont and Hoorn were not “put to the ques­ tion” due to their status as members of the Order of the Golden Fleece, a distinguished order of historic Burgundy and the Holy Roman Empire. Even Alva held back from violating its holders. However, Egmont and Hoorn were securely held and could be dealt with later. As many as 8,900 individuals were charged and brought before the tri­ bunal, of which just over 1,000 were executed.3 A further 9,000 were con­ demned with fines or total confiscation of their goods and assets. William had not heeded Alva’s summons but instead had moved to Hei­ delberg, at the court of the Elector Palatine, a Calvinist, the brother-in-law of Count Egmont, and an elector of the Empire. The Elector Palatine was offering sanctuary to all those fleeing Alva’s harsh regime. William, as the Prince of Orange, had issued his Justification, a document which was pro­ duced, printed, and distributed widely, despite Alva’s penalties against any and all those who distributed or were found in possession of the document. The Justification implied William’s rejection of Catholicism – or its use of the extreme inquisition – but still proclaimed his loyalty to Spain and to King Philip II, however declaring against the mistaken and malicious coun­ sellors and ministers.4 It was not only an assertion of loyalty but also an effective propaganda technique for continuing the struggle. William then moved across the border, still keeping out of Alva’s reach, and raised some funds to start the Revolt. Later in the Revolt, in 1571, William was to move to the safer location of Delft, which was to remain his headquarters. Significantly, one of his first acts was to issue a decree through the city authorities imposing religious toleration. But for now he at Cleves and his brother Louis in Emden, supported by French Huguenot forces, were raising forces and marching back into the Netherlands – and to meet with defeat. The French Huguenot forces had started to move from the south but were soon cut off and decimated at St Valery by French royal forces. Louis crossed the border and entered the Netherlands in the extreme north. Gro ­ ningen, its citizens cowed, refused entry to Louis’ forces. He pressed on and Spanish forces from Brussels marched north to meet him under Alva’s army commanded by two of Alva’s lieutenants. By May 1568, they had located Louis and his army, divided their forces and skilfully manoeuvred, threat­ ening Louis’ forces in a pincer movement in the area around the convent of Heiligerlee. But Louis outmanoeuvred them and inflicted a significant defeat upon the Spanish. It was an initial victory for the Revolt. Alva in Brussels countered the news of this victory for the Revolt. Egmont and Hoorn were brought from Gent to Brussels and publicly exe­ cuted in the main square. The executions shocked moderate public opinion, and the subsequent trials and executions caused further resentment and an­ ger. With Egmont and Hoorn executed that left William of Orange at large and the only prominent focal point for any further opposition to Alva. But first, to deal with Louis,

Alva

33

Alva moved large numbers of troops out of Brussels and speedily marched north to meet Louis and engaged. Louis’ forces retreated and fell back to Jemmingen on the river Ems. The Spanish forces under Alva followed and engaged. Alva deployed his superior artillery, outgunning and out-firing Louis’ 16 cannon, and his advancing troops overwhelmed the defensive positions of the insurgents. They eventually broke and fled. Louis had been soundly defeated, and he only escaped by stripping off his armour and swimming across a river. Jemmingen effectively quelled this Dutch Revolt. William, determined to continue, had also crossed the border at Liege and made a foray into Brabant. Alva deployed forces and held them at Maastricht, watching and waiting. William advanced, but the supporting French forces upon whom he had counted failed to materialise in large numbers, and those that did were poor-quality troops. His forces were now in arrears in pay and were hungry. The local population, far from supporting them, proved hostile – they were hostile to any and all armies – and refused them provisions and shelter. He retreated across the border into France where he disbanded his forces. He paid them and settled their pay arrears. This was costly, but prudent. He was now extremely short of funds, but had he not settled the payment of his troops he would have great difficulty in recruiting in future. Spain was later to learn the hard way the lesson of paying troops. Alva had quelled the Revolt. His military actions had been ruthlessly successful. His policy as Captain General and effective ruler had been dictatorial, reactionary, and violent. The Council of Blood tribunal had been appalling in its practice. However, Alva also inaugurated reforms in that he unified and standardised the criminal law – the non-seditious, nontreasonable offences – throughout the provinces and codified financial law and practice. This last brought a measure of gratitude and apprecia­ tion from the merchants of Antwerp and the commercial interests of other towns. But Alva’s reorganisation of government, and its institutions and administration, which eradicated traditional customary practice and local laws, was to be wide-sweeping and radical. It caused upheaval and further resentment. Indeed, “the King planned to force upon the Netherlands uni­ formity unprecedented in the governments of the time”. 5 Also finances were to come to the fore. Philip II, while fully appreciating and praising Alva’s draconian effi­ ciency in re-establishing order, also made it quite clear, in a direct despatch for Alva’s view only, that the troops based and operating in the Netherlands could not be paid by the Spanish central treasury. Revenues to pay for Span­ ish forces in the Netherlands had to be raised from and within the Nether­ lands. Alva was nothing loathe to comply. He consulted with tax officials and financial experts within his entourage. Then in 1569 he convened – or confronted – representatives of the states of the different provinces of the Netherlands and, following the advice of his officials with whom he had consulted, requested that the states authorise three new taxes. These three

34

William the Silent and the Revolt

new taxes were the Hundredth Penny, the Twentieth Penny, and the Tenth Penny. The Twentieth Penny was a 5% tax in all property sales; the Tenth Penny was a 10% tax on all other sales, a small amount but wide-sweeping, for well-off and poor alike; the Hundredth Penny was a single, one-off oc­ casion 1% tax on all capital with the capital of an individual being assessed in a sliding scale depending on the revenue gained from that capital. Initially, there was some room for negotiation. The states consented to Hundredth Penny, and it was collected, bringing in a revenue for Alva’s administration of 3,628,507 florins.6 The states were concerned about the other two taxes – the Twentieth Penny and the Tenth Penny – as these were to be permanent. The states offered to Alva, instead of these two taxes, a single grant of 4 million florins to be raised over a two-year period and the whole sum to be collected and given over by late 1571. Alva accepted this. By 1570, he had achieved a repression of the Revolt, and by 1571, for what would be the only period in the whole decade of 1566–1576, for a whole year the troops of the Spanish administration in the Netherlands were maintained entirely from revenues raised from the Netherlands. This contrasted with every other year, when the proportions were to be between four and six times as much monies sent by Spain to the Netherlands as those raised in the Netherlands.7 Alva did indeed accept the single grant from the States-General. But his acceptance was only as a temporary compromise. He calculated that this, together with the revenues raised from the Hundredth Penny tax, would maintain his forces in the Netherlands up to 1571. But he insisted that the Twentieth and Tenth Penny taxes must be implemented and collected eventually. Further attempts at negotiations took place, and the states ac­ cepted the Twentieth Penny tax but refused point-blank to pay the Tenth Penny tax. By mid-1571, Alva resolved again on force. He rode roughshod over the States-General and appointed his own tax collectors, and in early 1572 troops were deployed in intimidation of shopkeepers and merchants in Brussels and other big towns, forcing them to open for business and pay the taxes on their takings. By this time, large sections of the population were active in a general tax strike or a refusal to pay taxes; this took place over large parts of the Netherlands. The Antwerp exchange closed. The weavers of Valenciennes went on strike. In Namur, residents let loose their dogs on tax collectors. In towns, people, rather than buy and sell food and incur a tax, resorted to direct bartering of food. The States of Flanders, Brabant, and Hainault sent delegates to Spain to remonstrate with King Philip, while in the north there was open hostility to any government officials. Groups of rebels were discreetly arming, but there appeared little that they could achieve and little prospect of success. Alva had apparently achieved everything King Philip had ordered. He had ruthlessly repressed the Revolt, chased down and executed suspected subversives and heretics, and imposed financial measures to pay for the

Alva

35

Spanish forces in the Netherlands. However, two fatal misjudgements had been made, one by Philip and one by Alva. Philip II, from a distance in Ma­ drid, underestimated how much Margaret had restored and stabilised the situation, and Alva in situ had failed to recognise how much opposition he had caused in his follow-through measures. Anti-Catholic sentiment remained strong among many parts of the coun­ try, Calvinism remained strong, and anti-Spanish anger and resentment remained strong. However, in terms of effective opposition by force, there were only remnants of insurgent forces. But one unit of the remnants of the insurgent forces remained active. After the failure of William’s invasion, his forces disbanded, and William fled to Germany, attempting to raise loans and funds from sympathetic Protestant princes in the Empire. His brother Louis and a small but deter­ mined group of remaining fighters went to France and enlisted with the Huguenot Protestant forces. During the mid- and late 1560s, while the escalating disturbances and riots were occurring, while Alva having arrived with troops convened the ‘Council of Blood’ and his draconian repression, while the fresh outbursts occurred against the hated taxes, - while all of these were occurring in the Low Countries, turbulent events had been also occurring in neighbouring France. From the early 1560s to the mid-1590s, France underwent a series of civil conflicts known collectively as the Wars of Religion. The wars were a tri-cornered armed struggle for power in France and formed part of the Counter-Reformation in France of the attempts of Catholic forces to ex­ tirpate Protestantism. There were three contesting forces. First, those of the French Crown led by King Charles IX, and after him, Henry III, and their politically astute mother Catherine de’ Medici. They were, natu­ rally, determined to maintain the royal power, and in wielding this power that France remain predominantly Catholic but with a limited degree of toleration to Protestants. Second, those of the Guise family, the Prince of Joinville, formerly the Duke of Guise, were rivals for power to the royal family. In 1576, Duke Henry I of Guise was to form and become the leader of the Catholic League, an association of powerful Catholic no­ bles and their military retainers. The Guise were committed to ensuring France remained Catholic, with little if any toleration for Protestants, and also they were rivals for power to the royal family. Third are the Huguenots, led by Admiral Coligny, a staunch Calvinist.8 These were the French Protestants who, though in a minority, could raise substantial funds and were concentrated in certain areas in France. When hostilities started, both England and Spain discreetly intervened in order to keep France divided. Elizabeth of England sent supplies and troops to rein­ force the Huguenots, while Philip of Spain sent funds to maintain the Catholic League, and his embassy in Paris had agents closely liaising with the Guise family.

36

William the Silent and the Revolt

Between the early 1570s and mid-1590s, there were no less than eight short Wars of Religion in France. Each one was terminated by an ad hoc peace between the protagonists, that sometime was official and ratified by the King, and at other times peace came about simply because both sides ceased fighting because of exhaustion. Whether a lull in the fighting or official truce, the period of peace was used by each side to change alliances among the nobility and the armed forces of each side to regroup and rearm and prepare for the next conflict. The third of these religious wars, that of 1569–1570, was ended by an official peace, the Peace of St Germain, rati­ fied by King Charles IX by the Edict of St Germain in August 1570. The Edict of St Germain extended the forms of freedom of worship to the Huguenots and permitted them to maintain standing armed forces based in certain designated cities. These cities were La Rochelle, Cognac, Mon­ tauban, and La Charitie. This effectively created a Huguenot area or en­ clave within France. Charles IX was bitterly criticised by his advisors for this. His advisors, supported by the extreme Catholic nobles, argued that it established a de facto state within a state in France, and they accurately predicted that Catholic opinion would be implacably opposed to this and that further conflicts would follow. There was a further significant aspect to the Edict of St Germain. Charles IX formally recognised William, the Prince of Orange, and Louis of Nassau as his kinsmen and friends. On the international level, this meant that, in a low-key way, Charles IX was po­ tentially supportive to the Dutch cause. William continued to travel around the Empire trying to raise funds, and Louis of Nassau made La Rochelle his safe haven and base and recruited Protestant fighters. During his disastrous attempted invasion through Friesland, Louis had hired a small fleet to safeguard his seaborne supply lines of provisions and munitions. These freelance sailors came from a variety of backgrounds – anti-Spanish patriots, Calvinists, freebooters, or outright criminal pirates – but all were hardened and experienced seamen. This meant Louis had at his disposal a small fleet of 15 ships, but after Jemmingen they had no paymaster and turned back to freebooting. William, anxious to build and maintain a war fleet, ‘adopted’ these “Gueux de Mer” or Sea Beggars, who had taken the defiant name of the rebels and adapted it for themselves as seagoing rebels. In his capacity as the sovereign prince of Orange, William issued the captains with official letters of Marck and reinforced them with seamen from England who had fled Alva’s persecution. Queen Elizabeth of England, supportive of the Revolt, allowed the “Sea Beggars” fleet to use English ports to refit, take on provi­ sions, and recruit and expand. They were under the command of a minor noble, William Lumey van der Marck, a fervent Calvinist and implacably anti-Spanish. His zeal did not discriminate between Spanish and neutral shipping, if the latter were deemed supplying the Spanish occupiers (or if they were good plunder).

Alva

37

The indiscriminate attacks backfired. The Spanish organised a seaborne counteroffensive and managed to locate eight of the Sea Beggars ships, frost and ice bound off Friesland, and destroyed them with cannon fire. By this time, neutral powers, including the Hanseatic League, had made loud and repeated representations and protests to Queen Elizabeth of England about the Sea Beggars’ constant attacks, and in March 1572 Elizabeth closed the English ports to them, specifying that her withdrawal of support was spe­ cifically to the fleet of William of Orange.9 Elizabeth was careful, however. The official proclamations in March 1572 of the Special Commissioners of Kent, Sussex Southampton, and the Isle of Wight stated the offences of the Sea Beggars were ‘acts of war’ for which they could be arrested – but there were no grounds for their apprehension and arrest as pirates or as rebels. And Elizabeth did ensure that every Sea Beggars ship and crew were allowed to leave (i.e. escape) the ports unmolested. Nonetheless, the English south coast ports, the only real safe haven of the Sea Beggars, were now closed to them. The Sea Beggars’ fleet cruised in low morale up and down the English Channel, looking for coastal targets to attack. Brielle in Holland was a small fishing port. When the Sea Beggars under their naval commander Lumey van der Marck approached, it had been temporarily left without a Spanish garrison. Alva had concentrated his forces along the French fron­ tier to guard against an attempted rebel invasion from the south. Brielle had one main street, lined with simple dwellings and building, and a small inner harbour. The inner harbour was a well-sheltered area for refuge, repairing, and refitting ships. The layout of the small port made easy and speedy the plundering raid under Lumey van der Marck’s second-in-command, Wil­ liam de Treslong. However, not only could the port itself be taken speedily, more important, given the support of the small population, it could effec­ tively be held. This became apparent to de Treslong who persuaded Lumey van der Marck to take, occupy, and hold Brielle. It was taken, the small population welcomed the occupiers, and detachments of Sea Beggars were posted. Alva had received intelligence of the Sea Beggars’ attack The Span­ ish ambassador in London sent an urgent dispatch to Alva informing him that the some of the Sea Beggars were speaking of how the port of Brielle could be the objective, but the dispatch arrived too late.10 But Count Bossu, the loyalist Spanish-appointed Stadhouder of Holland and commander of troops, on learning that the Sea Beggars had attacked, landed, and were at Brielle, quickly assembled troops and tried to contain the attack. How­ ever, the Sea Beggars managed to quickly land more men and outnumbered Bossu’s troops, who then withdrew. The Dutch Revolt had gained control of its first piece of territory. The capture of Brielle was an undoubted success and was followed up by the taking of the port of Vlissingen. William was cautious about the Sea Beggars. He knew William Lumey van de Marck to be an unprincipled

38

William the Silent and the Revolt

freebooter and a fanatical Calvinist. Extreme Calvinists in the Revolt were to be a source of anxiety to William as their fanaticism could compromise and distract from the essential nationalist ethos of the Dutch Revolt.11 Days after the taking of Brielle, a group of Catholic priests in the nearby village of Gorkum were taken prisoners and hanged on Lumey’s direct orders; in October that year, a priest and several monks from a religious house near Gouda were taken and again on Lumey’s direct orders were summarily killed. Left untrammelled, Lumey and his fanatical Calvinist ilk could do more harm than good to the cause. However, William’s brother Louis of Nassau was less hesitant. Seeing Brielle as the first captured territory in the Revolt, he was determined to maintain the momentum. He hastily ordered his own Sea Beggar fleet vessels, presently in sanctuary at La Rochelle, to set sail. He targeted the port of Vlissingen, a fishing port to the south in Zeeland. The population of Vlissingen openly rebelled, declaring that they would only accept a garrison under William of Orange’s troops. The Brussels-appointed tax collector was murdered by a mob. The Brussels gov­ ernment troops in Vlissingen were expelled, and the Revolt had gained its second port. Only five days after Brielle had fallen, Vlissengen was also under Dutch rebel control and the populace acclaiming William and the Revolt. It took all of Bossu’s efforts and troops to secure and hold the Zeeland port of Middelburg. In May, the port of Enkhuizen declared for William. The sentiment was anti-Spanish, but the wealthier inhabitants were also appealing to William to restore order in a port in turmoil with mob violence. Between June and July, other towns inland in Holland defected from Spanish rule and de­ clared for William. Dordrecht, Bommel, Buren, Delft, Leiden, Naarden, Medemblik, Gouda, Oudewater, and the ports of Alkmaar and Hoorn, all placed themselves under William and the Revolt. By August 1572, a large part of Holland and Zeeland was under the control of William. Alva attempted to restore the situation by inviting – or summoning – all the main towns of the province of Holland to send representatives to a meeting of the States of Holland in the Hague. The rebel council of Dordre­ cht countered by inviting all the towns in Holland to send representatives to a meeting in Dordrecht. Twelve of the 18 towns in Holland responded to Dordrecht, sending representatives there, and shunning Alva’s projected meeting. Most of the nobility of Holland also attended the Dordrecht meet­ ing. William, as the Count of Nassau and the Prince of Orange, sent Philip Marnix de St Aldegonde as his representative to the Dordrecht meeting. In a historic meeting on 19 July 1572, Philip Marnix de St Aldegonde addressed the meeting, and after discussions it was agreed12 that all rec­ ognised William the Prince of Orange and Count of Nassau as the King’s Stadtholder in Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht. There was to be a common budget available to pay for troops and sailor and ships currently fighting in the prince’s name. Broad-based religious toleration was agreed, includ­ ing Catholicism. Some days later, governmental structures and institutions

Alva

39

were agreed. The individual provinces of states were to retain their Accounting Offices (Rekenkamer) and High Courts, but coming under the States-General were the Admiralty Colleges, and the Finance College. A Gecommiteerde Raad, or States Committee, was to advise and support the prince. A de facto constitution and government of the nation had come into being. Meanwhile in the far north, Sea Beggar raids on Friesland were repulsed by the Spanish-appointed Stadtholder Giles de Robles, who showed both drive and energy in suppressing insurgency in Friesland. The towns of Sneek, Bolsward, Franeker, and Dokkum rose in Revolt and held out. How­ ever, de Robles secured first Groningen and then the large and key city of Leeuwarden. The Revolt was being contained in Friesland, but it still had a toehold and was now being financed. Immediately after the capture of Vlissingen, the Sea Beggars engaged in privatereering, preying on merchant shipping making for the mouth of the Scheldt to Antwerp. This proved lucrative, and from the proceeds they  – and William and the Revolt – were able to refit their aging vessels and replenish supplies and still give over some proceeds to the Revolt. However, this was lucrative only in the short term as neutral traders – potential ship­ ping victims – were driven from the river. By early 1573, they had ceased to attack and seize neutral shipping, instead substituting it with a system of “licences” or “tolls” which replaced tolls that had previously been lev­ ied by the towns by the river. The terms they used were “convoys” which levied on all imports entering Scheldt from neutral shipping and “licences” on all imports and exports to and from enemy-held territory, that is, from Spain and the southern provinces, and any exports exiting the Scheldt from Antwerp. In this way, forms of trade continued, although Antwerp’s share decreased, and any trade exports became more expensive, further reducing its revenues. The Revolt gained a steady source of revenues.13 A northern front opened up for the Revolt when the port of Enkhuizen, situated in the north of the province of Holland, was captured. From this, the Sea Beggars’ fleet was reinforced by 14 captured ships, all newly fitted out for service. Later in the year, the Sea Beggars were to supplement their fleet and supplies when they captured another Zeeland port, Zierikzee, and took 8 more warships and 27 naval guns. During this engagement, Bossu himself was taken prisoner. He was a useful hostage and bargaining coun­ ter for William. The Sea Beggars taking the ports may have been an isolated action mo­ tivated partly by private greed and desperation for supply ports and only partly in support for the Revolt. However, these actions were to form part of a multipronged invasion by the rebel forces. Louis of Nassau, having travelled at speed from Vlissengen to France, raised and led a force of French Protestant fighters and, in May 1572, approached the city of Mons. Also, a relative of William the Silent had raised a force in the Empire and advanced from the east and invaded the Netherlands through Gelderland.

40

William the Silent and the Revolt

Another force of French Protestants in mid-July came from the south ad­ vancing in the direction of Mons as reinforcements for troops of Louis. William himself led a force from the Empire and deployed them in towns in the south-east, in particular targeting towns in the province of Limbourg. Alva was faced with an invasion on three or even four fronts. He took a major strategic decision, concentrating and deploying the bulk of his forces to the south. The south was where the forces of two of the main leaders of the Revolt, William and his brother Louis, were. Equally important, if this situation worsened, France would be tempted to declare war and intervene and range the French army against Alva. Alva rapidly increased his troop numbers, recruiting and forming loyal Flemish units. Then he made a quick strike south of Mons in late July, destroying the French reinforcement head­ ing for Mons, and eventually he took the city of Mons itself. This was fol­ lowed up by repulsing and defeating the forces led by William, which had been diverted to urgently attempt to relieve the pressure on the rebel forces in the Mons area. At the same time as Alva was stabilising the southern front and restor­ ing control in the south, significant developments were also occurring in France. The leader of the French Protestant, Admiral Coligny, was assas­ sinated, immediately followed by an organised massacre of Protestants, known to history as the Massacre of St Bartholomew. This accentuated the religious and political factions and divisions in France and embroiled France into further internal conflict. There would be no further French intervention in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. Alva, as we have seen, could act quickly and decisively. However, be­ ing both an experienced soldier and administrator, he knew the value of careful reflection when time permitted. Having dealt with the threat from the south, he paused and carefully chose his next move. Dozens of towns in the north had declared for the Revolt, many of them well-fortified. The Netherlands was one of the most densely populated areas in Europe, and many such towns were in close proximity to each other. The Spanish could not reduce them all, and to attempt to do so would involve the armies in lengthy sieges. In such prolonged siege warfare, Spanish forces would be­ come bogged down, mired in a semi-static war, and vulnerable to a nimbler enemy engaging in what would later be known as guerrilla war. Alva selected certain towns, strategically located, to besiege and make an example of them (as if by now the Netherlanders needed a show or an ex­ ample of how merciless Alva could be). The town of Zutphen was advanced upon, taken, and its defending troops and citizens ruthlessly massacred. The massacre at Zutphen by Alva’s victorious troops reverberated past Gel­ derland. The towns of Sneek, Bolsward, and Franeker, holding out for the Revolt, submitted and surrendered to pro-loyalist troops of the Spanishappointed Stadtholder de Robles. Alva then advanced his forces north and laid siege to Naarden. He of­ ficially called upon the town to surrender, which it first refused but later,

Alva

41

after putting up a very short resistance, submitted. However, its tardiness in surrendering gave Alva the pretext he needed. All the surviving troops of the garrison of Naarden and all the surviving inhabitants were massacred. Alva’s grim strategy at Zutphen and Naarden appeared to work initially. When Spanish troops moved towards Haarlem, a delegation from that city hastily came and attempted to start talks for surrender terms. However, the delegates in doing so were seeking negotiations; Alva expected uncon­ ditional surrender. The delegates were summarily sent away by Alva’s son Don Fernando de Toledo, Alva being ill and convalescing at Nijmegan. Don Fernando was as ruthless and fanatical as his father and intensely arrogant. He sent the delegation from Haarlem away with the recommendation that they reconsider, with the implied command that next time they come it would be to surrender unconditionally. However, the defenders of Haarlem had been reportedly inspired by one of the legendary heroes of the Dutch Revolt, Kenau, the wife of a merchant. She was determined to resist and inspired the defenders to do so. They had all learned of nearby Naarden which had surrendered, yet still suffered massacre, and the defenders of Haarlem felt that they had nothing to lose in resisting. The massacre at Naarden, far from cowing the Dutch, had stiffened their resolve to fight. Haarlem’s defences were not strong, but it was surrounded by a network of small canals which were fed by two major canal ways. The defenders used these and built up strong defence works inside the older dilapidated ones and strengthened the gateways. These were vigorously held against Spanish attacks, the Dutch being led by the resourceful commander van Hogensteyn and by the ever-present Kenau and the other militant women of Haarlem. There was heavy fighting around the Jansenpoort, leading to the centre which held. However, by July 1573, lack of supplies and food affected the defenders, and the Spanish finally broke through, firing the Kruispoort gate and quickly overwhelming the emaciated defenders.14 The defenders of Haarlem had put up a long and determined resistance, but with this breakthrough it was over. In July 1573, Haarlem surrendered. Learning of the extent and nature of the resistance of Haarlem, and the events of the Revolt, one of Philip II’s advisors, the Duke of Medinaceli, warned that the current situation in the Netherlands, if it not treated with caution, would result in a lengthy conflict. But Alva and his son weren’t daunted. The surviving garrison of Haarlem numbering 2,300 were executed, together with 60 of the most prominent citizens of Haarlem. As a sign of possible mercy, the remaining citizens of Haarlem were spared. Not surprising, the Dutch remained unim­ pressed and unconvinced that this was merciful. The siege had cost Philip II heavily, as much as 2 million ducats.15 The spirited defence of Haarlem surprised the Spanish. Alva wrote to Philip “never had a city been so capably defended”.16 However, its fall was a blow to the Revolt. The fall of Haarlem af­ fected one of the prominent towns of Holland, Gouda. In late 1573, after

42

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Haarlem had fallen, a plot by a group of royalists, including some mem­ bers of the town council, was made to stage a coup and take Gouda back into the loyalist side. A pro-Spanish noble was approached who promised a general pardon should the coup succeed. Two attempts were made, the first was aborted by the arrival of Dutch troops to garrison the town, and then the second attempt failed as well. Pro-Orange loyalists restored or­ der, two of the conspirators were executed, and Gouda remained loyal to the Revolt. Nonetheless, despondency and resentment remained in Gouda, whose town council constantly complained and demonstrated about the expenses they were forced to outlay in support of the Revolt. Gouda’s per­ ceived small-mindedness and parochialism was resented by the rest of the province of Holland. William and the Revolt could ill-afford such divisions within the province which was one of the main drivers of the Revolt. Alva then moved northwards against Alkmaar. It seemed an easy tar­ get, despite the Italian-style fortifications, and it appeared from intelligence that the population there favoured a quick surrender. However, Alkmaar refused to surrender and resisted. It was surrounded by a wide moat, and the defenders deliberately flooded the surrounding countryside. For six weeks, hampered by the floodwaters, the Spanish tried to force entry, but, increasingly frustrated, Alva ordered the siege to be lifted. He dismissed this as a minor setback, but the failure to take Alkmaar was to prove more significant in the long term. It was the first Dutch town to successfully hold out against the Spanish. Also, Alva should have paid more attention to the Dutch tactic of flooding. Moreover, Alva, by going so far north as Alkmaar, had turned his back on the south. There, in the south, the large port of Middelburg had fallen to the rebel forces. Middelburg had been the one significant town in Zeeland that had remained loyal to Spain while the rest of the province joined the Revolt. Now all of the province of Zeeland was solidly pro-William and the Revolt. However, at the time the Spanish army’s aggressive advance continued. Philip had become dissatisfied with Alva’s campaign and its growing ex­ pense and replaced Alva as governor of the Netherlands.

Notes 1 C Oman The XVI Century p 91 2 Staatsarchief Delft 406 3 PH Wilson The Thirty Years War – Europe’s Tragedy p 129. Also in the work endnote 16 gives and summarises other historian’s input. 4 “May his Majesty being instructed by light and by heaven turn and prevent further disasters; may he learn rightly to understand the actions of his good and faithful subjects at present wrongly slandered, persecuted and oppressed”. 5 CR Stein Margaret of Parma – A Life p 274 6 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 115 7 G Parker The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1597–1659 chapter 6 p 119

Alva

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8 Traditionally, the post of Admiral of France was that of a serving sailor in the navy rising up to command the navy. However, by the sixteenth century, the post-holder wax entirely preoccupied with administrative and financial duties. Coligny himself was an army officer, a colonel of an infantry regiment; he had been raised to the post of Admiral by his administrative abilities and family influence at the court. 9 The Warden of the Cinque Ports – the crucial ports on the south coast of England – ordered that “no matter of victuals from henceforth shall pass to be carried to the sea for the victualling ore relief of the fleet currently serving the Prince of Orange” 10 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 125 11 MO Connell The Counter-Reformation 1559–1610 p 25 12  R esoluties de Eerste Vrie Statenvergadering gehouden te Dordrecht 19 tot 23 July 1572 met instructie voor Marnix de Marnix de St Aldegonde van Marnix de St Aldegonde 14/7/1572 Regional Archives Dordrecht/1076 13 ST Bindoff The Scheldt Question to 1839 pp 83–84. This often underestimated work gives an account of trade and diplomacy around the river Scheldt and Antwerp through the ages from the thirteenth century to the end and settle­ ment of the nineteenth-century Belgian Revolt. It has a high degree of schol­ arship combined with an easy style. It was Bindoff’s first publication and set him on the way to becoming a well-respected sixteenth-century historian. He became Professor of History at one of the colleges of London University and had pioneered several distinguished historical projects, including the sixteenthcentury volume of History of Parliament 14 Archives Provincie Noord – Holland KNA006000679 15 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 132 16 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 62

4  Diplomatic glove covers military fist – but neither have finances

In the chessboard of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European diplo­ macy, Spain was the country that counted in both strength and power. Arguably, it was served by the highest calibre of diplomats. Within Europe, efficient diplomatic services had developed and evolved over the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The diplomatic service of Spain since as early as the various alliances and conflicts leading up to the 1495 Treaty of Ven­ ice had developed well ahead of the other countries.1 The other countries – France, England, the Vatican under Clement VII, the Holy Roman Empire under Maximilian I and the individual states within the Empire, the Republic of Venice, and the Dukedom of Savoy – also strengthened their respective diplomatic services. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain was still ahead in terms of a service in scale, operating efficiency, and calibre of diplomats. The wide-flung nature of the Spanish Empire and the delays in communication accentuated by Philip II, who micro-managed the handling and scrutinising of despatches, meant that the King, his ministers, and his advisers in Madrid were dependent upon a steady stream of informative and accurate reports from their repre­ sentatives in the Spanish possessions and the diplomats in the European cap­ itals. In Europe, diplomats like Rodrigo Gonzalez de la Puebla, Bernardino de Mesa, and Diego de Acuna, Count Gondomar to the Court of St James in London; Nicholas Perrenot de Granvelle, the Cardinal to the Holy See in Rome; Juan de Onate in the Court of St James and later in the Holy See in Rome; and Baltasar de Zuniga in the Court of French kings in Paris and then in the Court of Hapsburg Emperor in Vienna, all were experi­ enced and had consummate diplomatic skills in formulating informative despatches, submitting analytical counsel and engaging in intrigue. One serving member of this able diplomatic service was Luis de Reques­ ens y Zuniga. Requesens was a Spanish nobleman and diplomat and for­ merly Governor of Milan where he governed wisely and with moderation. He had no sympathy with rebellion against the Spanish Crown but would avoid the totally fanatical and intransigent approach of Alva, who stepped down and returned to the court in Madrid, still useful to Philip and still offering counsel.

Diplomatic glove covers military fist

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As the new governor, General Requesens was instructed by Philip to end the current hostilities by conciliation. He was to end the current hostilities because of the spiralling expense, but the long-term Spanish objective re­ mained, that of pacification of the Netherlands under Spanish rule, and that it remained Catholic. He arrived in Brussels in October 1573. Reviewing the situation, he realised the heightened levels of resistance and resolution by the Dutch, caused by Alva’s massacres. Cardinal Granvelle, now serving in Italy but still watching and following events in the Netherlands, had ob­ served when Alva was still the governor that he, Alva, “…should remember there are soldiers defending other towns who, facing the same treatment as the garrison of Haarlem, will fight to the last man”. 2 Requesens and the Spanish targeted the town of Leiden. Like Haarlem, Leiden had well-built bastions and was surrounded by a moat. The sur­ rounding countryside was wetlands, and the garrison amounted to a sub­ stantial number of defenders. However, there were local individuals against the Revolt, and these could, if treated sensibly, serve as useful guides for the advancing Spanish troops. In the taking of Leiden, combined with the fall of Haarlem, the Revolt would be cut into two, splitting north Holland from south Holland and Zeeland. In early 1573, the Spanish armies deployed and advanced over the wetlands near Leiden and began the siege. Requesens made overtures to the Dutch, sending envoys to William for peace. In November 1573, Requesens, through a Spanish officer named Colo­ nel Romero, attempted preliminary negotiations with William and the Dutch. Romero’s unit was guarding Marnix de St Aldegonde, who was taken pris­ oner earlier in the year. Romero was an experienced soldier and a pragmatic individual. He discussed the possibility of a settlement with Marnix de St Al­ degonde and persuaded the latter to write a letter outlining broad suggestions for peace terms. Marnix de St Aldegonde, preferring the role of compliant prisoner of war treated honourably rather than being treated as a Calvinist heretic and rebel, complied and wrote to William and sent follow-up mes­ sages urging William to consider. William received and accepted both letter and messages but regarded them with misgivings. Marnix de St Aldegonde, inevitably affected by captivity, may have fallen into a trap and the Spanish overtures looked treacherously plausible. However, duty-bound, he informed the States of Holland and put the suggestion to them in late 1573. At the meeting in Rotterdam, William exhorted the States of Holland to reject these overtures. To William’s relief, the States of Holland needed little convincing to do so. But Philip did not publicly make any official endorsement of the peace overtures. Moreover, the Dutch had seen and remembered the violations of the laws of war in the Spanish massacres of the surrendering Dutch troops at Zutphen, at Naarden, and at Haar­ lem. Besides, Requesens’ suggested terms for peace did not sanction two long-standing and essential Dutch demands, those of religious toleration and withdrawal of Spanish troops. William and the States of Holland re­ jected Requesens’ offers of conciliation.

46

William the Silent and the Revolt

The Dutch realised the significance of Leiden. In his headquarters at Delft, among many other pressing matters, including the settling the squab­ bling among some rebel factions, William insisted that the relief of Leiden was essential and must be the priority. Haarlem had fallen so Leiden had to be relieved at all costs.3 In the words of a Dutch historian “…had Leiden fallen, the Hague and Delft would have been untenable, and the Revolt as a whole might have collapsed”.4 Louis of Nassau, true to character, took quick action. He raised a force of over 9,000 troops within the Empire. 5 However, many of these troops deserted, due to a cause common to all mercenary armies – lack of or delays in pay. Then the Spanish inflicted further casualties in a surprise hit-and­ run attack. Louis arrived in the Netherlands with his forces reduced by over a thousand troops. Requesens was no gifted soldier, but he could recognise a relief column, and he realised that Louis’ forces were making to relieve besieged Leiden. He broke off the siege, deploying nearly 6,000 infantry and cavalry to con­ front Louis’s forces. Ably led by the Spanish commander, Bernardino de Mendoza, in mid-April 1574, these forces outmanoeuvred Louis, hemming him in and forcing him to engage which he did at the battle of Mookerheide, near Nijmegen. Louis deployed his cavalry and charged, attempting to break the encirclement, but he was wounded and the Spanish cavalry which contained units of well-trained Lancers, made several counter-charges and inflicted crippling losses on the Dutch cavalry. The Spanish infantry then moved in and dispersed the badly shaken Dutch infantry, remnants of which retreated in disarray. The mercenary contingents of the Dutch infan­ try withdrew. The Dutch had suffered 3,000 casualties in the defeat. Then it was the turn of the Spanish to suffer a setback. The Spanish troops mutinied, with several regiments demanding the settlement of pay arrears. Requesens quickly settled these, but it cost 500,000 ducats,6 mon­ ies the Spanish treasury could ill-afford, and it had delayed the siege of Lei­ den, which was resumed in May 1574. But the Dutch, besides their relieving forces being repulsed, had lost an able, energetic, if impulsive, leader. Louis of Nassau died of his wounds after retreating from the battle. Also Henry, another brother of William, had been killed at Mookerheide. There seemed little prospect that the besieged Leiden could be relieved. Requesens, being an able diplomat, realised that military success needed to be accompanied by negotiations, and he, again in mid-1574, tried concil­ iation. He realised the difficult financial expenditure needed to subdue the Revolt and the dire financial straits of the Spanish finances. And indeed, in 1575, Philip II was to declare the first bankruptcy of the Spanish Treasury – one of several over the coming decades – and his coming to an arrangement with his creditors. Of the suppressing the Revolt, Requesens wrote: There would not be time nor money enough in the world to reduce by the force the twenty four towns which have rebelled in Holland, if we

Diplomatic glove covers military fist

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are to spend as long in reducing each one of them we have taken over similar ones so far.7 He lifted the Tenth Penny tax and offered a general pardon. It was noted by William and pointed out to the States of Holland that Philip II had not endorsed the offer of a pardon. In fact, Philip, after much internal anxieties and torments, had sanctioned peace overtures and had despatched no less than four differing draft pardons to Requesens8 to be used by the latter as he deemed appropriate. William was not deceived. Meanwhile the siege of Leiden continued. The town’s defences had not been strengthened during the temporary halt in the siege when Spanish troops had been drawn away to meet and defeat Louis of Nassau’s forces, nor had fresh stores and supplies been laid in. Consequently, the defences of Leiden’s were weaker due to this complacency by its citizens and defenders. As stated, William made the relief of Leiden his priority. With his broth­ ers’ relieving forces routed, and the loss of his brothers, personal and as military leaders, and the Leiden defenders running out of food, supplies, and ammunition, he took recourse to another solution, utilising the same factor that had saved Alkmaar – water. Leiden’s position, in low-lying ter­ ritory between the great rivers of the Ijssel and the Maas, gave a possibility of flooding the area. If the waters were high enough, at a push a relief force could be floated by barge the 27 miles from Rotterdam to Leiden. His mil­ itary advisors were in favour but warned him that it was only a possibility. At the meeting at Rotterdam with the States of Holland, William convinced the States not to take the bait of Requesens’ offer of general pardon and negotiations and, turning to the priority of the siege of Leiden, exhorted that the necessary sluices be opened, the dykes in some places be breached, and the land be flooded. A young official in the States of Hol­ land had studied law at several European universities and on the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt immediately gave his full support to the Revolt. This official travelled the area observing, tirelessly persuading and reassuring landowners, and giving counsel and advice to the states on the breaking of the dykes. This was not the end of his valuable services. The Revolt and the Dutch Republic were to experience more and to owe much to Jan van Oldenbarneveldt. By August 1574, the supplies in Leiden were extremely low, and by early September citizens were facing starvation. To make matters worse, William fell seriously ill and was incapacitated during August 1574. Overwork, the strain of leading the Revolt, sleepless nights, all had made him vulnerable to fever which he caught. That month a heat-wave occurred, which made his condition worse. He was unable to sit up for more than a few minutes. Messengers from Leiden had managed to escape through the Spanish siege lines and made it to the Rotterdam, where William was bedridden in the first floor of St Sebastien’s militia barracks, attended by baffled doctors. The messengers were shocked and shaken by his condition, but he was able

48

William the Silent and the Revolt

to assure them that help was on the way to the besieged city, if they would only hold on and the messengers in turn pledged that the city would keep resisting. The States of Holland also gave them a message to the defenders, “Leiden saved is Holland saved”.9 A famous surgeon, Pieter van Foreest, was called in and immediately pre­ scribed a different, healthier diet and ensured the patient had rest. Within three weeks, William had recovered and was able to personally inspect the fleet of barges and light craft being assembled for the attempted relief of Leiden. His illness had been a crisis for the Revolt and had brought home to the States of Holland and Zeeland, and to the Dutch commanders, how much the Revolt depended upon him. The sluices were opened, dykes were breached, and on 10 September a fleet of barges under the Admiral of the Sea Beggars, Admiral Boisot, set out from Rotterdam carrying Dutch relieving troops. But the flood waters, while moving, were rising only slowly, and the barges were poled along shallow water slowly and with difficulty. They were met by the long-raised barrier, the Landscheiding which had been built specifically to guard Lei­ den and the countryside against sudden flooding. This was reached, and time had to be spent breaching this barrier in several places so the flood waters could flow. Finally, the waters flowed. Boisot was able to float his barges nearer Leiden, but then they came up against a raised highway, known as the Voorweg, which had been heavily fortified by the Spanish troops supported at various key points by artillery. Boisot then had to halt and regroup for three days in order to bring up Dutch artillery which was mounted on the barges. They then continued to float slowly in the shallow waters, often being heaved and pushed by infantry, towards Leiden. They made an attack on the Voorweg, answer­ ing the Spanish artillery fire with cannon fire from those mounted on the barges. However, the attack could not be sustained, and the Spanish held the Voorweg. Boisot’s forces retreated and reconnoitred the Voorweg. After a further few days, they found a suitable unguarded point and, in a sud­ den intensive bombardment, breached the fortified Voorweg, allowing the waters to flow through. It seemed the last barrier was overcome, and the barges with the relieving troops poured through. Then, however, the wind changed, and the floodwaters were substantially reduced and the barges stuck. By late September 1573, William himself had arrived on the scene and was exhorting and encouraging, sending messages by signal flags to the starving citizens of Leiden, and exuding a confidence though secretly despairing. The winds still prevented the waters from rising. Then, sud­ denly on 1 October the wind direction changed, exactly at the time of high tide and the waters rapidly rose and the barges gained speed. The Spanish troops forming defensive lines outside Leiden found themselves in leg-high water, then chest-high water and still rising; they broke and retreated. The barges with the reliving troop and much-needed food supplies floated into Leiden. Leiden had held.

Diplomatic glove covers military fist

49

After the relief of Leiden in early October 1574, there were further attempts at peace negotiations. The successful relief of Leiden showed Requesens that the Dutch Revolt was not to be so easily defeated. Philip had already given his assent to negotiations, provided that any agreement Requesens managed to secure still protected the Catholic faith and his own royal authority. Requesens delegated the carrying out of the negotiations to a small team led by Albertus Leoninus. Leoninus was a jurist and dis­ tinguished scholar, and was known and had been on friendly terms with William, visiting William’s home in Brussels in the pre-Revolt years.10 Leoninus’ team came with preliminary terms to the offer of the general pardon, being proclaimed by a royal proclamation, and restoration of priv­ ileges of the nobles and those of the states. They still, mistakenly, thought that the religious issue could be negotiated and a favourable compromise achieved. In informal meetings, Leoninus pointed out to William that any revolt against a more powerful enemy would inevitably end badly for the rebels and that it was in his and the Dutch interests to compromise. William replied that all his followers must be included in the restoration of privileges and of confiscated property, and he made it quite clear that in Holland and Zeeland the new religious establishment – Calvinism – would remain. He further stated that toleration to Catholics was possible in Holland and Zeeland, provided similar toleration to Protestants was established in all other provinces. Formal talks between the two negotiating teams began in Breda on 3 March 1575. The Breda talks initially generated some optimism. In early May, a contemporary chronicler was recording that the ordinary citizen of Amsterdam was convinced that peace was assured.11 However, this optimism soon disappeared. Before the formal talks began, a preliminary petition had been submit­ ted by the States-General, advised by William. It requested that foreign troops, that is, Spanish, leave the Netherlands and that the States-General be convened and be responsible for restoring order. It carefully avoided mentioning the religious questions. After two weeks, Requesens’ delegates gave their response. The substance of the response was almost the same as before – restoration of property and privileges to Catholics and a general pardon. The calling of the States-General and withdrawal of Spanish troops was not ruled out, but only after further progress on discussions could these be considered. Also, Catholic worship should be tolerated in Holland and Zeeland, and Protestants, that is, Calvinists, should leave within a time period. The States-General delegates made it clear that Protestants leaving was out of the question, and they wished for some form of further guarantees that any finalised agreement would be honoured. After internal consul­ tations within Holland and Zeeland and two other towns outside these provinces, the Dutch unanimously – and unsurprisingly– agreed that the Spanish terms were totally unacceptable. The talks had reached deadlock

50

William the Silent and the Revolt

over the religious issue and the rights of the provinces to have a part in government. The states then offered a concession, namely that the religious issues and that any future guarantees could be submitted to a future States-General. This appeared to be a concession, but the Dutch knew that public opinion in every province was fervently wishing the departure of Spanish troops and therefore would present a solid front with Holland and Zeeland; they also knew that such consultation and collaboration with the States-General was a step too far for Philip. Requesens realised that positions of the two sides were too far apart to enable compromise and that any concessions he made to narrow the gap would be unacceptable to Philip, who had maintained silence through­ out, giving no guidance or authorisation as to what could or could not be granted. The talks at Breda, faltering in circles for some time, were finished. Twelve weeks of talks and negotiations were ended. In July 1575, Reques­ ens withdrew the Spanish delegation. The cause of the talks being broken off was religion, in which the Spanish position was irreconcilable with the Dutch demand for toleration. However, the whole process had been a sym­ bolic gain for the Dutch, as they had appeared conciliatory and as Philip II, in agreeing to the talks (though keeping silent throughout), had afforded the Dutch a form of recognition. An outbreak of Calvinist extremism occurred in parts of the extreme north in mid-1575. Since Alkmaar had successfully repelled the Spanish in 1573, there was a constant fear that another Spanish thrust northward would occur. When Haarlem fell, William appointed separate commanders to the north, the Northern Quarter, and to south Holland. The commander of the Northern Quarter was Diederik Sonoy. He was an able defensive commander ideal for constructing defence lines of the North Quarter against another Spanish invasion, exploiting the various waterways and sea channels that crisscrossed the area. He was loyal to William and the Revolt, and a fanatical Calvinist. Sonoy commanded “Beggar” troops, ferocious fighters, but of the same ill-disciplined freebooting type as the Sea Beggars, and extremely anti-Catholic. When Alkmaar went over to the Revolt, Sonoy’ s troops beat up and hanged six Franciscan monks from a local convent. In fairness, Sonoy later disciplined and hanged one of his officers who had tortured and murdered a priest. However, this appears to have been an exception; generally, he tolerated his men oppressing and as­ saulting Catholics. In fact, Catholicism in the rural area between Haarlem, Alkmaar, and Hoorn – the rural area of the Northern Quarter – continued to be practised throughout the Revolt.12 Those Catholics were non-militant and law-abiding, but their very presence and religion was felt to be a threat by the extreme Calvinist Sonoy. Sonoy and his commanders and fellow ad­ ministrators of the North Quarter were constantly vigilant to both Spanish military activity and to any internal subversion among the populace of the North Quarter.

Diplomatic glove covers military fist

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In April 1575, rumours were circulating that a plot was afoot by a group of individuals to betray Alkmaar. On learning of this rumour, Sonoy or­ dered the detention of all strangers. A group of 20 individuals, mostly va­ grants, were seized and tortured. Under torture, they confessed to planning sabotage and named others as those who had approached and incited them to join the plot. These others were in turn arrested and tortured, and they gave up the identity of a small group of individuals living in Hoorn known as the leaders. This small group were Catholics. Both sets of suspects who had been interrogated under torture had been promised their lives if they gave up other names. Their captors reneged on the promises made to them, and most of the wretched suspects were publicly executed. Several of them, executed in different locations shouted out at their executions that all their confessions were false, had been ex­ tracted under torture, and the individuals they had named under torture were innocent. Sonoy and his inquisitors, undaunted, arrested in Hoorn the small group of Catholics named as the leaders. These were respectable citizens, one of them a capable lawyer. So far, there had been no evidence against them except that wrung out under torture of other individuals. But these alleged ringleaders were Catholics, a sinister aspect in Sonoy’s view. The suspects were taken to another part of the North Quarter, incarcerated in a small castle of Schagen and subjected to torture. However, the retracted confes­ sions of those already executed had already caused some public unease. Also within Hoorn, the friends of those taken to Schagen and several mem­ bers of the Hoorn town council, on realising what was occurring against respectable citizens of Hoorn, acted. They sent appeals to the central court of the province of Holland and made direct appeals to William. William sent agents to make inquiries, Sonoy attempted to frustrate their inquiries claiming that the rule of law and any criminal procedures were superseded by the Spanish threat and the war. However, William, though pressed and preoccupied with other events, persisted in his intervention, and the final result was the release of those Catholic suspects of Hoorn. The lawyer among them was even able later to bring a civil action against Sonoy (which dragged out and remained unresolved). William had deemed it “…more important to uphold the rule of law rather than to back Sonoy and his colleagues”.13 By 1573, William had converted to Calvinism. A we have seen, he was vigilant about some of his supporters committing injustices and, in the case of Lumey, atrocities against Catholics, and alienating moderate popular support. His Calvinist pastor was Jean Taffin. Taffin was an able religious scholar and in the 1550s had been a senior member of staff in the archives of Cardinal Granvelle when the latter was the Bishop of Arras. He moved to Geneva, further studied under Beza, and became a Calvinist. Also, signif­ icantly, he was joined on the spiritual staff of William by Pierre Loyseleur de Villiers, who proved himself a shrewd analyst and advisor to William

52

William the Silent and the Revolt

and ably handled intelligence matters. Villiers with his analytical mind and Marnix de St Aldegonde with his codebreaking ability were to become among William’s most loyal and steadfast supporters, advisors, and a for­ midable intelligence team. During the talks however, a significant development had occurred on the Dutch side. In June 1575, the Union of Delft was agreed, when the prov­ inces of Holland and Zeeland agreed to unite in a joint political, financial, and military union. It was the first stage of a Dutch state. The two prov­ inces agreed to common taxes (though not a unified taxation system) and joint administrative structure and a single military command of all their forces under William of Orange. William was granted interim powers to appoint all civil appointments. He was even given the power of conferring protectorate over the two provinces, which would and did enable him to offer sovereignty to a foreign ruler, if he deemed it necessary.14 Calvinism was to be the official religion, but there were guarantees to all individuals of freedom of conscience and freedom to practice in private other religions. The province of Utrecht joined the two provinces in a union later. Signifi­ cantly, both provinces quietly refused the jurisdiction of the States-General in Brussels. This was made clear when the States of Zeeland refused the general subsidy to the States of Brabant and officially stated that in the issues of raising funds and raising troops and in issues of peace and war it would carry out any such action in accordance with the terms of the Union of Holland and such actions would be taken only in conjunction with the province of Holland. Finances were to be a constant problem to William and the Revolt. He had imposed a wealth tax in 1572, and in December he ordered the arrest of all who had not paid; if the individual head of the household defaulters could not be apprehended, then his wife was to be arrested. The drastic nature of such action indicated the constant and urgent need throughout the Revolt – for finances. After the relief of Leiden, several of the towns of Holland, who had agreed through the States of Holland to pay for troops, went back on this decision. They amended their pledge and only agreed to provide two-thirds of the agreed sum. William, angry and anxious to avoid a mutiny among the troops who would be short of pay as a result, threatened to resign all his offices and leave the country. The States of Holland urgently convened and agreed to provide the full agreed sums. Subsequent taxes on wealth and income were levied to provide funds. Loans were raised targeting the wealthy with an undertaking of giving in­ terest returns whose rates would be three times the normal levels of preRevolt era.15 Taxes on trading with the enemy were implemented in 1573. Official per­ mission was required by ship-owners for the ships to sail for enemy ports. The “Sea Beggars”, now the official fledgling Dutch navy, who enjoyed almost complete control of the Dutch and northern French coasts, stopped

Diplomatic glove covers military fist

53

merchant ships, and those who could not prove they had permission were seized together with their entire cargo. The Dutch ship capturing the ap­ parently recalcitrant merchantman gained a portion or ‘prize money’, the rest of the seizure went towards providing the Revolt’s treasury. Catholic church property was requisitioned, and the incomes from the landed prop­ erty went directly into funding the Revolt. William wrote to Dutch Prot­ estant exile communities, asking for donations and funds; some responded with donations, but overall the leaders of the Revolt were disappointed with the amounts sent, as they expected more tangible solidarity from their fel­ low exiles, who may have been in exile but were at least out of the fighting and enjoyed a comparatively safe sanctuary. In 1576, in the increasingly confused situation and the Spanish going on the offensive, William tabled a proposal to the States of Holland for an imposed loan on the wealthier citizens of 100,000 guilders for funding the war. The representatives from Leiden and Rotterdam raised objections while representatives from Gouda only ceased their total opposition after Gouda was “visited” by William’s agents. That at least three of the six prin­ cipal towns of Holland had objected to the loan even at such a crisis time in the Revolt indicated how difficult it was for William to find sufficient funds for Revolt. The stark fact was that the Revolt was never adequately funded and was constantly short of finances. The key factor was that Spanish fi­ nances in attempting to suppress the Revolt were so much worse. The Spanish were indeed weaker in the significant factor of finances. The debts of the Spanish Crown were rising exponentially, and servicing the debt had increased to the point where it could no longer be sustained. Foreign bankers, notably the Genoese, had ensured funds were available to the Spanish Crown, but at a cost which financially was disastrous, and lenders were losing confidence and increasing the costs of lending. Loans taken out by the Spanish Crown in the 1560s were being maintained at an interest rate of 8%. By the mid-1570s, further loans were incurring interest rates at 16%. For years, one of Philip’s more able advisors, Juan de Ovando y Godoy, member of the Council of Indies and Council of Finances had been pointing out the deficits and the scale and threat of rising debts. Now, by 1575, he was totally frustrated and could no longer restrain himself. Respectfully, with dignity, but no less firmly, he confronted King Philip II, pointing out that he had managed to hold in check the situation over the years but all his efforts were nullified by inaction by the King. Now, he continued, the crisis point was reached, and the only way to end the vicious circle of unsustain­ able debt was to declare a Decree of Bankruptcy and impose alternative arrangements on all creditors. Philip conceded and agreed in December 1574 to implement bankruptcy. Even bowing to the inevitable, he moved slowly and cautiously, and in September 1575, the Decree of Bankruptcy was promulgated. All capital funds designated for repayment of loans between 15 and 20 million ducats

54

William the Silent and the Revolt

were frozen. Loans were to be replaced by asientos, consolidating all debts into a form of low interest-yielding bonds.16 International bankers were dissatisfied, but grudgingly accepted, choosing to eventually recoup part of their loans. Philip and his advisors had implemented what they hoped would be a long-term solution to the financial problems of Spain. However, the hard­ ened veterans of the Army of Flanders were preoccupied with their own financial problem – pay or rather lack of pay. The Bankruptcy Decree had meant that Requesens could not obtain any credit from the bankers of fi­ nanciers at Antwerp. These had been the mainstay of what had been at best an irregular flow of funds allocated from Spain to pay the Spanish tercios in the Netherlands. Now the flow completely had ceased. Requesens, already despairing at the overall situation and in declining health, was profoundly affected by the inability to access funds. His health further declined. In March 1576, he suddenly died. Sincere and well-meaning, anxious for rec­ onciliation, Requesens had tried diplomacy combined with timely military action and failed. It was perhaps better for him that he did not live to expe­ rience the forthcoming “Spanish Fury”.

Notes 1 G Mattingly Renaissance Diplomacy p 138 2 BNM/MS784/469-71, Granvelle to Don Juan of Austria 28/81573, cited in G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 134 3 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 141 4 JJ Wolter Kleine oorzaken grote gevolgen p 11, cited in J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 181 5 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 138 places the number at 15,000 6 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 136 7 Requesens despatch to King Philip II Archivo Historical National Madrid, Estado sections 559/104, cited by G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 164 8 G Parker Imprudent King. A New Life of Philip II p 215 9 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 144 10 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 151 11 Brother Wouter, prior of a monastery at Stein, near Gouda. He had taken ref­ uge in Amsterdam on the Spanish thrust north in 1573, cited by H van Nierop Treason in the North Quarter – War, Terror and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Republic p 3 12 J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 364 13 H van Nierop Treason in the North Quarter – War, Terror and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Revolt p 220. Van Nierop’s work is an enthralling and com­ prehensive account of events and is invaluable for its insights into the Revolt in the North Quarter 14 CV Wedgwood William the Silent pp 161–162 15 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 5 16 For fuller details, see Appendix I

5 Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

Following the death of Requesens, the Spanish Council of State in Brussels, suddenly charged with taking control, was out of its depth. Spanish troops in the Army of Flanders were angry and frustrated. Some had pay arrears stretching back six years. As we have seen during the siege of Leiden, after defeating the Dutch forces at Mookerheide, they mutinied and took over the city of Antwerp and held it to ransom until Requesens frantically found monies to settle their immediate pay demands. Now, with the Bankruptcy Decree and a nerveless government in Brussels, obtaining more funds was impossible. Cardinal Granvelle, now in Italy but still interested in and observing the situation in the Netherlands, accurately predicted: it was not the Prince of Orange who lost the Low Countries, but the soldiers born in Vallodolid and Toledo who had driven money out of Antwerp and destroyed all credit and reputation … if we fail to gain the goodwill of those provinces (ie Flanders, Brabant and the southern provinces) they will eventually ruin both Spain and the reputation of his majesty.1 Violent clashes were occurring in the southern provinces, particularly Brabant, between Spanish troops and civilians and between Catholic and Protestant communities. Undisciplined Spanish troops seized Maastricht, and groups of disgruntled and resentful Spanish soldiers roamed the streets of Ghent terrorising the populace. By mid-1576, the patience of the unpaid Spanish troops in the Netherlands – never long-suffering – ran out. In July 1576, they occupied and sacked the town of Aalst, near Brussels. That this town had remained steadfastly loyal to Spain throughout the disturbances and the Revolt was of complete indifference to the mutineers. Aalst was totally sacked and looted, and its citizens killed. The mutineers then turned their attention to Antwerp. Antwerp was a major commercial city in Europe, arguably the predominant commercial city in Europe in the mid-sixteenth century. 2 Throughout this century, Antwerp underwent three periods of expansion: 1501–1521, 1535–1537, and

56  William the Silent and the Revolt 1559–1568. After 1557, it had suffered a slump, and its financial sector, though still important, had declined. However, it adapted and supplemented its diminishing activities from financial services by forms of industry, principally linen-making, tapestry weaving, dyeing, and cloth manufacture. All this was part of the expanding cloth and fabric industries throughout the Low Countries, and in this Antwerp excelled, having to hand its own willing financiers ready to invest. Therefore, as a commercial city, Antwerp continued to flourish, enjoying overall wealth and capital. It was essential in the financial chain, through the bills of exchange and letters of credit, by which payments from Spain were made to the Spanish Army of Flanders – until the 1575 Bankruptcy Decree. Faced with the likelihood of Antwerp being the next target of the mutinous Spanish troops, the Council of State and States-General in Brussels took action, somewhat tardily. There was some strengthening of the defences of Antwerp, and they authorised and sent troops from the States of Brabant into Antwerp to defend the city. However, this was too little and too late. When the mutineers attacked in early November 1576, they easily overcame the makeshift and incomplete defences and within 24 hours had taken total control of the city. For several days, they murdered the defending troops and civilians alike and sacked and plundered. Over 1,000 houses and buildings were destroyed in an area over one-third of the city, and over 8,000 individuals were killed. In the words of a contemporary witness3: they spared no person or nationality, neither Portuguese nor Turk…. Jesuits had to give over like any other religious, their monies, their precious gold and silver and anything of value … rich were looted and robbed whilst the poor were hanged because they had nothing…. I passed by people lying on the ground gasping their last breath whilst others crouched and walked backwards to avoid the bullets of the musketeers, who would suddenly rush out from the side streets and fire terribly. First the Revolt, and now this, hastened the decline of Antwerp. Finance for loans and credit for the Spanish Crown were in future to come from the financiers in Genoa,4 and as a commercial city Antwerp’s decline was not immediate but was speeded up and inevitable. The plundering and the killings were indeed horrific and in modern eras of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries would constitute war crimes. However, William and his followers exploited the atrocities for the maximum propaganda possible. Reports were circulating that the number of slaughtered were at 18,000, 5 and the epithet “Spanish Fury” acquired common parlance and notoriety. After the extent of the “Spanish fury” became fully apparent, troops from the States of Brabant invaded the council chamber in Brussels and

Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

57

removed or expelled those pro-Spanish members of the Council of State. Aerschot was not affected as he had prudently “been ill” on learning of what was occurring in Brussels and had retired to his estates and avoided attending the council meetings. He was to remain in play during the subse­ quent various hastily convened negotiations. While the attacks and slaughter were occurring William was in Ghent, representing the States of Holland and Zeeland, and through a team of negotiators headed by Marnix de St Aldegonde was in negotiations with representatives of the states of the southern provinces. The latter had come together on the initiative of the Council of State in Brussels, with Flanders, Brabant, and Hainault immediately making for Ghent, and the other south­ ern provinces coming a short while afterwards. With events in Antwerp, negotiations were galvanised for reconciliation between the northern and southern provinces to find a way forward, in the power vacuum caused by the death of Requesens. The result was an agreement known as “the Paci­ fication of Ghent”. In the Pacification of Ghent, the provinces of Holland and Zeeland formally ceased hostilities against the southern provinces and undertook to cease hostilities and attacks against Catholics outside their provin­ cial borders. Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht agreed to combine with the southern provinces to expel the Spanish armies from the Netherlands and to establish a combined States-General based in Brussels. The im­ perial edicts against heresy were suspended. The religious issues were provisionally settled by agreeing to official toleration of all Protestant worship within Holland and Zeeland; all other provinces would remain officially Catholic. This was confirmed by all participants signing and ratifying the Union of Brussels in January 1577. Only the provinces of Luxembourg, Namur, and parts of Limburg refused to agree and re­ mained steadfastly loyal to Spanish rule. There now appeared to be a united front by most of the provinces of the Netherlands, north and south against Spanish rule, and the expulsion of Spanish troops. However, a fundamental divide remained. For Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, the die was cast – Spanish rule was at an end. For the southern provinces led by Brabant and Flanders, Catholicism remained and their anticipated way forward was some form of reconciliation with and under Spanish rule in a loose association dominated by Catholic nobles. This division was at present in the background, and the provinces focused on the ex­ pulsion of Spanish troops. For Antwerp, which remained one of Europe’s dominant trading ports for so long, the results were disastrous. With the departure of the Spanish troops and a form of stability restored by the Pacification, the economy of Antwerp revived. Over a period of two to three years, overseas trade returned. However, the dislocation and upheaval caused first by the Revolt and then the impact of the “Spanish Fury” was such that the long-term economic decline of Antwerp was irreversible.6

58

William the Silent and the Revolt

A new governor, Don Juan of Austria, had been appointed. He was an il­ legitimate son of Charles V and of a warlike fiery disposition which masked an inner sense of deep insecurity. A brave soldier, he had been prominent as a leader of the anti-Turkish coalition of Venice, Genoa, and Spain and had led from the front – literally – at the naval battle of Lepanto in 1571. When the coalition fleet sailed in battle order towards the massed Turkish fleet he was in the first of the large galleys forming the van. They soundly defeated the Turkish fleet at this battle. One historian sums up his personality when he arrived in the Netherlands as Governor-General as “…In 1571 he had virtually driven the Turks out of the western Mediterranean at Lepanto and had been insufferable ever since”.7 His mission to the Netherlands was to pacify, but with restraint. But this contradicted his own self-appointed personal grandiose mission in which he saw himself as the eventual conqueror of the Netherlands Revolt and then he would go on to lead the Spanish troops in invading England and restoring the true faith. While the sack and killings at Antwerp were occur­ ring he had arrived in Luxembourg, officially as Governor-General, but one whose authority was in tatters. He reflected on the situation but without overreacting. However, once the new coalition of the States-General had been formed and had signed the Union of Brussels, Don Juan was given very little time to reflect. The States-General informed him that he needed to sign and ratify the Union of Brussels, and within this, the Pacification of Ghent, or they would break off relations with him permanently. By such a break, the Governor-General and Spanish sovereignty would be repudiated. Don Juan was informed that he had four days, no more, to sign and ratify, oth­ erwise all relations would be terminated. The Duke of Aerschot, anxious to avoid this and intending that the States-General would be steered towards reconciliation – and a separate course to that wished by the States of Hol­ land and Zeeland – advised Don Juan to accept the Pacification of Ghent. Don Juan needed no second urging. He accepted the advice, accepted the Pacification, and confirmed and ratified the Union of Brussels. In doing so, he regained the political initiative and maintained dialogue with the States-General, giving effusive details about how the Spanish troops would be withdrawn. Exploiting the momentum of the continuing dialogue and good relations he and the States-General, with misgivings from the dele­ gates from Holland and Zeeland, agreed on his recognition as GovernorGeneral. All this was confirmed and ratified in the Perpetual Edict of Peace in February 1577, and Don Juan entered Brussels. On 7 February 1577, he took the oath as Governor-General. The states of every province, except Holland and Zeeland, then recognised the sovereignty of Philip II. So far so good, Don Juan had succeeded.8 Holland and Zeeland had refused to sign and ratify the Perpetual Edict. Their delegates in the States-General pointed out that the Spanish troops had not yet been withdrawn. The Spanish troops were finally withdrawn

Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

59

in April 1577, and by May they were all out of the Netherlands. The dele­ gates from the southern provinces were reassured, not so those of Holland and Zeeland. William and the Dutch knew that troops could be deployed and returned just as easily as they had been withdrawn. The rift between the southern provinces and Holland and Zeeland came to the fore as the delegates from Holland and Zeeland denounced the Perpetual Edict as con­ travening the Pacification of Ghent. They made repeated protests through resolutions and open letters. Their remaining distrust was clear and open. In June 1577, talks began between William, representatives of Holland and Zeeland, and of the southern provinces who had signed the Union of Brussels and Don Juan at the town of Geertruidenberg in the province of Gelderland. Some of the southern provinces were reconciled to some form of Spanish overlordship or sovereignty. Holland and Zeeland and the northern provinces were opposed, concerned that a return to such sover­ eignty would lead to possible tyranny and certainly religious persecution. William, as a precaution prior to the talks beginning, had deployed and stationed a unit of the Union of Brussels troops at Geertruidenberg. It was a complicated situation with William recognised as Stadhouder of Holland and Zeeland, with Don Juan recognised as the Governor of 13 provinces, and with the provinces of Friesland and Utrecht recognising neither. The talks turned upon the Pacification of Ghent and the Perpetual Edict. The former laid down that Protestantism could be officially practiced in Holland and Zeeland, and elsewhere there would be some forms of tol­ eration. The latter accepted Don Juan as Governor of the Netherlands and the sovereignty of Spain but made no mention of religious toleration. The vital issue involved was which had primacy – the Pacification or the Edict? So far, Don Juan had proceeded wisely and gently. He was the new gov­ ernor and so had an unblemished record. He had proven himself compli­ ant, wisely taking Aerschot’s advice. He had appeared conciliatory, keeping the dialogue going with the States-General, and had managed to become accepted by the Perpetual Edict. However, the talks at Geertruidenberg were not going well for him. He was upset by the skill in which William of Nassau and his negotiating team countered the arguments for the Perpet­ ual Edict superseding and – in terms of religious toleration – negating the Pacification of Ghent. This was to happen at a time when the talks were clearly going to reach an impasse over the issue of Perpetual Edict versus Pacification and the involved question of religious toleration. Frustrated by the seemingly interminable negotiations, the ingrained soldier training and nature in Don Juan came to the fore. Ever the soldier, he resorted to decisive military action. Don Juan quietly and discreetly left Brussels, giving out the reason that he needed to make arrangements for the final stages of the withdrawal of the small number of units of Spanish troops which remained. His next public appearance was in July 1577 at Namur, where he hosted an official function for a visiting royal dignitary. Once this was over and the distinguished guests had departed, he deployed a company of Spanish

60

William the Silent and the Revolt

troops and made a surprise attack and took the citadel of Namur. There he issued a denunciation of the States-General, declared William, the Prince of Orange, guilty of treason to the Spanish throne, and gave orders for the return of all Spanish troops of the Army of Flanders. He tried to take Ant­ werp with his small forces in a quick strike but was repulsed on 1 August 1577. He then issued orders recalling the Spanish troops from Italy, hun­ kered down with his few units in Namur, and waited for the Spanish army to return. Seizing Namur and recourse to military action was a mistake. In fact, Don Juan’s very appointment as the governor had been a mistake, “Madrid needed a peace-maker and had sent a warrior”.9 Philip II in Madrid was taken by surprise and initially countermanded the order to the Spanish troops in Italy but quickly changed his mind and endorsed Don Juan’s order. The tercios were on their way back to the Neth­ erlands. William was also taken by surprise, but pleasantly so. The sur­ prise was that Don Juan’s recourse to aggressive military action came so soon, not that it occurred. Never trusting Spanish intentions be they those of King Philip or his representatives, he fully expected that the situation would come to renewed hostilities. He realised that this sudden volte face by Don Juan would turn much public opinion against who up to now was perceived as a progressive and conciliatory and peaceful governor. The remnants of the Spanish troops which were still present in various towns and cities and prominent pro-Spanish citizens were expelled. In Antwerp, there were mass pro-William demonstrations; a statue of Alva, discovered in a vault of a civic building, was carried out into the street and hacked to pieces.10 Don Juan’s military action reduced the rift in the States-General, which sent for William and requested him to take charge of the government. William hesitated, unwilling to leave his power base of Holland and Zeeland. Don Juan had committed political suicide, so he could afford to give it some time and assess the situation, rather than take over on what may have been a wave of an initial burst of popular enthu­ siasm which could turn hostile. For a month he toured the north and the towns and cities of Holland and Zeeland, ensuring as much as possible that all was in order. Carefully emphasising that the well-being and opinion of the two provinces were his priority, he asked authorisation of those two provinces to leave and assume government in the south. Finally, in Sep­ tember 1577, he left for the southern provinces and was given a rapturous welcome by large crowds in Antwerp. Arriving in Brussels on 20 September 1577, he entered the city to an equally popular reception by packed crowds. There may have been an awkward moment at the entrance to Brussels, for representatives of the southern provinces were also there to receive him. These were the individuals who had vigorously supported Don Juan in the various debates in the States-General and who had ratified the Perpetual Edict while William’s representatives from Holland and Zeeland had re­ fused to do so. One of these representatives at the entrance to Brussels was the Duke of Aerschot, a long-time foe of William’s objectives and who had

Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

61

been one of Don Juan’s delegates at the difficult negotiations at Geertru­ idenberg. However, all these individuals, including Aerschot, behaved im­ peccably and welcomed William with due respect and deference. After all, William at present was their main bulwark against Don Juan’s hostility and the Spanish troops who were on their way back from Italy. William dined with Aerschot in Brussels within 24 hours of his arriving there. Aerschot pledged his friendship and loyalty to William on his own behalf and that of his fellow nobles. William was a Lord of Breda and there­ fore took his place in the States-General, as one of the nobility of the States of Brabant. An effusive States-General voted him Stadhouder of Brabant. As Stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland in the north, and now Stadhouder of Brabant in the south, he was in an even better position to guide the Neth­ erlands. However, within a short time Aerschot and some of the moderate traditionalist pro-Spanish nobles became alarmed and jealous. They felt that William had completed his usefulness in resolving the disastrous situ­ ation created by Don Juan. Now, having served his purpose, William had to be ousted, and they could start again. To counter William’s increased power, Aerschot by political manipulation and support from allies, was elected the Stadhouder of Flanders. Individual rivalries and jealousies were by no means the only difficulty facing William in his taking charge of the direction of the Netherlands. The north–south division was complex. The provinces of Holland and Zeeland were solidly Calvinist and were in no doubt about the direction, that of a complete break with the Spanish monarchy. William, conscious of his du­ ties as Stadhouder of these provinces and that they formed his power base, needed to treat them carefully. But their stubborn independence ignoring the States-General in Brussels, particularly in refusing the States-General ruling in Brussels that Catholics be tolerated in Holland and Zeeland as part of overall religious toleration, and in refusing financial contributions to the States-General towards the common struggle, was frustrating for William in his efforts to achieve some form of north–south unity. Other northern provinces were not so united and were to undergo internal power struggles fuelled by the religious question. The south itself was divided along linguistic lines; the southernmost provinces of Artois, Hainault, and Namur were French-speaking while Bra­ bant and Flanders were Flemish-speaking. Both regions of the south were predominantly Catholic although Protestant minorities – in the case of Calvinist, extremely vocal – were located in Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and further south, Valenciennes. Also, there were class divisions. Towards the northern parts of the southern provinces, burghers, merchants, and small landowners generally held political sway while further south the nobility still retained power. Here nobles like Aerschot and allies strongly resented Spanish rule which they regarded as unwarranted interference, yet they were far more loyal to the King of Spain and had more empathy with the monarchy than with the lower classes. Aerschot and his ilk looked askance

62

William the Silent and the Revolt

at any governing group of middle-class individuals who governed towns like Bruges or Ghent and were scornful of Antwerp’s financial power gen­ erated by its merchants and financiers. An indication of the complex nature of the political turmoil can be seen in the individual Count Bossu. Bossu, as we have seen, was a former loy­ alist Spanish-appointed commander under Alva of the Flemish troops and Spanish-appointed Stadhouder of Holland during the period when the posts of Brielle and Vlissingen were taken by the Sea Beggars and the Re­ volt expanded. Taken prisoner when the Sea Beggars captured Enkhiuzen in 1572, he was held prisoner for some months and then released in a pris­ oner exchange. Three years later, with the Spanish mutinies and the sack of Antwerp and the Pacification of Ghent, Bossu’s loyalties were now to the Netherlands, and he commanded units of the Flemish troops of the army of the States-General and the Union of Brussels, on the side of his former enemies and against Spanish occupation. One historian has described the complex situation in the mid- and late-1570s in the Netherlands as two rev­ olutions struggling to obtain their respective outcomes – “Revolt Holland” and “Revolt Brabant”.11 It was William’s dilemma to reconcile – as far as was possible – these two trends, compatible with creating an independ­ ent nation. The massive problem facing William was holding the southern provinces without alienating or losing the northern provinces. In the northern provinces, Utrecht and Gelderland both underwent po­ litical confusion. The States-General of the Union of Brussels, while ac­ knowledging William as Stadhouder of Holland and Zeeland, refused to acknowledge him as Stadhouder of Utrecht. Their support went to Gilles de Berlaymont, the Baron of Hierges. Hierges had been the loyalist Spanishappointed Stadhouder of Utrecht and also of the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel. Hierges was an able soldier, had led the Spanish armies at the battle of Jemmingen in 1568, repulsing the Dutch rebel invasion, and was a commander at the battle of Mookerheide in 1573, defeating Louis of Nassau’s attempted relief of besieged Leiden. Hierges was one of the nobility of the southern provinces which wished some sort of provincial federation reconciled under Don Juan and Spanish rule. Clearly, Hierges’ authority over three northern provinces, particularly the vital one of Utre­ cht, if it stood and was upheld would be a considerable threat to William and the objective of freedom from Spanish sovereignty. However, when the Spanish troops were withdrawn, the influence and authority of Hierges diminished. Divisions appeared within the regents of Utrecht. A minority of the regents were for William and the implementation of full toleration for Protestants, while the majority still favoured reconcil­ iation with Don Juan and Spanish rule and all that involved in suppress­ ing Protestantism. However, the majority of the citizens in the province of Utrecht and the guilds of the city of Utrecht favoured supporting William. Eventually the pro-William factions gained ground, and Hierges withdrew and pledged allegiance and service to Don Juan, who no doubt welcomed

Spanish Fury, unions and divisions

63

the support of such an able military commander and who would be put to good use once the Spanish troops returned. In October 1577, the States of Utrecht recognised William as Stadhouder. Utrecht, alongside Holland and Zeeland, was secure for William. Like Utrecht, the province of Gelderland was riven by political conflict. When Hierges went over to Don Juan, the position of Stadhouder of Gelder­ land was vacant, and two main factions came to the fore – the pro-Orange faction supporting William and the moderate Catholic faction who were at present against Don Juan and the Spanish but also against Orange ei­ ther through jealousy or against the dominance of the province of Holland. (Interprovincial rivalry was ever-present, and one facet of this that was to bedevil the Dutch fight for independence was the wariness of most prov­ inces against the dominance of the province of Holland, whose economic power and wealth dwarfed the others.) There was a third faction, the proSpanish loyalists, who wished that Bossu take the Stadhoudership, mainly supported by the regents of the city of Nijmegen who had been appointed by Alva. The moderate Catholics, though numerous, realised that they were not in a position to dominate, so they gave support to John of Nassau, Wil­ liam’s brother. He was not a Catholic, but nor was he a pro-Spanish loyalist and, they assumed, not a Calvinist but a Lutheran, and if he was appointed it would ensure that Gelderland had a Stadhouder separate from that of the powerful Holland province. The citizen, lower merchant classes, and the civic guard of Nijmegen intimidated the Regents to support John of Nassau. It became apparent later that John of Nassau was, in fact, a staunch Calvin­ ist, but too late. By the end of March 1578, the States of Gelderland con­ firmed John of Nassau as their Stadhouder. When he took office, pleasing to the obdurate Catholics, he pledged allegiance to the States-General of the Union of Brussels, but also, pleasing to the pro-Orange and Calvinists, he refused to swear allegiance to the King of Spain.12 Meanwhile in the southern provinces, Aerschot, as Stadhouder of Flan­ ders and a leading member of the States-General, had been active. He made overtures to a member of the ruling Austrian Hapsburg family, the brother of the Holy Roman Emperor, Archduke Matthias. Matthias, impressed and persuaded by Aerschot’s proposal and outlining of further possibilities, ac­ cepted the offered position of Governor of the Netherlands – and what next? Perhaps as sovereign ruler of the Netherlands? Aerschot planned to use Matthias to unite the southern nobility jealous of William’s growing power with the elements of extreme Catholics in the southern provinces. This was undoubtedly a successful coup for Aerschot and his political allies. Matthias was not a strong character and did not possess dynamic leadership abilities, but his dynastic name and title brought credibility to Aerschot and associates and their objective of reconciliation with Don Juan and Spain. However, events were to run against this plan. Within the province of Flanders, the city of Ghent was experiencing po­ litical turbulence. Though Catholic, the city was home to a substantial and

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vocal Calvinist minority who looked to William. Some of the more af­ fluent merchant class had met William and kept him informed. William also had agents of his own in the spy-ridden southern province, so he was fully aware of Aerschot’s long-term plans. While Aerschot was in Ghent, two Calvinist lawyers had become prominent in lobbying for restoration of some of Ghent’s traditional rights as a city. Ghent had long been a trou­ blesome city to authority, and, in 1539, it rose in open revolt against the Emperor Charles V. In less than a year, the revolt was crushed, and Ghent was deprived of all privileges. Now with the events of the last two or three years, the time seemed favourable for attempting to gain back at least some of those privileges. The two lawyers accosted Aerschot and asked for his authorisation for restoration of some of the city’s privileges as laid down in various char­ ters. Aerschot refused and the confrontation escalated, and he only man­ aged to extricate himself with difficulty and make his way back to his comfortable lodgings. However, resentment among the Calvinist had not dissipated, and during the night armed groups rose, broke into Aerschot’s lodging, made him prisoner, and took control of the city. Catholic citizens were subjected to violence. Whether William was involved in these events is uncertain; certainly, Aerschot suspected this and in his outburst against the two lawyers he shouted that he would not restore the privileges, not even to please the Prince of Orange – yet no one had as yet mentioned the Prince of Orange.13 Involved and implicated or not, William was now in the pleasing position of having the option to come to the rescue of his bitter political rival. He intervened, and secured the release of Aerschot, who in exchange resigned from his position as Stadhouder of Flanders. He retired to a small state within the Holy Roman Empire. Matthias, who was to be used by Aerschot against William, actually proved to be the reverse. The States-General appointed a special advisory council to whom Matthias was to submit any proposals concerning finance, legal, or constitutional changes. Matthias also undertook to defend Holland and Zeeland from any Spanish attacks. Matthias was sworn in in mid-January 1578 as Gov­ ernor of the Netherlands with William, in his position as Stadhouder of Brabant his chief advisor. William obtaining the release of Aerschot was made in the teeth of ex­ treme Calvinist opposition in Ghent, and when he attempted to moderate further against popular Calvinist excesses against Catholic families he was firmly rejected. These violent excesses in Ghent – as later in other locations in the southern provinces – were to result in a backlash reaction by certain Catholic groups and was to prevent William’s attempts to reconcile the religious factions. However, for now, as at early 1578, William’s main political foe Aerschot was neutralised, his allies in the States of Flanders quiescent, the foreign “protector” Matthias his ally and colleague, Ghent firmly standing for the

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cause of freedom, the States of Utrecht secure, and the States of Gelderland about to be secured. Politically, events appeared favourable. These political events and gains for William’s cause were significant. However, the military factor was to reassert itself. Don Juan and small unit of Spanish troops still hunkered down and held Namur. From the begin­ ning of December 1577, Spanish troops recalled from Italy began to arrive back in the Netherlands. Over 8,000 Spanish troops arrived, reinforced by a further 3,000 troops from German states of the Holy Roman Empire. More troops arrived, and by January 1578 Don Juan had up to 20,000 seasoned troops under his command. The Spanish troops were faced by a hybrid army of the Union of Brussels, positioned at a point between Namur and Gembloux. Their commanders included Count Bossu, and van der Marck, Lord of Lumey and the former commander of the “Sea Beggars”. The Union of Brussels army outnum­ bered the Spanish, but they were not as well-coordinated and their opera­ tional numbers were affected by sickness. The Spanish army was moving towards Namur, so the Union of Brussels army made what was to be a tem­ porary withdrawal towards Gembloux. On 31 January 1578, the Spanish army then advanced towards the Union army. The Spanish cavalry was first to make contact, engaging the rear units of the Union of Brussels army. Don Juan, in overall command and in the middle of the Spanish army, cautioned the cavalry not to go too far and allow the rest of his army to catch up. However, the commander of the Spanish cavalry, after the initial charges, assessed the overall state of the Union troops and suddenly gave orders for further full charges. The Union army cavalry took the brunt of this charge, held for a brief while in spasmodic engagements, then broke and fled, caus­ ing a panic in the rest of the Union army. The infantry units disintegrated and fled, many of them being picked off by the pursuing Spanish cavalry. Attempts by the Union army to reform and deploy in defence positions was broken up by the advancing Spanish infantry and well-drilled volleys from the musketeers. A remnant of the Union army numbering about 3,000 managed to reach Gembloux and hold it. But this was for matter of days, and by the first week in February they surrendered to the Spanish, being allowed to depart and retreat to join other Union forces. The leader of the Spanish cavalry at Gembloux who had shown such initiative combined with sound judgement was a noble, whose greatgrandfather was Pope Paul III, whose mother was Margaret, the Regent of the Netherlands who had been replaced by Alva, and whose half-uncle was Philip II himself. He had been well-educated in Spain, a willing learner of military skills, and had fought with Don Juan at Lepanto, and he had led the Spanish troops recalled from Italy back into the Netherlands in late 1578. He was to prove an able military leader who possessed “…powers of intellectual analysis which lifted the art of war to a level which the Six­ teenth Century saw but rarely”.14

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He was both a skilled soldier and an equally able diplomatist. Flanders, Brabant, the Netherlands, and Europe were all to hear and learn more about and have to reckon with him, Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma. After the victory at Gembloux, Brussels was no longer safe for William, and he, Matthias, and the States-General hastily moved and made their headquarters at Antwerp. Don Juan and his Spanish forces advanced and in the second week in February 1578 took the city of Leuven. They continued to advance. The Spanish troops advance triggered an anti-Catholic reaction in Ghent. Groups of militant Calvinists made for the town of Oudenaarde, took it over, and expelled the Catholic council replacing them with staunch Calvinists. In Kortrijk and Bruges, Calvinist merchants and middle-class citizens replaced any Catholic councillors with those known Calvinists while mobs ransacked churches and monasteries and religious buildings of images and rich tapestries. By this stage, the moderate Catholic nobility of the southern provinces were having serious doubts and concerns. It was one thing to be supporting a government of the States-General and the Union of Brussels which was successfully fighting against a Spanish regime whose mutinous troops were out of control. The eventual outcome, they had surmised, would be coming to terms from a position of strength with the Spanish regime and gaining a favourable settlement. However, the Spanish regime appeared to have a capable commander and governor whose troops were regaining control. It was quite another thing to be on the losing side, particularly when that side contained and condoned rising mob rule fuelled by the dreaded Calvinism. Some of the southern nobility must have reflected upon the fate of Counts Egmont and Hoorn who had attempted to keep to a moderate course, yet when Spain regained control they were both dealt with in exactly the same ruthless fashion as all the other extreme rebels. The southern nobility had their own processes of doubt, but, for the lower and middle classes of some towns, it was more impacting and urgent. The situation for them was evolving in a trend of vicious circle. Calvinists were extremely apprehensive of counterrevolution; they identified Catho­ lics as pro-Spanish and attacked them. The Catholics, thus provoked and attacked, became far more sympathetic to Spain, even looking to Spanish troops to restore peace, and this stance wherever it showed itself provoked further aggression from Calvinist mobs. William was tireless in attempt to stop this polarisation of the south. He travelled from Antwerp, to several towns, pacifying and attempting to reign in extreme Calvinists. He proposed that in any locality where a hun­ dred families or more so requested, a second religion written records of the States-General, Catholic or Protestant, would be officially tolerated. The States-General in Brussels endorsed and ratified this.15 However, as an implemented measure it was dead before it left the written records of the States-General. In a form of Catholic pushback, the States of Flanders

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and Brabant both declared that public practice of Protestantism would not be tolerated. Calvinist influence and violence had increased with the intervention of a member of a foreign royal family, John Casimir, brother of the Elector Pal­ atine. He had offered his services to the Revolt and had written to Elizabeth of England requesting that, if he so intervened, England would give finan­ cial help. Elizabeth responded favourably, and the States-General in Brus­ sels, needing all the assistance they could obtain, accepted. John Casimir raised a mercenary army and by August 1578 had led it from the Holy Ro­ man Empire into Brabant. His troops were in Brabant by late August 1578. William found little comfort in this new self-imposed ally. Casimir’s troops were welcome reinforcements to the Walloon levies of the States-General, and he took the funding by England of John Casimir’s army as a positive indicator of a precursor of English intervention. But he was uneasy about the potential damage the fervent Calvinist John Casimir could do to his attempts at limiting the spiralling interreligious violence on the southern provinces. His fears were justified. John Casimir was to reveal himself more concerned with spreading militant Calvinism in certain locations than he did in engaging the steadily advancing Spanish and loyalist Walloon and Flemish troops. By late Autumn 1578, some of the Catholic nobility in the south, while still supporting any struggle which would repulse the return of Spanish rule, came out and influenced the local populace and their own troops against the States-General in Brussels. In effect, they were against both the Spanish and the Union of Brussels, alarmed at the proposals and measures regard­ ing religious toleration and also alarmed at the trend in some cities which not only were becoming Calvinist-dominated but also cities that appeared to push for restoration of city privileges and reducing the authority of the provinces. These nobles grouped themselves under the term “Malcontents”. Then, in September 1578, the situation in the south worsened when, at the same time as the Catholic “Malcontents” were causing divisions in the south, units of the troops of the States-General mutinied. They had serious arrears of pay and, like their Spanish and German mercenary counterparts, had little patience with not being paid. Thanks to the concerted action against the “Spanish Fury” and the Union of Brussels, the States-General had con­ trol of a considerable force of over 50,000 troops, from differing provinces, authorised by the various individual states of the provinces. The control and deployment of these troops was provincial, but payment had to be central, a commitment that was by now unsustainable. Troops raised by one of the Netherlands grandees mutinied first, followed by the Walloon troops. The noble commanders of the Walloon troops who were nobles from the south willingly fell in with the mutiny as they were alarmed by the growth of Cal­ vinist militancy. Some units enlisted en bloc with advancing armies of Don Juan. Others held out for settlement of pay arrears, while their commanders included in the demands that Ghent be restored to the true faith.

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The Calvinist-dominated town of Ghent feared a Catholic counterrevolu­ tion and appealed to John Casimir for help to which he quickly responded, sending troops. On 10 October 1578, his troops arrived in Ghent and openly engaged in conflict with the Walloon troops, now loyal to the “Mal­ contents”. In late 1578, William met John Casimir in Ghent and over dinner confronted and upbraided him for fuelling such violence.16 Despite his de­ nials, John Casimir harboured an ambition to replace William. Fortunately for the latter, English funds to pay for John Casimir’s army had failed to materialise; appeals to the States-General in Brussels for funds failed. The States-General had more than enough commitments and troubles without a sudden demand for funds for unpaid mercenaries. With his unpaid troops drifting away, some to join the Spanish formations, John Casimir left for England in January 1579 to attempt to find funds. He failed. Tireless in his efforts at reconciliation all round, William intervened in Ghent, purging the council of its most extreme Calvinist elements. He attempted talks and negotiations to settle pay arrears of the mutinous States-General troops. But it was too late. The short time John Casimir had been in Ghent, he had made an already turbulent situation even worse and intensified the crisis in the south facing the States-General. The military advance of the Spanish and loyalist Walloon troops con­ tinued through Brabant and to the east, through Limburg. On the eastern front, they were now threatening the Roermond Quarter of Gelderland.17 Preoccupied with this crisis in the southern provinces, the States-General had little time or will to deal with the situation in the east, the threat to Gelderland. The States of Holland and Zeeland sent their own troops to cow Catholic communities in the province of Overijssel and to defend Gel­ derland from the potential Spanish threat. This threat to the east and the failure – or, in fairness, the inability – of the States-General in Brussels to give due attention to this made the northern provinces realise that they needed to look to their own resources. A defensive union was proposed by John of Nassau, the Stadhouder of Gelderland, to which Holland and Zeeland and Utrecht agreed fairly speedily. The Roermond Quarter of Gel­ derland, the area immediately threatened by the advancing Spanish troops, quickly acceded to the union. The Nijmegen Quarter and the Zutphen Quarter acceded by early 1579, and after troops form the States of Holland occupied the Arnhem Quarter, Arnhem signed up. Gelderland became part of the defensive union. The Ommelanden (later to become the province of Groningen) also had also signed by early 1579. Friesland gave full agree­ ment to the union in April 1579. The actual union was signed on 23 January 1579 by delegates from all these provinces in Utrecht and ratified a Union of States to act in common cause as if they were a single province in matters of defence, peace and war, and certain other common policy matters. Other major issues, including religion, were to be strictly the decision of the indi­ vidual province, and the overall rights of the individual province to govern itself was categorically and specifically stipulated. An official treasurer was

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appointed. A council was appointed, containing dedicated and capable in­ dividuals as Floris Thin of Utrecht; Paulus Buys, the pensionary of Leiden, who during the siege of Leiden had been one of the principal individuals supporting for the breaking of the surrounding dykes and water dams18; Reynier Cant, a prominent merchant and member of the Amsterdam council; and Karel Roorda, a prominent politician from the province of Friesland, and ridderschap member of the States of Friesland. John of Nas­ sau was appointed as coordinator or director of the union. The Union of Utrecht, initiated as a defensive alliance against an ongoing military threat, was to be the cornerstone of the new Dutch nation-state. But that the Union of Utrecht would later serve as “…a kind of consti­ tutional law for the republic of a united Netherlands” was certainly not foreseen nor intended at the time.19 Furthermore, given that the Union of Utrecht was formed within less than six months from that of the Union of Arras, the timing would suggest that the former, the union of the northern provinces, was in response to the latter, the union of the southern provinces. But this too was not so. As we have seen, the Union of Utrecht was formed mainly in response to the military situation, with the Spanish threatening the north-eastern front, and the need for more funds from those provinces whose powers – including fundraising – may have been under threat by the French Duke of Anjou, who was being proposed as a new Netherlands protector. The Spanish were concerned at the development of Anjou’s pres­ ence in the Netherlands and so were the northern provinces as his role and powers were undefined as yet. The initial statement in the first part of the Union of Utrecht denied there was an intention to break with the wider union constituted by the Pacifica­ tion of Ghent; however, it did commit the signing provinces (Holland, Zee­ land, Gelderland, Ommelands, Utrecht, and Friesland), to remain together in perpetuity and to act as a single province. 20 There was some opposition to the Union of Utrecht in the States of Utrecht. This was due to the lack of guarantees of religious toleration. No anti-Catholic worship stipulations were made in the union treaty. How­ ever, with the union and having closer relations with Calvinist Holland and Zeeland, and with no mention of allowing public practise of Cathol­ icism in other provinces, the overall policy of William and the weakening States-General of religious peace and stability was failing. This opposition by certain elements in the States of Utrecht was successfully frustrated by Floris Thin, Advocate of the States of Holland, who mobilised the ridder­ schap delegates of the states with the delegates from the city of Utrecht. Political management of the states of the provinces by a trusted and loyal supporter of the Stadhouder was to be a key element in the political process of the future Dutch state. 21 William, based in Antwerp, avoided participating or signing the Union of Utrecht. He still worked hard for keeping the southern provinces reconciled to the north and for overall religious toleration. He accepted the reality

70  William the Silent and the Revolt of the northern provinces being formally unified, and he realised that the Utrecht union effectively hollowed out the centre of the Union of Brussels. 22 But he hoped for and strived that this union could be incorporated in and be part of a wider union of as many provinces as possible, including the southern provinces, and in tandem with this he worked for a policy of overall religious toleration. However, extremists on both sides during the first six months of 1579 worked against him. In May 1579, even in Antwerp, now the headquarters of the States-General and of both William and Matthias, mass anti-Catholic rioting occurred in which hundreds of Catholics were attacked and many imprisoned. Matthias was one of these held and imprisoned by the extreme mobs, and it was only with difficulty that William’s intervention secured the release of Matthias, and some – but by no means all – of the unfortunate captive Catholic victims. Two events were to finally dash all William’s hopes and efforts. These were the southern provinces coming together, and Parma becoming the Governor of the Netherlands. Don Juan had suddenly succumbed to typhus, dying in October 1579. Parma, his able field commander, was appointed his successor as the Spanish Governor of the Netherlands. His appointment –inevitably, as per Spanish bureaucratic practice – took some months in being officially confirmed, but Parma, already in situ, continued military operations with renewed vigour, now as the governor. In the words of a historian, writing a large study of the Counter Reformation, “No-one was better suited than Farnese to take advantage of the disarray into which the Netherlands revolution had fallen”. 23 While even a partisan historian in a multivolume pro-Dutch independence struggle grudgingly admitted of Parma’s combined military and diplomatic skill: incisive, artful, he united the unscrupulous audacity of a condottiere with the wily patience of a Jesuit…. He came prepared not only to smite the Netherlanders but to cope with them in tortuous policy…. He possessed art and patience – as time was to prove – not only to undermine their most impregnable cities, but to delve below the intrigues of their most accomplished politicians. 24 Another historian, in a specialist military history of the period, states “… an operational master who also appreciated the interplay of politics and warfare, Farnese payed the game at all levels”. 25 The author of the classic biography of William the Silent trenchantly describes the advent of Parma as governor as follows: “…Now, after 10 years of error, Philip had chosen the right man to win him back the Netherlands”. 26 Parma had an astute appreciation of the geostrategic situation in Europe, no matter how complex it became. Soon after taking post, first as commander of Don Juan’s troops in the Netherlands, then as the governor, he

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grasped the potential solution to the situation. The solution was to exploit the differences between the southern and the northern provinces. He realised the rifts among the rebels in their attitude to a united Netherlands and their differing views on totally breaking with Spain. With timing, these could be exploited. He also realised the key factor in the solution – be it suppressing the whole Revolt or damage limitation if the Dutch Revolt succeeded – lay in the Catholic Walloon provinces and the necessity of regaining their trust, if not their loyalty to Spain. Later he was also to realise – unlike Philip and many of the court in distant Spain – that the defeat of England, even its conquest, lay in pacifying the Netherlands. Therefore, he resolved to con­ centrate upon the southern provinces and save for Spain all that could be saved. In the words of a historian in a work taking a long-ranging view of imperial Spain over the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, “… the Catholic provinces of the south, for him they were a smaller but more secure patrimony for the Spanish Hapsburgs”. 27 While the northern provinces were unifying closer, initially as a defensive union against a pressing military threat and then evolving into a political union, the southern provinces were developing a political union of their own. Even while William was trying to restore stability in Ghent and re­ assure the southern provinces, in the first week in January 1579 the States of Hainault and Flanders formed their own union, which was agreed at Arras. They were joined soon after by the States of Walloon Flanders. After the union talks of the southern provinces at Arras had been finalised and agreed in January 1579, the following month the States of Hainault and Artois agreed to start negotiations with Parma. In fact, Parma himself had contacted the Stadhouder of Hainault, Philip de Lalaing. De Lalaing was one of the principal “Malcontents” of the southern nobility. In April 1579, the 7,000 mutinous Walloon troops of the Malcontents reaffirmed their loyalty to Spain and King Philip II by the Treaty of Mont St Eloi, signed in the small village in Flanders. They were given a single cash payment totalling 250,000 florins, and their units were reintegrated into the royal army. Parma was gaining the trust and empathy of the southern nobility and had already gained 7,000 troops to his forces. Negotiations between Parma and the “Malcontents” representing the southern provinces continued and led to the Treaty of Arras in May 1579. The Treaty of Arras was a peace treaty agreed between Parma and the provinces of Hainault, Flanders, Walloon, Flanders, and Artois. The Treaty of Arras reaffirmed the provisions of the Pacification of Gh­ ent and, more important to Parma, the Perpetual Edict. The southern prov­ inces acknowledged and submitted to Spanish sovereignty. The privileges enjoyed by the provinces under the Emperor Charles V were to be restored, and taxes and taxation levels were to be adjusted to those in force under the Emperor Charles V. Roman Catholicism was the official religion, and all other religions were proscribed. The Council of State was to be recon­ structed to what it was under the Emperor Charles V, and over half of its

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members were to be appointed only with the approval of all the states of the provinces. 28 Also, Parma agreed that all Spanish troops were to leave these provinces: “His Majesty shall send out all Spanish Italian Burgundian and other foreign troops not acceptable to the country within six weeks or earlier…”. 29 This commitment to withdraw troops was clear and unequivocal. The troops stationed in the southern provinces would be local Flemish and Walloon levies, deemed “safe” by the states of the southern provinces. It deprived Parma of a substantial part of his forces, drastically reducing the number and quality of troops at his disposal. However, this was well worth the goodwill and loyalty of the southern provinces, effectively dividing the Revolt. Also “the country” referred to in the Treaty was the signatory of the southern provinces. From these provinces, the Spanish and allied troops were totally withdrawn, but Parma was still free to deploy and use them in and against the rebellious northern provinces. He also foresaw that the time would come when he would be able to persuade the southern prov­ inces to have Spanish troops return to them. In the meantime, he could manage what he intended with these troops. By April 1579, there were to be three unions among the States of the Netherlands, the Union of Arras, the Union of Utrecht, and the Union of Brussels of the States-General at Antwerp. William, tireless, still worked for reconciliation between the provinces, and at the same time he was lead­ ing and maintaining the Revolt. In February 1579, Parma, as commander of the troops of Don Juan, had advanced towards Antwerp itself, and his foremost units were within sight of the walls and an assault seemed inevita­ ble. Under William’s direction, trenches were hastily thrown up and defen­ sive positions put in place on the walls. On 1 March 1579, Parma’s troops attempted an initial assault but were driven back, with William directing the defence.30 Parma withdrew his forces. From the strategy map of the Netherlands which he knew by heart, he knew of more vulnerable cities to target. Antwerp could wait; its turn would come. With this immediate danger over, William, together with representatives from the States of Brabant, worked on a form of union. This union was to include all provinces, which would be represented through a strengthened States-General with increased central authority and under whose authority Catholic worship would be official and tolerated throughout the Nether­ lands in accordance with the Pacification of Ghent. However, the States of Holland, while utterly loyal to William, gave little encouragement to this. The States of Hainault and Artois clearly stated that their way lay through the Union of Arras and in a reconciliation with Spain – a complete impossi­ bility for William and the States of the Union of Utrecht. William’s efforts at reconciliation between all the provinces were for a union of all provinces which would constitute an entity independent of Spain, not a union recon­ ciled to an eventual return to Spanish sovereignty. William, on 3 May 1579, signed the Union of Utrecht.

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The political situation was made a little more complex by the attempted mediation of the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II. He had followed the events in the Netherlands and offered to mediate. The southern prov­ inces of the by-now failing States-General agreed to participate, as did Spain. In April 1579, Rudolf sent imperial emissaries to host talks at the imperial city of Cologne. This was the seat of one of the senior elec­ tors of the Empire, just across the border from the Netherlands and, being within the Empire, on neutral territory. The Union of Utrecht was represented by Marnix St Aldegonde, as we have seen, a loyal William supporter and a staunch Calvinist. Parma, then in overall command of Don Juan’s forces, attended on behalf of Spain but did not take these talks seriously and continued military operations. He had already ad­ vanced north-eastwards and had approached the city of Maastricht, a Dutch rebel stronghold, and, by mid-March 1579, the city was under siege. Parma’s forces outnumbered the defenders by 20,000 to 1,200. However, ever mindful of his troops, he avoided frontal attacks and engaged in mining operations. The defenders in their turn sank tunnels and for some months mining and countermining operations continued, with skirmishes underground. Parma allowed attrition to wreak its toll on the defenders. Then in late June, he judged it was time to attack. On 29 June 1579, a night attack by stealth was carried out; Parma’s troops gained entrance, and the city fell and was sacked for three days. A vital stronghold had fallen to Spain. The following month, the city of Mechelen was betrayed to Parma’s forces by its Walloon governor, the Baron de Bours. The talks in Cologne had started in May 1579. Some delegates from the various provinces, like those from Overijssel and Friesland as well as some of the delegates from the southern provinces, were willing to give this me­ diation a fair hearing and tried to be impartial. However, other delegates were unbending. On the Spanish side, Parma was in no mood to compro­ mise; the Union of Utrecht was represented by the loyal William supporter and Calvinist, Marnix de St Aldegonde, who was a staunch Calvinist and equally averse to compromise. The talks soon ran into difficulties, due to lack of willingness of either side to move from their respective extreme po­ sitions and compromise. An interesting dialogue occurred during the talks at Cologne. The dele­ gate from Spain, Carlos de Aragon, the Duke of Terranova, was authorised by Philip II of Spain to make contact with William and make offers to him in return for which William would make peace and accept a return to Span­ ish sovereignty. Terranova at Cologne made contact with one of the imperial delegates, Count Schwarzenberg. The Schwarzenbergs were a distinguished aristocratic family and through the centuries were to serve the Holy Roman Empire and later Hapsburg Austria with distinction. Schwarzenberg was an old acquaintance of William, and the two had close ties (William, due to his estates at Dillenburg and Nassau was a ruler of the Holy Roman

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Empire, like Schwarzenberg). William’s secretary Nicolas Bruynick ar­ rived for the talks in late June. He was approached by Schwarzenberg who informed him that should his master turn over all the territories of the Netherlands currently occupied by anti-Spanish forces, he, William, would be well rewarded by Philip II. The Duke of Terranova was encouraged by the progress Schwarzenberg had made. However, William proved difficult. He engaged in these discreet negotiations making a series of demands of his own, which included the release of his eldest son, (still confined and closely guarded by Spain); enough funds in payment for him to pay off sev­ eral of his mercenary commanders; confirmation of his Stadhouderships of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht; and a guarantee of the full toleration and maintenance of Protestant worship where it had been introduced to date as a result of the control of territory. This was a staggering demand to Philip II by an individual who was leading a Revolt against him. Schwarzenberg and, behind him, Terranova, were under the impression that these demands were merely a bargaining tactic, upping the demands to be able to gain more in the eventual compromise. They anticipated further communication, with possibly some lowering of William’s terms. In fact, the whole of William’s stated positions were some sort of smokescreen. The next, final communication by William via an envoy was that he would not engage into any separate negotiations and that he was part of and engaged in the imperial hosted talks and declared that since he had taken leadership of a struggle against Spanish tyranny, his constant and sole aim was to free the country from foreign domination. By this, he quelled any Spanish hopes of approaching and tempting him personally to compromise for peace in­ volving some form of Spanish sovereignty and emphasised the primacy of the states in conducting the negotiations. Meanwhile, the talks between the states and the Spanish delegation were reaching an impasse with no sign of compromise. The delegate from the province of Friesland, fully accepting the justice and aims of the Revolt and the breakaway from Spanish oppressive rule, was shocked at the intransi­ gence of the Calvinists and their unwillingness to countenance any form of religious toleration. He gave up in despair and abandoned his position in Friesland and retired to Cologne in the Empire. 31 On the other side, Parma’s continuing victories in the south encouraged the pro-Spanish dele­ gates to maintain a hard line, unwilling to compromise. The talks faltered, broke down, and were abandoned by November 1579. This further polar­ ised the provinces and forced individuals to choose which side of the Revolt they supported. William had already chosen. In fact, he had chosen long ago, aiming for a break with Spanish sovereignty. His more recent choice, made on 3 May 1579 when he signed the Union of Utrecht, was the way in which the freedom was to be achieved. It was increasingly clear to him now that the way to freedom from Spain lay in a united bloc of northern provinces, solid against any form of Spanish sovereignty but, if at all possible, allowing

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religious toleration. However, this northern bloc, the Union of Utrecht, was under threat. Parma’s troops were steadily advancing from the south consolidating their gains and taking town after town. However, a more immediate threat appeared to the provinces of the Union of Utrecht. The Stadhouder of Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Friesland had changed sides and defected to the Spanish. The Stadhouder was George de Lalaing – Count Rennenberg – a relative of the southern noble Philip de Lalaing. In 1577, with the establishment of the Union of Brussels, Count Rennenberg had been appointed the Stad­ houder of Friesland, Gelderland, Drenthe, and Overijssel by Matthias and the States-General in Antwerp, in order to stabilise the situation in the north. Matthias and the States-General felt that Rennenberg as a Catholic noble would be assuring to Catholics facing increasing hostility by mili­ tant Protestants. They issued instructions to him that Catholicism was to remain the official religion and to keep the situation peaceful. However, in Friesland, local nobility combined with local magistrates and officials were hostile to this and were pressing for the restoring of Protestant civic officials and representatives who had been removed by Spanish repression in the late 1560s and early 1570s. Rennenberg was content to act as Stadhouder but, with grave misgivings and doubts, was forced to bow to local pressure and remove any and all loyalist pro-Spanish officials, judicial officials from the central court of Friesland, and councillors and administrators from Franeker, Sneek, Bolsward, and Harlingen, and even to arrest and detain the Catholic bishop of Leeuwarden. Although the bishop was eventually released and allowed to depart and take refuge in the Empire, Rennenberg was becoming uncomfortable with his role as Stadhouder of the provinces. Like many others, he had been increasingly troubled with divided loyalties as the Revolt took its complex course. A devout Catholic and loyal to Spain, Rennenberg so far had not committed himself and had abstained during the discussion regarding the formation of the Union of Utrecht. (The province of Overijssel had not signed the Union of Utrecht.) But with the collapse of the Cologne talks, he realised he had to make a choice. He contacted and negotiated with Parma who guaranteed him his titles and lands. 32 Then in March 1580, he announced his defection from the States-General and declared his loyalty to Spain. By this defection, the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel and the eastern flank of the Union of Utrecht could be dan­ gerously exposed. In response to Rennenberg’s declaration of loyalty to Spain, the Catholics in the region rose against the Revolt. In Groningen, they rose and also a rising occurred in Zwolle. In Friesland, there were sporadic outbursts by Catholic groups. The rising in Zwolle was quickly crushed by local groups of Protestants without any need for outside military help, the rising in Groningen was contained, and the small Catholic outbursts in Friesland abated. Troops from the province of Holland were deployed in Overijssel as a precautionary measure. They met some hostility from local peasant

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groups, but they easily dealt with these. Anti-Catholic riots occurred in Deventer, churches were destroyed, and Catholic individuals targeted. The rising was short-lived, and any support for a Catholic rising in the region had been confined to some of the middle classes in Groningen and some of the nobility in Overijssel and Gelderland. The rest of the region stayed firm for William and for hostility to Spain and Spanish rule. At the end of March 1580, within a month of the rising starting, the States of Overijssel met with William attending and, while still holding back from signing up to the Union of Utrecht, declared their total loyalty to the cause of separation from Spain. Rennenberg’s defection and the brief conflict33 in the north-east resulted in the strengthening of the Union of Utrecht and allied provinces, and their objective of freedom from Spanish sovereignty. However, it also polarised the religious divide, furthering pushing away the southern loyalist prov­ inces and ensured that the northern entity, led by the Calvinist Holland and Zeeland, would be virulently Protestant: “…the great moral issue was decided. Netherlands liberty was to be anti-Romish. That was the doing, despite Orange, of the Calvinistic regime of Holland and Zeeland through the Union of Utrecht…”. 34 Parma and his troops were still advancing on at least two fronts, in the south and advancing north-westwards. In February 1580, Parma’s troops seized the town of Kortrijk. In the midst of the political turmoil of the late 1570s, there had been a fur­ ther complicating factor. Matthias, although successfully rendered tame by William, was proving an ineffective force. Another outside ally was sought, and the obvious choice was that of France. As early as 1576, the brother of the French king, the Duke of Anjou, had been in contact with William and the States-General, assuring them of his support against the Spanish. The States of Brabant, Hainault, and Flanders had written and then made overtures to Henri III of France, requesting assistance against the Spanish. However, popular opinion among those in the Netherlands who were sup­ porting the Revolt was as much anti-French as anti-Spanish. Also Elizabeth of England, embroiled in the tri-cornered struggle of France-Spain-England that was a near-constant factor of mid-sixteenth-century European diplo­ macy, intervened. She promised William and the States-General financial help – a 100,000-pound loan – provided they break off any negotiations with Anjou and France. This was agreed, and the first instalment payment of 20,000 English pounds duly arrived in Brussels in late 1576. 35 However, the situation became more urgent in early 1580 as the ter­ ritory controlled by the Revolt was being reduced. William, although he had accepted the Union of Utrecht, still sought that the Revolt include as much as the southern provinces as possible. Therefore, the Revolt had to be as religiously inclusive as possible, which was why he then called upon the States-General to offer the sovereignty of the Netherlands to France, more specifically to Anjou, younger brother of the King of France. French

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intervention was a possibility with which Spain had to constantly content. Back in the earlier days of the Revolt, the one strategic priority of Alva had been to deal with the risings in the south in order to forestall any French intervention. If Anjou could be offered the sovereignty of the Netherlands, French confidence and later support would follow, and a Catholic prince would reassure those in the southern provinces supporting the Revolt. After negotiations, Anjou entered the Netherlands, into the province of Hainault, and then to the States-General in Brussels. Negotiations were finalised by the Treaty of Plessis-les-Tours in September 1580, by which Anjou was granted sovereignty. Propaganda supporting this was circu­ lated, emphasising past connections between the French royal house and the duchy of Burgundy, whose rulers formally held the Netherlands prov­ inces.36 On William’s initiative, the States-General granted him the title, grand but generic, “Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries” and “Prince” – but not that of “sovereign” – in return for which he undertook to provide 12,000 much-needed troops. The troops were to be provided at Anjou’s expense37 and for which he pledged a subsidy of 2,400,000 livres year.38 Anjou by this treaty undertook de facto sovereignty but guaranteed the rights and privileges of all the provinces and those of the States-General, whom he was to convene at least once a year, and they, the States-General, could meet more frequently, if they so decided. The rights of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland were particularly protected in that no constitutional changes whatsoever were to be counte­ nanced. These two provinces had stubbornly opposed what they perceived as foisting Anjou upon the Revolt, and in late March 1580 – during the very negotiations between the States-General and Anjou – the States of Holland met and declared Philip to have forfeited all claims to be ruler and offered William the ‘high authority of the province’ and title of Count of Hol­ land. William agreed, included Zeeland in this agreement, and stipulated that this would be kept secret and both provinces would agree to Anjou. William took the discreet title of Count of Holland and Zeeland, and the following day Holland and Zeeland dropped their opposition to Anjou. Anjou’s Council of State was to be chosen by him in consultation with and recommendations from the provinces. Evidence of the ruthless ap­ proach by the provinces and the States-General in the negotiations could be seen in one draft clause which stipulated that the King of France had to either declare war on Spain or provide his brother, Anjou, with all due resources to enable him to also wage war. However, common sense pre­ vailed, and the finalised treaty stipulated that the King of France was “ex­ pected” to do either or both. Another clause stated that the treaty would not come into force until Anjou had in his possession, and handed over to the States-General, a declaration of assurance from King Henry III of France that the latter would provide the assistance as stipulated by the States-General. 39

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The Netherlands had gained more troops and a new sovereign (though as we have seen, this title was specifically avoided). France had gained in­ fluence and a potential territorial advantage. However, there were mixed feelings and misgivings about Anjou’s gain. King Henry III of France wrote to Anjou the day after Christmas 1580, fulfilling the clause in the Treaty of Plessis-les-Tours regarding assurances of assistance to Anjou: I will aid and assist you with all my power and I will join, league and associate myself with the provinces of the Netherlands that have con­ tracted with you…. I hope that God will have the goodness to restore my country to peace before that. While his mother Catherine de Medici, much more the political realist, also wrote to Anjou in the same month, fulfilling the clause in the Treaty of Plessis-les-Tours: my joy has turned to utter perplexity…. I have no doubt whatsoever that this project will only deprive you of the glory and recognition that you have earned by your service to the king…. The king your brother has always told you that he desired to contribute to your grandeur and advancement. But this is something he could not do until he first re­ stored peace to his kingdom…. Moreover, my son, do you not find it pertinent that you and your brother should undertake this war against the most powerful prince in Christendom before you have ascertained for sure the will and friendship of your neighbours.40 In other words, Henry III was giving full support to his brother as stipu­ lated by treaty, but only if and after the internal conflicts in France could cease. Catherine reiterated this and also pointed to Anjou that his titles were short of what his position deserved and, most important, that Anjou was exposed to, and exposing France to, possible war with Spain. Such forebodings were not a good start to Anjou’s tenure as “prince and lord of the Netherlands” when he took the oath to abide by all the agreed terms and was officially so inaugurated before the States-General in Antwerp 41 in January1581. This development was indeed regarded with grave forebodings by Spain. France may have been rent by religious wars, but it was still capable of in­ tervening in the Spanish Netherlands. Henry III of France may have been a physical and moral weakling, but he had an excellent, cunning mind and a certain grasp of strategy, and no one ever quite knew what he planned next. Anjou’s role and ambitions were as yet an unknown factor. The ne­ gotiations and even the possibility of Anjou being offered sovereignty of the Netherlands in the late 1570s had motivated Parma into giving more acceptable terms to the southern provinces in the negotiations that led to the Union of Arras. Back in Madrid, Spain responded. After Anjou had

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been officially inaugurated at Antwerp a short time later, in June 1580 Philip II issued a ban on William. The ban withdrew recognition of any of his titles and declared him an outlaw. A reward was officially issued for any and all who killed the outlaw. This royal and official encouragement of assassinating William had been pressed for in the royal councils by Car­ dinal Granvelle; it was opposed by Parma. The latter’s opposition was not through squeamishness or principle, but due to political pragmatism in that the ban on and sanctioning of assassination of William would be counter­ productive. Parma was to be proven correct. With Anjou as the new de facto sovereign (although, as we have seen, the title of “sovereign” was carefully denied him), Matthias, having found him­ self somewhat superfluous and for some time constantly side-lined, had left the Netherlands in March 1581.Then, some months later, in 1581 Philip II of Spain was deposed by the States-General. In April 1581, the StatesGeneral passed the Act of Abjuration or Plakket van Verlatinge which re­ pudiated and rejected for ever Philip II and any heirs as sovereign rulers of the Netherlands. Symbolic changes were ordered. Philip’s portrait was re­ moved from all coinage minted within the provinces of the wider union and from all official seals, and, along with the taking down of the Hapsburg coat of arms on public buildings, any reference to Philip or his portrait was erased from all of the official documents. No mention or reference to Philip or the King of Spain was to be made in court proceedings or governmental work and administration. More substantial, new oaths of allegiance to the States-General were required from all officeholders and judicial officials, and part of the new oath was that the individual taking it was no longer bound by any oath of loyalty to the Spanish king and, even more specifi­ cally, the individual did not have to swear to “be true and obedient to the States against the king of Spain and his followers”. This appeared to be a highly significant step. However, for William, his Rubicon had been crossed over a decade ago when he took up arms against the sovereignty of Spain and King Philip II and led the invasion into the Netherlands, a multipronged invasion which Alva defeated. For the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, the powerhouses of the Revolt, the Act of Abjuration was nothing new but merely a legal confirmation of the situation which had been so for a decade. However, there were doubts in other provinces. For certain individuals and sections, this was the point when the die was cast. Officeholders in Gelderland and Friesland, while not rabidly pro-Spanish, were troubled in conscience as to their duties – or the prospect of retribution with Parma’s successful campaign – and resigned their offices. The States of Overijssel assented to the Act with doubts and reluctance.42 But overall in all provinces, the deed was done and Philip II was formally deposed. But resolutions, unions, assembly debates, decisions, a new sovereign protector, acts, all of these now counted for little in the face of one trend – the increasingly successful military campaign of the duke of Parma.

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Notes 1 Granvelle to Zuniga 23 September 1574, Hispanic Society of America, New York, manuscripts, Altamira 3/V/15, cited by G Parker Imprudent King p 217 2 Braudel, in his Civilisation and Capitalism 15 to 18 Centuries Volume III – Perspectives of the World details the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth cen­ turies in Europe as cities in Europe, including Antwerp, establishing themselves as financial centres and gaining predominance and gives a detailed analysis of the rise and decline of each city. Each of these cities, in turn, lost their primus inter pares position to another city, a period of over a century in which Bruges, Genoa, Venice, Lisbon, and Antwerp all enjoyed their heydays. This was a con­ tinuous process up to the mid-eighteenth century, with Amsterdam being the last city to hold sway. He places this process in the overall context of a global financial order in which these differing cities operated and interacted econom­ ically in an area stretching from the Low Countries to the Mediterranean. He views the sequence of events of the rise and fall of each city as a north–south macroeconomic struggle within this area 3 George Gascoigne, English resident, cited in L Panhuysen and R van Stipriaan Ooggetuigen van Tachtigjarige Oorlog-van de eerste ruzie tot het laatste kan­ onschot pp 107–110 4 F Braudel Civilisation and Capitalism 15 to 18 Centuries Volume III – Perspectives of the World p 154

5 J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall

6 ST Bindoff The Scheldt Question to 1839 p 84

7 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 167

8 G Parker Imprudent King. A New Life of Philip II p 242

9 JH Elliott Europe Divided 1559–1598

10 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 174 11 J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 pp 188–190 12 J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 191 13 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 182 14 G Mattingly The Defeat of the Spanish Armada p 55 15 MO Connell The Counter-Reformation 1559–1610 p 256 16 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 198 17 Several of the northern provinces, while provinces in their own right, were divided into one of two subdivisions or Quarters. Sometimes, each subdivision had its own voting powers and rights and could influence the decisions of the provincial States. In the future Dutch nascent state, these voting rights and actions of some Quarters hampered unanimous decisions within the provin­ cial states and indirectly hampered the unified decisions of the States-General. For full details of the structures of the differing provinces – and an extremely informative overview – see J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, pp 68–70, 248–252 18 Paulus Buys had travelled to England in 1575 and pleaded before Queen Eliza­ beth for support for the Dutch rebels. His entreaties were refused. When Eliza­ beth finally intervened and accepted the Dutch offer of alliance and the Earl of Leicester arrived in the Netherlands to take charge, Buys was some time after arrested and imprisoned by Leicester for alleged plotting against him. Leices­ ter’s tenure in the Netherlands was a contentious one, with successful opposi­ tion against him taking too much power led by another able Dutch politician Jan van Oldenbarneveldt. Leicester was recalled by Elizabeth

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19 A van Cruyningen De Tachtigjarige Oorlog-de vriheidsstreid in de Nederland 1568–1648 p 76 20 H Rowen The Low Countries in Early Modern Times pp 69–70, cited in H Koenigsberger Monarchies, States-Generals and Parliaments – The Nether­ lands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries p 29 21 See N Ridley Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies chapter 5 22 A van Cruyningen De Tachtigjarige Oorlog-de vriheidsstreid in de Nederland 1568–1648 pp 74–76 23 MO Connell The Counter-Reformation 1559–1610 p 258 24 JR Motley The Rise of the Dutch Republic 1883 edition Vol III p 372; The Rise of the Dutch Republic – A History 1901 single volume edition p 772 25 T Arnold The Renaissance at War p 203 26 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 185 27 A Ballesteros y Beretta Figuras imperiales-Alfonso VII el Emperador, Colon, Fernando el Catolico, Carlos V, Felipe II pp 72–82 28 Articles i. xx, xv and xvi 29 Cited by H Rowen The Low Countries in Early Modern Times pp 71–72 30 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 201 31 J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall p 205 32 P Geyl History of the Dutch-Speaking Peoples 1555–1648 p 176 33 KW Swart, in his classic William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84, a work which fully acknowledged the leadership and importance of William in the Revolt, but was also sympathetic to the dilemma of Philip II and Spain (p 175) describes George de Lalaing’s defection as handing over a large part of the northeast Netherlands to the Spaniards. J Israel in his Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 pp 206–208 emphasises the shortness of the impact of the defection, the ineffectiveness of any resulting Catholic risings, and that it left the Union of Utrecht stronger 34 P Geyl History of the Dutch-Speaking Peoples 1555–1648 p 178. Geyl wrote from a favourable viewpoint towards greater Netherlands nationalism, and somewhat regretful that the independent state that resulted from the Revolt did not comprise at least a large part of the southern provinces, this truncated state being due to the rise of Protestantism 35 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 129 36 PAM Geurts Nederlands Opstand in pamfletten pp 294–296, cited in J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 209 37 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 166 38 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 216 39 PL Muller and A Diegerick Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d Anjou et les Pays-Bas Vol III pp 621–623, cited in KW Swart William of Or­ ange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 213 40 MP Holt The Duke of Anjou and the Political Struggle during the Wars of Re­ ligion pp 141–143, cited in P Limm The Dutch Revolt 1559–1648 Docs 15/16 p 128 41 The city of Antwerp, seat of the States-General, was virulently opposed to An­ jou, and William had to work long and hard with the councillors and official of Antwerp to persuade them to give support. KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 212 42 J Burchard van Hattum Gesch de stad Zwolle, iv/215, cited in J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 211

6

Unscrupulous audacity of a condottiere with the wily patience of a Jesuit

Alexander Farnese, the Duke of Parma – ever efficient, ever resourceful, and ever relentless – was reconquering territory for his sovereign King Philip II of Spain. His most experienced Spanish troops, the famous tercios, had left the Netherlands under the terms of the Treaty of Arras. He was relying upon Walloon levies and units of German troops from the Empire. ReguRegu­ lar payment of troops posed problems. The Army of Flanders always had cash-flow problems since Philip had made quite clear to Alva back in 1579 that there would be no funds from Spain, and payment must be raised from local provincial revenues. However, like all able commanders, he made do with what he had, avoiding excessive risks which would influence heavy casualties. He ensured his troops were regularly fed and supplied and in conflict avoided asking too much of units, and he shared the same camcam­ paign hardships as the ordinary soldier.1 And overall, it was paying off in terms of the troops being loyal to him, respecting his ability and having genuine empathy with him. As we have seen, in 1579 the Spanish made inroads, taking the strategic cities of Maastricht and Mechelen. Then throughout 1579 and 1580, ParPar­ ma’s forces recaptured Kortrijk and Breda. 2 Both towns were taken with the help of subversive pro-Spanish elements within. In the case of Breda, it was a corrupt sentry who, bribed with a substantial sum, quietly opened an outer gate to Spanish forces. Despite a speedy reaction by the defenddefend­ ers, who mobilised large numbers, the Spanish forces fanned out, attacked and took other gates to the city, and then were able to attack the key inner defensive positions. The defenders then surrendered, on condition of being given merciful terms, which Parma and his troops honoured. Thanks to the subversive and treacherous element – a sentry at an important gate – Breda had been quickly taken and a long siege had been avoided. Like General Mola in a later conflict, Parma knew how to use all five columns of troops. Also in Gelderland, Colonel Francisco Verdugo, one of Parma’s many able commanders, won a significant victory over the states’ troops, but shortage of resources – and monies – prevented Parma from exploiting this.3 HowHow­ ever, this was not to be the only engagement by Verdugo that was invaluable to Parma’s campaign of re-conquest.

The wily patience of a Jesuit 83 The Spanish advance continued from the south and towards the north­ east. Spanish forces numbering over 7,000 troops approached and laid siege to Steenwijk in the province of Overijssel. They were commanded by Lalaing – Count Rennenberg – having irrevocably omitted himself to Spain. They commenced a preliminary bombardment. The following month, Dutch forces attempted to relieve Steenwijk but were successfully repulsed by the besiegers. However, other help was at hand. Dutch troops and Eng­ lish troops based in Brabant hastened to relieve Steenwijk. They were com­ manded by John Norreys. This relieving force was suddenly attacked by units of besiegers diverted from the siege to head off the relieving force. However, “Black John” Norreys was an able professional soldier, in com­ mand of veteran mercenaries.4 The English and Dutch forces stood and fought a long engagement on 15 December, defeating the Spanish troops who retreated back to their own lines. Norreys then punched through the besieged lines and made it into Steenwijk, giving the defenders muchneeded supplies and reinforcements. The siege continued throughout the winter. Both sides suffered due to the excessively cold weather. Then in the last week of January 1581, Norreys made a surprise attack through sallyports and inflicted significant casualties on the besieged even capturing some artillery, hauling them back into Steenwijk to supplement the guns of the artillery. By late February 1581, the besieged were reduced in effective fighting numbers by illness from exposure and their supplies of ammuni­ tion were reduced to dangerously low levels. Rennenberg called off the siege and retreated. Later in the year Norreys and his forces were to inflict a crushing defeat upon Rennenberg’s forces at Kollum, and Rennenberg was killed. However, the Spanish advance on Steenwijk was only temporarily halted; they would be back. In the south, Parma and his troops approached Tournai, which was defended by States-General troops. The Governor of Tournai, Pierre de Melun, was away with some forces making a counterattack in the area at Gravelines. The wife of the Deputy Governor was a member of the de Lalaing family and a relative of Rennenberg, Marie Christine de Lalaing. Despite her family being ‘Malcontents’ and some of them were seeking a form of reconciliation with Spain, Marie Christine rallied the defences of Tournai against the approaching troops of Parma. She made rousing speeches to the troops who put up a strong resistance against the besiegers. The besieging troops numbered 12,000 in infantry and 5,000 in cavalry, vastly outnumbering the defenders. However, inspired by Marie Christine de Lalaing’s leadership, no less than 12 sorties were made by the Tournai defenders, and their resistance was fierce. Marie Christine herself was se­ riously wounded during the fighting. Parma, however, knew that attrition would work on his side and grimly maintained the pressure. At the end of November 1581, Tournai fell to Parma’s troops. In early 1582, the states of Artois, Hainault, Walloon Flanders, Douai, and Orchies met under Parma’s invitation at Tournai. There Parma skilfully

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explained that the Walloon troops had performed loyally and magnifi­ cently, but total victory could not be achieved by these troops alone. He needed to deploy Spanish tercios – troops deployed in the southern prov­ inces. Persuaded, on 8 February 1582, the states of Artois, Hainault, Wal­ loon Flanders, Douai, and Orchies all agreed to the return of the Spanish tercios. It was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, adding to his ongo­ ing military success. Orders were issued speedily to facilitate the return of Spanish troops. From Tournai in Hainault, Parma deployed his army into Flanders leav­ ing behind considerable forces for garrison and holding duties. In early 1582, he was moving towards the fortified town of Oudenaarde and by late March had started its siege. Oudenaarde had a small garrison of several hundred troops, but it had had its walls strengthened and several extensions or ravelins had been built, so it was a formidably fortified town. Parma deployed several units to build and man static defences at several points so that possible relief columns from either Ghent or Aalst would be blocked. Then the bombardment began from Parma’s artillery, and after this Parma concentrated some of his forces towards the gate whose exit led to Ghent and, after some heavy fighting, gained the ravelin. Having gained this, he used some of his heavy artillery, enabling a more concentrated and intense bombardment on that part of the town. Then a mutiny broke out within two units of the besieging Spanish army. The cause was the amount of payment. Funds for the Spanish troops in the Netherlands at this time were always in short supply, and there was a dispute among several troops about how much some units were due. Parma quickly attended in person and dealt with the situation firmly but fairly; he not only ensured that a few troublemakers were punished but also that correct amounts were paid. This having been settled, Parma continued the siege. The besiegers made further progress, gradually inflicting more casualties on the defenders. Suddenly, the defenders concentrated some of their forces and made a sortie. This was repulsed by the Spanish, leaving the defenders weaker. The Spanish then managed in several places to fill the deep moat surrounding the town and, accessing to the outer walls, started to under­ mine them. A relief force under the Duke of Anjou advanced and attempted to rein­ force the defenders but was easily repulsed by the Spanish. The siege contin­ ued. After further bombardment, and continuous attacks by infantry units, a breach was made in the city gates and the attackers occupied and held positions there. A lull in the fighting allowed the defenders to temporarily dislodge the Spanish from the city gate breach, but then later the defenders counterattacked and retook the positions. The defenders were now signif­ icantly reduced in numbers and their commander, realising the situation was near-hopeless, surrendered to Parma on honourable terms. Parma’s terms, as usual, were humanitarian. The surviving troops of the defenders were allowed to depart with colours flying, to eventually join elsewhere the

The wily patience of a Jesuit 85 other units of the states’ armies. A fine of 30,000 ecus was imposed upon the town; when the monies were collected Parma had them distributed to his troops. The town of Oudenaarde was garrisoned by Walloon units of Parma’s army. The citizens were unharmed. The Protestant citizens were granted a general pardon and given a choice. They could remain in Oude­ naarde provided they swore an oath of loyalty to the Spanish and did not ‘disturb’ Catholic citizens (i.e. no public Protestant services, any Protestant worship to be practiced in private) or they could leave with their goods within three months. Oudenaarde surrendered in June 1582. During the final days of the siege, the first of the Spanish troops, permitted to return to the Netherlands by the Treaty of Tournai, arrived back in the Netherlands. Eventually over the coming weeks, as many as 11,000 Spanish troops, units based in north Italy and Spain, returned to the Netherlands. These were a significant boost to Parma’s campaign. As we have seen, since 1579 he had been successful but had been constrained to use Walloon and loyalist troops and units from the Empire. By his ability in deploying troops, his husbanding of resources and manpower, and his political skill – Parma was as skilled in exploiting treachery among the enemy as he was in military tactics – territory had been conquered. Now he was significantly reinforced with large numbers of disciplined, experienced, and battle-hardened Spanish tercios. Parma now had over 60,000 troops at his disposal. The town of Ninove then fell to Parma’s forces. Meanwhile, the Spanish were also continuing the dual direction of attack, this time towards the fortress town of Steenwijk important for its control of the route from the province of Overijssel into the province of Friesland. In November 1582, units of the Spanish armies from Friesland stormed the city head on. They soon made breaches and took the city, with many of the Protestants in­ habitants fleeing (in accordance with Parma’s policy of mercy, the defeated Protestant defenders were allowed to flee unhindered and were not pur­ sued). Steenwijk was now a Spanish-controlled strong city. The capture of Steenwijk was due to Colonel Francesco Verdugo, one of Parma’s many able commanders. Verdugo was the Spanish-appointed Stadhouder of Friesland, replacing Rennenburg. It was Verdugo’s own initiative to strike out from Friesland and capture Steenwijk. Against the advancing Spanish, the Duke of Anjou proved ineffective. His attempts at relieving besieged towns generally were either too late or were repulsed. He concentrated almost exclusively in the southern prov­ inces. This was understandable, due to lack of resources. He and the States of Flanders and Brabant had a monumental task (in which they were fail­ ing) to stem Parma’s advances, but his concentrating upon the south accen­ tuated the growing north–south divide in the Revolt and did not endear Anjou to, or inspire loyalty from, provinces like Holland and Zeeland. By mid-1582, Anjou was being hampered in the extreme. The StatesGeneral had failed to furnish him with the promised monies, and the

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amounts he did receive could not meet his expenditure for confronting the Spanish. Catholics, to whom his presence was expected to guarantee some form of protection, continued to be harassed in the Flanders in territory controlled by the Revolt and were legally proscribed in Holland and Zee­ land. Some Catholic princes contacted him, expressing their total disap­ proval and advising him to withdraw. In July 1582, there was an attempt to assassinate him by a group of criminals in the pay of Spain. Despite his official status as ruler, he was constantly eclipsed in popularity by the Prince of Orange, 5 and commanders and politicians, members of the states and States-General, local councillors, all tended to turn to and consulted with William first. After yet another perceived slight, this time regarding the states’ inter­ minable delay in reorganising budget finances for the war effort, Anjou at­ tempted to stage a coup. The object of the coup was to overthrow both the states’ and William’s authority and reassert and stamp his own authority on the Netherlands.6 In January 1583, French troops, acting on the orders of Anjou, suddenly advanced on the Flemish coast towns. In addition, they occupied Aalst and Dendermonde. Two days later, they moved on the vital city of Antwerp but were repulsed with heavy losses – nearly two-thirds of their numbers.7 Anjou’s quick attempt at a lightening coup to assert his authority failed. But the damage to the Revolt was longer-lasting. William hastily took the initiative and managed to facilitate a formal reconciliation between the states and Anjou by late March 1583. Opinion among some of the southern nobility originally had been in favour of the alliance with Anjou; serving under a representative of the distinguished Valois dynasty would be more bearable than being under the Spain of Philip II.8 However, this action by Anjou alienated them. Among the governing bourgeois in the towns in the southern provinces, there was hostility. Some towns refused to admit any French troops, no matter how many attempts to convince them that these troops were allies of the Revolt. Other towns who had hitherto been peacefully garrisoned by French troops were now questioning the value of French support; some discreetly opened negotiations with representatives from Parma. The rapprochement between Anjou and the states, despite William’s tireless effort, was extremely fragile, and Anjou was at the end of his exasperated tether. By June 1583, he had left the Netherlands, giving up any further role of protector and ruler. Meanwhile, Parma’s campaign continued inexorably. On 16 July 1583, Parma’s forces approached Dunkirk and laid siege to the port. It was sur­ rounded, and an allocated battery of 18 heavy cannons was brought up and started the bombardment. This bombardment lasted several days, after which 3,000 troops launched a preliminary assault, taking two ravelins. From there they regrouped and pushed on and assaulted the main fortifi­ cations, quickly taming the town. Meanwhile on 18 July, units of Parma’s forces made for Nieuwpoort. Before the besiegers reached the town, units

The wily patience of a Jesuit 87 of the defending forces rushed out and attacked hoping to catch the attack­ ers off-balance, but they were speedily engaged and repulsed by units of mounted arquebusiers, who then retreated back into the town and manned the defences. On 23 July, siege artillery was brought up by the Spanish. The defenders, realising there was little hope of relieving forces, surrendered. In both sieges of Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort, Parma’s policy of merciful terms to the surrendering defenders was faithfully adhered to. Officers and men of the surrendering defending troops were allowed to leave, without arms and without supplies, but unharmed. The citizens were granted a gen­ eral pardon, and the Protestants were given six months to leave, either sell­ ing what goods and possessions they could or take them with them. Then in early August, units comprising a company of Spanish tercios and several companies of Walloon troops took the small town of Veurne, while two regiments of Walloon levies were deployed and took the other towns in the area.9 In 1583 in the northeast, Colonel Verdugo made another thrust and captured Zutphen. The capture of Steenwijk in 1582 by him and now Zutphen in 1583 effectively linked Friesland to the south where Parma’s forces continued to advance. In the south, in mid-1583, Parma deployed units to the southern coast and took Dunkirk, Nieuwpoort, and Dixmunde within two months. Later, in 1583, he moved further north, approaching the Zeeland border, and took Sas van Gent, Axel, and the small but strate­ gically important town of Hulst. Back in Madrid, Philip II in early 1583 was receiving the news of the succession of victories of Parma extremely favourably. In addition to mes­ sages of royal appreciation, he made a significant volte face on royal policy towards the Netherlands – he allocated funds from Spain to the armies of Netherlands. In June 1583, the Spanish Treasury sent a one-off payment of 500,000 ducats to Parma and then received further instructions to send to Parma 200,000 ducats every month.10 This was a significant reversal of the royal instruction to Alva over a decade ago, when the latter was sternly advised that his repression of the Netherlands disturbances had to be funded from revenues raised in the Netherlands. Then no monies would be forthcoming from Spain; now, with Parma’s combination of diplomacy and military success, funds were being sent. In 1583, Parma committed forces to an escalating conflict within the Holy Roman Empire. This was within the Archbishopric of Cologne, on the eastern borders of the Revolt-controlled northern provinces. The Cologne dispute and local civil conflict had its background in the spread of the Reformation in the early decades of the sixteenth century. In the see of Hildesheim, several of the districts had gone over to Lutheran­ ism so the Catholic church officials there, concerned at the growing threat, elected a son of Albert V of Bavaria, Ernst of Bavaria, as bishop. Ernst was scarcely a paradigm of religious propriety, but both the Pope and Spain gave their support, seeing Ernst being appointed to bishoprics as part of the strategy of how Catholicism could check the Lutheran expansion into

88 William the Silent and the Revolt church appointments within the Empire. In 1581, Ernst was also appointed the Bishop of Liege. The see of Cologne was to be the next target. In fact, the elected Archbishopric of Cologne, due to complex election manoeu­ vres, was to be another magnate, Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg, who was already the Bishop of Strasbourg. This was disappointing to Ernst, but Spain and the Hapsburg Emperor were content because Truchsess was a good Catholic, and the Catholic cause thus well-served by having the strategic sees of Strasbourg and Cologne secure. However, Truchsess shocked and divided his congregation in 1582 by forming a relationship with a nun and then marrying her. Facing the inevitable reaction and op­ position from the Catholic Church, Truchsess raised force within his arch­ bishopric and occupied the city of Bonn, and then converted to Calvinism. Clearly, from the Catholic view, the archbishopric and the electorate could not be held by such an individual, particularly in such times as these when church appointments within the Empire were a vital part of the Protestant– Catholic struggle for religious primacy in the turbulent Reformation period of Europe. In early 1583, the Pope formally deposed Truchsess. This further complicated the situation. While the other Catholic electors of the Empire were opposed to Truchsess retaining his archbishopric, they were at one with the Protestant electors in being alarmed at the Pope pre­ suming to remove a senior prince of the Empire. The Lutheran states in the Empire were alienated by Truchsess’ choice of Calvinism as faith, but the Calvinist Elector Palatine sent reinforcements to Truchsess. Other states within the Empire were alarmed about the escalating situation. Bavaria saw an opportunity and demanded that Ernst replace the deposed Truch­ sess. Spain, realising now that Truchsess was not the loyal Catholic prince/ elector of the Empire, despatched several thousand troops and intervened. The Emperor was uneasy at the blatant exploitation of the situation by Bavaria and Spanish intervention but could do nothing except to suggest a Hapsburg candidate for the archbishopric. Eventually, the Emperor bowed to the inevitable and confirmed and supported Ernst of Bavaria, who was formally elected as Archbishop of Cologne and an Elector in May 1583. Ernst advanced on Truchsess’ forces, and the latter took sanctuary in the Netherlands. Spanish troops remained in the electorate of Cologne, and later moved into Munster, as Ernst had also been elected to the bishopric of Munster. By 1585, Spanish forces had gained significant holdings within the electorate of Cologne. It was perhaps a risk by Spain, at the height of Parma’s successful coun­ teroffensive reconquering territory of the Netherlands, to so detach Spanish forces to intervene in the Empire. However, the skill of Spanish deploy­ ment, which included in its ranks a young officer, Count Tilly, who was to rise as one of the principal commanders of a European-wide war in the following century.11 Parma’s armies by late 1583 controlled significant imperial territory di­ rectly to the east of the Netherlands. As we have seen, with the capture of Steenwijk and Zutphen, Friesland was linked with the Spanish-controlled

The wily patience of a Jesuit 89 southern provinces. Together with the Cologne intervention, the Dutch Re­ volt was being well-nigh encircled by Parma.12 Early in the following year, Parma’s forces gained possession of Aalst. In February 1584, Aalst was betrayed by the English garrison for money, the bulk cash which Parma speedily furnished. Then the town of Ieper surren­ dered in April, after being surrounded by Parma’s forces for the previous six months. Parma’s forces approached the important town of Bruges, which surrendered quickly, in late May, without any siege being started. Parma was effectively taking control of the whole of Flanders and Brabant as well as making inroads to the north and east of the northern provinces. In the north, the province of Holland was still secure and intact and functioning as the commercial financial mainstay of the Revolt. However, Parma, by re­ gaining Flanders and Brabant, was taking effective control of the industrial heartland of the Netherlands. In mid-1584, Parma then took in his sights the vital port of Antwerp. At the beginning of September 1584, Parma quickly surrounded the town with a ring of strongly fortified emplacements. The defenders then opened the floodgates of the surrounding countryside, flooding the whole area around the town. However, Parma had sited his fortified strongholds well; with some minor re-dispositions they remained in place. Boats were hastily adapted, fitted with cannon, and served as mobile artillery to deal with any defender’s sorties. Any land fighting took place on the high-ground areas which had escaped the flooding. There were some engagements, but the Spanish troops were not dislodged – Parma’s veterans had learned the techniques of fighting in waist-deep water since Leiden. The Spanish troops spent the winter in their camps and their fortified emplacements, adequately supplied and secure. Within Antwerp, the defenders grew hungry. While Parma’s troops were stationed in their fortified emplacements, other troops in October 1584 were engaged in constructing a massive pontoon bridge across the Schelde, cutting off all river traffic. In late December, the defend­ ers made a sudden boat attack on the bridge while it was being constructed, but, despite some damage, the attack was repulsed and construction con­ tinued. By February 1585, the bridge was complete; it was 2,400-feet long, anchored and protected at each end by a strong fort and protected by 200 cannons. Its construction was a remarkable achievement in itself, and its effect was to completely cut off Antwerp by river communication. In early April, the defenders made two attempts to send bomb ships against the bridge. The first bomb ship grounded itself before it reached the bridge and blew up, harming none. Later that day, a second bomb ship was sent down and managed to reach the bridge, exploding near one of the end forts, killing over a hundred besiegers and rupturing the bridge. However, hastily assembled work parties promptly repaired the damage. By nightfall, Ant­ werp was once again completely cut off by river. The siege continued. By August, the defenders were at the end of their strength, and, on 17 August 1585, Antwerp surrendered. Significantly, the defenders were given gener­ ous terms of surrender. Equally significantly, Parma entered the town in

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triumph and promptly ordered and oversaw the payment of all pay arrears to his Spanish troops. Later in the year, the strategically important fortress town of Nijmegen, in the east in the northern province of Gelderland, fell. Parma’s taking of Antwerp on 17 August 1585 was significant among a series of events over a three-year period of re-conquest. His campaign was a veritable game-changer in Counter Reformation Europe. Parma’s cam­ paign has been described by a distinguished Belgian historian as follows: “…Thanks to Parma, as at 17 August 1585, all the factors came into be­ ing for the creation of, ‘a Catholic Netherlands’ facilitating all the more quickly, Belgium”.13 Parma had retaken territory from the Revolt by a combination of long­ term strategy, diplomacy and exploitation of enemy internal divisions and divided loyalties, careful disposition of troops whom he looked after as best he could, and patience in occasional, sudden, well-timed thrusts and sieges. Two historians have pointed out that Antwerp, the culmination of Par­ ma’s achievements, surrendered without a shot being fired.14 He had dou­ bled the territory controlled by Spain, reconquering the southern provinces and establishing significant inroads to the north and east into the northern provinces, inroads which would increase in the next two years. The loss of Antwerp was one of a series of blows over a three-year period. Its taking in August 1585 was a heavy blow inflicted on the Revolt. But less than a year earlier, the Revolt had sustained an even heavier blow.

Notes 1 G Mattingly The Defeat of the Spanish Armada p 55 2 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 209 3 L van der Essen Alexandre Farnese, Prince de Parme, Gouverneur des Pay-Bas 1545–1592 Vol II p 305 4 G Mattingly The Defeat of the Spanish Armada p 56 5 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 214 6 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 237 7 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 206 8 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 211 9 L van der Essen Alexandre Farnese, Prince de Parme, Gouverneur General des Pays-Bas 1545–1592 Vol IV p 144 10 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 213 11 For a fuller account of Tilly’s background and military exploits, see N Ridley Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Republic 12 A comprehensive and extremely clear view of Parma’s re-conquests from 1580 to 1587 is shown in three stages in maps in G Parker The Dutch Revolt pp 210–212. It shows the dramatic extent to which the Revolt was threatened, with Spanish-controlled territory stretching north to south, Friesland to Maas­ tricht, and then west to east from Maastricht to Gravelines. The south was re­ conquered, and among the northern provinces only four remained totally intact under Revolt control 13 L van der Essen Alexandre Farnese Gouverneur General des Pays-Bas 1545– 1592 Vol IV p 148 14 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 215, and T Arnold The Renaissance at War p 213

7

“Ayez pitie de ce pauvre peuple”

The sixteenth century, like most other centuries, was no stranger to polit­ ical assassination against a countries’ enemies both internal and external. William had married a victim of political assassination. Louise de Col­ igny, his wife, was the daughter of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, the leader of the French Huguenots. He and his son-in-law, Louise’s husband, had been murdered in August 1572 on the orders of Henry, and the Duke of Guise, leader of the Catholic League. This was the prelude to a general massacre of French Protestants, further escalating the civil wars of religion in France. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, France wit­ nessed several royal assassinations. King Henry III, a staunch Catholic King, was threatened in popularity and power by the Duke of Guise, the leader of the extreme Catholic League. In the complex politics in the era of the French wars of religion, the ambitions and power of the Duke and his family were viewed to be out of control. Accordingly, Henry III carefully lured the Duke and his brother, the Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons, to a contrived royal council meeting at Blois for Christmas in 1588. When the Duke was unaccompanied and making his way through the narrow corri­ dors, he was assassinated by a group of carefully selected royal guards. The Cardinal Archbishop was quietly murdered a short time after. King Henry III in his turn was assassinated the following year in June 1589 by a Catholic fanatic. France was soon to be plunged into another round of internal wars of religion, which become more intense. When it ap­ peared that the leader of the Protestants, Henry of Navarre, would be vic­ torious, it seemed likely that he would gain the throne of France. This was a prospect that caused both repulsion and alarm to Catholic Spain and the Empire. Spain intervened and prolonged the internal conflicts. However, Henry of Navarre was finally victorious and became the King of France. To assuage and reassure Catholics in France and as a first step to uniting his realm, Henry converted to Catholicism, and became King Henry IV of France. He reigned successfully for a number of years, but in 1610 he too fell victim to an assassin, being stabbed to death while being driven in a carriage through narrow streets by an extreme Catholic fanatic.

92 William the Silent and the Revolt In the early part of the century in England, Henry VIII was embroiled with his repudiation of the Papal authority in his attempts to gain a new queen and, eventually, a male heir, in order to establish a dynasty, a vital priority with less than two generations having elapsed from an English civil war. This involved much diplomacy, attempting to play off the Hapsburg Empire – then including Spain – against France. One individual noble had found favour with Henry, and for some years the King had personally paid his expenses so that he could study abroad at the finest universities in Eu­ rope. However, this individual, Reginald Pole, seeing the developments of the English Reformation, turned against Henry, wrote scholarly tracts de­ nouncing his actions and remained true to the Catholic Church. Pole was ordained and eventually rose to be a Cardinal. By the 1530s, with unrest growing England, which was to break out into an unsuccessful rebellion, Cardinal Pole was active in the Spanish Netherlands, advising and con­ spiring with imperial representatives against England. King Henry’s pa­ tience ran out while his anger increased. He despatched two secret service agents to Europe who spent several months searching in attempts to locate and trace Cardinal Pole. Their orders were clear; once located the Cardinal was to be quickly and quietly killed. Their efforts were unsuccessful but Henry had, unequivocally, sent official assassins to eliminate a prelate of the Catholic Church. In 1571 and 1587, there were unsuccessful plots against Queen Elizabeth I of England. The former, the Ridolfi Plot, was coordinated by an Italian banker based in England, supported by the Pope and assisted by the Span­ ish ambassador in London. In the second, the Babington Plot, supported by Spain and involving a group of English extreme Catholics and some Catho­ lic priests working clandestinely in England, the object was to free Mary Queen of Scots from her captivity and place her on the English throne. Both plots depended upon Queen Elizabeth being assassinated. In Spain during the reign of Philip II, there were no less than seven at­ tempts to assassinate the King. Despite these attempts, he adopted an open approach to his daily routine, travelling unarmed through crowded streets, and was happy to take drinks of water or delicacies offered to him by mem­ bers of the observing crowds. Philip II of Spain had engaged in assassination. During the early stages of the Revolt when the Spanish Netherlands government under Marga­ ret of Parma thought a compromise was still possible, Margaret ordered one  of her council to travel to Spain and plead and remonstrate with Philip. The individual chosen was Montigny, brother of Count Egmont. Montigny, full of foreboding,1 travelled to Spain in mid-1566. He was still there, under close surveillance attempting to plead with Philip when the Duke of Alva and troops were sent and arrived in the Spanish Neth­ erlands. Alva suppressed any remaining disturbances and set the Coun­ cil of Blood. He indicted the perceived three ringleaders, Count Hoorn, Count Egmont, and William of Orange, and managed to apprehend the

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first two. Back in Spain, because he was Egmont’s brother, Montigny was quietly murdered. Philip II never fully trusted the various Governor Generals of the Spanish Netherlands. Even Alva, whom he lauded for his ruthlessness, was warned that he, Alva, must expect no financial support from Spain. Even Parma, whom he lauded for his successful re-conquest and indeed supported finan­ cially with large amounts of funds direct from Spain, was in later years the subject of extreme royal censure. In the case of Don Juan of Austria, Philip II fully recognised Don Juan’s military abilities but also sent an official named Juan de Escobedo to monitor Don Juan’s activities and to report back direct to Philip. However, Philip’s careful arrangements went awry when de Escobedo, actually in situ in the Spanish Netherlands, over time became fully aware of the difficulties facing Don Juan and admired his ef­ forts and agreed and supported his actions. His despatches to Philip II were uncritical of Don Juan, held back the full facts. de Escobedo, brought up in the Spanish civil service and a protégé of one of grandees of the court, was a born intriguer. When he returned to Spain in mid-1578, he continued to intrigue at court and Philip’s suspicions rapidly increased, also fuelled by those misgivings of his principal secretary Antonio de Perez. Philip issued instructions to Perez to eliminate de Escobedo. After two unsuccessful at­ tempts by Perez at poisoning, de Escobedo was finally assassinated, killed by a group of alleged street robbers in April 1578. If Philip II had few qualms about quietly eliminating unreliable individ­ uals within his own Spanish service, he had none at all about ordering the assassination of perceived enemies of his country. There had been secret discussions and plans during the 1570s to have William quietly murdered. In 1573, following the surrender of Haarlem, the Duke of Alba commis­ sioned and sent a group of hired assassins to seek out and murder both William and his brother Louis, and the Spanish ambassador to the Vatican, de Zuniga, re-raised the assassination possibility by suggesting that Wil­ liam of Orange be quietly murdered. 2 In late 1573, Requesens, as Governor General of the Netherlands, was instructed by Philip II to organise attempts to kill William, but one of Philip’s secretaries informed Requesens that if such an attempt was successful, the involvement of the King must never become known.3 The Duke of Anjou, when he was made protector and liberator of the Netherlands, was targeted in an attempted assassination, but the principal target was William of Orange. After the failure of attempts at discreet killing of William, it was decided that it would not to be a murky act shrouded in secrecy but rather an offi­ cially sanctioned assassination, decreed by Spain as an example of treason and rebellion being struck down. The idea of officially sanctioned killing of William as the leader of Revolt came from Cardinal Granvelle. In 1579, he made the suggestion of an Edict of outlawry against William and a re­ ward for whosever eliminating him. The amount for the reward, he further suggested, should be 25,000 crowns and the individual(s) who succeeded

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in this should be pardoned for any and all crimes they had committed. Philip agreed to Granvelle’s suggestion, and the same month Granvelle was instructed by the King to send a letter to Parma in the Netherlands who would assess it. The letter also contained instructions to Parma to prepare the Edict for eventual proclamation and distribution. Parma’s Council were divided in their discussions of the proposed Edict. Some were supportive for an Edict of outlawry against the Prince of Or­ ange. They argued that it was a legitimate weapon, that the Prince’s trea­ sonous rebellion was beyond dispute, and killing him would render the Revolt leaderless. Parma however was completely opposed. Parma opposed any Edict, and certainly putting a price on William’s head, as it would be counterproductive in providing a good propaganda opportunity for the Revolt (as it did). Also Parma realised that for the King to personalise the issue of the Revolt in making William the threatened victim, it would draw the Dutch populace closer to William.4 Parma opposed the Edict but was overruled by Philip II. He drafted the Edict in accordance with Granvelle’s guidelines, including the reward of 25,000 crowns, and officially freeing all subjects of the Prince of Orange from any allegiance to him. William and all of his supporters were granted a month to desist and renounce their treasonable acts, after which the outlawry would come into effect. Philip approved the draft, grudgingly accepted of the month period of grace, and ordered its proclamation and publication. Parma, still unwilling, was tardy in following the order, but after being cajoled into acting more speedily by Philip, finally proclaimed and published the Edict in the Netherlands in August 1580. The Edict explicitly stressed and appealed to the loyalty of good Catho­ lics and, equally explicitly, guaranteed the substantial reward: If there be any found, either amongst our own subjects, or amongst strangers, so noble of courage, and desirous of our service and the pub­ lic good, that knoweth any means how to … set us and himself from (William), … delivering him unto us quick or dead, or at least taking his life from him, we will cause, to be given and provided, for him and his heirs, in good land or ready money, choose him whether, imme­ diately after the thing shall be accomplished, the sum of 25 thousand crowns of gold.5 This was a tempting sum to many in the various war-torn areas of the Netherlands. In December 1580, William responded to the Edict. Opening the States-General he laid before them his document “Apology”, requesting authorisation to publish and make available for general circulation. The “Apology”, written as a sincere submission, turned the accusation around and held that Philip II had failed in his duty as a sovereign. It stated the principle that when a sovereign fails in his duties and obligations to the

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welfare of the people then the people have a moral right, indeed a moral duty, to dethrone the sovereign. In it William exalted and stated the accu­ sations of his enemies, that is, that he engaged in treasonable rebellion, was a badge of honour for him. The “Apology” turned from William to Philip making a personal attack upon him. It accused Philip of having his eldest son murdered (his eldest son Don Carlos had been mentally unstable and confined and had died in mysterious circumstances), being in an incestuous marriage with his niece (he had married his niece, obtaining the contempo­ rary necessary dispensations), and having his third wife murdered (which Philip certainly had not). The personal attack was designed to cast doubt on his character and his suitability for being a sovereign. As a contrast, the “Apology” mentioned the personal wrongs inflicted upon William, the abduction of his son and the seizure of William’s lands. The “Apology” stated that William had always been willing to try truce talks and peace negotiations but held that Philip’s word and sincerity on these was worthless. Then it turned to the Revolt, stating that it was not a casual spasmodic mob rising but the aspiration of the Netherlands to be free, supported by the great of the land. This led on to the next assertion which resolutely defended the rights of the provincial states. Indeed, the “Apology” was Wil­ liam’s appeal for solidity and his personal pledge to continue the struggle and defending the rights of the Netherlands. In this it ended, subtly, with the pledge “Je maintiendrai” (I will uphold), a resonating phrase taken di­ rect from the Nassau family coat of arms and still part of the current arms of the reigning Dutch royal family. In using this phrase from the full motto, “Je maintiendrai Nassau”, but leaving out “Nassau”, William stressed his commitment and loyalty not to his own lands but to the whole of the Netherlands. It was read out in full to the States-General, who discussed the docu­ ment. They held that all accusations in Philip’s Edict against William were without foundation, requested him to keep his position as head of gov­ ernment, and offered a personal bodyguard of a unit of cavalry. Overall, the States-General was supportive of William, although there were reser­ vations by some on the vehemence by which the “Apology” had attacked King Philip II. Also foreign opinion regarded such an attack with distaste. Unsurprisingly, there was outrage in Spain, and some of the princes and nobility in the Holy Roman Empire were dismayed at the nature of the attack against a reigning sovereign. The States-General gave no opposi­ tion to its publication and general release, so it was published by print­ ers in Delft and Leiden in four languages and distributed to booksellers across Europe. Whatever misgivings some individuals and factions the States-General may have had about certain parts of the “Apology” regarding the attack on Philip II, they were unanimous about breaking their allegiance to him. Legally, this was necessary as the alliance with Anjou stipulated that he,

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Anjou, was Netherlands’ overlord (though carefully avoiding the term, or any designation of and bestowal of “sovereign”) and therefore Philip had to relinquish his overlordship. However, by this time it had been long held by all those involved in the Revolt that the Netherlands, or at least to the provinces of the Union of Utrecht, were an independent nation and as such free from Philip. On 26 July 1581, the States-General passed the Act of Abjuration, offi­ cially depriving Philip II of his sovereignty of the Netherlands.6 The years 1580 and 1581 were significant constitutional years indeed, with the publi­ cation of William’s “Apology”, the Act of Abjuration – and before both of these, the time bomb of the Edict and official sanctioning of the assassina­ tion of William. At the winter of 1583 the situation for the nascent state of the Nether­ lands was critical. Parma, as we have seen, was steadily advancing and re­ taking territory. The States-General had moved in retreat as Parma’s forces advanced. They had to evacuate Brussels and move to Antwerp and then in June 1583 back to the Union of Utrecht provinces into Middelburg and then further back to Dordrecht and then further north to the Hague. Wil­ liam had taken residence a few miles away from the Hague – in Delft, in a converted nunnery, the Prinsenhof, where he held court. Anjou, after the failure of his attempted coup, had retreated. However, Parma saw an pos­ sible opportunity and offered to negotiate separately with Anjou and enlist him as a useful ally.7 William and the States-General, seeing the potential danger of Anjou swinging over to total betrayal of the Dutch cause, hastily offered Anjou further terms and obtained a renewed alliance with Anjou by the Treaty of Termonde. This Treaty of Termonde, signed in June 1584, gave favourable terms not only to Anjou but also to France. In the event of Anjou dying without heir, the sovereignty of the Netherlands would revert directly to King Henry III of France, and the southern province of Flanders would come under the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris. These terms, despite the Revolt giving extreme concessions to France, revived moral in both the States-General and hitherto doubting or despairing elements with the prospect of French assistance. This was to be William’s last major ac­ tion in his constant, tireless struggle of the Revolt. After the Edict was issued, William did not alter his schedule or the rate of his activity, did not act more cautiously or cower under the threat of the Edict and a price upon his life, as Cardinal Granvelle, in arguing for the Edict predicted that William would so act. He was fully preoccupied and tireless as ever trying to shore up the defence of the Revolt. A pleasant and uplifting event occurred in January 1584 when his wife Louise gave birth to a son. Also his second son Maurits, (his eldest was in Spanish captivity) made frequent visits from his studies at Leiden University to the Prinsen­ hof. Now 17 years old, Maurits was valuable support to his father. But these were periods of pleasant relief in what were long days of keeping the struggle going.

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One of the leaders of the Revolt and loyal supporter of William, Marnix de St Aldegonde, came to Delft in June 1584 to attend the christening of the William’s baby son, Frederik Hendrik. While there he conferred with William and informed him of intelligence received that Parma, currently besieging Antwerp, was intending that as soon as Antwerp fell would of­ fer the provinces of Holland and Zeeland reasonable peace terms These peace terms even included freedom of worship for protestants. Marnix de St Aldegonde also warned William that if this occurred both provinces would accept. This worrying prospect would in effect halt the Revolt in its tracks, with the two driving provinces ceasing to fight and making terms. William continued to urge and cajole the States of Holland and Zeeland to continue the struggle, and, indeed, both provinces acknowledged that they needed him as leader. He made plans to attempt the relief of Antwerp. When Anjou died and the States of Holland learned of his death in midJune 1584, they, under William’s urging, sent envoys to Henri III of France with the submission that he, Henri III, should regard the Netherlands as part of France. As well as political affairs he was regularly involved in military matters, regularly conferring and planning with commanders of units, keeping an army in being and serving to stem the advance of Par­ ma’s troops. He was tireless and determined in his efforts to continue the struggle. Such constant activity, with little thought for his personal safety beyond the usual armed guards and sentries on duty, made him vulnerable to attempted assassination. The Edict stipulated a substantial reward for any and all who succeeded in killing William. In 1582, a serious attempt – indeed it was an extremely narrow escape – had been made on William’s life. A Spanish individual, Gaspar de Anastro, was a merchant whose business based in Antwerp was in serious decline. He had been approached in late 1581 by a Spanish agent. The agent, Juan de Zunca, had been tasked by Spain to find a well-placed individual in Antwerp to carry out William’s assassination. de Zunca met Anastro, who declined the proposal, but as his business went rapidly into decline and de Zunca persisted, promising substantial rewards, Anastro changed his mind and accepted. Secret correspondence ensued to further the plot. Anastro was happy to receive the rewards from any successful assassina­ tion but was not willing to carry out the deed personally. He approached both his employees – 21-year-old Antonio de Venero, his secretary, and 18-year-old Jean Jauregay, the junior clerk. Swearing them to secrecy, Anastro revealed the full extent of the company’ financial troubles, how these could be solved by the reward, and asked either or both of them if they were prepared to carry out the deed. De Venero refused, but Jauregay out of loyalty to his employer agreed. Anastro provided Jauregay with a handgun, ornate and decorated, and of the expensive type usually exchanged as friendship presents. Elegant as it was, it was also fully functional as a pistol. A date was fixed, it was a

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Sunday, and the location was chosen – a public dinner which had been arranged to celebrate a birthday at which William would be present. Four days before the scheduled action, Anastro closed the Antwerp office for good, leaving any outstanding administration to be carried out by Venero. Anastro headed quickly for Spanish-controlled territory. Once he had cleared Antwerp, Anastro wrote to Jauregay confirming and instructing him to go ahead and carry out the action as arranged. On Sunday 18 March, the day Jauregay was due to act, Anastro sought and gained an audience with Parma then based in Tournai. Anastro paying his respects to Parma, then joyously announced that he, Anastro, had found an assas­ sin, armed him, and he was now in place carrying out William’s assassina­ tion. Anastro congratulated himself on his courage and reminded Parma of the reward promised by the Edict. Parma sharply reminded him that the killing had not yet happened and that courage belonged to the assassin. Anastro was instructed to remain in Parma’s camp to await events, under close guard. The deed itself was carried out on schedule on Sunday 18 March 1582. William had, as usual, attended church, and then went to attend the cele­ bration dinner, open to the public. William’s bodyguards were in attend­ ance together with Marnix de St Aldegonde, but were a few paces away, as was usual in accordance with William’s instructions that he be open to individual petitioners and those who wished to plead or raise matters. En route to the dinner he was approached very respectfully by Jauregay, playing the innocent supplicant, who timorously requested a brief audience with William after the dinner to which William agreed. After the dinner, William rose from the table and walked over to an alcove where he was approached by Jauregay, who motioned that he had something to show William. Instead of pulling out a document, as William no doubt expected, Jauregay pulled out the primed pistol and fired it directly at William. The pistol had been overcharged with powder and exploded in Jauregay’s hand, taking off his thumb. The bullet discharged and went through William’s lower neck, through his mouth and out the far side of his head. William fell and was supported. Jauregay was pushed backwards by the recoil and staggering to his feet was cut down by several swords and lance stabs and cuts by guards. William was taken away and his wounds tended to, and placed in the care of two physicians. Marnix de St Aldegonde and Maurits quickly had the scene sealed off, and St Aldegonde and Villiers searched Jauregay’s body. They secured all correspondence they found and quickly took it to a private room and scru­ tinised it carefully. The papers indicated the address of Anastro’s business premises in Antwerp. Anjou, alerted to this, had the premises searched. Venero, the employee left in charge after Anastro’s speedy departure, was seized and vigorously interrogated. The whole plot was revealed and indi­ cated what was already suspected, that Spain was behind the assassination

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attempt. Venero, and a priest who had given final confession to Jauregay, were tried before the States-General and executed. William meanwhile was under intensive care of the two surgeons who, as far as possible in what was known to medical science then sterilised his wounds but did not touch or probe the opened neck artery for the fear of making it worse and decided to let the bleeding stop of its own accord. They were proven right, and within a week the bleeding had completely stopped and William was eating and drinking with care and talking, though still confined to bed. Then at the end of March, the artery opened again and William bled profusely and continuously. Eventually after two dangerous haemorrhages, a makeshift bolster was gently applied which managed to stem the bleeding. The physicians then, gently, applied a single finger held in place to the bolster and took it in turns over a period of days to keep the bolster in place with the application of a finger. They then felt safe enough to release the pressure, but William had to avoid talking, only to cough gen­ tly and take small amounts of liquid food. It was only in mid-April that the crisis was over and he could, still bed-ridden, take solid foods. He slowly but surely fully recovered. The perpetrators, those that the Dutch managed to apprehend, had been dealt with; William had recovered and the assassination attempt had failed. But it had been a crucial, narrow escape. And, as we have seen, Parma’s campaign of re-conquest was advancing. Other plots which had the objective of killing him came to light. In March 1583, a Spanish individual was detained, then arrested in Antwerp. Apparently, he was planning to assassinate William by stabbing him, a plan endorsed by both Philip II and Parma. Later in the year, three former Span­ ish soldiers who had defected to the Dutch wished to revert and re-join the Spanish side. To prove their renewed loyalty to Spain, they conspired with Parma to assassinate both William and his loyal supporter Marnix de St Aldegonde while they were on the island of Walcheren in Zeeland. This was to coincide with a military operation which would capture the port of Vlissingen. The attempt was aborted when William and Marnix de St Aldegonde returned from Zeeland to Holland before adequate preparations could be made for their killings. One individual resolved on William’s death had long been inflamed by his perceived heinous lead of the treasonable Revolt. As early as 1575, a young Catholic fanatic was incensed by William’s persuading the States-General to break with Don Juan.8 This individual, Balthasar Gérard, was born in a devout Catholic family living in a village near Besancon in Franche-Comté. Franche-Comté had a strong tradition of loyalty to the Hapsburgs. Gérard studied at the Catholic University of Dole in Franche-Comté. He was a devout and diligent student, and during these formative years he was af­ fected by the turbulent events of the Revolt which were occurring in the Netherlands, and he became determined to rid the world of the heretic and rebel William. He maintained this resolve throughout his studies. Having

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completed his studies, he eventually managed to obtain an audience with Parma where he stated his intention and was encouraged to carry this out. In May 1584, Gérard moved to Delft, where he cultivated his legend that he was a Huguenot whose father had been murdered by the Spanish. He then approached the Prinsenhof and, after being scrutinised by Villiers, William’s intelligence advisor, was permitted access.9 He then was a regu­ lar feature at the entrance and courtyard of the Prinsenhof, appearing to be constantly engrossed in Calvinist tracts and psalms. Hanging around the courtyard and the entrances to the Prinsenhof meant Gérard was accepted as an obvious non-military (and therefore not a poten­ tial threat) scholarly figure and a fervent loyal supporter of the cause. It also enabled him to thoroughly investigate the Prinsenhof. Eventually, he was trusted and given small errands and tasks, mainly carrying messages from the Prinsenhof to Villiers’ headquarters and also to other parts of Delft. He continued carrying out these errands throughout June 1584. Then, in early July 1584, Gerard was given a more important task. He was instructed to travel abroad with messages from the States-General to Dutch envoys. He claimed living and travel expenses from Villiers and was given 12 crowns. He then used the money to purchase pistols10 and am­ munition. These he carefully primed and armed, and then on the morning of 10 July 1584 he entered the Prinsenhof claiming he was collecting the necessary travel documents. Once there he made his way near to the room where William was eating a light meal and waited furtively behind a pillar. William finished eating and, ever busy, got up and walking slowly dis­ cussed military issues with some foreign officers in the Dutch armies. He first spoke with a Welsh soldier, then an Italian officer, and when he be­ gan to speak with an Englishman, Gerard stepped out from the pillar and discharged his pistols. The double charge hit him in the abdomen, tearing through his lungs and stomach and exited, embedding itself in the walls behind.11 He staggered forward, then was supported by guards, as he sank down. He cried out, “Mon Dieu aye pitie de mon ame, aye pitie de ce pauvre peuple”. He managed to answer a single faint ‘yes’ to his sister, the Coun­ tess of Schwarzenberg when she ministered the extreme unction, then fell unconscious. He was gently carried to a private room where he died. The leader of the Dutch Revolt was dead. His last words had included an appeal for the Dutch people.

Notes 1 CV Wedgwood William the Silent 2 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 135 3 LP Gatchard Correspondence de Guillarme le Taciturne Vol VI pp 4–5, cited by KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 186

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4 J Israel The Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806 p 210 and CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 214 5 Cited in L Jardine The Awful End of Prince William the Silent. The First Assas­ sination of a Head of State with a Handgun p 60. Lisa Jardine’s work The Aw­ ful End of Prince William the Silent. The First Assassination of Head of State with a Handgun gives a comprehensive account of the assassination of William, including the events leading up to the murder at Delft, including discussions of the Edict and the motivations of the unsuccessful would-be assassins and the assassin himself. One of the principal and highly informative aspects of the work, as per the title is the development of the handgun and its use by assassins 6 KW Swart, William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 198 raises the possibility that William’s vehement personal attack on King Philip II in the “Apology” dispelled any misgivings and broke any last resist­ ance to the passing of the Act of Abjuration 7 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 245 8 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 252 9 L Jardine The Awful End of Prince William the Silent – The First Assassination of a Head of State with a Handgun, states that Gérard had false documents and identity papers, p 55 10 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 249 states he purchased two pistols; KW Swart William the Silent and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–1584 p 253 states he purchased three pistols. L Jardine The Awful End of Prince William the Silent – The First Assassination of a Head of State with a Handgun p 57 states that he purchased a single pistol, but it was a wheel lock, which could be primed and ready in advance and fired a powerful charge, capable of being lethal at a distance. Having single or multiple pistols, Gerard was obviously determined his attack would cause fatality 11 The bullet gouges in the walls are still preserved under glass in the Prinsenhof

8

Aftermath

Balthasar Gerard was apprehended as he tried to exit the outer perimeter of the Prinsenhof; roughly handled, he was detained and tortured to reveal details of any plot and accomplices. Papers and items found on Gerard indi­ cated Spanish complicity and support. Gerard insisted that he acted alone, for the true faith. He was hastily tried and publicly executed, an execution which was both prolonged and involved intense torture. Philip II, meticu­ lous as always in details, ensured that the reward was paid in the form of a pension to Gerard’s family. Immediately after the shooting was questioned, it became clear to Vil­ liers that he had been genuinely deceived by Gerard’s cover as a devout Huguenot, as indeed all of the Prinsenhof had been deceived. Marnix de St Aldegonde was not present when the murder occurred. He had quarrelled with William, refusing to agree that Anjou should retain the protectorate after his failed coup in Antwerp. However, he and William were reconciled when William appealed to him to take charge of the defence of Antwerp when this became clear that Antwerp was Parma’s next target. Marnix de St Aldegonde willingly accepted William’s counsel, and the two were recon­ ciled. When Antwerp fell, Marnix de St Aldegonde retreated and went into private life, producing religious studies and literature. He died in Leiden in 1598, at a time when the nascent Dutch Republic was in a more secure posi­ tion. Boisot, the hero of the relief of Leiden, had continued to command the “Sea Beggars” facilitating its formation into the fledgling navy of the Dutch Republic. He was drowned in May 1576 during a naval action off Zeeland. The “Sea Beggars” capture of Brielle was the first territorial gain of the Revolt, in which Bossu, the Spanish-appointed Stadhouder of Holland was outmanoeuvred and defeated. Bossu eventually changed sides and fought for the Revolt, his forces of the States-General of the Union of Brussels be­ ing defeated at Gembloux in 1578. Bossu and some of his forces fought on and managed to regain some territory for the Revolt. He retired to Antwerp where he died in late 1578, amid the turbulence and political confusion in the Netherlands, However, he had chosen his side and loyally served. Anjou, the ambivalent and uncertain ally of the Dutch Republic, died a month before William’s assassination at Delft. Cardinal Granvelle, whose

Aftermath 103 reorganisation of the bishoprics caused opposition in the early stages of the Revolt and who had strongly advocated the Edict of William’s outlawry and putting a price on his head, outlived William by less than two years. In 1584, ever serving his master Philip II, Granvelle oversaw the negotiations which led to the marriage of Philip’s daughter to Charles Emmanuel I of Sa­ voy, checking French ambitions in the region. In 1584, Granvelle was made the Archbishop of Besancon but suffered a lingering disease which even­ tually proved fatal in 1585; Granvelle died in Madrid, without ever reach­ ing Besancon. Margaret of Parma, the Regent who effectively contained the disturbances in the early stages of the Revolt with a combination of concil­ iation and well-timed firmness, also outlived William by only two years. In containing the disturbances, she worked with William and the other Neth­ erlands grandees and took his advice and counsel. She and William both were conciliatory. Replaced by the Duke of Alva in 1567, she returned to Italy where she became the Governor of Abruzzo, a role she carried out with sense, wisdom, and moderation. Recalled to the Netherlands in 1578 to be co-Regent with her son, the Duke of Parma, her advice and role as coRegent was rejected by the duke; a thorough professional, he refused to coun­ tenance shared or divided command. She retired and eventually returned to Italy in 1583 and peacefully lived out the rest of her there, dying in 1586. The Duke of Parma’s reservations about the Edict and its appeal for the assassination of William were to prove justified. William was given a state funeral with full honours, and there were many public demonstrations of mourning. William was venerated as a liberator, and the overall Dutch re­ solve to continue the struggle was strengthened: “…for all his mistakes he commanded the respect even the love of the population at large”.1 But any potential counterproductive results of the Edict in creating a martyr, and generating an upsurge of popular sentiment and resolve in fa­ vour of William, did not alter the military situation. Parma’s troops were still advancing. As we have seen, both Antwerp and Brussels fell in the following year, 1585. The Dutch, after realising that France under Henri III was not going to give support, turned to England. Elizabeth I of England had for some time been adopting an official policy of strict neutrality towards the Nether­ lands’ Revolt, while tacitly sanctioning English privateer ships attacking and plundering Spanish shipping. 2 However now, with William s death and Revolt so seriously threatened, she committed to openly aiding the Dutch. By a treaty between the Dutch and England, she accepted sovereignty, and the Earl of Leicester was to be Governor General. More important to the Dutch, England committed over just over 7,000 troops, infantry and cav­ alry, and a subsidy of 600,000 florins a year to subsidise continuing the war. By 1586, the number of English troops in the Netherlands was to increase to over 8,000. Leicester’s tenure as Governor General in the Netherlands was not a happy one. He was one of the less feudal, more enlightened members of the

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Elizabethan aristocracy, forward-looking and well-informed about the in­ ternational situation. But he nonetheless misjudged the Dutch and his role. He took the role of Governor General as very much the senior authority, and, thus, for him, collaboration with the Dutch establishment was not a priority. He set up his own Council of State consisting of two English members and others from the individual provincial states, circumventing the States-General. He was opposed by the powerful States of Holland, led by Oldenbarneveldt and supported by Maurits. He attempted to set up a rival power base in the States of Utrecht, but he was fighting a losing battle within the complex arena of Dutch constitutional politics. He was recalled to England in late 1586 to attend an urgent English Council of State; returning in March 1587 with more troops, he was recalled again the following year, but this time for good. Elizabeth had already instructed all English troops and units to cooperate directly with Maurits. The English troops and monies were much-needed reinforcements to the Dutch struggle, but Parma’s inexorable advance continued. The strategi­ cally important fortress of Nijmegen fell in 1585, then in the east Venlo and Grave fell in 1586, and in 1587 the Spanish gained Deventer in the east and in the south the deep-water port of Sluis. However, the reason for Leicester’s final departure was the same reason why the Dutch Revolt would gain a respite. This was the crucial factor of the strategic overstretch of the Spanish. Philip II had decided to engage in open war with England and was assembling an invasion force. The “Enter­ prise of England” was to take first priority over quelling the Dutch Revolt, and Parma was instructed to organise and assemble forces on the Flemish coast, to be picked up by a huge armada sailing from Cadiz in the south of Spain, and from there cross the Channel and invade England. The re­ conquest of the Netherlands would have to wait. Parma, with misgivings, broke off the campaign and duly assembled the forces. He and his forces waited in vain as the Armada was disrupted and then scattered in the Channel by the English fleet, assisted by Dutch squad­ rons under Justin of Nassau, Vice-Admiral of Zeeland and William’s ille­ gitimate son. No sooner had Parma stood down the assembled invasion forces and decided to redeploy them to the Dutch struggle than he again was diverted by the latest strategic priority of Madrid. The religious civil wars in France had taken a significant turn, and there was a danger – a danger to Spain – that the Huguenots would win and their leader Henri of Navarre would become the King. In 1589, Parma was instructed to again strategically move away from the Netherlands Revolt and intervene in France against Henri of Navarre’s forces to ensure the civil wars continued. This would lead to the Dutch armies under Maurits and his cousin William Lodewijk, Stadhouder of Friesland, being reorganised and forged into a formidable fighting force and taking the offensive. Parma realised this and pleaded with Philip II, even proposing a peace initiative

Aftermath 105 with the Dutch. Philip II was adamant, and Parma unwillingly complied, successfully intervened in France, snatched Paris from the reach of the ad­ vancing Huguenot forces, and kept the civil war going. However, Maurits, a born soldier, led the Dutch in counteroffensives. Parma attempted to fight on two fronts and also made massive efforts to plead for and find more finances. Weary and ill, he kept fighting, but finally died in 1592. Spanish strategic overstretch had once again given the Dutch Revolt a respite. It was fully realised and exploited by the Dutch. While Parma was taking Paris, Maurits had indeed started his counteroffensive. Maurits had already moved south and taken the strategically vital town of Breda while Parma was trying to find more funds. Now, in a series of campaigns over the ten-year period from 1589 to 1599, Maurits and William Lodewijk would strike out to the east taking Deventer, then to the north as far as Groningen, then south again, clearing Gelderland, then east, then to the northeast, then south, then east again, at times crossing the Dutch–Holy Roman Empire border and then back again, all the time taking back territories from Span­ ish control. His main tactics were those of sieges, with siege lines and works well constructed by pioneer specialist troops, and the sieges carried out with carefully sited artillery bombardments, and then moving with welljudged strategic thrusts. By 1597, the Dutch had regained territory, and the Dutch Republic was bordered by the towns of Groningen and Wedde in the north; down the eastern frontier via Coevorden, Oldenzaal, Groenlo, and Rheinburg; and then a straight line westwards across to Hulst. Dutch terri­ tory had been reclaimed. No less than 43 towns had been retaken. The southern provinces had suffered economically as a result of the con­ flict. Tens of thousands of individuals had emigrated or fled to the north­ ern provinces, for economic or religious reasons or both. Manufacturing and agriculture had declined dramatically. Antwerp no longer was one of principal trading ports of Europe. However, in the first decade of the seven­ teenth century, the situation for the southern provinces improved, because of the stalemate between the warring forces and then an official truce. Philip II, after Parma’s death, and some confusion over who commanded Spanish forces, appointed Albert of Austria and his wife Isabella as Regents of the Spanish Netherlands. Albert was enlightened, moderate, and had experience in government both as a Viceroy of Portugal and a member of Philip’s Council of State. Under the wise Regency of Albert and Isabella, the southern provinces became reconciled and loyal to Hapsburg rule, and the economy recovered.3 The loyal Spanish Netherlands were making their own destiny, laying the foundations for – a long time in the future – separate nation. In the context of this unreal ambition of a united Netherlands, the north– south tensions still lingered among some Dutch politicians. At the climax of the Dutch counteroffensive, in 1600 the States-General decided upon an invasion of Flanders. Oldenbarneveldt, head of the representatives of the States of Holland in the States-General and leader of the States-General,

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insisted that the invasion would have oversight by the States-General. The whole strategy was opposed by Willem Lodewijk, and Maurits had grave misgivings. However, the latter complied and led Dutch forces into Flan­ ders. Contrary to Oldenbarneveldt’s confident predictions, the populace of Flanders did not rise in support of the Dutch. The Spanish armies re­ sponded to Albert and Isabella’s leadership and deployed rapidly. Maurits and his forces were eventually hemmed in in the dunes off Nieuwpoort, having started to besiege the town and then found themselves cornered by large forces of experienced Spanish troops who deployed and fought tena­ ciously. In the ensuing battle, thanks to Dutch skilled handling of artillery and the steadiness of the troops, Maurits managed to extricate himself and the bulk of his army and retreat hastily back into Dutch territory. It had been an invasion too far and a narrow escape from disastrous defeat. Two years earlier, Philip II, by now aging and suffering with illness, had realised the necessity of peace with France. A Spanish–French peace treaty was signed at Vervins in May 1598, with Henry of Navarre, now effective master of France and equally anxious for a period of peace. Now Spain could focus on the Dutch Revolt. Philip II died within five months of Vervins, to be succeeded by Philip III who saw his mission as restoring Spanish dominance, which included crushing the Revolt. In the loyal Spanish Netherlands, Albert and Isabella had a capable commander – Ambrogio Spinola, a soldier worthy to succeed Parma. In 1602, he called up more reinforcements from Italy and engaged on an aggressive campaign against Maurits to try to retake the lost territories. Spinola managed to retake parts of the eastern frontier into Spanish control, on a line of Oldenzaal, Groenlo, and Rheinburg, but Maurits took a small part of the southwest, including the ports of Sluis. By 1607, a stalemate had occurred. But the Dutch continued to mount sea-borne attacks on the Spanish shipping and inflict damage upon the Spanish economy, already weakened by a series of bankruptcies throughout the late sixteenth century. By December 1606, informed opinion in the Spanish Netherlands and even among the King’s advisors and minister in Spain made apparent their realising that the re-conquest of all of the Netherlands was no longer real­ istic. Parma and Spinola had achieved much in retaining the loyal southern provinces, but those of the United Provinces were out of reach. The struggle was draining the Spanish finances, and overseas the Dutch were inflicting further damage to the economy with their pirate raids on shipping and attacks on Spanish overseas territories. Archduke Albert, through Spinola and authorised by Philip, started negotiations for a ceasefire which would lead to a long-term truce. The process was protracted, and the Dutch navy continued to inflict further damage, but the Spanish forces had been suc­ cessful in gaining territory in Overijssel. Finally, in 1609, the Treaty of Antwerp happened. A truce of 12 years came into effect and hostilities ceased. However, there was more gain for the Dutch as a result of Olden­ barneveldt’s able grasp of the implications and potential of the situation

Aftermath 107 and his exploiting it with superb negotiating skills. In the Treaty, signed by the King of Spain himself, Spain effectively acknowledged the independ­ ence of the Dutch. Historians are agreed that this was Spain recognising the Dutch as an independent state.4 Dutch representatives were afforded the diplomatic status as ambassadors by other states in Europe, including those of England, France, and Venice. The Treaty of Antwerp was a diplomatic triumph for Oldenbarneveldt, and for the Dutch. The young Dutch Republic was secure from the main external enemy, Spain. The economy powered by the States of Holland grew dramatically, and the overseas trade and territories driven by the Dutch East India Com­ pany (VOC) expanded. However, throughout the first decade after the Truce was signed, there was grave political disorder and division. Calvin­ ism, the religious issue of the Revolt and one of the mainstays of the Re­ public, was in question. What started out as an academic dispute became a strong schismatic faction advocating for a more liberal, tolerant form of Calvinism than the original doctrine.5 The issue escalated into the political dimension, and in several towns and provinces the governing council and even states were divided, with purges and expulsions occurring in several town councils, and congregations set against each other, disputing the use of church property. The violence increased dramatically. Oldenbarneveldt publicly supported the liberal Calvinists, or Remonstrants, not out of strong religious sentiment but merely to settle the issue. In mid-1617, he and the States of Holland issued legislation in which each province was authorised to recruit mercenary soldiers to restore order and also transferred the oath and loyalty of troops of the regular army from the Republic to the individ­ ual states. Oldenbarneveldt and the States of Holland inaugurated these measures, well-meaning, to restore order. But what was a solution to Oldenbarneveldt and Holland was impossi­ ble to Maurits, builder of the army, Captain-General, Stadhouder of five provinces, as well as to the Prince of Orange. It was contumacious, an act of treason, and a serious threat to his and the Prince of Orange’s authority. Maurits publicly declared himself on the side of the Calvinists or Counter Remonstrants and for a period moved cautiously, building up political sup­ port in the states other than Holland and then struck. Troops of the army were sent into various towns and provinces, and councils and governing bodies were purged of Counter Remonstrants. The mercenary troops were forcibly disarmed and disbanded (and paid off). Oldenbarneveldt and some close associates were arrested. Oldenbarneveldt was tried for treason and executed. Maurits then ruled the Republic unchallenged for the remainder of his life. Unfortunately for the Republic, the internal divisions and turmoil had to a large extent distracted them from foreign affairs. And significant events were occurring in Europe. Within the Holy Roman Empire, religious tensions between differ­ ing states were increasing. The Catholic states, inspired by the Counter

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Reformation which was impacting upon Europe, had formed the Catholic League under the leadership of the powerful state of Bavaria, while Prot­ estant states and free cities had formed the Protestant Union. In 1618, a rebellion against the Hapsburg ruler broke out, and the Protestant rebels appealed to the Calvinist elector Palatine to take the throne. Not only was the rebellion an affront and treason to the Hapsburg ruler, with the elector Palatine taking the throne of Bohemia, it would also tilt the balance among the elector states to a Protestant majority and threaten the Catholic Hapsburgs’ position as future Holy Roman Emperors. The Hapsburgs combined with the Catholic League crushed the rebellion and proceeded to attempt to take back Catholic lands and territories within the Empire. The defeated Calvinist elector was the grandson of William the Silent and had been given tacit support by the Dutch Republic. Other Protestant states had also sup­ ported him and were now under threat. Hapsburg Empire and Hapsburg Spain were united in pursuing the Catholic counter strikes. The struggle escalated; other Protestant countries, afraid of upsetting the balance of power, decided against intervening militarily. Denmark and Sweden were to commit troops and engage in the conflict, the former suffering defeats against the forces of the Catholic League, the latter enjoying victories and dominating the struggle for several years throughout the Empire. In France, its civil wars resolved and the country no longer ruled by the capable mon­ arch Louis XIII, and an equally able first minister, Cardinal Richelieu, was anxious to check Spain becoming too powerful and engaged initially with diplomatic alliances and subsidies and eventually committed military resources to the conflict. In joining the Hapsburgs of the Empire Spain, under first ministers, Zuniga and later Olivares took the opportunity of the end of the Twelve Years Truce to restart hostilities with the Dutch Republic in April 1621. None, least of all Olivares, envisaged the unrealistic nature of the idea of reconquering the Dutch Republic, but here was an opportunity to inflict serious damage economically and militarily on the Dutch Republic. During Maurits’ final years, the Republic had to witness internal unrest as certain economic sectors were suffering decline; taxes were increased to meet in­ creased military expenditure and the Republic was on the defensive against Spain. Maurits, as almost his last major action, sent a delegation to France where an alliance was formed with Louis XIII of France and a welcome annual subsidy from France gained. This gave the Republic much-needed funds to continue the struggle. However, the Republic was under serious threat, faced by the forces of Spain and the Empire. The key fortress of Breda was under siege by the Spanish forces. Maurits died and was succeeded by William’s other son – Frederik Hen­ drik. Fortunately for the Dutch, Frederik Hendrik possessed the military skills and strategic perception of Maurits and also sound political and dip­ lomatic ability. He had, on Maurits urging and cajoling, married and was to ensure the continuation of the line of the House of Orange.

Aftermath 109 Soon after he took over the Stadhouderships of most of the provinces after Maurits’ death in 1624 and the leadership of the Dutch Republic, the strategic fortress of Breda fell to the Spanish. This was a significant blow, but Frederik Hendrik viewed the larger strategic picture and saw how the east part of the Republic, particularly the province of Overijssel, was threatened by both Spanish and imperial forces. Together with Ernst Casimir, the Stadhouder of Friesland and Groningen and a born soldier, Frederik Hendrik struck and took the vital fortress of Oldenzaal. The east­ ern part of the Republic was secured. This strategic perception was to char­ acterise throughout the leadership of Frederik Hendrik. The Dutch kept fighting, and, in 1627, they were given a respite due, yet again, to Spanish strategic overstretch. Spinola and many of the Spanish forces were deployed to Italy. Olivares had committed Spain to a new front, intervening in the civil war in the Duchy of Mantua. Frederik Hendrik then struck south, besieging and taking the great fortress of Hertogenbosch. This was a significant gain, a strategically vital fortress held by Dutch forces and the turning point in the post-Truce Spanish–Dutch struggle. Frederik Hendrik was a worthy military successor to Maurits and was to use the specialist techniques of siege warfare to fullest benefit. Internally, the Dutch economy continued to expand, and trade and pos­ sessions further increased thanks to the East India Company (VOC), and the later formed Dutch West India Company (WIC). Politically there were still divisions and controversies within the Republic. At the start of his tenure, Frederik Hendrik was faced with an outbreak of the Remonstrant controversy, with several localities experiencing violent divisions. Frederik Hendrik himself, though pragmatic and moderate otherwise, favoured the Remonstrant view over the Counter Remonstrant view but did not allow this to create an imbalance or reaction. He had to intervene with force in a Remonstrant versus Counter Remonstrant dispute in Amsterdam which involved mutiny and countercoup among militia factions. However, generally, the issues were settled with a laisse faire approach and, over­ all, in favour of permitting toleration and recognition of Remonstrants without veering to the other extreme of actively going against the Counter Remonstrants. The provinces remained conscious of their rights and sovereignty, and their states and their representatives in the States-General continued to as­ sert themselves against Frederik Hendrik. On occasions, certain issues, in­ cluding military expenditure, had the potential to cause deep divisions and violence within the Republic. However, this did not occur for two main reasons. First, the Republic was at war and under threat from external enemies. The second was due to Frederik Hendrik himself. Unlike his pre­ decessor, he was conciliatory, pragmatic, and non-confrontational; he en­ gaged in dialogue and compromise with differing parties and factions and the States, particularly the States of Holland, to which he always expressed deepest respect. Also within the individual states he had close associates

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who acted as de facto political managers, ensuring that the states were not too confrontational. Compared to the turbulent and wide-ranging fighting in complex mili­ tary situations throughout the Empire and Italy and the French and Spanish frontiers, the Dutch–Spanish fighting in the Thirty Years War was compar­ atively restrained. Nonetheless on one occasion – the Dutch pursuing again the unrealistic objective of invading Flanders – there was a situation of near disaster when, as a result of the unsuccessful foray, the crucial fortress of Schenkenschans was lost to the Spanish, opening the way for invading the Republic. However, during the 1630s and early 1640s, Frederik Hendrik in his campaigns made significant gains. In 1632, Frederik Hendrik’s forces took the massive fortress of Maastricht in the south and gained a tranche of territory known as the Meierij for the Republic. He then fought on, taking more towns in the east, and in 1636 retaking the vital fortress of Schen­ kenschans. He concentrated on sieges and perfected Maurits’ techniques of siege warfare, combining carefully prepared siege works with equally carefully placed artillery bombardment. The growing numbers of towns his forces took and retook led to him being called by politicians and soldiers and ascribed the historical label as “the taker of cities”. His achievements during the 1630s and 1640s were to secure the Dutch Republic from exter­ nal threat and add the territory of the Meierij in the south and small chunks to territory in the east to the Republic. Frederik Hendrik’s abilities extended beyond military skills; he was adept at diplomacy, which he and the Republic needed in the complexities and shifting sands of European diplomacy as states engaged in conflict, formed alliances, and, in the case of France, secretly financed differing war­ ring parties. Fortunately for Frederik Hendrik, during the crucial period of the 1630s, he was unhindered by the States-General in conducting foreign policy, as he carried this out through in conjunction with a small group of politicians, known as the “Secret Committee”. Frederik Hendrik won a confrontation with England in 1639. A large fleet of Spanish ships, a veritable armada, was carrying supplies and troops for an invasion of the Republic. The Dutch fleet under the redoubtable ad­ miral Tromp engaged and damaged a large number of enemy ships. The Spanish fleet retreated and took refuge in English coastal waters. Charles I officially warned the Dutch not to pursue the damaged Spanish fleet, and a small English squadron was deployed to monitor the situation. Frederik Hendrik ignored Charles and ordered Tromp to attack and finish them off, which Tromp did. After the engagement, the Dutch fleet departed and as they did so saluted the English fleet, thereby acknowledging English sover­ eignty in English waters. This caused ill-feeling, although Charles and England could not feel totally aggrieved as England had signed a treaty with Spain. This treaty agreed that Spanish silver was imported into England where it was minted

Aftermath 111 into currency and then transported in English – officially neutral – ships to Antwerp to pay Spanish troops in the Spanish Netherlands. England gained fees for minting and transporting, and Spain gained safe route for transporting vital bullion. Despite the differences, Frederik Hendrik remained friendly with the English royal family, and a dynastic marriage took place between one of Charles’ daughters and Frederik Hendrik’s son William. However, when the English civil war broke out in the 1640s, Frederik Hendrik, while sym­ pathetic to the English royal family and affording personal sanctuary in the Republic to Charles’ wife Queen Henrietta Maria, scrupulously adopted the policy of neutrality, under the careful gaze of the States-General which overall were sympathetic to the English parliamentarians. Frederik Hendrik had empathy with Denmark. Its ruler, Christian IV, was Charles I of England’s nephew, and Christian IV had committed Den­ mark to intervening on the Protestant side when the Bohemian Revolt was crushed. It was an unsuccessful intervention, and Denmark suffered de­ feat and economic damage. Frederik Hendrik made moves to ally the Re­ public with Denmark. However, Denmark was rivalled and confronted by Sweden, particularly over trade wars in the Baltic, and Sweden was the staunch ally of France, which in turn was the ally of the Republic. Also, the States-General was concerned by the Danish tolls imposed in the Baltic adversely impacting upon Dutch trade. Frederik Hendrik therefore avoided an alliance with Denmark, and, in 1644, after being long urged by the States General and the States of Holland, he first sent envoys to negotiate with Christian a reduction of Danish tolls on foreign shipping and when this failed he sent a Dutch fleet in 1645. The Danes had been severely wor­ sted by Sweden in naval battles in the Baltic and were threatened on land by advancing Swedish forces. Facing defeat on several fronts, Christian had little choice but to make peace with Sweden and accede to Dutch demands. Part of the Danish–Swedish peace terms were the cancellation of the in­ creasing in Danish tolls on foreign shipping passing through the Sounds. However, France and the Dutch Republic influenced and facilitated the Danish–Swedish peace treaty and made sure that Sweden did not gain too much territory and throughout the negotiations made it clear to Denmark that it was not diplomatically isolated. The diplomatic mainstay of Frederik Hendrik’s foreign policy was the alliance with France. France, in accordance with foreign policy of its able first minister Cardinal Richelieu, engaged in the Thirty Years War against the Hapsburg Empire and Hapsburg Spain by discreet subsidising of Swe­ den in the latter’s intervention and invasions of the various territories of the Empire. Then in the later stages, France committed troops and engaged in open warfare against Spain. The alliance with Dutch Republic was ex­ tremely useful, as it threatened the Spanish Netherlands, and the Dutch naval strength, continued by its attacks and piracy, damaged the Spanish economy. For the Dutch, it ensured near-continuous subsidies, which were

112 William the Silent and the Revolt renewed every time the alliance was extended, and French troops were wel­ come reinforcements when joint operations were carried out. The French alliance for the most part benefitted the Dutch Republic, but in the 1640s serious differences occurred between the two as to making peace with Spain. From 1640 onwards, peace talks were increasingly looked by all the war­ ring states. It took time to establish a convention for peace negotiations to a conflict of this scale, with so many warring parties. Part of the delay was due to the Holy Roman Emperor’s trying to impose the stipulation that the Empire would represent all its component states and whatever it negotiated would be binding, but he was unsuccessful and the individual states like Ba­ varia and Saxony sent their own representatives. Also, it was not a peace of exhaustion; states and countries would engage in further attacks and lunges at territory, in order to be in so much the better bargaining position for the eventual negotiations. Frederik Hendrik, ever “the taker of cities” and the Dutch took the southern fortress of Hulst in 1645. It had been taken and retaken by both sides no less than seven times; now it was permanently under Dutch control. By 1643, arrangements were being made and the logistics of an interna­ tional peace conference were ongoing in the Empire, in the state of West­ phalia, at two locations – Munster and Osnabruck. The Dutch delegation did not arrive at Westphalia until three years later. Spanish diplomats attempted to intrigue directly with Frederik Hendrik offering a separate peace favourable to Spain, in exchange for recognising the House of Orange as hereditary rulers of a reduced Dutch state, approaches which Frederik Hendrik rejected out of hand. There had been strong attempts by France to prevent the Dutch from making a separate peace with Spain. French diplomats attempted to intimidate the States-General into not making a separate peace with Spain, while Richelieu, through agents, substantially bribed key representatives in the States of Utrecht to oppose any peace with Spain. Also, the States of Zeeland were strongly opposed to any peace with Spain. The States of Zeeland were strongly Calvinist, and, content with the Dutch continuing the sea piracy on Spain, welcomed attacks on the Spanish overseas possessions and were anxious about the prospect of international shipping having access to the river Scheldt. The States-General took time and trouble and much discussion to shape the authorisation and remit of the Dutch delegation to be sent to the peace negotiations. However, the Dutch delegation finally set off, and, in January 1646, they arrived at Munster. Almost immediately they were met and re­ ceived cordially by the Spanish delegate Bracamonte, Count of Peneranda. Peneranda was an able diplomat, worthy of the Spanish diplomatic ser­ vice. He was a full realist and negotiated favourable terms for the Dutch which within months signed a truce ending hostilities and after further positive negotiations were able to send a draft peace treaty back to the

Aftermath 113 States-General for ratification in November 1647. By these terms, Spain recognised Dutch sovereignty and full independence, the territories gained by Frederik Hendrik remained part of the Dutch Republic, the river Scheldt was closed enabling the Dutch towns in the region to impose tolls on goods going to the ports of Flanders, Spain recognised all Dutch conquests in the West and East Indies as they stood in 1641, and within the Dutch Republic there was official toleration of the Catholic religion. Zeeland and Utrecht still opposed the Treaty, but the rest of the provinces approved. Utrecht then dropped its opposition just before the formal oath swearing by both Spain and the Dutch Republic; Zeeland still remained unreconciled but ceased its opposition. On 15 May 1648, representatives from Spain and the Dutch Republic swore to uphold the Treaty of Munster. This treaty, together with that of the Treaty of Osnabruck, formed part of the Peace of Westphalia which effectively ended the Thirty Years War. Frederik Hendrik had died the year before, but his work and achieve­ ments were complete. The Dutch Republic, due to its continuous economic expansion, Frederik Hendrik’s military success, and his diplomatic adroit­ ness, had emerged as a significant European power. In the strategic chess­ board of Europe, the power of Hapsburg Austria had been eroded, Spain had started its long-term decline, and the significant powers were now Eng­ land, France, and the Dutch Republic. In the words of a historian describ­ ing this European situation a decade later, “Spain’s former rebel subjects were now a major state”.6 For the nascent Dutch nation-state, it had been a long, hard struggle, a conflict that lasted 80 years. Maurits took the Revolt at its nadir of the year 1584 by a period of out­ standing military success followed by ruthless internal action to survival and unity. Frederik Hendrik took the Revolt from a point of danger by a period of military success and adroit diplomacy to rendering the Dutch Republic a major European power. But during the dark days of 1584, after over a decade of uneven military struggle and complex and changing political cross currents, that the Dutch Revolt was still in being and continuing and that this was a revolt of a na­ tion for its independence was due to William, Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau, Stadhouder of Holland and Zeeland. William had forged a nation.

Notes 1 G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 206 2 JE Neale Queen Elizabeth I p 292 3 G Parker The Dutch Revolt gives a trenchant and informative account of the economic recovery of the loyal southern provinces pp 263, 267 4 J Motley History of the Dutch Republic Vol 4 p 378; G Parker The Dutch Republic p 240 and G Parker Europe in Crisis 1598–1648 p 135; J Israel The

114 William the Silent and the Revolt Dutch Republic – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477–1806; L Duerloo Dynasty and Piety Archduke Albert and Hapsburg Political Culture in an Age of Reli­ gious Wars p 214. Analysis of the Treaty and Spanish recognition is outlined in N Ridley Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt Comparative Insurgencies chapter 7 and R Lessafer The Twelve Years Truce 1609  – Peace, Law and War in the Low Countries at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century 5 The two sides were named Arminians, after the academic that formulated the revised tolerant version, and the Gomarists who held to the original harsh faith. They were also known respectively as Remonstrants and Counter Remonstrants 6 D Mckay and HM Scott The Rise of European Powers 1648–1815 p 3

Part III

Other Revolts and Insurgencies

9

Late twentieth- and twenty-first-century insurgencies

This part of the book will consider and compare other later revolts and insurgencies. Later, revolts and insurgencies were considered and compared in the previous two books, Maurits of Nassau and the Survival and the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies and Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies. However, in these previous two books, the analysis centred upon the reasons for success or otherwise of the insurgencies and applied four principal criteria, namely, a national identity, adequate armed forces, financing the insurgency, and the exploitation of or trends of favourable international events. However, unlike these previous books, in this book this part will involve only one of those four criteria, that of national identity. In this, it will consider and analyse later revolts and insurgencies with two fundamental questions: At what stage, or which event(s) did violent unrest and disturbances turn into a national insurgency with the objective of independence? Were there at any stage opportunities by the government of the possessing power or country for a rapprochement or compromise, and so avoid the violent unrest becoming a national insurgency for independence? The first three insurgencies considered are those of and within Indonesia. Indonesia is a large archipelago consisting of thousands of islands, of which over 5,000 are inhabited. The islands are spread over a wide area. If the silhouette of the country of Indonesia was to be transposed upon the sil­ houette of the United States, then the westward islands of Indonesia would be situated well into the Pacific Ocean and the eastward islands into the Atlantic. Such a vast extended territory gave serious challenges to the pos­ sessing governing power attempting to maintain control, to the Dutch in the mid-twentieth century and to the independent Indonesia in the early twenty-first century.

Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the Netherlands In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, much of what is modern Indone­ sia was colonised by the VOC, the well-organised and well-financed Dutch

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Other Revolts and Insurgencies

East Indies Company. The company was fully supported by the Dutch Re­ public. Dutch possession of the territories continued in comparative tran­ quillity up to and including the early twentieth century. Then, in the second decade, political movements among the Indonesians which had the objec­ tive of increased autonomy developed and grew. Some movements went further and formulated the objective of full independence. The main par­ ties which formed were those of the Indonesian National Party (PNI), an Islamic party, Sarekat Islam, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Sarekat Islam had officially pledged loyalty to the Dutch regime, but as it spread to rural areas it was taken by supporters there as a movement of na­ tionalist solidarity and against Dutch bureaucracy and against Dutch rule.1 In some areas, violence had been fomented. All three parties, Sarekat Islam, PKI, and PNI, grew in popular support and generally participated within the established political arena. There were two individual leaders, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta who denounced any compromise or engagement with the political process. These two individuals stood for Indonesia being completely independent from Dutch rule. The PKI during this period underwent a violent and at times chaotic period, often torn over communist dogma and over the policy of whether to align itself with smaller mainstream left-wing parties such as Sarekat Rakyat, the People’s Union. There was violence, answered by gangs in ‘green uniform’, in effect police officers and violent street thugs encour­ aged by the authorities to attack Sarekat Islam and PKI members and dis­ rupt their meetings. The numbers of recruited ‘green uniform’ members rose to up to 20,000 by the mid-1920s, and they made a significant im­ pact upon the PKI. In 1925, the PKI was under pressure from the Soviet Union-backed international communist organisation, the Comintern, to achieve more substantial results. They attempted to organise a series of strikes, but this proved a failure. This was followed by suppression of the main trade unions and the PKI being driven underground. The principal leaders of the PKI were arrested, and the PKI lacked central coordination. However, this diffusion encouraged local ‘variations’ in the PKI, and the party doctrine was altered in accordance with local cus­ tom and culture, and the PKI, in its diffused form, paradoxically grew in strength and numbers. The arrest of branch leaders by police action became a threat again, so the remaining leaders of the PKI decided upon full-scale insurrection. This started in November 1926. Uprisings oc­ curred in three cities, including Jakarta. These were quickly suppressed, but the revolts had spread to parts of Java and Sumatra. Heavier fight­ ing occurred than that which had taken place in the three cities, but by mid-January, the insurrection was suppressed. It was the end of the PKI as a major force for at least a decade. Thousands of individuals were imprisoned and were executed in large numbers. It also marked a significant hardening, even ruthlessness, in Dutch policy towards any nationalist movements. Irrespective of how moderate or self-described

Late XX and XXI century insurgencies

119

as nonviolent such movements were, nationalists movements, parties, or factions were no longer tolerated. In the 1930s, a somewhat bewildering array of new parties and factions formed and coalesced, all advocating material progress and freedom for the masses, with variations of measures to be resorted to gain the objec­ tives. The parties as at the mid-1930s were PI, PSII, Partindo, Garrudo, and GAPI. Most remained relatively small compared to the two main parties – Sarekat Islam and the PNI. The growth of parties and political awareness was accompanied by the growth of nationalist schools, schools for early and late secondary education which also fostered – rather indoctrinated – a sense of Indonesian nationalism and awareness of history from an Indone­ sian perspective. These schools formed and proliferated outside the Dutch state system. They were known by the authorities as “wild schools” and regarded with suspicion by the police and security agencies. However, they were not suppressed, and even tolerated, as they gave a thorough education in the basics of literacy and numeracy to a large and generally underprivi­ leged section of the communities, and the teachers were paid small wages. But the “wild schools” did foster, inspire, and contribute to the growing sense of Indonesian nationalism. These developments coincided with the rising tide of Fascism in Ger­ many, Italy, and in other parts of Europe and extreme nationalism in Japan. Germany, Italy, and Japan had left the League of Nations by 1935, and in 1936 Japan started its expansionist war against China. While well-meaning international diplomatic efforts were being made to restrain and appease German and Italian ambitions, Japan had made extensive preparations and was set on expanding into Southeast Asia. Part of those preparations was a widespread network of paid professional spies and local informers. Japa­ nese commercial and business executives from large companies such as Su­ zuki and Mitsubishi, small one- or two-person enterprises such as barbers, photographers, food-stall traders, and sex workers in “entertainment cen­ tres”, all had spread into Malaysia, Singapore, 2 and Indonesia. Some were fully salaried Japanese spies, some were sponsored by Japanese intelligence and the Japanese Foreign Ministry as part-time agents, and many were informers paid on an ad hoc basis. One Indonesian commentator wittily observed, “…they became barbers because the ear is close to the mouth”. 3 In the 1930s, Sukarno was arrested for refusing to cooperate with the Dutch authorities; indeed, he had publicly advocated complete non­ cooperation with them. Also during this period, the Dutch took a hard line with the communists. Any political meeting of more than four individuals was prohibited. However, events were to show that the greatest enemies, internal and external, to Dutch rule were the Japanese. As at 1940, the Dutch had effectively contained all nationalist move­ ments by Indonesians for independence. Had it not been for the Japanese invasion, arguably Indonesia would not have come into being as a fully independent nation.

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In the late 1930s, the Japanese had spread propaganda which offered and promised the Chinese and all Southeast Asians a part in the ‘Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’, a trade and economic zone under Jap­ anese leadership. This was appealing to the Indonesians. It implied the end of Dutch rule and, as Asians, they would be part of a pan-Asia selfdetermining economy. The debacle in 1940 in Europe resulted in German victories in the West over several of the Allies, including the Dutch surrender and occupation by the Germans. In the East, the Japanese were successful in their advance down Southeast Asia, and, in March 1942, the Dutch commander-in-chief and the governor-general unconditionally surrendered to the Japanese. A large proportion of the Dutch population did not leave and remained. This was partly out of self-interest in retaining property, possessions, and businesses but also out of genuine affinity to “their people,” the Indone­ sians, whom they did not wish to desert but rather stay with them. Many of the Dutch government officials and administrators and some business own­ ers thought that they would be retained by the Japanese to run the civil ad­ ministration and keep commerce going. They were sorely mistaken. Dutch civilians were made prisoners and up to 100,000 of them were placed in de­ tention camps in Java. Dutch and British and other allied combatants who had been made prisoners were placed in prisoner-of-war camps in harsh, almost unendurable, conditions. From this point on, the Netherlands East Indies was finished.4 The Japanese encouraged Indonesian national identity, mobilising them for the Japanese war effort. Indonesia was recognised as a state – but firmly subservient to Japan and under Japanese control. There were three Japa­ nese commands: one army occupying Sumatra, one army occupying Java, and the navy occupying the eastern islands. A rigid command hierarchy was established. The three Indonesian-based commands reported to Jap­ anese command Singapore, which in turn reported to Japanese command Indo-China, based in Saigon. Saigon reported back to Tokyo. An Indonesian national leader was designated to head the administra­ tion in Ambon. Other Indonesian nationalists were appointed to key ad­ ministrative positions. The Japanese encouraged and promoted growing of vegetables and manufacturing of soap and home weaving. They also initiated programmes for the textile industry, but these were unsuccessful. They made efforts to ensure that the population was fed, but in Java and other locations the main problem was not amounts of food production but its distribution which was severely hampered by petrol and fuel shortages. There was commandeering and storage of large stocks of rice for long­ term planning, but this led to severe immediate and mid-term shortages and large-scale starvation. 5 Japanese efforts, such as they were, to stimulate the Indonesian econ­ omy and feed the population encouraged to a limited extent Indonesian self-identity, but the main effect was to cause much misery and hardship.

Late XX and XXI century insurgencies

121

The main priority was to use Indonesia for Japanese supply purposes for subsistence and manpower, as part of the Japanese Empire. Any dissent or disorder was ruthlessly suppressed. Immediately after the defeat of the Dutch, there were spontaneous attacks by Indonesians on Dutch officials and landowners. Mini land grabs started in the country, and lootings oc­ curred in several cities. The Japanese restored order ruthlessly. Indonesians soon learned that the Dutch had gone, but much of Indonesia as some sort of state had come into being, which was firmly under Japanese mastery. Indonesians had to bow to Japanese officers, and physical violence was meted out to civilians by soldiers on a whim. Indonesian able-bodied males as well as Dutch and British prisoners of war were liable to forced labour. Many were sent abroad to work in harsh conditions, and up to 50,000 were forced to work on the infamous Burma railway construction. The Japanese strenuously encouraged and fostered military values among the Indonesians. Their zeal and intense militarism in the ethos of the war­ rior instilled, intangibly, a spirit of militarism into certain sections of Indo­ nesian society. More substantially, they provided opportunities for military training for pro-Japanese Indonesian military units. This training included officer training for suitable ‘reliable’ Indonesians, a concept unheard in the era of Dutch rule. Various pro-Japanese militia groups were established and given support and some weapons. Even a Muslim militia was estab­ lished whose ethos and loyalty was to God with the principal enemy, the Westerner. Women were also imbued with militarism and included in the mobilisation of the population; they wore long trousers and fatigues and conscripted into disciplined work groups, and some were given military training for frontline support roles. In one or two cases, Japanese milita­ rism worked too well. Two of the combat militia groups, in separate inci­ dents in early 1945, turned against Japanese units. They were suppressed with brutality. Japanese encouraging of forming and training militia groups was part of mobilising the Indonesian population in support of the Japa­ nese regime and the wider Nipponese Empire. However, it also resulted in radically advancing Indonesian nationalism and a large number of people gaining basic military training. One militia group, faithful to the Japanese regime but after the latter’s defeat a combat force for independent, num­ bered 37,000. During the Japanese occupation, the communists in Indonesia clandes­ tinely regrouped. Indonesians were not permitted to form political parties but were allowed to attend Japanese-approved political meetings. Hatta, one of the pre-war nationalist leaders, gave mass lectures on economic co­ operatives, which the Japanese approved, but under this academic guise he managed to promulgate further Marxist ideology. Communist cells and groups were formed. One main communist group, formed in 1943, was Menteng 31, named after the address of a hostel in Jakarta where they held regular meetings. Another extreme left-wing leader, Aidet, also organised separate cells and meetings.

122 Other Revolts and Insurgencies Another nationalist group, non-communist, Prapatan 10, was formed in Jakarta with a declared policy of non-cooperation with the Japanese. Com­ prised mainly of intellectuals, its regular meetings were allowed to be held unhindered by the Japanese, presumably because its members were assessed by the Japanese secret service, the Kempetai, as harmless. The Kempetai, efficient as usual, were accurate in their judgement of the non-threat by Prapatan 10. However, that it formed and met at all is evidence of the rising nationalism. News of the steady pushing back of Japan’s southeast territorial pos­ sessions by the United States and the vital defeat at the Battle of Midway only filtered through slowly to the Indonesian population. However, when the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, the news of this reached Indonesia quickly. The Japanese, still occupying In­ donesia, were ambivalent in any statements, obfuscating the fact they had surrendered. A group of ‘Young Turks’ among the Indonesian communists, linked to Menteng 31, kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to make a declaration of independence. On 17 August 1945, 48 hours after the Japanese had surrendered, Sukarno and Hatta issued a statement in Jakarta, declaring Indonesia an independent state. Sukarno and Hatta were under pressure to make the independence dec­ laration an inflammatory and defiant proclamation. However, to avoid offending the Japanese and ensure that violence was not encouraged, the independence declaration was calm and restrained. It simply declared that the people of Indonesia declared the independence of Indonesia and that transfer of power arrangements would be implemented conscientiously and as quickly as possible. Republicans established a central government with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Vice-President and a Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) to assist the president in government with provincial committees established in the differing provinces and islands. A constitution, previously prepared by underground nationalists in Jakarta during the Japanese occupation, was adopted in most of its principles. As with all the European colonial territories in Asia which had been conquered and occupied by the Japanese, the situation was confused after the Japanese surrender. In Indonesia, the confusion was all the greater due to the extent and distance of the islands in the archipelago. According to the terms of the Japanese surrender, the Japanese kept their arms and main­ tained order until Allied troops reached the various locations and took over control. In Indonesia, the Japanese were ordered to disarm all Indonesian troops and militias. Naturally this was contested and Indonesian militia forces and Indonesian resistance groups rose up and made attacks to con­ trol the cities. Where they were successful, the Indonesian fighters gained access to and took possession of armouries and military equipment. Men­ teng 31 cells staged mass and aggressive demonstrations, which Hatta and Sukarno tried unsuccessfully to restrain. They both were more concerned

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with planning the future government and governing structures. The com­ munist cells and many of the nationalist groups were more interested in immediate action. In most of the islands “liberation committees” were set up, and militias were organised, expanded, and armed. A military structure was formed from Republican units of fighting groups, usually officered by Indonesian young men and women trained in military training by the Japanese during the occupation. It was organised by divisions. In early November 1945, divisional commanders in a briefing session in Jakarta chose one of their member, Sudirman, as the commander­ in-chief of Indonesian forces. During this somewhat confused period of the new militias forming and the existing ones expanding, the fledgling Indonesian revolutionary gov­ ernment and its army led by Sukarno and other leaders was only one of many rival formations. Some formations were from communist cells, some were former Japanese-sponsored units unprepared to give up their auton­ omy, and some were formed from criminal gangs whose loyalty to an inde­ pendent Indonesia took second place to the potential immediate gains from violent conflicts. The Indonesian republican army started from a nucleus of units, led by Japanese-trained officers and was a small but efficient formation, namely, the People’s Security Body (PKR). This then expended by taking in first republican militias and integrating them, then through careful negotiation, other militia groups who had been formed under the Japanese and were now fighting the struggle independently. By November 1945, the merged units and the PKR had changed the title symbolising the increase in num­ bers, to be the Peoples Security Army (PKR). Finally, with more resistance forces merging and the divisional formations being adopted, it became by 1946 the National Army of Indonesia (TNI). The formation of a national army, so important to the independence struggle, was due to the planning ability of Sukarno and Hatta, and the practical operational foresight of Sudirman, who never failed to contradict and override the political leaders and gain his own way in implementing the military organisation and fight­ ing the struggle. In Jakarta, in the midst of violent activity by Indonesian groups against the Japanese, British forces arrived to take control in order to eventually to hand over and restore Indonesia to Dutch control. The atmosphere was fer­ vent, with frequent attacks on Dutch and Chinese individuals suspected of spying and many militia groups chafing to start conflict with any perceived attempts at restoring Dutch control. Republican newspapers, ruthlessly suppressed by the Japanese during the occupation, had reappeared inciting militancy and further spurring Indonesian opinion for independence. Demonstrations in September held in Jakarta numbered over 100,000 protesters. Thanks to the leaders, extreme violence was narrowly avoided. At other locations mob rule took place and organised lynching of alleged pro-Japanese, or even those denounced as “enemies of the people”, occurred.

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In late September 1945, the situation rapidly escalated in Surabaya, a port in eastern Java. Six thousand British troops and Indian troops had landed in Surabaya. The troops were constantly harassed and subject to verbal and physical attacks. After initial spasmodic attacks by Indonesians, street fighting broke out and casualties mounted. The leaders of the Re­ publican forces negotiated a ceasefire. Then a senior officer was killed in an incident. The British senior officer, a brigadier, was travelling about the port under a white flag to speedily inform the combatants of the ceasefire and was heading for a meeting with Indian troops besieged by a large force of Republicans. He was killed. The exact circumstances of his shooting were unclear, but his death caused widespread fury among British forces. The British responded quickly and with force. Surabaya was subjected to artillery fire throughout November, and reinforcements were sent in and intense street fighting occurred. Sukarno discreetly disowned the Indone­ sian forces, who suffered several thousand casualties. Indonesian fighters and innocent civilians alike who fled the city were strafed by British fighter planes. The British had regained control of Surabaya by end of November 1945, but the situation, if anything became more inflamed and Indonesian nationalism grew even more. Ironically to Indonesian nationalists, the long-term enemy to independ­ ence was the Dutch, the recent enemy was the brutal Japanese regime; yet what was to become an epitome, or resonating symbol of the Indonesian struggle for independence, was the battle of Surabaya, a bloody engagement against the British. The latter were angry and ruthless in their retaliation against Indonesian forces in Surabaya but became quickly aware of the popular support by Indonesians for what were well-organised resistance forces. Britain was to adopt an increasingly neutral stance in the conflict. Throughout 1946, British and Indian troops facilitated the landings of Dutch troops and civil servants, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administra­ tion officials on Java and other islands by targeting the possession of key cities. In the taking of Jakarta, thousands of civilians were killed. Jakarta fell in January 1946, and the Republican leadership and “administration” and nationalist ministers fled to the ancient city of Yogyakarta. This was the Royal Javanese capital, and the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX made a significant move by declaring himself and his kingdom for the Republi­ can nationalist cause. While Jakarta had fallen and was now under Dutch control, and more Dutch troops were being deployed to the region, the Dutch gained control only of the main cities in Java and Sumatra; the rural areas still remained under nationalist control. The Dutch only managed to take control of the outer islands of the archipelago, particularly those eastern islands. The Dutch may have taken the outer islands, but in many of them and in the rural areas of Java and Sumatra a parallel revolution was taking place, a social revolution. In Kalimantan, when the Japanese surrendered, there were attacks on the royal officials and any official who was perceived

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as being part of the Dutch regime. All such were decried as ‘feudal’ and attacked, their property seized, and in some extreme cases they were be­ headed. In Aceh, the territory on the north end of Sumatra, the regents and aristocracy who had always been supporters of Dutch rule, were declared deposed and land grab occurred in favour of the rural poor. From then on Aceh remained a stronghold of Republican nationalism. These outbreaks of social revolution were welcome to the Republican nationalist in that they were giving power and land to Indonesians and sweeping away the admin­ istration and overall legacy of the detested Dutch rule. However, nationalist leaders like Hatta and Sukarno were suspicious and at times alarmed by the left-wing and communist ideology in some areas which drove the rev­ olution. Such ideology compromised full loyalty to the cause of nationalist independence – and to the Republican leaders. One such area was in Java where three former regencies under royal Javanese families had been subjected to violent revolutionary change. Several groups of militias, some communist and others simply opportunist, combined to overturn the regime in the regencies, an area which became known as the Three Regions. In the Three Regions, pro-Japanese regents and Indonesians who had collaborated were humiliated, dispossessed, and those suspected of supporting the Dutch regime were murdered. Commu­ nist resistance fighters had combined with a militia formed from a criminal gang to make this violent revolution in The Three Regions. A revolution was proclaimed, and the region declared independent under a communist government. Though the area was liberated, this was a step far too far for the nationalist Republicans. Within ten days of the Three Regions be­ ing declared under a communist government, the revolution was ruthlessly crushed by the troops of the TNI and the area brought under Republican nationalist control. Meanwhile, the struggle continued between the Dutch, who were rein­ forcing their forces, and the expanding TNI. The Dutch continued exerting control on the outer and eastern islands, creating them into separate ter­ ritories or mini states, such as the “Stare of East Indonesia”, comprising of many of the eastern islands, with a capital of Makassar, or the “South East Borneo” Federation. By mid-1948, the area controlled by TNI forces and the Republic even in central Java was reduced due to Dutch military advances. However, British support for the Dutch was waning rapidly. The fighting in Surabaya had shown that the Indonesian forces were fully committed and supported by the population which clearly wished for inde­ pendence. Britain no longer wished to aid the restoration of Dutch rule; its troops longed to return home after years of fighting in Southeast Asia. Also the Indian contingents of the British forces were anxious to return to their homeland and the promised independence. The British commander-in-chief Southeast Asia, Lord Mountbatten, echoed British policy in respecting in­ dependence aspirations of new states. Within three years, Mountbatten himself would preside over and broker negotiations which would result in

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the independence of Britain’s most populous possession, the Indian subcon­ tinent, creating two independent states, India and Pakistan. British policy regarding Indonesia had become neutral, and the most desired result would be a compromised form of Indonesian independence. Accordingly, the British pushed forward a possible compromise set­ tlement to both sides. After negotiations, an agreement was formulated known as the Linggadjati Agreement. The Netherlands formally acknowl­ edged the Republic as the authority in Java, Sumatra, and the small island of Madura adjacent to northern Java. Both Republic and the Netherlands agreed to a Unified States of Indonesia, a federal state headed by the ruler of the Netherlands. Republican Indonesian territories of Java and Suma­ tra would form part of this federation, together with the Dutch-controlled Kalimantan, and the eastern islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, and the other islands, including the western half of New Guinea, currently held by the Dutch. Subject to ratification by both sides, this new federative state would come into being by the beginning of 1949. Both sides agreed to this in principle during the negotiations, but neither side was truly content. Indonesian Republican politicians debated and argued at length and the agreement was viewed as a flawed and biased compromise settlement. It was not until the 1947 that they finally ratified the agreement. Meanwhile, the Netherlands Parliament also debated and, a month after the Indone­ sians had ratified the agreement, they too ratified it but with significant amendments. The Indonesians took this as bad faith and refused to accept the amendments. Recriminations followed and, more important, both sides accused the other of violating the agreement. However, political accusations and statements were one tactic; but the Dutch went further and violated the ceasefire. They restarted military op­ erations. Officially calling it a “policing action”, in July 1947 Operation Product was launched, a military attack upon Republic-controlled areas of Java and Sumatra. The military operation lasted just under a month and ended with Dutch gaining some areas of Java and Sumatra. The Re­ publican areas still under control were directed by those held by the Dutch military. However, Dutch troops had suffered casualties, and the Republic had not been expelled from either Java or Sumatra, and in Java Dutch ad­ ministrators and businesses were subject to Republican guerrilla attacks by bombings. Republican fighters and militants pressurised traders not to do business with any in Dutch areas. Also international opinion was hostile. The Dutch were viewed as violating a ceasefire, and thousands of Indone­ sians had been displaced. The Republican areas in Java did not have access to a sizeable port. Within these areas, small trade enterprises declined and unemployment in­ creased. The Republic issued its own currency; the Dutch areas used their own currency. Fluctuations in both – and illicit exchange – occurred caus­ ing further economic disruption. An experienced division of Republican

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forces was deployed that moved from western to central Java to give the Republican areas extra security. One of the Republican leaders was Amir Syarifudin – a lawyer from Medan, educated in both Indonesia and Dutch universities, and a distin­ guished intellectual. He became a member of the underground communist resistance during Dutch rule and remained a communist but was willing to coalesce and serve in the Republican government, alongside Sukarno, Hatta, and the other leaders. Amir served as clandestine Minister of Defence and, in agreement with Sukarno, as de facto Foreign Minister for a certain period. He attempted to establish relations on behalf of the Repub­ lican government with the United States. However, the United States was embroiled with the Cold War against the Soviet Union and was focusing mainly on Europe. Its interest or attention and support for Indonesian in­ dependence was at best lukewarm. By mid-1947, international opinion had moved against the Dutch. There was disquiet at the continuing conflict, the cause of which was blamed upon the Dutch who broke the ceasefire. Newly independent India condemned the conflict. Australia showed its hostility to Dutch military operations and repeatedly called for cessation of hostilities. Australian trade unions had imposed a ban on loading and servicing any Dutch ships in Australian ports and called for withdrawal of investments in Dutch-sponsored enterprises. Also, the United States was changing its stance and was pressing the Neth­ erlands to adopt a less rigid stance towards Indonesian self-determination. There was intense diplomatic activity on the whole issue of Indonesia at the United Nations (UN), and, in June 1947, the UN called for a ceasefire. The Dutch complied, and a temporary ceasefire came into effect in early August. A representative from the Indonesian Republican leadership was given a platform to speak to the UN; significantly, representatives from the Dutch-sponsored areas of Indonesia were refused. This was followed by the creation of a UN Good Offices Committee with representatives from the United States, Australia, and Belgium to assist and facilitate negotia­ tions for a permanent ceasefire. In January 1948, an agreement was reached, after negotiations held on a US warship docked in Jakarta Harbour. The Renville Agreement, named after the ship the USS Renville, laid down ceasefire lines following the van Mook line, named after the Dutch operational commander which territori­ ally favoured the Dutch positions. However, what strategic military advan­ tage the Indonesians lost was more than made good by the impression and resulting goodwill they gained from the United States due to the Indonesian conciliatory attitude throughout the negotiations and their willingness to accept the ceasefire agreement. The Dutch meanwhile continued to set up neo-client states. They estab­ lished East Sumatra, Madura, another one in western Java named Pasun­ dan, and in early 1948 a state in South Sumatra, and later the state of East Java. Smaller entities were established, and no less than 15 neo-client states

128 Other Revolts and Insurgencies were set up in this Dutch-created federation. The Republican-controlled areas, particularly those in Java, suffered dramatic economic decline. Java was overpopulated with the influx of Indonesian refugees and the deploy­ ment there of Republican military units. Food shortages occurred, and the Republican government printed more currency to meet costs and inflation soared. This had the usual detrimental effect on prices but also peasants’ incomes rose with increased demand for rice and the inflation effectively wiped out many of the debts owed by peasants. Overall, the rural peasants enjoyed a comparative rise in living standards. The left-wing politicians, including Amir, resigned from the Republican government. The new KNIP, or the governing cabinet of ministers selected by Sukarno, was now more centrist. The communists were now adopting the position of outright opposition to the Republican government. Also, some PKI units of the Republican army, as well as their commu­ nist political colleagues, were dissatisfied with the Renville Agreement and resentful of the increasingly centrist nature of Sukarno’s Republican gov­ ernment. In August 1948, left-wing and communist factions of the military together with some left-wing political groups moved and seized control of the city of Madiun, a hundred miles northeast of Yogyakarta. The rebel troops in Madiun numbered between 5,000 and 10,000 troops, together with members and workers from PKI, who set up their own regime. They called upon all left-wing groups and sympathisers to rally there. Amir and other communist leaders travelled to Madiun. They went there to join their comrades, though they had no intention of leading or encouraging insurrec­ tion against the Yogyakarta government. Sukarno and Hatta, both more realistic and aware of the implications, immediately assessed and officially declared the seizure of Madiun as an illegal rebellion. Those leaders of the PKI who had remained in Yogyakarta were arrested. Sukarno’s public statements were a ringing appeal to Indo­ nesian nationalism and emphasised that the struggle was against the Dutch and the Madiun insurgents were a dangerous breach in what had to be a united struggle. One of the leaders of the Madiun insurgents issued a coun­ terstatement, pushing their position clearly to the extreme left, stating that the Sukarno government and its forces were slaves to both Japan and Amer­ ica. The leaders of the Madiun insurgents misjudged the impact of Sukar­ no’s appeal which resonated across Indonesia. Their counterstatements included a defiant pronouncement that they would fight to the end. This polarised the positions. To Indonesian civilians and Republican military units, it was a binary choice between Sukarno or the Madiun insurgents and the left, and the Republican fighting units gave unequivocal support to Sukarno, as did the rest of Indonesia. In Banten and Sumatra, the leftwing party of Amir, the Peoples’ Democratic Front, declared that they had nothing to do with Madiun. Republican forces advanced on Madiun, and on 19 September they en­ gaged the rebel forces. The latter put up a bitter resistance, but despite

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this the defenders were pushed back, killing any Republican government officials they could and finally abandoning Madiun at the end of Septem­ ber. They were pursued through the countryside by victorious Republican troops. Two communist leaders managed to flee and eventually reach China (one of them, Aidet, was to return to an independent Indonesia, become a prominent member of the communist party in Indonesia, and lead an un­ successful coup against the government in the mid-1960s). Another PKI leader, Musso, who had issued the statement about the Republicans being slaves to both Japan and the United States and that Madiun would fight to the last, was captured and summarily shot. Amir, together with over a hun­ dred rebel troops, was captured by mid-November. Eight thousand rebel troops and civilian communist sympathisers were killed in the fighting and by the summary justice meted out by Republican forces afterwards. Within six weeks, the Sukarno government had ruthlessly crushed a schismatic movement; the Indonesian national struggle had unity restored, supported by most of the population. To the United States, already moving sympathetically towards Indonesian aspirations of independence, the crushing of Madiun was proof enough that the Republican regime under Sukarno enjoyed popular support and, more important, was opposed to communism and generated more goodwill ac­ cordingly. However, the Dutch failed to realise from the Madiun events the extent to which Indonesians supported the Republicans. In mid-December, they launched a second military campaign, Operation Crow, which they in­ sisted upon using the term, like their previous campaign, “a police action”. Within 24 hours, they had captured Yogyakarta, and in the following week took swathes of Republican territory. The Republican government and its leaders Hatta and Sukarno offered no resistance and deliberately appeared as passive as possible, playing to worldwide media. They real­ ised that the Dutch military action was ultimately a mistake. The Republi­ can forces hastily executed Amir and other Madiun captives that they held and then retreated from Yogyakarta and other positions. The Republican forces, however, were not so passive as their leaders and waged intense and skilful guerrilla warfare from rural and jungle hideouts and camps. There was even a strong counterattack by guerrilla units on Yogyakarta showing that Republican forces were still operationally fully active. This “policing action” was a quick military victory for the Dutch forces and gave them a considerable strategic advantage in military terms. All the major towns and many villages in Java and Sumatra were now under Dutch control, and of the islands and provinces, only Aceh remained en­ tirely under the control of the Republic. However, the Dutch soon realised that a military victory is almost meaningless when enemy guerrilla for­ mations continue to be given support by the population and are operating unhindered in rural areas. This lesson was learnt fast by the Dutch; it took decades of fighting in Vietnam by the US troops before the United States learnt the lesson, and even then the United States repeated the mistake in

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Iraq in the following century. The Dutch military continued to take casu­ alties by speedy guerrilla attacks, and in the rear areas of territories their supplies and other logistical support were disrupted by both attacks and sullen non-cooperation by civilians. Also, as hoped by Sukarno and Hatta, passively submitting to their de­ tention by Dutch forces in Yogyakarta, the “policing action” was a diplo­ matic disaster for the Dutch. The Dutch had clearly broken an international agreement, the Renville Agreement, which was a result of considerable ef­ fort and mediation by the United States, Australia, and Belgium. These countries unequivocally condemned the Dutch action. The UN Security Council was outraged the way its efforts and official body, the UN Good Offices Committee, had been treated with such disrespect and contempt. The UN made demands for a ceasefire, for the release of the Indonesian Republican leaders, for the establishment of an interim government, and for full sovereignty to be granted to Indonesia by July 1950. The United States suspended all transfers of aid funds to the Netherlands which were to be used for the Netherlands for expenditure in Southeast Asia. There was the threat by the United States to suspend economic aid to the Netherlands, part of US assistance granted to war-damaged Europe. Even some of the Dutch-sponsored states in the Dutch-created federation criticised the “po­ lice action”, and in two of these client states, Pasendan and East Indonesia, the entire governing cabinet resigned in protest. Under this pressure, and realising that their military victory counted for little, the Dutch complied but insisted upon preliminary talks with the Republican government. From these, it was agreed that Sukarno and Hatta would return to Yogyakarta and order a ceasefire to all Repub­ lican forces; a conference would be convened between the Dutch, the Dutch-sponsored federation states, and the Republican leaders; and, sig­ nificantly, the Dutch would create no more states within ‘their’ federa­ tion. There were misgivings among the Republican army leaders about talking to the Dutch, and they questioned the authority of the Republi­ can leaders who had apparently meekly surrendered while they, the army, had continued the struggle. However, Sukarno overrode these doubts and even threatened to resign if they did not cease. In July the conference was convened, with sessions taking place in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. The Dutch federal states proved extremely sympathetic towards the Repub­ licans, respecting the Republicans for their long struggle and, in some cases, recognising their frustration over the lack of real power and that their creation was merely a cloak for the continuation of Dutch rule. It was agreed that a new state would come into being, a Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), with Sukarno and Hatta as President and Vice-President, respectively. The new state would have the Republi­ can army forces as the core of its new army, with other forces and guer­ rilla units being integrated. A permanent ceasefire would be implemented between 11 and 15 August. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Java acted

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as neutral arranger of the handover of power from the Dutch military authorities to the Republican units. Then, in August 1949, a further conference between the Republicans and the Dutch was convened, this time at the Hague. These talks were am­ icable, and a final settlement was discussed and agreed upon. A loose and flexible union of the Netherlands and their federal states and the RUSI was agreed, with the Queen of the Netherlands as Head of State and Sukarno as President and Hatta as Prime Minister of the RUSI. The Netherlands re­ tained sovereignty over the territory of Irian Jaya. RUSI took over the debt of the Dutch East Indies. After negotiations, the debt was fixed at the equiv­ alent of 4.3 billion Sterling. Among the Indonesian delegation, and back in Indonesia, it was sullenly pointed out that a large part of the debt consisted of the costs incurred by Dutch military operations during the independence struggle. The formal transfer of sovereignty of Indonesia was made by the Netherlands to the RUSI. The series of negotiations had been, overall, amicable, but the settlement had been and was a delicate balance, and future steps needed to be taken cautiously. This balance was upset by a sudden impetuous act from the Dutch side. In January 1950 a Dutch officer, who had acquired a reputa­ tion for action and ruthlessness due to his success in counterinsurgency operations against Republican forces, was unable to accept the settlement. He and several units of troops mounted an offensive and captured sev­ eral positions in Bandung on the island of Bali, near Java. His action was not supported officially, and the Dutch High Commissioner and the Dutch garrison commander of Bandung hastily intervened and persuaded him to withdraw within less than 24 hours. The situation was apparently defused. However, damage was done when shocking information came to light that the officer had planned to mount an assault on the RUSI government and assassinate several cabinet mem­ bers. It came to light that after he had been forced to leave Bandung, troops acting on the officer’s orders had infiltrated and were in place in Jakarta. These troops were expelled by Republican forces. Despite Dutch strenu­ ous official disowning of the officer and his attempted actions,6 the affair damaged trust and relations between the Dutch, their federal states, and the RUSI. Several Indonesian politicians in the Dutch federation state of Pasundan were arrested, suspected of being part of the plot. The assembly of that state, shocked and angry, pleaded that Pasundan be dissolved and integrated into the RUSI. Several other Dutch federal states followed and integrated themselves into the RUSI, and one was forcibly integrated fol­ lowing the discovery that its Sultan had been involved in the plot. In April 1950, pro-Dutch colonial troops in the large Dutch federal state of East Indonesia clashed with Republican troops. The East Indonesian govern­ ment resigned, and the new government started implementing measures for integration into the RUSI. This prompted a rebellion by pro-Dutch elements attempting to set up a separatist state, which was crushed by Republican

132 Other Revolts and Insurgencies troops. By November 1949, only one large Dutch federal state remained outside the RUSI, and this dissolved itself into the RUSI by the end of the year. In April 1950, the constitution of the federal structure of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, in which the Republic of Indonesia was a part together with other constituent states, was replaced by a new constitu­ tion. This established a central unitary state – the Republic of Indonesia  – with its capital as Jakarta. The final step had been taken. Indonesia was to face many political prob­ lems and challenges in the international arena in the coming decades. But as at 1950, Indonesia had gained its full independence and was now a united sovereign state. Analysis During the period of Dutch rule, even during the 1930s, the Dutch author­ ities kept in check the most extreme movements for independence, with­ out resorting to unduly repressive measures. Their dealing with nationalist movements was nowhere near approaching the brutality of the Japanese oc­ cupation. Arguably, had the events and circumstances of the Second World War not occurred, Dutch rule in time may, possibly, have arrived at grant­ ing Indonesia some form of autonomy and degrees of self-determination combined with mutually beneficial economic and commercial agreements. The Japanese rapid defeat of and ousting of the Dutch from Indonesia changed the situation completely. During the occupation between 1941 and 1945, Indonesian militant nationalism for independence grew ex­ ponentially. After the Japanese surrender, moderate Indonesian opinion anticipated some changes in the status of Indonesia in some form of selfdetermination; communist groups expected and advocated full independ­ ence, as part of Indonesia being part of the international communist frater­ nity; and the nationalists also anticipated full independence. The strategic assessment shared by the communists and the nationalists was that the Jap­ anese had completely expelled the Dutch and, with the Japanese completely defeated, they, nationalists or communists, would move in to fill the power vacuum and take power. All Indonesians, moderates, communists, and na­ tionalists alike held that Dutch rule had gone, never to return. The Netherlands also had expectations. As fighting forces in exile, and then as part of the invasion of Europe, together with their Resistance or­ ganisation against the occupying Germans, they were part of the Allies. Like France in Indo-China, they expected that now the Axis occupiers of the Asian colonies had been defeated and would leave, they would return in possession of their territories and to the status quo of perceived pre-1939 colonial normality. In the post-1945 upheavals, the Dutch refused to accept the Indonesian government as a serious responsible government that was widely supported by Indonesians; they failed to realise the significance that

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it was the Indonesian government and TNI that crushed the pro-communist Madiun enclave and that the Indonesian government was not an extreme left-wing subversive – the United States did observe this. The Dutch did quickly learn the lesson – unlike the United States later in Vietnam – after the second “policing” operation. This was the lesson that military success was of limited value without political settlement. However, the sheer feroc­ ity of the “policing operations” and that the second one had violated and broken an international agreement had eroded whatever trust the Indone­ sians had had towards the Dutch. As at 1945, the Netherlands and Indonesia had conflicting viewpoints of the future, and actual conflict between the two was near-inevitable. The only outcomes were either reversion to Dutch control or Indonesian independence.

East Timor struggle for independence from Indonesia – 1975 to 2003 East Timor, part of Timor, is of one of the eastern islands within the ge­ ographical archipelago of Indonesia. During the seventeenth century, the Portuguese and Dutch were both engaged in trade wars in the Far East. Several islands, including Timor, and some trading posts were conquered by one side then retaken by another. By the end of the eighteenth century, the western half of Timor was possessed by the Dutch, while the eastern half of Timor was possessed by the Portuguese, and both remained in their respective possessions up to the mid-twentieth century. During the Second World War, both East and West Timor were jointly occupied by Austral­ ian and Dutch troops. (Portugal refrained from any action in its Southeast Asian colonies.) Both the Dutch and the Australians prepared against a Jap­ anese aggression, correctly assuming that Japanese offensive would be in Southeast Asia. The Japanese did indeed strike towards the Southeast Asia, gaining victories and territories at great speed. They conquered the islands in the region, including Timor. The Timorese (unlike some sections of the Acenese population) refused to collaborate. Aided by Australian troops, the Timorese conducted a campaign of resistance against the Japanese and tens of thousands of them lost their lives in their resistance. After the Second World War, East Timor reverted to Portuguese control, although it was a loose, distant form of control. In 1974, the Portuguese revolution toppled the dictatorship in Lisbon, and Portuguese sovereignty was declared to be relinquished. In the ensuing political vacuum in East Timor, three main political parties were formed, the Uniao Democratica Timoreana (UDT), the Associacao Popular Democratica (Apoditi), and the Fronte Revolutionaria de Timo-Leste Independente (Falinitil). The first, UDT, represented the traditionalists who wished to keep close links with Portugal; the second, Apoditi, had leanings towards union and integra­ tion with Indonesia; and the third, Falinitil, represented left-wing views

134 Other Revolts and Insurgencies and advocated independence. In the following decade, UDT and Falinitil emerged as the two dominant parties. However, Indonesia continued to liaise and keep close ties with Apoditi. Back in distant Europe, Portugal was preoccupied with its own post-revolutionary issues and loosening ties with its former colonies. As Portugal became more involved in its inter­ nal revolutionary politics and settlements and became less concerned with East Timor, Indonesian interest in the developing situation increased and intensified. By mid-1975, the UDT was alarmed at the resonance among the popula­ tion that Fretilin’s calls for independence were arousing. The UDT tried to force the issue by staging a coup, which was met with spasmodic resistance by Fretilin supporters. At the outbreak of this resistance, Indonesia reacted by portraying to international opinion that the situation in East Timor was that of civil war. The overall situation continued to be uncertain, with the UDT insisting that it had the reins of power and was the governing author­ ity in East Timor, and the Fretilin supporters continued violent resistance in certain areas while its political spokespersons claimed that the UDT coup was illegitimate. Then in November 1975, Fretilin issued a unilateral decla­ ration of independence and proclaimed East Timor an independent, sover­ eign state. Only a handful of countries, mainly those with Marxist-Leninist regimes, gave official diplomatic recognition to the East Timor independ­ ence. Leaders of Apoditi and some of the UDT leaders signed a policy agreement which called for full integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Indonesia made substantial investments into infrastructure and subsistence in East Timor, and living standards in certain areas improved. However, East Timorese resistance also occurred, waged by Fretilin’s militant wing, Falinitil. A nationalist insurgency for independence had begun. The Indonesian army and security forces pursued a ruthless campaign against Falinitil. Their strategy was quick and harsh action, which they believed, if carried out thoroughly enough, would completely crush Falin­ til. And the insurgent forces of Falintil were indeed quickly overwhelmed by the large numbers of ably coordinated Indonesian troops. But many ci­ vilians were caught up in waves of indiscriminate killings by Indonesian soldiers. The surviving remnants of Falinitil and large swathes of the popu­ lation were driven into the central areas. By 1976, the Falinitil forces were substantially reduced and splintered into small groups, but the Indonesian forces were unable to totally finish them off. East Timorese resistance con­ tinued. President Suharto was forced to concede in a press conference that Falinitil forces were still in strength ‘here and there’.7 There was a short period of stalemate. Then Indonesian airborne and helicopter-borne forces were landed in the central areas and launched rapid attacks; chemical warfare was waged against Falinitil forces in the heavier forested and jungle areas. The Indonesian army, as part of delib­ erate Indonesian government policy, systematically destroyed food and crops to cripple and wear out the Falinitil forces. This had also resulted in

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the starvation of those civilians fleeing to the central area of subsistence. Detention ‘centres’ were established to corral large numbers of civilians, within which sexual and other kinds of abuse against women suspects and civilians occurred. There were widespread allegations that sexual abuses were being officially sanctioned and used as a weapon of counterinsur­ gency. Still the resistance continued at a low level, and small groups of Falinitil fighters survived – but only just. Throughout 1979 and 1980, a broken and fragmented Falinitil still mounted attacks. Groups still survived in the east, two small groups in the north and central areas, and one group near the capital Dilli. Each group was autonomous in deciding when and where to make attacks. The overall strategy was each group establishing within their area several small mobile units to carry out the attacks, targeting isolated Indonesian convoy and supply lines. A priority was to capture storable food and weapons. Resist­ ance continued.8 In the early and mid-1980s, two military operations pushed further into Falinitil-controlled territory. These military thrusts were accompanied by organised mass shootings in which there was little effort to distinguish in­ nocent civilians from suspected guerrillas. Crowds of civilians were forced to act as human shields by the advancing Indonesian forces and forced to march in front of advancing Indonesian forces as human shields. As a result of these two operations, there were many surrenders by Falinitil troops, but a small but significant amount of fighters escaped. In their escape they were aided by Timorese villagers’ human chain. Resistance continued. By the late 1980, global media attention was focusing upon the situa­ tion. There had been a steady outpour of differing NGO relief reports on conditions among the East Timorese. These specifically made mention of atrocities perpetrated by the Indonesian military. By 1990, the situation be­ came an issue in international relations, with governments taking positions. In January 1990, the United States ambassador to Indonesia met a group of pro-East Timorese demonstrators, and later the Indonesian police vio­ lently dispersed the demonstrators that resulted in fatalities. Witnessed by US diplomats and Australian tourists, news of it reached the two countries and emotions ran high. In 1991, Indonesian troops confronted a peaceful pro-East Timorese demonstration in a cemetery in Dilli. They fired on the crowds and killed over 200. President Clinton of the United States cut US military ties and links with the Indonesian military. The Australian govern­ ment unequivocally condemned the Dilli massacre. Portugal was outraged and urgently raised the whole issue of East Timor with the European Union. International opinion was turning against Indonesian policy in East Timor. By 1991, Indonesia had a new President, President Habibie replacing President Suharto. The latter’s sole response had been a policy of military repression. And for some time Indonesia’s economy had been struggling, which was exacerbated by the 1987 financial crisis. Military operations against East Timor were now forming a heavy burden, haemorrhaging

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much-needed funds. Economic necessity impelled Habibie to look for a compromise for the East Timor insurgency. Under Australian pressure, Ha­ bibie agreed to a referendum in East Timor. The referendum was held under UN supervision in August 1999, with the question on the ballot offering a choice to East Timor between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. Over 78% voted for full independence. As soon as the referendum result became public, pro-Indonesian para­ military groups, tacitly encouraged by the Indonesian military, started a campaign of violence. This may have been motivated by a despairing final attempt to reverse the trend towards independence combined with a doctri­ naire reaction. The violence, deliberately perpetrated by the Indonesian par­ amilitary groups, inflicted over 1,000 deaths and damaged and destroyed homes, irrigation systems, infrastructure, and electricity supplies. Over 250,000 Timorese fled to West Timor. The violence caused global outrage in Australia, Europe, and the United States. The Catholic Church spoke out. Throughout the entire Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church had fearlessly exposed and condemned the excesses of the Indonesian mil­ itary, at the same time carrying out what relief work it could do on the ground (and sending first-hand reports of Indonesian violations of human rights). Immediately, at the start of the paramilitary violence, it called upon the Australian government to send an armed peacekeeping force to East Timor. The Australian government expressed total outrage at Indonesia and liaised with the UN, calling for an international peacekeeping military force to enter East Timor and restore order. US president Clinton was fully sympathetic and pledged logistical and financial support. In September, Clinton went further. He made a clear and unequivocal statement, com­ mitting to suspending any and all further economic aid to Indonesia with immediate effect if Indonesia did not appropriately “handle the situation”. President Habibie indeed “handled the situation”, and quickly. The fol­ lowing day of Clinton’s thinly veiled threat he contacted the UN and – a bitter blow to national sovereignty – committed Indonesia to accepting an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. The UN authorised a peacekeeping force of nearly 10,000 UN troops from 17 countries to be deployed to East Timor. The violence came to an end by late September 1999. From then on, the UN administered East Timor, ensuring a peace­ ful transition to final independence. A constituent assembly was elected in 2001, and a constitution had been drawn up and approved by 2002. Formal independence followed with a head of state being sworn in May. Finally, in September 2002, East Timor joined the UN as a fully sovereign and independent country. Analysis With regard to the first question – when did the insurrection become a national insurgency for independence? – there were long-term factors.

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There was always a strong national identity. This transcended the devas­ tating Indonesian military offensives which constantly damaged and de­ graded Falinitil military strength. The separateness of East Timor was a long tradition, dating back to the times of Dutch–Portuguese possession of the differing west–east halves of the island. When the Portuguese control and sovereignty weakened in the post-1974 period, East Timorese national identity was strengthened. East Timorese identity was further reinforced by its religion, Roman Catholic, within the nation of Indonesia which, within its vast area, had the largest Muslim population on the world. The Catholic Church, conscious of their pastoral role towards the East Timorese, as we have seen, con­ stantly monitored the situation and in doing so discreetly and tacitly sup­ ported the aspirations of the East Timorese for some form of independence. When Indonesian military repression intensified, two overt events openly indicated this support for East Timor as a nation. In 1996, a Timorese Catholic bishop received the Nobel peace prize for efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor, implying mediation between two nations in conflict. Earlier, in 1989, the Pope himself made a visit to East Timor. On arriving, he symbolically kissed a cross and pressed it to the ground, pointedly alluding to the Vatican practice of the Pope of kissing the ground on arriving in a sovereign country. The actual trigger point of the conflict of national independence insur­ gency was the period between 1975 and 1976, when the UDT attempted to stage a coup. Armed resistance against this was met by the Indonesia insist­ ing that the troubles were that of an internal civil war, and this Indonesian insistence in turn was responded to by the November 1975 Falinitil forces’ unilateral declaration of independence that proclaimed East Timor an inde­ pendent, sovereign state. With the Indonesian invasion the following year, the struggle had rapidly escalated into a situation where political stances and positions were replaced by armed conflicts. A national insurgency for either independence or total suppression was under way Regarding any possibility of reconciliation, there was, arguably, a possi­ ble opportunity in 1975, immediately after the Indonesian invasion. While there had been a nationalist declaration of independence by Fretilin, this was recognised by few countries, those with Marxist regimes. Interna­ tional opinion held by countries such as Australia and the United States was largely noncommittal and, with the Cold War at its height, suspicious of any rebellious left-wing nationalist movements. There had indeed been conflicts between Fretilin and the UDT, and if the Indonesian forces had acted more as genuine peacekeepers adopting a neutral impartial stance against both Fretilin and the UDT and less as an invasion force deployed by Indonesia as an opportunity for territorial expansion, the interven­ tion would have been more credible. Also following the invasion if the Indonesian investment into infrastructure and subsistence had been fol­ lowed by more long-term investment, and if the long-term nature of this

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governmental investment been made clearer and more transparent, then possibly support for Fretilin among the East Timorese would have dissi­ pated. This then may have been followed by East Timorese accepting inte­ gration within Indonesia. This can only be speculation, a possibility based upon a possible sequence of different events to what actually occurred. However, if there had ever been a possible opportunity for reconciliation and avoidance of East Timorese unrest becoming and continuing as a na­ tional insurgency for an independent state, it was, and at this one only period, that of late 1975. Conversely, the point of no return, when compromise and reconciliation between the two sides was no longer possible, came in the early 1980s with the two intense military operations by the Indonesian army, pushing further into Falinitil-controlled territory. Militarily, the operations were well-coordinated and carried out operationally efficiently, at times rather too efficiently. The tactics employed by the military, fully sanctioned by the Indonesian government, impacted heavily and excessively on the East Timorese civilian population, many of whom before the operations did not support Fretilin and the national independence cause. Little distinction was made by the Indonesian troops in deploying and engaging against sus­ pected Falinitil fighters and innocent rural village communities. The oper­ ations caused heavy civilian casualties, devastated whole rural areas, and turned many who were not already in support of Falinitil to support, or seek sanctuary with, the Falinitil fighters. The casualties, material damage, and legacy of army atrocities meant any further reconciliation and com­ promise impossible. The early 1980s was a point of no return. It was now a struggle for either total East Timor independence or total quelling of the nationalist insurgency.

Aceh struggles for independence from Indonesia, but reconciliation is achieved The area of Aceh is at the northwest extreme of Sumatra, the western-most island of Indonesia. It is just over 58,000 square kilometres in area; by comparison, modern countries of Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark are, respectively, 30,000, 41,000, 41,000, and 42,000 square kilometres in area. Modern Aceh has a population of 4 million. In the sev­ enteenth and eighteenth centuries, the islands of the Indonesian archipel­ ago, together with those of the Philippines and territories of south East Asia, were under the sway of the Dutch East India Company, backed by the Dutch Republic. These possessions were disputed by the expanding Brit­ ish Empire and at times subject of armed conflict between the two coun­ tries. The Napoleonic Wars saw the Dutch Republic conquered by France, but Dutch overseas possessions were prevented from coming under French sway by Britain. After Napoleon was defeated, the Dutch East Indies pos­ sessions were restored to the Dutch, now a united kingdom of Belgium and

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Holland under King William. However, it was agreed by an Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 that Aceh was not to be claimed by either power and to remain a neutral area. This treaty lapsed in 1873, and the Dutch started to occupy it and recon­ quer. A long struggle ensued whereby Aceh resisted the Dutch re-conquest, which only ceased in 1903. Aceh was once again a Dutch possession, but with many remote areas, it was never fully pacified. During the early decades of the twentieth century, movements for In­ donesian independence from the Dutch grew. One of the principal move­ ments was Sarekat Islam, or the Islamic League. Originally founded by Javanese traders as commercial protectionist organisation against Chinese trade rivals, it switched the focus and target from Chinese traders to Dutch colonialism, and its political objective was Indonesian independence. It produced two able leaders – Sekarmadji Kartosuwiryo and Bung Sukarno. The two individuals were united in the goal of Indonesian independence but had significantly different beliefs. Sukarno’s objective and beliefs were Indonesian independence, while Kartosuwiryo was fully Islamic but also emphasised the egalitarian nature of the struggle, embracing parts of the communist ideology as the model for the future independent Indonesia. Sukarno increasingly looked to the struggle and achievements of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, who successfully established a secular state. For Kar­ tosuwiryo, Ataturk had betrayed what was formerly an Islamic Empire of Greater Turkey. In 1927, Sukarno broke with Kartosuwiryo and founded the Indonesian National Party. This party gained in popular support, resonating with Muslims of Java and the central island of the Indonesian archipelago. Kar­ tosuwiryo kept Sarekat Islam going, though its following declined. The message of Sukarno’s INP was clear and unequivocal; the objective was independence for Indonesia. While Kartosuwiryo’s communication empha­ sised the egalitarian ideology and the Islamic faith, with the nationalist message tending to be at times obscured. During the Second World War, the Dutch were defeated in Europe and, together with Belgium and France, were overran by the German armies in the blitzkrieg campaign of 1940. Germany’s Axis ally Japan expanded and occupied many of the Dutch Southeast Asian possessions, including Indonesia. As part of their occupation strategy, the Japanese, in an ex­ tremely pragmatic policy, encouraged any indigenous and independence movements as potential foes of the Allies. Kartosuwiryo, in an equally pragmatic move, offered the services of his movement to the Japanese in In­ donesia, conveniently putting aside the communist ethos of his movement. The Japanese accepted and gave over arms and training facilities in West Java for his followers. Despite it being so obviously collaborationist, the movement with its Islamic nationalism attracted many of the Sundanese ethnic communities of Java, who were traditionally Muslim and harboured some grievances against the Hindu populations of Java. By the end of the

140 Other Revolts and Insurgencies war, large numbers of potential militant Islamic fighters had been through these training camps. After the Japanese and the Axis powers were defeated, the Dutch were restored to their Southeast Asian possessions, but anti-colonialism and In­ donesian nationalism had taken a firm hold. A war of independence against the Dutch broke out in 1947, led principally by Sukarno’s Indonesian In­ dependence Party and its militant followers, uneasily supported by Karto­ suwiryo’s Islamic movement. Kartosuwiryo’s movement had been renamed Dar-ul-Islam, or Darul Islam, the name embodying the objective of an inde­ pendent state ruled by Islamic Law. Aceh militants were involved in support of the common struggle against the Dutch. The Dutch finally granted independence to Indonesia in December 1949. Immediately Sukarno and his nationalist party and followers abandoned any relations with and refused to engage with Darul Islam. The alliance be­ tween both sides, the IIP and Darul Islam, during the independence strug­ gle against the Dutch was a marriage of convenience, but the nationalists of Sukarno had emerged on top, and were the winning faction, the party in posse. In 1951, Darul Islam, which had constantly denied the nationalists party right of government, started an armed insurrection. It had established cells in West Java and in that province there were widespread riots and shoot­ ings. The uprising spread to South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. In the latter province, the cause of the uprising was less due to religion and more due to dissatisfaction among large numbers of Darul Islam fighters who had steadfastly fought in the independence war but were now unemployed and felt abandoned by the new state. Aceh too joined the Darul Islam uprising. The Acenese, who always regarded themselves as the most extremely pious Muslims of Indonesia, had also fought steadfastly against the Dutch in the war of independence. However, they felt extremely aggrieved with the nationalist government in Jakarta which they felt was distant and high-handed. During the war of independence, they had been led by Daud Beureu’eh, who was Darul Islam commander of the self-proclaimed province of Aceh; with independence, Beureu’eh expected to be confirmed as governor, and the Acenese expected their provincial status to be confirmed. However, the Jakarta government placed Aceh as an area within and under the larger province of North Su­ matra and installed their own appointee as governor of the new larger prov­ inces. More significant, this governor was a devout Christian. In September 1952, the Aceh broke out in open revolt and stated it’s solidarity – in fact a loose alliance – with Darul Islam. The Indonesian army quickly moved in and restored control in the main towns, but the Aceh countryside, with its heavy undergrowth and often dense jungle areas, stayed under rebel control. The insurgencies across Indonesia continued for some years and reached a hiatus with large areas of Indonesia coming under rebel control and the rebel leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi issuing

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a joint series of demands for reforms to the Jakarta government. How­ ever, despite the seriousness of the situation, Sukarno refused point-blank to any form of engagement. Sumatra and Sulawesi formally seceded from Indonesia in 1958 and declared themselves as the revolutionary govern­ ment of Indonesia, the PRRI, in a federation with Darul Islam. This rebel alliance resonated well in rebel leaders’ rhetoric, but in terms of military operations it was ineffective and poorly coordinated. Within six months, the Indonesian army had defeated the PRRI forces. Darul Islam continued its guerrilla war, but by the early 1960s the revolt was over. Kartosuwiryo and a few devoted Darul Islam followers went underground, but time and again surfaced to make an occasional appeal for revolution. The Indonesian army and security forces hunted them down and in mid-1962 an aged and ailing Kartosuwiryo was captured in the deep forests of Bandung. Taken to Jakarta, he was cared for, given medical treatment, and, his physical condition much improved, he was tried, found guilty, and in August 1962 executed by a firing squad. Aceh had supported the insurgency but only on its own terms. Rebel troops in North Sumatra, consisting of large numbers of Christian mili­ tants, arranged a joint attack with Acenese fighters against the provincial capital Medan in early 1958. Plans were laid for a joint offensive, and tim­ ings were finalised. On the date of the attack, the Acenese failed to appear. During the final months of conflict when the PRRI were losing ground and being defeated, Acenese were in discreet bilateral peace talks with the Jakarta government. The negotiations were slow, but hostilities between the Acenese and the government forces all but ceased. As a result of these negotiations – and their unilateral military inactiveness – the Acenese won concessions. In 1959, Aceh was no longer part of the larger province of North Sumatra and given ‘special status’, the equivalent of an autonomous province. A final settlement was reached, and the terms including Aceh’s special status were ratified by the government in Jakarta in 1962. The spe­ cial status afforded to Aceh gave the Aceh government control over educa­ tion, religious policies, and Islamic laws and customs. Since the era of Dutch colonisation, the Acenese were always uneasy in relations with Javanese residents and the near-constant flow of Javanese coming to reside or trade in Aceh. These tensions were small until the 1950s but worsened with independence with an increase in the inflow of Javanese. In the 1970s, the tensions increased causing unease among the more tra­ ditional rural Muslim communities in Aceh. Large gas reserves were dis­ covered in a wide area of Aceh, and modern refineries were established by the Indonesian government, and international investment accelerated modernisation and disruption of what the Acenese saw as their traditional way of living. Seeing an opportunity, one of the leaders of the remnants of Darul Islam, acted swiftly and formed and recruited the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM). It was to gain up to 200 activists, and in attacks

142 Other Revolts and Insurgencies it targeted the perceived cause of Acenese grievances – foreign oil compa­ nies and their executives. Not only were the oil companies disrupting tradi­ tional Aceh lifestyle, but the government in distant Jakarta was taking all the oil revenues and not reinvesting any back into Aceh. The leader of Darul Islam who formed GAM was Hasad Di Tiro, an Indonesian who was a descendant of a famous Indonesian independence militant killed fighting the Dutch in the nineteenth century. Proud of both his Indonesian nationality and as an Acenese he was a qualified scholar, had studied at US universities, and also served in the Indonesian delegation at the UN. He committed to Darul Islam in the 1960s as the “foreign minis­ ter” of Darul Islam for which he was proscribed by the Indonesian govern­ ment. Staying in exile after the failure of the Darul Islam/PRRI insurgency, he returned to Aceh in the early 1970s, committed to Acenese independence and formed GAM. Aceh had gained a formidable and tenacious individual committed to its cause. The GAM campaign of attacks lasted for two years before the Indone­ sian army and security forces fully re-established order and effectively elim­ inated the small GAM forces. di Tiro fled abroad, taking refuge in Sweden. In 1999, an Indonesian parliamentary body, a special parliamentary committee on Aceh, recommended improvements by the government on recognising and maintaining aspects of Aceh society. Their recommenda­ tions included funding and restoring facilities and infrastructure that had been damaged by conflict and investigations into abuses of human rights by the security forces. Also, the recommendations stipulated increased auton­ omy for Aceh. Shortly afterwards, a draft legislation was prepared for sub­ mitting to parliament which would grant measures of increased autonomy. The Indonesian government ignored any and all such recommendations and deployed more troops to Aceh. These troops meted out summary jus­ tice to whole villages in Aceh in retaliation for GAM attacks. GAM was now enjoying rapidly increasing support among the Acenese. GAM stepped up its activities, not only in the military conflict and at­ tacks but also in taking over and forming its own localised government administration. There was little opposition, and most local administrators collaborated or discreetly looked the other way when Aceh officials carried out their functions. Those Indonesian government officials who showed unwillingness or outright refusal to cooperate were abducted, and eventu­ ally, it was made clear to them that if freed they would no longer be part of any administrative body. “War taxes” and “duties” were imposed upon local businesses (some of which pre-empted this by voluntarily giving “do­ nations” which they wilfully insisted for form’s sake that these would be for relief work in conflict areas). Many of populace gave small donations. The total amount raised resulted in a substantial war chest for GAM. In March 2001, the Indonesian Defence Minister deployed more troops to Aceh, and in April 2001, Indonesian President declared a civil emer­ gency in Aceh and issued special instructions to target GAM forces and

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any apparent GAM facilities.9 The Indonesian forces took this instruction and gave it a wider interpretation, killing many civilians in their offensives. The GAM forces resisted fiercely. The conflict continued throughout 2001 and into 2002. More Indonesian troops were drafted, and preparations were made to deploy even more. Meanwhile, the self-styled government of Aceh, in exile in Norway, convened an assembly with GAM members in Stavanger. GAM and the “government,” led by di Tiro, discussed and argued over possible peace agreement. They were later joined by repre­ sentatives of a Swiss-based humanitarian NGO,10 and possible peace terms were formulated. GAM had demanded Indonesian troop withdrawal from Aceh, but this was rejected. However, a peace plan was eventually agreed by both GAM leaders and the Indonesian government in which hostilities were to cease forthwith. Aceh was to be given increased autonomy, rights to hold elections for a provincial assembly with law-making powers, and the establishment of a provincial administration. This was signed by both par­ ties in December 2002. However, GAM did not cease its demands for total independence, and the Indonesian government refused to countenance any move beyond Aceh autonomy. The peace agreement was breaking down. A meeting between GAM leaders and the Indonesian government officials in Tokyo in mid-2003 achieved nothing. Then the Indonesian President declared a six-month period of martial law, and the Indonesian forces launched an offensive. There were now 23,000 Indonesian troops deployed on operations in Aceh. Two developments need to be noted at this stage. First, the Indonesian army had vastly improved its skills in counterinsurgent tactics since the 1970s, especially on account of the experience it gained in handling in­ surgency during its 1950s campaigns. Looking back on the 1950s against Darul Islam, one Indonesian general unfavourably compared Indonesian forces fighting as insurgents against the Dutch occupiers and the Indone­ sian army fighting Darul Islam and observed that “Our armed forces had replaced the Dutch as the conventional military, and Darul Islam had re­ placed as the guerilla army”.11 In the campaign of 1999–2003, they were now far more successful in eliminating insurgent forces. Also they were more ruthless in accepting ci­ vilian casualties. This was due to the second development, the global rise of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, there was now a near-global threat of Islamic extremist terrorism. There had already been a previous jihadi attack in the 2000 Medan Christmas Eve bombing in North Sumatra. After 9/11, there had risen differing al Qaeda-affiliated groups, all active in the first half of the last decade of the twentieth century. In 2002, the Bali bombings had occurred, and Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah groups were active in several parts of Indonesia. Against this threat, the last thing the Indonesian government needed was a prolonged and debilitating separatist guerrilla war in Aceh. This needed to be dealt with ruthlessly and GAM neutralised.

144 Other Revolts and Insurgencies The anti-GAM campaign further intensified. Martial law was relaxed in May 2004, as the Indonesian government was confident that the security situation had been restored. GAM had sustained significant casualties, and their fighters were surrendering in large numbers. They had lost ground, though they were by no means finished. But the Indonesian army and secu­ rity forces, while continuing the fight, were gaining. Then, in December 2004, a new factor completely changed the situation. In that month, a huge tsunami in a series of massive waves devastated parts of South and Southeast Asia. Fourteen countries were seriously impacted, the highest casualties and devastation being wrought on India in the state of Tamil Nadu, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand. Over 227,000 indi­ viduals lost their lives. The highest death toll was in Indonesia, between 130,000 and 167,000 fatalities (confirmed and estimated). Thirty-one thousand of these occurred in the Aceh city of Banda Aceh. The head of the UN Kofi Annan viewed Aceh and stated that it was the worst devastation he had ever seen.12 On 27 December, a spokesperson for GAM declared a ceasefire in or­ der that humanitarian aid could reach survivors. Initially, there were some doubts and uncertainties that a ceasefire would be effective and that there would be cooperation between GAM and the Indonesian army. On 6 January, the Indonesian military reported that soldiers had been attacked while on humanitarian missions, and a section of GAM countered by claiming that the Indonesian military were taking advantage of the situ­ ation. There were reports that 24 hours after the tsunami Indonesian forces had mounted an attack which killed four GAM fighters.13 World attention was focussed, and governments and relief agencies had been stunned by the extent and extremity of the tsunami. Soon the sheer scale of the disaster and tragedy did result in both sides starting dialogues. In January 2005, representatives from GAM and the Indonesian government travelled to Fin­ land and met in Vantaa for talks. The talks were organised and facilitated by an international NGO and chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland. The talks were positive and led to a Memorandum of Understanding, signed in Hel­ sinki on 15 August 2005 by the leader of the Indonesian delegation Hamid Awauluddin and GAM leader Malik Mohmud. In this memorandum, both the Indonesian government and GAM committed to “…a peaceful, com­ prehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all”. This was to be achieved by a democratic process, “…within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia”. Herein lay the key to the success of the talks and of a peaceful settlement – GAM had dropped the demand for an independent Aceh. A joint mission consisting of representatives from the EU and ASEAN formed an Aceh Monitoring Mission to observe and oversee the combat­ ants disengaging and the disarmament process. The Indonesian President

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issued a presidential decree which released 1,400 suspected GAM members from prison and granted amnesty to a further 500 GAM member who had fled into exile. In exchange for GAM abandoning the demand for total independence, the Indonesian government agreed to, and assisted with, the establishment of Aceh-based political parties. The Indonesian government granted increased autonomy of Aceh, including full agreement to the Aceh Government Leg­ islature, that is, law-making powers14 (but the Indonesian government had powers to monitor all aspects of Aceh’s regional administration). It further committed to substantial reconstruction projects in Aceh and agreed that the Aceh government would take 70% of all revenues gained from the nat­ ural resources of Aceh. In terms of restoring peace to Aceh and, most important, the disar­ mament of GAM and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, the Vantaa/ Helsinki peace talks “worked beyond all expectations”.15 Also regarding the reconstruction in Aceh, the Indonesian government, overall, kept its word. By 2006, the economy of Aceh grew by over 7%. The oil and gas revenues did decline later, but the service sector, including financial services and investment, increased. Since the time the agreement came into effect, there was political devel­ opment and progress. Free elections were held in 2009 in Aceh between sev­ eral Aceh-based political parties, and Partei Aceh won, gaining a majority. In 2012, Zani Abdullah, a former GAM leader, in gubernatorial elections, gained a majority for Partei Aceh. The overall situation is by no means perfect. Relations between the Aceh regional government and the Indonesian central government have been marred by issues over certain powers. Issues remain concerning the Indonesian military. While Indonesian combat forces withdrew after the tsunami, and the military participated in the disaster relief operations, over the years there has not been a total withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces; several thousand troops remain deployed on Aceh. The Indonesian government claims that they are Indone­ sian troops stationed on Indonesian territory, just like any other part of In­ donesia; the regional Aceh government questions the motives and purpose of such a large military presence. Also, the Acenese have waited in vain for an official inquiry into any war crimes committed by Indonesian troops in the past conflicts, even though in 2003 a legislation was drafted by the Indonesian parliament to establish such an inquiry. There is also the Indonesian government concern regarding the Aceh gov­ ernment passing extreme forms of Sharia Law and also questioning whether any such laws and punishments should apply to non-Muslim residents. At the time of writing, Malik Mahmud, a former prominent GAM leader, and cosignatory of the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, has voiced repeated concerns over an unfulfilled commitment of the Indonesian gov­ ernment, that of land redistribution in favour of former GAM fighters, and

146 Other Revolts and Insurgencies inconsistencies in regulation and oversight regarding the Indonesian central government and the autonomous Aceh government.16 However, overall, there is peace. Both the Indonesian government and GAM, an insurgent separatist movement engaged in conflict with the pos­ sessing country, found a compromise. Analysis ‘Our’ twin questions are posed – what was the turning point that made vi­ olence and disturbances a part of nationalist insurgency for independence? Was a rapprochement or a compromise possible? In answering the first, it is submitted that there were two turning points. The first was the advent of Hasun di Tiro – able, intellectual, and plau­ sible in his dual pride of being Indonesian and of Aceh, his formation of GAM, and supported by equally able, if more practical colleagues such as Malik Mahmud and Zani Abdullah in the 1970s. The second turning point was that of a missed opportunity by the Indo­ nesian government to defuse the goal of independence and achieve reconcil­ iation. The total and wilful ignoring of the 1999 Indonesian parliamentary recommendations regarding human rights inquiries and, more important, increased powers of autonomy for the Aceh government and the Indonesian government to invest in reconstruction after their successful anti-insurgent campaign and, even more particularly, its renewing the military campaign in 2000, resulting in GAM’s counter by raising funds – generally voluntar­ ily given by the Acenese – thus building a war treasury, and the Indonesian government’s efforts to impose its own de facto administrative structures in Aceh – all of this provoked the Acenese people and helped sustain their struggle for a separate nation. The struggle for either independence or total repression was on and, apparently, past the point of no return. One salient point needs to be mentioned. The early 2000s was the post-9/11 period, and during the whole decade after the 9/11 attacks Indonesia was sub­ jected to attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated or inspired groups. These had grown up – some before 9/11, while others after – and were active and militant in vari­ ous parts of Indonesia. Darul Islam extreme supporters became part of Jemaah Islamiyah. Aceh had always been a staunch and extremely orthodox, devout Islamic province of Indonesia. Yet despite – or because of this – the Free Aceh Movement remained aloof and neither engaged nor was infiltrated by al Qaeda or any of its affiliated groups.17 Free Aceh remained a nationalist insurgency movement with the objective of territorial independence. To the first question regarding a rapprochement, at the very stage when it appeared the national insurgency conflict could only be resolved with victory either to the nationalist insurgents or to the Indonesian government, an overriding event stamped itself on both sides. The sheer devastating – and tragically levelling – effect of the 2004 tsunami and the international reaction resulted in both sides having to cease hostilities. Large numbers

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of GAM fighters were among the large numbers of Aceh fatalities. The Indonesian army and security forces in Aceh suffered significant losses as well. Urgent international relief was committed to by both national govern­ ments and NGOs, but, significantly, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Indonesia not to use any of the military aid which was urgently being provided for relief efforts for counterinsurgency efforts. A senior EU law enforcement officer, after attending a closed security symposium in Asia in which Southeast Asian countries were represented, reported cynically: “…the tsunami decimated GAM, caused heavy losses to Indonesian security forces and international attention is watching the Indonesian government reaction too closely”.18 Unlike the previous struggle by the Indonesian government against East Timor, the struggle with Aceh concerned increased autonomy and/or in­ dependence. Indonesia had, and has, the largest Muslim population in the world; the population of Aceh predominantly practise a particularly strict form of Islam. Therefore, any issues regarding religion turned on how much the common religion to both of Islamic law and customs should prevail. In the struggle with East Timor, with its large Catholic population, the reli­ gious element was a clash of two faiths. In an interview in 2006, Mahmud Malik stated, Aceh had been in a conflict situation, but with the tsunami … we saw indeed that the people of Aceh needed peace. We took this opportunity to pursue peace negotiations … the previous negotiations collapsed but this time everyone was very sympathetic with Aceh. While helping tsu­ nami victims they urged and supported this peace initiative.19 The ‘they’ referred to could equally apply to Indonesian political opinion wishing a compromise and to international governments sending urgent relief. In strategic military terms, Indonesia also needed peace. Its security forces were engaged in antiterrorist duties in various parts of Indonesia. During the period from 2003 to 2005, there were several al Qaeda-affiliated groups active. There had been bomb attacks against one of the international hotels in Jakarta, against the Australian embassy in Jakarta, and a second bomb attack on Bali. Only two months before the tsunami a new Indonesian gov­ ernment had been elected, and after the tsunami they fully realised the need for immediate relief and rapprochement. The new Vice-President, Yusuf Kala, on his own initiative and despite the misgivings of the new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, authorised immediate relief to Aceh. The In­ donesian government fulfilled its side of the Helsinki agreement withdraw­ ing troops and allocating urgent resources in disaster rescue and relief and in investing in reconstruction. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, both sides, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were engaged in a

148 Other Revolts and Insurgencies full-scale conflict. Free Aceh Movement was engaged in a nationalist insur­ gency with the objective of independence; the Indonesian government was engaged in conflict to prevent separatism and maintain Aceh within the ter­ ritory of the Indonesian state. Both sides were immovable in their respective positions and objectives. However, in 2004, an opportunity for cessation of hostilities and possible solution, cataclysmic and tragic, stamped and imposed itself on both sides. Both sides responded, and compromise and reconciliation resulted.

Western Sahara, Morocco, and SADR – conflict and attempts at compromise Within the region of the Western Sahara, currently under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco, there is an ongoing nationalist struggle for self-determination and independence of the self-proclaimed Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, largely consisting of the Sahrawi peoples. The con­ tested region borders and follows parallel to the Atlantic Ocean and covers an area of just over 252,000 square kilometres. The region of the Western Sahara was taken as a protectorate by Spain in 1884. This was the era of European powers expanding their respective em­ pires and overseas territories in the 1880s and 1890s, termed “the Scramble for Africa”. France had had possessions, interests, and investments in North Africa for over 50 years, having conquered Algeria in 1830. In 1904, Spain and France came to an agreement and carved out for themselves parts of Morocco. The Rif rebellion started in 1924 in the Spanish-controlled part of Mo­ rocco but spread to the larger French part and called for freedom from for­ eign domination. Morocco gained independence from France by the Treaty of Fez in 1956. At the same time, Tunis was ceded independence by France. Its third North African possession, the vast country, Algeria, remained firmly under French sovereignty. This despite the movement for Algerian independence gaining full momentum and had escalated since 1954 into an armed conflict, with the militant FLN engaging its fighters against French security forces. In the words of one historian, “Although in retrospect, any further delay in according independence to these two Maghreb territories seemed out of the question in 1956, to do so without doing also the same for Algeria seemed a major strategic error…”. 20 However, in the wider international context of France’s position and sta­ tus, Algeria remaining an integral part of France was near sacrosanct. 21 But France from 1956 onwards was to become increasingly preoccupied with the struggle to retain control in Algeria. French aid, if any, to Spain in the latter’s struggle against the Polisario, was reduced. Soon after Morocco gained its independence, the Moroccan Army of Liberation was formed, with discreet approval and support from certain sections of the Moroccan government. The objective of the MLA was to free the Western Sahara from Spanish control and to unite it with Morocco.

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In 1956, the Moroccan Army of Liberation started what became known as the Ifni War, an attempt to liberate Spanish Western Sahara for Mo­ rocco. The conflict lasted two years and included small amounts of terri­ tory coming under control by fighters from MAL being retaken by Spanish units of paratroops being flown across from the Canary Isles. The whole area was restored under Spanish control by mid-1957, with Spanish forces being assisted by those from France. The Sahrawis gave scant support to the efforts of the Moroccan Army of Liberation, regarding the conflict as yet another struggle between colonial powers. In 1963, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1514 which de­ manded self-determination for Western Sahara. However, the three powers in the region were unwilling to relinquish their claim on the province. In the early 1970s, small numbers of students attending universities in Morocco organised a movement whose long title proclaimed a liberation movement for the areas of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro. Despite some of their leaders travelling extensively, publicising their cause in original and ingenious ways, and pleading their cause passionately, they failed to gain support from any Arab country except Libya. The movement and its leaders then relocated to the Western Sahara, then under Spanish control. This re­ location was followed in May 1973 with the formation, in the comparative safety of Mauretania, of the Polisario Front. Its stated, unequivocal objec­ tive was the expulsion of Spanish colonisation and occupation of Western Sahara by military means. They had planned an armed rebellion. Within a fortnight of the front being formed, small armed actions by Polisario fighters were carried out against small bases of Spanish-sponsored auxil­ iary forces, and in some of the raids arms were seized. Throughout 1974, the conflict escalated with the Polisario continuing their rapid attacks, of­ ten resulting in more weapons being seized, and their support among the populace growing and their cause gaining international publicity. In 1975, the UN addressed the issue. Algeria continued to support, and refugees from the conflict area were given sanctuary over the border in the Algerian province of Tidouf. These camps were administered and controlled by the Polisario Front, liaising with Algerian officials. The tensions between Spain and Morocco increased during the 1960s, and even more so in the 1970s when Morocco, ever pursuing its ideal of “Greater Morocco”, was reportedly fully willing and making initial prepa­ rations to go to war. However, in this era, with the Franco dictatorship declining, and even Portugal undergoing regime change, colonialism itself was declining. In 1975, a UN mission to the region was led by Simon Ake. Ake was a member of the diplomatic service of the Ivory Coast, experienced in inter­ national diplomacy, extremely pragmatic and realistic, and later to become foreign minister of his country. The UN mission officially reported and held that support for independence was “overwhelming” among the Sahrawi people, and the principal force in the country was the Polisario.

150 Other Revolts and Insurgencies In November 1976, the international treaty was signed – namely, the Ma­ drid Accords. The participants were Spain, Morocco, and Mauretania. By this treaty, Spain relinquished its sovereignty and presence in the province of Western Sahara. A period of transition overseen by representatives of all three countries would ensue and then Morocco would possess the north­ ern part of the province, about 65%, while Mauretania would possess the southern remaining part. This treaty was, predictably, bitterly denounced and opposed by the Polisario and also by Algeria. In February 1976, the Polisario started a war, an independence struggle against Mauretania and Morocco. The Polisario Front fighters numbered a maximum of 800, discreetly supported by Algeria. The Polisario Front had formally declared the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Direct confrontation occurred in a series of engagements at Amgala between Polisario forces and Moroccan troops. Algeria was support­ ing the Polisario, discreetly sending arms supplies and military “advisors”. In February 1979, France intervened, attempting a ceasefire. In 1979, the UN once again addressed the issue, and the UN General Assembly issued in November that year Resolution 34/27/ of 1979 which stated directly and unequivocally that it was the “…inalienable rights of the peoples of West­ ern Sahara to self-determination and independence”. In 1979, Mauretania withdrew from any conflict and from any territo­ rial claims, leaving the struggle as one between the Polisario, supported by Algeria, and Morocco. In the 1980s, the actual fighting abated with only occasional flare-ups leading to short military engagements. In the mid­ 1980s, Morocco built and fortified a border barrier “sandwall” or berms. Morocco built the berms slowly, in five phases of construction with bor­ der fortifications dividing the area controlled by the Polisario with the rest of Western Sahara. The wall was formed partly by concrete bunkers and partly by a wall of raised and reinforced sand. There were five more open sectors left so that Moroccan troops could engage in hot pursuit of any Polisario retreating attackers. The wall reduced the war to low-intensity en­ gagements, with the Polisario relying upon sudden and quick short period strikes and small attacks. In the three-year period 1989 to early 1991, Mo­ roccan troops mounted several offensives to try and gain the upper hand. However, by 1991, the situation was effectively at stalemate. Even so, by the time of the 1991 ceasefire at a conservative estimate, the war between the Polisario and Morocco had cost over 10,000 lives. Eventually, in 1991, a ceasefire between the Polisario and Morocco was brokered and held. The territory under the control of the Polisario has a population of just over 30,000. The Polisario made its main base in terms of fighters in the refugee camps of Algeria, with the camp of Tidouf as the main camp. A principal part of the ceasefire agreement was a referendum to be held which would offer the voters the choice of Western Sahara full in­ dependence or full integration within Morocco. This referendum was to

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be arranged and to take place by the end of 1992, and facilitated by the UN-created task force, established in April 1991 by the UN Security Coun­ cil Resolution 690, of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sa­ hara (MINURSO). Two UN teams were established, one on each side of the ceasefire line, and over 200 UN troops, seasoned experts, and police advisors from 19 different countries were deputed to monitor and maintain the ceasefire. The scheduled date for the referendum was stalled and then increasingly and inordinately delayed. During the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, the governing regime in Morocco became more liberal. In 1999, a new monarch, Muhammed VI, came to the Moroccan throne. He was, at least initially, a re­ forming monarch, and, in the early years of his rule, a new family law code was passed giving women more power, recognising their “civic and social equality”. Monarchical powers were transferred to the Prime Minister by which the latter appointed senior civil servants and diplomats, and consti­ tutional legal reforms were enacted ensuring increased independence of the judiciary. These raised the possibility of a more conciliatory approach by Morocco on the issue of Western Sahara. More demonstrations and occasional violent outbreaks occurred in the Moroccan-controlled part of the Western Sahara, to which the Moroccan authorities responded with restraint, while still maintaining their official stance of opposing any form of independence James Baker had been ap­ pointed UN Envoy to the Western Sahara in 1997. Baker was a former US Republican politician, having served as US Secretary to the Treasury and US Secretary of State. He was conscientious and well-meaning and always sought to be impartial between disputing parties in international relations. In 1988, he opposed any possible change of status of the Palestinians, when they issued a declaration of statehood and attempted to change their status within the UN from observer to Palestinian state. On the other hand, a year later, he called on Israel to end its striving for the creation and recognition of ‘greater Israel’ and to cease their policy of advancing settlements in the West Bank, much to Israel’s resentment. Two years later in 1991 at the Madrid peace conference he was the first US Secretary of State to negotiate directly with Palestinians. He applied himself diligently to the whole issue of Western Sahara. In 2000, Baker started formulating a settlement, the whole process be­ coming known as the Baker Plan. His proposed agreement gave Western Sahara autonomy within Morocco. Morocco would retain control over de­ fence, foreign policy, and overall economic policy, and all other powers and responsibilities would be given to the autonomous entity of Western Sahara. The proposed plan was accepted by Morocco but rejected by both the Polisario and Algeria. Accordingly, Baker took time and revised the plan. This time the plan proposed Western Sahara being self-ruling and autonomous under a specially created Western Sahara Authority for a pe­ riod of five years. When this period expired there would be a referendum

152 Other Revolts and Insurgencies on independence. The Polisario and Algeria expressed reservations but for­ mally accepted the plan as a starting point for negotiations. The UN Se­ curity in July 2003 officially endorsed the plan and called upon all parties to implement it. Morocco reacted by rejecting the plan. Its official stance was now that it could not agree to any proposal, plan, or settlement which included independence as an option. Perhaps Moroccan stance had been hardened by events of the previous two months. Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, there had been several largescale terrorist attacks in various locations, emphasising that the current wave of terrorism was a neo-global problem, and Morocco was no excep­ tion. Two months before the UN Security Council endorsed the Baker Plan in 2003, suicide bombers had struck in Casablanca. They had targeted a large hotel, a Jewish cemetery, two restaurants, and the Belgian consulate, and their bombings had killed 34 civilians. (Later, in 2007, Casablanca was to be further subjected to a spate of suicide bombing, three attacks within two months.) The Polisario Front officially condemned the 2003 terrorist attacks and sent a message of condolence to the Kingdom of Morocco. However well-intentioned, Morocco appeared to be in no mood to listen. From the viewpoint of the Kingdom in this era of terror attacks, separatist movements may have been regarded as akin to terrorism. Nonetheless, Baker was clearly and palpably frustrated. The proposed compromise settlement had taken years to formulate, taking into account the concerns of all parties and its primary concern being a permanent peace for the region. The holding of a referendum on independence had been an accepted commitment by the international community for well over a dec­ ade, and still unfulfilled, Morocco was now negating and rejecting any such possibility. Thoroughly frustrated and disappointed, Baker resigned as US Envoy to Western Sahara. Significantly, Baker was the second UN Envoy to Western Sahara to re­ sign. Also significant, he cited the reasons for his resignation as the apparent inability of both sides to be reconciled and the inability or unwillingness of the UN to enforce its various long-standing resolutions. Both the Polis­ ario and Algeria expressed sincere regret at his resignation, but Morocco, through its Foreign Ministry, positively exulted at Baker’s departure. In 2005, violence broke out, regarded by the Sahrawis as an intifada, in parts of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara which resulted in the death of one rioter and over a hundred individuals wounded. In late 2010, there was an outbreak of violence in the Western Sahara over a period of two months when Moroccan forces forcibly dismantled a ‘protest camp’. Sahrawis had erected several thousand tents in the Gdeim Izik area to protest about the low standard of living and harsh social condi­ tions endured by the Sahrawi population living in the Moroccan-controlled part of Western Sahara. The protestors had been peaceful at the start, but clashes occurred later between them and Moroccan security forces. During the violent incidents, and as a result of resistance to the Moroccan forces

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dismantling the tent city and dispersing the protestor, several individuals from the Moroccan security forces and two civilians died. The following year in 2011, more protests broke out in February by Sah­ rawis in Dakhla who were alleging police failure to give protection from gangs of Moroccan youths perpetrating racial attacks on them. The pro­ tests had come to a halt by May. The Sahrawis closely watched the “Arab Spring” in late 2010 and 2011. Encouraged by the fall of Moubarak in Egypt and planned to ally themselves to any protest movements in Mo­ rocco. However, the Moroccan security forces effectively contained any protest movements, and they carried this out without any significant ad­ verse reaction from other countries or international organisations. The “Arab Spring” movement of 2011 did not impact on the situation in West­ ern Sahara. 22 In 2015, the Polisario gained a significant recognition. In June of that year, it formally presented to the Swiss Federal Council a unilateral dec­ laration applying the liberation struggle between the Polisario Front and the Kingdom of Morocco as coming under and being within the 1949 Ge­ neva Convention, and its accompanying Protocol I article 96(3). (Part of the remit of the Swiss Federal Council was to decide upon, and if accepting, deposit and hold such additions of conflicting parties and states to such international protocols and conventions.) Significantly, the Swiss Federal Council accepted this declaration, the first time a nationalist liberation movement engaged in conflict had its declaration accepted. The Swiss Fed­ eral Council informed all relevant states and parties that the declaration had been accepted. In doing so the Switzerland – the giant in the domain of international neutrality and diplomacy – accepted the Polisario as legiti­ mate belligerents engaged in conflict, and international opinion in general, except Morocco, followed suit. In 2016, the long-standing leader of the Polisario Front, Mohamed Ab­ delaziz, died. At this point, there appeared a crossroads facing the Polisario, whether, as favoured by the younger members, to adopt a more aggressive policy involving conflict or to continue with attempting to progress the elusive referendum. But Morocco was appearing to harden its stance. In March of that year, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon made an offi­ cial visit to Sahrawi refugee camps in southern Algeria. During an official announcement, he referred to the 1975 Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara as “the occupation”. Immediately, Morocco reacted with outrage. Large demonstrations occurred in Rabat expressing popular support for the Moroccan government. Morocco expelled the UN civilian mission which had as part of its remit the organising of the long-delayed referen­ dum. Within three weeks of his provocative announcement, Ban Ki Moon attempted to clarify, stating that it was a “misunderstanding”, followed by a UN spokesperson repeating this statement, and who then tried to issue reassurances that no ill intention or offence was intended. In April, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2,285 of 2016 extending the remit

154 Other Revolts and Insurgencies of MINURSO for another year and demanding the return of the civilian mission to the Moroccan side of the ceasefire line. The following year, as was becoming almost routine, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2,351 of 2017 extending the remit of MINURSO for a further year. In 1984, the Organisation for African Unity (the OAU) had given gave formal recognition as a member-state to the SADR, and Morocco with­ drew from the OAU in protest. Only later, in 2017, Morocco re-joined the African Union (formerly the OAU), committing to engage in peaceful reso­ lution of the Western Sahara situation. In 2017, Horst Kohler, then UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara, made an initiative. Kohler, besides being a prominent member of the German political party the CDU, and a former president of Germany, was a distin­ guished international economist. He had been head of the European Bank for Research and Development and head of the International Monetary Fund from 2000 to 2004. In 2017, he was appointed UN special envoy for Western Sahara. He invited the foreign ministers of Morocco and Maureta­ nia and the Head of the Polisario to roundtable talks to be held on neutral territory at Geneva. The meeting was held in late 2018, also attended by the foreign minister of Algeria, the additional presence being demanded by Morocco, who had consistently accused Algeria as supporting the Polisario. By the first week in December 2018, the talks had stalled, but all parties agreed to meet again in 2019. However, in that year, Kohler resigned as UN special envoy to Western Sahara due to ill-health. However, it was a laudable initiative, reviving the all-party negotiating process which had not been in effect for over half a decade. In November 2020, Morocco mounted a major military operation, send­ ing troops into the southern border area of Western Sahara to end the per­ ceived blockade by Polisario supporters. Over a 14-day period in November 2020 clashes occurred. They started with the Moroccan troops on 13 November intervening to disperse a small group of Sahrawi activists forming a human barrier and were al­ leged to be preventing commercial traffic travelling between Morocco and Mauretania. 23 Polisario armed groups retaliated by firing upon Moroccan fortified bases and on two checkpoints along the wall. The following day the Polis­ ario, through an official declaration made in the name of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, declared war on the Kingdom of Morocco, and im­ mediately after this its forces launched artillery fire against Moroccan mil­ itary positions in Guerguerat and in two other small towns. On the 15 November, there was further exchange of fire between Polisario fighters and Moroccan soldiers at several points on the border sand wall. On 18 November, UN observers reported spasmodic Polisario sniper fire directed against several points on the wall. Moroccan soldiers, according to Moroccan authorities, had entered Guer­ guerat to enable them to clear the blockade formed by Polisario supporters

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forming human barriers. This action in the view of the Polisario violated their territory and breached the ceasefire. The SADR claimed any such traffic across SADR territory was illegal. The operation produced heated rhetoric on both sides, the Polisario stating that Morocco had restarted the war, while Morocco accused the Polisario of using women and children civilians to block an internationally agreed overland trade highway. On 19 November 2020, King Mohamed VI spoke directly to the Secretary Gen­ eral of the UN, reaffirming Morocco’s commitment to any ceasefire and a political process. But significantly, Omar Hilale, Morocco ambassador to the UN, in a media interview, 24 stated categorically that “…there is only one solution – large autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty”. In November 2020, the UAE opened a consulate at Dakhla. By this time there were 15 African countries who had established consulates in the Moroccan part of Western Sahara, acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty. With the UAE consulate this was the 16th African country to give recog­ nition. After November 2020, developments on the diplomatic level had been ongoing. In March 2020, Liberia opened a Liberian consulate at the port of Dakhla, in the Moroccan-controlled part of the Western Sahara, thereby diplomatically acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty in the region. In October 2020, Zambia opened a consulate in Western Sahara, escalating the conflict resulting in the Moroccan intervention, and Jordan announced that it would formally open a consulate in the Moroccan-controlled part of Western Sahara. 25 By late 2020, the Polisario appeared to have lost much international support. Of the 84 countries which recognised the SADR in the first decade of the twenty-first century, no less than 44 countries had rescinded this recognition. 26 Analysis The struggle for Western Sahara, or the independent state of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, from 1976 to 2020 can be divided into two periods – one from 1976 to 1991, and the other from 1991 to 2020. In terms of armed conflict, the intense military engagement occurred in the first period. The second period up to 2020 was marked by outbursts of civil disobedience and unrest, assuredly violent but certainly not armed conflict akin to that of the first period. The second period witnessed mainly politi­ cal and diplomatic initiatives and attempts at conciliation and compromise. The compromise has hinged upon the possibilities from “large auton­ omy”, in the expression used by the Moroccan ambassador to the UN, consistently offered by Morocco, with Morocco retaining defence, foreign policy, and fiscal policy (though how the epithet “large autonomy” applied was questioned by the Polisario) to the holding of a referendum with one of the voting options being full independence. In the post-1991 period, there was no shortage of diplomatic initiatives by the UN and pronouncements by other countries. The UN held to the commitment of holding the ceasefire

156 Other Revolts and Insurgencies line and a referendum and passed several Security Council Resolutions on the issue. As at the time of writing, the UN has assumed responsibility for settling the Western Sahara question. It assumed the responsibility based on the premise that Western Sahara is an issue of de-colonisation and that the colony in question should have its future decided upon by its population exercising self-determination through a UN-organised referendum. But the referendum made no progress over 30 years. The UN resolutely renewed the remit of MINURSO, but without any attempt to enforce the implementation of the referendum. In the words of one resentful Sahrawi protestor in 2020, “30 years is long enough to place ballot boxes”. 27 The basic premise for the UN assuming responsibility for the Western Sahara question has effectively been abandoned by the UN, but it continued to attempt to play the role of dispute arbiter. Also, the sincerity of the involved parties was questionable. The pro­ posals by both Morocco and the Polisario and the declared commitments by both sides to continued negotiations were mostly addressed to the UN, to the United States, and to the governments of EU member-states rather than being sent and addressed by one side direct to the other side. This tactic was trenchantly identified as early as 2007 by an international study organisation as the “…proposals have the character of ploys to impress the international gallery rather than opening moves in a sincere negotiation with the historic adversity”. 28 As the twenty-first century entered its second decade, after 2012, both sides may have welcomed turning away from armed conflict and let time work on their reactive sides. For Morocco, with the advance of time, gener­ ations of schoolchildren grew up and had been brought up on the doctrine of the recovery of Western Sahara and that this province was an integral part of the Kingdom. The population of Morocco-controlled part of West­ ern Sahara could be relied upon to settle down, enjoying the economic benefits of being part of Morocco. For the Polisario, it could be viewed as developing from a militant and violent separatist movement to an en­ tity capable of engaging in diplomacy on the international level, fully com­ mitted to peaceful means of conciliation and a referendum. Supported by the UN, they could rely on increasing diplomatic pressure on Morocco to yield ground. But an “inevitable” tide of history can be outgoing as well as incoming. For the Polisaro, as we have seen, diplomatic support for its cause from several nations was slipping away. Some Arab countries, with the passage of time, have recognised Moroccan sovereignty as irreversible. Also its pol­ icy of peaceful means may be under attack from within. There are many Sahrawis in refugee camps in Algeria, and, as experience of Palestinians in Jordan refugee camps has shown, many are docile but more remain angry

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and militant and few, if any, accept that these camps are their permanent home. Also while some Sahrawis in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara have settled down in the region, a new militant generation has grown up, turning away from the Polisario policy of negotiation and a solution by peaceful means. When the 2020 outbreak of violence occurred, one of the “Young Turks” of the Polisario stated publicly, “The end of the war is now linked to the end of the illegal occupation” while another stated, “for more than 30 years we have never lowered our guard”. 29 For Morocco, whatever the above advantages of letting time pass, there is an economic cost. The Moroccan economy is relatively sta­ ble, but there is a wide disparity of wealth and income gap, and youth unemployment is over 40%. Civil servants working on the Moroccocontrolled part of Western Sahara have a higher salary and allowances as an incentive to be located and to work there. Business enterprises enjoy tax breaks to pirate there. In 2019 military expenditure increased the 2020 defence budget, rising by 30% over the 2019 defence budget. A defence and security publication stated “…the threat posed by the prospect of prolonged insurgency in the Western Sahara region makes it imperative for Morocco to allocate substantial expenditure to counterterrorism and counter insurgency efforts”. 30 Perhaps time is not such a reliable ally to either the Polisario or to Morocco. The insurgency of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, lasting over 30 years, 31 may serve as an example of a nationalist struggle for independence as having had the armed conflict phase deescalated into faltering attempts for conciliation and compromise.

Catalonia 2017 – peaceful insurgency, but uncompromising Catalonia has a long tradition as an independent state during the Medieval era and as a successful trading and entrepreneurial region of the Iberian Peninsula and as part of Spain. Situated over 30,000 square kilometres in the north-eastern part of Spain with a population of between 7 and 8 mil­ lion, it has a history of independence aspirations. In the thirteenth century, as an independent kingdom among several independent kingdoms within the Iberian Peninsula, Catalonia was a formidable trading nation, look­ ing and expanding east into the lucrative Mediterranean markets. In the post-4th Crusade period, with the splintering of the Byzantine Empire by the Western Catholic powers, Catalonia acquired briefly the Duchy of Ath­ ens, 32 expanding her territory and trading reach as far as the Aegean Sea. In the following century, Catalonia became part of the Kingdom of Aragon. Catalonia was integrated into Aragon under King Juan II, but only after a short war in the 1460s. The Catalans, ever zealous for their independ­ ence, were supported by the Duke of Lorraine, who was tacitly encouraged

158 Other Revolts and Insurgencies by Louis XI of France. However, the Catalan resistance was overcome by 1470. The Catalan leaders finally surrendered in October 1472, giving up the capital Barcelona. Juan II granted them and their forces lenient terms in exchange for their oath of future loyalty to the Kingdom of Aragon. Aragon in the fifteenth century was a part of the dual Kingdom of Castile and Aragon, with Ferdinand of Aragon having married Queen Isabella of Castile. This dual Kingdom was eventually to absorb the other territories of the Iberian Peninsula and become the Kingdom of Spain. The new kingdom expanded its possessions but, while maintaining territories in the Medi­ terranean in Milan and Naples in Italy, looked more westward to central and south America, where the silver mines provided the much-needed rev­ enue. However, Catalonia retained its own identity and to some extent its government. The Castile-Aragon had two parliaments or Cortes, those of Castile and Aragon; the Cortes of Aragon was divided into three separate bodies, those of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. When the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, head of a massive Hapsburg Empire with territories in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Americas, requested revenues from his Spanish territories in 1518, he was obliged to petition the separate Cortes of Castile, Aragon, and Catalonia. The Catalan Cortes, held in Barcelona, granted him 100,000 ducats.33 With the death of Charles V, the Spanish and Austrian branches of the Hapsburg family divided. Spain and Austria, which dominated the Holy Roman Empire, became separate European powers. Within Spain, there was a strong feeling of Catalan identity and Catalonia enjoyed some form of autonomy with its own parliament which, as we have seen, had to be consulted by the ruler for grants of finances. The immediate cause which resulted in hostilities was economic. With the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, Spain allied itself to Catholic Austria and the Holy Roman Empire. The King of Spain, Philip IV, had a strong sense of Spain’s imperial mis­ sion and longed to restore the greatness of the Spanish Empire and counter the spread of Protestantism in Europe. However, the conflict, as always, drained the financial resources of Spain. The First Minister, Olivares, con­ scientious, hard-working and fair-minded, saw the necessity of reforming the current situation by which the burden of raising both monies and man­ power for the army fell excessively on Castile. To rectify this, he proposed raising more revenues from all parts of Spain and the Empire to contribute to the Treasury. Olivares implemented the Union of Arms to ensure more equitable ar­ rangements for all parts of the Spanish Empire. Under its provisions, Portugal and Catalonia would each furnish and pay for 16,000 troops. Immediately, the Union of Arms was opposed by regional Cortes or par­ lements, although Valencia and Aragon did eventually undertake to make regular contributions. However, the Catalonian parliament, the Diputac­ ion, proud of its traditional and long-established rights and service to the province, rejected the Union of Arms. Two successive Viceroys of Catalonia

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were each tasked in turn by King Philip to resolve the situation. By their tactlessness and perceived high-handedness and lack of respect to Cata­ lonian customs, both failed in either raising contributions or in calming the situation. Catalonian national feelings and pride had been aroused to violent levels. By 1635, Spain was at war with France, as part of the complex and chang­ ing alignments of the ongoing XXX Years War and France invaded Cata­ lonia in order to conquer two of its border counties. Olivares sent Spanish troops to Catalonia. In 1640, the Spanish troops were ordered to remain in Catalonia for the foreseeable future in order to reengage the French dur­ ing the next campaigning season the following year. Tensions mounted between the Catalan nobility and gentry, with the Catalan agricultural workers on the one side, and the Castilian troops based and billeted in Cat­ alonia on the other. These tensions finally boiled over into an insurrection whereby armed Catalonian mobs invaded Barcelona. Barcelona quickly came under the control of the insurgents, and other towns were equally quickly subdued or suborned and almost the entire province was in armed revolt. At this stage, there was unease among the Catalonian nobles about the excesses of the armed mobs, but the insurgency still held together and was unstoppable. The leaders of the various Catalan insurgent forces de­ clared an independent republic. They appealed to and placed themselves and the republic under the protection of France. By 1645, Catalonia was entirely under French control. However, the Catalans chafed under French rule, and the Catalan nobility were expressing open dissatisfaction with the French occupation and the excesses of the Catalan rebels. Among the rebels were egalitarian and quasi-anarchic elements whose schemes were involving land and wealth redistribution, alarming the nobles and wealth­ ier citizens of the rebels. The dissatisfaction with French rule by the Catalan nobility and mer­ chants grew, and by 1650 they were openly preferring and advocating a return to Spanish rule. In 1651, Philip IV sent one of his commanders, Don Juan of Austria, to recover Catalonia by force. His Spanish troops on crossing the border into Catalonia were received with little hostility and soon approached Barcelona, which was besieged. Barcelona surrendered in 1652. Catalonia reconciled itself to Spanish rule, having had some of its provincial rights and privileges restored. France had withdrawn its troops and agreed to a peace settlement with Spain in which some parts of the border territory were ceded to France. Economic pressure and Spanish government tactlessness at approach­ ing the situation ensured the outbreak of the Catalan insurgency. The in­ surgents’ mistake of appealing to and placing themselves under a foreign power ensured the end of the insurgency. In the early part of the eighteenth century, Europe was faced with the issue of the successor to Charles II of Spain. Spain was an empire in de­ cline but still had substantial possessions. Rulers of Europe attempted an

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equitable partition. However, Charles II, partly out of justified anger at other countries’ intervention and partly out of future strategic considera­ tions for Spain, bequeathed his succession to France. Louis XIV, realising that France and Spain being ruled by the same royal family would be un­ acceptable to most of Europe, hesitated, and then accepted on behalf of his grandson. Accordingly, this individual became Philip V. This had triggered hostilities across Europe – Bourbon France and Bourbon Spain fighting England, the Dutch Republic, Portugal, and the Holy Roman Empire. The last being ruled by Hapsburg Austria who wished Spain to remain Haps­ burg and claimed the succession for its own candidate, Charles. The con­ flict ranged from Spain, the Netherlands, and Central Europe and lasted until 1713, when a peace of exhaustion was arranged by the Treaty of Utre­ cht whereby, as far as Spain was concerned, Philip V retained his throne, with the stipulation that he renounce for him and his heirs any succession rights to the throne of France and that France and Spain were never to be ruled by the same individual. Spanish possessions in Italy were transferred to Austrian Hapsburg rule, as were the Spanish Netherlands. During the long struggle, Philip’s main Spanish supporters were from Castile. He was also supported by Aragon and Valencia and the Spanish territories in Naples and Northern Italy, However, Catalonia unequivocally supported the Hapsburg Charles and during the conflict in Spain itself was supported by English military forces. After the general peace of Utrecht in 1713, Catalonia fought on alone, still opposing Philip V’s succession to the Spanish throne. However, the Catalan resistance was broken by pro-Philip Spanish troops from Naples and French troops besieging Barcelona which held out until late 1714. The date of the surrender of Barcelona, 11 Septem­ ber 1714, was to become, centuries later, a sacred date to Catalan national­ ists and the day itself marked by massive demonstrations for independence. (Centuries later, September 11 was to become another historic anniversary, though marked with tragic remembrance, not strident pride.) When the defenders of Barcelona surrendered to the French besiegers, they were given honorary terms by the besieging French forces, guarantee­ ing their lives and freedom to depart where they could. However, Philip V understandably was not so forgiving and was determined to restore royal authority. He carefully and thoroughly dismantled and disbanded many political institutions of several of the provinces, and particular baleful at­ tention was given to Catalonia. The Catalan Generalitat was abolished, and Catalan autonomy was nullified and Catalonia during his reign was increasingly brought under the central government in Madrid. 34 In August 1931, the government of the Republic of Spain, by the Catalan Statute, granted Catalonia autonomy: “at long last, in the Catalan Statute, Catalonia found a settlement that satisfied her and which turned her into a stronghold of the Republic”. 35 The Catalonian Generalitat was restored, with powers in the areas of finance, social legislation, public order, and law enforcement albeit some

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areas were ill-defined as to overlap between Generalitat and central gov­ ernment authority. In the mid-twentieth century, Spain was convulsed by political upheaval which ultimately led in the mid-1930s to civil war between the right-wing Nationalist forces rising in rebellion against the Republican government. In the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, many of Catalan industries and business enterprises were taken over by the various socialist and left-wing groups. Collectives of varying sizes and composition were formed. How­ ever, foreign investors and local business interests were reassured by the efficiency and pragmatic approach of the way the industries and enterprises continued to run and by the way business economic criteria were strictly applied.36 Modernisation was not reversed, and, although there was con­ siderable disruption and hindrance due to the conflict, Catalonian industry became one of the mainstays of the Spanish Republic during its struggle in the Civil War. Catalonian militancy also was a principal driving force con­ tinuing the Republican struggle, and indeed Catalonia was one of the last regions to fall to Franco’s nationalist forces. After the death of Franco, during Spain’s return to democracy, the Cat­ alans gained some autonomy. In the early years in the post-Franco era, relaxing the central government authoritarianism in the various regions was one of the main issues. In 1977, the people of Catalonia voted for au­ tonomy, and the Statute of Autonomy in 1979 enacted this. By the statute, the government of Catalonia had complete powers within Catalonia, over transport, policies on commerce and environment, its own police and law enforcement agencies, and the administration of civil law. It shared with the central government of Spain responsibilities for public health and educa­ tion. The historic Generalitat was restored, ensuring Catalonia had its own parliament, a president as head of government, and a governing executive council. Catalan politics were dominated by the centre-right party Con­ vergence. This was led by Jordi Pujol. Pujol, trained as a medical physician but from his youth was an active, fervent Catalan nationalist. He had been arrested and detained during demonstrations against the Franco regime. He founded Convergence coalition in 1974, and for decades led the Catalan government. From 1980 to 2003, Convergence won the Catalan elections. The main tenet of Convergence was that of conservative nationalism. This held that Catalonia was a separate nation and should exist as an auton­ omous entity within a federal Spain. In the 1980s, this was an effective policy. Breakaway or separatist movements were not politically favourable, with the ongoing terrorist violence of the Basque separatist organisation, ETA. Despite ETA experiencing divisions within itself, most factions still engaged in terrorism.37 By contrast, the Catalonian peaceful way to in­ creased autonomy was far more politically effective. As one contemporary political journalist writing on the Catalonia issue pointed out, “The year that Pujol took charge of Catalonia – 1980 – was the year ETA killed the most people in Spain”.38

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Pujol was not only a strong Catalan nationalist but also a pragmatic politician. (Also, he was apparently a skilful financier. Some years after he left office, several alleged financial scandals appeared concerning his private wealth.) His skill in politics revealed itself in that his CDU party, one of the two parties in the Convergence party coalition, won the Catalan elections in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1999. He stepped down and re­ tired as leader of the CDU party after his last victory. He was succeeded as CDU party leader by Artur Mas, a trained economist with liberal economic views and a former Minister for Economic Affairs in the Catalan govern­ ment. Mas proved not as successful in political manoeuvring as Pujol; his party, the CDU, gained the majority of votes in both the 2003 and 2006 Catalan elections, but it is the Socialist Party that gained power having gained the support of other parties. It was not until 2010 that Mas’ CDU won the Catalan elections and gained power. However, by 2010, the post-2007 global financial crisis had impacted upon Spain. A property collapse and banking crises occurred, and Mas, as the head of the Catalan government, had to pursue budget cuts and eco­ nomic austerity, just as the rest of Spain was undergoing. Mas’ government, inevitably, suffered unpopularity among large sections of the Catalan population due to the implementation of austerity meas­ ures, accompanied by hostility against the central Spanish government. Also in 2010, the year Mas took office, there occurred what was widely perceived as Spanish central government interference. During the period of the Socialist government in Catalonia in 2006, the Catalan government attempted to gain more autonomy by a new Statute of Autonomy. However, in 2010, parts of this legislation were declared invalid by the Constitu­ tional Court of Spain. The Constitutional Court nullified the section of the preamble which described Catalonia as a nation, and within the statute it nullified the sections which gave increased judicial independence to Cata­ lonia and stipulations on the minimum amount of state expenditure within Catalonia. The Constitutional Court only nullified parts of the Statute of Autonomy, but its very intervention caused popular resentment and anger in Catalonia. With the austerity measures impacting, and the central government in Spain appearing to be constantly interfering, many Catalans saw independ­ ence as a better economic option. Independence would somehow lead to im­ provement of the financial crisis situation. This hostility manifested itself in the 2012 large-scale demonstrations on the annual Catalan remembrance ceremony of the 11 September surrender of Barcelona. Mas, conscious of his government’s increasing loss of popularity, seized an opportunity. On 12 September 2012, Mas publicly demanded from the central government in Madrid increased fiscal powers and autonomy for Catalonia. He then publicly promised to the population of Catalonia that if the Spanish gov­ ernment refused his demand then he would take Catalonia out of Spain. He referred to Spain coming from dictatorship to democracy and ended

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with the ominous statement – “Spain made its transition – and now it is our turn”. In 2013, two of the main political parties in Catalonia came to an agree­ ment over Catalonian sovereignty and issued an official declaration with the long title – but with the objective clearly shown – “Declaration of Sov­ ereignty and of the Right to Decide of the Catalan People”. This declaration was officially endorsed and passed by the Catalonian parliament on early 2013 which held that the Catalan people had the right to decide their own political future. The Spanish government in Madrid appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court considered the matter and ruled that the declaration itself was unconsti­ tutional but did not strike down or reject the ‘right to decide’ as this did not automatically imply or mean self-determination or sovereignty. Massive demonstrations had occurred in Catalonia. Encouraged by this develop­ ment, four political parties came together and all agreed to hold a referen­ dum, scheduling it for November 2014. The referendum was to pose the binary questions whether Catalonia should be a state entity and whether such an entity should be independent. To circumvent the ruling of the Con­ stitutional Court, the Catalan government gave the referendum the official name of “citizens participation process”, supervised by citizens as opposed to using official electoral officials. The Spanish government made an appeal to the Constitutional Court which deliberated the issue and ordered the “process” suspended pending its ruling. Defying the Constitutional Court, the Catalan government held the vote. This gave an ambivalent result of over 80% for independence, but based on a voter turnout of only 42%. The Spanish government brought criminal charges against Catalan leaders and the organisers of the referendum for being in contravention of the Consti­ tutional Court’s order. The beginning of 2015 saw political bickering among the various po­ litical parties in Catalonia, but by mid-2015 two of the major parties had formed an coalition, ‘Junts pel Si’ (Together for Yes) in order to fight the general election later that year. In September, the election within Catalonia took place, and the coalition won a majority of seats in the parliament gain­ ing 48% of the total vote. Two months later, the Catalan Parliament passed a resolution, officially declaring that the process of holding an independent referendum had started. In response, the Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy made a public speech pledging to uphold the unity and sovereignty of Spain and stated that any means would be used and further stating that he did not rule out mili­ tary intervention. In early 2016, a reshuffle within the coalescing parties of Junts pel Si resulted in Carlos Puigdemont becoming President of the Catalan government. Puigdemont was from a Catalan family traditionally supporting and pledging independence for Catalonia. Extremely articu­ late and skilled in writing, he had an experienced career in journalism be­ fore entering Catalan politics. He became in 2019 an MEP for the region.

164 Other Revolts and Insurgencies On assuming office as president, he underwent the swearing-in ceremony and, significantly, he omitted the oath of loyalty to the King of Spain and the Spanish Constitution. On the 11 September, the Catalan day, in 2016, there were massive demonstrations in Barcelona in favour of independence. The following year Puigdemont and his government gave assurances to the Catalan populace that a referendum would take place later in the year. Arrangements were made to hold the referendum in October, timed to exploit the popular out­ pouring of pro-independence demonstrations of the previous month on Catalan national day. The Spanish government warned that any such ref­ erendum would be both unconstitutional and illegal. Arrangements were made by the Catalan authorities supplemented by vol­ unteers. Ad hoc polling centres were set up, and ballot papers were printed and distributed or even sent widespread online. On 1 October 2017, the polling stations were opened. Tensions within Catalonia had increased and troops and paramilitary police were deployed in Barcelona to separated pro- and anti-independence groups. During the actual “voting” units from the Spanish National Police raided several polling stations, seizing ballot papers and boxes, closing the centres in attempts to disrupt the unofficial referendum. (The Catalonian police adopted a less aggressive approach. Later, the government in Madrid raised allegations of collusion with the illegal election by some Catalonian police officers.) The police used consid­ erable violence which was covered by the international press and the images of violence went viral and on many media broadcasting networks. During the weeks following the unofficial referendum, there were mass demonstrations in Barcelona for both independence and for remaining within Spain. Amidst the demonstrations and the atmosphere of tension and uncertainty, two of the Spain’s largest banks, Sabadell and Caixa Bank, stated that they would relocate their establishments from Catalonia to another region of Spain. The Catalan authorities claimed there had been a 90% vote in favour of independence, but this was from a reported turnout of 43%.39 The reaction from Madrid was swift and clear; Prime Minister Rajoy repeated his dec­ laration that the election was illegal and invalid. At the end of the month, the Catalan parliament voted by clear majority to declare independence. The Catalan government issued a Declaration of Independence of Cata­ lonia. On the same day, the Senate of Spain authorised Rajoy to activate an article in the Spanish Constitution which suspended the government of regions and re-imposed direct rule by the central government in Madrid. Immediately, the same day, 27 October, Prime Minister Rajoy dismissed the Catalan government and ordered fresh regional government elections to take place the following month. Large-scale demonstrations both for and against independence contin­ ued in various parts of Catalonia. On 30 October, the Spanish Attorney General officially laid criminal charges against Puigdemont and five other

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ministers of the former Catalan government. Earlier in the day, Puigdemont and others had fled Catalonia and took refuge in Belgium. Belgium gave sanctuary to Puigdemont and his associates, but by no means condoned the independence declaration. Nor did any other coun­ try. The international responses to the Catalan declaration of independ­ ence were uniformly negative, refusing recognition. The President of the European Commission stated that nothing changed and Spain was the sole interlocutor. The President of the EU Parliament stated that the Catalan Declaration of Independence was a breach of the rule of law in that it con­ travened the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the Spanish Constitution, and the legal framework of the European Union.40 France refused to recognise Catalonia. Germany, although Chancellor Merkel was reported to have se­ rious misgivings about the violence used by Spanish police to suppress the illegal referendum,41 was equally categorical in refusing to recognise Cata­ lonian independence. The United States tersely affirmed Catalonia to be an integral part of Spain, as did the United Kingdom, while both Russia and China stated that the Catalonia was a Spanish domestic issue. During these 2017 official elections, the combined parties supporting Catalan secession won a narrow majority. In May the following year, there were elections for Catalan president. Of the candidates for president, one of them was a former minister under Puigdemont, the other a principal leader of the Catalan independence movement. The Spanish government inter­ vened, declaring these two pro-independence candidates invalid. The new President was Quim Torra. He graduated in law from Barcelona and then pursued a successful career in corporate law before entering politics. Prag­ matic and careful, he was nonetheless a committed Catalan nationalist. Following elections of May 2018, Quim Torra selected his cabinet for the government of Catalonia. He included four ministers from the previous gov­ ernment; these former ministers were either detained by Spanish authorities on charges of misuse of public funds and rebellion, or had fled and were in exile. The Spanish government promptly intervened, rejected the cabinet and imposed direct rule. To avoid further confrontation – and a potentially indefinite period of Madrid direct rule – Torra appointed a new government whose cabinet excluded previous contentious ministerial choices. It was not the end of Torra’s controversial acts. Already he had written several articles highly critical of Spanish government policy towards Cat­ alonia and its aspirations to self-determination. The vehemence and the vitriolic nature of the language used and terms employed in these articles had been criticised by two party groups within the European Parliament.42 In December 2018, Torra organised a 48-hour fast in solidarity with four Catalonian separatist politicians who, imprisoned, were on a hunger-strike. He also allowed Catalonian independence banners and placards and large logos to be displayed on public buildings in Catalonia. In December 2019, Torra was disqualified from holding public office for 18 months by the High Court of Catalonia and fined 30,000 Euros for

166 Other Revolts and Insurgencies refusing to remove the pro-Catalan banners and logos from the Generali­ tat, as ordered by the Spanish agency which oversaw electoral impartiality. Torra appealed and fought the judgement, but in September 2020 the Su­ preme Court of Spain upheld this judgement. The Secretary of the Catalan parliament had already deprived Torra’s status as a member of the legisla­ ture. Torra had appealed to the leader of the ERC party and Speaker of the Generalitat, Roger Torrant, but the latter refused to intervene. Meanwhile Puigdemont in self-imposed exile in Belgium had been pre­ vented from being appointed Catalan leader by the Catalan parliament. He announced the formation of a Catalan government in exile. This body was to be known as “the Council of the Republic”. He travelled in several parts of Europe attempting to gain some form of official recognition. On return­ ing from one of his “missions” travelling through Germany in March 2018 he was stopped at the border and arrested under the terms of a European Arrest Warrant. Spain had issued this, charging him with rebellion and misuse of public funds. The Lander Court in the German state where he had been arrested ruled that no extradition to Spain would take place for rebellion but would still deliberate on the charges of misusing public funds, and he was bailed pending this decision. The Lander Court finally ruled that extradition on this charge was valid, but Spain eventually withdrew its arrest warrant. Perhaps they preferred Puigdemont out of the country rather than hauling him back for comparatively lesser charges and giving Catalonian separatism yet more publicity. In mid-2019, Puigdemont was a distant candidate to be a Spanish Member of the European Parliament in the European Union elections of that year. He was elected, but he did not attend at Madrid the mandatory service of observance of the Spanish Constitution and therefore was not awarded the certificate as a Member of the European Parliament. He was informed by the European Parliament that he could not attend or speak at the European Parliament as an MEP. However, in December 2019, the European Court of Justice ruled that he could take his seat and role as an MEP. Spain remained unforgiving. In January 2020, the Spanish Supreme Court made formal application to nullify the immunity of Puigdemont and his fellow MEP Toni Comin from extradition and prosecution for the al­ leged offences under Spanish criminal law relating to the unofficial referen­ dum of 2016. Analysis The situation became more intense from 2010 onwards due to the impact of the financial crisis and the intervention by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Arguably the situation could have been deescalated after Mas’ op­ portunist seizing of the emotional moment the day after the 2012 Catalan national day by demanding more fiscal autonomy from the Madrid govern­ ment. The government of Rajoy, beset by the massive Spanish debt and the

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necessity of an EU bail-out, refused point-blank. Had Rajoy shown more sympathy and willingness to dialogue and negotiate, and even grant some small measures of fiscal autonomy, the situation may possibly have been rendered less volatile. In contrast to previous attempts at gaining independence, the unilateral attempt of 2017 gained no international backing. One of the four factors for nationalist insurgencies to succeed to gaining independence is international events being favourable to and successfully exploited by the insurgents.43 In the issue of the Catalan attempt at independence in 2016, there was a com­ plete lack of international recognition or support for Catalonia. Also, one of the other factors for a successful insurgency, that of adequate financial resources, appeared to be jeopardised by the 2017 referendum. As we have seen, some large financial establishments made contingency plans to relo­ cate, and foreign investors became nervous about the escalating situation. At the time of writing, the Catalan independence movement appears to have seriously stalled. The momentum since 2017 appeared to have been lost, and Spain’s ruthless pursuit of filing criminal charges against those involved in the unofficial referendum, and forcing important leaders into exile, may have damaged the movement’s strength, although it could be argued such ruthlessness created sympathy for pursued leaders and their cause, being seen as underdogs sincerely striving for a form of self-determination. Also for the Catalan separatist movement there was a sharp decline in attention given to and preoccupation with political issues, understandably with the onset and increasing impact of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. All of Spain was affected, and Catalonia suffered high fatality tolls, and the social and economic im­ pacts of restricted movement drastically reduced services and commercial and retail activity as the Spanish government, like all governments, desper­ ately tried various countermeasures in attempts to reduce the pandemic. Also the separatist movement, hindered by some leaders being abroad in exile, revealed significant divisions. Roger Torrent, the leader of the Cata­ lan Republican-Left Party (ERC), while generally in favour of Catalan selfdetermination, preferred a more “realistic” and inclusive approach which involved dialogue and agreement if possible with the Spanish government. He and the ERC disagreed with confrontational approach of Puigdemont and Torra and the Together for Catalonia party. Their rivalry hindered any progress towards independence, splitting support of the pro-independence sections of the Catalan populace. Also Puigdemont, ever full of intense energy while in exile, formed a new coalition party replacing Convergence. This was the coalition of three parties into the Catalan European Demo­ cratic Party, with the logo “Together with Catalonia”. However, during the period June–July 2020, heated political disputes broke out, partly as a result of Puigdemont’s leadership and partly through fears that the coali­ tion was sliding too far to the left. Puigdemont broke away with a splinter group. Both sides insisted that the logo and general names “Together with Catalonia” was theirs. Internal fighting continued.

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Perhaps Catalonia is an example of an entity which has a long and proud tradition and sense of its own identity, with several periods throughout history of enjoying varying degrees of autonomy, but for which autonomy appears never enough, yet enough support for independence falls short.

Notes 1 MC Ricklefs A History of Modern Indonesia since 1300 p 167 2 P Thompson The Battle for Singapore – The True Story of the Greatest Catastrophe of World War II p 39 3 A Vickers A History of Indonesia p 86 4 A Vickers A History of Indonesia p 91 5 A Vickers, in his A History of Indonesia p 95 cites a possible figure of death by starvation on Java alone as 2.4. million individuals 6 By the various agreements between the Dutch and Republicans, both sides agreed to draw a line on any potential atrocities or war crimes that had oc­ curred during the conflicts. It was agreed either side would seek extradition of suspected individual combatants. It was held that the Dutch officer who had at­ tempted the Bandang–Jakarta coup was covered by this. He fled, made his way back to Europe, entered the Netherlands via Belgium, and eventually settled down in Amsterdam, owning a bookshop for antique books 7 “Indonesia admits Falinitil still alive” The Times 26/8/1976 8 For a detailed account of the military struggle during this period, see N Ridley Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative In­ surgencies, chapter 9 ‘Later Twentieth and Twenty First Century Revolts and Insurgencies’ pp 138–145 9 Presidential Instruction No 11 April 2001 10 The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 11 Cited in K Conboy The Second Front – Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network pp 5–6 12 “Annan shocked by Aceh destruction” BBC World News 7/1/2004 13 “Crisis profile – Deadlock in Indonesia’s Aceh conflict” Reuters AlertNet 30/8/2005 found on http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/thefacts/ reliefresources/111997187760.htm 14 Law on the government of Aceh, Law No. 11 of 2006 15 International Crisis Group “Aceh, so far, so good” ICG Briefing No. 44 13/12/2005 16 MI Gorbiano “Former GAM official demands improvement in Aceh 15 years after Helsinki MOU” Jakarta Post 13/2/2020 found on https://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/13/ex-gam-official-demands-improvement-in­ aceh-15-years-after-helsinki-mou.html 17 R Gunaratna Inside al Qaeda – Global Network of Terror p 201 18 Confidential source EU senior law enforcement officer early 2005 19 Interview with Jakarta Post 28/5/2006 20 A Horne A Savage War of Peace p 130. 21 N Ridley in Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies, Part III, Algeria, gives an analysis of why Algeria remained firmly under French sovereignty 22 C Lynch “Preventing the Arab Spring from reaching Western Sahara” For­ eign Policy 20/4/2011 found on https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/20/ turtleleaks-preventing-the-arab-spring-from-reaching-western-sahara/

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23 “Moroccan troops launch operation in Western Sahara border zone” Aljazeera News 13/11/2020 found on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/ morocco-launches-operation-in-western-sahara-border-zone 24 Interview with CNN News shown 17:20 hrs CET 20/11/2020 25 “Jordan plans consulate in Western Sahara amid flare-up” al Monitor 20/11/2020 found on https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/ jordan-western-sahara-morocco-uae-consulate-polisario-rabat.html 26 A Popociciu “The failed diplomacy between Morocco and Polisario” Al­ jazeera News Conflict 18/11/2020 found on https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2020/11/18/the-failed-diplomacy-between-morocco-and-polisario 27 MR Martinez and O Crowcroft “Western Sahara – who are the Polisa­ rio Front? and what do they want” Euronews 17/11/20 found on https:// w w w.eu rone w s . com / 2 02 0 / 11 / 17/ we s t er n- s a h a ra-who - a re - t he - t he ­ polisario-front-and-what-do-they-want 28 ICG “Western Sahara – out of the impasse” International Crisis Group Report No. 66 11/6/200 29 MR Martinez and O Crowcroft “Western Sahara – who are the Polisa­ rio Front? and what do they want” Euronews 17/11/20 found on https:// w w w.eu rone w s . com / 2 02 0 / 11 / 17/ we s t er n- s a h a ra-who - a re - t he - t he ­ polisario-front-and-what-do-they-want 30 Global Security, found on globalsecurity.org/military/world/morocco/budget. htm 31 This paragraph and suggested conclusion was drawn by the author at the time of writing. It is a most fervent hope that the December 2020 conflict exchange has proven to be yet another short-lived flare-up in a continuing period of peaceful, though difficult, striving for a resolution to the issue of Western Sa­ hara and Sahrawis’ self-determination 32 PH Wilson The Holy Roman Empire – A Thousand Years of Europe’s History p 164 33 K Brandi The Emperor Charles V p 89 34 G Rude The Eighteenth Century p 110 35 R Carr Spain 1808–1975 p 608 36 A Beevor The Spanish Civil War pp 132–134 37 For a detailed account of these divisions and the ETA violent attacks, see N Ridley chapter on ‘Later Revolts and Insurgences’, in Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt pp 145–157 38 R Minder The Struggle for Catalonia Rebel Politics in Spain p 2 39 International Crisis Group “Spain” CrisisWatch October 2017 found on https://www.crisisgroup/org/crisiswatch/october-2017 40 European Parliament President’s statement on the situation in Catalonia 27 October 2017, found on europarl.europa.eu 41 G Russell “Merkel told Rajoy, Europe cannot accept police brutality during independence referendum” The National 15/6/2018 found on https://www. thenational.scot/news/16292063.merkel-told-rajoy-europe-cannot-accept­ police-brutality-independence-referendum/ 42 The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and the Party of European Socialist 43 For defining and discussions of the four factors, see N Ridley Maurits of Nas­ sau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies

Part IV

William the Silent and the forging of a nation

10 Revolt becomes a national insurgency

At what point, or at what stage, did the large and violent disorders become a national uprising for independence? When was the point of no return reached when compromise was no longer possible? Some generic, intangible form of national unity was already felt by many Netherlanders by the end of the fifteenth century. The transfer of the prov­ inces from the fallen Duchy of Burgundy to Hapsburg control and the in­ troduction of some unifying administrative reforms under Hapsburg rule had had an effect. Provincial rights and sovereignty remained strong, yet some spoke of the ‘Fatherland’, meaning the collective of the 17 provinces, as opposed to speaking of their town or area or province. The younger gen­ eration travelled abroad, including students who went abroad for studies, and adopted various devices from the coat of arms of the former Duchy of Burgundy – the lion and the sheaf of 17 arrows tightly bound together  – as a national emblem. In the eternal nature of foreign students studying abroad, students from the Netherlands tended to stick together in national groupings. However, empathies and feelings such as this towards a national entity were vague and akin to those of Germans adopting a German nationality in the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and for such feelings and ambitions to be advanced it was to take massive causes in the form of dra­ matic political events. In the case of Germans, it was to be the upheaval of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts followed by Bismarck’s incomparable clarity of vision and international statecraft. With the Neth­ erlands, those events were to come two centuries earlier. The rising of 1566–1567 was not a “pure” nationalist one. Indeed, it was an attempted revolt against the excessive anti-heresy measures and a reac­ tion against the perceived erosion of provincial privileges and rights and as such a revolt in which upper noble classes and lower classes were united. An historian in an old but classic work on the Dutch Republic highlighted the cause of the rising in the 1560s as that of religion, in an unequivocal statement: “The great cause of the revolt, which within a few years was to break forth throughout the Netherlands, was the inquisition”.1

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The 1560s rising may not have been a rising for the nation status on the Dutch side, but from the Spanish viewpoint, it was an affront to Spanish sovereignty. In the words of an eminent historian, the reaction of Philip II was that of any sixteenth-century ruler, as no sixteenth-century ruler “… could have acted differently when faced with the double opposition of the high nobility (albeit a constitutional opposition) and revolutionary religious movement with military opposition”. 2 Another historian turns this line of argument in a different direction, citing the ruthless doctrinaire repression of Alva as the cause of unifying the opposition: “It took the heavy handedness of the regime in Brussels to combine the zeal of the Protestant minority with the fierce pride of Dutch nobility in their traditional local privileges”. 3 Another historian, in a work on English history, gives summaries of Eu­ ropean events, and in a trenchant manner takes the same view on Alva: “The rebellion, which the first 12 years of Philip II’s rule had made prob­ able, the 5 years during which it was personified by Alva made certain”.4 In this, Alva’s policy completely reversed – and undid – the achievement of the more subtle policies of Margaret of Parma according to one histo­ rian. This eminent historian, giving a summary of events in Philip’s Neth­ erlands as part of a monumental overview of political and economic history of Europe during his reign, states that Margaret effectively quelled the vi­ olence and disturbances of 1566–1567 by divise et impero, splitting the opposition by pitting the violent religious extremist lower classes against the protesting – but alarmed – nobility.5 If a single point, a single year is to be identified, it is submitted that 1572 is the year during which the Revolt, hitherto a series of violent disturbances with the mixed causes of resentment against incursions against the rights and sovereignties of the Netherlands and the individual provinces, religious intolerance, and unwarranted and excessive taxation became fused into a nationalist insurgency. Territory, albeit a small tranche, had been taken and held, and other towns and areas had declared for the Revolt. At the historic meeting at Dordrecht in that year, an insurgent assembly, representing dif­ fering areas, had been convened. A constitution and insurgent government created and – significantly – substantial finances had been committed and al­ located to the leader William, Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg. This was no longer a religious dispute or widespread violence against op­ pressive taxes. An eminent historian, in making an eloquent observation and a point, epitomised the turning point of 1572 as a national revolt. In giving an account of the proceedings of the assembly at Dordrecht in July 1572, and the assembled representatives voting William a hundred thou­ sand crowns in ready funds with the commitment of more funds later, she states: “…a hundred thousand crowns … and more to come. The tenth, twentieth and hundredth penny would not half cost them half that sum. What matter? Their rights not their purses were at stake”.6 This was now an uprising for freedom, against foreign rule.

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For William the Silent, the point of no return came at this early stage. By 1572, the national song “Wilhelmus” stated that William had always been loyal to the King of Spain and William continued to claim that he and followers were against, not Philip II, but his loyal counsellors and minis­ ters who were leading him astray. However, the song was a patriotic song for the Netherlands solidarity against Spain, and the claims of malevolent counsellors and ministers were more for form’s sake and propaganda. By 1572, William had been recognised by the rebel assembly as Stadhouder of three provinces and head of an embryonic nation-state, with its own allocated financial resources, armed forces, and constitution. This placed him, by standards of international law and customs, beyond any doubt as fully reasonable. Earlier in the year, he had led an attempted armed inva­ sion of the Netherlands and had been forced to retreat. A year earlier, on Alva’s arrival in Brussels, he was marked down together with Egmont and Hoorn for arrest and execution in order to extinguish the leadership of the anti-Spanish opposition. (William had prudently stayed in Germany, within the Empire, and outside the Netherlands and had not heeded Alva’s summonses.) If 1572 is the year when the Revolt turned into an insurgency for national freedom from foreign rule, for William himself the veritable point of no return, no compromise, probably came half a decade earlier. After Egmont returned from Spain in April 1565, he was effusive and full of good cheer and then turned to extreme anger when Philip II’s official hard line against heresy arrived to Margaret and the Council of State, and he, Egmont, real­ ised how he had been fooled and his attempted mediation visit and stay in Spain had been a waste of valuable time. For William, far less trusting than Egmont and Hoorn and Montigny, this was clear proof of Philip’s true intentions and an indicator that there would be no concessions or any compromise. The follow-up letter Philip sent to Margaret in November was hard line and explicit. There was to be no toleration. In short, William, try as he may to remain loyal to Margaret and assist her as a member of her council in restoring peace during the dis­ turbances, realised that the point of no return had come in the early 1560. By 1572, his actions and the events triggered by those actions could only result in either his triumphing as leader of a successful national insurgency or in his death or exile as a defeated leader who was guilty of treason. On the other side, Philip II was totally intransigent. There was to be no toleration of Protestantism, or any compromise or dilution of the sover­ eignty of Spain over the Netherlands. To achieve this, duplicity was fully in order. Philip II’s absolute conviction of his divine mission not only led him into reckless policies it freed him from being constrained by any scruples.7 On several occasions, Philip did indeed make concessions and apparently backed away. However, this was only so that he could retreat, regroup, and then reassert his authority all the more strongly. The Nine Years Subsidy and the withdrawal of Spanish forces were followed by the implementation

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of the reorganisation. As one historian stated, “When the time came it would not be too difficult to send another army”.8 The recall of Granvelle was followed by the rigid instruction to Margaret to enforce anti-heresy measures. The receiving and hosting of Egmont’s visit in Spain and giving favourable signals to his remonstrance, made on behalf of the Netherlands nobility, were followed by sending to Margaret of Parma the rigid instructions of the Segovia Woods policy enforcing antiheresy measures. Throughout this crisis of the 1560s, throughout the Re­ volt, and indeed throughout his reign, Philip II was implacable in upholding the Catholic faith, anti-heresy doctrine, and Spanish sovereignty. Philip’s ethos and beliefs were clearly shown in his reply to the StatesGeneral of 1562. In February of that year, the States-General sent a petition against the reorganisation of the bishoprics of the Netherlands, outlining their reasons, which consisted of appealing to certain privileges and also complaints about possible abuses during the reorganisation. Philip’s reply rejected both the States-Generals privileges and complaints and ended with two Roman maxims, cum summa sit ratio quae pro religionem facit, and salus populi suprema lex sit (“religious reasons are the highest reasons” and “public security must be the supreme law”). A historian giving an account of this exchange in a work on the provincial states and States- General of the Netherlands in this era summarised Philip II with the trenchant statement – “These were Philip II’s fundamental beliefs, the bottom line one might say, below which he would never consent to act”.9 Philip II was never to stray below that line. However, there was an opportunity for Philip to retrieve the situation and restore good and loyal relations between the Netherlands and the Crown without unduly compromising. In August 1567, the various dis­ turbances and iconoclastic riots had been quelled, thanks to Margaret’s firm actions supported by most of the nobility. Margaret – and Spanish rule – had the support of William (with reservations), Egmont, and Hoorn and the pro-Spanish southern nobility such as Aerschot and Berlaymont. The “Moderation” of April 1566 was still in place, provided it did not lead to more extreme religious activities and extremist sects emerging. The mo­ ment was right for Philip to visit the Netherlands, acknowledge and hold to the situation as at mid-1566, give support to Margaret, and engage in a charm offensive. In this way, taking this opportunity at a propitious time, he would identify himself with the Netherlands as Charles V had done (and as he himself was to do in Spain) yet retain control and maintain the substance of the anti-heresy policy. One historian, in a wide-sweeping and comprehensive history of the whole Hapsburg dynasty, makes mention of this particular missed opportunity, stating, “Had Philip been able to return to the Low Countries in 1568 … he might have been able to dampen passions”.10 However, this was an opportunity that was missed. Instead of going him­ self, as we have seen, he sent the Duke of Alva with instructions to restore

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order and punish at what speed he, Alva, judged best. Alva was rigid in his Catholicism and his stance on anti-heresy. He allowed no pause which would have shown that order and peace were restored for the most part. His objective was speedy punishment ruthlessly enforced. The repression and reprisals were compounded by the need, as Philip made quite clear to Alva, that Alva’s administration and the maintenance of his forces had to be from revenues raised in the Netherlands; Spain neither would nor could send any monies. Alva’s “Council of Blood”, implemented so quickly in a period of calm and combined with three sets of taxes, caused the Revolt to flare up again with a vengeance. He made a peaceful solution impossible. An eminent historian and specialist on Philip II states categorically, “Without question, in the 1560s Philip should have moved back to the Netherlands to restore the shattered authority of his government”.11 Philip not coming to the Netherlands was a missed opportunity but this – perhaps – could have been retrieved had he sent a more suitable person to take charge at this stage. Requesens, had he been sent at this stage, would have been more level-headed. While willing to engage in conflict if he judged necessary, as his period of governorship was to show, he was more a diplomat and inclined towards conciliation and negotiation. Perhaps as the commander in situation he could have made the situation of restored calm, with the status quo of the “Moderation” acceptable to Philip. Had he arrived at that point he would not have speedily implemented repression of the “Council of Blood”. Even had he felt necessary to resort to military intervention he would not have slaughtered the surrendering rebel forces of Naarden and Haarlem. In fact Requesens, as we have seen, was to be given some leeway for con­ ciliation, although in Philip’s view this was a short-term measure to calm the situation. The long-term objective of specifying the Netherlands and the implementation of Philip’s changes remained. For Philip, ever the micromanaging ruler, sent Alva to the Netherlands and at the same time had commissioned a Spanish man of letters to dis­ creetly monitor Alva’s actions and report back to him. This spy was a distinguished scholar, Benito Montana, who was in Antwerp negotiating his publication of some religious tracts with the famous printer Plantin. Montana dutifully wrote back to Philip supporting Alva’s policies and he, Montana, insisted, that Spain must retain a grip on the Netherlands. He based his insistence on his identifying the three major Spanish priorities of upholding the faith, the importance of trade, and the strategic location of the Netherlands. However, after Alva had nullified the threat from the rebel invasion from the south and his aggressive retaliation against selected towns and the massacres of the surrendering defenders, Montana modi­ fied his assessment. In June 1573, he wrote a further report to Philip. In this report, there was a strong recommendation for a more conciliatory approach by Spain. By the time this second report had reached Philip, Alva had been replaced as governor by Requesens. Philip received this second

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report containing Montano’s changed opinions but neither accepted nor rejected its recommendations. Instead, in October 1573, he sent the report back to the Netherlands to Requesens with a letter stating that he, Philip, did not know the truth of the matter and that it was up to Requesens to de­ cide. Requesens, as we have seen, attempted reconciliation, but this policy was hindered and frustrated by the Spanish mutinies, and during the crises Requesens fell ill and died. Philip had specifically avoided either endorsing or vetoing the proposed reconciliation policy of Montana’s report. Why? When judged necessary, he would unhesitatingly micromanage his minis­ ters and officials, and Netherlands’ governors were no exception. He had given Alva specific instructions on a policy of repression (the only aspect he left open to Alva being how to pay for the forces carrying out that repres­ sion). Philip, in his reaction to Montana’s report, may have recognised the necessity for conciliation but could not bring himself to actively encourage or support any form of compromise with heretic rebels. So he transferred any decision and action to Requesens, who received the report favourably. However, Requesens, in partly implementing a policy of reconciliation, was embarking on a direction which, if pursued to the full, would lead to a solu­ tion which would ensure peaceful settlement. But what to Requesens was a stage to a permanent solution was to Philip, as on previous occasions, a concession or retreat in order to gain strength to all the better counterat­ tack. Conciliation to Requesens was to lead to a permanent solution, and in contrast, for Philip, it was merely a temporary expedient to totally defeat and eradicate heretical rebels. Even more so, had the duke of Parma been sent by Philip at this point, it is reasonable to assume that political subtleties would have been used by Parma, as he was later to do so successfully. Parma would have won over the Catholic south and possibly found favourable support in the northern provinces, isolating the extreme Calvinists. In any subsequent military ac­ tion against the rebels – and Parma would not have hesitated when and where necessary, as he was to do later – he would have avoided breaking “…the first rule of military good sense … in treating William’s men as trai­ tors and outlaws, not soldiers with accepted rights”12 and treated the sur­ rendering rebel forces at Naarden and Haarlem according to the convention of armed conflict and avoiding fuelling Dutch emotion and strengthening their determination to resist. Parma did achieve much in negotiating the Treaty of Arras with the southern provinces, effectively bringing them back to reconciliation with Spain. However, Philip’s reaction is significant and epitomises his stance. He replied to Parma’s update reports, refuting the term “reconciliation” and insisted on it being a stage of the provinces’ “reduction to obedience”.13 These scenarios regarding if Philip II had sent a more conciliatory in­ dividual than Alva are theoretical. The fact remains Philip not returning to the Netherlands in 1567, and instead dispatching Alva as its governor, was a missed opportunity to retrieve the situation. But Philip would not

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recognise the necessity to so retrieve. He only viewed his duty and task to repress any opposition, extirpate heresy and rebellion, and restore the Catholicism – the true faith. As for William, he realised the totality of Philip’s implacable hostility. In a letter to his brother, John of Nassau, he explained the political objective he had pursued since 1568: I am firmly resolved, if it please God, to defend such a good and right­ eous cause to the end of my days and never to make terms with the Spaniards, knowing that the latter would mean … the annihilation of God’s churches in this country and unbearable tyranny for all its subjects.14 For William, the point of no return of the Revolt had been in the late 1560s, and by 1572 it was insurgency struggle for national independence.

Notes 1 J Motley The Rise of the Dutch Republic, opening sentence to Chapter III p 164. In fairness, it must also be borne in mind that Motley was fervently ortho­ dox Lutheran Protestant 2 HB Koenigsberger Estates and Revolutions p 234, also cited in G Parker The Dutch Revolt p 16 3 D MacCulloch Reformation – Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700 p 310 4 ST Bindoff Tudor England p 247 5 F Braudel The Mediterranean in the Time of Philip II Vol II p 1040 6 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 123 7 M Rady The Hapsburgs – The Rise and Fall of a World Power p 87 8 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 45. And, indeed, when Alva and his Span­ ish forces were first ordered to the Netherlands they departed in April, crossed the Alps in June, and were in Brussels by mid-August. The deployment via ‘the Spanish Road’ had been trouble-free 9 H Koenigsberger Monarchies States Generals and Parliaments – The Nether­ lands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries p 203 10 M Rady The Hapsburgs – The Rise and Fall of a World Power p 94 11 G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 42 12 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 137 13 Philip III to Duke of Parma 12/9/1579 Gachard Correspondence d’Álexandre Farnese pp 119–120, cited in H Koenigsberger Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments p 292 14 CG van Prinsterer (ed) Archives de la correspondence de la Maison Orange-Nassau Vol VIII p 348, cited by KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 251

11 William the Silent – summary and achievement

William was the leader of the Revolt, a Revolt which initially encompassed all 17 provinces of the Netherlands. He strove valiantly to reconcile the southern provinces and those of Holland and Zeeland and the others in the Revolt in the north in order to maintain some sort of unity. However, at least one historian has judged that by the beginning of 1578 the wider Un­ ion of Brussels was disintegrating.1 His determination and search contin­ ued for reconciliation and unity, even after the Unions of Utrecht and Arras had been formed and Parma was in lengthy and extended negotiations with the latter. He eventually was forced to acknowledge that the Revolt, and independence would be confined to the seven northern provinces. How­ ever, this itself was a great achievement, considering the complex political problems as well as the Spanish military opposition that William had to overcome. He was the only politician who by strength of personality could motivate the provinces to cooperate. 2 As the head of the insurgent government, William was the overall leader of its armed forces. He had had military training and was given commands by the Emperor Charles V, fought in the campaign of the French–Imperial war of the late 1550s (where his fellow Netherlands noble, Count Egmont won the decisive victory of St Quentin. But William was not a great or brilliant soldier). Arguably, both Alva and Don Juan were more able sol­ diers than him. Indeed, if the epithets of brilliance and outstanding are to be applied to military commanders throughout the Revolt, then they are applicable to the Duke of Parma and Spinola on the one side and to Wil­ liam’s successors, Maurits of Nassau and Frederik Hendrik, on the other. William was a competent soldier rather than a brilliant one. But he did have a clear perceptive and grasp of the overall strategy that he would need to adopt to sustain the Revolt and achieve the end-goal – a united Netherlands – while avoiding acrimony and keeping tenable his dealings with the Spanish kingdom. He realised the overriding importance of reliev­ ing Leiden (and of the consequences if the siege was not lifted) of the mili­ tary and economic power base of the two provinces, Holland and Zeeland, and the essential support of the northern provinces in their military power, to rectify the weakness in quality numbers and reliability of the troops of

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the States of Brabant and the Union of Brussels. In terms of achievement, after the Pacification of Ghent, whatever complex political events and alignments followed, the territories of Holland and Zeeland were never again subject to foreign, that is, Spanish invasion. 3 Even at the ultimate crisis point, at the zenith of Parma’s re-conquest of the Netherlands, when by 1587 the territory of the Dutch Republic comprised – only just – of four provinces.4 But those provinces included the vital economic powerhouses of Holland and Zeeland. His personal courage was never in doubt. He lived and worked in the constant danger of assassination, and during several engagements he was at the centre of the fighting and on at least one occasion personally confronted a group of mutinous English mercenary troops. 5 In 2017, two Dutch historians wrote an interpretative biography of William the Silent,6 challenging the standard view of him as a sincere leader of the Revolt motivated by the aim of freeing the Netherlands from Span­ ish rule. Their main premise was that William was a political opportunist who realised the potential for personal opportunity and rode the Revolt accordingly. However, another historian exposed several historical inaccu­ racies in their work.7 The main premise of this work, that he was mainly an opportunist, is somewhat harsh and misjudged. William was a ruler of one of many states of the Holy Roman Empire, and, like every other ruler of that era, he was mindful of his own interests and territories. However, as we have seen, by generational chance, he inherited substantial lands and titles; he was not a parvenu, needing to be constantly en vedette to gain fortune. Moreover, political opportunists do not go against their most sup­ portive and able commanders in times of crises, as William did in the cases of Lumey and Sonoy. He did precisely this against both, even imprisoning Lumey, in order to uphold religious freedom and the rule of law. During the controversy and opposition to Granvelle in the early 1560s, William was indeed self-serving in that he wished to oust Granvelle and he himself would become more powerful in the various councils and the gov­ ernment of the Netherlands.8 However, accompanying this ambition, even at this early stage of the Revolt, there was a deep and sincere commitment to freedom and religious compromise and toleration, a commitment which only a few other of his contemporary nobles had.9 His actions during the earlier stages of the Revolt in 1566–1570 were not those of a self-seeking opportunist. He escaped Alva’s sweep of arrests, yet returned to lead an unsuccessful invasion. He bankrupted his personal assets to finance the Revolt in these years. When his forces were defeated and he had to take refuge in France, he was scrupulous in settling the pay arrears of his defeated troops. In July 1572, nearly four years after his dis­ astrous retreat, he crossed the Rhine at Duisburg and entered Gelderland declaring that he would stay in the Netherlands to his grave at a time when others would have given up or at least ensured their own personal safety and survival.

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His insisted on religious toleration, as he held this was an essential part of freedom. When a Catholic, he stated, “However strongly I am attached to the Catholic religion, I cannot approve of princes attempting to rule the consciences of their subjects and wanting to rob them of their liberty of consciences”.10 When commanding the Revolt, he took action against Calvinist violence against Catholics. His insistence for toleration and struggle against both the Catholic Spain and the Calvinist extremists of his own side are evidence of a sincere and deep-seated commitment to freedom. William was dogged and unbending in his determination not to surrender to what he and the Dutch perceived as Spanish tyranny or to tolerate any form of Spanish sovereignty. Even when the Revolt was going badly and at times the situation was critical, William never considered or countenanced surrender. One historian makes a parallel of William’s determination in this to “…the unshakeable determination shown by Winston Churchill … in 1940”.11 His determination was accompanied by skills as a shrewd politician and diplomat, and all these skills were used to further the cause of Netherlands ending the rule of Spain. One of his strengths which served him and the Revolt well was his able assessment of character and level-headedness, combined with natural cau­ tion. The Count of Bossu was the Spanish-appointed Stadhouder of the province of Holland. Bossu remained to Spain and commanded troops un­ der Alva during the 1572 events of the Revolt. He deployed troops and unsuccessfully attempted to contain the escalating Revolt when Brielle and Vlissingen were taken by the “Sea Beggars”. Despite being on the opposing side, William recognised Bossu as a sincere individual and retained respect, even friendship, with him. Bossu served and fought as one of the com­ manders of the States-General’s troops against the Spanish at the battle of Gembloux. When he died in 1578, William was genuinely saddened. By contrast, with Admiral Lumey van de Marck, commander of the “Sea Beg­ gars”, and as such fully supportive of the struggle for freedom from Spain, William kept him at arm’s length. However able a commander of valuable troops and seamen Lumey may have been, his rabid Calvinism and fanat­ ical anti-Catholicism, William realised, was potentially damaging to the cause. Be it the massacre of priests at Gorkum or of monks in the religious house near Gouda in 1572 or the harassing of Catholics in Holland or the wild accusations against the States of Holland that it was an assembly full of papists, all of these actions by Lumey alienated him from moderate opinion. William finally struck and had Lumey arrested and imprisoned in February 1573 when the latter had an elderly humanist and head of a convent tortured and murdered, despite being given a safe-conduct to travel by William. William took action against Lumey, carefully ensuring that it was not for a religious-inspired atrocity, which could possibly raise issues

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with the Calvinists, but because of Lumey’s contumaciousness in flouting a direct order from the Prince of Orange. Lumey was imprisoned, eventually released whereupon he retired quietly to his estates around Liege. Admiral Boisot was chosen to replace Lumey, an equally capable commander, but moderate and sensible. Under his command, the “Sea Beggars” became a disciplined force, and he was in command of the relieving fleet at the siege of Leiden. William’s mistrust of Spain and Philip II began early. Philip’s hostility was apparent at an early stage before Philip left the Netherlands. The hos­ tility was possibly caused by jealousy as to how well William was regarded by the Emperor Charles V. William sensed his hostility, realised that it would endure, and never trusted Philip. Even when the latter was leaving the Netherlands for Spain in August 1559, William held back from joining some of his more effusive colleagues and courtiers in going on board the docked ship to say final words to Philip and wish him safe journey. William said his good wishes and farewells back on the quayside12; he had no wish to be “accidently” left on board and be transported back to Spain. Before the Geertruidenberg talks between the States-General represent­ atives and Don Juan, William cautiously deployed units of States-General troops, a preventative measure against Don Juan suddenly sending troops and arresting all the troublesome Netherlands politicians who would so conveniently be assembled in one confined location. No such attempted coup took place, but William’s caution was justified, as seen in Don Juan’s subsequent action in late July when he suddenly seized Namur and holding it while recalling Spanish troops back to the Netherlands. Perhaps William’s mistrust against Don Juan at this stage was exagger­ ated. Without doubt, Don Juan was anxious for reconciliation and a good working relationship with the states and provinces of the Netherlands, and willingly gave – and indeed he did – significant concessions. However, in the long term, William’s caution and mistrust was justified. Philip, though accepting through Don Juan the Pacification of Ghent, made it quite clear he was opposed to William being the Stadhouder of Holland and Zeeland, positions which had been confirmed by one of the clauses of the Pacifica­ tion. Also, he was hostile to the prospect of any religious policy, that is, any deviance from Catholicism as the sole recognised religion and other being heretical – being decided by the States-General. Also, his exhorta­ tions to Don Juan to keep with the negotiations and obtain a settlement were motivated by strategic necessity of playing for time. Restoring a form of peace to the Netherlands would free up troops to meet other more press­ ing military threats to his empire; once these were met and dealt with the troublesome parts of the Netherlands could be dealt with more robustly. His despatches to Don Juan contained significant phrases such as “…ac­ commodate yourself to time and necessity, ‘which are the best counsellors you can have’”.13 William’s caution and mistrust in the long term were well-founded.

184 William the Silent & the forging of a nation William’s great strength was his political ability. As a man of high prin­ ciples, he constantly searched for reconciliation between differing factions, and he was a hard-working conciliator in regards to his zeal to preserve unity. In negotiating through the complex political situations which arose, frankly, he had proven himself to be a shrewd politician. He was always deferential to the States. Within this was the vital princi­ ple of keeping the loyalty of the States of Holland. A distinguished historian specialising in the Hapsburg Empire wrote a short work on the Dutch Revolt,14 intended mainly for secondary school students taking exams which would gain them university entrance, in many cases to study history as un­ dergraduates. In keeping with the academic level of the readership he stated very simply, but extremely accurately, that The greatest service brought by the war to the United Provinces was in reducing the tensions caused by the untidy government of the country. In wartime, all the provinces had to recognize Holland leadership, for it was Holland’s wealth which sustained the military budget. Holland led the Revolt, and if William held the loyalty of Holland, he held the leadership of the Revolt. In being deferential to States-General and the individual provincial states, he was touching on the very cause for which nobles and middle classes were anti Spanish – the continued and increasing exclusion of the states and pro­ vincial nobles from government by a central rising Spain. It is worth noting that Philip II, after his experience with the States-General in 1566–1567, gave strict orders that this institution should never meet again. At the his­ toric meeting of representatives from Holland at Dordrecht in July 1572, they formed an embryonic government and empowered William as leader of the Revolt and Stadhouder of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, leader of the States-General, and the “protector” of all the other provinces; William, in accepting these positions, was careful when it came to granting increased rights to the states. He acknowledged that they could meet on their own authority and initiative and when and how often they deemed it necessary and recognised that they should have an input in discussions on major policy issues. This last was to be significant during the varied and complex negotiations that had taken place in the following decade over the vexed question of religious toleration. Two years later, at a crucial stage of the siege of Leiden, after a first attempt at persuasion failed, William managed to persuade the States of Holland to authorise the breaking of the dykes to flood the wide area en­ abling the units of the rebel Dutch navy float barges ferrying troops to the relief of the town. During the same period, he managed to persuade the states to raise an additional 45,000 guilders for the struggle. After Lei­ den was relieved, in the general euphoria, the states reversed their decision and limited the additional monies granted to 30,000 guilders. William was

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extremely frustrated by this. He realised that the revised sum would fall short of the amounts needed to pay the troops the sums already owed to them, and he feared mutinies, which would have been disastrous for the Revolt. He adopted a more confrontational approach, stating that if the full 45,000 guilders was not authorised, he would resign all his offices and leave the country accompanied by any and all who would follow him. It was a threat made in eloquent style. It worked, and the states hastily granted the full amounts. William spoke strongly in the States-General of the Union of Brussels af­ ter the “Spanish Fury” against reconciliation with Don Juan, claiming that neither he nor Philip could be trusted. He did not succeed in preventing the States-General in their intention to move towards reconciliation, and their agreeing to the Perpetual Edict, so he accepted their decisions with good grace albeit with grave doubts. He also supported the States of Holland and Zeeland in their refusal to accept the Perpetual Edict. During the debates in the States-General of the Union of Brussels regarding agreements with Don Juan, William did speak in favour of recognising Don Juan as governor but insisted for the withdrawal of all Spanish troops before such recognition was given and, significantly, the restoration of Netherland’s government as under Charles V, including those rights and privileges of the Mediae­ val charters granted to the provinces of Brabant and Flanders. He thus respected the rights of the provinces and their states and carefully – and publicly – emphasised the rights of the southern provinces. When, in April 1576, the States of Holland and Zeeland passed their union of the two provinces, Calvinism was made the official religion. There were moves to prohibit all other religions, but William, by tact and persua­ sion, managed to have a compromising clause inserted guaranteeing toler­ ation of all other religions which were not inconsistent, or did not conflict, with the gospel. In this way, William managed to keep open a way to rec­ oncile the Catholic south and maintain the possibility – for now although this was to prove a losing battle for him – of an eventual result of religious toleration. When Don Juan, in July 1577, suddenly resorted to military ag­ gression, taking Namur and recalling Spanish troops, the delegates at the States-General of the Union of Brussels appealed to him to come and take charge, William was careful to obtain first authorisation from the States of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht (which also had joined the Union of Holland and Zeeland). He made several journeys to the three provinces, making sure that many of the local disputes and grievances were settled. Then and only then, with authorisation obtained from the States of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht and affairs in the provinces settled as far as possible, did he move to Brussels, finally arriving there well after the appeal from Brussels.15 During late 1577, Aerschot’s initiative against Don Juan – and against William becoming too dominant – was carried out by ensuring that the Imperial Archduke Matthias would become the governor, and this was duly ratified by the States-General in Brussels. William accepted and acquiesced

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with a good grace, ever respectful of the states. However, he skilfully per­ suaded the States-General in January 1578 to make permanent his appoint­ ment as Stadhouder of Brabant, to which they agreed. When Matthias was duly sworn in as the governor late January 1577, William, as the Stad­ houder of the most important southern provinces, became Matthias’ chief advisor and de facto chief minister. William was offered by the King of Spain, through a series of negotia­ tions and intermediaries at the Imperial mediation talks at Cologne, the guaranteeing of the Stadhoudership of Holland to his son (under close Spanish supervision in genteel captivity) and substantial sums of money as well as restoration of his properties should he make peace and acknowledge Spanish sovereignty. William refused, stating that he would not enter any separate negotiations, and he referred them back to the States-General of the Union of Brussels. He accompanied this refusal with an assertion that his only ultimate aim was for his country to be free from foreign domina­ tion. He did indeed string the negotiators along and was to an extent in­ deed entering into separate negotiations, but this was a mere ruse and never pursued seriously by William. It ended with William yet again showing full respect to the States-General and an opportunity for him to show his un­ shakable determination to achieve the end of Spanish sovereignty. The respect that William showed to the States-General and the indi­ vidual provincial states and the skill with which he handled them were especially a valuable lesson for his two successors. Maurits acquiesced in States-General’s interference in military strategy – only once. Indeed, this had happened only once – after the narrow victory of Nieuwpoort, Mau­ rits’ military ability and his soldiers’ discipline retrieved a near-disastrous situation brought on by the States-General insisting upon the invasion of Flanders. After that, Maurits would brook no political interference and was happy to confront and face down States-General and provincial states alike and was increasingly hostile to the States of Holland. However, even he, the ruthless Maurits, during the 1617–1619 crisis, was mindful to ob­ tain support from several provincial states by making several carefully crafted political appeals and skilful manoeuvres. Maurits’ successor, Fred­ erik Hendrik, not only displayed considerable conciliatory initiatives to the states over several issues but also used representatives in the states who were his associates as political managers in several provincial states.16 On the issue of offering to Anjou the protectorate of the Netherlands, William managed the opposition of the northern provinces by dividing them. He carefully wooed the States of Holland and Zeeland. He visited Holland in 1580 and assured the States of Holland that they would not have to acknowledge Anjou as their overlord.17 In response to this, the States of Holland voted William their overlord and as the Count of Hol­ land, a decision which William accepted but made it clear that it must be kept secret during his negotiations with Anjou. Zeeland also inclined to making William their Count. Feeling reassured by the issue of sovereignty

William the Silent

187

under William, both provinces agreed not to oppose the States-General’s treaty with Anjou. Having secured benevolent neutrality on the issue from Holland and Zeeland, William did not try to persuade the other northern provinces. Perhaps discussions would only inflame the issue further, and in any case Anjou’s activities and his troops would be deployed in the southern provinces. Any issues over billeting the French troops and their behaviour would not impact on the northern provinces. (Also, the northern province of Friesland, having acknowledged William as their Stadhouder, agreed to his policy regarding Anjou.) Handling the provinces and their respective state’s assemblies and the States-General could be difficult as they were constantly guarding their own sovereignty and rights, often in jealous rivalry with one another. Wil­ liam showed due respect and deference to them all and used persuasion and negotiating skills to achieve his aims. In dealing with the states and States-General, he had another advantage – his undoubted sincerity for freedom and determination to achieve this, which, whatever the issues, all states and provinces fully acknowledged and respected. Thanks to his determination to never give up the struggle, his leadership, his tireless energy, and his political shrewdness and negotiating skills, he had brought into being a nation-state which unified differing prov­ inces, leading them through nearly 20 years of revolts and military conflicts and complex and changing political alliances. With his assassination and the inexorable military advances of the Spanish, the Revolt and the nation fell under serious threat, and it needed the military and strategic abilities of William’s son and successor to ensure the survival of the nation.18 When he became the overall leader and commander of the Revolt, William was obliged to fight a defensive war particularly during the years of Parma’s campaign of re-conquest. He never had enough finances to fight the war; this was mainly due to the states’ and States-General’s unwilling­ ness to grant sufficient funds. He did lead a defensive struggle for freedom on behalf of the provinces, with each province fiercely defending first its own sovereignty but later from the year 1572 onwards collectively fighting for freedom from foreign rule. He led a successful fight against the Spanish rulers and their supporters; at the time of his assassination when the Revolt was at its nadir, it was a Revolt of a nascent nation-state for national inde­ pendence. He had forged a nation. That the nation was in being was due to William of Orange, known as the Silent. The provinces had been troublesome, constantly quarrelled with one another, and were fierce in the defence of their own sovereignty and in­ terests and for decades in the future were to quarrel and be fierce in defence of their own sovereignty and interests. But in their judgement of William, they were unanimous and unequivocal. After his death, they bestowed upon him the title and ordered it inscribed on his grave in Delft Cathedral, “Father of the Fatherland, who valued the fortunes of the Netherlands above his own”.

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Notes 1 CC Hibben Gouda in Revolt – Particularism and Pacifism in the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–88 p 175 2 M Prak The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century p 21 3 H van Nierop Treason in the Northern Quarter – War, Terror and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Revolt p 9 4 R Lesaffer The XII Year Truce – Peace, Truce, War and Law in the Low Coun­ tries at the Turn of the 17th Century 5 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 200 6 A Brouwer and M Wouters Willem van Oranje. De opportunistische Vader des Vaderlands. 7 J van der Steen “Aron Brouwer and Marthijn Wouters, Willem van Oranje. De opportunistische Vader des Vaderlands” in Early Modern Low Countries, 1(2) 2017. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.18352/emlc.37 8 J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall p 140 9 KW Zwart “Wat bewoog Willam van Oranje de sterke regent de Spaanse over­ heersing aan te binden” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden 1984 pp 555–556, cited in J Israel The Dutch Republic 1477– 1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall p 140 10 P Geyl The Revolt of the Netherlands 1968 edition p 78, cited by MO Connell The Counter-Reformation 1559–1610 p 147 11 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 29. However, possibly exaggerated the comparison – and historical parallels can all too often be ‘falsos amigos’ – this is understandable in the case of this author. Swart, a distinguished historian and meticulous researcher in his own right, lived through the Second World War in occupied Netherlands, and in 1947–1949 he was the accredited representative of the Netherlands Institute of War Documentation at the Nuremburg Trials of War Criminals. He had both first-hand experience and full documentary evidence of the extent of the devastation of the Second World War and how close in 1940 a Nazi victory in Europe would have been possible 12 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 39 13 Philip II to Don Juan 31 January 1577 Archivo General de Simancas Estado 2843/3, cited by G Parker The Grand Strategy of Philip II p 145 14 M Rady The Netherlands, Revolt and Independence 1550–1650 p 107 15 CV Wedgwood William the Silent p 174 states that William was requested to come immediately after Don Juan moved upon Namur, which was 24 July 1577. KW Swart William the Silent and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–1584 states that the popular acclaim from the people of Brussels in reaction to Don Juan’s military action was for William to come to Brussels and take charge, but the official request from the States-General for him to come and take charge was not issued until 6 September 1577. Either way, William did not come im­ mediately, but waited for the States of Holland and Zeeland for authorisation. He did not arrive in Brussels until late September 1577, some three weeks later 16 See N Ridley Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies and N Ridley Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies 17 KW Swart William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–84 p 211 18 See N Ridley Maurits of Nassau and the Survival of the Dutch Revolt – Comparative Insurgencies

Appendix I

The financial state of Spain

In terms of capital finance flows, a major change between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had occurred in that the region of Milan-VenetoTuscany in Italy lost its predominance to southwest Germany. This was epitomised by the decline of the Medici banking house losing out to the German banking houses of the Fuggers and the Welsers.1 In the mid-sixteenth century, the Emperor Charles V had borrowed heav­ ily, even to obtain the title of Holy Roman Emperor. In this, the German banking firm the Fuggers had given help to Charles of Hapsburg during the imperial election. This resulted in Charles being elected as Emperor Charles V over the rival candidate Frances I of France. The help was that of providing ‘contributions’ – or bribes – and inducements to various imperial electors and their entourages. The head of the Fugger bank, Jacob Fug­ ger, afterwards asserted to Charles that he, Charles, would not have been elected without the help of the Fuggers. This was an exaggeration, but there was some truth in the frank statement. Charles’ election campaign cost over 830,000 florins, some provided by the Welsers and also by two Genoese banking houses; however, the Fuggers provided over 65% of the total. 2 The Fuggers continued to help Charles V in 1531 when Charles managed to en­ sure that his brother Ferdinand was elected as the King of the Romans, the customary second title of the Holy Roman Emperor; the Fuggers provided 36,000 florins for ‘contributions’. In the early 1540s, Charles made prepa­ rations for war to quell the Protestant Schmalkaldic League; the Fuggers provided a substantial part of the 500,000 ducats advance loan. Charles’ loans were paid for by the credit instrument of the asiento. By this arrangement, the bank would agree to pay the monies through an agent bearing a bill of exchange to one of Charles’ representatives abroad and the monies would be drawn on presenting the bill of exchange at one of the banks in the locality. The bank would be reimbursed at the exchange in Antwerp or in Spain. Charles often promised prompt repayments, but often deferred payment was the bank’s preferred option, as the bank would add a ‘handling charge’ to the sum owed – a form of additional interest. These handling charges varied, depending upon the political and military situation confronting the Emperor. On making peace with France in 1544,

190

The financial state of Spain

handling charges for the loan fell to 20%; in 1545, when the struggle with the Schmalkaldic League would last an inordinately long period, the han­ dling charge was a massive 80%; after Charles’ complete victory over the League at the Battle of Mühlberg in 1547, the handling charges fell to just 14%. Under the Emperor Charles V, the Fuggers had virtually become bankers to the Emperor, and under Charles V borrowing had become the only way to balance the Spanish budget. Within a decade of his accession, Philip II was confronted by the early stages of the Dutch Revolt which accordingly increased the national debt of Spain. The borrowing and credit transfer was effected by continuing the asiento system and bills of exchange. The King, through his financial offi­ cials, would make an arrangement with a merchant or financier or bank, whereby the lender would furnish a fixed sum to the Army of Flanders via the paymaster and his staff. The asiento was a short-term loan of one or two years at comparatively high rates of interest. By 1575, servicing the loans was becoming unsustainable. Following Juan de Ovando’s frank and stark advice, Philip issued the 1575 Decree known as “the Decree of Bankruptcy”. It froze the capital of all loan con­ tracts worth between 15 and 20 million ducats. All payments to bankers ceased. It was not a total abrogation or cancellation of the state debts. Spain would need large-scale loans again and could ill-afford to cut loose from the banking houses. International bankers needed such constant sources of loan incomes, such as the Spanish Crown. Asiento loans and repayment schedules were suspended, and payments and settlements were to be resumed when Spain so chose and deemed it an appropriate time and when financially viable. Bankers, merchants, fi­ nanciers, and all other creditors were given a choice. They could retain their holding and full rights of repayment of the asientos and await the resumption of settlements and repayments. This was highly unlikely, given the commitments of Spain to various theatres of conflict and the contin­ ued spiralling of the Spanish Treasury’s spending, especially on the Army of Flanders. The alternative for the creditor was to take in exchange for the asiento loan an income-bearing bond, or juros. Asientos were usually short-term loans with high interest rates and “handling charges”, while juros were long-term bonds with much lower interest returns. Bankers and other creditors accepted with an ill-grace the changeover to juros, and by this step, the huge Spanish floating debts were consolidated into long-term loan bonds that provided moderate interest rates. Juros indeed imposed upon the Spanish Crown interest repayments, but these were comparatively low and the effective cancellation of the asien­ tos increased revenues which had been raised from extraordinary taxation hastily imposed for asiento repayments. With these particular revenues now remaining in the Treasury instead of going straight out for servicing asientos, they could be used as security to gain further loans from bankers to finance the war and a cycle of high loans and compromise bankruptcy could begin again.

The financial state of Spain

191

Charles V had made such ‘conversions’ of asiento; Philip II was to carry out such conversions to a greater extent and more frequently by Decrees. Almost the first act of his reign was a Decree of 1557 consolidating ex­ isting asientos into juros at the lower long-term interest rate of 5%. 3 The rising costs of the Army of Flanders made this Decree of 1575 necessary, and other Spanish monarchs and the Treasury were to use such Decrees throughout the Dutch Revolt. Decrees were issued in 1596, 1607, 1627, and 1647. Decrees of Bankruptcy did result in bankers gaining bonds or juros at low rates of interest and overall losing significant sums in the cancelled asiento repayments. However, the effects of the Decrees were often allevi­ ated by a compromise agreement made with the major creditors one or two years later, such an agreement being known as the medio general. By this, the Spanish Crown agreed to repay or reimburse some of the ‘lost’ asiento payments with grants of royal lands. In drawing up these medio general, the Spanish Crown was often able to insert into the agreement a further advance of monies or terms of another loan. By the cycle of short-term asientos being ‘converted’ into long-term juros, the Spanish war effort against the Dutch Revolt was able to continue, albeit in a somewhat financially ramshackle way. Nonetheless, the Decrees did take their toll. The first Decree of 1557 impacted upon the Fuggers who effectively ceased to be bankers to Spain. After the 1557 bankruptcy, or conversion to juros, the Fuggers withdrew from any dealings in the asiento market and went into decline along with several other prominent banking houses.4 The Fuggers were supplanted as lenders in bankrolling the Spanish war against the Dutch Revolt by the Genoese banking and finance houses.5 Crucially, the Decree of 1575 disrupted the Army of Flanders. The bank­ ruptcy decree of issued that year was followed, two years later, by a medio general which was agreed with Spain’s banking creditors. Until the medio general was agreed, Philip had deprived himself of any credit, and no bills of exchange could be issued or drawn upon.

Notes 1 JR Hale Renaissance Europe p 139 2 G Polnitz Die Fugger, Tubingen 1981, cited in M Rady The Emperor Charles V p 16 and K Brandi The Emperor Charles V p 106 3 H Kamen Imperial Spain 1477–1715 p 167 4 F Braudel Civilisation and Capitalism 15 to18 Centuries Volume II – The Wheels of Commerce pp 479, 524 5 EG Koenigsberger “Western Europe and the power of Spain” in The Cam­ bridge Modern History Vol III – The Counter Reformation and the Price Rev­ olution p 257

Appendix II

Requesens, the diplomat and his attempts at reconciliation

The tenure of Requesens as the Governor of the Netherlands was only three years, and during this short tenure he appears to have devoted much time and thought and effort into attempts at reconciliation. As one of the issues in insurgency and revolt addressed in this book is that of possible reconcil­ iation, compromise, and settlement between the nationalist insurgents and the occupying power, it may be of benefit to consider various specialist his­ torians and their views on Requesens and the attempts to peacefully settle the Dutch Revolt. CV Wedgwood, in her William the Silent, is somewhat scathing about Requesens’ potential for reconciliation: “…He was a reserved, undemon­ strative Castilian without a word of French or Flemish in his vocabulary, and why Philip imagined that he would be able to rally the loyal Nether­ landers more effectively than Alva was Philip’s secret” (p 135). P Limm in his The Dutch Revolt 1559–1648 also downplays Reques­ ens’ diplomatic activity, stating that at the start of his governorship he was forced to follow Alva’s advice of the military solution, and in late 1573 he was still forced to follow Alva’s advice and continue to fight (pp 40, 42). The author suggests such criticisms are somewhat unfair. When Reques­ ens tried reconciliation, he ensured that capable negotiators were used, fully competent in the necessary language(s), and that the sage of Leiden itself was pursued militarily, but during this Requesens made overtures for a peaceful settlement. Also CV Wedgwood in the same work recounts how Requesens’ lifting of the Tenth Penny tax and offering a free pardon was a “disturbing move” causing anxiety to William as possibly weakening the unity of the Revolt (pp 139–140). K W Zwart in William the Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–1584 (pp 86–89) focuses principally on the Breda talks with the Romero initiative of 1573 briefly mentioned. The formal Breda talks and their various stages are dealt with in detail. In this, Zwart emphasises Wil­ liam’s skill in presenting the Dutch demands as conciliatory and reasona­ ble, eventually winning the propaganda struggle after the talks collapsed. He is also sympathetic to Requesens, pointing out that Requesens was, for

194

Requesens, the diplomat and his attempts at reconciliation

months during the Breda talks, left “completely in the dark” by Philip II over what concessions could be made by Spain during the negotiations. Geoffrey Parker in the compact account covering the period from 1560s right to the 1648 Westphalia peace, in The Dutch Revolt, and dealing with Requesens (pp 164–167), focuses only on the Breda talks and emphasises Requesens’ recognising the reality of Spain’s predicament, particularly the perilous state of Spain s finances. He also relates the circular nature of the  direction of the formal Breda talks with neither side compromising on the religious issues and Spain not offering any concessions beyond the orig­ inal offer of a pardon and restoration of privileges and property to Catho­ lics. He also points out Requesens having no guidance or royal instructions on what concessions could be offered in response to any Dutch concessions. Jonathan Israel, in his massive single-volume history of the Dutch Re­ public, The Dutch Republic 1477–1806 – Its Rise, Greatness and Fall (pp  183–184) appears to treat Requesens’ attempts as a continuous policy from the relief of Leiden. In this, Requesens was attempting the near-im­ possible. He emphasises the role of Albert Lenoninus and the incompat­ ibility of the two sides, and that Requesens, despite this, persisted in his attempts in the formal talks. In these talks, William and the States General emphasised their desire not to break their loyal tie with King Philip II, but the King needed to permit Protestantism and uphold the “rights and privileges” of the provinces – two conditions Philip refused to concede. He concludes that the Breda talks revealed that the positions of the King and the insurgents were irreconcilable due to the issues of religion and govern­ ment and that, effectively, “…prospects for compromise were so remote as to be negligible”. Pieter Geyl is his comprehensive History of the Dutch-speaking Peoples 1555–1648 (pp 136, 140–142, 144) is sympathetic to Requesens and em­ phasises Philip’s intransigence. He states that on taking up his governor­ ship, Requesens was inclined to conciliation but was constrained by Philip II, “…shut off from all reality in his convent-like Palace, from no reality so distant as that from the Netherlands, who nevertheless indicated the lines along which Netherlands affairs had to move; and on the question of reli­ gion was immovable”. He emphasises Requesens was fully realistic as to the straits in which Spain s finances were. He emphasises that the formal talks at Breda were the initiative of Requesens, without Philip’s consent, “who, as so often at critical moments, took refuge in silence”.

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Index

Aalst 89 Aerschot, duke of 27, 57–64, 175, 185 Alkmaar 38, 42, 47, 50, 51 Alva, Fernando Alvarez, duke of, Governor of Netherlands 1567–1573 21, 27, 29–57, 60–62, 65, 77–80, 87, 92, 93, 174–181, 193 Anastro, Gaspar 97, 98 Anjou, duke of 69, 76–81, 84–86, 95–98, 102, 103, 186, 187 Antwerp 14, 39, 43, 54–60, 62, 66, 69, 70, 72, 75, 80, 86, 89, 90 Arras, Union of see Unions Axel 87 Berlaymont, Count of 19, 26, 62, 176 Boisot, Louis de, Dutch admiral 48, 102, 183 Bossu, Count of 37–39, 62, 63, 65, 182 Breda, peace negotiations 14, 49, 50, 193, 194 Brederode, Henri de 25–28 Brielle, capture of 27, 29, 37, 38, 62, 102, 182 Bruynick, Nicholas, secretary to William the Silent 74 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor 1519–1555 9–15, 19, 58, 64, 71, 158, 169, 176, 181–185, 189–191 Delft, Union of see Unions Egmont, Count 12, 21, 66, 92, 93, 176, 177, 180 Elizabeth I, Queen of England 1558– 1601 35, 37, 67, 76, 80, 92, 103, 104, 113

Fredrik Hendrik, son of William the Silent and future leader of the Dutch Republic 1624–1647 97, 108–112, 180, 186 Gerard, Balthasar 99–102 Granvelle, Antoine de Perronet, Cardinal, archbishop of Besancon 10–12, 18–24, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 80, 93–96, 100, 102, 103, 176, 181 Haarlem, siege of 29, 41, 42–46, 50, 93, 177 Heiligerlee, battle of 32 Henri II, King of France 12–15, 21 Henri III, King of France 35, 77, 78, 99 Hoorn, Count 21–31, 92, 175, 176 Hulst 87, 105, 112 Jaureguy, Jean 97–99 Jemmingen, battle of 33, 36, 62 John Casimir, brother of Elector Palatine and mercenary soldier 67, 68 Don Juan of Austria, Governor of Netherlands 1576–1578 54, 58–67, 70–73, 93, 99, 100, 181, 183, 185, 188 Leiden, siege of 45–51, 63, 69, 95, 103, 180, 183, 184, 193, 194 Leoninus. Albert 49 Louis of Nassau, brother of William the Silent and Dutch military leader 10, 25, 26, 31, 32–40, 46, 47, 62, 93 Luis XIII, King of France 108 Lumey, William, lord de la Marck 36–38, 65, 181, 183 Marnix, Philip Count of St Aldegonde, follower, confident of William the

200 Index Silent and joint Dutch head of intelligence 26, 30, 38, 43, 45, 52, 57, 93, 97–99, 102 Matthias, archduke of Austria 63–66, 70, 75, 76, 79, 185, 186 Maurits of Nassau, son of William the Silent and future leader of Dutch Republic 1584–1624 96, 97, 104, 110, 113, 114, 180, 186, 188 Maximilien I, Holy Roman Emperor 1508–1519 42 Montana, Benito scholar and Philip’s agent in Netherlands 177, 178 Montigny, Baron of 23, 26, 32, 92, 93, 175 Mookerheide, battle of 46, 55, 62 Oldenbarneveldt, Jan van, Dutch politician and future statesman 47, 80, 104–107 Oudenaarde 66, 84, 85 Ovando, Juan de Ovando y Godfroy, Council member and financial advisor to Philip II 53, 190 Parma, Margaret of, Regent of the Netherlands to 1567 5, 19, 21–30, 35, 65, 92, 103, 174, 175, 176 Parma, Alexander Farnese, Duke of 66, 70, 90, 93, 100, 102–106, 178–181, 187 Perronet, Jerome de, brother of Cardinal Granvelle and tutor to young William the Silent 10 Perronet, Nicholas de, minister of Emperor Charles V and father of Cardinal Granvelle 10 Perpetual Edict 58–60, 71, 185 Philip II, King of Spain 1566–1598 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 25, 29, 32, 35, 41–50, 53, 58, 71, 74, 79–87, 99, 100–105, 174–179, 180, 188, 190–194

Rennenberg, Georges de Lalaig, Count of 75, 76, 83 Requesens, Don Luis, Governor of Netherlands 1573–1576 44–55, 57, 93, 177, 178, 193, 194 Romero, Colonel, commander Spanish army 45, 93 St Valery, battle of 32 Sas van Gent 87 Schwarzenberg, Count 73, 74 Sonoy Diederik, Dutch leader 50, 51, 181 Steenwijk 83, 87, 88 Terranova, Certes de Aragon, duke of 73 Tournai 6, 28, 30, 83, 84 Treaties: of Antwerp (Twelve Years Truce) 106, 107; of Arras 71, 78, 178; of Cateau-Cambresis 12; of Chambord 21; of Mont St Eloi 71; of Munster (Westphalia) 113; of Osnabruck (Westphalia) 113; of Passau 22; of Plessis-le-Tours 77; of Termonde 96; of Tournai 85; of Venice 44; of Vervins 106; of Westphalia 112, 113, 194 Unions: of Arras 51, 69–72, 78, 180; of Brussels 57, 67, 70, 72, 75, 178, 181–186; Of Delft 52; of Utrecht 69–76, 81, 96, 180 Verdugo, Colonel, Spanish commander 82, 85, 87 Villers, Pierre Loyseleur de, cleric and together with Marnix St Aldegonde joint Dutch intelligence chief 51, 52, 100, 102 Vlissingen 15, 37–39, 62, 99, 182 Zutphen 40, 41, 45, 68, 87, 88