Where Do the Parties Stand?: Political Competition on Immigration and the EU in National and European Parliamentary Debates (Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy) 3030775879, 9783030775872

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Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy

Stella Gianfreda

Where Do the Parties Stand?

Political Competition on Immigration and the EU in National and European Parliamentary Debates

Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy Series Editor David L. Leal Univ of Texas at Austin, Dept of Govt AUSTIN, TX, USA

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8832

Stella Gianfreda

Where Do the Parties Stand? Political Competition on Immigration and the EU in National and European Parliamentary Debates

Stella Gianfreda Department of Political Science (DISPO) University of Genoa Genova, Italy

ISSN 2625-8544     ISSN 2625-8552 (electronic) Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy ISBN 978-3-030-77587-2    ISBN 978-3-030-77588-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many people who supported me in various ways through the long and challenging journey that is writing a book. First, my senior colleagues and mentors, Prof Eugenio Pizzimenti (University of Pisa), Prof Fabrizio Coticchia (University of Genoa) and Prof Marco Di Giulio (University of Genoa). Without their comments and suggestions, and also their encouragement and support, this book probably would have not seen the light of day. Second, the academic community that kindly hosted me for 7 months during my PhD at King’s College London. In particular, I thank Prof Edoardo Bressanelli for his insightful comments on my research, and Margherita, Marianna, Matilde, Cristina and Janaina, the special girls of the ‘Fish Bowl’, for their much needed support, chitchatting and amusement. A special thank goes to my friend and colleague Benedetta Carlotti, an amazing young scholar, who was an endless source of inspiration and motivation for me through these years. Many thanks also to Luigi Caiazza for his professionalism and patience who helped me out with the technical aspects of web scraping. Last but not least, I am immensely grateful to my mother and to Virgilio for being always by my side; to my aunt Mariangela for her advice; and to Grazia, Giancarlo, Valentina and Fabrizio for having made me feel immediately at home. This book is dedicated to Francesco, my husband and ‘unofficial tutor’, for his unconditional love, support and care. Many more people have contributed to improving the quality of this work; its remaining flaws are entirely my own responsibility.

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Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    6 Part I Framework and Context 2 Political Competition on Immigration and the European Union��������   11 2.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 2.2 Definitions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   13 2.3 Models of Party Competition������������������������������������������������������������   14 2.4 A Multidimensional Approach to Political Competition������������������   16 2.5 Research Design��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   20 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   27 3 Debating Immigration and European Issues in Italy, the United Kingdom and the EP��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 3.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 3.2 A Process of (Dis)integration? Italy and the UK������������������������������   35 3.3 Immigration to Italy and the UK: An Overview ������������������������������   44 3.4 Party Competition in the European Parliament��������������������������������   55 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   58 Part II Empirical Analysis 4 Immigration Debates in National Arenas����������������������������������������������   67 4.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 4.2 Issue Salience������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   69 4.3 Opposition and Support to Immigration ������������������������������������������   73 4.4 Framing Immigration������������������������������������������������������������������������   76 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 5 EU Debates in National Arenas��������������������������������������������������������������   91 5.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 5.2 Issue Salience������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 vii

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Contents

5.3 Opposition and Support to the EU����������������������������������������������������   96 5.4 Framing the EU��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  100 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  111 6 Debating Immigration and the EU in the EP����������������������������������������  113 6.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 6.2 Transnational Competition on Immigration��������������������������������������  117 6.2.1 Issue Salience������������������������������������������������������������������������  118 6.2.2 European Political Parties’ Positions on Immigration����������  120 6.2.3 Framing Immigration in the European Parliament ��������������  123 6.3 Transnational Competition on the EU in the EP������������������������������  128 6.3.1 Issue Salience������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 6.3.2 European Political Parties’ Positions on the EU������������������  130 6.3.3 Framing the EU in the EP ����������������������������������������������������  132 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  141 Part III Conclusion 7 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 7.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 7.2 Where do the Parties Stand? ������������������������������������������������������������  148 7.3 Debating Immigration in National Parliaments: Issue Salience and Framing Strategies ��������������������������������������������������������������������  149 7.4 Debating the EU in National Parliaments: Issue Salience and Framing Strategies ��������������������������������������������������������������������  152 7.5 Continuity and Differentiation Between National and European Arenas������������������������������������������������������������������������  154 7.6 Concluding Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������  156 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  158 Appendix 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  161 Appendix 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  165 Appendix 3��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  173 Appendix 4��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  177 Appendix 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  181

Abbreviations

Abbreviation ALDE ANL BNP CEAS CON CpE DC DS EASO ECR EFD EFDD EEC EMS EMU ENF EP EPPs EPP EPPG EU FI FN ID ITS IV LAB LN – Lega MEPs MSs M5S NDC NF PC

Original name Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Anti-Nazi League British National Party Common European Asylum System Conservative Party Centristi per l’Europa Democrazia Cristiana Democratici di Sinistra European Asylum Support Office European Conservatives and Reformists Europe of Freedom and Democracy Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy European Economic Community European Monetary System Economic and Monetary Union Europe of Nations and Freedom European Parliament European Political Parties European People’s Party European Political Party Group European Union Forza Italia French Front National Identity and Democracy Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Italia Viva Labour Party Lega Nord – Lega Members of the European Parliament Member States Movimento Cinque Stelle Nuovo Centro Destra Front National Partito Comunista

English name

Centrists for Europe Christian Democratic Party Left Democrats

Forward Italy

Italy Alive Northern League – League

Five Star Movement New Centre Right National Front Communist party ix

Abbreviations

x Abbreviation PD PdL PDS PLI PRI PRC PSDI RE RN SC S&D SNP UKIP US

Original name Partito Democratico Il Popolo della Libertà Partito Democratico di Sinistra Partito Liberale Partito Repubblicano Partito di Rifondazione Comunista Partito Socialdemocratico Renew Europe Rasseblement National Scelta Civica Socialist & Democrats Scottish National Party United Kingdom Independent Party United States

English name Democratic party The People of Freedom Left Democratic party Liberal party Republican party Communist Refoundation party Socialdemocratic party National Rally Civic Choice

About the Author

Stella  Gianfreda  is a research fellow at the University of Genoa. Her research interests are migration politics and policy, party politics, and populism. Among her most recent publications are ‘Populismo e Immigrazione’, in L.  Viviani and A. Masala (Ed.) (2020), ‘The Governance of Reception in Italy. The Case of Liguria (2011–2020)’, in Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche; L’Età dei Populismi, Roma: Carrocci Editore; (with G. Baldini and E. Bressanelli) (2019), ‘Taking Back Control? Brexit, Sovereignism and Populism in Westminster (2015–17)’, in European Politics and Society; (with B. Carlotti) (2018), ‘The Different Twins A Multilevel Analysis of the Positions of the Northern League and M5S on the Integration-Demarcation Dimension’, in Italian Political Science.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract  Why should we still care about political parties? After all, party membership and voter turnout have been dropping across parties and countries over the last decades. Besides, the legitimacy of traditional parties has been put under severe strain by the anti-establishment claims of populist parties and movements that are emerging in many Western societies. Nevertheless, political parties still run elections, deliver political decisions, and inform public debate. Thus, studying these organizations can help us understand the function of political life in Western European democracies. This book analyses party framing and positioning strategies over two of the most politicised issues in European democracies: immigration and the European Union. In so doing, it offers a contribution to the academic literature on the politicization of multidimensional policy issues. Besides, by focusing on Italy and the United Kingdom, two emblematic cases for studying the effects of the politicisation of immigration and the European Union on party politics, the book assesses empirically the alleged contagion effect of populist parties on mainstream parties’ policy positions both at the national and at the European level. Overall, this volume advances our understanding of political parties as vehicles of ideas and policy proposals that influence and structure political competition in Western Europe. Keywords  Political parties · Cleavages · Political competition · Politicisation · Democracy

Why should we still study political parties? After all, party membership and voter turnout have been dropping across parties and countries over the last decades (Scarrow, 2007; van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). Further, the legitimacy of mainstream parties has been put under severe strain by the anti-establishment claims of populist parties and movements that are emerging in many Western societies (Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021). Populist parties are not a pathology of representative democracies (Taggart, 2002), rather, they are ‘mainstream’ in society and politics. Currently, these parties are included in coalition governments as both junior and major partners in at least twelve European countries (Vittori & Morlino, 2021, p. 28). According to Peter Mair (2002, 2009), the populist rise can be explained by the decline of traditional parties as intermediaries between the citizens and public

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_1

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1 Introduction

policy. Political parties are losing relevance everywhere as instruments of voters’ mobilization, channels for citizen participation, vehicles of articulation and aggregation of societal interests (Bardi, 2014). This process is due to both systemic and intra-­party factors. At the systemic level, the de-politicisation of the decision-making processes in an increasing number of policy areas in favour of technocratic bodies, such as the European Central Bank and other EU institutions (Mair, 2000, 2007, 2008; Bardi et al., 2015; Bardi, 2017), has reduced the decision-making power of political parties. At the party level, political parties across Europe have undergone a reorganization process known as cartelization (Katz & Mair, 1994), which has transformed them into state-centred parties (Ignazi, 2007, 2019) that, instead of acting as agents of the civil society (‘the principal’), have become state agents in exchange for public benefits (Calossi & Pizzimenti, 2018; van Biezen, 2014). Political parties have thus retained control over their procedural functions – namely, recruiting political personnel and organizing public institutions – while their representative functions have declined (Bartolini & Mair, 2001). However, political parties still run elections, deliver political decisions and inform public debate. Thus, studying political parties can help us understanding the function of political life in Western European democracies. This is why I believe it is still important to devote attention to political parties, both as organizations and as vehicles of ideas that influence and structure political competition. This book focuses on party competition on two issues: immigration and the European Union. According to many scholars, conflicts over immigration and the European Union constitute a new transnational cleavage, which pits the ‘winners’ of globalisation against its ‘losers’, and which is mobilised mainly by populist and radical-right parties. More precisely, according to Kriesi and his collaborators (2006, p. 924), ‘European integration and immigration correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalisation’. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2018) claim that the impact of immigration and European integration on Western European politics has been equally as disruptive as the previous junctures identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in cleavage politics. From this perspective, political competition in contemporary democracies articulates mainly around post-­ materialistic values rather than along the traditional economic left/right dimension. Populist parties are net winners of the re-structuring of the political space (Ignazi, 1992). They have been successful in mobilising identity issues, most notably immigration and the European Union. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 107) note, the electoral fortune of populist (radical-right) parties can be explained by the ‘ideological vacuum of the liberal democratic parties that created opportunities for populist parties to capture the agenda and frame the debate’. In recent years, contributions in the field of party politics have tried to assess the impact of this new transnational cleavage on the structure of party competition – in particular, on parties’ polarization (Hooghe et al., 2002; Bale, 2008; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Odmalm & Super, 2014; Odmalm, 2019). However, this literature is negatively affected by shortcomings. First, it often focuses on single case studies or cross-disciplinary works that do not build on existing theories of party competition. Second, it analyses partisan positions on either European integration

1 Introduction

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or immigration issues, without comparing the two and trying to understand what discursive tread, if any, links them (with the notable exception of Odmalm & Super, 2014). Third, the literature of party politics focuses on populist radical right-wing parties (see, for example, Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, Arzheimer, 2009, and Hernández & Kriesi, 2016), while far less attention is devoted to comparative studies on the dynamics of political competition between populist and non-populist parties (with some notable exceptions, such as Akkerman et  al., 2016, Wolinetz & Zaslove, 2018, and Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021). Fourth, the existing specialised literature on party competition studies either parties’ positions in the national political arena or the European Parliament (EP), but it rarely compares them. Finally, the existing studies rely on aggregated data sources, such as party manifestos, roll-call votes (RCVs), elite or mass surveys and media content, which fail to account for the multifaceted nature of policy issues, thus compromising the validity of these measurements. (For a critique of the use of these methods to assess parties’ positions, see Zulianello, 2014). To address these shortcomings, the objective of this volume is to answer the following research questions: How do mainstream left, mainstream right and populist parties frame the issues of immigration and the European Union? To what extent, and how, are anti-immigration and anti-European Union (EU) frames connected in political speeches? What are the factors that influence mainstream and populist parties’ framing strategies on transnational politicised issues? Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) are two emblematic cases for studying the effects of the politicisation of immigration and the European Union on the dynamics of political competition; indeed, they both recently experienced the rise and electoral success of populist parties – the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain, and the Northern League (Lega Nord [LN])1 and the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle [M5S]) in Italy  – mainly due to the politicisation of immigration and the European Union (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Moreover, following a Most Different System Design (MDSD; Przeworski & Teune, 1982, Lijphart, 1971), Italy and the UK enable us to verify whether broadly generalizable links exist between policy-specific issues and patterns of party polarisation in polities of different contexts; indeed, these countries present different constraints on the potential development of the dependent variable (party positioning). First, the electoral system, which impacts the relative power of political parties in the decision-making arena. Most elections in the UK are decided using the first-­ past-­the-post electoral system – considered particularly efficient, as it tends to produce a two-party system and stable governments. In contrast, Italy has experienced four electoral reforms over the last quarter century, causing the Italian political system to be highly fragmented and scarcely institutionalized; indeed, Italy is the only country in Western Europe with as many as three elections (all recent) among the

1  In 2017, the party changed its name into the League (Lega, L). Throughout this book, I will use both denominations interchangeably.

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1 Introduction

ten most ‘volatile’ since 1945 (Baldini et al., 2018). The different degree of party systems’ institutionalisation between the two countries demonstrates how different dynamics of party competition impact party positioning and framing strategies. Second, the degree and characteristics of EU membership. Italy was long considered by scholars a Europhile country and Britain a Eurosceptic country. In recent years, however, scepticism about the benefits of European integration has spread across the continent, including in Italy (Passarelli et al., 2018). According to recent pools, fewer than half of Italian citizens say they would vote to stay in the union (Balfour & Robustelli, 2019). Nevertheless, a difference persists between the two countries; indeed, the UK was among those countries with the lowest levels of trust (29%) in the European Union (EB92). Finally, the history of immigration. In Britain, an immigration country since post-WWII, immigration was relevant as an electoral issue already before the country joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. In contrast, in Italy, a traditional emigration country until the 1980s, the political salience of the immigration issue is much more recent. All these factors potentially affect the logic driving party positioning. The European Parliament is chosen as an additional case study to assess how institutional settings affect parties’ framing strategies  – or, more specifically, whether a framing convergence exists between mainstream left, mainstream right and populist (radical-right) parties and their national delegations in the EP. Party positions are assessed by looking at parliamentary debates. The importance of parliaments for studying political competition is generally overlooked in academic literature. However, as Katz and Mair (2002, p. 124) stress, the party in public office has acquired enhanced status, prestige and autonomy through the ‘parliamentarisation’ of political parties (Koole, 1994, pp. 291–292). Thus, parliaments are an arena par excellence to study party politics. Moreover, parliaments are forums where official political discourse is publicly constructed and debated by the political elite while accomplishing formal political activity, such as governing and legislating (van Dijk, 2006). Thus, parliamentary speeches are preferred over other data sources, based on the conviction that the ‘real’ policy position of a party can be better inferred by considering its day-to-day political confrontation in policy-­ making arenas, rather than by looking at its official position as stated in electoral manifestos or inferred by secondary sources (Wendler, 2016). Further, the study of political confrontation within parliamentary arenas enables a cross-national and inter-institutional comparison, crucial for assessing how institutional settings influence the content of political discourse (Steiner, 2004). As we will see in the empirical part of this book, the mixed-method approach favours an understanding of the thematic categories as well as the discursive argumentations utilised by speakers to support their positions – namely, their framing strategies. The Structure of the Book This book’s analysis of party competition on immigration and the European Union issues is organized at two levels. A horizontal dimension compares parties’ positions in two European countries: Italy and the United Kingdom. To what extent do

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parties belonging to the same party family adopt similar positions in two countries with very different historical, political and institutional constraints? How have party positions changed over time and what factors have underpinned those changes? To what extent are anti-immigration and anti-EU stances connected when political actors mobilize their demands in the public debate? A vertical dimension compares partisan positions between the national and the supranational level of political competition. The goal is to assess to what extent competition framing strategies differ across decision-making arenas, in particular, if the framing strategies adopted by national representatives are coherent with those endorsed by supranational delegations. The vertical dimension of this study advances our understanding of political competition in a multi-level polity. The book is structured as follow: Chap. 2 reviews the literature on party competition, both at the national and supranational level, highlights the key variables identified by scholars to explain parties’ competition strategies on transnational issues, and set the central hypothesis to be tested through the book. Besides, the second chapter presents the theoretical contribution of the book, in particular, an innovative operationalisation of party positioning that enable a fine-grained assessment of party competition in a multi-level political space. I argue that to understand the complex logic of party positioning on transnational issues, it is necessary to disentangle their constitutive policy dimensions. Consequently, I propose a new working conceptualisation of both the issue of the European Union and the issue of immigration. I divide the former into four dimensions, thus comparing parties’ positioning to the very idea of European integration (both regarding deepening and widening the European Union), the set of policies enacted by the EU, and its institutional architecture. Similarly, following a well-established approach in immigration studies (Hammar, 1985; Money, 1999), I conceptualise immigration along with its control vs integration dimension. Chapter 3 provides background information necessary to understand the process of politicization of immigration and the European Union in Italy and the United Kingdom. In particular, the chapter reviews the history of immigration and European integration of both countries and identifies the different constraints to the development of the dependent variable (party position) across time and between institutional levels. The empirical part of this project (Chaps. 4, 5 and 6) provides an investigation into the framing choices of the mainstream left, mainstream right and populist (radical right) parties on each of the policy dimensions constituting immigration and the European Union issues. In so doing, it offers an in-depth assessment into how distinct political actors select issues connected to immigration and the EU, choose among competing frames, and justify their positions towards any given policy-­ specific target. Each empirical chapter is divided into the following parts: first, the share of attention (i.e., issue salience) devoted by each political party to each of the above-mentioned analytical dimensions is compared across decision-making arenas (national and European). Second, the positions (support or opposition; principled or pragmatic) endorsed by each party toward any of the analysed targets is assessed. Finally, through keyword analysis, the frames most emphasised by each party to

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justify its positions vis-à-vis any given policy issue is identified. This multi-stage analysis enables us to elucidate whether opposition and support to immigration and the European Union are framed differently by different parties, to what extent a link exists between anti-immigration and anti-EU attitudes, as well as how political stances change according to policy issues and decision-making arenas. Chapter 7 systematizes the patterns of partisan positioning towards immigration and the European Union deriving from the conducted empirical analysis. In particular, the chapter classifies the analysed political parties based on their positions (opposition/support; principled/pragmatic) on immigration and the European Union. The core objective of the chapter is to provide the reader with a set of guidelines useful to identify parties’ positioning toward issues related to the EU and immigration, overcoming the dualistic and oversimplified classification between mainstream and populist parties. Overall, this book offers a contribution to the academic literature on the politicization of multidimensional policy issues. The empirical results suggest that the politicisation of immigration and the European Union produces complex patterns of party polarisation, which seem to vary according to four main factors: party ideology, policy issue, institutional settings, and practical constraints, e.g., government involvement. The book assesses the complex dynamics of parties’ competition framing strategies on immigration and European affairs and their relevance to understand the evolution of political competition in Western Europe in recent times.

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Calossi, E., & Pizzimenti, E. (2018). Mutamento Dei Partiti e Mutamento Dello Stato. In D. G. Bianchi & F. Raniolo (Eds.), Limiti e Sfide Della Rappresentanza Politica (pp. 161–191). Franco Angeli. Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2018). National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. Pelican. Hammar, T. (Ed.). (1985). European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Comparative Ethnic and Race Relations Series). Cambridge University Press. Hernández, E., & Kriesi, H. (2016). The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 55(2), 203–224. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018). Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C.  J. (2002). Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration? Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), 965–989. Ignazi, P. (1992). The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-­ Wing Parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(1), 3–34. Ignazi, P. (2007). The Questionable Legitimacy of the “State-Centered Party” (Estudio/Working Paper 79). Ignazi, P. (2019). Partito e democrazia. L’incerto percorso della legittimazione dei partiti. Il Mulino. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1994). The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organization. American Review of Politics, 14(1), 593–617. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2002). The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies. In R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, & J. J. Linz (Eds.), Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges (pp. 113–135). Oxford University Press. Koole, R. A. (1994). The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands. In R. S. Katz & P.  Mair (Eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaption in Party Organization in Western Democracies (pp. 278–303). SAGE. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared. European Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 921–956. Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review, 65(3), 682–693. Lipset, S.  M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Free Press. Mair, P. (2000). The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems. West European Politics, 23(4), 27–51. Mair, P. (2002). Populist Democracy vs Party Democracy. In Y.  Mény & Y.  Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (pp. 81–98). Palgrave. Mair, P. (2007). Political Opposition and the European Union. Government and Opposition, 42(1), 1–17. Mair, P. (2008). The Challenge to Party Government. West European Politics, 31(1–2), 211–234. Mair, P. (2009). Representative Versus Responsible Government (EUI Working Paper). Resource Document. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/12533, Accessed 7 April 2021. Money, J. (1999). Defining Immigration Policy: Inventory, Quantitative Referents, and Empirical Regularities. Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Atlanta, GA, September 2–5. Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C.  R. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Odmalm, P. (2019). The Party Politics of Migration and Mobility. In A. Weinar, S. Bonjour, & L.  Zhyznomirska (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe (pp. 118–125). Routledge. Odmalm, P., & Super, B. (2014). If the Issue Fits, Stay Put: Cleavage Stability, Issue Compatibility and Drastic Changes on the Immigration ‘Issue’. Comparative European Politics, 12(6), 663–679.

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Passarelli, G., Serricchio, F., & Tuorto, D. (2018). Euroscepticism and Populism in Italy: Parties and Citizens in National and European Elections. ECPR Paper. Resource Document. https:// ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/2492dc6e-­ae2e-­44b3-­b728-­baa326e82f27.pdf. Accessed 6 April 2021. Pirro, A.  L. P., & van Kessel, S. (2018). Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises. Politics, 38(3), 327–343. Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1982). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. Wiley-Interscience. Scarrow, S. (2007). Political Activism and Party Members. In J. Russell & H. Klingeman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour. Oxford University Press. Steiner, J. (Ed.). (2004). Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse. Cambridge University Press. Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan. van Biezen, I. (2014). Political Parties as Public Utilities. Party Politics, 10(6), 701–722. van Biezen, I., & Poguntke, T. (2014). The Decline of Membership-Based Politics. Party Politics, 20(2), 205–216. Van Der Brug, W., & Van Spanje, J. (2009). Immigration, Europe and the ‘New’ Cultural Dimension. European Journal of Political Research, 48(3), 309–334. van Dijk, T.  A. (2006). Politics, Ideology, and Discourse. In K.  Brown (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics (pp. 728–740). Elsevier. Vittori, D., and Morlino, L. (2021). Populism and democracy in Europe. In D. Albertazzi & D. Vampa (Eds.), Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western Europe (pp. 19–49). Oxon; New York: Routledge. Wendler, F. (2016). Debating Europe in National Parliaments: Public Justification and Political Polarization. Palgrave Macmillan. Wolinetz, S.  B., & Zaslove, A. (Eds.). (2018). Absorbing the Blow: Populist Parties and Their Impact on Parties and Party Systems. Rowman & Littlefield International. Zulianello, M. (2014). Analyzing Party Competition Through the Comparative Manifesto Data: Some Theoretical and Methodological Considerations. Quality & Quantity, 48(3), 1723–1737.

Part I

Framework and Context

Chapter 2

Political Competition on Immigration and the European Union

Abstract  Political conflicts over immigration and the European Union (EU) are seen as the sign of the emergence of a new transnational cleavage, which pits the ‘winners’ of globalisation against its ‘losers’ and which is mobilised mainly by populist and radical right parties. In recent years, a consistent bulk of contributions in the field of party politics has tried to assess the impact of this new transnational cleavage on the structure of party competition, in particular, on parties’ polarization. However, these studies are affected by some shortcomings. First, they mainly analyse partisan positions either on European integration or on immigration issues, without comparing the two and trying to understand what discursive tread, if any, links them. Second, these studies focus predominantly on radical right parties, while comparatively less attention has been devoted to study the competition strategies adopted by mainstream right and mainstream left parties. Finally, the existing specialized literature on party competition looks at parties’ positions either in national or in supranational political arenas, without comparing the two. This chapter presents the theoretical contribution of the book, in particular, an innovative operationalisation of party positioning that enable a fine-grained assessment of party competition in a multi-level political space. Keywords  Party politics · Party position · Issue politics · Populist parties · Mainstream parties

2.1  Introduction On 24 June 2016, it came as an immense shock to many people in the UK to wake up and discover that their country had voted to leave the European Union, their Prime Minister had resigned, and Scotland was considering a referendum that could bring to an end the very existence of the United Kingdom. But was it something that took place overnight? Or perhaps scholars and commentators alike had underestimated some deeper structural factors at the bottom of these processes? If we look at the Brexit vote, we see two factors in the opinion polls that really mattered. The first was immigration, and the second was sovereignty, and these represent a desire for people to take back control of their own countries, and the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_2

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feeling that they are unrepresented by politicians (e.g., Hobolt, 2016; Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Baldini et al., 2019; Menon & Wager, 2020). The Brexit vote teaches us something about the nature of politics today. Contemporary politics is no longer just about right and left. It’s about globalization. The fault line of contemporary politics is between those that embrace globalization and those that fear globalization. More precisely, as Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators (2006) put it, ‘European integration and immigration correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization’ (p. 924). In a similar vein, Hooghe and Marks (2018) claim that the impact of immigration and European integration on Western European politics has been no less disruptive than the previous junctures identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in cleavage politics. In their words: Just as the Bolshevik revolution was a critical juncture in the expression of the class cleavage, so the euro crisis and the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a transnational cleavage. (p. 116)

Conflicts over immigration and the European Union are seen as the sign of the emergence of a new transnational cleavage, which pits the ‘winners’ of globalisation against its ‘losers’ and which is mobilised mainly by populist and radical right parties (PRRPs). As a result, in recent years, a consistent bulk of contributions in the field of party politics has tried to assess the impact of this new transnational cleavage on the structure of party competition, in particular, on parties’ polarization (e.g., Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2002; Rovny & Whitefield, 2019; Green-Pedersen, 2019; De Sio & Lachat, 2020). However, these studies are affected by some shortcomings. First, they mainly analyse partisan positions either on European integration or on immigration issues, without comparing the two and trying to understand what discursive tread, if any, links them (with the notable exception of Odmalm, 2014). Second, these studies focus predominantly on PRRPs, while comparatively less attention has been devoted to study the competition strategies adopted by mainstream parties (Abdou et al., 2021). Finally, the existing specialized literature on party competition looks at parties’ positions either in national or in supranational political arenas, without comparing the two. In so doing, most of the existing literature on party competition overlooks the complex logic of parties’ positioning in a multi-level political system. The book draws on saliency theory (Budge & Farlie, 1983), issue ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996; see also Walgrave et al., 2015), and yield theory (De Sio & Weber, 2014; De Sio et al., 2018; D’Alimonte et al., 2020; Abou-Chadi et al., 2020; De Sio & Lachat, 2020) to investigate two aspects that have not received sufficient attention in academic research on party competition: the multidimensional nature of political competition, and the relevance of institutional settings in determining party framing strategies. In so doing, the book answers to the following research questions: (a) By which political actors, and how, are ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ mobilised as political issues in the public domain? (Actor comparison); (b) How and to what degree are ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ linked as issues, when actors mobilise political demands? (Issue comparison); (c) Do parties’ framing strategies of ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ differ between national and supranational decision-making arenas? (Institutional comparison).

2.2 Definitions

13

The aim of the book is to assess the role played by immigration and the EU in reshaping political competition in legislative arenas, once these issues have been normalized within party systems. This, in turn, implies to evaluate to what extent anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stances are linked by political actors when they mobilize political demands in public domains. In so doing, the book advances our understanding of the dynamic of party competition on highly politicized policy issues. The book focuses on Italy and the United Kingdom as they are emblematic of the effects of the politicization of immigration and European affairs on domestic politics. Moreover, the European Parliament is considered as an additional case study to understand to what extent party framing strategies on transnational issues are coherent between the national and supranational level, thus contributing to the study of party competition in multi-level politics. In the following pages, I provide an in-depth analysis of approximately 2000 parliamentary speeches delivered in the low chamber of Italian and British national parliaments, and in the EP between 2015 and 2020. This volume seeks to contribute to the literature on the politicization of immigration and European Union. On the one hand, I should build upon existing theories and hypotheses to advance our understanding of which factors impact the most on the dynamics of politicization and de-politicization of transnational issues. On the other, I shall broaden the scope of investigation of the politicization of immigration and the EU to contribute to our understanding of the complex logics of party positioning in multi-level politics. The remainder of this chapter will introduce the key features of the academic contribution of the present book, discussing its innovative theoretical aspects as well as the research hypotheses that it sets to test and then, discuss the research design and the methodology of the study.

2.2  Definitions Through this book I will refer to mainstream and populist parties. According to Peter Mair (1989, 2008), mainstream parties are those parties which hold a moderate position along the left-right spectrum, and are accustomed to being in office, such as Labour/Social Democrats for the mainstream left and Conservatives and Liberals for the mainstream right. Populism is usually classified by scholars according to the importance attributed to the ideological (Mudde, 2007), discursive (Laclau, 2005), strategic (Weyland, 2001, 2017), or performative (Moffit, 2016; Moffit & Tormey, 2014) dimension. Recently, some scholars have proposed a ‘minimalist’ definition of populism (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 4; Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019, p. 64), centred on some minimum criteria necessary to classify a political actor as populist. The minimal definition is based on two elements: the centrality of the concept of ‘people’, namely the attention placed on a collective subject identified as representative of the unspoken needs of society; and anti-elitism, namely the opposition between the people and the elite (either political, economic or of some other kind).

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However, the appeal to the people can be defined in ethnic, civic, collectivist or particularistic terms, depending on the social, economic and political context in which it occurs (de Raadt et al., 2004, p. 4). In particular, while the right-wing populist political parties tend to conceptualize the people as belonging to the national community, conceived in strictly ethnic terms (e.g., Betz, 1994, p. 417; Odmalm & Rydgren, 2019, p.  375), the left-wing populist parties define the concept of the people in terms of class, in a post-Marxist perspective (e.g., March, 2017, p. 284; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 3). In this work, I will use the term ‘populist parties’ to refer to Mudde’s (2007) definition of populism: a thin-centered ideology that considers society as separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people. Following Mudde’s classification, ‘populist radical right-wing parties’ are a sub-set of populist parties, emerged in the ‘80s and located at the right-­ wing periphery of the left-right scale, which adds to the populist platform: (i) an exclusivist conceptualisation of the nation; and (ii) a concern for moral order and security (Ignazi, 1992, 1996; Mudde, 2007, 2019).1

2.3  Models of Party Competition This book focuses on the dynamics of political competition on immigration and the European Union in legislative arenas. The combination of rising anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments across Europe makes it necessary to study the dynamics of politicization and de-politicization of immigration and the European Union in public debates, at different levels of governance. The existing literature on party competition suggests three different modes of politicisation of European and immigration issues: government versus opposition; left versus right; and mainstream versus peripheral parties. According to the first two approaches, political polarisation on the issues of Europe and immigration has been ‘domesticated’. More specifically, it has been incorporated into the traditional patterns of party competition, namely government versus opposition and left versus right. On the contrary, the third approach states that party competition on transnational issues has changed the structure of the political space, creating new patterns of polarisation among political parties. For the government versus opposition approach, which looks predominantly at the political opportunity structure, mainstream (incumbent) parties are expected to have access to resources and to influence the decision-making process, both at the national and at the supranational level. As a result, they are expected to converge towards balanced, pragmatic and less ideological positions (Helbling, 2014). On the 1  For an overview of the academic literature on varieties of populism refer to Gidron and Bonikowski (2013), Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn (2016), Heinisch and Mazzoleni (2017), Caiani and Graziano (2019), Albertazzi et al. (2021).

2.3  Models of Party Competition

15

contrary, parties in opposition, usually smaller and equipped with less resources, are expected to focus on a sub-set of issues and to adopt single-frame categories. Moreover, being excluded from the decision-making process, they have an incentive to be critical towards the EU in order to hold their government accountable for its actions at the European level (Wendler, 2013; Statham & Koopmans, 2009). Another strand of the literature explains party politicisation of transnational issues by focusing on the ideological identity of political parties. In this vein, parties’ positions on immigration and the European Union are expected to be integrated into the traditional left-right continuum of political competition (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Bale, 2003; Carvalho & Ruedin, 2020 for party competition on immigration; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000; Gabel & Hix, 2002; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002; Braun et al., 2019 for party competition on the EU). According to this approach, European integration is a matter of contention that is ‘regulated capitalism versus neoliberalism’ (Marks & Steenbergen, 2002, p. 888). Therefore, party positions towards European affairs are expected to resonate with domestic stances on the representation of functional interests. Similarly, according to some well-known theories in immigration studies, mainstream left and mainstream right parties are expected to be equally restrictive towards immigration control, while mainstream left parties are expected to be more permissive when it comes to integrating already resident migrants (Money, 1999; Lahav, 2004; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2012; Carvalho & Ruedin, 2020). Finally, the mainstream versus peripheral parties’ approach claims that political competition over transnational issues has added a second dimension to the traditional left-right divide, thus giving birth to atypical patterns of polarisation among political parties (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Mainstream left and mainstream right parties are expected to be internally divided on matters related to immigration and European integration. Indeed, mainstream right parties need to combine their neoliberal economic orientations, which push for the liberalization of the labour market, with their cultural nationalism, which calls for the defence of a constructed homogeneous national identity (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008; Odmalm, 2019; Bale, 2003, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). Similarly, mainstream left parties have to constantly bridge the divide between the liberal sociocultural preferences of their middleclass supporters, which are in favour of individual freedoms and international solidarity, and the protectionism of the working class, threatened by economic competition of cheap labour (Bale et al., 2010; Akkerman, 2015; Castelli Gattinara, 2016; Hooghe et al., 2002). According to Perlmutter (1996): Liberal mass parties face conflicts between unions who favor restrictive policies and liberals and ethnic groups who favor expansionist policies; conservative parties are divided between employers who favor expansionist immigration policies and cultural conservatives who favor restrictive policies […] Since seeking to exploit immigration as an issue is as likely to divide one’s own party as one’s opposition, mass parties are reluctant to do so. (p. 377).

As a result of these ‘conflicting ideological pulls’ (Odmalm & Bale, 2015, p. 10) mainstream parties are likely to adopt ‘vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions’ on immigration instead of a clear ideological stance, ‘in order to either attract

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broader support, or at least not deter voters on these issues’ (Rovny, 2012, pp. 5–6). To sum up, according to the third account of the literature on party polarisation on the European Union and immigration affairs, mainstream parties are expected to stick to their entrenched positions on the left-right (economic) spectrum, while blurring their positions on cultural-identitarian issues related to the two issues at stake. This in turn creates an opportunity for peripheral parties to attack the cartel of mainstream parties with Eurosceptic and anti-immigration positions (Kitschelt & McGann, 2005; Minkenberg, 2013), generating an ‘inverted U’ curve of polarisation (Taggart, 1998; Sitter, 2002, 2003; König et al., 2017). Previous studies have tested the explanatory power of ideological and strategic variables, i.e., incumbency, on a unidimensional conceptualisation of the immigration and the EU-issues, that does not take into account their complexity. In this book, I aim to re-test the impact of these factors on parties’ positions across the key policy dimensions that constitute immigration and EU-issues. The central hypothesis of the book is that parties belonging to the same party family compete on the same policy-dimensions and adopt the same frames, irrespective of country-specific or institutional constraints.

2.4  A Multidimensional Approach to Political Competition When studying political competition on transnational issues, scholars have usually conceptualized them as unidimensional to collocate political parties along the left-­ right continuum of the political spectrum. In so doing, they have overshadowed the complexity of party positioning on multidimensional policy issues, that often crosscut the traditional left-right divide and put political parties under considerable ideological pressure. Rather than a single issue, my claim is that immigration and the European Union are multi-dimensional issues that bundle socio-economic, political and cultural-identitarian aspects. Immigration comprises two dimensions: immigration control and migrant integration. The policy of immigration control defines the degree to which a nation opens its borders to the entry and residence of foreign citizens. At the same time, it accounts for the mechanisms of deterrence, namely the measures in place to identify and expel those foreign citizens who do not possess the right to stay legally in a country, i.e., irregular or undocumented migrants. The policy of migrant integration defines the degree of membership in the host society. Integration policies range across three main areas: civic, social and political (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992). The civic element encompasses the rights related to individual freedoms, e.g., freedom of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, right to justice. The social element entails the right to share the welfare of the receiving society, namely access to social services, health care, housing, the labour market, education, retirement benefits, minimum living standards and so on. Finally, the political element refers to the right to participate in the decision-making process of the host nation, namely the right to vote and the right to citizenship.

2.4  A Multidimensional Approach to Political Competition

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Citizenship is the status of those who are full members of the receiving community: they are equal to national citizens and share the same rights and duties. Indeed, the rules governing the process of naturalisation and the availability of citizenship to children born in the host country are important in this respect. Here the main distinction is between jus soli, when a person’s nationality at birth is determined by the territory within which he or she was born, and jus sanguinis, the principle according to which a person’s nationality depends on that of his or her natural parents. According to this brief review, the control/integration dichotomy can be further broken down into the following policy areas (Table 2.1): • Immigration control policy: a) border controls; b) humanitarian migration, e.g., refugees and asylum seekers, vulnerable migrants); c) family reunification, namely, family members of already resident immigrants and d) labour migration, e.g., seasonal workers, trans-borders workers, international students. • Integration policy: a) socio-economic integration; b) cultural-religious integration; c) civic integration. The European Union can be understood as a polity à la Easton (1965) as it is possible to distinguish ‘between the ideas of European integration’ and ‘the current embodiment of these ideas’ (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p.  300), namely between ‘what the EU is’ – the components of the EU-political system – and ‘what the EU does’ – the outputs of the EU-political system. To sum up, I classify the targets of parties’ positioning as: EU Integration; EU Institutions; and EU Policies (Table 2.2). The variety of features of transnational policy issues has led to the emergence of multiple party politicization strategies, ranging from attempts to elicit these policy issues from political competition, to the polarization of party positions, either on the left or on the right of the political spectrum. Therefore, issues related to immigration and European affairs are particularly interesting to study political competition. They allow to assess the different dimensions and framing strategies structuring party competition on multidimensional transnational issues, advancing our understanding of the logic of party positioning. Based on these considerations, I set out to investigate two aspects that have not received sufficient attention in academic research on party competition: the multidimensional nature of policy issues, and the relevance of institutional settings in determining party framing strategies. By empirically assessing party positioning strategies on complex and multidimensional transnational issues, I propose an Table 2.1 Conceptualization of the immigration issue

Control Admission and entrance Residence status Expulsion

Integration Cultural-religious integration Socio-economic rights Civic integration

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Hammar (1985) and Money (1999)

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Table 2.2  Conceptualisation of the European Union (EU) issue Targets European Integration

European Policies

European Institutions

Components EU membership EU enlargement EU deepening EU identity Objectives Instruments Financial endowments Outputs EU Council EU Commission EU Parliament Other institutions

Sub-targets

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Schengen Area

EU elite

Source: Author’s elaboration

understanding of political competition based on the breaking down of policy problems into constitutive issue-dimensions (for a similar approach see Castelli Gattinara, 2016). The concept of dimensionality is based on the idea that complex policy issues involve a large number of dimensions of choice. Political actors need to select some of these dimensions and disregard some others to convey a political massage that is understandable by as many electors as possible. In order to win elections, political actors have an incentive to represent complex policy issues in a simplified way or, according to the valence theory (Stokes, 1963), they strategically choose and promote dimensions that the own party is very positively connected with or that the opposing party is very negatively connected with among the electorate. For this reason, the study of political competition needs to focus not only on which policy dimensions are emphasised by any political actor, but also on how the political message is crafted. To fully understand the logic of party positioning, it is necessary to look not only at the dimensions of political competition (positioning), but also at how political parties frame issues associated with those dimensions in the programmatic offer that they put forward (issue framing). The concept of framing is derived from the framing theory (Goffman, 1974), according to which the way something is presented to the audience (‘the frame’) influences the choices people make about how to process that information. In line with the previous literature, I define framing as the process in which some issues become salient and some other are silenced in order ‘to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Frames can be either principled, when they refer to normative argumentations based on claims about values or moral standards of justice and legitimacy (Wendler, 2016), or pragmatic, when they refer to ‘[m]eans-ends type of rationality where actors are considered to take decisions

2.4  A Multidimensional Approach to Political Competition

19

made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests’ (Sjursen, 2002, p. 494). By combining the twofold aspects of the process of party positioning (dimensions and frames), I operationalize a party position as made of three parts: a direction (positive, neutral or negative), a character (principled or pragmatic) and a frame. I build upon Helbling (2014), Castelli Gattinara (2016) and Pirro and van Kessel (2018) to identify six frame categories, useful as heuristics to assess EU and immigration-related discursive strategies: socio-economic, cultural-religious, moral-universal, sovereigntism, security, and legitimacy frames. Socio-economic frames link a party’s position to economic and financial arguments (Table 2.3). With respect to immigration, these frames may refer to the negative effects of immigration, e.g., social dumping and stress on the welfare system or, on the contrary, to the economic benefits provided by immigration, e.g., a cheap labour force for boosting economic growth, filling labour shortages, and fighting an ageing population. With respect to the EU, socio-economic frames may refer to a party evaluation (positive or negative) of the European economic and fiscal governance or, more generally, to the effects (positive or negative) of a country’s membership of the Eurozone. Cultural-religious frames link a party’s position to identitarian arguments. They may express opposition or support towards the immigration of Muslims, Roma or other ethnic and religious minorities, or, similarly, they may express opposition or support to EU enlargement towards non-Cristian countries. Moral-universal frames link a party’s position to universalistic arguments. They can be used by a speaker to defend the basic human rights of migrants or to call for democracy and human rights in the EU to be respected. Sovereigntist frames link a party’s position to nationalistic arguments. They can express opposition to the process of EU deepening, namely the transfer of competences and powers to EU institutions, or support for border controls, in the name of the respect of core state interests and prerogatives. Security frames link a party’s position to law-and-order arguments. They may express concern regarding the level of immigration or connect this phenomenon to major security threats such as terrorism, human trafficking and other types of Table 2.3  Frames classification Frames Socio-­ economic Cultural-­ religious Sovereigntist Moral-­ universal Security Legitimacy

Thematic dimension Welfare, labour and social security, economic growth, Euro, European fiscal and monetary policies, European economic governance Ethnic and religious minorities, multiculturalism, civic integration, EU values, identity and symbols Control of national borders, transfer of decision-making powers and policy competences to supranational institutions International protection, human rights, rule of law, peace promotion, democracy Emergency, civic and moral order, terrorism, organized crime Effectiveness, competence, corruption, management of public resources, democratic deficit

Source: Author’s elaboration from Castelli Gattinara (2016) and Pirro and van Kessel (2018)

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international organized crime. Finally, legitimacy frames link a party’s position to functional arguments. They can be used to evaluate (positively or negatively) the efficacy of a policy, as well as to express opposition towards the economic or political elite. It is worth stressing that the above-mentioned frames are not mutually exclusive and can be used by political actors either to express opposition or to express support to any given target (Urso, 2018). As an example, the reception of refugees can be framed both as a pressure on social welfare (socio-economic frames) and as a threat to a supposed homogeneous and cohesive society (cultural-religious frames) or, on the contrary, as a source of cheap labour to boost economic growth (socio-economic frames) and as a source of cultural diversity that enriches host societies (cultural-­ religious frames).

2.5  Research Design This book is a comparative analysis of the positions endorsed by Italian and British mainstream left, mainstream right and populist parties on two increasingly politicised issues – immigration and the European Union – in three distinct legislative arenas – the House of Deputies of the Italian Parliament, the House of Commons in the British Parliament and the European Parliament (EP) – from 2015 until 2020. Political parties have been selected according to two criteria: party affiliation (on the left-right dimension) and party position (governing vs opposition) in the national political arena (see Appendix 1). In the time frame considered, Italy experienced two national elections (in 2013 and in 2018) and five governments. The results of the 2013 election mirrored a common trend in Western European democracies: the decline of mainstream parties in favor of anti-establishment parties (e.g., Berman & Snegovaya, 2019; D’Alimonte, 2014; Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Ignazi, 2020). Although PD, the Democratic party (Partito Democratico, PD) thanks to the majority bonus, obtained the highest number of seats in the House of Deputies (297), it lost three million votes in respect to the 2008 national election. However, Berlusconi’s The People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL) was the net looser of the election, as the party lost six million votes in respect of his 2008 victory. Lacking the majority in the Senate, PD was forced to form a coalition government – the Letta cabinet (28 April 2013–22 February 2014) – with PdL and with a small number of Members of the Parliament (MPs) elected in former PM Mario Monti’s list (Civic Choice, Scelta Civica, SC). The net winner of the 2013 election was M5S, with more than eight million votes and 109 seats (Pasquino, 2014). M5S became the largest party in the country, attracting votes across the political spectrum and from all sectors of the society (Garzia, 2013). As a result of a power struggle within PD, Enrico Letta resigned after only 9 months and 25 days. His successor, Matteo Renzi, formed the longest cabinet in the history of the Italian Republic (2  years and 8  months). The government was composed of members of PD together with the New Centre-Right (Nuovo

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Centrodestra, NCD), the Union of the Centre (Unione di Centro, UdC), Civic Choice and other minors parties. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi resigned after losing the 2016 constitutional referendum. His successor, Paolo Gentiloni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, formed a new cabinet (12 December 2016–1 June 2018), led by PD, and including NCD and Centrists for Europe (CpE) as junior partners. In the election of 4 March 2018, the coalition that received most votes was the centre-right. Within this coalition, the most relevant party was the LN, led by Matteo Salvini, which gained four million votes (+13% as compared to 2013) and 123 seats. On the contrary, the party led by Berlusconi, renamed Forward Italy (Forza Italia, FI) after the poor electoral results of PDL in 2013, continued its decline (−2,7 million votes). Among the winners, M5S got a third of all votes (Garcia, 2018). PD was among the losers of the last Italian election, with 2,5 million votes less as compared to 2013. After the 2018 election, for the first time in Europe, a fully-fledge Eurosceptic and populist government – the Conte I cabinet (1 June 2018–5 September 2019), also called Yellow-Green coalition  – was formed. It was composed of M5S and LN.  In the 2019 European elections, LN triumphed gaining 34.33% votes and cementing its position as Italy’s biggest party. Tensions within the government coalition increased (Castelli Gattinara & Froio, 2020, p. 4), leading to the collapse of the first Giuseppe Conte Cabinet in August 2019, the formation of a new coalition executive (Conte II), this time between M5S and PD, and the return of LN to the opposition. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, increasing tensions over the management of the EU Next Generation Fund led to the resignment of three cabinet members of Italy Alive (Italia Viva, IV) (the Minister of Agriculture, Teresa Bellanova, the Minister of Family, Elena Bonetti, and the Undersecretary for Economy, Ivan Scalfarotto). Unable to find enough votes in Parliament to move ahead with the government, on 26 January 2021 Conte resigned. A pro-European government led by Mario Draghi, one of the major representatives of the European institutions, was formed. Perhaps surprisingly, Draghi’s cabinet has been supported by both M5S and LN, traditionally fierce Eurosceptic parties. The instability of the party system and government coalitions in Italy allows to observe how parties change their position on policy issues while shifting from government to opposition. In the last ten years, British politics has gone through turbulent times as well, especially after the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Many times, it appeared that the traditional patterns of British electoral politics, where two major parties competed to form single-party-majority government, thus conferring stability to the country, was about to vanish (Renwick, 2016, p. 39). However, this scenario never materialized, and the Conservative Party (CON) managed to stay in government for three consecutive mandates. In the 2015, Tories’ victory was unexpected, as most pools had put the two mainstream parties neck and neck. Cameron was re-elected Prime Minister and formed the first Conservative major government since 1992. As promised in the electoral manifesto, Cameron committed to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the European Union and announced that he would have campaigned in favour of remaining within a ‘reformed Union’ (BBC, 2016). The Brexit

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referendum, held on 23 June 2016, was won by a narrow majority (52 per cent) by the ‘Leave’ supporters. A few hours after the referendum, Cameron addressed the country in a dramatic speech in which he acknowledged the results of the referendum and resigned (Goodlad, 2016, p. 19). Theresa May took his place, becoming the second female British Prime Minister, after Margaret Thatcher. Although Mrs. May had voted Remain, she had not played a prominent role in the Brexit campaign and, once installed as PM, she quickly set out to reassure the party that ‘Brexit means Brexit. On 29 March 2017, Ms. May triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, under which the British government would have two years to negotiate an exit deal with the European Union. Then, to capitalise on Labour’s apparent weakness and to increase the Tories’ majority and her room for manoeuvre in Brexit negotiations, she called a snap election in April 2017. Although the governing Conservative Party remained the single largest party in the House of Commons, it nevertheless lost its majority, resulting in the formation of a minority government with a confidence and supply arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. Conversely, the Labour Party (LAB) finished as the second largest party in Parliament but increased its share of the popular vote to 40%, resulting in a net gain of 30 seats. It was the first time Labour had made a net gain of seats since 1997. The party’s 9.6% increase in vote share was its most significant gain in a single general election since 1945. The reality of Brexit negotiations proved to be more complicated than Mrs May had expected. Almost two and a half years after the Brexit referendum, the European Union and the United Kingdom finally reached an agreement on 25 November 2018. In 2019, Boris Johnson won the General Election with an overall majority of 80, ending years of paralysis in the EU-UK negotiations. During the electoral campaign, he promised to ‘get Brexit done’. Indeed, on 31 January 2021, after signing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the UK get from the Single Market and Customs Union. Italy and the United Kingdom are two very good cases to study the evolution of political competition on immigration and European Affairs. Both countries experienced the rise of populist and populist radical right parties in recent years  – the United Kingdom Independence Party in Britain, LN and M5S in Italy – mainly due to the politicisation of the immigration and the European Union issues (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Baldini & Giglioli, 2020). However, the pace of politicization of these two policy issues, and the constraints on the potential development of the dependent variable (party positioning), vary significantly between the two countries for at least three reasons. First, the electoral system, that impacts on the relative power of political parties in the decision-making arena. In the UK, most elections are decided using the first-­ past-­the-post electoral system, which is considered particularly efficient as it tends to produce a two-party system and stable governments. However, the number of MPs a party has in parliament rarely matches its popularity within the electorate, as small parties without a geographical base find it hard to win seats. This is exemplified by the case of UKIP that got only one MP after the 2015 general election, although it was supported by 3.9 million voters, gaining 12.6 per cent of the votes (Appendix I). Nevertheless, as we will see better in the next chapters, the party

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guided by Nigel Farage managed to set the political agenda in the UK by implementing a successful ‘fusion strategy’ (Ford & Goodwin, 2014) between issues connected with the democratic deficit of the EU institutions and the widespread public dissatisfaction towards the level of immigration in the UK. On the contrary, Italy has experienced four electoral reforms over the last quarter of a century. As a result, the Italian political system is highly fragmented and scarcely institutionalized: Italy is the only country in Western Europe with as many as three – all recent – elections among the ten most ‘volatile’ since 1945 (Baldini et al., 2018). With the 2013 ‘electoral earthquake’ (Chiaramonte & De Sio, 2014), Italy experienced the collapse of the bipolar pattern of party competition that had characterised the Second Republic since 1994 (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2014), as an entirely new populist party, the M5S, came third (with 25.56% of the vote and 108 seats) after the two dominant mainstream left and mainstream right parties. From the point of view of agenda setting studies, Italy and the UK are two interesting cases to observe the variable dynamics of issue salience in contexts with a very different political opportunity structure. Second, the degree and characteristics of EU membership. For a long time, Italy was considered a Europhile country, while Britain has never been entirely at ease with its membership of the EU, so much so that it was famously labelled as ‘the awkward partner’ (George, 1990). Euroscepticism has been a dominant trait for Britain ever since the early 1960s (Gifford, 2008; Gamble, 2003; Baker & Schnapper, 2015; Tournier-Sol, 2015). Indeed, the first UK-wide referendum on membership was held by the Labour government under Harold Wilson in 1975, after the UK had joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Britain’s membership of the EU has always been based on self-interest, which explains why that membership has long been accompanied by many ‘opt-outs’ in key policy areas for state powers (e.g., Economic and Monetary Union and the Schengen Agreement). This, in turn, has resulted in the UK being one of the less integrated Member states in an increasingly differentiated Europe (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014; Leruth, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2018). On the contrary, Italy was one of the six funder members of the EEC in 1957, having already joined the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The unconditional support of the Italian political elite for the process of European integration – it suffices here to recall that some of the founding fathers of the European project, such as Altiero Spinelli and Alcide De Gasperi, were Italians – was made possible by a long-standing strong and stable public support, even years after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The politicization of the EU-issue in Italy started only recently, in particular, after 2008, when first the economic crisis – and then the migration crisis2 – threatened not just European economies (Serricchio, Tsakatika & Quaglia, 2013) but also European solidarity and political cohesion (Lang, 2018). 2  Through this book, I refer to the peak of refugee heading for Europe between 2015 and 2016 as the ‘refugee crisis’ or the ‘migration crisis’ interchangeably. This terminological choice follows the same argumentation as the discourses analysed. Nonetheless, I am aware of the problems that arise from this oversimplification, which have been widely addressed by worldwide comparative research (e.g., Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 5; Tedesco, 2016, p. 51).

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Finally, the pace and modes of politicization of the immigration issue were different between Italy and the UK. Britain is one of the European countries with the longest history of post-colonial migration, while Italy became an immigration country in the 1970s (Einaudi, 2007). Therefore, immigration in the UK was a salient electoral issue already in the 1960s, as exemplified by the famous ‘River of Blood’ speech (1968) by Enoch Powell, a senior member of CON, in which he maintained that immigration of non-whites from former colonies was a threat to British cultural homogeneity and predicted a civil war if immigration was not stopped. On the contrary, immigration became a politicized issue in Italy only in the 1990s, with the first two waves of mass migration from the Balkans, and then after the mass arrival of refugees in 2015. To sum up, Italy and the UK are a sort of prototypical cases in terms of political system (proportional versus majoritarian), experience of immigration (new versus old immigration country) and history of European integration (recent versus old Eurosceptic country). This makes it possible to assess whether a generalizable link exists between politicisation of policy-specific issues and partisan positioning in political contexts with different constraints on the development of this political process. Adding the European Parliament (EP) as an additional case study allows me to compare the positions endorsed by national parties with those held by their delegations in the EP, and to assess the extent to which they are coherent – in terms of policy dimensions and frames – with each other (Proksch & Slapin, 2015). In doing so, the book bridges two branches of the literature (party competition in national arenas and party competition in supranational arenas) that have been often considered separately, and thereby advances our understanding of partisan competition in a multi-level political space (Leruth, 2015). This book aim is to assess party framing strategies within multidimensional policy issues, rather than competition strategies over issues. Understanding how political actors compete on a number of interrelated policy dimensions, and which frames they adopt, requires an in-depth analysis of political debates to identify the direction, character and frames of party positions. For this reason, I decided to focus on parliamentary debates, rather than relying on the more commonly used party manifestos, roll-call votes, and expert surveys (Wendler, 2016). In line with other scholars (van Dijk, 2006; Wendler, 2016), I believe that party positioning can be better inferred by looking at political confrontation in policy making arenas, namely through the analysis of what parties say, instead of looking at party positions as stated in electoral manifestos or inferred by secondary sources. Parliaments are the institutions par excellence where representatives of the people discuss and decide about the critical issues for their country. Here, elected representatives publicly fight for their policy proposals, opposing alternative argumentations and worldviews. Parliaments are at the heart of democratic representation: political discussions of highly relevant policy-issues and legislative proposals are accessible to the public and, especially when there is media attention on specific issues, politicians are held accountable for their decisions by the broader public (Usherwood, 2017). Besides, parliamentary settings favour political

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confrontation, since the stakes for parties are much lower with speeches than with votes (Rasmussen, 2008). This is particularly true at the European level, where Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who disagree with the position taken by their European Political Party Group (EPPG) may use speeches to present the position of their national party on some policy-specific issues (Proksch & Slapin, 2015). Also, parliaments make it possible to study the day-to-day position of political parties over a broad range of issues, tackling both positional shifts and intraparty dissent, an aspect that is often neglected by the existing literature on party competition (Leruth, 2015, p. 817). Moreover, there is much cross-national variation across parliament, which in turn makes it possible to study how institutional settings influence the content of political discourse. Finally, parliaments have a complete record of plenary debates, which is of invaluable practical help for empirical research. In this book, I analyse debates hold in plenaries, as they constitute a major public forum where more comprehensive and confrontational debates regarding the general principles of laws, or matters of urgency, take place; at the same time, it is also in these sessions that politicians provide public justification for the decisions of the Parliament (Lord, 2013, p. 253). I used a Python script to automate the procedure of retrieval and extraction of parliamentary speeches from the parliamentary repositories, as well as to build a machine-readable collection of speeches (or corpus) already divided by political party and by deputy. The results were then manually scanned, and only debates whose content explicitly referred to the policy-specific dimensions of immigration and the EU defined above were considered. A total number of 2.000 speeches were collected and analysed. To analyse parliamentary speeches, I have applied a mixed-method approach made of three steps (Bakker et al., 2015). First, speeches were manually codified using MaxQDA, a software for Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), on the basis of a codebook that assigns two categories to each policy dimension (immigration control, migrant integration, EU integration, EU policies, and EU institutions), expressing the ‘directionality’ of the positioning (positive, negative or neutral), and the character of party positioning (principled or pragmatic). Then, the frequencies of coded sentences were used to build an additive index of party positioning. To construct the index, I firstly considered the frequency of coded sentences to assess the direction of party positioning as:

Opposition / Support = log ( CN + 1) log ( N + 1) − log ( CP + 1) log ( N + 1) (2.1)

where ‘CN’ equals all parts of text coded as ‘negative’, ‘CP’ stands for all parts of text coded as ‘positive’ and ‘N’ represents the totality of coding, including those parts coded as ‘neutral’. This index is an adaptation of Prosser’s (2014) re-­ elaboration of Lowe et al.’s (2011) logit scaling technique for calculating political parties’ positions on a left-right scale. It is based on a logarithmic structure which accounts for the diminishing importance of subsequent mentions of a policy in a party’s manifesto or discourse (Lowe et al., 2011). A similar index has been previously applied to the study of party opposition in the European Parliament (Carlotti,

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2021). Adding a unit to the number of positive and negative quasi-sentences keeps the values of non-mentioned issues equal to zero, given that log 1 = 0. This, in turn, prevents an overestimation of non-mentioned issues in short speeches (Prosser, 2014, p. 96). The resulting index is a continuous variable, ranging between 1 and −1, indicating the highest opposition to or the highest support for the considered targets respectively. Whenever the variable takes the value of 0, it indicates either a lack of salience of the specific target to the party or that the same proportion of coded negative/positive or coded restrictive/permissive sentences is present. To complete the index of positioning, I include a value indicating the character: principled or pragmatic. To assign this, I look at the resulting directionality: if a party displays a positive directionality (thus denoting opposition) and if the majority of the sentences coded negative/restrictive are principled in character (value of 1), then the party is exercising a principled opposition, and vice-versa. The resulting index looks like:

( Q ± q ) ∗100

(2.2)

where Q represents the continuous variable mentioned above, and q refers to the character of the expressed positioning. The formula presents the ± operator to obtain a symmetric scale of positioning: if Q is positive the value of q is added, whereas, if Q is negative, the value of q is subtracted. The index ranges between +200 and −200, indicating the maximum degrees of principled opposition and principled support respectively, whereas a value of +100 or −100 indicates the maximum degree of pragmatic opposition or pragmatic support respectively. If the index takes the value of 0 it indicates a neutral position of the parties. In order to re-scale the index between −1 and +1 and make it more readable, I have divided it by 200. The analysis assumes that the more a specific dimension of the two issues is important to the parties, the more they emphasise it. In the same way, a lack of reference towards one of the specific dimensions signals a lack of saliency to the party of that specific dimension (Budge, 1994; Lowe et al., 2011). The last step of the coding process was aimed at identifying the frames used by political parties to support their policy positions. Using WMatrix, an open-source software for corpus analysis and comparison (Rayson, 2008), I performed keywords-analysis to identify each corpus’s keywords.3 This method allows to identify the words that are prototypical for any party avoiding potential biases in their selections, as WMatrix objectively establishes the keywords according to their statistical significance or ‘keyness’.4 The identified keywords were also used to report quotes from the analysed speeches in an objective way, providing the reader with a qualitative hint of party positioning.

3  A keyword is ‘a word which occurs with unusual frequency in a given text. This does not mean high frequency but unusual frequency, by comparison with a reference corpus of some kind’ (Scott, 1997, p. 236). 4  A high value of ‘keyness’ indicates a prototypical word in a given corpus. I considered as statistically significant only those items with a ‘keyness’ value over 7, since 6.63 is the cut-off point for 99% confidence of significance (Rayson, 2012).

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This book innovates in many respects. In terms of scope of political competition, it investigates the relationship among different modes of politicisation of complex policy issues across political contexts and institutional arenas. In particular, being the UK and Italy two diverse cases in terms of political system, experience of immigration and history of European integration, the book assesses whether a generalizable link exists between the politicisation of transnational political issues and party positioning. In terms of data collection, the book advances qualitative content analysis as a source of information about political positioning and brings frame analysis to bear on it.

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Chapter 3

Debating Immigration and European Issues in Italy, the United Kingdom and the EP Abstract  Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) are two emblematic cases to observe the effects of the politicisation of immigration and European affairs on party politics. First, the UK is traditionally a two-party system, while the Italian political system is highly fragmented and scarcely institutionalized. Second, Italy used to be a Europhile country, while the UK has never been entirely at ease with its membership of the European Union (EU), so much so to exit from the Union. Finally, Italy has only recently turned into an immigration country, while immigration is a long-­standing phenomenon in the UK.  These differences increase the variance in party politics, thus making it possible to understand if a generalisable relation exists between party family and party positioning. The European Parliament (EP) is considered as an additional case study as it allows to compare political competition across levels of government. This chapter presents a review of the history of immigration and European integration in Italy and the UK from the ‘90s until today, as well as an analysis of the evolution of political competition on immigration and European affairs in the EP. Keywords  Italy · UK · European Parliament · Immigration · Party politics · Political competition

3.1  Introduction Over the last ten years, immigration and European affairs have become central in the political debate of most European countries (Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021). The 2008 financial crisis, first, and then the 2015 migration crisis, made EU governance a very contested issue. As Castelli Gattinara and Froio (2014) notice ‘the progressive Europeanization of the public debate combined with the persisting absence of the space for political opposition – as is the case when politics is led by emergency and technocratic reasoning’ (p. 3) have provided breeding grounds for populism and Euroscepticism. In many cases, the electoral success of populist parties was given by their capacity to link anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiments in a claim for national sovereignty. The objective of this book is to understand the impact of politicisation of immigration and the European Union on party positioning in political contexts with different constraints on the development of this political process. Therefore, Italy and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_3

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the UK were selected following a Most Different System Design or Mill’s Method of Similarity (Przeworski & Teune, 1982; Lijphart, 1971), with the aim of showing that, across polities with very different contextual conditions, broadly generalizable links exist between party families and corresponding patterns of party polarisation. Among its advantages, this research strategy makes it possible to maximise the experimental variance, namely the variance produced by the manipulation of the independent variables (IV). Indeed, even in research where laboratory experiments are not envisaged–in truth, the majority of political science–it is nevertheless possible to increase the variance of the IV through the selection of cases. In particular, following a MDSD, cases are selected so as to increase the variance of the independent variable and observe the variation (if any) of the relationship between the dependent variable (DP) and the IV across several values of the IV. In my specific case, the choice of Italy and the UK increases the variance of the independent variables–ideology–and helps us observe the variation of the relationship between them and the DV–party positioning (see Chap. 1). Moreover, a MDSD research strategy aims to reduce the possible causes of a phenomenon rather than to identify the real causes of that phenomenon. In so doing, the results are highly generalizable precisely because they manifest themselves in very different contexts. Italy and the UK present different constraints on the potential development of party positioning. First, the electoral system, that impacts on the relative power of political parties in the decision-making arena. In the UK, most elections are decided using the first-past-the-post electoral system, which is considered particularly efficient as it tends to produce a two-party system and stable governments. On the contrary, Italy has experienced four electoral reforms over the last quarter of a century. As a result, the Italian political system is highly fragmented and scarcely institutionalized: Italy is the only country in Western Europe with as many as three – all recent – elections among the ten most ‘volatile’ since 1945 (Baldini et al., 2018). Second, the degree and characteristics of EU membership. For long time, Italy was considered a Europhile country and Britain a eurosceptic country. In recent years, however, scepticism about the benefits of the European integration has spread across the continent, without sparing Italy (see the results of the INTUNE project in Sanders et al., 2012, and also Passarelli et al., 2018). In 2019, in occasion of the last European election, trust in the European Union attained a record low: only 37% of Italians tended to trust the EU, whereas 55% expressed distrust (European Commission, 2019). Finally, the history of immigration. Being the UK a country of immigration since the post-WWII, immigration was relevant as an electoral issue already before the country joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. On the contrary in Italy, a traditional emigration country until the late ‘80s, the political salience of the immigration issue is much more recent. All the above-­ mentioned factors potentially affect the logic driving party positioning, allowing me to maximise the variance of political positions on immigration and the EU. To sum up, Italy and the United Kingdom were selected as the best countries for studying party framing strategies towards immigration and the European Union for essentially two reasons. First, the relevance that these two issues have in the national political debate of the two countries. Second, their political, institutional and

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socio-economic differences, which increase the variance of the independent variable and make it possible to generalise the empirical results. The EP is taken as an additional case study for two reasons. First, it enables me to verify Mair’s hypothesis on party competition in the context of a European Parliament increasingly constituted of Eurosceptic MEPs. According to Mair (2007) and Mair and Thomassen (2010), at the European level, there is no central governmental authority. Thus a ‘classical opposition’ (a government vs opposition dynamic) is missing. In other words, as the EU is a polity without politics (Schmidt, 2007), political opposition to the EU is by nature an opposition of principle, or an anti-systemic opposition, which is directed against the EU polity as a whole, rather than against specific EU policies or embodiments (Mair, 2007, p.  12). Second, studying party positions in the EP makes it possible to compare the positions endorsed by national parties with those held by their delegations in the EP, and to assess the extent to which they are coherent–in terms of frames and arguments–with each other. In so doing, this book bridges two branches of the literature (party competition in national arenas and party competition in supranational arenas) that have often been considered separately and thereby advances our understanding of partisan competition in a multi-level political space. In the following Sections, the specific features of party competition on immigration and the European affairs in Italy, the UK and the EP from the ‘90s until today will be detailed.

3.2  A Process of (Dis)integration? Italy and the UK Italy Italy was one of the six founder members of the EEC in 1957, having already joined the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The country then joined the European Monetary System (EMS) from its inception in 1979 and acceded to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the first wave of membership in 1999. The unconditional support of the Italian political elite for the process of European integration  – it suffices here to recall that some of the founding fathers of the European project, such as Altiero Spinelli and Alcide De Gasperi, were Italians–was made possible by a long-standing strong and stable public support, even years after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). According to Bartolini (2005), the ‘supportive stand of the Italian […] political elite’ is to be attributed to ‘the reaction to the late and stormy national unification of multicentred territories defeated in the Second World War’ (p. 322). Indeed, in the context of the Cold War, Italian membership of the EEC was vigorously promoted by all the parties within the coalition government led by the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Liberal Party (PLI) (mainstream right), the Republican Party (PRI) and the Social Democratic Party (PSDI) (mainstream left). Italy’s membership of the EU was regarded as a strategy for consolidating democracy, economic prosperity and a closer alliance with the Atlantic bloc–the post-war stabilisation and modernisation syndrome (Quaglia, 2007). The reorientation of the only major anti-Europeanist party (the Communist

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party, PC) away from Eurosceptic positions depoliticised Italy’s EU policy and rendered it bipartisan, overcoming the division between government (in favour of EU integration) and opposition (largely Eurosceptic). Indeed, until at least the mid-­1990s, Italy was one of the countries most supportive of European integration (Conti & Verzichelli, 2012). The European constraints imposed by the creation of the EMS were considered for a long time as necessary for containing public spending and fighting the national malaise of clientelism and corruption (Cotta & Isernia, 1996). The so-called external constrain (vincolo esterno) was even widely accepted by the public at large as the price to be paid to be part of the European club (Quaglia, 2011). In 1991, the PC experienced an internal split and transformed into the party of the Democratic Left (PDS) (further re-named in 1998 as Democratici di Sinistra, Democrats of the Left, DS, and in 2007 as PD), an explicitly social-democratic ‘catch-all’ party in favour of further European integration; and the Partito di Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party, PRC), on its left. While the former endorsed a stable pro-EU stance (albeit punctuated with increasing criticisms of the fiscal and economic policies implemented by the EU after the 2008 economic crisis), the latter remained the leading political force at the extreme left of the political spectrum opposing EU integration on the basis of economic, labour and social security arguments. With the end of the so-called First Republic in 1994, all the traditional parties disappeared. In the new political system, the EU became a salient and divisive issue (Conti, 2015, p. 138). Eurosceptic parties were either newly established, such as the mainstream right party, Forza Italia (FI), led by Silvio Berlusconi, and the populist Lega Nord (LN), led by Umberto Bossi, or substantially transformed, such as the successor to the right-wing Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the National Alliance, led by Gianfranco Fini. PdL/FI, launched by the businessman Silvio Berlusconi, entered parliament in 1994 as the most popular party (with 21% of votes) and went on to become the leading political force in four coalition governments (1994, 2001, 2005 and 2008). Often defined as a ‘personal party’ (McDonnell, 2013) due to the pre-eminent role of the leader-founder in the party’s creation and subsequent history, FI’s position on the EU has never been clear-cut. Indeed, the soft Euroscepticism of personalities such as Antonio Martino and Giulio Tremonti coexists with a number of pro-European figures within the party (Quaglia, 2005, 2011). The party leader, Silvio Berlusconi, has displayed varying attitudes towards the EU, often distinguishing himself through his ‘manifest ignorance of European institutions and international politics’ (Lucarelli, 2015, p. 50). During the first and, especially, the second Berlusconi government, however, increasing attention was devoted to defending the ‘national interest’, to raising Italy’s international profile and to promoting closer links with the US, even when detrimental to the relationship with the EU (Romano, 2006). This became evident with the war in Iraq, which saw the Italian government allied with the British and Spanish governments in supporting United Stated (US) intervention in Iraq. As several scholars have noted (Quaglia, 2011; Conti & Verzichelli, 2005), a peculiarity of the Italian case is that Euroscepticism emerges in political parties’ attitude in public debate, rather than in the parties’ manifestos. In this respect, Berlusconi introduced, once in government,

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a rhetorical style made of populist claims, a delegitimisation of EU institutions, and the definition of an Italian interest beyond European cooperation (Lucarelli, 2015; Tarchi, 2018). LN, which entered parliament with 8.6% of the vote in 1992 and which has since become an essential player in Italian politics, can be considered a case of ‘utilitarian Euroscepticism’. Indeed, while the prospect of the autonomy of Padania within the European framework was viable, the party endorsed a pro-EU stance, advocating a federal Europe of Regions. From 1998, however, the LN intensified its opposition to the process of European integration (Conti & Verzichelli, 2005, p. 106), criticising the socio-economic consequences of the Euro, the opening up of the markets, as well as the Eastern enlargement (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018). In the early 2000s, the former LN leader, Umberto Bossi, defined the Nice Treaty as a ‘text written by communists and freemasons’ and infuriated Europhiles by referring to the EU as the ‘Soviet Union of the West’ (Harding, 2002). From the 2000s onwards, due also to external events such as the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, LN started framing the EU as a significant threat to national security and to the Christian roots of Europe. Besides this, after a scandal in 2011 that involved the LN leader and other key figures in the party, the LN used Euroscepticism to re-build the party’s identity and to gain new legitimacy and support by pleasing the growing anti-­political sentiment of the population. Finally, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini (from 2013 onward), the party, thanks also to a ‘socially mediated’ form of communication based on the massive use of social media (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018), sharpened its rhetorical armoury by using a combination of sovereigntist, legitimacy, cultural-religious and socio-economic frames to delegitimize the European project (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018, p. 6). First, in its 2014 European manifesto, the LN used legitimacy and sovereignty frames to highlight the democratic deficit of the EU (comparing it with an authoritarian regime such as the USSR), and to advocate for a ‘Europe of the people’, in which EU treaties would be ratified by means of referenda and the EU’s activities would be under the control of national parliaments (Lega Nord, 2014a, pp. 1–6). Second, in the same manifesto, the party used cultural frames to oppose the cultural globalisation promoted by the EU in favour of country-specific values and traditions (Ivi, p. 30). Furthermore, Salvini, under the motto ‘Italians first!’, linked public discontent regarding the perceived high level of immigration to the collusion of the Roman elite with EU technocrats, whom he accused of being in favour of ‘uncontrolled migration’ (Bulli & Soare, 2018, p. 141). Third, the LN used socio-economic frames to oppose the common currency. In a booklet titled ‘Stop €uro. How to get out from a Nightmare’ (Basta €uro. Come uscire dall’incubo) (2014b), the LN directly linked the Euro with the economic crisis and proposed 31 ways to build ‘another Europe’. The adoption of strong anti-EU and anti-immigration stances has been successful for the party, as it scored an unprecedented 17.37% of the total of vote and gained 73 seats in the most recent Italian elections (March 2018). Overall, the twenty-first century has so far evinced an increasing politicisation of the EU in Italy. The wide enlargement of 2004 (followed by the subsequent smaller enlargements in 2007 and 2013), the failure of the EU constitutional treaty in 2005 and the signing and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2007/9) were all critical

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events in the EU’s life that were debated in the Member States to an unprecedented extent. However, the most significant troubles for Europe arose after 2008, when first the economic crisis and then the migration crisis threatened not just European economies but also European solidarity and political cohesion. As a result, Italian public opinion has moved progressively towards Eurosceptic positions, mainly because the fiscal and economic policies implemented by the EU–especially after the 2008 Euro crisis–were perceived as a threat to people’s economic prosperity and social security (Serricchio et  al., 2013, p.  57). In 2019, in occasion of the last European elections, trust in the European Union attained a record low: only 37% of Italians tended to trust the EU, whereas 55% expressed distrust (European Commission, 2019). As a result, populist parties, traditionally excluded from the governmental arena, have significantly increased their share of the vote in recent elections, at the expenses of their mainstream counterparts (Wolinetz & Zaslove, 2018). The most remarkable example of the trends mentioned above was the M5S. Originally born in 2005 as a network of local meet-ups launched by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo with the aim of ‘having fun, hanging out and discussing ideas and proposals for a better world’, which then developed into a protest movement in the form of ‘V-days’ (‘Vaffanculo days’, literally ‘Fuck off days’) and finally into a fully-fledged political party in 2009. The party advocates for direct democracy (under the mantra of ‘everyone is worth one’)1 and overcoming the mechanism of representation through the use of the Internet. Even if the party is identified with several labels–‘anti-party party’ (Diamanti & Natale, 2013), ‘anti-­ establishment party’ (Mosca, 2014), ‘strange animal’ or ‘web-populist’ (Corbetta & Gualmini, 2013)–scholars agree on its populist features: its anti-elitism, emphasis on direct democracy, Manichean visions, charismatic leadership, etc. (Taggart, 1995; Mosca, 2014). Initially, the M5S did not connect the EU directly with the economic crisis. Indeed, its primary targets were the banks and big economic and political elites (the ‘caste’). However, from 2011 the M5S started to direct its criticism towards the Eurozone and to question the legitimacy of EU institutions in general. In several posts on his blog, Grillo condemned the single currency and the Economic and Monetary Union as an ‘economic insanity’ (2015). By the end of 2011, the M5S held an internal referendum on withdrawal from the Eurozone (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018). Indeed, one of the key points of the M5S’s 2014 European electoral manifesto was a pledge to hold a referendum to let people decide on Italian membership of the Eurozone. The Eurosceptic discourse of the M5S is full of economic sovereigntism and legitimacy frames, but lacks the cultural-religious frames that I have noted in the case of the LN. To sum up, during the First Republic, Italy was an example of a Europhile country. Indeed, in the early 1990s, the Italian political and economic elites supported the consolidation of the European project and the joining of EMU in 1999. Thanks to the high and relatively stable public support for European integration, Europe was considered by all parties the only possible

1  This mantra is also the title of M5S’s anthem, as reported in the movement’s official blog http:// www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/2010/07/ognuno-vale-uno.html

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39

perspective for Italy and failing to join EMU was perceived as an unacceptable exclusion of one of the ‘founding members’ from the core of Europe. This led to an acceptance of the socio-political costs associated with meeting the convergence criteria as well as of the economic consequences that followed, e.g., deflation and low growth (Sbragia, 2001). With the collapse of the First Republic in 1994, traditional political parties (DS/PD in the first instance) kept their pro-European attitude substantially unchanged, albeit with more nuance (Conti & Verzichelli, 2005). Conversely, especially during the second Berlusconi government (2001–2006), arguments concerning national sovereignty characterised Eurosceptic discourse on the right (Bellucci, 2005)–from the centre of the political spectrum to the more peripheral forces such as LN. The United Kingdom On 31 January 2021, the United Kingdom left the European Union, ending 47 years of membership, as decided by 52% of British voters in a referendum held on 23 June 2016. This event represented an unprecedented affirmation of national sovereigntism, undertaken by a country that has never been entirely at ease with its membership of the EU, so much so that it was famously labelled as ‘the awkward partner’ (George, 1990). Indeed, Euroscepticism has been a dominant trait for Britain ever since the early 1960s (Wall, 2008; Gowland & Turner, 2000; Gamble, 2003; Young, 1999; Baker & Schnapper, 2015). Britain’s membership of the EU has always been based on self-interest, which explains why that membership has long been accompanied by many ‘opt-outs’ in key policy areas for state powers (e.g., Economic and Monetary Union and the Schengen Agreement). This, in turn, has resulted in the UK being one of the less integrated Member states in an increasingly differentiated Europe (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014; Leruth, 2015). To understand British Euroscepticism, it is necessary to go back to the post-­ imperial crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, during the debates surrounding accession to the EEC (Gifford, 2008). Indeed, ‘Europe’ has developed as a divisive issue for both major British political parties; the first UK-wide referendum on membership was held by the Labour government under Harold Wilson in 1975, after the UK had joined the EEC in 1973. Until the 1980s, the greatest political resistance towards the process of European integration came from LAB, as the EEC was considered a pro-­ business, ‘capitalist club’ against labour and social rights. Since the late 1980s, however, LAB has largely embraced a united pro-EU stance, especially after the European Commission’s decision to add a social policy dimension (the EU Social Charter, signed by Tony Blair in 2002). During the New Labour decade (1997–2010), under the leadership of Tony Blair (1997–2007) and Gordon Brown (2007–2010), the party faced a number of internal and external challenges: the modernization of the party, the resizing of the role of the Trade Unions and, most importantly, the economic crisis (for a complete review, see Baldini & Pritoni, 2016, pp. 145–49). The issue of the EU was therefore put on the back burner, until 2015, when Jeremy Corbyn became party leader. Several scholars and commentators suggest that Corbyn is entrenched within a social-democratic Eurosceptic tradition and has led the party towards adopting more Eurosceptic positions (Hickson & Miles, 2018).

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Conversely, CON was initially supportive of the European project in its form of a rather narrow, trade-based deal. The party’s stance on the EU changed after the famous Bruges speech given by Margaret Thatcher in 1988, in which the relationship between the EU and the UK was defined as ‘willing cooperation between sovereign states’, setting aside the possibility of closer political integration. Since then, and especially since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), CON has embraced a convinced Eurosceptic rhetoric, which was maintained until late 2005, under the leadership of William Hague (1997–2001), Iain Duncan Smith (2001–2003) and Michael Howard (2003–2005) (Bale, 2018, p.  4). When David Cameron became leader of CON in 2005, he declared that he wanted the party to stop ‘banging on about Europe’. It would not be an easy task, however, as he never dared to confront those Conservatives who continued to be uncomfortable with the ‘EU-issue’: both Little Englanders, obsessed with ‘sovereignty’, and the ‘hyper-­ globalisers’, more concerned with the corporatist constraints that were supposedly preventing the country fulfilling its free-trading destiny (Baker et al., 2002). Several factors contributed to the politicisation of the EU in the British political debate during the 2000s (for a review see Grande et al., 2018). First was the process of EU enlargement. The 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement brought 10 countries, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU.  This was followed by the 2007 enlargement, through which Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.  These events gave new energy to British Eurosceptics: they were able to link their opposition to the EU with concerns over employment and job security deriving from the immigration flows from EEC countries, as well as to issues of border security, which they perceived as being threatened by EU enlargement to the East. Second was the economic crisis and the refugee crisis, which challenged the internal cohesion and the operational capacity of the EU. In particular, the economic and financial crisis that erupted in 2008 enabled Eurosceptic actors to attribute all the socio-economic consequences of the crisis to the EU institutions: the rising cost of living, unemployment, austerity cuts, bailouts and so on. Alongside this, the refugee crisis that started in 2015 showed the divisiveness of the immigration issue for Member states as well as the inability of the EU to implement collective decisions effectively. A third factor needs to be taken into account to understand the politicisation of the EU in the UK, as well as the increasing dividedness of mainstream parties on the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2016): the rise of a challenging Eurosceptic populist party, the UKIP. Dismissed by Cameron in 2006 as a collection of ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists’, the UKIP gained one position at every European Parliament election from 1999–when the proportional representation system was introduced for EP elections–to 2014, quadrupling its vote share from 6.6% to 26.6%. More importantly, Nigel Farage, elected as party leader in 2006, was able to move UKIP from a single-issue, anti-EU party into a fully-fledged populist party, attracting voters alienated by Cameron (Vampa, 2021, p. 213). Nigel Farage also successfully implemented a “fusion strategy” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p. 282) between the issues of the UK’s membership of the EU and immigration. He talked about the pros and cons of membership in emotional and psychological terms, focusing on the shortcomings of the principle of the freedom of movement and its impacts on Britain in terms of

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41

both economic competition and cultural threats (Startin, 2015). Moreover, helped by the parliamentary expenses scandal, which broke in May 2009, Nigel Farage conducted a campaign against the British ‘corrupt elite’, further intensifying the growing alienation between citizens and the mainstream parties. Faced with these combined challenges, when still in opposition, Cameron hoped to appease the Eurosceptic fringe of his party by conceding some ground to them or, as stressed by Vampa (2021) by adopting a co-optation strategy (p. 217). In 2009, obeying to a commitment he made to become party leader in 2005, Cameron dissociated Conservative MEPs from the European People’s Party grouping in the European Parliament and aligned them with the smaller and explicitly anti-­federalist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. Then, in creating the coalition agreement with the Lib-Dem (2010–2015), the Conservative and the Liberal-­ Democrat leaderships agreed on the ‘referendum lock’, a plan to legislate for an automatic referendum on any EU agreement which involved a ‘significant’ transfer of powers to Brussels. However, this was not enough to appease most of Cameron’s backbenchers, many of whom remained discontented that they had been denied a referendum on the newly ratified Lisbon treaty. As a result, as early as October 2010, just months into his premiership of the coalition government, Cameron faced the first rebellion by 37 Tory MPs on the UK’s financial contribution to the EU. Later on, in October 2011, he had to rely on the support of the Liberal Democrats and Labour to defeat a rebellion by 81 Tory MPs, who wanted a straightforward in/out referendum (Bale, 2018, p. 9). Eventually, in the Bloomberg speech held in January 2013, Cameron gave in to continuing pressure from hard-line Eurosceptics promising that, if re-­ elected in 2015, he would renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership and then offer an in/out referendum. Economy and immigration were the two most salient issues in the 2015 British general elections (Cutts et al., 2017, p. 71). This was due not only to the rising levels of net migration into Britain, but also to the failure of David Cameron’s Conservative government to fulfil the pledge made in the 2010 electoral manifesto to reduce annual net migration to the ‘tens of thousands’. In the public debate, the high number of immigrants in the UK was attributed to the effect of the free movement of people. This was a fruitful opportunity for UKIP to make the point even more forcefully that any attempt to bear down on net migration was doomed to failure unless and until the country ended freedom of movement, something achievable only by leaving the EU. The results of the 2015 general elections were somewhat surprising. CON returned to government alone, with the Liberal Democrats reduced to just a few MPs; the leader of LAB, Ed Miliband, resigned after the party received 30.5% of the vote and lost 26 seats, with almost all Scottish seats now held by the Scottish National Party; UKIP, although it received four million votes, only secured the election of a single MP.  The small size of the Conservative majority made Cameron more vulnerable to backbench rebellions (Goodlad, 2016, p. 18). In order to fulfil his promises, Cameron set out to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the European Union, which in the end proved fatal for Cameron’s premiership. In the European Summit on 18–19 February 2016, a ‘new settlement’ deal was agreed. Several of the

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concessions asked by the PM were granted. Most importantly, there was a recognition that the United Kingdom was not committed to further political integration; a mechanism to limit the access of EU workers newly entering Britain’s labour market to in-work benefits for a total period of up to four years; and a reassurance of non-discrimination towards states outside the Eurozone (Rose & Bressanelli, 2016, p. 237). Nonetheless, after Cameron’s announcement of the results of his renegotiation, five Cabinet members, together with some junior ministers–most notably the Justice Minister Michael Gove and the Mayor of London Boris Johnson–announced that they would openly campaign for ‘Brexit’. On 15 April 2016 the Referendum campaign began: the ‘Remain’ side was represented by ‘Britain stronger in Europe’, while the ‘Leave’ side was represented by the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign, close to leading Brexiteers such as Michael Gove, Boris Johnson and Iain Duncan Smith. Remainers focused their campaign on the economic disadvantages of leaving the EU, such as the loss of jobs, risk to investments and economic competitiveness. In so doing, they framed the UK’s membership of the EU in functional terms rather than in identitarian terms. On the contrary, Leavers focused on the power of ‘tacking back control’ of immigration policy that leaving the EU would give back to the British people. In other words, Brexiteers associated Brexit with the positive feeling of redemption and renewal for Great Britain (Rose & Bressanelli, 2016, p. 239). According to many scholars, this communicative strategy was decisive in winning the referendum (e.g., Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Indeed, a follow-up study to respondents to the 2015 British Social Attitudes survey conducted in May and early June 2016, found that no less than 49% agreed that ‘being a member of the European Union is undermining Britain’s distinctive identity’, while just 31% disagreed. Moreover, no less than four in five of those who agreed with that point of view indicated that they proposed to vote to Leave, while, contrarily, as many as 89% of those who disagreed with the proposition were Remain supporters (Curtice, 2016, p. 6). Here is a clear explanation of the advantage of a referendum campaign based on the question of identity (especially when coupled with high levels of immigration). The Brexit referendum, held on 23 June 2016, was won by a narrow majority (52%) by those in favour of leaving the European Union. A few hours after the referendum, Cameron addressed the country in a dramatic speech in which he acknowledged the results of the referendum and resigned (Goodlad, 2016, p. 19). Theresa May took his place, becoming the second female British Prime Minister, after Margaret Thatcher. Although Mrs May had voted Remain, she had not played a prominent role in the Brexit campaign and, once installed as PM, she quickly set out to reassure the party that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, a concept that she repeated in every major speech, particularly at CON conference in October 2016 and at Lancaster House in January 2017. Her first move was a Cabinet reshuffle, in which she appointed prominent Brexiteers such as Boris Johnson to key Ministerial roles and purged most of Cameron’s allies, including Michael Gove and George Osborne. On 29 March 2017, Mrs May triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, under which the British government would have two years to negotiate an exit deal with the European Union. Then, in order to capitalise on Labour’s apparent weakness and to increase the Tories’

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majority and her room for manoeuvre in Brexit negotiations, she called a snap election in April 2017 (Bale & Webb, 2017, p. 20). Although the governing Conservative Party remained the single largest party in the House of Commons, it nevertheless lost its majority, resulting in the formation of a minority government with a confidence and supply arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. Conversely, LAB finished as the second largest party in Parliament but increased its share of the popular vote to 40%, resulting in a net gain of 30 seats. It was the first time Labour had made a net gain of seats since 1997. The party’s 9.6% increase in vote share was its most significant gain in a single general election since 1945. In any case, LAB came out severely divided after Brexit. From the one side, the Parliamentary Party had cohesively campaigned for ‘Remain’, essentially for three reasons. First, Brexit was seen by the majority of MPs as a neoliberal project led by Conservatives to get rid of the European constraints related to economic and social deregulation. Indeed, in the 2017 Labour Manifesto, Brexit was defined as ‘A Conservative Brexit [that] will weaken workers’ rights deregulate the economy [and] slash corporate taxes’. Second, Brexit was regarded as a significant threat to the supremacy of the Parliament over the Executive. Third, the base of the party remained strongly pro-EU, even more so after the referendum (Bale et al., 2018). From the other side, however, the party’s leader, Jeremy Corbyn, adopted an approach of ‘constructive ambiguity’ towards Brexit (Diamond, 2018). As a result, he incurred the ire of his Parliamentary Party, so much so that, after the UK voted to leave the EU, Labour MPs passed a vote of no confidence in Corbyn by 172 votes to 40, following the resignation of around two-thirds of Corbyn’s Shadow Cabinet. Nevertheless, in the September 2016 leadership contest, Corbyn retained the party leadership with an increased vote share of 61.8%. The reality of Brexit negotiations proved to be more complicated than Mrs May had expected, and the type of Brexit to be pursued became a matter of hard bargaining between the UK and the EU–in the person of Mr Barnier, the EU’s Chief Negotiator for Brexit–as well as within the governing Conservative party. The EU made it clear from the outset that access to the Single Market requires acceptance of all four freedoms, including freedom of movement, as well as the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Almost two and a half years after the Brexit referendum, the European Union and the United Kingdom finally reached an agreement on 25 November 2018. This includes both the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration on the future relationship between London and Brussels. The agreement was considered too soft by dozens of Conservatives MPs dozens of Conservatives MPs, ready to vote against it, making a common front with the opposition (Labour, Scottish Nationalists and the Lib-Dems) and Northern Irish unionists. In 2019, Boris Johnson won the General Election with an overall majority of 80, ending years of paralysis in the EU-UK negotiations. During the electoral campaign, he promised to ‘get Brexit done’. Indeed, on 31 January 2021, after signing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the UK got out from the Single Market and Customs Union. As Arnand Menon (2021) as argued, ‘the interminable arguments and parliamentary wrangles over what Brexit might mean in theory are over, but our

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understanding of what Brexit does mean in practice is just beginning’ (p. 2). The future of British politics will depend on the effects that the departure from the Single Market and Customs Union will have on the economy and on the State of the Union. According to a 2020 pool, 54% of Scottish voters are in favour of independence, while this figure rises to no less than 60% if we consider those who voted to remain in the EU (Curtice, 2021). In May 2021 a parliamentary election will take place in Scotland, and the Scottish National Party will seek support for holding a second referendum on independence. This could open a new phase of British history.

3.3  Immigration to Italy and the UK: An Overview Italy Italy has traditionally been a country of emigration: it is estimated that more than 30 million Italians emigrated, mainly within Europe and to the US, between the mid-­ nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century (Castellazzi, 2010, pp. 101–102). Only at the beginning of the 1970s was this trend reversed by a positive net migration rate. Then, between the 1970s and the 1980s, the number of foreign citizens living in Italy more than quadrupled (from 146,989 in 1970 to 423,004 in 1985; see Einaudi, 2007). Since then, it has increased steadily, up to the current level of more than 5 million people (Table 3.1). Due to its geographical position–a peninsula in the heart of the Mediterranean Sea– Italy experienced two waves of mass immigration from the Balkans, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the 1990s, which had a strong media impact both in Italy and across Europe. These unprecedented influxes, together with concerns about cross-border crime once the Schengen Agreement was signed in 1995, contributed to placing immigration at the top of the political agenda.2 Hence, the first comprehensive immigration framework, the Turco-Napolitano law, often referred to as the Testo Unico dell’Immigrazione (TUI), was enacted in 1998 by the then mainstream left government (Andall, 2007). Table 3.1  Total number of residents and foreigners residing in Italy (1998–2020)

Year (Y) 1998 2000 2010 2020

Number of total residents (thousands) 56.904.379 56.923.524 60.626.442 59.641.488

Difference from previous census (Y-1), in percentage +0.05 +0.03 +0.47 −0.3

Number of non-national residents (thousands) 1,240,721 1,338,153 4,570,317 5,039,637

Difference from previous census (Y-1), in percentage +13.2 +7 +7.9 +0.9

Non-nationals/ total population, in percentage 2.2 2.4 7.5 8.4

Source: Author’s elaboration from official census data provided by ISTAT (www.istat.it/en/)  It is worth noting that the politicisation of the immigration issue in Italy started quite late if compared to the British case, where it was initiated already in the late-‘60s with the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech by Enoch Powell (see below). 2

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Italy experienced two other major influxes of migrants: between 2011 and 2013, during the so-called North Africa Emergency (Emergenza Nord Africa–ENA), when approximately 118,000 migrants arrived in Italy, mainly from Tunisia and Sub-­ Saharan Africa (Marchetti, 2014), and during the so-called refugee crisis (Petracchin, 2020), marked by a surge in arrivals in 2014 (170,000) caused by the enduring war in Syria and the political instability in Libya (Fig. 3.1). Scholars agree that during the so-called Second Republic (1994–2013), which was characterised by a very fragmented party system and a bipolar pattern of party competition (Diamanti, 2007), Italy experienced a convergence between mainstream left and mainstream right parties towards restrictive immigration policies (Massetti, 2015; Dennison et al., 2018). From the one side, LN profoundly influenced three mainstream right coalitions (1994–1995, 2001–2006, and 2008–2011) by passing the Bossi-Fini Law in 2002 and the security packages in 2008 and 2009, which criminalised illegal entry and illegal residence, restricted access to social rights and made deportations easier (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Perlmutter, 2015, p. 1341). Through these measures, the mainstream right built a strong public reputation for being ‘tough’ on immigration, even though passing from ideological state-

140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Fig. 3.1  Asylum applications trends (2011–2020). (Source: Author’s elaboration from the official data on asylum provided by the Interior Minister)

ments to policies has often been somewhat tricky, as shown by the largest amnesty ever declared in Europe, through which the mainstream right government regularized around 650,000 immigrants in 2001 (Massetti, 2015, p. 10). From the other

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side, the mainstream left has tried to strike a balance between the pro-immigration positions of the radical-left, such as the call for a permanent system of regularisation advanced by Sinistra Arcobaleno (SA) in the 2008 general election, and the hegemonic discourse of the right. In the 1990s, passing the first comprehensive legislative framework, the Turco-Napolitano law (Law 286/1998), the mainstream left tried to present itself as a competent border patroller, while remaining open in terms of social integration and multiculturalism (Andall, 2007). However, during the 2000s the left has been increasingly dragged into a securitisation discourse, showing a willingness to address the growing anxieties of many Italians on identity and security (Massetti, 2015, p. 15). Overall, during the Second Republic, Italian immigration policies have been marked by a paradox: a strong anti-immigration rhetoric, which mixes with bi-partisan market-driven immigration policies, characterised by periodic amnesties for irregular migrants already present in the country (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2008, p. 5; Castellazzi, 2010, p. 107; Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 182). The period referred to as the Third Republic started with the ‘electoral earthquake’ (Chiaramonte & De Sio, 2014) of the 2013 general elections, when an entirely new party, the M5S, gained 25.56% of the vote and 108 seats. It came third after the two dominant mainstreams left and right coalitions, thus leading to the collapse of the bipolar pattern of party competition that had characterised the Second Republic (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2014). The XVII legislature (2013–2018) has seen the alternation of three different coalition governments led by PD–Letta (2013–2014), Renzi (2014–2016), and Gentiloni (2016–18) – which have faced the biggest refugee crisis that has ever happened in Europe. Overall, the immigration policies pursued by the mainstream left governments in the period considered have been restrictive concerning border control, and liberal regarding migrants’ civic rights. The Immigration Plan of 2017 promoted by the Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, foresaw the extension of the network of identification and expulsion centres to foster the expulsion of irregular migrants. It also envisaged the reform of the asylum system, particularly the abolition of the possibility of appeal for those who were denied asylum in the first instance, in order to make the asylum process faster. Moreover, in February 2017, the Minister signed a cooperation agreement with Fayez Al-Serraj, the Libyan President of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, to ‘cooperate to identify urgent solutions to the issue of illegal migrants crossing Libya to travel to Europe’ (Italian Government, 2017). The Agreement was strongly criticised by NGOs and immigration experts alike as putting migrants at risk of torture and human rights violations by externalising the control of borders between Italy and Libya to an undemocratic country (Amnesty International, 2017). At the same time, however, PD promoted a reform of the citizenship law, as Bersani had already promised in the 2013 electoral programme.3 The Chamber of Deputies approved a unified text that provided for the extension of cases of acquisition of citizenship by birth (ius soli) and the introduction of a new form of acquisition of

3   “L’Italia Giusta” (2013). nals/32440_2013.pdf

available

here:

https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu//down/origi-

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47

citizenship following a scholastic path (ius culturae). However, the provision did not pass through the Senate. The general elections held in March 2018 confirmed the tri-polar structure of the Italian political space, but with a radically changed balance of power among the major parties. Indeed, while the former ruling party, PD, saw a collapse of its electoral base (22.86% and 28 seats), the M5S, led by Luigi Di Maio, and the LN, led by Matteo Salvini, were the real winners of the elections, with 32.68% and 92 seats and 17.35% and 73 seats respectively (Emanuele, 2018). After nearly three months of tense negotiations, LN and M5S managed to form a coalition government (the so-called yellow-green coalition) led by Giuseppe Conte, a former academic close to M5S. The issue of immigration was highly politicised during the 2018 electoral campaign, particularly by the LN and its leader, who benefitted the most from the massive use of social media to spread a strong anti-immigration message (Bracciale & Cepernich, 2018, Giannetti Combei & Giannetti, 2020). The electoral manifestos of the coalition parties put a strong emphasis on the need to ‘change the course of things’ in immigration policy. The centrality of the immigration issue was confirmed by the Government Agreement (Contratto di Governo) signed by LN and M5S and by the portfolio allocation, with the Ministry of Interior allocated to Matteo Salvini (Baldini & Giglioli, 2020, p. 14). Overall, the Yellow-Green coalition expressed a ‘broader nationalist push’ (Palm & Barana, 2019), with respect to both the external and in the internal dimension of migration. As for the external dimension, the Conte I government acted in continuity with respect to bilateral relations, and in discontinuity with regard to multilateral relations. From the one side, the bilateral agreements with Libya were renewed, albeit with different objectives and modalities of cooperation (Camilli, 2019). From the other side, Italy was absent in Marrakech for the approval of ‘The Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration’ (known as Global Compact) (Camilli & Spinelli, 2018) and led to the dismissal of Operation EUNAVFORMED Sophia by unilaterally changing the disembarkation rules agreed upon by previous governments (Chirico, 2019; Peduzzi, 2019). Moreover, Matteo Salvini was involved in a series of disputes with other European countries over the responsibility for the coordination of search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Under the motto ‘Chiudiamo i porti!’ (‘Let us close our harbours!’), Salvini blocked NGO rescue ships from Italian ports on two occasions in order to cut the number of migrants arriving in Italy by sea.4 In both cases, Salvini was able to take advantage of the issue of immigration to attack the European Union, and in particular its lack of solidarity towards frontline countries such as Italy (Cusumano & Villa, 2020). 4  In June 2018, Matteo Salvini refused to authorise the ship Aquarius of the NGO Doctors Without Borders to enter an Italian port. The case came to a definitive end thanks to the intervention of the Spanish authorities, who decided to take into their charge, materially and legally, the survivors rescued by the Aquarius. In August 2018, the Interior Minister refused to allow over 100 migrants rescued by the Coast Guard to disembark from the ship Diciotti during a 10-day standoff with the EU.

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As for the internal dimension of migration, the Yellow-Green coalition passed the so called ‘Salvini Decree’ on migration and security (Legislative Decree 113/2018). The decree was approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers and voted compactly by the M5S, except for five dissidents (Cuzzocrea & Rubino, 2018). It contained a series of hard-line measures such as the abolition of the humanitarian protection and made it easier for asylum seekers to be deported (Open Polis & ActionAid, 2019). Moreover, it suspended the refugee application process of those who are considered ‘socially dangerous’ or who have been convicted of a crime. In a Facebook post, Salvini called the decree ‘a step forward to make Italy safer’, and ‘to expel delinquents and bogus refugees more quickly’. On the contrary, NGOs and immigration experts alike argue that these measures have had a dramatic impact on the lives of tens of thousands of already resident migrants and have led to an increase in the number of irregular migrants (Villa, 2018, Amnesty International, 2019, Geddes and Petracchin, 2020, p. 4). After the elections for the European parliament in May 2019, tensions within the government coalition increased (Castelli Gattinara & Froio, 2020: 4). The M5S and the LN hold opposite positions on several issues (Conti et al., 2020). First, the LN opposed the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen as the new President of the EU Commission, while the M5S backed her. Second, the M5S opposed the introduction of the flat tax, a fiscal measure sponsored by the LN. Finally, the LN was in favour of the Turin-Lyon high-speed railway, an infrastructure strongly opposed by the M5S.  These tensions ultimately led to the collapse of the first Giuseppe Conte Cabinet in August 2019, the formation of a new coalition executive (Conte II), this time between the M5S and PD, and the return of the LN to the opposition. As far as immigration is concerned, the Conte II approved the so called ‘Lamorgese decree’ (L. 173/2020) that partially abolished the measures introduced by the security decrees of Matteo Salvini. According to the Secretary of PD, Nicola Zingaretti, the Lamorgese decree is a radical change. As he explained in a tweet: ‘The true security decrees are now law. We have left behind an era of propaganda and empty talks. Italians need protection. We have to solve problems, not use them as an instrument of propaganda’. Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are only partially satisfied with the provisions introduced by the Lamorgese decree (Testore, 2021). Different aspects raise concern: notably, in relation to the citizenship law, the revocation of Italian citizenship from a foreign citizen deemed a threat to national security was not questioned, and the duration of the citizenship process was reduced to 36 months rather than the original 24 months. In other words, changes were mainly marginal, while the law-and-order approach continues to prevail. Since March 2020, due to the outbreak of a global pandemic (WHO, 2020), immigration issues have lost salience in the political debate in Italy. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom is one of the European countries with the longest history of post-colonial migration. As a result, it started to develop a national immigration policy much earlier than other countries, which can be summarized along four phases. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, the country experienced a period of ‘open

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migration regime’. After the Second War World, there was a need for a workforce to build the national healthcare system, to work in public transport and also in the car and textile industries. Therefore, the 1948 British Nationality Act decided that all citizens of the Commonwealth had full rights to hold passports and to enter Britain. Commonwealth migrants to post-war Britain came not only from the Caribbean but also from India, Pakistan and Africa. In the 1950s, the British economy was in trouble, so there was no longer a need for a large number of foreign workers. Immigration of people of colour from the Commonwealth became to be associated with social and economic problems. It is possible to identify a process of early politicisation on the immigration issues as marked by three episodes. First, the ‘race riots’ against black people that took place in Notting Hill (West London) and Nottingham in 1958. Second, in the 1964 general election, a Conservative candidate was elected Member of Parliament (MP) for Smethwick after a campaign which included the slogan ‘if you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour’ (Hansen, 2000). Third, in 1968, Enoch Powell, a senior member of CON, made what still is one of the most notorious speeches in post-war British politics, the so called ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech. He maintained that immigration of non-whites from the former colonies was a threat to British cultural homogeneity and predicted a civil war if immigration was not stopped. His speech had a huge impact. There were marches in support, and few months later a Gallup survey found that 75% of people in Britain believed there were too many non-white migrants in the country (Spafford & Lyndon, 2016, p. 87). The 1970s were a decade of economic depression, high unemployment and industrial disputes. This context favoured the consolidation of racist movements, such as the National Front (NF), formed in 1967 with the aim of banning all non-­ white immigration, whose public profile was raised through street marches and rallies, which often resulted in clashes with anti-fascist protesters, most notably the 1974 Red Lion Square disorders and the 1977 Battle of Lewisham (Fielding, 1981).5 In response both to the popularity in public opinion of Enoch Powell, and to the resurgence of the far right, the Conservatives moved to the right on the immigration issue (Peele, 2018, pp.  380–2). The former Leader of CON, Mr. Edward Heath, included in the 1970 manifesto stronger legislation and measures to aid voluntary repatriation. There is even evidence that the Conservatives won the 1970 General Election because of the popularity in public opinion of Enoch Powell’s radical view on immigration (Ibidem).6 In order to respond to public anxieties and court the more extremist voters, the Conservative governments that ran the country between the

5  In 1982, Under Tyndall, former leader of the National Front, left the movement to form his own British National Party (BNP). The BNP failed to make a national breakthrough, due to institutional factors, such as the British electoral system, as well as the bottom-up actions of the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) and the media, which ostracised the party as too extremist (Carvalho et al., 2015, p. 161). 6  For a recent re-appraisal of the discussion on the different dynamics of policisation of the immigration issue in Britain, see the Special Section titled ‘Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ Speech’, in The Political Quarterly (2018), 89(4): 352–426.

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1970s and 1980s put in place such a strict system of immigration control that some scholars have pointed to Britain in this second phase as a successful ‘zero-­ immigration country’ (Layton-Henry, 1982). This was evident during the 1979 general elections when Margaret Thatcher based her electoral campaign on the fear of being ‘swamped by alien cultures’. Indeed, through the 1981 British Nationality Act, her government significantly tightened the definition of British citizenship. From the mid-1990s, the number of asylum seekers began to increase, reaching a peak of 84,132  in 2002 (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p.  34). Asylum became a political priority for the new Labour governments led by Tony Blair, which inaugurated the third phase of British immigration policy, the so called ‘managed migration’ approach: restrictive policies towards asylum seekers and illegal migrants, coupled with a liberal approach towards skilled and highly skilled migrants. To do this, the UK government has passed several major pieces of legislation on immigration and asylum, in 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009 (Messina, 2007). The logic underpinning the ‘managed migration approach’ mirrored the neo-­ liberal economic shift that characterised the New Labour political economy–and that eventually led the party to lose its working-class basis (Ford & Goodwin, 2017, p. 18). It was well explained by Barbara Roche, Minister for State of Asylum and Immigration during the first Blair government (1997–2001): ‘The UK is in competition for the brightest and best talents – the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high-­ technology specialists who make the global economy tick…[and]…we need to explore carefully their implication for immigration policy’ (quoted in Hollifield et  al., 2014, p.  206). Indeed, Blair’s governments pursued a liberalisation of the work permit schemes such as the High Skilled Migrants Entry Programme in 2002 and the Sector-Based Scheme for the food and hospitality sectors in 2003. In 2003, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, said in a TV interview that he saw no obvious upper limit to the number of skilled migrants that could be admitted (cited in Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 36). Eventually, Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown (2007–2010), introduced a five-tier system for labour migration which defined entry quotas according to immigrants’ level of education and income: Tier 1 for non-EEA ‘high-­ value migrants’; Tier 2 for non-EEA ‘skilled workers’; Tier 3 for low-skilled workers (never opened); Tier 4 for International Students and Tier 5 for temporary workers (Zincone et al., 2011, p. 199; Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 37). The liberal approach towards economic migrants pursued by Labour governments was marked by the decision, back in 2004, to allow unfettered access to the UK labour market to citizens of the countries in Eastern Europe that had just joined the EU. By the end of 2005, nearly 300,000 Europeans had entered the UK, mainly from Poland, while between 1997 and 2003 a total of 67,000 European citizens moved to the UK (Vargas-Silva, 2020). In 2005, CON fought the general election on the issue of immigration, with a slogan saying that ‘it is not racist to impose limits on immigration’. The party lost the elections. Immigration was not (yet) such a politicised issue. However, the Labour government became aware of the potential of anti-­ immigration rhetoric on its support and adopted a more restrictive approach to all forms of immigration (Adolino & Blake, 2011, p. 139). In 2007, Gordon Brown said that the government would seek to provide ‘British jobs for British workers’.

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This proposal, however, was not feasible, given that the government had no power to control ‘free movement’ within the European Union. In the 2010 general election, the Conservative manifesto pledged to reduce annual immigration from hundreds of thousands of people to tens of thousands (The Conservative Manifesto, 2010). To meet this promise, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010–2015) inaugurated the fourth phase of British immigration policy, characterised by a ‘hostile environment’ to immigration and setting itself a flawed net migration target (Grove-White, 2014). The Immigration acts of 2014 and 2016 contained though measures on irregular migration and significantly restricted access to healthcare, housing, while also reducing support for asylum seekers. The wide-ranging scope of the measures introduced new criminal offences (e.g., employment of unauthorized immigrants) and harsher civil penalties (e.g., illegal working). Notwithstanding the net migration cap, as Fig. 3.2 shows, the number of immigrants rose between 2010 and 2014. In 2015, the highest net immigration peak since 2005 was reached with 330,000 immigrants (Travis, 2015). This figure was made up of European citizens, extra-EU citizens (mostly workers or family members) and more than 200,000 international students. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) led by Nigel Farage played a crucial role in placing the question of EU migrants–or, we should say, EU citizens exercising their free movement rights–at the top of the political agenda in the UK. The party fought the 2014 European election campaign entirely on the negative effects of EU free movement, particularly from Eastern European member states such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, on the British economy (Treib, 2014, pp. 1548–49). Eventually, the UKIP received 26.7% of the vote and 24 seats, almost doubling the vote share it had obtained in the 2009 European election.

Fig. 3.2  Net migration to the UK

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Fig. 3.3  Top concerns for British people

As shown by Fig.  3.3, above, UKIP succeeded in raising the salience of the immigration issue in public opinion: between June 2015 and October 2016 immigration was the first concern for British voters, above Europe and the economy. In particular, the party succeeded in a ‘fusion strategy’ (Dennison & Goodwin, 2015, p. 172), connecting the issue of Britain’s membership of the EU with the issue of immigration. Indeed, several scholars found a strong relationship between attitudes towards immigration and the EU referendum vote choice. In particular, according to Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), more than half of the Leave voters were intensely opposed to immigration, compared to just 13% of Remain voters. Such difference reveals how immigration and the EU are often closely connected in the minds of many voters and how many of those who supported leaving the EU felt significantly more hostile towards immigration. People distrust towards the capacity of the traditional parties to manage immigration translated into an erosion of the Labour votes in the North and Conservative votes in the South (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). To fight back, both Labour and Conservative parties converged towards stricter positions on EU citizens (Geddes, 2014). Labour leader Ed Miliband, for example, called for employers to hire one British worker for every non-British worker hired (Wintour & Topping, 2012), while Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper said that transitional controls should last longer than the current seven years for new member states, and also advocated tougher labour market rules (Syal, 2014). Moreover, an open letter to The Observer from seven Labour MPs called for controls to be imposed on the free movement of labour from the EU’s poorer countries to remove some of the pressure on public services (Field et al., 2014). As shown by Table 3.2, Conservatives’, Labours’ and UKIP’ manifestos for the 2015 General Election were comparable with respect to immigration. Conservatives repeated their pledge to reduce immigration to the ‘tens of thousands’ from the ‘hundreds of thousands’. Cameron enshrined his promise to have a referendum on the EU–first advanced in his Bloomberg speech in early 2013–after a renegotiation of the terms of membership. All parties were equally restrictive towards EU citizens, calling for a cap on net EU migration and a

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Table 3.2  Comparison of parties’ manifestos LAB

2015 «With a Labour Government, migrants from the EU will not be able to claim benefits until they have lived here for at least two years […] we will stop child benefit being sent to families living abroad». (pp. 11, 50)

CON «We will renegotiate new rules with the EU, so that people will have to be earning here for a number of years before they can claim benefits». (p. 30)

UKIP «Work visas will be issued to key and skilled workers under our Austrialian-­ style points system […] Any European Union citizen who is resident in the UK at the time of the referendum will be permitted to remain and work here […] and have the opportunity to apply for UK citizenship after five years». (pp. 12–3)

2017 «Labour will develop and implement fair immigration rules […] Labour will protect those already working here, whatever their ethnicity […] Labour values the economic and social contributions of immigrants […] We will not cut public services and pretend the cuts are a consequence of immigration». (pp. 28–9) «We will control immigration and secure the entitlements of EU nationals in Britain and British nationals in the EU […] we will always ensure that our British businesses can recruit the brightest and best from around the world […] our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands». (pp. 36, 54) «Britain must have full control of immigration and asylum policies, and border control. We must not be bound by any freedom of movement obligation, and we must be free to set and meet our own annual migration targets […] UKIP’s immigration policies will bring to Britain the brightest, the best, and those with the talents our economy most needs». (pp. 7, 34)

Source: Author’s elaboration from parties’ official manifestos

restriction of EU citizens’ access to social benefits in the UK (Wilkinson, 2015). Overall, UKIP’s proposals were not much more radical. Like the other parties, it promised a cap on immigration, with a five-year moratorium on unskilled workers. Mainstream parties’ convergence on strict stances towards EU citizens was a clear sign of UKIP’s political victory: the party managed to set the agenda for the 2015 general elections (Goodwin, 2015). British attitudes towards immigration have changed in recent years. If immigration was often named as Britain’s ‘most important issue’ between 2001 and mid-2016, since the EU Referendum people have been more likely to name Europe/ the EU and the NHS as their primary concerns (Blinder & Richards, 2018). In 2019, with only 26% of people saying that a few or no immigrants of a different race should be allowed, Britain turns out to be one of the least anti-immigration countries in Europe (Zotti, 2021, p. 58). This perhaps explains–together with the change of leadership in all the two major British parties–why parties’ manifestos for the 2017 snap election called by Theresa May to strengthen her negotiation power in the context of Brexit were much more diversified on immigration than in 2015. In particular, a clear divergence emerged between the Labour and CON, and between them and UKIP. While LAB made no commitment to reduce immigration and mentioned a vague reform of the system to make it work ‘for the many, not the few’,

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CON renewed its commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of the present system to reduce the annual net migration rate to the tens of thousands. On the contrary, UKIP endorsed the strongest position vis-à-vis immigration, calling for a hard Brexit which would have ensured the full control of immigration and asylum policies, without being bound by any freedom of movement obligations coming from the UK’s membership in the EU.  After Brexit, EU rules ceased to apply to the UK. This have had a major impact on asylum policies, as the UK is not anymore bounded by the provisions of the EU directives of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) concerning reception standards. At the same time, the UK will no longer adhere to the Dublin regulation, thus it will not be able to send back those asylum seekers that firstly applied to other EU countries. However, the UK government is planning to rely on bilateral agreements with country of origin. The divorce deal has not changed British immigration controls policies, as the UK has always opted out from EU regulations and directive concerning the management of migration flows. In this respect, the most important change in British immigration policies concerns EU citizens. From January 2021, they no longer have the right to move to the UK to work and settle, and vice versa. The Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act, approved in November 2020, has inaugurated a new phase of British immigration policy. Under the planned points-based system to attract skilled workers, EU nationals will no longer have preferential treatment. All migrants looking to enter the UK for other reasons than just visiting (such as work or study) will need to apply for permission in advance. A government policy document in February 2020 said one of the aims was to end ‘a reliance on cheap labour from Europe’. Some scholars have seen a continuum in British immigration policy in the Conservative era (2010–present): a restrictive approach based on the net migration cap and the creation of a hostile environment for irregular migrants, asylum seekers included (Zotti, 2021, p. 70). However, with Brexit a further step has been taken. The populist attempt to fuse anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiments has been institutionalised by CON as the fleg of EU integration, namely the freedom of movement, has been questioned in the name of immigration control. As stressed by Bobby Duffy (2020), after Brexit ‘there is strong evidence that Britain has become affectively polarised – particularly in terms of people’s Brexit affiliations and identities’ (p. 23). A clear divide remains between the views on immigration of those who voted Remain and those who voted Leave, perhaps supporting the idea that immigration is now a point of political cleavage in Britain (Evans & Mellon, 2019).

3.4  Party Competition in the European Parliament Academic studies on party competition at the supranational level show that EP political groups are highly cohesive and vote along ideological rather than national lines, mainly according to two cleavages – the left/right and the pro/anti-integration divides (Hix, 2001; Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Noury, 2002; Kreppel & Hix, 2003).

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Mainstream parties’ MEPs share similar attitudes towards the EU, being ‘at least’ moderately pro-European, but differing on specific policy proposals (Castelli Gattinara & Froio, 2014, p. 7).7 At the same time, Euroscepticism is a long-standing phenomenon in the European Parliament, at least since the first European elections took place in 1979. Tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism have emerged at each step towards further integration, in particular, during the approval of the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and during the process of constitutional reform (2004) (Moravcsik, 2006). Furthermore, the effects of the multiple crises–the 2008 economic and financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis and Brexit–that the European Union has faced in the last decade, have exacerbated public and party-based Euroscepticism across Member States (MSs) (Vasilopoulou, 2013). In the 2009 European elections, right-wing Eurosceptic parties first swept to power in the EP. After the 2014 European elections, they had 51 MEPs, 15 more than after the 2009 election, mostly as a result of the success of the French Front National (FN) whose 4.711.339 votes accounted for 42.5% of all far-right votes (Mudde, 2018, p.  415). The decline of mainstream parties was confirmed by the results of the 2019 European election (May 2019), as for the first time since the parliament’s inception, the assembly’s two largest groups combined – the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the European People’s Party (EPP)–no longer have the 376 seats needed for a majority. However, the predicted surge of radical right populist parties did not materialise. If the LN of Matteo Salvini scored high, in Finland, Slovakia, Denmark, Germany and French far right parties scored the same as they did in 2014. The far-right block did not materialise in the EP. Right-wing soft-Euroscepticism can be classified along two major historical traditions. First, Gaullism, expressed by the European Progressive Democrats group (renamed European Democratic Alliance in 1984), a Gaullist-dominated group formed in 1965 after the French Gaullists withdrew from the Liberal group. Second, British Conservatives, represented by the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, formed in 2009 as a split-off from the EPP group (for a complete overview of the soft-Euroscepticism traditions in the EP see Leruth, 2018, pp. 384–395). Initially, the ECR group was formed by three main parties (the British Conservative Party, 24 MEPs; the Polish Law and Justice Party, 15 MEPs; and the Czech Civic Democratic Party, 9 MEPs) as well as five smaller parties from Latvia, Lithuania, Belgium, the Netherlands and Hungary. After the 2014 European elections, however, the ECR group became the third largest group in the EP, with 70 members from 15 countries. Studies conducted at the beginning of the 8th EP legislative term (2014–2019) showed a relatively high degree of cohesion in the ECR group, both in terms of ideology and roll-call votes (e.g., Cherepnalkoski et  al., 2016). Nevertheless, the group was significantly divided over the position it should 7  Scholars explain the overarching loyalty to the EU shown by European elites as both a result of their adherence to the supranational ideal as personified by the founding fathers of the European project, and as a result of personal and institutional interests, mainly connected to the access to power and resources granted by sitting in the EP (Brack & Costa, 2017, p. 373).

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take during the UK referendum on EU membership. While seven British Conservative MEPs, including the ECR group’s leader, Sayed Kamall, openly campaigned in favour of Brexit, thirteen campaigned in favour of the Remain side, together with the majority of non-British MEPs (Leruth, 2018, 394). The principles inspiring the ECR group were initially expressed in the Prague Declaration as ‘the urgent need to reform the EU on the basis of Eurorealism, Openness, Accountability and Democracy, in a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness’, as well as ‘the sovereign integrity of the nation-state, opposition to EU federalism and renewed respect for true subsidiarity’ (ECR, 2009). ECR MEPs prefer to call themselves Eurorealist, rather than Eurosceptic. Eurorealism can be defined as ‘a pragmatic, anti-federalist and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails, aiming to reform the current institutional framework to extend the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process’ (Lehrut, 2016, 50). On the ECR group’s website (2018) ‘Eurorealism’ is presented as a sort of ‘third way’ in the process of European integration: The European Union needs a new direction. Some argue that the solution is more Europe, others that the solution is no Europe. We offer a bold alternative vision of a reformed European Union as a community of nations cooperating in areas where they have some common interests that can best be advanced by working together.

Under the mottos ‘Doing less, but better’, ‘Cooperation yes! Superstate no!’ and ‘An EU led by national governments, not Brussels bureaucrats’, the ECR group advocates for ‘minimal’ integration, to be pursued only in those areas where it is functional to member states’ interests and does not hinder national sovereignty. This ‘Eurorealist’ stance is combined with a pro-liberal, free trade stance. As reported on the ECR Group’s website, a key priority of the group is ‘cutting much of the suffocating regulation that the EU has adopted and applied to businesses’ to enhance competitiveness and profits. For these reasons, the ECR group supports the negotiations for free trade agreements such as the Canada-EU Trade Agreement, known as CETA, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investments Partnership (TTIP) Agreement with the United States. After the 2014 European elections, hard Eurosceptic MEPs were organised in three groups: Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), and the non-group NI. The EFDD was formed as a continuation of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group (represented in the 7th legislative term) after several of its members either left it for other groups or failed to be re-elected.8 Lacking the numbers to form a parliamentary group, it reached out to the M5S of Italy. After having been rejected by the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) groups, the M5S offered its activists a limited-choice online referendum to choose a European Parliament group for the party, in which 78% of participating activists 8  Most notably, the Danish People’s Party (DF) and the Finns Party were admitted into the ECR group, and Lega Nord (LN) joined the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF).

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voted for the EFD. In order to accommodate M5S’s and UKIP’s stances in favour of direct democracy, in June 2014, the EFD group changed its name to EFDD, and David Borrelli of the M5S was chosen as the group’s new co-president. The EFDD group was composed of 45 MEPs from seven countries, largely from the M5S (14). The EFDD’s position towards EU integration was expressed in the group’s Charter as follows: Committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation among the Nation States, the Group favours an open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among the sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European superstate. […] The Group favours that any new treaties or any modification of the existing treaties are to be submitted to the peoples' vote through free and fair national referenda in the Member states. […] Furthermore, the group subscribes to the concept of direct democracy believing it to be the ultimate check on political elites.

As Mudde (2018) notes, the EFDD was not ideologically homogeneous in respect of its Euroscepticism, which ranges from M5S’s opposition to the Euro to UKIP’s opposition to the whole EU (p. 420). The EFDD group was not able to organize itself to compete for the 2019 European election as many MEPs defeated top other EPPG or failed to be re-elected. The ENF was founded in June 2015, with 34 members from nine countries, after a previous attempt to form a far-right group in the European Parliament during the 6th term (2009–2014) in the form of the short-lived Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS) group in 2007. The ENF was the parliamentary group of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom although the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) was part of the European Alliance for Freedom and other MEPs lack European affiliations. The ENF was the smallest political group in the EP, counting 34 MEPs from nine states, the majority of whom are from the French National Rally (15), which was known as the National Front until June 2018. The ideology of the ENF was well expressed by the words of the group’s co-president, the Dutch Marcel le Graaf (PVV), on the group’s official website: Our European cultures, our values and our freedom are under attack. They are threatened by the crushing and dictatorial powers of the European Union. They are threatened by mass immigration, by open borders and by a single European currency: one size does not fit all. Nation states must be able to establish their budgets, draw up their laws, take control over their borders, protect their languages and cultures and have their currencies. Therefore, we want a different kind of cooperation. […] We stand for a Europe of economic cooperation between nation states.

The group was replaced for the ninth parliament on 13 June 2019 by the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group, which after the 2019 election counts 76 MEPs and it is the fourth group in the EP, the majority of whom is from the LN (28) of Matteo Salvini and from the Ressemblement National (23) of Marine Le Pen. Often dismissed by scholars as too small, disorganized and poorly coordinated to effectively influence the EP’s deliberation process, recent studies have shown a relatively high degree of cooperation between groups considered as Eurosceptic, like ECR, EFFD, ENF, and the group of non-aligned members (Cherepnalkoski et al., 2016, p. 17). In

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addition, these groups have displayed a high degree of activism in the EP, especially in terms of questions and speeches, though less in terms of amendments and reports (Brack, 2018, p.  403). The capacity of Eurosceptic groups to influence the EP’s decisions appears to remain limited (Brack & Costa, 2018, p. 377), as the chairs of the EP’s most potent committees are in the hands of Europhile political groups (Mudde, 2018, p.  421). Nevertheless, their dissenting voices have changed the dynamics within the chamber, by forcing the EPP and the S&D to dilute their left-­ right differences in order to pass key legislation in the EP (VoteWatch, 2017). Academic evidence explaining MEPs’ positions on immigration is rather scarce and inconclusive. Lopatin (2013), for example, shows that EP positions on immigration appear to be closely linked to institutional dynamics–namely, to the changing power structure among the European Union (EU) institutions. More specifically, the author shows that, after 2005, upon achieving co-decision authority in irregular immigration and asylum, many MEPs changed their positions and voted in favour of restrictive measures towards immigration, in line with the Council’s traditional, conservative outlook. Lopatin claims that, as a result of increasing responsibilities in terms of the legislative process once the EP gained co-decision authority over immigration and asylum issues, the apparent polarisation between the traditional liberal (Party of European Socialists (PES), ALDE, Green, and the European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (GUE)) and conservative (EPP) parties’ positioning was no longer evident. In any case, other scholars reach different conclusions. Hix (2008), for example, claims that the increased authority of the EP has led to a general increase in competition between the political groups and that the liberal-­conservative coalitions in the EP are likely to be maintained. According to Hix, ‘[I]t will be difficult for the EPP to secure more conservative policies on these questions (referring to civil liberties) against this powerful coalition [that is, the Greens, Liberals, Socialists, GUE political groups]’ (p. 8). Given the limited number of recent studies looking specifically at MEPs’ positions on immigration and asylum, the empirical part of this book aims to be a pioneering exploration of MEPs’ attitudes towards immigration.

References Adolino, J.  R., & Blake, C.  H. (2011). Comparing Public Policies: Issues and Choices in Industrialized Countries (2nd ed.). CQ Press. Albertazzi, D., & Vampa, D. (2021). Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western Europe. Routledge. Amnesty International. (2017). Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion. Abuses Against Europe-­ Bound Refugees and Migrants. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed 21 January 2021. Amnesty International. (2019). I sommersi dell’accoglienza – conseguenze del DL 113/2018 sul sistema di accoglienza italiano. https://www.pendingprogetto.it/wp-­content/uploads/2020/01/ Amnesty-­I-­sommersi-­dellaccoglienza.pdf. Accessed 28 January 2021. Andall, J. (2007). Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in Government (1996–2001). Patterns of Prejudice, 41(2), 131–153.

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Part II

Empirical Analysis

Chapter 4

Immigration Debates in National Arenas

Abstract  The analysis of political competition on immigration shows a significant variation in party positioning across different immigration targets, with no clear patterns of polarisation emerging. From the one side, mainstream right and mainstream left parties are equally restrictive – yet to varying degrees – towards immigration control. However, they do not oppose all immigration control targets equally. In particular, both in the UK and Italy, bipartisan support for humanitarian migration emerges, motivated by moral-universal arguments such as the respect of human rights and the protection of refugees. Moreover, when we look at migrant integration, there is no clear-cut divide between mainstream left and mainstream right parties: country-specific factors seem to explain parties’ positions on migrant integration better than ideological positioning, at least for mainstream parties. In contrast, populist parties endorse a somewhat stable position across all targets. They exploit the political opportunity offered by the refugee crisis to foster their anti-establishment claims. Nevertheless, LN and UKIP represent immigration as a national threat, which raises criminality and insecurity within host societies and threatens both economic prosperity and socio-cultural cohesion. On the contrary, M5S tends to position itself closer to the left continuum of the political spectrum, underlining the humanitarian emergency. Keywords  Immigration control · Migrant integration · Refugee crisis · M5S · UKIP · Frames

4.1  Introduction During the last decade, immigration has become one the most debated issues in contemporary western democracies (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Grandi et al., 2019; Hutter & Kriesi, 2021). Immigration entails both socio-economic and cultural-political aspects, thus cross-cutting the traditional left-right dimension of political competition and challenging intra-party cohesion (Odmalm, 2014). In particular, immigration calls into question the control of national borders and the distribution of scarce resources (Brubaker, 2010). Traditionally, opposition to immigration has been owned by radical right parties (McGann & Kitschelt, 1995;

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_4

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Minkenberg, 2013). However, due to the salience that immigration has acquired in the aftermath of the migration crisis, it cannot be simply ignored by mainstream parties. For this reason, it is a good proxy for studying how mainstream political parties’ position on a contested issue that they are not at ease with. The academic literature on the politicization of migration reveals that the choice to emphasise or de-emphasise a certain aspect of the immigration issue ‘depends crucially on whether a political actor is situated on the left or on the right and whether or not this actor belongs to established political forces’ (Höglinger et al., 2012, p. 243). Immigration is expected to be a particularly divisive issue for centre-­ left and centre-right parties. Indeed, centre-right parties need to combine their neoliberal economic orientations, which push for the liberalisation of the labour market, with their cultural nationalism, which calls for the defence of a constructed homogeneous national identity (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008; Odmalm, 2011; Bale, 2003; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). Similarly, centre-left parties have to constantly bridge the divide between the liberal socio-cultural preferences of their middle-­class supporters, which are in favour of individual freedoms and international solidarity, and the protectionism of the working class, threatened by economic competition of cheap labour (Hooghe et  al., 2002; Bale et  al., 2010; Akkerman, 2015; Castelli Gattinara, 2016). Political parties can follow essentially three strategies to respond to multidimensional issues (Elias et al., 2015). They can decide to emphasise only specific issues on one dimension, ignoring other dimensions of political competition. This is the case of single-issues parties, or niche parties (Meguid, 2008), such as the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) with its central policy of withdrawal from the European Union (Usherwood, 2008). Alternatively, when an issue is already high on the agenda and it cannot simply be ignored, political parties can decide to blur their responses, namely, to adopt ‘vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions’ instead of a clear ideological stance, ‘in order to either attract broader support, or at least not deter voters on these issues’ (Rovny, 2012, pp.  5–6). As a third option, political parties can adopt a subsuming strategy and incorporate new issues into the dominant left-right dimension of political competition. Finally, parties can decide to take clear, distinguishable positions on both economic and cultural dimensions of political competition, following a two-dimensional strategy (Alonso et al., 2015). The above-mentioned studies consider political parties as rational actors that craft their opinions on complex issues according to a bundled set of ideas and worldviews organized along a left-right continuum. On the contrary, some more fined-grained analyses of partisan competition have shown that political parties do not always hold coherent positions across policy issues. As an example, Cochrane (2013) shows that party policies on the economic, immigration and social dimension are organized coherently by left-wing parties, while right-wing parties’ positions are much more dispersed (p. 112).

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69

This chapter aims to test the above-mentioned hypothesis on party position on immigration in Italy and the UK, two emblematic cases to understand the politicization of immigration in Europe (Hutter & Kriesi, 2021). In line with previous research, I expect party framing strategies on immigration to be rather incoherent among parties and across policy dimensions. In particular, I expect both mainstream right and mainstream left parties to converge towards restrictive positions vis-à-vis immigration control (Money, 1999; Lahav, 2004; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2000). However, mainstream right parties are expected to talk about immigration with sovereigntist frames, while mainstream left parties are expected to use socio-­economic frames. With regards to migrant integration, I expect mainstream left parties to support this target with cultural-religious frames, while I expect mainstream right parties to oppose migrant integration with socio-economic frames (Table 4.1). Populist parties are supposed to mobilise the issue of immigration to boost their anti-elitist claims (Bulli & Soare, 2018). On the contrary, nativism, xenophobia, and welfare chauvinism should be crucial features of populist radical right parties’ (PRRP) speeches (Betz, 1994; von Beyme, 1988; Mudde, 2007). The next paragraph presents the salience of each policy dimension of the immigration issue as operationalised along the immigration control and migrant integration dimensions. Then, the analysis moves to show the frames and the arguments used by mainstream and populist parties to talk about immigration in national parliaments. A number of excerpts accompany the reader to better compare position and framing strategies of mainstream and populist political parties.

4.2  Issue Salience Mainstream Parties Both in Italy and the UK, mainstream parties devote a particular attention to those aspects connected with immigration control – yet at varying degrees across targets Table 4.1  Political positions on immigration and the EU issues by party family Party family Mainstream left Mainstream right Populist Populist radical right

Frames Immigration control Socio-economic (+) Sovereigntist (+) Legitimacy (+) Sovereigntist Cultural (+)

Migrants’ integration Cultural-religious (+) Socio-economic (−) Legitimacy (−) Sovereigntist Cultural (−)

Source: Author’s elaboration. (+) indicate a party’s support for any given target, (−) indicate a party’s opposition to any given target

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PD

FI

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Border Controls

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Cultural-religious integration

Socio-economic integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 4.1  Issue salience. (From now on, issue salience is expressed as the percentage of coded segments for each target (Number of codes for any given target/Total coded segments)) (immigration issue). Italian mainstream parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

(Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 below). In Italy, both PD and FI devote a small number of coded segments to talking about border controls (6.4% and 13.3% over a total of 452 and 173 coded segments respectively). Conversely, they mainly refer to humanitarian migration, namely refugees and asylum seekers, vulnerable migrants and other related topics (64.6% and 41.6% respectively). On the contrary, in the UK, issue salience differs between CON and LAB MPs: while the formers predominantly talk about border controls (31.5%), LAB representatives refer predominantly to ­humanitarian migration (41.4%). Other targets of the immigration control dimension are rarely mentioned in parliamentary debates in both countries. CON refers to the target of family reunification in 5% of the total coded segments associated with this party, while LAB mentions this target only 4.5% of the times. In Italy, family migration is not addressed at all. This is probably due to the specific type of debates that took place in the House of Deputies in the period considered, which were mostly devoted to solving issues connected with the refugee crisis such as how to deal with unprecedented inflows of asylum seekers. Similarly, economic migration (EU citizens and labour migration) constitutes only a small percentage of the mainstream parties’

4.2  Issue Salience

71

LAB

CON

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Border Controls

Humanitarian Migration

Family Reunification

Labour Migration Socio-Economic Cultural-Religious Integration Integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 4.2  Issue salience (immigration issue). British Mainstream parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

speeches: 4% in the case of CON, 1.7% in the case of the FI, 0.8% in the case of LAB, 1.3% in the case of PD. On the migrant integration targets, it can be noted that neither Italian nor British mainstream parties are particularly vocal on these aspects. The only notable exception is the FI, which dedicates 12.7% of its coded segments to talking about cultural-­ religious issues and 22% to talk about citizenship, while PD devotes only 4.2% and 9.1% respectively to these targets. As will become clear later on in the analysis, these are the targets towards which the FI endorses the most vigorous opposition (and is thus more vocal). Besides this, in Italy mainstream left and mainstream right parties together devote 10.2% and 8.1% of their statements respectively to the question of the reception of migrants, while this issue is rarely mentioned by mainstream parties in the UK. As Italy is a frontline country in the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, the reception of refugees is a particularly relevant topic for all parties. Indeed, the Italian reception system has been involved in a judicial procedure, known as ‘Mafia Capitale’, involving allegations of mismanagement of public money and violations of fundamental rights of the people hosted in the reception centres.

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M5S

LN

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Cultural-religious integration

Socio-economic integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 4.3  Issue salience (immigration issue). Italian populist parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

Populist Parties As reported in Fig. 4.3 above, for Italian populist parties the immigration control dimension is more salient than migrant integration. However, consistent differences exist between LN and M5S. First, while the former devotes 55.8% over a total of 706 coded segments to security issues (border controls, the expulsion of irregular migrants and so on), the M5S dedicates only 18.8% of its statements to these topics. Besides this, the M5S dedicates many more statements to humanitarian migration (48.6%) than LN does (12.5%). Moving our attention to the migrant integration targets, it is worth noting that Italian populist parties are much more vocal on these targets than Italian mainstream parties are. In particular, M5S and LN devote 30.1% and 13% of their coded statements respectively to discussing issues connected with the reception of migrants. LN is also vocal on the issue of socio-­economic integration, with a total of 10.8% of its coded statements focused on this issue. During the 2015–2018 Parliamentary sessions, UKIP was represented by only one MP in the House of Commons: Douglas Carswell. Previously a Conservative MP, he had resigned his seat in 2014 and fought a by-election for UKIP, winning the Clacton by-election on 9 October.1 In an interview with the BBC, he explained that

1  In truth, Mark Reckless was also victorious in the Rochester and Strood by-election on 20 November 2014. However, he lost his seat to the Conservative Kelly Tolhurst in the 2015 General Election.

4.3  Opposition and Support to Immigration

73

the reason he joined UKIP was to see ‘fundamental change in British politics’ and because he believed ‘many of those at the top of CON are simply not on our side. They aren’t serious about the change that Britain so desperately needs’ (BBC, 2018). Eurosceptic, a supporter of the ‘Exit’ side in the Brexit referendum campaign, and highly critical of the party’s leader, Nigel Farage, on 25 March 2017 he left UKIP to sit as an Independent MP. He did not stand in the 2017 General Election. Given that UKIP had only one representative in Parliament in the time span considered, I based the analysis of the party’s positions on the EU on a small sample of speeches (27). In the period considered, Mr Carswell took the floor in the House of Commons only three times, once in the debate on the Immigration Bill (October 13, 2015) and twice during the debate on the European Agenda on Migration (December 14, 2015). In November 29, 2018, Nigel Farage and Catherine Blaiklock founded the Brexit Party, a populist Eurosceptic party with the stated purpose of advocating for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.  In 2019, although Boris Johnson refused an electoral pact proposed by Farage to maximize the seats won by pro-Brexit MPs, the leader of the Brexit Party decided not to stand in those 317 constituencies won by the Conservatives at the last election (Malnick, 2019). The Brexit Party failed to win any seat in the 2019 election. On January 2021, in the attempt to re-build the party’s identity after Brexit, the Brexit Party was relaunched as Reform UK.  Given the limited number of coded segments referred to UKIP, it was not possible to calculate issue salience for this party. Therefore, I based my analysis of UKIP’s positions at the national level on the results of the analysis of frames and keywords.

4.3  Opposition and Support to Immigration Party positioning towards each target is identified by a coloured marker (one for each party). Parties’ positions range from −1 to +1. The zero line represents the neutral position (i.e., the number of sentences coded as positive/permissive equal those coded as negative/restrictive) or the lack of coded sentences for that target. Whenever opposition to the target is present, the markers are drawn in the negative side of the graph, while support is shown in the positive side of the graph. The distinction between principled and pragmatic party positioning is represented by the markers being above or below ±0.5 (principled positioning above ±0.5). Mainstream Parties In the UK, a clear divide between mainstream left and mainstream right parties emerges. On the one side, Labour MPs endorse liberal positions towards all the targets composing the immigration control dimension (Fig. 4.4): they are pragmatically against border controls (−0.2), and they support with pragmatic stances both family reunification (+0.3) and economic migration (+0.2). On the other side, CON endorses more restrictive positions towards immigration control: it is moderately in

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CON

LAB

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Border Controls

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-Economic Cultural-Religious Integration Integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 4.4  British mainstream parties’ positions (immigration issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

favour of border control (+0.1), and it opposes family reunification (−0.03) and economic migration (−0.04). Labour MPs’ opposition to border controls can appear counter-intuitive, even so, given that it contradicts Money’s (1999) hypothesis, according to which mainstream left and right parties converge in supporting immigration control measures. Nevertheless, this result needs to be understood in light of the context-specific political debate on immigration that took place in the UK in the time frame considered. Indeed, many of the analysed speeches refer to the Immigration Bill 2016, which became law in May 2016, and to the Illegal Immigration (Offences) Bill 2017–19, discussed between 2017 and 2018, which both contained several provisions on the criminalisation of irregular migrants. In these debates, Labour’s representatives fought against the unlimited administrative detention of irregular migrants as proposed by CON.  Moreover, during the post-­ Brexit debate, a prominent issue was the status of the EU nationals. What would happen to them with Britain leaving the EU became a matter of discussion, particularly as the government refused to unilaterally guarantee their rights after Brexit (see Chap. 3). On this matter, LAB took a favourable position towards granting rights to EU citizens, stressing the benefits brought to British economy by EU nationals, as well as intentions to protect the rights of EU citizens that resided in the UK at the time of the referendum (e.g., Harrop, 2017; Roos, 2019).

4.3  Opposition and Support to Immigration

PD

75

FI

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-Economic Cultural-Religious Integration Integration

Reception

Citizenship

Fig. 4.5  Italian mainstream parties’ positions (immigration issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

Differently form the UK, Italian mainstream parties’ positions tend to converge in favour of immigration control measures. As shown by Fig. 4.5, both PD and FI are in favour of border controls and security measures (+0.08 PD, +0.2 FI). Besides, PD endorses positive, pragmatic, stances towards labour migration (+0.06), while FI representatives do not mention this group of migrants. Family reunification is a target that is not salient in the Italian parliamentary debate. Both in Italy and in the UK, however, mainstream parties hold a principled bipartisan support of humanitarian migration (+0.7 in the case of both LAB and PD, +0.6 and +0.5 on this item in the case of CON and FI respectively). This result could be taken as a hint of a successful process of policy transfer (Radaelli, 2000) of international and EU values and norms; in particular, the principles enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), into domestic politics. Coming to parties’ stances towards migrant integration, it is worth noting that Conservative MPs hold principled support towards cultural and religious integration of already resident migrants (+0.6), often stressing the multicultural roots of British society, considered the essence of Britishness. In the words of Mims Davies (Immigration Bill, 13 October 2015): ‘Our melting-pot nation is a global force precisely because of our diversity. That permeates our history and defines what it is to be truly British’. On the contrary, Labour representatives do not mention issues related to cultural-religious integration, while taking a permissive position, although a very moderate one, in support of the socio-economic integration of already resident migrants (+0.1). Moreover, both parties take hostile positions towards reception: the Conservatives do so with a pragmatic character (−0.1), while Labour’s

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position has a principled character (−0.6). Indeed, they justify their opposition using different arguments: the former denounces the economic burden that the reception of asylum seekers poses on local authorities, while the latter denounce the conditions of destitution and the violation of fundamental rights that asylum seekers often have to face in reception centres. In Italy, mainstream parties’ positions towards migrant integration are reversed with respect to the UK. The PD is in favour of all measures to integrate migrants who are already resident, while the FI is against them. Indeed, PD representatives express principled support towards cultural-religious integration (+0.7) and citizenship (+0.6), as well as pragmatic support for the socio-economic integration (+0.2) and, although very moderately, the reception (+0.3) of migrants already present in the host country. On the contrary, FI’s delegates express principled opposition towards cultural and religious integration (−0.5) and citizenship (−0.7), as well as a pragmatic, although moderate, opposition to reception of migrants (−0.1). However, the Italian mainstream right party is moderately in favour of the socio-economic integration of already resident migrants (+0.1). This pro-immigration position resonates with the free-market liberalism that characterises the right (Helbling, 2014). Populist Parties When looking at the positions endorsed by populist parties in Italy, it clearly emerges a positional difference between the LN and the M5S.  As illustrated in Fig. 4.6 below, the LN advocates harsher security measures (+0.78) and expresses a principled opposition towards the socio-economic (−0.67), cultural-religious (−0.74) and civic (−0.67) integration of migrants. Conversely, the M5S holds a more ambiguous position towards immigration, scoring values close to zero on all targets except for humanitarian migration. The party endorses the latter on a principled basis (+0.6). As already noted in the previous paragraph, it is worth stressing again that the reception of migrants is a category that plays a central role in the Italian political debate, especially for populist parties. In this respect, both the M5S’s and the LN’s representatives endorse a negative pragmatic stance (−0.08 in the case of the M5S and −0.17 in the case of the LN).

4.4  Framing Immigration Mainstream Parties Both in Italy and in the UK, there is a marked difference between how the mainstream left and the mainstream right frame the immigration issue in the Parliament. In the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, Conservative MPs perceive immigration as an uncontrolled phenomenon, which needs to be strictly regulated by restoring national sovereignty over external borders. Indeed, Conservative speeches abound with words such as ‘security’, ‘nationals’ and ‘defence’. Besides, as shown in Table 4.2 below, the Tories use predominantly security frames (30,5% of total coded sentences).

4.4  Framing Immigration

77

M5S

LN

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-Economic Cultural-Religious Integration Integration

Reception

Citizenship

Fig. 4.6 Italian populist parties’ positions (immigration issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data) Table 4.2  Immigration frames by actor. British mainstream parties. National Arena

LAB CON

Codes % Codes %

Socio-­ economic 30 4 86 7

Culturalreligious 10 1.3 25 2.1

Moral-­ universal 364 48 171 14

Sovereigntism 0 0 107 8.7

Security 5 0.7 371 30.5

Legitimacy 63 8.3 186 15.2

Neutral codes 286 37.7 275 22.5

Total 758 100 1221 100

Source: Author’s data Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

CON representatives often stress the need to combat illegal immigration and distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. […] it is not immigration but uncontrolled immigration that I believe is unsustainable. […] it is imperative that we first reassert sovereignty over our national borders.2 (Kevin Hollinrake (CON), Immigration Bill, 13/10/2015)

 From now on, in quotation keywords will be reported in italic.

2

78

4  Immigration Debates in National Arenas The report states that the EU needs to be firm with those who do not need protection, who pose a security risk or who refuse to co-operate with the asylum process. (Sir Christopher Chope (CON), Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill, 04/03/2016)

Moreover, the two main British political parties are divided on the impact of immigration in their country: while Conservative MPs represent the UK as a country which has lost control of its borders and is threatened by an unprecedented number of aliens, Labour MPs stress the social and economic enrichment for the nation. Immigration now stands at its highest level ever, with huge social and economic consequences for our country. […] such a colossal increase in our population is unsustainable and sensible controls are needed. Through our ever-closer integration with the European Union, I fear that we have lost sight of our place in the world as a global, trading nation, neglecting our close ties with the English-speaking world and Commonwealth, and instead aligning ourselves most closely with the one region of the world where economic growth is stagnating. (Kevin Hollinrake (CON), Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill, 04/03/2016) The first [proposition] with which I am sure all Members will agree, is that immigrants have made an enormous contribution to this country, which we should celebrate, not diminish. The second is that, in this country, we have a proud history of offering asylum to some of the poorest and most vulnerable people who have come here seeking refuge. Of course, there must be rules on immigration and asylum, and of course those rules need to be firmly and effectively applied. We also need to listen carefully to the concerns that have been expressed in the debate about immigration, and to take them seriously. But fairness is the touchstone: fairness to those wishing to come here and fairness to those who are already here. (Keir Starmer (LAB), Immigration Bill, 13.10.2015)

However, when the Covid-19 pandemic arose, CON’s MPs start to put increasing emphasis on the contribution of foreign workers, in particular, NHS nurses and doctors, to British economy. If they have no doubt about the need to uphold the outcome of the 2016 referendum by trading off free movement,3 at the same time they stress the need to protect those immigrants that were beneficial for the country (Table 4.3). Table 4.3  Top ten keywords (CON and LAB). Immigration issue. National Arena Conservative

Keywords security nationals defence citizens police referendum pension NATO purdah campaign

Keyness 471.35 329.25 287.12 271.88 210.24 192.72 182.93 164.45 135.46 134.68

Labour

Keywords refugees dubs children rights home child minister teenagers borders families

Keyness 153.06 151.09 140.44 126.39 114.38 98.63 83.06 82.59 75.82 74.8

Keywords are sorted on ‘keyness’. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥ seven are reported 3  Free movement between the UK and the European Union ended on 31 December 2020 and on 1 January 2021, the UK implemented a points-based immigration system that treats EU and non-EU citizens equally. Thus, no longer will EU, EEA and/or Swiss nationals be allowed to move to the UK and work without a visa. The point-based immigration system shows that on the core issue of

4.4  Framing Immigration

79

[…] Immigration is a question of balance. It may bring pressures, but it also brings significant gains. Finding that balance is crucial. […] a nation’s having a sovereign say over its borders should not be confused with its being anti-immigration; as my party’s manifesto set out, it is more about offering a balanced package of measures that are fair, firm and compassionate. The importance of the new immigration system is to identify and welcome the skills our country needs. (Alberto Costa (CON), Point-based Immigration System, 24.02.2020)

On the contrary the positions held by Labour MPs are stable over time. During the migration crisis they represent immigration mainly as a vast humanitarian crisis  – they often refer to ‘children’ ‘families’ ‘teenagers’ ‘home’  – and stress the moral duty of assisting those persons in need while coming up with long-term strategies and inclusive policies Unfolding across Europe and the north of Africa is a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen since the Second World War. […] Terrible images of families and children in great distress continue to fill our television screens. […] Does it adequately describe the people  – the desperate parents carrying children at the Hungarian border and the children sleeping on the streets in Greece? Is the Government’s decision not to take any refugee from Europe sustainable from a moral and practical point of view? Although I understand the Government’s reluctance to take part in the proposed quota system, surely an offer of some help would live up to the historic tradition our country has always had. (Andy Burnham (LAB), Migration, 16/09/2015)

After Brexit, LAB opposes the immigration point-based system. LAB MPs call for a new consensus on immigration based upon the recognition of the enormous contribution of foreign citizens to British economy and society. More than half of the NHS and careworkers who have died from coronavirus were born abroad; they could not have given more to this nation, and we owe them so much. […] The Government have to ditch the divisive rhetoric of recent years and recognise that the hostile environment, and the treatment of the Windrush generation4 as a result, demean us and can never be part of a new consensus. (Yvette Cooper (LAB), Point-based Immigration System, 24.02.2020)

Similarly, in Italy, a clear divide between mainstream left and mainstream right parties emerges. The PD always takes liberal positions towards immigration in the time span considered. During the refugee crisis, the party frames immigration mainly as a humanitarian crisis, often referring to the effects of immigration on unaccompanied minor refugees (‘minori’, ‘stranieri’, ‘accompagnati’) and using moral-universal frames (43.4% of all coded segments related to immigration, Table 4.4).

free movement UKIP’s agenda has been embraced by the Conservatives in delivering a ‘hard’ version of Brexit (on this point, see also Vampa, 2021). 4  The Windrush scandal, which broke in April 2018, saw the UK government apologise for deportation threats made to Commonwealth citizens’ children. Despite living and working in the UK for decades, many were told they were there illegally because of a lack of official paperwork. Since then, reports and compensation schemes have been launched, but some people are concerned that not enough has been done.

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Table 4.4  Immigration frames by actor. Italian mainstream parties. National Arena Socio-­ economic PD Codes 16 % 3.3 FI Codes 16 % 8.8

Culturalreligious 39 8 16 8.8

Moral-­ universal 210 43.4 16 8.8

Sovereigntism 31 7 30 16.5

Security 32 6.4 41 22.5

Legitimacy 22 4.4 8 4.4

Neutral codes 133 27.5 55 30.2

Total 483 100 182 100

Source: Author’s data Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

Once in government (2015–2018), the party was very active in promoting a law regarding the protection measures for unaccompanied minors (Zampa Decree), as expressed in the following quote: As far as we are concerned, everything depends on the eyes with which we choose to look at the change that crosses us. We can decide to see in this exodus of unaccompanied minor refugees as many dangers and potential evildoers. Alternatively, we can decide to wear the right glasses, and then we would give a different title to this adolescent migration. Perhaps we will call it ‘the sunrise of humanity’. (Barbara Pollastrini (PD), ‘Proposta di Legge Zampa’, 20.03.2017)

PD was strongly associated with the issue of Italian citizenship. Indeed, the party promoted a proposal to guarantee citizenship to those children born on Italian soil (ius soli). These words by deputy Andrea Giorgis summarise the party’s position on the matter: […] regarding the matter of citizenship [we endorse] a principle that could be summarised as follow: anybody living and working permanently in Italy and to whom the Italian Constitution and its laws apply, has the right to be recognised as an Italian citizen. (Andrea Giorgis (PD), ‘Proposte di legge: Nuove norme in materia di cittadinanza’, 10/08/2015)

During the Conte I government (June 2018–July 2019), also known as the Yellow-Green coalition between the M5S and the LN, PD strongly opposed the socalled Salvini decrees, advocating for a comprehensive approach to immigration. According to the party, security cannot be improved with restrictive measures. It needs to be built on solidarity, respect for fundamental rights, and real opportunities for socio-economic integration. It is a serious mistake to put security and immigration together in the same law. […] This decree will produce less security and more criminality. […] The abolition of the humanitarian protection will produce […] thousands and thousands of irregular migrants in our country. […] This is how your party manages the issue of immigration: by looking at opinion polls in a quest to elicit public consensus, rather than by examining the problem and trying to solve it; by demagogically declaring that immigration is just a problem – and it is a problem indeed – of numbers, rather than trying to discern and eliminate its root causes; you prefer to detain immigrants in places where they are invisible, in blatant violation of their fundamental rights, […] just so you can say that the issue of immigration has been taken care of. (Emanuele Fiano (PD), ‘Discussion of the law decree 4 October 2018’, n. 113, 27.11.2018)

On the contrary, FI delegates frame immigration using security (22.5%) and sovereigntist (16.5%) frames to strongly oppose the policy measures proposed by PD,

4.4  Framing Immigration

81

which they consider dangerous for social and cultural cohesion. The manifest hostility towards the mainstream left governing party is signalled by the presence of the word ‘Renzi’ – PM between 2014 and 2016 – among the top ten keywords of FI. For us, there are non-negotiable values, which are respect, defence and pride of Italian identity, of that common social, historical and cultural background that qualifies and distinguishes us as Italians. (Annagrazia Calabria (FI), Proposte di legge: Nuove norme in materia di cittadinanza, 28/09/2015)

During the Conte I cabinet, FI MPs claim to be among the originators of the Salvini decrees, as the latter had already been envisaged in the electoral manifesto of the centre-right coalition for the 2018 general election. They connect immigration to terrorism and criminality. Thus, they convincingly support the most restrictive measures contained in the Salvini decrees (e.g., the abolition of the humanitarian protection, the extension of the maximum detention period allowed, and the abolition of the system of protection for asylum seekers and refugees) (Table 4.5). The migratory phenomenon of recent years is a wave that must be monitored constantly to prevent it from further affecting Italy and the European Union. It is an emergency that must be faced with firm policies, otherwise we risk being overwhelmed, leaving Italy and Europe at the mercy of jihadist terrorism and organized crime. (Gregorio Fontana (FI), Discussion of the law decree 14 June 2019, n. 53, 23.7.2019)

The positions held by FI delegates do not change during the Conte II cabinet (2019–2021) formed by PD and M5S. The party accused the M5S of hypocrisy for having softened its positions once allied with a centre-left party

Table 4.5  Top ten keywords (PD and FI). Immigration Issue. National Arena

PD

FI

National Arena Keywords legge maggioranza minori strutture ottobre accompagnati stranieri mozione cittadinanza commissioni consiglio Europa Italia Berlusconi ministro governo fatto Renzi politica riforme

Keyness 62.42 57.18 45.06 44.84 36.39 34.31 34.24 34.12 32.05 31.02 277.29 205.57 158.79 135.34 105.49 90.42 82.05 65.32 64.8 60.29

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥ seven are reported.

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4  Immigration Debates in National Arenas To combat illegal immigration, we need an approach that is radically different from the one taken by the second Conte’s government. […] Domestic actions and foreign initiatives must be combined. […] We need to implement both severe measures to block illegal immigration and bilateral agreements to repatriate those who do not have the right to enter the European Union. […] Unless the goal is the replacement of our aging population with a younger one coming from Africa, then, clearly, the immigration policies proposed by the current government go in the wrong direction. (Gregorio Fontana (FI), Discussion of the law decree 21 October 2020, n. 130, 27.11.2020)

The comparative analysis between Italy and the UK shows that there is a correlation between party family and party positions on immigration: in both countries, the mainstream left and mainstream right parties differ both in terms of the framing of the problem and policy proposals. The former represents refugee and immigration as structural phenomena, to be regulated, but also accepted and integrated into European societies. Thus, the mainstream left calls for a coordinated European response based on ‘humanity’ and ‘solidarity’, mostly using moral-universal frames. On the contrary, the mainstream right frames the migration crisis as a serious security, social and economic threat to the nation, using mainly security frames. Mainstream right parties in both countries criticise the legitimacy of the EU’s decisions regarding the management of the crisis and call for the restoration of ‘sovereign powers’, enforcing the rule of law and the enhancement of border controls and effective return policies, using sovereigntist frames. The electoral success of populist parties and their inclusion into coalition government as major of minor partners have direct consequences on political competition in Western Europe. Mainstream parties are increasingly under severe pressure to respond to the challenges posed by (mainly right-wing) populist parties. Our analysis shows that, both in Italy and in the UK, mainstream right parties have tried to co-opt the stances of populist (right) parties, at least, to engage with some of their demands, thus moving towards the right side of the political spectrum (Vittori & Morlino, 2021, p. 39). Populist Parties The framing of immigration in Italy differs among types of populist parties. LN uses security frames (55%) more often than the M5S (15%), which instead is much more prone to use humanitarian frames (26.3%) than the radical right (1.3%) (Table 4.6). In a similar vein, the LN’s representatives use socio-economic frames more often than their populist counterparts (13.5% and 1% respectively). Besides this, the M5S uses legitimacy frames much more frequently (25%) that its radical right counterpart (8.5%). However, a more accurate interpretation must also account for whether these frames are used to support or to oppose the various immigration targets, as is likely the case for socio-economic and cultural-religious frames. With this in mind, I now move to the frames’ evaluative content, through the analysis of keywords. Table 4.7 shows the keywords most frequently used by M5 and LN MPs. As can be seen, populist radical right politicians frame immigration as an ‘invasion’, which threatens social cohesion and the supposed cultural homogeneity of the country. LN’s deputies criticise the governments led by PD – and the left in general – for favouring uncontrolled and irregular immigration due to an ideologically pro-­ immigration attitude, and thus failing to guarantee security and to protect national

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Table 4.6  LN’s and M5S’s immigration frames. National Arena

LN

Codes % M5S Codes %

Socio-­ economic 104 18.8 33 4.2

Culturalreligious 0 0 0 0

Sovereigntism 41 7 3 0.5

Moral-­ universal 8 1.3 150 26.3

Security 345 55 86 15

Legitimacy 52 8.5 141 25

Neutral 57 9.4 166 29

Total 607 100 579 100

Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded Table 4.7  Top ten keywords for Italian populist parties. Immigration issue

M5S

LN

National Arena Keywords minori migranti accompagnati accoglienza stranieri Italia età prima sistema bambini clandestini immigrazione immigrati clandestina paese cittadini invasione cento CIE espulsione

Keyness 212,373 113,222 107,244 89,848 79,253 48,934 48,193 43,036 41,081 40,696 150,191 115,117 105,343 77,066 72,277 71,375 63,234 59,455 59,119 52,413

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥ seven are reported

borders. Conversely, they advocate strict policies to curb irregular migration by strengthening detention and repatriation of irregular migrants. Not surprisingly, words such as ‘illegal migrants’ (‘clandestini’ in Italian), ‘invasion’, and ‘deportation’ are among the top ten keywords used by LN MPs to talk about migration (Table 4.7). The victims of immigration are a collateral effect of an emergency created by those who did not want to manage the immigration flows which have now become a real invasion. (Marco Rondini (LN) Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the reception and identification system 23.03.2016)

When Matteo Salvini, the leader of the LN, was appointed Interior Minister of the Conte I cabinet, he was particularly active in imposing his line on migration, often causing harsh clashes with the Defence Minister, Elisabetta Trenta, and even

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with the armed forces, who reacted to the inference of Salvini (who, for instance, order to Italian navy to block NGOs with a ministerial directive). Most importantly, the former Interior Minister promoted a set of laws, known as Salvini decrees, aimed at strengthening domestic security by fighting against criminality, terrorism and irregular migration (Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020). The Salvini decree is a decree that should unite […] all those who believe that a State must exercise its prerogatives as a sovereign State, unite all those who believe that the State has the right to regulate access to its territorial waters. […] We prefer to defend the women and men who, in uniform, protect us every day. Precisely for this reason, we have increased the resources allocated to the police forces. We prefer clear rules against irregular and indiscriminate immigration […] To those who wanted a bent country, to those who wanted a country ridiculed by all of Europe, we prefer a country that regains its dignity. To those who wanted a country hostage to non-governmental organizations, we prefer a country that makes itself respected. (Alberto Stefani (LN), Discussion of the law decree 14 June 2019, n. 53, 22.07.2019)

Regarding migrant integration, LN delegates are very concerned about the impact of immigration on economic prosperity and social cohesion. In particular, they argue that the government should first and foremost care about its disadvantaged citizens before providing care and services to foreigners.5 LN representatives claim that the distribution of national services is unfairly allocated in favour of irregular migrants, at the expenses of Italians. Also, they accuse the government of exercising ‘a form of reverse racism’ against Italians (Polo Grimoldi, LN MP, Debate on the establishment of the National Day in memory of the victims of migration, 15.04.2015), as expressed in the following quote: To help those 4.5 million Italians that live below the poverty line […], the Government planned to spend 600 million Euro in 2016. On the contrary, to guarantee […] an assisted invasion of our country the Government has allocated 4.2 million. These numbers show the priorities of this Executive, which in the name of political correctness […] opens the doors to the repopulation of our country through uncontrolled immigration. (Marco Rondini (LN), ‘Zampa Decree’, 26.10.2016)

Conversely, and as already highlighted, M5S representatives are more concerned about the respect of migrants’ rights. As confirmed by the list of the top ten keywords utilised by the party, the M5S cares much more about the rights of the most vulnerable among migrants, namely ‘minors’ and ‘children’, than the members of the LN. On the presumption of minority: yes, it should be given, because, I will say while I have breath in my lungs, these minors are already victims of organized crime, so why should they also be victims of a world that they have not chosen and of a system that they have not chosen? Why should they be presumed adults, resulting in less protection? (Fabiana Dadone (M5S), ‘Zampa Decree’, 26.10.2016)

Besides, the M5S strongly politicises the refugee crisis. The party often associates the mismanagement of the reception system with the corruption of the national  Indeed, Salvini made ‘Italians first!’ his slogan during the 2018 Italian elections.

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political elite (Gianfreda, 2018; Bulli & Soare, 2018), as shown by the following citation: Mineo6 is the centre of illicit interests, it is the most relevant example of how the migration phenomenon can be exploited by those who want to earn from emergencies. Mineo represents the complete failure of the reception system, both from an economic and from a human rights perspective. (Lorefice Marialucia (M5S), ‘Lorefice and others Motion n. 1 01342 concerning initiatives related to the reception centre for Mineo asylum seekers’, 10.03.2016)

Moreover, M5S MPs see in the reception of asylum seekers an illegal business through which entrepreneurs, connected with the government, receive economic profits in exchange for votes. Alessandro di Battista, one of the leading exponents of the M5S, explicitly refers to the existence of a ‘criminal connection between politicians and immigration, intended as the possibility to speculate on desperate people’ (Di Battista, 14.10.2015). He goes even further, by saying that ‘illegal immigration, here in Italy, is a new form of public funding to political parties’ (ivi). When talking about the reception of migrants, the security dimension is stronger in the LN MPs’ speeches: they accuse the Government of attracting illegal immigrants through the promotion of lax asylum policies, and thus of contributing to insecurity and criminality all over the country. I am sure that many social cooperatives have celebrated due to the direct and indirect costs of immigration, while taxpayers have disbursed three million Euros. I think that citizens are less happy since their cities are now transformed into a no-man’s-land, where there is a total lack of security and the rule of the jungle is in place. We think that only those who respect the rules, who respect the laws of this country, should receive benefits. (Massimiliano Fedriga (LN), European Council (15 and 16 October 2015), 14/10/2015)

Nevertheless, while I found evidence of authoritarian, law-and-order and welfare chauvinism stances in LN speeches, I did not find any explicitly xenophobic or racist stances. One reason for this pattern could be the institutional pressure exercised by the parliamentary context on the lexicon of LN representatives. A second reason could be a strategic choice made by the LN’s representative to ‘project itself as more moderate and civic […] in order to appeal to a wider range of voters’ (Griffini, 2019, p. 193). The evolution of the M5S’s positions on immigration in the last five years is probably the most interesting demonstration of the chameleonic nature of a ‘pure’ populist party (Pirro, 2018; Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020). As we have already noticed, during the refugee crisis the party held positions very closed to PD, advocating for the protection of vulnerable migrants and the respect of fundamental rights. Once in government with the LN, however, the party passed the Salvini decrees, a mix of security-driven provisions to fight against irregular migration, terrorism, and organized crime, increasing funds for police forces while shrinking integration policies. 6  Mineo is the name of a reception centre in the province of Catania (Sicily), which has been in the spotlight for corruption and human rights violations. For further details, see: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/01/migrants-more-profitable-than-drugs-how-mafia-infiltrateditaly-asylum-system

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The M5S used legitimacy frames to justify this policy shift. In particular, M5S MPs mobilised anti-establishment arguments arguing that the Salvini decrees were a significant step forward in the fight against the alleged business of migrant reception. Finally, after the collapse of the Yellow-Green coalition and the formation of the Yellow-Red coalition between M5S and PD, the M5S shifted back to liberal positions towards migration, supporting the (partial) abolition of the Salvini decrees, which were dismissed as inefficient. The Salvini decrees, strongly championed by the former Minister of the Interior, had an opposite effect to that initially promised. They led to an increase of irregular migrants, few repatriations, and an increase in appeals that inevitably generated costs for the Italian justice system […] leaving many migrants out of a system of support that would indeed have guaranteed a more effective control. (Filippo Giuseppe Perconti (M5S), Discussion of the law decree 21 October 2020, n. 130 (Lamorgese decree), 27.11.2020)

The positions of UKIP are very closed to those endorsed by LN. Mr Carswell was highly critical of the EU’s management of the refugee crisis (see the high number of legitimacy frames used by the UKIP’s representative to delegitimise the EU policies and institutions, namely 45.7% of the total coded segments, see Table 4.8). EU immigration and asylum policies are seen as a threat to the UK’s ability to control its borders and decide ‘who comes in’, infringing British sovereignty – indeed, he often uses sovereigntist frames, which account for nearly 35% of the total coded segments. In this vein, he strongly opposes the EU-Turkey Agreement to manage the Balkan borders: [The EU-Turkey Agreement] is not in our national interest. First, the deal will give 75 million Turks visa-free, unrestricted access to the Schengen area from next October. We may not be part of Schengen, but that does affect us. There will be no mechanism to log people coming into the Schengen area and none to log people out. The deal can only add to the porousness of the EU’s frontiers, which can only contribute to the increase in numbers of those camped outside Calais seeking entry into the UK. Secondly, the talks between the EU and Turkey mean that Turkish accession to the EU is back on the table. I would not wish joining the EU on anyone, certainly not a friend such as Turkey. (Douglas Carswell (UKIP), ‘European Agenda on Migration’, 14/12/2015)

In addition, Mr Carswell stresses the negative impact that EU policies and decisions have on British people, without their say: ‘[as result of the EU-Turkey Bill] many more thousands of migrants to find their way into this country […] and many voters out there will deeply resent the fact that they have simply not been asked’ (Ivi) (Table 4.9). Finally Mr Carswell does not distinguish between different types of immigrants but instead focusses on the negative effect that the free movement of people within Table 4.8  UKIP’s Immigration frames. National Arena Socioeconomic UKIP Codes 1 % 3 Source: Author’s data

Culturalreligious 0 0

Moraluniversal 0 0

Sovereigntist 12 34.3

LegitiSecurity macy 0 16 0 45.7

Neutral codes Total 6 35 17 100

4.4  Framing Immigration

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Table 4.9  Top ten keywords (UKIP). Immigration issues. National Arena UKIP

Keyword Turkey deal UKIP Schengen assigned log radicalism enshrine motion Arabia

Keyness 70.54 50.75 44.56 37.68 35.8 23.86 20.05 18.33 17.65 15.15

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥ seven are reported

the Schengen Area has on the UK. As already noted in Chap. 3 the free movement of EU citizens has been a central issue in the process of politicisation of immigration in the UK eventually leading to the UK’s referendum on EU membership (e.g. Portes, 2016) The analysis of parliamentary debates reveals that populist parties differ in the way they frame the immigration issue. While the LN and UKIP) mainly perceive immigration as a security threat, the M5S swings between humanitarian claims in support of vulnerable migrants (when allied with mainstream left parties) and antielitist claims in support of anti-immigration provisions (when in government with a radical right party). These results clearly suggest that partisan ideological differences matter in explaining the framing strategies employed in parliamentary competition. Also, they confirm Mudde’s (2007) definition of populism: populist parties frame the immigration issue differently than populist radical right parties.

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Chapter 5

EU Debates in National Arenas

Abstract  European politics is increasingly contested along two dimensions: the economic left-right dimension and a relatively new dimension focused on European integration and immigration. This chapter aims to compare the strategies adopted by mainstream and populist parties to compete on EU issues in national parliaments. The analysis reveals that support for the EU is no longer unconditional, even for mainstream left parties of both countries, which criticise certain aspects of the functioning of the EU, although they do not dispute the European horizon towards which their country needs to move. On the contrary, mainstream right parties, both in Italy and in the UK, express principled Eurosceptic positions towards the process of EU integration and towards EU institutions, mainly criticising the legitimacy of EU institutions. Populist radical right parties (LN and the UKIP) hold principled negative stances towards all the EU targets and link closely anti-immigration attitudes with anti-EU attitudes using both legitimacy and sovereigntist frames. Conversely, the M5S holds much more nuanced positions towards the EU.  The chameleonic nature of the M5S is explained by its nature as a ‘pure’ populist party. Keywords  European Union · European integration · Sovereigntism · Euroscepticism · Populist parties

5.1  Introduction In the last decade, the European Union experienced multiple crises. First, the economic and sovereign debt crisis of 2008. Second, the migration crisis that unfolded in 2015. Third, the Brexit crisis (2016), which marked a historical turning point as, for the first time, a Member state decided to end its membership of the union (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 1158). To manage these crises, the EU adopted a number of unpopular policies, e.g., bailouts and relocation of asylum seekers (Mudde, 2014). More importantly, the economic slowdown undermined one of the core foundations of public support for the EU, namely the promise that it generates economic prosperity (Brack, 2018, p. 397). Academic research shows that a link exists between the European multiple crises and the development of public and party-based Euroscepticism (Schäfer & Gross,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_5

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2020; Taggart & Szczerbiak 2018). Kneuner (2019) argues that the debt crisis and the refugee crisis led to the formation of a new transnational cleavage – running along inclusive versus exclusive and European/cosmopolite versus nationalist orientation – that crosscuts the ideological axis. What strikes is that, even in traditionally Europhile countries, the level of support for the European project seems to be compromised (Verney, 2018). The politicization of this relatively new transnational cleavage fostered the electoral success of populist and Eurosceptic parties across Europe: between 2010 and 2018 they have been included into (coalition) governments as either minor or major partners in at least twelve European countries (Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021, p. 28). Italy is a case at stake. Euroscepticism is on the rise among Italian citizens and, after the 2018 national election, the yellow-green coalition government, composed by the LN and the M5S, has often been on a collision course with the EU (Conti et al., 2020). The aim of this chapter is to assess whether a difference exists in the way mainstream and populist parties compete on European issues. Recent research shows that mainstream political parties shift their positions on European integration in response to threats from niche parties, with mixed electoral fortunes (Meijers & Williams, 2019; Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2020). However, while mainstream right parties are likely to adopt co-optation or cooperation strategies – implying a level of stylistic or programmatic convergence with populist parties -, mainstream left parties are more likely to adopt adversarial strategies, as they clash with the positions endorsed by populist (right) parties on the European/cosmopolite versus nationalist dimension (Vampa & Albertazzi, 2021, pp. 270–277). Italy and the United Kingdom are very interesting laboratories to observe these patterns. In Italy, the coalition government formed in 2019 between PD and M5S represents an example of full cooperation between a mainstream left and a populist party. Scholars have explained this anomaly with the fact that the M5S is not clearly positioned on the left-right dimension, resulting in a ‘polyvalent’ or ‘valence’ populist party (Zulianello, 2019). In the United Kingdom, instead, both Conservative and Labour parties adjusted their positions on immigration and European issues and moved in UKIP’s direction (Vampa, 2021, p. 219). In the case of LAB, co-optation was mainly limited to the political style. In the case of the Conservatives, instead, this co-optation process resulted in the adoption of a decision that had unprecedented effects on British society. Apart from ideological divides, other factors could explain why parties adopt one strategy or another one. Indeed, time and country specificities may influence the content of the European political space (Kriesi et al., 2008; Marks et al., 2006). The multiple crises experienced by the EU impacted on the dimensions of political competition at the European level. In particular, in countries most affected by the economic and the refugee crisis, Eurocriticism has become a common feature to all parties, irrespective of their ideology. In Southern European countries, EU attitudes became connected to economic issues as a result of European fiscal policies after the Euro-crisis and mainstream parties converged in advocating anti-austerity measures (e.g., Serricchio et  al., 2013). On the contrary, populist parties hold strong Eurosceptic positions, often opposing the very idea of European integration and

5.2  Issue Salience

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connecting anti-EU stances to anti-immigration sentiments, irrespective from the impact of the crises on their countries. Drawing on the literature on opportunity-structure (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2000), I expect a government versus opposition dynamic to be observed in political debates on ‘constitutional’ matters, such as on the European institutional design or competences allocation to EU institutions (Table 5.1). Given that Europeanisation has an impact on the mechanisms of executive-­ legislative accountability by advantaging governing parties, I expect the latter to favour the transfer of decision-making power towards EU institutions, while I expect parties in opposition to oppose it. The Italian case is particularly interesting in this respect, as it allows to test this hypothesis on populist parties. In fact, after the collapse of the Conte I cabinet (2018–2019), the LN moved back in opposition, while the M5S formed a coalition government with PD, the Conte II cabinet (2019–2021). Thus, in this chapter the reader will observe how populist (radical right) parties’ policy positions change according to the position held in the system. The main hypothesis here is that populist parties’ Eurosceptic stances soften once in government. I expect populist (radical right) parties to oppose EU policies, rather than the process of EU integration, using legitimacy frames.

5.2  Issue Salience Mainstream Parties Both in Italy and in the UK, the most debated issues by mainstream parties are those connected to the process of European integration and to policies enacted by the European Union. As shown by Fig. 5.1, in the UK, CON and LAB refer predominantly to issues connected to European Integration (42% in the case of CON, 48% Table 5.1  Political positions on EU issues by party family Party family Mainstream left

Mainstream right

Populist Populist Radical Right

Frames European integration Socio-economic Moral-Universal (+) Socio-economic Moral-Universal (+) Legitimacy (−) Sovereigntist (−)

European institutions Legitimacy (+)

European policies Socio-economic (+/−)

Legitimacy (+)

Socio-economic (+/−)

Legitimacy (−) Sovereigntist Legitimacy (−)

Legitimacy (−) Legitimacy (−)

Source: Author’s elaboration (+) indicate a party’s support for any given target, (−) indicate a party’s opposition to any given target

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Labour

Conservative

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

European Integration

EU Elite

EU Institutions

European Policies

EMU

Schengen Area

Fig. 5.1 Issue salience (EU-issue). British mainstream parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

in the case of LAB) and European policies (44% in the case of CON, 45% in the case of LAB). Interestingly, neither party mentions the target of the EU elite, which is in line with expectations concerning mainstream parties (Helbling, 2014). Moreover, CON refers to the Schengen Area 13% of the times, while LAB does not mention this target at all. Conversely, while Conservative MPs refer to the EU institutions only in 1% of its statements in the House of Commons, Labour MPs devotes 7.2% of its coded segments to this target. As might be expected, as the UK is outside the Eurozone, neither Conservatives nor Labour refer to the Economic and Monetary Union. Similarly, in Italy, EU integration and EU policies are the two most debated issues by PD and FI in the House of Deputies (46.7% and 30.7% respectively in the case of PD, and 40.7% and 22.2% respectively in the case of FI) (Fig. 5.2). Less attention is given to the EU institutions by PD (14% of the party’s speeches), while FI’s delegates tackle this target in about 8.3% of their speeches. The least debated targets are the Schengen Area (1.4% of the total coded segments in the case of PD, 2% in the case of FI) and EU elites (1.4% and 3.7% respectively). It is worth noting that, between 2015 and 2018, the governing party (PD) is more vocal than the opposition party (FI), on all targets except for EMU, to which the FI representatives devote 23.1% of their speeches, while PD dedicates only 6% of its speeches. Populist Parties Not differently from mainstream parties, both in Italy and in the UK, populist parties talk predominantly about EU integration and EU policies. Figure  5.3 below shows the salience of the EU-issue for the only British populist party with a seat in the House of Commons (2015–2017): the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The most salient targets are EU policies (48%) and EU integration (33%), followed by issues connected with the Schengen Area (14.8%).

5.3  Opposition and Support to the EU

95

PD

FI

50

40

30

20

10

0

EU integration

EU policies

EU institutions

EU elite

Schengen Area

EMU

Fig. 5.2 Issue salience (EU-issue). Italian mainstream parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

EU Integration

EU Elite

EU Institutions European Policies

EMU

Schengen Area

Fig. 5.3  Issue salience (EU-issues). British populist party. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

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M5S

LN

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

EU Integration

EU policies

EU institutions

EU elite

EMU

Schengen Area

Fig. 5.4  Issue salience (EU-issue). Italian populist parties. National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

Similarly, in Italy, both the LN and the M5S talk predominantly about EU integration (61.4% and 47.7% respectively) and EU policies (20.5% and 27.4% respectively, Fig. 5.4). Much less attention is devoted to EU elites (6% of the EU codes for the LN and 9.7% for the M5S) or to the European Economic and Monetary Union (3.6% and 12.8% respectively). UKIP does not mention the EU elite target at all. EU institutions is a target rarely mentioned by populist parties in both countries. If LN delegates mention it 8.4% of the times when talking about the EU-issue, and UKIP devotes only 3.7% of its speeches to this target, the M5S does not mention EU institutions at all. Conversely, M5S representatives refer to the Schengen Area (2.3% of the time respectively), while the LN does not pay any attention to this topic.

5.3  Opposition and Support to the EU Mainstream Parties The analysis of parliamentary debates reveals that, both in Italy and in the UK, a clear difference exists between the arguments used by mainstream left parties and mainstream right parties to support their positions on the various EU targets (see Figs. 5.5 and 5.6). Overall, the formers endorse a pro-EU position, while the latter hold a principled opposition to the EU. More specifically, LAB supports the process of European integration with pragmatic – yet moderate – stances (+0.01), in contrast

97

5.3  Opposition and Support to the EU

CON

LAB

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU Integration

EU Policies

EU Institutions

Schengen Area

EMU

Fig. 5.5  British mainstream parties’ positions (EU-issue). National Arena. (Source: Authors’ data)

PD

FI

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU Integration

EU Institutions

EU Policies

EU elites

Schengen Area

EMU

Fig. 5.6  Italian mainstream parties’ positions (EU-issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

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to CON, which endorses a principled negative stance on this target (−0.6). Similarly, while Labour MPs endorse pragmatic and positive – yet moderate – stances on the EU institutions (+0.01), CON shows a negative and principled attitude towards this target (−0.5). Interestingly, the two parties’ positions are reversed when we look at EU policies. In this respect, CON holds a positive and pragmatic – yet moderate – stance (+0.01), while LAB endorses a negative and pragmatic stance on the same target (−0.01). As we will see in more detail in the following paragraphs, Conservatives positive stances towards EU policies are due exclusively to the support of the Dublin Regulation, according to which asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than being allowed to ‘asylum shop’ across Member States. This measure is particularly favourable to the UK, as it assures that the majority of asylum seekers remain in the first country of arrival, such as Italy and Greece. This finding hints at the selective approach that the British Conservative elites have towards EU policies, supporting only those measures that favour their country (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). In Italy, while PD legitimises the process of EU integration (+0.5), FI endorses a negative and principled position towards this target (−0.6), rejecting the very idea of a supranational project (Fig.  5.6). This finding seems to confirm that Euroscepticism is a prerogative of the political right (Quaglia, 2011). Besides this, Tarchi (2018) notes that FI’s Eurosceptic stances grow systematically when the party is relegated to the opposition, probably to stem competition from the LN. The two other significant targets towards which FI’s opposition is directed are the EU institutions (−0.12) and EMU (−0.15). Conversely, PD endorses an extremely moderate and pragmatic supportive position towards these targets (+0.02 and  +0.004 respectively). It is worth noting that both PD and FI representatives endorse negative and pragmatic positions concerning EU policies (−0.07 and −0.2 respectively) and EU elites (−0.2 and − 0.1 respectively). This finding confirms that support for the EU is no longer unconditional, even for mainstream left parties, which criticise certain aspects of the functioning of the EU, although they do not dispute the European horizon towards which Italy needs to move (Conti & Verzichelli, 2005). Populist Parties In the UK, UKIP holds a principled opposition to the EU integration (−0.8) – in terms of transfer of powers and enlargement, but also values and symbols. Similarly, the party opposes EU policies (−0.3) and the Schengen Area (−0.2) but using pragmatic arguments (Fig. 5.7). UKIP does not mention the European Monetary Union, while the party expresses a neutral position towards EU institutions (the number of negative and positive codes are equal). In Italy, both M5S and LN endorse an anti-EU stance at the national level. As shown by Fig. 5.8 below, both parties oppose the process of EU integration in a principled manner (−0.6 in the case of the M5S, −0.8 in the case of the LN), and the EU-elite (−0.7 and −0.6 respectively). Nevertheless, the M5S endorses a pragmatic opposition towards EU policies (−0.2), whereas the LN sticks to a principled opposition towards this target too (−0.7). Besides this, while LN hold a principled

99

5.4  Framing the EU

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU integration

EU institutions

EU policies

Schengen

EMU

Fig. 5.7  British populist party position (EU-issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

MS

LN

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU EU policies EU integration institutions

EU elite

EMU

Schengen

Fig. 5.8  Italian populist parties’ position (EU-issue). National Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

opposition towards EU institutions (−0.7), M5S is neutral towards this target. The two parties also take different positions on the two geometries of the EU, namely the Schengen Area and the Euro Area. While the M5S holds a positive and

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principled stance on Schengen (+0.6), the LN does not mention this target. Both parties converge towards a negative and principled opposition to the European Monetary Union (−0.8 and −0.6 respectively).

5.4  Framing the EU Mainstream Parties Table 5.2, below, shows the share of frames used by the two major British mainstream parties. Both parties predominantly use legitimacy frames (32.4% in the case of CON, 35.7% in the case of LAB), mainly referring to the efficacy of EU policies for managing immigration flows. However, while the sovereignty dimension is important for the representatives of CON (28.4%), this is not the case for Labour MPs (2.9%). Similarly, while Conservative delegates use security frames on 14.5% of occasions, Labour MPs use them significantly less (5.7%). The keyword analysis reveals that Conservative Euroscepticism is closely linked with sovereignty and the perceived power grab of the EU institutions via-à-vis the UK: ‘national’ (frequency: 11, keyness: 14.91),1 ‘sovereignty’ (8, 10.84) and ‘nationals’ (7, 9.49) are among the top ten keywords used by Conservative MPs in talking about the EU (Table 5.3). When exploring the excerpts of texts containing these keywords, a link emerges between sovereigntism, populism and support for Brexit. As other scholars have found, in Britain, sovereigntism is closely associated with Euroscepticism and often goes hand in hand with populist claims (Baldini et  al., 2020). It is therefore not surprising that Brexiteers endorse much of the Eurosceptic populist rhetoric referring both to the EU power-grab vis-à-vis the UK and the lack of democracy at the EU-level. In addition, they invoke the ‘will of the people’, relying on a mythical view of democracy as direct popular decision making (Weale, 2018) and conveniently ignoring the 62.5% of the electorate made of ‘Remainers’ and those who Table 5.2  British mainstream parties’ frames (EU-issue). National Arena

LAB CON

Socio-­ economic Codes 9 % 12.8 Codes 3 % 2

Culturalreligious 0 0 3 2

Moral-­ universal 7 10 1 0.7

Sovereigntism 2 2.9 41 28.4

Security 4 5.7 22 14.5

Legitimacy 25 35.7 48 32.4

Neutral codes 23 32.9 30 20

Total 70 100 148 100

Source: Author’s data Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

 The low frequency is due to the limited number of debates on the issue of the European Union undertaken in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, keyness is above the cut-off point of 6.63, and therefore still significant. 1

5.4  Framing the EU

101

Table 5.3  Conservative and Labour top ten keywords. National Arena Conservatives

Labour

Keywords national democracy EU people media sovereignty rights focus nationals conclusions Parliament Minister Ireland co-operation customs steel border European northern Russia

Keyness 14.91 13.56 12.29 10.84 10.84 10.84 10.18 9.49 9.49 9.45 46.65 22.96 20.7 19.46 17.51 17.51 15.92 13.97 12.73 11.32

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported

abstained from voting in the referendum (Freeden, 2017, p. 4). This type of populist sovereigntism is well represented by the quote below: Many of us feel that the EU as currently constituted is thoroughly undemocratic. It stifles and prevents the will of a once-sovereign people from being adequately expressed. It means that a Government cannot be elected on a prospectus that they can implement in all respects because the European Union will not let them do so. Above all, the European Union represents the past: it is holding us back. It is something from the last century. […] Let us get rid of these myths. […] being out of the EU or in a better and new relationship with the EU is the future: it means […] above all, restore the sovereignty of the British people. (John Redwood (CON), EU Referendum Bill, 09/06/2015)

In the discussion on the exit deal, Brexiteers accused the Parliament of having betrayed the result of the referendum, thus putting in danger British citizens’ trust in their representatives. Pledges, promises and manifesto commitments all evaporated in the face of an obstructionist Parliament, where the majority of politicians thought they knew better than the majority of the British people. That Parliament wanted to stop Brexit and succeeded in doing so. It let our country down and in doing so broke faith with the British people. […] through the enactment of this Bill, we will do so confidently and looking forward with optimism, in the knowledge that it is what millions of people around the country want us to do, that it is borne out of legitimacy and integrity, and that it derives from a noble aspiration for ­sovereignty and out of a heartfelt call for freedom. (Suella Braverman (CON), Exiting the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, 20/12/2019) I pointed out that we Maastricht rebels – I had the honour to lead that rebellion in 1992-93 – acted as we did because for us it was about democracy and the benefits that will now come

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to us as we leave the European Union. The European Union was going to take the democratic decision making of this country and hand it over to what was, in effect, a European government. As I said yesterday, parliamentary sovereignty and democracy run together. We are not “hard Brexiteers”; we are democrats. We are people who believe that this country should be governed by the people, that people should be governed by themselves. (Sir William Cash (CON), Exiting the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, 09/01/2020)

However, the Conservative Parliamentary Party is divided over the optimal post-­ Brexit relationship with the EU.  On the one side, and in line with a historically ‘hyperglobalist’ Eurosceptic strand within British Conservatism, Brexiteers believe that the UK will be better off leaving the single market as it will regain its place in the world as a global, trading nation, traditionally connected with the English-­ speaking world and the Commonwealth. For instance: I sincerely believe that this process [Brexit] is not a triumph of nationalism, or of us being apart from them. It is quite the opposite: part of a new internationalism and recognition of our common citizenship of the whole world. We stand ready to break free of the protectionist barriers erected by the EU that have so damaged much of the third world, and rejoin the world at large. (Sir Edward Leigh (CON), EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, 31/01/2017)

Conversely, Remain Conservative MPs stress the economic benefits of EU membership and claim that any trade agreement negotiated as an external partner of the EU will be less favourable to the UK than the current membership of the single market. This is shown by the excerpt below: I think that the British benefited more from the single market than any other member state. It has contributed to our comparative economic success today. (Kenneth Clarke (CON), EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, 31/01/2017)

The official position endorsed by LAB right after the Brexit Referendum was that the result of the referendum must be respected, and that the UK must leave the Customs Union and the Common Market. Nevertheless, the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party voted to remain in the EU and was worried about the consequences of the referendum, especially the ‘no deal’ option, which would result in the UK leaving the EU without any conditions agreed with Brussels (so-called ‘hard Brexit’). According to them, being outside the Customs Union and the Single Market would have had two significant consequences: first, to create frictions in trade; second, to lead inevitably to a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Moreover, the end of co-operation in several crucial policy areas – e.g., external border controls, security in relation to multiple cross-border crimes, foreign policy and so on  – was considered detrimental for the future of the UK, as expressed in the following quotes: Even on the optimistic assumption that we can sign trade agreements all over the world, this does not even come close to making up for the loss of the single market. (David Lammy (LAB), EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, 31/01/2017) Our continued membership of the single market, along with our ability to stay in the European customs union, is the most important issue for our country. It is about jobs and

5.4  Framing the EU

103

trade, but it is also about tackling austerity and investing in our schools and hospitals. (Heidi Alexander (LAB), EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 11/09/2017)

In the last parliamentary debate before the approval of the Brexit deal, several Labour MPs continued to denounce the risks of the post-Brexit era, as clearly expressed by the following excerpt: We are leaving, but our role now is to define what leaving means: what our values are and what nationalism means. There is a high risk that racism and discrimination will be given permission by the Bill. I have seen it happen. It happened straight after the referendum and it has happened since. It is therefore important to say here, in this place, that we may be leaving the EU, but we are proud of our place in Europe and the world. We must be a society that is ambitious for everyone, welcomes diversity and is open to all. We must both take pride in our country and define that pride as being more internationalist than ever. (Paul Blomfield (LAB), Exiting the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, 09/01/2020)

Labour MPs also saw another major threat in Brexit, namely the infringement of the centrality of the Parliament. In other words, during the parliamentary debates on exiting the European Union, Labour MPs often acted as the watchdogs of the Westminster model, stressing the centrality of the House of Commons and opposing any power grab by the Government. For example, Labour MPs strongly opposed the so-called ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, contained in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which enable ministers to convert EU laws into UK law by using secondary legislation, over which parliament has little say. In the words of a Labour MP: The Bill does the opposite of what people expected for parliamentary democracy and the enhancement of our courts […] The Prime Minister talks about British values, and there are no more fundamental British values than parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. (Geraint Davies (LAB), EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 11/09/2017)

It is worth noting that Labour members subverted the national sovereigntist arguments typically used by Brexiteers, mainly the ‘take back control’ claim and used them to demand clarity and accountability regarding the Brexit negotiations from the government. Those who wanted to leave talked about giving the British people control – taking back control. Why, then, are we producing a Bill that will, effectively, give that control to the Government of the day, to make decisions behind closed doors, and not to this Parliament, which represents the democratic will of the people? (David Lammy (LAB), EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 11/09/2017)

Moreover, Labour MPs use terms from the populist lexicon, but use them to stress the principles of parliamentary democracy. They speak in the name of those British people who did not vote in favour of Brexit, and who equally deserve to have a say on the post-Brexit arrangements. Some MPs, such as the shadow Brexit minister, Keir Starmer, openly advocate a second referendum, in order to let British citizens decide on the future deal with the EU (choosing among three options: Remain/ no deal/May’s deal), and call for Article 50 to be extended to delay Brexit. I welcome the steps taken on Russia and on steel, given the steel industry in my constituency. Does the Prime Minister not recognise, however, that there is a complete paradox here? At the very time, she talks about the need for more co-operation on Russia, more

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co-operation on steel, more co-operation on data and more co-operation on counter-­ terrorism, her Government are pursuing a reckless hard Brexit. Does she not agree that as the facts change, and as people see these changing contexts, people have the right to change their minds? (Stephen Doughty (LAB), European Council, 26/03/2018) I, therefore, put it to the House that people now feel that they have not had their reasonable expectations fulfilled, which is why, although I accept the vote to leave in principle, I believe there should be a vote – a final say – of the people on the exit package for Britain. Such a vote would allow the people to decide whether that package meets their reasonable expectations and whether it is better than currently being in the EU – if they do not agree, they can stay. (Geraint Davies (LAB), EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, 31/01/2017)

In the speeches of Labour MPs, there is no evidence of the so-called ‘social democratic Euroscepticism’ typical of the early 1980s. This hints at a significant difference between the positions endorsed by the Parliamentary Labour Party and those held by the leader of the party, Jeremy Corbyn, whom several scholars suggest was motivated by an anti-capitalist hostility towards the EU (e.g., Whiteley et al., 2019). On the contrary, the majority of Labour MPs stress how the UK’s membership of the EU has increased workers’ rights (for example through the Workers’ Agency Directive and the Parental Leave Directive) and they fear that Brexit is a project led by Conservative Brexiteers to foster neoliberal policies, such as cuts in taxes and public spending. It is true that Labour representatives take strong positions against austerity. However, their criticisms are addressed against the government, rather than against the EU institutions: The previous Labour Government signed up to the social chapter, ensuring that every worker own the right to four weeks’ paid holiday […] Voting to leave the EU could put at risk hard-won rights, because we know that some of the biggest cheerleaders for Brexit see protections for ordinary British workers as red tape to be binned. (Caroline Flint (LAB), EU Membership: Economic Benefits, 15/06/2016) They [the Government] threaten to create a low-tax, low-public-service haven on the coast of Europe if we do not get a trade deal with the EU, but that is precisely the kind of UK that they want, free from what they see as the constraints of employment rights and environmental protection. (Christian Matheson (LAB), EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, 01/02/2017)

It is important to stress, however, that LAB is also divided on Brexit (although to a lesser extent than CON), and Eurosceptic voices exist in the ranks of the Labour Parliamentary Party. Kate Hoey and Kelvin Hopkins, for example, argued for the multiple benefits of leaving the EU, particularly the control of a consistent share of British resources and the transfer of the decision-making power over national economic policies to a democratically elected Government, rather than to the Brussel-­ led technocratic institutions, as explained by the following citation: The CAP [common agricultural policy] is nonsense. We ought to abolish it and repatriate agricultural policy to member states. We can decide in our own country which parts of agriculture should be subsidised and to what extent, and we can decide where and when we buy food. (Kelvin Hopkins (LAB), European Union (Finance) Bill, 23/06/2015)

As noticed for the British case, the two major mainstream left and mainstream right parties in Italy frame the European Union mainly using legitimacy frames

5.4  Framing the EU

105

Table 5.4  Italian mainstream parties’ frames (EU-issue). National Arena

PD FI

Codes % Codes %

Socio-­ economic 81 22 39 34.8

Culturalreligious 0 0 0 0

Moral-­ universal 107 29 4 3.6

Sovereigntism 9 2.4 1 0.9

Security 7 1.9 4 3.6

Legitimacy 116 31.5 43 38.4

Neutral codes 50 13.2 21 18.7

Total 370 100 112 100

Source: Author’s data Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

(31.5% in the case of PD and 38.4% in the case of FI, Table 5.4). Socio-economic frames are used only secondarily  – the FI much more often than PD (34.8% of coded segments vs 22% respectively). These results show two things. First, both parties devote the majority of their speeches to legitimising or de-legitimising the process of European integration or specific aspects of the EU architecture. Second, the economic dimension of the EU, namely the European economic governance and its effect on Member States, is an important dimension in the Italian political debate, especially for FI. Finally, moral-universal frames are relevant in the speeches of PD representatives (29% of the total coded sentences), while FI uses these types of frames on just 3.6% of occasions. As will become evident from the analysis of keywords, moral-universal frames are predominantly used by PD MPs to talk positively about the EU’s founding values such as democracy, solidarity, human rights and so on. As the results of the keyword analysis show (see Table 5.5 below), the critique of the role played in Europe by the government – both under the leadership of Matteo Renzi and under the premiership of Giuseppe Conte – emerges strongly from the speeches of FI MPs. FI representatives are particularly concerned about Italy’s international profile, both in Europe and beyond, as shown by the following quotations: […] the previous Government based its relations with partners on subordination: with the result that Italy has played an irrelevant role in Europe […] without any change even the Old Continent is destined to be irrelevance in the world. (Elvira Savino (FI), European Council, 08/03/2017) Your government (the Conte I) has just produced uncertainty and isolation to date. […] which in turn has produced another negative effect: that Europe goes on alone without us. Italy has been absent in those decision-making processes that will lead to decisive choices, choices that may harm our country’s interests. The Franco-German axis has won, while Italy has remained silent. […] As a result, we have proved powerless in countering this Europe that – and we probably share this point of view – we dislike. As a matter of fact, your government has strengthened this Europe that we dislike. (Renato Brunetta (FI), European Council, 11.12.2018)

Besides this, FI MPs criticise the course the process of European integration has taken. As expressed in the citation below, the EU is seen as a non-competitive project, led by a technocratic elite to the detriment of national sovereignty.

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Table 5.5  Italian mainstream parties’ top ten keywords (EU-issue). National Arena

PD

FI

National Arena Keywords Europa politica forze lavorare importante futuro bisogna cambiamento comune bisogno legge europea governo normativa disposizioni disegno ordinamento delegazione unione infrazione

Keyness 37.74 35.31 24.82 24.82 24.42 23.52 23.27 23.27 22.57 22.54 166.28 74.06 73.57 66.01 64.23 50.04 49.71 48.57 40.51 38.69

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported

The European Union that I want has vanished in the last ten, twelve years. How? In a sort of funnel, due to a technocratic drift that has transformed the Maastricht Treaty from a convergence instrument into an instrument of dominion, that Mr Juncker in the last Council wanted to extend even further with the so-called “Five Presidents’ Plan”. No, Mr Prime Minister! Without the dream of a political Europe, our country will never again cede its sovereignty to a German-led Europe, to a technocrats-led Europe. (Renato Brunetta (FI), European Council, 24/06/2015)

Conversely, PD delegates reiterate in almost every one of their speeches the necessity of boosting European integration, as the European Union is considered necessary to face increasingly complex transnational challenges. As highlighted in the quotation below, Italian democrats argue that the European project, as envisaged by the founding fathers of the EU, is the only possible way to preserve peace, stability and democracy: First and foremost, we must continue to do something remarkable: we must cultivate the desire to look at the future of Europe, our future, with trust and hope, with the awareness that we […] have a history, some values that are important for every man and every citizen in order to realize himself and for all humanity to live in peace. The awareness of this shared identity must guide us […]. (Marina Berlinghieri (PD), European Council, 12/10/2016)

At the same time, however, democratic MPs acknowledge the urgency (‘bisogno’ – need, ‘bisogna’ – it is necessary) of reforming several aspects of the Union. In particular, they call for a reform of the Dublin system, for the creation of a more Social Europe and, more generally, for the transformation of the EU into something closer to its citizens. The following quote makes this point clear:

5.4  Framing the EU

107

Without Europe there is no future and Italy will only be more alone and isolated in solving the challenges of our time. Of course, it is necessary to make a battle for a better, social and solidarity Europe, a Europe of peoples, a Europe that convinces, and involves the 500 million citizens. (Piero De Luca (PD), European delegation law 2018, 07/11/2018)

Populist Parties Both in Italy and in the UK, populist parties use predominantly legitimacy and sovereigntist frames to talk about the European Union. This result is in line with expectations regarding populist parties (Bulli & Soare, 2018). In Italy, both the LN and the M5S representatives mainly use legitimacy frames (55.3% of the times in the case of M5S, 61.2% in the case of the LN). Perhaps surprisingly, the M5S employs sovereigntist frames more often than the LN (Table 5.6). As we will see in a moment, this counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact that Grillo’s party refers to economic sovereignty, and in particular, exit from the Eurozone. The keyword analysis makes it possible to investigate in depth which arguments are used by LN and by the M5S to oppose the EU. Both parties justify their opposition to the process of EU integration using populist arguments (see the presence of ‘cittadini’ – citizens and ‘popolo’ – people among the top ten keywords in Table 5.7 below) and criticising the lack of democracy and accountability in the EU: According to the LN, there is a genetic bias in this Europe: it has been founded on flexibility but without the people, without democracy. (Giancarlo Giorgetti (LN), European Council, 18/03/2015) The Union’s democratic deficit must be reset […] This system has failed; it is floating but nearly drowning. The EU […] should be rebuilt on a reliable basis, which must be distant from the Fiscal Compact, the austerity, walls, barriers and borders. […] Solidarity, cooperation, and integration: these must be the pillars of the EU. (Sergio Battelli (M5S), European Council, 27/06/2016)

However, in the M5S speeches, the dimension of economic sovereigntism prevails. Indeed, in the 2014 European election and throughout the eighth EP legislature (2014–18) the party advocated for exiting the Eurozone, as shown by the presence of the words ‘moneta’ – currency and ‘euro’ among the top ten keywords used by the party. The following quotations exemplify very well the M5S MPs’ position on this point:

Table 5.6  Italian populist parties’ frames (EU-issue). National Arena Socio-­ economic M5S Codes 55 % 20.7 LN Codes 11 % 13

Culturalreligious 0 0 3 3.5

Moral-­ universal 9 3.4 0 0

Sovereigntism 20 10.5 8 9.4

Security 4 1.5 1 1.2

Legitimacy 147 55.3 52 61.2

Neutral codes 23 8.6 10 11.7

Total 258 100 85 100

Source: Author’s data Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

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Table 5.7  Italian populist parties’ top 10 keywords (EU-issue). National Arena

M5S

LN

National Arena Keywords unione piano Dublino cittadini europea euro Europa banche Italia moneta problema Europa popolo consenso immigrazione parte fenomeno risposte priorità modo

Keyness 21.751 20.657 20.463 19.616 19.571 19.267 18.761 18.729 18.329 15.493 32.82 24.998 22.49 21.62 19.727 19.258 17.018 17.018 16.239 15.524

Source: Author’s data. Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported I want a referendum on the Euro, yes, because I believe that the Euro is not merely a currency but a system of government through which the banks are monitoring the fiscal, monetary and monetary policies of the EU countries, taking them away a vital economic weapon […] You are the ones who betrayed! We believe in the spirit of the European founding fathers, whereas you have chosen JP Morgan and the ECB […] We can continue to stay in this Europe only with monetary sovereignty. (Alessandro Di Battista (M5S), European Council, 27/06/2016) We want a Government that strongly advocates against the Fiscal Compact, against the budgetary equilibrium, in order to give Italy the possibility to regain its monetary sovereignty, because this is the key of our future: sovereignty! (Luca Frusone (M5S), European Council, 14/10/2015) […] it is enough to observe what is happening nowadays. The EU is strictly tied to finance, banks, big powers, to this pure technocracy. Everything can happen under this European government ruled by banks […]. (Daniele Pesco (M5S), European delegation law 2014, 30/06/2015)

Once in government, the positions of the M5S change according to the orientation of the coalition partner. During the Conte I cabinet (June 2018–September 2019), M5S MPs accuse the European Union of having betrayed Italy, by not providing support for managing transnational crises, at the advantage of Northern European countries. Thus, the M5S fully supports the unilateral actions promoted by the Interior Minister Matteo Salvini to protect the Italian borders.

5.4  Framing the EU

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[…] the Union continues to be unable to provide answers to the problems that afflict our countries, the Member States of the Union: economy, immigration. […] It is as if someone in this Europe wanted to continue to pursue a policy of austerity, cuts, and sacrifices. It is as if there was a European Union with two weights and two measures, master states and slave states, as if Italy were to be relegated to a slave state. (Francesco D’Uva (M5S), European Council (28 June 2018), 27/06/2018) We asked Europe for help in managing the biggest migration crisis of recent decades; […] we received empty promises, not facts […] we managed to tackle the crisis on our own, thanks to the strong political action of this government, thanks to Minister Matteo Salvini […] From this Chamber, today, we reiterate our support for the position that our Government has been consistently advocating to its European partners: Italian borders are European borders and as such they must be considered. (Alessandro Giglio Vigna, European Council (18 October 2018), 16/10/2018)

Once in government with PD, however, the M5S changes its positions on the EU once again. The party shifts back to reformist stances, thus not criticising the European project per se, but rather proposing reforms to restore its original values and intents. Interestingly, among the key proposals advocated by the M5S there is a strong environmental policy, which was among the key policy proposals put forward by the Movement during its infancy stage as a ‘movement-party’ (Tronconi, 2015; Lanzone, 2015). It has been a long time since the Five Star Movement first identified the direction to follow to restore those European values and ideals which today, too many times, have no meaning. […] We, Mr. President, are Italians but also Europeans, and for this reason we cannot put our future in the hands of a technocratic body […] Why speaking of an environmental revolution if then austerity is pursued? (Daniela Torto (M5S), European Council (17 and 18 October 2020), 16/10/2019)

Notably, in a debate on the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), M5S abandons its traditionally fierce opposition to adopt a more pragmatic and conciliative position. We have always disliked the philosophy of the EMS. However, Mr President, with pragmatism, we did read the text issued by the Eurogroup in June and identified some critical issues. We think a longer reflection is needed to tackle and overcome such issues. […]. (Filippo Scerra (M5S), Urgent information by the President of the Council of Ministers on the amendments to the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, 02/12/2019) We have never hidden our doubts on the ESM. […] But, today, we are not discussing whether or not there should be the ESM. We are discussing which changes, which revisions should be implemented; in this regard, we must do our best to improve this reform before its approval. (Francesco Silvestri (M5S), Urgent information by the President of the Council of Ministers on the amendments to the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, 02/12/2019)

The chameleonic nature of the M5S is explained by its being as a ‘pure’ populist party (Gianfreda & Carlotti, 2018). In other words, the M5S is characterized by a ‘thin’ ideology, which displays a clear anti-establishment identity while holding elusive positioning on transnational policy issues such as immigration, citizenship, and European affairs (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019) and adapting to ‘host ideologies’

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on many other policy issues. Thus, once in government with the LN, the M5S tailors its stances on transnational issues to the ‘host’ (nativist) ideology of the coalition partner. On socio-economic issues, instead, the party holds left-of-centre positions, making the universal basic income its policy priority. Once in government with PD, M5S adapts to the pro-European positions of its new coalition partner, thus relaxing its opposition to the European Union and adopting reformist stances. To sum up, the main difference between the LN and the M5S is that, while the former party rejects the European project as a whole and maintains its position stable over time,2 the latter tends to oppose the current embodiments of the EU, denouncing the lack of solidarity among MSs and calling for a restoration of the values envisaged by the Treaty. In other words, the M5S accuses the ‘Eurocrats’ in Brussels, as well as the Italian political élite, of having betrayed the ‘good’ values of the EU (e.g., solidarity, peace, democracy), in the name of fiscal austerity and economic rigour. The positions endorsed by the UKIP is closed to those held by the LN. UKIP employs sovereigntist frames on 44.5% of the occasions, while the party uses legitimacy frames 40.7% of the times (Table 5.8). When looking at the excerpts of texts containing the top ten keywords used by UKIP to talk about the EU (Table 5.9 below), it appears that the party stresses the adverse effects of being a member of the EU.  In particular, the party rejects the principle of the free movement of people, which allows people to move freely within the EU. A few days ago, the EU announced what is, in effect, a four-part deal with Turkey […] The deal was negotiated and signed without our input, involvement or ability to vote it down. However, it is not in our national interest. First, the deal will give 75 million Turks visa-­ Table 5.8  British populist party frames (EU-issue). National Arena Socioeconomic UKIP Codes 1 % 7.4

Culturalreligious 0 0

Moraluniversal 0 0

SoverLegitieigntist Security macy 11 0 11 44.5 0 40.7

Neutral codes Total 2 25 7.4 100

Source: Author’s data 2  At the time of writing (March 2021), the pandemic crisis has led to the collapse of the coalition government formed by the PD and the M5S, and the formation of a pro-European government led by Mario Draghi, one of the major representatives of the European institutions. Perhaps surprisingly, Draghi’s cabinet has been supported also by the LN, a traditionally fierce Eurosceptic party. This can be perhaps explained by the exceptional situation in which the Draghi’s cabinet has been formed. On the one side, Italy (and Europe) is facing the biggest health and social crisis ever seen. On the other side, the European Union has taken unprecedented decisions to counter the socio-­ economic effects of the sanitary crisis. Notwithstanding the initial opposition of the “frugal four” (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria), the EU has been able to finally implement significant redistributive measures  – most notably the Next Generation EU Fund  – towards those countries most affected by the crisis. To some extent, the formation of a grand-coalition pro-EU government could be explained by the effect of the pandemic on national politics. However, this aspect is beyond the scope of this book.

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Table 5.9  Top ten keywords used by the UKIP (EU-issue). National Arena UKIP

Keywords turkey motion deal Schengen bill referendum migration control migrants effect UK

Keyness 62.12 34.7 33.86 32.78 28.48 24.15 22.59 20.81 20.81 20.24 19.82

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7are reported free, unrestricted access to the Schengen area from next October. We may not be part of Schengen, but that does affect us. There will be no mechanism to log people coming into the Schengen area and none to log people out. The deal can only add to the porousness of the EU’s frontiers, which can only contribute to the increase in numbers of those camped outside Calais seeking entry into the UK. Secondly, the talks between the EU and Turkey mean that Turkish accession to the EU is back on the table. I would not wish to join the EU on anyone, certainly not a friend such as Turkey. (Douglas Carswell MP, European Council, 23/02/2015)

References Abou-Chadi, T., & Wagner, M. (2020). Electoral Fortunes of Social Democratic Parties: Do Second Dimension Positions Matter? Journal of European Public Policy, 27(2), 246–272. Albertazzi, D., & Vampa, D. (2021). (Eds.) Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western Europe. Oxon; NY: Routledge. Baldini, G., Bressanelli, E., & Gianfreda, S. (2020). Taking Back Control? Brexit, Sovereignism and Populism in Westminster (2015–17). European Political Science Journal, 21(2), 219–234. Brack, N. (2018). Opposing Europe in the European Parliament. Rebels and Radicals in the Chamber. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Bulli, G., & Soare, S. C. (2018). Immigration and the Refugee Crisis in a New Immigration Country: The Case of Italy. Hrvasta I Komparativna Javna Uprava, 18, 127–156. Carlotti, B., Gianfreda, S. (2018). The different twins: A multilevel analysis of the positions of the Northern League and the Five Star Movement on the integration-demarcation dimension. Italian Political Science, 13(2), 45–63. Conti, N., & Verzichelli, L. (2005). La dimensione europea del discorso politico in Italia: un’analisi diacronica delle preferenze partitiche (1950–2001). In M.  Cotta & L.  Verzichelli (Eds.), L'Europa in Italia. Élite, opinione pubblica e decisioni (pp. 61–116). Bologna. Conti, N., Marangoni, F., & Verzichelli, L. (2020). Euroscepticism in Italy from the Onset of the Crisis: Tired of Europe? South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360874 6.2020.1757885. Freeden, M. (2017). After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology. Journal of Political Ideologies, 22(1), 1–11. Geddes, A., & Scholten, P. (2016). The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. SAGE.

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Helbling, M. (2014). Framing Immigration in Western Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(1), 21–41. Kneuner, M. (2019). The Tandem of Populism and Euroscepticism: A Comparative Perspective in the Light of the European Crises. Contemporary Social Science, 14(1), 26–42. Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (2000). Migration and Ethnic Relations as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity Structure Approach. In R. Koopmans, & P. Statham (Eds.) Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (pp. 1–25). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge University Press. Lanzone, M. E. (2015). Il MoVimento Cinque Stelle: Il popolo di Grillo dal web al Parlamento. Edizioni Epoké. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M, Edwards, E. (2006). Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West Different Structure, Same Causality. Comparative Political Studies, 39(2), 155–175. Meijers, M. J., & Williams, C. J. (2019). When Shifting Backfires: The Electoral Consequences of Responding to Niche Party EU Positions. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(10), 1506–1525. Mosca, L., & Tronconi, F. (2019). Beyond Left and Right: The Eclectic Populism of the Five Star Movement. West European Politics, 42(6), 1258–1283. Mudde, C. (2014). Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change. Party Politics, 20(2), 217–226. Quaglia, L. (2011). ‘The Ebb and Flow’ of Euroscepticism in Italy. South European Society and Politics, 16(1), 31–50. Schäfer, C., & Gross, M. (2020). Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis: A Macro-Level Analysis of the Euro Crisis’ Effects on Public Opinion and Party Competition on European Integration. In M. Baldassari, E. Castelli, M. Truffelli, & G. Vezzani (Eds.), Anti-Europeanism. Critical Perspectives Towards the European Union. Springer. Schimmelfennig, F. (2018). Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Crises of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(7), 1578–1594. Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M., & Quaglia, L. (2013). Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis: Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 51–64. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2018). Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(8), 1194–1214. Tarchi, M. (2018). Italia populista: Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo. Il Mulino. Tronconi, F. (2015). Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication and Ideology. Ashgate. Vampa, D. (2021). The United Kingdom. In D. Albertazzi & D. Vampa (Eds.). Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western Europe (pp. 206–231). Oxon; NY: Routledge. Vampa, D., & Albertazzi, D. (2021). Conclusion. In A. Albertazzi & D. Vampa (Eds.), Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western Europe (pp.  269–288). Oxon; NY: Routledge. Verney, S. (2018). Losing Loyalty: The Rise of Polity Euroscepticism in Southern Europe. In B. Lehrut, N. Startin, & S. Usherwood (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism. Routledge. Weale, A. (2018). The Will of the People: A Modern Myth. Polity Press. Whiteley, P., Poletti, M., Webb, P., and Bale, T. (2019). Oh Jeremy Corbyn! Why did Labour Party membership soar after the 2015 general election? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(1), 80–98. Zulianello, M. (2019). Anty-System Parties from Parliamentary Breakthrough to Government. Routledge.

Chapter 6

Debating Immigration and the EU in the EP

Abstract  After the 2019 European elections, the EP became more fragmented and politicised than ever. Peripheral parties at both sides of the political spectrum were the net winner of the elections. Thus, the EP became a privileged platform for Eurosceptic parties. This chapter compares the positions on immigration and European affairs endorsed by the Italian and British MEPs, in a context of increasing politicization of both issues. The empirical analysis reveals that mainstream MEPs tend to converge in a sort of ‘grand-coalition’ on several aspects of immigration issues. Besides, they hold a pragmatic opposition to the EU, that is, they criticise specific embodiments of the EU, without undermining their support to the process of EU integration. Notably, FI shifts from a principled opposition to the EU in the national arena, to a pragmatic support to this target in the supranational arena. The party’s positions seem to be conditioned by institutional factors, a finding that contradicts previous scholarly work classifying FI as a Eurosceptic populist party. LN and UKIP MEPs oppose both immigration and European affairs in a principled manner, using sovereigntist and security frames. On the contrary, M5S MEPs support humanitarian migration through moral-universal frames, holding a reformist position vis-à-vis the EU. These findings support Mudde’s distinction between populist and populist radical right parties. Keywords  European parliament · MEPs · European Union · Euroscepticism · Sovereigntism · UKIP · M5S · LN

6.1  Introduction Over the years, the European political space has significantly changed. Between 1950 and 1970, European integration was about market integration and trade liberalization, which were supported by mainstream right parties and opposed by mainstream left parties (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002). As a result, the European political space was two-dimensional, with a pro−/anti-EU dimension strongly correlated to an economic left-right dimension (Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002; Kreppel & Hix, 2003; Hix et al., 2007). The more a party was economically left, the more it was against the process of EU integration (and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_6

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vice versa). In the 1990s and early 2000s, European integration was about market regulation, social liberalism, non-discrimination and EU fiscal constraints. In this new political space, social democratic parties became pro-European as they supported market regulation and European social policies, while centre and right parties became more anti-European as they were against fiscal regulation. The European space was still two-dimensional, but the pro-/anti-EU dimension was now correlated with the liberal-conservative dimension – or Green, Alternative and Liberal and Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (GAL-TAN) dimension – which was orthogonal to the economic left-right dimension. In other words, over time the social/cultural dimension became the most powerful source of variation in party support towards European integration (Hooghe et al., 2002; Giannetti et al., 2016). From the 2000s until today, another major change occurred in the European political space. The debate on European integration shifted around very contentious issues related to pro-/anti-integration choices to face multiple crises (the sovereign debt crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and, lately, the Covid-19 crisis). For the first time, the European political space moved to one dimension. Political parties are now divided between economic left, socially liberal and pro-European parties and economic right, socially conservative and anti-European parties. Political actors’ preferences over EU integration are thus endogenous to the underlying economic and social/cultural dimensions of politics, which now overlap (Ademmera & Stöhra, 2019; Wheatley & Mendez, 2021). Research on European politics can be divided in two strands. On the one side, EP specialists focus on the evolution of the European political space, relying mostly on roll-call votes and expert surveys on MEPs attitudes towards the EU (Hix & Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002; Faas, 2003; Coman, 2009; Hix & Noury, 2009; Whitaker et al., 2017), but also, more recently, on qualitative analysis and participant observation (Kantola & Miller, 2021). On the other side, a prolific line of research looks at the triangular relation between MEPs, their national parties and their parliamentary group to understand group cohesion and coalition patterns (O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007; Raunio, 2009; Winzen, 2013; Auel & Raunio, 2014; Hoerner, 2017; Poguntke et al., 2008; Raunio & Wagner, 2020). Recent studies on MEPs voting behaviour show that political groups are highly cohesive and vote along ideological rather than national lines, mainly according to two cleavages  – the left/right and the pro/anti-integration divides (Hix, 2001; Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Noury, 2002; Kreppel & Hix, 2003; Bressanelli, 2014). In particular, mainstream MEPs, share similar attitudes towards the EU, being ‘at least’ moderately pro-European, but differing on specific policy proposals. The only exception is constituted by the British Conservatives who are widely recognized as Eurorealist, advocating for an ‘anti-federalist and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails’ (Leruth, 2016, p. 50). Scholars explain the overarching loyalty to the EU shown by European elites as both a result of their adherence to the supranational ideal as personified by the founding fathers of the European project, and as a result of personal and institutional interests, mainly connected to the access to power and resources granted by sitting in the EP (Brack & Costa, 2017, p. 373).

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The 2014 European elections, however, have altered the composition and the internal dynamics of the EP. Paradoxically, the EP has become a privileged political platform for Eurosceptic parties.1 Indeed, the latter have gained a significant number of seats in the chamber at the expense of the representation of two of the three major EPPGs: the ALDE group, led by federalist Guy Verhofstadt, which lost 20 seats, and the EPP group, which fell from 274 to 221 MEPs (Brack, 2015, p. 242).2 Overall, after the 2014 EP elections, there has been a net reduction of 65 MEPs among the three historically Europhile groups, while Eurosceptic MEPs now represent almost 30% of the assembly (Brack & Costa, 2017, p. 374). In addition, populist radical right parties have increased their presence in the EP notably. In June 2015, they managed to form a radical right group, the ENF group, in which the French Rassemblement National, led by Marine Le Pen, and the Italian LN, led by Matteo Salvini, are the biggest parties. After the last European election in 2019, the EP looks even more fragmented and politicised (Ripoll Servent, 2019a; Mudde, 2019). Overall, peripheral parties at both sides of the political spectrum are the net winner of the elections. For the first time in EU history, mainstream parliamentary groups lost their combined parliamentary majority. On the pro-EU side, the most relevant parties are the ALDE group, renamed Renew Europe (RE), and the Greens-EFA group. Populist MEPs are now a permanent feature of the EP (Treib, 2020). In 2019, they took between a quarter and a third of the EP’s seats, with populist radical-right parties making the biggest. Among them, the ENF grouping – reformed and renamed Identity and Democracy – made the greatest gains. Eurosceptic parties have gained seats, but also increased speaking time and media exposure. Besides, the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU had significant implications on the composition of the EP (Fabbrini & Schmidt, 2019). First, after Brexit finally happened on 31 January 2020, the seats of the British delegation were redistributed across Member States. As a result, the ECR group shifted more towards the right, as the Polish Law and Justice party comes to dominate the group (Crum, 2020). Besides, the Italian Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) conquered a pivotal role in this group, as it is demonstrated by the appointment of its leader, Giorgia Meloni, as president of the ECR group (Steven, 2020). Second, Brexit has weakened the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, which Nigel Farage co-chaired. Of its 46 MEPs, 22 were from UKIP. For the scope of the book, it is worth spending a few words on the troubled experience of M5S MEPs. After the 2014 elections, the party had initial difficulties in

1  Although since the first direct European elections were held in 1979, right-wing soft Eurosceptic groups have always been formed in the EP (Lehrut 2018), before the 2014–2019 term they were not numerous, organized or integrated enough in the EP to really influence its deliberation (Brack, 2018, p. 398). 2  On the contrary, the Socialist and Democrats (S&D) group gained seats in the EP between 2009 and 2014, moving from 184 seats in 2009 to 191 seats in 2014. Similarly, the European Conservative and Reformist (ECR) group increased its seats by 16 following the 2014 European elections, becoming the third major EPPG within the EP.

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finding a parliamentary group to join after the rejection of the Greens. Afterwards, the party made an agreement (more technical than political) with the UKIP and joined the EFDD party group. Then, in 2017, the M5S unsuccessfully attempted to join the ALDE party group. Finally, after the 2019 elections, three M5S MEPs (Ms Rosa D’Amato, Ms. Eleonora Evi and Mr. Ignazio Corrao) left the delegation accusing the movement of having betrayed its original ecological mission, and joined the Greens, while the rest of the delegation joined the non-attached members of the Parliament. Overall, it seems that the M5S has had great difficulty in defining its role within the EP. The analyses of the voting behaviour of M5S MEPs show that they have always held positions very distant from those of the anti-European parties with which they were formally allied. In the eighth EP (2014–2019), M5S delegation voted in line with the Greens in 74% of cases and with the S&D group in 71% (Salvati, 2019, p. 2). Looking at votes, the party’s political profile appeared much more similar to that of Podemos than that of UKIP or LN, and in contrast with the positions held by the movement at the national level (Vassallo, 2021). In 2019, while at home the M5S was governing with the LN, a nativist and anti-European party, at the European level the party took a rather pro-European position. It supported the election of Ursula von der Leyen, voted in favour of the Recovery Plan, and supported the rule of law clause against the Polish and Hungarian populist governments. What is more, for the first time in the history of the EP, a M5S nonattached member (Mr Fabio Massimo Castaldo) was elected vice-­ president of the EP. It is still too early to evaluate the leverage of Eurosceptic and populist parties over the decision-making and legislative process on immigration and European affairs in the ninth EP legislature (2019–2024). Meijers and Veer (2019) argue that mainstream party groups do not increase their emphasis of immigration issues in response to radical right MEPs’ issue emphasis. On the contrary, the increasing representation of Eurosceptic political parties could change the dynamics of the chamber by forcing the EPP and the S&D political groups to dilute their policy-­ specific differences and to converge in a ‘grand coalition’ (VoteWatch, 2018; Crum, 2020). At the same time, mainstream party groups are likely to adopt the tactic of the ‘cordon sanitaire’ to exclude Eurosceptic populist parties from the decision-­ making process (Ripoll Servent, 2019a; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019), exacerbating the problem of the democratic deficit of the EU (Shein, 2020). Other observers, however, claim that, with a group of 73 MEPs, the newly formed Identity and Democracy group will be able to at least disrupt, if not impact, future legislative discussions on migration and European affairs in the coming years (Ardittis, 2019). This Chapter looks specifically at MEPs positions on immigration and the European Union issues. The aim is to advance our understanding of political competition in a multi-level political space in the light of the increasing salience of Eurosceptic MEPs after the 2014 and 2019 European elections. Given the limited number of recent studies looking specifically at MEPs’ positions on immigration and the EU, what follows aims to be a pioneering exploration of MEPs’ attitudes towards these topics.

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6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration Immigration In 2015, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimated that 65.3 million individuals had been forcibly displaced worldwide because of persecution, armed conflicts, generalised violence or human rights violations (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2): 21.3 million persons were refugees, of which 4.9 million came from Syria. Although no member state of the European Union (EU) figures among the top ten host countries in the world (UNHCR, 2016, p. 16), the influx of refugees heading for Europe was still unprecedented, without equivalent in Europe since World War II (Frontex, 2016, p. 14). The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) reported that more than one million people applied for asylum in 2015, the highest number since EU-wide data collection started in 2008 (EASO, 2016, p. 8). As a result, several MSs implemented unilateral measures to discourage asylum seekers from entering their territories: they built fences, restored border controls and introduced restrictive asylum policies.3 In May 2015, the European Commission proposed its European Agenda on Migration, a comprehensive approach based on solidarity and shared responsibilities among MSs. Following these proposals, in September 2015, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted two Decisions to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece, the frontier countries most affected by refugee arrivals. Although only a minority of asylum seekers were eventually relocated, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – the so-called Visegrád group – fiercely opposed the compulsory quotas and denounced these as a clear infringement of national sovereignty. As a result, in September 2017, the programme abruptly stopped, with the relocation of less than 30% of the number initially pledged, amounting to only 2% of arrivals to Italy and Greece over the preceding two years. The failure of the relocation scheme shows MSs’ reluctance to comply with the EU’s immigration and asylum policies,4 as well as the potential of issues connected 3  In particular, eight countries (Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Belgium) introduced Schengen border controls, based on Article 25 of the Schengen Border Code (SBC) (events requiring immediate action) and Articles 23/24 SBC (foreseeable events). Other countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden, restricted the right to family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Finally, Hungary, Denmark and Germany introduced cuts in the provision of material reception conditions (Wagner et al., 2016, pp. 38–42) 4  The process of ‘communitarisation’ of immigration and asylum policies has been incremental and characterised by strong resistance on the part of MSs to transfer their responsibilities to the EU’s institutions. After more than two decades of intense transgovernmental cooperation (Wallace et al., 2015, p. 458), under the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) migration and other related policies were transferred from the third intergovernmental pillar of the EU, established by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), to the first supranational pillar. Two years later, at the Tampere European Council, MSs agreed on the legal basis for a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Since then, several directives and regulations on immigration control and asylum have been adopted, but their implementation still lacks coherence among MSs (Wagner et al., 2016).

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with immigration and asylum to challenge the internal cohesion and the operational capacity of the EU (Scipioni, 2018; Ripoll Servent, 2019b). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament acts as a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council in many policy areas, including immigration and asylum (Nugent, 2010; Ripoll Servent, 2012). The EP has adopted numerous own-initiative resolutions addressing migration, in particular its resolution of 16 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration. Moreover, the European Parliament and the Council reached political agreement on several proposals (e.g., the establishment of the European Union Agency for Asylum, and the reform of Eurodac, the EU’s migrant fingerprint database). Most notably, the European Parliament worked for almost two years on a proposal to reform the current Dublin Regulation, under which the first EU country that asylum seekers enter is responsible for examining their asylum claims, putting disproportionate responsibilities on ‘frontline’ countries (Italy and Greece and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Malta). On 29 January 2020, the European Commission’s new work programme was published. Under the fifth priority  – ‘Promoting our European Way of Life’, the Commission announced its intention to launch a New Pact on Asylum and Migration. In line with the long-standing European approach to migration, the New Pact on Migration mixes security and humanitarian concerns (e.g., Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Ceccorulli, 2021). Among other things, it foresees a new solidarity mechanism for situations of pressure on the external border of the EU, an effective return policy but also fair and efficient asylum rules and new legal pathways for those in need of protection, and a renewed commitment to stipulate mutual beneficial agreements with third countries of origin and transit to manage migration flows.

6.2.1  Issue Salience As already noted at the national level, both for mainstream and populist parties, issues regarding the dimension of immigration control are comparatively more salient than issues related to the dimension of migrant integration (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 below). This is most probably related to the types of challenges faced by the European Union in the period considered, strictly connected to the management of immigration flows and the control of the common European frontiers (e.g., the institution of a European coast guard, the relocation of asylum seekers, and the reform of the Dublin system). However, the delegations of mainstream left parties in the EP put comparatively less emphasis on issues connected with immigration control: mainstream right parties’ coded segments related to immigration control (border control, humanitarian migration, labour migration and family reunification) amounted to double those of the mainstream left parties (13% for PD, 12% for the LAB, 23% for FI and 24% for the CON). Among the targets encompassing the dimension of immigration control, MEPs mainly discuss humanitarian migration (e.g., refugees, vulnerable migrants, victims of trafficking and so on), amounting to 40% of all coded segments related to

6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration

PD

FI

119

LAB

CON

15

10

5

0

Borders Control

Humanitarian Labour Migration Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-economic Cultural-religious integration integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 6.1  Mainstream parties’ issue salience (immigration issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data. Note: Issue salience is expressed as the percentage of coded segments for each target (Number of codes for any given target/Total coded segments))

M5S

LN

UKIP

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-economic Cultural-religious integration integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 6.2  Populist parties’ issue salience (immigration issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

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immigration. The second most addressed topic, except among LAB MEPs, is security (25%), followed by economic migration (8%). When we move our attention to the dimension of migrant integration, it is worth noting that the socio-economic integration of migrants is tackled by PD (1%) and by LAB (10%), while among mainstream right MEPs only the conservative delegation mentions this target 1% of the times. Moreover, all parties considered discuss the reception of migrants, except for PD. In particular, mainstream right MEPs devote a moderate number of statements to the reception issue (4% for both parties). As already noted at the national level, some targets of the dimension of migrant integration (citizenship and cultural-­ religious integration in this case) are not addressed in the EP. The three populist parties considered in this analysis (LN, M5S and UKIP) differ substantially from each other (Fig. 6.2). Both LN and UKIP devote the majority of their sentences to security issues (53% and 45% respectively), while the M5S MEPs dedicate just 19.4% of their sentences to this target. Moreover, while UKIP and LN dedicate approximately one-third of their speeches to humanitarian migration, the M5S MEPs tackle this target in 53% of their sentences. Among migrant integration targets, cultural-religious integration is the most important for UKIP and the LN (10% and 5.2% of their coded segments respectively), while the M5S MEPs do not address it. As already noted in the empirical analysis of the political debate at the national level, the reception of migrants is a target that matters for Italian parties. Indeed, M5S MEPs dedicate 18% of their sentences – and the LN 7.8% – to this issue, while UKIP does not mention this target at all.

6.2.2  European Political Parties’ Positions on Immigration Figure 6.3 shows mainstream parties’ positions vis-à-vis the different targets of immigration. Party positioning towards each target is identified by a coloured marker (one for each party). Party positions range from −1 to +1. The zero line represents the neutral position (i.e., the number of sentences coded as positive/permissive equal those coded as negative/restrictive) or the lack of coded sentences for that target. Whenever opposition to the target is present, the markers are drawn on the negative side of the graph, while support is shown on the positive side of the graph. The distinction between the principled and pragmatic character of parties’ positioning is represented by the markers being above or below ±0.5 (principled positioning above ±0.5). As can be seen, in line with the findings in the academic literature on MEPs’ voting behaviour (e.g., Hix, 2001), mainstream EPPGs seem to converge in a sort of ‘grand-coalition’ on several aspects of the immigration issue. Security (e.g., issues concerning border controls, the expulsion of irregular migrants, the fight against human trafficking and organized crime) is one of those issues towards which mainstream right and mainstream left MEPs converge towards positive and pragmatic positions (+0.4  in the case of FI MEPs, +0.3  in the case of Conservative MEPs, +0.2 in the case of Labour MEPs and +0.04 in the case of PD MEPs). Similarly, they

121

6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration

LAB

CON

PD

FI

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-economic Cultural-religious integration integration

Citizenship

Reception

Fig. 6.3 Mainstream parties’ positions (immigration issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

all endorse positive stances on humanitarian migration. However, while the support of PD and LAB is principled (both parties score +0.8), FI and CON give pragmatic support to this target (+0.5 and +0.06 respectively). Nevertheless, on economic migration (e.g., people moving to a different country for economic reasons) it is possible to notice a left-right polarisation between mainstream left and mainstream right MEPs. Indeed, while PD and LAB hold permissive and pragmatic positions vis-à-vis economic migration (+0.3 and +0.2 respectively), FI and CON endorse a restrictive and pragmatic position (−0.5 and −0.03 respectively) on this target. Concerning migrant integration, a clear pattern of differentiation between mainstream left and mainstream right parties does not emerge for all targets. PD and LAB do indeed hold permissive and pragmatic positions on the socio-economic integration of migrants (+0.3 and  +0.2 respectively), while both Forza Italia and CON hold a negative – yet very moderate – position on this target (both scoring −0.05). However, this polarisation disappears once the other targets of the

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dimension of migrant integration are taken into account. For example, both PD and CON support in a principled way the cultural-religious integration of migrants (+0.7% and  +0.6% respectively), while Forza Italia holds a restrictive and pragmatic position on this target (−0.4). Political parties therefore seem to position themselves on cultural-­religious issues independently of their left-right positioning on the political spectrum. This finding partially contrasts with Helbling’s (2014) results, according to which conservative and social democratic-type of parties in Europe hold remarkably similar views on multiculturalism. Finally, it is worth noting that citizenship is not a relevant topic in the EP debates on immigration. Moving now to populist parties’ position towards immigration in the European Parliament, the positions endorsed by LN MEPs are rather similar with those endorsed by UKIP MEPs, both of which differ from those held by the M5S’s delegation (Fig. 6.4). More specifically, both LN and UKIP give a pragmatic endorsement of security measures (+0.4), combined with principled opposition to both humanitarian migration (both scoring −0.8 on this target) and cultural-religious integration of migrants (−0.7 and 0.6 respectively). Moreover, they also hold a pragmatic and restrictive – yet moderate – stance towards the socio-economic integration of migrants (both scoring −0.1 on this target). Finally, LN maintain a principled opposition towards the reception of migrants (−0.7), a target which is not mentioned by UKIP.  On the contrary, M5S MEPs are slightly against a securitarian

M5S

LN

UKIP

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Borders Control

Humanitarian Migration

Labour Migration

Family Reunification

Socio-economic Cultural-religious integration integration

Citizenhsip

Reception

Fig. 6.4  Populist parties’ positions on immigration. Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration

123

approach to migration (−0.06), while they hold permissive and principled stances towards humanitarian migration (+0.9), coupled with pragmatic – yet moderate – support for the socio-economic integration of migrants (+0.1). Two further considerations are noteworthy: first, M5S pragmatic opposition towards the reception system at the national level is confirmed at the EU level (–0.13%). Second, the ‘citizenship’ target is not salient for any of the analysed populist parties.

6.2.3  Framing Immigration in the European Parliament Table 6.1, below, shows the share of frames used by different delegations of the Italian mainstream parties in the EP. As can be seen, PD and LAB MEPs use predominantly humanitarian frames (45% of all coded segments related to immigration issues for the former, 36% for the latter). Conversely, while FI MEPs use mainly security frames (26.6%), CON delegation mainly uses sovereigntist frames (38%) to talk about immigration. Interestingly, legitimacy frames (e.g., the evaluation of policies’ effectiveness and legitimacy) are relevant for both governmental parties, namely PD (between 2015 and 2018) and Conservative MEPs (13% and 15% respectively), but not for opposition parties. The keyword analysis reveals the arguments that are used by political parties to support or oppose immigration (Table  6.2). S&D Italian and British delegations stress the need to enforce effective and fair European immigration and asylum policies while fostering solidarity and shared responsibilities among MSs through a reform of the Dublin Regulation and the establishment of a permanent relocation system. This dimension is particularly relevant in the speeches of the Italian S&D delegation: as the keyword analysis shows, the word ‘responsibility’, together with the respect of fundamental ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ envisaged by the Treaties, is highly significant in PD MEPs’ speeches in comparison to the other delegations’ speeches, as shown by the following quote:

Table 6.1  Mainstream party frames (immigration issue). Supranational Arena

PD FI LAB CON

Codes % Codes % Codes % Codes %

Socio-­ economic 18 9 23 13.3 9 12 10 4.6

Culturalreligious 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.4

Moral-­ universal 92 45 25 14.5 27 36 47 21

Sovereigntist 2 1 40 23 3 4 85 38

Security 18 9 45 26.6 11 15 23 10

Legitimacy 27 13 11 6.6 2 3 34 15

Neutral codes 46 22 27 16 23 30 24 11

Total 205 100 173 100 75 100 225 100

Note: Share of coded segments dedicated to immigration in parliamentary debates. Percentages are rounded

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Table 6.2  Top 10 keywords by mainstream parties. Immigration issue. Supranational Arena S&D – LAB

ECR – CON

Keywords commission council commissioner colleagues luxury smart giving minors presidency proposal EU rules need better others UK must British leaders help

Keyness 55.68 49.44 38.72 36.95 34.33 34.33 34.32 27.82 27.82 27.82 53.91 40.43 28.21 27.88 26.18 24.6 20.08 18.2 17.06 14.94

S&D – PD

EPP – FI

Keywords integrazione diritti discussione libertà accesso responsabilità politica proposta europeo legali italia dobbiamo accogliere turchia clandestini italiani assolutamente noi fatto confine

Keyness 23.23 20.06 14.78 14.78 13.72 13.51 13.37 11.61 11.02 10.55 22.18 21.75 15.79 15.63 14.75 12.91 12.75 12.73 12.29 11.06

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported

Solidarity and full sharing of responsibilities are vital principles of our system and not instruments to be voluntarily used if certain conditions are met, if the nationality of the beneficiaries is, for example, to our liking, if age and gender seem more appropriate to us. This restrictive and discriminatory system of preferences is punishable as much as the absolute lack of commitments. By choosing the path of denial of the law, we violate the human dignity of thousands of women, men and especially children; we deny them fundamental rights, we send them away from legality, we deprive them of a future. (Cécile Kashetu Kyenge (S&D – PD), ‘Making relocation happen’, 16/05/2017) It was the egoism of the Member States that caused all this suffering, that led children to self-harm and even commit suicide. We need measures of immediate solidarity with those people who find themselves stuck [in Greece]. We do not need to defend our borders but instead we need to establish an emergency relocation mechanism, starting from unaccompanied minors. It is unthinkable that children are left facing those conditions! (Pietro Bartolo (S&D – PD), ‘Humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean’, 17/07/2019) What is happening in the Mediterranean, despite what we have heard from the Council about the numbers who are dying reducing, is an assault against human dignity in the Mediterranean and a challenge to our European values. […] And let’s be clear: the human instinct, the European instinct, the global instinct to aid people who may be dying, as we have just heard, is one that we need to clarify and we need to accept as one of our values. (Claude Moraes (S&D  – LAB), ‘Humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean’, 17/07/2019)

The Leader of the British delegation of the S&D group, Claude Moraes, often commends the European ‘Commission’ for the work done on immigration and asylum, while he blames the ‘Council’ for not implementing European Asylum Policies:

6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration

125

On migration, after all the difficulties of relocation and after all the work we have done with the Commission here in Parliament, we now need to seize the challenge of Dublin. Let us get the mandate from the Council and let us get the mandate from the Member states. So much hard work was done here. (Claude Moraes (S&D  – LAB), ‘Commission Work Programme 2018’, 24/10/2017)

Conversely, the Italian and British MEPs in the ECR and EPP emphasise fighting irregular immigration and human trafficking to keep external borders secure. They stress the need to establish a strict but fair immigration regime that is able to distinguish between bogus asylum seekers and genuine refugees successfully. Moreover, they call for cooperation agreements with third-country nationals, to address the root causes of migration by promoting socio-economic development in countries of origin. The sense of urgency is represented by the use of expressions such as ‘need’, ‘must’, ‘we have to’, and ‘absolutely’. We cannot begin to solve this crisis until we enforce the rules in place: to protect the external Schengen border, to focus on the basics of processing detention and returns, and to prevent asylum seekers and economic migrants moving around the EU at will. (Ashley Fox (ECR – CON), ‘European Council (18 and 19 February 2016)’, 24/02/2016) The EU needs to bear responsibilities for asylum seekers and illegal migrants (‘clandestini’ in Italian) because in Italy we cannot keep up; we need to think about Italians first and foremost. We understand that those who flee from war need to be welcomed, but illegal migrants must go back to their country. (Laura Comi (EPP  – FI), ‘Asylum: provisional measures in favour of Italy and Greece’, 14/09/2016)

Overall, looking at both the share of frames and the arguments used by different mainstream parties, it seems that a left-right pattern of polarisation prevails in the EP, rather than a convergence of mainstream parties into a sort of ‘grand coalition’ (e.g., Kreppel, 2002). Once again, the LN and UKIP frame the immigration issue very differently from the M5S (Table 6.3). Both the LN and the UK Independent Party use predominantly sovereigntist frames (+62.3% and 65% of all coded segments respectively) and security frames (12.9% and 15.7% respectively), while the M5S MEPs mainly use legitimacy (40%) and moral-universal frames (39%). When we look more closely at the themes associated by the M5S with the legitimacy frames, it appears that the party uses these types of frames to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies implemented by the EU in terms of goals-results and costs-benefits calculations. Table 6.3  Populist parties frames (immigration issue). Supranational Arena Socioeconomic M5S Codes 7 % 5 LN Codes 5 % 6.5 UKIP Codes 7 % 6 Source: Author’s data

Culturalreligious 0 0 3 4 10 9

Moraluniversal 11 39 1 1.3 5 3.4

Sovereigntist 54 8 48 62.3 75 65

Security 0 0 10 12.9 18 15.7

Legitimacy 61 40 5 6.5 1 0.9

Neutral codes 11 8 5 6.5 0 0

Total 144 100 77 100 115 100

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Table 6.4  Top 10 keywords. Populist parties. Issue of immigration. Supranational Arena M5S

LN

UKIP

Keywords membri stati solidarietà ricollocazione equa responsabilità ripartizione meccanismo permanente ricollocare Europa immigrazione clandestini milioni persone politica immigrati mare guerra confini European people union EU Europe us British going referendum Britain

Keyness 31.934 17.195 17.195 16.299 14.739 12.282 12.282 12.282 11.86 11.86 46.867 21.757 19.581 17.101 15.877 15.23 13.902 13.054 13.054 10.879 408.12 345.47 278.01 226.93 192.92 188.67 156.81 153.32 105.88 103.76

Source: Author’s data Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported

Socio-­economic and cultural-religious frames are marginal overall for all populist (right) parties. However, while LN and the UKIP use the former 6.5% and 6% of the times respectively, and the latter 4% and 9% respectively, M5S MEPs employ socio-­ economic frames only 5% of the times and never use cultural-religious frames. The analysis of keywords enables us to look in more depth at the themes associated by populist actors with immigration issues (see Table 6.4 below). Again, UKIP and LN delegations represent the migration crisis very differently from M5S MEPs. The M5S considers immigration flows to Europe as a humanitarian crisis, which calls into question the founding values of the EU, such as justice and respect for human dignity. As a result, they advocate for solidarity among MSs and call for the decisions enacted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in September 2015, aimed at relocating refugees from frontline countries among MSs, to be respected, as expressed in the following quotation:

6.2  Transnational Competition on Immigration

127

[…] In the Council decision, I did not see any common policy, any solidarity […]. I saw solidarity towards concrete walls and barbed wire, I saw the same attachment to hypocrite economic and electoral interests as usual. […] Selfishness and disregard by few Member states cannot kill the dignity of all the others, of entire Europe, otherwise will be the end of the European project as a whole. […] The European Parliament asks for it; the European citizens want it. The rule of law, justice and humanity demand it. (Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD – M5S), ‘European Council’, 16/09/2015)

On the contrary, UKIP and LN delegates represent immigration as an uncontrolled phenomenon and a security threat for European society, often establishing a link between immigration and criminality/terrorist threats, as evident in the quotations below: We are vulnerable because we are not able to protect external borders and internal borders are gone. Illegal immigrants and Islamic terrorists wander around unhindered. (Mara Bizzotto (ENF – LN), ‘Valletta Summit’, 25/11/2015) We ask ourselves what have you done in recent years, what has France done, for example? […] The truth is that only our Interior Minister Matteo Salvini had the courage […] to trying to stop the business of human trafficking and illegal immigration. Closing harbours is the only possible solution to stop dismemberments and reduce deaths in the Mediterranean sea. (Annalisa Tardino (ID  – L), ‘Humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean’, 17/07/2019) Mr Juncker, this morning, seemed to suggest that perhaps he would even include people who were fleeing poverty. I am sorry, we cannot accept countless millions. […] But there is a real and genuine threat. When ISIS say they want to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists, they mean it, and there is nothing in this document that will stop those people from coming. Indeed, I fear we face a direct threat to our civilisation if we allow large numbers of people from that war-torn region into Europe. (Nigel Farage (EFDD – UKIP), ‘European Council (23 April 2015)’, 29/04/2015)

Interestingly, both UKIP and LN MEPs link their positions against further immigration with their opposition to the EU, which they accuse of interfering with the sovereign right of nation states to control their borders and repatriate illegal migrants (‘clandestini’ in Italian). In particular, UKIP’s delegates consider a withdrawal from the EU necessary to regain control over British borders. The EU has a commitment to endless, mass, uncontrolled migration, both within its borders and from without. […] If the British people want their government to have any control on migration whatsoever, then they must vote to leave the European Union on 23 June. (Gerard Batten (EFDD – UKIP), ‘The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration’, 12/04/2016) For years we have been the only ones denouncing the danger of illegal migration (‘clandestini’) that is invading Italy and the EU, and for this, you have called us racists, populists, xenophobic. You, Commission and the Italian government, have made many chitchats and zero facts […] even worse […] you have declared that immigrants are economic resources, and thus they all have to be helped. Shame on you! Shame on you because you are making fun of the poor people. Shame on you because you are responsible for this mass invasion. (Mara Bizzotto (ENF – LN), State of play of the external aspects of the European migration agenda: towards a new ‘Migration Compact’, 07/06/2016)

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According to them, the majority of people coming to Europe are just bogus refugees, and among them, several have links with international criminal organisations. Therefore, the solution they propose is to invest in socio-economic development in third-country nationals (under the motto ‘let us help them at home!’) rather than spending public money in unsuccessful reception policies. The only recipe is not Frontex, Triton, Mare Nostrum, Pippo, Pluto or Donald Duck, but it is to avoid these people leaving helping them to try not to run away from hunger and war. (Matteo Salvini, LN MEP, Way forward for Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office, 26/02/2015)

On the contrary, M5S MEPs stress the need to address the root causes of migration – e.g., wars and the arms trade – while at the same time implementing resettlement policies, humanitarian corridors and a permanent mechanism for redistributing asylum seekers and refugees among MSs. The socio-economic integration of refugees is a complex process that needs to be based on the principles of solidarity and fair distribution of responsibilities among the Member states. […] Refugees’ access to the labour market […] can reduce the costs of reception […] and contribute to the economy of host societies. (Laura Ferrera, (EFDD  – M5S), ‘Refugees: social inclusion and integration into the labour market’, 16/03/2016)

6.3  Transnational Competition on the EU in the EP In the last years, the European Union has faced multiple crises in the economic, financial, immigration and, lastly, in the health and social security fields. As a result, strong tensions have risen inside the EU institutions as well as among its member states (Cotta & Isernia, 2021). Public trust towards the EU has decreased, particularly in those peripheral countries most affected by the financial and migration crises (Dotti Sani & Magistro, 2016). Finally, for the first time in Europe’s history, one Member state decided to withdraw from the Union, fostering an unprecedented process of (dis-)integration (Schimmelfennig, 2018; Leruth et  al., 2019; Markakis, 2020; Wellings, 2020). Recent research has focused on the impact of the politicization of European integration on the balance of power between the EU institutions (Bressanelli et  al., 2019; Closa, 2020). As an example, Ripoll Servent (2019b) show that the EP was not able to influence the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as the European Council took a leading role in the decision-making process in the attempt to protect the interests of Member states in such an electoral sensitive area (p. 306). On the contrary, Bressanelli et al. (2021) show that the EP preserved its policy-making capacity as Brexit unfolded, becoming a ‘quasi negotiator’ of the future EU-UK relationship (p. 17). Other scholars have investigated EPPGs composition and internal coherence (Crum, 2020), MEPs’ legislative behaviour in the EP (Whitaker et al. 2017), or the contributions that Eurosceptic MEPs have made to specific EU policies, e.g., territorial reforms (Tobeau & Massetti, 2013), Euro-­ Mediterranean affairs (Völkel, 2019) or foreign policy (van Berlo & Natorski, 2020; Raunio & Wagner, 2020).

6.3  Transnational Competition on the EU in the EP

129

So far, however, we know comparatively little about the positions taken on, and the salience given to different issues related to the European Union, and to what extent they differ from their national parties back home. Thus, what follows is a pioneering contribution to the debate on party politics of European affairs in the EP, in the context of increasing politicization of the EU.

6.3.1  Issue Salience Figure 6.5, below, shows the salience of the different EU targets for the Italian and British delegations of the S&G Group (PD and LAB), as well as the British delegation to the ECR Group (CON) and the Italian delegation to the EPP Group (FI). Several differences can be seen. First, the aspect of EU integration is particularly salient for the FI MEPs (28% of the total coded segments in EU debates), while for the other three delegations this target is much less salient (around 10% of the coded segments). In a similar vein, EU policies are particularly relevant for PD MEPs (34%), while LAB and CON MEPs devote 19% of the total coded segments to this target, and the FI MEPs refer to this target just 15% of the times. EU-institutions are the third most relevant target in EU debates, particularly so for the Italian and the British delegations of the S&D Group, which refer to this target in 18% and 19% of their coded segments respectively. Conversely, FI and CON delegates devote just 9% and 10% of their

PD

FI

LAB

CON

40

30

20

10

0

EU integration

EU Policies

EU Institutions

EMU

Schengen

Fig. 6.5 Mainstream parties’ issue salience (EU issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

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M5S

LN

UKIP

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

EU integration

EU policies

EU institutions

EU elite

EMU

Schengen area

Fig. 6.6  Populist parties’ issue salience (EU issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

speeches to talking about EU institutions. Finally, both European Monetary Union and the Schengen Area are much less salient for all mainstream parties’ delegations. Populist parties mobilise different policy issues in the EP (Fig. 6.6). The more vocal parties are LN and UKIP. However, while the former mainly talk about EU policies (50.4% of the party’s speeches), the latter focuses on EU integration (34.8% of the coded sentences). M5S participate less in European parliamentary debates, devoting its attention mainly to EU policies (33.2 of the coded sentences). Interesting, populist parties do not refer often to EU elites – 19.2% of codes in the case of the LN, 12% in the case of UKIP, 10% in the case of the M5S – but they rather prefer to speak about EU institutions – around 20% of the times in the case of the M5S and UKIP, in only 10% of the occasions for the LN.  Also, the varying geometries of the European Union do not receive much attention. The European Monetary Union is mentioned less than 10% of the times by all parties, while they refer to the Schengen Area in less than 5% of cases.

6.3.2  European Political Parties’ Positions on the EU When looking at the positions on the EU issues endorsed by the mainstream parties’ delegations, no clear-cut pattern of support/opposition emerge, either between or within the mainstream left and mainstream right delegations. Besides, at the supranational level, opposition to the EU tends to be pragmatic rather than principled,

6.3  Transnational Competition on the EU in the EP

PD

FI

LAB

131

CON

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU integration EU Policies EU Institutions

EU elite

EMU

Schengen Area

Fig. 6.7  Mainstream parties’ positions (EU issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

except for the principled support for the process of EU integration endorsed by PD (Fig. 6.7). Both PD and LAB endorse a positive stance towards the process of EU integration – in a principled manner in the case of the former (+0.6), and with pragmatic and moderate stances in the case of the latter (+0.1). Nevertheless, they hold slightly different positions concerning the other targets of the EU issue. Both parties oppose EU policies pragmatically (−0.05 in the case of PD, −0.3 in the case of LAB), and support further economic and financial integration  – yet extremely moderately (+0.01 and +0.2 respectively), as well as the existence of the Schengen Area (+0.01 and +0.06 respectively). Conversely, while PD MEPs show a moderate opposition towards EU institutions (−0.002), LAB endorses a positive stance on this target (+0.04). Finally, while PD holds a negative position vis-à-vis the EU elite (−0.2), LAB does not mention this target at all. Moving to the positions endorsed by the two mainstream right delegations, it is worth noting that while FI endorses a positive and pragmatic stance on the process of EU integration (+0.05), Conservatives MEPs endorse a pragmatic opposition on this target (−0.1). In particular, the formers hold positive stances towards both EMU (+0.3) and the Schengen Area (+0.01), while CON opposes both these targets (−0.2 and  −0.1 respectively). Both the mainstream right’s Italian delegation and CON delegates hold a negative and pragmatic stance towards the EU policies (−0.03 and −0.04 respectively), EU institutions (−0.03 and −0.05 respectively). Besides this, CON holds a negative stance towards the EU elite (−0.2), while the FI MEPs do not mention this target.

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LN

M5S

UKIP

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

EU-integration EU-policies EU-institutions

EU-elite

EMU

Schengen Area

Fig. 6.8  Populist parties’ position (EU issue). Supranational Arena. (Source: Author’s data)

Figure 6.8, above, shows the positions endorsed by the populist parties in talking about the issue of the EU in the supranational arena. As can be seen, populist parties are largely positioned below the zero line, which means that they oppose the European Union in a principled manner. However, while the M5S endorses a pragmatic opposition – except for the EMU and the EU-elite targets, towards which the party endorses a principled opposition (−0.7 and −0.8 respectively) and the Schengen Area, which the party supports pragmatically (+0.1) – LN and UKIP hold a principled opposition towards all targets. In particular, UKIP and LN strongly oppose the process of EU integration (−0.9 and −0.8 respectively), EU-policies (−0.9 and −0.8 respectively), EU-elite (−0.7 and −0.9 respectively) and EU-institutions (both scoring −0.7 on this target). On the contrary, M5S expresses pragmatic opposition towards these targets, scoring  −0.3 on the EU-integration issue, −0.1 on the EU-institutions and  −0.2 on EU-policies. Furthermore, in contrast to the M5S, LN and UKIP oppose the Economic and Monetary Union (−0.7 and −0.6 respectively) and the Schengen Area (both scoring −0.7 on this target).

6.3.3  Framing the EU in the EP Legitimacy frames are the most used frames by all mainstream delegations in talking about issues connected to the EU, irrespective of ideological orientation (Table  6.5). However, mainstream right delegations use legitimacy frames more

CON

ECR

Total codes % Total codes % Total codes % Total codes %

Source: Author’s data

FI

LAB

Party PD

EPP

EPPG S&D

Socio-economic 210 30 20 10 39 13.1 39 13.8

Cultural-religious 0 0 0 0 2 0.7 0 0

Table 6.5  Mainstream parties’ frames (EU issue). Supranational Arena Moral-universal 157 22 56 27.4 80 26.9 9 3.2

Sovereigntist 4 0.5 3 1.5 1 0.3 44 15.5

Security 11 1.5 13 6.3 29 9.8 33 11.6

Legitimacy 224 31.3 69 33.8 101 34 118 41.5

Neutral codes 105 14.7 43 21 45 15.2 41 14.4

Total 715 100 204 100 297 100 284 100

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often that mainstream left delegations (41.5% – CON, 34% – FI, 33.8% – LAB and 31.3. – PD). These types of frames are used by all the parties analysed to criticise the EU institutions and, in the case of PD, FI and CON MEPs, the European elites too (the so-called ‘Eurocrats’). For PD, LAB and FI MEPs, moral-universal frames (e.g., call for the respect of democratic, cosmopolitan or international principles, human rights, Europeanism and so on) are also very important (these parties use them 22%, 27.4% and 26.9% respectively). Socio-economic frames are widely used by PD MEPs (30% of the party’s coded segments). CON MEPs are those who most often use standard right-­ wing frames to talk about the EU, namely sovereigntist frames (15.5% of the party’s coded segments) and security frames (11.6%). Overall, cultural-religious frames are rarely used across all delegations. When analysing the arguments associated with the frames mentioned above in depth, it emerges that at the supranational level, opposition to the EU tends to be pragmatic rather than principled. In other words, both mainstream left and mainstream right delegations criticise specific aspects of the EU (the effects of its policies, the decision-making processes within its institutions and so on), rather than arguing for a complete dismantling of the Union. An attitude in favour of reforming the EU in order to tackle the differentiated needs of the MSs more effectively is evident in the words of the ECR’s spokesperson: A growing number of people believe that Europe cannot go on as it is. Europe has to change, and that change has to start now. They do not believe that the choice is between more Europe or no Europe: they want a better Europe, a Europe that allows our nation states to cooperate freely and not a one-size-fits-all European super-state. A Europe which embraces the future, not one that lives in the past; a Europe to meet the challenges of the 2050s, not the problems of the 1950s. (Syed Kamall, (ECR – CON), European Council, 24/06/2015)

It is worth noting that CON’s delegation is internally divided over the issue of European integration. Indeed, there are some hardline-Eurosceptic MEPs within the British delegation of the ECR who advocate the repatriation of EU competences to national member states, as expressed by the following quote: MEPs should be the first to recognise that the citizens of our countries do not want an even closer union. They want national governments responsible to them for their actions. They want a European Union that costs less and which spends its resources more effectively. They want an EU that cuts red tape and removes barriers to trade and competitiveness and which hurries to conclude free trade agreements with countries such as India and our transatlantic partners. They certainly do not want the whole nature of our countries changed by the massive uncontrolled influx of people from other cultures. Our countries should be able to adjust their benefit systems as necessary and should be given greater flexibility in the scope and duration of suspending EU rules for public policy or national security reasons. (Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR – CON), European Council, 19/01/2016)

Moreover, British MEPs often endorse populist rhetoric, highlighting the democratic deficit of the EU and the lack of accountability of its institutions: Increasingly, decisions in the EU are not necessarily being made openly and transparently, especially in this Chamber. Decisions are not always made by all 751 MEPs. Politics is

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about perception, and there is a perception that decisions are increasingly made by five men sitting in a room and cutting deals among themselves. This is not a perception of democracy – and, if you want to show that you are open and transparent, then stop the ‘grand coalition’ backroom stitch-ups. (Syed Kamall (ECR  – CON), European Council, 05/07/2016)

On the contrary, the Italian delegation of the EPP group endorses a position moderately in favour of the EU, in contrast to the FI MPs at the national level. Indeed, as shown in the quotation below, they recognise that, in order to cope with complex transnational challenges, it is necessary to coordinate responses at the supranational level. We must find a way to be in Europe. Member states must discard the nationalistic mind-set because otherwise, we cannot give an adequate answer to the complex phenomena that we face. (Elisabetta Gardini (EPP – FI), Outcome of the UE-Turkey Summit, 03/09/2016)

However, their support of the EU is motivated by utilitarian arguments, rather than by sincere affection for the EU. For example, their support of the Schengen Area is predominantly motivated by free-market argumentation, such as the economic benefits deriving to the Italian economy from the free movement of capital and people, as the following citation shows: When Austria introduced border checks and put in place 70 kilometres of a tail on its borders, the result has been damaging the import and export trade of the Italians. We need to control the external border […] this is what Italian citizens are asking for: to stay in Europe but a different Europe. They want to exit neither from the euro nor from Europe. (Elisabetta Gardini (EPP – FI), Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area, 29/05/2018)

Moving our attention to the positions endorsed by the Italian and the British delegations of the S&D Group, it is worth noting that they endorse a positive stance towards the European project – PD in a principled manner, LAB with pragmatic stances. As the keywords in Table 6.6 show, PD MEPs place particular emphasis on European economic and fiscal policies. They defend the Eurozone against sovereigntist attacks, they argue in favour of further economic and fiscal integration, although they acknowledge the need to invest more in social policies to reduce unemployment, fight against social inequalities within the EU and boost the economic growth: For too many years, Europe has been waiting for recovery, and it is precisely the lack of investments that is one of the main obstacles to its realisation […] The EFSI [European Fund for Strategic Investments] represented an excellent measure that brought some benefits. We need to insist, increase the funds available and correct those aspects that did not work. (Mercedes Bresso (S&D – PD), Preparation of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2016, 14/12/2016)

As the following quote shows, PD MEPs believe that the European Union needs to achieve further integration in several policy areas (defence, economic and monetary union, migration), but also a significant shift towards social policies, especially in favour of young people. The celebrations for the sixty years of the Treaty of Rome are an opportunity to give new impetus to the European project and to focus on the priorities of Europe we want. We want

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Table 6.6  Top ten keywords (EU issue). Supranational Arena S&D_IT

EPP_IT

S&D_UK

ECR_UK

Keywords investimenti commissione Euro bilancio ripresa parlamento misure EFSI piano europeo dobbiamo oggi troviamo Italia greci Mediterraneo popolo cittadini bisogno possiamo market single rights colleagues Britain implementation semester ensure digital growth countries leaders start new Europe crisis EU sides stop looking

Keyness 26.98 23.14 19.93 19.37 17.66 17.24 15.38 14.81 14.71 14.17 81.41 29.99 29 23.58 23.2 21.3 20.3 17.99 17.62 17.46 78.17 71.2 30.13 23.88 23.51 23.18 21.9 17.84 17.53 17.35 21.02 20.98 18.65 18.19 15.73 15.5 14.46 13.2 13.2 12.43

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7are reported. Word frequency and LL in parenthesis a united and strong Europe in foreign policy, a Europe with a common defence, that can ensure internal security. We want a Europe that promotes economic growth, investment and competitiveness, which strengthens the economic and monetary union by developing a single market and a single fiscal policy. We want a Europe without internal borders that will implement an all-encompassing migration policy; a Europe with a social dimension that invests on young people, the only ones able to restore strength to the original project. We

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want an innovative Europe that invests on digital infrastructures, start-ups, collaborative economy and employment growth. (Nicola Caputo (S&D  – PD), Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 9 and 10 March 2017, 15/03/2017)

The Brexit Referendum is a central issue of debate in the EP as well. The British delegation to the S&D Political Group takes strong positions against the exit of Britain from the EU, as reported in the following quotes: I believe, and my party believes, that remaining in the EU is in the best interest of Britain’s economy and security: it is good for jobs, workplace rights and the environment. We have to face our future challenges, not through isolation but cooperation. […] I want the UK to remain part of the EU family for our long-term future as a country and our long-term prosperity as a nation. (Catherine Stihler (S&D – LAB), Preparation of the European Council meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016, 02/03/2016) Citizens in the UK already benefit from our membership of the EU. They benefit from jobs, from rights in those jobs – like the right to paid holiday – from the protection of our environment, tackling tax avoidance, dealing with climate change and protecting our security. Our future also lies in our membership of the EU: a future in innovation, development and research, and a future economy. (Claire Moody (S&D – LAB), Preparation of the European Council meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016, 02/03/2016)

When moving to populist parties, it emerges that the M5S, the LN and UKIP predominantly use legitimacy frames (58.3%, 47% and 34.3% of the total coded segments respectively) (Table 6.7). Moreover, in the case of the LN also security frames constitute a significant share of the total frames used by the party to refer to the EU (19.2%). Conversely, UKIP uses a fair amount of sovereignty frames (32.1%), showing how the party strongly connects European issues to national sovereigntism throughout the period considered. Interestingly, the positions endorsed by LN MEPs are significantly different from those held by M5S MEPs. First, LN opposes both EU integration and EU institutions using sovereigntist argumentation related to the EU power-grab vis-­à-­ vis Member states and the lack of democracy at the EU-level. In particular, they criticise the lack of electoral accountability of the EU-institutions vis-à-vis democratically elected national authorities. In doing this, they often refer to the Catalan and British experiences, taken as examples of successful popular self-determination. This surreal debate confirms that who governs this Europe – the European Commission – are strong powers and a few dangerous subjects. […] Come back down to earth, because there is little left to govern this European Union that has become a madhouse. (Matteo Salvini (ENF – LN), Preparation of the EC meeting of 15th December 2015, 13/12/2015) There is a great crisis of representation in this Europe, even though someone sees it projected towards more democracy. If we do not […] even remotely examine the Catalan question, the question of Northern Italy and the question of minorities asking for representation, what would this so-called European democracy be? […] the only solution is the Europe of the people and regions, not that of the bureaucracy, the banks and the multinationals that matter most to you all. (Mario Borghezio (ENF  – LN), Commission Work Programme 2018, 24/10/2017)

LN

UKIP

EFD/ID

EFDD

Source: Author’s data

Party M5S

EPPG EFDD/NI

Total codes % Total codes % Total codes %

Socio-economic 35 11.4 9 6.9 93 15.2

Cultural-religious 0 0 10 7.7 11 1.8

Table 6.7  Populist parties’ EU frames. Supranational Arena Moral-universal 43 14 10 7.7 3 0.5

Sovereigntist 2 0.7 11 8.5 196 32.1

Security 18 5.8 25 19.2 50 8.2

Legitimacy 179 58.3 61 47 209 34.3

Neutral codes 30 9.8 4 3 48 7.9

Total 307 100 130 100 610 100

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139

Conversely, M5S stresses the need to inject democracy at the supranational level but does not reject the existence of the Union. On the contrary, it proposes alternatives to reform the EU, starting from its core values (e.g., solidarity) expressed in the Treaties (see the presence of ‘sociale’  – social  – among the keywords in Table 6.8, above): We want to change: we want a different Europe, firstly and foremost in terms of treaties, agreements, and policies. We have fervently talked about treaties such as the Fiscal Compact, but we have never held a speech on the Social Compact or on some social measures of rebalancing, a subject that apparently you do not care about. (Ignazio Corrao (EFDD – M5S), Commission Work Programme 2017, 25/10/2016)

Looking at the keyword analysis (see Table  6.8, above), it appears that LN focuses its criticism of the EU’s immigration policies using security arguments. In particular, the party’s MEPs accuse the European Commission of putting the

Table 6.8  Top ten keywords (EU-issue). Populist parties. Supranational Arena EFDD/NI_IT

ENF/ID_IT

EFDD/NI_UK

Keywords austerità europeo sociale crisi istituzioni greca mafia rubato misure politica Europa qualcuno zero europea immigrazione Isis commissione palazzo Turchia difesa European people union EU Europe us British going referendum Britain

Keyness 31.934 17.195 17.195 16.299 14.739 12.282 12.282 12.282 11.86 11.86 46.867 21.757 19.581 17.101 15.877 15.23 13.902 13.054 13.054 10.879 408.12 345.47 278.01 226.93 192.92 188.67 156.81 153.32 105.88 103.76

Keywords are sorted on “keyness”. Only items with log-likelihood (LL) value ≥7 are reported. Word frequency and LL in parenthesis

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security of European citizens at risk by externalising the control of the external borders to undemocratic and culturally different countries such as Turkey and Libya. The visas of 75 million Turks, most of whom are Muslims, have sold out the values ​​of Europe, human rights and freedom of the press. […] Do we want to remember these values ​​ or do we think of selling them out in front of the refugee problem? Shame on Europe! Shame, shame, shame! (Mario Borghezio (ENF – LN) EU-Turkey summit, 12/02/2015)

As already noticed, both LN and M5S endorse a similarly principled and robust criticism of the EU elite, contesting its moral values and its alleged connections with lobbies and big financial/economic powers to the detriment of the EU’s citizens. Furthermore, both parties reject on a principled basis the Euro area geometry  – considered to be the cardinal mistake of the EU, causing macro-economic divergences between Member States – and propose to leave it. One single road is left to rebuild a Europe of peoples from its foundations: abandoning the crazy project of the euro that has accelerated its disintegration instead of reducing divergences among the member states […]. Markets have blackmailed and dismantled the European project that can now be rebuilt only by betting on democracy, common goods, the real economy, labour and social welfare. (Marco Valli, (EFDD – M5S), Conclusions of the European Council (25–26 June 2015) and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece, 08/07/2015) How many beautiful speeches about social, fair and integrated Europe! However, on how to achieve it: always a mystery. Nowadays the EU is an utterly sclerotic system: the only form of economic coordination applied up to now is called austerity; it has exacerbated disparities and inequalities between the regions of Europe, adding its effects to those of the economic crisis. (Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD  – M5S), Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 9 and 10 March 2017, including the Rome Declaration, 15/03/2017)

As Table 6.8 reports, UKIP MEPs widely use the European arena to advocate for the UK’s exit from the EU. In doing this, they use typical populist rhetoric (people vs élite), stressing how the interests of Britain/the British cannot be pursued while staying in the EU. The EU is about nothing more than the erosion of national sovereignty and the centralisation of powers in Brussels. Moreover, what is Brussels but an autocratic, bureaucratic Leviathan wallowing in red tape and destroying any competitiveness that Europe could have with regulations on everything imaginable? (David Coburn (EFDD – UKIP), European Semester package – Annual Growth Survey 2016, 11/11/2015) This is the modern-day implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine. This is precisely what happened to states living inside the USSR. What has been made clear here, with Greece and indeed with Portugal, is that a country only has democratic rights if it is in favour of the project. If not, those rights are taken away. (Nigel Farage (EFDD – UKIP), Valletta Summit, 27/10/2015) The EU has a commitment to endless, mass, uncontrolled migration, both within and from without its borders. David Cameron did not even try to gain concessions on immigration in his so-called renegotiation with the European Union. There is nothing in his great reforms that take back any control whatsoever over migration. If the British people want their government to have any control on migration whatsoever, then they must vote to leave the

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European Union on 23 June. (Gerard Batten (EFDD  – UKIP), The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, 12/04/2016)

What is most interesting is that UKIP does not seem to be affected by institutional factors. That is, UKIP’s representatives in the EP openly advocate for Brexit, using the supranational arena to boost their anti-systemic claims: We believe in national self-determination. Your aim and ambition are to destroy nation-state democracy. Gibraltar is clearly a deal-breaker on current terms. With these demands, you have shown yourselves to be vindictive, to be nasty, and all I can say is thank goodness we are leaving. You are behaving like the mafia. You think we are a hostage, we are not, we are free to go […] What must be very difficult for all of you to get into your minds is that there is a bigger world out there than the European Union. 85% of the global economy is outside the European Union. If you wish to have no deal, if you wish to force us to walk away from the table, it is not us that will be hurt. Do you know, we do not have to buy German motor cars, we do not have to drink French wine, we do not have to eat Belgian chocolate. There are a lot of other people that will give that to us. (Nigel Farage (EFDD – UKIP), Negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union, 04/05/2017)

In the last debate before Brexit definitely happened, in what he considers “the summit of my own political ambitions”, Nigel Farage made it clear, once again, his fierce opposition to the European political project, considered profoundly undemocratic and against the will of the British people: I became an outright opponent of the entire European project. I want Brexit to start a debate across the rest of Europe. What do we want from Europe? If we want trade, friendship, cooperation, reciprocity, we don’t need a European Commission. We don’t need a European Court. We don’t need these institutions and all of this power. And I can promise you, both in UKIP and indeed in the Brexit party, we love Europe; we just hate the European Union. It’s a simple as that. So, I’m hoping this begins the end of this project. It’s a bad project. It isn’t just undemocratic, it’s anti-democratic, and it puts in that front row, it gives people power without accountability – people who cannot be held to account by the electorate. And that is an unacceptable structure. (Nigel Farage (NI – UKIP), Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 29/01/2020)

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Salvati, E. (2019). Una relazione paradossale: il M5s nel Parlamento europeo. Il comportamento di voto degli eurodeputati pentastellati durante la legislatura 2014–2019. Distanti dai partiti con cui vorrebbero allearsi. Istituto Cattaneo. Resource Document. https://www.cattaneo.org/ wp-­content/uploads/2019/02/Analisi-­Istituto-­Cattaneo-­Verso-­elezioni-­europee-­2019-­Il-­M5s-­ nel-­Parlamento-­europeo.pdf. Accessed 2 March 2021. Schimmelfennig, F. (2018). Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Crises of the European Union: LI and the EU Crises. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(7), 1578–1594. Scipioni, M. (2018). Failing Forward in EU Migration Policy? EU Integration After the 2015 Asylum and Migration Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(9), 1357–1375. Shein, S. (2020). EU Political System’s Resilience in the Age of Politicization: Lessons from the 2019 European Parliamentary Elections (Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 35/IR/2020). Resource Documents. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3656975. Accessed 2 March 2021. Steven, M. (2020). The European Conservatives and Reformists Parliamentary Group. In M. Steven (Ed.), The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). Manchester University Press. Tobeau, S., & Massetti, E. (2013). The Party Politics of Territorial Reforms in Europe. West European Politics, 36(2), 297–316. Treib, O. (2020). Euroscepticism Is Here to Stay: What Cleavage Theory Can Teach Us About the 2019 European Parliament Elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(2), 174–189. UNHCR. (2016). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015. Resource Document. https:// www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-­global-­trends-­2015.html. Accessed 25 February 2021. van Berlo, M., & Natorski, M. (2020). When Contestation Is the Norm: The Position of Populist Parties in the European Parliament Towards Conflicts in Europe’s Neighbourhood. In E.  Johansson-Nogués, M.  Vlaskamp, & E.  Barbé (Eds.), European Union Contested. Norm Research in International Relations (pp. 191–211). Springer. Vassallo, S. (2021). Il congresso sulla strategia politica del Pd si farà a Bruxelles e riguarda il M5s. Domani. Resource Document. https://www.editorialedomani.it/idee/commenti/il-­ congresso-­sulla-­strategia-­politica-­del-­pd-­si-­fara-­a-­bruxelles-­e-­riguarda-­il-­m5s-­lznmge1i. Accessed 2 March 2021. Völkel, J. C. (2019). The Impact of Brexit on the European Parliament: The Role of British MEPs in Euro-Mediterranean Affairs. In T. Christiansen & D. Fromage (Eds.), Brexit and Democracy. The Role of Parliaments in the UK and the European Union (pp. 263–291). Palgrave Macmillan. VoteWatch. (2018). European Elections 2019: What Will the New Parliament’s Composition Be? Research Document. https://www.robert-­schuman.eu/en/european-­issues/0491-­european-­ elections-­2019-­what-­will-­the-­new-­parliament-­s-­composition-­be. Accessed 25 February 2021. Wagner, M., Dimitriadi, A., O’Donnell, R., Krales, A., Perumadan, J., Hagen Schlotzhaue, J., Simic, I., & Yabasun, D. (2016). The Implementation of the Common European Asylum System. Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Wallace, H., Pollack, M. A., & Young, A. R. (Eds.). (2015). Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford University Press. Wellings, B. (2020). Brexit, Nationalism and Disintegration in the European Union and the United Kingdom. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.202 0.1753664. Wheatley, J., & Mendez, F. (2021). Reconceptualizing Dimensions of Political Competition in Europe: A Demand-Side Approach. British Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 40–59. Whitaker, R., Hix, S., & Zapryanova, G. (2017). Understanding Members of the European Parliament: Four Waves of the European Parliament Research Group MEP Survey. European Union Politics, 18(3), 491–506. Winzen, T. (2013). European Integration and National Parliamentary Oversight Institutions. European Union Politics, 14(2), 297–323.

Part III

Conclusion

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Abstract  The results of this book suggest that the politicisation of immigration and the EU produces complex patterns of parties’ polarisation. On the one hand, immigration crosscuts the traditional lines of divisions among political parties, creating conflicting ideological pulls within mainstream parties. They seem to be in a state of flux, and often adopt vague or blurred positions, with no clear patterns of polarisation emerging. Populist (radical-right) parties are the only ones that endorse stable positions across policy issues and levels of government, which might explain their electoral success in recent elections in many European countries. On the other hand, Euroscepticism has been, at least partially, mainstreamed and normalized in the political arena. However, while mainstream right parties endorse a principled opposition to the EU polity, mainstream left party exercise a contingent and pragmatic opposition aimed to build a better and stronger Europe. Thus, Euroscepticism needs to be understood as a cumulative concept, which ranges from reactionary to reformist forms. Overall, the immigration crisis has broadened the political contraposition between an elite-led pro-integration coalition vs a Eurosceptic sovranist coalition, bridging anti-immigration stances with anti-EU stances. Keywords  Euroscepticism · Politicisation · Party polarisation · EU · Mainstream parties

7.1  Introduction This book has answered a series of interrelated questions that have been rarely addressed in the academic literature, with reference to Western European politics: (a) By which political actors, and how, are ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ mobilised as political issues in the public domain? (Actor comparison) (b) How and to what degree are ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ linked as issues, when actors mobilise political demands? (Issue comparison) (c) Do parties’ framing strategies of ‘immigration’ and the ‘European Union’ differ between national and supranational decision-making arenas? (Institutional comparison).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9_7

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Building on previous research on party politics (Kriesi et al., 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Grande et  al., 2019; Swen & Kriesi, 2019; Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021), the book shows that transnational issues such as immigration and the European Union are increasingly salient and have significantly restructured political competition in most European countries. Besides, the book questions a certain tendency in academia to consider complex policy issues as a whole, without disentangling them into their constitutive dimensions to better understand party positional strategies. This volume presents two introductory chapters which, respectively, propose an innovative operationalisation of party positioning that enable a fine-grained assessment of party competition in a multi-level political space (Chap. 2) and provide a comparative overview of the politicization of immigration and the European Union issues in Italy, in the UK and in the EP (Chap. 3). The remaining chapters in this book (Chap. 4, 5 and 6) compare mainstream and populist parties’ positions on immigration and the European Union in Italy, the UK and the European Parliament from 2015 to 2020 by focusing on the role of ideological and strategic factors, namely, being in government or in opposition. In this concluding chapter, I aim to gather together the various findings that have emerged from the empirical analysis of party competition both at the national and supranational level, by also suggesting lines for further research. I start from a review of the strategies that mainstream and populist parties are expected to adopt while competing on complex, multidimensional matters that challenge their internal cohesion and programmatic coherence (Odmalm, 2014; Odmalm & Bale, 2015). Thus, for instance, mainstream parties are expected to stick to their entrenched positions on the left-­right (economic) spectrum, while blurring their positions on cultural-identitarian issues. This in turn creates an opportunity for peripheral parties to attack the cartel of mainstream parties with Eurosceptic and anti-immigration positions, contributing to polarize political competition. The role of both ideological and strategic factor is assessed across the key policy dimensions that constitute immigration and EU-issues. The central hypothesis of the book is that parties belonging to the same party family compete on the same policy-dimensions and adopt the same frames, irrespective of country-specific or institutional constraints. In the concluding part of this chapter, I highlight the main contributions of the book to the study of party competition, and I suggest that future studies should take seriously into account the multidimensional nature of politics and the role of political arenas to explain party positional strategies across level of government.

7.2  Where do the Parties Stand? Political conflicts over immigration and the EU are seen as the sign of the emergence of a new transnational cleavage, which pits the ‘winners’ of globalisation against its ‘losers’ and which is mobilised mainly by populist and radical right parties. In recent years, a consistent bulk of contributions in the field of party politics

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has tried to assess the impact of this new transnational cleavage on the structure of party competition, in particular, on parties’ polarization (Kriesi et al., 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Grande et al., 2019). In this book, I have tried to assess the role played by immigration and the European Union issues in reshaping political competition in legislative arenas, once these issues have been normalized within party systems. This, in turn, implies to evaluate to what extent anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stances are linked by political actors when they mobilize political demands in public domains. In so doing, the volume advances our understanding of the dynamic of party competition on highly politicized policy issues. The existing literature on party competition suggests three different modes of politicisation of European and immigration issues: government versus opposition; left versus right; and mainstream versus peripheral parties. According to the first two approaches, political polarisation on the issues of Europe and immigration has been ‘domesticated’. More specifically, it has been incorporated into the traditional patterns of party competition, namely government versus opposition and left versus right. On the contrary, the third approach states that party competition on transnational issues has changed the structure of the political space, creating new patterns of polarisation among political parties. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the politicisation of immigration and the European Union produces complex patterns of party polarisation, which seem to vary according to four main factors: party ideology, policy issue, institutional settings, and practical constraints, e.g., government involvement. In particular, while populist (radical right) parties tend to hold coherent positions across time and level of government, mainstream parties are in a state of flux (Mair, 1989). This book suggests that to understand the complex dynamics of party positioning strategies it is necessary to take seriously into account the multidimensional nature of politics. This can be done by disentangling complex policy issues into their policy dimensions and by comparing party positions across level of governments.

7.3  D  ebating Immigration in National Parliaments: Issue Salience and Framing Strategies This volume has followed a multidimensional approach to party positioning, disentangling the immigration issue into its control and integration dimensions (Chap. 2). When looking at party positions on the immigration control dimension  – border controls, humanitarian migration, family reunification, labour migration – it appears that mainstream parties hold distinct and variable positions on different targets, with no clear patterns of polarisation. On the one side, both in Italy and in the UK, mainstream right and mainstream left parties converge in supporting border controls and security measures – yet to varying degrees. On the other side, there is principled bipartisan support for

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humanitarian migration, which hints at a successful process of policy transfer (Radaelli, 2000) of international and EU values and norms into domestic politics. Further, mainstream left parties tend to hold permissive and pragmatic stances towards family reunification and economic migration, while mainstream right parties tend not to mention these two targets. When looking at partisan positions on migrant integration  – socio-economic integration, cultural-religious integration, citizenship and reception – the empirical analysis shows inconclusive evidence. On the one side, in Italy, there is a clear left-­ right divide on cultural and civic integration. PD endorses a principled and permissive stance towards cultural-religious integration and citizenship  – indeed, in the XVII legislature, the party promoted the institution of the ius soli – while FI opposes both targets in a principled manner. On the other side, in the UK, CON and LAB embrace remarkably similar views on multiculturalism. That is, in the UK both conservative and social democratic-type of parties tend to communicate favourable – yet moderate – attitudes regarding cultural differences. Arguably, historical factors play an important role in the UK in determining mainstream parties’ positions towards migrant integration. In particular, nation-state citizenship regimes matter (e.g., Joppke, 2010): as the UK has historically been a multicultural country, with strong anti-discrimination laws (Chap. 3), it has ‘institutionalised’ bi-partisan support of cultural diversity. Concerning the arguments used by mainstream parties to motivate their support/ opposition towards the immigration issue in depth, it is worth noting that they significantly differ in both problem framing and policy proposals, configuring a left vs right pattern polarisation. Indeed, mainstream left parties, both in Italy and in the UK, represent refugees and immigrants as structural phenomena, to be regulated through immigration control measures, but also accepted and integrated into the host societies. Additionally, in the face of the refugee crisis, they call for a coordinated European response based on ‘humanity’ and ‘solidarity’, using mostly moral-­ universal frames (43.4% of the total coded segments in the case of PD, 48% in the case of LAB). On the contrary, mainstream right parties frame the immigration issue predominantly as a security and socio-economic threat to the nation, using sovereigntist and security frames (22.5% security frames of the total coded segments and 16.5% sovereigntist frames in the case of FI, 26.3% and a significantly smaller 4.3% respectively in the case of CON). Besides this, they criticise the legitimacy of the decisions taken by the EU to manage the refugee crisis and call for a restoration of ‘sovereign powers’ in order to effectively implement a firm but fair immigration policy by returning bogus asylum seekers. Looking at populist parties, significant differences exist between LN and M5S in Italy. First, LN endorses principled support of border controls and security measures, framing immigration as an ‘invasion’ and a threat to social cohesion and the economic prosperity of the nation, using predominantly security frames (57% of the total coded segments). Conversely, M5S endorses a much more ambiguous position on the issue of immigration: the party expresses principled support for humanitarian migration, using moral-universal frames (26.3% of the total coded segments), but it also scores close to zero on all the other immigration control

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targets. Besides, LN endorses principled opposition towards all targets of migrant integration, using cultural-religious and socio-economic frames, in particular, welfare chauvinism and nativism. Conversely, M5S opposes socio-economic integration, albeit moderately, while it expresses a permissive stance towards the concession of citizenship to already resident migrants. The reception of asylum seekers plays a crucial role in the Italian political debate on immigration. Indeed, both LN and M5S have highly politicized this target, by linking the mismanagement of the national reception system to the corruption of the political elite, using legitimacy frames (25% of the total coded segments in the case of M5S, a more modest 8.5% in the case of LN). The evolution of M5S positions on immigration in the last five years is probably the most interesting demonstration of the chameleonic nature of a ‘pure’ populist party (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018; Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020a). During the refugee crisis, the party held positions very closed to PD, advocating for the protection of vulnerable migrants and the respect of fundamental rights. Once in government with the LN (2018–2019), however, the party passed the Salvini decrees, a mix of security-driven provisions to fight against irregular migration, terrorism, and organized crime, increasing funds for police forces while shrinking integration policies. The M5S used legitimacy frames to justify this policy shift. In particular, M5S MPs mobilised anti-establishment arguments arguing that the Salvini decrees were a significant step forward in the fight against the alleged business of migrant reception. Finally, after the collapse of the Yellow-Green coalition and the formation of the Yellow-Red coalition between M5S and PD, M5S shifted back to liberal positions towards migration, supporting the (partial) abolition of the Salvini decrees, which were dismissed as inefficient. Despite the low number of coded segments UKIP, some patterns clearly emerge. First, the party is highly critical of the EU’s management of the refugee crisis: indeed, 45.7% of the total coded segments are composed of legitimacy frames. Although the UK is not a member of the Schengen Area, the party considers the porousness of the EU’s frontiers as a threat to the UK, as there is no mechanism to log people coming into the Schengen area or to log people out. Therefore, according to UKIP, the only solution allowing the UK to regain control over its borders is to leave the European Union: indeed, sovereigntist frames are the second most frequent type of frames used by Mr. Carswell (34.3% of occasions) in the period considered. To sum up, LN and UKIP qualify as populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2007), opposing all targets for the issue of immigration with welfare chauvinism and nativist arguments and using mainly sovereigntist, security and cultural-­religious frames. Conversely, M5S mobilises the immigration issue, particularly the target of migrant reception, predominantly to boost its anti-elitist claims, while the party holds a somewhat ambiguous position on the various immigration targets (except for humanitarian migration, towards which the party holds a permissive and principled stance using moral-universal frames). Interestingly, the party shifts positions on immigration depending on the ‘host ideology’ of the coalition partner, in line with chameleonic nature of a ‘pure’ populist party (Carlotti & Gianfreda, 2018; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019).

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Overall, the multi-dimensional analysis of party positions on the immigration issue conducted in this volume has shown a significant variation in party positioning across different immigration targets, with no clear patterns of polarisation emerging. On the one side, mainstream right and mainstream left parties are equally restrictive – yet to varying degrees – towards immigration control – with the exception of the target of humanitarian migration towards which they both express principled support. However, when we look at migrant integration, there is no clear-cut divide between mainstream left and mainstream right parties: country-specific factors seem to explain parties’ positions on migrant integration better than ideological positioning, at least for mainstream parties. These findings partially disconfirm what hypothesised by several scholars (Hammar, 1985; Money, 1999; Alonso & da Fonseca, 2012), namely, that both mainstream right and mainstream left parties support immigration control measures, while they diverge on migrant integration issues. In contrast, populist parties endorse a somewhat stable position across all targets. They exploit the political opportunity offered by the refugee crisis to foster their anti-establishment claims. Nevertheless, while populist radical right parties (the LN and UKIP in this case) represent immigration as a national threat, which raises criminality and insecurity within host societies and threatens both economic prosperity and socio-cultural cohesion, M5S tends to position itself closer to the left continuum of the political spectrum, underling the humanitarian emergency. The main picture that emerges from the results of my analysis is that the state of flux identified by Mair (1989) now also affects the party politics of migration (Odmalm, 2019), with no clear patterns of polarisation identifiable, especially for mainstream parties. That is, the politicisation of immigration produces complex patterns of party polarisation, which depend on the specific policy dimension under analysis, on national factors as well as on ideological constraints. Overall, this book proves that political parties’ attitudes on delicate topics such as refugees, cultural-­ religious integration, border controls and so on, cross-cut left-right political divides, often being fluid and continually-changing and producing a fuzzy polarisation among political actors.

7.4  D  ebating the EU in National Parliaments: Issue Salience and Framing Strategies The analysis of mainstream party positions towards the EU reveals a left-right pattern of polarisation. Indeed, both in Italy and in the UK, mainstream left parties support EU integration – pragmatically in the case of LAB, and as a matter of principle in the case of PD  – while expressing a contingent, pragmatic opposition towards specific EU policies and embodiments, in particular, European economic and fiscal governance. In doing this, both PD and the LAB employ predominantly legitimacy frames (31.5% and 35.7% of the total coded segments respectively).

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On the contrary, mainstream right parties, both in Italy and in the UK, express principled Eurosceptic positions towards the process of EU integration and towards EU institutions, mainly using legitimacy frames. Interestingly, FI opposes EU policies pragmatically, in particular, the effects of the austerity measures implemented by the EU to combat the economic crisis, using equally legitimacy (38.6% of the total coded segments) and socio-economic frames (34.8%). On the contrary, CON expresses pragmatic support for EU policies, which is explained by the party’s functional support for the Dublin Regulation, which favours Northern European countries (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). However, FI’s Eurosceptic stances grow systematically when the party is relegated to the opposition, probably to stem competition from the LN (Tarchi, 2018). Looking at populist parties’ positions towards the EU, both LN and UKIP hold principled negative stances towards all the EU targets. However, while the former party justifies its opposition using mainly legitimacy frames (61.2% of the total coded segments), the latter uses predominantly sovereigntist frames (44.5%). In particular, UKIP links closely anti-immigration attitudes with anti-EU attitudes. According to the party, the only way to manage immigration flows is to leave the EU. Conversely, M5S holds much more nuanced positions. The party criticises the austerity measures implemented by the EU to manage the economic crisis and the lack of solidarity among MSs during the refugee crisis, using predominantly legitimacy frames (55.3%). It is worth noting that, in line with Mudde’s (2007) definition of populist parties, all three parties share populist rhetoric expressing a principled opposition towards the EU elite. They all criticise the lack of democracy within the EU institutions and the technocratic nature of the EU project. At the same time, both LN and – even more so – UKIP link their opposition to the EU with sovereigntist claims, thus behaving as radical right parties. The substantial differences that exist between LN and M5S positions on the ‘integration-demarcation’ axis of the political space can explain the formation of ‘wedges’ in the yellow-green Italian governmental coalition and its final collapse in August 2019. This book confirms the chameleonic nature of the M5S already shown by previous research (Mudde, 2010; Corbetta & Vignati, 2014; Musso & Maccaferri, 2018). Born as an anti-establishment party that built its fortunes on anti-party sentiments diffused in the Italian public opinion (Lanzone, 2015; Tronconi, 2015), the M5S holds fierce Eurosceptic positions both in opposition (2015–2018) and once in government with the League (2018–2019), often endorsing a type of economic sovereigntism and advocating the exit of Italy from the Eurozone. Then, once in government with PD (2019–2021), the party moderates its positions vis à vis the EU, adopting more pragmatic stances in favour of a democratic reform of the Union (Moschella & Rodhes, 2020). Finally, it enters a pro-European coalition government, led by Mario Draghi, one of the major representatives of the European institutions. M5S’s evolution can be explained by the party’s neutrality  – namely, its position beyond left or right  – as constantly (and strategically) advocated by its leaders. The M5S is thus characterized by a ‘thin’ ideology, defined by the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric, while on transnational policy issues such as immigration and European affairs it adapts to ‘host ideologies’ of coalition partners (Mosca

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& Tronconi, 2019). This also explains how rapidly the party has adapted to the institutional environment toward a normalisation of its anti-system claims (Tronconi, 2018; Mosca, 2020). To conclude, the empirical analysis of parties’ positions towards the EU reveals the following aspects: first, Euroscepticism has, at least partially, been mainstreamed, and is thus challenging from within European democratic institutions (e.g., Brack & Startin, 2015). Second, country-specific factors are important to explain parties’ positions towards the EU. Indeed, in Italy, a country severely hit by the socio-economic consequences of the austerity measures implemented after the Euro crisis (Serricchio et al., 2013), both mainstream left and mainstream right parties endorse negative positions on EMU. On the contrary, in the UK, less hit by the Euro crisis, the issue of European economic and financial governance is less salient for mainstream parties. Populist parties, in contrast, criticise EU policies irrespective of the impact of the multiple European crises on their countries.

7.5  C  ontinuity and Differentiation Between National and European Arenas The multidimensional approach followed in this work shows that political parties endorse distinct positions depending on the immigration target, both at the national and at the European level. If it is true that mainstream left and mainstream right parties support  – to varying degrees  – border control and security measures in both arenas, nevertheless they do not hold restrictive positions towards all groups of immigrants. Most importantly, in both arenas, there is principled bipartisan support for humanitarian migration. Similarly, there is a coherence between the arguments used by mainstream left and mainstream right parties to talk about immigration in national parliaments and those employed in the EP. Mainstream left parties motivate their permissive positions towards humanitarian migration by emphasising moral responsibilities towards displaced persons and calling for the respect of human rights and international protections, both at the national and the European level. Conversely, mainstream right representatives endorse a law-and-order approach, stressing the need to implement a firm but fair approach to immigration, accepting only those people really in need of protection, while sending back irregular migrants. Coming to the issue of the EU, the empirical analysis shows that on issues related to EU integration a left versus right dynamic of polarisation emerges in both arenas. Mainstream right parties express Eurosceptic positions – except for the Italian delegation in the EPP Political Group which, in contrast to Forza Italia in the Chamber of Deputies, endorses a moderate pro-EU stance in the EP. On the contrary, mainstream left parties hold principled pro-EU positions, mainly using moral universal and legitimacy frames.

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Concerning EU policies, country-specific factors seem to explain the majority of the variance in parties’ positions in both arenas. Indeed, in Italy, both mainstream right and mainstream left parties are critical of EU policies, in particular, the EMU, given the effects that the economic crisis had on the domestic economy (Serricchio et al., 2013). On the contrary, this target is not particularly relevant in the speeches given by the representatives of the leading British mainstream parties, both in the House of Commons and in the EP, due to the smaller impact that these crises had on the United Kingdom. This analysis has also shown that LN and M5S hold different positions when talking about immigration and EU affairs in the EP. In particular, LN opposes immigration by relying mainly on cultural-religious and sovereigntist frames in both the observed arenas, thus confirming itself as a populist radical-right party (Mudde, 2007). Similarly, LN frames its opposition to the EU using predominantly legitimacy and sovereignty frames and denouncing the power grab of EU institutions vis-à-vis member states. Conversely, M5S mobilises both issues to boost its antielitist claims, focusing on the mismanagement of the immigration crisis, in particular, the failure of the solidarity mechanisms put in place to help those countries most affected by the refugee flow, and on the technocratic nature of the European institutions, which lack democratic accountability. When looking at populist parties, it is worth noting that at the supranational level, the LN and M5S behave differently. While the M5S expressed principled criticism of the EU elite but pragmatic and constructive opposition to EU policies, the LN endorses principled criticism of the EU elite, the EU regime and the EU community, thus constituting a sort of anti-systemic opposition to the EU (Carlotti, 2021). In other words, LN behaves like an opposition, anti-immigration and Eurosceptic party, both at the national and at the supranational level. Furthermore, the book shows marked differences between LN and M5S Euroscepticism. While the former sees the EU as a threat to national territorial/cultural unity, the latter mainly stresses the lack of democracy and democratic accountability of the EU-elite, highlighting the elite vs people distinction typical of a populist party (Mudde, 2007). Moreover, while LN positions remain constant across time and between political arenas, the positions endorsed by M5S MEPs change over time, in line with the chameleonic nature of the national party. In particular, once in government with PD, M5S MEPs became more pro-European than when the party was governing with the League in the Conte I cabinet. Overall, a well-established tendency in academia to regard mainstream parties’ delegations in the EP as generally pro-European and form coalition on the basis of left-right ideology, not nationality (e.g., Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Hix et al., 2007), is partially disconfirmed in this book. While PD, FI and LAB alike endorse a moderate and pragmatic opposition to the EU at the supranational level, CON expresses a principled opposition towards the EU-elite and EMU.  This exception can be explained by the fact that British Conservatives are widely recognized as Eurorealist, advocating for an ‘anti-federalist and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails’ (Leruth, 2016, p.  50). Conversely, as confirmed by previous research (e.g., Brack, 2015; McDonnell & Warner, 2019; Kantola

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& Miller, 2021), populist parties endorse a principled opposition towards the EU polity. However, while the populist radical right parties of my sample (LN and UKIP) endorse a principled opposition to the very idea of European integration, behaving as anti-systemic actors, M5S, a ‘pure’ populist party (Carlotti & Gianfreda, 2018), exercises principled opposition towards the EU-elite and EU-institutions, while adopting a reformist position on EU policies, particularly so when in government with a mainstream left party.

7.6  Concluding Remarks This book has provided an analysis of mainstream and populist parties competition over two of the most contested issues in Western European politics: immigration and the EU. In so doing, the volume contributes to our understanding of the link between Euroscepticism and anti-immigration attitudes. Besides, it proposes an original approach to the study of party positioning. By adopting a multi-­dimensional conceptualisation of the issues of immigration and the EU, the volume suggests a fruitful approach to studying political competition on complex policy issues. In addition, the combination of qualitative content analysis and corpus linguistic techniques is suggested as a fruitful way to grasp both the overall degree of parties’ opposition/support, as well as the thematic categories and the arguments utilized by speakers to support their positions. This is a considerable improvement on other methods such as the analysis of RCVs, expert surveys or party manifestos. The research design followed in this book has enabled a multi-level comparison of party framing strategies across two legislative arenas (the national parliaments and the EP). This, in turn, has contributed to assess the role played by institutional arenas in explaining political competition between mainstream and populist parties. Moreover, by studying party politics in parliamentary arenas, the volume reminds to the reader the importance of considering political parties as multifaceted organizations (Katz & Mair, 1994). Indeed, the analysis of parliamentary speeches shows that the positions endorsed by the parliamentary party are often different from the ones hold by the party leader or by the party in central office. This in turn suggests the importance of studying party competition in legislative arenas to enhance our understanding intra-party dynamics. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the politicisation of immigration and the EU produces complex patterns of parties’ polarisation (Wagner et al., 2016; Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020b). On the one hand, immigration crosscuts the traditional lines of divisions among political parties, creating conflicting ideological pulls within mainstream parties (Odmalm & Bale, 2015). They seem to be in a state of flux (Mair, 1989), and often adopt vague or blurred positions, with no clear patterns of polarisation emerging. Populist radical right parties are the only ones that endorse stable positions across policy issues and levels of government, which most probably explain their electoral success in recent elections in many European countries.

7.6  Concluding Remarks

157

On the other hand, Euroscepticism has been, at least partially, mainstreamed and normalized in the political arena (Mudde, 2019). However, while mainstream right parties endorse a principled opposition to the EU polity, mainstream left party exercise a contingent and pragmatic opposition aimed to build a better and stronger Europe. Thus, Euroscepticism needs to be understood as a cumulative concept, which ranges from reactionary to reformist forms (Carlotti, 2021). Looking at the variation of framing strategies between the national and supranational level, the most important result is that the immigration crisis has broadened the political contraposition between an elite-led pro-integration coalition vs a Eurosceptic sovranist coalition, bridging anti-immigration stances with anti-EU stances. Mainstream parties are highly critical towards the effects of several European policies – in particular towards the European management of the so-­called refugee crisis – both at the national and at the European level, and sometimes they even question the identity and the constitutional design of the European Union. The cases study analysed in this book suggest that the way mainstream parties interact with populist parties on highly politicised topics have a strong impact on domestic politics, yet with different outcomes (Chap. 3). In the UK, CON neutralised the challenge posed by UKIP by heavily co-opting its anti-immigration and Eurosceptic positions. On the contrary, in Italy, PD, the main incumbent party during the period considered, was trapped in the tension between responsibility and representation (Froio, 2021, p.  264). Although the party, under the leadership of Matteo Renzi, progressively adopted a more securitarian approach to migration, nevertheless this move was not enough to contrast the electoral rise of the LN and the Five-star Movement, than eventually formed a coalition government in 2018. Overall, this book innovates in many respects. In terms of scope of political competition, it investigates the relationship among different modes of politicisation of complex policy issues across political contexts and institutional arenas. In particular, being the UK and Italy two diverse cases in terms of political system, experience of immigration and history of European integration, the book assesses whether a generalizable link exists between the politicisation of transnational political issues and party positioning. In terms of data collection, the book advances qualitative content analysis as a source of information about political positioning and brings frame analysis to bear on it. The avenues for further research cluster them around four main objectives. The first aims at providing a broader understanding of patterns of EU and immigration opposition’s evolution within the EU multi-level governance. For example, countries where immigration and the EU are not politicised could be included as case studies – as could Eastern European countries, where populist radical right parties govern – to better understand the mechanism of politicisation or non-politicisation of immigration and the EU.  The second research avenue accounts for a broader understanding of the factors impacting patterns of EU and immigration opposition within the EU governance. A multivariate hierarchical regression model could be run to statistically test the impact of party ideology, policy issue, institutional settings and intra-party politics on parties’ positions on transnational issues. The third line for future research concerns the development of a theoretical framework to

158

7 Conclusion

conceptualize the interconnections between two broadly discussed and contested concepts: Euroscepticism and populism. And the last objective regards the comparison between different frames, votes and policies, to assess the coherence of political parties’ legislative action. Particular attention should be devoted to explaining under which circumstances mainstream parties promote and implement populist policy proposals once in government.

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Appendix 1

Table A.1  Italian General Elections: votes (%) and seats (N, Chamber of Deputies) 2013 2018 Party Abb. Party Family Votes Seats Votes Partito Democratico PD Mainstream 25.43 292 18.76 left Sinistra Ecologia e SEL/LEU Left 3.2 37 3.39 Libertà/Liberi e Uguali Others – – 0.92 11 4.7 Total centre-left coalition 29.55 340 26.25 Partito della Libertà/Forza PdL/FI Mainstream 21.56 97 14 Italia right Lega Nord/Lega LN/L Populist 4.09 18 17.35 radical right Fratelli d’Italia FdI Radical right 1.96 9 4.35 Others – Mainstream 1.58 – 1.30 right Total centre-right 29.18 124 37 Movimento Cinque Stelle M5S Populist 25.56 108 32.68 Monti’s coalition Liberal 10.56 45 – Radical Right – – – – 1.34 Radical Left RC – 2.25 – 1.46 Others 2.9 – 0.67 Total 100 617a 100

Seats 107 14 9 130 103 123 32 4 262 225 – – – 617a

Source: Authors’ elaboration from Interior Minister data a Seats attributed to foreign constituencies are not counted

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9

161

Appendix 1

162 Table A.2  British General Elections: votes (%), seats (N, House of Commons) Party Conservative Labour Scottish National Party Liberal Democrat Democratic Unionist Party Sinn Fein Plaid Cymru Social Democratic & Labour Party UK Independent Party The Brexit Party Green Other Total

MPs 331 232 56

2017 Votes 42.4 40 3

MPs 318 262 35

2019 Votes 43.6 32.8 3.9

MPs 365 202 48

Opp. 7.9

8

7.4

12

11.5

11

Opp. 0.6

8

0.9

10

0.76

8

– Plaid SDLP

Regionalist Opp. 0.6 Regionalist Opp. 0.6 Social Democrats 0.3

4 3 3

0.7 0.5 0.3

7 4 –

0.57 0.48 0.37

7 4 2

UKIP

Populist Radical Right Party

Opp. 12.6

1

1.8

–

–

–

– Opp. 3.8 – 100

– 1 0.11 650

– 1.6 0.7 100

– 1 – 650

2 2.7 1 100

– 1 1 650

Abb. CON LAB SNP

Party family Mainstream Right Mainstream Left Regionalist

Role Gov. Opp. Opp.

LibDem DUP

Liberal Mainstream right

– – –

Left –

2015 Votes 36.9 30.4 4.7

Appendix 1

163

Table A.3  European Elections (2014, 2019), votes (%), seats (N) Party 2014 – Italy PD FI LN M5S Others parties

Votes

EPPG (N)

MEPs

% tot. EPPGa

40.81 16.81 6.15 21.15 15.08

S&D EPP NI EFDD GUE/NGL EPP

31 17 5 17 3 4

16 8 10 35 6 2

2014 – UK LAB CON UKIP Others parties

24.74 23.31 26.77 25.18

S&D ECR EFDD ALDE GUE/NGL Greens/EFA NI

20 20 24 1 1 6 1

10.5 9 0.5 2 2 12 2

2019 – Italy PD FI LN M5S Other parties

22.74 8.78 34.26 17.06 17.16

S&D EPP ID NI ECR EPP

19 7 28 14 5 1

12 4 38 25 8 0.5

2019 – UK LAB CON Brexit Party UKIP Other parties

13.74 8.86 30.79 3.22 43.55

S&D ECR NI – Renew Europe Greens/EFA NI GUE/NGL

10 4 29 – 17 4 1 1

6 6 51 – 16 5 2 2

Source: Author’s elaboration EPP Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats), S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group, EFDD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, Renew Europe Renew Europe group, GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left Nordic Green Left, Greens/EFA Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, ID Identity and Democracy, NI Nonattached Members a Percentages rounded

Appendix 2

Table A.4  List of parliamentary debates (plenary sittings, 2015–2020) Date House of Commons (UK) Immigration Control 09.01.2015 10.09.2015 16.09.2015 13.10.2015 01.12.2015 19.10.2015 02.11.2015 14.12.2015 25.01.2016 22.02.2016 29.02.2016 04.03.2016 09.03.2016 21.03.2016 04.05.2016 04.07.2016 05.07.2016 06.07.2016 12.07.2016 05.09.2016 19.10.2016 22.11.2016 29.11.2016 01.12.2016

Title

UK Borders Control Bill 2014–2015 (II reading) Immigration Detention Migration Immigration Bill 2015 (II and III readings) European Council Benefits: EU Nationals European Agenda on Migration Child Refugees in Europe European Council Child Refugees: Calais Illegal Immigrants (Criminal Sanctions) Bill 2015–16 EU-Turkey Agreement European Council Dublin System: Asylum EU Nationals: UK Residence NHS Services for EU Nationals and UK Citizens Abroad EU Nationals in the UK EU Citizens Resident in the United Kingdom (Right to Stay) EU Nationals: residency Rights of EU Nationals Refugees EU Nationals EU Nationals: UK status

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9

165

Appendix 2

166 Date 26.01.2017 09.03.2017 03.07.2017 19.07.2017 07.09.2017 29.11.2017 19.12.2017 08.01.2018 26.02.2018 16.03.2018 16.07.2018 06.09.2018 16.01.2019 24.02.2020 18.05.2020 30.06.2020 Immigrants Integration 12.10.2015 02.02.2017 European Integration 23.03.2015 9.06.2015 7.09.2015 11.06.2015 23.06.2015 26.04.2016 24.10.2016 19.12.2016 14.03.2017 23.10.2017 26.06.2017 19.12.2017 26.03.2018 Brexit 09.06.2015 07.09.2015 31.01.2017 08.02.2017 11.09.2017 17.01.2018 20.12.2019 09.01.2020 27.02.2020

Title EU Nationals: Residency Rights EU Nationals in the UK Non-UK EU Nationals: Residency Rights EU citizens in the UK Immigration Act 2016: Section 67 Dublin III Regulation EU Nationals Law Enforcement Co-operation and Border Control: Schengen Information System Immigration: Effect on the Economy EU Nationals: Residency Rights Refugees (Family Reunion) (No. 2) Bill 2017–19 Immigration: Skilled workers Immigration control Leaving the EU: Immigration Points-based Immigration System Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 Settling of Refugees Hate crime: non-UK citizens European Council European Union Referendum Bill (2nd and 3rd reading) European Union (Finance) Act 2015 (II and III readings) European Convention on Human Rights: UK Membership European Council European Council European Council European Council European Council European Council European Council European Union Referendum Bill 2015 (II and III readings) European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (II and III reading) European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (II and III readings) Exiting the European Union (European Union) (II and III readings) European Union: Future relationship

Appendix 2 Date Chamber of Deputies (Italy) Immigration Control 22.04.2015 11.06.2015 15.06.2015 24.06.2015 30.07.2015 14.10.2015 16.12.2015 17.02.2016 10.03.2016 16.03.2016 23.03.2016 24.10.2016 20.03.2017 12.10.2016 10.04.2017 12.04.2017 21.06.2017 05.07.2017 02.08.2017 18.10.2017 27.06.2018 03.08.2018 06.08.2018

25.09.2018 27.09.2018

16.10.2018 26-27-28/11/2018 22-23-24/07/2019 27-30/11/2020 1/12/2020 Immigrants Integration 10.08.2015 28.09.2015 13.10.2015 23.03.2016

167 Title

Extraordinary European Council (23 April 2015) LaValletta Summit on Migration Schengen Committee Report (Doc. XVI-bis, n. 3) European Council (25 and 26 June 2015) EUNAVFOR MED – (A.C. 3249) European Council (15 and 16 October 2015) European Council (15–16 December 2015) European Council (18 and 19 February 2016) Lorefice and others Motion n. 1 01342 European Council (18 and 19 March 2016) Discussion on the parliamentary committee of inquiry into the reception and identification system Legislative Decree n. 47/2017 (Legge Zampa) European Council (20 and 21 October 2016) Legislative Decree n. 13/2017 European Council (22 and 23 June 2017) Urgent notice on the management of immigration flows Italia-Lybia Cooperation Agreement European Council (19 and 20 October 2017) European Council (28 and 29 June 2018) Law Decree S. 624 – Conversion into law, with amendments, of the decree-law 10 July 2018, n. 84, containing urgent provisions for the sale of Italian naval units in support of the Coast Guard of the Ministry of defense and coastal security organs of the Libyan Ministry of Interior (Approved by the Senate) (A.C. 1004) Discussion of the motion Delrio and others n. 1-00036 on the position to be supported by the European Parliament regarding the application of Article 7(1) of the EU Treaty to Hungary, in relation to the resolution adopted by the European Parliament European Council (18 October 2018) Discussion of the law decree 4 October 2018, n. 113 (First Salvini decree) Discussion of the law decree 14 June 2019, n. 53 (Second Salvini decree) Discussion of the law decree 21 October 2020, n. 130 (Lamorgese decree) Law decree proposal: new rules on citizenship

Italian Reception System

Appendix 2

168 Date European Integration 07.02.2015 30.06.2015

18.03.2015 09.10.2015

16.12.2015 30.03.2016

27.06.2016 08.03.2017 27.04.2017 18.04.2017 27.04.2017 19.06.2017

07.11.2018 08.11.2018 13.11.2018 11.12.2018 09.03.2019 13.05.2019 15.07.2020 14.10.2020 9.12.2020 European Parliament (EP) Migration 11.02.2015 26.02.2015 12.02.2015 29.04.2015

20.05.2015 06.09.2015 28.10.2015 09.09.2015 16.09.2015

Title Annual Report on Italy’s participation in the EU for the year 2013 (Doc. LXXXVII, n. 2) – Annual Report on Italy’s participation in the EU for the year 2014 (Doc. LXXXVII, n. 3) European Council (18 and 19 March 2015) Annual Report on Italy’s participation in the EU for the year 2015 – European Commission Programme 2015 – Eighteen months Programme of the Council of the European Union (Doc. LXXXVII-bis, n. 3-A) European Council (17 and 18 December 2015) Annual Report on Italy’s participation in the EU for the year 2016 – European Commission Programme 2016 – Eighteen months Programme of the Council of the European Union (Doc. LXXXVII-bis, n. 4-A) European Council (28 and 29 June 2016) European Council (9 and 10 March 2017) European Council (29.04.2017) Fiscal Compact European Council (29 April 2017) Annual Report on Italy’s participation in the EU for the year 2017 – European Commission Programme 2017 (Doc. LXXXVII-bis, n. 5-A) European delegation law 2018

European Council (13 and 14 December 2018) European Council (21 and 22 March 2019) and Memorandum of Understanding with China Brexit and the rights of Italian citizens European Council (17 and 18 July 2020) European Council (15 and 16 October 2020) European Council (10 and 11 December 2020)

Way forward for Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office EU-Turkey summit Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting (23 April 2015) – The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies European Agenda on Migration Smart borders package Migration and refugees in Europe Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on migration (14 September 2015)

Appendix 2

169

Date 06.10.2015

Title Conclusions of the informal European Council of 23 September 2015 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 October 2015, in particular the financing of international funds, and of the Leaders’ meeting on the Western Balkans route of 25 October 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 November 2015 Refugee emergency, external borders control and future of Schengen – Respect for the international principle of non-refoulement – Financing refugee facility for Turkey – Increased racist hatred and violence against refugees and migrants across Europe EU-Turkey Summit Communication on implementing the European agenda on migration The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU-Turkey summit Legal aspects, democratic control and implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement Restoring a fully functioning Schengen system Entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, volunteering, pupil exchange and au pairing Legal migration package – Action plan on integration of third country nationals State of play of the external aspects of the European migration agenda: towards a new ‘Migration Compact’ Communication on implementing the European agenda on Migration Preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU-Turkey summit Asylum: provisional measures in favour of Italy and Greece Preparation of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 October 2016 European Commission Recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement and the reinstatement of Dublin transfers Making relocation happen The fight against illegal immigration and people smuggling in the Mediterranean (topical debate) Establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the EU external borders – Amendment of the Schengen Borders Code as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area

27.10.2015 25.11.2015

02.02.2016

12.02.2016 08.03.2016 12.04.2016 13.04.2016 28.04.2016 11.05.2016 11.05.2016

07.06.2016

03.08.2016 03.09.2016 14.09.2016 05.10.2016 14.12.2016

16.05.2017 25.10.2017 25.10.2017

29.05.2018

170 Date 15.01.2019 17.07.2019 10.03.2020 Migrant Integration 07.04.2016 16.03.2016 European Integration 25.03.2015 24.06.2015 08.07.2015

27.10.2015 13.12.2015 15.12.2015 16.12.2015 19.01.2016 24.02.2016

02.03.2016 05.07.2016 25.10.2016 01.03.2017 15.03.2017 17.05.2017 14.06.2017 24.10.2017

24.10.2017

Appendix 2 Title Reform of the EU asylum and migration policy in light of the continued humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean and Africa Humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean Migration situation at the Greek-Turkish border and the EU’s common response to it Refugees: social inclusion and integration into the labour market Conclusions of the European Council meeting (19–20 March 2015) European Council Conclusions of the European Council (25–26 June 2015) and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece Commission Work Programme 2016 Preparation of the EC meeting of 15th December 2015 14th December 2016 Euro area recommendations-Completing EU’s Economic and Monetary Union Preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016 European Semester for economic policy coordination: Annual Growth Survey 2016 Preparation of the European Council meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 June 2016 Commission Work Programme 2017 Statement by the President of the Commission on the White Paper on the future of Europe Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 9 and 10 March 2017, including the Rome Declaration Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 29 April 2017 Preparation of the European Council of 22 and 23 June 2017 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 19 and 20 October 2017 and presentation of the Leaders’ Agenda (Building our future together) Commission Work Programme 2018 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 19 and 20 October 2017 and presentation of the Leaders’ Agenda (Building our future together)

Appendix 2 Date 13.12.2017 29.05.2018 12.06.2018 15-16.01.2020 17.06.2020 Euro Crisis 28.01.2015 24.06.2015 28.10.2015 03.11.2015 11.11.2015 15.12.2015 24.02.2016 25.10.2016 14.02.2017 15.03.2017 04.10.2017 12.12.2017 06.12.2018 15.09.2020

Brexit 28.06.2016 05.04.2017

03.10.2017 13.12.2017

29.01.2020

30.01.2020

171 Title Enlargement and strengthening of the Schengen area: Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (topical debate) Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area The Economic and Monetary Union package European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe Conference on the Future of Europe European Fund for Strategic Investments European Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2015 priorities – Steps towards completing the Economic and Monetary Union European Semester package – Annual Growth Survey 2016 Euro area recommendation – Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union European Semester for economic policy coordination 2016 European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination 2017 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 9 and 10 March 2017, including the Rome Declaration Fiscal Compact and its incorporation in EU legal framework Extension of the duration of the European Fund for Strategic Investments The Economic and Monetary Union Package Covid-19: EU coordination of health assessments and risk classification and the consequences on Schengen and the single market Outcome of the referendum in the United Kingdom (debate) Negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (debate) State of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom (debate) Preparation of the European Council meeting of 14 and 15 December 2017 – State of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom (debate) Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community

Appendix 3

Codebook for the Speeches on Immigration The Dimensions of the Coding Scheme First Dimension: The Target of Positioning Immigration Control:  to this target belong all coded sentences referred to the normative framework or policy measures to control the entry and stay of third country nationals in the EU, as well as to expel irregular migrants. Among them there are: coded sentences related to border controls and security measures, admission policies, definition of immigrants’ status, types of permit of stay and expulsion policies. This target takes the numerical value of 1. Migrants’ Integration:  to this target belong all coded sentences referred to the normative framework or policy measures to integrate third country nationals into their host societies: reception, integration into the labour market, access to the welfare system, cultural and religious expression, right to vote. This target takes the numerical value of 2. Other:  to this target belong all coded sentences somehow related to the issue of immigration, but not belonging to any of the above mentioned two targets, such as historical records, personal migration experiences of MPs/MEPs and so on. Second Dimension: The Directionality According to the two broad targets proposed above, a party can express different positioning, which represents the second broad dimension of the coding system. Party positioning is given by the level of restrictiveness expressed by a party, taking © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9

173

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Appendix 3

on higher values for greater stringency. Therefore, coded sentences are scaled as one for higher stringency and zero for less, as follows: Permissive:  coded sentences expressing a broadly speaking liberal approach to migration, being in favour at least of the entry and stay of legal migrants and those in need of international protection. General view of migration as a positive or at least as a long-lasting phenomenon of Western societies, that need to be accepted and regulated, in respect of human rights and international law obligations. Call to tackle the root causes of migration, e.g., weapon trade, resources and environment exploitation. This directionality takes the value of 0; Restrictive:  coded sentences expressing a broadly speaking illiberal approach to migration, considering immigration as an emergency, an unsustainable burden if not even a socio-economic and/or cultural-identitarian threat for European societies, that need to be restricted both in terms of numbers, rights and entitlements given to third country nationals. General call for restrictive and even punitive measures against irregular migration. In favour of cooperation agreements with countries of origin and transit to stop immigrants’ flows. Small or no concern for respect of human rights and international law obligations. This directionality takes the value of 1; Neutral:  this “directionality” collects all the coded sentences that do not report any judgment by the orator (e.g.: résumé of what has been discussed during the plenary without expressing any positive or negative judgment, description of migration’s patterns in Europe based on official data such as Eurostat or national statistical institutes, and without expressing any positive or negative judgment on them). This “directionality” takes the value of 9. Third Dimension: The Character of the Expressed Positioning When dealing with support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets, political actors can also characterise their stances such that: • They express a pragmatic support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets. Pragmatic support is based on utilitarian frames, aimed to attain a specify policy-goal or to meet a particular material, political or legal interest. They are usually based on cost-benefits argumentations. In this case the Character of the expressed judgment takes the numerical value of 1; • They express a principled support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets. Principled claims can be based on moral-universal frames, such as respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights, or identity-related frames, such as cosmopolitanism, mobilized to protect and sometimes promote cultural diversity, or nationalism, mobilized in protection of national boundaries or to preserve a homogeneous cultural society. Examples of nationalistic claims are the fear of mass immigration and xenophobic attitudes, or the fear of an i­ ncreasing

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‘Islamisation’ of Europe and the need to fight for the European Christian heritage. In this case the Character of expressed judgments takes the numerical value of 2; • They neither express a principled nor a pragmatic support. In this case no judgment whatsoever is expressed (as in the case of non-directional coded quasi-­ sentences) and the Character of expressed judgments takes the value of 9. The Fourth Dimension: Sub-Targets For the purposes of this analysis nine sub-targets were created for the main two targets: five pertains to immigration control, while four refer to migrants’ integration. Sub-targets concerning immigration control: Humanitarian Migration.  In this target fall all coded sentences referred to asylum seekers, refugees, and people who are not recognized as refugees but are nonetheless protected under subsidiary/humanitarian protection or admitted for humanitarian reasons (e.g. victims of domestic violence, victims of human trafficking, medical cases). This sub-target also refers to those persons in need of protection identified by the European law as vulnerable. In particular, they are: unaccompanied children refugees, pregnant women, elderly, disabled persons, persons affected by mental diseases etc. This sub-target takes the numerical value of 1. Family reunification.  This sub-target refers to those migrants that are let in for the social reason of family reunification. It comprises partners, children, parents, and extended family members, both of third country nationals and of European citizens, as defined by Article 4 of Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification. This sub-target takes the numerical value of 2. Labour Migration.  This sub-target refers to labour migrants, namely those individuals that states accept for economic reasons. This group contains high and low skilled workers, seasonal workers, sponsors etc. This sub-target encompasses both third-country nationals and internal migrants, namely those people that migrate within the European Union to look for better economic opportunities. This sub-­ target takes the numerical value of 3. Border controls:  This sub-target encompasses the control of national borders, i.e. those laws, regulations and policy measures aimed to control national and European borders, as well as to respond to internal and external security threats related to migration, crime and terrorism (e.g. irregular migration, human trafficking, smuggling, organized crime). This sub-target takes the numerical value of 4. N.B.:  in case no sub-target of migrants’ control is present in the quasi-sentences the sub-target dimension takes the value of 9. Sub-targets concerning migrants’ integration:

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Socio-Economic Integration.  This sub-target includes all sentences that refer to the impact of international and internal migration on national economy and domestic services. This sub-target can be declined in two opposite ways: from the one side, immigrants can be seen as a resource for national economy, contributing to a country’s economic performance, either because they are high-skilled migrants or because they fill the labour shortage in sectors where native labour is increasingly scarce (e.g. elderly care, construction, agriculture), or because they contribute to the state budget by paying taxes. From the other side, labour migrants can be seen as illegal competitors, which reduce job opportunities available for natives, create social dumping, pressure on the welfare and house system and an overall decline in social security. This sub-target takes the numerical value of 1. Cultural and religious Integration.  To this sub-target pertains all sentences that refer to the impact of international and internal migration on national culture and identity. This sub-target can be declined in two opposite ways: from the one side, immigration can be seen as an increasing and uncontrolled phenomenon, which threaten an otherwise homogeneous and cohesive society. In this view, the core values of community belonging are stressed against a perceived identity threat brought by foreign cultures, religions and traditions (exclusivist nationalism). From the other side, belong to this sub-target those quasi-sentences that encourage respect and tolerance, or even promotion and positive discrimination, towards different cultures and regard immigration as an enrichment for host societies (multiculturalism). It follows that under this sub-target fall all those quasi-sentences relative to anti-­ discrimination, fight against racism and xenophobia. This sub-target takes the numerical value of 2. Citizenship:  this sub-target refers to those quasi-sentences relative to the process of naturalization, namely the acquisition of the set of full civic and political rights granted by the country of residence to its citizens. It includes quasi-sentences referred to the rules for citizenship acquisition (ius soli/ius sanguis vs naturalization). This sub-target takes the numerical value of 3. Reception:  this sub-target refers to all those quasi-sentences relative to the general culture and practices of welcoming wards third-country nationals in need of international protection, in particular, to the characteristics of the national reception systems. In addition, this category also refers to those very first policies put in place to redistribute migrants across the European Union or within each Member State once arrived on the shores or at the borders (relocation, redistribution, dispersion etc.). This sub-target takes the numerical value of 4. N.B.:  in case no sub-target of migrants’ integration is present in the quasi-­sentences the sub-target dimension takes the value of 9.

Appendix 4

Codebook for the Speeches on the European Union The Dimensions of the Coding Scheme First Dimension: The Target of Positioning European Community:  this target refers to a speaker’s judgment on ‘what the EU is’, namely on the very idea of the existence and the development a supranational body, as well as its identity. To this target belong all those references that deal with: • a country membership in the Union, • the balance of power between member states (MSs) and the level of cooperation among them to enforce EU decisions, • the process of EU enlargement to neighbouring countries, • the process of EU deepening, namely the transfer of competencies to the European institutions in an increasing number of policy areas, • the EU values as expressed in the funding Treaties, • the EU symbols, such as the EU anthem and the EU flag. European Policies:  to this target belong all those quasi-sentences that refer to the embodiments of the EU, or ‘what the EU does’, namely the bulk of policies enforced by the EU.  Coded sentences may refer to the evaluation of EU policies’ goals, instruments, financial endowments, results and impacts. In particular, this target encompasses all those references to: • Economic and Financial Affairs, • Migration and Home Affairs, • Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9

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European Institutions:  this target encompasses all sentences that refer to the legitimacy, efficacy and accountability of European institutions. Therefore, this ­target refers to both the decision-making procedures of EU institutions and to EU elite, such as the Head of the main EU institutions, some specific commissioner and their general staff, the so called “technocrats” or “Eurocrats”. Other:  to this target belong all sentences somehow related to the issue if the European Union, but not belonging to any of the above mentioned three targets, such as personal political experiences of MPs/MEPs, anecdotes etc. Second Dimension: The Directionality According to the two broad targets proposed above, a party can express three different positioning, which represent the second broad dimension of the coding system. Party positioning is given by the level of opposition expressed by a party to any of the above mentioned targets, taking on higher values for greater opposition. Therefore, the quasi sentences are scaled as one for higher opposition and zero for less, as follows: Positive:  sentences expressing a broadly speaking positive positions towards the European Union, being in favour of (at least) the very idea of European integration. This directionality takes the value of 0; Negative:  sentences expressing a broadly speaking negative approach towards the European Union, ranging from criticizing specific policies, to oppose the very existence of the Union. This directionality takes the value of 1; Non-Directional:  this “directionality” collects all the sentences that do not report any judgment by the orator (e.g.: résumé of what has been discussed during the plenary without expressing any positive or negative judgment, description of some historical events regarding the process of European integration without expressing any positive or negative judgment on them). This “directionality” takes the value of 9. Third Dimension: The Character of the Expressed Positioning When dealing with support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets, political actors can also characterize their stances such that: • They express a pragmatic support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets. Pragmatic support is based on utilitarian frames, aimed to attain a specify policy-goal or to meet a particular material, political or legal interest. They are usually based on cost-benefits reasoning. In this case the Character of the expressed judgment takes the numerical value of 1;

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• They express a principled support or opposition to one of the aforementioned targets. A principled support to the EU is based on internationalism, which advocates for greater political or economic cooperation among nations and people. A principled opposition to the EU is based on sovereigntism, which supports the preservation or re-acquisition of political sovereignty of a nation or a region, as opposed to the demands and policies of international and supranational organizations. In this case the Character of expressed judgments takes the numerical value of 2; • They neither express a principled nor a pragmatic support. In this case no judgment whatsoever is expressed (as in the case of non-directional coded sentences) and the Character of expressed judgments takes the value of 9. The Fourth Dimension: Sub-Targets For the purposes of this analysis were created some sub-targets for two of the above mentioned targets: EU-Community and EU Institutions. It is worth noticing that for the “EU Policies” target no sub-target is foreseen. Sub-target referred to EU Community: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU):  this sub-target refers to the integration EU economies. All sentences that refer to the coordination of economic and fiscal policies of MSs, to the adoption of a common monetary policy, and of a common currency, the euro, are coded as 1; Schengen:  all sentences referring to the enforcement of an area without internal borders – the Schengen Area – among MSs are coded as 2. Sub-target referred to EU institutions: European Council:  all sentences dealing with EU-institutions and specifically with the European Council are given a numeric value of 1; European Commission:  all sentences dealing with EU-institutions and specifically with the European Commission are given a numeric value of 2; European Parliament:  all sentences dealing with EU-institutions and specifically with the European Parliament are given a numeric value of 3; Other Institutions:  all sentences dealing with other institutions that the aforementioned (such as the European Central Bank) are given a numeric value of 4.

Appendix 5

Table A.5  A summary of results Expectations Mainstream parties are in favour of immigration control measures

Empirical support Partially supported

Mainstream left parties support migrant integration, while mainstream right parties oppose it

Partially supported

Populist parties oppose both immigration control and migrant integration Populist Radical Right Parties oppose both immigration control and migrant integration Mainstream parties support the process of European integration Populist parties oppose the process of EU integration

Supported

Supported

Not supported Partially supported

Supported Populist Radical Right parties oppose the process of EU integration

Results Mainstream right and mainstream left parties are equally restrictive towards immigration control – yet to varying degrees. They do not oppose all the immigration control targets equally: bipartisan support for humanitarian migration emerges. In Italy, there is a clear left-right divide on cultural and civic integration. In the UK, both conservative and social democratictype parties tend to communicate favourable – yet moderate – attitudes regarding cultural differences. The M5S mobilises the immigration issue, in particular, the target of migrant reception, predominantly to boost its anti-elitist claims. Both the LN and UKIP oppose all targets of the immigration issue using mainly sovereigntist, security and cultural-religious frames. There is a left-right polarisation among mainstream parties; in particular, mainstream right parties endorse Eurosceptic positions. The M5S criticises the lack of democracy within the EU institutions and the technocratic nature of the EU project. However, when in government with a mainstream left party, it adopts a reformist positions towards the EU. Both the LN and, even more so, UKIP link their opposition to the EU with sovereigntist and anti-immigration claims.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Gianfreda, Where Do the Parties Stand?, Immigrants and Minorities, Politics and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77588-9

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182 Empirical Expectations support In countries most affected by Supported the economic and immigration crises, mainstream parties oppose EU policies In countries less affected by the economic and immigration crises, mainstream parties support EU policies Populist (radical right) parties oppose EU policies independently from the impact of the crises on their countries In the EP, mainstream parties endorse pragmatic opposition towards the EU polity In the EP, populist (radical right) parties endorse a principled opposition towards the EU polity Source: Author’s elaboration

Supported

Results In Italy, a country severely hit by the socioeconomic consequences of the austerity measures implemented after the euro crisis, both mainstream left and mainstream right parties endorse negative positions towards the European Economic and Monetary Union. In the UK, a country less directly affected by the economic and immigration crises, the issue of European economic and financial governance is less salient for mainstream parties.

Supported

Both in Italy and in the UK, populist (radical right) parties criticise EU policies irrespective of the impact of the economic and migration crises on their countries.

Partially Supported

At the supranational level, while the PD, FI and LAB endorse moderate and pragmatic opposition to the EU, the CON holds a principled opposition to the EU-elite and EMU. The LN and UKIP endorse a principled opposition to the very idea of European integration, behaving as anti-systemic actors. The M5S endorses a principled opposition towards the EU-elite.

Supported