When Democracy Trumps Populism: European And Latin American Lessons For The United States [1 ed.] 1108483542, 9781108483544, 1108728820, 9781108728829, 1108692796, 9781108692793

Citation preview

i

When Democracy Trumps Populism

The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election left specialists of American politics perplexed and concerned about the future of US democracy. Because no populist leader had occupied the White House in 150 years, there were many questions about what to expect. Marshaling the longstanding expertise of leading specialists of populism elsewhere in the world, this book provides the first systematic, comparative analysis of the prospects for US democracy under Trump, considering the two regions – Europe and Latin America – that have had the most ample recent experiences with populist chief executives. Chapters analyze the conditions under which populism slides into illiberal or authoritarian rule and in so doing derive well-grounded insights and scenarios for the US case, as well as a more general cross-national framework. The book makes an original argument about the likely resilience of US democracy and its institutions. Kurt Weyland is Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His recent books include Revolution and Reaction: The Diffusion of Authoritarianism in Latin America and Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848. Raúl L. Madrid is Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America and Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond.

ii

iii

When Democracy Trumps Populism European and Latin American Lessons for the United States

Edited by KURT WEYLAND University of Texas, Austin

RAÚL L. MADRID University of Texas, Austin

iv

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906 Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108483544 DOI: 10.1017/9781108692793 © Cambridge University Press 2019 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2019 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A. A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Weyland, Kurt Gerhard, editor. | Madrid, Raúl L., editor. Title: When democracy trumps populism : European and Latin American lessons for the United States / edited by Kurt Weyland (University of Texas, Austin) and Raúl L. Madrid (University of Texas, Austin). Description: Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, [2019] Identifiers: LCCN 2018039950 | ISBN 9781108483544 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108728829 (paperback) Subjects: LCSH: United States – Politics and government – 2017– | Trump, Donald, 1946 – Political and social views. | Populism –United States. | Democracy – United States. | Populism – Europe – History. | Populism – Latin America – History. | Europe – Politics and government – 1989– | Latin America – Politics and government – 1980– Classification: LCC E912.W47 2019 | DDC 973.933092–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018039950 ISBN 978-1-108-48354-4 Hardback ISBN 978-1-108-72882-9 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

v

To Andreas and Nikolas, and Bela and Nico

vi

vii

Contents

List of Tables and Figure List of Contributors Foreword

page ix xi xv

Anna Grzymala-Busse

Acknowledgments

xxv

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism: What Are the Prospects for US Democracy?

1

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

1

Dealing with Populism in Latin America: Lessons for Donald Trump’s Populist Presidency in the United States

35

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

2

Donald Trump and the Lessons of East-Central European Populism

60

Kevin Deegan-Krause

3

Has Populism Eroded the Quality of European Democracy? Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

84

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

4

Trump’s Populism: The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages and the Future of US Democracy Bart Bonikowski

vii

110

viii

Contents

viii

5

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay: A Comparative Perspective on Political Polarization in the United States

132

Kenneth M. Roberts

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

154

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

References Index

187 211

ix

Tables and Figure

Tables 4.1 Four popular conceptions of American nationalism 4.2 Proportion of respondents with selected attributes by type of nationalism

page 117 118

Figure 4.1 Distribution of four types of American nationalism, 1996–2012

ix

121

x

xi

Contributors

Bart Bonikowski is Associate Professor of Sociology at Harvard University, Resident Faculty at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, and a Faculty Affiliate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, where he co-directs the Research Cluster on Populism and the Future of Democracy. Relying on survey methods, computational text analysis, and experimental research, his work applies insights from cultural sociology to the study of politics in the United States and Europe, with a particular focus on nationalism and populism. Kevin Deegan-Krause is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University with a PhD in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame. His research emphasizes European politics, political parties, democratic institutions, and national identity. He is the author of Elected Affinities:  Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (2006), as well as the editor of several volumes and journals and numerous articles. He is currently completing a co-authored book entitled The New Party Challenge: Cycles of Party Birth and Death in Europe and Beyond. Anna Grzymala-Busse is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. She directs the Global Populisms Project, and is the author of Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Politics, as well as other books and articles on post-communist political parties, the state, and religion.

xi

xii

xii

List of Contributors

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser is full Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile. He is the co-author, with Cas Mudde, of Populism: A Very Short Introduction (2017) and is one of the editors of the Oxford Handbook of Populism (2017). He has published articles on populism in several journals, including Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Government and Opposition, Latin American Research Review, Party Politics, and Political Studies. Raúl L.  Madrid is Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include democratization, populism, ethnic politics, political parties, and social policy in Latin America. He is the author of The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America (2012) and Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond (2003) and is a co-editor of Leftist Governments in Latin America:  Successes and Shortcomings (2010). He is currently working on a book on the origins of democracy in Latin America. Kenneth M. Roberts is the Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government at Cornell University. His research interests explore the politics of inequality in Latin America and the relationships between political parties, populism, and social movements. He is the author of Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era (2014), along with Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (1998). He is co-editor of The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (2011) and The Diffusion of Social Movements (2010). Bertjan Verbeek is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Management Research at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His research interests include the impact of domestic politics on international relations, crisis decisionmaking in foreign policy, and the changing role of intergovernmental organizations in contemporary world politics. His work has been published in journals such as European Journal of International Relations, Journal of International Relations and Development, Democratization, European Political Science Review, Acta Politica, and Comparative European Studies. Kurt Weyland is Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. He has done ample research on democratization, neoliberalism, populism, and social policy in Latin America and in recent years has studied the diffusion of democracy and authoritarianism in

xii

List of Contributors

xiii

Europe and Latin America. He is currently finishing books on the proliferation of authoritarianism and fascism during the interwar years and on the wave of military coups in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. Andrej Zaslove is Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Political Science, in the Faculty of Management, at the Institute for Management Research at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His research focuses on various aspects of populism: measuring populism (as a political attitude), foreign policy and populism, gender and populism, and the influence of populism on party systems. His publications have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, West European Politics, European Political Science Review, and Democratization.

xiv

xv

Foreword Anna Grzymala-Busse

Could it happen here? The election of Donald Trump in November 2016 created a cottage industry of comparisons to Weimar Germany and analogies to fascism. Compounding the anxiety was a tide of growing populism across Europe and elsewhere, as increasingly authoritarian populists took power in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, Poland, and the Philippines. More sober analyses followed, but the picture they painted was anything but reassuring, with titles such as How Democracies Die (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), The People vs. Democracy (Mounk 2018), Trumpocracy: The Corruption of the American Republic (Frum 2018), and Can It Happen Here?1 (Sunstein 2017). Among scholars of comparative and American politics, a peculiar tension emerged. The former were alarmed  – the latter were relatively sanguine. Comparativists, familiar with the pattern of democratic erosion in twentieth-century Europe and Latin America, tended to emphasize the incremental nature of the slide toward authoritarianism. They were troubled by the acceptance by both the president and his supporters of racist, xenophobic, sexist, and violent language that denigrated political opponents and divided society into patriotic loyalists and the traitorous rest. Above all, they pointed to the new president’s attacks on the media, the opposition, and marginalized groups, and the willingness to flout long-held norms of transparency and accountability, whether avoiding business conflicts of interest or publishing tax returns. Such steps – the attempts to limit suffrage, to delegitimize the opposition, to 1

It Can’t Happen Here is the confident and deeply ironic title of the 1935 Sinclair Lewis classic, detailing the authoritarian aftermath of the election of President Buzz Windrip.

xv

xvi

xvi

Foreword

attack institutions of oversight such as courts and the media – were all too familiar for students of comparative authoritarian regimes. In contrast, students of American politics, the most durable democratic republic in the world, pointed to two salient aspects of the political context. First, the electoral coalition that brought Trump to power was a typical Republican coalition: he won 89 percent of the Republican vote, with 91  percent of white Republican women and 92  percent of Republican men supporting him.2 There was no discernible impact of income, and Trump did best among white voters without a college degree. This was a typical Republican electorate, rather than furious impoverished mobs with pitchforks. The campaign itself was won in red and swing states, with many observers pointing to the weakness of Hillary Clinton as a candidate as the deciding factor. Donald Trump did not win the popular vote – but, then, neither did George W. Bush. In short, the winning coalition was a typical, normal one. Second, many observers pointed to the unique institutional structure of the United States:  a relatively weak presidency ensconced within a federal system with a strong set of checks and balances. These would be the guardrails of democracy:  a Congress eager to defend its prerogatives, a court system that provided independent oversight, and states that offered an alternative set of regulations and safeguards. These scholars pointed to the extension of the sanctions on Russia, the early defeats of the Muslim travel ban, and the doubling down on climate change initiatives by states such as California as evidence for the system constraining whatever authoritarian impulses the new president would try to exercise. In short, students of comparative and American politics appear to have been speaking past each other. And it is precisely this gap in understanding that this book addresses. The analyses here are both anxious about the future of liberal democracy, and tentatively confident that the separation of powers, the greater stability of political parties and durability of formal institutions, the political polarization (instead of the convergence that leads populists to come to power), and the absence of an economic or international crisis will all work to arrest democratic erosion in the United States. Several of the authors emphasize that the United States is different:  here, the powers of an entrenched system of checks and balances, a strong party system, and the lack of majority support act as constraints on the power of populism to do damage. The 2

See www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-exit-polls-how-donald-trump-won-the-us-presidency.

xvi

Foreword

xvii

strength and stability of these institutions, and the public criticism, will arrest the erosion of democracy. It is undoubtedly true that the United States is unlikely to follow fully the authoritarian pattern of Poland or Hungary, for example. The numerous veto points that exist in the presidential system make either changing the constitution or bringing the judiciary under formal political control, as Fidesz and PiS have done, unlikely and implausible, respectively. But Trump has followed other elements of the authoritarian populist template:  attacking the media as “enemies of the people” and his opponents and critics as “crooked” or “criminal,” dividing society into good loyalists and treasonous critics, and freely lying about everything from the size of his inauguration crowds to the costs and benefits of free trade agreements. What Europe, Latin America, and now the United States show is that populists pose a threat to liberal democracy. This is not only, as Raúl Madrid and Kurt Weyland note, because they divide the people and attempt to override institutional constraints. Populism may disregard minority rights, promote new political divisions, and create an antagonistic political culture, as Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove also argue. I would go further: the anti-democratic implications of populism follow from its very principles. And it is here that three lessons of comparative politics should be brought to the forefront. First, ideology matters. Second, informal institutions are as important as their formal counterparts. Third, the strength and content of political competition, and the alternatives it offers, may be orthogonal to the age and durability of the parties. Populist Ideology: Take Them Seriously and Literally First and fundamentally, populists in government oppose and corrode two fundamental aspects of liberal democracy: the equal representation of all citizens, and the structuring of politics by the rule of law and formal institutions. They do so because their very ideological commitments, however thin they may be, demand both the redefinition of legitimate citizens and an anti-institutional stance. As Cas Mudde has crisply defined it, populism is a “thin-centered” ideology “that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543). Populist parties thus share a fundamental emphasis

xvi

xviii

Foreword

on the division between a popular, positively valued “us” and a corrupt, elite “them” (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000; Stanley 2008; Weyland 2001). Such parties thus emphasize the unity and organic cohesion of the people/nation, who mistrust an equally monolithic political elite (Stanley 2008; Mudde 2004). This is not to argue that ideology is destiny – but that the actions of populists follow directly from their ideological commitments, such as they are. Thus, populist parties and movements are defined by their claim to represent a “people” or a nation, rather than specific interests, and by their rejection of the political elites as corrupt and unresponsive to the people.3 First, however, the people or the nation have to be defined. While in Latin America this meant the inclusion and prioritization of marginalized groups, such as indigenous populations or the poor, in Europe this has meant renewed efforts to exclude vulnerable groups from the definition of the “people.” Such groups include non-citizens, ethnic minority groups, religious minorities, and other vulnerable populations, such as gays or (immigrant) children. This is majority rule without minority rights. Second, those who disagree with populist representation of “the people” are obviously not the “real” nation. The opposition (whether elite or popular) is, by definition, treasonous and treacherous  – and should be summarily dealt with. Note here that Trump has successfully fused populist, authoritarian, and nationalist frames, as Bart Bonikowski points out, making defense of “the people” against the threats posed by immigrants, free trade, and international organizations a paramount priority. He has freely attacked the media, his political opponents, and those who are not 3

Other scholars have focused on populism as a form of discourse or rhetoric that pits the people against the elites in a Manichean moral struggle (Hawkins 2009) or a mode of political expression (Kazin 1995; Jansen 2011). Here, populism is treated as a mode of expression, or a context, rather than a way to characterize political parties or politicians. Populism serves as a language that can be used by many, instead of defining specific political actors. As Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009) point out, political parties may have some populist characteristics but not others, and combine them to varying degrees with other appeals: “populist” is a spectrum rather than a binary category. Yet, if any actor can use populist discourse, identifying the impact of populism becomes more difficult. Defining populists as those who consistently articulate the populist ideology makes their identification, and the tracing of their impact, easier. Populism is also defined as a political strategy that promotes redistributive politics through a personalized, top-down approach, with unorganized popular support (Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin 2011; Weyland 2001; Levitsky and Roberts 2011a). This definition applies particularly well to Latin American populist movements. In Europe and North America, many parties have made redistributive appeals and populists have not relied on particular organizational forms. Finally, other scholars see populism as the “politics of personality” (Taggart 2000: 101). Yet personalism is certainly not sufficient for populism – and it is not clear that it is necessary.

xx i

Foreword

xix

“his people”  – much as Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński has spoken derisively of the “worst sort of Poles,” who do not demonstrate loyalty. In short, the need to define “the people” often results in societal division and the marginalization of vulnerable populations. The anti-institutional stance of populists is just as corrosive. In the populist vision, the institutions of liberal democracy, whether courts, parliaments, or laws, are not to be trusted precisely because they are the products of corrupt elites who do not have the people’s interests at heart (and who actively oppose these interests). Therefore, these institutions need to be circumvented, or, better yet, brought under the control of “the people” – as represented, of course, by the ruling populist party. This is in keeping with the populist assumption that the “people” have a common shared interest, a general will that ought to be the aim of politics, and that the “elites” betray it. Moreover, and as a result, populists also emphasize demands for popular sovereignty and direct democracy, rather than the mediation of interests through democratic institutions such as parliaments or parties. Rallies and tweets, rather than press conferences and policy proposals, are the order of the day. As a result of this suspicion of the institutions of liberal democracy, among the most dangerous of populism’s consequences are its erosion of formal democratic rules and liberal institutions. These destructive effects of populist rule include the takeover and taming of formal institutions of the rule of law and liberal democracy (such as the takeover by the ruling party of the constitutional courts in Poland and Hungary), and new legal constraints that undermine liberal norms (constitutional changes, limiting the freedom of the media, financing only loyal NGOs, etc.). These legal and formal maneuvers have been used to undermine the opposition’s legal standing as well as to limit criticism, transparency, and accountability. As the authors in this book note, institutions in new or unstable democracies are especially vulnerable to such corrosive de-engineering. The Vulnerability of Critical Informal Institutions Just as importantly, however, populist governments have also made a point of undermining informal democratic norms (conflict of interest laws, financial transparency, respect for the opposition, access and accountability to the media, and party loyalty as the basis for the awarding of tenders, contracts, and government responsibilities). Such informal institutions, unlike their formal counterparts, are not enforced by the state or written down on parchment – yet they are critical to the

xx

xx

Foreword

functioning of any regime, since they can reinforce, undermine, or substitute for formal institutions (Carey 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). It is in the erosion of the critical informal institutions of democracy that President Trump has excelled: beginning with his refusal to publish his tax returns, as all modern presidential candidates before him have, to the opaque financial dealings with Russian partners, to his scurrilous and derisory nicknames for his political critics, to his willingness to tolerate allegations of rank corruption in his administration, as with Scott Pruitt, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Here the damage may go deeper and be far less reversible; such norms and informal rules are the product of decades of elite and popular interactions and the shaping of expectations that govern political behavior. Once the Overton window4 of acceptable political discourse and behavior shifts, the unthinkable becomes normalized. While Americanists have emphasized the strength of formal institutions, comparativists have also focused on these informal institutions, which are both critical to the functioning of formal institutions and vulnerable to failures of the consensus that underpins them. And it is here that one might disagree with Madrid and Weyland’s relatively optimistic conclusion about the powers of an entrenched system of checks and balances, a strong party system, and the lack of majority support as constraints on the power of populism to do damage in the United States. Checks and balances work only when there is some degree of autonomy, or dissonance, between the various branches, and when informal norms of appropriate political behavior hold. A  complicit and compliant Republican Congress has offered little constraint on the presidency so far (with the notable exceptions of federal budget spending and Russian sanctions). Without that partisan balance, the formal capacities of a system of separation of powers simply are not exercised. Further, checks and balances rely on both sides being willing to play by the same rules – the “Can they do that?” problem identified by Kevin Deegan-Krause. So far politicians in power have been unafraid to use mechanisms and instruments that the opposition could not, such as abolishing the filibuster rule for judicial appointments (Democrats in 2013) or being unwilling to even consider

4

The term “Overton window” – coined by Joseph P. Overton, former vice-president of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy – refers to the range of politically acceptable policies and stances. For example, in the first half of the twentieth century the window included policies that were discriminatory against women and minorities; such direct and obvious legal discrimination is now outside the Overton window of acceptable policy.

xxi

Foreword

xxi

a Supreme Court nominee because the vacancy occurred too late in a president’s term (Republicans in 2016). It is true that, “as long as President Trump cannot garner overwhelming popular support, his capacity for translating his mass backing into influence on decision-making seems distinctly limited” (Weyland and Madrid), in the sense that he does not have the mandate to transform the polity. But, given the lack of formal checks and balances in the Republicanheld Congress, and the unwillingness of active Republican politicians to criticize the president’s excesses, the calculus is simple:  so long as the Republican base supports the president, the Republican majority in Congress will offer no effective brake on his erosion of democratic norms and values. And, as Ken Roberts notes, the dangers of democratic erosion “rest heavily on Trump’s ability to induce ongoing Republican collaboration with his autocratic mode of governance. Trump cannot dismantle democratic checks and balances on his own; he needs partisan collaborators to help stack the courts, uphold executive decrees, emasculate and politicize investigative bodies, and manipulate electoral institutions” (Roberts). Without an informal (and externally unenforceable) commitment to liberal democratic rules within the Republican Congress, then the system of checks and balances is less than reassuring. Party Competition and Why It Matters This brings up a final point comparativists would emphasize: the importance of critical and strong party competition. Here, the institutionalization of party systems is not enough, since it is orthogonal to the quality and robustness of democracy (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011). After all, authoritarian single-party regimes were also ruled by long-lived and entrenched parties. The Republican Party may be a storied and entrenched organization, while Trump is an amateur, and one whose rhetoric far exceeds his actual actions, as Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Kevin Deegan-Krause note in their respective chapters. But that makes his takeover of the Republican Party more, not less, alarming. Precisely because the Grand Old Party(!) is an entrenched and established political party, it is deeply worrying to observe its rapid transformation into a far more nativist, protectionist movement that is skeptical of formal state institutions, such as the courts or the intelligence services, and disparaging of free media and the opposition. And the party has done so not on the strength of policy successes, but by virtue of the powerful appeals of the president.

xxi

xxii

Foreword

What matters instead, it appears, is the robustness of party competition. First, if it is to preclude populists from entering governments in the first place, political party competition has to offer real policy alternatives – neither polarization nor convergence, both of which have led to new opportunities for populists, as Verbeek and Zaslove note. In Europe, mainstream political parties have tended to converge on many aspects of policy – whether European Union accession in the newer postcommunist democracies, the acceptance of immigration (prior to 2015), or the “third way” politics that merged left and right approaches to the economy in the 1990s (Innes 2002). The result is that populist parties became the one set of critics of this consensus: the one set of parties that would speak for popular concerns and grievances regarding this consensus. These same populists could then differentiate themselves from the mainstream consensus, as the one set of responsive and accountable political actors. In the United States, for its part, both the Republican and Democratic electorates share policy preferences; what differs is that the Republican voters are more susceptible to fear- and identity-driven appeals (Mason 2018). This meant that Trump could capture this anxious and threatened electorate, capitalizing on its worries and grievances while promising beautiful health care and endless winning. Here, partly as a result of Clinton-era economic and social policies, and partly as a result of the beholdenness of both parties to big donors, the Democratic Party could not articulate a convincing alternative to this rhetoric, nor could it persuade more voters that its proposals were different and credible enough. Had mainstream parties conducted more of a debate over policy and ideology, had they differentiated themselves more in the eyes of the electorate, populists would have had less of a field. Once in power, political competition also matters as a constraint on populist impulses. To do so, it has to offer a credible electoral threat that keeps the governing populists in check for fear of losing office. In Slovakia, as Deegan-Krause explores, a populist authoritarian was eventually defeated precisely because the opposition did coordinate, offered a clear alternative, refused to enter Vladimír Mečiar’s governing coalition, and shunned him into political irrelevance. In contrast, the authoritarian populist governments of Poland and Hungary are currently aided by weak and fragmented opposition forces that neither exercise discipline in parliament nor articulate why they should govern instead. It remains to be seen how the Democratic Party in the United States will tackle the twin problems of internal cohesion and popular alternatives.

xxi

Foreword

xxiii

Conclusion Liberal democracy has been under siege, or simply defeated, time and time again in Europe and Latin America. Informed by the lessons of historical democratic collapses in other regions, many scholars of comparative politics and other observers have been sounding alarms. For all committed democrats, this volume represents a chance to evaluate these anxieties against a background of careful and sustained analyses. The message that emerges is necessarily speculative  – but one that suggests a cautious optimism, if the formal institutions and the durability of the political parties can offset the ideologically justified erosion of informal democratic norms and an attenuated political party opposition.

xxvi

xxv

Acknowledgments

Donald Trump’s election created a problem for US democracy, but an opportunity for political science. The unexpected electoral victory of a populist leader challenged many conventional assumptions in the field of American politics and provided a chance for specialists in comparative politics to offer insights and lessons. After all, populism has played a much more central role in Latin American and, increasingly, European politics than it has in the United States. Experts on these regions therefore had ample experiences to draw from that might shed light on the typical strategies and tactics employed by populist leaders and the political repercussions of their rise and fall. To take advantage of this analytical opportunity, we, the editors, organized a research conference in September 2017 that gave rise to the present volume. We are grateful to Virginia Garrard, director of the University of Texas’s LLILAS Benson Latin American Studies and Collections, Douglas Biow, director of our Center for European Studies (CES), and Robert Moser, chair of the Department of Government, for their strong support and financial help for this initiative. We also thank the College of Liberal Arts, the Institute of Historical Studies, and the Mike Hogg Professorship in Liberal Arts for generous funding. Most importantly, we thank Sally Dickson and Nhi Nguyen of CES and, especially, Paloma Díaz of LLILAS for the excellent conference organization. Revised versions of all the papers presented at the conference appear in this volume. For their helpful comments and suggestions, we thank the colleagues who served as speakers and discussants at the workshop, namely Caitlin Andrews, Jonathan Brown, Steven Levitsky, Lorinc Redei,

xxv

xxvi

xxvi

Acknowledgments

Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Jeffrey Tulis. Moreover, Caitlin Andrews took excellent notes of the conference proceedings. We presented draft chapters in various venues and received insightful comments from the Latin America Faculty Study Group at the University of Texas (Daniel Brinks, Zachary Elkins, Kenneth Greene, and Wendy Hunter); from discussant Catherine Conaghan, Eliza Willis, and many other audience members at the 2018 International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association in Barcelona; and from Julio Carrión and numerous participants in the workshop on “Democracy in Decline? The Challenge of Global Populism,” held in Newark at the University of Delaware in May 2018. One of us (Weyland) also thanks Andrew Stein for all the interesting reports and data he shared. An early synopsis of our core findings and conclusions was published under the title “Liberal Democracy: Stronger than Populism, So Far,” in The American Interest vol. 13, no. 4 (March/April 2018), pp. 24–28. We thank Larry Diamond and Adam Garfinkle for interesting comments on this essay, on which we draw with permission. We are full of admiration and gratitude for Sara Doskow, our editor at Cambridge University Press, who shepherded this manuscript through the review process at record speed. We thank two anonymous experts for incisive and helpful comments on the draft chapters. We also thank Mike Richardson for his careful, precise copy-editing. Finally, we are grateful to Bianca Vicuña for her excellent assistance with the references. This book is dedicated to our children, Bela and Nico Madrid, and Andreas and Nikolas Weyland, who will have to live with the repercussions of President Trump’s populism much longer than we do. Their fate is an additional reason to hope that our sanguine conclusions about the likely resilience of US democracy are on the mark!

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism What Are the Prospects for US Democracy? Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

In November 2016 populist Donald Trump unexpectedly won the US presidency. Not since Andrew Jackson has the United States had a populist leader as chief executive.1 Therefore, observers were at a loss what to expect:  how would Trump govern, and with what consequences? Above all, would the new president persist with his polarizing, confrontational strategy, try to win personal predominance, and establish political hegemony? With this domineering approach, would Trump’s populism end up doing serious damage to liberal democracy in the United States, as observers have feared?2 Given the United States’ fortunate inexperience with populism in government, American politics specialists had difficulty answering these questions.3 But many other nations, especially in Europe and Latin America, have recently had ample experiences with populism, which may offer important insights on the prospects of the Trump presidency and its repercussions for US democracy (see de la Torre 2017a). This volume examines a number of salient cases of populist movements and 1

2

3

Donald Trump has indeed invoked Jackson as his presidential role model (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 119). Even if one follows Tulis (1987: 87–93), who counts Andrew Johnson as a populist, the United States did not have a populist president for almost 150 years before Trump. See, e.g., Illing 2017; Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018; and Sunstein 2018, especially the chapters by Ginsburg and Huq, by Holmes, by Posner, and by Strauss. For instance, a number of observers have gone so far as to invoke the specter of interwar fascism (see, e.g., Connolly 2017; Snyder 2017:  18–20, 23–25, 39–44). We, however, agree with Berman’s (2016) forceful rejection of this analogy (see Weyland and Madrid 2018: 24–25).

1

2

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

governments in foreign countries, especially those headed by Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Rafael Correa, and Hugo Chávez in Latin America (Chapter  1, by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser); by Vladimír Mečiar and Viktor Orbán in Eastern Europe (Chapter  2, by Kevin Deegan-Krause); and by Silvio Berlusconi and Geert Wilders in Western Europe (Chapter 3, by Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove). Considering the differences in national context, what light do these experiences with populism shed on the contours and likely consequences of the Trump administration? The analysis of this book focuses on three main questions. (1) Under what conditions can populist leaders achieve political success? (2) What options does the opposition have for containing these overbearing leaders? (3) Is democracy in the United States likely to emerge intact from the challenge of Trump’s populism? The Main Argument The editors derive relatively sanguine conclusions from the comparative experiences examined in this book (see preview in Weyland and Madrid 2018). We believe that liberal democracy in the United States will prove resilient, although some contributors to this volume are more pessimistic (see the chapters by Kevin Deegan-Krause and Kenneth Roberts). As Western European cases of populism suggest, institutional constraints and the strength of the partisan opposition and of civil society will probably limit President Trump’s room for maneuver and will thus preclude serious infringements on liberal safeguards, a skewing of the competitive arena, and a lasting deterioration of democratic norms. Consequently, the country is likely to avoid the more far-reaching and profound efforts to strangle liberal democracy that have proceeded in some East European and Latin American countries, such as Hungary and Venezuela, where counterweights were absent or weaker. Trump may well do serious damage in policy areas where the president has a great deal of decisionmaking latitude, such as environmental and foreign policy, but he is unlikely to achieve the institutional transformations that populist leaders in other countries used to undermine democracy. The comparative investigations of this book highlight the importance of four types of obstacles that will probably protect liberal democracy in the United States from the deleterious effects of populism. First, the federal and presidential system of government enshrines a firm separation of powers, unlike parliamentary systems, for instance. The legislature and

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

3

the judiciary, in addition to independent federal agencies and state and local-level authorities, all have considerable influence in the US system, including the power to block or modify presidential initiatives. Therefore, President Trump will face difficulty in seeking to concentrate power, overhaul democratic institutions, and infringe upon liberal safeguards and fair competition. The narrow legislative majority of the Republican Party does not pave the way for unfettered political hegemony and a battery of rule changes that push the country in an illiberal direction, as happened in Hungary, where Orbán enjoyed a large parliamentary majority. Moreover, in contrast to populist executives in Latin American countries, such as Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador, a populist leader in the White House cannot revamp the venerable US charter through a constituent assembly nor simply bend, disrespect or override its well-entrenched procedural rules. US institutions are not just strong, they are also stable (see Levitsky and Murillo 2009). Thus, unlike his populist counterparts in East-Central Europe and Latin America, President Trump faces a set of rather firm institutional constraints.4 Second, the US party system is stronger and more cohesive than was the case during the emergence of populism in most European and Latin American countries. Consequently, Donald Trump did not form a new party, which he could easily control and use to gain power, as Berlusconi did in Italy, Fujimori in Peru, and Chávez in Venezuela. Instead, the US populist could rise only by taking over an established party. While his victories in the contest for the Republican presidential nomination and in the general election give Trump considerable clout and while he can draw fervent support from the party’s radical mass bases, he does not control the GOP establishment, which views this political outsider and amateur with concern and distrust. Thus, Donald Trump has a much weaker political position than populist leaders such as Fujimori and Chávez, whose domination of their parties facilitated their assault on liberal democracy. Instead, President Trump’s situation is similar to that of Carlos Menem in Argentina, who captured the presidential candidacy of the longestablished Peronist party in a primary yet never won full control over this massive organization.5 Although the Argentine populist managed for years to keep intra-party rivals at bay, eventually another Peronist 4

5

The contrast with Latin America, where institutions are often weakly enforced and easy to change (see Weyland 2002a:  66–68), highlights the importance of US institutions, which serve as serious constraints on political behavior. The party’s official name is the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista: PJ), but it is better known by its founder’s name, Juan Perón.

4

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

leader insisted on his own bid for the chief executive office and thus blocked Menem from winning a third term, which might have done serious damage to Argentine democracy. Third, the social and political cleavage structure of the United States does not favor a populist leader’s quest for overwhelming influence. As Kenneth Roberts highlights in Chapter 5, the US case is unusual in that a populist leader came to power during a time of pronounced partisan and ideological polarization. Typically, populist politicians win office after preexisting parties have lost touch with many voters because they have undergone programmatic convergence, which leaves many citizens feeling unrepresented. In Latin America, for instance, the widespread enactment of neoliberal market reforms made the positions of many mainstream parties virtually indistinguishable; and, in Italy, the end of the Cold War buried the cleavage caused by Communism, around which the traditional party system had revolved. In these countries, party dealignment and voter fluidity allowed populist outsiders to mobilize “the people” and win over broad swaths of voters. In the United States, by contrast, partisan polarization and ideological fervor run high, especially on the right side of the political spectrum. On the one hand, this divisiveness provides fertile ground for the confrontational strategy typically employed by populist leaders. If President Trump were to encroach on opposition rights or put illiberal pressure on critics, he could probably count on unconditional support from his core base among the right-wing movements associated with the Republican Party (see Diamond 2018). In this way, party polarization creates risks for liberal democracy, as Roberts argues. But, on the other hand, these deep divisions and the extremism of Trump’s hard-core backers, with their resentments and thinly disguised prejudices (see Donovan and Redlawsk 2018:  197–201), seriously limit the chances of this populist leader to win broader-ranging support, not to speak of the massive approval that allowed Peru’s Fujimori and Venezuela’s Chávez to trample on liberal democracy. Stuck in an ideological ghetto, and reinforcing this selfenclosure with his stream of confrontational rhetoric, Donald Trump seems unable to achieve the endorsement of a majority. Social cleavages in the United States also make it difficult for Trump to achieve commanding popular support. In Latin America the lower classes represent a large majority of the population, and they have provided disproportionate support for populist leaders. By contrast, the middle classes predominate in the United States, and their educated segments have maintained their distance from Trump. Moreover, ethnic and racial

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

5

minorities, especially African Americans and Latinos, constitute a significant share of the electorate, and they have massively opposed Donald Trump. The new president has used exclusionary ethno-nationalist appeals to solidify backing from some of his most loyal white supporters, but at the cost of lower overall approval ratings. How powerful can a populist be who is not broadly popular? Because mass support is the crucial political asset of populist leaders (Weyland 2001), President Trump is unlikely to gain the political preponderance required for seriously bending, if not breaking, liberal democracy. His hard-core following, which may well back such efforts (see Diamond 2018), is simply too limited in a competitive democracy that has strong institutions, a robust opposition party, a vibrant civil society, and critical public opinion. Fourth, a crucial factor that – paradoxically – helps to keep President Trump’s popularity ratings low is the absence of an acute, profound crisis that he could quickly overcome with determined countermeasures. This kind of severe yet resolvable challenge has been crucial for the political rise and governing success of right-wing populist leaders, especially Latin America’s neoliberal populists of the 1990s. Fujimori in Peru, Menem in Argentina, and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–92) drew striking political benefits from hyperinflation, which imposed enormous socioeconomic costs on the population, discredited the established “political class,” and thus opened the path for their electoral victories. Upon taking power, these populist market reformers managed to end skyrocketing price rises with drastic adjustment packages. The seemingly miraculous success in averting a full-scale catastrophe and the resulting relief for the mass citizenry induced large majorities of people to back their populist saviors (Weyland 2002b: chap. 5). This overwhelming groundswell of support allowed the three leaders to concentrate enormous power and move in an illiberal direction. Fujimori and Menem managed to change the constitution and win consecutive reelection. Fujimori, who won additional backing by defeating another dangerous enemy, namely the Shining Path guerrilla movement, even got away with a direct assault on Peruvian democracy via an authoritarian palace coup in April 1992. In sum, international experiences, especially from Latin America, show how acute problems can offer auspicious political opportunities to populist leaders  – and thus jeopardize liberal democracy. President Trump, by contrast, lacks the opportunity to turn adversity into advantage. Because his predecessor left the US economy in good

6

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

shape, this populist leader cannot easily become his country’s savior. The problems that fueled Trump’s rise, such as deindustrialization and the loss of well-paid jobs, do not allow for a quick resolution, especially in a market economy, which precludes massive employment programs. The cultural value shifts that many of Trump’s core supporters decry are even harder to reverse. The US president therefore does not have the chance to effect a stunning turnaround that would earn him overwhelming popular support and in this way enable him to distort, hollow out, and perhaps suffocate liberal democracy. In conclusion, we are confident that these four impediments will protect US democracy from the populism of Donald Trump. While international experiences show that this type of plebiscitarian leadership can undermine and destroy democracy from the inside, systematic efforts by elected chief executives to abuse their power have succeeded only under conditions that do not seem to prevail in the United States. Thus, this book suggests that typical populist strategies and tactics are unlikely to achieve resounding political success in the United States and to do substantial, lasting damage to liberal democracy. President Trump’s impulses certainly seem worrisome, but he is hemmed in by a web of obstacles and cannot cut these fetters due to his lack of overwhelming mass support. Contrary to the fears expressed in a recent essay title (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017), “America is still safe for democracy” (our emphasis). Yet, although the strength of the checks-and-balances system in the United States and his limited popular and party support will prevent President Trump from concentrating power and undermining democratic institutions, he can singlehandedly violate liberal democratic norms. In fact, the populist in the White House has delighted in committing such transgressions by employing harsh, hostile rhetoric, ignoring financial conflicts of interest, questioning the legitimacy of elections, and intervening in traditionally non-partisan institutions. These deviations from long-established rules of proper behavior have not seriously affected the functioning of US democracy, however. In particular, President Trump’s degradation of democratic norms is exceedingly unlikely to undermine and limit democratic competitiveness, the core principle and engine of liberal democracy, which stimulates popular participation, guarantees the government’s accessibility, and induces its accountability and responsiveness (Schmitter 1983: 889–891). The populist leader’s insults and threats, verbal attacks on politicians and the press, and violations of transparency and accountability have certainly not succeeded in intimidating civil society and the partisan opposition or

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

7

skewing the electoral playing field in a significant way. Instead, the new president’s brash and impulsive behavior has had the opposite effect, energizing his adversaries and prompting a wider range of citizens and political groups to counteract his initiatives and to contest him and his supporters in elections. Thus, rather than distorting or suffocating democratic competitiveness, as populist leaders such as Fujimori, Chávez, Orbán, and Erdoğan have managed to do (see, in general, Levitsky and Way 2010), Trump has inadvertently mobilized the opposition, fomented electoral contestation, and thus – paradoxically – strengthened democratic competitiveness. Because President Trump has failed to win over the majority of the citizenry or garner numerous legislative achievements, future US leaders are unlikely to emulate his confrontational style. The president’s unpredictable, incoherent behavior and the corresponding chaos in the White House do not offer attractive role models for ambitious politicians. To the contrary, the new president’s transgressions may well prompt a prodemocratic backlash, similar to the reassertions of liberal democracy that have occurred in Latin American countries such as Brazil and Peru after the downfall of their populist leaders. Rather than serving as a paragon for imitation, this populist leader has already turned into an example to avoid, both inside the United States and on the global scene, where the backlash against Donald Trump contributed to Marine Le Pen’s striking defeat in France’s presidential election of 2017. A Pragmatic Conceptual Basis Liberal, Pluralist Democracy To assess the probable consequences of Donald Trump’s populism for US democracy, this volume employs a conventional definition of democracy, which highlights the centrality of electoral procedures in a liberal institutional framework and a pluralistic society. This concept, explained best by Robert Dahl’s classic study (1971:  chap.  1),6 guided the literature on democratic transitions in the 1980s (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: chap. 2) and has since turned into the standard notion employed in the field of comparative politics. Dahl’s concept essentially conceives of democracy as comprising two dimensions. “Public contestation” means

6

Writing shortly after the student revolt of 1968, at the tail end of the direct democracy upsurge of the 1960s, Dahl (1971) pragmatically avoided normative debates about the true meaning of democracy and employed the neologism of “polyarchy” for what political science has subsequently called liberal, pluralist democracy.

8

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

fair political competition in a setting of pluralistic debate and open criticism, while “inclusiveness” or “participation” denotes the extension of political citizenship: is most of the adult population entitled to take part in political competition? These two dimensions reflect the historical emergence of liberal, pluralist democracy (Held 2006: chap. 3; Keane 2009: 159–169). This model of rule arose from a marriage of the majoritarian principles derived from the maxim of popular sovereignty (“rule of the people”) and the liberal quest to guarantee political freedom. This latter goal requires firm safeguards against the potential abuse of power, even if government power is exercised by the popular majority. To prevent a “tyranny of the majority,” liberalism insists on tempering majority rule with protections for minority rights. In sum, liberal democracy rests on a compromise between partly complementary, yet partly divergent, criteria for minimizing political domination. The majority gets its way, as long as it does not infringe on core concerns of minorities. The double-sided nature of liberal, pluralist democracy has crucial implications for assessing the repercussions of populism (see recently Mounk 2018: 25–28). As discussed below, populism can bring advances on the dimension of inclusiveness and participation, especially during the early stages of democratic development, when one of the crucial conflicts centers on the extension of suffrage. As regards the dimension of contestation, by contrast, populism, with its strong majoritarian impetus and power-concentrating tendencies, creates problems and risks. Indeed, as we discuss below, populism is inherently opposed to the liberal side of democracy (see recently, on “good” versus “bad” populism, Diamond 2017: 4–6). Yet, before discussing these normative questions in greater depth, it is crucial to clarify the meaning of “populism.” The Concept of Populism Populism has long been a heavily contested concept. Despite decades of discussion and innumerable contributions, including by some contributors to this volume (see, e.g., Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Madrid 2008; Roberts 1995; and Weyland 2001), no consensus has emerged on how to conceptualize populism. Instead, scholars have continued to use a wide variety of definitions. The brand new Oxford Handbook of Populism (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017), for instance, features three distinct conceptual approaches. Because this volume focuses on a specific research question, it can avoid these thorny and perhaps interminable conceptual debates. Instead,

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

9

we employ a pragmatic approach. Many authors escape from conceptual swamps by settling on “working definitions.” In a similar spirit, this study adopts a “working list” of broadly consensual cases. Interestingly, despite the continuing definitional disagreements, scholars largely agree on the political movements and leaders that count as populist.7 This working list, which will serve as a comparative reference for elucidating the Trump presidency, includes the following. (1) In Europe: - Austria, Jörg Haider - France, Marine Le Pen - Greece, Alexis Tsipras (chief executive 2015–present) - Hungary, Viktor Orbán (2010–present)8 - Italy, Silvio Berlusconi (1994–5, 2001–6, 2008–11) - the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders - Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar (1990–1, 1992–4, 1994–8) and Robert Fico (2006–10, 2012–18) - Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003–14, 2014–present) (2) In Latin America: - Argentina, Juan Perón (1946–55, 1973–4), Carlos Menem (1989–99), Néstor Kirchner (2003–7), and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–15) - Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–2) - Ecuador, Rafael Correa (2007–17) - Peru, Alan García (1985–90) and Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) - Venezuela, Hugo Chávez (1998–2013) President Trump as a Populist Given that this volume focuses on Donald Trump, we take this pragmatic approach to the conceptualization of populism one step further by demonstrating that the new US president qualifies as a populist under all the main definitions. For this purpose, we briefly analyze the Trump administration in light of the crucial criteria and indicators of populism.

7

8

There is the exceptional borderline case. Due to his grounding in a movement-based party, Bolivia’s Evo Morales does not count as a full-scale populist in Weyland’s politicalstrategic approach (Weyland 2017b:  66), whereas he qualifies under the ideational approach of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013:  148, 156), and, for Madrid (2008; 2012), he constitutes a prototypical case of “ethnopopulism.” Orbán also served as prime minister from 1998 to 2002 but did not employ a populist strategy at that time.

10

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

One of the most widely used definitions frames populism as a personalistic political strategy (Barr 2009; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Weyland 2001). Weyland (2001:  14), for example, defines populism “as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.” This definition has a couple of key components. First, it stresses the top-down, personalistic, and uninstitutionalized nature of populist leadership. Populism concentrates power in individuals, rather than in institutions. Second, it emphasizes the direct linkages that populist leaders seek to establish with their supporters. Populist leaders are often charismatic individuals who seek to communicate directly with the populace rather than working through intermediaries or party organizations. Populist leaders may preside over political parties, but they tend to circumvent party rules and bypass party organizations, governing in a personalistic, unmediated, and top-down manner. According to some scholars, populists are typically political outsiders who are not beholden to the traditional parties and the political establishment (Barr 2009; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Weyland (2017b:  56–57) also stresses that the power of populists rests on their popular support – the sheer number of people supporting them – rather than on coercion, elite support, or economic clout. Populist leaders therefore often resort to mass rallies, elections, and plebiscites to strengthen their hold on power and intimidate the opposition. President Trump certainly fits this definition of populism. The real estate magnate and media celebrity is very much of a political outsider and a personalistic leader who ran for president with little organized support. During the campaign Trump largely dispensed with organization, preferring to concentrate decision-making authority in his person. Since taking office he has continued that trend, wielding power in a personalistic manner, while marginalizing governmental and party bureaucracies. Although Trump won the presidential nomination of the Republican Party, he has kept party leaders at a distance and has not hesitated to attack them, including the Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell, and the Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan. Trump has staffed his Cabinet mostly with a variety of business and military leaders, rather than with powerful GOP politicians. Moreover, the most prominent Republican Party leader in his initial Cabinet, Reince Priebus, the former head of the Republican National Committee, was forced out of his position as chief of staff after only six months and replaced with a military general.

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

11

Furthermore, Trump has made direct communication with his supporters a priority, even after the end of his presidential campaign. Against the advice of his aides he has continued his prolific tweeting, in spite of the frequent controversies that his uncensored messages have caused. He has also held further mass rallies to maintain direct contact with his supporters and energize his base. More generally, Trump has seemed obsessed with demonstrations of his popular support, as indicated by his exaggerated claims about the size of the crowd on his inauguration day. A second widely used approach to populism portrays it as an antiestablishment discourse or ideology that views the world in Manichaean terms as a struggle between good and evil. Mudde, for example, defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543). Similarly, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 514) define populism as “a political discourse that posits a cosmic struggle between a reified ‘will of the people’ and a conspiring elite.” Thus, populists claim to represent the people and vow to defend their interests against the depredations of the elite. The notions of “the people” and “the elite” are central to the ideational definition of populism, but both notions remain vague and fluid. Therefore, adherents of this perspective define populism as a “thin,” highly flexible ideology that has few specific tenets. Consequently, populism is usually attached to a variety of “thicker” ideologies, ranging from socialism to neoliberalism. This conceptual flexibility and ideological promiscuity make populism more useful to its political practitioners, allowing for opportunistic adaptations to prevailing political opportunities and constraints. Donald Trump certainly counts as a populist by this definition as well. The new US president has frequently railed against the elites and extolled the wisdom of “the people.” He has repeatedly promised to “drain the swamp” in Washington, indicating that he would purge the political establishment and govern instead by the rule of the people. He has denounced a global elite that has stripped the United States of wealth and rigged the economy against the working class (Chokshi 2016; Fisher 2017). In a 2016 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, Trump (2016) wrote: The only antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is a bold infusion of popular will. On every major issue affecting this country, the people

12

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

are right and the governing elite are wrong. The elites are wrong on taxes, on the size of government, on trade, on immigration, on foreign policy.

Moreover, Trump intensified his populist rhetoric once Steve Bannon became his campaign chief (Friedman 2017). One quantitative study has concluded that Trump employed more populist rhetoric in the 2016 campaign than any other candidate (Oliver and Rahn 2016: 200). Similarly, a textual analysis of Trump’s speeches finds that, although he was inconsistent in his usage, he did use a strong dose of populist discourse at the height of the presidential contest in the second half of 2016 (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). Nor did the winner of the 2016 election end the populist rhetoric once he took office. Indeed, his inauguration address was very much in the populist mode: “January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again,” Trump declared. “The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer” (Trump 2017). From the White House, the new president has repeatedly denounced elites and the media, which he has called “the enemy of the people.” Scholars have employed various other notions of populism as well. Economists have defined populism according to the macroeconomic policies employed. Dornbusch and Edwards (1991:  1, emphasis in original), for example, define populist governments as those that use “overly expansive macroeconomic policies … which have relied on deficit financing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic economic equilibria.” Another definition characterizes populism as a type of political-cultural appeal associated with strong authoritarian leadership, a coarse, hyper-masculine style, and (stereo-)typically popular, crude, and “low” language (Ostiguy 2017). Finally, many definitions of populism are multidimensional. An early generation of scholars, for example, defined populism as urban-based, multi-class, anti-establishment, and personalistic movements associated with economic nationalism and protectionism (Conniff 1982; Drake 1982; Germani 1978; Ianni 1975). More recently, various scholars have included both anti-establishment discourse and personalistic strategy, along with other attributes, in their definitions (Barr 2009; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Madrid 2008; Roberts 1995). Trump also falls under these definitions of populism. With his massive tax cuts, for instance, he is pursuing a supply-side version of the “overly expansive macroeconomic policies” that embody “a disregard for basic economic equilibria,” especially budget balance (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991: 1). The new US president has also embraced aspects of

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

13

economic nationalism that are often associated with populism, including trade protectionism and industrial promotion.9 Similarly, Trump has demonstrated authoritarian leadership and a coarse popular style in his first year in office. His intemperate language and his penchant for insults starkly deviate from US norms of proper behavior and ostentatiously “flaunt the sociocultural ‘low’ ” (Ostiguy and Roberts 2016:  41–46). Finally, President Trump has also exhibited most of the characteristics identified in multidimensional definitions of populism. For instance, his movement is multi-class, anti-establishment, and personalistic, albeit not urban-based. Thus, Donald Trump certainly counts as a populist because he qualifies under all the extant definitions (see also Kazin 2016; and, recently, Fukuyama 2018: 17). Nevertheless, with its focus on a specific question, this volume seeks to steer clear of the continuing debates about the definition of populism. Fortunately, there is a great deal of scholarly agreement on the extension of this concept. The resulting “working list” of cases can serve as a firm comparative base for the lesson drawing undertaken in this study. The Inherent Tension between Populism and Liberal Democracy This volume is motivated by the widespread concern that President Trump’s populism could damage liberal democracy in the United States. In concrete terms, these fears arise from Donald Trump’s imperious, overbearing, and “unhinged” personality, his penchant for confrontation and conflict, and his tendency to make arbitrary, uncontrolled decisions and trample on long-established rules and norms. Moreover, scholars of American political development (Lieberman et al. 2017) see Trump’s very rise as a product and symptom of a more profound deterioration that US democracy has suffered during recent decades. In this view, the new president’s worrisome idiosyncrasies are not the underlying cause of the threat to liberal democracy but part of a much deeper problem. Most importantly, the partisan and ideological polarization that started in the civil rights era of the 1960s and that has worsened ever since 9

By contrast, Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann (2017b:  127–128) cast doubt on President Trump’s populism because, in their view, he governs primarily with and for the rich, and thus diverges from the tendencies toward (moderate) socioeconomic redistribution often associated with the notion of populism.

14

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

has led to the erosion of democratic civility and has brought obstruction and conflict. As a result, the presidential system of government, whose strict separation of powers is designed to force negotiation and compromise, has turned dysfunctional. Electoral politics, congressional deliberations, and relations between the three branches of government no longer ensure effective governance. Instead, there has been increasing reliance on “politics by other means,” which employs personal attacks, embarrassing revelations, and politically motivated judicial challenges to “destroy” politicians from the opposing party (Ginsberg and Shefter 2002). From this scholarly perspective, the electoral triumph of populist outsider Trump was the mere culmination of a much longer process of liberal democracy’s decline. The headstrong new president thus faces an institutional framework that is already problem-ridden and precarious (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b). Consequently, the risks are particularly high that the populist in the White House will further exacerbate the longstanding deterioration and resolutely push the United States in an illiberal, and perhaps even non-democratic, direction. The comparative perspective employed in this volume adds further fuel to these worries. Ultimately, scholars of all stripes agree that populism stands in inherent tension with liberal democracy, especially its liberal side, centered on institutional guarantees of pluralistic debate and fair competition (see, e.g., de la Torre 2017b: 187, 193–195; Diamond 2017:  6–9; Grzymala-Busse 2017a; Madrid 2012:  178–183; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Weyland 2013; and Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Regardless of the definition of populism that authors embrace and independently of their normative framing of populism as a transgressive or progressive approach to politics, they all see the divisive, confrontational strategy of populist movements and the ceaseless efforts of their leaders to concentrate power and weaken institutional constraints as an assault on liberal democracy. Some scholars celebrate this radical overhaul as an attempt to empower popular sectors, whereas many others deplore it as a power grab by personalistic leaders. Yet, despite these differences in interpretation, there is widespread consensus that the first victim of populism is liberal, pluralist democracy. After all, populism constitutes a powerful push for change, and therefore it incessantly seeks to bend or break the constraints on determined change that liberal democracy imposes with its strict limitations on the exercise of political power. Before explaining the inherent risks that populism poses to political liberalism, it is important to acknowledge, however, that populism can

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

15

in principle benefit the inclusionary, participatory dimension of democracy. Essentially, populist leaders mobilize mass movements, and push to give them political voice and influence. This majoritarian impulse has had positive effects, especially in the early stages of democratic development, when suffrage used to be restricted. For instance, populist leaders in Latin America, such as Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina, mobilized the marginalized and downtrodden working classes and extended voting rights to women (Kampwirth 2010: 4). As political citizenship has become virtually universal across the world, however, populism has exhausted its clearly positive contributions to democracy. Certainly, many populist leaders claim to improve participation by mobilizing people who have long felt neglected and who have dropped out of the democratic game. But this accomplishment is harder to evaluate, because the nature of the prior “exclusion” is unclear:10 in the absence of formal institutional barriers, was it structural marginalization or simply voluntary abstention? Even more importantly, does mobilization by populist leaders enable people to engage in autonomous participation or use them primarily for plebiscitarian acclamation engineered from the top down, with unfair inducements and informal pressure and intimidation, as in Chávez’s Venezuela? In essence, how democratic is political participation if liberal rights and pluralist debate are not guaranteed? After all, populism threatens liberal pluralism, the second principal dimension of democracy, in several ways. By mobilizing “the people” against the allegedly corrupt elite, populism foments polarization and conflict and delegitimizes negotiation and compromise. It turns political adversaries into enemies and calls for attacks that jeopardize open debate and fair competition. When politics descends into an all-out struggle of “us versus them,” alternation in government becomes unacceptable. The self-appointed populist saviors claim the right to use all means in order to keep their foes from foiling their projects and, especially, from returning to power. As the noble end of implementing “the will of the people” seems to sanctify any means, populist governments have little compunction about polarizing public debate, harassing the opposition, and skewing the electoral arena through the misuse of state resources,

10

Interestingly, a recent study by Huber and Ruth (2017:  473–476) does find positive effects of populism on some aspects of political participation and representation. But the analysis covered only European countries, where the framework of liberal democracy was ensured and the risk of top-down manipulation (mentioned below) was precluded.

16

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

especially massive patronage spending, and targeted coercion. With all these tricks, populist movements and their leaders trample on liberal safeguards, disable democratic competitiveness, and establish a stranglehold on political power. Moreover, populist leaders constantly seek to boost their personal power and see checks and balances as obstacles to their efforts to establish their own political predominance (see recently Fukuyama 2018: 16). Accordingly, they try to weaken, undermine, or override the institutions with which liberal democracy aims to forestall the abuse of power and to protect fair political competition. Liberal democracy disperses and limits political power. Populist leaders, by contrast, work hard to concentrate power. Therefore, successful populism tends to hollow out, if not strangle, liberal democracy. Furthermore, populist leaders mobilize their mass supporters through direct, personal appeals. They mostly do not rely on firm organizations nor do they build strong parties. Consequently, they lack a reliable, disciplined following on which they can count “in good times and in bad.” Instead, populist leaders depend on their popularity, which can shift drastically; Peru’s Alan García, for instance, enjoyed approval ratings of approximately 80 percent in 1986, but saw them drop below 10  percent in 1988. To avoid this fickleness, populist leaders seek to boost the intensity of their followers’ commitment. For this purpose, they search for enemies from whom they can “save” the people. By inciting conflict, they intend to strengthen and solidify their own support base. Thus, populist leaders’ quest for political survival and continuing preeminence feeds the confrontational strategy that poses a serious threat to liberal democracy. In sum, populist movements and, especially, their leaders typically act in ways that are detrimental to liberal democracy. In theoretical terms, populism rests on majoritarian notions of politics that diverge from the fundamental goal of liberalism to protect minorities against the potential abuse of power. Whereas liberal democracy deliberately makes governing difficult so as to force deliberation and compromise, populism is determined to cut through these obstacles and impose the will of the people, as interpreted and advanced by their leader. With this purpose in mind, populist movements and their leaders make powerful efforts to dismantle and overcome liberal democracy. In principle, therefore, populism constitutes a serious threat to the institutional framework of the United States.

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

17

Populism’s Illiberal, Authoritarian Tendencies in the United States In line with these general tendencies, populist challengers have repeatedly sought to move the United States in an undemocratic direction during the last century, after the basic outlines of liberal democracy had been instituted in the country. Leaders such as Huey Long and George Wallace used illiberal appeals and trampled on established norms of the democratic game. Considering the firm historical roots of and the widespread support for “the liberal tradition in America” (Hartz 1955), it is remarkable that populist leaders could pose such anti-democratic challenges. The fact that these outsider politicians did not shy away from such steep uphill battles demonstrates the inherently authoritarian tendencies of populism, which came to the fore even in the United States. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century, when voting rights were heavily restricted, populism initially had a pro-democratic impact due to its inclusionary impulses. After all, US democracy started out with high public contestation, yet restricted participation, in Dahl’s (1971) terms. The American Founders instituted a rather oligarchical form of competitive rule because they doubted the political sophistication of the populace. Popular pressures, which brought the reduction of suffrage limitations during the 1820s, then culminated in the election of the first populist to the US presidency, Andrew Jackson (1829–37). This headstrong leader pushed for further democratization and reoriented policy-making toward popular interests. By attacking elites and their institutional bastions and by mobilizing the common people, Jackson achieved a profound political transformation (Keane 2009:  294–311). Consequently, some scholars, such as Huntington (1991:  16), date the United States’ transition to democracy – which helped to usher in the first long wave of democratization in the world – to the Jacksonian era. The agrarian populism of the late nineteenth century set in motion a process of changes that ended up bringing another step toward fuller democracy. While the populist standard-bearer, William Jennings Bryan, was defeated in the epic presidential election of 1896, a groundswell of popular mobilization demanded direct elections to the national Senate, hitherto filled via appointment by the state legislatures. After years of increasing agitation this proposal, first raised by the Populist Party, found adoption via the Seventeenth Amendment, promulgated in 1913. In the early stages of the US system the mobilizational dynamism of populism thus helped to eliminate the limitations on democratic participation that

18

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

the Founders had enshrined out of the typically liberal fear of majority tyranny and demagoguery. Once the United States had instituted full democracy (for the vast majority of white citizens, that is: see recently Mickey 2015), populism assumed a different historical role; accordingly, populist leadership arose in a darker, distinctly autocratic complexion. Louisiana’s Huey Long, for instance, who employed the typical promises of popular empowerment to rise to the governorship in 1928, quickly engineered his own political hegemony and ruthlessly undermined checks and balances and skewed democratic competition in his state. Thus, this overbearing populist leader established “the first American experiment with the authoritarian state,” as a critic charged (quoted in Brinkley 1983:  28; see also 8–9). With determined demands for socioeconomic redistribution and brazen electoral campaigns in other states, the ambitious Long quickly claimed a prominent place in national politics, positioning himself as a rival to Franklin Delano Roosevelt for the presidential election of 1936. Only Long’s assassination in 1935 forestalled the foreseeable clash between the authoritarian tendencies of populism and the institutions of liberal democracy. Three decades later plebeian politician George Wallace, whose populist appeals share many basic similarities with Donald Trump (see Kazin 1998:  chap.  9; and Lowndes 2008:  chap.  4), mobilized working-class whites with his ostentatious defiance of the civil rights movement and his attacks on liberal politicians and intellectual elites. By giving voice to a racial backlash, to “law and order” concerns, and to the socioeconomic needs and resentments of disadvantaged whites, the Alabama governor built a plebiscitarian mass base of fervent followers. This rightwing populist soon extended his appeals beyond the South, especially to the Midwest, and sought the presidency with a third-party challenge in the troubled year of 1968. With all these efforts, Wallace tried hard to push the United States in a distinctly illiberal direction. While it is an exaggeration to refer to his movement as fascist,11 Wallace’s populism had a pronounced “authoritarian” streak (Kazin 1998:  237; Lowndes 2008: 87, 94–97). By contrast, Ross Perot, who ran an impressive third-party campaign in 1992, did not embrace right-wing extremism nor employ racial appeals, 11

The drawing by David Levine that accompanied Hardwick’s (1968) famous denunciation of Wallace (see Kazin 1998:  235–236) featured a swastika on the Alabama governor’s chin.

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

19

but presented himself as a pragmatic go-getter and moderate economic nationalist. His pronounced personalism and lack of any organizationbuilding, however, created an inherent tension with the institutional framework of liberal democracy. In fact, Perot’s autocratic personality and his trajectory as a rather “tyrannical” business leader (Church 1992; Wendt and Fairhurst 1994: 188–190) created serious concerns during the electoral campaign, which ended up undermining the presidential candidacy of this populist outsider. In conclusion, populism has revealed its fundamental tension with liberal democracy even in the United States. Although the widespread commitment to liberal values and institutions poses serious problems for populist strategies in the country and creates powerful disincentives for their use,12 populist leaders in recent decades have “shown their true colors” and revealed an illiberal, even authoritarian, slant. Because a populist outsider has now captured the White House, there is an urgent need to assess the likely impact on liberal, pluralist democracy. This book systematically draws comparative lessons from Europe and Latin America, which have had instructive recent experiences with populists in government. What, then, are the main issues that this volume seeks to elucidate? Despite the unpredictability of the new president’s specific decisions – a typical feature of populism  – the four important obstacles mentioned above and the comparative lessons arising from the following chapters allow for clear conjectures and shed light on the strategic options that are open to the crucial players in this ongoing drama. Opportunities and Constraints Facing President Trump’s Populism How to Make Friends – and How to Make the “Right” Enemies The European and Latin American cases uniformly show that populist leaders obtain enormous political mileage from deliberate confrontation and polarization (Müller 2016:  42). To strengthen their backing from citizens and powerful groupings, they systematically foment conflict. To rally support, they claim to save the country from pernicious, dangerous enemies. To unite their base, they divide the polity, pitting “the people” 12

For this reason, despite its usefulness in election campaigns, populist rhetoric has had a limited  – albeit constant  – presence in the United States (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016: 1599–1614).

20

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

against selfish traitors or illegitimate intruders, such as “the corrupt political class” or alien-looking and culturally unfit immigrants. In the United States, however, this typically populist strategy of confrontation and polarization runs up against the institutional incentives of the checks and balances system, which calls for wide-ranging outreach and willingness to compromise. Given the multitude of veto players and veto points in this pluralistic polity and fragmented institutional system, efforts to enact political change require concessions. Reforms advance only via “wheeling and dealing,” the exact opposite of the populist style. Will these requirements induce President Trump to learn from his early governing failures, tone down his incendiary rhetoric, and moderate his populism? Will he thus turn from a protagonist of transformational leadership into another transactional leader (see Burns 1978)? It seems more likely that the US populist will continue with his confrontational approach, even at the cost of decisional paralysis and policy failure. In principle, Donald Trump could eventually use these self-inflicted problems as justification to attack the checks and balances system, grab more power for himself, and revamp the institutional framework of US democracy through the concentration of power. A number of populist leaders, such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, have invoked political gridlock that they themselves helped to provoke in order to override or abolish institutional constraints. Will the US populist use a similar strategy and try to skew the separation of powers, establish his own political hegemony, and then undermine fair electoral competition? Such an antidemocratic end run seems improbable in the United States, especially because President Trump faces an additional constraint. Whereas a majority of populist leaders (such as Berlusconi, Fujimori, and Chávez) ascended on the back of political movements that they themselves founded and continue to control, the new US executive depends on a longstanding political party that has a good deal of independent weight and clout. Although many leaders of the GOP now support him, they did not want him to obtain the party’s nomination and they continue to disapprove of many aspects of his leadership style and policy agenda. Thus, many of his most powerful supporters are far from committed to Trump’s cause. How to cope with this complication? Because populist leaders get the greatest political payoff from stark binary rhetoric – “me versus (all of) them” – and broadside attacks on the whole political establishment, it is unlikely that populism can be very effective in the United States, where this ostentatious outsider needs to cooperate with numerous insiders.

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

21

International experiences of populist leaders rising inside or with the help of established parties are instructive on this issue. How, for instance, did Viktor Orbán in Hungary (Grzymala-Busse 2017a: S6–S8) and Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina (Corrales 2002; Levitsky 2003; Levitsky and Roberts 2011b: 410–411) deal with longstanding party leaders and powerful political insiders? What constraints did these leaders, in turn, face? Interestingly, in contrast to some of their populist counterparts who founded their own parties, such as Chávez and Fujimori, both Menem and Fernández de Kirchner failed to gain approval to run for a second consecutive reelection; in Menem’s case, intra-party resistance was crucial in enforcing the existing term limits (Weyland 2002b: 197–198). President Trump faces additional constraints that make it even more difficult for him to cope with his own party. Menem, for instance, managed to pacify many intra-party skeptics with lucrative appointments in Argentina’s interventionist state (Manzetti and Blake 1996). The United States’ traditions of economic liberalism and administrative professionalism give the new US president fewer opportunities for buying off potential critics and rivals. How to Overcome Institutional Constraints Populist leaders strenuously seek to boost their personal power, and therefore they try to weaken or dismantle institutional constraints, especially effective checks and balances. If possible, they want to use their claim of asserting popular sovereignty to engineer a complete overhaul of the institutional framework and cement their predominance through a new constitution, as Hugo Chávez did immediately after taking office (Brewer-Carías 2010), and Alberto Fujimori after managing to defeat hyperinflation (Roberts 1995). Given the venerable age and institutional solidity of the US constitution, President Trump is exceedingly unlikely to pursue such a profound transformation project. But the typically populist strategy of confrontation and polarization, which the current chief executive relishes using, is likely to provoke serious institutional conflict sooner or later. International experiences show that populist leaders have an ample gamut of tools for eliminating, overriding, corroding, or simply disrespecting institutional constraints (see recently Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Weyland 2013; and de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos 2016). President Trump has clearly displayed a transgressive attitude, for instance by violating longstanding norms of US politics in refusing to release his tax returns and in mixing up politics and business in the most flagrant ways.

22

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

The fact that the US citizenry holds Congress in low esteem gives the new chief executive leverage to put considerable pressure on the legislative branch. His party’s delegation in Congress may go along with powerenhancing initiatives for reasons of interest or ideology. As a result, there is a definite risk that the legislature may not impose reliable checks on the populist leader. How about the judiciary, which proclaims strong commitment to independence, but which can be susceptible to considerable partisanship, as during the adjudication of the electoral mess in Florida in late 2000 (Ginsberg and Shefter 2002: chap. 6)? Many tactics that European and especially Latin American populists used in order to take control of the judicial branch, such as court packing or systematic informal harassment, seem out of the question in the United States. But President Trump does have enormous influence over many judicial appointments, which the Republican Party has eagerly supported. Moreover, in specific controversies, he can push his viewpoints with Twitter barrages, trying to discredit judges personally, pushing “urgent” safety concerns, or mobilizing nationalist sentiment. Will these tactics effectively sway or intimidate courts, or will they backfire as arbitrary and illegitimate interference? As US courts zealously guard their independence and enjoy strong protections against executive interference, the second scenario seems more probable. How to Marshal Mass Support Emerging mostly as political outsiders and trying to retain and further increase their personal authority, populist leaders tend to base their electoral rise and to sustain their governmental clout on ample, heterogeneous, and unorganized mass support. Because most of these leaders command fluid movements and flimsy electoral vehicles, such widespread yet uninstitutionalized backing constitutes their most distinctive political asset and their main power capability. The divergent interests, causes, and values of populists’ variegated groupings of followers would make it impossible to integrate this welter into a programmatically oriented and disciplined organization. Consequently, the links between the leader and the mass supporters are tenuous, feeble, and volatile; the popular base itself has very little capacity for collective action. How, then, can President Trump make concrete use of this mass support and translate it into effective political clout? The Latin American experience shows that, historically, populist leaders marshaled the millions for enormous rallies, for instance by packing the plaza in front of the presidential palace. Venezuela’s Chávez maintained this ritual even in the third

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

23

millennium, filling downtown Caracas with crowds much larger than those that the opposition could usually mobilize. He then invoked this gap to sustain his claim that he represented “the people,” in contrast to the “rancid oligarchy” opposing him. After the embarrassment of his comparatively sparse inauguration crowd, however, President Trump has shied away from direct popularity contests in high-profile neutral settings, such as the Mall in Washington. Would enough fervent Trump supporters turn out to trump the hundreds of thousands protesting against him during the women’s march? Instead, the US populist is engineering public demonstrations of mass backing only in settings where he can count on sufficient numbers of committed followers. These “victory rallies” prove the intensity of his support among core constituencies, but give little indication of his relative strength among the citizenry in general. Nowadays, the main mechanisms for populist leaders to authoritatively certify and employ their mass support are the frequent elections and plebiscites that they use every pretext to convoke. Latin America’s “new left” populists were especially eager to rely on this mechanism; Chávez, for instance, held such a contest approximately once per year (Madrid, Hunter, and Weyland 2010: 149). The US constitution does not provide for national-level plebiscites, however, and President Trump has not announced any willingness to use this mechanism. Can the new chief executive channel his popular support for electoral purposes? Off and on, he has sought to discipline dissenters from his own party by threatening to sponsor their rivals in primaries, where Trump’s popularity among the Republican base may offer him a realistic opportunity of shaping the outcome. How effective can these intimidation efforts be? As Trump is not building the mobilizational apparatus for systematically executing such targeted interventions, can he succeed with tweeted endorsements and attacks, which are easy to fire off? It seems that many of his diverse supporters will follow his indications and vote strategically against the president’s intraparty adversaries in Republican primaries, but, given Trump’s low popularity ratings, it is questionable whether the resulting candidates have very good chances in general elections. Thus, the US populist seems to be caught in a dilemma, either having to work with electable politicians whom he cannot control, or sponsoring hard-core candidates who run the risk of losing. Another typical populist tactic is the systematic invocation of opinion polls and of novel forms of popular approval, such as Twitter followership. These indications of mass support serve only as indirect means of

24

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

pressure, however. While elected politicians may fear a backlash when they come up for reelection, appointees who cannot be removed by the president, especially judges, have a great deal of institutional immunity. Whether they bend to the supposed “will of the people” thus depends on the thickness of their skin. As long as President Trump cannot garner overwhelming popular support, his capacity for translating his mass backing into influence on decision-making seems distinctly limited. The Opposition’s Chances for Containing Trump’s Populism Making Use of Checks and Balances International experiences with populism suggest that the opposition cannot count on using institutional strategies of resistance with reasonable prospects of success. In Latin America, right-wing and especially leftwing populists found the existing institutional framework so weak that they managed to transform it thoroughly. With this overhaul, they also succeeded in marginalizing the opposition, for instance by closing down elected legislatures through the convocation of constituent assemblies (Weyland 2013; Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016:  348–349, 354, 361). In Europe, parliamentary systems prevail, which by institutional design do not impose stringent checks and balances on chief executives (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 350, 361). In this respect the United States differs fundamentally, because of the firm roots of the fairly strict separation of powers enshrined in the constitution. Nobody is proposing a constituent assembly, and Congress is not at risk of being closed down. Nor will the United States switch to a parliamentary system. But two developments offer some openings for populist leadership, and therefore require special attention by opposition forces. First, in response to the worsening gridlock and political paralysis of recent years, both sides of the partisan divide have weakened checks and balances. President Obama, for instance, extended the usage of executive orders, which do not require the approval of Congress. Congress, meanwhile, lowered safeguards for the minority; for instance, during the Obama administration, the Senate eliminated the filibuster for executive and judicial appointments other than the Supreme Court, and under Trump it did so for Supreme Court appointments as well. Second, with the striking electoral defeat of the Democratic Party in November 2016 and with the recent appointment of Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, conservatives control every branch of government.

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

25

As a result, the remaining veto points in the US system of government may no longer offer ironclad guarantees against populist efforts to undermine liberal democracy. Observers therefore worry that President Trump will push through further changes or simply override or disrespect longstanding political conventions or norms. But the experiences of Italy, where the long rule as prime minister of Silvio Berlusconi did not end up doing serious damage to a weaker institutional framework (see Chapter  3 below; and Verbeek and Zaslove 2016), suggest more sanguine conclusions. Indeed, Donald Trump has so far done remarkably little to eliminate veto points or weaken horizontal accountability in the United States. It therefore seems likely that the Democrats can use the remaining minority prerogatives to block presidential assaults or even put the chief executive on the defensive, for instance by investigating the Trump family’s striking usage of public office for private gain. The fact that Trump was elected with the help of an established political party, which is unusual for a populist, offers further opportunities for an institutional strategy to yield payoffs for the Democrats. The congressional opposition may well be able to make headway by seeking targeted cooperation with Republican moderates or Trump skeptics in the GOP (something the opposition to populism in Poland managed to do: Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 352). As mentioned above, the US populist has unusually low control over his own party members in the legislature. His ambivalent relationship with a good part of the Republican establishment gives Democrats chances to reach out to some members of the GOP’s congressional contingent and thus block or soften the changes that populist Trump is trying to impose. The Role of Extra-Institutional Mobilization and Protest As international experiences show, if the institutional framework provides only weak protection against populist leaders, there is a strong tendency for the opposition to resort to “other means.” In the most clear-cut case, Chávez foreclosed institutional resistance by radically transforming the constitutional order, leading the opposition to engage in street protests, strikes, lockouts, and eventually a military coup attempt (Brewer-Carías 2010; Gamboa 2017). In many other cases, when populist leaders did not succeed in pushing through such a dramatic institutional overhaul, the opposition did not go nearly as far in its contentious responses, but frequently mobilized for street demonstrations and protests. In a similar vein, Donald Trump’s election has fired up many Democrats and induced a wide range of activists to express their intense discontent in public.

26

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

What effect is this kind of mobilization likely to have? European and Latin American experiences suggest that mass demonstrations and, especially, contention can be a double-edged sword. After all, populist leaders relish confrontation and thrive on polarization, as highlighted in the preceding section. They deliberately try to deepen ideological and symbolic cleavages, bait the opposition, and push it into a protest strategy. Then populist leaders exploit the public demonstrations that they have deliberately provoked by, for instance, stigmatizing their participants as unrepresentative of “the people” (“Look at these privileged elite members!”). Moreover, they take advantage of any violent incidents that may occur at the margin of street protests to reinforce their own image as guarantors of “law and order.” Thus, a protest strategy may backfire and play into the hands of the populist leader, as happened most clearly in Chávez’s Venezuela (Gamboa 2017). It can unintentionally strengthen a populist president, who appeals to national unity and chastises what he condemns as efforts at division. Street contention can discredit the opposition, making its complaints about the confrontational style of the populist leader appear hypocritical. Moreover, it threatens to undermine any efforts to reach across the aisle and wean away lukewarm members of the populist leader’s support base. This cost would be especially significant in the US case, where (in contrast to Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro, for instance) an institutional strategy does constitute a realistic and promising alternative. In the years to come, what opposition strategy will the Democratic Party use, or at least prioritize? Can its moderate wing cooperate with Trump-skeptic Republicans in Congress while its more contestatory wing spearheads street demonstrations or internet campaigns? Perhaps the partisan opposition can focus on institutional mechanisms while a more diffuse, heterogeneous, and diverse societal opposition takes an extra-institutional route. It is not entirely clear, however, what effective impact high-profile demonstrations such as the Women’s March can have. As President Trump faces difficulties leveraging his mass backing into concrete political clout, so, too, do sectors that publicly express their intense discontent with the populist in the White House. The best option for the opposition would be to use the mobilizational energy that the strong aversion to populist Trump has unleashed among Democratic constituencies to boost electoral participation in upcoming electoral contests, such as the mid-term elections of late 2018 and the presidential election of 2020. The chances for putting an end to the US experiment with populism would greatly increase if “the missing Obama millions”

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

27

(McElwee et al. 2018) – that is, Obama voters who did not turn out for Hillary Clinton – return in massive numbers to the voting booths. How to Recapture Erstwhile Supporters One of the shocking challenges of Donald Trump’s victory for the Democratic Party was that this billionaire tycoon managed to win over some of the party’s traditional constituents, especially in declining industrial areas of the Midwest. A large majority of the white working class voted against the party claiming to represent its socioeconomic interests and fell for the “wild promises” of a super-rich celebrity who has built his fortune by taking advantage of working-class people (Donovan and Bowler 2018: 127–128). How can the Democratic Party try to win back part of this blue-collar contingent? Most likely, the party will need to put renewed emphasis on the socioeconomic issues that became central to its appeal in the New Deal era, during the Great Society of the 1960s, and with Bill Clinton in the 1992 campaign. Such an effort at regaining earlier supporters may require toning down the very advanced, progressive positions that the party has taken on a host of cultural and value issues, ranging from immigration to transgender rights (see Lilla 2017:  97–141; Mounk 2018:  203–208; and Stenner and Haidt 2018: 213–217). A good many previous and current Democratic voters, especially in the Midwest and South, are skeptical of these nonconventional, postmodern stances (Fukuyama 2016:  62–63). While clearly not a cultural conservative, as indicated by his moralitydefying lifestyle, President Trump successfully appealed to some of these sentiments and resentments, especially by attacking illegal immigration. At the same time, however, Democrats must be careful not to alienate their core base. The ability of the partisan opposition to mobilize its firmest supporters, such as African Americans and Latinos, will play a key role in determining the party’s future electoral success – and the political fate of Donald Trump. After all, unexpectedly low turnout among African Americans in a few key states helped tip the 2016 election in the US populist’s favor. If these “missing millions” (McElwee et  al. 2018) start again to vote in full force, they can help confine the real estate magnate to a single term. It will not be easy for the Democratic Party to strike an optimal balance, move beyond its reflexive hostility to Donald Trump, and define a proactive and constructive strategy (Fukuyama 2018:  18). Specifically, how much success the party can achieve in recapturing wayward members of its traditional working-class constituency remains an

28

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

open question. Will principled positions on value questions cede to strategic calculations about electoral support? European experiences with populism can be instructive. Facing powerful populist appeals to antiimmigrant sentiments and Islamophobic prejudices, many of Europe’s mainstream parties have over time hardened their own positions, as Verbeek and Zaslove highlight in their analysis of the Netherlands in Chapter 3. But this strategic accommodation has prevailed far more on the right side of the political spectrum. Can a center-left party such as the Democrats credibly make a similar move without alienating many of its core supporters, and under what conditions is it willing to do so? The way in which the party navigates this difficult issue also has implications for the overall bundle of opposition strategies. It would be difficult, for instance, for Democratic politicians to de-emphasize values issues, while at the same time societal sectors (seen as) aligned with the party engage in public protests about these very same issues. Organization of the Book The first three chapters examine populist governments in various regions of the world and discuss what lessons these populist episodes have for Trump’s presidency. Chapters  4 and 5 then turn the focus back to the United States and analyze what impact the Trump presidency might have on political attitudes and institutions in the country. The Conclusion draws on all five empirical chapters to flesh out our argument about the constraints that will bind the Trump administration and thus protect US democracy. Chapter  1 examines the lengthy Latin American experiences with populism, which offer a number of important lessons for the United States. As Rovira Kaltwasser shows, the Latin American populists who have achieved political success have typically managed to build a strong coalition of support at both the mass and elite levels. The ability of these leaders to overcome acute economic challenges played a central role in determining whether they garnered widespread support. Populist presidents such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru resolved severe hyperinflationary crises and were rewarded with an upsurge of support, while Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, who failed to defeat runaway inflation, foundered. Populists who ended up building grassroots organizations, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, were also more likely to endure than those who had little interest in organization building. Rovira Kaltwasser argues that the behavior of the opposition

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

29

also matters. If populists’ adversaries remained united and committed to democratic norms, they were more likely to impede efforts to concentrate power and undermine democracy. Based on his analysis of the Latin American cases, Rovira Kaltwasser identifies a number of reasons why Donald Trump has had a much harder time in asserting control and weakening democratic norms and institutions. To begin with, the mass base of the US populist is distinctly limited. Although he retains the support of a large majority of Republicans, his overall public approval ratings have typically hovered near 40  percent. Moreover, Trump has had difficulty obtaining the support of many Republican Party elites. Rovira Kaltwasser notes that the new president, unlike Latin American populists, emerged through an established party over which he has limited control. Finally, the United States has much stronger and more effective political institutions than Latin American countries, which constrains Trump’s room for maneuver. In Chapter 2, Deegan-Krause examines what lessons can be extracted from the experiences of two East-Central European populists: Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. As this investigation shows, Trump’s actions and policies resemble those of Mečiar and Orbán in important ways. Both of these leaders used a combination of populist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric to mobilize their supporters. As chief executives, they then sought to concentrate power, gain control of traditionally non-partisan institutions, and weaken horizontal accountability. Mečiar ultimately failed in his illiberal efforts, however, because he was unable to win a majority of legislative seats in Slovakia’s electoral system of proportional representation. By contrast, Orbán won a two-thirds majority in the legislature, because Hungary combines proportional representation with a first-past-the-post tier. In the country’s parliamentary system of government, this supermajority enabled the power-hungry populist to carry out sweeping constitutional reforms. These illiberal changes, along with Orbán’s dominance of his own party, helped him establish political hegemony and gain control of non-partisan institutions. As Deegan-Krause suggests, Trump’s position appears to be closer to that of Mečiar than Orbán, while being weaker than both East-Central European leaders. After all, the US populist has limited influence in his own party, and in Congress more generally. Moreover, in contrast to Orbán, Trump has not invested resources in building up his own organizational capacity, either at the grassroots or the national level. The new US president also has few prospects for carrying out the constitutional

30

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

transformation that Orbán enacted, especially because the opposition is much more united in the United States than it has been in Hungary. Like Mečiar, Trump has had to face numerous investigations into his administration, and his efforts to impede these probes have further limited his popularity. These weaknesses will not prevent Trump from undermining democratic norms, which are informal, unwritten rules that do not strictly bind US presidents, as Deegan-Krause highlights. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Trump will have a lasting negative impact on the institutional framework and the overall quality of liberal democracy. Verbeek and Zaslove’s analysis of Italy and the Netherlands in Chapter  3 argues that, in these relatively well-institutionalized systems (compared to Latin America and East-Central Europe), populist movements have had both positive and negative effects on democratic quality. On the positive side, populist challengers in both countries, as well as in the United States, have given voice to sectors of the population that felt excluded, and have brought controversial issues, such as immigration reform, corruption, and free trade, to the policy agenda. On the negative side, however, populist movements have polarized the political debate, exacerbated ethnic tensions, and made governance more difficult in both countries. Populism has also reshaped party systems, weakening the mainstream parties in the Netherlands and producing a fragmented bipolar system in Italy. Nevertheless, as Verbeek and Zaslove acknowledge, democracy in Italy and the Netherlands has not been seriously undermined by populism, which bodes well for democracy in the United States. Although the parliamentary system prevailing in both countries enshrines a weaker separation of powers than US presidentialism, populist leaders have not been able to concentrate power, overhaul the institutional framework, tilt the electoral playing field, and persecute the opposition in the manner that populist leaders in Eastern Europe and Latin America have done. Institutions in Italy and the Netherlands have proved resistant to populist machinations. The proportional representation systems governing elections in both Italy and the Netherlands have allowed populist movements to win some representation, but they have made it difficult to gain the legislative majorities necessary to consolidate power and carry out sweeping reforms. As Verbeek and Zaslove note, Silvio Berlusconi, the most successful of the populist leaders in the two countries, did attack the judiciary and the media, but these institutions proved relatively resilient and played an important role in his eventual ouster. This suggests that the strength of institutions in developed democracies, such as the United

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

31

States, Italy, and the Netherlands, is a powerful antidote to populism. The Italian and Dutch experiences also show that populist movements tend to breed imitators, however. Thus, Verbeek and Zaslove caution that the populist sentiments stirred up by the Trump presidency may persist long after he leaves office, perhaps giving birth to a second generation of populist leaders. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the United States, examining what threat Donald Trump poses to democratic norms and institutions in the country. In Chapter 4, Bonikowski argues that the US leader has employed a dangerous combination of populist, authoritarian, and ethno-nationalist appeals in his campaign and since taking office. This strident and hostile rhetoric, which has included attacks on journalists, political opponents, the judiciary, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has frequently violated democratic norms. Bonikowski therefore worries that the opposition will be tempted to engage in similar violations once it comes back to power, especially because the Republican Party has only rarely censured these norm violations, allowing Donald Trump to establish a problematic precedent. Bonikowski is particularly concerned about the threat to democracy posed by Trump’s ethno-nationalist appeals, which have included attacks on immigrants and affirmative action policies and a travel ban on people from some Muslim countries. The president’s xenophobic rhetoric and policies have emboldened his white nationalist supporters and have reconfigured what is considered acceptable in everyday discourse. Bonikowski fears that, once ethno-nationalist cleavages are activated, they are not likely to disappear; indeed, they could even deepen in the event of a national security crisis. Moreover, he suggests, such cleavages are likely to become increasingly congruent with partisanship, and could even lead to violent conflict in the worst-case scenario. Bonikowski acknowledges, however, that institutional checks and balances along with Trump’s meager popular support and limited influence in the Republican Party may constrain the president’s excesses. The chapter concludes that the political impact of Trump’s ethno-nationalist appeals will depend in large part on how the main parties respond to them. In Chapter  5, Roberts presents a relatively pessimistic view of the threat to US democracy posed by Donald Trump. The author stresses how populists take over democratic institutions and convert them into instruments of partisan advantage that enable them to undermine minority rights and loosen institutional constraints. He acknowledges that the United States differs considerably from Latin America, where

32

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

populists took advantage of the collapse of the traditional parties and convoked constituent assemblies that overhauled the existing political institutions and enabled personalistic leaders to consolidate their power. Yet Roberts highlights that the US context offers some opportunities for populist machinations as well. Trump, like some of his counterparts in Eastern Europe, wields significant power, since the ruling party controls the legislature in addition to the executive branch. Moreover, the high level of party polarization in the United States has strengthened Trump’s popularity among his base and encouraged him to demonize his rivals and seek to politicize previously non-partisan institutions. Based on this analysis, Roberts argues that the fate of US democracy in the coming years hinges in large part on the behavior of the Republican Party. He sketches out three scenarios – populist bandwagoning, populist containment, and aborted populism – that could occur depending on how the GOP responds to Trump. For the latter two scenarios to prevail, significant numbers of Republican legislators would have to check Trump’s anti-democratic behavior or go so far as to abandon the president. In Roberts’ view, however, the most likely scenario is that GOP legislators go along with Trump’s machinations to achieve their own political objectives and policy goals. The chapter argues that, to date, the Republican leadership has mostly exhibited bandwagoning behavior: the leaders fear antagonizing Trump’s numerous grassroots supporters and hope that the new president uses his control of the executive branch to promote their ideological principles and policy interests. Moreover, Roberts is concerned that a major domestic or international crisis could strengthen Trump and cause even more bandwagoning behavior. The Conclusion brings together the various insights of the previous chapters and sketches out the prospects for US democracy under President Trump. We argue that this populist leader is unlikely to do permanent damage to democratic institutions, for four principal reasons. First, US institutions are relatively strong and stable. The age-old constitution is notoriously difficult to amend, and the federal and presidential system of checks and balances provides many veto points that defenders of democracy can use to block any efforts by Trump to concentrate power and transform the institutional parameters to his advantage. Second, the well-established two-party system poses additional obstacles to Trump. Unlike most Latin American populists, the US leader did not create his own party but, instead, ran as the candidate of an existing party, which he does not control. Moreover, Trump faces a strong opposition party that commands considerable resources, in marked contrast to the fragmented

Introduction: Donald Trump’s Populism

33

and demoralized opposition parties that have faced most Latin American and East-Central European populists. Thus, Trump cannot count on the legislature to approve any proposals that would weaken democratic institutions. Third, the political and social cleavage structure in the United States is not conducive to a populist transformation. The electorate is highly polarized between Democrats and Republicans, and a substantial majority of voters staunchly opposes Donald Trump and his agenda. The working and lower classes, which have traditionally formed the core supporters of populists, represent a much smaller percentage of the electorate in the United States than in Latin America and East-Central Europe. Moreover, African Americans and Latinos, who have overwhelmingly opposed Trump because of his white nationalist appeals, constitute a significant proportion of the lower strata. Thus, Trump will have a very difficult time obtaining the commanding popular support that other populists have used to concentrate power and transform their countries’ institutions. Fourth and finally, Trump did not face an acute crisis when he took office. The economy, for example, was in relatively good shape, with low levels of inflation and unemployment and solid economic growth. Thus, the new president could not boost his popularity by resolving an economic disaster, as a number of populists – such as Alberto Fujimori and Carlos Menem – have done. In the future Trump could potentially benefit from a national security crisis, such as a major domestic terrorist attack. But these incidents, whose occurrence is unpredictable, tend to provide only brief boosts in popularity for presidents, if they supply any at all. Although President Trump will probably not be able to overhaul democratic institutions in the United States, he will most likely continue to violate democratic norms. Indeed, he has already intervened in traditionally non-partisan institutions, ignored financial conflicts of interest, made racially charged and xenophobic appeals, and denounced the news media, his opponents, and even members of his own party in extraordinarily harsh terms. But, in our view, these norm violations are not likely to set a precedent and usher in ongoing deterioration. Future presidents will have little incentive to emulate the governing style of a president who has low public approval ratings and no major legislative accomplishments apart from tax reform. In fact, Trump’s norm-breaking behavior could easily lead to a democratic backlash in which the leaders of both parties agree to enact reforms designed to prevent future violations of democratic norms.

34

Kurt Weyland and Raúl L. Madrid

Thus, on balance, our view is relatively optimistic. Donald Trump will, no doubt, seek to undermine democracy in various ways, but his lack of popular support and the strength of US parties and institutions will impede him. Liberal democracy in the United States will survive, and may even come away from the Trump era rejuvenated and stronger than before.

1 Dealing with Populism in Latin America Lessons for Donald Trump’s Populist Presidency in the United States* Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

Introduction To the astonishment of academics and pundits alike, Donald Trump won the US presidential election held on November 8, 2016. Given that his campaign was characterized by unprecedented levels of political incorrectness and fierce populist rhetoric directed against the establishment, many thought that he had limited chances of electoral success. His discourse sometimes resembled that of the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Marine Le Pen in France. For instance, in his campaign speech in Florida on October 13, 2016, Trump claimed that “[t]he establishment and their media enablers wield control over this nation through means that are well known. Anyone who challenges their control is deemed a sexist, a racist, a xenophobe and morally deformed.” In the same speech, Trump also argued: The corrupt establishment knows that we are an existential threat to their criminal enterprise. They know that, if we win, their power is gone and returned to you. The clouds hanging over our government can be lifted, and replaced with a bright future – but it all depends on whether we let The New York Times decide our future, or whether we let the American people decide our future. * For helpful suggestions on previous versions of this chapter, the author would like to thank all the participants of the conference “Trump’s Populism  – Lessons from Latin America and Europe” held at the University of Texas at Austin on September 22, 2017, and particularly the organizers of this conference, Raúl Madrid and Kurt Weyland, who provided very detailed comments. Moreover, the author would like to acknowledge support from the Chilean National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT project 1180020) and the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES, CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009).

35

36

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

Many believed that Trump’s populist language was a strategy to win the election and thus would disappear once he achieved power. Because the United States has a complex institutional system that requires continuous bargaining to reach agreements, intense confrontation is not a wise approach to governance. Nonetheless, Trump’s presidency has been marked thus far by constant attacks on the media and the maintenance of a radical rhetoric toward the opposition. The question that arises, then, is: what are the most useful strategies for dealing with Trump’s administration and avoiding the erosion of the liberal democratic regime? This is a common question in Latin America, since the region has experienced the rise (and fall) of several populist forces with controversial legacies (de la Torre and Arnson 2013; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017a). In contrast to other places, populist leaders in Latin America have often been able to win elections and stay in power for years. Although it is true that they normally foster the incorporation of sectors that are excluded from society, one should acknowledge that they also defend majority rule at all costs and are at odds with the basic rules of public contestation (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014b). In consequence, there are several examples of populist rule in the Latin American context, and it is possible to examine these cases to identify their impact on democracy and how oppositional forces have reacted. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that there is no one-size-fits-all approach when coping with populism (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), and scholars should keep in mind that there are different types of populist forces, particularly in terms of their organizational characteristics (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Roberts 2006b). While in Latin America there are many examples of personalistic populist leaders without strong party organizations behind them, in Western Europe there are many populist parties that exist and endure without a personalistic leader. As I  argue in this chapter, the organizational characteristics of the populist project have important consequences for the question of how to deal with the rise of a populist government. In fact, the case of Donald Trump is quite peculiar, because he is a populist personalistic leader who maintains an uneasy relationship with the Republican Party, as Weyland and Madrid highlight in the Introduction to this volume. At this writing, it remains an open question if the latter will transform into a party akin to the European populist radical right (Mudde 2007), exemplified by the Freedom Party in Austria and the National Front in France. After all, it could be the case that Trump is just the tip of the iceberg, since the long-term influence

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

37

of populism is usually related to its capacity to force mainstream political parties to adapt, thereby fostering a process of “creative destruction” (Rovira Kaltwasser and Zanotti 2018; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017b). The rest of this chapter is structured in four sections. I  begin by discussing the oppositional strategies employed during the first wave of populism in Latin America, which was distinguished by the existence of weak democratic regimes between the 1940s and 1960s. After this, we turn to the second wave of populism in Latin America, which emerged at the beginning of the 1990s after the resurgence of democracy in the region. Here I  focus the discussion on oppositional strategies that were used against the governments of Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000) and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–2). The third section considers the recent wave of radical populist leftist leaders in Latin America, who appeared at the turn of the new millennium and have been challenged with limited success by actors at both the national and international level. In the final section I turn my attention to Donald Trump’s populist government, and examine how the insights from the Latin American cases discussed shed light on current and future political developments in the United States. Dealing with the First Wave of Populism in Latin America Latin America was profoundly affected by the Great Depression of the 1930s, which aggravated the economic and social problems facing many of its countries at the time. As various scholars have noted, with the onset of the Great Depression Latin America went through a crisis of incorporation: a period of major conflict during which large sections of the population fought to obtain political and social rights (Collier and Collier 1991; Drake 2009; Roberts 2008). This struggle was fought not only by labor unions and leftist political forces but also by populist leaders, who, instead of using communist and socialist jargon, opted to advance a populist rhetoric centered on “the people” rather than on the “working class,” which was quite effective in mobilizing the urban and rural poor (Angell 1998). Paradigmatic examples of this first wave of populism can be found in Argentina (Juan Perón), Brazil (Getúlio Vargas), Chile (Carlos Ibáñez del Campo), and Ecuador (José María Velasco Ibarra). All these cases were characterized by the emergence of personalistic populist leaders, who allegedly were able to represent the “true” interests of

38

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

“the people” and therefore invested little energy in creating political parties (de la Torre and Arnson 2013: 17; Roberts 2013). By eschewing the construction of strong political organization, these leaders were able to maintain a direct relationship with their supporters and avoid the potential constraints of a political party (Weyland 2001: 13–14). The leaders of the first wave of Latin American populism maintained an ambivalent relationship with liberal democracy. Although they certainly facilitated the incorporation of impoverished segments of the population, they tended to tilt the rules of the game in their favor and were prone to mobilizing their supporters to force through reforms that were resisted by segments of both the establishment and the population (Roberts 2006b: 136–137). An important corollary of this was increasing polarization and the formation of strong partisan identifications for and against the populist experiments. The intensity of this conflict was so strong in some places that a new political divide between populism and anti-populism emerged, which became orthogonal to the classic left–right cleavage (Ostiguy 2017). Moreover, by promoting an “anything goes” attitude, populist forces ended up undermining the shared commitment to democratic political norms that is crucial for the endurance of democratic regimes. These populist experiences were pathbreaking, in the sense that they modified political culture by giving birth to new repertoires of action and contention that legitimized the transgression of norms with the aim of respecting the will of “the people.” Some of the populist leaders of the first wave had a military background (e.g., Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in Chile) and established links with the armed forces to try to secure governability during their administrations. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to equate the first wave of populism with the fascist experience in Europe (Finchelstein 2014; Germani 1978). Perhaps the most important distinction is that, in contrast to the fascist experience in Europe, the first wave of Latin American populist projects did not seek to construct a new elite devoid of bourgeois individualism, nor did it aim to forge a holistic nation in order to survive internal and external threats (Eatwell 2017). As Finchelstein (2017) has rightly noted, these Latin American populist leaders were aware of the fascist experiences, but, instead of embracing their dictatorial nature, they preferred to support a plebiscitary form of politics, whereby the periodic realization of elections was considered something essential and thus non-negotiable. One should not overlook, however, that populist leaders at that time maintained an ambivalent relationship with the armed forces, since they often tried to

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

39

win the military’s political support, with the aim of securing their own power rather than safeguarding the democratic regime. It is important to realize that the first wave of Latin American populism took place at a time when democratic regimes were weak. Significant segments of the population did not have the right to vote, and electoral abuses such as fraud and vote buying were widespread (Drake 2009: 163– 170). Moreover, civilian control of the military was the exception rather than the rule in Latin America during that period. Given that the rise of populist leaders signified a threat to segments of the elite, the latter frequently tried to mobilize the military to exercise pressure and sometimes even to orchestrate coups d’état. In other words, during the first wave, opposition to populist leaders usually involved the use of non-democratic mechanisms, which contributed to zero-sum conflict. Consequently, the formation of strong political identities in favor of and against populist projects was the result not only of the populist leaders themselves but also of the behavior of the opposition, which usually was keen to use all the mechanisms at its disposal to fight back. This means that an uncomfortable state of affairs occurred during the first wave of populism in Latin America: there was little agreement within society about respecting the liberal democratic rules of the game. Both populist and non-populist forces had an inclination to behave as disloyal actors toward the democratic regime. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to suggest that a crucial prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy was absent in Latin America during the period of the first wave of populism, namely legitimacy. Under these circumstances, coping with populism usually involved employing authoritarian tactics and dubious mechanisms of “militant democracy.” As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) have argued, the rise and fall of Latin American democracy is directly connected to the normative preferences of elites; that is, when they value democracy intrinsically, its chances of survival are much better than when they adopt an instrumental attitude toward democracy and endorse policy radicalism by any means necessary. Dealing with the Second Wave of Populism in Latin America After difficult years of economic decline and authoritarian rule, most Latin American countries underwent a process of democratic transition during the 1980s. Despite important differences in the modes of transition and the legacies of the authoritarian regimes, Latin American

40

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

electorates were not typically interested in supporting populist leaders, whose radical attacks on the establishment could put the consolidation of democracy at risk. Nevertheless, a few Latin American countries saw the rise to power of populist forces in the 1990s, in what became known as the second wave of populism. In contrast to the first wave of populism, this new wave was distinguished by the implementation of freemarket reforms, and thus offered a strange mixture of populist discourse and neoliberal ideas. By depicting themselves as outsiders interested in getting rid of the corrupt political class that was allegedly entrenched in the state, neoliberal populists were able to conquer the hearts and minds of millions of voters who were disillusioned with the state of affairs after the return to democracy (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996). Not by chance, the second wave of populism emerged in countries in which the postauthoritarian governments had implemented erratic and disastrous economic programs, particularly regarding the control of inflation (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014a). It is worth noting that, with the onset of the second wave of populism, a rich debate about the consequences of populism on democracy took place between scholars interested in Latin America. Particularly influential was the perspective of Guillermo O’Donnell (1994), who coined the concept of “delegative democracy” to portray the type of regime that the populist leaders that emerged in the early 1990s aimed to construct. According to O’Donnell, these leaders were able to concentrate a great amount of power by presenting themselves as the “true” interpreters of the will of “the people,” and therefore were inclined to get rid of any mechanisms of horizontal accountability that could diminish their political strength. Although O’Donnell claimed that this new type of regime could endure over time and meet the minimal criteria to be democratic, some populist leaders of the second wave were unable to stay in power for a very long period and others gradually dismantled their democratic regimes. Several scholars have criticized the impact of these populist leaders on democracy, since they tended to embrace a plebiscitarian form of politics that ended up not only eroding the rule of law but also jettisoning checks and balances (see de la Torre 2000; Carrión 2006a; Panizza 2000a; and Weyland 1996). In the following paragraphs I  will focus on the strategies used by the opposition in dealing with a successful and a failed populist leader: Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, respectively. This comparison provides an interesting contrast, since the former was capable of limiting the power of his adversaries to

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

41

the point that he ended up being reelected and building a competitive authoritarian regime in Peru, while the latter was ousted from government through an impeachment process that contributed to the consolidation of the democratic regime in Brazil. The success of Fujimori in contrast to the failure of Collor de Mello is directly related to the fact that both countries were experiencing a serious hyperinflationary crisis, but only the former was able to overcome this critical situation effectively. This outcome reinforces Weyland and Madrid’s argument (see the Introduction) about the extent to which a major crisis can open up a window of opportunity for the electoral breakthrough of populist actors, but their electoral consolidation over time hinges upon their ability to master the crisis successfully. In addition, this comparison suggests that, the longer a populist leader stays in power, the greater the chance that the democratic regime will erode or even break down. After all, Fujimori clearly had enough time and political power to enact reforms that paved the way for the destruction of Peruvian democracy, whereas Collor de Mello did not have sufficient time and failed to secure enough power to implement institutional changes that might have endangered Brazilian democracy. At the end of the 1980s Peru was facing a dramatic economic and political situation. On the one hand, the Peruvian economy was on the brink of collapse due to unmanageable levels of public debt, growing pressure from international financial institutions that had stopped lending, and the emergence of hyperinflation. On the other hand, the Shining Path guerrilla movement was becoming increasingly powerful in rural and urban areas, to the point that public security became one of the main concerns for the voting public. As a consequence, the 1990 presidential election in Peru took place in very exceptional times. Although he was previously a completely unknown figure, Fujimori rose to prominence in the electoral race. He was a political outsider, who portrayed himself not only as a clean actor who wanted to get rid of “the corrupt establishment” but also as an authentic representative of “the common people.” Through this discourse, he heavily criticized the elitist nature of Mario Vargas Llosa, a famous intellectual who touted a neoliberal modernization program as the only way to solve the deep crisis that the country was facing. To the astonishment of most observers, Fujimori finished second in the first round and won the runoff election comfortably. Fujimori was a political neophyte without a strong political party behind him, and thus nobody knew with whom he would govern. Moreover, his party, Cambio 90, controlled only 32 of the 180 seats in

42

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

the lower house of Congress and 17 of the 62 seats in the upper chamber (Roberts 2006a: 93). Once Fujimori came to office, he unsettled the establishment by rapidly adopting a draconian free-market adjustment plan (Stokes 2001:  50–53). Even though this policy was resisted by certain political forces and various civil society organizations, it helped to put the Peruvian economy back on track and thus helped stabilize his rule. As Tanaka (2005:  263) has pointed out, “Fujimori succeed in a confrontational strategy … because he was able to stop hyperinflation, an achievement that enabled him to build a coalition and consolidate his power.” In fact, the success of his economic project facilitated the formation of an alliance with two de facto powers: business groups and the military. Whereas the former were in favor of economic stability and privatization, the latter was pleased to receive funds and political backing for its fight against the Shining Path guerrilla movement. In addition, polls show that Fujimori was able to secure strong public support due to the disappearance of hyperinflation and the undermining of the terrorist threat (Carrión 2006b). Given that, in a relatively short period of time, Fujimori had crafted a coalition of support at both the mass and the elite level, he had enough power to push further, and in April 1992 he undertook what has become known as the “autogolpe,” or self-coup. This measure consisted of closing the national parliament with the argument that the congressmen were “unproductive charlatans” and that there was a need for a “government of emergency” (Conaghan 2005:  29–30). After the self-coup Fujimori increasingly relied on Vladimiro Montesinos, an obscure figure in charge of Peru’s intelligence service, who helped the president co-opt his allies and control his opponents. Thanks to his ability to successfully combine “carrot and stick” measures, Fujimori was able to stay in power until 2000. The impact of his administration on democracy was devastating, however: he implemented institutional reforms that allowed him to govern without constraints, fostering the systematic violation of democratic procedures (Tanaka 2005). In consequence, there is no doubt that the self-coup was a watershed, after which Peru should be classified as a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Loxton 2012). Why didn’t Fujimori establish an authoritarian regime similar to the one that General Augusto Pinochet had constructed in Chile in 1970s? As Levitsky and Way (2010: 161–170) have convincingly argued, a full-blown dictatorship was not established in Peru due to the response of the international community to the 1992

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

43

self-coup. Because foreign governments and transnational institutions threatened sanctions against Fujimori, he opted to write a new constitution, which was approved in a referendum in 1993, and hold new elections in 1995, which he won easily, in large part thanks to his control of the state apparatus and his overwhelming popularity at the time (Conaghan 2005: 90–92). Nevertheless, when the Fujimori administration pursued a third consecutive term in 2000, pressure from abroad was much stronger than before. At that time there was mounting evidence of human rights abuses committed by the regime, as well as efforts to co-opt and intimidate the opposition (McClintock 2006). This certainly played an important role in the fall of Fujimori, who, despite winning the 2000 election in a rigged process, had to resign at the end of the year because of leaked videotapes revealing the vast network of corruption created by his administration. The collapse of Fujimori’s regime was as abrupt as his ascent to power. To understand this, one must consider that, even though Fujimori crafted a coalition of support at both the mass and the elite level, he never made a serious effort to build a strong political organization. He constructed a new political party for each of the elections in which he competed (1990, 1995, and 2000), and consequently, after his resignation, there was no organizational base for a viable successor to continue the Fujimorista project (Roberts 2006a). In summary, the collapse of Fujimori had less to do with the capacity of the opposition and much more to do with outside pressure and the organizational weakness of the Fujimorista project. The rise and fall of Fernando Collor de Mello offers an interesting contrast to the example of Alberto Fujimori. As I will briefly explain, the Brazilian case reveals that, if populist leaders are not able to master the crises that catapulted them into power, nor develop a broad coalition of support at both the mass and the elite level, the opposition may be able to oust them from power. At the end of the 1980s the specter of hyperinflation was haunting the Brazilian economy, and the 1989 presidential race was marked by strong polarization. By creating a personalistic electoral vehicle and advancing an anticorruption platform, Fernando Collor de Mello was able to present himself as a new and unsullied actor in tune with “the people” and at odds with “the establishment” (Moraes Valença 2002: 125). Unexpectedly, he obtained a bit less than a third of the vote in the first round of the presidential election, while Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva came in second. Given that the rise of the latter represented at that time a major threat to conservative forces and thus might have put the survival of Brazilian democracy at risk (Weyland 2005:  95), Collor de

44

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

Mello was able to win the election, thanks to the support of an array of constituencies seeing him as the lesser evil. In contrast to Fujimori, who switched to neoliberalism only once he came to office, Collor de Mello advocated the implementation of free-market reforms during his campaign. Although center-right forces enjoyed a majority in both chambers of congress, Collor de Mello made little effort to build a coalition in parliament. Instead, he opted for a confrontational strategy, issuing a series of presidential decrees that allowed him to enact the “Collor Plan”: a package of neoliberal reforms seeking to generate growth and ensure inflation control (Panizza 2000b:  184– 185). But, in contrast to the policies implemented by Fujimori, the ones enacted by Collor de Mello failed to deliver the expected outcomes. The economic situation quickly started to worsen, and this dragged down the approval ratings of the new president (Cheibub Figueiredo 2010: 114–115). Moreover, Collor de Mello’s measures were resisted by a large faction of the business community, particularly those groups with interests in the industrial sector. In addition, the adoption of a confrontational strategy alienated many actors who were not necessarily against the policies of his government but, rather, at odds with his arrogance and uncompromising position. With declining approval ratings and limited elite support, Collor de Mello faced challenging prospects. Those who elected him were not loyal followers but, rather, voters who expected that he would be able to improve the economic situation. By his second year in government Collor de Mello realized that, to break the deadlock, it was necessary to form a coalition in parliament, something that he achieved by the end of 1991 (Power 2000: 193–194). Yet the new strategy came too late. During the first two years in government he had made far too many adversaries keen on ousting him from power. The tipping point was the outbreak of a corruption scandal related to his presidential campaign. Collor de Mello did not enjoy strong support at the mass or the elite level. As a result, the impeachment process initiated by parliament was a chronicle of a death foretold. Collor de Mello announced his resignation at the end of 1992, before the Senate could vote on his removal from government, and the vice-president, Itamar Franco, then assumed the presidency of Brazil. In contrast to the case of Fujimori in Brazil, Collor de Mello’s fall has less to do with international pressure and much more to do with the failure of his government to deliver. Because he was not able to improve the economic situation of the country and did not have the capacity to form a coalition of support at either the mass or the elite

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

45

level, his administration faced growing challenges that paved the way for its breakdown. In addition, Collor de Mello made little effort to construct a political party, and Brazilian opposition forces proved to have enough strength to deal with an unpopular president. This is why Collor de Mello, unlike Fujimori, disappeared from the political scene without sorrow or glory. Interestingly, Collor de Mello’s impeachment contributed to the consolidation of the democratic regime in Brazil (Fleischer 1999). Instead of mobilizing the military, oppositional forces employed institutional mechanisms to fight against a corrupt president, and this certainly contributed to the development of shared political norms on how to deal with a political crisis. Dealing with the Third Wave of Populism in Latin America Toward the end of the 1990s Latin America entered a new political era, marked by the coming to power of moderate leftists and radical populist forces. While the former consisted of political parties that were inclined to enact gradual reforms and respect liberal democracy, the latter were headed by personalistic leaders who sought profound economic changes and pursued the construction of what they called a radical democratic model (Panizza 2009; Weyland, Hunter, and Madrid 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011b). The emergence of this new wave of radical populist actors has been categorized as the third wave of populism in Latin America (de la Torre 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014b). Why did these populist leaders come to power in some countries of Latin America and not in others? To answer this question, one should remember that the Andean countries underwent a crisis of democratic representation during the 1990s: massive discontent with established political parties paved the wave for the rise of radical leftist forces, which promised to get rid of the corrupt establishment and revamp the political system (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006). Despite some important differences between the cases of the third wave of populism, they are all characterized by the implementation of deep institutional changes that tended to have a negative impact on democracy. This is particularly true with regard to the realization of constitutional reforms, which have weakened horizontal accountability and thus facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of the president. Another important similarity between these instances of populism is that they were prone to advance harsh rhetoric and strong sanctions against

46

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

their enemies, undermining pluralism and leading to political polarization. As we will see, this toxic dynamic was the result of the actions of both populist forces and their enemies, which often took radical positions that did not help to foster democratic dialogue. Moreover, these radical populists emerged during a period of rising international prices of oil and gas, which in turn facilitated strong economic and social policy performance. In the following paragraphs the three main cases of this type of populism are described. The most well-known example of the third wave of Latin American populism is Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. He was a young lieutenant who became famous for orchestrating a failed coup in 1992, in which he criticized “the establishment” because of its corruption and inability to take care of the real problems of “the people.” After two years in prison Chávez was released, and he promptly built a populist electoral platform in alliance with several leftist groups, which enabled him to win the 1998 presidential election, thereby marking the downfall of the two-party system that had distinguished Venezuelan democracy (López Maya and Panzarelli 2013: 247–250). Chávez’s rhetoric was relatively moderate at the beginning (Buxton 2009: 149). The radicalization started at the turn of the new millennium, to a certain extent as a reaction to the strategies adopted by the opposition, but also as a result of Chávez’s gradual accumulation of power, starting with the new constitution of 1999 and then a package of decrees in late 2001. Two incidents were crucial. First, some sectors of the opposition established an alliance with factions of the military, which conducted a coup against Chávez in April 2002 and declared Pedro Carmona  – a member of the business community with dubious democratic credentials – the interim president of the country. The military rebellion failed, however, as the armed forces were divided, and after two days in prison Chávez was reinstated as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Second, with the aim of forcing the resignation of Chávez, several actors at odds with the government organized a general strike between December 2002 and February 2003. The strike targeted the whole economy, but the main aim was the stoppage of production at the stated-owned oil company, PDVSA. Nevertheless, the government was able to resist and to take control of PDVSA in a massive intervention, during which the government purged many employees and installed loyal supporters at the company. By backing a coup against Chávez and endorsing a general strike, the opposition not only contributed to increasing political polarization but also showed little respect for the democratic rules of the game (Abi-Hassan

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

47

2019). This behavior helped deepen the growing radicalization of the Chávez regime. Consequently, he adopted a new approach that consisted in the formation of a strong base of support at the mass level through the strengthening of the so-called Bolivarian circles (Hawkins 2010:  166– 194) and, later, the creation of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela: PSUV). At the same time, he also crafted a coalition at the elite level by recruiting loyal military officers and establishing links with business groups aligned with the regime (Gates 2010:  94–110; López Maya and Panzarelli 2013:  258–262). Chávez’s strategy was successful, and it reveals one of the mechanisms whereby personalist populist governments can endure:  by controlling the state and building links with civil society. In fact, Chavismo in Venezuela has been able to survive the death of Chávez, because the latter not only constructed grassroots organizations from above but also was able to build a coalition with elite groups (the military in particular) that control several branches of the state. By contrast, Alberto Fujimori in Peru neither constructed a political party nor had the capacity to establish durable links with the business community and the military, so the “Fujimorista” project collapsed after his resignation (Ellner 2003: 153–155).1 Interestingly, it seems that the Venezuelan opposition learned an important lesson from its past behavior. Key figures within the opposition began to acknowledge the relevance of respecting the democratic rules of the game, and this facilitated the formation of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática: MUD), a broad coalition of political parties that, despite dissimilar policy positions, share the idea that it is crucial to join forces to restore democracy in Venezuela (Cannon 2014). This learning process among the opposition has gone hand in hand with increasing support from external actors worried about the authoritarian tendencies of the administration of Nicolás Maduro (Hawkins 2016:  12–15). Transnational civil society organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been playing a leading role in denouncing arbitrary actions committed by the government against the opposition. Furthermore, the arrival of Luis Almagro 1

Despite the rapid collapse of the “Fujimorista” project, Keiko Fujimori (Alberto’s daughter) has been able to gradually construct an electoral platform that is quite successful in electoral terms. Her rise is related to her capacity to build a partisan identity anchored in favorable memories of Alberto Fujimori’s government and its legacies (Meléndez 2014). As I will argue later on, populist forces that have stayed in power for several years and implemented major reforms supported by important segments of the population have produced long-lasting political identities that have restructured their political systems.

48

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

as secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) has marked a new era within the institution, which is nowadays extremely vocal about the Venezuelan government’s violations of human rights, monopolization of the media, and detention of political prisoners. While it remains to be seen if growing international pressure will lead to the breakdown of the Maduro administration, there is no doubt that external actors are playing an important role in supporting the opposition. Rafael Correa in Ecuador is another of the cases that are normally seen as paradigmatic of the third wave of Latin American populism. Despite his position as finance minister in the government of Alfredo Palacio, in the 2006 presidential election Correa was able to present himself as a political outsider who was interested in getting rid of “the corrupt establishment” and enacting radical reforms demanded by “the people.” One cannot understand Correa’s electoral victory without acknowledging that the political class was highly delegitimized in Ecuador, and this permitted him to advance fundamental institutional changes in a relatively short period of time (Conaghan 2011: 262–264). As soon as he came to power Correa spared no effort in pushing for the adoption of a new constitution, which was drafted by a constituent assembly in 2007 and ratified in a plebiscite in 2008. In accordance with the rules of the new constitution, presidential elections were held in 2009, and not only did Correa win but his party also obtained an overwhelming majority in Congress. Similarly to what happened with Chávez during the first years of his presidency, Correa’s second term (2009–13) was marked by favorable international oil prices. This allowed him to secure strong approval ratings thanks to high rates of economic growth and increasing welfare expenditures (Montúfar 2013: 306–312). Securing economic and political stability is a major achievement in a country as unstable as Ecuador, and Correa used this success to form a coalition at both the mass and the elite levels. On the one hand, he implemented a plebiscitarian presidency characterized by a permanent campaign strategy, which helped him to mobilize public support (Conaghan and de la Torre 2008). On the other hand, Correa established a tacit alliance with various business groups that benefited from the policies implemented by the government (Bowen 2014: 108–109). At the same time, the Correa administration employed with great skill various co-optative and repressive measures against civil society organizations and social movements, and also intervened in the media to boost Correa’s presence and silence his opponents (de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos 2016).

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

49

External pressure on the Correa regime has been milder than in the case of Chavismo in Venezuela. Part of this is related to the fact that Correa pursued bold foreign policy initiatives viewed sympathetically in leftist circles (e.g., protecting Julian Assange and Edward Snowden). His administration invested little energy, however, in creating either a strong political party or grassroots organizations that would keep the populist project alive once Correa was no longer in power. This means that support for the “Correista” project hinges much more on maintaining a redistributive apparatus than on strong organizations in civil society and his control of the ruling party (de la Torre 2013: 45). It is not a coincidence that an overwhelming majority of the electorate was against allowing the indefinite reelection of the president (Conaghan 2016: 116). As a result, Correa didn’t participate in the February 2017 presidential election, and his vice-president, Lenín Moreno, was able to win only in the runoff election. This result reveals declining support for the “Correista” project, and signals not only its likely implosion but also Correa’s inability to control the ruling party. Finally, it is also important to consider the case of Evo Morales in Bolivia. He is usually depicted as another of the key examples of the third wave of Latin American populism, whose electoral success is directly related to the development of ethnopopulism (Madrid 2008). The latter should be thought of as the combination of traditional populist appeals, including the Manichean distinction between “the people” versus “the elite,” with an inclusive ethnic discourse that emphasizes combating racial discrimination against indigenous people. This inclusionary ethnopopulist appeal is at the core of the success of the Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo:  MAS), the political party led by Morales, which has been in government in Bolivia since 2006. The “winning formula” of MAS has consisted in developing a populist rhetoric that, due to its inclusionary appeals, has been able to conquer the hearts and minds of different constituencies, which share the opinion that the time has come to get rid of the established political forces that have governed the country in the past. Not by chance, Evo Morales has appointed a well-known white intellectual as his vice-president, and the party has made conscious efforts to recruit candidates with different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds (Madrid 2012: 60). After the approval of the new constitution via referendum, the country went through general elections in 2009 and 2014, and both times Evo Morales and MAS obtained overwhelming majorities. Although it is true that the opposition remains strong in the lowland provinces of Bolivia,

50

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

it does not have enough electoral power to oust Morales. Moreover, his administration has also enjoyed an economic boom related to high international energy prices, and the surplus has been employed to expand social transfers, increase public investment, and broaden social policies (Gray Molina 2010). Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate about the state of democracy in the country under Morales. The Bolivian president has used protests to intimidate the opposition and has undertaken institutional reforms that undermine horizontal accountability, but, at the same time, he has generally respected civil liberties and has held periodic elections that have been relatively free and fair (Madrid 2011: 251–255). To understand why the Morales administration in Bolivia seems to have better democratic credentials than the governments of Chávez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador, it is important to reflect on the organizational characteristics of the populist project supported by MAS, particularly its capacity to limit the power of the president (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 57–58). As Anria (2013) has argued, MAS is a peculiar case of populism that is characterized by the articulation of three types of actors, who from time to time have disputes over the best course of action. First of all, Morales is a personalistic leader who undoubtedly plays a crucial role within MAS, but there is growing debate within the party about who should be the next in line. Second, MAS should be thought of as a political party built on organized popular constituencies in rural and urban areas. Third and finally, MAS is also supported by grassroots organizations and social movements, which despite their populist rhetoric have not issued Morales a blank check. The tension between these different actors works as a kind of internal “checks and balances” mechanism that limits the power of leader. In other words, “Morales is not in fact free to govern ‘as he sees fit,’ and some of the biggest constraints on him come from mobilized groups within his own political camp” (Anria 2016: 100–101, emphasis in original). Seen in this light, divisions among those who support a populist incumbent can work as a safety mechanism to prevent authoritarian backsliding. Dealing with Donald Trump’s Populist Presidency In the previous sections, I have analyzed the three waves of Latin American populism: classic populism, neoliberal populism, and radical populism. Despite some important differences between each of these waves, most instances of Latin American populism are characterized by the implementation of controversial reforms that tend to have a negative impact on

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

51

democracy. The Latin American experience reveals that populist forces usually foster the incorporation of disadvantaged groups, but the downside of this is the disdain for the norms of public contestation (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014b). Given that populist constituencies and leaders are inclined to portray their foes as illegitimate actors, they usually defend the will of “the people” by any means and therefore have little respect for oppositional forces. The consequence of this behavior is that the political battle is transformed into a zero-sum game in which it is almost impossible to reach agreements between the government and the opposition. In addition, from this analysis one can learn some important lessons about the ways in which oppositional forces have dealt with populist forces in power in the Latin American context. To begin with, if the opposition does not show a clear commitment to the liberal democratic regime, it will be inclined to employ undemocratic tactics that can end up generating more ill than good. By supporting an “anything goes” attitude, oppositional forces become actors semi-loyal to democracy, and this type of behavior might well lead not only to a radicalization of the populist actors in power but also to a steady erosion of the shared norms necessary to sustain a democratic regime over time. This has been particularly true in those Latin American countries marked by weak institutions, which can be easily modified by incumbents to strengthen their own power and undermine the influence of the opposition. Furthermore, I have also shown that populist actors can stay in power for a long period if they are able to build a coalition of support at both the mass and the elite level. This means that, if sectors of the opposition are co-opted by the populist administration, the latter has much better chances of survival. By contrast, if the opposition is able to remain united and develop strong grassroots organizations disdainful of the populist administration, the latter will have to devote its efforts to delivering public goods (e.g., increasing welfare expenditure) and fulfilling campaign promises (e.g., economic growth) in order to gain public approval. If the populist administration is not able to accomplish this, however, it will face growing pressure from above and below that will threaten its durability. As Weyland and Madrid rightly maintain in the Introduction, major crises offer a window of opportunity for the electoral breakthrough of populist forces, but their electoral consolidation depends on their ability to master the crisis in question successfully. We should also reflect on the fact that the survival of populist administrations hinges upon their organizational capacity. The Latin American experience reveals that populist governments usually rely on

52

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

personalistic leaders who do not build partisan vehicles, and that fact diminishes their ability to find viable successors. Nevertheless, populist forces that have stayed in power for several years, and implemented major reforms supported by important segments of the population, have produced long-lasting political identities that end up restructuring the political system. Consider, for instance, Peronism versus anti-Peronism in Argentina, Fujimorismo versus anti-Fujimorismo in Peru, or Chavismo versus anti-Chavismo in Venezuela. These examples reveal that populist leaders who undertake major transformations, as demanded by their supporters but deeply resisted by their opponents, can have a durable legacy: the formation of a polarized electorate divided into two camps, with clear political identities, that transcend the life of the populist leader. Under these circumstances, political competition transforms into a struggle between two rival partisan groupings, which are divided not only because of programmatic differences but also, and mainly, because of the existence of durable psychological identifications that generate strong in-group and out-group distinctions (Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Another important lesson is that international actors can play an important role when it comes to supporting the opposition. Given that populist forces in power are prone to tipping the rules of the game in their own favor by, for instance, regulating the media and purging institutions, the opposition can use the international arena to denounce abuses by the government. In turn, foreign governments, international organizations, and transnational advocacy networks have the possibility of not only providing financial, organizational, and moral resources, which are crucial for those who are fighting against populist forces in power at the national level, but also exercising direct pressure against the regimes. Influence from abroad is also important in Latin America because of the existence of strong links with the Western world and the capacity of the latter to exert pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010). This lesson is probably less relevant in the case of Trump, since the United States is one of the most powerful countries of the world. Trump’s accession to power also implies that external democratizing pressures from the West will decline and the United States has lost legitimacy in defending democratic values at the global level. To what extent can the lessons provided by the Latin American experience shed light on the case of Donald Trump’s populist government? Before answering this question, we need to disentangle the peculiarities of the Trump phenomenon in comparison to the instances of Latin

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

53

American populism discussed. This is an important exercise, because there are at least three significant differences between Trump and the Latin American populist experiences. First, as we have seen above, populism in Latin America is usually articulated by personalistic leaders who are not tied to existing political parties. In this regard, the case of Trump is quite different, since he can be classified neither as an insider nor as an outsider but as an amateur. Amateurs should be thought of as “politicians who are new to politics but compete in traditional parties” (Carreras 2012: 1456). Given that amateurs have neither political experience nor involvement with political parties, they are well equipped to advance populist appeals to attack “the establishment” and defend the will of “the people.” Trump represents a type of populist leader who can be labeled an economic entrepreneur: someone who presents himself as a self-made businessman who allegedly became rich because of his talent despite “the corrupt politicians,” and who is thus able to govern for “the people” rather than for “the elite” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 70–71). Trump’s populist rhetoric alienates many leaders of the Republican Party, however, whom he calls dishonest politicians out of tune with the wishes of the electorate. This represents a major problem for Trump’s administration. He has little control over the party that supports him, and many actors within the party are at odds with him. The conflictive relationship between Trump and the Republican Party means that the president has limited capacity to pass bills in Congress and thus to govern adequately. In other words, the disagreement within the Republican Party toward its own president is beneficial to those who are against Trump, since he is not free to govern “as he sees fit.” A second aspect that is worth mentioning is that the United States has a two-party system that is well entrenched, whereas party systems in Latin America tend to be much more fluid, and some countries in the region have even seen the collapse of their party systems (Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014). Although populist outsiders are not uncommon in US politics, they are doomed to fail in presidential elections, since the Democratic and Republican Parties dominate the electorate. If the Republican Party had not nominated Trump as its presidential candidate for the 2016 election, he would not have had a chance of winning the presidency. In addition, the United States exhibits not only an entrenched two-party system but one that is marked by growing polarization. This means that US voters “today are much less likely to defect from their party in presidential or congressional elections than in the past because their partisan and ideological orientations are much more consistent than

54

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

in the past” (Abramowitz 2010:  9). Growing polarization implies that the electorate is becoming increasingly divided into two groups that have very different views and assess political reality through their own lenses (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). As I will show later, this is not a trivial issue, because intense polarization means that partisan voters behave as loyal supporters of those who belong to their own party and resolute opponents of those who belong to the opposition party. Finally, there is a third aspect that it is important to emphasize when comparing populist actors in power in Latin America and the United States. Whereas Latin American countries are characterized by relatively weak institutions that can be transformed by presidents with strong public support, the United States is distinguished by strong institutional checks and balances that seriously diminish the maneuvering room of the president regardless of how strong his or her approval ratings are. Thus, it is implausible to expect that Donald Trump will be able to copy the approach of Latin American populist presidents such as Chávez in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador and Morales in Bolivia, who convoked constitutional assemblies to draft new constitutions, which were subsequently approved in referendums. This does not mean that institutional constraints are so strong that Trump’s administration will have no opportunity to harm US democracy. Although it is true that the United States is marked by an array of independent and non-elected agencies that have enough autonomy to counter the president, as Roberts indicates in Chapter 5, Trump may be able to undermine democracy by using his appointment powers to pack the courts and place personnel loyal to him at the head of these agencies. What is even more worrying is that many of the personnel appointed by him will stay for a long period of time after Trump himself has gone. After this short examination of the peculiarities of Trump’s populism vis-à-vis the Latin American cases of populism, it is time to turn our attention to the opposition strategies against Trump in the United States today. Since at the moment of writing he has been in power for a little over one year, we can assess only a short period, but it is still possible to identify some general trends. To what extent has Trump been able to build a coalition of support at both the mass and the elite level? By addressing this question, one can have a better appreciation for the maneuvering room of the opposition, as well as the potential challenges that this populist administration might experience in the near future. Let us begin by looking at the mass level. An obvious fact worth recalling is that Donald Trump won the presidential election notwithstanding the fact

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

55

that Hillary Clinton obtained more votes in absolute terms. Although the difference was not huge (Clinton got approximately 3 million more votes than Trump, which is equivalent to 2 percent of the total vote), this reflects how divided the American electorate is. Nevertheless, Trump’s approval ratings have experienced a gradual decline: at the end of January 2017 52 percent of the electorate disapproved of Trump, but this number had increased to 60 percent in December 2017, before falling to 55 percent in June 2018.2 If his approval ratings remain low, the opposition will face a favorable electoral scenario, particularly if the Democratic Party is able to stay united and nominates a candidate who is able to mobilize voters who, independently of their own partisanship, are disenchanted with Trump. If we consider the political identity of voters, however, the data reveals a very uneven pattern: more than 80 percent of Republican supporters like Trump and less than 10 percent of Democratic supporters typically approve of the president. Because of the adoption of polemical measures, such as the withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement and the reduction in the number of migrants and refugees allowed from Muslim countries, supporters of the Republican Party see the president as fulfilling the promises made on the campaign trail and thus are prone to approve of Trump’s job performance. By contrast, given that supporters of the Democratic Party are at odds with the policies promoted by Trump during the campaign and that he is trying to implement now in government, it is unsurprising that they disapprove of his administration. The key point, then, is that approval ratings in the United States are driven by partisanship (Abramowitz 2010: 27–29), and there is no indication that this trend might change due to the rise of a populist president. Quite the contrary, everything suggests that Trump will continue to have strong approval ratings among those who identify with the Republican Party and will therefore be able to maintain a coalition of support at the mass level. Since he retains the endorsement of Republican voters, the leaders of the GOP have limited incentive to attack Trump directly or back his impeachment. It is also interesting to note that, among independents, Trump’s approval ratings have declined from about 40 percent in January 2017 to the low 30s in December 2017, before rebounding to the upper 30s

2

Data on Trump’s approval ratings can be found on the homepage of Gallup (http://news .gallup.com/poll/203198/presidential-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx), as well as on the homepage of FiveThirtyEight, which summarizes the findings of different polls (https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings).

56

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

in June 2018. If this number remains low, Trump will be in a difficult situation, because independents are not necessarily apathetic citizens but, rather, informed voters who are active in politics without clear preferences for a specific party brand (Dalton 2013). At the same time, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) reveal that, because increasing polarization has transformed partisan labels into something negative and oppressive in the United States, citizens eschew expressing their partisanship. This doesn’t mean that independents are citizens without opinion and political preferences, however. What is troubling for Trump is that he has problems winning the approval of this segment of the electorate, which could hurt him and the Republican Party in the coming elections. As a consequence, Democrats should make an effort to reach independents and to mobilize non-voters, who have a negative image of Trump. For instance, the 2017 Senate special election in Alabama reveals that attacking Trump’s radical rhetoric can be an effective strategy for the Democratic Party to mobilize new voters and obtain the support of ethnic minorities. What about Trump’s capacity to secure a coalition of support at the elite level? This is probably the most fragile part of his presidency, particularly because the president doesn’t control the Republican Party. To understand the difficult relationship between Trump and the GOP, it is important to consider the increasing tension between a moderate and radical faction within the Republican Party. While the agenda of the former is closer to the ideology of mainstream right parties (i.e., the defense of the free market and conservative values), the latter’s agenda is nearer to the position of populist radical right parties (e.g., the promotion of xenophobia as well as tough law and order policies). Although it is true that this tension is part and parcel of the GOP, the emergence of the Tea Party has brought this tension to the forefront (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Behind the rise of the Tea Party are grassroots organizations that are not controlled by the GOP, as well as some elite groups (e.g., conservative business groups such as the Koch Brothers) that provide financial and organizational resources (Formisano 2012: 81–96). Nevertheless, Trump has alienated most elite actors that support both the Tea Party and the GOP. As Judis (2016: 74) has indicated, “Trump’s stands against neoliberal economics and neo-conservative foreign policy deeply offended upper crusts of business leaders, think tankers, writers, editors, columnists, and television and radio hosts” who historically have supported the Republican Party. Moreover, many of Trump’s nominations have increased the conflict with the GOP establishment. There is no better example of this than the

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

57

selection of Steve Bannon as the White House chief strategist, since he is a polemical figure who favors economic nationalism over free trade and holds strong anti-immigrant positions. Despite Bannon’s expulsion in August 2017, Trump has not been able to craft a strong coalition of support at the elite level. As we have seen in the Latin American cases discussed in this chapter, the more a personalistic populist leader alienates the establishment, the more he needs active support at the mass level and the party level to secure governability. Trump has limited capacity to control the Republican Party, however, and the data discussed above reveals that his approval ratings at the mass level are still quite low. At the same time, important sectors of the business community have shown signs of discontent with Trump’s racist rhetoric and his policy proposals. Nevertheless, Trump was able to finish his first year in government on a high note, by uniting the Republican Party elite, the business sector, and Tea Party supporters behind a major tax reform that massively reduced the corporate tax rate. Whether this legislative success will lead to a durable partnership between the different conservative forces in the United States remains unclear, as Trump’s behavior is quite unpredictable. Certain conservative elite groups could easily turn against him, for instance, over the modification of trade policies and the imposition of tariffs on various products by the Trump administration. It is also worth asking what role three crucial actors will play in the resistance to Trump: the Democratic Party, the media, and civil society organizations. So far, it seems that the Democratic Party has not been able to develop a clear strategy for dealing with Trump. Part of the problem lies with the internal divisions in the Democratic Party. As with the GOP, there are a moderate faction and a radical faction, which are trying to pull the Democratic Party in different directions, and this has generated a sort of stalemate. The radical faction is pursuing a confrontational strategy against Trump and seeking to move the party toward leftist programmatic positions, yet the moderate faction is trying to build bridges with the more pragmatic actors working for the Trump administration while keeping the Democratic policy profile intact. Because of these internal divisions, the Democratic Party has not been able to advance a clear strategy against Trump’s populism. The 2018 mid-term elections and the 2020 presidential election will probably reveal whether one of these two factions is able to take the lead and impose enough discipline to adopt a clear strategy to cope with Trump. By attacking Trump’s radical rhetoric and espousing pluralism, the Democratic Party can mobilize new voters and foster the participation of minorities. This

58

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

means that the electoral success of Democrats depends on their ability to get the votes not only of partisans but also of independents who are at odds with Trump’s populist presidency. Another actor that is important to examine is the media, which plays a crucial role in democracy since it permits the airing of different arguments and standpoints, which in turn influence the political agenda as well as the decision-making process. When it comes to dealing with populism, media outlets can opt to attack populist actors or establish implicit alliances with them and endorse their political agenda (Rovira Kaltwasser 2017:  495). As we have seen above, leftist populist forces in contemporary Latin America have undertaken major institutional reforms to limit the autonomy of the media and generate new media outlets that are sympathetic to the populist administrations (Kitzberger 2010). Because of institutional obstacles in the United States, Trump will probably not succeed in silencing media outlets that are at odds with his administration. In the United States there is a well-established complex of conservative media outlets, however, that has served as a platform for the populist Tea Party (Skocpol and Williamson 2012), and they are largely backing Trump’s administration. At the same time, the president himself uses Twitter and Facebook to mobilize and maintain a direct relationship with his base. It remains to be seen if this approach will allow him to maintain a permanent campaign strategy similar to the one adopted by Rafael Correa in Ecuador (Conaghan and de la Torre 2008). In addition, there is little doubt that several media outlets have been very vocal in criticizing Trump and denouncing several irregularities of his administration. This is particularly true in the case of independent journalism, which to a certain extent has established a tacit alliance with several civil society organizations – another actor that is worth considering when thinking about how to cope with populism. Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) have been crucial in monitoring Trump’s government. Thanks to their active role in denouncing Trump’s assaults on civil liberties, they have been able to reinforce his unfavorable image in the public sphere. One should not forget, however, that the US electorate is deeply polarized, and independent journalism and progressive civil society organizations may not have much influence in certain sectors of society. There are enough media outlets in the United States that provide the type of information that Trump’s supporters want to hear and consider real.

Dealing with Populism in Latin America

59

Conclusion The Latin American experience offers some important lessons for pondering the fate of Donald Trump’s populist presidency. By presenting a brief analysis of the fate of various populist chief executives in Latin America, I have shown that their success depends on several factors (e.g., the building of a coalition of support at the elite and mass level, the effective mastering of a major crisis, tight control of the ruling party, etc.) that are not present in the United States today. As a consequence, one could conclude that Trump does not have enough strength to consolidate power and will therefore disappear from the political scene sooner rather than later. Although this is likely, it would be a mistake to assume that Trump’s departure means that everything will return to normal. After all, the Latin American experience tells us that the rise of populism is directly related to the health of the democratic system. When the latter is not working properly and large segments of the electorate do not feel well represented by the political establishment, there is fertile soil for the emergence of populist actors who politicize the issues that mainstream political forces have  – deliberately or otherwise  – neglected. US democracy is indeed a political system with serious shortcomings, including the undue influence of money in politics (see, e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010), rising social inequality despite economic growth (see, e.g., Piketty 2014), and increasing polarization (see, e.g., Abramowitz 2010). These shortcomings will not vanish after the departure of Trump, but might become even more profound, and, in consequence, it is not far-fetched to suggest that US democracy is entering a highly uncertain era. Last but not least, the Latin American experiences of populism reveal an uncomfortable truth that also applies in the case of Trump’s populist administration in the United States:  when populists have the capacity to implement reforms that are demanded by important segments of the electorate, their supporters are often willing to curb the opposition to prevent these reforms from being overturned in the near future. In other words, it is wrong to assume that the whole electorate endorses liberal democratic values, because more than a few voters are in favor of a government that responds to their needs even if they are clearly illiberal and potentially undemocratic. If anything has become clear from the rise of Trump, it is that practitioners and scholars should seriously consider whether the prerequisites that are necessary for the very survival of democracy are present in the United States or not.

2 Donald Trump and the Lessons of East-Central European Populism Kevin Deegan-Krause

No one is incomparable, not even Donald Trump. But Trump is unusual, and some of the best comparisons come from unexpected places. Since most concerns about Trump’s presidency focus on the consequences of his populism, his nationalism, or his authoritarianism, it makes sense to turn to East-Central Europe. That region’s recent history provides some notable examples of leaders with populist, nationalist, and authoritarian views who threatened democracy by reshaping political institutions in their own interest. Can these tell us anything about the contemporary United States? A closer look at the two East-Central European countries where populist governments had the most sustained hold on power  – Vladimír Mečiar’s premiership of Slovakia between 1994 and 1998 and Viktor Orbán’s premiership of Hungary since 2010 – offers useful insights into a wide range of dangers posed by such leaders and some effective responses to these dangers. In an attempt to make appropriate comparisons that help illustrate Trump’s potential threats to democracy, this chapter examines the political style and governing methods of Mečiar and the consequences for democracy, then does the same for Orbán. The chapter concludes by analyzing Donald Trump within the same framework and identifies the most significant lessons of the comparison. Both Mečiar and Orbán used shifting combinations of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism, along with strong and effective political party organization, to gain and then hold onto political power. Mečiar’s authoritarian aspirations ultimately exceeded his grasp, and, after his government descended into a reactive abuse of authority, it ended with electoral failure. As a result, Slovakia’s democracy survived the populist assault. Orbán, by contrast, has achieved a more sustainable 60

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

61

dominance of his political system thanks to a more favorable institutional environment and a more subtle mastery of the institutional mechanisms of power. Hungary has therefore turned into an illiberal democracy, and, after Orbán’s reelection in early 2018, the country seems headed toward competitive authoritarianism. Trump exhibits populist rhetorical tendencies that are even stronger than those of his East-Central European counterparts, and he seems to share their nationalist and authoritarian outlook. But the new US president faces different constraints from both the external political environment and his own innate capacity. Despite the similarities in tone, Trump’s stabs at political power have little in common with the systematic institutional progression of Orbán, whose institutional and electoral environment proved ideal for gaining tight control, or early Mečiar, who lacked Orbán’s electoral bonus and ultimately failed to free himself from oversight. Since Trump faces an institutional environment with less scope for dominance, and since he has shown little interest in or adeptness at the work of bending formal political institutions to his will, his efforts to avoid accountability have remained at the level of the defensive outbursts that marked the later stages of Mečiar’s premiership. But, as Slovakia’s history shows, authoritarianism is not the only danger. Democracy can take a long time to recover from a desperate leader with control over the executive branch and few scruples about how to use its power. A flail is a dangerous weapon. Mečiar in Slovakia: Democracy Survives Government Assault Vladimír Mečiar’s political aspirations dominated Slovakia’s first postcommunist decade. Claiming to wield power in the name of the Slovak people, he became increasingly hostile toward political rivals, and his push for control nearly overwhelmed the new country’s democratic institutional framework. Mečiar’s overreach sparked resistance among the remaining independent political institutions, which in turn pushed him to ever more extreme strategies. Eventually, however, opposition parties came together to win an electoral victory that ended Mečiar’s government, and thus rescued Slovakia’s democracy from the dangers posed by populism. Mečiar’s Populist Appeals Mečiar jumped into politics after the 1989  “Velvet Revolution” as a man of the people and maintained his populist reputation even after he

62

Kevin Deegan-Krause

had taken near-complete control of Slovakia’s politics. Physically strong and unimpressed by finery, he projected a forceful, common-sense air that appealed to the anti-communist dissidents enough to appoint him to the Interior Ministry and, shortly thereafter, the premiership. Mečiar was often glibly identified as a “populist” in the pejorative sense of “someone who is more popular than he has any right to be,” but his political strategy conformed also to scholarly definitions. Especially in his early years, Mečiar epitomized Weyland’s “personalistic leader” whose use of power rested largely on “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland 2001: 14). His political discourse frequently echoed Mudde’s ideology of a homogeneous “pure people” against an equally homogeneous “corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004:  543). In his frequent public rallies and personal appearances, Mečiar came particularly close to Taggart’s vision of populism, which sees the world divided between “us” and “them.” Populism so defined rejects “the forms and practices of representative politics” and hearkens back to “an implicit or explicit heartland – a version of the past that celebrates a hypothetical, uncomplicated and non-political territory of the imagination,” whose “natural constituency” is “unified, diligent and ordinary” (Taggart 2012). Some elements of Mečiar’s populism were so well developed that, even in power, he insisted on his “underdog” position against opponents, whom he characterized as both out of touch with ordinary Slovaks and in league with Hungary and its Western supporters, successfully “label[ing] his political opponents as privileged even when they were languishing in opposition” (Deegan-Krause 2012: 189). Although “populist” was perhaps the most common label applied to Mečiar, the strength of his populism went hand in hand with his ethnic appeals and his growing desire to govern without the interference of other political institutions. Over time his frequent references to “the people” became reserved exclusively for “ ‘the Slovak people,’ a population … defined in ethnic terms” (Deegan-Krause 2012: 186, emphasis in original). The association is not surprising, since nationalism shares populism’s emphasis on the integrity of a societal collective and on the threat from outside that collective. Ernest Gellner’s widely accepted definition of the nation combines common culture with a mutual recognition of that common culture and defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1). Hechter notes that such principles may thus involve not only the “peripheral nationalism” of minority groups, seeking

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

63

more autonomy, but also the “state-building nationalism” of majority populations, seeking “to foster homogeneity” by some combination of assimilation and expulsion” (Hechter 2001: 15–17). As the most prominent advocate of autonomy for the region of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia, and later as premier of the new, independent country that he helped create, Mečiar linked his fortunes to a particular vision of Slovakia based on ethnicity rather than citizenship. He focused in particular on the importance of the “titular” or “stateforming” (štátotvorný) ethnicity, claiming that the new state of Slovakia was primarily an entity of and for Slovaks. Other ethnic groups might be tolerated, but they were warned not to expect the same entitlements as the state-forming majority. At the same time, Slovaks who refused to embrace the dominant position of their ethnicity found themselves identified by the government as “ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘anti-Slovak’ ” (Fisher 2006: 111). The other basis for Mečiar’s populism was his increasing desire to avoid accountability to other power holders. This quest for autonomy appeared to strengthen over time into an authoritarian “mentality” that justified his desire to be “de legibus solutus, above the law” (O’Donnell 1999: 70) and “free from restraint” (Linz 2000: 51). Over time, Mečiar wove together these strands of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism into a rationale for exercising power without constraint: “Mečiar liked to portray himself as the father of the nation and his opponents as the enemies of Slovakia,” and used these national appeals to “overshadow” concerns about democracy and maintain his electoral support (Haughton and Fisher 2008: 441). It is the growing authoritarianism of his methods and the increasing ruthlessness with which he pursued political control that best define Mečiar’s rule during the last and longest of his three terms, when he held the premiership from 1994 to 1998. Mečiar and Democracy: Systematic Encroachment Meets Institutional Constraints The anti-communist movement Public Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu:  VPN) chose Mečiar as the premier of the Slovak Republic of Czechoslovakia after the first democratic elections in 1990 but removed him in 1991 after becoming uncomfortable with his increasingly independent and aggressive political style. Mečiar responded by founding a new party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko: HZDS), and returned to the premiership in 1992 with 37 percent of the vote and 49 percent of the seats. As premier, Mečiar negotiated

64

Kevin Deegan-Krause

Slovakia’s independence, but defections within his own party caused him to lose a parliamentary vote of confidence in 1994, turning him out of the premiership for a second time and leading, after several months, to the country’s third democratic election in less than four years. Facing a chaotic transition to freer markets and uncertainty over the future of the small new country, voters once again returned Mečiar to the premiership, this time with slightly fewer votes and fewer seats but with an even larger lead over a more fragmented opposition. Mečiar returned to government in 1994 with a vengeance, making full use of his prerogatives to enhance his power and taking advantage of the ambiguity of the untested laws and procedures of the newly created state. In its initial months in office, Mečiar’s government not only made maximum use of the government’s statutory power of appointment in areas such as broadcast media, privatization, and state administration but also “consolidated appointment power over positions that initially lay with the president, such as the military’s general chief of staff and the intelligence service director.” Then the premier “progressively whittled down the opposition’s representation on key supervisory committees” so as to eliminate the possibility of oversight in the strategic areas that it now controlled (Leff 1996: 42). The placement of allies in so many positions served the party’s tactical goals of distributing rewards to supporters. Moreover, it had strategic implications, because it “established the conditions for further violations of accountability and a further tilting of the institutional balance” (Deegan-Krause 2006: 35). Mečiar’s ability to push as hard as he did for political control in every possible realm depended heavily on his construction of a capable and loyal political party apparatus. The skills and priority that he devoted to securing his own organizational base were apparent from the beginning of his political career. After leaving VPN, he quickly built one of the strongest party organizations in the region, with numerous party clubs and branch offices across the country (many of which after 1994 were installed directly inside state administrative buildings). The defections of party leaders that briefly removed Mečiar from the premiership in 1994 also helped to rid him of intra-party rivals and offered instructive lessons on how to keep parliamentary deputies under control (including written pledges of loyalty by deputies, which were technically unconstitutional but had a strong deterrent effect). Backed by a unified party, Mečiar could act as a gatekeeper of state resources and thereby maintain a tight grip on his two small coalition partners. As a result, the premier managed personally to dominate all governmental and parliamentary activity.

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

65

Mečiar and Democracy, Part II: Reactive Abuse Contributes to Electoral Defeat By mid-1995 Mečiar had obtained the highest degree of control allowed by Slovakia’s institutional framework, but it was still not enough. Although he was in complete control of the executive and legislative branch, he continued to face a vocal parliamentary opposition, an outspokenly critical president, and an independent-minded constitutional court whose judges he could not buy or silence and who were protected by a constitution that he did not have the votes to change. Rather than accepting this lot, Mečiar responded with power. Having gained control of the intelligence services, the police, and the prosecutorial apparatus, as well as of their oversight bodies, he began to employ them directly in his political struggles. Mečiar’s opponents in the media and civil society found themselves subject to surveillance and harassment, members of the parliamentary opposition faced investigations, and at least one whistleblower died in a fatal explosion. Intelligence service agents tried to hobble the presidency with an ill-conceived kidnapping of the president’s son, and a scheduled referendum question on a directly elected presidency simply disappeared when officials removed it from the ballot at the government printing office. These machinations provoked a public outcry and revelations by public officials who retained the vestiges of institutional independence. Mečiar’s government sought to limit this fallout from its previous illegal efforts by further interfering in the legal process. Mečiar’s associates pressured civil service staff in the justice and interior ministries to shelve governmentrelated cases, and, unable to stop the high-profile investigation into the abduction of the president’s son, Mečiar repeatedly replaced prosecutors until he found one who was willing to rule it a “self-kidnapping.” When the presidency later fell vacant, Mečiar used his newly acquired presidential powers to issue a blanket amnesty for all involved in the kidnapping. These reactive efforts ultimately did little to extend Mečiar’s political control; instead, they seem to have actually contributed to his political demise. The use of the justice system against political opponents did not bother the core group of Mečiar’s supporters, for whom national survival had become bound up with the authority of the leader (the threat to the nation requiring decisive action). But many moderate populists and nationalists found it difficult to accept the increasingly jagged edges of Mečiar’s authority (Deegan-Krause 2006: 221–222). One of Mečiar’s coalition partners – a party with little organization of its own – also began to show the strain of rigid adherence to the government line and saw its

66

Kevin Deegan-Krause

voter base collapse. For those in opposition parties, private media, and civil society, the use of troublesome legal restrictions and targeted public criticism by the government-controlled media did have a chilling effect, but it also frequently backfired, strengthening the opposition’s resolve and helping to guarantee it support from Western European organizations. A  last-minute government effort to sabotage the opposition through a new electoral law proved particularly ineffective, and even became counterproductive. It encouraged opposition parties to coalesce into a more solid-looking force that could plausibly cast itself as a single electoral alternative (rather than a cluster of alternatives) and that made it more difficult to break ranks and join with Mečiar in a post-election coalition. The elections of 1998 were the critical moment for Slovakia’s battered democracy. The endurance of opposition parties despite Mečiar’s political pressure allowed the country’s proportional voting system to compensate for its centralizing constitutional system. Slovakia’s parliamentary system of government magnified the opportunities for institutional control by a parliamentary majority without the checks and balances of a full presidential system, but its proportional representation electoral system made such majorities hard to come by. Voters cast more votes for Mečiar’s than for any other party, but, weakened by the loss of a coalition partner and by new centrist rivals and facing a more unified opposition, the powerhungry premier lacked the votes to maintain his position. Although his takeover had often seemed uncomfortably close to complete, Mečiar never achieved the full hegemony he sought over Slovakia’s politics. The combination of a few institutional barriers, a resolute opposition, and Mečiar’s own overreach ultimately limited the damage he could do. Slovakia’s fledgling democracy survived intact, though not unscarred. Orbán in Hungary: Government Assault Tramples Democracy The decline of Hungary’s democracy has come as a late and unpleasant surprise. Whereas Slovakia’s democratic weakness showed itself early, even before the country’s independence in 1992, Hungary’s democratic trajectory by contrast shows a sharp reversal, from early successes and high expectations to weakness and then to near-collapse (Buzogany 2017). Political and constitutional changes beginning in 2010 represent a massive political change in a country whose democracy had been relatively stable. Signs of change were raised by some as the result of Orbán’s centralization of government and its willingness to play the national card

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

67

between 1998 and 2002. Moreover, the weakness of the 2006–2010 coalition governments headed by the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt: MSZP) veered into abuse of political and police power in the face of public protest. The real break, however, came with the post2010-election dismantling of democratic structures. These changes were not only unprecedented by Hungarian standards but even more thorough and comprehensive than most opponents had feared. The potential for such backsliding was woven into the structure of Hungary’s constitutional system, but the danger did not manifest itself fully until Viktor Orbán’s skillful political leadership used all the tools at its disposal in a disciplined fashion. As in neighboring Slovakia under Mečiar, Orbán’s post-2010 government in Hungary also exhibited a populism characterized by ethnically based nationalism and an authoritarian aversion to accountability. But the Magyar premier achieved far greater success in achieving his goals, thanks in part to the institutional setting, especially the winner-take-all components of Hungary’s electoral system (a system that Mečiar sought but could not deliver in Slovakia). Once he commanded a firm supermajority in parliament, Orbán not only used the new political tools in his arsenal but did so with more skill and confidence than had Mečiar. Consequently, the damage to liberal democracy has been more severe. Orbán’s Populist Appeals Mečiar dominated Slovakia’s politics in the 1990s and then faded away. Viktor Orbán came to political prominence even earlier and has stayed in Hungary’s political game ever since. Like Mečiar, Orbán has been frequently identified as a populist, and for many of the same reasons. From the early 2000s onward his rhetoric began to focus on “the people,” the ordinary men and women “who work hard, raise children, take care of each other, try to survive with dignity.” Orbán contrasted this “pure people” to an effete class of “new aristocrats, good-for-nothing fellows, who have never worked, have never struggled for something, who feel secure only in an artificial environment, are averse from the reality, because confrontation with reality shows how weak and helpless they are” (Enyedi 2015: 233). During the second half of the new millennium’s first decade Orbán also called for a more direct, organic connection between the government and its populace, expressed directly through referendums: In a democracy people have two choices. One is to go and elect representatives and then to trust them. But in Hungary people were misled, deceived, they cannot trust indirect democracy, therefore I  wouldn’t recommend this to Hungarians.

68

Kevin Deegan-Krause

The other option is to turn to the tools of direct democracy, instead of indirect democracy. This is the referendum, where I, as the people, can decide for myself on a number of issues. Not through politicians. (Enyedi 2015: 233)

Such direct appeals to ordinary citizens fit the definition of populism even better than Mečiar’s, because “the people” had fewer ethnic overtones in Hungary owing to its more homogeneous population. But Orbán’s populism had its own, different limits. While Orbán fiercely attacked his opponents as elites, he also showed less aversion to the idea of “elites” in general. According to Enyedi, “elements of elitist conservativism have never completely disappeared from the party’s discourse” (Enyedi 2015: 234). Orbán’s populism was also modified by the effects of his overwhelming victory in 2010, after which emphasis on certain populist “components of the party ideology,” such as referendums, were “phased out” (Enyedi 2015: 237) and replaced by a reliance on mail-and-return “consultations” with provocative questions but no obligation for the government to release or adhere to the results. The object of populist ire also shifted as Orbán, like Mečiar in the previous decade, attempted to square the circle of populism in power by attacking elites elsewhere: “By focusing its criticism on Brussels, on Washington or on the various international agencies, compared to which the government of Hungary was presented as an underdog, the party could continue to voice anti-establishment feelings even after it became the de facto political elite and even after it enlisted among its supporters the largest oligarchs” (Enyedi 2016: 14). According to Enyedi, Orbán’s ability to reconcile his party’s populism with longstanding elitist tendencies and new elite positions also depended on his skillful use of nationalism: “Nationalism is capable of this integrating function because, on the one hand, it is a majoritarian ideology, while, on the other hand, it expects from citizens some sort of contribution to the common cause in return for rights within the community. In this sense, it allows for defining the circle of legitimate decision-makers rather narrowly” (Enyedi 2016:  21). As with Mečiar, national issues played a critical role in Orbán political appeals. As part of his party’s shift away from its initial libertarian, pro-Western position, it began to emphasize the plight of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia and to pursue policies that would grant them Hungarian citizenship (and not, incidentally, give them the right to vote). The message of ethnic Hungarian “ownership” of Hungary was echoed in the new constitution written by Orbán’s party, which, like Slovakia’s 1992 constitution,

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

69

begins with a prominent “We” statement that identifies the authors as the members of the majority nation and continues for many paragraphs before mentioning other nationalities (Constitute Project 2011). The arrival of thousands of refugees to Hungary’s southern border in 2014 and 2015 allowed a new phase to nationalist appeals, which shifted the conversation from Hungarian populations abroad to the even more potent issue of non-Hungarian populations at home. In addition to the construction of a razor wire fence on the border with Serbia, the government also sponsored thousands of billboards that announced “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians” and “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws.” Since the government printed these signs in Hungarian, their effort seemed directed less toward shaping the behavior of migrants and more toward unifying Hungarians against the newcomers. At the same time, the government sent an official questionnaire entitled “National Consultation on Migration and Terrorism” to every adult Hungarian, with questions such as “There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?” and “Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?” (Hungarian Government 2015). Orbán and Democracy: Systematic Encroachment Overwhelms Weak Institutions While both Orbán and Mečiar were politically active from the beginning of the post-communist period, Orbán’s career developed over a much longer period of time and followed a slow path. Orbán began as part of the founding committee of the pro-Western and pro-democracy Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége: FiDeSz) in the late 1980s, and over several years consolidated power around himself, ultimately taking on the position of party president while transforming the party’s ideology and programmatic orientation. Under Orbán the emphasis in the party’s name shifted from “youth” toward connotations of “faith” (fidesz is the Hungarian spelling of the Latin fides), and its electoral appeals shifted successfully toward older and less resolutely democratic voters. After nearly fatal election results in 1994, the changes helped revive the party, and Orbán gained the premiership in 1998 in coalition with other conservative parties. In retrospect it is possible to see in Orbán’s first government some signs of his subsequent inclination toward centralization and executive authority,

70

Kevin Deegan-Krause

but the scholarly accounts written at the time do not mention fundamental abuses of power or violations of democratic norms (Kiss 2002; Baylis 2007). As well as striving to strengthen and centralize government within a fragile and fractious coalition, Orbán was also expending significant energy on the creation of a strong party organization, and (even more successfully than Mečiar) he managed the difficult task of forming an extensive structure while ensuring that it remained responsive primarily to the party leader. The party’s 1994 election debacle limited the influence of Fidesz in the mid-1990s but it also gave Orbán the opportunity to rebuild the party apparatus from the ground up, increasing its presence at the local level and working toward substantial membership involvement. While expanding the party’s local networks, Fidesz’s core leadership also developed a chain of command that could undermine the formation of any rival centers of power. Fowler describes the party’s “micro-management” and imposition of “internal unity” as sources of its strength in a period when activists from other, similar parties were looking for a new institutional home (Fowler 2004: 107). Fidesz brought in newcomers by establishing a large network of Civic Circles and other organizations, whose “amorphous structure served the prevailing antiparty sentiments well” and which “lacked internal formal procedures for accountability. Orbán, like Silvio Berlusconi, was the initiator, the leader and the only relevant politician of the movement” (Enyedi 2015: 232– 233). In the terms employed by Levitsky to describe Argentina’s Peronist party, Orbán managed to control the party’s extensive growth by infusing values of party unity and loyalty to the party leader into the expanding organization, rather than through a routinization of structure that might provide a foothold for rival party leaders (Levitsky 1998). Orbán’s party increased its vote share significantly in 2002 but the collapse of Fidesz’s coalition partners created space for a Socialist-led coalition, and, although in 2006 Fidesz again strengthened its vote share, the Socialists once more managed to form a coalition government. That government was almost immediately beset by major scandals and a significant economic decline, and it reacted in shady ways that sharply undercut its credibility. Facing a shattered MSZP, Orbán returned to power in 2010 in dramatic fashion. Fidesz not only won 53 percent of the vote, two and a half times that of its nearest competitor, but also achieved a 173-to-3 sweep of the first-past-the-post parliamentary seats, which magnified the party’s 53 percent electoral majority into a 68 percent share of seats in parliament.

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

71

After the 2010 election landslide, Orbán quickly set about “weakening the separation of powers and attacking judicial independence … and compromised accountability institutions that were once known for their independence and expertise” (Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 2015). Like Mečiar, Orbán began with a wholesale change in personnel, which he used to enable other, bigger changes. Orbán quickly moved on to comprehensive governmental restructuring as a means of deepening his party’s control. Whereas Mečiar used his small parliamentary majority with limited success against new but constitutionally protected bodies, Orbán’s constitutional supermajority was large and disciplined enough to undermine even government structures strengthened by two decades of institutionalization. With two-thirds support in parliament, Fidesz made frequent resort to constitutional change, amending the document 12 times in 12 months to remove “most of the institutional checks that could have stopped what the government did next” (Scheppele 2015). To ensure that constitutional interpretation would remain favorable, it also increased the size of the Constitutional Court, to make room for new, loyal justices, and it replaced other judges across the judiciary (Scheppele 2012). Ultimately, the party decided simply to replace the constitution in full and to do so in a manner that eliminated nearly all opportunities for oversight: “The new Fidesz constitution was drafted in secret, presented to the Parliament with only one month for debate, passed by the votes of only the Fidesz parliamentary bloc … Neither the opposition parties nor civil society organizations nor the general public had any influence in the constitutional process. There was no popular ratification” (Scheppele 2013: 43). The new constitution exempted the prime minister and leaders of the party from nearly all institutional accountability mechanisms. Subsequent changes in the electoral law further limited the potential for opposition parties and voters to exert electoral accountability. Those outside the government who continued to call the government to account experienced increased pressure as parliament placed limits on the activities of private universities, police conducted financial raids on nongovernmental organizations with foreign funding sources, and firms close to Fidesz purchased independent media outlets and reoriented them toward supporting the government. Throughout this process, Orbán’s constitutional majority in the legislature allowed him to impose such pressure by changing the legal framework itself. The Hungarian premier therefore had less need to skirt the law and risk the police and security service abuses that would, in turn, require subsequent cover-ups and

72

Kevin Deegan-Krause

evasions, whose disclosure tainted the final years of Mečiar’s government. According to one of Orbán’s prominent critics, this control at the constitutional level made it extremely difficult to criticize government abuse of power effectively: “It is invisible because it is the law itself … Paradoxically, from a democratic point of view, the problem is not so much whether people in government break the law but whether they keep it” (Bozóki 2015: 16). Unlike Mečiar’s story, Orbán’s is not over. In the 2018 general election Fidesz gained slightly less than 50 percent of the vote, but the electoral system translated this into 133 out of 199 seats, again giving Orbán a constitutional majority. Opposition parties gained only 14 of the country’s 93 single-member districts, despite an unexpectedly high level of cooperation that included both the left and the radical right. The seat totals of the government as against the opposition offer a dismal view. Given the combination of Fidesz’s genuine electoral support, the uneven playing field that the party has created in media and electoral resources (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2018), and its overt efforts to disrupt the opposition (Bojar 2016), there are few prospects for dislodging the party or even forcing it into a coalition. Furthermore, among the government’s first post-election legislative efforts was a broadly written prohibition on assistance to undocumented migrants that combines the government’s themes of national identity – against both migrants and insufficiently loyal Hungarians such as billionaire George Soros, at whom the law was specifically targeted – and restriction on opposition civic activity (Council of Europe 2018). The Hungarian case thus provides a blueprint for the transformation of populist leadership into illiberalism and then nationally oriented authoritarian rule. Electoral success built on a leader’s defense of the ordinary people against the out-of-touch incumbent elite, followed by systematic neutralization of all rival centers of power using each as a stepping stone to the next, sustained by appeals to national unity and defense of the nation against a hostile international elite and supported by the unity of a well-organized leader-driven party. The blueprint is no guarantee: Mečiar lacked both the institutional basis and perhaps some of the skill to succeed with it in Slovakia, and similar efforts in Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia have collapsed with the death of the leader or a buildup of frustration that operated outside democratic channels. Many see a similar set of circumstances emerging in Poland, and some have suggested that the United States is also at risk.

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

73

Trump in the United States: Democracy Survives Trauma Analysis of these problematic populist governments in East-Central Europe sheds significant light on the strengths and weaknesses of Donald Trump’s presidency. Trump’s public persona bears a close resemblance to both of East-Central Europe’s national-authoritarian populists, but he faces different political rules, and his political activity has taken a quite different course. An analysis of Trump according to the same framework used for Mečiar and Orbán reveals an extremely low capacity for political control but a wide range of opportunities for lasting damage to institutions. Trump’s Populist Appeals Like Mečiar and Orbán, Trump exhibits a combination of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism, as Bart Bonikowski highlights in Chapter  4. But Trump’s populism overshadows any other quality. His attacks on the establishment in politics and media turned “Drain the swamp” and “Fake news” into household phrases and allowed him to position himself as the defender of “the forgotten men and women of America.” His even more frequent call, “Make America great again,” is an explicit eight-syllable evocation of a heartland and a return to a mythical golden age. Indeed, as Weyland and Madrid make clear in the introduction to this volume, Trump makes for an unusual subject in the game of “spot the populist,” because he transcends the question “By what definition?” There are many conflicting ways to define populism, but Trump manages to fit every one. In addition to his populism, Trump comes surprisingly close to his East-Central European counterparts in his use of rhetoric around specific issues of “the nation.” Most of the broad themes and even many of the specific issues employed in East-Central Europe can be found in Trump’s own expressions: his focus on the ethnicity of his opponents, his claim to prioritize domestic interests over any others, and the constant emphasis on dangers to national sovereignty from outsiders and their allies on the inside. Though not spelled out as explicitly, Trump’s overall national positions are remarkably close to East-Central European notions of a “state-forming people.” These appeals link the interests of the country as a whole with those of the “American” population, largely defined as native-born and inclined toward those of European and Christian heritage (see Lieven 2012; and Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). As in the

74

Kevin Deegan-Krause

Mečiar and Orbán models, those who fall outside this grouping are characterized as guests, people who are potentially acceptable and sometimes even welcomed, but only in distinction to the dominant group and only to the extent that their distinct interests take a subordinate role. In policy terms, Trump has devoted a disproportionately high share of his efforts to nationalist issues, including multiple executive orders and legislative initiatives related to travel and immigration and his repeated attention to the proposed wall between the United States and Mexico. As in Slovakia and Hungary, however, these policies were of limited practical value and seemed designed more to raise consciousness of nationalist issues and send signals to potential voters than to have a direct impact on combating perceived national threats. Trump’s rhetoric on authority questions also resembles that of his East-Central European counterparts, featuring a rejection of institutional constraints on leaders and an assertion of the need for a leader with a firm hand. Trump’s speeches and advertisements claiming “I alone can fix it” bear striking resemblance to Mečiar’s 1992 campaign billboard “Only he can do it” (Nový Čas 2012). By the standards of American politics, furthermore, Trump has engaged in unusually sustained and sharp criticism of those who might block or criticize his decisions, especially judges and media outlets. As a candidate, Trump also made a variety of statements that appeared to condone violence by his own campaign supporters and the police, and as president he frequently praised aggressive efforts at political control by leaders in other countries, including the Philippines’ Duterte, Turkey’s Erdoğan, Russia’s Putin, and North Korea’s Kim as well as Hungary’s Orbán (Spiegel Online 2018). Trump and Democracy: Institutional Constraints Compound Executive Inattention Fortunately for democracy in the United States, most similarities between Mečiar, Orbán, and Trump do not extend from political rhetoric to political practice. Mečiar in his third term and Orbán in his second managed to gain comprehensive control over the mechanisms of government whereas Trump has not. Much of the difference is due to the American system of separated powers and relatively decentralized parties, whose importance Weyland and Madrid highlight in the Introduction and Conclusion to this volume. In particular, the checks and balances of US presidentialism impose tighter constraints on populist leadership than the European system of parliamentarism, which gives chief executives sustained by parliamentary majorities much greater clout. In addition, it is noteworthy

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

75

that Trump has not even made full use of the many powers that are directly and legally available to him. Partisan change of personnel was one of the first strategies of control in East-Central Europe but the Trump administration has showed relatively little interest in using its powers of appointment to positions in the US federal government. According to an ongoing monitor of appointments, the administration has made appointments at a slower rate than any recent administration, with over 50  percent of positions having no nominee more than a year after the new president took office (Washington Post 2018). Many of Trump’s Cabinet members did engage in active restructuring of their agencies and departments, but the efforts have tended to reduce personnel and capacity rather than increase it. This effort is consistent with the administration’s programmatic priorities but has little in common with Mečiar’s or Orbán’s determined and successful attempts to pack public agencies with their political supporters and thus turn these institutions into instruments for further abuse of power. In political terms, moreover, Trump’s closest appointments seemed designed more for insulation rather than organizational capacity or external influence. He drew his inner circle of aides largely from family, friends, and campaign leaders, and, of the few Washington insiders he nominated to key positions, many came from military rather than civilian circles. Trump’s legislative performance also differed dramatically from that of the East-Central European leaders, who maintained rigid, often obsessive control over party discipline. To a good extent, this meager record of lawmaking reflects the constitutional separation of powers between the presidency and Congress and long traditions of independence and sometimes outright hostility between the two branches. Moreover, the highly decentralized structures of American political parties make it hard for anyone, even a president, to build a dominant base within the party organization or create a strongly unified party caucus in Congress. Here too, though, Trump’s efforts fell short even by US standards. In his dealings with Congress, the US populist maintained a distinct distance, showing little interest in building cohesive support within his party’s congressional delegation and opting for one-off salesmanship and threats over long-term, detailed engagement. According to a detailed analysis by Edwards, Lacking a mandate but fortunate to serve in a unified government, Trump overestimated his public support, which was low, and Republican cohesion, which was imperfect. He also underestimated the impact of partisan polarization

76

Kevin Deegan-Krause

and Democratic opposition, which was strong. Moreover, the president lacked a strategic plan of his own, had few substantive proposals, and demonstrated little skill in garnering support. (Edwards 2017: 21)

Republican members of Congress remained bound to Trump as the president on “their” side of the aisle, whose signature was necessary on laws and executive orders but toward whom they otherwise held very little loyalty. Moreover, Trump’s tendency to intervene in primary campaigns to support those loyal to him did not produce widespread deference (and in many cases did not even elect Trump’s preferred candidate). Finally, Trump’s impact on the US party system bears little resemblance to Orbán’s or Mečiar’s. The tradition of two-party dominance in the United States made it impossible for Trump to follow Mečiar’s strategy of creating a new party, and the pronounced decentralization of American parties precluded Orbán’s strategy of reshaping an existing party to his liking. Nor did the US constitutional system give Trump much incentive to build long-term party structures: Unlike East-Central Europe’s parliamentary systems, in which leaders cannot gain or keep the premiership without at least the nominal support of their parties, the United States’ presidential system puts individuals into the executive with only indirect, campaign-related connections to other members of their own party. Here, again, Trump did less than most American presidents, making little effort to play a meaningful role in the party that supported his candidacy. This is understandable in part as the effort of an outsider candidate within the Republican Party to distinguish himself from other presidential primary candidates, most of whom were party notables with governorships or Senate seats. But Trump’s hostile attitude toward his own party went beyond his immediate opponents to include the leadership of both houses of Congress as well as the Republican National Committee, and his sharp attacks on “disloyal” Republicans continued after his primary victories. Even after winning the nomination and gaining the commitment of the party, his campaigns continued their use of non-traditional methods of organization, with a relatively high emphasis on large rallies and social media, and a relatively low emphasis on working with state and locallevel parties (Darr 2016). Even if the United States had a constitutional system resembling the parliamentary system of Slovakia or Hungary, Trump’s reliance on rhetoric and individual relationships over sustained institution building would leave him far short of Mečiar’s temporary political control, not to mention Orbán’s more lasting hegemony. Trump’s limits as a

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

77

political leader, while notable in human terms, only compounded the already overwhelming constraints enshrined in the American system of presidentialism, which make it difficult to imagine that any US populist could follow in the footsteps of his counterparts in East-Central Europe, especially Viktor Orbán. Certainly, however, a significant outside shock such as a major terrorist attack, foreign aggression, or economic crisis might temporarily change the landscape of American politics in Trump’s favor. But the example of temporary national unity and bipartisanship that followed the 2001 attacks would be unlikely to recur in the same form in the face of higher overall levels of polarization, exacerbated by an unusually polarizing president whose primary virtue is not stability in crisis. Nor do historical events repeat themselves without being modified by what happened before; accordingly, any new crisis will be shaped in part by the experience of 2001, especially the memories of moderates from the opposition party who came to regret jumping on the presidential bandwagon during that crisis. The analogy from East-Central Europe that better matches Trump’s position has less to do with Mečiar or Orbán than with other, less-known figures. The United States’ constitutional and party system often puts presidents and congressional delegations in a position akin to coalition partners in multi-party systems. Viewed from this perspective, Trump’s relationship with Congress resembles a particularly disparate EastCentral European government coalition in which Trump plays the role of the junior member, following the legislative initiatives of others. Given the new president’s relatively weak position and the Republican inability to muster a majority on many issues, his role is actually more reminiscent of a junior partner in a minority coalition. Instead of a Mečiar or an Orbán, Trump’s potential for exercising institutional political power more closely resembles that of Jozef Moravčík, who led a minority government in Slovakia in 1994, or the dozens of other executives in the region who left no lasting impact on the patterns of using institutional political power. Trump and Democracy: Reactive Abuse Threatens Vulnerable Norms Institutional political power, of course, is not the kind that Trump would be most likely to abuse, given the constraints imposed by the US system of checks and balances. Trump’s presidential style leaves him with less formal power than most executives but more freedom of action (which

78

Kevin Deegan-Krause

can, in turn, lead to other, unexpected kinds of power). He lacks lifelong personal relationships with other political leaders, shared experiences of political interaction, and long-term goals linked to an enterprise larger than his own. This makes ordinary political engagement and sustained cooperation extremely difficult for him, but it also gives him an unusual ability to disrupt political institutions. In this respect, he shares an important trait with both Mečiar and Orbán, many of whose political victories resulted from their willingness to push the rules until someone pushed back. In theory, such dangers should be less likely in the United States, a longstanding democracy with extensive legal scaffolding and many layers of tradition, but this secret to the system’s stability also includes a built-in weakness that can be exploited by outsiders, at least temporarily. In East-Central Europe, Mečiar discovered that the new post-communist institutions were sufficiently weak to make it worthwhile to probe them for openings that could yield political advantage. In the contemporary United States, Trump has succeeded in similar probing because some seemingly invulnerable formal institutions rest heavily on informal institutions  – norms and traditions  – that can be violated by those who simply do not care about the consequences. Because Trump is eager to gain political advantage in the moment alone – uninterested in past practice and seemingly unconcerned about the future implications – he has shown little hesitation about violating political norms. In the process, he has revealed how many basic principles of American democratic procedure are not clearly codified in law. His successes point to the United States’ unwitting dependence on consensual norms and traditions whose fragility is hidden in plain sight; yet this fragility is apparent to a populist leader who cannot or will not see the barriers that others take on principle. The combination of weak institutions and unconstrained leaders that prevailed in East-Central Europe put political opponents at a significant disadvantage. Like the covered-wagon driver under siege in a 1984 Far Side cartoon who cries “Hey, they’re lighting their arrows! […] Can they do that?” (Larson 1984: 108), opposition leaders in Slovakia and Hungary who expected business as usual found themselves quickly marginalized when business became unusual. As Mečiar’s opponents became more accustomed to his tactics, they turned more effective at anticipating his moves and responding effectively. Thus, having been caught off-guard by the sudden, unauthorized change in referendum questions in 1997, the opposition began warning voters to anticipate a 1998 “pre-election bombshell” in the form of falsified documents or electoral fraud. In the

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

79

United States, this kind of anticipation and pre-emption is essential for preventing abuse through the violation of informal rules, because the American constitutional system contains few if any control mechanisms for presidential behavior beyond attempts at persuasion. Presidents can be defeated, but they cannot easily be disciplined. Since US presidents cannot be forced to obey norms, the only viable response is to follow the Slovak pattern, imagining areas where the answer to “Can they do that?” might be “Yes.” As investigations of the Trump administration move forward, some effective anticipatory responses are under way. The firing of FBI director James Comey caught most people by surprise, which undermined a coordinated response, but the decision raised the possibility of more such steps. Trump’s opponents therefore responded by taking action to prevent the firing of Robert Mueller, the special counsel, and by cautioning Trump regarding pardons. These efforts show an improved awareness of how even major investigations depend on trust and presidential selflimitation. But, since Mueller’s removal has become the expected next move, a successful defense may now depend on anticipating a Trump initiative that is even more off-center. Given the dispersal of power in the US constitutional system, Trump will never become an Orbán, but, in his disregard for institutions and his willingness to save his own political skin by using every available instrument of power, he does still have the capacity to become an end-stage Mečiar. Faced with a series of damaging revelations that were spiraling out of his control, Mečiar spent the remainder of his term reacting to each problem and pulling every institutional lever that he had acquired over the previous years. He started parliamentary and prosecutorial investigations, used state media to intimidate opponents and create an alternate news environment, changed electoral rules, and tightened administrative procedures to make opponents’ lives difficult. Then he put undue influence on courts and police when these manipulations got out of hand and were revealed in public. Trump has not spent much time acquiring such extensive institutional powers, but the US presidency already includes at least some of them, others may be available in the private sector, and his behavior patterns show an alarming similarity to the Slovak premier fighting off his adversaries. In some ways, Slovakia offers a hopeful story, because its democracy, damaged when still young, first by Mečiar’s institutional encroachments and then by his reactive abuses, has managed to recover over time. But it is also worth noting that populist governments’ defensive reactions to

80

Kevin Deegan-Krause

accountability violations can continue to warp politics even if the leader is ushered from power. Mečiar’s self-protecting amnesties of 1998, to take one example, forced his successors into a series of no-win decisions. Should they let Mečiar and his government off the hook despite clear law-breaking? Or should they prosecute them in violation of a technically valid government amnesty decree? The unresolved dilemma forced a long and acrimonious political debate, which did not find any legal resolution until a constitutional majority of members in parliament finally reset the balance in 2017. Concluding Reflections: After Trump, Democracy Heads East? At some point, perhaps sooner, perhaps later (perhaps even by the time this book finds its way into print), Donald Trump will no longer be president. The main challenge then will be how to deal with what the US populist leaves behind. In addition to the current (and potentially additional) institutional chaos of his reactive abuses discussed in the previous section, Trump’s impact will not be the result solely of his erratic political agency but of what that agency reveals about the United States’ underlying political landscape. Like the reverse storm surges that briefly drain beaches during recent hurricanes, the Trump experience has revealed features that, although perhaps they should have been obvious, were hidden to many observers. There are no doubt many such revelations, but there are two features in particular that have for some time already been visible in the East-Central European cases of Slovakia and Hungary: the political potential of an ethno-nationalism oriented toward the “titular people,” and the unexpected political opportunities available to outsider candidates. In each of these areas, Trump himself certainly altered the terrain, but he may have made his biggest impact simply by exposing buried structures that were there before he arrived and that will endure once he leaves the scene. The question is whether the newly revealed landscape will favor Trump’s emulators or their opponents. What Next? The New Nationalism How Trump’s opponents respond to his ethno-nationalism will depend at least in part on how they react to other ways in which his efforts have altered the grounds of political competition. Trump is the first successful presidential candidate in recent decades, either in primaries or the general election, to link traditional elements of cultural conservatism – themes of

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

81

religion, personal morality, and law and order – to concerns about immigration (Sides 2017) and to doubts about international trade. None of these positions is new, but Trump’s “Make America great again” narrative managed to unify these multiple strands into a single, integrated position. In the process, Trump has effectively developed a viable American version of the East-Central European narrative of the “titular people.” Like Mečiar and Orbán, he has argued that policy should work to the benefit of hard-working, faithful, and native-born citizens, those after whom the country is named and to whom it properly belongs. Trump certainly did not invent “American” as an ethnic group, and his American ethnic nationalism and its policy corollary of “America first” have long played a role in American political discourse. But Trump has been its most effective proponent, and his increasingly strong statements about the size of the migrant flow and the criminality of migrants indicate how far he has expanded the range of politically viable ethno-nationalist positions. The long-term impact of Trump’s actions will depend on his continued ability to integrate his core supporters and on potential attempts to persuade additional followers. Geoffrey Layman and Thomas Carsey’s (2002) groundbreaking work on issue politics underscores the role of elite cues in aligning voters’ positions on otherwise unconnected or loosely connected issues, but the effort can cut in two directions. Done well, the emphasis on multiple issues can bring in voters who care about any one of these issues and induce them to care about the others as well, but, when done with too rigid or heavy a hand, it can reduce a candidate’s support only to those who support all the positions. Mečiar began his political career in Slovakia with effective conflict extension that embraced those who sought more autonomy vis-à-vis the Czechs, those who were afraid of the power of neighboring Hungary, and those who wished to avoid an extreme free-market economy. By the end of his third term, however, Mečiar’s increasingly intense linkage of nationalism and authoritarianism had alienated many of the less authoritarian nationalists, who drifted to other parties. Having identified and then crystalized the connection between these issues, Trump has helped to create a new configuration. Even if he does not manage over time to sustain the balance between vehemence and electability, others will certainly try to pick up where he leaves off. What Next? The New Newcomers East-Central Europe provides one final insight into the potential aftermath of the Trump presidency. This comparative lesson relates not to

82

Kevin Deegan-Krause

the strengthening of authoritarian control under Mečiar or Orbán but, rather, to the weakening stability of political competition that goes hand in hand with the sudden success of newcomers. At first glance, the emergence of new parties in East-Central Europe seems strikingly irrelevant to the enduring two-party system of the United States. But, as with the question of institutional fragility discussed above, a slight change in perspective shows the relevance of examples in Slovakia and Hungary, and other countries across the world. In these cases, established parties have seen the emergence of substantial new challenger parties that reject existing issue dimensions and campaign on a platform of “new versus old” and “clean versus corrupt,” with strong use of the anti-elite and antiinstitutional appeals that characterize populism (though often without populism’s vision of “the people” or “the heartland”). Since 1860 new parties in the United States have been consistently unsuccessful, thanks in part to the country’s institutional framework. Winner-take-all elections and the long tradition of two-party competition have, understandably, discouraged the supply of serious third parties; and the ability of America’s parties to choose a new public face in almost every four-year presidential cycle has diminished public demand for wholly new parties. Yet, in recent years, that cycle of internal renewal has seen a major shift toward primary campaigns among political factions that in many ways resemble East-Central Europe’s new parties. It is commonplace that American candidates run from “outside the Beltway” and “against Washington,” but in 2016 Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders raised such appeals to a different order of magnitude. They used new models of campaigning that avoided much of the expensive, fixed infrastructure of previous campaigns. Moreover, they relied on non-traditional methods of communication, strong charges of corruption against all regular politicians, and candidates who were able to make plausible claims to be different from ordinary politicians. Trump and Sanders fit perfectly within existing worldwide party trends – as long as one stops viewing the United States as having a twoparty system and instead imagines that it has two distinct party systems. At the level of presidential candidates, the Republicans and Democrats are electoral worlds in their own right, with recognizable, competing subdivisions (Silver 2015), some of which have deep institutional roots while others do not. Within the “Democratic party system,” the insurgent new party of Sanders challenged but could not quite overcome the established party backing Hillary Clinton. In the “Republican party

Lessons of East-Central European Populism

83

system,” the new party of Trump emerged with a plurality over other internal factions, some established and others new. Few would put “endless novelty” on the list of ways that Donald Trump threatens the United States’ political system, but the cycle of constant newcomers that he may represent has changed East-Central European politics in ways that we are only now beginning to understand. The anti-establishment candidates who constantly rotate into and out of East-Central European politics  – often businessmen and reality TV stars, as well as journalists, comedians, musicians, and other outsiders – respond to a genuine desire for a more responsive, cleaner political sphere. Democratic systems are now more open than before, but, in their ostentatious rejection of the value of experience, these newcomers have rarely delivered on their promises. In fact, they have often made things worse, either blocked by systems that they do not understand well enough to change or captive to those unelected advisors with the experience to navigate the environment (Jay and Lynn 1980). Research also suggests that newcomers exhibit shorter time horizons and less effective policy choices (Simmons 2016). Trump’s performance may inoculate some voters against a preference for newcomers, but it has also shown that unconventional candidates can achieve a surprising degree of success. A series of outsiders – a Trump followed by an Oprah Winfrey or a Mark Cuban or a Jon Stewart – could introduce a new destabilizing element in American politics even if they run under the existing Republican and Democratic labels.

3 Has Populism Eroded the Quality of European Democracy? Insights from Italy and the Netherlands Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove*

Introduction Populism is by no means a new or a fleeting phenomenon. While populism in Europe seems to be relatively recent, it has had a longstanding presence in Latin American politics, dating back to Peronism. In fact, Latin American countries such as Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have witnessed a populist surge since the 1990s, similar to Europe. The recent election of Donald Trump in the United States demonstrates the global nature of populism. Given the persistent presence of populism, even in well-established democracies, the precise relationship between populism and democracy becomes a pertinent question. In particular, the question is often raised whether populism poses a threat to democracy, as the Introduction to this volume explains. Paradoxically, populism is in its essence of a democratic nature, because its point of departure is the ultimate right of the sovereign people to govern (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; and Urbinati 1998). Indeed, conceptualizing democracy without reference to the people is inconceivable. Almost all definitions of democracy, from electoral notions (e.g., Schumpeter 2013 [1942]) to more radical versions of democracy (e.g., Pateman 1970), rest on the sovereignty of the people. The picture becomes more complicated, however, when we place populism within the context of liberal democracy. First, to the extent that democracy is equated with the protection of societal pluralism, populism

* We would like to thank Luuk de Cock and Anna Napoletano for their valuable work as research assistants.

84

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

85

often seems to be in conflict with liberal democracy, given that it is critical of pluralism and minority rights. Second, because liberal democracy entails some form of procedural justice, it may be at odds with populism. This is especially the case given populism’s emphasis on popular sovereignty, which may assign priority to the direct will of the people over procedural justice (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 83). Since contemporary democracy is liberal in nature, the pertinent question is whether populism constitutes a threat to liberal democracy. In this chapter, we conceive of populism as a thin-centered ideology. All populist parties have a Manichean conception of politics: politics is seen as a battle between the pure people and the corrupt elite (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Populist parties differ, however, in their notions of who constitutes the people and the elite: radical rightwing populists tend to have a nativist idea of the pure people, whereas left-wing populists point to the exploited (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; March 2007), and market-liberal populists think in terms of the honest, hard-working citizen, whom they view as oppressed by the overly bureaucratic welfare state (see Sawer and Laycock 2009). In turn, politicians and liberal intellectuals constitute the wicked elite in the eyes of radical right-wing populists, whereas left-wing populists lambast the global financial elite, and market-liberal populists condemn bureaucrats and welfare state politicians. Accordingly, despite their common song of the people versus the elite, populist parties borrow from other ideologies across the political spectrum to complement their populism (Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). This chapter seeks to assess the extent to which populism threatens liberal democracy by employing the set of criteria developed by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017:  83), who distinguish between four positive and four negative potential effects of populism on democracy. We apply these criteria to two parliamentary democracies, Italy and the Netherlands. We have chosen these two countries for several reasons. First, populism has been relatively successful in both Italy and the Netherlands. Italy has experienced three waves of populism, which have included three distinct parties. Populism began in the 1980s with the emergence of the Northern League (Lega Nord: LN), grew in size with the rise of Forza Italia (FI) in the 1990s, and has experienced a resurgence since 2009 with the formation of the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle: M5S). Although populism came rather late to the Netherlands, it has had a constant presence since the emergence of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the 2002

86

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

elections. The populist upsurge in the Netherlands then continued with Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid: PVV). Dutch populism is now experiencing a third wave with the Forum voor Democratie (FVD), led by Thierry Baudet.1 Second, the dominant populist parties in both countries, FI and the LN in Italy, and the PVV in the Netherlands, have had governmental experience. Silvio Berlusconi, the head of the FI, is the only populist leader who became prime minister of a Western European country; he managed to hold this powerful position, off and on, for about a decade.2 Consequently, for an investigation of populism’s impact on liberal democracy, the Italian case is especially instructive. The LN, meanwhile, served as Berlusconi’s main coalition partner. Similarly, Wilders’ PVV in the early 2010s helped sustain a Dutch government through a detailed support agreement. Thus, populist actors in both Italy and the Netherlands are large enough to have a substantial impact on democracy, allowing us to apply Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s criteria. Third, although the two countries have both had important populist movements, they differ substantially in two respects, allowing us to identify specific conditions that may shape the effect of populism on democracy. To begin with, the Netherlands and Italy have different party systems:  whereas accommodation prevails among Dutch parties, even across the left/right political spectrum, left–right confrontation runs high in Italy. In addition, these two countries vary significantly in the timing and political context of the emergence of their populist parties. These differences allow for particularly interesting inferences on the possible consequences of populism for democracy. Fourth, Italy and the Netherlands have an important institutional similarity that offers an interesting contrast to the case of Donald Trump. Because both of these European countries are parliamentary democracies, the analysis below can elucidate the impact of this system of government, compared to the presidential system in the United States. The chapter is structured as follows. First, we outline our criteria for assessing the positive and negative impacts that populism can have on liberal democracies. Second, we place Italy and the Netherlands within the context of European populism. Third, we trace the three waves of

1

2

There are other actors that may be considered populist, such as the Socialist Party (SP). Due to space considerations, we have chosen not to include them in our analysis. Italy’s current head of government, Giuseppe Conte, leads a coalition of two populist parties, namely the LN and M5S.

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

87

populism in Italy and the Netherlands. We then assess the impact of populism on Italian and Dutch democracy, with the intention of drawing conclusions for the US case. We conclude that several patterns are discernible. Populist parties in both countries were able to bring new, often uncomfortable issues to the table, ranging from immigration in Italy and the Netherlands to decentralization in Italy. Arguably, this expansion of political debate increased the level of democratic legitimacy for those segments of the population who had felt that their interests and concerns were excluded from public debate and political decision-making. At the same time, however, it is also clear that populist leaders polarized politics and turned it into a moralistic struggle, often exacerbating political animosities between the left and the right, in particular. In the Italian case, where we find a bipolar alternation of political power and where the left and right compete directly against one another, populism solidified and intensified this ideological conflict. In the Netherlands, where consensus politics prevails, we see two developments occurring: electoral competition has increased between the left and the right, while the political spectrum has been pulled to the right, especially regarding cultural issues. Nevertheless, the long tradition of consensus and coalition politics means that government formation has attempted to bridge political cleavages, which were often introduced by populist forces. In sum, we find several patterns that are important in both the Netherlands and Italy. Populist movements have sought to incorporate previously marginalized voices into the political system, introducing new, often controversial issues. These inclusionary moves have had a dual effect: they often mobilize those who feel disenfranchised, but they also lead to political polarization and to moralistic dogmatism in political discourse. In the conclusion, we reflect on what our insights from Europe may imply for the United States. Three important lessons emerge. First, we can expect a hardening of political discourse, stoked by populists as well as anti-populists. Second, the electoral defeat of a populist movement does not mean the demise of populism and the definitive victory of liberal democracy. Populism is a political response to deeper structural divisions within society, which liberal democratic parties have failed to address. As long as the problems and discontent that gave rise to populism persist, it can easily reappear. Third, and most importantly, populism is unlikely to do serious damage to democratic institutions in advanced democracies, such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, where the

88

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

institutional framework is strong and relatively resilient. Although populist leaders in these countries routinely violate democratic norms, their ability to undermine democratic institutions, such as the media and the judiciary, is limited. Assessing Populism’s Effect on Liberal Democracy The democratic credentials of populism have always been a topic of hot debate. The most sanguine observers have regarded populism as a movement that succeeded in incorporating disenfranchised citizens into the political system. The fiercest critics, by contrast, have depicted populism as a path toward authoritarianism (Urbinati 1998). The current public debate places much emphasis on the non-democratic aspects and repercussions of populism, whose surge has sparked counter-movements across the globe. In the academic world, discussions of European populism have produced an overemphasis on radical right populist parties, due in part to their controversial anti-immigration message. This chapter seeks to present a more balanced view by assessing eight effects that a populist party may have on the quality and nature of liberal democracy, as summarized by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 83). On the one hand, these authors distinguish four positive potential effects. First, populism may represent those citizens who feel excluded by the political elite. Second, populism may produce policies that reflect the preferences of disenfranchised voters. Third, populism may go beyond pure representation and integrate excluded voices into the political system. Lastly, populism may increase the legitimacy that citizens confer on the political system. In essence, therefore, populism may enfranchise the disenfranchised. On the other hand, they identify four potential negative effects of populism on democracy. First, populism may disregard minority rights and thus hinder efforts at integration. Second, it may erode the institutions supporting the framework of minority rights. Third, populism may promote new political divisions that compromise political cooperation. Lastly, populism’s Manichean worldview may foment a political culture in which moral antagonism thrives (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 83). In essence, therefore, populism may polarize the political system. Below, we describe the circumstances under which populist leaders in the Netherlands and Italy walked the thin line between enfranchising excluded voices and concerns and exacerbating divisions in the political system.

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

89

The Rise of Populist Parties in Western Europe Populist parties have been commonplace in Western European democracies, especially since the turn of the millennium. In the 1970s and 1980s populism looked to many observers like a temporary phenomenon:  the 1970s witnessed an unexpected upsurge of populist parties, such as the Danish and the Norwegian Progress Parties, followed in the 1980s and the 1990s by the success of the French National Front, Italy’s Northern League, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Swiss People’s Party. Increasingly, however, it became clear that populism was there to stay (Zaslove 2008). At present there are more populist parties in more European countries than there were ten to 15 years ago. Moreover, while initially populist parties arose mainly on the right, they can now be found across the ideological spectrum. In many countries, the recurring electoral success of populist parties has made them a stable component of the party system. Examples include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Many populist parties have even succeeded in passing the litmus test of leadership succession (e.g., the Austrian Freedom Party, the Northern League, and the French National Front). Finally, populist parties have demonstrated that they are capable of governing both as fullfledged coalition partners (e.g., in Austria and Italy) and in supporting roles (e.g., in Denmark and the Netherlands). In some cases they have returned to power (e.g., in Austria, Italy, and Denmark). In our two country cases, Italy and the Netherlands, populism has long played an important role. In Italy populism was prominent long before the populist wave of the twenty-first century. In the Netherlands populism appeared at the national level only in the 2000s, but since its initial appearance it has continued to thrive. In Italy, populism first emerged with the rise of various regionalist movements in the 1980s, which merged into the Northern League in 1991. In the early 1990s the LN espoused regionalist populism, but in the midto late 1990s the LN moved toward a radical right variant of populism (Zaslove 2011). Forza Italia, founded by media mogul Silvio Berlusconi just before the 1994 general election, embraced market-liberal populism (McCarthy 1997; McCarthy 1996). Finally, the Five Star Movement is the most recent populist party to emerge in Italy. Initially the M5S combined populism with post-material issues, while more recently it has campaigned on issues often associated with the right, making it hard to classify this fluid grouping on a left–right dimension (Corbetta 2017).

90

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

Populism came rather late to the Netherlands. Its first real incarnation was the List Pim Fortuyn. This party combined an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic message with elements of a liberal stance. For instance, the LPF opposed the overly bureaucratic welfare state and advocated free-market economic policies (see Lucardie 2008). Since the death of the LPF’s leader, Pim Fortuyn, and the subsequent demise of his party, the Party of Freedom, led by Geert Wilders, has become the dominant populist party. It espouses a strong anti-Islam and anti-EU message (Vossen 2017). More recently the Forum voor Democratie has emerged as a new populist contender. In both Italy and the Netherlands, therefore, populism has established itself as a permanent fixture of the political system. Populism Italian Style: Three Waves In order to assess the impact of populism on Italian democracy, we need to focus on three phases: first, the origins and initial rise of populism in the 1980s, spearheaded by the LN; second, the institutionalization of populist parties, specifically the LN and the FI, in the 1990s; and, finally, the counter-populist response by the M5S to the dominance of FI and, to a lesser extent, the LN in the 2000s. Elsewhere, we have referred to this development as “mutating populism” (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016) – that is, a situation in which new populist parties emerge in reaction to earlier forms of populism. Phase 1: The Northern League and the Origins of Italian Populism Populism emerged in Italy in the 1980s with the rise of various regionalist movements in the north, in particular in Lombardy, the Veneto, and Piedmont (Diamanti 1996). These social movements started organizing as so-called movement parties (see Kitschelt 2006), which achieved their initial success due to several structural changes that Italy experienced during the 1970s and the 1980s. First, the recession of the 1970s ushered in a process of economic restructuring. The epicenter of Italy’s industrial production moved from the traditional “Industrial Triangle” (Milan, Turin, Genoa) to what is called the “Third Italy,” located in the northeastern and central regions. This shift coincided with a transformation from large-scale factory production to small and medium-sized, often family-based, businesses and industrial districts (Zaslove 2011). The second change concerned the unfreezing of the political system. The Italian party system had been stagnant since World War II: because of the Cold War, the largest opposition party, the Italian Communist Party

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

91

(Partito Comunista Italiano: PCI), was not considered salonfähig – that is, admissible to the halls of government power. Moreover, the largest party, Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana: DC), was not large enough to govern on its own, but needed to rely on the support of several smaller parties (see Diamanti 1996; Biorcio 1997; and Zaslove 2011). The result was decades of similar coalitions in which the DC dominated a center-right (and sometimes center-left) government. Effectively, this DC dominance caused a lack of true democratic alternation (see Dahl 1971). In the 1980s this socioeconomic and political situation was no longer sustainable. First, the DC’s economic policies were seen as increasingly out of touch with the needs and demands of large segments of the population located in its traditional electoral stronghold, the above-mentioned Third Italy. Second, the ruling DC was viewed as a southern-dominated political party that sustained its predominance through patronage and corruption in the south. Due to these geographic tensions, the regional leagues began to challenge this stagnant and archaic political system. Soon the Northern League, under the leadership of Umberto Bossi, espoused a political message that combined regionalism and populism (Schmidtke 1993; Biorcio 1997). This populist revolt galvanized support in northern Italy by using a regionalist identity discourse and populist appeals that pitted a pure people against a corrupt elite. As with other forms of populism, Italian populism cannot stand on its own. Accordingly, the LN combined populism with regionalism, nationalism, and a radical right ideology revolving around nativism and authoritarianism. In the 1990s, when the LN also highlighted its opposition to immigration and espoused demands for “law and order,” it achieved significant electoral gains even before the collapse of the so-called First Republic. In the 1992 general election the LN received more than 10 percent of the vote in Piedmont and the Veneto, while in Lombardy it garnered approximately 20 percent (Biorcio 1997: 64). As populist mobilization started in northern Italy, the end of global communism and the discovery of entrenched corruption among the DC (the mani pulite scandal) led to the complete collapse of Italy’s postWWII party system. The main political parties, especially the DC, fell into disrepute because they were implicated in a broad web of scandals and corruption. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent transformation of the PCI into a social democratic party meant that voters who no longer supported the DC but who had strategically voted for the party out of fear of communism were now free to switch to a party such as the LN (Passarelli 2015: 228–229). As a result of both developments, most

92

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

parties that had dominated the post-WWII era were transformed (e.g., the Communist Party) or fell apart because of their involvement in the corruption scandals (e.g., the DC). These profound changes ushered in the so-called Second Republic, which revolved around a new electoral and party system. Moving from pure proportional representation (PR) to a combination of PR and majoritarianism, Italy’s new electoral rules were designed to offer voters a clear choice between left and right. Subsequently the party system developed into a bipolar multi-party configuration in which smaller parties clustered around center-left and center-right positions, creating a window for the rise of a new type of populism (FI) that would prove capable of governing. Phase 2: Forza Italia and the Governing Experience of Italian Populism Forza Italia is the key actor in the second phase of Italian populism. Its unexpected success in 1994 helped to strengthen and eventually institutionalize Italian populism. Silvio Berlusconi, after a long association with socialist leader Bettino Craxi, decided to enter politics himself by founding a separate political party: Forza Italia (fans’ battle cry for the nation’s successful soccer team). After all, the success of the LN had taught Berlusconi that the political system was no longer closed and that there was ample electoral space on the center-right. Thus, Berlusconi sought to exploit the demise of the DC by forming his own populist movement at the national level. Unlike the DC  – or any Italian party, for that matter  – Berlusconi’s FI offered a market liberal alternative that was almost like that offered by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. Indeed, there was considerable support among Italians for a party that championed less state, less bureaucracy, lower taxes, and more market (McCarthy 1996; McCarthy 1997). In addition, Berlusconi worried about the electoral prowess of the PCI’s successor, the newly formed Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra: PDS). Even though the fear of communism had waned, Berlusconi was able to profit from, but also to fuel, latent fears of the left, a game he would continue playing even in the 2010s. Employing the resources of his media empire, Berlusconi succeeded in building a new party from scratch in just a few months, and proved highly successful in the 1994 election. Gaining 21 percent of the vote,3 FI was 3

Italian Ministry of Interior: see www.interno.gov.it/it.

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

93

able to form a center-right government with the LN and the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN). FI is a highly personalized party, thriving on the image and charisma of its leader (McDonnell 2013). As with the LN, Berlusconi conceives of the hard-working common man, especially the entrepreneur, as representing the people. More than the LN, however, he holds a relatively nuanced conception of the elite: being a member of the economic elite himself, Berlusconi concentrates his attacks on the leftwing political elites and the judicial elites in his Manichean view of good versus bad (see McCarthy 1997). The change in the electoral system and the unexpected rise of centerright populism transformed the Italian party system. The new electoral rules were meant to give the Italian electorate the possibility of choosing between distinct alternatives. The success of Berlusconi’s electoral coalition in 1994, combined with his tempestuous first government, caused the party system to polarize as the center-left rallied against Berlusconi as a person, a party leader, and an ideological opponent (see Bartolini, Chiaramonte, and D’Alimonte 2004). Overall, the dominant political culture in Italy took on increasingly Manichean tendencies, with the center-right and the center-left perceiving each other as arch-enemies. Italian politics thus became polarized, ironically even more so than during the First Republic (see Verbeek, Zaslove, and Rooduijn 2018). Moreover, political conflict turned increasingly moralistic, because the opposition and Berlusconi viewed each other as ethically reprehensible: Berlusconi accused the center-left of being cryptocommunist, and the center-left charged Berlusconi with being corrupt, authoritarian, and unfit for power due to the conflict of interests caused by his media empire. This polarization and moralistic struggle galvanized the emerging bipolar yet fragmented party system throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Phase 3: A New Twist in Italian Populism: The Rise of the Five Star Movement In 2009 Beppe Grillo, spurred on by public enthusiasm for the increasing political edge of his standup comedy shows, founded his own political party: the Five Star Movement. The five stars represented post-material values that Grillo regarded as worth fighting for: public water, transportation, development, the public use of the internet, and the environment (Pedrazzani and Pinto 2015: 79). This orientation gave the M5S a progressive, left-wing flavor. Italy’s dominant political elites, in particular those surrounding Berlusconi, have constituted the main target of the

94

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

M5S’s anti-elitism. Grillo has accused them of representing a corrupt political class and attacked them as “the political caste.” In recent years the M5S has become more critical of the European Union and has at times even taken an anti-immigrant stance, making it look more right-wing. Throughout its existence the M5S has advocated an innovative sort of participatory politics based on new technologies. Accordingly, it has depicted itself as a democratic movement rather than a political party (see della Porta et  al. 2017). Grillo argues that, with the rise of the internet, politics operate differently. M5S has consistently advocated more direct participation by citizens, and has designed its own system for selecting candidates and determining party positions in parliament in a way that allows ordinary M5S members to directly influence these processes (Tronconi 2015; Corbetta 2017). Grillo’s movement has steadily grown, becoming the single largest party in parliament in the 2013 general election. It did not join the government, however, refusing to form a coalition with any other party. The M5S repeated its success in the 2018 parliamentary election, winning one-third of the popular vote. In this contest the LN also scored an alltime high of 17 percent of the popular vote, and therefore it took over the baton of center-right leadership from the FI. Based on their combined majority, the M5S and LN teamed up in a populist coalition government under Giuseppe Conte. Effects of the Three Waves of Populism on Italian Democracy As argued above, populism can have both positive and negative effects on the quality and functioning of democracy. Positive effects include giving voice to and mobilizing marginalized sectors, and producing policies that represent the interests of those who feel disenfranchised. These inclusionary moves may legitimize the political system and induce citizens to feel better represented. During the first and second phases of Italian populism the LN and then FI managed to place new issues on the political agenda. The LN, in particular, successfully challenged the existing political consensus by raising controversial issues, including the questions of immigration and EU integration. In these ways, the LN gave voice to a segment of society that no longer felt that its concerns were represented by the traditional political elites in Rome and that saw itself threatened by migration and European integration. Emphasizing (“inventing”) a distinct northern

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

95

identity, the LN was able to mobilize northern center-right voters and to include them in the political system. The LN also stimulated a debate regarding economic policy and Italy’s development model, arguing that the old policies centered on the traditional Industrial Triangle were no longer adequate. Its fellow populist party, FI, was also able to galvanize loyal support among the centerright and among advocates of market reform. Its core constituents were mostly older voters, who supported lower taxes and higher pensions and who were particularly apprehensive of the left. Whether FI and the LN were able to mobilize new voters or whether they were simply able to incorporate voters from other parties is not clear, though volatility did increase substantially in the 1994 election (Verbeek, Zaslove, and Rooduijn 2018). As for the potential positive effects of the M5S on Italian democracy, Grillo’s party also drew new voters into the political system, especially younger people, particularly in its early years. Moreover, the M5S raised new issues, focusing on institutional reform and corruption. Opening politics to the young and to a new crop of politicians gave the M5S a unique place in Italy’s political landscape, which had previously been dominated by old professional politicians. Last but not least, the M5S’s practice of using the internet to enhance participation constitutes an interesting democratic innovation (Ceri and Veltri 2017). Even so, it is too early to tell how successful the party has been in renewing democracy. As noted in other chapters in this book, populism may also have negative effects on democracy. In short, populism may hinder minority rights, it may erode the workings of democratic institutions, and, perhaps most importantly, it may polarize politics and turn it into a moralistic struggle, thus making collaboration more difficult. The first and second phases of Italian populism put two types of political institutions under strain: the media and the judiciary. While the media and the courts had always been politicized to some degree, Berlusconi, as a media mogul who owned numerous publishing houses and television stations, was able to challenge the information monopoly held by established parties. When he became prime minister he also took charge of the state-run television and media stations, prompting considerable concern about his undue influence on the media (Stampa 2006a; Stampa 2006b). In addition, Berlusconi had frequent conflicts with the Italian legal system, because of his populist transgressions, but also because of his financial and personal endeavors. The FI leader skillfully turned adversity to advantage, attacking the judges as being biased (e.g., Stampa 2006c).

96

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

It does not seem, however, that minority rights and democratic institutions suffered significant, lasting damage. The leaders of both the LN and FI commonly made inflammatory and outrageous comments. In particular, the LN drew strong criticism for what critics decried as its racist rhetoric. The EU Commission, for instance, expressed concern about the LN’s pejorative pronouncements concerning Roma and Albanians (TicinOnline 2002). Berlusconi was less concerned with immigration and therefore did less damage in this respect, but the populist prime minister challenged the democratic framework through his antagonism toward legal institutions. In the end, however, Berlusconi fell from power in 2011 in part due to his norm violations and legal troubles (Fella and Ruzza 2013: 44–45). Additionally, international pressure had helped mobilize Berlusconi’s opponents in Italy (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016: 315–316). Ultimately, therefore, public opinion and the threat of judicial action, coinciding with international pressure, managed to constrain populist leadership, helping to protect the institutional framework of Italian democracy. Populism also polarized politics and exacerbated the ideological differences between Italy’s political parties. Ironically, the party system was more divided during the 1990s and early 2000s than during the Cold War period (Verbeek, Zaslove, and Rooduijn 2018). Polarization prevailed along several dimensions. The LN stirred up moralistic divisions and fomented political conflict. A strident discourse pitting the north of the country against the south, and the common citizen against the corrupt elite, was spreading. The LN’s denigration of the “backward” south then mutated during the mid-1990s into opposition to immigration from “backward” countries. New, stricter immigration laws were implemented under Berlusconi’s center-right governments between 2001 and 2006 and again from 2008 to 2011 (Cento-Bull 2010; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Zincone 2006). Berlusconi also sought to demonize the left, and frequently attacked leftist politicians and judges. In return, the left demonized Berlusconi as the prototypical authoritarian, amoral politician propelled only by self-interest and greed. Berlusconi’s negative image was reinforced by criticism raised in the international press and by deliberately unflattering comments from world leaders such as Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. In a similar vein, the M5S also polarized politics, and for years refused to form a coalition with any other political party. This intransigent stance

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

97

weakened democratic governability. After all, the M5S emerged from the 2013 election as the largest party, yet it held an insufficient number of seats to form a government without a coalition partner. This obstructionist strategy reflected its specific “anti-caste” stance and thus pitted the M5S against all other parties, deliberately pushing the Italian party system from a bipolar to a tripolar constellation:  The center-right, the center-left, and M5S now confront each other. Uncertainty looms since the 2018 election smashed the center-left and led the LN and the M5S to form an exclusively populist coalition government, defying the bipolarism of the Second Republic. Second, because the M5S cannot be aligned along a traditional left– right axis (Di Virgilio et al. 2015), its emergence has created a cross-cutting cleavage, mainly at the expense of the center-left Partito Democratico (PD), the successor of the DS. More than FI and even the LN, the M5S has succeeded in charging up public debate with moralistic discourse and thus exploiting the people versus elite distinction. The opportunity for these broadside attacks arose because, after roughly a decade of FI/LN governments, those two parties by the 2010s had come to resemble the political establishment (see Fella and Ruzza 2013). In an ironic twist, old populist Berlusconi now advertises himself as the moderate anti-populist who can save Italy from the M5S, much as he claims to have saved the country from communism in 1994. On balance, the fluidity of populist movements and parties and the precariousness of the governments led by Berlusconi, whose FI was far from gaining a firm partisan majority, have limited the negative impact of populism on Italian democracy. The parliamentary system of government forces the chief executive to forge a majority support coalition, which is not easy to do in Italy’s multi-party system. Berlusconi never managed to overcome the significant tensions between FI, the LN, and the neo-fascists. As a result, populist efforts that could have done serious, lasting damage to liberal democracy, especially initiatives for constitutional reform, did not prove politically feasible (Fella and Ruzza 2013: 41–42, 48). The continuing divisions of Italy’s party system thus precluded a march toward illiberalism, and the creation of a competitive authoritarian regime like the one that Hungary’s Viktor Orbán managed to achieve based on the parliamentary majorities won by his own party, as Deegan-Krause explains in Chapter 2. While a parliamentary system of government has fewer institutional veto points than US-style presidentialism, its frequent coexistence with multi-party systems creates a number of partisan veto

98

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

players, which impose important restrictions on the personalistic leadership of populist chief executives.4 Overall, none of Italy’s populist parties and leaders has managed to establish political hegemony nor to transform the country’s institutional framework. Thus, the basic parameters of liberal democracy have remained unscathed. The main problems that populism has caused have emerged from its anti-institutional and anti-immigrant bent, as indicated by Berlusconi’s relentless attacks on the judiciary and the strong antiimmigrant rhetoric of the LN. Moreover, the machinations of personalistic leadership and the fluctuating fate of populist movements have prevented the consolidation of the party system and have thus kept the door open for yet another round of populist actors to appear on the political scene. In sum, populism has proved strong enough to claim a prominent place on Italy’s political stage, yet has remained too weak to overpower or undermine Italian democracy. Dutch-Style Populism: Three Waves Phase 1: The List Pim Fortuyn and the Origins of Dutch Populism In 2002 the List Pim Fortuyn became the first populist party in the Netherlands to achieve electoral success at the national level. Arguably, however, the potential for populism had existed long before the emergence of populist parties: already by the 1990s Dutch citizens had grown increasingly frustrated with the dominant political parties, while themes that populists would later pick up, such as opposition to immigration and frustrations with government performance, had become increasingly salient for voters (Rydgren 2004). Indeed, the first populist movements, the so-called livable movements, arose at the local level in the mid-1990s (Kaal 2011). Small radical-right parties that focused on migration, such

4

Interestingly, to counteract the impact of populism on party fragmentation, Italian presidents have increasingly used their – formally limited – discretionary powers to promote stable government, as Giorgio Napolitano did in 2011, and Sergio Mattarella did in 2018. On the first occasion, when the international markets attacked the Italian economy and put pressure on the ruling Berlusconi government, President Napolitano used his institutional prerogatives to appoint former EU commissioner Mario Monti as senator for life. In this way, with one stroke of his pen, he created a credible alternative to Silvio Berlusconi without having to call new elections. Seven years later President Mattarella threatened to use his discretionary powers to dissolve parliament and call new elections in order to force parties to reach agreement on a coalition government, and, later, to prevent the appointment of Euroskeptic Paolo Savona as treasury minister.

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

99

as Centrum Democraten (CD), also emerged in the 1990s and even won seats in parliament, but they were not populist (see Muis 2015). The LPF won an unprecedented 26 seats in the 2002 parliamentary election,5 after its flamboyant, charismatic leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an ecological extremist a few days before the vote. The party joined the newly formed coalition between Christian Democrats (Christen-Democratisch Appèl: CDA) and right-wing liberals (VVD). But this coalition proved highly unstable. A  new election followed in early 2003, which resulted in the LPF, hampered by a lack of leadership, losing 18 of its 26 seats. Thereafter, the orphaned party continued to suffer from defections, until it was dissolved in 2008 (see Otjes 2011). The rise of the LPF reflected the state of flux in Dutch society and politics after the end of the Cold War (Thomassen, Aarts, and van der Kolk 2000). The disappearance of the Soviet Union as an ideological and political enemy left traditional parties bereft of a dominant theme; and the rise of post-materialist values strengthened non-traditional parties, such as the left-liberal D66 and the green party GroenLinks. Whereas, during the Cold War, Dutch politics had been dominated by Christian Democratic parties in multi-party coalitions (similar to the DC in Italy), the new era suddenly made it legitimate and feasible to form a coalition government without the CDA. Indeed, the period from 1994 to 2002 witnessed the reign of a secular, so-called purple coalition comprising the VVD, D66 and the social democratic Party of Labor (Partij van de Arbeid: PvdA). For many voters, this new coalition, which was hailed as a beacon of the new left à la Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and Gerhard Schröder, raised hopes for major changes in Dutch society. But the purple coalition ran up against populist undercurrents that had become visible in the 1994 election. In that contest, the CDA unexpectedly lost in its southern heartland, due to the meteoric rise of a party that appealed to elderly citizens with the scary claim that governmental promises of guaranteed pensions might not be kept. Furthermore, during the 1990s perceptions of the dangers of globalization spread, and European integration came to be seen less as a safeguard against globalization than as a threat to Dutch society, especially after the Schengen Treaty, which envisaged the free movement of people within the European Union. Moreover, citizens feared the privatization of governmental services and expressed dissatisfaction with the seeming malfunctioning of government and with occasional problems in the judicial system. 5

The Dutch second chamber has 150 seats in total.

100

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

In addition, a sizeable number of Dutch felt endangered by the move toward a multicultural society. After all, labor migrants, who had been seen as temporary inhabitants, were becoming permanent residents, accompanied by their whole families. Unexpectedly, the purple coalition also seemed to continue the objectionable practices of previous power holders, sharing the spoils of office by appointing their followers to numerous positions in the government, the public administration, and newly privatized agencies. Yet established politicians did not foresee an impending tsunami of electoral volatility; it would take Pim Fortuyn to catalyze these developments (Mair 2008). Fortuyn based his populist appeals on an eloquent juxtaposition of the corrupt elite versus the pure people. The LPF leader explicitly placed himself in the tradition of the short-lived Dutch Republic of 1795–1806, which had rested on the sovereignty of the people and the ideals of the French Revolution, as expressed in a very progressive constitution and the call for referenda. Fortuyn rejected the constitutional monarchy in place since 1848 as well as the political parties that had evolved under these institutional parameters. He sought to give voice to the people who felt overrun by politicians, bureaucrats, the European Union, and possibly the global economy. Fortuyn borrowed from many other ideologies, thus making it very difficult to classify him on a left–right scale. Although conservative in his skepticism about immigration and European integration, he was progressive in terms of civil rights, and close to Christian democratic ideas in wanting to protect the welfare state, which was under fire from neoliberalism (Akkerman 2005). The LPF’s participation in government ensured that policies on public security, immigration, and asylum were toughened. More importantly, the party’s representation in parliament and its inclusion in the ruling coalition legitimized its role in Dutch politics and ensured that policy issues that had not previously been part of the political agenda became recognized as topics for regular debate and deliberation. Most fundamentally, the rise of the LPF made it clear that the Dutch political landscape had drastically changed in the 1990s and that dissatisfied citizens were an electoral force to be reckoned with. In this sense the LPF paved the way for Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid. The widely appealing charisma of Pim Fortuyn, a quality often associated with populist leadership, thus helped to effect a substantial, lasting transformation of Dutch politics. The LPF captured an undercurrent in the electorate that political elites had ignored until a charismatic maverick and outsider appeared on the scene (Pellikaan, de Lange, and van der Meer 2007). The new party’s

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

101

success showed that even a seemingly profound renovation of the political system, namely the end of Christian Democratic dominance in 1994, was not sufficient for stopping a populist surge. The LPF’s meteoric ascent also confirmed that in a more volatile party system, as in the Netherlands after the Cold War, a new movement could appeal to large numbers of voters and mobilize them behind a cause or politician. Obviously, a crucial permissive cause was that the Dutch electoral system rested on proportional representation, which did not discourage discontented citizens from voting for a novel, untested party. Phase 2: The Rise of Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom Geert Wilders’ rise to political prominence and influence occurred in the context of three developments, namely internal struggles within the VVD, the general disquiet among Dutch politicians regarding the LPF’s success, and the post-9/11 world of generalized anxiety. The attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the general mood in Dutch society:  Islam-inspired terrorism was seen as a serious threat. Consequently, many voters took a critical position toward new immigrants, especially from countries with many Muslims, yet also toward migrants already living in the Netherlands. Simultaneously, the European Union was discussing the potential entry of Turkey, which for segments of the electorate exacerbated fears of Muslim influx. Moreover, the unexpected success of Fortuyn and his LPF had brought home to establishment politicians the risks of electoral volatility and had highlighted popular aversion to the political and administrative elite living in the “The Hague cheese box,” the popular Dutch metaphor for what in the United States is known as “inside the Beltway.” In the early 2000s European integration had become a bone of contention, partly as a result of the scandals surrounding the European Commission led by Jacques Santer. Finally, the internal struggle within the VVD contributed to Wilders’ emergence. This party had been rather leaderless since the game-changing elections of 2002. Wilders, a VVD MP since 1998, had frequently refused to toe the party line, especially regarding Turkey’s entry into the European Union. In a 2004 manifesto, he urged the VVD to take a more radical right position. In response, the party expelled him. Wilders became a oneman band in the Dutch parliament. When after the Islam-inspired assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, in autumn 2004, Wilders received serious death threats, he entered a complicated life of full-time police protection. Wilders thus donned, involuntarily yet ostentatiously, the cloak

102

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

of victim. He then tried to turn himself into a hero by asking for a full halt to immigration and for the surveillance of Islamic institutions. The Islam-inspired terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) added fuel to Wilders’ populist fire (Vossen 2017). When Wilders proved a crucial mobilizer of the “No” vote in the 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty, it became clear that he was able to capture support from a wide array of voters. In 2005 this brash leader founded the PVV, which entered parliament with nine seats in 2006 and grew to 24 seats in 2010. With the electoral success of populism, the 2000s clearly marked an important change in the Dutch multiparty system. It became increasingly difficult to govern, because support for the three main traditional parties had declined dramatically. Like the LPF, the PVV does not unambiguously fit its usual label as a radical right party. Clearly, the PVV embraces a strong anti-Islamic and anti-immigration orientation, and is fiercely Euroskeptic, but it is also increasingly protective of the welfare state, has positioned itself as a strong defender of individual rights, especially of women and the LGTB community, and taps into such post-material values as animal rights. Most importantly, the PVV claims to defend the pure Dutch people against the assault of external threats, especially Islam, migrants, the European Union, and globalization (Vossen 2011). The rise of the PVV sparked lively debates within the Dutch party system. Although there was no cordon sanitaire against the populist newcomer, as there was in Belgium against the Vlaams Belang, most parties professed that they wanted to prevent the PVV from governing. There also was considerable societal mobilization against the PVV. For instance, Wilders was accused of xenophobia, leading to a series of trials in which he was charged with discrimination. Nevertheless, thanks to its electoral strength and its entry into parliament, the PVV has had considerable influence on the position of Dutch parties on issues such as immigration and European integration. With the PVV riding high in the polls, Wilders effectively forced mainstream parties to move closer to his positions, even during the recent 2017 general election (van Klingeren, Zaslove, and Verbeek 2017). Phase 3: A New Twist in Dutch Populism? The Forum voor Democratie The 2017 contest did not bring Wilders the electoral breakthrough that observers had expected, however. One reason for his disappointing result was the backlash from Donald Trump’s triumph in the United

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

103

States, which had deterrent effects in Western Europe and hurt the political fortunes of right-wing populists across the region, including the Netherlands. Interestingly, however, the stifling of Wilders’ advance opened up space for the rise of another populist leader. Since 2017 Thierry Baudet’s Forum voor Democratie has emerged as a new contender for the populist vote, drawing support away from Wilders’ party and mobilizing previous non-voters as well. The FvD entered parliament with two seats in the 2017 elections, but recent polls would give it approximately 15 seats. Several factors help explain Baudet’s rise. First, there is some fatigue with Wilders’ PVV, especially after its problematic, not very constructive participation in the government from 2010 to 2012, which made this populist leader look unfit to govern. Second, the fact that Wilders has never established a party organization has hindered his chances of competing in municipal and provincial elections. This made the PVV vulnerable to a competitor that aims partly for the same electorate, yet is capable of building a party organization and can employ social media for this purpose. Third, Baudet resembles what one might call the “Fortuyn syndrome”: he conveys the impression of an eloquent intellectual, as a legal philosopher opposing the supranational character of the European Court of Human Rights, an artist who writes novels and plays the piano, and a romantic young revolutionary with a sense of humor. The key to his success may lie in the mobilization of young and more highly educated voters as well as in his diligence in building a party organization, which may prove a valuable vehicle in the provincial contests of 2019. The Effect of Three Waves of Populism on Dutch Democracy We now turn to our criteria in order to assess the impact of populism on Dutch democracy. First, we address the positive effect, focusing on the question of mobilization, on giving voice to those who feel excluded, and on the influence that these inclusionary efforts have on policy and eventually political legitimization. Dutch populism emerged in a context of complaints about various issues: the state’s diminishing responsiveness in health care, pensions, and education and the bureaucracy’s treatment of the citizenry; increased tensions about how to integrate immigrants in the Netherlands; and debates over European integration. Together these complaints reflected a sense of exclusion among a sizeable part of the Dutch population, which felt that establishment politicians had not represented their concerns and fears.

104

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

Pim Fortuyn’s eloquence catalyzed a movement in the 1990s that sought to give voice to the average citizen against the ruling elite. The genuine enthusiasm for Fortuyn during his life and the unprecedented public display of grief after his assassination demonstrate how he captured the hopes of people who felt marginalized and who sought new forms of representation. The LPF’s electoral success in 2002 left mainstream parties bewildered. While some establishment politicians campaigned hard against the new outsider party, others sought to accommodate populist voters by tightening migration and integration policies and by allowing a special referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005. All the same, these adjustments proved insufficient to curb the populist wave. To the contrary, Geert Wilders capitalized on the unexpectedly strong anti-EU sentiment in the 2005 referendum and vociferously insisted on the undesirability of a future entry by “Islamic Turkey” into the European Union. The Dutch rejection of the treaty helped convince this aspiring populist that there was room for a new party. Indeed, the initial success of the LPF and the subsequent success of the PVV testify to the existence of a reservoir of frustrated, discontented voters, representing 15 to 20 percent of the electorate, who are motivated by a mix of left- and right-wing issues and who see the mainstream parties as out of touch with their concerns, or even as illegitimate. In the 2010s the influence of the PVV has helped to make immigration policies increasingly restrictive (see van Klingeren, Zaslove, and Verbeek 2017) and has induced Dutch governments to take an ever more critical stance toward Brussels. Moreover, the strength of populism has prompted political parties of all stripes to contemplate the need to involve citizens more actively in party politics and in the policy process, leading to the adoption of new democratic instruments, such as the consultative referendum, citizen juries in municipalities, and several mechanisms of citizen consultation by various governmental actors. Paradoxically, this pro-democratic expansion of citizen involvement has not dissipated the populist vote but has, instead, served as a platform for further populist mobilization, thus paving the way for the third wave of populism, the Forum voor Democratie. On the negative side, Dutch populism, much as in Italy, has polarized politics, turned conflicts into moralistic battles, and contributed to the rise of new social cleavages, especially over national identity. Wilders’ success in elections and in setting the parliamentary agenda has exacerbated

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

105

divisions in Dutch society. Political discourse has become confrontational, such that an opponent is often vilified as an enemy. Populist leaders attack what they perceive to be the left-leaning cultural and political elites and condemn their policies regarding immigration and integration as excessively lenient. In response, mainstream parties denounce the populists as xenophobic outsiders who are unfit to govern. Wilders’ performance elicited both societal support and opposition, eventually leading to two trials on charges of discrimination, one initiated by the judiciary and the other one by massive complaints from individual citizens (see van Noorloos 2014). Although the verbal confrontation has continued, recently the mainstream parties have adopted many themes from populist parties, especially on immigration and the European Union, pulling the center of gravity toward the right. Nevertheless, the PVV emerged from the 2017 election as the second largest party, suggesting that absorbing populist themes does not eradicate the deeper frustration of many citizens with the political elite. As a consequence, the political landscape has become increasingly fragmented, with 13 parties in a 150-seat parliament, making the formation of governing coalitions ever more difficult. Yet, while the rise of populism and the recurrence of populist movements have reduced political civility in the Netherlands and have led to a less liberal orientation in policy-making, these developments have not inflicted any damage on the institutional framework of Dutch democracy. Instead, the increasing fragmentation of the party system has kept the clout of populist forces limited and has prevented them from taking over the government. The electoral system of proportional representation used in the Netherlands has multiplied the number of partisan veto players and thus forestalled any serious risks to liberal democracy that could, in principle, emerge from the country’s parliamentary system of government. Since no single party can control the executive branch, it is impossible for populist forces to concentrate power and undermine liberal safeguards, as they have succeeded in doing in some East European countries such as Hungary (see Chapter  2, by Deegan-Krause). Moreover, the strength of Dutch institutions and the attachment of the public to them make it unlikely that any infringement of the parameters of liberal democracy would succeed even if populist movements managed to gain a parliamentary majority. Thus, despite the surprising upsurge and persistence of populist mobilization in the Netherlands, a progressive and cosmopolitan country, political pluralism and democratic competitiveness are not at risk.

106

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove Conclusions: Lessons for the United States under President Trump

What do the Italian and Dutch experiences with populism suggest for the contemporary United States? One immediate finding concerns the depth of discontent that currently pervades the advanced democracies and that opens the door for populist movements to flourish. After all, the early successes of the Italian LN and the Dutch LPF point to the importance of hitherto neglected undercurrents in the electorate. Evidently, alternations in power between mainstream parties do not necessarily alleviate the feelings of neglect and marginalization among large portions of the electorate:  The formation of a government coalition without the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands, or a swing between center-left and centerright coalitions led by the Italian DC, do not reliably produce a sense of genuine change. In a similar vein, a change of partisan colors in the US presidency or Congress may not be seen as genuine renovation. Instead, there are opportunities for new parties to arise when widespread popular dissatisfaction prevails about the lack of policy change on salient issues, and when ambitious new leaders pose as genuine outsiders and representatives of the true people. In the Netherlands this insurgent role fell to Pim Fortuyn, and in Italy first to the Northern League’s Umberto Bossi and then to Silvio Berlusconi. In fact, one does not even have to be a true outsider to spearhead successful populist challenges to the political establishment: Geert Wilders had long been part of the mainstream VVD. These trends, which have affected many advanced democracies for some time and which have spurred a wave of populism in recent years, came to the fore in the United States with the presidential election of 2016. This remarkable contest laid bare widespread dissatisfaction with the effects of globalization among numerous voters in pivotal states. Outsiders in their own peculiar ways, both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump successfully tapped into those sentiments. Indeed, during the primary season they succeeded in mobilizing new classes of Democratic and Republican voters. Hillary Clinton, the consummate insider, failed to recognize the undercurrents of frustration and discontent that were upending electoral politics, especially in the Rust Belt states. Yet, while current conditions allow populist outsiders to rise, only some of them achieve sustained political success. On this issue, our analysis of the Netherlands and Italy suggests the importance of party organization. Fortuyn and Baudet in the Netherlands and Bossi, Berlusconi,

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

107

and Grillo in Italy understood that continued success required the foundation of a party. Fortuyn’s party fell apart quickly after his death, but the Italian populists went to great lengths in constructing organizations. Few of them followed the model of traditional party organizations, however:  while the LN eventually took such a route, Berlusconi adopted a highly personalized form of party leadership, and Grillo combined personalization with direct input from party members through his use of new media. In the United States, Donald Trump eventually decided to run on the Republican ticket, though he had previously considered going it alone. This decision to don the Republican cloak testifies to our point that party organization is important for winning elections, even for populists. Interestingly, given the substantial increase in turnout at Republican primaries and caucuses, Trump’s candidacy seems to have had a mobilizing effect on previously excluded voters. The extent to which the billionaire tycoon really represents the interests and needs of these citizens, especially their socioeconomic frustrations and demands, remains a complicated question, however. As outsider politicians have forcefully pushed previously suppressed issues onto the political agenda, the populist waves in Italy and the Netherlands have resulted in clear polarization and fierce moralistic conflict. This sharpening of political divergences had different effects on the two countries’ party systems. In Italy it produced a fragmented bipolar system, which has in recent years faced an additional challenge from Grillo’s M5S. In the Netherlands the aggravation of conflict led to the continued bleeding of mainstream parties, so that coalition building has become very difficult. Obviously, the problems that the rise of populism causes for government formation are of crucial relevance in Italy and the Netherlands, which, like most of Western Europe, feature parliamentary democracies. Yet, while populist movements in Italy and the Netherlands have violated democratic norms with their confrontational tactics, they have not seriously undermined democratic institutions. Populist leaders in these two nations, in contrast to their counterparts in Eastern Europe and Latin America, have not been able to concentrate power, overhaul their countries’ institutional parameters, or eviscerate the opposition. Berlusconi’s attacks on the judiciary, the parliament, and the media, for example, did not prevent these institutions from contributing to his downfall. This interesting finding suggests that populist leaders in developed democracies, such as the United States, face much more serious

108

Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove

institutional constraints and resistance from civil society than those in developing democracies. The polarization and intensification of conflict promoted by populist leadership have also affected the United States, but they have had different repercussions in the country’s presidential system of government. During the 2016 election season, Trump, Clinton, and Sanders campaigned in highly moralistic terms. This fervor was fueled on the left side of the spectrum by minority rights issues, especially “Black lives matter” and women’s rights, and on the right side by Tea Party issues, such as state rights, gun ownership, and fundamentalist Christianity. Moreover, the battle between Clinton and Trump was cast in terms of individual decency. As a consequence, the 2016 election was not the normal kind of competition for the moderate Republican and moderate Democratic voter, but a fierce battle between deeply antagonistic groupings, decided only by the arithmetic of the Electoral College. As president, Trump has continued this game of polarization with his broadside attacks, lambasting and belittling foreign and domestic enemies and displaying an ostentatious reluctance to act as a president for all Americans. Yet, while in a parliamentary system, as in Europe, a chief executive supported by a majority party could push his populist goals with little restraint, the checks and balances of the presidential system in the United States make life much harder for President Trump. As a result, his policy success has remained limited, due to reluctance among his co-partisans in Congress and to widespread resistance in the judiciary. Any move toward an institutional overhaul designed to pursue the populist goal of power concentration would have particularly low chances of success. The main damage that the new US president has done to liberal democracy has therefore been confined to the promotion of illiberal values and the erosion of norms of democratic civility. As in Italy and Netherlands, this debasement of the public discourse has had a mixed impact, drawing strident responses from some sectors and efforts to “take the high road” by others. In sum, populism has so far not done serious damage to liberal democracy in Italy, the Netherlands, or the United States. Yet it is important to keep in mind that this novel form of politics has proved more than a temporary affliction. After all, Italy and the Netherlands have witnessed three waves of populism because the negative undercurrent of popular frustration with the incumbent elite is hard to control. Populist parties may be succeeded by new populist movements, even if mainstream parties move closer to the issue positions proclaimed by populist leaders.

Insights from Italy and the Netherlands

109

Remarkably, in Italy the M5S managed to portray former outsiders, namely Berlusconi’s FI and to a lesser extent the LN, as the new ruling elite – and to pose as the true populists. The ease with which new populist movements can arise suggests that it would be unwise to expect populist sentiments to disappear after the Trump presidency. The door that the billionaire tycoon has pushed open may give entry to recurring sets of populist movements. After all, the root causes of the populist surge in the United States have not disappeared. The Democratic Party seems more focused on bashing Trump than on solving the problems that caused Clinton’s failure to win the Rust Belt. The Republican Party still does not care that the Tea Party’s strategies within its party organization are chasing away moderate Republican voters. Neither party, therefore, is pursuing a prudent strategy for the 2020 elections, but, instead, each persists with highstakes confrontation. By maintaining fertile ground for the perpetuation or recurrence of populism, the two mainstream parties are inadvertently exposing liberal democracy in the United States to continued risks.

4 Trump’s Populism The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages and the Future of US Democracy Bart Bonikowski

Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral success has been widely interpreted as an unexpected victory for populism in the United States and a harbinger of a populist era across Western democracies. In one sense, this view is correct:  the Trump campaign succeeded by employing discursive strategies comparable to those of populist radical-right parties in Europe (Mudde 2007), and it did so against an initial headwind of elite resistance within the Republican Party. Trump’s effective capture of the party’s base caught many experts off-guard and suggested that no country is immune from populist politics. At the same time, however, the centrality of ethnonationalism in Trump’s populist rhetoric calls into question the novelty of his approach and the degree to which the United States is a surprising site for a nativist revival. As I will argue in this chapter, multiple traditions of nationalism – understood here as distinct understandings of nationhood held by subsets of the population  – have competed over the course of US history, with their relative dominance shifting with socio-historical context. Indeed, this feature of political culture is not unique to the United States: similar nationalist cleavages are commonplace throughout Western democracies, and they have been fueling the successes of rightwing populist parties in a growing number of countries. In light of these insights, the main analytical tasks of this chapter are to understand the circumstances under which nationalist cleavages become politically mobilized and what the long-term consequences are of the normalization of nativist discourse, particularly when championed by a major national party. In answering these questions, I will emphasize the importance of a confluence of large-scale social, economic, and cultural changes, which gave ethno-nationalist populism renewed resonance, and 110

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

111

argue that the embrace of this form of politics by the Republican Party poses considerable, though not inescapable, dangers to the future of US democracy. Whether or not the erosion of democratic institutions comes to pass, the radicalism mobilized by Trump, but also by his Republican predecessors, has upended longstanding political norms, and in so doing has generated favorable conditions for the future success of radical candidates. As a result, ethno-nationalist populism is likely to remain a central feature of US politics for years to come. The Populist Radical Right: Anti-Elitism, Ethno-Nationalism, and Authoritarianism The field of populism research is rife with definitional debates. Given the plethora of conceptual work published in recent years (Aslanidis 2016; Gidron and Bonikowski 2013; Hawkins 2009; Mudde 2007; Müller 2016), I  will set aside the issues of populism’s ontology and operationalization and, instead, focus on the relationship between populism and two phenomena with which it is closely aligned on the radical right: nationalism and authoritarianism. If we understand populism to represent a form of politics predicated on a moral opposition between the virtuous people and a fundamentally corrupt elite (Mudde 2007), it becomes apparent that populism must be combined with other ideas in order to serve as a mobilizing force in politics. The definition of the people is typically vague in populist claimsmaking, and the choice of vilified elites is flexible (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). To give shape to “the people,” right-wing populist discourse often draws on widely shared, but contested, conceptions of nationhood. By distinguishing between legitimate members of the nation and those whose claims to nationhood are questionable, radical-right actors are able to tap into viscerally experienced collective identities and activate powerful ingroup and out-group dynamics (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Mason 2018). The choice of elites follows from this as well:  those who have ostensibly abandoned the “true” members of the nation in favor of minorities, immigrants, and other putative outsiders must be removed from political power and replaced with the people’s legitimate representatives. But the moral decay of the elites, according to the standard radicalright populist narrative, is not limited to individuals; it is systemic:  it infuses the institutions used by elites to pursue their self-interest and to advance the pluralist project that gives unfair advantage to minority groups. This is where the third element of radical-right ideology becomes

112

Bart Bonikowski

relevant:  in order to reform the institutions and rout their occupants, anti-elite populism and ascriptive nationalism are combined with authoritarian measures that allow the people to take back control of the state, typically in as direct a manner as possible (Mudde 2007; Müller 2016). Hurdles presented by an autonomous judiciary, a free press, and grassroots protest must be sidestepped or, when necessary, eradicated. During campaigns, such tendencies are typically expressed through discursive norm violations, such as threatening one’s opponents, encouraging vigilante violence, or delegitimizing existing institutions. When in power, more authoritarian radical-right parties take active steps to secure extensive and lasting power for themselves and “the people” to whom they owe allegiance. In connecting anti-elite claims with exclusionary nationalism and authoritarianism, I want to be clear in avoiding two misunderstandings. First, even though these three phenomena are often interconnected, they need not necessarily be so. Indeed, radical-left populism is less prone to ethno-nationalist tendencies than is radical-right populism, at least in contemporary Europe and the United States (Judis 2016). Moreover, within the radical-left and radical-right party families, there is considerable variation in the degree to which authoritarianism is an expressed strategy or tacit objective of radical candidates. Therefore, there is value in analytically separating anti-elitism, nationalism, and authoritarianism and not conflating them under a single rubric of radical politics. Second, while these three elements function somewhat similarly (each is manifested in discourse and mobilizes corresponding popular attitudes), not all three are equally potent in mobilizing deeply rooted identities. Anti-elite claims may resonate with those who have lost confidence in the state, while authoritarian promises may mobilize those who have little regard for democracy, but institutional distrust is a dynamic and therefore thin sentiment, whereas disregard for democracy is likely to be salient only to a minority of voters. Conceptions of nationhood, on the other hand, are pervasive, deeply held, emotionally charged, and lasting (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). As a result, they provide a powerful basis for political mobilization that can be profitably combined with antielite and authoritarian claims. In his presidential campaign, Donald Trump made frequent use of all three elements of radical-right discourse (Oliver and Rahn 2016). In attacking Washington elites for being out of touch with the interests of the people, he appealed to longstanding anti-statist tendencies in the American electorate (Lipset 1997), which had been further aggravated by

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

113

popular discontent with legislative deadlock and failed political promises by the Republican Party, as well as by the persistent delegitimization of President Obama and his policies by conservative media and politicians. Trump also repeatedly violated norms of political decorum and responsible democratic discourse by threatening to jail Hillary Clinton, encouraging violence at his rallies, and criticizing the autonomy of the media and the judiciary. This mobilized voters who perceived the Democratic Party as fundamentally un-American (itself a consequence of rapidly rising partisan polarization [Baldassarri and Gelman 2008]) and who had no qualms about violating the niceties of democratic conduct to punish their perceived enemies. Finally, and  – as I  will argue  – most importantly, Trump appealed to ethnically, racially, and culturally exclusionary understandings of American identity widespread in US society, by representing Mexican immigrants as criminals, publicly battling the parents of a fallen American soldier of Muslim faith, questioning the impartiality of a MexicanAmerican judge, and, for years prior to the election, fanning the flames of Islamophobic and racist conspiracy theories concerning President Obama’s place of birth. In short, the Trump campaign regularly intermixed, and eventually fused, populist, authoritarian, and nationalist political frames, which resonated deeply with supporters’ anti-elite, illiberal, and exclusionary sentiments (on the roots of such resonance, see Bonikowski 2017a). While all three dimensions of radicalism were prominent in the Trump campaign, nationalism is of central relevance for understanding the campaign’s appeal and the future of radical politics in the United States. This is the case for three reasons. First, nationalism is the one feature of Trump’s politics that has been consistent over time, from his early engagement with the “birther” movement, through his vitriolic campaign, to his presidency. This is true both of his discourse and of his favored policy proposals. The anti-elitist promises to “drain the swamp” of corrupt elites and to champion those left behind by neoliberalism and economic globalization were cast aside shortly after the election, as the Trump administration became a haven for Wall Street veterans and its economic policy came to be outsourced to conservative Republicans (Waldman 2016). Trump’s trenchant critiques of political elites have also had few effects: with the exception of appointing an inexperienced Cabinet and circle of close advisors, the administration has taken no steps to limit lobbying or usurp power from elected representatives. In contrast, the anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and

114

Bart Bonikowski

racist elements of Trump’s bleak nationalism have remained prominent, as exemplified by the Muslim travel ban, the scaling back of anti-discrimination law enforcement by the Department of Justice, the tacit endorsement of white supremacist groups after the Charlottesville attack, the renewed critical attention to affirmative action in elite higher education, and the separation of families at the US–Mexico border (Bier 2017; Huseman and Waldman 2017; Keith 2017; Savage 2017; Zapotosky 2018). Second, unlike authoritarianism, and to some degree anti-elitism, nationalism represents a deep and longstanding fissure in American political culture that has been perennially exploited by opportunistic politicians during times of social and economic uncertainty (Lieven 2012). This is why the administration’s displays of ongoing commitment to social exclusion, reinforced by widespread negative partisanship, have been sufficient to maintain a seemingly unshakeable base of support for the president, consisting of more than 30 percent of the electorate (Manchester 2017). Because the sentiments awakened by Donald Trump’s campaign and presidency are visceral and rooted in a long ideological tradition, their renewed salience is unlikely to subside even after Trump ceases to be president. Third, because ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural exclusion has historically vacillated in and out of prominence in US political culture and policy-making, it carries more legitimacy for a sizeable subset of Americans than overtly authoritarian abuses of executive power. As such, it is more likely to galvanize an existing base of support and result in less effective counter-pressure than a sudden scaling back of democratic practices. While the same could be said of anti-elitism, the omnipresence of less radical varieties of populism in US political culture (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016; Lipset 1990) makes it a less potent mobilizing force, at least when employed in the absence of powerful nationalist frames. In light of the centrality of nationalism in Trump’s discourse and governing agenda, it bears asking just why this form of politics resonates so deeply with the American public. To begin answering that question, it is important to understand that, contrary to common conceptions of American national identity, historically, liberalism and civic republicanism have not been the sole defining characteristics of the country’s political culture. Just as important has been a persistent and often dominant view of American nationhood as defined by race, ethnicity, religion, and other largely immutable traits (Smith 1999). In fact, the coexistence of multiple conflicting understandings of the nation is not limited to the

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

115

United States. Similar cleavages exist in all modern democracies, even if their specific content and the timing of their temporal fluctuations varies (Bonikowski 2013). While exclusionary forms of nationalism routinely affect social interaction, equal access to resources and opportunities, and political preferences – and even cause eruptions of violence – it is only occasionally that they emerge as the primary determinants of political outcomes. Recent years have witnessed just such a moment. Nationalist Cleavages in the United States For decades nationalism was peripheral to, if not altogether missing, from scholarly discussions of contemporary American politics. Its use was relegated to discussions of early nation-building efforts in the nascent republic and to research on extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the neo-Nazis, which had been excluded from mainstream politics in the post-Jim-Crow era (and well before then outside the South) (see, e.g., Blee 2008; and Waldstreicher 1997). Nationalism was therefore seen largely as a problem of the past – or, alternatively, of other countries, where separatism or incomplete modernization generated ongoing tensions concerning the nation’s self-understanding and future direction (e.g., Hechter 2001). The seemingly settled nature of American nationhood was reinforced by perceptions of continued progress with respect to social inequality. Whatever mistakes America had made in the past, such injustices were often perceived as short-term deviations from a foundational commitment to equality, and it is the latter that made the United States an exceptional nation (Smith 1993). Against this liberal narrative stood a less dominant, more radical tradition of critical race scholars (Bell 1989; Feagin 2010; Omi and Winant 1994) and revisionist historians (Billington 1964; Higham 2002 [1955]), for whom the United States’ lengthy record of social exclusion and injustice was not merely a deviation from the nation’s core egalitarian ideals but a constitutive feature of America’s national character (for more recent accounts, see Anderson 2016; and Coates 2015). The insights of this critical perspective were subsequently brought into research on American nationalism, in the form of the “multiple traditions” approach. It is this approach that is of particular value for understanding contemporary radical-right politics. For scholars such as Smith (1999) and Lieven (2012), neither liberalism nor racial domination is the sole foundation of America’s national character. In fact, the very notion of a single homogeneous value system at the heart of a country’s political culture is

116

Bart Bonikowski

misguided. Instead, what has defined the United States from its inception is protracted competition between alternative views of American nationhood. These views diverge on who deserves to legitimately belong to the nation, whether America should be a progressive champion of social equality, both at home and abroad, and what aspects of the nation or the state are worthy of pride and admiration. In certain historical periods this competition has erupted into violence, most notably during the Civil War, but also in waves of public lynchings during the Jim Crow era or less coordinated terrorist attacks, such as that in Charlottesville in August 2017. More routinely, however, these tensions manifest themselves in everyday social interactions, public discourse, and policy. As Smith (1999) demonstrates, entire domains of policy-making (in the case of his research, immigration law) were shaped by the struggle between incompatible nationalist visions, whose traces can still be observed in the complex web of legislative decisions produced over the past two centuries. Whereas historical research has traced multiple traditions of nationhood in institutional practices and elite discourse, a distinct survey-based approach in political science and sociology has sought to identify them in the attitudes of ordinary Americans. The evidence is largely consistent with the historical record: Americans disagree sharply about the meaning of their nation, and these distinct beliefs are associated with out-group attitudes, opinions on immigration and welfare policy, and other political preferences (Citrin et al. 1994; Schildkraut 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009). For some scholars these differences are a matter of degree, but more recent research suggests that they constitute distinct cultural camps, each of which is characterized by a particular attitudinal profile. Inductively clustering multiple attitudinal measures of national attachment, beliefs about appropriate criteria of national belonging, domain-specific national pride, and comparisons of the United States with other nations, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) identify four such camps. Two are distinguished by extreme attitudes on all the variables (those with low values are termed “the disengaged”; those with high values, “ardent nationalists”), and two by cross-cutting combinations of attitudes (“restrictive nationalists” hold exclusionary definitions of national membership, have low pride in institutions, and are moderately chauvinistic, and “creedal nationalists” are inclusive, reasonably proud of the nation, and moderately chauvinistic). These patterns are summarized in Table  4.1. Because the four cultural models are highly correlated with political preferences but cut

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

117

Table 4.1. Four popular conceptions of American nationalism Distribution of attitudinal variables

Type of nationalism

Strength of Criteria Pride in attachment of national the nation to nation belonging and state

Sense of national superiority

Creedal

High

Elective

High

Moderate

Disengaged

Moderate

Elective

Low

Restrictive

Moderate

Ascriptive

Ardent

High

Ascriptive

Low (esp. state) Low (esp. state) High

Moderate High

Note: The categories in the columns are shorthand for 24 distinct attitudinal variables. The four types of nationalism in the rows were inductively generated by a latent class analysis of data from the 1996 and 2003 General Social Survey (GSS) and a 2012 online panel collected by GfK Custom Research. Source:  Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016). Reprinted with permission of SAGE Publications, Inc.

across partisan identity, they represent deep cultural cleavages that divide Americans from one another on issues of fundamental political importance: what the nation means, how its past should be understood, and what its future ought to be. Strikingly, no fewer than one half of Americans espouse views of the nation that restrict legitimate membership on the basis of native birth, Christian faith, and linguistic fluency (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). For a more detailed breakdown of the sociodemographic correlates of the four nationalist cleavages, see Table 4.2. Of course, it is one thing for multiple conceptions of nationhood to coexist and compete for dominance, as suggested by both the historical and survey-based research, but another for them to become the central determinants of electoral outcomes. In most US federal elections of the last four decades, both parties engaged in routinized evocations of patriotic symbols and narratives, downplaying the heterogeneity in nationalist beliefs that characterizes the US population. Attempts to mobilize racial resentment were certainly prevalent, but they were typically coded and implicit. The 2016 election was different. Instead of evoking a broadly shared common identity, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton offered two sharply contrasting views of American nationhood (Lieven 2016). Trump’s vision was one of ethnic and religious exclusion, nostalgic longing for a day when white Americans were the unquestionably dominant group,

Table 4.2. Proportion of respondents with selected attributes by type of nationalism Creedal

Disengaged Restrictive

Class prevalence 0.22 0.17 Male 0.25 0.17 Female 0.19 0.17 White 0.24 0.16 Black 0.02 0.19 Hispanic 0.11 0.17 Other 0.48 0.32 Born in United States 0.19 0.16 Born outside United 0.47 0.24 States Less than high school 0.10 0.14 High school or some 0.17 0.12 college BA 0.33 0.24 Advanced degree 0.32 0.29 Strong Democrat 0.09 0.35 Democrata 0.15 0.27 Independent 0.16 0.17 Republicana 0.32 0.04 Strong Republican 0.36 0.00 Lives in Midwest 0.21 0.16 Lives in mountain 0.25 0.17 states Lives in Northeast 0.19 0.25 Lives in Pacific states 0.31 0.19 Lives in South 0.18 0.12 Catholic 0.23 0.12 Evangelical Protestant 0.17 0.07 Mainline Protestant 0.23 0.13 Black Protestant 0.02 0.17 Jewish 0.56 0.19 Other 0.34 0.23 None 0.20 0.41 Strongly religious 0.22 0.12 Not strongly religious 0.22 0.20 Mean age 44.44 38.36 Mean income (2004 $78,582 $39,724 dollars) a

Ardent

0.38 0.31 0.43 0.33 0.68 0.55 0.11 0.40 0.15

0.24 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.13

0.50 0.43

0.26 0.28

0.27 0.23 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.38 0.17 0.41 0.38

0.16 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.47 0.22 0.21

0.29 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.32 0.71 0.17 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.38 41.21 $42,048

0.26 0.14 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.30 0.20 51.31 $48,185

P-value 0.061 0.016

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.15

0.000

0.63 0.000 0.003

Includes independents who report leaning Democrat or Republican, respectively.

Notes: Data are from 2004 GSS. P-values for differences in model parameters across classes are based on Wald tests with robust standard errors. Source:  Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016). Reprinted with permission of SAGE Publications, Inc.

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

119

and a withdrawal from the world across multiple domains, from military alliances and wars to trade and the environment. Of the four nationalist cleavages identified by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), Trump’s rhetoric most closely resembled “restrictive nationalism,” which combines ethno-cultural exclusion with distinctively low levels of pride in the nation and its institutions, perceiving the latter as having failed “true” Americans. Clinton’s nationalist imagery was strikingly different:  it celebrated ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, emphasized egalitarianism and social justice, and advocated active engagement in international affairs. This was a creedal nationalism par excellence (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016): an exultant but inclusive narrative that sought to harness love of country in the service of continued social progress. These divergent campaign messages, on full display during the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, mobilized latent cultural cleavages marked by sharp disagreements over the nation’s meaning. In the process, popular understandings of America and Americanness came to define the primary cultural battle lines in the election and the subsequent struggle between Trump supporters and detractors during the president’s term in office. Despite the unusual prominence of explicit nationalist cleavages in the presidential election, it would be a mistake to see this type of political discourse as unprecedented. Clinton continued in the tradition of inclusive civic nationalism, which had long been a hallmark of the Democratic Party’s political discourse, and combined it with an ostentatious celebration of national symbols and American exceptionalism that previously had been more common among mainstream Republican candidates. Trump, on the other hand, drew on forms of white nationalist politics that had been front and center in George Wallace’s and Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaigns, and the latter’s subsequent “Southern strategy,” and that had reappeared periodically since then among Republican candidates (as in the Willie Horton attack ads against Michael Dukakis in 1988 and Patrick Buchanan’s 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns) (Carter 1999). For all the pronouncements of an era of “post-racial politics” in the late 2000s (or perhaps because of them) (Wise 2010), appeals to exclusionary nationalism further intensified in recent years among radical Republican politicians, the right-wing media, and conservative social movements, such as the Tea Party (Parker and Barreto 2013). Particularly notable was the persistent vilification of President Obama as fundamentally un-American, fueled by conspiratorial myths about his putative Muslim

120

Bart Bonikowski

faith and birth outside the United States (Pham 2015). The “birther” narrative epitomized a potent mix of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and populism (Bail 2016; Chavez 2013; Gilens 2000) that would come to define Trump’s campaign and presidency. The political impact of these ideas was amplified by ongoing political developments, especially the sharp rise in partisan polarization – and, with it, negative partisanship – since the early 2000s (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008) and the Republican Party’s persistent obstructionism and delegitimization of its Democratic opponents (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017a). For a variety of reasons, to which I  will return, Trump’s brazen ethno-nationalism fell on fertile ground. Survey-based analyses demonstrate that voters who held strong ethno-nationalist attitudes were more likely to support Trump’s candidacy in the primary and general elections (though in the latter, of course, the best predictor remains Republican Party membership) (Jones and Kiley 2016; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Tesler 2016). Many of those voters have maintained their support during Trump’s presidency (Saletan 2017). Despite these patterns, it does not appear that ethno-nationalist attitudes have become more widespread in the American population in the two decades leading up to the 2016 election (Bonikowski 2017a). As Figure  4.1 illustrates, the distribution of the four nationalist cleavages identified by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) was relatively constant from 1996 through 2003 to 2012. Instead, the Trump campaign appears to have successfully mobilized previously latent nationalist cleavages in an opportune socio-political context, making identity concerns central to voters’ decision-making. Even though the Trump phenomenon is particularly American in some respects, the broad contours of nationalist politics have much in common across Western democracies. Competing definitions of nationhood exist within all countries, in the form of latent cultural cleavages that can be effectively mobilized by political entrepreneurs when the structural conditions are ripe (Bonikowski 2013). Indeed, the structure of these cleavages is strikingly similar across cases: the same patterns of attitudes that constitute liberal, restrictive, ardent, and disengaged forms of nationalism in the United States are found in France and Germany (Bonikowski 2017b), as well as other Western and Eastern European democracies (Bonikowski 2013), even if the specific manifestations of such nationalist beliefs vary. Thus much of the contemporary rise of radical-right politics can be understood as a result of an active struggle between segments of the electorate over the nation’s meaning.

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

121

0.40

0.30

0.20 1996 2004

0.10

2012 0.00

Creedal

Disengaged

Restricve

Ardent

1996

0.25

0.27

0.31

0.17

2004

0.23

0.18

0.35

0.25

2012

0.24

0.25

0.31

0.19

Figure 4.1. Distribution of four types of American nationalism, 1996–2012 Note: The data come from the 1996 and 2003 General Social Survey and a 2012 online panel collected by GfK Custom Research. Source: Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016). Reprinted with permission of SAGE Publications, Inc.

The Rising Salience of Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century Why has nationalism become particularly salient in the United States over the past few years? Some of the likely causal factors are consistent with those observed in other advanced democracies, while others are USspecific. In general, the rise of radicalism across the West appears to be a result of acute perceptions of collective status threat on the part of national majority-group members (i.e., typically native-born whites), fueled by a confluence of rapid social changes (Bonikowski 2017a; Gidron and Hall 2017). Some of these changes are economic (e.g., unemployment and wage decline due to trade shocks and capital flight [Autor et al. 2016; Rodrik 2017]), while others are demographic (e.g., the rise in immigration), cultural (e.g., restrictive linguistic norms, the expansion of LGBT rights and multiculturalism, and the displacement of white workingclass culture from the mainstream [Inglehart and Norris 2016]), spatial (e.g., the concentration of economic gains and cultural changes in urban centers [Cramer 2016; Sassen 2001]), or related to national security (e.g., terrorism). This diverse mix of structural transformations affects people’s outlook in a variety of ways. Changing conditions on the ground shape people’s life chances (both real and subjective), their perception of their group’s relative status affects their evaluations of self-worth, and decoupling

122

Bart Bonikowski

between local and national culture creates a sense of cultural alienation. Moreover, the notion that a group (in this case, an ethno-racial one) is under threat is both a result of direct experience and of exposure to narratives transmitted through the media and social networks. It is these narratives that have the potential to channel generalized grievances into resentments toward stigmatized out-groups (and their elite coconspirators). That such resentments tend to activate and mobilize latent nationalist beliefs makes them prime ideological tools for opportunistic elite actors, both in the media and in electoral politics. To be sure, this general multi-causal account glosses over considerable heterogeneity between specific countries. The relative weight of the proposed causal factors is likely to vary and specific cases may also feature other unique causes of nationalist backlash. In the United States, trade liberalization, rapidly rising inequality, partisan polarization, the cosmopolitanization of popular culture, the ideological fragmentation of the media market, and, more recently, the election of an African-American Democratic president were among the probable exacerbating factors that contributed to the increased salience of nationalist cleavages in politics. The fact that these long-term trends preceded Donald Trump’s political success suggests that his candidacy was as much a symptom as a cause of a nationalist resurgence (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017a). Not only did Trump’s embrace of the “birther movement” and his leveraging of ethno-nationalist populist discourse build on a long history of racism and xenophobia in the United States, but it also amplified tendencies that were already present in the Republican Party in the years leading up to the 2016 presidential election. The party’s problematic relationship with race (Carter 1999) came to the fore during Barack Obama’s candidacy and presidency, as his American and Christian bona fides were repeatedly questioned (Pham 2015), he was exposed to racist slurs by Republican media personalities such as Ted Nugent and Ann Coulter (Ornstein 2014), his measured responses to police brutality and terrorist attacks against African Americans were criticized in racial terms and resulted in decreases in approval ratings among white Republicans (Reid 2017), and his policy initiatives were persistently obstructed and undermined by Republicans in Congress (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017a). Some of this was a matter of ever-intensifying negative partisanship, but many of these episodes also involved dog-whistle appeals that had been perfected over decades of white nationalist politics, dating back to Nixon’s “silent majority” (Carter 1999).

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

123

It appears, then, that Trump’s embrace of explicitly racist and misogynist discourse, his tacit alliance with white nationalist movements, and his vilification of the media and his political opponents were a more explicit rearticulation of subtler Republican talking points. That he initially advanced his campaign against the opposition of Republican elites served to enhance both the legitimacy of his anti-establishment claims and the veracity of his nationalist policy promises. By the time the Republicans embraced him for having delivered them the presidency and a majority in both houses of Congress he had succeeded in bringing the white nationalist agenda from the fringes of the Republican Party into its very core. Donald Trump’s subsequent eruptions of nationalist vitriol during his presidency would meet with either overt approval or passive resignation from establishment Republicans, a pattern that served to further legitimize ethno-nationalism in American politics (Fallows 2017). The Implications of Republicans’ Ethno-Nationalism The possible consequences of Trump’s specific brand of anti-elitism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are manifold, ranging from the erosion of basic norms of decency in politics and the undermining of objective truth as a valued feature of public discourse to the delegitimization of democratic institutions at home and the decline of the United States’ influence abroad. Given that democracy is the backbone of the American social and political order, and the primary mechanism through which the excesses of the Trump administration can be reversed in the future, it is understandable that scholars have dedicated particular attention to the credible risk of democratic backsliding in the post-2016 era. Müller (2016), for instance, warns of four possible channels through which anti-pluralist radicals, such as Trump and his European counterparts, can co-opt democratic institutions for their own selfserving ends. These include the “colonization” of state bureaucracy with regime loyalists willing to do the autocratic leader’s bidding; mass clientelism, which secures support for the ruling party through the granting of various favors and privileges to its constituents; “discriminatory legalism,” which maintains legal protections for some segments of the population but withholds them from others (typically minorities vilified by the state) (Weyland 2013); and the delegitimization of civil society organizations to suppress dissent. Although these quasi-authoritarian governance practices serve to bolster the authority of the ruling elites while they are in power, radical

124

Bart Bonikowski

politicians are also likely to undermine the democratic processes that would eventually lead to a successful transition of power. Building on their prior research on Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s and Western Europe prior to World War II, respectively, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) identify two democratic norms that are at greatest risk from radical politics: mutual toleration and procedural forbearance. Central to the former norm is the assumption that one’s political opposition, however ideologically different it may be, operates in good faith in the best interests of the country. This ensures that electoral losses are accepted, that the ruling party is seen as legitimate, and that legislative compromise is possible. When mutual toleration erodes, as in cases of extreme partisan polarization, the opposition may instead be portrayed as fundamentally morally corrupt and even treasonous, which justifies various forms of retribution and may ultimately threaten the peaceful turnover of power. The second norm, of procedural forbearance, ensures that political actors do not use the full extent of the law against those with whom they disagree, by, for instance, engaging in frivolous investigations and prosecutions of opponents, obstructing basic legislative procedures, ruling by decree rather than legislative process, or routinely blocking presidential nominees. While such actions may be within the strict bounds of the constitutional order, they are not consistent with its spirit, because they undermine the basis for good-faith debate and cooperation and inhibit the ability of the state to govern. Based on the first two years of President Trump’s term (and his discourse during the election), there is cause for concern on many of the fronts identified by Müller (2016) and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Among the more egregious of Trump’s norm violations have been threats to prosecute Hillary Clinton, personal insults targeting his opponents (such as referring to Clinton as “Crooked Hillary”), the firing of FBI director James Comey, and hints at the possible dismissal of the special counsel investigating the Trump campaign, Robert Mueller (Goldsmith 2017). These instances signal fundamental disregard for both mutual toleration and procedural forbearance, which pose serious threats to the stability of American democracy. Equally dangerous have been verbal attacks on journalists, persistent disinformation concerning the allegedly widespread problem of electoral fraud, threats to disregard the results of the 2016 election if Clinton were to win, portrayals of the media as a liberal conspiracy spreading “fake news,” the framing of social protest as illegitimate and un-American, and attempts to undermine the autonomy of the judiciary and federal law

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

125

enforcement (Goldsmith 2017). Not only do such claims directly threaten democratic practices but they also affect public confidence in institutions and the very basis on which truth claims can be evaluated in public discourse. That Trump’s norm violations have not been censured, and in many cases have been wholeheartedly embraced, by the Republican Party makes their risks all the more acute. The added danger of such developments is that they encourage a cycle of recrimination not limited to any single party. Once norms are shattered and the opposition assumes power, it too is likely to take advantage of newly legitimized political tactics against the former incumbents, thus further eroding the quality of democratic institutions. The examples cited thus far are troubling, but they are primarily associated with the authoritarian and anti-elite aspects of Donald Trump’s and the Republican Party’s radicalism rather than with the mobilization of nationalist cleavages by the Trump campaign and administration. Indeed, because political scientists have been primarily interested in institutional stability, they have not fully attended to the possible implications that ethno-nationalism itself may have for social inequalities, both at the hands of the state and in more diffuse inter-group relations. Chief among these are variants of “discriminatory legalism” – that is, various attempts by the government to target minority groups whose legitimate membership in the nation is called into question (Weyland 2013; Müller 2016). Given that ethno-nationalism in the United States places emphasis on whiteness, native birth, Christian faith, and English language fluency (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Schildkraut 2003), groups that are particularly vulnerable to discriminatory treatment include African Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and nonEuropean immigrants. It is no surprise, then, that in its first year the Trump administration has sought to build a border wall with Mexico, impose a travel ban on people from Muslim-majority countries, investigate affirmative-action admission practices at elite universities, defund the Civil Rights Division and curtail oversight of discriminatory police departments at the Department of Justice, repeal the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program for undocumented migrants brought to the United States as children, and pursue draconian law enforcement measures against undocumented migrants. All these initiatives have signaled to Trump’s ethno-nationalist supporters that the administration is delivering on its promises to champion the interests of white Americans, which have been portrayed as mutually exclusive with the interests of non-whites.

126

Bart Bonikowski

The Trump administration’s exclusionary governance practices are likely to persist and intensify in the coming years, given the centrality of ethno-nationalism among the president’s electoral support base. Their consequences may well be far-reaching and include increased social inequality, continued racial discrimination, and a general climate of insecurity for members of minority groups. Policy is not the only channel through which ethno-nationalism affects social outcomes, however; the content of political discourse has its own distinct consequences. The president’s frequent reliance on racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic language has reconfigured the boundaries of mainstream public debate, and, with it, of what is permissible in everyday interactions. Whether calling Mexicans rapists, smearing National Football League players protesting police brutality, vilifying Muslims after terrorist attacks, or embracing neo-Nazis after the Charlottesville attack, President Trump, with the passive approval of the Republican Party, has portrayed minority groups as fundamentally un-American. The legitimization of ethno-nationalist forms of thought, speech, and practice is likely to further embolden white supremacist movements and exacerbate patterns of hate speech and violence in quotidian social interactions. There is some evidence that this has already been the case, with increases in reported hate crimes and far right activity following the 2016 election (Cohen 2017). While mainstream Republicans may eventually disavow such behavior, there is a risk that a self-perpetuating cycle of outbidding (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) may give rise to increasingly radical, and potentially violent, forms of white nationalism. Thus far, however, there has been no equivalent ratcheting tendency on the left (with the possible exception of the “Antifa” movement [Beinart 2017]) or among ethnic minority groups that could fuel the mutual recrimination typical of the ethnic outbidding model. Whether or not the ethno-nationalist populism of the Trump administration erodes democratic institutions and exacerbates existing patterns of inequality and discrimination, the political activation of nationalist cleavages is likely to have its own consequences for the future of electoral politics in the United States. First, once ethno-nationalist beliefs are made salient, they do not easily revert to a latent state. These beliefs are rooted in visceral moral reactions to stigmatized out-groups that are continually reinforced by sensationalist media and political discourse. Moreover, the structural changes that increased the resonance of these dispositions in the first place will continue to serve as sources of grievance and resentment. Had ethno-nationalism been vocally repudiated by Republican

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

127

Party elites, perhaps the tide could have been stemmed, but instead the party has unconditionally stood by President Trump, effectively embracing white nationalism as its own central ideology. Given that the distribution of the competing varieties of nationalism in the US population has been relatively stable (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), this suggests a continued base of support for Republican ethno-nationalist politics for years to come. Second, nationalist cleavages are likely to become increasingly congruent with partisanship. In the past, pluralist and exclusionary forms of American nationalism partly cut across partisan identities (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). This is beginning to change, however, with growing numbers of people switching their party affiliation in line with their views of American nationhood (Griffin 2017). This partisan sorting may exacerbate the already historically high levels of political polarization in the United States (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008) and cement the identity of the GOP as an ethno-nationalist party. Moreover, not only are partisan identity and conceptions of nationhood functioning as mutually reinforcing cultural cleavages but their confluence is further reinforced by alignment with structural social cleavages. Core support for the Republican Party is concentrated not only among ethno-nationalists but also, increasingly, among white working-class voters with low levels of education who live outside major urban centers (Cramer 2016). When multiple social and cultural cleavages become mutually reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, the likelihood of compromise across party lines declines and the probability of severe and protracted conflict increases (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This, in turn, can cause further erosion of the norms of mutual toleration on which the stability of democratic institutions depends. Third, the negative implications of Donald Trump’s  – and, increasingly, the Republican Party’s  – ethno-nationalist authoritarianism for the welfare of minority groups and for democratic stability are likely to deepen in the event of a major national security crisis, such as a masscasualty terrorist attack or a large-scale war. Past research has shown that such events often trigger “rally-round-the-flag” effects, whereby exclusionary nationalist attitudes intensify and the legitimacy of the state and its leaders is enhanced (Feinstein 2016). In such instances, civil liberties and constitutional rights can be weakened in the ostensible interest of national security under state-of-emergency measures (Scheppele 2003). Groups seen as particularly threatening to the nation are at the greatest risk of being targeted by such policies, which makes Donald Trump’s

128

Bart Bonikowski

vilification of immigrants, refugees, Muslims, and African Americans all the more foreboding. It appears unlikely that President Trump would exercise the same level of caution and restraint as did George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks in order to prevent the undue targeting of minorities in the aftermath of an acute crisis. There are countervailing factors, of course, that may mitigate some or all of the potential risks associated with the rising dominance of populism, authoritarianism, and nationalism in mainstream US politics. Chief among these are the institutional checks and balances designed to constrain excesses of executive, legislative, and judicial power. As Weyland and Madrid have argued in the Introduction to this volume, the existence of three robust branches of government in the United States would make it difficult for the president to pursue policies that fundamentally threaten the democratic system. Moreover, unlike Latin American populist leaders, President Trump must contend with the preferences of his party that only partly align with his agenda, and he has only limited capacity to rely on patronage networks that would enable him to “colonize” the state and engage in mass clientelism (Müller 2016; Weyland 2017a). Whether the Republican Party’s timidity in confronting the more dangerous of Trump’s ethno-nationalist and authoritarian tendencies serves to undermine these countervailing institutional factors – many of which are dependent on norms as much as on laws – remains to be seen. Institutional constraints are not, however, the only potential counterforces against the persistence of ethno-nationalism and the risk of democratic backsliding in the United States. The other mechanism is the power of the public, both as an electorate and as a source of social movement mobilization. Under the right circumstances, shifts in the behavior of American voters in 2018 and 2020 could generate the necessary incentives for the Republican Party to abandon its ethno-nationalist agenda. One such scenario is that electoral enthusiasm among 2016 Trump voters will diminish in the coming elections, not only due to the president’s historically low approval ratings but also because many of these voters had previously been politically unengaged and, having made their statement in 2016, may opt out of voting once again. The partisan turnout differences in the 2017 Virginia and Alabama special elections, both of which swung dramatically toward Democratic candidates, may serve as early evidence of this pattern. This raises a larger question about the potentially self-limiting aspects of President Trump’s populist and ethno-nationalist politics. While the fervency of his core support base is undeniable, the explicitly exclusionary

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

129

content of Trump’s rhetoric and policy will make it difficult for his coalition to expand in future elections. He is unlikely to win over new voters, given the difficulty of bridging deep nationalist cleavages, and may in fact lose some 2016 supporters due to his failure to deliver on campaign promises, if not due to the underlying content of his ideas (the president’s mediocre polling numbers appear to be consistent with this scenario). It appears, then, that ethno-nationalism may be a powerful, but ultimately constrained, political strategy that will make future congressional and presidential elections precarious for the Republican Party. If so, the lack of large-scale majoritarian support – alongside other mechanisms, such as independent judicial oversight – may serve as a brake on the Trump administration’s authoritarian proclivities. This stands in sharp contrast to key Latin American cases, where the ability of populist politics to transform political institutions was fueled by large electoral majorities (Levitsky and Loxton 2012; Roberts 2012). The discussion thus far has assumed relative stability in the size of the nationalist cleavages in the US population over the short term, which can serve as reliable reserves of support for candidates who mobilize the right kind of political rhetoric. In the long term, however, demographic shifts may reconfigure public opinion trends in favor of more inclusive forms of nationalism. The question is whether the political effects of the country’s increasingly diverse population will continue to be muted by the geographic concentration of non-white voters in Democratic-majority states and in urban areas throughout the country. Because of these compositional factors, the political preferences of minority groups have thus far constituted largely redundant signals in the electoral arena, despite pronouncements by pundits of a new demographic reality with which both parties must reckon. Against this demographic backdrop, partisan redistricting and the erection of new barriers to voting in Republicancontrolled states has given the GOP an additional advantage in congressional elections, raising the electoral threshold for an anti-Trump backlash by Democratic voters. Although the over-representation of liberal voters in densely populated areas may hinder the repudiation of ethno-nationalism through electoral channels, these same segments of the population may become mobilized by grassroots social movements and pursue extra-institutional means of political change. The wave of protests during the early months of President Trump’s term in office exerted pressure on the administration and policy-makers to scale back potentially discriminatory travel bans and to abandon multiple attempts to repeal the Affordable Care

130

Bart Bonikowski

Act. Should the Trump administration continue pursuing policies that target minority groups and endanger democratic institutions, large-scale protests are likely to continue. The challenge for those resisting the incursion of ethno-nationalism into American political life is how to harness the impact of isolated protests into a lasting social movement that can apply continued pressure on elected officials. In the absence of organizational infrastructure, such episodes may have a fleeting impact on policy, and their frequency and size are likely to decrease as the public grows weary of active mobilization. Conclusion Setting aside the specific dangers posed by President Trump’s populism and the possible countervailing forces that may avert them, the larger question is whether the present historical moment represents a short-term backlash against neo-liberalism, globalization, and cultural change that will dissipate with due time or whether we are witnessing a more profound crisis of liberal democracy stemming from internal contradictions that cannot be resolved without large-scale political and economic transformation. The widespread diffusion of radical politics throughout the world suggests the latter. Whatever the specific features and causes of radicalism are in any given country, there exists a common pattern of widespread dissatisfaction with political institutions, the globalized elites who control them, and the various minority groups that ostensibly benefit from the elite’s patronage and threaten the status of native-born white majorities. The response to this crisis from entrepreneurial political and media actors, particularly in wealthy democracies, has been to mobilize preexisting nationalist cleavages in the service of anti-establishment politics (Rodrik 2017). While the fortunes of individual radical politicians may rise and fall, and some radical parties may prove to be more effective when in power than others, the underlying grievances that fuel this form of politics are likely to remain relevant for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, the onus for addressing the situation rests less on the new radical parties and leaders than on established political elites. Centerright parties face a stark choice of whether to take up the grievances of frustrated voters, while rejecting the radical right’s ethno-nationalism and anti-democratic authoritarianism, or to embrace the radical right’s exclusionary strategies. The latter solution presents a serious danger to

The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages

131

the stability of democratic institutions, because the center-right is often the last bulwark against authoritarian rule (Ziblatt 2017). The center-left, on the other hand, faces its own challenges. It can continue pursuing neoliberal policies typical of “third way” politics, which may have contributed to the present democratic crisis in the first place, or it can reorient itself toward the pursuit of economic justice, an issue once central to the left’s agenda. In the latter case, the further choice is whether to pursue these policies primarily on behalf of resentful native-born white voters or to combine an economic agenda with a robust articulation of an inclusive, multicultural, and proud vision of nationhood that actively resists ethno-nationalism (Gidron 2018). These are difficult strategic decisions, but it does appear that an economic justice agenda that turns a blind eye to the importance of nationalist cleavages, as did Bernie Sanders’ primary campaign, may be insufficiently compelling in an era of identity-driven politics. Whatever strategies established parties might pursue, it is imperative that they remain committed to the defense of constitutional rights, the rule of law, and the integrity of democratic institutions. As these fundamental principles come under powerful attack from radical anti-system actors, placing the interests of the country above partisan concerns is the necessary starting point for the maintenance of political stability. To do otherwise is to engage in a Faustian bargain, the costs of which are likely to be borne by future generations.

5 Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay A Comparative Perspective on Political Polarization in the United States Kenneth M. Roberts

In his acclaimed novel The Feast of the Goat – among the most insightful and unsettling works ever written on authoritarian rule – Peruvian Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa (2002) peeled away the outer layers of autocracy to reveal its hidden transcripts. Behind any dictator and his victims, the novel suggests, lies a deeply compromised web of sycophants, collaborators, and opportunists without whom autocracy cannot exist. This basic insight offers a prescient starting point for any effort to understand whether, and how, Donald Trump’s presidency might pose a threat to American democracy. A focus on the layers of collaboration directs attention to the highly unconventional and contradictory relationship between Trump as a populist figure  – a vintage outsider and strident critic of the political establishment – and an increasingly ideological and movement-based Republican Party that inadvertently cleared his pathway to the presidency. It also invites comparative analysis of the intricate relationships between populism, social movements, party politics, and regime institutions, in particular the institutions designed to safeguard democracy from unwarranted concentrations or abuses of executive power. A  comparative analysis strongly suggests that the implications of a Trump presidency for American democracy are heavily conditioned by the role played by the Republican Party in his administration. Much hinges, in particular, on the strategic behavior of the party – or, more properly, its varied and conflicting currents – to either protect or dismantle regime-level checks and balances in the party’s pursuit of more narrow partisan and ideological goals. Viewed from a comparative perspective, the multiple and formidable institutional checks and balances against populist autocracy in the United 132

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

133

States are readily apparent. Few democratic regimes were so consciously and cleverly designed to fragment and disperse power, or to restrain rulers’ more irresponsible and transformative impulses. Fewer yet have enjoyed over 200 years of uninterrupted – though at times deeply flawed – democratic practice to test and fine-tune procedural rules of the game, build and consolidate regime institutions, and cultivate democratic norms to sustain them. No democratic regime as longstanding as that of the United States has ever broken down. Neither has one in a society as wealthy as the United States. Nevertheless, a comparative perspective amply demonstrates that institutional checks and balances against unwarranted concentrations of power are neither automatic nor self-enforcing. In the wrong hands, or in contexts of acute political conflict or violence (whether domestic or international), democratic institutions can be “repurposed” and transformed into instruments of partisan advantage and autocratic rule. Such is the wellknown pattern of democratic “backsliding” toward competitive authoritarianism, whereby elected rulers and their partisan collaborators gain control over key state agencies, then use the levers they provide to whittle away at minority political rights and loosen institutional constraints on executive authority (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bermeo 2016). Such backsliding toward competitive authoritarianism has occurred in recent decades in countries as varied as Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, Hungary under Victor Orbán, Poland under the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS), and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, not to mention Russia under Vladimir Putin, whom Trump much admired while campaigning for office. Although such a denouement is often thought to be implausible in the United States, it is one that scholars should take seriously in the current political context, given the stakes at play. The reassuring belief that democratic backsliding “couldn’t happen here” does not require a naïve or unreflective faith in “American exceptionalism”; more sophisticated formulations may simply presume that the Republican Party is a “conventional” party organization – i.e., one that is controlled by elite actors who belong to the political establishment, restrain aspiring autocrats, and uphold institutional checks and balances. It is precisely this presumption of conventionality, I argue, that can no longer be taken for granted. Once this presumption is subjected to critical scrutiny, institutional checks and balances appear more tenuous, the range of plausible political outcomes expands considerably, and the “regime question” inevitably enters into discussion.

134

Kenneth M. Roberts

The regime question has, in fact, been raised by prominent scholarly voices assessing the state of American democracy in the era of Trump, warning that indicators of institutional corrosion, norm violations, and democratic backsliding are both visible and proliferating in recent years (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Lieberman et al. 2017; Walt 2016). Many of these warnings have diagnosed longerterm patterns of partisan and ideological polarization as a major source of democratic dysfunction in the United States. The sui generis character of Trump’s rise cannot be understood in isolation from these forms of polarization, which allowed the populist figure to channel diverse – and even highly contradictory – ideological and anti-establishment currents within American conservatism. This channeling was a logical (if not inevitable) product of the long-term process of transforming a conventional conservative party  – until recently a pillar of the US political and economic elite – into what has essentially become a movement-based party (Anria 2018) with pronounced populist and anti-establishment currents (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; McAdam and Kloos 2014; Schlozman 2015). The 2016 primary campaign left little doubt that these currents, several of which openly flout democratic norms and practices, are dominant in the party’s grassroots networks and core electoral constituencies. The process of “movementization” (Meyer and Tarrow 2018) has thus laid bare the internal struggle for the identity and soul of the Republican Party, a struggle that is sure to weigh heavily on the fate of the Trump administration – and, beyond it, the functioning of America’s democratic institutions. So conceived, Trump’s autocratic proclivities and his contempt for political rivals are merely the tip of the iceberg, rather than the source of the problem; they are the most visible manifestations of often submerged cultural and institutional changes that have altered the face of American democracy and created unprecedented levels of uncertainty about its survivability. The transformation of the Republican Party and its relationship to autocratic populist leadership – in short, the grafting of populist leadership onto a highly ideological movement-based party – raise a number of important questions for comparative inquiry. In comparative perspective, the capture of a mainstream conservative party by far right nationalist and populist forces is rare in Western democracies, as is the ascendance of a populist alternative in a context of heightened and polarized partisanship. The first two sections of this chapter explore these anomalies in comparative perspective and provide an account of their

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

135

development over time, as well as an account of the uncertainty they generate regarding the strategic behavior and internal cohesion of the Republican Party. The final section explains how this uncertainty, in conjunction with the erratic comportment of the president himself, allows for the identification of three quite different scenarios for American politics in the era of Trump: aborted populism, populist containment, and populist bandwagoning. The latter, I argue, has pronounced authoritarian tendencies, posing formidable challenges to the institutional framework of checks and balances in American democracy. These three scenarios have radically different implications for the character and resiliency of US democracy in the years to come. Without laying odds on their relative probabilities, the mere fact that they are identifiable and plausible outcomes suggests that the United States has entered a period of political crisis with heightened unpredictability  – that is, a period in which the normal constraints of institutionalized roles and behavior have been relaxed, and an unusually wide range of institutional changes and outcomes are realistic possibilities. Whether this uncertainty culminates in democratic re-equilibration or democratic erosion is contingent on the strategic choices, interaction, and alignments of key political and social actors, foremost among them the varied currents of the Republican Party. Such periods of heightened institutional uncertainty and accentuated political agency are hallmarks of critical junctures in political development (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Soifer 2012). These junctures are historically rare in the United States, but portentous in their effects; all the more reason to scrutinize the political conflicts and strategic behavior that can shape divergent outcomes. Polarization, Movementization, and Party System Change in the United States In the comparative study of democratic regimes, the United States has long stood out as an unusually successful case of stable presidentialism. Presidential systems in Latin America and other world regions have been susceptible to destabilizing political conflicts, which political scientists have often attributed to their institutional design – namely, the separation of powers between executive and legislative branches with independent electoral mandates, the rigidities introduced by fixed terms in office, and the high-stakes competition for an executive office

136

Kenneth M. Roberts

that fuses together the head of government and the head of state. In the influential account of Juan Linz (1990: 53), the United States was able to avoid the “perils of presidentialism” because of “the unusually diffuse character of American political parties.” The presence of two large, ideologically eclectic “catch-all” parties created a centripetal dynamic of political competition in the United States, centering competition on the median voter and facilitating the construction of flexible bipartisan policy-making coalitions. This centripetal logic – in theory, reinforced by a plurality or winner-take-all electoral system – allowed the country to avoid the extreme types of ideological polarization that plagued presidentialism elsewhere. Linz wrote at a time when the US party system was in the early stages of a major transformation, however: one that would replace its centripetal tendencies with a more polarizing centrifugal logic (Mann and Ornstein 2012; Lee 2016), while also strengthening the influence of movement currents in internal party affairs. These dual processes of polarization and movementization reflected basic shifts in the social and institutional settings for partisan competition. On the social front, as McAdam and Kloos (2014) argue, patterns of social mobilization and countermobilization on the left and right flanks of the party system drove a wedge between the Democratic and Republican Parties, while sharply dividing their core constituencies and activist networks. Starting in the 1960s, civil rights, student, anti-war, women’s, and LGBT movements reshaped the social and cultural agenda of the Democratic Party, triggering a conservative counter-mobilization among social and religious conservatives who gravitated to the Republican camp (Schlozman 2015). Social movements drove the conservative South into the Republican Party, made both parties more ideologically cohesive, and pushed both parties toward their respective ideological poles, even if public opinion itself was not highly polarized ideologically. Given that the Democratic Party remained wedded, in comparative perspective, to relatively centrist economic positions  – especially on trade issues – it could be argued that polarization was more pronounced on social and cultural issues than economic issues. Nonetheless, the Republicans coupled their socio-cultural conservatism with an ideologically orthodox economic conservatism that pilloried state intervention and championed free-market values. Following the election of Barack Obama to the presidency, this coupling was evident in the Tea Party movement on the right flank of the Republican Party, which energized grassroots activists from three principal currents of movement conservatism in the

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

137

United States:  market fundamentalism, Christian evangelicalism, and white ethno-nationalism (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Parker and Barreto 2013). The infusion of these movement currents into the party was encouraged by institutional changes in the electoral arena – namely the shift in both parties toward a greater reliance on primary elections for the selection of presidential and legislative candidates starting in the 1970s (McAdam and Kloos 2014). This shift eventually weakened the “gatekeeping” role of party elites in the selection of candidates for public office, while magnifying the influence of rank-and-file voters and ideologically committed activist networks that are more likely to participate in low-turnout primary and caucus elections (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Although the Republican establishment prevailed over the party’s movement currents in the 2012 primaries to nominate Mitt Romney for the presidency, by 2016 the movement currents had thoroughly swamped the party elite: not only was the nomination captured by the populist outsider and virulent anti-establishment critic Donald Trump, but the second-place finisher was Tea Party icon and ideological hardliner Senator Ted Cruz, the bête noire of the party leadership in Congress. The astonishing spectacle of the Republican establishment rallying around Cruz in a last-ditch effort to derail Trump’s “hostile takeover” provided graphic evidence of the party’s desperation, not to mention its loss of control over the movement and populist currents it had long nurtured. In the absence of the primary system, a populist outsider such as Trump could have aspired to the presidency only by running as an independent candidate; he never could have obtained the Republican nomination had the party’s candidate been chosen by a parliamentary bloc (as in a parliamentary system) or a nominating convention controlled by party elites, as was the tradition prior to 1972. In short, polarization and movementization sharply differentiated parties that earlier, in the post-war period, had overlapped programmatically around the median voter. In so doing, they sorted voters into rival and increasingly hostile partisan camps, strengthening partisan identities (Hetherington 2011) as well as forms of “negative partisanship” marked by their antipathy for one side or the other (Abramowitz and Webster 2015). The dual processes of polarization and movementization were diametrically at odds with the centripetal pattern of partisan competition noted by Linz; more importantly for our purposes, they not only set the stage for Trump’s political ascendance but also shaped the contentious and illiberal character of his presidency.

138

Kenneth M. Roberts Populism and Democracy in Comparative Perspective

In comparative perspective, the rise of a populist outsider such as Trump in a context of heightened partisanship and ideological polarization is deeply puzzling. In Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) influential formulation, populism entails the antagonistic construction of a political divide between “the people,” however conceived, and a dominant elite or political establishment. Populism itself is intrinsically polarizing and antagonistic in its construction of a binary elite/popular divide. Such a divide presupposes some type of failure or crisis of political representation – that is, a detachment of voters from established parties that have failed to respond to a plethora of societal demands. In both Europe and Latin America, however, such crises of representation have typically been associated with patterns of convergence, not polarization, in mainstream party organizations. When mainstream parties converge on a narrow set of programmatic alternatives, or jointly fail to articulate meaningful positions on a set of issues that are salient to large numbers of voters, political space is opened for populist contenders who politicize unmet demands. Such was the case in Latin America in recent decades, where mainstream parties responded to financial crises by converging on programs of free-market or neoliberal reform. In countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador – where traditional labor-based and center-left parties played a major role in the process of market reform, and massive protest movements brought down a series of elected pro-market presidents  – programmatic convergence opened vacant political space for left-leaning populist figures to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy (Madrid 2010; Roberts 2014). Traditional parties were fully or (in the Argentine case) partially eclipsed by this rise of left-wing populism. A  similar dynamic played out in Southern Europe after the 2008 financial crisis, when orthodox austerity and adjustment measures were initiated by governments led or supported by mainstream socialist and social democratic parties (as well as their conservative rivals). Following a major cycle of social protest in 2011–12, anti-establishment populist alternatives emerged or strengthened in Italy, Greece, and Spain, the latter two with strong leftist profiles and social movement bases (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Aslanidis 2016; Della Porta et al. 2017). In most of these countries populist leaders, movements, or parties emerged outside and on the left flank of mainstream party systems.1 1

Argentina and Italy were partial exceptions. In Argentina, the moderately populist leadership of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner emerged inside the traditional

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

139

They effectively politicized an economic issue dimension that mainstream parties had largely ceased to contest, and they incorporated their rejection of market liberalism within an overarching critique of an allegedly corrupt, collusive, and unrepresentative political establishment. According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), such forms of leftist populism had an “inclusionary” character, in the sense that they aimed at the political and economic incorporation of neglected or underprivileged sectors of the national community  – a broadening, so to speak, of the populist “people.” Similar dynamics, albeit with quite different effects, can also be seen on the right flank of mainstream party systems. Right-wing forms of populism often politicize a cultural axis of competition rather than an economic axis.2 Europe’s far-right populist parties, for example, have emphasized nativist or ethno-nationalist identities through strident criticisms of immigrants, Islam, and transnational European institutions (Mudde 2007; Bornschier 2010; Art 2011; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). In so doing, they have politicized issues that mainstream parties often downplayed or approached in a consensual manner. They have also constructed highly restrictive or “exclusionary” conceptions of the national community by defining the “people” in ethno-nationalist terms that largely exclude immigrants and cultural or religious minorities (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Clearly, Donald Trump appealed to very similar types of nativist and ethno-nationalist currents in American society, starting with his prominent role in the “birther” movement that questioned Obama’s constitutional qualifications for the presidency, and continuing into his presidential campaign and his presidential administration itself. Trump leveled harsh criticisms at immigrants and made high-profile pledges to “build a wall” along the southern border, ban immigration from Muslim

2

Peronist party, but very much on the left flank of the ideologically heterogeneous party. Ironically, the rise of this left populism inside Peronism followed closely on the heels of the right-wing populist leadership of Carlos Menem within the same party in the 1990s. In Italy, the Five Star Movement led by the comedian and political blogger Beppe Grillo emerged very much outside the party establishment, but it eschewed conventional ideological positioning and adopted an eclectic mix of programmatic stands. This is not necessarily the case, however. A  conservative, pro-market, and anti-state brand of populism may also politicize the economic dimension by criticizing a political establishment for taking away citizens’ hard-earned tax money and squandering it on wasteful ends  – whether those be collusive, rent-seeking special interests, government “boondoggles,” the “undeserving poor,” or the venality and corruption of the “political caste” itself (see, for example, Weyland 1996).

140

Kenneth M. Roberts

societies, abandon or renegotiate trade accords, and “make America great again.” In a country where race relations have been a focal point of political contention for over 200 years, Trump’s vitriolic rhetoric could not help but stir up “white identity” currents lurking just below the surface of mainstream politics in the United States. As such, he made populist appeals to a highly exclusionary, ethno-nationalist conception of national identity with deep roots in the rural and small-town US “heartland” where his electoral support was concentrated. In contrast to Western Europe, however, Trump’s national-populist appeals were channeled into and through a major conservative party, rather than a smaller “niche” party on the far-right flank of the party system. Such far-right parties have been growing in much of Western Europe, and they have entered into governing coalitions in a number of countries, most prominently in Austria and Italy. As such, they have placed considerable pressure on mainstream conservative parties – and some non-conservative parties as well – to shift toward more restrictive positions on immigration and European integration. Nowhere, however, have far-right national-populist parties assumed direct control of a national government in Western Europe; although they have become increasingly influential coalition partners in Italy and Austria, in other countries mainstream actors from across the political spectrum have coalesced to block their path to power, as in France with Marine Le Pen’s National Front. To date, therefore, far-right parties have contributed to a reshaping of the policy agenda, but their impact on democratic institutions and governance remains relatively modest in the most advanced and longstanding Western democracies (Mudde 2013; Mudde 2017). Parliamentary institutions, proportional representation elections, and multi-party systems have allowed far-right parties to access the democratic arena, but they have also capped their electoral support and – with the exception of contemporary Italy, perhaps  – relegated them to secondary roles in governance and public policy-making. If far-right parties have neither taken over a mainstream conservative party nor captured national executive office on their own in Western Europe, closer parallels to the Trump phenomenon may perhaps be found in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian case is especially instructive, as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party  – in power since 2010  – has roots in the student democratization movement of the late 1980s and was founded during the period of regime transition as a party with a liberal orientation. Fidesz gradually shifted toward more conservative and ethno-nationalist positions over time, however, including

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

141

anti-immigration and Eurosceptic stands, as well as the open advocacy of “illiberal” forms of government. With their main rival, the Hungarian Socialist Party, in steep decline after mishandling a period of financial crisis, Orbán and Fidesz captured the premiership for the second time in 2010, and proceeded to use a parliamentary supermajority to amend the constitution, weaken judicial and media independence, and centralize political authority. Similarly, Poland’s Law and Justice party was a descendant of a centrist Christian democratic party founded during the postcommunist regime transition, but it gradually moved in a populist and nationalist direction under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński. Since winning its first ever parliamentary majority in 2015 (despite winning less than 38 percent of the vote), PiS has adopted a number of measures to assert its control over the courts and the media, provoking widespread social protest (Rupnik 2016; Stanley 2017). The Polish and Hungarian cases demonstrate that even mainstream parties with democratic backgrounds can harbor populist and authoritarian tendencies that strengthen over time and manifest themselves when the party gains access to the reins of power in contexts in which rival parties are weak, divided, or discredited. In such contexts, even a slim electoral advantage might allow such a party to gain control over key regime institutions, repurpose them into instruments of partisan advantage, alter the democratic rules of the game, and erode institutional checks and balances. Although parliamentary systems, in comparison to presidentialism, make it harder for a populist outsider to be elected head of government, their fusion of executive and legislative powers may enable autocrats who lead disciplined majoritarian parties to concentrate authority in their own hands. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, moreover, shows how a ruling party can take advantage of a domestic political crisis – such as an attempted military coup – to crack down on opposition forces, dismantle institutional checks and balances, and further concentrate political authority. The Latin American experience sheds additional light on the pathways that populists can take to gain and concentrate power. The parties founded by populist figures in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador were quite new  – that is, they had little (Bolivia) or no (Venezuela and Ecuador) parliamentary experience prior to their capture of national executive office – but their eruption onto the national political scene coincided with (and surely accelerated) the weakening and virtual collapse of traditional party systems. Indeed, with traditional parties thoroughly discredited, populist figures in all three countries were elected on campaign platforms

142

Kenneth M. Roberts

to convoke a constituent assembly and “refound” the democratic regime. Upon taking office, they relied on their mass appeal and plebiscitary measures (i.e., popular referendums) to circumvent existing legislative bodies, elect new constituent assemblies, and ratify new constitutions. These plebiscitary ruptures with the ancien régime helped to empower national executives and expedite the election of new legislative bodies under the hegemonic control of populist parties. The Venezuelan case demonstrates the myriad ways in which a populist party can use its plebiscitarian appeal and institutional leverage to purge and pack judicial bodies, control the electoral machinery, muzzle independent media outlets, and tilt the playing field against political opponents (Weyland 2013; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). The United States, certainly, is far removed from this latter set of cases. Trump did not take office in a context in which established parties were suffering a severe crisis and on the verge of political collapse. The Democratic Party continues to hold a sizeable bloc of legislative seats and an institutional presence across much of the public administration, providing it with leverage to push back against what Bermeo (2016) calls “executive aggrandizement.” There is no “vacuum” in the state administration waiting to be filled by the partisans of a populist figure, and the Republican Party does not have the type of parliamentary supermajority that allowed Hungary’s Fidesz to claim a democratic mandate for rewriting the rules of the game and concentrating power by legal means. Neither does the Republican Party operate with the levels of organizational cohesion and hierarchical discipline that are often seen in parliamentary systems that fuse together party-mediated executive and legislative powers, as in much of Europe. With separate electoral mandates for executive and legislative branches, presidentialism in the United States, as elsewhere, is prone to inter-branch conflict and party factionalism and indiscipline (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Trump cannot simply assume that his adopted party will follow his political lead or behave as a unitary actor; he has not formed and built a new party around his leadership, the way Chávez did in Venezuela, and neither has he served as the longstanding, undisputed leader of his party, like Orbán in Hungary. As the Argentine case under Carlos Menem demonstrated, populist figures who govern in collaboration with established parties are likely to see their control over said parties vary over time, particularly as their own popularity ebbs and flows. Argentine Peronism largely fell in line behind Menem during his first term in office, when the maverick president enjoyed economic success and strong approval ratings, but the

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

143

party became an increasingly fractious and unreliable ally thereafter, as internal rivals challenged Menem’s authority and ultimately blocked him from standing for reelection a second time. The US presidential system may endow Trump with substantial decree and appointment powers, but even these powers can be neutralized in the absence of reliable partisan collaborators. After all, executive orders are subject to judicial review and legislative override, and senatorial approval is a potential constraint on presidential appointments. Furthermore, Trump is hardly in a position to employ plebiscitary appeals to “the people” as an end run around established institutions, much less as part of strategy to “refound” them. With public approval ratings consistently hovering near 40 percent for most of his first year and a half in office, Trump could not credibly claim to speak and act on behalf of a unitary sovereign people, much less evoke their plebiscitarian acclamation for a break in the constitutional order. A  vigorous independent press and varied civic groups engaged in acts of “resistance” (Meyer and Tarrow 2018) are sure to raise the political costs of egregious executive aggrandizement. But, if the United States is not confronting a Venezuela-type situation in which the old order crumbles beneath the plebiscitarian appeal of a charismatic populist outsider, neither does the country belong to the category of Western European democracies in which ethno-national populist forces occupy electorally marginal niches and secondary institutional roles. Populist currents are clearly dominant at the base of the Republican Party, as the 2016 primary election campaign demonstrated. Indeed, Trump maintained approval levels ranging from 78 to 89 percent among Republicans during his first year in office (Gallup 2018), which helps to explain why the overwhelming majority of the party’s legislators in Washington stayed loyal to the president, save for a handful of dissenters who were not standing for reelection. Despite virtual electoral parity at the national level, the Republican Party in 2018 – thanks to the Electoral College and various forms of legislative malapportionment – controls the executive branch and both houses of Congress. Having blocked President Obama from naming a Supreme Court justice during the final year of his mandate, Republicans may be positioned to appoint a highly partisan Supreme Court for a generation to come, and to pack the federal judiciary beneath it. The party also controls 33 state legislatures, one shy of the two-thirds majority required to initiate a convention on constitutional amendments. Given the decentralized character of US electoral institutions, this control over state legislatures creates opportunities for

144

Kenneth M. Roberts

district gerrymandering to lock in electoral advantages, as well as opportunities to pass voter registration and identification laws that suppress electoral turnout among Democratic-leaning constituencies (namely racial and ethnic minorities, the young, and the poor). The United States, in short, is not so far removed from a Hungarian or Polish type of situation in which an ethno-national populist party uses democratic means to gain control over key institutional levers, which can then be deployed to whittle away at democratic checks and balances – if it so chooses. In a context of hyper-polarization, incentives to tilt the democratic playing field are readily available, in part because the Democratic Party, a non-partisan judiciary, a wary electorate, a vigilant media, and an independent civil society do remain significant checks on the implementation of the Republican agenda. Ultimately, then, serious efforts to tilt the democratic playing field depend largely on the strategic role and positioning of the Republican Party’s multiple currents in the Trump administration. The alternative scenarios outlined below depict different strategic alignments between the party and Trump, and the conditions under which they are more or less likely to produce democratic backsliding. Trump and the Republican Party: Alternative Scenarios The United States has a wide array of institutions that have long been regarded as relatively independent or “above” partisan politics. The Supreme Court and the judicial apparatus beneath it, the Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, the armed forces, state-level electoral agencies, and the Federal Reserve Board are prominent, but hardly exclusive, examples. Combined with the overarching separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, political institutions in the United States create a complex web of “veto points” that are explicitly designed to fragment and disperse power, frustrate radical policy change, and safeguard democratic procedures (Tsebelis 2002). Within democratic theory, however, the philosophical foundations for the separation of powers and institutional checks and balances were laid by Baron de Montesquieu and James Madison well before the rise of modern political parties. Simply put, parties change the equation; once they arise, the existence of separate institutions does not guarantee independent functioning. Parties that are centralized and disciplined can control multiple institutions and coordinate between them, essentially transforming separate institutions into instruments of partisan hegemony. To become

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

145

fully operative, then, veto points rely heavily on a competitive equilibrium among rival parties  – or, at least, significant political pluralism within them. Veto points are not automatic or self-enforcing properties of the institutions themselves. The independent, non-partisan character of state- and regime-level institutions is encouraged by the centripetal competitive dynamics identified by Linz (1990). Such independence can be severely challenged, however, when partisan and ideological polarization intensifies. Polarization raises the stakes of partisan competition, since alternation in office can lead to dramatic policy shifts or self-aggrandizing partisan behavior that threatens the vital interests of the opposing side. Taken to its logical extreme, polarization leads parties to question the very legitimacy of their rivals as democratic interlocutors. Indeed, rivals may be conceived as existential threats who must be excluded from positions of power at all costs, and impeded from making policies, laws, or appointments in the unfortunate event that they do gain access to public office. As such, acute polarization undermines the norms of mutual recognition and tolerance that are the sine qua non of liberal democracy, or institutionalized pluralism. It may also weaken the reciprocal forms of contingent consent – the willingness to respect democratic outcomes so long as one’s rivals do the same and adhere to established norms and procedures  – that are essential to institutionalized democratic contestation (Rustow 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). For these reasons, then, acute polarization tends to “politicize” public and even civic institutions  – from the judiciary to the private media  – that were previously non-partisan in character, inducing actors who gain control over specific institutional levers to transform them into instruments of partisan advantage. In short, temporary competitive advantages can be used to tilt the democratic playing field in ways that “lock in” those advantages or create durable imbalances (Levitsky and Way 2010). These patterns of delegitimization, norm erosion, and politicization pre-date Trump’s rise to power, but they have reached new heights under the populist president. Efforts to demonize opponents and deny their democratic legitimacy can be seen in the racially coded “birther campaign” against Barack Obama, as well as anti-Hillary chants of “Lock her up” at Trump campaign rallies and the Republican National Convention. An IPSOS survey in 2018 found that Republicans had more unfavorable views of House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi than they did of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un (Resnick 2018). Trump, moreover, has routinely challenged the legitimacy of both regime and civil society

146

Kenneth M. Roberts

institutions that are independent of partisan control, from the electoral system to federal investigative bodies and the private media. He claimed, for example, that the elections in 2016 were rigged, and he designated a short-lived commission to investigate how to correct “massive fraud” in the electoral system. Given the high stakes of electoral outcomes and the parity in electoral support for the two major parties at the national level, electoral manipulation and vote suppression have become legal battlegrounds over restrictive voter registration laws, the purging of voter registries, and blatant partisan gerrymandering of district boundaries. Likewise, partisan and ideological conflicts have eroded the procedural norms for appointing and confirming nominees to the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary, and they have induced both parties to use the threat of a government shutdown as political leverage in legislative and policy disputes. Critical media coverage is routinely derided as “fake news,” and Trump has called the independent media the “enemy of the people.” His administration has circumvented Department of Justice restrictions on the seizure of journalists’ data, and the president has threatened to ease libel laws and suspend television broadcast licenses (Grynbaum 2018). Trump has also fired the director of the FBI, accused officials from the FBI and the Justice Department of waging a “witch-hunt” against his administration, and called FBI special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of his campaign’s ties to Russia “an attack on our country” (Shaw 2018). In an extraordinary memo submitted to Mueller, Trump’s legal team essentially argued that the president was above the law, claiming that, “by virtue of his position as the chief law enforcement officer,” the president’s actions “could neither constitutionally nor legally constitute obstruction because that would amount to him obstructing himself.” Consequently, “he could, if he wished, terminate the inquiry, or even exercise his power to pardon if he so desired” (New York Times 2018). Given the multidimensional nature and growing frequency of these challenges to democratic norms and procedures, it is hard not to conclude that the risks of significant democratic backsliding in the United States are real and becoming less remote. Indeed, they account for a significant portion of the political contention that surrounds the Trump administration, above and beyond the contention focused on concrete policy issues such as immigration, medical care, tax reform, trade pacts, and environmental deregulation. The risks of democratic backsliding, however – the “regime question,” so to speak – rest heavily on Trump’s ability to induce ongoing Republican collaboration with his autocratic mode of governance. Trump cannot dismantle democratic checks and

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

147

balances on his own; he needs partisan collaborators to help stack the courts, uphold executive decrees, emasculate and politicize investigative bodies, and manipulate electoral institutions. A  Republican Party that places the interests of the regime above those of more narrow partisan or ideological goals would not engage in such forms of collusion, but the behavior of one transformed by highly ideological movement currents with ill-disguised illiberal tendencies is far less certain. The grafting of Trump’s populist authority onto the ideological agenda of a movement-based party in a context of hyper-polarization thus poses genuine threats to democratic checks and balances. It also generates internal contradictions, however, that heighten the uncertainty surrounding the course of Trump’s presidency. This uncertainty makes it possible to identify at least three different scenarios for the evolution of the Trump presidency. These scenarios are associated with distinct patterns of party–leader relations, and, as explained below, they have sharply divergent implications for the future of American democracy. Populist Bandwagoning The first scenario – and surely the one that poses the greatest threat to democratic institutions – is perhaps best labeled populist bandwagoning. Under this scenario, the different factions and currents within the Republican Party stay loyal to their populist president, use his leadership and grassroots appeal to advance their more narrow programmatic agendas, and deploy their institutional leverage to shield him from legal and political threats. This scenario essentially represents continuity with the trend lines and political alignments that brought Trump the Republication nomination in the first place, as well as his election to the presidency. It is not without its contradictions, however; in particular, the bandwagoning scenario requires that Trump continue to serve as a populist “empty signifier” who is able to weld together, and provide expression for, disparate ideological currents and strands of anti-establishment politics (Laclau 2005). To the surprise of many observers, Trump largely succeeded in holding these strands together during the early stages of his administration. This reflected, in part, the extraordinary malleability of Trump’s ideological and programmatic profile, but also the unabashed opportunism of the ideological currents that have stamped their agendas onto Trump’s largely blank slate and hitched their star to his populist wagon. Of the three movement currents that have transformed the modern Republican Party  – market fundamentalism, Christian fundamentalism, and white

148

Kenneth M. Roberts

ethno-nationalism  – Trump’s limited ideological profile maps neatly only onto the third, which incorporates the president’s virulent antiimmigration stands and provides his most natural “core” constituency. With respect to the first two movement currents, however, Trump has long taken stands that were highly unorthodox within the Republican Party. His initial positions on trade protectionism, economic nationalism, infrastructure spending, and social safety net programs were anathema to proponents of free markets and limited government, while his personal background, lifestyle, and stands on abortion and gay rights could hardly have been more at odds with the family values orientation of the evangelical movement. Nevertheless, on the campaign trail and especially once ensconced in public office, Trump demonstrated a willingness to allow these more ideological currents to define his agenda, and in the process induced them to climb aboard the populist bandwagon. Enamored by the prospect of influencing Supreme Court and judicial appointments, evangelicals largely fell in line behind Trump, as did freemarket proponents of massive tax cuts and market deregulation. Neither of these currents is a natural ally of Trump’s brand of populism, but both have opportunistically lent support when it provided them with access to policy-making influence. In short, Trump’s populist leadership is largely devoid of ideological content in its own right beyond its strident ethno-nationalism, but, in classic empty signifier fashion, it provides a common meeting ground and a personalistic vehicle to which other actors can inscribe meaning in the pursuit of their separate agendas (even when these agendas are in conflict with each other). Indeed, Trump’s political and ideological heterodoxy allowed him to claim the mantle of the populist figure who challenged the establishment and broke the mold of “politics as usual.” This was most dramatic, perhaps, in his use of economic nationalism and trade protectionism to appeal to blue-collar voters in the US “heartland” who were not traditional Republican voters. This not only helped the party reach out to new constituencies but also effectively politicized a key issue area, that of international trade and economic globalization, where the two major parties were not previously polarized. Incentives for bandwagoning, therefore, are largely attributable to a populist leader’s ability to expand a party’s voter base and activate grassroots networks, thus enhancing the prospects for capturing and controlling executive office. It is Trump’s hold over the base of the Republican electorate that induces the bulk of the party establishment to collaborate with a populist outsider whom they initially loathed. Likewise,

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

149

this grassroots support discourages elite defections from the Trump camp. Defections are discouraged in part by fear  – namely the threat of Trump-inspired primary challenges to Republican incumbents who fail to toe the line. This threat has been made explicit by Steve Bannon and other representatives of the populist current on the far-right flank of the party, which is openly contemptuous of the Republican establishment and capable of exerting powerful pressures on party legislators to support Trump’s agenda. Defections are also discouraged, however, by simple opportunism – namely the incentives for party leaders and activist networks to “stay the course” and rally round a president who can use executive powers to advance their partisan and ideological objectives. Such opportunistic bandwagoning was readily apparent during Trump’s first year in office as he sought to “deliver” on judicial appointments, deregulatory policies, and tax cuts, key priorities for different components of the Republican coalition. Among the three scenarios, populist bandwagoning is most likely to entail a significant erosion of democratic checks and balances. Bandwagoning rallies support around the president and enables the ruling party to act more cohesively, using its control over institutional levers to shield Trump from scandals and investigations, push public policies in desired directions, and, at least potentially, tilt the democratic playing field to its advantage. In short, bandwagoning largely eliminates the ruling party as an institutional check on executive power, and it threatens to politicize other state agencies in ways that undermine their own ability to monitor and constrain the executive. The ever-present possibility of a major domestic or international crisis – such as a war overseas, a terrorist incident at home, or an outbreak of violent social protest – clearly raises the political stakes and increases the pressure on the party to rally behind its commander-in-chief. As Moffitt (2016) suggests, populist figures may construct or “perform” crises precisely for this reason: to provide a pretext for rallying support, concentrating power, and portraying critics as disloyal or even traitorous members of the body politic. Populist Containment A second scenario, populist containment, could unfold if a significant number of Republican office holders assert their independence from Trump and join Democrats in enforcing institutional checks and balances on executive power. Under this scenario Trump would continue in office, but be forced to govern  – if he governs at all  – within the parameters of existing democratic norms and procedures. Trump could theoretically

150

Kenneth M. Roberts

be sidelined or reduced to figurehead status by a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers that assumes responsibility for making and administering public policies. More likely, perhaps, he would muddle through a term in office with limited partisan and legislative support that is only forthcoming for minor initiatives or those that are broadly acceptable, or at least non-threatening, to a bipartisan establishment. Leaders from both major parties would vigilantly monitor executive behavior, block or sanction abuses of power, and place the well-being of the democratic regime above partisan and ideological considerations. An erosion (but not a collapse) of Trump’s support among rank-andfile Republicans would clearly enhance the odds of this scenario, as this would lower the political risks for party leaders and legislators who assert their independence from the president. This scenario would also likely require that party leaders put much of their ideological agenda “on hold” in order to work with Democrats to safeguard the democratic regime. Indeed, it would signify that a significant number of Republican leaders had determined that the threats to democracy posed by Trump were real, that bandwagoning was politically risky and irresponsible, and that the party needed to serve as a restraining force against erratic or autocratic executive authority. Only a handful of Republican office holders, however – namely several senators not running for reelection – adopted such a stand during the early stages of the Trump administration, when bandwagoning behavior predominated. It is far from clear what line Trump would have to cross – such as firing the special counsel for the Russian meddling investigation, or attempting a self-pardon if the investigation encroaches on Trump’s business interests  – to elicit more independent behavior from a larger bloc of Republican legislators. What is clear is that Trump’s chronic and willful violation of established political norms and etiquette has not prevented the bulk of Republican legislators from falling in line behind their president. Like many other populist figures – such as Berlusconi in Italy, Chávez in Venezuela, and Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador – Trump has reveled in coarseness, incivility, and political incorrectness, providing a classic example of what Ostiguy (2017) labels the populist “flaunting of the low,” or what Moffitt (2016) simply calls “bad manners.” He has verbally attacked political opponents from both parties, belittled them with demeaning nicknames, pedaled conspiracy theories, encouraged his supporters to rough up protestors, and made offensive comments about women, immigrants, and media personalities. However offensive this “flaunting of the low” might have been to much of the political establishment, it seemingly helped to authenticate

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

151

Trump in the cultural domain as a “man of the people,” in spite of his status as a billionaire business tycoon. Indeed, it gave expression to cultural and political resentments that the Republican establishment had long nurtured, but increasingly ceased to control. Little suggests that the party establishment will break with Trump over such norm-breaking behavior, so long as he continues to effectively channel the myriad resentments of the party base. Aborted Populism Finally, a scenario of aborted populism is conceivable if grassroots support for the Trump administration collapses and the leadership of the Republican Party abandons a sinking ship. Such a scenario could culminate in a presidential impeachment or resignation, and a highly uncertain process of regime re-equilibration or ongoing instability and polarization. The most likely context for this crisis scenario would involve the Trump administration becoming so mired in political scandals  – over personal and family finances, for example, or efforts to cover up collusion with Russian meddling in US institutions – that even his core movement constituencies begin to peel away or demobilize. Egregious policy failures, such as a major foreign policy blunder or a significant economic downturn, could also set the stage for such a political crisis. Shorn of his popular constituencies, the opportunistic rationale for Republican elites to defend and protect Trump would be gone, and support for Trump from the party establishment would likely crumble like the house of cards that it is. Those core constituencies are fervent in their support, however, and highly resilient in the face of repeated scandals and misdeeds, reflecting in part the remarkably polarized and partisan coverage of events in their preferred media outlets. Indeed, outlets such as Fox News, Breitbart, and conservative talk radio are integral to the movement currents that have transformed the Republican Party, and they are quick to interpret alleged scandals and misdeeds as conspiratorial machinations of political adversaries who are determined to bring down the Trump presidency. Once again, it is far from clear what line would have to be crossed before the president’s core constituencies might begin to waver. Were a scenario of aborted populism to unfold, Trump could well be removed from the political scene, and the immediate threats to democracy posed by his erratic and autocratic leadership traits would be eliminated. It is crucial to recognize, however, that Trump’s rise was only the most visible manifestation of much deeper socio-cultural forces that

152

Kenneth M. Roberts

have transformed the character and content of American politics in recent decades. Such forces might recede if Trump is removed, but they surely will not go away. Indeed, a narrow focus on Trump’s leadership might even divert attention from more far-reaching threats to democracy – such as acute partisan polarization, exclusionary ethno-racial identities, political intolerance and norm-breaking, etc. – that will continue to afflict political life in the United States well after Trump’s departure from the scene. That is – or, at least, should be – a sobering thought for Trump’s many opponents who anticipate his administration’s demise through scandal, impeachment, or electoral defeat. Conclusion In a seminal article that anchored a generation of scholarship on the spread of democracy to unlikely places, Dankwart Rustow (1970) argues that polarization and conflict are not antithetical to democracy. They are, instead, its primary impetus, as democracy is first and foremost an elaborate set of rules and procedures for waging and managing conflict by institutionalized means. Indeed, democracy can emerge even where there is a dearth of democrats – that is, as a compromise, second-best alternative for rival actors who prefer other political orders but are unable to impose them on adversaries. So conceived, democratic norms and values are not a precondition for democratic rule but an endogenous by-product that emerges through joint political learning, confidence building, and democratic habituation. According to Rustow, such political learning can even generate a “double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats:  one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties” (Rustow 1970: 358–360). That double process of Darwinian selectivity has broken down in American democracy, and arguably shifted into reverse. With the transformation of the Republican Party into a movement-based party with far-right currents that dominate at the grass roots, neither inter-party nor intra-party competition necessarily favors convinced democrats. Indeed, acute partisan polarization is breeding forms of political intolerance and animosity that clash with the norms and procedures of democratic checks and balances. The grafting of Trump’s autocratic populist leadership onto this polarized political landscape adds fuel to the fire, magnifying the importance of the Republican Party and its contradictory relationship to the populist president. The functioning of institutional

Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay

153

checks and balances rests in part on this relationship. Absent a revival of democratic norms within the ruling party, the fate of democracy in the United States may well hinge on the strength of countervailing forces within the opposition and their ability to resist undue concentrations of power. Rustowian democracy, after all, was a product of gridlock and stalemate – not consensus.

Conclusion Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

Populism is bad for democracy (see recently Müller 2016; Rummens 2017; and Urbinati 2017). As the chapters by Rovira Kaltwasser and DeeganKrause have shown, populist leaders in Latin America and East-Central Europe have concentrated power, undermined horizontal accountability, attacked the media and opposition parties, and exacerbated political and social polarization. Their actions and rhetoric have severely weakened democratic norms and institutions in a number of countries, transforming several nations into competitive-authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010; see especially Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Weyland 2013; and Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 347–354). Donald Trump is clearly operating from the same populist playbook and, accordingly, has “a penchant for authoritarianism” (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b:  chap.  4). But will the new US president undermine democracy to the same degree as his populist counterparts in Latin America and East-Central Europe? Or will the political and institutional constraints that have protected liberal democracy against similar populist machinations in Western Europe, as the chapter by Verbeek and Zaslove has shown for the case of Italy, operate in the United States as well and forestall any power grab by the impetuous president? The comparative lessons emerging from the preceding chapters suggest that any damage to democracy inflicted by the billionaire in the White House will remain distinctly limited, for several reasons. First, political institutions in the United States are much stronger and more resilient than those in Latin America and East-Central Europe. In particular, the entrenched system of checks and balances imposes firm constraints

154

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

155

on populist machinations and illiberal initiatives. Moreover, President Trump lacks the political clout to transform these institutions, concentrate power, and weaken horizontal accountability. Second, the party system in the United States is relatively strong and stable – much stronger than in the countries of Latin America and EastCentral Europe (Stanley 2017: 140–141) that fell prey to populism and suffered democratic backsliding. The United States’ new chief executive must deal with two established parties: one that adamantly opposes him, and another that has only reluctantly embraced him and that he does not control. Partisan veto players have significant clout in the United States, as they do in Western Europe, where they have kept populist leaders from achieving lasting political hegemony and from overpowering liberal democratic safeguards against the abuse of power. Third, political and social cleavages in the United States are less favorable to the populist quest for political hegemony than in most Latin American, East-Central European, and even Western European countries. The United States is polarized politically, and groups that generally oppose Trump, such as college-educated voters and ethnic/racial minorities, represent a large share of the electorate. Trump, in contrast to populist leaders in other countries, has never enjoyed majority support from the citizenry and he seems to have little possibility of achieving it in the future, given the divisions in the electorate. Fourth and finally, the US populist took over an economy that was in relatively good shape. The absence of a severe, yet quickly resolvable crisis means that he cannot boost his support by portraying himself as the economic savior of the country. As a result, Trump cannot achieve the massive upsurge of support that several Latin American populists, such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, received – and then used to undermine democracy (see Chapter  1, by Rovira Kaltwasser). Because there are no dragons, such as hyperinflation or guerrilla forces, to slay, Donald Trump cannot turn into a triumphant St. George and elicit mass adulation. Indeed, the strong performance of the economy in Trump’s first year in office did little to help his anemic approval rating. A populist with low popularity is simply not very powerful and lacks the ability to establish political preeminence and overpower the institutional constraints of liberal democracy. Thus, President Trump is in a weaker position than the populist leaders of the other countries examined in this volume, especially his counterparts from Latin America and East-Central Europe who

156

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

succeeded in grabbing power and suffocating liberal democracy. The new chief executive faces an interlocking set of obstacles – even more than populist leaders in Western Europe, where parliamentary systems of government and less pronounced partisan polarization leave more room for democracy-damaging machinations. The comparative perspective of this book suggests that these hindrances will preclude President Trump from dramatically overhauling or surreptitiously undermining the institutional framework of liberal democracy. Trump may do considerable damage in areas where he can act alone, such as environmental and foreign policy, but the venerable constitutional system of the United States seems safe from any onslaught that this headstrong new leader might unleash. These constraints are unlikely to prevent Trump from continuing to violate democratic norms, however. After all, as Deegan-Krause points out in Chapter 2, many democratic norms in the United States are unwritten and presidents can violate them unilaterally. Indeed, the country’s populist leader has already trampled democratic norms by firing the director of the FBI, intervening in investigations by the Department of Justice, and declining to release his tax returns. Trump has also shown little respect for democratic norms in his intemperate attacks on minority groups, the media, the opposition, and even members of his own party and administration. Might these violations of norms create a precedent that leads future presidents to commit similar transgressions, thereby gradually degrading democracy in the United States? Do they foreshadow increasing efforts to disadvantage the democratic opposition, hamstring civil society, or silence the independent media, as has happened in so many countries that have experienced populist leadership (see, e.g., de la Torre and Ortiz Lemos 2016)? In addition, given racial tensions and conflicts over immigration in the United States, are Trump’s norm violations likely to lead to increased ethnic polarization and even violence that tear at the fabric of American democracy? We argue that Trump’s transgressions will not do lasting damage to democratic norms. The ample forces opposed to this impulsive leader have prudently refrained from stooping to his level and responding with norm violations of their own, thus avoiding the escalatory dynamic of mutual confrontation that destroyed Venezuelan democracy under Hugo Chávez, for instance (see Chapter  1, by Rovira Kaltwasser). Moreover, the US president’s low level of popular support and his lack of legislative successes make him an unattractive candidate for emulation by other

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

157

political leaders. As long as Trump’s approval ratings hover around 40 to 45 percent and his legislative achievements remain rare, it is unlikely that future presidents will seek to follow in his footsteps. To the contrary, Trump’s unpopular transgressions might even spark a democratic backlash, as occurred in the United States in response to President Nixon’s abuses of power. Nor is it likely that Trump’s incendiary rhetoric and exclusionary policies will lead to a wave of ethnic conflict in the United States. The absence of ethnic parties, the strength of US institutions, and the commitment of the economic and political establishment to peaceful inter-ethnic relations should all help tamp down the risks that the confrontational tactics of the new president will set off a cycle of inter-ethnic violence. Instead, the unprecedented behavior of the new president, especially his hostile rhetoric and his whimsical urge to “shoot from the hip,” at opponents and supporters alike, may well serve as a deterrent. His example may induce a wide range of political forces to come together to prevent a recurrence of populist leadership and prompt a concerted effort at democratic reequilibration (see Linz 1978: 87–96). Of course, these arguments are based upon the assumption that popular backing for Trump will remain limited. A  massive terrorist attack on the order of 9/11 or some similar exogenous shock could boost support for the president, as could excessive radicalization of the opposition. Nevertheless, party polarization, the cleavage structure of the United States, the strength of the economy when Trump took power, and Trump’s proclivity to damage himself with his outbursts make it unlikely that he will ever enjoy the massive level of popularity that populists in other countries have used to consolidate their control. For all these reasons, the populist in the White House is much less of a threat to US democracy than is commonly portrayed. This chapter is organized as follows. The first through fourth sections discuss the four main obstacles that should prevent Trump from gaining political hegemony and weakening democratic institutions in the manner of populist leaders elsewhere. Section five then highlights how these four obstacles interact to form an interlocking syndrome of impediments to any populist power grab. The sixth section explores Trump’s violations of democratic norms and explains why we would not expect these violations to serve as a model for future presidents or to threaten liberal democracy by inciting inter-ethnic conflict. The conclusion summarizes these arguments and discusses the three key actors who will likely determine the impact that the Trump administration has on US democracy.

158

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland Institutional Strength and Stability

The US institutional framework, which is based on the principles of federalism, the separation of powers, and checks and balances, should hinder any effort by President Trump to undermine democracy. Whereas European parliamentary systems and Latin American presidential systems tend to concentrate a great deal of power in the hands of the executive, the US political system disperses power (see the recent forceful analysis by Howell and Moe 2016). The legislature, the courts, and state-level authorities can all block or amend initiatives by the US president. Moreover, political institutions in the United States, unlike those in Latin America and East-Central Europe, cannot be easily overhauled. As a result, Trump should have a much harder time concentrating power and weakening horizontal accountability than have populist leaders in Latin America and East-Central Europe (see also Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 354–355). The importance of the formal institutional framework emerges from a comparison of the US and Western European countries, such as Italy, on the one hand, with nations in Eastern Europe and especially Latin America, on the other. In the latter regions, parchment institutions often lack consistent, rigorous enforcement and are fairly easy to transform (see Levitsky and Murillo 2009), as the frequent overhaul of constitutions suggests (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). By contrast, in Western Europe and the United States, strong enforcement and the difficulty of change, as indicated by the rarity of constitutional amendments in the United States, turn formal institutions into serious constraints on political behavior, including power grabs by populist leaders. Thus, whereas in Eastern Europe and in particular Latin America, political action often deviates from formal rules or simply reshapes them (see Weyland 2002a: 66–68), in the United States they constitute serious impediments to President Trump’s machinations that would be difficult to overcome. The legislature provides one crucial check on presidential authority (Howell and Moe 2016: xvii, 95–96, 113–142). In the United States, only Congress may enact legislation; the US president has no formal legislative decree powers.1 To protect its own attributions and clout against a power-hungry executive, Congress is unlikely to go along with attempts by the Trump administration to enact laws that undermine democracy. Although presidents typically have some influence over Congress, 1

The US president can issue executive orders, but these are not laws per se.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

159

throughout its history Congress has frequently modified or blocked presidential initiatives. It has also often enacted measures that the president has opposed, and it has even occasionally overridden presidential vetoes of congressional legislation. In these ways, Congressional politicians have asserted their own interests and goals against presidential desires and have guaranteed the autonomy and influence of the legislature. A number of observers, including Roberts in Chapter 5 and Levitsky and Ziblatt in their recent book (2018), worry that intensifying party polarization (a factor we discuss below) may induce the GOP’s congressional delegation to go along with Trump’s attacks on the Democratic Party and with efforts to skew the electoral playing field, for instance through restrictive laws on voting. Indeed, broadly comparative investigations by McCoy, Rahman, and Somer (2018) and by Svolik (2018) demonstrate that, in general, ideological polarization fuels democratic backsliding and “the subversion of democracy by incumbents,” in terms of Svolik’s (2018) subtitle. In the United States, executive–legislative collusion that leads to such democratic erosion is not unimaginable, but the institutional framework with its firm checks and balances makes this kind of deterioration unlikely, as the research of American politics specialists suggests. Instead, by widening the divisions inside Congress, party polarization will probably make it even more difficult for President Trump to use the legislature for smothering liberal democracy. As many experts on American politics have commented, partisan polarization and the resulting conflicts have exacerbated congressional stalemate (see recently Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b; and Fiorina 2017:  72–76). Paradoxically, this frequently bemoaned problem (see recently Howell and Moe 2016) creates additional safeguards against populist machinations designed to undermine democracy; in particular, it precludes any transformation of the institutional framework of US democracy. The “insecure majorities” (Lee 2016; see also Fiorina 2017: chap. 1) in the Senate and the House of Representatives focus more on demonstrating their divergences from the opposition than on forging the minimal agreement required to pass legislation, as the dismal legislative record of the Trump era confirms. A “dysfunctional Congress” (Binder 2015) cannot easily turn into the majoritarian rubber-stamp institution that autocratic populists such as Chávez, Fujimori, and Orbán have used to augment their power, enact illiberal measures, and strangle democracy. While congressional gridlock hinders the resolution of pressing problems (Howell and Moe 2016:  61–88) and fuels the popular discontent that facilitates the electoral rise of populist leaders, it also limits what any

160

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

populist chief executive can accomplish in the legislature. Because partisan polarization exacerbates the friction in the checks and balances of the United States, it prevents Congress from turning into Donald Trump’s compliant instrument. Above all, the very “dysfunctionality” of the legislature precludes any formally legal power grab that would threaten liberal democracy. In contrast to the fairly even dispersal of power in the presidential system of the United States, Latin American presidents have traditionally dominated the legislature, weakening its capacity to avert populist attacks on democracy. Most chief executives south of the Rio Grande enjoy significant decree powers; and even those who lack decree powers typically command considerable informal influence over legislative behavior (Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Carey and Shugart 1998). Indeed, Ginsburg, Cheibub, and Elkins (2010: 1720) argue that, “to the extent that Latin American constitutions represent a distinct breed of presidentialism, the distinction is manifested in the strong lawmaking power that they vest in the president.” The fusion of powers in European parliamentary systems similarly provides the prime minister with significant legislative influence. In such systems, the head of government is chosen by the majority in parliament and typically commands its support. As a result, legislatures in Latin America and Europe are less able to resist the influence of populist executives, who can much more easily establish their political predominance than in the checks and balances system of the United States, as the experiences of Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary show (see the chapters by Rovira Kaltwasser and Deegan-Krause). The judiciary in the United States offers an additional check on the authority of the president. Because judges have the power of judicial review, they may block presidential policies and the laws of Congress by declaring them unconstitutional. Moreover, most federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, are granted life terms, so the president cannot remove those members of the judiciary who stymie presidential initiatives. Last but not least, the professional ethos and corporate strength of US judges ensure that they zealously guard their independence and are relatively immune to presidential pressures, such as President Trump’s criticism of a “so-called judge” who temporarily blocked the administration’s travel ban on citizens from seven majority-Muslim countries. This tempestuous attack probably strengthened the spine of many judges, rather than inducing them to succumb to political pressures. The US populist therefore faces a similar constraint to Silvio Berlusconi in

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

161

Italy, whose attacks on the judiciary backfired and helped to stimulate constant legal challenges and intense scrutiny of his political and personal transgressions, which eventually contributed to his political downfall in 2011 (see Chapter 3, by Verbeek and Zaslove). Most countries in Europe and Latin America also allow for judicial review, but their judiciaries sometimes have more limited authority even in formal terms. For example, much of Europe and Latin America grants the power of judicial review only to special constitutional courts or tribunals. More importantly, judiciaries in Latin America and East-Central Europe often lack autonomy from the executive branch. Lifetime appointments to the highest courts (e.g., the Supreme Court and the constitutional courts) are quite rare in Latin America, and there are numerous examples of political interference with the courts, which undermine the independence of the judiciary (van Zyl Smit 2016: 9–12; Walsh 2016). Judiciaries in East-Central Europe have also struggled to assert and maintain their independence (Bugaric 2015; Fruhstorfer and Hein 2016). As a result, the courts in Latin America and East-Central Europe are less likely to block democratic transgressions of a populist leader than is the judiciary in the United States. The federalist structure of the United States offers additional checks on the power of the president. State-level authorities, which have no obligation to do the bidding of the president, control many important decision-making bodies. The management of elections in the United States, for example, is controlled by state and local officials who are independent from the chief executive (Lee 2017: 5). Thus, any effort by President Trump to intervene in elections might meet resistance from these state and local authorities. By contrast, most European and Latin American countries have unitary systems, which tend to concentrate power at the national level. Moreover, even in Latin America’s federal systems, such as Venezuela’s, elections are typically managed by national-level organizations, which are more vulnerable to presidential interference. US political institutions are also difficult to change because major reforms would require a constitutional amendment, which cannot easily be undertaken. Modifications of the constitution may be proposed either by a two-thirds vote of both chambers of Congress or by a convention of states that is convoked by two-thirds of the state legislatures. To become part of the constitution, an amendment must then be ratified by threequarters of the state legislatures or state-ratifying conventions. These requirements make constitutional reform quite onerous and exceedingly

162

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

rare. Indeed, only 27 constitutional amendments have been approved to date, the last one in 1992. By contrast, constitutional reform is easier in Latin America, and most Latin American countries have replaced their constitutions repeatedly. According to Ginsburg, Cheibub, and Elkins (2010: 1732), that region had 231 distinct constitutions between 1810 and 2010; Venezuela alone adopted 26 different constitutions during this period. Nearly 90 percent of the post-1979 constitutions in Latin America allow the president to propose constitutional amendments, which populist leaders have regularly exploited (Ginsburg, Cheibub and Elkins 2010:  1726). As Rovira Kaltwasser discusses in Chapter 1, many Latin American populists, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru, have convened constitutional assemblies to rewrite their charters in ways that strengthened the powers of the presidency and allowed them to gain control of the legislature (see also de la Torre 2017a: 202–203; Brewer-Carías 2010; and Carrión 2006a). Constitutional reform has also been quite frequent in East-Central Europe in recent years. Some East-Central European populist leaders have revised their country’s constitutions to concentrate power and undermine horizontal accountability (Fruhstorfer and Hein 2016; Bugaric 2015). For example, as Deegan-Krause points out in Chapter 2, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, used his control of parliament to draft a new constitution that exempted the chief executive and ruling party leaders from institutional accountability mechanisms. Tellingly, the government of Poland’s nationalist-populist Law and Justice party, which has moved in the same illiberal direction as Orbán (Fomina and Kucharczyk. 2016: 59–63; Rupnik 2016: 78–81), has also called for constitutional reforms. These important differences in the strength and configuration of political institutions mean that presidents in the United States are much more constrained than their counterparts in Latin America and East-Central Europe. US chief executives face a variety of powerful veto players who can block their policy initiatives and who have incentives to use their clout and assert their independence. Any effort by President Trump to undermine liberal democracy is thus likely to face significant obstacles from the legislature and the judiciary as well as state- and local-level authorities. Nor is it likely that this combative populist can overhaul US institutions to gain control of them. Any significant transformation of the institutional framework would require a constitutional amendment, which, as described above, is extremely difficult to achieve. Trump can use

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

163

his powers of appointment to gain influence in or control over government institutions, such as the judiciary and the FBI. Nevertheless, many of these appointments, such as federal judges, are subject to congressional approval, which provides parties with leverage that they can use to limit populist influence. Thus, the institutional context in the United States represents a significant impediment to populist attempts to achieve political predominance and weaken democracy. As Verbeek and Zaslove analyze in Chapter 3, Trump’s predicament may resemble most closely that of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. Although the Italian populist undermined democratic norms and debased public discourse (Viroli 2011; Ruzza and Balbo 2013: 171–173), he was unable to significantly weaken democratic institutions. Indeed, the very institutions that Berlusconi criticized so severely – parliament, the judiciary, and the media – played an important role in his ouster, as Verbeek and Zaslove highlight. Thus, the contemporary populist leader who was most similar to Donald Trump in his right-wing orientation, his business background and opulence, and his oversized media presence also faced considerable institutional constraints. As a result, Berlusconi did not undermine Italian democracy nor do lasting damage to its quality (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 351–352; Verbeek and Zaslove 2016) – an auspicious omen for the United States under President Trump, who faces even greater impediments emerging from federalism and the presidentialist system of checks and balances. Party Systems Another important constraint on President Trump is the party system in the United States. In contrast to his populist counterparts in Latin America and East-Central Europe, the US leader must work within an institutionalized two-party system in which he has limited influence. One of the two main parties, the Democratic Party, energetically and categorically opposes him; and the other, the Republican Party, has embraced him only slowly, reluctantly, and opportunistically. As a result, Trump lacks the firm control of the partisan arena that has facilitated populist attempts to undermine democracy in other countries, such as Hungary, Peru, and Venezuela. Most Latin American and European populists have emerged in decaying or weakly institutionalized party systems. The declining legitimacy of the traditional parties has created space for new movements and political outsiders. Populists have taken advantage of this political

164

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

opening, founding new parties that have dominated elections in these fluid settings. Thanks to their iron control of their own electoral vehicles and their dominance of legislatures, populist leaders have been able to overhaul political institutions, concentrate power, and undermine democracy. As Rovira Kaltwasser discusses in Chapter 1, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador all rose to power in the wake of the decline of the traditional parties. Each of these leaders formed his own political movement and triumphed repeatedly in elections, which allowed them to consolidate control and weaken the existing democratic institutions. A similar phenomenon has taken place in some East-Central European countries, where most parties emerged only after the fall of communism in 1989. As Deegan-Krause discusses in Chapter 2, Viktor Orbán in Hungary helped found a new party in the early 1990s, which he gradually subjected to his control and turned into an instrument for his populist ambitions. Once this thoroughly transformed party won a parliamentary majority in 2010, the Magyar leader used it to carry out wide-ranging constitutional reforms that solidified his stranglehold over the political system and weakened democracy (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016:  350– 351, 361; Kingsley 2018).2 Donald Trump, in contrast, has risen to power in a well-established two-party system that retains a strong grip on voter loyalties3 and that boasts a good deal of legitimacy.4 Both the Republican and Democratic Parties have numerous members, highly developed party bureaucracies, and reasonably strong roots in society. They control virtually all the seats in Congress as well as in the state legislatures. It is therefore nearly impossible to win elections or pass legislation without the support of at least one of these parties. The Democratic Party vigorously opposes Trump, and, to date, it has remained relatively united in resistance to his policies. Although Democrats represent a minority of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Republican advantage is relatively slim in both chambers, which means that the GOP must remain disciplined to prevail. In the Senate, the Republicans hold a majority by only one seat. 2

3 4

On party weakness as a facilitating cause for the rise of populism in East-Central Europe and for its deleterious impact on liberal democracy, see also Grzymala-Busse (2017b: 1, 6). For evidence from the 2016 election, see Donovan and Bowler (2018: 126–127). For a recent analysis of party system institutionalization that documents the contrast between the United States and Latin America, especially those countries in which populist leaders have won power, see Mainwaring (2018).

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

165

Moreover, Senate rules require supermajority votes to undertake some actions, such as ending filibusters, which provides Democrats with considerable leverage in some areas. In addition, given the current approval ratings of President Trump and the Republican Party, the Democrats stand a fair chance of gaining control of at least one chamber of Congress in the 2018 mid-term elections. Thus, by the time this book appears, the Democratic Party may well be in an even better position to block any governmental initiatives that would undermine democracy. Donald Trump currently has the support of the Republican Party, but his influence within the party is limited. The GOP establishment opposed him during the presidential campaign and some of its leaders continue to maintain a distance from him today. As ideological affinities and partisan loyalties between the new president and the GOP are feeble, strictly instrumental calculations prevail – which are by nature contingent and subject to change. Party leaders are inclined to support him only as long as it is in their interests to do so. After all, as Roberts points out in Chapter 5, many of Trump’s ideas and impulses run contrary to the Christian fundamentalist and free-market orientations that have long dominated important currents in the Republican Party. Thus, Trump cannot count on GOP support should he undertake controversial, risky infringements of established rules and institutions. Some Republican Party leaders, in fact, have already sought to deter him from undertaking some measures that might undermine democracy, such as firing special counsel Robert Mueller. Although GOP politicians have been surprisingly tolerant of Trump’s rhetorical attacks and norm violations (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b:  6–7, 32–35, 280; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), they have not yet gone along with any measures that would do serious damage to liberal democracy. The comparative approach of this book sheds light on the limitations that the need to rely on an established party imposes on President Trump. The constraints that the US populist faces in the Republican Party resemble those that Carlos Menem (president from 1989 to 1999) had to deal with in Argentina. Menem, like Trump, gained the presidential nomination of a longstanding party, the Peronist party, and led it to victory in 1989 as a self-styled populist outsider. Although Menem managed to win a second term in 1995 thanks to his success in ending devastating hyperinflation and stabilizing the economy (an opportunity that Donald Trump does not have: see below), he faced growing dissent from within his party in the run-up to the presidential contest of 1999. An intra-party rival pursued his own political ambitions and used his political clout

166

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

inside the Peronist party to block Menem’s renewed candidacy (Weyland 2002b: 177–178, 194; Novaro 2009: 498–502, 543–544). Thus, the party helped prevent the self-perpetuation of its top leader, the typical dream of populists. In fact, Menem’s efforts to make a comeback in the presidential election of 2003 were impeded by another Peronist rival and aspiring populist, Néstor Kirchner. The Argentine experience therefore suggests that a populist leader who relies on an established party will sooner or later face political constraints, since such parties will have other powerhungry politicians who can command enough support to pursue their own ambitions. Where personalistic predominance is contained by an established party, it cannot permanently distort and hollow out liberal democracy. In some ways, President Trump’s relationship with the Republican Party may also resemble the situations that Silvio Berlusconi and Vladimír Mečiar faced in their countries’ fragmented coalition governments. The chapters by Deegan-Krause and by Roberts argue that the GOP is quite weak in its internal organization, hollowed out by powerful donor groups and right-wing media outlets, and pulled and shoved by fervent currents among its mass base, where religious fundamentalists, dogmatic free marketers, and militant nativists push for divergent goals. In this view, Donald Trump has the difficult task of forging and maintaining a coalition among fairly independent quasi-parties, akin to what Berlusconi had to do in Italy. This complicated balancing act helped to prevent the Italian leader from cementing political predominance and limited his capacity to enact illiberal policies and to override or abolish democratic safeguards (Tarchi 2008: 96–98). Even more importantly, infighting among his partisan coalition brought about the downfall of Slovakia’s Mečiar, allowed for the reversal of his illiberal measures, and thus protected pluralist democracy from lasting harm, as Deegan-Krause shows in his chapter. Similar types of quasi-partisan veto players are likely to hem in the US populist as well. In sum, the institutionalized party system in the United States makes it more difficult for President Trump to consolidate his control over the political system and undermine democracy. Unlike many Latin American populists, the real estate magnate from New York did not found his own party to run for office but had to win the nomination of an established party, whose leadership has only reluctantly come to support him. Moreover, Trump faces staunch resistance from the opposition Democratic Party, which retains considerable influence. The continuing strength of the US party system thus makes it unlikely that the new president will be able to

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

167

enact the kinds of controversial authoritarian measures populists in Latin America and East-Central Europe have managed to implement. Cleavage Structure The political cleavage structure in the United States should also constrain efforts by President Trump to undermine democracy. In contrast to most Latin American and European populists, Trump took power in a country where the two main parties and their hard-core electorate have been highly polarized for years, which will make it difficult for him to build broad support. In addition, the class and ethnic structure of the United States is less favorable to populism than it is in many countries. The lower classes, who disproportionately tend to support populists, represent a much smaller share of the electorate in the United States than in Latin American countries. Moreover, ethnic minorities, especially Latinos and African Americans, make up a significant share of the electorate and overwhelmingly oppose Trump. As Roberts argues in Chapter 5, many populists have taken power in the wake of significant ideological convergence among the traditional parties. This shrinking of political options leaves little meaningful choice for voters and has typically led to disenchantment among large sectors of the electorate, which populist leaders have exploited by attacking the apparent collusion among “the political class” as a whole. In Latin America, for example, many left-of-center parties joined their centrist and rightist competitors by embracing market-oriented reforms after the outbreak of the debt crisis in the 1980s. This shift to the right, a betrayal of longstanding ideological commitments, alienated their traditional constituencies and opened up political space for the emergence of new populist movements (Madrid 2010; Roberts 2014). In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, these emerging populist groupings quickly won over the large numbers of voters who were disenchanted with the freemarket measures and who rejected the traditional parties more generally. By capturing this upsurge of discontent, populist movements managed to achieve commanding electoral majorities. According to Roberts (Chapter  5), a similar process of ideological convergence took place in southern Europe, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, leading to the emergence or strengthening of populist movements in Italy, Greece, and Spain. More broadly, ideological divisions have declined over the last few decades across Europe (Fiorina 2017: 144–150), especially since the fall of communism (for East-Central

168

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

Europe, see Grzymala-Busse 2017b:  2) and after the gradual adoption of liberal economic measures by parties across the political spectrum, such as Germany’s Social Democratic Party. As Chapter  3, by Verbeek and Zaslove, documents for the Netherlands, the diminishing differentiation between established parties has helped to open up space for the rise of a series of populist movements. Even more clearly, the end of the Cold War forced a fundamental renovation of Italy’s Communist Party and prompted the collapse of its longstanding adversary, the Christian Democratic Party – crucial preconditions for the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconi and his frequent control of the government during the subsequent two decades (for populism’s further advance in the 2018 general election, see Horowitz 2018). Thus, in both of the regions from which this book derives comparative lessons, the disappearance or softening of old ideological distinctions paved the way for the emergence of populist leaders and allowed them to achieve striking, and in some cases overwhelming, political success. In the United States, however, Donald Trump has taken power at a moment when the two main parties are highly polarized and the electorate is becoming more divided as well (Lieberman et al. 2017: 14–15; Kuo 2018; Kuran 2018). Democrats and Republicans in Congress rarely cooperate on important legislation, nor do they often vote together on controversial bills. Due to a combination of polarization and partisan sorting, the Democratic and Republican electorates have also moved increasingly apart (Fiorina 2017: chaps. 2–3; see also Azari 2016). They live in separate neighborhoods, join different organizations, and hold differing views on a wide range of issues. Many Democrats can scarcely imagine voting for any Republican presidential candidate, much less for Donald Trump, whose approval rating among Democrats is under 10 percent. To be sure, many Americans lack attachment to either one of the two parties and self-identify as independent (see Fiorina 2017: 25–28, 113, 120). In exit polls, 31 percent of voters chose that option during the 2016 elections (CNN 2016), and more than 40  percent of respondents have typically described themselves as independents in surveys taken since that time (Gallup 2018).5 Trump has been able to make some inroads among self-described independents, capturing 46  percent of their vote in his presidential victory, according to exit polls (CNN 2016; Donovan 5

Data from exit polls should be viewed as rough estimates, given the numerous problems with these types of surveys.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

169

and Bowler 2018:  126).6 Nevertheless, as Rovira Kaltwasser mentions in Chapter  1, Trump’s approval rating among independents fell below 40  percent shortly after his inauguration and has remained at those meager levels ever since. Given the new president’s dismal levels of support among Democrats, he would need to win over large numbers of independents to assemble an electoral majority. Thus, the high levels of political polarization in the United States pose a significant obstacle to efforts by Trump to obtain the electoral dominance that other populists have used to consolidate power and transform their countries’ political institutions. When he took office, President Trump may have missed an opportunity to realign the US party system and potentially raise his support to higher levels. In recent decades the Republican and Democratic Parties have diverged to a degree along two main axes, namely economic liberalism and cultural liberalism:  the GOP has linked orthodox economic liberalism with cultural conservatism, whereas the Democrats have embraced cultural liberalism and a good deal of economic interventionism (Miller and Schofield 2003:  255–258; Miller and Schofield 2008:  435–440; Fiorina 2017: 86). By contrast, Donald Trump in his campaign rhetoric proposed a policy agenda that represented an unusual combination of cultural conservatism and nationalist economic interventionism, under the motto “Make America great again.” If the incoming president had pursued this interventionist project by launching a massive infrastructure construction and job creation program right after his inauguration, he might have been able to win over some previously Democratic voters while retaining a good part of his backing among the GOP with his support for cultural conservatism, for instance in his judicial appointments (Fiorina 2017: 87–89, 219). Given the health of the US economy and the resulting availability of resources for such a bold effort at partisan realignment, Donald Trump might have succeeded in forging a new, majoritarian coalition.7 By stimulating economic growth and revitalizing part of the Rust Belt, the populist leader could have drawn citizens out of their partisan trenches and won over a wider range of supporters.

6

7

The 2016 American National Election Study, which was taken after the election and used a seven-point party identification scale, found that 43.9 percent of independents voted for Trump. See Donovan and Bowler 2018: 126–127. Perceptively, Miller and Schofield (2003: 248–249, 253) label this unusual combination “populist.”

170

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

But, probably out of fear of losing more backing than he might win with such a daring attempt at realignment, Trump did not take advantage of this initial window of opportunity. Instead, the new president traced a traditionally Republican, surprisingly market-friendly and economically orthodox agenda during his first year in office (Pierson 2017: S106, S111–S113). In this way, he aggravated partisan polarization and missed the possibility of gaining majority support. By surrounding himself with billionaires and embracing economic liberalism, especially with his massive tax cut, he adopted the longstanding GOP agenda and refrained from reaching out to Democratic constituencies, particularly that party’s union wing. Thus, Donald Trump cornered himself and played to established partisan divisions, rather than boldly trying to overcome them. Through this risk-averse move, the populist in the White House forfeited the chance to soften partisan conflict and to seek majoritarian backing. Trump’s limited base weakens his political clout and thus provides additional protection for liberal democracy in the United States. As in Western European countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands (see Chapter 3, by Verbeek and Zaslove), the class structure in the United States will also constrain Trump’s efforts to build commanding electoral majorities. Populist leaders typically draw a disproportionate amount of their support from the lower socioeconomic classes, and Trump is no exception in this regard (see Cramer 2016; Gest 2016; and Hochschild 2016). In the case of the US leader, however, it is education, rather than income, that clearly divides his supporters from his opponents. According to exit surveys, in the 2016 presidential election 51  percent of poll respondents without a college degree reported voting for Trump, as opposed to only 44 percent of respondents with a college degree and a mere 37 percent with some postgraduate education (CNN 2016; Byler 2017: 34–39; Donovan and Bowler 2018: 126). In Latin America, where the lower classes represent the vast majority of the electorate, this level of support among people without a college degree would typically win a candidate a majority of the popular vote. In the United States, however, better-educated people represent a much larger share of the electorate. What proportion of the 2016 electorate was made up by college graduates has been the subject of some dispute – estimates have ranged from 37 to 50 percent – but all sources agree that they constituted a considerable share (CNN 2016; Edsall 2018; Griffin, Teixera, and Halpin 2017). The relatively high education levels in the United States will make it difficult for Trump to achieve the large electoral majorities necessary to carry out a transformational project.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

171

The ethnic composition of the United States is also an important barrier to Trump’s efforts to win a commanding share of the popular vote. Ethnic and racial minorities represent a significant percentage of the US electorate, yet members of these groups have overwhelmingly opposed Trump, in part because of his white nationalist appeals. According to the 2016 exit polls, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans together constituted 27  percent of the electorate, but only 8  percent of African Americans, 28  percent of Latinos, and 27  percent of Asian Americans reported voting for the US populist, as opposed to 57 percent of whites (CNN 2016; see also Byler 2017:  40–49; and Donovan and Bowler 2018: 126). Some Latin American countries also have large indigenous, Afro-Latino, and mestizo populations, but recent Latin American populists, including Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Alberto Fujimori, have made considerable efforts to be racially and ethnically inclusive (Madrid 2012). As a result, these leaders have won high levels of support among Afro-Latino and indigenous voters in their countries, as well as among the dominant mestizo population. By contrast, as Bonikowski discusses in Chapter 4, Trump has alienated ethnic and racial minorities in the United States with his anti-immigrant rhetoric and proposals, his attacks on the Black Lives Matter movement, and his Islamophobia. As a result, he depends largely on white voters, who represent a declining share of the US electorate. Thus, the social cleavage structure in the United States poses a significant barrier to any efforts by Trump to overhaul US political institutions, reduce horizontal accountability, and undermine democracy. Trump’s political support is limited by the high levels of political polarization in the country and by the large share of educated voters and ethnic minorities in the electorate. Gerrymandered districts favor the Republicans in many states, but, even with this advantage, Trump will probably not be able to achieve the massive electoral success that enabled populists in other countries to carry out sweeping institutional reforms. Absence of Crisis Surprisingly, Donald Trump may also be constrained by the fact that he was unable to bring dramatic relief from an urgent crisis. Because the US economy was performing relatively well when he took office, the populist president could not easily boost his popularity by resolving an economic crisis and ending the losses facing a suffering population, as other populists have done.

172

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

Many personalistic leaders, especially right-wing populists, have achieved electoral triumphs during economic crises, which often open up a pathway to power for political outsiders. For example, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru both took office when their countries were in the midst of severe hyperinflation, which imposed extreme costs on large segments of the population, especially the poor. In both cases, the newly elected presidents enacted bold countermeasures that stabilized their economies and restored economic growth. This success in bringing quick economic relief dramatically boosted their popular support (Weyland 2002b:  chap.  5), which they used to consolidate power and, especially in the case of Fujimori, transform their countries’ institutions and undermine democracy. By contrast, as Rovira Kaltwasser discusses in Chapter 1, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil did not manage to resolve the economic crisis facing his country. As a result, he could not consolidate power or overhaul Brazil’s constitution, but was instead impeached in the wake of a major corruption scandal. In contrast to Fujimori and Menem, Trump inherited a relatively strong economy when he took office in early 2017. After experiencing a devastating recession in 2008–9, the US economy bounced back, and by 2010 was on the mend. During Obama’s second term growth proceeded at a respectable rate of 2.2 percent annually and the poverty rate declined to 9.8  percent in 2016. The United States also enjoyed considerable job growth. By January 2017, at the time of Trump’s inauguration, the unemployment rate had fallen to 4.8 percent, down from 16.7 percent in 2010. In addition, inflation remained low throughout the Obama years and the stock market grew steadily. The Dow Jones Industrial Average, for example, rose by 149 percent over the course of Obama’s presidency (Lewis 2017). This does not mean that there were no economic weak spots. Wages and labor participation rates, for example, remained low by historical standards. Overall, though, the economy was quite healthy by 2016. Because the US economy was doing reasonably well when he moved into the White House, Trump could not hope to boost his popularity by overcoming an acute crisis, as other populists have done. To be sure, some areas of the United States had stagnant economies. Moreover, Trump has claimed that the United States as a whole was in crisis and has sought to project himself as the country’s savior. During the presidential campaign Trump scored political points by blaming Obama for stagnating wages, the decline of the coal industry, and the loss of industrial jobs, as well as a host of social problems, such as crime and the opioid crisis. But, unlike

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

173

hyperinflation or recession, these deeply rooted structural problems do not lend themselves to quick fixes. The US populist cannot easily reverse the decline of coal mining or the flight of industries to low-wage countries, nor can he quickly boost wages. The economy has remained strong under Trump, but this has brought him few political benefits. Indeed, his public approval ratings have remained quite low in spite of the healthy economy, presumably in part because many Americans do not give him credit for the strong economic performance. Trump could potentially get a boost from another type of crisis  – a national security conflict – since a major act of domestic terrorism or US involvement in a foreign war might create a surge in popular support. Studies have found that this so-called rally-round-the-flag effect is usually small, however, and frequently does not occur at all (Oneal and Bryan 1995; Chapman and Reiter 2004). Moreover, any surges in presidential approval that do occur as a result of national security conflicts tend to be quite short-lived. Consider George H. W. Bush, for example, whose popularity soared in the wake of the 1990–1 Persian Gulf War, but who lost his reelection bid the following year by a large margin. Moreover, US involvement in long-term wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Syria has undermined the public’s appetite for foreign entanglements. In addition, a US military intervention might feed into popular perceptions that Trump is rash and unstable. Consequently, such a measure could actually undermine the new president’s popularity, unless the public perceived that the United States was not the originator of the conflict or was responding to a serious national security threat. A US military intervention that had bipartisan support or that was approved by the UN Security Council would be more likely to elicit a rally-round-the-flag effect (Chapman and Reiter 2004), but it is far from certain that any military action by the Trump administration would receive support from the Democratic Party or the United Nations. Thus, it is not at all clear that a US invasion of a foreign country would boost Trump’s popularity. In sum, then, President Trump’s opportunities for achieving wideranging, clearly majoritarian support are distinctly limited. As he did not face an acute crisis when taking office, he has not managed to engineer dramatic improvements and thus win the overwhelming support that allowed several Latin American populists to push successfully for institutional transformations. And, the further Trump’s term advances, the more it is likely that the new president will be blamed for any serious challenge that might erupt. Given his chaotic management style, his tendency toward rash decision-making, and his penchant for confrontation,

174

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

he is likely to be perceived more as the source of any problem than as its solution. This is not a recipe for winning massive backing. A Syndrome of Obstacles The preceding sections have highlighted the four main obstacles that President Trump’s populist machinations face. As the comparative analyses in this book suggest, there is, remarkably, no other country, especially in Latin America and Europe, where all these impediments prevail. Consequently, Donald Trump is uniquely constrained: a Gulliver hemmed in by a multitude of ropes. While presidential powers give him some latitude, especially in policy-making and administration, his shifty and haphazard approach, minuscule attention span, and lack of a systematic program make it unlikely that he can escape from these fetters, as Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver eventually did. Thus, it seems unlikely that he can overhaul or undermine the institutional framework of liberal democracy. Despite a gradual tendency toward institutional erosion, as evident in restrictions on the use of filibusters in the Senate, the United States’ presidential system of government is unique in the strength of its checks and balances and its pronounced dispersal of power. While Latin American countries have a separation of powers as well, their presidents command much greater constitutional authority than the comparatively weak chief executive in the United States, with his distinctly limited attributions (Samuels and Shugart 2003: 43; Howell and Moe 2016: 146–152). Moreover, although the control of the GOP leadership over the Republican Party, over its support groups, and especially over its energized mass base has diminished, the party remains much stronger than the leader-dominated populist movements and parties that prevail in numerous Latin American and some European countries. Thus, President Trump’s institutional position is unusually weak in international comparison. At the same time, the US leader cannot easily boost his popular support, the main political asset leveraged by populist politicians who managed to override or cut down the institutional constraints they faced (especially by convoking constituent assemblies). The class and ethnic cleavage structure in the United States does not favor populists in Trump’s mold. Working-class voters, which typically form the core support of populists, represent a small share of the electorate in the United States compared to Latin America and East-Central Europe, and

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

175

many of those working-class voters are African Americans and Latinos who have largely rejected Trump. The depth of ideological, cultural, and partisan polarization, another feature in which the contemporary United States stands out, makes efforts to reach across the divide unpromising and probably confines Donald Trump to minority status; in fact, the headstrong populist aggravates this self-enclosure by incessantly making incendiary appeals to his hardcore supporters that offend and antagonize many other sectors. Last but not least, the absence of an acute crisis has prevented the new president from emerging out of his political isolation and winning the sweeping popular backing that allowed some populist leaders to win political hegemony. Due to these four obstacles, President Trump is much more hemmed in than populist leaders in other countries. Therefore, he has very low chances for achieving the concentration of power that allowed several of his counterparts to bend or break liberal democracy. In addition, the four obstacles interact and thus reinforce each other, trapping President Trump in a web of hindrances. In particular, the new chief executive cannot turn adversity into advantage by overcoming weakness on one front through strength on another, as other populist leaders did. As Rovira Kaltwasser’s chapter points out, for instance, Peru’s Fujimori and Venezuela’s Chávez invoked actual or anticipated resistance from other branches of government to close Congress, overhaul the constitution, and thus cement their preeminence. But President Trump cannot follow this script, because he lacks the overwhelming popular support that enabled the Peruvian and Venezuelan leaders to cut the Gordian knot; after all, preexisting polarization and the absence of a crisis that the new US president could “miraculously” resolve tightly limit his backing. This interlocking set of obstacles also strengthens Trump’s adversaries in politics and civil society. Whereas opposition forces in Peru and Venezuela were delegitimized and intimidated by populist saviors who commanded overwhelming support, the Democratic Party in the United States, energized by ideological polarization, faces a chief executive who has negative net approval. Consequently, the political and societal opposition is determined to defend the institutional framework, which in turn offers many veto points for countering Trump’s populist initiatives. Therefore, the Democratic Party can pursue an institutional strategy of opposition, which holds much greater prospects of success than the extra-institutional strategy of protest, civic disobedience, and military rebellion through which Venezuelan adversaries of Hugo Chávez

176

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

inadvertently played into the populist leader’s hands and unintentionally facilitated the very strangulation of liberal democracy that they had desperately intended to forestall (Gamboa 2017).8 In sum, the web of constraints that President Trump confronts and that empowers his opponents provides strong safeguards for liberal democracy in the United States. As a result, the country’s venerable institutional framework is likely to survive the recent bout of populism. Violating Democratic Norms As the preceding discussion has made clear, the Trump administration is constrained in a number of key respects. Trump’s public approval ratings are low and he is not likely to be able to bolster them by solving an economic crisis or engaging in a foreign military intervention. The high levels of political polarization in the United States limit his chances of improving his popular support, as does his meager appeal to ethnic/racial minorities and college-educated voters, who represent a large share of the electorate. The main opposition party is united against Trump, who maintains only limited control over his own party. Moreover, US political institutions provide the opposition with numerous veto points that they can use to block Trump’s initiatives. All these obstacles will make it difficult for Trump to overhaul US democratic institutions, which are well entrenched and resistant to change. But what about democratic norms, which are important for the sustenance of liberal democracy as well (Lieberman et  al. 2017: 20–24)? Trump’s weak levels of support among party leaders and the electorate as a whole do not prevent him from violating liberal principles and disrespecting democratic values. Because many democratic norms are unwritten, customary practices, presidents can break them at their discretion. Indeed, since taking office Trump has engaged in an unprecedented number of norm violations. Many of these transgressions are rhetorical:  the US populist has made many threats and used unusually intemperate and acrimonious language to attack his political opponents, the media, and even members of his own party and administration. Some of the violations involve acts of commission or omission, however. For example, Trump has blatantly deviated from conventions with regard to 8

Gamboa’s article underestimates the extent to which the Venezuelan populist had already taken over all institutional avenues, however, making an institutional strategy utterly unpromising.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

177

financial transparency and conflicts of interest, refusing to release his tax returns or divest himself of his investments. Violations of the principles of mutual toleration and forbearance  – two basic norms that have traditionally undergirded US democracy, but that were eroded even before the rise of Donald Trump – may have particularly deleterious repercussions, according to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018:  chap.  8). Mutual toleration mandates that parties accept each other as legitimate competitors for power, while forbearance enjoins the party in power to observe self-restraint in its use of legal mechanisms so as to guarantee ample political space for the opposition (similar concerns are expressed in Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 9, 69–93; and Lieberman et  al. 2017:  2–3, 20–25). US parties have traditionally respected both these norms, refraining from employing the “discriminatory legalism” so widespread in Latin America, whereby governments often make maximum use of their formal legal authority to single out the opposition for harassment and attack (see Weyland 2013: 23). Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018:  chap.  8) argue that Trump has further undermined both these norms in seeking to tilt the electoral playing field in his favor, to sideline some key players in the democratic process, and to gain control of traditionally independent non-partisan institutions. Trump has sought to skew democratic competition in his favor by disenfranchising many supporters of the opposition. Charging without evidence that voter fraud takes place on a large scale, the new president established a Commission on Election Integrity to investigate this issue in spite of concerns by the opposition that this was a pretext to make it more difficult for supporters of the opposition to vote. Trump has sought to sideline some of the key players in the democratic process by repeatedly denouncing them and threatening legal action. For instance, he has criticized the media for conspiring against him and has threatened to change the libel laws to make it easier to sue the press. Finally, the US populist has aimed to capture what Levitsky and Ziblatt refer to as the referees: traditionally independent and non-partisan ethics, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies as well as the courts. Toward this end, Trump has not only fired the director of the FBI but also forced out the head of the Office of Government Ethics, an independent agency. As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018: 187) acknowledge, however, Trump’s violations of democratic norms have had little concrete impact to date. His denunciations of voter fraud and his threats against the media have failed to yield any reforms, and his efforts to gain control of the FBI largely foundered as well. One of the principal reasons that these efforts

178

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

have failed is that they would require the cooperation of other power holders to implement. Yet Republican and Democratic legislators and state-level electoral authorities alike, as well as members of the judiciary and even members of Trump’s own staff, have refused to go along with these curtailments of democratic principles. The employees of state agencies, such as the FBI, have also resisted efforts to turn into political arms of the president. In the United States, commitment to equality before the law is strong enough to block any efforts by the government to resort to discriminatory legalism. Most importantly, democratic competitiveness, the core principle and crucial engine of liberal democracy (see Schmitter 1983: 889–891), has survived Trump’s first 18 months in office unscathed. Trump’s rhetorical attacks and norm infringements have not managed to intimidate or seriously disadvantage the opposition, but have, instead, energized many sectors in the Democratic Party and in civil society. They have mobilized new candidates and voters, and stimulated an eagerness to contest the populist in the White House and his political supporters (Jordan and Clement 2018). Because these political energies are largely flowing into conventional channels of political participation, especially in the electoral arena, they have helped to maintain democratic competitiveness and to preserve pluralist democracy in the country. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) suggest that Trump’s efforts to weaken democratic norms and institutions in the United States may prove more successful in the years ahead. After all, other populist leaders have typically done most of their damage to democracy after their first year in power (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018: 187–188). For example, Fujimori in Peru and Orbán in Hungary began systematically to undermine liberal democracy only after they had consolidated power. These leaders enjoyed very high levels of popularity, however, and they bent and broke institutions that were relatively weak and pliant. Donald Trump, by contrast, is saddled with low presidential approval ratings, and he faces strong institutions that are difficult to overhaul. Another concern is that Trump’s heated rhetoric and embrace of white nationalism could lead to a dramatic downturn in inter-ethnic relations in the United States that would threaten the country’s democracy. The ethnic conflict literature warns that ethno-nationalist appeals by major political figures can lead to a dangerous cycle of exclusionary outbidding (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985). In order to mobilize their supporters, ethno-nationalist politicians will demonize members of other ethnic groups, prompting their leaders to respond in kind. Both sides

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

179

will appeal to ethnic prejudice and resentments, exaggerating the threats represented by members of the targeted ethnic groups. The result is a cycle of increasing ethnic polarization that drives out moderate leaders and often ends in violent conflict. This kind of escalation has afflicted numerous countries throughout the world, especially in Asia and Africa. As Bonikowski outlines in Chapter  4 (see also Lieberman et  al. 2017: 15–20; and Donovan and Redlawsk 2018: 197–201), Trump has extensively employed nationalist and ethnically charged appeals and has emphasized exclusionary conceptions of American identity. He has sought to mobilize white Americans concerned about demographic changes that threaten their power and status (see Cramer 2016; Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; and Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). The new president has denounced immigrants and has made the reduction of legal and illegal immigration a key part of his governing platform, pushing relentlessly for the construction of a wall on the country’s southern border. He has referred to Mexican immigrants as rapists and has exhibited similar hostility to Muslims, Africans, and African Americans. For instance, Trump has criticized the Black Lives Matter movement, has sought to ban immigration from Muslim countries, and has taken steps to undercut affirmative action programs. In spite of Trump’s exclusionary appeals, however, there is little indication that a dynamic of ethnic outbidding is under way. Muslim, black, and Latino leaders have not responded to Trump’s rhetoric by using equally intemperate language against whites. Nor have any prominent leaders of the opposition voiced ethnic hostility or espoused violence or ethnic conflict. Ethnic political violence has been rare in the United States in recent decades, and there are no signs that it is about to increase. The vast bulk of the political and economic establishment in the United States wants to avoid a deterioration in inter-ethnic relations and has adopted programs, such as affirmative action, that are designed to improve societal coexistence and reduce ethnic inequality. Moreover, the United States lacks the ethnic parties that have often fueled violence and the outbidding process elsewhere. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party, is multiethnic and therefore has a strong interest in limiting ethnic polarization, which could break it apart. Thus, Trump’s provocations will probably not foster a cycle of ethnic conflict that would threaten democracy in the United States. Admittedly, Trump’s violations of democratic norms could undermine democracy in the long run if they create a precedent that other politicians follow. One concern is that future presidents could seek to emulate his

180

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

approach, employing incendiary language, ignoring conflicts of interest, questioning the legitimacy of elections, threatening opponents with prosecution, and seeking to capture and control non-partisan institutions in order to protect their friends and persecute their enemies. Another concern is that the opposition could respond to Trump’s transgressions in kind, thereby leading to a spiral of overheated rhetoric and aggressive tactics. Such escalation could corrode the liberal norms and unwritten rules on which US democracy depends and might pave the way for a more authoritarian style of politics, which in turn could resonate with the authoritarian attitudes held by significant parts of the American citizenry (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that many politicians would seek to emulate the governing style of a president who is widely judged to be a failure. It is typically success that leads to imitation, but the Trump administration can hardly be depicted as a success. Indeed, his approval ratings during his first year in office were the lowest any president has had at this early stage of his term. Trump’s abrasive rhetoric and impulsive behavior have alienated many senior Republican figures and divided the party. Most of his policy initiatives, apart from the tax reform bill, have foundered in the legislature. Nor is it clear that his poll numbers and policy record will improve in the years ahead, given the constraints he faces. Due to these failures, Trump’s populist style and illiberal machinations are unlikely to turn into a model for other US politicians, from either side of the aisle.9 While Republican candidates may seek to copy his campaign, especially in primary races, since it was an astonishing success, they have little incentive to imitate a governing style that has paid so few dividends to date. And, rather than retaliating against Trump’s transgressions with equivalent violations, Democratic politicians will have incentives to respect liberal norms and draw contrasts between their own behavior and policies and those of the pugilistic populist. Because the Democratic Party commands disproportionate support from well-educated voters, it benefits from maintaining the high ground and emphasizing its distance from Trump’s crude insults, attacks, and norm violations, with

9

Given intense party polarization, it is unlikely that the Democratic Party will follow the examples of opposition forces in Greece and Hungary, which responded to the rise of populist parties and their takeover of the government by adopting a populist strategy as well, as Pappas (2014: 14–18) highlights.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

181

which the new president is ostentatiously deviating from rules of proper behavior and “flaunting the [sociocultural] low” (Ostiguy and Roberts 2016: 41–46). A more likely scenario, especially if the Republican Party fares poorly in the 2018 and 2020 elections, may be a regenerative impulse that brings new strength to democratic norms and institutions. Historicalinstitutionalist scholars often extrapolate from current trends, and therefore fear that deterioration and decline will continue in a linear fashion (see Lieberman et  al. 2017; and Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).10 But history can have cyclical tendencies, because worsening problems may dialectically prompt efforts at restoration and renovation. In this vein, Linz’s (1978:  chap.  5) study of democratic breakdown points out that crisis-ridden democracies can achieve “reequilibration.” Finland’s fledgling democracy, for instance, survived aggressive right-wing challenges in the early 1930s as pro-democratic forces left earlier rivalries behind and cooperated to guarantee a return to liberal democratic normality (Capoccia 2005). France also escaped from serious problems and risks after the costly and unsuccessful war in Algeria in the early 1960s. Similar kinds of pro-democratic backlashes have occurred in recent years in the wake of populist governments with illiberal or authoritarian tendencies. For example, Peru experienced a resurrection of democracy after the resignation of Fujimori in 2000. Interim president Valentín Paniagua (2000–1) was widely lauded for restoring respect for democratic norms, facilitating the prosecution of institutionalized corruption, and bringing about national reconciliation during the eight months that he served in office. Although the ensuing presidencies have been somewhat rockier, Peru has remained democratic ever since. A similar democratic recovery occurred in Brazil after the impeachment of Fernando Collor de Mello, who had made unusually heavy use of presidential decree powers to impose economic adjustment. Subsequent presidents, including Itamar Franco (1992–4), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), and Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003–10), largely respected democratic norms and refrained from populist machinations. As a recent example, Ecuador’s new president, Lenín Moreno, is breaking the anti-democratic stranglehold of his populist predecessor Rafael Correa, promoting the

10

In a similar line of reasoning, Brooks’ op-ed (2018) invokes Italy’s serial populism to predict “chaos after Trump.”

182

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

reinstitution of presidential term limits, ending attacks on the media, and refraining from confrontation with the opposition. The United States, too, experienced a pro-democratic backlash in the wake of Richard Nixon’s presidency. Nixon’s transgressions prompted a wave of democratic reforms that sought to make government more transparent, to monitor and restrict campaign financing, to expand congressional oversight of the executive branch, and to curb future abuses of power. For example, in response to Nixon’s covert bombing of Cambodia, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which required the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of any deployment of armed forces abroad. To prevent the abuses committed by the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Nixon years, and earlier, Congress also imposed restraints on the intelligence agencies and required them to submit to additional congressional oversight. In addition, Congress in 1974 enacted amendments to the Campaign Finance Act, which established the Federal Election Commission, placed limits on campaign contributions, and required campaigns to file periodic reports listing their expenditures and contributors. The same year Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act, which required, with some exceptions, that meetings of government agencies be open to public observation. Although not all these measures have proved effective, they represented determined efforts to restore public trust in government and to reinvigorate democracy in the United States. As all these experiences suggest, President Trump’s violations of democratic norms will not inexorably lead to the deterioration of democracy in the United States. To the contrary, it is quite possible that Trump’s undemocratic behavior and inflammatory rhetoric could prompt a backlash that would reinvigorate liberal pluralism (a similar sentiment is expressed in Mounk 2018:  259–261). Perhaps this “crisis is an opportunity,” as longstanding observers of US politics argue (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 3–8). Due to the strength of US civil society and the mobilizational energies awakened by the new president’s transgressions (Jordan and Clement 2018), such a liberal democratic turnaround is well possible (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 274–281), as a surge of electoral candidacies and a number of striking victories suggest. In institutional arenas, there have already been steps in this direction as well. For example, in response to Trump’s typically populist threats to fire Robert Mueller, a bipartisan group of senators has proposed legislation that would empower a panel of federal judges to determine whether there was adequate cause to remove the special counsel.

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

183

Interestingly, the illiberal machinations of President Trump have also arguably had a deterrent effect on Western Europe, where fellow populists have done worse than expected in recent elections. Analysts argue that some voters abandoned Norbert Hofer in Austria, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Marine Le Pen in France because they associated these candidates with the new US leader (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 23–24; Shuster 2017). As the anti-Trump backlash has reached across the Atlantic Ocean, it is even more likely to give a boost to opposition in the United States. Thus, there may be a silver lining behind Trump’s populist cloud. Conclusion In contrast to the dire warnings of various recent publications, we take a relatively sanguine view about the impact that the Trump administration will have on liberal democracy in the United States. Our optimism does not stem from any faith in Donald Trump himself. To the contrary, we believe that the current president, like Latin American and European populists, will seek to concentrate power and weaken democratic norms and institutions. Instead, our optimism stems from a conviction that the US political context is less favorable to populist machinations; and we take heart from the experiences of Western Europe, where populist parties and even populist governments have not done any substantial damage to liberal pluralism so far (see, e.g., Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016). US institutions are much stronger and more stable than their Latin American and East-Central European counterparts, and they impose tighter checks and balances on a populist chief executive than Western Europe’s parliamentary systems. Our institutions are difficult to change and create numerous veto players  – from the legislature to the courts to state and local authorities – that can block efforts to weaken democratic norms and institutions. The longstanding two-party system in the United States also poses a significant obstacle to any efforts by Trump to transform democratic institutions. Unlike most Latin American and East-Central European populists, the billionaire tycoon did not create his own party but, rather, won the nomination of an established party, which he does not control. Although the GOP has gradually thrown its support behind Trump, he cannot count on its backing for his more controversial proposals, which carry substantial reputational costs and electoral risks for US politicians. Moreover, the Democratic Party remains relatively

184

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

strong and is firmly united in opposition to Trump and any efforts he might undertake to weaken democracy. Another obstacle that Trump faces is his meager public approval ratings. Various Latin American and East-Central European populists used their impressive mass support to win elections, concentrate power, and intimidate the opposition. Trump’s low popularity forecloses that option at this point. Moreover, his popular support is not likely to improve in the near future, given that social and political cleavages in the United States are much less favorable to populism. The US partisan arena is polarized between Republicans and Democrats, and the latter are very unlikely to embrace Trump. White voters with college degrees have tended to disapprove of Trump, and African Americans and Latinos have overwhelmingly opposed him. Finally, Trump, unlike some Latin American populists, will not be able to boost his popularity by engineering an economic turnaround, because the US economy was already in good shape when he took office. Without massive popular support, there is little possibility of Trump overhauling the US political system. Trump will continue to violate democratic norms, especially in his use of harsh rhetoric and threats, but it is unclear that these violations will have much substantive impact. Some of his transgressions, such as the threats to change voting and libel laws, require the cooperation of other power holders to become effective, and these authorities have so far resisted Trump’s efforts. His nativist, exclusionary rhetoric, meanwhile, has not significantly worsened inter-ethnic relations or led to outbreaks of open conflict. Nor does it seem likely that future presidents and politicians will seek to emulate Trump’s tactics, given that his public approval ratings have remained comparatively low and his policy successes have been few and far between. Indeed, his presidency could well generate a prodemocratic backlash, stimulating a wave of reforms such as those enacted after the Nixon administration. Ultimately, the fate of US democracy during and after the Trump administration will depend in large part on the actions of several key actors. First, as Roberts argues in Chapter  5, the behavior of the Republican Party will be crucial. Defections from the ruling party helped frustrate undemocratic behavior by the Roosevelt and Nixon administrations, but Roberts fears that Republicans may opt to support Trump given his popularity within the Republican electorate. Republicans in battleground states and competitive districts have to worry not just about the Republican primary, however, but also the general election. As long as Trump remains unpopular with the electorate as a whole,

Conclusion: Why US Democracy Will Survive Trump

185

these Republicans will have incentives to woo independent voters and Democrats by demonstrating their independence from the controversial president. Moreover, the Republican establishment remains distant from Trump because his arbitrary and shifty populism diverges from the central programmatic planks and ideological commitments of the GOP, as is evident in his divergences with party leaders over protectionist tariffs (Swanson, Landler, and Haberman 2018). All these tensions and conflicts create problems for the US populist. After all, the defection of only a few Republican legislators will typically be sufficient to block Trump’s initiatives, given that Republicans currently hold only a narrow majority in both chambers of Congress. The behavior of the opposition, especially the Democratic Party, will also be important. As Chapters  1 and 2 illustrate, it is crucial for the opposition to remain united in order to block populist leaders. If Trump manages to peel off the support of some fraction of the Democratic Party, his prospects for enacting legislation that could weaken democratic institutions will rise considerably. It is also crucial that the opposition avoid polarizing rhetoric, not to mention violence. Responding to the new president’s provocations in kind would antagonize moderate voters, exacerbate ideological and ethnic polarization, and justify harsh antidemocratic measures by Trump. As populist leaders thrive on confrontation, liberal democratic forces are well advised to avoid the “natural” reflex of promoting unruly street protests, which would allow Trump to appeal to the authoritarian attitudes of many of his followers, as the chapter by Bonikowski suggests (see also Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Instead, the unusual strength of US institutions suggests that the Democratic Party is much better served by an electoral and institutional strategy. For this purpose, centripetal campaigns that target weak partisans and political independents seem most promising (Fiorina 2017: 113–121, 183–184, 222–223). Electoral appeals therefore need to focus on the widely held, potentially majoritarian material and social concerns of the middling and lower strata,11 rather than on controversial cultural and identity issues, which threaten to exacerbate divisions and conflicts and thus play into the current chief executive’s hands (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 154–162; see also Lilla 2017; and Miller and Schofield 2008: 443–444). After all, core constituencies of the Democratic Party find Donald Trump so offensive that they will vote in 11

Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann (2017b:  166–170). For an interesting set of ideas about such a program, see Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann (2017b: chap. 7).

186

Raúl L. Madrid and Kurt Weyland

large numbers against him anyway. As the exceedingly narrow margins of the 2016 contest suggest, the fate of the country will probably hinge on swing voters in the middle, including some members of the white working class. If the Democratic Party concentrates on addressing the economic needs and social deprivations of these segments, it should be able to draw support away from a multi-billionaire living in a golden tower – whom experienced observers have described as a rather “phony friend of the working class” (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: chap. 5). Given that the Democratic Party has indeed channeled the mobilizational energies unleashed by aversion to the US populist into ample electoral efforts (Jordan and Clement 2018; Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017b: 274–281), the final and most decisive actor is the voting public. Should the GOP triumph in the upcoming mid-term elections, Trump will be strengthened considerably. Republican legislators will be more inclined to support the president’s initiatives, and Democrats could turn on each other in defeat. Nevertheless, a more likely scenario, given the current poll numbers, Trump’s liabilities, and the fervor among his opponents, is that voters will deal the Republicans a clear defeat in November 2018. If this first step in a pro-democratic recovery happens, Trump’s ability to undermine US institutions will be weakened further. Democrats will use their newfound majorities to block the president’s initiatives, while Republicans will have additional incentives to distance themselves from an unpopular and unsuccessful chief executive. Under this latter scenario, liberal democracy will have trumped populism.

References

Abi-Hassan, Sahar. 2019. Populism in Venezuela: The Role of the Opposition. In Kirk Hawkins, Ryan Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis, 311–329. Abingdon: Routledge. Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Abramowitz, Alan, and Steven Webster. 2015. The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is the Other Party. University of Virginia Center for Politics, June 4.  www .centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-only-thing-we-have-to-fear-isthe-other-party. Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. A Political Theory of Populism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128:2 (June): 771–805. Akkerman, Tjitske. 2005. Anti-Immigration Parties and the Defence of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn. Journal of Political Ideologies 10:3 (October): 337–354. Anderson, Carol. 2016. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide. New York: Bloomsbury USA. Angell, Alan. 1998. The Left in Latin America since c.  1920. In Leslie Bethell, ed. Latin America:  Politics and Society since 1930, 75–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Anria, Santiago. 2013. Social Movements, Party Organization, and Populism: Insights from the Bolivian MAS. Latin American Politics and Society 55:3 (July): 19–46. 2016. More Inclusion, Less Liberalism in Bolivia. Journal of Democracy 27:3 (July): 99–108. 2018. Movements, Party, and Power:  The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Art, David. 2011. Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

187

188

References

Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. Populist Social Movements of the Great Recession. Mobilization: An International Quarterly 21:3 (September): 301–321. Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure, Working Paper no. 22637. Cambridge, MA:  National Bureau of Economic Research. www.nber.org/papers/w22637. Azari, Julia. 2016. Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship Are a Bad Combination. Vox, November 3. www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/3/13512362/ weak-parties-strong-partisanship-bad-combination. Bail, Christopher. 2016. Terrified:  How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion. American Journal of Sociology 114:2 (September): 408–446. Bánkuti, Miklós, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele. 2015. Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution. In Peter Krasztev and Jon Van Til, eds. The Hungarian Patient:  Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, 37–46. Budapest: Central European University Press. Barr, Robert. 2009. Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. Party Politics 15:1 (January): 29–48. Bartolini, Stefano, Alessandro Chiaramonte, and Roberto D’Alimonte. 2004. The Italian Party System between Parties and Coalitions. West European Politics 27:1 (June): 1–19. Baylis, Thomas. 2007. Embattled Executives:  Prime Ministerial Weakness in East Central Europe. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40:1 (March): 81–106. Beinart, Peter. 2017. The Rise of the Violent Left. The Atlantic, September. http:// theatln.tc/2hBsaU6. Bell, Derrick. 1989. And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice. San Francisco: Basic Books. Berman, Sheri. 2016. Populism Is Not Fascism. Foreign Affairs 95:6 (November/ December): 39–44. Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy 21:1 (January): 5–19. Bier, David. 2017. Muslim Ban? Fewer Muslim Refugees, Immigrants, and Travelers Enter U.S.  in 2017. Cato Institute, December 12. http://bit.ly/ 2CLmPjE. Billington, Ray Allen. 1964. The Protestant Crusade 1800–1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism. New York: Quadrangle Books. Binder, Sarah. 2015. The Dysfunctional Congress. Annual Review of Political Science 18:1 (May): 85–101. Biorcio, Roberto. 1997. La Padania promessa:  La storia, le idee e la logica d'azione della Lega Nord. Milan: Saggiatore. Blee, Kathleen. 2008. Women of the Klan:  Racism and Gender in the 1920s. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bojar, Abel. 2016. Orbánism at Its Limits? Hungary’s Referendum Has Exposed the First Cracks in Viktor Orbán’s Rule. London School of Economics and

References

189

Political Science, October 4.  http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/10/04/ hungary-refugee-referendum-Orbán. Bonikowski, Bart. 2013. Varieties of Popular Nationalism in Modern Democracies: An Inductive Approach to Comparative Research on Political Culture, Working Paper no. 13–0001. Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 2017a. Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment. British Journal of Sociology 68:S1 (November): S181–S213. 2017b. Nationhood as Cultural Repertoire: Collective Identities and Political Attitudes in France and Germany. In Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich, eds. Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism, 147–174. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bonikowski, Bart, and Paul DiMaggio. 2016. Varieties of American Popular Nationalism. American Sociological Review 81:5 (October):  949–980. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0003122416663683. Bonikowski, Bart, and Noam Gidron. 2016. The Populist Style in American Politics:  Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996. Social Forces 94:4 (June): 1593–1621. Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right:  The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia:  Temple University Press. Bowen, James. 2014. The Right and Nonparty Forms of Representation and Participation:  Bolivia and Ecuador Compared. In Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. The Resilience of the Latin American Right, 94–116. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bozóki, András. 2015. Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism. In Peter Krasztev and Jon Van Til, eds. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, 3–36. Budapest:  Central European University Press. Brewer-Carías, Allan. 2010. Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chávez Authoritarian Experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brinkley, Alan. 1983. Voices of Protest:  Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression. New York: Vintage. Brooks, David. 2018. The Chaos after Trump. New York Times, March 6: A25. Bugaric, Bojan. 2015. A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: “Lands in-between Democracy and Authoritarianism.” I-Con 13:1 (January): 219–245. Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Buxton, Julia. 2009. The Bolivarian Revolution as Venezuela’s Post-Crisis Alternative. In Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi, eds. Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America, 147–173. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzogany, Aron. 2017. Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian Diffusion or Domestic Causation? Democratization 24:7 (December): 1307–1325. Byler, David. 2017. Demographic Coalitions: How Trump Picked the Democratic Lock and Won the Presidency. In Larry Sabato, Kyle Kondik, and Geoffrey Skelley, eds. Trumped: The 2016 Election that Broke All the Rules, 30–51. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

190

References

Cannon, Barry. 2014. As Clear as MUD:  Characteristics, Objectives, and Strategies of the Opposition in Bolivarian Venezuela. Latin American Politics and Society 56:4 (September): 49–70. Canovan, Margaret. 1999. Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Studies 47:1 (March): 2–16. Capoccia, Giovanni. 2005. Defending Democracy:  Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. World Politics 59:3 (April): 341–369. Carey, John. 2000. Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 33:6/7 (September): 735–761. Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart, eds. 1998. Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carreras, Miguel. 2012. The Rise of Political Outsiders in Latin America, 1980– 2010:  An Institutionalist Perspective. Comparative Political Studies 45:12 (December): 1451–1482. Carrión, Julio, ed. 2006a. The Fujimori Legacy:  The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2006b. Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori’s Peru. In Julio Carrión, ed. The Fujimori Legacy:  The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru, 126–149. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Carter, Dan. 1999. From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich:  Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994. Baton Rouge, LA:  Louisiana State University Press. Cento-Bull, Anna. 2010. Addressing Contradictory Needs: The Lega Nord and Italian Immigration Policy. Patterns of Prejudice 44:5 (December): 411–431. Ceri, Paolo, and Francesca Veltri. 2017. Il movimento nella rete: Storia e struttura del Movimento 5 Stelle. Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier. Chapman, Terrence, and Dan Reiter. 2004. The United Nations Security Council and the Rally ’Round the Flag Effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:6 (December): 886–909. Chavez, Leo. 2013. The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Cheibub Figueiredo, Angelina. 2010. The Collor Impeachment and Presidential Government in Brazil. In Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet, eds. Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies, 111–127. New  York:  Palgrave Macmillan. Chokshi, Niraj. 2016. Trump Accuses Clinton of Guiding Global Elite against U.S. Working Class. New York Times, October 13. www.nytimes.com/2016/ 10/14/us/politics/trump-comments-linked-to-antisemitism.html. Church, George. 1992. The Other Side of Perot. Time, June 29: 38–47. Citrin, Jack, Ernst Haas, Christopher Muste, and Beth Reingold. 1994. Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly 38:1 (March): 1–31.

References

191

CNN. 2016. Election 2016:  Exit Polls, November 23. www.cnn.com/election/ 2016/results/exit-polls. Coates, Ta-Nehisi. 2015. Between the World and Me. New York: Random House. Cohen, Richard. 2017. Hate Crimes Rise for Second Straight Year; Anti-Muslim Violence Soars amid President Trump’s Xenophobic Rhetoric. Southern Poverty Law Center, November 13. http://bit.ly/2B1zdi0. Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Conaghan, Catherine. 2005. Fujimori’s Peru:  Deception in the Public Sphere. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2011. Ecuador: Rafael Correa and Citizens’ Revolution. In Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, eds. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 260–282. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2016. Ecuador under Correa. Journal of Democracy 27:3 (July): 109–118. Conaghan, Catherine, and Carlos de la Torre. 2008. The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa:  Making Ecuador’s Plebiscitary Presidency. International Journal of Press/Politics 13:3 (July): 267–284. Conniff, Michael. 1982. Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism. In Michael Conniff, ed. Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, 3–30. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. Connolly, William. 2017. Aspirational Fascism: The Struggle for Multifaceted Democracy under Trumpism. Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press. Constitute Project. 2011. Hungary’s Constitution of 2011. www.constituteproject .org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf. Corbetta, Piergiorgio, ed. 2017. M5S: Come cambia il partito di Grillo. Bologna: Il Mulino. Corrales, Javier. 2002. Presidents without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Council of Europe. 2018. Hungary: “Stop Soros” Provision on Illegal Migration Should Be Repealed as It Seriously Impairs Legitimate NGO work, Say Venice Commission Legal Experts. June 22. https://search.coe.int/directorate_of_ communications/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016808b64a6. Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern. 2001. Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents. Comparative Politics 33:2 (January): 171–189. Cramer, Katherine. 2016. The Politics of Resentment:  Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy:  Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dalton, Russell. 2013. The Apartisan American:  Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Darr, Joshua. 2016. Where Clinton Is Setting Up Field Offices  – and Where Trump Isn’t. FiveThirtyEight, October 7. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ trump-clinton-field-offices.

192

References

De la Torre, Carlos. 2000. Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 2007. The Resurgence of Radical Populism in Latin America. Constellations 14:3 (August): 384–397. 2013. Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: Technocratic Populism in Ecuador. Journal of Democracy 24:3 (July): 33–46. 2017a. Populism in Latin America. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 195–213. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017b. Trump’s Populism:  Lessons from Latin America. Postcolonial Studies 20:2 (June): 187–198. De la Torre, Carlos, and Cynthia Arnson. 2013. Introduction: The Evolution of Latin American Populism and the Debates over Its Meaning. In Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson, eds. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, 1–35. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. De la Torre, Carlos, and Andrés Ortiz Lemos. 2016. Populist Polarization and the Slow Death of Democracy in Ecuador. Democratization 23:2 (June): 221–241. Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2006. Elected Affinities:  Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Palo Alto, CA:  Stanford University Press. 2012. Populism, Democracy, and Nationalism in Slovakia. In Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? 182–204. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Tim Haughton. 2009. Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism:  Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia. Politics and Policy 37:4 (August): 821–841. Della Porta, Donatella, Joseba Fernandez, Hara Kouki, and Lorenzo Mosca. 2017. Movement Parties against Austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Di Virgilio, Aldo, Daniela Giannetti, Andrea Pedrazzani, and Luca Pinto. 2015. Party Competition in the 2013 Italian Elections: Evidence from an Expert Survey. Government and Opposition 50:1 (January): 65–89. Diamanti, Ilvo. 1996. Il male del Nord: Lega, localismo, secessione. Rome: Donzelli Editore. Diamond, Larry. 2017. When Does Populism Become a Threat to Democracy? Paper presented at conference “Global Populisms: A Threat to Democracy?” Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, November 3. 2018. Are People Losing Faith in Democracy? The American Interest March 16. www.the-american-interest.com/2018/03/16/people-losing-faith-democracy. Dionne, Eugene, Norman Ornstein, and Thomas Mann. 2017a. How the GOP Prompted the Decay of Political Norms. The Atlantic, September 19. http:// theatln.tc/2yosxFM. 2017b. One Nation after Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned, the Desperate, and the Not-Yet Deported. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

References

193

Donovan, Todd, and Shaun Bowler. 2018. Donald Trump’s Challenge to the Study of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 28:2 (May): 125–134. Donovan, Todd, and David Redlawsk. 2018. Donald Trump and Right-Wing Populists in Comparative Perspective. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 28:2 (May): 190–207. Dornbusch, Rüdiger, and Sebastian Edwards, eds. 1991. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Drake, Paul. 1982. Conclusion:  Requiem for Populism? In Michael Conniff, ed. Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, 217–245. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. 2009. Between Tyranny and Anarchy:  A History of Democracy in Latin America, 1800–2006. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Eatwell, Roger. 2017. Populism and Fascism. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 363–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edsall, Thomas. 2018. The 2016 Exit Polls Led Us to Misinterpret the 2016 Election. New  York Times, March 29. www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/ opinion/2016-exit-polls-election.html. Edwards, George. 2017. No Deal:  Donald Trump’s Leadership of Congress. August 20. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3022796. Elkins, Zachary, Thomas Ginsburg, and James Melton. 2009. The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ellner, Steve. 2003. The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori. Journal of Latin American Studies 35:1 (February): 139–162. Enyedi, Zsolt. 2015. Plebeians, Citoyens and Aristocrats or Where Is the Bottom of Bottom-Up? The Case of Hungary. In Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis Pappas, eds. Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, 235–250. Colchester: ECPR Press. 2016. Paternalist Populism and Illiberal Elitism in Central Europe. Journal of Political Ideologies 21:1 (January):  9–25. DOI:  10.1080/13569317.2016. 1105402. Fallows, James. 2017. The Republican Party Is Enabling an Increasingly Dangerous Demagogue. The Atlantic, August 23. http://theatln.tc/2xdP1sC. Feagin, Joe. 2010. Racist America:  Roots, Current Realities and Future Reparations. New York: Routledge. Feinstein, Yuval. 2016. Rallying around the President:  When and Why Do Americans Close Ranks behind Their Presidents during International Crisis and War? Social Science History 40:2 (Summer): 305–338. Fella, Stefano, and Carlo Ruzza. 2013. Populism and the Fall of the Centre-Right in Italy: The End of the Berlusconi Model or a New Beginning? Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21:1 (May): 38–52. Finchelstein, Federico. 2014. The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina. New  York: Oxford University Press.

194

References

2017. From Fascism to Populism in History. Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press. Fiorina, Morris. 2017. Unstable Majorities:  Polarization, Party Sorting and Political Stalemate. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Fisher, Marc. 2017. The Political Lexicon of a Billionaire Populist. Washington Post, May 9.  www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-political-lexicon-ofa- billionaire- populist/ 2017/ 03/ 09/ 4d4c2686- ff86- 11e6- 8f41- ea6ed597 e4ca_story.html?utm_term=.ae8de0dbc22d. Fisher, Sharon. 2006. Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Fleischer, David. 1999. Beyond Collorgate:  Prospects for Consolidating Democracy in Brazil through Political Reform. In Keith Rosenn and Richard Downes, eds. Corruption and Political Reform in Brazil:  The Impact of Collor’s Impeachment, 49–71. Miami: North–South Center Press. Fomina, Joanna, and Jacek Kucharczyk. 2016. The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland. Journal of Democracy 27:4 (October): 58–68. Formisano, Ronald. 2012. The Tea Party:  A Brief History. Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press. Fowler, Brigid. 2004. Concentrated Orange:  Fidesz and the Remaking of the Hungarian Centre-Right, 1994–2002. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20:3 (September):  80–114. DOI:  10.1080/1352327042 000260814. Friedman, Uri. 2017. What Is a Populist? And Is Donald Trump One? The Atlantic, February 27. Fruhstorfer, Anna, and Michael Hein. 2016. Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe:  From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems. New York: Springer. Frum, David. 2018. Trumpocracy:  The Corruption of the American Republic. New York: HarperCollins. Fukuyama, Francis. 2016. American Political Decay or Renewal? The Meaning of the 2016 Election. Foreign Affairs 95:4 (July/August): 58–68. 2018. The Populist Surge. The American Interest 13:4 (March/April): 16–18. Gallup. 2018. Party Affiliation. http://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation .aspx. Gamboa, Laura. 2017. Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela. Comparative Politics 49:4 (July): 457–477. Gates, Leslie. 2010. Electing Chávez: The Business of Anti-Neoliberal Politics in Venezuela. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press. Germani, Gino. 1978. Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Gest, Justin. 2016. The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gidron, Noam. 2018. The Left Shouldn’t Fear Nationalism. It Should Embrace It. Vox, February 8. https://bit.ly/2nSoaiI.

References

195

Gidron, Noam, and Bart Bonikowski. 2013. Varieties of Populism:  Literature Review and Research Agenda, Working Paper no.  13–0004. Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Gidron, Noam, and Peter Hall. 2017. The Politics of Social Status:  Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right. British Journal of Sociology 68:S1 (November): S57–S84. Gilens, Martin. 2000. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ginsberg, Benjamin, and Martin Shefter. 2002. Politics by Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater, 3rd edn. New York: W. W. Norton. Ginsburg, Tom, José Antonio Cheibub, and Zachary Elkins. 2011. Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Texas Law Review 89:7 (August): 1707–1739. Goldsmith, Jack. 2017. Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency? The Atlantic, October. http://theatln.tc/2h1YNqi. Gray Molina, George. The Challenge of Progressive Change under Evo Morales. In Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds. Leftist Governments in Latin America:  Successes and Shortcomings, 57–76. New York: Cambridge University Press. Griffin, Robert. 2017. Party Hoppers: Understanding Voters Who Switched Party Affiliation. American Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, December. http:// bit.ly/2kBbJ8A. Griffin, Robert, Ruy Teixeira, and John Halpin. 2017. Voter Trends in 2016: A Final Examination. Washington, DC:  Center for American Progress. https:// cdn.americanprogress.org/ content/ uploads/ 2017/ 11/ 02102135/ VoterTrends2016-report-update.pdf. Grynbaum, Michael. 2018. In Targeting Reporter, Justice Dept. Backs Trump’s Anti-Press Rhetoric. New  York Times, June 10. www.nytimes.com/ 2018/ 06/ 10/ business/ media/ justice- department- press- first- amendment .html. Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2017a. Global Populisms and Their Impact. Slavic Review 76:S1 (August): S3–S8. 2017b. Populist or Authoritarian:  The Erosion of Democracy in Poland and in Hungary. Paper presented at conference “Global Populisms: A Threat to Democracy?” Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, November 3. Hacker, Jakob, and Paul Pierson. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster. Hardwick, Elizabeth. 1968. Mr. America. New  York Review of Books, November 7. Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Haughton, Tim, and Sharon Fisher. 2008. From the Politics of State-Building to Programmatic Politics:  The Post-Federal Experience and the Development of Centre-Right Party Politics in Croatia and Slovakia. Party Politics 14:2 (July): 435–454.

196

References

Hawkins, Kirk. 2009. Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Political Studies 42:8 (August): 1040–1067. 2010. Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2016. Responding to Radical Populism: Chavismo in Venezuela. Democratization 23:2 (August): 242–262. Hawkins, Kirk, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017a. The Ideational Approach  to Populism. Latin American Research Review 52:4 (October): 513–528. 2017b. What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can’t. Swiss Political Science Review 23:4 (December): 526–542. 2018. Measuring Populist Discourse in the United States and Beyond. Nature Human Behaviour 2:4 (April): 241–242. Hechter, Michael. 2001. Containing Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Held, David. 2006. Models of Democracy, 3rd edn. Palo Alto, CA:  Stanford University Press. Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. 2004. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:  A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics 2:4 (December): 725–740. Hetherington, Marc. 2011. Resurgent Mass Partisanship:  The Role of Elite Polarization. In Richard Niemi, Herbert Weisberg, and David Kimball, eds. Controversies in Voting Behavior, 5th edn, 242–265. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Hetherington, Marc, and Jonathan Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hicken, Allen, and Erik Martínez Kuhonta. 2011. Shadows from the Past: Party System Institutionalization in Asia. Comparative Political Studies 44:5 (May): 572–597. Higham, John. 2002 [1955]. Strangers in the Land:  Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Hochschild, Arlie. 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York: New Press. Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Horowitz, Jason. 2018. In Italy, Populists Chip Away at Political Firewall Built by Establishment. New York Times, March 6: A6. Howell, William, and Terry Moe. 2016. Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government  – and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency. New York: Basic Books. Huber, Robert, and Saskia Ruth. 2017. Mind the Gap! Populism, Participation and Representation in Europe. Swiss Political Science Review 23:4 (December): 462–484. Hungarian Government. 2015. National Consultation on Immigration to Begin. April 24. www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/nationalconsultation-on-immigration-to-begin.

References

197

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave:  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Huseman, Jessica, and Annie Waldman. 2017. Trump Administration Quietly Rolls Back Civil Rights Efforts across Federal Government. ProPublica, June 15. http://bit.ly/2sD5nM8. Ianni, Octavio. 1975. La formación del estado populista en América Latina. Mexico City: Era. Illing, Sean. 2017. 20 of America’s Top Political Scientists Gathered to Discuss Our Democracy: They’re Scared. Vox, October 13. www.vox.com/2017/10/ 13/16431502/america-democracy-decline-liberalism. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash, Research Working Paper no. 16–026. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2818659. Innes, Abbey. 2002. Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe:  The Great Electoral Lottery. Comparative Politics 35:1 (October): 85–104. Jansen, Robert. 2011. Populist Mobilization:  A New Theoretical Approach to Populism. Sociological Theory 29:2 (June): 75–96. Jay, Anthony, and Jonathan Lynn. 1980. Yes, Minister, season 1. BBC Comedy Collection. Jones, Bradley, and Jocelyn Kiley. 2016. More “Warmth” for Trump among GOP Voters Concerned by Immigrants, Diversity. Pew Research Center, June 2. http://pewrsr.ch/1TRwICz. Jordan, Mary, and Scott Clement. 2018. Rallying Nation: In Reaction to Trump, Millions of Americans Are Joining Protests and Getting Political. Washington Post, April 6.  www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/04/06/ feature/ in- reaction- to- trump- millions- of- americans- are- joining- protestsand-getting-political/?utm_term=.27245f81f75a. Judis, John. 2016. The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. New York: Columbia Global Reports. Kaal, Harm. 2011. A Conceptual History of Livability:  Dutch Scientists, Politicians, Policy Makers and Citizens and the Quest for a Livable City. City 15:5 (November): 532–547. Kampwirth, Karen. 2010. Introduction. In Karen Kampwirth, ed. Gender and Populism in Latin America:  Passionate Politics, 1–24. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kazin, Michael. 1995. The Populist Persuasion: An American History. New York: Basic Books. 1998. The Populist Persuasion:  An American History, rev. edn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2016. Trump and American Populism: Old Whine, New Bottles. Foreign Affairs 95:6 (November/December): 17–24. Keane, John. 2009. The Life and Death of Democracy. New York: W. W. Norton. Keith, Tamara. 2017. President Trump Stands By Original Charlottesville Remarks. National Public Radio, September 14. http://n.pr/2jahBp7. Kingsley, Patrick. 2018. Taking an Ax to Hungary’s Democracy as Europe Fidgets. New York Times, February 11: 1, 10.

198

References

Kiss, Csilla. 2002. From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young Democrats in Post-Communist Hungary. East European Politics and Societies 16:3 (August): 739–763. Kitschelt, Herbert. 2006. Movement Parties. In Richard Katz and William Crotty, eds. Handbook of Party Politics, 278–290. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Kitzberger, Philip. 2010. The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments: Does Ideology Matter?, Working Paper no.  151. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Klar, Samara, and Yanna Krupnikov. 2016. Independent Politics: How American Disdain for Parties Leads to Political Inaction. New  York:  Cambridge University Press. Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Takis Pappas, eds. 2015. European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press. Kuo, Didi. 2018. The Paradox of Party Polarization. The American Interest, March 27. www.the-american-interest.com/2018/03/27/paradox-party- polarization. Kuran, Timur. 2018. Another Road to Serfdom: Cascading Intolerance. In Cass Sunstein, ed. Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America, 233–275. New York: Dey Street Books. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso Books. Lamont, Michèle, Bo Yun Park, and Elena Ayala-Hurtado. 2017. Trump’s Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class. British Journal of Sociology 68:S1 (November): S153–S180. Larson, Gary. 1984. The Far Side Gallery. Kansas City:  Andrews McMeel Publishing. Layman, Geoffrey, and Thomas Carsey. 2002. Party Polarization and “Conflict Extension” in the American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 46:4 (October): 786–802. DOI: 10.2307/3088434. Lee, Frances. 2016. Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2017. Thinking about the Unthinkable: Prospects for Democratic Backsliding in the United States. Paper presented at the Bright Line Watch conference “How Do Democracies Fall Apart (and Could It Happen Here?).” Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University, October 6. Leff, Carol Skalnik. 1996. Dysfunctional Democratization? Institutional Conflict in Post-Communist Slovakia. Problems of Post-Communism 43:5 (September/October): 36–50. Levitsky, Steven. 1998. Institutionalization and Peronism. Party Politics 4:1 (January): 77–92. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, Steven, and James Loxton. 2012. Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism: The Case of Fujimori’s Peru. In Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas:  Threat or Corrective for Democracy? 160–181. New  York:  Cambridge University Press.

References

199

2013. Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes. Democratization 20:1 (January): 107–136. Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo. 2009. Variation in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science 12:1 (June): 115–133. Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts, eds. 2011a. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2011b. Democracy, Development, and the Left. In Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, eds. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 399–426. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism:  Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die: What History Reveals about Our Future. New York: Crown. Lewis, Nicole. 2017. Comparing the “Trump Economy” to the “Obama Economy.” Washington Post, December 14. www.washingtonpost .com/news/factchecker/ wp/ 2017/ 12/ 14/ comparing- the- trump- economy- to- the- obamaeconomy/?utm_term=.e3aac638be1a. Lieberman, Robert, Suzanne Mettler, Thomas Pepinsky, Kenneth Roberts, and Richard Valelly. 2017. Trumpism and American Democracy:  History, Comparison, and the Predicament of Liberal Democracy in the United States. August 29. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028990. Lieven, Anatol. 2012. America Right or Wrong:  An Anatomy of American Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016. Clinton and Trump: Two Faces of American Nationalism. Survival 58:5 (October): 7–22. Lilla, Mark. 2017. The Once and Future Liberal:  After Identity Politics. New York: HarperCollins. Linz, Juan José. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy 1:1 (Winter): 51–69. 2000. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1997. American Exceptionalism:  A Double-Edged Sword. New York: W. W. Norton. 1990. Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge. Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Florence, MA: Free Press. López Maya, Margarita, and Alexandra Panzarelli. 2013. Populism, Rentierism, and Socialism in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of Venezuela. In Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson, eds. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, 239–268. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lowndes, Joseph. 2008. From the New Deal to the New Right:  Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism. New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press. Lucardie, Paul. 2008. The Netherlands: Populism versus Pillarization. In Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, eds. Twenty-First Century Populism: The

200

References

Spectre of Western European Democracy, 151–165. Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan. McAdam, Doug, and Karina Kloos. 2014. Deeply Divided:  Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America. New York: Oxford University Press. McCarthy, Patrick. 1996. Forza Italia:  The New Politics and Old Values of a Changing Italy. In Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, eds. The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi, 130–146. London: Routledge. 1997. Italy: A New Language for a New Politics? Journal of Modern Italian Studies 2:3 (April): 337–357. McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2008. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McClintock, Cynthia. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism versus Partially Democratic Regimes: The Case of the Fujimori Government and the 2000 Elections. In Julio Carrión, ed. The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru, 242–267. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. McCoy, Jennifer, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer. 2018. Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy. American Behavioral Scientist 62:1 (January): 16–42. McDonnell, Duncan. 2013. Silvio Berlusconi’s Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo della Libertà. Political Studies 61:S1 (April): S217–S233. McElwee, Sean, and Jason McDaniel. 2017. Fear of Diversity Made People More Likely to Vote Trump. The Nation, March 14. http://bit.ly/2nq1Dbo. McElwee, Sean, Jesse Rhodes, Brian Schaffner, and Bernard Fraga. 2018. The Missing Obama Millions. New York Times, March 11: SR3. Madrid, Raúl L. 2008. The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America. World Politics 60:3 (April): 475–508. 2010. The Origins of the Two Lefts in Latin America. Political Science Quarterly 125:4 (Winter): 587–609. 2011. Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento al Socialismo. In Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, eds. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 242–267. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2012. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. New  York:  Cambridge University Press. Madrid, Raúl L., Wendy Hunter, and Kurt Weyland. 2010. The Policies and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left. In Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings, 140–180. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Mainwaring, Scott. 2018. Party System Institutionalization in Contemporary Latin America. In Scott Mainwaring, ed. Party Systems in Latin America, 34–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, eds. 2006. The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

References

201

Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2013. Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America:  Emergence, Survival, and Fall. New  York:  Cambridge University Press. Mair, Peter. 2008. Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective. Acta Politica 43:2/3 (July): 235–253. Manchester, Julia. 2017. Poll:  Trump’s Approval Rating Makes Him Least Popular First-Year President on Record. The Hill, December 16. http://bit .ly/2CouvHp. Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein. 2012. It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books. Manzetti, Luigi, and Charles Blake. 1996. Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America. Review of International Political Economy 3:4 (Winter): 662–697. March, Luke. 2007. From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox populi:  LeftPopulism as a “Shadow” of Contemporary Socialism. SAIS Review of International Affairs 27:1 (Winter/Spring): 63–77. Mason, Lilliana. 2018. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meléndez, Carlos. 2014. Is There a Right Track in Post-Party Collapse Scenarios? Comparing the Andean Countries. In Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. The Resilience of the Latin American Right, 167–193. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Meléndez, Carlos, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. Political Identities: The Missing Link in the Study of Populism. Party Politics (forthcoming). DOI: 10.1177/1354068817741287. Meyer, David, and Sidney Tarrow. 2018. Introduction. In David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Charting the Resistance:  The Emergence of the Movement against President Trump, 1–23. New York: Oxford University Press. Mickey, Robert. 2015. Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep South, 1944–1972. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. Mickey, Robert, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. 2017. Is America Still Safe for Democracy? Why the United States Is in Danger of Backsliding. Foreign Affairs 96:3 (May/June): 20–29. Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. 2003. Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States. American Political Science Review 97:2 (May): 245–260. 2008. The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S. Perspectives on Politics 6:3 (September): 433–450. Moffitt, Benjamin. 2016. The Global Rise of Populism:  Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Montúfar, César. 2013. Rafael Correa and His Plebiscitary Citizens’ Revolution. In Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson, eds. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, 295–321. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Moraes Valença, Marcio. 2002. The Politics of Giving in Brazil:  The Rise and Demise of Collor (1990–1992). Latin American Perspectives 29:1 (January): 115–152.

202

References

Morgan, Jana. 2011. Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Mounk, Yascha. 2018. The People vs. Democracy:  Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mudde, Cas. 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39:3 (Autumn): 541–563. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New  York:  Cambridge University Press. 2013. Three Decades of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe:  So What? European Journal of Political Research 52:1 (July): 1–19. 2017. ed. The Populist Radical Right: A Reader. Abingdon: Routledge. Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism:  Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. Government and Opposition 48:2 (April): 147–174. 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Muis, Jasper. 2015. The Rise and Demise of the Dutch Extreme Right: Discursive Opportunities and Support for the Center Democrats in the 1990s. Mobilization 20:1 (March): 41–60. Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press. New York Times, The. 2018. The Trump Lawyers’ Confidential Memo to Mueller, Explained. June 2.  www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/02/us/politics/ trump-legal-documents.html. Novaro, Marcos. 2009. Argentina en el fin del siglo:  Democracia, mercado y nación (1983–2001). Buenos Aires: Paidós. Nový Čas. 2012. Mečiar, Len On, Boxer Či Otec Vlasti:  Šéf HZDS Má Dnes 70! July 26. www.cas.sk/clanok/228944/meciar-len-on-boxer-ci-otec-vlastisef-hzds-ma-dnes-70. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy 5:1 (January): 55–69. 1999. Comments on O’Donnell: A Response to My Commentators. In Andreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds. The Self-Restraining State:  Power and Accountability in New Democracies, 68–73. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:  Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Oliver, Eric, and Wendy Rahn. 2016. Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667:1 (August): 189–206. Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge. Oneal, John, and Anna Lillian Bryan. 1995. The Rally ’Round the Flag Effect in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1985. Political Behavior 17:4 (December): 379–401. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2018. Hungary Parliamentary Elections 8 April 2018:  ODIHR Limited Election

References

203

Observation Mission Final Report. Vienna:  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/385959? download=true. Ornstein, Norm. 2014. How Racists and Partisans Exploit the Age of Obama. The Atlantic, December 11. http://theatln.tc/2ARvRtO. Ostiguy, Pierre. 2017. Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 73–97. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Ostiguy, Pierre, and Kenneth Roberts. 2016. Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low. Brown Journal of World Affairs 23:1 (Fall/Winter): 25–50. Otjes, Simon. 2011. The Fortuyn Effect Revisited:  How Did the LPF Affect the Dutch Parliamentary Party System? Acta Politica 46:4 (October): 400–424. Panizza, Francisco. 2000a. Beyond “Delegative Democracy”: “Old Politics” and “New Economics” in Latin America. Journal of Latin American Studies 32:3 (October): 737–763. 2000b. Neopopulism and Its Limits in Collor’s Brazil. Bulletin of Latin American Research 19:2 (April): 177–192. 2009. Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy beyond the Washington Consensus. London: Zed Books. Pappas, Takis. 2014. Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and PostCommunist Hungary. Government and Opposition 49:1 (January): 1–23. Parker, Christopher, and Matt Barreto. 2013. Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. Passarelli, Gianluca. 2015. Populism and the Lega Nord. In Erik Jones and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics, 224– 239. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pedrazzani, Andrea, and Luca Pinto. 2015. The Electoral Base:  The “Political Revolution” in Evolution. In Filippo Tronconi, ed. Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication and Ideology, 75–98. Farnham: Ashgate. Pellikaan, Huib, Sarah de Lange, and Tom van der Meer. 2007. Fortuyn’s Legacy:  Party System Change in the Netherlands. Comparative European Politics 5:3 (September): 282–302. Pham, Vincent. 2015. Our Foreign President Barack Obama:  The Racial Logics of Birther Discourses. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 8:2 (May): 86–107. Pierson, Paul. 2017. American Hybrid: Donald Trump and the Strange Merger of Populism and Plutocracy. British Journal of Sociology 68:S1 (November): S105–S119. Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

204

References

Power, Timothy. 2000. The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil:  Elites, Institutions, and Democratization. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University Press. Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory in Democratic Instability. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill. Reid, Joy-Ann. 2017. The Seeds of Trump’s Victory Were Sown the Moment Obama Won. NBC News, October 20. http://nbcnews.to/2xajs2t. Resnick, Gideon. 2018. Kim Jong Un More Popular among Republicans than Nancy Pelosi: Exclusive Poll Results. Daily Beast, June 18. www.thedailybeast .com/kim-jong-un-more-popular-than-pelosi-among-republicans-exclusivepoll-results. Roberts, Kenneth. 1995. Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case. World Politics 48:1 (October): 82–116. 2006a. Do Parties Matter? Lessons from the Fujimori Experience. In Julio Carrión, ed. The Fujimori Legacy:  The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru, 81–101. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2006b. Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America. Comparative Politics 38:2 (January): 127–148. 2008. The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization. Annual Review of Political Science 11:1 (June): 327–349. 2012. Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. In Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas:  Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, 136–159. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Parties and Populism in Latin America. In Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson, eds. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, 37–60. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2014. Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rodrik, Dani. 2017. Populism and the Economics of Globalization, Working Paper no. 23559. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. www.nber.org/papers/w23559. Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis. West European Politics 34:6 (November): 1272–1283. Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. 2014a. From Right Populism in the 1990s to Left Populism in the 2000s – and Back Again? In Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. The Resilience of the Latin American Right, 143– 166. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2014b. Latin American Populism: Some Conceptual and Normative Lessons. Constellations 21:4 (November): 494–504. 2017. Populism and the Question of How to Deal With It. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 490–507. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, and Paul Taggart. 2016. Dealing with Populists in Government:  A Framework for Analysis. Democratization 23:2 (September): 201–220.

References

205

Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. 2017. The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, and Lisa Zanotti. 2018. The Comparative (Party) Politics of the Great Recession: Causes, Consequences and Future Research Agenda. Comparative European Politics 16:3 (May): 535–548. Rummens, Stefan. 2017. Populism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 554–570. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Rupnik, Jacques. 2016. The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East. Journal of Democracy 27:4 (October): 77–87. Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. Transition to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics 2:3 (April): 337–363. Ruzza, Carlo, and Laura Balbo. 2013. Italian Populism and the Trajectories of Two Leaders: Silvio Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi. In Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral, eds. Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, 163–175. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Rydgren, Jens. 2004. Holland and Pim Fortuyn: A Deviant Case or the Beginning of Something New? Current Politics and Economics of Europe 13:3 (January): 209–238. Saletan, William. 2017. What Trump Supporters Really Believe. Slate, August 29. http://slate.me/2vGYdDP. Samuels, David, and Matthew Shugart. 2003. Presidentialism, Elections and Representation. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15:1 (January): 33–60. 2010. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sassen, Saskia. 2001. The Global City:  New  York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Savage, Charlie. 2017. Justice Dept. to Take on Affirmative Action in College Admissions. New York Times, August 1. http://nyti.ms/2uhXNmO. Sawer, Marian, and David Laycock. 2009. Down with Elites and Up with Inequality: Market Populism in Australia and Canada. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47:2 (May): 133–150. Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2003. Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6:5 (May): 1001–1083. 2012. How to Evade the Constitution: The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Decision on Judicial Retirement Age, Part I. Verfassungsblog, August 9. https:// verfassungsblog.de/ evade- constitution- case- hungarian- constitutio nal-courts-decision-judicial-retirement-age. 2015. Prepared Statement of Dr.  Kim Lane Scheppele. In The Trajectory of Democracy: Why Hungary Matters, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, March 19, 2013, 20–24. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office. www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission .house.gov/ files/ The%20Trajectory%20of%20Democracy%20%20Why%20Hungary%20Matters.pdf.

206

References

Schildkraut, Deborah. 2003. American Identity and Attitudes toward OfficialEnglish Policies. Political Psychology 24:3 (July): 469–499. Schlozman, Daniel. 2015. When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schmidtke, Olivier. 1993. The Populist Challenge to the Italian Nation-State: The Lega Lombarda/Nord. Regional and Federal Studies 3:3 (November): 140–162. Schmitter, Philippe. 1983. Democratic Theory and Neocorporatist Practice. Social Research 50:4 (Winter): 885–928. Schumpeter, Joseph. 2013 [1942]. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge. Shaw, Adam. 2018. Trump Slams FBI Raid of Lawyer Michael Cohen: “Attorney– Client Privilege Is Dead.” Fox News, April 10. www.foxnews.com/politics/ 2018/ 04/ 10/ trump- slams- fbi- raid- lawyer- michael- cohen- attorney- clientprivilege-is-dead.html. Shuster, Simon. 2017. The “Trump Effect” Was Supposed to Transform Europe. It Hasn’t. Time, April 24. http://time.com/4752762/europe-populismnationalism-le-pen-france-election. Sides, John. 2017. Race, Religion, and Immigration in 2016:  How the Debate over American Identity Shaped the Election and What It Means for a Trump Presidency. American Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, June. www.voterstudygroup.org/ publications/ 2016- elections/ race- religionimmigration-2016. Silver, Nate. 2015. Romney and the GOP’s Five-Ring Circus. FiveThirtyEight, January 13. https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/romney-and-the-gops-five-ring-circus. Simmons, Joel. 2016. The Politics of Technological Progress:  Parties, Time Horizons and Long-Term Economic Development. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2012. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, Rogers. 1993. Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz:  The Multiple Traditions in America. American Political Science Review 87:3 (September): 549–566. 1999. Civic Ideals:  Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Snyder, Timothy. 2017. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books. Soifer, Hillel. 2012. The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures. Comparative Political Studies 45:12 (December): 1572–1597. Spiegel Online. 2018. Trump lobt Orbán für Flüchtlingspolitik. 17 June. www.spiegel.de/ politik/ ausland/ donald- trump- lobt- viktor- orban- fuerfluechtlingspolitik-a-1213429.html. Stampa, La. 2006a. La competizione nella CDL riapre i giochi per conquistare il video. January 6. 2006b. Presa di posizione del presidente di Vigilanza Rai Gentiloni: O regole condivise o niente faccia a faccia in TV. February 6.

References

207

2006c. Il Cavaliere attacca:  “Giudici infami, nascondono le carte che mi scagionano. Rischio brogli, mi appello all’ONU.” April 7. Stanley, Ben. 2008. The Thin Ideology of Populism. Journal of Political Ideologies 13:1 (February): 95–110. 2017. Populism in Central and Eastern Europe. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 140–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stavrakakis, Yannis, and Giorgos Katsambekis. 2014. Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery:  The Case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies 19:2 (May): 119–142. Stenner, Karen, and Jonathan Haidt. 2018. Authoritarianism Is Not a Momentary Madness, but an Eternal Dynamic within Liberal Democracies. In Cass Sunstein, ed. Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America, 175–219. New York: Dey Street Books. Stokes, Susan. 2001. Mandates and Democracy:  Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sunstein, Cass, ed. 2018. Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America. New York: Dey Street Books. Svolik, Milan. 2018. When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue:  Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents. https://pdfs .semanticscholar.org/4d2c/50628b3333c52e6f0c7488cae125a996b3f3.pdf. Swanson, Ana, Mark Landler, and Maggie Haberman. 2018. Trump Resolute as G.O.P. Leaders Criticize Tariffs. New York Times, March 6: A1, A16. Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 2012. Populism Has the Potential to Damage European Democracy, but Demonising Populist Parties Is Self-Defeating. London School of Economics and Political Science, December 13. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/12/13/ populism-has-the-potential-to-damage-european-democracy-paul-taggart. Taggart, Paul, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2016. Dealing with Populists in Government:  Some Comparative Conclusions. Democratization 23:2 (June): 345–365. Tajfel, Henri, and Jonathan Turner. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In William Austin and Stephen Worchel, eds. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33–47. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Tanaka, Martín. 2005. Peru 1980–2000: Chronicle of a Death Foretold? Determinism, Political Decisions, and Open Outcomes. In Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds. The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, 261–288. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tarchi, Marco. 2008. Italy: A Country of Many Populisms. In Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, eds. Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, 84–99. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tesler, Michael. 2016. Trump Is the First Modern Republican to Win the Nomination Based on Racial Prejudice. Washington Post, August 1.  http:// wapo.st/2aVQr03. Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth. 2009. Who Counts as an American? The Boundaries of National Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

208

References

Thomassen, Jacques, Kees Aarts, and Henk van der Kolk. 2000. Politieke veranderingen in Nederland 1971–1998: Kiezers en de smalle marges van de politiek. The Hague: Sdu. TicinOnline. 2002. Razzismo:  Lega Nord italiana nel mirino del Consiglio d’Europa. April 23. www.tio.ch/estero/101066/razzismo--lega-nord-italiananel-mirino-del-consiglio-d-180-europa. Tronconi, Filippo, ed. 2015. Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication, and Ideology. Farnham: Ashgate. Trump, Donald. 2016. Let Me Ask America a Question. Wall Street Journal, April 15. www.wsj.com/articles/let-me-ask-america-a-question-1460675882. 2017. The Inaugural Address [press release]. White House, January 20. www .whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address. Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. Urbinati, Nadia. 1998. Democracy and Populism. Constellations 5:1 (March): 110–124. 2017. Populism and the Principle of Majority. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 571–589. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Klingeren, Marijn,Andrej Zaslove, and Bertjan Verbeek. 2017.Accommodating the Dutch Populist Radical Right in a Multi-Party System: Success or Failure? In Pontus Odmalm and Eve Hepburn, eds. The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right, 108–129. Abingdon: Routledge. Van Noorloos, Marloes. 2014. The Politicisation of Hate Speech Bans in the Twenty-First-Century Netherlands: Law in a Changing Context. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40:2 (February): 249–265. Van Zyl Smit, Jan. 2016. Judicial Appointments in Latin America:  The Implications of Tenure and Appointment Processes. London:  Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. Vargas Llosa, Mario. 2002. The Feast of the Goat, translated by Edith Grossman. New York: Picador. Verbeek, Bertjan, and Andrej Zaslove. 2015. The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Foreign Policy: The Northern League as a Junior Coalition Partner in the Berlusconi Governments. European Political Science Review 7:4 (November): 525–546. 2016. Italy:  A Case of Mutating Populism? Democratization 23:2 (June): 304–323. Verbeek, Bertjan, Andrej Zaslove, and Mathijs Rooduijn. 2018. Italian Populism:  Toppling and Re-Building the Party System Twice. In Steven Wolinetz and Andrej Zaslove, eds. Absorbing the Blow: Populist Parties and Their Impact on Parties and Party Systems, 197–222. Colchester: ECPR Press. Viroli, Maurizio. 2011. The Liberty of Servants:  Berlusconi’s Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vossen, Koen. 2011. Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom. Politics 31:3 (October): 179–189.

References

209

2017. The Power of Populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Abingdon: Routledge. Waldman, Paul. 2016. If You Voted for Trump Because He’s “Anti-Establishment,” Guess What? You Got Conned. Washington Post, November 11. https:// wapo.st/2IMObaF. Waldstreicher, David. 1997. In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes:  The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820. Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press. Walsh, Jessica. 2016. A Double-Edged Sword:  Judicial Independence and Accountability in Latin America, Thematic Paper no.  5.  London:  Human Rights Institute, International Bar Association. Walt, Stephen. 2016. 10 Ways to Tell If Your President Is a Dictator. Foreign Policy, November 23. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/ten-ways-to-tellif-your-president-is-a-dictator. Washington Post, The. 2018. Tracking How Many Key Positions Trump Has Filled So Far. June 27, 08:58. www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/ trump- administration- appointee- tracker/ database/ ?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.4d42ef10b01d. Wendt, Ronald, and Gail Fairhurst. 1994. Looking for “the Vision Thing”: The Rhetoric of Leadership in the 1992 Presidential Election. Communication Quarterly 42:2 (Spring): 180–195. Weyland, Kurt. 1996. Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities. Studies in Comparative International Development 31:3 (September): 3–31. 2001. Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. Comparative Politics 34:1 (October): 1–22. 2002a. Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics. Studies in Comparative International Development 37:1 (Spring): 57–85. 2002b. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies:  Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2005. The Growing Sustainability of Brazil’s Low-Quality Democracy. In Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds. The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, 90–120. New York:  Cambridge University Press. 2013. Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left. Journal of Democracy 24:3 (July): 18–32. 2017a. There Are 4 Big Barriers to the Populist Model in America (and Your Democracy Is Safe). Washington Post, August 11. http://wapo.st/2hPizJo. 2017b. Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. The  Oxford Handbook of Populism, 48–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weyland, Kurt, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds. 2010. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings. New  York:  Cambridge University Press. Weyland, Kurt, and Raúl L. Madrid. 2018. Liberal Democracy:  Stronger than Populism, So Far. The American Interest 13:4 (March/April): 24–28.

210

References

Wise, Tim. 2010. Colorblind:  The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat from Racial Equity. San Francisco: City Lights. Zapotosky, Matt. 2018. 17 States and D.C. Sue over Trump’s Family-Separation Policy. Washington Post, June 26. https://wapo.st/2tNC8Vs. Zaslove, Andrej. 2008. Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type. European Review 16:3 (July): 319–336. 2011. The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press. Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zincone, Giovanna. 2006. The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32:3 (April): 347–375.

Index

American political scholarship, see scholarship Argentina, see also Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de; Kirchner, Néstor; Menem, Carlos; Perón, Juan convergence by mainstream parties, 138 crisis politics, populist use of, 5 inclusiveness/participation dimension of populism, 15 mass support for populism, 167 Austria anti-Trump backlash, 183 Freedom Party, 36, 89 populist party success, 89, 140 authoritarianism collaboration and compromise with, 132 democratic “backsliding” towards, 133 populism in United States, 17 Bannon, Steve, 12 Berlusconi, Silvio coalition governments, 166 Forza Italia (FI), 3, 20, 89, 92 impact on democracy, 25, 96, 97, 163 institutional conflicts, 95, 107, 160 institutional constraints, 30 international pressure against, 96 new populist movements, and, 97, 109 opposition from Beppe Grillo, 93 personalistic leadership, 107

political elite, and, 93 political polarization, and, 93, 96 reactive rhetoric and abuse, 150 terms in office, 9, 86, 168 Bolivia, see Morales, Evo Brazil crisis politics, populist use of, 5 democratic consolidation, 7, 41, 181 inclusiveness/participation dimension of populism, 15 see also Collor de Mello, Fernando; Vargas, Getúlio Bryan, William Jennings, 17 Central Europe, see Europe Chávez, Hugo anti-opposition measures, 26 institutional change, 21 institutional transformation, 25, 54 mobilization of support, 4, 15, 21, 22, 46 opposition to, 46, 156 party support, 3, 28, 142 political party, 3, 20 racial inclusiveness, 171 reactive rhetoric and abuse, 150 term in office, 9 third wave of Latin American populism, and, 46 undermining of democracy, 7 checks and balances, see institutions Collor de Mello, Fernando career as president, 43

211

212 economic crisis, and, 5, 28, 41 impact on democracy, 41, 44 impeachment, 44, 172, 181 term in office, 9 comparative political scholarship, see scholarship conservative parties, see political parties Correa, Rafael campaign strategy, 58 career as president, 48 institutional change, 54, 162 political party, 164 terms in office, 9, 48 crisis politics, populist use of, 5 democracy “backsliding” toward authoritarianism, 133 comparative perspective on, 138 constraints on populism, 2 crisis of liberal democracy, 130 Darwinian selectivity, and, 152 defense by democratic parties, 131 definition of, 7 deterioration in US democracy, 13 emergence of, 8 inclusiveness/participation dimension, 7, 14 polarization, and, 152 populism and liberal democracy in tension, 84 potential effects of populism, 84, 88 “public contestation” dimension, 7 rise in participation in USA, 17 survival in United States, 154 threat from populism, 8, 13, 84 Trump’s impact on, 2, 6, 13 unlikely places, 152 Democratic Party (USA) future of US democracy, and, 185 opposition to populism, as, 185 Eastern Europe, see Europe economy crisis economic policies, populist use of, 5 economic definition of populism, 12 Ecuador convergence by mainstream parties, 138 democratic consolidation, 181 first wave of populism, 37

Index populist party success, 141, 167 populist surge since 1990s, 84 see also Correa, Rafael electorate future of US democracy, and, 185 see also support elites, see political elites Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip political crisis, and, 141 terms in office, 9 undermining of democracy, 7 Europe comparisons with Donald Trump, 60 examples of populist governments, 9 lessons from experience of populism, 29, 73 rise of populist parties in Western Europe, 89 formal institutions, see institutions Fortuyn, Pim assassination, 99, 107 “Fortuyn syndrome,” 103 populist appeals, 100, 104 France Algerian war, 181 National Front, 36, 89 nationalism, 120 populist party success, 89 see also Le Pen, Marine Fujimori, Alberto career as president, 41 economic crisis, and, 5, 28, 41, 172 impact on democracy, 41, 47, 52, 155, 178 institutional change, 5, 21, 162, 175 party support, 3 political gridlock, and, 20 political party, 3, 20, 164 popular support, 4 racial inclusiveness, 171 resignation, 181 term in office, 9 undermining of democracy, 7 García, Alan approval ratings, 16 term in office, 9 Grillo, Beppe Five Star Movement (M5S), 93

Index internet and social media, use of, 94, 107 opposition to Silvio Berlusconi, 93 personalistic leadership, 107 Hungary authoritarianism, 61 institutional change, 29, 142 populist defeat of democracy, 66, 69 see also Orbán, Viktor ideology, populist, 85 informal institutions, see institutions institutions checks and balances containment of populism, 24, 132 operation of, 20 populist “repurposing” of, 133 dissatisfaction with, 130 extra-institutional mobilization and protest by opposition, 25 formal institutions constraints on populism, 2, 20 populist leaders’ circumvention of institutional constraints, 21 strength in United States, 158, 183 Trump’s undermining of, 6, 77 Italy emergence of populist parties, 86 first wave of populism, 90 Five Star Movement (M5S), 93 governmental experience of populist parties, 86 institutional structure, 86 lessons from experience of populism, 30, 87, 106 party system, 86 political realignments, 4 populism’s emergence, 89 populism’s impact on democracy, 87, 94 populism’s origins, 90 populism’s success, 85 populist party success, 140 populist political movements, 20 rise of regionalist movements, 90 second wave of populism, 92 third wave of populism, 93 see also Berlusconi, Silvio; Grillo, Beppe Jackson, Andrew, 1, 17

213

Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de political establishment, and, 21 term in office, 9 Kirchner, Néstor opposition to Carlos Menem, 166 political establishment, and, 21 term in office, 9 Latin America comparisons with Donald Trump, 35 constitutional reform, 162 convergence by mainstream parties, 4 crisis economic policies, populist use of, 5 examples of populist governments, 9 first wave of populism, 37 inclusiveness/participation dimension of populism, 15 lessons from experience of populism, 50, 59 political realignments, 185 populist party successes, 141 populist surge since 1990s, 84 second wave of populism, 39 third wave of populism, 45 Le Pen, Marine, democratic backlash against, 7, 140, 183 leadership confrontational and polarizing strategy, 19 personalistic leadership, 10 support from established parties, 21 liberal democracy, see democracy Long, Huey, 17, 18 marginalized groups, see minorities mass support, see support McConnell, Mitch, 10 Mečiar, Vladimír anti-opposition measures, 65, 79 authoritarianism, 81 career as prime minister, 61 coalition governments, 166 comparisons with Donald Trump, 29, 73 concentration of power, 63, 74 democratic defeat, 29, 60, 61, 66 impact on democracy, 67, 71, 72, 79 impact on institutions, 78 nationalism, 73, 81 “Only he can do it” slogan, 74 opposition response, 78

214

Index

political party, 76 populist appeals, 61 terms in office, 9, 60 Menem, Carlos constraints, 165 economic crisis, and, 5, 28, 172 institutional change, 5 opposition from Néstor Kirchner, 166 party support, 3 political establishment, and, 21, 142 term in office, 9 minorities populist dislike of, 130 Morales, Evo constraints, 49 impact on democracy, 164 institutional change, 54 Movement toward Socialism (MAS), 49 racial inclusiveness, 171 third wave of Latin American populism, 49 Mudde, Cas, populism impact criteria, 85, 88 nationalism France, 120 Hungary, 73 Republican Party’s ethno-nationalism, 123 rise in twenty-first century, 121 Slovakia, 73, 81 Trump’s economic nationalism, 12 Trump’s new nationalism, 73, 80, 110 US varieties, 115 Netherlands emergence of populist parties, 86 first wave of populism, 98 governmental experience of populist parties, 86 institutional structure, 86 lessons from experience of populism, 30, 87, 106 List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), 85, 98 party system, 86 populism’s emergence, 89, 90 populism’s impact on democracy, 87, 103 populism’s origins, 98 populism’s success, 85 second wave of populism, 101

third wave of populism, 102 see also Fortuyn, Pim; Wilders, Geert newcomers, rise of, 81 opposition parties and groups containment of populism, 24 extra-institutional mobilization and protest, 24 mobilization against Trump, 7 recovery of support, 27 Orbán, Viktor career as prime minister, 66 comparisons with Donald Trump, 29, 73 concentration of power, 60, 74 impact on democracy, 178 impact on institutions, 78 institutional change, 162 mobilization of support, 29 nationalism, 73 parliamentary majority, 3 political establishment, and, 21 political party, 76, 140, 142, 164 populist appeals, 67 term in office, 9 undermining of democracy, 7, 69 outsiders, rise of, 81 Perón, Juan first wave of populism, 37 military background, 38 mobilization of support, 15 terms in office, 9 Perot, Ross, 18 personalistic leadership, 10, 16 Peru competitive authoritarian regime, 42 crisis politics, populist use of, 5 democratic consolidation, 7, 181 economic crisis, 41 personalistic leadership, 16 political crisis, 41 populist political movements, 20 populist surge since 1990s, 84 see also Fujimori, Alberto; García, Alan Poland Law and Justice party, 141, 162 polarization democracy and, 152 Italy, 93, 96 populist strategy of, 19 United States, 135, 152

Index political elites populist rejection of, 11, 15, 85, 130 response to populist challenge, 130 political opposition, see opposition parties and groups political outsiders, rise of, 81 political parties changes in US party system, 135 constraints on populism, 3, 20 defence of democracy, 131 newcomer parties, rise of, 81 political realignments, 185 populist capture of mainstream conservative parties, 134 response to populist challenge, 130 rise of populist alternatives, 134 support for populist leaders, 21 US party system, 163 see also opposition parties and groups political polarization, see polarization politics crisis politics, populist use of, 5 political-cultural conception of populism, 12 populist political movements, 20 see also elections populism agrarian populism, 17 analysis and argument by current study, 2 authoritarianism, 17 comparative perspective on, 138 concentration of power, 16 concept of, 8, 10 confrontational and polarizing strategy, 19 containment by opposition, 24 crisis politics, 5 democratic nature, 84 economic constraints, 5 examples of populist governments, 1, 8 ideology, 85 inclusiveness/participation dimension, 8, 14 institutional constraints, 2 longstanding presence, 84 negative effects on democracy, 88 personalistic leadership, 10, 16 political movements, 20 positive effects on democracy, 88 potential effects on democracy, 84, 88

215

“public contestation” dimension, 8 rejection of political elites, 11, 15, 85 socio-political constraints, 3, 4 “the people,” concept of, 11, 15, 84 threat to democracy, 8, 13, 84 Priebus, Reince, 10 protest by opposition, 25 Republican Party (USA) “aborted populism” scenario, 151 alternative scenarios under Trump, 144 collaboration and compromise with Trump, 132 ethno-nationalism, 123 future of US democracy, and, 184 ideological movements within, 147 “movementization,” 134 polarization, 152 “populist bandwagoning” scenario, 147 “populist containment” scenario, 149 populist shift within, 110, 134 Trump presidency, and, 10, 20 rhetoric, Trump’s reactive rhetoric and abuse, 77 Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, populism impact criteria, 85, 88 Rustow, Dankwart, 152 Ryan, Paul, 10 scholarship analysis and argument by current study, 2 populism’s impact on democracy, 13 Slovakia democracy’s survival, 61, 79 see also Mečiar, Vladimír socio-political constraints on populism, 4 suffrage, see electorate support extra-institutional mobilization and protest by opposition, 25 opposition’s recovery of support, 27 populist marshaling of mass support, 22 Trump’s disinterest in building support, 75 see also electorate “the people,” populist concept of, 11, 15, 84 Trump, Donald absence of economic crisis, 171 aftermath of Trump, dealing with, 80

216

Index

approval ratings, 55, 184 checks and balances system, and, 20 combination of constraints, uniqueness of, 174 comparisons with Vladimír Mečiar and Viktor Orbán, 29, 73 confrontational and polarizing strategy, 19 constraints on, 2, 19 degradation of democratic norms, 6 disinterest in building support, 75 economic constraints, 5 economic nationalism, 12 future outsiders, and, 81 impact on democracy, 2, 6, 13, 74, 77, 134, 183 institutional constraints, 2, 20, 21, 74 “Make America great again” slogan, 73, 81, 140, 169 mobilization of opposition to, 7 nationalism, 73, 80, 110 opportunities for, 19 political analysts’ uncertainties after election of, 1 popularity, 4 populism, 9, 110 populist appeals, 73 reactive rhetoric and abuse, 77 rejection of political elites, 11 Republican Party, and, 10, 20, 132 role model, as, 7 scenarios for politics under, 135 socio-political constraints, 3, 4, 20, 167, 184 threat to democracy, 31 tweeting, 11 violation of democratic norms, 176, 184 Turkey, see Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip tweeting, Trump’s usage, 11 United States absence of crisis, 171 agrarian populism, 17 anti-elitism, 111

authoritarianism, 111 constraints on populism, 2 democracy’s state under Trump, 134 democracy’s survival, 73, 154 deterioration in democracy, 13 future political outsiders, rise of, 81 institutional constraints on populism, 132, 158, 183 “movementization,” 135 nationalism mobilization, 110 new nationalism, 80 rise in twenty-first century, 121 varieties, 115 other populist governments compared, 2 party political constraints on populism, 163 party system change, 135 polarization, 135, 152 populism and democracy in tension, 17 populism’s rise, 110 populist radical right, 111 rise of democratic participation, 17 scenarios for politics under Trump, 135, 144 socio-political constraints on populism, 184 socio-political divisions, 167, 184 see also Trump, Donald Vargas Llosa, Mario, 132 Vargas, Getúlio, 15 Venezuela constitutions, 162 inclusiveness/participation dimension of populism, 15 see also Chávez, Hugo voters, see electorate Wallace, George, 17, 18 Wilders, Geert electoral success, 104 loss of popularity, 102, 183 Party for Freedom (PVV), 86