What about the workers?: The Conservative Party and the organised working class in British politics 9781526103628

Citation preview

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Series editor Richard Hayton The study of conservative politics, broadly defined, is of enduring scholarly interest and importance, and is also of great significance beyond the academy. In spite of this, for a variety of reasons the study of conservatism and conservative politics was traditionally regarded as something of a poor relation in comparison to the intellectual interest in ‘the Left’. In the British context this changed with the emergence of Thatcherism, which prompted a greater critical focus on the Conservative Party and its ideology, and a revitalisation of Conservative historiography. New Perspectives on the Right aims to build on this legacy by establishing a series identity for work in this field. It will publish the best and most innovative titles drawn from the fields of sociology, history, cultural studies and political science and hopes to stimulate debate and interest across disciplinary boundaries. New Perspectives is not limited in its historical coverage or geographical scope, but is united by its concern to critically interrogate and better understand the history, development, intellectual basis and impact of the Right. Nor is the series restricted by its methodological approach: it will encourage original research from a plurality of perspectives. Consequently, the series will act as a voice and forum for work by scholars engaging with the politics of the Right in new and imaginative ways. Reconstructing conservatism? The Conservative Party in opposition, 1997–​2010  Richard Hayton Conservative orators: From Baldwin to Cameron  Edited by Richard Hayton and Andrew S. Crines The right and the recession  Edward Ashbee The territorial Conservative Party: Devolution and party change in Scotland and Wales  Alan Convery David Cameron and Conservative renewal: The limits of modernisation? Edited by Gillian Peele and John Francis Rethinking right-​wing women: Gender and the Conservative Party, 1880s to the present  Edited by Clarisse Berthezène and Julie Gottlieb English nationalism, Brexit and the Anglosphere: Wider still and wider  Ben Wellings Cameron: The politics of modernisation and manipulation Timothy Heppell The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): Politics, parties and policies  Martin Steven

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

What about the workers? The Conservative Party and the organised working class in British politics Andrew Taylor

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Andrew Taylor 2021 The right of Andrew Taylor to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 5261 0360 4 hardback First published 2021 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. COVER IMAGE: Victor Maddern as Knowles from the Boulting Brothers’ film, I’m All Right Jack (1959). Courtesy of Studio Canal.

Typeset by Newgen Publishing UK

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

They have given us into the hands of the new unhappy lords, Lords without anger and honour, who dare not carry their swords, They fight by shuffling papers; they have bright dead alien eyes; They look at our labour and laughter as a tired man looks at flies. And the load of their loveless pity is worse than the ancient wrongs, Their doors are shut in the evenings; and they know no songs. We hear men speaking for us of new laws strong and sweet, Yet is there no man speaketh as we speak in the street. It may be we shall rise the last as Frenchmen rose the first, Our wrath come after Russia’s wrath and our wrath be the worst. It may be we are meant to mark with our riot and our rest God’s scorn for all men governing. It may be beer is best. But we are the people of England; and we have not spoken yet. Smile at us, pay us, pass us. But do not quite forget. G.K. Chesterton, ‘The Secret People’ (1907)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements

page viii ix

Introduction 1 A strong taste for the despotism of numbers? 2 Peace and good will? 3 We shall get their help 4 War, conservatism and union power 5 Milk and water socialism? 6 The smack of firm government? 7 Confronting the British disease? 8 The enemy within Conclusions

1 16 43 67 95 120 145 172 198 231

Bibliography Index

237 263

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Tables

5.1 Conservative Party trade union organisation and membership, 1952 5.2 The Low Committee’s survey of 1961 8.1 ‘Trade unions have too much power in Britain today’ 8.2 Support for Conservative trade union reforms 8.3 Sectoral changes in employment, 1980–​90 (000s)

page 143 144 229 229 230

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Acknowledgements

This book has been a long time in writing. I would like to thank Richard Hayton as series editor of ‘New Perspectives on the Right’ for including the book in the series and to the editors at Manchester University Press, especially Robert Byron, who shepherded the book to final publication. I would also like to thank all those many people who gave up their time to talk to me; there are too many debts to acknowledge individually but I would like to single out the late Michael Fraser (Baron Fraser of Kilmorack), the late Robert Carr (Baron Carr of Hadley) and the late Peter Thorneycroft (Baron Thorneycroft of Dunstan), who generously shared with me at great length their memories and recollections and so added much of value to the book. My colleagues in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield provided a congenial intellectual and working environment, and as the book draws on a wide range of academic and other literature covering a long period of time the University Library was crucial in facilitating the research. I would like to thank the following for permission to cite and quote from material in their possession:  Dr Mari Takayanagi, Senior Archivist at the Parliamentary Archives, for permission to quote from the political and private papers of John Colin Campbell Davidson MP, First Viscount Davidson and the private papers of Andrew Bonar Law; Liz Bregazzi, County Archivist, for permission to quote from the diary of Cuthbert Headlam MP in the Durham County Record Office; Sam Lindley, of the Special Collections Reading Room, to quote from the papers of Frederick James Marquis, First Earl of Woolton in the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Howard Davies, Information Policy Manager at the National Archives, Kew, for permission to quote from Crown copyright papers under the Open Government Licence; Professor Seamus Perry, Fellow Librarian, to quote from the papers of Walter Turner Monckton, First Viscount Monckton of Brenchley held at Balliol College, Oxford; Chris Collins of the Thatcher Archive Trust and Andrew Riley for permission to quote from the Thatcher Papers held by the Churchill Archives Centre at Churchill College, Cambridge. Finally, I

newgenprepdf

x

Acknowledgements

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

would like to thank Harry Methley, of the Conservative Campaign HQ, and Jeremy McIlwaine, of the Bodleian Library, for permission to use and quote from the Conservative Party Archives at Oxford. My wife, Georgina, was a tower of strength in completing this book, not least by helping me through the illness that delayed the book’s completion and by providing a critical, but always constructive, commentary. Last, but certainly not least, our daughter, Kay, provided all the necessary diversions that make life (even life in a contemporary British university) so fulfilling.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

There was a time when, odd though it may seem today, British politics was focussed on the needs and desires of the working class. Post-​war Britain saw the emergence of not just the welfare state but also a determination by politicians of all parties never to return to the mass unemployment of the 1930s. Both of these developments were implemented in the name of the working class. A  form of corporatism was adopted by both Conservative and Labour governments so that working class interests were represented politically and the ‘forward march of labour’ was consolidated as part of the ‘long revolution’. (Evans and Tilley 2017, 1)

This book explores one notable aspect of this lost era, the relationship between the proportion of the working class that joined trade unions (the organised working class) with the Conservative Party  –​ the party that dominated twentieth-century British government and politics. The organised working class, though always a minority of the working class, was perceived by most Conservatives as a significant challenge, even a threat, to the economic and political order. Unions were condemned as threatening property rights and as harbingers of class conflict, confiscatory democracy and ultimately socialism; historically many union members dismissed the Conservative Party as the bosses’ party, ever-​ready to inflict retribution on the unions and their members in the interests of profits. The threat posed by the unions went beyond their numbers and resided in their class nature, and the unions’ organisation of the working class constituted the characteristic feature of a new social, economic and political order: industrial capitalism (Hobsbawm 1975, 13). This was, as figures as different as Karl Marx and Lord Salisbury (the Conservative leader between 1881 and 1902 and three-​time prime minister) insisted, a wholly new form of politics –​class politics –​driven by the industrial working class. Although this new class’s lack of revolutionary consciousness proved a disappointment to Marx and a relief to Salisbury, the working class was nonetheless critical to the transformation of politics particularly when it was organised into trade unions. ‘Trade Unions’, Marx wrote,

2

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerrilla war against the effects of the current system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system. (Marx 1970 [1875], 226)

For Conservatives Marx’s description of the unions’ limited role of fighting ‘a guerrilla war’ was quite bad enough and dealing with this became fundamental to defining Conservative politics. This working class, or more correctly a part of it, adapted many existing strategies as well as developing new forms of collective action (Stedman Jones 1983), notably the trade union and the strike, as well as a new language and vocabulary of politics stressing occupational solidarity (Briggs 1960, 43–​77). These institutions and language were central to a new ‘cycle of contention’ (Tarrow 2011) and trade unions were at the centre of a contentious politics (Tilly 2008; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) characteristic of industrial capitalism  –​ a politics that hinged around conflict over control of the workplace and the distribution of the fruits of production. A second important component of this contentious politics was the Conservative Party. Although widely (and correctly) seen as the party most hostile to democracy’s growth, most committed to maintaining the existing pattern of social and economic inequality, and most suspicious of the unions, the Conservative Party prospered mightily in this contentious politics, which its actions did much to mould. There exists a vast literature on working-class electoral behaviour and the Conservative Party (Waller 1994, 580–​585) and to a considerable extent, as Evans and Tilley suggest, twentieth-century British politics was oriented around these two institutions, but only rarely have these two institutions been analysed together. Marquand suggests the working-class Conservative was seen by many as ‘somehow an aberration or an anachronism sliding inexorably toward the margin of history, not a robust, red-​blooded creature, with as much sociological staying power as his Labour-​voting, dues-​paying party neighbour’ (Marquand 1991, 59). The classic texts of political sociology and electoral behaviour address the high point of class politics in twentieth-century Britain and despite their many intellectual differences they demonstrate significant commonalities:  first, that trade union members were more likely to vote Labour than non-​union voters; second, Conservative working-​ class supporters, whether union members or not, were much more likely to identify unions as too powerful and in need of legislative reform; and third, around 25–​30 per cent of the organised working class voted Conservative. What these sources do not address (a partial exception is McKenzie and Silver 1968) is the broader relationship between the organised working class and the Conservative Party,

3

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

3

Conservative governments and the trade unions (Butler and Stokes 1971; Goldthorpe et al. 1968; Jessop 1974; McKenzie and Silver 1968; Nordlinger 1967). A notable exception is the work of Peter Dorey (notably 1995 and 2009a). Anyone working in this field owes Dorey a debt so why write this book? Dorey’s work devotes most attention to the Conservative–​trade union relationship after 1945, whereas my object is to place this relationship in a much longer historical context and consider the relationship as an aspect of mass democracy. Dorey’s approach tends to privilege 1945 but I see 1945 as not only the beginning of a new relationship but also the culmination of a series of contingencies. For example, I have a strong sense that if Bonar Law had not died and been replaced by Stanley Baldwin, then State–​labour relations in Britain would have been very different, and if Chamberlain had avoided war, then the structure of politics would have been very different. Rather than seeing Thatcherism as the end result of the failure of One Nation Conservatism, I prefer to see it as the latest phase in a long debate within Conservatism on the place (if any) of trade unions in politics (see Morgan 1992, 475 for a comparison of the 1920s and 1980s). Whereas Dorey tends to focus on the Conservative government–​union relationship, I wanted to give greater attention to the understudied efforts of the party to create a Conservative labour organisation and the reasons for the repeated failure of these attempts. The party’s electoral record suggests strongly that these failures have not affected Conservatism’s ability to attract working-​ class and trade union votes, but the failure of these organisational efforts tells us much about the nature and contours of British governance. Early attempts to capture this approach is my chapter in Seldon and Ball’s, The Conservative Century (Taylor 1994, 499–​543) and my article in the Labour History Review (1992, 21–​28). My approach has been influenced strongly by Keith Middlemas’s synoptic exploration of British politics, Politics in Industrial Society (1979) and his analysis of the post-​war British state in his trilogy, Power, Competition and the State (1986a, 1990, 1991). In Politics in Industrial Society Middlemas aspired to write the new Bagehot, in order to lay bare the ‘efficient secret’ of state power and governance, and the secret of Britain’s avoidance of the domestic political turmoil of the twentieth century. He identified this efficient secret as ‘corporate bias’ (Middlemas 1979, 371–​385); this, the core characteristic of the governing process, required ministers, employers and the unions (the governing institutions) to negotiate a continuous contract that was infused by a cult of equilibrium. As a result power shifted away from Parliament and parties to the executive, civil service and interest groups. Corporate bias, defined as ‘governing institutions [sharing] some of the political power and attributes of the state [and] avid to admit representative

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

4

What about the workers?

bodies to its orbit rather than face a free-​for-​all with a host of individual claimants’ (Middlemas 1979, 20), was produced by the threat (and reality) of class politics and the need to promote harmony by encouraging collaboration between government, employers and the unions, which, in this case, led to a shift in the unions from being a concern to a governing institution, in return for limiting class conflict. Middlemas never defines the cult of equilibrium clearly but it is discussed extensively (see Middlemas 1979, 389–​429) as both a description of behaviour and as a norm infusing the political and policy process, with an emphasis on the management of opinion and a closed and confidential policy process in which authority was grounded on consent. The cult of equilibrium grew as the scope of policy grew and previously ‘private’ activities (for example, wage bargaining) assumed a public guise and became politicised, so changing dramatically the way of doing politics and the content of policy. Middlemas is careful to describe corporate bias as only a tendency and, therefore, open to dramatic change. Corporate bias began under Lloyd George and the 1916 crisis of manpower and production and developed thereafter under the impact of the inter-​war depression and the Second World War, reaching its apogee between 1951 and 1979. Middlemas’s analysis has been heavily criticised. Rodney Lowe, focusing on his characterisation of the Ministry of Labour as the core manifestation of corporate bias, identified major errors of fact that, he argues, undermine the overall thesis (1980, 23–​27). This is not the place to go into the detail of Lowe’s critique which focuses on the 1920s and 1930s rather than on the war and post-​war era (see Lowe 1974, 1978)  but he concludes that Middlemas’s emphasis on corporate bias is grossly exaggerated and that party and Parliament remained more important in policy-​ making than Middlemas allowed. Lowe argues that representation was never conceded on a scale that transformed, for example, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) into a governing institution but sufficient representation was granted that gave the TUC a privileged role, even if not as privileged as that of the employers. Whilst it is true that neither the Ministry, its ministers, nor its civil servants were as important as Middlemas claims Lowe shows the inter-​war Ministry ‘did go through the process of consulting unions and employers and it did inject into Conservative Cabinets more knowledge and perhaps understanding of the trade union movement (but would not the strength of unions have ensured this anyway?)’ (1980, 25). Post-​war politics suggests that Middlemas’s overall thesis has validity. In a review of Politics in Industrial Society in the Labour History Review Michael Dintenfass takes issue with the idea of corporate bias (1980, 63–​65). For corporate bias to carry the analytical weight required, Dintenfass argues, Middlemas has to show that the working class was radical to the

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

5

point of being revolutionary, which, he argues, it was not, and so organised labour did not become a governing institution; thus corporate bias (if it existed) is simply a description of how politics was done in a complex industrial society. Again, Middlemas is accused of exaggeration, but we do not have to accept the thesis of the TUC as a governing institution or the working class as revolutionary in order to accept that the TUC was perceived as crucial to policy-​making and that the organised working class posed a threat  –​ a possibility that fuelled the unions’ integration into the policy process. Politics in Industrial Society coincided with the election in 1979 of the Thatcher Government, which was determined to uproot a system many Conservatives believed responsible for national decline and the crises of the 1970s, as recognised in Power, Competition and the State. A major concern of this book is why Conservative attitudes and policy towards the unions shifted so dramatically in so short a time. The Conservative analysis sees the governance described by Middlemas as the result of paying Danegeld to the unions and the failure of political conviction by many Conservatives and employers, so corporate bias, governing institutions and the cult of equilibrium become synonyms for the management of national decline. Thus, the political methods that were deemed necessary for the country’s survival in 1940–​41 and to fight a ‘people’s war’ dramatically reduced the country’s ability to adapt to a changing world (see, for example, Barnett 1986; Barnett 1995). Also relevant is Mancur Olson’s argument that post-​ war British governance facilitated the creation and institutionalisation of structural rigidities and constellations of vested interests that make it far harder for a political economy to adapt to changing world-​market conditions (Olson 1982). Adaptation requires a major exogenous shock or endogenous action (usually the two go together) to break these structural and political rigidities, which is what happened in Britain after 1979 when a government was elected that was determined, in contrast to past behaviour, to address ‘the union problem’ as part of the wider ‘British disease’. Before proceeding further I need to explain some concepts that are used throughout the book. First of all, I use governance, a popular if contested concept in academia, in two ways: first, to describe the relationship between the unions and the Conservative Party in government, and second, to describe the union movement’s internal political processes that determine policies and behaviour. Governance, then, refers to the interaction of actors in relation to collective problems via the creation and reproduction of rules, norms, policies and institutions. The way rules, norms, policies and institutions are developed, structured and regulated in the case of industrial relations through a process of largely private governance that had growing public effects (collective bargaining and industrial action) was progressively

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

6

What about the workers?

joined by processes emphasising public governance via a transformed legal environment, particularly after 1979 and the election of Margaret Thatcher. Second, voluntarism (see Currie 1979; Flanders 1974) is used to conceptualise and describe the unions’ collective attitude to the scope and extent of legal intervention and the external regulation of their internal affairs, and the conduct of collective bargaining and industrial relations. Essentially, voluntarism entailed minimising external regulation in favour of self-​ regulation and of unions and employers cooperating relatively free from state interference, and was based on the conviction that in the final analysis the judiciary and the state were fundamentally hostile to the unions. Voluntarism was structured by the State granting trade unions legal immunities –​ immunities that were fundamental to union power and which were of serious concern for many Conservatives. Third, One Nation Conservatism (Seawright 2010) is a style of politics intended to integrate the lowest social classes into conformist politics and so protect the status quo. The elite’s primary role and responsibility was reconciling potential and actual competing interests to the status quo by emphasising mutual interests and obligations and making necessary and judicious concessions in a timely manner. However, One Nation Conservatism could also be deployed to justify hostility to the unions, as in the 1926 General Strike and after 1979, when their behaviour was deemed to conflict with the national interest. One Nation requires, therefore, a pragmatic approach to politics and a high degree of policy flexibility that may require the party elite pursue policies that are deeply disliked by party activists. The fourth concept is governability, which goes wider than just ‘the ability to govern’ and implies a capacity to deliver legitimate rule, and that both effectiveness and legitimacy depend on more than electoral sanction. This is because democracy and plural politics, the consequence of social complexity, widened effectiveness and legitimacy far beyond just electing a government to include the conduct of government–​society relations. Effective and legitimate rule came to rest on positive relations between government and society (in this case government-​ union relations) which implies that this interaction imposes restraints on what government can do, so the concept of governability segues into the idea that the ability of government to ensure their decisions are implemented depends on the consent of their social partners. So, governability refers, first, to the idea that government is made easier and more effective by engagement with societal interests and second, to the idea that engagement entails government’s dependence on these interests. At the book’s core is a puzzle:  why, throughout its history, was the Conservative Party seemingly more sympathetic and accommodating towards the organised working class than its ideology, social composition and the prejudices of its members would seem to allow? And why, in the

7

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

7

space of a relatively few years, did it abandon this heritage? Part of the answer lies in the long-​term political hegemony of One Nation Conservatism and the party’s articulation and re-​articulation, according to different historical circumstances, of a narrative that claimed Conservatives had never endorsed laisser-​faire or a capitalism red in tooth and claw. Related, though of more importance, was the Conservative Party’s history of electoral success and its penetration of (particularly) English society, a penetration that familiarised the party with working-class attitudes and the potentialities of class politics –​organised in unions or not –​a familiarity that persuaded many Conservatives that the working class constituted a manageable threat so encouraging a flexible and politically pragmatic Conservatism (see Ziblatt 2017 for this argument). Confident it could win office and prosper politically in a class society made Conservatism less overtly hostile towards the unions and more willing to accommodate them. This tolerance, however, did not rule out a hostile response when unions were considered to have stepped outside what was deemed legitimate politics (as happened in the 1920s and 1970s) neither did this rule out attempts to divide the working class to the party’s electoral advantage. Probably a majority of Conservatives consistently regarded the unions as a significant threat and problem, but what is remarkable is how little influence this attitude had on the party’s policies and behaviour. Although Ziblatt’s thesis concerning Conservative penetration into society is persuasive, it also has limitations. One notable limitation is the party’s repeated failure to develop a sustainable organisational presence in the existing unions or create a Conservative union movement, such as exist in some West European countries. Although party leaders from Disraeli onwards opposed creating autonomous working-class organisations that sought to win working-class (organised or not) support for the Conservative cause, such organisations have periodically existed. However, the largest and most successful, the Primrose League, was most definitely neither purely working class nor autonomous as it was intended to be the physical embodiment of One Nation and cross-​class integrative politics (Pugh 1985). Attempts to create a Conservative labour movement before, during and after 1914–​18 were unsuccessful, as were subsequent attempts in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as in the 1970s and 1980s. These efforts tended to occur in periods of industrial and political unrest when union behaviour was perceived as politically threatening and contrary to the ‘real’ interests of union members and the country. Once the immediate crisis was over these organisations faded, having had little substantive influence on the party and none on the unions (Parkinson 2020). Each instance of Conservative labour organisation had broadly the same purposes: intelligence (what was the state of organised working-class

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

8

What about the workers?

opinion?), propaganda (the advocacy of Conservative nostrums to challenge socialism), persuasion (winning the votes of union members) and policy (informing party policy) and each failed for the same reasons. First, they failed to attract and develop a significant presence in the unions or the workplace; and second, the activist stratum was small and failed to overcome the social and political prejudices of the wider party membership or find a recognised place in the party’s organisation and power structure. Related was the reluctance of many employers to permit Conservative trade unionists any role that threatened to ‘politicise’ workplace industrial relations. At best these organisations had a transient political utility, enabling the party to argue it was not irredeemably hostile to the unions. The party leadership refused to grant these bodies any influence over policy (except where their preferences were those of the party leadership) and party leaders were sensitive to the party’s wider support for an increased role for the law in industrial relations and union governance. The relationship was stabilised by the labour organisation’s deference, its acceptance of the limits placed on it, and its approval of the party leadership’s refusal to amend the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927). The unions constituted a profound concern for a party that denied the validity of class, but the party’s dislike of, or even hostility, towards the unions did not, of itself, offer an effective policy or political response. The fact of the unions’ existence, their strength and resilience, and the sway they held over broad sections of the working-class interacted powerfully with the party’s recognition that it could only protect the status quo if it was elected to government. Successive Conservative leaderships concluded it could not form a government unless it demonstrated a willingness to recognise organised labour as a legitimate component of British society and governed accordingly. What about the workers? therefore became, at times, the central question of Conservative politics. The words and language that constitute the stories individuals tell themselves and each other do much more than convey meaning because ‘the mobilization of words can actually change how people act collectively’ (Tarrow 2013, 3). Language reflects the social and political context and forms the linkage between behaviour and its framing. This book considers a long period of history, during which the Conservative Party’s language about trade unions changed from active hostility, to grudging acceptance, to positive endorsement, and then back to active hostility. Throughout the period unions and industrial relations were important aspects of the British repertoire of contentious politics, but how that contention was managed and manifested depended on the nature and shape of the specific conflicts that characterised each epoch, which, in turn, prompted shifts in language and action.

9

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

9

This evolution was quite easily presented as being in conformity with the Conservative Party’s One Nation tradition, and was matched by the unions’ corresponding long-​ standing commitment to the voluntarist tradition, but ultimately these two narratives became incompatible as the party and the State became increasingly committed to the legal reform of industrial relations and union governance as the solution to ‘the British disease’ of poor industrial relations, low productivity and high levels of industrial action. Nevertheless, the historical interaction of One Nation and voluntarism produced a pattern of relationships between the unions and the TUC and the Conservative Party, whereby each conceded the inviolability of the other’s central purpose, and although occasionally destabilised and producing serious conflict, the relationship was always re-​established as being an essential feature of effective governance. This remained characteristic of Conservative Party–​union relations until the mid-​1970s. The formula of One Nation plus voluntarism in the interests of governability and electability, although dominant, was never universally accepted within the Conservative Party. Historically, grassroots party sentiment, which found allies amongst the leadership and intellectual elite, continued to regard unions as a fundamental challenge. This was reinforced after 1918 by the electoral challenge posed by the Labour Party, by union affiliation to Labour, the rise of the shop stewards movement and the prominence of Communists in union leadership. From their earliest days unions were criticised by the party for their perceived organisational failings, which could be (and were) reduced to the contention that the vast majority of the unions’ members, who were assumed to be industrially and politically moderate, were manipulated by a militant activist stratum. A  poster produced by the Conservative Trade Unionists in the 1980s, entitled Who Speaks for You?, captures this critique: Take 200 people 180 of them stay at home and wonder why their union is run by left-​wing extremists 20 will vote regularly in union elections 5 of these regularly attend union meetings And one of these is a Left-​wing extremist Never has so much been achieved against the interests of so many by so few.

Union members were dominated and manipulated by organisationally cohesive and ideologically conscious radical minorities. These minorities exploited the membership’s natural sentiments of solidarity with fellow workers as well as their apathy, to deploy union power and resources

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

10

What about the workers?

in pursuit of political and industrial objectives not endorsed by the vast majority of the membership. In essence the relationship between One Nation Conservatism and voluntarism rested on accepting that unions could only function if they enjoyed a series of immunities from legal regulation. Social, economic and political relationships in capitalism are based on the fallacy of individual equality. A  worker, for example, is not obliged, or forced, to accept the terms of engagement offered by an employer (and vice versa) and under capitalism’s terms of exchange a worker has the right to charge the maximum price for her labour, but equally an employer has the right to refuse and seek an alternative, cheaper supply of labour. The assumption of equality, given the actual imbalance in power between individual employers and individual employees, inevitably produced a conflict between individual and collective rights in which the unions combine the individual’s rights via organisation, thus constituting a ‘collective individual’ and amplifying the individual’s power. Similar interests organised in similar ways and behaving in similar ways constituted a class interest; organising a class interest is the core of the problem because organisation means that the unions can be deemed as a result to pose a serious threat to the stability of the economy and polity. Union legal immunities offered one solution even though critics argued they put unions ‘above the law’ and were the core of union power –​ a situation that could be remedied by the legal regulation of union behaviour and governance employing a positive legal framework to bring union behaviour and moderate mass membership sentiments into alignment by, for example, extensive individual balloting. However, achieving this alignment required a level of external interference inimical to the voluntarist tradition, which could then easily be portrayed as a rejection of One Nation and which would guarantee union hostility. Although he was not then a Conservative, Churchill captured the political implications of the voluntarist tradition in 1911 in the House of Commons: ‘It is not good for trade unions that they should be brought into contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts … where class issues are involved, it is impossible to pretend that the courts command the same degree of influence’ (Milne-​Bailey 1929, 381). The measures required transforming the unions and industrial relations by, for instance, banning the closed shop, extensive union balloting before industrial action and when electing union officers, imposing limitations on the right to strike in essential services, banning unofficial strikes, and restricting union affiliation to Labour, would fundamentally challenge the unions’ role in economy and polity. These and other measures were, however, put in place by successive Conservative governments from the 1980s onwards (and which were not repealed by succeeding Labour governments) and transformed the governance of trade unions. Notwithstanding, what is

11

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

11

remarkable is not that these measures were passed, but the extent to which Conservative elites were able to resist repeated demands from the party to establish a transformed regulatory legal regime. Chapter 1 considers the broad strategic choice facing the Conservative Party with respect to the unions and the organised working class, namely, exclusion or inclusion. Workers who were not union members posed less of a problem because their attitudes were not influenced by a collective perspective (symbolised by union membership) that was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as inimical to much of what the Conservative Party represented. Exclusion or inclusion were different responses to the challenge posed by the contentiousness of class politics and by the hostile legal regime regulating unions that gave way progressively to the acceptance not only of the unions’ right to exist, but also to organise, bargain collectively and influence government policies. Despite the decline in radicalism after the 1840s, unions were still seen by many as collectivist tyrannies threatening individual freedom and property rights, but by the 1860s the balance had shifted decisively in favour of integration. This was reflected by both the Second Reform Act (1867) and Disraeli’s One Nation romance which reinforced voluntarism. The Disraeli Government’s concession of legal protection (in the Trade Union Act of 1875), coupled with the first steps to enfranchising the industrial working class marks the tentative Victorian acceptance of trade unions and was a major influence on Conservative statecraft. One Nation and voluntarism were the twin foundations of the relationship between the Conservative Party and the trade unions but many Conservatives saw the growth of trade unions, democracy and socialism as intertwined and united by a commitment to wealth redistribution. The emergence of large-​ scale national industrial disputes in the 1890s and the growing demand for independent working-​ class parliamentary representation came at a time when judicial activism threatened the legal settlement passed by the Disraeli Government in 1875. Chapter 2 examines the Conservative response. The party refused to make any appeal to trade unionists, preferring instead the safer ground of patriotic constitutionalism and piecemeal legislative concessions such as the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act. The pre-​1914 Conservative Party disliked but accepted the Liberal Government’s social legislation, including the Trades Disputes Act (1906) which thereafter became the bedrock of British union legislation. Despite public commitments to protect the individual right to work and to defend the life of the community from industrial disruption Conservatism proved incapable of developing a coherent response and acquiesced in the Liberal Government’s tentative (re-)construction of politics in industrial society. Indeed, the lack of a response indicates strongly a calculation

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

12

What about the workers?

that the party had nothing to gain from departing from the contours of traditional Conservative politics. For Conservatives the war posed both serious challenges and offered substantial opportunities and whilst the party demonstrated a willingness to challenge militancy it also recognised that it had to adapt to a trade movement whose size and influence had increased dramatically. Many union members supported a Labour Party whose star was on the rise and which was now committed to socialism by its 1918 Constitution. Organised labour’s new political significance seemed to be confirmed by the creation in 1916 of the Ministry of Labour and Labour participation in the wartime coalitions. Preserving the status quo required that the party experiment with, for example, a formal labour presence, but of infinitely greater significance was the party’s radical extension of One Nation under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin. Whilst being careful not to exaggerate the scale of the Conservative opening to organised labour, there is no doubt that Baldwin’s approach was different to that of Bonar Law, who tried to neutralise post-​ war labour militancy and reduce the State’s exposure to industrial conflict and disruption. However, Baldwin’s accommodationist politics had limits as the party’s reaction to the General Strike showed. Although Baldwin sought to restrain the party’s desire for revenge after 1926, he recognised there were very real political constraints on his room for manoeuvre and the growing engagement of Whitehall with the TUC and unions, though real, should not be exaggerated, and there was no evidence of a significant shift in power towards the unions. In the aftermath of the General Strike, the collapse of the Labour Government in 1931 and the onset of a depression, senior figures in the union movement were convinced that the unions’ influence depended on demonstrating their utility to government. Baldwin was convinced greater political and electoral gains would flow to the party from developing a cooperative relationship with the unions and the TUC than by their exclusion. Of course, as Chapter 3 shows, this was an asymmetrical relationship, although the TUC enjoyed a role as the authoritative voice of the organised working class –​ a development that ministers recognised as an important aid to governance. The emerging threat of war with Germany in the late 1930s had implications for this developing relationship, as Conservative politicians recognised that the scale of rearmament and mobilisation needed to fight another Continental war would inevitably enhance dramatically the political and economic power of organised labour. Chapter  4 contrasts Chamberlain’s rearmament programme with the mobilisation for total war that took place after May 1940. Conservative ministers had favoured limited bilateral (union–​management) cooperation at factory and industry level, whereas many individual unions and the TUC increasingly preferred tripartite (union–​ management–​ government)

31

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

13

cooperation, but defeat in 1940 and the demands of the ‘people’s war’ led to a significant extension of the labour movement’s influence. The TUC, however, remained the weakest participant. Many Conservatives recognised the political consequences of total war, but could conceive of no alternative other than resistance or acquiescence  –​ whilst the Labour Party’s role in the Churchill Coalition meant a degree of political change far in excess of anything seen between 1914 and 1918. Unlike Lloyd George, Churchill as Prime Minister was determined to keep his party base intact and a clear manifestation of this was Churchill’s endorsement of the party’s enthusiastic support for the 1927 legislation despite the tensions this caused in the Coalition. The changes induced by the war and Labour’s triumph in 1945 pushed the Conservative Party deeper into a dilemma: recognising political realities meant recognising organised labour’s and the working class’s new status whilst simultaneously fearing the consequences of this status while struggling to find a distinctly Conservative response. The modalities of post-​ war politics and the reframing of politics (a process that had begun in the 1920s) stimulated extensive thinking about the party’s relationship with the unions and the organised working class and voters. As Chapter 4 shows, the party’s attempts to penetrate the organised working class after 1945 failed yet again, but far more successful was the party’s appeal based on a reputation for governing competence. Many in the party elite (albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm) believed a connection existed between governing competence and good relations with organised labour, and governing competence made it easier to satisfy the unions, and satisfied unions were themselves an indicator of governing competence. This connection was accepted by the TUC and union leaders who strove to maintain the wartime spirit of cooperation, but this aspiration was increasingly challenged by new un-​and semi-​official, frequently Communist, leadership cadres at workplace level, marked by a rise in unofficial industrial action. This put the Conservative governments of the 1950s under considerable pressure and, as Chapter  5 shows, this pressure stimulated criticism and demands for a new direction of policy with respect to the unions, one based on legislation. This conflicted directly with the government’s objective of combining full employment and low inflation, whereas critics contended that a long-​term equilibrium was impossible and radical action was needed to prevent the unions bidding up the price of labour, thereby affecting the inflation rate. If this led to higher unemployment and disaffected unions, then this was a price worth paying in the long run, but government feared the short-term economic and political costs of doing so. As Chapter 6 shows, no Conservative government was able to develop a workable strategy to sustain the status quo, although after July 1961 the Macmillan Government opted for a more interventionist approach (as did the succeeding Labour

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

14

What about the workers?

Government elected in 1964)  –​   a shift that stimulated further hostility from the unions who rejected any attempt to limit their right to bargain collectively on wages or to change in the legal environment. By the time the Conservatives left office in 1964, however, party opinion (including the elite) favoured increased legal intervention in hitherto extremely sensitive issues, such as the closed shop, and a more interventionary legal strategy (captured in Fair Deal At Work in 1968) was seen by many Conservatives as absolutely necessary for dealing with what was increasingly known as ‘the British disease’. Nevertheless, the commitment of the party’s elite to this new approach was uncertain and this uncertainty is explored in Chapter 7. The tension between the new approach and established patterns exploded under the leadership of Edward Heath and the consequent government–​ union conflict was blamed for increased ungovernability. The governability crisis was reflected in the unions’ neutralisation of the Industrial Relations Act and the miners’ strikes of 1972 and 1974 that produced severe economic dislocation, power cuts, a three-​day week and, finally, a general election on the theme of ‘Who governs?’ –​ a general election which the government lost. These events and the experience of the subsequent Labour governments culminating in the Winter of Discontent stimulated a dramatic shift in Conservative strategy. The development of this strategy is described in Chapter 8 and was quite clearly exclusionary. The legal, institutional and governance changes introduced encouraged squeezing the unions as actors in polity and economy, thus reversing a trend that originated in the early twentieth century. This process was reinforced by the restructuring of the economy to a service-industry dominated post-​ industrial economy, which was characterised by low union membership and privatised public industries. Dealing with union power in the workplace and economy was one aspect of Conservative strategy after 1975; another one was altering union governance and removing them as major participants in the policy process. This chapter focuses on the government’s uncertainties in developing its response in its early years and sees the pivotal event as the steel industry strike of 1981, rather than the 1984–​85 miners’ dispute. Although it was climactic, the outcome of the 1984–​85 coal dispute reflects the Government’s broad strategy developed whilst in opposition, but which was refined and developed in response to the steel dispute. This period is also noteworthy because government strategy came to rest far more clearly on a sharp distinction between the unions and their members. These members were understandably and even commendably loyal to their unions as organisations, but union members were regarded by Conservatives as often misguided and open to manipulation. Union membership overlapped with those who agreed with the Government’s analysis of the need for radical reform; many members of the organised working class (around 30

51

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

15

per cent) in the guise of voters endorsed the case for extensive legal change whilst retaining a belief in the protection offered by unions –​ something also accepted by public opinion. It is hard not to conclude that, in this instance, the Government was following public opinion’s preferences. Public opinion got the sort of unions it wanted. We live currently in an epoch fundamentally different from that described in the first paragraph. The party’s attitude to trade unions remains one of clear and unequivocal hostility. In part this is a reflection of the continued influence of the Thatcher legacy and its rejection of what had become the norm of union involvement combined with the rise of a post-​industrial society characterised by declining union membership. The party retains a rhetorical commitment to One Nation politics especially after the 2019 general election, but one lacking any real substance, although the concept of the organised working class plays no role in Conservative politics other than as a ritual totem of dislike. Attempts to fill this space with, inter alia, blue-​collar conservatism and ‘white-​van man’ conservatism have failed –​ a failure that reflects the fragmentation of class politics in Britain as does the swing to the Conservatives in Labour’s former heartlands in the 2019 general election. Compared to the epoch described in the first paragraph, politics have been turned upside down and the unions and the organised working class marginalised and ignored to a degree that not so very long ago would have been thought inconceivable. How, and why, this change came about is the subject of this book.

1

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

Introduction Conservatives frequently differentiated between the working class, sometimes wayward and unpredictable but essentially sound, and the trade unions, at best undesirable and at worst a positive evil, although there was no easy way to divorce the latter from the former, which made it hard to criticise one without criticising the other. The party’s solution to this dilemma was to accept the unions’ existence and role whilst criticising their supposed negative attributes, notably the unions alleged vulnerability to control by politically motivated oligarchies who usurped the unions’ power and resources for their selfish political and industrial objectives, and who tyrannised a moderate, politically diverse membership. The party developed a narrative that claimed Disraeli as the midwife of modern trade unionism. An example is from Alfred Lyttleton (Con, St George’s), speaking in the Second Reading of the Trade Union Bill in 1912: Speaking for myself, and I am sure for those who act with me, I may say we have no objection to trade unions –​on the contrary, very much the reverse. For forty years or more … our party supported trade unions in all that is legitimate, and to Mr Disraeli and other prominent Members of our party trade unions owe very much of the charter of liberty that they have now. Nothing that we have done in the past, or shall do in the future, will in any way fetter the legitimate functions and liberties of trade unions. (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col. 3069)

This narrative reflects the Conservative Party’s reluctant acquiescence in the Victorian acceptance of the unions as a fact of life (Phelps Brown 1983, 19–​ 40). It emphasises that trade unionism and Conservatism were compatible and the party’s purpose had been ‘directed to abolishing the ancient and harsh rules against the combination of labour on even terms with capital in industrial disputes’ (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col.  3070). This narrative was influenced by the party’s broader critique of democracy,

71

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

17

which it held would culminate in socialism, and the unions were central to this transition, but the party’s dominant strategy, conventionally described as One Nation politics, denied the validity of class in favour of a cross-​class integrative strategy involving piecemeal legislation to preserve the existing social and political order (Seawright 2010,  4–​13).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conservatism and trade unions Walsh sees the relationship between the party and the working class in the North-​West down to 1867 as a precursor of what happened nationally as industrial capitalism matured (2012, 1, 105–​111. See also Hill 1929). Walsh’s discussion of ‘operative Conservatism’ does not, however, explicitly cover the growth of trade unionism, a growth that sustained a genuine concern about the possible political consequences of a working class organised by trade unions. The demise of Chartism in the 1840s and the minimal responsiveness of political institutions (for example, the Ten Hours Act of 1847) suggested the possibility of working-class improvement within the status quo that in turn pointed to the political integration of the organised working class. The acceptance of this possibility by the unions and the Conservative Party ‘was probably the fundamental break with political solutions. As the decades proceeded, people increasingly looked to parliamentary action simply to protect autonomous organisations’ (Thompson 1986, 334). Combination ‘in restraint of trade’ was historically illegal at common law and by the end of the eighteenth century some forty Acts of Parliament forbad combination (‘the Combination Acts’). Their justification was, as an 1806 Parliamentary report proclaimed, the protection of individual freedom and the right of everyone to employ the capital he inherits or has acquired, according to his own discretion, without molestation or obstruction, so long as he does not infringe on the right or property of others is one of those privileges which the free and happy Constitution of this country has long accustomed every Briton to consider his birthright. (Aspinall 1949, ix)

Until the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824 trade unions were effectively illegal, with no right to bargain collectively or strike, but whilst reducing the threat of conspiracy charges, repeal did not make unions fully legal or effective. Repeal did not render unions equal with employers and, as Lord Lansdowne noted in 1825, conceding equality would mean ‘no manufacture could be carried on if workmen could dictate to the masters who should be employed, and prevent men from exercising their right of

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

18

What about the workers?

labouring on what ever terms they might please’ (Aspinall 1949, xxx–​ xxxi). Repealing the Combination Acts meant, however, unions ‘were now protected from actions for criminal conspiracy so long as they limited themselves to the determination of wages and hours, and in particular so long as they and their members avoided certain specified offences, namely violence, threats, intimidation, molestation, and obstruction’ (Clegg et al. 1964, 44). This repeal did not end the unions’ legal vulnerability and they were still perceived by many as an affront to the laws of political economy and threats to the political and industrial order, to be intimidatory and coercive, and potentially tyrannical. Many Conservatives frequently lamented that honest working men with legitimate grievances were led astray by demagogues who, in pursuing their industrial and political agendas, intimidated employers and workers, disrupted livelihoods, and undermined the country’s prosperity and social order. Conservatives, however, also accepted the unions had a positive role to play and were seeking to join the status quo, not overthrow it. This duality goes back to the origins of modern Conservatism, drawing on the paternalistic, anti-​industrial and reformist Toryism of individuals such as Richard Cobbett, Richard Oastler and Lord Shaftesbury. This strain of Conservative thought emphasised working-class social deference, prescriptive rights and custom, together with hostility to the rapacious ‘Millocracy’, and which saw the State as an arbiter between social groups. A foundational exposition of these sentiments was Benjamin Disraeli’s novel, Sybil, or, The Two Nations (1845), which lies at the foundation of One Nation Conservatism. Historians have stressed the centrality of social integration in Conservative politics, coupled to the conviction that moderate, incremental reform was an essential component of a governing strategy intended to marginalise radicalism (see, for example, Gash 1976, 155–​174; Hawkins 2015, 77; Walsh 2012, 20)  –​ a strategy that became particularly significant after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, which pushed Britain’s political economy irrevocably along the path of industrialism. The maturation and consolidation of industrial capitalism by the 1860s also saw the stabilisation of trade unionism, exemplified by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) which was composed of skilled, aspirational workers often anxious, along with their leaders, to demonstrate their status, that focused on wages and conditions, and expressed a desire for mutually beneficial and cooperative relations with employers. This culture, however, did not protect the ASE and similar unions from attack. In 1851 the ASE found itself subject to a lockout and other major disputes included  the builders’ lockout (1859–​ 60), the Birmingham carpenters’ strike (1864), the Staffordshire ironworkers’ strike (1865) and the Sheffield

91

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

19

Outrages, triggered by a wage claim, culminating in a lockout in 1864. The dispute was concerned with the introduction of file-​making machinery that needed fewer skilled workers, lowered wages and produced conflict over job regulation. The dispute culminated in the blowing-​up of a non-​unionist’s house. The 1860s were also a decade of agitation for franchise reform. The working class was perceived by some Conservatives as becoming organised as a separate political power, and they claimed union leaders would be unable to resist the temptation to deploy their organisational resources for political purposes. Lord Derby, the joint leader of the party with Disraeli, noted in his diary that ‘something like a panic was spreading among the upper and middle classes. They believe that opinion among the masses is thoroughly revolutionary’ (6 May 1871 in Vincent 1994, 79). The 1867 Reform Act and Disraeli’s union legislation of the 1870s was part of the response and flowed from a desire to integrate these new political forces into the status quo (Cowling 1967, 25). No MP wanted manhood suffrage, but even a limited extension of the vote would give more trade unionists the vote. ‘What is vaguely feared’, Derby wrote, ‘is legislation … in the Socialist or Trade Union sense which does not suit a House essentially of the middle classes, and very wealthy’ (8 July 1871 in Vincent 1994, 84). One of the most trenchant Conservative critics of trade unions in this period was Viscount Cranbourne, the future Lord Salisbury. For Salisbury politics was about the defence of property, social stability and the preservation of established institutions; unions posed a serious threat because they organised a single class. The fundamental political divide was between those who possessed and those who lacked property; thus unions were an epochal political development because they were class-conscious collectivities pursuing the redistribution of wealth, using their resources to subvert the laws of supply and demand and influence the contours and content of public policy (Thompson 1987, 252–​289). Trade unions expressed perfectly the characteristics of their class (‘power of combination … ignorance of economical laws … strong taste for the despotism of numbers’) and their core ethic –​class solidarity –​made them especially dangerous: Probably no class in this country or in any other, have exhibited such a perfect party discipline, or so well drilled a contempt for ruin and hunger incurred by obedience to their elected chiefs, and of what they can do and suffer, has not been lost upon the employers of labour. (Cranbourne 1866, 549)

The growing activism of trade unions in industry and politics would be directed by ‘the most reckless, worthless and noisy of their class’ and in politics: The artisan force would be handled in the conduct of elections as they are now handled in the conduct of strikes, with as much promptitude of action and as

20

What about the workers? much exactness of drill. The whole body of artisan voters would be turned over from one candidate to another at a given order. (Cranbourne 1866, 547)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Unions, Cranbourne insisted, were inherently tyrannical and redistributionist and, at heart, socialist. The intertwining of democracy with class and redistributionist politics in the form of trade unions produced ‘civil war with the gloves on’ (Salisbury 1883, 56).

Disraeli and the trade unions The 1860s saw the first instance of a repeated pattern in which a judicial decision overthrew what had been hitherto understood to be the unions’ legal status, thus provoking union pressure for remedial legal action. Hornby v. Close (1867) found unions to be organisations in restraint of trade and so their funds enjoyed no legal protection. At the same time the political and economic debate over the unions was captured by two Royal Commissions (1869 and 1875). These were dominated by two interpretations: first, that unions were fundamentally tyrannical, threatening individual freedom, economic well-​ being and the community and so they required strict regulation. The second interpretation understood unions as the inevitable product of capitalism’s laws of supply and demand and the natural result of the asymmetry of power between employers and workers, and justice and freedom for workers could only be achieved by organisation and collective action. Advocates of this interpretation also argued effective organisation would promote order and peace in industrial relations  –​ benefits that far outweighed any defects. The minority report of the 1867 Royal Commission was sympathetic to the unions and its recommendations were endorsed by the TUC and formed the basis of Gladstone’s trade union bill (Hansard, 14 February 1871, cols 257–​273), that sought to restore a degree of protection to union funds, but the Criminal Law Amendment Act (1871) made picketing illegal, thus rendering many of the rights won in the Trade Union Act nugatory. The sympathetic minority report of the 1875 Royal Commission informed the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act and the Employers and Workmen Act (both 1875) passed by Disraeli’s Conservative Government, which was elected in 1874. Disraeli’s legislation was perceived by many Conservatives (and Liberals) as radical interventions. The two Acts of 1875 were justified on four grounds:  first, the legislation was not a radical departure but built on past precedent; second, the legislation was addressing injustices that were widely seen as such; third, legislation would benefit the community and not just a single class; and finally, the proposals represented a final settlement. The case for such seemingly un-​Conservative

12

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

21

acts of policy was made by Disraeli’s Home Secretary, R.A. Cross, who sat for a Lancashire constituency (see Mitchell 1991). In the Second Reading of a Factories Bill, for example, one Conservative backbencher described the bill under discussion as ‘wise, safe and well conceived, which will confer incalculable benefits on the operative class [and] will have the effect of settling this vexed question for a long time’ (Hansard, 11 June 1875, col.  1437). Cross described the bill as consensual, enjoying the support of employers, employees, trade unions, expert opinion and Members from both sides of the House of Commons; he denied the legislation had departed from the existing approach to public policy and sought to remedy obvious shortcomings and injustices thereby promoting social stability. Cross insisted that the Government’s wider social legislation rested on a well-​established philosophy, denying that it was legislation for a specific class, but rather it sought to promote the common good. Second Reading debates on such legislation in this period often discussed the principles of liberal political economy and the legitimate (or otherwise) role of state intervention in interfering with these laws. Speakers tended to conclude that it was probably not good for the law to interfere in ‘private’ relationships such as that between the employers and employed, but then to concede that this principle had been breached many years before and on many occasions since. Nevertheless, despite growing unionisation, collective agreements remained voluntary and hard to achieve, and were unstable because of the employer–​employee power asymmetry, so that only legislation could provide a guarantee of certainty and general applicability. Gladstone’s legislation undoubtedly made effective trade union action risky. Union members, unlike employers, were liable to criminal sanctions under the Criminal Law Amendment Act which stipulated three months imprisonment with hard labour for any person convicted of attempting to coerce any other person during the course of an industrial dispute. Specifically forbidden were the making of threats, persistent following, hiding tools, watching and besetting an individual’s house, and two or more persons following an individual. The law did nothing to dissuade the Courts from potentially applying the full weight of criminal conspiracy to industrial disputes and effectively deeming strikes as coercive and therefore criminal. It was in response to this legal environment that Disraeli’s Government passed its trade union legislation that proved to be so significant for Conservatism’s narrative on relations with the organised working class. We must, however, be careful not to ascribe any substantial embryonic populist, reformist programmatic motivation behind what came to be described as One Nation politics; rather Disraeli’s union legislation was more concerned with promoting order and governability (Cowling 1967, 148). Moreover, the party was exposed to a major tension. Ramsden

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

22

What about the workers?

believes that the ‘flood of middle class voters who had come over to the Conservatives had done so in the expectation that they would put a brake on the legislative wheel of reform’, whereas working-class votes ‘had been conditional on a new programme of reforms’ and concludes the tension between the two constituted a ‘fundamental strategic issue’ that required speedy resolution (1998, 125). Cross believed this strategic issue could be resolved by appealing to the well-​established Conservative concern with the preservation of social order by passing legislation intended to reduce tension between employers and the employed and by doing away with law ‘which so much puzzled and confused them, and from time to time exposed them to so many unjust punishments’ (Hansard, 28 June 1875, col. 675). Within Conservatism the New Social Movement of 1871 (Smith 1967, 36–​37) advocated similar reforms, but while Derby thought some of Disraeli’s ideas innocuous he believed others threatened an ‘economical revolution’, culminating in ‘the suppression of the capitalist … landholder and fundholder’ (26 July 1871 in Vincent 1994, 85–​86). Disraeli’s two 1872 speeches, at the Manchester Free Trade Hall and the Crystal Palace, addressed the party’s strategic dilemma and in office Disraeli’s Government produced ‘a series of reluctant concessions made necessary by the pressing demand of circumstance’ (Greenleaf 1983, 214). Translating Disraeli’s sentiments was left to his ministers, which in the case of trade unions was Richard Cross (Smith 1967, 198–​200). To give effect to this Cross offered a Royal Commission into trade union law, but the TUC Parliamentary Committee refused to cooperate, arguing that ‘the unions position had been set out in the minority report of the 1867 Royal Commission. Initially, Disraeli’s Cabinet members agreed neither to repeal nor amend Gladstone’s legislation, but then changed their mind. Derby noted that despite differences over details ‘in principle all were agreed, Salisbury & Carnarvon saying that they both disliked the proposed legislation, but agree that it cannot be avoided’ and Disraeli concluded ‘we are so pledged to them they must not be given up without absolute necessity’ (29 May 1875 in Vincent 1994, 220). The legislation evoked little controversy in Disraeli’s Cabinet because Cross enjoyed Disraeli’s confidence and so in the interests of maintaining order the Cabinet was willing to give the go-​ahead (Carnarvon diary, 4 March, 26 November and 17 November 1874, in Gordon 2009, 213, 234, 240). Disraeli also hoped in this way to ‘gain and retain for the Tories the lasting affection of the working classes’ (Bradford 1983, 321) and Carnarvon noted that subsequent Cabinets believed the legislation was ‘essential’ and ‘agreed to adhere to the bills’ (Carnarvon diary, 29 May, 3 July and 7 July 1875, in Gordon 2009, 252, 255, 256). In the First Reading of the Employers and Workmen Bill, Cross described the motivation behind the legislation. Cross insisted the unions would not

32

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

23

oppose the Courts punishing anyone guilty of a crime, but were deeply concerned about the threat posed to their activities by their vulnerability to breach of contract and the criminal law; the Government’s intention was to make employers and employees equal before the law, but Cross conceded this raised complex legal problems, notably relating to picketing. Cross proposed specific and limited changes to the law of conspiracy as applied to industrial disputes and remove all uncertainty by abolishing union criminal liability for conspiracy. Conservative MPs, whilst often critical of the details of legislation, accepted legislation was the appropriate response and that it should both address working class concerns whilst seeking to bind together all classes. As a party seeking votes it was in its interest to respond to major social groups seeking change and, as the party of social order, it had a responsibility to address sources of discord even though legislation risked the charge that Conservatives were in fact surrendering to a sectional interest in the pursuit of votes and bolstering union power. Charles Newdegate (MP for Warwickshire North), argued that, as an employer, he had seen his workforce subjected to ‘very great pressure on the part of the trade unions’ and he complained that ‘the tendency of the legislation now before the House was to increase the power of trade unions’ (Hansard, 28 June 1875, col. 684). Changing the law on conspiracy and picketing would encourage the worst traits of trade unionism, which Newdegate described as a disposition to exercise something more than moral terrorism on the part of these unions … they seemed determined not only to decide, where they could, how industry should be controlled, but to erect tribunals of their own, totally irresponsible to any other authority, for the decision of all questions relating to labour.

He concluded by warning the House that they would eventually be compelled to reverse course and ‘to regulate them, for trade unionism was becoming a source of great power [and] was in fact, creating a new jurisdiction’ (Hansard, 28 June 1875, col. 685). Despite these concerns (or perhaps because of them) the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) and the Employers and Workmen Act (1875) have been described as a remarkable coup and the most significant of Disraeli’s social reforms. The two Acts gave the unions nearly everything they were seeking and which Gladstone had refused (Smith 1967, 217). Derby believed ‘something not inconsiderable had been done’ and opined the legislation showed ‘there is no reason why workingmen should not be conservative … since they have … nothing more to get or expect from agitation’ (17 August and 17 December 1875 in Vincent 1994, 238, 259). ‘It was’, Coleman argues, ‘a moment when Disraeli’s inconstant taste for

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

24

What about the workers?

gesture and rhetoric towards the working class had the opportunity to take concrete form, but the episode only delayed the identification of the party with hostility to trade-​union interests which was soon to become apparent’ (Coleman 1988, 417). The ‘fundamental strategic issue’ identified by Ramsden was addressed by action on the trade unions allied to a message that ministers now regarded these questions as settled. Cross’s legislation cost little but helped sustain a powerful narrative about the Conservative concern for the ‘welfare of the people’. The two Acts undoubtedly, if temporarily, eased tension and added substance to the One Nation myth (a term never used by Disraeli); however, the legislation was not the foundation of a coherent approach, nor did it alter the unions’ attitudes towards the party (or vice versa). Green argues ‘the socialist threat’ achieved prominence in Conservative politics between 1880 and 1886 (1995, 123), but this threat and its connection with trade unionism concerned the party from the 1860s. Derby, for instance, believed the 1877 railway strikes in the United States demonstrated a wider phenomenon: ‘The distinctively socialistic idea that it is the business of the State to provide employment for the labourer.’ This, he believed, was the inevitable result of extending the vote: ‘the masses will ask “What is the good of having votes if we are not going to use them for the advantage of our class?” & it is on the cards that we may see a social war of strikes and lockouts such as England has not yet witnessed’ (19 August 1877 in Vincent 1994, 433). The party’s response to the organised working class was limited further by hostility to class enclaves within Conservatism. Addressing a delegation of working men, Disraeli declared: ‘I have never been myself at all favourable to a system which would induce Conservatives who are workingmen to form societies confined merely to their class’ (quoted in McKenzie 1964, 148). In response to a proposed compact between Conservative members of the House of Lords with Conservative workingmen to promote social reform, Lord Carnarvon concluded it was a serious and, by extension, an attractive proposition, but nonetheless he evinced extreme caution (Carnarvon diary, 20 July 1871, in Gordon 2009, 197). His caution seemed justified after a series of press leaks and Carnarvon concluded: ‘we have narrowly escaped burning our fingers’ (Carnarvon diary, 16 October 1871, in Gordon 2009, 199). The Third Marquess of Salisbury (prime minister in 1885–​86, 1886–​92 and 1895–​1902, and party leader in 1881–​1902) was, despite his proven ability to play the democratic game, equally suspicious. Politics was for Salisbury about the defence of private property and he regarded unions as pernicious class-conscious collectivities organised to pursue class ends, primarily the redistribution of wealth (Thompson 1987, 252–​289). Although Salisbury moderated the public expression of these views, he never fundamentally changed them, as it was the unions’ class

52

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

25

solidarity that made them particularly threatening. Salisbury’s strategy was to counter these tendencies by exploiting divisions within the working class by employing, for example, the medieval mummery of the Primrose League (Pugh 1985), but he remained convinced that any Conservative bid for working-class support would fail and fracture the party, paving the way for extreme radicalism (see Bentley 2001; Marsh 1978; Roberts 1999) and Green concludes the policy implications of Salisbury’s Conservatism for the party’s approach to the organised working class was ‘quietistic’ (1995, 15).

Developments after Disraeli Disraeli’s Conservative Government may have considered the legislation of the 1870s a final settlement of the trade union question, but it was inevitable it would re-​emerge and require a further response as the unions evolved into what the Webbs (1894, chapter vii) termed ‘the New Unions’. These unions were perceived as industrially militant, politically conscious, pro-​socialist and less amenable to control by their leaders, but pulling in the opposite direction was a developing belief that government, employers, the employed and the wider community had much to gain from stable, organised workplace industrial relations (see Davidson 1978; Davidson 1980; Davidson 1985). Although the concept of New Unions has been criticised by later historians, contemporaries certainly noted their role in the upsurge in industrial unrest in the 1880s and 1890s. This period also witnessed a willingness by judges to challenge Disraeli’s settlement and the worsening of industrial relations encouraged the State, as the community’s representative, to promote a resolution. Many Conservatives saw this confluence –​industrial militancy and the rise of socialism (the Independent Labour Party (ILP), was founded in 1893)  –​as marking a fundamental shift in politics  –​ a shift that Conservatives had been predicting since the 1860s. The development of Conservative thinking was captured in Dicey’s Law and Opinion in England, first published in 1905, which argued that from the 1860s there had been a change in politics from a Benthamite (legislation should interfere as little as possible with the individual) to a collectivist disposition, defined as ‘the intervention of the State, even at some sacrifice of individual freedom, for the benefit of the people’ (Dicey 1914, 64). Contrasting 1860 with 1900, Dicey concluded that by the century’s end ‘the doctrine of laissez-​faire … had more or less lost its hold upon the English people’ (1914, xxxix–​xxxi) and he identified labour laws regulating private business and conferring unwarranted legal privileges on trade unions and

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

26

What about the workers?

their members as the foremost example of this collectivism. What had simulated this shift to collectivism? According to Dicey, growing economic and social complexity allied to the rise of bureaucratic organisations of employers and employed had irrevocably blurred the public–​ private boundary that had hitherto sustained the balance between individual and collective rights in favour of the latter. Second, collectivism and, therefore socialism, no longer faced coherent ideological competition from classical liberalism, nationalism, or religion; third, the incremental reformism pursued by Liberal and Conservative governments had created the perception that reform was the normal disposition in politics. However, the growth in the scope of, for example, trade union demands showed incrementalism was coming under greater pressure. Fourth, the progressive extension of the franchise had increased the redistributionist impulse in politics, as poor working class voters would be inevitably attracted by promises of wealth distribution. Again, unions embodied this impulse. Fifth, instancing the parliamentary obstructionism of the Irish Nationalists, Dicey emphasised the ability of a highly disciplined parliamentary faction to exert an influence over public policy far beyond its numbers and he predicted (wrongly) that this would be the role of the emerging Labour Party. Sixth, improved global communications and the mass media meant that the more aggressive collectivism of unions in Australia, the United States, France and Germany would influence the behaviour of British unions. Finally, Dicey developed a theory of relative deprivation to explain why a society far wealthier than in the 1860s was subject to growing conflict over distribution and why wage earners and union members increasingly looked to the state for the redistribution of wealth and power (Dicey 1914, liii–​lxx). During the Second Reading of an industrial conciliation bill in 1896 Charles Ritchie, the Conservative President of the Board of Trade (the Board of Trade Labour Department, founded in 1886 and granted increased autonomy in 1892, was by the mid-​1890s an embryonic labour Ministry of Labour), insisted that his bill’s underlying principle was uncontroversial, consisting merely of granting the Board the power to facilitate the creation of conciliation boards where they did not exist, but controversially it conferred on the Board of Trade the power of intervention in a dispute to bring the two sides together. There was, not surprisingly, criticism that the bill’s unintended effect would be to boost union power by enabling them to employ the threat of industrial disruption in order to persuade the state to coerce employers to settle. Employee–​employer relations, in this view, were best left to those concerned and the debate revealed considerable Conservative backbench hostility towards, and suspicion of, any state engagement with industrial relations. The contrary arguments were, first, that recent disputes (notably

72

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

27

the 1893 coal lockout) had demonstrated the changing nature and scale of industrial organisation, which expanded the scope of conflict and its effects, making state intervention inevitable; and second, the scale of these disputes meant that public opinion and the community’s interests had to be taken into account and only government could do this (Hansard, 30 June 1896, cols 419–​437). The 1890s saw the rise of ‘the social question’ (essentially, what should be done about the urban industrial working class) of which ‘the union problem’ was a part. Politically this was a period of Conservative dominance and there were several efforts, for example Randolph Churchill’s gossamer-​like Tory Democracy and Joe Chamberlain’s far more substantial but divisive tariff reform campaign, to address ‘the condition of England question’. Tariff reform argued that Conservatives should appeal directly for working class and trade unionists votes, but there were two major structural obstacles confronting a more active and interventionist Conservatism. A  major obstacle was that party leaders (Salisbury and his successor, his nephew Arthur Balfour) were neither attracted by, nor believed in, programmatic politics. Neither the middle-​ class suburban ‘villa Toryism’, nor industrial and commercial wealth, were attracted by extensive and costly social reform and both were suspicious of the trade unions at a time when industrial conflict was increasing in scale and scope (Soldon 1974). Conservative leaders concluded they had very little to gain and much to lose from governmental activism, and the Government went no further than minimalist legislation, such as the Conciliation Act (1896) and the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1897) (Marsh 1978, 258). This was also a time when Britain’s economic supremacy was coming under challenge by the United States and Imperial Germany and this led to efforts by management to assert greater control over the workplace to control costs and improve profitability. The influx of industrial and commercial wealth into the party and disquiet over increased foreign competition meshed easily with the renewed judicial activism identified with Lord Halsbury (Disraeli’s Solicitor-​General and Salisbury’s and Balfour’s Lord Chancellor) that sought to reduce union power by attacking the legislative settlement of the 1870s. This was allied to a reassertion of individual property rights that culminated in the Taff Vale Judgement (1901) and faced by this intractable problem the party’s response, therefore, was to proclaim the government’s neutrality in such matters and to assert the sanctity of due legal process. But if neutrality meant inaction, then it also meant siding with the employers as their lawyers steadily reduced trade union immunities, for only a government decision to legislate could have overruled the courts. (Ramsden 1998, 196)

28

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Disraeli’s legislation had granted the unions a degree of legal protection but in so doing had put them in an anomalous position that led directly to the charge that the tendency of legislation was to aggrandise union power (Lecky 1896, 370). Speaking in the debates during the passage of the Trade Disputes Bill in 1906 Sir Thomas Wrightson (Con, St Pancras Central) condemned this tendency to expand union power, declaring Let them go back to the origins of trade unions. Their first function was simply to watch the interests of labour with regard to wages but they had now gone a good deal beyond that; they dictated terms of employment and even the number of apprentices; they dictated the amount of work to be done by either man or machine, and they also dealt with questions of overtime and piecework, and the discharge of non-​union men. (Hansard, 10 March 1906, col. 1078)

However, the scale of the legal assault appeared to render any form of effective trade unionism ineffective. Lyons v. Wilkins (1896) prevented the picketing a workplace not directly involved in the original dispute whilst Taff Vale (1901) rendered unions liable for damages for their actions, and Quinn v. Leatham (1901) deemed secondary or sympathetic action illegal and subject to damages. By the mid-​1900s judge-​made law on picketing, breach of contract, civil conspiracy and liability rendered the Conservative assumption that the 1875 legislation was a final settlement untenable as the unions sought legislative redress. The Balfour Government stonewalled, but eventually appointed a Royal Commission that reported in 1905, but which was boycotted by the TUC. In 1906 the Liberal Party was returned to government, committed to a wide range of social reforms, and it was under great pressure to reverse the Taff Vale Judgement. The Cabinet was, however, split and a resulting compromise bill was subject to heavy criticism; trade union MPs introduced their own bill which was, likewise, criticised. It was clear that trade union questions were once again provoking serious ideological conflict and stimulating deep conflicts over principles, as well as over electoral strategy amongst Conservatives (and, it must be admitted, for many in the Liberal Party) (Rubinstein 1982, 57–​78). During the debates on the Liberal bill Conservatives often began critical speeches by declaring their support for workplace trade unionism, but then declaring their hostility to, first, granting unions unique privileges; and second, they opposed party-​political, or partisan, trade unionism, a criticism that assumed greater prominence as unions seemingly increased their influence over public policy and as more affiliated to the Labour Party (founded in 1900 as the Labour Representation Committee). Conservatives attempted to cast their attitude to trade unionism as an aspect of maintaining social order (properly constituted, unions could discipline the workforce and promote stability in the workplace) whilst

92

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

29

simultaneously urging union equality before the law. Typical, perhaps, was Henry Duke (Con, Plymouth), who ‘contended that masters and men should be placed on an equal footing. Were workers to be authorised to do wicked things because it was said some employers did them? He would rather bring them both into a proper subordination to the law.’ The effect of reform, he feared, ‘would be to place the trade unions in a state of sovereignty which no king ever enjoyed with the consent of the English people’ and particularly disturbing were the bill’s clauses on picketing (Hansard, 10 March 1905, col. 1083). Sir Thomas Wrightson (Con, St Pancras Central) admitted that judicial decisions had encouraged uncertainty and ferment that certainly required a response. However, the proposed remedy was sectional  –​even class legislation  –​and any response must address ‘not the interests of employers or workmen or the merits or demerits of trade unionism, but rather the interests of society as a whole’ (Hansard, 10 March 1905, col. 1077). Any further expansion of union power could only damage the economy, and changes to picketing law pointed to a legalised tyranny –​ a tyranny now about to be extended to the House of Commons as many unions had ‘practically threatened to knock them out of the House of Commons at the next election if they voted against the Bill’ (Hansard, 19 March 1905, col.  1080). Henry Duke agreed on the inevitability of a special body of trade union law, but this bill ‘introduced privileges for one of the strongest bodies, if not the strongest organized body in the country’. In a civilised society law must rest on the principle that individuals were liable for the damage they caused; he believed that employers and employees should be legally equal (Hansard, 10 March 1905, col. 1081). During the committee stage of the Liberal Government’s bill F.E. Smith (Con, Birkenhead) attacked the bill as ‘practically immoral … if these proposals were carried out they would be creating a privilege for the proletariat giving a sort of benefit of clergy to the trade unions’ (Hansard, 3 August 1906, col. 1716). The bill’s long-​term effect would be to encourage irresponsible behaviour, as the law would now protect unions from the consequences of their actions. If their actions entailed no legal consequences, then why should unions behave moderately and responsibly? This was a theme taken up by Sir Edward Carson (Con, Dublin University), who averred that protecting the unions from damages for any illegal or criminal acts meant that ‘they were getting rid of all the fundamental principles which the law of this country possessed’ (Hansard, 3 August 1906, col. 1738). Sir George Kane (Con, Kingston) also emphasised the importance of unions being open to being sued for damages, ‘If a union, through its agents, threatened an act of trespass or violence or other wrong no Government was allowed to grant an injunction to prevent that wrong being committed. The result … was an innovation in our own laws and a grave injustice’ (Hansard, 3 August 1906, cols 1754–​1755).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

30

What about the workers?

The Liberal Government’s parliamentary majority meant the Conservative opposition could not stop the bill. The Trade Disputes Act (1906) restored what had been considered to be the status quo ante the Taff Vale Judgement, but Conservatives, following the critique developed by commentators like Dicey and Lecky, deemed the 1906 Act was responsible for further encouraging the transformation of unions into tyrannies wielding unjust power over individuals and society (for example, Feiling 1913, 119). Arthur Balfour, the Prime Minister (1902–​05), doubted (for example) that picketing could ever be peaceful and non-​coercive, and believed that unions ought to be liable for damages. Balfour’s Cabinet and a majority of Conservatives (as well as half of the subsequent Liberal Cabinet) thought Taff Vale was legally correct but a failure to act, however, entailed electoral consequences (by-​ elections at Clitheroe, Woolwich and Barnard Castle testified to working class and trade union hostility) but Balfour believed ‘it was our duty in the interests of the country at large to resist any demands which we conceive to be contrary to justice and sound policy’ (Egremont 1980, 202–​203; Mackay 1985, 218). Conservatives believed the Liberal Government’s behaviour was the direct consequence of the unions growing political influence and partisanship. During the debates on the Trade Disputes Bill the influence of the Labour Party, the TUC and the unions over the Liberal government and public policy was a prominent aspect of the Conservative critique. Balfour, for example, when complaining of the government’s sudden change of direction in favour of immunity for the unions claimed this ‘indicated the pliability of some members of the Government to the pressure exerted by the Labour Party’. The problem, Balfour opined, was not the unions or Labour seeking to pressure ministers (discussion of legislation with interested parties was a normal part of the policy process) but the problem was the Government’s surrender. This action pointed to the eventual emergence of the political strike, which was common in other countries but hitherto had been ‘wholly alien to the minds of the trade union leaders in our country’ (Hansard, 3 August 1906, cols 1710–​1711). Similarly, Bonar Law, the party’s rising rhetorical attack-​dog, wondered why Liberal opposition in the Cabinet to immunities had collapsed: What was the explanation? “There” [pointing to the LABOUR benches] was the explanation. In this Parliament, for practically the first time an extraneous body had forced itself into the solid substance of the Liberal Party [and] had tried to plant itself on the domestic hearth of the Liberal Party. (Hansard, 1 November 1906, cols 1375–​1376)

Appeasing Labour, Law insisted, would prove fatal (‘the more they stroked it the more it growled’) to the Liberal Party.

13

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

31

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

What is the alternative? The Liberal Government concluded granting the unions’ specific immunities constituted the least bad solution; Conservatives were hostile to what they interpreted as surrendering to political and industrial labour but they had as yet no workable alternative (Russell 1973, 71–​72). It has been assumed by historians that the Conservative failure to reverse Taff Vale when still in government cost the party votes in the 1906 election (Egremont 1980, 211–​ 212; Mackay 1985, 230; Young 1963, 264–​265). Was the Conservative failure to reverse Taff Vale a major error? Zebel, for instance, argued that Taff Vale ‘stimulated Labour’s discontent and drive for greater political power’ (1973, 123), and Balfour’s failure and the result of the 1906 election ensured any response would come from a Liberal government and so any political gain would accrue to the Liberals. Some Conservatives believed that a Disraeli or a Randolph Churchill would have been alive to the political possibilities of Conservative action, but more common was a conviction, as Balfour told the King’s Secretary, Lord Knollys, that the general election result showed ‘We are face to face (no doubt in a milder form) with the Socialist difficulties which loom so large on the Continent. Unless I  am greatly mistaken, the Election of 1906 inaugurates a new era’ (Halévy 1961, 92). Despite Conservatism’s proven ability to win working class and trade union votes, the 1906 election was seen by some as indicating the need for a new Conservative strategy because of a sense that the working class was formulating demands outside the ideological and policy parameters of the old parties. The 1906 election signalled that ‘the proletariat … have perceived … that power is in their hands if they come to use it, and have set up in the last seven years, old age pensions and insurance for themselves, legal irresponsibility for their members, and free meals for their school children’ (Feiling 1913, 8). The unions were undoubtedly a growing presence in society. By 1911 membership density was around 25 per cent, albeit with variation by sector: membership in 1910 was 4.1m and TUC affiliation increased from 1.2m (1900) to 2.0m (1913). Conservative alarm stemmed not just from increasing union membership, but from the changing scale and scope of industrial conflict, because, as unions and companies grew, major strikes potentially affected the whole community. As Balfour asked: Who suffers the most? The poor, the employed, the men, women, and children remote from the scene of the struggle, who have nothing to do with the controversy, its rights or wrongs, but who nevertheless see the cost of living rise, the necessities of life becoming more difficult to obtain, employment diminishing, trades driven from the country. (Hansard, 21 March 1912, col. 2089)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

32

What about the workers?

Pessimistic Conservatives had long feared that socialism was the future and that, as intrinsically collectivist organisations, unions would inevitably be central to this new politics in which the 1906 election was crucial. ‘In the aftermath of the 1906 General Election’, writes Green, ‘the Conservative view of the Socialist challenge turned from near complacency to near panic’ (1995, 141). Their growing political influence was reflected in public policy. The Liberal Government passed eleven major statutes –​the Trade Disputes Act 1906, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906, the Factories and Workshops Act 1907, the Employment of Women Act 1907, the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1907, the Trade Boards Act 1909, the Labour Exchanges Act 1909, the Old Age Pensions Act 1908, the National Insurance Act 1911, the Minimum Wage Act 1912 and the Trade Union Act 1913 –​that Conservatives concluded were the result, at least in part, of union pressure and which constituted blatant Liberal bribery of the working class and unions. In 1912 Bonar Law, now leading the Conservatives, accused the Government of creating ‘a spoils system which already resembled that of the United States’ (Halévy 1961, 446–​447). For example, the Mines and Quarries Act reserved thirty sub-​ inspectors posts for mine and quarry workers (usually union officials), by 1912 the Board of Trade employed 117 union members, 124 joined the National Insurance Department, forty-eight the Home Office and eighty-five were employed in other parts of the civil service. However, these were routine clerical posts at the lowest tier of the State and hardly constituted a redistribution of power to a new class. In the 1900 general election the nascent LRC (Labour Representation Committee) polled just 1.8 per cent of the vote, electing two MPs; in 1906 (under the electoral cooperation of the Gladstone–​Macdonald Pact) the Labour Party polled 5.9 per cent, electing thirty MPs, which increased to forty-two in December 1910. More unions, notably the mineworkers, were affiliating to the Labour Party which was, at this stage of its development, essentially a trade union party with 92.8 per cent of its MPs being sponsored financially by trade unions (Muller 1977, 30). It has been argued that after 1910 Labour was in electoral decline (Douglas 1974, 105–​125), but whatever the party’s direction the Progressive Alliance between Liberals and Labour remained electorally viable and Tanner concludes there were few signs that the Liberal–​Labour connection was failing before 1914 (1990, 426). There was, therefore, much to concern the Conservatives. Balfour had resigned the party leadership in November 1911 and been replaced by Andrew Bonar Law (an acerbic Scots-​Canadian who was said to care only about Ulster and tariff reform), whose primary political concern was Conservative unity. Many of his supporters saw industrial unrest as proof of political change and the growth of union power and feared its consequences for government authority and governability. A Conservative

33

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

33

whip, William Bridgeman, noted in his diary (16 August 1911), ‘A sign of the times when the London Dock strike was going on was that the Postmaster General … got the strike leader to write on Govt. paper a permit for the King’s mails to pass. Thus we are governed’ (Williamson 1988, 51). Law was naturally concerned about the threat posed by the unions but was careful to distinguish hostility to socialism, industrial unrest and trade union militants from hostility to the working class and trade union members (Sutton 1981, 878–​879; Sykes 1979, 259) and under Law the party’s critique of unions wove together long-​established themes that focused on the unions’ supposed vulnerability to oligarchy. Two examples serve to explore this: the party’s response to the Osborne Judgement (1910) and the Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act (1912). The Osborne Judgement concerned the unions’ growing political activism and Labour partisanship and the Liberal response, the Trade Union Act (1913), was to be of great significance for Conservative attitudes towards the unions. Osborne v.  the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) found union expenditure from general funds on political objects to be illegal –​a prohibition that appeared to threaten to cripple union lobbying and party-​political activity. Some Liberals and very many Conservatives defended the Osborne Judgement as protecting individual consciences, as well as delivering a blow against the nascent Labour Party and independent working-class politics. A Liberal bill introduced in May 1911 was strongly opposed by both the unions and the Labour Party. It provided for a political fund that would be raised via a separate political levy approved in a ballot of all union members, and objectors had the right to ‘contract-​out’ of the political levy, but many Conservatives vehemently opposed this on the grounds that it required non-​ Labour supporters to identify themselves, thereby exposing themselves to intimidation. An identical bill was introduced in 1912 and Labour was offered a stark choice:  the bill or the Osborne Judgement. It accepted the former (Clegg 1985, 217–​218). Conservatives interpreted the Trade Union Act as a further example of legal privilege being conferred on the unions and Law favoured its eventual repeal (BLP BL to Cockerell, 6 July 1913; Sykes 1979, 219–​221). Arthur Salter (Con, Basingstoke) like many Conservatives had no objection to Labour representation in the Commons ‘but the bill was a dangerous innovation because it was, in effect, a forced levy in the interests of the Labour Party’. Salter noted that despite Osborne Labour and the unions were increasingly politically active so there must be a different motivation behind the insistent demands for repeal:  the money ‘to be taken from the average trade unionists is going to be applied for Socialistic purposes’. This charge was pithily put by Ernest Jardine (Liberal Unionist, Somerset East):  ‘The trade unions are now simply crawling to

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

34

What about the workers?

Parliament asking us to tax the whole of the workpeople … for Socialistic purposes’ (Hansard, 6 August 1912, cols 2991 and 3044). Election results in industrial constituencies showed only a minority of trade unionists could be described accurately as socialists, the bill ignored the interests of the far more numerous Liberal and Conservative voters, and the bill was a further instance of Parliament conferring unwarranted privileges on unions at the expense of individual freedom. Moreover, individuals opposed to a union’s political preferences were required by the bill to declare publicly that fact, thereby opening themselves to intimidation and retribution with no hope of legal redress and ‘There will be no abiding peace and no industrial security so long as these great and powerful bodies are outside the law’ (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col.  2999). Sir Basil Peto (Con, Devizes) insisted many, if not most, union members ‘will most strenuously object’ to seeing ‘the trade unions turned into a mere political caucus for the advocacy of one particular view’ and Peto argued that the source of the problem was the steadily growing influence of socialists, an unrepresentative minority, in the unions (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col. 3004) that would inevitably result in minority oligarchical control. Viscount Wolmer (Con, Newton) argued that the bill reversed the relationship between majority and minority rights: When you are dealing with free and voluntary associations of men who have met together, and who have decided to be bound by the rules of the majority, then the minority have no complaint. But when you have men forced into organizations against their will, and further forced to subscribe to the propagation of political principles which they detest … that is absolutely inconsistent with individual and civic liberty. (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col. 3034)

This concern with the rights of the minority became a central component of the Conservative critique of the unions because of the unions’ growing Labour partisanship. Edmund Denniss (Con, Oldham), who sat for an industrial constituency known for its large number of Conservative trade unionists, believed unions were inevitably political and ‘As long as the leaders of trade unions were either Liberals or Conservatives nobody made a fuss about the funds of trade unions being used for political purposes. It was only when the Executives were captured by the Socialists that trade unions objected’ (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col. 3058). The Trade Union Act (1913) crystallised the long-​ held Conservative disquiet about the unions’ partisan threat, transforming disquiet into a real fear concerning the unions’ impact on the party system –​ a threat rendered more alarming by the unions’ drift towards the Labour Party (see McKibbin 1974, 20–​ 47). For Conservatives the political pluralism of the unions’ membership as well as the unions’ collective power meant they should not be used for narrow partisan purposes or to promote socialism. This

53

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

35

did not exclude unions representing their members’ interests in the policy and legislative process; by 1914 it was, for example, a well-established practice that unions should be consulted on legislation that affected their vital interests but problems arose for Conservatives when unions stepped outside these conventions. The surge in industrial militancy after 1909 raised equally complex questions. Naturally Conservatives were hostile, seeing the sinister influence of socialism, syndicalism, and even German gold in the strikes, but their response remained uncertain (Church 1987; Church and Outram 1998; Cronin 1979; McIvor 2003; Wigham 1982). Particularly problematic for Conservatives was the predilection of Lloyd George and his successors at the Board of Trade for intervention in trade disputes, which, they believed, could encourage unions to strike in an attempt to coerce ministers into persuading employers to settle in order to avoid disruption. In pursuing these objectives Lloyd George used the growing specialisation and professionalisation of the Board of Trade’s Labour Department begun under Hubert Llewellyn Smith, the department’s first industrial commissioner (Davidson 1972, 232–​234; Davidson 1978; Davidson 1985). The Labour Department quickly came to be regarded and to regard itself as the repository of the community interest and as an advocate of rationalism in industrial relations, becoming the State’s main vehicle for its developing role in industrial relations. A second important figure was Sir George Askwith, the Chief Industrial Commissioner between 1909 and 1919 (Askwith 1920; Wrigley 1976, 47–​77), whose skills as a mediator and conciliator, combined with the political and bureaucratic tendency towards consultation in policy making and crisis intervention, encouraged the development of a broad consensus around the management of labour and industrial affairs (Crosby 2014, ­chapter  5; Wrigley 1976, ­chapter 3). Out of office, the Conservatives could do little about what they interpreted as the collectivist, interventionist and socialist drift in politics and public policy. Confronted by Lloyd George’s renewed activism when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer many Conservatives attacked ‘Lloyd-​ Georgeism’, arguing (the specific reference is to the 1912 coal strike) that ‘these negotiations and conferences are doing no good because the miners’ people are certain that the Government, when the pinch comes, will try to coerce the owners in favour of the men’ (BLP 25/​3/​6 Frances Hopwood to BL, 15 March 1912). Law saw this interventionism as corrosive of both the State’s authority and good governance, but given the potential social and economic disruption concluded pragmatically that he had no alternative other than to acquiesce in the government’s approach (BLP 33/​4/​23 BL to Charles Bathurst, 18 March 1912). Law’s awareness of the government’s limited room for manoeuvre was further enhanced by confidential briefings from Askwith.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

36

What about the workers?

The national coal strike began in March 1912 and involved over one million mineworkers striking over their demand for a statutory minimum wage. Ministers resisted the Mineworkers’ Federation of Great Britain’s demand that specific wage rates be enshrined in law, but conceded a statute could determine wages and argued that the State had an obligation to resolve large, nationwide disputes in key industries. Putting aside the specifics of the dispute Law saw it as the culmination of deep-​seated historical tendencies that saw socialists supplanting the old Lib–​Lab union leaders, with the result that ‘the country had before it an outlook as serious as it ever had before’. Although the Opposition could do little other than acquiesce in the Liberal Government’s legislative solution, he considered legislation was a remedy ‘that may prove to be far more serious than the disease itself’ (Hansard, 19 March 1912, cols 1733–​1734). The Liberal legislation reflected, Law insisted, the industrial and political power wielded by the Miners’ Federation and he predicted that other unions would take note and seek the extension of the bill’s principle to their industries and would employ the same tactics. A piecemeal response to a specific crisis would ineluctably lead to unions asserting themselves over Parliament: is it not evident to every man in the House that what we are doing by this bill is inviting every other trade, which has a powerful organisation, to use it in the same way, to obtain the same result, and, in more than that, involving all men in trades where there is not this organisation to form an organisation so that they can come to Parliament and put pressure on to obtain the minimum wage? (Hansard, 19 March 1912, cols 1736–​1737)

Law conceded that the Government was understandably anxious to rid itself of this difficulty as soon as possible, but he insisted that its proposed solution had damaging long-term consequences for all governments and the country’s governance ‘because society is being held up … It is one of the greatest evils which can happen to any society [but] the worst is yet to come I am afraid’ (Hansard, 19 March 1912, col. 1739). Balfour believed the coal strike was the inevitable consequence of the Liberal Government’s policies since 1906: We see the spectacle, the new, the strange, and the portentous spectacle of a single organization, acting within its legal powers, practically threatening to paralyse, and in a large measure actually paralysing, the whole trade and manufactures of a community … The power they have got, if used to the utmost, is, under our existing law, almost limitless. (Hansard, 21 March 1912, col. 2078)

The problem of defining a Conservative response, however, remained. Law and other Conservative leaders felt constrained by the scale of the conflict which was of such a magnitude that ‘an attempt to make party

73

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

37

capital out of this disaster … would do us harm and not good’ (BLP 33/​4/​ 27 BL to Sir H Graham, 29 March 1912). The remedies proposed by some of his correspondents raised complex political questions of enforcement and consent. If, for example, large numbers of mineworkers refused to obey the law, how could the law be enforced? Was it possible to prosecute such large numbers? What would be the long-​term consequences of large-scale State coercion? This Conservative reticence contrasts strongly with Law’s ruthless, even reckless, exploitation of Home Rule for party advantage but, as one Conservative noted, ‘Our leaders had some difficulty in deciding how to act but finally settled with the agreement of a large majority of the party to oppose [the Minimum Wage] Bill directly, but not to try and delay its progress’ (Bridgeman diary, n.d., in Williamson 1988, 58). Law felt only a government with a substantial and fresh parliamentary majority had any hope of dealing with a strike of this magnitude, but a general election was not desirable during a time of national crisis and an election would not solve the problem of consent. Radical anti-​union legislation and/​or punitive measures would require a level of public consent that might not be forthcoming, and so the Conservatives would not oppose the bill at Third Reading, despite opposing at the Second Reading (BLP 23/​ 3/​19 Lord Robert Cecil to BL, 9 March 1912). Law also wanted to ‘prevent the Lords wishing to throw the Bill out [which] would have forced the Govt. to resign & no one else could take office while the Coal Strike was on & no election could take place. If we had taken office we could not have retained it for a moment without an election’ (Bridgeman diary, 27 March 1912, in Williamson 1988, 59). It would be better, Law concluded, for the Liberals to take the opprobrium for the unrest and for Conservatives to foist on them the reputation as the party that surrendered to union power (BLP 33/​4/​21, BL to F. Gardiner, 8 March 1912). One constitutional crisis at a time was enough, but the problem of the nature and extent of the party’s relationship with the organised working class remained unresolved.

A necessary and beneficial national institution? With the exception of working-​men’s clubs and the operative associations Conservative attempts to create an organisational presence in the organised working class had met with little success (McCrillis 1998, 112) and as we have seen party leaders opposed class enclaves in the party as both a matter of principle and because such organisations could stimulate internal party conflict. Sykes suggested that the ‘stumbling block of Unionism, radical or Conservative, throughout the Edwardian period was its relationship with organised labour, as distinct from the various vague appeals to the working

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

38

What about the workers?

class or Tory Democracy’ (1979, 194). An instructive attempt to organise a Conservative front in the unions was a component of Joe Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign. Chamberlain, originally a Liberal Radical mayor of Birmingham left the Liberal Party in protest at Gladstone’s Home Reform proposals in 1886 becoming a leading figure in the Conservative and Liberal Unionist government elected in 1895. He developed a programme beginning with his Radical Programme (June 1885)  while still a Liberal, which, inter alia, sought to increase the protections available to unions in an effort to win working-class votes, this was followed by his Memorandum of a Programme for Social Reform (1893), which he sent to Salisbury, that mirrored to some extent Bismarck’s attempt to kill off social democracy in Wilhelmine Germany, and culminated in Chamberlain’s tariff reform programme (March 1903)  (Green 1995, 131–​132). Chamberlain aspired to realign British politics via a populist Conservatism appealing to Empire and Nationalism, advocating a costly collectivist and interventionary social programme in an augmented One Nation strategy financed by tariff reform (Chamberlain 1903a; Chamberlain 1903b; Sykes 1979, 149–​151). The Trade Union Tariff Reform Association (TUTRA), founded by Leo Amery in 1903, was intended to win over the organised working class but ‘never secured from Conservative headquarters the attention or support it deserved’ (Amery 1953, 298) and in failing to plant self-​sustaining roots it prefigured accurately the fate of subsequent similar efforts by the party. Amery presented TUTRA as a Chamberlain-inspired populist-​nationalist, pro-​ Empire and anti-​ socialist organisation, intended to secure for the organised working class a significant presence in the party. Amery saw it as ‘the beginning of a body that would gradually dispute the tyranny of the present official Labour representatives and that the time would come when at least 20 or 30 of them would sit on the Unionist side of the House of Commons’ (Barnes and Nicolson 1980, 63). Given support from the party, it ‘might at the end of a few years stand entirely on its own feet and compete effectively with the existing Labour Party’ but it proved ‘thoroughly distasteful to a great body of working men’ (Barnes and Nicolson 1980, 63, 64) and Coetzee described TUTRA as an empty shell (1990, 99). Conservatives ‘agreed that if the masses were to accept the political structure, and in particular the Parliamentary system, as legitimate then the working class had to have direct representation’ (Green 1995, 295) but the rise of independent labour representation and the party’s approval of the Osborne Judgement seemed to confirm Conservatism’s hostility to the unions’ partisan-​political role. Bonar Law, the first Conservative leader confronted by independent working-class political representation and serious labour unrest, believed that ‘for the Conservatives social reform was not on the whole a profitable line to pursue. If the country wanted more and

93

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

39

better social reform it would not vote Conservative’ (Blake 1955, 145). Law was familiar with one segment of the industrial working class. Liverpool, Glasgow, Manchester and Belfast were the heartlands of the Protestant Unionist organised industrial working class; being fiercely patriotic, anti-​ socialist, and staunchly anti-​ Catholic, they provided an insight into an alternative understanding of the organised working class that was open to a Conservative appeal (Taylor 2005a, 53). Law was genuinely concerned at the union and socialist threat, but recognised tariff reform’s failure amongst the organised working class, and he was careful to differentiate anti-​socialism from anti-​labourism but did this constitute a policy (Sutton 1981, 878–​879; Sykes 1979, 259)? Arthur Steel-​Maitland (a Birmingham MP, party chairman 1911–​16 and a founder in 1911 of the Unionist Social Reform Committee (USRC), an unofficial research body with F.E. Smith as chair), sent Law a detailed memorandum, summarising letters received from Conservative MPs. Steel-​Maitland noted their belief that ‘Hitherto our party has attempted to detach voters by vague promises of social reform … which were not given effect to, and currying favour with the Trade Union leaders by passing bills which they supported, although we knew to be unjust and not in the interests of the country’ (BLP 5/​1/​31. Steel-​Maitland to BL, 15 January 1912). Steel-​Maitland endorsed the MPs’ conviction that ‘nothing our party can do, or justly promise, will detach from the Labour Party the votes of any of its Leaders, or the militant portion of Trade Union membership. Any sop our Party offers them they will accept, sneer at us for giving it, [and] will either vote Labour or Radical’. Conservatives should, therefore, attack union leaders and seek to attract ordinary members, ‘who have in great numbers been forced by ill usage, threats and the fear of losing employment to join Unions against their will, and who would be thankful to be freed from tyranny’ (BL 5/​1/​31. Steel-​Maitland to BL, 15 January 1912). Though sceptical of the measures proposed –​the repeal of the 1906 Act, prohibition of picketing, banning the closed shop, stopping union financed political activity, ending the right to strike in essential services, and the sequestration of union funds for non-​compliance –​Steel-​Maitland recommended Law read the memorandum carefully. In July 1912 Lord Selborne, part of the party leadership and Salisbury’s son-​in-​law, wrote as follows: While supporting Trades Unions as a necessary and beneficial national institution the Unionist Party must stand unflinchingly for the right of the individual workman to hold aloof from them if he chooses, to withhold his money from a political propaganda of which he disapproves … and to work or strike when he chooses whether he belongs to them or not. [Government] must give protection to all men who want to work always and it must repress intimidation in all forms whether directed against the striker or against the worker. (Boyce 1987,  87–​88)

40

What about the workers?

Ministers, Selborne maintained, had an overriding responsibility to maintain the government of the country and sustain its authority in the face of union disruption:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The nation must live and it cannot be sacrificed … The whole nation must not be held up. The nation must under all circumstances be able to eat and work and live, and the Government is bound to intervene decisively in any strike where the existence of the nation is jeopardised. (Boyce 1987, 89)

No government of whatever party could accept what Selborne termed an ‘imperium in imperio’ (a government within a government). Law was always unlikely to declare war on the unions, and accepted that improved wages and conditions were a legitimate objective (achieved ideally by individual effort) and although he understood the reasons for the Liberal Government’s actions, he disapproved of them (BLP 30/​1/​24. Steel-​Maitland to BL, 20 August 1913; BLP 33/​5/​65. BL to H.A. Gwynne, 2 October 1913). There was, however, an alternative. ‘There is’, one backbench MP noted, ‘I am afraid, an almost invincible feeling amongst Trade Unionists that the Tories wish to trample upon all the aims and aspirations of Trade Unionists, expressed as they are in the main fairly and moderately by their political representatives in the House, the Labour Party.’ Similarly, The objects the Labour Party aims at are in their essentials reasonable[;]‌better wages, better conditions at home and at work and a wider life. During the last twenty years we have, and rightly, done much by the way of the education system … to broaden their outlook and their interests: it is only natural that they now want those interests to be met. (BLP 29/​1/​3. H. Fitzherbert-​Wright to BL, 1 February 1912)

This approach to the unions took its most developed form in the shape of the USRC (Ramsden 1978, 76–​77; Ridley 1987, 391–​413), which, in a policy paper on industrial relations, claimed ‘we are following along a line of development based on the historic traditions of the Tory Party in its dealings with the industrial problem in the past’ (USRC 1914, vii). Influenced by both Disraelian One Nation politics and Dicey’s ideas, the USRC argued the complexity and interdependence of industrial society meant that the interests of community, worker, shareholder and manager had to be balanced, and finding a workable balance was the role of the State. Industrial conflict could no longer be resolved satisfactorily by the mutual adjustment of private interests because of the political significance of public opinion and because of the scale and scope of the recent industrial unrest that threatened the national community. The USRC insisted the analysis presented in Industrial Unrest was consistent with Conservative traditions that accepted, first, that the State had a long-​established duty to regulate conditions of employment; second, the government’s duty was

14

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A strong taste for the despotism of numbers?

41

to defend the community and the consumer; third, the USRC accepted the notion of the minimum wage but not that it should be established by statute; fourth, employers should maintain profitability by capital investment not by screwing down labour costs; and finally, labour market regulation to be effective had to be enforced by legislation to ensure general applicability and the avoidance of free-​loading by employers and employees. The USRC, however, saw compulsory, legally binding arbitration and banning strikes as inimical to the British tradition of industrial relations and that excessive legalism posed insuperable problems of legitimacy, enforcement and consent (‘penal clauses cannot possibly be enforced … against considerable bodies of men’). The merest suggestion of legal curbs of trade union activities or the right to strike would create ‘a strong feeling of resentment in large sections of the working population’ (USRC 1914, 3–​5, 18). On the other hand, the USRC believed ‘a Government can take whatever steps are expedient and legal to secure the public interest when services are interrupted which are of vital concern to the nation; and undoubtedly, under these circumstances, its action will be supported by public opinion’ (USRC 1914, 24). The USRC’s objective was a system that ‘accept[ed] the existing organization of industry [and] fortif[ied] the tendencies and pressures which have already commended themselves to the genius of the nation’ but the possibility remained of ‘a more severe regulation’ if these voluntary and permissive efforts failed (USRC 1914, 37–​38). However, the USRC’s immediate impact on policy was non-​existent, although many of the positions it advocated did become more influential (Green 1995, 296).

Conclusions From the middle of the nineteenth century, Conservatives feared industrialisation would culminate in a democracy that was inherently socialistic and many Conservatives believed democracy, socialism and trade unionism had in common ‘the rule of mere numbers’. Members of the working class –​organised or not –​enjoyed multiple identities which the party was able to exploit because of the party’s penetration into society by strategies such as One Nation and ‘The Politics of Beer and Britannia’ (Joyce 1982), which appealed not only to ‘their interests as working men but in terms of their community of interests with the other classes in society’ (Smith 1967, 262). Disraeli’s legislation, intended to be a final settlement of the trade union question, proved to be nothing of the sort and, by the 1880s and 1890s, growing industrial unrest, changes in the nature of trade unionism, and a legal offensive raised once again the ‘trade union problem’.

42

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Unions had secured a substantial degree of legal privilege and the party accepted external intervention in the unions’ affairs was best avoided, but insisted that the interests of the state and community had to be protected. Alfred Lyttleton (Con, St George’s), speaking in the debates on the 1912 minimum wage bill, expressed the party’s disquiet with the tendency of legislation to go beyond redressing legitimate grievances. The bill, Lyttleton contended, takes trade unions as they now stand equipped with formidable powers which we know that they have, with privileges and immunities which do not exist with regard to any other section of the community; it takes these bodies and organisations thus equipped, endowed with these powers not for purposes of politics but for purposes of industrial conflict and launches them avowedly into the political arena, there to use these opportunities and privileges in a manner which no one thought possible. (Hansard, 6 August 1912, col. 3071)

Thus, ‘When the European crisis broke, the Conservative party was still locked in debate over how to control the excesses of industrial conflict and how best to integrate organized labour into the modern State’ (Green 1995, 97).

2

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

Introduction By 1914 the Conservative Party had reached a modus vivendi with the organised working class, which was to accept the unions as a fact of life whilst remaining deeply critical of their failings. As the Opposition, the Conservatives had little option but to acquiesce in the Liberal Government’s management of industrial politics but opposition spared the party from having to develop a specific response. This changed with wartime governance, which was concerned with managing the politics of production and mass political consent for the war effort. This new politics forced the Conservatives to consider two issues:  the first related to the current and future role of the trade unions in governance; and the second related to the Conservative Party’s institutional relationship with the organised working class.

The impact of war The battle for production required unions to surrender control over labour practices and utilisation, encapsulated by dilution (replacing skilled with semi-​and unskilled workers, male with female workers) which the unions accepted as temporary wartime measures coupled with assurances that they would play a role in managing dilution. Lloyd George’s description of the conference on munitions production held in the Queen Anne Throne Room at the Treasury (19 March 1915) suggests a shift in political power: ‘stalwart artisans leaning against and sitting on the steps of the throne of the dead queen, and on equal terms negotiating conditions with the Government of the day upon a question vitally affecting the conduct of a great war. Queen Anne was indeed dead’ (Lloyd George 1938, 177). Whilst the scale of this shift was not as great as Lloyd George suggested, it was clearly something

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

44

What about the workers?

new. The Treasury Agreement, the creation of the Ministry of Munitions, the Defence of the Realm Acts, the Military Service Acts, the Munitions of War Acts and the creation of the Ministry of Labour represented stages in the unions’ involvement in the governance of the war effort. Growing working class and union discontent over wages and inflation, food shortages, profiteering, poor housing, unrest over dilution, war weariness and the threat of conscription posed a new set of problems reflected in declining labour discipline, absenteeism, strikes and the rise of the shop stewards movement, all of which required careful political management. Labour’s new significance was symbolised and expressed by the presence of Arthur Henderson and two junior Labour representatives in the First Coalition, followed by the foundation of the Ministry of Labour in December 1916 and the appointment of John Hodge and then George Roberts as Minister of Labour by Lloyd George. The ministry was the culmination of a long debate concerning the need for such a ministry and its creation reflected both the exigencies of war as well as the changing character of British politics and the growth of democracy (see Lowe 1974, 415–​435; Lowe 1988, 18–​21). Government and union interaction increased as working class and union discontent grew (between 1914 and 1916 real wages fell by 30 per cent), culminating in the 1917 strike wave (Clegg 1985, 168). In response the government appointed the Commission on Industrial Unrest, which identified food prices and poor food distribution, and the operation of Munitions of War and the Military Service Acts, as the main causes of working class and trade union discontent. Discontent was exacerbated by poor coordination between government departments, the breakdown of pre-​ war industrial relations, and ‘the feeling that there has been inequality of sacrifice, that the Government has broken solemn pledges, that the Trade Union officials are no longer to be relied upon, and that there is a woeful uncertainty as to the industrial future’ (Cd 8696 1917, para. 13, 7). Declining trust in both union leaders and ministers stimulated further unrest. Whilst one must be careful not to exaggerate conflict between official and unofficial leaders, the rise of the Shop Stewards and Workers’ Committee movement and its emergence at a conference in Manchester (18–​19 August 1917) was significant, focusing as it did on the politics of production in the factories and the transfer downwards of power from national leaders (see Murphy 1972, chapters vi–​ viii for a fascinating contemporary account). The response to the discontents identified by the Commission coalesced around the conviction that ‘Labour should take part in the affairs of the community as partners rather than as servants’ and the Commission recommended ministers take urgent action to remove the workers’ perception ‘that their conditions of work and destinies are being determined by a distant authority over which they have no influence’ (Cd 8696 1917, para. 18, 7–​8). George Askwith,

54

Peace and good will?

45

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

still the Chief Industrial Commissioner, stressed the unions’ desire for improved status and equality of treatment but, he argued, those responsible for day-​to-​day industrial relations were hampered by Ministers’ (especially Lloyd George) predilection for piecemeal intervention, interference and concession. This produced a policy style that did more to cause unrest … than almost any other factor in the War, and to lessen hopes of establishing a sane method of settlement of labour disputes. Since the War the same policy has from time to time been followed, the sole restraint being whether the trade is important enough or the unions powerful enough to gain access to Downing Street. (Askwith 1920, 395)

It was, Askwith argued, impossible to develop a coherent policy because of ‘the maze of authorities and opportunistic arrangements’ that had grown up piecemeal in response to immediate crises (Askwith 1920, 415). There were, however, attempts to create a more systematic scheme, but this implied extensive change in voluntarism. At the end of the war a number of schemes for improving industrial relations were under active consideration  –​for example, the National Industrial Conference, suggestions for an ‘industrial parliament’, Whitleyism, nationalisation, Joint Industrial Councils, and so on  –​but interest either faded or their growth was limited. Faced by an upsurge in industrial action  –​Direct Action  –​the Lloyd George Coalition became increasingly conservative and authoritarian in its approach towards organised labour and neither the employers nor the TUC evinced much interest in promoting change. These efforts hinted at a new social contract –​consultation in return for work flexibility and improved productivity  –​and the restructuring of industrial relations but the onus was placed on employers and unions. Management was increasingly concerned at union encroachment on the right to manage, the union leaders feared these initiatives would undermine union organisational coherence, and the Government was concerned that they would lead to its permanent engagement with, and involvement in, industrial relations. These efforts were seen by Government, employers and unions as a serious, possibly fatal, challenge to voluntarism. Conservative politicians recognised that the war would enhance the unions’ role in governance and they found this unpalatable. In his War Memoirs, Lloyd George clearly took delight in Arthur Balfour’s discomfort at the 1915 Treasury Conference: He had addressed many an assembly largely composed of workmen, but this was his first experience of sitting down to confer with them on a basis of equality. So far he had only talked to them; now he was talked to by them. The expression on his face was one of quizzical and embarrassed wonder. (Lloyd George 1938, 177)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

46

What about the workers?

Lloyd George presented the Treasury Conference as a profoundly destabilising event for Balfour and Conservative politicians generally. Conservatives conceded the unions’ new significance in the policy and governing process that came about as a result of the war but the end of the post-war boom and Conservative hostility to any radical restructuring of industrial politics reinforced a determination to return to ‘normalcy’. Lowe stresses the Ministry of Labour’s limitations and its lowly place in the Whitehall pecking order (it narrowly avoided abolition) but concedes it nonetheless played a significant role in Britain’s post-​1918 democracy. Despite limited resources and often poor ministerial leadership, it increasingly concentrated on ‘home rule for industry’, or voluntarism, thereby reinforcing the status quo in place of ambitious schemes promoting ‘ordered freedom’ (see Lowe 1988, 87–​105 for the Ministry’s early years). Reviewing the 1918 industrial scene in his diary, William Bridgeman, the Conservative parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Labour, lamented (like Askwith) the ‘perpetual friction’ between the many Departments responsible for labour relations and particularly Lloyd George’s privileging of the engineers, which though understandable was regrettable because it made the engineers ‘overweening in their demands’ (Williamson 1988, 125–​126). Austen Chamberlain, Lloyd George’s post-war Chancellor of the Exchequer, believed government was not at all suited to involvement in industrial relations: ‘the whole story’, he told his sister, ‘illustrates the difficult [sic] of government dealing with the intricate & very various conditions of service in great trades & industries by broad declarations & general rules’ (Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 February 1919 in Self 1995, 108–​109). This involvement rendered government vulnerable. After serious disturbances in Glasgow Tom Jones, the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet who worked for Lloyd George, Bonar Law and then Baldwin, believed Bolshevism was a threat only ‘if it can lodge itself in the soil of genuine grievances’, noting that after the war working people were expecting ‘big and rapid improvement in their social and economic conditions’ (Jones to Lloyd George, 8 February 1919 in Middlemas 1969a, 73). Jones regarded shop stewards as a threat to orderly governance and believed the ‘decision to stand by the accredited leaders is the only possible policy but it does not get over the fact that leaders no longer represent the more active and agitating minds in the labour movement’ (Jones to Lloyd George, 8 February 1919 in Middlemas 1969a, 73). Some Conservatives pressed for a reinvigorated Tory democracy, and others for an aggressive anti-​socialism, but all recognised that after 1918 the party needed working-class and trade-union votes whilst simultaneously protecting the middle and lower-​middle class, who staffed the party and were generally hostile to the unions (see McKibbin 1990 and, particularly,

74

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

47

McKibbin 1998, 50–​62, 98–​105). The labour unrest of 1911–​14 saw the development of a critique of the unions that distinguished between a supposed militant socialist leadership and a moderate membership, coupled with policy changes (such as the use of extensive secret ballots) to increase the influence of the latter over the former (Green 1995, 296). The experience of wartime and post-​war industrial unrest firmed up this critique. In response to strikes over union recognition on the railways and the London Underground for example, Law came close to accepting the case for confrontation. Faced by a dispute in the power stations, however, the scale of the potential disruption meant ‘there was nothing to do but capitulate’ even though public opinion ‘readily condone[d]‌the use of the army and navy to man the power stations’ (Jones to M. Hankey, 10 February 1919 in Middlemas 1969a, 75). Labour’s electoral advance in 1918 and 1922, the surge in union membership, and the growth of Direct Action (industrial action to achieve political objects) suggested a broad assault on capitalism was developing. ‘We have’, Law warned a deputation of railway company directors, ‘in the House of Commons … an element such as we have never seen before because there are enough [Labour MPs] to create a serious opposition [and] our whole industrial system is challenged’ (BLP 116/​3/​1. Notes on a Deputation from the Railway Companies, 28 November 1922). The Conservative response was to combine resisting Direct Action with an appeal to moderate workingclass voters to detach themselves from the militants, and for this reason Law would not endorse publicly general wage cuts to stimulate recovery (BLP 112/​47/​1 Lord Weir to BL, 1 December 1922). Conservative leaders tried to balance the working-class fear of unemployment and middle-class fears of Bolshevism, Socialism and industrial militancy, by seeking to isolate politically motivated trade unionism which, Conservatives believed, fomented political unrest and made investors and the business community generally nervous. This strategy would not, however, be cost-​free. Labour unrest had prompted Lloyd George to ask how much it might cost to buy off discontent; the figure was £71m, which led ministers to balk. Lloyd George responded: ‘Supposing the War had lasted another year, could we not have raised somehow or other £2,000,000,000? It was blank nonsense to talk of a bagatelle like £71,000,000  –​cheap insurance against Bolshevism’ (Jones to Maurice Hankey, 27 February 1919, in Middlemas 1969a, 80). Negativity was insufficient on its own and recognising this eventually pushed the party to combining anti-​socialism with limited social reform (Cowling 1971, 94, 249). This strategy lay, however, in the future and in 1919–​20 ministers seemed close to panic. Austen Chamberlain, for instance, described a railway strike as ‘a revolutionary attempt to subvert government & establish class rule … It is a challenge to the Government & a challenge to the nation … it is the biggest internal struggle that we have ever had &

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

48

What about the workers?

a new experience for all of us’. But he predicted the strike’s defeat (A.C. to Ida Chamberlain, 26 September 1919 in Self 1995, 108–​109). At a Cabinet conference on industrial unrest, where politicians and generals expressed concern over industrial unrest and the availability of sufficient troops to deal with unrest, Jones hints at Lloyd George’s amusement at this anxiety when he asked perhaps sarcastically whether the Royal Air Force ‘could use machine guns and drop bombs’ on strikers instead. Bonar Law wondered about distributing weapons to the Government’s friends:  he argued ‘the Universities were full of trained men who could cooperate with clerks and stockbrokers’ and Jones adds that ‘During the discussion Bonar Law so often referred to the stockbrokers as a loyal and fighting class until one felt that potential battalions of stockbrokers were to be found in every town’ (Jones, ‘Notes on a Conference on Industrial Disturbances’, 2 November 1920, in Middlemas 1969a, 99–​101). After the Coalition’s fall as a result of the Conservative meeting at the Carlton Club and the subsequent Conservative election victory in 1922 (its manifesto called for ‘minimum interference at home and disturbance abroad’). Bonar Law, now Prime Minister, sought to promote governability by eschewing Lloyd George’s interventionism in favour of reducing union expectations of what they could legitimately expect from a Conservative government, and in so doing Law was helped by rising unemployment as the post-​war boom faded. Jones reported a conversation with Law: I listened to a long exposition of the virtues of individualism and the motives which moved mankind on the usual lines proper to a Glasgow business man. I begged him to shew [sic] some real sympathy with the Glasgow unemployed, described the groups of half-​starved men … I had been told that the birds were nesting in the cranes by the banks of the Clyde. (Jones diary, 12 November 1922, in Middlemas 1969a, 221)

Law sought to convince the unions they could look to neither the state nor the taxpayer for succour but should work with their employers to restore prosperity. Montague-Barlow, Law’s Minister of Labour, blamed Lloyd George for undermining voluntarism and industrial self-​government, and dragging government into the day-​to-​day hurly-​burly of industrial relations. His Ministry’s policy he defined as ‘one of observation –​intervention did not take place until every alternative had been exhausted’ (BLP/​111/​4/​22. Montague-Barlow to Law. Memorandum on Non-​Intervention, 23 April 1923). The unrest of 1911–​14, wartime governance and post-​war unrest had fostered in the unions a habit of appealing to government, often directly to the Prime Minister rather than to the Minister of Labour, by employing an implicit threat of disruption that undermined order and stability in industrial relations. Montague-​Barlow believed ‘Nothing is easier than to

94

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

49

intervene, few things are more difficult than to refrain from interfering’ and he and Law agreed the Ministry ‘would retain its watching brief and be ready to intervene only when all other alternatives were exhausted’ (BLP/​ 111/​4/​22 Montague-Barlow to Law. Memorandum on Non-​Intervention, 23 April 1923). Whatever the short-​ term benefits of Lloyd George’s interventionism, Conservatives believed ‘Lloyd-​Georgism’ had weakened government authority and circumscribed its ability to manoeuvre and Conservatives were determined to re-​ establish both in the interests of improved governability (Wrigley 1990 explores this at length). Law’s standard response to union delegations seeking government intervention was to concede they had a good case but then insist neither he nor his government could help. To a delegation of mineworkers, for example, Law conceded that coalfield conditions were ‘horribly bad’, but then rejected their call for the industry’s compulsory reorganisation or a temporary subsidy. Law told a TUC deputation, which was requesting a special session of Parliament and Government action to address unemployment, that he agreed the situation was grave and restated his government’s commitment to reducing unemployment. The Government’s sole available option, however, was to restore conditions favourable to economic growth:  ‘What can the Government do? It is easy to say [it] is the business of Government to put it right. How can they put it right?’ With respect to the miners he concluded, ‘I see your case –​You are working hard and not getting reward and you are hoping that the Government is going to give it to you. I cannot.’ To the TUC Law reiterated his determination to restore conditions favourable to growth, but his Government would not borrow, subsidise, or raise taxes, as this would be self-​defeating because business confidence would be destroyed (BLP 116/​3/​2. Deputation from the Miners’ Federation, 2 December 1923; and BLP 116/​3/​3. Deputation from the TUC General Council, 16 January 1923). To the TUC delegation’s observation that a government failure to act might result in serious political unrest, Law’s response was unequivocal: no government could or would yield to extra-​parliamentary pressure and ‘I think we can imagine nothing more foolish than [the unemployed] should waste whatever money they had and their shoe leather’ on protest marches. It was perfectly acceptable for representatives of the unemployed to meet the responsible ministers but he as Prime Minister would not do so. The Ministry of Labour was a buttress of normalcy and, despite its weaknesses, the Ministry was the definer and defender of voluntarism, as well as the government’s source of advice on industrial politics (Lowe 1988, 79). The Ministry’s endorsement of voluntarism and the party’s commitment to One Nation politics neatly overlapped and were mutually supporting. The commitment to voluntarism and collective bargaining free from state interference was deeply ingrained. ‘The policy of the Government’,

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

50

What about the workers?

the Ministry of Labour declared, ‘is to foster the spirit of self government in industry on the basis of organisations of employers and workpeople and the existence of means for joint discussion between them, and to avoid, as far as possible, the functions of intermediary’. This depended on the participants, especially the TUC, accepting the fiction of the neutrality of the Ministry and all participants agreeing that sound industrial relations could not be based on party-political spasms or enforcing reform against the will of the participants (LAB 2/​921/​7 1921a, 2). The Ministry of Labour saw itself as an honest broker and sought the closer involvement of the employers and unions with government in the task of sustaining voluntarism (LAB 2/​212/​ 18, 1917). Between 1922 and 1930 the Ministry went further and opposed both non-​intervention and legislation, and engaged in ‘a covert battle to defend trade-​unionism against attack from employers’ associations and the right-​wing of the Conservative Party’ (Lowe 1988, 108). The Ministry’s policy was to place the prime responsibility for the harmonious working of industry upon the employers and employed in each industry, leaving [the Ministry] with statutory powers to intervene at discretion and according to circumstances as viewed in the light of experience, such intervention to be generally directed towards the proper use by industries of responsible self-​government. (LAB 2/​ 921/​7, 1921a. Original emphasis)

Self-​government did not mean non-​intervention, but instead meant that ‘when the State intervenes … it should be either to secure, by methods of persuasion, a settlement, or else to secure by statute … a measure of protection for unorganised and badly paid workpeople’ (LAB 2/​921/​7, 1921b). Compulsion or intervention by the State in collective bargaining and industrial relations was politically undesirable for four main reasons. First, it would weaken the official leadership and strengthen unofficial leaders, thus destabilising industrial relations; second, industrial relations would be politicised and collective bargaining undermined by shifting the responsibility for securing any settlement to the State; third, experience overseas showed that State intervention did not prevent major disputes and in many cases worsened them; and fourth, intervention could undermine the government’s authority because ‘It is not possible to imprison a million miners if they have insisted on stopping work’ (LAB 2/​921/​7, 1921c). Henry Betterton (the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour) warned the National Association of Manufacturers, when it was seeking drastic changes to trade union law after the General Strike, ‘I am sure you would agree with me that the one thing that is desirable is not to do anything which would tend to bring the State automatically into every trade dispute’

15

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

51

(LAB 10/​4, 1926). Except where the life of the community was threatened, intervention could only be justified at the request of the parties concerned and the reliance on collective bargaining meant the Ministry ‘encouraged the formation of joint machinery for settling industrial differences’ (LAB 10/​ 73, 1934a, 16). Collective bargaining remained ‘the most desirable method of bringing about a pacific adjustment of wages and working conditions’ and was most successful when both sides of industry were fully organised and recognised each other as legitimate interests to be reconciled in their own and the national interest (LAB 10/​73, 1934b, 1). The Ministry of Labour opposed significant changes in the law as it affected union practices. Responding to an employers’ deputation F.W. Eady, a civil servant, noted, for example, trade union opinion is so overwhelmingly hostile to the principle of compulsion in industrial disputes, and that employers’ organisations are probably equally hostile … it does not appear necessary to consider immediate legislation … to change the considered policy of the Government of non-​intervention in industrial matters except as a friend of the parties. (LAB 2/​921/​7,  1921d)

Legislation would inevitably disrupt the relationship between government, management and the unions and in any event, ‘the accredited representatives of employers and workers … have shown no desire for the adoption of such measures and, indeed, have not departed from their position of hostility’ (LAB 10/​4 1926). The Ministry’s conciliation officers believed steadfastly that government should do nothing to threaten relationships built up over years; the use of ‘accredited’ above conveys the idea of a system composed of officially recognised actors. The conciliation officers feared greater intervention would lead them to be seen by the unions as partisan and union leaderships, both official and unofficial, would resist, as indeed would the employers, to the community’s and economy’s detriment. Consequently, the status quo ‘is more likely to provide an atmosphere that would bring forth all the disagreements and be futile in providing any permanent agreements … The question of making Trade Unions as they are now constituted quasi statutory authorities is more likely to lead to conflict and confusion than promote industrial peace’ (LAB 2/​1467/​5 1932, 3). Similarly, on the arguments for secret ballots in union elections or before strike action the Ministry of Labour concluded that ‘The trade unions are extremely jealous of any interference with their own machinery’ and unless the case for change could be demonstrated unequivocally ‘it would be unwise to arouse their hostility by an attempt to impose on them outside direction’ (LAB 2/​921/​ 7, 1921e). Finally, for consultative and policy advice purposes the Ministry (and all governments) recognised the TUC as the authentic representative of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

52

What about the workers?

working class. Ministers consulted ‘representatives of employers and workers on a draft of clauses in Bills which affect them … each Minister must use his own discretion as to how he consults the respective organisation’ (LAB 10/​1 1924b). The Labour Government’s uncertainty over the propriety of consultation and the TUC’s fear that ministers would depart ‘from what we regard as a practice’ led Fred Bramley (TUC General Secretary) to insist there now existed a constitutional convention concerning consultation because ‘For a considerable period we have had the opportunity of private and confidential consultations with Ministers regarding contemplated legislation’ (LAB 10/​1 1924a). Bramley warned Labour ministers that without this consultation the government should not be surprised if the TUC opposed legislation; on the other hand, with consultation political consent could be maximised and the legislative process smoothed. Consultation on legislation that directly affected the unions’ interests showed that the TUC was an integral and legitimate part of the political process. This practice was maintained by the Conservatives when in government and this left little or no room for the Conservative labour organisation, to which we now turn.

Cog or crankshaft? The emphasis in wartime governance on production and popular consent placed organised labour at the forefront of British politics. Trade union growth coupled with the new Labour Party Constitution of 1918 with its socialist objective (Clause IV) and the enormous extension of the franchise in 1918 meant that the organised working class was now a central concern of Conservative politics. One aspect of this was the question of whether or not the party should develop a labour movement (McCrillis 1998, 113). The answer had implications for internal Conservative politics, its relations with the existing union movement, and for governance. The endorsement of the war by the working class and their unions confirmed the existence of a ‘sane and sound’ organised working class that induced many Conservatives to believe a considerable political prize was available to them, namely ‘patriotic labour’, which would realign politics and prevent the emergence of class politics and a mass socialist movement. However, the concept of patriotic labour posed substantial problems. First, to many Conservatives patriotic labour often seemed to be more labour (that is, socialistic) than patriotic; second, the established unions were hostile; third, a meaningful Parliamentary presence for patriotic labour required major concessions from Conservative constituency associations; and finally, to attract support patriotic labour would have to remain independent of the party –​ something party managers were reluctant to concede –​ but without

35

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

53

this autonomy patriotic labour would be seen as a Conservative creature. Notwithstanding, cooperation with patriotic labour seemed feasible and desirable. Patriotic labour emerged in 1916 as the British Workers’ League (BWL), subsequently renamed the National Democratic Labour Party (NDLP), which was attracted to the Conservative Party’s traditional message of cross-​class politics and sought the integration of organised labour with government and politics (Douglas 1972, 533–​552; Stubbs 1972, 717–​754). Leading Conservatives sought the party’s political and financial backing for patriotic labour and began talks with the NDLP on electoral cooperation. By the end of 1916 talks were underway to translate the NDLP’s and the Conservatives’ mutual interest in making cooperative relations between labour and capital into a political programme. William Bridgeman, a Conservative Whip, attended a meeting on what he described as The New Labour Movement, but expressed concern about the scope of their policies: ‘Their programme is to fight the ILP, the Pacifists & Loyalists, & they advocate protection provided the high standards of wages is part of the protective policy, national service, an Imperial policy, & the restriction of output.’ The BWL had sought electoral cooperation with the Conservatives for five years after the war and ‘for my part I think we ought to agree, as it is the only way to fight Syndicalism & ultra-​Socialism which are bound to be very dangerous after the War’ (Bridgeman diary, 23 June 1916, in Williamson 1988, 104). However, these talks petered out. Discussions beginning in April 1917 sought to secure Conservative withdrawal in thirty constituencies, which proved difficult but party interest in the NDLP increased with the Russian Revolution and increased industrial unrest. The former Party Chairman and now coalition minister, Arthur Steel-​Maitland, negotiated a common programme (the current party chair, Sir George Younger, was responsible for negotiating electoral cooperation) but was careful to give these relations only unofficial status because both the NDLP’s socialism and electoral cooperation were disliked by many Conservatives (Stubbs 1972, 741–​742). In November 1917 Law proposed formal cooperation with patriotic labour (The Times, 2 November 1917). At a Special Party Conference in November 1917 attention was drawn to the opportunities the current divisions in the Labour Movement offered Conservatives, and Law was asked whether ‘the time is an opportune one to take advantage of this split … to organise trade unionists and working men [sic]?’ The war, Law argued, offered an opportunity to make the working man ‘feel that he is something beyond a cog in the machinery of the party, and to see if we cannot make him a crankshaft’. The party, Law agreed, would benefit but warned ‘one of the reasons why we have never succeeded in getting labour support in the past … was that they were supposed to be paid by our money.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

54

What about the workers?

Whatever happens we must avoid giving the enemies of the working men who help us any excuse for making assertions of that kind’ (NUA 2/​1/​ 35 1917, 8). A  further consideration was that this effort might disrupt relations with union leaders at a time when their cooperation was essential. Constituency associations proved extremely reluctant to accept NDLP candidates unless endorsed officially and financed centrally by the party but this, party managers feared, would lead to their being identified by workingclass voters as Conservative candidates, thus rendering them unattractive to many. On paper the NDLP was impressive: five of its vice-​presidents were Labour MPs but, except for John Hodge of the steel smelters, they were not leading figures; in addition the NDLP overestimated its influence over, and reach into, the organised working class and, moreover, the result of the 1918 general election seemed to make it less urgent to appeal specifically to labour. Patriotic labour was both organisationally and financially weak and many of its candidates were uninspiring; it was a classic ‘mushroom party’, whose emergence and growth was the product of a specific context, but when the context changed it was doomed. In 1918 the NDLP had eighteen MPs but was wiped out in the 1922 general election. The Representation of the People Act (1918) ‘brought with it the reality of a massive un-​propertied working-class infusion into the electorate with the attendant fears of socialism’ (Stubbs 1975, 32). In November 1917 Lord Salisbury noted ‘the governing class had been inclined hitherto to regard the working class as a sort of dangerous animal of enormous strength and great potential violence, which it was necessary to be very civil to but never trust’ (The Times, 8 November 1917). The working class had proved their patriotism in the war and their unions had made a signal contribution to victory but the problems with the NDLP pointed to the greater value of revitalising One Nation Conservatism in a form appropriate to the post-​ war context –​ something that was recognised by Law, who acknowledged the force Lloyd George’s contention that ‘the Nation will sternly reject purely Party solutions’ (BLP 96/​ 1/​ 6 Coalition Policy. The PM’s Policy Speech, October 1919). Confronted by the inevitability of mass democracy the party considered various mechanisms (such as a revived House of Lords, proportional representation, various forms of anti-​socialist front) to limit democracy’s impact, but party leaders and strategists concluded that adaptation was more effective a strategy than resistance (Close 1977, 893–​918). This adapted One Nation Conservatism implied a somewhat different approach to politics. Did anti-​socialism offer a sufficiently broad electoral appeal (Cowling 1971, 22–​23)? J.C.C. Davidson, Stanley Baldwin’s Party Chairman, comparing pre-​and post-​war politics concluded in 1929 that

55

Peace and good will?

55

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Before the war it was possible with a limited and highly expert electorate to put forward Party programmes of a restricted and well defined character, but nowadays I  am quite sure that while not departing from the principles of our Party we must endeavour to gain the confidence not only of our own supporters but of the mugwump vote. (Davidson Papers. JCCD to Baldwin, 14 January 1929)

Its victory in 1918 suggested the Coalition might stem Labour’s advance but the Lloyd George’s Coalition’s failure (as well as the failure of proposals for the fusion of the anti-​socialist parties) simplified matters for the Conservative Party, which was presented with an opportunity to present itself as the sole effective barrier to socialism. In Liverpool, where politics was organised around a Protestant–​ Catholic divide, Conservatives cooperated with Liberals to prevent Labour taking control of the city. Was this a model for national politics? Alderman Archibald Salvidge, Liverpool’s Conservative political boss, cited Liverpool as demonstrating the viability of cross-​party anti-​socialist politics. ‘We fought the elections’, Salvidge informed Law, on industrial unrest and we derived considerable benefit from the action of the Labour Party in resisting a proposal that was made at the end of last year to offer the Freedom of the City to the Prince of Wales. We have made a point of tracking the Labour Party down and getting private reports of their meetings, with the result that we have received very valuable evidence as to their true feelings and made good use of it in our election literature. (BLP 99/​ 7/​1 Archibald Salvidge to BL, 2 November 1920)

A reformulation of One Nation Conservatism coupling moderate reform, hostility to industrial militancy and anti-​ socialism seemed capable of winning large numbers of working-class and trade-union voters despite the party’s reluctance to make concessions in policy and candidate selection. In these calculations the idea of a Unionist Labour movement was of growing interest. In June 1914 the National Union’s (the party’s national organisation) Organisation Sub-​Committee had considered Conservatism’s relationship with the working class; after adjourning for consultations a special meeting was convened (8 July) to discuss strategy. It was estimated that about half of the enfranchised male working class voted Conservative but Conservatives were woefully under-​represented as office holders in the unions and the working class had no presence in the party’s structures (NUEC, 1914). The outbreak of the war prevented further developments but in November 1916 Steel-​Maitland, the party chair, agreed to the election of a new executive and Central Council which he hoped would contain ‘responsible working-​ men’ (NUCUA 1916). The inspiration for this came from Lancashire, the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

56

What about the workers?

ground-​zero of working-class conservatism, which had a regional trade union sub-​committee before 1914 but which had suspended operations in May 1915. In early 1918 the project was revived by Alderman Whitaker, a local politician who had been active in the pre-​1914 organisation; Leigh Maclachlan (the Central Office Agent in Lancashire) was sympathetic and encouraged a conference of Conservative trade unionists to explore the possibilities of an organisation (ARE 3/​13/​1, 12 February 1918). The interest shown encouraged Whitaker and Maclachlan to meet the Chairman of the Party Organisation, Sir George Younger, with the approval of Lord Derby, the leader of Lancashire Conservatism, and an approach was made to the Lancashire constituency associations for endorsement and support (ARE 3/​ 13/​1, 26 February and 6 March 1918). Maclachlan reported that Central Office was in ‘entire agreement’ with the project and hinted at financial support (ARE 3/​13/​1, 6 August 1918). The Lancashire committee’s report implied considerable activity in the 1918 election that added weight to a Central Council proposal to create a national equivalent: That as the Unionist and Coalition Candidates at the General Election had the support of the majority of the working classes (most of whom are Trade Unionists) … it is imperative that every sympathetic consideration be given to the aims and aspirations of Labour, and that opportunities should be offered them of making their desires known, and facilities given them for taking their share in the government of Local and Industrial bodies, in order to bring about a closer relationship with our Party so as to secure their full and continued support. (ARE 3/​13/​1, 6 May 1919; Central Council, 20 May 1919)

This was approved unanimously. The Conservative union movement would not, it was agreed, compete with the existing unions, but would challenge ‘that small and determined body which dominated the present Labour Party … the men who would shake hands with Bolshevists and would upset the whole fabric upon which the Constitution of the country had been built’. In the workplace it sought ‘a readjustment of the ideas between employers and the employed, whereby they might have industrial peace and good will amongst men’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 2 July 1919). The Lancashire committee’s objects were as follows: first, to promote the election of Conservative working men and women to trade union office, to local government and to Parliament; second, to provide intelligence on the views of Conservative working men and women and to press for legislation to improve working and living conditions; and finally, to break down the prejudice against working people and trade unionists inside the party by establishing a working-class presence in every constituency. These aims meshed comfortably with the One Nation tradition, the post-​1918 political environment, and the party’s diagnosis of union vulnerability to domination

75

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

57

by unrepresentative minorities. The obstacle was ‘the apathy of our members’ which meant ‘the management of these unions has been secured by Socialists, members of the ILP and Extremists who, under the pretence of looking after the interests of labour, are promulgating mischievous doctrines tending to revolution and Bolshevism’. The committee also sought to challenge the widespread conviction that ‘the Party is the Party of the rich and has no sympathetic consideration for the aims and aspirations of the working classes’ (ARE 1/​13/​1 1919). Whitaker, in a memorandum to Younger and the Central Committee, identified three objects for a national body: first, to challenge the Labour Party’s efforts to monopolise the political and industrial representation of the working class; second, to counter ‘pernicious doctrines’ circulating in the working class and unions and challenge extremist control of the unions; and third, familiarise the party with the true nature of the working class and its reasonable expectations. Without this sort of organisation, the report argued, the party risked losing a substantial segment of working-class support (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 2 July 1919). Sir George Younger assembled a small working party, which reported in favour of a national version of the Lancashire Committee and the National Union Executive Committee’s Labour Sub-​Committee (LSC) held its first meeting on 22 July 1919. Robert Mathams, the former Central Office agent in Lancashire, was appointed as organiser and Sir Vincent Caillard of the Federation of British Industries provided some funding (McCrillis 1998, 118). Party apparatchiks, however, whilst satisfied with the organisation’s purposes were determined it would not become an internal pressure group with a distinct policy agenda. Although Younger approved the Lancashire and national body’s objectives, he was far less sanguine about the policies thought necessary to win trade unionist support. Leigh Maclachlan had previously prepared a report, Conservative Trade Unionists and Legislation After the War (ARE 3/​ 1/​1, 1918), reporting on the views of Lancashire cotton spinners, engineers, glass workers, railwaymen and general workers. The report found that the Empire (other than as a source of raw materials and markets) evoked no great enthusiasm; there was ‘absolute unanimity’ on the need for more and better housing provided by the state; and ‘There is an almost universal desire for the legal [that is, enforced by statute] Eight Hours Day.’ Workingclass opinion supported Wage Councils and co-​partnership, but not profit-​ sharing, and that industry should be helped to adjust to post-​war conditions ‘even if a State subsidy is necessary to tide them over the first few years’. Improvement in pensions and comprehensive medical insurance for families were strongly supported, as were tariffs, the state regulation of prices and firm action against war profiteers. Working-class opinion was divided on

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

58

What about the workers?

nationalising the mines and railways, but there was no deep-​seated hostility to the state control of basic industries per se. Last, and most worrisome, was the deeply held belief of much of the Lancashire working class that the party was irredeemably hostile to trade unionism (ARE 3/​13/​1, 1918). Richard Houghton, the party’s full-​time Labour organiser in Lancashire, insisted ‘our working class supporters, whilst loyal to their Trade Unions, remained staunch supporters of the Constitution, and were bitterly opposed to the Nationalisation of Land, Mines, Railways or the Industries of the Country generally[,]‌and also to the policy of “direct action” agreed to at the Socialist Labour Conference recently held at Southport’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 2 July 1919). Younger saw the LSC as an auxiliary to the party’s organisation, providing a specifically trade unionist input into the party, whereas its committed advocates saw it in a more evangelistic light. The LSC should mobilise Conservatives in the unions to defend Country and Empire and challenge the socialist and extremist minority for union office; in contrast to Conservatives socialists were quick to recognise and nurture workingclass talent and ambition, financing these activities with union funds and trade-union-sponsored education classes. The LSC should, therefore, encourage (and finance) Conservative working men to be equally active, encouraging them to form cadres to influence the unions and demonstrate the party’s social and political openness (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 2 July 1919). Many working men and women were Conservative, but if they were to challenge ‘the ILP, the extremists, and the Bolshies, all that heterogeneous conglomeration of heretics’, they would need the party’s resources and support. Whilst it was acceptable to ‘stimulate Conservatives and Unionists to take greater interest in all Labour and Industrial Problems, and take a more active part in the work of Trade Unions’ it was quite another to create a class-​based organisation inside the party. So far as policy was concerned the LSC was permitted to discuss and pass resolutions of direct interest to labour but it would remain purely advisory and consultative (NUA 6/​ 1/​1–​13, 2 July 1919). For the LSC’s inaugural conference at Southport in 1920 constituency associations were invited to send representatives but the resolutions for discussion were drafted centrally: these covered opposition to the nationalisation of the mines and railways, opposition to municipal socialism, opposition to Direct Action and support for extensive cuts in state spending. Conference discussed the reform of the unions, especially union immunities and the injustices of the political levy but it was made crystal clear that ‘It is not the intention to create a separate Unionist Labour Association but to give Trade Unionists … a place in the organisations and counsels of our Party’ (NUA PAM 1920, 4–​5). Initially, then, the labour

95

Peace and good will?

59

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

organisation focused on combating socialism and revolution, opposing the unions’ growing politicisation, and arguing for the compatibility of trade unionism and Conservatism’ (McCrillis 1998, 113). However, its influence in the party was limited and it tended to be at its most influential when the parliamentary party took a similar view and particularly important was the general Conservative hostility to the political levy (Ball 2013, 261).

The whole thing will fail The LSC’s political limitations can be clearly seen in the party leadership’s attitude to reforming the political levy. The LSC assumed that its hostility to the political levy and contracting out (one of the earliest resolutions discussed by the LSC urged the amendment of the 1913 Act to protect Conservative trade unionists) was equally enthusiastically endorsed by the party leadership. Unfortunately, it was not. The reluctance of party leaders to agree to replace contracting-​out with contracting-​in had the potential to cause serious conflict in the party. Austen Chamberlain, for instance, the leader between March 1921 and October 1922, was a committed supporter of the Coalition, which he saw as the vehicle best suited to appealing to moderate trade unionists but Chamberlain like Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) refused to act for fear of the electoral consequences. Support for the reform of the political levy, however, intersected with hostility to the Coalition and played an important role in undermining Chamberlain’s leadership, leading to the Carlton Club meeting that triggered the end of Chamberlain’s leadership and the Coalition’s fall (A.C. to Ida Chamberlain, 21 November 1922. See Ball 2013, 55; Ramsden 1978, 133). From this point the political levy becomes a fixture in Conservative politics. The 1913 Act was certainly disliked by party leaders but they acquiesced in it despite resolutions supporting reform passing the 1921, 1922 and 1923 party conferences. The Conservative press publicised iniquities and private members’ bills were introduced in every parliamentary session between 1922 and 1925; in 1920 the party had, for example, supplied 1.2m contracting-​ out forms but with little effect on the incidence of contracting out (see, for example, NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 19 August 1919 and 9 March 1920). The LSC supported a March 1921 private members’ bill restricting contracting-​out (abandoned when Lloyd George as Prime Minister declared his opposition), and a year later the government was urged to support another bill, although this time the request was accompanied by a warning that a failure to legislate would cost the party working-class votes. The LSC believed that a lack of action on the 1913 Act was a major obstacle to a Conservative

60

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

breakthrough in the unions and it warned that in the absence of reform ‘Conservative working men will finish entirely with the Unionist Labour Movement’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 13 January 1920, 7 March and 9 May 1921, 13 March and 12 June 1922; NUEC 1921). Law, on the one hand, denied that Conservatives intended to ‘destroy the possibility of political action by trade unions’, whereas, on the other hand, he conceded that reform of contracting-​out was reasonable, before concluding that we are going to have no rash action about it. Before we dreamt of dealing with it, we should consult both trade union leaders and employers; and if we have to do anything, we should certainly try to get an arrangement that seemed fair to reasonable members of trade unions. (The Times, 8 November 1922)

Legislation, Law feared, as well as causing an almighty row with the unions, might undermine labour’s commitment to parliamentary politics and constitutionalism and increase the attractiveness of using industrial militancy for political ends, and he favoured more Labour MPs to promote the unions’ socialisation into liberal-​democratic politics and the values of constitutionalism. Younger warned Law of the party’s steadfast hostility to contracting-​out and that this was ‘a very burning issue’ and ‘it is certain to crop up in the next session of Parliament if any Private Member interested in the question is successful in the Ballot’ (BLP 111/​34/​162, Sir G. Younger to BL 29 December 1923). Montague-​Barlow (the Minister of Labour between October 1922 and January 1924)  believed a Conservative backbench challenge was inevitable and that Labour would fight a bill every inch of the way inside and outside Parliament. Montague-​Barlow suggested Law announce an inquiry but he cautioned, ‘I have never been fully satisfied that the alleged oppression has been effectively demonstrated’ (this was the Ministry of Labour’s position) and ‘At all costs Conservatives had to avoid being seen as the aggressor’ (BLP 111/​4/​20, Memorandum in the Trades Union Bill, 1923). When Stanley Baldwin became Party Leader (in May 1923) after Law’s retirement, Davidson warned him that working-class  Conservatives, backbench MPs and the party membership generally remained determined to see the 1913 Act repealed. Davidson reminded Baldwin of Law’s hints of an enquiry and that Law’s failure to call one had stimulated disquiet. In addition he suggested that reform might compensate for the inevitable loss of support in, for example, mining, shipbuilding and cotton constituencies, if the party adopted tariff reform as Baldwin intended. Davidson noted, however, that if the 1913 Act was not addressed, then the party ‘have no right to expect the continued support of the Conservative Trade Unionists’ and concluded ‘Political freedom for Trade Unionists’ would be a ‘good

16

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

61

election cry’. Davidson acknowledged, however, that there was no hard evidence of political fund maladministration (Davidson Papers. Report of a Meeting with the Northumberland Unionist Executive and Durham Conservative Working Men, 23 October 1923). Ministerial insistence on evidence of widespread and systematic injustice proved a major obstacle because the LSC could not provide such evidence. LSC deliberations are peppered with assertions of abuse but no cases demonstrating that contracting-​out made Conservative trade unionists vulnerable to intimidation and therefore reluctant to challenge the extremist political minorities are documented (NUA 6/​ 1/​ 1–​ 13, 12 December 1921; NUEC, 13 December 1921). In 1924 the LSC established a working party to gather the information needed but no results are reported in its proceedings. ‘Surprise and regret’ were expressed by the National Union Executive at Baldwin’s failure to include a commitment to reform in the King’s Speech in contrast to the policy statement, Looking Ahead, which stated that ‘whilst upholding Trade Unionism in all its legitimate objects, [the party would] endeavour to secure that every Trade Unionist shall be free to exercise his own unfettered discretion as to whether or not he should contribute to any political levy through his union’ (NU PAM 23/​50 1923, 7). Accused of reneging on a commitment, Baldwin counter-​attacked, citing the need to act solely on the basis of evidence and proceed circumspectly (NUEC, 13 January and 10 February 1925; Central Council, 24 February 1925; NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 6 April 1926). Notwithstanding the extensive support for action on the political levy, this had the potential to cause Baldwin serious trouble (Headlam diary, 23 and 24 February 1925, in Ball 1992, 53–​54). Law had been advised that ‘In theory the [reform] Bill is unassailable: in practice it will be worth very little’ and party leaders were warned not to give too much attention to vociferous demands for change from a self-​ selecting minority (BLP 107/​2/​58 J.P. Croal to BL, 25 August 1922). The Chief Agent, Admiral Sir Reginald ‘Blinker’ Hall, warned Davidson that the LSC ‘are very strong on this point and will undoubtedly feel that they have been let down’, and many backbench MPs supported action, but others were equally conscious that action ‘will re-​unite the Labour men who are now quarrelling amongst themselves’ (Davidson Papers. Hall to JCCD, 23 July 1923). Baldwin’s intervention on the Macquisten Bill (6 March 1925), which sought to replace contracting-​out of the political levy with contracting-​in, stemmed the pressure for reform until after the General Strike. Baldwin’s motivation was straightforward: although he recognised the injustice done to Conservative trade unionists he was determined not to offer at this moment a direct challenge to industrial

62

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

unrest. He knew the bulk of his own party wished to disarm organised labour before it exerted its strength but he preferred to defeat his own extremists as a token of the Conservative Party’s will towards industrial peace. (Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 292)

Whilst acknowledging Baldwin’s coup, critics felt his government was losing sight of the fundamental problem, namely, that ‘trade unions have been collared by the extremists’ and the party was passing up ‘our one and only opportunity of putting things right’, preferring to dress ‘in a mantle of self-​ righteousness’. The government had done nothing for Conservative trade unionists, who ‘will continue to be trampled upon ad infinitum because we Conservatives are too silly to see that our enemies are out to destroy us’ (Headlam diary, 3 and 6 March 1925, in Ball 1992, 55 and 56). Baldwin despatched Sir Stanley Jackson, the Chairman of the Party Organisation between 1923 and 1926, to explain to the LSC that ‘the door was not shut on this question and if there was a strong feeling on the part of trade unionists in the Party that something should be done, it was up to the Party to remember their commitments’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 6 April 1925). In 1927 the Central Council was admonished for complaining that nothing positive resulted from its resolutions. It received the magisterial response that ‘it was not for the Committee to dictate the Policy of the Government, but to pass on to the Government any Resolution passed as an indication of what the Party thought of the Government’s policy’ (NUEC, 15 March 1927). In contrast, the TUC’s privileged ‘constitutional’ position was, as we have already seen, well established by 1924 and the LSC was unable to challenge the TUC’s monopoly of representation. In June 1927, for example, the LSC complained that local Unemployment Committees and Courts of Referees were ‘mainly composed of Trade Union delegates who are either Socialists or Communists’, and called on Baldwin and Steel-​ Maitland, the Minister of Labour, to appoint Conservative trade unionists (NUA 6/​1/​1–​3 1927, 13 June). The LSC established a working party to consider how Conservative wage earners might secure membership of these and other bodies. Steel-​Maitland responded with a detailed explanation of how members of these committees were appointed (appointments were made on the basis of specialist knowledge, not political loyalties) and rejected the LSC’s call for representation (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13 1927, 11 July,7 November). Not satisfied, the LSC asked Davidson, the Chairman of the Party Organisation, to intercede on its behalf with the Ministry of Labour, but Davidson requested that in the party’s wider political interests the LSC should not pursue this. After considerable discussion the LSC concluded that ‘on the whole it was perhaps best not to attempt any interference with, or substitution for, the existing machinery’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13 1928, 13 February).

36

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

63

A major reason that party leaders felt able to ignore the LSC was its lack of success. It recruited few actual wage earners and its problems were due not to policy differences with the party but to administrative and organisational difficulties and, perhaps most importantly, to social differences and prejudices (McCrillis 1998, 110). Ball notes that ‘there was often fierce resistance to the creation of sections for trade unionists’ in the constituency associations and it took a great deal of effort by party agents to sustain minimal activity by bodies that were generally isolated from the unions milieu and their members (2013, 157–​159). ‘A network of labour committees’, writes Ramsden, ‘was eventually established throughout the country, but no power on earth could persuade the party actually to listen to their advice’ (Ramsden 1978, 253). An important aspiration of the Conservative labour movement was to secure the election of Conservative trade unionists and working people as MPs but the social, organisational and ideological obstacles stemming from the party’s power structure proved insuperable (Ball 2013, 200; McCrillis 1998, 115). Haxey’s study of the inter-​war party, for example, estimated that around one-​third (or about fifty-three MPs) were closely affiliated to the aristocracy (‘the Cousinhood’); he found that the fathers of 300 MPs came from industry, banking and commerce (29 per cent), landowners or rentiers (20 per cent), military officers (16 per cent); professional politicians (15 per cent); the Church (7 per cent); the civil and diplomatic services (5 per cent); and the professions (8 per cent). Haxey identified only one MP, Sir Walter Womersley (Grimsby), as coming from a ‘poor’ background and Haxey described him as the only Conservative working man in the Commons. Haxey, however, ignores Gwilym Rowlands, chair of the LSC from 1925 who came from a South Walian mining background (his father was a mine manager and Rowlands worked in the pits for a time) and he was a member of Rhondda Urban District Council (1913–​19 and 1922–​29); he was a regular Conservative candidate in safe Labour mining constituencies eventually being elected for Flintshire in 1935. He was defeated in 1945. Originally a Liberal Unionist, William Paterson Templeton was Conservative MP for Banffshire (1924–​29 and Coatbridge 1931–​35) and was a former fisherman. These meagre numbers show the accuracy of Haxey’s conclusion that ‘the Conservative Party [was] the political party of the very wealthy’. Conservative MPs were sociologically dissimilar to the average Conservative voter or citizen but this unrepresentativeness did not reduce the party’s ability to win elections and Haxey concludes that ‘employees are not to be found among the Conservative MPs; only their employers are to be found’ (1939, 179, 191). A substantial body of evidence –​political and sociological –​shows the candidate selection process was plutocratic. Conservative working men

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

64

What about the workers?

and trade unionists, lacking financial resources or a patron, were therefore likely to be selected only in hopeless constituencies whereas the creation of a parliamentary cadre required their selection in safe seats (Headlam diary, 25 November 1936, in Ball 1999, 99–​100). This would not happen because selection committees were socially prejudiced and composed of those social groups most hostile to the organised working class. These committees would inevitably select candidates who were socially similar to themselves or who conformed to the committee’s idea of a parliamentary candidate. Second, constituency associations, even relatively wealthy ones, expected a candidate to pay their election expenses and contribute generously to the association and local charities. This often amounted to many hundreds of pounds annually and was utterly beyond the resources of working-class candidates. The obvious solution was a role for Central Office but the constituency associations’ determination to defend their autonomy meant central financial and organisational support was a non-​starter. The refusal to select working-class candidates prompted Cuthbert Headlam (then the Northern Area chairman) to predict a decline in the already low levels of working-class political interest in Conservative politics. Reviewing the 1937 annual meeting of the Northern Area’s labour advisory committee, which Headlam judged as active, he condemned the lack of leadership locally and nationally (Headlam diary, 13 February 1936, in Ball 1999, 106). In 1924 the Blain Report (in which Sir Herbert Blain, the party’s Principal Agent, inquired into the state of the party’s labour organisation) painted a damning picture of an organisation with a negligible and unrepresentative membership (McCrillis 1998, 115–​116). Only eighty-eight (17 per cent) of the 514 English and Welsh constituencies had a labour committee and only in Northumberland, Durham, Glamorgan and Lancashire could these committees be described as active (NUA 6/​ 1/​ 1–​ 13, 1924). Subsequent surveys in August 1927 found 170 constituencies (48 per cent) had a labour committee; by 1929 172 existed and forty-nine were in various stages of formation, but twenty-nine had actually refused to create a labour committee. The last survey (1930) found 172 in existence and 126 constituencies claimed some provision for trade unionists. Labour committees tended to be geographically concentrated and, not surprisingly, most active in safe Labour areas and at times of industrial unrest. Membership tended to be small, composed often neither of wage earners nor trade unionists, which meant their advisory role and claim to speak for Conservative trade union members lacked both credibility and legitimacy (Ball 2013, 157–​159; McCrillis 1998, 115–​ 120). Attempts at reform to increase membership and therefore to achieve greater representativeness, to provide them with a distinct advisory role and to provide opportunities for candidate selection had little visible effect, and Neville Chamberlain’s overhaul of the party

56

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Peace and good will?

65

organisation in 1931 further eroded the labour organisation’s role. The Conservative labour movement, Headlam noted, ‘cannot lead to any good results unless it is properly run and all the local efforts coordinated’ and he concluded: ‘I am sure the whole thing will fail unless the owners are wise enough to recognise its existence and help it’ (Headlam diary, 12 January 1937, in Ball 1999, 110). Headlam acknowledged the force of Conservative complaints about victimisation but also conceded that these people were ‘rather trying employees’. Significantly, employers were hostile to Conservative working men and trade unionists operating in the workplace. In response to a complaint made by the National Conservative League (a pre-​war lodge-​based patriotic organisation with a presence in the NorthEast) about this Headlam agreed to take up their complaint with a mine manager: but I know very well that mine managers are not going to put themselves out for the sake of any Conservative working men. They don’t mind the Socialists being as active politicians as they choose –​but woe betide the Conservative worker if he airs his politics and causes any kind of disturbance. It is all rather absurd, but there it is –​His Majesty’s Govt. must be carried on’ –​the pit must be kept working. (Headlam diary, 16 July 1938, in Ball 1999, 132)

The refusal of factory owners and managers to have Conservative trade unionists active in their factories and workplaces whilst the unions proselytised for the Labour Party was referred to frequently in the LSC’s proceedings. This was seen as a major obstacle but nothing was done.

Conclusions By the outbreak of war in 1914 the Conservative Party was groping towards a relationship with the organised working class. These efforts were unstructured, hesitant and lacking coherence but this changed during the war. Conservative politicians had pragmatically accepted the unions’ growing involvement in public policy –​ an involvement that became more extensive because of wartime production demands. Although the scale of union involvement would inevitably decline with the end of the fighting, the Conservatives continued to accept that unions had a legitimate consultative and representative role in making public policy. Conservatives, however, criticised industrial militancy and its use for political purposes, as well as the unions’ supposed vulnerability to oligarchic control and tried to encourage unions to engage in ‘constitutional’ politics. More difficult was the following question:  should the Conservatives develop their own labour and trade union organisation? The LSC and its constituency and regional equivalents failed to become an influential

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

66

What about the workers?

component of the party because of obstacles –​ideological, organisational and social –​posed by the party’s power structure. A second set of reasons for the LSC’s failure was the authority enjoyed by the Ministry of Labour, whose ideas and policies dominated government thinking (and policy) on the nature and conduct of industrial politics. There was a potentially serious divide between government and party perspectives on relations with the unions, which were not improved by government hostility to party preferences on, notably, the political levy. This became apparent in the Conservative response to the 1926 General Strike.

3

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

Introduction Under Bonar Law the party had differentiated the unions’ role in partisan politics from their role in governance. Union consultative rights were, despite the General Strike, maintained because this satisfied the government’s need for authoritative advice to contribute to the legitimacy and acceptability of public policy. This relationship was supported by Baldwin’s amplification of One Nation politics and the State’s endorsement of voluntarism in industrial relations, allied to the TUC’s rejection of Direct Action. Maintaining this relationship necessitated holding in check Conservative hostility to the unions, which entailed the marginalisation of the party’s LSC. The key definer of government-​union relations was, as we saw in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Labour (see also Lowe 1988, 105–​116) many of whose policies and attitudes were diametrically opposed to those of the LSC. Good relations with the party, however, were maintained by ministers passing and then vociferously defending the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927) and attacking political and industrial militancy in the unions. Although it was detested by the unions, union leaders did not permit their dislike of the 1927 Act to interfere with their relationship with government. Rearmament after 1934 increased the necessity of good relations with the unions even though the Government’s appeasement policy sought to limit union influence, but sustaining this became much more difficult post-​Munich. The policy collapsed with the German invasion of Western Europe in May 1940 and the arrival of Churchill and Labour in the Coalition. This ushered in fundamental changes in the political regime and saw the entrenching of the situation outlined in the first paragraph of the Introduction to this book.

68

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Regular and natural consultation? As Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin was consciously less abrasive than Law but he continued the broad contours of Law’s policy (see Williamson 1999, 167–​202 for Baldwin’s thinking on industrial relations and Taylor 2015, 14–​29 for his One Nation rhetoric). This was reflected in Baldwin’s handling of the General Strike (3–​12 May 1926), which avoided action that might precipitate a crisis before he was ready to use state power resolutely to defeat the General Strike (classic accounts include Desmarais 1971, 112–​147; Desmarais 1973, 165–​175; Desmarais 1975, 1–​15; Mason 1969, 1–​21). In August 1925 Jones described Baldwin’s strategy thus:  ‘He had mollified the [party] malcontents but it would be necessary … to speak firmly about the growing menace of aggregations of labour like the [Triple] Alliance. He must make it plain that the Government were prepared to fight the extremists’ (Jones diary, 5 August 1925, in Middlemas 1969a, 325). Baldwin’s self-​consciously One Nation rhetoric combined a determination to defeat industrial militancy coupled with pleas for moderation and cooperation between workers and employers, as well as a positive relationship with the TUC (Baldwin 1925; Baldwin 1926). On the eve of the General Strike Baldwin admitted in conversation with a backbencher that he was ‘bitterly disappointed at his failure to bring about peace –​but he declared himself ready now to fight the extremists’ (Headlam diary, 30 April 1926, in Ball 1992, 85). In the aftermath of the TUC’s withdrawal of strike notices and at a time of employer obduracy, the value of Baldwin’s emollient persona assumed great political significance. Responding to his Cabinet’s expression of appreciation of his actions during the strike, he emphasised the need for the ‘right spirit’ in order to bring about national reconciliation but confessed ‘He was apprehensive of the effects of the wrong spirit not only on this Government but on all Governments’ (CAB 23/​53, 17 May 1926). The General Strike placed ministers under great pressure to legislate on union reform and not to do so risked a severe internal party crisis, but legislation might well damage the governing process (as Baldwin clearly feared) and political stability but the political symbolism of labour law reform was crucial for the party (Anderson 1971a for an account). Ramsden, for example, emphasises the strength of party feeling about the political levy and Baldwin’s apparent reluctance to act. At the time of the Macquisten Bill Baldwin had withstood considerable pressure from his Cabinet and the party but he exploited divisions in the Cabinet and amongst backbenchers, as well victory in the 1924 general election to pursue his preferred policy of conciliation (Ramsden 1978, 272–​279). Despite this and his government’s successful handling of the General Strike many Conservatives remained unhappy with Baldwin’s

96

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

69

approach to industrial politics and, in part, blamed the General Strike on his ‘appeasement’ of the unions (McCrillis 1998, 127–​129). Early in 1927 Lord Birkenhead described the party as ‘inflexibly determined’ to have legislation on the unions (Birkenhead to Irwin, 3 February 1927 in Ball 2014, 122). There were, however, other considerations. The TUC had secured an important concession from the 1924 minority Labour Government when the Cabinet agreed to recognise formally the convention that the TUC had the right to be consulted on legislation directly relevant to its interests before legislation was submitted to Parliament (LAB 10/​1 1924b). As the TUC’s interests were so broad this was a claim to be consulted on virtually all government policy and the TUC’s objective was to expand consultation in scale and scope. Walter Citrine, the TUC General Secretary, wrote in his diary as follows: The principal lesson I learned [from 1926] was that the trade union movement must exert its influence in an ever-​widening sphere … until we could establish an efficient system whereby the TUC would be regularly and naturally consulted by whatever government was in power on any subject of direct concern to the unions. (1964, 238)

Neither legislation nor government diktat, the TUC argued, would improve industrial relations; the only sure way was through trust and cooperation between employers and unions, with government acting as facilitator. This is a central theme of Bullock’s biography of Ernest Bevin, the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) general secretary, whose objective after the 1926 strike was, like Citrine’s, to ensure that the TUC’s and unions’ right ‘to be consulted on any legislation or to be represented on any inquiry dealing with social and industrial matters was taken for granted’ (Bullock 1960, 622). For Bevin, 1926 marked the end of Direct Action and he opted for a strategy of slowly accumulating influence in the policy process by demonstrating the unions’ usefulness to Government, which was recognised by his membership of the Macmillan Committee (1930) and the Economic Advisory Council. This approach was reinforced by Bevin’s defeat at Gateshead in the 1931 general election, a defeat that convinced him of the drawbacks of the parliamentary route as a vehicle for union influence (Bullock 1960, 345–​ 348). Jones, however, believed that trade unionists would always be at a disadvantage compared to employers in any relationship with ministers:  ‘It is impossible not to feel the contrast between the reception which Ministers give to a body of owners and a body of miners. Ministers are at ease at once with the former, they are friends jointly exploring a situation’ (Jones diary, 23 April 1926, in Middlemas 1969b, 19). The trade unionists’ lack of social proximity to ministers did not, however, rule out mutually beneficial cooperation. Citrine and Bevin’s

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

70

What about the workers?

ideas overlapped, focusing on the role of the TUC General Council and its Economic Committee (its ‘inner cabinet’) as authoritative spokes-​groups for organised labour, but these aspirations had little immediate impact (the Mond-​Turner talks of 1928–​29, for example, led nowhere), and faced resistance from TUC affiliates who regarded themselves as the best judges of their interests (a sentiment reflected by the employers’ organisations) and who dismissed this as ‘Mond Moonshine’ (Mond Moonshine was the title of a critical pamphlet by A.J. Cook, the left-​wing secretary of the Mineworkers’ Federation) and class collaboration (Gospel 1979, 180–​197; McDonald and Gospel 1973, 807–​829). Citrine and Bevin, although convinced laissez-​faire was in its death-​throes, recognised the dangers inherent in their strategy but believed, particularly after 1931 and the collapse of the Labour Government, that the unions had no choice but to seize any opportunity to engage with ministers, but they did so cautiously. Baldwin’s diagnosis was that the General Strike showed that militants in the union leadership had to be neutralised by the (assumed) moderate mass membership for the union–​government relationship to evolve further (Jones diary, 4 May 1926, in Middlemas 1969b, 36). J.C.C. Davidson (a close ally of Baldwin, who acted as deputy chief civil commissioner during the General Strike) lamented any thirst for revenge: At times one became rather sad because it was so difficult to make some people understand that the Communist who fired a revolver or threw a bomb from within the ranks of the strikes against the Police or for pure mischief would have ended his days most painfully at the hands of the strikers long before he could have been rescued by the Police. (Davidson to Irwin, 14 June 1926, in Ball 2014, 52)

Moreover, Davison argued, the strike demonstrated the essential unity of the country: ‘if you could have moved about amongst the people, it would have been borne in upon you that the heart of the people is absolutely sound and that the vast majority of the public and the vast majority of the strikers are not only good citizens but very patriotic’ (Davidson to Irwin, 14 June 1926, in Ball 2014, 54). Baldwin wanted to isolate the militants but finding a way to use public policy to do so without provoking further trouble with the unions proved difficult and Baldwin, faced by a party demanding retribution for the General Strike (McCrillis 1998, 130–​133), concluded that doing as little as he could get away with was the least bad solution. Baldwin’s broad strategy can be seen in his telegram (5 September 1926) to Churchill, who was in charge of the post-​strike negotiations with coal-​owners and mineworkers, which reveals Baldwin’s thinking: ‘My desire, and I think the desire of all of us, is to wean the Coal Industry from the Government, and that any agreement must be between owners and men’ (Jones to Prime Minister

17

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

71

and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 5 September 1926 in Middlemas 1969b, 76). Thus, government should have no direct role in industrial relations, which was the concern of the employers and employed; government’s role was, by extension, to facilitate this whilst representing and protecting the national interest. Baldwin had no problem with a positive relationship with the unions as long as unions accepted their subordinate role and confined themselves to constitutional politics but the General Strike showed clearly that, when faced by a major national industrial challenge, the State could respond by mobilising against the unions (Ramsden 1978, 278–​281. For the Ministry of Labour’s reaction to the General Strike, see Lowe 1988, 113–​ 116). By late 1926 ministers were under considerable pressure to produce firm proposals. Henry Betterton, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, noted that the Government was subject ‘to great pressure from some of our people to introduce legislation of a far-​reaching kind designed to cripple the Unions’; although it was understandable, ‘this attitude, if adopted would be fatal, and would be the end of a better feeling industry’. However, concluded Betterton, some legislation would have to be passed to satisfy the party, but it was hoped that it would be limited in scope (Betterton to Irwin, 6 November 1926, in Ball 2014, 112). On 8 May the Cabinet considered draft legislation to give ministers the power to make general strikes illegal and agreed this limited legislation would be proposed on 10 May (CAB 23/​52, 8 May 1926. See also, Anderson 1971b, 37–​54). However, the propriety of a quick limited bill was challenged by, first, ‘persons of experience’ and then by the Chief Whip, who reported that some Conservative backbenchers doubted whether the time was opportune because legislation might unify an uncertain and divided union movement (CAB 23/​52, 10 May 1926). A further factor reinforcing Cabinet doubts was Mr Justice Astbury’s judgement in the Chancery Division which found the General Strike to be illegal under existing law, thus rendering immediate legislation nugatory, and confidential information that the General Council was on the verge of surrender. William Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had been concerned at the Cabinet’s interest in speedy legislation, but stated: ‘I felt strongly that legislation would be needed later[;]‌the effect of introducing it at once would have consolidated the whole Trade Union world & give the strike leaders the best rallying cry “attack on the Tus” which they could have’ (diary, 1 May 1926, in Williamson 1988, 195). Baldwin decided not to act on the Cabinet’s decision to legislate immediately. However, the insistence on legislation from the Conservative Party was irresistible and many ministers were in agreement, seeing this as an opportunity to promote fundamental reform, and so began a ten-month process that was to result in the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (Ramsden 1978, 284–​286). The Act was to be a significant element in

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

72

What about the workers?

the Conservative relationship with the organised working class as well as in the relationship between the party grassroots and leadership. Until the Act was repealed in 1947 it was roundly condemned by the labour movement and wholeheartedly supported by the party; thus it provides a lens through which to view the competing pressures facing Conservative politicians in their relationship with the organised working class. On 17 May the Cabinet considered a memorandum by Lord Cave, the Lord Chancellor, which was in a large part a response to the ‘unavoidable’ pressure on the government to legislate as quickly as possible. At the top of Cave’s agenda was to ensure the illegality of a strike ‘not founded on a real trade dispute but [which] is intended to coerce or intimidate the public’; second, to obtain greater legal protection for those who refused such a strike call; and third for compulsory secret ballots and compulsory arbitration before strikes to be considered urgently. The Cabinet’s public order committee had already called for restrictions on the right to strike in essential services and questions were being raised by ministers and the party about civil service trade unionism and the closed shop in local government. Most significant was ‘the considerable demand’ (the House of Lords was about to debate such a bill) for the repeal of the immunities granted by the 1906 Act (CAB 24/​180, 1926a). However, Bridgeman, for example, confessed that despite pressure ‘to attack the Trade Unions and deprive them of their power’ any changes were likely to be limited (Williamson 1988, 199). Cave’s paper was referred to a sub-​committee, the Legislation Committee, with an instruction to develop a draft bill, with a view to introducing it ‘while the memory of the strike is fresh in the public mind. If legislation is postponed until after the holding of an enquiry it may never be passed’. Of pivotal importance to legislation were questions of consent and acceptability which meant any ‘bill should be such as will command the support of the great mass of public opinion, including that of moderate trade unionists, and that it shall not be capable of being represented as having a party character’ (CAB 24/​180, 1926b, para. 3, 1–​2). Banning general strikes was uncontentious but several issues discussed in Cave’s paper proved more difficult. After consulting two leading industrialists, Lord Weir and Sir Andrew Duncan, and despite strong demand from the public and party, the committee concluded that no action should be contemplated on secret ballots until after the most careful scrutiny, even though a majority of the committee endorsed legislation. Some committee members thought restrictions on picketing were unwise because existing law could deal with intimidation; nor did the committee think this was ‘a convenient time to deal with the political levy’, and finally it rejected compulsory arbitration as too far reaching a change. However, it agreed unanimously that Section 4 of the 1906 Act should be repealed as this ‘gives to Trades Unions alone

37

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

73

an immunity against the civil consequences of wrong-​doing, [and] cannot in principle be defended’. The committee recognised this ‘would be construed as an attack upon Trade Unions generally and might only result in the return at the next election of a Government pledged to restore it’ (CAB 24/​180 1926b, para. 15, 9–​10). The Legislation Committee’s recommendations were discussed by Cabinet on 30 June where, in contradistinction to its proposals, there was strong support for action on, for example, the political levy, picketing and immunities. Pressure from the party showed no sign of declining and Sir Leslie Scott’s (Con, Liverpool Exchange) backbench ginger group was pushing for action (Conservative members of the House of Lords had been persuaded not to introduce legislation) but within the Cabinet considerable doubts remained over the extent and even wisdom of immediate legislation. Delay was encouraged by the Cabinet’s decision to seek further advice on a number of issues and evaluate the constraints of the parliamentary timetable. Pressure on ministers was maintained over the summer and the National Union Conference at Scarborough in October, though carefully stage-​ managed, was able to convey effectively its displeasure at both ministerial inaction and the seemingly limited ambitions of the government, by calling, for example, for the abolition of the closed shop. Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, seems to have spoken for those who wanted more extensive legislation by supporting secret ballots (even advocating a degree of state aid) and action on the political levy (‘a real and dangerous abuse’), which he noted would cut the ground from under the Labour Party (CAB 24/​181, 1926c). A  more cautious approach was advocated by the Minister of Labour, Arthur Steel-​Maitland, who expressed deep misgivings about the party’s current approach, arguing that the real question facing the Cabinet was as follows:  ‘Do we wish to attack the Trade Unions as such or do we not?’ Steel-​Maitland conceded the strength of hostile feeling but doubted whether the political levy (for example) was of significance to more than a small minority, and he believed ‘it is a mistake to suppose that the average trade unionist regards his trade union as a [sic] instrument of oppression or his officials as arbitrary tyrants’. Conservatives, he concluded, ‘may delude themselves … that we are only acting for their good and we are in fact their best friends, but we shall not delude others’. Steel-​Maitland cautioned that extensive legal change could prove counterproductive and so should be as limited as possible ‘to avoid the danger of pushing the rank and file wholly into the arms of the Socialist party’ (CAB 24/​182, 1926d, para. 3, 2–​3, 4). These two papers represent the basic strategic positions in the debate. Churchill’s position was that now was the time for extensive reform, that reform was correct in principle, would remedy glaring abuses, and was in

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

74

What about the workers?

the party’s political interests. Steel-​Maitland, on the other hand, believed the party’s understandable desire for revenge was clouding its judgement and seriously misunderstanding the unions and their members, and that legislation would have dangerous immediate and long-​term consequences. Lowe argues convincingly that the proof of the Ministry of Labour’s influence can be seen in the final contours of the 1927 Act, which did not include the substitution of the criminal law for civil law industrial relations, which repealed neither the 1875 nor the 1906 Acts, and did not institute secret ballots before strikes or impose compulsory arbitration (Lowe 1988, 108). The Ministry’s opposition to these measures was justified by the following: first, what it saw as the impracticability of these proposals; second, the problems of enforcing legal sanctions against determined trade unionists; and third, the unforeseen and unintended consequences of any weakening of ‘free’ collective bargaining. Baldwin was anxious to avoid a decision for as long as was humanly possible, as he feared the emergence, and institutionalisation of, a diehard right-​wing backbench ginger group and these fears influenced the 1927 Act’s evolution. Baldwin worked to keep the bill tightly focused on the minimum changes that would be acceptable to the party and was ‘concerned with the tone and the atmosphere it would create’ (Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 448). During the parliamentary recess the Legislation Committee examined proposals submitted to Baldwin and the Ministry of Labour by the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF), the National Confederation of Employers’ Organization (NCEO) and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). These agreed on the need for the ‘drastic amendment’ of the 1906 Act, as well as action on, inter alia, picketing and reform of the political levy, but only the NAM supported secret ballots; the EEF thought secret ballots desirable but too complicated to implement, whereas the NCEO were opposed to them. The extended Cabinet deliberations, the conflicting ideas of Churchill and Steel-​Maitland, and the employers’ failure to agree enabled Baldwin to manoeuvre between a ‘strong and growing demand’ for action on immunities and a majority that ‘remain[ed] of the opinion that the political and other objectives to any substantial modification of the [1906 Act] outweigh any advantages to be derived from such action’ (CAB 24/​182, 1926e, 3). Writing to his sister, Ida, in January Neville Chamberlain believed ‘our Trade Union legislation will either make us or mar us and I am anxious that we should not make a mistake over it’ (Self 2000, 385). The bill was ready by 1 February but Cabinet postponed a final decision. In Cabinet every member participated in the discussion and the final version was approved on 23 March. In an April 1927 diary note Bridgeman confessed that ‘It seems that we were wise not to be rushed into hasty legislation on Trade Unions immediately after the general strike.

57

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

75

Mature deliberation has produced a Bill which finds little opposition from any but Labour & timid Liberals’ (Williamson 1988, 203). In the House of Commons the Attorney General, Sir Douglas Hogg, conceded the bill was extremely controversial (two Labour MPs were expelled from the House of Commons for disorder) but argued it dealt with matters of great principle and Hogg insisted the Government would resist amendment. The bill would make general strikes illegal, all forms of intimidation would be illegal, no trade union member would be compelled to make political contributions, no civil servant would be permitted to join a union affiliated to the TUC, and employment by a local authority could not be conditional on union membership. Nothing was proposed on trade union immunities or secret ballots. The bill’s overall aim was declared to be to defend the individual. Hogg insisted the bill posed no threat to the right to strike but only to strikes that were ‘a concerted action by a body of citizens to compel the Government and the community at large to do something which the Government and the community do not desire to do’ (Hansard, 2 May 1927, col. 1309). The General Strike, Hogg insisted, ‘sets up a rival to the authority of the Government. It seeks … to substitute the dictatorship of the proletariat for the authority of Parliament’. Ministers had no wish to limit the right to strike on industrial and employment matters (Hansard, 2 May 1927, col. 1315). Conservative MPs were, as one would expect, supportive. Sir Gerald Hurst (Con, Manchester Moss Side), for example, insisted the bill reflected the interests and wishes of a majority in the country, noting that 90 per cent of his constituents were working class, and of these a large percentage were union members, and that he was a long-​ standing advocate of reform (in 1923 he had introduced a bill to repeal the 1906 Act) but notwithstanding he had been re-​elected. Hurst saw the bill as returning the unions to their historic non-​revolutionary role in which guise unions had done much to improve both living conditions and industrial relations whilst acting on constitutional lines and there was nothing in this bill to prevent them from so acting. Hurst conceded that the bill had flaws but ‘is the best we can pass in existing circumstances’ (Hansard, 2 May 1927, col.  1396). Prominent in several contributions were references to the bill as an example of One Nation Conservatism. Arthur Dixey (Con, Penrith and Cumberland), for example, described himself as one of those who had supported enthusiastically Baldwin’s appeal over the Macquisten Bill and regretted this forbearance had evoked no response from the unions. He denied the Labour Movement’s claim that it was the authentic representative of the organised working class: ‘it is preposterous for hon. Members opposite to state that we stand for one class in the country. A large number of Members on this side of the House owe their votes to

76

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

workers … We are not afraid of facing our constituents on this matter’ (Hansard, 4 May 1927, col. 1705). Another prominent Conservative theme addressed by the bill was that a power shift had taken place within the unions. Charles Foxcroft (Con, Bath), for example, believed that In former days the rank and file … formed a determined and strong phalanx, and, to some extent, forced their leaders forward. Then it was the duty of the leaders to hold their men back. Now … we find the leaders trying to flog their followers into a fury, which the followers do not feel. (Hansard, 4 May 1927, col. 1712)

With this Bill the Conservative Party was again carrying out its historic task of protecting the working man; ‘this Bill will curb the illicit efforts of the Communists when attacking the freedom of Englishmen and English women … it curbs revolutionary effort and the ultimate objective of the Communists … using wage earners for the purposes of class war’ (Hansard, 4 May 1927, cols 1712 and 1714). Robert Bird (Con, Wolverhampton West) described the bill as a ‘charter of freedom’ for union and non-​union workers alike and not an attack on the unions, and Bird concluded that the two sides of the House spoke for different constituencies, ‘Hon. Members opposite seem to muddle up trade unionists and trade union leaders. Trade unionists’ interests are often very different from trade union leaders’ (Hansard, 5 May 1927, col. 1858). A mildly critical Conservative speech came from Harold Macmillan (Con, Stockton-​on-​Tees) (a second critic was Henry Cavendish-​Bentinck who was described as living up to the reputation of his ancestor, Lord George, a member of Disraeli’s ‘Young England’) who conceded much of the bill was unobjectionable but Macmillan was more concerned with ‘the inevitable psychological effect upon the delicate situation of our industrial fabric’. He recalled Baldwin’s actions over the Macquisten Bill and expressed the fear that the Conservative Party was moving rightwards and if this was the case ‘I am bound to admit it means the beginning of the end of this party … and it means also the end of all the members of the moderate party opposite’ (Hansard, 2 May 1927, cols 1409–​1410). A criticism of the bill was that it was motivated by revenge –​ a charge that Sir Robert Sanders (Con, Wells) came close to conceding. Sanders noted that much of the bill’s content had been mooted for years and enjoyed vociferous support in the party. The strength of feeling in the Conservative associations ‘was so strong [at the last NUCUA conference] that people with very considerable positions in the party who ventured to cast a little doubt on the resolutions that were put forward had a very bad hearing’ (Hansard, 4 May 1927, col. 1801). Legislation was, therefore, inevitable but it should be limited and its long-​ term implications carefully thought through.

77

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

77

Baldwin, in justifying the bill, noted a generation had passed since the 1906 Act –​ an Act that had taken the unions in a direction few had anticipated. The Liberal Government’s legislation fuelled change in the unions and governments were living with the consequences –​the unions’ shift from industrial to political action –​but unions had at the same time been entrusted with responsibilities in the making of public policy and had played an important role in industrial relations. The tension between these two developments had shown unions to be vulnerable to minority control. Despite these changes ‘when we came into office in the autumn of 1924, nothing was further from our thoughts than that we should bring in a Bill affecting trade unions’ [Hon. Members: Oh!]. This, Baldwin claimed, was demonstrated definitively by the Cabinet’s response to the Macquisten Bill that showed ‘I was not going to be responsible for firing the first shot’ (Hansard, 4 May 1927, col.  1666). The Government’s sincere gesture evoked no response from the unions, whilst the General Strike showed the unions had been captured by extremists but, notwithstanding the pressure from the party and elsewhere for action, the government refused to undertake any ‘extreme and vindictive action’. Baldwin had no hope of persuading the Opposition; he was addressing those Conservatives who believed that the bill did not go far enough. Despite his determination to defeat utterly the strike, Baldwin’s actions show that, although he recognised the inevitability of legislation, his objective remained unchanged and ‘he continued to press, gently but persistently, for a sane and unobtrusive détente’ (Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 445).

An inherent part of our system of government? George Lane-​Fox, the minister of mines between 1924 and 1929, was ‘not quite sure whether the Bill is the result of really thought out policy, or due to the pressure of the Diehard Conservative elements but it produced great enthusiasm in the Conservative Associations’ and ‘all our more extreme Conservatives were slapping each other on the back over it, and saying “at last this bloody Government has shown some guts,” &c, &c’ (Lane-​ Fox to Irwin, 13 April 1927 in Ball 2014, 134). Neville Chamberlain also felt Baldwin had given insufficient thought to the legislation. Despite the complaints of the Conservative press speculating about the bill’s limited content, notably on the political levy and secret ballots, Chamberlain believed they would be surprised by the government’s proposals (Self 2000, 390). The General Strike was regarded by many Conservatives (in part) as the inevitable consequence of Baldwin’s style and conciliatory approach set out, for example, in his collection of speeches, Peace and Goodwill in

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

78

What about the workers?

Industry (Baldwin 1925); hence the pressure on him to act. Nonetheless, expert opinion in the Ministry of Labour was hostile to radical legislation, believing it would provoke hostility from the unions and could poison industrial relations for years to come (Ramsden 1998, 267–​268). In the aftermath of the General Strike, with relationships in something of a flux, Arthur Steel-​Maitland identified two broad tendencies at work in the Labour Movement. The first tendency was the ‘political’ (those who sought a more ‘corporatist’ relationship with the State via some form of national industrial council) which Steel-​ Maitland thought characterised most of the Labour Party and TUC leadership. The second, described as the ‘industrial’ dismissed corporatism in favour of voluntarism augmented by national collective bargaining and access to ministers. These were imprecise categories (Ernest Bevin was, for example, attracted to a closer relationship with ministers but remained completely committed to voluntarism) and obscured the complex cross-​ cutting political currents in the TUC and unions, whereas Steel-​ Maitland believed the TUC was institutionally predisposed towards corporatism. This would become clearer, he argued, as contacts with ministers developed but progress would require the TUC (and ministers) to take a positive decision to move in this direction and this would require approval by the annual Congress and most likely by the Labour Party’s annual conference. Steel-​Maitland favoured the corporatist path but he conceded the primacy of voluntarism: good relations and a spirit of co-​operation are more likely –​if employers act wisely –​to be established in the factories and workshops … and so re-​act on the Trade Union movement at headquarters, [rather] than to be spread from the centre outwards and downwards. (CAB 24/​184, 1927, para. 9, 7)

A ‘bottom-​up’ approach would be durable but less easy to establish than a central concordat because it was more likely to enjoy the support of the union rank-​and-​file. Steel-​Maitland was not arguing for greater state engagement with, or institutional innovation in, industrial relations, but rather for investing the current system with greater rigour. The Cabinet, however, merely ‘noted’ Steel-​Maitland’s paper. Although Some Tendencies of Trade Union Opinion had no policy effect it nonetheless shows that some ministers were thinking constructively about post-​1926 industrial politics and in some ways it predicts their development in the 1930s. After 1926 the Conservatives entered a period of political difficulty that culminated in its 1929 election defeat, followed by a serious attack on Baldwin’s leadership. The 1924–​29 Conservative Government was crucial for both the State and the party because no major assault on the unions occurred and despite Baldwin’s difficulties there was no significant change in his approach to industrial relations (Ball 1988, 218–​ 219). Baldwin

97

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

79

continued to differentiate trade unionism from socialism and industrial militancy, but electoral and party-​political advantage did sometimes require that he should conflate the two. In a radio broadcast (22 October 1931), for example, Baldwin charged that the Labour Party was dominated by the TUC, and harking back to 1925–​26, declared that the electorate had to decide ‘whether this country is to be governed on Parliamentary and constitutional lines … or whether it is to be dominated by the TUC’. Party propaganda gave prominence to the Daily Mail’s judgement that ‘If the Labour manifesto means anything at all it means a Bolshevik revolution with “Uncle Arthur” [Henderson] as the Lenin of it’ (NU 1931 Gleanings and Memoranda, 421, 424). Baldwin also resolutely defended the 1927 Act. Labour’s King’s Speech in 1929 had contained a reference to reforming the 1927 Act and by the summer of 1930 the unions were demanding action and the Labour Government announced its intention to amend the Act. This provoked an instantaneous and powerful reaction from the Conservative Party:  in November 1930, for example, the Conservative Central Council pledged the party’s ‘uncompromising opposition’ to reform. Neville Chamberlain, now Baldwin’s heir presumptive, wound up for the Opposition in the House of Commons debate on Labour’s bill. In a letter to his sister, Ida, he explained that he intended to make the illegality of a general strike the centrepiece of his attack because ‘I believe that is what the country will be chiefly interested in’ (25 January 1931 in Self 2002, 231). Chamberlain described Labour’s bill as a diversion from far more serious problems and he rejected any suggestion that the 1927 Act was at all revolutionary. ‘The Act of 1927’, he averred, ‘was not the beginning of a revolution; it was the end of an attempt at revolution, whether conscious and deliberate or not  –​an attempt which failed, and which the country is determined shall not be made again’. Chamberlain thought it significant that the Act had had no dramatic effect on the conduct of legitimate trade unionism but if repealed, he warned, the results would be devastating for the country (Hansard, 28 January 1931, cols 1089–​ 1090). Labour’s proposals produced an upsurge in Conservative association protests condemning the bill as ‘designed to legalise a General Strike’, encouraging the ‘moral intimidation of workers and their families’, and that it would ‘reduce political freedom in Trade Unions and … legalise active participation in strikes by Civil Servants and employees of Public Authorities’ (Central Council, 25 November 1930 and NUEC, 10 February 1931). Conservative MPs voted en bloc against the bill. When the bill was withdrawn by the Labour Government the party concluded that this episode confirmed ‘that under a majority Socialist Government the rights of the Community [would] be sacrificed to the interests of … the TUC’ (NU 1931, Gleanings and Memoranda, 249).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

80

What about the workers?

The anti-​socialist, anti-​trade-union-militancy rhetoric of the National Government (elected in October 1931)  remained fierce, but the TUC was gradually absolved, partly because of the government’s ‘National’ image (NUA 2/​1/​47, 1932, 5), but also because Bevin and Citrine and their allies were re-​ orienteering the unions towards cooperation whilst fighting Communists and left-​wingers. This demonstration of the unions’ fundamental ‘soundness’ seemed confirmed by a TUC General Council report (1934) that described the USSR as a dictatorship comparable to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Citrine had entertained serious doubts about the National Government but, with Bevin’s support, ‘we worked together to increase the influence of the TUC, to establish its right to consultation in the national sphere, and to make it a centre with power to evolve policy and take decisions on general principles affecting the trade union movement as a whole’ (Citrine 1964, 240). The breakthrough came when Ernest Bevin was appointed to the Macmillan committee on finance and thereafter TUC representation on government committees increased from seven members on five committees in 1931–​32 to twenty-nine members on eleven committees in 1936–​37. This meshed with Baldwin’s understanding of the State’s proper relationship with the unions, and with Citrine’s objective (which Baldwin found unobjectionable), which was to get the TUC ‘regarded as an indispensable part of the democratic apparatus of the State … while retaining its voluntary character and independence of State control, nonetheless it was an inherent part of our system of government’ (Citrine 1964, 316). The scale of the change after 1926 can be seen in the National Government’s determination to secure a settlement of the 1935–​ 36 mineworkers’ wage claim that threatened to escalate into a serious national dispute which led ministers to pressure the employers to make significant concessions on a national wage increase (Taylor 1996, 65–​92). The acceptance of the TUC as fit to join the great and good was signalled by Citrine’s controversial acceptance of a knighthood in 1935 (Bevin turned down an honour), which was widely interpreted as marking organised labour’s post-​1926 rehabilitation. Bevin believed organised labour’s status in politics and governance was increasing slowly, telling the TGWU Executive that the 1920s ‘were the days of advocacy. Ours is the day of administration’ (Bullock 1960, 600). On the other hand, the party could not be ignored. Baldwin’s 1931 speech on the Labour Government’s proposed repeal of the 1927 Act was of considerable significance as it provided an opportunity for him to outline the Act’s place in industrial and Conservative politics and to delineate the difference between the Labour and Conservative parties. This difference was the Conservative conviction that the Act was a necessary and positive contribution to good industrial relations. Baldwin identified the years

18

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

81

following 1918 as the most anxious faced by the State and stated that this anxiety had framed his actions at the time of the Macquisten Bill in 1925. However, he claimed his gesture had been spurned and events in 1926 had led directly to the 1927 Act. Baldwin ‘remember[ed] being pressed very hard by all kinds of people in the autumn of 1926 to pass drastic trade union legislation’ but true to his convictions he had ‘resisted it the whole time’ (Hansard, 22 January 1931, col. 418). Early legislation would, he believed, have had serious and unforeseen consequences and a breathing space would allow the atmosphere to improve and would result in a better and more acceptable bill. Baldwin reminded the House of the size of the Conservative Party’s majority in 1927 which meant they could have passed whatever measures they wished but in the national interest they refused to do so. Baldwin was convinced that Labour’s repeal bill had little public support, and Baldwin contrasted the current indifference with the national mood at the time of the Taff Vale decision. The bill’s proposed changes seriously concerned the Conservative Party and the bill was a seriously retrograde step in what was still a young, immature democracy. Baldwin insisted the 1927 Act was playing a crucial role in stabilising democracy and warned the Labour Government that By giving these concessions … to a limited class in the community, you are setting up … an imperium in imperio, and you are getting a body which in some ways is independent of the State, and yet can hit the State in a vital place. I think that for some years yet the State needs protection for her own development  –​that protection we gave in the Act of 1927. (Hansard, 22 January 1931, col. 425)

Baldwin contrasted Labour sectionalism as exemplified by this bill with the Conservative commitment to all classes and the national interest, once again laying claim to the mantle of Disraelian One Nation politics: ‘You do not represent in this matter either the nation or a class. You represent a class within a class, and that is political labour and no other Labour at all. We have a consciousness that we are the interpreters of the will of the people’ (Hansard, 22 January 1931, cols 425–​426). Neither hostility to socialism nor Labour’s electoral defeat in 1931 vitiated the need for Conservatives to continue to handle carefully workingclass opinion. Developments must be seen in the context of an inter-​war Conservative electoral coalition which united the middle and lower-​middle classes and the non-​ trade union working class in opposition to a stereotypical view of a Labour movement dominated by left-​wing militants. Greater emphasis, therefore, was placed by Baldwin on One Nation politics and reinforcing voluntarism in order to bypass this Socialist threat. To Conservatives unhappy with the National Government, Baldwin stressed

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

82

What about the workers?

the continued relevance of Disraeli who, he claimed, brought the working class into politics ‘to correct the influence of the bourgeoisie’. He warned his party that ‘conventional Conservatism could never hold the Country’, but with Disraelian Conservatism ‘you can always win’ and Baldwin insisted on pragmatism: ‘I would shrink from no methods, nor would my colleagues if they felt they were methods that would help our country … the experiments must go on’ (The Times, 7 October 1933). Baldwin was, however, ‘not ‘moderate’ or ‘accommodating’ towards socialism and ‘political’ trade unionism … stigmatising them as ‘foreign imports’, alien to British character and culture’ in an attempt to create a broad political centre-​ground dominated by the Conservative Party on which Government and TUC could meet (Williamson 1999, 352). Baldwin’s emphasis on the Disraelian legacy was important but it caused some trepidation amongst his supporters. In early 1927, for instance, the government was poised to introduce a new Factories Bill and William Bridgeman told Baldwin that the policy ‘of “sanitas sanitatum” as expounded by Dizzy is our practical answer to the nonsensical nostrums of the Socialists, and we cannot be driven away from that’ (letter to Baldwin 10 January 1927 in Williamson 1988, 202). The bill, however, proved unpopular with the party and employers, and was thus withdrawn. There were very real political limits beyond which the party could not be pushed by the leadership.

At arm’s length Where does the LSC fit into these developments? The Conservative labour movement had been founded to provide working-class access to the party, but, as was discussed, in the last chapter it had been received unenthusiastically and had no success. The LSC saw in the General Strike an opportunity that justified the creation of anti-​socialist cadres in the unions and an appeal for working-class support based on the removal of union immunities, secret ballots, and branding union leaders as Communists. The LSC aspired ‘to reconcile loyalist Trade Unionism with Conservative principles’, which was clearly an objective compatible with Baldwin’s approach to politics. The LSC’s problem, however, was that Baldwin believed the existing unions were to a large degree compatible with his political vision and the LSC’s vision was perceived as partisan; for example, the LSC urged the Government legislate to make ‘the Trade Unions … purely Industrial Organizations’ (NUA 6/​1/​1–​13, 1926; NUA 6/​1/​1–​4, 1928). Secret ballots, for example, became a panacea for neutralising militants, strengthening moderates and depoliticising the unions. Under these proposals unions would have protection from legal action only if secret ballots sanctioned a

38

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

83

strike and those who refused to strike were protected from intimidation and victimisation. Many Conservatives believed strikes, including the General Strike, were fomented by Bolsheviks and financed by Moscow gold, duping a politically moderate and patriotic workforce into attempting to overthrow the constitution (NUEC, 7 September and 14 December 1926). In February 1929 the LSC petitioned for an election manifesto appealing directly to working-class and union voters but Davidson, the party chairman, rejected this. The LSC’s approach contrasted sharply with the policy of the Ministry of Labour which was regarded by Ministers as the definer, advocate and defender of what constituted good industrial relations: voluntarism. Although the LSC had some contact with Ministers and MPs, there is no evidence it had any influence on government policy. The Ministry of Labour, for example, gave the LSC short shrift. An LSC deputation seeking representation for Conservative trade unionists on government committees was told that, at a time when the unions were moving against the Left, they ‘should be encouraged to persevere with the best side of their work’. The implication was that a higher profile for the LSC would stimulate conflict and boost the Left. It was made clear such representation would deliver little of value to the policy or political process (NUEC 1934a). As previously noted, secret ballots were central to the LSC and the party critique of the unions and so the Ministry’s rebuttal is important, as it provides an insight into a very different and long-​established understanding of what constituted legitimate trade unionism. It was, the Ministry counselled, highly unlikely the unions would submit to, or use, State-sponsored machinery, because ballots were regarded by the unions as a supremely ‘domestic matter’. If union leaders did use Statesponsored machinery, then they would be accused of selling out, thereby strengthening militant elements. Second, the case for ballots was based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between union leaders and union members, which was based on a complex internal process of negotiation and compromise, and if the power to run their own affairs was reduced, unions were unlikely to behave responsibly. Third, ballots were not solely concerned with decision making but were part and parcel of collective bargaining so interference might embitter industrial relations as the unions adopted extreme positions reinforced by popular sanctions. Balloting, though attractive, would reduce negotiators to mere delegates by limiting their room for manoeuvre and encouraging demagogy, thereby releasing passions that might prove difficult to control. Fourth, the Ministry’s research and experience showed leaders seldom imposed their will on reluctant memberships and in their industrial attitudes leaders were generally representative of their members, so elections were unlikely to change outcomes or behaviour significantly. The Ministry opposed banning factory

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

84

What about the workers?

gate meetings as these provided a speedy method of gauging opinion and there was little evidence of intimidation; conversely, the evidence did not indicate ballots would produce broader participation and moderate outcomes. The Ministry concluded that state imposed secret ballots would have no positive effect on shop-​floor politics. ‘The trade unions are extremely jealous of any interference with their own machinery’, so unless change could be shown definitively to be a significant improvement on what existed, ‘it would be unwise to arouse their hostility by an attempt to impose on them outside direction’ (LAB 2/​921/​7 1921e). This also explains why secret ballots were ruled out by the Cabinet during its deliberations on the 1927 Act. After 1931 Gwilym Rowlands (‘for most of the interwar era … the most visible representative of working-​class Conservatism’; Ball 2013, 269), the LSC chair (from 1925), again pressed for equal treatment of Conservative trade unionists. The annual National Union report gave unusual prominence to the LSC and the constituency Labour Advisory Committees (LACs), endorsing wholeheartedly their request for representation on government committees (NUA 2/​1/​47 1932, 6–​13). In March 1932 the National Union Executive discussed the Ministry of Labour’s continued failure to consult the Conservative wage earners; a resolution was sent to Baldwin and forwarded to the Minister, Sir Henry Betterton, who in July 1933 denied discrimination, insisting (as had, for example, Steel-​Maitland) appointments were made solely on the grounds of expertise and not as representatives of a political interest (NUEC, 11 May 1932, 15 May 1932, 12 July 1933). A resolution from the Midlands Area Labour Advisory Committee regretted the non-​ appointment of Conservative wage earners and the LSC urged the National Union Executive to send a deputation to Baldwin ‘so that non-​Socialists, who form the greater part of the workers, should be fairly represented’ (NUA 6/​1/​4 1933, 7 November). The deputation met Baldwin in January 1934. Rowlands explained why Conservatives trade unionists sought representation and handed over a list of committees created in the previous four years, none of which had a single Conservative trade unionist appointed as a member. Baldwin professed to be impressed by Rowlands’s case and promised that he would put their case his colleagues (NUA 6/​1/​4 1934, 30 January; NUEC 1934b). Rowlands declared at the 1934 Conference that ‘In the past socialists had been looked upon as the mouthpiece of the workers. Their Trade Union leaders were thought to be the only authority who could voice their views in responsible quarters’ (NUA 2/​1/​49, 1934, 19). Rowlands, however, failed to appreciate Baldwin’s skill at procrastination. In February 1935 the National Union Executive noted that, despite Baldwin’s favourable response in January 1934, still no Conservative wage earner had been appointed to any official government committee. It agreed to remind Baldwin of the conclusions of the January 1934 meeting (NUEC

58

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

85

1935a). The LSC tried to use the unrest prompted by the promulgation of the new Unemployment Assistance Board scales to persuade the government to consult Conservative wage earners (NUEC 1935b). In December the Executive noted the Ministry of Health was preparing a pensions bill and immediately ‘raised the question of the constitution of Commissions or Enquiries, and stated that whenever a Commission was required the TUC was invited to supply the Labour element … the Conservative Party was being left altogether out of account’ (NUEC, 11 December 1936, 14 April 1937). Despite Baldwin’s professed sympathy nothing changed. In December 1936 the Yorkshire Area LAC passed a resolution critical of the government’s appointments policy that was considered by the National Executive. Sir Douglas Hacking, the Party Chair, conveyed the Executive’s and LSC’s ‘strong feelings’ to Baldwin and once again reminded him of the January 1934 discussions. Hacking reported that Baldwin again ‘expressed sympathy’ and ‘promised to give careful consideration to the question’ (NUEC, 9 December 1936, 10 February 1937). The creation of the Amulree Committee (on holidays with pay) led Rowlands to complain once more at the non-​appointment of Conservative wage-​earners as committee members. An emergency executive meeting expressed extreme disappointment and resolved that the National Government persists in giving places on Royal Commissions, committees of enquiry and the like to its Socialist opponents, while ignoring the representatives of Non-​Socialist Wage Earners who are qualified for the work; and desires that the Leader of the Party should be informed that the continuance of this policy is causing the deepest resentment among his Conservative Working-​Class supporters. (NUEC, 14 April 1937)

Approved by the Executive and forwarded to the Leader, Baldwin expressed sympathy but once more he did nothing. In party management terms the significance of the 1927 Act was that it constituted a ‘contract’ between ministers and the grassroots at a time when many Conservatives were suspicious of many National Government policies. The contours of this contract had been well expressed by Chamberlain in 1931 (against the Labour Government’s bill repealing the 1927 Act) and, given the contract’s significance, it is worth quoting his remarks: What justice does this Bill offer to the man who is threatened with the loss of employment by reason of his refusal to take part in a strike? What justice does it offer the Conservative and Liberal trade unionist who does not desire to become marked men by refusing to contribute to the funds of their political opponents? What justice does it offer to persons whose health and well being may be dependent upon the continuance of essential public services carried on by local authorities? What justice does it offer to the member of a trade union

86

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

who does not desire to see the funds of the union dissipated by revolutionary strikes? What justice does it offer the vast majority of the nation who claim that they shall be protected by Parliament from a repetition of the terrors, hardships and disastrous losses of May, 1926? (Hansard, 28 January 1931, col. 1094).

Chamberlain’s peroration raised a series of questions the answers to which clearly differentiated Conservative from Labour, and so established a moral narrative on the correct and legitimate relationship of the State and party with the organised working class. In party management terms as long as ministers did not depart significantly from this critique the party in the country acquiesced in other policies that would normally excite their opposition and hostility. Baldwin’s treatment of the LSC in the 1920s and 1930s testifies eloquently to the view that it was regarded as a potentially dangerous and disruptive nuisance that should be kept away from industrial politics. In terms of representation and the provision of authoritative advice the TUC General Council was unchallengeable. Whilst many union leaders were socialists and Labour Party supporters and were attacked as such, ministers were careful to ignore their politics in their day-​to-​day relationship, just as union leaders ignored ministers’ and civil servants’ politics in the interests of governance. Partisanship could wreck these relationships; the LSC had nothing to offer.

Rearmament In May 1938 Chamberlain, now Prime Minister after Baldwin’s retirement in May 1937, held two meetings with Citrine and the General Council. Chamberlain sought a voluntary agreement with the unions to address the labour shortages and production bottlenecks that were dogging rearmament. The first meeting did not go well but Chamberlain described the second as ‘a complete success’. As he told his sister, Ida, ‘the delegates who began by being reserved & suspicious the first time they came to see me this time started where they had left off. They were mellow when they arrived and in high good humour, laughing & joking when they went away’. Chamberlain concluded smugly ‘We shall get their help all right’ (25 May 1938 in Self 2005, 326–​327). Chamberlain’s appeasement policy was reinforced by the Ministry of Labour, which despite creating space for cooperation between unions, employers and government during the 1930s, discouraged any corporatist impulses (Lowe 1988, 116). Chamberlain did not envisage radical changes in governance, for example, he promised his government would not ‘legislate on … trade union practices [which] would be justified only if we were at war or if war was felt to be imminent’ (PREM 1/​251

78

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

87

1938. Note by H.J. Wilson, 30 May). As his policy was intended to avoid war he did not expect to have to act on this promise. In 1936 the National Government under Baldwin had accelerated rearmament but both Baldwin and Chamberlain were determined that rearmament must not interfere with normal economic activity or non-​defence spending, and this had implications for union–​government relations. Foreign and defence policy have understandably been the lenses through which rearmament and appeasement have been viewed, and their implications for governance and the domestic distribution of power have been relatively ignored (but see Parker 1981, 306–​343) but ministers recognised union influence would wax and wane according to rearmament’s scale and the type of war being prepared for. The more extensive the rearmament programme, and, if Britain were to undertake a 1914–​18-style Continental commitment, the greater the need for union cooperation in production and governance, then the greater the possibility of political change. The interconnection between the pressures of domestic governance and imperial overstretch met in the policy of appeasement. Chamberlain described his strategy to his sister, Hilda, thus: If the menace of attack from Germany is as imminent as Winston would have us believe, there is nothing we could do which would make us ready to meet it. But I do not believe it is imminent. By careful diplomacy I believe we can stave it off, perhaps indefinitely, but if we were now to follow Winston’s advice and sacrifice our commerce to the manufacture of arms we should inflict a certain injury upon our trade from which it would take a generation to recover, we would destroy the confidence which now happily exists and we should cripple the revenue. (14 November 1936 in Self 2005, 219–​220. Original emphasis)

Even limited rearmament would deal a sharp blow to the status quo as it would inevitably reveal the shortcomings in the organisation of production in key industries –​ building, engineering and steel making, for ­example –​and ministers were conscious of the political implications of dealing with these shortcomings. Taking greater control over capital and labour in peacetime was contrary to Conservative philosophy and a further obstacle was that ‘industrial mobilization would involve cooperation with the trade unions’ (Peden 1984, 21). The most explosive issue was the direction of labour. Chamberlain warned the House of Commons that ‘you must associate with that some power of control over labour, because the principal difficulties … will be in getting the kind of labour which will be necessary for the more skilled operatives and getting the labour where it is wanted’ (Hansard 23 April 1936, col.  434). As Baldwin’s Chancellor of the Exchequer and then Prime Minister, Chamberlain had been, and remained, determined to control defence spending (Charmley 1988, 73) and he was determined to avoid a 1914–​18-type Continental commitment (which he

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

88

What about the workers?

experienced during an unhappy spell as director of national service) and he disliked the prospect of an increase in the labour movement’s political influence. Restricted rearmament satisfied Chamberlain’s economic, political and foreign policy goals. Chamberlain had no deep-​ seated ideological objection to State intervention (see his time at the Ministry of Health in the 1920s, for example) or even consulting the unions  –​as with, for example, the Factories Act (1937), the Coal Act (1938) and Holidays with Pay Act (1938)  –​but he disliked directive state planning. The Government recognised the TUC’s consultative and representational rights but would go no further and union access to high policy remained severely restricted (Cowling 1975, 53). Nevertheless, ‘the government could only avoid explicit compromise with the TUC if its foreign policy [appeasement] succeeded’ (Middlemas 1979, 258). In response to the direction set by Chamberlain Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for Defence Co-​ ordination, produced two reports (December 1937 and February 1938)  entitled Defence Expenditure in Future Years. Fundamental to rearmament and Britain’s ability to fight a long war was ‘the maintenance of our economic stability’, an objective ‘which can properly be regarded as a fourth arm in defence … without which purely military effort would be of no avail’ (CAB 24/​273 1937, para. 10, 2). Current defence expenditure, Inskip noted, was unsustainable after March 1942 (greater defence spending would require a combination of loans, increased taxation and cuts in social services, all of which were unpalatable options), but a failure to rearm convincingly made war more likely. Caught between a rock and hard place, Inskip argued home defence was rearmament’s cornerstone, and so ‘It follows that our first and main effort must be directed at two principal objectives … protect[ing] this country against attack, and to preserving the trade routes on which we depend for essential imports and raw materials’ (CAB 24/​273 1937, para. 42, 7). This meant concentrating on fighter and anti-​aircraft defences and bombers (for defence and retaliation), and the Navy (for homeland and sea-​route defence) but it meant no continental role for the Army. Even this focused programme raised considerable logistical and organisational problems, for example, shortages of semi-​skilled and skilled engineering workers in the aircraft factories. Inskip’s February 1938 report concluded that defence expenditure could not be kept within the current £1.5bn budget. The defence programme was ‘subject to limitations imposed by the industrial conditions of the country, and in particular by the amount of skilled labour which can be made available without disrupting our peace-​time industrial system’ (CAB 24/​ 274 1938, para. 44, 8). Inskip calculated that spending above £345m per annum would require that ‘we must envisage war measures of compulsion on industry and labour, measures not only most difficult politically, but

98

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

89

threatening the maintenance of [economic and financial] stability’ (CAB 24/​ 274 1938, para. 45, 8). The Treasury insisted that further resources could only come from increased taxation (loans were inflationary while cuts in non-​defence spending were politically unpalatable), which would weaken confidence in the government and damage the country’s economy. As long as maintaining peacetime conditions remained an overriding consideration, rearmament would have to be limited, because a larger programme would necessarily have entailed greater union involvement. Even with the current rearmament programme there were, however, problems with producing armour plate for the Navy, the Army had recruitment difficulties, as had the Air Force, which was competing with industry for skilled labour. Rearmament had been managed thus far via industry-​ level bipartite employer–​ union relations, and although local and industry-​level progress had been made with deskilling in engineering, war powers in peacetime were not politically feasible. Tapping his sources in the unions, Sir Joseph Ball (Director of the Conservative Research Department and formerly of MI5) warned the Prime Minister about his unpopularity and cautioned against a reliance on Walter Citrine (and other General Council members), as many ordinary union members thought them to be too close to the Government. Citing the case of the engineering industry, Ball outlined the price the unions would ask for their enhanced cooperation: ‘a Government guarantee that any relaxation of Union standards, rules and workshop practice … will not be permitted to worsen the Union’s position … and that everything its members give up now will be restored when the emergency is over’ (PREM 1/​251 no date, ‘Information from a Trade Union Source’). A  similar consideration underpinned Chamberlain’s reluctance to institute conscription. In a speech to the 1922 Committee Chamberlain argued forcefully against conscription ‘on the grounds that we couldn’t have the existing harmony with the TUC converted into hostility at the critical moment’ (26 March 1939 in Self 2005, 402). Conscription, however, was announced on 26 April 1939. Ministers feared, with good reason, that trying to persuade the unions to accept the drastic changes in working practices necessary for a much expanded rearmament programme would be rejected or come with a price tag they could not pay so they relied on voluntary compliance via bipartite relations at industry level. Chamberlain was not willing to pay the political price of increased union influence demanded by tripartism and did not believe such a dramatic change was, in any case, necessary, but it was already apparent that mobilisation for the current rearmament programme ‘was essentially a political problem of securing the cooperation of both management and workers’ (Peden 1984, 22). The Ministry of Labour estimated that, by the end of 1938, 70,000 more workers would be needed in engineering compared to the number employed in December 1936. These

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

90

What about the workers?

did not have to be the most-​skilled workers but expanding the skill level of the existing labour supply (by training, tapping the ranks of the unemployed, transfers, sub-​ contracting, and dilution and deskilling) required union cooperation and the unions would demand a price for their cooperation. It was axiomatic that consultation with the unions was inevitable but employers and government were anxious to avoid deeper involvement because of the increased power and control this would give the unions. As rearmament continued and the labour market tightened (and wages and profits rose) ministerial and civil service concern about wage inflation and windfall profits increased and to ease the political pressure Chamberlain urged on employers a voluntary ‘National Defence Contribution’ (NDC) to reduce excess profits and act as a sop to organised labour without the need to significantly open up the policy process. The NDC, however, proved a failure and the Government were increasingly concerned about the growing likelihood of industrial unrest. ‘I can see’, Chamberlain wrote, that we might easily run, in no time, into a series of crippling strikes, ruining our programme, a sharp steepening of costs dues to wages increases, leading to the loss of our export trade, a feverish and partly artificial boom followed by a disastrous slump and finally the defeat of the Government and the advent of an ignorant unprepared & heavily pledged Opposition to handle a crisis as severe as that of 1931.

The NDC intended to address these threats by appealing for the support of the working class by demonstrating government sympathy with their concerns. ‘Industrial unrest’, Chamberlain concluded, ‘is only just around the corner [the NDC] may help to keep it there’ (25 April 1939 in Self 2005, 247). The failure of the NDC meant that pressure for a political reconstruction of the Government increased. Of huge significance was the memory of what unions interpreted as their betrayal after 1919, as pre-​war customs and practices were not restored as promised under the Treasury Agreement (1915) as employers sought to make permanent temporary wartime concessions. The unions were determined not to be caught out again. Bevin warned ministers he was determined they would not ‘put one over’ the working class: The temptation to the trade unions … from the other Party granting concessions is very real. The industrial policy of your opponents has changed. Do not be under any delusion. The old bitter hostility which made the trade unions fight on the basis of the Taff Vale Judgement and similar things had gone. It is a new technique which is being introduced. (Labour Party 1936, 146)

Union suspicion of the government, government suspicion of organised labour, suspicion between union and union, and union suspicion of the General Council proved powerful inhibitors. Sub-​contracting and dilution

19

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We shall get their help

91

were, ministers concluded, best left to industry and the TUC was not to be involved because many unions believed the General Council of the TUC was too close to ministers and divorced from factory conditions. Unions, especially the Engineers, were suspicious of TUC ‘interference’, believing reasonable trade union demands could only be settled in bilateral talks. Notwithstanding, the unions and the TUC would inevitably push for broader government concessions as rearmament peaked, and the Government would inevitably be subject to increased pressure to ensure the rearmament programme was completed successfully (Parker 1981, 322–​324, 334–​335). Government and Ministry of Labour resistance to tripartism remained strong. Ministers focused on bipartite local arrangements as there were no serious national labour shortages as yet and the changes in working practices necessary for the current rearmament programme were being achieved piecemeal. There remained, however, serious problems of consent. Amongst the unions a perception existed that they, unlike the employers, were not in the government’s confidence. This feeling energised the TUC’s desire for tripartism and it encouraged talk of creating a body modelled on the Committee of Imperial Defence whereby a small number of selected union leaders could be briefed confidentially by ministers on defence, rearmament and production problems. Unenthusiastic about this proposal, ministers concluded that the difficulties were insuperable and employers could not be excluded, ‘in which case we should be landed with the tripartite arrangement which … is not to be desired’. Tripartism ‘would enable either or both parties … to get out of their responsibilities and place them upon the Government’ (PREM 1/​251 1938. Note by H.J. Wilson, 27 June). Chamberlain’s persona was widely perceived as not conducive to promoting cooperation. Variously characterised as vain, arrogant, of ‘having been weaned on a pickle’, and of ‘having been born sneering’, he had privately described Labour politicians as ‘dirt’ (10 June 1927 in Self 2000, 7, 14, 412). Chamberlain’s reputation worried many in government (for example, Lord Halifax) at a time when union cooperation was deemed increasingly necessary (Cowling 1975, 277) but, on the other hand, Citrine’s portrait of Chamberlain is positive and Citrine found him open and friendly (1964, 366–​ 367). Notwithstanding, many trade unionists would have agreed with Bevin that The Government and the ruling class were doing just what they had done in 1915:  after securing Labour’s co-​ operation on a voluntary basis, they brought in conscription by the back door … The next step would be industrial conscription for which the employers had long been hankering. (Bullock 1960, 637)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

92

What about the workers?

Without price control, profit restrictions and the conscription of capital the unions could only limit their cooperation. However, ‘If the Prime Minister was not yet willing’, Charmley writes, ‘to heed the siren voices, he was at least prepared to be a little nicer to his enemies’ (1988, 178). Any acceleration of rearmament, Hankey noted, ‘could only be accomplished with the co-​ operation of the Trade Unionists’ and acceleration would inevitably draw the unions deeper into policy and governance (PREM 1/​251 1938. M. Hankey to H.J. Wilson, 12 March). Chamberlain’s rejection of a ‘council of state’ and tripartism flowed from a combination of his commitment to appeasement and his doubts about the General Council’s ability to deliver any agreement; on its part, the General Council was inhibited by a reluctance to be perceived as bargaining with a Chamberlain government. Many General Council members opposed attending any meeting with Chamberlain but Bevin and Citrine argued successfully that the unions must support rearmament and meetings represented an opportunity to raise union concerns at the heart of government. Chamberlain and Halifax sought to address union concerns, although the General Council remained critical of foreign policy, the large profits being made, and attempts to introduce dramatic changes to working practices, as well as condemning the government’s pro-​employer bias (Middlemas 1979, 256–​257). This was formidable litany of union complaints. It was clear that the declaration of war would lead inevitably to a marked decline in Conservative Party activity (see CCO 4/​1/​86 1939). Whatever the actual government–​union relationship, there was a strong and growing perception amongst Conservatives that union influence was growing inexorably to the point at which governance was not possible without the unions. Douglas Hacking, the party chairman, told Collin Brooks, a right-​ wing journalist, that ‘The real problem, however, was this –​it is impossible to re-​arm effectively without the good will of the trade unions, and to get it that it may be necessary to broaden the basis of the Government.’ The alternative, according to Hacking, was a general election that the Conservatives might lose and, even if they won, the resulting controversy would threaten rearmament. Hacking concluded that ‘we cannot defend the nation against the will of the unions, there it is. It is part of the price we pay for this alleged democracy’ (Brooks diary, 5 October 1938, in Crowson 1998, 221). Lord Weir, on behalf of the employers, had endorsed bipartite consultation but concluded that ‘rearmament and private work had marched side by side [but] from now onwards rearmament must take first place’, although this change in priorities would stimulate dramatic political change. The current political dispensation ‘amounts in fact to a sort of half-​ way house between voluntary conditions and war conditions and this might give rise to some difficulty’ (PREM 1/​251 1938. Notes by H.J. Wilson,

39

We shall get their help

93

28 March). Commenting on the constraints on the rearmament programme Chamberlain wrote, ‘Anything we can do can only be done by agreement with at least the TUC. I have an idea of the way to approach them but I am not going to be hustled into rash & foolish commitments which might do us infinite harm’ (26 March 1939 in Self 2005, 398).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion The period covered in this chapter was marked by the acceptance of growing union engagement, albeit subordinate, in policy making but attempts to systematise and institutionalise a new industrial settlement failed because Government, management and unions remained committed to voluntarism. Nevertheless, after 1934, Clegg argues, the looming threat of war saw ‘the opening up of channels of communication between the government and individual unions or groups of unions from a single industry’ (1985, 209). These were the foundations of the industrial relations system and governance that lasted until the late 1970s. With the exception of 1919–​21 and 1926 party considerations were not a significant factor for Conservative ministers. The LSC was neither given, nor permitted to seek, a representative role in policy and politics. When concessions were made (notably the 1927 Act) this was for party-​ management reasons, freeing the party leadership to ignore the LSC and develop a relationship with the TUC unencumbered by party considerations that were unsuitable for governance. Although the 1927 Act rankled with the unions, and whilst a new relationship with ministers took time to develop, Conservative ministers defended voluntarism and developed cooperation with the TUC. Until the decision to rearm in 1934 was taken, union influence was easily containable, but thereafter containment became more difficult because of the inevitable production problems whose solution required union cooperation. This was achieved primarily by bipartite factory and industry-​ level negotiations; tripartism and union access to, and influence over, high policy only really began after Munich, accelerating after 3 September 1939. Events between 1936 and 1939 increasingly pointed to the likelihood of Britain’s involvement in a war very different to the one for which Chamberlain had been preparing, and these changes not only required organised labour’s participation, but made a major political restructuring in Labour’s favour inevitable. The war Chamberlain envisaged was very different to that of Churchill. Chamberlain’s objective was to avoid war and, failing that, to avoid a 1914–​18-style war, and until mid-​1939 there was from a governance perspective no need for significant change. Chamberlain’s calculation was

94

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

that the unions would demand a very high price –​ a price he did not want to pay –​ and, although he was gradually forced to give ground, it was the crisis of May 1940 and the arrival of Churchill as Prime Minister, with Attlee and Bevin (as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and National Service) that transformed the unions’ role in governance and the organised working class’s place in politics.

4

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

Introduction Following the creation of the Coalition in May 1940, the union–​government relationship changed profoundly because the war could not be fought without national mobilisation, which required the positive engagement of the unions and working class, and so wartime governance paid particular attention to working-class and union interests and rested on the Labour Party’s participation in government. The war ‘had profound implications for workers and working conditions … the high unemployment of the 1930s gradually disappeared, and the trade union movement rapidly developed in both size and industrial strength’ but the war’s effects on industrial relations were limited because ‘the government stuck to existing collective bargaining procedures, facing down demands for statutory wage controls and trade unions also gained in prestige from a new pattern of industrial consultation’ (Jefferys 1995,  62). This change was symbolised physically by Ernest Bevin’s appointment as Minister of Labour and National Service (MLNS), and Clement Attlee as Lord President of the Council (becoming the Deputy Prime Minister on 19 February 1942), and as members of the War Cabinet on 11 May 1940. Relations were, however, made more complex by differing understandings of the wartime truce. Conservatives tended to interpret this broadly as a political truce (for example, no controversial or ‘class legislation’ until after the war); Labour interpreted it narrowly as avoiding electoral contests between the Coalition’s members. Churchill was determined not to repeat Lloyd George’s mistake of not having a secure party base so he paid careful attention to Conservative attitudes in and out of Parliament, much of which remained suspicious of Churchill as well as of contemporary political developments. Both considerations were reflected in Churchill’s defence of the 1927 Act –​ an Act which he had done much to frame. Coalition and the demands of war necessitated compromises that were unpalatable to many Conservatives and many perceived Coalition policies were entrenching socialism and union power.

96

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Chamberlainite legacy A general election held in 1940 or 1941 would not have produced a Labour government. In the by-​elections of 1931–​35, the 1935 general election and the by-​elections of 1935–​39, Labour appeared to be recovering much of the ground it had lost in 1931. The average by-​election swing was 7 per cent, falling to 4 per cent before the 1940 truce came into force, and an election held in 1940 and 1941 would have required a 10 per cent swing to deliver a bare Labour parliamentary majority (Fielding et al. 1995, 7–​10; Stevenson and Cook 1980, 260–​261). The unions’ presence in Whitehall would not have grown as it did if Chamberlain’s rearmament programme had ended as intended in 1942 or without the dire national emergency of the summer of 1940 that so boosted the TUC’s status and involvement with the State. During Chamberlain’s premiership labour and production difficulties in the engineering and aircraft industries had been resolved locally and at industry level and ministers avoided ‘at any rate at this stage’ detailed involvement, because the desired changes were ‘going on quietly in every factory’ and the complications that would flow inevitably from accelerated rearmament had been avoided. ‘The best way’, Viscount Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air, wrote, ‘of avoiding abstract discussions at the centre is to get people to work on concrete problems in the localities’ (PREM 1/​251, 1938. Swinton to H.J. Wilson, 31 March). Britain’s near defeat in the summer of 1940 and the arrival of Churchill’s Coalition was the beginning of a new regime, or style of political rule. The Coalition’s internal politics were complicated but Labour secured a ‘foot in the door for something very much more formidable’ (Cowling 1975, 387–​ 388). Many Conservatives believed themselves now to be fighting a rearguard action against war socialism which they feared would determine the agenda for peacetime politics. Under Chamberlain union influence in government and policy-​making had increased but there was in no sense a major shift in power, but Chamberlain’s reluctance to broaden his government’s political base had alarmed some Conservatives. In late 1939 Baldwin told Lord Reith, for instance, that Chamberlain was far too right-​wing and was squandering the national unity that he (Baldwin) had fostered as Prime Minister (Jefferys 1995, 65–​66; Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 1054). From the union side, Ernest Bevin was loath to cooperate more than necessary with Chamberlain. When in 1936 Basil Sanderson (the Chairman of the Port Employers) suggested that the TUC should endorse a joint recruitment drive for the armed forces, Bevin refused: ‘How could any Labour man, with the past ten years before him appeal to men to join the Army? … since 1931 Labour had been treated like a caste apart. It was not for us to appeal or be suppliant; it was for them to come to

79

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

97

us and for the first time to recognize Labour as equals’ (Bullock 1960, 598). Early in the Churchill Coalition the head of the TGWU’s political department wrote ‘Labour was distrustful of both Mr Chamberlain and his Government and, in fact, of the whole Chamberlain “system” ’ (Price 1940, 164)  and Attlee made the same point, ‘we had no trust in Neville Chamberlain’s Government. There was always the possibility that they would prefer the evil dictators to democracy’ (Williams 1961, 12). In October 1939 at a conference called to discuss cooperation, which was chaired by Ernest Brown, the then Minister of Labour, Citrine declared the unions ‘suspected that they were being deliberately held at arm’s length by the Government and that the Government was trying to limit the scope of such consultations as might be necessary to what the Government might consider to be “Labour Questions” ’. Ministers could not maintain the status quo while expecting the unions’ full cooperation because the unions ‘had no intention of being treated by the Government as distant relations and were not going to be told that these functions were something that lay within the field of the employers and the advice of the Trade Unionist was not wanted upon them’ (TUC 1939, 2). This criticism led to the General Council meeting Chamberlain at the House of Commons. Citrine insisted to Chamberlain that the unions were not being consulted on relevant issues and were particularly exercised by their exclusion from the Ministry of Supply, which ‘was either contemptuous of the Trade Union Movement or oblivious of its existence’ (TUC General Council, 5 October 1939). Chamberlain immediately ‘issued instructions to all Government Departments emphasising … there should be the most complete understanding and cooperation between the Departments and the Trade Union Movement’ (TUC General Council 25 October 1939. See PREM 1/​430 1939–​40 for details of the evolving relationship). Nevertheless, some union leaders continued to believe that ministers ‘in their heart of hearts’ (Bevin’s phrase) were un-​reconciled to the unions’ new role. The Chamberlain government’s limits on making concessions to the unions can be seen clearly in Chamberlain’s refusal to consider any amendment of the 1927 Act until after the war. Somewhat patronisingly, the TUC felt, Chamberlain told the TUC they were welcome to raise this question then and the government’s response would be greatly influenced by the unions’ conduct in the war (TUC General Council, 1 September 1939, and PREM 1/​ 431, 1939–​40). This attitude, as we shall see, was also Churchill’s position as Prime Minister, and reform of the 1927 Act later emerged as a major controversy under the Coalition, nearly destabilising it. A Chamberlainite backbench MP believed that the war effort lacked drive, which he blamed on Chamberlain, who ‘should have realised, when the Labour people refused to come in with him, that it was useless to carry

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

98

What about the workers?

on. Unless they would cooperate, [Chamberlain] could not count on the full support of the trade unions and a whole-​hearted effort by the workers’ (Headlam Diaries D/​He 36, 1 July 1940). Before 3 September 1939 the TUC concluded the government would avoid any action that altered significantly the unions’ subordinate position and Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, seemingly confirmed this when he stated that the government’s objective was to ‘keep our industry on a peace footing [so] that it will be less difficult to return to normal conditions after the war’ (Colville 1985, 31 January 1940, 78). The proposals for cooperation that flowed from the Emergency Powers Act (1940), which gave ministers absolute control of the domestic sphere, were seen paradoxically by the TUC as further proof of Chamberlain’s determination to keep the TUC at arm’s length because they ‘did not deal with the rights of the Trade Unions in industrial activities, as it was the desire of the Government that the Unions should carry on as freely as possible’ (TUC General Council, 25 August 1939). However, there were limits to Chamberlain’s resistance. When, for example, the TUC found there was no labour representative on the Ministry of Information’s (MoI) Advisory Committee, it responded by articulating the principle that ‘they could not be associated with a machine unless they had some control over it’ (TUC General Council, 31 August 1939) and representation was conceded immediately. The unions were chided for pursuing partisan-​ sectional issues, and wage increases were blamed for inflation. Chamberlain’s official biographer noted that ‘though industrial Labour was sincerely enlisted for the war and by every device of consultation associated with its conduct, that was not enough. Labour’s political structure had so grown that it would not pull its full industrial weight until it shared political responsibility’ (Feiling 1946, 433). In the TGWU Record in October 1939 Bevin fulminated against the Chamberlain Government’s attitude and what to him, and others, seemed their irredeemable hostility towards organised labour, failing to recognise that without union cooperation the war effort could not be sustained. Cooperation would entail not only an improvement in the workers’ economic position, but also a marked improvement in their status. For Bevin, war meant that labour was now the most significant factor of production and in a position to supplant the employers in terms of political influence. In war, Bevin continued, ‘We represent probably the most vital factor in the State: without our people this war cannot be won, nor can the life of the country be carried on. The assumption that the only brains in the country are in the heads of the Federation of British Industries and Big Business has yet to be corrected’ (Williams 1952, 216). This was transformed by Chamberlain’s fall. Bevin went to the MLNS determined both to fight the war and raise the Ministry’s and the unions’ status and influence in Whitehall. Bevin remarked

99

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

99

to Attlee that if the Ministry ‘remains what it is now, a glorified conciliation board, it will be a waste of time’ (Williams 1961, 36) and presciently, ‘They say Gladstone was at the Treasury from 1860 to 1930. I’m going to be at the Ministry of Labour from 1940 to 1990’ (Williams 1952, 217). Bevin became, after Churchill, the Coalition’s most powerful member. ‘I thought’, commented Bevin perhaps mischievously, ‘it would help the prestige of the Trade Union Movement and the Ministry of Labour if I went in. No one has ever put the Ministry of Labour in the forefront like this before’ (Pimlott 1986, 3 October 1940, 88). Bevin believed the war could only be fought with union involvement but hitherto they were ‘tolerated as long as they keep their place and limit their activities to industrial disputes, industrial relationships and similar matters, and are willing to bury all their memories and feelings and assist the national or industry when in difficulties, and go back to their place when their work is done’. However, there has been, and will have to be, a great re-​casting of values. The conception that those who produce or manipulate are inferior, and must accept a lower status than the speculator must go … the task of re-​casting these values … is reflected in the process of weaving the fabric of legislation, at the same time demonstrating the steadily changing status of the producer-​workman. (Price 1940, v)

Hugh Dalton reported a conversation with Bevin had with Sir Evan Williams, a major coal owner and President of the Mining Association of Great Britain; Bevin told Williams that he ‘would no longer allow the mineowners to call themselves “employers”. “In this war”, he had said, “you are not employers any more; you are only agents of the State.” Williams, he said, had taken this quite well’ (Pimlott 1986, 12 March 1942, 394). How would the Conservative Party react to these developments?

Wartime governance In the summer of 1940 R.A. Butler’s constituency chair lamented ‘the socialistic mess we shall have to clear up’ complaining that increased wartime taxation ‘will mean the final collapse of the upper middle class … and the end of the old social [order]’; and ‘this will be the policy all along of our trade union Government  –​tax and over tax the middle classes so that the proletariat may be better paid at their expense’ (Howard 1987, 90. See also Fielding et al. 1995, 55–​58). Sir Douglas Hacking, the party chair, argued forcefully that irrespective of any cross-​party cooperation the Conservatives must maintain their organisation as Labour would exploit the war and its collectivist impulses, and the Conservative Party was the only organisation in the country capable of resisting the war’s collectivist

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

100

What about the workers?

drift (NUEC, 20 September and 13 December 1939; NUEC 1939a), and Robert Topping, the Central Office General Director, cautioned ‘We may as well face the fact that a war brings about most revolutionary changes both in the constitution and policy of political parties’ (CCO 4/​1/​86 1939, 4). The principle difficulty, however, was not identifying the threat but formulating an effective response and from early in the war Conservatives sensed they were losing the political initiative. In the industrial North-east, for example, the Conservative regional office closed with the declaration of war but the constituency organisations were expected to carry on and combat the expected flood of socialist propaganda. The problem was that Hacking had been told officially that ‘all propaganda would be conducted by the Ministry of Information [MoI] and on that understanding he advised Conservative associations to close down’ but the MoI was ‘a wash out and the Labour and Liberal organisations are working hard’ (D/​He 35, 26 October 1939). Headlam earned Central Office’s disapprobation ‘because I  said that active [Conservative] propaganda was essential … so long as Labour propaganda was so active’ but in the spring of 1940 he concluded, ‘so far as I can see the Conservative Party is as dead as makes no difference’ (D/​He, 36, 13 and 20 March 1940). Coalition undoubtedly strengthened the war effort and boosted support for the Government but the very visible presence of Labour ministers in government inhibited Conservative politics. David Margesson, the Conservative Chief Whip, for example, reported a majority of Conservative MPs had been very annoyed by a speech made by Bevin attacking the profit motive, observing ‘Whether Bevin is right or wrong he should not in a time of national unity raise party issues. There would be terrible trouble if Conservative Ministers went about denouncing socialism and proclaimed their panaceas for the future’ (Colville 1985, 21 November 1940, 298). Headlam, expressing views with which many Conservatives sympathised, complained about ‘the faddists and fools’ who want us ‘to say to-​ day exactly what we intend doing when the war ends’. A year later Headlam described the scale of Labour’s –​political party and trade union –​influence as ‘extremely depressing’ but that it was impossible ‘to keep Conservatism alive without workers and without money’, both of which the unions provided to the Labour Party. Conservatives were, moreover, dancing to Labour’s tune: chaos is looming ahead: all the cranks and faddists are getting ready to put things right, and the so called Conservatives are playing up to them –​we are to have a ‘better Britain’ after the war, ‘there must be no going back to the status quo’, etc etc –​and … there must be no more profit making and that everything must be nationalised. (D/​He 35, 7 November 1939; D/​He36, 30 November 1940)

101

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

101

Colville noted that MoI morale reports found a general expectation that ‘this war must bring the end of class conflict and the abolition of great inequalities of wealth [because] rationing and shortages affect the rich very little, since they can pay the extra price and feed in well-​stocked restaurants … Employers and Labour both claim that the other is profiting from the war’ (Colville 1985, 5 February 1941, 420). It proved difficult to reconcile Conservative propaganda, even One Nation propaganda, with the peoples’ war, which could not be fought without working-class engagement. After 3 September 1939, and even more so after 10 May 1940, working-class and union opinion was a major Conservative concern but the party had a limited capability to monitor and respond. The obvious mechanism was the network, albeit very fragmentary, of Labour Advisory Committees but, as we have seen, these had been consistently ignored or by-​passed, and were described officially as moribund. In early 1941 Topping oversaw the establishment of several working parties to explore reviving the party organisation, and one reported on the LACs (NUEC, 8 January 1941. Unfortunately the minutes and papers of the Labour Sub-​Committee do not exist after 1935). On the eve of the war, E.S. Adamson, the secretary of Central Office’s Labour Department, restated the traditional justification that without the Conservative organisation the voice of non-​socialist/​non-​Labour opinion would not be heard and socialist propaganda would go unchallenged (ARE 9/​1/​2, 1939). Topping hoped to create a network of informants transmitting political intelligence about working-class opinion to Central Office. Neither Security Service intelligence nor Special Branch reports on working-class opinion, nor MoI Home Intelligence Reports, were officially available to the party, although their contents did sometimes filter through via, for example, Sir Joseph Ball. Constituency Agents had been consulted about the feasibility of creating a panel of Conservative wage earners to submit quarterly reports on working-class concerns and attitudes and, when required, produce reports on special topics. All those consulted agreed with the need for such a body (NUEC 1939b) but there is, however, no evidence of any sustained activity. Questions were distributed periodically (one was circulated on the Beveridge Report in late 1942), but the National Union’s proceedings provide few details of these and there exists no assessment of the panel’s effectiveness, although its ineffectiveness can be deduced from a July 1943 decision to regroup its members at the Area level (NUEC, 19 September 1941, 8 July 1943). In July 1940 Hacking had asked Butler to start work ‘with a view eventually to adjusting the Party’s outlook to the radically different trends of thought which prevail at a time like this’ (quoted in Ramsden 1980, 96). Politics was clearly changing in ways that were not to the Conservatives’

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

102

What about the workers?

advantage. ‘I always feel in despair’, Headlam wrote, ‘when I  attend meetings of the [National Union] Executive … it always appears to be so utterly out of touch with the realities of politics … [it is] still living in the atmosphere of the Primrose League’ (D/​He 38, 26 May 1942) and up to 1943 ‘most of the wartime demands for a revival of Conservatism came from the Right, and threatened to plunge the Party into still greater irrelevance’ (Addison 1975, 229). In March 1941 the Central Council called for the preparation of a post-​war Conservative programme, and in May Butler proposed a committee be established to collate the party’s views on likely post-​war problems and their solution and then present the results to Churchill as party leader (Central Council, 27 March 1941 and NUEC, 14 May 1941). This was agreed. In May Topping invited Butler to chair the Post-​ War Problems Central Committee (PWPCC). Butler took the opportunity when addressing the Central Council (his speech was published as a pamphlet, Looking Ahead) to warn the party of the inevitable social, economic and political changes the war would bring, and that the Conservatives must embrace these changes and respond with a reform programme (Central Council, 2 October 1941). By the summer of 1942 Thomas Dugdale, now the Party Chair, was warning of the ‘difficulties being met by Conservatives in counteracting adverse propaganda’ (ARE 8/​1/​2, 1942), the Executive discussed complaints about the BBC’s supposed socialist bias, and the National Union resolved that whilst recognising the need for maintaining the political truce in the interests of political unity, [the Executive] views with misgivings the subtle propaganda of our opponents, including the Communists, which is having such a damaging effect on our Party, and advocates measures to counter such propaganda being put in hand at once rather than wait until the end of the war. (NUEC, 8 July 1942)

These statements came after the Grantham by-​election (25 March), a safe seat lost by the Conservatives, where the local Labour Party broke the electoral truce by supporting an Independent Labour candidate. Grantham is often interpreted as marking the re-​emergence of partisan politics. The National Union endorsed fully post-​war reconstruction but remained extremely wary of wartime reforms and feared that wartime regulations and controls, which it usually described as ‘socialistic’, would become the peacetime norm. As a result ‘we may find that our individual liberty of action has been “planned away”, and therefore we call upon the Members of the Party to watch this trend very closely and do everything in their power to effect a removal of these restrictions as soon as practicable after the restoration of peace’ (NUEC, 11 November 1943). Butler envisaged the PWPCC as a forum for integrating the party into the broader movement for reform, whereas

301

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

103

the Party remained hostile to what it interpreted as leftist propaganda, preferring talk of reform to be postponed until the war’s end. Concerned by these attitudes and the ‘diehard’ nature of the 1935 intake Butler went to great lengths to ensure that the 1922 Committee was consulted but there were inevitably disagreements and the Executive complained that Butler was publishing reform proposals without consulting an increasingly wary party (Howard 1988, 142–​143; NUEC, 11 November 1942). For Conservatives wartime industrial relations offered a dreadful portent, conflict peaked in 1944 with 2,194 stoppages involving 821,100 workers and costing 3,710,000 lost working days (Cmd 7225 1947, 385–​ 385). Many Conservatives sincerely believed that the wartime state that emerged under the Coalition was dominated by the TUC and Labour Party, and served their political and ideological interests. In May 1940 Headlam, for example, concluded that ‘in a democratic country like ours war is made almost too difficult for soldiers and statesmen’; in July 1941 he described the TUC as ‘our overlords’, and in 1943 condemned efforts to repeal or amend the 1927 Act as part of an effort to ‘make the TUC supreme in the land’ (D/​He 36, 6 May 1940; 37, 25 July 1941; 39, 21 August 1943). The union role in maintaining labour discipline and boosting production was naturally welcomed by Conservatives, but not the extension of union influence into the politics of production, which challenged managerial prerogatives and even property rights. Full employment and greater official solicitude for the working class eased many of the pre-​war inhibitions and psychological restraints that had underpinned working-class acquiescence and pointed to an infinitely more self-​confident and assertive working class compared to pre-​war –​ a phenomenon that had haunted Conservative politics since before Disraeli’s time. The inevitable deterioration of industrial relations under the strain of war was interpreted by many Conservatives not as evidence of growing exhaustion and war weariness, but as evidence of growing bloody mindedness and a working-class and union perception that power was shifting and that they could, and should, exploit the shift. Both the unions and the working class, these Conservatives felt, were determined to exploit the war in their class interests even at the expense of the national interest. As strikes and industrial action were illegal under wartime regulations their incidence was taken as evidence of declining patriotism or worse, as the result of the machinations of militants and political extremists. Conservatives (and others, including Labour politicians and union leaders) criticised industrial disputes and poor workforce attitudes severely, but did not go as far as, for example, Cuthbert Headlam who believed that ‘There is not half enough drive in our war industries and all most workers think of is their wage increases and of their grievance in having to pay taxes, etc.’ (D/​ He 37, 13 June 1941). Poor attitudes in the factories and industrial unrest

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

104

What about the workers?

were blamed frequently by Conservatives on managers no longer having the freedom to manage their factories or enforce discipline because of the power now enjoyed by union officials, especially shop-​floor and unofficial leaders. Bevin’s determination to increase the unions’ status and influence was blamed for poor attitudes and industrial disruption and the National Union Executive condemned ‘the tendency of the Minister of Labour to indulge in Class Legislation, at a time when the whole energies of the Nation should be directed to the National War effort’ (NUEC, 11 November 1942). Conservatives complained about the state control of private property and demanded greater control of labour, insisting Bevin exercise his vast powers over labour, and from 1942 Conservative claims about ‘slacking’ in the factories became increasingly common. Mass Observation found older workers were often more disciplined than younger workers and that production took place against ‘a background of aimlessness, irresponsibility and boredom’. Factory workers were as resentful of bureaucracy as any Conservative shopkeeper subject to the intrusions of Ministry of Food inspectors, and ‘There is a good deal of rather rambling complaint about “them” [which] refers to a sort of hazy mixture of office girls, Mr Bevin, a lot of typed notices, and a row of people who sit at the far end of the canteen’ (Mass Observation 1943, 71, 117). Increased working-class prosperity, employment security and status had led to a shift in attitudes: There they were, getting good wages, with comfortable transport to and from their work, wonderful canteens, ENSA concert parties, military bands and all the rest of the circus to play for them, and all their outlook on the war was coloured by those surroundings. And here we are with an Empire crashing in ruins around our ears. (D/​He 40, 13 March 1944)

For many Conservatives wartime Britain was truly a Workers’ Playtime, the title of the BBC’s live broadcasts from factories ‘somewhere in Britain’, which started in 1941 and enjoyed Bevin’s enthusiastic support. Workforce apathy was blamed on poor understanding, a lack of interest, a continued sense of inferiority and specific complaints (long hours, infrequent breaks, the lack of decent toilet facilities, for example) and worryingly for many Conservatives ‘Not until Russia was invaded … did any real desire to get on with the job make itself apparent’ and even then this was ‘only amongst the politically aware and those vaguely attracted to socialism’. One factory manager concluded that until the whole population really gets down to the job of fighting and winning this war, there will always be slackness, as evidenced by absenteeism, lavatory mongering, petty strikes, and manifested in other sections of the population in Black Market operations, evasions of quotas, illegal use of petrol, luxury feeding, and the like. (Mass Observation 1943, 125)

501

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

105

The problem was finding an effective response. Wartime regulations, notably Order 1305 (1940), making industrial action illegal were welcomed by Conservatives, but industrial relations experts were dubious about the effects of draconian regulation. Their doubts seemed confirmed by the 1942 mass prosecution of striking miners at Betteshanger colliery in Kent (Emmerson 1968, 340–​ 341). Wartime industrial relations were actually surprisingly peaceful because disputes tended to be brief (a few days) and confined to a locality or single enterprise and industry and, as in peace time, a few industries, notably coal, dominated the statistics. Between 1939 and 1945 an average of 46.2 per cent of all disputes were in the coal industry. The solution to the 1942 coal crisis, for example, Headlam thought was simple:  ‘if only [the miners] would work a 42 hours week all would be well’ but the problem was that ‘they won’t and now they are paid higher wages are less likely to do so’ (D/​He, 38, 6 June 1942. Original emphasis). Discussion of post-​war reform at a time when Germany and Japan were undefeated and the cost of reform was unknown was, many Conservatives thought, irresponsible and raising popular expectations was politically dangerous. Kow-​towing to the unions and the working class was ultimately self-​defeating and was ‘part and parcel of this absurd “new world” business which is going to lead us to a complete breakdown … and maybe to revolution’ (D/​He, 38, 11 June 1942). This attitude led to the left-​wing Labour MP, Aneuran Bevan, declaring ‘We can see the Conservatives crawling out of their holes. In 1940 and 1941 they would not have dared to say these things’ (Hansard, 12 November 1942, col. 138). In the unofficial strike wave of 1944, which badly affected coal, shipbuilding and engineering, some Conservatives, though rarely in public, advocated extreme methods: Would to God that they [the South Wales miners] could be treated by Russian methods –​but what the Russians may if done here would arouse a tremendous uproar[;] from the Archbishop of Canterbury to Mr Shinwell would come shrieks of dismay, and yet the shooting of a few miners would end strikes. (D/​ He 40, 13 March 1944)

Shooting a few mineworkers was, however, not a feasible option. In early 1942 Conservative backbenchers had, with Churchill’s support, blocked Hugh Dalton’s (the Labour President of the Board of Trade) proposal to ration domestic coal as excessive interference with personal liberty and to demonstrate their hostility to war socialism and undue Labour and union influence (see Jefferys 1995, 96–​ 98). On 17 March Dalton announced the government’s intention of instituting a fuel rationing scheme (developed by Sir William Beveridge) as part of a raft of measures including manpower proposals, and the reorganisation of the coal industry

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

106

What about the workers?

under a national authority to deal with the production crisis in the industry. Despite some criticism from Labour MPs who preferred nationalisation and from Conservative MPs who wanted less state control Dalton was surprised initially at the limited hostile reaction despite the political sensitivity of the coal industry and its importance to the Conservative back bench (Pimlott 1986, 17 March 1942, 413). When the scheme was announced, however, the reception of the rationing scheme from the House of Commons and the press was hostile. The scheme focused on several Conservative discontents with the coalition and the conduct of the war but Dalton was determined not to give way despite what he considered to be Churchill’s ambivalence and, despite Dalton speaking to the 1922 and receiving a good reception, he feared the opposition from the Conservative back bench might prove to be too strong to overcome (Pimlott 1986, 30 April 1942, 420). As the opposition organised itself, it became clear that Dalton’s scheme was deeply unpopular with many Conservatives. In his diary Dalton listed the reasons for the scale of Conservative opposition: 1 2 3 4 5 6

An instinctive feeling against the rationing of coal. A dislike of miners; why can’t they work harder? A dislike of coupons and ‘officials’. A dislike of Labour ministers in general … Some dislike of me in particular … A feeling that this plan is ‘a benefit for Grenfell’ [the Labour minister of mines] and is only necessary because he has made a mess of his job. (Pimlott 1986, 6 May 1942, 423)

Some forty to fifty Conservative backbenchers were thought likely to rebel and the difficulty was exacerbated by the conduct of the war, rising pressure for post-​war reform, and what was perceived as growing Labour influence. Ministers faced down the opposition and placed the coal industry under State control in a new Ministry of Fuel and Power, which many Conservatives saw, in company with the Beveridge Report on social services, as testifying to the socialist drift of politics. In February 1943 the Independent MP for Oxford University, A.P. Herbert, opined that future historians would think it strange that, at a time when ‘Europe is waiting to hear the thunder of the guns of the United Nations’, the House of Commons was devoting an inordinate amount of time to the catering industry (Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1534). Bevin’s Catering Wages Bill produced the largest wartime Conservative rebellion against the Coalition government. The Conservative rebels interpreted Bevin’s bill as a fundamental challenge to private enterprise, designed to increase union influence, and as symptomatic of Labour’s grip on the political agenda, condemning it as a breach of the undertaking that no controversial or ‘class legislation’ would be introduced (Hansard, 12 November 1942, col. 385).

701

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

107

Sir Douglas Hacking MP, who had stepped down as Party Chairman in 1942, organised a backbench Conservative committee to oppose the bill and, claiming the support of 200 MPs, he declared, the bill ‘originate[d]‌ solely from the personal desire of the Minister [Bevin] to impose regulation on an industry the individuality and complexity of which have so far puzzled those who would like to see every industry controlled and regulated’ (The Times, 23 October 1942. See also 14 January 1943). The managing director of one major catering company condemned the bill as ‘the very antithesis of the liberty for which we are fighting’ (The Times, 15 January 1943). Bevin denied vehemently that his bill was a ‘Labour or Socialist measure’ but was simply a continuation of a fifty-​ year-old policy of government encouraging decent wages in poorly organised industries and as such reflected the Coalition’s policy of improving working conditions. The bill, Bevin noted, had Cabinet approval and so was by definition non-​party and non-​controversial so there was no reason for such passionate opposition (Hansard, 9 February 1943, cols 1195–​ 1196). Conservative ire focused on the bill’s proposed regulatory commission and its relationship with the Minister who had the power to accept or reject its recommendations; this was condemned as unwarranted interference with private property and even backdoor nationalisation, and an instance of Bevin exploiting ministerial office for partisan purposes. This produced the following exchange:  ‘You have trusted me since 1940 with powers and have never questioned my exercise of them. If you have never questioned me in ordering millions of people about the country why do you question my integrity …?’, Bevin wondered. To which a Conservative backbencher responded: ‘You are not going to be there all the time’ (Hansard, 9 February 1943, cols 1201–​1202). Hacking contended that Bevin ‘desire[d]‌to interfere with private enterprise in any circumstances, while I  would say you should never interfere with private enterprise until you have proved it is not doing its job’ (Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1211). Conservative MPs scented a socialist conspiracy, claiming the bill had been prepared in secret and introduced while Churchill was out of the country, and it was, Captain Peter Macdonald MP (Con, Isle of Wight) claimed, ‘the first step towards nationalising one of the most individualistic industries in the country to-​day’ (Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1239). If state control was to be extended over so diverse an industry, no industry was safe, and so the bill was both a massive extension of state power and augmentation of Bevin’s powers to a degree that would dwarf those of Parliament. Sir Leonard Lyle MP (Con, Bournemouth) warned that ‘if we allow the Minister to do this not only with regard to wages and regulations of that sort, but to be able, if he so desires, to try and apply [state] control to the management of industry, we might as well give up our position altogether’ (Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1268). For many Conservatives Bevin

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

108

What about the workers?

physically embodied growing state control and union power, and was acting as a conduit for both socialism and increased Labour Movement power over the Coalition and the community. So great was Bevin’s influence deemed, the rebels believed Conservative Coalition ministers (including Churchill) were incapable of resistance (‘the Minister of Labour has cracked the whip and brought them to heel’. Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1238) and the Catering Wages Bill’s sole justification was ‘that the Minister of Labour wants it … he has demonstrated quite clearly “The Importance of Being Earnest” ’ (Hansard, 9 February 1943, col. 1250). On the Second Reading 118 MPs (111 Conservatives, four National Liberals, two Independents, and one National Labour) voted against and 107 Conservatives and 138 Labour MPs voted in favour of Bevin’s bill. The Times noted the rebellion was twice as large as that expected by the Whips Office, making it the biggest vote (up to then) against the Coalition Cabinet and the first substantial Conservative wartime rebellion (The Times, 10 February 1943). Hacking’s belief that the rebellion would make the government more amenable was, however, wrong and the Cabinet proceeded with the bill because ‘Bevin is an obstinate brute and Winston, they say, believes in him.’ Conservative disunity and pusillanimity also played a role; ‘so many of our party –​more especially the younger members –​are more “left” than the Labour Party, terribly afraid of being thought unprogressive  –​and nowadays to be progressive you must be all out for totalitarian methods of administration however much you may condemn such methods in Germany and Italy’ (D/​He, 39, 11 February 1943). Bevin refused any amendments and this, coupled with the displeasure of the Conservative frontbench, led to the rebellion’s speedy collapse and the bill becoming law. In March 1944 the Industrial Sub-​ Committee of Butler’s committee published, Work. Its objective was to boost post-​war economic growth by continuing wartime cooperation into peace via the Joint Production Committees, to address common problems and promote mutual understanding. To foster worker commitment workplaces ‘should be well lit, evenly heated, not overcrowded, well ventilated, with good washing and sanitary arrangements, and an efficient canteen wherever numbers justify it’ (Anon. 1944, 2–​3). Unions were portrayed as a natural and legitimate feature of industry and history showed that hostility between them and the Conservative Party was not inevitable because it was ‘a Conservative Ministry which first legalised trade unions, [and] Mr Chamberlain’s Government established the principle that the trade unions, jointly with the employers’ representatives, should be brought into consultation with the Government on all labour questions arising out of the war’. Traditional Conservative attitudes to unions nevertheless remained strong. Legitimate trade unionism was defined thus:

901

War, conservatism and union power

109

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

1 All trade union members, irrespective of political alignment, should play their full part in union business. 2 Every employee should enjoy the liberty of freely deciding whether to join a union or not. 3 There should be no discrimination for or against trade unionists, within the works. (Anon. 1944, 4)

This implied continued hostility to union affiliation with the Labour Party, no closed shop and no union monopoly of representation in the workplace, and it also implied leaving the pre-​war structure of industrial relations and the philosophy of voluntarism undisturbed. Work was strongly anti-​interventionist in tone and recommended that wartime controls on capital and labour, rationing and high taxation be abolished as soon as practicable. Additionally post-​war government should commit to balanced budgets, which appeared to rule out changes such as those envisaged by the 1942 Beveridge Report on social welfare or the 1944 White Paper on full employment. Any transition period between war and peace was to be as brief as possible as the continuation of wartime controls would undermine prosperity and individual liberty. A  post-​ war Conservative government would use the state to resist monopoly and protect small businesses, and a Conservative government would aim ‘not to establish a bureaucratic scheme of State control but to build up a practical system of cooperation between the Government and industry’ (Anon. 1944,  9–​12). The Conservatives’ most extensive analysis, Politics and the Trade Unions, authored by Thomas Gee, a shop steward in the electrical engineering industry, chair of the Rugby branch of the Electrical Trades Union (ETU), a delegate to the Rugby trades council and officer of the Rugby Conservative Association, reflects Conservative fears about unions and their post-​war role (Gee 1945). Union association with the Labour Party and socialism, Gee argued, had compromised union independence and their ability to ‘maintain and improve the standards of living conditions’ of their members, and the unions reliance on the Labour Party threatened to put the unions at the state’s disposal. Unions could only remain free under Conservative governments who were ‘unconcerned whether their actions favoured or prejudiced the fortunes’ of the party or government (Gee 1945, 4–​5). The unions’ most significant gains had been won by their own efforts not by party politics, and certainly not by pursuing socialism, as experience showed ‘problems [are] capable of a solution within the framework of the established social system’ (Gee 1945, 7). Balancing union interests with those of a party, or even the state, inevitably meant party and state interests would predominate, stimulating unofficial strikes from a membership whose interests were no longer their leaders’ main concern. Of even greater danger was the possibility that the unions’ industrial power would be used

110

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

to pursue sectional political objectives at the community’s expense and the strike would supplant democratic voting. Politics and the Trade Unions warned that without the active engagement of the moderate majority unions could be easily captured by a militant minority. Mass apathy amplified the influence of Communists (whose influence in Gee’s own union, the ETU was significant) who were assiduous in their attendance at branch meetings … [t]‌hey elect each other to key positions … If they secured control of the trade union movement the Communists would control the political funds of the unions and determine the policy of the Labour Party, whether or not the Labour Party accepted Communist Party affiliation … It is only a matter of time before the door is prised open and, once inside, the red tail will soon be wagging the pink dog. (Gee 1945,  9–​10)

Thus, instead of defending and extending the real and justified improve­ ments in pay and conditions made during the war ‘the unions are spending their energies in building a political machine to support a creed which is accepted by only a fraction of their members’, and therefore the 1927 Act was a safeguard for both the unions and democracy generally (Gee 1945, 12–​ 13, 18–​ 19). The unions’ socialist commitment would end in their being ‘used to buttress up a Slave state’ and only ordinary union members involving themselves in their unions could prevent this. Union policy, Gee concluded, often reflected only the aspirations of the militant minority and the solution was for the moderate majority –​with Conservative trade unionists to the fore  –​challenging this minority. The Conservative task was ‘to defend the unions from those who would subvert them for political ends’ (Gee 1945, 11–​14).

Red line: The 1927 Act As we saw in the last chapter the 1927 Act played a vital role in Conservative politics at a time when many Conservatives were suspicious of its leaders’ attitudes towards the unions. With Labour’s entry into the Coalition, and with the unions’ importance in wartime governance, pressure inevitably grew for repeal. In response, the Conservatives united around the defence of the 1927 Act and the conflict produced, though muted, reflected an important aspect of the party’s relations with the unions. For the Conservative Party the Act represented a long overdue corrective to union power and defence of individual liberty; for the TUC it created bitter memories and a deep antagonism directed at those Conservatives who initiated and supported the Act. The 1938 TUC Congress had called for repeal but in January 1939 the

111

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

111

TUC General Council’s Finance and General Purposes Committee concluded that it seemed ‘we should have to wait until a Labour Government is in power with its own majority’. ‘Perhaps the best course’, Citrine concluded, ‘would be to express to the Prime Minister the resentment of the movement in regard to the Act, and ascertain his general reaction’ (Citrine Papers 1939. Repeal of the Trades Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927, 18 January). In February 1939 Bevin had urged Chamberlain to repeal the Act arguing ‘no better way could be found by the Government to show their confidence in the Movement’. Chamberlain, however, concluded ‘It seems to me impossible in time of war to throw a stone into a pond’, stirring up ‘controversies which are, for the moment, quiescent and which would disturb those feelings of good will and determination’. After the war, however, ‘there will be a great many things which we shall want to discuss amongst ourselves. If you still think you desire to have some alteration of the Act then, it seems to me, will be the time for you to come forward again with your record behind you and put your case’. Chamberlain’s position, Citrine concluded, was ‘be good boys, conduct yourselves properly during this war, and you will have such a strong case for change’ (TUC General Council, 1 September 1939; Citrine Papers 1941. Report of a Meeting of the General Council with the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 15 May). After the formation of the Coalition, Attlee agreed with Churchill that it was undesirable to open controversies that would destabilise the Coalition ‘but we ought not to shrink from necessary changes because they have been in the past bones of contention between the Parties’. This stricture applied to the 1927 Act where ‘the continuance of an existing grievance may be as much the cause of division as its amendment’ (Attlee Papers 2/​2 1941, 11). Attlee’s memorandum is untitled and undated but Harris (1982, 185) dates it from the spring of 1941 so from its earliest months the 1927 Act was a bone of contention in the Coalition. The unions, Attlee believed, should not be alone in being required to surrender cherished principles for the war effort, especially as the war had disrupted ‘alternating periods when rival [political] views find expression’ and Attlee compared the war to 1905 when ‘[t]‌he country was ripe for change’. He urged the Coalition to amend the 1927 Act, which ‘was imposed on the Unions as a kind of Brest Litovsk Peace and the memory rankles’, warning that ‘the Unions will not be content with a post dated cheque’ and inaction would ‘play into the hands of disruptive elements and weaken the authority of the men who are in responsible positions’ (Attlee Papers 2/​2 1941, 12). Attlee conceded Labour ministers could not, and would not, push their support for change to the point where the Coalition’s stability was endangered, but, nevertheless, he insisted that amendment was the best and most correct course of action.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

112

What about the workers?

The TGWU and the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) persuaded the 1940 TUC at Southport to support a direct approach to Churchill on amending the Act, and Citrine actively canvassed Labour ministers. Attlee doubted the Commons would repeal the ‘political’ clauses, but it might be persuaded to amend the ‘industrial’ clauses that prevented the affiliation of civil service unions to the TUC, prohibited local authorities from making union membership a condition of employment and restricted picketing. In November the General Council postponed seeking an interview with Churchill to allow Attlee and Bevin to consider the best way forward. At Bevin’s suggestion (Bevin being the main conduit between the General Council and Churchill) a small delegation of the National Council of Labour (representing unions affiliated to the Labour Party and the TUC) would meet Churchill. The General Council felt that Churchill ‘had been encouraging’ and that ‘something was going to be done’, but in March 1941 Churchill wrote to Citrine, concluding that changing or repealing the 1927 Act would contribute nothing to the war effort and would provoke serious discord, so this issue should be left until the war’s end (the same as Chamberlain’s policy). Notwithstanding, the General Council voted to seek an interview with the Prime Minister (TUC Special General Council, 10 March 1941). At this meeting Churchill agreed to consult his party on its attitude to amending the 1927 Act (TUC General Council. Deputation to the Prime Minister, 10 April 1941). Labour ministers believed a failure to reform ‘would bring to the surface immense latent feeling’ and it would be impossible to confine the pressure for change to the industrial clauses (TUC General Council, 7 May 1941). Attlee warned that even if the Labour Party united behind the TUC and if the Cabinet could be persuaded to support legislation, ‘it was quite useless to suggest that the Government could do exactly as it pleased with the House of Commons’. The key might be to link the call for reform with Conservative demands for a ‘total war effort’, especially if it could be shown that disruptive elements were using the Act to justify attacks on official union leaders (TUC General Council, 7 May 1941). The General Council was prepared to make reform a measure of the Coalition’s sincerity towards organised labour, arguing all sides must contribute to creating national unity. Reform was, therefore, portrayed as being of broad political significance: ‘They had not entered the government on the basis of the status quo. The Movement would not enter into a Government if it meant that everything had to be left until the end of the War.’ The TUC had no desire to destabilise the Coalition but nonetheless was unalterably convinced that the Act aroused great resentment and believed reform was permissible because the electoral truce was not a political truce (TUC General Council, 7 May 1941).

311

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

113

The Conservative response was unequivocal and swift. Captain J.F.E. Crowder (Con, Finchley) raised the matter at the National Union Executive and moved an emergency resolution opposing any change to the 1927 Act that received unanimous endorsement. This resolution expressed ‘great concern’ at the TUC’s proposal and urged Churchill ‘to refuse any amendment that will violate the fundamental principles underlying the 1927 Act’, and the resolution was forwarded to the Prime Minister. One Executive member felt that without a strong response from the party to calls for reform (calls described as ‘sheer blackmail’) reform would be conceded by Churchill for the sake of a quiet life (NUEC, 14 May 1941; D/​He 37, 14 May 1941). On the following day the General Council met the PLP and although the PLP agreed to support the TUC, its spokesmen wondered what would happen if Conservatives remained obdurate? The TUC ‘had not considered the next step’ but believed the TUC was in a strong bargaining position because ‘The goodwill of the industrial side of the Movement was a very important factor in the present war situation.’ However, equally, ‘it was impossible for them, in accordance with their own conception of what the war was for, to take such action as would impair the effective conduct of the war’. The PLP’s support would strengthen the TUC, enabling it ‘to tell the Prime Minister that it was for him to see that the Party he led went to the same degree in order to secure national unity for the period of the war’ (TUC General Council, Special Meeting with the PLP, 15 May 1941, 4 and 5). On 3 September the General Council, gathering for the annual Congress, received a telegramme from Attlee announcing that Churchill had agreed a committee composed of an equal number of party and General Council representatives should meet for discussions (TUC General Council, 3 September 1941). Sir Eugene Ramsden, the Executive’s chair, emphasised to his committee that Churchill ‘was most anxious’ the party meet the TUC and a delegation was appointed (NUEC, 17 September 1941). Before meeting the TUC the National Union received a reminder of the party’s sensitivities on this issue. The Hackney Conservatives, for example, resolved that any attempt to alter the Trades Disputes Act during the War would be a breach of the political truce, and in view of the fact that this Act was a major issue at the last General Election, no amendment should be made until after a General Election. Should the Socialist Party make an attempt, the Committee would consider themselves no longer bound by the truce. (NUEC, 12 November 1941)

There was little disposition to compromise in the Conservative Party. A  three hour meeting with the TUC took place on 11 December. The Conservative delegation stressed they had no authority to negotiate an agreement and, in any event, the party opposed any change at this time.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

114

What about the workers?

Citrine emphasised that the TUC was not seeking to exploit the unions’ wartime indispensability but it was not ‘prepared to allow the war to be used as an excuse for refusing to redress the wrong done to the Trades Union Movement’. The TUC believed Churchill would accept some change but ‘he was being restrained. By whom? By the Conservative Party?’, which ought to ‘make a contribution to unity’ and remove a stigma, and the General Council warned ‘no one felt more strongly than the Labour members of the war Cabinet’. Refusal, Citrine hinted, could have major political consequences: ‘We needed some evidence of a change of heart on the part of the Conservatives. We were not prepared to accept the status quo to the end of the war.’ The Conservatives responded by suggesting that Civil Service affiliation to the TUC (banned by the 1927 Act) might result in ‘attempts to blackmail the Government’ and civil service unions might even affiliate to the Communist Party; both contentions were dismissed by the TUC because civil service union rulebooks contained no provision for strikes and these rules would not be changed by TUC affiliation (Citrine Papers 1941. Informal Meeting of the General Council with Representatives of the Conservative Party, 11 December, 1–​3). The Conservative delegation would report to the National Union Executive, which would then report to Churchill as party leader. This was a dialogue of the deaf. Citrine doubted the possibility of agreement and Headlam concluded that the TUC was ‘asking for too much’ and that its real object was ‘to put themselves in a position where they will be to all intents and purposes as powerful as Parliament. This would be bad enough even if they were not part and parcel of one of the political parties’ (D/​He 37, 11 December 1941). The Conservative delegation’s report and recommendations were presented in June by Headlam to the Executive. The report disputed the TUC’s claim that ordinary union members were deeply offended by the 1927 Act and the report concluded that getting reform ‘through the present House of Commons would be very doubtful’, even if the National Union Executive agreed with the TUC, because any attempt ‘would arouse the most bitter political controversy’. Thus, ‘in time of war, when a political truce has been agreed upon between Parties, there can be no justification for one party in a minority in the House of Commons insisting upon a change in the law which is wholly repugnant to the other party, under the threat that, unless its policy [was] accepted, there will be [a]‌ slackening of the war effort’ (NUEC, 14 January 1942). When the TUC asked for the party’s decision they were referred to Churchill but it took several weeks before the TUC received any reply. Churchill’s tardiness reflected both the scale of the demands on his time but also his consciousness of the matter’s sensitivity for both sides. Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was warned by a party delegation

511

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

115

‘for Winston’s benefit, that we meant every word in our report and stood by it, also that it had been accepted by the Nat. Exec’ [sic] (D/​He, 38, 16 April 1942). Churchill (accompanied by Wood) had met Citrine in June to tell him that the time for change was inopportune. Churchill expressed regret and suggested further talks but Churchill could be in no doubt about his party’s attitude. The unions’ attitude was equally clear (TUC General Council, 22 July 1942). A subsequent letter from Churchill, though friendly in tone, requested ‘as strongly as possible that the matter should not be stressed’ but Churchill was willing to reconsider the matter ‘if unity could be maintained’ but if this proved impossible ‘the national interest would be best served by the [TUC] refraining from pressing the matter at the present time’. Churchill’s letter, the General Council concluded, ‘did not [say] anything which advanced our case one scrap’ (TUC General Council, 4 September 1942). The affair was given a further twist when the Union of Postal Workers (UPW), followed by three other civil service unions (the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, the Post Office Engineering Union and the Civil Service Clerical Association), applied for TUC affiliation (TUC General Council, 25 November 1942 and 27 January 1943). The UPW had called on the 1942 TUC Congress to initiate ‘an active militant policy’ to remove ‘the indignity imposed on them by that repressive measure’ (the 1927 Act) but the General Council decided not to act because they recognised ‘they were embarking upon a road which might easily lead them into serious opposition to the Government’. A letter from Attlee stated that he, Bevin and Morrison ‘did not see that it was possible to do anything more in the matter at the present time’ (TUC General Council, 21 April 1943). There was, they concluded, no possibility of presenting any change to the Act as either non-​controversial or necessary for winning the war because clearly ‘It was a subject of direct Party controversy.’ The UPW still sought TUC affiliation with the General Council’s support but Conservatives had dubbed this ‘a direct challenge to the Trades Disputes Act –​if the Govt. gives way to a challenge of this description during the political truce, it will be disgraceful –​but I should not be in the least surprised if it did’ (TUC General Council, 26 May 1943; and D/​He 39, 29 May 1943). The TUC was exasperated that ‘For four years they had gone along the road of consultation’, but The General Council regarded the attitude of the Conservatives … as a test of their sincerity in the post-​war period. There did not seem very much evidence of the new spirit which was going to secure their broader legislation in the post-​war period … All they had received was advice to leave the matter alone … The General Council felt that if they could not [secure an] accommodation after demonstrating up to the hilt that the Trade Union Movement was vital in helping in winning the war, there was not much hope of getting it immediately following the war.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

116

What about the workers?

Whatever Churchill’s personal disposition was, ‘no progress was made because the Conservative Party had set their faces against concessions to Labour whatever’ (TUC General Council, 8 June 1943). The TUC challenge and the Conservative determination to protect the 1927 Act worried Labour’s ministers because ‘If the TUC asked the [PLP] to support the defiance of the law upon the floor of the House of Commons that would mean driving the Prime Minister to the country … at the height of his popularity.’ The PLP and the General Council believed Churchill would win a general election and the Act would only be repealed by a majority Labour government, so ‘They could either break up the Government or carry on.’ The UPW’s proposed affiliation was illegal under the 1927 Act, so any decision to prosecute the UPW would have been taken at the very highest levels of government, which meant Labour ministers would have to give (or withhold) consent and a decision either way would produce a major political crisis for the Coalition. Citrine, for example, did not believe that ‘the Movement would stand for members representing the Labour Movement using coercive measures against an organisation coming back into the [TUC]’ (TUC General Council, 8 June 1943). Several General Council members were anxious lest the UPW’s request provoked conflict within and between the unions and party but Arthur Deakin’s (Bevin’s successor at the TGWU) attempt to postpone the issue was defeated 13 to 8 (TUC General Council, 23 June 1943). Churchill readily conceded that times were totally different to 1926 and he was anxious to avert ‘a rift in the great democratic, national forces which are marching steadily on towards the final victory over Fascism and Nazism’. He declared he had an open mind on reform even hinting the time for change had come but the UPW’s decision, with the General Council’s support, defied the law. A  crucial principle was at stake. If reform was conceded now, ‘it would undoubtedly be said that we had yielded to the threat of breaking the law’, and so the UPW challenge would be met because ‘the position under the law is inescapable. The Government had no choice in this matter, the application of the law is automatic –​and absolutely clear’. The UPW’s members risked dismissal and the loss of pension rights and, under wartime regulations, prosecution if they continued in pursuit of their demands, but when the war ended the matter could be settled at the general election. The critical obstacle, as Churchill conceded (‘I do not think I could force a [bill] through Parliament even if I tried’) was the Conservative Party (Citrine Papers 1943. Deputation of Civil Service Unions to the Prime Minister, 3 August, 5–​6) and in July 1943 the National Union Executive reiterated its rejection of reform instructing the Party Chairman to so inform Churchill (NUEC, 8 July 1943).

711

War, conservatism and union power

117

The impossibility of legislation and that Labour ministers could not countenance law breaking were reiterated to Citrine by Attlee:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

I asked Mr Attlee whether it meant that he and his Labour colleagues in the Cabinet were prepared to use the law to intimidate the post office worker and prevent his union from joining the TUC … Mr Attlee said they would have no alternative in the matter but to carry out the law. It was impossible to legislate under a threat.

This led to a remarkable exchange: That raised the question as to whether they should continue in the Government … They certainly had not gone into the Government for the purpose of coercing civil servants and keeping them apart from other Trade Unionists. Mr Attlee said he realised that this might lead to a break-​up of the whole show, and I  agree with him. (Citrine Papers 1943. Memorandum of Interview, 9 August,  1–​3)

Attlee increased the pressure by announcing that Labour’s ministers would only attend meetings of bodies ‘not directly involved in the action contemplated’ by the UPW and the Government ‘had decided that it could not even discuss [its] merits so long as the threat to challenge the law otherwise than through Parliament existed’ (TUC Special General Council, 19 August 1943). The episode became a test of Coalition sincerity over reconstruction because ‘if the government, when the prestige of the TUC was at a maximum, would not give them this small thing, what was the hope of getting anything after the war?’ (Note the assumption that the Conservatives would win the post-​war general election.) For Conservatives the 1927 Act was not a small thing, but was rather of great significance. The categorising by Conservatives of these issues as ones ‘which they would have to discuss after the war’ led the TUC to suggest that Labour’s ministers ‘should be made to understand that [the TUC’s] relations with the Government were drifting … [they] had been given no hope or encouragement [and] they were not prepared to leave it at the status quo. They could see themselves drifting into the position of active opposition’ (TUC Special General Council, 19 August 1943). An open breach between the TUC and the Labour Party would have been a priceless political gift for the Conservatives. George Ridley, the PLP chair, suggested a compromise (this may have originated with Attlee, who had presumably cleared it with Churchill) that was based on Churchill’s comment at the August meeting with the civil service unions that he had no personal objection to their affiliation to the TUC. Ridley proposed a committee to explore links short of affiliation and if the UPW withdrew its application the government would rescind the threat of legal

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

118

What about the workers?

action. The UPW agreed in the Movement’s wider interests to withdraw its application (TUC Special General Council, 19 August 1943). Civil service union affiliation was, however, raised with Labour’s ministers, who remained reluctant to act and the provocative decision of the Scottish TUC to accept the UPW’s affiliation was later reversed (TUC General Council, 23 August and 16 October 1944). A final attempt to persuade Churchill was rebuffed. His letter to the General Council harked back to Chamberlain’s February 1939 stance that repeal ‘should be submitted to the electorate … their verdict would govern its treatment in the New Parliament’ (TUC General Council, 21 March 1945; The Times, 19 and 20 March 1945). Two conclusions can be drawn from this episode. First, the Conservative Party’s suspicion of the unions remained strong and was reinforced; and second, it confirmed their view that unions were exploiting the war to advance a socialist agenda. In combination these show the party to be essentially Chamberlainite in its fundamentals and to be deeply suspicious of the direction of politics.

Conclusions Although the union’s presence in government increased as a result of rearmament (planned to end in 1942), the prevailing view (reinforced by a strategic decision not to prepare for a long, non-​continental war) was that bipartite, industry-​level cooperation was preferable to national tripartite cooperation, as the former would leave the existing distribution of power unchanged. Chamberlain’s Government was determined that rearmament would have a minimal impact on the structure and distribution of power in politics and industry. This changed on 10 May 1940. Coalition required that both sides should compromise. Conservatives, for instance, had to accept the continuation of voluntarist industrial relations even in wartime and unions had to accept that Conservatives would never agree to changes in the 1927 Act (Jefferys 1995, 75). After September 1939 Conservative party organisation entered a period of desuetude. Although the party revived somewhat in 1942 and despite a widespread recognition of the likely consequences of war socialism, Conservatives felt themselves to be increasingly politically marginalised. However, the party’s overall narrative about, and understanding of, the unions underwent little change. Party attitudes towards the organised working class were complex and ambivalent. Conservatives recognised that the unions’ cooperation and engagement was essential to the war effort and that securing this would entail significant improvement in wages and conditions. The resulting full employment, however, was seen as the root of growing indiscipline and

911

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War, conservatism and union power

119

even of selfish and unpatriotic attitudes amongst the working class and their unions. Conservatives accused the unions, on the one hand, of encouraging workers’ selfish behaviour and lack of patriotism, but on the other hand they fully recognised the unions’ importance in managing the workforce and avoiding conflict. However, to an even greater extent than previously, the unions were seen as the prisoners of politically motivated minorities determined to use the war to force through radical changes in public policy and challenge managerial prerogatives. This is hardly surprising given that the Conservative parliamentary party was elected in 1935 and the party organisation in the country (where still active) was dominated by older, more right-​wing members, who saw Bevin, Labour’s position in the Coalition, the popularity of Russia and ‘Uncle Jo’, Churchill’s lack of interest in domestic politics, and the pressure for post-​war reconstruction as ill omens. This explains why the party repeatedly and resolutely defended the 1927 Act and why Conservatives insisted the Coalition rested on both a political and an electoral truce, and why episodes such as coal rationing and the Catering Wages Bill stimulated serious political conflict. The row over the 1927 Act demonstrated that older, deeper party attitudes were unchanged. Unions saw the Act as grossly vindictive and believed their wartime role justified reform; the Conservatives saw reform as a gross infringement of liberty and that such a contentious change (for Conservatives) should wait until after the war’s end. Labour ministers, constrained by the Coalition, searched for a compromise, but Churchill, who was determined to keep his party base loyal, and confident he would win the post-​war election and that Labour would not threaten the government’s stability, refused change (citing the same grounds as Chamberlain). By 1945 there was a disconnect between Conservatives such as R.A. Butler, who believed the war had permanently changed the unions’ status and role, and that the party had to recognise this change, and those in the party, probably a majority, who conceded the unions new status but thought it temporary. Their conception of the unions’ essence had not changed and they believed the unions would not surrender this status easily.

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

Introduction In 1950 the party leadership were warned that ‘the Conservative Party will not make headway unless the Trade Union Movement is brought to the fore-​ front of the Party’s policy … it is the wage earners who will sway the final issue on which the existence of this Country as a free one depends’ (NUEC, 13 July 1950). Labour’s landslide victory in 1945 and the unions’ newly acquired status meant all the elements in the party’s long-​standing critique of unions had finally arrived. The Conservative response to the rise of the organised working class combined One Nation politics and voluntarism, and had developed into a successful political strategy. However, the war simultaneously reinforced and jeopardised this strategy, forcing a re-​think that had three dimensions. First, policy (how should the party respond to the political changes underway); second, electoral (how should the party approach the organised working class); and third, organisational (what party structures should be directed at the organised working class)? The modalities of post-​1945 politics, meant that the unions and the organised working class were the core of contentious politics, particularly because of the emergence of ‘the British disease’ of, inter alia, restrictive practices, demarcation disputes, unofficial strikes, sterling crises, balance of payments crises, outdated industrial technology and poor management (Barnett 1995, 123–​151). Tarrow notes that ‘When people are thrown together in new configurations against new or different targets, they produce new forms of action and the words to describe them’ (Tarrow 2013, 14). This chapter explores the party’s efforts to develop ‘new forms of action and the words to describe them’ in the policy, electoral and organisational dimensions. It shows that the results were often meagre. Thus, The Industrial Charter had few, if any, major policy consequences; attempts to woo the trade union vote failed, notwithstanding the large numbers of trade unionists voting Conservative;

121

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

121

and, as in the past, efforts to organise Conservative trade unionists failed (Jones 1999, 171–​188; Taylor 2002, 85–​88). Developing a response to post-​1945 politics meant, broadly, reconciling a powerful tension between a governing imperative and an ideological reflex. The governing imperative required adaptation to ‘the new political realities’ in order to try to influence them; the ideological reflex called for the recognition of the unions’ potential challenge to governability. These two broad dispositions had to be reconciled in a strategy by the Conservative Party that would return it to government, and developing this reconciliation depended primarily on how a Conservative government would rule in the post-​war, post-​1945 world. This chapter explores Conservative attempts at reconciliation with the organised working class that reinforced the party’s emphasis on Conservative governing competence but this appeal was subject to two imponderables: first, what if the Conservatives lost their reputation for competence?; and second, what if economic difficulties and the unions’ perceived damaging role, meant the party’s historic critique of unions emerged to challenge the demands of the governing imperative?

Questions and dilemmas After the 1945 general election the party’s problem was ‘defining the relationship between Government, Industry and the Individual’ and the unions were a major component of this problem, and in this dilemma the party retained an instinctive dislike of the new dispensation (Conservative Party 1945a, 12–​15). Cuthbert Headlam, who had retained his Newcastle seat in 1945, was one of those Conservatives who complained about the workforce’s lack of engagement with the production drive but believed this would not change ‘so long as we submit to the dictation of the trade unions and kow-​tow to “organized labour” we simply cannot carry on’ (Headlam diary, 3 April 1948, in Ball 1999, 551). Conservative leaders readily accepted that union leaders played an important role in governance and saw the unions’ main responsibility as social control, to ‘maintain discipline among [their] members and induce them to honour in the letter and spirit the agreements which have been made on their behalf by their elected leaders’, which implied strong, centralised unions. However, there appeared little prospect of union leaders cooperating with a Conservative government to strengthen themselves at the expense of the union rank-​and-​file in the interests of Conservatism. Moreover, a policy of strengthening union leaderships would not be easy to sell to the party, which hardly relished stronger unions (Conservative Party 1945b, 20–​21). Britain’s economic plight called for drastic remedies but these had to be

122

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

viewed through the lens of their impact on the unions and the organised working class, whose cooperation was essential (for a survey of policy to 1955, see Smith 1990, part II). At the time of the 1947 fuel crisis Headlam, for example, regretted the consideration being shown to workers in general and mineworkers in particular; the government planned to give special food concessions to miners, more consumer goods in mining villages, more prefabricated houses, etc … The miners, in my opinion, have blackmailed the country in 2 wars –​continuously, indeed, since the General Strike … One simply cannot understand why so much should be done for the miners  –​or as we now call them ‘the shock troops of industry’. (Headlam diary, 28 February 1947, in Ball 1999, 490)

Harold Macmillan noted that higher wages had had little impact on output. This was a ‘tantalising dilemma’ and was ‘typical of Socialism in action, where high taxation and shortages of commodities, with rising prices has destroyed all incentive either to earn or to save’ (Macmillan diary, 4 January 1951, in Catterall 2003, 44). For many Conservatives post-​war Britain was truly the world turned upside down. The perceived need to conciliate (or appease) the organised working class limited the party’s options. In 1946, for example, R.A. Butler began work on revising Conservative policy to take account of defeat in 1945. Butler rejected incomes policy because of the trouble it would cause with the unions, who would not accept such a policy unless profits were included, which was anathema to business. Butler was convinced ‘restrictive practices’ in industry ought to be addressed but he believed that ‘The whole subject will have to be treated with great discretion since nothing is to be gained by antagonising the T.U.s who are very susceptible on the subject of their practices whether or not these have a restrictive effect.’ A proposal that the party should endorse enthusiastically incentive schemes (used widely in the United States) was scotched because ‘It would conflict with collective bargaining and antagonise the Shop Union [workplace branch], the Trades Unions and the worker generally’ (CRD 2/​ 7/​2 1947a; NUEC, 6 May 1948). Reformers like Butler also recognised that there existed a ‘considerable body of Conservative thought which is unsympathetic to and even opposed to trade unionism’, and the unions’ new prominence and role reinforced the ‘real doubts which all Conservatives have about the future trends of trade unionism’. Underpinning these doubts was the question: what if the unions refused to accept a future Conservative election victory? (Conservative Party 1947a, 2). The party’s position was riddled with contradictions: accepting freedom of association, for example, clashed with the closed shop, accepting the right to strike clashed with the right to strike’s consequences for the

321

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

123

community, and accepting a union political role clashed with the norms of parliamentary democracy. Moreover, the scale and scope of the unions’ role in governance was seen by many Conservatives as a de facto veto power and a significant threat to governability. A future Conservative government would not therefore threaten the TUC’s consultative and representative rights but the TUC and the unions would resist forcefully any changes directed at satisfying party opinion or changing the unions’ role in the economy. So, the unions’ natural and legitimate interest in public policy had for many Conservatives a major downside: ‘The monopolistic power gained during the war had translated the struggle from the factory to the political chamber and the Trade Unionist is in danger of becoming no longer part of a movement within industry, but of a vast Socialist machine’ (CCO 503/​3/​ 2, April 1947, 2). Addressing Conservative trade unionists when launching the policy statement, The Right Road for Britain in 1949, Churchill insisted Conservatives ‘support the principle of free collective bargaining between responsible Trade Unions and employers, and we include in collective bargaining the right to strike. They [the unions] have a great part to play and we think they should keep clear of party politics’. A  Conservative government’s primary obligation was therefore deemed to be to preserve free collective bargaining and voluntarism as a component of One Nation Conservatism. In his speech Churchill explored in detail the union-​ government relationship, contending that nationalisation inevitably extended state control over worker and union but events showed the unions, now so critical to governance, held a declining influence over their members because many workers saw them as instruments of workforce control. This was reflected in the prevalence of unofficial disputes and inter-​union conflicts which were portrayed in some party propaganda as protests by workers who believed their interests were being sacrificed by leaders who were more interested in influencing public policy. Churchill declared, ‘it will be our aim to maintain the closest contact with the trusted and able Trade Union leaders and to discuss with them means of improving working conditions. But we shall not ask them to compromise their position with their members by becoming government owned monopolies’ (CRD 2/​ 7/​11, 1949). This suggested a complex but possibly unstable relationship with the unions in which a Conservative government would abstain from interference with union governance even when union actions jeopardised wider cooperation. Butler insisted that Conservatism was compatible with tripartite consultation –​‘Consultation … to make the plan, free enterprise to carry it out’  –​and was superior to state socialism where ‘Everything planned by the Government and orders to carry it out are piped down from Whitehall’ (Conservative Party 1947b, 20). However, the unions’ role had

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

124

What about the workers?

become both more complex and sensitive and the party sought a nonpartisan union movement because ‘from the moment they tied themselves to a party [Labour] which makes a god of the State … unions have taken the wrong turning, their true function is to get as much as they fairly can from the “bosses” for their members. Now they are on the boss’s side, because the state is the boss’ (CCO 1949, Trade Union Bulletin, 30 October, 2). Free collective bargaining rested on voluntarism and non-​intervention but no government could ignore collective bargaining’s public effects, yet experience showed that state intervention in collective bargaining eroded both worker freedom and union independence and led ineluctably to the state to seek to control wage bargaining (Butler 1946a). This tendency, Conservatives believed, would culminate inevitably in a major political crisis as union leaders would eventually be compelled to choose between their members and government; if they chose government, the militants would take over, but if they chose their members they and the State would clash at a huge cost to the community (CRD 2/​7/​11 1950). It remained an article of faith for Conservatives that unions should not be party-​political and that politicians would do well to keep out of collective bargaining, but under conditions of full employment governments could not ignore the public consequences –​notably wage inflation and wage disputes –​of this ‘private’ activity. The tension between the public and the private could be resolved by promoting the development of more centralised unions where official leaders dominated the rank-​and-​file leaders but any attempt to achieve this would be resisted by both the Conservative Party and the unions. It would be a mistake to ask of the unions more than they could deliver. A Central Office analysis of the breakdown of Labour’s incomes policy (see Panitch 1976, 7–​40 for Labour’s incomes policy) emphasised that the low paid resented pay restraint at a time of full employment and the skilled worker resented the erosion of differentials, and significantly for Conservatives both groups appealed to individual freedom as justification for their stance. Incomes policy was a frontal attack on union freedom and union members feared that temporary restrictions on collective bargaining would become permanent. Not surprisingly there was a ‘growing belief that trade union principles are being sacrificed upon the altar of party politics’ (CCO 4/​3/​52 (n.d.); and CCO 1950 Trade Union Bulletin, January, 6). This situation, it was agreed, offered the Conservatives a major political opportunity. The Advisory Committee on Policy (ACP), after considering relations between a future Conservative government and the unions, concluded that Organised labour has won its place as a full partner in the state to be consulted equally at government level and on the floor of the shop. The Trade Union Movement has now firmly established itself as one of the three interests that

521

Milk and water socialism?

125

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

support our industrial fabric: namely, Labour, Management and Government. (ACP 3/​51/​13 1950, 1)

The ACP’s report concluded, therefore, that there was no reason to suppose a future Conservative government would not receive the unions’ full cooperation and it would be folly to do or say anything that implied the opposite. This meant that, first, the party (and government) should do nothing to destabilise the existing pattern of industrial relations; second, a Conservative government should consider positively any suggestion from union leaders to strengthen their authority; and third, no legislation should be contemplated without the fullest consultation (see, for example, CCO 500/​24/​4, 1950). Future tripartite talks, it was suggested, would focus on six topics:  first, the speedy withdrawal of remaining wartime restrictions on the right to strike. Restrictions on strikes in public utilities would be retained and possibly extended, general strikes would remain illegal, and strikes threatening the community (such as in the docks) would be handled using the Emergency Powers Act (1920), in the same way as the Labour Government (Jeffery and Hennessy 1983, 143–​ 180). Second, the party rejected a ‘National Wages Council’ but a Conservative government would expand the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s National Advisory Council on Productivity to consider improvements in industrial efficiency. Third, compulsory arbitration was ruled out but greater use by industry of the Ministry of Labour’s voluntary conciliation and arbitration services would be encouraged. Fourth, the closed shop in central government would be illegal and its effects would be carefully monitored in the nationalised industries. No measures would be implemented in private industry unless action was required to protect individual liberty and employers agreed. Fifth, despite continued party hostility to the political levy, it was apparent any future action by a Conservative government after Labour’s repeal of the 1927 Act in 1946 would provoke serious conflict. The party, as with picketing, promised only to keep the situation under review. Finally, no legislation would be passed to make secret ballots before strike action compulsory. As in the past the party leadership preferred the status quo to satisfying the party’s anti-​union sentiments which, they believed, would cause a furiously hostile response from the unions and which would seriously impact on governability (ACP 3/​51/​13, 1950). The simple truth was that the organised working class was simply too strong for a Conservative government to risk a clash. In the 1951 election Harold Macmillan confessed he was ‘impressed by the class solidarity of the Labour vote. They grouse, and tell the Gallup poll man that they will never vote Socialist again –​but when the election comes, they vote the party ticket’ (Macmillan diary, 21 September 1951, in Catterall 2003, 100).

126

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Industrial Charter Defeat in 1945 led the party to reconsider policy and strategy. Butler’s major concern was the transmission of Conservative ideas in a climate dominated by social democratic politics. A  manifestation of this concern was The Industrial Charter (including The Workers’ Charter) of 1947, which is portrayed as one of the party’s most important post-​war policy documents, representing the emergence of a ‘New Conservatism’ (see CRD 2/​7/​2 1947b for the Workers’ Charter). This is, however, largely a myth. Industrial relations were prominent in the party’s deliberations and, despite Churchill’s reluctance to sanction a major policy review, the Industrial Policy Committee (IPC) began work. Butler’s objective was to produce a broad statement signalling the party’s acceptance of the changes brought about by the war, and political, not doctrinal, considerations dominated. The Industrial Charter, the IPC’s most significant output, was a compromise: ‘it was indeed ‘broad’ rather than detailed, vague where it might have been specific, and restrained … this was largely because [Churchill] would not have tolerated the binding of the Leader before the party was back in power’ (Butler 1971, 135). However, a Conservative return to power was thought unlikely unless the party could convince voters it had changed. Though carefully composed and based on extensive consultation The Industrial Charter was still controversial and after its publication in May 1947 a campaign to ensure its acceptance by the 1947 conference began in haste. Churchill gave the impression he had not read it and disliked what he had been told, but it was approved by the National Union Conference with only three dissentients (Butler 1971, 135). The Industrial Charter accepted the established contours of the State–​ union relationship. There would be no interference in either collective bargaining or voluntarism but wage inflation needed to be controlled and so the Ministry of Labour would ‘keep the two sides of every industry informed about the general economic situation of the country … In this way wage levels may be kept in proper relationship to productivity and wage rates between different industries can be harmonised’ (Conservative Party 1947c, 12). The Industrial Charter recognised and emphasised the broader social value of collective bargaining and union involvement in the policy process, and it accepted a future Conservative government would take on the State’s role as a Keynesian economic regulator and guarantor of full employment. The country’s serious economic difficulties meant, however, that the Government would have to control wage inflation and end restrictive practices. This implied a potential for serious conflict with the unions (Conservative Party 1947c, 23).

721

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

127

The Industrial Charter’s analysis of the unions’ defects was located in the mainstream of Conservative thinking. ‘Trade unions must’, The Industrial Charter argued, ‘depend for their vitality upon a large and active membership and upon a leadership which has the confidence of the membership’, but the unions’ adverse economic impact (particularly wage inflation, restrictive practices and unofficial disputes) was blamed on inadequate leadership and membership apathy which permitted the unions to ‘fall into the hands of a small clique’. Participation by the moderate majority was the party’s panacea and The Industrial Charter was forthright: We do not intend to indulge in a game of political tit for tat, but there are certain issues [the closed shop and political levy] which raise important constitutional principles, and which we shall have to examine further … We consider that legislation should be introduced to restore … the Trade Disputes Act. (Conservative Party 1947c,  21–​22)

Part III of The Industrial Charter was The Workers’ Charter, and described how this new climate in industrial relations was to be realised (Conservative Party 1947c, 28–​34). The Workers’ Charter referred to human, not industrial, relations (Dorey 2002, 139–​162) which was based on the assumption there were no opposing sides in industry and The Workers’ Charter’s One Nation objective lay in ‘fostering a sense of united purpose among all those engaged in industry whatever their position’. As a manifestation of One Nation Conservatism The Workers’ Charter would not, however, be realised by legislation; government would establish codes of practice approved by Parliament and would publicise widely examples of good practice in industry. Employers were to be encouraged to treat their workers as individuals, provide welfare services, improve consultation and communication, and extend share ownership to encourage amongst employees a sense of common endeavour and identification with the fortunes of their firm. By no stretch of the imagination was The Industrial Charter or The Workers’ Charter a radical departure in Conservative thinking. Sir Waldron Smithers MP (Con, Orpington), who spoke against it at the annual conference, described it as ‘milk-​and-​water Socialism’ which Headlam thought it probably was. Headlam had read the Charter and believed it captured how things were done ‘in the best managed firms’, concluding ‘there does not seems to me much harm in this’. Perhaps because of these features Headlam doubted attacks on The Industrial Charter would have much effect on the party (Headlam diary, 4 October 1947, in Ball 1999, 523). The Industrial Charter’s impact was monitored by Mass Observation and the Conservative Research Department. They found it was ‘accepted by a satisfactorily large proportion of the Party. It has been well received by the Press [and] blunted some of our opponents’ weapons [and] has helped to

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

128

What about the workers?

confirm and consolidate a shift of the Party’s centre of gravity’. However, its publication evoked no popular response and it manifestly failed to provide ‘that clear concrete alternative policy to Socialism’ (CRD 2/​7/​7 M. Fraser to D. Clarke 8 January and 12 January 1948). The Charter was not, however, widely read and would not be unless it was presented in ‘simple working class terms’ and the person charged with this task had ‘aimed at the language of the cinema … The difficulty is that it is literally impossible to be both brief and intelligible to Demos’ (CRD 2/​7/​7 Mr Stelling to Mr Clarke, 11 November 1947). Although many businessmen applauded the Charter, a majority insisted they did not want it, or their endorsement of it, publicising in the workplace. Central Office tracked the Charter’s impact, and although the results were deemed disappointing, it concluded we ‘can weaken the hold which the Socialist Party has over Trade Unionism if we develop [the Charter]’ (CRD 2/​7/​7 M.  Fraser to D.  Clarke, 8 January and 12 January 1949). The Charter’s content was, however, perhaps less important than its existence. Lord Woolton, the Party Chairman, recognised its symbolic importance:  ‘People began to sense there was a new Conservatism, more practical in its outlook and therefore safer than the current Socialist practices’; but Woolton did not regard it as a ‘new Conservatism’ emphasising its continuity with pre-​war Conservatism (Woolton 1959, 359). The Charter was ‘saying … that the policy was new and different [but] [c]‌ontinuity of content was needed alongside a change of packaging and style … changing political fashion helped to restore such issues as freedom and housing on which Conservatives felt safer’ (Ramsden 1987, 63). In this period party propaganda stressed Conservative support for unions as participants in governance, even hinting that the latter now depended on the former, but Labour’s incomes policy and nationalisation were exploited to demonstrate the dangers of state control in an effort to challenge the party-​politicisation of the unions (Butler 1946a; Butler 1946b; Eden 1947, 8). As well as threatening the unions’ freedom as organisations, unions as party-​political actors threatened both individual political liberty and the constitution. Some in the party tried to outdo Churchill’s 1945 slur (he suggested a Labour government would need a Gestapo) by, for example, describing the closed shop as ‘slavish copying’ of Nazism: The TUC with the connivance of the Government, is deliberately setting out to create a British Arbeitersfront. The attempt to compel all workers to belong to certain approved Trade Union Organisations which are affiliated to the TUC and, therefore, to the Socialist Party, is a political crime of the highest order. (Rosebery 1947,  9–​10)

His Lordship’s spleen-​venting was hardly unknown in Conservative circles and the party’s reaction to Labour’s repeal of the 1927 Act in 1946 was

921

Milk and water socialism?

129

presented as a Labour Government meekly kow-​towing to its union bosses, but Labour’s parliamentary majority rendered Conservative opposition nugatory. Headlam, for example, complained that

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The tyranny of these unions nowadays is very alarming –​they are primarily political organisations and claim a complete dominion over their members –​ to deprive a man of his livelihood because he exercises his own judgement in political matters unconnected with his union or his job is a monstrous infringement of liberty. (Headlam diary, 25 March 1947, in Ball 1999, 495)

The repeal of the 1927 Act, trade unionists were warned, ‘means that you will have to pay to keep the Socialist Party going, or else publicly declare your politics as an anti-​ Socialist’ and thereby be made vulnerable to intimidation. The pamphlet cited above used a cartoon of two Brownshirt-​ like figures beating up and robbing a union member, demonstrating ‘as past experience shows, [union leaders] have considerable powers of coercion’ (Conservative Party 1946a; Conservative Party 1945c). Ending the legal prohibition on general and political strikes by the Labour Government was ‘a threat to Parliamentary Government and the Constitution’. ‘Why’, the party wondered, ‘do the trade unions want this power unless they expect to use it?’ (Conservative Party 1946b, 1; Conservative Party 1946c, 2). Weakened rules on picketing would increase intimidation and ‘short of actual violence a worker who refused to strike could be subject to every form of coercion. His home could be picketed; his wife and family could be abused, and their lives made intolerable’ (Conservative Party 1946d). In 1945 The Socialist New 6-​Point Policy predicted a Labour Government in thrall to the unions would result in more strikes intended to coerce the government and directed at a community hitherto protected by the 1927 Act (Conservative Party 1945d). Notes on Conservative Policy, published in 1948, is worth quoting at length: we look on the “closed shop” and the forcing of workers into a union as a denial of liberty … we deny the right to trade unions or any other body to dictate to the constitutionally elected Parliament of the country. We would declare by Statute that any strike or lockout designed to coerce the Government of the day is illegal. We recognise the right of any trade union to take part in democratic action by raising political funds. But we insist that the political levy should be confined to those members of a Trade Union who declare their desire to pay it. Industrially the Unions are threatened by indiscipline which culminates in unofficial strikes. We deplore these tendencies which if unchecked would undermine the Trades Union Movement, and the established and invaluable system of collective bargaining and negotiation. (Conservative Party 1948,  3–​4)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

130

What about the workers?

Union vulnerability to minority control was the inevitable consequence of membership apathy and intimidation by Communists and other militants, and ‘unless their leaders can control the shop stewards the majority of whom today are Communists –​so as these people run the show there can be no real peace in industry’ (Headlam diary, 3 July 1947, in Ball 1999, 512). These themes were continued into the 1950s. The union movement had clearly ‘outgrown its stormy adolescence’ but many unions had illegitimately entered the realm of party politics, committing themselves to a party dedicated to growing a State that would ultimately destroy them (Conservative Party 1953, 15. See also Conservative Party 1951a; Conservative Party 1951b). Of particular concern were unions using industrial action for political purposes and to coerce a Conservative government (Conservative Party 1954a and 1954b). Ministers would, of course, continue to consult the TUC but the TUC must acknowledge unreservedly the government’s right to govern, and if it did there was no reason why relations could not be cordial and fruitful (Conservative Party 1954c, 9). Conservatives were acutely conscious of the historical legacy of distrust between the two and the party retained its traditional critique of the unions, but too much was at stake for this to interfere with governance: It is to the credit of the responsible trade unionists of Great Britain that, in spite of the adherence which some have to one political creed, their co-​operation with the Government of the day, of whatever Party, has been exercised with sincerity and moderation, and has become part of the fabric of our industrial system. (Conservative Party 1954c, 20)

Neither deflation (which produced unemployment) nor a national wages policy (which stimulated worker discontent) was acceptable to Conservatives, but full employment could be maintained only ‘by the joint efforts of Government, employers and organised labour’ (Conservative Party 1955a, 13). Even while blaming union wage claims for inflation, Conservatives defended voluntarism and free collective bargaining as the best available means of resolving conflict in industry, and thereby contributing to political stability and governance: The machinery of collective bargaining is a private institution. It is worthy, we believe, to rank amongst the great achievements of the British constitutional genius. But we should always remember that it is the responsibility not of the State but of the industry in which it developed and by whom it was created. (Conservative Party 1955b, 9)

These sentiments contrasted with a more hard-​line approach that remained attractive to many Conservatives, and reconciling the two was difficult. A policy statement, The Right Road for Britain, had been finally wrung out of Churchill at Wolverhampton in July 1949. Churchill’s statement did not

131

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

131

depart markedly from The Industrial Charter, although the tone was notably more free-​market and anti-​statist; Churchill stressed the Conservative aim was cooperation between management, unions and government. Industrial relations would not be the subject of legislation, although Churchill promised action on the political levy and closed shop but only after detailed negotiations and with the unions’ cooperation (Conservative Party 1949). The 1950 general election manifesto, This Is The Road, drew on both The Industrial Charter and The Right Road for Britain, and was located squarely in the One Nation tradition. The manifesto opposed incomes policy and endorsed voluntarism, collective bargaining and tripartism, pledging ‘We shall consult with the Unions upon a friendly and final settlement of the questions of contracting out and compulsory unionism, on both of which Conservatives have strong convictions of principle, and on any other matter that the Unions may wish to raise’ (Conservative Party 1950). It proposed The Workers’ Charter be implemented only after extensive discussions with employers and unions, and the manifesto stressed the value of union involvement with government, pledged support for collective bargaining and once again there was no incomes policy. Similar themes were prominent in the 1951 manifesto, whose tone was influenced by the Conservative failure to win the 1950 general election: Nationalisation has proved itself a failure which has resulted in heavy losses to the taxpayer or the consumer, or both. It has not given general satisfaction to the wage-​earners in the nationalised industries. It has impaired the relations of the Trade Unions with their members. In more than one nationalised industry the wage-​earners are ill-​content with the change from the private employers, with whom they could negotiate on equal terms through the Trade Unions, to the all-​powerful and remote officials in Whitehall. (Conservative Party 1951c)

Every effort would be made to end Labour’s class war (‘appealing to moods of greed and envy’) and, as Conservatives, We seek to create an industrial system that is not only efficient but human. The Conservative Workers’ Charter for Industry will be brought into being as early as possible, and extended to agriculture wherever practicable. The scheme will be worked out with trade unions and employers, and then laid before Parliament. (Conservative Party 1951c)

Commenting on the 1950 manifesto Headlam opined that ‘of course 20 years ago one would have taken it for a Socialist pamphlet –​but times have changed’ (Headlam diary, 25 January 1950, in Ball 1999, 616). The circumstances in which the Conservatives entered government in 1951 influenced profoundly its approach to the unions. Despite the apparent importance attached to The Industrial Charter by Butler neither it nor The

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

132

What about the workers?

Two-​Way Movement of Ideas programme had any substantive influence on policy and despite the rhetorical endorsement of party sensibilities on the closed shop and political levy any suggestion of change was dropped. The Industrial Charter is perhaps best seen as the last flowering of the policy approach developed in the 1930s, for example, by Harold Macmillan (in The Middle Way) and other Tory Corporatists, and by wartime reformers such as the Tory Reform Group, and so it marks the closing, not the opening, of an era and it had no discernible consequences for the party’s electoral strategy or governance in the 1950s. The CRD’s review of policy after the 1951 election identified several imponderables that were to plague the Conservatives in government. First, the commitment to maintaining a ‘high and stable’ level of employment in the 1950 and 1951 manifestos was balanced by increasing warnings about wage inflation (of major concern to many party members, especially those on fixed incomes), which implied some type of wages policy even if confined to the public sector. Second, The Workers’ Charter was deemed voluntary and many sympathetic employers did not want their support to be publicised for fear of an adverse reaction from the unions (so how was compliance to be achieved?); and finally, Conservative rhetoric had appeared to commit a Conservative government to legislation (on, for example, the closed shop) but legislation would antagonise the unions, but not acting would antagonise the party (CRD 2/​7/​11, 1951). A  solution seemed to rest on persuading the party that continued electoral success depended on continued cooperation with the unions and persuading the unions to cooperate fully with a Conservative government.

The Trade Union Vote In March 1948, commenting on the Brigg by-​election, Headlam fixed on the working-class voters’ extraordinary loyalty to ‘the Movement’: How we are to break the industrial vote I  cannot imagine  –​despite all the pundits of the Rab [Butler], Harold Macmillan type, I don’t believe that the ‘Industrial Charter’ will do the trick –​we cannot offer these people (so-​called working classes) any form of policy which will be a greater bribe than the Socialists are giving them –​nothing but clear proof that Socialism must cause a national collapse will convince the ignorant voter that its gospel is fallacious –​ only hunger and unemployment will get rid of our present rulers. (Headlam diary, 25 March 1948, in Ball 1999, 550)

Macmillan contrasted the Conservative ideological appeal (built around opposing steel nationalisation) to Labour’s bread-​and-​butter appeal:  ‘the Socialists are sticking to full employment & the welfare state’ and two weeks

331

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

133

later he lamented the absence of any national swing to the Conservatives despite five years of turbulent Labour government (Macmillan diary, 26 September and 14 October 1950, in Catterall 2003, 21, 24). The Conservative Brentford Trade Union Council in 1950, for example, viewed ‘with alarm the failure of the Conservative Party to secure the maximum industrial vote’, asking the party ‘to recognise the fact that the industrial vote is allied to the Trade Union Movement, and there is urgent need for a large scale development of the [CCO] Labour Department’ (NUEC, 13 July 1950). The union vote was defined by the party as ‘that large section of Trade Unionists who are not Socialists by conviction but who “vote the Labour ticket” because of environment, pressure of local opinion or a sense of class loyalty’. This vote was critical to both Labour and Conservative electoral success but ‘Time is running against us and unless we can do something between now and the next election to pull over at least one million votes, which will assure our party of a working majority … then I am afraid we have had it’ (CCO 4/​3/​297, 1950a. H.V. Armstrong to Mr Watson, 5 May). The final draft of a strategy, The Trade Union Vote, considered by the Executive in May 1950, conceded Labour’s strength amongst trade unionists but noted that, as some 54 per cent of Conservative voters were wage earners and trade unionists, so it was ‘wrong to imagine that there is any clear distinction between the two parties’. The problem was that the solid core of ‘support for Labour remains unimpaired by events and impervious to our propaganda’ (NUEC, 18 May 1950; CCO 4/​3/​297a and 1950b, 13–​14). The rapid penetration of this vote by Conservatives was not thought possible so the party needed, first, a long-​term strategy of eroding Labour’s hold by addressing the widespread conviction amongst these voters that the Conservative Party was the party of privilege and was hostile to unions. Second, Conservatives needed to clarify urgently party thinking and policy on industrial issues (a further indication of The Industrial Charter’s lack of impact) and then communicate the results simply and effectively. Third, the party ought to become more sociologically representative of wider society and encourage more workers and trade unionists become party members and activists, and eventually candidates and MPs. Despite the large numbers of votes at stake, the hesitation surrounding discussion of The Trade Union Vote confirmed the party felt itself, as in the 1920s and 1930s, to be operating in an alien and hostile environment. Headlam, and many others, believed the party was the victim of long-​term hostile propaganda; ‘the working classes … have been taught to believe that if the Tories were to come back [into government] their wages would be reduced and they would be faced with unemployment’ (Headlam diary, 11 September 1947, in Ball 1999, 521). The best way to win over these voters

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

134

What about the workers?

was by a ‘friendly and social’ approach drawing union families into party activities; this ‘personal touch’ and ‘indirect approach’, characteristic of the pre-​1914 Primrose League, could, if done properly and sincerely, mitigate the party’s image of social exclusivity (CCO 4/​3/​297, 1950a, 1–​2). An early draft of the document recommended ‘There should be high-​level contacts with leaders of Industrial and Trade Associations who would be urge to encourage their members firms to conduct their affairs in such a way as to secure the goodwill and respect of their working class electors.’ Inculcating positive One Nation attitudes amongst the organised working class, it was thought, depended on the engagement of employers organisations (‘in which confidence can be shown’) such as Aims of Industry and the Economic League, who ‘should be informed of the plan and asked to cooperate’ (CCO 4/​3/​297, 1950a, 13–​14). This was dropped because knowledge of it would confirm the perception of many trade unionists of the Conservatives as the bosses’ party and because of the hostility of many employers. Operationalising The Trade Union Vote was the responsibility of the Executive’s Sub-​ Committee on Political Education, which on 24 May 1950, established a group to consider how the Conservative case could be presented effectively to union members. The main targets were the semi-​ skilled and skilled workers (soon to be known as the ‘C1s’ and ‘C2s’). CRD believed many union members had become discontented with the positions taken by their unions on a variety of issues that potentially rendered them open to a Conservative appeal (CRD 2/​13/​15, 1950a, 1–​2). The unions’ experiences with the Labour Government’s pay policy were, for example, presented as offering a Conservative Government an opportunity to erode Labour support amongst the organised working class. Union leaders’ endorsement of Labour’s incomes policy was presented as marking the shift from unions as defenders, to unions as managers of the workforce, with the Conservatives now on the side of the workers. This, of course, was a contemporary take on the party’s long-​established Disraelian narrative of the party–​union relationship. Labour was a bureaucratic state socialist party dominated by middle-​class intellectuals who used their partisan alliance with union leaders and their militant cliques to impose collectivist policies on an essentially individualistic working class. However, ‘30% of the working population is of a mentality which will respond to a “something for nothing” type of policy’ and was politically and electorally unreliable and ‘the sort of policy which would satisfy the shiftless and idlers would be to antagonise the more self-​reliant workers’ (CRD 2/​13/​15, 1950a, 2). The latter group were the Conservative target. The growing affluence of skilled-​workers and semi-​skilled workers, together with the increasing number of white-​collar workers, who occupied a position of great influence in the workplace and unions, encouraged social and psychological traits (flowing from expanding

531

Milk and water socialism?

135

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

home ownership and consumerism) that encouraged Conservative voting (Whiting 2008, 519–​536). Winning these workers over to Conservatism would stimulate a ‘ripple effect’ in the industrial vote that might shift as much as 40 per cent of the working class and trade union electorate to the party. Major obstacles, however, were high levels of class loyalty and poor industrial relations: The whole effect of Conservative policy can be destroyed in a whole district by the action of a bad employer … A good example … is worth more than hundreds of pamphlets … the same man who subscribes £100,000 to the Party’s funds loses many votes by his actions as an employer. (CRD 2/​13/​15, 1950a, 3)

The report noted that industrial workers were deeply suspicious of the party’s links with business and there was no easy way of eradicating this other than by patient work and the constant reiteration of simple messages. So, for example, it recommended speakers make constant reference to The Industrial Charter, stress the party was not anti-​union, that nationalisation and Labour’s state threatened union independence, free collective bargaining and voluntarism, employers should stress the benefits of cooperation under free enterprise, that Conservatives were committed to full employment and were more likely to deliver than Labour (CRD 2/​13/​15 1950b,  1–​2). In May 1950 the resources of the CCO education department were directed at the union vote. In June political education officers began to organise training and this became a major topic of The Two-​Way Movement of Ideas process, and specialist publications such as The Worker in Industry appeared. Some 10,000 copies of a Weekly Newsletter and other literature were produced and distributed in workplaces for the 1950 election. The CCO Publicity Department devoted a lot of time to identifying the most effective type of literature (‘simple, easy to read, and in character with the type of literature with which this section of the electorate were conversant’, similar points were made about speakers) but the days of the political pamphlet were over (CCO 4/​3/​297, 1950b). The Trade Union Advisory Committee structure seems to have played little role in electoral strategy (because of its organisational, financial and personnel problems) and a further inhibition was the party leadership’s caution (flowing from Churchill) and the desire not to antagonise the unions. The consensus concerning this effort’s effect on the 1950 election was that it was so limited as to be invisible (CCO 500/​ 24/​23, 1950; CCO 503/​1/​9, 1950). Victory in 1951 offered little comfort. Reports on the 1951 general election stressed the resilience of Labour’s core electorate: ‘in the early stages of the campaign there was a tendency for the support of the industrial voter to move away from Socialism, but with the whispering campaign on warmongering there was a hardening

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

136

What about the workers?

against the Conservative Party’. Fear of unemployment and an upsurge of industrial action as a consequence of a Conservative victory were also cited and Woolton, the Chairman of the Party Organisation, deprecated the Labour Party’s and the union leaderships’ use of ‘the Goebbels technique’ and their aggressive promotion of class sentiment. He concluded, ‘Now the Conservatives were in office they must strive to create in all people a sense of belonging to one nation’ (NUEC 1951; NUEC, 8 November 1952). A prescient analysis of the implications of the 1951 general election can be found in Harold Macmillan’s diaries. The fundamental political problem, Macmillan contended, was that The nation is evenly divided  –​almost exactly even … So the result is, once again, a moral stalemate. This follows a long innings by a Govt wh [sic] has made a tremendous number of mistakes; had had egregious failures in administration; and has been thrown about, like a rudderless ship in a storm, from crisis to crisis.

The incoming Conservative Government, with its small majority, faced being in office for three to four years ‘with the inevitable mistakes and failures … what will happen with so many almost insoluble problems, crowding on us, at home and abroad?’ An evenly divided nation meant the Conservative Party’s electoral base remained secure and this pointed to a strategy: The truth is that the Socialists have fought the election (very astutely) not on Socialism but on Fear. Fear of unemployment; fear of reduced wages; fear of reduced social benefits; fear of war … If, before, the next election, none of these fears have proved reasonable, we may be able to force the Opposition to fight on Socialism. Then we can win. (Macmillan diaries, 28 October 1951, in Catterall 2003, 112–​113)

This formulation suggested not a specific appeal to the organised working class but rather a Conservative government governing competently and ensuring a steady improvement in working-class (organised or not) living standards. In 1951 Labour polled more votes than the Conservatives (and more than in 1945) and did not lose a by-​election after 1945. This, coupled with serious economic difficulties, meant Conservative ministers and party strategists concluded that cooperation with the unions was absolutely essential to sustain governability and image of governing competence; the party’s attitude to the union vote also shifted somewhat as a result of growing mass affluence, growing public criticism of the unions, and the beginning of the erosion of traditional political loyalties. Combining these offered a way of developing a new Conservative appeal. This would attract trade unionists not as trade unionists, but as aspiring members of ‘the property owning democracy’ and ‘the affluent society’, and this strategy was deployed first in the 1955 general election.

731

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

137

In March 1953 Woolton noted with satisfaction the robust state of Conservative organisation, commenting ‘I believe that the most important and fruitful source from which we can develop our strength in the coming years is among the ranks of trade unionists’ (CCO 4/​5/​95 1953). As the party chairman, Woolton was, at least initially, convinced of the desirability of an explicit appeal to the trade union vote but after 1951 his scepticism about a direct appeal increased steadily. Woolton believed Conservatives could never realistically expect to dent Labour’s shop-​floor dominance:  ‘The factory floor has no equal as a last-​ minute political recruiting ground for votes, “Come along boys: vote the ticket”, is worth tens of thousands of votes.’ In a 1953 letter to Churchill commenting on the Stoke by-​election Woolton stressed the futility of a direct appeal to union voters as union members. ‘Our candidate’, he wrote, ‘was an official of the Miners’ Union, this is the third election he has fought, so that he is well experienced, but both the Miners’ Union and the Potters’ Union told him he was a traitor, and consequently they were determined to down him’ (Woolton 1959, 352; and Woolton Papers, Woolton to Churchill, 2 April 1953). The party should, therefore, side-​step the unions as organisations and, moreover, Woolton came to express increasing frustration with colleagues who seemed anxious to do anything to avoid antagonising the unions’ leaderships. At the time of a threatened rail strike in 1954, for example, Woolton believed appeasement of the unions by ministers was costing the government support and ‘whilst we should lose trade union support if we had a strike, we should lose a great deal of our own supporters if we gave way’ (Woolton Papers, diary, 13 December 1954). Although the government continued to emphasise, and work for, a positive relationship (explored in the next chapter) with the unions, this growing hostility was not confined to Woolton and it was to have profound implications for Conservative attitudes and policy.

Organisation In 1945 the Central Council called for taking every possible step to keep the Policy of the Party before the Men and Women employed in Industry, and for this purpose recommend the appointment of a Labour Adviser to the Party, and the formation of strong Area Labour Advisory Committees, which would keep the Executive informed of the needs and aspirations of the Industrial Electorate, and advise on the best method of appropriate Industrial Publicity and Propaganda. (Central Council, 28 November 1945)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

138

What about the workers?

Reports of irregular union practices and Communist influence were cited as reasons for reviving a Conservative trade union organisation. The aim was a network of factory cells culminating in a Conservative Central Trade Union Council, a Labour Organiser and a CCO Labour Department; a Central Trade Union Advisory Committee (subsequently the Trade Union National Advisory Committee, TUNAC) would advise the party on trade union matters (NUEC 1946; see also Taylor 1992, 21–​ 28). A  special executive meeting (30 July 1946) recommended reviving a trade unionists advisory group (local government, women’s and youth advisory groups already existed) and TUNAC held its inaugural meeting on 8 March 1947. It was addressed by members of the committee that had produced The Industrial Charter, who stressed the urgent need to address the party’s poor image in the eyes of trade unionists and they asked for its views on a wide range of workplace issues (CCO 503/​2/​21. TUNAC, 8 March 1947). TUNAC reported that Conservative trade unionists believed an effective appeal depended on the party acting on ‘the ideas and desires of the working man’ [sic] and complained that party speakers were seldom able to articulate or appreciate working-class feelings; moreover, the overall Conservative image was damaging. Woolton, acknowledging the force of these criticisms, promised a positive response (NUEC, 11 December 1947 and 12 February 1948). The Report on the Approach to the Industrial Worker raised once again the shibboleth of creating Conservative cadres inside the unions. Constituency associations were recommended to encourage young, married skilled workers to join the party to demonstrate its social inclusivity and, in what was a perennially unrealised objective, encourage the selection of working-class candidates in safe Conservative parliamentary constituencies (CRD 2/​13/​15, 1950b, paras vii–​viii, 3). The party should commit to maintaining skill differentials, the party’s attitude to the closed shop, the political levy and unofficial strikes (perceived as unpopular with many workers) should be clarified, and finally ‘free enterprise’ (a term believed redolent of the 1930s and an uncaring capitalism) should be clearly and positively defined (CRD, 2/​ 13/​ 15, 1950b, para. ix, 3). Ignorance had always tended to characterise the party’s knowledge of factory and workplace opinion and a draft of the report contained a section on intelligence gathering. This was deemed necessary ‘for keeping in the closest touch with working-​class opinion and for assessing the results of the campaign. This machinery should include sources in addition to, and apart from, the ordinary channels provided by our organisation’ (CCO 4/​3/​297 1950b, 15). This recommendation was dropped from the final report as too controversial.

931

Milk and water socialism?

139

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The party’s difficulty in identifying a ‘voice’ different to that normally associated with the party and which appealed to union voters was widely acknowledged: Although I  agree that personal contacts, if made by the right type of man [sic], are quite the most effective … the trouble is that there is so much ground to cover and that a very large number of professional organisers would be necessary to make any substantial impression. Even if financial considerations are ruled out I  am afraid that it would not be easy to find people with the qualifications for carrying out this work. (CCO 4/​3/​297, 1950. S.H. Pierssené to S. Bell, 22 March)

The obvious place to look for these individuals was the party’s labour organisation. Within a couple of years there were twenty full-​and two part-​ time organisers in eleven Areas, 169 Constituency Trade Union Committees (CTUCs), forty-five discussion and forty-nine factory groups, and 155 groups based on Conservative Clubs as well as thirty-four old-​ style LACs and mailings of the monthly Trade Union Bulletin indicated a membership of around 7,000. The influence of this apparatus was limited by the usual suspicion and dislike of labour organisation in the party, and in response the Central Council called for ‘greater and more vigilant attention to be given by all sections of the Party Organisation to the question of Trade Unionism and Industrial Organisation’ (Central Council, 17–​18 March 1949. See also NUEC, 13 February 1947, 9 December 1948, 10 February 1949 and 9 November 1950 for the movement’s problems). The Executive sanctioned a detailed enquiry into the organisation (NUEC, 15 May 1952). The Keatinge Committee, set up in May 1952, provided a comprehensive analysis of the Conservative union movement (see Table 5.1, p. 143). Of the 364 constituencies claiming a union organisation, 178 (around 48 per cent) exhibited no signs of life; where organisation existed it was often dependent on a few activists and many recruits dropped out after two or three meetings. The Central Office Labour Department found that organisers were difficult to recruit, expensive to train and they quickly lost intimacy with the workforce. A  second obstacle was social prejudice (‘A lot of die-​hard members … believed that Tory Trade Unionists were men with straps on their knees and red handkerchiefs’) and, not surprisingly, the movement had degenerated into a preserve of ‘Political adventurers and publicists’ (CCO 503/​1/​1, 1952). A Conservative Agent from the Midlands noted that ‘The basic [party] membership [is] “middle class” and many [constituency] officers are employers of labour’; furthermore the factory was alien territory so Conservatives were often not ‘in touch with Trade

140

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Unionists … Constituency Associations are lukewarm … only in a few cases do the Constituency Officers and Agents give sympathetic guidance. Seldom are the [CTUCs] asked for advice or given a job to do’ (CCO 503/​1/​1, 1952). The workplace, so integral to the identity of the working class, was alien and hostile territory for the party, because, The large Trade Unions have an iron grip on the Parliamentary and Local Government Elections and form the major part of the Socialist organisation. Conservative Trade Unionists have fear in proclaiming their politics although there are a number … occupying official positions in Trade Union Branches. (CCO 503/​1/​1,  1952)

It would take many years and great effort for the party ever to become a significant presence in factory political culture and this was thought very unlikely to happen. Despite the constituency associations’ social prejudice against working-class members, many Conservatives did recognise the movement’s potential propaganda value but there existed a disconnect between political work in the factories by Conservative trade unionists (which employers were reluctant to sanction) and the associations’ electoral tasks which took primacy (CCO 503/​1/​6, 1952). Conservative trade unionists often concluded ‘that the Conservative Party did not want the Trade Unionists, only their votes’ (which was to a large degree correct) and to be effective the organisation had to be composed solely of bona fide union members but this prompted suspicions of a party within the party (CCO 503/​1/​4,  1952). The Keatinge Committee’s report recommended that members should be active trade unionists (but not necessarily party members), organised in factory groups, which then combined into the Councils of Conservative Trade Unionists; their target was to be Socialist and Communist activity and their function was advising the party (NUA 6/​2/​9, 1952). Even though the proposed factory groups were not expected to meet in work time or in the workplace and although trade unionism was admitted to be a natural field of operations for the Labour Party, Conservatives were urged not to meekly abandon the workplace despite ‘Fear of intimidation, entrenched Socialism, [and] widespread apathy’. Only a long-​term approach based on cells of high quality activists offered any hope of Conservative gains but ‘it cannot be too strongly emphasised that no part of the Party’s Trade Unionist Organisation is intended to usurp the function of the Trade Union’ (NUA 6/​ 2/​9, 1952, 6). Combating Socialists, Communists and industrial militants in the workplace and union needed organisational and psychological support from the constituency associations and employers because whenever ‘Socialist and Communist views are being spread in factories and works employers should allow the Conservative case to be put independently to

141

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

141

counter it.’ If needed, Churchill should be asked to approach the employers to facilitate (NUA 6/​2/​9, 1952, 16). The post-​ Keatinge organisation followed a distinct trajectory:  the report’s call for an organisation in every constituency was never achieved. The number of District Council Trade Unions (DCTUs) peaked in 1957 and their failure was blamed on a lack of interest by the party: ‘associations very seldom ask for advice on trade union matters, partly because they do not take a great deal of interest in them and partly because they know nothing about trade union matters –​indeed they still have a certain hostility to them in any case’ (CCO 503/​3/​3, 1962a, 2). Party organisers often dismissed these bodies and their members as a nuisance and a distraction from their primary electoral and constituency concerns. A 1960 assessment concluded that few groups were active and many group leaders were neither trade unionists nor employed (CCO 4/​8/​143, 1960) and in 1964 The Sunday Times published pictures of a half-​empty hall where the annual Conservative trade unionists conference was being held. Only 300 of 600 available tickets issued were used and party officials judged the conference to be a waste of time and resources; The Sunday Times described the movement as a ‘hot-​house’ growth dominated by white-​collar workers, quoting an agent, ‘We’ll never really get anywhere so long as we insist in treating them as if they were Africans or something’ (The Sunday Times, 8 March 1964). The Industrial Department had asked Sir Toby Low (later Lord Aldington, the party Deputy Chairman, 1958–​63) in 1961 to review the organisation. Of the 381 associations (Table 5.2, p. 144) that responded to his survey (a response rate of 69.9 per cent), 219 (57.4 per cent) had no DCTU, whereas 162 (42.3 per cent) claimed an organisation of some sort. Of those without, 64 (30.7 per cent) cited the reason as constituency culture, 37 (17.7 per cent) that the organisation had lapsed, in 43 (20.6 per cent) repeated efforts to create a DCTU had failed, in 15 (7.2 per cent) the constituency association had objected to their creation, and in 49 (23.5 per cent) failure was blamed on a lack of support, enthusiasm, or leadership. Of these 71, thought the formation of a DCTU was still possible. Of those with a DCTU, 91 (56 per cent) met regularly (not defined), in 56 (34.5 per cent) the DCTU chair was a constituency vice-​chair, 96 (59 per cent) sent a trade unionist to the annual party conference and 133 (82 per cent) enjoyed the constituency association’s active support. Overall membership was in the range of 0–​50, with an average of 11–​30 (CCO 503/​3/​3 1962a; CCO 4/​8/​143 1961). The Low Committee submitted no final report (apparently ceasing to meet in January 1962) but concluded that the DCTU structure should be maintained and even expanded; arguing on the basis of slender evidence the party had received greater benefit from the union organisation

142

What about the workers?

than its numbers suggested (CCO 503/​3/​5 1962b). However, during the 1960s the movement declined and was not revived until the mid-​1970s (CCO 503/​3/​3, 1966; Rowe 1980, 217).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusions Defeat in 1945 did not lead to a fundamental refashioning of Conservatism but the Conservative approach was influenced by, first of all, the conviction that successful governance and its commitment to maintaining full employment, sustaining the welfare state and nationalisation required union engagement; and second, a recognition of the narrow Conservative victory in 1951 and the resilience of Labour’s support required a cautious approach. Despite the ballyhoo surrounding The Industrial Charter it had a limited impact, and the Conservative critique of the unions’ vulnerability to oligarchic control remained an idée fixe, as did its commitment to voluntarism as an aspect of One Nation. Worries that an incoming Conservative government would face a hostile union movement still bitter over the 1930s and now determined to protect their gains ignored the staunch constitutional conservatism of the union leadership and reflected the belief that unions were vulnerable to control by a Communist minority and were irredeemably partisan and hostile to Conservatism. The Conservative critique of unions stressed their organisational shortcomings but political necessity meant doing nothing that might disturb the status quo. However, by the mid-​1950s the perception was growing that post-​war industrial politics were revealing the limits of the Conservative approach to the unions and that a new one was required. Conservative elites appear surprisingly defensive with respect to the unions. The political environment made a direct appeal to the trade union vote, seem blindingly obvious and the party devoted considerable attention and resources to this segment of the electorate. These efforts, however, had little visible effect and it was increasingly thought that the decision of trade union voters to vote Conservative was not dependent on a direct appeal, because in the mid-​1950s union voters began to shift towards Conservatism, as accumulating social change and the perception of effective Conservative governance contributed to political and electoral change. Macmillan, for example, argued that if Conservatives governed competently, Labour would be left only with nationalisation and socialism, neither of which was popular. Conservatives had long recognised not all trade unionists were socialists and

341

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Milk and water socialism?

143

that the adverse Conservative image compared to Labour’s image of being ‘for’ the working class was a major obstacle. Growing mass affluence and good governance offered a response. Always present in the Conservative One Nation appeal was an appeal to the skilled, upwardly mobile working class, and attracting this group was central to the party’s electoral strategy. The Conservative appeal to the skilled worker could be combined with ‘the property owning democracy’, and the developing narrative of ‘the British disease’ into an electoral appeal that could embrace significant elements of the organised working class. The overall effect was not to remove the unions from contentious politics. Their role in governance and the workplace stimulated increased controversy, which had the effect of widening the gap in the party between those anxious to reach an accommodation and those who identified doing so as appeasement. Disguised by electoral and governing success, as well as by membership deference to leaders, this conflict became significant in Conservative politics. The next chapter shows how the seeds of a new approach to the unions were planted.

Table 5.1  Conservative Party trade union organisation and membership, 1952 Area

Organiser Councils %

London 1 Northern 1 NorthWestern 5 Yorkshire 1 East Midlands 2 West Midlands 2 Eastern 1 Home Counties North 2 Home Counties 2 SouthEast Wessex 1 Western​ –​ Wales and 1 Monmouthshire Totals 19

Groups %

Members %

26 23 50 15 12 21 16 26 26

10.0 8.8 19.2 5.7 4.6 8.0 6.1 10.0 10.0

30 70 34 –​ 44 27 13 6 6

8.5 19.9 9.6 –​ 12.5 7.6 3.7 1.7 1.7

2164 1065 2354 650 1749 1233 959 652 652

12.6 6.2 13.7 5.5 10.2 7.3 5.6 3.8 3.8

18 11 18

6.9 4.2 6.9

9 37 37

2.5 10.5 10.5

1094 1747 1509

6.3 10.2 8.8

260

351

17118

Source: CCO 503/​1/​1 (1952) Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation. Evidence of E.S. Adamson, 6 June.

What about the workers?

144

Table 5.2  The Low Committee’s survey of 1961

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Area London Northern NorthWestern Yorkshire East Midlands West Midlands Eastern Home Counties North Home Counties SouthEast Wessex Western Wales and Monmouthshire Totals

Constituencies Returns %

Without % DCTU

With DCTU

%

42 34 79 54 42 60 29 55

32 22 50 35 26 43 23 35

76.1 64.7 63.2 64.8 61.9 71.6 79.3 63.6

20 14 30 25 7 29 9 16

62.5 63.6 60.0 46.2 26.9 67.4 39.1 45.7

12 8 20 10 19 14 14 19

37.5 36.3 40.0 28.5 73.1 32.6 60.8 54.3

51

39

76.4

23

58.0

16

41.0

37 28 36

34 26 16

91.8 92.8 44.4

22 12 12

64.7 46.1 75.0

12 14 4

35.3 53.8 25.0

547

381

57.4 162

42.5

69.6 219

% With/​Without District Council of Trade Unions (DCTU) = % of returns

Source: Calculated from data in CCO 4/​8/​143 (1961) Questionnaire on Conservative Trade Unionist Organisation, 31 May.

6

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

Introduction In January 1956 a Daily Telegraph editorial delivered a devastating verdict on Eden as Prime Minister: Why are Conservatives around the country restive, and Ministers and backbenchers unenraptured with their leader? There is a favourite gesture of the Prime Minister which is sometimes recalled to illustrate this sense of disappointment. To emphasise a point, he will clench one fist to smack the open palm of the other hand –​the smack is seldom heard. Most Conservatives, and almost certainly some of the wiser trade union leaders, are waiting to feel the smack of firm government. (Daily Telegraph, 3 January 1956)

What was ‘firm government’? To what end was it to be directed? The reference to union leaders gives an important clue. The politics of free collective bargaining was a fundamental concern of all Conservative governments after 1951. High union membership and full employment increased union bargaining power whilst the 1944 commitment to full employment, One Nation politics and voluntarism limited the Government response. Government concern over union induced inflation and its fear of deflation-​induced mass unemployment made wages policy increasingly attractive (see, for example, PREM 11/​1402, 1956; Booth 2000, 827–​847) but the risks of promoting such a policy were great. The policy Holy Grail was disinflation. Disinflation occurs when the consumer price index increases more slowly than in the previous quarter (for example) and thereby influences bargaining behaviour by reducing inflationary expectations and pressure for compensatory wage (or price) increases. Wage increases were a problem because of ‘stickiness’ caused by unions, collective bargaining and the inflexibility of labour markets, which tended to sustain the rate of price increases. Policy-​makers opted for what they believed would be a politically neutral and gradualist response to avoid conflict but disinflationary policies lacked credibility and were easily

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

146

What about the workers?

circumvented in a decentralised industrial relations system like Britain’s. The political objective of disinflation was to avoid a wage–​price spiral that would stimulate employers and unions into seeking compensatory price (or wage) increases; disinflation also would preserve full employment, price stability and economic growth with minimum political disruption. Whatever its economic drawbacks, disinflation was politically attractive. However, a lack of success in dealing with wage inflation and growing turbulence in industrial relations stimulated growing interest in the Government and Conservative Party in both the reform of trade union law and incomes policy as solutions to ‘the union problem’. These policies, many Conservatives increasingly believed, were the epitome of ‘the smack of firm government’.

Moncktonism Two factors underpinned the Churchill Government’s attitude to the unions:  first, the narrowness of the Conservative victory in 1951; and second, the attitude of Churchill. It is easy to forget that the scope and scale of his involvement with the unions was probably greater than that of any other British politician (Seldon 1981, 196–​207; Wrigley 2004, 47–​63). Innate political caution, long experience, the legacy of full employment, voluntarism and the One Nation tradition, determined his government’s relationship with the unions. Churchill pithily summed up his government’s strategy thus:  ‘the programme of the Tory Party must be:  ‘ “Houses and meat and not being scuppered”… [and] he subsequently added, perhaps “not being broke” is going to be our major difficulty and preoccupation’ (diary, 22–​23 March 1952, in Colville 1987, 298). Good relations with the unions were fundamental to avoid being scuppered and this ruled out other more radical choices, such as Operation ROBOT, a plan to float the pound to deal with recurring balance of payments and Sterling crises that would have transformed politics (including the role of the unions) and undermined the commitment to full employment and the welfare state (Bulpitt and Burnham 1999, 1–​31; Burnham 2000, 379–​408). The Government was not, at least initially, overly concerned with wage inflation, being more worried about maintaining full employment, prosperity and the consultative relationship with the TUC in the interests of sustaining governability. These worries were reflected in Churchill’s reconsideration of David Maxwell-​ Fyfe’s appointment as MLNS after the latter made speeches before the 1951 election suggesting a return to the 1927 Act leading to his replacement with the ‘non-​party’ Sir Walter Monckton to what Churchill described as ‘the worst job in the Cabinet’. Monckton’s remit was clear:

741

The smack of firm government?

147

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Winston’s riding orders to me were that the Labour Party had foretold grave industrial trouble if the Conservatives were elected, and he looked to me to do my best to preserve Industrial peace. I said that I should seek to do that by trying to do justice in the many problems and disputes which would come before me according to my lights without worrying about party politics. (Monckton Papers, n.d., 49 Autobiographical Fragments, 5 and 8)

Monckton’s appointment was something of a surprise (not least to himself) and while Churchill’s support rendered him fire-​proof there was no doubt Monckton had personal and professional qualifications that suited the MLNS. Macmillan, for instance, regarded Monckton as one of Churchill’s best appointments, ‘handling the trade union leaders with consummate skill’ (Macmillan diary, 10 July 1952, in Catterall 2003, 170). Not for nothing was Monckton dubbed ‘the old oil-​can’. Despite Conservative fears that many unions would not be disposed to cooperate with a Conservative government, the TUC General Council committed itself to cooperation with the Churchill Government (in response to an unofficial strike of oil tanker drivers Arthur Deakin, the TGWU general secretary, told Monckton that deploying troops was fully justified) but Monckton recognised the unions would not countenance interference in collective bargaining (PREM 11/​ 543, 1953; Birkenhead 1969, 300). Notwithstanding, Ministers believed the economic situation would be made vastly easier by union wage restraint, but this was only likely if accompanied by price restraint (LAB 43/​179, 1952). Inflation, triggered by the Korean War, however, led to Monckton’s unprecedented reference back to twelve Wage Council awards (hitherto Wage Council awards had always been accepted by Ministers) –​ an action interpreted by the unions as a significant attack on established procedures. In May 1952 Butler, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, warned the National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) that the room for wage increases was extremely limited, Prices cannot be kept down if wages and salaries keep on rising unreasonably. It would be foreign to our ideas and practices to attempt to curb wages and salaries by central direction and administrative fiat. Responsibility rests on both sides of industry to establish conditions under which the national wage bill will advance in step with national production but not outstrip it, without destroying the flexibility of relative wages. (The Times, 16 May 1952)

Butler favoured appointing an expert committee to consider the relationship between wages, prices and productivity, and to identify and publicise the national interest in an effort to influence wage bargaining, and in this speech we can discern the contours of the Government’s approach to wages. Monckton insisted he must take Butler’s statement seriously and in referring back the Wage Councils’ proposals he believed

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

148

What about the workers?

he was satisfying his statutory duty as well as laying down a clear marker for bargainers. Monckton denied his actions undermined good governance, nor did they prejudice his, or the Ministry’s, mediating role in industrial disputes, or discourage a spirit of cooperation (Hansard, 21 July 1952, cols. 35–​ 44). Butler’s policies and Monckton’s actions led to the TUC meeting Churchill and Monckton who assured them the government did not intend an attack on the unions or on free collective bargaining (PREM 11/​ 315, 1952). Ministers were cautious about undertaking any rapid shift in policy for fear of producing ‘a degree of unemployment which the people (after years of over-​full employment) will regard as intolerable and … deliberately organised by the Tories’ (Macmillan diary, 29 March 1952, in Catterall 2003, 154). Butler’s economic programme (which entailed cuts in cost-​of-​living subsidies of around £160m), nevertheless, led Monckton to complain in Cabinet that this policy imperilled government relations with the unions (CAB 129/​53 1953) but Butler’s measures, though controversial, had little impact on the relationship with the trade unions (Seldon 1981, 166). Monckton generally preferred informal face-​to-​face conciliation, but also made extensive use of Courts of Inquiry to build agreement and compromise. He was not an innovator in industrial relations and his methods were clearly those of his predecessors dating back to the 1890s. He described his approach thus: One’s task was not to give judgement as in a Law Court, it was much more to examine and explore the field of conflict and reduce it patiently to its narrowest limits and then to indicate a way in which … the Parties might find a way of getting together. (Monckton Papers, 5 Monckton to Macleod, 20 January 1953, 7)

When trouble threatened ‘Moncktonism’ meant extensive contact with employers and with what were frequently referred to as ‘the wiser Trade Union leaders’ (Monckton Papers 192, Monckton to Eden, 3 September 1955) but even when his methods were successful it became apparent that they often resolved nothing. Over time this stimulated a reaction to Monckton’s methods and philosophy. In 1952 Charlie Geddes, the chair of the General Council, had emphasised the TUC had no wish to increase the Government’s economic problems but he stressed it was increasingly hard to convince TUC affiliates to moderate wage claims when prices and profits were rising (PREM 11/​ 1636 1952, Monckton to Churchill, 19 September). A good example of the Government’s problems was illustrated by the Cameron Report into a rail dispute that raised complex issues of nationalised industry finances and private–​public sector pay comparability. The report argued that

941

The smack of firm government?

149

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Nation has provided by statute that there shall be a nationalised system of railway transport, which must therefore be regarded as a public utility of the first importance. Having willed the end, the Nation must will the means. This implies that employees of such a national service should receive a fair and adequate wage, and that, in broad terms, the railwaymen should be in no worse case than his colleague in a comparable industry. (Cmd 9352 1955, para. 10, 6)

Government, the Court of Inquiry concluded, was therefore obligated to make resources available to an industry lacking them in order to pay its employees rates comparable to other (profitable) private industries. Not surprisingly doubts were increasingly expressed about Moncktonism. Free collective bargaining, ministers were convinced, did serious damage but government options were limited except for ‘occasional attempts to make the flesh creep’. The Cabinet were reluctant to confront the public with the seriousness of the country’s predicament, ‘So things drift on’ (Macmillan diary, 30 May 1952, in Catterall 2003, 163–​164). ‘Set the People Free’ had been a seductive slogan but it implied continued non-​ interference in union governance and wage bargaining even though both were identified as significant problems and some, such as Lord Woolton, a former party chairman, became convinced confrontation was inevitable, desirable and necessary (Woolton 1959, 380; see also Butler 1971, 164). Conservatives believed a conviction existed amongst the unions that the party was irredeemably hostile to them,  a conviction that made Conservatism electorally vulnerable and complicated governance, and which made Conservatives loath to challenge the unions. However, over time, Monckton’s approach was perceived not as a solution but as part of the problem but for the time being, with Churchill’s support, Monckton and his approach was secure. ‘There is of course’, Monckton mused in 1952, ‘still the query whether a moderate agreed rise in costs would be less harmful … than the cost of a prolonged dispute’ but relief at avoiding a major disruption in the rail industry (for example) was inevitably balanced by a recognition that avoidance was merely a postponement and increased the likelihood of further disputes (PREM 11/​1636, 1952; also Monckton Papers 1955, 5, Macleod to Monckton, 16 January). In 1953, for example, Monckton narrowly averted a rail strike but he feared the inevitable wider effect would be to stimulate further wage claims. Macmillan urged ‘firmness’ but Monckton thought this was unrealistic because Churchill and Butler “wanted peace at any price” (Macmillan diary, 20 December 1953, in Catterall 2003, 280). Ministers disbelieved employer pronouncements favouring resistance (they were making high-​profits and could pass on increased costs) and when Butler asked Monckton hint to bargainers that they moderate their

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

150

What about the workers?

wage claims because the evidence indicated the price index would soon fall, Monckton refused because to do so ‘would do positive harm by prejudicing my position as an impartial and neutral intermediary … and would give colour to left-​wing propaganda which seeks to identify … the Government with the employers’ (LAB 43/​243, 1955). Monckton, however, sensed his ‘honest broker’ role had created the widespread perception that ministers were anxious to avoid conflict (thereby encouraging it) concluding ‘What we had to do [i.e. concede] was not good, but better than the alternative [i.e. conflict]’ (CAB 129/​75, 1955; Monckton Papers 1955, 5 Monckton to Macleod, 20 January) and electoral calculation inevitably neutralised Monckton’s intuition that confrontation was probably inevitable. In response to a 1954 railway dispute, for example, Woolton ‘was interested to note that Monckton –​for the first time in my experience –​was against giving way [which] would start off another series of demands from the miners, postmen, engineers, etc.’. The Cabinet conceded that backing down would cost it support, but nevertheless Woolton ‘didn’t see why they would not see it through’ (Woolton Papers, diary, 13 December 1954). The reason why –​notably fear of a major confrontation and a political and economic crisis –​was discussed extensively by a committee on industrial relations, but its members found no solution other than the status quo (see CAB 134/​1273 1955 for details of this debate). Churchill’s support of Monckton and the Cabinet’s belief that a historically high level of inflation was a price worth paying for full employment bolstered Monckton’s conciliatory policy (Seldon 1981, 204). This approach did not change when Eden became Prime Minister after Churchill’s retirement in 1955; Monckton was replaced by Iain Macleod at the MLNS (see Fisher 1973, 107–​ 140; Shepherd 1994, 106–​113;). In the Cold War climate of the 1950s strikes were often blamed on the machinations of Communists (Maxwell-​Fyfe, the Home Secretary, was convinced Communists were trying to engineer a General Strike) but Eden told Macmillan, his Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he ‘wd like to revive the general policies of the Industrial Charter and to take some lead, with the covert, if not the open approval of the moderate T.U. leaders’ (Macmillan diary, 12 January 1954, in Catterall 2003, 288). Eden’s reputation was as a foreign policy expert which led him to work hard to develop a close relationship with members of the General Council (Rhodes James 1986, 409, 414–​415; Eden 1960, 318–​319 and 324–​326). Particularly vexing for Eden, was what he considered to be the TUC’s powerlessness (a product of the strength of voluntarism) because, as Macmillan pointed out, the General Council was dominated by ‘moderate men and know that rising wages followed rising prices do little good to anyone … they would like moderation. But they are not dictators and they have to keep

151

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

151

the sympathy of their workers if they are to go on leading them’ (T 230/​ 309, 1956). Moderate union leaders were invited to secret dinners at, for example, the Dorchester. Attendance was carefully calibrated. To a request for a suitable companion to accompany Tom Williamson (a former Labour MP, general secretary of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, 1946–​61 and TUC President, 1957–​58), Monckton suggested in order of preference ‘Sir Lincoln Evans [Iron and Steel Trade Confederation general secretary 1946–​53, then nationalised deputy-​chair of Iron and Steel Board, who had helped Conservative ministers with steel privatisation], Alfred Roberts [assistant general secretary of the National Union of Vehicle Builders and General Council member] and C[harles] J. Geddes [general secretary of the Union of Postal Workers 1944–​57 and in 1955 President of the TUC]’. Honours were also distributed (all of the above received them). Eden, for example, asked Monckton whether Tom O’Brien (a Labour MP 1945–​59, general secretary of the National Association of Theatrical and Kine Employees 1932–​70 and a member of the TUC International Committee) or Tom Williamson should be knighted. Monckton advised that Williamson was more important but ‘as Deakin’s successor as the leader of the right wing in the trade union movement, it might be better tactically for him not to get an honour immediately’. O’Brien was the second most senior member of the General Council and despite ‘occasional lapses of judgement’ (articles in the left-​ wing Tribune and criticism of the United States) Monckton believed ‘his bluntness and forthrightness have been a great help … he has in my time taken a courageous line at risk to his own position, and his personal intervention has more than once helped to steady his colleagues and bring them down on the side of good sense and responsibility’. Eden questioned this assessment, but Monckton reiterated that honouring Williamson now would be a mistake because ‘if the impression were given that recognition –​ particularly when it is in the gift of a Conservative Government  –​went automatically and immediately to the leader of the [TUC] right wing’ that person’s usefulness to the government would be over. Monckton discussed this with Williamson who agreed (he was knighted in 1956); O’Brien was subsequently knighted (Monckton Papers 1955, 19 Monckton to Eden, 18 November and 19 December). Harold Watkinson, the parliamentary secretary at the MLNS, reinforced Monckton’s view. Efforts to increase the General Council’s power, he cautioned Eden, had been blocked by Jock Campbell (a Communist, elected general secretary of the NUR in 1953 and a General Council member), ‘who I think is a very bad man’, and Frank Foulkes, another Communist, of the Electricians’ union. Watkinson believed the moderates’ task ‘would be made easier if the Government gave them a strong lead’ but Monckton

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

152

What about the workers?

warned Eden that the General Council might be tempted to try to outflank Communist influence in the TUC by attacking the Government (PREM 11/​ 1043, 1955). Perennial unrest in the mines despite nationalisation reinforced Woolton’s belief that a showdown with the unions was inevitable. The country’s dependence on coal meant a coal strike’s consequences were so severe that the General Council and National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) moderates would probably try to assert themselves vis-​à-​vis the militants, but the possibility of facing down a miners’ strike was discussed by ministers, although, as Woolton noted acerbically, Eden had ‘just been down a mine in Durham and was so impressed by the cordiality of [his] reception … he could not bear to contemplate anything so rough as this’ (Woolton Papers, Woolton to Macmillan 24 October 1955). Charlie Geddes, discussing the state of industrial relations with Macmillan, urged the Cabinet to ‘take advantage of the present state of public opinion and get some discipline restored to the Trade Unions’; Macmillan agreed but ‘the problem was, how to act in full alliance with a Tory govt, without the cry of betrayal being raised by extremists’. By June Eden was having second thoughts about taking a hard line and Macmillan concluded it was ‘very dangerous to take up too firm a position’ (Macmillan diary, 8 June and 13 June 1955, in Catterall 2003, 434–​435). Macmillan cautioned that ‘the TUC are very sensitive about the accusation of being “Tory stooges”. Their sensitivity was increased because the union leadership believed the government was correct about the effect of wage increases’ (PREM 11/​1402, 1956). Ministers were facing the consequences of long-​term political and economic changes that had ‘affected the spirit of the men’:  ‘Before the war Railwaymen, relatively to other workers, were in a secure and adequately paid employment. Now, compared with for instance miners or steel workers, they are underpaid’ (CAB 129/​68 1954; see also PREM 11/​775, 1954). By 1955 Monckton was blaming over full employment for the government’s difficulties even suggesting ‘It may well be that … there will have to be a showdown at some point but we must be careful in selecting the issue.’ The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen’s (ASLEF) strike in the run-​up to the 1955 general election perhaps crossed a threshold as ‘they would be interfering with the process of democratic government in this country’ (PREM 11/​1637, 1955). Charlie Geddes made it clear to ministers that a majority of the General Council believed it was impossible to convince union members of the sense of wage moderation when profits were increasing and implied that a harder line from the government vis-​à-​vis the employers might help, but Macmillan feared a hard line on wages and prices would trigger an economic and political crisis. Eden told Macmillan he was convinced inflation was now the government’s single most serious economic problem, urged Macmillan

351

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

153

do all he could to achieve wage moderation and asked Harold Watkinson to request Charlie Geddes say nothing in his speech on wages and prices to the 1955 TUC that might undermine sterling (PREM 11/​1883, 1955). Civil servants at the MLNS and Treasury were working towards a wages policy via the Ministerial Committee on Industrial Relations and the Informal Group on Industrial Relations composed of Treasury and MLNS representatives. The 1944 full employment commitment remained sacrosanct, but the Treasury wondered what level of unemployment would influence the inflation rate at a time when mass unemployment was considered politically and electorally insupportable. The post-​war norm of around 2 per cent unemployed was clearly insufficient but ministers were unlikely to sanction an unemployment rate high enough to influence bargainers. and so this left the usual mix of persuasion, education and indirect policy manipulation, although ministers accepted that achieving price stability required changes in union bargaining behaviour. Two decades of full employment had weakened the threat of insecurity amongst a highly unionised working class habituated to rising wages and living standards. The Treasury endorsed ‘trying to establish … confidence and understanding and a realisation that the economic process is a joint endeavour with a social purpose in which those who take part have responsibility not only to one another but also to the community as a whole’ (T 234/​91 1955, 7). There were no clear policy options: the MLNS rejected legislative solutions, a Royal Commission would require TUC cooperation (which was highly unlikely), price control would antagonise business and government intervention in wage bargaining would worsen relations with the unions. The Treasury argued the UK’s experience of full-​and over-​full employment since 1940 meant even a marginal increase in unemployment might have a dramatic political effect (CAB 134/​ 1273 1955, 23 July). The MLNS agreed but noted the TUC would demand rent, price and profit controls as a quid pro quo, and until inflation fell why should the unions agree to wage moderation? Ministers and civil servants believed, however, there were encouraging signs of the unions shifting their position so precipitate action would do more harm than good and Government should encourage these developments (CAB 134/​1273, 1955, 28 July). The MLNS hoped to persuade unions that the wage-​price spiral was self-​defeating (something many union leaders already privately accepted) but the Treasury concluded ‘This is a very hard task for political leadership. Self-​interest, reinforced by group loyalty, is a powerful force to combat, and the voice of reason is at present muffled by a good deal of political suspicion and mistrust’ (CAB 134/​1273 1955, 23 July). Macmillan’s diary for 1956 refers frequently to relations with the TUC. Macmillan describes the TUC’s attitude as follows: ‘We want to help [but]

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

154

What about the workers?

[w]‌e don’t want to be called Tory stooges’ (27 March) but a serious problem was that ‘The T.U.s are getting into the hands of Communist leaders, and the employers are too weak or too selfish to resist’ (12 May); and (24 June) he noted a new left-​wing leadership had taken office in the TGWU and that was likely to stimulate change in other unions (Catterall 2003, 546, 559, 568). A meeting in Eden’s room at the House of Commons in May 1956 discussed the limitations on the General Council and whether this might be balanced by an appeal to a public opinion thought to be increasingly hostile to union wage demands. Political change in unions like the TGWU was a major complication and Macleod, now Minister of Labour and National Service, warned that Frank Cousins, elected the TGWU general secretary in May 1956, represented a new element who ‘were well to the Left … although they are in no sense Communists, but they are not persuaded of the necessity for a halt to wage increases’ (LAB 43/​276 1956; Shepherd 1994, 123–​128). Macmillan opposed deliberately induced unemployment as a policy tool, noting that The collective bargaining power of the trade unions is considerable in a state of full employment; but is it really right to use that power to contract out of a measure of sacrifice imposed on the community in an effort to deal with inflation? (Hansard, 20 February 1956, col. 57)

Balance of payments and Sterling crises would require deflation, which would increase unemployment, but Macmillan’s medium-​and long-​term economic objectives were growth, which, he conceded, threatened rising inflation. Macmillan portrayed the fight against inflation as a fight for full employment but his difficulty was finding effective weapons to fight inflation to supplement appeals to self-​discipline and moderation. This problem was apparent in the White Paper published in March 1956. This White Paper, The Economic Implications of Full Employment, reviewed the period since the 1944 White Paper and the relationship between wages and inflation in conditions of full employment, and it drew a direct connection between full employment and rising prices. Since 1945 unemployment had never, except in the winter of 1947, exceeded 3 per cent and was currently under 2 per cent. Unless domestic costs could be controlled the fruits of economic growth and full employment would be jeopardised, and whilst many could isolate themselves temporarily from inflation’s corrosive effects, increased money wages eventually forced up prices producing a wage–​ price spiral confronting society with a choice between inflation and full employment. Thus, The solution lies in self-​restraint in making wage claims and fixing profit margins and prices, so that total money income rises no faster than total output. In the absence of such self-​restraint, it may seem that the country can make a

551

The smack of firm government?

155

choice –​albeit a painful one –​between full employment and continually rising prices. (Cmd 9725, para. 26, 11)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The White Paper contained strictures for management but its main target was the unions, who were called upon to exercise self-​ restraint and abandon restrictive practices in the national interest. Everyday industrial relations would, however, continue to rest on free collective bargaining and voluntarism: The Government of this country does not attempt to tell the people what incomes each one of them ought to be receiving at any given moment. Wages are fixed by free negotiation between employers and work people, within a system of collective bargaining which was built up over a long period of years. (Cmd 9725, para. 31, 12)

How could this private activity pay due attention to its public consequences? Macmillan recalled that the White Paper ‘was received with some derision by the Press, since they regarded it as containing too much exhortation and too little action … action could only mean some form of compulsory wages freeze as opposed to the voluntary methods on which we were to rely’ (Macmillan 1971, 29). The White Paper’s implied contract was that if unions exercised wage moderation, government would do all it could to maintain full employment. Conservative rhetoric on freedom, policies of decontrol and the changing contours of internal union movement politics made it impossible for the TUC to contemplate pay restraint. Whatever the personal and private views of union leaders it was institutionally impossible for the TUC to concede the government’s case. At the 1956 TUC Frank Cousins (Goodman 1979, 124–​129, 132–​136) lambasted the Conservative government and pledged that the TGWU would resist any attack on living standards individually or in alliance with other unions: We do not share the view that it is not of any great consequence which political party is in power … We think it matters very much. We think that a Government which, by its very nature, represents labouring groups and is pledged by its election promises to look after the interests of the working class, and in making these policies, intends to carry them out, is more ready to discuss and examine properly with us the effects of those policies. (TUC 1956, 399)

Cousins questioned the value of the unions’ consultative role in post-​war governance and delivered an unequivocal commitment to free collective bargaining, declaring ‘We accept that in a period of “freedom for all” we are part of the “all”.’ In a direct attack on Macmillan (who had expressed a wish to address the TUC) Cousins asked, ‘What does he think it is –​a Film Festival? We will welcome a Chancellor of the Exchequer but … we

156

What about the workers?

will wait for a Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer’ (TUC 1956, 400). Ministers could repose little hope in the General Council and the 1956 TUC strengthened those in the Party advocating significant changes in trade union and industrial relations law.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Macmillan era In the aftermath of Suez, Macmillan, now the Prime Minister, focused on political and economic stabilisation, which was expressed memorably in his ‘You’ve never had it so good’ speech at Bedford (20 July 1957), which warned of inflation’s threat to prosperity. Macmillan faced increased industrial action, quickening inflation and a sterling crisis  –​ crises that stimulated his thinking on these problems (Turner 1994, 231) and underlay his lament: ‘The truth is that we are now paying the price for the Churchill-​ Monckton regime  –​industrial appeasement, with continual inflation’ (Macmillan diary, 15 March 1957, in Catterall 2011, 18). Under Macmillan there was a decisive shift to incomes policy –​ a shift that was to influence profoundly both Conservative and British politics (O’Hara 2004, 25–​53). Macmillan frequently emphasised the political significance of a fundamental shift in mass psychology that had taken place: ‘I think the unions have got their own way for so long (since 1939) that they cannot imagine that there is any point at which they can meet firm resistance’ (Macmillan diary, 15 March 1957, in Catterall 2011, 18). One of Macmillan’s earliest actions as Prime Minister was to request civil servants prepare a study, The Economic Cost of Industrial Disputes. This concluded that the economic damage of strikes was, in fact, far less than commonly supposed but groups such as the miners could halt the economy and small groups of strategically located workers (for example oil tanker drivers) could have an effect out of all proportion to their numbers. The paper’s analysis assumed a strike of four weeks’ duration, but it conceded a wage strike of this length was unlikely, ‘provided, of course, that the door was being kept open to a reasonable settlement and that no issues emerged which would lead the Unions to believe their fundamental rights were being challenged’ (CAB 129/​88 1957a, 2–​3). Was confronting a major strike feasible? The emergency organisation was described as in good shape but was not designed for strike breaking and in any case the critical variable was energy supply: Most serious might perhaps be the interruption of supplies of coal and power. Not only might absolutely essential services (such as hospitals) have to be suspended, but the hardship, especially to the very old and the very young, of living without warmth and light at the coldest time of the year might be intolerable. This, indeed, may be the limiting factor in deciding whether in any

751

The smack of firm government?

157

practical sense strikes in these key sectors could be ‘borne’ by the community. (CAB 129/​88, 1957a, 17)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Major disputes involving the power stations, fuel distribution, the mines, the railways, engineering and the docks would also trigger a sterling crisis and ‘the damage on this score may well be greater than the damage from a stoppage’ (CAB 129/​88 1957a, 3). Notwithstanding, Macmillan believed that we should try to correct the view which has recently gained ground among the public and the Press that it is the government’s duty in the interests of the national economy to prevent strikes at almost any cost. Obviously, the Government’s attitude to a strike must depend on the circumstances in each particular case and cannot be decided as a matter of general principle in advance. But it seems to me that we should emphasise the economic cost of inflation rather than the economic damage of stoppages of production. (CAB 129/​88 1957a, 2)

The Cabinet concluded that ‘It was unrealistic to suppose that, in modern conditions, a government could hope to deal with widespread industrial unrest’ and ‘repressing a major strike would … be more than offset by the bitterness and ill-​feeling which would result’ that would neither foster union moderation or augment government authority (CAB 128/​31 1957, 1 August, 3). In response the Government should, first, condemn intimidatory picketing; second, stress the futility of the wages and price spiral; and finally, repeatedly assure the unions that free collective bargaining was sacrosanct. Resilience depended on a public opinion that was increasingly frustrated by unofficial strikes but ‘the political objective of the government was, and must remain, the establishment of the Conservative Party, in the eyes of public opinion, as a national Party which was concerned to represent all sections of the community’. The votes of union members had contributed to the victories of 1951 and 1955 so ‘It would be inexpedient to adopt any policy involving legislation, which would alienate this support and divide, rather than consolidate, public opinion’ (CAB 128/​31 1957, 1 August, 5). Macmillan recognised contemporary industrial institutions and procedures had evolved over decades ‘by a series of arrangements, unrelated and based sometimes upon tradition, sometimes upon practice and sometimes even upon emergency legislation … Some of our arrangements are based upon statutes’ (Hansard, 5 November 1957, col. 41). This diversity created difficulties but whilst government remained committed to this system it nonetheless had a duty to fight inflation. At this stage Macmillan’s policy was distinctly orthodox, and he warned ‘finance cannot automatically be forthcoming’ and ‘merely creating additional money’ would not be countenanced but neither would there be a return ‘to the Stockton days I  remember before

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

158

What about the workers?

the war’. People ‘have feared unemployment more than inflation … because they have never had experience of a runaway inflation and they have had experience of high unemployment. But it is surely becoming clear that on the curbing of inflation and on the stability of the £ [sic] the full employment of our people must depend’ (Hansard, 5 November 1957, col. 44). It is not surprising, therefore, that the government’s response remained tentative. After the presentation of Courts of Inquiry reports into disputes in shipbuilding and engineering, for example, Iain Macleod had adopted their suggestion of creating a national council to pronounce on the justification of wage claims and thereby influence future claims. The engineering employers, the shipbuilding employers, and the TUC were, however, united in opposition and Macleod would not impose this proposal; nevertheless, Peter Thorneycroft, Macmillan’s successor as Chancellor, was attracted by the idea of deploying public opinion as a counterweight. As Chancellor, Macmillan had expressed support for employers resisting wage demands and in response to the 1956 TUC the British Employers’ Confederation (BEC) recommended that its members should resist a claim from the Engineers, which led to a meeting at Number 10 between Macmillan, Macleod and the leaders of the EEF, BEC and the Shipbuilders. Employers were told the Government was neither politically nor organisationally prepared for what it believed, somewhat melodramatically, would be a de facto general strike. The EEF, convinced it could defeat the AEU, was worn down by Macleod and the EEF issued a statement comparing their treatment to that of the Czech Government in 1938 (Wigham 1982, 113–​116). By 1958 Macmillan was contemplating the utility of a showdown with a group of public sector workers. Unless the government did so, Macleod believed, employers ‘will claim, as they have done before, that although they were ready to resist wage claims, the pass [had] been sold by a nationalised industry and their position thereby hopelessly compromised’. Macmillan agreed but feared the challenge. The 1957 London bus dispute seemed ideal and Macmillan informed Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Transport, that resisting the TGWU was of great significance to the government’s economic policy. Resistance, Macleod argued, was ‘much better than a weak settlement’ (PREM 11/​2512 1958; Shepherd 1994, 134–​142). The London bus dispute saw the government in two minds over its desire to resist union wage demands and avoid disruption. MacLeod saw the dispute as a symbolic of both the government’s and the bargainers’ duty to take into account the wider national interest, but the main problem was the effect of the transformation wrought by full employment: If we look at industry, we find it full of restrictive practices on both sides. Those practices grew up in the frightened days of the twenties and thirties, and have no meaning at all in the fifties … much of our policy, and indeed some of

951

The smack of firm government?

159

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

our legislation, actually assumes the existence of fairly heavy unemployment … the whole nexus of industrial relations is still too often conceived of in terms of struggle instead of partnership. (Hansard, 6 February 1958, col. 1385)

So extensive was the change required that Macleod concluded an inquiry into the industrial relations system was needed. After 1951 the Conservatives had largely accepted Labour’s state and its relationship with the unions but Middlemas identifies a shift under Macmillan (1986a, 278). Whereas the focus of Labour’s policy was on limiting consumption generally to control inflation, the Conservative focus was primarily on limiting wage increases so its effects fell primarily on the working class. A combination of wages policy with increased unemployment risked open conflict and the destabilising of governance; economic expansion risked further accelerating inflation and stimulating a sterling crisis, but inflation was deemed electorally preferable despite hurting middle-​and lower-​middle-class Conservative activists and voters, which made it harder to defend concessions to working class and trade union opinion despite the significance of the One Nation strategy (discussed in the next chapter). In April 1957 Peter Thorneycroft, Macmillan’s Chancellor, questioned the viability of the government’s disinflation strategy (CAB 129/​87 1957). Thorneycroft described unemployment as a tool of economic management as ‘economically and intellectual repulsive’, but wage fixing by the State was equally distasteful, and so a new policy was necessary. Public opinion had to recognise that full employment and low inflation rested on responsible wage bargaining, and so the Government should set an example in the public sector, and support private sector resistance even if this led to strikes. Pay should be linked closely to increased productivity and government should announce what it believed the country could afford but a pay norm could not be rigid; although it would apply in the public sector it would not be enforceable in the private sector. The pay norm idea was a response to several Courts of Inquiry reports calling for such a body to issue authoritative advice. In April 1957 the Cabinet appointed a group to explore the feasibility of this but it was clear that if prices were excluded such a body would be unacceptable to the unions. From this emerged the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes (CPPI or the Cohen Council). Thorneycroft concluded government had no choice but to press ahead with this proposal but admitted doing so ‘would come as a shock to public opinion … at a time when there is considerable unease at home and abroad about inflation and rising prices here’ (PREM 11/​1884, 1957). The Cabinet concluded that It would not be politically disadvantageous if, as a result, labour discontent culminated in a strike … the risk of a strike might well need to be accepted if a

160

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

more realistic wages policy was to be established so [ministers] would also need to consider whether it would be possible, in the last resort, for the Government to withstand … a widespread strike. (CAB 128/​31, 1957, 19 July, 4)

In September 1957 the CPPI was established to provide impartial and authoritative advice from ‘The Three Wise Men’ (a lawyer, Lord Cohen; an accountant, Sir Harold Jowitt; and an economist, Sir Dennis Robertson) and their pronouncements were intended to encourage what Macmillan called ‘restraint without tears’. The TUC gave the CPPI a cool response and under pressure from its affiliated unions refused to have anything to do with the CPPI, which published four reports (February 1958, August 1958, July 1959 and July 1960)  before its absorption into the National Incomes Commission (NIC, or ‘Nicky’) in 1962. Thorneycroft believed such institutions were flawed fatally and would never be successful (CAB 129/​ 88 1957b; Macmillan 1971, 352). In a Cabinet paper Macmillan argued the growing despondency in the party had encouraged a desire to lash out at the unions. He believed many union leaders privately recognised the futility of wages chasing prices but they could not change their unions’ behaviour ‘until we can stop the flow of the inflationary tide. If we can even get slack water, or still better a slight ebb, their task would be much easier’ (CAB 129/​88 1957c, 3). Macmillan agreed with Thorneycroft that public spending needed to be reduced but excessively tight control of the money supply would produce a major row with the public sector unions and result in increased unemployment. Macmillan was confident that the Government’s emergency preparations were adequate but any conflict would be ferocious and conflict had to be on ground of the Government’s choosing, and he continued to reject deflation as a response (Macmillan 1971, 346). Thorneycroft questioned what he interpreted as Macmillan’s elevation of short-​term party interests (winning the next election) over the national interest (defeating inflation), arguing these were interdependent, and he believed the Government was courting disaster: The Tory Party may lose the next election anyway. What matters is not whether it loses but why. If we are thrown out because we have been too tough … and have allowed a modest growth in unemployment, we shall be returned again, perhaps quite soon. If we are thrown out because we have flinched from our duty and allowed our economy to drift into disaster, I see no reason why we should ever be asked to resume control.

Thorneycroft concluded that ‘unless we can get away from the idea that over-​full employment must be supported at all costs we have no hope of curing the inflation’ (CAB 129/​88 1957d, 1, 3). Macmillan was deeply concerned about the consequences of any perceived weakening of the full employment commitment. On his part, Thorneycroft

161

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

161

emphasised the making of credible commitments –​that when government took a stance it must stick to it –​but in the final analysis he concluded that the Cabinet and Prime Minister lacked the strength of political purpose and this led to his resignation –​along with his two ministers, Enoch Powell and Nigel Birch –​from the Treasury in January 1958. Macmillan initially saw Thorneycroft’s orthodoxy as symbolic of his government’s determination to ‘get over’ Suez but significantly Thorneycroft was prevented from including in his 1957 budget a statement on the need to change policy in order to attack inflation effectively. The resignation of the Treasury team expressed the dilemma facing the Macmillan Government (Cooper 2011, 227–​250; Green 2000, 409–​430; Jarvis 1998, 22–​50). Powell, an adherent of the (then unfashionable) quantity theory of money did not believe that union wage demands caused inflation (governments did) and neither did Nigel Birch (another true believer), and Thorneycroft (much less of a believer) pushed for greater control of the money supply, which pointed to increased unemployment, public spending cuts, and a major political crisis. Despite Macleod’s broad sympathy for Thorneycroft’s stand he opposed their policies’ impact on the unions (Shepherd 1994, 130–​133) but the most serious obstacle was Macmillan. Cousin’s speech to the 1956 TUC had captured a significant shift in union politics and the TUC refused cooperation with the CPPI, whose reports (closely argued, detailed statistical assessments) were intended to encourage a consensus between bargainers and would lead to effective action against wage-​push inflation. The CPPI was, however, a ‘non-​governmental body without any formal powers’, though ‘far-​ sighted’ it was ‘grossly-​ overworked’ (Middlemas 1986a, 301) and, one might add, ignored. It was generally recognised that ministers had no intention of using unemployment to regulate wage costs and the growing political pressures to reflate the economy were proving irresistible. Derick Heathcoat Amory, who replaced Thorneycroft as Chancellor, believed current policy and institutions were not working and Macleod, as we have seen, was conscious of how little influence the Minister had over wage bargaining; notwithstanding, he and Amory pushed the idea of ‘guiding light’ for wage increases in Cabinet (CAB 134/​2572 1958, 5–​6). The obvious weakness was that a guiding light would inevitably be interpreted by many unions as a minimum and also seen as a challenge by many unions. It was not clear how a guiding light would work in the public sector as Ministers had no statutory powers over the nationalised industries and if they had used them the result would be uproar. Percy Mills, the Minister of Fuel and Power, had sought to increase his control over the nationalised industries wages and prices policies whilst preserving the ‘appearance of independence’, by institutionalising the informal meetings of civil servants and board officials that developed after the 1957–​58 railway

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

162

What about the workers?

dispute. As Chancellor Amory concluded that no general increase in wages was justified but this was not thought feasible. With the economy growing in line with Macmillan’s wishes preparatory to the forthcoming election achieving a ‘going rate’ of a 3 per cent increase in wages would need a considerable number of zero settlements and this implied active Government resistance to public sector wage demands. Macmillan believed this analysis was overly pessimistic (prices were stabilising at last) and he suggested that ministerial statements on wages should be confined to generalities. Up to this point Macmillan’s policy had been broadly deflationary but Amory’s 1958 budget saw a significant change. Concessions made to the NUR led to a Times newspaper leader, The Price, which was as critical of Macmillan as the Daily Telegraph had been of Eden. Concessions meant ‘little if anything is left of the Government’s wages policy … it is hard to feel that it is worth buying off a strike at the price of sacrificing the Government’s stabilisation policy and with it a golden opportunity of checking the price-​wage spiral decisively’ (The Times, 15 May 1958). In this period a Cabinet Committee was discussing possible approaches to wages policy that avoided detailed Government intervention in wages but which would influence union behaviour (see CAB 134/​2572 1958 for details). The March 1959 budget delivered a major economic stimulus, which soon required dramatic remedial, deflationary action but Macmillan postponed changes in policy until after the general election. After the election and with growing industrial unrest, Macmillan complained, ‘Tomorrow back to London and a day of worry and trouble. We have got through the Power Strike but the Seamen’s Strike is still running; and there are troubles in the Docks and the motor works which threaten us’ (Horne 1989, 246).

Permanent incomes policy? Amory resigned in 1960 to return to business and was replaced by Selwyn Lloyd who Macmillan believed to be more malleable. By the spring and summer of 1961 the economic situation was so bad that devaluation was being discussed and Lloyd’s budget (April) was followed by a sterling crisis and in July further measures, which included a pay pause, were introduced. In addition to seeking membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), between July 1961 and June 1962 Macmillan’s Government adopted a pay pause, the guiding light, set up the National Incomes Commission (NIC, ‘Nicky’), and established the National Economic Development Council (NEDC, ‘Neddy’) (Middlemas 1986b; Ringe 1998, 82–​98; Wood 2000, 431–​ 459). All were created without consultation with the TUC (Lloyd justified not consulting because the July measures included an

361

The smack of firm government?

163

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

increase in Bank Rate and were therefore commercially sensitive) and while Lloyd had emphasised to the Cabinet (20 July) the need for long-​term pay restraint he lacked plans to put this into effect. When announcing the pay pause Selwyn Lloyd insisted ‘a pause is essential for continued prosperity and growth’, but such a pause is certainly not a lasting solution to the problem of rising costs and prices. A pause must mark the beginning of a new long-​term policy. That policy is that increases in incomes must follow and not precede or outstrip increases in national productivity. (Hansard, 25 July 1961, cols. 222–​223)

The weaknesses of government policy were revealed graphically in November 1961 when the ETU secured a wage increase double that indicated under the pay pause which Macmillan blamed on the weakness of the employers and the incompetence of the minister (Richard Wood) (Macmillan diary 20 November 1961, in Catterall 2011, 427). From Macmillan’s defence of the outcome on the following day in the House of Commons it was clear that this defeat was a major blow and Macmillan emphasised how few powers ministers had to take effective action (Hansard, 21 November 1961, col. 1145). In Cabinet on 8 January 1962 Lloyd reported on the TUC’s reluctance to engage with planning or incomes policy, although he was still trying to persuade the General Council to cooperate. He indicated two changes of emphasis:  first, ‘increases in profits and dividends should not out-​run increases in wages and salaries’; and second, ‘the main emphasis should be laid on the concept of economic growth’. This was the NEDC’s primary purpose, of course, but long-​term growth was only possible via the restraint of wages, profits and dividends. Summing up, Macmillan stated ‘that the main objective at this stage was to secure the cooperation of the TUC in long-​term planning directed towards economic growth’. Ministers should therefore present wage restraint as a prerequisite of growth but it must ‘be made plain that there must be a period in which only in exceptional cases could there be any possibility of a substantial increase in wages or salaries’ (CAB 128/​36 1962, 8 January, 3–​5). Proposals for a permanent incomes policy from 1 April 1962 were set out in a White Paper. Cmnd 1626 (1962) was the linear descendant of Cmd 9725 (1956); its objective was ‘that increases in personal incomes of all kinds should be brought into a more realistic relationship with increases in national production’ via a ‘pay pause’ followed by a permanent incomes policy negotiated with both sides of industry (Cmnd 1626 1962, paras 2–​3, 3). Incomes Policy set out the principles that would govern wage bargaining and which combined to demonstrate ‘there is no scope in 1962 for more than strictly limited increases in wages and salaries. In many cases there may be

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

164

What about the workers?

no justification … for any increases at all’ (Cmnd 1626, para. 5, 4). Despite the importance attached to inflation the government proposed, however, not to interfere with the institutions and processes of industrial relations and collective bargaining, noting, ‘The effectiveness of this approach necessarily depends heavily on the willingness of workers not to press claims which go beyond the limits which the policy indicates’ (Cmnd 1626, 1962, para. 10, 5). It soon became apparent that private sector bargainers were ignoring the policy thereby stoking resentment in the public sector. The level of resentment increased when John Hare, now the Minister of Labour (the MLNS became the Ministry of Labour (MoL) once again in November 1959), declared his intention to refer back (as happened in 1952) 12 Wages Council awards that breached the 2.0–​2.5 per cent norm suggested by Cmnd 1626. In response, the Cabinet agreed government must demonstrate ‘their determination to maintain the policy of restraint’ and it agreed to Hare’s reference back of the Awards because the Wages Councils’ proposals were clearly out of line with government policy (CAB 128/​36 1962, 29 March, 3–​5). Ministers were, however, unable to influence public sector arbitration awards (as in the National Health Service), which broke the norm and again ministers discussed the feasibility of extending their powers over the public sector. Such was the concern the Cabinet emergencies committee ‘were examining what steps might be taken to enable the country to withstand the effects of a major strike’. Peter Thorneycroft, in government again as Minister of Aviation, was disquieted by Government inaction in the face of blatant breaches of policy, arguing their ‘acquiescence would make the present policy valueless, and no alternative policy had been devised’ (CAB 128/​36 1962, 24 May, 8–​9). The discussion continued later in the day. The gist was that ministers rejected further involvement in nationalised industry pay bargaining (this could only cause trouble), and concluded lamely, if truthfully, that all policy responses had serious drawbacks. Summing up, Macmillan concluded that if a free society and a managed economy were incompatible, then inflation was the price to be paid for full employment but this would inevitably produce serious social dislocation and conflict. It was agreed to hold further discussions (CAB 128/​36 1962, 24 May, 4). Revealing his thinking to the Cabinet, Macmillan wondered if the objectives of economic policy –​full employment, stable prices, a strong pound and economic growth –​were attainable simultaneously. Was, he asked, the choice facing them the sacrifice of one of these objectives (if so, which one?), or should they try for ‘as much as possible of all four by a judicious mixture of controls and exhortation?’ There were huge obstacles when it came

561

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

165

to influencing the private sector, but any policy that concentrated on the public sector would inevitably generated injustices and this, he concluded, pointed to the creation of a permanent policy embracing both the public and private sectors. Macmillan identified three options: first, the economic anarchism of free markets; second, deflation and higher unemployment; and third, a broader policy with growth at its heart. The latter would realise the four objectives, but opposition could be expected ‘on a more serious and widespread scale from the trade unions who, while accepting that the objectives were sound in theory, would doubt whether they could be applied fairly in practice’. Unless the unions could be persuaded of the policy’s fairness, it would not be acceptable and would jeopardise governability. Macmillan suggested legislation to improve the manual workers’ status (contracts of employment, redundancy pay, retraining and better sick pay, as well as improved health, safety and welfare) and the complaints and resentment of the middle classes should also be addressed. Fiscal measures could be used ‘to keep profits down to an acceptable level’ (CAB 128/​36 1962, 28 May, 3–​5). Cabinet agreed that Macmillan should develop an expanded proposal. The fruit of Macmillan’s labours was a paper, Incomes Policy, which argued existing policy had reached its limits and the ‘problem is to find both a policy which will work and the means of applying it’. The key difficulty was the private sector. Underpinning Macmillan’s proposals was a refusal to finance inflation, but to be acceptable and effective policy had to be flexible but no policy could ‘be entirely painless, if a painless one existed, we would have introduced it long ago [but] it must … minimise the risk of collision with either the employers or the trade unions’ (CAB 129/​109, 1962, 1–​2). Macmillan concluded a standing commission on pay, whose expert judgement could reconcile contradictory interests, and which commanded public respect was required. Macmillan described inflation as ‘intractable, obscure, and baffling’ (Macmillan diary, 27 May 1962, in Catterall 2011, 473), although he believed an independent expert body was essential, despite its inevitable limitations, not to supplant existing collective bargaining institutions and procedures, but to influence their operation. Enforceability and legitimacy were critical, because such a body might be likely to arouse strong opposition from the trade unions, who might well criticise it as bringing to an end the traditional system of collective bargaining. Given the difficulty of devising effective sanctions and the doubt whether any incomes policy can succeed [without] at least the passive support of the trade unions, it may be desirable to consider … that the Government should rely on persuasion and the force of public opinion. (CAB 129/​109, 1962, 5)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

166

What about the workers?

Macmillan’s paper raised tentatively the possibility of legal sanctions for non-​cooperation, but rejected them as not politically feasible. Government would refer cases of ‘manifest national importance’ to the commission but the commission would have no sanctions other than public opinion and as a sweetener Macmillan proposed legislation to improve the manual workers’ status. It was not immediately apparent how this policy differed from its predecessors, but significantly Macmillan argued it demonstrated ‘that we still in a very real sense [are] the only party working for the creation of one nation –​a classless society’ (CAB 129/​109, 1962, 8). The Cabinet, when discussing Incomes Policy, was reminded this policy was an investment in future economic growth and that deflation and unemployment were the most serious long-​term political threats to these goals. The Cabinet agreed few would object to sound economic growth and better conditions of employment, but nonetheless it believed the measures ‘would be unlikely to command the necessary support from both sides of industry’. Particularly dangerous was any hint of compulsion but ‘a reliance on general exhortation [was] inadequate to the political and economic needs of the situation’. The policy would have to be flexible but any departure from its provisions would be interpreted as a defeat for the government and the policy. This led to an extensive discussion of the proposed commission’s relationship with existing collective bargaining institutions and procedures. Members of the Cabinet were concerned that maintaining the commission’s independence required government cede some control over a core policy so the commission’s terms of reference would have to be carefully formulated (CAB 128/​36 1962, 6 February, 6–​9). Macmillan blamed Lloyd who, he believed, had done little to develop the policy: ‘This’, he wrote, ‘makes me all the more angry with the Treasury and the Chancellor for their delay and lack of initiative. A whole year gone and then the P.M. has to do it himself, at the last minute’ (Macmillan diary, 22 June 1962, in Catterall 2011, 479). Macmillan identified Lloyd’s failure to develop incomes policy as grounds for his sacking; ‘The Pay Pause started a year ago, exactly. By the end of the year, it was clear that it was to be succeeded by a more permanent policy. In spite of continual pressure from me, nothing at all was done, except long and fruitless discussions in the Economic Policy Ctee and in Cabinet’ (Macmillan diary, 8 July 1962, in Catteral 2011, 481, original emphasis). Incomes Policy lead directly to Lloyd’s sacking in ‘the night of the long knives’ (13 July 1962)  which so badly damaged Macmillan’s government and his reputation (Alderman 1992, 243–​266). Despite its importance to the Government’s policy the NIC had serious weaknesses, including public acceptability, the problem of dividends

761

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

167

and profits, and poor implementation. On 2 July, for example, the Cabinet considered the NIC’s public acceptability. Macmillan argued that acceptability would be achieved, first, by promoting a balance between incomes and productivity; second, by paying careful attention to troublesome exceptional cases; third, by not interfering with arbitration or the Wages Councils; and fourth, the Commission could give an ex post facto judgement on already decided cases that appeared to conflict with the national interest. Public confidence was essential ‘if it was to be an effective instrument’ but if it appeared that Government applied a ‘harsher discipline to their own servants [sic] than they were prepared to enforce on workers in the private sector’ (who set the pace for wage increases) its authority would be fatally diminished. Ultimately, ‘it would be necessary to convince the country at large that the [NIC] was not merely another device for dividing up the nation’s wealth to the disadvantage of the individual worker, but that it would contribute to a general increase in prosperity’ (CAB 128/​36 1962, 12 July, 4–​5). Although the TUC was eventually persuaded to cooperate with the NEDC, Reginald Maudling (who replaced Lloyd as Chancellor in October 1961) suggested that critics ‘might argue that it was solely an instrument to restrain wages and salaries, and that the Government had taken care not to extend restraint to profits and dividends’. Macmillan agreed it was vital ‘to find a form of words that would make it clear that the Commission were not precluded from examining profits and dividends’ but wages remained the NIC’s main target (CAB 128/​26, 1962, 9 October, 7–​8). These institutional changes and the growing emphasis on inflation and wages risked ministers being increasingly overloaded by being drawn into the detail of collective bargaining in the public and private sectors. A good example of this detail and the possibility of ministerial overload can be seen in relation to the railways. Macmillan decreed, for example, that Dr Beeching (the chairman of British Railways) ‘should take the line that 5 per cent must be accepted as the outside limit for a settlement. They should indicate that negotiations should open with an offer of about 3½ per cent; that the Government would hope for a settlement at about 4½ per cent … some small increase above this figure might be granted’ (CAB 128/​36, 1962, 25 October). Similarly, on 6 December, for example, the Cabinet found itself dealing with the minutiae of the Scottish building industry. The proposed settlement, 7 per cent, was ‘unjustifiably large’ and the BEC and English building employers ‘had both privately pressed the Government to refer this settlement’ to the NIC, the course favour by the Chancellor (CAB 128/​36, 1962, 6 December, 8). A  permanent incomes policy could only increase the amount of time ministers would spend on these contentious issues.

168

What about the workers?

In the House of Commons Macmillan justified the necessity of permanence:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

if the nation as a whole pays itself in increased wages, salaries and dividends more than is justified by increasing production, it is surely accepted that costs will rise and exports fall. In that event even the increase in individual incomes will be but Dead Sea fruit … An incomes policy is, therefore, necessary as a permanent feature of our economic life.

Permanent incomes policy, Macmillan conceded, was an infringement of freedom and was likely to be unsuccessful, ‘Even in war –​with controlled prices, rationing, the direction of labour, 100 per cent Excess Profits Tax and post-​war credits to reduce the impact of increasing wages and the rest –​we did not have a wholly successful incomes policy’ (Hansard, 26 July 1962, cols 1757–​1758). The post-​1945 Labour Government faced comparable problems and its policy failed but, Macmillan believed, their experience of inflation had made public opinion more aware of the wage–​price spiral’s dangers and that a new approach was needed because ‘In a free society an incomes policy cannot … be imposed. It can come about only by general acceptance, and if it is to be a permanent feature and not a temporary thing in a difficult crisis … it must be regarded as both necessary and fair’. George Woodcock, the TUC General Secretary, however, dismissed the NIC as ‘even more fatuous than the … pay pause or … the guiding light’ (Hansard, 26 July 1962, col. 1758; TUC 1962, 367). In discussions (23 August 1962)  between the General Council and Reginald Maudling, Maudling ‘was left in no doubt that trade unionists were united in opposition to the Government’s decision to impose a wage freeze’. The TUC complained that Government protestations about the value of consultation were a sham because ministers ‘had ignored the TUC’s proposals: yet was now asking the trade unions to take the brunt of policies about which they had not even been consulted’ (TUC 1962, 241). The NIC showed it was insufficient for ministers to offer guidance or publish authoritative statements by expert independent bodies, but Government was severely constrained by its frequent statements endorsing the value of the existing government–​ union relationship. Furthermore, ‘There is no intention to deprive any man of his right in a free society to sell his labour or hire other men’s labour as he may wish … free negotiation shall continue [and] the right to withdraw or withhold employment shall remain unimpaired’ (Hansard, 26 July 1962, col. 1759). The Cabinet agreed to go ahead with the establishment of the NIC on 25 October. The White Paper published in November set out how the NIC would provide ‘impartial and authoritative’ advice on incomes; it was to pay due regard to the national interest particularly ‘the desirability of keeping the rate of increase of

961

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The smack of firm government?

169

the aggregate of monetary incomes within the long-​term rate of increase of national production’ (Cmnd 1844, 1962). The NIC could not alter a settlement but would present its conclusions on a referred claim and if its prescriptions were ignored public opinion would draw its conclusions. That was it. The entire policy ‘was extinguished within three months by industrial and political troubles’ (Barnes and Reid 1980, 36). To succeed, incomes policy needed a much more extensive and intensive and trusting government–​union relationship (with a much more centralised trade union movement) that could evolve into a broader modernisation strategy (Tomlinson 1997, 18–​ 38). The defence of sterling, periodic deflation, full employment and the perception of union power as a major contribution to relative economic decline rendered such a relationship impossible. The transfer from the Treasury of Sir Laurence Helsby to be permanent secretary at the Ministry of Labour marked the start of a more critical attitude to the unions and increased interest in incomes policy. Inter-​ union conflicts, demarcation disputes, unofficial strikes, competition over wages, downright malpractice, resistance to changes in technology and working practices, suspicion of individual workplace and employment rights, and the TUC’s reluctance to engage with tripartism eroded Government and public trust in the unions just as incomes policy eroded union trust in Government. Strikes and poor industrial relations were regarded less and less as reflecting legitimate grievances and claims for social justice but as a purblind refusal to accept modernisation. This mood was captured by the Boulting brothers’ film, I’m All Right Jack (1959), a satirical portrayal of factory politics, and the most popular film in Britain in 1959. In his memoirs Maudling reports George Woodcock, the TUC general secretary, saying, ‘I have come to the conclusion that if achieving greater productivity means getting up half an hour earlier in the morning, I am against it’ (Maudling 1978, 112). The TUC began to sense that its post-​war role in governance had resulted in less influence than they believed, a feeling expressed by Woodcock to the TUC, we have learned from bitter experience over the last ten years in talking to ministers, all kinds of ministers, that the attitude they take up in relation to our criticisms is a defensive one. They seek to justify what they have done, they seek to explain away difficulties … They tend to be circumspect. We do too … we tend to be defensive. (TUC 1962, 369)

Nevertheless, the General Council would not abandon cooperation and did nothing that might stimulate wage militancy (for instance, refusing a special conference and mass demonstrations against the government, or coordinated union action on pay) but did warn that government policy ‘was threatening the machinery on which good industrial relations was

170

What about the workers?

based … [developments] suggested that the way to gain a wage increase was to threaten strike action’ (TUC 1962, 242). Not surprisingly, increasing numbers of Conservatives favoured a radical re-​evaluation of the unions’ role, which is a development that will be covered in the next chapter.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusions Conservative governments after 1951 were unable to develop an effective and coherent policy vis-​à-​vis the unions because of their commitment to a macro-​political narrative emphasising the avoidance of political conflict. This led to a reliance on exhortation and education, plus a modicum of policy manipulation, in an effort to modify union wage bargaining behaviour. Initially Conservative governments hoped cooperation and growing working-class prosperity and security would mitigate conflict. The government’s pursuit of disinflation was, however, supported by spasmodic attempts to discipline the unions by deflation, half-​ hearted attempts to encourage employer resistance, and even direct challenges as in the 1957 London bus dispute. None, however, went far enough to challenge the dominant narrative, which emphasised the value of cooperation. The approach was established under Churchill and Eden; Macmillan, first as Chancellor and then as Prime Minister, developed it further. After Suez, the 1959 election and the July 1961 crisis the tempo of intervention increased markedly in 1962; with the creation of the NEDC and NIC in 1962 the Government’s emphasis moved to encouraging economic growth. Permeating this approach was the conviction that inflation was the most serious domestic economic problem and the most significant component of inflation were wage increases that were not backed by increases in productivity. This conviction inevitably drew attention to the state of trade union law and industrial relations practice. Although both Government and the TUC remained committed to consultation and voluntarism, the perception grew that the evolution of policy after 1951 was testing the limits of cooperation and that the unions were institutionally incapable of playing the role expected by ministers. The TUC also sensed its influence over policy was far more limited than they had hitherto believed and ministerial rhetoric implied. On the other hand, the ethic of the war-​time state and the post-​war government–​union relationship remained intact, together with powerful inhibitors on changing the relationship that flowed from the full employment commitment, the norms of post-​ war governance, electoral strategy, and union and TUC hostility to incomes policy. Combined, these narrowed significantly the Government’s policy options.

171

The smack of firm government?

171

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

By the early 1960s a policy stasis was accompanied by a widespread awareness of a need ‘to do something’ about unions and industrial relations. This awareness was particularly strong amongst the Conservative Party’s membership and challenged directly the ‘official’ interpretation of the State’s relationship with the unions. By the time the Home Government took office in 1963 there was a growing feeling that the time for a radical shift in policy had arrived. How the conflict between these two understandings worked out will be explored in the next chapter.

7

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

Introduction The next two chapters explore the consequences of the Conservative Party’s growing interest in the legal reform of trade unions and industrial relations as a response to what was commonly referred to as ‘the British disease’ (Taylor 1999, 151–​186). This period embraces the Wilson Governments (1964–​70), the Heath Government (1970–​74) and the Wilson and Callaghan Governments (1974–​79) that ended in the Winter of Discontent, paving the way for Thatcherism, a project intended to cure the British disease. All these governments were dominated by the issue of trade union power. Central to these two chapters is the concept of governability and the related concept of overload, concepts that became prominent in political science and political debate during the 1970s and 1980s (see, for example, Birch 1984, 135–​160; Douglas 1976, 483–​505; King 1975, 284–​296). The first section examines developments in the late 1950s and the consequences of A Giant’s Strength (1958), the first major post-​ war expression of a Conservative legal reform agenda for the unions and industrial relations, and the Macmillan Government’s adoption of tripartite politics as a response to wage inflation and relative national economic decline, as a means of avoiding a contentious legal reform programme. The second part explores the Conservative response to Rookes v Barnard (1964) that reinforced party thinking about the unions and culminated in Fair Deal at Work (1968). The Wilson Government, elected in 1964, established the Royal Commission of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (the Donovan Commission) to consider reform but it and Labour’s reform proposals, In Place of Strife (1969), were skewered by union resistance and a Cabinet crisis. Labour’s failures and industrial unrest fortified the Conservative move towards legal solutions. The final section deals with the Heath Government, which undertook a seismic shift in policy. This shift was based on the premises that a positive legal framework was needed to

371

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

173

modernise industrial relations, encourage responsible collective bargaining, and break the wage–​price spiral. Despite its prima facie free-​market tone and aggressive rhetoric the Heath Government’s ‘quiet revolution’ evolved (or as it critics insisted, degenerated) into tripartism and a governability crisis, the failure of which reinforced many Conservatives’ commitment to legal solutions and a new style of governance that was less open to union involvement. However, the lessons drawn from the political and economic crisis of February 1974 varied: some Conservatives saw it as confirming the necessity of union involvement in governance, but others saw it as pointing to their exclusion (Smith 2011, 115–​154, for example). The election of Margaret Thatcher, a former member of the Association of Scientific Workers, as party leader in 1975 pointed to exclusion as the Conservatives’ favoured option. Not since Bonar Law had the Conservative Party had a leader so hostile to trade unions (see, for instance, Campbell 1995, 108; Thatcher 1995, 109–​111; Young 1989, 45–​46).

At the end of the road? In September 1957 Macmillan was warned of an incipient middle-class revolt, of which the main ‘public expression takes the form of demands from the hard core of the Party for “more Conservative policies” and for a “show-​down” with the trade unions’. Michael Fraser, the report’s author, believed the government had committed a grave strategic political blunder after the 1955 election when it failed to address middle-class discontents whilst seeming to give primacy to working-class and trade union electors’ interests (PREM 11/​ 2248 1957). Peter Thorneycroft, the Chancellor, worried that inflation was hitting ‘the hard core’ of the party, ‘the men and women who do the hard slogging work in the constituencies’ who were, he believed, increasingly bitter and disaffected. Macmillan agreed that ‘those who have been injured by [inflation] are disproportionately represented in the Party Organisation in the constituencies’, but their desire to lash out, Macmillan contended, is merely the instinctive reaction of a class of people who resent the depression of their own standards at the time when the standard of so many are rising so rapidly. There is no object in having a row with the Unions per se[; we] might have a splendid row –​and even win –​but you would be no better off afterwards.

Union leaders, Macmillan believed, were exploiting market conditions ‘just the same as any other merchant in capitalist society’ and many had behaved with remarkable restraint. Attacking the unions, Macmillan concluded,

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

174

What about the workers?

would unite union militants and moderates, making the government’s task even harder (PREM 11/​1824 1957, 1). Walter Monckton’s message to the party remained intact: the government had no intention of becoming embroiled with the unions over, for example, the closed shop (see, for example, NUCUA 1952, 67–​69; 1953, 78). An upsurge in industrial unrest ironically delayed Monckton’s attendance at the 1954 Conference but he offered no concessions to party opinion, lauding voluntarism and dismissing legislation, arguing that ‘nothing could be more certain to upset the smooth relations of the Government with the Trade Union movement’ (NUCUA 1954, 106). Moderate union leaders told any minister who would listen that conceding to party opinion would make it impossible for them to control their militants. Macmillan, for example, reported Sam Watson (the Durham miners’ leader) cautioning:  ‘Tell your friend [Monckton] not to give in an inch about the Closed Shop … If you do, we are all sunk’ (Monckton Papers 230 1952). The CRD counselled party leaders to remain calm and recommended the party be told on all possible occasions of voluntarism’s virtues and that intervention would make things worse. In 1956 James Douglas of the CRD wrote to Robert Carr (Eden’s parliamentary private secretary (PPS) and a future employment minister) to warn of serious pressure in the party and amongst back benchers for legislation on pre-​strike secret ballots, but he argued strongly against legislation (LAB 43/​280, 1956). He was strongly supported in his opposition by the MLNS, Iain Macleod, who was conscious of changing party and public attitudes and felt that these were increasingly hard to ignore but, equally, recognised the political difficulties of any change (Shepherd 1994, 124–​128). ‘I shall’, Macleod wrote before the 1956 party conference, ‘have to tread something of a tightrope’ (on secret pre-​strike ballots, which he opposed) and ‘I must persuade what will probably on this point be a hostile Conference that they are wrong’ (LAB 43/​273 1956, 1). Industrial disruption was, however, exercising the party. For example, a strike by provincial bus drivers in 1957 had been marked by violence and after the dispute’s end (Macleod referred the dispute to arbitration) on July 11 Conservative MPs tabled a Commons motion calling for a full enquiry. A second bus dispute in London (May–​June 1958), again marked by violence and serious disruption added to the party’s disquiet (Fishman 1999, 268–​292), but Macleod defended current practice, telling the 1958 conference that If I  thought that [legislation] would contribute to industrial peace I  would not hesitate to put it to the Cabinet. I am quite sure that my colleagues would accept the need for legislation because to do otherwise would be to give a veto over Government action to a body outside Parliament, and that is unthinkable.

571

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

175

Experience showed, he continued, that secret ballots often produced a result opposite to the one desired and the case for legal reform assumed ‘that the workers are less militant than their leaders’, concluding ‘all I can tell you, speaking quite frankly, is that this is not my experience, nor is it the experience of any Minister of Labour. I  am certain it was not Walter Monckton’s’ (NUCUA 1958, 84–​85). Macleod felt the six-​week-long London bus strike might represent a watershed, strengthening the ‘forces of sanity’ in the unions, and he began to push a positive approach to industrial relations involving legislation to improve the employee’s security and status and the Ministry of Labour published Positive Employment Policies (Shepherd 1994, 130). This followed on from his 1958 party conference speech where Macleod had outlined his, and the government’s, philosophy. Good industrial relations, he argued, rested on five principles:  first, the rejection of incomes policy; second, support for voluntarism and independent trade unionism; third, the government’s duty was to represent the national interest; fourth, a partnership between government, unions and industry; and fifth, whilst consultation was necessary and legitimate the power of decision must lay with government (NUCUA 1958, 56–​58). To prepare for the 1959 election Macleod was given charge of the industrial relations section of the manifesto and he hoped to use this to recast the Government’s approach by using proposals on redundancy payments, training and other measures to improve the employees’ status (Shepherd 1994, 113) but he faced opponents in the Cabinet (from, for example, Heathcoat Amory and Percy Mills) who argued the time was ripe for a thorough enquiry into industrial relations. Although increasingly sceptical of the status quo, Macleod was worried about the likelihood of conflict if such a commitment to an inquiry was made (PREM 11/​2248 1958). In an early draft of the manifesto Macleod included a commitment to legislation but it was removed at Macmillan’s insistence (Shepherd 1994, 194) and the manifesto confined itself to the message that ‘We have shown that Conservative freedom works. Life is better with the Conservatives’ (Conservative Party, 1959, original emphasis). However, Prosperity depends on the combined efforts of the nation as a whole. None of us can afford outmoded approaches to the problems of today, and we intend to invite the representatives of employers and trades unions to consider afresh with us the human and industrial problems that the next five years will bring. (Conservative Party, 1959)

Ministers were increasingly hemmed in by economic problems, industrial disputes and party restiveness, and there was a growing sense that the status quo was unsustainable. For example, the 1961 dispute with the nurses (then, as ever, a group enjoying universal public sympathy) damaged the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

176

What about the workers?

Government because, as Enoch Powell (the Minister of Health) argued, incomes policy and spending restrictions inevitably ‘placed the government at logger heads with great sections of the public’ (Ramsden 1989, 27). The Government’s position was that unions and management must work together with minimum interference from the government but there was a growing sense that as this was proving difficult, if not impossible, change was necessary (Lockwood 2005, 335–​371). The years 1961–​62 were seen by Robert Carr as a time of growing disillusionment, marking a decisive shift in Conservative thinking, but the Government’s emphasis remained on ‘creating the right climate’ by coupling incomes policy and tripartism. Carr, like many, was concerned that consultative (such as the moribund NJAC) and new tripartite bodies (like the NEDC or NIC) held amiable conversations and produced worthy policy statements but the results  –​ improved industrial relations, lower inflation and economic growth –​were meagre because participants could not bind their constituents. Whilst ‘jaw, jaw was better than war, war’, Carr and Macleod (and others) searched for a new approach and Carr admitted later, ‘I’d have liked to have seen, with Iain Macleod … reforms being implemented on trade union reform’ (Ramsden 1989, 28). To understand why we must to go back to 1958. In 1957 the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society (ICCUS) submitted proposals to Macleod, titled The New Estate. Some Thoughts on the Constitutional Position of Trade Unions in England (1957), and the better known A Giant’s Strength (1958), for his comments. He recognised this as a significant development in party thinking, commenting that ‘it fills me with a good deal of gloom’. In a note to his Chief Industrial Commissioner MacLeod commented that ‘the Society carries quite a lot of guns … those who have written the pamphlet are very able barristers. Unfortunately they know very little about industrial affairs’. MacLeod contended the ICCUS was aiming at the wrong target, which was wage inflation, and it was unclear how this ‘woolly and theoretical’ paper or the legal changes recommended would improve things as they ‘could only be forced through in the teeth of extensive trade union opposition’ (LAB 43/​289 1957, Macleod to Chief Industrial Commissioner, 1 July; Shepherd 1994, 148). A Giant’s Strength argued the unions’ relationship with the law rested on a fallacy:  namely, that workers were equal bargainers with employers. Conservatives had long recognised this required legal rectification and had conceded, albeit reluctantly, a legally privileged position to the unions. However, the unions were now, as Churchill had declared, an estate of the realm but were using their power and privileges, derived from these immunities, against society. The pamphlet outlined how ‘a settlement might be reached that would regulate the relationship of trade unions with the State by bringing them under the rule of the law’ (ICCUS 1958, 53).

771

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

177

The pamphlet, eighty-​ six pages long, targeted the privileges and the immunities conferred by the 1871, 1875, 1906 and 1913 Acts. A Giant’s Strength defined the problem thus: ‘how to retain the right to strike while limiting its scope to the minimum necessary to give the worker sufficient countervailing power against his employer?’ (ICCUS 1958, 20). Immunities should be available only to unions registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies (which would approve union rules), and without registration any strike not preceded by an independent inquiry and a fourteen-​day cooling-​off period would be vulnerable to legal action. To qualify for registration union rules would have to safeguard individuals against the closed shop; restrictive union practices could be referred to a court, which would also regulate inter-​ union disputes. Any union able to recruit and retain a substantial proportion of employees would have to be recognised by their employers for bargaining purposes but where non-​membership could result in the loss of employment the closed shop would be illegal. A Giant’s Strength believed imprisonment was neither feasible nor desirable, so it looked to the sanction of public opinion coupled with suing those responsible for illegal action. A Giant’s Strength opposed pre-​strike ballots as likely to make official strikes more likely, long lasting and bitter, and reduce the influence of official leaders. A Giant’s Strength captured Conservative unease at union power over society and the individual, and is clearly part of the long-​ established Conservative critique of the voluntarist tradition. Obvious omissions, such as on the political levy, attracted criticism as did its declared objective of strengthening union leaders’ authority but its significance was as being the first attempt to produce a coherent Conservative legal reform programme. Macleod, saw A Giant’s Strength as dangerous, contending that industrial relations problems were concentrated in a few industries (coal-​ mining, engineering, ship-​building and cars) and that in general ‘relations between the Government and the Trade Unions had never been so good as they were at present’. Problems were, therefore, best resolved by those closest to them and he pledged to resist pressure for legislation. ‘It should not be forgotten’, he warned, ‘that no Party in this country could form a Government without the support of a major proportion of the Trade Union Vote.’ Butler, the ACP chair, warned, however, that whilst legislation was undesirable, there was a case for an enquiry and ACP agreed to consult TUNAC (ACP 2/​1/​1–​50 (1958), 30 April and 12 November). The CRD responded to A Giant’s Strength in November with Trade Union Reform (CCO 1958). This document was so sensitive it warranted a ‘Top Secret’ classification and for meetings numbered copies were distributed and then collected. It agreed that the unions’ role in society, polity and economy had changed dramatically in recent years, generating profound concern. Much of this criticism, the CRD argued, was based on ignorance and

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

178

What about the workers?

resentment, and focused on four substantive problems:  strikes, restrictive practices, collective bargaining and personal liberty issues. Restricting the right to strike by law would shift the balance of power too far towards employers, thus stimulating conflict and, outside of war or a dire national emergency, CRD did not believe working people would accept curbs, which raised the difficulty of securing mass compliance. Trade Union Reform, however, conceded the case for a wide-​ranging enquiry; the last had been in 1917 since when the industrial scene had changed out of all recognition but CRD stressed this was an issue on which Conservatives needed to act with circumspection. Government’s scepticism meant no further action on Trade Union Reform was undertaken and ‘The general opinion was that things were progressing in this field, although very slowly, along the right lines’ (ACP 2/1/1–50 (1958), 9 July). The ideal would be a request from the TUC for an enquiry but such a request was extremely unlikely and there was no guarantee an enquiry would recommend reforms acceptable to the party. TUNAC endorsed the undesirability of legislation on unofficial strikes and restrictive practices but disagreed strongly on ‘conscience’ issues, arguing that individual freedom was fundamental to Conservatism. Even though contentious, the principle of legislation, the ACP concluded, ought to be debated in the party (ACP 1959 3/​6/​74). CRD advised that ministerial speeches should ‘be fairly tough about the unions’ attitude to individuals on disputes and wage bargaining while stressing their sympathy for trades unionism as a whole’ but ministers should adopt a different tone for party audiences. For one such speech Macmillan, for example, was advised not to mention picketing ‘as it is [Conservative trade unionists] who get bashed about on occasion’ whilst stressing his concern for individual freedom. If he did not do so there would profound disappointment ‘ “if the hungry sheep look up and are not fed”. I think they will accept and digest almost anything as long as it is said by the Prime Minister’ (CRD 2/​7/​11 1957; CRD 2/​7/​ 11 1959). CRD felt that a good deal of party disquiet ‘springs from a much more general fear that the Trade Unions have become overmighty subjects in a way that is generally sensed and not very accurately defined in the public mind’ (CRD 2/​7/​8 1959, J. Douglas to M. Fraser, January).

Changing direction There was a growing sense that the status quo was unsustainable (see Wigham 1961 for an influential contemporary analysis) but what exactly was to be done? The Minister of Labour’s (now John Hare, appointed in July 1960) dilemma was that the established methods seemed no longer able to deliver but legislation was unattractive. Hare believed that successive

971

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

179

governments had had unrealistic expectations of the TUC and union leaders generally. ‘They are elected’, he wrote in a memorandum, ‘representatives and their power of initiative is limited by the general apathy of the mass of the membership. There is often an active and watchful Left wing, every ready to accuse the leaders of a “sell out to the bosses” ’ (CAB 129/​105, 1961, 2). The ETU ballot-​rigging case raised questions about Communist exploitation of these weaknesses (see Powell 2004, 1–​26; Rolph 1962), but Hare believed that acceptable, and therefore sustainable, improvements in union governance could come only from the unions but that government could facilitate change by legislating enhanced individual employment rights (a trend begun by Macleod) and, more controversially, by strengthening official union leaders. Hare’s ideas were discussed in Cabinet on 18 May which agreed with avoiding overt interference in favour of an indirect approach based on legislation dealing with contracts of employment, redundancy payments, and so on to improve industrial relations, but some members, for example Macleod, urged, for example, measures to sequester union funds (CAB 128/​35 1961, 18 May, 4–​5). The CRD, John Hare and Macleod (now Party Chair) all conceded the strength of party sentiment favouring legal intervention but agreed with Butler’s warning ‘against the danger of over-​ simplifying the issues involved in legislation. Successive Ministers of Labour had found the disinterest of the unions a real obstacle’ (CRD 2/​7/​15 1962, 3). Notwithstanding these sentiments, in 1963–​64 we reach a tipping point in Conservative thinking. A  Cabinet discussion of future legislation (10 August 1963) made no mention of changing union law but in the New Year this issue became pressing. Critical was the decision (on 29 January 1964) Rookes v. Barnard on the closed shop and, to a lesser degree, Stratford v.  Lindley which ruled against secondary action (Kahn-​ Freund 2017, 81–​95; Smith 2017, 37–​78). As in the past judicial decisions on what was thought to be settled law triggered a crisis. Douglas Rookes, a draughtsman employed by the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), resigned from his union in 1956 (the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsman, AESD) after a disagreement. However, BOAC and AESD had a closed shop agreement, and AESD threatened a strike unless Rookes left or was fired. BOAC suspended Rookes and subsequently dismissed him with one week’s salary in lieu of notice. Rookes then sued AESD officials (Barnard, was the branch chair), contending that he was the victim of intimidation designed to induce BOAC to fire him. At first hearing Rookes’s action was endorsed but was then overturned by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords reversed this, finding in favour of Rookes, which rendered the union guilty and facing punitive damages. The decision was controversial and was received with outrage by the unions because Rookes v. Barnard called into question the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

180

What about the workers?

immunities-​based system built up under the Trade Disputes Act (1906) and it added significantly to the pressure for a wide-​ranging inquiry into trade union and industrial relations law. In government an Official Committee on Trade Unions and the Law met three times between June 1963 and May 1964. The committee was composed of MoL civil servants (four of its ten members, including the chair, were from the MoL), the law officers and the Registrar of Friendly Societies; its extensive report focused on unofficial strikes, union governance and the lessons of overseas experience, and was a distillation of the thenofficial conception of the law’s role in industrial relations. There is little to be gained from trawling through its analysis; more important here is its narrative and tone. The report conceded that unofficial strikes caused economic damage and were symptomatic of the breakdown of internal union authority and the rise of the shop steward. The Report acknowledged disquiet at the unions’ threat to individual liberties and agreed that compared to other voluntary organisations, the law played a strikingly limited role in regulating the unions’ internal affairs and conceded union rules often left much to be desired. However, remedial legislation should be resisted. The ETU ballot-​rigging scandal, though a rare instance, had stimulated demands for legal intervention that provoked the TUC’s hostility and had endangered its participation in the NEDC. Existing law had provided a solution to the ETU’s problems, albeit slowly, and the best remedy for similar cases was a much beefed-​up TUC process to deal with problems of union governance. The language of the Summary of Conclusions describes legislation as, inter alia, ‘unacceptable’, ‘impracticable’, ‘would not help’, would ‘not be desirable’, have ‘no advantages’, and having ‘no advantage at present’ even though ‘The main body of Trade Union Law is virtually the same to-​day as it became 50 years ago [and] There are probably fewer legal constraints on the trade unions in this country than in any other major country in the world’. The Report did suggest that thought be given to collective agreements being enforceable at law and there was a sting in the tail. ‘The need for reform’, it concluded, ‘is becoming more urgent and if the TUC does not carry it out, and cannot be persuaded to, then in the long run the more drastic remedy of legislation, and with it greater oversight of trade union affairs by the State, may become inevitable’ (CAB 129/​117 1964a, para. 161, 28). On 14 January 1964 the Cabinet discussed the growing concern over the state of union law. The TUC General Council had concluded Rookes v. Barnard made it ‘impossible to make any threat of a strike without running the risk of incurring legal action’ and warned of serious industrial consequences, citing Counsel’s opinion was that it would not be difficult to return to the status quo ante (TUC 1964, 353–​354). The TUC was reluctant to cooperate with an inquiry but doing nothing was not really an option for

181

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

181

the Government because ‘the risk that Left-​wing opinion … in the interval before the election [would] disseminate the view that, if the Government were returned [in the upcoming election] they would seek to weaken the industrial power of the unions’. Joseph Godber, the Minister of Labour from 20 October 1963, suggested deferring any public announcement, whilst making the reasons for the Government’s proposed inquiry known privately to its supporters, because any Government announcement ‘might serve only to invite their supporters to entertain expectations which could not be fulfilled, whilst prejudicing the prospects of securing the co-​ operation of the trade unions in an enquiry after the election’ (CAB 128/​ 38 1964, 14 January, 3–​ 4). However, powerful pressures were pulling in the opposite direction. Rookes v.  Barnard, party resentment over the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance (which seriously affected many small shopkeepers) and the perception that the system built up around the 1906 Act was inadequate to the industrial relations problems facing the country stoked up considerable resentment in the Party. In February 1964 the Cabinet were informed some 120 backbenchers (including Macleod, who after Macmillan’s resignation in October 1963 had refused to serve under his successor, Sir Alec Douglas Home) were considering motions responding to Rookes v. Barnard which provided cover for creating a Royal Commission into trade unions and industrial relations, something which ‘would be welcome to many supporters of the government’. Although the Official Committee had been sceptical, the Cabinet concluded there were advantages to a Royal Commission because of the discontent at party grassroots and amongst backbenchers, and it agreed to proceed (CAB 128/​ 38 1964, 13 February). A group of ministers had, on 18 February, asked the Minister of Labour to consult the TUC informally on the prospects of its agreeing to cooperate with a proposed Royal Commission but hostility and the general election’s proximity ‘made it impossible for [Godber] to secure the co-​operation of the TUC’. The Government’s options were, first, make no announcement until the election and face down the inevitable reaction from the party; second, a manifesto commitment to an inquiry; or third, announce an inquiry immediately after the election. Ministers chose the last (CAB 129/​ 118 1964b). On 9 March the Cabinet had approved a draft statement that noted much of the legal status quo had been thrown into doubt by Rookes v. Barnard, and concluded the time was ripe for a review early in a new Parliament. Whilst issues such as productivity, restrictive practices and resistance to technological change were deemed matters for unions and employers, not legislation, Godber announced a review into industrial relations would be established early in the next Parliament (Hansard, 19 March 1964, cols 1598–​1602).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

182

What about the workers?

On 11 June Godber met the TUC’s ‘inner cabinet’. The TUC delegation insisted Rookes v.  Barnard posed a fundamental threat to industrial relations but could be easily reversed, cautioning Godber that an inquiry was irrelevant. Rookes v. Barnard would, the delegation warned, undermine official leaders and shift power to shop stewards and, furthermore, they had evidence that some employers were preparing to use Rookes v. Barnard to attack the unions. Godber conceded the Government was concerned about the decision but claimed its actual effect remained unclear, and he suggested it was unrealistic for the TUC to expect legislation on so sensitive a topic so late in a Parliament but action could be expected after the general election. The existing law was unsatisfactory, but a quick restoration of the status quo ante ‘would be unacceptable to our own backbenchers and would give members the opportunity for proposing other difficult and controversial changes in the law’ (CAB 129/​118 1964b, 3). The TUC’s position on legislation was clear. In 1964, the TUC President, George Lowthian, issued an unequivocal warning: ‘no one will be allowed to legislate the trade union Movement out of existence or hamstring it in the conduct of its essential activities’ (TUC 1964, 74). By October 1964 ministers were balancing the demands of retaining union cooperation and electoral support (about 20 per cent of Conservative voters were union members) with the pressure from the party to act. The 1964 manifesto, Prosperity with a Purpose, emphasised achieving inflation free growth of 4 per cent a year with full employment. ‘The trade unions have a vital responsibility’, the manifesto continued, ‘to diminish such handicaps to Britain’s competitive strength. We shall continue to seek their co-​operation in matters of common interest and to work in partnership with them through NEDC’. As a result of Rookes v. Barnard the law would be the subject of an inquiry (Conservative Party 1964). Home made little use of the union problem in the election and the dominant assumption was that legislation could do more harm than good (Wrigley 2007, 326–​333). Summing up the Conservative reaction to Rookes v.  Barnard, the TUC General Secretary, George Woodcock, told Congress: ‘We gave the Government … a chance –​ accept trade unionism as we understand it and collective bargaining as we understand it … The present Government fluffed it … Now it is up to the next Government’ (TUC 1964, 352). Following his general election defeat Home resigned and was replaced by Edward Heath as party leader, but the policy review groups set up by Home continued their work. Heath replaced Sir Keith Joseph with Robert Carr, as the chair of industrial relations group, who working closely with Geoffrey Howe extended the party’s thinking on industrial relations (Howe 1994, 40). Heath’s priority as Party Leader was to complete the policy review quickly and publish Putting Britain Right Ahead, described

381

Confronting the British disease?

183

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

by Ramsden as ‘the key document of 1964–​1970’ (Ramsden 1996, 257). The 1966 manifesto, Action Not Words (Conservative Party 1966), gave five pledges. On industrial relations, it pledged a Conservative government would ‘reform both British management and British trade unions’; in this was an opportunity to promote One Nation politics because Everyone is fed up with pointless strikes and outdated management. We reject the argument that there is a clash between the interests of management and workpeople. Higher wages, good profits and competitive products are in the interests of both. Efficient production and stable prices are what the customer wants.

Industrial relations would be transformed by an Industrial Relations Act (significantly there was no mention of incomes policy) and a new Code of Industrial Relations Practice; second, collective agreements would be made legally enforceable; third, union rules would be required to be fair and in the public interest, and be subject to scrutiny by a new Registrar; fourth, an Industrial Relations Court would be established; fifth, restrictive practices would be addressed; and finally, the Trade Disputes Act (1965), which had reversed Rookes v.  Barnard, would be repealed. Heath’s foreword emphasised the manifesto’s radicalism, central to which was trade union reform, and he pledged that a Conservative government would not be diverted from its goals by opposition. The manifesto testified eloquently to the distance travelled by the party since the publication of A Giant’s Strength. The review of Conservative policy was overseen initially by Heath, as chair of the ACP and then as party leader, and industrial relations were a central concern. Heath ‘was insistent that the reform of trade union law should not be seen as an attack on the unions but simply putting them on a proper footing to operate effectively in a modern economy’ (Campbell 1993, 203). In his memoirs Heath portrayed the unions as ‘the only major sector of British life which had been immune from modernisation’, and in a speech at Southampton, perhaps his most important one before the 1966 election, he promised a revolution in union law but one based on the principles of One Nation Conservatism (Heath 1998, 279–​281). During the Rookes v.  Barnard fracas the TUC set out its position on legislation and did not thereafter depart from it significantly. The absence of a positive legal framework was necessary, it argued, because history repeatedly showed the law and judges to be biased against the unions. Legal frameworks posed serious procedural and structural problems and industrial relations would suffer, becoming more conflict prone, bitter and litigious. The drift of Conservative thinking was in effect interpreted as challenging the unions’ raison d’être, undermining the stability of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

184

What about the workers?

industrial relations system, and posing a direct threat to worker freedom by making strike action far more difficult and costly. Heath’s speeches implied a radical intent and Heath was committed to modernisation, but he was not as anti-​union as many thought; moreover, he was not interested in pandering to such sentiments. Conservative defeat in 1964 meant that the Labour Government established the proposed Royal Commission, the Donovan Commission, from which flowed the Wilson government’s defeated 1969 reform proposals, In Place of Strife (see, for example, Dorey 2019; Jenkins 1970; Tyler 2006, 461–​476). Wags suggested that the TUC’s Plan for Action should be merged with In Place of Strife to produce In Place of Action; the TUC’s commitment to a ‘solemn and binding’ undertaking to work for improved industrial relations saw the emergence of a new actor, Solomon Binding, in industrial politics. The split in the Labour Cabinet and Labour’s (losing) conflict with the TUC reinforced Heath’s conviction that a future Conservative government must stick to its principles. Events after the 1966 election only confirmed Heath’s view of the need for urgent reform. ‘The balance of power’, Heath wrote, ‘was moving steadily towards the unions and away from management and from government, with its responsibility for holding the ring for the protection of ordinary people’ (Heath 1998, 287)  and the Industrial Relations Group under Robert Carr continued its work on developing the party’s proposals. Heath and the Industrial Relations Group dismissed the Donovan Report as toothless, and the Cabinet’s surrender over In Place of Strife stirred up the party who ‘endorsed with enthusiasm our main strategy for reversing Britain’s economic decline’ (Heath 1998, 300). Material advocating legislation circulated widely in the party and constituency associations repeatedly endorsed proposals for the extensive legal reform of unions. There was nothing remarkable in this but ‘What made the 1960s different, however, was that the party hierarchy was more responsive to grass-​roots opinion … such arguments went from being local party pipe-​ dreams to central party policy … legal reform of trade-​union law became a central feature of Conservative policy’ (Green 1998, 33). Published two weeks before the Donovan Commission’s report, Fair Deal At Work (1968, hereafter FDAW) was the product of Heath’s recasting of Conservative industrial relations philosophy and policy (Roberts 1968, 360–​363). Campbell speculates that the failure of the Industrial Relations Act, the FDAW’s offspring, flowed from FDAW’s detailed legalism and lack of involvement by industrialists and MoL experts, while Enoch Powell criticised the party’s policy review’s failure to debate (or even understand) fundamental issues about the unions’ economic impact (as a monetarist Powell rejected the idea that the unions created inflation). The policy review had been divided over whether a Conservative government would seek

581

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

185

an incomes policy or rely on unemployment to regulate bargaining and Brendan Sewill, the CRD director, identified the absence of a clear anti-​ inflation policy as a serious weakness because ‘Everybody said the trade unions were too powerful but nobody was prepared to say the only way to reduce their power was to increase unemployment’ (Campbell 1990:  36–​ 37, 38). However, the party grassroots were united in regarding union monopoly power as the source of inflation, and so expected FDAW to reduce union power and discipline bargainers but many of those involved in its preparation were uncertain whether FDAW could both carry the weight of reforming industrial relations and act as a surrogate incomes policy. Nevertheless, FDAW and the Conservative frontbench’s opposition to In Place of Strife raised party expectations to a pitch that could not be easily satisfied (Ramsden 1996, 257–​258). The justification for FDAW was that the current structure of union law was outdated and so ‘a fair, relevant and sensible framework of law, while providing no panaceas, can exert stabilising pressures and help to raise general standards’ (CPC 1968, 10). Reform was an essential adjunct to economic growth and fundamental to reform was challenging the fiction of voluntarism: Huge organisations are involved, wielding immense power over individuals and the economic and social life of the nation. Government has both the right and the duty to ensure that these bodies operate in the public interest. It is nonsense to treat them as if they were privileged private clubs. (CPC 1968, 61)

Outdated union structures, extensive unofficial disputes, outlandish restrictive labour practices, uncontrolled shop stewards and the misuse of economic power for sectional purposes would be addressed by a single Industrial Relations Act whose main provisions would be, first, a new Registrar to ensure rules were just, democratic and in the public interest. Registration would be necessary for a union to qualify for full legal protection. Second, unions would enjoy a corporate personality but be immune to civil actions when pursuing a lawful trade dispute. Third, a special industrial court comprising lay and professional members would be created. Fourth, proper standards for the conduct of strikes would be enshrined in a Code of Behaviour. Fifth, collective agreements would enjoy the same status as other contracts and be legally enforceable. Sixth, employers would have a legal duty to recognise and negotiate with unions where a majority of employees wished them to do so. Seventh, employees would have a statutory right of appeal against union or employer actions. Eighth, strikes to enforce a closed shop, in inter-​union disputes, sympathy strikes and strikes against the employment of non-union labour would be illegal. Ninth, closed shops must guarantee individual conscience and freedom. Finally, the MoL would more actively

186

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

pursue conciliation without being asked by the parties involved, could refer a dispute to the Industrial Court for arbitration where it considered the national interest threatened, apply for an injunction to stop a strike or lockout, and finally, arrange to ballot those involved. These changes were designed to strengthen responsible leaders by inhibiting unconstitutional action by stripping them of legal protection. The package meant that unions Would no longer be wholly immune against civil proceedings … their funds would be at risk [and] be liable … for the actions of their servants, agents and members [unless] they could show clearly that they had dissociated themselves from such action and taken reasonable steps to prevent them. (CPC 1968, 66)

At the 1968 Conference Carr’s speech stressed the One Nation underpinnings of FDAW, whilst arguing that both the traditional approach to industrial relations and the Wilson Government’s attempts to control wages had proved profoundly destabilising. Inevitably, ‘Constitutional trade union leadership is undermined … power passes increasingly away from the more responsible union leadership to the less responsible unofficial militants’ and FDAW was intended ‘to tilt the balance of power in favour of the majority [and] against the irresponsible minority’ (NUCUA 1968, 33–​34). What was not clear, however, was what would happen if a guilty party refused to follow a court’s instructions? What would happen if a trade union refused to register? Or refused to pay a fine? Inherent in FDAW, then, was a confrontation between unions and the State. The party’s seemingly new hardline attitude appeared captured by the Shadow Cabinet meeting at the Selsdon Park Hotel in January 1970, which purportedly gave birth to the right-​wing throw-​back, ‘Selsdon Man’. Heath and Carr attacked the Labour Government and its supposed subservience to over-​mighty unions, implying strongly that a Conservative government would not back down in the face of union opposition; Heath believed the unions would huff and puff (this appeared confirmed by private talks with union leaders) and then accept the Act (Campbell 1993, 228–​230; Ramsden 1996, 285). To reorient industrial relations FDAW combined legal modernisation with the strengthening official leaders, and Heath’s objectives were to create a fair and free market, in which the balance of power between labour and employers would guarantee that common sense could prevail. We wanted to restore a healthy system of free collective bargaining, within which both sides of industry would behave responsibly and sensibly, in their own long term interests and in the best interests of the country as a whole. (Heath 1998, 327)

Political rhetoric lauded ‘common sense’, ‘responsibility’ and being ‘sensible’; and at the 1969 Conference Carr declared, ‘We know what we

781

Confronting the British disease?

187

are doing, and we have made it clear. Our will is strong, and will not be broken’ (NUCUA 1969, 36).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Heath Government There is nothing to be gained from yet another recitation of the calamitous industrial relations of 1970–​74 or the Government’s failure to address ‘the British disease’; excellent accounts exist (for example, Beckett 2009; Black et al. 2015; Sandbrook 2010; Turner 2006). Instead, this section explores the tensions generated in Conservative politics by a government committed to One Nation politics but whose leader (and many Conservatives agreed) believed the party was committed to a radical revision of trade union law and were now convinced the unions were ‘in a position to threaten not only our economic and industrial well being, but also our political stability’ (Heath 1998, 326). The 1970 Conservative manifesto promised a new style and philosophy of governance, and in industrial relations it promised ‘to strengthen the unions and their official leadership’ and ‘establish clear rights and obligations … It will lay down what is lawful and what isn’t lawful … It will also introduce new safeguards for the individual’ (Conservative Party 1970). Soon after coming into office the Heath Government used unrest in the docks to signal this new attitude, The Government’s determination not to be influenced by the threat of national industrial action needed to be brought home to the unions and workers as well as to the employers. It was important to encourage a new and a more restrained climate of expectation in relation to the pursuit of wage claims through industrial action. (CAB 128/​47, 1970, 7 July, 5)

Symptomatic of this new attitude was the speedy winding up Labour’s National Board for Prices and Incomes and exercising closer control over public sector pay on the grounds that a firm government stance would compel union to re-​examine and moderate their behaviour (CAB 129/​153 1970). The government foreswore incomes policy but by doing so placed an increased burden on the Industrial Relations Bill because, as Heath’s PPS, James Prior, later emphasised ‘enormous faith was placed in the Industrial Relations Act, because really it was the means of bringing about a regulation of the economy, without having to go back to all the old problems of incomes and prices policy all over again’ (Whitehead 1985, 70). Heath believed ‘the prospect for the months ahead was a troubled one especially in the light of the increasing evidence of widespread industrial unrest’, so it was essential ministers adhere to the manifesto but ‘they might have less time than they had originally hoped in which to come to grips with

188

What about the workers?

… prices and incomes policy and industrial relations’. Heath concluded that the Industrial Relations Bill had to be quickly introduced because

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

until the climate of industrial relations could be radically altered, the Government would be perpetually at risk of becoming trapped in the type of sterile confrontation with organised labour which had frustrated the efforts of their predecessors to deal effectively with industrial problems. (CAB 128/​47 1970, 3 September, 3)

Drafting produced a bill of nine Schedules and 170 sections (for the genesis of the Act, see Seldon 1988, 37–​40) and Carr recalled the Act’s complexity commenting, ‘I had to have a brief in order to understand the purpose of the clause I  was talking about. So it was complex to me, one of its main authors. What it seemed to other people I dread to think’ (Whitehead 1985, 71). The TUC was infuriated by both the bill’s content and the lack of consultation (the consultation document was published on 5 October and consultation was to be completed by 13 November) and, furthermore, consultation would not apply to the bill’s ‘eight pillars’, which Carr told the TUC were inviolable. Phelps Brown describes this as ‘not only humiliating but unprecedented … a Conservative government was thrusting radical changes upon them with deliberate denial of discussion’ (Phelps Brown 1983, 190). Carr’s bill gave the Secretary of State, and the Courts, a much more visible role in industrial relations and the proposals clearly entailed the possibility of imprisonment for trade unionists. On picketing, for example, the NIRC could issue a restraining order, the breaching of which opened the possibility of damages, or an injunction and the possibility ‘of imprisonment for non-​compliance’. Similarly, where a dispute threatened the national interest and the Secretary of State applied for an injunction, ‘Non-​compliance … could lead in the last resort to imprisonment for refusal to pay a fine.’ It was obvious ‘the bill would be a major political issue, which would provoke strong controversy and vigorous debate’ and Carr warned, ‘Once they had embarked upon it the Government would have to carry it through to full enactment whatever the political battle or the industrial action might ensure’ (CAB 128/​47, 1970, 30 July, 12, 13, 15). Heath attended a meeting with representatives of the TUC (1 September), in which the TUC made its opposition clear (the TUC was preparing for mass demonstrations against the bill) and Carr noted (3 September) that the number of strikes and days lost were higher and of greater duration than in the previous year which justified action. The problem was that ‘Militancy was also continuing to be rewarded with success’, and so employers and government needed to offer ‘sustained resistance’ and wait for the bill to pass and take effect (CAB 128/​47, 1970, 3 September, 8). The Cabinet agreed that ‘enlist[ing] the support of public opinion against

981

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

189

trade union militancy’ was essential but it was not easy to achieve. During the local authority manual workers’ dispute of late 1970 the Cabinet noted that public sympathy was, in fact, on the side of the low-​paid manual workers and ministers feared any action interpreted as strike breaking would provoke a hostile public (as well as union) response. A  critical question was ‘how long could the government permit a dispute to continue whose effects impacted directly on the public?’ (see CAB 128/​47, 1970, 15 October for this debate). The public’s desire was, not unreasonably, to see an end to its inconvenience and the public regarded ending its discomfort as the government’s task, and so it was only a short step to blaming the government, not the unions, for its discomfort. This was a dilemma the Heath Government never resolved. The political temperature was increased by the bill’s slow progress through Parliament. Its complexity and controversial nature made limiting debate inevitable and the Leader of the House allocated only ten days for the Committee stage, and three each for the Report and Third Reading stages. This culminated in continuous voting in fifty-seven divisions on un-​ debated Opposition amendments, taking eleven hours. In February 1971 140,000 trade unionists and others marched to ‘Kill the bill’ and a March 1971 Special TUC Congress advised unions not to register (in September 1971 Congress changed this to an instruction). The one-​day strike called by the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and TGWU against the bill received a ‘general, if reluctant, response’. These were political strikes and open to legal retribution but the Cabinet considered it ‘unwise for the Government to encourage legal action, which could all too easily enable those against whom it was directed to be presented as martyrs’. This was followed by the remarkable statement that it was difficult for [those opposed] to stand out against an official union instruction, even if they were out of sympathy with it; and to condemn them for obeying it would seem inconsistent with the Government’s aim of promoting greater self-​discipline in industrial affairs. (CAB 128/​49, 1971, 18 March, 7)

The TUC continued to boycott the Act, unions withdrew from the Register, and refused to make collective agreements legally enforceable by insisting on a clause stating, ‘this is not a legally enforceable agreement’ (or ‘Tina Lea’). Of the 141 TUC affiliated unions twenty-eight (19.8 per cent) remained registered, sixty-one (43.2 per cent) had cancelled registration and fifty-two (36.8 per cent), it was believed, might still register. Carr was initially optimistic that the unions would come round (for Carr’s post mortem on the Act, see Seldon 1988, 46), but as the Act was not yet fully in force and ‘it will be some while before Trade Unions affiliated to the TUC are prepared to adopt a more pragmatic, realistic approach to the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

190

What about the workers?

Act’, Carr concluded that ‘it is far from true to say that the trade unions will … prevent the implementation or nullify the effects of the Act’ (CAB 129/​160, 1971, 2). The muted disquiet of the 1971 Conservative conference changed to growing alarm. There were fifty-seven resolutions on the agenda of the 1972 conference on industrial relations and Conference speakers stressed repeatedly the worsening of industrial relations and the Government’s failure to get its message about reform across to rank-​ and-​ file trade unionists. Speakers called urgently for action ‘to end the lawlessness and brutal intimidation of the majority by a politically motivated minority’, noting, ‘The people of this country are sickened by the constant state of turmoil in our industrial relations and weary of the distress and discomfort which this brings them.’ Not only were strikes increasingly violent, more and more strikes were politically motivated:  ‘When the mob forced the closure of Saltley coke works [scene of a mass NUM picket in the 1972 dispute] was this justice or was it expediency? … When policemen were seriously injured by revolting pickets, a few men were fined £40. Was this justice or was it expediency?’ The Government had a democratic mandate and should deal firmly with what was described as anarchy: ‘All over the country, whenever there is an industrial dispute … Armies of 100 people or a dozen people are wandering round applying very unfair pressures.’ The Earl of Ancram recommended ‘that the Government should show these attackers up for what they are, and crush them into the political gutter where they belong’ and a TUNAC area chair insisted the Government’s supporters were ‘fed up with the disturbances and the intimidation … they look to us for protection’. In reply Maurice Macmillan, the Employment Secretary, called for patience and, we may assume that delegates were sceptical about his call for stronger unions; many no doubt thought they were too strong (NUCUA 1972, 96–​102). Two events are worth noting:  first, on 9 January the NUM held a national strike ballot with 58.8 per cent in favour that led directly to a seven-week strike (see Taylor 2005b, 49–​72 for an account of the dispute). The NUM’s innovatory picketing tactics prevented the supply of power stations, resulting in power cuts, and the closure of the Saltley coke dump in Birmingham became symbolic of union power and the government’s loss of authority. Second, and of equal symbolism, unemployment exceeded one million for the first time since the 1930s on 20 January 1972 and ‘the growth of unemployment loomed very large as a primary consideration of policy’ (Kandiah 1995, 200). The Industrial Relations Act was weakened by a ballot ordered by the NIRC on the railways that produced a massive endorsement of strike action (this provision was never used again) and by two cases involving dockers opposing containerisation. These disputes

191

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

191

led to massive fines on the TGWU and the imprisonment of pickets; in an appeal to the House of Lords Lord Denning argued that unregistered unions could not be responsible for their members’ actions, which led to the intervention of the Official Solicitor to appeal for the pickets’ release. The second dispute produced further arrests, which led the TUC to break off talks with ministers and threaten a one-​day general strike, resulting in mass demonstrations outside Pentonville prison. Denning’s ruling was reversed on appeal. The AEU’s opposition to, and non-​compliance with, the Act cost it some £8m in fines, and it was estimated that around one-​third of the TUC’s affiliated membership participated in some form of protest against the Act. The 1972 building strike against casual cash-​paid work lasting twelve weeks eventually led to the prosecution and conviction of twenty-four building workers and the jailing of six pickets under the Conspiracy Act (1875). By the summer of 1972 the Industrial Relations Act was a dead letter (Lyddon 1999, 326–​352). Between 1970 and 1971 the Government’s ‘indirect’ incomes policy seemed to work. The Heath Government sought progressively lower wage increases (the N-​1 policy) in the public sector and it encouraged the private sector to do the same, and initially it proved successful (Kandiah 1995, 195). A  work-​to-​rule by power station workers in late 1970 which led to power cuts was hurriedly settled by a Court of Inquiry but the Union of Postal Workers (UPW) strike in early 1971 was effectively defeated and the Government’s N-​1 policy held until the end of 1971. Increased unemployment led to renewed contact with the TUC but neither side was prepared to depart from their prepared positions even though common ground, notably a commitment to growth and full employment, remained and the NEDC provided a useful forum whose deliberations were out of sight of the Conservative Party membership. Heath and Vic Feather, the TUC General Secretary, were anxious to avoid a rupture but between May and July 1971 their gavotte of signal and counter-​signal produced nothing of substance. These contacts provided the back-​drop to Anthony Barber’s, the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s, commitment on 19 July 1971 to a second Maudling-​esque dash for growth (producing the ill-​starred ‘Barber Boom’). This expansionary boost was welcomed by the TUC, but progress was halted by the dispute with the NUM, whose outcome (effectively a government surrender via the Wilberforce Court of Inquiry) underlay Heath’s conviction that there had to be a more sensible way of proceeding and so he prepared the ground for tripartite talks. Offering the unions a significantly increased role in economic and political governance was part of an effort to reduce overload and improve governability. In response to a dock strike, for example, Heath was anxious to enhance the State’s ability to deal with industrial emergencies and so

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

192

What about the workers?

improve its resilience. The use of troops to maintain essential services was discussed during a docks dispute in the summer of 1972 because public opinion expected the Government to take early action especially as the Government had taken emergency powers after only three days during the 1970 docks dispute. However, troops needed about seven days to deploy and if they were used there was the danger that attitudes would harden and there would be sympathetic action from, for example, lorry drivers. Nonetheless, Heath ordered a review of the Government’s provisions for civil emergencies and an upgrade of the Government’s contingency planning (CAB 129/​64 1972, 1 August, 1–​2). Another aspect of the government’s strategy was intended to be a significant augmentation of One Nation and partnership politics: offering the TUC a role in economic management, but this offer was not as attractive to the TUC as Heath had imagined. Heath’s relationship with the General Council was complicated by the latter’s insistence on repealing the Industrial Relations Act before any cooperation was forthcoming and Heath’s offer ignored the complexity of internal TUC politics and inter-​union politics. Heath emphasised the public’s expectation that the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), TUC and government address inflation and concluded the Government had to keep the TUC under pressure to cooperate. Although the TUC rejected Heath’s original offer, it was, in fact, willing to engage in tripartite talks (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 6 July, 7–​8; also 13 July, 5). TUC acceptance, however, stimulated conflict over cooperation within the TUC and General Council which meant the TUC would demand a high price for cooperation but many ministers believed there was no guarantee the TUC could deliver any agreement. In making this offer the Government also opened itself to attack from the party and those demanding greater reliance on free markets and the unions’ exclusion. Notwithstanding, tripartite talks began at NEDC on 19 July. The initial assessment was that discussions with the TUC and CBI had gone well; a programme of work was outlined and the parties agreed to meet again on 14 September. The TUC could not commit itself to full cooperation until after its annual Congress but Ministers were optimistic as ‘their attitude on the question of the Industrial Relations Act appeared to becoming more reasonable’ (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 8 August, 6). The Cabinet was told that the 14 September meeting ‘had been conducted in a more cordial and co-​operative spirit than some of the earlier exchanges’, the TUC had not referred to the necessity of repealing the 1971, Act and there had been agreement on a uniform flat-​rate wage increase (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 21 September, 8; CAB 129/​164 1972a, 1). The tripartite discussions ‘will be attacked from both extremes of the political spectrum’ so ministers must ‘mobilise the force of public opinion’ and convince them of ‘the benefits

391

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

193

of working by voluntary agreement’. The main concern was promoting confidence between participants and sustaining One Nation politics. In a statement Heath emphasised the ambition of the talks for the conduct of governance stressing, ‘they mark a major step forward in the management of our economy for the benefit of everybody concerned’ (CAB 129/​164 1972a, 3). Although significant progress towards a voluntary prices and incomes policy had been made, ‘it was regrettable that the TUC Council had subsequently rejected them’ but public opinion, which was favourable, would, it was hoped, strengthen the government’s position. The problem, as Heath acknowledged, was that it was ‘necessary to press the TUC about their ability to enforce any agreed proposals which depended upon the cooperation of their members’ (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 29 September, 6; 6 October, 7). Government, and the CBI, opposed price control, because if ‘it were introduced, Parliament and public opinion would expect it to be matched by an equivalent control of wages’ but significantly the Government hinted it was prepared to consider amending the 1971 Act after a decent interval (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 25 October, 5; see also Seldon 1988, 40–​41). Faced by a breakdown in the tripartite talks, the Government had two choices: first, to pursue its existing policy as each pay claim came forward; or second, to institute a temporary statutory pay and price freeze as a precursor to a long-​term policy (CAB 129/​164, 1972b). The Cabinet perhaps predictably opted for the second but this opened Government to the charge of inconsistency, as they had told the TUC ‘that it was administratively not possible to enforce effective and comprehensive statutory price control’. Enforcement would be difficult and creating the necessary institutions ‘would undoubtedly give great offence to the Government’s supporters in Parliament if the Government were seen to be unable to give effect to their policies except by invoking powers which their predecessors had taken’ and they had criticised when in Opposition (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 30 October, 4–​5). None of this would be welcomed by either the unions or the Conservative Party, and many in the latter would be infuriated by a Conservative government adopting a policy diametrically opposed to that on which they were elected. On 1 November the General Council rejected the Government’s insistence that the unions accept that anti-​inflation policy must regulate both pay and prices. Unless a voluntary agreement could be finalised, however, a temporary freeze on both would be imposed and ministers would prepare a permanent policy, and it was ‘important to ensure, if possible, that the TUC should not be able to manoeuvre the Government into a position in which the breakdown would have appear to have been provoked by some other aspect of the proposal’ (such as the Industrial Relations Act or the Housing

194

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Finance Act, which had increased council rents). It was now clear that any concession would be interpreted as ‘a political retreat [and] would be keenly resented by the Government’s supporters’. However, Geoffrey Howe recalled in 1995 that the return to incomes policy aroused resignation rather than fury in the party (Kandiah 1995, 201). Notwithstanding, the Government had very little room for manoeuvre. It was virtually certain that the militant unions had now decided to force the issue to a breaking point; and there was little, if any, prospect that the current discussions could result in an agreement which the Government could accept on either political or economic grounds. (CAB 128/​50, 1972, 2 November, 6–​7)

On 6 November 1972 the government announced a ninety-day statutory pay freeze. Enoch Powell predicted union–​government relations would now follow the same trajectory as had all previous incomes policies, observing ‘it is fatal for any Government [to introduce] a compulsory control of wages and prices, in contravention of the deepest commitments of this party’ and asked, ‘has my right hon. Friend [Heath] taken leave of his senses?’ (Hansard, 6 November 1972, col. 631). The government remained open to discussions but the TUC refused to engage with the pay and price policy’s institutions (the Pay Board and the Prices Commission) because the TUC’s room for manoeuvre was limited by its internal politics so ‘There seemed little prospect of any constructive discussion on economic and industrial affairs with the TUC in the near future’ (CAB 128/​51, 1973, 15 February, 7). The Government’s push for a permanent incomes policy led a Special TUC Congress (March 1973)  to approve a one-​ day strike against the counter-​inflation policy but in May the TUC accepted an invitation to talks with ministers despite opposition from within the TUC and from the party grassroots and back benches. Tripartite politics seemed an appropriate and logical response that fitted neatly with Heath’s political style and philosophy, and could be presented as in the mainstream of post-​war governance and as part of a pragmatic One Nation Conservative tradition but there was no guarantee that the participants, each facing serious internal opposition, could secure agreement. Paradoxically, measures intended to reduce overload and enhance governability increased the load on ministers in the short term, reducing further their ability to govern effectively. Over the summer of 1973 it became clear that the policy’s survival depended on Stage III of incomes policy accommodating the NUM and reconciling TUC and CBI preferences (‘the TUC wanted flexibility on pay and rigid control of prices, the CBI could envisage only very limited relaxation of the pay limits’), and it was in this impasse that union–​government relations approached the oil crisis and the second miners’ strike (CAB 128/​53, 1973, 2 October).

591

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

195

The dispute with the NUM was ‘a conflict between the Government and the NUM militants [and an] open challenge to the authority of Parliament’ and ‘The Government must make absolutely clear that there will be no concession, and the overtime ban will bring nothing more.’ In a covering note Maurice Macmillan (who was replaced as Secretary of State for Employment on 2 December with William Whitelaw, the Northern Ireland Secretary) had noted that if ‘the Government has to make a concession, the militants everywhere will be encouraged to try their hand against the policy’. When confronting politicised industrial action the Government ‘should be prepared to use the Conservative Party organisation to the full’, arguing ‘There is nothing improper in using the Party organisation to put across a policy approved by Parliament.’ If there was a strike, we can expect the miners to stay solidly behind the NUM. They would certainly outlast the fuel supplies [so] the Government would have to consider … concessions outside the [Pay] Code … altering the policy to ensure that all those with the strength and will to damage the economy seriously could be paid what they demand, while the rest were held down. I  regard this as politically intolerable.

Macmillan’s conclusion was profoundly depressing and pointed to an election to resolve the dispute, ‘If the [NUM] ballot goes in favour of a strike … It should be made clear to the country that Government, Parliament and people are facing intolerable blackmail’ (CAB 129/​173 1973, paras 17 and 25.v). There is little evidence that government was breaking down under the strain at the end of 1973 and beginning of 1974, 1963–​64 was remembered as a much more difficult time, but ministers and civil servants were certainly under strain (Kandiah 1995, 212–​213). The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War and the consequent OPEC oil crisis, and the descent into the second miners’ strike culminated in the Heath Government’s defeat in the general election on 28 February 1974 (see Taylor 2005b, 84–​102 for an account of the dispute). On 9 January 1974 Sidney Greene, the general secretary of the National Union Railwaymen, made an offer at the NEDC on behalf of the TUC that captures the limits of the union-​government relationship. The TUC General Council, he told Anthony Barber, accepted that the situation in the coal industry was ‘exceptional’ and if the NUM’s pay claim was treated outside Stage 3 other TUC affiliated unions would not use this to justify their own claims. This seriously meant, but poorly prepared and delivered, offer was rejected by Barber and Heath, even though Len Murray, the TUC General Secretary, confirmed it was a serious offer. There were two broad positions in Cabinet:  acceptance (‘There were no means of putting pressure on the miners, and as unemployment increased public opinion was likely to turn

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

196

What about the workers?

against the Government’) and rejection (‘the monopoly power of unions … would strike at the heart of democratic government’) (CAB 128/​53, 1974, 10 January, 3–​4). Even if the offer was genuine, considerable doubt existed that all unions would have refrained from seeking a special settlement of their own claims (although this was never tested) and ministers’ reactions showed they lacked the confidence in the TUC’s word to risk acceptance. The episode reinforced the drift to a ‘Who governs?’ general election, which was now the only mechanism that could establish where authority resided (Conservative Party 1974a).

Conclusions Permeating this chapter are the tensions generated by the perception of the TUC’s and trade unions’ growing impact on governability and overload. The Conservative response was informed by two convictions: first, that the unions were a major cause of national economic and political decline, and, as institutions, they were ripe for modernisation; and second, that effective and legitimate government required TUC participation in governance. The unresolved problem was establishing the institutions that could reconcile these contradictory convictions. The Macmillan and Heath governments were strongly attracted by tripartism but their efforts foundered on the participants’ difficulty in delivering their constituents support. The Heath Government’s response to the failure of Labour’s incomes policy was initially to eschew incomes policy in favour of a positive legal framework for trade unions and industrial relations. Conservative interest in a legal solution was piqued by A Giant’s Strength (1958) and the perception of deteriorating industrial relations, factors that questioned the voluntarist tradition’s viability. Beginning under the Home Government, this trend led directly to Fair Deal At Work (1968), part of a wider questioning of the voluntarist tradition reflected by the Donovan Commission and the Labour Government’s In Place of Strife. In the Conservative Party, this shift was presented, first, by its advocates as a continuation of the One Nation tradition and modernising the unions to enable them to represent their members better and play a constructive role in the economy and society. Both hinged on enhancing the official leaderships’ authority to enable them to deal with ill-​ disciplined industrial relations and marginalise militant left-​ wing minorities. Second, a legal framework and a more aggressive approach to fulfilling its electoral mandate by a Conservative government was interpreted by a majority in the party as initiating a new governing style, and party opinion was not enthused by making the unions stronger; it believed they were already too strong. Finally, the Industrial Relations Act

791

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Confronting the British disease?

197

was, in the absence of other policy instruments, fundamental to the Heath Government’s wider modernisation and counter-​ inflation programmes but successive ministers found TUC opposition to significant interference with the voluntarist tradition triggered a hostile response that appeared to confirm the conviction that the country could not be governed against the will of its organised working class. Macmillan’s Government concluded that the unions possessed a de facto veto power, which a government could overcome only at ruinous economic and political cost. The Macmillan and Heath Governments’ efforts to enhance the State’s resilience were half-​hearted at best, characterised by the conviction that there were some confrontations that the Government could not win, were adamant that preparations might be interpreted as expressing a desire to confront the unions, and both rejected increasing unemployment consciously and deliberately to cow the unions. This left tripartism. Growing criticism of the unions led to the adoption of a legal framework but its neutralisation, economic and political crisis, defeats at the unions’ hands, and exogenous events (notably the 1973 oil crisis) stimulated the desire for a new approach to the organised working class. Absent from the Macmillan, Home and Heath Cabinets deliberations are significant discussions of the party consequences of government policies. This omission, as well as government U-​turns, were resented by an increasingly large proportion of the party who were keen to see an assault upon trade union power.

8

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

Introduction Between 1975 and 1990 British politics were dominated by Margaret Thatcher who regarded unions as a major component of ‘the British disease’ and in this period her governments transformed the unions’ legal environment, their role in industrial relations and in governance (Beynon 2014, 214–​233). In her ‘Principles of Thatcherism’ speech, Mrs Thatcher declared her programme ‘meant cutting back the trade union privileges, which had effectively placed trade union leaders above the law. This had multiplied strikes and restrictive practices in our labour market. Those in turn, had put up industrial costs and so increased unemployment. So they had to be changed’ (Thatcher Papers 1992). And changed they were. There is little evidence of ministers seeking conflict actively (a major exception is the dispute with the NUM in 1984–​85) but ministers accepted that conflict with the unions was inevitable (for a discussion, see Auerbach 1990; Towers 1989). The scale and scope of the assault meant that ‘union leaderships were excluded from any direct involvement in state bodies and agencies’ (Fairbrother 2000, 17) and after 1979 there were six major Acts, a legacy described by the TUC as ‘irrelevant, malicious and one-​sided’ (TUC 1991, 39). Conservative thinking on the union problem in the aftermath of 1974 focused on governability, including State resilience in the face of industrial unrest. Although some Conservatives had their belief in tripartite politics reinforced by 1970–​ 74, these were a threatened species. Many more concluded that should the government’s authority be challenged by the unions it must resist, but if the State chose to resist it would have to win. Victory depended on increased resilience, a resolute political will, and the effective management of public opinion, but ministers proceeded circumspectly. The basic elements of the Conservative diagnosis of, and strategy towards, the union problem were in place by 1979, but the implementation of this

991

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

199

strategy was pragmatic, sometimes producing retreat; however, the overall direction of travel was clear. In this period the membership of TUC-affiliated unions declined by 3.1m (24 per cent); membership density (the proportion of the workforce who were union members) fell from 43.7 per cent (1981) to 34.3 per cent because of a combination of deindustrialisation and globalisation, and the decline of heavily unionised public and private sector industries. Despite Mrs Thatcher’s resignation as prime minister in November 1990 the TUC noted the continued hegemony of her policies and in the 1992 general election Conservatives celebrated the successful reorientation of politics. The organised working class were no longer the focal point of contentious politics, but whether ‘the British disease’ had been cured was a different question.

Conservatives and governability This section focuses on three reports on the problems posed by the organised working class after the political crises of 1970–​ 74 and the trauma of 1974: the Stepping Stones Report, the Ridley Report and, first, the report of the Authority of Government Group (AoGG). These illustrate the contours of the party’s thinking in opposition but they should not be understood as a blueprint for government, where events played a critical role in determining government actions. The AoGG was set up by Mrs Thatcher soon after becoming leader (Dorey 2009b, 135–​151). Its members were Lord Jellicoe, Ian Gilmour, George Younger, William Waldegrave and John Sumption (of the CRD) as secretary; the chair was Lord Carrington. The AoGG was invited to provide guidance on promoting resilience and reducing the vulnerability of the electricity, water, docks and oil supply industries to disruption. The group focused on five problems: first, the political consequences of increased social complexity; second, the competing interests of those willing and unwilling to strike; third, the threat posed by the ethic of union solidarity and picketing; fourth, the role of public opinion; and finally, measures to improve State resilience. The Group started work in September 1975 and reported in June 1977. Taken as a whole, the Group’s discussions implied a challenge to a government (Conservative or not) by the unions was inevitable but could be prepared for. Fundamental to the AoGG’s thinking was the nature of consent. The Industrial Relations Act, it noted, had been neutralised by the unions, leading to a loss of both public support and a serious weakening of government

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

200

What about the workers?

authority. The AoGG worried about public opinion’s fungibility and that support for resistance to industrial disruption weakened as the public’s discomfort grew. George Younger argued the answer was convincing public opinion ‘that faced with a confrontation, we could win’ so AoGG ‘should look in detail at all the weapons available for at least lengthening the time for which it was possible to resist a major strike’ (Thatcher Papers 1975, AoGG 10 September, 3–​ 4). Carrington was initially ‘pessimistic about the Conservatives winning a confrontation’ but equally Ian Gilmour’s contention –​‘the best hope was to avoid serious disputes in the first place’ –​ did not find favour as it was understood as a recipe for surrender. Retaining public support depended on government demonstrating the will and ability to resist, or, as Younger put it, ‘if Government could secure the electricity supply, then it was 75 per cent of the way towards solving the problem’ (Thatcher Papers 1975, AoGG 22 October). Discussions with James Prior, the Employment spokesman, revealed him to be sceptical about the prospects of resistance, believing some groups of workers were undefeatable and, as February 1974 suggested, once a conflict had begun the sole (apart from surrender) remaining response was an election, whose outcome was unpredictable. Prior concluded that ‘What we had to do was to try and persuade the trade unions to work with any Government, because it was the Government –​as had been the case for many years before 1970.’ Prior’s corporatism was disputed strongly by Younger who agreed ‘Government should not get involved … unless it could be sure of winning’, but to do as Prior suggested, Younger continued, was tantamount to conceding a union veto, which Prior denied. Reviewing the Group’s work Carrington identified the central dilemma: resilience depended on mobilising public opinion and the State’s resources but mobilisation risked stiffening union resistance, thereby rendering a settlement more difficult and risking a loss of public support. Though regretting the defeatism of much testimony received, Younger discerned ‘the possibility of at least somewhat more effective action’ (Thatcher Papers 1976, AoGG, 6 July, 1). Senior civil servants, such as William Armstrong (the former Cabinet Secretary, who, because of his influence in Heath’s Government was known as the ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ and who during its dispute with the miners in 1974 suffered a breakdown), opined that the best solution was that ‘the government should not take on somebody they can’t beat’. Though welcoming proposals to improve crisis management and resilience, he concluded that ‘no arrangements could stand up to opposition by really determined unions’ (Thatcher Papers 1976, AoGG, 21 July, 3). Sir Conrad Heron (Department of Employment), doubted the wisdom of ‘quite such a fundamental reform’ as the Industrial Relations Act; he agreed government public relations had been ineffective but doubted the TUC and the unions would have been more

102

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

201

amenable if the government had won the February 1974 election. Heron concluded that the unions’ relationship with a Conservative government would always be difficult (Thatcher Papers 1976, AoGG, 24 November, 1 and 4). This Report was essentially diagnostic, saying little about how the party and state might respond but more significant in this respect was the Stepping Stones Report. The Stepping Stones Report was weighty (a three-​page summary, fortythree pages of analysis, a sixteen-page appendix and six dense diagrams) and closely argued; John Hoskyns, the prime author, claimed to have had kept it ‘as short as possible’ and urged Mrs Thatcher to read it at least twice (see Dorey 2014, 89–​16; Smith and Morton 2001, 131–​147; Taylor 2001, 109–​ 125). The group’s primary purpose was communications strategy, asserting the market’s primacy, and, whilst stressing Britain’s currently bleak prospects, identifying the possibilities of radical change. The unions were identified as an existential threat to both the country and the Conservative Party. Labour’s claim to be able to work with the unions was a major but wasting political asset as Labour’s Social Contract (and later the Winter of Discontent) were transforming this asset into a liability, which offered the party a major opportunity of ‘creating a climate of opinion which will first reject socialism and will then make it impossible for the trades unions to remain unchanged’ (Thatcher Papers 1977a, 15). Unions were the strategy’s focal point because they were the most significant obstacles to change. Voters had to be convinced that a Conservative government would bring change and not indulge in ‘an archetypal Tory war dance’ (Thatcher Papers 1977a, 19). Working with the unions was not a priority so ‘avoiding confrontation is not an available option’ (Thatcher Papers 1977a, 33 (point 4). Mrs Thatcher’s underlining). The Report’s Appendix A, which sets out the Stepping Stones Report’s approach to the union problem, argued that unions were feared by public opinion so a party perceived by voters to be exacerbating this fear by talking blithely about confrontation would inevitably lose votes. So, ‘They [voters] must be made to dislike [unions] so intensely that their fear turns to anger … They must come to believe passionately in the ineffectiveness of the current union approach, and of the harm it can do if carried forward into the future’ (Thatcher Papers 1977a, A-​1). The Stepping Stones Report set the target of transforming union members’ behaviour: we wish him [sic] to desert his union. But if he is to transfer his loyalty, it must be for something better and, importantly, something which is equally, or preferably, more reassuring to him. He must be made to feel insecure … and to experience intense disquiet as to what the union stand for, and therefore its values. (Thatcher Papers 1977a,  A-​13)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

202

What about the workers?

Change in the unions also depended on widening the gulf between leaders and led. Geoffrey Howe, who, together with Keith Joseph, oversaw the Stepping Stones Report’s development, described it as ‘apocalyptic in its diagnosis’ but it received Mrs Thatcher’s endorsement which ensured it would be a significant influence on a future Conservative government (Howe 1994, 104). The Ridley Report emerged from the Nationalised Industries Policy Group, part of the Economic Reconstruction Group, chaired by Nicholas Ridley, and completed its work in June 1977. The report concluded that Conservative plans for the nationalised industries (especially on pay) ‘would be challenged sooner or later. A  number of different unions might try to be the first to breach it, so that all might power through the breach. It would be cardinal for the government to hold firm’ (Thatcher Papers 1977b, 9). The Government’s ability to survive a major industrial dispute varied by industry:  in Category I  industries (water and sewerage, electricity, the NHS and gas) survivability was judged to be zero, whereas for Category III (buses and the tube, post and telecommunications, education, the civil service, air transport and steel) survivability was thought to be good; but Category II industries posed complex problems and the report’s survivability estimates were as follows:  railways (four weeks), coal (six weeks), docks (eight weeks) and waste disposal (ten weeks). Ridley concluded nothing was to be gained by making strikes illegal as ‘One can imagine the zest with which such legislation would be opposed; legislation … would cause the maximum political “aggro” with very little worthwhile result.’ The only feasible response in the short run, Ridley believed, was to pay up while cutting investment and imposing cash limits and by using the time bought, ‘government should seek to manoeuvre the nation out of the position where it is vulnerable to monopoly unions in vital industries’ (Thatcher Papers 1977b, 10–​11). Leaked to The Economist (27 May 1978), the report’s confidential annexe, Countering the Political Threat, garnered most attention because it predicted that, between 6 and 18 months into a Conservative government pursuing these policies vis-​à-​vis the nationalised industries, such a government would probably face a major confrontation with unions. The strategy had five aspects: first, trouble might be delayed or avoided by conceding substantial wage increases. Second, the Government could ‘try and provoke a battle in a non-​vulnerable industry’ where it could win. Third, most controversially, it stated ‘we must take every precaution possible to strengthen our defences against all out attack in a highly vulnerable industry’. The most likely serious conflict was in coal, where defeating the NUM was judged difficult, but not impossible, and the political pay-​off from defeating the mineworkers would be correspondingly great. Fourth, ending social security payments to

302

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

203

strikers’ families would increase the pressure on strikers and their unions. Fifth, aggressive policing using a ‘large, mobile squads of police who are equipped and prepared to uphold the law against the likes of a Saltley Coke-​ works mob’ would be deployed and the recruitment of non-​union lorry drivers prepared to break picket lines was recommended (Thatcher Papers 1977b, 24–​25). The Economic Reconstruction Group discussed the annexe on 14 July 1977 and called for further thoughts on ‘which strikes it was possible to withstand and to win’. From the outset ministers would make ‘it clear [nationalised industries] would not be bailed out’ (which made disputes inevitable) and ‘Ministers must avoid interfering in wage disputes … The political pressures were always in favour of keeping negotiations going’ (Thatcher Papers 1977b,  1–​2). No single document provides the key to the actions of the post-​1979 Conservative governments. The annexe to the Ridley Report is the closest and overlaps with the Carrington Report, but this looked back to 1974, however the AoGG emphasised the management of public opinion and resilience, and it is here that AoGG, the Stepping Stones Report and the Ridley Report intersect. These documents express the Conservative mentalité that underpinned the Government’s response to the union problem  –​  a mentalité that defined the unions as a potentially existential threat. Winning and retaining office was a necessary but insufficient first step and many Conservatives, including Mrs Thatcher, feared an aggressive approach would have serious electoral consequences aborting the broader Thatcherite project. Public opinion was fundamental to dealing with ‘the union problem’ (Edwards and Bain 1988, 311–​326). In order to win a major conflict public opinion had to be confident, first, that Government had done everything possible to resolve a dispute; second, the Government had to be perceived not to be actively seeking confrontation, but rather as defending the rule of law; third, basic services must continue in order to minimise public inconvenience and sustain an impression of normality; and finally, public opinion had to feel that their short-​ term inconveniences would produce future benefits. In terms of legislation public opinion favoured laws on ‘secret ballots before strikes, and against secondary picketing, the closed shop and political strikes’ (Marsh 1990, 62). Between October 1977 and August 1979 MORI (now Ipsos/​MORI) found Labour enjoyed a 12.6 per cent average advantage over the Conservatives as ‘The best party on trade unions/​ strikes/​ industrial relations’, but this was transformed by the Winter of Discontent to an average Conservative advantage of 15.5 per cent (January–​April). Labour regained its advantage, albeit at a lower level (an average of 3.8 per cent) with the Conservatives accruing a small lead (2.4 per cent between May 1983 and June 1987). This fragmentary data does not show a public opinion converted to seeing

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

204

What about the workers?

the Conservative Party as the best party to handle unions/​strikes/​industrial relations but Conservatives benefitted immeasurably from the decline in Labour’s hitherto positive rating. Ipsos/​MORI data shows that until August 1989 (Table  8.1, p. 229) a majority of all adults agreed the unions were too powerful, albeit with substantial net disagreement. The percentage of union members agreeing unions were too powerful peaked at 73 per cent in September 1978 (that is, before the Winter of Discontent), drifting down from 65 per cent (October 1975)  to 14 per cent (February 1992), those disagreeing increased from 28 to 82 per cent (a 54 per cent increase) and around one-​third of union members (October 1975 and August 1984) felt unions were too powerful. Initially, then, there was a widespread perception of excessive union power (Table  8.2, p. 229). The percentage of those who believed unions were controlled by extremists peaked at 70 per cent (July 1980)  and for trade union members the percentage was 64 per cent. Despite their manifest defects, unions were perceived by a substantial majority of all adults and trade union members as an essential protection for the individual, and there is little evidence that unions became decisively more unpopular (the party-​ political role of unions was, however, disliked), but short-​term events played an important role in the development of government policy (Marsh 1993, 63; Roiser and Little 1986, 271). Internal Conservative polls found strong support for legislative reform except for stopping social security payments to strikers’ families (Table 8.2, p. 229). Public opinion was certainly hostile to aspects of union activity, especially their relationship with the Labour Party (Marsh 1990: 62–​63), but citing Gallup data, Roiser and Little found substantial public endorsement of pre-​strike postal ballots, majority support for votes for a closed shop, a ban on secondary action and making illegal strikes in public industries (1986, 265). Especially during its early years the Government had a broadly sympathetic public opinion and whilst endorsing the unions’ protective role the public disliked, inter alia, the closed shop and secondary action, and supported secret ballots (Heath et al. 2001, 38–​41).

What is to be done? The Winter of Discontent both confirmed the Conservative diagnosis of the union problem and was taken by many as warranting the ramping up of the party’s legislative proposals. Prior, for seven years the Conservative employment spokesman, had argued successfully for a minimalist, ‘reasonable’, ‘step-​by-​step’ approach to union reform which was limited in its ambitions. Many Conservatives agreed with a piecemeal approach but queried Prior’s ambition, favouring a more radical programme, and

502

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

205

even one that required several pieces of legislation. John Hoskyns, for instance, argued that by September 1978 there was a widespread belief in the Conservative Party that Prior’s proposals did not go far enough and that this increased the widespread concern that an incoming Conservative government would revert to the old discredited corporatist ways but, on the other hand, dramatic radical reform risked spooking a public opinion that feared ‘there would be an all-​out war with the trade union movement, culminating in a coal strike’ (Hoskyns 2000, 114). Lord Thorneycroft, Mrs Thatcher’s chairman of the party appointed in 1975, described wage bargaining and union power as ‘Perhaps the most frustrating problem’ confronting the party. Should Conservatives ‘challenge and condemn’ union practices and their growing politicisation or ‘refrain from opening an attack on the Unions’ utilising the overlap between the government’s aims and those of moderate union members? If government policies were attacked ‘it would defend them but it would not initiate hostilities’ (Thatcher Papers 1979, 7–​8). During the 1980s the Conservative Trade Unionists (CTU) provided an important symbol, and example,  of the type of trade unionism and approach to industrial relations the Thatcher Government aspired to create. It also in this period enjoyed substantial access to, and influence with, ministers; however, in common with its predecessors, CTU faced serious obstacles (Kelly 1986, 163–​178). By 1981 the Government was suffering from frustrated expectations because of the limited nature of its union reforms. The Government had been elected to check union power, but the unions ‘remain very willing to abuse their powers, which have only been gently curbed’. This caution was coming under increasing criticism but powerful doubts persisted about the wisdom of confronting the unions (Thatcher Papers 1981, 3). The 1979 Conservative manifesto’s diagnosis was clear: by heaping privilege without responsibility on the trade unions, Labour have given a minority of extremists the power to abuse individual liberties and to thwart Britain’s chances of success. One result is that the trade union movement, which sprang from a deep and genuine fellow-​ feeling for the brotherhood of man, is today more distrusted and feared than ever before.

To remedy this, the manifesto proposed three changes: first, in the law on picketing because In the last few years some of the picketing we have witnessed has gone much too far. Violence, intimidation and obstruction cannot be tolerated. We shall ensure that the protection of the law is available to those not concerned in the dispute but who at present can suffer severely from secondary action (picketing, blacking and blockading).

206

What about the workers?

Second, on the closed shop,

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

No union card can mean no job. So the law must be changed. People arbitrarily excluded or expelled from any union must be given the right of appeal to a court of law. Existing employees and those with personal conviction must be adequately protected, and if they lose their jobs as a result of a closed shop they must be entitled to ample compensation.

Finally, a Conservative government would encourage participation to neutralise the militant minority: Wider use of secret ballots for decision-​making throughout the trade union movement should be given every encouragement. We will therefore provide public funds for postal ballots for union elections and other important issues. Every trade unionist should be free to record his decisions as every voter has done for a hundred years in parliamentary elections, without others watching and taking note.

The objective was responsibility and moderation in industrial relations and the manifesto reserved the right to undertake further legal changes if necessary (Conservative Party 1979). A noteworthy presence in this debate was the revived party trade union organisation. In 1975 the existing organisation was moribund but Thorneycroft, with Mrs Thatcher’s support, decided to revive it and direct substantial resources at the CTU (Taylor 1978, 10–​11; 1994, 532). The CTU emerged in 1976 and its objectives included ‘strong, independent and responsible trade unionism’ by promoting participation, and advising the party and ministers on industrial relations (CCO n.d.). Placed under the Director of Community Affairs (Andrew Rowe and then John Bowis) it was headed by a Director and staffed by Industrial Officers and it undertook a recruitment drive aimed primarily at white-collar workers. CTU’s constituency presence varied but its main organisational structure were thirteen Specialist Groups (Civil Service, Local Government, Health Service, Teachers, ASTMS, Communications, Finance, Energy, Firemen, Engineering, Aerospace, London Transport and Railways) and by the mid-​ 1980 CTU was estimated to have 50,000 individual members (Thatcher Papers 1976). The CTU’s main success was as a communication channel in the party and unlike previous manifestations it enjoyed considerable leadership support. Mrs Thatcher, who appreciated the need to win and keep union voters, was a keen supporter and, moreover, the CTU enjoyed access to MPs and Secretaries of State for Employment. The CTU’s influence appears to have peaked in the mid-​1980s when the party won 31 per cent of the union vote in the 1983 election and it played an active role in the back-​to-​work campaign in the 1984–​85 miners’ dispute (Wintour 1985). This activity enabled Michael Buxton, a member of the CTU National

702

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

207

Committee, to declare that as a result of the CTU’s efforts ‘the Party now understands Trade Unionists better than at any other time; this is now understood by much of the electorate as well as Trade Unionists’ (CCO n.d.). CTU took attacks by trade unionists as evidence of its growing influence. CTU events were used to launch policy initiatives, ministers (including the Prime Minister) spoke at its conferences, and the CTU held fringe events at the TUC and enjoyed high-level policy access (for example, Thatcher Papers 1980a). The CTU was used to make the argument that the party was not hostile to trade unionism per se, but to a particular type of trade unionism. It was also used to substantiate the party’s claim to be broadening its social base, demonstrating it was a truly national party. James Prior used the CTU as a countermeasure to those seeking more radical reform measures (the CTU lobbied against banning strikes in essential services) but it is also true that the CTU was nonplussed by the Government’s failure to institute contracting-​in and it was banned from campaigning in the political fund ballots. Despite the CTU’s role it suffered from many of its predecessors’ weaknesses, such as a failure to put down sustainable roots in constituencies and unions, it faced hostility from elements in the party, and it had a limited membership. The CTU proved to be at its most influential precisely at the moment when the actions of the Government were ending the need for the CTU. With the collapse of trade union membership and industrial conflict, the CTU’s utility declined. Although Prior agreed legislation was necessary, his strategic goal of a cooperative relationship with the TUC and unions depended upon avoiding ‘big bang’ legislation and keeping the Government’s channels to the TUC open. Whilst she disliked this, it made political sense to Mrs Thatcher to keep Prior in place and Prior concluded, not unreasonably, that this made his position virtually unassailable (Prior 1986, 154). In July 1979 Prior’s department published consultation papers on the closed shop, picketing and union ballots, with a bill projected for December. To the chagrin of many Conservatives, under these proposals the closed shop would not be unlawful (but greater protection was offered to individuals) and, whilst picketing was to be restricted to the place of work, Prior drew the line at compulsory secret ballots for strikes and union elections. Prior’s purpose was, first, to remedy abuses; and second, encourage employers and unions to reach a modus vivendi, but many Conservatives were unhappy with pace and scope of reform. Although some Conservatives believed incomes policy was inevitable and even desirable, the Government resolved to avoid a formal policy, relying instead on cash limits as a surrogate incomes policy in the public sector, coupled with the threat that excessive private sector wage claims risked

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

208

What about the workers?

increased unemployment. The Government’s disposition on incomes policy was reflected in its approach to the Commission on Pay Comparability (the Clegg Commission) set up by Prime Minister Callaghan in March 1979. Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor, and Prior agreed the Commission should complete its current work while its future was being reviewed, but its days were clearly numbered; Mrs Thatcher, for example, objected to it as inflationary and a manifestation of corporatist politics. It was disbanded in 1980 (CAB 129/​206 1979; Moore 2014, 459). Conflicts over union recognition (such as the Grunwick Dispute) and picketing focused ministers’ attention on the interconnected issues of picketing and union immunities, which lay at the heart of union power. These sensitive issues were complicated by a legal case, Express Newspapers v.  McShane. National Union of Journalists (NUJ) members had been instructed to ‘black’ (refuse to use) copy supplied by the Press Association in support of provincial journalists; the Appeal Court under Lord Denning ruled the NUJ’s action was too distant from the original dispute to qualify for immunity, but this was reversed on appeal by the House of Lords. The Lords’ decision implied that secondary action enjoyed immunity no matter how far removed from the original dispute as long as those calling it could show they believed sincerely their action was in furtherance of the original dispute. Prior’s bill on secondary picketing was severely weakened by this decision. McShane disrupted the parliamentary timetable and stimulated demands to further restrict immunity for secondary action, but Prior opposed action specifically responding to McShane, arguing that rushed legislation on so sensitive an issue would be folly. These debates coalesced around the balance between individual and collective rights. On the closed shop Prior noted ‘There is a difficult balance to be struck here between the rights of the individual and the orderly conduct of Industrial Relations’ (CAB 129/​207 1979, 5–​8), and few doubted Prior favoured the latter over the former. Summing up, Mrs Thatcher stated in Cabinet that Prior ‘should make every effort’ to tighten the conscience clauses on the closed shop, so the pressure for legislation was irresistible because ‘The Bill’, she pointed out, ‘was central to the Manifesto and should be given high priority’ (CAB 128/​66, 22 November 1979, 6–​10). McShane raised politically sensitive issues in a context where many Cabinet ministers distrusted Prior’s motives and it also stimulated and reinforced union opposition. In this context the start of a strike in the nationalised steel industry acted as a powerful catalyst. Attempts by pickets to extend the strike to private steel plants led to a second injunction from Lord Denning, which was again overturned on appeal. Sympathy strikes occurred in some coalfields, with NUM members joining Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) pickets, raising the threat level markedly and

902

The enemy within

209

the Government came under pressure to ‘do something’. For example, 100 Conservative MPs signed an Early Day Motion (7 February) supporting immediate action on secondary action but were dissuaded from proceeding by Prior at the 1922 Committee.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Steel, immunities and governance Understandably the dispute with the NUM dominates the Thatcher Government–​union narrative, but this has obscured other significant events that influenced the development of the policy that culminated in the 1984–​ 85 miners’ dispute (there is a vast literature on this. Taylor 2005b, ­ provides a summary). The 1980 steel strike triggered a rapid evolution in the Government’s thinking and constitutes a watershed in the party’s relationship with the organised working class. The strategy for dealing with the organised working class that emerged was conditioned by the party’s thinking in Opposition and influenced by the steel strike, and was radically different from that of any Conservative government since the 1920s. The Government was determined to support nationalised industry managements committed to restructuring their industries and returning to profit (Pandit 1998, 69–​70). BSC management was aiming to fundamentally reshape industrial relations in order to boost productivity and reduce costs, and was prepared to do so using methods unacceptable to the ISTC (Blyton 1992, 641–​648). The steel strike began on 2 January 1980, lasted thirteen weeks and was in response to a 6 per cent pay offer (plus 10 per cent in local productivity deals), which attracted considerable public criticism, and the Government was accused of blundering into a strike. Beauman argues the Government ‘had no prior intention of provoking a steel strike, or even risking one … and once the strike had started, the Cabinet displayed damaging signs of disunity about it’ (1996, 2). Whatever their uncertainties and differences, ministers agreed that defeat could have serious, possibly fatal, consequences for the incipient Thatcher revolution. After eleven weeks both sides approached the Employment Secretary to seek the creation of three-​person committee, the Lever enquiry, which met on 29 March and recommended a 16 per cent pay increase (the miners had received 20 per cent). The strike was called off on 1 April. Despite the enormous cash cost of the strike, the Government saw the outcome as positive, as it opened the door to the revision of industrial relations, and Blyton wrote: ‘the steel strike can partly be explained as an element of (at least unofficial) the government policy of precipitating and subsequently defeating strikes in order to weaken union power’ (1992, 642). Public opinion was crucial. A CRD survey, for example, found 39 per cent of non-​union members and 27 per cent of union members blamed

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

210

What about the workers?

the union for the strikes; 21 per cent of non-​union members and 30 per cent of union members blamed government. Twenty-three per cent of non-​ trade unionists (17 per cent of union members) pinned responsibility for a settlement on union leaders, whereas 28 per cent of non-​members and 35 per cent of union members placed the onus on government. The CRD thought it significant that 32 per cent of non-​unionists and 47 per cent of union members believed the Government was seeking a ‘showdown’, but noted that 58 per cent of non-​union and 44 per cent of union members agreed employers and unions should negotiate. The CRD concluded this showed ‘the Government’s case for its non-​involvement is getting over to both’ but public opinion disagreed on the unions’ motives, with 46 per cent (non-​union) and 40 per cent (union members) believing the dispute was political; 40 versus 47 per cent believed the unions were engaged in a conflict over pay and jobs (Thatcher Papers 1980b). The strike was kept under observation by the Interdepartmental Contingency Group (ICG), a small group of ministers chaired by Mrs Thatcher. The ICG concluded that the British Steel Corporation’s (BSC) public relations ‘were less than adequate’ and events pointed to a lengthy dispute. It recommended that ministers should ‘exploit any disaffection … among the union rank-​and-​file’ but avoid involvement in negotiations, instead offering management ‘discrete guidance’. Ministers were surprised by the restrictions they faced (for example, on the scope for the use of countermeasures), as lawyers advised that the Emergency Powers Act (1920) could not be used because its provisions did not cover steel; and ministers were advised by civil servants that picketing could ‘snowball’ in scale and scope if not handled carefully. The law officers advised that the law on picketing and ‘blacking’, thrown into uncertainty by the decision of the House of Lords on McShane, ‘gives us little comfort’ because it ‘largely rules out the prospect of obtaining injunctions’ against secondary picketing. This judgement effectively placed the Government in an even worse position than the Labour Government in the Winter of Discontent because recent judicial interpretation of section 31(1) of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act (1974) appeared to have legalised ‘lawful intimidation’. Prior’s proposed Employment Bill was unlikely to be of any use (PREM 19/​308 1980). Although the two sides were close on pay, the BSC was virtually bankrupt and the ISTC had agreed already to substantial job losses and changed working practices, and feared further concessions would fragment the ISTC. The strike had implications for the coal industry (especially in South Wales), and although there were few signs of the NUM preparing for national action, this did not rule out strikes in support of the ISTC. There were no steel shortages but their absence might trigger more aggressive

112

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

211

picketing, whilst the strikers’ conviction that they were defending jobs and communities meant the ‘endurance of the steel workers might prove to be longer than that of industry’. When it came to the dispute’s optics, ministers were keen to keep their distance but also ‘emphasise that no workers were entitled to automatic pay increases … the average steelworker was already £10 a week better off than the average worker … who was asked to contribute through taxation to the subsidisation of the steel industry’. The Cabinet acknowledged that pressure for government intervention was considerable and would inevitably increase but ‘the long-​term credibility of the Government’s economic policies was at stake, and it could not afford to buy off a strike’. There was, however, a bright spot. The Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, emphasised to the Cabinet that chief constables ‘could be relied upon to enforce the law on obstruction, disorder and violence’ and would draw no distinction between primary and secondary picketing even though McShane meant that ‘For all practical purposes, blacking and primary and secondary picketing by unions was now immune from action at civil law by injured employers.’ From this point onwards, strikes and picketing were treated as a public order issue by the Government. This shifted the focus to Prior, who was preparing amendments to his bill for the Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy (the E Committee) which neither banned secondary picketing nor affected directly the steel dispute but had a wider rationale, the re-​ordering industrial relations. In this discussion Margaret Thatcher remained circumspect, noting ‘the Government should continue not to intervene … and any necessary contingency planning [should be] undertaken’ (CAB 128/​67, 1980, 10 January, 3). The 10 January Cabinet was significant for two reasons. We see, first, as if through a glass darkly, the strategy used in 1984–​85 emerging, and second, the opening of the final confrontation over Prior’s approach  –​ a confrontation that was to lead to his exile in Northern Ireland. In a note (the copy in her papers is heavily underlined by Mrs Thatcher), Prior recorded that the ISTC’s picketing of steel stockholders, engineering factories and private steel producers had increased unemployment, and that dockers had agreed to unload steel imports but not to sanction movement. Prior’s bill made picketing unlawful at any place other than the picket’s place of work (subject to a High Court injunction), giving secondary action and flying pickets no immunity unless it was undertaken at first customers or suppliers in furtherance of a trade dispute. Thus, miners picketing power stations, or steel workers picketing steel users (such as car plants) would enjoy immunity (PREM 19/​261 1980). These proposals were discussed at the E Committee the following day, which agreed that The Government should not be seen to give way in the face of industrial action and should not attempt to impose mediation. It must be left to the parties to

212

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

negotiate a solution within the financial limits laid down by the Government. A  face-​saving solution could be costly to the Government in the long run. (CAB 134/​4338  1980)

Prior insisted his bill contained ‘considerable limitations’ on picketing and he believed the unions would eventually accept them, but there was vocal support for widening the scope for injunctions, despite ‘the risk of deliberate martyrdom by politically-​ motivated individuals’. The proposal to limit immunity to the place of work and the first supplier or customer, ministers noted, meant ‘any implied right of industrial action extending beyond the parties to a dispute put a very strong weapon in the hands of the unions’. The Prime Minister concluded that ministers agreed on the need to restrict … immunities in the light of the McShane Judgement. While in principle the Committee would have preferred a more radical approach, they agreed for tactical and Parliamentary reasons it was best to proceed as proposed by the Secretary of State for Employment. (CAB 134/​4338 1980,  3–​5)

The first round went to Jim Prior but a reaction quickly set in. At the end of January 1980 the Party Chair, Lord Thorneycroft, linked future Conservative electoral success with union law reform and the steel strike. He emphasised in Cabinet and at the 1922 Committee the scale of the swing (8.5 per cent) to the party amongst skilled and unskilled workers in the 1979 election (many of whom were union members), which he ascribed to their expectation that a Conservative government would limit union power. He warned that a failure to address directly McShane, Lord Denning’s ruling, and the ISTC’s actions ‘would be widely interpreted as a licence to extend certain strikes over an almost indefinite area’. A major problem was that party and public opinion would likely deem any outcome that appeared to mean that every strike had the potential to become a general strike as wholly unacceptable and indicative of government ‘inertia and inactivity –​while industry grinds to a halt’. This would lead to demands for radical action (Thatcher Papers 1980c, 2). On 4 February Geoffrey Howe circulated to colleagues an impassioned plea for a reconsideration of Prior’s proposals. Howe argued that developments in the steel strike  –​possible legal action by private steel companies, sympathy action by (for example) miners and increased secondary picketing on private steel producers and users –​meant wider changes ought to be considered. ‘I do not believe’, Howe wrote, ‘we should, with our eyes open, create substantial (and unnecessary) opportunities for individual martyrdom’ while unions as organisations remained untouched. Howe dismissed Prior’s determination not to attack union funds and objected to leaving the first supplier or customer without any remedy if picketed, arguing the general withdrawal of immunity would

312

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

213

return the law to that which existed between 1906 and 1971 (‘Not, it may be thought, a very radical objective’). Howe concluded that ‘Public opinion is looking for effective change. Unless we do achieve such change we cannot expect to make a significant impact on our central economic policies. And we might as well not have fought (and won) the last General Election.’ Howe did not dispute the value of the step-​by-​step legislative strategy but denied concessions would mitigate the ‘unqualified opposition of the union hierarchy’ to the Government. Prior’s approach, Howe claimed, risked disillusion so ‘May we please have a further opportunity of considering what is probably the most important issue in the life not just of this Government but of the nation’ (PREM 19/​682 1980). On the same day, Prior received a broadside from Angus Maude, the Paymaster General, who also agreed with Prior’s incremental strategy but felt the steel strike had transformed matters. There was, Maude argued, more at stake than putting industrial relations on a sound footing because ‘if we do not get it right this time, and be seen to remove the injustices and put the law beyond reasonable doubt we shall get the worst of all worlds. We may well never get a second chance at a politically suitable moment’. Radical action, he believed, would not inevitably produce an extreme reaction from the unions but, if it did, then surely we have a much wider responsibility as a Government, to the public at large as consumers, as workers, and as the main sufferers from industrial disputes as at present conducted. We shall not be forgiven if we appear to let this majority down in deference to minority vested interests. (PREM 19/​ 262 1980a)

Unless union immunities were restricted (or abolished), union power would neutralise the government’s economic policy and ‘I feel strongly that this is perhaps the most important and critical decision this Government will ever have to make’ (PREM 19/​262 1980a). A  note to Prior from John Nott, the Secretary of State for Trade, argued ‘in principle we would have preferred a more radical approach and to impose further restrictions on trade union immunities’ because, like Prior’s other critics, Nott was ‘not at present convinced that the best way to approach the problem is to legislate narrowly. The general point of principle  –​the protection of the law for those not concerned in a dispute –​was a fundamental point in our manifesto and is underlined by what is happening in the steel strike’ (PREM 19/​262 1980b). Hoskyns, at the Downing Street Policy Unit and a long-standing critic of Prior, weighed in with an analysis harking back to the Stepping Stones Report that was extremely critical of ‘the Establishment’, including the CBI, who ‘know we’ve got to crack the problem but fear the pain of doing so’. Nervousness was the direct consequence, Hoskyns argued, of

214

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Prior’s blocking debate on dealing with the unions and, as a consequence, the Government had no strategy and so policy degenerated into ‘huffing and puffing’. Restricting immunities and picketing was central to the power of unions such as the NUM; legal complexity and problems of definition certainly existed, but were not an excuse for inaction (PREM 19/​262 1980c). In a conversation with Thorneycroft, Prior opposed restricting immunities further and threatening union funds: Lord Thorneycroft asked Jim Prior what his reaction would be if the Bill was strengthened by removing the trade union immunity for strikers and picketing. In reply Jim Prior was adamant that such a move would be counter-​productive and indicated that he would not go along with it; leaving Lord Thorneycroft in no doubt that if it went forward his resignation would ensue. (Thatcher Papers 1980c)

Thus, a failure to take decisive action would antagonise the Government’s supporters but strengthening the bill might provoke Prior’s resignation and cause a serious Cabinet crisis in the middle of major industrial dispute, at a time when unemployment was rising and Mrs Thatcher and her government were deeply unpopular. This was, however, Prior’s last hurrah, as February 1980 marks the tipping point in the evolution of the Thatcher Government’s approach to organised labour. Prior’s resignation threat was widely known but the decisions of the E Committee and Cabinet made his a pyrrhic victory because a clear majority of both now favoured more radical action (Howe 1994, 165) and whilst Howe (and those of a like mind) acquiesced in Prior’s broad approach, Howe’s Taunton speech (9 February) and Cabinet criticism forced Prior to concede a Green Paper on the more extensive reform of trade union immunities (Cmnd 8128, 1981). A remarkable real-​time insight into the shift in Government thinking is captured in a series of seven phone calls on 17 February involving the Prime Minister and senior ministers. Triggered by the picketing of Hadfields (a private steel firm in Sheffield) on 14 February, Sir Keith Joseph phoned the Prime Minister at 10.40 a.m. to express his conviction there had been ‘a massive breach of common law’. Mrs Thatcher, however, first wanted to employ the civil law to test the effectiveness of Prior’s proposals, suggesting these clauses be extracted from the current bill and presented to Parliament as a one-​clause bill (PREM 19/​263 1980, 1). Twenty minutes later Mrs Thatcher phoned William Whitelaw, insisting that events at Hadfields meant ‘The Government could not sit aside doing nothing’, and suggesting she might have to instruct Prior to present a revised picketing bill urgently, as the strike was lasting longer than expected ‘and was getting uglier day by day’. Recognising that such a Thatcher–​Prior conversation would be unlikely to end well, Whitelaw offered to make the call and confessed events

512

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

215

at Hadfields had had a profound effect on his views. He contrasted the pusillanimity of Lonrho’s board of directors (Hadfields’ parent company) with the robust determination of South Yorkshire’s Chief Constable to prevent disorder (PREM 19/​263 1980, 2). A  second call from Joseph (at 11.35) raised the culpability of Arthur Scargill and the NUM’s pickets, with Joseph arguing Scargill should be arrested for affray. Mrs Thatcher doubted the wisdom of doing so, but all three were agreed an alternative strategy was required. At 12.45 the Attorney General confirmed that the Hadfields picket, prima facie, constituted affray, but he advised the police would have great difficulty in gathering the necessary evidence. This only reinforced Mrs Thatcher’s conviction that ‘The Government could not simply stand by in the face of the threat of further scenes like these at Hadfields’ (PREM 19/​ 263 1980, 4). At 19.30 Geoffrey Howe and the Prime Minister discussed the legal problems surrounding the Hadfields’ picket. Howe was sceptical about a one-​clause bill, commenting ‘that the Government would look very foolish if they rushed the clause through and it didn’t work’ to which she replied; ‘it would be worse to find it ineffective next winter’ (PREM 19/​263 1980, 4–​5). At 21.30 Whitelaw reported he had been unable to contact Prior. Mrs Thatcher, her anger undimmed, insisted Hadfields’ ‘had not been a matter of mass picketing but of mass intimidation. It was a public order situation’. The Government, she felt, lacked both accurate intelligence on the movement of pickets and an effective public order response, but Whitelaw disagreed and noted the police faced conflicting priorities –​keeping a workplace open or maintaining public order –​it is unclear whether the Prime Minister agreed such a distinction existed in reality but on balance she favoured public order. She insisted the police needed ‘guidance’, but Whitelaw cautioned ‘that the keeping of public order would inevitably mean a major confrontation and the Government must be aware of this before embarking on that course’ (PREM 19/​263 1980, 6). At 22.45 Whitelaw reported on a conversation with the Chief Constable of Kent, who was expecting a mass picket at a private steel works at Sheerness. The Chief Constable had warned that he might have to arrest a great many people. He was quite determined to keep Sheerness working: he hoped that Ministers would support him although he feared they would not. The Prime Minister hoped that Mr Whitelaw had made it quite clear that the Government would be fully behind the Chief Constable. Mr Whitelaw confirmed that he had done. (PREM 19/​ 263 1980, 6)

Whilst agreeing with Mrs Thatcher’s conviction ‘that people should not have to run the gauntlet of intimidation like that at Hadfields’, Whitelaw repeated his warning that ‘It might become necessary to arrest thousands of people and the Government would have to be clear what it intended to do with them’ (PREM 19/​263 1980, 7).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

216

What about the workers?

This exchange confirms the significance of the 1980 steel strike, and particularly Hadfields, in crystallising disquiet with Prior’s approach and shows how Hadfields influenced the policing of industrial disputes (see Geary 1985, 88–​91). Prior assumed that despite his concession on immunities he would retain control of policy but his bill kept the debate on immunities –​the core of union power –​alive. In Cabinet Whitelaw declared the end of picketing by consent. This was a direct result of the Hadfields’ picket ‘in which a contingent of South Yorkshire miners led by Mr Arthur Scargill had taken part, [and] had presented serious problems that morning’, requiring large numbers of police to maintain access (CAB 128/​87, 1980, 14 February, 7). One week later Whitelaw reported ‘the planned mass picket of the steel works at Sheerness had passed off relatively quietly, thanks to the determined action of the Kent police’ (CAB 128/​87, 1980, 21 February, 6). There would be ‘no more Saltleys’. A further indication of a hardening of the Government’s approach was in its response to the powerfully symbolic issue of the receipt of social security benefits by striker’s families. In the Heath years and after, there had been considerable discussion of the State subsidy theory of strikes, which held that the incidence of strikes and the endurance of strikers were increased by the payment of tax rebates and supplementary benefits to strikers and their families. In 1971 expenditure was estimated to be £1.5m, but by 1980 it was estimated to be £9m and these payments were widely seen by Conservatives as both a self-​inflicted wound and unjust. The Heath Government had backed off from any change and the academic evidence for this phenomenon was equivocal (Durcan and McCarthy 1974; Gennard 1977; Gennard 1981; Hunter 1974), but in early 1980 an informal group chaired by the Prime Minister considered the problem and decided to legislate, ‘deeming’ that strikers were in receipt of strike pay of £12 per week (few, if any, unions provided strike pay) (CAB 129/​208, 1980). Cabinet decided not to differentiate between union and non-​union strikers because ‘the public was less keen to support the families of strikers than of people unemployed through no fault of their own’ (CAB 128/​67, 1980, 13 March, 5–​6). The changes were enacted by the Social Security (No. 2) Act. Many Conservatives felt Prior’s bill, though important, was little more than a toe in the water when compared to the scale of the problem, but its coincidence with the steel strike reinforced the case for more extensive reform. Hoskyns, in the Number 10 Policy Unit, believed the strike offered ‘the opportunity to give the public a first lesson in economic reality. It would be an expensive lesson, but cheap at the price if it could be converted into a political stepping stone on the long road to a reformed trade union movement’ (Hoskyns 2000, 149). Whilst the 1980 Act addressed some abuses of union power, wider events reinforced the view that relationships

712

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

217

were ripe for transformation. Given what was at stake, the Government’s 1981 retreat in the face of threatened coal strike, for example, was sensible because preparations for defeating a coal strike had scarcely begun (Lawson 1994, ­ chapter  13). In his memoirs Howe described the steel strike’s reinforcement of the Government’s determination, concluding ‘It was tragic that so many different groups of workers apparently needed to learn by first-​ hand experience that the government would not change its mind’ (Howe 1994, 164). Prior’s removal from the Employment Department (14 September 1981) and his replacement with Norman Tebbit marked the start of a new phase in the Government’s relationship with the unions and organised working class. Tebbit, a critic of Prior, regarded the 1980 Act only as a first instalment and he rejected Prior’s desire to preserve the pattern of post-​war governance when it came to government–​union relations and to establish a new modernised government–​union relationship. Confronted by demands for action, Prior conceded on the closed shop but refused to ban it or curb union immunities further (Prior 1986, 170–​171). Tebbit defined his Employment Act (1982) as a principal pillar of Thatcherism and, like Prior, he ‘was determined not to enact unenforceable legislation’ (the main defect of the 1971 Act) in order to retain the support of public opinion and bring about lasting change. His retention of Prior’s incremental approach was not significant, but the closed shop and immunities were the twin foundation of union power and Tebbit’s intention was to have a transformative effect (Tebbit 1989, 234). Ministers concluded that the steel strike had revealed serious shortcomings in preparation, intelligence and the cost of depending on politically unreliable management. The head of BSC, Sir Charles Villiers, perceived by many in government (wrongly) as the epitome of the effete upper class (he served in the Guards and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the war) merchant banker (chair of J. Henry Schroder Wagg), was thought ineffective and was replaced by Ian MacGregor, a Scottish-​American metallurgist and former chair of Lazard’s, who had developed a reputation in the United States for hostility to trade unions and aggressive management. Although appointed to the board of British Leyland by Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan, he was regarded as ‘one of us’ by Mrs Thatcher and was subsequently appointed chair of the National Coal Board (NCB), overseeing the 1984–​85 dispute (where he lost Mrs Thatcher’s confidence) but the shift to MacGregor encapsulated changing government attitudes (for an account see MacGregor 1986). Many of the failings that were characteristic of the Government’s handling of the steel strike were repeated in the 1981 coal crisis. The pit closure programme had ‘been seized upon by militants … as an excuse for confrontation with the Government’ and by 23 October

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

218

What about the workers?

unofficial area-based strikes were threatening to coalesce into a proto-​ national strike, hence David Howell’s (the Energy Secretary) intervention that led to Sir Derek Ezra’s (the NCB chair) withdrawal of the proposed closures. Ministers believed they had been misled by the NCB into believing the closures would be accepted by the NUM and Mrs Thatcher conceded this was a public relations disaster (CAB 128/​72 1981, 1). Deciding when to concede in any industrial dispute was always going to be a complex calculation for the Cabinet. For example, when discussing a civil service wage claim the calculus was described thus: If no concessions were made, the present, relatively moderate, Civil Service Union leaders would lose the support of their membership. The Government would then risk facing, both in the present dispute and in later years, a much more hostile and militant union leadership. It could be damaging to the Government if, as a result of a protracted dispute, its relationship with its employees was soured and embittered.

The case, however, for not making concessions was strong:  ‘The unions’ morale was declining and their confidence weakened by the realisation that public opinion generally supported the Government and that this support could be reinforced … industrial, financial and Conservative Party back-​ bench opinion was likely to be highly critical of any increase in the present offer’ (CAB 128/​72 1981,  2–​3). When framing his legislation Tebbit, like Prior, sought to avoid complexity or compelling unions to do anything (such as registration) that enabled unions to employ non-​compliance as a disruptive strategy. Some measures were, to his regret, abandoned as the feeling was that they went too far, too soon. Describing his approach as a combination of ‘menace and reasonability’, Tebbit intended his bill to discourage union resistance à la 1971, thus averting the possibility of losing of public support; he was also determined his legislation would not end in the jailing and martyrdom of any trade unionists (Tebbit 1989, 236). Cabinet approval of Tebbit’s proposals came shortly after his ‘on your bike’ Conference speech, and his White Paper was welcomed enthusiastically by the party. Disingenuously Tebbit described the bill as a ‘modest measure’, declaring ‘We have tried to provide specific remedies for real abuses, to provide effective protection … and to redress the imbalance of bargaining power’. The bill’s proposals on immunities were the most important because ‘Since 1906 trade unions in this country have enjoyed virtual total immunity from civil actions even if they have acted unlawfully, quite outside a trade dispute’ (Hansard, 8 February 1982, cols 738 and 745). The bill laid down increased compensation if a refusal to join a union resulted in dismissal and extant closed-​shop agreements had to be approved by 80 per cent of the workforce or 85 per cent of those

912

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

219

voting in a secret ballot. More significantly it was insufficient for industrial action to be ‘connected with’ a dispute, it now had to be ‘wholly or mainly’ connected, and unions were opened to damages; it became unlawful for unions to engage in, for example, sympathy or politically motivated strikes. Breaches were subject to the civil, not criminal, law and shifted the onus for action onto those affected, thereby insulating government from the pressure to intervene and avoid creating martyrs (Tebbit 1991, 94). Tebbit’s response to his critics was to concede that further legislation was possible, but the 1982 Act undoubtedly marks a significant change in tone. A  major concern for Prior had been maintaining good relations with the unions with a view to resuscitating consultation as an aspect of governance, but the steel strike provided the opportunity for change (Smith et  al. 1993, 365–​382). Perhaps to the surprise of many colleagues, Mrs Thatcher responded positively in the strike to a request by Bill Sirs, the ISTC General Secretary, for a meeting, but insisted that Sirs should first see Joseph and Prior as the responsible ministers (CAB 128/​67, 1980, 17 January, 11). This set alarm bells ringing. A memorandum from Ian Gow, her private secretary, urged caution. First, any meeting, Gow argued, would inevitably be interpreted as negotiations, thereby weakening the principle that the dispute was between the BSC and its employees; second, meeting Sirs ‘could be interpreted as an assumption by you of responsibility’ for the dispute and its resolution; and third, ‘The precedent thus created, that in an industrial dispute, particularly in the Public Sector, Trade Union Leaders have the “right” to come to Number Ten, to see you, is one which it will be difficult to discontinue, in later disputes.’ Finally, ‘Such a settlement’, Gow wrote, ‘if made between BSC and its employees will be less damaging to the Government than a settlement to which the Government is perceived to be a party because of prior discussions’ (Thatcher Papers 1980b, 19 January). By the end of the steel strike Mrs Thatcher was adamant the Government would have nothing to do with the Lever inquiry because, first, the Government’s position was well known and, second, Government should not be drawn into negotiating a settlement (CAB 128/​67, 1980, 26 March, 4). The shift in governance was palpable and significant. Meetings between the TUC and ministers continued and whilst abiding by the conventions Mrs Thatcher refused to invest these meetings with any significance. The change in tone and esteem emerges clearly in an exchange of letters between Len Murray, the TUC general secretary, and Margaret Thatcher over Tebbit’s Employment Bill. Murray charged that the bill ‘will cause serious damage to relations between workers and their employees and harm to British industry’ by removing long-​held rights, and creating such uncertainty would damage arrangements that ‘have done much to stabilise industrial relations’. Murray appealed to the Prime Minister to withdraw the

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

220

What about the workers?

bill ‘before it is too late’ and focus instead on reducing unemployment (PREM 19/​1061, 1982a). In reply, the Prime Minister gave no ground whatsoever, noting that ‘Every opinion poll has shown that the Bill is welcomed by the vast majority of people in the country and indeed by most trade union members.’ Denying that the bill reduced workers’ rights, she insisted it did not affect the right to organise, bargain collectively, or organise legitimate industrial action and her language and tone were uncompromising (PREM 19/​1061, 1982b). This stiff formality contrasted with, for example, Prior’s letters to Murray (‘Dear Len’ v. ‘Dear Mr Murray’ from Mrs Thatcher) and reflects a clear difference in esteem. Tebbit’s attitude to consultative norms also contrasted starkly with that of Prior. Tebbit noted industrial relations had improved without ‘cosy tête à tête meetings with union leaders’, notably at the NEDC, whose meetings (which Mrs Thatcher reduced from monthly to quarterly) Tebbit ‘detested’, describing them as ‘an agony of boredom’, and he regretted its survival. It was eventually abolished by John Major in 1992 (Tebbit 1989, 244). Howe, for instance, noted that ‘For Margaret and Keith [Joseph] in particular this prospect of regular contact with trade union leaders [at the NEDC] came close to supping with the Devil. It was only a short step, or so they feared, from “beer and sandwiches at Number 10” to incomes policy and the rest’ (Howe 1994, 215). Ministers (including Tebbit) enjoyed better relations with union leaders hostile to the Left; for example, Frank Chapple of the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EEPTU) was a favourite.

The new normal Planning for the next tranche of legislation began before the final passage of Tebbit’s bill and the proposals signalled a higher degree of intervention in union governance (Cmnd 8778, 1983). This focused on mandatory secret ballots for the election of union officers, replacing contracting-​out with contracting-​in (a very long-​standing party demand) and amending the definition of political objectives, and canvassing mandatory secret pre-​strike ballots ‘but in the expectation that it will not be pursued’. Tebbit believed ballots would be counterproductive and he regarded consultation ‘mainly as a way of handling pressure from some of the Government’s supporters in Parliament’. A briefing paper for Mrs Thatcher had, however, noted ‘You will no doubt wish to stress that the possibility of pursuing more radical approaches to trade union reform in the next Parliament should remain open’ (PREM 19/​1061 1982c, 1–​3). Reforming the political levy had been described by Tebbit as an ‘explosive idea’, despite its popularity, and this fuelled a cautious approach (PREM 19/​1281 1983a, 1). In the discussions

122

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

221

over the next tranche of legislation, the replacement of contracting-​ out with contracting-​in provoked considerable internal debate. Change was endorsed by many Conservative MPs, was universally endorsed by the party, and enjoyed the support of the CTU, and of public opinion. However, it could be too easily portrayed as a wholly partisan attack upon the Labour Party and an unjustified assault on legitimate union political activity (not all unions with political funds were affiliated to Labour). For these reasons it was agreed to invite the TUC to propose measures to give individuals greater protection while retaining contracting-​out. If the TUC proved incapable or unwilling, the Government would legislate (PREM 19/​ 1281, 1983b, 1). There had been persistent pressure for the removal of immunity from strikes in essential services, but problems of defining ‘essential’ as well as problems of enforcement slowed progress. Although the removal of immunity in the absence of a pre-​strike ballot was attractive, it was agreed to consult further, focusing on procedure agreements, the breach of which (as had happened recently in the water industry) would result in any dispute losing immunity. These measures satisfied, first, ‘the principle that agreements once made should be honoured’, and second, legislation would discourage action but would trigger a reaction that ‘would simply have to be faced’. Union withdrawal from existing procedure agreements (which was believed inevitable) ‘would nullify the legislation and also present greater opportunities for militants’ (CAB 129/​127, 1983, 105). However, political calculation was as ever dominant in decisions on the scope and tempo of legislation, and union resistance could be used to justify further legislation (CAB 128/​76, 1983, 10 May, 1–​2). The 1983 Conservative election manifesto surprisingly acknowledged the positive role reformed unions could play and claimed the Government was creating unions at the service of their members. ‘Both trade union members and the general public’, it noted, ‘have welcomed the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts, which restrain secondary picketing, curtail abuse of the closed shop, and restore rights of redress against trade unions responsible for committing unlawful acts’. Abuses, however, remained so members would be given greater control via elections for governing bodies and over political funds, and immunity would be further curtailed if unions failed to hold pre-​strike ballots (Conservative Party 1983). In this period there were indications that the TUC was shifting its position in response. Outright opposition to the legislation and other policies had proved ineffective and the TUC’s developing response was described as ‘The New Realism’. This developing shift was, however, destabilised by the 1984–​85 miners’ dispute. The coincidence of the coal dispute with the Government’s decision to forbid union membership at the Government Communications

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

222

What about the workers?

Headquarters (GCHQ) (see later in this chapter), an act the TUC compared with the Tolpuddle Martyrs (‘who would have believed that a group of workers would be denied their right to union membership by Government diktat?’), and it condemned the Trade Union Act (1984) as ‘an unprecedented interference with the internal operations of unions’ (TUC 1984a, 1). The Secretary of State for Employment, Tom King, told the Cabinet the legislation ‘was effecting a quiet revolution in trade union attitudes’. Pre-​ strike ballots had undermined industrial action, unions ‘were acquiescing in the disappearance of closed shops’, and the TGWU, a staunch advocate of non-​compliance with the legislation, was rumoured to be reconsidering its attitude (CAB 128/​79, 1984, 5). This shift was reflected in the document, TUC Strategy (TUC 1984b), which sought to identify means whereby unions could adapt to this new environment, an adaptation, as we have seen, stalled by the Government banning union membership at GCHQ and the coal dispute. A confidential study for the party of union leaders’ attitudes noted that an increase in their confidence consequent on the fading of the recession was premature, and union leaders were now far more realistic in their aspirations and less concerned with political aims despite their continued hostility to government policy. Union leaders were described as ‘embittered by their present impotence’, but, nevertheless, ‘there is not a majority view that it is best to withdraw co-​operation from the Government in order to force a more co-​operative attitude’; rather ‘it makes more sense for the unions to deal with them rather than cut themselves off’ (Thatcher Papers 1984). On 29 September 1983 representatives of the General Council met Tebbit to urge him not to proceed with his proposals on the political levy and offered to negotiate a non-​legislative agreement on contracting-​out. On 16 October 1983 Tom King, Tebbit’s replacement, citing the government’s electoral mandate, offered talks with the TUC on the political levy. The Green Paper, Democracy in the Trade Unions, of October 1983 focused on union elections, secret ballots before strikes and the periodic re-​approval of union political funds, and was a significant intrusion into union governance. King believed the General Council ‘was clearly anxious to improve the trade unions’ general working relationship with the Government and had been making considerable efforts to ensure a voluntary undertaking on the political levy’. This, he felt deserved a positive response. A  draft agreement was developed between King and the TUC on the political levy and, although he proposed to press for further concessions, he believed the agreement was broadly satisfactory. The Prime Minister (and later the Cabinet) agreed with King’s approach but they agreed that if the TUC’s scheme proved unsatisfactory, legislation remained likely (PREM 19/​1281,

322

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

223

1984). The Cabinet agreed ‘it was not sufficient to obtain only the formal endorsement of the TUC General Council’ and it was unwise to abandon the threat of legislation; a Government ‘pledge of good faith [must]be met with equal good faith by the trade unions’ and Government would ‘reserve the right to legislate’ (CAB 128/​80, 1984, 9 February, 1–​2). This caused some unhappiness amongst backbenchers, in the wider party and the CTU and prompted John Townend MP to propose an amendment to the bill to institute contracting-​in, arguing change was a matter of principle and the TUC could not enforce any agreement. Townend denied change would damage Labour because Labour won its largest election victory in 1945 under the 1927 Act and change would stop Labour’s Marxist drift and speed up the realignment of politics. Supporters of the Government’s bill thought it wisest not to write off ‘the forces of moderation’, especially given the miners’ strike. King believed the TUC had met its obligations and reminded those opposed that legislation remained a possibility (see Hansard, 2 April 1984, cols 721–​761). Townend’s amendment was defeated by 57 to 472. However, the banning of union membership at GCHQ and the start of the coal dispute significantly worsened Government–​TUC relations. On 25 January 1984 Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, announced that GCHQ employees must resign their union membership or accept a transfer of employment. This produced a furore (including walk-outs) and on 1 and 23 February TUC representatives met the Prime Minister in the hope of a negotiated outcome, but Mrs Thatcher would not alter her government’s position. The GCHQ union ban ‘called into question the whole issue of trade union relations with the Government’ and the TUC decided, for example, to withdraw from the NEDC and review its involvement with other public bodies (TUC 1984a, 1). This was scarcely a threat that concerned ministers. As the coal dispute ground towards its awful denouement there were, however, signs of a renewed TUC reconsideration of strategy. This was hinted at in a General Council statement, Trade Union Law: Developing TUC Policy. TUC policy since 1980 had been to defeat the legislation and deter employers from using it, but the unions were not committed to defying the law or to extensive non-​compliance because of different affiliate interests and consequent dangers of a split in the TUC. Though never really likely, there was much speculation in this period about the possibility of a ‘non-​political’, non-​partisan break-​away (Taylor 1987, 137–​143 and 1990, 137–​143) from the TUC and the General Council could not ignore the forces at work nor ‘the trend toward detailed judicial intervention in union affairs’ which had created serious difficulties and as a result ‘a number of unions have been taking the view in recent years that it is necessary or desirable for them to reshape their practices’ (TUC 1985, 103).

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

224

What about the workers?

The 1980, 1982 and 1984 Acts framed the transformation of the unions’ legal environment and the political and policy relationship with the government. Woodrow Wyatt, for example, cautioned Mrs Thatcher that the Government’s success would undermine its future prospects, opining that ‘The public’s memory is short. They’ve already forgotten their alarm about Labour at the last election. They’ve almost forgotten the miners’ strike. The Falklands are becoming a distant memory.’ This implied continued action. Wyatt called for ‘a vigorous campaign … to remind the public of the horrors of a Labour Government’. ‘There must be a continual attack on Labour’s subjection to the TUC … “Back to the bad old days”, Scargill and … Ron Todd running the show’, and Far more emphasis must be repeatedly put on the success of the new union legislation. It must be endlessly pointed out that Labour would not have brought it in and intends either to reverse it or seriously damage it. As I said, memories are short. Union members must be reminded that their new freedom came from you and is under threat from Labour. (Thatcher Papers 1985)

The 1987 Conservative general election manifesto lauded The British Revival: It is really only such a short time ago [since  1979] that inflation rose to an annual rate of 27 per cent? That the leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union was widely seen as the most powerful man in the land? … that Labour’s much vaunted pay pact with the unions collapsed in the industrial anarchy of the ‘winter of discontent’ …?

The manifesto declared ungovernability to be a thing of the past and asked voters to contrast the currently low level of industrial conflict with the coal dispute (‘violence and intimidation on a massive scale’), and voters were enjoined not to endanger what had been achieved. Union reform was presented as part of a wider agenda promoting national regeneration, extending freedom, redressing the imbalance between the collective and the individual, and preventing militant minorities from coercing moderate majorities by bringing unions within the law. The manifesto promised further reform on pre-​strike ballots, voting for governing bodies, further restrictions on the closed shop, and a commissioner to help individuals enforce their rights (Conservative Party 1987). Before Mrs Thatcher left office there were two further Employment Acts. Proposals set out in Trade Unions and Their Members (Cm 95, 1987) sought to weaken collectivist impulses further and undermine solidarity by promoting workforce atomisation through the mandatory use of postal ballots, because voting in the home, it was believed, brought moderating influences to bear and neutralised workplace pressures. Under the Employment Act (1988) individual union members were given, first, the

522

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

225

right to complain to an industrial tribunal about unjustifiable disciplinary measures (such as refusing to join a strike); second, individuals could apply for a court order restraining strikes called without a ballot; third, immunity was removed from industrial action to enforce a closed shop; fourth, dismissal for a refusal to join a union was ruled unfair; fifth, non-​voting executive members, general secretaries and presidents were to be re-​elected every five years; sixth, postal ballots were required for executive and political fund ballots; seventh, pre-​strike ballots were to be held at each place of work and bargaining unit; eighth, the Secretary of State was given the power to draw up codes of practice on pre-​strike ballots and union elections; and finally, a Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members was created. The final piece of legislation developed under Margaret Thatcher was directed at making unofficial action a thing of the past. Unofficial Action and the Law (Cm 821 1989) is fascinating, as it rested explicitly on the conviction that union members were less militant than their leaders. The Employment Act (1990) made it unlawful to refuse employment to any individual whether or not they were a union member; second, unions were required to repudiate unofficial industrial action or adopt it and then hold a ballot, and immunity was withdrawn from strikes called to support dismissed unofficial strikers, who also lost the right to take their case to an industrial tribunal; third, immunity was removed from all forms of secondary action; fourth, it extended the law on strike ballots and secondary action to self-​employed union members; and fifth, it extended the powers of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members. These acts were amplifications of the existing legislation, addressing ‘weaknesses’ revealed by their operation and further reinforced the emphasis on the absolute pre-​eminence of individual, over any other, rights. With the passage of the 1990 Act the Conservative riposte to the unions’ perceived defects was complete. Anxious to escape from being trapped between the upper mill wheel of the Government’s legislation and the lower one of union hostility to the legislation, pressure compounded by changes in the structure of employment (and therefore the trade union movement), the TUC established a Special Review Body (SRB) in 1987 to structure a consensus on how the unions might deal with their new environment (TUC 1988a). The SRB’s now forgotten reports represented a response to the changing terrain of union activity and sought to come to terms with Thatcherism, signalling the recognition that ‘the locus of power both within and between the trade unions ha[d]‌shifted so that the basis for past relationships and practices no longer exist[ed]’ (Fairbrother 2000, 12). Potentially, initiatives such as the SRB and the model of unionism it represented (one aimed at women, part-​ time workers and middle-​class, white-​collar professionals; see TUC 1988b, 1989, 1991) could be understood as a shift to a critical accommodation to

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

226

What about the workers?

a State that was now, at best, indifferent or, at worst, actively hostile to the unions. Reversing membership decline, which would then increase union influence in government and the workplace, would flow from providing services to members, and potential members, which was itself a reflection of Thatcherism’s emphasis on the individual as a consumer. In a world where the Government’s approach to the unions and industrial relations remained unchanged, the TUC had to recognise that its efforts to deflect the Government had failed. The SRB was a recognition that the world had changed. Considerable academic and journalistic attention was devoted to the emergence of ‘the new industrial relations’ (for example, Bassett 1986; Hanson 1991; Howell 2007; Howell 2017; Marsh 1993; Taylor 1983) generated by the union legislation and changes in the UK’s employment structure. There was, as we have seen, ample evidence that Conservative governments had no interest in sustaining traditional relationships and the difficulties faced by the unions in adapting to this new climate were reflected in the conflict between the AEU, the TGWU and the Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) union over single-​union recognition at a never built Ford plant in Dundee (the EETPU was involved in two similar but separate disputes) that led to the creation of the SRB. Attempts to accommodate to this new environment and ease inter-​union tensions were not always successful; in 1988, for example, the EETPU and its 336,000 members (3.6 per cent of the TUC’s affiliated membership) was expelled from the TUC for refusing to accept General Council adjudication in an inter-​union dispute. The TUC noted in 1990 that ‘After eleven years of much ill-​founded and malicious legislation the legal framework governing employment matters and industrial relations is unfair and unbalanced.’ It approved a statement, Employment Law:  A New Approach, that, perhaps for the first time, accepted positive employment and industrial relations law, seeking a melding of collective and individual rights in collective bargaining (TUC 1990, 23). In his memoirs Norman Tebbit saw these developments as marking the emergence of a new pattern of industrial relations:  ‘strikes in the private sector diminishing rapidly, those in the public sector dragging on … ending in considerable personal loss on the part of the strikers. Time and again we simply stood firm and won’ (Tebbit 1989, 245). In understanding the scale of the unions’ decline we need to balance two sets of influences:  the legislative and the macroeconomic. Freeman and Pelletiert developed an ‘index of favourableness of labour laws to unionism’, ascribing the decline in union density to the legislation that, they claimed, reduced density by 1.0 to 1.7 per cent annually between 1980 and 1986, concluding ‘the legal changes caused density to fall by 9.4 percentage points … effectively the entire decline in UK density’ (1990,

722

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The enemy within

227

155). Disney, however, rejects this and focuses instead on macroeconomic factors, which, he contends, explain over 90 per cent of the decline (1990, 166). The decline of trade union membership can be plausibly attributed to the changing structure of employment and the disappearance of large, heavily unionised workplaces, especially in private manufacturing and the nationalised industries  –​   changes accelerated by government economic policy, mass unemployment and globalisation. The concomitant shift to traditionally poorly unionised service industries (under way for many years), and the increased number of women, white-​collar and part-​time workers in employment, (groups that were difficult to unionise) exacerbated these trends. Conservative trade union legislation made the unions’ task even harder. Table  8.3 (p. 230) captures the contours of this post-​industrial economy. Some industries had been in long-​term decline (for example, agriculture and textiles) but losses in others (notably, engineering) accelerated dramatically owing to a combination of government policy (the overvaluation of Sterling) and globalisation (foreign competition), and the expanding sectors signal the emergence of a services-​led economy and the significance of the public sector. Disney points out that legislation had little direct effect on density but it inhibited unions taking effective industrial action (1990, 171; see also Mason and Bain 1993, 338–​341), and so ‘The decline of manufacturing employment, particularly that in large establishments, has occurred in the context of the structural shift of employment from manufacturing to services’ and the effect ‘is compounded by weaknesses in union organization at establishments where employment is expanding’ (Waddington 1992, 305). The shift to a post-​industrial economy and the obstacles to effective trade unionism and industrial action enacted by the legislation meant that the changing composition of the workforce had a greater effect on unionisation than did legislation, but ‘This is not argue that legislation had no influence, but to suggest that the structural and economic context of legislative enactment conditions its effects’ (Waddington 1992, 311). On the tenth anniversary of Mrs Thatcher’s entry to Number 10 there was no sign of a union revival despite unions winning some 90 per cent of strike ballots held and all the political fund ballots. The Government continued its forward march. In 1989, for example, the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) might, some commentators speculated, produce a dispute as bitter as the steel and coal disputes. The TGWU worked hard, however, to ensure its campaign against the Scheme’s abolition remained within the law and the legal process played a key role in spinning out the dispute but as happened in other disputes in this period, the employers and Government exploited divisions in the dock workforce between those who benefitted from the NDLS and those who did not. In July 1989 the TGWU was defeated and both the NDLS and national wage bargaining in the docks

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

228

What about the workers?

were swept away; on the other hand, the NUR was able to inflict a heavy defeat on British Rail. The juridification of industrial relations continued and TUC attempts to come to terms with the legal changes and the changing structure of employment, were reflected in its Organising for the 1990s (June 1989), but union membership and influence continued to decline. During the late 1980s the TUC’s irrelevance in governance and the policy process was confirmed repeatedly. In a meeting with Norman Fowler, the Secretary of State for Employment, on 24 June 1988 the TUC noted ‘the unfairness of the Government’s one-​sided approach which undermines the ordinary worker, both as an individual and as a trade-​union member through hostile trade-​union legislation’ (TUC 1988a, 33). These trends continued under Mrs Thatcher’s successor, John Major, in the 1990s and under his successor, Tony Blair (Taylor 2017, 161–​179).

Conclusions In this chapter we see the triumph of a long-​standing Conservative critique of trade unions and their removal, along with industrial relations as an issue, from the realm of contentious politics. The Government’s legal changes were reinforced by other developments (such as privatisation, mass unemployment, deindustrialisation and globalisation) that produced declining union membership and created a low-​ skill, low-​ wage, post-​ industrial service economy. Conservative governments no longer regarded the unions as an element of One Nation politics, but their members were still regarded as a key component of One Nation politics as indicated in the rhetoric of all post-​Thatcher party leaders. What caused the collapse of British trade unionism  –​legislation or changes in the structure of the economy –​remains open to debate but it is indisputable that the nature of contentious politics shifted dramatically with the ‘resolution’ of the union problem. What we see is the end of a debate that had begun at the time of the First World War, but whose antecedents lay deep in the nineteenth century, a debate that encapsulated two strategies: inclusion or exclusion. Up to the mid-​twentieth-century inclusion predominated and this was reflected the party elites’ understanding of how to govern an industrial society. Never accepted totally by Conservatives, the politics of inclusion were challenged increasingly after 1945 by the material, behavioural and psychological consequences of full employment, union membership growth, the union role in governance, and the role of the organised working class in Conservative electoral strategy –​ developments that culminated in the governability crises of the 1970s. These crises were rationalised as either the consequences of governing complex societies or were blamed on pusillanimity in the face of union power. Central to

922

The enemy within

229

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Thatcherism was a determination to neutralise union power but what emerges strongly is the difference between rhetoric and action. The steel strike provided the stimulus for developing the necessary tactics in order to implement the Government’s strategic objective, and this commitment was demonstrated unequivocally in the 1984–​85 miners’ dispute. Thereafter, Conservatism’s relationship with the organised working class was simplified radically and the only significant relationship that remained was with a declining number of union members as voters and consumers. Table 8.1  ‘Trade unions have too much power in Britain today’

Agree Oct 1975 Aug 1977 Sept 1978 Sept 1979 July 1980 Nov 1981 Aug 1982 Aug 1983 Aug 1984 Feb 1985 Nov 1985 Aug 1987 Aug 1989 Dec 1989/​ Jan 1990 Aug 1990 Feb 1992

All adults Disagree Net

Trade union members Agree Disagree Net

75 79 82 80 72 70 71 68 68 n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 35

16 16 16 16 19 22 21 25 24 n.a. n.a. n.a. 42 54

59 62 66 64 53 48 50 43 44 n.a. n.a. n.a. −1 −19

65 68 73 69 58 58 62 56 55 40 42 31 26 15

28 27 25 28 31 31 34 39 37 45 41 51 62 75

37 41 48 41 27 27 28 17 18 −5 1 −20 −36 −60

38 27

45 61

−7 −37

22 14

66 82

−44 −68

− = Net disagree

Source: IPSOS/​Mori  2017.

Table 8.2  Support for Conservative trade union reforms Percentage who strongly support:

Non-​trade union

Trade union

Banning secondary picketing Banning ‘blacking’ Banning secondary action Allowing third parties to sue for losses Preventing strikes’ families claiming social security

70 59 58 50 36

59 45 42 38 30

Derived from data in Thatcher Papers 1980a.

230

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Table 8.3  Sectoral changes in employment, 1980–​90 (000s) Banking, insurance and finance Wholesale and distribution Health Education Public administration Timber Paper Agriculture, forestry and fishing

1032 Gas, electricity and water supply −77 552 450 149 17 −14 −72 −75

Chemicals Transport Construction Food, drink and tobacco Coal, oil and gas extraction Textiles, leather Metal working and mechanical engineering

Calculated from Department of Employment data.

−95 −103 −146 −181 −198 −239 −1221

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusions

The Conservative Party was the dominant governing party in Britain from the mid-​ nineteenth century onwards, a Britain that was the first capitalist industrial society in which the working class (organised and unorganised) was perceived to constitute a threat to the status quo, and so how the Conservative Party (the party of the status quo) should handle the organised working class was a highly contentious issue in British politics. This book’s central question is as follows: why, throughout its history, was the Conservative Party (particularly when in government) seemingly more accommodating towards the organised working class than the beliefs, social composition and prejudices of its members would seem to warrant? Trade unions were, from their inception, a contentious element in politics; the trade unions’ contentiousness was a reflection of the traits that flowed, or were believed to flow, from their fundamental characteristics. First, they organised the working class and sought to advance their interests; second, unions were consequently seen by many Conservatives as redistributionist, oligarchical and hostile to individual liberty. Despite this diagnosis the trajectory of public policy –​ often under Conservative governments –​ was to accept the unions’ existence and make concessions. For pragmatic political reasons, for instance, Disraeli’s Government reduced union legal disabilities and, by extending mass democracy, integrated their members into the political nation. At the risk of oversimplification, the Conservative Party was faced by a choice between exclusion and integration and whilst many Conservatives favoured exclusion, Conservative Party and government strategy and policy, was dominated by inclusion, a choice was the result of the fact that unless it could successfully appeal outside its traditional social and economic base the party would never form a government. Understood at least from the 1840s this became even truer as social change and industrialisation developed and calls for democracy expanded. Conservative statecraft recognised the importance of timely concession; Conservatives not merely endorsed, but adopted as their own, Tancredi Falconieri’s dictum in Lampedusa’s novel, The Leopard:  ‘Unless we ourselves take a

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

232

What about the workers?

hand now, they’ll foist a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ This attitude enabled the Conservative Party to endorse throughout its history seemingly contradictory policies, developing a flexible ideology –​One Nation –​as the core of its cross-​class appeal, which facilitated its ability to adapt. Another aspect of this was Conservative support for industrial relations largely being the responsibility of the participants with the State acting as a supporter and facilitator of this voluntarist system. Conservative electoral success was the result of its penetration of particularly English society  –​   a penetration that familiarised the party with the working class (organised or otherwise), its beliefs, attitudes and the limits of class politics. Taken as a whole this led the party to see the organised working class as less of a threat than many commonly supposed, thus encouraging a more pragmatic and flexible Conservatism. The consequent political confidence made the party in government less hostile and aggressive towards the unions and more willing to make concessions than its social composition would seem to warrant. This, however, did not rule out an aggressive response when the unions were considered to have stepped outside the boundaries of acceptable politics. The evidence presented in this book testifies to a strong Conservative dislike of unions but this dislike seldom got in the way of governing. Unions were regarded as a potential threat but a remarkable feature of the Conservative–​union relationship was how little influence this dislike and fear had on official Conservative policy and behaviour until relatively recently. In part this outcome reflected the party’s internal power structure in which, historically, the parliamentary and therefore the governing élite enjoyed considerable autonomy from membership pressure ‘to do something’, and partly because of the party’s deference to the elite’s conception of what was necessary to win and retain office. By 1914 the party had achieved a modus vivendi with the unions, accepting the unions’ unique legal position under the 1906 Trades Disputes Act. Of critical importance in the evolution of the Conservative Party’s relationship with the organised working class were the two world wars. Neither of these wars could have been fought without the positive engagement of the unions, and in both wars the unions played a key role in governance, growing their membership, and enjoying an enhanced status. Attempts to roll this back to pre-​war levels after 1918 were only partially successful and the war’s wider legacy, as well as the legacy of the 1926 General Strike and mass unemployment slowed the unions’ integration with the State. Seen in this light the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act, so bitterly resented by the unions and steadfastly defended by the party, was the minimal retribution for the General Strike that a Conservative government could get away with.

332

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusions

233

Conservative attempts to create a Conservative trade union organisation failed and far more significant was Baldwin’s national-​Conservatism that meshed with Citrine and Bevin’s effort to draw the TUC and the State closer together. The limitations of this joint effort were, however, apparent and emerged with even greater clarity with rearmament after 1934 and the appeasement of Nazi Germany. Without the crisis of 1940, the Wartime Coalition and ‘the people’s war’ the Conservative conviction that it must accommodate itself to the political consequences of war that were then institutionalised by the 1945–​51 Labour Governments, would have been far more limited. After an initial burst of enthusiasm for remaking Conservatism, the party moved rightwards after 1947 but the general elections of 1950 and 1951 showed the degree of distrust which the organised working class had for the party. This distrust, coupled with Churchill’s caution in the face of post-​ 1951 election economic difficulties and opinion research’s demonstration of the importance of the organised working-class voters (which encouraged a revival of the Conservative labour movement) led the Conservative Government to reaffirm its commitment to full employment, to consultation with the unions, and placing the interests of the organised working class high on its political and governing agenda. The Conservative governments of the 1950s were, however, afflicted by a steadily growing tension. On the one hand, there was the conviction that effective government (and re-​election) depended on sustaining a developing prosperity but, on the other hand, and pulling in the opposite direction, was a growing perception that this emerging prosperity was quite likely to be unsustainable without a dramatic change in union attitudes and behaviour. Many Conservatives in government and the party concluded that if the unions could not be persuaded to change, then there would have to be a radical shift in policy but such a shift would entail seriously adverse electoral consequences and social and industrial unrest. From the late 1950s, then, Conservatives sought to address a serious conundrum: their growing conviction that the post-​war settlement needed serious attention was paralleled by a conviction that full employment and prosperity could not survive under the existing configuration of industrial relations and politics. As the political skies darkened with the wings of chickens coming home to roost there was a dramatic shift in Conservative opinion, a shift not confined to the Conservative Party, that unions, in common with so much else in Britain, required modernisation. This modernisation took the form of advocating change in the unions’ legal framework and the conduct of industrial relations, both of which were on the party’s political agenda by the mid-​1960s. The 1964–​70 Labour Governments’ travails presaged the catastrophic experience of the Heath Government, which was taken as indisputable

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

234

What about the workers?

proof of the unions’ ability and willingness to block an elected government, a perception that was reinforced by the fate of the 1976–​ 79 Labour Government and the collapse of its Social Contract with the unions and by the industrial unrest of the Winter of Discontent. The perception of the unions’ transformation into an existential political threat from the mid-​ 1960s onwards underpinned the Conservative Party’s shift to a radical approach, advocating extensive legal change and the disciplining of the unions, which culminated in their progressive exclusion from governance and industrial relations. Thatcherism’s assault on ‘the British disease’ was not, however, as carefully thought through or strategically coherent as it sometimes appeared to be or became. Certainly a great deal of effort was devoted by the Conservative Party to diagnosing the problem and defining solutions in Opposition and by 1979 the party had a coherent narrative, but pulling in the opposite direction was the pragmatic calculation of Mrs Thatcher that precipitate action risked political defeat and a premature end to her revolution. Only by the mid-​1980s, after the steel strike and with the onset of the 1984–​85 coal dispute, were ministers ready for the final solution to the union problem. The convention that ministers, up to and including the Prime Minister, met union leaders for discussions continued, but this pales when compared to the scale and scope of the Government’s legislation that accompanied extensive deindustrialisation and the rise of the post-​industrial service economy. Periodically the Conservative Party considered it necessary to establish organisations that were intended to provide a direct link between the party and the organised working class. Notable instances came in the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s; these have in common that they were periods when the trade unions were perceived as a potential political and industrial threat that, in turn, created the possibility of the Conservative Party making significant electoral inroads amongst the organised working class. The party aspired to boost its organisational links in order win votes, demonstrate that Conservatism was not inimical to the organised working class, and mitigate the unions’ disruptive potential, but the party was never able to work successfully in what was an essentially alien environment. Despite this, the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s were periods when the Conservative Party won substantial support amongst the organised working-class electorate. The party’s adoption of a legislative response reflected the conviction that voluntarism was increasingly incapable of supporting the weight being placed upon it. The proposals that were to form the Industrial Relations Act (1971) were not especially radical except in the context of the post-​1906 status quo. The Act’s aim was actually to strengthen rather than end the existing arrangements by altering the balance of power between the official and unofficial leadership of the unions in favour of the former. In a real

532

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusions

235

sense, the Heath Government’s measures were intended to enable the British unions to play a role similar to that of the post-​war West German unions but efforts to ‘corporatise’ the unions failed. The unions had sufficient power to neutralise the Industrial Relations Act and undermine Heath’s pay policy, a degree of power that was sufficient to convince many Conservatives that were was no point in trying to sustain the voluntarist status quo, and that to do so was both self-​defeating and posed a severe threat to political stability and governability. The party’s post-​ war experience and the cataclysmic industrial and political events of 1974, subsequently reinforced by the Winter of Discontent, stimulated a dramatic shift in party policy. This shift from inclusion to exclusion and how it developed combined a deep suspicion of collectivism and a commitment to free markets that rested on a determination to strip any hostile institutions of their power and ability to resist Thatcherism. The unions and the organised working class were primary targets but an effective assault required separating the unions as organisations (and their activists) from the mass of the membership. The One Nation appeal was sufficiently flexible as to be able to treat the organised working class as individuals as part of the nation and the unions as organisations as hostile to the nation, enabling Conservative governments to weaken and then destroy the voluntarist tradition whilst addressing the vexing problem of governability. By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, trade unions and industrial relations had been eliminated as an aspect of contentious politics and the structure of British politics shifted. A fundamental aspect of this change was the successful articulation of a long-standing narrative about the nature of trade unionism. This narrative held that the unions as currently constituted were fundamentally un-​and anti-​democratic, oligarchical, politically motivated entities that exercised tyrannical power over their essentially moderate members, so that the preferences of a militant minority prevailed over the moderation and plural loyalties of the membership. Whilst unions existed primarily to defend their members (a role endorsed by public opinion), this Conservative analysis meant they did so under the thrall of the militant, activist minority that pursued a political agenda that ran counter to their members’ and the country’s real long-​term interests. The Conservative response was to confine unions to their ‘legitimate sphere’ and ensure their internal governing and political processes were tightly regulated so as to make industrial action as difficult as possible and provide the maximum opportunity for the supposedly moderate majority to assert themselves. In combination with deindustrialisation, legal change transformed what had been one of the major defining characteristics of British politics. The situation described in the first paragraph of the Introduction was the product of long-​ term historical change. Britain’s contemporary

236

What about the workers?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

post-​industrial politics seems to offer no way back to even a simulacrum of what had existed. Despite the Conservative Party’s recent efforts to promote ‘blue-​collar conservatism’ and the breaching of ‘the red wall’ in the 2019 general election, the question What about the workers? no longer has the same significance it had in twentieth-century British politics. Compared to 1945 or even 1979, What about the workers? is no longer a question that places the organised working class at the centre of politics.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

List of abbreviations used in references ACP Advisory Committee on Policy ACPPE Advisory Committee on Policy and Political Education Minutes and papers of Conservative Party Area organisations ARE Bonar Law Papers BLP CAB Cabinet minutes and papers CCO Conservative Central Office CPA Conservative Party Archives Conservative Political Centre CPC CRD Conservative Research Department D/​He Cuthbert Headlam Diaries Ministry of Labour LAB NU National Union (Conservative Party) NU PAM National Union Pamphlet NUCUA National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations National Union Executive Committee NUEC Pamphlet PAM PREM Records of the Prime Minister’s Office TNA The National Archives (Note: All URL references were correct and valid on 20 June 2020.) ACP (1959) ACP 3/​6/​74  ‘TUNAC’s Response to the ACP Paper, “Trade Union Reform”’, 24 June. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ACP (various dates) Advisory Committee on Policy. Minutes and Proceedings. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ACP 3/​51/​13 (1950) Conservative Research Department. Parliamentary Labour Committee. Report of the Trade Union Problems Sub-​ Committee, 2 May. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ACPPE (various dates) Advisory Committee on Policy and Political Education. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. Addison, P. (1975) The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War. London: Jonathan Cape. Alderman, K. (1992) ‘Harold Macmillan’s “night of the long knives”’, Contemporary British History, 6(2), 243–​266.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

238

Bibliography

Amery, L.S. (1953) My Political Life, Volume 1. London: Hutchinson. Anderson, A. (1971a) ‘Political Symbolism of the Labour Laws’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History (now Labour History Review), 23,  13–​15. Anderson, A. (1971b) ‘The Labour Laws and the Cabinet Legislative Committee of 1926–​1927’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History (now Labour History Review), 23, 37–​54. Anon. (1944) ‘The Future of British Industry’, Notes on Current Politics, March, Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. ARE 1/​13/​1 (1919) Lancashire Labour Sub-​Committee Rules and Objects. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ARE 3/​13/​1 (1918) Conservative Trade Unionists and Legislation after the War, 4 June. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ARE 3/​13/​1 (1918) Minutes of the Lancashire Trade Union Sub-​Committee. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ARE 8/​1/​2 (1942) Home Counties North Annual Meeting, 18 June. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. ARE 9/​1/​2 (1939) Home Counties North Labour Advisory Committee Minutes. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. Askwith, Lord (1920) Industrial Problems and Disputes. London: John Murray. Aspinall, A. (ed.) (1949) The Early English Trade Unions. Documents from the Home Office Papers in the Public Record Office. London: The Blatchworth Press. Attlee Papers 2/​2 (1941?) Undated and untitled memorandum 2/​2, in Papers of Clement Richard Attlee, 1st Earl Attlee. Oxford, Bodleian Library: The University of Oxford. Auerbach, S. (1990) Legislating for Conflict. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Baldwin, S. (1925) Peace and Goodwill in Industry. Three Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin. London: G. Allen and Unwin. Baldwin, S. (1926) ‘The Citizen and the General Strike, 12 June’, in S. Baldwin, Our Inheritance. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Ball, S. (1988) Baldwin and the Conservative Party. The Crisis of 1929–​1931. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Ball, S. (1992) Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and Macdonald. The Headlam Diaries 1924–​1935. London: The Historians’ Press. Ball, S. (1999) Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee. The Headlam Diaries 1935–​1951, Volume 14, Camden Fifth Series. London: Royal Historical Society/​Cambridge University Press. Ball, S. (2013) Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918–​1945. Oxford: Oxford University of Press. Ball, S. (ed.) (2014) Conservative Politics in National and Imperial Crisis. Letters from Britain to the Viceroy of India, 1926–​1931. Farnham: Ashgate. Barnes, D. and Reid, E. (1980) Governments and Unions. The British Experience 1964–​1979. London: Heinemann/​Policy Studies Institute. Barnes, J.H. and Nicholson, D. (1980) The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume 1: 1896–​1929. London: Hutchinson. Barnett, C. (1986) The Audit of War. The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation. London: Macmillan.

932

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

239

Barnett, C. (1995) The Lost Victory. British Dreams, British Realities 1945–​1990. London: Macmillan. Bassett, P. (1986) Strike Free. New Industrial Relations in Britain. London: Macmillan. Beauman, C. (1996) ‘British Steel: A Turnaround under Public Ownership’, Business Strategy Review, 7(3), 17–​29. Beckett, A. (2009) When the Lights Went Out. Britain in the Seventies. London: Faber and Faber. Bentley, M. (2001) Lord Salisbury’s World. Conservative Environments in Late-​ Victorian Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beynon, H. (2014) ‘ “Still too much socialism in Britain”: The Legacy of Margaret Thatcher’, Industrial Relations Journal, 45(3), 214–​233. Birch, A.H. (1984) ‘Overload, Ungovernability and Delegitimation:  The Theories and the British Case’, British Journal of Political Science, 14(2), 135–​160. Birkenhead, Lord (1969) Walter Monckton. The Life of Viscount Monckton of Brenchley. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Black, L., Pemberton, H. and Thane, P. (eds) (2015) Reassessing 1970s Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Blake, R. (1955) The Unknown Prime Minister. The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Blake, R. (1985) The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher. London: Fontana Press. BLP (various dates) The Private Papers of Andrew Bonar Law. London: House of Lords Record Office. Blyton, P. (1992) ‘Steel: A Classic Case of Industrial Relations Change in Britain’, Journal of Management Studies, 9(5), 635–​650. Booth, A. (2000) ‘Inflation, Expectations and the Political Economy of Conservative Britain 1951–​1964’, Historical Journal, 43(3), 827–​847. Boyce, D.G. (ed.) (1987), The Crisis of British Unionism. The Domestic Papers of the Second Earl of Selbourne, 1885–​1922. London: The Historians’ Press. Bradford, S. (1983) Disraeli. New York: Stein and Day. Briggs, A. (1960) ‘Languages of Class in Early Nineteenth-​Century England’, in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History. London: Macmillan. Bullock, A. (1960) The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume 2:  Trade Union Leader. London: Heinemann. Bulpitt, J. and Burnham, P. (1999) ‘Operation ROBOT and the British Political Economy in the Early-​1950s’, Contemporary British History, 13(1), 1–​31. Burnham, P. (2000) ‘Britain’s External Economic Policy in the Early-​1950s:  The Historical Significance of Operation ROBOT’, Twentieth Century British History, 11(4), 379–​408. Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (1971) Political Change in Britain. Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Butler, R.A. (1946a) The Worker and Nationalisation. PAM 1946/​69. London: The Conservative and Unionist Party. Butler, R.A. (1946b) Fundamental Issues. PAM 1946/​26. London: The Conservative and Unionist Party. Butler, R.A. (1971) The Art of the Possible. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

240

Bibliography

CAB 127/​117 (1964) Memorandum by the Minister of Labour. Trade Union Law and Practice, 4 March. London: TNA. CAB 128 (various dates) Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions. London: TNA. CAB 128/​31 (1957) Cabinet Conclusions. The Budget, 8 April. London: TNA. CAB 128/​72 (1981) Most Confidential Record. Conclusions. Industrial Affairs, 19 February. London: TNA. CAB 128/​76 (1983) Cabinet Conclusions. Limited Circulation, 10 May. London: TNA. CAB 128/​79 (1984) Employment Legislation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 22 November. London: TNA. CAB 128/​80 (1984) Cabinet Conclusions. Most Confidential Record, 9 February. London: TNA. CAB 129/​105 (1961) Industrial Relations. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 19 May. London: TNA. CAB 129/​109 (1962) Incomes Policy. Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 19 June. London: TNA. CAB 129/​117 (1964a) Report of the Official Committee on Trade Unions and the Law, March. London: TNA. CAB 129/​118 (1964b) Trade Unions and the Law. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 16 June. London: TNA. CAB 129/​127 (1983) Trade Union Legislation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 9 May. London: TNA. CAB 129/​ 153 (1970) Future of the National Board for Prices and Incomes. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 27 October. London: TNA. CAB 129/​160 (1971) Trade Union Attitudes to the Implementation of the Industrial Relations Act. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Employment, 1 December. London: TNA. CAB 129/​164 (1972a) Tripartite Meetings with the CBI and TUC. The Government’s Proposals, 26 September. London: TNA. CAB 129/​164 (1972b) Prices and Incomes Policy:  Discussions with the CBI and TUC. Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 26 September. London: TNA. CAB 129/​ 173 (1973) Handling the Miners’ and Power Engineers’ Disputes. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 27 November. London: TNA. CAB 129/​206 (1979) The Standing Commission on Pay Comparability, 11 May. London: TNA. CAB 129/​ 207 (1979) Industrial Relations Legislation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 19 November. London: TNA. CAB 129/​207 (1979) Industrial Relations. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Employment, 12 October. London: TNA. CAB 129/​ 208 (1980) The Financial Treatment of Strikers and Their Families. Memorandum by the Cabinet Secretary, 11 March. London: TNA. CAB 129/​53 (1953) Wages and Prices. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service, 9 October. London: TNA. CAB 129/​ 64 (1972) Civil Emergencies. Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 1 August. London: TNA.

142

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

241

CAB 129/​68 (1954) Unrest on the Railways. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service, 10 June. London: TNA. CAB 129/​75 (1955) Industrial Disputes: Railways. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service, 26 April. London: TNA. CAB 129/​87 (1957a) Wages and Prices. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Labour and National Service, 15 May. London: TNA. CAB 129/​87 (1957b) Wages and Prices. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 9 May. London: TNA. CAB 129/​88 (1957a) The Economic Cost of Industrial Disputes. Memoranda by the Prime Minister, 30 July. London: TNA. CAB 129/​88 (1957b) Inflation. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 17 July. London: TNA. CAB 129/​88 (1957c) The Economic Situation. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1 September. London: TNA. CAB 129/​88 (1957d) The Economic Situation. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 September. London: TNA. CAB 134 (various dates) Cabinet Conclusions. London: TNA. CAB 134/​ 1273 (1955) Minutes and Papers. Cabinet Committee on Industrial Relations. London: TNA. CAB 134/​2572 (1958) Minutes and Papers. Cabinet Committee on Wages Policy. London: TNA. CAB 134/​4338 (1980) Minutes and Papers. Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy, 15 January. London: TNA. CAB 23 (various dates) Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions. London: TNA. CAB 23/​53 (various dates) Cabinet Conclusions. London: TNA. CAB 24/​ 180 (1926a) Trade Union Legislation. Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 17 May. London: TNA. CAB 24/​180 (1926b) Report by Legislation Committee. Memorandum by Secretary, 11 June. London: TNA. CAB 24/​181 (1926c) Trade Union Legislation. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 27 October. London: TNA. CAB 24/​182 (1926d) Trade Union Legislation. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 22 November. London: TNA. CAB 24/​182 (1926e) Third Report of the Legislation Committee. Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 6 December. London: TNA. CAB 24/​184 (1927) Some Tendencies of Trade Union Opinion. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour, 28 January. London: TNA. CAB 24/​273 (1937) Defence Expenditure in Future Years. Interim Report by the Minister for the Co-​ordination of Defence, 15 December. London: TNA. CAB 24/​274 (1938) Defence Expenditure in Future Years. Further Report by the Minister for the Co-​ordination of Defence, 8 February. London: TNA. Campbell, J. (1990) ‘Symposium. Conservative Party Policy Making, 1965–​1970. Part I’, Contemporary Record, 3(3), 36–​38. Campbell, J. (1993) Edward Heath. A Biography. London: Jonathan Cape. Campbell, J. (1995) Margaret Thatcher, Volume 1:  The Path to Power. London: Jonathan Cape.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

242

Bibliography

Catterall, P. (2003) The Macmillan Diaries. The Cabinet Years, 1950–​ 1957. London: Macmillan. Catterall, P. (2011) The Macmillan Diaries. Prime Minister and After, 1957–​1966. London: Macmillan Pan. CCO (1958) Conservative Research Department:  Trade Union Reform, 25 November. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. CCO (n.d.) Presenting the Conservative Trade Unionists. London: Conservative Central Office. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. CCO (various dates) Trade Union Bulletin. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​1/​36 (1939) Sir Robert Topping’s Views on the Effect of War on Political Life Afterwards. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​1/​86 (1939) Political Organisation and Structure. General Director’s Memorandum on the Possible Effect of War on Political Life and Organisation, 14 November. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​3/​297 (1950a) The Trade Union Vote. Draft Report and Correspondence. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​3/​297 (1950b) The Trade Union Vote. Report, 20 July. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​3/​52 (n.d., but late 1949/​early 1950) TUC Wage Freeze. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​5/​95 (1953) Chairman’s Circular, 11 March. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 4/​8/​143 (1960) Work of the Industrial Department amongst Trade Unionists and Industrial Workers, 8 July. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 500/​24/​23 (1950) Memorandum from the Labour Department. General Election 1950, 3 October. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​1/​1 (1952a) Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation. Evidence of E.S. Adamson. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​1/​1 (1952b) Proceedings of the Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation. Evidence of the Labour Department. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​1/​4 (1952) Proceedings of the Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation. Evidence of the Conservative Trade Unionists. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​1/​6 (1952) Proceedings of the Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation. Evidence of the Party Agents. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​1/​9 (1950) The Industrial and Agricultural Worker, 9 November. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​2/​21 (1947) The Trade Union National Advisory Council, 8 March. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​3/​2 (1947) The Conservatives and the Trade Unions, April. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​3/​3 (1962a) Report of the Industrial Department, 9 January. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CCO 503/​3/​3 (1962b) Conservative Central Office. Draft Report on DCTU Organisation, January. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA.

342

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

243

CCO 503/​3/​5 (1966) Notes on the Industrial Department, 9 November. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. Cd 8696 (1917) Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. Summary of the Reports of the Commission. London: HMSO. Central Council (various dates) Proceedings of the Central Council of the Conservative and Unionist Party. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Chamberlain, J. (1903a) ‘Tariff Reform, Trade Unionism and Shipping. Speech to the Liverpool Working Men’s Association, 27 October’, in C.W. Boyd (ed.), Mr Chamberlain’s Speeches, Volume 2. London: Constable. Chamberlain, J. (1903b) ‘Trade Unionism and Tariff Reform. Speech to the Organised Labour Branch of the Tariff Reform League, 17 May’, in C.W. Boyd (ed.), Mr Chamberlain’s Speeches, Volume 2. London: Constable. Charmley, J. (1988) Chamberlain and the Lost Peace. London: Macmillan. Church, R. (1987) ‘Edwardian Labour Unrest and Coalfield Militancy 1880–​1914’, Historical Journal, 30(4), 841–​857. Church, R. and Outram, Q. (1998) Strikes and Solidarity. Coalfield Conflict in Britain 1889–​1966. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Citrine Papers (various dates) The Papers of Walter McLennan Citrine, 1st Baron Citrine. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Citrine, W. (1964) Men and Work. London: Hutchinson. Clegg, H., Fox, A. and Thompson, A.F. (1964) A History of British Trade Unions since 1989, Volume 1: 1889–​1910. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Clegg, H.A. (1985) A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, Volume 2: 1911–​1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Close, D.H. (1977) ‘The Collapse of Resistance to Democracy: Conservatives, Adult Suffrage, and Second Chamber Reform, 1911–​1928’, The Historical Journal, 20(4), 893–​918. Cm 821 (1989) Unofficial Action and the Law. London: HMSO. Cm 95 (1987) Trade Unions and Their Members. London: HMSO. Cmd 7225 (1947) Ministry of Labour and National Service. Report for the Years 1939–​46. London: HMSO. Cmd 9352 (1955) Interim Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute between the British Transport Commission and the National Union of Railwaymen. London: HMSO. Cmd 9725 (1956) The Economic Implications of Full Employment. London: HMSO. Cmnd 1626 (1956) Incomes Policy: The Next Step. London: HMSO. Cmnd 1844 (1962) National Incomes Commission. London: HMSO. Cmnd 8128 (1981) Trade Union Immunities. London: HMSO. Cmnd 8778 (1983) Democracy in Trade Unions. London: HMSO. Coetzee, F. (1990) For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coleman, B. (1988) Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth Century Britain. London: Edward Arnold. 1955, Colville, J. (1985) The Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939–​ Volume 1: September 1939–​October 1941. London: Sceptre Books.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

244

Bibliography

Colville, J. (1987) Downing Street Diaries, Volume 2:  1941–​April 1955. London: Sceptre Books. Conservative Party (1945a) How the Conservatives Have Helped the British People. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1945b) Facing the Facts. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1945c) It’s Your Money They’re After! PAM 1945/​69. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Point Policy. PAM 1945/​ 68. Conservative Party (1945d) The Socialist New 6-​ Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1946a) A Plain Man’s Guide to the Political Levy. PAM 1946/​ 5. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1946b) All You Want to Know About the Trade Disputes Act. PAM 1946/​4. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1946c) What Repeal Means. PAM 1946/​9. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. 12. Archives of the Conservative Party (1946d) Back to Bullying. PAM 1946/​ Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1947a) What Do You Think? About the Trade Unions. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1947b) Facts and Ideas. R.A. Butler Talks With You About the Industrial Charter. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1947c) The Industrial Charter. London:  Conservative and Unionist Central Office. Conservative Party (1948) Notes on Conservative Policy. PAM 1946/​21. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1949) The Right Road for Britain. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1950) This Is the Road. The Conservative and Unionist Party’s Policy. www.politicsresources.net/​area/​uk/​man/​con50.htm Conservative Party (1951a) Three Rights Going Wrong. PAM 1951/​23. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. 88. Conservative Party (1951b) Trade Union Sense or Nonsense? PAM 1951/​ Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications.

542

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

245

Conservative Party (1951c) The Conservative Party Manifesto. www. conservativemanifesto.com/​1951/​1951-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1953) The Growth of the Trade Union Movement. Trade Union Series No. 1 PAM 1953/​53. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1954a) Trade Union Organisation. Trade Union Series No. 3.  PAM 1954/​ 4. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1954b) Trade Unions and Communism. PAM 1954/​58. Trade Union Series No. 7. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1954c) Trade Unions and Government. Trade Union Series No. 8. PAM 1954/​59. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1955a) Trade Union and Full Employment. Trade Union Series No. 12. PAM 1955/​55. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1955b) Trade Unions and the Employers. Trade Union Series No. 10. PAM 1955/​53. Archives of the Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. Conservative Party (1959) The Next Five Years. www.conservativemanifesto.com/​ 1959/​1959-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1964) Prosperity With a Purpose. www.conservativemanifesto. com/​1966/​ Conservative Party (1966) Action Not Words. The New Conservative Programme. www.conservativemanifesto.com/​1966/​1966-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1970) A Better Tomorrow. www.conservativemanifesto.com/​ 1970/​1970-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1974) Firm Action for a Fair Britain. www.conservativemanifesto. com/​1974/​Feb/​february-​1974-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1979) The Conservative General Election Manifesto. www. conservativemanifesto.com/​1979/​1979-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1983) The Conservative Manifesto. The Challenge of Our Times. www.conservativemanifesto.com/​1983/​1983-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Conservative Party (1987) The Conservative Manifesto. The Next Moves Forward. www.conservativemanifesto.com/​1987/​1987-​conservative-​manifesto.shtml Cooper, C. (2011) ‘ “Little Local Difficulties” Revisited:  Peter Thorneycroft, the 1958 Treasury Resignations and the Origins of Thatcherism’, Contemporary British History, 12(2), 22–​50. Cowling, M. (1967) 1867. Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cowling, M. (1971) The Impact of Labour 1920–​1924: The beginning of modern British politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cowling, M. (1975) The Impact of Hitler. British Politics and British Policy 1933–​1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

246

Bibliography

CPC (1968) Fair Deal At Work. The Conservative Approach to Modern Industrial Relations. CPC Pamphlet Series 400. London: Conservative Political Centre. Cranborne, Viscount (1866) ‘The Reform Bill’, Quarterly Review, 119, April, 530–559. CRD 2/​13/​15 (1950a) Sub-​ Committee on Political Education. Report of the Working Party on the Approach to the Industrial Worker (Draft). Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​13/​15 (1950b) Parliamentary Labour Sub-​ Committee. Report on the Approach to the Industrial Worker. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/17/11 (1952) Industrial Relations: Committee Correspondence, 17 March. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/7/9 (1959) Trade Disputes. J. Douglas to M. Fraser, 22 January. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​11 (1949) Speech by Sir Winston Churchill to Conservative Trade Unionists. Central Office Press Release, 13 October. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​11 (1950) Industrial Research Department. M. McCorquordale. Socialism versus Trade Unionism, 4 January. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​11 (1951) Conservative Research Department. Review of the Conservative Party’s Commitment on Labour Policy, n.d. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​11 (1957) Industrial Research Department Correspondence. Mr Spearman to Mr Beaton, 11 April. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​11 (1959) Industrial Research Department Correspondence. Mr Spearman to Mr Fraser, 26 February. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​15 (1962) Pay Pause. Advisory Committee on Policy 50th Meeting, 2 May. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​2 (1947a) Industrial Research Department. Parliamentary Labour Committee Brief on Manpower Policy, 5 February. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​2 (1947b) Workers’ Charter. Papers. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​7 (1948) Industrial Research Department. Correspondence on The Industrial Charter. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. CRD 2/​7/​8 (1959) Trade Practices, Productivity Rates. Papers and Correspondence. J. Douglas to M. Fraser, 22 January. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. Cronin, J.E. (1979) Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Cronin, J.E. (1989) ‘Strikes and Power in Britain, 1870–​1920’, in H. Haimson and C. Tilly (eds), Strikes, War and Revolution in an International Perspective. Strike Waves in the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crosby, T.J. (2014) The Unknown Lloyd George. A  Statesman in Conflict. London: I.B. Tauris. Crowson, N.J. (1998) Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics. Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–​1940, Volume 2. Camden Fifth Series. London: Royal Historical Society/​Cambridge University Press. Currie, R. (1979) Industrial Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Daily Telegraph (various dates). D/​He (various dates) D/​He 1–​46. The Political Diaries of Cuthbert Headlam MP. Durham: Durham County Record Office.

742

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

247

Davidson Papers (various dates) The Political and Private Papers of John Colin Campbell Davidson MP, 1st Viscount Davidson. London: House of Lord Record Office. Davidson, R. (1972) ‘Llewellyn Smith, the Labour Department and Government Growth, 1886–​1889’, in G. Sutherland (ed.), Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century Government. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Davidson, R. (1978) ‘The Board of Trade and Industrial Relations, 1896–​1914’, Historical Journal, 21(3), 571–​591. Davidson, R. (1980) ‘The Ideology of Labour Administration’, Labour History Review (formerly Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History), 40,  29–​35. Davidson, R. (1985) Whitehall and the Labour Problem in Late-​Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Desmarais, R. (1971) ‘The British Government’s Strike-​breaking Organisation and Black Friday’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6(2), 112–​127. Desmarais, R. (1973) ‘Strike Breaking and the Labour Government of 1924’, Journal of Contemporary History, 8(4), 165–​175. Desmarais, R. (1975) ‘Lloyd George and the Development of the British Government’s Strikebreaking Organisation’, International Review of Social History, 20(1), 1–​15. Dicey, A.V. (1914) The Relation between Law and Public Opinion during the Nineteenth Century. 2nd edn, first published 1905. London: Macmillan. Dintenfass, M. (1980) ‘Politics in Industrial Society:  A Review’, Labour History Review (formerly Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History), 41,  63–​65. Disney, R. (1990) ‘Explanations of the Decline in Trade Union Density in Britain: An Appraisal’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 28(2), 165–​177. Dorey, P. (1995) The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions. London: Routledge. Dorey, P. (2002) ‘Industrial Relations as ‘Human Relations’:  Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945–​1964’, in S. Ball and I. Holliday (eds), Mass Conservatism. The Conservatives and the Public Since the 1880s. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Dorey, P. (2009a) British Conservatism and Trade Unionism. Aldershot: Ashgate. Dorey, P. (2009b) ‘Conciliation or Confrontation with the Trade Unions? The Conservative Party’s ‘Authority of Government Group’, 1975–​1978’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 27/​28, 135–​151. Dorey, P. (2014), ‘The Stepping Stones Programme: The Conservative Party’s Struggle to Develop a Trade-​Union Policy’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 35, 89–​116. Dorey, P. (2019) Comrades in Conflict:  Labour, the Trade Unions and 1969’s In Place of Strife. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Douglas, J. (1976) ‘Review Article:  The Overloaded Crown’, British Journal of Political Science 6(4), 483–​505. Douglas, R. (1972) ‘The National Democratic Labour Party and the British Workers’ League’, The Historical Journal, 15(3), 533–​552. Douglas, R. (1974) ‘Labour in Decline’, in K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-​Labour History. Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain. London: Macmillan.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

248

Bibliography

Durcan, J.W. and McCarthy, W.E.J. (1974) ‘The State Subsidy Theory of Strikes: An Examination of Statistical Data for the Period 1956–​1970’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(1), 26–​47. Dutton, D.J. (1981) ‘The Unionist Party and Social Policy, 1906–​ 1914’, The Historical Journal, 24(4), 871–​884. Eden, A. (1947) Three Partners of Industry. Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden. PAM 1947/​38. London: The Conservative and Unionist Party. Eden, Viscount (1960) Memoirs. Full Circle. London: Cassell. Edwards, P.K. and Bain, G.S. (1988) ‘Why Are Trade Unions Becoming More Popular? Unions and Public Opinion in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 26(3), 311–​326. Egremont, M. (1980) Balfour. London: Collins. Emmerson, H. (1968) ‘Mass Prosecutions in Wartime’, in Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965–​68, Cmd 3623. London: HMSO. Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (2017) The New Politics of Class. The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fairbrother, P. (2000) ‘British Trade Unions Facing the Future’, Capital and Class, 24(2),  11–​42. Feiling, K. (1913) Toryism. A Political Dialogue. London: G. Bell and Sons. Feiling, K. (1946) The Life of Neville Chamberlain. London: Macmillan. Fielding, S., Thompson, P. and Tiratsoo, N. (1995) ‘England Arise!’ The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Fisher, N. (1973) Iain Macleod. London: André Deutsch. Fishman, N. (1999) ‘ “Spearhead of the Movement”? The 1958 London Busworkers’ Strike, the TUC and Frank Cousins’, in A. Campbell, N. Fishman, and J. McIlroy (eds), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, Volume 1:  The Post-​War Compromise, 1945–​64. Aldershot: Ashgate. Flanders, A. (1974) ‘The Tradition of Voluntarism’, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(3), 352–​370. Freeman, J. and Pelletiert, J. (1990) ‘The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on British Union Density’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 28(2), 141–​164. Gash, N. (1976) Peel. London: Longman. Gaunt, R.A. (2010) Sir Robert Peel. The Life and Legacy. London: I.B. Tauris. Geary, R. (1985) Policing Industrial Disputes 1893–​1985. London: Routledge. Gee, T. (1945) Politics and the Trade Unions. Signpost Booklet 21. London: Signpost Press. Gennard, J. (1977) Financing Strikes. London: Macmillan. Gennard, J. (1981) ‘The Effects of Strike Activity on Households’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 19(3), 327–​344. Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J. (1968) The Affluent Worker:  Political Attitudes and Behaviour. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Goodman, G. (1979) The Awkward Warrior. Frank Cousins: His Life and Times. London: Davis-​Poynter.

942

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

249

Gordon, P. (2009) The Political Diaries of the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon 1857–​1890. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press and the Royal Historical Society. Gospel, H.F. (1979) ‘Employers’ Labour Policy: A Study of the Mond-​Turner Talks 1927–​1933’, Business History, 21(2), 180–​197. Green, E.H.H. (1995) The Crisis of Conservatism. The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880–​1914. London: Routledge. Green, E.H.H. (1998) ‘Thatcherism: An Historical Perspective’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 9, 17–​42. Green, E.H.H. (2000) ‘The Treasury Resignations of 1958:  A Reconsideration’, Twentieth Century British History, 11(4), 409–​430. Greenleaf, W.H. (1983) The British Political Tradition, Volume 2: The Ideological Heritage. London: Routledge. Guardian (various dates). Halévy, E. (1961) A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, 1914. First published 1932. Volume 6:  The Rule of Democracy 1905–​ London: Ernest Benn. Hansard (various dates) House of Commons Debates. London: HMSO. Hanson, C. (1991) Taming the Trade Unions. A Guide to the Thatcher Government’s Employment Reforms. Houndmills: Macmillan. Harris, K. (1982) Attlee. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Hawkins, A. (2015) ‘Lord Derby’, in C. Clarke, T.S. James, T. Bale and P. Diamond (eds), British Conservative Leaders. London: Biteback Publications. Haxey, S. (1939) Tory MP. London: Gollancz. Heath, A.F., Jowell, R.M. and Curtice, J.K. (2001) The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heath, E. (1998) The Course of My Life. The Autobiography of Edward Heath. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Hill, R.L. (1929) Toryism and the People, 1832–​1846. London: Constable. Facsimile edition (1977) New York: Porcupine Press. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1975) The Age of Capital. 1848–​1875. London: Sphere Books. Holton, R. (1976) British Syndicalism 1900–​1914. London: Pluto Press. Horne, A. (1989) Macmillan: Volume 2: 1958–​1986. London: Macmillan. Hoskyns, J. (2000) Just in Time. Inside the Thatcher Revolution. London: Aurum  Press. Howard, A. (1988) RAB. The Life of R.A. Butler. London: Macmillan. Howe, G. (1994) Conflict of Loyalty. London: Macmillan. Howell, C. (2007) Trade Unions and the State:  The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–​ 2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Howell, C. (2017) ‘Regulating Class in the Neoliberal Era: The Role of the State in the Restructuring of Work and Employment Relations’, Work, Employment and Society, 30(4), 573–​589. Hunter, L.C. (1974) ‘The State Subsidy Theory of Strikes:  A Reconsideration’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(3), 438–​444. ICCUS (1958) A Giant’s Strength. London: Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

250

Bibliography

Ipsos/​MORI (2017) Attitudes to Trade Unions 1975–​2014. www.ipsos.com/​ipsos-​ mori/​en-​uk/​attitudes-​trade-​unions-​1975-​2014 Jarvis, M. (1998) ‘The 1958 Treasury Dispute’, Contemporary British History, 12(2),  22–​50. Jeffery, K. and Hennessy, P. (1983) States of Emergency. British Governments and Strikebreaking since 1919. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Jefferys, K. (1995) The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940–​ 1945. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Jenkins, P. (1970) The Battle for Downing Street. London: Knight. Jessop, B. (1974) Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture. London: George Allen and Unwin. Jones, H. (1999) ‘New Conservatism? The Industrial Charter, Modernity and the Reconstruction of British Conservatism After the War’, in B. Conekin, F. Mort and C. Waters (eds), Moments of Modernity? Reconstructing Britain 1945–​1964. London: Rivers Oram. Joyce, P. (1982) Work, Society and Politics. The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England. London: Methuen. Kahn-​ Freund, O. (2017) ‘Rookes v Barnard and after’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 38, 81–​95. Kandiah, M.D. (1995) ‘The Heath Government’, Contemporary Record, 9(1), 188–​219. Kelly, R. (1989) Conservative Party Conferences. The Hidden System. Manchester: Manchester University Press. King, A. (1975) ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’, Political Studies, 33(2 and 3), 284–​296. LAB 10/​1 (1924a) Deputation to the Prime Minister from the TUC General Council, 8 April. Kew: TNA. LAB 10/​ 1 (1924b) Cabinet Decision Concerning the Submission of Proposed Legislation to the TUC before Submission to Parliament. 12 April. Kew: TNA. LAB 10/​ 4 (1926) Deputation of National Union of Manufacturers to Discuss Amendments to Trade Union Law, 12 October. Kew: The National Archives. LAB 10/​73 (1934a) Compulsory Enforcement of Collective Agreements and Papers Regarding State Intervention in Industrial Relations (1934–​ 36), Committee Paper No. 1. London: TNA. LAB 10/​73 (1934b) Compulsory Enforcement of Collective Agreements and Papers Regarding State Intervention in Industrial Relations (1934–​ 36), Committee Paper No. 3. London: TNA. LAB 2/​212/​18 (1917) Memorandum on the Formation and Purpose of the Ministry of Labour. London: TNA. LAB 2/​921/​7 (1921a) Draft Covering Note on Industrial Relations Policy to the Cabinet, 30 November. London: TNA. LAB 2/​921/​7 (1921b) W. Eady to F.W. Leggett, 20 October. London: TNA. LAB 2/​921/​7 (1921c) Memorandum by W. Eady, 20 October. London: TNA. LAB 2/​921/​7 (1921d) Industrial Relations Department. Concerning the Mechanisms for Settling Industrial Disputes. London: TNA.

152

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

251

LAB 2/​921/​7 (1921e) Memoranda on Machinery for the Settlement of Industrial Disputes and the Government’s Policy in Relation to Industrial Disputes. Appendix C, Trade Union Ballots. London: TNA. LAB 43/​ 179 (1952) Meetings of the Minister and Chancellor with the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers Confederation about the Economic Situation and Wages Policy. Response to the 1952 Budget. MLNS Briefing, 9 April. London: TNA. LAB 43/​243 (1955) Wage Claims in the Engineering Industry. Monckton to Butler, 31 July. London: TNA. LAB 43/​ 273 (1956) Conservative Party Conference, Llandudno. Secret Ballots before Strikes: Comments Requested by the Conservative Research Department. Memorandum by the Minister, 20 August. London: TNA. LAB 43/​276 (1955) Wage Claims and the National Economy. Note of a Meeting, 2 May; and Macleod to Macmillan, 4 September 1956. London: TNA. LAB 43/​ 280 (1956) Secret Ballots before Strikes:  comments requested by the Conservative Research Department. J. Douglas to R. Carr, 30 July. London: TNA. LAB 43/​289 (1957) Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society:  Comments on Reports on Trade Unions ‘The New Estate’. P.W. Medd to Macleod, 4 June; Macleod to Medd, 7 June; and Note to Chief Industrial Commissioner, 1 July. London: TNA. Labour Party (1936) Report of the Annual Labour Party Conference. London: The Labour Party. Lawson, N. (1993) The View from No 11. Memoirs of a Tory Radical. London: Corgi Books. Lecky, W.E.H. (1896) Democracy and Liberty, Volume 2. (1981 edn). Indianapolis, IA: Liberty Fund. Lloyd George, D. (1938) War Memoirs, Volume I. London: Odhams. Lockwood, G. (2005) ‘Trade Union Governance:  The Development of British Conservative Thought’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 10(3), 335–​371. Lowe, R. (1974) ‘The Ministry of Labour, 1916–​ 1924:  A Graveyard of Social Reform?’, Public Administration, 52(4), 415–​435. Lowe, R. (1980) ‘The Ministry of Labour: Fact or Fiction’, Labour History Review (formerly Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History), 41, 23–​27. Lowe, R. (1978) Adjusting to Democracy. The Role of the Ministry of Labour in British Politics 1916–​1939. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Lyddon, D. (1999) ‘Glorious Summer’, 1972:  The High Tide of Rank and File Militancy’, in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell (eds), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics. The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1974–​1979. Aldershot: Ashgate. MacGregor, I. (1986) The Enemies Within. The Story of the Miners’ Strike 1984–​85. London: Collins. Mackay, R.F. (1985) Balfour. Intellectual Stateman. Oxford: Oxford University  Press. Macmillan, H. (1971) Riding the Storm, 1956–​1959. London: Macmillan. Marquand, D. (1991) The Progressive Dilemma. London: Heinemann. Marsh, D. (1990) ‘Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Mrs Thatcher’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 28(1), 57–​65.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

252

Bibliography

Marsh, D. (1993) The New Politics of British Trade Unionism. Union Power and the Thatcher Legacy. London: Macmillan. Marsh, P. (1978) The Discipline of Popular Government. Lord Salisbury’s Domestic Statecraft 1881–​1902. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Martin, R., Smith, P., Fosh, P., Morris, H. and Undy, R. (1995) ‘The Legislative Reform of Union Government 1979–​1994’, Industrial Relations Journal, 26(2), 145–​165. Marx, K. (1970 [1875]) ‘Wages, Prices and Profit’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume. London: Lawrence and Wisharts. Mason, A. (1969) ‘The Government and the General Strike, 1926’, International Review of Social History, 14(1), 1–​21. Mason, B. and Bain, P. (1993) ‘The Determinants of Trade Union Membership in Britain:  A Survey of the Literature’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(2), 332–​351. Mass Observation (1943) War Factory. London: V. Gollancz. Maudling, R. (1978) Memoirs. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. McCrillis, N.R. (1998) The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage. Popular Conservatism, 1918–​1929. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. McDonald, G.W. and Gospel, H.F. (1973) ‘The Mond-​Turner Talks, 1927–​1933: A Study in Industrial Co-​operation’, The Historical Journal, 16(4), 807–​829. McIvor, A.J. (2003) ‘Industrial Relations in Britain, 1900–​1939’, in C. Wrigley (ed.), A Companion to Early Twentieth Century Britain. London: Blackwell. McKenzie, R. and Silver, A. (1968) Angles in Marble. Working Class Conservatives in Urban England. London: Heinemann Educational. McKenzie, R.T. (1964) British Political Parties. The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties. 2nd revised edn. London: Mercury Books. McKibbin, R. (1974) The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910–​ 1924. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McKibbin, R. (1990) Languages of Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKibbin, R. (1998) Classes and Cultures. England 1918–​1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meacham, S. (1972) ‘The Sense of an Impending Clash:  English Working-​Class Unrest before the First World War’, American History Review, 77(5), 1343–​1364. Middlemas, K. (1969a) Whitehall Diary, Volume I:  1969–​1925. London:  Oxford University Press. Middlemas, K. (1969b) Whitehall Diary, Volume II: 1926–​1930. London: Oxford University Press. Middlemas, K. (1979) Politics in Industrial Society. The Experience of the British System since 1911. London: André Deutsch. Middlemas, K. (1986a) Power, Competition and the State. Volume 1:  Britain in Search of Balance 1940–​1961. London: Macmillan. Middlemas, K. (1986b) Industry, Unions and Government. Twenty-​one Years of NEDC. London: Macmillan. Middlemas, K. (1990) Power, Competition and the State. Volume 2: Threats to the Postwar Settlement. Britain 1961–​1974. London: Macmillan. Middlemas, K. (1991) Power, Competition and the State. Volume 3: The End of the Postwar Era: Britain since 1974. London: Macmillan.

352

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

253

Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J.H. (1969) Baldwin. A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Milne-​Bailey, A.W. (1929) Trade Union Documents. London: G.W. Bell and Sons. Mitchell, D.J. (1991) Cross and Tory Democracy: A Political Biography of Richard Assheton Cross. New York: Garland. Mitchell, N.J. (1987) ‘Where Traditional Tories Fear to Tread: Mrs Thatcher’s Trade Union Policy’, West European Politics, 10(1), 33–​45. Monckton Papers (various dates) Papers of Walter Turner Monckton, Ist Viscount Monckton of Brenchley. Oxford: Bodleian Library. Moore, C. (2014) Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography, Volume 1. London: Penguin. Morgan, K. (1992) The People’s Peace. British History 1945–​1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muller, W.D. (1977) The Kept Men? The First Century of Trade Union Representation in the British House of Commons 1874–​ 1975. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Press. Murphy, J.T. (1972) Preparing for Power. A  Critical Study of the History of the British Working-​Class Movement. First published in 1934 with a new introduction by J. Hinton. London: The Pluto Press. Nordlinger, E.A. (1967) The Working-​Class Tories: Authority, Deference and Stable Democracy. London: McGibbon and Kee. NU (various dates) National Union Gleanings and Memoranda. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NU PAM (1920) The Wherefore and Why of the Unionist Labour Committee, or the Labour Wing of the Unionist Party. NUM PAM 1920/​42. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NU PAM (1923) Looking Ahead. PAM 23/​50. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA (various dates) Central Council Minutes and Proceedings. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA (various dates) National Union Labour Sub-​Committee. Minutes and Papers. University of Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA 2/​1/​35 (1917) Special Conference on the Representation of the People Bill, 30 November. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA 2/​1/​42 (1926) Minutes of the Annual Conference, 6–​7 October. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA 2/​1/​43 (1927) Minutes of the Annual Conference, 7–​8 October. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA 2/​1/​47 (1932) National Union Executive Committee Annual Report. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

254

Bibliography

NUA 6/​1/​1–​13 (1920) Report of the Labour Sub-​Committee to the National Union Executive Committee, 9 March. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUA 6/​1/​1–​13 (1924) The Report of the Principal Agent, July (The Blain Report). Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA 6/​1/​1–​13 (various dates) Minutes and Proceedings of the Labour Sub-​ Committee. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA 6/​1/​1–​4 (1928) Minutes and Proceedings of the Labour Sub-Committee. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA 6/​2/​9 (1952) Report of the Committee on Trade Unionist Policy and Organisation, 20 September. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA 6/​6/​(various dates) Minutes and Proceedings of the National Union Labour Sub-​Committee. Oxford, Bodleian Library: CPA. NUA PAM (1920) Labour Committee Annual Conference. Southport, 6 March 1920. PAM 1920/​ 36. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. statement of Unionist Principles and NUA PAM (1924) Looking Ahead. A  Re-​ Aims. NUA PAM 23/​50. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUCUA (1916) National Union of Conservative and Unionist Association, Central Council Minutes, 16 November 1916. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUCUA (1952) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1953) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1954) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1958) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1968) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1969) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUCUA (1972) Annual Conservative Conference. Verbatim Report. London: Conservative Party. NUEC (various dates) Minutes and Proceedings of the Executive of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1914) Report of the Executive Committee to the Central Council (Organisation Sub-​Commitee), 7 July. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1921) Report of the Labour Sub-​Committee, 10 May 1921. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications.

552

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

255

NUEC (1934a) Representation of Conservative Wage Earners on Royal Commissions. Report of a Deputation to the Leader of the Party, 30 January. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1934b), Report of a Deputation to the Minister of Labour, 10 April. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1935a) National Union Executive Committee: Report of the Labour Sub-​ Committee, 12 February. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1935b) Report of a Special Meeting of the Labour Sub-​Committee, 10 April. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1939a) Sir Eugene Ramsden’s Letter to All Constituency Associations, 23 September. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1939b) Report of the Sub-​Committee Appointed to Examine a Proposal Submitted in Connection with the Labour Advisory Committees, May. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1946) Memorandum on the Conservative Labour Movement. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton:  Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. NUEC (1951) Central Trade Union Advisory Committee Report on the General Election, November. Archives of the British Conservative Party. Hassocks, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf Microform Publications. O’Hara, G. (2004) ‘Intractable, Obscure and Baffling:  The Incomes Policy of the Conservative Government, 1957–​ 1964’, Contemporary British History, 18(1),  25–​53. Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Pandit, N.R. (1998) ‘British Steel Corporation:  Probably the Biggest Turnaround Story in UK Industrial History’, Strategic Change, 7(2), 62–​79. Panitch, L. (1976) Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy. The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy 1945–​ 1974. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Parker, R.A.C. (1981) ‘British Rearmament 1936–​1939: Treasury, Trade Unions and Skilled Labour’, English Historical Review, 96(379), 306–​343. Parkinson, J. (2020) ‘Can Tories and Trade Unions Be Friends?’ BBC, 6 March. www/​bbc/​co/​uk/​news/​uk-​politics-​51707579 Peden, G.C. (1984) ‘A Matter of Timing:  The Economic Background to British Foreign Policy’, History, 69(225), 15–​28. Phelps Brown, H. (1983) The Origins of Trade Union Power. Oxford: Clarendon  Press. Pimlott, B. (ed.) (1986) The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–​45. London: Jonathan Cape. Powell, G. (2004) ‘Turning Off the Power:  The Electrical Trades Union and the Anti-​communist Crusade, 1957–​61’, Contemporary British History, 18(2),  1–​26.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

256

Bibliography

PREM 1/​251 (1938) Defence Organisation. Acceleration of Defence Programme. PM’s Meeting with EEF and TUC Leaders. Kew: TNA. PREM 1/​430 (1939–​1940) Deputations from the Trades Union Congress and Their Representation on Supply and other Committees. Kew: TNA. PREM 1/​431 (1939–​1940) Deputations from the Trades Union Congress on the Repeal of the Trades Disputes Act. Kew: TNA. PREM 11/​1043 (1955) Annual Conference of the Trades Union Congress. Prime Minister’s Letter to the President of the TUC:  Harold Watkinson to Eden, 7 September, and Sir Godfrey Ince to Monckton, 12 September. London: TNA. PREM 11/​1402 (1956) Current Industrial Problems: Eden to Macmillan, 11 April and Macmillan to Eden, 14 July. London: TNA. PREM 11/​1636 (1952) Claim for Increased Wages by Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Monckton to Churchill, 13 September. London: TNA. PREM 11/​1637 (1955) Fleet Street. Monckton to Eden, 13 April. London: TNA. PREM 11/​ 1824 (1957) Inflation. Michael Fraser to Harold Macmillan. The Economic Situation, 7 September. London: TNA. PREM 11/​1883 (1955) Annual Conference of the TUC. Prime Minister’s Letter to Mr Geddes, September. London: TNA. PREM 11/​1884 (1957) Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes. Thorneycroft to Macmillan, 15 July. London: TNA. PREM 11/​2248 (1957) Minutes and Papers. Steering Committee to Consider Future Policy Initiatives. London: TNA. PREM 11/​2512 (1958) Continuation of Bus Strike:  Wage Claims Arising Out of the Railway Settlement. Personal Minute. Macmillan to Watkinson, 20 June, and Macleod to Macmillan, 22 May. London: TNA. PREM 11/​315 (1952) Note on the Referral of the Wage Council Awards, 23 July. London: TNA. PREM 11/​543 (1953) Distribution of Petrol and Fuel Oil in the London Area. Unofficial Strike of Tanker Drivers:  Note to the Prime Minister, 22 October. London: TNA. PREM 11/​ 775 (1954) Strikes and Industrial Disputes:  Railway Dispute over Lodging Terms. London: TNA. PREM 19/​1061 (1982a) Len Murray to Margaret Thatcher, 10 June. London: TNA. PREM 19/​1061 (1982b) Margaret Thatcher to Len Murray, 28 June. London: TNA. PREM 19/​ 1061 (1982c) Industrial Relations. P.L. Gregson to M.  Thatcher, 12 October. London: TNA. PREM 19/​1281 (1983a) Memorandum. Norman Tebbit to Margaret Thatcher, 27 March. London: TNA. PREM 19/​1281 (1983b) M. Scholar to J.B. Shaw, 11 May. London: TNA. PREM 19/​1281 (1984) No.10. Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Employment, 13 January. London: TNA. PREM 19/​261 (1980) The Steel Strike and the Law on Secondary Picketing. James Prior to Margaret Thatcher, 14 January. London: TNA. PREM 19/​262 (1980a) Immunities for Secondary Industrial Action. A. Maude to J. Prior, 4 February. London: TNA. PREM 19/​ 262 (1980b) Trade Union Immunities. John Knot to James Prior, 4 February. London: TNA.

752

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

257

PREM 19/​262 (1980c) E Committee –​Employment Bill. J. Hoskyns to Margaret Thatcher, 5 February. London: TNA. PREM 19/​263 (1980) Summary of Telephone Conversations on Sunday 17 February, 19 February. London: TNA. PREM 19/​308 (1980) I.  Ellison (Department of Industry) to T.  Lankester (No. 10),  Steel Strike; Law Officers Department to the Prime Minister, The Present Law on Picketing and Blacking; and Sir Robert Armstrong to the Prime Minister, Cabinet: Steel Strike, 9 January. London: TNA. PREM 19/​682 (1980) Immunities for Secondary Industrial Action. Geoffrey Howe to Margaret Thatcher, 4 February. London: TNA. PREM 11/​2248 (1957a) Some Thoughts on the Present Situation, Michael Fraser, 20 September. London: TNA. Price, J. (1940) Labour and the War. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Prior, J. (1986) A Balance of Power. London: Hamish Hamilton. Pugh, M. (1985) The Tories and the People 1880–​1935. Oxford: Blackwell. Ramsden, J. (1978) The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902–​1940. London: Longmans. Ramsden, J. (1980) The Making of Conservative Party Policy:  The Conservative Research Department since 1929. London: Longmans. Ramsden, J. (1987) ‘A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners? How Far Did the British Conservative Party Really Change After 1945?’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 5th Series, 37, 49–​63. Ramsden, J. (1989) ‘Symposium. 1961–​64: Did the Conservatives Lose Direction?’, Contemporary Record, 2(5), 26–​31. Ramsden, J. (1996) The Winds of Change:  Macmillan to Heath, 1957–​ 1965. London: Longmans. Ramsden, J. (1998) An Appetite for Power. A  History of the Conservative Party since 1830. London: HarperCollins. Rhodes James, R. (1986) Anthony Eden. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Ridley, J. (1987) ‘The Unionist Social Reform Committee: Wets Before the Deluge’, The Historical Journal, 30(2), 391–​413. Ringe, A. (1998) ‘Background to Neddy:  Economic Planning in the 1960s’, Contemporary British History, 2(1), 82–​98. Roberts, A. (1999) Salisbury. Victorian Titan. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Roberts, B.C. (1968) ‘Fair Deal at Work’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 6(3), 360–​363. Roiser, M. and Little, T. (1986) ‘Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations’, Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59(3), 259–​272. Rolph, C.H. (1962) All Those in Favour? London: André Deutsch. Rosebery, Lord (1947) Lord Rosebery Calls For Unity. PAM 1947/​45. London: The Conservative and Unionist Party. Rowe, A. (1980) ‘Conservatives and Trade Unionists’, in Z. Layton-​Henry (ed.), Conservative Party Politics. London: Macmillan. Royal Commission (1968) Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations Cmnd 3623. London: HMSO. Rubinstein, D. (1982) ‘Trade Unions, Politicians and Public Opinion 1906–​1914’, in B. Pimlott and C. Cooks (eds), Trade Unions in British Politics. The First 250 Years. London: Longmans.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

258

Bibliography

Russell, A.K. (1973) Liberal Landslide. The General Election of 1906. Newton Abbot: David and Charles. Salisbury, Lord (1883) ‘Disintegration’, Quarterly Review, 156 (October), 559–595. Sandbrook, D (2010) States of Emergency. The Way We Were: Britain 1970–​1974. London: Allen Lane. Seawright, D. (2010) The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. New York: Continuum. Seldon, A. (1981) Churchill’s Indian Summer. The Conservative Government 1951–​1955. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Seldon, A. (1988) ‘The Trade Unions and the fall of the Heath Government’, Contemporary Record, 2(1), 36–​46. Self, R. (1995) The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with His Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–​ 1936. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Self, R. (2000) The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Volume 2:  The Reform Years, 1921–​1927. Aldershot: Ashgate. Self, R. (2002) The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Volume 3:  The Heir Apparent, 1928–​1933. Aldershot: Ashgate. Self, R. (2005) The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Volume 4:  The Downing Street Years, 1934–​1940. Aldershot: Ashgate. Shepherd, R. (1994) Iain MacLeod. A Biography. London: Hutchinson. Smith, J.D. (1990) The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest, 1945–​1955: A Study in Consensus. London: Pinter. Smith, P. (1967) Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform. London:  Routledge and Kegan Paul. Smith, P. (2011) ‘Order in Industrial Relations: From Donovan to Neo-​liberalism’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 31 and 32, 115–​154. Smith, P. (2017) ‘The Law Behind the Law: Rookes v Barnard [1964], the Common Law and the Right to Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 38,  37–​78. Smith, P. and Morton, G. (2001) ‘The Conservative Governments’ Reform of Employment Law: “Stepping Stones” and the “New Right” Agenda’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 12, 131–​147. Smith, P., Fosh, P., Martin, R., Morris, H. and Undy, R. (1993) ‘Ballots and Union Government in the 1980s’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 31(3), 365–​382. Soldon, N. (1974) ‘Laissez-​ Faire as Dogma:  The Liberty and Property Defence League, 1882–​ 1914’, in K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-​ Labour History. Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain. London: Macmillan. Stedman Jones, G. (1983) Languages of Class:  Studies in English Working Class History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stevenson, J. and Cook, C. (1980) The Slump. Society and Politics during the Great Depression. London: Quartet Books. Stubbs, J. (1972) ‘Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour’, English Historical Review, 87 (Oct), 717–​754. Stubbs, J. (1975) ‘The Impact of the Great War on the Conservative Party’, in C. Cook and G. Peele (eds), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918–​1939. London: Macmillan.

952

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

259

Sykes, A. (1979) Tariff Reform in British Politics 1906–​1913. Oxford: Clarendon  Press. T 230/​309 (1956) Discussions between HM Government, Industry, and TUC on the UK Economic Situation. Note of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and Minister of Labour with the General Council of the TUC, 26 February. London: TNA. T 234/​91 (1955) Papers leading up to the White Paper on the Economic Implications of Full Employment. Meetings of the Informal Group on Industrial Relations. London: TNA. 1918. Tanner, D. (1990) Political Change and the Labour Party 1900–​ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. (2011) Power in Movement. 3rd revised edn. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. (2013) The Language of Contention. Revolutions in Words 1688–​2012. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, A.J. (1987) ‘The Politics of Non-​partisan Trade Unions: The British Case’, Politics, 7(1), 8–​13. Taylor, A.J. (1990) ‘Nonpartisan Trade Union Political Action: An Anglo-​American Comparison’, Political Studies, 38(1), 137–​143. Taylor, A.J. (1992) ‘The Conservative Party Trade Union Movement, 1952–​1961’, Labour History Review, 57, 21–​28. Taylor, A.J. (1994) ‘The Party and the Trade Unions’, in A. Seldon and S. Ball (eds), Conservative Century. The Conservative Party since 1900. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Taylor, A.J. (1996) ‘ “Maximum Benefit for Minimum Sacrifice”: The Miners’ Wage Campaign of 1935–​1936’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 2, 65–​92. Taylor, A.J. (1999) ‘The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions’, in A. Campbell, N. Fishman and J. McIlroy (eds), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, Volume 2:. The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964–​1979. Aldershot: Ashgate. Taylor, A.J. (2001) ‘The “Stepping Stones” Programme: Conservative Party Thinking on Trade Unions, 1975–​1979’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 11 (Spring), 109–​133. Taylor, A.J. (2002) ‘Speaking to Democracy:  The Conservative Party and Mass Opinion from the 1920s to the 1950s’, in S. Ball and I. Holliday (eds), Mass Conservatism. The Conservatives and the Public since the 1880s. London: Frank Cass. Taylor, A.J. (2005a) Bonar Law. London: Haus. Taylor, A.J. (2005b) The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2:  1969–​1995. Aldershot: Ashgate. Taylor, A.J. (2015) ‘The Oratory of Stanley Baldwin’, in R. Hayton and A. Crines (eds), Conservative Orators from Baldwin to Cameron. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Taylor, A.J. (2017) ‘Industrial Relations’, in K. Hickson and B. Williams (eds), John Major. An Unsuccessful Prime Minister? Reappraising John Major. London: Biteback. Taylor, R. (1978) ‘The Tories and the Unions’, Socialist Commentary, April,  10–​11. Taylor, R. (1983) Workers and the New Depression. London: Macmillan.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

260

Bibliography

Taylor, R. (1993) The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and the Unions since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell. Tebbit, N. (1989) Upwardly Mobile. London: Futura Books. Tebbit, N. (1991) Unfinished Business. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Thatcher Papers (1975) Authority of Government Policy Group Proceedings. PG/​ 40/​75/​11–​13. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​111381 Thatcher Papers (1976) Conservative Research Department. Party Organization, 12 March. LCC/​76/​105. Thatcher MSS 2/​6/​1/​158. www.margaretthatcher.org/​ document/​110132 Thatcher Papers (1977a) J. Hoskyns and N. Strauss. Stepping Stones. Final Report, 14 November. THCR 2/​6/​1/​248. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​111771 Thatcher Papers (1977b) Economic Reconstruction Group, 14 July. PG/​ 10/​ 77 Thatcher MSS 2/​6/​1/​37. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​110248 Thatcher Papers (1979) General Election. Report by Lord Thorneycroft, 10 January. THCR 2/​7/​3/​f15. w ​ ww.margaretthatcher.org/​documents/​131340 Thatcher Papers (1980a) CTU National Committee 191st Meeting, 26 April. THCR 2/​11/​10/​1(15). www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​119558 Thatcher Papers (1980b) Secret:  Trade Union Survey. D.K. Britto, 7 February. THCR 2/​6/​2/​174. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​114838 Thatcher Papers (1980c) Note to Cabinet. ‘The Unions and Public Opinion.’ Lord Thorneycroft, 30 January. THCR 2/​6/​7/​174 Part 2 f 93. www.margaretthatcher. org/​document/​114832 Thatcher Papers (1980d) Richard Pryor. Record of a Conversation between 1/​ 4/​ 97. www. James Prior and Lord Thorneycroft, 12 February. THCR 2/​ margaretthatcher.org/​document/​151801 Thatcher Papers (1980e) Ian Gow to Margaret Thatcher, 19 January. THCR 2/​6/​2/​ 174. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​114831 Thatcher Papers (1981) ‘Strategy’. A  draft paper by Lord Thorneycroft, 15 June. Thatcher MSS 1/​15/​5/​Part 2 f 13. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​121277 Thatcher Papers (1984) Attitudes of Trade Union Leaders. An ORC Survey, 5 July. THCR 1/​9/​18. www.margaretthatcher.org/​document/​119558 Thatcher Papers (1985) Woodrow Wyatt. Notes for Margaret Thatcher, 20 September. THCR 1/​1/​25 f 3. www.margarethatcher.org/​document/​142295 Thatcher Papers (1992) The Principles of Thatcherism, 3 September. Speech Delivered in Taiwan (1 September) and Korea (3 September). www.margaretthatcher.org/​ document/​108302 Thatcher, M. (1995) The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins. The Sunday Times (1964) ‘Labourers for the Tory Cause’, 8 March. The Times (various dates). Thompson, D. (1986) The Chartists. Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution. Aldershot: Wildwood House. Thompson, E.P. (1968) The Making of the English Working Class. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Thompson, F.M.L. (1987) ‘Private Property and Public Policy’, in Lord Blake and H. Cecil (eds), Salisbury. The Man and His Politics. London: Macmillan. Tilly, C. (2008) Contentious Performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2007) Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

162

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bibliography

261

Tomlinson, J. (1997) ‘Conservative Modernisation 1960–​ 1964:  Too Little, too Late?’, Contemporary British History, 11(3), 18–​38. Towers, B. (1989) ‘Running the Gauntlet:  British Trade Unions under Thatcher, 1979–​1988’, ILR Review, 42(2), 163–​188. Tryon, G.C. (1936) ‘Socialist Policy Exposed’, Politics in Review 11/​1 (January–​March),  6–​9. TUC (1939) Labour in War-​Time. Report of a Joint Meeting of the General Council and the British Employers’ Confederation, 4 October. TUC (1956) Annual Report and Proceedings of Congress. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1962) Annual Report and Proceedings of Congress. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1964) Annual Report and Proceedings of Congress. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1984a) Annual Report and Proceedings of Congress. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1984b) TUC Strategy. Consultative Document. London:  Trades Union Congress. TUC (1985) Annual Report and Proceedings. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1988a) Meeting the Challenge. First Report of the Special Review Body. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1988b) Services for Members. The Special Review Body’s Report on Services. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1989) Organising for the 1990s. The Special Review Body’s Second Report. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1990) Annual Report and Proceedings of Congress. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (1991) Towards 2000. The Special Review Body’s Report on Services. London: Trades Union Congress. TUC General Council (various dates) Minutes and Reports of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress. Archives of the Trades Union Congress. Brighton, Hassocks: Harvester Microform Publications. Turner, A.W. (2006) Crisis? What Crisis? London: Aurum Press. Turner, J. (1994) Macmillan. London: Longman. Tyler, R. (2006) ‘ “Victims of our History”? Barbara Castle and In Place of Strife’, Contemporary British History, 20(3), 461–​476. USRC (1914) Industrial Unrest. A  Practical Solution. A  Report of the Unionist Social Reform Committee. London: John Murray. Vincent, J. (1994) The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby, Volume 4. Camden Fifth Series. London: Royal Historical Society. Waddington, J. (1992) ‘Trade Union Membership in Britain, 1980–​ 1987: Unemployment and Restructuring’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 30(2), 287–​324. Waller, R. (1994) ‘Conservative Electoral Support and Social Class’, in A. Seldon and S. Ball (eds), Conservative Century. The Conservative Party since 1900. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

262

Bibliography

Walsh, D. (2012) Making Angels in Marble. The Conservatives, the Early Industrial Working Class and Attempts at Political Incorporation. London:  Breviary Publications. Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1894) The History of Trade Unionism. New York: Barnes and Noble Digital. Whitehead, P. (1985) The Writing on the Wall. Britain in the Seventies. London: Michael Joseph. Whiting, R. (2008) ‘Affluence and Industrial Relations in Post-​ war Britain’, Contemporary British History, 22(4), 519–​536. Wigham, E. (1961) What’s Wrong With the Unions? Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1981. 2nd edn. Wigham, E. (1982) Strikes and the Government, 1893–​ London: Macmillan. Williams, F. (1952) Ernest Bevin. Portrait of an Englishman. London: Hutchinson. Williams, F. (1961) A Prime Minister Remembers. London: Heinemann. Williamson, P. (1999) Stanley Baldwin:  Conservative Leadership and National Values. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williamson, P. (ed.) (1988) The Modernisation of Conservative Politics. The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904–​1935. London: The Historians’ Press. Wintour, P. (1985) ‘Top Tories Trek North to Play Union Card’, Guardian, 2 December. Wood, S. (2000) ‘Why “Indicative Planning” Failed:  British Industry and the Formation of the National Economic Development Commission’, Twentieth Century British History, 11(4), 431–​459. Woolton Papers (various dates) Papers of Frederick James Marquis, First Earl of Woolton. Oxford University, Bodleian Library. Woolton, Earl (1959) The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Woolton. London: Cassell. Wrigley, C.J. (1976) David Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Wrigley, C.J. (1990) Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour. The Post-​War Coalition 1918–​1922. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Wrigley, C.J. (2004) ‘Churchill and the Trade Unions’, in D. Cannadine, and R.C. Quinault (eds), Churchill in the Twenty-​First Century. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press/​Royal Historical Society. Wrigley, C.J. (2007) ‘Trade Unions and the 1964 General Election’, Contemporary British History, 21(3), 325–​335. Young, H. (1989) One of Us. London: Macmillan. Young, K. (1963) Arthur James Balfour. London: G. Bell and Son. Zebel, S.H. (1973) Balfour. A  Political Biography. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Ziblatt, D. (2017) Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index

A Giant’s Strength (1958) 172, 176 argument of 177 captures party mood 177 ACP (Advisory Committee on Policy) 177 Action Not Words (1966) 183 marks a radical shift in policy 183 Advisory Committee on Policy see ACP Amalgamated Society of Engineers see ASE AoGG (Authority of Government Group) 199–201, 203 ASE (Amalgamated Society of Engineers) 18 Askwith, Sir George 35, 45 Attlee, Clement, MP 111 Authority of Government Group see AoGG Baldwin, Stanley, MP 12, 233 approach to industrial relations 68 attitude on becoming party leader 60 attitude to LSC 61 convergence with TUC on its role 80 defence of the 1927 Act 158 differentiates trade unionism from socialism and industrial militancy 79 ignores Labour Sub-​Committee 85 positive role for TUC after General Strike 70–71 pressured to legislate 75–76 reluctant to legislate after General Strike 68

reorientation of unions towards National Government 80 trade unions and One Nation 80–82 Balfour, Arthur failure to develop a strategy 31 failure to reverse Taff Vale 31 inability to develop a strategy 32 problem of union legal immunities 30 union demands for legal reform 28 unions inherently coercive 30 Ball, Sir Joseph 89, 101 Barber Boom 191 Bevin, Ernest 80, 111, 233 appointed Minister of Labour and National Service see Ministry of Labour and National Service Catering Wages Bill 107 Conservative criticism of Catering Wages Bill 108 Conservative suspicions of 100 policy at MLNS 98 suspicion of Chamberlain Government 90, 96 Blain Report (1924) 64 Bonar Law, Andrew, MP 30, 32, 35 attitude to post-​war labour unrest 47, 48 attitude to social reform 38 avoids a clear policy on unions 40 national coal strike (1912) 36–37 and patriotic labour 53 and political levy 60 Prime Minister 48–49

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

264

Index

Bridgeman, William, MP 46, 53, 71–72, 82 British Disease, the 5 British Revival, The (1987) 224 British Workers’ League see BWL Brooks, Collin 92 Butler, Richard A., MP 102 as Chancellor of Exchequer 147 revision of Conservative policy 122 wartime Conservative thinking on unions 110 BWL (British Workers’ League) 123 Carr, Robert, MP 174, 182, 186 complexity of the Industrial Relations Bill 188 criticised by Enoch Powell 184 growing disillusionment in party 176 Industrial Relations Group 184 stresses One Nation approach 186 Catering Wages Bill (1943) 108 Cave, Lord legislative proposals 72 CCTUC (Conservative Central Trade Union Council) 138 Central Trade Union Advisory Committee see CTUAC Chamberlain, Austen 47, 59 Chamberlain, Joseph, MP tariff reform and unions 38 Chamberlain, Neville, MP 12, 64 appeasement implications for union influence 90, 93 attitude to 1927 Act 77 attitude to trade unions 79 concedes union representation 98 cooperates with unions 96 defends 1927 Act 79 political persona 91 refuses to amend 1927 Act in wartime 97 refuses to concede increased union influence 89 relations with TUC 86 seemingly endorses Labour Sub-​Committee views  85

Churchill, Winston S., MP determined to keep party support 95 implications of coalition 96 legacy of distrust 130 long involvement with unions 146 refuses to amend 1927 Act in wartime 97 reluctance to amend 1927 Act 111–112 Right Road for Britain, The (1949) 123 risks union cooperation 115 Citrine, Walter 69, 80, 111, 233 suspicion of Chamberlain Government 97 Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act (1912) 33 coal strike (1912) 35 Combination Acts 17–18 Commission on Industrial Unrest (1917) 44 Conservative Central Trade Union Council see CCTUC Conservative Research Department see CRD Conservative Trade Unionists see CTU Conservative Trade Unionists and Legislation After the War (1918) 57 contentious politics 2 Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes see CPPI Cousins, Frank 154–155 CPPI (Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes) 159, 161 Cranbourne, Viscount 20 see also Salisbury, Lord (Third Marquess) CRD (Conservative Research Department) 178, 185 cautions against legal intervention 179 public attitude towards 1980 steel strike 209 Trade Union Reform (1958) 177

562

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cross, Richard A., MP 21–22 CTU (Conservative Trade Unionists) 9, 206, 221 oppose Tom King on political levy 223 organisation 206 used by James Prior 207 CTUAC (Central Trade Union Advisory Committee) 138 Dalton, Hugh, MP 99 coal rationing scheme 105 Conservative resistance to coal rationing 106 Davidson, John C.C., MP 54, 60–61, 83 DCTU (District Council of Trade Unions) 141 Defence Expenditure in Future Years 88 Democracy in the Trade Unions (1983) 222 Derby, Lord 19, 22–24 trade unions and collectivism 26 Dintenfass, Michael 4 Direct Action 45, 47, 58, 69 Disraeli, Benjamin 18, 22, 231 attitude to towards unions 20 dislike of class organisation 24 trade union legislation 21, 23 District Council of Trade Unions see DCTU Dorey, Peter 3 Douglas Home, Sir Alec, MP 181 Douglas, James 174 Economic Implications of Full Employment, The (1956) 154 implications for wage bargaining 155 Economic Reconstruction Group 203 Eden, Sir Anthony, MP absence of ‘the smack of firm government’ 145 attempts to foster good relations with TUC 151

265

reluctant to harden line on unions 152 wants to revive Industrial Charter 150 Electrical Trade Union see ETU ETU (Electrical Trade Union) 179 Express Newspapers v. McShane (1980) 208 Fair Deal at Work (1968) 172, 184–185 Fowler, Norman, MP 228 Fraser, Sir Michael 173 GCHQ dispute 223 General Strike (3–​12 May 1926) 68 Godber, Joseph, MP 181 announces review into industrial relations 181 discussions with TUC 182 tries to reconcile party and TUC opinion 181 governability 6, 198, 224 governability crisis 194, 196 see also overload governance 5, 219 Gow, Ian, MP 219 Grunwick Dispute 208 Hacking, Sir Douglas, MP 107 impact of war on Conservative Party 99 Hadfields 214, 216 Hare, John, MP 164 erosion of post-​war system 178 refers back Wages Council awards 164 seeks to reform industrial relations 179 Headlam, Sir Cuthbert, MP 65, 97, 100, 102 concerned at drift to collectivism 100 Conservative criticism of wartime industrial relations 105

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

266

Index

Headlam, Sir Cuthbert, MP (continued) frustration with union attitudes 105 post-​war Conservatism  122 working-​class loyalty  132 Heath, Edward, MP 172, 182, 233, 235 believes union will accept reform proposals 186 commitment to legislation 183 commitment to One Nation 183 contacts with TUC 191 criticised by Enoch Powell 194 growing alarm in party 190 incomes policy 191, 193 introduces Industrial Relations Bill quickly 188 offers TUC an augmented role 192 public opinion 188 review of civil emergencies 192 signals a new era 187 tripartism 194 tripartite talks 192 TUC rejection of Industrial Relations Bill 188 Heathcoat Amory, Derick, MP guiding light policy 162 price–​wage spiral  162 Hoskyns, John 201, 205, 213, 216 Howe, Sir Geoffrey, MP 194 significance of steel strike 217 ICCUS (Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society) 176 I’m All Right Jack (1959) 169 immunities, trade union 10 In Place of Strife (1969) 172, 184 Incomes Policy (1962) 163 Industrial Charter, The (1947) 120, 128 criticisms of 127 impact of 127 Workers’ Charter 127 Industrial Relations Act (1971) 185, 197, 234 Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society see ICCUS Inskip, Sir Thomas 88

Jackson, Sir Stanley 62 Jones, Thomas 46, 48, 68–69 Joseph, Sir Keith, MP 214, 220 Keatinge Committee 139–141 King, Tom, MP 222–223 Labour Advisory Committees see LACs Labour Department (Board of Trade) 35 Labour Sub-​Committee see LSC LACs (Labour Advisory Committees) 84–85, 101, 139 Lane-​Fox, George 77 Lloyd George, David 45, 47 Lloyd, Selwyn, MP 162 desire for incomes policy 163 refusal of TUC to cooperate 163 Low Committee (1961) 141 Lowe, Rodney 4 LSC (Labour Sub-​Committee) 93 fails to influence policy (1930s) 83 hostility to political levy 59 organisational weaknesses 64 political limitations 59 reasons for failure 65 response to General Strike 82 role in party policy making 58 see also Unionist Labour Movement Macleod, Iain, MP 158 believes a major inquiry into industrial relations is needed 159 desirability of a showdown 158 faces opposition in Cabinet 175 Positive Employment Policies (1958) 175 reaction to A Giant’s Strength 176 resists pressure from party 174 Macmillan, Harold, MP 132 analysis of 1951 general election 136 cautioned on party sentiment 178 disappointment with Lloyd 166 Economic Cost of Industrial Disputes, The (1957) 156 emphasises need for TUC cooperation 163

762

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index feasibility of confrontation 157 impact of full employment on union attitudes 152 limits on union willingness to cooperate 153 need for a new Conservative appeal 132, 142 on need for a permanent incomes policy 168 post-​war Conservatism  122 resilience of post-​war Labour support 125 response to Thorneycroft’s critique 160 rising tide of industrial unrest 162 ‘You’ve never had it so good’ speech (1957) 156 Macmillan, Maurice, MP 195 Macquisten Bill (1925) 61, 76 Marx, Karl 1 Maude, Angus, MP 213 Maudling, Reginald, MP creation of NIC 168 relations with TUC 168 Middlemas, Keith 3–4 Ministry of Labour (MoL) concern over shortage of skilled labour 89 growing interest in incomes policy 169 inter-​war industrial relations policy 49–52 post-​war attitude to labour unrest 48 reasons for creation 46 relationship between wages and inflation 153 resistance to tripartism 91 Ministry of Labour and National Service Bevin’s policy at 99 MoL see Ministry of Labour Monckton, Sir Walter, MP appointment as Minister of Labour and National Service 146 conciliatory approach 148–149

267

reassures TUC on wage bargaining 148 refers back Wage Council awards 147 resists party opinion 174 tries to manage TUC General Council 151 Montague-Barlow, Sir Clement, MP 48 Murray, Lionel 195, 219 National Democratic Labour Party see NDLP National Dock Labour Scheme see NDLS National Economic Development Council see NEDC National Incomes Commission see NIC National Union of Mineworkers see NUM NDLP (National Democratic Labour Party) 54 see also BWL; patriotic labour NDLS (National Dock Labour Scheme) 227 NEDC (National Economic Development Council) 162 New Estate, The. Some Thoughts on the Constitutional Position of Trade Unions in England (1957) 176 New Unions 25 NIC (National Incomes Commission) 160, 166 pay pause 162 Nott, John, MP 213 NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) 1972 strike 190 1973–​74 dispute  195 Official Committee on Trade Unions and the Law (1963–​64) 180 One Nation 6–7, 17, 54, 68, 101, 120, 127, 131, 143, 193, 232, 235 Operation ROBOT 146 ‘operative Conservatism’ 17 organisational weaknesses 142

268

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Osborne Judgement (1910) 33 overload 172, 194, 196 patriotic labour 52 pay pause (1961) 166 Politics and the Trade Unions (1944) 109–110 post-​industrial economy  228 Post-​War Problems Central Committee see PWPCC Primrose League 7, 25 Prior, James, MP 187, 200 growing criticism of 212–213 incremental reform 204 maintains link with TUC 207 motives suspected by many in Cabinet 208 steel strike’s impact on legislation 211 threatens resignation 214 Prosperity with a Purpose (1964) 182 public opinion 203–204, 209 PWPCC (Post-War Problems Central Committee) 102 Report on the Approach to the Industrial Worker (1950) 138 Representation of the People Act (1918) 54 Ridley, Nicholas, MP 202 Ridley Report 199, 202–203 Right Road for Britain, The (1949) 123, 130 Rookes v. Barnard (1964) 172, 180, 182 Rowlands, Gwilym 63 Royal Commission of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (Donovan) 172 Salisbury, Lord (Third Marquess) 19, 24 dislike of class politics 25 response to industrial unrest 27 Saltley mass picket 190, 203, 216 Salvidge, Alderman Archibald 55

Selborne, Second Earl of 39–40 Selsdon Park Hotel conference 186 Shop Stewards and Workers’ Committee movement 44 smack of firm government 145 State subsidy theory of strikes 216 steel industry strike 208–210 Steel-​Maitland, Arthur 39, 53, 55, 73, 78 Stepping Stones Report, the 199, 201, 203 Taff Vale Judgement (1901) 27 Tarrow, Sidney 2, 8, 120 Tebbit, Norman, MP 217 critic of Prior’s approach 217 detestation of tripartite meetings 220 legislative strategy 218 new industrial relations 226 radical erosion of voluntarism 220 secret ballotts 220 shift in TUC attitude 221 union political objectives 220 Thatcher, Margaret, MP 198, 203, 234 accepts King’s strategy on political levy 222 Cabinet favours radical reform 214 cautioned against meeting union leaders 219 coal crisis (1981) 217 dismisses relevance of meeting unions 219 growing criticism of handling of steel strike 211 monitors steel strike 210 need for stronger police action 215 new industrial relations 226 priority of action on closed shop 208 rejection of incomes policy 208 scope of reform 205 significance of the 1980 steel strike 216 supports Prior’s strategy 207 Thatcherism 226, 229

962

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index This Is the Road (1950) 131 Thorneycroft, Peter Lord 212 party chair 205 Prior threatens resignation 214 revival of party union organisation 206 Thorneycroft, Peter, MP 158, 173 Government strategy 159 questions viability of Macmillan 164 resignation as Chancellor 161 Tory Democracy 27, 46 Trade Union Act (1875) 11 Trade Union Act (1913) Conservative criticism of 33 and politicisation of the unions 35 significance for Conservatives 33 Trade Union Advisory Committee see TUAC Trade Union National Advisory Committee see TUNAC Trade Union Tariff Reform Association see TUTRA Trade Union Vote, The (1950) 133 Trade Unions and Their Members (1987) 224 Trades Disputes Act (1906) 11, 30 Conservative criticism of 28–29 Trades Union Congress see TUC TUAC (Trade Union Advisory Committee) 135 TUC (Trades Union Congress) 4–5 Baldwin, Stanley 12, 67–68, 70, 79–80, 82 Bonar Law, Andrew 3, 49 Churchill Government (1951–55) 146–148, 152–153 Disraeli’s reforms 22 Eden Government (1955–57) 150–151, 154 governance 13, 31 Heath Government (1970–74) 188–189, 191–197 Home Government (1963–64) 180–182

269

inter-war governance 49–52, 62, 69–70, 78, 80, 85–86, 88, 93 Macmillan Government (1957–63) 156, 158, 160–163, 167–170 post-war governance 128, 130, 169–170, 178–180, 182, 188, 191–193, 196, 219, 223, 226, 228 rearmament 89, 91–92, 96–98 Rookes v. Barnard 180, 182–183 Taff Vale Judgement 28 Thatcher Government (1979–90) 207, 219, 221–228 threat to governability 184, 188–189, 196, 200, 219, 223–224 Trade Union Act (1906) 30 Trades Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927) 75, 110–118 war-time governance (1914–18) 45 war-time governance (1939–45) 13, 97, 103, 110–118, 123 TUC Strategy (1984) 222 TUNAC (Trade Union National Advisory Committee) 138 TUTRA (Trade Union Tariff Reform Association) 38 Union of Postal Workers 191 union power 2, 6, 10, 16, 23, 28–29, 31–32, 36, 42, 72, 80, 90, 103, 108, 118, 123, 129, 145, 169, 172, 185, 196–197, 204–205, 208, 213, 216, 224, 229, 235 Unionist Labour Movement 60 aims and objectives 56 creation of a national body 56 growing interest in 55 initiative for formation 55 Unionist Social Reform Committee see USRC Unofficial Action and the Law (1989) 225 USRC (Unionist Social Reform Committee) 39, 40 Industrial Unrest (1914) 41

270

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

voluntarism 6, 78, 81, 118, 234 Whitelaw, William, MP 195 end of picketing by consent 216 and Hadfields 214 policing of steel strike 211 public order consequences 215 Winter of Discontent 14, 204, 234–235 Woodcock, George 168–169, 182 Woolton, Frederick, Earl of 128, 136–137

criticism of Monckton 149 on Eden’s enthusiastic reception by Durham miners 152 senses Monckton’s doubts about conciliation 150 Wyatt, Woodrow 224 Younger, Sir George 53, 56–58, 60 Ziblatt, Daniel 7