Welfare Chauvinism in Europe: How Education, Economy and Culture Shape Public Attitudes 1803925523, 9781803925523

Citation preview

Welfare Chauvinism in Europe

Welfare Chauvinism in Europe How Education, Economy and Culture Shape Public Attitudes

Gianna Maria Eick Assistant Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Gianna Maria Eick 2024

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023949649 This book is available electronically in the Sociology, Social Policy and Education subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781803925530

ISBN 978 1 80392 552 3 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80392 553 0 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Contents List of figuresvi List of tablesviii Preface and acknowledgementsix 1

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

1

2

What is welfare chauvinism?

18

3

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

32

4

Welfare chauvinism across countries

60

5

Welfare chauvinism across time

88

6

Welfare chauvinism across policies

113

7

The future of European welfare states

143

Bibliography161 Index174

v

Figures 1.1

Average total international migrant stock in the European Union versus elsewhere in the world (in millions)

4

1.2

Levels of welfare chauvinism: ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ among the tertiary educated (in percentage)

8

1.3

Estimated population (25–34 years) with tertiary education in Europe (in percentage)

9

1.4

Analytical framework: the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism across different national economic and cultural contexts

12

Radical right parties in European parliaments, accumulated percentages from the most recent national election between 2019 and 2022

23

2.2

Migration Integration Policy Index, overall scores (2019)

26

3.1

Education gap for levels of welfare chauvinism (averages)

33

3.2

Education gaps for levels of attitudes on migration (averages)

34

3.3

Education gaps for levels of attitudes on welfare (averages)

34

3.4

GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards) (2022)

38

3.5

Public social expenditure (2022)

39

3.6

Education gap on subjective income insecurity (in percentage)

42

3.7

Levels of authoritarianism (averages)

47

4.1

Levels of welfare chauvinism: ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ (in percentage)

63

4.2

Welfare chauvinism, all categories (in percentage)

64

2.1

vi

Figures

vii

4.3

Educational gaps for ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ across countries (in percentage)

69

4.4

Educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe (in percentage)

70

4.5

More detailed educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe (in percentage)

70

4.6

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017

79

4.7

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017: marginal predicted mean on authoritarianism (left panel), education effects on marginal predicted mean on authoritarianism (right panel)

83

Europeans identifying migration and economy as the most pressing issues facing their country in EU (28) between 2005 and 2019 (in percentage)

89

5.2

Change of the levels of welfare chauvinism between 2007/2008 and 2016/2017 (in percentage points)

92

5.3

Educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe across time

95

5.4

Change of the educational gaps in welfare chauvinism between 2007/2008 and 2016/2017 (in percentage points)

96

6.1

Education gap on welfare chauvinism in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, all categories

124

6.2

Welfare chauvinism across seven social policies (in percentage)

129

6.3

Welfare chauvinism across social policies and educational groups (in percentage)

133

7.1

Convergence and divergence of ‘Government should reduce differences in income levels’ (averages) across the tertiary and the non-tertiary educated (2002–2018)

151

Opposition towards a redistributive policy measure on the EU level amongst the tertiary educated in comparison to non-tertiary educated (in percentage)

159

5.1

7.2

Tables 3.1

Overview of theoretical mechanisms that may explain welfare chauvinism explored in this book

35

4.1

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 – individual characteristics

72

4.2

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 – economic prosperity

78

4.3



5.1

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008–2009 – individual characteristics

98

5.2

The relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017

100

5.3

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008/2009 – economic prosperity

104

5.4

Impact of changes in national economic contexts on welfare chauvinism (results from multilevel logistic regression)

105

5.5

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008/2009 – authoritarianism

108

5.6

Impact of changes in national cultural contexts on welfare chauvinism (results from multilevel logistic regression)

109

6.1

The effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across different policies

135

viii

83

Preface and acknowledgements Welfare states in Europe have a long history of protecting and promoting economic and social well-being. Still, until today conflict in welfare states remains over fundamental questions: Which welfare policies and welfare recipients should be prioritised? How much should the welfare state be expanded and to what extent should private arrangements stay in place? And which governance level should make these decisions and administer these policies? Welfare state institutions are also subjected to constant change, with the increasing economic and social disparities and crises in recent decades adding further pressures and challenges. The latest crises revealed not only the immense importance of welfare states but also their failures. For example, research has shown that welfare states have become more conditional and selective and do not benefit all individuals equally. These issues are reflected in both policy designs and public attitudes. In this context, welfare chauvinism, or the opposition to granting migrants access to welfare provisions, is a critical issue for welfare states in times of globalisation that must be addressed. Migrants is used here as the overall term to describe different international migrant groups and refugees. How widespread is welfare chauvinism in Europe, how can it be explained, and how can more exclusive welfare systems be built? I wrote this book to stimulate critical discussions about these questions and beyond. Such discussions are particularly important in times when the redistribution of welfare resources to migrants continues to polarise society. Politicians from not only the radical right but also more mainstream parties are capitalising on the idea of ‘welfare for our kind’. In this book, I aim to construct an extensive overview of welfare chauvinism’s causes and consequences, and shed light on the multidimensionality of welfare chauvinist attitudes across countries, time, social policies and different migrant groups. I aim also to unveil hidden nuances regarding welfare chauvinism that are frequently overlooked in current discourse, particularly concerning socio-economic cleavages in Europe. By doing this, I intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of welfare chauvinism in Europe, with a focus on exploring how it is shaped by education, economy and culture. Using high-quality data on public attitudes and macro-level conditions, I investigate the common misperception that higher levels of education universally lead to more tolerant attitudes and argue that governments and welfare institutions play a crucial ix

x

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

role in shaping public opinion. Hence, on the one hand, the book aims to provide a broader introduction to welfare chauvinism; on the other, it hopes to promote more theory building and more critical, nuanced analysis of welfare chauvinism and related topics. Welfare chauvinism is certainly a big part of the puzzle surrounding welfare state transformation and the rise of illiberal democracies. Mainstream parties are often co-responsible for creating environments of public discontent leading to the election successes of welfare chauvinist, radical right parties. For decades now there have been trends in some countries of welfare cuts and marketisation of social services and inequality is increasing. Migrants are then used as scapegoats to deflect from the larger societal, political and economic problems. The recent rise of radical right parties across Europe is likely to reinforce these problems. Another related issue is the legitimisation of anti-migrant, welfare chauvinist and radical right ideas and movements through mainstreaming processes, leading to political earthquakes across the continent that are affecting not only nation states but also the European Union since radical right parties are often eurosceptic. Unravelling welfare chauvinism in a way that critically examines contexts and political actors in power is therefore important to open the door to addressing these overarching problems. In order to unravel welfare chauvinism, this book includes a wide range of literature that includes views from different disciplines and methodological approaches. The main analysis is mostly made up of the interpretation of statistical data. Furthermore, I was dependent on the welfare state in the past and I have lived in different countries since my youth. These experiences convinced me early on that governments strongly influence the life experiences of and solidarity between different groups in society. In fact, I wrote most of this book during my time in the United Kingdom, where discourses around welfare chauvinism are very present, particularly in the Brexit context. Being able to write a book on topics that are close to my heart feels like an enormous privilege. I could not have finished this book without the support of many wonderful and inspiring people; unfortunately, not all can be mentioned here. I also want to emphasise that none of them is responsible for any possible mistakes. The journey of this book started in 2017 at the University of Kent, which granted me a scholarship for my research on welfare chauvinism. I am first and foremost grateful to Heejung Chung and Trude Sundberg, who gave me constant guidance, patience, encouragement and inspiration during this time. I also want to thank my many other colleagues at the University of Kent for their additional feedback, particularly Ben Baumberg Geiger, Tina Haux, Erik Gahner Larsen and Peter Taylor-Gooby. Part of this book was written based on primary data that I collected in collaboration with Christian Albrekt Larsen. I am grateful for the time he invested in our project, and for his inviting me for a short research stay in

Preface and acknowledgements

xi

2019 at the Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies at Aalborg University. Part of this book was written during another research stay in 2019 at Leuven University, where I received the Jos Berghman Welfare Studies Stipend. I am grateful especially to Wim van Oorschot and Bart Meuleman, who helped to shape some of my theoretical and empirical ideas. I also worked on this book at the University of Konstanz, where I started to work in 2020 as a postdoctoral researcher in the EU Horizon Project ‘The Future of European Social Citizenship’ (EUSOCIALCIT). I would also like to thank in particular Brian Burgoon, Marius Busemeyer and the Comparative Political Economy working group in Konstanz for their encouragement and comments on my work. I am also grateful to everyone involved in granting me the Konstanzia Fellowship, particularly Gudrun Damm, Tanja Edelhäußer and my mentor Steffen Mau, who gave me input for this book and more. I put the finishing touches on the book in my current position, at the University of Amsterdam, and want to thank my programme group Challenges to Democratic Representation for supporting me in this process. Additionally, there are many helpful individuals who have provided comments on parts of this book during the following invited talks: Democracy and Elections Research Cluster, University of Manchester, March 2022; Sociology Department, Umea University, December 2021; Social Policy and Social Work team, University of Leuven, November 2019; Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liège, November 2019; and at the Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies, University of Aalborg, October 2019. Finally, I would like to thank Stefanie Kley, who encouraged me to pursue postgraduate studies during my degrees at the University of Hamburg. This was a pathway I never imagined as a first-generation student for myself, and one that ultimately led me to write this book. I am also grateful to the brilliant team from Edward Elgar Publishing that supported me with this publication. Last but not least, I would like to thank my advisers, friends and family from around the globe, who believed in my personal and professional growth and supported my lifelong aim to understand how we can create a more equal society.

1. Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis 1.1 INTRODUCTION Welfare states are essential for European societies to prosper and weather crises. However, in recent years European welfare states have been in the grip of a perfect storm: demographic changes, labour market transformations, globalisation, the rise of the radical right and the emergence of new risks. Additionally, another economic recession resulted from several crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the European energy crisis, the climate crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These developments have sparked debates about welfare conditionality and the allocation of scarce welfare state resources. It is not surprising that such developments create ideal conditions for radical right movements to fuel the scapegoating of migrants. Part of it is the aim to convince the public that it is time to close borders and curb migration (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung 2017). To clarify, the overall term migrants is used in this book to describe different international migrant and refugee groups. This often also includes individuals who are perceived as belonging to these groups by the public. What is more, not only radical right parties but also politicians from mainstream parties across Europe have capitalised on the winning formula of ‘welfare for our kind’ (Eger and Valdez 2015), which can be called ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). In general, this book defines welfare chauvinism as the (public) opposition to granting migrants access to welfare provisions. This is because certain public groups often do not consider migrants overall or migrants with specific characteristics as belonging to their national welfare community. Over the past thirty years, the rationales for welfare chauvinism in Europe have received increasing attention in academic debates. Scholarly work often emphasises the importance of different mechanisms, particularly related to education, economy and culture, for welfare chauvinism in the public (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007; Mewes and Mau 2013). To get a more complete picture of the causes and consequences of public welfare chauvinism, this book examines the interplay between these three mechanisms across countries, 1

2

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

time, social policies and different migrant groups. With this comprehensive approach, the book unveils hidden nuances regarding welfare chauvinism, particularly concerning socio-economic cleavages in Europe, that current discourses frequently overlook. Consequently, it adds to the vast institutional literature, which argues that governments and welfare institutions have the power to shape public attitudes (Mau 2004; Larsen 2008). Existing work has focused extensively on the impact of governments and institutions on social policy attitudes or on anti-migrant attitudes but less so on the compound between those two, which are welfare chauvinist attitudes. To fill this gap, this book examines three main research questions: 1. What are the levels of welfare chauvinism in the public across countries, time and social policies in Europe? 2. How do these attitudes vary amongst different socio-economic status groups, particularly educational groups? 3. How do national contexts shape these socio-economic cleavages on welfare chauvinism, particularly economic and cultural contexts? This book investigates these questions by analysing primary and secondary cross-national survey data gathered between 2002 and 2019 from 33 countries across Europe, involving around a half million individuals. The analysed data focuses on migrants in general and on Eastern European workers who migrate to Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, the book also touches on discussions related to other migrant groups in Europe, such as lower-skilled workers and Syrian refugees. The results of this book demonstrate that welfare chauvinism is widespread across European countries, across time and across different social policies. The results show that there is not one public entity, since the public is diverse, individuals are complex and attitudes are multidimensional. Education can serve as a remedy for welfare chauvinism, but, contrary to current thinking, this remedy is not universal. For example, it is not the case in countries where the economy is suffering or where radical right cultures are thriving. This means the current combination of the rise of both economic crises and authoritarianism has the potential to create a worst-case scenario when it comes to the normalisation of public welfare chauvinism. Therefore, it is vital to understand which life experiences shape specific attitudes and what governments can do to enhance life qualities and well-being. This book also discusses the bigger picture and possible solutions for the issues it reveals: to create more solidarity in Europe both national governments and the European Union could counteract economic deprivation and cultural intolerance before they lead to bigger crises. Furthermore, the book adds to the literature that examines variations in attitudes across different social policies, particularly social investment versus

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

3

compensatory policies. In this book, ‘social investment policies’ refer to policies that create, mobilise or preserve skills to support individuals’ earning capacities (often in-kind services, such as education or childcare). And ‘compensatory policies’ refer to policies that compensate for income losses (often cash benefits such as unemployment benefits or social assistance). Interestingly, the book shows that the public appears more open to granting migrants access to social investment policies than to compensatory ones (see also Eick and Larsen 2022).

1.2

THE INTEREST IN THE MIGRATION–WELFARE NEXUS

To understand the context of this book, it is essential to remember that throughout the last four decades, Europe has experienced a significant increase in the number of international migrants, also in comparison to the rest of the world. This is shown in Figure 1.1 and here, international migrants are measured as the number of individuals born in a country other than where they live (including refugees). Global mobility increased for various reasons, such as work, study, reuniting family members and seeking asylum. Migration histories and patterns vary across Europe; thus, the newcomers transform not only the social composition but also the ethnic fabric of many countries in different ways (Castles, Haas and Miller 2014). Consequently, the political salience of migration has increased in Europe, and migrants’ access to national welfare states has become among the most polarising topics, frequently deepening socio-economic cleavages. Debates regarding migration and welfare rights relate to migration defined by European countries as both wanted and unwanted. In terms of public perceptions and social rights, examples of wanted migrants are highly skilled workers, and examples of unwanted migration are asylum seekers. Arguments for openness and closure then centre on the implications of migration for national needs. Therefore, welfare states remain mainly national institutions, regardless of European integration, with respect to the economy and politics (Geddes 2003). Two factors can capture the core dynamics underpinning the migration– welfare nexus. On the one hand, European countries have sought to manage the contradiction between the pressures to expand migration, specifically (1) the continuing demand for migrant workers, (2) the assertion of human rights, and (3) the right to social protection. On the other hand, there is the countervailing pressure for closure exerted by limits on national resources. These contradictory forces are manifested through tensions between national welfare states, open markets, regional integration within the European Union and the pragmatism at the borders of the European welfare states (Lafleur

4

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Source: World Development Indicators Database, based on United Nations population division data.

Figure 1.1

Average total international migrant stock in the European Union versus elsewhere in the world (in millions)

and Vintila 2020). Consequently, at the local level, debates around migration can be evident in tensions between migrants and natives over access to scarce welfare resources. Arguments that are critical towards the future of European welfare states with increasing levels of migration sometimes refer to the issue as the ‘progressive dilemma’ (Kulin, Eger and Hjerm 2016). While disputed amongst scholars, the causal argument of the progressive dilemma is that rising levels of migration (and the related ethnic, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity) lead to political and cultural conflicts, which may weaken social trust and solidarity in society. Negative beliefs, perceptions and stereotypes about migrants may reinforce these conflicts. In particular, the public often assumes that migration decisions are made based on the generosity of the receiving nations’ welfare state, also known as the welfare magnetism hypothesis (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). This hypothesis has limited support empirically, and migration, in general, has been found to affect welfare resources very little across European countries. Nonetheless, the public frequently perceives migrants as a group that receives more welfare resources than natives (Larsen 2011). Such mechanisms can be challenging for national welfare states that are legitimised through feelings of belonging to a national membership. Therefore, some scholars argue that increasing levels of migration weaken the willingness

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

5

to share resources with others, particularly migrants (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Thus far, no consensus exists amongst scholars on whether the sustainability of national welfare states depends on ethnic homogeneity, which was the ideal of the traditional national-state conception, or if new forms of social cohesion can be created that go beyond the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm and allow the inclusion of migrants. It is known that the public debates around migration and national welfare state have been increasingly politicised, and the welfare state itself has started to become a new political cleavage as a result. Such political cleavages come with a certain permanence of division. Having the two cleavages of anti-migration and pro-welfare aligned is a compelling structure that political movements can effectively mobilise. In particular, radical right parties use this debate to attract voters by building on existing anti-migrant attitudes amongst the European public (Eger and Valdez 2015). While it is known that welfare chauvinism increasingly polarises Europe (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020), radical right and mainstream movements in many European countries have further normalised welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). For example, the latest European Union enlargement – once again – increased fears about Eastern Europeans placing a financial burden on national welfare states, particularly on more generous ones (Scharpf 2016; Eick and Larsen 2022). These political movements have already cost millions of migrants the loss of their rights, including rights to welfare resources and citizenship, which poses a barrier to their economic and cultural integration (Lafleur and Vintila 2020). The withdraw of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2020 has most recently manifested such a loss of rights (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Since then European countries have witnessed an increase in radical right parties and illiberal migration policies that are further threatening migrants’ rights, including their access to social protection.

1.3

WHY DOES EDUCATION MATTER?

In times of increasing socio-economic divides on the inclusion of migrants in welfare states, it is crucial to understand why certain individuals are more prone to welfare chauvinism than others. Considering the various migration populations and histories across Europe (Castles, Haas and Miller 2014), one could expect public attitudes towards migrants’ inclusion in welfare states to be complex. Overall, the literature has developed three prominent rationales, which can be argued to be non-competing, that can explain why individuals support welfare chauvinism: first, group threat theories from the economic perspective; second, group threat theories from the cultural perspective; and third, institutional context theories.

6

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Regardless of the complexity of these rationales, it seems that academic, political and public discourse frequently emphasises attitude cleavages between two particular socio-economic status groups: on the one side, the tertiary-educated individuals, in this book referred to as ‘higher educated’, are seen as the tolerant and cosmopolitan group that is pro-migration. Conversely, non-tertiary-educated individuals, in this book referred to as ‘lower educated’, are seen as the economically and culturally threatened anti-migrant group (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Amidst times of uncertainty, discourses frequently point to tertiary education as the most effective prevention for support for radical right movements, anti-migrant attitudes and welfare chauvinism (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Jenssen and Engesbak 1994). The following list shows a selection of newspaper headlines from past years that appeal to the discourses portraying the lower educated as responsible for scapegoating migrants, voting for radical right parties, Euroscepticism and illustrating universities as breeding sites for left-wing ideology: • ‘Why are highly educated so liberal?’ (The New York Times, May 13, 2016) • ‘How the education gap is tearing politics apart. In the year of Trump and Brexit, education has become the greatest divide of all – splitting voters into two increasingly hostile camps’ (The Guardian, October 5, 2016) • ‘How education level is the biggest predictor of support for Geert Wilders. FT data analysis reveals surprising trends behind populist backing in the Netherlands’ (Financial Times, March 2, 2017) • ‘Brexit caused by low levels of education, study finds. A slight increase in higher education could have kept Britain in the EU’ (Independent, August 7, 2017) • ‘Are left-wing American professors indoctrinating their students?’ (The Economist, January 9, 2020) • ‘Our universities have become woke superspreaders’ (The Telegraph, September 12, 2020) Such discourses largely blame individuals and their socio-economic background rather than policies and systems for their attitudes. They also show that it is tempting in today’s world to reduce individuals to one-dimensional stereotypes. Kuppens and others (2018) show that lower-educated individuals often blame themselves or are often blamed by higher-educated individuals for their lower socio-economic status and related challenges, even more so than individuals with lower incomes or working-class individuals. Consequently, the emphasis on education cleavages and meritocracy without a more critical reflection might play a role in legitimising social inequality. Ultimately, this type of stigmatisation may also be self-serving for individuals in positions of power and influence, who could be scrutinised more for systemic racism, clas-

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

7

sism and other forms of exclusion. Therefore critical and nuanced discourse should be encouraged in order to avoid the further stigmatization of an already disadvantaged socio-economic group and this of course also applies to the academic literature. In the academic literature, higher education is generally known as one of the few ways to reduce exclusive attitudes towards migrants. The education-as-liberation argument – the argument that more education leads to more tolerant attitudes – is the most prevalent argument in the growing literature that has examined welfare chauvinist preferences. Studies usually assume that higher levels of formal education are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism for two reasons. From the perspective of economic group threat theories or economic self-interest, lower levels of real or perceived competition for limited resources may immunise the higher educated against welfare chauvinist attitudes (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). The self-interest argument thus rests on the assumption that the higher educated have sufficient access to limited resources, such as income or career opportunities. Other studies have contended that the role of differences in cultural group threat or cultural ideology between the higher and the lower educated is the dispositive factor, as the higher salience of pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian attitudes tends to prevent welfare chauvinism among the higher educated (Mewes and Mau 2012). The cultural ideology argument rests on the assumption that the higher educated absorb such attitudes from their more extended education experience. These assumptions do not come as a surprise. Nowadays, tertiary education is seen as the key to knowledge, skills and democratisation in society – both at the personal and at the national level. The education-as-liberation evidence is telling indeed. However, there are several limitations in the current literature, including testing this effect mainly through associations – compared with a test through causal identification or the fact that the correlations are less than perfect. Such evidence ignores the fact that welfare chauvinism is prevalent amongst generally more privileged socio-economic status groups as well, including the higher educated. This can be seen in Figure 1.2, which shows that many tertiary-educated individuals across the 22 examined European countries do not want welfare provisions for migrants. On average, more than every third individual with tertiary education can be classified as a welfare chauvinist (there is more information on this particular survey question in Chapter 4). This is puzzling for several reasons. First, the proportion of the higher educated has constantly increased over the past decades in Europe; almost every ten years, ten per cent more of the younger population has received a tertiary education degree (see Figure 1.3). Still, this expansion could not stop the surge of radical right, anti-migrant and welfare chauvinist political movements and attitudes in a number of European countries. This is especially surprising

Levels of welfare chauvinism: ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ among the tertiary educated (in percentage)

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 8,422. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 1.2

Source:

8 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

9

considering that higher-educated individuals usually have more influence on policymaking than their lower-educated counterparts (Mols and Jetten 2017; Burgoon et al. 2022). Second, the expansion of tertiary education is frequently emphasised over social mobility into tertiary education. Hereby education policies create an elevating effect but mainly for the more privileged parts of the population that are already more represented in tertiary education, resulting in even more profound socio-economic cleavages in society. Third, despite the increasing proportions of migrants in tertiary education, the socially constructed concepts of migration, ethnicity and race continue to be an essential basis of socio-economic division within university student populations (Kassis et al. 2014; Levin, van Laar and Sidanius 2003). Furthermore, there are also ongoing debates about banning certain contents that are aimed at teaching university students about migration and race and several initiators of radical right debates and even founders of radical right parties are themselves university professors. Finally, while the lower educated might be more selective regarding their welfare solidarity with migrants, they are also the group that usually shows more overall support for welfare states in Europe than the higher educated, both on the national and on the European Union level (Eick 2023a).

Source:

OECD data.

Figure 1.3

Estimated population (25–34 years) with tertiary education in Europe (in percentage)

10

1.4

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

THE MISSING LINK – VARIATIONS ACROSS INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

This book argues that the causal nature of the relationship between different socio-economic factors and welfare chauvinism has not been sufficiently questioned. It exemplifies this research gap using education since, so far, no prior study has systematically examined the impact of education on welfare chauvinism in a way that allows for a more nuanced analysis across Europe. A more nuanced analysis is important, as the economic and cultural assumptions underlying the education-as-liberation argument can be readily violated across different institutional contexts. This book argues that this can happen, for example, in contexts where higher education does not automatically lead to more labour market security and where the education system does not automatically convey more pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian norms. Building on institutional context theories, different economic and cultural contexts play an essential role for welfare chauvinism in this book. Focusing on such contexts is much more important as Europe has experienced several economic crises in recent decades, the renewed rise of authoritarian regimes and the normalisation of the radical right. Nonetheless, the book also covers other contexts, such as unemployment, migration levels, migration policies and welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Overall, this book demonstrates that a range of factors shapes public attitudes and reveals that not even the higher educated are immune to welfare chauvinism in specific institutional contexts. Using a comparative approach, the book fills essential gaps in the literature by giving a more comprehensive picture of welfare chauvinism and by questioning common narratives around welfare chauvinism. Comparative studies already demonstrate that welfare chauvinism is widespread in most European countries, but as Figure 1.2 shows, there is also significant cross-country variation. This book illustrates how welfare chauvinism varies amongst different socio-economic status groups across countries. Various factors are considered for defining socio-economic status, including income, employment and welfare dependence, but the main focus is education. The book also touches on other factors, such as age, gender, migration background and a wide range of social and political attitudes. It re-evaluates explicitly the importance of education, economy and culture in this context. Since many studies have shown that education works within the boundaries of a society (Cavaillé and Marshall 2019; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2001), it is important to ask how national contexts shape the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. Therefore, the book argues that there is cross-country variation in the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst different educational groups and also in the educational cleavages

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

11

between the higher- and the lower educated in Europe. Moreover, there are theoretical reasons to believe that economic self-interest and cultural ideology do not necessarily lead to the higher educated being immune to welfare chauvinism in certain national contexts. As studies on welfare chauvinism are often conducted in countries where more education is associated with an advantage in the labour market and more liberalised norms, a cross-national perspective can reveal whether these assumptions can be violated across a broader range of national contexts. Additionally, even though both national and cross-national analyses of welfare chauvinism routinely include education among the predictors, so far, the question of whether and how national contexts shape the cleavages between the lower and higher educated across Europe remains open, and this book aims at pushing the frontier of knowledge in this regard. Apart from the cross-country variation, a few studies also demonstrate that welfare chauvinism varies across time (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020; Kros and Coenders 2019). The literature on such cross-time variation is still in its early stages. Thus far, the findings show that the public in Europe has become more polarised in the last decades. This book investigates how welfare chauvinism varies amongst different socio-economic status groups across time (again based on various factors) and re-evaluates the importance of education, economy and culture in this context once more in detail. Related to the education-as-liberation assumption from the current literature, this book aims to explore to what extent changes in welfare chauvinism can be accounted to different educational groups across Europe. Within this novel approach, the book investigates the cross-time variation in the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst different educational groups and the educational cleavages between the higher and lower educated in Europe. Here, the book is particularly interested in whether changes in national economic and cultural contexts can explain the cleavages in welfare chauvinism across educational groups. Economic self-interest and cultural ideology rationales can help again to understand the cross-time variations in the levels of welfare chauvinism. This is because, in the last decades, norm and threat patterns have significantly changed in Europe, which can be argued to impact the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. This book argues that welfare chauvinism varies not only across countries and time but also across different social policies in Europe. The arguments build on a study conducted by Eick and Larsen (2022), who argue that welfare chauvinism varies systematically across compensatory and social investment policies. This book examines how welfare chauvinism varies amongst different socio-economic status groups across different compensatory policies or cash benefits (unemployment benefits, social assistance, child benefits within countries and across the European Union) and different social investment policies or in-kind services (education, healthcare, childcare). In this way, the

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

12

book investigates the importance of education, economy and culture, and also different welfare regimes. It aims to do so because it can be assumed that the policy design shapes the educational cleavages between the higher and lower educated. Based on economic self-interest and cultural ideology perspectives, this can be explained by some policies being more normalised than others and some policies having more (perceived) costs to the higher educated.

1.5

ANALYSING WELFARE CHAUVINISM ACROSS COUNTRIES, TIME AND POLICIES

Building on a wealth of interdisciplinary literature on migration, welfare, and institutions, this book develops a unique analytical framework which is presented in Figure 1.4. This includes the presumed directions of the relationship between education, welfare chauvinism, and national economic and cultural contexts. More specifically, Figure 1.4 represents a visual representation of the effect of (1) education on welfare chauvinism, (2) national cultural and economic context factors on individuals’ levels of welfare chauvinism, as well as (3) the effect of cultural and economic context factors on the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. As indicated before, this analytical model is tested in three different ways – across countries, time and policies – to derive a comprehensive overview of welfare chauvinism in Europe.

Figure 1.4

Analytical framework: the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism across different national economic and cultural contexts

To study levels of welfare chauvinism and systematically analyse the relationship between individual- and contextual-level factors across Europe, the

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

13

ideal research strategy uses quantitative methods. The analytical framework of this book is analysed through cross-country and cross-time surveys, and macro-level data to examine the three research questions. The survey data includes primary and secondary cross-national survey data gathered between 2002 and 2019 from 33 countries across Europe, comprising close to half a million individuals. Survey respondents who were not born in the country where they were interviewed were excluded since they were not or were only partly socialised in that country and socialisation is a vital part of the theoretical argument in this book. However, when indicated, the analysis includes migration background. Next to the individual-level data, additional country-level data material is used in this book to capture economic and cultural conditions. The novel combination of these data sources allows a comprehensive analysis of welfare chauvinist attitudes in the public. The most central analysis took place between 2007 and 2019. This time frame is of particular importance because (1) the worldwide financial crisis of 2007/2008 that culminated in the Great Recession in the late 2000s had a clear impact on the European public, particularly in countries significantly impacted by austerity (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung 2017), and (2) many European countries have experienced an increase in the numbers of asylum seekers in 2015/2016, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan countries, which has led to increasingly polarised discourses around migration (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020). The European Social Survey from the years 2007/2008 and 2016/2017 are primarily used in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book to analyse welfare chauvinism across countries and time. These are the largest samples asking a question on welfare chauvinism thus far, covering 23 European countries. The European Social Survey is produced on a biennial basis and the sampling method includes residents in private households aged 15 years and over, disregarding nationality, citizenship, legal status and language. Face-to-face interviews are conducted using multistage probability sampling to ensure representative results. The European Social Survey is designed to explore patterns in attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of the public. Countries included in the European Social Survey cover various political, cultural and economic backgrounds. Furthermore, the survey allows for the examination of the interplay between these and contextual characteristics across Europe. Thus, these surveys provided useful information for this book about public attitudes across a broad range of European countries with different characteristics. The Welfare States Attitudes Survey from the year 2019 is used in Chapter 6 of this book to analyse welfare chauvinism across countries and social policies. The survey was carried out simultaneously in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. Christian Albrekt Larsen collected the Danish data using a research grant from the School of Politics and Society at Aalborg University.

14

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

The author of this book collected the data from Germany and the United Kingdom using a research grant from the University of Kent. The Welfare State Attitude Survey data was collected through YouGov from adult respondents (18–79 years) based on online panels. The survey aims to improve the understanding of variances in welfare chauvinism across a range of different welfare policies. Furthermore, it focuses on attitudes towards welfare access for one specific migrant group, namely Eastern European workers. Newer data on the topics of this book for periods covering the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not available at the time of writing. Observing current trends, it can be assumed that the mechanisms outlined in this book have not fundamentally changed. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic has further deepened existing social divides and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine war has shown that Ukrainian refugees are more welcome than Syrian refugees, hereby replicating well-established mechanisms in the literature on anti-migrant attitudes that will be elaborated on in this book. A little note on the analysis methods: these are partly of a descriptive nature, showing percentages and means, to demonstrate the bigger picture of welfare chauvinism in Europe. Selected regression methods dive deeper into the different relationships examined in this book. Here, education, self-interest factors and cultural ideology factors are included step by step in the analytical models to test whether education systematically affects welfare chauvinism across Europe and whether other self-interest factors (such as age, gender and employment) and cultural ideology factors (such as political and welfare attitudes) mediate that effect. Furthermore, the book considers whether the impact of education on welfare chauvinism varies across countries and time. This multilevel approach (Hox, Moerbeek and Schoot 2017) plays an important role in the analysis methods as it allows for testing as to whether national economic and cultural contexts (or changes in contexts) impact welfare chauvinism and whether they shape the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism across Europe. The relatively low number of countries restricted the degrees of freedom needed for adding control variables at the country level. Hence, one context-level variable is included in each model (Stegmueller 2013). All variables in these analyses are group mean centred and z standardised. This is critical for effectively interpreting the findings, particularly the interaction coefficients. Additional sensitivity tests that could not be included in this book demonstrate that the results from these analyses are similar to those presented in this book. Such tests include different codings of the variables or alternative and additional variables in the models. Naturally, the analysis of a book cannot go into every detail and include all possible terrains to explain a topic. For example, in this book, more specific policy analysis of specific countries is mainly left out, as are firm conclusions about causality regarding national economic and cultural contexts affecting

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

15

welfare chauvinism. However, assuming causality with certainty can rarely be achieved in studies on public attitudes. Another constraint regarding the methodology is that the quantitative approach simplified the findings. Based on the conclusions of this book, a more in-depth qualitative approach could disentangle the complexity of the relationship between welfare chauvinism, education, economy and culture (for example, Eick et al. 2023; Larsen, Frederiksen and Nielsen 2018). Furthermore, this book accounts for contexts on the national level, but examining the meso level could help understand why certain effects were seen in the analysis. Building on previous literature, this book makes certain assumptions for the meso-level analysis, which could be further nuanced in empirical tests. Expressly, this book assumes that national cultural and economic factors are transmitted to individuals through the education system. For example, Busemeyer and Trampusch (2011) argue that the regional implementation of different education systems results in different labour market and learning outcomes. Such outcomes could also be relevant for self-interest and cultural ideology rationales. The current literature also assumes that classroom contexts are socialising agents where political attitudes develop and become more tolerant with higher levels of education (Campbell 2008). Therefore, future studies should further disentangle these mechanisms in more detail as they may be part of the narrative on welfare chauvinism, education, economy and culture. Finally, it should be noted that this book focuses in European countries, but the theories, methods and results are relevant for other countries too.

1.6

A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

The book is split into three parts. The first three chapters set the scene, explaining the core causes and consequences of welfare chauvinism in Europe, and the importance of education, economy and culture. The analysis in Chapters 4 to 6 depicts welfare chauvinism across countries, time and social policies, particularly related to education, economy and culture. Chapter 7 sums up the analysis and presents the bigger picture for the future of European welfare states and possible conclusions for policy-making. Thus, after this first chapter, Chapter 2 offers an overview of the literature on welfare chauvinism and how welfare chauvinism can be defined as a public attitude that combines both migration and welfare attitudes. The chapter also discusses the relationship between migration and the welfare state in more detail. In this context, the public often considers migrants as undeserving welfare recipients. The chapter also further discusses the consequences of welfare chauvinism in the context of radical right movements and exclusive policies and what this means for social cohesion in Europe.

16

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Chapter 3 begins by introducing the three prominent rationales that can explain why different socio-economic status groups, specifically educational groups, may support welfare chauvinism. First, self-interest theories assume that lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for economic reasons. Second, the chapter introduces cultural ideology theories that assume lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for normative reasons. Third, Chapter 3 introduces institutional context theories, which point to various contextual-level determinants that might exacerbate welfare chauvinism. Finally, the chapter argues that such institutional context-level factors can shape the relationship between public attitudes, self-interest and cultural ideology factors. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the empirical analysis for this book. Chapter 4 examines welfare chauvinism across countries, presenting a descriptive and a multilevel approach using European Social Survey 2016/2017 data from 22 countries. Chapter 4 starts this analysis by examining variations in welfare chauvinism levels across countries. Second, the chapter identifies various predictors for welfare chauvinism on the individual level and identifies education as one of the main dividers, which is in line with other literature. Third, the chapter argues that institutional factors shape the relationship between welfare chauvinism and education. Finally, Chapter 4 elaborates on the institutional factors that can shape welfare chauvinism across countries, including economic prosperity and authoritarian norms. Chapter 5 focuses on welfare chauvinism across time, presenting a descriptive and a multilevel approach that used European Social Survey 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 data from 23 countries. First, the chapter examines variations in welfare chauvinism levels across these time frames. Given the increasing salience of migration in many of these countries, one could have expected attitudes to become more negative, but this is not the case in all observed countries. Second, the chapter examines whether education cleavages on welfare chauvinism increased or decreased within welfare states. Finally, Chapter 5 elaborates on the (changing) institutional factors that can shape welfare chauvinism and the education divide across time. Here the focus is again on economic prosperity and authoritarian norms. Chapter 6 examines welfare chauvinism across social policies in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom with a focus on Eastern European migrants. Examining the cross-policy variation is important because the current literature mainly uses general items to measure the exclusion of migrants from welfare states. Cross-policy variation is usually only an implicit assumption in previous empirical studies and theoretical discussions. First, the chapter examines variations of welfare chauvinism across seven different social policies, with a focus on compensatory and social investment policies. Then, the chapter

Migration, welfare and education in times of crisis

17

examines education cleavages in welfare chauvinism across compensatory and social investment policies as well as mediating factors. Chapter 7 recalls the book’s main findings and contextualises them in light of the blame game between higher and lower socio-economic groups. It then elaborates on new and old challenges for European welfare states in a globalised world. Against this background, the chapter focuses on the possible coalitions or divisions across different socio-economic status groups. The chapter also explains how the move to social investment policies may solve the dilemma between migration and welfare states. Finally, the chapter concludes with some considerations on the future of European welfare states, particularly welfare policies on the European Union level, and the possible scenarios that might emerge in the years to come.

2. What is welfare chauvinism? 2.1 INTRODUCTION The term ‘welfare chauvinism’ has been used in the academic literature since the 1990s to describe public or political resistance of migrants in the welfare state. Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) mentioned the term first, in the context of the growing radical right in Denmark and Norway. Their research shows that voters support welfare provisions only for natives, not for migrants. In a later work, Kitschelt and McGann (1997) show for a broader range of Western European countries that the positions of voters and parties can reflect these two interlinked dimensions: on the one side, the economic and pro-welfare position, and on the other side, the socio-cultural and anti-migrant position. They define welfare chauvinism as ‘a system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and have contributed to it’ (p. 22). The term welfare chauvinism is not uncontested in the literature. Some scholars propose alternative terms, such as ‘welfare nationalism’ (Larsen 2020), ‘welfare state restrictiveness’ (Degen et al. 2019) or ‘selective solidarity’ (Magni 2021). No single term is of course perfect for describing highly complex social phenomena. Therefore, this book moves forward with the term welfare chauvinism for reader clarity, since these other terms define and measure the phenomena similarly. However, it is worth noting that these newer terms have yet to become as established as the original term in the academic literature. Overall, this book focuses on welfare chauvinism as the public opposition to granting migrants access to welfare provisions. This means welfare chauvinism is defined as one form of anti-migrant attitude, while intersections with other issues, most importantly welfare attitudes, are elaborated upon too. More specifically, the analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this book examines welfare chauvinism as the support for excluding migrants who have not yet acquired citizenship in their country of residence from having any access to social policies or excluding migrants from accessing social policies altogether, which can be seen as a more extreme form of welfare chauvinism (see more information in Chapter 4). While migrants can also prefer to exclude new arrivals from the welfare system (Breidahl et al. 2021; Lubbers et al. 2018), in this book the focus is on the attitudes of individuals without migration experience. Still, 18

What is welfare chauvinism?

19

Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that individuals with parents that have migration experience (so-called second generation migrants) or individuals who do not hold citizenship in their country of residence hold overall lower levels of welfare chauvinism. Following the initial welfare chauvinism definition, four central lines of literature on welfare chauvinism have emerged: (1) the impact of migration on the welfare state; (2) party positions to exclude migrants from the welfare state; (3) policy reformation to exclude migrants from the welfare state; and (4) public attitudes that favour excluding migrants from the welfare state. Considering the intersections between public attitudes towards migration, migrants’ inclusion into the welfare state and welfare attitudes, this chapter describes the relevant literature to examine welfare chauvinist attitudes across Europe.

2.2

THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA

Welfare states across Europe can be seen as a key element of the social fabric and enjoy longstanding public support. However, in recent decades, welfare states have also experienced increasing pressures from various angles. Policymakers face difficult choices and trade-offs as they respond to challenges created by permanent austerity politics, ageing populations, gender inequality, non-standard employment relations and public resistance against governmental redistribution policies. Regardless, the impact of migration on the public has been the most salient challenge in public discourse. This is because migration has shaped welfare states in a manner that has not been seen before. European countries have a substantial migrant population after experiencing a dramatic increase in migration (Castles, Haas and Miller 2014). This has substantial consequences for welfare states, in terms of how they are organised and how they are legitimised. Migration has transformed Europe’s traditional nation-states (Geddes 2003). Consequently, migration additionally affects welfare states, as welfare states support the process of nation-building and the creation of nation-states (Svallfors 2012). Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, international human mobility increased for a variety of reasons, such as work, study, joining family members and seeking asylum. Migration histories and patterns vary across Europe; thus, the newcomers transform not only the socio-economic composition but also the ethnic fabric of many countries in different ways. Consequently, the political salience of migration has increased in Europe, and migrants’ access to the welfare state has become among the most polarising topics in the population. Within academic debates, the relationship between migration and the welfare state has attracted the attention of many scholars. Since migrants are

20

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

an indispensable part of European welfare states, particularly in times where European societies are ageing, this raises the question of how to extend welfare states due to increasing levels of migration in the future. Therefore, a relatively new line of research focuses on the attitudes of the public towards the inclusion of migrants (Eger 2010; Eick and Busemeyer 2023; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016; Taylor-Gooby 2008). In these studies, the sustainability of a welfare state is seen as dependent on strong public support. In particular, arguments that are critical towards the future of European welfare states with migration refer to the issue as the ‘progressive dilemma’ (Kulin, Eger and Hjerm 2016) as well as the ‘ethnic heterogeneity hypothesis’ (Alesina and Glaeser 2004) or the ‘heterogeneity–redistribution trade-off’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Thus far, no consensus exists amongst researchers on whether the sustainability of the welfare states depends on ethnic homogeneity, which is the ideal of the traditional national-state conception, or if new forms of social cohesion can be created that go beyond the us-versus-them paradigm and allow the inclusion of migrants. There are usually two sides to these debates. First, the causal argument of the progressive dilemma is that rising levels of migration (and the related ethnic, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity) lead to political and cultural conflicts that weaken social trust and solidarity in society. These conflicts are enforced through the negative beliefs, perceptions and stereotypes about migrants that will be described later in this chapter. In particular, the welfare magnetism hypothesis, which assumes that migration decisions are made based on the generosity of the receiving nation’s welfare state, has limited support empirically (Kulin, Eger and Hjerm 2016). However, the public frequently perceives migrants as a group that receives more welfare provisions than natives (Larsen 2020). This is because migrants or specific groups of migrants are often perceived as not belonging to their national welfare community. Thus, the public does not consider migrants or these specific groups as eligible for welfare support. These processes are problematic for national welfare states that are legitimised through feelings of belonging to a national membership. Therefore, some scholars argue that increasing levels of migration weaken the willingness to share resources with others, mainly migrants but other groups too (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Freeman 1986). It seems increasingly important to examine the assumptions of the progressive dilemma – that is, whether perceptions of scarcity further reinforce the question of who should receive public support in times of limited resources. Welfare budgets are ever more constrained due to permanent austerity politics, and the financial sustainability of welfare states is continuously scrutinised (Taylor-Goby, Leruth and Chung 2017). Based on results from the United States, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) support the claim that migration threatens the future of European welfare states. While

What is welfare chauvinism?

21

research has found public resistance towards including migrants in national welfare states, reliable empirical data does not always back the argument that increased welfare state generosity is associated with higher levels of such resistance (Freeman 1986; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). According to Taylor-Gooby (2005), the association cannot be replicated in the European context. Other scholars have even found opposite effects in this context, where increasing migration augments support for the welfare state (Burgoon, Koster and van Egmond 2012; Finseraas 2008). With this line of research receiving more attention among scholars, research designs have become more nuanced. For example, while the studies at the country level yield little evidence that higher migration levels reduce welfare support in Europe, regional-level analysis shows that higher migration levels do indeed reduce welfare support (Eger 2010; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). This could be because examining this question at the regional level targets the individual’s actual exposure to migrants better than country-level perceptions of national migration policies and migration levels. Eick and Busemeyer (2023) advanced this regional approach by focusing on an even smaller geographical unit where contact in everyday life is likely to be more intense: local districts. They show that public support for welfare is lower in localities with higher migration levels. This effect persists for welfare directed at groups that are perceived as more deserving of welfare support (such as children, and sick or older individuals). The effect also lasts when the levels of employed migrants (who pay into the welfare state) are examined. This finding is in contrast to a study by Burgoon (2014), who argues that economic integration softens the tendency of migration to undermine support for the welfare state. Finally, in line with some theories explained in this book, the findings from Eick and Busemeyer (2023) show that individuals facing higher economic risk support welfare less than their counterparts when exposed to migration. Van der Meer and Reeskens (2021) have yet again different results from their research: they look at neighbourhoods in the Netherlands and show that ethnic diversity promotes welfare chauvinism without undermining public welfare support. Hence, there is still much to explore in this field of research, and it is not yet known whether and how European welfare states can be sustained with increasing levels of migration and diversity. One of the issues with the progressive dilemma is that while some studies might find an association in the data, this might not make for a sound causal argument. In other words, no universal causal mechanism has been proven between more welfare state generosity and higher levels of welfare chauvinism. What is known is that the public debates on migration and the welfare state have been increasingly politicised, and it is argued that the welfare state has started to become a new political cleavage as a result (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). Such political cleavages come with a certain permanence of division.

22

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Having the two cleavages of migration and welfare align is a compelling structure that can be effectively mobilised. In particular, new radical right parties use this debate to attract voters by building on existing anti-migrant attitudes amongst the European public. As a result, socio-economic divisions increase further, particularly between the working and middle classes, whose members are the primary beneficiaries of the welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983).

2.3

WELFARE FOR ‘US’, NOT FOR ‘THEM’ – A WINNING POLITICAL FORMULA?

The new radical right parties across member states capitalise on the winning formula of ‘welfare for our kind’ (Eger and Valdez 2015). Politicians from mainstream parties in many European countries have partly adapted to the new formula, which further normalises its use (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). For example, the latest European Union enlargement brought out fears about Eastern Europeans placing a financial burden on welfare states, particularly on more generous ones (Baute, Abts and Meuleman 2019; Scharpf 2016). These political movements have already cost millions of migrants the loss of their rights, including rights to welfare resources, most recently manifested in the Brexit referendum (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Initially, the research on welfare chauvinism showed that this phenomenon appeared in the context of socio-cultural changes in traditional voter compositions (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). Remarkably, the argument was that the new cleavage was between ‘left libertarians’ and ‘right authoritarians’ and in line with the new left and radical right parties (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Afonso and Rennwald 2018; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). This was the origin of the argument that welfare chauvinism is popular amongst lower-educated workers with authoritarian values. The literature on welfare chauvinism and parties includes a range of case studies on radical right parties in specific countries, such as the Danish People’s Party (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016) or the Swedish Democrats (Norocel 2016). This line of research shows that the radical right parties have different strategies for why and how they have incorporated welfare chauvinist positions. But the literature also indicates that mainstream parties have incorporated such positions too (Abou-Chadi 2016). Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) show for the Netherlands that mainstream parties have responded differently to welfare chauvinism amongst the radical right. While more left-leaning parties adopt more restrictive migration policies, more right-leaning parties adopt more generous welfare policies. Jylhä et al. (2019) even found that more welfare chauvinist voters in Sweden were likelier to

Figure 2.1

Radical right parties in European parliaments, accumulated percentages from the most recent national election between 2019 and 2022

Note: Selected parties include: Austria (Freedom Party), Belgium (New Flemish Alliance, Flemish Interest), Bulgaria (Revival), Croatia (Homeland Movement), Czech Republic (Freedom and Direct Democracy), Denmark (Danish People’s Party, New Right, Denmark Democrats), Estonia (Conservative People’s Party), Finland (The Finns), France (National Rally), Germany (Alternative for Germany), Hungary (Fidesz, Our Home Movement), Ireland (Sinn Féin), Italy (Brothers of Italy, League), Latvia (National Alliance, Latvia First), Luxembourg (Alternative Democratic Reform Party), Netherlands (Party for Freedom, Forum for Democracy), Poland (Law and Justice, United Poland), Romania (Alliance for the Unity of Romanians), Serbia (Dveri), Slovakia (Our Slovakia), Slovenia (Slovenian Democratic Party), Spain (Vox), Sweden (Sweden Democrats), Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party).

What is welfare chauvinism? 23

24

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

change their voting preference from the more mainstream party to the radical right party. Therefore, one can imagine that radical right voters cannot be easily convinced to change their voting preference again to a more mainstream party, at least not as long as the migration issue remains salient. Figure 2.1 shows how normalised radical right parties in European parliaments and their welfare chauvinist positions have become to date. In particular, radical right parties are not only present in certain regions across Europe; they are spread across the whole continent. For example, in the recent Italian election, the Brothers of Italy and League together won 34.9 per cent of the vote and are currently leading the country with an anti-migrant agenda. It should be noted that welfare chauvinism and migration alone cannot provide the ‘winning formula’ for radical right parties seeking to attract a larger electorate, especially if they are concerned with remaining in power. For example, radical right parties also distinguish themselves through specific welfare stances. Enggist and Pinggera (2022) found that radical right parties across Europe tend to prioritise compensatory policies over social investment policies or workfareism policies. The latter require participation in labour market activation programmes as a condition for receiving cash benefits. In a similar vein, Busemeyer, Rathgreb and Sahm (2022) also found that voters of radical right parties across Europe are less likely to support social investment policies than other social policies.

2.4

EXCLUDING MIGRANTS FROM THE WELFARE STATE

The impact of globalisation and migration on the public has been the most salient challenge in public discourse in the past years. This is because globalisation and migration shape European welfare states in a manner that has not been seen before. A majority of European countries have a substantial migrant population after experiencing a dramatic increase in migration in recent decades (see Figure 1.1). This has significant consequences for European welfare states, how these welfare states are organised and how they are legitimised. While not all migrants have the same rights to welfare resources, welfare states across Europe have included migrants to a greater or lesser extent into their welfare systems. This is, in particular, the case for migrants that have been granted permanent residency (Guiraudon 2000). In fact, today, migrants’ inclusion into the welfare system is not as much reliant on whether migrants have attained citizenship but on whether they have attained legal residency in a host country, particularly in EU countries (Bruzelius 2019). In that sense, the worth of citizenship as the eligibility criteria for accessing welfare provisions has been lowered, so it is crucial to examine public attitudes towards this criterion, as this book will do in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

What is welfare chauvinism?

25

While the impact of migration on European welfare states is a complex matter, the most prominent social processes concerning this book are: (1) the increase of migration in welfare states, specifically the challenge that the inclusion of migrants brings to the traditional national-state conception; and (2) public discussions around inclusion, specifically the challenge of public preferences for excluding migrants in the welfare state and who does not want to include them. This is because welfare states have developed into nation-states reliant on national membership or membership of the ingroup. Therefore, the extension of social rights and the notion of redistribution are based on a closed collective of identities that trust each other to achieve common aims (Korpi 1983). What welfare states signify to individuals and welfare states’ relationship to identities has thus created an ingroup that shares an understanding of citizenship embedded in national (welfare) institutions (Geddes 2003; Mau 2003). Thus the inclusion of migrants challenges national welfare states, particularly when access to welfare provisions is increasingly based on residence and contribution versus citizenship (Sainsbury 2006, 2012). Furthermore, migrants are frequently perceived to be more reliant on welfare state support, which is another challenge for their inclusion (Larsen 2020). The term welfare chauvinism is also frequently used in the literature on the discrimination of migrants in certain social policies. This discrimination can take the form of total exclusion, difficulties in access to existing social rights or lower levels of generosity (Careja et al. 2016; Gschwind 2021). In this context, new indexes on general policy outputs and outcomes have entered the discussion. Such indexes lay a base for comparing migrants’ social rights systematically across countries, time and migrant groups (for example, Koning 2019; Römer 2017). The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is one of the most prominent indexes. The MIPEX score is based on a range of legal and policy indicators that cover eight migration policies: access to nationality, anti-discrimination, education, family reunification, health, labour market mobility, permanent residence and political participation. The highest scores in this index are awarded when the policies meet the highest standards for treating migrants equally to natives. Figure 2.2 shows the average MIPEX scores for the covered countries inside Europe and beyond, using the last round of the data collection from 2019. The scores in the covered European countries range from 86 (Sweden) to 37 (Latvia). Compared with the non-European countries covered here, the European countries are not always as generous as expected. Using an earlier version of the MIPEX, Schmitt and Teney (2019) find that the cross-national variation in migrants’ access to social policies can be interpreted using the welfare chauvinist perspective. Interestingly, they find that left-wing governments are particularly reluctant to grant migrants access to social policies, which demonstrates again how normalised welfare chauvinist policies are

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

26

Note:

Lighter bars show European countries; darker bars show countries outside Europe.

Figure 2.2

Migration Integration Policy Index, overall scores (2019)

What is welfare chauvinism?

27

already. However, they also find that countries with a generous welfare state and those that face large migration numbers are likelier to provide migrants with more generous access to social policies. This is also the overall finding from the research on migrants’ exclusion from the welfare state (Römer 2017; Gschwind 2021). The MIPEX data will be further analysed in Chapter 4 of this book. So, while there is still a lot to understand regarding welfare chauvinism, the current findings demonstrate how prevalent and complex the issue is.

2.5

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO ANALYSE WELFARE CHAUVINIST ATTITUDES?

This chapter has shown that welfare chauvinism is present in party politics and policy-making, but, as explained before, this book focuses on welfare chauvinist attitudes in Europe. Negative attitudes towards migrants are among the most examined concepts in social research, but there is no one-size-fits-all definition for these attitudes. So, what are attitudes? The literature has frequently defined attitudes as ‘a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favourable or unfavourable manner with respect to a given object’ (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, 6). In this book, the given attitude objects are migrants in the welfare state. Furthermore, attitudes can be considered as informed by beliefs and values as well as by perceptions and stereotypes. Oskamp and Schultz (2005) argue that, (1) attitudes are the affective dimension towards an object, (2) beliefs are the cognitive dimensions towards an object, and (3) values are essential life goals or societal circumstances. According to this definition, values are more fundamental and more deeply rooted in national institutional contexts than attitudes. Moreover, Haller (2002) emphasises that values change slowly, while attitudes may change more rapidly. Therefore, in this book, attitudes towards migrants could be separated from beliefs and values about migrants. How far the attitude differences between countries remain constant over time is important to examine (see Chapter 5). This is particularly significant for exploring how education might form attitudes across different national, cultural and economic contexts. Connected to attitudes, beliefs and values about specific objects are perceptions and stereotypes of these objects as well. While attitudes can be seen as an inner reaction towards the object, stereotypes can be seen as a portrait of the object. Hence, when conceptualising welfare chauvinist attitudes, it is additionally essential to notice that attitudes are not necessarily rational and are often imprecise, multidimensional or downright contradictory (Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot 2013). An example is shown by Taylor-Gooby et al. (2019) about attitudes towards migrants in welfare states in Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom, using qualitative interview data. The researchers showed

28

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

that the majority population feared that migrants would take away their jobs. Simultaneously, migrants were perceived as work shy, undermining work ethics and taking welfare resources from natives. Consequently, this book defines attitudes as inner reactions to migrants informed by beliefs, values and stereotypes. Furthermore, it assumes that attitudes affect behaviour (for example, voting behaviour). So why is public opinion analysis on welfare chauvinism vital? First, democracies and welfare states are built on the assumption that the majority of public preferences are represented. However, this assumption has long been debated. The main issue is whether public opinion on social policies encourages or constrains officials from adapting them to public preferences. This question is becoming more complex the more societies diversify, and attitudes differ across different groups in the public. A substantial and expanding body of scholarship on substantive representation aims to empirically trace correlations (or lack thereof) between public opinion on the one side and real policy changes on the other (Brooks and Manza 2008; Schakel, Burgoon and Hakhverdian 2020; Dahl 1971). A range of these studies finds a correlation between public opinion and policy, whereas others find none (Schakel, Burgoon and Hakhverdian 2020; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The lack of data on these particular topics makes it hard for researchers to determine causal linkages. It has also been argued that public opinion can counteract sudden policy changes or drive such changes if welfare states must adjust to shifting socio-economic situations. For example, events such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis can also sway public opinion (Chung and van Oorschot 2010). Busemeyer and others (2020) find that public opinion influences governments most when an issue is salient and public preferences are consistent. The discussions on public opinion and policymaking in democracies often revolve around political representation. While more study is needed to draw conclusions regarding political representation in Europe, the basic result thus far is that average voters, particularly lower-educated individuals, have less impact on policymaking than elite or higher-educated individuals (Schakel, Burgoon and Hakhverdian 2020). Therefore, analysing public attitudes on welfare chauvinism more critically across countries, time, and social policies makes it harder to conflate public and elite attitudes. This is important because particularly political elites often claim to speak for majorities (Svallfors 2012). In the context of migration policies on the EU level, this is especially true since political elites in the EU institutions are often criticised for not representing public interests (Katz 2001). These discussions often relate to social legitimacy and the morality of institutions, and thus have far-reaching consequences for democracy. Ultimately, a better understanding of public attitudes towards social rights for migrants

What is welfare chauvinism?

29

may be a resource and opportunity for European policymakers seeking to challenge the institutionalised status quo and promote political change at the national and European levels.

2.6

WELFARE CHAUVINIST ATTITUDES VERSUS ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES

Amongst the public across Europe, a range of beliefs, perceptions and stereotypes of migrants persists based on different migration histories, patterns and policies (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). For this reason, it can be challenging to develop an encompassing definition of migrants that applies to the public in Europe in general, as there may be cross-national differences. What the definitions of the migrant object across Europe have in common is the process of othering, which is crucial for intergroup relationships within nation-states. The notion of othering has been primarily established by the social identity theory (Tajfel 1982), which demonstrates how group membership shapes individual identities through adopting group norms and values. As a result, group identification gives rise to differentiating between an ingroup ‘us’ versus an outgroup ‘them’. Hence, what nation-states provide can be described as a closed collective of identities, which can strengthen social cohesion within ingroups. However, the notion of othering simultaneously reinforces divisions between the ingroup and the outgroup. Consequently, migration challenges these collective boundaries within nation-states. Migrants are frequently conflated with negative political and media discourses, which are frequently explanatory factors for anti-migrant attitudes (Blinder 2015). In particular, the public perceives that migrants have lower skill levels (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), are welfare recipients or welfare tourists, are ethnic and religious minorities, and are asylum seekers and illegal migrants (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009). This frequently leads to analyses summarising different anti-migrant attitudes. However, such results are to be taken with a grain of salt, considering that it is additionally known that anti-migrant attitudes across Europe vary significantly depending on the migrant group in question. For example, Dustmann and Preston (2007) have demonstrated that, among the public in the United Kingdom, opposition towards migrants increases by ethnic and cultural distance. Furthermore, the researchers have shown that welfare concerns over new migrants predominate in the public and that labour market concerns play a more significant role in forming anti-migrant attitudes than ethnic and cultural concerns. Overall, economic and cultural fears are frequently the main sources of anti-migrant attitudes. To reiterate, these fears may vary across European countries, which has complicated a general definition of migrants and the summarising of multiple forms of anti-migrant attitudes in the research.

30

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

However, are welfare chauvinist attitudes just another form of anti-migrant attitudes? In an attempt to systematically delimit the logical universes of related terms, this book focuses on one form of anti-migrant attitude that also overlaps with migration/social policies: welfare chauvinism. According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010, 314), ‘[e]fforts such as these are critical for remapping the field and must be carried on in the future with a sense of priority.’ Preferences for migration policies have been salient on the political agendas in Europe for many years, and research has revealed increasing approval for the implementation of exclusionary migration policies (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006). Notably, the concept of who is seen as a migrant across different European countries has historically developed from previous concepts related to the national context, such as skills, contribution to the national community, citizenship, ethnicity, race and religion. Therefore, it can be argued that migration policies continue to be used to legitimise discrimination based on migration and class background (Dustmann and Preston 2007). It remains possible that any limitation on migration based on these criteria is viewed as a Trojan horse for racism or ethnocentrism, since race and ethnicity are correlated with other characteristics such as poverty, religion and culture. The welfare and migration policy this book examines included preferences for excluding migrants from accessing welfare provisions, namely welfare chauvinism. The belief that migrants misuse welfare resources without sufficiently contributing to the welfare system is frequently related to negative attitudes towards migrants. A number of survey experiments demonstrate that not only nationality but also ethnicity matters for public attitudes towards who should be granted welfare resources (Bay, Finseraas and Pedersen 2016; Cappelen et al. 2016; Ford 2016; Hjorth 2015). When examining welfare chauvinism, research has also found that inclusion and exclusion matter, and the specific conditions under which welfare resources should (not) be granted. The majority of current studies have examined these conditions in three ways, First, there should not be any conditions for migrants’ access to welfare resources. Second, migrants should work and pay taxes to access welfare resources (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). Third, individuals should not be granted access to welfare resources, whether they have national citizenship or not (Heizmann, Jedinger and Perry 2018). Ultimately, the public considers migrants the least-deserving beneficiaries of welfare provisions and ranks beneficiaries who are elderly, sick, disabled or unemployed as more deserving (van Oorschot 2008). However, as explained previously, this book defines welfare chauvinism as more than only a form of anti-migrant attitude. Welfare chauvinism can be seen as intersecting with welfare attitudes and other factors such as deservingness, political rhetoric, media representation and self-interest (Kitschelt

What is welfare chauvinism?

31

and McGann 1997; Kulin, Eger and Hjerm 2016; Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot 2013). In that sense, researchers argue that welfare chauvinism might not be as much about xenophobia, ethnic prejudice or racism, but more about the welfare state per se. Chapter 6 of this book elaborates on the intersections and demonstrates that welfare chauvinism varies systematically across different welfare policies and specific policy paradigms, such as social investment and compensation. These more nuanced findings demonstrate that the public is not necessarily against welfare support for natives but is specifically reluctant to grant migrants access to welfare resources. Furthermore, Chapter 6 demonstrates that welfare chauvinism varies across social policies. The variation in welfare chauvinism among different migrant groups and social policies demonstrates the importance of defining welfare chauvinism not only as attitudes towards migrants but also as general attitudes towards social policies or welfare (Kulin, Eger and Hjerm 2016; Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot 2013).

CONCLUSIONS Welfare chauvinism can be seen as nativist resentment, which is expressed in the unwillingness to grant migrants access to welfare resources. This resentment is based not only on cultural fears but also, and often, on the fear that migrants might take away jobs and welfare provisions from natives. Again, while migrants can hold preferences for excluding new arrivals from the welfare system as well, this book focuses on citizens without a migration background. In other words, for individuals who support welfare chauvinism, it is not necessarily the welfare system as such that is at risk; instead, it is the concern as to which individuals should be included on the basis of citizenship and migration background. This is connected to how citizens define who is a citizen and who is a non-citizen. Furthermore, economic and cultural distance matter when the public differentiates between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the welfare context too.

3. Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public 3.1 INTRODUCTION In times of increasing divides concerning the inclusion of migrants in welfare states, it is crucial to understand why some individuals are more prone to welfare chauvinism than others. Considering the various migration populations and histories across Europe, one could expect attitudes towards migrants’ inclusion in welfare states to be complex. To build a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between education, economy, culture and welfare chauvinism, Chapter 3 dives into the current literature on this topic. While there are some overlaps amongst the research on welfare chauvinist parties, policies and public attitudes, the attitudes category has its own specific mechanisms and nuances. Overall, the literature has developed three prominent rationales, which can be argued to be non-competing, that can explain why individuals support welfare chauvinism. These are, first, group threat theories from the economic perspective; second, group threat theories from the cultural perspective; thirdly, institutional context theories. Especially at the individual level, group threat theories from the economic and cultural perspective have proven fruitful in explaining why individuals are prone not only to anti-migrant attitudes in general (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010) but also to welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). The basic idea of group threat theories is that ingroup and outgroup members compete over limited economic and cultural resources. This particularly applies to individuals who compete with migrants (Blalock 1967; Coenders 2001). Such competition can intensify perceptions of group threat and turn into anti-migrant attitudes and welfare chauvinism (Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). The previous chapter introduced welfare chauvinism as a preference for excluding migrants from the welfare state that intersects with anti-migrant attitudes and welfare attitudes in general. Figure 3.1 provides further information with regard to the data on welfare chauvinism and education from 22 European countries, covered in the European Social Survey 2016/2017; this data will be analysed in detail in Chapter 4 (the chapter also elaborates on the operation32

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

33

alisation of the variables). It shows that, in line with the current literature, the levels of welfare chauvinism are overall lower amongst the higher educated than amongst the lower educated. However, it should be emphasized how small the education gap is – on a scale from 1 to 5, the average level of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated is 3.04 while it is 3.31 amongst the lower educated.

Note: Scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least welfare chauvinist value and 5 being the most welfare chauvinist value. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 3.1

Education gap for levels of welfare chauvinism (averages)

When it comes to sharing welfare resources with migrants, studies have contended that the lower educated are more prone to anti-migrant attitudes and, consequently, welfare chauvinism (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). Using the above-mentioned European Social Survey 2016/2017 data, Figure 3.2 shows that the attitudinal mechanisms for welfare chauvinism and education indeed resemble anti-migrant attitudes, as the higher educated appear also (slightly) less anti-migrant than the lower educated. These results are not the complete picture, and including the aspect of welfare attitudes is vital for the analysis. This is because prominent welfare state theories suggest that individuals with a lower socio-economic status tend to be generally more supportive of redistributive social policies (Korpi 1983). Using the European Social Survey 2016/2017 data again, Figure 3.3 shows that the lower-educated individuals indeed have more pro-welfare attitudes than their higher-educated counterparts. Hence, the attitudinal mechanisms for welfare chauvinism and education do resemble anti-migrant attitudes more

34

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Note: Scales range from 0 to 10, with 0 being the most pro-migrant value and 10 being the most anti-migrant value. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,811-36,611. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 3.2

Education gaps for levels of attitudes on migration (averages)

Note: Scales range from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most pro-welfare value and 5 being the most anti-welfare value. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 37,342–35,714. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 3.3

Education gaps for levels of attitudes on welfare (averages)

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

35

than welfare attitudes. In other words, rationales for welfare chauvinism might resemble rationales for anti-migrant attitudes more than rationales for welfare attitudes. Table 3.1

Overview of theoretical mechanisms that may explain welfare chauvinism explored in this book

Theory

Mechanism

Factors explored in this book

Individual level:

Attitudes shaped by rational

Education

Socio-economic

calculation of cost/benefit

Income Unemployment experience Unemployment experience Welfare dependency Having children Parents’ education Community size Migration background Age Gender

Individual level:

Attitudes shaped by values

Attitudes towards the welfare state

Cultural ideology

and beliefs

Attitudes towards welfare recipients Attitudes towards migrants Egalitarian attitudes Authoritarian attitudes Voting behaviour

Macro level:

Attitudes shaped by

Economic prosperity

Socio-economic

economic institutions

Social expenditure Unemployment rate Migrant levels Percentage tertiary education

Macro level:

Attitudes shaped by cultural

Authoritarianism

Cultural ideology

institutions

Migration integration Policy index Individual liberties Linguistic fractionalisation Salience migration

These data insights demonstrate that one should be cautious about overstating the education effect on welfare chauvinism, and the potential collapse of European welfare states overall, particularly because this is the group most in need of welfare resources. On the contrary, this book argues that the higher educated might play a vital role in spreading welfare chauvinism across Europe. For this reason, the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism needs a more nuanced analysis.

36

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Considering the complexity of explaining welfare chauvinism, this chapter elaborates on what is known from the current literature about who supports welfare chauvinism and why. Importantly, this chapter also explains why welfare chauvinism is particularly important for the critical analysis of the education-as-liberation assumption. Table 3.1 summarises the theoretical mechanisms this book explores, some in more detail than others. Of course, these do not include all possible factors that can explain welfare chauvinist attitudes, but they feature those that have been prominent in the literature and at least partly overlap with factors that cannot be covered in this book. The particular operationalisation of these factors will be explained in Chapters 4 to 6, where the main analyses take place. The distinctions between economic and cultural here are exemplary, since these theories can also overlap. In particular, education can be seen from an economic and cultural perspective, as will be explained in this chapter in more detail. Additionally, some factors can be relevant both on the individual level and on the macro level. For this reason, amongst others, the percentage of tertiary education on the country level is later also included in the analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are only included in some parts of the analyses, since the previous pages already hinted at too much overlap between such attitudes and welfare chauvinist attitudes.

3.2

ECONOMIC RATIONALES: INCREASING LABOUR MARKET VULNERABILITY

Welfare chauvinist attitudes can be explained using economic group threat or self-interest theories. These theories explain these exclusive attitudes as a result of objective or subjective competition between ingroups and outgroups. Notably lower education, lower income, lower occupational status and perceived economic insecurity have been found to correlate with welfare chauvinist attitudes (Hjorth 2015; Kros and Coenders 2019; Mewes and Mau 2012). Hence, these rationales assume that lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for economic reasons (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). The economic approach emphasises that higher levels of real or perceived competition over limited resources increase preferences to exclude migrants from the welfare system amongst individuals with lower social status. Hence, individuals in less privileged economic situations are expected to be more prone to welfare chauvinism (van Oorschot 2006). In particular, studies point out that the material deprivation of lower socio-economic status plays the most decisive role in developing welfare chauvinism (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Amongst others, survey experiments help to examine these theories in

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

37

a more nuanced way. They show, for example, that perceived economic threat can moderate cultural values on welfare chauvinism (Ford 2016; Hjorth 2015). The next figures show the high variances in economic contexts around Europe. First, the gross domestic product (GDP) is an important measure of the economy. Basically, the GDP is the value of all goods and services produced, taking into account the value of the goods and services that were used in their creation. Figure 3.4 shows the volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards. This is a common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels between countries, allowing for a more meaningful comparison across countries. It is clear that economic activity varies significantly across the European continent. A central measure of the political economy is social expenditure, which is shown in Figure 3.5. This measure includes: (1) cash benefits that are directed at individuals with low incomes, older individuals, disabled or sick individuals and young individuals; (2) direct in-kind provision of goods and services; and (3) tax breaks with social purposes. This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP per capita. A closer look at the cross-national differences shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 reveals that a high GDP does not automatically translate to generous social expenditure. The GDP and social expenditure data will be further analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book. Importantly, research often finds significant overlaps between social expenditure and an often-used measure of social policy outcomes, the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (Eick, Burgoon and Busemeyer 2021). The Gini coefficient is defined as income inequality, and a higher value means that income is distributed more unevenly in the country concerned. But the relationship between social expenditure and the Gini coefficient is also not perfect. This could be because countries have developed different political economies and policy interventions, and some lead to better outcomes than others. Additionally, the Gini coefficient is, of course, not the only measurement for a social policy outcome. Other examples could be gender equality or educational mobility.

3.3

EDUCATION FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

One common argument that is frequently used to explain why higher education levels can lead to lower levels of welfare chauvinism derives from an economic or self-interest perspective. Accordingly, it is argued that the education system sorts individuals into different socio-economic positions in society. While this book challenges this argument to some extent, individuals with higher levels of education are usually defined as part of the upper strata of society. Researchers argue that the structural cleavages between the higher and lower educated will

Figure 3.4

GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards) (2022)

Source: Eurostat.

38 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Public social expenditure (2022)

OECD data.

Figure 3.5

Source:

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public 39

40

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

only grow in the coming years (Sobolewska and Ford 2020), which might reinforce these economic mechanisms. This pits those adversely affected by deindustrialisation, automation and globalisation materially and symbolically against those benefiting from these structural changes (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Kitschelt 1994). The central tenet of the economic perspective is that it is either the real or the perceived competition over limited resources that drives the desire to exclude migrants (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958). In other words, if the public believes that migrants take away scarce resources from them, the public feels threatened by migrants and, in turn, anti-migrant attitudes emerge. Since lower-educated individuals are seen as more deprived of scarce resources, particularly of welfare resources due to these individuals’ socio-economic status, this group is further seen as more exclusive towards migrants (Hello, Scheepers and Sleegers 2006). Different theories have been used in the literature to explain the educational effect on welfare chauvinism that is based on an economic, competition or self-interest framework. One theory is the split labour market theory by Bonacich (1972). Here, the welfare chauvinism bias across individuals from different socio-economic statuses is explained through the fear that migrants act as a substitute for lower-status workers on the labour market. Consequently, the theory assumes that lower-educated individuals might be more prone to welfare chauvinism than higher-educated individuals. This is particularly true for the European context, where migrants are expected to be employed in low-paid, manual jobs (Quillian 1995). While this theory is used to explain why the higher educated as a higher-status group are less likely to hold preferences for welfare chauvinism, this book argues that this theory is limited in explaining variance in welfare chauvinism across countries, time and policies. Realistic conflict theory is a more prevalent theory in the field (Fussell 2014). In line with the split labour theory, this theory assumes that welfare chauvinism is rooted in real or perceived competition over limited resources such as employment, housing, status or power. However, the realistic conflict theory additionally allows for explaining variances in the perceived economic threat across countries, time and policies, as it emphasises the historical development of intergroup relations. Here is where the perceived nature of competition is emphasised, as the relationship between ingroups and outgroups depends on individual perceptions that can have real consequences for attitude formation. Therefore, individuals in precarious socio-economic situations are expected to be more prone to welfare chauvinism from this theoretical perspective. Overall, following this line of theory, the highly educated fear real or perceived competition with migrants less than their lower-educated counterparts and are therefore seen as less prone to welfare chauvinism.

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

41

Figure 3.6 demonstrates that there are significant differences in how individuals perceive their income, not only across the 22 examined European countries but also amongst educational groups. In the European Social Survey 2016/2017, subjective income indicated how a respondent felt at the time of answering questions about their household’s income. Specifically, the question indicated which description came close to how the respondent felt at the time about their household’s income on a four-point scale: (4) living comfortably on present income; (3) coping on present income; (2) finding it difficult on present income; (1) finding it very difficult on present income. The results indicate that the higher-educated individuals perceive their income as more comfortable than the lower-educated individuals across all countries in the sample. On average, subjective income insecurity is felt by 10 per cent of the higher-educated respondents versus by 23 per cent of the lower-educated respondents. Still, these numbers also show that even the higher-educated individuals are not immune from perceived income difficulties. However, when examining the education-as-liberation assumption from the economic perspective, it is important to note that the causal mechanism might not be that the higher education system transmits more inclusive attitudes towards migrants; rather, it better positions the higher educated on the labour market, which gives the higher educated an advantage over lower-educated labour market participants. The competition and self-interest theories, therefore, emphasise the relative or material impact of education. According to Nie and others (1996, 6), ‘Relative education is not the absolute number of years attained, but the amount of education attained compared to those against whom the citizen competes.’ Related to this, the education system is frequently considered a sorting model where individuals are assigned their future positions in society (Campbell 2009). In other words, higher education is assumed to translate into a more privileged labour market position. These mechanisms depend on the specific labour market inequalities between the higher and lower educated across countries, which vary significantly (Chung 2019). Therefore, the assumption that a higher educational degree leads to less resource competition depends on the national context. Mechanisms get even more complex when the deskilling of migrants is taken into account. This means, even when migrants are higher educated or ready to compete with higher-educated nationals, they are more likely to take lower-skilled jobs and thus become another source of competition for the lower educated rather than for the higher educated. Hence, to a certain extent, labour markets pre-select which group faces greater competition. Moreover, it is widely known that the educational system, particularly the tertiary education system, systematically excludes individuals with lower socio-economic status (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). These inequalities vary by country and need to be considered when examining the relationship

Education gap on subjective income insecurity (in percentage)

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 37,312. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 3.6

Source:

42 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

43

between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Related to that, research has shown that parents’ socio-economic status matters for their children’s attitudes towards migrants (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). Hence, it can be argued that these socio-economic inequalities must be critically reflected and emphasised over simple narratives that assign more exclusive attitudes to the lower educated. Compared with the cultural perspective, the economic perspective demonstrates that education matters not only because of what is assumed to happen while a person receives an education, but also because of all the events that occur before and after a person exits the educational system. Individuals are selected unequally into higher education. The successful completion of additional degrees translates into different labour market opportunities – for example, lower unemployment risks and higher wages – which influence preferences for including or excluding migrants. Overall, the higher educated appear to be in positions in the labour market where they feel less threatened by migrants; thus, it seems from an economic perspective that it is not as much that educational attainment matters but rather how a specific degree translates to labour market opportunity matters. However, the assumed causality of this argument can be violated across different national economic contexts. Since it is known from extended scholarship that labour markets differ across Europe (Chung 2019), it can also be assumed that the positive effect of the labour market and the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism vary across countries. Furthermore, the higher educated might, nonetheless, feel competition with migrants on the labour market – be it because of real or perceived reasonings. Overall, education-as-liberation theories underlie specific cultural and economic assumptions that can be readily violated, in particular, in a cross-national setting.

3.4

VARIATIONS ACROSS ECONOMIC CONTEXTS

Importantly, it can additionally be argued from the economic perspective that the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism is nested in country contexts and therefore varies across countries. This is because higher education can be considered an essential indicator of socio-economic status in a given country. Hence, higher levels of education can translate to different positions in society across countries, time and policies, as labour markets differ and change across Europe. Furthermore, it is already known that there are different extents to which the public feels threatened by migrants, which vary by country (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Specifically, resource competition for different education groups varies across countries based on different migration patterns, economic developments and social policies. This means that, following the logic of the self-interest theory, welfare chauvinism can possibly be associated with higher

44

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

levels of welfare chauvinism in countries where the higher social status of the higher educated is more at risk. However, cross-national variation in resource competition may depend, for example, on the labour market structures of a given country. This section examines the importance of having a closer look at salient measurements for economic competition, considering how these could be affected by labour markets and redistribution policies, and why this book consequently focuses on economic prosperity within European countries. To explain this mechanism, it sometimes makes more sense to use the term ‘economic deprivation’. However, it should be kept in mind that European countries are generally characterised by wealthy economies (particularly in comparison to non-European countries), so deprivation should be seen in a more relative way. Overall, the main argument of this section is that economic deprivation in a given country may weaken the positive effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism or possibly reverse that effect. While the economic mechanisms are less straightforward than the cultural mechanisms, the main aim of this section is to demonstrate the importance of including the national context when analysing the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. One of the theoretical approaches to examining whether the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism varies across countries from an economic perspective is the factor proportion model (Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). This model can be helpful for examining how labour market competition can shape the relationship between anti-migrant attitudes and tertiary education. It predicts that the arrival of lower-educated migrants will increase the amount of lower-educated labour. Using this model across Europe, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) have found that the appearance of lower-educated migrants lowers wages or employment for lower-educated natives and increases competition amongst lower-educated natives. In other words, the public imagines the effect of migration to be different depending on their own skills as well as the skills of the migrants. Mayda (2006) has applied the factor proportion model to a worldwide sample and arrived at different findings. Countries where the public is more educated overall than migrants have stronger associations between education and inclusive attitudes towards migrants. In these countries, the higher educated further benefit from the wage effects of migration from lower-educated individuals. Thus, the higher educated may at least imagine that they profit from lower-educated migrants who provide inexpensive service work for them, while additionally helping them to profit from lower wages that have been stagnant in the past decade. Nonetheless, higher-educated individuals also compete against each other in the job or housing market in a given country. Socio-structurally, women

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

45

(Schwander and Häusermann 2013) and younger individuals (Chung, Bekker and Houwing 2012) represent relatively highly educated groups that frequently have precarious positions in European labour markets. Häusermann and others (2014) implicate the growing labour market insecurity amongst highly skilled workers, including the higher educated, across different countries in Europe. According to these authors (2014, 238), ‘a skilled white-collar occupation is no guarantee of employment security and high income anymore.’ Thus, one can argue that labour market competition is not only experienced by the lower educated but also challenges the stability of the economic position of the higher educated in society. Furthermore, nowadays, many countries design migration policies intending to attract highly skilled migrants (who usually hold tertiary education degrees). While there might be a range of reasons for such policies, it is frequently argued that such policies are designed on the basis of increased demand for highly skilled workers and for the increased levels of education of young migrants from high-income countries. This is one of the reasons for the rapid growth of high-skilled migration in the last decades (Cerna and Czaika 2016), especially relative to the pace of overall migration. Overall, this section demonstrates that the relationship between welfare chauvinism and higher education across countries is ambiguous, and the impact of education on welfare chauvinism may vary across countries.

3.5

CULTURAL RATIONALES: THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIAN VALUES

A range of studies attribute welfare chauvinist attitudes to cultural, ideology or identity rationales. Overall, cultural group threat or cultural ideology theories assume that lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for cultural reasons. The literature on welfare chauvinism suggests that the positive relationship between lower socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism might be related to cultural differences amongst lower- and higher-status groups (Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Houtman 2003; van der Waal et al. 2010). According to this explanation, the higher salience of anti-democratic and pro-authoritarian dispositions amongst individuals with a lower socio-economic status makes these individuals more prone to welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007; van der Waal et al. 2010). Some literature suggests that these cultural-ideology rationales are more important than economic rationales. For example, studies show that economic rationales become insignificant once factors like authoritarian attitudes are taken into account (Ford 2016; Hjorth 2015). However, this mainly applies to objective economic factors and less to subjective economic

46

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

factors (Mewes and Mau 2012; van der Waal et al. 2010). A subjective economic factor is, for example, subjective income (see Figure 3.6). Consequently, the prevailing literature points to a range of different individual-level determinants that are related to social cleavages and cultural ideology that might exacerbate welfare chauvinism: for example, lower cultural capital (van der Waal et al. 2010), authoritarian values (Mewes and Mau 2012), perceived ethnic threat, negative stereotypes towards migrants (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002) and radical right voting preferences (de Koster, Achterberg and van der Waal 2013). Although both cultural and economic rationales for welfare chauvinism amongst lower-status groups have gained much attention, it is essential to acknowledge that these factors are intertwined and further determine welfare chauvinism. Figure 3.7 shows the levels of authoritarian attitudes across Europe. To measure authoritarian attitudes, the analyses in this book employed the preference of respondents to follow the rules given to them by authorities unconditionally. Specifically, to measure authoritarian attitudes, the book uses the following survey question: ‘Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you: He believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should follow the rules at all times, even when no-one is watching’ (6 – much like me, to 1 – not like me at all). While there has been much discussion about the measurement of authoritarian attitudes, this book is particularly interested in the social conformity dimension of this concept. A closer look at the differences across countries reveals that the highest levels can be found in Poland, Italy and Norway. This emphasises that authoritarian tendencies are widely spread across Europe and are not only limited to certain countries or regions. The authoritarianism data will be further analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book. Another theory that can explain welfare chauvinism at the individual level is the deservingness theory. According to the deservingness theory, public support for welfare provisions varies depending on who benefits (Larsen 2008; van Oorschot 2000). Such preferences are context dependent, for example, depending on economic and cultural contexts. However, migrants are frequently found to be the least deserving group in European societies. The sick, the elderly or the unemployed have priority when it comes to public preferences for who should be granted access to welfare resources. This is because, regardless of whether or not it is actually true, the public perceives migrants to contribute less to the welfare state, which the researchers refer to as the reciprocity principle that matters for deservingness. The identity principle additionally explains why the public perceives migrants to be less deserving than other groups, as migrants are not perceived to be part of the national community. Lastly, migrants are seen as individuals who made a choice to

Levels of authoritarianism (averages)

Scale ranges from 1 to 6, with 1 being the least authoritarian and 6 being the most authoritarian. European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 37,141. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 3.7

Note: Source:

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public 47

48

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

relocate from one country to another, which the researchers refer to as the control principle. In this book, the deservingness theory is used in particular to demonstrate the overlaps between welfare chauvinism and welfare attitudes (see Chapter 6).

3.6 EDUCATION FROM A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE As explained already, recent studies have emphasised that the relationship between socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism has cultural roots. In other words, different levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher and lower educated might be related to cultural differences between the two groups. This line of literature specifically assumes that the higher salience of pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian dispositions in the higher educated eventually protects this group from welfare chauvinism. While some of this literature focuses theoretically on working-class individuals, cultural roots related to the disposition towards authority and democracy are occasionally used to explain higher-educated individuals’ attitudes. In this context, education systems are frequently defined as the most relevant socialising agent (Collins 1971; Durkheim 1925; Hyman and Wright 1979; Selznick and Steinberg 1969). Hence, educational institutions provide the principal channel by which society teaches its national culture to citizens. This is because the education system is the only institution that has such a broad and inclusive scope that all citizens are required by law to be a part of for several years. Moreover, since educational institutions are demarcated as places of learning, they are seen as well suited for implanting ideology (Jackman 1978; Jackman and Muha 1984). The higher educated, who attend these institutions for a more extended time than the lower educated and particularly attend at the university level, are frequently seen as more progressive, and are therefore seen as more socialised in the national culture of a given country. While this book later emphasises that the national culture can differ across countries and change across time (Inglehart 1990; Mau 2004), the education-as-liberation literature generally considers the national culture that the educational institutions promote to be democratic, multicultural and morally enlightened (Stubager 2008). Furthermore, education is assumed to create more positive contact experiences between natives and migrants, which, in turn, is considered to decrease intolerance towards migrants (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). The longer individuals stay in the education system, the more they are assumed to bestow a culturally tolerant perspective with a broader, more universalistic set of norms. That is how this line of literature explains why higher-educated individuals are frequently found to hold more inclusive migration attitudes than lower-educated individuals (Jenssen and Engesbak 1994).

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

49

On the contrary, fewer years in the educational system have been commonly assumed to bestow a more narrow nationalist and authoritarian strain of thought, particularly in studies from Western countries (Hello, Scheepers and Sleegers 2006; Stouffer 1955; Stubager 2008). This cultural mechanism is further underlined by the literature that assumes the higher educated are cognitively more sophisticated in unveiling misperceptions about migration (Hyman and Wright 1979; Selznick and Steinberg 1969), including being more informed about the positive impact of migration in their communities, and more involved in diverse networks that include migrants (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000), all of which are supposed to lead to higher levels of tolerance towards migrants. Furthermore, individuals with lower educational attainment are assumed to hold more authoritarian views (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Hello, Scheepers and Sleegers 2006; Houtman 2003). Mewes and Mau (2012) argue that the relationship between authoritarianism amongst groups with a lower socio-economic status across Europe and welfare chauvinism is based on new political cleavages that have abandoned the left–right dimension and moved towards the authoritarian–libertarian dimension – in other words, emphasising the cleavage between the higher and lower educated. Authoritarianism amongst lower-status groups is a classical explanation for why these groups are assumed to distance themselves from migrants and hold more negative attitudes towards migrants. These assumptions are based on the authoritarian personality concept by Adorno and others (1950). Here, authoritarianism is defined as a character trait where individuals subordinate themselves to authorities and have subordinates themselves (Adorno et al. 1950). The original research on the authoritarian personality did not assume that authoritarianism develops as an outcome of a specific educational degree but instead in early childhood, because of a particular style of upbringing (Adorno et al. 1950). In other words, authoritarianism is not necessarily a result of lower educational attainment. Nonetheless, studies have long argued that authoritarianism is associated with the working class and particularly with the lower educated in certain countries (Selznick and Steinberg 1969). Moreover, a study by Hello and others (2006) has found for a Dutch sample that authoritarian norms can explain a significant part of the positive relationship between lower levels of education and anti-migrant attitudes. Still, while research has found correlations between lower levels of education and authoritarianism, this might not be a causal relationship. Related to the studies on authoritarianism, Hello and others (2004) have found that it is actually the socialisation process in the family that can explain a significant part of the positive relationship between lower levels of education and anti-migrant attitudes. Specifically, it could be parents’ education, not children’s, that matters. The study by Hello and others (2004) emphasised the

50

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

importance of early socialisation in the family, that may lead to anti-migrant attitudes amongst individuals who grew up in intolerant households. To summarise, while the specific mechanisms around the education-as-liberation mechanism seem more complex than the cultural perspective, the cultural perspective generally assumes that individuals with higher educational attainment have extended exposure to pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian dispositions; and consequently, levels of welfare chauvinism decrease. While there are different definitions of the authoritarian–libertarian dimension, this book is particularly interested in the factor of obedience to traditional ingroup norms that could strengthen national group identity. Higher-educated individuals are frequently thought of as more critical than lower-educated individuals towards the norms and rules presented by the establishment (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988). However, several researchers argue the opposite; that is, that the educational system teaches students that they must obey and trust in authorities. Jackman and Muha (1984) argue that the education system is extremely hierarchical, particularly the tertiary education system. As others have noted, the structure of educational institutions is neither democratic nor teaches students to be less faithful towards authorities (Merelman 1980). In the latter case, it can also be argued that the educational system teaches students to place faith in authorities, which can be seen as a form of institutional trust. According to Jackman and Muha (1984: 761), ‘Students are graded into classes according to their demonstrated ability and level of advancement; students are subject to the authority of teachers who are themselves graded in a hierarchy based on achievement and advancement in the system. Not only does this provide a microcosm of the system of social inequality in the larger society, it additionally establishes knowledge and expertise as a legitimate basis for authority.’ In other words, those who receive relatively short exposure to the formal education system only learn basic principles. There is the significant realisation that others know more than them, which is reinforced regularly in their daily lives, for example by the negative press published about the lower educated on a regular basis (Chapter 1). Related to welfare chauvinism, values such as equal opportunities for all may be readily overruled when talking about solidarity with migrants, which can additionally be assumed to apply to the higher educated. This is because those individuals who advance further in the educational system to the tertiary level implicitly may understand that the authority bestowed upon them is a result of their individual achievements and that they deserve a more privileged position in society. While it can be seen that the higher educated are more familiar with dominant hierarchies and the national culture, this book focuses on the question of whether the positive correlations found in the literature between higher education and welfare chauvinism are based on internalised norms or, rather,

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

51

based on a superficial commitment to these norms in order to be politically correct and preserve the status quo (from which the individuals with higher socio-economic status arguably profit the most). In other words, is it possible that when finding educational effects, these are driven by another factor than higher education entirely? For example, it is known from research that anti-migrant attitudes and racism are widespread on university campuses (Kassis et al. 2014). Therefore, it may be worth questioning whether the alleged impact of education on more pro-migration attitudes is real or superficial. Even though the education-as-liberation assumption is prevalent today, this assumption has been challenged in previous literature. One of the early critics of the socialisation theory was Jacob (1957), who argued that the value changes brought by higher education are not internalised. For Jacob (1957), higher education represents superficial socialisation that is only sufficient to allow individuals to comfortably fit in with the societal expectations of higher educational attainment. In line with this, a range of scholars argue that, while education may indeed increase an individual’s commitment to democratic norms, this may only happen at a superficial level (Condran 1979; Jackman 1978; Jackman and Muha 1984; Merelman 1980). In this literature, national education systems can merely refine attitudes to fit into the prevailing national norms, but education cannot significantly change attitudes. In other words, with time, the higher educated will have the same attitudes as the lower educated (Chapter 5). Jackman and Muha (1984) even suggest that higher-educated individuals are one step ahead of lower-educated individuals in developing a defence of their self-interests that is based on their qualification, individualism and symbolic concessions. The researchers conclude that ‘to call this process a liberalisation of student values is a misnomer’ (1984, 752). According to Condran (1979, 474), higher-educated individuals ‘may have simply improved their conformity to the increasingly institutionalised normative standards of an officially ‘liberal’ society’ but are not actively willing to sacrifice their own status to actually realise these principles. In the case of this book, one could argue that the higher educated may express more positive attitudes towards granting migrants access to equal social rights because it is seen as politically correct rather than because they are actually willing to share their own privileges with migrants. In the more recent literature on anti-migrant attitudes, this education-assuperficial-commitment argument has frequently been tested in the literature on social desirability bias. This is a type of response bias in which certain respondents incline to answer in a way they consider to be more socially acceptable than would be their true answer. In particular, higher-educated individuals are likely to respond favourably towards migrants to appear more politically correct, unprejudiced and enlightened (An 2015; Heerwig and McCabe 2009). Therefore, it is possible that higher-educated individuals may

52

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

feel a need to hide their true attitudes when welfare chauvinism is not widely accepted in society. Consequently, those in countries where welfare chauvinism is not normalised may continue to hold such attitudes but would not necessarily feel that those attitudes can be voiced.

3.7

VARIATIONS ACROSS CULTURAL CONTEXTS

One of the main arguments of this book is that one must consider that the assumptions of socialisation theories are nested in cultural national contexts when examining the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across Europe. Cross-national variances in societal norms have already been well established in the literature (Inglehart 1990; Mau 2004). This is because a country’s historical, welfare and political tradition shapes such norms (Esping-Andersen 1990). Hence, the norms a country’s educational system transmits reflect the existing symbols, national images and socio-economic structures. In particular, according to Hello and others (2002, 7), a ‘country’s communal leaders determine to a certain degree which norms and values are transmitted at school.’ This section is about the importance of having a closer look at salient measurements for cultural norms, how these could be affected by democratic norms and radical right politics, and why this book consequently focuses on authoritarian norms within European countries. Overall, the main argument of this section is that authoritarian norms in a given country may weaken the positive effect that higher education has on welfare chauvinism or, possibly, reverse that effect. To understand why it is assumed that educational institutions transmit national norms, ideally one would need to return to the emergence of the modern educational system that happened when the modern nation-state was created (Mitter 1993). Furthermore, integrating civic education with national education had an important impact on modern educational systems. According to Hjerm (2003), this is how the educational system was used not only to transfer knowledge but also to encourage faith in the nation-state as well as loyalty towards higher-status groups and elites, which, once more, determine the official culture, tradition and norms of a nation-state. One could go as far as to argue that the educational system therefore transfers, imposes and strengthens an unequal and nationalistic belief system in society. Notably, it can be additionally argued from the cultural perspective that the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism is nested in country contexts and therefore varies across countries. This is because higher education transmits dominant norms to individuals. Hence, higher levels of education can translate to different norms in society across countries, as norms differ across Europe (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2001).

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

53

Generally, educational systems are one of the institutions socialising individuals into a certain country’s society, which is shaped through a partly imagined history. According to Hjerm (2001, 38), ‘the education system operates with a single dominant language and with the use of national images and tokens that transform and celebrate the modern nation-state.’ Nonetheless, in certain countries, the educational system’s operation is closely intertwined with other national discourses and thus is not as salient for the public. For example, former countries in Eastern Europe were relatively outspoken about such practices. However, similar practices happened when modern welfare states in Western European countries emerged. Coleman (1965) considers the educational system to carry out essential functions in the wider political system. Such functions may include, (1) socialising the young into the political culture; (2) selecting, recruiting and training political elites; and (3) making the public believe they belong together, which can additionally be called nation-building or political integration. Massialas (1969) further elaborates on the relationship between education and the political order. The main argument is that a political system, to survive, needs support from its citizens. Frequently, the education system undertakes this task by politically socialising the public. Hence, the political system can maintain its existence and continuity by shaping the political orientations of its citizens through the education system. The education system is ideal for this task, as each young person participates in this system for a longer or shorter time. Without this strong connection between the educational system and the nation-state, it is possible that the norms transmitted through the educational system or other social agencies (for example, friends and family) do not support the nation-state. This could then lead to the change or collapse of the nation-state, as demands for new norms would arise. In line with these arguments, other prominent scholars, such as Foucault (1995) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), have long argued that the educational system serves as a tool for the elites in society. Consequently, it is vital to question the nature of the education system liberalising public attitudes. Schleicher (1993) also acknowledges that the education system is closely intertwined with the nation-state. However, he (1993) argues that there is another side to the education system that is closer to what has been previously discussed in this book: the educational system is also expected to socialise individuals into democratic and multicultural norms. Many modern democracies make this an official aim of their educational systems. Nonetheless, officially making it a purpose to transfer tolerant norms does not mean that the educational systems are successful in accomplishing such a task. For example, although multiculturalism may be a national symbol, the public might not be aware of this, as this symbol may be hidden in discourses around racism and xenophobia (Hjerm 2001). Furthermore, according to Schleicher (1993, 39),

54

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

‘[e]ducational systems are not able to change their context as far as political and economic structures or national values and clichés are concerned. At best, they have limited influence on nationalistic or ethnic behaviour.’ Consequently, the education-as-liberation assumption encounters two problems. First, it seems questionable whether the educational system promotes pro-migrant norms. Second, it appears uncertain whether the educational system truly affects norms towards migrants. Generally, one can assume heterogeneity across countries regarding higher education systems; therefore, it is vital to examine the cultural national context. This is because a country’s education system represents the conventional norms and values of a particular nation. Therefore, country differences may systematically affect which norms and values towards migrants may be transmitted. Overall, one can assume that different countries transmit different norms and values through their education systems. Previous research has found that cultural contexts might shape the educational divide on anti-migrant attitudes (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2003; Weil 1985). One can expect similar mechanisms for the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Finally, if one examines the development of higher education institutions in Europe across time, there are signs of substantial institutional change. While public discourse emphasises the notion that universities indoctrinate their students with radical left norms, progressive and pro-migrant ideology (see Chapter 1), the academic literature tells a different story. A substantial body of literature argues that universities are finding themselves in a position of ‘moral loss’ and require ‘moral reconstruction’ (Brady 2012). This moral loss is frequently attributed to the neoliberalisation of modern universities, which, in Europe, is often discussed using the example of the higher education system in the United Kingdom. Critics assert that the tertiary education of recent decades has altered higher education institutions as assistants and students as customers in the knowledge economy (Naidoo and Jamieson 2007). Although there are national differences across Europe, one can see that neoliberal education policies attempt – more or less successfully – to erode the important autonomy of tertiary education institutions. This is done by removing power from institutions and giving increased power to marketplaces. Therefore, the utilitarian preoccupation might be eroding what is supposed to be the main mission of a tertiary education institution, the promotion of learning through critical thinking and research (Brady 2012). One of the main concerns is that learning may suffer from students’ focus on their degree classifications and managements’ focus on positions on university league tables such as the ‘Times Higher Education World University Rankings’ or the ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities’, that assess the performance of universities and specific subjects on several quantitative

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

55

indicators. Consequently, researchers agree that the (partial) marketisation of universities has had a negative impact on interpersonal interactions and learning experiences in academia (Naidoo and Jamieson 2007). In other words, as a consequence of the neoliberalisation of higher education systems, the system may have shifted in terms of priorities, from normative to utilitarian aims. Such a development fundamentally disagrees with an institutional aim to universally transmit tolerance and democracy. One can consider – if it were the case at one point – that the role of the education system as a socialising agent has changed regarding what values and beliefs it transmits and that there may be differences in how such alterations have been implemented across countries. The critique towards the relationship between nation-states and higher education systems demonstrates the need to question the education-as-liberation literature further. In particular, previous research has found that democratic norms and values can shape the relationship between anti-migrant attitudes and education. This assumption aligns with socialisation theories that assume a country transmits democratic norms and values through education. This section demonstrates the importance of having a closer look at salient measurements for democratic norms, how these could be affected by radical right politics and why this book ultimately takes a closer look at authoritarian norms within European countries. To conclude this section, the higher educated appear to be more socialised in the national culture. Still, one cannot be sure whether this culture is internalised, or if the attitudes of the higher educated merely reflect the pressure of political correctness or the pressure of avoiding language or actions that can be offensive to discriminated groups in society. In other words, higher education may not produce more pro-migrant individuals per se, it might socialise individuals into a given national culture. Overall, this section also demonstrates that the relationship between welfare chauvinism and higher education across countries is ambiguous, and the impact of education on welfare chauvinism may vary across countries. What is puzzling about the findings from the group threat theories from an economic and cultural perspective is the underlying assumption that economically higher-status groups or culturally more tolerant groups are immune from welfare chauvinism. One could argue that the opposite mechanism is in place. For example, from an economic perspective, higher-status groups are not willing to contribute to a welfare system that supports mainly lower-status groups. One could also argue that access to welfare resources is more normalised for lower-status than for higher-status groups, and that lower-status groups identify with others who claim access to such resources. The next section elaborates more on these contradictions about the higher educated.

56

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

However, more dynamic mechanisms might be in place than are generally assumed in the literature and these mechanisms will be examined in this book.

3.8

INSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES: THE POWER OF GOVERNMENTS

Comparative research additionally points to a range of different contextual-level determinants that might exacerbate welfare chauvinism; these are again related to various economic and cultural rationales. One prominent way of explaining welfare chauvinism at the contextual level is determining whether welfare states influence welfare chauvinist attitudes. Crepaz and Damron’s (2009) and van der Waal and others (2013) argue that the levels of welfare chauvinism are the lowest in social-democratic welfare states. In contrast, they argue that the levels of welfare chauvinism are the highest in liberal welfare states. Other studies on contextual-level determinants for welfare chauvinism demonstrate that lower unemployment rates (Mau and Burkhardt 2009), a higher gross domestic product (GDP) (Mewes and Mau 2012), higher levels of social globalisation (Mewes and Mau 2013) and higher levels of asylum seekers are associated with lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Heizmann, Jedinger and Perry 2018). Furthermore, Eger, Larsen and Mewes (2020) have found that changes across time in particular contexts are related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism, such as increases in the share of the foreign-born population and a shift in public opinion regarding the importance of migration as an issue. Contextual-level determinants that might exacerbate welfare chauvinism additionally allow for a more dynamic approach. Both Mau (2003, 2004) and Larsen (2008) have argued that institutional contexts shape individual economic and cultural divisions on welfare issues. Overall, it can be seen that while the current literature demonstrates a large number of determinants for welfare chauvinism, the most widely emphasised determinant is the socio-economic status, particularly education. However, as also explained in this chapter, the impact of higher education may not be expected when certain assumptions of the self-interest and cultural ideology rationales are violated. Of these assumptions, two aspects can be focused on. First, questioning the economic position where the higher educated are assumed to have an economic advantage in comparison to their lower-educated counterparts. In economically less affluent countries, higher education might not lead to less welfare chauvinism. Second, whether higher education leads to the rejection of authoritarian values and how accepting social norms frequently results in welfare chauvinism can be questioned. In countries where radical right values and authoritarianism are prevalent, higher education might not lead to less welfare chauvinism. Of course, there is a range of contexts that can shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, such

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

57

as migration policies or social policies. These factors will also be taken into consideration for the analysis in the next chapters of this book. National and cross-national analyses frequently include education amongst the predictors of welfare chauvinism. However, the studies that assume an education-as-liberation effect have several limitations, such as the conceptualisation of specific variables, their methodologies and their sample sizes. Several studies also imply that the relationship between anti-migrant attitudes and education is shaped by national contexts. Still, there has been limited evidence for effects related to cultural ideology (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Weil 1985) and self-interest (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002) on cross-national variances in the educational effect on anti-migrant attitudes. This book builds on these studies and aims to add further theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to it.

3.9

VARIATION ACROSS NATIONAL CONTEXTS

A majority of research suggests that an association between higher education and welfare chauvinism exists but that this association rests on unexamined assumptions and mistakes correspondence for causality. This book aims to scrutinise the widely proven positive relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. It is argued that the missing link between tertiary education and anti-migrant attitudes involves the national cultural and economic contexts in which these attitudes are formed, as visualised in the analytical framework in Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1. The previous sections presented the finding that whether cultural norms and economic deprivation encourage or limit welfare chauvinism largely depends on the national context examined. On the one hand, the socialisation theory is based on the assumption that societies have pro-migrant values that are actively transmitted through education systems. Only if society holds pro-migrant values can an explanation be given for time spent in the education system relating to being exposed to more pro-migrant values. On the other hand, many anti-migration theories focus their explanations on the concept of self-interest, which is also related to the context (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009). Thus, anti-migrant attitudes arise when individuals are directly affected by real or perceived issues that surround migration, such as a threat to the job market or the housing market. However, on the basis of these previous theories, the cross-national variation of the role of higher education is inevitable because of differences in cultural norms and economic deprivation across countries. This gap has yet to be addressed in full in prior literature. This section emphasises yet again that individuals’ self-interest and cultural ideology vary across countries and that national institutional contexts are

58

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

a frequently overlooked and underestimated missing link between anti-migrant attitudes and education. Generally, the argument is that it is neither economic nor cultural determinants that matter more when examining anti-migrant attitudes, as these determinants often intersect. Therefore, this book analyses economic and cultural determinants as complementary patterns. This analysis is done by first examining possible variations in economic competition across countries and then exploring possible variations in cultural norms that shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. The statistical approach of multilevel modelling has increased the understanding of such relationships. Therefore, when possible, this book will also make use of this methodology to disentangle how public opinion is shaped individual and contextual factors. A vast amount of research supports the assumption that individuals’ attitudes are shaped not only by individual-level characteristics but also by national institutional contexts. Other scholars, such as Larsen (2008), emphasise a dynamic relationship between attitudes and institutional structures too. And Svallfors (2007) explains that institutions also (besides individual-level characteristics) affect perceptions and norms in three ways: (1) how visible social phenomena are; (2) what the public perceives as politically possible to achieve in a given setting; and (3) by embodying, and therefore creating, norms about what is perceived by the public as fair and just. Therefore, it is essential to consider institutional effects when examining the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. While recently researchers have additionally identified a variation of the educational impact on anti-migrant attitudes in other contexts such as federal states, universities, faculties, curriculum and teaching (Hjerm, Eger and Danell 2018), this book focuses on the country context, as this context has previously been shown to be the most eminent context when examining European societies (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

CONCLUSIONS Overall, there are three prominent explanations for welfare chauvinist attitudes, which can be argued to be non-competing. First, self-interest theories assume that lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for economic reasons. Second, cultural ideology theories assume that lower-status groups feel more threatened by migrants for cultural reasons. Thirdly, institutional context theories point to a range of different contextual-level determinants that might exacerbate welfare chauvinism. This book argues that such institutional context levels can shape the relationship between self-interest/ cultural ideology and socio-economic status, and in particular education. For example, in countries with generous welfare support, individuals with lower

Explanations for welfare chauvinism in the public

59

socio-economic status might not fear as much competition from migrants as in countries where welfare support is scarce. The next three chapters present novel analyses on welfare chauvinism in Europe across countries, time and policies, with a focus on disentangling how public attitudes towards welfare chauvinism are shaped by education, economy and culture.

4. Welfare chauvinism across countries 4.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter empirically challenges the assumption that groups with relatively low socio-economic status are the key drivers of welfare chauvinism across Europe. While higher levels of education are frequently conflated with more economic stability and more tolerant attitudes, a gap remains in the welfare chauvinism literature in closely examining higher education as a predictor. In particular, the chapter adopts tertiary education (referred to as ‘higher education’) as an indicator of socio-economic status because higher education is increasingly considered a basis for social division, an agent for change across Europe and an influential factor impacting attitudes. As explained before, compared with their lower-educated counterparts, the higher educated are generally regarded as less welfare chauvinistic and more typically inclusive of migrants. Moreover, research has suggested that the negative relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism may be explained by the material privileges – which lower-educated individuals may lack – of higher-educated individuals, which may be decisive in preventing their adoption of the welfare chauvinist attitude (Achterberg and Houtman 2006). From the perspective of self-interest, lower levels of real or perceived competition for rare resources may inoculate the higher educated against the preference to exclude migrants. Thus, individuals in more privileged economic situations are expected to be less prone to welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2013). Other studies have contended that the role of differences in cultural ideology between the higher and the lower educated is the dispositive factor (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007); the higher salience of pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian attitudes tends to prevent welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated (Mewes and Mau 2012). The education-as-liberalisation evidence is compelling, but it needs to be considered that differences in experiences and attitudes make it less likely in the first place for the lower educated to benefit from educational and occupational opportunities, which are necessary to improve their socio-economic positions. This leads to a cycle of deprivation that limits opportunities and threatens social cohesion (Manstead 2018). Furthermore, the previous studies have mostly been based on simple correlations between higher education and 60

Welfare chauvinism across countries

61

welfare chauvinism. Researchers have often neglected to consider how groups with higher socio-economic status, including the higher educated, also hold relatively high levels of welfare chauvinism. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a surge in exclusionary attitudes towards migrants during times of increasing levels of higher education and economic prosperity in European societies is thus a perplexing problem for scholars (Mols and Jetten 2017). The prevalence of welfare chauvinism amongst higher-educated individuals has been additionally surprising in times when increasing levels of migration have led to more contact with migrants through education. This chapter argues that welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated is underestimated in many academic narratives. The overlooked link between higher education and such attitudes involves certain national contexts in which these attitudes are formed. Specifically, the first aim of this chapter is to examine how cross-national variances in education attainment influence attitudes towards welfare chauvinism; a few studies have previously demonstrated significant variations in the impact of education on ethnic prejudice across Europe (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2001). Research on welfare chauvinism has been frequently conducted in countries where more education is associated with more liberalised norms and an advantage in the labour market. Both national and cross-national analyses of welfare chauvinism have routinely included higher education amongst the predictors, and minimal research has been devoted to how national contexts shape the divide between lower- and higher-educated individuals across Europe. By adopting a cross-national perspective, this book aims to reveal that these assumptions are violated when evaluated across a broader range of countries. This is explained in this chapter. Furthermore, self-interest and cultural ideology may lead to higher levels of welfare chauvinism amongst higher-educated individuals in certain economic and cultural national contexts. Therefore, this chapter further explains these cross-national variations in educational divides in welfare chauvinism through context variables with a focus on the cross-national variance in economic prosperity and authoritarian norms. The argument is that where there would be lower levels of economic prosperity and where higher levels of authoritarian norms would be more of a concern for higher-educated individuals, the educational divide between the higher and lower educated would be smaller and vice versa. Using this critical theoretical and methodological perspective, the analysis provides a timely re-evaluation of the role that higher education plays in shaping welfare chauvinism. Given the ambiguous relationship between welfare chauvinism and education across countries, the first arguments of this chapter are as follows:

62

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

• Both lower-educated and many higher-educated individuals hold views of welfare chauvinism across European countries. • The impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism varies across countries.

4.2

DIFFERENT LEVELS ACROSS COUNTRIES

As explained before, this book follows the approach used in comparative welfare studies of examining attitudes towards migrants using international survey data and comparing welfare chauvinism across different countries in Europe. For the purposes of most of the analyses in this book the term welfare chauvinism refers to the public opposition to granting migrants access to welfare provisions. The focus in this and the following two Chapters is welfare chauvinism in the extreme sense, where it refers to the support for excluding migrants who have not yet acquired citizenship in their country of residence to have any access to welfare provisions or excluding migrants from accessing these welfare provisions altogether. The question on welfare chauvinism that was already shown in Figure 3.1 from the European Social Survey 2016/2017 was: ‘Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to welfare provisions as citizens already living here?’ The following answer categories are provided: (1) immediately on arrival; (2) after living in [country] for a year whether or not they have worked; (3) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (4) once they have become a citizen; and (5) they should never get the same rights. This question has been interpreted in different forms in the literature: as ordinal (Mewes and Mau 2013), nominal (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012) and binary (Heizmann et al. 2018). For most of the analyses in this book, a binary variable was used to indicate either ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ (1) (category 4–5) or ‘(Conditional) welfare provisions for migrants’ (0) (category 1–3). This grouping is in line with the welfare chauvinism definition of this book. The reason for this grouping was that making welfare benefits and services contingent on citizenship across Europe can make it difficult or impossible for ‘people coming to live in [country]’ to qualify to receive welfare benefits. Acquiring citizenship is a much more significant obstacle than, for instance, working and paying taxes for a year (category 3). This is further emphasised, as the item implicitly refers to first-generation migrants (‘people coming to live in [country] from other countries’) who usually do not have an automatic right to citizenship. Simultaneously, it could be further argued that citizenship is an indicator of integration (van Oorschot 2006). This may be the case, as acquiring citizenship generally requires passing tests about

Welfare chauvinism across countries

Source:

63

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,219. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 4.1

Levels of welfare chauvinism: ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ (in percentage)

the language, culture and law of the country. However, making access to social benefits and services dependent on integration can be seen as problematic, particularly in light of radical right movements around. To demonstrate that the interpretation of the dependent variable did not change the overall results for the analysis, a range of robustness checks was conducted. Amongst others, ordinal models that take all the five answer categories separately into account were tested too. Generally, it is important to keep in mind that this welfare chauvinism item from the survey refers to five specific conditions under which the public would grant migrants access to welfare states’ benefits and services. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the item cannot capture all the complexities that are involved in the policy-making process. For example, it cannot capture how generous welfare provisions for migrants should be. Additionally, one could be concerned about measurement variance, as in how individuals respond in different countries. For example, the fact that countries have different requirements to become a citizen might give this category different meanings per country. As previously mentioned, the item also does not differentiate amongst different groups of migrants or different welfare policies, and the book will address this in detail in Chapter 6. However, such concerns are unavoidable

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

64

when conducting comparative research, and the amount of research undertaken on this item demonstrate how meaningful it is to critically analyse it. Figure 4.1 shows country-specific attitudes towards excluding all migrants from welfare provisions (hence category 4 or 5) across the available 22 European countries for the total population. The results demonstrate that welfare chauvinism is widespread overall across Europe (39.21 per cent). However, as expected, levels of welfare chauvinism varied significantly. Figure 4.1 additionally shows that the share of respondents who wished to exclude all non-citizens and migrants indefinitely from welfare provisions is as high as 20.56 per cent to 58.92 per cent of the respondents in different countries agreeing with such views. These views are mainly observed in certain countries in Eastern Europe, such as Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, but are additionally observed in Western and Southern European countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Finland and Austria. Hence, the usual East–West divide underestimates how widespread welfare chauvinism is already across the continent. In the next step, the overall educational divide between the higher and lower educated on welfare chauvinism is examined.

Source:

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,219. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 4.2

Welfare chauvinism, all categories (in percentage)

Welfare chauvinism across countries

65

The five detailed answers in Figure 4.2 demonstrate that the most popular reply across Europe, with 42.15 per cent, is actually to grant migrants access to social benefits and services after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year. These preferences reflect the conditional and selective nature of contemporary welfare states. It is difficult to say whether respondents would apply the same conditionality for natives since the question does not cover this issue. But Chapter 6 will show that such preferences vary significantly according to which policy is covered.

4.3

WELFARE CHAUVINISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION ACROSS COUNTRIES

As explained in Chapter 2, communities in modern welfare states have become less homogenous due to increasing levels of migration in a lot of countries across Europe. Nevertheless, migrants are frequently seen as outsiders by nationals and are consequently more often excluded from the welfare state. Part of the success of the new radical rights parties that emerged over the past three decades can be attributed to a general support of the welfare state combined with an opposition to allowing migrants to benefit from that system (Eger and Valdez 2015). For a majority of individuals who hold views of welfare chauvinism, the welfare system as such is not a concern; instead, the concern is the inclusion of individuals who have migrated to a country and wish to benefit from welfare. This is not to say, of course, that individuals who hold welfare chauvinist attitudes do not oppose the welfare state in general. Again, Chapter 6 will dive deeper into this issue. As elaborated in Chapter 3, prominent welfare state theories suggest that individuals with a lower socio-economic status tend to generally be more supportive of redistributive social policies (Korpi 1983). However, when it comes to sharing welfare resources with migrants, studies have contended that this group is more prone to anti-migrant attitudes and consequently welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012). This chapter argues that the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism is more complex than described in the literature; moreover, both anti-migrant attitudes and welfare attitudes literatures must be taken into account when examining welfare chauvinism. For example, from a self-interest perspective, lower-educated individuals may be assumed to hold higher levels of welfare chauvinism because they are more likely to experience resource competition with migrants (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Still, they additionally tend to be the group in Europe that pays fewer taxes and is more supportive of basic income provisions (Roosma and van Oorschot 2020). From an ideological perspective, lower-educated individuals may be expected to be more welfare chauvinistic because they identify more strongly with the national community (Mewes and Mau 2012).

66

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

They may also be expected to be less welfare chauvinistic because they can identify more with other vulnerable groups, such as migrants, that are in need of welfare provisions (Kros and Coenders 2019). Despite these tensions, the positive effect of higher education on attitudes towards migrants is frequently described as universal (Hyman and Wright 1979; Jenssen and Engesbak 1994), and the literature on welfare chauvinism has yet to challenge this assumption. This chapter argues that a universal effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism is highly unlikely from a cross-national perspective. First, levels of welfare chauvinism vary significantly across countries and depend on a range of national contexts (de Koster, Achterberg and van der Waal 2013; Mewes and Mau 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; van der Waal et al. 2010). Second, national contexts have additionally been proven to shape the relationship between education and prejudice towards migrants (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2004). Third, the higher educated have been found to be more sensitive to pressure to be politically correct. In particular, higher-educated individuals are likely to respond favourably to questions assessing attitudes concerning migrants to appear more politically correct, unprejudiced and enlightened (Jackman and Muha 1984). Consequently, higher-educated individuals may feel a need to hide their true attitudes when welfare chauvinism is not widely accepted in society. In other words, higher education may not be an agent that significantly changes attitudes but rather one that merely refines attitudes in order for these attitudes to be suitable for the dominant societal norms. In that sense, the higher educated may be one step ahead of their lower-educated counterparts in developing a defence of their interests that rests on qualification, individualism and symbolic concessions. Hence, the higher educated in countries where welfare chauvinism is not normalised may continue to hold such attitudes but may not necessarily feel at liberty to voice them. Given the ambiguous relationship between welfare chauvinism and education across countries, the chapter will further examine it.

4.4

THE EDUCATION GAP

As explained before, the literature has generally assumed that higher education has a positive impact on welfare chauvinism in Europe. However, this book critically examines this education-as-liberation assumption and argues that the impact of higher education and welfare chauvinism varies across countries. This means it is expected that there might be countries in which the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism would be negative. In the European Social Survey, the participants’ level of higher education is generally measured by four variables: (1) a simple question on whether the respondent had a formal education; (2) what age the respondent left school; (3)

Welfare chauvinism across countries

67

the respondent’s highest educational level attained; and (4) the International Standard Classification of Education. For this book, the first variable does not provide sufficient information to examine the effects of tertiary education on welfare chauvinism. The information about the respondent’s age is necessary for providing more detail about their educational level. This is because the various educational systems across Europe are different regarding the age at which individuals leave school. For the same reason, it was also decided that the question about the respondent’s highest educational level cannot be used for this book, as it is not cross-nationally comparable. Therefore, the ideal available proxy for respondents’ level of education is the variable measuring the International Standard Classification of Education, which standardised the respondent’s highest educational level for all countries in the sample. The International Standard Classification of Education item provides comparable definitions for international educational qualifications. As a result, it facilitates comparisons of education systems across countries. It is commonly used in comparative research, including cross-national studies on welfare chauvinism (Heizmann et al. 2018). Therefore, it was ideal for the analysis in this book. The survey item includes seven categories: (1) pre-primary education; (2) primary education; (3) lower secondary education; (4) upper secondary education; (5) post-secondary, non-tertiary education; (6) first-stage tertiary education; and (7) second-stage tertiary education. The first stage of tertiary education is defined as academically based or practically oriented and includes short-cycle academic, undergraduate and postgraduate degrees below the doctorate level. The second stage of tertiary education is defined as advanced academic degrees equivalent to the doctorate level and habilitation. Chapter 3 discussed the issue of previous research measuring exclusive attitudes towards migrants based on tertiary education. One particular issue is the measurement of education using a linear scale. For example, if the International Standard Classification of Education item from the European Social Survey is used as a linear scale, one would assume that the distance between the educational levels is the same. However, this book considers the fact that it is not a priori certain to expect that these levels have the same distance to each other. Given the fact that tertiary education seems to be a step-change in welfare chauvinism and that the academic and societal discourses surrounding higher education frequently define it as a step-change regarding cultural and economic factors, this book mainly models education as a binary variable. It defines a binary variable using the International Standard Classification of Education, indicating that individuals have either (1) higher education (tertiary degree and above), or (0) lower education (below tertiary degree). While a more detailed coding of this variable could give further insight into a possible linear relationship between education and welfare chauvinism, the binary coding reflects the academic and societal discourses surrounding higher

68

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

education as a superior socio-economic status, and the coding is methodologically more feasible considering the limited amount of respondents for each category. It would have been interesting to examine different graduates with different university degrees, as one could expect that certain degrees might be less likely to promote or mitigate welfare chauvinist attitudes. However, the available data does not include such fine-grained data on respondents. The takeaway from the average difference between the higher and the lower educated across Europe in Figure 4.3 is simple: the higher educated in the sample had lower levels of welfare chauvinism than the lower educated. More specifically, the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated are 7.11 per cent lower than amongst the lower educated. This observation aligns with most of the literature on welfare chauvinism across Europe (van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 2013). However, contrary to current thought, the difference is relatively minor. Specifically, the difference is not as sizeable as one would expect based on the education-as-liberation view of exclusive attitudes towards migrants. After all, the results demonstrate that more than every third higher-educated individual across Europe holds preferences for not granting migrants welfare provisions under any circumstance. Since the previous studies have used empirical models that have not differentiated these levels in different countries, it has not been surprising that the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism is commonly significantly negative (Chapter 3). For this reason, this book went a step further and analysed variances across countries to offer a different perspective on the educational gap between the higher and lower educated. Figure 4.3 additionally presents the welfare chauvinism levels of higher- and lower-educated individuals across 22 countries. The distribution of welfare chauvinism amongst higher- and lower-educated individuals appear to undermine the common assumption concerning the universal effect of education. First, although in a majority of countries higher-educated individuals are found to hold lower levels of welfare chauvinism than lower-educated individuals, the educational divide varied. In Russia and Finland, the higher educated are found to show more welfare chauvinism than their lower-educated counterparts. Second, variations in welfare chauvinism appear much larger across countries than across educational groups, which emphasises the importance of national contexts. Overall, these first observations confirmed that both lower- and higher-educated individuals would hold considerable levels of welfare chauvinism in certain countries. The results concerning the divide between higher- and lower-educated individuals with respect to a country’s average welfare chauvinism revealed a general tendency: the higher the average prevalence of welfare chauvinism in a country, the lower the educational divide. It may be possible to argue that the results stemmed from an East–West divide across Europe. However, the results additionally demonstrate that Northern and Western European

Educational gaps for ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ across countries (in percentage)

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 4.3

Source:

Welfare chauvinism across countries 69

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

70

Source:

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 4.4

Source:

Educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe (in percentage)

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 4.5

More detailed educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe (in percentage)

Welfare chauvinism across countries

71

countries show more prevalence in welfare chauvinism and lower educational divides. However, this should not come as a surprise, as studies have previously shown that, including in Nordic countries, ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects support for redistribution (Eger 2010). Others may argue that the prevalence of welfare chauvinism is related to the level of tertiary education in a given country, but (through multilevel analysis) further analysis finds no such proof. This finding is supported by longitudinal studies demonstrating no relationship between educational expansion and a decrease in ethnic prejudice (Thijs, Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2018). The next step in the analysis is to systematically examine these descriptive results through the multilevel analysis, starting with the individual-level effects. Looking at the five detailed answer possibilities in Figure 4.4, it becomes clear that the tertiary and non-tertiary respondents have even more nuanced differences in their attitudes. Particularly, the tertiary educated are more likely to respond that migrants should get access to social benefits and services immediately on arrival, while the non-tertiary educated are more likely to respond that migrants should never get the same rights. Still, it could be possible that the two groups are thinking of different kinds of social policies since the questions could be more specific. Figure 4.5 zooms into the different education levels in more detail. There are some differences between the levels, but overall the most considerable distinction is the tertiary-educated respondents versus the rest. Particularly with the most extreme answer about never granting migrants the same right, it appears that the higher the education levels, the less likely respondents are to give this answer. Notably, individuals with a doctoral degree or habilitation seem to have slightly higher levels of welfare chauvinism than individuals with an undergraduate or postgraduate degree.

4.5

EDUCATION AS THE MAIN DIVIDER?

In the first step of the multilevel analysis, the empty model is estimated to reveal how much the preference for welfare chauvinism can be explained by country differences (Table 4.1, Model 0). Here, a normal distribution of the dependent variable is assumed and an approximate indication of the ICC is 8.4 per cent. This means a considerable share of the variation in welfare chauvinism can be explained not by differences between individuals but by between-country differences. When adding the effect of higher education to the empty model (Table 4.1, Model 1), it becomes clear that higher education generally had a significant negative effect on welfare chauvinism, meaning that higher-educated individuals overall had lower levels of welfare chauvinism than lower-educated individuals across the 22 countries in the sample.

S.E.: standard error. Sig.:

p < 0.001;

**

8.3%

8.1%

7.4%

7.3%

.032

.017

.084

.110

.009

.011

.013

.001

.025

.304

.018

.029

.045

.050

.011

.056

S.E.

p < 0.01; p < 0.05; † p < .10.  Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N = 29,693; level 2 N = 22. *

8.4%

***

-18793.431

.262*

-.473

ICC

-.18896.345

.081

.110

-18777.586

-19402.058

.264*

-.467

-19459.399

.116

Log-Likelihood

.290*

-.472

.073*

.092

Co-variance (slope/intercept)

.300*

***

.049***

.139***

-.092***

.002

*

-.066**

-1.442***

-.128***

.047

-.088

*

-.057

-.034**

-.214***

Coeff.

.044*

.093

.012

.013

.001

.025

.304

.018

.029

.045

.050

.010

.031

S.E.

Model 4 +Random slope

Random slope variance (education)

-.478

.303*

Between-country variance

.048***

Authoritarian attitudes (1–6)

Intercept

.140***

Egalitarian attitudes (1–6)

***

-.093***

***

-.002

.001

**

-.063**

-1.443

-.129***

.025

.303

.018

Welfare attitudes (1–5)

.117

.002

Age (in years)

-.474

.088***

Male (Ref.: no)

**

-1.440***

Migration background (Ref.: no) **

-.123***

Subjective income (1–4)

.049*

-.094

.066*

Unemployment exp. (Ref.: no) .029

.045

-.108

Father tertiary edu. (Ref.: no) *

*

-.032**

-.176***

Coeff.

-.051

.010

.031

S.E.

.049

-.212***

Coeff.

-.063

.029

S.E.

Mother tertiary edu. (Ref.: no)

-.311***

Coeff.

Model 3 +Cultural-ideo.

-.038***

.118

S.E.

Model 2 +Socio-economic

Model 1 +Tertiary

Community size (1–5)

***

Coeff.

Model 0

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 – individual characteristics

Tertiary education (Ref.: no)

Table 4.1

72 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Welfare chauvinism across countries

73

In the next step, the individual-level control variables are added as two variable groups: socio-economic and cultural ideology (Table 4.1, Model 2 and Model 3). First, a variety of socio-economic controls is included in the analysis. Community size measures where the respondent lived, ranging from a large city to a home in the countryside. It represented the respondent’s area according to a five-point scale: (5) a large city; (4) the suburbs or outskirts of a large city; (3) a town or a small city; (2) a country village; and (1) a farm or home in the countryside. This variable is included with the expectation that respondents from smaller communities would be prone to more welfare chauvinism, an expectation based on the literature arguing that, in smaller communities, there are fewer migrants. Consequently, respondents would be less likely to gain positive contact experiences with migrants, which would reduce exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Pettigrew and Tropp 2013). The results show that respondents who lived in larger communities indeed held lower levels of welfare chauvinism than respondents living in smaller communities. Unemployment experience represents a binary variable concerning whether or not a respondent had been unemployed and had sought work for more than three months. Here, unemployment experience is one indicator of experiences of job market insecurity, which is generally assumed to be related to more exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Mewes and Mau 2013). The results show that having experience with unemployment additionally increases the likelihood of an individual holding welfare chauvinism. The same applied to respondents with lower subjective income (see also Figure 3.6 for more details on this variable). Subjective income indicates how a respondent felt at the time of responding to questions about their household’s income. Subjective income is used as one indicator of income insecurity, which was generally assumed to be related to more exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Subjective income indicated which description came close to how the respondent felt at the time about their household’s income on a four-point scale: (4) living comfortably on present income; (3) coping on present income; (2) finding it difficult on present income; (1) finding it very difficult on present income. Higher education of parents measures the education level of a participant’s father and mother through the higher education binary variable (same coding as for the main education variable). A tertiary education degree of the respondents’ parents is generally assumed to be significantly related to less exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Hello et al. 2004). Although having a mother with higher education did not appear to be significantly related to preferences for welfare chauvinism, a father with higher education is significantly related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism. Age was included, which was measured as a continuous variable in years. The literature generally assumes that older respondents are more prone to welfare chauvinism (van Oorschot and Uunk

74

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

2007). Here, the results show that younger respondents are indeed less inclined to hold preferences for welfare chauvinism than older respondents. For gender, female is used as the reference category. The literature generally assumes that men are more prone to welfare chauvinism (van der Waal et al. 2013). Looking at Table 4.1, gender additionally affected attitudes of welfare chauvinism, with females being less likely to hold views of welfare chauvinism. Finally, migration background is defined as having at least one parent who was not born in the country or the case of the respondent not having the relevant national citizenship. Respondents who did not have a migration background were in the reference category. It was expected that welfare chauvinism would be less prevalent amongst respondents with a migration background (Mewes and Mau 2013). And indeed, respondents who had at least one parent who was not born in the country or did not have the relevant national citizenship held lower levels of welfare chauvinism than respondents who did not. Second, several relevant cultural ideology controls were included. Welfare attitudes indicate whether a respondent agreed or disagreed that individuals obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled to. This phenomenon is often referred to as free riding. Welfare attitudes were measured through the following question: ‘Please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country]: Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled’ (1 – agree strongly, to 5 – disagree strongly). This variable was included with the expectation that negative attitudes towards welfare beneficiaries, in general, would be related to more negative attitudes when these beneficiaries were migrants (van Oorschot 2006). The results show that those respondents with fears of individuals committing benefit fraud in their country are more likely to hold preferences for welfare chauvinism than otherwise. Egalitarian attitudes were measured through respondents’ preferences for each individual in the world being treated equally and having equal opportunities in life. Egalitarian attitudes were measured through the following question: ‘Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you: They think it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. They believe everyone should have equal opportunities in life’ (1 – much like me, to 6 – not like me at all). This variable is included because respondents who hold more egalitarian attitudes are assumed to hold fewer exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Jenssen and Engesbak 1994). And indeed, those who held more strongly egalitarian attitudes are less chauvinistic than respondents holding lower levels of such attitudes. To measure authoritarian attitudes, the analysis employed the preference of the respondent to unconditionally follow the rules given to them by authorities (see also Figure 3.7 for the descriptives on the country level). To measure

Welfare chauvinism across countries

75

authoritarian attitudes, the book uses the following item: ‘Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you: They believe that people should do what they are told. They think people should follow the rules at all times, even when no-one is watching’ (6 – much like me, to 1 – not like me at all). This variable is included since respondents with higher levels of authoritarian attitudes were assumed to hold more exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Mewes and Mau 2012). While there has been much discussion about the measurement of authoritarian attitudes, this item has been frequently used in the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2019); and as described in Chapter 3, this book is particularly interested in the social conformity dimension of this concept. The results prove that respondents with higher levels of authoritarian attitudes are more likely to support welfare chauvinism. Overall, it is expected that the higher education effect becomes smaller after adding these socio-economic variables to the analysis, as it is assumed that these variables would explain part of the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism. In other words, it is additionally expected that these socio-economic variables would mediate the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism. This is also the case: the educational effect is further decreased by adding the additional variables. Hence, by accounting for factors other than education on the individual level, it becomes clear that higher education is not the only factor that affected welfare chauvinism. Of course, one can always think about other variables or operationalisations to include here, but this is not the focus of this book and the results for all control variables are consistent overall with the literature in the field. To gain insight into whether the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism might systematically differ between countries, a random slope is added in the model that came next (Table 4.1, Model 4). The results confirmed that the effect of education on welfare chauvinism varied significantly across the countries in the sample. Furthermore, the covariance structure is positive, which indicates that welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated increased when the level of welfare chauvinism in a country increased.

4.6

SELF-INTEREST ACROSS COUNTRIES

In line with the education-as-liberation argument, self-interest is frequently cited as one of the reasons why higher educational levels may lead to lower levels of welfare chauvinism. According to this view, the educational system sorts individuals into different socio-economic positions in society and individuals with higher levels of education are usually defined as part of the upper strata of society (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Migrants are generally seen as part of the lower strata of society (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

76

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Consequently, the literature has generally assumed that higher-educated individuals compete less with migrants for resources than lower-educated individuals because they are not directly competing with migrants, and studies have contended that this results in higher-educated individuals being less inclined to hold welfare chauvinism (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). This chapter argues that self-interest may motivate welfare chauvinism amongst both the lower- and the higher educated. The educational divide may be shaped by a number of contextual factors that affect the socio-economic position of groups with various levels of education (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2004). This chapter focuses on objective and subjective economic deprivation, which are frequently associated with higher levels of negative outgroup attitudes, including welfare chauvinism (Kros and Coenders 2019). This is because competition over (perceived) scarce resources between native citizens and migrants results in a conflict of interests, which has a negative effect on the relationship between these groups (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Economic deprivation at the national level is generally believed to affect lower-status groups, such as the lower educated, more; for example, the lower educated may face a more precarious labour market or spending cuts on welfare provisions (Mewes and Mau 2012). For this reason, lower-educated individuals are believed to experience more (imagined) resource competition with migrants, which is associated with higher levels of welfare chauvinism. On the basis of the self-interest perspective, it can be argued that the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism varies across countries. Higher levels of education may translate to different positions in society across countries. Following the logic of self-interest theory, welfare chauvinism may be further associated with higher levels of education in countries where the higher social status of the highly educated is more precarious. This chapter does not deny that a higher educational degree generally confers certain labour market advantages to individuals. However, it can be argued that the higher social status of the higher educated also means they have more to lose (Mols and Jetten 2017). Consequently, contexts of economic deprivation may be associated with status anxiety or economic anxiety amongst higher-educated individuals because, in times of economic hardship, governments tend not only to cut welfare provisions but also to increase taxes (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung 2017), which predominantly affects higher-status groups such as the higher educated. Therefore, the (perceived) tax burden of migration on the welfare state represented by the disbursement of welfare provisions to migrants may additionally be related to more support for welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated. Here is where the anti-welfare element of the welfare chauvinism concept comes into play. Thus,

Welfare chauvinism across countries

77

in countries with higher levels of economic deprivation, smaller educational divides may be expected. It is difficult to discuss economic deprivation in the context of a majority of European countries, since, in comparison to other countries in the world, Europe is rather affluent. Therefore this chapter examines economic prosperity at the country level. Basically, economic prosperity would have the opposite effect on the higher- versus lower educated in comparison to economic deprivation. Economic prosperity can be defined as a rather stable concept, although individuals living in a country that enjoys economic prosperity can still experience economic deprivation. For example, the United Kingdom might have suffered more economically from the Covid-19 crisis than other European countries, but, overall, the United Kingdom remains richer than other European countries. Therefore, GDP per capita rather than GDP growth rates is examined in the empirical analysis. Similar to economic deprivation, it can be argued that higher education, welfare chauvinism and economic prosperity are related to each other. Given the ambiguous role of self-interest described previously, this chapter proposes the following arguments: • Economic prosperity at the country level shapes the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. • In countries with lower levels of economic prosperity, the educational divide is smaller.

4.7

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CONTEXTS

A range of contextual-level variables are included in this analysis. First, the main national economic variable represented economic prosperity. To measure the macro level of economic prosperity, the analysis employs the average of the GDP per capita (in US $1,000) in the year of the interview, 2016. The values were divided by 1,000 in order to obtain more interpretable results. The data was taken from the United Nations. Descriptives on the country level for a similar GDP measure can be seen in Figure 3.3. GDP is commonly applied in assessing welfare chauvinism across countries (Mewes and Mau 2012). As seen in Model 5 of Table 4.2, the aggregated economic prosperity measure is added to the set of variables. The results indicate that higher levels of economic deprivation are significantly associated with higher levels of welfare chauvinism. More specifically, welfare chauvinism is less prevalent in more affluent countries. This result is in line with other research that shows higher levels or increases in GDP are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Mau and Burkhardt 2009).

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

78

Table 4.2

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 – economic prosperity Model 5

Economic prosperity

Model 6

Coeff.

S.E.

Coeff.

S.E.

-1.200**

.004

-1.140**

.004

-.046†

.002

Economic prosperity x tertiary education Intercept

-.323*

.151

-.296*

.005

Between-country variance

*

.237

.073

.237

*

.152

Random slope variance (education)

.045*

.020

.032*

.016

Log-Likelihood

-18448.030

-18445.955

ICC

6.7%

6.7%

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N= 29,693, level 2 N = 22, United Nations 2016.

Importantly, it can be expected that GDP per capita would be relevant for both the lower-educated individuals (resource competition) and the higher-educated individuals (economic anxiety). The cross-level interaction (Table 4.2, Model 6) between economic prosperity and higher education is negative, meaning that higher education’s effect of decreasing levels of welfare chauvinism is diminished in countries where country-level economic prosperity is lower. While the significance of the interaction is statistically weak, the p-value requirements can be relaxed, as the sample included only 22 cases at level two (Mewes and Mau 2013). These effects for Models 5 and 6 are visualised in Figure 4.6. Overall, the results demonstrate that economic conditions at the country level influenced the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, the interaction is negative, which indicates where the economic conditions are less favourable; a smaller impact of higher education on the likelihood of having welfare chauvinist views is seen. This confirmed that the educational divide would be smaller in countries with lower levels of economic prosperity. The findings from testing additional macro-level variables such as social expenditure, strengthen the self-interest argument because they further demonstrate the importance of economic conditions. Social expenditure measured this expenditure as the percentage of the GDP for a given country in 2016. One can assume that higher levels or increases in social expenditure are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). The data was taken from the OECD. Running the same analysis with this variable, the results show that the cross-level interaction between social expenditure

Welfare chauvinism across countries

79

Notes: Marginal predicted mean on GDP (left panel); education effects on marginal predicted mean on GDP (right panel). Predictive margins and average marginal effects of tertiary education with 95% Cis. The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N = 29,693, level 2 N = 22, macro-level data; United Nations 2016.

Figure 4.6

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017

and higher education is positive, meaning that the education divide is smaller in more generous welfare states. This can be explained by the fact that the higher-educated individuals have to pay more into the welfare state and maybe perceive migrants more as a financial burden in more generous welfare states. Further macro-level variables that are commonly applied in studies of welfare chauvinist and anti-migrant attitudes across Europe were tested, but those turned out to have no significant impact on welfare chauvinism or the relationship to education. These indicators included the following. Unemployment rates measured the rates for a given country in 2016. Here one could have assumed that higher levels or increases in unemployment rates are related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism (Mau and Burkhardt 2009). The data was taken from Eurostat. The rate of tertiary educated measured the proportion of tertiary-educated individuals in the population for a given country in 2016. One could have assumed that higher levels of tertiary educated are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012). This data was taken from the OECD. Percentage migrants measured the number of migrants as the percentage of the total population for a given country in 2016. One could have assumed that higher levels or increases in migrants are related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism (Eger et al. 2020). The data was taken from Eurostat. Notably, the percentage of migrants can also be seen as an indicator of culture, as a higher percentage of migrants would further allow for more positive contact experiences (Pettigrew and Tropp 2013). In this case,

80

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

one could have assumed that higher levels or increases in migrants would be related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism.

4.8

CULTURAL IDEOLOGY ACROSS COUNTRIES

Higher educational levels may lead to lower levels of welfare chauvinism because the degree of exposure to the education system represents an essential socialising agent. The literature on education and outgroup attitudes suggests that educational systems propagate democratic norms. This means that the longer individuals remain in the educational system, the more they are assumed to develop an enlightened perspective with a broader, more universal set of norms. By contrast, spending fewer years in the educational system has commonly been assumed to result in a narrow nationalist and authoritarian strain of thought (Stouffer 1955; Stubager 2008). This chapter argues that cultural ideology still may influence welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated. The educational divide may be shaped by a number of cultural contexts that affect the attitudes of groups with various levels of education (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2001). This chapter focuses on authoritarian norms because these norms are commonly used to explain that lower-educated individuals are frequently not open-minded with regard to migrants’ social rights (Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Mewes and Mau 2012). This argument builds upon studies that have assumed higher-educated individuals tend to adopt more liberal attitudes (especially at university) while, in contrast, lower-educated individuals are assumed to favour authoritarian attitudes (Stubager 2008). Although the authoritarian–libertarian dimension and other concepts may be relevant, this chapter is particularly interested in conformity to traditional ingroup norms as one dimension of authoritarianism that strengthens national group identity (Feldman 2003). Higher-educated individuals are frequently thought to be more critical of the dominant culture and therefore less prone to follow norms and rules presented by the establishment (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988). As a group phenomenon, conformity with traditional rules versus openness to change can explain cross-national variation in the inclusion of migrants in the welfare state (Mewes and Mau 2012; Stouffer 1955). This line of thought leads to the common assumption that educational divides in welfare chauvinism are larger in countries with more authoritarian norms. However, although the education system can be assumed to socialise students into the dominant societal norms, it should not be assumed that these norms are liberalising or pro-migration. As suggested for the self-interest perspective, it can be argued that cross-national variation is evident in the dominant norms of society, depending on a country’s political and historical traditions, including migration traditions. In particular, scholars have argued

Welfare chauvinism across countries

81

that the norms transferred by the educational system of a country, including the tertiary education system, echo the (political) culture of that country (Hjerm 2001). Following the logic of cultural ideology theory, welfare chauvinism may also develop amongst the higher educated when they are within an authoritarian context. This view may have been underestimated in the literature, but it is not new; political histories and contexts demonstrate that workers’ unions and parties have frequently been a major force in the progress of social rights in society to the benefit of all individuals, including minorities. Scholars frequently emphasise the liberalising side of education, but research on institutional racism and structural inequality in the educational systems across Europe has demonstrated that the educational systems tend to be traditional and resistant to change (OECD 2018). Notably, in countries with higher levels of authoritarian norms, education systems can be expected to transmit more conformist and traditional rules. Education systems across Europe may reinforce authoritarian norms by teaching students to obey strict hierarchies and traditional norms that are predefined by the institution, which may create (perceived) environments of more narrow individual freedoms (Hjerm 2001). These systems may consequently punish those deviating from the rules. Moreover, the higher educated frequently adapt to the dominant societal norms to occupy high-status roles in society where they enforce adherence to the dominant norms by others (Jackman 1978; Jackman and Muha 1984). Given that the educational system is considered a primary socialising agent, this may explain how societies, where authoritarian norms are more prevalent, can be associated with smaller educational divides regarding welfare chauvinism. Authoritarian norms, and as defined in this book, particularly social conformity to prevalent norms, may be related to variations in welfare chauvinism amongst both lower- and higher-educated individuals; furthermore, it can be additionally argued that a mutual relationship between these terms may be operative. Based on the ambiguous role of cultural ideology, this chapter proposes the following arguments: • Authoritarian norms at the country level influence the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. • In countries with higher levels of authoritarian norms, the educational divide is smaller.

82

4.9

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS

In order to quantify authoritarianism at the country level, this book focuses on a dimension that is commonly applied for assessing authoritarianism, including in relation to education (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Societal conformity to dominant norms and rules addresses a key element of authoritarianism in society (Feldman 2003), specifically when it comes to critical thinking, which is frequently assumed to be more prevalent amongst the higher educated (Jackman and Muha 1984). Furthermore, welfare chauvinism is more pervasive in countries where individual freedoms are limited (Schmitt and Teney 2019). Hence, for the context-level indicator of authoritarianism, this study applied an aggregated measure of the individual-level measure for a specific dimension of authoritarian attitudes, namely social conformity. The exact question wording from the European Social Survey is shown in Chapter 3 and descriptives across countries are shown in Figure 3.7. The method of aggregating individual results is occasionally criticised. Still, the advantage for this analysis outweighs this criticism and is twofold. First, aggregated data can provide salient measurements of the cultural concept at hand; second, representative samples provide a reasonable estimate for such aggregates. One can assume that higher levels or increases in authoritarianism are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012). Importantly, as explained in Chapter 3, higher levels of authoritarianism may affect not only the lower educated but also the higher educated, as the latter spend more time being socialised into the dominant norms of a given country through the education system. It is expected that neither the higher nor the lower educated would be immune towards authoritarian norms on the country level. As seen in Model 7 of Table 4.3, the aggregated authoritarianism measure is added to the set of variables. The effect of authoritarian norms is highly significant. Thus, the results indicate that higher levels of authoritarianism are associated with a higher prevalence of welfare chauvinism in the population. In the next step, a cross-level interaction between authoritarianism and higher education is added to the analysis (Table 4.3, Model 8). The cross-level interaction between welfare chauvinism and tertiary education was highly significant, which confirmed that authoritarian norms at the country level influenced the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. More specifically, the interaction is positive, which means that higher education’s effect in reducing welfare chauvinism is diminished in countries where the level of authoritarianism is high. This demonstrates that in countries with higher levels of authoritarian norms, the division between the higher and lower

Welfare chauvinism across countries

83

educated in their welfare chauvinistic views would be smaller. The effects from Models 7 and 8 are visualised in Figure 4.7. Table 4.3

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 – authoritarianism Model 7

Authoritarianism

Model 8

Coeff.

S.E.

Coeff.

S.E.

2.957

.863

.807

.869

***

Authoritarianism x higher education

**

.302*

.157

-3.425**

1.058

Intercept

-2.191***

Between-country variance

.164*

.181*

.180

Random slope variance (education)

.043*

.030*

.035

Log-Likelihood

-18776.370

-18775.628

ICC

4.7%

5.2%

.491

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N= 29,693, level 2 N = 22.

Notes: Predictive margins with 95% Cis, average marginal effects of tertiary education with 95% Cis. The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N = 29,693, level 2 N = 22, macro-level data.

Figure 4.7

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017: marginal predicted mean on authoritarianism (left panel), education effects on marginal predicted mean on authoritarianism (right panel)

84

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

The results are further supported by the tests of additional macro-level variables, such as inclusivity of migration policies. Inclusivity of migration policies measured the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) for a given country in 2014. The 2014 version of the index was chosen as many valuable macro-level indicators, including the MIPEX, are not available for every year. Figure 2.2 already elaborated on some descriptives of this measure across countries using the updated data from 2019. One could assume that higher levels or increases in the inclusivity of migration would be related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Eger et al. 2020). Running the same analysis with this variable, the results show that the cross-level interaction between MIPEX and higher education is positive, meaning that the education divide is smaller in more generous migration policies. This can be explained by the fact that the higher-educated individuals are adapt more to the social norms around them. Also here, a number of related cultural controls were included, but they turned out not to have significant effects. The salience of migration measures when individuals in the public named migration as one of the greatest problems for the country they lived in for 2016. One could have assumed that higher levels or increases in the salience of migration would be related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism (Eger et al. 2020). The data was taken from Eurostat. Individual liberties measures the level of democracy for a given country in 2016. Based on the socialisation theory (see Chapter 3), one could have assumed that higher levels or increases in individual liberties are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism. The data was taken from the European Social Survey. Linguistic fractionalisation is measured for a given country in 2016. Based on the ethnic heterogeneity hypothesis (Chapter 2), one could have assumed that higher levels or increases in linguistic fractionalisation are related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). The data was taken from the European Social Survey. Overall, the chapter established that both economic and cultural contexts played an important role in shaping the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism.

CONCLUSIONS The positive effect of higher education on negative outgroup attitudes is rarely contested amongst scholars. However, the theoretical assumptions underlying this positive effect, namely cultural ideology and self-interest theory, can be readily violated in cross-national settings. This chapter re-examines the liberalising effect of education and argues that welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated is underestimated in many academic narratives and that the overlooked link between education and such attitudes involves certain national

Welfare chauvinism across countries

85

contexts in which these attitudes are formed. Thus, the study reported herein aims to supplement the theory and close the research gap by (1) examining variations in the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across Europe, and (2) explaining the effect of educational divides on welfare chauvinism through cross-national variation in economic prosperity and authoritarian norms. Additional sensitivity tests of the analysis models that are not included in the book demonstrate that the results are robust. Amongst others, these tests include different operationalisations of the variables in the models and other variables in the models. The results demonstrate a high prevalence of welfare chauvinism amongst higher-educated individuals across Europe. Furthermore, the analysis revealed significant differences in the effect of the educational divide on welfare chauvinism. More specifically, the findings suggest that particular country-level predictors affect the influence of educational divides on welfare chauvinism. Economic deprivation and authoritarian norms do not only increase welfare chauvinism in general. These and related factors increase support for welfare chauvinism, including amongst individuals with higher levels of education within countries, and this decreases differences between educational groups. This means, within such countries, the rights of migrants, and potentially welfare state legitimacy overall, might be compromised, as there is less polarisation on this matter. Overall, the importance of the contextual indicators on the educational divide is another example of how critical the effect of national contexts is on attitude formation amongst majority populations. These findings suggest, at least partly, that governments in Europe have the power to shape public opinion. What is more, governments may be able to unite societies by adopting policies that combat economic insecurity and intolerant norms. This is particularly important in current times where another economic crisis hit European countries to different extent and authoritarian tendencies are increasing in specific countries that might further increase welfare chauvinism amongst all groups in societies. Through multilevel modelling, this book overcomes some of the limitations of previous studies in the field. However, certain limitations remain with this method. First, having shown the importance of economic prosperity and authoritarian norms on the country level for the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, one cannot say for sure that these are the reason for the results. More specifically, other contextual factors might better explain the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, and therefore one has to be careful about the conclusions. Second, given that cross-national data was used for the analysis, the analysis did not allow for definite conclusions about the causality of the mechanisms. For example, the analysis could not explore whether certain national contexts actually changed an individual’s preferences for welfare chauvinism. Third, because no longitu-

86

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

dinal dimension was included, the results might not hold for earlier data, and this will be the focus of Chapter 5. Hopefully, future rounds of the European Social Survey will also include the question on welfare chauvinism to continue this line of research. Fourthly, the variable used for measuring welfare chauvinism in this chapter did not distinguish between different migrant groups or particular welfare provisions. As Chapter 6 will show, such differences add further nuance to the results. Lastly, social desirability bias is a type of response bias that refers to the inclination of certain respondents to answer a survey question in a manner they consider to be more socially acceptable than is their true answer. As previously mentioned in the chapter, higher-educated individuals are likely to respond favourably to questions concerning their views on migrants to appear unprejudiced and enlightened (An 2015). This means that, possibly, higher-educated individuals may not feel a need to hide their true attitudes when welfare chauvinism is widely accepted in society to appear politically correct. Consequently, individuals in those in countries where welfare chauvinism is not normalised may continue to hold such attitudes but would not necessarily feel that these attitudes can be voiced. This study did not test for this bias because no cross-national data is available to control for it; nevertheless, controlling for such a bias could strengthen the argument of this chapter further. Given the limited scope of this chapter, more research into the interplay between higher education and welfare chauvinism is needed. Nevertheless, this chapter provides novel insight into the complex interplay between national contexts, higher education and welfare chauvinism. The chapter demonstrates that educational systems across Europe are not necessarily tools of indoctrination in liberal attitudes towards migrants’ social rights because of the influence of national contexts. This runs counter to a dominant view in the literature on the liberalising effect of higher education, which argues that the higher educated are more resistant to welfare chauvinism than lower-educated individuals (Mewes and Mau 2012). Moving beyond the education-as-liberation debate is particularly important in light of the increasing pressure on societies from the new radical right parties as well as the financial pressures of austerity (Inglehart and Norris 2019; Chung, Leruth and Taylor-Gooby 2017). Practically, more effort should be made to shift the discussions from nativist tendencies amongst the lower strata to holding the upper strata accountable for creating and reproducing certain normative and economic environments. Moreover, if education is to be a tool for social cohesion across Europe, educational systems require further transformation whereby they come to embrace diversity and globalisation fully. While this chapter analysed variations in the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across countries, it remains unknown whether these variations only randomly appear in 2016/2017 or whether one can find similar patterns at other

Welfare chauvinism across countries

87

points in time. Hence, the following chapter examines variations in the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time.

5. Welfare chauvinism across time 5.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter builds on the previous chapter by examining whether the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism in Europe changed across time and whether the potential variation can be explained by changing national economic and cultural contexts, specifically changing levels of economic deprivation and authoritarianism. This is important to study since the results can demonstrate whether the patterns presented in the previous chapter are stable across time. When examining welfare chauvinism across time across Europe, past decades have received attention from various researchers (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020; Heizmann, Jedinger and Perry 2018). First, the worldwide financial crisis of 2007/2008 that culminated in the Great Recession in the late 2000s had a clear impact on the European public, particularly in countries significantly impacted by austerity (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung 2017). Second, many European countries experienced an increase in the number of asylum seekers in 2015/2016, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan countries, which has led to increasingly polarised discourses around migration (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020). Conveniently, the two rounds of the European Social Survey that include a question on welfare chauvinism coincided with these two major challenges in 2008/2009 as well as in 2016/2017. This is because the salience of these two topics represents an ideal opportunity to study whether changing national economic and cultural context matter for the evolution of welfare chauvinism across time. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of Europeans who identify migration and economy as the most pressing issue facing their countries, using representative Eurobarometer data. When the fourth wave of the European Social Survey was fielded in 2008–2009, the average proportion of the public choosing migration as one of the most critical issues facing their country was 5 per cent, while economic concerns were mentioned by 22 per cent of the public. Nearly the opposite was the case in 2016/2017, when the eighth round of the European Social Survey was fielded: 15 per cent of the public chose migration as one of the most important issues, compared with 10 per cent that chose economic concerns. The public opinion reflected here that the general sentiment in the public 88

Welfare chauvinism across time

89

Source: Eurobarometer, dates of European Social Survey 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 data collection shaded.

Figure 5.1

Europeans identifying migration and economy as the most pressing issues facing their country in EU (28) between 2005 and 2019 (in percentage)

and political shifted away from economic concerns towards concerns about migration between 2008 and 2016, which is the time period of interest for this chapter. One can expect that there are similar economic concerns in this period, but the increasing levels of refugees added cultural concerns, which may have reinforced welfare chauvinism. Therefore, this shift is not trivial, as many countries actively sought to restrict migration and migrants’ social rights after the peak of arrival from asylum seekers to Europe. This included both countries that are traditionally less hospitable to migrants, such as Hungary, as well as those countries well known for their liberal and inclusive migration policies, such as Sweden (Sainsbury 2006, 2012). Many European governments justified their adoption of more exclusive policies by referring to the growing concerns about migration amongst the public, but welfare chauvinism has not been fully understood in this context. Thus far, there remains a lack of examination of the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time. Longitudinal studies of welfare chauvinism have found significant variation in the evolution of welfare chauvinism across Europe in recent years (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020; Heizmann, Jedinger and Perry 2018; Kros and Coenders 2019). However, these researchers have held the effect of education on welfare chauvinism stable across time. For example, Eger, Larsen and Mewes (2020) have demonstrated variations in

90

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

the evolution of welfare chauvinism between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 across Europe that are related to changing national contexts. In particular, there are signs of increasing polarisation in certain countries, such as Austria, Hungary and Poland, which have become more welfare chauvinist. In contrast, other countries, such as Belgium, Germany and Spain, have become less welfare chauvinist. In addition and contrary to current belief, a Dutch study has shown that ethnic prejudice has increased further amongst the higher educated than amongst the lower educated (Thijs, Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2018). Given such trends, it is critical to determine why welfare chauvinism has not decreased significantly over recent decades across all countries in Europe, including amongst higher-educated individuals. Throughout recent decades, European countries have witnessed a significant increase in levels of higher education. Consequently, using the education-as-liberation rationale, one would expect a decline in welfare chauvinism on the national level over time. In contrast, previous studies have shown that welfare chauvinism has not decreased in all European countries (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020; Kros and Coenders 2019). In several countries, welfare chauvinism has significantly increased regardless of educational expansion. There are three possible explanations for this: welfare chauvinism may have risen amongst all educational groups, risen more amongst the higher educated or risen more amongst the lower educated. Contrary to current thinking, Chapter 4 shows that the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism varies across countries. Therefore, one can assume variation in the dynamics of welfare chauvinism across time amongst these groups. Furthermore, Chapter 4 shows that national economic and cultural contexts shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Given the changes in both national economic as well as cultural contexts in recent decades in Europe, it is important to examine whether and to what extent the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism varies across two distinct points in time and whether such distinctions are systematically related to the changing national economic as well as cultural contexts, such as changes in economic deprivation or authoritarianism. This chapter sheds further light on why the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated as well as educational gaps, may vary across time. Hereby, it provides another timely re-evaluation of the education-as-liberation assumption, in this case using a critical perspective that examined the role of higher education on welfare chauvinism over the years. As seen in previous chapters, this book defines welfare chauvinism as the opposition to granting migrants access to welfare provisions. It is important to take a broader perspective on the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, as rising levels of welfare chauvinism have detrimental consequences for social cohesion in European welfare states. Understanding to what extent the dynam-

Welfare chauvinism across time

91

ics of welfare chauvinism between the higher- and lower educated may inform policies, may reduce tensions within the public.

5.2

POLARISATION IN ATTITUDES ACROSS THE LAST DECADES

The European Social Survey of 2008/2009 included the same question on welfare chauvinism as the 2016/2017 survey, concerning under which conditions migrants should gain access to national welfare states: ‘Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?’ As before, a binary variable was used for the multivariate analysis, indicating either (1) ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ (categories 4–5), or (0) ‘(Conditional) welfare provisions for migrants’ (categories 1–3). Figure 5.2 shows the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst individuals across 18 European countries that are available for a comparison between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. The development of welfare chauvinism between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 provided important insights for this chapter. First, given the increasing salience of migration in many countries (see Figure 5.1), one can expect attitudes to become more negative. Nonetheless, this is different from what the representative survey data shows overall. Welfare chauvinism decreased from an average of 42.2 per cent to 39.1 per cent, which represented a decrease of 3.2 percentage points within the sample of 18 countries across Europe. While this increase appears significant, it is necessary to be critical of the simple conclusion that public attitudes were becoming more inclusive. It is essential to remember that the welfare chauvinism variable only shows respondents that held extreme levels of welfare chauvinism, namely respondents who did not want migrants who had not yet become citizens in the country to have any access to welfare provisions or respondents that did not want migrants to access these welfare provisions altogether. Therefore, these levels remain high, particularly considering that the status quo in a majority of the countries in the sample allowed migrants to access certain social policies based on residency. Second, considerable variation in the development of welfare chauvinism can be seen between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 across Europe. A majority of the countries in the sample witnessed a decrease in welfare chauvinism, mainly the United Kingdom, Germany and Estonia, but others such as Belgium, Spain and, further, Hungary and Sweden did as well. However, several countries witnessed an increase in welfare chauvinism, namely Switzerland, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. It is important to note that for some of the countries in the sample, the changes are small and insignificant.

92

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Source: European Social Survey, 2008/2009, level 1 N = 30,673; 2016/2017, level 1 N = 29,546. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 5.2

Change of the levels of welfare chauvinism between 2007/2008 and 2016/2017 (in percentage points)

While the results did not fit into the standard patterns regarding the evolution of exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009), an observation is made that fits into the cultural ideology theory as applied in this book: the levels of welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 are significantly negatively correlated with the changes that happened between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. In other words, the more negative the attitudes were in 2008/2009,

Welfare chauvinism across time

93

the smaller are the changes between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. This fits into the understanding of the cultural ideology theory, as attitudes are linked to the overall norms of a country (Chapter 3). Furthermore, this is an important finding when considering the current polarisation in migration that has been increasingly discussed in the literature, and which deserves more attention according to the results found. Third, regarding the development of welfare chauvinism from 2008/2009 to 2016/2017, the results question the education-as-liberation rationale, where an expansion in (higher) education should have led to an automatic decrease in exclusive attitudes towards migrants. Additional analyses demonstrate that the average level of tertiary education in the 25–65-year-old population of the countries in the sample had increased significantly, from 28.8 per cent to 35.4 per cent. Furthermore, there is minimal variation in this increase, as all countries had higher levels of tertiary education in 2016/2017 in comparison to 2008/2009. While significant decreases in welfare chauvinism can be observed between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017, these are not universal across Europe, and it is found that these changes are not related to the change in levels of tertiary education at the country level. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the primarily small changes in welfare chauvinism had a sufficient impact on creating social change across Europe. This is not the case for the countries where welfare chauvinism increased and it is also not the case for countries with an increase of welfare chauvinist political parties and policies. In the next step of the descriptive analysis, how welfare chauvinism developed amongst higherand lower-educated individuals across Europe is more closely examined.

5.3

WELFARE CHAUVINISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION ACROSS TIME

Academic and political discourses often suggest that expanding national education systems might benefit the public across Europe to adopt more inclusive attitudes, including towards migrants. As described in Chapter 3, this is because higher levels of education amongst the public are expected to decrease intolerant, authoritarian norms amongst individuals and improve their economic positions. Levels of education, specifically tertiary education, have increased significantly in European countries in recent decades (see Figure 1.3). Consequently, using the education-as-liberation rationale, one would expect a universal increase in inclusive attitudes towards migrants at the national level over time. In contrast, a look at the literature on attitudes towards migrants demonstrates that the expansion of national education systems across Europe has not led to an automatic increase of inclusive attitudes towards migrants and that the evolution of anti-migrant attitudes across Europe varies significantly

94

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

across countries (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006; Thijs, Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2018). This is also the case within the welfare chauvinism literature, which shows different dynamics over time (Eger, Larsen and Mewes 2020; Kros and Coenders 2019). In particular, Eger and others (2020) have shown that exclusionary attitudes increased in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Kros and Coenders (2019) have found similar trends as well in the Netherlands. As mentioned before, there are three possible explanations for this when one focuses on the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. First, welfare chauvinism may have risen amongst all educational groups. In that case, the prevalence of welfare chauvinism has gained sufficient strength to offset the impact of the expansion of national education systems. Second, welfare chauvinism may have risen more amongst the lower educated. If this is the case, higher levels of education amongst the public actually seem to have an impact on public attitudes towards the inclusion of migrants. Third, welfare chauvinism may have risen, particularly amongst the higher educated. In this case, expanding national education systems could not have decreased the prevalence of welfare chauvinism amongst the public. Given the rapid changes in both national economic as well as cultural contexts in the past decades in Europe described above, this chapter also argues that a universal effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time is highly unlikely. As presented here, variation in the dynamics of welfare chauvinism across time amongst the higher and lower educated is assumed in the book. Given the ambiguous relationship between welfare chauvinism and higher education across time, the first arguments of this chapter are as follows: • Both lower-educated, and many higher-educated, individuals hold views of welfare chauvinism across time. • The impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism varies across time.

5.4

IS EDUCATION BECOMING MORE OR LESS IMPORTANT?

The average changes between the tertiary-educated and non-tertiary-educated individuals across Europe show interesting tendencies about the polarisation of the two groups. While the tertiary educated have become more generous, the opposite appears to be true for the non-tertiary educated. However, a closer look at the data across countries offers a more nuanced interpretation. Figure 5.3 shows that welfare chauvinism has decreased on average amongst both higher- and lower-educated individuals between 2008 and 2016.

Welfare chauvinism across time

Source:

95

European Social Survey 2016/2017; N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 5.3

Educational gaps for different categories of welfare chauvinism in Europe across time

While welfare chauvinism decreased 3.7 percentage points amongst the higher educated, it decreased 3.4 percentage points amongst the lower educated, which did not represent a significant difference. In other words, the overall education gap did not change significantly over the years. Furthermore, Figure 5.4 presents in more detail the development of welfare chauvinism across different countries in Europe amongst both the higher and the lower educated. Examining the changes in overall levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher and lower educated between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 provides a more complete picture of the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across time in Europe. The distribution of welfare chauvinism amongst higher- and lower-educated individuals across time appears to undermine the common assumption concerning the universal effect of higher education. First, Figure 5.4 allowed for the identification of the change in welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated. As with the general public, significant variation in the change in welfare chauvinism is found amongst the higher educated. The change resembled the general public to a certain extent. Still, the change varied somewhat, for example, in Switzerland, Slovenia and Russia, where the attitudes of the higher educated developed in opposition to the attitudes of the lower educated. Notably, the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated are significantly negatively correlated with the changes that happened between 2008 and 2016. This effect is larger than the effect of the general public (or the lower educated). This may have been further

96

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Source: European Social Survey 2008/2009, N = 30,673; 2016/2017, N = 29,546. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 5.4

Change of the educational gaps in welfare chauvinism between 2007/2008 and 2016/2017 (in percentage points)

Welfare chauvinism across time

97

evidence that the higher educated are more sensitive to cultural norms than the lower educated. Basically, welfare chauvinism became more polarised, regardless of the level of education. Second, in terms of undermining the universal effect of higher education, Figure 5.4 offers more differentiated insights into how the education divide developed over time. It can be observed that the development of this divide varied across the European countries in the sample. Contrary to common belief, the higher educated are not the main drivers of more inclusive attitudes in all countries across Europe. The higher educated actually delayed the decrease in welfare chauvinism in countries such as Germany, Hungary and Spain. In other countries, such as Russia and Poland, the higher educated are the main drivers for increasing levels of welfare chauvinism. Overall, the descriptive results demonstrate that both many lower-educated and many higher-educated individuals hold views of welfare chauvinism across time and that the impact of education on welfare chauvinism in different countries varied across time. The variations in the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time demonstrate that the expansion of higher education systems alone will not automatically lead to more inclusive attitudes towards migrants. This finding is supported by longitudinal panel studies that demonstrate no relationship between educational expansion and a decrease in ethnic prejudice (Thijs et al. 2018). It should also be noted that some of the changes are relatively low and that this could be explained by institutions being deeply intertwined in nation states which can slow down societal change (Chapter 3). The theories in this book and results also imply that younger generations are not automatically more inclusive to migrants in the welfare state. Particularly when taking into account the specific context of this book’s data, future financial shocks or increases in the numbers of migrants may reinforce the observed trends. The results may additionally lead – at least for certain European countries – to the conclusion that the higher educated suffer from increasing (economic) status anxiety and cultural threat. For this reason, there is a need to explore these descriptive results through multivariate analysis further. Similar to the previous chapter, in the first step of the multilevel analysis, the empty model is estimated to reveal how much preferences for extreme welfare chauvinism can be explained by country differences (Table 5.1, Model 9). Here, it can be considered once more as if it is normally distributed, as the probabilities involved are not considered extreme. The approximate indication of the ICC resulted in slightly higher results in 2008/2009 and (9.8 per cent) in comparison to 2016/2017 (8.4 per cent). This means that the variation in welfare chauvinism could be better explained by between-country differences in 2008/2009 in comparison to 2016/2017 (Chapter 4).

-1.700*** .092*** .001

Migration background (Ref.: no)

Male (Ref.: no)

Age (in years)

*

-.068***

Subjective income (1–4)

.344*

-.425

S.E.: standard error. Sig.:

p < 0.001;

**

9,5%

9,3%

9,5%

S.E.

.013

.116

.139

.010

.012

.009

.001

.025

.101

.017

.029

.054

.059

.011

.048

p < 0.01; p < 0.05; † p < .10. Source: European Social Survey 2008–2009, level 1, N = 29,882; level 2, N = 19.

10,0%

9,8%

***

-18656.811

.114

.138

ICC

-.18722.181

.338*

-.420

-18649.009

-18985.608

.117

.140

-19041.059

.348*

-.429

Log-Likelihood

.123

.061†

.365*

**

.056***

.079***

-.066***

.001†

.078**

-1.68***

-.070***

-.057†

-.005

-.126*

-.071***

Co-variance (slope/intercept)

.121

.010

.012

.009

.001

.025

.101

.017

.030

.054

.060

.011

Coeff. -.220***

.024**

.359*

Between-country variance

S.E. .029

Model 13 +Random slope

Random slope variance (education)

-.407

Intercept

.057*** **

.078***

Authoritarian attitudes (1–6)

.001†

.001

Egalitarian attitudes (1–6)

.076**

-1.687***

-.071***

-.058†

-.000

-.126*

-.071***

.025

.101

.017

.030

.054

.059

.011

Coeff. -.200***

-.066***

**

S.E. .029

Model 12 +Ideology

Welfare attitudes (1–5)

.143

-.067*

Unemployment experience (Ref.: no)

**

-.006

Father tertiary education (Ref.: no)

-.406

Coeff. -.226*** -.131*

**

S.E. .028 -.073***

-.294***

Coeff.

Mother tertiary education (Ref.: no)

.142

S.E.

Model 11 +Self-Interest

Model 10 +Tertiary Edu.

Community size (1–5)

**

Coeff.

Model 9

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008–2009 – individual characteristics

Tertiary education (Ref.: no)

Table 5.1

98 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Welfare chauvinism across time

99

Adding the effect of higher education to the empty model (Table 5.1, Model 10) demonstrates a significant negative effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism in 2008/2009. In other words, higher-educated individuals systematically had lower levels of welfare chauvinism than lower-educated individuals across the 19 countries in both 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. The fact that the effect did not change in strength between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 indicates that the education gap had not changed systematically across the 19 countries in the sample. In the next step, the effects of the individual-level control variables are compared between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 (Table 5.1, Models 11 and 12). Overall, the additional socio-demographic and attitude controls show nearly no difference in 2008/2009 compared with 2016/2017, regarding both the significance and the direction of the effects. As expected, the positive effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism decreased with these control variables in 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 to nearly the same extent as in Chapter 5. To gain insight into whether the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism systematically differed between countries in 2008/2009 as well, a random slope is added in the next model (Table 5.1, Model 13). The results confirmed that the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism significantly varied across the countries in the 2008/2009 sample as the effect did in the 2016/2017 sample in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the covariance structure is once more positive in 2008/2009, which indicates again that the gap between the higher- and the lower educated became smaller when the level of welfare chauvinism in a country increased. The next group of models analysed the pooled sample, i.e. the combined data sets from 2008/2009 and 2016/2017, leading to a country sample of 18 as Denmark was not covered in the latest survey round. A binary variable for 2016/2017 was included, to test whether the prevalence of welfare chauvinism and the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism changed significantly between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. For the pooled data set, a binary variable is included for the year 2016/2017 to distinguish between respondents who were interviewed before the significant increase of asylum seekers in 2015/2016. It is expected that this variable would show the overall direction of the evolution of welfare chauvinism across Europe, including amongst the higher and lower educated. Furthermore, it is expected that the binary variable would show the effect of populations being exposed to the increase of asylum seekers, as in Figure 5.1. The results from the pooled analysis in Table 5.2, Model 14 show that welfare chauvinism significantly decreased from 2008 to 2016, which was also the observation from the previous sections. This finding is in line with the literature that compares welfare chauvinism across time using the European Social Survey data (Eger et al. 2020). This is nonetheless unexpected consid-

.002

.001

-1.645*** .093*** ***

.002

Migration background (Ref.: no)

Male (Ref.: no)

Age (in years)

.311

.103

8,6%

8,2%

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10. Source: European Social Survey 2008/2009 and 2016/2017; level 1 N=51,575, level 2 N = 18.

8,6%

8,3%

8,5%

-32740.467

ICC

-32868.892

-32720.265

-33001.072

.296

-33088.372

.099

Log-Likelihood

.295

.056*

.104

*

-.270*

.048***

.102***

-.073***

.002

**

.076***

-1.630***

-.116***

-.042†

-.038

Co-variance (slope/intercept)

.310

-.049

-.065†

***

-.209***

.015

-.164***

.026

.104

.307

*

.129

.007

.009

.008

.001

.019

.222

.013

.022

.034

.036

.008

.029

.043

.022

.029

.011

.010

.123

.007

.099

.007

.001

.019

.223

.013

.022

.034

.036

.008

.049

.043

.022

S.E.

Model 18 (+Random slope) Coeff.

Random slope variance (education)

*

*

Between-country variance *

-.271*

.132

-.331*

Intercept -.324*

.048***

Authoritarian attitudes (1–6) .131

.102

Egalitarian attitudes (1–6)

**

-1.628***

-.118***

-.073***

.222

.013

Welfare attitudes (1–5)

-.275*

.074***

.019

-.114***

-.045*

-.039

Subjective income (1–4)

.022

-.042 -.056*

Father tertiary education (Ref.: no)

-.064†

Unemployment experience (Ref.: no)

.132

.035 .033

-.048

.008

*

-.070

-.051

Mother tertiary education (Ref.: no)

***

Community size (1–5)

.022

-.165***

-.190***

.042

.022

.029

-.011

-.159***

S.E.

Model 17 (+Ideology) Coeff.

***

.029

.042

.022

S.E.

Model 16 (+Self-Interest) Coeff.

-.215***

.279***

Tertiary education (Ref.: no)

-.172***

.019

S.E.

Model 15 (+Tert. Edu.) Coeff.

S.E.

-.006

-.165***

Coeff.

Model 14

The relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017

2016 x tertiary education

2016 binary

Table 5.2

100 Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Welfare chauvinism across time

101

ering the salience of the increase of asylum seekers in 2015/2016, as Figure 5.1 in this chapter demonstrates. The finding can hint that the politicisation of the rise in refugees does not automatically play into the hand of the new radical right parties who champion a policy of ‘welfare for our kind’. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the effect is relatively small and that it varies across countries (Figure 5.1). Furthermore, Table 5.2, Model 15 demonstrates that the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism did not change across time in Europe overall (see also for Netherlands Thijs et al. 2018). This result is in line with the findings of Semyonov and others (2006), who did not find that the impact of education on anti-migrant attitudes varied across time between the years 1988–2000 in Europe. Nonetheless, as previously seen in Figure 5.3, the effect changed across a range of countries, but these observations do not seem to be systematic. Therefore, these multivariate results had to be taken with a grain of salt. The next section presents the inclusion of national factors in the models that are expected to explain the variation in the levels of welfare chauvinism as well as the educational gap across Europe.

5.5

SELF-INTEREST ACROSS TIME

This section argues that a universal effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time is unlikely from a self-interest perspective. Current studies on the evolution of welfare chauvinism have used changing national economic context indicators and continue to be inconclusive. For example, Eger and others (2020) have tested the effect of increasing unemployment rates and changes in inflows of refugees on the change of welfare chauvinism across time in Europe and found that the two variables are not related. Nonetheless, an increase in the percentage of the foreign-born population seems to be related to an increase in welfare chauvinism. The research on anti-migrant attitudes has found that the evolution of such attitudes across time depends on national economic contexts. A range of studies has found that rather than national economic contexts per se, it is the change of national economic contexts that are related to the development of anti-migrant attitudes across time (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009; Semyonov et al. 2006) Specifically, the researchers point to increases in unemployment and migration levels boosting anti-migrant attitudes across time in Europe. This is in line with the progressive dilemma theory (Chapter 2) that assumes a relationship between increasing levels of ethnic competition and anti-migrant attitudes. Hence, one can assume that increasing levels of economic deprivation should be accompanied by (at least temporarily) increasing levels of welfare chauvinism and vice versa.

102

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Consequently, one can assume that changes in economic deprivation additionally impact the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across Europe. This book argues that the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism in different countries varies over time. Therefore, it focuses on two possible explanations for how changes in national economic contexts might shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. One possible explanation is that welfare chauvinism may increase or decrease amongst the lower educated with increasing levels of economic deprivation. As explained in Chapter 2, resource competition is believed to increase the prevalence of welfare chauvinism, in particular, amongst the lower educated. The lower educated are particularly affected by the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007–2008 (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2017) and may have become more susceptible to perceptions of resource competition with migrants. This mechanism may have been reinforced in times when the public experiences an increase in lower-educated, unskilled migrants – as was the case in 2015/2016 – leading to resource competition amongst the lower educated to increase in particular. Overall, the lower educated are frequently seen as left behind regarding globalisation as well as new economies and labour markets, consequently finding themselves with increasingly fewer economic resources in a rapidly changing world. Therefore, it is possible that the lower educated have increased or slowed the decrease of welfare chauvinism across Europe. In other words, the lower educated – who already hold more preferences for welfare chauvinism in general, according to the self-interest perspective – have become more welfare chauvinist than before. Another possible explanation is that welfare chauvinism may have increased more or decreased less amongst the higher educated with increasing levels of economic deprivation. As seen in Chapter 4, the educational gap in welfare chauvinism diminished in countries with economic deprivation, as this group felt more status anxiety. While migrants across Europe are more likely to be part of the lower strata, their socio-economic positions have partly improved in recent decades (Chapter 3). Following the resource competition theory, the higher educated may have increasingly perceived resource competition with the lower educated, particularly when economic deprivation has increased. This can lead to higher levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated. For example, Lancee and Sarrasin (2015) have found that the higher educated in Switzerland show more exclusive attitudes towards migrants once they enter labour markets in which they compete with the higher educated. This mechanism may have been reinforced by the fact that through the expansion of national education systems, higher education has become more heterogeneous, with more individuals from the lower strata achieving tertiary education degrees. An additional factor contributing to this mechanism could

Welfare chauvinism across time

103

be migration policies geared at attracting mainly higher-skilled migrants. It is also known from research that social status influences attitudes towards migrants, including before individuals attend higher education (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015); therefore, it is possible that the group may have become more sensitive to resource competition over time. So while the higher educated are frequently seen as the beneficiaries of globalisation as well as new economies and labour markets, it is also possible that the group has increasing status anxiety for different reasons. Hence, it is possible that the higher educated have increased or slowed the decrease of welfare chauvinism across Europe. In other words, maybe the higher educated have become more exclusive towards migrants over time. This would mean that the liberalising impact of higher education decreases. To summarise, while an increase in economic deprivation at the country level can be related to more increases or decreases in welfare chauvinism amongst both lower- and higher-educated individuals, it can also be argued that an interplay between the three exists. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, given economic deprivation and context changes in terms of the increasing numbers of refugees, this is examined in the period from 2008–2017. Based on the ambiguous role of self-interest, this chapter argues the following: • A decrease in economic prosperity at the country level shapes the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. • In countries with decreases in economic prosperity, the educational divide is smaller.

5.6

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

To measure the economic prosperity for 2008 and the change in economic prosperity, this analysis includes the same variables that are presented in Chapter 4. The difference between this chapter and the previous one is that the aim here is not only to examine the effect of economic prosperity in 2008/2009 but also to examine change, which is why different intervals post-crisis are included for the macro-level variables. Specifically, the change from 2008–2016, 2010–2016, 2012–2016 and 2014–2016 is examined. The available macro-level control variables from Chapter 4 are additionally used for the 2008/2009 data. In Model 19 of Table 5.3, the aggregated economic prosperity measure is added to the set of variables, and it is significant for both 2008/2009, just as it was for 2016/2017 (Chapter 4). The results indicate that higher levels of

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

104

Table 5.3

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008/2009 – economic prosperity Model 19

Economic prosperity

Model 20

Coeff.

S.E.

Coeff.

S.E.

-.012*

.001

-.012*

.001

.000

.000

Economic prosperity x tertiary education Intercept

.073

.267

.135

.269

Between-country variance

.271*

.092

.271*

.092

Random slope variance (education)

.020*

.011

.020*

.011

Log-Likelihood

-18649.54

-18649.545

ICC

7,6%

7,6%

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2008/2009; level 1 N=29 882, level 2 N = 18, United Nations 2016.

economic deprivation are associated with higher levels of welfare chauvinism across the time frame this book examines. Here, the results point towards the long-lasting effects of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 in Europe, which are still ongoing. This reinforces the importance of self-interest regarding welfare chauvinism. In the previous chapter for 2016/2017, the cross-level interaction between economic prosperity and higher education is significant, but it is not significant for 2008/2009 (Table 5.3, Model 20). In other words, in more affluent countries, the gap between the higher and the lower educated was larger in 2016/2017 but did not have any significant effect in 2008/2009. Thus, the results demonstrate that economic prosperity at the country level only shapes the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism but that this relationship did not remain stable over time. The tests of additional macro-level variables that are related to economic prosperity are insignificant too. This is an important result that could hint at economic contexts becoming more important when examining the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism, especially considering the most recent (economic) crises in Europe. The next group of models analyses the 2016/2017 data and test whether changes in economic prosperity impacted welfare chauvinism and the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Table 5.4 shows the results from different multilevel logistic regression models for the perception of the likelihood of welfare chauvinism. The models demonstrate that a decrease in economic prosperity is linked to higher levels of welfare chauvinism, but the results are not significant. Hence, the results can only partly confirm the argument that a decrease in economic prosperity

Welfare chauvinism across time

Table 5.4

105

Impact of changes in national economic contexts on welfare chauvinism (results from multilevel logistic regression) Welfare chauvinism Coeff.

S.E.

-.001

.001

Model 21

Change in economic prosperity in last 2 years

Model 22

Change in economic prosperity in last 2 years x higher education

-.001

.001

Model 23

Change in economic prosperity in last 4 years

-.001

.001

Model 24

Change in economic prosperity in last 4 years x higher education

-.001†

.001

Model 25

Change in economic prosperity in last 6 years

-.014

.018

Model 26

Change in economic prosperity in last 6 years x higher education

-.002*

.001

Model 27

Change in economic prosperity in last 8 years

-.004

.001

Model 28

Change in economic prosperity in last 8 years x higher education

-.001†

.001

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: p < 0.001; p < 0.01; p < 0.05; † p < .10. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N = 23,788, level 2 N = 18, macro-level data; United Nations 2016. ***

**

*

on the country level shapes the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. However, a decrease in economic prosperity is associated with significantly smaller gaps in welfare chauvinism between the higher and the lower educated between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 as well as between 2010 and 2016. In particular, descriptives show that a majority of countries experienced a decline in economic prosperity between these years. In other words, the initial hunch that countries with decreasing levels of economic prosperity have smaller educational divides can be confirmed. This can be explained by the worldwide financial crisis of 2007/2008 that culminated in the Great Recession in the late 2000s. The results demonstrate that the crisis impacted not only the lower educated but also the higher educated in Europe. This result built on the previous results from Chapter 4, which demonstrate that the higher educated also felt economic insecurity in less affluent contexts. The results are further supported by the tests of additional macro-level variables, such as unemployment levels. Therefore, it can be established that changes in economic contexts play an important role in shaping the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism.

5.7

CULTURAL IDEOLOGY ACROSS TIME

It can be argued that a universal effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time is unlikely not only from a self-interest perspective but also from a cultural ideology perspective.

106

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Current studies on the evolution of welfare chauvinism that have used national cultural context indicators are still in the early stages. For example, Eger, Larsen and Mau (2020) found that support for welfare chauvinism decreased in countries where multiculturalism became more politically salient. An increase in inclusivity regarding migrant integration policies, however, has not been found to decrease welfare chauvinism. Research on anti-migrant attitudes found that the evolution of such attitudes across time depends on national cultural contexts (Weil 1985). Specifically, Weil (1985) points to lower levels of democracy and higher levels of religious heterogeneity that boost anti-migrant attitudes across time in Europe. This is according to the progressive dilemma (Chapter 2), which assumes a relationship between increasing levels of ethnic competition and anti-migrant attitudes. One can assume that increasing levels of authoritarianism should be accompanied by (at least temporarily) increasing levels of welfare chauvinism and vice versa. Consequently, this book argues that changes in authoritarianism impact the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across Europe. The chapter assumes that the impact of education on welfare chauvinism in different countries varies across time. Therefore, two possible explanations are used for how changes in national cultural contexts might shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. One possible explanation is that welfare chauvinism may have increased more or decreased less over time amongst the lower educated with increasing levels of authoritarianism. As explained in Chapter 2, exclusive norms are believed to increase the prevalence of welfare chauvinism in particular amongst the lower educated. Compared with the higher educated, the lower educated are generally assumed to favour authoritarian attitudes, are seen as more conforming to traditional ingroup norms and viewed as resistant to change (Feldman 2003). Apart from the economic consequences of the financial crisis in 2007/2008 and the increasing numbers of asylum seekers around 2015/2016, the lower educated have experienced cultural consequences. In particular, the erosion of their social status may additionally increase adherence to following what authorities say. As explained in Chapter 3, the rise of radical right politics in recent years in Europe may have further contributed to the perceptions of such an erosion. Therefore, it is often expected that the lower educated would adapt more to authoritarian norms when these become more prevalent in society. Consequently, it is possible that the lower educated have increased or slowed the decrease of welfare chauvinism across Europe. In other words, the lower educated – who already held more preferences for welfare chauvinism in general – have further become more welfare chauvinist than before. Another possible explanation is that welfare chauvinism may have increased more or decreased less amongst the higher educated with increasing levels of

Welfare chauvinism across time

107

authoritarianism. As seen in Chapter 4, the educational gap in welfare chauvinism diminished in countries with higher levels of authoritarian norms, as this group tended to adapt more to dominant societal norms than its lower-educated counterparts. While attitudes towards including migrants have developed in different directions across Europe over recent decades (Figure 5.2), European societies have witnessed a significant increase in radical right parties in parliaments. As a consequence, following the cultural ideology theory, one can imagine that the higher educated have perceived the normalisation of hierarchies and traditional norms more and more, particularly where authoritarian norms have increased. In other words, in countries with increasing levels of authoritarian norms, the higher educated as well may not be immune towards such norms. This can lead to higher levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated, and a decrease in the gap between the higher and the lower educated on welfare chauvinism. This mechanism may have been reinforced by the expansion of national education systems and the normalisation of migration policies that attract high-skilled migrants. Therefore, the higher educated may have adapted further to the dominant societal norms to defend their higher-status roles in society (Jackman and Muha 1984). Overall, the higher educated are frequently seen as being more liberalised than the lower educated. However, it is additionally possible that the group has increasingly clung to more traditional norms for different reasons. Consequently, it is possible that the higher educated have increased or slowed the decrease of welfare chauvinism across Europe. In other words, the higher educated may become more exclusive towards migrants over time, thereby reducing the liberalising effect of higher education. To summarise, while an increase in authoritarianism at the country level can be related to more increases or decreases in welfare chauvinism amongst both lower- and higher-educated individuals. It can also be argued that an interplay between the three exists. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, given the rise in radical right politics following the 2008 financial crisis and context changes in terms of the increasing numbers of refugees, the 2008–2017 period is analysed again here. Based on the ambiguous role of cultural ideology, this chapter argues the following: • An increase in authoritarianism at the country level shapes the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. • In countries with increases in authoritarianism, the educational divide is smaller.

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

108

5.8

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE

To measure the authoritarianism for 2008 and its change, this analysis additionally includes the same variables that are presented in Chapter 4. Specifically, the change from 2008–2016, 2010–2016, 2012–2016 and 2014–2016 is examined. Table 5.5

Multilevel logistic regression on support for welfare chauvinism in 2008/2009 – authoritarianism Model 29

Authoritarianism

Model 30

Coeff.

S.E.

Coeff.

.271

.387

.214

.387

.223**

.118

Authoritarianism x tertiary education

S.E.

Intercept

-1.467

1.493

-1.187

1.500

Between-country variance

*

.329

.111

*

.328

.111

Random slope variance (education)

.014*

.011

.014*

.009

Log-Likelihood

-18651.271

-18649.64

ICC

9,1%

9,1%

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.1, including tertiary education. Source: European Social Survey 2008/2009; level 1 N = 29 882, level 2 N = 19.

As seen in Model 29 of Table 5.5, the aggregated authoritarianism measure is added to the set of individual variables for the 2008/2009 data. While the effect of authoritarian norms is significant in 2016/2017, it is not significant for the data from 2008/2009. Thus, the results indicate that higher levels of authoritarianism are associated with higher levels of welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 but not in 2008/2009. Possibly, this may be explained by the radical right rhetoric surrounding welfare chauvinism. As discussed in Chapter 2, new radical right parties in Europe have increasingly adopted the winning formula of ‘welfare for our own’ and are associated, therefore, more with welfare chauvinism in 2016 than in 2008. The results may additionally be related to migration, only gaining more salience in the public in the years around 2016 (Figure 5.1). In the next step, a cross-level interaction between authoritarianism and higher education is added to the analysis (Table 5.5, Model 30). The cross-level interaction between authoritarianism and higher education is significant, as seen in the previous chapter, for 2016/2017, and it was also significant for 2008/2009. Thus, the results demonstrate that authoritarianism at the country level shapes the relationship between higher education and

Welfare chauvinism across time

109

welfare chauvinism and that this effect remains stable over time. Therefore, it could be established that cultural contexts played an important role in shaping the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across time. The next group of models analyses the 2016/2017 data and tests whether changes in authoritarianism impacted welfare chauvinism and the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. The models in Table 5.6 demonstrate that a change in authoritarianism is not systematically associated with an increase of welfare chauvinism, the directions of the associations appear random and are not significant. An increase in authoritarianism also seems not to be associated with larger or smaller education gaps over the observed periods. Therefore, it is found that only changes in economic contexts played an essential role in shaping the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Table 5.6

Impact of changes in national cultural contexts on welfare chauvinism (results from multilevel logistic regression) Welfare chauvinism Coeff.

S.E.

Model 31

Change in authoritarianism in last 2 years

.025

.168

Model 32

Change in authoritarianism in last 2 years x higher education

-.260

.372

Model 33

Change in authoritarianism in last 4 years

.219

.146

Model 34

Change in authoritarianism in last 4 years x higher education

-.459

.290

Model 35

Change in authoritarianism in last 6 years

.078

.092

Model 36

Change in authoritarianism in last 6 years x higher education

-.210

.192

Model 37

Change in authoritarianism in last 8 years

.041

.092

Model 38

Change in authoritarianism in last 8 years x higher education

-.313

.187

S.E.: standard error. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10. Note: The models control for all individual variables included in Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 4.1. Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017; level 1 N=23,788, level 2 N = 18.

CONCLUSIONS This chapter starts with questions concerning possible variances in the relationship between education and welfare chauvinism across time in Europe: Did the expansion of national education systems automatically lead to lower levels of welfare chauvinism? And are changes in national economic and cultural contexts related to variances in the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across time? While there is only limited data with an extended number of countries for this analysis – specifically, European Social

110

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Survey data for 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 – the results revealed vital trends that can contribute to the current literature and that may continue in future years. The results in this chapter are also robust in sensitivity tests of the models, including different operationalisations of the included variables and including similar variables. The time observed here is of particular importance, as many countries actively sought to restrict migration and migrants’ social rights after the peak of arrival of asylum seekers from Syria and other non-European countries to Europe. This included both countries that are traditionally less hospitable to migrants, such as Hungary, but additionally, those countries that are well known for their liberal and inclusive migration policies, such as Sweden (Sainsbury 2006, 2012), therefore justifying the question of whether and how public opinion shifted in this time period. This research substantially addressed the overarching topic of how to sustain solidarity in times of increasing diversity across Europe. First, in terms of findings for this chapter, in line with previous studies, welfare chauvinism significantly decreased overall between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 across Europe. The finding is puzzling considering the rhetoric that the growing number of asylum seekers, particularly around that time, posed a threat to national welfare states. Hereby, the results reveal a worrisome mismatch between public opinion, on the one hand, and political agendas and mass media depiction, on the other hand (Schmidt-Catran 2016). This finding is in line with the work of Eger, Larsen and Mewes (2020), who found minimal evidence that attitudes towards migrants’ social rights changed because of the migration crisis. Regardless, through the descriptive analysis of this book, it became clear that there are several countries where welfare chauvinism increased. In particular, the more negative the welfare chauvinist attitudes were in 2008/2009, the smaller are the changes between 2008/2009 and 2016/2017. This finding fits into the understanding of the cultural ideology theory of attitudes being clearly linked to the overall norms of a country (Chapter 3). Overall, this finding also pointed to increasing European polarisation regarding public opinion towards migrants’ access to welfare provisions. Second, in terms of findings for this chapter, countries with higher levels of welfare chauvinism had lower divides between the higher and the lower educated, as demonstrated in the preceding Chapter 4. However, the overall effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism did not significantly change over time. Here, it is important to note that, through descriptive analysis, significant changes are found in this relationship for several countries across Europe. In certain countries, the increase in welfare chauvinism can be explained by the higher educated adapting more negative attitudes than their lower-educated counterparts. To a greater degree than the lower educated, the higher educated became more welfare chauvinist when the levels of welfare chauvinism are

Welfare chauvinism across time

111

already relatively high. This is another sign of the higher educated being more likely to adapt to national norms (see also Chapter 4) and additionally demonstrates that public opinion across Europe on the matter became more polarised regardless of levels of education. Overall, there is limited evidence that expanding national education systems led to decreasing welfare chauvinism across Europe. Third, this chapter demonstrates the significance of national contexts in shaping the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Economic prosperity can explain welfare chauvinism across time. In particular, economic prosperity shaped the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism in 2016/2017 but not in 2008/2009. More affluent countries had more substantial educational divides (see also Chapter 4). This may be explained by economic anxieties across Europe strengthening national group identities, including amongst those of higher status. On the contrary, authoritarianism on the country level shapes the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, and this effect remains stable over time. This could possibly be explained by the importance of normative environments for forming attitudes. Furthermore, particularly, countries with decreasing levels of economic prosperity between 2008 and 2016, 2010 and 2016 as well as 2012 and 2016 faced higher levels of welfare chauvinism, particularly amongst the higher educated. In other words, in countries with decreases in economic prosperity, the educational divide is smaller. This could be explained by the worldwide financial crisis of 2007–2008, which culminated in the Great Recession in the late 2000s. The results demonstrate that the crisis had an impact not only on the lower educated in Europe but also amongst the higher educated. This result built on the previous results from Chapter 4, which demonstrate that, additionally, the higher educated felt economic insecurity in less affluent contexts. Once again, these findings suggest, at least partly, that governments may be able to shape public opinion and unite societies by adapting social policies that combat economic insecurity and intolerant norms. Through analysing the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across time, this chapter provides greater insight into the variances found in that relationship across Europe. Nonetheless, the findings suffered to a certain extent from methodological problems. First, as mentioned in Chapter 4, having shown the importance of economic prosperity and authoritarian norms on the country level for the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism, other factors might explain the relationship better, and one has to be careful about the conclusions. Second, the data can only account for between-individual variation in welfare chauvinism. Hence, without longitudinal data at the individual level, it cannot be ruled out that attitudes amongst individuals changed during the period of the analysis. For example, while

112

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

the analysis shows a decrease in welfare chauvinism for Germany, Marx and Naumann (2018) have found an increase during the first year of the increasing applications of asylum seekers, using individual-level panel data, and that this increase was not restricted to radical right-wing voters. Third, the pooled sample in this book included only 18 countries, which meant that interpretations of the national economic and cultural context variables had to be and should be cautiously made. Regarding the effect of higher education across time, it is possible that there are specific cohort characteristics and effects that should be addressed in future research. Fourthly, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the possibility of a social desirability bias that may have specifically shifted the answers of the higher educated for them to appear more politically correct cannot be excluded. Regardless of these common limitations in comparative public opinion data across time, this chapter has a number of implications for research on the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. Similar to the results from Chapter 4, the results of this chapter suggest that the effect of higher education is significantly more complex than has been previously assumed. The results demonstrate that essential changes occurred during recent decades that provide further insight into the complicated relationship amongst education, welfare chauvinism, and national economic and cultural contexts. Overall, the higher educated continue to be found to have more economic anxiety and to be more adapted to official norms in certain countries than their lower-educated counterparts. While the previous two chapters used a generalisation of welfare chauvinism, the next chapter sheds light on welfare chauvinism across particular social policies in Denmark, Germany and the UK.

6. Welfare chauvinism across policies 6.1 INTRODUCTION Chapters 4 and 5 showed that significant variations in the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism across country and time is found in Europe. The chapters further demonstrated that self-interest and cultural ideology can play a vital role in how the relationship between higher education and that welfare chauvinism is shaped across time and countries. However, the previous two chapters treat welfare chauvinism as a general concept – theoretically and empirically – without differentiating across different policies. This aligns with most of the current literature on welfare chauvinism, as introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. For the purpose of this chapter, this general view is labelled ‘general welfare chauvinism’. The primary purpose of this chapter is to present the investigation of variations in welfare chauvinism across seven different policies such as education, healthcare and unemployment benefits. Here, this phenomenon is labelled ‘policy-specific welfare chauvinism’. As seen in the previous chapters, this book defines welfare chauvinism as the attitude that supports excluding migrants from accessing welfare provisions. This chapter focuses on presenting the investigation of how the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated as well as the gaps between the higher and the lower educated vary across different policies, as this remains underexplored. Furthermore, it assesses whether the role of self-interest and cultural ideology could explain these variations. A range of studies have already demonstrated variations in public opinion across different social policies for the general population across Europe, without focusing on migrants. For example, it is known that sick individuals are seen as more deserving of welfare support than unemployed individuals (van Oorschot 2006) and that the public across Europe is more willing to invest in education than in pensions (Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017). However, the literature that focuses on migrants’ social rights usually does not differentiate public opinion across a range of social policies and, rather, theoretically and empirically focuses on general welfare chauvinism (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Mewes and Mau 2012; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 2013). Moreover, while only a handful of studies have explored welfare chauvinism across individual social policies 113

114

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

for migrants, to date they have not investigated systematic variations across a range of different policies (Bay, Finseraas and Pedersen 2016 on child benefits; Bay, Finseraas and Pedersen 2013; Careja et al. 2016; Hjorth 2015; Marx and Naumann 2018 on social assistance, as well as Kootstra 2016 on housing and disability benefits). Interestingly, Eick and Larsen (2022) have found significant variations in welfare chauvinism across different social policies, in particular across compensatory policies and social investment policies. The study even found that this pattern is stable across different groups of voters, including voters for radical right parties. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in this book, ‘social investment policies’ refer to policies that create, mobilise or preserve skills to support individuals’ earning capacities (often in-kind services, such as education or childcare). And ‘compensatory policies’ refer to policies that compensate for income losses (often cash benefits such as unemployment benefits or social assistance). In this study, members of the public were more inclusive in their attitudes towards migrants when asked about social investment policies in comparison to compensatory policies, but this research did not differentiate between the higher and the lower educated. If welfare chauvinism varies across different social policies, it is worth examining whether this applies to the higher educated as well. Because the relatively lower levels of welfare chauvinism found in the literature for the higher educated (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007) might not be the same across different social policies. Additionally, due to the cross-country and cross-time variances in the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism that were identified in Chapters 4 and 5 in this book, such cross-policy variances can bring the education-as-liberation argument further into question. With this, there can be further understanding of rationales to explain welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated. Using once again the self-interest and cultural ideology theories, it can be argued that the higher educated hold particularly negative views towards compensatory policies in comparison to social investment policies for migrants, perhaps because compensatory policies are less normalised than social investment and because compensatory policies may be perceived as a larger tax burden for individuals with higher incomes, such as the higher educated. On the contrary, the right to social investment policies may be perceived as a fundamental human right, and the higher educated might be able to afford to pay for these social investment policies privately. Through these discussions, this chapter adds to existing studies in comparative research and aims to provide another re-evaluation in this book of the role that higher education plays in shaping welfare chauvinism. This chapter presents the use of the novel comparative Welfare States Attitudes Survey data from 2019, gathered to examine policy-specific welfare chauvinism and institutional contexts. The study’s design enables the argu-

Welfare chauvinism across policies

115

ments mentioned above to be addressed through the investigation of welfare chauvinism in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom towards Eastern European workers across seven different social policies. Consequently, while the previous two chapters presented the investigation of public opinion towards welfare chauvinism across Europe and migrants in general, this chapter focuses on public opinion towards policy-specific welfare chauvinism for intra-EU migrants. The Welfare States Attitudes Survey is based on a population-based online panel survey amongst adult respondents from age 18 onwards and was conducted through YouGov. YouGov aimed to create a representative set of the public based on stratification on socio-demographic characteristics that are known to form attitudes, for example education, gender, age and regions. The Welfare States Attitudes Survey is not as representative as the European Social Survey, and there is a chance of panel effects. However, in comparison to the face-to-face interviews from the European Social Survey, the online YouGov surveys might have the advantage of social desirability bias being a lesser issue. As mentioned before, through face-to-face interviews, the effect to appeal in a politically correct manner may be further reinforced if interviewers that are identified by the participants as migrants further strengthen the education-related response bias (Janus 2010; An 2015). Overall, this chapter explores whether the levels of welfare chauvinism across policies as well as the educational gaps between the higher and the lower educated would vary across a range of social policies. While the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across policies was tested for this book, taking additional socialisation and self-interest factors into account, this is not the focus of this chapter. The main arguments here are: • Welfare chauvinism varies across social policies. • Levels of welfare chauvinism are higher across compensatory policies than across social investment policies. • The educational divide on welfare chauvinism is smaller across compensatory policies than social investment policies.

6.2

SELF-INTEREST ACROSS POLICIES

As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, self-interest mechanisms play an important part in explaining welfare chauvinism across countries and time. This chapter argues that the role of self-interest also helps to explain welfare chauvinism across a range of different compensatory policies and social investment policies. For example, Heedegaard and Larsen (2014) have demonstrated that a person who receives certain welfare resources, such as unemployment benefits, holds more preferences for increased spending for unemployment benefits

116

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

while holding fewer preferences for increased spending for other welfare resources. Furthermore, Mau (2003) argues that individuals are embedded in their social networks and, accordingly, individuals’ self-interests cannot be divided from their families, friends and specific social network interests. For example, if a person has a disabled family member, there is a high chance that this person would support an increase in state support for disabled persons. If this argument is followed, one can additionally assume that similar mechanisms apply to welfare chauvinism, where individuals support limiting welfare resources that are more important to them. This means that unemployment recipients, for example, may not support migrants’ access to unemployment benefits. However, unemployment recipients may support migrants’ access to other welfare resources, such as childcare. Consequently, from a self-interest perspective, one can assume that welfare chauvinism varies across policies and across the groups in question. From a comparative perspective, this chapter does not focus in detail on the variations across countries, which were demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5. Instead, this chapter compares groups of policies to provide more detailed insight into how institutional structures can shape support for migrants’ social rights, a focus that cannot be investigated in the previous analytical sections of the book. Cross-policy variation can be explained via a range of competing theories; following the literature on attitudes towards the welfare state in general (Larsen 2008; Titmuss 1974), universalism – giving to all citizens – has been theorised to decrease welfare chauvinism, while selectivism – giving only to the poor – has been theorised to increase welfare chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron 2009; van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 2013). Other institutional scholars have argued that compulsory social insurance systems (Ruhs and Palme 2018) or perceived inclusive social rights for migrants (Larsen 2020) can lower welfare chauvinism. This chapter advances these institutional arguments by theorising how welfare chauvinism can be shaped by whether social risks are covered by compensatory policies and social investment policies (Harell, Soroka and Mahon 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), as it is theorised that this differentiation can be of particular importance considering the educational gap in welfare chauvinism. From a comparative perspective, it can be argued that the self-interest perspective points to different levels of welfare chauvinism across compensatory policies and social investment policies. Specifically, it can be argued that the public is less willing to grant migrants access to compensatory policies than to social investment policies. Importantly, the welfare state is frequently imagined as being a reciprocal giver–taker relationship (van Oorschot 2006). Mau (2003) refers to this as the moral economy of the welfare state. Basically, it means that public preferences for who deserves welfare resources underly a gift heuristic where reciprocity is key (Mau 2004). This chapter argues that

Welfare chauvinism across policies

117

imagined reciprocity in the public is more prevalent for social investment policies than for compensatory policies. In other words, the public imagines that the link between paying taxes and individuals receiving compensatory policies is stronger than the link between paying taxes and individuals receiving social investment policies. This can be explained because benefits are cash transfers that are paid in a currency, just like taxes or insurance are paid. Therefore, the public might perceive a stronger link between giving and receiving for cash benefits than for in-kind services. The recipients of welfare benefits take out directly what the tax or insurance payers put into the welfare system. This chapter also argues that this imagined link between tax payments and in-kind services is lower than the imagined link between tax payments and cash benefits, as the recipients of in-kind services do not take out directly what taxpayers put into the welfare system. Logan (1986) refers to this as the ‘fiscal illusion of the public’ since individuals generally cannot calculate the exact value of services. When focusing on compensatory policies and social investment policies for migrants, the (perceived) perception of the public in Northern and Western European countries that migrants place a strain on the welfare system might reinforce the compensatory policies versus social investment policies divide (Larsen, Frederiksen and Nielsen 2018). Furthermore, it could be argued that the public only supports welfare where free riding is not perceived as a significant problem. However, as explained in Chapter 2, it is known from numerous studies on perceptions towards migrants that the group is afflicted with a range of negative characteristics, including the fear that migrants are free-riders who misuse welfare resources (Allport 1954). Here, lower levels of welfare chauvinism across services can be argued, as it is harder to imagine free riding across in-kind services in comparison to cash benefits. This is because, for the public, it might seem plausible for migrants to receive benefits, such as unemployment benefits or social assistance, while having a job in the shadow economy. On the contrary, the potential for cheating might seem less plausible for the public across services that are consumed. For example, childcare or education require the beneficiaries to be present, and there are usually public employees who check their attendance. In comparison, services, such as hospitals, schools, childcare or employment agencies, facilitate the beneficiaries and the individuals close to the beneficiaries to participate in the labour market. Hereby, the beneficiaries of services are able to become contributors to the moral economy described previously. Furthermore, when female migrants have higher participation rates in the labour market, this participation is frequently seen as an integration indicator (Zimmermann, Heuer and Mau 2018). In other words, regarding migrants, services can be imagined not only as enabling participation in the labour market but also as being a more comprehensive integration.

118

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Still, one can also imagine other institutional mechanisms, in particular because services are often universally available for all residents in a country. From a competition perspective, this is because universal services can increase welfare chauvinism as migrants can access them more directly (Bay and Pedersen 2006). The public may perceive such direct access as a welfare magnet, especially for groups of migrants that the public already perceives to have lower human capital, such as Eastern European migrants (Hjorth 2015). In contrast, the right to access other policies is conditional upon needs (here means-tested policies) or contribution (here insurance-based policies). In other words, the universalism argument is not readily applicable, as the positive destigmatising effect of universalism can lead to less welfare chauvinism. Hence, it is simpler to imagine that levels of welfare chauvinism would be lower across compensatory policies than across social investment policies. To address these points, the analysis in this chapter will include universal in-kind services and universal cash benefits. Building on the previous arguments and based on the self-interest rationale, it can be argued that the gap between the higher and the lower educated varies across social policies as well. As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, this theoretical perspective can affect educational differences between the higher and the lower educated across countries and time. In the context of this chapter, it can be imagined that the educational gap is smaller in relation to compensatory policies when compared with social investment policies. There are various reasons for this argument; these are elaborated on in the following paragraphs. It is possible that the higher educated relate cash benefits to higher costs regarding tax financing (Morel and Palme 2012). Hence, the (at least imagined) tax burden of migrants through benefits can be related to more support for benefits for migrants amongst this group. This effect can be accelerated through the belief that migrants claim cash benefits they are not entitled to. For the same reasons, one can additionally argue that the higher educated generally do not want to grant cash benefits to anyone regardless of the recipient’s nationality (Mols and Jetten 2017). In contrast, the lower educated may want to only reduce cash benefits for migrants, as they see migrants as their main competitors (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Furthermore, while the lower educated are particularly assumed to fear economic competition with migrants, it can additionally be argued that compensation policies for migrants, such as social assistance or unemployment benefits, shield against a possible downward pressure on earnings, as they offer a safety buffer. In other words, cash benefits can secure a basic income, which employers should at least meet to make participation on the labour market (versus the receipt of cash benefits) profitable. One can additionally argue that cash benefits or more generous cash benefits can, therefore, at least partly, prevent economic competition with recipients. However, when focusing on the higher

Welfare chauvinism across policies

119

educated, they are the ones who primarily profit from low reservation wages or cheap labour. One could, therefore, imagine that the higher educated are less supportive of granting individuals cash benefits and that this mechanism is once more reinforced when the cash benefits are directed at migrants. However, it can also be argued that the educational gap is smaller across social investment policies in comparison to compensatory policies. This is because the higher educated as well may use in-kind services, such as healthcare, school and childcare. Therefore, the higher educated also compete with migrants for such services. Nonetheless, services are often universal, and, depending on the welfare state, their availability is not necessarily restricted. Furthermore, the higher educated may opt into private alternatives to welfare services, such as private healthcare, education and childcare, as they are more likely to earn sufficient money to afford these private alternatives. Overall, a more nuanced discussion of the self-interest perspective demonstrates that the higher and the lower educated can be expected to hold conflicting attitudes about different compensatory policies and social investment policies for migrants. Specifically, this section argues that the higher educated may hold particularly negative views towards cash benefits for migrants.

6.3

CULTURAL IDEOLOGY ACROSS POLICIES

As previously seen in Chapters 4 and 5, cultural-ideology mechanisms can also explain welfare chauvinism across countries and time. This chapter argues that this mechanism can shine further light on welfare chauvinism across a range of different compensatory policies and social investment policies. The literature generally assumes that the members of a national community share an identity, also referred to as ingroup identity (van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 2013). This is because modern welfare states are fostered by class arrangements, political mobilisation and boundaries of democracy formed through the nation-state (Larsen, Frederiksen and Nielsen 2018). When examining the arguments for the public to generally not support granting migrants access to welfare provisions, it is assumed that the public simply differentiates between insiders and outsiders of the nation-state. In relation to different educational backgrounds, lower-educated individuals can be expected to hold higher levels of welfare chauvinism because they identify more strongly with the national community (Mewes and Mau 2012). However, lower-educated individuals can be additionally expected to hold lower levels of welfare chauvinism because they can identify more with other vulnerable groups that are in need of welfare provisions, such as migrants (Kros and Coenders 2019). Hence, theoretically, it is difficult to simply conclude that the higher educated would show more solidarity with migrants’ general access to welfare provisions than their lower-educated counterparts.

120

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Similar to the self-interest rationale, one can additionally argue the cultural ideology rationale that welfare chauvinism varies across different social policies. Here, the aforementioned deservingness theory is relevant, in which public attitudes are thought to depend on the group of welfare recipients to which a person belongs (van Oorschot 2000). As explained in Chapter 2, the judgement on whether an individual deserves welfare support depends not only on shared identity but also on whether they can control their personal circumstances. For example, unemployment can be seen as a more controllable situation than sickness, which can be seen as a less controllable situation (van Oorschot 2000). This is reflected in public attitudes in Europe that demonstrate more support for generous healthcare recipients than for unemployment benefits recipients (van Oorschot 2006), and the same applies to public support for social healthcare and unemployment expenditure (Eick 2023a). This chapter argues that the same logic can be applied to public attitudes towards migrants’ access to welfare provisions. Hence, using the same example, it can be expected that the public would be more supportive of healthcare for migrants and less supportive of unemployment benefits for migrants. From a comparative perspective, it can be argued that the cultural ideology perspective also points to different levels of welfare chauvinism across compensatory policies and social investment policies. This can be due to various reasons. Importantly, services are frequently the welfare provisions that are needed by all in society and that are frequently universally available for all, including schools and healthcare. In particular, universal in-kind services can be considered to be basic social rights in that all individuals in a country should have access to. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that education is a fundamental human right for all individuals. This is a reason why the public can be more receptive to in-kind services being available to all, and universal services, in particular, help to break the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by defining all individuals in a country as belonging to one group. Cash benefits, in contrast, are generally welfare provisions for individuals in need and are frequently selective. As a result, benefits reinforce the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This means that, for the public, receiving cash benefits is an exception, while receiving in-kind services is the norm. Furthermore, cash benefits are transferable across countries; this breaks the main solidarity premise of the welfare state, which has been historically built on sharing social commitments and risks within the nation-states but not beyond. Services can only be used in the country of destination, and by residents who live within the state borders more permanently. In line with this, Bay and others (2016), by means of a survey experiment, showed that the levels of welfare chauvinism are higher when migrants in Norway can use child benefits in the country of origin and lower when migrants in Norway can immediately access child benefits in their host nation. Furthermore, it can be

Welfare chauvinism across policies

121

argued that the public might perceive migrants who use services such as school or childcare as more integrated into society (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2020). In that sense, childcare might be perceived as particularly important for migrant women in order for them to work and contribute taxes to society. This can be particularly crucial for welfare chauvinism in North-Western Europe, as migrants are often imagined by the public as being less or not at all integrated into society. Based on the cultural ideology rationale, it can be argued that the gap between the higher and the lower educated varies across social policies as well. As discussed in previous chapters, this theoretical perspective affects educational differences between the higher and the lower educated across countries and time. In the context of this chapter, it can be imagined that the educational gap is smaller amongst compensatory policies in comparison to social investment policies. There are various reasons for this argument, which will now be elaborated on. According to the cultural ideology theory, in-kind services are more normalised in society than benefits, as access to them is generally based on universalism (Larsen 2008; Titmuss 1974). In contrast, one can assume that cash benefits are less normalised, as access to them is generally based on selectivism (Crepaz and Damron 2009; van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot 2013). As discussed various times in this book, it is assumed that the higher educated are more socialised into believing in the official norms of a country. Consequently, the higher educated may be more likely to hold welfare chauvinist attitudes across cash benefits in comparison to in-kind services. Applying the universalism versus selectivism argument to the higher educated, one can imagine how socialisation processes may reinforce these differentiations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature assumes that the higher educated hold more inclusive attitudes towards migrants because they have more positive contact experiences with them. Translating this argument to recipients of compensatory policies and social investment policies, it can be argued that the higher educated are more likely to have contact with individuals who receive social investment policies than with those in receipt of compensatory policies. This is because the higher educated are less likely to receive cash benefits themselves due to their more advantaged labour market status. Consequently, it is possible that the higher educated can empathise less than the lower educated with cash benefit recipients than with individuals who use in-kind services. This would once more lead to the assumption that the education gap is smaller across cash benefits than across in-kind services. Similarly, one can assume that the lower educated feel more solidarity with other cash benefit recipients in comparison to recipients of in-kind services. This is because, as explained before, the benefit group is more likely to consist of lower-educated than of higher-educated individuals. Hence, the lower edu-

122

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

cated may be more likely to grant migrants access to benefits in comparison to the higher educated, as the lower educated may fear that cuts in benefits for migrants would additionally mean cuts in benefits for them. Therefore, one would once more assume that the education gap is smaller with cash benefits than with in-kind services. Overall, a more nuanced look into the cultural ideology rationale shows that it can be expected that the higher and the lower educated hold at least ambivalent attitudes about different compensatory policies and social investment policies for migrants. Specifically, this section argues that the higher educated might hold particularly negative views towards compensatory policies for migrants.

6.4

MEASURING WELFARE CHAUVINISM ACROSS POLICIES

The country choice of Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom for the Welfare State Attitude Survey is relevant to measure welfare chauvinism across policies for several reasons. First, country choice allowed for the exploration of the research questions across prevalent welfare states in the north-western countries in the EU, frequently referred to as social-democratic (Denmark), conservative (Germany) and liberal (United Kingdom) (Esping-Andersen 1990). Similar to other welfare states in Europe, these countries have experienced significant transformations, such as welfare retrenchment, globalisation, labour market relations and the erosions of traditional class arrangements. Here, the United Kingdom stands out in particular, as the liberal welfare state has become increasingly dominated by neoliberalist characteristics, such as privatisation, individualism and inequality (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2017). Furthermore, after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the United Kingdom officially left the EU in 2020. The Brexit campaign was largely based on welfare chauvinism, particularly concerning Eastern European migrants from the EU (Hjorth 2015; Rzepnikowska 2019). Second, debates about welfare state reforms have become increasingly intertwined with discussions about migrants’ access to welfare provisions in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. All three countries have witnessed an increase in right-wing parties that have capitalised on the winning formula of ‘welfare for our kind’ (Eger and Valdez 2014), in particular the Danish People’s Party, the Alternative for Germany and the UK Independence Party. Furthermore, politicians from mainstream parties in these countries have partly adapted to these strategies, which has further normalised welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2014). These discourses are reinforced by the media representation of migrants’ rights to welfare provisions. In particular, the media in the United Kingdom reinforce negative stigmas about

Welfare chauvinism across policies

123

migrants as welfare recipients, which is in line with the findings from Larsen and Dejgaard (2013). These researchers demonstrated that the media in liberal welfare regimes have represented welfare recipients more negatively than the media in social democratic welfare regimes. This normalisation of welfare chauvinism is relevant to this book, as higher education is assumed to socialise students into the dominant norms of a society. Third, there are studies that assume a relationship between the welfare state regime, welfare attitudes (Svallfors 1995) and welfare chauvinism amongst the public (van der Waal et al. 2013). The assumption is that the public in more liberal (and conservative) welfare states hold more negative attitudes towards distribution than the public in more social democratic welfare states. For example, since Denmark is a social-democratic welfare state, this would mean that the public in Denmark would be more likely to hold preferences for granting migrants access to welfare support in comparison to the public in the United Kingdom and Germany. For a conservative test, including different welfare regimes in the Welfare Attitudes Survey sample is advantageous. In particular, finding the same patterns in cross-policy variation across welfare regimes that were most different in their regime type but most similar in recent migration issues, could strengthen further the argument for the importance of these structures. Fourthly, the country choice allowed for a more conservative test, as welfare chauvinism is less prevalent amongst the higher educated than their lower-educated counterparts in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, demonstrated in Figure 6.1. This chapter sheds further light on why the levels of welfare chauvinism amongst the higher educated as well as educational gaps may vary across policies. For the analysis, the representative European Social Survey samples demonstrate that Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom had significant educational gaps between the higher and the lower educated in general welfare chauvinism. In other words, from a case selection perspective, these countries are relatively similar. From Chapters 4 and 5, it is known that the significant educational gaps between the higher and the lower educated can be related to these countries having relatively low levels of authoritarian norms and relatively high levels of economic prosperity. Thus, the sample allowed for the critical investigation of the complexities and nuances in the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across policies, specifically based on compensatory policies and social investment policies. The differences between the three countries regarding their welfare regimes, political discourses and public attitudes to (migrants as) welfare recipients presented as interesting cases for this study of the impact of higher education on welfare chauvinism. Thus, the sample was expected to allow for the critical

124

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Source: European Social Survey 2008/2009, Denmark (N = 1,661); 2016/2017, Germany (N = 2,751), United Kingdom (N = 2,352). Design- and population weighted.

Figure 6.1

Education gap on welfare chauvinism in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, all categories

investigation of the complexities and nuances in the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across different welfare policies. The new survey and country sample also allowed for the research’s specification to a particular migrant group, namely Eastern European workers. The frequently used item for examining welfare chauvinism from the European Social Survey defines migrants as ‘people coming to live in [country] from other countries’. The Welfare States Attitudes Survey replaces this formulation with ‘workers from Eastern Europe’. It is known from the current literature that public attitudes towards migrants vary according to their (ethnic) background, and research has shown that public attitudes in the EU are especially negative when the migrant group in question is Eastern Europeans (Hjorth 2015; Rzepnikowska 2023). Hence, the focus on Eastern European workers

Welfare chauvinism across policies

125

was chosen for linking the question of welfare chauvinism across different policies and intra-EU migration to the three countries in the sample. Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom have a similar baseline standard regarding the rights of Eastern European workers, as these countries were all in the European Union at the time of the survey (although Brexit had already been planned at this time). This setting is important because the 60-year anniversary of the establishment of social security coordination and the 50-year anniversary for the establishment of free mobility of workers in the European Union was celebrated in 2018. Thus, from the outset, labour mobility is believed to be an essential pillar of the European Union, and the European Union has aimed to attach social rights to labour mobility. In general, EU regulations have the objective of maintaining welfare rights and welfare obligations for EU citizens who move from one member state to another. In other words, mobile EU workers generally have the same welfare rights and obligations as natives. Furthermore, mobile EU workers generally have the right to transfer certain welfare rights across countries. An example of such a right are exportable child benefits from the host countries for children who reside in the origin countries (Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser 2018). While such cross-border welfare rights are aimed at establishing solidarity across EU member states (Sangiovanni 2013), such rights can additionally be related to higher levels of welfare chauvinism because migrants within the European Union have more rights than migrants from countries that are not part of the European Union (Cappelen and Peters 2018). This is indeed the case when examining the research on Eastern European migrants in Northern and Western European countries, such as Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, where these migrants account for the largest part of intra-EU migrants. Migration numbers from Eastern European countries to Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom have increased considerably after 11 Eastern European countries joined the European Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Such European Union enlargements evoked fears about Eastern Europeans placing a financial burden on welfare states, particularly on more generous Northern and Western welfare states (Scharpf 2010). An example of this argument has been examined by Hjorth (2015). The research demonstrates that the levels of welfare chauvinism in Sweden are higher for migrants from Bulgaria than for migrants from the Netherlands. The findings could be explained by perceptions around lower levels of human capital amongst migrants from Bulgaria than amongst migrants from the Netherlands. Such perceptions were most recently manifested in the United Kingdom’s leaving the European Union, where politicians and the media created a narrative about welfare tourists, with a focus on low-skilled Eastern European workers who come to the United Kingdom to take advantage of the welfare system. While the welfare magnetism hypothesis empirically has

126

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

limited support, research has shown that the public in several EU member states is concerned that generous welfare states attract intra-EU migrants to a higher level than less generous welfare states (Giulietti and Kahanec 2013). As explained in Chapter 2, mainly new right-wing parties across member states mobilise welfare chauvinism in Northern and Western Europe towards Eastern European migrants, which enables these parties to combine their anti-migrant, nationalist, anti-EU and pro-welfare stance. Hereby these parties can call for maintaining access to welfare provisions for the general public while limiting welfare provisions for intra-EU migrants. Having a relatively homogenous migrant group for the comparison allows this book to focus on cross-policy variation. While there may be smaller differences in the perceptions across Eastern European countries, it can be assumed that the discourses around Eastern European workers include similar countries of origin. Thus, the origin countries in the survey were not differentiated. Furthermore, the wording ‘workers’ was used to avoid respondents’ belief that long-term freedom of movement is unconditional, which is a common misconception. Hence, a conservative test of this migrant group could be provided. The main aim of the Welfare State Attitude Survey is to examine the cross-policy variation of welfare chauvinism. The welfare chauvinism item was adapted from the European Social Survey data of 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 used in the previous two chapters. The Welfare State Attitude Survey contrasts the item across different policies. For this chapter, seven items are included in the analysis across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, namely: (1) healthcare; (2) childcare; (3) school education; (4) child benefits domestic (child benefits for children living in the host country; (5) child benefits origin (exportable child benefits for EU citizens with a child or children living in a different member state); (6) unemployment benefits; and (7) social assistance. The policy selection underwent a range of criteria, such as comparability across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom as well as current salience in national discourses. To allow further variation, the policies covered several components, for example, several deservingness criteria and several policy structures (van Oorschot 2000; Bonoli 2007; Morel and Palme 2012). More precisely, despite the regime differences across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, the three countries design cash benefits and in-kind services in a similar manner. Nevertheless, there are a few variations, which were exploited in the analysis. Welfare chauvinism across cash benefits or compensatory policies is measured for child benefits for children who live in the country of destination (child benefits domestic) as well as for child benefits for children who live in the origin country (child benefits origin), unemployment benefits, social assistance and childcare in the United Kingdom. Social assistance is, in all three countries, a typical means-tested benefit, and the

Welfare chauvinism across policies

127

unemployment benefit is, in all three countries, a typical insurance benefit. Though massively state subsidised, it is voluntary in Denmark, and it is compulsory in Germany and the United Kingdom. The two child benefits are, in all three countries, a typical universal benefit given to all individuals who have children. Lastly, there are a range of policies in the United Kingdom aimed at reducing childcare costs. Still, a majority of these policies have benefit features, some of them universal and some of them means tested. Accordingly, childcare in the United Kingdom is categorised mainly as a cash benefit. Welfare chauvinism across in-kind services or social investment policies was measured for school education, healthcare as well as childcare. In Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, school education is a typical universal in-kind service. In Denmark and the United Kingdom healthcare is also universal, but in Germany it is insurance based. However, health insurance is state covered in Germany if not already covered by the employer or employee. Hence, healthcare in Germany is also similar to a universal policy as it covers all residents – Eastern European workers included. As mentioned before, while childcare is designed as an in-kind service in Denmark and Germany, in the United Kingdom it is primarily designed as a cash benefit (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2020). In Denmark and Germany, childcare is a typical tax-financed in-kind service. Specifically, in Denmark, childcare is provided through the state; in Germany, childcare is provided through both the state and institutions of the civil society. Childcare in Denmark is a particularly interesting case, at it is compulsory in areas that are considered to be socially marginalised to increase integration.

6.5

CASH-BENEFIT CHAUVINISM

Apart from replicating the general welfare chauvinism item from the 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 European Social Survey, this book differentiated welfare chauvinism in the Welfare States Attitude Survey using the following item: ‘In relation to the migration of the East European workforce that has been discussed, when and to what extent should they have the same rights as [Danish/ German/United Kingdom] citizens? When do you think workers from Eastern Europe should have the same rights as citizens that already live here?’ To allow potential cross-survey comparability, this book used the same ordinal five-point answering scale as used in the European Social Survey: (1) immediately on arrival; (2) after living in [Denmark/Germany/United Kingdom] for a year, whether or not they have worked; (3) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (4) once they have become a Danish citizen; and (5) they should not get the same rights. As with Chapters 4 and 5, a binary variable is used for the main analysis indicating either (1) ‘No welfare provisions for migrants’ (categories 4–5), or (0) ‘(Conditional) welfare provisions for

128

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

migrants’ (categories 1–3). As with the samples in the previous two chapters, the analyses excluded respondents who were not born in the country in which they were interviewed. First, descriptive data explored the cross-policy variations in the public as well as across the higher and the lower educated. Whether the differences between policies are significant was additionally tested via t-tests. It is assumed that welfare chauvinism would vary significantly across policies. Figure 6.2 presents the percentage of the general welfare chauvinism item and welfare chauvinism across seven social policies in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom (ranging from lowest to highest within each country). The descriptive results indicate that welfare chauvinism varied significantly across the seven policies, confirming the argument that welfare chauvinism varies across different social policies. This shows once more that welfare chauvinism is not simply an anti-migrant attitude but also a welfare attitude. Importantly, the variation across policies is more relevant than the variation across countries. The largest differences are found in the public attitudes towards the rights of Eastern European workers to healthcare and child benefits origin (for children living abroad). Granting migrants access to healthcare was acceptable to approximately 75 per cent of the majority populations in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. In contrast, granting child benefits for children living abroad was acceptable to approximately 25 per cent of the majority populations. These are the most exclusive attitudes found in the data material. Hereby, it can be demonstrated how important it is for the public that beneficiaries are inside the state borders as it seems to be an important benchmark for welfare reciprocity (Bay, Finseraas and Pedersen 2016). These results are not surprising, as the welfare attitude literature also demonstrates that the public is more generous when it comes to certain social investment policies in comparison to cash policies (Harell, Soroka and Mahon 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Furthermore, it is known from the literature that negative media representation and discourse can play an important role in the formation of inclusive attitudes towards migrants (Blinder 2015). While it is not the focus of this book, it is crucial to acknowledge that such influences may have a role to play in the cross-policy variations that are found across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. A closer examination of the level of welfare chauvinism across particular policy structures sheds further light on the results. Overall, welfare chauvinism varies across policies and, specifically, between compensatory policies and social investment policies. As previously assumed, in the three countries, the levels of welfare chauvinism are lower across social investment policies than across compensatory policies. This specifically applied to social investment policies (healthcare, school education and childcare service) and compensatory policies (unemployment benefits, child benefit domestic, child benefit

Welfare chauvinism across policies

129

Source: Welfare State Attitude Survey, Denmark (N = 1,849), Germany (N = 1,902), United Kingdom (N = 1,846). Design- and population weighted.

Figure 6.2

Welfare chauvinism across seven social policies (in percentage)

130

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

origin, childcare benefit and social assistance) in Denmark and Germany. The differences are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A similar pattern is seen for the public in the United Kingdom, where the levels of welfare chauvinism are lower across social investment policies (school education and healthcare) than across compensatory policies (child benefit domestic, child benefit origin, unemployment benefit and social assistance), observed at the 0.01 level as well. One exception to this pattern included levels of welfare chauvinism towards childcare in the United Kingdom, which are significantly more negative than the attitudes towards healthcare and school education. This data used in this book additionally shows that the public in Denmark and Germany is more likely to grant Eastern European workers access to childcare than the public in the United Kingdom. The difference is sizeable and clearly significant. This could be explained by the fact that the childcare system in the United Kingdom is one of the most expensive in the EU, and, as mentioned previously, providing parents with financial support for childcare services works in a similar manner to benefits. Finally, the public in Denmark and Germany are more likely to grant Eastern European workers access to childcare service than to a domestic child benefit and an origin child benefit (the differences are sizeable and clearly statistically significant). This means it mattered whether the risk is covered by compensatory policies or social investment policies, even if the social risk observed is the same. This result highlighted one of the limitations of this analysis: it could be argued that the compensatory policies and social investment policies examined in the analysis covered different social risks. However, the results demonstrate that the level of welfare chauvinism might be about who is at risk rather than the policy structure that matters for the attitudes. In other words, the results demonstrate that different policy structures matter more for the level of welfare chauvinism than different deservingness rationales. While the evidence found in this book for cross-policy variation in welfare chauvinism is new, this variation is not a surprise when examining public support for different policies amongst the general population (Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017; Eick, Burgoon and Busemeyer 2023; van Oorschot 2000). Interestingly, it was additionally found that support was higher for granting the general population access to social investment policies than to compensatory policies. Hence, the results substantially reflected policy support in general and did not seem specific to migrants. The popularity of compensatory policies versus social investment policies is in line with current literature that differentiates between compensatory policies and social investment policies as well (Harell, Soroka and Mahon 2008). The data shows support for this book’s argument for policy-specific welfare chauvinism and reveals several interesting patterns that may need more attention in future research.

Welfare chauvinism across policies

131

Finally, the social investment versus compensation distinction underwent additional tests. It was analysed whether welfare chauvinism across different policies measures underlying unobservable variables indirectly. Specifically, the chapter investigated whether the different policies could be reduced to the latent variables benefits and services through an exploratory factor analysis. Child benefits for children living abroad were excluded from the factors benefits and services because the policy did not fit the models. This makes sense, since this policy is an EU-level policy, while the other policies are national-level policies. Other than that, the internal consistency of the two factors – social investment and compensatory policies – is good (Cronbach’s alpha above .8 in each country). The latent variable for social investment policies correlated with the one for compensatory policies (Denmark, .68; Germany, .75; United Kingdom, .76), which indicated a strong relationship between the two variables. The relationship between child benefits origin was weaker for benefits (Denmark, .38; Germany, .48; United Kingdom, .53) and services (Denmark, .15; Germany, .27; United Kingdom, .35). The means of the variables emphasised the compensatory versus social investment policies distinction and that the variation between policies was larger than the variation across countries (means services: Denmark 1.2, Germany 1.2, United Kingdom 1.4; means benefits domestic: Denmark 2.1, Germany 2.0, United Kingdom 2.1; means child benefit origin: Denmark 3.3, Germany 3.0, United Kingdom 2.9). Nonetheless, it was decided not to use the latent variables for more analysis as this means losing important nuances in the theoretical discussions and empirical results. Running the factor analysis only with samples of higher- or lower-educated individuals, the outcomes are the same. In other words, the compensatory versus social investment variation can be identified through factor analysis, regardless of the educational differences. Another important observation from Figure 6.1 is the level of the general welfare chauvinism item in comparison to the cross-policy items. The level of the general item resembles the level of the (national) compensatory policies. This is a vital finding that makes one question what respondents think about when responding to it. Section 6.7 will come back to this point and elaborate on it further.

6.6

WELFARE CHAUVINISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION ACROSS POLICIES

The following sections offer a discussion about theoretical arguments for expecting variations in both welfare chauvinism across policies – specifically regarding compensatory policies and social investment policies – and educational gaps across these. As in the previous chapters, two theoretical strands

132

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

focus on investigating variations in the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across Europe, namely the cultural and economic perspectives. For this chapter, higher education was measured once again in terms of holding at least one tertiary education degree. As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the lower educated are more likely than the higher educated to hold preferences for welfare chauvinism across all policies. This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom, where the educational gaps are slightly larger overall, according to expectation, as discussed regarding Figure 6.1. In particular, the findings from the United Kingdom mirror the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, where it was found that countries with similar characteristics to the United Kingdom had higher educational gaps, possibly because the higher educated were socialised into relatively tolerant norms as well as having experienced relatively low levels of economic competition. All differences between the higher and the lower educated are significant. Regarding the size of the educational gaps, the variations are minimal and did not appear to be systematic across policies or across compensatory policies and social investment policies. The only exception is that Denmark and the United Kingdom had smaller educational gaps when child benefits for children living in origin countries are examined. In other words, there is more agreement amongst both the higher and the lower educated not to grant Eastern European worker access to child benefits abroad. Overall, the small differences in educational gaps further emphasised the importance of institutional impact on attitude formation, regardless of the level of education. Furthermore, a variance over compensatory policies and social investment policies was still found across the higher and the lower educated in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, a pattern cannot be found for differences in the educational effect across policies within countries; at least not without additional control factors. In Denmark, more inclusive attitudes towards all social investment policies in comparison to all compensatory policies held true for both the higher and the lower educated. Higher levels of welfare chauvinism concerning childcare benefit in comparison to chauvinism with regard to childcare services and child benefits abroad held true for Danish higher- and lower-educated individuals. In Germany, for both the higher and the lower educated as well, less restrictive attitudes held true towards all social investment policies than towards all compensatory policies. Finally, as in Denmark, the public in Germany is more likely to grant migrants the childcare service than the domestic childcare benefit and the child benefit for children living in origin countries and this holds true for both the higher and the lower educated. In the United Kingdom, there are more inclusive attitudes towards all social investment policies than towards all compensatory policies, which holds true

Welfare chauvinism across policies

133

Source: Welfare State Attitude Survey, Denmark (N = 1,849), Germany (N = 1,902), United Kingdom (N = 1,846). Design- and population weighted.

Figure 6.3

Welfare chauvinism across social policies and educational groups (in percentage)

134

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

for the higher and the lower educated. Specifically, the public is more likely to grant migrants access to healthcare and school education than to any of the compensatory policies included in the analysis. However, amongst both the higher and the lower educated, childcare is attached to lower levels of welfare chauvinism in comparison to child benefit domestic and child benefit origin, the reasons for which are discussed above. Finally, both the higher and the lower educated in the United Kingdom are the most restrictive in their attitudes towards child benefit for children of Eastern European workers who live in their country of origin. Welfare chauvinism varies across compensatory policies and social investment policies, regardless of the level of education. The next step is to test whether these results would continue to apply after controlling for additional factors at the individual level.

6.7

EDUCATION IMPACT ON DIFFERENT POLICIES

The final step of the analysis presented in this chapter examined whether the higher educated across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom hold welfare chauvinist attitudes towards Eastern European workers across social policies. Based on running logistic regression coefficients of the higher education effect in Table 6.1 without control variables, higher education had a significant effect on general welfare chauvinism in Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany. This is expected, as the European Social Survey data (see Figure 6.1) shows that higher education had a significant effect on welfare chauvinism in general. Table 6.1 also examines whether this pattern changed when controlling for additional individual-level variables that touched on self-interest and cultural ideology factors. Suppose a variation is found in the effect of higher education across the different policies. In that case, it can be concluded that higher education is not a universal predictor of cross-policy welfare chauvinism after all. Again, Table 6.1 only displays the effects of tertiary education. Table 6.1 shows the analysis models for the different policies step by step – first, only with the tertiary education variables, then also including variables that control for self-interest and, finally, variables that control for ideology. The measurement of the self-interest and ideology variables will be explained below. The results demonstrate that the higher educational effect of welfare chauvinism varied both in significance and magnitude across policies when additional control variables are added to the regression models in this book. In other words, there are other factors apart from higher education that had a significant impact on welfare chauvinism across policies. In particular, after adding self-interest control variables, the impact of higher education on unemployment benefits in Germany and child benefits origin in the United Kingdom

Welfare chauvinism across policies

Table 6.1

135

The effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism across different policies

 

+Tertiary

SE.

education

+Self-

SE.

+Ideology

SE.

Interest

Denmark

 

 

 

 

 

 

General welfare chauvinism (39–41)

-.307**

.109

-.398***

.112

-.058

.121

Healthcare (42–44)

-.541***

.144

-.520***

.146

-.284

.155

School (45–47)

-.693***

.142

-.692***

.142

-.487**

.149

Childcare (48–50)

-.544***

.134

-.538***

.135

-.308*

.141

Child benefit domestic (51–53)

-.543

.106

***

-.586

.108

-.377

.115

Unemployment benefits (54–56)

-.416**

.121

-.443***

.121

-.190

.129

Social assistance (57–59)

-.397***

.105

-.397***

.107

-.135

.116

Child benefits origin (60–62)

-.315*

.315

-.508***

.126

-.283*

.137

Germany

 

 

 

 

 

 

General welfare chauvinism (63–65)

-.248†

.132

-.234

.132

-.037

.138

Healthcare (66–68)

-.590**

.590

-.645***

.184

-.511**

.188

School (69–71)

-.603***

.167

-.620***

.167

-.451**

.172

Childcare (72–74)

-.321*

.144

-.325*

.144

-.149

.148

Child benefit domestic (75–77)

-.426

**

.138

-.451

.138

-.256†

.143

Unemployment benefits (78–80)

-.368**

.141

-.379

.141

-.209

.146

Social assistance (81–83)

-.360**

.138

-.372**

.138

-.159

.143

Child benefits origin (84–86)

-.424**

.126

-.354**

.126

-.168

.130

General welfare chauvinism (87–89)

-.583***

.137

-.534***

.140

-.225

.149

Healthcare (90–92)

-1.005***

.172

-.943***

.175

-.649**

.187

School (93–95)

-1.094

.182

-1.076***

.186

-.790***

.195

Childcare (96–98)

-.853

***

.144

***

-.784

.147

-.479**

.158

Child benefit domestic (99–101)

-.862***

.139

-.829***

.142

-.537***

.152

Unemployment benefits (102–104)

-.711***

.135

-.673***

.138

-.361

.150

Social assistance (105–107)

-.893***

.135

-.850***

.138

-.566

.150

Child benefits origin (108–110)

-.365

.125

-.241†

.132

-.031

.137

***

†

**

**

United Kingdom

**

Notes: Binary regression analysis. Three models are shown for each individual policy; only tertiary education, additionally with self-interest factors, and finally also with ideology factors. Design- and population weighted. Sig.: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < .10. Source: Welfare State Attitude data, Denmark (N = 1,849), Germany (N = 1,902), United Kingdom (N = 1,846).

is not significant anymore. This can mean that the included self-interest rationales are not that relevant for this analysis. However, it is challenging to capture self-interest rationales in terms of objective socio-economic variables, because

136

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

they cannot measure subjective feelings about their own status. For example, an individual can have an above-average income but still have the perception that it is below average because of certain life experiences. After adding ideology control variables, there are almost no discrepancies in welfare chauvinism across educational groups when considering welfare provision for compensatory policies (unemployment benefits in Denmark, Germany; social assistance in Denmark, Germany; child benefits origin in Germany, United Kingdom). This is interpreted as the educational divide in welfare chauvinism being smaller across compensatory policies than across social investment policies. Furthermore, the higher education effects on the general welfare chauvinism variable reflect the effects on the compensatory policies more than towards social investment policies. This indicates once again that the general welfare chauvinism term from the European Social Survey may actually capture attitudes towards compensatory policies. This would have important implications for the study of welfare chauvinism in Europe, since the levels of public welfare chauvinism might be frequently overestimated in studies. The new findings of the educational effect on welfare chauvinism are interesting considering that the current literature has frequently assumed a universally positive effect of tertiary education on welfare chauvinism across Europe and that the effect of tertiary education on welfare chauvinism is significant when using the European Social Survey data. Examining the specific countries, it appears that the educational divide between the higher and the lower educated is larger in the United Kingdom than in Denmark and Germany. One can argue that the United Kingdom represented a critical case in the analysis, in particular in the context of the 2016 EU referendum that led to the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU at the beginning of 2020. Lower-skilled Eastern European workers, in particular, in the United Kingdom, played a crucial role in voter mobilisation for leaving the EU. The country experienced a large inflow of EU workers after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2008. Public and political discourses brought up fears in the public about lower-skilled Eastern European workers taking away not only jobs from the natives but welfare resources, such as healthcare services, as well. Here, one must additionally consider that the United Kingdom represents a classical liberal welfare regime that has undergone significant cuts in welfare provisions through austerity measures. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, such contexts may increase more fears of economic competition amongst the lower educated than amongst the higher educated. Hence, it made sense that a larger gap can be observed between the higher and the lower educated in the United Kingdom in comparison to other countries. Moreover, higher education had no significant effect on general welfare chauvinism regarding welfare provisions for Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom when adding the additional control variables. This is an

Welfare chauvinism across policies

137

interesting finding, as Chapters 4 and 5 found significant education effects on general welfare chauvinism across a range of European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, using additional control variables with 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 data. There are three explanations for this. First, the control variables are different and explain the educational effect better. Additional results demonstrate that predictors for welfare chauvinism varied both in significance and in magnitude for general welfare chauvinism across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, due to data limitations in the Welfare States Attitude Survey, the exact control variables that are used with the European Social Survey data for this book cannot be accounted for. Second, as mentioned before, social desirability bias plays an important role in the positive education effect frequently reported in computer-assisted personal interviews. Online surveys, such as the one used for this book, have been found to be less affected by social desirability bias. Third, another explanation could be that the YouGov sample is more recent, and that the educational gap has changed over time. This would be in line with the findings from Chapter 5, which shows that the educational gap is – at least to some extent – dynamic over time. While Table 6.1 does not show the results, the multivariate analysis includes a number of related self-interest factors. Considering these factors, some notable observations can be made. The relationship between receiving social benefits or having at least one child and welfare chauvinism is not significant across the different policies. Nevertheless, this book has argued that such economic interests are, both for the lower and for the higher socio-economic status groups, ambiguous and therefore challenging to capture empirically. Age and gender do not predict welfare chauvinism across most policies and countries either. The multivariate analysis also includes a number of related ideology rationales and these result in more significant results. A variable on possible welfare state expansion was measured through the following statement: ‘In the current economic situation, public expenditure on social welfare benefits and services cannot be increased’ (1 – strongly agree, to 5 – strongly disagree). This variable was included as individuals who hold more egalitarian attitudes are assumed to hold less exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Jenssen and Engesbak 1994). A variable on the possible cultural threat of migration was measured through the following question: ‘Migration poses a serious threat to our national identity’ (1 – strongly agree, to 5 – strongly disagree). This variable was included as individuals who hold more multicultural attitudes are assumed to hold less exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Scheepers et al. 2002). Individuals who held welfare chauvinist attitudes towards Eastern European workers were likely to fear that migrants pose a threat to the national culture. A variable on

138

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

the possible economic burden of migrants was measured through the following statement: ‘Migrants and refugees have come to the United Kingdom for many various reasons. Some work and pay taxes, but at the same time they also use healthcare and welfare benefits/services. Do you think migrants and refugees generally receive more than they contribute, or do they contribute more than they receive?’ (0 – Generally, they receive more than they contribute, to 10 – Generally, they contribute more than they receive). This variable was included as individuals who believe that migrants contribute more contribution to the economy are assumed to hold less exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Giulietti and Kahanec 2013). The results demonstrated that individuals who held welfare chauvinist attitudes towards Eastern European workers were likely to fear a negative economic impact through migrants. A variable on the possible threat of welfare rights for EU-citizens was measured through the following question: ‘The rights of EU-citizens to receive [Danish/German/United Kingdom] welfare benefits and services pose a serious threat to the [Danish/German/United Kingdom] welfare state’ (1 – strongly agree, to 5 – strongly disagree). This variable was included as individuals who believe that migrants do not pose a threat to the national welfare state, are assumed to hold less exclusive attitudes towards migrants (Ehata and Seeleib-Kaiser 2017). Individuals who held preferences for limiting Eastern European workers’ right to child benefits origin were likely to fear that migrants’ social rights pose a threat to the EU, especially in Denmark and Germany. Considering that this was the only cross-border policy or EU-level policy in the analysis, this does not only make sense but could even be considered a tautology. A binary variable was additionally included on whether a respondent voted for the radical right in the previous election, specifically Danish People’s Party, the Alternative for Germany and the UK Independence Party. This was important since this group of voters could be assumed to be more prone to welfare chauvinism (Eger and Valdez 2014). Voting for the radical right predicts welfare chauvinism across most policies and countries in the analysis, particularly in Germany. Additionally, the explained variances in the models gave further insights into the relationship between cross-policy versus general welfare chauvinism. The models helped to better explain attitudes towards more exclusive access, especially in Denmark and Germany. The same applied to the general welfare chauvinism item. Furthermore, regarding the item on general welfare chauvinism, the predictors are similar to the items on compensatory policies but with a few variations on the self-interest variables. The results point once more towards the possibility that the general welfare chauvinism actually measures public attitudes towards compensatory policies. Generally, the predictors for cross-policy welfare chauvinism vary in significance and in magnitude. Hence,

Welfare chauvinism across policies

139

it is important to emphasise the need for investigating welfare chauvinism more systematically across policies in future research. Overall, the results of the additional control variables demonstrated that these variables can explain part of the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism, just like in Chapter 4 and 5. And in the cases of the general welfare chauvinism item and the compensatory policy items the higher education effect became even insignificant. In particular, concerns around migrants having a negative impact on national economies but also about migrants’ access within the EU were strong predictors in the analysis. While the analysis classified them as cultural ideology factors these variables could also be seen as subjective self-interest factors. This makes one wonder again how to best measure self-interest and if the literature is right in usually emphasising cultural fears over economic fears in relation to migration and the welfare state (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; van der Waal et al. 2013).

CONCLUSIONS This chapter demonstrates that both the higher and the lower educated in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom are not merely divided into being for or against including Eastern European workers in the welfare state, regardless of the level of education. In particular, the chapter has three main findings. First, welfare chauvinism varied across social policies. The results demonstrate that both the higher and the lower educated did not embrace a cross-policy welfare chauvinism towards Eastern European workers, regardless of the long-term exposure to anti-migration, anti-EU and pro-welfare debates. In particular, this book finds that welfare chauvinism is lower across the examined social investment policies than across compensatory policies. This is not a trivial finding, and one can consider services as fertile ground to further combine migration and the welfare state in a way that the public supports. To emphasise also for this chapter, sensitivity tests of the models, such as different operationalisations of the included variables and similar variables, show that the results are robust. The second finding is that – regardless of the level of education – welfare chauvinism varied across compensatory policies and social investment policies. While minimal cross-country variance is found, there is significant variance at the level of welfare chauvinism across compensatory policies and social investment policies. Hereby, the chapter additionally supports the more specific argument about welfare chauvinism being influenced by whether the existing programmatic structures covered a social risk through benefits or services. It can be expected that the levels of welfare chauvinism are lower across social investment policies than compensatory policies for several reasons, such as the fact that cash benefits can be transferred more easily than services or the

140

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

public imagining free riding across benefits more easily than across in-kind services. Indeed, the levels of welfare chauvinism are lower across services than benefits, even amongst the higher and the lower educated in all three countries. This is an important finding, as the (relative) public willingness to grant migrants access to social investment has the potential to boost the living quality of many migrants significantly. Most of the higher- and the lower-educated individuals in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom wanted within-border benefits for Eastern European workers to be conditional. Such results agreed more with the results obtained through the item on general welfare chauvinism, which are not in line with the current EU legislation. Furthermore, considering that child benefits, for example, are a universal benefit, the results put into question the assumption that universal welfare protection generate more public support in comparison to welfare protection that is not universal (Bay and Pedersen 2006). Possibly, the public might have perceived parents as the main beneficiaries of child benefits, which may then explain why the deservingness is lower here. The highest levels of welfare chauvinism are found for the exportable child benefits for children living in the country of origin. Both the higher and the lower educated in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom hold strong preferences for completely removing this EU-level right for migrants. In comparison to the results from the general welfare chauvinism item, these attitudes are significantly more negative. Moreover, this finding is additionally surprising because child benefits origin are a universal cash benefit and children are usually categorised as highly deserving (van Oorschot 2000). The results may not only reflect the controversial debates in Denmark, Germany and (previously) the United Kingdom on this cash benefit but also mirror the importance of the residence criterion for accessing welfare protection. Another question this finding inspires is whether Euroscepticism caused these negative attitudes towards EU-level cash benefits for children or whether these negative attitudes cause Euroscepticism. In the end, both are probably related and the framing of the policy or survey question matters too. Overall, the chapter adds further evidence for the overall theoretical argument of this book that the institutional environment, here the welfare institutions, may shape public support for welfare chauvinism. The third major finding for the overall argument of this chapter shows that the educational effect for welfare chauvinism varied both in significance and magnitude across policies when additional control variables are added to the regression models. This is important, considering that the current literature has frequently assumed a universally positive effect of tertiary education on welfare chauvinism across Europe. In particular, across the compensatory policy items, higher education was not significantly related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism in the three countries. Hereby, it can be confirmed that the

Welfare chauvinism across policies

141

educational divide on welfare chauvinism would be smaller across compensatory policies than across social investment policies. The smaller gap between the higher and the lower educated in welfare chauvinism across certain compensatory policies can be based on a range of theories that are discussed in this chapter. First, according to the role of self-interest, one can assume that the higher educated feared the access of Eastern European workers to compensatory policies would be related to higher contributions for them. Or, it may be possible that the higher educated feared their tax contributions being misused by workers from Eastern Europe. Second, according to the role of cultural ideology, one can assume that compensatory policies are less normalised than social investment policies, which might have been related to respondents holding higher levels of welfare chauvinism across compensatory policies. Or, it can be possible that the higher educated can empathise less with benefit recipients than with individuals who used services, as the higher educated (in comparison to the lower educated) are less likely to receive cash benefits themselves due to their often more advantaged labour market status. These theories additionally reflect the results of Chapters 4 and 5, which emphasised that the higher educated felt more status anxiety than the lower educated in some contexts and that the higher educated are more likely to adapt to dominant social norms than the lower educated. Another interesting finding from this chapter is that higher education also had no significant effect on general welfare chauvinism in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom when adding the additional control variables. This is important, as Chapters 4 and 5 found significant education effects on general welfare chauvinism across a range of European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, using additional control variables with 2008/2009 and 2016/2017 data. In other words, if one were to consider particular characteristics of the tertiary educated, then the effects of self-interest or cultural ideology might disappear. More research needs to be conducted to understand why no effect of higher education is seen on general welfare chauvinism when using the Welfare State Attitude Survey sample. Overall, there are several limitations to the analysis presented in this chapter. First, due to limited resources, the Welfare State Attitude Survey data is not used to differentiate amongst different groups of migrants or to compare them to attitudes towards welfare for natives, but rather aims to focus on one migrant group, namely Eastern European workers. Generally, there might have been variation in the interpretation of this term across the three countries in the sample, as different nationalities might be more or less prominent in the national discourses. Second, the Welfare State Attitude Survey sample included only three countries, and future research should examine whether the patterns observed in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom would additionally apply to other countries across Europe. Third, the analysis of this

142

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

chapter could have reflected more on the difference in generosity (compensatory policies) and availability (social investment policies) across the given countries and policies. For example, childcare in Denmark is much simpler to access than childcare in Germany. Meanwhile, the austerity measures in the United Kingdom are related to significant cuts in compensatory policies and social investment policies, which have disproportionately impacted lower-educated or lower-income groups (Sobolewska and Ford 2020) and which might have been related to why larger educational gaps can be seen in that country. Lastly, the limitations mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5 also (partly) apply to this chapter. Regardless of the limitations of the analysis, this chapter demonstrates that the general question about welfare provisions from the European Social Survey obscures important nuances about public attitudes across Europe. Such nuances are important when discussing welfare chauvinism in general. Still, they raise further questions about the education-as-liberation assumption. as the higher educated as well hold more welfare chauvinism across specific policies and, in particular compensatory policies. The next and final chapter discusses the overall conclusions and implications of the results.

7. The future of European welfare states 7.1 INTRODUCTION To respond to current challenges, welfare states experience different political pressures to retrench, and thus European societies face difficult choices and trade-offs. At the same time, welfare state policies enjoy high levels of public support. Consequently, instead of retrenching the welfare state across the board, policy proposals concentrate retrenchment on the target groups perceived as the least deserving by the public, particularly migrants. Such welfare chauvinist policy proposals are becoming more influential politically and the parties that propose them rise in numbers and power. And while some argue that such proposals are indispensable for welfare states’ survival, most evidence indicates that if welfare states are to successfully transition to the 21st century, ensuring that they will be inclusive of migrants will be critical. This means, there is an urgent need to understand and address the emerging welfare chauvinist preference. Who is voicing these chauvinistic proposals? And who is supporting them? And why? These are all overarching matters that this book has explored. Importantly, this book did not find evidence for the argument that migration causes the weakening of solidarity in European welfare states, as previously stated in the literature (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Instead, the results emphasise once more how difficult it is to disentangle the relationship between migration and the welfare state. The results demonstrate that welfare chauvinism varies significantly in the public across countries, time and social policies, and that governments have the power to shape public attitudes in a significant manner. Thus, what should be focused on is which groups in Europe are likely to unite in solidarity and how governments can enhance social cohesion, as such questions are becoming even more complex in times dominated by economic and cultural uncertainty.

7.2

RECAP OF THE FINDINGS

The first research question investigated in this book was: What are the levels of welfare chauvinism across countries, time and social policies in Europe? Broadly speaking, the results showed that welfare chauvinism is widespread across Europe, but the level of welfare chauvinism varies across countries, 143

144

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

time and policies. Furthermore, the book has demonstrated that there is not one public or one higher- or lower-educated group since the public and socio-economic status groups are diverse, individuals are complex, and attitudes are multidimensional. What is most important is to understand which life experiences shape specific attitudes and what governments can do to enhance life qualities and well-being. Chapter 4 demonstrated that around 40 per cent of the European public wishes to exclude all non-citizens and migrants indefinitely from all welfare resources. The results varied between around 20 to 60 per cent across countries. Such views were mainly observed in certain countries in Eastern Europe, such as Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, but were also observed in Western and Southern European countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Finland and Austria. Hence, a simple East–West divide appears to be unhelpful when examining welfare chauvinism because it underestimates how widespread welfare chauvinism is already across the continent. Thus, a considerable share of the variation in welfare chauvinism cannot be explained by differences between individuals but could rather be explained by between-country differences. Chapter 5 demonstrated that welfare chauvinism decreased by only 3 per cent in the past two decades across Europe, and it also became more polarised. Again, considerable variation in the development of welfare chauvinism could be seen across countries because while most countries witnessed a decrease in welfare chauvinism (particularly the United Kingdom, Germany and Estonia, but others such as Belgium, Spain and, further, Hungary), several countries witnessed an increase in welfare chauvinism (namely Switzerland, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland). Chapter 6 demonstrated that welfare chauvinism varies significantly amongst different social policies across Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. This variation across policies is more relevant than the variation across countries or welfare regimes. Importantly, the levels of welfare chauvinism were lower across the tested social investment policies (healthcare, school, university, childcare, social housing) than across the tested compensatory policies (unemployment benefits, social assistance, working tax credit, child benefits for children living in resident and home countries). For the observed policies, the largest differences in welfare chauvinism are found for healthcare (25 per cent opposition) and child benefits for migrants’ children living in their home countries (75 per cent opposition). The second research question investigated in this book was: How do these attitudes vary amongst different socio-economic status groups, particularly educational groups? In line with the welfare chauvinism literature, the results identified various factors that can increase welfare chauvinism, including several socio-economic factors (for example, living in a smaller region, experience of unemployment, lower subjective income, lower education of

The future of European welfare states

145

parents, having no migration background, older age and being male) and several ideology factors (for example, welfare attitudes, egalitarian attitudes and authoritarian attitudes). Since the education of a person can be ascribed both socio-economic and ideological importance when it comes to welfare chauvinism, it comes as no surprise that cleavages on welfare chauvinism are found across different education groups and specifically individuals with a higher education degree versus individuals without a higher education degree. Chapter 4 showed that the higher educated have lower levels of welfare chauvinism across almost all countries in Europe (7 per cent on average). However, contrary to current thought, the difference was not as sizeable as one would expect based on the education-as-liberation view of exclusive attitudes towards migrants. After all, the results demonstrated that more than every third higher-educated individual across Europe prefers not to grant migrants welfare provisions under any circumstance. Furthermore, other factors explain at least part of the education effect. Chapter 5 showed that welfare chauvinism has decreased on average amongst both higher- and lower-educated individuals, but the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism did not change across time overall but the effect did change across different countries. In other words, higher education is not an automatic panacea for welfare chauvinism. As with the general public, significant variation in the change in welfare chauvinism and contrary to common belief, the higher educated were not the main drivers of more inclusive attitudes in all countries across Europe. Chapter 6 showed that the lower educated were more likely to hold preferences for welfare chauvinism than the higher educated across all policies. This was particularly the case in the United Kingdom, where the educational gaps were slightly larger across all policies. Once again, variation is found in the effect of higher education across the different policies. In particular, cleavages between the higher and the lower educated are lower when it comes to compensatory policies in comparison to social investment policies. Overall, the book finds a strong correlation between education and welfare chauvinism, but this correlation is not perfect. How can this be explained? To address this matter, this book investigated a final research question: How do national contexts shape these socio-economic cleavages on welfare chauvinism, particularly economic and cultural contexts? The book finds that national economic and cultural contexts systematically shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. In other words, a tertiary education degree has a different meaning regarding attitude formation in different European countries. The first analysis chapter (4) finds that the economic prosperity and the authoritarian norms in a given country could shape the effect of higher education on welfare chauvinism. Significantly smaller gaps are found between the higher and the lower educated on welfare chauvinism in countries that were less economically affluent and that showed a higher prev-

146

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

alence of authoritarian norms. For such countries, the results were explained by higher-educated individuals tending to feel more economic anxiety and tending to be more adapted to societal norms than their lower-educated counterparts. The second analysis chapter (5) found that the economic prosperity of a given country did not shape the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across time, but authoritarian norms did. Furthermore, it was found that the economic development shapes the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism. In particular, the gap between the higher and the lower educated was smaller, where society saw a decline in economic prosperity. These results further emphasised the importance of economic anxiety amongst the higher educated and, likely, the impact the financial crisis 2007/2008 had on all groups in society. Here it should be mentioned once again that the expansion of higher education systems alone did not automatically lead to more inclusive attitudes towards migrants. Additionally, Chapter 6 demonstrated the importance of welfare contexts and policy design for the arguments of this book, further strengthening the main arguments. To summarise, this book finds that national economic and cultural contexts were a missing link in explaining the relationship between higher education and welfare chauvinism across countries, time and social policies in Europe. Consequently, it adds a critical element to the education-as-liberation literature. The book demonstrates that the higher educated may not be immune to welfare chauvinism if they feel economic anxiety and if anti-migrant cultures are more normalised in their surroundings. In other words, education can be an important factor in the fight against welfare chauvinism. Still, the higher educated should not be underestimated as a potential group that could drive welfare chauvinism in Europe or, in contrast, overestimated as a potential group that could decrease welfare chauvinism. The importance of the contextual indicators for the educational divide shows how vital national contexts are for attitude formation amongst individuals. Hereby this book mainly contributes to the growing literature on attitudes towards welfare chauvinism but additionally contributes towards the comprehension of the interplay between migration and the welfare state (Geddes 2003; Mau 2003). Moreover, the results add to the self-interest (Mewes and Mau 2013; van der Waal et al. 2010) and cultural ideology literature (Achterberg and Houtman 2009; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007) that generally defines lower-status groups as more intolerant. Furthermore, the results add to the comparative literature that assumes individual attitudes to be shaped by context mechanisms (Larsen 2008; Mau 2004). The results have important implications for the future of welfare and migration regimes in Europe as well as for Social Europe.

The future of European welfare states

7.3

147

PUTTING A STOP TO THE BLAME GAME

Taking a broader policy-oriented perspective, much of the rise in welfare chauvinism across Europe has been thought of as coming from the lower educated, while higher-educated elites are frequently seen as naturally more multicultural and welcoming to migrants in welfare states. Of course, as explained in this book, education matters in many ways, and in line with most research on this matter, this book argues that more targeted investment in education is needed. However, what makes the argument of this book unique is that it demonstrates one should not assume that welfare chauvinism is prevalent only amongst the lower-educated or lower-status groups. To a greater or lesser extent, welfare chauvinism is prevalent across various socio-economic status groups in Europe, regardless of the level of education of an individual within a group. These results challenge the public discourse that is mentioned in Chapter 1, where the lower educated are blamed not only for welfare chauvinism but also for racism, anti-migrant attitudes, Brexit and the election of radical right politicians, while universities are seen as the breeding ground for liberal and left-wing attitudes. This is particularly important for welfare chauvinist attitudes, as these constitute an anti-migrant attitude and a welfare attitude too. And as explained in Chapter 3 of this book, the higher educated have shown less favourable stances towards the welfare states than the lower educated in other research, as it does not serve their self-interest as much (see also Eick 2023a). Hence, if the goal to increase overall social cohesion in European countries, societal discourse needs to change, and a more well-rounded approach to the fears of different socio-economic status groups needs to be developed that go beyond further discriminating disadvantaged groups because of government failures. Next, taking a more practical policy-oriented perspective, the results of this book point to the importance of developing strategies to address the cleavages across educational groups. This is a task that would require the involvement of many actors, from politicians to educators to the media. It may include creating higher intergenerational educational mobilities, including more inclusive teaching environments at all levels of the education system (Hjerm, Eger, and Danell 2018). This may also include including more critical thinking elements in the curriculum (Eick, Burgoon and Busemeyer 2021). Especially in times of rapid changes in societies, the critical thinking element of education is important, as authorities or current norms usually take a long time to change. Also of significance, is launching information campaigns that reach everyone, including lower-educated individuals, as research has demonstrated that knowledge about migration could shape public opinion at least to a certain extent and may ultimately lead to more pro-migrant attitudes (Sides and Citrin

148

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

2007). However, this only applies to a certain point, as research has found that higher-educated individuals, in particular, have confirmation biases that may prevent them from adapting to different attitudes (An 2015). If the goal is to reduce anti-migrant attitudes, such knowledge should be combined with other measures, such as positive contact experiences with migrants, that can also lead to more pro-migrant attitudes (Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). One could go a step further and say that social cohesion can only be fully achieved by reducing ‘us versus them’ dynamics amongst all groups in society – not only between natives and migrants. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the intersections between migrants and other disadvantaged groups in society demonstrate that welfare chauvinism is not only about migration but also about issues such as racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, ableism and classism. In particular, more attention should be paid to examining how national contexts and political actors in power could shape ‘us versus them’ dynamics, including welfare chauvinism amongst different socio-economic status groups. While a range of (welfare state) contexts may shape welfare chauvinism, it is argued in this book that specific national economic and cultural contexts can shape the important relationship between education and welfare chauvinism. This is because the literature assumes that higher education reduces welfare chauvinism. After all, higher educated groups are assumed to be economically more advantaged and culturally more tolerant than the lower educated. This assumption was critically investigated in this book, and it was found that the theoretical assumptions underlying this positive effect of higher education, namely from the self-interest and cultural ideology theories, can readily be violated in cross-national settings. This contrary evidence was found by examining a range of contexts, in particular, national economic prosperity and authoritarian norms, as well as the structure of specific social policies, namely, compensatory and social investment policies. What is more, the current combination of the rise of both economic disasters and authoritarianism has the potential to create a perfect storm when it comes to rising levels of welfare chauvinism in the public. As a result, there is an opportunity to critically dismantle the theoretical assumptions behind higher education being generally seen as liberation in the literature. Evidently, fully explaining variation in public attitudes across contexts is a difficult task for any researcher, and this book does not specifically examine causality flows between policies that reduce economic insecurities and intolerant cultural attitudes and attitudes in society. However, the results from this book demonstrate that national economic prosperity, authoritarian norms and the structure of social policies were associated with higher levels of welfare chauvinism regardless of the level of education. These findings suggest, at least partly, that governments have the power to shape public opinion. As a matter of fact, a range of research has shown that governments may be able

The future of European welfare states

149

to unite societies by adopting policies that combat economic insecurity and intolerant norms. Economic contexts play an important role, particularly given that Europe (and other parts of the world) have been confronted with economic challenges for welfare states to varying degrees over the last decades. These challenges also diffused the relationship between the priorities of need and risk within welfare states. This includes, for example, the energy crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, the expansion of the service and knowledge-based economy, digitalisation, and rapid socio-demographic shifts. Starting with the 2007/2008 financial crises and the following Great Recession, discussions focused on increasing inequality, increasingly precarious work, and a weakened capability of welfare systems to ensure economic and social stability. And these issues lead to more general questions in the context of public attitudes. For example, will the current contexts lead to more solidarity or to more conflict in society? Due to the recent crises, many individuals have been exposed to poverty or economic insecurity. While the extent varies, risks have increased across the board and thus the answer to this question is still open. In Chapter 5, this book showed that welfare chauvinism became more polarised across Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the arrival of millions of refugees to Europe. This applied both to the higher and the lower educated, at least in some countries. This is consistent with research that examines the impact of various crises on public attitudes and discovers that these attitudes change depending on the economic context. Individuals who lost their jobs in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, for example, have supported unemployment benefits not only in the short term, but also in the long term (Margalit 2013). For governments, this means that the effect that declines in economic risk have on public attitudes should be seriously considered, along with reducing economic anxiety amongst all individuals in the public so as not to further undermine social cohesion. The importance of cultural contexts should also be emphasised once more, since European countries have been confronted with the rise of radical right parties over the past decades, and authoritarian norms are currently on the rise across the continent. To what extent radical right parties have an influence on democracies differs: in certain countries, these parties have elected representatives to office; in others, they have become the leading opposition. Elsewhere, parties that have yet to gain political power have led centrist parties to adapt to them, which means that mainstream parties have moved towards the discourse and policy positions of the radical right (Abou-Chadi 2016). Literature has found that the parliamentary entry of radical right parties represents a crucial step in the normalisation of radical right discourse and ideology. Radical right populists in power frequently subvert democratic norms and values, for example, by undermining the media, or judiciary or minority

150

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

rights. This can change perceptions of which norms and values are considered to be acceptable in society. While empirical studies frequently emphasise that the lower educated are overrepresented amongst new radical right voters (Achterberg and Houtman 2006), the higher educated continue to make up a significant amount of the radical right voting share (not only due to welfare chauvinism but also their own interest), which might as well be the stepping stone to bring radical right politicians into office. Furthermore, this book has shown that authoritarianism and the normalisation of welfare chauvinist norms from radical right parties across Europe affect both the higher and the lower educated. In particular, as radical right populist parties gain political power and presence in governments and parliaments, they can influence education policies and curriculum. This is not only historically relevant, remembering universities in the German Empire and Weimar Republic, which were the breeding ground for fascist norms and values (Kater 1975). Also, there are examples of today’s radical right parties or movements that support cuts in education-related services, changes in curriculums and restrictions to academic freedom to undermine social inclusion. For mainstream parties, this means that the effect of radical right ideas and movements on public attitudes should also be seriously considered for future policymaking. For example, welfare cuts and marketisation of social services in some countries are related to increasing levels of inequalities and public discontent. Instead of using migrants as scapegoats to deflect from the larger societal, political and economic problems, these problems should be the focus. This could also be important not to legitimise anti-migrant and welfare chauvinist ideas and movements through mainstreaming processes. This is all important in order to avoid continuing the blame game of xenophobia and racism and further stigmatising already disadvantaged groups for holding certain attitudes.

7.4

A FUTURE OF WELFARE ALLIANCES OR FURTHER DIVISIONS?

Chapter 5 of this book revealed increasing polarisation in relation to welfare chauvinist attitudes in many European countries; this cannot directly be associated with education (or other socio-economic factors) but rather with changing economic and cultural contexts. Related to this polarisation, how governments deal with the rising economic inequality might be decisive in whether there will be future welfare alliances or further divisions. This is due to an increase in both old and new social risks (Taylor-Gooby 2008), and trends over the last three decades show that the literature assumes associations between labour market vulnerability and education are frequently overestimated.

The future of European welfare states

151

For example, Eick (2023a) finds growing potential for pro-welfare alliances between higher- and lower-educated groups who support increased government income redistribution. Figure 7.1 shows an example of this from a bird’s-eye perspective. While the tertiary educated have historically been more critical towards government redistribution, the education gap is narrowing. As can be seen through the spike in the figure after the financial crisis in 2008, crises also have a role to play here, since these positively affect public willingness to support welfare states and redistribution.

Notes: Continuous line shows the overall mean. Dotted line indicates the financial crisis in 2008. Source: European Social Survey, 1 = agree strongly, to 5 = disagree strongly, 418,713 individuals, 33 countries. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 7.1

Convergence and divergence of ‘Government should reduce differences in income levels’ (averages) across the tertiary and the non-tertiary educated (2002–2018)

Such effects could appear because both higher- and lower-educated individuals have encountered two interconnected social risks in the labour market, either objectively or subjectively. And these experiences could relate to their preferences for more income redistribution from the government. Usually, the higher educated are equipped with higher levels of human capital that should

152

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

allow them to perform well in the labour market. Still, in current times, they may only be weakly integrated into that market. This (potential) precariousness may hinder even higher-educated individuals from feeling secure in their job or from recognising the advantage they (typically) have (see also Häusermann, Kurer and Schwander 2014). Related to this, one must consider that some labour market sectors are more precarious than others. For example, the service sector is seen as more precarious, and the service and knowledge-based economy have been growing in post-industrial societies over the past decades. This suggests that labour market risk may have spread to more educated and higher-income groups too, which were previously in more secure labour market positions. These are important developments that have the potential to expand our understanding of polarisation and solidarity, as well as the politics of the welfare state beyond the migration–welfare nexus. What remains to be seen is if the increasing support of the higher educated for government income redistribution could be related to decreasing or increasing welfare chauvinist attitudes among this group in the future. While there might be potential for future welfare state alliances, another related point for discussion here is what type of welfare state the different socio-economic status groups want – in other words, possible recalibration from one area to another. As explained in Chapter 2 of this book, this question is important because welfare states have long been argued to be in crisis and to respond to current challenges, and welfare states experience different political pressures to dismantle, restructure, retrench and cut back in size. Thus, European societies face difficult choices and trade-offs on how to prioritise scarce resources. At the same time, the legitimacy of the welfare states hinges on voters, at least to a certain extent, in terms of getting their expectations fulfilled. This implies yet another pressure on the welfare states. The risk is more conditional for groups that are seen as less deserving, and this includes not only migrants but also other groups, such as unemployed individuals. A stronger focus on welfare chauvinism, stricter citizenship criteria and the selection of opening borders only for higher-educated migrants in some governments implies a less strong pressure on welfare states than the traditional conservative parties’ stance related to welfare provisions. And, by considering unemployment to be the responsibility of the individual and not a systematic responsibility, more pressure is put on the individual to make an observable effort to re-enter the labour market. Still, welfare states are also expected to cover new areas, and to increase the level and quality of social investment policies that are believed to promote economic and social opportunities, including labour market integration. And public attitudes frequently show support for such policies, too (Busemeyer, Garritzmann and Neimanns 2020; Eick et al. 2023).

The future of European welfare states

153

To further complicate the considerations, in line with Chapter 6 of this book, Häusermann et al. (2022) show that the higher and the lower educated differ in the relative importance they attribute to social investment and compensatory policies. The higher educated appear to attribute higher absolute and relative importance to social investment than the lower educated. This might be because compensatory policies immediately cover the basic financial needs, while social investment policies are rather long term in their scope. In accordance with their main voters’ preferences, radical right parties take a clear stance favouring compensatory policies over social investment (Enggist and Pinggera 2022), thereby defending a more traditional over a more inclusive welfare state once more.

7.5 CAN SOCIAL INVESTMENT SOLVE THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA? Reforms to improve social investment or essential in-kind services (for example, in the fields of education, childcare, labour market activation and healthcare) are essential for the future of European welfare states and can even be seen as the most important types of welfare reforms in the 21st century. This is because they can be empowering and protecting, preventing challenging life transitions from becoming long-term disadvantages and resulting in social and economic benefits for the broader society (Garritzmann, Palier and Häusermann 2022; Hemerijck 2017). While the distributive and stratifying effects of social investment policies are already the focus of a large and vibrant research agenda, the book shows that the politicisation of these effects, especially in the realm of public opinion, are likely to follow specific dynamics when it comes to migrants as the group affected by the policies. International migration and integration are amongst the most significant challenges of our time. Good-quality social investments can make a great deal of difference in promoting the considerable benefits and positive outcomes that migration can generate while also improving opportunities and well-being for migrants. However, such policies are not designed by default, which is why it is so essential to feed knowledge into the policymaking process. In line with the literature on the radical right and national welfare states, Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) implies that compensatory policies are less likely to attract welfare chauvinism in radical right parties across Europe, whereas social investment policies are more prone to draw nativist appeals. However, the social investment literature shows that social investment policies remain highly attractive amongst European voters (Busemeyer, Garritzmann and Neimanns 2020), and this particularly applies to more globalised countries (Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2019). In relation to these findings, Chapter 6 of this book found that the levels of welfare chauvinism across social investment

154

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

policies is relatively low, particularly in comparison with compensatory policies. This is also in line with voters across the board (see also Eick and Larsen 2022). It was argued that this support is based on four main characteristics of social investment policies: (1) lower levels of transferability; (2) lower imagined potential for cheating; (3) weaker imagined giver–receiver link; and (4) higher imagined positive externalities. Hence, one should not too quickly assume that radical right parties know what (radical right) voters want, as this could lead to further conflicts in national welfare states and discrimination of migrants. In fact, the results from this book point to social investment policies as a fruitful way to combine welfare states with rising levels of migration across different socio-economic status groups. Particularly the Covid-19 crisis has demonstrated migrant workers’ key role in the functioning of European labour markets and services. The crisis has also exposed many migrants’ interlinked vulnerabilities, including their concentration in precarious work, thinner financial safety nets and insecure social rights (Fasani and Mazza 2020). So far, research suggests that social investment policies are often harder to access for migrants and are less effective in improving their prospects in the job market (Bonoli 2020). However, the results from this book suggest that the public appears to be relatively supportive of integrating migrants into social investment or in-kind services compared with compensation policies or cash benefits. This would imply an incongruence between public opinion and policy outcomes, revealing social investment as a potential solution for combining increasing migration levels and generous welfare states. It will be important for the future, to further study the link between the policies individuals want and the responses they receive from political elites is essential for representative democracies (Brooks and Manza 2008; Dahl 1971). And this is particularly the case with the dilemma between migration and welfare states, which is very prominent in academic and public debates (Ruhs 2022). Social investment policies can be a promising way to support migrants and lower socio-economic status groups, resulting in social and economic benefits for the broader society (Hemerijck and Patuzzi 2017). As mentioned before, key here is not to simply extend the public expenditure in social investment policies but to ensure that social investment policies work for everyone in society, including migrant populations. Because lower socio-economic status groups can be disadvantaged when it comes to the access to social investment policies, this includes enhancing social mobility and developing or extending high-quality services, including education systems. This also refers back to the discussion in Chapter 3 about the neoliberalisation of higher education system and that the system may have shifted in terms of priorities, at least partly in some countries. This means high-quality education could aim to reconcile normative and utilitarian aims.

The future of European welfare states

155

Overall, good-quality social investment policies could be a promising way to counteract current crises that have further increasing inequalities in Europe. Europe’s workforce is getting more and more diverse, and enhancing the employability and participation in society of all groups in society can address not only labour shortages in specific sectors but also economic recovery and growth more in general. As the results of this book show, the alternative could be further negative impacts on European welfare states, including pressures from radical right movements.

7.6

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL EUROPE

As well as national welfare states, Chapters 2 and 6 of this book touched on the social dimension of the European Union, often referred to as ‘Social Europe’, as the social dimension of the European Union that increasingly aims to harmonise national welfare states across the continent, with a focus on social investment policies that could eventually also benefit different migrant groups (Eick, Burgoon and Busemeyer 2023). Such an institution can play an important role for the future of European welfare states since European governments are very heterogeneous in their responses to increasing levels of migration. Specifically, Hemerijck (2016) argues that the European Union should become a ‘holding environment’ for national welfare states. This expression underscores that the European Union itself should not become a welfare state but should rather support and facilitate the development of flourishing national welfare states. Indeed, while promoting the social dimension within individual European Union countries as well as workers’ mobility and equality across the European Union has been an established goal of the European integration process already since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Union has considerably strengthened its social dimension since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Importantly, through the Lisbon European Council (2000), a new strategic aim for the next decade for the European Union was set. Here, the European Council adopted the aim that not only economic growth but also social cohesion should be strengthened in the European Union. The modernisation of the European social model was a vital part of this objective to further invest in individuals and in the knowledge-based economy. As can be seen from the rhetoric, the Lisbon agenda had already highlighted the importance of social investment. When the Council pointed towards eradicating poverty as a strategic social policy aim within the Union, aspirations were high. Thus, the Lisbon Summit promoted social citizenship as a noticeable target for European cooperation. In line with its target to strengthen the social investment dimension of social citizenship, the Lisbon process explicitly coupled the economic and social policy agendas of the integration process. Thus, rather than conceiving the welfare state as being constructed as a force

156

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

‘against markets’ (Esping-Andersen 1985), the European Union approach to social policy recognised that welfare state institutions and social policies play an important role in stimulating economic growth, progress and innovation. As mentioned throughout this book, European welfare states had and have been struggling to deal with both long-term transformations and the short-term impact of economic crises. At the European Union level, the response of policymakers was to continue to expand the social dimension of the European integration process while also focusing on social investment. In the European Semester process, social issues became more important over time (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2018), while roadmaps on the future of the economic and monetary union emphasised the need for a social dimension to fully realise the European Monetary Union. In 2013, the European Commission’s Social Investment Package emphasised the need to widen the agenda. The 2017 proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights was an important step forward and a part of the broader evolution in European Union policymaking. Thus conceived, the European Pillar of Social Rights signalled a gradual paradigm shift away from the singular focus on economic and fiscal performance (Vanhercke, Ghailani and Sabato 2018). The EPSR underlines the European Union’s ambition and its member states to develop a meaningful European Union social dimension and can potentially play a key role in counteracting today’s market disruptions by providing effective, rights-based social support to the EU citizens. Recently, the Europe 2020 strategy – the successor to the Lisbon strategy – reinforced the goal of promoting what amounts to a social investment approach. Still, even if there are more social policy recommendations at the European Union level, these are often based on soft law, and therefore lack teeth (Vandenbroucke 2016; Jordan, Maccarrone and Erne 2021). The contours of this European model of the welfare state increasingly resemble the social investment approach of the Nordic countries in some policy areas, such as education, employment and/or family policy. Eick and others (2021) find certain public spending trends that are shifting from compensatory to social investment policies across education, employment and family policies between 1985 and 2020 across European Union member states. Importantly, coming back to crisis times, while evidence shows a significant increase and convergence of public social expenditure (also in different policy areas, including social investment policies), these were partly reversed with the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Such setbacks can be expected to be even more pronounced due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Still, Eick (2023a) generally finds that the support for social investment policies (such as education) has been high and increasing over the past four decades and that public support for compensatory policies (such as unemployment benefits) has been in decline. This shift demonstrates that, while public solidarity across the European Union remains relatively strong, this solidarity is also increasingly conditional,

The future of European welfare states

157

particularly when it comes to individuals expecting to take responsibility for their own labour market situation. Such trends are in line with the widespread support for active labour-market measures, such as investment in training and lifelong learning. Notably, research on public preferences for social investment versus compensation on the national versus European Union level show that the public holds preferences for social investment policies to be administered on the European Union level and for compensatory policies to be administered on the national level (Eick, Burgoon and Busemeyer 2023). This further demonstrates potential for expanding social investment policies on the European Union level. Considering the complex nature of welfare states, any policy actions to improve redistribution across multiple policy domains should be well justified by policymakers. The public should comprehend the policy’s origins and aims while also considering the interests of taxpaying citizens and the long-term repercussions of economic downturns. This is particularly important in relation to social investment policies, as their developments, implementation and outcomes require patience that not everyone in need of support can afford. Generally there is a need for a more in-depth understanding of why some policies receive public support while others are opposed. Apart from different types of quantitative surveys that can examine levels of support and trade-offs, there is also a need for more qualitative public opinion research to get a more nuanced and differentiated picture of what individuals think in terms of the welfare state, including a better understanding of attitudes that might seem contradictory (see for recent focus group discussions on European social citizenship Eick et al. 2023). In the context of this book, these developments immediately beg the question: which socio-economic status groups would support more involvement of the European Union in national welfare state policymaking? Figure 7.2 examines the opposition towards one potential redistributive policy measure on the European Union level. The European Social Survey 2016/2017 mentions three relevant characteristics of this policy: (1) the purpose is to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all poor people in the EU; (2) the level of social benefits people receive will be adjusted to reflect the cost of living in their country; and (3) the scheme would require richer European Union countries to pay more into it than poorer European Union countries. Respondents were asked, ‘Overall, would you be against or in favour of having such a European Union-wide social benefit scheme?’ The respondents answered the question on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 = ‘Strongly against’, to 4 = ‘Strongly in favour’. Figure 7.2 uses a binary variable for the analysis to indicate either (1) ‘Against’ (categories 1–2), or (0) ‘In favour’ (categories 3–4). Notably, the higher educated are more against such an EU-level redistributive measure, which could also be categorised as a compensatory policy, than the

158

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

lower educated, in almost all countries in the sample. However, the findings from Eick and others (2023) hint that the opposite effect might be in place for social investment policies on the European Union level, which makes sense theoretically. While the literature on this question is still limited, the observation from Figure 7.2 hints at persisting self-interest patterns. The lower educated favour certain European Union policy proposals that could help lift this group out of poverty and social exclusion (see also Eick 2023b). The observation also emphasises that the higher educated are not universally more inclusive and tolerant than the lower educated and shows again how multidimensional public attitudes towards the welfare state are. Lower-educated individuals are typically more Eurosceptic (Hakhverdian et al. 2013), and the results from Figure 7.2 indicate that there is untapped political potential for a progressive, redistributive European Union-led welfare state. Furthermore, implementing such policy proposals could be an opportunity to increase the European Union’s perceived legitimacy amongst groups that often feel left behind by European integration (Eick 2023b). However, this means potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that higher-status groups are more likely to oppose. As recently seen in Hungary and Poland, elites may have the power to block the expansion of Social Europe, spark Euroscepticism or even pose a threat to liberal democracy – bringing the book back to its starting point: public attitudes are complex and institutions matter. Finally, it should be emphasised that the exportable child benefits (referred to as child benefits origin), examined in Chapter 6 of this book, are also European Union-level policy. However, the questionnaire framed the issue in terms of access for migrants, and this policy was disapproved by the majorities in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, reaching up to 80 per cent opposition. These findings reveal a challenge for Social Europe since welfare beneficiaries being inside the state borders appears to be a benchmark for welfare reciprocity (see also Bay, Finseraas and Pedersen 2016). Thus, the framing of these policies or social policies in general are of utmost importance for future policymakers – both on the national and the European Union level.

CLOSING REMARKS Over thirty years after Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) first published about the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism to describe it in Denmark and Norway, the belief that migrants should be excluded from the welfare state has spread across the European continent, and many researchers have strived to uncover its complex causes and consequences. The fact that welfare chauvinism is receiving increasing attention in public, political and academic debates can be related to the topic’s not being a stand-alone challenge for social policymak-

Opposition towards a redistributive policy measure on the EU level amongst the tertiary educated in comparison to non-tertiary educated (in percentage)

European Social Survey 2016/2017, N = 36,082. Design- and population weighted.

Figure 7.2

Source:

The future of European welfare states 159

160

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

ing. As mentioned before in this book, the unwillingness of the public to share welfare resources with migrants is embedded in the most pressuring social conflicts Europe faces nowadays: the deepening of globalisation and greater European Union integration, rapid socio-demographic changes, rising inequality and poverty, reduced capacity of welfare systems to secure economic and social stability, as well as a rise of the radical right and illiberal democracies. Welfare chauvinism is arguably at the heart of these conflicts because welfare states are based on a community of solidarity that shares risks, and in times of crisis, such communities are weakened, and groups that are perceived as less deserving are often excluded from that community. Migrants are often not recognised as part of the risk-sharing community. Hence, the public perceives migrants as the least-deserving target group for welfare support, and politicians often use migrants as scapegoats for deeper institutional problems. This book shows that welfare chauvinism is here to stay, particularly in times of crisis. Even during the Covid-19 crisis, borders were instrumentalised for political reasons; and once more, citizens from specific parts of the world were deprived of ever-so-important welfare resources. This further emphasises that norms on who deserves welfare support and who does not deserve welfare support will continue to challenge societies in the decades to come. However, this book also shows that there is hope for the future of European welfare states in the globalised world. With policy choices that support solidarity, inclusion, diversity and sustainable investments in individuals, more generous welfare and increasing levels of migration are compatible.

Bibliography Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2016. ‘Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact’. British Journal of Political Science 46(2): 417–36. Achterberg, Peter, and Dick Houtman. 2006. ‘Why Do So Many People Vote “Unnaturally”? A Cultural Explanation for Voting Behaviour’. European Journal of Political Research 45(1): 75–92. Achterberg, Peter, and Dick Houtman. 2009. ‘Ideologically “Illogical”? Why Do the Lower-Educated Dutch Display So Little Value Coherence?’ Social Forces 87: 1649–70. Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and Nevitt Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. Afonso, Alexandre, and Line Rennwald. 2018. ‘Social Class and the Changing Welfare State Agenda of Radical Right Parties in Europe’. In Welfare Democracies and Party Politics: Explaining Electoral Dynamics in Times of Changing Welfare Capitalism, eds. Philip Manow, Bruno Palier and Hanna Schwander. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 171–94. Alesina, Alberto and Edward L. Glaeser. 2004. Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Allport, Gordon W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley. Altemeyer, Bob. 1988. Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. An, Brian P. 2015. ‘The Role of Social Desirability Bias and Racial/Ethnic Composition on the Relation between Education and Attitude toward Immigration Restrictionism’. The Social Science Journal 52(4): 459–67. Andersen, Jørgen Goul, and Tor Bjørklund. 1990. ‘Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway’. Acta Sociologica 33(3): 195–217. Banting, Keith, and Edward Koning. 2017. ‘Just Visiting? The Weakening of Social Protection in a Mobile World’. In Multicultural Governance in a Mobile World, ed. A. Triandafyllidou. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 108–35. Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka. 2006. Multiculturalism and the Welfare State Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press On Demand. Baute, Sharon, Koen Abts, and Bart Meuleman. 2019. ‘Public Support for European Solidarity: Between Euroscepticism and EU Agenda Preferences?’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 57(3): 533–50. Bay, Ann-Helén, Henning Finseraas and Axel West Pedersen. 2013. ‘Welfare Dualism in Two Scandinavian Welfare States: Public Opinion and Party Politics’. West European Politics 36(1): 199–220. Bay, Ann-Helén, Henning Finseraas and Axel West Pedersen. 2016. ‘Welfare Nationalism and Popular Support for Raising the Child Allowance: Evidence from a Norwegian Survey Experiment’. Scandinavian Political Studies 39(4): 482–94. 161

162

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Bay, Ann-Helén, and Axel West Pedersen. 2006. ‘The Limits of Social Solidarity: Basic Income, Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State’. Acta Sociologica 49(4): 419–36. Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: Wiley. Blinder, Scott. 2015. ‘Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of “Immigrants” in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain’. Political Studies 63(1): 80–100. Blumer, Herbert. 1958. ‘Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position’. Pacific Sociological Review 1(1): 3–7. Bonacich, Edna. 1972. ‘A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market’. American Sociological Review 37(5): 547–59. Bonoli, Giuliano. 2007. ‘Time Matters: Postindustrialization, New Social Risks, and Welfare State Adaptation in Advanced Industrial Democracies’. Comparative Political Studies 40(5): 495–520. Bonoli, Giuliano. 2020. ‘Immigrant Integration and Social Investment’. Journal of European Social Policy 30(5): 616–27. Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1990. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Brady, Norman. 2012. ‘From “Moral Loss” to “Moral Reconstruction”? A Critique of Ethical Perspectives on Challenging the Neoliberal Hegemony in UK Universities in the 21st Century’. Oxford Review of Education 38(3): 343–55. Breidahl, Karen Nielsen, Troels Fage Hedegaard, Kristian Kongshøj and Christian Albrekt Larsen. 2021. Migrants’ Attitudes and the Welfare State: The Danish Melting Pot. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. 2008. Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bruzelius, Cecilia. 2019. ‘Freedom of Movement, Social Rights and Residence-Based Conditionality in the European Union’. Journal of European Social Policy 29(1): 70–83. Burgoon, Brian. 2014. ‘Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe’. World Politics 66(03): 365–405. Burgoon, Brian., Ferry Koster and Marcel van Egmond. 2012. ‘Support for Redistribution and the Paradox of Immigration’. Journal of European Social Policy 22(3): 288–304. Burgoon, Brian, Noam Lupu, Jonas Pontusson and Wouter Schakel. 2022. ‘Understanding Unequal Representation’. European Journal of Political Research 61(2): 297–303. Busemeyer, Marius R., and Christine Trampusch, eds. 2011. The Political Economy of Collective Skill Formation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Busemeyer, Marius R., and Julian L. Garritzmann. 2017. ‘Public Opinion on Policy and Budgetary Trade-Offs in European Welfare States: Evidence from a New Comparative Survey’. Journal of European Public Policy 24(6): 871–89. Busemeyer, Marius R., and Julian L. Garritzmann. 2019. ‘Compensation or Social Investment? Revisiting the Link between Globalisation and Popular Demand for the Welfare State’. Journal of Social Policy 48(3): 427–48. Busemeyer, Marius R., Julian L. Garritzmann and Erik Neimanns. 2020. A Loud but Noisy Signal? Public Opinion and Education Reform in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bibliography

163

Busemeyer, M. R., P. Rathgeb and A. H. Sahm. 2022. Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: The Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters. West European Politics 45(1): 77–101. Campbell, David E. 2008. ‘The Basic Concept for the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy’. Wien: The Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy. At https://​nbn​-resolving​.org/​urn:​nbn:​de:​0168​-ssoar​-29063 (accessed on September 27, 2023). Campbell, David E. 2009. ‘Civic Engagement and Education: An Empirical Test of the Sorting Model’. American Journal of Political Science 53(4): 771–86. Cappelen, Cornelius, and Tor Midtbø. 2016. ‘Intra-EU Labour Migration and Support for the Norwegian Welfare State’. European Sociological Review 32(6): 691–703. Cappelen, Cornelius, and Yvette Peters. 2018. ‘The Impact of Intra-EU Migration on Welfare Chauvinism’. Journal of Public Policy 38(3): 389–417. Careja, Romana, Christian Elmelund-Præstekær, Michael Baggesen Klitgaard and Erik Gahner Larsen. 2016. ‘Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People’s Party’. Scandinavian Political Studies 39(4): 435–57. Castles, Stephen, Hein Gysbert de Haas and Mark J. Miller. 2014. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. 5th edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cavaillé, Charlotte, and John Marshall. 2019. ‘Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms across Western Europe’. American Political Science Review 113(1): 254–63. Ceobanu, Alin M., and Xavier Escandell. 2010. ‘Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research’. Annual Review of Sociology 36(1): 309–328. Cerna, Lucie, and Mathias Czaika. 2016. ‘European Policies to Attract Talent: The Crisis and Highly Skilled Migration Policy Changes’. In High-Skill Migration and Recession: Gendered Perspectives, eds. Anna Triandafyllidou and Irina Isaakyan. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 22–43. Chung, Heejung. 2019. ‘Dualization and Subjective Employment Insecurity: Explaining the Subjective Employment Insecurity Divide between Permanent and Temporary Workers across 23 European Countries’. Economic and Industrial Democracy 40(3): 700–729. Chung, Heejung, Sonja Bekker and Hester Houwing. 2012. ‘Young People and the Post-Recession Labour Market in the Context of Europe 2020’. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 18(3): 301–17. Chung, Heejung, and Wim van Oorschot. 2010. Employment Insecurity of European Individuals during the Financial Crisis: A Multi-Level Approach. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe Working Paper. Coenders, Marcel T. A. 2001. Nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in a comparative perspective: An empirical study of attitudes toward the country and ethnic immigrants in 22 countries (Vol. 78, pp. 1–277). Radboud University Nijmegen. Coenders, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2003. ‘The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison’. Political Psychology 24(2): 313–43. Coleman, James S. 1965. ‘Introduction: Education and Political Development’. In Education and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2–32.

164

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Collins, Randall. 1971. ‘Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification’. American Sociological Review 36(6): 1002–19. Condran, John G. 1979. ‘Changes in White Attitudes toward Blacks: 1963–1977’. Public Opinion Quarterly 43(4): 463–76. Crepaz, Markus M. L., and Regan Damron. 2009. ‘Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes about Immigrants’. Comparative Political Studies 42(3): 437–63. Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. de Koster, Willem, Peter Achterberg and Jeroen van der Waal. 2013. ‘The New Right and the Welfare State: The Electoral Relevance of Welfare Chauvinism and Welfare Populism in the Netherlands’. International Political Science Review 34(1): 3–20. Degen, Daniel, Theresa Kuhn and Wouter van der Brug. 2019. ‘Granting Immigrants Access to Social Benefits? How Self-Interest Influences Support for Welfare State Restrictiveness’. Journal of European Social Policy 29(2): 148–65. Durkheim, Émile. 1925. Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education, tr. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer. New York: Free Press. Dustmann, Christian, and Ian Preston. 2007. ‘Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration’. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7(1): 1–41. Eger, Maureen A. 2010. ‘Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Support for Welfare State Spending’. European Sociological Review 26(2): 203–17. Eger, Maureen A., Christian Albrekt Larsen and Jan Mewes. 2020. ‘Welfare Nationalism Before and After the “Migration Crisis”’. In Welfare State Legitimacy in Times of Crisis and Austerity: Between Continuity and Change, eds Bart Meuleman, Tijs Laenen and Wim van Oorschot. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 177–98. Eger, Maureen A., and Sarah Valdez. 2015. ‘Neo-Nationalism in Western Europe’. European Sociological Review 31(1): 115–30. Ehata, R., and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. 2017. ‘Benefit Tourism and EU Migrant Citizens: Real-world Experiences’. Social Policy Review 29: 181–98. Eick, Gianna M. 2023a. ‘Welfare Euroscepticism and Socioeconomic Status’ (SocArXiv). Eick, Gianna M. 2023b. ‘The Evolution of Welfare Attitudes in Europe’. In Welfare States in Turbulent Times, ed. Bent Greve. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 71–83. Eick, Gianna M., Brian Burgoon and Marius R. Busemeyer. (2023). Public preferences for social investment versus compensation policies in Social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy (online first). Eick, Gianna M., Berriochoa, Kattalina, Busemeyer, Marius R., Burgoon, Brian, Bolesta, Karolina, Grabowska, Izabela, Gómez Abelleira, Francisco J., Mercader Uguina, Jesús, Muñoz Ruiz, Ana B., & van der Duin, David (2023). How citizens understand European social citizenship: deepening quantitative results with focus groups analysis. EUSocialCit Working Paper. Eick, Gianna M. and Marius R. Busemeyer. 2023. ‘Migration Levels and Welfare Support: Evidence from the Local Level’. Journal of European Public Policy (online first). Eick, Gianna M., Brian Burgoon and Marius R. Busemeyer. 2021. ‘Measuring Social Citizenship in Social Policy Outputs, Resources and Outcomes across EU Member States from 1985 to the Present’. EUSocialCit Working Paper.

Bibliography

165

Eick, Gianna M., and Christian Albrekt Larsen. 2022. ‘Welfare Chauvinism across Benefits and Services’. Journal of European Social Policy 32(1): 19–32. Eick, Gianna M., Erik G. Larsen, Ben B. Geiger and Trude Sundberg. 2021. ‘Beyond the Numbers: The Impact of Quantitative Teaching on Overall Student Performance’. Journal of Political Science Education 17(1): 693–702. Emmenegger, Patrick, Silja Häusermann, Bruno Palier and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, eds. 2012. The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies. New York: Oxford University Press. Enggist, Matthias, and Michael Pinggera. 2022. ‘Radical Right Parties and Their Welfare State Stances – Not so Blurry after All?’ West European Politics 45(1): 102–28. Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. 2018. ‘Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles’. Social Policy & Administration 52(1): 293–314. Escandell, Xavier, and Alin M. Ceobanu. 2009. Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and Welfare State Regimes in Europe. University of California, San Diego, CA. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1985. ‘Power and Distributional Regimes’. Politics & Society 14(2): 223–56. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fasani, Francesco, and Jacopo Mazza. 2020. Being on the Frontline? Immigrant Workers in Europe and the COVID-19 Pandemic (IZA Discussion Paper No. 13963). Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). Feldman, Stanley. 2003. ‘Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism’. Political Psychology 24(1): 41–74. Finseraas, Henning. 2008. ‘Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis of European Survey Data’. Comparative European Politics 6(4): 407–31. Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen. 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Ford, Robert. 2016. ‘Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State’. Political Studies 64(3): 630–50. Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books. Freeman, Gary P. 1986. ‘Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State’. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (From Foreign Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities). Garritzmann, Julian L., Silja Häusermann and Bruno Palier. 2022. The World Politics of Social Investment: Volume II: The Politics of Varying Social Investment Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geddes, Andrew. 2003. ‘Migration and the Welfare State in Europe’. The Political Quarterly 74(1): 150–62. Gijsberts, Mérove, Tom van der Meer and Jaco Dagevos. 2012. ‘“Hunkering Down” in Multi-Ethnic Neighbourhoods? The Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Dimensions of Social Cohesion’. European Sociological Review 28(4): 527–37. Giulietti, Corrado, and Martin Kahanec. 2013. ‘Does Generous Welfare Attract Immigrants? Towards Evidence-Based Policy-Making’. In Social Benefits and Migration: A Contested Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU, eds. Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera. Brussels: CEPS, 111–27.

166

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Gorodzeisky, Anastasia, and Moshe Semyonov. 2009. ‘Terms of Exclusion: Public Views towards Admission and Allocation of Rights to Immigrants in European Countries’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 32(3): 401–23. Gschwind, Lutz. 2021. ‘Generous to Workers ≠ Generous to All: Implications of European Unemployment Benefit Systems for the Social Protection of Immigrants’. Comparative Political Studies 54(9): 1629–52. Guiraudon, Virginie. 2000. ‘European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue Shopping’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 38(2): 251–71. Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. ‘Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe’. International Organization 61(2): 399–442. Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. ‘Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment’. American Political Science Review 104(1): 61–84. Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. ‘Public Attitudes toward Immigration’. Annual Review of Political Science 17: 225–49. Hakhverdian, Armen, Erika Van Elsas, Wouter van der Brug and Theresa Kuhn. 2013. Euroscepticism and Education: A Longitudinal Study of 12 EU Member States, 1973–2010. European Union Politics 14(4): 522–41. Haller, Max. 2002. ‘Theory and Method in the Comparative Study of Values: Critique and Alternative to Inglehart’. European Sociological Review 18(2): 139–58. Harell, Allison, Stuart Soroka and Adam Mahon. 2008. ‘Is Welfare a Dirty Word? Canadian Public Opinion on Social Assistance Policies’. Options Politiques 29(8): 53–56. Häusermann, Silja, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. ‘What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice’. In The Politics of Advanced Capitalism, eds. Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 202–30. Häusermann, Silja, Thomas Kurer and Hanna Schwander. 2014. ‘High-Skilled Outsiders? Labor Market Vulnerability, Education and Welfare State Preferences’. Socio-Economic Review 13(2): 235–58. Häusermann, Silja, Michael Pinggera, Macarena Ares and Matthias Enggist. 2022. ‘Class and Social Policy in the Knowledge Economy’. European Journal of Political Research 61(2): 462–84. Hedegaard, Troels Fage, and Christian Albrekt Larsen. 2014. ‘How Proximate and Visible Policies Shape Self-Interest Satisfaction, and Spending Support: The Case of Public Service Production’. In How Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting, and Attitudes, eds. Staffan Kumlin and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 269–88. Heerwig, Jennifer A., and Brian J. McCabe. 2009. ‘Education and Social Desirability Bias: The Case of a Black Presidential Candidate’. Social Science Quarterly 90(3): 674–86. Heizmann, Boris, Alexander Jedinger and Anja Perry. 2018. ‘Welfare Chauvinism, Economic Insecurity and the Asylum Seeker “Crisis”’. Societies 8(3): 1–17. Hello, Evelyn, Peer Scheepers and Mérove Gijsberts. 2002. ‘Education and Ethnic Prejudice in Europe: Explanations for Cross-National Variances in the Educational Effect on Ethnic Prejudice’. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 46(1): 5–24.

Bibliography

167

Hello, Evelyn, Peer Scheepers and Peter Sleegers. 2006. ‘Why the More Educated Are Less Inclined to Keep Ethnic Distance: An Empirical Test of Four Explanations’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 29(5): 959–85. Hello, Evelyn, Peer Scheepers, Ad Vermulst and Jan R. M. Gerris. 2004. ‘Association between Educational Attainment and Ethnic Distance in Young Adults: Socialization by Schools or Parents?’ Acta Sociologica 47(3): 253–75. Hemerijck, Anton. 2017. The Uses of Social Investment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hemerijck, Anton, and Liam Patuzzi. 2017. ‘“Diversifying” Social Investment: European Welfare States and Immigrant Integration in the Wake of the COVID-19 Crisis’. Migration Policy Institute Europe. At https://​www​.migrationpolicy​.org/​ research/​social​-investment​-european​-welfare​-states (accessed September 27, 2023). Hjerm, Mikael. 2001. ‘Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27(1): 37–60. Hjerm, Mikael. 2003. ‘National Sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe’. Nationalities Papers 31(4): 413–29. Hjerm, Mikael, Maureen A. Eger and Rickard Danell. 2018. ‘Peer Attitudes and the Development of Prejudice in Adolescence’. Socius 4: 1–11. Hjorth, Frederik. 2015. ‘Who Benefits? Welfare Chauvinism and National Stereotypes’. European Union Politics 17(1): 3–24. Houtman, Dick. 2003. Class and Politics in Contemporary Social Science: ‘Marxism Lite’ and Its Blind Spot for Culture. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Hox, Joop, Mirjam Moerbeek and Rens van de Schoot. 2017. Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. Abingdon: Routledge. Hyman, Herbert H., and Charles R. Wright. 1979. Education’s Lasting Influence on Values. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jackman, Mary R. 1978. ‘General and Applied Tolerance: Does Education Increase Commitment to Racial Integration?’ American Journal of Political Science 22(2): 302–24. Jackman, Mary R., and Michael J. Muha. 1984. ‘Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement?’ American Sociological Review 49(6): 751–69. Jacob, Philip E. 1957. Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching. New York: Harper. Janus, Alexander L. 2010. ‘The Influence of Social Desirability Pressures on Expressed Immigration Attitudes’. Social Science Quarterly 91(4): 928–946. Jenssen, Anders Todal, and Heidi Engesbak. 1994. ‘The Many Faces of Education: Why Are People with Lower Education More Hostile towards Immigrants than People with Higher Education?’ Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 38(1): 33–50. Jordan, Jamie, Vincenzo Maccarrone and Roland Erne. 2021. ‘Towards a Socialization of the EU’s New Economic Governance Regime? EU Labour Policy Interventions in Germany, Ireland, Italy and Romania (2009–2019)’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 59(1): 191–213. Jørgensen, Martin Bak, and Trine Lund Thomsen. 2016. ‘Deservingness in the Danish Context: Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Crisis’. Critical Social Policy 36(3): 330–51.

168

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Jylhä, Kirsti M., Jens Rydgren and Pontus Strimling. 2019. ‘Radical Right-Wing Voters from Right and Left: Comparing Sweden Democrat Voters Who Previously Voted for the Conservative Party or the Social Democratic Party’. Scandinavian Political Studies 42(3–4): 220–44. Kassis, Wassilis, Charlotte Schallié, Sonja Strube and Judith von der Heyde. 2014. ‘Prediction of Anti-Muslim Sentiment on Campus: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Prejudice in Two University Populations’. Journal of Islamic Theology and Religious Education 5(9): 141–65. Kater, Michael H. 1975. Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918–1933: eine sozialgeschichtl. Studie z. Bildungskrise in d. Weimarer Republik. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. Katz, Richard S. 2001. ‘Models of Democracy: Elite Attitudes and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union’. European Union Politics 2(1): 53–79. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann. 1997. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Koning, Edward A. 2019. Immigration and the Politics of Welfare Exclusion: Selective Solidarity in Western Democracies. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division. Kootstra, Anouk. 2016. ‘Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment’. European Sociological Review 32(3): 325–38. Korpi, Walter. 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Kros, Mathijs, and Marcel Coenders. 2019. ‘Explaining Differences in Welfare Chauvinism Between and Within Individuals Over Time: The Role of Subjective and Objective Economic Risk, Economic Egalitarianism, and Ethnic Threat’. European Sociological Review 35(6): 860–73. Kulin, Joakim, Maureen A. Eger and Mikael Hjerm. 2016. ‘Immigration or Welfare? The Progressive’s Dilemma Revisited’. Socius 2: 1–15. Kunovich, Robert M. 2004. ‘Social Structural Position and Prejudice: An Exploration of Cross-National Differences in Regression Slopes’. Social Science Research 33: 20–44. Kuppens, T., R. Spears, A. S. Manstead, B. Spruyt and M. J. Easterbrook. 2018. ‘Educationism and the Irony of Meritocracy: Negative Attitudes of Higher Educated People towards the Less Educated. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 76, 429–447. Lafleur, Jean-Michel, and Daniela Vintila, eds. 2020. Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 1): Comparing Access to Welfare Entitlements. Cham: Springer Nature. Lancee, Bram, and Oriane Sarrasin. 2015. ‘Educated Preferences or Selection Effects? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Educational Attainment on Attitudes towards Immigrants’. European Sociological Review 31(4): 490–501. Larsen, Christian A. 2008. ‘The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support’. Comparative Political Studies 41(2): 145–68. Larsen, Christian A. 2011. ‘Ethnic Heterogeneity and Public Support for Welfare: Is the American Experience Replicated in Britain, Sweden and Denmark?’ Scandinavian Political Studies 34(4): 332–53.

Bibliography

169

Larsen, Christian A. 2020. ‘The Institutional Logic of Giving Migrants Access to Social Benefits and Services’. Journal of European Social Policy 30(1): 48–62. Larsen, Christian A., and Thomas E. Dejgaard. 2013. ‘The Institutional Logic of Images of the Poor and Welfare Recipients: A Comparative Study of British, Swedish and Danish Newspapers’. Journal of European Social Policy 23(3): 287–299. Larsen, Christian A., Morten Frederiksen and Mathias Herup Nielsen. 2018. ‘European Welfare Nationalism: A Democratic Forum Study in Five Countries’. In Attitudes, Aspirations and Welfare: Social Policy Directions in Uncertain Times, eds. Peter Taylor-Gooby and Benjamin Leruth. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 63–91. Levin, Shana, Colette van Laar and Jim Sidanius. 2003. ‘The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal Study’. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 6(1): 76–92. Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Logan, Robert R. 1986. ‘Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government’. Journal of Political Economy 94(6): 1304–18. Lubbers, Marcel, Claudia Diehl, Theresa Kuhn and Christian Albrekt Larsen. 2018. ‘Migrants’ Support for Welfare State Spending in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands’. Social Policy & Administration 52(4): 895–913. Magni, Gabriele. 2021. ‘Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-Group Favoritism’. British Journal of Political Science 51(4): 1357–80. Manstead, Antony S. R. 2018. ‘The Psychology of Social Class: How Socioeconomic Status Impacts Thought, Feelings, and Behaviour’. British Journal of Social Psychology 57(2): 267–91. Margalit, Yotam. 2013. ‘Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession’. American Political Science Review 107(1): 80–103. Marx, Paul, and Elias Naumann. 2018. ‘Do Right-Wing Parties Foster Welfare Chauvinistic Attitudes? A Longitudinal Study of the 2015 “Refugee Crisis” in Germany’. Electoral Studies 52: 111–16. Massialas, Byron. 1969. Education and the Political System. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Mau, Steffen. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared. London: Routledge. Mau, Steffen. 2004. ‘Welfare Regimes and the Norms of Social Exchange’. Current Sociology 52(1): 53–74. Mau, Steffen, and Christoph Burkhardt. 2009. ‘Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe’. Journal of European Social Policy 19(3): 213–29. Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. ‘Who Is against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants’. The Review of Economics and Statistics 88(3): 510–30. Merelman, Richard M. 1980. ‘Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education’. American Political Science Review 74(2): 319–32. Meuleman, Bart, Eldad Davidov and Jaak Billiet. 2009. ‘Changing Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe, 2002–2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach’. Social Science Research 38(2): 352–65. Mewes, Jan, and Steffen Mau. 2012. ‘Unraveling Working-Class Welfare Chauvinism’. In Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond, ed. Stefan Svallfors. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 119–57.

170

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Mewes, Jan, and Steffen Mau. 2013. ‘Globalization, Socio-Economic Status and Welfare Chauvinism: European Perspectives on Attitudes toward the Exclusion of Immigrants’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 54(3): 228–45. Mitter, Wolfgang. 1993. ‘Education, Democracy and Development in a Period of Revolutionary Change’. International Review of Education 39(6): 463–71. Mols, Frank, and Jolanda Jetten. 2017. The Wealth Paradox: Economic Prosperity and the Hardening of Attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morel, Nathalie, and Joakim Palme. 2012. ‘Financing the Welfare State and the Politics of Taxation’. In The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State, ed. Bent Greve. London: Routledge, 400–409. Naidoo, Rajani, and Ian Jamieson. 2007. ‘Empowering Participants or Corroding Learning? Towards a Research Agenda on the Impact of Student Consumerism in Higher Education’. Journal of Education Policy 20(3): 267–81. Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. Education and Democratic Citizenship in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Norocel, Ov Cristian. 2016. ‘Populist Radical Right Protectors of the Folkhem: Welfare Chauvinism in Sweden’. Critical Social Policy 36(3): 371–90. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Odmalm, Pontus, and Eve Hepburn. 2017. The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right. London: Routledge. OECD. 2018. Equity in Education: Breaking Down Barriers to Social Mobility. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Oskamp, Stuart, and P. Wesley Schultz. 2005. Attitudes and Opinions. 3rd edn. New York: Psychology Press. Pennings, Frans, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, eds. 2018. EU Citizenship and Social Rights: Entitlements and Impediments to Accessing Welfare. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp. 2006. A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5): 751–83. Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. ‘Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe’. American Sociological Review 60(4): 586–611. Reeskens, Tim, and Wim van Oorschot. 2012. ‘Disentangling the “New Liberal Dilemma”: On the Relation between General Welfare Redistribution Preferences and Welfare Chauvinism’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 53(2): 120–39. Römer, Friederike. 2017. ‘Generous to All or “Insiders Only”? The Relationship between Welfare State Generosity and Immigrant Welfare Rights’. Journal of European Social Policy 27(2): 173–96. Roosma, Femke, John Gelissen and Wim van Oorschot. 2013. ‘The Multidimensionality of Welfare State Attitudes: A European Cross-National Study’. Social Indicators Research 113(1): 235–55. Roosma, Femke, and Wim van Oorschot. 2020. ‘Public Opinion on Basic Income: Mapping European Support for a Radical Alternative for Welfare Provision’. Journal of European Social Policy 30(2): 190–205. Ruhs, Martin. 2022. Who Cares What the People Think? Public Attitudes and Refugee Protection in Europe. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 21(3): 313–44.

Bibliography

171

Ruhs, Martin, and Joakim Palme. 2018. ‘Institutional Contexts of Political Conflicts around Free Movement in the European Union: A Theoretical Analysis’. Journal of European Public Policy 25(10): 1481–500. Rzepnikowska, Alina. 2019. ‘Racism and Xenophobia Experienced by Polish Migrants in the UK Before and After Brexit Vote’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45(1): 61–77. Rzepnikowska, Alina. 2023. ‘Racialisation of Polish Migrants in the UK and in Spain (Catalonia)’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 49(6): 1517–33. Sainsbury, Diane. 2006. ‘Immigrants’ Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, Forms in Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes’. Journal of European Social Policy 16(3): 229–44. Sainsbury, Diane. 2012. Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion. New York: Oxford University Press. Sangiovanni, Andrea. 2013. ‘Solidarity in the European Union’. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33(2): 1–29. Schakel, Wouter, Brian Burgoon and Armen Hakhverdian. 2020. ‘Real but Unequal Representation in Welfare State Reform’. Politics & Society 48(1): 131–63. Scharpf, Fritz W. 2010. ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”’. Socio-Economic Review 8(2): 211–50. Scharpf, Fritz W. 2016. ‘The Costs of Non-Disintegration: The Case of the European Monetary Union’. In The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity, eds. Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 29–49. Scheepers, Peer, Mérove Gijsberts and Marcel Coenders. 2002. ‘Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat’. European Sociological Review 18(1): 17–34. Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. ‘Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy’. The Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1): 133–45. Schleicher, Klaus, ed. 1993. Nationalism in Education. Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang. Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W. 2016. ‘Economic Inequality and Public Demand for Redistribution: Combining Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Evidence’. Socio-Economic Review 14(1): 119–40. Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W., and Dennis C. Spies. 2016. ‘Immigration and Welfare Support in Germany’. American Sociological Review 81(2): 242–61. Schmitt, Carina, and Céline Teney. 2019. ‘Access to General Social Protection for Immigrants in Advanced Democracies’. Journal of European Social Policy 29(1): 44–55. Schumacher, Gijs, and Kees van Kersbergen. 2016. ‘Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?’ Party Politics 22(3): 300–312. Schwander, Hanna, and Silja Häusermann. 2013. ‘Who Is In and Who Is Out? A Risk-Based Conceptualization of Insiders and Outsiders’. Journal of European Social Policy 23(3): 248–69. Selznick, Gertrude J., and Stephen Steinberg. 1969. The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America. New York: Harper & Row. Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2006. ‘The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988–2000’. American Sociological Review 71(3): 426–49.

172

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

Sobolewska, Maria, and Robert Ford. 2020. Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soroka, Stuart N., and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stegmueller, Daniel. 2013. ‘How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches’. American Journal of Political Science 57(3): 748–61. Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955. Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stubager, Rune. 2008. ‘Education Effects on Authoritarian–Libertarian Values: A Question of Socialization’. The British Journal of Sociology 59(2): 327–50. Svallfors, Stefan. 1995. ‘The End of Class Politics? Structural Cleavages and Attitudes to Swedish Welfare Policies’. Acta Sociologica 38(1): 53–74. Svallfors, Stefan. (ed.). 2007. The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages, and Orientations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Svallfors, Stefan. 2012. Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Tajfel, Henri, ed. 1982. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor-Gooby, Peter. 2005. ‘Is the Future American? Or, Can Left Politics Preserve European Welfare States from Erosion through Growing “Racial” Diversity?’ Journal of Social Policy 34(4): 661–72. Taylor-Gooby, Peter. 2008. Reframing Social Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, Peter, Benjamin Leruth and Heejung Chung, eds. 2017. After Austerity: Welfare State Transformation in Europe after the Great Recession, 1st edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, Peter, Bjørn Hvinden, Steffen Mau, Benjamin Leruth, Mi Ah Schoyen and Adrienn Gyory. 2019. ‘Moral Economies of the Welfare State: A Qualitative Comparative Study’. Acta Sociologica 62(2): 119–34. Taylor-Gooby, P., Jan Ocko Heuer, Heejung Chung, Benjamin Leruth, Steffen Mau and Katharina Zimmermann. 2020. ‘Regimes, Social Risks and the Welfare Mix: Unpacking Attitudes to Pensions and Childcare in Germany and the UK through Deliberative Forums’. Journal of Social Policy 49(1): 61–79. Thijs, Paula, Manfred Grotenhuis and Peer Scheepers. 2018. ‘The Paradox of Rising Ethnic Prejudice in Times of Educational Expansion and Secularization in the Netherlands, 1985–2011’. Social Indicators Research 139(2): 653–78. Titmuss, Richard. 1974. Social Policy. London: Allen & Unwin. Vandenbroucke, Frank. 2016. The Idea of a European Social Union: A Normative Introduction. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Vanhercke, Bart, Dalila Ghailani and Sebastiano Sabato, eds. 2018. Social Policy in the European Union: State of Play 2018. Brussels: ETUI/OSE. van der Meer, Tom, and Tim Reeskens. 2021. ‘Welfare Chauvinism in the Face of Ethnic Diversity: A Vignette Experiment across Diverse and Homogenous Neighbourhoods on the Perceived Deservingness of Native and Foreign-Born Welfare Claimants’. European Sociological Review 37(1): 89–103. van der Waal, Jeroen et al. 2010. ‘“Some Are More Equal than Others”: Economic Egalitarianism and Welfare Chauvinism in the Netherlands’. Journal of European Social Policy 20(4): 350–63.

Bibliography

173

van der Waal, Jeroen, Willem de Koster and Wim van Oorschot. 2013. ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? How Welfare Regimes Affect Support for Distributing Welfare to Immigrants in Europe’. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 15(2): 164–81. van Oorschot, Wim. 2000. ‘Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public’. Policy & Politics 28(1): 33–49. van Oorschot, Wim. 2006. ‘Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness Perceptions among Citizens of European Welfare States’. Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 23–42. van Oorschot, Wim. 2008. ‘Solidarity towards Immigrants in European Welfare States’. International Journal of Social Welfare 17(1): 3–14. van Oorschot, Wim, and Wilfred Uunk. 2007. ‘Welfare Spending and the Public’s Concern for Immigrants: Multilevel Evidence for Eighteen European Countries’. Comparative Politics 40(1): 63–82. Weil, Frederick D. 1985. ‘The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism Using Public Opinion Survey Data’. American Sociological Review 50(4): 458–74. Zeitlin, Jonathan, and Bart Vanhercke. 2018. ‘Socializing the European Semester: EU Social and Economic Policy Co-Ordination in Crisis and Beyond’. Journal of European Public Policy 25(2): 149–74. Zimmermann, Katharina, Jan-Ocko Heuer and Steffen Mau. 2018. ‘Changing Preferences towards Redistribution: How Deliberation Shapes Welfare Attitudes’. Social Policy & Administration 52(5): 969–82.

Index Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 1, 14 cross-country variation 10, 11 cultural ideology theory 7, 16, 45, 58, 60, 81, 121

age 10, 35, 66–7, 73, 115, 137, 145 ageing population 19 asylum seekers 3, 13, 29, 56, 88, 101 attitudes from elites 7, 55, 95 shaped by education 35, 50 austerity 13, 19, 88, 136 authoritarian libertarian dimension 49, 80 norms 10, 16, 52, 61, 81, 82, 107, 108, 145 personality 49 regimes 10 values 46, 56 authoritarianism 2, 35, 46–7, 49–50, 56, 80, 82–3, 88, 90, 106–7, 108–9, 111, 148, 150

deservingness theory 46, 48, 130 deskilling of migrants 41 economic deprivation 44, 57, 76, 85 prosperity 16, 35, 44, 61, 77, 78, 85, 103–4, 105, 111, 123, 145, 146, 148 education 35, 44, 48 cleavage 10–11, 37, 145 system 10, 50, 52, 81, 93, 102 created by nation-state 29, 52 shape norms and values 50, 52, 57 tertiary 6, 7, 41–3, 44, 54, 82, 93, 102, 136, 140, 145 education-as-liberation assumption 7, 10, 11, 35, 41, 49–50, 51, 54, 57, 60, 68, 75, 86, 90, 93, 114, 142, 145, 146 education gaps 66, 95, 99, 121, 122, 124 egalitarian attitudes 74, 145 elections 147 elite discourse 6, 147 ethnic heterogeneity hypothesis 20 ethnocentrism 30, 148 Eurobarometer 14, 88 European Social Survey 13, 16, 136 European Union child benefits 128, 136 migration policies 30, 89 European Union-wide social benefit scheme 157 Euroscepticism 158 Eurostat 79, 84

Bologna Process 132, 156 Brexit 22, 147 cash benefits 117, 141 child benefits domestic 126, 128, 130, 134 origin 126, 128, 130, 131, 134, 136, 138, 140 childcare 116, 117, 119, 121, 126–7, 130, 132, 134, 142, 144 citizenship 18, 24, 152 civic education 52 classroom 15 community size 35, 73 compensatory policy 3, 17, 144, 145 confirmation bias 148 conformity 51, 80 Covid-19 pandemic 1, 14, 77, 156, 160 crisis climate 1 Covid-19 1, 14, 77, 156, 160 energy 1 financial 13, 85, 102, 104, 105, 146, 149, 156

financial crisis 146, 149, 156 174

Index

free riding 117 gender 10, 19, 35, 74, 115 globalisation 24, 40, 56, 86, 160 Great Recession 13, 88, 111 group threat theory 5, 32, 45, 55 having children 35 healthcare 119, 120, 126, 127, 128, 130, 134, 136, 138 housing 40, 44, 57, 114, 144 human rights 3, 114, 120 ideology 45–6, 48, 56, 58 income 35, 36, 37, 41, 45, 65, 73, 114, 144, 151 individual liberties 35, 84 in-kind services 117, 120 institutional context theories 5, 10, 27, 32, 58–9, 114 institutions 2, 3, 25, 28, 32, 35, 48, 50, 52, 54–5, 56, 58–9 interaction effects 78, 84, 104 International Social Survey Programme 14 labour market competition 44, 45 inequality 50, 81 insider 40, 41, 119 outsider 119 left-right dimension 49, 71 liberal welfare regimes 136 linguistic fractionalisation 35, 84 longitudinal studies 89, 97 media 29, 30, 110, 147 meso-level 15 migrant background 13, 18–19, 31, 35, 74, 145 Eastern Europe 2, 22, 115, 124–5, 127, 128, 132, 134, 137–8, 140, 141 Sub-Saharan Africa 13, 88 Syria 13, 88 migrant levels 35 migration history 3, 19, 29 Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 25–7, 35, 84 misperceptions 49

175

multiculturalism 53–4, 106 multilevel modelling 58, 71 multivariate analysis 91 nation state 19, 29, 52, 119 OECD data 9, 81, 121 panel studies 97, 112 parents’ education 35, 50, 73, 144–5 percentage tertiary education 35, 44, 50, 54, 57, 67, 71, 73, 81, 82, 93, 102, 134, 136, 145 polarisation 3, 11, 144, 150 political cleavage 5, 9, 21–2, 49 correctness 55, 66, 86, 112 integration 53 salience 3, 19, 24, 30, 48 politicisation 5, 101 populist contagion theory 150 privileged 7, 36, 50 professors 6, 9 progressive dilemma 4, 20, 153 in the United States 20–21 public attitudes 2, 5, 10, 19, 20, 24, 30, 32, 94, 143, 148, 158 expenditures 104 racism 30, 31, 51, 54, 81, 147, 148, 150 radical right-wing parties 1, 5, 22, 107, 149 Alternative for Germany 9, 122 Brothers of Italy 24 Danish People’s Party 22, 122 League 24 normalisation 2 Swedish Democrats 22 realistic conflict theory 40 refugees Syria 13, 14, 88, 110 Ukraine 14 salience of anti-democratic attitudes 46, 60, 108 of migration 3, 16, 19, 91 salience migration 35, 84, 91 authoritarianism 49, 82

176

Welfare chauvinism in Europe

towards egalitarianisms 74 welfare state 84 self-interest 51, 56, 57, 58, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 138, 141 self interest theory 16, 43–4, 58 social cohesion 147, 155 desirability bias 52 division 9, 22, 60 Europe 17, 155, 158 exclusion 158 expenditure 35, 37, 39, 78, 156 identity theory 29 inclusion 5, 25, 150 investment policies 2–3, 17, 114, 116–17, 119, 120, 121, 123, 128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 152, 153–5, 156 socialisation theories 52 solidarity 4, 20, 50, 110, 119 split labour market theory 40 stereotypes 4, 20, 27, 46 stigmatisation 6, 150 superficial commitment 51–2 teachers 50 trade unions 81 trust 4, 25, 50 unemployment 10, 43, 115 experience 35, 73 rate 35, 56, 79, 101 university neo liberalisation 54 racism 51, 81 voting behaviour 28

welfare chauvinism Czech Republic 91, 144 Denmark 130 Germany 97 Hungary 90, 91, 94, 97, 144 Italy 144 Netherlands 91, 94 Poland 90, 144 Russia 95, 97, 144 Slovenia 95, 144 Sweden 89 Switzerland 91, 95, 102 United Kingdom 144 conditionality 1 definition 1, 19, 30, 62, 90 magnetism hypothesis 20 reciprocity 46, 116, 128 resources 4, 30, 33, 65, 160 state 1, 5, 19, 20, 24, 65, 90, 139, 143, 152, 155 tourist 29 welfare chauvinism 10, 31, 94 attitudes 15, 27, 32, 61, 66, 74, 86, 143, 147 definition 1, 30, 90 levels 11, 21, 66, 68, 76, 92 normalisation 2, 150 policies 16, 131, 132, 143, 144 rationales 56 welfare regime conservative 152 Welfare States Attitudes Survey 13–14, 114 World Development Indicators Database 4 World Values Survey 14