Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy [1 ed.] 9781617283444, 9781617281082

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

GLOBAL POLITICAL STUDIES

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WEAK AND FAILING STATES: SECURITY THREATS AND U.S. POLICY No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

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WEAK AND FAILING STATES: SECURITY THREATS AND U.S. POLICY

ADRIAN J. REYES EDITOR

Nova

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Weak and failing states : security threats and U.S. policy / editor, Adrian J. Reyes. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-61728-344-4 (eBook) 1. Failed states. 2. National security--United States. 3. United States--Military policy. I. Reyes, Adrian J. JC328.7.W43 2010 355'.033073--dc22 2010016067

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

vii Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy Liana Sun Wyler Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities Nina M. Serafino Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues for Congress Nina M. Serafino Department of Defense ―Section 1207‖ Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns Nina M. Serafino Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization-Report No. ISP-I07-25, May 2007 United States Department of State Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas - Landon Lecture (Kansas State University) Robert M. Gates

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41

79

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Contents 189

Index

191

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Chapter Sources

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PREFACE Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. This book provides the definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states, U.S. national security, and development challenges. Also explored are the recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states and the relevant issues that U.S. policy toward these states that Congress may consider. Chapter 1 - Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a highpriority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. The U.S. government remains in the early stages of developing targeted capabilities and resources for addressing a complex mix of security, development, and governance challenges confronting weak states. U.S. programs and initiatives fall under five main categories: (1) conflict and threat early warning, (2) international cooperation and diplomacy, (3) foreign development assistance, (4) post-conflict stability operations, and (5) interagency coordination. However, as U.S. policies toward weak and failing

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viii

Adrian J. Reyes

states have grown in priority and cost, particularly since 9/11, some policy makers and analysts have begun to question the Administration‘s commitment to addressing effectively the problems posed by these states. Congress plays a crucial role in the funding and oversight of programs designed to address weak and failing states. Several recent bills in the 110th Congress and laws directly relate to and have changed aspects of U.S. policy toward these states. Among these include efforts to address (1) civilian postconflict management authorities and funding (S. 613/H.R. 1084, S. 3288, and H.R. 5658), (2) temporary Department of Defense (DOD) funding transfer authorities to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), (3) temporary DOD security assistance authorities and funding (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), and (4) options for reforming foreign assistance and interagency coordination (as mandated in P.L. 108- 199 and P.L. 109364). This chapter first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states, U.S. national security, and development challenges. Second, the report surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states. Finally, it highlights relevant issues about U.S. policy toward these states that Congress may consider. For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss; CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina Serafino; CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina Serafino; and CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell. Chapter 2 - The second session of the 111th Congress faces a number of issues regarding the development of civilian capabilities to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. In September 2008, Congress passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008). This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of government employees with an active and a standby

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component, and a reserve component. Although the establishment of active and standby units began under the Bush Administration, Congress has yet to fund the reserve component. The first session of the 111th Congress created a new fund to support Corps deployments, but the second session faces questions about the appropriate funding level for it. S/CRS was established in 2004 to address longstanding concerns, both within Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction, and balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning, and conducting post-conflict operations, as is fielding the appropriate civilian personnel. Since July 2004, S/CRS has worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out such operations. Working with a staff that has slowly grown from a few dozen to 175 individuals, S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapidresponse crisis management ―surge‖ capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action. In 2008, Congress first provided funding to establish civilian response capabilities. Bush Administration plans at that point contemplated a CRC force of 4,250, including a sizable reserve component of private citizens similar in concept to the U.S. military reserve. In 2009, the Obama Administration requested $323.3 million in FY2010 funds for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) to continue developing and to deploy a CRC active component and a CRC standby component, and to establish a 2,000-member civilian reserve component. In addition, the Administration requested a $40 million Stabilization Bridge Fund under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to support the activities of deployed CRC members and $76 million to establish a response fund under the USAID Transition Initiatives account. The first session of the 111th Congress partially funded this initiative. In the FY20 10 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) Congress provided $150 million for CRC development and support: $120 million for the

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State Department and $30 million for USAID to support the recruitment, hiring, and training of the first two response corps components, the Active and Stand-by units of federal government employees. Congress did not provide funding for the CRC reserve component. In addition, Congress established a new USAID Complex Crises Fund to support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises abroad, but the $50 million appropriated for it falls short of the amount many analysts argue is necessary. Chapter 3 - Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism support. This authority expires in FY2011. As of October 13, 2009, Section 1206 allocations total a little under $1 billion for FY2006 through FY2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some $100 million for FY2006, $274 million for FY2007, $272 million for FY2008, and $340 million for FY2009. (The amounts allocated are somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over $1 billion for FY2006FY2009.) For FY2010, Congress provided $345 million in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-118. (The amount is not specified in the act, but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.) The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put in place a temporary limit of $75 million on the use of Section 1206 funds for each FY2010 and FY2011 to train military troops that would deploy to military or stability operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. The President signed the FY2010 NDAA into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84). Through the use of FY2006 through FY2009 funds, Section 1206 has supported bilateral programs in 24 countries, 13 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program. Just over 40% of the FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding has been obligated for three countries: Pakistan, Lebanon, and Yemen. Pakistan has been by far the largest recipient, receiving $203.4 million or over 20% of total. About 20% has been allocated to bilateral programs in four countries: Bahrain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Most of the Section 1206 funding to the latter three focuses on controlling the Celebes Sea that sits among them, as well as adjoining waters. Smaller allocations (i.e.,

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those ranging from $1 million to $32 million) comprise close to 40% of the total. Some Members are concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow and broad. Specific current concerns include whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and whether the authority should be expanded to provide training not only military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces. (Currently, Section 1206 limits security force training to maritime security forces.) An overarching issue is whether Congress should place Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department with other T&E authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in permanent law, as requested by DOD.) A related issue is whether Congress should grant the State Department its own security assistance contingency fund with purposes that overlap Section 1206, as provided in the House-passed FY2010-FY2011 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2410, Section 841). Finally, as the Obama Administration conducts an overall assessment of foreign assistance, including security assistance, some Members may wish to examine the status of Section 1206 in the context of broader security assistance reform. Among the issues related to U.S. assistance to foreign military and security forces, one of the most salient for the 111th Congress is the status of Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA ), P.L. 109-163, as amended. This authority, enacted in 2005, provides the Secretary of Defense with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two purposes: To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. Nearly all Section 1206 assistance to date has been CT training and equipment, and To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (To date, the Department of Defense (DOD) has authorities other than Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign militaries in conjunction with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the use of Section 1206 for that purpose is permitted by law.) Section 1206 is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign

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countries. For almost the past half-century, DOD generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs. On occasion, Congress has given DOD authority to train and equip specified countries, and over the years Congress has provided DOD with specific Title 10 authorities or DOD funding to provide foreign military forces with opportunities attend military schools, but Section 1206 is the first DOD global train-and-equip authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed oversight for military assistance with the Secretary of State. Congress‘ decision to grant DOD Section 1206 authority has been controversial. Some Members have stressed the need for a DOD authority that combatant commanders can use to respond to emerging threats that put the well-being of U.S. military personnel at risk or might eventually require robust, and costly, U.S. military action. But others have questioned whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and, above all, whether providing DOD with its own train-and-equip (T&E) authorities undermines the Secretary of State‘s statutory responsibility to ensure coherence of U.S. foreign policy. While no other single DOD security assistance authority has generated as much controversy as Section 1206, some analysts have been concerned with the addition of a few new security assistance authorities after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, as well as the perceived expansion of pre-9/11 DOD security assistance and other foreign assistancetype activities. Of particular concern to some Members is Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, an authorization to provide support to ―foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals‖ that assist or facilitate U.S. military operations conducted by special operations forces to combat terrorism.1 Two other post 9/11 security assistance authorities of concern are the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds foreign military officers and defense and security officials to attend U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and conferences and later made permanent law, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which funds countries assisting in U.S. military operations. The former is viewed by some analysts as overlapping with the State Department International Military and Education Training (IMET) program, the latter is viewed as performing the same function as the State Department Economic Support Fund (ESF).2 This chapter provides background on the pre-Section 1206 status of security assistance authorities and the factors contributing to the enactment of Section 1206. It then sets out the purposes of the legislation and scope of its

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activities, restrictions on its use, the DOD-State Department planning process, and funding. It concludes with a discussion of issues for Congress. An appendix provides a descriptive legislative history of the bill and evolving Congressional committee attitudes towards the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense and the State Department regarding Section 1206 authority. Chapter 4 - Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provides authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. It expires at the end of FY2010. The State Department‘s FY2011 Foreign Assistance budget request asks for $100 million for a Complex Crises Fund, established last year by Congress as a USAID account, ―to respond to emerging or unforeseen crises through support for reconstruction, security, or stabilization needs.‖ It notes that this fund is ―similar to Section 1207 Authority.‖ DOD transferred $10 million in FY2006, $99.7 million in FY2007, and $100 million in FY2008 under this authority. For FY2009, Congress added special authority to transfer up to an additional $50 million for Georgia: DOD transferred a total of $143.3 million to the State Department in FY2009 Section 1207 funds. In all, these funds have supported projects in 18 countries and two regions. In action on the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84), Congress extended the $100 million authority through FY2010. Congressional authorizers and appropriators strongly expressed in several documents that Section 1207 authority is temporary, and indicated that such funding is better provided under the State Department budget. The Obama Administration decision to request Section 1207-type funding under the Foreign Assistance account may moot further discussion of Section 1207 authority. Chapter 5 - Despite its broad mandate, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc- tion and Stabilization (S/CRS) has not yet carved out a leadership role in the management of reconstruction and stabilization crises. It has remained on the periphery in the interagency handling of such crises, playing only an incremental role. At present, S/CRS has four central issues on its agenda that will determine whether it will expand significantly the parameters of its present responsibilities and establish for itself a viable institutional

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role. These issues are: a new relationship with the Director of Foreign Assistance, a major role in implementing the S/CRS charter in National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), a lead role in developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), and management of the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) FY 2007 $100 million transfer authority. Although S/CRS has not played the role its proponents hoped it would, the S/CRS divisions have continued to develop doctrine, manage exercises, and provide useful, albeit limited, assistance to embassies through the Active Response Corps (ARC). S/CRS has excellent leadership, an able committed staff, and surprisingly high morale. S/CRS needs to restructure. Its current organizational pattern does not adequately reflect the actual delineation of responsibilities within the office and inhibits coordination and communication. The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 23 and February 9, 2007. Ambassador Daniel O‘Donohue (team leader), Richard English (deputy team leader), Alan Berenson, Don Bramante, Eric Chavera, Siobhan Hulihan, Kristene McMinn, and Vandana Patel conducted the inspection. Chapter 6 - This chapter is edited and excerpted testimony by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at Kansas State University as part of the Landon Lecture Series on November 26, 2007.

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Chapter 1

WEAK AND FAILING STATES: EVOLVING SECURITY THREATS AND U.S. POLICY

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Liana Sun Wyler SUMMARY Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. The U.S. government remains in the early stages of developing targeted capabilities and resources for addressing a complex mix of security, development, and governance challenges confronting weak states. U.S. programs and initiatives fall under five main categories: (1) conflict and threat early warning, (2) international cooperation and diplomacy, (3) foreign development assistance, (4) post-conflict stability operations, and (5) interagency coordination. However, as U.S. policies toward weak and failing

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states have grown in priority and cost, particularly since 9/11, some policy makers and analysts have begun to question the Administration‘s commitment to addressing effectively the problems posed by these states. Congress plays a crucial role in the funding and oversight of programs designed to address weak and failing states. Several recent bills in the 110th Congress and laws directly relate to and have changed aspects of U.S. policy toward these states. Among these include efforts to address (1) civilian postconflict management authorities and funding (S. 613/H.R. 1084, S. 3288, and H.R. 5658), (2) temporary Department of Defense (DOD) funding transfer authorities to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), (3) temporary DOD security assistance authorities and funding (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), and (4) options for reforming foreign assistance and interagency coordination (as mandated in P.L. 108- 199 and P.L. 109364). This chapter first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states, U.S. national security, and development challenges. Second, the report surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states. Finally, it highlights relevant issues about U.S. policy toward these states that Congress may consider. For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss; CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina Serafino; CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina Serafino; and CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell.

SCOPE OF THE ISSUE Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, successive U.S. Administrations have explicitly identified weak or failing states as U.S. national security concerns since 1998. The past three U.S. National Security Strategy documents all point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in

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crisis, or collapsed.1 These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing or exacerbating conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. The President, in his 2005 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, asserts that ―the United States should work to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate....‖ To this end, the Administration has established as a goal the ―transformation‖ of U.S. national security institutions ―to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century,‖ which includes strengthening weak and failing states.2 However, as U.S. policy toward these states has grown in priority and cost — particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 — some U.S. officials and other analysts have begun to question the effectiveness of the Administration‘s policies for dealing with these types of problem states. As the debate continues into the next presidential term, this is likely to continue to be a contentious area, with congressional involvement in U.S. policy toward weak and failing states flowing from its funding and oversight responsibilities. Currently, policy makers and observers are advocating competing visions for addressing state weakness, which could pose significant consequences for U.S. national security policy and U.S. preparedness for combating 21st-century security threats. On one side of the spectrum are those who advocate a ―Whole-ofGovernment‖ vision for strengthening weak states. Advocates of this approach perceive weak states to present multiple, interdependent challenges to political stability, military and security capabilities, and development and humanitarian needs. As a result, they recommend developing mechanisms and procedures for interagency planning that coordinate all aspects of U.S. policy toward weak states. The implications of enhancing U.S. government interagency processes could be substantial for the legislative and executive branches. Supporters have discussed the potential for significant reform of congressional funding and authorizing responsibilities, as well as a substantial organizational overhaul of several federal agencies. At the other extreme are those who are critical of U.S. nation-building activities; they fundamentally question the appropriateness of state weakness as a lens through which to identify national security threats. Instead, such analysts recommend developing strategies to combat specific threats, such as ungoverned territories conducive to criminal exploitation, international terrorism, transnational crime, and nuclear weapons proliferation, regardless of

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how strong a state‘s government is. In the case of conflict or post-conflict situations, some critics also discourage institutionalizing potentially costly U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Some critics also claim that the concept of strengthening states inherently prescribes a Western model of state function that may not be appropriate in all situations.3 If U.S. national security policy priority on weak and failing states is not necessary or desirable, the existence and funding levels of several recently created programs and strategies to combat weak states threats may be called into question. U.S. policy toward weak and failing states currently hangs in an uneasy balance between these two perspectives. In recent years, this has resulted in a proliferation of new programs designed to address the challenges of strengthening weak and failing states. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State, stood up in July 2004, is mandated with leading and coordinating U.S. efforts for conflict prevention and response in failing states; in this capacity, S/CRS has sought to implement a whole-of-government approach for addressing conflict in failed states since at least 2006.4 At the same time, DOD has expanded its role in conflict prevention and stability operations — revising military doctrine to elevate these activities to primary missions, devoting greater resources to such activities, and establishing new institutions to train DOD personnel and facilitate DOD‘s involvement in stability operations, including ―phase zero‖ or ―shaping‖ operations that, prior to 2004, had not been the purview of DOD strategy or mission goals.5 U.S. weak states initiatives, however, remain limited by a lack of interagency cohesion and unclear resources across agencies to carry out programs to strengthen weak states and combat potential national security threats emerging from such states. Pointing to these limitations, some observers question whether U.S. commitment to strengthening weak states is in decline. In light of the current debate, possible oversight questions for Congress relating to U.S. policy toward weak and failing states include the following: Is there a need for an interagency strategy to coordinate agency responses to weak and failing states? When is it appropriate for the United States to prevent or respond to situations of state failure abroad? How effective are U.S. programs in preventing state failure? To what extent are U.S. government ―early warning‖ predictors of state failure influencing policy planning?

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What do other countries do and how can international cooperation on weak and failing states be improved? What types of unintended consequences could U.S. policies to strengthen weak states have in the short- and long-term? This chapter is intended to serve as a primer on weak and failing states and related U.S. policy issues. The report first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states and U.S. national security and development challenges. Second, it surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states and identifies remaining issues related to the new programs. Finally, it highlights potential legislative issues that Congress may be asked to consider.

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DEFINITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS No universal definition for ―weak state‖ or ―failing state‖ exists. Some analysts describe state weakness as the erosion of state capacity — a condition characterized by gradations of a regime‘s ability to govern effectively, which, in its most extreme form, results in the complete collapse of state power and function. Most countries in the developing world fall along this spectrum, exhibiting at least some elements of weakness. Failing states, which are seen as including only a handful of countries in the world, exhibit more pronounced weaknesses than others. Among the universe of weak and failing states, there is no single pathway to failure. In some cases, states are characterized by gradual, yet persistent, institutional decay and political instability. In other cases, states rapidly tumble into failure, faltering under the weight of political instability, an acute natural disaster, or economic crisis. Based on quantitative development indicators, weak and failing states tend to be among the leastdeveloped and most underperforming states in the world. Notable U.S. government and government-affiliated efforts to describe weak and failing states focus on four major, often overlapping, elements of state function. Factors stressed include (1) peace and stability, (2) effective governance, (3) territorial control and porous borders, and (4) economic sustainability. Peace and Stability: Failing states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or newly emerging from conflict. Lacking

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Liana Sun Wyler physical security, other state functions are often compromised; frequently cited examples of such states today include Sudan and Iraq. Effective Governance: Countries can also be hampered by poor governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens. In some cases, as in North Korea or Zimbabwe, this may occur because leaders have limited interest, or political ―will,‖ to provide core state functions to all its citizens. A government‘s perceived unwillingness to provide adequate public services can incite destabilizing elements within a state.6

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Territorial Control and Porous Borders: Weak and failing states may lack effective control of their territory, military, or law enforcement — providing space where instability can fester; such places may also be called ―ungoverned spaces‖ or ―safe havens.‖ The Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the Sahel region of Northern Africa are common examples where such elements of state weakness exist.7 Economic Sustainability: Many weak states are also among the poorest countries in the world. Arguably as a consequence of other security and political deficiencies, weak and failing states often lack the conditions to achieve lasting economic development. Such countries include Bangladesh and many in Sub-Saharan Africa.

LINKS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS Failed states have appeared as a matter of concern in U.S. National Security Strategy documents since 1998, though the term had long been the topic of significant academic debate and implicitly informed U.S. national security policy since at least the end of World War II.8 As the Cold War concluded in the early 1990s, analysts became aware of an emerging international security environment, in which weak and failing states became vehicles for transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation pathways, and hot spots for civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The potential U.S. national security threats weak and failing states pose became further apparent with Al Qaeda‘s September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, which

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Osama bin Laden masterminded from the safe haven that Afghanistan provided. The events of 9/11 prompted President George W. Bush to claim in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy that ―weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.‖9 In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice further emphasized how weak and failing states pose ―unparalleled‖danger to the United States, serving as ―global pathways‖ that facilitate the ―movement of criminals and terrorists‖ and ―proliferation of the world‘s most dangerous weapons.‖10 Many national security observers highlight such Administration language to indicate that U.S. interest in weak and failing states has become more substantial since 9/11 and is motivated largely by national security interests.

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Current Threats Analysts identify numerous links between weak and failing states and transnational security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security. U.S. national security documents generally address weak states in relation to four key threat areas: (1) terrorism, (2) international crime, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) regional instability. Other analysts caution, however, that despite anecdotal evidence supporting a potential nexus between state weakness and today‘s security threats, weak states may not necessarily harbor U.S. national security threats. Furthermore, the weakest states may not necessarily be the most significant threats to U.S. national security; relatively functional states, characterized by some elements of weakness rather than complete state collapse, may also be sites from which threats can emerge.

Terrorism According to several analyses, weak and failing states are perceived as ―primary bases of operations‖ for most U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-IMohammed.11 Terrorists can benefit from lax or non-existent law enforcement in these states to participate in illicit economic activities to finance their operations and ease their access to weapons and other equipment.12 As with Afghanistan in 2001, weak and failing states can also be ideal settings for terrorist training grounds, when the host country‘s government is unable to control or govern parts of its territory. States mired in

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conflict also provide terrorists with opportunities to gain on-theground paramilitary experience.13 Researchers find, however, that not all weak states serve as safe havens for international terrorists.14 Terrorists have been known to exploit safe havens in non- weak as well as weak states. The Political Instability Task Force, a research group commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, found in a 2003 report that terrorists operate in both ―caves‖ (i.e., failed states, where militant groups can exist with impunity) and ―condos‖ (i.e., states that have the infrastructure to support the international flow of illicit people, funds, and information). The preference for ―condos‖ suggests that countries most devoid of functioning government institutions may sometimes be less conducive to a terrorist presence than countries that are still weak, but retain some governmental effectiveness.15

International Crime As with terrorist groups, international criminal organizations benefit from safe havens that weak and failing states provide. According to the U.S. Interagency Working Group report on international crime, weak states can be useful sites through which criminals can move illicit contraband and launder their proceeds, due to unenforced laws and high levels of official corruption.16 Since the Cold War, the international community has seen a surge in the number of transnational crime groups emerging in safe havens of weak, conflict- prone states — especially in the Balkans, Central Asia, and West Africa. Criminal groups can thrive off the illicit needs of failing states, especially those subject to international sactions; regimes and rebel groups have been known to solicit the services of vast illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel deadly conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan when arms embargoes had been imposed by the United Nations and other members of the international community.17 Links between transnational crime and terrorists groups are also apparent: Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have worked with several criminal actors, ranging from rebel groups in the West African diamond trade to crime groups in the TriBorder region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, among others.18 In 2008, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official stated that at least 19 of 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) listed by the State Department have established links to drug trafficking.19 Some researchers contend, however, that the weakest states are not necessarily the most attractive states for international criminals. This may be because some illicit transnational groups might be too dependent on access to

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global financial services, modern telecommunication systems, transportation, and infrastructure that do not exist in weak states. Researchers also find that some forms of international crime are more associated with weak states than others. Narcotics trafficking and illicit arms smuggling, for example, often flow through weak states. However, other types, such as counterfeiting and financial fraud, may be more prevalent in wealthier states.20

Weapons Proliferation Weak and failing states, unable or unwilling to guarantee the security of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBRN) materials and related equipment, may facilitate underground networks that smuggle them. Endemic corruption and weak border controls raise the possibility of these states being used as transshipment points for illicit CBRN trafficking. Porous international borders and weak international controls have contributed to 1,080 confirmed nuclear and radiological material trafficking cases by member states from 1993 to 2006, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.21 The majority of smuggled nuclear material reportedly originates in Central Asia and the Caucasus where known stockpiles are said to be inadequately monitored.22 Other sources of concern include poorly secured materials in research, industrial, and medical facilities. A relatively new region of concern for the United States is Africa, where more than 18% of the world‘s known recoverable uranium resources exist. Lax regulations, weak governments, and remotely located mines that are difficult to supervise combine to make the removal and trafficking of radioactive substances in Africa ―a very real prospect.‖23 Analysts also contend that while the potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) trafficking through weak states is considerable, most weak states may be unlikely destinations for smuggled WMD devices. Such equipment requires a certain level of technological sophistication that may not exist in some weak and failing states.24 Regional Instability According to recent research, states do not always become weak or failed in isolation — and the spread of instability across a region can serve as a critical multiplier of state vulnerability to threats. Instability has a tendency to spread beyond a weak state‘s political borders, through overwhelming refugee flows, increased arms smuggling, breakdowns in regional trade, and many other ways.25 The National Intelligence Council acknowledges that state failure and its associated regional implications pose an ―enormous cost in resources and time‖ to the United States.26

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CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPMENT In addition to the potential transnational security threats that weak and failing states pose to the United States, they also present unique challenges from a development perspective — a dimension of U.S. international policy that the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy elevated in priority to be equivalent to U.S. policy on defense and diplomacy. According to some U.S. officials, the primary programs to support development are inappropriate for fragile states. For example, weak and failing states have greater difficulty achieving the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and qualifying for U.S. assistance programs under the Millennium Challenge Act (22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), which essentially precludes assistance under this act to most weak and failing states.27 Some weak states also have difficulty absorbing large amounts of foreign assistance, even when donor countries provide funding.28 According to the World Bank, fragile states grow only one-third as fast and have one-third the per capita income, 50% higher debt-to-gross domestic product ratios, and double the poverty rates of other low-income countries.29 The World Bank also finds that nearly all fragile states identified in 1980 are still fragile today, highlighting the difficulty in achieving sustained progress in weak and failing states. Statistical estimates by World Bank analysts predict that a fragile states is likely to remain so for 56 years, and the probability of a fragile state experiencing a ―sustained turnaround‖ in any given year is a mere 1.8%.

ISSUES FOR NEW U.S. PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES The United States does not have an official strategy or interagency guidelines for dealing with weak and failing states. However, several notable programs and initiatives have been created since 9/11 that aim to help prevent state failure, strengthen weak states, and counter existing threats emanating from weak and failing states. These programs span all aspects of state weakness issues to include (1) identifying threats and monitoring weak states, (2) engaging weak states through diplomacy, (3) directing foreign assistance toward the alleviation of state weakness symptoms, and (4) implementing onthe-ground civilian and military stabilization operations. Depending on the level of state weakness, available resources, and political considerations, U.S. policy makers may decide to apply one or more of these programming areas to

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weak states. Some analysts remain critical of recent U.S. programs designed to address issues of state weakness. The following sections describe new U.S. programs and initiatives and highlight existing criticism and concerns.

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Conflict and Threat Early Warning The U.S. government uses conflict and threat early warning systems to predict which states are likely to fail and to identify which near-term emerging conflict situations require U.S. engagement. These include quantitative measures and subjective government analyses of state fragility. Early warning systems are used to assist U.S. agencies to prepare for international crises and identify areas in which assistance can be provided before a state slides further into failure. The overarching goal behind the implementation and use of these early warning systems is to help identify in advance weak states so that the U.S. government can plan and prepare for a likely crisis situation, and possibly preemptively react to developments. The National Intelligence Council, Department of State‘s Office of Early Warning and Prevention (located within S/CRS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) have roles in identifying and monitoring potential threats emanating from weak and failing states. One U.S. government warning list of weak and failing states has been prepared by the National Intelligence Council twice per year since 2005, using classified and unclassified sources. According to government officials, this assessment is based at least in part on analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency-commissioned Political Instability Task Force, which boasts more than an 80% accuracy rate for predicting politicide, genocide, and ethnic and revolutionary wars. USAID began producing a separate list of fragile states under its Conflict and Fragility Alert, Consultation, and Tracking System (C/FACTS) in 2006. In addition, U.S. officials say DOD has worked on developing a list of potential countries where future U.S. military force may be required; DOD has also worked on identifying potential ungoverned areas and assessing the threats that they pose to U.S. national security. According to U.S. officials, the lists of weak states generated by these efforts are used to inform the various agency‘s programming agendas. A May 2007 report by the State Department‘s Office of Inspector General praised the extent to which interagency coordination for early warning conflict assessment occurs between S/CRS, DOD, USAID, the intelligence community, and others.30 However, the extent to which the U.S. government can respond to

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multiple crises, let alone mobilize to prevent a crisis from occurring, based on early warning assessments remains unclear. Among some analysts, the value of effective early warning assessments can often be undermined by lack of political will to mobilize in time for an emerging crisis, as well as the lack of sufficient resources and capabilities to deploy to the potentially numerous states that present early signs of potential state failure at any given time.31 In the case of S/CRS, for example, which is mandated with leading and coordinating U.S. efforts for conflict prevention and response in failing states, many observers have suggested that the office‘s small size and limited resources hamper its ability to address the full range of today‘s weak states; instead, S/CRS has been able to focus only on a small handful of weak states.

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International Diplomacy International diplomacy is one way in which the United States can engage countries on issues that weaken the state and pose threats to U.S. national security. By working in cooperation with international actors on weak states issues, including democracy promotion, the United States aims to prevent transnational threats from emerging. In 2006, Secretary Rice unveiled transformational diplomacy as one such initiative. Under the banner of transformational diplomacy, approximately 300 U.S. diplomats were designated to be shifted to ―strategic posts‖ in the Near East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America over the course of the next several years. The new posts focus on promoting democracy and good governance as well as bolstering state capacity against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and other security threats in countries often characterized as weak.32 Although the scope of transformational diplomacy extends beyond the issues of state weakness, the resulting Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012 specifically aims to ―directly confront threats to national and international security from ... failed or failing states,‖ and strengthen state capacity to ―prevent or mitigate conflict, stabilize countries in crisis, promote regional stability, protect civilians, and promote just application of government and law.‖33 According to some analysts, however, the future of transformational diplomacy hangs in question. There remains some disagreement over whether transformational diplomacy requires new congressional legislation; the Administration claims the initiative does not and has not requested new authorities from Congress to implement transformational diplomacy. In addition, some experts and foreign governments have raised concerns about

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the particular prominence of democracy promotion in Administration‘s transformational diplomacy initiative and its potential use as a ―pretext‖ for intervening in other country‘s domestic affairs.34 Lacking legal requirements to implement the transformational diplomacy initiative, it is possible that the next Administration may rethink or replace it.

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Foreign Assistance The Bush Administration has begun several new, and sometimes controversial, foreign aid initiatives that seek to help fragile states build, or reinforce weak institutions and basic state infrastructure. These include transformational development; civilian stabilization and reconstruction assistance; USAID‘s Fragile States Strategy; and military, police, and counterterrorism assistance. In aggregate, these programs have raised several questions that tie into larger debates about the use of foreign assistance for national security purposes, including weak states. Major related issues include whether the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 should be modified, revised, or entirely rewritten; what role the U.S. military should participate and the extent to which the U.S. military should be involved in foreign assistance funding to strengthen weak states; and whether or to what extent U.S. foreign assistance should be used to train and equip foreign police and other interior law enforcement elements.

Transformational Development The State Department‘s 2006 transformational development initiative created the office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) and introduced a new Foreign Assistance Framework.35 The DFA serves concurrently as the USAID Administrator and has authority over State Department and USAID foreign assistance programs. The Foreign Assistance Framework categorizes foreign aid recipients as rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partners, and restrictive countries, and identifies five development objectives for all country categories — peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. U.S. officials claim that the Framework implicitly addresses state fragility, with the majority of so-called weak and failing states falling in the rebuilding category and some falling in the developing and restrictive categories.

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The new framework has the potential to improve alignment of foreign assistance allocations with foreign policy priorities, such as weak and failing states, by centralizing management and accountability over State Department and USAID funds. However, U.S. officials have stated that the new Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance has yet to develop strategic guidelines or a methodology to inform the allocation of aid resources to any of the Framework‘s country categories and for weak states specifically. Furthermore, the extent to which the Director of Foreign Assistance will be able to influence other U.S. agencies — particularly DOD — that provide foreign assistance funding remains unknown.36 In CY2005, 48% of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) was controlled by agencies outside of the State Department and USAID, including the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury. In CY2005, DOD alone disbursed more than one-fifth of U.S. foreign assistance. Civilian Stabilization Assistance From 2006 to 2007, S/CRS has supported projects in 18 countries that it identified as in crisis or at risk of crisis, including Kosovo, Haiti, Colombia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Liberia, Chad, Somalia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Nepal, and Afghanistan.37 Funding for these projects was supported through traditional foreign assistance accounts, as well as through DOD under a temporary transfer authority provided by Congress — capped at a total of $100 million per fiscal year through FY2008 — in section 1207 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended (commonly referred to as ―Section 1207‖ funds). Some point to the fact that DOD funds these civilian stabilization assistance programs as indicative of resource shortfalls within the State Department for effectively addressing fragile states. Some also raise concern with DOD‘s role in approving these civilian programs; such critics argue that the requirement that the Defense Secretary sign off on civilian stabilization assistance projects could encourage DOD to encroach into foreign assistance policymaking that had previously been the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State. On the other hand, supporters of DOD‘s role in civilian stabilization assistance argue that it creates opportunities for whole-ofgovernment approaches to foreign assistance and enhances interagency programming by requiring approach of both the State Department and DOD (and thus potentially improving civil-military coordination between military combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors, and other State Department and

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DOD policy officials).38 Supporters also argue that this budgetary arrangement between the State Department and DOD for civilian stabilization assistance is practical and necessary for U.S. national security purposes, as it enables the State Department to respond to immediate reconstruction and stabilization needs before more formal programs can be developed.39 USAID’s Fragile States Strategy USAID has been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to prevent future state failure by addressing the underlying sources of weakness. In 2003, USAID established the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management to examine the underlying causes of political instability, conflict, and extremism, and to improve the Agency‘s response to such conditions. In 2004, USAID also created a new type of foreign service officer, called ―Crisis, Stabilization, and Governance Officers,‖ that specializes in providing the humanitarian, economic stabilization, and governance aspects of development assistance to fragile and weak states. They are given different training and shorter tours that focus specifically on the post-conflict phase of development, and operate in countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan.40 In 2005, USAID unveiled its Fragile States Strategy, which provides a strategic vision for how USAID can most effectively respond to fragile states. Among its main objectives, the Strategy sought to enhance the Agency‘s rapid crisis response capabilities and establish a strategic planning process that could take into account conditions of weakness unique to each country. According to U.S. officials and independent observers, however, the Strategy‘s new programming objectives and strategic priorities for fragile states seem to have been sidelined by the 2006 launch of the Secretary of State‘s transformational development initiative.41 Military, Police, and Counter-Terrorism Assistance A subset of foreign assistance distinct from bilateral economic aid, U.S. support for foreign military, police, and counter-terrorism assistance is a primary means by which to prevent security threats emanating from weak and failing states. By providing this specialized form of assistance, the Administration seeks to build and reinforce the security sector capabilities of partner nations in order to prevent state weaknesses that transnational threats could exploit. Examples of counter-terrorism programs in weak states that focus on military assistance and training include the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program42 and the Trans-Sahel CounterTerrorism Initiative (TSCTI).43

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Congress has actively supported the growth of this realm of foreign assistance in recent years through military, police, and counter-terrorism funding appropriated in the annual Foreign Operations and supplemental appropriations bills. Under new authorities granted by Congress in 2005, DOD is using additional funds to train and equip foreign security forces for counterterrorism and stability operations.44 DOD‘s growing prominence in providing security sector assistance, however, has raised particular concern among some policy makers, including Members of Congress, who question whether the U.S. military is playing too large a role in a realm of foreign affairs traditionally dominated by the State Department and USAID.45

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Post-Conflict Stability Operations Civilian Capabilities The current Administration has sought to develop effective civilian procedures for stability operations in failing states that go beyond traditional peacekeeping activities.46 In August 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to plan and conduct civilian post-conflict operations and to coordinate with DOD in situations that require a military presence. In December 2004, Congress granted statutory authority for the existence of S/CRS in the Department of State and Related Agency Appropriation, 2005.47 One year later, the President officially lent his support to S/CRS with NSPD 44 in December 2005. NSPD 44 not only identified the State Department as the lead agency for coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations in failing states, but also mandated that it consider and propose ―additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities.‖ S/CRS responded to the President‘s NSPD 44 with a proposal for a ―Civilian Stabilization Initiative.‖ Under this plan, S/CRS seeks to create a cadre of volunteer civilians that could be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world in response to an emerging crisis. These civilians would have unique skills and training that could be useful in post-conflict situations and would include police officers, judges, lawyers, agronomists, public health officials, city planners, economists, and others. S/CRS aims to develop three distinct pools of such civilians: (1) an ―Active Response Corps‖ of about 250 full-time U.S. federal government employees who can be continuous deployed abroad;

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(2) a ―Standby Response Corps‖ of about 2,000 U.S. federal government employees that can be called up from their day jobs to deploy within 45 to 60 days of a crisis; and (3) a ―Civilian Reserve Corps‖ of about 2,000 additional people from the private sector and from state and local government work, who can be called up from their day jobs to deploy within two months of a crisis.48 See ―Possible Legislative Issues for Congress‖section, below, for further discussion.

Military Capabilities The Secretary of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 on ―Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.‖49 In Directive 3000.05, the Secretary elevates stability operations to a ―core U.S. military mission‖and calls on the military to be prepared to conduct and support ―all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order‖ — including tasks normally ―best performed‖ by civilians. Stability operations from a Department of Defense perspective encompass a broad array of nontraditional military engagements, which include peacekeeping, humanitarian and civic assistance, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counterinsurgency efforts. Since 2005, DOD has created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, a Defense Reconstruction Support Office, and Senior Directors for stability operations in each Combatant Command. According to DOD officials, Directive 3000.05 remains in the initial stages of implementation and U.S. military doctrine is under revision to incorporate stability and reconstruction operations into military field manuals. Recent post-conflict stability operations have highlighted possible tensions in DOD‘s relationship with civilian agencies. In 2005, for example, a report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on the status of DOD stability operations capabilities found that ―the progress of other organs of Government has been less fulsome‖ and that it could not ―have confidence in the speed with which changes in other departments and agencies outside DOD will take place.‖ Analysts suggest that DOD efforts to compensate for other agencies‘ shortcomings may have the unintended consequence of causing civilian agencies to rely increasingly on DOD in future stabilization operations. Some argue that such reliance is not necessarily problematic, as the military‘s ―builtin‖ capabilities in war zones and standby logistics to immediately deploy and provide basic-needs reconstruction relief makes it a ―natural lead‖ in postconflict reconstruction.50 Others, however, argue that the potential reliance on

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military capabilities could compromise or conflict with broader U.S. foreign policy goals.

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Interagency Coordination Cross-agency collaboration on U.S. projects in weak states appears to be increasing in frequency and institutionalization. The creation of S/CRS in 2004 is one testament to this development, as it is the first formally mandated office to serve indefinitely as the lead coordinator for all civilian and military activities related to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. S/CRS is also leading an ongoing effort, the Interagency Management System, to develop interagency planning and improved coordination for stability operations.51 Prior to the creation of S/CRS, President Clinton‘s 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) governed interagency management of post-conflict situations. Under PDD 56, an ad hoc interagency working group called the Executive Committee would be called upon to supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. operations when crises occured. Many analysts and U.S. officials observe, however, that the current interagency approach to weak states — which spans not only post-conflict stability operations planning, but also development assistance and intelligence community cooperation on early warning threat assessments in weak and failing states — nevertheless remains a ―messy amalgam‖ of programs and policies, lacking strategy-level, cross- agency guidance.52 Criticism by U.S. officials points to overlapping and redundant responsibilities, as well as programs that are, at times, working at cross-purposes. Recent World Bank and OECD research indicates, for example, that foreign assistance flows to fragile states tend to be uneven, irregular, and fragmented from all major donor countries and organizations, including the United States.53 Some officials acknowledge that confusion also remains regarding which agencies should be invited to interagency policy planning discussions on various weak state issues. In the case of the S/CRS Interagency Management System, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that this proposed interagency planning mechanism for post-conflict situations remains hampered by several fundamental problems. These include (1) ―unclear and inconsistent guidance‖ on the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and other offices within the State Department, which have resulted in ―confusion and disputes‖ about who leads policy development and who controls the resources for stability

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operations; (2) a ―lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations‖ across the interagency, which makes it unclear when, where, or how the Interagency Management System would be applied in actual crises; and (3) concerns that the Interagency Management System was ―unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant‖ and general skepticism among interagency participants that this new planning process would improve outcomes or increase resources available for fragile states.54 Other recent U.S. projects in weak states are also testing U.S. capacity for interagency coordination. Such efforts include the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, and counter- extremism projects in the Horn of Africa. In all of these recent initiatives, civilian and military officials are working together to strengthen state capacity holistically across multiple dimensions of security sector reform, institutional capacity building, and economic development. In the case of the Horn of Africa projects, as an illustrative example, USAID funded an assessment that examined the causes of extremism and identified the most unstable areas in the region. USAID then collaborated with the Department of State and DOD‘s Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa to implement a variety of initiatives to counter extremism in the region. DOD provided the ―hardware‖ by building or rehabilitating essential infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, and wells, while the Department of State and USAID provided the ―software,‖ which included educational and medical training and resources and building institutional capacity.55 USAID has also been working to synchronize civilian-military relations in national security-related programming since 2005, with the creation of the Office of Military Affairs56 and the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework for on-the-ground conflict situations.57 The recently created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new DOD combatant command post that will include significant State Department leadership, is also indicative of increasing civil-military collaboration.58 According to U.S. officials, DOD also aims to apply the AFRICOM model to transform the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) by 2016.

POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS The following sections identify several wide-ranging legislative issues that relate to U.S. programs and initiatives for weak and failing states. They

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include (1) civilian post-conflict management authorities, (2) DOD transfer authority to the State Department for Security and Stabilization Assistance, (3) DOD global train and equip authorities and funding, (4) foreign police training authorities, and (5) interagency policy effectiveness.

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Civilian Post-Conflict Management Authorities Building civilian post-conflict capabilities in weak states is a key area of focus, which policymakers have been debating at least since 2004. At the State Department‘s request, Congress is considering new authorizations to develop civilian post-conflict stabilization capabilities in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (S. 613, H.R. 1084, and H.R. 5658).59 These bills seek to authorize funding for stabilization and reconstruction assistance in failing states, as well as the creation of a Response Readiness Corps. This Response Readiness Corps would include what S/CRS currently calls the ―Active Response Corps‖ and the ―Standby Response Corps.‖ Congress has appropriated up to $75 million in initial funding for the Response Readiness Corps to the State Department and USAID in FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriations (P.L. 110-252). Congress also appropriated an additional $50 million for the creation of the third component of the S/CRS Civilian Stabilization Initiative, the ―Civilian Reserve Corps,‖ in FY2007 supplemental appropriations; this funding, however, is contingent upon specific authorization.60 For FY2009, the State Department included in its budget request to Congress a total of $248.6 million to stand up the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and other costs associated with S/CRS. The State Department did not include in its FY2009 request funding for a Conflict Response Fund; instead it requests the continuation of DOD‘s authority to transfer funds to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance, which currently is set to expire at the end of FY2008.61 Supporters of the bill, including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, maintain that the State Department‘s ability to perform its mandated mission in post-conflict situations is hindered by the lack of support for a conflict response fund and a civilian reserve corps; critics remain hesitant to provide additional funding to a relatively new office, charged with developing new concepts.62 Unlike the State Department, which has had difficulty in obtaining permanent funding for civilian stabilization capabilities, the Department of Defense has obtained more congressional funds for U.S. stabilization

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operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some analysts have pointed to DOD‘s Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP) as a potentially useful example of an emergency funding mechanism for strengthening weak and failing states. Through CERP, U.S. commanders can rapidly disburse discretionary funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs of local civilians. International support for the development of civilian post-conflict capabilities appears to be developing, albeit slowly.63 In early 2008, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposed a 1,000-person civilian rapid reaction force that could respond to crises in fragile and failing states. This force would resemble the State Department‘s proposed Civilian Stabilization Initiative, consisting of police, emergency service personnel, judges, trainers, and other crisis experts who could be called upon in humanitarian or post-conflict emergencies.64

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DOD Transfer Authority to the State Department for Security and Stabilization Assistance U.S. foreign assistance for stabilization efforts in fragile states is funded in part by DOD through a controversial, temporary transfer authority. Under authority stated in Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815), Congress provided the State Department a mechanism to receive DOD funds for ―reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.‖65 In the conference report that accompanied H.R. 1815 (H.Rept. 109-360), the conferees noted that they viewed this provision as a ―temporary authority to provide additional resources, if needed, to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and adequately resourced.‖ S.Rept. 110-77, which accompanied the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, also described it as a ―pilot project.‖ Nevertheless, Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) extended the original transfer authority to September 30, 2008. For FY2009, DOD is requesting an increase in the transfer authority cap, up to $200 million per fiscal year from the current $100 million. DOD is also requesting that the transfer authority be extended to other U.S. agencies, besides the State Department. Supporters of the extended transfer authority provision argue that the State Department‘s stabilization capabilities remain underfunded and prevent effective civilian management of post-conflict situations. Critics echo the 2006

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conference report, which states that the conferees ―do not believe it is appropriate, and are not inclined, to provide long-term funding from the Department of Defense to the Department of State so that they Department of State can fulfill its statutory authorities.‖ Highlighting continued debate over the appropriateness of DOD‘s Section 1207 authority, the House version of the FY2008 bill did not extend the transfer authority, while the Senate version extended the transfer authority through September 30, 2008, and increases such authorized funding from $100 million to $200 million. In the final FY2008 defense authorization, Congress ultimately agreed to extend the transfer authority, but maintained the funding limit of $100 million through FY2008.66

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DOD Global Train and Equip Authorities and Funding An ongoing congressional concern is the extent to which DOD should be involved in strengthening weak states‘ militaries to combat terrorism and other transnational threats that are perceived to emanate through such states. At the heart of this debate is a temporary congressional authority to allow DOD to train and equip foreign military forces for counter-terrorism operations and military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are involved (under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 [P.L. 109-163]). In 2006, DOD obligated $100.1 million under this authority; in 2007, $279.5 million; and as of May 2008, $24.8 million.67 This new authority, which began as a two-year pilot program, has raised concerns among some analysts that it is contributing to a perceived shift in U.S. foreign assistance funding control from the State Department to DOD.68 Supporters of Section 1206, however, argue that DOD may be better able to operate such train and equip programs than the Department of State. To this end, the Administration has requested that Congress broaden DOD‘s Section 1206 authorities to include (1) training and equipping foreign gendarmerie, constabulary, border protection, and internal defense forces; (2) increasing funding authorization levels from $300 million to $750 million; (3) allowing the President or the Secretary of State to waive any legislative restrictions, including human rights restrictions, that may apply to assistance for military or other security forces; and (4) making the authorities permanent.69 Although Congress raised the initial amount of authorized funding from $200 million to $300 million per year in Section 1206 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L.

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109-364), Congress has turned down the Administration‘s request to broaden Section 1206 authorities further. Additionally, Congress has not appropriated funds in any fiscal year for the purpose of Section 1206 authorities. For FY2009, the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5658), which passed on May 22, 2008, would extend Section 1206 authorities to FY20 10. The Senate version would extend the authorities to FY20 11, increase the authorized funding cap to $400 million per fiscal year, and extend the authorities‘ use beyond foreign national militaries to include building the capacity of a foreign country‘s coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counter-terrorism missions.

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Foreign Police Training Authorities The U.S. government‘s ability to assist foreign countries in law enforcement is a critical component in stabilizing weak states. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended by the 1973 Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act (P.L. 93-189), restricts the use of foreign assistance funds for the training of foreign police, unless Congress grants an exception. Some observers consider Section 660 as ―among the most significant restrictions for stabilization and reconstruction operations‖ in weak and failing states.70 Such analysts recommend repealing this prohibition to allow for greater flexibility in developing strategies to address weaknesses in foreign police forces.71 On the other hand, some observers also point to Congress‘s willingness to grant numerous exemptions to Section 660 over the years as indication that Congress has already taken sufficient account of the potential importance of foreign police training assistance for strengthening weak states.

Interagency Policy Effectiveness According to some observers, the issues surrounding challenges posed by weak and failing states highlight the broader problem of interagency coordination in national security affairs.72 In one recent, congressionally mandated effort to address long-term strategies related to foreign assistance policy, the bipartisan ―HELP Commission‖ recommended that Congress rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to address, among other

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considerations, the perceived need for improved coordination between security concerns and development priorities in failed and failing states.73 ―Once thought to be distinct and removed from one another, security and development now intersect regularly,‖ the Commission explains. ―Moving states from failed and failing to capable requires going beyond assistance, linking trade, democratic principles of governance, and security with traditional assistance.‖74 Other groups are exploring options for reforming interagency coordination on national security issues, which could include rewriting the National Security Act of 1947 and revising congressional rules governing committee structure and practice to improve oversight of interagency activity.75 The implications of enhancing U.S. government interagency processes, not only could be substantial; observers often compare calls for interagency reform of U.S. national security institutions to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433), which fundamentally altered how the various branches of the U.S. armed services coordinate capabilities and function. Advocates of interagency reform call for institutionalized mechanisms to require interagency strategic and operational planning, as well as coordinated resource allocation and execution. Critics, however, caution that such proposals could potentially involve significant reform of congressional funding and authorizing responsibilities for national defense, foreign operations, and intelligence.

APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF WEAK STATES Selected U.S. government and government affiliated efforts to define weak states include the following:

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) In the 2005 Fragile States Strategy,76 USAID uses the term ―fragile states‖ to include those that fall along a spectrum of ―failing, failed, and recovering from crisis.‖ The most severe form of fragile states are ―crisis states,‖ where conflict is ongoing or ―at great risk‖ of occurring and the central government does not exert ―effective control‖ over its territory, is ―unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory,‖ and holds ―weak or non-existent legitimacy among its citizens.‖

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National Intelligence Council (NIC) The NIC describes ―failed or failing states‖ as having ―expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control‖ and are caused by internal conflicts, in the 2020 Project‘s 2004 final report, Mapping the Global Future.77 In this chapter, the NIC considers the terms ―postconflict‖ and ―failed state‖ to be synonymous.

National Security Council (NSC) The NSC defines ―weak states‖ as lacking the ―capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities‖ in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT).78 The strategy document also describes some weak states as lacking ―law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their entire territory.‖ The NSC describes ―failing states‖ in the 2006 NSCT as similar to ―states emerging from conflict.‖79

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U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) GAO, in its 2007 report Forces That Will Shape America’s Future,80 defines ―failed or failing states‖ as ―nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security.‖

U.S. Interagency Working Group on International Crime81 In the 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment report, an interagency working group created under the Clinton Administration defines ―failed states‖as ―unwilling or unable‖ to meet ―many of the accepted standards and responsibilities of sovereign control over its territory,‖ which may lead to ―significant economic deterioration and political unrest that threatens both internal and regional stability.‖82

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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The OECD‘s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of which the United States is a member, defines ―fragile states‖ as lacking ―either the will or the capacity to engage productively with their citizens to ensure security, safeguard human rights, and provide the basic function for development.‖ They are further characterized as possessing ―weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence, or the legacy of civil war.‖83

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Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Originally commissioned by the CIA‘s Directorate of Intelligence in 1994 and called the ―State Failure Task Force,‖ PITF defines ―state failure‖ as a ―range of severe political conflicts and regime crises‖ and is characterized by a ―total or near-collapse of central political authority.‖ The Task Force‘s statistical methodology identifies instances of politicide, genocide, adverse regime changes, and ethnic and revolutionary wars as situations when total or partial state failure occur.

U.S. Commission on Weak States This bipartisan commission, sponsored by the Washington think tank Center for Global Development, in its final 2003 report entitled On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, defines ―weak states‖ as those with ―governments unable to do the things that their own citizens and the international community expect from them: protecting people from internal and external threats, delivering basic health services and education, and providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the population.‖

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World Bank The World Bank‘s Fragile States Initiative, previously called the LowIncome Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, describes ―fragile states‖ as often characterized by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous postconflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority. All are low-income, which is defined as countries with a 2006 gross national income (GNI) per capita of $905 or less, calculated using the World Bank‘s Atlas Method.84

APPENDIX B. VARIOUS LISTS IDENTIFYING ―AT RISK‖ STATES

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Table 1. 2007 World Bank Fragile States/Territories Afghanistan Angola Burma Burundi Cambodia Central African Rep. Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Comoros Cote d‘Ivoire Djibouti

East Timor Eritrea Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Laos Liberia Mauritania Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome & Principe

Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Togo Tonga Uzbekistan Vanuatu Zimbabwe Territory of Kosovo

Notes: The World Bank uses two criteria to define its set of fragile states: per capita income within the threshold of International Development Association eligibility, and performance of 3.2 or less on the overall Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating. Some low-income countries or territories without CPIA data are also included. The World Bank does not publicly rank these states, according to their level of fragility. This list is in alphabetical order and is available at [http://webSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ IDA/0,,content MDK:2 138997 4~pagePK:5 12361 75~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73 1 54,00.html].

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Table 2. 2007 U.S. Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework ―Rebuilding Countries‖ Afghanistan Colombia Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d‘Ivoire Haiti

Iraq Lebanon Liberia Nepal Sierra Leone

Somalia Sudan Territory of Kosovo

Notes: This list of states, prepared by the DFA, includes all those identified by the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework as ―rebuilding countries,‖ defined as ―states in or emerging from and rebuilding after internal or external conflict.‖ There are no public documents that explain how these states were distinguished from other conflict and post-conflict states not listed as ―rebuilding.‖ The list is available at [http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/c2 1 508.htm].

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Table 3. 2007 George Mason University Researchers ’ State Fragility Index Country Congo, Dem. Rep. Afghanistan Sierra Leone Somalia Chad Burma Country Sudan Burundi Cote d‘Ivoire Ethiopia Liberia Nigeria

Score 23 22 21 21 20 20 Score 20 19 19 19 19 19

Country Angola Guinea Iraq Rwanda Congo, Rep. Guinea-Bissau Country Nepal Niger Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Score 18 18 18 18 17 17 Score 17 17 17 17 17

Notes: Developed by Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone of George Mason University, the State Fragility Index measures fragility across eight categories: security effectiveness and legitimacy, political effectiveness and legitimacy, economic effectiveness and legitimacy, and social effectiveness and legitimacy. The 23 countries listed here are identified in the original index by the color red as the most fragile states in 2007. For the full list of states, see Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone, ―Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007,‖ Foreign Policy Bulletin, Winter 2007.

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Table 4. 2007 Fund for Peace Failed States Index

Country Sudan Iraq Somalia Zimbabwe Chad Cote d‘Ivoire Congo, Dem. Rep. Afghanistan Guinea Central African Rep. Haiti Pakistan North Korea Burma Uganda Bangladesh

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Country Nigeria Ethiopia Burundi East Timor Nepal Uzbekistan Sierra Leone Yemen Sri Lanka

Rank 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

10

Congo, Rep.

26

11 12 13 14 15 16

Liberia Lebanon Malawi Solomon Islands Kenya Niger

27 28 29 30 31 32

Notes: The Fund for Peace annually publishes its Failed States Index. The 2007 iteration measures 177 countries across 12 indicators of instability. The 32 countries listed here are labeled ―alert‖ states, which are those predicted to be most likely at risk of failure. See [http://www.fundforpeace.org/ webindex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366] for full list of states.

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Liana Sun Wyler Table 5. 2008 Brookings Institution Index of State Weakness in the Developing World

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Country Rank Country Somalia 1 North Korea Afghanistan 2 Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. 3 Burma Iraq 4 Guinea-Bissau Burundi 5 Ethiopia Sudan 6 Congo, Rep. Central African Rep. 7 Niger Zimbabwe 8 Nepal Liberia 9 Guinea Cote d‘Ivoire 10 Rwanda Angola 11 Equatorial Guinea Table 5 (Continued) Haiti 12 Togo Sierra Leone 13 Uganda Eritrea 14 Nigeria

Rank 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Notes: Developed by Susan E. Rice of the Brookings Institution and Stewart Patrick of the Center for Global Development, this Index of State Weakness measures 141 countries across 20 common metrics of state performance. The 28 countries listed here are in the bottom quintile of the developing countries assessed. These 28 countries also represent what the authors identify as ―failed‖ (numbers 1 through 3) and ―critically weak‖ (numbers 4 through 28) states of the world. See [http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx] for full list of states.

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Table 6. Comparison List

2006 World Bank ―Fragile States‖

2007 Foreign Assistance Framework ―Rebuilding Countries‖

2007 State Fragility Index ―Red States‖

2007 Fund for Peace Failed States Index ―Alert States‖

2008 Brookings Index of State Weakness ―Failed and Critically Weak States‖

Afghanistan Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d‘Ivoire Liberia Somalia Sudan Burma Burundi Congo, Rep. Guinea

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X X X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X

Haiti

X

X

X

X

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Countries

Table 6 (Continued)

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Countries

Iraq Nepal Nigeria Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Angola Central African Rep. Chad Ethiopia Guinea- Bissau Niger Uganda East Timor Eritrea Kosovo Lebanon North Korea Rwanda Solomon

2006 World Bank ―Fragile States‖

2007 Foreign Assistance ramework ―Rebuilding Countries‖ X X

X X X X

2007 State Fragility Index ―Red States‖ X X X X X X

X X X X X X

X

X X X

2007 Fund for Peace Failed States Index ―Alert States‖ X X X X X

X X X X X X

X

X

X X

X X X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X

2008 Brookings Index of State Weakness ―Failed and Critically Weak States‖

X

X X

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Islands Togo Bangladesh Cambodia Colombia Comoros Equatorial Guinea Kenya Laos Malawi Pakistan Sri Lanka Uzbekistan Vanuatu West Bank and Gaza Yemen Zambia

X

X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

34

Liana Sun Wyler

End Notes

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1

White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 1998, 2002, 2006). 2 The White House first outlined this goal in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy and repeated it in the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html] and [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/]. 3 For a description, see Louise Andersen, ―International Engagement in Failed States: Choices and Trade Offs,‖ Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 2005/20 (2005); Rose E. Brooks, ―Failed States, or the State as Failure?‖ The University of Chicago Law Review 72 (Fall 2005). This is a concept that is often discussed in the context of African states. See, for example, Pierre Englebert and Dennis M. Tull, ―Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,‖ International Security, Spring 2008, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 106-139. 4 State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ―Fact Sheet: A Whole-of-Government Approach to Prevent, Resolve, and Transform Conflict,‖ August 23, 2006. 5 The origins of ―phase zero‖ reportedly date back to a memo by then-Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 2004 and the term ―shaping operations‖ was introduced into official military doctrine in DOD‘s ―Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0‖ in August 2005. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from May 2007 describes the shift in military doctrine on operations succinctly: ―[P]revious Joint Staff planning guidance considered four operational phases, including deter and engage the enemy, seize the initiative, conduct decisive operations, and transition to peaceful activities. The revised planning guidance now direct consideration of six phases of an operation, which include shaping efforts to stabilize regions to that conflicts do not develop, and expanding the dimensions of stability operations that are needed in more hostile environments occur. This new planning guidance requires planners to consider the types of activities that can be conducted to help a nation establish a safe and secure environment, eliminating the need for armed conflict, and activities to assist a nation in establishing security forces and governing mechanisms to transition to self-rule.‖ See GAO, ―Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD‘s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,‖ May 2007; and Maj. Elizabeth A. Medina, ―Integrated Planning for Unified Action in Phase Zero,‖ School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. 6 See, for example, ―State Capacity: The Dynamics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Government Action in Fragile States,‖ Working Papers on Fragile States No. 2, produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development and prepared by the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland at College Park, June 2005. 7 For an analysis of several ―ungoverned territories‖ case studies, see Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 8 Though not necessarily identified as weak or failing states in the contemporary sense of the terms, some analysts have argued that the United States has had strategic interest in such states well before 1998. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, ―The Strategic Significance of Global Inequity,‖ Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 187-198. 9 See also Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and Congress (2002). 10 Condoleezza Rice, ―The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security,‖ Washington Post, December 11, 2005. 11 See Stewart Patrick, ―Weak States and Global Threats: Fact of Fiction?‖ The Washington Quarterly 29 (2006), pp. 27-53; Rumsfeld (2002), op. cit.; and Ray Takeyh and Nikolas

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Gvosdev, ―Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?‖ The Washington Quarterly 25 (2002). See also White House (2006), op. cit.; National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004); Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States (2005); U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, ―Chapter 5 - Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report),‖ Country Reports on Terrorism (2007). 12 ―U.N. Says Trafficking Crimes Funding Terrorism,‖ Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report, September 27, 2007. 13 Rabasa (2007), op cit.; U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for CounterTerrorism (2007), op. cit. 14 See Edward Newman, ―Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism,‖ Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, 2007, pp. 463-488. 15 Rabasa (2007), op cit. 16 U.S. Government Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment (2000); and NIC (2004), op. cit. See also U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report (2007); U.S. Government Interagency Working Group (2000), op. cit. 17 U.S. Department of Treasury, ―Treasury Designates Viktor Bout‘s International Arms Trafficking Network,‖ April 26, 2005; Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes Wars Possible (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2007). 18 ―Al Qaeda Cash Linked to Diamond Trade,‖ Washington Post, November 2, 2001; Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, ―Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism — A Dangerous Mix,‖ statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, May 20, 2003. 19 Michael Braun, DEA Chief of Operations, speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 18, 2008. 20 Patrick (2006), op. cit. 21 International Atomic Energy Agency, Illicit Trafficking Database (2006). See also Fund for Peace, Threat Convergence: New Pathways to Proliferation? (2006), and Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (2005). 22 Fund for Peace (2006), op. cit. 23 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2006/525, July 18, 2006, and ―Exploiting Africa: Securing the Continent‘s Uranium Resources,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 2007. According to the above-cited sources, Congolese experts reported that between 2000 and 2006, state officials confiscated more than 50 cases containing uranium or cesium. The United Nations has confirmed at least one instance of this: in 2005, Tanzanian customs officials intercepted a shipment that contained a yellow cake-filled barrel that allegedly came from abandoned mines in Katanga, a southern province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 24 Fund for Peace (2006), op. cit. 25 See Myron Weiner, ―Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows,‖ International Security 21(1996), pp. 5-42; Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003). 26 NIC (2004), op. cit. 27 To receive foreign assistance funds under the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (P.L. 108199, H.R. 2673, 22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), countries must have achieved certain performance benchmarks, based on quantitative development indicators. Since weak and failing states tend to be among the most underperforming and least developed states in the world, they often are precluded from Millennium Challenge assistance. See also CRS Report RL3 2427, Millennium Challenge Account, by Curt Tarnoff.

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See World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006); Chauvet and Collier, ―Helping Hand? Aid to Failing States,‖ Oxford University Working Paper (2006). 29 See Chauvet and Collier (2004), op. cit.; Francois Bourguignon, ―Broadening Progress Toward the MDGs,‖ Speech prepared for the ECOSOC 2007 High Level Segment, Geneva, Switzerland, July 2-5, 2007, available at [http://www.un.org/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/Bourguignon. pdf]. 30 Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection, ―Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,‖ Report No. ISP-I-07-26, May 2007. 31 See Appendix B for various public lists of suggested fragile states. For more on arguments critical of early warning mechanisms, see Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair, ―States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First,‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2004; Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, ―Making States Work: From State Failure to State-Building,‖ United Nations University and International Peace Academy, July 2004. 32 As part of the State Department‘s initiative, U.S. diplomats will continue their work on the Regional Strategic Initiative, which, in collaboration with host governments, is designed to boost regional political will and capacity to counter terrorism. As of 2006, RSI programs exist in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad, and Mali. See U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (2007), op. cit. 33 See White House (2006), op. cit. 34 For a full discussion of the pros and cons of transformational diplomacy, see CRS Report RL34141, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy, by Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein. 35 For more information on restructuring foreign assistance, see CRS Report RL3349 1, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development, by Connie Veillette, and CRS Report RL34243, Foreign Aid Reform: Issues for Congress and Policy Options, by Susan B. Epstein and Connie Veillette. 36 Medina, pp. 34-35. 37 Countries/Territories include Kosovo, Haiti, Colombia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Liberia, Chad, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nepal, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. See U.S. Department of State, ―S/CRS Engagement Around the World,‖ at [http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4AN5]. 38 Testimony of John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State, ―Military‘s Role Toward Foreign Policy,‖ Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 2008. 39 See issues section for further discussion and CRS Report RS2287 1, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina Serafino. 40 Crisis, Stabilization, and Governance Officers are also referred to as ―Backstop-76 Officers.‖ USAID officials say the creation of this new foreign service officer specialization was based on the Agency‘s observations that officers in failing states require special expertise to address, simultaneously, such states‘ lack of adequate governance, humanitarian crises, and dysfunctional economies. 41 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007). 42 The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) has become the ―go to‖ program within DOD to train international security personnel to combat terrorism as part of the U.S. Global War on Terror. It was established in FY2002 (10 U.S.C. 2249c) as a permanent authorization, not to exceed $20 million per fiscal year. The National Defense

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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364) raised the authorization to $25 million per fiscal year. 43 Launched in 2004, TSCTI targets extremism, instability, and violence in the Sahel region of Africa by providing military support and other assistance, enhancing cooperation among the region‘s security forces, and promoting democratic governance and economic growth. Joint assessments by the State Department, USAID, and DOD in several Sahelian countries are also conducted to identify causes of extremism and terrorist recruitment. 44 Under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109163), Congress authorized DOD to train and educate foreign military forces for counterterrorism operations and military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are involved. See ―Legislative Issues for Congress‖ section below for a further discussion of Section 1206. 45 Reflecting ongoing interest in DOD‘s role in foreign assistance, Congress requested, under Section 1209 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (H.R. 1585), a report from DOD on foreign assistance-related programs carried out and implemented by DOD, which specifies, on a country-by-country basis, a description of the dollar amount, type of support, and purpose of each foreign-assistance related program. H.R. 1585 was pocket vetoed by the President, effective December 28, 2007, for reasons unrelated to Section 1209. 46 Stability operations are defined here to include broadly security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and the other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges. This follows the 2005 Defense Science Board Task Force definition. 47 Section 408, Division B, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, P.L. 108447; 22 U.S.C. 2651a note. 48 Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Briefing on Civilian Stabilization Initiative, February 14, 2008, at [http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/100913 .htm]. 49 See CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina Serafino. 50 Council on Foreign Relations, debate between Craig Cohen and Col. Garland H. Williams, ―Who Should Lead Post-Conflict Reconstruction?‖ February 11, 2008. 51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, ―Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps,‖ GAO-08-39, November 6, 2007. 52 Patrick and Brown (2007), op. cit. See Defense Science Board Task Force (2005), op. cit; and Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report (2005), available at [http://www.csis.org/media report.pdf]. 53 OECD-DAC Fragile States Group (2006), op. cit. 54 Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, U.S. Government Accountability Office, ―Provincial Reconstruction Teams,‖ Committee on House Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 30, 2007. 55 USAID, ―Conflict in the Africa Region,‖ June 14, 2007, available at [http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict 56 USAID established the Office of Military Affairs in 2005 and serves as the focal point for interactions between USAID and DOD. The office is staffed by former military officers, foreign service officers, and subject matter specialists. 57 The TCAF was initially field-tested in 2006 as part of a field training exercise with U.S. Army civil affairs personnel. The purpose of TCAF is to bring development-oriented, conflictsensitive approaches into an integrated interagency planning process. 58 See CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. 59 Nearly identical versions of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act have been introduced in the House and Senate since 2004. During the 109th Congress, the

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Senate unanimously passed the 2006 version (H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28); the House version was referred to Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and did not resurface. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina Serafino and Martin A. Weiss. 60 Section 3810 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans‘ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28). 61 U.S. Department of State, ―Reference Guide to the President‘s FY 2009 Budget Request for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative,‖ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), at [http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display &shortcut=4QJW]. DOD‘s authority is located in Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as extended by Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181). This provision caps the amount of money authorized for transfer to $100 million per fiscal year. 62 See Robert M. Gates, ―Landon Lecture,‖ Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech199]. See also Richard G. Lugar and Condoleezza Rice, ―A Civilian Partner for Our Troops,‖ Washington Post, op-ed, December 17, 2007. 63 Patrick and Brown, (2007). 64 Richard Norton-Taylor, ―Brown Plans to Send British Civilian Force to Conflict Zones: Threats to Security Wider Than During Cold War: Civil Protection Network to Monitor Local Areas,‖ The Guardian, March 20, 2008; Katherine Baldwin, ―UK Sets Up Force for Failing States in Wake of Iraq,‖ Reuters News, March 19, 2008. 65 For additional information, see CRS Report RS2287 1, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina Serafino. 66 Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110- 181). See also H.Rept. 110-477. 67 For further information, see CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina Serafino. 68 See ―Taking Defense‘s Hand Out of State‘s Pocket,‖ Washington Post, July 9, 2007. 69 See DOD request to Congress on legislative proposals as part of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2008, May 2, 2007, available at [http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/BGPA.pdf]; for FY2009, see [http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc]. 70 Derek Chollet, Mark Irvine, and Bradley Larson, A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States, CSIS Report, October 2007 (draft) and March 2008 (final). 71 Dana R. Dillon, ―The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Developing Law Enforcement,‖ Backgrounder #1720, The Heritage Foundation, January 22, 2004. 72 See the congressionally funded Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report (2005), op cit. See also The Project on National Security Reform [http://www.pnsr.org/], which seeks to ―produce recommendations on changes to the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments, presidential directives to implement reforms, and new Congressional committee structures and practices.‖ 73 Pursuant to the HELP Commission Act (P.L. 108-199), a bipartisan group of policymakers published a report in December 2007 on recommendations for foreign assistance reform entitled ―Beyond Assistance.‖ The report is available at [http://helpcommission.gov/ portals/0/Beyond%20Assistance_HELP_Commission_Report.pdf]. 74 ―Beyond Assistance,‖ pp. 26-27. 75 See, for example, the Project on National Security Reform, a non-profit and non-partisan project led by James Locher III, available at [http://www.pnsr.org/].

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U.S. Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy (2005), available at [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf]. 77 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project (2004), available at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/ 2020.pdf]. 78 White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism _strategy.pdf]. The 2006 NSCT does not use the term ―weak states.‖ 79 White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf]. 80 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Forces That Will Shape America’s Future: Themes from GAO’s Strategic Plan, 200 7-2012 (2007), available at [http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d07467sp.pdf]. 81 The interagency working group that created the International Crime Threat Assessment report was composed of representatives from the CIA; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; National Drug Intelligence Center; the Departments of State, the Treasury, Justice, and Transportation; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; and the NSC. 82 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment (2000), available at [http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/45270Book WG.pdf]. 83 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee High Level Meeting, Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007). 84 The World Bank acknowledges that ―fragility‖ is ―not clear cut‖ and non-low-income countries may also exhibit characteristics of fragility. This includes ―higher-income countries facing the aftermath of conflict, genocide, or social instability (such as the Balkans), more strongly performing countries facing rising conflict risks (for example, Nepal), and strongly performing states facing fragility in particular sub-national regions (as in India, the Philippines). See World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006), p. 175.

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Chapter 2

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PEACEKEEPING/STABILIZATION AND CONFLICT TRANSITIONS: BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE/RESERVE CORPS AND OTHER CIVILIAN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES Nina M. Serafino SUMMARY The second session of the 111th Congress faces a number of issues regarding the development of civilian capabilities to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. In September 2008, Congress passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008). This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of government employees with an active and a standby component, and a reserve component. Although the establishment of active

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and standby units began under the Bush Administration, Congress has yet to fund the reserve component. The first session of the 111th Congress created a new fund to support Corps deployments, but the second session faces questions about the appropriate funding level for it. S/CRS was established in 2004 to address longstanding concerns, both within Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction, and balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning, and conducting post-conflict operations, as is fielding the appropriate civilian personnel. Since July 2004, S/CRS has worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out such operations. Working with a staff that has slowly grown from a few dozen to 175 individuals, S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapidresponse crisis management ―surge‖ capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action. In 2008, Congress first provided funding to establish civilian response capabilities. Bush Administration plans at that point contemplated a CRC force of 4,250, including a sizable reserve component of private citizens similar in concept to the U.S. military reserve. In 2009, the Obama Administration requested $323.3 million in FY2010 funds for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) to continue developing and to deploy a CRC active component and a CRC standby component, and to establish a 2,000-member civilian reserve component. In addition, the Administration requested a $40 million Stabilization Bridge Fund under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to support the activities of deployed CRC members and $76 million to establish a response fund under the USAID Transition Initiatives account. The first session of the 111th Congress partially funded this initiative. In the FY20 10 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) Congress provided $150 million for CRC development and support: $120 million for the State Department and $30 million for USAID to support the recruitment,

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hiring, and training of the first two response corps components, the Active and Stand-by units of federal government employees. Congress did not provide funding for the CRC reserve component. In addition, Congress established a new USAID Complex Crises Fund to support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises abroad, but the $50 million appropriated for it falls short of the amount many analysts argue is necessary.

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INTRODUCTION The second session of the 111th Congress faces several issues regarding the continuing development of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), the effort begun by the George W. Bush Administration to develop a threecomponent ―ready response‖ civilian force of 4,250 members. For FY2010, the 111th Congress‘s first session provided $150 million of the Obama Administration‘s $323 million May 2009 CSI budget request. Of this, Congress provided $120 million to the State Department and $30 million to USAID to support continued recruitment, hiring, and training of the first two response corps components, the Active and Stand-by units of federal government employees. It did not provide funding for the third proposed component, a reserve corps of private citizens similar in concept to the U.S. military reserve. In addition, Congress established a new USAID Complex Crises Fund with $50 million, available until expended, to support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises abroad. For well over a decade, there has been widespread concern that the U.S. government lacks appropriate civilian ―tools‖ to carry out state-building tasks in post-conflict situations. This concern grew from U.S. military operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, where military forces were tasked with a variety of state-building tasks, such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, consensus increased that the United States must develop adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and personnel to response effectively to post-conflict and other ―stabilization and reconstruction‖ (S&R) situations. The George W. Bush Administration launched several initiatives to do just that. The centerpiece of its efforts was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Office of the Secretary of State. Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was tasked with designing, and in some cases establishing, the new structures within the State Department

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and elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies, processes, and personnel to build stable and democratic states. Among other tasks, S/CRS developed plans for the creation of a civilian ―surge‖ capability that could respond rapidly to S&R emergencies. In the early months of the Obama Administration, Administration officials signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton mentioned the State Department‘s new S&R responsibilities, citing a Department need to demonstrate competence and secure funding to carry them out. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while serving in that position under former President George Bush, urged the development of civilian capabilities in major speeches.1 As Senator, Vice President Joseph Biden was the co-sponsor, with Senator Lugar, of legislation, first introduced in 2004, to create an office within the State Department that would coordinate U.S. government S&R operations and deploy civilian government employees and private citizens to carry out state-building activities in crises abroad. In its second session, the 110th Congress enacted legislation that ―operationalizes‖ certain groups of personnel within the Department of State and other federal agencies for S&R efforts by authorizing the creation of federal civilian ―response‖ units, as well as the creation of a volunteer S&R civilian reserve force, akin to the military reserve force. This legislation advances the work of previous Congresses regarding Bush Administration initiatives to improve the conduct of (S&R) efforts. With the passage in September 2008 of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417), signed into law October 14, 2008, Congress took two important steps: It established S/CRS as part of permanent law. It formally ―operationalized‖ certain units in civilian federal agencies, most particularly the State Department, transforming it from an institution devoted solely to diplomacy to one that also has a role in effecting change through ―onthe-ground‖ personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security and stability in transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations. This was accomplished by authorizing the creation of a two component ―readiness response‖ corps consisting of a small active unit of federal employees drawn from several agencies and a federal standby unit, and a large civilian reserve corps, analogous to the military reserve.

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The 111th Congress is faced with several remaining tasks. One is whether to create a mechanism, such as envisioned in early legislation, to create a flexible, no-year, discretionary Conflict Response Fund to be drawn upon by civilian agencies for S&R efforts. The other is the appropriate level of staffing and funding for S/CRS, and the means to develop, maintain, support and deploy the Civilian Response Corps and Civilian Reserve Corps. This chapter provides background on these issues. It also discusses proposals and tracks related legislative action.

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BACKGROUND Former President George W. Bush‘s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union address, ―to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures‖ cast the once-discredited concept of building or rebuilding government institutions, economies, and civic cultures in a new light. During the 1 990s, many policymakers considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries to be an overly expensive, if not futile exercise. The use of U.S. military forces for such activities, particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many Members. In the past few years, however, the Bush Administration, in response to concerns about the threats posed by weak and fragile states, reframed both U.S. security and international development policy and initiated dramatic corresponding changes in U.S. governmental structures and practices. These changes, the Bush Administration argued, would enable the United States to perform such tasks more efficiently and at a lesser cost, particularly in transitions from conflict and in post-conflict situations. A key component of these changes was the establishment and reinforcement of new civilian structures and forces, in particular S/CRS and the civilian response/reserve corps. The Bush Administration made these new civilian entities a prominent feature in two initiatives: the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of December 2005 on the management of interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations and the ―transformational diplomacy‖ reorganization of State Department personnel and practices announced in January 2006.

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These initiatives were intended to enhance the United States‘ ability to function effectively on the world scene in the environment. created by the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). In that environment, many analysts perceive that the greatest threats to U.S. security often will emerge within states that are either too weak to police their territory or lack the political will or capacity to do so. To deal with that environment, in 2006 former Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the ―intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security‖ and involving extensive changes in government to carry that strategy out.2 State-building (or nation- building as it is often called) was at the center of this strategy. Both initiatives reinforced the important role that the Bush Administration gave S/CRS in policymaking and implementation dealing with conflict transitions and weak and fragile states.

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Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs3 The creation of S/CRS in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the improvement of U.S. civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-building operations. Several factors combined after 9/11 to lead many analysts to conclude that such operations are vital to U.S. security and that the United States must reorganize itself to conduct them effectively, in particular by creating new and improving existing civilian institutions to carry them out. Foremost among these factors, for many analysts, was the widespread perception since 9/11 that global instability directly threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to transform weak and failing states into stable, democratic ones. Related to this was the expectation that responding to the threat of instability will require the United States and the international community to intervene periodically in foreign conflicts with ―peacekeeping‖4 and ―stabilization‖ forces at about the same intensive pace as it had done since the early 1990s. Because that pace stressed the U.S. military, many policymakers believed that the United States must create and enhance civilian capabilities to carry out the peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary for stability and reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and postconflict states. Finally, numerous analyses distilling the past decade and a half of experience with multifaceted peacekeeeping and peacebuilding operations raised hopes that rapid, comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding efforts could significantly raise the possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.

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Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the participation of several United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the international financial institutions and a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations, as well as the military and other departments or ministries of the United States and other nations.5 The United States developed its contributions to the earliest international ―peacekeeping‖ operations of the 1990s on an ad hoc basis, with little interagency planning and coordination, and often with the U.S. military in the lead. The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military‘s superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nationbuilding contribution, even though some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those tasks involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs. During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and increase civilian contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those activities related to planning and conducting operations and to establishing a secure environment. An important Clinton Administration initiative was the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. According to the white paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address interagency planning and coordination problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms.6 Due to what some analysts describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56‘s provisions were never formally implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. (In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which replaced PDD56. For more information, see below.) The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71, which a white paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening criminal justice systems in support of peace operations.7 While never implemented by the Clinton Administration, PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush Administration.8 Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance were also viewed as crucial to successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need ―safety net‖ and poverty alleviation programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on monetary and fiscal policy and debt management in order to create an environment conducive to democratization and economic growth.9

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While the popular image of U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II Marshall Plan, through which the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for Europe‘s post-conflict reconstruction, the United States is no longer the sole, and often not the dominant, donor in post-conflict situations. Multilateral institutions became increasingly important during the 1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of the Soviet Union. International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now play crucial roles, working with the U.S. government to provide economic assistance and technical advice on rebuilding post-conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the United States has provided some funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan and Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations is provided bilaterally.) Many analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective for the recipient country than bilateral aid for two reasons.10 First, disbursing funds multilaterally through U.N. agencies or international organizations gives greater assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid bilaterally with direct payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to the donor‘s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient country.11 For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation has illustrated a U.S. government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would provide a leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations and new civilian capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible, and greater international coordination. The perception of a continued need for such operations, and the perceived inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses have reinvigorated calls for planning and coordination reform. The extreme stresses placed on the U.S. military by combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian capabilities to perform those tasks.

Calls for Change The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states convinced many policymakers and analysts of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster security, good governance and

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economic development, especially in post-conflict situations. The 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security found that weak states, as well as unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, pose a threat to U.S. security.12 These groups argued that such states often experience economic strife and political instability that make them vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and to linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network). Weak states also are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic instability.13 These commissions, and other analysts, argued for assistance to the governments of weak states and of postconflict transitions regimes to help them control their territories, meet their citizens‘ basic needs, and create legitimate governments based on effective, transparent institutions. These and other studies recognized a need to enhance U.S. government structures and capabilities for conducting post-conflict operations.14 Although differing in several respects, the studies largely agreed on five points: (1) the ad hoc system needs to be replaced with a permanent mechanism for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations led by civilians; (2) mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government- contracted personnel need to be put in place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4) the U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-conflict security tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible funding arrangements are needed to deal with such situations. In addition, some urged substantial amounts of funding for flexible U.S. and international accounts.15

Proposals for New Civilian Forces A prominent feature of several of the reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a recommendation to develop rapidlydeployable civilian forces to undertake state-building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term stability and democracy in an intervened or postconflict country. Many view the development of civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible.

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The concept of a cohesive, rapidly deployable unit of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations dates back at least to the Clinton Administration. In PDD-71, which dealt with strengthening criminal justice systems in peace operations, the Clinton Administration identified such an initiative as a high priority, according to the PDD-71 White Paper.16 Six studies between 2003 and 2005 endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly deployable units of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations. These include a 2003 report of the National Defense University (NDU;17 a March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS);18 an April 2004 report of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP);19 a book by a USIP analyst;20and the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from hostilities.21 The establishment and deployment of such a corps, now in its initial stages (see below), marks a substantial change from past practices.

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Critics Respond Some analysts have questioned the utility of S/CRS and of the rationale that underlines its creation and the adoption of the transformational diplomacy strategy more broadly. Two think- tank studies published in January 2006 dispute the concept that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that weak states are not the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well. A report of the Center for Global Development states that many factors beyond the weakness or lack of government institutions—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contribute to the development of terrorism.22 As a result, an emphasis on weak and failed states can lead the United States to give short shrift to more tangible threats and to areas of greater U.S. interest. The CATO Institute study worries that former Secretary Rice‘s focus on promoting ―responsible sovereignty‖ as an underpinning of transformational diplomacy may provide potential justification for eroding the current international norm of respect for national sovereignty, leading the United States into fruitless interventions.23 In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and failed states can be most dealt with through military and political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions. The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and the

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number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success. There is some skepticism that state-building efforts will result in success in most instances. In the words of one scholar, ―barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.‖24 Others, however, point to cases such as Mozambique and El Salvador as examples that state building efforts can promote peace after civil strife.

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Creating Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities: Congressional and Executive Actions, 2004-2007 The “Lugar-Biden” Legislation On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 ―to build operational readiness in civilian agencies.... ‖ (At the time, these senators were respectively the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [SFRC].) The bill provided concrete proposals for establishing and funding the two new ―operational‖ entities that had been recommended in think tank reports. This legislation contained three main proposals: (1) establish in law and fund a State Department Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (2) create an Emergency Response Readiness Force, and (3) create and fund an annually replenishable emergency response fund similar to that used for refugee and migration funds.25 The SFRC reported S. 2127 on March 18, 2004, but it was not considered by the full Senate; its companion bill (H.R. 3996, 108th Congress, introduced by Representative Schiff) was not considered by the House International Relations Committee. In subsequent years, similar legislation was introduced,26 but until 2008 the only bill to pass either chamber was a subsequent Lugar-Biden measure, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress). S. 3322 was introduced in the Senate May 26, 2006, and approved without amendment by unanimous consent the same day. It was received by the House on June 6, 2006, and referred to the House International Relations Committee. No further action occurred until the 110th Congress until the House passage of on March

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5, 2008, of a House bill with almost the same title, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084) , and the incorporation of a version of that bill into the conference version of the FY2009 NDAA, (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, see below.)

S/CRS Start-Up and Early Congressional Mandate S/CRS began operations in July 2004 on a somewhat more tentative status than that envisioned by the Lugar-Biden bill. The office was created by then Secretary of State Colin Powell without statutory authority and the Coordinator, appointed by the Secretary, was not given the rank of ―Ambassador-at-Large.‖ By the beginning of 2005, S/CRS had a staff of 37 individuals from the State Department, USAID, and several other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury. The U.S. military supported S/CRS‘ creation and its mission. In prepared statement for testimony before the Armed Services committees in February 2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the creation of S/CRS as ―an important step‖ in helping ―post- conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.‖ ―In the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations,‖ according to General Myers.27 S/CRS also received an endorsement from a task force headed by two former Members. The June 2005 report of the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the United Nations, chaired by former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, recommended that the United States strengthen S/CRS and that Congress provide it with the necessary resources to coordinate with the United Nations.28 2004 Congressional Mandate Congress first endorsed the creation of S/CRS in 2004 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447), signed into law December 8, 2004. Section 408, Division D, defined six responsibilities for the office, the first five of which respond to the first need— to create a readily deployable crisis response mechanism—stated above. As legislated by P.L. 108-447, S/CRS‘ functions are (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources and capabilities of executive branch agencies, state

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and local governments, and private and non-profit organizations ―that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife‖; (2) to determine the appropriate nonmilitary U.S. response to those crises, ―including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts‖; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the development of interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in such countries or regions‖; and (6) to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance. In subsequent legislation (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Congress expanded this list of functions. (See below.) Congress funds S/CRS under the State Department‘s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs budget. S/CRS has received funding through annual appropriations and supplemental appropriations.

S/CRS Role in Interagency Coordination The S/CRS role in interagency coordination was formalized under NSPD44, issued by former President Bush on December 7, 2005, to improve conflict-response coordination among executive branch agencies. NSPD-44 assigns the Secretary of State the lead responsibility for developing the civilian response for conflict situations and related S&R activities; the Secretary may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist with those tasks. Under NSPD-44, the Secretary of State is also responsible for, and may delegate to the Coordinator, coordination of the interagency processes to identify states at risk, the leadership of interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and the development of detailed contingency plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations, as well as for identifying appropriate issues for resolution or action through the National Security Council (NSC) interagency process as outlined in President Bush‘s first National Security Policy Directive (NSPD- 1, ―Organization of the National Security Council System,‖ signed February 1, 200129). NSPD-44,, entitled ―Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,‖ expanded S/CRS activities beyond those conferred by the Congressional mandate (see above). (NSPD-44 supersedes PDD-56, referred to above.) S/CRS developed the mechanism for interagency cooperation in actual operations, drafting the January 22, 2007, Interagency Management System

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(IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) deputies meeting. This document lays out a plan for interagency coordination in responding to highly complex reconstruction and stabilization crises.. Under the IMS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is one of three co-chairs of the central coordinating body for the U.S. government response to a crisis. (The others are the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State and the relevant NSC Director.) Under the plan, S/CRS is charged with providing support to a civilian planning cell integrated with relevant military entities (a geographic combatant command or an equivalent multinational headquarters).

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CODIFYING CIVILIAN RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE AND STATE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES: TITLE XVI, P.L. 110-417, OCTOBER 14, 2008 The effort to expand civilian capabilities to perform stabilization and reconstruction tasks reached an important benchmark in October 2008. Through Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress amended the basic foreign assistance and State Department statutes to (1) authorize the President to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis, (2) formally establish S/CRS and assign it specific functions, and (3) authorize a Response Readiness Corps (RRC) and a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The authority to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis was created by amending chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2351 et. seq.) by inserting a new section. This authority is, however, subject to a time limitation: it may be exercised only during FY2009-FY2011. The new authority for S/CRS, the RRC and the CRC was created by amending Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C..2651a et. seq.). These authorities are permanent.

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Authorizes Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises Under the heading Authority to Provide Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises, Section 1604 of P.L. 110-417 adds a new section to the FAA. Section 681 provides authority for the President to use U.S. civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to furnish assistance for reconstruction and stabilization in order to prevent conflict and to secure peace. The specific authority permits the President to ―to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife... .‖ As passed in P.L. 110-417, this authority may be exercised for three fiscal years (FY2009-FY2011). To provide such assistance, the President must determine that U.S. national security interests are served by using such personnel. The President may use funds made available under any other provision of the FAA that are transferred or reprogrammed for the purposes of this section, subject to the 15day prior notification to congress required by section 634A, FAA. The President must also consult with and provide a written policy justification to Congress‘s foreign affairs and appropriations committees (under Section 614(a)(3), FAA) prior to its use. The assistance may be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine. The section does not provided authority ―to transfer funds between accounts or between Federal departments or agencies.‖

Makes S/CRS a Permanent State Department Office and Assigns Specific Functions A major objective of proponents of improving the civilian capacity to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations was to provide S/CRS with a permanent authorization and specified functions mandated by law. Such an authorization was a key feature of the initial and subsequent versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, codifies the existence of S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651 et seq.), which, among other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level positions within the Department of State. This codification prevents the dismantling of the office without the legislative consent of Congress. It also assigns nine specific functions to S/CRS, largely

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mirroring the functions assigned by Congress in its original legislation on S/CRS, as cited above. In general, these functions convey on the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization an overall responsibility for monitoring and assessing political and economic instability, and planning an appropriate U.S. response. Some of these functions are to be undertaken in coordination or conjunction with USAID and other relevant executive branch agencies.30

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Authorizes a Civilian Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps Civilian personnel available through the U.S. government to perform S&R activities are scarce, decentralized in organization, and difficult to call up. Many analysts viewed the remedy to this situation as the creation of a corps of ―on-the-ground‖ civilian personnel which could develop and implement statebuilding activities and interact with U.S. military personnel at all levels in order to foster security and stability in troubled situations. From the beginning, Luger\Biden legislation sought to authorize the establishment of such a corps. The Bush Administration began creating a small response cadre of government employees in its FY2006 and FY2007 budget submissions, and proposed a full-scale corps in its February 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative.31 P.L. 110-417 establishes the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps ―to provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.‖ [Note that the terminology for this “surge” capability differs in the legislation from that used by the Bush and Obama Administration in naming its components. The Obama Administration combines the Civilian Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps into one “Civilian Response Corps” (CRC) with three components. The Obama Administration’s CRC active and standby units (CRC-A and CRC-S) correspond to this legislation’s Civilian Response Readiness Corps, and the reserve component (CRC-R) corresponds to this legislation’s Civilian Reserve Corps.] This civilian capability consists of two components: The Response Readiness Corps (RRC) of federal employees composed of active and standby components consisting of U.S. government personnel, including employees of the Department of

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State, USAID, and other agencies who are recruited and trained to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary of State. No specific number is provided for members of these components. The legislation notes that members of the active component would be specifically employed to serve in the Corps. The Secretary of State is authorized to establish and maintain the SRC, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID and the heads of other appropriate U.S. government agencies. The Secretary of State alone is authorized to deploy its members. The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of individuals with ―the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose.‖ The Secretary is authorized to establish the Corps in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, and is authorized to employ and train its members, as well as to deploy them subject to a presidential determination under the proposed Section 618 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. No size was specified for the Civilian Reserve Corp. For the Corps to deploy, the President must issue a determination that U.S. national security interests would be served by providing assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis (see above).

DEVELOPMENT OF THE S/CRS OFFICE, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CAPABILITIES Since 2004, S/CRS has worked to develop the knowledge, capacity, and procedures to ably respond to the needs of countries at risk of conflict, in transitions from conflict, and in the early stages of recovery from conflict. S/CRS has slowly grown from a few dozen to a staff of 175, as of January 27, 2010. Of that staff, a little under half are State Department personnel: 30 Foreign Service officers, 45 State Department permanent civil service employees, and one additional State Department person on detail from another State office. Eleven others are on detail from other executive branch agencies: Justice (1); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (1); USAID (3); DOD (3); Army Corps of Engineers (1); the Department of Agriculture (1); and the Department of Health and Human Services (1). In addition, 80 contract employees work for S/CRS, as do eight fellows and interns. S/CRS carries out

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a wide range of activities: monitoring potential conflict, planning for U.S. responses to conflict, and evaluating and initiating programs to prevent conflict or the spread of conflict, among others.

Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts

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To monitor potential crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it twice a year with a list of weak states most susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses one or more as test cases to prepare contingency plans for possible interventions. S/CRS also has worked with the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, which develops techniques for preparing highly detailed assessments of current and impending conflicts. In addition, S/CRS has worked with the U.S. military‘s Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS also assists U.S. embassies abroad in assessing the potential for conflict in individual countries.

Developing and Carrying Out Conflict Response Activities S/CRS takes a lead in planning, developing, and implementing most of the small conflict response programs that are carried out with funds and other assistance provided under DOD‘s ―Section 1207‖ authority. From FY2006 to FY2009, ―Section 1207‖ authority has been used to carry out conflict prevention and response efforts in 14 individual countries and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Trans-Sahara region.32 In the wake of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, S/CRS is playing a supporting role to USAID‘s humanitarian relief effort.

The Response Corps Pilot Project Well before Congress authorized the creation of a Civilian Response Corps (see above), S/CRS took the first steps in the lengthy process of creating integrated and coherent groups of crisis- response personnel from executive branch agencies. In 2006, S/CRS created, as a pilot project, a small nucleus of

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active and retired government employees to deploy to operations. S/CRS began deploying members of the active response component during the last half of 2006. In 2006, ARC members were deployed to Darfur, Lebanon, Chad, and Nepal. About ten other deployments followed, some with standby component members and other members of the S/CRS staff.33

Other Activities To address the need for greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning and coordination, S/CRS worked with the military entities to develop civilian-military training exercises for stabilization and reconstruction operations. It has entered into an agreement with the U.S. Army to train civilian planners. And, among other activities, it has developed ties with other international participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS (CRC) On July 16, 2008, then Secretary of State Rice formally launched the Civilian Response Corps active and standby components with a speech thanking Congress for the passage of funding in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, to establish the CRC. Under plans developed by the Bush Administration (and continued by the Obama Administration) the threecomponent corps would consist of a 250-member active component (CRC-A) of U.S. government employees who could deploy within 48 hours, a 2,000member standby component (CRC-S) of U.S. government employees who could deploy within 30 days, and a 2,000 member reserve component (CRCR) of experts from other public institutions and the private sectors who would be available for deployment in 45-60 days. Under the leadership of S/CRS, two other State Department offices and eight other contributing departments and agencies are now recruiting the first 100 members of the CRC-A, and 500 members of the stand-by component. Besides the State Department, contributors are USAID and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Justice, Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Treasury, and Transportation.

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Initial CRC Funding: FY2008 and FY2009 As of May 7, 2009, the date the Obama Administration presented its detailed FY20 10 budget request, Congress had appropriated $140 million for the establishment and deployment of the active and standby civilian response components. These FY2008 and FY2009 funds together provided for the establishment of a 250-member active component and a 500-member standby component. In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $65 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities in supplemental appropriations through the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, signed into law June 30, 2008.34 Of that amount, up to $30 million was appropriated as FY2008 funds (under the State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs account) for the State Department ―to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity‖ and up to $25 million was appropriated to USAID as FY2008 supplemental funds for that agency to do the same (122 Stat.23282329). The remaining $10 million was part of FY2009 supplemental bridge fund appropriations for the State Department. (This appropriations was less than the $248.6 million that the Bush Administration requested in February 2008, for its CSI, which rolled into one its request for funds for continued operations of S/CRS, funds for a 250-member interagency CRC Active Response component and a 2,000-member Standby Response component, and a 2,000-member Civilian Reserve component, and money for deployment of experts.) The P.L. 110- 252 funding expires on September 30, 2009. In March 2009, Congress provided $75 million in FY2009 appropriations to the newly created Civilian Stabilization Initiative account in order to establish and support the CRC active and standby components (Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, signed into law March 11, 2009). This included $45 million in State Department funds and $30 million in USAID funds.

FY2010 Funding The Obama Administration Request The Obama Administration‘s May 7, 2009, FY2010 budget request of $323.272 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) was designed to continue Bush Administration plans for the establishment of a 4,250 member,

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three-component civilian response corps. According to the State Department request for these funds, this CSI would provide ―trained, equipped, and mission-ready civilian experts and institutionalized systems to meet national security imperatives, including in partnership with the U.S. Armed Forces.... ‖ This corps will enable the President and Secretary of State ―to react to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries‖ while reducing or eliminating ―the need for large military deployments in such crises,‖ according to the State Department request. The requested FY2010 CSI funding also was intended to support the continued development of the CRC, including the establishment of a reserve component, which has yet to receive funds, and provide for the institutional structure to coordinate interagency conflict response efforts. CRC development requires not only recruitment and hiring, but the training and prepositioning of equipment for U.S. government response personnel. The State Department broke down the uses of the requested $323 million as follows: $136.9 million to build and support an active component of 250 members and a standby component of 2,000 members, to fund up to 1,000 members of the active and standby component to deploy to S&R missions in FY2010; $63.6 million to establish a trained and equipped 2,000 member reserve component that will draw other public and private sector experts into U.S. S&R responses; $12.5 million to fund the deployment of other experts during the first three months of an operation, ―ensuring that critical staff such as police trainers and advisors can be deployed when.... most needed‖; $51.3 million to sustain deployed personnel and provide logistics for up to 130 responders for three months, including $7.1 million to operate and maintain a civilian deployment center; $34.3 million to provide security for up to 130 civilian responders (in up to threedeployed field teams) in a semi-permissive environment for three months; and $24.7 million to augment Washington-area leadership, including 10 new positions for S/CRS operations and staff. The Obama Administration requested an additional $40 million in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account for Stabilization Bridge Funds (SBF) to provide for urgent on-the-ground needs during the initial stages of a crisis. These funds could be used while other funds are reprogrammed, transferred, or

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appropriated for the crisis. Under its ―General Provisions‖ request, the Obama Administration asks authority to transfer SBF funds into the CSI account. In response, Congress provided a $50 million ―Complex Crisis Fund‖ under USAID. (See the section on ―Flexible Funding for S&R Operations,‖ below.)

Congress’s FY2010 Appropriations For FY2010, Congress provided $150 million for the CSI Active and Standby components in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related programs Appropriations Act, 2010, Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, (H.R. 3288, P.L. 111-117, signed into law December 16, 2009). Of this, Congress provided $120 million to the State Department and $30 million to USAID. It did not provide funding for the proposed reserve component. The P.L. 111-117 appropriations language requires USAID and the State Department to coordinate their activities. Congress specified that the CSI funds were provided to enable the State Department and USAID to ―support, maintain, mobilize, and deploy a Civilian Response Corps ... and for related reconstruction and stabilization assistance to prevent or respond to conflict or civil strife in foreign countries or regions, or to enable transitions from such strife ...‖ under Section 667 of the FAA. These funds are available until expended. The bill‘s conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) mandated the following allocations from the State Department‘s funding. $21.00 million for Active Response Component salaries, benefits, and other personnel costs. $15.22 million for Active and Standby Response Component training. $25.00 million for equipment acquisition. $26.66 million for deployments. $8.02 million for operations support. $21.10 million for S/CRS policy and planning functions. In addition, Congress provided established a new USAID Complex Crisis Fund with $50 million to ―support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas.‖ These funds are also available until expended.

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Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Active Response Component (CRC-A)

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As of January 8, 2010, the CRC-A totaled 74 members onboard (i.e., trained and ready for deployment). This is about a fifth under the goal of 100 members by the end of FY2009, distributed among the seven participating agencies, as follows. Those currently onboard come from all participating agencies, as follows. In addition to those onboard, seven more individuals had assigned start dates as of January 8, 2010. Of these, five belonged to USAID, one to Commerce, and one to DHS. By the end of FY2010, the CRC-A is expected to reach 247 members onboard, trained, and ready for deployment. This is nearly all the originally planned of 250 CRC-A members. Plans call for all CRC-A personnel from the USDA, HHS, DHS, and Commerce to be onboard as of March 31, 2010. (The one person from Treasury is already onboard.) As of that date, the State Department contingent would total 48, the USAID contingent 45, and the Department of Justice contingent 36. Table 1. CRC-A Agency Contributions: Goal as of mid-2009 for First 100 Members State 30

USAID 37

Justice 24

USDA 3

HHS 2

Commerce 2

DHS 1

Treasury 1

Table 2. CRC-A Onboard Members by Agency as of January 8, 2010 State 32

USAID 14

Justice 21

USDA 2

HHS 2

Commerce 1

DHS 1

Treasury 1

Table 3. CRC-A Agency Contributions: Planned Onboard as of September 30,2010 State 68

USAID 91

Justice 62

USDA 8

HHS 5

Commerce 5

DHS 7

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According to plans in 2009, the Civilian Response Corps would be composed of personnel filling over 100 specific job specialties. The first 100 active component members would be hired for roughly half of those specialties. These were to include 29 rule of law personnel dealing with police, the judicial system, corrections, and human rights. Other personnel will be skilled in commerce, finance, revenue and budgets; civil works and infrastructure; demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration; security sector reform; agriculture; strategic communications; health; drug enforcement; environment; urban and rural planning and management; and disarming explosives.

Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Standby Component (CRC-S)

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As of January 8, 2010, the CRC-S had 553 members ready and trained for deployment. This exceeds the 500 that were scheduled to be onboard as of the end of FY2009. Plans have called for a CRC-S of 2,000 members. Current plans call for 1,186 to be onboard as of the end of Calendar Year (CY) 2010.

Establishing a Civilian Reserve Capability Congress did not provide FY2010 funding for a civilian reserve capability as noted above, even though the Obama Administration‘s FY2010 budget request called for $63.3 million to establish a 2,000-member CRC reserve component (CRC-R), whose members would be deployable within 45-60 days. (As of early 2009, S/CRS had developed a general concept for a reserve component of retired government personnel, personnel from state and local governments, private for-profit companies, and non-profit NGOs to carry out rule of law, civil administration, and reconstruction activities.35) Table 4. CRC-S Contingents as of January 8, 2010 State 374

USAID 79

Justice 60

USDA 2

HHS 0

Commerce 37

DHS 1

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Treasury 0

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Table 5. CRC-S Contingents as Planned for December 31, 2010 State 552

USAID 200

Justice 248

USDA 64

HHS 40

Commerce 40

DHS 42

Treasury 0

ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

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S/CRS Capacity and Status Some observers have argued that the magnitude of the S/CRS mission requires improved capabilities within the office and enhanced status, if it is to provide adequate direction and personnel for an interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction crises. ―It is not clear that S/CRS is large enough, well enough funded, or sufficiently high in rank to pull an interagency effort together,‖ according to a 2008 MIT Security Studies Program report.36 Such reservations persist about the office‘s ability and capacity to carry out its mission, despite widespread support for S/CRS. Especially in the early years, some observers argued that S/CRS had not moved expeditiously in carrying out its functions. This perceived lack of initiative was often blamed on an ―anti-operational‖ social culture of the State Department and a lack of support from top State Department leadership. Given that perspective, some observers question whether all of the functions assigned S/CRS are appropriate for that office. For instance, some contend that an office with the mission of mobilizing civilian personnel for stabilization and reconstruction missions would be better placed in USAID,37 which fields disaster response units (the Disaster Assistance Response Teams) and has an Office of Transition Initiatives that has worked in post-conflict settings. Others, however, fault a lack of adequate resources for any S/CRS shortcomings. Some urge firm support for S/CRS.38 With the passage of the Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Assistance Management Act of 2008, see above, Congress appears to have mooted the debate on which agency is best suited to accomplish the S/CRS mission, although the issue may resurface within the context of a larger debate on interagency reform. For the moment, the most salient question seems how best to enhance S/CRS capabilities to carry out assigned functions. One improvement suggested would be to extend the period of Foreign Service officer (FSOs)

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tours with S/CRS. FSOs now serve on one-year rotations with S/CRS, rather than the two to three year rotations standard for other assignments. To provide the head of S/CRS with greater clout within the State Department and in dealing with other departments and agencies, some suggest that rank of that official or the Status of the Office itself, be upgraded. Some suggest that the Coordinator‘s functions be assigned to an Under Secretary, or that S/CRS become a State Department bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary. (The ―Coordinator‖ position is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary, according to an S/CRS official.)

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Appropriate Size for the Civilian Response Corps Some policymakers and analysts question whether the CRC active, standby, and reserve components are large enough to perform effectively their intended functions. One study, prepared by the National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy, argues that the CRC should be considerably larger, with 5,000 total in the active and standby components and 10,000 in the reserve component. An active/standby component of that size ―would provide a fairly large pool of trained experts in each category‖ if personnel were ―properly distributed,‖ according to the study. ―This sizable, diverse pool, in turn, would help provide the flexibility, adaptability, and modularity to tailor complex operations to the missions and tasks at hand in each case, without worrying that the act of responding effectively to one contingency would drain the force or expertise in key areas needed to handle additional contingencies.‖39 This study also states that a combined active and standby force numbering 2,500 (compared to the 2,250 now planned) ―should be backed by a reserve force of 4,500 personnel, not 2,000.‖40 Another study envisions the possibility of a larger corps than currently contemplated by the Obama Administration, but somewhat smaller than that proposed in the NDU study. Cosponsored by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, this study finds that the ―magnitude of growth beyond FY2010 will depend largely on the experience gained based on deployments in that year. For the purposes of projection, we propose that the active response team would grow to 500 by FY2014, the standby response corps would remain at 2,000, and the civilian reserve would grow to 4,000.‖41

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Flexible Funding for S&R Operations For many years, proponents of ―operational‖ civilian capabilities for S&R operations have urged Congress to provide the State Department with a flexible conflict or crisis response fund that would allow U.S. government civilian agencies to respond rapidly to S&R emergencies. The Bush Administration repeatedly requested such a fund, and proposals for a flexible, replenishable fund were including in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation and subsequent related legislation.42 But Congress, which has long resisted the provision of ―blank check‖ pots of money as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and oversight powers, turned down several Bush Administration requests for more flexible S&R funding mechanisms in the State Department budget.43 The first session of the 111th Congress, on the other hand, took a first step in providing flexible funding by creating a USAID Complex Crises Fund with a $50 million appropriation in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations act (Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117), although this is less money than many analysts would argue is necessary. This fund was Congress‘s response to the Obama Administration‘s FY2010 budget request for a total of $116 million in flexible funding for S&R purposes: $40 million for a Stabilization Bridge Fund under the Economic Support Fund account (mentioned above), and $76 million for a Rapid Response fund under the USAID Transition Initiatives (TI) account ―to provide flexible funding to respond to emerging opportunities to divert conflict in new and fragile democracies.‖ As stated by the conferees on the bill, this ―new account provides greater flexibility to USAID to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas, and ... consolidates the budget request for a Rapid Response Fund and a Stabilization Bridge Fund to provide greater efficiency and oversight by the Administration and Congress of these activities.‖44 (The conferees defined ―complex crisis‖ for the purposes of this account as ―a disaster or emergency, usually of longterm duration, that includes a combination of humanitarian, political and security dimensions which hinders the provision of external assistance.‖) Proponents of flexible funding argue that it is needed because many crises that demand a U.S. rapid response cannot be foreseen and thus planned for in annual budget submissions. In addition, they argue, the existing mechanisms for transferring funds to an emergency situation are too time- consuming to provide an immediate response. Some proponents have argued for a mechanism like the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and

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Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. Many proponents suggest that ERMA provides a model for a response fund to be used for conflicts or related crisis situations. Several bills were introduced that would, among other provisions, permanently establish a conflict response fund, but none passed Congress. In December 2007, the HELP Commission recommended the establishment of two rapid- response crisis funds. One would be a permanent humanitarian crisis response fund to meet the needs of natural disasters. The other would be a foreign crisis fund to meet security challenges. No recommendation was made regarding the agency responsible for these funds.45 Since 2006, the funding for security and stabilization activities that Congress has made available through the DOD budget has served as a de facto response fund for small S&R projects carried out by personnel from the State Department and USAID. Section 1207 of the conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109163, H.R. 1815/S. 1042; signed into law January 6, 2006 and subsequently amended) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide the Secretary of State with up to $100 million in services, defense articles and funding for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country per fiscal year.46 The Obama Administration, in its FY2010 budget request asked for an appropriation of $200 million, according to a DOD Summary Budget Justification document.47 Although Congress has regularly extended ―Section 1207‖ authority, which now expires on September 30, 2010, at the end of FY2010, defense authorizers and appropriators have signaled their unwillingness to extend the fund through FY20 11. In extending the authority for an additional year, the conferees on the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84, signed into law October 28, 2009) stated that ―Congress has always intended for this transfer authority to be temporary and are disappointed that the Department of State has not yet achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory requirements. The conferees urge the administration to work toward this goal as rapidly as possible. They further recommend that the administration examine ways to maintain this coordination [between DOD and State Department] in the absence of this authority.‖48 Similarly, defense appropriators signaled their expectation that DOD‘s Section 1207 funding would not be provided for another year. In their report on the FY2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118, H.Rept. 111-380), conferees recommended an allocation of $97.09 million (from the overall Defense Security Cooperation Agency appropriation), but

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stated that the establishment of the Complex Crises Fund ―will enable USAID and the Department of Sate to meet emergent requirements that fall under their purview without relying on the Department of Defense.‖ Nevertheless, they argued for continued DOD participation in the planning process for smallscale security and stabilization projects, directing the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director of USAID ―to maintain and strengthen the interagency process created from the section 1207 program when formulating, reviewing, and approving future projects that would have been funded through section 1207.‖ In creating the Complex Crises Response Fund, conferees on the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) urged the State Department and USAID to develop additional capacity in order to replace Section 1207 DOD funding with additional funding Complex Crisis funding. ―USAID and the Department of State should continue to establish and bolster crisis prevention and response capabilities in order to assume most, if not all, of the functions currently funded‖ by DOD under Section 1207 authority, they wrote. Much like the defense appropriations conferees, the foreign operations conferees also specified that ―USAID and the Departments of State and Defense shall continue to consult on the formulation and implementation of stabilization and security assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or funds appropriated by this Act.‖

Funding for a Reserve Component In his January 23, 2007, State of the Union address, former President Bush pointed to the need for a civilian reserve corps as a tool in the generational struggle against terrorism. ―Such a corps would function much like our military reserve,‖ he said. ―It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.‖ In 2008, Congress provided authorization for the establishment of a Civilian Reserve Corps (P.L. 110-417, see above) that could substitute for military troops in a wide variety of state-building activities. The Bush Administration‘s 2008 CSI proposal called for the establishment of a reserve component of 2,000; the Obama Administration‘s 2009 CSI proposal called for the same.

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Nevertheless, Congress has yet to provide funds to establish a civilian reserve. In considering the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010 (H.R. 3081 and S. 1434), House and Senate appropriators denied the Obama Administration‘s request for funding for the CSI reserve component. In their respective reports (H.Rept. 111-187 and S.Rept. 111-44), both committees indicated their desire for a gradual build-up of the civilian response corps components, with the focus now on the active and standby components. Proponents of the creation of a civilian reserve corps foresee a variety of advantages from the creation of such a corps. DOD promoted the concept on the grounds that it would free military personnel from state-building tasks during military operations, thus increasing the personnel available for combat and other more strictly military tasks.49 Proponents also view such a corps as a means to enhance prospects for success in S&R operations as the personnel who would be sent to perform such tasks would in general have a much higher level of expertise and depth of experience than soldiers and could, unlike many military personnel assigned to such tasks, perform at peak efficiency from the outset. Many view this as particularly true at the national level, where extensive experience with developing national-level structures is desirable over the long run. (Although military Civil Affairs officers are largely reservists whose civilian jobs are relevant to state-building tasks, many analysts state that there are too few civil affairs personnel to provide the depth needed to deploy the appropriate person in most circumstances.) Many argue that civilian personnel are also preferable for symbolic reasons, as they may signal a greater commitment to the construction of a democratic state. Skeptics look at the concept of a civilian reserve as untested and potentially unfeasible. Some wonder whether qualified experts would sign up in sufficient quantities to make the corps an effective replacement for military troops in S&R operations.50 Some question whether the existence of such a corps would provide an incentive to interventions of various types that the United States otherwise would not have undertaken. Cost may well be a major issue. In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assembled a cost estimate for the Bush Administration‘s CSI. Its estimate for the recruiting, screening, enrolling, training, and equipping the 2,000 members contemplated by the CSI was $87 million in FY2009 and $47 million in 2010.51 (The CBO estimate of first-year costs is considerably higher than the Obama Administration‘s $63.6 million FY2010 request to establish the reserve.) Although some may view the potential cost of the civilian corps as high, some proponents argue that the costs of deploying civilian personnel

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would result in a net savings to the military. (It is likely, however, that any possible savings would depend on the circumstances in which such civilian personnel were deployed and the effect of their deployment on the number of military personnel needed.) Proponents also maintain that even if high, the monetary cost to maintain and deploy civilian reservists would still be relatively inexpensive when compared to the multiple costs, both tangible (such as money and lives) and intangible (such as domestic and international political support and loss of strategic leverage) of prolonged or failed military interventions.

End Notes 1

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2

3

4

5

U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, KA (the ―Landon Lecture‖), November 26, 2007, and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, D.C., October 1, 2008. Accessed through http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/secdef.aspx; last accessed February 3, 2009. Taken from a speech delivered by then-Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice. Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. This theme was reiterated by Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at the State Department. Remarks at the Center for Global Development, January 20, 2006. Available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/ event%20docs/Krasner%20Transcript.pdf. Parts of this Background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn from a now archived CRS Report RS2203 1, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss. ―Peacekeeping‖ is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as ―nation-building‖; a better term, some analysts suggest, is ―state-building.‖) As used here, the term encompasses both ―peace enforcement‖ operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace, and ―peacebuilding‖ activities. Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a postconflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and promotion of political participation and human rights. The term ―post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction‖ is broad but is usually understood to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major hostilities. In the past, many of the ―stabilization‖ activities were loosely labeled ―peacekeeping.‖ Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term

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economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems) For additional background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne. 6 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive. May 1997. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm. 7 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24, 2000 http://www.fas.org/irp/ offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm, hereafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm. 8 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino. 9 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke ―Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,‖ World Bank Working Paper, October 2002. 10 Milner, Helen, ―Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent Problems,‖ available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf, and SchiavoCampo, S., ―Financing and Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,‖ World Bank Working Paper, May 2003. 11 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, ―Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?‖ NBER Working Paper No. w6612, June 1998. 12 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, sponsored by the Center for Global Development, May 2004. Also see CRS Report RL34253, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler. 13 Prins, Gwyn, ―AIDS and Global Security,‖ International Affairs, vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004. 14 The reports are (1) Play to Win: The Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on PostConflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book- length version was published in mid2004, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert C. Orr, ed.); (2) Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase I Report, CSIS, March 2004; (3) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, April 2004, (4) On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, December 2004; and In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, July 2005. 15 The July 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report recommends the establishment of a conflict response fund of $500 million, a five-fold increase over the amount requested by the Bush Administration for FY2006. In addition, the report recommends establishing a new $1 billion standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund under the auspices of the Group of Eight industrialized nations. This trust fund would be modeled on existing post-conflict trust funds located at the United Nations and the World Bank. 16 That white paper states that PDD 71 instructed that ―programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to respond quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies.‖ PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p. 6. 17 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.

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18

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Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report, op.cit. See pp. 64-65. 19 Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic and Beth C. DeGrasse, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 118, April 2004. 20 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of this proposal. 21 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58. 22 Patrick Stewart. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers. ” Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global Development, January 2006. 23 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006. The authors make substantial reference to a Fall 2004 paper by Stephen Krasner, State Department Director of Policy Planning, that challenged the conventional sovereignty norms. Krasner argues that these norms are outmoded and an obstacle to dealing with the international threats caused by weak and unstable states. He argues for granting international acceptance to new norms of shared-sovereignty (more than one country) or international trusteeships following successful interventions, Stephen Krasner, ―Sharing Sovereignty,‖ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 5-43. 24 Rajan Menon, ―Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,‖ as reproduced in U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Final Report. pp. 80-8 1. This chapter summarizes the result of a conference held April 19-20, 2006, and three preceding workshops, conducted under the aegis of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series. It also reproduces several papers presented at one workshop. The final report was distributed by email in late 2006, but as of January 18, 2007, does not appear on either the PKSOI or Eisenhower Series website. 25 The emergency response fund would have been subject to limited conditions, but requiring extensive consultation with Congress, similar to spending authority provisions of Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. FAA Section 614(a)(3) requires the President to consult with and provide a written policy justification to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Appropriations committee of each chamber. CBO estimated that implementing the bill would cost some $50 million in 2005 and $550 million from 2005 through 2009. 26 These include two similar versions of the original Lugar-Biden bill with same name: the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005 (S. 209/109th Congress, by Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel), and of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress by Senators Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Alexander and Warner, and H.R. 6104/109th Congress by Representatives Farr, Blumenaurer and Saxton). Similar provisions were included in Title VII of the Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600/109th Congress). A related bill was the International Security Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1361/109th Congress, introduced by Representative Dreier), which also would provide authority for preventive action not included in the other bills. (H.R. 1361 would have allowed the president, acting through S/CRS, to authorize the deployment to a country likely to enter into conflict or civil strife in addition to countries emerging from conflict.) Related bills were: The Winning the Peace Act of 2003 (H.R. 2616/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Farr); the International Security Enhancement Act of 2004 (H.R. 41 85/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Dreier); and the United States Assistance for Civilians Affected by Conflict Act of 2004 (H.R. 4058/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Hyde).

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27

Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted on the Senate Armed Services Committee website. 28 American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005, p. 25. 29 NSPD-1 established 17 NSC/PPCs to ―be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy,‖ providing policy analysis for more senior committees (the NSC Principals Committee and the NSC Deputies Committee) and ensuring timely responses to presidential decisions. Membership on the NSC/PCC is to consist of representatives from the departments of State, Defense, Justice and the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget, the offices of the President and Vice President, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC. Representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, are to participate when issues pertain to their responsibilities. 30 The specific functions, as detailed in P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, are (1) ―Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or ... in transition from, conflict or civil strife‖; (2) ―Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and cataloging and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of agencies ... that are available to address such crises‖; (3) ―Planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, rebuilding of civil society, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly arise in stabilization and reconstruction crises‖; (4) ―Coordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel to address the various types of such crises‖; (5) ―Entering into appropriate arrangements with agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008‖; (6) ―Identifying personnel in State and local governments and in the private sector who are available to participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps ... or to otherwise participate in or contribute to reconstruction and stabilization activities‖; (7) ―Taking steps to ensure that training of civilian personnel to perform such reconstruction and stabilization activities is adequate and, is carried out, as appropriate, with other agencies involved with stabilization operations‖; (8) ―Taking steps to ensure that plans for United States reconstruction and stabilization operations are coordinated with and complementary to reconstruction and stabilization activities of other governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplication‖; and (9) ―Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.‖ 31 In its FY2006 and FY2007 budget requests, the Bush Administration‘s budget proposed funding for S/CRS to establish a 100-person ready-response cadre of government employees. Congress has not yet provided funds for establishing such a cadre or a civilian reserve corps: although in 2007, Congress approved $50 million in supplemental funds (available through FY2008) to establish and maintain a civilian reserve corps, the release of these funds was made contingent on a subsequent authorization of the corps. (Section 3810, [U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans‘ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28, signed into law May 25, 2007.) 32 For more on this program, and funding details, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino. 33 The first active response component member was deployed to Lebanon, to assist with efforts to train and equip additional Lebanese Internal Security (LIS) forces. (The purpose of this effort was to enhance LIS ability to replace the Lebanese Army Forces which had been

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maintaining law and order in conflictive areas such as the Bekaa Valley before being deployed to southern Lebanon.) Several standby response component members also deployed to post-conflict situations in 2006. The first person from this group was deployed to Eastern Chad and two more began working in Nepal on demobilizing and reintegrating Maoist rebels. In the course of early 2007, several active component members deployed to Kosovo to help prepare for the status settlement process, one deployed to Beirut to help coordinate reconstruction assistance, and one to Chad to monitor activities on the Chad side of the border with Sudan. Other response corps deployments were to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, as well as to work with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Original plans had called for the ARC to number 30 by the end of 2006. U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: State Department Stands Up Active Response Corps. August 23, 2006. http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/71038.htm. 34 The $10 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental appropriations for the State Department was provided as part of a lump sum for State Department diplomatic and consular programs. 35 Two outside studies forming the basis for planning for the reserve were completed in 2006. BearingPoint, Inc. Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve. Prepared for the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. May 30, 2006. 36 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams. Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation. MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, p. 89. 37 Gordon Adams, Obama‘s test: Bringing order to the national security process. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, web version, posted January 26, 2009. Accessed through http://www.thebulletin.org. Last accessed February 4, 2009. 38 The HELP Commission, established by Congress in January 2004 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L. 108- 199, Section 637) to study U.S. foreign assistance programs, recommended in its report of December 2007 that Congress ―strengthen and fund the capacities of the State Department Office S/CRS and assign it responsibility for coordinating Sate and Defense Department programs for security-related aspects of addressing crises and weak and failing states.‖ Recommendation 2.2.2., at http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/recommendations_final.pdf; last accessed February 3, 2009. 39 Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler. ―Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations‖ in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University. December 2008. p. 7. 40 Ibid., p. 9. 41 Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, et.al., A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness, American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2008, p. 45. Accessed through http://www.stimson.org. Last accessed May 22, 2009. 42 A provision for a flexible, replenishable fund was included in early versions of the LugarBiden legislation. Most recently, some legislation in the 110th Congress contained provisions for a $75 million replenishable fund that could be used by the President to respond to crises in countries or regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. Of that, some $25 million could be used for expenses related to the development, training, and operations of the Response Readiness Corps. 43 These requests were contained in both annual and supplemental appropriations measures) for no-year funds to be used for conflict emergencies in foreign countries or regions, and proposals in previous iterations of the Lugar/Biden legislation to establish a replenishable fund for conflict response.

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Conferees stated that the Complex Crises Fund is similar to the $100 Emergency Crises Fund proposed by the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC). The SAC‘s version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 2010, appropriations bill (S. 1434) bill would have established a new $100 million Emergency Crises Fund to ―enable the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, to respond to unforeseen complex foreign crises, under certain conditions and after consultation with Congress.‖ (S.Rept. 111-44, to accompany S. 1434, p. 46.) In its report SAC explained that this fund, together with other funds provided under the CSI and TI accounts, would assist with the State Department‘s effort to ―assume most if not all of the functions currently funded‖ by Section 1207. (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 46.) ―In order to prevent gaps in the U.S. government‘s ability to act expeditiously to prevent crises, the Committee emphasizes that funding and authorities provided under the ECF and TI accounts may be utilized to carry out crisis prevention activities including in locations where no CSI deployment is required. The Committee intends the Departments of State and Defense to coordinate formulation and implementation of security and stabilization assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or the new capabilities within the Department of State.‖ (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 47.) The HAC, which provided no flexible funding for the State Department in its version of the bill, would nonetheless have provided $50 million in the USAID TI account for a Rapid Response Fund (RRF), with RRF programs to be implemented by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives. (H.Rept. 111-187, p. 58.). 45 http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/recommendations_final.pdf. Recommendation 3.5. Last accessed February 3, 2009. 46 For more on Section 1207, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns. 47 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, p. 1-13. 48 Similarly, both the House and the Senate armed services committees both stressed the temporary nature of Section 1207 authority. HASC wrote: ―While the projects undertaken with funds provided by this authority are worthy, the committee is concerned that insufficient progress has been made in building the capacity within the Department of State to assume the statutory and fiscal responsibility necessary to fulfill its statutory requirements.... . The committee stresses that it has always been a temporary authority and urges the Administration to develop capacity within the Department of State so that this transfer authority is no longer required.‖ (H.Rept. 111-166, p. 413) SASC also ―reaffirms its view that Section 1207 is a temporary authority.‖ (S.Rept. 111-35, p. 193.) Under its version of the bill (H.R. 2647), HASC would have reduced FY1207 authority to $25 million for FY20 10, while the SASC version (S. 1390) retained the full $100 million. 49 However, DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSR) Operations, issued November 28, 2005, states that many stability operations tasks ―are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,‖ but nonetheless ―U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.‖ Among the tasks listed are the rebuilding of various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems, the revival or building of the private sector, and the development of representative governmental institutions. (Points 4.3, 4.3.1-4.3.3. Access through http://www.dtic.mil /whs/directives Some military analysts argue that at the beginning of an operation or in extremely volatile situations the use of U.S. troops to perform nation-building efforts may be considered highly desirable as they can ―multi-task,‖ performing combat missions in one area while switching quickly to state-building efforts in another. In addition, some believe that it will always be desirable to have trained military civil affairs officers who can deal with civilian leaders and populations involved in state-building efforts at the local level, as a means of

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demonstrating goodwill toward such populations and enhancing the image of soldiers, especially in counterinsurgency operations. For information on the experiences of the Germany, Canada, and the United Nations in recruiting personnel for state- building rosters and deployments to other countries see CRS Report RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of implementing the Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act, H.R. 1084 (110th Congress),51 if ―employed in a manner consistent with the [President‘s] Civilian Stabilization Initiative.‖ (The estimate is included in H.Rept. 110-537, 110th Congress.)

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In: Weak and Failing States… Editor: Adrian J. Reyes

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Chapter 3

SECURITY ASSISTANCE REFORM: ―SECTION 1206‖ BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

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Nina M. Serafino SUMMARY Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism support. This authority expires in FY2011. As of October 13, 2009, Section 1206 allocations total a little under $1 billion for FY2006 through FY2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some $100 million for FY2006, $274 million for FY2007, $272 million for FY2008, and $340 million for FY2009. (The amounts allocated are somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over $1 billion for FY2006FY2009.) For FY2010, Congress provided $345 million in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-118. (The amount is not specified

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in the act, but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.) The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put in place a temporary limit of $75 million on the use of Section 1206 funds for each FY2010 and FY2011 to train military troops that would deploy to military or stability operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. The President signed the FY2010 NDAA into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84). Through the use of FY2006 through FY2009 funds, Section 1206 has supported bilateral programs in 24 countries, 13 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program. Just over 40% of the FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding has been obligated for three countries: Pakistan, Lebanon, and Yemen. Pakistan has been by far the largest recipient, receiving $203.4 million or over 20% of total. About 20% has been allocated to bilateral programs in four countries: Bahrain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Most of the Section 1206 funding to the latter three focuses on controlling the Celebes Sea that sits among them, as well as adjoining waters. Smaller allocations (i.e., those ranging from $1 million to $32 million) comprise close to 40% of the total. Some Members are concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow and broad. Specific current concerns include whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and whether the authority should be expanded to provide training not only military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces. (Currently, Section 1206 limits security force training to maritime security forces.) An overarching issue is whether Congress should place Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department with other T&E authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in permanent law, as requested by DOD.) A related issue is whether Congress should grant the State Department its own security assistance contingency fund with purposes that overlap Section 1206, as provided in the House-passed FY2010-FY2011 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2410, Section 841). Finally, as the Obama Administration conducts an overall assessment of foreign assistance, including security assistance, some Members may wish to examine the status of Section 1206 in the context of broader security assistance reform. Among the issues related to U.S. assistance to foreign military and security forces, one of the most salient for the 111th Congress is the status of Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA ), P.L. 109-163, as amended. This authority, enacted in 2005, provides the

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 81 Secretary of Defense with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two purposes:

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To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. Nearly all Section 1206 assistance to date has been CT training and equipment, and To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (To date, the Department of Defense (DOD) has authorities other than Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign militaries in conjunction with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the use of Section 1206 for that purpose is permitted by law.) Section 1206 is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For almost the past half-century, DOD generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs. On occasion, Congress has given DOD authority to train and equip specified countries, and over the years Congress has provided DOD with specific Title 10 authorities or DOD funding to provide foreign military forces with opportunities attend military schools, but Section 1206 is the first DOD global train-and-equip authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed oversight for military assistance with the Secretary of State. Congress‘ decision to grant DOD Section 1206 authority has been controversial. Some Members have stressed the need for a DOD authority that combatant commanders can use to respond to emerging threats that put the well-being of U.S. military personnel at risk or might eventually require robust, and costly, U.S. military action. But others have questioned whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and, above all, whether providing DOD with its own train-and-equip (T&E) authorities undermines the Secretary of State‘s statutory responsibility to ensure coherence of U.S. foreign policy. While no other single DOD security assistance authority has generated as much controversy as Section 1206, some analysts have been concerned with the addition of a few new security assistance authorities after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, as well as the perceived

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expansion of pre-9/11 DOD security assistance and other foreign assistancetype activities. Of particular concern to some Members is Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, an authorization to provide support to ―foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals‖ that assist or facilitate U.S. military operations conducted by special operations forces to combat terrorism.1 Two other post 9/11 security assistance authorities of concern are the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds foreign military officers and defense and security officials to attend U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and conferences and later made permanent law, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which funds countries assisting in U.S. military operations. The former is viewed by some analysts as overlapping with the State Department International Military and Education Training (IMET) program, the latter is viewed as performing the same function as the State Department Economic Support Fund (ESF).2 This chapter provides background on the pre-Section 1206 status of security assistance authorities and the factors contributing to the enactment of Section 1206. It then sets out the purposes of the legislation and scope of its activities, restrictions on its use, the DOD-State Department planning process, and funding. It concludes with a discussion of issues for Congress. An appendix provides a descriptive legislative history of the bill and evolving Congressional committee attitudes towards the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense and the State Department regarding Section 1206 authority.

BACKGROUND For nearly 50 years, since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the Secretary of State has exercised the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military assistance, specifically military education and training.3 With the exception of a period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s inclusive of the Vietnam War, major foreign military assistance programs have been carried out under State Department authority, oversight and guidance,4 with a DOD agency responsible for implementation.5 ―Traditionally the State Department plans, budgets and oversees security assistance programs and is the lead agency in charge of all U.S. foreign policy and global engagement,‖ according to a recent report co-sponsored by The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center. ―The

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 83 DOD has supported overall foreign and national security policy by implementing these programs. This relationship was designed to ensure that security assistance was aligned with general U.S. foreign policy goals.‖6 For many years, DOD had little interest in security assistance activities, as they were regarded neither as a military mission nor as an activity of more than marginal value to ensuring national security. In particular, training foreign military forces was not considered a task for the general purpose military forces, and until recently limited training was most often conducted by U.S. military Special Operations Forces, often under State Department authority.7 DOD perspectives on training foreign military forces slowly began to change after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Defense officials began to regard the defeat of terrorist groups in the countries where they train and prepare as essential to U.S. national security. But some realized that these groups could not be disrupted and defeated solely with U.S. forces employed under existing U.S. arrangements. U.S. military forces lacked the language, country knowledge and cultural sensitivity to conduct effective counterterrorist (CT) activities in many countries where threats could be expected to emerge. Some DOD officials realized that foreign military and security forces would have to take the lead in conducting such activities, and would need training to assume that role. At the same time, DOD officials considered the State Department as lacking the necessary expertise and capabilities to carry out an effective counterterrorism program. DOD officials also viewed the State Department‘s planning and implementation processes under authorities for traditional T&E programs8 as too slow and cumbersome to meet emerging threats. In the mid-2000s, DOD officials developed a proposal for a ―Global Train and Equip‖ authority to increase U.S. support for foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist networks, to build the capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign territory to prevent terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate states to participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions. This proposal called for a DOD lead, but also required State Department concurrence. Although this proposal was initially resisted by certain sectors at both DOD and the State Department, it won the support of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the enthusiastic endorsement of geographic Combatant Commanders, according to one DOD official who promoted the legislation.9

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At the same time, perspectives on the use of U.S. military forces to train foreign military forces began to evolve. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has asserted that training foreign forces is a military mission for U.S. general purpose forces.10 In early 2005, DOD requested, and Congress granted, Section 1206 as a special contingency authority. Nevertheless, the armed services committees repeatedly expressed hesitation about conceding this authority to DOD and cautioned that it was to be regarded as a pilot program. (See the Appendix for a legislative history of Section 1206, FY2006-FY2009.) In April 2008 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that still stands as the DOD position on Section 1206, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described this authority as ―a means to fill longstanding gaps in an effort to help other nations build and sustain capable military forces ... ‖ Explaining DOD‘s need to carry out such activities, Secretary Gates stated that after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), ―building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement‖ for DOD to fulfill its national security mission. The ―security of America‘s partners is essential to America‘s own security,‖ according to Gates, and Section 1206 is a preventive tool through which the United States helps allies and partners to ―confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their borders ... before festering problems and threats become crises requiring U.S. military intervention.‖ At the same time, Secretary Gates dismissed the idea that Section 1206 duplicates or could be viewed as a substitute for State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. (However, other government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs. See the section below entitled ―Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?‖) The Obama Administration has opted to continue the program begun under the George W. Bush Administration. According to the Administration‘s FY2010 Budget Request Summary Justification Document accompanying DOD‘s May 2009 budget request, U.S. Combatant Commanders consider this the Section 1206 program ―the single most important tool for the Department to shape the environment and counter terrorism.‖11 According to that document, the Section 1206 program is important because it allows the United States to train and equip foreign military forces to respond to ―urgent and emergent threats,‖ and because it ―provides opportunities to solve problems before they become crises....‖12

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 85

SECTION 1206 IN ACTION

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Purpose, Scope, and Timeline of Current Activities As noted above, Congress provided Section 1206 authority for two purposes. One is to enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. The other is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. Despite Section 1206‘s dual purpose, as of FY2009, nearly all Section 1206 funding has been used to provide counterterrorism equipment and related training. The types of equipment provided include radios and communications systems; surveillance and reconnaissance systems; trucks, ambulances, boats, and other vehicles; small arms and rifles; night vision goggles and sights; and clothing. Through the use of FY2006 through FY2009 funds, Section 1206 has supported bilateral programs in 24 countries and 13 multilateral programs. The multilateral programs include 2 to 15 countries. In addition, a DOD organization, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), has been provided funds for training foreign troops in human rights and respect for civilian authority. The cost for bilateral and multilateral projects has ranged from $40,000 to $30.6 million, with most between $1 million and $15 million. (See Table 1, below.) Although a primary rationale for Section 1206 funding was that it would enable the U.S. government to respond more quickly to emerging needs than possible under the FMF process, the delivery of Section 1206 equipment has not always proved as expeditious as originally expected. Although DOD stated in a FY2009 budget request document that Section 1206 authority ―allows a response to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less,‖13 the actual delivery time for much equipment can be much longer. A January 2009 DOD letter to certain Members of Congress states that ―Section 1206 authority can provide training and equipment in one to two years, or less.‖14 State Department officials attribute the lag on some cases to multiple causes, most importantly the shortage of readily-available equipment in many cases due to the small number of U.S. producers. Some analysts also cite processing delays at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as a factor.15

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Section 1206 Recipients

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Just over 40% of the $986 million in allocated Section 1206 funds from FY2006 through FY2009 (as of October 13, 2009) has gone to three countries. Pakistan has been by far the largest recipient, receiving $203.4 million or over 20% of total. It received almost twice as much as Lebanon, the second largest recipient at $105.5 million. Yemen is the third largest recipient at $97.3 million. Pakistan and Lebanon have received Section 1206 funds in each of the program‘s four fiscal years. Yemen has received funds in three fiscal years. For Pakistan, Section 1206 has provided equipment and training to increase the government‘s ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A central feature has been helicopter support. In FY2006, Section 1206 assistance was first used to address spare part shortages that limited availability from Pakistan‘s ―impressive inventory of helicopters.‖16 These funds provided spare parts for Mi- 17 and Cobra helicopters, as well as aviation body armor, night vision goggles, and limited visibility training for pilots. FY2008 and FY2009 funds also have provided the means, technical support, and training to repair, maintain, shelter, and operate Pakistan‘s helicopters for use in FATA operations. FY2009 funds supply four Mi-17 helicopters and spare parts for use along Pakistan‘s western border. Support to Pakistan‘s Special Services Group (SSG), a special forces unit, to operate more effectively in the FATA has included a variety of equipment in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. Equipment contracted during those fiscal years includes radios and other communications equipment, targeting systems, sniper rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles, global positioning systems units, lifesaver kits, body armor and other field gear. In FY2007 it included training for conducting nighttime raids from helicopters (FY2007). In FY2008, equipment was also provided to the Pakistan Army Aviation 21st reaction squadron. Additional FY2009 aid includes support to build a ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for counterterrorism operations to support Pakistan Army counterterrorism operations in the FATA, and kits to assist the Pakistan Army and Navy effectively investigate improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and other explosives used in terrorism operations.

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 87 For Lebanon, Section 1206 assistance first focused on helping the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to bring order to southern Lebanon and secure the country‘s northern border in the wake of the July 2006 Israel strikes against Hizbullah in Lebanon. FY2006 assistance bought spare parts for trucks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. FY2007 assistance purchased trucks, secure communications equipment, vehicles and helicopter spare parts, spare parts for guns, and soldier equipment, including night vision goggles and body armor. FY2008 and FY2009 assistance has focused on equipment for Lebanese special operations forces. FY2008 items include secure communications equipment, as well as vehicles, night vision sights, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, vehicles and ambulances, small arms, clothing, textiles, and individual equipment. FY2009 Urban Solider Equipment items are intended to help Lebanese force conduct CT operations in an urban environment. This package includes bulldozers, Humvee ambulances, tactical armor vests, rifles, and night vision device rifle scopes. FY2009 funds are also supplying four Cessna Caravan aircraft, as well as related spare parts and training. For Yemen, Section 1206 assistance started in FY2006 with a relatively small package of equipment (small arms and ammunition, computers, radios and their installation, and light tactical vehicles) to aid the Yemeni Armed Forces in preventing cross-border arms trafficking. Significantly more FY2007 funds were devoted to enhance Yemen‘s border security CT capability, with vehicles of various types (as well as maintenance training and support), spare parts, crisis action center equipment, and transportation. Most Section 1206 assistance to Yemen is being provided with FY2009 funds. This assistance includes not only trucks, radio systems (with operation and maintenance training) and body armor to help the Yemeni Border Security Force deter, detect, and detain terrorists along the Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman borders, but also equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard (patrol boats and accessories, and shipboard radios), and for the Yemini Air Force (helicopter spare parts and surveillance cameras) to enhance CT capability. FY2009 funds also will support Yemen‘s Ministry of Defense with an explosive ordnance disposal program. About 20% of the FY2006-FY2009 funding has been allocated to bilateral programs in these four countries: Indonesia ($57.4 million), Philippines ($55.1 million), Bahrain ($50.3 million), and Malaysia ($43.9 million). Most of the Section 1206 funding to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia focuses on controlling the Celebes Sea (also known as the Sulawesi Sea), which provides a water border for all three countries, as well as the adjoining Molucca Sea and

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Sulu Sea. Assistance to these countries has consisted of various coastal and maritime surveillance and detection systems and items, communications systems and equipment, aircraft equipment and training, and maritime interdiction packages. For Bahrain, Section 1206 focuses also on maritime assistance, providing coastal patrol crafts and related equipment and upgrading Bahrain‘s coastal surveillance system, as well as building the Bahrain Navy‘s special forces CT capability. Section 1206 assistance also helped to equip Bahrain‘s Defense Force special operations personnel for rapid deployment to rugged areas. The remaining allocations, all under $32 million and comprising close to 40% of the total, supported bilateral programs in 17 countries, 13 multilateral programs, and the DIILS program. Most of these programs focus on controlling adjacent maritime waters and on securing land and maritime borders. Some help military forces control their territories against terrorist threats. About 10% of these allocations is equally divided between bilateral and multilateral programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, much of it for surveillance and control of maritime and land borders. Through FY2009, only a small part of Section 1206 allocations was provided to enhance the ability of partner nations to contribute to stability operations. FY2007 funds provided stability operations training and equipment to Kazakhstan and to a group of four countries (Albania, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine) to enable their current and future participation in NATO and/or U.S. led stability operations. Table 1, groups programs by magnitude of funding. For details, see Table 2.

Conditions on Section 1206 Programs Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the ―legitimate civilian authority within that country.‖ The authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program.

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Table 1. FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 Funding Allocations by Magnitude ($ US millions, as of October 13, 2009) Top Tier

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Pakistan: $203.4 Lebanon: $105.5 Yemen: $97.3

Upper Middle Tier Indonesia: $57.4 Philippines: $55.1 Bahrain: $50.3 Malaysia: $43.9

Lower Middle Tier Kazakhstan: $31.8 Kenya: $25.9 Ethiopia: $25.5 Caribbean Basin I: $23.4 Kyrgyzstan: $21.2 Tunisia: $18.6 Sri Lanka: $18.2 EARSI: $14.2 Georgia: $18.0

Bottom Tier Djibouti: $16.4 Bangladesh: $15.7 DR/Panama: $14.4 Mexico: $13.9 Albania: $12.0 Ukraine: $12.0 Caribbean Basin II: $11.1 West Africa Maritime Capability: $10.9 West & Central Africa Maritime Caribbean Basin CT unit: $9.3 South East Africa Maritime Security: $8.4 Nigeria and Sao Tome: $6.8 Chad and Nigeria: $6.2 Africa Maritime Awareness/ Territorial Water Threat Response: $5.8 Mali: $5.1 TSCP Support: $3.4 Macedonia: $3.0 Nigeria: $2.3 DIILS: $ 2.1 Azerbaijan: $1.7 Chad: $1.7 Africa Intelligence Aid: $1.1

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Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and compiled from more detailed information provided in Table 2, Notes: DR = Dominican Republic. Sao Tome = Sao Tome and Principe. EARSI = East Africa Regional Security Initiative. TSCP = TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Recipients in groups are as follows: 5 in Caribbean Basin I (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua); 4 in EARSI (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania); 4 in Caribbean Basin CT unit (Belize, Guyana, Honduras, and Suriname); 5 in West and Central Africa Maritime Capability (Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone); 6 in Caribbean Basin II (Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama); 8 in West & Central Africa Maritime Equip (Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo); 15 in Africa Maritime Awareness/Response (Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe); 4 in TSCT Support (Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal); and 8 in Africa Intelligence Aid (Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali).

Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 91 This notification must specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the source and planned expenditure of funds.

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Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process17 Section 1206 programs are developed and selected under a ―dual-key‖ process that culminates with the signature of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. As modified by the FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Section 1206 support with the ―concurrence‖ of the Secretary of State. According to DOD and State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of State‘s approval. Section 1206 also requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and coordinate in its implementation. Coordination for the first year programs in FY2006 was reported to be spotty,18 but since then DOD and the State Department agencies have developed an extensive joint review process. Early in the fiscal year, the DOD Joint Staff and the State Department‘s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) kick off the process with a call for proposals issued with identical guidance. Most recommendations originate at the field level, where geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and U.S. embassy country teams jointly formulate proposals, although the degree of collaboration may vary. For proposals originated by the military, the COCOM forwards the proposal to Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For proposals originated in State Department channels, the Embassy forwards it to the State Department. The relevant Ambassador and Combatant Commander each must personally sign off on a proposal. At the Pentagon and the State Department, staff conduct an extensive review process to prioritize the many proposals (they have numbered in the hundreds in recent years). The OSD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities and Counterterrorim19 takes the DOD lead. It coordinates reviews for feasibility, political-military considerations, and legal status with OSD and Joint Staff regional and functional offices. At the State Department, the Bureau for Political-Military affairs consults with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), the regional bureaus, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), and then forwards proposals to the State Department legal and

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Congressional liaison offices for vetting. The offices of the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and of State may also indicate their priorities. Selection criteria include the urgency of the threat, the ability of the host nation to address that threat from its own resources, the ability of the host nation to sustain the capability, either from its own resources or through FMF funding, and the risks of inaction.20 Once prioritized within each agency, the DOD and State lead offices convene a joint DOD-State review board to select those proposals that will be recommended to the Secretaries. Either Secretary can veto a project. Once program memoranda are signed by both secretaries, DOD sends Congressional notifications to the armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees. No funds can be obligated until 15 days after these committees are notified and given the opportunity to review the projects. A DOD document described this joint review process in 2008 as the ―gold standard‖ for interagency planning and cooperation.21 Nonetheless, some participants have described their experiences with the process as competitive and time-consuming, absorbing staff hours that are needed for other priorities. Some have expressed frustration that considerable time can be spent developing projects that are not approved. (Hundreds more proposals have been developed than approved, according to some participants.) Some participants state that the process has improved as those involved in developing projects get a better of understanding of the intended purposes of Section 1206 and do not offer inappropriate projects. A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that the Combatant Commands, after consultation with the State Department, should appraise Embassy staff whether a project is likely to be approved before Embassy staff invest too much time in developing it.22

FUNDING PROVISIONS AND ANNUAL OBLIGATIONS Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance account. During the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to fund activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy (OSD/P). For FY2008, Congress appropriated $300 million for Section 1206 in the DOD Appropriations Act, 2008 (also known as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, P.L. 110-116). In its 2008 request for permanent Section 1206

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 93 authority, the Bush Administration requested that spending authority be increased to $750 million, but in its FY2009 budget request asked for $500 million in appropriations for that year. Congress denied the Bush Administration‘s requested increases. In the FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA, Congress increased the authorized amount to $350 million. In the same bill, Congress also provided authority for funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program begun in one fiscal year may also be used for that program in the next fiscal year). As of October 13, 2009, Section 1206 allocations total a bit under $1 billion for FY2006 through FY2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some $100 million for FY2006, $274 million for FY2007, $272 million for FY2008, and $340 million for FY2009. (See Table 2 below.) The amounts allocated are somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over $1 billion for FY2006-FY2009.

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FY2010 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (H.R. 2647, S. 1390, P.L. 111-84) In action on the proposed FY2010 NDAA, HASC set forth its evolving views on whether Congress should move Section 1206 authority from DOD to the State Department and SASC proposed new stipulations on Section 1206 use. As signed into law in October 2009 (P.L. 111-34), the FY2010 NDAA retains the $350 authorized funding level, but introduces a new funding provision by specifying that up to $75 million could be used to train the military troops of coalition partners in each FY2010 and FY2011. As marked up by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on June 10, and reported to the House on June 18 (H.R. 2647), the FY2010 NDAA would have authorized $350 million for Section 1206, according to the HASC press release. The Committee report accompanying the bill (H.Rept. 111-166) noted that the bill contained Section 1206 funding, but did not specify the amount. The report also noted an evolution of the HASC position on Section 1206 funding. In discussing Section 1206, HASC noted that while it previously had regarded Section 1206 ―as part of the foreign assistance family of authorities

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that has traditionally resided within the Department of State‘s purview‖ in order to assist foreign countries meet their own security needs as part of a U.S. foreign policy framework, it now views Section 1206 is a ―new type of authority‖ to meet the Secretary of Defense‘s assessment of a combatant commander‘s need to build certain capacity‖ as an important aspect of a combatant commander‘s theater engagement strategy.‖ (p. 411) While not discounting the idea that the authority might better be placed at the Department of State than at DOD, HASC reflects that wherever the authority ultimately lies, the need for projects responding to a DOD-led assessment of U.S. national security needs means that the ―Secretary of Defense must play a primary role in generating requirements.‖ (p 412) As reported July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2011 NDAA (S. 1390) would have permitted the use of up to $75 million (of the total $350 authorized for Section 1206) on programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant. This limitation would pertain to programs that begin on or after October 1, 2009, and be effective for FY2010 and FY2011. Previously there was no specification regarding the amount that could be spent for either of Section 1206‘s two stated purpose. (As noted elsewhere, little funding has been spent through FY2009 on building capacity other than counterterrorism capacity.) As described in the SASC report (S.Rept. 111-35), this limitation was made in response to DOD‘s request for new authorities to build the capacity of a foreign country‘s national military forces preparing to support a coalition operation conducted as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, or by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; and to built the capacity of NATO and partner special operations forces to support NATO or coalition special operations conducted as part of OIF or OEF in Afghanistan, or by the NATO ISAF. SASC stated that ―both these activities can be conducted within the existing authority of section 1206‖ and that the committee ―would be open to considering proposals to use the authority under this section to help build the capacity of NATO and other coalition partners whose ability to contribute to ongoing military or stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would otherwise be limited. Nevertheless, SASC explains the cap as a means to ensure that Section 1206 funding serves its intended purpose (i.e., to provide a means to address emerging needs) and not as substitute for security assistance under the State Department‘s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority. As

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 95 expressed in the report accompanying its bill, DOD‘s ―stated desire to conduct sustained capacity building to prepare special operations to deploy for coalition operations suggests that it intends to establish multi-year programs with respect to certain recipient countries.‖ The $75 million limit is intended to reduce ―the potential impact of such multi-year programs on the section 1206 program as a whole.‖ The SASC report emphasized the temporary nature of Section 1206 authority. It also urged the Obama Administration to review existing DOD and State Department security assistance authorities in order ―to reconcile, deconflict, and improve the effectiveness of these authorities.‖ As signed into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84), the FY2010 NDAA put in place a temporary $75 million limit for FY2010 and FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military troops of coalition partners to participate in or support military and stability operations.

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Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410) Congressional concerns regarding the appropriate agency to exercise responsibility for security assistance programs emerged in House action the FY2010-FY2011 foreign relations authorization bill (H.R. 2410). In that bill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a new ―Security Assistance Contingency Fund‖ for the State Department with purposes that would overlap with Section 1206. The House passed H.R. 2410 with that proposal intact in June 2009. No Senate action has occurred on H.R. 2410, received by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on June 22, 2009. No corresponding Senate bill has been introduced. H.R. 2410, Section 841, as reported to the House on June 4 (H.Rept. 111136) and passed by the House on June 10, would authorize the Secretary of State ―to conduct a program to respond to contingencies in foreign countries or regions by providing training, procurement, and capacity- building of a foreign country‘s military forces and dedicated counterterrorism forces in order for that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States is a participant.‖ Section 841 would authorize the appropriation of $25 million in each FY2010 and FY2011 for these purposes, as well as the use of up to $25 million in Foreign Military Financing funds in each of those fiscal years for the same purposes. Funds would remain available until expended.

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Like Section 1206, this authority could not be used to provide any type of assistance otherwise prohibited by law nor used to assist any foreign country otherwise prohibited from receiving such type of assistance under any provision of law. Unlike Section 1206, this authority would be exercised by the Secretary of State, with the only coordination requirement being that the Secretary ―shall consult with the head of any other appropriate department or agency in the formulation and execution‖ of programs conducted under this authority. Section 841 would require a 15-day notification to congressional foreign affairs and appropriations committees before funds are obligated.

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Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3326) As reported by the House Appropriations Committee (July 16, 2009, H.Rept. 111-230) and passed by the House (July 22, 2009), the House version of the DOD appropriations act would have appropriated $195 million for Section 1206 funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee version (reported September 10, 2009, S.Rept. 111-74) approved the full $345 million requested by the Obama Administration; no change was made by the Senate in approving the bill on October 6, 2009. As signed into law on December 19, 2009, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118), contains $345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. (The amount is not specified in the act itself, but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the Operations and Maintenance [O&M] Defense-wide budget.)

ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Congress established Section 1206 as a flexible funding mechanism in order to provide the U.S. government with a means to respond rapidly to emerging (and some would say urgent) threats to U.S. security, and in particular the security of U.S. military forces that would pose too great a risk if left unattended. Established as a ―pilot program,‖ Section 1206 authority is subject to continuous Congressional scrutiny. Issues range from the broad question of whether DOD should retain its own T&E authority, and whether it should be expanded or limited, to questions concerning Section 1206‘s utility

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 97 and whether it should be reconsidered in the context of broader security assistance reform.

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Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority? Because Congress has bestowed responsibility on the Secretary of State for the oversight of all foreign assistance, including military education and training programs, and for ensuring foreign policy coherence,23 many analysts argue that Section 1206 authority should be transferred to the Department of State, perhaps as a subset of FMF authority. On the other hand, those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority, and even that Congress should make it a permanent DOD authority under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, argue that Section 1206 serves very different purposes than FMF or Title 22 (Foreign Assistance) military education and training. Those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority emphasize its perceived importance as a military tool, as explained above, and differentiate the general purposes of Section 1206 and FMF. Over the past four years, defense and military officials, including geographic combatant commanders, have come to regard Section 1206 funding as vital to the U.S. defense efforts.24 The January 2009 letter from the Under Secretary of Defense to Members of Congress (cited above) states that Section 1206 funds meet the military needs determined by the geographic Combatant Commanders ―for tools to build capable, reliable, and interoperable partners as they prepare for—and seek to minimize the necessity for—military missions in the AORs [Areas of Responsibility].‖ Section 1206, according to the letter, is a flexible, strategic tool ―to meet urgent and emergent threats and opportunities to build partner capacity... [and] ... to address critical counterterrorism needs as defined by the U.S. Government.‖ In contrast, the DOD letter presents FMF as a political tool ―critical ... for executing our foreign policy‖ and ―key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests align.‖ While Section 1206 responds to needs identified by the U.S. government, FMF is often used to meet the security needs of foreign countries as perceived by their governments. ―Because many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their military procurement budgets,‖ FMF allocations are ―affected by hostnation preferences and political engagement,‖ the letter states.

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One indicator of differing uses of Section 1206 and FMF assistance may be the relative size of funds spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region whose insecure borders and ungoverned spaces present, many argue, an ideal habitat for terrorist groups and thus a threat to U.S. military forces and U.S. national security. Estimated FY2009 FMF obligations in Africa are less than 2% of total obligations ($8.3 million compared to $4.6 billion overall). Section 1206 allocations for Africa are relatively greater, representing some 14% of total FY2009 allocations ($48.7 million of $339.9 million as of October 13, 2009. In the letter, DOD denies that Section 1206 programs are ―as some have claimed, programs historically conducted by the State Department....‖ The United States ―has not conducted programs like this before.‖ On the other hand, critics of Section 1206 deny any significant distinction between Section 1206 and State Department train and equip authorities, and some frequently cite it as one of a number of programs that signal the ―militarization‖ of U.S. foreign assistance,25 which is perceived as detrimental to U.S. relations with foreign governments and damaging to the U.S. image with foreign populations. Advocates of placing Section 1206 under the State Department‘s authority and budget see an inevitable difference of perspective between a military commander and those vested with authority for foreign policy. A military commander, they argue, rightfully focuses on the objectives of the current mission, without necessarily taking into account the long-term implications for foreign relations. Providing DOD with authority and funding for Section 1206 and other foreign assistance-type activities outside of active combat zones gives DOD undue influence over shaping and conducting foreign relations and U.S. diplomacy, which are the responsibility of the Ambassador and the State Department, proponents argue. Some also state that DOD Section 1206 authority ―weakens congressional oversight, including human rights protections.‖26 Several foreign policy research institutions have advocated placing Section 1206 programs under State Department authority and the oversight of the Secretary of State. The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center argue that ―the Secretary of State has and should have responsibility for assuring that all foreign and security assistance is carried out in accord with U.S. foreign policy, including setting overall policy, approving countries to receive assistance, and setting the budget for such assistance.‖27 The authors of this chapter, drawing on a panel comprised of former Ambassadors and other State

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 99 Department personnel, stated that to do otherwise would undermine the Secretary of State‘s responsibility for the ―fundamental direction of U.S. foreign policy.‖28 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, while recognizing Section 1206‘s importance to DOD, nevertheless voiced concern that Section 1206 ―has the potential to impinge on State Department leadership in U.S. foreign policy and the authorities given the secretary of state under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).‖29 A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report expresses concrete concerns regarding coherence, transparency, and fiscal discipline. Authors Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams argue that authority for Section 1206 (as well as for other security assistance programs) should be vested in the State Department ―in order to ensure that security assistance does not drive or conflict with overall U.S. international engagement.‖30 They view Section 1206 and other recent security assistance authorities as generally parallel to or duplicating State Department‘s traditional security assistance programs.31 ―The risks in this parallel system of authorities and programs are that security assistance becomes more complex and confusing, that it is disconnected from overall, long-term U.S. diplomacy and national security strategy, and that money is wasted through overlapping, uncoordinated, or conflicting efforts,‖ they wrote.32 Despite this widespread perception, some may argue that there may be ways in which DOD- controlled Section 1206 assistance can benefit U.S. interests. For instance, recipients may perceive DOD assistance as representing a serious, enduring U.S. security interest in that country, facilitating military-to-military contacts.

Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Appropriately? Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that Section 1206 funds are being used in some countries for programs that would be funded more appropriately under FMF. An August 2009 report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General that reviewed programs in eight countries carried out with FY2006 funds stated that ―the Defense and State Departments

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have conducted the Section 1206 program in compliance with the law.‖33 Member concerns seem to center on other countries and a longer timeframe, however. Member concerns were reflected in a Members‘ letter to Secretary Gates in October 2008. In that letter, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees expressed concern that the DOD and the State Department were requesting funds for projects that did not fit within Section 1206‘s stated purposes.34 They also expressed concern that some Section 1206 programs seemed to address general foreign policy and security concerns, rather than an identifiable link to a transnational terrorist movement or threat to the United States as required for Section 1206 funding. In some cases, these Members stated that Section 1206 proposals appeared identical to FMF programs or substitutes for FMF where a country did not want to use FMF funds. The letter pointed specifically to Pakistan in this regard, stating that the helicopter maintenance provided by Section 1206 could not be considered an emerging need because the Pakistani government had requested such assistance in 2005. The letter also pointed to the provision of certain equipment to Kazakhstan as failing to meet ―an identifiable terrorist threat,‖ and noted that Indonesia had communicated that it would not use radar systems provided through Section 1206 primarily for CT purposes. To clarify accepted purposes for Section 1206 funding and prioritize the requests that DOD presented to Congress, the Members requested that DOD provide ―greater clarification as to the threshold test for the ‗emerging threats‘ concept.... Absent sufficient metrics to evaluate an emerging threat, the 1206 program remains just as susceptible as FMF to be used as a political tool with foreign countries, not as a strategic tool to address critical U.S. counterterrorism needs.‖ The Members stated that they believed Section 1206 ―should be provided in cases where there is more than just a potential terrorist threat....‖ As noted earlier, the outgoing Bush Administration responded to the Members with a three and one-half page defense of the program in a letter from the Under Secretary of Defense. In that letter, DOD not only differentiated between Section 1206‘s military and strategic purposes and FMF ‘s political purposes (as discussed in the section above), but also stated that Section 1206 funds ―can play a useful role in addressing security concerns before they develop into acute threats, and thereby mitigate the need for future U.S. military intervention.‖ 35

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 101 The letter did not specify criteria for a ―threshold test‖ that would define and identify an emerging threat. It did, however, explain in general terms the basis on which Section 1206 programs are chosen. In addition to Section 1206 emphasis on strategic purposes (as discussed above), the letter states that the authority is used ―proactively‖ to take the early steps necessary to counteract negative trends to forestall crises. The letter also discusses the parameters within which Section 1206 funds are used. ―There has been no attempt to ensure that all regions are provided assistance under this authority—or that all elements of a foreign military are provided with equipment,‖ according to the letter. ―To the contrary, Section 1206 programs are targeted at countries—and particularly military units within countries—where focused training and equipment will have the most significant impact in achieving the objectives of the Section 1206 authority.‖ Programs are chosen ―not only based on current threats, but also on the gap between these threats and partners‘ capacity to prevent or deter them, and the likelihood that this gap will grow without U.S. military support.‖ Addressing the Members‘ concerns about Section 1206 aid to Pakistan, the letter describes Section 1206 support for Pakistan‘s helicopter fleets as meeting U.S. military needs by supporting ―security operations in Pakistan‘s border region that are critical to the United States [emphasis in the original] for success in Afghanistan.‖ There is a separate five-year FMF with Pakistan that serves a different purpose: it was designed ―to build our bilateral relationship and assist Pakistan as it procures the capabilities it sees as important for its own defense,‖ according to the letter. Some analysts have questioned whether the purposes for which FMF and Section 1206 can be used are as different as described by DOD. Some also wonder whether items provided under Section 1206 assistance could not just as well be provided through FMF, a State Department fund, if that pot of money were increased.

Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively? With the Section 1206 program in its fourth year, some policymakers and analysts have begun to question whether the program is effective. Some are troubled by the lack of criteria for determining the effects of Section 1206 programs. A July 2008 assessment of Section 1206 assistance to four countries was generally positive, citing improvements in operational capacity, greater

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information-sharing and cooperation, and troop morale, but also noting one country‘s lack of capacity to investigate warnings produced by sensors and another‘s inability to identify known or suspected terrorists.36 Likewise, an August 2009 joint report by the DOD and State Department inspectors general found the projects that it examined in eight countries (all conducted with FY2006 funds, as noted above) to be ―effective in building partner nation capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations and helped those nations increase control over their borders and ungoverned spaces and counter terrorism.‖37 Nevertheless, this same report recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, together with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands ―should develop metrics of effectiveness for building Section 1206 partnership capacity and establish clearly defined outputs and outcomes.‖38 Some proponents note that establishing the outcomes of programs that are essentially preventive in nature is impossible, not unlike trying to prove a negative. Some, however, suggest that a possible indicator of utility would be an estimate of the cost to the U.S. military of compensating for the lack of the capability provided under Section 1206 or of carrying out that function itself. Two issues related to effectiveness are whether Section 1206 programs can be sustained and whether they can be carried out in a timely manner.

Sustainability For Section 1206 CT programs to be effective, most believe that they must be sustained over the long-run. Some policymakers are concerned that recipient countries will not continue to fund Section 1206 programs when Section 1206 funding ends. (Because Section 1206 authority established to meet immediate needs, Section 1206 must cease when a threat is no longer ―emerging,‖ however that may be defined.) The HFAC-HASC letter of October 2008 stated that DOD and the State Department had not provided sufficient information on how recipient countries would sustain Section 1206provided equipment. ―We understand the Departments‘ plan to use FMF (or encourage a recipient country to use national funds) for this purpose, but this approach simply defers resource shortcomings by a few years.‖ According to DOD‘s January 2009 letter, DOD and the State Department have determined that ―Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests.‖ The ability of recipient governments to sustain programs is taken into account in program planning, and at times programs have been cut back to ensure a recipient

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 103

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government could sustain the program, according to the letter. In addition, Section 1206 programs all provide ―two-year spare parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-trainer support.‖ This is intended to minimize future costs. Some analysts question whether the U.S. government can be adequately assured that a program will be sustained unless, in the planning stages, the host nation government expressly agrees to the program and promises to sustain it. The 2009 joint State Department and DOD Inspectors General report recommends that, during the planning process, host nation governments commit to a program and demonstrate the capability to sustain it.39

Timeliness A major rationale for establishing Section 1206 authority was to provide an antidote to the long lead time required by FMF to supply equipment. As mentioned in a section above, some Section 1206 deliveries are taking longer than originally anticipated. The August 2009 joint report of the DOD and State Department Inspectors General indicates a 6- to 18-month timeline for delivery of Section 1206 equipment and supplies provided through FY2006 funds and stated that DSCA agency actions are needed to reduce procurement and shipping delay to respond more quickly to actual or emerging terrorist threats, and to ensure all approved case funds are obligated before funding authorization expires.40 State Department officials attribute lags, where they occur, to multiple causes, most importantly the shortage of readily-available equipment due to the small number of U.S. producers. They also cite processing delays at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), attributed to an insufficient number of staff to handle the agency‘s workload and time-consuming procedures, as a factor. Some analysts point out that these same factors affect deliveries of FMF-provided equipment. The DOD and State Department Inspectors General report, cited above, indicates that consistent information on Section 1206 expenditures and deliveries is not available to U.S. Embassy country team members. As a result, the report recommends that DOD develop a periodic report to track actual obligations and expenditures of funds and other data.41 Similarly, a January 2010 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that the Administration ―develop a centralized information management system, with appropriate checks and balances for accuracy, to accurately track the status of all Section 1206 assistance.‖42

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Should Congress Provide the State Department and DOD with Overlapping Section 1206-type Authorities? As discussed above, Section 841 of the House version of the foreign relations authorization bill for FY2010 and FY2011 (H.R. 2410, H.Rept. 111136) would create a new ―Security Assistance Contingency Fund‖ for the State Department with purposes that would overlap with Section 1206 (i.e., for counterterrorism programs and for training foreign military and other security forces for participating in operations with U.S. forces). The bill would provide $50 million in each FY2010 and FY2011, half by authorizing new appropriations and half by authorizing the use of FMF funds for these purposes. There is no indication in the bill‘s report language that it is intended to replace Section 1206. As drafted, it seems designed as a complementary measure. The accompanying House Foreign Affairs Committee report states merely that the ―authority is necessary for the Department of State to start stepping up to the responsibility to provide assistance to train and equip foreign military forces to support U.S. security operations and to better engage in counter-terror operations.‖ (H.Rept. 111-136) Some policymakers may regard such a contingency fund as a means to provide the State Department with funds for activities that it may regard as a higher priority than does DOD or the armed services committees. For instance, the State Department is interested in providing resources to train troops to participate in U.S. stability operations as a means to cultivate foreign relations.43 This has not been a priority for DOD, and the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2010 NDAA would cap funding for such purposes at $75 million. In addition, some policymakers may view Section 841 as a means to provide the State Department with resources to provide follow-up to counterterrorism activities begun under Section 1206, rather than using FMF funds for that purpose. However, some might question whether Section 841 would provide sufficient advantage over the existing FMF funding mechanism to justify creating a new authority. As Section 841 would not require consultation with DOD on the use of the funds, this authority may somewhat expedite decisionmaking within the State Department on counterterrorism funding. The amount of time that could be saved over the current three-year timeline for FMF funding decisions might well depend on the procedures developed by the State Department to process such funding, including coordination with DOD, and on possible reforms to the DSCA. Another factor would be whether

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 105 Congress was willing to consider such funds in a expedited manner through Congressional committees, as it does for Section 1206 funding, rather than as part of the annual budget request as it does with FMF funding. For some policymakers and analysts, Section 841 might fall far short of the ample reform that some advocate to address what they perceive as a serious imbalance between DOD and State Department resources and authorities, including in the security assistance area.44 Some Members may not wish to create yet another flexible funding mechanism that puts funds beyond the oversight of Congress as a whole, although as Section 1206 specified congressional committees would exercise oversight before the State Department could obligate funds.45 (Section 841 would require that the State Department notify the two foreign affairs committees and the two foreign operations appropriations subcommittees 15 days before obligation funds.)

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Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E for Security Forces? For several years, DOD has argued for authority to train and equip a variety of counterterrorism security forces outside the military structure. DOD‘s original proposal included ―armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces,‖ but the initial Section 1206 legislation restricted the use of funds to military forces. Subsequent requests by DOD (in 2007 and 2008) proposed expanding Section 1206 authority to include other security forces. DOD‘s FY2009 NDAA proposal requested that a wide range of police and security forces be included, specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. In 2008, Congress amended Section 1206 authority to include only non-military maritime security forces, such as coast guards,46 a category not named in the DOD request. Because foreign counterterrorism units sometimes are configured as civilian forces under foreign Ministries of the Interior rather than as military forces, some analysts argue that the lack of authority to train and equip foreign security forces impedes the United States‘ ability to build foreign capacity for counterterrorism. In January 2008, the final report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended the expansion of 1206 authority to include non-

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military security forces because of ―the operational necessity of working with foreign security forces to advance key counterterrorism objects....‖47 However, some analysts argue that Congress should reserve funding for civilian security force training to the State Department. Some argue that there are fundamental differences in training civilian and military personnel and U.S. military forces are suited solely for training the latter. Some stress that the use of U.S. military forces to train civilian police and other security forces conveys an undesirable blurring of police and military roles and functions, and puts a military face on U.S. assistance in a sensitive area, undermining the concept that civilians should be in the lead on internal security affairs.

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Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform? Discussion about Section 1206 often takes place in the context of a perceived need for broad security assistance reform. Section 1206 represents a significant part of the security assistance package, but many analysts are concerned with the problems involving the whole gamut of security assistance programs under both State Department and DOD authorities.48 Indeed, some relate the establishment of Section 1206, as well as perceived problems with it, to problems experienced with traditional State Department authorities: ―The current [State Department] mechanisms, some of which reflect statutory requirements, are antiquated and slow to respond to changing security threats, one of the explanations for DOD‘s expanded assistance portfolio in recent years,‖ according to one report.49 Some analysts question whether Section 1206 authority would be needed at all if the systems carrying out traditional security assistance authorities were provided sufficient funds and personnel, and were reorganized to operate more efficiently. Several recent reports have reviewed current security assistance programs, authorities, and resources, and recommended substantial reform. The MIT report mentioned in a section above advocates the creation of ―a new architecture that is agile, flexible and adequately funded to deal with the new security challenges‖ and that ―can and should make ample use of DOD‘s capabilities....‖50 Specific recommendations call for changes that would improve strategic planning, policy coherence, interagency coordination, budgeting procedures, transparency, and discipline, and Congressional oversight. Among their suggestions where Congress has a direct role are the following:51

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 107

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Restructure security assistance authorities by grouping State Department and DOD authorities to create new programs. Expand contingency authority for all security assistance, and provide multiyear funding in order to provide the State Department and DOD with broader discretion to reallocate and target funds as requirements change. Consolidate security assistance budgets, with the executive branch agencies presenting a single, multiagency, security assistance budget. (Some would emphasize the need for a single counterterrorism budget.)52 Undertake reforms within the State Department to ―right-size‖ the Bureau of Political Military (PM) Affairs, as well as the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, to enable the State Department to oversee budgeting for security assistance programs.53 Review the DSCA structure and processes to ―to right-size its bureaucracy and reduce inflexibility.‖54 Consider joint Congressional hearings on security assistance programs, involving both defense and foreign policy authorization and appropriations committees.55 Recommendations for systemic reforms that are largely within the purview of the executive branch include: Provide White House oversight of security assistance by establishing a permanent interagency group under the National Security Council (NSC);56 and Provide for stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level.

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Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations (as of October 13, 2009) ($ U.S. Millions)

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Recipient(s) Program FY2006 FY2007 General Human Rights/Respect for Civilian Authority (HR/RCA) Training Recipients HR/ RCA)Training — — unspecified. Funding to Defense Institute of International Legal Studies to conduct training. Recipients and Follow-on to FY2008 trainer(s) HR/RCA training for 35 unspecified. countries Bangladesh, Guyana, Follow-on to FY2008 Kyrgyzstan, HR/RCA training. Suriname, (Notified Indonesia are named Amount) recipients. Trainer(s) unspecified. Total HR/RCA Training Recipient(s) Program AFRICA Chad Tactical Airlift Capacity Training

—

—

FY2008 0.6

—

—

—

FY2009

Totals

—

1.2 0.3

—

0 FY2006

0 FY2007

0.6 FY2008

1.5 FY2009

2.1 Totals

—

1.7

—

—

1.7

Djibouti

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Ethiopia

Kenya

Mali

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Response, Interdiction, and Coastal Security Enhancement Counterterrorist (CT) Communications Package CT Capabilities Package CT Communications and Combat Engineering Capability Night Vision Capability Package Regiment and Platoon CT Initiative Border Security Initiative Border and Coastal Security Enhancement Maritime Security Initiative Light infantry Equipment for CT (Redirected FY2007 Mauritania aid and additional storage and transportation costs charged in FY2009.)

—

8.0

—

— 16.4

—

—

5.1

—

—

—

—

3.3

—

—

13.3

—

—

—

1.9

—

—

—

—

10.3

—

—

4.1

—

—

—

6.6

—

—

—

—

15.2

4.5

0.6

25.5

25.9

5.1

Table 2 (Continued)

Nigeria

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Tunisia

Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal

Recipient(s) Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Chad and Nigeria Algeria, Chad, Mali, Maurit-ania, Morocco, Niger and Senegal Algeria, Benin,

CT Capacity Building for Military Forces Light infantry Vehicles, Communications Equipment, and other equipment (Equipment redirected from Chad FY2007 program.) Suppressing TransBorder Terrorist Activity Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capability to secure borders. Civil-Military Operations Training in Support of the TransSahara CT Program Program East Africa Regional Security Initiative Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Aid Multinational Information-sharing Network Aid Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid MDA and Territorial

—

—

—

1.5

—

—

—

0.8

—

—

10.0

—

—

—

—

8.6

—

3.4

—

—

3.4

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

Totals

—

14.2

—

—

14.2

6.8

—

—

—

6.8

6.2

—

—

—

6.2

—

1.1

—

—

1.1

—

5.8

—

—

5.8

2.3

18.6

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Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Togo Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone (Guinea deleted due to the Dec. 2008 coup d‘etat.) Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles Total Africa GREATER EUROPE Albania

Georgia Macedonia Ukraine

Water Threat Response Capability Establishment

West and Central Africa Maritime Equipment Package

—

—

9.8

—

9.8

West Africa Maritime Security Capability Enhancement

—

—

10.9

—

10.9

—

—

—

8.4

8.4

13.0

38.7

61.7

48.7

162.1

South East African Maritime Security Initiative

CT Capability Aid Maritime Coastal Patrol CT Capability Enhancement CT Capability Aid Special Forces T&E CT Capability Aid CT Capability Aid

—

6.7

—

—

—

—

5.3

—

—

6.5

— —

3.0 12.0

— 11.5 — —

12.0 — — — —

18.0 3.0 12.0

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Table 2 (Continued)

Total Greater Europe — ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Including Central Asia) Indonesia Integrated Maritime 18.4 Surveillance System Eastern Fleet Regional — Command Center Recipient(s) Program FY2006 Eastern Fleet Maritime — Equipment Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait Network — Coastal Surveillance — Stations Western Fleet Command and Control (C2) Center — and HQ Kazakhstan Coalition CT and Stability Operations — Capacity Aid Caspian Security — Kyrgyzstan Increasing Armed Forces — CT Capabilities CT Forces Support — Malaysia Eastern Sabah MDA — Radars Strait of Malacca MDA — Support MDA Package — CENTRIX Stations — C2 Center for Joint — Forces Sabah HQ Maritime Interdiction —

28.2

16.8

0

—

—

—

3.8

—

—

45.0 57.4

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

7.3

—

—

6.1

—

—

11.5

4.3

—

—

2.0

—

19.3

—

—

—

12.5

—

—

11.6

—

—

—

9.6

13.6

—

—

2.2

—

—

— 0.5

11.5

— —

—

7.1

—

—

9.0

—

Totals

31.8

21.2

43.9

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Philippines

Recipient(s) Sri Lanka

Package Maritime T&E for Interdiction Purposes Coast Watch South High Frequency Radios (FY07)/ Radars for Sulu Archipelago (FY08) Maritime Interdiction Capability Interdiction and Offensive Capabilities Improvement (of UH-1 Huey helicopters) Border Control Interdiction Coast Watch South (CWS) Radars for Eastern Mindanao and adjacent border surveillance CWS Intelligence – Operations CT Capability Program Maritime Security T&E for Interdiction Purposes Aircraft C2 Integration Maritime Security and Navy Interdiction Capability

—

3.0

—

—

—

1.8

11.1

—

—

6.4

—

—

—

4.4

—

—

—

—

5.8

—

—

—

—

14,5

—

—

—

8.1

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

10.8

—

—

—

—

6.0

—

—

—

1.4

—

—

55.1

Totals

18.2

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Table 2 (Continued)

Total Asia and the Pacific 29.2 MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERN ASIA Azerbaijan Naval Commando CT — Training Bahrain Patrol Boats 5.3 (Value of equipment redirected from cancelled Thailand program) Coastal Patrol Capability — Development Defense Force Counterintelligence — Analysis Center Development Defense Force Special — Operations T&E Coastal Surveillance — System Upgrade Bangladesh Maritime Patrol and — Interdiction Initiative Naval Special Forces CT — T&E Lebanon Military Assistance to 10.5 Lebanese Armed Forces Special Operations — Forces T&E Secure Communications for Special Operations — Forces Urban Soldier Equipment — Cessna Caravan — Pakistan Border Area T&E/ 23.3

87.3

78.9

32.2

227.6

—

1.7

—

1.7

—

—

—

24.6

—

—

0.04

—

—

—

4.3

—

—

—

16.1

—

7.2

—

—

—

8.5

30.6

—

—

—

7.2

—

—

7.9

—

— — 5.7

— — —

21.5 27.8 —

50.3

15.7

105.5

203.4

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Recipient(s)

Yemen

Marines T&E Enhance Shared MDA and Cooperative Maritime Security Aid Helicopter CT Capability Special Services Group COIN Kick Start Initiative Mi-17 Support Program Mi-17 Helicopters Aviation Maintenance Shelters in Federally Administered Tribal Areas Army and Navy Capability Building to Investigate Explosives Special Operations Forces CT Package Ground-Based Intelligence S&R Capability Cross Border Security and CT Aid Yemeni Special Operations Capacity Development to enhance border security Air Force Aerial Surveillance Initiative Coast Guard Maritime Security Initiative

—

8.1

—

—

—

—

20.9

—

—

—

14.9

—

— FY2006 —

— FY2007 —

17.0 FY2008 —

— FY2009 80.0

—

—

—

3.1

—

—

—

0.6

—

—

—

17.0

—

—

—

12.8

4.3

—

—

—

—

26.0

—

—

—

—

—

5.9

—

—

—

29.9

Totals

97.3

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Table 2 (Continued)

Increased Border Security CT Initiative Explosive Ordnance Disposal Initiative Total Middle East and South Asia WESTERN HEMISPHERE Mexico CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT Capability Package (FY08) Dominican Republic Joint Maritime CT and Panama Capability Aid Bahamas, Dominican Caribbean Basin Republic, Honduras, Maritime Security Aid Jamaica, and (radios and boats) Nicaragua Bahamas, Belize, Caribbean Basin Dominican Republic, Capability Enhancements Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama Belize, Guyana, CT Unit T&E for Honduras, and participation in Operation Suriname Enduring Freedom Total Western Hemisphere Additional Transportation Expenses for items obligated during FY06-FY08 but deliveredlater. Totals 100.0

—

—

—

—

—

25.4 5.8

—

43.4

95.0

81.1

254.4

473.9

—

1.0

12.9

—

13.9

14.4

—

—

—

14.4

—

23.4

—

—

23.4

—

—

11.1

—

11.1

—

—

9.3

—

9.3

14.4

24.4

33.3

—

72.1

—

—

—

3.1

3.1

273.6

272.4

339.9

985.9

Totals

Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Allocations as of October 13, 2009. In one case, as noted, the figure is the amount notified to Congress. Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 117

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APPENDIX. EVOLUTION OF SECTION 1206 LEGISLATION: 2005-2009 The George W. Bush Administration‘s proposed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 contained a provision for a new partnership capacity-building authority. As submitted to Congress, the DOD-proposed authorization legislation differed in several important respects from the ―Section 1206‖ legislation that was eventually passed. DOD‘s proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to ―authorize building the capacity of partner nations‘ military or security forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations.‖ The proposed legislation provided the Secretary of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: ―The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership security capacity building....‖ DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions. DOD‘s proposed authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign military and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately enacted into law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were much broader, and included ―armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces.‖ The proposed annual cap on such assistance was $750 million, much greater than that eventually approved. DOD‘s proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to $750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

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Congressional Action in 2005 Congressional action in 2005 on the DOD proposals started with Senate approval of a floor amendment to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA (S. 1042). The legislation that emerged from conference committee action on the conference version of the bill (H.R. 1815) and was signed into law on January 6, 2006 (P.L. 109-163) differed significantly from the DOD proposals. Not one of the armed services or appropriations committees included the DOD proposals for a global train and equip authority or appropriation in legislation they reported that year. Congressional action began when Senator Inhofe introduced a modified version of the DOD authorization proposal as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to S. 1042. On November 8, 2005, the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment, supported by Senator Lugar. Both would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD. Each version of the Inhofe amendment progressively strengthened the State Department role compared to the DOD proposal. Conference committee negotiators made further changes, however, strengthening the DOD role, diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types of forces that could be supported, and lowering the funding cap. The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to $750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia forces for counterterrorism required that ―Seven different authorities for funding and sources ... be stitched together‖ in a process that took eight months.57

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 119 The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State‘s role by making three changes. One change eliminated DOD‘s ability to implement proposals on its own. Another eliminated DOD‘s ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department. In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support only by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill. In a November 8, 2006 floor statement, Senator Lugar stated that ―the amendment as now written leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding to the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program....‖58 At the same time, Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the ―State Department oversight of these kinds of programs [is] cumbersome and slow.‖ He stated: ―These obstacles need to be overcome. State Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should develop plans to push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly.‖ (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.) A distinct final version, as mentioned above, emerged from the conference committee. There were four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version of H.R. 1815 stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD‘s role by providing authority for the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State‘s role by providing that the Secretaries of Defense and State were to ―jointly formulate any program directed by the President‖ and the Secretary of Defense was to ―coordinate with the Secretary of State in the implementation of any program directed by the President....‖ Second, the conference committee version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual funding cap considerably, to $200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks and to close safe havens to enabling them to conduct counterterrorist operations. In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program,

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which would be reviewed at the end of that period. They noted that ―under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State. The conferees signaled the importance of ensuring that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor detract from DOD‘s focus on core responsibilities, particularly warfighting tasks.

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Congressional Action for FY2006-2009 Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent NDAAs. Most important among them was the 2007 modification elevating the State Department‘s role while, at the same time, vesting authority for the program in the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) amended Section 1206 by eliminating the President‘s role in directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support such programs. Instead, it authorized ―the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State‖ to conduct or support those programs. Other changes in that legislation raised the authorized amount to $300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.59 This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their explanatory statement, the conferees stated that ―the authorities provided in this section are provided in the spirit of a pilot program.... The conferees believe it will be important to demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in future years budget requests.‖60 Through the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress rejected the Bush Administration‘s 2008 request to make Section 1206 authority permanent law under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the United States Code. Instead, it extended the temporary authority for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also expanded Section 1206

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Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues… 121 authority to include the provision of assistance to maritime security forces,61 and raised the spending cap to $350 million. In their respective reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate armed services committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being appropriately used. The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee‘s earlier position that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, ―not intended to duplicate or substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor ... intended to sustain train and equip programs over multiple years.‖ It expressed the committee‘s concerns that Section 1206 funds were ―being used for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist threat is currently low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities.‖62 The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had ―pushed beyond the clearly articulated limits of this authority‖ in the case of Panama, raising concern ―about the responsible execution of this authority in the future.‖ In the report, the committee expressed its belief ―that capable foreign partners play a vital role in the international security environment but remain unconvinced that this authority should reside permanently with the Department of Defense. The committee expects that, over the long-term, these ‗train and equip‘-type authorities, which appear to be migrating to the Department of Defense, might better remain within the Department of State‘s jurisdiction.‖63

End Notes 1

2

This authority was established by Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, P.L. 108-375, entitled Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism, and is often referred to as ―Section 1208‖ authority. The initial authorization extended from FY2005 through FY2007, with a $25 million limit on funding. It was subsequently extended, first through FY20 10, and then in 2008 through FY20 13, with a spending limit of $35 million and a requirement for Chief of Mission concurrence (Section 1208, FY2009 NDAA, P.L. 110-417). Information concerning this program is classified. Other DOD foreign assistance-type accounts of concern are two post-9/11 authorities, the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP), used by military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines for small-scale humanitarian or development projects, and the Security and Stabilization fund (―Section 1207‖) through which DOD transfers funds to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, mostly outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

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3

As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, ―shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.‖ 4 Before the FAA, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373) created a Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President, whose Director was responsible for the ―continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign aid— military, economic, and technical assistance.‖ U.S. Congress, House. U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and Related Information, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 116, Washington: USGPO, June 11, 1959, p. 69. During part of the 1950s, DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House‘s policy direction and guidance. Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State Department (P.L. 8 1-329, 63 Stat. 714). Two lower-ranking State Department officials were charged (consecutively) with coordinating with DOD regarding military aid before the responsibility was finally bestowed on the Secretary of State. For more detail on the further evolution of Military Assistance Authority, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino. 5 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), under the DOD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor agency. While the original language in 1961 applied specifically to assistance authorized under the FAA, a 1976 amendment deleted this restriction. 6 The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness, Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, Project Chairman, October 2008, p. 22. Hereafter referred to as A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future. 7 Special Operations Forces also train together with foreign troops under a DOD authority, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: training with friendly foreign forces. The primary purpose of the Joint Combined Exchange Training program, conducted under this authority, is to provide training for the U.S. forces. 8 State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to DOD, this ―traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution,‖ while ―Global Train and Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less.‖ U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereafter referred to as FY2009 DOD Summary Justification. In practice, however, the time frame for a Section 1206 response is sometimes considerably longer than six months; see the section below on―Timeliness.‖ 9 Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. 10 See, for instance: Robert M. Gates. A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009. In this article, Gates worries that the military personnel and promotions system is not able ―to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.‖ 11 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 1-13. 12 Ibid.

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FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 103. A copy of the letter was provided by DOD, with the permission of a Congressional recipient. It is signed by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric S Edelman, who occupied that post as of the date of the letter, January 16, 2009. Hereafter referred to as OSD letter of January 16, 2009 responding to Members of Congress. 15 The DSCA is a defense agency (under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) that administers and implements a wide variety of security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, Excess Defense Articles, and drawdowns, as well as Section 1206. More information on the DSCA is available at http://www.dsca.mil. 16 CNA Corporation, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe, by Eric Thompson and Patricio AsfuraHeim, CRM D0017988.A4/1Rev. July 2008, p. 25, http://www.cna.org/ documents/D0017988.A4.pdf. Hereafter referred to as CNA Corporation Assessments. 17 A joint report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General dedicates Chapter 2 to the approval process and recommends several changes intended to strengthen and formalize the process. Inspectors General U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, Department of Defense and Department of State, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2009-007 and Department of State Report No. ISP-I-09-69, August 31, 2009, pp. 9-15, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/129491.pdf. Hereafter referred to as Inspectors General Report. 18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation, GAO-07-416R, February 28, 2007. See p. 3. 19 This office is located under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and International Cooperation (SO/LIC&IC). 20 Author‘s interviews with Department of State officials, September 2009, and e-mail exchanges with DOD and State Department officials, October and November 2009. 21 FY2009 DOD Summary Justification, p. 103. 22 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending, committee print, 111th Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 2010, S. Prt. 111-38 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 13 and 24. Hereafter cited as Following the Money. 23 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), Section 622(c)(22 U.S.C. 2382), states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, ―shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.‖ The Armed Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, be responsible for ―the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter... .‖ (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752). 24 According to a DOD document, the ―geographic Combatant Commanders consider global train and equip authority the Department‘s single most important tool for building partner operational capacity, shaping the environment, and countering terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan.‖ FY2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 102.

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I.e., Congress‘ grant to DOD of several new or expanded DOD authorities and funding accounts such as the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP), 26 Adam Isacson, The Pentagon’s military aid role grows, on the Just the Facts website http://justf.org/blog January 26, 2010. 27 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23. 28 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 12. 29 Representative Robert Andrews and Representative Mark Kirk, co-chairs, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2008, p. 7. (On the same page, the report further notes: ―A number of legislators on Capitol Hill have expressed fear that Section 1206 could undermine the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, by allowing combatant commanders to assist foreign security forces without taking account of broader U.S. considerations at stake in bilateral and regional relationships.‖) Hereafter referred to as Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance. 30 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2008, p. 21. Hereafter referred to as Strengthening Statecraft and Security. 31 Other DOD security assistance authorities specifically discussed in this chapter are Coalition Support Funds, CERP, and CTFP. 32 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 70. 33 The countries are reviewed were Dominican Republic, Georgia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sri Lanka. Inspectors General Report, p. ii (quotation).. 34 Addressed to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the letter was dated October 8, 2008, and signed by Representatives Howard L. Berman, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HFAC), Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, HFAC ranking member, and Duncan Hunter, HASC ranking member. 35 OSD letter of January 16, 2009, responding to Members of Congress. op. cit. Moreover, the letter notes that Secretary of State Gates ―has argued consistently for increased funding for Title 22 programs—including FMF— because our diplomats need additional resources to advance U.S. interests.‖ 36 CNA Corporation Assessments. The countries are Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sao Tome and Principe. The study was conducted in response to a request from the OSD Global Security Affairs Office. The report noted that in some cases it relied on secondary source reporting. See the Executive Summary, pp. 1-4. 37 Inspectors General Report, p.iii. 38 Inspectors General Report, p. iv, Recommendation 9. 39 Inspectors General Report, p. iii (Recommendation 1) and p. iv (Recommendation 8). Recommendation 1 suggests that DOD and the State Department revise the Section 1206 proposal submission template to require a statement describing the actual or potential terrorist threat in detail, as well as the ―bilateral consultation and coordination process for formulating the proposal‖ and the ―partner nation‘s commitment and capability to sustain project implementation.‖ Recommendation 8 states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, ―in coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff and Department of State‘s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, should direct Security Cooperation Officers to work with partner nations to develop a full Concept of Operations by the final approval of the project.‖ 40 Inspectors General Report, pp. ii and iv (Recommendation 3). 41 Inspectors General Report, p. iv (Recommendation 4), and pp. 21-23. 42 Follow the Money, p. 21.

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Author‘s interview with State Department officials, September 2009. Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance. This chapter suggests an alternative to Section 1206 would ―simply be to build a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible counterterrorism funding. In principle, there is no reason that the administration could not propose—and Congress fund—a contingency fund within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security forces in counterterrorism and stability operations.‖ (p. 11) It specifically recommends ―the gradual phasing out of Section 1206 authority with the creation of a substantial, flexible contingency fund (notionally within FMF) to support current 1206 programs.‖ (p. 39) 45 Congress in general has resisted providing the executive branch with ―blank checks‖ by creating contingency accounts. One often cited example is the standing Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. This account is drawn on in urgent situations and is replenished automatically as needed. In establishing Section 1206 years later, Congress built in a higher level of Congressional review by requiring notification to specified committees. 46 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1206. 47 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 10. 48 According to the report by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, one of ―the most striking trends during the past two decades has been the growing role of the Defense Department in providing foreign assistance under its own statutory authorities....by the end of the 1990s ... DOD was directly managing 15 security assistance programs accounting for well over $1 billion annually.‖ A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 22. 49 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23. 50 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 71. This recommendation would place the new architecture under State Department authority, however. 51 This section draws principally on specific recommendations made in three reports: Strengthening Statecraft and Security, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, and Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, although other reports may have similar proposals. Related proposals are contained in Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, December, 2007, and Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, November 2008, as well as other publications. 52 See Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 38, which recommends that ―DOD, State and USAID present relevant Congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require executive branch transparency on how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together.‖ (p. 38) 53 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 73. In A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center also express concerned about State Department staffing levels for security assistance, in particular the number of foreign service personnel who specialize in political-military affairs. (p. 23) 54 Strengthening Statecraft and Security suggests creating three new programs: (1) a more flexible train and equip program combining FMF, Section 1206, and the State Department‘s peacekeeping account (PKO); (2) a more coherent foreign military education program by combining IMET and the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program; and (3) a revamped support program combining the coalition support and the economic support (CSF and ESF) funds. It also suggests redistributing responsibility for activities carried out under the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and other DOD ‗foreign assistance‖ programs, assigning responsibility for longer-term governance and development programs to the State Department and USAID, and reserving to DOD responsibility for shorter-term, urgent projects closely related to combat needs or to operations in insecure areas. (p.74) 55 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 75.

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Strengthening Statecraft and Security recommends that this group be co-chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in order to ensure ―the integration of security assistance policies and programs into the broader national security strategy,‖ to resolve ―policy and program disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense,‖ and to provide ―overarching policy guidance to improve consistency with overall national security strategy... .‖ (pp. 72-73). 57 Senator James Inhofe, Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, November 4, 2005, p. S12395. 58 Senator Lugar further stated that ―The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of State.‖ He concluded: ―All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with consideration of the traditional concerns—the recipient country‘s treatment of its own people, potential reactions from neighboring sates in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State‘s job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make recommendations to the President that strike the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor.‖ (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.) 59 The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206 programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the President, in order to ―increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206 program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue timesensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations.‖ DOD also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces (―specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and counterterrorism forces ... ‖), and an increase in the spending cap to $750 million. 60 These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S. 2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152. The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands ―to respond to unanticipated changes in a security environment‖ within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to $50 million per year per commander for Section 1206 purposes, with total spending limited to $200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders ―to respond to urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander‘s AOR‖ if the commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient country, up to a total of $200 million ―in any country in a fiscal year.‖ In response, the House, which had no similar provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance. 61 As passed by the Senate, S. 3001 would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically ―a foreign country‘s coast guard, border protection, and other security

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forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations.‖ The Administration had requested authority to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. S.Rept. 110-335 continued: ―While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities.‖ The committee also indicated that it viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance. H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD ―to use members of the United States military to conduct the training provided under this authority whenever possible.‖

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Chapter 4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ―SECTION 1207‖ SECURITY AND STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE: BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS

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Nina M. Serafino SUMMARY Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provides authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. It expires at the end of FY2010. The State Department‘s FY2011 Foreign Assistance budget request asks for $100 million for a Complex Crises Fund, established last year by Congress as a USAID account, ―to respond to emerging or unforeseen crises through support for reconstruction, security, or stabilization needs.‖ It notes that this fund is ―similar to Section 1207 Authority.‖ DOD transferred $10 million in FY2006, $99.7 million in FY2007, and $100 million in FY2008 under this authority. For FY2009, Congress added special authority to transfer up to an additional $50 million for Georgia: DOD

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transferred a total of $143.3 million to the State Department in FY2009 Section 1207 funds. In all, these funds have supported projects in 18 countries and two regions. In action on the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84), Congress extended the $100 million authority through FY2010. Congressional authorizers and appropriators strongly expressed in several documents that Section 1207 authority is temporary, and indicated that such funding is better provided under the State Department budget. The Obama Administration decision to request Section 1207-type funding under the Foreign Assistance account may moot further discussion of Section 1207 authority.

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INTRODUCTION Since FY2006, Congress has relied on the Department of Defense (DOD) to fund small-scale security and stabilization activities carried out by the State Department and USAID to prevent or stabilize conflict situations abroad. The ―Section 1207‖ authority used for this funding expires at the end of FY2010, and defense authorizers and appropriations have indicated their unwillingness to extend it once again. The State Department‘s FY2011 Foreign Assistance budget request asks for $100 million for a Complex Crises Fund, established last year by Congress as a USAID account, ―to respond to emerging or unforeseen crises through support for reconstruction, security, or stabilization needs.‖ It notes that this fund is ―similar to Section 1207 Authority.‖ The Obama Administration decision to request Section 1207-type funding under the Foreign Assistance account may moot further discussion of Section 1207 authority. Congress first provided DOD with ―Section 1207‖ authority in 2005. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, provided authority for DOD to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million in defense articles, services, training or other support in FY2006 and again in FY2007 to use for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. This authority was first extended through FY2008 by Section 1210 of the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181) and again extended through FY2009 by Section 1207 of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA (P.L. 110-417). The FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA provides special authority for up to $50 million to be spent under Section 1207

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for Georgia, in addition to the up to $100 million authorized for other countries. Most recently, Congress has extended the $100 million transfer authority through FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84). Section 1207 authority has been used to fund activities of the State Department‘s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS, established in 2004) and activities implemented by other agencies that are coordinated by S/CRS, including activities of USAID. These funds have supported activities in 14 countries and in two regions. (For further information on these countries and projects, see the text below and Table 1 at the end of this chapter.) According to a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, Section 1207 was introduced ―in response to requests from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to help jump start S/CRS by providing authorization and funding for projects that would involve interagency coordination. This action was taken in recognition of the fact that Congress was unable to pass a State Department authorization bill that would authorize S/CRS to conduct a comparable program1 and ―because of the perception that it was easier to obtain funding from Congress‖ in the DOD bill rather than the State Department bill.2

Conditions Section 1207 authority requires that any services, defense articles, or funds provided or transferred to the Secretary of State comply with the authorities and limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, or any law making appropriations to carry out such Act. The Secretary of Defense must notify congressional armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees when the authority is exercised; the notification must be prepared ―in coordination‖ with the Secretary of State. As of FY2009, Section 1207 funds may not be used to support the budgets of foreign governments.

Funding Sources and Transfers Section 1207 legislation does not specify a funding source. From FY2006 to FY2008, DOD tapped operations and maintenance (O&M) funds from the

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three military services and from the DOD defense-wide account to make these transfers. For FY2009, Congress appropriated $100 million specifically for Section 1207 funding, although it had authorized up to $150 million in Section 1207 spending. For FY2010, Congress indicated that $97.09 million should be allocated for Section 1207 uses from the O&M Defense-wide, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) appropriation. In FY2006, DOD transferred $10 million to the State Department for assistance to Lebanon in the midst of the Lebanese conflict. According to a spokesperson for S/CRS, DOD lacked the funds for further transfers through this authority in FY2006, even though the authorized amount was $100 million. In FY2007, DOD transferred a total of $99.7 million to the State Department for programs in seven countries and regions. DOD described the projects funded in FY2007 as ―a few small focused activities in various critical countries/regions to demonstrate proof of concept‖ and judged that while largely successful, ―most could have more significant impact if continued or expanded.‖3 Countries benefiting from FY2007 Section 1207 funds were Colombia, Haiti, Nepal, Somalia, and Yemen. In addition, FY2007 funds supported regional activities in Southeast Asia and in the Trans-Sahara region. In FY2008, DOD provided $100 million in transfers from the DOD budget. This included $50 million for Georgia and $50 million for activities in six other countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. In FY2009, DOD transferred a total of $143.3 million to the State Department: $50 million for activities in Georgia and $93.3 million for activities in 11 other countries. The other countries are Bangladesh, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lebanon, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND STATEMENTS 2005-2007 Section 1207 authority was the result of a Senate floor amendment offered by Senator James Inhofe to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA (S. 1042), which would have provided funding up to $200 million per fiscal year. (For FY2006, the Administration had asked for $200 million for a State

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Department Conflict response fund, but neither authority nor funding was provided in non-DOD legislation.)4 Conferees on the FY2006 DOD authorization bill stated in their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360), that they were providing ―a temporary authority ... to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and adequately resourced.‖ Further, the conferees on that bill stated that they were not inclined to continue authorizing DOD funds to enable the State Department to ―fulfill its statutory authorities.‖ Subsequently, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in its report on S. 1547 (S.Rept. 110-77), the Senate version of the FY2008 NDAA, described Section 1207 as a ―pilot project.‖ In addition to extending the authority through FY2008, Section 1210 of the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181) augmented the role played by the Secretary of Defense. Under the FY2006 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense‘s role was limited to providing services and transferring defense articles and funds to the Secretary of State. The FY2008 NDAA included a provision requiring the Secretary of State to ―coordinate with the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and implementation of a program of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country that involves the provision of services or transfer of defense articles or funds‖ under this authority.

2008 In action on the FY2009 NDAA (P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008), Congress extended the $100 million Section 1207 transfer authority for one fiscal year, through FY2009. In a March 20, 2008, letter, DOD requested that Congress double Section 1207 authorized funding to $200 million per year, extend the authority for five fiscal years, and broaden the authority to permit DOD to provide that services or transfer defense articles and funds to the head of any U.S. government department or agency, not just the Department of State. As reported by SASC, its version of the FY2009 NDAA (S. 3001) would have doubled the authorized amount to $200 million, as requested by DOD, and would have extended Section 1207 authority three years, through September 30, 2011.5 The conference version of the bill conformed to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) version of the FY2009 NDAA (H.R. 5658), which did not change the authorized amount and provided for a one-year extension. Nevertheless, Congress did approve a special additional authority

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under Section 1207 to provide up to $50 million in Section 1207 assistance to Georgia in FY2009. In addition, Congress amended the original legislation to prohibit the use of Section 1207 funds to support the budgets of foreign governments.

2009

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In early May, DOD indicated in the DOD Summary Budget Justification document that it was requesting a $200 million appropriation for Section 1207 FY2010 funding.6 Nevertheless, in action on the FY2010 NDAA, Congress again extended existing authority for up to $100 million in transfer authority through September 30, 2010, the end of FY2010 (P.L. 111-84, signed into law October 28, 2009). As noted above, congressional appropriators indicated that $97.09 million should be allocated for Section 1207 spending from DSCA appropriations in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118, signed into law December 19, 2009, H.Rept. 111-380, December 15, 2009).

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS Appropriate Uses From the beginning, there has been some confusion about the appropriate uses of Section 1207 and questions about the desirability of funding State Department activities through the DOD budget. HASC and SASC reports on the their respective versions of the FY2009 NDAA (H.R. 5658 and S. 3001) both state separate concerns about Section 1207 authority, reflecting a perceived need to clarify intended purposes and restate the original congressional intention that Section 1207 was to be a temporary authority. In its report accompanying S. 3001 (S.Rept. 110-335, May 12, 2008), SASC stated that DOD had ―inappropriately restricted‖ the uses for which Section 1207 services or funds can be provided to the State Department. Pointing to the Secretary of Defense‘s April 15, 2008, testimony at a HASC hearing that Section 1207 authority ―is primarily for bringing civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of our armed forces,‖ SASC stated that the legislative intent of Section 1207 authority was broader, and was meant ―to

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enable the Secretary of Defense to support the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.‖ SASC further stated such assistance could include ―providing early civilian resources to avert a crisis that could otherwise subsequently require U.S. military forces to assist or intervene.‖7 In May 2009, DOD seemed to reply to this statement in its FY2010 Budget Request Summary Justification document, in which it asserts that Section 1207 funding is ―for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance—primarily to put civilian professionals alongside warfighters, or to provide early civilian resources to avert crises that could require U.S. military forces to intervene.‖8 In its report accompanying H.R. 5658 (H.Rept. 110-652, May 16, 2008), HASC stated that the committee ―reaffirms that the resources provided under this authority are intended to meet immediate, short-term needs.‖ The committee reiterated the concern that had been expressed in the conference report accompanying the original Section 1207 legislation (H.Rept. 109-360, December 15, 2005) that DOD should not provide long-term funding in order to enable the Department of State to ―fulfill its statutory requirements.‖ This concern, according to H.Rept. 110-652, applied to both long-term development programs and to the broader security assistance initiatives ―that would be better suited for traditional foreign military financing authorities.‖

Transfer of Section 1207 Functions to the State Department and USAID In addition to some Members of Congress, some outside analysts believe that Section 1207 activities would be better funded through the State Department and/or USAID. (DOD has never requested that Section 1207 be made permanent law, although it did, as mentioned above, request in 2008 that Congress extend the authority for five fiscal years.) While noting the utility of DOD Section 1207 funding, which enables the U.S. government ―to meet critical needs and to take advantage of key opportunities,‖ the USIP report mentioned above urges that in the future Congress appropriate such quick reaction funding to the State Department. ―The DOD could still participate in deciding on project proposals, but the money would be guaranteed and could be made available more quickly. This would require coordinating the efforts of various congressional committees, but it would restore the traditional role of the DOS [Department of State] in funding U.S. foreign assistance.‖9

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In action on the FY2010 defense authorization and appropriations acts, and the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related appropriations act, armed services authorizers, defense appropriators, and foreign operations appropriators expressed the sense that the State Department should have responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction funding. However, some attributed continued funding under DOD to a lack of State Department capacity to handle the funding. Conferees on the FY2010 NDAA stated that ―Congress has always intended for this transfer authority to be temporary and are disappointed that the Department of State has not yet achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory requirements. The conferees urge the administration to work toward this goal as rapidly as possible. They further recommend that the administration examine ways to maintain this coordination [between DOD and State Department] in the absence of this authority‖ (H.Rept. 111-288, October 7, 2009). Similarly, in action on their versions of the FY2010 NDAA (H.R. 2647 and S. 1390), the House and Senate armed services committees both stressed the temporary nature of Section 1207 authority.10 House Armed Services Committee members wrote: ―While the projects undertaken with funds provided by this authority are worthy, the committee is concerned that insufficient progress has been made in building the capacity within the Department of State to assume the statutory and fiscal responsibility necessary to fulfill its statutory requirements.... The committee stresses that it has always been a temporary authority and urges the Administration to develop capacity within the Department of State so that this transfer authority is no longer required‖ (H.Rept. 111-166, p. 413). The Senate Armed Services Committee also ―reaffirms its view that Section 1207 is a temporary authority‖ (S.Rept. 111-35, p. 193). Foreign operations appropriators expressed similar sentiments. In creating a new USAID Complex Crises Fund, conferees on the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Division F, P.L. 111-117, signed into law December 16, 2009), urged the State Department and USAID to develop additional capacity in order to replace Section 1207 DOD funding with additional funding Complex Crisis funding. ―USAID and the Department of State should continue to establish and bolster crisis prevention and response capabilities in order to assume most, if not all, of the functions currently funded‖ by DOD under Section 1207 authority, they wrote. However, the conferees also specified that ―USAID and the Departments of State and

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Department of Defense ―Section 1207‖ Security and Stabilization… 137 Defense shall continue to consult on the formulation and implementation of stabilization and security assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or funds appropriated by this Act.‖ Earlier, in action on its version of the FY20 10 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (S. 1434), the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) would have created a larger fund in the State Department budget. It stated that the purpose of the fund, to be used together with other funds in the bill, was to assist the State Department‘s effort to ―assume most if not all of the functions currently funded‖ by Section 1207 (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 46). Further, the committee expressed its intention that DOD and the State Department ―coordinate formulation and implementation of security and stabilization assistance, as appropriate, whether through the utilization of section 1207 or the new capabilities [that SAC would have provided] within the Department of State‖ (S.Rept. 111-44, p. 47). In action on the FY2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118), defense appropriators also signaled that they did not expect to again provide DOD funds for Section 1207-type activities. They did expect, however, that DOD would remain involved in future planning for such activities even though they would be funded by other agencies. In their report (H.Rept. 111-380), conferees on the bill recommended an allocation of $97.09 million (from the overall Defense Security Cooperation Agency appropriation) to serve as a bridge fund while the Complex Crises Fund was put in place. That fund ―will enable USAID and the Department of Sate to meet emergent requirements that fall under their purview without relying on the Department of Defense,‖ the conferees wrote. Nevertheless, they directed the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director of USAID ―to maintain and strengthen the interagency process created from the section 1207 program when formulating, reviewing, and approving future projects that would have been funded through section 1207.‖

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Table 1. Section 1207 Funded Projects, by Country or Region, FY2006-FY2009 Amount ($ millions) Country Project’s Purpose FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Afghanistan Renovate the Pol-e-Charki prison. 10.0 Bangladesh Provide mentoring, training, and technical 15.1 assistance to enhance community-based policing skills, and to provide outreach to communities and training to local volunteer groups in order to strengthen ties between communities and government authorities ($8.0 million). Support the Bangladeshi government‘s curriculum development for and oversight of unregulated privatelyfinanced madrassahs ($7. 1 million). Colombia Help provide, with FY07 funds, basic 4.0 5.0 4.8 health, education, and infrastructure in areas recently reclaimed from insurgents through the Initial Government Response Program. FY08 funds support implementation of the Integrated Consolidation Plan for La Macarena Region (PCIM), a unified military and civilian strategy. FY09 funds provide infrastructure, technical assistance, and education to at-risk populations in the Meta region. Democratic Extend central government authority to 9.1 5.8 Republic of Eastern Congo. FY08 funds used to enhance Congo border police capabilities to control the

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Country

Georgia

Project’s Purpose border in Northern Katanga; extend reach of justice services and facilitate prosecution in remote areas; increase the activity and accountability of local governments. FY09 funds improve the prosecution and adjudication of gender-based violence and other crimes, and reinforce provincial government capacity to provide key services ($2.8 million). They also provide training to police in sexual and gender-based violence ($2.97 million). With FY08 funds, rebuild the police force ($20 million) and meet priority food, shelter, and livelihood requirements for internally displaced persons in Shida Kartli ($30 million). FY09 funds provide stabilization assistance in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict with Russia. Assistance includes resettlement and livelihood support, and vocational training for Internally Displaced Persons; rebuilding of schools and municipal infrastructure; landmine surveys and clearance; and restoration of Georgian Coast Guard infrastructure.

Amount ($ millions) FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09

50.0

50.0

Table 1 (Continued)

Haiti

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Kenya

Lebanon

Combine community policing with smallscale employment and infrastructure projects to improve security and stability and extend central government authority in Cite Soleil, Port au Prince‘s largest slum (Haiti Stabilization Initiative.) In the areas most affected by post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008, support leadership development and positive civic engagement among disaffected youth, improve morale within police units and foster trust between police and local commu-nities; enhance Kenyan military‘s ability to provide security and stability, help train military engineers in civil affairs; and provide equipment for rebuilding infrastructure damaged by postelection violence. With FY06 funds, clear unexploded ordnance posing an immediate threat to noncombatants ($5 million). Help train and outfit additional Lebanese Internal Security Force

20.0

8.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

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Country

Morocco

Project’s Purpose (ISF) members (i.e., Lebanon‘s national police) to allow police to free Lebanese Army forces performing policing duties in the Bekaa Valley to enforce the IsraeliHezbollah cease-fire in southern Lebanon ($5 million). With FY07 funds, strengthen the ISF communications capacity ($5.0 million) and assist the ISF in introducing community and proximity policing in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and surrounding areas ($5 million). With FY09 funds, strengthen ISF forces ability to provide security by implementing a nationwide communications system that will help them perform police duties and reduce vulnerability to outside interference and surveillance. With $5.08 million in FY09 funds, teach life skills to at-risk youth who are imprisonned or have been released from prison without rehabilitation instruction and may be susceptible to terrorist messages ($5.08 million).

Amount ($ millions) FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09

5.1

Table 1 (Continued)

Nepal

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Panama

Paraguay

Philippines

Extend the government‘s police presence to four districts at risk of communist domination and create community-based infrastructure projects in those districts. Provide social and security programs to curb infiltration of Panama‘s Darien region, which adjoins Colombia, by members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and criminals fleeing counterinsurgency and counternarcotics initiatives in Colombia ($5.07 million). Promote stability in Paraguay‘s five poorest and most volatile provinces where criminal activity flourishes and threatens to destabilize the tri-border area (with Argentina and Brazil) by bolstering regional law enforcement, strengthening local government and citizen confidence, and fostering economic growth ($6.69 million). Support community policing, improve three model police stations, and upgrade capabilities of the Regional Crime Lab in Zamboanga City, Mindanao. Also construct roads and boat landings in Mindanao.

10.0

5. 1

6.7

14.0

Country .

Somalia

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Sri Lanka

Project’s Purpose Support civilian police reform, security and justice infrastructure rehabilitation, youth employment and income generation activities ($17.5 million, Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization Program), and enhance community-police coordination for cross-border security and to establish neutral zones ($7.5 million). With FY08 funds, support programs to improve livelihoods for conflict-affected populations, assist government institutions, building the technical capacity of municipal and provincial governments, encourage citizen participation, and foster a bilingual environment in Sri Lanka‘s eastern province. With FY09 funds, complement Section 1207-funded FY08 projects by improving basic policing skills and practices in the East by training civilian police officers ($2.0 million). Also with FY09 funds, support the return and reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced persons in the north of the country ($10.28 million).

Amount ($ millions) FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 25.0

6.0

12.3

Table 1 (Continued)

Tajikistan

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Uganda

Yemen

Southeast Asia Region

Provide training and technical assistance to local government, local law enforcement representatives, and community leaders to enhance skills to promote stability in conflict-affected and unstable areas, including the Ferghana and Rasht Valleys and the Afghan border areas. Create 8 Justice Community Centers to reestablish justice, law, and order in north Uganda. Funding ($6.46) to support construction, training, technical aid, and institutional guidance and development of the Uganda police force and other justice and law enforcement institutions. Promote stability by assisting in areas where the central government is largely absent in order to deter youths from joining terrorist groups. Support the multi-year, interagency, ―3-D‖ (diplomacy, development, and defense) Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative to deter terrorist recruitment and deny terrorists

9.9

6.5

8.8

16.9

Country

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TransSahara Region

Totals

Project’s Purpose sanctuary in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Support Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership programs in Mali and Niger to reduce terrorist recruiting and sanctuary areas. (Mauritania was originally part of the program, but its funds were not spent due to sanctions imposed after the August 2008 coup., according to information provided by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development.) 10.0

Amount ($ millions) FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09

15.0

99.7

100.0

143.3

Sources: Office of the Secretary of Defense for FY2006-FY2008 information and figures, last verified June 1, 2009. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development (S/CRS) for FY2009 information and figures, January 26, 2010. Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

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End Notes

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1

Robert M. Perito, Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, July 2008, p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as Integrated Security Assistance.) 2 Integrated Security Assistance, p. 3. 3 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 104. 4 For more on the conflict response fund, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino. 5 In testimony before Congress in April 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates requested that Section 1207 authority be extended for five years and the amount be doubled to $200 million. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process, April 15, 2008. Video and audio versions of the hearing are available through http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/schedules/2008.shtml, last accessed June 1, 2009. 6 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, p. 1-13. Hereinafter referred to as FY2010 Budget Justification. 7 In February 2008, the State Department and DOD set forth guidance for Section 1207 proposals that clarified the uses of the fund and procedures for developing proposals and coordinating with other agencies and programs. This document specifies that programs should ―clearly advance U.S. security interests by promoting regional stability and/or building governance capacity of foreign partners to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism,‖ ―focus on security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives in regions and countries where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. forces,‖ ―address urgent or emergent threats or opportunities that conventional foreign assistance activities cannot address in the required time frame,‖ ―seek to achieve short term security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives that are coordinated with longer-term development efforts and that are expected to be sustained by the host government, international organizations, or other forms of U.S. foreign assistance,‖ and ―address stability, security, and development goals from a holistic perspective, integrating initiatives across multiple sectors.‖ (See http://www.crs.state.gov /index.cfm?fuseactions=public.display&shortcut=4PRW.) 8 FY2010 Budget Justification, May 2009, pp. 1-13. This statement continues: ―These programs help to promote stability and to reduce terrorist space and influence. The programs are often executed in the same place where U.S. forces are operating or may be forced to operate if conditions worsened.‖ 9 Integrated Security Assistance, p. 11. 10 Under its version of the bill (H.R. 2647), HASC would have reduced FY1207 authority to $25 million for FY2010, while the SASC version (S. 1390) would have retained the full $100 million.

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Chapter 5

REPORT OF INSPECTION: OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION-REPORT NO. ISP-I-07-25, MAY 2007

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United States Department of State KEY JUDGMENTS Despite its broad mandate, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc- tion and Stabilization (S/CRS) has not yet carved out a leadership role in the management of reconstruction and stabilization crises. It has remained on the periphery in the interagency handling of such crises, playing only an incremental role. At present, S/CRS has four central issues on its agenda that will determine whether it will expand significantly the parameters of its present responsibilities and establish for itself a viable institutional role. These issues are: a new relationship with the Director of Foreign Assistance, a major role in implementing the S/CRS charter in National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), a lead role in developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), and management of the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) FY 2007 $100 million transfer authority.

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United States Department of State Although S/CRS has not played the role its proponents hoped it would, the S/CRS divisions have continued to develop doctrine, manage exercises, and provide useful, albeit limited, assistance to embassies through the Active Response Corps (ARC). S/CRS has excellent leadership, an able committed staff, and surprisingly high morale. S/CRS needs to restructure. Its current organizational pattern does not adequately reflect the actual delineation of responsibilities within the office and inhibits coordination and communication.

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The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 23 and February 9, 2007. Ambassador Daniel O‘Donohue (team leader), Richard English (deputy team leader), Alan Berenson, Don Bramante, Eric Chavera, Siobhan Hulihan, Kristene McMinn, and Vandana Patel conducted the inspection.

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION – STILL STRUGGLING FOR A VIABLE ROLE S/CRS was formally created in June 2004 and placed in the Office of the Secretary in response to problems perceived by Congress, academia, and the executive branch in the organizing of a coordinated, civilian-agency approach to reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, its focus was to be on future crises, not Iraq/Afghanistan. The S/CRS mandate was broad and diffuse: to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U. S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and help stabilize and reconstruct societies that are in transition from conflict or civil strife. In December 2005, that mandate was codified in NSPD-44, giving the Secretary of State, and at her direction S/CRS, responsibility for pulling together all U.S. government civilian agencies in an integrated governmentwide effort to prepare, plan, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related efforts. NSPD44 assigns to the Secretary, with S/CRS assistance, the lead role in developing reconstruction and stabilization strategies, ensuring civilian interagency program and policy coordination, and

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 149

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carrying out a wide range of other actions, including development of a civilian surge capacity to meet reconstruction and stabilization emergencies. The Secretary and S/CRS are also charged with coordinating with DOD on reconstruction and stabilization responses, and integrating planning and implementing procedures. Despite its congressional and presidential mandates, S/CRS, in its two and one- half years of existence, has struggled to find a viable institutional role within the Department of State (Department) and the interagency community. It has faced various problems that include: S/CRS has received adequate funding from the Department‘s operations budget, but in FY 2006 and FY 2007, congressional appropriation commit- tees rejected Administration funding requests for major S/CRS program activities. ($200 million was requested in FY 2006 and $75 million in FY 2007.) The pending FY 2008 request is $25 million. Whatever the language of the Secretary‘s broad mandate, S/CRS has found little traction within the Department, and with other key interagency players, in its efforts to play a lead role in reconstruction and stabilization of nations in crisis. Usually, it finds itself on the sidelines or marginlly involved, in part because the other players have not seen what value or resources S/CRS could add. The original S/CRS approach was perceived by some major officials of the Department and other agencies as bureaucratically overreaching and overly theoretical. For its part, S/CRS encountered quiet, yet strong, bureaucratic resistance from entities that resented its efforts to carry out its responsibilities. In sum, S/CRS has been unable to carve out the leadership role assigned to it. That inability has led to skepticism as to whether the office will be able to play a major role in managing reconstruction and stabilization, and some original proponents outside the Department are writing S/CRS off as a failed experiment. Although it has not yet achieved the role expected of it, S/CRS has achieved several significant accomplishments. Among them are: It created an office whose staff has grown from 20 to 74, giving it sufficient capacity to undertake responsibilities in planning, development of doctrines, and country engagements. The office has also attracted a well-motivated and capable staff.

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United States Department of State

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S/CRS has an embryonic ARC and a Standb Reserve Corps (SRC) and is creating a CRC to meet the eventual surge needs of civilian agencies. It has dispatched representatives to Darfur, Chad, Lebanon, Nepal, and Haiti. In Kosovo, S/CRS is, for the first time, playing the broad interagency planning role envisioned at its creation. It is also bringing its expertise to bear in contingency planning for a number of other atrisk countries It is now actively engaged in a range of planning, exercises, and other activities with the DOD, Joint Staff, Joint Forces, and other military commands. In the multilateral framework, S/CRS has added reconstruction and stabilization issues to the agenda of the Group of Eight major industrial democracies and is working closely with the United Nations and key bilateral partners, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. S/CRS has 74 employees, including 15 authorized positions, 20 Foreign Service officers serving one-year tours, and 39 employees on detail from other agencies and on contract. It manages a budget of $6.5 million and coordinates up to $100 million provided by DOD under Section 1207 of Public Law 109163.

PRESENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS S/CRS hit its nadir in 2006. The office had been leaderless for five months after the December 2005 departure of the former Coordinator. Its staff had struggled unsuccessfully to find a meaningful role within the interagency arena. Furthermore, there was a general sense of drift as the key agencies and Department offices that originally supported S/CRS were seen expressing a lack of confidence by pulling back personnel they had assigned to the office. Coincident with the arrival of the new Coordinator in June 2006, S/CRS has seen a reversal of its fortunes. After first reinvigorating S/CRS with a renewed sense of mission, the Coordinator actively sought engagement with regional bureaus by sending small groups of personnel to support bureau and embassy efforts in managing crises and near-crisis situations, most notably in Darfur and Lebanon. For the first time, S/CRS undertook operational tasks and

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 151 had its first experiences in actual reconstruction and stabilization environments. The S/CRS contributions were at most incremental, but they elicited positive feedback from other Department players. More importantly, four major developments are in play that, over the next months, will determine the parameters of the organization‘s future role and responsibilities. How S/CRS meets these challenges will largely determine its longer-term institutional viability and whether it will fulfill its role as the Department‘s central focus for coordination of reconstruction and stabilization planning, operations, and resource management. These issues center on the S/CRS relationship with the Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance (F), its response to NSPD-44, its ability to develop a civilian surge capacity, and its role regarding DOD support and Section 1207 transfer authority.

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The Relationship with the Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance In response to the problems S/CRS was having in gaining traction within the Department and in the interagency framework, the Secretary made the Coordinator a deputy director in F, while preserving S/CRS‘s mandated direct reporting link to the Secretary. Attaching S/CRS to F was logical and was generally welcomed within the Department as enhancing S/CRS‘s bureaucratic clout and giving the Coordinator a needed major interlocutory role in the development, packaging, and processing of integrated resource requests for nations that had been identifi ed as targets for U.S. reconstruction and stabilization programs. At the same time, there are potential pitfalls in the F relationship relating to S/CRS‘s broader responsibilities, should the relationship become a precursor to absorption into the larger F structure and subsequent diversion of S/CRS attention from its priorities outside of foreign assistance. Recognizing that the new F relationship will inevitably mean change in the S/CRS organizational alignment, the current S/CRS designation should be maintained as a structure that clearly contains the current range of S/CRS responsibilities and activities. The relationship with F should not impinge on S/CRS‘s capacity to meet its other crisis-management tasks. Further, designation of the Coordinator as an Ambassador at Large would also enhance his role. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team has conveyed these views to F.

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United States Department of State

National Security Presidential Directive-44

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NSPD-44 is the bedrock document, codifying the role and responsibilities of the Secretary of State, with S/CRS assistance. The directive is not selfenforcing, and S/CRS has labored over a year to secure interagency consensus on a mechanism to implement the directive and defi ne the roles of S/CRS, the regional bureaus, and other agency players. The consensus document, agreed on in a January 25, 2007, policy coordination committee meeting, has been viewed by S/CRS as a signal achievement for the office, a view shared by several regional bureaus and other major agency participants. That draft document provides, for the first time, a highly structured, uniform, interagency approach, with a well-defi ned, major role for S/CRS in responding to reconstruction and stabilization crises. There is still more work to do on the NSPD-44 implementing document, and there are major challenges ahead. The S/CRS-designed structured approach to crises is still untested in a real-world situation. It may yet be found to be overly cumbersome, even unworkable, with its troika-like leadership, which includes the staffs of the National Security Council, S/CRS, and the involved regional bureau. Nevertheless, S/CRS deserves credit for persevering through protracted interagency negotiations to achieve consensus on the implementing document.

Development of a Civilian Surge Capacity One of the major S/CRS mission objectives is the development of a civilian surge capacity to meet the demands of crisis reconstruction and stabilization. Besides the creation and development of the CRC, as discussed in this section, this chapter also addresses S/CRS‘s existing capacity to meet surge requirements via the ARC and SRC. The Iraq situation, the President‘s decision to increase troop levels, and the con-comitant need for a civilian agency surge, have raised the need for a CRC to priority status. The President touched on that issue in his 2007 State of the Union message, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also weighed in on the need for greater civilian capacity to meet the challenges of reconstruction and stabilization. The Secretary repeatedly outlined to Congress, and in her public statements, the need for a CRC that has diverse skills not found among Civil or Foreign Service personnel and that the Department could call on in reconstruction and

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 153 stabilization crises. The Secretary also indicated the Department would submit specific proposals for congressional consideration. On a priority basis, S/CRS, in concert with the National Security Council staff, is developing a fleshed-out CRC proposal, with an attendant legislative action strategy. In 2005-06, S/CRS did preliminary work on developing a CRC, commissioning the Bearing Point Company to produce an extensive report on the development of a governmental civilian reserve capability for deployment in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The report was delivered in May 2006 and was the basis for initial tentative efforts in December 2006 to move ahead on the civilian reserve concept. The OIG team has concerns about relying on that report as the foundation for developing the CRC, however, since the report has not been subjected to rigorous analysis within S/CRS, and other interested Department offices have not assessed the report‘s utility in meeting the Department‘s civilian reserve needs. Also, S/CRS has not yet set up a mechanism to secure the contributions of operational offices in the Department and other key agencies in the effort to design the Department‘s congressional presentation on the CRC. S/CRS needs to establish a working group to engage key operational entities in the Department and other agencies in the creation and development of the CRC. Such a working group would allow early contributions of those offices in the planning process and enlist their help in the effort to secure congressional support and establish the CRC. Participants in such a group could include the Department of Justice, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and representatives of the Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Population, Refugees, and Migration; Near Eastern Affairs; and South and Central Asian Affairs. It would also assure that the CRC concept would be integrated into an overall approach of embracing the existing and future surge plans of individual operational offices. S/CRS agrees with the need to establish an effective dialogue with the major program and operational offices having experience in the field. Recommendation 1: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish an ongoing mechanism by which the senior levels of the major program and operational offices of the Department and other agencies will engage in the development and establishment of the Civilian Reserve Corps. (Action: S/CRS)

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Department of Defense Support and Section 1207 Transfer Authority DOD has been an active, vocal supporter of the concept of a strong S/CRS having broad authority. Although disappointed at the failure of S/CRS to play that role, DOD has remained an active supporter, most obviously through its transfer of Section 1207 authority funds for S/CRS programs. Section 1207 of Public Law 109-163 authorizes the DOD to provide services, Defense articles, and funds to the Department of up to $100 million annually in FY 2006 and FY 2007. The authority provides for reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance to a foreign country to restore or maintain peace and security. Generally, a Section 1207 initiative may be proposed by any U.S. agency, and funding for such foreign assistance can be used by any agency at the direction of the Secretary of State. S/CRS is charged with coordinating submissions for funding under Section 1207 and monitoring project implementation. In 2006, DOD transferred $10 million to the Department under Section 1207, funds allocated entirely to projects in Lebanon. S/CRS, as coordinator for the U.S. effort in Lebanon, sent the director of its Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management to Beirut for two months to oversee the program and assure proper use of the funds. So far in 2007, $20 million in Section 1207 funds is destined for programs in Haiti, and the Haiti advisor in the S/CRS Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination has been assigned as team leader to oversee project implementation. In 2006, there was an initial period of bureaucratic confusion involving S/CRS, USAID, and other Department players as they grappled with DOD rules for Section 1207 transfer authority. S/CRS has since drafted comprehensive guidelines for handling submissions of Section 1207 funding requests. The guidelines are awaiting Department clearances. The OIG team informally recommended that S/CRS gain the needed clearances and publish and disseminate the guidelines to ensure maximum utilization of Section 1207 funds.

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ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS

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Executive Direction In his seven-month tenure, the Coordinator has given strong leadership and effective policy direction to S/CRS. The office‘s staff speak highly of his personal qualities and give him full marks for having reinvigorated the office in the wake of the five-month hiatus after the departure of the previous Coordinator. He has also worked effectively to establish good relations with key officials of the Department and other agencies and entities having a role with S/CRS, including the regional bureaus. Those interviewed at the Department, DOD, USAID, and in Congress, including critics of the S/CRS role, expressed near-universal respect and appreciation for the Coordinator‘s performance. The relationship between the Coordinator and his deputy is excellent, paralleling the traditional embassy pattern found between an Ambassador and deputy chief of mission. The deputy focuses primarily on internal management and coordination of the office‘s disparate elements and easily substitutes for the Coordinator in interagency forums. In the pattern of his predecessor, however, the Coordinator is very much the main actor and takes center stage in all major policy issues. Both officials are open and easy in their relationships with S/CRS personnel, working hard at ensuring good communication and coordination. Overall S/CRS performs impressively under the hands-on direction of the Coordinator and deputy. The Coordinator and deputy are both adroit, confident interlocutors in the public arena. They actively and regularly engage congressional staff, the media, and academia in pursuit of S/CRS policy objectives. Public diplomacy is at the forefront of their activities. At the same time, the front office and S/CRS, as a whole, suffer from a formal organizational structure that inhibits effective management, coordination, and communication. S/CRS functions well despite, not because of, its current internal organization. This chapter elsewhere deals with the need for an office-wide restructuring. The S/CRS executive office has 14 people, including seven substantive assistants, advisors, military liaison officers, and contractors, blurring lines of authority and communication. Within S/CRS there is a general sense that personnel not directly related to support of the Coordinator and deputy should be placed in the divisions appropriate to their responsibilities. S/CRS would function more effectively if the front office only

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consisted of direct support staff, a single military advisor, and a legislative and public affairs unit that coordinated outreach activities. The remaining staff could be assigned to the offices dealing with their areas of activity. S/CRS agrees with the need to reorganize the front office.

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Recommendation 2: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should reduce the number of staff members who report directly to the Coordinator and the deputy coordinator to include only personnel that directly support the Coordinator and deputy. (Action: S/CRS) One by-product of S/CRS organizational weakness is the excessive use of meetings to ensure coordination and communication. Both the Coordinator and deputy have too long a list of daily and weekly internal meetings. The OIG team informally recommended that they review and reduce the number of meetings. The current increased pace of major program- and policy-related activities puts heavy demands on the Coordinator and deputy. Internally, S/CRS has grown in the past years from an original staff of 20 to 74. And the office is slated to grow more, with 57 additional positions requested for FY 2008. The office‘s yet-undefi ned relationship with F will put new responsibilities on the S/CRS leadership and on NSPD44 implementation. The Coordinator will personally be increasingly absorbed in the high-priority Department campaign to create and secure congressional support for the CRC concept. Furthermore, the Coordinator and deputy are senior Foreign Service officers. Thus, the office needs a broader interagency leadership team. S/CRS agrees that the office needs a second deputy position, preferably a USAID senior officer with program/crisis management experience. Recommendation 3: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should request that the Bureau of Human Resources ask the U.S. Agency for International Development to detail a senior officer to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to serve as a deputy coordinator. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with HR)

Bureau Strategic Plan S/CRS has faced great uncertainties about its role and responsibilities and the resources that will be available to it. In light of these uncertainties, S/CRS

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 157 has had difficulty with planning. The Bureau of Resource Management‘s Office of Strategic and Performance Planning has criticized previous S/CRS Bureau Performance Plan submissions, and S/CRS needs to pay more attention to the Bureau Strategic Plan process and to future strategic planning.

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Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination S/CRS‘s Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination (BPC) is well managed and has a multifaceted character. In coordination with other government entities, the office produced several detailed, comprehensive lessons-learned guides for government planners about post-conflict stabilization, including an essential tasks matrix and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration guide. Besides its lessons-learned role, the office constructs country-specific strategic plans and undertakes operational activities abroad. The office developed a one-year strategic planning template for Haiti, a compact, yet complete listing of the elements needed to support U.S. policy goals. During the inspection, two officers left for a two-week operational visit to the U.S. embassy in Haiti. Overall, the office is congenial and has a skilled, motivated, and dedicated staff as well as efficient and generous management that deals well with a heavy and constantly shifting workload and unforgiving deadlines. The office director, besides managerial duties, has a signifi cant operational portfolio, but has not had a deputy director. The last deputy director left in September 2006 and will not be replaced until a Foreign Service officer arrives in summer 2007. There is some functional ambiguity in the office‘s structure. Countryspecific operations consume over half of the office‘s time, with priorities changing as crises arise. The office shares these country workloads with other S/CRS elements. The Haiti team‘s organizational leader is in BPC, for instance, but the team members are spread out over three offices. The Cuba team, also led by BPC, encompasses team members spread over about four S/CRS offices. And plans for both country teams foresee the addition of signifi cantly more staff. The result is a vague functional structure that blurs lines of authority, pulls too few positions in too many directions, and adds an element of unpredictability in an already unstructured environment. The office structure is adversely affected by the inclusion of many temporary staff members. Ten of 11 positions in the office are filled by detailees, contractors, or Foreign Service officers on limited-tenure assignments. Only one staff member is a full-time employee. The advantage

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provided to the office‘s coordinating role by having detailees from other agencies is countered by a sense of instability and loss of continuity because of the many temporary employees. The office‘s coordination role is being squeezed by its large countryspecific duties. As a result, increasingly fewer hours can be devoted to sectoral coordination, and S/CRS has yet to fi rmly establish its preeminence in interagency coordination. Furthermore, the office must deal with other large governmental entities that also have planning, coordination, and operational responsibilities. USAID, for example, has an Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has an Office of Policy, Planning, and Coordination. In sum, the blurred lines of authority, increasing country-specific activity, and the signifi- cant coordination role imposed on a relatively small staff, all support S/CRS reorganization and restructuring, as recommended elsewhere in this chapter.

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Office of Early Warning and Prevention (EWP) The Office of Early Warning and Prevention (EWP) has seven employees, runs well, and has sound leadership. It is staffed by talented, experienced, and motivated officers who seem to thrive on a steady diet of conflicts around the world. As in other S/CRS offices, the staff spends over half its efforts on country-specific operations. But most of its country work fits into its primary early-warning role. Zimbabwe, for example, was the subject of an EWP-led prevention planning exercise. Though not specific to EWP, many regional operations cut across office lines and have changing priorities that respond to the crisis of the moment; this contributes to a sense of an unstructured, even amorphous, S/CRS organization. One distinguishing feature of EWP is its concentration on near-term, emerging conflicts, as opposed to post-conflict stabilization, the concern of other elements in S/CRS. For example, in coordination with the interagency community, the office produced a broad-based methodology to assess instability and conflict; the guide covers such topics as diagnosing sources of conflict and understanding trends of conflict. The office is now engaged in the first test of that methodology, working with an interagency committee. In another country-specific exercise, also part of its early warning and prevention mandate, the office played a major role in assessing the sources of instability and conflict in Chad.

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 159 The office has a strong coordinating role in its conflict assessment responsibility, involving the Department, DOD, USAID, the intelligence community, and others. Its success can be measured by the high quality of its major works and their implementation. The office‘s heavy workload rarely impinges on its effort on the important coordination process, mostly due to the high quality of its staff and leadership.

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Office of Planning The Office of Planning works with the interagency community and Department bureaus and offices to plan for stabilization, reconstruction, and conflict transformation arising from country crises, failed or failing states, or other unstable country conditions. For example, it provided leadership for the draft U.S. Planning Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Conflict Transformation, which was recently adopted as part of the NSPD-44 process. The office is well managed and performs effectively, but organizational problems that affect S/CRS as a whole tend to impede the office‘s performance. The authorizing legislation for S/CRS and NSPD-44 provide for an S/CRS planning function. By statute, S/CRS must plan for such requirements as demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, and to coordinate interagency plans for response efforts. Planning is aimed at diminishing destructive forms of conflict and developing local institutions to prevent a nation from falling back into violent conflict. The office led collaborative efforts to develop a four-part set of planning and metric tools, including an update of the Planning Framework, the development of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Tasks Matrix, and a metrics framework to assess program progress and effectiveness. These tools form a major part of U.S. efforts at stabilization, reconstruction, and conflict transformation. But a major concern is whether the planning process produces analysis, strategy, and tactics that will, in fact, be useful and practical in the field. In that respect, there will be no substitute for constant, determined, managerial vigilance and energy to ensure realism and practicality in planning. Many planning staff members work on country-specific projects. For example, S/CRS has engaged in several country-specific planning exercises that cut across office lines, including those for Haiti, Sudan, post-Castro Cuba, and Kosovo. The office also assigned one officer whose principal

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responsibility is to develop the use of metrics to measure results in these exercises and to teach and advise others in S/CRS on the use of metrics. The Office of Planning‘s managerial problems are common to all of S/CRS. With the office actively engaged in an innovative field, prioritization of work is sometimes a problem. Staff members still encounter organizational ambiguity in this relatively new office. And the frequent turnover in staff, stemming from the use of contractors and Foreign Service officers on one-year tours, has made it more difficult to develop in-depth expertise and continuity. In addition, S/CRS is in danger of losing the interagency character that it had immediately after its formation. At the time of the inspection, only two officers, out of the Office of Planning‘s staff of 12, were representing another agency. To be effective in interagency coordination the office needs to continue to recruit from other agencies.

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Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management The Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management encompasses two different functions under one directorate. Two of its sections, Concept Development and the ARC, have duties related to developing and implementing an integrated U.S. government civilian response to foreign crises and conflicts, while a third section, the management unit, performs traditional administrative functions for S/CRS and its staff. This organizational structure is an awkward combination for one director to manage and will become more difficult as S/CRS continues to grow and its resource management responsibilities increase. The planned reorganization of S/CRS, discussed elsewhere in this chapter, addresses the problem. Overall, the office is plagued by some of the same problems faced by other S/CRS offices. These problems include rapid turnover, with many employees on oneyear tours or temporarily detailed from other offices and agencies, and having functions that cross office lines, resulting in unclear lines of authority.

Concept Development Unit The unit consists of five employees and a chief, who is also the deputy director for the Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management. The unit is involved in a number of other initiatives and projects related to improving the operational response to conflict. These include facilitating and serving on working groups to implement NSPD-44, coordinating with other agencies and Department offices to build a robust civilian response capability,

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developing operational doctrine for integrated interagency field teams (Advance Civilian Teams), and developing training to ensure that responders have the essential skills in each phase of reconstruction and stabilization. Working with the Foreign Service Institute and other S/CRS offices, the staff has designed five courses related to reconstruction and stabilization that have been attended by over 300 interagency personnel. The Concept Development unit is a key player in developing a civilian surge capability, an S/CRS main objective. The first element in developing this capability, the ARC, has been up and running for the past year and represents a major accomplishment for S/CRS and the Concept Development staff. The second element is the SRC.

Active Response Corps The ARC represents the Department‘s first-responder capability, those who will be the first employees on the ground in a crisis or post-conflict situation. The current corps consists of 11 S/CRS staff members, including a director who plans and executes operational deployments to support reconstruction and stabilization policy objectives. The ARC‘s establishment was an early success story for S/CRS. Its members have been deployed to hot spots such as Darfur, Lebanon, and Kosovo, and their work has garnered positive feedback from the regional bureaus and posts. When not deployed, ARC members are in training, participating in other U.S. government exercises, planning for possible future deployments, and working with other S/CRS offices and Department bureaus on related issues. The ARC and other offices recognize that the ARC needs to be better integrated into S/CRS work. In the past, there have been misunderstandings about the role of the ARC, and ARC members have sometimes been excluded from planning activities and meetings where their participation would add value and that would aid them in their understanding of potential deployments. Coordination is improving, and a recent meeting between the ARC and the other S/CRS office directors was said to be educational for all parties. Because ARC members are on the front lines of S/CRS reconstruction and stabilization efforts, there is always a danger of over-deploying ARC members when responding to requests from regional bureaus or embassies. The office has carefully offered assistance, when needed and when resources are available, and is avoiding work that is only marginally related to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

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The Standby Response Corps The second element is the SRC, which consists of over 350 active and retired Foreign Service officers who have volunteered for deployment in overseas crises. So far, two members of the SRC have been deployed, one to Chad and one to Darfur. The SRC is still very much a work in progress, as problems continue to be ironed out. Although the volunteers are available for deployment, and their home bureaus and posts have agreed in principle to their availability, S/CRS has encountered difficulty in getting bureaus and posts to release the volunteers. Management Staff As noted, the Management unit performs integral resource management functions for S/CRS, such as budgeting, financial management, human resources, and general services. A discussion of its operations is in the Resource Management section of this chapter.

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ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING During the inspection, there was a general recognition in the S/CRS front office and the divisions, that S/CRS needs an organizational overhaul. The current structure does not adequately reflect the actual patterns of activity, and there is too much reliance on ad hoc working groups that are drawn from across S/CRS in hopes of surmounting the crossed lines of authority and communication. The formal designations of the individual divisions tend to obscure, rather than describe, their responsibilities In addition, S/CRS has grown well beyond its modest beginnings and is on track to grow further; current workloads are increasing, and S/CRS will be taking on new expanded responsibilities in such areas as NSPD-44 and the CRC. Prior to the inspection, S/CRS already had held informal meetings soliciting views within the office, and several restructuring proposals were circulating. S/CRS needs to move promptly to adopt a more effective organizational structure. The presently undefined relationship between S/CRS and the Director of Foreign Assistance will affect the office‘s organization, and there is more than one approach to reordering S/CRS‘s organizational structure. The OIG team suggested that S/CRS revise its portfolio in the following manner:

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 163 Adopt a slimmed-down front office, as outlined in the Executive Direction section of this chapter; Establish three reorganized divisions that more closely align actual responsi- bilities along the lines of planning and policy, regional activities and programs, and resource strategies and programs; Create a Resource Strategies and Programs division to incorporate the ARC, SRC, and a new unit devoted to policy and program support for the CRC concept; and Establish a stand-alone Resource Management unit for the work now subsumed under the current Response Strategy and Resource Management division.

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Recommendation 4: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should restructure its organization to more accurately reflect its responsibilities and improve coordination and communication. (Action: S/CRS) Organizationally, S/CRS is in flux. In all likelihood, its pending merger with F will affect S/CRS‘s structure and staffing. As of February 1, 2007, S/CRS had 74 employees, including 15 authorized positions filled by Civil Service employees, 20 Foreign Service officers serving one-year tours, and 39 other employees on detail from other agencies and on contract. But contract personnel are costly. From January 1, 2005, to February 1, 2007, S/CRS spent over $3.6 million for such employees. Currently, the Department is requesting an increase of 57 full-time positions for S/CRS in FY 2008.

Personnel Issues The temporary and short-term nature of assignments in most positions in S/CRS has adversely affected operations. S/CRS‘s work is complex and requires coordination with Department organizations and outside entities. With the incumbents of most positions turning over every year, a considerable amount of staff time is spent bringing new employees up to speed on current issues and establishing the contacts needed to accomplish their work. S/CRS is aware of the problem and has requested additional full-time-equivalent positions to stabilize its staffing.

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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Program/ Fund Diplomatic and Consular Programs Supplemental Conflict Response Fund DOD Transfer Authority Total

FY 2004 Allocated $730,000

FY 2005 Allocated/Used $730,000

FY 2006 Allocated $6,200,000

FY 2007 Earmarked $6,500,000

FY 2008 Request $14,500,000

$0

$2,900,000

$4,800,000

$N/A

$0

$0

$0

$1,300,000 Requested $0

$0

$0

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

$0

$730,000

$3,630,000

$21,000,000

$107,800,000

$39,500,000

$25,000,000

Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 165 Though creating permanent slots is important, the office also needs to preserve a mix of personnel from the Department and other agencies to support its interagency role. The ratio of other-agency personnel to Department employees has been declining. The OIG team informally recommended S/CRS renew its efforts to have qualified detailees assigned to S/CRS from other agencies engaged in reconstruction and stabilization work.

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The Management Unit, Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management The Management unit has an executive director, budget officer, budget analyst, and a general services officer. S/CRS receives management support from the Bureau of Administration‘s Executive Office and the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat (S/ES-EX), with the former assisting in human resources and S/ES-EX providing financial and general services operations. Though the Management unit cannot absorb a significant increase in workload, it can assume several functions currently provided by S/ES-EX, relieving that over-burdened staff. Functions that may be transferred include supplies procurement, accountable property officer responsibilities, government credit card use, and travel authorizations. Recommendation 5: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should identify administrative functions that it can assume and coordinate with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat to transfer responsibility for the agreed-upon functions. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX) The Management unit is performing satisfactorily. As noted, it can assume responsibility for additional administrative functions. However, if the number of S/ CRS personnel, such as in the ARC, were to increase significantly, the unit‘s staffing would have to be increased. Currently, there is no provision for S/CRS in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Though S/CRS has a foundation in statute and NSPD-44, those sources are less accessible than the Foreign Affairs Manual.

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Recommendation 6: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should draft, obtain approval of, and arrange for publication of a Foreign Affairs Manual provision that describes its function and operations. (Action: S/CRS)

Office Space S/CRS occupies part of the seventh floor in State Annex 3, directly across from the Harry S Truman building. That space is adequate for current S/CRS staffing levels. But if some or all of the Department‘s requested increase of 57 full-time positions is added to staffing, S/CRS will need additional space. In that case, Department planning calls for S/CRS to move to a building that is less convenient to the Department headquarters than its current location.

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Information Management and Information Security The Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) adequately provides information technology (IT) services for S/CRS. Currently, IRM provides one full-time employee and one full-time contractor for IT systems support. S/CRS has one full-time contractor and one full-time employee to provide systems and web site support. Although these four employees administer and manage IT support services well for more than 70 S/CRS employees, there is room for improvement. The service-level agreement (SLA) between S/CRS and IRM should be revised to more accurately describe the IT support provided. S/CRS should use the Universal Trouble Ticket (UTT) system more consistently and should establish and monitor usersecurity practices.

Information Technology Support Services IRM provides S/CRS with IT support services and with administrative management from S/ES-EX. During S/CRS‘s formation in 2004, senior management decided that IRM could more efficiently provide IT support services to the new organization, because IRM had more IT staff resources and IRM InfoCenter staff members were located in the same building. As a result, IRM and S/ES-EX established an SLA outlining IT responsibilities. Under the current SLA, dated March 16, 2004, IRM provides IT support functions,

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including maintenance of desktop computers, helpdesk services, server accounts, Internet connectivity, and backup services. In addition, IRM supports information security for S/CRS network services by conducting virus updates and maintaining systems documentation. S/ES-EX assists S/CRS with staff training, equipment procurement, and maintenance of its IT equipment inventory. According to the SLA, S/CRS pays IRM $150,000 per year for IT support services, a cost based on the number of unclassifi ed and classifi ed users within S/CRS and on the number of IRM support staff required. Since March 2004, IRM and S/CRS have not restructured the SLA to reflect changes in management, increased staff levels, or new technology, and IRM has not provided a copy of the SLA to S/CRS management. As a result, S/CRS officials must contact S/ES-EX representatives for clarifi cation when IT support questions arise. An updated and properly disseminated SLA could improve communication and IT support services. In May 2006, IRM and S/ES-EX drafted a revised SLA, but it has not been finalized because IT consolidation changed the organizational structure. Recommendation 7: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should revise their service-level agreement to reflect information technology support services. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with IRM and S/ES-EX) S/CRS staff rated the quality of IT service, with 88 percent of respondents responding favorably. They said IT support teams from IRM and S/CRS are knowledgeable, skilled, provide efficient services, and are customer oriented. Not all S/CRS employees follow consistent procedures when requesting IT support from IRM. Some contact the IRM support staff directly, and others contact the IRM InfoCenter to report a problem. This mixed approach for requesting assistance affects the level of service because IRM management uses the UTT system to determine work levels for its staff and to assess availability for other tasks. Without consistent use of the UTT system, IRM management cannot accurately determine the staff level needed to support S/CRS. With more consistent use of UTT in S/CRS, IRM management could provide better attention to problems requiring immediate action and more efficiently identify S/CRS system problems.

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Recommendation 8: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish and enforce procedures for its staff to use the Universal Trouble Ticket system for reporting information technology support issues. (Action: S/CRS)

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MANAGEMENT CONTROLS S/CRS and S/ES-EX need better coordination and communication to improve controls in S/CRS. So far, S/CRS has not named a management controls coordinator, nor has it established a formal management controls program. It is also unclear whose employees are responsible for a number of key management control functions. Controls over labor services contracts, in particular, should be strengthened. According to 2 FAM 022.6, the head of a Department office must designate in writing a management controls coordinator as the liaison and quality assurance officer to the Bureau of Resource Management (RM). It was unclear whether the S/ ES-EX management controls coordinator serves, or even should serve, as the S/CRS management controls coordinator. Furthermore, S/CRS‘s management controls documentation has not always been submitted through S/ES-EX. For example, in August 2006, S/CRS submitted a Management Controls Statement of Assurance to S/ES-EX, but in December 2006 it submitted risk assessment questionnaires directly to RM without coordinating with S/ES-EX. Recommendation 9: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should formally designate a management controls coordinator and inform the Bureau of Resource Management of this action. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX) Although S/CRS has fulfi lled some management controls program requirements, it has not yet fully implemented a management controls program. According to 2 FAM 021.3.q, bureaus and offices must maintain a current file of written policies, procedures, manuals, organization charts, and other documentation, and must publish these responsibilities. Although S/CRS had some of the documentation on file, the information was not centrally

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 169 maintained, and it was not clear who was responsible for several key management controls functions. In December 2006, S/CRS completed RM‘s risk assessment questionnaires. The OIG team found that the S/CRS self-assessment was accurate. Some S/CRS employees noted that delegations of authority often overlapped, some formal policies and procedures needed work, position descriptions and work requirement statements were outdated, internal control policies were not documented, and most staff members had not had management controls training nor seen management controls documentation. Based on the risk assessment, RM recommended that S/CRS develop corrective action plans. At the time of the inspection, S/CRS had not assigned responsibility for this task nor had it developed corrective action plans.

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Recommendation 10: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should implement a formal management controls program that includes delegation of responsibility for key management control functions and should develop corrective action plans for defi ciencies outlined in its risk assessment. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX)

Labor Services Contracts In 2005 and 2006, S/CRS contracted for about $3.5 million in labor services. To obtain the services, S/CRS coordinated with S/ES-EX and the Bureau of Administration‘s Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM) to issue task orders for current contracts and to establish new ones. But S/CRS did not adequately track funding availability for task orders and contracts. According to 14 FAH-2 H-517, contracting officer representatives must maintain working files that include copies of contractor invoices, a payment register indicating the remaining fund balance for the task order or contract, and other documents. The payment register ensures that government employees do not request or accept contractor services unless valid funding obligation documents exist. Some contracting officer representatives have not maintained a register of available contract funds and some have not had training or received AQM-generated letters of designation. Neither the contracting officer representatives nor the S/CRS budget officers have been comparing the contractor labor rates on invoices to the labor rates specifi ed in the contract itself, though they are required to do so by 14 FAH-2 H-522.4(e) to ensure against being overcharged for services.

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Recommendation 11: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should designate contracting officer representatives, designate responsibilities in writing, and provide required training. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with A)

FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

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Recommendation 1: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish an ongoing mechanism by which the senior levels of the major program and operational offices of the Department and other agencies will engage in the development and establishment of the Civilian Reserve Corps. (Action: S/CRS) Recommendation 2: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should reduce the number of staff members who report directly to the Coordinator and the deputy coordinator to include only personnel that directly support the Coordinator and deputy. (Action: S/CRS) Recommendation 3: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should request that the Bureau of Human Resources ask the U.S. Agency for International Development to detail a senior officer to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to serve as a deputy coordinator. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with HR) Recommendation 4: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should restructure its organization to more accurately reflect its responsibilities and improve coordination and communication. (Action: S/CRS) Recommendation 5: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should identify administrative functions that it can assume and coordinate with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat to transfer responsibility for the agreed-upon functions. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX) Recommendation 6: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should draft, obtain approval of, and arrange for publication

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 171 of a Foreign Affairs Manual provision that describes its function and operations. (Action: S/ CRS) Recommendation 7: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should revise their service-level agreement to reflect information technology support services. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with IRM and S/ES-EX) Recommendation 8: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish and enforce procedures for its staff to use the Universal Trouble Ticket system for reporting information technology support issues. (Action: S/CRS)

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Recommendation 9: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should formally designate a management controls coordinator and inform the Bureau of Resource Management of this action. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX) Recommendation 10: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat, should implement a formal management controls program that includes delegation of responsibility for key management control functions and should develop corrective action plans for defi ciencies outlined in its risk assessment. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with S/ES-EX) Recommendation 11: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should designate contracting officer representatives, designate responsibilities in writing, and provide required training. (Action: S/CRS, in coordination with A)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS Informal recommendations cover matters not requiring action by organizations outside of the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau and are not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG

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inspection or onsite compliance review will assess the mission‘s progress in implementing the informal recommendations. S/CRS has an excessive number of meetings. Informal Recommendation 1: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should review and reduce the number of meetings held in its front office. The guidelines for submitting Section 1207 requests are still in draft form. Informal Recommendation 2: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should gain the needed clearances and publish the guidelines. S/CRS‘s ratio of other-agency personnel to Department employees has been declining.

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Informal Recommendation 3: The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should renew its efforts to have qualifi ed employees from other agencies assigned to the office.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS Name Coordinator Deputy Coordinator Office Directors: Early Warning and Prevention Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination Planning Response Strategy and Resource Management

Arrival Ambassador John E. Herbst Mark L. Asquino

Date May 2006 July 2006

Thomas H. Moore

August 2006

Michele Schimpp Oscar G. DeSoto

June 2006 July 2006

Patricia Nelson-Douvelis

July 2006

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ABBREVIATIONS AQM ARC BPC CRC Department DOD EWP F IRM IT NSPD-44 OIG RM S/CRS

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S/ES-EX SLA SRC USAID UTT

Bureau of Administration, Office of Acquisitions Management Active Response Corps Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination Civilian Reserve Corps Department of State Department of Defense Office of Early Warning and Prevention Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance Bureau of Information Resource Management Information technology National Security Presidential Directive-44 Office of Inspector General Bureau of Resource Management Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Office of the Executive Director in the Executive Secretariat Service-level agreement Standby Response Corps U.S. Agency for International Development Universal Trouble Ticket

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Chapter 6

REMARKS AS DELIVERED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROBERT M. GATES, MANHATTAN, KANSAS - LANDON LECTURE (KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY)

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Robert M. Gates Thank you, Jon for that kind introduction, and for inviting me to speak here today. Congresswoman Boyda, Speaker Neufeld, thank you for being here. It is also good to see General Durbin and soldiers with us from Fort Riley and Leavenworth. I‘d like to extend a special thanks to the ROTC cadets in the audience. Your willingness to serve in this time of peril is a testament not only to yourselves, but to a new generation of leaders who will face great challenges in the coming years. It is both an honor and a pleasure to be part of the Landon Lecture series – a forum that for more than four decades has hosted some of America‘s leading intellectuals and statesmen. Considering that fact, I at first wondered if the invitation was in fact meant for Bill Gates. It is a pleasure to get out of Washington, D.C., for a little while. I left Washington in 1994, and I was certain, and very happy, that it was the last time I would ever live there. But history, and current events, have a way of

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exacting revenge on those who say ―never.‖ I‘ve now been back in the District of Columbia for close to a year, which reminds me of an old saying: For the first six months you‘re in Washington, you wonder how the hell you ever got there. For the next six months, you wonder how the hell the rest of them ever got there. As I look down at my remarks and the material I want to cover this afternoon, I am reminded of the time George Bernard Shaw told a speaker he had 15 minutes to speak. The speaker replied, ―15 minutes? How can I tell them all I know in 15 minutes?‖ Shaw responded, ―I advise you to speak very slowly.‖ I want to warn you in advance that my remarks are more than 15 minutes. Dr. Wefald has highlighted my K-State bona fides. I would just comment that my mother who is 94 attended my swearing-in ceremony in Washington. That night Conan O‘Brian remarked on the fact that I had announced that my 94 year-old mother was there and then he said, ―she came up to me and said…‗now go beat the hell out of the Kaiser.‘‖ It is good to be back in Kansas, where my family has lived for more than a century. I believe Kansas imparts to its children three characteristics that have been a source of strength for me over the years: a rejection of cynicism and an enduring optimism and idealism. Looking around the world today, optimism and idealism would not seem to have much of a place at the table. There is no shortage of anxiety about where our nation is headed and what its role will be in the 21st century. But I can remember clearly other times in my life when such dark sentiments were prevalent. In 1957, when I was at Wichita High School East, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, and Americans feared being left behind in the space race and, even more worrisome, the missile race. In 1968, the first full year I lived in Washington, was the same year as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where American troop levels and casualties were at their height. Across the nation, protests and violence over Vietnam engulfed America‘s cities and campuses. On my second day of work as a CIA analyst, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. And then came the 1970s – when it seemed that everything that could go wrong for America did. Yet, through it all, there was another storyline, one not then apparent. During those same years, the elements were in place and forces were at work that would eventually lead to victory in the Cold War – a victory achieved not by any one party or any single president, but by a series of decisions, choices, and institutions that bridged decades, generations, and administrations. From:

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The first brave stand taken by Harry Truman with the doctrine of containment; to The Helsinki Accords under Gerald Ford; to The elevation of human rights under Jimmy Carter; to The muscular words and deeds of Ronald Reagan; and to The masterful endgame diplomacy of George H. W. Bush. All contributed to bring an Evil Empire crashing down not with a bang but with a whimper. And virtually without a shot being fired. In this great effort, institutions, as much as people and policies, played a key role. Many of those key organizations were created 60 years ago this year with the National Security Act of 1947 – a single act of legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the United States Air Force, and what is now known as the Department of Defense. I mention all this because that legislation and those instruments of national power were designed at the dawn of a new era in international relations for the United States – an era dominated by the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, and the attacks of September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations – an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope. In important respects, the great struggles of the 20th century – World War I and World War II and the Cold War – covered over conflicts that had boiled and seethed and provoked war and instability for centuries before 1914: ethnic strife, religious wars, independence movements, and, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, terrorism. The First World War was, itself, sparked by a terrorist assassination motivated by an ethnic group seeking independence. These old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive during and after the Great War. But, like monsters in science fiction, they have returned from the grave to threaten peace and stability around the world. Think of the slaughter in the Balkans as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. Even now, we worry about the implications of Kosovo‘s independence in the next few weeks for Europe, Serbia, and Russia. That cast of characters sounds disturbingly familiar even at a century‘s remove. The long years of religious warfare in Europe between Protestant and Catholic Christians find eerie contemporary echoes in the growing Sunni versus Shia contest for Islamic hearts and minds in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia.

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We also have forgotten that between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, two American presidents and one presidential candidate were assassinated or attacked by terrorists – as were various tsars, empresses, princes, and, on a fateful day in June 1914, an archduke. Other acts of terrorism were commonplace in Europe and Russia in the latter part of the 19th century. So, history was not dead at the end of the Cold War. Instead, it was reawakening with a vengeance. And, the revived monsters of the past have returned far stronger and more dangerous than before because of modern technology – both for communication and for destruction – and to a world that is far more closely connected and interdependent than the world of 1914. Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict, among them: A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism; New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world; The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Failed and failing states; States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and internal peace – but also with implications for regional and global security. Worldwide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear. One of my favorite lines is that experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the United States has come to the end of a war, concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security – in the process, giving ourselves a so-called ―peace‖ dividend. Four times we chose to forget history. Isaac Barrow once wrote, ―How like a paradise the world would be, flourishing in joy and rest, if men would cheerfully conspire in affection and

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 179 helpfully contribute to each other‘s content: and how like a savage wilderness now it is, when, like wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and devour each other.‖ He wrote that in the late 1600s. Or, listen to the words of Sir William Stephenson, author of A Man Called Intrepid and a key figure in the Allied victory in World War II. He wrote, ―Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee.‖ After September 11th, the United States re-armed and again strengthened our intelligence capabilities. It will be critically important to sustain those capabilities in the future – it will be important not to make the same mistake a fifth time. But, my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use ―soft‖ power and for better integrating it with ―hard‖ power. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described. So, we must urgently devote time, energy, and thought to how we better organize ourselves to meet the international challenges of the present and the future – the world you students will inherit and lead. I spoke a few moments ago about the landmark National Security Act of 1947 and the institutions created to fight the Cold War. In light of the challenges I have just discussed, I would like to pose a question: if there were to be a ―National Security Act of 2007,‖ looking beyond the crush of day-today headlines, what problems must it address, what capabilities ought it create

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or improve, where should it lead our government as we look to the future? What new institutions do we need for this post Cold War world? As an old Cold Warrior with a doctorate in history, I hope you‘ll indulge me as I take a step back in time. Because context is important, as many of the goals, successes, and failures from the Cold War are instructive in considering how we might better focus energies and resources – especially the ways in which our nation can influence the rest of the world to help protect our security and advance our interests and values. What we consider today to be the key elements and instruments of national power trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s, to a time when the government was digesting lessons learned during World War II. Looking back, people often forget that the war effort – though victorious – was hampered and hamstrung by divisions and dysfunction. Franklin Roosevelt quipped that trying to get the Navy, which was its own cabinet department at the time, to change was akin to hitting a featherbed: ―You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted,‖ he said, ―and then you find the damn bed just as it was before.‖ And Harry Truman noted that if the Navy and Army had fought as hard against the Germans as they had fought against each other, the war would have been over much sooner. This record drove the thinking behind the 1947 National Security Act, which attempted to fix the systemic failures that had plagued the government and military during World War II – while reviving capabilities and setting the stage for a struggle against the Soviet Union that seemed more inevitable each passing day. The 1947 Act acknowledged that we had been over-zealous in our desire to shut down capabilities that had been so valuable during the war – most of America‘s intelligence and information assets disappeared as soon as the guns fell silent. The Office of Strategic Services – the war intelligence agency – was axed, as was the Office of War Information. In 1947, OSS returned as CIA, but it would be years before we restored our communications capabilities by creating the United States Information Agency. There is in many quarters the tendency to see that period as the pinnacle of wise governance and savvy statecraft. As I wrote a number of years ago, ―Looking back, it all seem[ed] so easy, so painless, so inevitable.‖ It was anything but. Consider that the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947 – the Department of Defense – was meant to improve unity among the military services. It didn‘t. A mere two years later the Congress had to pass another law

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 181 because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anything but joint. And there was no chairman to referee the constant disputes. At the beginning, the Secretary of Defense had little real power – despite an exalted title. The law forbad him from having a military staff and limited him to three civilian assistants. These days, it takes that many to sort my mail. Throughout the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, the various parts of the government did not communicate or coordinate very well with each other. There were military, intelligence, and diplomatic failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, and many other places. Getting the military services to work together was a recurring battle that had to be addressed time and again, and was only really resolved by legislation in 1986. But despite the problems, we realized, as we had during World War II, that the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions – many of them non-military. The Marshall Plan and later the United States Agency for International Development acknowledged the role of economics in the world; the CIA the role of intelligence; and the United States Information Agency the fact that the conflict would play out as much in hearts and minds as it would on any battlefield. The key, over time, was to devote the necessary resources – people and money – and get enough things right while maintaining the ability to recover from mistakes along the way. Ultimately, our endurance paid off and the Soviet Union crumbled, and the decades-long Cold War ended. However, during the 1990s, with the complicity of both the Congress and the White House, key instruments of America‘s national power once again were allowed to wither or were abandoned. Most people are familiar with cutbacks in the military and intelligence – including sweeping reductions in manpower, nearly 40 percent in the active army, 30 percent in CIA‘s clandestine service and spies. What is not as well-known, and arguably even more shortsighted, was the gutting of America‘s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world – the ―soft power,‖ which had been so important throughout the Cold War. The State Department froze the hiring of new Foreign Service officers for a period of time. The United States Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts – its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 during Vietnam to about 3,000 in the 1990s. And the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department. Even as we throttled back, the world became more unstable, turbulent, and unpredictable than during the Cold War years. And then came the attacks of

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September 11, 2001, one of those rare life-changing dates, a shock so great that it appears to have shifted the tectonic plates of history. That day abruptly ended the false peace of the 1990s as well as our ―holiday from history.‖ As is often the case after such momentous events, it has taken some years for the contour lines of the international arena to become clear. What we do know is that the threats and challenges we will face abroad in the first decades of the 21st century will extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency. The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War – from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called ―asymmetric warfare.‖ As I told an Army gathering last month, it is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms – at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one‘s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between. Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole. But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently – to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America‘s non-military instruments of power. So, what are the capabilities, institutions, and priorities our nation must collectively address – through both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the people they serve? I would like to start with an observation. Governments of all stripes seem to have great difficulty summoning the will – and the resources – to deal even with threats that are obvious and likely inevitable, much less threats that are more complex or over the horizon. There is, however, no inherent flaw in

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 183 human nature or democratic government that keeps us from preparing for potential challenges and dangers by taking far-sighted actions with long-term benefits. As individuals, we do it all the time. The Congress did it in 1947. As a nation, today, as in 1947, the key is wise and focused bipartisan leadership – and political will. I mentioned a moment ago that one of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, longterm success. The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past, although new resources have permitted the State Department to begin taking on a larger role in recent months. Still, forced by circumstances, our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils – usually in a language they don‘t speak. They have done an admirable job. And as I‘ve said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities – something the ROTC cadets in this audience can anticipate. But it is no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise. A few examples are useful here, as microcosms of what our overall government effort should look like – one historical and a few contemporary ones. However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development. The CORDS program, as it was known, involved more than a thousand civilian employees from USAID and other organizations, and brought the multiple agencies into a joint effort. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting ―all of us on one side and the enemy on the other.‖ By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam. The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned – the hard way – through the effort to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development – to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they

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are on the ground – even in small numbers – we have seen tangible and often dramatic changes. An Army brigade commander in Baghdad recently said that an embedded PRT was ―pivotal‖ in getting Iraqis in his sector to better manage their affairs. We also have increased our effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside the government – untapped resources with tremendous potential. For example, in Afghanistan the military has recently brought in professional anthropologists as advisors. The New York Times reported on the work of one of them, who said, ―I‘m frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we‘re really anthropologizing the military.‖ And it is having a very real impact. The same story told of a village that had just been cleared of the Taliban. The anthropologist pointed out to the military officers that there were more widows than usual, and that the sons would feel compelled to take care of them – possibly by joining the insurgency, where many of the fighters are paid. So American officers began a job training program for the widows. Similarly, our land-grant universities have provided valuable expertise on agricultural and other issues. Texas A&M has had faculty on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. And Kansas State is lending its expertise to help revitalize universities in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, and working to improve the agricultural sector and veterinary care across Afghanistan. These efforts do not go unnoticed by either Afghan citizens or our men and women in uniform. I have been heartened by the works of individuals and groups like these. But I am concerned that we need even more civilians involved in the effort and that our efforts must be better integrated. And I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institutions to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. The examples I mentioned have, by and large, been created ad hoc – on the fly in a climate of crisis. As a nation, we need to figure out how to institutionalize programs and relationships such as these. And we need to find more untapped resources – places where it‘s not necessarily how much you spend, but how you spend it. The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 185 either – even if they were to be more deployable overseas. New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set. For example, public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, ―How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world‘s greatest communication society?‖ Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications. Similarly, we need to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills, a need which president bush called for in his 2007 state of the union address, and which the State Department is now working on with its initiative to build a civilian response corps. Both the President and Secretary of State have asked for full funding for this initiative. But we also need new thinking about how to integrate our government‘s capabilities in these areas, and then how to integrate government capabilities with those in the private sector, in universities, in other non-governmental organizations, with the capabilities of our allies and friends – and with the nascent capabilities of those we are trying to help. Which brings me to a fundamental point. Despite the improvements of recent years, despite the potential innovative ideas hold for the future, sometimes there is no substitute for resources – for money. Funding for non-military foreign-affairs programs has increased since 2001, but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities. Consider that this year‘s budget for the Department of Defense – not counting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – is nearly half a trillion dollars. The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is $36 billion – less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the Foreign Service. The need is real. Despite new hires, there are only about 6,600 professional Foreign Service officers – less than the manning for one aircraft carrier strike group. And personnel challenges loom on the horizon. By one estimate, 30 percent of USAID‘s Foreign Service officers are eligible for retirement this year – valuable experience that cannot be contracted out.

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Overall, our current military spending amounts to about 4 percent of GDP, below the historic norm and well below previous wartime periods. Nonetheless, we use this benchmark as a rough floor of how much we should spend on defense. We lack a similar benchmark for other departments and institutions. What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years. Now, I am well aware that having a sitting Secretary of Defense travel halfway across the country to make a pitch to increase the budget of other agencies might fit into the category of ―man bites dog‖ – or for some back in the Pentagon, ―blasphemy.‖ It is certainly not an easy sell politically. And don‘t get me wrong, I‘ll be asking for yet more money for Defense next year. Still, I hear all the time from the senior leadership of our Armed Forces about how important these civilian capabilities are. In fact, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was Chief of Naval Operations, he once said he‘d hand a part of his budget to the State Department ―in a heartbeat,‖ assuming it was spent in the right place. After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises. A last point. Repeatedly over the last century Americans averted their eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country. How could an assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia-Herzegovina effect us? Or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland? Or a French defeat at a place called Dien Bien Phu? Or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran? Or the radicalization of an Arab construction tycoon‘s son? What seems to work best in world affairs, historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book On the Origins of War, ―Is the possession by those states who wish

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Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction… 187 to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.‖ In an address at Harvard in 1943, Winston Churchill said, ―The price of greatness is responsibility . . . The people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility.‖ And, in a speech at Princeton in 1947, Secretary of State and retired Army general George Marshall told the students: ―The development of a sense of responsibility for world order and security, the development of a sense of overwhelming importance of this country‘s acts, and failures to act, in relation to world order and security – these, in my opinion, are great musts for your generation.‖ Our country has now for many decades taken upon itself great burdens and great responsibilities – all in an effort to defeat despotism in its many forms or to preserve the peace so that other nations, and other peoples, could pursue their dreams. For many decades, the tender shoots of freedom all around the world have been nourished with American blood. Today, across the globe, there are more people than ever seeking economic and political freedom – seeking hope even as oppressive regimes and mass murderers sow chaos in their midst – seeking always to shake free from the bonds of tyranny. For all of those brave men and women struggling for a better life, there is – and must be – no stronger ally or advocate than the United States of America. Let us never forget that our nation remains a beacon of light for those in dark places. And that our responsibilities to the world – to freedom, to liberty, to the oppressed everywhere – are not a burden on the people or the soul of this nation. They are, rather, a blessing. I will close with a message for students in the audience. The message is from Theodore Roosevelt, whose words ring as true today as when he delivered them in 1901. He said, ―…as, keen-eyed, we gaze into the coming years, duties, new and old, rise thick and fast to confront us from within and from without…[The United States] should face these duties with a sober appreciation alike of their importance and of their difficulty. But there is also every reason for facing them with high-hearted resolution and eager and confident faith in our capacity to do them aright.‖ He continued, ―A great work lies ready to the hand of this generation; it should count itself happy indeed that to it is given the privilege of doing such a work.‖ To the young future leaders of America here today, I say, ―Come do the great work that lies ready to the hand of your generation.‖ Thank you.

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CHAPTER SOURCES

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The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL34253, dated August 28, 2008. Chapter 2 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL32862, dated January 28, 2010. Chapter 3 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22855, dated January 28, 2010. Chapter 4 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22871, dated February 4, 2010. Chapter 5 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection. Report Number ISP-I-0726, dated May 2007. Chapter 6 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, as part of the Landon Lecture Series at Kansas State University, dated November 26, 2007.

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INDEX 9 9/11, viii, xiii, 2, 8, 13, 57, 60, 63, 87, 98, 100, 101, 147 9/11 Commission, 60, 87

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A accountability, 17, 167 Afghanistan, xiii, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 23, 25, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 54, 59, 60, 61, 90, 97, 113, 121, 143, 147, 150, 159, 166, 180, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 Africa, 7, 8, 11, 15, 23, 43, 44, 46, 47, 90, 106, 107, 108, 117, 132, 133, 134, 153 AFRICOM, 23, 86, 90 agricultural sector, 220 agriculture, 78, 219 AIDS, 87 Air Force, 105, 139, 211 Al Qaeda, 8, 9, 10, 44, 61 Albania, 106, 107, 134 Algeria, 45, 108, 132 ambiguity, 191, 193 Angola, 10, 33, 34, 36, 40 anthropologists, 219 anthropology, 219 ARC, xv, 72, 91, 180, 182, 185, 194, 195, 197, 200, 208

Argentina, 10, 172 armed conflict, 43 armed forces, xi, xii, 27, 46, 84, 96, 97, 102, 113, 161 Asia, 15, 137, 212 assassination, 212, 222 assessment, xii, 14, 23, 90, 97, 112, 122, 192, 204 assets, 215 attacks, xiii, 3, 57, 98, 100, 101, 211, 217 availability, 104, 196, 202, 204 Azerbaijan, 107, 137

B Bahrain, xi, 96, 105, 107, 137 Balkans, 10, 49, 212, 217 Bangladesh, 8, 36, 41, 90, 107, 129, 138, 159, 166 basic needs, 61 basic services, 214 behavior, 117, 217 border security, 105, 126, 139, 142, 173 Bosnia, 54, 223 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 223 Brazil, 10, 172 bureaucracy, 128 Burma, 33, 34, 36, 38 Bush, President George W., 8, 56

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Index

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C Cambodia, 33, 41 Cameroon, 108, 132, 133 Canada, 93, 182 capacity building, 23, 113, 142 Capitol Hill, 150 Caribbean, 107, 108, 140 category a, 17 Caucasus, 11 Central Asia, 10, 11, 135, 186 Chad, 17, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 45, 72, 90, 107, 108, 130, 131, 132, 182, 192, 196 chaos, 217, 223 children, 210 CIA, 31, 48, 210, 214, 215, 216 City, 172 civil service, 70 civil society, 90 civil war, 31 Civilian Response Corps, ix, 52, 55, 69, 72, 76, 78, 80 Civilian Stabilization Initiative, x, 20, 24, 25, 46, 47, 52, 53, 69, 74, 93 Coalition Support Fund, xiv, 98, 150 Coast Guard, 105, 139, 168 coherence, xiii, 98, 116, 118, 127, 150 Cold War, vii, 1, 8, 10, 47, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217 collaboration, 22, 24, 45, 109 Colombia, 17, 33, 41, 45, 158, 159, 166, 172 communication, xvi, 180, 188, 189, 196, 197, 202, 203, 205, 212, 221 community, ix, 10, 14, 22, 32, 52, 56, 57, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 181, 192 community cooperation, 22 compliance, 119, 207 components, x, 53, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 85 confidence, 21, 172 conflict prevention, 5, 15, 22, 71 confusion, 22, 23, 161, 187 Congressional Budget Office, 86, 93 consensus, 54, 184, 185

consent, 64, 68 consolidation, 202 construction, 85, 174, 223 contingency, xii, 61, 65, 66, 71, 81, 90, 97, 101, 124, 128, 151, 182 continuity, 191, 194 contour, 217 control, 7, 9, 27, 30, 31, 61, 106, 122, 167, 203, 204, 206, 213 corruption, 7, 10, 11, 32 cost, viii, 2, 3, 12, 56, 86, 89, 93, 103, 122, 201 costs, 25, 86, 123, 130 counterterrorism, xi, xii, 46, 95, 97, 100, 102, 104, 113, 114, 117, 120, 124, 125, 126, 128, 144, 145, 151, 153 Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, xiv, 98, 152 creativity, 218 credit, 185, 200 crime, vii, 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 criminal activity, 172 criminal justice system, 59, 62 criminals, 8, 10, 11, 172 crisis management, x, 52, 189 criticism, 13 CSF, xiv, 98, 152 Cuba, 90, 191, 193 culture, 79, 220 curriculum, 166 curriculum development, 166 Customs Service, 48

D danger, 8, 194, 195 decisions, 89, 125, 152, 211 defense, xiv, 12, 26, 27, 29, 83, 84, 87, 98, 101, 109, 116, 120, 121, 126, 128, 142, 149, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 163, 164, 175, 214, 217, 222 democracy, vii, 1, 3, 15, 57, 61, 64, 220 Democratic Republic of Congo, 44, 90, 159, 167 democratization, 59

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Index Department of Agriculture, 71 Department of Defense, v, viii, ix, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, 2, 14, 21, 25, 26, 44, 46, 48, 83, 86, 90, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99, 115, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155, 156, 161, 164, 177, 180, 187, 208, 211, 215, 218, 221 Department of Health and Human Services, 71 Department of Justice, 77, 186 developed countries, 62 developing countries, 37 development assistance, viii, 2, 18, 22 development policy, 56 diplomacy, viii, 2, 12, 13, 15, 45, 55, 56, 57, 62, 118, 119, 175, 188, 211, 222 directives, 48, 92 disaster, 6, 80, 82 discipline, 118, 127 discounting, 112 displaced persons, 168, 173 disseminate, 187 District of Columbia, 210 division, xiv, 99, 197 division of labor, xiv, 99 Dominican Republic, 108, 140, 150 draft, 48, 184, 193, 200, 206, 207 drug trafficking, 10, 60 duties, 170, 190, 191, 194, 223

E early warning, viii, 2, 5, 13, 14, 22, 45, 192 East Timor, 32, 35, 40 economic assistance, 59, 147, 149 economic crisis, 6 economic development, 7, 23, 60, 214, 219 economic growth, 16, 46, 59, 87, 172 economics, 216 Education, xiv, 98, 148, 149 El Salvador, 63 emergency response, 63, 89 employment, 169, 173 energy, 9, 193, 214 engagement, 13, 99, 112, 117, 119, 169, 183

193

environment, 8, 43, 57, 58, 59, 75, 78, 87, 102, 105, 147, 150, 153, 173, 191 environmental degradation, 9 Equatorial Guinea, 36, 41 Eritrea, 33, 37, 40 Europe, 59, 134, 212 evolution, 112, 148 execution, 29, 115, 147, 148 exercise, 47, 56, 114, 125, 192 expertise, 46, 81, 85, 100, 161, 182, 194, 219, 220

F failed states, 5, 10, 31, 62, 63 failure, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 31, 36, 177, 187 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 48 financing, 150, 162 First World, 212 fiscal policy, 59 flexibility, 28, 81, 82 foreign affairs, 19, 68, 109, 110, 115, 125, 158, 221 foreign aid, 16, 144, 148 foreign assistance, viii, xii, xiii, 2, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 45, 46, 48, 59, 67, 91, 97, 98, 99, 112, 116, 117, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152, 163, 177, 184, 187, 222 foreign policy, vii, ix, xiii, 1, 3, 17, 21, 52, 57, 60, 98, 99, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119, 128, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152 fragility, 13, 16, 33, 35, 49 freedom, 213, 220, 223

G Gabon, 108, 132, 133 GDP, 222 generation, 173, 209, 223, 224 genocide, 14, 31, 49 George Mitchell, 64

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194

Index

Georgia, xv, 90, 106, 107, 134, 144, 150, 156, 157, 159, 160, 168 Germany, 63, 93 goals, 5, 21, 99, 177, 190, 214, 221 governance, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 7, 15, 18, 29, 31, 32, 46, 54, 60, 87, 152, 177, 214, 215, 218, 219 GPS, 105 Grenada, 216 gross domestic product, 12 grouping, 127 growth, 19, 81, 87 guidance, 22, 23, 43, 99, 109, 148, 152, 174, 177 guidelines, 13, 17, 59, 187, 207 Guinea, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 108, 132, 133 Guinea XE "Guinea" , Gulf of, 132 Guyana, 108, 129, 141

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H habitat, 117 Haiti, 17, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 45, 54, 71, 90, 158, 169, 182, 187, 190, 191, 193 hands, 144, 188 health, 32, 78, 166, 221 health care, 221 health services, 32 hiring, x, 53, 74, 217 HIV, 61 HIV/AIDS, 61 Honduras, 108, 140, 141 host, 9, 45, 110, 117, 123, 177 hostilities, 61, 62, 87 hot spots, 8, 195 House, xii, 26, 27, 43, 47, 64, 85, 89, 92, 97, 101, 112, 114, 115, 119, 124, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153, 160, 163, 177 human nature, 218 human resources, 196, 200 human rights, xi, 27, 31, 65, 78, 87, 90, 96, 102, 109, 118, 193, 211 humanitarian crises, 46

Hunter, ix, 51, 55, 65, 67, 111, 146, 150, 151, 157

I ideal, 9, 117 image, 59, 93, 117 implementation, 13, 21, 57, 84, 92, 99, 100, 109, 142, 144, 145, 151, 160, 164, 166, 187, 189, 192 in transition, 55, 56, 65, 67, 69, 70, 90, 91, 180 income, 12, 32, 33, 49, 173 India, 49 indication, 28, 124 indicators, 6, 36, 45 indigenous, 92, 214, 218 Indonesia, xi, 17, 45, 96, 105, 107, 120, 129, 135, 150, 175 industrial democracies, 182 inefficiencies, 60 infectious disease, 9 information technology, 201, 202, 206 infrastructure, 10, 11, 16, 23, 78, 87, 126, 142, 153, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173 instability, vii, 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 36, 46, 49, 57, 61, 65, 68, 89, 101, 177, 191, 192, 212 institutions, xiv, 3, 5, 10, 16, 29, 32, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 73, 87, 92, 98, 118, 173, 174, 193, 211, 213, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222 instruments, 211, 215, 216, 218, 222 integration, 152 intelligence, 14, 22, 29, 30, 104, 192, 213, 215, 216 interagency coordination, viii, ix, 2, 14, 23, 28, 52, 65, 66, 89, 127, 157, 191, 194 interference, 170 international financial institutions, 58 International Monetary Fund, 59 international relations, 211 international terrorism, 4, 60 intervention, 101, 120 Iran, 216

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Index Iraq, xiii, 7, 17, 23, 25, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 45, 47, 48, 54, 59, 60, 90, 97, 113, 143, 147, 150, 180, 185, 186, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 Israel, 104 issues, vii, viii, ix, xii, xiv, xv, 2, 6, 13, 15, 16, 22, 24, 28, 46, 51, 53, 56, 61, 66, 89, 96, 97, 99, 122, 152, 179, 182, 183, 188, 195, 199, 202, 206, 220

J Jamaica, 108, 140 Japan, 63, 182 judges, 20, 25 jurisdiction, ix, 52, 147 justice, 54, 167, 173, 174 justification, 62, 68, 89

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K Kartli, 168 Kazakhstan, 106, 107, 120, 135 Kennedy, John F., 212 Kenya, 36, 41, 107, 108, 130, 132, 159, 169 Korea, 216 Kosovo, 17, 33, 34, 40, 45, 90, 182, 193, 195, 212 Kyrgyzstan, 107, 129, 135

L labor, 203, 204 lack of confidence, 183 land, 106, 220 language, 8, 76, 100, 124, 142, 148, 152, 181, 218 Laos, 33, 41 Latin America, 15 law enforcement, 7, 9, 16, 28, 30, 174 laws, viii, 2, 10 leadership, xv, xvi, 24, 60, 66, 73, 75, 79, 99, 118, 145, 169, 179, 180, 182, 185, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 218, 222

195

Lebanon, xi, 17, 33, 35, 40, 45, 72, 90, 96, 103, 104, 107, 138, 149, 150, 158, 159, 170, 182, 183, 187, 195 legislation, ix, xiv, 15, 51, 54, 55, 63, 65, 68, 69, 70, 81, 91, 99, 101, 109, 126, 142, 143, 144, 146, 158, 159, 160, 162, 193, 211, 216 legislative proposals, 48 Liberia, 10, 17, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 90, 108, 132 likelihood, 121, 199 limitation, 67, 113 Lincoln, Abraham, 212 links, vii, viii, 2, 6, 9, 10, 60 local government, 20, 65, 78, 90, 167, 172, 174

M Macedonia, 106, 107, 134 maintenance, 105, 111, 120, 142, 158, 201 Malaysia, xi, 17, 45, 96, 105, 107, 135, 175 management, viii, xv, 2, 17, 22, 24, 26, 56, 59, 78, 124, 179, 180, 184, 188, 190, 194, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206 mandates, 150, 181 manpower, 58, 216 maritime security, xi, xii, 95, 96, 97, 102, 126, 146 market economy, 64 Mauritania, 17, 33, 45, 108, 130, 131, 176 Mauritius, 134 measures, 13, 35, 36, 37, 91 media, 47, 188 men, 213, 218, 220, 222, 223 mentoring, 166, 218 messages, 171 Mexico, 107, 140 microcosms, 219 Middle East, 140, 212 military aid, 148, 150 military school, xiii, 98 military spending, 222 military tasks, ix, 52, 85

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196

Index

missions, 5, 28, 58, 63, 75, 80, 81, 84, 87, 92, 100, 111, 116, 153 model, 4, 24, 71, 82, 172 money, 47, 74, 81, 82, 86, 119, 121, 163, 216, 221, 222 morale, xvi, 122, 169, 180 Morocco, 45, 108, 132, 159, 171 movement, 8, 120 Mozambique, 63, 108, 132, 134

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N narcotics, 21, 147, 153 nation, 4, 43, 57, 58, 59, 87, 92, 110, 117, 122, 123, 151, 170, 193, 210, 215, 218, 220, 223 National Defense Authorization Act, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xiv, 2, 17, 26, 27, 46, 47, 48, 51, 55, 65, 67, 83, 95, 96, 97, 112, 142, 151, 155, 157 national income, 32 national interests, 8 national security, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 28, 29, 68, 70, 74, 89, 91, 99, 100, 101, 112, 117, 119, 152, 213, 222 National Security Council, 30, 66, 128, 185, 211 nation-building, 4, 58, 59, 87, 92 NATO, 106, 113 natural disasters, 82 Nepal, 17, 34, 35, 36, 39, 45, 49, 72, 90, 158, 171, 182 network, 61, 201 NGOs, 58, 60, 78 Nicaragua, 108, 140 Nigeria, 33, 35, 37, 39, 107, 108, 131, 132, 150

O Obama Administration, x, xii, xv, 52, 53, 54, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 97, 102, 114, 115, 156

objectives, ix, 16, 18, 52, 118, 121, 177, 185, 188, 195 obligation, 125, 204 OECD, 22, 31, 47 Office of Management and Budget, 89, 152 Official Development Assistance, 17 oil, 213 Omnibus Appropriations Act,, 74 Operation Enduring Freedom, 113, 141 order, 19, 21, 33, 59, 67, 69, 74, 84, 90, 91, 92, 100, 104, 112, 114, 115, 119, 128, 152, 153, 162, 164, 166, 174, 175, 204, 213, 223 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 31 oversight, viii, xiii, 2, 3, 5, 29, 81, 82, 98, 99, 116, 118, 125, 127, 128, 144, 166

P Pacific, 137 Pakistan, xi, 7, 35, 41, 96, 103, 104, 107, 120, 121, 138, 149, 150 Panama, 107, 108, 140, 147, 150, 159, 172 Paraguay, 10, 159, 172 parameters, xv, 121, 179, 183 partnership, 74, 122, 142, 143, 144 peacekeeping, 20, 21, 57, 58, 64, 87, 152 Pentagon, 110, 148, 150, 221, 222 per capita income, 12, 33 Persian Gulf, 212 personal qualities, 188 Philippines, xi, 17, 45, 49, 96, 105, 107, 136, 147, 159, 172, 175 pitch, 222 planning, ix, xiv, 4, 5, 22, 29, 43, 47, 52, 58, 60, 66, 68, 71, 72, 76, 78, 83, 91, 99, 100, 110, 123, 164, 181, 182, 183, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 200 police, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 54, 57, 59, 75, 78, 86, 126, 142, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 214, 218 policy makers, viii, 2, 4, 13, 19 political instability, 6, 18, 60 political participation, 87

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Index population, 32, 219 portfolio, 127, 190, 197 positive feedback, 183, 195 poverty, 12, 59 poverty alleviation, 59 power, 6, 32, 142, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 222, 223 president, 89, 211, 221 President Clinton, 22 prevention, 5, 84, 92, 164, 192 private sector, 20, 73, 75, 90, 92, 221 probability, 13 producers, 103, 123 profit, 48, 65, 78 programming, 13, 14, 18, 19, 23 proliferation, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 213 public affairs, 189 public health, 20, 61 public service, 7, 31

Q

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quality assurance, 203

R Reagan, Ronald, 211 realism, 193 reason, 151, 223 recognition, 157, 196 recruiting, 73, 86, 93, 176 reforms, 48, 125, 128 refugee flows, 12 refugees, 87 region, 7, 10, 11, 12, 23, 46, 67, 71, 89, 117, 121, 143, 152, 159, 166, 172 rehabilitation, 171, 173 relationship, xv, 21, 99, 121, 152, 179, 183, 184, 188, 189, 197 relief, 21, 25, 71, 82, 87, 151, 153 Republic of the Congo, 44, 108, 132 Requirements, 88 resettlement, 168 resistance, 58, 181

197

resolution, 66, 223 resource allocation, 29 resource management, 183, 194, 196 resources, viii, ix, 1, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 52, 58, 64, 65, 80, 90, 110, 125, 127, 150, 162, 181, 190, 196, 201, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221 responsiveness, 153 restructuring, 45, 188, 191, 196 retirement, 221 revenue, 78 risk, xiii, 7, 17, 30, 36, 66, 67, 69, 70, 89, 91, 98, 116, 166, 171, 182, 203, 204, 206 risk assessment, 203, 204, 206 Roosevelt, Franklin, 215 Roosevelt, Theodore, 223 rule of law, 32, 61, 78, 79, 214 Russia, 168, 212 Rwanda, 34, 36, 40

S safe havens, vii, 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 142, 145 sanctions, 176 Saudi Arabia, 105 Secretary of Defense, v, xi, xii, xvi, 21, 47, 54, 83, 86, 88, 95, 97, 100, 101, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 120, 122, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158, 160, 161, 176, 177, 185, 209, 214, 216, 222, 224 secure communication, 104 security forces, xii, 19, 27, 28, 43, 46, 92, 96, 97, 100, 124, 126, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 153 self-assessment, 204 Senate, 26, 27, 44, 46, 47, 54, 63, 64, 85, 89, 91, 92, 111, 113, 114, 115, 124, 125, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 152, 153, 159, 163, 164 Senate approval, 143 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 46, 54, 63, 111, 114, 124 September 11, xiii, 3, 8, 57, 98, 100, 101, 211, 213, 217

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198

Index

Serbia, 212 Seychelles, 134 shaping, 5, 43, 118, 150, 217 shortage, 59, 101, 103, 123, 210 Sierra Leone, 10, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 108, 132, 133 skills, 20, 70, 84, 166, 171, 173, 174, 185, 195, 220, 221 Solomon I, 33, 36, 41 Somalia, 17, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 54, 159, 173, 217 South Asia, 140 Southeast Asia, 48, 71, 159, 175 sovereignty, 62, 88 Soviet Union, 59, 210, 215, 216 space, 7, 177, 200, 210 spectrum, 4, 6, 29, 153 speech, 44, 47, 72, 86, 222, 223 Sri Lanka, 35, 41, 90, 107, 137, 150, 159, 173 stability, viii, ix, xi, xii, 2, 4, 5, 7, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 31, 43, 46, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64, 69, 92, 96, 97, 102, 106, 113, 114, 122, 125, 142, 151, 169, 172, 174, 175, 177, 212, 213 staffing, 55, 152, 200 standard of living, 213 standards, 31 State of the Union address, 56, 84 strategic planning, 19, 127, 128, 190 strategies, 4, 28, 181, 197 students, 214, 223 substitutes, 120, 188 Sudan, 7, 10, 17, 18, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 90, 193 supervision, 147, 148, 149 supply, 104, 123 support services, 201, 202, 206 support staff, 189, 201, 202 surveillance, 102, 104, 105, 106, 136, 170 sustainability, vii, 1, 3, 7 Switzerland, 45

T Tajikistan, 159, 174 Taliban, 61, 63, 220 Tanzania, 108, 132, 134 tax system, 87 team members, 124, 191 technical assistance, 59, 148, 166, 174 tenure, 188, 191 territory, 7, 9, 30, 31, 57, 100 terrorism, xiv, 9, 15, 16, 19, 21, 27, 28, 45, 46, 48, 62, 84, 98, 102, 103, 104, 122, 143, 150, 152, 177, 212, 213 terrorist organization, 9 terrorists, vii, 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 62, 100, 105, 122, 175, 212, 217 Thailand, 137 thinking, 215, 221 threat, viii, 2, 9, 13, 22, 57, 60, 110, 117, 120, 122, 147, 151, 170 threats, vii, viii, xiii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 27, 32, 56, 57, 62, 88, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 127, 148, 177, 217, 218 threshold, 33, 120 time frame, 148, 177 timing, 152 Title I, 46, 67 Title IV, 46 Title V, 89 Togo, 33, 37, 41, 108, 133 trade, 10, 12, 29 training programs, 116, 145, 147, 149 transformation, 3, 192, 193 transition, 43, 46 transitions, ix, 32, 52, 57, 60, 61, 62, 76 transparency, 118, 127, 152 transportation, 11, 105, 130

U UK, 48 Ukraine, 106, 107, 134 uniform, 84, 185, 218, 220

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Index United Kingdom, 182 United Nations, 10, 44, 45, 58, 64, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 182 uranium, 11, 44 USAID Complex Crises Fund, x, 53, 81, 163 USDA, 73, 77, 79 Uzbekistan, 33, 35, 42

V Vanuatu, 33, 42 vehicles, 8, 102, 104, 105 violence, 31, 46, 167, 169, 210 vision, 4, 18, 102, 104 vocational training, 168 vulnerability, 12, 170

W

weapons, 8, 9, 11, 213 weapons of mass destruction, 11, 213 web, 33, 36, 91, 201 West Africa, 10, 107, 133 West Bank, 42 White House, 43, 44, 45, 48, 128, 148, 216 women, 218, 220, 222, 223 working groups, 194, 196 workload, 123, 190, 192, 200 World Bank, 12, 22, 32, 33, 38, 39, 45, 49, 59, 87, 88 World War I, 8, 59, 211, 213, 215, 216

Y Yemen, xi, 17, 35, 42, 45, 96, 103, 105, 107, 139, 149, 150, 159, 175 Yugoslavia, 212

Z Zimbabwe, 7, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 192

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war, 21, 63, 152, 212, 213, 215 War on Terror, 46, 48, 218 weakness, 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 18, 19, 62, 189

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Weak and Failing States : Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook