Water Scarcity, Climate Change and Conflict in the Middle East: Securing Livelihoods, Building Peace 9781350989719, 9781786731302

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Christopher Ward is Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He was educated at Whitgift, and at St John’s College, Oxford and St Antony’s College, Oxford. Formerly with the World Bank, working largely in the field of natural resource management and rural development in the Middle East and Africa, he is currently a consultant to a number of international organizations, including the World Bank and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. He has lived in Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Somalia, as well as Kenya, Madagascar and the USA. He is the author of The Water Crisis in Yemen: Managing Extreme Water Scarcity in the Middle East (I.B.Tauris, 2015). Sandra Ruckstuhl is a social development specialist who works with the World Bank, United Nations and US Government to improve conflict sensitivity of international development and humanitarian aid initiatives in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. She has specialized field experience supporting water and natural resource management projects, and has conducted analysis and provided operational guidance for programmes in more than 20 countries. She holds a PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. She currently serves as Senior Social Specialist, Global Water Practice, World Bank, supporting programmes in fragile, conflict-affected and transboundary contexts, and as Program Manager for the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network’s USA Sustainable Cities Initiative.

‘Nowhere does water play a greater role in the social, economic and political dynamics of nations than in the water-scarce Middle East and North Africa region, whose stability and prosperity matter greatly for global stability, evidenced by recent and current events. Ward and Ruckstuhl write with the knowledge and confidence of practitioners, having spent much of their careers working on water projects and policy in the region, and with the rigour and detail of scholars, weaving vivid case studies into their analyses of the region’s water-related challenges and potential remedies. If you want to increase your general knowledge of the region and the challenges it faces, or to understand specifically how water impacts its vulnerable societies today, or to assess the risks to other societies that may face similar impacts in our rapidly changing world, and to examine potential solutions – read this unique book.’ Professor David Grey, University of Oxford and University of Exeter

‘Water scarcity is scary. Global experience shows that water scarcity can be mitigated. This book exposes the extreme version of water scarcity faced by the people and economies of the Middle East and North Africa. It also provides an authoritative account of the diverse technical and institutional measures that have enabled versions of sustainable water security to be enjoyed in most of the economies of the region.’ Professor Tony Allan, King’s College London and SOAS, University of London ‘Arguably nowhere on earth is the management of scarce water resources as precarious as in the arid and hostile region known as the Middle East and North Africa, where ongoing vulnerability is further exacerbated by current and impending climate change. The authors weave three inextricably intertwined stories together to craft a comprehensive and nuanced portrait of the situation: water scarcity, variability and the impacts on both of climate change; conflict and cooperation at the local, national, and transboundary scales; and the promise of harnessing both new technologies and new approaches to markets and governance to enhance resilience through this crisis. Their combined years of practical experience are on display both in the breadth of the material that they cover, and also in the telling case studies that bring their examples to life. Starting with “challenges,” then shifting to “options,” and finally to an “agenda for change,” the authors leave the readers with a sense of hope for this fragile region, and offer governments and development partners a detailed path forward.’ Professor Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST Securing Livelihoods, Building Peace

BY CHRISTOPHER WARD

AND

SANDRA RUCKSTUHL

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2017 Christopher Ward and Sandra Ruckstuhl The right of Christopher Ward and Sandra Ruckstuhl to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by the authors in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of Human Geography 40 ISBN: 978 1 78453 776 0 eISBN: 978 1 78672 130 3 ePDF: 978 1 78673 130 2 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Christopher Ward dedicates this book: For my lovely wife Isabelle Ruth and my beautiful daughters Catriona and Antonia, for all the adventures we have had and will have together. And in memory of my parents, for my upbringing in love and learning. Sandra Ruckstuhl dedicates this book: For Rawhi and habibti Karla – the most incredible explorers to partner with on any journey.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Introduction Background on the Middle East and North Africa Region The countries of the region Global and regional trends Water in the region Part I CHALLENGES The Challenge of Water Scarcity, Climate Change and Water-related Conflict 1. The Challenge of Water and Agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa and the Drivers of Water Scarcity Water resources and uses Climate and farming systems The contribution of agriculture Recent trends: an agriculture already under stress Agriculture and water Irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa Agricultural heritage and conservation Food security and agricultural water management Conclusion: drivers of scarcity and the challenge of water for agriculture 2. Climate Change and its Expected Impacts Climate change events anticipated in the Middle East and North Africa Expected impacts of climate change on agricultural water and farming

xi xv

1 1 2 6

11 13 13 16 18 20 23 26 29 31 36 38 38 40

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3. Water and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa A deadly water conflict The nature and role of conflict in the water sector of the region Why does conflict so often arise over water? Types of water conflict in the region The challenge of transboundary water Conflict at the national or inter-sectoral level Conflict at the local level Factors exacerbating water conflict in the Middle East and North Africa Water and conflict in the Syrian crisis Part II OPTIONS Responses to Water Scarcity, Climate Change and Water-related Conflict, and Options for the Future 4. Policies and Institutions for Managing Water Resources for Agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa Bringing integrated management to bear on agricultural water to promote efficiency Overall water governance and institutions in the Middle East and North Africa IWRM and the basin approach Subsidiarity, decentralization and participation Acting on the supply-side drivers of scarcity Groundwater depletion The incentive framework for promoting water use efficiency and water productivity in agriculture 5. Water Use Efficiency and Crop Water Productivity in Agricultural Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa Water use efficiency and water productivity Surface irrigation: increasing water use efficiency and closing the yield gap through modernization Pressurized irrigation and high value agriculture Sustainable groundwater irrigation Rainfed agriculture Watershed management and water management in the region’s drylands Salinization, waterlogging and drainage

46 46 47 49 52 57 60 70 76 80

85 87 88 91 93 94 96 100 105

108 108 114 125 129 137 142 149

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

6. Adapting to Climate Change and Ensuring Food Security How farmers may adapt to climate change Adaptation options for farming systems Household-level livelihood strategies Strategies for adapting agriculture under climate change Regional and international dimensions Climate change mitigation and the agricultural carbon footprint Food security and climate change Coping with the food security crisis in Syria and other post-conflict countries in the region Conclusion 7. Water Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa Options for managing and resolving water conflict From conflict to cooperation on transboundary waters Transboundary cooperation in practice: the case of the West Bank aquifers Cooperation on the Nile: experience and lessons The problem of the Euphrates The cause and urgency of the Euphrates problem Resolving conflict through good water management within the nation Conclusion 8. Beyond Conflict Resolution: Peacebuilding Through Water Governance in the Middle East and North Africa Peace, peacebuilding and ‘environmental peacebuilding’ Environmental peacebuilding strategy Capacities for collaborative governance Practicalities: taking advantage of the context Maximizing operational approaches Conclusion 9. An Agenda for Change Managing water resources for agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa: gaps and options Improving water use efficiency and crop water productivity Are these new approaches to agricultural water management? Scope to adapt to climate change Resolving conflict over water

ix

154 154 156 159 161 165 169 170 176 181

183 183 188 189 193 208 210 220 237

239 240 243 244 251 260 275 276 278 284 291 294 298

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Syria and other crises in the region Peacebuilding Difficult policy choices and deciding on trade-offs Creating momentum for change Notes Bibliography Index

302 303 305 310 315 325 335

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures Figure 1.1 Cumulative agricultural total factor productivity growth in the Middle East and North Africa

21

Figure 2.1 Average cereal yields in the Middle East and North Africa – historic climate and alternative scenarios 43 Figure 4.1 Morocco – Annual renewable groundwater potential and current withdrawal rates

102

Figure 4.2 Drop in the water table at Souss (top); drop in the water table at Saiss (bottom)

103

Figure 5.1 Tunisia: Development of water-saving irrigation technology 1995 – 2009

110

Figure 5.2 Tunisia: Improvements in water conveyance efficiency and in-field efficiency

111

Figure 5.3 Furrow-enhanced rainwater (runoff) harvesting, Syria

138

Figure 7.1 Timeline of cooperation in the Nile River Basin

204

Figure 7.2 Euphrates inflow to Iraq 1932– 2003

209

Figure 7.3 Depletion of water from the Euphrates

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Figure 7.4 Schematic of diminishing transboundary flows in the Euphrates

218

Figure 8.1 Water Access-Conflict Trajectory

240

Figure 8.2 Environmental peacebuilding model

243

Figure 8.3 Lederach’s Peacebuilding Hierarchy

267

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Tables Table I.1 Key facts on GDP of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

3

Table I.2 Key facts on demographics of Middle East and North Africa countries

5

Table 1.1 Water resources in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

14

Table 1.2 Water storage in the countries of the region

15

Table 1.3 Shares of water by sector for countries of the region

16

Table 1.4 Precipitation and aridity in countries of the region

17

Table 1.5 Principal farming systems of the Middle East and North Africa

18

Table 1.6 Agricultural contribution to GDP in $ and % share

19

Table 1.7 Key facts on poverty and malnourishment in countries of the Middle East and North Africa

25

Table 1.8 Irrigated and rainfed lands in the Middle East and North Africa

27

Table 1.9 Agricultural water withdrawals in Middle East and North Africa countries

28

Table 1.10 Types of irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa

30

Table 1.11 Cereals self-sufficiency and food import dependence in the Middle East and North Africa

31

Table 1.12 Food security vulnerability in countries in the Middle East and North Africa

33

Table 2.1 Exposure – climate change events expected to occur in the region

39

Table 2.2 Projected rate of annual change for rainfed wheat under one climate change scenario

42

Table 2.3 Climate change impacts on farming systems of the region

44

Table 3.1 Classification of water conflict in the region

53

Table 3.2 Conflict at the national or inter-sectoral level

61

Table 3.3 Conflict at the local level

70

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

xiii

Table 5.1 Water savings in Morocco after improvement of network delivery and in-field water management

110

Table 5.2 Water productivity gains from switching from surface to drip irrigation in India

112

Table 5.3 Physical and economic crop water productivity ranges for selected crops

113

Table 5.4 Irrigated v. rainfed yields measured at Morocco’s Doukkala irrigation scheme 2010/11

115

Table 5.5 Physical crop water productivity measured at Doukkala 2010/11

116

Table 5.6 Yield gap measured at Doukkala 2010/11

118

Table 5.7 Raising overall system efficiency

120

Table 5.8 Cost recovery on selected schemes: actual and potential

122

Table 5.9 Pressurized irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa

126

Table 5.10 Eight of the world’s top twenty groundwater irrigating countries are in the Middle East and North Africa region

130

Table 5.11 Saudi Arabia’s plan for transformation to a more sustainable agriculture

133

Table 5.12 Agricultural water management (AWM) strategies and techniques for improving rainfed productivity

141

Table 5.13 Aridity Index ranges used to define drylands

147

Table 6.1 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for Middle East and North Africa countries

168

Table 6.2 Food security strategy options for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

177

Table 7.1 A framework for conflict management and resolution

186

Table 7.2 Economic value of cooperation: status quo v. full cooperation

195

Table 7.3 Euphrates flow

211

Table 7.4 Water conflict and approaches for conflict resolution in the Middle East and North Africa

234

Table 8.1 Capacities that promote collaborative governance

244

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Table 8.2 Intervention practicalities that enable peacebuilding

252

Table 9.1 Identifying misaligned incentives and deciding on trade-offs

309

Box Box 8.1 Good Water Neighbours Project and Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study

242

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The material for this book has been collected over the more than two decades during which the authors have been working on questions of water in the Middle East and North Africa. Our debts are almost too many to list. Christopher Ward acknowledges some of the people who have particularly helped him over the years. ‘I have learned enormously from Professor Tony Allan of SOAS and King’s College, London, the doyen of Middle East water studies, conceiver of the virtual water thesis, and winner of the Stockholm International Water Prize; from Professor Michael Cernea (George Washington University), who taught me to care first and foremost about the human and social aspects of water in the region; from Salah Darghouth and Safwat Abdel Dayyem, who know all aspects of water in the region and bring enormous enthusiasm to thinking about the subject; from Mohammed al-Eryani, Anwer Sahooly and AbdulRahman al-Eryani, who taught me about water in super-scarce environments; from Abdessalam Ould Ahmed, Assistant Director General of the FAO and Pasquale Steduto, FAO Country Representative for Egypt; from Ken Matthews, architect of the Australian water sector reforms; from Professor David Grey, my former colleague at the World Bank and architect of the Nile Basin Initiative; and from Jeremy Berkoff and John Hayward, who first introduced me to the formal study of water resources in the region. Three researchers have provided particular insights into key questions: Francesca de Chaˆtel on Syria, Ana Cascao on the Nile; and Rachael McDonnell on climate change. I owe a real debt to these specialists. ‘On particular aspects on which I have worked, I want to recognize: on water in the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf, Bekele Debele Negewo, Ken Matthews, Marcus Wijnen, Professor Donato Romano, Matthias Grueninger, Dr Keith Pitman, and Frank van Steenbergen; on the Nile, Barbara Miller, JB Collier, Nagaraja Rao Harshadeep, Christina Leb and Eileen Burke; on

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Morocco, Hassan Lamrani and Omar Alaoui; on Iraq, Nejdet al-Salihi, Ahmed Shawky, Maher Abu Taleb and Suhail Jme’an; on the Palestinian Territories, Sabine Beddies, Fuad Bateh, Dr Shaddad al-Attili, Aiman Jarrar, Kasim Abdo, Michael Talhami, Mark Zeitoun, the mayor and citizens of Jayyous, the residents of Hebron, Masafir Yatta and Khan Yunis, Pier Mantovani, Omar Zimmo, Anan Jayyousi, Adnan Ghosheh, Rama Ramakrishnan, Firas Zaghal and Vahid Alavian; on climate change, Julian Lampietti, Dorte Verner, Rachael McDonnell and S. Ismail; on drainage and on Egypt, Safwat Abdel Dayem; on water scarcity in the region, Abdessalam Ouldahmed, Pasquale Steduto, Muhammad Bazza, Jean-Marc Faures, Guy Alaerts and Isin Tellioglu; on ancient and recent work on Yemen, Marcus Moench, Anwer Sahooly, Professor Mohammad al Eryani, Dr Mohamed al Hamdi, Ghazi al Saqqaf, Yogita Mumssen, Amal Talbi and Naif Abu Lohom; on social and political economy aspects of water, Sabine Beddies, Taha Taher and Khaled Hariri; and on community water management in the region, Helen Lackner, who usually agrees with me on the ends of equity and social justice but rarely (and stimulatingly) on the means of getting there. ‘I also thank: . .

.

.

Dr Isabelle Learmont, Catriona Ward and Antonia Ward, who provided research and support throughout the entire enterprise. My colleagues at the University of Exeter, especially Kamil Mahdi, who organized my fellowship in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, and Marc Vale´ri, Eleanor Gao and Andrea Muya and their students, who have each year provided much stimulating discussion of my ideas. My former teachers at Oxford: the late, masterly and much-regretted Albert Hourani; the late and great Professor A.F.L. Beeston, who first introduced me to the Middle East; Professor Roger Owen; and Dr Robert Mabro. Also to Professor Eugene Rogan, Director, Dr Michael Willis, and the fellows of the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s, who encouraged me in my work and who kindly hosted the launch of my last book, The Water Crisis in Yemen. Many others who have helped and inspired me, including: Dr Mark Zeitoun (University of East Anglia), and Parviz Kahoofkhan.’

Sandra Ruckstuhl acknowledges some of the people who have shaped and inspired this inquiry over the years: ‘This study of environmental peacebuilding grew from a collision of two separate areas of inspiration: conflict resolution and water governance. One of my most valuable mentors, Dr Dennis Sandole (School for Conflict Analysis

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xvii

and Resolution, George Mason University), ignited my interest to explore the concepts of peacebuilding practice and encouraged me to apply those to the fields of recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development. And as I ambled down that path, I have been grateful for the faculty of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University – including Susan Hirsch (for chairing my dissertation research on this topic), Sandra Cheldelin, Terrence Lyons, Richard Rubernstein, Daniel Rothbart and Solon Simmons – who provided diverse guidance, tools and creative space to investigate conflict-sensitive development. ‘Irreplaceable insights from an inspiring group of transboundary water practitioners were responsible for seeding my interest in the practicalities of water, conflict and peacebuilding: Claudia Sadoff, David Grey and Aaron Wolf. I have learned an enormous amount about equitable and inclusive development due to the tacit knowledge of a range of development practitioners who value interdisciplinary innovation: Maher Abu Taleb, Guy Alaerts, Vahid Alavian, Inger Anderson, Sabine Beddies, Cynthia Brady, Erick Fernandez, Daryl Fields, Vesna Francic, Takayuki Hagiwara, Jana El Horr, Nagaraja Rao Harshadeep, Tracy Hart, Toyoko Kodama, Markus Kostner, Christina Leb, Pier Mantovani, Alexandre Marc, Gary Milante, Barbara Miller, Grant Milne, Benjimin Petrini, Bekele Debele Negewo, Andrew Norton, Colin Scott, Ahmed Shawki, Jeff Thindwa and Per Wam. ‘Through collaboration and exchange, an inspiring community of researchers, educators and organizers has grown the fields of conflict sensitive development and environmental peacebuilding, and informed this analysis: Geoff Dabelko and Lauren Herzer Risi (Woodrow Wilson Center), David Jensen (United Nations Environment Program), Gidon Bromberg (EcoPeace Middle East), Ken Conca (American University), Alexandre Carius and Dennis Tenzler (Adelphi), David Michel (Stimson Center), Carl Bruch (Environmental Law Institute), Todd Walters (International Peace Parks Expeditions), Emily Gallagher (New America), Emery Brusset (Social Terrain) and Ben Orlove (Columbia University). I want to thank Rawhi Afaghani, who provided a critical perspective on peacebuilding theory and practice over the course of this project. And finally, I am grateful for the innumerable practitioners, community members and local leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen who have engaged in this field research and shared their reflections on water and peacebuilding, as they constantly educate me on the practical realities of environmental peacebuilding and ground all elements of guidance that our research hopes to provide.’

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This book is a collaborative work. Sandra Ruckstuhl wrote Chapter 8 and other passages related to that chapter. Christopher Ward wrote the rest of the book. Sandra Ruckstuhl also collaborated on much of the research that contributed to the analysis of water conflict. Finally we thank all those at I.B.Tauris who have helped so generously with the process of publication, and above all, David Stonestreet, an exemplary editor, and David Campbell, who steered the book adroitly through the vicissitudes of the production process.

INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION

This introduction provides a background on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region and sketches out the key themes of water scarcity, climate change and water conflict that are the subject of this book. The discussion summarizes the characteristics of the countries of the region and the trends which are affecting their society, politics and economies. The common thread of water scarcity is introduced, along with the demographic, economic and natural pressures which are increasing that scarcity. Agriculture uses the lion’s share of the region’s water and dominates discussion of water scarcity in the region. The discussion summarizes the importance of agriculture in the region and looks at the links, both real and imagined, between agriculture, water scarcity, poverty, malnutrition and food security. At the end, the discussion introduces the issue of water and the conflicts which inevitably arise in conditions of scarcity and competition, including the relation between water conflict and broader patterns of conflict.

The countries of the region A varied set of countries This book takes as its subject of analysis the 17 countries commonly grouped together as the Middle East and North Africa region. These countries are: the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia); the countries of north-east Africa (Libya, Egypt); the countries of the Mashreq and the Fertile Crescent (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq); Iran; and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrein, Qatar, United Arab Emirates or UAE, and Oman). Two other countries – Sudan and Mauretania, more typically considered as African – are discussed only when data sets include them.

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With the exception of Iran, these countries share a common language, religion and considerable cultural affinity. Nonetheless, they have some very diverse characteristics. Economically, they vary from the poorest to several of the wealthiest countries in the world. Most are middle-income countries, but one (Yemen) is extremely poor, amongst the poorest nations on the face of the globe.1 At the other end of the scale, several states in the Arabian Peninsula are amongst the wealthiest in the world thanks to their hydrocarbon resources – see Table I.1. Wide structural differences and diverse natural endowments There is a wide range in the economic structures of these countries too, from economies largely dependent on poor agriculture to diversified modern economies to countries entirely reliant on the export of oil and gas. Underlying this diversity in structures is a huge variation in the gifts of nature to the countries of the region, from immeasurable hydrocarbon resources and considerable mineral wealth to some of the scantiest natural endowments to be found anywhere in the world. Of the region’s ten largest economies, only Egypt and Morocco are not substantial oil exporters. These two countries have developed more diversified economies with a relatively high degree of modernization and integration. The poorest country, Yemen, trails behind, with its largely subsistence agriculture and limited diversification.2

Global and regional trends The Middle East and North Africa region is strongly affected by global trends, particularly economic and political trends. In addition, several trends within the region are reflections of trends in the world as a whole, particularly natural resource degradation and climate change. There are also two striking trends which are more specific to the region: demographic trends and pressures; and – most tragically – the effects of widespread conflict in the region. Sluggish growth, poor fiscal outlook and low investor confidence Up to 2008, two decades of rapid global expansion of demand drove widespread economic growth throughout the Middle East and North Africa region, supported by increasingly open economic policies in key agricultural exporting and tourist economies such as Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. The oil-exporting economies, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, benefited from high oil prices. The increased level of economic activity allowed governments to increase the supply of public goods, including programmes

Countries with GDP growth averaging † . 5% annually: Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Palestinian Territories, Oman

Countries with annual GDP: † . $200 billion annually: Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE (all oil exporters) † . $100 billion annually: Egypt, Algeria (oil exporter), Qatar (oil exporter) † . $50 billion annually: Kuwait (oil), Morocco, Iraq (oil), Libya (oil)

Source: Aquastat; FAO.

GDP growth annual %

Key facts on GDP of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Total GDP

Table I.1

Regional average: $9,600 Range from $800 –$55,000 Countries with GDP per capita: † , $1,000: Yemen † $1,000 – $5,000: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia † $5,000 – $15,000: Bahrain, Oman † . $15,000: Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia

GDP per capita

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

for food security and social protection. Across the region, levels of poverty and food insecurity dropped. The global economic downturn since 2008 has led to the reversal of the favourable trend of the previous years. Poverty and food insecurity are again on the rise in many locations, a trend enormously affected in many states of the region by political instability and by civil strife. Almost everywhere, investor confidence is at a low ebb. To some extent, this is likely to prove a short- to medium-term correction. Although, the global economic outlook remains sombre for the next two to three years, with slower growth in developing countries, especially China, and with the decline in the price of oil and other commodities, global conditions are expected to pick up towards the end of the decade. However, the outlook for the Middle East and North Africa is more mixed. The World Bank forecast growth of . 4% in the region in 2016– 17, but no growth for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) oil-exporters of the Arabian Peninsula due to flat oil prices. By 2016, the drop in oil prices had already caused a massive reduction in fiscal resources – 50% down in the case of Saudi Arabia – and all the GCC countries were running huge fiscal deficits. The effects of the economic crisis in the GCC were felt far beyond the oil-exporting countries, with remittances sharply down in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. Beyond that, prospects for oil exporters remain weak for some time, and this will have a knock-on effect throughout the region through reduced demand, lower employment and continued reduction in remittances. In addition, there is no clear end in sight for the conflicts in Yemen, Libya, Syria or Iraq. Trade and food security In an increasingly globalized and competitive world, the region has been faced with the need to increase international competitiveness through the development of transport and communications infrastructure, technological innovation and trade policies. One pathway to this was expected to be strengthening of regional economic integration. However, in recent decades, countries of the region have made only limited moves towards regional trade agreements and economic integration. As a result, complementarities in value chains amongst countries have not developed and the countries of the region have done little to present a coordinated regional case in global trade negotiations. At the same time, most countries of the region have seen a rising level of food import dependence and exposure to market shocks. With continued population growth, world demand for food continues to rise and changes in patterns of demand are combining with supply-side issues of quantity and price volatility to maintain a level of global risk. Supply risk is exacerbated in

BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

5

the region by threats from conflict and by the weak regional integration. Domestic food production is affected by economic, technical and natural resource constraints limiting expansion of output. In any case, many countries of the region lack comparative advantage for expanding food production. As a result, most Middle East and North Africa countries are becoming increasingly dependent on food imports and are consequently vulnerable to price and supply risks.3 Political change Over the last decades, the world has experienced extraordinary political and social change, dominated by growing democracy and inclusiveness, by less reliance on planning and more on markets, and by increasingly costless access to information. Political conditions have relaxed, social movements have strengthened and there has been greater participation in power and in control of public institutions. These global changes have been reflected throughout the Middle East and North Africa to varying degrees and have had a significant influence on programmes aimed at reducing poverty and improving food security, and on environmental protection. Female education has been a powerful mechanism for female empowerment. The wave of change dubbed the Arab Spring initially had a liberating effect but over the course of time has dissipated into contrasting fragments from which no region-wide picture emerges. Demographic trends and pressures The total population of the Middle East and North Africa region is about 400 million people – see Table I.2. Two countries in the region are populous (over 50 million inhabitants) and eight are medium-sized countries (over 10 million inhabitants). In most of the countries, population growth rates have dropped considerably, but the poorer countries, particularly Yemen, continue to Table I.2

Key facts on demographics of Middle East and North Africa countries

Total population

Rural – urban population balance

. 50 million: Egypt, Iran 20 –50 million: Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria 10 –20 million: Tunisia

Regional average urban: 70% Fast urbanizing: average 3.3% yearly Current urbanization: † . 80% urban: Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE † 70 –80% urban: Iran, Jordan, Libya, Palestinian Territories, Oman † , 50% urban: Egypt, Yemen

Source: Aquastat; FAO.

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

experience high rates of growth up to 4% per annum. Past high population growth rates and rising expectations are driving rural to urban migration across the region, with consequent impacts on food systems, nutrition and poverty. The demographic bulge of young people aged 18–30 coming onto the labour market is driving very high rates of youth unemployment (30%) and is a major push factor in migration. Despite advances in female education, the Middle East and North Africa region continues to have the lowest rate of female participation in the workforce of any region in the world. The effects of conflict The most pronounced and tragic regional trend of recent years has been the proliferation and escalation of conflict. Four countries became locked in internecine struggles – Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. Other regional economies had to bear the huge brunt of refugees, and forced displacement created vast numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). By 2016, 12 million Syrians had been displaced (half of the population). Half were within their own country, and over 6.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries – 1.5 million in Lebanon, where they made up one quarter of the population, 1.4 million in Jordan, and 2.8 million in Turkey. By early 2016, more than 800,000 Syrians had gone to Europe. At the same time there were 4 million IDPs in Iraq, and in Yemen 2.5 million, including 30% in femaleheaded households. The economic costs were horrendous. By 2016, the cost of war to Syria and neighbouring countries in loss of output had been estimated at $35 billion, equal to the entire Syrian GDP in 2007. Damage to capital stock in Syria 2011 – 14 was estimated at $72 billion. In Libya, oil exports collapsed, In Yemen, public debt and inflation spiralled and damage in four cities alone was estimated to have cost $4 – 5 billion. The cost to neighbouring economies was also enormous. In Jordan, the cost of Syrian refugees in 2016 was estimated at $2.5 billion for the year, 6% of GDP and one quarter of the Government budget. The consequent need for humanitarian assistance was overwhelming. In addition, terrorism took a huge toll on the Egyptian and Tunisian economies.

Water in the region Water scarcity is a common thread Across the world, finite natural resources are under growing pressure from population growth, changes in land use, and competition amongst sectors for scarce resources. The pressures on land, water and biodiversity are exacerbated by degradation resulting from human use and by climate change.

BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

7

These pressures are felt more keenly in the Middle East and North Africa than anywhere else, particularly on water because the region is the most waterscarce region in the world. Current per capita water availability is one tenth of the global average, and is declining fast as populations grow and resources are depleted; current levels are one third of those 50 years ago. Within these averages lie some huge variations. Three countries – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – have access to very significant water resources that flow largely from outside their boundaries. Iran has significant internal resources. Other countries in the region have little or no renewable water resources, particularly the very arid nations of the Arabian Peninsula. For millennia across the region, in the great river valleys of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates and in the mountain and desert cultures of the Levant, of the Maghreb and of the Arabian Peninsula, ancient seats of civilization developed their scant water resources and drew great wealth from them. Today, the countries of the region have developed a higher proportion of their available water resources and have constructed more water storage per capita than any other region in the world. The region has invested in putting its scarcest resource to use, but very little of the resource remains unused. There is scant room for increasing the supply of water. Demographic pressures are contributing to scarcity At the same time, demand for water has risen rapidly. The demographic changes mentioned above are driving this increased demand – rapid urbanization, rising incomes, temporary and permanent migration movements, and continuing high population growth rates in some countries. The region is relatively urbanized compared to other regions of the world, with over two thirds (70%) of the population region-wide living in towns. In only two countries do more than half of the population still live in rural areas. The generally quite dense urbanized populations are concentrated in areas where water is available. These demographic changes are contributing to fast-rising demand for water supply and sanitation and to pressure on water resources.4 Economic changes are also exacerbating scarcity Over the last two decades, most of the countries of the region have modernized at a rapid pace, with strong growth of industry, commerce and services. The influence of hydrocarbons – oil and gas – has been pervasive, driving growth even in non-producing countries of the region, where investment, employment and prices track the economic fortunes of the oil states. As a result, demand for water for settlements and business has shot up. Domestic water consumption has risen towards European levels,

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

and often beyond those levels, particularly in better-off countries with hot climates. The demand for food and agricultural products has risen with population, and the nature of that demand has changed as populations have become better-off and could afford different foods. As incomes rose and tastes changed, there has been growing demand for more water-intensive products like meat and dairy. The intensification of agriculture continues and agriculture is expanding in all countries of the region even while its share of growing economies dwindles. These economic factors contribute to rising demand for water, exacerbating scarcity. The faint but clear voice of the environment and of water’s ecological services One of the real achievements of the environmental movement in recent years has been the growing recognition of the need to conserve water and to protect the many services it provides to people and their lives. Understanding of water’s ecosystem functions and services today goes beyond the simple functions of water use in human activity to embrace the whole of the hydrological cycle and the mutual interactions of water, soil, biomass and landscape. The result in the region has been the emergence of a constituency and a voice for the environment, and the beginning of action to protect the broader functions and services that water provides. The result may be better protection of the water resource, but less water available for use.5 Water scarcity and climate change Under various pressures, the water resource itself is changing, and not only through the impact of human development and use. Climate continues its slow changes in varying ways across the region. These changes, both manmade and natural, are bringing new risks to the water resource and increasing the vulnerability of those dependent on it. All countries of the Middle East and North Africa are vulnerable to climate change which is likely to intensify existing water scarcity and aridity, bringing higher temperatures, more heat waves, lower and less reliable precipitation and more extreme rainfall events. This will lead to increased frequency of droughts and floods and increased erosion. In addition, global warming will lead to rising sea levels and seawater intrusion in coastal areas.6 Water scarcity and the need for an integrated approach The story of water scarcity in the region is thus one of fast rising demand and a very limited and vulnerable resource. Under demographic and economic pressure, demand for water is rising continually. Water has been developed

BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

9

rapidly for use in fast-growing economies. Demand and competition for water are growing due to rapid urbanization, rising living standards in cities and demand for more water-intensive products. Non-renewable resources have been depleted and quality impaired. Changes in climate, in temperature and in precipitation are increasingly affecting both demand and supply and, as we have seen, there is also rising recognition of the need for water for environmental services. All these changes are leading toward growing competition and conflict. The demand for water will increase over time, and agriculture will inevitably have to give up a portion to higher value uses. In every country of the region, almost all of the water that can be economically harnessed has already been developed. The priorities now are integrated management for optimal allocation and efficient use, environmental protection to prevent degradation, and adaptation to climate change. These themes are the heart of the analysis in this book.7 Water and conflict8 Conflict over water is on the rise at every level in the region, from conflict between neighbours to conflict between nations. Growing scarcity and competing demands are bringing multiple constituencies into situations of competing claims and conflicting interests. Systems for dealing with water conflict are evolving, but are not keeping pace. The politics of water is changing, with some emerging elements of a new governance and new ways of dealing with conflict. More vocal constituencies have come forward but there are also more open arenas for airing and resolving conflict. More open political systems allow citizens to express their views on how water might be allocated and used. In the Middle East and North Africa, popular and political awareness of the importance of correct choices in water management has risen sharply in recent years, particularly as a result of the Arab Spring. This has opened up criticism of past approaches and a search for new initiatives. Growing awareness and participation have brought many latent conflicts into the open, and the resolution of these conflicts has taken on a more public character, if not necessarily a more equitable one. The consequences of neglecting emerging water conflict are all too clear and dreadful. The most salient example is the appalling neglect of the humanitarian crisis amongst the population of north-east Syria during the droughts of 2006 – 10. This neglect, which came as the culmination of fifty years of sustained mismanagement of natural resources in the region by the regime, was certainly amongst the triggers for the Syrian uprising.9 *****

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These, then, are the key themes that this book will explore – a scarce, highly developed water resource, under threat from climate change; growing competition for the resource turning towards conflict; and frail and only slowly adapting institutions to promote efficiency, equity and sustainability and to reconcile conflicting claims on water for the benefit of the peoples of the region. The discussion in this book does not, however, stop short at detailing these challenges. Much of the book is devoted to exploring the choices – and related trade-offs – that governments and their peoples can make to meet the challenges and to promote sustainable and efficient growth with equity. In too many parts of the region, these choices will have to be made as nations emerge from violent conflict. It can only be hoped that post-conflict settlements will provide an opportunity for a clearer vision of how to manage natural resources better for the benefit of these troubled nations of the region and their beleaguered peoples.

PART I CHALLENGES THE CHALLENGE OF WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER-RELATED CONFLICT

The Introduction provided a rapid review of the countries which make up the Middle East and North Africa, and of their economies, societies and state of development. The main constraints and drivers of change were discussed, including the sluggish growth, weak regional integration and import dependence. Demographic pressures and lacklustre economies combine to create high rates of unemployment, particularly for youth. Political change driven by poor government and inequity has veered into conflict. The Introduction then touched on the natural resource challenges related to water, agriculture and climate. These themes are taken up in detail in Part I of this book. Chapter 1 looks at the challenges of water and agriculture and at the drivers of water scarcity. The changes in climate and the resulting risks and impacts on the farming systems of the region are the subject of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 then demonstrates how scarce water is combining with poor water governance to create situations of conflict. Part I, Challenges, is essentially a diagnostic. Part II, Options, which follows, highlights the possible remedies and demonstrates how good water management, adaptation to a changing climate, and water conflict resolution can contribute to sustainable, efficient and equitable growth across the region. Both Part I and Part II show that there is a dangerous downside. With inaction, or through perseverance with certain current trends, including mismanagement of natural resources, there is a risk that countries in the region may become trapped in a pattern of protracted crisis. The result might be a long term instability characterized by continuing high levels of internal and international migration, loss of social capital and weakening of states and institutions.

CHAPTER 1 THE CHALLENGE OF WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND THE DRIVERS OF WATER SCARCITY

This chapter reviews, in detail, the challenges of water and water scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa region that were sketched out in the Introduction. As agriculture uses on average 90 per cent of the region’s water, the focus is very much on agriculture and on the drivers of water scarcity in agriculture. The chapter looks first at the resource base, at water resources and current uses. The discussion then moves to the current status of agriculture across the region, and to emerging trends in agriculture, particularly agriculture’s contribution to food security and the stresses to which agriculture is subject. A discussion of the extent and role of irrigation in agriculture follows, and the chapter concludes by summarizing the drivers of water scarcity for agriculture on both the supply and demand side.

Water resources and uses The countries of the Middle East and North Africa are very water scarce. With 6 per cent of world population but only 0.6 per cent of the world’s accessible renewable water, the Middle East and North Africa region has the lowest renewable water resources per capita of any region in the world. Worldwide, water resources average 6,400 m3 per capita, whereas the regional average is currently only one-tenth of that level (688 m3), and most regional countries have significantly less than that (see Table 1.1). Only three countries across the region have more than 1,000 m3 of water per capita. All the rest have per capita resources below that threshold and so are classed as ‘water scarce’ – and six countries are counted as ‘extremely water scarce’ (less than 100 m3 per capita).

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Table 1.1

Water resources in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Total renewable water resources per capita In the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, renewable water resources per capita are: † 3 countries . 1,000 m3: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon † 2 countries 500– 1,000 m3: Egypt, Morocco † 7 countries 100 –500 m3: Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Palestinian Territories, Oman, Syria, Tunisia † 6 countries ,100 m3: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Source: Aquastat.

The situation is worsening. Current levels are just one third of those fifty years ago. With rapid population growth, resources per capita have plummeted from 3,500 m3 to current levels of 688 m3. The implications of water scarcity vary by country within the region. Amongst the water-scarce countries, five are oil-exporting states where water is essential only for municipal use and where desalination allows the substitution of oil for water. Other countries are middle income states where agriculture remains important and water dependency is therefore correspondingly higher. The poorest country of the region, Yemen, is highly water dependent. Yemen’s large agriculture sector uses 95 per cent of available water. Over five millennia, countries in the region have progressively developed a higher proportion of their available resources than any other region in the world. The process of water resource development accelerated greatly in the second half of the twentieth century, with massive public investment in storage, irrigation and water supply. Today, taken together, countries in the region withdraw almost 80 per cent of the available water: this compares to less than 30 per cent for the next region – South Asia – and to a worldwide average of just 10 per cent. Reflecting water scarcity, the region also has the highest level of water storage in the world. In view of the scarcity of water and the seasonality of flows, and also the high proportion of water which would otherwise flow unused to the sea, a number of countries have built significant inter-seasonal and long term storage capacity – see Table 1.2. In some countries, the scope for further storage is little, except for small hill dams and water harvesting. However, storage could probably be increased in some countries where water still runs to seas or sinks – Lebanon is one example.

THE CHALLENGE OF WATER Table 1.2

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Water storage in the countries of the region

Total dam water storage capacity In the Middle East and North Africa, seven countries have more than 1 billion m3 dam water storage capacity: 1. Egypt 168.2 billion m3 2. Iraq 151.6 billion m3 3. Iran 31.6 billion m3 4. Syria 19.7 billion m3 5. Morocco 16.9 billion m3 6. Algeria 5.7 billion m3 7. Tunisia 2.5 billion m3 Source: Aquastat.

The source of water varies greatly by country, and consequently countries face varied challenges in water resource management. In a group of arid or semi-arid countries which nonetheless enjoy some rainfall, the sources of water are predominantly rainwater, storage and diversion from internal rivers and groundwater. This group includes Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria. These countries face the particular challenge of climate change. In a group of countries where there is little rainfall but where large rivers flow in from outside the national territory, the main source of water is transboundary water stored and diverted within national territory. This group includes Iraq, Egypt and Syria. Jordan benefits from the Yarmouk which is fed from both Syrian and Jordanian territory. These countries face the particular challenge of dependence on upstream riparians for the water resource. For hyper-arid countries where there is little or no rainfall, the predominant source of water is groundwater, often non-renewable. This group includes the states of the Arabian Peninsula, plus Libya and the Palestinian Territories. These countries face the particular challenge of depletion of non-renewable water resources. Water scarcity is increasing in the region. With population growth and the changes in the pattern of demand that attend urbanization and industrialization, water scarcity is growing, and with it pressure for reallocation of water from lower value uses like agriculture to higher value uses. The population of the region is expected to grow from the present 400 million to around 500 million by 2025, and average resources per capita are expected to shrink by one third. Of this drop, about four-fifths is attributed to increased population, and the balance to reduction of supply through climate change impacts.1

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Table 1.3

Shares of water by sector for countries of the region Billion m3 withdrawn for agriculture

Percentage withdrawn by sector Domestic

Industry

More than 90% of withdrawals used in agriculture Yemen 3 95% Syria 19 95% Iraq 39 92% Iran 66 91% Oman 1 90%

4% 3% 3% 7% 8%

1% 2% 5% 2% 2%

More than 80% of withdrawals used in agriculture Morocco 11 87% Egypt 59 86% Saudi Arabia 17 86% Libya 3 83% Tunisia 2 82%

10% 8% 10% 14% 14%

3% 6% 3% 3% 4%

Less than 80% of withdrawals used in agriculture Jordan 1 75% Lebanon 1 67% Algeria 4 65%

21% 33% 22%

4% 1% 13%

Country

Agriculture

Source: Aquastat; World Bank 2007a: 148.

Water uses by sector All countries of the region use most of their water for agriculture (see Table 1.3). Five countries use more than 90 per cent of their abstractions for agriculture, and a further five use more than 80 per cent. Only two countries use less than two-thirds of the water they withdraw in agriculture.

Climate and farming systems Climate Most of the Middle East and North Africa is arid to hyper-arid, with agriculture possible only under irrigation. The dry areas in the region – those with rainfall under 300 mm a year – account for 90 per cent of the land (see Table 1.4). In these areas, agriculture can only be practised with various forms of irrigation, including water harvesting. The main land use is pastoral. These areas contain less than 30 per cent of the agricultural population. The temperate, higher rainfall areas have a Mediterranean climate, typically long dry summers and mild wet winters. However, even in these areas it is only in restricted parts of some countries that rainfall is enough to

THE CHALLENGE OF WATER Table 1.4

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Precipitation and aridity in countries of the region

Precipitation

Aridity and length of growing period

Region-wide average precipitation: 183 mm Countries with: † More than 300 mm: Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Territories † Less than 100 mm: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Mauretania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

Share of land area of the region that is classed as † † † † †

Desert (LGP 0): 5% Arid (LGP ,60 days): 73% Dry semi-arid (LGP 60 –119 days): 9% Moist semi-arid (LGP 120– 79 days): 7% Sub-humid (LGP 180– 269 days): 5%

Note: LGP ¼ length of growing period

Source: Aquastat.

grow crops without irrigation. These areas account for less than 10 per cent of the land area – but nearly half of the agricultural population. In addition to low rainfall, the region is also characterized by high variability of rainfall. All regional countries experience the unusual and problematic combination of low precipitation and high variability, which not only increases the need for irrigation to bridge dry spells but also makes more uncertain the availability of springs, stream flow and shallow groundwater which are directly recharged by current rainfall. Farming systems Regional farming systems are diverse, varying by geography, climate and natural resource endowments. In fact, the character of the multiple farming systems in the region (see Table 1.5) is determined in large part by the availability and reliability of water sources. In the higher rainfall areas, which account for less than 10 per cent of the land area, combined cropping and livestock systems support almost half (48 per cent) of the agricultural population. Large scale irrigated areas cover less than 2 per cent of the land area, but account for 17 per cent of the agricultural population.2 In rainfed agriculture, relatively low-yielding and lower value cereals predominate. Because precipitation occurs over most of the Maghreb and Mashriq in winter, rainfed crops are grown in the winter months, maturing for harvest generally in spring and early summer. The main rainfed crops are wheat, barley, legumes, olives, grapes, and fruits and vegetables. Grain production accounts for two-thirds of the cultivated area (against a world average of 46 per cent). Yields for rainfed crops vary widely, depending on the farming system, but are generally below world averages.

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Table 1.5

Principal farming systems of the Middle East and North Africa % of the region’s

Farming system Irrigated Highland mixed Rainfed mixed Dryland mixed Pastoral Arid zones

Land area

Agricultural population

2 7

17 30

2

18

4 23 62

Main livelihoods

Prevalence of poverty Moderate Extensive

14

Fruit, vegetables, cash crops Cereals, legumes, sheep, off-farm income Tree crops, cereals, legumes, off-farm income Cereals, sheep, off-farm income

9 5

Camels, sheep, off-farm income Camels, sheep, off-farm income

Extensive Limited

Moderate Extensive

Source: FAO 2001; World Bank 2013.

By contrast, yields under irrigation are relatively high by global standards. Irrigated areas are cultivated all year round, with peak demand for irrigation water during the dry summer months. Under irrigation, yields can be very good, with yields of irrigated wheat in Egypt for example averaging 6.5 t/ha. A wide range of higher value crops is grown. Fresh fruit and vegetable production accounts for about 10 per cent of the cropped area region-wide, but for a much higher share in countries practising intensive irrigated agriculture (Egypt 20 per cent, Jordan 28 per cent, Lebanon 37 per cent).3 Livestock are integrated in all farming systems, providing important synergies and complementarities between and within systems – from extensive pastoralism to feedlots in peri-urban agriculture.

The contribution of agriculture Economic importance of rural areas and of agriculture in the region Rural areas and agriculture remain very important in most countries of the region. Despite the pace of urbanization, there are still about 170 million rural people in the region. Rural population growth rates – 1.6 per cent a year 1990 – 2004 – are high, and the rural population is expected to continue growing at over 1 per cent through to 2030. Most rural people are involved in farming. Almost two-fifths (38 per cent) of the region’s households are still engaged in farming. Of the total economically active population of 126 million, 48 million (38 per cent) are engaged in

THE CHALLENGE OF WATER Table 1.6

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Agricultural contribution to GDP in $ and % share

Agricultural value added in $

Agricultural value added as a % of GDP

Agriculture contribution to GDP in $: † . $20 billion annually: Iran † . $10 billion annually: Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia † . $2 billion annually: Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen

Agriculture share in GDP: † . 20%: Syria † . 10%: Egypt, Iran, Morocco † . 5%: Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen

Source: Aquastat.

agriculture, ranging from under 5 per cent in Lebanon and the Gulf states to over 50 per cent in Yemen.4 Because most farmers are relatively poor, and because poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon, agriculture contributes significantly to poverty reduction and to assuring household and local level food security. Agriculture contributes to economic growth and export earnings, contributes to domestic food supply and reduces import dependence.5 Region-wide, agriculture accounts for $95 billion of value added annually, with agriculture in Iran adding more than $20 billion annually to GDP, and more than $10 billion annually in Egypt and Morocco. Food exports ($20 billion annually, 4 per cent of total merchandise exports – and more than 10 per cent in Jordan and Egypt) make a considerable contribution to the economy of many countries of the region. Agricultural GDP per head of the agricultural population averages about $720, ranging from $133 in Yemen to $1,100 in Tunisia.6 With modernization and urbanization, agriculture’s share of the region’s economies has been declining, but the sector is still growing in absolute terms. The sector remains key to primary production and is the mainstay of the rural economy. Overall, agriculture contributes 13 per cent to regional GDP, and considerably more in some countries, ranging from 2 per cent in Jordan to more than 20 per cent of the total – before the troubles – in Syria (see Table 1.6). Rainfed and irrigated agriculture Rainfed farming systems still predominate in many countries, covering 55 million hectares, more than two thirds of the region’s cultivated land. Rainfed farming, largely growing cereals, provides livelihoods for nearly two-thirds of the agricultural population region-wide, and produces more than half of the value in the region’s agriculture. Rainfed farmers face particular challenges of

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low productivity and unpredictable rainfall, challenges which are growing as climates change. Irrigated systems occupy less than one third of the cultivated area (24 million hectares) but contribute almost half of agricultural value. Because of the generally arid climate, there is a high level of development of water resources for irrigation and relatively high levels of performance in agricultural water management. Irrigated agriculture is market-oriented and commercialized, responding to fast-growing demand from urban and export markets for higher value products. However, shortfalls persist in irrigation efficiency and in crop water productivity.

Recent trends: an agriculture already under stress Land and water use in agriculture Cultivable land is abundant across the region. There are some restrictions on land use due to soil suitability, but everywhere it is water not land that is really the binding constraint. Due to the arid conditions of most parts of the region, irrigation has for millennia been the principal path to intensification. As a result, irrigation has become far and away the largest water user, but now water is already fully allocated – or even overallocated. Hence, agricultural growth in both rainfed and irrigated systems is likely to come not from new water diversions but from productivity gains, especially gains in water efficiency – getting the water to the plant root – and in crop water productivity – getting the maximum return per drop of water.7 As population grows and agriculture intensifies, pressures on natural resources increase. Water resources, particularly groundwater, are already being overused in many parts of the region. In-stream environmental flows have diminished. Rangelands, too, have come under considerable stress. Growth in demand for fresh meat, linked to income growth, has been met by swelling livestock populations, often supported by feed subsidies on imported grains. As a result, livestock populations are today well beyond the carrying capacity of the rangelands. Older systems of rangeland management have not adapted. In general, these pressures on water resources and the environment will only grow as populations continue to expand.8 Pressures on agriculture Worldwide, significant pressures and risks affect sustainable agricultural growth and productivity, and these are reflected in most countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Global factors include world demand and prices for agricultural products, patterns of trade and the progress of World

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Trade Organization requirements on reducing subsidies and protection. Agricultural production in the region is sensitive to energy prices, which affect both irrigation and the cost of inputs and (through transport costs) the price and market for outputs. Production and markets are affected by conflict within the region. In many countries, policy biases against rural areas exist, and incentives, services and infrastructure investment favour urban and modern sectors. Urbanization is encroaching on prime agricultural land, and inheritance patterns are leading to continuing land fragmentation. Productivity, technology and innovation Despite these pressures, the last three decades have witnessed a strong average growth rate in agricultural value added across the region. After two decades of little or no growth in agricultural productivity (1964–84), the subsequent two decades (1984– 2004) witnessed a strong average growth rate of 2 per cent per annum. Total factor productivity levels in 2004 stood twothirds above the levels of 1961 (see Figure 1.1). This growth has largely continued over the last decade, conflict regions excepted, and in many countries the agricultural sector is still growing in absolute terms. In six countries of the region (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria), agricultural growth averaged more than 4 per cent per annum growth over two decades 1990– 2011. Although the causes are complex and vary by

Figure 1.1 Cumulative agricultural total factor productivity growth in the Middle East and North Africa (index 1961 ¼ 1). Source: IFPRI 2010.

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

country, this strong growth can be generally attributed to more intensive irrigation systems and to an increase in production of higher value crops following the start of liberalization in the 1980s. It is certainly true that the high growth rates have occurred predominantly in countries using modern irrigation and which have pursued a strategy of moving to high value exports (regionally and to the EU). Sadly, the upheaval and strife in the region since the Arab Spring have caused a set-back in some of these trends. Recent growth has not been confined to high value crops. Cereals production has also accelerated, helped by the improvement in the terms of trade for cereals, and livestock production has also expanded fast. This growth is not, however, shared all across the region. In Yemen, for example, even before the troubles productivity improvements had virtually ceased, as access to improved technologies and support services had dwindled. Region-wide, research has made a substantial contribution, but has not focussed adequately on vulnerable production systems or on more efficient use of water.9 Market orientation A dominant factor driving agricultural growth in the countries of the region has been the increasing market-orientation and commercialization, responding to fast-growing demand from urban and export markets for higher value products. In the Mediterranean countries, market linkages with demand from Europe and formal trade arrangements with the EU have provided profitable market outlets for fresh fruit and vegetables. Many households have diversified into related off-farm business lines such as catering, tourism, etc. Policies, institutions and public goods Investment and the policy environment have generally favoured agriculture in recent years. Many countries across the region have made considerable investment in irrigation, rural infrastructure and farmer services such as research and extension. Agriculture has responded with the rapid growth rates noted above. However, some components of past public policy introduced structural distortions in the sector which reduced its resilience and sustainability, and some of these distortions persist. These policies and distortions included past water policies which over-allocated water to agriculture. Now water is becoming more valuable for other purposes, but mechanisms for reallocating water between sectors are generally frail or non-existent. At the same time, lack of demand management through pricing or rationing has contributed to reduced water use efficiency in some agricultural uses. A second distortion has been in groundwater development and abstraction. Government incentives and lack of regulation of groundwater extraction have

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contributed to the depletion of the resource in many locations – a topic which we will hear much about further on in this book. A third set of perverse outcomes have stemmed from food self-sufficiency policies which have promoted food production. These policies have had negative impacts on land and water resources and brought an opportunity cost to both households and the national economy, as they undermined diversification and production of high value crops. A fourth distortion has been introduced by incentive structures which have favoured commercial and irrigated production but disfavoured research and investment in rainfed farming. As a result, rainfed farmers have not been on a ‘level playing field’ and rainfed production has dwindled in many locations. There has been a knock-on effect on landscape and the environment, for example in the abandonment of mountain terrace systems in Yemen. Overall, these policies required trade-offs with growth, social equity and environmental sustainability. Recent years have witnessed a move away from these policies, and particularly a rebalancing towards private enterprise. However, these policy changes have been accompanied by a decline in public investment – the net average public investment in agriculture across the region dropped from $6.1 billion annually 1986 – 90 to $1.9 billion 1996 – 2000. In addition, terms of trade remain generally unfavourable to agriculture, for example in Egypt and Tunisia, and there is scope to remove remaining constraints and improve incentives. This would foster further growth.

Agriculture and water Agriculture and water scarcity In all countries of the region, agriculture takes the lion’s share of available water, up to 90 per cent or more of the resource in most cases. Traditionally, irrigation was almost entirely by diversion of surface water onto fields, by collecting run-off on run-on lands, or by use of shallow wells. The arrival in the region in the 1970s of the tubewell and of deep drilling techniques transformed agriculture. Pumping out groundwater produced an apparently heaven-sent supply of abundant high quality water on tap. Groundwater has now become a significant source of agricultural water across the region, and it has been the basis for the rapid growth of new agricultural economies in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, every country is experiencing a new and critical phenomenon – groundwater depletion. Over-pumping beyond the sustainable yield is leading in many locations to the salinization and ultimate exhaustion of the aquifer, and creating a new and entirely manmade water scarcity.

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Agriculture and climate change The impact of higher global warming on agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa is already a reality and it is likely to increase significantly. Water availability is the key determinant of agricultural potential throughout the region, and climate change will affect this availability, largely negatively. Soil moisture is likely to decrease and rivers arising within the region are likely to experience decreased flows. All water storage is likely to suffer increased evaporation due to higher temperatures. With increasing aridity, demand for irrigation water is expected to increase. These changes in agro-climatic conditions will certainly have their impact on production. Some negative impacts can be offset by improved water use efficiency and water productivity. Output is still likely to increase but below trend. However, an element of uncertainty is introduced by the expected increased variability and increased frequency of extreme events, especially of drought but also of destructive storms, floods and heat waves. All farming systems across the region will be exposed to increased aridity and to declines in water availability, with rainfed systems most at risk. The most marginal and affected systems – dryland and pastoral systems – are those for which fewest solutions are available and some areas may go out of production altogether. Countries throughout the region have developed plans anticipating climate change and preparing to handle impacts on agriculture but research will be needed to increase the availability of technology and institutional options. Agriculture is also a significant contributor to emissions.10 Competition for water and the case for transfer of water out of agriculture Agriculture’s predominant share in the region’s water resources is coming under question. Returns to water as the scarce resource are typically much lower in agriculture than in other uses, and demand from other sectors is rising fast. Many argue that water has been ‘over-allocated’ to agriculture, and that agriculture is not using its large share wisely. Critics point to low efficiency, poor productivity, harm to groundwater resources and consequent intergenerational harm as today’s farmers use up their non-renewable groundwater capital. As a result, some argue that mechanisms need to be devised to divert water from agriculture to higher value urban and industrial uses.11 Water, agriculture and rural poverty On the other side of the argument, defenders of agriculture and the rural sector advance powerful arguments of economic contribution, poverty reduction, rural development and food supply and security.

THE CHALLENGE OF WATER

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The surprisingly high economic contribution of agriculture to national and local incomes was described above – $95 billion contribution to GDP across the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 38 per cent of jobs, $20 billion of annual exports. These contributions are made in what are, for the most part, poorer areas. Consequently, one strong reason that policy makers in the region put forward for the priority given to allocation of water to what are often low-yielding agricultural activities is its poverty reducing effects. Certainly it is true that, across the region, poverty is concentrated in rural areas, and this translates into household level food insecurity and malnutrition. Today, a quarter of the region’s population as a whole is counted as poor, and this poverty is concentrated in rural areas where overall more than one third (34 per cent) of the population are poor, ranging from 8 per cent in Tunisia to over 50 per cent in Yemen – see Table 1.7. Rural unemployment is high, averaging about 13 per cent, with higher rates for women than men, and much higher rates for youth: 26 – 53 per cent depending on the country.12 Rural poverty is particularly acute in certain parts of the region and under certain specific conditions and is chronic largely for specific countries and vulnerable segments. In the poorest nation of the region – Yemen – rural poverty is chronic and widespread. All across the region, poverty particularly affects three high risk categories: households headed by women, the landless and farm labourers.13 Poverty also translates into malnutrition. Recent data show widespread household food insecurity and undernourishment, concentrated in rural areas and in the poorest countries. Over one fifth of the region’s under-five population are stunted. Across the region, rural children are almost twice as likely to be underweight as urban children. Populations are most vulnerable in Yemen, one of the ten most food insecure countries in the world. Already in

Table 1.7 Key facts on poverty and malnourishment in countries of the Middle East and North Africa Rural poverty headcount

Prevalence of under-nourishment

Rural potable water access

Average 34% Countries with: † . 50%: Yemen † 30 –50%: Iraq, Egypt

Countries with more than 25% undernourished: † Iraq, Palestinian Territories, Yemen

Countries with ,50% of the rural population with access to safe drinking water: † Yemen

Source: Aquastat; FAO.

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2012, about 46 per cent of the Yemeni population (some 10.5 million people) did not have enough food, and almost half of all households (45 per cent) were purchasing food on credit. With the civil war in the country, the situation has subsequently deteriorated sharply. At the start of 2016, 56 per cent of the population was food insecure and 21 million Yemenis were said to be in need of humanitarian assistance.14 Many policy makers in the region naturally see allocation of water to agriculture as a way to combat rural poverty and malnutrition. Although in fact most rural households in the region have quite a diversified domestic economy and multiple sources of revenue, there is an understanding amongst policy-makers that rural populations depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, and that agriculture should be sustained both for its food production capability and for its effect on reducing rural poverty and vulnerability. There is strong resistance everywhere to the economist’s argument that water should be reallocated out of agriculture to activities where it can produce higher value. In fact, policy for agriculture and for rural areas may often be based on ideas not well grounded in fact. Rural people may not depend on agriculture for most of their incomes. Agriculture may or may not be the best route out of poverty or malnutrition. And maintaining high levels of water allocation to agriculture may not be the best use of that water, either for rural people or for the economy as a whole. We shall see the intricacies and problems with these arguments in later chapters.

Irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa The importance of irrigation in the region Irrigated agriculture has been practised in the Middle East and North Africa for over four millennia. Today, irrigated systems are widespread throughout the region, covering a total of 24.6 million ha. Seven countries in the region have more than 1 million ha under irrigation – see Table 1.8. The countries of the region have developed more of the irrigation potential and irrigate a higher share of agricultural land than any other region in the world. Four countries have equipped more than 90 per cent of their irrigation potential, and a further six countries have equipped more than 50 per cent. A high percentage of cultivated land is irrigated (31 per cent region wide), with two countries irrigating more than half of their cultivated land, and a further five countries irrigating more than one-third. At the same time, many countries of the Middle East and North Africa have large areas of rainfed land under cultivation, on which various forms of

Source: Aquastat.

Area under rainfed cultivation in countries of the region:

Share of the cultivated area that is irrigated in countries of the region: † 2 countries . 50%: Egypt, Iraq † 5 countries . 30%: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan † 2 countries . 15%: Syria, Libya † 1 country . 10%: Morocco

Share of the irrigable area that has been equipped for irrigation in countries of the region: † 4 countries have equipped more than 90%: Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Yemen † 3 countries . 70%: Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia † 3 countries 50 –70%: Iraq, Lebanon, Iran

Area under irrigation in countries of the region: † 6 countries with more than 1 million hectares: Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi, Morocco, Syria † 5 countries with 100,000 – 1 million hectares: Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Lebanon

† 1 country with more than 10 million hectares of rainfed cultivation: Iran † 4 countries 4 –10 million ha: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria † 3 countries 0.5 million ha: Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen

Large areas of rainfed land under cultivation

High % of cultivated land irrigated

High % of irrigation potential has been equipped for irrigation

Irrigated and rainfed lands in the Middle East and North Africa

High levels of irrigation in countries of the region

Table 1.8

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agricultural water management are practised. Region-wide, rainfed cultivated land totals 55 million hectares. Iran has more than 10 million hectares of rainfed land, and four more countries have over 4 million hectares under rainfed agriculture. Agricultural water withdrawals Several countries in the region are irrigating on a massive scale, with attendant risks stemming from the vulnerability of transboundary waters or from groundwater depletion – or both. Four regional countries are using vast volumes of water in irrigation, more than 20 billion m3 – see Table 1.9. Of these four countries, three have the benefit of huge rivers running through them – Iran, Egypt and Iraq – but these rivers are generally transboundary resources, with the accompanying issues (see Chapter 3). Several countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) are withdrawing very sizable volumes of non-renewable groundwater for agriculture. However, agriculture in most countries of the region is still largely dependent on rainfall, surface run-off and limited groundwater resources. These countries are correspondingly highly constrained in the quantities of water they can withdraw for agriculture. Countries which have very high rates of water withdrawal may be depleting non-renewable resources. They may also be subject to claims from other sectors or vulnerable to climate change. In fact, a number of countries are currently withdrawing for agriculture more than their entire renewable resource. In the case of several rich arid states – for example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – withdrawals of non-renewable groundwater are several multiples of the annually renewed resource (up to 25 times). The reason for this persistent depletion of a finite resource is principally lack of planning and regulation for groundwater. However, even if it were a policy to mine water just as mineral resources are mined, a policy which threatens the future water security of a nation through groundwater depletion merits a Table 1.9 countries

Agricultural water withdrawals in Middle East and North Africa

Volume of water withdrawn for agriculture by countries in the region: † 4 countries withdraw more than 20 billion m3: Iran 86; Egypt 59; Iraq 52; Saudi Arabia 25 † 2 countries withdraw 5 –20 billion m3: Syria 14; Morocco 11 † 5 countries withdraw 1– 5 billion m3: Libya 3; Algeria 3; United Arab Emirates 3; Yemen 3; Tunisia 2 Source: Aquastat.

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strategic and economic review – see Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussion of this critical issue. Other countries which use a very large part of their renewable water resources for agriculture are highly vulnerable to growing demand from other sectors. Six countries in the region use over 90 per cent of their renewable resources in agriculture – Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Yemen. As these countries are all fast-urbanizing countries, there may soon be pressure for transfer of water out of agriculture to meet the ever-rising demand for municipal and industrial water from towns. Countries withdrawing very high proportions of their resource are also more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, as even small variations in water availability may lead to critical shortages in one sector or another. Types of irrigation in the region Surface irrigation is the predominant form of irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa, accounting across the region for 20.6 million hectares, 85 per cent of the total irrigated area – see Table 1.10. Iran alone accounts for more than one-third of the total surface irrigated area, with 7.4 million hectares. Pressurized irrigation accounts for just over 3 million hectares, 13 per cent of the total. Spate irrigation accounts for 0.46 million hectares, 2 per cent of the total irrigated area.

Agricultural heritage and conservation Recently, countries in the region have also come to a more integrated appreciation of agriculture’s role in the economies, ecologies and societies of the region. These new perspectives include an understanding of the value of conserving ecosystems and of the environmental services provided by rural areas, such as water infiltration and soil conservation. There is also a new appreciation of the socio-cultural services provided by traditional agriculture and its infrastructure and practices, which are now seen to be an important part of a country’s cultural heritage. A good example of this is the aflaj of Oman. Since time immemorial, Omanis have developed their scarce water resource through the ingenious technology of the aflaj, channel systems that access groundwater by gravity flow from underground galleries or surface springs on neighbouring mountain slopes. Traditionally, management of these systems was subject to locally agreed collaborative rules. Today aflaj remain an important irrigated agricultural system. Around 3,000 aflaj systems are still working in Oman, and they account for 30 per cent of the irrigated area and 31 per cent of total agricultural water use.

30 Table 1.10

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT Types of irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa

Type and extent of irrigation

Main countries

Surface irrigation (85%) Surface irrigation: 20,546 thousand hectares (5 countries . 1 million hectares)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Iran: 7,432 thousand hectares Iraq: 3,517 thousand hectares Egypt: 3,029 thousand hectares Morocco: 1,209 thousand hectares Syria: 1,043 thousand hectares

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Saudi Arabia: 716 thousand hectares Iran: 280 thousand hectares Egypt: 172 thousand hectares Syria: 187 thousand hectares Morocco: 152 thousand hectares

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Iran: 420 thousand hectares Egypt: 221 thousand hectares United Arab Emirates: 195 thousand hectares Saudi Arabia: 198 thousand hectares Syria: 111 thousand hectares

1.

Yemen: 218 thousand hectares

Sprinkler (7%) Sprinkler: 1,680 thousand hectares (5 countries . 100,000 ha)

Localized (6%) Localized: 1,396 thousand hectares (5 countries . 100,000 ha)

Spate (1%) Spate: 459 thousand hectares (1 country . 100,000 ha) Source: Aquastat.

The former economic role of aflaj in Omani village life has weakened, as the incomes they produce are marginal in today’s much wealthier Oman. More than 1,000 aflaj, one quarter of the total, have gone out of production in recent years. Yet aflaj form an integral part of the agricultural heritage of the country and they have had an important impact on social organization and institutions. They remain key to the survival of Oman’s rural society and its values and to the maintenance of the landscape and environment. All Omanis wish to conserve this integral part of village life and to strengthen not only the economic value of these systems and the agriculture that depends on them but also their social, cultural, environmental and amenity values.

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Table 1.11 Cereals self-sufficiency and food import dependence in the Middle East and North Africa Cereals self-sufficiency Countries with rates of cereals self-sufficiency of: † . 70%: NONE † 60 –70%: Egypt, Iran, Morocco † 40 –60%: Algeria, Syria, Tunisia † , 20%: Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

Food imports as a share of merchandise imports Food imports as % of total merchandise imports: † Regional average 13% † More than 20%: Algeria, Libya, Yemen

Source: Aquastat.

Food security and agricultural water management Food production and consumption in the Middle East and North Africa No country in the region approaches self-sufficiency in cereals, and most countries in the region import a large share of their food needs. Only three regional countries – Egypt, Iran, Morocco – cover two-thirds of their cereals needs from domestic production (see Table 1.11). In five countries, domestic production covers less than 20 per cent of cereals consumption. The poorest of these countries, Yemen, is vulnerable to national-level food insecurity (see below). Food imports average 13 per cent of total merchandise imports across the region, and in Yemen the share of food in merchandise imports exceeds 20 per cent. This, the poorest country in the region, is spending large sums of foreign exchange on importing food.15 Food security and insecurity Food security concerns have been a perennial preoccupation in the countries of the region and these age-old preoccupations have been redoubled by changes in recent years. Policy makers have been driven to question whether reliance on markets is sufficient to ensure access to stable affordable food supplies for their peoples.16 At the global level, recent years have seen higher prices and price volatility. These effects might be exacerbated in coming years due to climate change but this is far from certain, as production responses from temperate countries with spare production capacity such as Russia and Ukraine may compensate for expected declines in cereals production in hotter regions. World Bank commodity price forecasts are that food prices will stabilize at lower than current levels into the medium term.

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At the national level, any global food price rises or volatility would affect all countries of the region, due to their dependence on imported food, particularly the oil-importing states. All the countries in the Middle East and North Africa are net food importers, hence rises or volatility in global food prices would affect them all, but in particular the oil-importing countries, because food and oil prices tend to rise in parallel. Macroeconomic impacts would be on the balance of payments, budget deficits and inflation. By contrast, oil-exporting countries would be protected by the same parallel movements in prices.17 At the household level, global best practice on food security seeks to ensure that all households enjoy adequate nutritional status at all times. The primary mechanisms for achieving this are that food markets should make adequate supply available at affordable prices, and that all households should have the means and the knowledge to acquire and consume a balanced and caloriesufficient diet. In most countries of the region, both sides of this equation have worked fairly well. According to the Global Hunger Index, the region has amongst the world’s lowest proportion of undernourished people, the lowest prevalence of underweight children, and the lowest under-five mortality rate of any nonOECD set of countries, and most countries have registered significant improvements in recent times. However, over the last decade poverty and undernourishment have started rising again in many countries, attributed to rising food prices, global recession and – in some countries – to conflict and the displacement of populations. Conflict apart, IFPRI have projected that a combination of policies is likely to sustain a continuing drop in rates of malnourishment in children in the region, but that if global food prices continue to rise, this may depress demand amongst the poor and contribute to a return to higher rates of malnutrition.18 However, the picture is not uniform across the region, particularly in rural and remote areas and in the poorest countries. Nutrition status is worse in rural areas and far worse in the very poor countries. In some poorer countries and remote or very poor parts of middle income countries, markets are often imperfect and households lack the income or information needed to maintain adequate diets. The poorest countries are particularly at risk. The high rate of chronic malnutrition and stunting in Yemen even before the civil strife in that country is a witness to this problem. Most at risk have been rural non-farm households which spend a higher share of their income on food, making them more vulnerable to price surges. The rising food insecurity in Yemen bears testament to the more general systemic food security risk of poor countries dependent on a fragile natural resource base, poorly developed markets, and institutional environments which hinder both development and social

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protection operations. In addition to these structural problems, the shocks of 2008 have provoked a reflection on whether there are better ways to organize food markets. Links between agriculture and food security Best practice links food security and insecurity to four factors: availability of food, economic and physical access to food, the ways in which food is used and the stability of these factors over time. The impact of these factors on the food security status of populations varies considerably. In Morocco, for example, which ranks 59th out of 107 countries in the Global Food Security Index, the main factors found to contribute to the population’s relative food insecurity are the volatility of levels of agricultural production and low purchasing power. The lesson here is that it is not food production per se but agricultural production as a whole and hence rural incomes which are key factors contributing to Morocco’s food insecurity. Studies have, in fact, found scant relation between national food security and the level of self-sufficiency in food production. In general, these studies have found weak links and, in some cases, have found the counter-intuitive result that policies which tilt the incentive structure in favour of domestic food production may bring economic losses to the nation and may even increase food insecurity of producing households by reducing their potential incomes. Table 1.12 shows three categories of countries in the region, together with their main food security vulnerability. Table 1.12 Food security vulnerability in countries in the Middle East and North Africa Main food security vulnerability

Country characteristics

Examples

Poorer country with a vulnerable population dependent on farming

Yemen19

Rural malnutrition and famine

Middle income countries that want moderate food prices for their citizens and to maintain a viable rural sector

Maghreb and Mashreq countries, Iran

Price spikes Difficult access and affordability for poorer rural areas and households

Better off countries requiring Oil-exporting countries Geopolitical risk assurance of food supplies of the Arabian peninsula

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Impacts of conflict on food security20 The consequences for food security of the appalling conflicts in the region have been overwhelming. First and foremost has been the need for humanitarian assistance. In 2016, in Syria, 8.7 million people were unable to meet basic food needs, and two-thirds of people lack access to safe water. Half of Syrian externally displaced people are in debt and 40 per cent cannot afford medical care. Overall, 13.5 million Syrians need humanitarian assistance, at an annual cost $3.2 billion. In Yemen, where 82 per cent of the population were classed as poor in 2016 and 15 million had no access to medical facilities, 21.1 million people need humanitarian assistance, at an annual cost $1.6 billion. Food security is also affected by the decline in agricultural production in the conflict areas. There has been a devastating effect on agricultural infrastructure and production. Syria has lost close to half of its livestock, crop production has plummeted (40 per cent below pre-crisis levels), and the violence has destroyed agricultural infrastructure, displaced farmers and disrupted regional food and agricultural input trade. A large part of Iraq’s cereal production belt and irrigation systems were in 2016 directly under the control of armed groups. The human impact is catastrophic. Levels of child mortality have soared, and children have suffered from lack of medical facilities and schooling. In Syria, half of all children have lost three years of schooling, in Yemen half of all children are currently out of school. In Iraq, one fifth of schools have been destroyed. Even when peace returns, recovery is likely to be slow. Syria, Iraq and Yemen have already been in crisis for half a decade or more. Often peace settlements collapse, and rebuilding food security and a productive economy is far harder than destroying one. The challenge is to deal with these social and economic impacts beyond the first round humanitarian responses, in particular how to ensure the return of food security during any peace process, and at the same time to see how food security interventions can contribute to stabilization and peace building. Can food insecurity drive conflict? Food insecurity is rarely a cause of conflict, although it can act as a threat multiplier, for example in the mishandling of the aftermath of the Syrian droughts of 2008 – 11 and the resulting increase in food insecurity and malnutrition. The links here have been well analysed, most notably by Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014), on whose work the following account is largely based.

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As in other Arab countries, the uprising in Syria was triggered by a series of social, economic and political factors. First and foremost amongst these factors was the growing poverty. The gap between urban and rural living standards had widened and unemployment was rising fast. The political system was closed and oppressive, and corruption was rampant. In Syria’s north-east, these effects were amplified by growing food insecurity. The area was traditionally the breadbasket of the country and more recently had become the source of valuable oil production. However, over several decades the region actually grew poorer, as groundwater became depleted and state projects strained land and water resources. As a result, a series of droughts which struck from 2006 onwards accelerated the rise in poverty and plunged the population into deep food insecurity. Drought is not unusual in Syria. It is, in fact, endemic, with drought being recorded in half of the years over the half century 1961–2009. On average, the droughts lasted around four and a half years each, though a drought in the 1970s lasted ten consecutive years. The droughts which persisted 2006–2011 were therefore not unusual, except in their intensity. The 2007/8 drought was particularly devastating, with rainfall deficits up to 60 per cent and some regions receiving no rain at all. The consequences for national agricultural production were devastating: the 2007/8 wheat harvest came in at 2.1 million tonnes, compared to the long-term average of 4.7 million tonnes (of which 3.8 million tonnes was consumed internally), forcing Syria to import wheat for the first time in 15 years. Not only were these droughts particularly intense, they also had a greater impact than in earlier periods. This was in part because of changes in demographics and the agricultural economy. The population was higher, there were more livestock, and groundwater resources were depleted. The UN estimated that between 2008 and 2011, 1.3 million people were affected by the drought, with 800,000 people ‘severely affected’. As the drought extended into a second and third year, the population was less and less able to cope: with no crops for two consecutive years, farmers no longer had seeds, while herders were forced to sell or slaughter their flocks due to a lack of pasture and fodder. Inevitably, the result was a rise in food insecurity and malnutrition. Malnutrition, which was already widespread in the north-east, rapidly increased, with ‘up to 80 per cent of those severely affected surviving on a diet of bread and sugared tea’. The incidence of nutrition-related diseases soared between 2006 and 2010, with 42 per cent of infants suffering from anaemia in Raqqa governorate. By 2010, the UN estimated that 3.7 million people, or 17 per cent of the Syrian population, were food insecure and that 300,000 people had migrated due to the drought, leaving more than two-thirds of

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villages in two governorates (Hassakeh and Deir ez-Zor) deserted. Some 65,000 families had migrated from the north-east to the tent camps that lie around Damascus and Aleppo. The families that settled in a tent camp in Mzeirieb near Dara’a from 2008 onwards found their relatives and friends there who had been subsisting in these conditions for a decade or more. It was not the drought or the decline in production or even the rise in food insecurity which contributed to the disaffection of the Syrian people from their government. It was the lamentable failure of that government to respond with adequate humanitarian assistance or to help farmers to ride out the drought and restore their productive capability.21 By corollary, improving food security can help reduce tensions and address grievances, and food-related interventions can contribute to rebuilding society. In the first instance, beyond the immediate challenges of providing adequate nutrition on an emergency basis, food security interventions can help to stabilize the situation and reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. They can form part of the confidence building and economic revitalization that are one of the priority peace building interventions,22 particularly if they are timely and tangible, for example: school feeding programmes, which deliver both education and nutrition; furnishing of seeds and tools; or cash for work programmes which can deliver much-needed incomes, create infrastructure, and begin to rebuild social cohesion. If properly done, food security interventions can build capacity and social capital, improve the sustainability of livelihood systems, and even enhance the legitimacy of institutions and the state.

Conclusion: drivers of scarcity and the challenge of water for agriculture Water scarcity is a structural imbalance between supply and demand for water. In the Middle East and North Africa, the growing water scarcity is being driven by five factors on the supply side. First and foremost amongst these is the low water resource endowment described earlier in this chapter – the Middle East and North Africa is by far the most water scarce region in the word. The second factor is the vulnerability of that resource stemming from the high degree of dependence on waters flowing from outside the region. The existing resource is threatened by actions by upstream riparians – as has been happening in recent decades on the Tigris and Euphrates (see Chapter 3). Compounding this vulnerability is the third factor, the likely shrinking of the resource under climate change. Fourth in the litany of growing risk of scarcity is the rapid depletion of non-renewable groundwater. The final factor is the already very high level of development of water resources, which makes the mobilization of new supplies difficult and costly.

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Three demand-side factors increase the chances of water scarcity. The first and most important of these factors is the ever-growing demand, particularly from the municipal and industrial sectors. Second is the little-voiced but pressing need for water to meet environmental and ecological requirements. Finally, in most countries of the region demand is unmanaged and may even be inflated beyond real requirements because of an enabling environment and incentive framework that encourages over-use of water, particularly in agriculture but also in municipal and industrial use. The principal elements at play here are low prices and absence of governance and regulation which would align demand with available supply in an economically efficient way. This picture of diminishing and vulnerable supply and increasing competition from other sectors drives the challenge of scarcity for agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa. Inevitably in the coming years, agriculture will have no more water, and probably less, yet, in so dry a region, water is essential to the agricultural growth needed for the rural economy to prosper and contribute more to GDP, for rural incomes to be maintained or increased, and for more food to be produced. The result is the challenge for agriculture in the region for the coming years – more production and more income with less water. Agriculture must become ever more water-efficient. How this may happen is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5.

CHAPTER 2 CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACTS

There is general agreement that global climate trends and risks are likely to bring progressive change to the relationship between people and their environment, and that action is needed right away to adapt to a new emerging reality.1 As discussed in Chapter 1, the challenge is nowhere greater than in the Middle East and North Africa, with the region’s already high levels of water scarcity and aridity and the dependence of the livelihoods of many on climate and natural resources. Already, changes are bringing a warmer, drier and less predictable climate and increasing the vulnerability of those dependent on it. These changes are likely to intensify existing water scarcity and aridity, bringing higher temperatures, more heat waves, lower and less reliable precipitation and more extreme rainfall events. This chapter summarizes the climate change events anticipated in the Middle East and North Africa, and their expected impacts on water resources and on agriculture. Chapter 6 then moves to a discussion of possible responses – the readiness of the countries of the region – and particularly of farmers – for climate change and the need for both strategic preparedness and for policies, investment and capacity building and research on issues of agriculture and climate change.

Climate change events anticipated in the Middle East and North Africa All countries in the region are likely to be highly vulnerable to climate change. Although changes and impacts will vary, climate change is expected to accentuate the already severe water scarcity and increase existing high levels of aridity. The main expected changes are higher temperatures and more heat

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACTS Table 2.1

39

Exposure – climate change events expected to occur in the region

Maghreb

Mashreq

Arabian peninsula

† Overall a hotter, drier Maghreb † Temperature increase of up to five degrees † Decrease in precipitation, fewer rainy days † More drought events, especially in summer † Overall increase in aridity, with 20% drying † Sea water intrusion

† Overall, a hotter, † Relatively uniform drier Mashreq warming † Possible increase in † Higher temperatures summer precipitation, both summer and but highly uncertain winter and local † Generally drier, especially in the rainy † More severe rainfall events (winter) season † Rainfall may drop below threshold for agricultural production for some areas

Source: Authors, based on World Bank 2013.

waves, lower and less reliable precipitation and more extreme rainfall events. Second-round effects are likely to include reduction in soil moisture, run-off and groundwater recharge, increased frequency and intensity of droughts and floods, loss of winter precipitation storage in snow pack, and sea water intrusion into coastal aquifers as sea levels rise.2 Agriculture will be particularly affected by likely higher temperatures during the growing season and by more frequent and intense heat waves. These temperature changes will increase aridity and change evapotranspiration patterns. By 2100, temperatures in the region could average 3 – 7 degrees higher. Aridity will also be intensified by the expected lower average rainfall and the consequent reduction in soil moisture, run-off and groundwater recharge. In some areas, run-off is predicted to decrease by as much as 40 per cent. Increasing uncertainty over the weather will increase farmer risk. In particular, less reliability in timing and quantity of precipitation will make agricultural planning more difficult. Risk of damage to crops and infrastructure is likely to intensify as extreme rainfall events become more common, causing flooding and erosion. The related increased frequency and intensity of floods, and also of droughts, will drive up uncertainty and reduce agricultural productivity. In several mountainous countries, including Lebanon and Morocco, loss of winter precipitation storage in the snow pack will reduce run-off and stream flow in subsequent warmer cropping periods. Coastal areas will experience growing levels of sea water intrusion as sea levels rise, leading to flooding of coastal areas and exacerbating ongoing salinization of coastal aquifers.

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Finally, expected increases in winter temperatures may have negative impacts on fruit species which need a cold winter to flourish the next season. These anticipated changes are expected to affect different parts of the region in different ways (see Table 2.1). In part, these differences are driven by the predominant weather systems. The Arabian Peninsula is affected by the monsoon systems of the Indian Ocean, whereas the Maghreb and Mashreq are predominantly affected by Atlantic and Mediterranean systems. Within different countries, too, there are likely to be differences of exposure. Some mountain areas in Morocco, for example, may benefit from higher temperatures whilst semi-arid interior regions of the country may simply become more arid.

Expected impacts of climate change on agricultural water and farming Impact on water resources Water availability is the key determinant of agricultural potential throughout the region, and climate change will affect this availability. In the Maghreb, significantly lower rainfall and higher temperatures are likely to lead to a decline in soil moisture availability to the plant roots. These same changes would decrease infiltration and run off, so that groundwater recharge and river flows are also likely to diminish. The Mashreq will experience similar increases in water stress, and the many parts of the region that are now dependent on groundwater irrigation will suffer decreased recharge together with continuing loss of groundwater reserves. At the same time, demand will increase for groundwater for supplementary irrigation during dry periods in the cropping season, and this will place further stresses on aquifers. Rivers arising within the region are likely to experience decreased flows. These reductions in river flows are likely to result from diminished run off, and also from some change in seasonal distribution through changes in snow patterns, for example in Lebanon and Morocco. The region’s major international rivers will be largely affected by events outside of the region. The Nile may experience increased potential flows arising in equatorial regions. The Tigris and Euphrates, arising largely in Anatolia and the Zagros, may see lower volumes of water. In addition, all water storage is likely to suffer increased evaporation due to higher temperatures. The extreme case is Lake Nasser, where higher temperatures may cause an additional 2 billion m3 of water to be lost to evaporation each year.3 Impact on irrigation Demand for irrigation water is expected to increase. Impacts of climate change on irrigation requirements will be felt through net changes in

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACTS

41

precipitation and evapotranspiration. Increased frequency of droughts is expected to stress water reservoirs, as more water will be necessary to offset increased crop demand. It is forecast that crop irrigation requirements may increase 5 – 20 per cent by 2080. Demand for increased irrigation may push up the ratio of irrigation withdrawals to available renewable water resources. A recent FAO forecast suggested that irrigation water withdrawals in the region could rise from 347 million m3 in 2005/7 to 374 million m3 by 2050, bringing the share of renewable water resources withdrawn for irrigation across the region up from 58 per cent to 62 per cent.4 Impact on crop and livestock yields and production These changes in agro-climatic conditions will certainly have an impact on production. Although the pace and direction of change is far from certain, and will inevitably vary considerably across locations, generally climate change is expected to lead to lower production in the long term (beyond 2050). In the shorter term, however, yields may well go up – but below levels they would have attained in the absence of climate change. The figure Average cereals yields illustrates this – cereals yields may still be well up by 2050, but they would have been up to half a ton higher in the absence of climate change. In the longer run, yields of key rainfed cereals may drop, with a projection that in North Africa, maize yields could fall towards the end of the century by 15 – 25 per cent if temperatures rise by three degrees. One case study of maize and wheat suggests that by 2080 average yields across the region will decrease by 20 per cent and 12 per cent respectively5. Overall, the most likely picture on cereals that emerges is that natural resource and climate change pressures will contribute to a slow fall in the production area from 2010, but that overall output will rise in most major producing countries in the region as investments are made in enhancing productivity. Negative impacts will be offset at least up to 2050 by improved water use efficiency and water productivity and by agronomic choices and improved crop husbandry, but output would still be below trend. The increase in production up to 2050 is expected to be particularly strong in Egypt, where total output of rainfed wheat is expected to double 2010– 50 due to strong growth in yields – see Table 2.2. In effect, a combination of improved incentives due to rising commodity prices together with application of productivity-enhancing measures is expected to keep yields rising through to mid-century, after which they will begin to drop off. Beyond 2050, production of wheat and maize across the region is expected to begin to decline6.

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

Table 2.2 Projected rate of annual change for rainfed wheat under one climate change scenario7 Morocco

Egypt

Yield: annual rate of increase/decrease Baseline 2010 þ 5.4% þ 1.4% 2020 þ 1.2% þ 2.4% 2050 þ 0.2% þ 1.4%

Syria

Iraq

þ 1.3% þ 0.7% 2 0.3%

þ 4.6% þ 0.7% 2 0.3%

4,585 5,106 5,162

1,851 2,040 2,133

Area: annual rate of increase/decrease Baseline 2010 2020 2050

0 2 0.1% 2 1.0%

þ 0.5% þ 0.1% 2 0.7%

Forecast production (000 mt) Baseline 2010 2020 2050

4,634 5,322 5,622

4,847 6,511 10,848

Source: IFPRI crop models (using CSI A1B), IFPRI website, 19 December 2011: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/food-security-farming-and-climate-change-2050.

An element of uncertainty is introduced by the expected increased variability and increased frequency of extreme events, especially of drought but also of destructive storms, floods and heat waves. In Oman, for example, there is likely to be an increased risk of extreme events, particularly destructive cyclones and an associated increased risk of flooding. The coastal margins of the rich agricultural plain of al Batinah are most at risk. Already the long south-eastern coast, which lies in the zone of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea Tropical cyclone tracks, has suffered an unprecedented natural disaster from Cyclone Guno in 2007, which brought over 900 mm of rain in a very short space of time and caused 50 mortalities and OR 1.5 billion ($4 billion) in damage. Torrential rainfall, more than eight times the annual average, led to flooding, the overtopping of dams and substantial damage to irrigation and other infrastructure throughout the coastal areas of the country. These risks may affect agricultural production in Oman. There may be threats to the quantity of water resources from changing rainfall patterns and threats to water quality from increased saline intrusion resulting from sea level rise. Higher temperatures may lead to new disease vectors and to intensification of existing vectors which may bring threats to animal and plant health. Finally, there may be threats to ecosystems and biodiversity from rising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns.8

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACTS

43

Figure 2.1 Average cereal yields in the Middle East and North Africa – historic climate and alternative scenarios. Source: IFPRI 2010. NoCC: no change.

Region-wide, increased variability and more extreme events will reduce yields in the year of incidence and may also create risk aversion and disincentives to investment, and make planning at household, local and national scale more challenging. Yields of several economically important fruit species (olives, apples, pistachios, nuts, pomegranates) may also suffer reduced yields or crop failure if winter temperatures are too high. Climate change will also increase risks for livestock production, particularly for the intensive feedlots that are becoming more common. The likely rise of animal pests and diseases under climate change could affect all animal production, but especially intensive systems. The lack of prior conditioning to extreme weather events can result in major losses in confined livestock feedlots. In addition, animal nutrition models have shown that higher temperatures can limit dairy milk yield in relation to feed. Impacts by farming system All farming systems will be exposed to increased aridity and to declines in water availability – see Table 2.3. All systems are sensitive to these changes, especially rainfed systems without access to reliable irrigation sources. More marginal systems may be pushed further towards or beyond their margins: some marginal rainfed lands may revert to pasture or simply go out of production. Some scanty rangeland may revert to desert.

Increase in aridity Greater risk of drought Possible lengthening of the growing period Reduced supply of irrigation water Increase in aridity Greater risk of drought Reduced supply of irrigation water Increase in aridity Greater risk of drought Reduced supply of irrigation water Increase in aridity Greater risk of drought Reduced water for livestock and fodder

Highland mixed

Source: World Bank 2013, Annex Table 2.

Pastoral

Dryland mixed

Rainfed mixed

Increased temperatures Reduced supply of surface irrigation water Dwindling of groundwater recharge

Irrigated

Exposure What climate change-related events will occur

Climate change impacts on farming systems of the region

Farming system

Table 2.3

Reduction in yields Reduction in cropping intensity Increased demand for irrigation water A system very vulnerable to declining rainfall. Some lands may revert to rangeland. Increased demand for irrigation water A very vulnerable system, where desertification may reduce carrying capacity significantly. Increased dependence on non-farm activities and some exit from farming and migration

More water stress Increased demand for irrigation and water transfer Reduced yields when temperatures are too high Salinization due to reduced leaching Reduction in cropping intensity Reduction in yields Reduction in cropping intensity Increased demand for irrigation water

Sensitivity Likely impacts on farming systems

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACTS

45

At least some technology and institutional options that can help maintain productivity and livelihoods under climate change are known and are either accessible to farmers or could be made accessible. What is needed is further research to prioritize and adapt these options to the changing situation in varying locations and farming systems. However, the strength of these adaptive measures declines in inverse proportion to the sensitivity of the system to climate change. The most marginal and affected systems – dryland and pastoral systems – are those for which fewest solutions are available. It is in these systems that impoverishment is most likely unless there is policy and programme intervention, and even with interventions, exit from farming may still be inevitable for some. Adaptation options and strategies are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. ***** Clearly, climate change represents a massive risk to the future of agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa, more so than in any other region of the world due to the existing water scarcity and high levels of aridity. There are, nonetheless, adaptation options open to countries and, above all, to farmers. These options, and how they might fit into adjusted household-level livelihood strategies, are the subject of Chapter 6: Adapting to climate change.

CHAPTER 3 WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Opening with a description of a deadly conflict over water that shocked a nation, this chapter examines the nature and role of conflict in the water sector of the region. It asks why conflict so often arises over water, and puts forward a typology of water conflict that is the basis for detailed analysis of both challenges and, in Chapter 7, of options for resolving conflict. Conflict is assessed at all levels – at transboundary level, at national and inter-sectoral level and at the local level. The chapter discusses growing pressures to water conflict in the region, driven by changes in patterns of demand and supply and by a complex and often deteriorating institutional and political context. Finally, the chapter concludes with a sad example of this deterioration – water and conflict in the Syrian crisis.

A deadly water conflict Unmanaged water conflicts can be destabilizing and costly, and result in violence and death. It was in 1997 that a dispute over water first arose between two villages on Yemen’s Jabal Sabr. One village – Quradah – received money from the government’s rural water supply agency to rehabilitate the village piped water supply system. This system was fed from springs belonging to Quradah that flowed into a collection tank. However, the tank was sited uphill of a spring that belonged to a second village, al Marzooh. Al Marzooh became afraid that the project would reduce the flow of their spring. In night raids, al Marzooh blew up part of the new project. The police made arrests, and the governor visited and ordered the project to continue. Al Marzooh responded by blowing up more installations and equipment. Soldiers sent in only created further tensions. Although traditional mediation mechanisms were called on, the explosions continued. Gun battles left five

WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 47

dead (including one woman) and more than 20 injured. The situation got so out of hand that the President of the Republic had to intervene and knock heads together. Only then did both sides agree to go to court, where the dispute rose all the way up to the Court of Appeal. The final court ruling was accepted reluctantly on both sides. The villages were to construct one collective tank for their water supply. Quradah could connect a four-inch pipe, and al Marzooh a two-inch pipe, with a pro-rata reduction in supply in case of shortage.1

The nature and role of conflict in the water sector of the region Water institutions in the region are constantly evolving. Institutions to govern water rights and allocations in all parts of the region have been negotiated for thousands of years, and have played a significant role in establishing and maintaining social cohesion. They have never been fixed, but have rather constantly evolved from equilibrium to conflict to conflict resolution to a new equilibrium in a process of evolution and adaptation to changing social, economic and physical realities. Conflict, difficult though it may seem, has proved to be a normal stage in the evolution of water institutions in the region. In this process, water conflict in its broad sense of competing claims for water, or for water-related environmental services, may provoke a wide range of responses, ranging from discussion of a policy issue to extreme violence. Although conflict may seem undesirable, it is, on this definition as unresolved competition, a normal, even positive, part of the process of negotiating institutional change in the light of changing realities. Conflict in fact is a typical component of societal change and can be seen as part of a normal cycle. Indeed, when handled constructively, conflict can be an important catalyst for positive change.2 Yet to describe conflict as a normal part of institutional change may seem too simple, and at odds with experience. Handled inadequately, within a poorly-adapted institutional set-up, conflict may lead to inequity and violence. It is certainly true that when conflict arises within a deteriorating socio-political, institutional and environmental context, it may become embedded, and may have a multiplier effect, contributing to insecurity and fragility in countries already experiencing latent and overt conflict. At a minimum, this can mean the breakdown of the social contract between governing bodies and their constituents, as is the case in some Palestinian communities that feel their needs have been neglected by the Palestinian Water Authority. At the other end of the spectrum, violence can result, as in the case of Yemen’s Jabal Sabr described above.

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Water conflict is becoming more common throughout the Middle East and North Africa. This is due in part to rising demand for water resources, as populations have grown, economies have expanded, and better off and more urbanized populations use more and more water, especially in the hot climate. At the same time, supply side options for new development have diminished and, as we have seen in Chapter 2, climate change has begun to affect the quantum and predictability of supply. Technological and institutional changes have shifted water rights, access and accountability, creating resentments and counter-claims but failing to provide equitable mechanisms for resolving those claims. It has become correspondingly important to ensure that conflict resolution mechanisms are in place to avoid competition turning to conflict, and conflict to violence. The challenge is to improve water governance and, where competition is inevitable, to support non-violent societal change and adaptation. Although conflict resolution is often seen as a last resort and as a sign of failure, it can also be viewed in a positive light. It may even drive improved water governance. In the negative view, water conflict has been seen as ‘a symptom of inefficient allocation’.3 In this sense, water conflict looks to be the result of failures of the governance system of water management, at the local, national and even international scale. It is true that resolution of conflict may thus require, as we shall see, improvements to all aspects of water governance and management. But this itinerary from conflict to better governance also demonstrates how conflict can be an opportunity to identify and prioritize needed reforms in the water sector and to move towards a new equilibrium. In any case, and as in all water governance and management, an integrated approach is required. Best practice in water that has emerged over the last thirty years aims to develop a framework of water governance that provides for the three principles of equity, efficiency and sustainability, elements that are essential to conflict resolution and peacebuilding (see Chapter 8). The equity goal is to ensure equitable access for all users to an adequate quantity and quality of water necessary to sustain human well-being. Typically this would include making sure that water services are available for all, that existing water uses are respected, and that the benefits of water resources development, allocation and use are shared equitably, with a care for the poorest. Under the efficiency goal, the aim is to bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number of users with the available financial and water resources. This would mean that water is available for its highest value economic use and that in all uses, value per drop of water is maximized. Regarding sustainability, the goal is to sustain the ecological services provided by water and to ensure the sustainability of the resource, both in quantity and quality. This would mean, for example, ensuring that the water resource and the broader

WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 49

environment are not harmed and that adequate allocation of water is made to sustain the functioning of natural ecosystems and their services. The needs of future generations also have to be taken into account. Conflict arises when these three principles of equity, efficiency and sustainability are not respected. The challenge of conflict resolution (and of peacebuilding, see Chapter 8) is to put in place better governance, organizational development and policy reform, and investment and technological change that will satisfy the three principles. If well done, integrated water management and development can not only achieve typical objectives of improved social equity, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. It may also help promote the norms and values that reduce violent conflict more generally. These are key factors for conflict resolution and for longer-term peacebuilding (see Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of peacebuilding through water governance).

Why does conflict so often arise over water? Why does water conflict arise at all? And how are water conflicts different from conflicts over other resources, for example over land? Three sets of characteristics distinguish water and suggest why conflict over water is common and why it is different from conflict over other economic assets. The first of these sets of characteristics is the physical property of water as a natural but fugitive resource. The second is the unique social and economic role of water both as a necessity and as an economic commodity and the specific institutions that have been created to manage it. Finally, water intersects with politics and power relations, and conflicts over water may reflect or be part of larger struggles. These three sets of characteristics are discussed in the following paragraphs, which also illustrate how the character of water may give rise to a wide variety of conflicts.4 The nature of the resource Water is a natural but fugitive resource. Water flows by, it is a transient resource: there may be conflict between those upstream and those downstream over access. Its quantity is not fixed, but varies over time, between seasons, between years, or over longer cycles: conflict may arise when there is a change in water availability. Water is also often the scarce factor, and this is perhaps the greatest driver of water conflict in the Middle East and North Africa where almost all areas are water scarce. Conflict may easily arise amongst potential users over access to this scarcest of resources. Added to the character of water as a fugitive and often scarce resource is the integral nature of the water cycle and the patterns of mutual dependence and

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responsibility that this creates. Water is part of a complete hydrological cycle over space and time. Any intervention in the cycle affects the rest of the cycle and those who depend on it: those adversely affected may enter into conflict with those responsible for earlier interventions, whether it be downstreamers contesting upstream abstractions, as we saw in the Yemen case; or late-comers contesting the water rights or resource depletion of earlier arrivals. Actions within the hydrological cycle can also have impacts on the rest of the ecosphere: upstream uses may conflict with environmental priorities through pollution, desertification or desiccation of wetlands. Some interventions may permanently impair the resource: salinization of aquifers, for example, may bring present day users into conflict with the needs of future generations. Unseen and by its nature hard to manage, groundwater is particularly prone to creating contentious situations. It is a hidden resource, difficult to quantify or to measure change. With myriad points of access, groundwater is incredibly hard to regulate, yet in the absence of regulation it is an open access resource where free-for-all over-abstraction typically occurs. In the absence of regulation or even of information on sustainable yields, there are perverse incentives to competitive unsustainable over-pumping.5 Competition is built in, and conflict can easily ensue. Social and institutional specifics of water Water is seen as both a human right and an economic commodity. Water is a basic necessity, and also a factor of production: conflict may arise between basic needs and economic uses. Water demand is closely linked to demographic and economic change: population growth and economic development mean steeply rising water demand, and competition and conflict easily emerge. Institutions and organizations are essential, but they need to be constantly adapted. Most water, except groundwater, which is usually individually developed, requires cooperation between users to develop and allocate it: willingness to cooperate may dwindle and bring users into conflict. Formal rules and organizations may be established by powerful groups to serve their political, economic or social interests and to extract rents: when these inequities become burdensome, conflict emerges and less powerful groups may organize into a critical mass, contest with the powerful, and so bring about change. Therefore, rules and organizations need to be popularly accepted and adaptable to change: violent and non-violent conflict can arise when people do not see the formal rules as fair, when formal rules do not consider traditional governance systems, when formal rules are not fully implemented or enforced or when the formal rules no longer match a changed situation, as, for example, when informal norms and practices undermine

WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 51

formal rules. There may be more than one set of rules and more than one forum for decision making: local rules may, for example, bring users into conflict with a new water law, or decentralization may create new roles and responsibilities that conflict with existing interests. Water management is a knowledge-based activity. Water management entails considerable technical complexity, and there may be scientific uncertainty and disagreement over information: different interests may enter into conflict over ‘facts’, or be excluded from essential knowledge. Knowledge is a component of power, and access to and control over information perpetuates power asymmetries: conflict may emerge from the resulting development inequities. Political economy and power relations over water Water management is inevitably a political matter. Water usually involves multiple parties with multiple objectives: differing interests and values may bring stakeholders into conflict. For example, requirements for agricultural water in pursuit of food security policies supported by an agriculture or irrigation ministry may conflict with targets for supplying water for urban consumption supported by a water ministry. Public interests may be incompatible with private interests: different interests in water may bring individuals and groups into conflict with the state. Water flows across multiple jurisdictions and involves interests at an increasing scale: local interests may come into conflict with regional, national or international interests, or the jurisdictions may dispute with each other. Water is best managed at the lowest possible level, but governments may be reluctant to surrender power and resources. Decentralization to the local level is key to good water management: conflicts can emerge when central government is reluctant to relinquish power over, for example, water tariffsetting to local government; or when decentralization is incomplete as, for example, when fiscal decision-making is not decentralized; or when local government lacks capacity to fulfil its decentralized roles and responsibilities. Water tends to flow towards power. Asymmetrical power relations are often reflected in asymmetrical access to water: inequity may lead to conflict, and water conflict may be a sub-set of a larger struggle. ***** It will be clear that the characteristics of water make water matters particularly prone to conflictual situations, and this propensity is very high in the Middle East and North Africa region because of scarcity. The next section provides a summary classification of water conflict particular to the region, and subsequent sections illustrate actual examples.

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WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

Types of water conflict in the region This section draws on practical studies in order to develop a classification of water conflict based on experience in the countries of the region. The classification identifies three levels of conflict: at transboundary level, at national or sectoral level and at the local level. For each level, there are typical causes of conflict – conflict drivers – and typical ways in which a conflict could escalate if it is not managed. The classification also identifies the likely longer term socio-economic impacts and aggravation of societal response to unmitigated or mismanaged conflict. The rest of this chapter illustrates the classification, with numerous examples. Table 3.1 provides a summary. A classification of transboundary conflict Transboundary conflict is of particular concern in the region, where very large rivers flow across national boundaries and where no moderating cooperative agreements on the development or use of the resource exist. The connection between this and potential conflict – and not just in the water sphere – will be evident. The Tigris and Euphrates are shared between Turkey, Syria and Iraq (and the Tigris with Iran). The Nile is shared amongst eleven riparians. The Yarmouk is shared between Syria, Jordan and Israel. Groundwater aquifers are also often transboundary, particularly the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer between Egypt, Libya and Chad, the Western Mountain Aquifer between the Palestinian Territories and Israel, the Disi Aquifer between Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the Umm al-Ruduma Aquifer between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Competition in the region for these important transboundary resources is not moderated by any cooperative agreement. The result is often economically sub-optimal unilateral investment in a ‘race to establish facts on the ground’. Outcomes are too often determined by power relations rather than by mutual economic benefit. If conflictual situations are not managed, there can be deterioration of bilateral relations and slowed growth. Ultimately, if diplomatic or cooperative tracks fail, there may even be threats of ‘water wars’. A classification of conflict at the national or water sector level Conflict arises at the national level because water is typically treated as a public resource. In fact, the constitutions or water laws of all countries in the region declare water to be a national resource and attribute to government the right to set the rules for its allocation, development and use. Conflicts therefore inevitably arise between stakeholders and the government, and even within government. These conflicts fall into three classes. There is, first, conflict over access by various stakeholders to water and water-related services.

Imbalances between demand and supply exacerbated by climate change, inadequately mediated by institutions and under pressure from powerful interest groups.

National or inter-sectoral conflict 1:

Between government waterrelated policy and other interests

National or sectoral conflict 2:

Imbalances between demand and supply intensified by state intervention in investment, policy and institutions.

Competition over a finite resource unmoderated by any cooperative agreement.

Transboundary conflict

Between water users, water managers and policy makers over access to water and water related services

Conflict drivers

Classification of water conflict in the region

Type of conflict

Table 3.1

Lobbying and lawsuits by the powerful. Demonstrations, violence.

Lower economic growth.

Collapse of traditional institutions, social disintegration, rural urban migration. Disaffection, undermined trust in government, civil unrest.

Demonstrations, violence.

Struggles amongst rural people and communities, confrontations with government.

Inequity and impoverishment.

Deterioration of bilateral relations. Slowed growth. Threats of ‘water wars’.

Long-term conflict impacts

Confrontations with regulatory authorities, water utilities and government.

Sub-optimal unilateral investment in a ‘race to establish facts on the ground’. Outcomes determined by power relations rather than by mutual economic benefit. Struggles between farmers, of weaker users against stronger, amongst users and uses within communities.

Near-term conflict escalation

Source: Authors.

State intervention in investment and institutions at the local level.

Struggle within communities, against the stronger, with upstreamers. Confrontations with government Demonstrations, violence

Struggles within communities, of weaker users against stronger (such as those with access to technology). Confrontations with regulatory authorities. Demonstrations, violence.

Groundwater boom stoked by spiralling demand and unmoderated by institutions

Local conflict 2: Provoked by state intervention at the local level

Confrontations between downstreamers and polluters, and between downstreamers and government.

Imbalances between demand and supply intensified by inadequate regulation and neglect of environmental impacts.

National or sectoral conflict 3: Between water development and use and environmental needs or sustainability of the resource base Local conflict 1: Arising from adoption of new technology

Near-term conflict escalation

Conflict drivers

Type of conflict

Table 3.1 Continued

Civil unrest.

Rural urban migration.

Inequity and impoverishment, collapse of traditional institutions, social disintegration.

Decline in amenity, depletion of natural capital and economic loss. Disaffection, mobilization of civil society

Long-term conflict impacts

WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 55

Second, conflicts may arise within government where the goals of government water-related policy are at variance with other government policies. Finally, a more subtle but increasingly apparent conflict can emerge between water development and use and environmental needs or the sustainability of the resource base. Regarding the first class of these conflicts at the national level, conflicts amongst stakeholders – water users, water managers, policy makers – within a country over access to water and water related services typically arise from imbalances between demand and supply when these are inadequately mediated by institutions or when there is pressure from powerful interest groups. As climate change starts to exacerbate scarcity, these types of conflict may increase. These conflicts may take the form of struggles amongst different groups of farmers (upstream v. downstream farmers, herders v. settled farmers, irrigated farmers v. rainfed, cereals farmers v. horticulture, etc.). Or between farmer groups and other interests or the state (agriculture v. hydropower, agriculture v. urban). These conflicts may pit weaker users against stronger, or become contests amongst users and uses within communities. Confrontations may emerge between water users and regulatory authorities or water utilities or with government, and take the form of demonstrations or even violence. If this kind of conflict is not resolved, inequity and impoverishment may be the result. More generally, disaffection, undermined trust in government and civil unrest may stem from this kind of conflict. This itinerary may seem extreme but the examples given below will amply illustrate the risks. In the second variant of national or inter-sectoral conflict that we have identified, conflicts may arise within government where there is a mismatch or contradiction between two goals of government water-related policy. This is very common – for example, the conflict between over-allocation of water to agriculture and the policy goal of bringing affordable potable water to all. Wrangles between water supply agencies and agriculture ministries over allocation and development of water resources pervade public policy debate throughout the region. Demand is rising from both sectors, both are priorities, something has to give. These imbalances between demand and supply are often intensified by state intervention in investment, policy and institutions which may favour one goal over another. More frequently these days, too, environment ministries struggle to defend the interests of the environment against ministries bent on developing and using water at the expense of the ecological services it provides (see below). If these conflicts around water allocation and development and the necessary trade-offs in public policy are not managed in a fair and transparent way, the result may be struggles amongst rural people and communities, confrontations with government, lobbying and lawsuits by the powerful, and even

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demonstrations and violence. In the long run, results of unresolved conflict amongst government policies may result in inequity and impoverishment for some, with accompanying collapse of traditional institutions, social disintegration and rural urban migration. In the economic sphere, poor resolution of these conflicts can result in lower growth, in the social sphere in disaffection and unrest. Again, these outcomes may seem exaggerated, but examples below will show the risks. The third type of conflict at the national level concerns conflict between water development and use and environmental needs or the sustainability of the resource base. Again the root cause is attributable to imbalances between demand and supply, which in this case are intensified by inadequate regulation and neglect of environmental impacts. If this kind of conflict is not recognized and dealt with through a transparent governance process, confrontations between downstreamers and upstream polluters may result, or confrontations may arise between downstreamers and government or other parties diverting or impounding water upstream. Where environmental impacts are neglected, there may be a decline in amenity, depletion of natural capital and economic loss. Ultimately this may lead to inequity and impoverishment in rural areas and provoke a move to towns. Disaffection and related mobilization of civil society are becoming increasingly common responses. A classification of conflict at the local level Conflict over water at the local level has characterized the region since time immemorial. Some of the earliest epigraphical evidence from Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula concerns water rights, disputes and dispute resolution at the local level. These conflicts arise because agriculture – and life itself – in so dry a region depends on access to water, and any threat or change in that access undermines livelihoods. Complex institutions have arisen everywhere to mediate and resolve conflict, but in modern times new types of conflict have emerged, and the discussion here will concern these new manifestations. They are of two classes: local conflicts arising from the adoption of new water-related technology; and conflict arising from state intervention. The most prominent example of the first class of conflict, that arising from the adoption of new technology, concerns the tubewell and groundwater revolution. When the tubewell and the motor pump erupted into the lands of the region, they seemed heaven-sent, but difficulties quickly emerged. The groundwater boom, stoked by spiralling demand and unmoderated by institutions, led to wholesale depletion of water tables and the arbitrary abrogation of traditional, long-negotiated water rights.6 As aquifers were

WATER AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 57

drained and ancient springs dried up, struggles began within communities, pitting the weaker users against the stronger, the downstream against the upstream. Confrontations with regulatory authorities, demonstrations and violence followed. As with other forms of unresolved conflict, inequity and impoverishment may result, traditional institutions may collapse and the social fabric may weaken. Rural urban migration and civil unrest may sometimes be traced back to conflicts like these, as in the case of north-east Syria discussed below. The second class of local conflict analysed here may seem a surprising one – conflict not resolved by the state but actually caused by it. Yet in the context of strong top-down development impulses and weak participatory governance institutions that have characterized most of the countries of the region, this kind of conflict is ubiquitous. Everywhere development-minded states intervene in water matters at the local level in the name of growth, modernization and progress. And too often, the infrastructure and institutions imposed from the top fit poorly with the local context. The example from Yemen cited at the start of this chapter is a signal case, but everywhere poorly adapted state interventions have provoked struggles within communities, struggles of the weaker against the stronger, struggles of downstreamers with upstreamers, direct confrontations with government, demonstrations, even violence. Unresolved conflict at this level, as at higher levels, can result in inequity and impoverishment, in the collapse of traditional institutions and in social disintegration. The end may be rural urban migration or civil unrest.

The challenge of transboundary water A fertile field for conflict in the region With 60 per cent of the region’s surface water shared across boundaries, transboundary waters are a major challenge. However, there are no comprehensive cooperative agreements or joint river basin organisations. In the absence of agreement there has been a race for facts on the ground – favouring the strong. Egypt, Israel and Turkey have invested heavily in developing transboundary resources and have taken over the use of the largest share of those resources. Competition over transboundary water in the region has been intense, and international conflict has been often threatened. Israel defends its water interests in the West Bank against Palestinians by force. Israel also threatened armed intervention if Jordan and Syria went ahead with the al Wehda Dam on the Yarmouk. Development on the Euphrates has also brought the risk of regional conflict. In 1973 – 5, during the simultaneous filling of the Keban and al Thawra dams in Turkey and Syria, water supplies diminished

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dramatically and Iraq and Syria nearly came to blows. Only the mediation of Saudi Arabia with Soviet assistance prevented armed conflict. Chapter 7 discusses the problem of the Euphrates in detail, together with the effects of the crisis in Syria and Iraq on the Euphrates and the ‘weaponization’ of international waters.7 Egypt, too, has been belligerent in defence of its water interests, threatening war to protect its interests in the Nile. For millennia, Egypt’s superior power and its vulnerability as downstream riparian have made it fiercely defensive of its interests in the Nile waters. After the peace agreement with Israel, the Egyptian President declared: ‘The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.’ When Ethiopia was considering water projects, the Egyptian President again declared (7 July 1991) that Egypt would consider any Ethiopian water diversions a casus belli, and he threatened to bomb Ethiopian water facilities. When, in 1995, Sudan suggested amending the 1959 bilateral agreement on Nile waters, President Mubarak declared: ‘Any steps taken to this end will force us into confrontation to defend our rights and our life. Our response will be beyond anything they can imagine’.8 It was in the mid-1990s that Egypt in fact began developing massive new water infrastructure, including the New Delta Project in southern Egypt and the Salaam Canal in the Sinai Peninsula. These threatened to increase Egyptian water consumption at the same time as the two upstream riparians on the Blue and Main Nile – Sudan and Ethiopia – were beginning to assert their own rights to dam the river for hydroelectric development and agriculture. Sudan proposed to develop the Kajbar Dam near Khartoum at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles and the Merowe Dam south of the Kajbar and to undertake the enlargement of the Roseires Dam, located 300 miles southeast of Khartoum on the Blue Nile. Taken together, these projects looked likely to lead to Sudan exceeding its water allotments from the 1959 treaty. Ethiopia also began a more assertive programme of dam development. By 2000, over 200 small dams had been constructed along Nile headwaters within Ethiopia, which collectively impound almost 500 million m3 annually. The full nature of the challenge of the Nile and of movements towards a cooperative framework is described in Chapter 7 below. The case of the Euphrates illustrates how, where there is no cooperative framework, unilateral development of transboundary water resources can propel nations into conflictual situations. The lack of cooperation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq over the Euphrates has prevented the development of an integrated water management plan for the Euphrates basin, and creates particular risk for Iraq as the downstream riparian of a diminishing and increasingly uncertain flow. At full development, Turkish and Syrian projects could reduce Iraq’s share of the Euphrates from the present 19–21 billion cubic

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metres to just 9 billion cubic metres, and less in a drought year. Iraq’s share of Euphrates water could ultimately drop from 75 per cent to 28 per cent. Again, Chapter 7 below contains a full discussion of the Euphrates problem.9 Scant cooperation to date The reality is that there has been scant cooperation over the region’s transboundary water resources. Nations in the region have proved very reluctant to cooperate. Although there are apparent strong advantages of cooperation, riparians have proved loathe to move away from unilateral development and from the resulting conflictual situations. One reason is that inter-state relations over water reflect broader power relations and mirror their asymmetry. This can be seen at a glance from the fact that the three strong regional riparians (Israel, Turkey and Egypt) have been among the least cooperative in managing transboundary water resources. By contrast, the weaker states are generally eager to cooperate: in the case of the Nile, for example, the weaker upstream riparians have proved much readier to proceed with a cooperation agreement than Egypt. Nonetheless, the Nile is turning out to be the transboundary river in the region on which there has been the greatest progress towards cooperation (see Chapter 7 below). In practice, four factors have driven the behaviour of states in the region regarding transboundary water, and these factors have much to do with noneconomic factors, particularly power relations. First, it is clear that states will take account of the economic and other benefits of cooperation, but they will also set against those benefits the political costs, particularly the loss of sovereign power and the risks of dependency on each other for a strategic resource. Internal political costs also play an important role here. In Egypt, for example, governments see very high political costs in appearing to give up any of Egypt’s supposed historical rights to Nile water.10 Second, experience in the region shows that the more dependent a state is on the resource for its socio-economic development, the more likely it is to seek cooperation. Thus Jordan has been compelled to agree to Israel’s diversion of the vast bulk of the water from the Sea of Galilee in order to be allowed to exploit the Yarmouk and other local resources unhindered. Similarly, the Palestinian Authority has had to agree some fairly difficult water sharing and resource management arrangements with Israel in order to have some measure of access to the Mountain Aquifer. The third factor is that the greater the level of depletion or scarcity, the more likely it is states will cooperate, if this is seen as the most beneficial and feasible solution. A complement to this factor is that states are more likely to cooperate if there is a perception that failure might escalate the conflict and even lead to violence at local and international levels. The high levels of threat

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of inter-state violence behind negotiations over water between Jordan and Israel, and even more so between the Palestinians and Israel, are examples of this. Finally, and perhaps most significantly for this vexed region, the greater the power asymmetry, the more the cooperation will follow the stronger state’s approach. This phenomenon is, of course, not unique to the region but it is of particular significance because of the conjunction of water scarcity and the frequency with which conflict results in hostilities. This is certainly true for cooperation over water between Jordan and Israel, and again for the Palestinian Territories and Israel, where in both cases Israel is by far the stronger riparian party. It has also proved true for cooperation over the Nubian Aquifer between Chad and Libya, and for cooperation between Syria and Turkey over the Tigris and Euphrates (see Chapter 7).11 In the turbulent regional and global politics of the Middle East and North Africa, water itself is only a component in deciding states’ approaches to decisions over cooperation on the resource. This can be seen clearly in relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, where the agreement over water was only a component of a much larger package (the Oslo Accords), and where the breakdown in cooperative arrangements over water has its origin in other parts of a broader breakdown. In addition, the context in the region is constantly shifting, and incentives and motives are also constantly shifting, which makes the typically long process of getting to an acceptable agreement on water particularly vulnerable. Pointers for the future Nonetheless, and despite the considerable hurdles, there has been growing cooperation over transboundary water in the region, particularly over the Nile, and there are many lessons on both the process of negotiating cooperation on transboundary water and on tackling substantive cooperation issues. These are discussed in Chapter 7 below.

Conflict at the national or inter-sectoral level As discussed above, experience suggests that at the national or sectoral level, conflict can arise in three ways. First, conflict may arise over access to water and water-related services. A second class of conflict situations occurs when government water-related policy conflicts with other interests. Third, conflict arises when development and use of water comes into conflict with environmental needs or sustainability of the resource base. Table 3.2 summarizes these three types of conflict and the actors involved. The rest of this section then discusses and illustrates each of the three types of ‘macro’ conflict.

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Conflicts over access to water and water-related services Where demand is in excess of supply, water users may enter into conflict with government and government agencies over access. In one extreme case from the borders of the Palestinian Territories with Israel, West Bank villagers got into conflict with the occupying authorities. The conflict occurred in the north-east part of the Jenin governorate, where there is a cluster of ten villages located along the border with Israel. The villagers always say: ‘Water is our Table 3.2

Conflict at the national or inter-sectoral level

Type of conflict Conflict over access to water and water-related services Where demand exceeds supply

Where water-using sectors compete, especially agricultural and municipal uses When government mandates supply reductions or transfers between uses Conflict of government waterrelated policy with other interests Conflict over pricing of water and water-related goods Conflict over preferential treatment for certain water users

Conflict of water development and use with environmental needs or sustainability of the resource base Untreated wastewater creating conflict with the environment and downstream residents Over-abstraction bringing water users into conflict with environmental interests and future generations Source: Authors.

Typical participants

Rural and urban users against government and government agencies and service providers Agricultural water users amongst themselves, and against government and urban users

Government ministries and agencies amongst themselves Sector representatives against government Rainfed farmers against irrigated farmers, and against government Rural users surrendering water against government Rural poor against the powerful, and against government

Third parties and downstreamers against polluters or government Current users against public interest

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number one problem’, and it was lack of access to water that brought the villages into conflict with the occupying Israelis. One village, called Arrabona, lies right on the wall that has been put up to divide the Palestinian Territories from Israel. The villagers buy their water from cisterns and tankers, at a cost of up to $4/m3. The quality is very poor and there is water-related disease in the village. For years villagers tried to get a licence to drill a well. Under Article 40 of the Oslo Accords, they have essentially to apply to Israel to get this licence, and permission was systematically refused. In early 2007, the villagers started to drill an unlicensed well for water supply. One morning soon afterwards, ‘40 –50 military vehicles came with a bulldozer. The Israelis surrounded the village and called a curfew. They bulldozed two houses and filled in the well.’ The villagers have now turned the well site into a small play park, with a dry fountain in the middle. They say, ‘We spent 90,000 shekels for nothing. All we wanted was safe water for our children. Now we have a very expensive play park – and the same contaminated expensive water.’12 A second type of conflict over access may arise between water-using sectors competing with each other for water: for example, agricultural water users may enter into conflict with urban water utilities. In most countries of the region, no equitable or efficient mechanism exists for ruralurban water transfer. The most usual approach is simply for the state to assert the right to appropriate the resource. Where this kind of rural-urban transfer is carried out without proper consultation or integrated planning, it can result in severe inequity and impoverishment of rural areas. For example, in Iran, Tehran water supply is conveyed from catchment areas up to 200 km distant. Four dams (Latian, Amir Kabir, Lar and Talleghan) have been built but existing water and property rights were not taken into account and no compensation was given. As a result, irrigated agriculture has been severely curtailed, and displaced rural people have swelled the ranks of the urban poor.13 Some of the more extreme cases of inequitable rural-urban transfer and resulting conflict are found in Yemen. One notable case of conflict over the transfer of water from the country to the town concerns a rural urban water transfer project in the Ta’iz area of the country. From the mid-1980s, Taiz city was desperately searching for a new water source. The government’s previous appropriation of water from rural areas had led to desertification and the impoverishment of the local population. Studies identified the Habir area as a promising source of new water supply. A protracted negotiation ensued, spreading over a decade, with much bad blood, imprisonment and shooting. Only in 1996, after four ministers had intervened, was an agreement to go ahead with a transfer project apparently reached.

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However, during implementation of the project, local people proved uncooperative and often hostile. They said it was sheikhs and not they who had made the deal. Today, although the city is able to extract some water from the area, farmers frequently disrupt the supply. In an attempt to keep good relations with farmers, the utility ‘gives’ 20 per cent of the water to local associations for rural water supply. It also employs 108 local people from the area to operate and ‘guard’ the eight wells. Nonetheless, about 30–40 per cent of the water is stolen. The utility director said: ‘Whenever we made locks, they are being broken for the sake of irrigating crops. We are supposed to receive 170 m3 per hour but actually the tanks only receive 60–70 m3 per hour.’14 Third, conflict over access may arise when government tries to make supply reductions or transfers from one use to another. Reduction in supplies may pit water users against government, seen as failing in its duty of equitable water allocation. In three successive years (2002– 4), there were riots in front of state buildings in Algeria, protesting water shortages. Under similar circumstances, protests were held in the West Bank in 2008 and 2009. This potential for conflict is exacerbated by increasing levels of environmental risks and shocks, including those associated with climate change (see Chapter 2). Even just the perception of loss of water rights may lead to conflict. For example, where supply reductions are managed and do not have negative impacts, conflict may still arise because of the perceived impairment of ‘rights’, especially if costs and benefits are not assessed and equitably assigned, and if proper consultation with representative institutions is lacking. A striking example is the Sirjan Water Transfer Project in Iran which, probably needlessly, created enormous politicized conflict, even though the project did not harm the source area and generated considerable benefits for the country as a whole. The case arose when, in 2007, parliamentarians from Khuzestan Province objected to the transfer of 180 million m3 of water from the 11 billion m3 annual flow of the Karoon River to the thirsty plains of Sirjan, a major-producing area of Iran’s pistachios. The conflict smouldered and then burst into conflagration, with rowdy demonstrations and near-riots. The case even went so far as to cause the impeachment of the Minister of Energy. The Ministry of Energy was at fault in failing to demonstrate the economic and social advantages of the scheme both to the source area and to the receiving area, and in conducting a weak public consultation process. This allowed a technical project with clear socio-economic benefits to become the cause for a broader political conflict.15 Typically, these conflicts over access are driven by a combination of demandand supply-side factors. The boost to demand given by demographics and

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economic growth is intensified by changing consumption patterns driven by education and social change. State intervention has typically stoked demand and enormously expanded supply, creating a sense of entitlements, whilst climate change has introduced increasing risk to supplies. Inequities in access have increased, reflecting changing power relations. Adaptation of institutional frameworks to identify and manage new conflicts has lagged well behind the rapid changes in the sector. These conflicts over access, if not properly managed, may result in local struggles between competing interests, between weaker users and the stronger, or between communities. Such local struggles may escalate to confrontations with the authorities or with water supply agencies. Unsatisfied grievances may result in demonstrations and violence. If these conflicts persist unresolved, inequity may increase. Rural areas in particular may see impoverishment, the collapse of traditional institutions, social disintegration and chaotic rural urban migration. Trust in government may be undermined, and civil unrest may result. Conflict of water-related policy with other interests Because water is widely seen as a public and social good, and because it is an input to almost every branch of human activity, it features in virtually all government policies and programmes. Very often these policies and programmes are at variance with good water policy, and they may be inconsistent and unintegrated. The result is widespread conflict of government water-related policy with other interests. Two examples are considered here: conflict over pricing of water and water-related goods; and conflict over preferential treatment for certain water users. These types of conflict not only pit one part of the government apparatus against another, they bring large segments of the population into conflictual situations – sector representatives against government, rainfed farmers against both irrigated farmers and government, rural users surrendering water against government, the rural poor against the powerful and against government, and so on. Conflict of water-related policy with other interests may occur when government policy determines water allocation and pricing. Governments may allocate water resources between sectors, or set an incentive framework which influences patterns of supply and demand. In many countries of the region, for example, the government subsidizes the costs of developing water supply and sanitation services, and retains a say in what price should be charged to the consumer. Governments also frequently control or influence the prices of inputs to water production, particularly energy, and the price of water-based products, particularly agricultural produce.

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Government involvement inevitably makes pricing a political affair, and brings sector representatives into constant conflict with the government. The pricing of irrigation water in Jordan’s surface irrigation in the Jordan Valley, for example, has been the subject of acrimonious political conflict for decades. In the mid-1990s, an agreement was finally reached, based on a hugely expensive study, that water should be priced to cover full operating and maintenance costs of the irrigation system. However, farmers – particularly the big, influential ones who have carved out sizable estates in the Valley – have never ceased to protest, and when those influential ‘farmers’ are also cabinet minsters the protests can be loud indeed. So conflict on the issue has persisted. Having been obliged to admit the principle of full recovery of operating and maintenance costs, the farmers have fought a long rear-guard action on what those costs actually are. So for years the debate has been stuck on the definition and quantification of those costs.16 The more powerful can generally influence these conflicts to their own advantage. Conflict over pricing can bring change, but it rarely benefits less powerful groups and the poor. In Yemen in 2005, government doubled the diesel price. One objective was to manage water demand, as diesel is the main cost of providing water from deep tubewells. However, the increase also raised the cost of transport and hence the prices of all consumer goods. This particularly hit the poor. Riots followed and when 35 demonstrators were killed, government agreed to modify its policy. However, it was the farmers with deep wells who did the best out of this arrangement, as government transferred resources to a special agricultural promotion fund. The fund was designed to offset the impact of the higher diesel price for farmers, but it was contractors and larger farmers who chiefly benefitted. Larger farmers also benefitted from a project to provide subsidized water saving equipment, which allowed them to maintain their income whilst laying off labourers. In the apparent resolution of this conflict over diesel price, rent went to the better off, and the less powerful and poor lost both income and employment.17 The second example of this class of conflict concerns conflict over preferential treatment for certain water users. Privileges given to one waterusing subsector or group over others distort incentives and create conflict amongst water users and with government. For example, some governments in the region have distorted incentives to the detriment of the poor rainfed farmer. In Morocco, farmers on the public Offices re´gionales de mise en valeur agricole (ORMVA) surface irrigation schemes have benefitted from massive subsidies over several decades, whilst rainfed or traditional irrigated farmers in the remote Atlas Mountains have received virtually no support until recently. Given that rainfed farmers typically have little voice, representation or clout, this conflict has been largely latent, although in the Morocco case the

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strong Berber community bloc in parliament has been influential in promoting balancing support for poor mountain agriculture. In the West Bank, Israeli settlements are given priority, creating conflict. Privileges given to Israeli settlers over access to water in the West Bank have reduced the quantity of water available to Palestinians. Israeli settlers consume, on average, four to five times more water per capita than Palestinians. This has led to conflictual situations, for example where Israeli wells in the West Bank have dried up local Palestinian wells and springs. In one example, at Bardala, in the North Eastern corner of Tubas Governorate, eight Palestinian wells were constructed before 1967 for domestic and agricultural purposes, with depths ranging from 30 to 65 metres. After the 1967 war, Israel constructed two deep wells (Bardala 1 in 1968 and Bardala 2 in 1979) a few hundred metres from the Palestinian wells. The water level in the Palestinian wells dropped at the rate of 2 metres a year, and salinity increased. Now the Palestinian wells are dry, as are most of the local springs used by Palestinian consumers for domestic and agricultural purposes.18 In countries in the region, priority in water allocation is typically given to the municipal and industrial sectors, which may bring conflict with other users who may have to surrender water, notably agriculture. Some governments have sought to transfer fresh water out of agriculture to urban uses. In Jordan, the government gives priority to the municipal and industrial sectors, and has transferred water from the surface water irrigation schemes in the Jordan Valley and from groundwater agriculture in the highlands to municipal and industrial uses. One solution the Jordanian government adopted was to compensate farmers in the Valley for the loss of fresh water with treated wastewater sent back down from the highlands after municipal and industrial use. However, the transfer has remained contentious and conflict has frequently arisen over water quality, with farmers claiming contamination by heavy metals in the effluent. In 1990, poor quality water was blamed for crop failure and a public investigation was launched. Although the investigation found that the failures were due to pest damage rather than contaminants, farmers still sued the government (unsuccessfully). In a later incident in the 1990s, untreated water was mistakenly released to the Valley, causing the Minister of Water to lose his job. In summary, these underlying conflicts that stem from policy are driven by the same demand and supply side factors discussed above. The difference here is that government is the originator of the conflicts, through poor policies that intensify imbalances and through failure to adapt institutions to manage and resolve the resulting conflicts. If conflicts arising from government water-related policy are not detected early and dealt with, struggles within communities may result, particularly in

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rural areas. There may be confrontations between users and government, leading to demonstrations and possible violence. The more powerful may seek to influence resolution through lobbying or lawsuits. In the longer run, if these conflicts are not resolved, they may result in inequity and impoverishment and in the decline of the rural economy and society. Economic growth will suffer, and disaffection may lead to civil unrest. Conflict with environmental needs or resource sustainability A class of conflict which has only been recognized in recent years is conflict between water development and use and environmental needs or the sustainability of the resource base. Yet impacts on the environment and tradeoffs between current use and sustainability are pervasive in water development and management in the region. These impacts lead to conflicts, but of a more diffuse nature, sometimes without readily identifiable stakeholders, organized interests or voices. Essentially the constituency for the environment or for sustainability is loosely society at large or – even more vaguely – future generations. However, NGOs may become vocal champions of these causes, and latent conflicts can sometimes emerge into open contests.19 One of the most obvious examples of this class of conflict is that of untreated wastewater, which throughout the region has imposed costs on third parties, creating conflict with the environment and downstream residents. In some cases, neglect of sanitation and effluent treatment is threatening both the environment and human health. Two examples stand out – the Palestinian Territories, where only 26 per cent of the population have access to proper sanitation (see below) and Lebanon, where only 8 per cent of wastewater is treated, and raw sewage is discharged into wadis and the Mediterranean. Industrial effluent also poses problems for water quality and health. The result is pollution of land and water resources, and health risks. Essentially, uncompensated costs are imposed on society, leading to conflict between polluting consumers and the environment. In the Palestinian Territories, the potential conflict between polluting consumers and the environment over sewage pollution has been actualized in acrimonious exchanges within and between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Untreated wastewater is polluting the West Bank environment and aquifers, and flowing into Israel. Ariel Sharon at one stage asked whether there was not a ‘sewage intifada’ going on.20 But the debate is being played out also at the local level where both Palestinian and Israeli NGOs are vocal partisans of the environment (on this fascinating topic, see Chapter 8 below). However, NGOs, and even public outcry, are unable to make much headway, as broader political and security concerns take precedence in decision-taking.

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In Gaza too, although the question of untreated sewage and its impact on the environment is important, the issue takes a back seat to security concerns. Wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure is inadequate and existing plants provide only partial and intermittent treatment. Violent conflict has destroyed treatment plants, and draconian movement and access restrictions prevent reconstruction. Most sewage is either returned raw to lagoons, wadis or the sea, or seeps through the soil and ultimately reaches the aquifer. Households not connected to the network use cess pits which, in the current economic climate, are not being properly emptied. Local residents live among raw sewage in vast ponds or flowing in wadis, polluting the aquifer, the beaches and the sea. The Israelis complain that Gaza raw sewage discharged to the sea may be drawn into the newly-constructed desalination plants just up the coast.21 Another example of this kind of conflict is the case where wholesale water abstractions from watercourses have significantly reduced stream flows. This very common practice has led in some cases to whole sections of perennial rivers drying up. Since 1999, for example, the Khabur River tributary of the Syrian Euphrates has had no perennial flow as the karstic springs around Ra’s al-’Ayn which feed it have dried up. As a result, the ecology of the watercourse and of the basin as a whole is suffering dramatic damage. Abstractions from Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River have caused alarming drops in the level of the Dead Sea and have raised environmental concerns for this unique ecosystem. The Jordan River itself in its lower reaches is these days no more than a narrow, dirty drain receiving untreated wastewater discharged from irrigated fields or higher elevations, such as neighbourhoods around Jerusalem. Elsewhere, over-abstraction from aquifers has led to desiccation of ecosystems and also to water quality deterioration, particularly where there is risk of saline intrusion, as in the Tehama coastal strip in Yemen. In the al Batinah coastal plain in Oman, over-abstraction has led to decline in water quantity and quality and to saline intrusion and salinization of agricultural land. More than 30 per cent of the farmed area in al Batinah now depends on groundwater with high salinity, and almost 12,000 feddan, 12 per cent of the total cultivated land in the plain, has gone out of production, too salinized for agriculture.22 A notable example of conflict between human water uses and the environment is the conflict at Jordan’s Azraq Oasis between, on the one hand, agriculture and domestic uses of water and, on the other, protection of this Ramsar Convention ecosystem. Over many years, heavy abstraction of groundwater for irrigation and for drinking water for Amman and Zarqa has significantly damaged the fragile ecosystem of the oasis and the surrounding wetlands, which are a haven for migratory birds and for plant and animal

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biodiversity. For years, the rate of pumping has exceeded 50 million m3, compared to the safe yield of about 24 million m3. The water table has fallen, water quality has deteriorated and the oasis and wetlands are now reduced to about one-fifth of their original size, resulting in destruction of much of the ecosystem. With the support of local non-governmental organizations and of UNESCO, a rehabilitation project is being funded by GEF to partially restore the wetland through discharge each year of 1.5 million m3 of groundwater. However, even this partial mitigation is currently under threat as some 50,000 Syrian refugees have been accommodated since 2014 at the Zarqa Refugee Camp nearby, run by the UN High Commission for Refugees. These tragically dispossessed people are naturally a priority. Jordan’s hard-pressed government is faced with deciding on further trade-offs between human need and conservation of a word class environmental asset.23 Although conflict between water abstraction and the environment would typically evoke only latent responses, there are cases where changes in ecosystems have provoked overt opposition. In the case of the Mesopotamian marshes, for example, engineered drainage was understood by the primarily Shi’ite populations as a means for the Baghdad government to extend political and social control over the marsh region. This fostered grievances which can still be traced to group identities that are a part of today’s sectarian dynamics in Iraq. Use of non-renewable water resources may bring current users into conflict with the interests of future generations. Many aquifers in the region are ‘fossil’, huge underground reserves of water laid down millennia ago. All countries exploit these aquifers where it is economic (in the near term) to do so, just as they would exploit mineral resources. Conflicts have arisen where higher value uses have emerged, as in Jordan’s transfer of fossil water from the Disi wellfields in the south. Previously used for commercial agriculture, the water is now being pumped up to the highlands for Amman water supply, a much higher value use. However, the question still arises as to whether conflicts may not also arise between this present day consumption of a finite natural resource and the needs of future generations. It will be clear from this discussion that conflicts with environmental needs and sustainability may affect present day constituencies directly – for example, downstreamers suffering from pollution – or indirectly, for example, when society loses the amenity value of environmental assets. But future generations are losers too. They may not have a direct voice, but they plainly have an interest. A tipping point in the discourse may be reached as more environmentally aware young people realize that threats to water security are as real as threats to food security or human security or national security. Like other types of conflict, environmentally-related conflicts are driven both by demand and by supply side factors. These factors may have negative

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environmental impacts if not regulated through institutional mechanisms and accountability structures adapted to the environmental risks. Responses may emerge when downstreamers confront the polluters or the government, or when public interest groups protest. Longer term impacts may be inequity and impoverishment in rural areas, and depletion of natural capital and consequent economic loss. Civil society may, as a result, become disaffected and mobilize aggressively against the government. How these interests may best be represented and the inherent conflicts mediated or mitigated is discussed in Chapter 7 below.

Conflict at the local level This section examines water-related conflict at the local and site-specific level. The analysis distinguishes ‘endogenous’ local conflict, largely induced by local adoption of new technology, from conflict triggered by external factors, notably local conflict provoked by state intervention. Table 3.3 summarizes these two types of local conflict and the actors involved. Conflicts arising from local adoption of new technology Changes in water management and water rights at the local level have been induced by the rapid spread of new technologies. Conflicts have been most evident in the case of groundwater, arising between groundwater users and users of other connected water services – springs, shallow wells – and also

Table 3.3

Conflict at the local level

Type of conflict Arising from local adoption of new technology Individual groundwater abstraction creating conflict with other water rights holders Provoked by state intervention at the local level Government development of upstream infrastructure conflicting with downstream water uses Conflict between government initiatives and local water governance Source: Authors.

Parties involved

Rural people within communities Rural poor against the powerful

Downstream rural people v. upstream users and infrastructure developers Rural people disputing within communities and with the government

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between one groundwater user and another, as each user has incentives to engage in a competitive ‘race to the bottom’. The groundwater boom created both winners and losers, and the effects of this conflict on society and the economy are still being felt. The arrival of tubewell technology greatly altered the water balance and water rights for many local communities across the region. Old spring-fed water distribution systems and shallow wells dried up as the water table fell. In a few years, ageold water rights were extinguished. The changes in access to water left many much better off, and some much poorer. Some communities did adapt, but usually with losers as well as winners. One such case of conflict, adaptive capacity and a shifting equilibrium, occurred in Yemen’s Wadi Dahr. Yemen has an age-old history of water conflict and of subsequent accommodation of change. Wadi Dahr, close to Sana’a, had a long, well-documented history of managing its water resource. Rules had been agreed over centuries through an evolving process of conflict, contentious judgments, and ultimate development and acceptance of new rules that progressively crystallized into ‘established tradition’. In 1970, the tubewell burst into the finely balanced water economy of the wadi. A downstream community in the wadi complained to the sheikh’s court that upstream motor pumps had reduced the stream flow and disturbed ‘laws and customs . . . by which we have been guided for thousands of years.’ This new conflict got resolved – but not by the courts. The rich and influential downstream farmers simply invested in the new pump technology themselves. ‘The stream dwindled and died, but no one with influence any longer cared.’ A new equilibrium emerged: assets were rebalanced and concentrated a little more in the hands of the richer. The conflict was resolved – even if not fairly – and a new ‘established tradition’ emerged.24 Traditional governance institutions have proved poorly adapted to regulate groundwater. The groundwater revolution driven by introduction of tubewell technology took place largely in an institutional vacuum. Occasionally, old lore would be applied. In many locations in Yemen, for example, a ‘500 metre between wells’ spacing rule was applied. However, this readily understandable rule of thumb has provided little protection of existing water rights in the face of the enormous economic pressures. Throughout the region, groundwater development and exploitation has followed this pattern of unregulated development, and everywhere perverse incentives have driven the ‘race to the bottom’. Governments have attempted to introduce modern formal governance systems (through rules and regulations), but nowhere in the region has this achieved any broad success. Regulation is simply not implemented or enforced. Groundwater has become an open access resource, increasingly appropriated by the better off with access

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to capital and land, and governments everywhere have strengthened the inherent perverse incentives through subsidies of various kinds. These conditions have led well owners throughout the region to over-pump competitively against each other. The result has been a classic version of the ‘tragedy of the commons’.25 For example, in Iran, over-extraction of groundwater threatens livelihoods and is leading to conflicts and the destruction of social solidarity. As in most countries of the region, governance of groundwater in Iran is largely absent. There has been extensive illegal well drilling, and this along with protracted drought (1995–2002) and over-pumping from licenced wells has led to drastic drops of water levels in most of the country’s aquifers. Today, threequarters of Iran’s 600 groundwater irrigation plains are reported to be in ‘very critical condition’. In more than 100 aquifers, water levels have dropped 50 meters, drying up wells at higher elevations.26 A study of two representative groundwater areas (Dashta in Kerman and the Ordibehesht Production Cooperative in Hamadan) showed that overpumping of groundwater had contributed to drying up of traditional qanats, springs and shallow wells, and had led to sinking of the plains due to collapse of the water-bearing formations. The drop in water tables has contributed to widespread conflicts, threatening social cohesion within rural communities. Often, clan members will prosecute one another before the court. Yet courts lack the knowledge and legal rules to adjudicate. Alternatively, recourse is to violence. These extreme economic and ecological risks are found in many areas of the country, and elsewhere all across the region. The study indicates large loss of livelihoods, pauperization, conflicts and the destruction of social solidarity.27 These competitive dynamics have escalated conflict and, in some cases, contributed to violence. When managing an unseen resource, perception is everything: perceived conditions contribute to a sense of economic, social and environmental insecurity. These fears can drive competitive behaviour and action for individual rather than collective benefit, leading to physical and structural violence. In socially fragile contexts, these dynamics can be particularly dangerous in that weak governance systems and social capital can be exploited, and grievances can be displaced and aggrieved groups can mobilize. The social impact of groundwater overdraft can be seen in an example from Yemen’s Wadi Bani Khawlan, where upstreamers have prospered but downstream areas have been left desolate and their populations angry. The upper part of Wadi Bani Khawlan in Yemen’s Taiz Governorate is covered with crops and lush fruit trees. The lower area of the wadi, once also a rich agricultural zone, is now struggling and partly abandoned. Dry wells dot the

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fields. In some areas, pipes still cross the ground ready to transport water to waiting fields, should water somehow return to the wells. In most areas, however, the pipes have been removed – sold since they no longer serve any purpose. Where wells still operate in the lower wadi (mostly at points at which minor side wadis enter the main one), women wait for six hours or more daily to fill up plastic containers of water for domestic use. Protest and armed confrontation proved useless to stop the upstreamers, who were stronger. Now most men from the lower wadi have migrated in search of work, joining a disaffected population in the slums of Ta’iz. A few remain, spending their time and the remittance money sent by others in the small dusty stores that are remnants of more prosperous days in the valley.28 Supply- and demand-side pressures have led to these conflicts, which have arisen from local adoption of new technology and which have overwhelmed traditional governance. These conflicts have been driven by supply-side factors – particularly, the sudden arrival of the tubewell – and by the explosion of demand for irrigated products. Modern and traditional institutions have proven unable to regulate groundwater use, and the resulting free-for-all has led to an inequitable rebalancing of access to water in the hands of the better situated and the more powerful. As a result, rural people have been in conflict with one another, and poorer people in particular have come into conflict with the better off and the more powerful. The resulting struggles may end in confrontation and violence. In the longer term, inequity and poverty increase, traditional institutions may be undermined and social disintegration, rural urban migration and civil unrest may result. Conflict provoked by state intervention at the local level Government involvement has often come into conflict with water institutions at the local level. The twentieth century saw widespread government involvement in water development and management, not only at the national level but also at the local level. Much of this intervention has helped to develop the resource and to promote efficient use. Often, however, government involvement has been the source of conflict, particularly at the intersection between government’s modernizing policies and programmes and local institutional set-ups. This conflict can weaken the social contract between central government and local or traditional entities, contributing to state fragility and conflict escalation. Upstream development of dams, terraces and other water-related infrastructure reduces water available to downstream sites, contributing to inequity. Throughout the region, local communities historically evolved elaborate institutions for water rights and management. In the modern era,

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the entry of the state with its power and capital into construction of major upstream impoundment and diversion projects has very significantly altered access to water at downstream sites. In recent years, rules have been developed, such as the World Bank’s resettlement guidelines, to ensure no uncompensated harm results from such projects. However, these rules often do not filter down to affected locations. Significant conflict still occurs within the region over the issue, and sometimes this has degenerated towards social unrest and violence. One example of this is from Ghom City in Iran where angry demonstrations erupted when the 15 Khordad Dam was perceived to reduce traditional access to water. In 1996 when the dam was completed and became operational, it deprived many water right-holders downstream. The farmers had already planted their crops. They angrily stormed the Office of the Governor in Ghom City and occupied the building for hours. The Governor immediately ordered that the dam outlets be opened so the water could flow into channels previously used to irrigate lands before the dam was constructed. However, although these orders solved the farmers’ problems, the solution caused water shortages in the city of Ghom for which the dam was constructed in the first place. The dam had been designed and constructed without consultation of downstream interests and without any plan for compensation or resettlement. These events alerted the government to the need for due process, for which experience was available from best practices introduced under the World Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project. In addition, the crisis forced the government to look again at its policies and programmes for social safety nets and for handling reinsertion of displaced people in urban and rural environments. This example shows not only how conflict can arise, but also how it can lead through resolution to beneficial change.29 Conflict can also occur when government attempts at pro-poor development do not take account of local water governance. Risks arise when a modern investment is placed within a traditional water management system without proper understanding of local institutions and without consultation or involvement of all stakeholders, including the poor, the unorganized, or less powerful groups. The following example from Yemen shows how a modernizing public agency with the best of intentions came into conflict with the very communities it was trying to benefit. In this Yemeni case, two village water committees cooperated to protect their resource – and to fight off a threat from a government agency. In the very water-scarce Qadas area of Ta’iz Governorate, al Kareefah and al Dhunaib are neighbouring villages. Each village has its own potable water scheme with its own management committee. Having seen the problems of water scarcity

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in other parts of Qadas, the two villages cooperate to protect the drinking water resource, which is their first priority. The two committees keep an eye on the activities of local farmers and have stopped the digging of many new wells. Ironically, the committees had the most problem with the official rural water agency, the General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARWSP). Proposing to bring a larger scale water supply system to the area, GARWSP started to drill a borehole in the catchment area of the existing drinking water schemes of both villages, and within 400 meters of an existing well. The committees pointed out to GARWSP that this proximity violated their local harim rule that wells must be at least 500 meters apart. Their protest fell on deaf ears. The villagers resorted to armed resistance, and the contractor was forced to leave the area. The two committees then decided jointly to hand-dig a well for community use at the new site to prevent GARWSP from any future attempt to drill in this location. Clearly, government agencies trying to help solve the water problem can create more problems than they solve. In this case, GARWSP’s technical appraisal of the source was deficient. Furthermore, the agency totally lacked a ‘demand-driven’ and participatory approach.30 One problem is that water administration in the region is often declared a state responsibility but state-devised institutional mechanisms for allocating water or resolving conflicts at the local level are often not mature. In all countries of the region, governments have sought to develop or adapt modern and formal institutional mechanisms for water governance, including for allocating water and resolving disputes at the local level. However, modern institutions have been slow to develop or to gain acceptance, and often the rules that government seeks to introduce have been at variance with local practice. The result has been conflict between two sets of institutions – modern formal and traditional informal – which has translated into poor water governance and weak dispute resolution at the local level. In Egypt, conflict resolution through modern institutions is only slowly becoming effective. One study showed that modern institutions sit uneasily beside traditional institutions, and that dispute resolution works imperfectly, with the more educated and better off able to play the system to their advantage. The study looked at a village in Bangar El-Sukar in Alexandria Governorate where young university graduates have been settled. There is a persistent water shortage in the village, and this has occasioned multiple conflicts. Big investors are diverting water upstream, there is theft of water from the canal and upstreamers are using more than their share. A user-managed Water Board was set up to organize irrigation turns among the farmers, settle disputes and handle irrigation violations.

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However, the Board lacks legal status and cannot enforce decisions or apply sanctions. As a result, most irrigation disputes are still resolved informally by a customary council. But as this is a settlement area, the usual kinship and community ties that make local governance effective are lacking. Irrigation disputes continue, and they are of an unusually violent nature: ‘They do not stop at the exchange of harsh words or cursing, but go far beyond to physical attacks, beating and – according to some reports – even killing.’31 Thus conflict provoked by state intervention at the local level may result from public investment, which can change existing access, bringing rural people into conflict with each other or with the state. Conflicts may also arise when government seeks to graft new water institutions onto the existing, or simply to mandate wholesale adoption of a new institutional set up. These conflicts may lead to struggles within communities, or struggles between downstreamers and upstreamers, often pitting weaker users against the stronger. There may be confrontation with government, demonstrations and violence. Unresolved, these conflicts lead along the paths of the inequity and impoverishment that contribute to the collapse of rural institutions and communities and to a move to town of a pauperized and disaffected population.

Factors exacerbating water conflict in the Middle East and North Africa It is clear from the discussion above that conflict over water – both latent and overt – is growing more prevalent at transboundary, national and local levels. Some conflict situations are descending towards confrontation and violence, whilst others are being contained. This section seeks to analyse the main causes of this rise in water conflict, and then assesses which improvements in water management and governance in the region have been successful in managing conflict and turning it to good account – and which have not. Increasing competition for water is provoking more conflict in the region. Competition for water has always existed in this very water-scarce region, where water is life and where it has been the basis of civilization. Throughout the region, communities and states have evolved rules and institutions to develop and manage the resource and to handle conflict. The history of water management in this dry region has been a long dialectic to arrive at everchanging equilibria between users and uses. However, the demographic and economic pressures of recent years have driven up demand for water, scarcity is on the rise, and the resulting increase in competition for water is provoking more conflict in the region. In the twentieth century a new generation of conflicts emerged, for which existing traditional institutions, and the new rules and organizations

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introduced by modernizing governments, have often proved ill-adapted. A mismatch between conflicts and the institutional mechanisms for containing and resolving them can be seen in most countries of the region. The emergence of new patterns of conflict can be traced to fundamental changes in the water sector. An analysis of the conflicts described above shows that a number of changes have dramatically altered water management in recent years and have led to the proliferation of new factors that can trigger or escalate conflict. These changes can be grouped under three heads: changes in patterns of demand; changes on the supply side; and changes in institutions and power relations. Drawing on the classification and examples of conflict discussed above, significant changes to the sector are assessed in more detail in this section. The case of the Syria crisis is discussed in the final section of this chapter. Changes in patterns of demand Demographics and economic growth have led to a rapid urbanization and to increased consumption of water and of water-intensive food products. Inevitably in water-short countries, water has to be diverted from agriculture to the cities, yet this is at a time when there is increasing demand for farm products. Reduction in agricultural water can lead to reduction in farm employment and more rapid urbanization, as farmers abandon their farms and migrate to cities. Agriculture may be compensated but with lower quality water, as in the Jordan Valley example discussed above. In addition, urbanization and concentration of population have led to changes in the intensity and location of demand. In recent, years, the massive flux of migrants and displaced persons has come to place extraordinary stresses on water and food in locations ill-prepared for such sudden shifts in demand.32 Education and broader social change, including in the status of women, have led to more emphasis on potable water and safe sanitation. Higher levels of education, especially of girls, have led to pressure for access to potable water and improved sanitation. Education and empowerment, promoting increased equity in access and opportunity, including that associated with water management and supply, have contributed to the demand for better services and more accountability. These changes have had clear beneficial impacts on welfare (health, infant mortality, girls’ education, women’s use of time, etc.), but have also led to strong demand for water and water-related services. State intervention has also changed demand, often distorting it. In particular, subsidies to certain water users have favoured one group over another, inflated demand and distorted access. Governments are often more pliable towards the demands of powerful key constituencies such as organized urban consumers or commercial farmers. For example, urban water and sanitation subsidies,

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universal in the region, privilege better-off urban residents over poorer urban residents not connected to the network, and over rural dwellers. Again, in many countries of the region, energy subsidies privilege the farmer with access to pumping technology over rainfed farmers or those without access to deep well technology. Similarly, agricultural trade and pricing policies frequently favour certain classes of producer, typically market-oriented commercial farmers. Taken together, agricultural pricing and water pricing policies have tended to favour commercial irrigated agriculture, inflating demand for water and reducing incentives to water use efficiency.33 Changes on the supply side The groundwater revolution has led to unmanageable over-exploitation. The explosive growth of individual groundwater exploitation has overwhelmed institutional capacity to manage the resource. Attempts to connect formal with informal governance approaches and to align accountabilities between the policy and the community levels are being made. For example, the promotion of water user associations as the lowest building blocks of water management (for instance, in Yemen – see Chapter 7) is promising but is still very much in the pilot phase.34 The rapid expansion of supply investments has created an inflexible pattern of rights and expectations. Heavy investment in physical infrastructure (storage, irrigation schemes, etc.) has locked in a fixed allocation to users, who perceive this as an ‘entitlement’. As a result, allocations have proved inflexible as water demand patterns change, for example, fixed allocations to permanent irrigation schemes while the needs of growing cities and expanding industry are on the increase.35 Climate change has introduced costs and risks that are hard to manage. High variability and low means in rainfall, exacerbated by climate change (see Chapter 2), have led to unpredictable, often declining water resources, variations in supply, and increased disasters, such as floods, drought, and so on. The prospect of further climate change is likely to exacerbate these stresses.36 Management of environmental degradation has been neglected. Negative and uncompensated environmental impacts – pollution, contamination, erosion, sedimentation, salinization – have proliferated, with far-reaching and costly effects on third parties and on environmental capital. Untreated effluent from towns has flowed back as a low quality return to the water balance. Saline agricultural drainage water has flowed into watercourses with eutrophic effect. Public and private investments in water infrastructure have altered existing water rights, in some cases increasing inequity. Water investments have been

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made with little reference to existing patterns of rights, and compensation or benefit sharing have not generally been practiced. Negative social and distributional impacts have often been borne by the poor.37 The changing institutional context and power relations New technology and the development of resources have produced and entrenched patterns of inequitable access. Asymmetrical power has led to asymmetrical access to water. Water ‘flows uphill to money and power’.38 Although recent moves towards free expression give hope for improvement, the political economy of the countries of the region has not hitherto generally provided for the accountability mechanisms or educated participation in decision making that would promote more equitable outcomes. Restricted access to land also limits access to water, for instance through increased privatization of public or endowment land by powerful interests at the expense of poor and vulnerable groups (such as the rural or landless poor). Governments have developed the resource and allocated water between sectors and to users but have not developed the flexible and participatory institutional mechanisms and accountability structures needed to respond to changing demand, create accountability or resolve conflicts. Governments are introducing modern forms of governance through legal and regulatory frameworks, policies, and so on, but are unable to fully implement them. Yet these introduced forms of governance can undermine traditional governance systems. This creates a ‘hybrid governance system’ that can even increase conflict. In addition, governments have not developed the economic and social safety net mechanisms to mitigate negative impacts of change, particularly for the poor.39 Changes in power relations, particularly concentration of power in the hands of certain groups within society, have contributed to changes in access to water. Inadequate coverage of affordable, low-cost water and sanitation networks leaves the poor to purchase more expensive water from tankers or vendors. Vulnerable and marginalized groups can be most at risk as they lack the resources to manage the systemic factors that contribute to poverty. Development of transboundary waters may be inequitable. Emerging nations have begun to assert rights to shared transboundary waters, whilst more powerful nations have developed the resource unilaterally without any comprehensive agreement on benefit-sharing. ***** The challenges are clearly considerable. Essentially, widespread improvements to water governance at all levels are indicated as the best means of

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tackling these issues. What these improvements may be, and how and where to apply them, is the subject of chapters 7 and 8.

Water and conflict in the Syrian crisis Water and the causes of the Syrian crisis The causes of the current (2016) conflicts that are tearing several countries of the region apart are many and varied. Some observers have seen problems of natural resource scarcity and climate change as amongst them. In Syria, a range of social, economic and political factors has clearly contributed to the uprising and to the subsequent cataclysmic conflict. In addition to more specifically political causes, a series of frictions arose for which a disaffected population blamed the regime. These included a growing rural – urban divide, high and rising unemployment, particularly amongst the young, widespread corruption, worsening poverty and the failure of the state to protect the poor and vulnerable affected by the rapid economic liberalization.40 Some of these frictions can be attributed to government policies towards the development of water resources, policies which have proved inequitable and unsustainable and which have had the tendency to reduce employment. Grievances over these natural resource issues and over the way the government handled the impacts on the population have been amongst the triggers of the uprising. One example is the fate of the families displaced by the construction of the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates. The dam has brought undoubted benefits to some, but not to the people who were living in the dam area. In 1999, these families were driven off their land and away from their ancestral homes. They were forced to migrate to the environs of Damascus and were still living there in tents in al-Hammouriyeh a decade later. Grievances like those of the youth who grow up in such tenuous conditions have certainly fuelled the Syrian uprising. The role of drought in the Syria crisis Amongst grievances have been the effects of the sustained and severe drought that hit the region between 2006 and 2010. In a paper full of insights, Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014) shows how this long period of natural disaster was particularly severe in its incidence and impacts in Syria’s north-east. This is a region that has historically been poor and neglected by government, but which had seen in recent decades two remarkable growth phenomena. One was the discovery and extraction of oil, which brought considerable benefit to government revenues and to the Syrian economy as a whole but which did little to relieve the prevalent poverty of the local population. The other was

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the rapid development of the region’s water resources. Major irrigation schemes were developed by river diversion and groundwater was exploited by a rash of tubewells. However, the development of these resources brought little benefit to local people, and whilst the state and some individuals benefitted, the region as a whole experienced even higher levels of poverty and malnutrition than before (see Chapter 1). Nationwide, agricultural value added rose by 9 per cent 2001 – 7, but agricultural employment dropped by a third. Almost half a million jobs were lost in the agricultural sector over the same period, a reduction of 10 per cent of the total labour force. It was in this situation that Syria and other countries of the region experienced the worst series of droughts in decades. Drought is a common feature of this semi-arid region, with wide fluctuations in rainfall and cycles of wet and dry years. Over the half-century from 1960, nearly half of the years were drought years. Drought cycles have historically lasted up to ten years, with the average drought spell lasting four to five years. Syria thus might have been well prepared for the series of droughts that hit the region from 2007/8. In that year, the country suffered rainfall deficits of up to 60 per cent and some regions received no rain at all. The drought series also affected Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.41 Syria proved to have little resilience in the face of this drought. In the first year, 2007/8, the impact on production – and livelihoods – was catastrophic. The effect was felt by all Syria’s farmers but was buffered for some by access to irrigation water. Crop yields dropped by a third in irrigated areas, but by much more (up to 80 per cent) in areas dependent only on rainfall. Yields of the staples produced by rainfed farmers were down by half or more – 47 per cent below the previous year for wheat, and 67 per cent for barley. Nationwide, the 2007/8 wheat harvest amounted to just 2.1 million tons, against a long term average of 4.7 million tons. For the first time in almost two decades, Syria imported wheat. The impact on livelihoods was devastating. As the drought extended into the two subsequent years, the UN reported 1.3 million people affected in the north-east of the country, with 800,000 people severely affected. By 2010, farmers no longer had seeds to sow and livestock herds were slaughtered wholesale as herders could not maintain them. The impact on food security and malnutrition was extreme. Yet there was scant government response to this crisis. Despite the advanced development of water resources for agriculture in the region, this brought no protection to the majority of households still dependent on rainfed farming. Government discourse blamed ‘climate change’ rather than its own unbalanced development policies. And for long, there was little or no intervention to relieve the humanitarian crisis.42

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How could this happen in a country that developed its water resources for agriculture to such a high extent? The paradox is that this natural resource disaster and its grave humanitarian and ultimately political consequences occurred in a country that had invested for years to develop its water resources for agriculture, and particularly in the north-east, where the crisis was worst. Over the 35 years 1985 –2010, Syria had doubled its irrigated area, from 651,000 hectares in 1985 to 1.35 million hectares in 2010. Of this, about 40 per cent was irrigated by new surface diversions, especially those from the Euphrates as it flows through the north-eastern corner of the country. This surface water development benefited the relatively few farmers who were allocated land on the new schemes. A greater area – 60 per cent of the total – was irrigated by groundwater, as private and public tubewell projects proliferated. Again, these developments benefitted only a segment of the local population, as this was commercial development that required capital and land. It is reported that much of the resource was wasted, with some 80 per cent of groundwater irrigators using flood irrigation. The consequences have been predictable. As with other such developments in the Middle East and North Africa, the country began to deplete its non-renewable water resources. By 2007, Syria was withdrawing 19.2 billion m3 nationwide, against renewable resources of 15.6 billion m3. The impact on the resource was soon clear. In two badly affected areas – Mhardeh in Hama governorate and Khan Shaykhun in Idleb governorate – the groundwater table fell by up to 100 metres 1950–2000. In the aquifers around Damascus, the water table is plummeting at the rate of 6 metres a year or more, and springs have dried up in many areas. Since 1999, the Khabur River has had no perennial flow. Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014) reports that: One of the largest karst springs in the world, the Ras al Ain Springs on the Syrian – Turkish border, has disappeared completely since 2001 following extensive over-extraction in the spring catchment area over the last 50 years. The area of Nebk north of Damascus, which used to be renowned for its vines and wheat fields, has turned to desert following extensive overexploitation of groundwater. Conclusion: water issues and the Syrian crisis It cannot be said that water issues are a direct cause of the Syrian crisis, but the government’s policies and practices to develop the resource in an inequitable and unsustainable way are certainly amongst the indirect causes. In addition, Syria was alone amongst the countries of the region in its failure to deal with the effects of the protracted droughts of recent years. Neighbouring countries,

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including Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, all experienced high levels of rainfall deficit but it was only in Syria that a grave humanitarian crisis occurred, with large scale migration of vulnerable people and massive food insecurity and malnutrition. The government’s general indifference to the social, economic and humanitarian consequences of its policies on water and its failure to protect vulnerable populations against the effects of climatic disaster through adequate social safety nets have without doubt contributed to the loss of confidence and widespread disaffection which have fuelled the Syrian uprising and all that followed.

PART II OPTIONS RESPONSES TO WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER-RELATED CONFLICT, AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Part I of this book looked at the considerable water challenges facing the countries of the region, with a particular focus on issues of scarcity and the influence of climate change. The discussion concentrated on the agriculture sector because throughout the region, agriculture is far and away the biggest user of water, and it is the sector from which most is expected in terms of ‘upping its game’ to produce more income for less water. It is also the sector that tends to be treated as a potential reserve of water that could be tapped to meet increasing demand from other sectors, particularly municipal and industrial use, and to satisfy the growing claims of the region’s ecology. Part I also looked at when things go wrong, drawing a picture of a resource that is constantly leading divergent or competing interests into conflictual situations. The purpose of Part II is therefore to show how these tangled Gordian knots may be cut or untied in the way that is best for the peoples of the region and their economies. Chapter 4 examines questions of governance and incentives in the water sector and suggest options for improving transparency, accountability and management. The chapter discusses water resources management from an integrated perspective, as it should, but with a special eye on the key case of agriculture. Chapter 5 brings the focus fully back to agriculture as the predominant water-using sector, looking at ways of getting ‘more income for less water’ through better water use efficiency and improved crop water productivity. Chapter 6 opens the black box of climate change and suggests what countries – and farmers – might do with no regrets to face up to this protean menace. Chapter 7 then examines the options for managing

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and resolving water conflict and Chapter 8 assesses the scope for using water and natural resources initiatives as part of a structured approach to building the peace so fervently desired in this troubled region. Can water governance move to a higher level of purpose and help not only to build social capital but even to promote peace in the region?

CHAPTER 4 POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING WATER RESOURCES FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The reasons for the focus in this book on agriculture are evident: in an increasingly water scarce region, agriculture uses on average at least four-fifths of each country’s water resources. More than half of the region’s population draw their income or much of it from using this water for farming. However, productivity lags and incomes are consequently low. At the same time, other sectors, particularly the fast-growing towns, are eyeing the resource. Together these facts underline the need for top notch management of the water resource, particularly the part allocated to agriculture, and for the highest efficiency and productivity in the use of this precious resource. This chapter therefore looks at policies and institutions for managing water resources in the region, with a particularly sharp eye on agriculture, while the subsequent Chapter 5 explores in depth the question of how agriculture may make the best possible use of the water that is allocated to it. The present chapter examines the policies and institutions that the countries in the region have put in place to allocate water to agriculture and to manage the agricultural water resource efficiently. The chapter opens with a brisk discussion of how countries have revised their policies and institutions in recent years, and then reviews in turn: overall water governance and institutions; the principles and practice of integrated water management and the basin approach; subsidiarity, decentralization and participation; supply management measures, including new supply options and nonconventional water and tackling groundwater depletion; and, on the demand side, the incentive framework for promoting water use efficiency and water productivity in agriculture.

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Bringing integrated management to bear on agricultural water to promote efficiency With the growing pressures of rising demand, depleting groundwater and climate change shocks to the resource (chapters 1 and 2), it is clear that the countries of the region have to manage their water resources more efficiently, more sustainably and more equitably. Fortunately the tools for this are to hand, and they are in fact already being taken up and applied in the countries of the region. Global best practice: integrated water resources management Over the last thirty years, global best practices in water management have emerged. These practices have been formed from experience. In particular they reflect responses to four inter-related problems that had emerged in previous decades – problems which had been experienced particularly in the water scarce countries of the Middle East and North Africa. First, economic and demographic growth had created a surge in demand for water and led to conditions of scarcity and inequity, competition between sectors and even conflict (see Chapter 3). These conditions were prevalent globally but were particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa. Second, the typical fragmented sectoral approach to water management had led to poor services and unsustainable resource use and had proved unable to cope with rising demand and inter-sectoral competition. Again, these conditions will be perfectly familiar from most of the countries of the region. Third, the topdown water resource management style that dominated in the past – and this was precisely the case of the countries of the region – proved to be unresponsive to the changing needs. Essentially, ‘top-down’ approaches disempowered the populations they were designed to serve. Finally, water was being developed and used piecemeal without understanding that hydrological resources are fundamentally interconnected and need to be addressed holistically, and that the environment has water demands too The new practices that emerged in the 1980s in response to these problems are typically grouped under the title ‘integrated water resources management’ (IWRM). IWRM is defined by the Global Water Partnership (GWP) as ‘a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’. Essentially, this definition brings together the challenges of allocating and managing water in the face of competing demands: agriculture, domestic uses, hydropower, industry and commerce, and the environment. However, at this level of abstraction, it is hard to comprehend meanings. So in practice what is IWRM and what does it bring to the table?

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The goals of IWRM The goals and principles of IWRM were hammered out at the International Conference on Water and the Environment held in Dublin in 1992. IWRM aims to promote changes in practices in order to improve water resource management. To act as an overall framework, Dublin proposed three goals which are already familiar from Chapter 3 – social equity, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. Essentially, this framework is nonnegotiable in the sense that any government or country would undoubtedly accept that these are the valid, appropriate and sufficient goals for the development and management of its water economy. It is in the breakdown of these goals that the real framework for action emerges. The social equity goal, for example, is to ensure equitable access for all users to an adequate quantity and quality of water necessary to sustain human well-being. The goal is undeniable – essentially that water services are available for all, that existing water uses are respected, and that the benefits of development are shared equitably, with a care for the poorest. Under the economic efficiency goal, the aim is to bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number of users with the available financial and water resources. The results targeted are that income per drop should be maximized, and water should be available for its highest value economic use. The environmental sustainability goal is to sustain the ecological services provided by water and to ensure the sustainability of the resource, both in quantity and quality. This entails that the water resource and the broader environment should not be harmed, and that adequate allocation should be made to sustain the functioning of natural ecosystems and their services. The needs of future generations must also be taken into account. Three IWRM principles To translate these goals into a programme of improved water management, Dublin set out three principles for forming IWRM policies and actions. These are the institutional principle, the instrument principle and the ecological principle. Again, these rather opaque and remote concepts require a breakdown to make them understandable. The institutional principle provides for the participation of all stakeholders, for separation of responsibility for water allocation and management from the interests of water users, and for decentralization and management of water at the lowest possible level (‘subsidiarity’). The instrument principle provides for the efficient management of supply and demand through an incentive structure reflecting the value of water to society. The ecological principle provides for integrated, inter-sectoral management, with the basin as the unit of management.

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The goals and principles, once understood, make up an agenda which amounts to common sense – almost self-evident truths. This explains why, since 1992, the goals and principles have been readily adopted and applied across the world, not least in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, most of which have incorporated IWRM into legislation, institutions and practice to varying degrees. The nature of IWRM reforms in the region and the pace of their implementation have naturally been varied, and results have been mixed. Not all principles have made sense in all contexts. It is evident that each country in the region has to decide on the weight it gives to each of the goals and on the relevance and feasibility of applying each of the principles in the national or local context. Clear lessons have emerged – that implementation requires strong political support, and that programmes need to be constantly evaluated and flexibly adapted to success or failure or to the changing context. Implementing IWRM Operationally, IWRM approaches involve integrating disciplines and interests, applying knowledge from various disciplines as well as insights from diverse stakeholders, in order to devise and implement efficient, equitable and sustainable solutions to water resources and water-related development. IWRM can thus act as a comprehensive, participatory planning and implementation toolkit for managing and developing water resources in a way that balances social and economic needs, and that ensures the protection of ecosystems for future generations. Water’s many different uses – for agriculture and industry, for energy, for people and livelihoods, for healthy ecosystems – demand coordinated action. An IWRM approach is consequently cross-sectoral, aiming to be an open, flexible process, and bringing all stakeholders to the table to set policy and make sound, balanced decisions in response to specific water challenges faced. An IWRM approach focuses on four basics, designed to strengthen an integrated, non-fragmented strategy. The first area of focus is getting the enabling environment right – that is, to get the policies and legislation that support IWRM in place. An example would be a water law that provided for integration and decentralisation of water resources management to the basin level. The second priority is to define the roles of institutions needed for the formulation and implementation of IWRM policies and programmes, and to make sure they are in place and equipped for the tasks. Examples might include organizations such as basin agencies and participatory institutions like water user associations. The third area is to ensure the availability of the management instruments required for IWRM – the tools and methods such as basin plans that enable decision-makers to make rational and informed

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choices between alternative actions. The final area of focus, on the principle that ‘you cannot manage what you cannot measure’, is on high quality data and analysis to guide planning and management. This would typically include water resources assessment and monitoring. IWRM in the region In general, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa have embarked on a progressive transition towards IWRM approaches, moving at varying rates and in different fashions away from supply augmentation and direct provision of water services toward a greater focus on water management, decentralization and inclusion. Steps have been undertaken at various paces in different countries to strengthen water management institutions and to apply principles of decentralization and participation. Supply and demand management measures have been used in different ways to manage water scarcity. Several countries have practiced integrated water resources planning anchored at basin level and have worked to improve allocative efficiency and to integrate investment programming. Setting and enforcement of environmental regulations have been strengthened. Climate change has sharpened attention to the need for IWRM approaches.1 The objective of bringing IWRM to bear on agricultural water management is to achieve higher levels of efficiency: allocative efficiency between and within sectors, and water use efficiency and water productivity within agriculture, together with social equity and environmental sustainability. Specifically in the irrigation sector, many countries have moved to improve the efficiency of irrigation through modernization of both infrastructure and institutions. Decentralization and an inclusive approach towards irrigators and the constitution of water user associations have been adopted on a wide scale, together with tariff reform for irrigation. Government agencies responsible for irrigation and drainage planning and investment have been strengthened in many countries.2 These measures have certainly improved efficiency of water use and have increased output and farmer incomes. What remains is to apply these measures across the board in all countries where they still have the potential to bring the intended benefits. The remainder of this chapter looks in more detail at what has been achieved and what are the options for next steps.

Overall water governance and institutions in the Middle East and North Africa Although there is always room for a critique and for improvement, water institutions in the region are comparatively highly rated. Most countries of

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the region have one ministry responsible for water planning and investment programming. Where these ministries have responsibility for large investment budgets – as in Iran, Egypt or Morocco – or for service provision, as in Jordan, they are well-staffed, competent and politically influential. Where they are responsible only for planning and coordination functions, they can be less effective, as is the case in Yemen. In most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, there are water laws which reflect the Dublin IWRM principles of good water management (see above). Overall, one influential study has rated water institutions in the region, taken together, as ‘better on average than in other regions’. However, there are many shortcomings, and the bottom line is that the world’s most water scarce region really has to have not just ‘good enough’ water management institutions, but the best in the world.3 One area where IWRM practice is certainly followed is with the region’s irrigation agencies, which are progressively decentralizing. Past irrigation development in the region was typically the responsibility of central ministries with little decentralization. In Egypt, separate authorities are responsible for irrigation, drainage and groundwater. Historically these organizations adopted a ‘top-down’ engineering approach and favoured capital intensive projects. The influence of global best practice approaches of ‘subsidiarity’ (see above) – essentially the practice of decentralization and participation – has gradually made itself felt. In Egypt, for example, local level irrigation and drainage boards have been established, working with water user organizations on both investment and on management, operations and maintenance (MOM).4 However, the quality of public investment has been variable. Some public investments still show the results of a ‘top-down’ engineer’s approach. In Morocco, for example, coordination of investment planning and financing between government institutions involved in the irrigation and the water sectors has been weak, resulting in a persistent gap between water mobilization capacity through dam storage and the area irrigated downstream. In 2013 there was a gap of 108,000 hectares between the area that could be economically irrigated on a sustainable basis from existing reservoirs and the area actually developed for irrigation, including 21,000 hectares at Loukkos, and 42,000 hectares in the Gharb. A similar imbalance exists in Algeria, where only 8 per cent of the area that could be irrigated with water already stored has been developed for irrigation. In Iran there is a similarly huge gap.5 The pathway to better water governance and institutions is essentially to continue the ongoing transition away from centralized management and capital intensive engineering approaches. Across the region, public agencies will be expected to delegate more and to take on more regulatory and

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monitoring roles. Standards of transparency and accountability for public agencies will rise further. Specific actions for progress could include strengthening accountability and incentives for good performance and for transparency. There is also a case in most countries of the region for strengthening management and execution capacity for implementing legislation and enforcing regulations. A third area would be to take measures to improve the quality of public investment by more participatory and locallevel approaches to investment planning and by improving the quality of economic analysis. Finally, measures could also be taken towards further reduction in the fiscal burden of the irrigation sector and in its dependence on the general budget. These measures might include increased cost sharing and public/private partnerships (PPP) and other mechanisms for moving more towards a business-like relationship between farmers and service providers.6

IWRM and the basin approach As mentioned in the discussion above, the countries of the region have made considerable progress towards applying the principles of integrated water resources management. A key principle of this approach is inter-sectoral management of water integrated at the basin scale, and there have been many initiatives across the region in integrated basin planning. Egypt, for example, has strengthened integrated management of Nile resources within its territory, and has also worked with upstream riparians on planning at the scale of the entire Nile basin. An integrated planning process for the entire Blue Nile/White Nile basin has been undertaken (see Chapter 7 below). Morocco and Algeria have established basin agencies and have associated water stakeholders in basin planning, including civil society. Some basin plans for water resources development and management have been prepared. Next steps in basin planning need to build on this experience. These steps could include the generalization of the basin approach, both within countries and across borders, and further decentralization of decisions on investments and allocations to the basin level. There should also be an increase in accountability by giving more voice to non-state stakeholders.7 There are specific advantages to be drawn from the basin approach for the agricultural sector and for agricultural water management. The basin approach reflects the multiple inter-dependencies of agricultural water within all water sources, uses and users within a basin plan. In practice, the approach underlines the interdependence of agricultural water management with overall water resources management, as well as the social interdependence of agricultural water use with other users and other sectors. It also highlights ecological interdependence as agricultural water use interacts with the

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environment in multiple significant ways. The approach thus integrates agricultural water management with the entire natural resource and socioeconomic context of the basin. The basin approach should also bring the advantage that water allocations are firm within the basin plan. In Morocco, for example, water allocations to irrigation are now confirmed within basin plans, and irrigators can plan on this basis. The results have been encouraging: in one basin, allocations were cut to 60 per cent of previous levels but the assurance of a set quantity and improvements in agricultural water management resulted in higher yields per hectare and higher water productivity. As demand from other sectors grows, institutional mechanisms for orderly transfer of water between uses will become increasingly necessary, and the basin approach has to provide an equitable and efficient framework for considering and implementing these transfers. Historically, agriculture has had far and away the largest share of water (see Chapter 1). Now, as other claims on water increase, agriculture may have to give up water. Where these transfers have been done in a top-down fashion outside of an integrated and equitable framework, they have proved extremely problematic. For example, the transfers of groundwater from the Habir and al-Haima valleys to the southern Yemeni city of Ta’iz in the 1990s led to conflicts that continue to this day, as discussed in Chapter 3. In the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, there is a stealthier transfer from agriculture to municipal uses. The government simply drills deeper and pumps harder than neighbouring farmers. This is seen by the farmers, who are perfectly aware of what is happening as their groundwater is drained off, as no less an infringement of existing agricultural water rights. As demand from other sectors grows, it will be essential to develop transparent and equitable institutional mechanisms for these transfers of water between uses. The basin framework has thus to provide a fair and efficient mechanism for inter-sectoral water transfer. Although this has proved extremely difficult, there are examples in the region where an integrated approach has resulted in fair outcomes. The transfer of water from Jordan Valley agriculture to Amman municipal use in the 1980s and the replacement of that fresh water with treated wastewater from the al-Samra treatment plant created persistent contentions (Chapter 3), but it was done within an orderly governance framework. Vested interests opposed it but ultimately it was seen as fair by almost all.

Subsidiarity, decentralization and participation All across the region, the IWRM agenda of subsidiarity, decentralization and participation has been essayed. One particular example is the development of water user associations which have been introduced in most countries as the

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lowest level of irrigation governance. These associations represent the ‘bottom up’ participatory approach central to the implementation of IWRM’s ‘subsidiarity’ principle. They have been developed in recent years in irrigation schemes across the region. These associations are essentially the modernized equivalent of the ubiquitous community groups which managed water resources in the region since time immemorial. Most countries in the region have helped these water user associations to establish themselves and have provided capacity building support. Their functions have ranged from simple representation of users (for example, as counterparts to a project) up to financing and managing parts of the infrastructure, for example at branch canal level. In Egypt, higher level ‘branch canal water user associations’ represent a number of lower level ‘tertiary associations’ and they manage systems from the district level down, covering not only irrigation and drainage but environmental issues as well. Across the region, where water user associations exist, they are generally responsible at least for tertiary canal management and for collecting and paying over water charges. Although these associations have been in existence for up to twenty years, there has been no general study of the experience in the region to examine how effective they are in improving water management or in reducing the fiscal burden. One partial study that was carried out (see below) found that water user associations were less effective in the Middle East and North Africa than elsewhere in the world, primarily because they were not sufficiently empowered. However, the study and findings were based on a limited sample. After almost two decades of experience, there is scope for stocktaking and the drawing of lessons to date. The IWRM themes of decentralization and community collaboration have also been applied to broader natural resource and environmental management in the region, including to watershed management, groundwater management and conservation of ecosystems and environmental services. The approach of decentralizing decision making to the lowest possible level, encouraging participation of stakeholders, and fostering of local level community or interest groups as primary agents of development and as counterparts to public services has been applied in water management beyond formal irrigation schemes. Applications include, for example, watershedbased soil and water management systems, and conservation of ecosystems and environmental services. Decentralized, community management approaches have also been implemented for the development of collective groundwater management, with notable success in Tunisia.8 There is considerable experience in the region with this kind of bottom-up and integrated approach to natural resource management – but with mixed

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results. Experience in Morocco, for example, showed that there were difficult trade-offs in promoting community natural resource management. A decade of investment in a series of community-driven integrated rural development projects in the 1990s and 2000s (De´veloppement rural integre´ – petits et moyens hydrauliques (DRI-PMH); De´veloppement rural integre´ – mise en valeur des zones bours (DRI-MVB); Projet Oued Lakhdar) gave good results but proved expensive, and the needed cross-sectoral approach was difficult to realize in practice. In the end, the effort was absorbed into a larger community-driven approach – Initiative Nationale du De´veloppement Humain (INDH) – which had the advantage of lower costs and nation-wide scale, but which lost the focus on community natural resource management. Public services need to develop and adapt to this kind of integrated collective approach, which also fits new ways of thinking and approaching natural resource management. The challenge will be for public services to organize themselves cross-sectorally, so that support is forthcoming not only on agriculture, but also on water management, marketing, downstream processing, off farm activities, environment, and so on, as well as human development aspects key to sustaining livelihoods. Bottom-up community organizations gaining support from top-down ‘convergent’ public services and community development funds comprise a key set of capabilities that can achieve substantial impact on rural livelihoods. New ways of thinking and approaching natural resource management such as ‘green agriculture’, ecotourism, and landscape and cultural heritage management require these public/community partnership approaches.9

Acting on the supply-side drivers of scarcity Mobilizing new supplies As mentioned in Chapter 1, there will be increasing demand for irrigation water, but as climate change reduces the available resource (Chapter 2), where would increases in irrigation supply or water to make up for transfer from agriculture to municipal and industrial (M&I) uses come from? FAO have predicted that water withdrawals for irrigation in the region will increase from 287 billion m3 in 1997/9 to 315 billion m3 in 2030 – and this at a time when the general expectation is that agriculture will have to use less water, not more. Most countries are already at – or beyond – the limit for sustainable withdrawal of water. Are there still possibilities of increased impoundment and storage in dams or of more efficient release schedules? Is there scope for increasing supply of non-conventional water to agriculture?10 Although most resources are fully developed, there may be some potential to develop further storage and to optimize releases on existing storage. In many

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countries of the region, suitable major projects have been exhausted, any potential is likely to be high-cost and marginal economically, and under climate change, the reliability and cost-effectiveness of any future storage will decrease. In fact, worldwide, the high cost of large storage dams is usually only justified by hydropower or municipal supply benefits, not by agricultural benefits alone. There is, however, still some limited scope for expansion – Lebanon is an example of a country in the Middle East and North Africa where storage is low by regional standards and where significant further development is planned. There is potential for increased impoundment and storage in dams in Syria and Iran. Some irrigation water could also be added by optimizing release rules on existing dams. Transboundary cooperation on water resources development and management could also increase water available for irrigation. For example, hydropower dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia could provide extra irrigation water for Sudan and Egypt downstream whilst generating an overall increase in net benefits for all three riparians.11 However, the economic and environmental tests for new development will be very hard to pass. Any new storage projects will have to cope with more variable and extreme flows, and are likely to be set in an environmentally more sensitive landscape. Options will need to be flexible and have low capital and operating costs. Local hill dams, water harvesting or on-farm water storage may prove to be the most economic solutions. But all such impoundments require social, economic and environmental assessment of the trade-offs involved. Projects need to be studied within a basin planning framework. In addition, all water storage is likely to suffer increased evaporation due to higher temperatures (see Chapter 2). Further implications of climate change affecting the potential for mobilizing new supplies are discussed in Chapter 6.12 Non-conventional sources of water for agriculture In so water-scarce a region as the Middle East and North Africa, there have been constant reflexions on how to increase water supply by using ‘nonconventional water’ – water not drawn from natural fresh water sources like rainfall or surface or underground fresh water bodies. Non-conventional water includes wastewater (water used already at least once), salty water and agricultural drainage water. Desalinated water is also a non-conventional source, but largely dismissed as a potential source for agriculture as too expensive. Only low-cost technologies like solar powered desalination for high-value greenhouse agriculture, as is practised in Oman, may have some potential at present. Worldwide, only about 60 per cent of water withdrawn is actually consumed, and 40 per cent returns to the hydrological cycle in the form of

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used water. Particularly in the most water-short countries of the region, investment in reuse of treated wastewater and drainage water can offset water scarcity, albeit to a strictly limited extent. Treated wastewater, rich in nutrients, will be increasingly used, especially where scarcity is extreme and demand from peri-urban agriculture is strong. Institutional arrangements for allocation and safe use will be required. Drainage water reuse can be an even more important source for agriculture. There are several examples of good practice on wastewater reuse in the region. Currently, reuse of wastewater accounts for around 2 per cent of total withdrawals for agriculture region-wide – and for over 4 per cent in the Mashreq countries. In the Sultanate of Oman, conventional water resources (including surface and groundwater) represent about 87 per cent of the nation’s water resources, and non-conventional water resources account for 13 per cent. Nonconventional water resources in Oman are desalinated seawater or brackish water and treated wastewater. In 2011, the total volume of treated wastewater was 42 million m3. Up to now, most of the treated wastewater in the capital area has been used for landscaping and public gardens, with any unrequired excess (averaging about 15 per cent of the total) discharged to the sea during winter. Now the Muscat municipal wastewater treatment utility is expanding capacity and wants to sell the extra production to farmers. However, the treated wastewater is relatively high-cost and it is proving difficult to persuade farmers to pay for it, especially when they have access to freshwater resources free of charge.13 FAO has been piloting low cost wastewater treatment and subsequent reuse in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, with either constructed wetlands or a simplified wastewater treatment plant. In Egypt, treated wastewater has been used to irrigate woodlots and has boosted wood production locally over two decades, within a forest management plan. In Morocco, treated wastewater has been used for fertigation (irrigation water delivered complete with balanced nutrients) for the green belt around Marrakech. In Algeria, constructed wetlands were developed to solve the massive problem of wastewater pollution in the wadis. The effluent has irrigated palms and agro-forestry downstream. In Tunisia, reuse is common practice, after tertiary treatment. The large scale return of treated wastewater from the Jordanian highlands to the Valley has been mentioned above.14 However, although there is considerable experience in the region with wastewater reuse, this can only be a modest new source. Overall, although cities and municipal and industrial (M&I) use are growing constantly, it is likely that water that can be economically reused will not exceed 10 per cent of influent because of the high cost of treatment, including removal of heavy

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metals. Location of the resource is also a problem as most effluent arises in coastal cities at the level of the coastline, so that it would have to be pumped back up to agricultural areas. This is the case in Oman, for example, where almost all the population and the effluent arising are on the coastline, whereas the agricultural areas are inland. In addition, in many locations a more workable incentive framework is required to maximize reuse. Treated wastewater is an expensive resource and in many cases it is not economic for farmers to use it unless it were priced at below cost. In some locations, too, there is difficulty in getting farmers to use treated wastewater. Regulation and restrictions on reuse add to costs and limit benefits. Recent experience in both Lebanon and Yemen has been that farmers can be reluctant to switch from using untreated to treated wastewater, because of cost and loss of nutrients. There may also be a socio-cultural reticence about the use of effluent, as appears to be the case in Palestine.15 A further constraint is availability as, in many locations, there has been little investment in wastewater collection and treatment. This not only limits the volumes available for reuse but also has negative environmental impacts. In the Palestinian Territories, for example, despite ambitious plans for wastewater collection, treatment and reuse, there has been little investment in sanitation since Oslo II, and only 31 per cent of West Bank Palestinians are connected to a sewerage network. About one quarter of the 62 MCM of wastewater generated annually in the West Bank is collected in sewage networks, and about two thirds of the sewage collected is treated in the West Bank’s six treatment plants. Some 18 million m3 of raw sewage is being discharged in 350 locations. Israeli settlements are also discharging raw sewage to the environment. The failure to develop wastewater systems is the more damaging because, under Oslo, water supply quantities – and hence wastewater quantities – have gone up. The environment and groundwater quality have been the major victims. By contrast, Israel is widely seen as a world leader in wastewater treatment and reuse. Israel has invested extensively over many years in an integrated water resources diversion, abstraction and conveyance system, with a National Water Carrier that runs the entire length of the country. An extensive wastewater collection, treatment and reuse system conveys treated wastewater along a Red Line. Some of the water is used directly, some is injected into aquifers for later reuse. As a result, Israel achieves an exceptionally high rate of water reuse for irrigation, with half of the agricultural water budget being met by treated wastewater. A further non-conventional resource is represented by salinized and sodic drainage water and groundwater. Salinized and sodic drainage water and groundwater can be reused, although these relatively saline waters pose risks

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due to soil salinization and water quality degradation downstream. A legal and regulatory framework is needed, and programmes have to be assessed at the level of overall basin efficiency and socio-economic benefit. These features characterize successful programmes such as that of Egypt, which reuses over 5 billon m3 of drainage water, 10 per cent of its annual freshwater withdrawals, without deterioration of the salt balance.16 Recent research has also revealed the value of brackish water sources for biosaline agriculture. In research commissioned by IFAD, the International Centre for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA) analysed the potential use of saline and brackish water resources for animal feed production in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The study showed that sufficient saline and brackish water resources exist in the region to irrigate up to 330,000 hectares, findings particularly relevant given the increasing salinization of groundwater.17

Groundwater depletion The groundwater boom has revolutionized agriculture across the Middle East and North Africa. From the 1970s, all countries of the region experienced the arrival of the tube well and motorized pump technology at the same time as internal and export markets for higher value agricultural produce were growing. This happy combination revolutionized the economics of agriculture based on groundwater use and led to rapid growth of private irrigated agriculture and of farm incomes in all countries of the region. The rate of adoption was accelerated by favourable government programmes, including tax-free imports, cheap credit and low cost energy, and by the absence of any regulation of groundwater development. The use of groundwater for supplementary irrigation also boosted rainfed agriculture in many locations. However, many rainfed agricultural economies suffered from unequal competition from the subsidized and more productive irrigated sector. Rainfed agriculture became, in many locations, a rather poor relation. The downside of the successful expansion and undoubted benefits of groundwater-irrigated commercial agriculture is that two negative results of unregulated development have emerged: inequitable access, and rapid depletion and deterioration or destruction of aquifers in many locations. The ‘open access’ nature of the resource and the absence of institutions to regulate development and abstraction led to a free-for-all in which water rights have been appropriated by the more nimble or more powerful, and other related rights have been attenuated – for example, where groundwater abstraction has led to the drying up of springs. At the same time, the common pool nature of the resource has led to a ‘race to the bottom’, as no individual has any

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incentive to conserve the resource, but rather to pump it out before his or her neighbour does. These two results have contributed to conflict (see Chapter 3) and have driven rapid depletion of the resource in many locations. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the drama from one country, Morocco. Figures 4.1 shows all the major aquifers of the country and demonstrates graphically that every single one is overdrawing on the renewable resource, pumping out more than is replenished from rainwater and run-off each year. The rate of overdraft ranges from relatively small to 50 per cent or more. In extreme cases, more than double the recharge volume is being pumped out. It should be noted that the rate of overdraft is 50 per cent or more in the three largest aquifers. The two graphs tell the other side of the story, the plummeting water table. In two of Morocco’s three largest aquifers – Souss and Saiss – the water table has dropped by 70 metres or more in the last decades. As reserves are depleted, wells have to be drilled ever deeper and pumping costs go up. Progressively, pumped yields decline and water quality deteriorates as salts accumulate. At a certain point the geological structure of the aquifer may collapse, and ultimately the aquifer will run completely dry. The challenge is that establishing a governance framework for groundwater is hard, and very hard indeed once unregulated development and abstraction have got out of hand. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have tried to recover state control over groundwater through licencing and regulation systems, but these – as everywhere in the world – have proved extraordinarily difficult to impose. The case of Jordan is amongst the more successful: this combined a military-style licencing and regulation operation with incentives to compliance in the form of permits to sell groundwater to the profitable potable water market. However, even here the situation remains precarious. Attempts in Yemen to reduce over-abstraction simply by raising the price of diesel were not successful, as this led to price rises throughout the economy which provoked considerable civil turmoil. Subsequently, Yemen has registered more success with approaches that decentralize water resources management to local areas and communities and give incentives to greater water use efficiency through subsidies to water-conserving infrastructure (infield pipe distribution, hydrants, pressurized irrigation) and which advise on water management and irrigated cropping. Supply-side measures like aquifer recharge enhancement, rainwater harvesting and urban wastewater reuse increase incentives. However, there are few locations where communities have managed to bring water abstraction back into sustainable balance. Many countries have tried to persuade farmers to reduce abstractions by subsidizing more efficient irrigation, on the logic that farmers would be able to maintain their incomes whilst using less water. However, in the absence of

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Système Gantour Haute Moulouya Aquifère My Driss Zerhoum De Saiss - Aïn Jemaa Essaouira Bahira Occidentale Foums du bani Crétacé Inférieur Bou Sbäa Bou Agba Mejjat annual resource Euronien Bassin De Guercif Haouz - Mejjate Béni Moussa Est (Dir)

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833 million m3 of non-renewable groundwater resources abstracted each year

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Figure 4.1 Morocco – Annual renewable groundwater potential and current withdrawal rates. Source: SNE – Monitor from Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Morocco Country Paper.

Current withdrawal rates from the aquifer (% of the annual renewable potential pumped)

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Figure 4.2 Drop in the water table at Souss (top); drop in the water table at Saiss (bottom). Source: DRPE from Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Morocco Country Paper.

regulation of water quotas, this approach has had limited and often counterproductive – even counter-intuitive – results. This is because of the Jevons paradox, named after the British nineteenth-century economist who argued that, if the use of a resource is made more efficient, people will use more of it as it will be more profitable.

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Although there has been considerable confused discussion about this effect, some regional studies have demonstrated its working empirically. In Oman, for example, studies have shown that modern irrigation can reduce water requirements by almost half. In a study of water use efficiency in Oman’s rich al Batinah agricultural plain, Zekri et al. (2014) found that use of modern irrigation systems can save about 44 per cent of irrigation water over the traditional flood system. So far, so good. However, another study of the same region found that, paradoxically, modern irrigation tended to increase rather than decrease groundwater pumping unless it was coupled with regulation of water abstractions. This study of farms in al Batinah (Al-Said et al., 2007) found that farms equipped with modern irrigation used more water than farms using traditional irrigation. Farmers with modern irrigation grew almost the same vegetable crop area in summer as they did in winter, while farms under furrow irrigation cropped less than 1 per cent of their vegetable cropped area in summer compared to winter. The reason is simple: precision irrigation allowed farmers to produce the summer crop profitably and gave them enough water to do so. The finding of the study was therefore that modern irrigation tends to increase rather than decrease groundwater pumping given the financial incentives to farmers to have an extra harvest during summer. The conclusion of the study was that, if water is to be saved, modern irrigation needs to be coupled with regulation of water abstractions, for example through a metering and quota system. By contrast, where self-regulation has been successfully practised, it has been shown to be effective in reining in groundwater overdraft. In Egypt, for example at Salheia in the East Delta, a local groundwater association established a common management system and invested in a piped network, and now manages the aquifer sustainably.18 Options thus include both top-down and bottom-up approaches – or a blend. Problems and solutions on groundwater depletion are discussed in full in Chapter 5. In practice, options for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa include: a rights and regulation approach; changing the incentive structure to favour conservation and efficiency; decentralizing groundwater resource management to the local level; complementary supplyside measures to increase water availability; support to making water use more profitable, resulting in ‘more income for less drop’; and monitoring, information, education and communications. In most situations, a balanced combination of several items from this menu will be needed.19 There should, however, be no doubt that it can be done. In Israel, for example, a combination of top-down regulation through nationalization of the water resource combined with extraordinary advances in water practices

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have curbed groundwater overdraft. Use of water in agriculture dropped from 8,700 m3 per hectare in 1975 to 5,500 m3 per hectare in 2002, while the value of agricultural output increased twelvefold.20

The incentive framework for promoting water use efficiency and water productivity in agriculture Countries in the region have long recognized the need for demand management in irrigation through adjustment to the incentive structure to encourage water conservation and more efficient use. Policy analysis in recent years has pointed to the role of a distorted incentive structure in promoting over-use and inefficient use of water in irrigation. A recent study21 lists four ‘perverse incentives for excess irrigation’: barriers to imports, domestic price support, subsidized credit and energy subsidies. The study then goes on to document how the irrigation incentive structure in most countries of the region practises all four of these perverse incentives. In fact, all but two countries of the Middle East and North Africa where irrigation is important have incentive structures containing all four of these ‘perverse incentives’. Only Iraq does not set barriers to imports, and only Lebanon does not offer subsidized credit. There are three components of the incentive structure where there has been progress in region, but where there is scope for further steps. These components are irrigation water pricing, the protection of domestic production, and energy subsidies. Irrigation water pricing A best practice principle within IWRM is that water prices should reflect scarcity and opportunity cost. The price of water should reflect not only its production cost but also its value in alternative uses. This would mean, for example, that water that could be switched from agricultural use to satisfy industrial demand should be priced to farmers at the margin at the price that industries are prepared to pay for it. In practice, however, there is nowhere in the region that irrigation water prices are set like this, except in private water markets. In the cases where functioning inter-sectoral water markets exist – for example, the rural-tourban water sales in Yemen or Jordan – this pricing mechanism works automatically, although even here prices do not necessarily reflect resource cost. Outside of these private markets, no government in the region has considered adopting scarcity or opportunity cost for irrigation water pricing, on the grounds that water has been allocated to agriculture and prices should reflect only production costs within that sector. In the case of private irrigation, particularly private groundwater irrigation, this has resulted in

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prices of water considerably below economic levels, notably where water is scarce and/or non-renewable. The result has been the kind of uneconomic and unregulated over-use that is draining the region’s aquifers. Governments in the region have generally sought to recover management, operation and maintenance costs (MOM) and sometimes a share of the capital costs. On publicly managed schemes, governments in the region have concentrated their approach on covering recurrent costs, although in some cases a land betterment charge or a fee to cover costs of rehabilitation has been levied.22 However, even on this measure of cost recovery, there is a shortfall on many irrigation schemes which limits autonomy and may impair services. In a move to restrict demand by charging farmers for each unit (m3) of water that they use, Morocco has, since 1984, operated volumetric tariffs linked to supply costs. Tunisia also operates a volumetric tariff system. In an attempt to improve incentives to use less water and to use it more productively, Jordan introduced in 1996 a ‘step tariff’ system which charged for a basic quantity of water at a low rate and at progressively higher rates for water use above the basic quantity. A lengthy study of the costs of providing irrigation water in the Jordan Valley was conducted to set prices for each step in the tariff schedule so that overall the revenue would cover costs. Yet none of these approaches has yet arrived at full coverage of management, operation and maintenance (MOM) costs and hence no irrigation scheme in the region has achieved the financial autonomy that would come from full coverage of MOM costs by farmers. Either governments continue to subsidize, which reduces the benefits of decentralization and allows central government to continue to dictate, or MOM costs are underfunded. Not recovering costs also limits the scope for private sector participation. The shortfall in cost recovery has reduced the scope for public/private partnership (PPP) in irrigation. Only on the Guerdane perimeter in Morocco has a PPP project become operational in the region – and then only in the circumstances of heavy government capital subsidy and well-off commercial fruit farmers. Protection of domestic production Protection still keeps farm gate prices high in many countries, distorting incentives. In several countries in the region, tariff protection or direct price support to local cereals production encourages the use of water for lower value cereals cultivation. One striking example has been Saudi Arabia, where domestic output of wheat has been purchased by government at three times the import parity price or more. Recognizing the economic cost of this policy, several countries where there are alternative higher value crops that could

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profitably be produced using the same water have reduced or eliminated barriers to cereals imports or phased out price support to cereals in recent years. In addition, the rise of cereals prices globally in recent years has also made domestic production more competitive. Nonetheless, import controls and price supports persist across the region, and phasing them out would improve incentives to water productivity in agriculture.23 Energy subsidies In many countries of the region, cheap energy prices have driven groundwater depletion. Energy subsidies have made it cheaper to pump water, and this has improved the financial profitability both of surface water lift pumping for irrigation and of groundwater abstraction. This has contributed to the decline of non-renewable groundwater reserves in some locations. The most extreme examples are in the Arabian Peninsula where, at current rates of abstraction for agriculture, groundwater in the supply areas of two national capitals (Riyadh and Sana’a) will run out in the next two to three decades at most. Adjusting the entire incentive structure Although there is a pure economic case for adjusting the incentive structure, in practice this usually requires careful balancing of trade-offs. Often the incentive structure is highly complex and comprises elements from not only the agricultural sector and water sector policies but also elements of broader macro policy. In Saudi Arabia, for example, adjustment was required on a number of levers in order to reduce incentives to over-use of water in agriculture and to reallocate water to higher value crops. In Yemen, attempts to reduce groundwater overdraft by simply reducing diesel subsidies led to widespread social protest. The problem was that prices rose in all sectors of the economy, because diesel was a major component of the consumer price structure, largely through its use in transport. In addition, when the price was raised, it tended to increase poverty, as investment in more efficient, water conserving irrigation led to lower labour requirements. These factors are not arguments against adjusting the incentive structure, but just examples of how all effects have to be weighed and trade-offs carefully judged.

CHAPTER 5 WATER USE EFFICIENCY AND CROP WATER PRODUCTIVITY IN AGRICULTURAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Chapter 4 discussed the overall management of water resources, the policies and institutions that guide efficient allocation of water to agriculture, and the incentive framework that motivates farmer behaviour. The present chapter looks at how water service providers and farmers in the region can manage agricultural water for maximum efficiency and productivity. The first section discusses the relevant measures: measures of efficient water service – water use efficiency and irrigation efficiency – and measures of water productivity – physical crop water productivity and economic crop water productivity. The following sections then assess a range of agricultural water management systems and related issues: larger-scale surface irrigation and the challenge of modernizing systems to improve irrigation efficiency and crop water productivity; pressurized irrigation; groundwater irrigation; rainfed agriculture; the challenge of soils and land degradation; and watershed management and drylands agriculture. A final section reviews issues of salinization, waterlogging and drainage and drainage water reuse.

Water use efficiency and water productivity Water use efficiency Water use efficiency (WUE) is generally defined as the proportion of water consumed which ends up being transpired through the plant and thereby contributing to plant growth.1 Sadly there is very little monitoring data available for comparison or benchmarking on how much water is actually

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beneficially consumed in this way. In practice, subsidiary component indicators of water use efficiency which are easier to measure tend to be used, and each has its value. The two most common are: the consumptive fraction (total water consumed through evaporation and evapotranspiration divided by total abstractions); and irrigation efficiency (total water delivered to the farmer divided by total abstractions). Globally, the consumptive fraction in irrigated agriculture averages about 59 per cent. Efficiency can be increased to 70 per cent or beyond, and in the case of protected agriculture or drip to 90 per cent or more. However, in open irrigation, going beyond 70 per cent could lead to salinization and pollution, especially if leaching is ignored. In open channel surface irrigation, irrigation efficiencies of 40 – 50 per cent are usual, but efficiency can reach 70 per cent or more with lined canals, more with closed pipe irrigation. However, low irrigation efficiency does not necessarily mean a low consumptive fraction, as water not transpired by the plant may not be lost through non-beneficial evaporation: it may return to the system as canal seepage or as drainage water and be available for reuse downstream within the basin. In Morocco, an FAO study found that about 35 per cent of water supplied to irrigation was ‘lost’, but of those apparent losses between 22 per cent and 34 per cent were potentially reusable.2 In the typically arid and water scarce countries of the region, the usual objective of irrigation and agricultural water management is to increase water use efficiency to the maximum whilst taking account of the cost of improvement at the margin. Water use efficiency can approach 100 per cent with drip irrigation in greenhouses, but drip irrigation is much more expensive than open field furrow irrigation, in terms of both capital and operating costs. Therefore, the cost per m3 transpired has to be set alongside the water use efficiency as a performance indicator. Improving water use efficiency Water use efficiency can be improved by improving water service to the field through minimized canal losses, by timely delivery to the field of water of the correct quantity and quality, and by making sure that all fields are served, including those at the tail end of canals. Water use efficiency can also be improved by in-field water management, conveying water efficiently to the plant root zone at the right time and in the right quantity and minimizing non-productive evaporation from the field. An FAO study on Morocco (see Table 5.1) found that improved water service and in-field water management could reduce water losses on average by 25 per cent, and by as much as 45 per cent in some cases.3

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Table 5.1 Water savings in Morocco after improvement of network delivery and in-field water management Reduction in losses after improvement

Basin

Current losses (million m3/year)

%

Million m3/year

Oum er Rbia Souss Massa Tensift Sebou Loukkos Moulaya Sud Atlasiques TOTAL

920 306 396 607 92 352 224 2900

30% 30% 5% 30% 45% 30% 13% 25% (average)

276 92 20 182 42 105 29 750

Source: Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Morocco Case Study.

000 hectares

A study on irrigation in Tunisia4 found that the rapid take-up of modern irrigation has given a considerable boost to water use efficiency. Currently (2015) about 374,000 hectares – 77 per cent of the irrigated area – are equipped with modern water-saving technology, including 135,000 hectares under drip (22 per cent), 112,000 hectares under sprinkler (27 per cent), and 98,000 hectares under improved surface irrigation (28 per cent). The spread of drip irrigation has been particularly rapid – see Figure 5.1. The study found that irrigation efficiency – water arriving at the field divided by total abstractions – varied from 60 per cent for older gravity systems to 90 per cent for modern pressurized systems, with a very high nationwide 500 400 Gravity irrigation 300 Localized (drip) 200 Sprinkler 100 Improved surface irrigation 0 1995

1998

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 5.1 Tunisia: Development of water-saving irrigation technology 1995 – 2009. Source: Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Tunisia Country Paper: 6– 7, 33 –5.

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Figure 5.2 Tunisia: Improvements in water conveyance efficiency and in-field efficiency. Source: Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Tunisia Country Paper: 6 –7, 33 –5.

average of 80 per cent – see Figure 5.2. This compares with a nationwide average of 60 per cent twenty years ago – a huge improvement in irrigation efficiency. In-field efficiency averaged 72 per cent (in 2012), up from 61 per cent in 1995. The range was from 50–60 per cent for traditional gravity irrigation to 80–90 per cent for localized irrigation. These two measures give an idea of the overall increase in efficiency – the bottom line in Figure 5.2. In 1995, on average only 38 per cent of water abstracted was being used beneficially by the plant. By 2012, this had rocketed up by nearly half to 55 per cent. These hugely improved efficiencies are reflected in reduced average water consumption for different crops. Consumption for tomatoes, for example, dropped from 7,275 m3/ha in 1995 to 6,100 m3/ha in 2014, and for potatoes from 4,763 m3/ha to 4,075 m3/ha. Crop water productivity and how to improve it Crop water productivity (CWP) is defined here as the production per unit of water transpired or ‘crop per drop’. The simplest measure is kg/m3 transpired ( physical CWP) but a more meaningful measure is net income per unit of water transpired ($/m3 or economic CWP). Although teledetection now makes transpiration measurements readily available, more rough and ready measures like production per unit of water delivered to the farm still give a good idea of what is going on. Crop water productivity can be improved by soil, crop and water management at all stages of the production process. Land preparation techniques can improve soil moisture conservation through zero or minimum tillage. The choice of crop and variety can provide increased yield per unit of water

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consumed, or crops or varieties may be selected simply because they are less ‘thirsty’ and consume less water. Soil and water management prior to and during production can promote soil fertility and reduce salinity. Deficit, supplemental or precision irrigation can ensure that just the right amount of water is taken up by the plant roots at just the right time, and good irrigation water management can ensure that just the right quantity of water is delivered to reduce stress at critical moments in crop growth. Nutrient management can boost yields per unit of water consumed. Nonproductive evaporation can be minimized by mulching, by enhancing soil infiltration and storage properties, or by enhancing canopy cover. Other ways to reduce non-productive evaporation include the use of subsurface drip irrigation, and cropping calendar choices such as matching the planting and growing calendar with periods of less evaporative demand. Husbandry techniques like weed management reduce non-beneficial evapotranspiration, and pest management will boost yields per m3 of water consumed. Harvest and post-harvest management are often forgotten components of crop water productivity, but in many situations they can be the biggest contributor. In Oman, for example, some 35 per cent of fruit and vegetables harvested are lost through poor post-harvest practices, equivalent to a reduction of one third in effective yield and income, and an equivalent of a one third reduction in crop water productivity.5 Table 5.2 gives a very simple picture of how, as an example, switching to drip irrigation can greatly increase physical crop water productivity. The numerator goes up by 29– 50 per cent and the denominator goes down by as much as 47 per cent, and so physical crop water productivity increases by between 46 per cent and 145 per cent. Again, the costs of inputs and husbandry in relation to benefits at the margin are relevant, as well as the calculation of risk. A very high input crop may not yield the highest financial return to water. It might, therefore, have a high physical crop water productivity but a lower economic crop water productivity. Table 5.2 in India Crop Potatoes Sugar cane Tomatoes

Water productivity gains from switching from surface to drip irrigation Increase in yield (%)

Decline in water supplied (%)

Increase in water physical CWP (%)

þ 46% þ 29% þ 50%

0 2 47% 2 39%

þ 46% þ 143% þ 145%

Source: Adapted from IWMI 2007: 296, Table 7.4.

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Although growing conditions and farming systems vary enormously across the region, available information suggests that there is scope for some improvements in crop water productivity in almost all production situations. Table 5.3, based on global ranges, shows that physical crop water productivity varies between and within locations and systems by factors of from 2 to 10, and economic crop water productivity varies by factors of from 2 to 8. The table also shows that there is a huge variation between crops in water productivity, with cereals and legumes providing relatively much lower economic water productivity than vegetables and fruits. In the Middle East and North Africa region, there is potential for improvements in both physical and economic crop water productivity but, in order to assess this scope, some benchmarking is needed. Limited work has been done on this, but what there is discussed later in this chapter. In general, in so water scarce a region, physical crop water productivity is already quite high but with scope for improvement, particularly in progressive conversion to pressurized irrigation and protected agriculture, which would improve both water use efficiency and physical crop water productivity. Switching to higher value crops is also a first-rate means of improving economic crop water productivity. Although Table 5.3 provides only global benchmarks for the range of possibilities found across all farming systems and levels of intensification and in both irrigated and rainfed conditions, the benchmarks are nonetheless useful for the Middle East and North Africa. The upper bound in each case represents the level of water productivity that can realistically be obtained in the region under best practice physical, technical and economic conditions. Table 5.3 Crop Wheat Rice Maize Lentils Faba beans Potatoes Tomatoes Onions Olives Dates

Physical and economic crop water productivity ranges for selected crops Assumed price per kg (US cents/kg) 20 31 11 30 30 10 15 10 100 200

Physical CWP (kg/m3)

Economic CWP (US cents/m3)

0.20– 1.20 0.15– 1.60 0.30– 2.00 0.30– 1.00 0.30– 0.80 3.00– 7.00 5.00– 20.00 3.00– 10.00 1.00– 3.00 0.40– 0.80

4 – 30 5 – 18 3 – 22 9 – 30 9 – 24 30 – 70 75 – 300 30 – 100 100 – 300 80 – 160

Source: based on IWMI 2007: 292, Table 7.3.

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Entry points for further increasing water use efficiency and water productivity in the region Overall, water use efficiency and crop water productivity are relatively high in the Middle East and North Africa, as expected in so arid a region. However, as discussed above, there is nonetheless scope in most countries for improvement, particularly in progressive conversion to pressurized irrigation and protected agriculture, in switching to higher value crops, and in improving all aspects of irrigation and of land, crop and water management. There is also a key role for technology development to increase productivity. Plant breeding and biotech can develop planting material to increase the harvest index and strengthen drought and pest resistance, or to allow earlier planting or maturing or extend the growing period, and so. There is also scope for research on water management and on integrated land/ crop/water management. In order to assess the scope for improving efficiency and productivity in the region, benchmarking is also needed. A regional approach to this research and benchmarking is highly desirable, with a partnership of international, regional and national agencies working on a combination of basic research, applied and adaptive research, and farming systems research, together with benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation.

Surface irrigation: increasing water use efficiency and closing the yield gap through modernization The region has practised surface irrigation for more than five millennia, and constant improvements have made irrigated agriculture highly productive. The populations of the region pioneered irrigation even before history began, and the region’s earliest civilizations were founded on the people’s skill in harnessing water for productive agriculture. Improvements in technology and management have been continuous since then, and today irrigated production in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa can boost yields per hectare by up to four times compared to rainfed production. In one study on a 100,000-hectare scheme in Morocco, irrigated yields for wheat, faba beans and sugar beet were more than twice as high as rainfed yields – and four times as high in the case of maize (see Table 5.4). The case for irrigated cultivation is technically very strong. The main constraints are water availability and economic viability. This section discusses ways in which irrigation efficiency and crop water productivity can be improved on the region’s larger surface irrigation systems. These account for some 20 million hectares, 85 per cent of the total irrigated area. Hence improvements on these larger schemes would have a considerable impact on production and incomes.

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Table 5.4 Irrigated v. rainfed yields measured at Morocco’s Doukkala irrigation scheme 2010/11

Wheat (winter) Faba beans (winter) Sugar beet (winter) Maize (summer)

Area on which measured (hectares)

Average irrigated yield measured (t/ha)

Average rainfed yield measured (t/ha)

78,700 17,500 7,100 6,700 110,000

3.87 3.96 51.94 4.71

1.75 1.67 23.26 1.10

Irrigated/ rainfed 2.2 2.4 2.2 4.3

times times times times

Source: WaterWatch 2011.

Comparing the performance of irrigation in the region with global performance Recent benchmarking studies show that schemes in the Middle East and North Africa are relatively efficient overall at delivering a timely, quality water service.6 In these studies, FAO worked with country teams to measure performance on seven irrigation schemes in the region and to compare that performance with a sample of fifty schemes in other regions of the world. The schemes included both surface water diversion schemes and groundwaterbased schemes, and included both pumped and gravity fed systems. Scheme size varied from 362 hectares to 96,000 hectares. Overall, results were comparable across all types and sizes of scheme. The regional schemes examined were: Morocco Doukkala; Jordan Valley; Syria Monshahat; Egypt Mit Yazid; Iran Dez; Tunisia Ain Bou Marra; and Lebanon Dardara. The studies found that irrigation infrastructure and operating systems in the region generally compare favourably with those elsewhere. All schemes in the region were rated generally good on these two criteria, and ‘far better than those found elsewhere’. Unsurprisingly, modernized schemes were found to do better, although it took time for modernization improvements to bring tangible results – at the Iran Dez scheme, for example, all parameters improved after modernization but only gradually over a ten year period. Water delivery service was also rated higher in the region than elsewhere at all levels of the system. The studies found that, measured against criteria of flexibility, reliability, equity and control/flow, water delivery service at all levels of the systems was more efficient in the region than elsewhere. At lower levels (lowest level operated by a paid employee, and at the individual farmer level), performance was somewhat less strong, a fall off attributed to loss of control and lack of flow measurement.

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In addition to specific factors, other factors found to affect performance included the overall governance in the country, scheme management and staff competence. The studies found that a good governance environment and strong scheme management made a big difference. Staff quality and development were also key factors in levels of staff productivity, which were more than 50 per cent higher in the region than globally. With average staffing density for canal systems of 165 ha/staffer; and for pressurized systems of 68 ha/staffer, schemes in the region were well below comparator staffing densities. On these results, schemes in the Middle East and North Africa are certainly not bloated, as has often been claimed. The studies found that the generally good water service in the region translated into yields/ha and yields/m3 well above global averages. Land productivity on the schemes was found to be high compared to irrigation systems in other regions. The studies found that the median value of production for the regional schemes was $4,071/ha against a global median of $1,400/ha. Analysis showed that the reason was that production systems in the Middle East and North Africa are more intensive and a higher proportion of high value cash crops is grown. Regional schemes are thus achieving high land productivity. Physical crop water productivity was found to be at the high end of the global range. For specific crops, physical crop water productivity (kg/m3) on one scheme in Morocco compared well with the global average – see Table 5.5. Physical crop water productivity per unit of irrigation water was above the top end of the global range for wheat and faba beans, and for maize towards the higher end of the global range. The results suggest that schemes in the region are relatively water-efficient, with the corollary that further gains will be harder to attain. However, there were considerable variations found within schemes and between schemes, suggesting potential for improvement. This view is strengthened by the existence of a considerable yield gap (see below). One Table 5.5

Physical crop water productivity measured at Doukkala 2010/11 Average physical CWP Average measured: all physical CWP Area on water, including measured: which rainwater irrigation measured (kg/m3) water (kg/m3)8 (hectares)

Wheat (winter) Faba beans (winter) Sugar beet (winter) Maize (summer)

78,700 17,500 7,100 6,700

0.93 1.08 14.20 1.18

Source: WaterWatch 2011; global range from Table in 5.1.

1.29 1.47 20.17 1.44

Global range CWP 0.20– 1.20 0.30– 0.80 n.a. 0.30– 2.00

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follow up action recommended by the studies was to assess the potential for improvement by identifying why areas with lower productivity occur and what improvements could close the gaps in yield and water productivity.7 Economic crop water productivity was found to be much higher than on schemes in other regions, but there is still scope for further increases. With a median value of $0.47/m3 compared to $0.087 for schemes in other regions, economic crop water productivity in the Middle East and North Africa was found in the studies to average five times that on schemes in other regions. At $0.85/m3, pressurized systems in the region achieved almost twice the regional median for all forms of irrigation – and ten times the average elsewhere in the world. Comparing these figures for economic crop water productivity with the global ranges in Table 5.3 earlier in this chapter, regional performance is certainly at the higher end – but with some global comparators returning well in excess of $1.00/m3, there should be scope for further increases. There is a wide variation between schemes in the region, particularly in overall irrigation efficiency, where the most water-scarce schemes are the most efficient. The studies found an inverse correlation between the depth of water applied and water productivity, with the most water abundant schemes having the lowest return per m3. Similarly, the more water abundant schemes have lower overall irrigation efficiency.9 There is also wide variation in performance amongst farmers on the same scheme and a considerable ‘yield gap’. A large scale study of an area of 110,000 ha (80 per cent irrigated) at Doukkala in Morocco showed considerable yield gaps – see Table 5.6. Average yields were well above the national average for wheat (more than double) and maize (more than four times the national average), but there were nonetheless yield gaps under irrigated conditions of between 2 per cent and 44 per cent, depending on the crop. These yield gaps represent the difference between average yields and the maximum attainable yields as measured by the best actual yields recorded in the study area. There was a wide variation of yields around the average. Could improved agricultural water management help to close the yield gap? Given that farmers, soils, planting material and crop husbandry are broadly similar throughout the Doukkala study area, most of the yield gap could be explained by differences in how farmers manage water. Certainly the findings suggest that, even in a fairly intensive production system, there are many farmers who could greatly improve their productivity and close the yield gap. The gap might be closed through improved water management, for example through improved quality of water service to the field, and through better in-field water management, including conversion to pressurized irrigation.10

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Table 5.6

Yield gap measured at Doukkala 2010/11

Wheat (winter) Faba beans (winter) Sugar beet (winter) Maize (summer)

Area on which measured (hectares)

Average yield measured t/ha

Max attainable yield t/ha*

Average yield gap %

National average yields

78,700 17,500 7,100 6,700

3.41 3.68 47.78 3.99

6.47 5.70 98.37 7.18

33% 23% 29% 44%

1.49 n.a. 52.19 0.69

Source: WaterWatch. National average yields from WaterWatch: 82. *98 percentile value measured.

There is thus scope to improve economic crop water productivity (more $ for less drop). Ways to achieve this could include not only actions to improve system level efficiency through infrastructure modernization and investment in software and staff11 but also in-field water management and agronomic choices and levels of husbandry. Strengthening control and measurement at lower levels through use of measurement devices and strengthening the quality of staff, particularly at lower levels, could improve service considerably. Emerging constraints and opportunities: water user associations There are three areas where improvement in efficiency and productivity might be achieved through further modernisation of irrigation institutions and practices: the potential and performance of water user associations; the water and energy nexus; and financing and cost recovery. For each of these areas of possible improvement there are, however, trade-offs to be considered. All across the region, water user associations (WUAs) have developed as the lowest level of irrigation governance, taking on tasks ranging from simple representation right up to management at branch canal level – see the section Subsidiarity, decentralization and participation in Chapter 4. Water user associations have potential to improve the efficiency of agricultural water management, and they have performed well on this in many locations. However, water user associations have been found to be weaker in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa than in other regions. In the cross-country benchmarking studies discussed above, although the region’s water user associations were correctly found to have been established and to be functioning, they were perceived as under-performing, largely because they were not empowered in water distribution and members considered that they had little influence over real-time water deliveries.12

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Irrigation managers and professionals are unanimous that empowered water user associations have an important role to play in improving water service and in cost recovery. However, despite this knowledge and good practice and intentions, reasons for under-performance are still poorly understood. One set of factors is clearly socio-political. Where, for example, there is no social cohesion in a group of irrigators, or where there is a power imbalance between larger farmers and poor farmers, or between upstreamers and downstreamers, water user associations may not perform so well. The pathway would be to strengthen the capacity of water user associations in the region and to empower them so that they are better able to influence outcomes. There is some good experience along these lines in the region. The basic conditions for a water user association to work are well known – legal framework and mandate, empowerment with responsibility, capacity building – and there are some region-specific lessons emerging – for example that larger associations with paid employees tend to work better.13 Further study is indicated, to examine how to make water user associations more effective in improving water management and reducing fiscal burden. Issues will vary by country, and each country needs to conduct a contextspecific assessment and to formulate its own action plan. Emerging constraints and opportunities: the nexus of energy and agricultural water management Cross-country benchmarking studies reveal high energy consumption on nearly all schemes in the sample. Energy costs in surface irrigation are particularly high on pressurized or lift schemes, and this makes for high operation and maintenance costs. Investments to raise irrigation efficiency may thus not always be cost-effective as energy prices rise. On some schemes, the studies found that overall irrigation efficiency was relatively low, and this resulted in even higher relative energy costs/m3 as substantial quantities of water were being lifted only to go to non-beneficial uses. Here a solution would be to work to improve overall irrigation efficiencies (see Table 5.7). However, this is a scheme-specific challenge and not necessarily energyreducing – for example, in cases where excess water would have to be pumped back up. In the case of pressurized schemes, or pressurized farms within schemes – for example, where farmers store water in their own basins and pump the water under pressure from there to the field – the farming becomes even more energy-intensive. With the slump in energy prices experienced in 2015/16, attention to these issues temporarily slackened. However, as energy prices return towards trend in the medium to longer term, the irrigation/energy nexus is likely to become a key area for trade-offs,

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Table 5.7

Raising overall system efficiency

System

Estimated overall irrigation efficiency Possible improvements

Iran Dez

30%

Syria Monshahat Egypt Mit Yazid

40% 48%

Lebanon Dardara

50%

Tunisia Ain Bou Marra Morocco Doukkala

67% 75%

Jordan Valley

100%

Large savings can be made at both canal and field level Could reuse outflows downstream but this would require pumping, with consequent energy cost. Water supply is double the design requirements. Hence, irrigation efficiency is already at its maximum. Eliminate water losses along the canal. Improve field water application techniques. Fully piped and pressurized system. No action.

Source: CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 29, Table 18.

with water use efficiency becoming less financially attractive when energy prices rise.14 Emerging constraints and opportunities: financing operations and recovering costs from farmers As discussed in Chapter 4, scheme management, operation and maintenance are often not adequately financed, and farmer contributions are frequently too low. One key finding from the cross-country benchmarking studies discussed above was that recovery of the costs of scheme management, operation and maintenance (MOM), although considerably increased in recent years, was still everywhere short of what would be required to cover the costs of these services. In no scheme studied were management, operation and maintenance costs fully financed, and in no scheme did farmers cover 100 per cent of these costs, even though farm incomes were high enough for farmers to afford to pay (see below). This resulted in lack of budget for the management, operation and maintenance costs, and also in a less accountable scheme service. Even after years of study that show that full financing of management, operation and maintenance (MOM) costs by farmers increases autonomy and accountability and improves scheme

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performance, and even after legion bruising political battles, cost recovery on irrigation schemes in the region remains too low to finance scheme operations, leading to sub-standard performance. Full cost-recovery for MOM would allow schemes to be free of subsidy and hence empower farmers to play a full role in determining their programmes and to hold management accountable. Yet in general, irrigation farmers’ incomes in the region are relatively high because of the higher value cash crops grown, and incomes should allow farmers to pay full management, operation and maintenance costs. With median value of production from irrigation schemes in the region at $4,071/ha (against a global median of $1,400/ha), MOM costs generally represent 10 per cent or less of production revenue. Table 5.8 shows the potential on selected regional schemes. Planning for irrigation modernization Measures to improve performance on irrigation schemes are often packaged under the heading ‘modernization’. Modernization packages integrate physical, economic, institutional and agronomic improvements and comprise both hardware and software. Each scheme is different and work is required at the scheme level to define modernization objectives and to draw up modernization programmes. Integrated rather than single solution approaches are needed, incorporating physical improvements to the delivery system, along with economic, institutional and agronomic improvements. Given the region’s existing high levels of efficiency and in the light of experience with modernization to date, a modernization package for a regional scheme would typically target three objectives: first, raising water use efficiency; second, improving water productivity; and third, ensuring high levels of user participation.15 Measures to raise water use efficiency would target improvements in the flexibility, equity and reliability of water delivery services. This could include infrastructure investments, for example, in gates and control structures, lining of canals, and construction of interceptor canals and reservoirs. Investments in modern information and control systems like SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, a system for remote monitoring and control – would also likely be important. If implemented in conjunction with satellite monitoring of soil moisture, these systems would permit matching of irrigation water deliveries to actual crop water demand. They can also monitor actual deliveries to farms and compare with target deliveries, and allow sharing of data with farmers. This would ensure equitable and predictable service, and ultimately permit a volumetric tariff schedule. At the management level, rotational delivery schedules might be introduced, with variable intervals rather than a fixed rotation. On piped

$46 (MOM) $129 (MOM þ rehab and modernization) $96

$572 (with rehab costs) $236 (O&M) $392

$144

Annual MOM cost/ha

2%

1% 3%

$92/ha

n.a.

$78/ha

O&M cost is reasonable Full cost recovery is affordable

O&M cost is reasonable Full cost recovery is affordable O&M cost is reasonable (pressurized system) Full cost recovery is affordable. O&M cost is high as 80% is for energy. Nearby groundwater farmers pay pumping costs of $485/ha. O&M cost is very reasonable. Full cost recovery is affordable.

$0.044/m3

6% 10%

Potential for full cost recovery of MOM

Current cost recovery

$179/ha

$0.065 (dry year) $0.047 (normal year)

Cost/m3

14%

4%

Cost as % of gross farm incomes (assuming $4,000/ha)

Cost recovery on selected schemes: actual and potential

Source: CIHEAM/FAO 2013.

Iran Dez

Egypt Mit Yazid

Syria Monshahat

Morocco Doukkala Jordan Valley

Scheme

Table 5.8

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systems, schedules could even allow higher-frequency deliveries on demand, which would be well adapted to the needs of sprinkler or drip irrigation. Improvements in water productivity could be attained by encouraging investments in improved irrigation technology and improvements in on-farm water management. Investments in crop intensification and diversification and improvements in crop husbandry could also be encouraged. User participation in modernization strategy and system management and moves towards full cost-sharing would strengthen farmer ownership and increase mutual accountabilities. The aim of greater user involvement would be to achieve improved system performance, service-oriented management and financial self-sufficiency. Measures would naturally give pride of place to the development of effective, empowered and self-sufficient water user associations at different levels in the system that could take part in water distribution and influence the quality of water service. Full costsharing would allow the scheme to be free of subsidy and hence empower farmers to play a full role in determining its future.16 Elements for an action plan All schemes differ and modernization measures need to be identified at scheme level. One methodology available to guide the design of a modernization programme is the MASSCOTE tool. Mapping Systems and Services for Canal Operation Techniques (MASSCOTE) was developed by FAO from the rapid assessment and benchmarking tools elaborated by Burt and Styles in 1999 (FAO/IPTRID/World Bank). The tool can provide a complete evaluation of external and internal performance indicators and help with design of practical modernization programmes. MASSCOTE helps planners to organize project development through an iterative process in a sequence. The first set of steps maps and describes system characteristics, the water context and the actors who affect management. At this stage, five steps are designed to collect baseline information, comprising a rapid assessment of current performance, an assessment of the capacity and sensitivity of the system, an analysis of perturbations, assessment of the hierarchy of the infrastructure networks and the water balance, and mapping of the costs of management, operations and maintenance. In the second set of steps, manageable sub-units are defined and a strategy for service and operation of each unit is devised. Steps include the mapping and economic analysis of services to be provided to users, division of the system into discrete management units, assessment of the resources, opportunities and demand for improvements, and identification of the options for improvement of each management unit.

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The final stage integrates the strategies from the management unit level, aggregating and consolidating the operating strategy at the main system level. The two steps are integration of the preferred options at system level, and finalization of a modernization strategy, a capacity building plan, and M&E arrangements. Specific modules have also been incorporated in MASSCOTE to allow analysis of specialized systems. These modules include one for lift irrigation systems (MASSLIS); MASSMUS for use where there are multiple uses of water in the command area; MASSFISH, where fisheries are associated with irrigation; and MASSPRESS for pressurized irrigation systems Applying MASSCOTE in the region MASSCOTE was applied to selected irrigation systems in seven countries of the region 2007–12. FAO and CIHEAM-MAI Bari worked with local teams, typically involving about 20 local engineers and staff over a period of two weeks per scheme. The MASCOTTE tool helped to identify eight sets of investments, beginning with upgrading of physical infrastructure to improve water services and irrigation efficiency. A second set of investments aimed to improve measurement, control and monitoring of system operation and of irrigation delivery services, including installation of measurement devices and development of procedures for service monitoring, water accounting and volumetric tariffs. Accountable contracting for water service, with special reference to flexibility and equity, was a third area of investment. Fourth were measures targeting establishment or strengthening of empowered water user associations, which had the objective of endowing the associations with powers to influence water distribution scheduling and the quality of water service, and with responsibility for covering management, operation and maintenance costs. Next came capacity building for managers, operators, user associations and farmers, through the whole chain from diversion of water at the scheme headworks down to field application. Sixth in these sets of measures were programmes to help increase water use efficiency to convey water to the plant roots more efficiently, including moving to pressurized and drip irrigation where this was economically feasible. Measures to improve yields per m3 of water consumed were seventh in the list. This was to be achieved through provision of irrigation advisory and extension services to farmers and other means to improve irrigation water management and crop husbandry by managing cropping patterns, farming practices, input costs and marketing to increase incomes and employment per m3 consumed. The last step was to introduce systematic periodic benchmarking.17

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There has been success region-wide and globally with MASSCOTE. It has been applied not only to conventional gravity schemes but also to lift and pressurized systems and to multi-functional schemes. MASSCOTE can be applied to both large and small schemes. There is demand from within the region for further application of MASSCOTE, and there are proposals to develop regional centres of excellence that can help countries and schemes to apply it. Already, Tunisia has proposed to adopt MASCOTTE as its standard methodology for evaluating any pumped system.

Pressurized irrigation and high value agriculture Pressurized and micro-irrigation – drip and sprinkler – is being adopted worldwide, and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are global leaders in this. Currently, about 1 per cent of the worldwide irrigated area is under drip, and about 4 per cent under sprinkler. Development has been much faster in the very dry and water-scarce countries of the Middle East and North Africa, where about 6 per cent of the irrigated area (1.4 million hectares) is under drip and about 7 per cent (1.7 million hectares) is under sprinkler – see Table 5.9. The 1.4 million hectares of drip irrigation in the countries of the region represent more than a quarter of the global total of 5.2 million hectares. In the region, Iran (420,000 hectares) and Egypt (220,000 hectares) are the largest drip irrigators, and Saudi Arabia (720,000 hectares) and Iran (280,000 hectares) are the largest sprinkler irrigators. Two-thirds of Jordan’s irrigated area has been converted to pressurized irrigation. There are many advantages to drip and sprinkler irrigation. Drip is often used in greenhouse agriculture but also in open field irrigation for vegetables (often with plastic tunnels) and for tree crops. Drip irrigation increases water use efficiency to as high as 90 – 100 per cent, as little or no water is lost either to seepage and percolation or to non-beneficial evaporation. Drip also increases water productivity as it allows a shift to higher value crops. It allows savings on inputs (for example, through fertigation, where fertiliser is applied mixed in with the dripped irrigation water) and on labour, as numerous workers are not required to open and close gates, and so on. In Yemen, conversion of open channels to pressurized hydrants allowed farmers to reduce labour inputs by half. It also does not require the land levelling that conventional irrigation does, and allows cultivation of lower quality lands, including hilly, sandy and rocky lands.18 One country which has seen rapid adoption of drip irrigation technology for high value crops is Jordan. Water shortage in the Jordan Valley is extreme,

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Table 5.9

Pressurized irrigation in the Middle East and North Africa

Drip

Sprinkler

Drip irrigation: about 1.4 million hectares across the region, 6 per cent of the total irrigated area, with five regional countries having more than 100,000 hectares equipped: † Iran: 420,000 hectares † Egypt: 221,000 hectares † UAE: 195,000 hectares † Saudi: 198,000 hectares † Syria: 111,000 hectares

Sprinkler irrigation: about 1.7 million hectares across the region, 7 per cent of the total irrigated area, with five countries having more than 100,000 hectares equipped: † Saudi: 716,000 hectares † Iran: 280,000 hectares † Egypt: 172,000 hectares † Syria: 187,000 hectares † Morocco: 152,000 hectares

Source: Aquastat.

and demand management measures have long been practised, including irrigation water quotas and a step tariff that penalizes excess water use. However, farmers also have profitable market outlets for high-value fruit and vegetables. As a result, about two-thirds of the farmers in the Valley shifted from surface to drip irrigation over a ten year period. Farmers have constructed on-farm storage reservoirs to provide the on-demand water availability required for drip irrigation.19 Recent studies have shown that pressurized irrigation can lead to significant positive results, saving water and increasing returns/m3. Pressurized irrigation allows diversification of cropping patterns away from lower value cereals and fodders to higher value horticultural and industrial crops. It allows for more intensive land use, including more double cropping in summer. Overall water consumption can be reduced by 30 – 50 per cent, and water productivity can increase greatly: research in Asia shows physical crop water productivity increasing by more than 100 per cent, as yields went up and water use went down: more crop for less drop (see Table 5.2 earlier in this chapter). However, pressurized irrigation also leads to higher levels of cost and risk and to vulnerability to energy prices. Depending on the system, capital costs can be very high, as much as $5,000/ha and more. The operation and maintenance costs are also high, particularly energy costs. Pressurized irrigation requires a readily available water source. It is best suited to groundwater, which is reliable and clean (and so does not clog the emitters on drip systems). Using pressurized irrigation where water is being supplied by canals on a scheme is more problematic, as water may not be available when required. As in the Jordan Valley case discussed above, many farmers

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have overcome this constraint by constructing on-farm water storage. The relatively hi-tech pressurized systems require skills to get the best out of them, and they require a supply chain for equipment, parts and maintenance. Perhaps most importantly, the investment will only pay good returns if there are profitable ready markets for higher value produce. Overall, pressurized irrigation, in the conditions of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, is a first rate technical solution, but with a measure of risk as its profitability is dependent on the existence of profitable market outlets. Options for future development Interventions may be needed to reduce barriers to entry. The entry cost to pressurized irrigation is typically high, so that adoption is constrained, and poorer people are excluded. Options may be to encourage the development of lower cost technology, particularly where market failures are keeping prices high. This was the case in India where non-market subsidies were keeping prices artificially high and slowing down innovation and adoption of drip technology. Drip and sprinkler technologies had been aggressively promoted in the country since the mid-1980s; yet, after two decades, the area under pressurized irrigation was only 60,000 hectares. A big part of the problem turned out to be subsidies that, instead of stimulating the adoption of these technologies, actually stifled their market. Subsidies were directed at branded, quality-assured systems, and in the process had not allowed viable, demand-responsive solutions to mature. Subsidies were channelled through the big irrigation equipment companies. Their equipment typically cost $1,750/ha, which put it out of reach of most farmers – apart from the few, better-off farmers who managed to access the subsidy programmes. Fortunately, a grey market of unbranded products began to offer drip systems at $350/ha. Then, one innovative manufacturer introduced a new product labelled ‘Pepsi’ – basically a disposable drip irrigation system consisting of a lateral with holes. At $90/ha, Pepsi cost a fraction of all other systems and adoption was rapid.20 Entry costs can also be reduced by programmes to improve the efficiency of the supply chain, for example, training of stockists. Programmes to make credit available through hire purchase, leasing or micro-finance may help. Capital cost sharing, possibly targeted to poorer farmers, may also be an option: Morocco’s Plan Vert, for example, provides a 50 per cent cost sharing on adoption of pressurized irrigation. This has helped small farmers convert to drip on Morocco’s Doukkala scheme. The scheme, which covers an enormous 96,000 hectares, is experiencing water shortages, and has received in recent years only 50 – 60 per cent of the designed supply. To eke out the reduced

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quantity of water, larger farmers introduced drip irrigation on 2,500 hectares. Smaller farmers were excluded as they could not afford it. Government therefore implemented a project (2009– 10) to test the conditions under which drip irrigation could be adopted profitably by smaller farmers. The approach was to group farmers with a total of about 40 hectares of land-holding around a storage basin and to train and accompany these farmers in the installation and operation of drip irrigation. The management agency for the scheme (ORMVAD) contracted to supply a specific quantity of water at set intervals. The approach was tested and evaluated on four pilot sites, with technical options adapted to each. Results on the positive side were, first and foremost, diversification of cropping patterns away from lower-value cereals and fodders to higher-value horticultural and industrial crops and a more intensive land use, including more double cropping in summer thanks to water stored in the storage basin. The switch resulted in a reduction in water consumption by 30 – 50 per cent but also in increased returns per unit of water. Gross margins per unit of water amounted to . DH 8/m3 (equivalent to $1.00/m3), compared to the average for the whole scheme of DH 5/m3 (equivalent to $0.57/m3). One site was getting even higher returns of DH 13/m3 ($1.50/m3) for tomatoes and DH 18/m3 ($2.07/m3) for sugar beet. On the institutional side, the switch empowered the local water user associations. The associations were well organized and were motivated to prompt payment of water charges, as water supply was conditional on this. The switch was not, however, without its difficulties. In farmers’ eyes the negative side was the increase in water charges, with the charge for water more than doubling, to DH 0.7/m3 ($0.08/m3) from DH 0.3/m3 ($0.03/m3). This extra cost was largely due to the higher costs for the extra use of energy – DH 0.32/m3 ($0.04/m3) – which represented half of the total cost. Overall, the variable costs were different between sites and better water management could reduce them. Including the cost of equipment, the cost of water came to an average DH 1.28/m3 ($0.19/m3). This experience in Morocco is now being generalized across other major schemes. It has clearly proved possible to help small farmers convert from open channel irrigation to pressurized irrigation provided that a package of technical and marketing support is offered. In view of the high capital costs, some cost sharing is essential. In this case, Plan Maroc Vert gave 50 per cent capital subsidies. Institutionally, an important lesson is that the irrigation agency ORMVAD – previously seen as a top down, dirigiste organization – showed itself well capable of reorienting its services towards groups and basins, and was able to ensure reliable water services. The experience also showed that the technology is quite demanding, and that,

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consequently, introduction of pressurized irrigation has to be in close collaboration with farmers, with good follow-up and technical training and advice. The strengthening and empowerment of water user associations was also important here.21 Interventions may also be needed to ensure profitable market outlets. For pressurized irrigation to be viable, there must be access to profitable markets. Moving to higher input agriculture, farmers face increased market risk and there may be scope for developing market risk management instruments – price information, promoting increased competition among buyers, promotion of cooperative marketing institutions, storage to allow sales to be spaced out, outgrowers contracting, and so on. Research may develop packages that can help farmers manage risk. Cropping patterns must balance profit and risk management. For example, on one scheme in Morocco, farmers converted to drip irrigation and opted to grow sugar beet because they could get advances on inputs and a sure price. However, as they needed cash in the house to live on and with the beet they had to wait until after delivery to get their money, they also grew fodder which had a lower return but which could provide a regular short term income. If higher value crops with assured market outlets and regular cash flow had been available, farmers’ returns and economic value added would have been higher.22 A further set of issues requiring risk management stems from climate change – on which see the analysis of risks in Chapter 2 and the discussion of responses in Chapter 6.

Sustainable groundwater irrigation Policy and institutional issues of groundwater and groundwater depletion were discussed in Chapter 4 – see the section Groundwater depletion. The present section discusses groundwater from the viewpoint of farmers and from the perspective of groundwater irrigated farming and looks at experience with strategies to improve the sustainability of groundwater resources. Eight of the world’s top twenty groundwater irrigating countries are in the region. Over 11 per cent of the world’s groundwater-irrigated area is in eight countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and these eight countries figure on the list of the world’s ‘top twenty’ users of groundwater for irrigation – see Table 5.10. Iran has a massive 3.6 million hectares under groundwater irrigation, more than 5 per cent of the global groundwater irrigated area. Groundwater irrigation accounts for 50 per cent of Iran’s irrigated area and 21 per cent of its total cultivated area. In Saudi Arabia, 1.5 million hectares are cultivated using groundwater. In six of the eight

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Table 5.10 Eight of the world’s top twenty groundwater irrigating countries are in the Middle East and North Africa Region

Country Iran Saudi Arabia Syria Libya Morocco Yemen Egypt Algeria

Area under groundwater irrigation (‘000s hectares)

Share of global groundwater irrigated area

Share of irrigated area

Share of total cultivated area

3,639 1,538 610 464 430 383 361 352

5.3% 2.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%

50% 96% 60% 99% 29% 80% 11% 62%

21% 40% 11% 22% 5% 23% 11% 4%

Source: Adapted from IWMI 2007: 401, Table 10.2.

countries, groundwater is the predominant source of irrigation water, even in Iran, which also has considerable surface water resources. The advantages of groundwater As sketched out in Chapter 4, there are many reasons why groundwater development and abstraction have proved very popular with farmers throughout the region, as they have worldwide. It is an ‘open access’ resource that farmers can typically appropriate simply by drilling a well on their own land. Once developed, groundwater offers full water control – it can essentially be turned on and off like a tap. It is generally managed as an individual resource, through a well on the farmer’s own land. The farmer is sovereign in his or her decisions about use, and there is no need for messy collective management arrangements. It is typically a high quality source of water, suitable for irrigating without restrictions. It adapts readily to pressurized irrigation and is ideal for the demands of high value cropping. It is easy to convey, through flexible hoses, and does not require heavy fixed investment in canals or high annual maintenance. It also has multiple uses in addition to agriculture and can readily be conveyed to other points of use – domestic, home garden, and so on.23 Groundwater also plays a key buffer role in maintaining optimal soil moisture during dry spells, and this role will grow with increasing climatic variability (see Chapter 6). Groundwater productivity can be improved by conjunctive use and, as discussed above, by adopting precision techniques such as drip irrigation, combined with agronomic measures such as fertigation and protected greenhouse agriculture.

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The problems of groundwater The principal problem with groundwater is the obverse of the ‘open access’ characteristic. As discussed in Chapter 4 in the section on Groundwater depletion, this characteristic has led to competitive over-pumping, mining of non-renewable resources, deterioration of water quality, saline intrusion, and in some locations collapse of the geological formation and sinking of the land.24 The rest of this section explores how two neighbouring but very different countries in the Arabian peninsula – Saudi Arabia and Yemen – are facing up to the groundwater challenge in agriculture, and then looks at options for future groundwater management. Groundwater in Saudi Arabia Although Saudi Arabia is blessed with very extensive reserves of nonrenewable groundwater, groundwater depletion is threatening the nation’s future. The reason is that the nation is using four times as much water as is replenished. At present, Saudi Arabia is depleting its non-renewable resources by about 12 billion m3 each year. If nothing changes, it is likely that the rate of depletion would increase to 13 billion m3, with the result that this precious resource will be effectively exhausted within two to three generations – sooner around major population centres. Municipal water supply targets can be met from desalination and long distance water transfer – but only at very high economic, fiscal and environmental cost. In the Riyadh supply area, groundwater will be exhausted within 30 years. Even before reaching this final point of exhaustion of the aquifers around the nation’s capital, there will be a continuous deterioration in the quality and in the economic and technical conditions for exploiting the resource: more and more wells will be drilled ever deeper and ever more distant from waterusing centres to squeeze out water of continually worsening quality and at spiralling cost. Almost entirely dependent on mining of the fossil water resource, the country’s important agriculture sector is not sustainable. Agricultural depletion of the aquifers has slowed down recently, but the sector still accounts for 85 per cent of the unsustainable rate of drawdown. The effects of depletion already threaten the future of agricultural production in many locations. Yet the use of most agricultural water produces little or no benefit for the nation. More than half of the water used in agriculture actually produces a negative social benefit, reducing GDP. The financial resources invested to produce wheat, for example, exceed the financial returns from the sale of the wheat produced, even without counting any cost for the nonrenewable fossil groundwater used in the production of the wheat. In 2010,

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more than half of the annual abstraction of the nation’s non-renewable water capital (8 billion m3) was used to produce a reduction in GDP of 0.1 per cent. The nation has been alerted to the risks and there is now planning for an agricultural transformation, with a national consensus forming around a clear strategy for reducing dependence on non-renewable groundwater. The future of both agriculture and of the water resource requires a plan for transformation of agriculture into a highly water-efficient industry, coupled with a plan for sustainable water resources management. Strategic options are available under which the overdraft of non-renewable resources could be held at 5 billion m3 – increasing the life of the resource to more than 200 years. Under these options, irrigation would have to live within a leaner water budget. However, if efficiencies of water use in agriculture are raised across the board, as is perfectly feasible technically and economically, agricultural GDP, employment and incomes could remain at least at current levels. An agricultural transformation strategy could, in fact, reduce agricultural water use over time from 12 billion m3 to as little as the targeted 5 billion m3 whilst protecting – or even enhancing – farm incomes, employment and GDP if – and only if – the water quota of 5 billion m3 were used for crops for which Saudi Arabia has a comparative advantage. This agricultural transformation would need to be accompanied by a clear plan for returning groundwater extraction to sustainable levels, and by an engagement from the government to back up the plan with stable water allocations to agriculture and needed investment and safety nets for small farmers. This strategy could produce two beneficial outcomes: a sustainable, profitable agricultural sector, and conservation and optimal use of precious, non-renewable groundwater. Following intensive policy analysis supported by FAO, Saudi Arabia is already adjusting a number of levers in order to reduce incentives to over-use of water in agriculture and to reallocate water to higher-value crops – see Table 5.11. The result is expected to be water conservation, improved allocative efficiency, and improved water use efficiency and water productivity. Groundwater boom and bust in Yemen 25 An even more challenging case of groundwater depletion is Yemen, which is fast drawing down its reserves but which lacks the financial resources of the richer states to move progressively to a less water-dependent economy or to develop new non-conventional sources such as desalination. Agriculture consumes more than 90 per cent of Yemen’s water and is the source of much prosperity for those who have had access to sufficient land and water. Agriculture is also the source of Yemen’s chronic water problems, particularly of the very rapid depletion of the nation’s non-renewable groundwater. The rapid growth of markets and demand for higher-value

Ongoing. Major new programme starting up. Started in 1996. Ongoing reduction in public purchases at support prices. Vegetable export ban started in 2012.

Promoting water-saving irrigation and developing efficient agricultural practices. Phasing out support for cereals production.

Phasing in a ban on export of vegetables grown in the open field. Removing tariffs on agricultural imports. Direct regulation of groundwater use by halting well drilling, plugging unlicensed wells and imposing metering and tariffs. Suspending new land development. Developing a national groundwater management programme.

Source: Author’s compilation.

Status

Measures

No systematic monitoring data, but improvements likely. Cereals area declined by 65 per cent 1995 –2010, groundwater use in agriculture dropped by 40 per cent.

Impact

No wells developed in new areas. Water resource assessment and well Capacity for management is being built, inventory almost compete. No groundwater but there has been no impact on groundwater management plan or regulation yet. over-abstraction to date.

Most have been removed. So far applied only for industrial supply wells.

Saudi Arabia’s plan for transformation to a more sustainable agriculture

Table 5.11

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products, including the locally appreciated soft drug qat, and the explosive spread of tubewell technology and profitable groundwater irrigation have driven growth and employment in agriculture. Now, however, productivity is stagnating and groundwater availability is fast declining. A second transformation is needed, focussed on boosting productivity and conserving water. Agricultural water management faces critical challenges. Traditional water harvesting is widely uneconomic, and springs have largely dried up. Large spate schemes under government management have suffered from the pervasive fiscal crisis. Groundwater irrigation is in full transition from boom to bust. A national programme to build small hill dams has generally brought little benefit and at high cost. As water scarcity grows, qat stands out more and more as the most profitable solution. Public programmes have been successful in introducing piped groundwater conveyance and distribution, albeit at the cost of high subsidies. Programmes have been less successful in promoting pressurized irrigation, with basin and furrow irrigation remaining the predominant forms of irrigation. Coverage of improved irrigation technologies remains limited, and there is little spontaneous adoption by farmers. Without an institutional framework to regulate abstractions, it is not even clear that ‘saved’ water really is saved and not just used elsewhere. The rationale for public subsidy looks questionable, as most of it goes to the better off to enhance a private good. Reforms in irrigation in Yemen to improve efficiency and sustainability essentially aim at two related goals: to sustain (or even improve) farmer incomes whilst reducing groundwater use – not just more income per drop but more income for less drop. Yemen’s water strategy is striving towards these twin goals through three means. The first is to try to introduce changes in the incentive structure, particularly increases in the price of energy, so that farmers have a motive to pursue water use efficiency and groundwater conservation. The second means is to spread knowledge through research and extension about technology that can bring more crop for less drop, and to empower farmers to adopt it through the creation of farmer associations, subsidized provision of inputs, and so on. The third approach is to promote development of an institutional structure that will allow farmers to understand the challenge of groundwater depletion and to take collective action to control it. The main thrust here is to encourage the adaptation or development of local water management associations to regulate local abstractions and make water use more efficient. So far, results are mixed – government’s periodic adjustment of the energy price has reduced incentives to groundwater use but costs have fallen mainly

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on the poor and have driven up prices throughout the economy. The knowledge agenda is lagging. Water user associations formed at the behest of projects are proliferating, with variable results – from empty shells set up to garner subsidies to associations that look capable of taking collective action on water resources management. The best hope now is to build from the bottom up on the many initiatives of communities for managing their own groundwater resources, in partnership with public agencies. It is clear that in the Yemeni situation, state-led water governance is weak and decision-making over water is generally decentralized to the level of the micro-catchment, the local community and the household. In practice, many communities have become well aware of the need for collective action, and there are many examples of communities organizing themselves to reassert control over their local water resources and to manage them for sustainability. In some cases, these initiatives have benefitted from public support for information, monitoring and investment. The challenge is to catalyse the replication of this bottom-up partnership approach across all areas of the country. The travails that have beset Yemen in recent years obscure the steps to be taken towards improved groundwater governance. But surely when the situation is stabilized, groundwater governance will have to be rebuilt from the local level up. Options for future groundwater management Groundwater has proved a bountiful resource which has revolutionized agriculture and the lives of farmers in many locations in the region. Future development pathways need to promote higher levels of productivity, coupled with sustainability of groundwater quantity and quality and with equitable access. Essentially, four sets of measures can contribute to opening up these future pathways: technical measures, economic measures, institutional measures and social measures. Technical measures can include ever more efficient and water-saving technology, especially pressurized and localized irrigation and protected agriculture, changes to higher value or more water efficient crops and improvements in water management, farming and post-harvest value added activities. Complementary supply-side measures such as recharge infrastructure to increase water availability may be available. Economic measures could address the incentive framework which influences the revenue side (e.g., trade policy) and the cost side – the cost of pumping (e.g., energy policy) and the cost of technological upgrading (e.g., tariffs on equipment, cost sharing programmes like those in Saudi Arabia and Morocco). Institutional measures set the governance and regulatory framework, which in high governance countries may

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comprise the application of laws (as in Jordan); or – in lower governance environments – the decentralization of resource management on a partnership basis to the local level (as in Yemen). Social measures can help, through targeted programmes, to remove barriers to entry or improvement for those with difficult access (e.g., the poor, women). One option that is being explored in several countries of the region is to reduce the costs of pumping by using alternative sources of energy. Oman, for example, has reviewed potential renewable resources – hydropower, solar energy, biogas, wind energy, geothermal – and found that the most feasible options for adoption in agriculture are solar and wind energy. Oman has one of the highest solar densities in the world (solar insolation between 4.5 and 6.1 kWh/m2 per day, corresponding to 1,640 to 2,200 kWh per year), while there is significant wind energy potential in coastal areas in the south and in the Dhofar mountains. These two sources could be developed as off-grid power generation sources at the local level – individual farms or groups of farms – everywhere in the country. Next steps would be research and development and the formulation of a renewable energy policy and programmes. As the introduction of low cost energy would increase incentives to groundwater use, its introduction would need to be matched with measures to regulate abstractions.26 There are, however, formidable challenges to sustainability of groundwater use. Country programmes to improve sustainability have to recognize that establishing a governance framework for groundwater is exceptionally hard once the resource has been fully developed. This is true whether top-down or bottom-up approaches are selected – or a blend. In practice, options for countries in the region to manage groundwater demand are few, and their feasibility depends very much on the local context and on the stage of development of the resource. In one or two higher governance countries, for example Oman, a rights and regulation approach may be a workable approach. In all countries of the region, governments can adjust the macroeconomic levers to change the incentive structure to favour conservation and efficiency. However, the levers most easily adjusted, like energy prices, have effects throughout the economy, and even within irrigated agriculture there may be perverse unintended consequences of inequity and unemployment. The most attractive approach is to decentralize groundwater resource management to the local level, supported by monitoring, information, education and communications. However, this requires a leap of faith by governments – essentially to surrender power in order to gain users’ ownership of the solution. Governments in the region have in the past proved reluctant to decentralize in this way. The approach also requires intensive local level support.

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Rainfed agriculture Across the region, the three farming systems that are wholly or predominantly rainfed – Highland mixed, Rainfed mixed, and Dryland mixed (see the section on Climate and farming systems in Chapter 1) support almost two-thirds of farming households (62 per cent). The main rainfed crops are cereals, legumes and tree crops. Cereals predominate, covering two-thirds of the rainfed cultivated area. In most situations, cropping is integrated with livestock keeping. Incomes are generally low and poverty is prevalent in many communities dependent largely on rainfed agriculture. Raising the productivity of these systems, including through improved water management, would have a significant impact on reducing poverty. However, rainfed agriculture in the region faces multiple constraints. Although varying greatly by location, most rainfed systems in the Middle East and North Africa are up against considerable natural resource challenges. The principal constraints are the generally low and variable water availability in this largely arid region; and environmental and soil problems of salinity, temperature and lack of nutrients. Although technological change has occurred, there has never been a Green Revolution for rainfed agriculture anywhere in the world, and the availability of technical solutions to the region’s farmers is limited. Risks are prevalent – notably climatic and hydrological risk, including drought and floods – and these risks are being intensified by climate change risks (see chapters 2 and 6). There is also considerable market risk, as well as land and water tenure risk. Farming strategies are understandably characterized by risk aversion and low levels of investment.27 A number of possibilities for improved productivity and risk management in the region’s rainfed agriculture are known. These possibilities include: soil moisture management; rainwater harvesting; supplementary irrigation; managing crop water risk by choosing the right crops and varieties; soil fertility; and integrated soil, crop and water management. The more attractive and low-risk of these options are discussed in the following paragraphs. Soil moisture management Given the scanty moisture available, productivity of water use is key. It can be improved by a combination of soil moisture management and choice of crops and varieties. In dry areas, soil moisture conservation techniques – tillage and mulching practices, inter-cropping and shade planting – can reduce nonbeneficial evaporation and make more moisture available to the plant roots, so improving water use efficiency. These techniques can be combined with the adoption of more drought tolerant or shorter-cycle varieties and (where

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Figure 5.3 Furrow-enhanced rainwater (runoff) harvesting, Syria. Source: F. Turkelboom.

available) with supplementary irrigation. All these measures can boost crop water productivity, contributing to ‘more income per drop’. Rainwater harvesting Farmers may also use rainwater harvesting techniques to increase soil moisture. Rainwater harvesting techniques have been practised since time immemorial in the rainfed systems of the region. The terrace systems of the Yemeni and Omani highlands, for example, are legendary, and some date back at least 3,000 years. Rainwater harvesting captures run off from a managed catchment area and reserves it either in a storage area or in the soil profile. Technologies range from simple in-field structures diverting water to a planting pit, through structures in the catchment which divert run off to storage or run-on fields, to permanent terraces or to dams. With its long history of practising agriculture in arid and semi-arid conditions, the region is, in fact, home to some of the global best practices in in-situ water harvesting. One technology concentrates run-off on individual plants or trees, allowing cropping in areas of just 120–30 mm rainfall. In the Muwaqqar area of Jordan, for example, where rainfall averages only 125 mm

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and droughts are frequent, almond trees planted in small basins (negarim) have been growing and producing crops for more than two decades. In the Mehasseh area of the Syrian steppes, where rainfall averages only 120 mm, shrubs planted in micro catchments have a survival rate of 90 per cent. At Matruh in Egypt, with rainfall averaging 130 mm, small water harvesting basins with catchments of just 200 m2 support olive trees. In the same area of North West Egypt, rainwater harvested from greenhouse roofs provides half the water for vegetables grown inside the greenhouse.28 Rainwater harvesting can boost yields by two to three times over conventional rainfed agriculture, especially when combined with improved varieties and minimum tillage methods that conserve water. Several of the CGIAR centres, particularly ICARDA, are researching issues of rainwater harvesting, and related issues of drought-tolerant and water-efficient germplasm and agronomic management for dryland conditions.29 Supplementary irrigation Supplementary irrigation provides a ‘just in time’ source of water in rainfed systems. Even in areas with adequate rainfall, there is always risk of delayed or poorly spaced rains, and also of drought and floods. Unpredictable rainfall may translate into delayed planting, with negative impact on yields. At the limit, if planting is delayed by more than a few weeks, crops may fail to mature. There may be crop failure or reduced yields. In addition, unpredictable rainfall may lead to drought spells during the growing season, contributing to yield losses. These risks can be managed if supplementary irrigation is available. Supplementary irrigation provides famers with a range of risk management options. Sourced typically from water harvesting or from wells or springs, it can provide a ‘just in time’ increase in moisture available to the plant to avoid water stress and maintain optimal growth. For example, the impact of delayed rains can be offset by using supplementary irrigation early in the season. Farmers can also use supplementary irrigation to bridge any unexpected drought spells during the growing season, and to extend the growing season into the autumn. Supplementary irrigation is thus a first class riskmanagement instrument for rainfed cropping. Where more than one source is available, conjunctive management of rainfall and surface and groundwater irrigation provides even better risk management. Crop water risk may also be managed by choosing the right crops and varieties. Faced with risks of unpredictable rainfall, farmers may use droughttolerant or shorter cycle crops, or change their cropping calendar. For example, the impact of delayed rains could be offset by growing shorter cycle crops or varieties. Farmers may simply adjust to early season rainfall deficits by switching to fast-growing crops, such as maize, that can be planted later.

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Soil fertility Soil fertility is key to productivity in rainfed agriculture. Most of the soils of the region are generally low in natural fertility and are likely to suffer further depletion through erosion and decline in organic matter (see below). Low fertility and poor soil composition reduce the water retention capacity and impede water and nutrient uptake, reducing crop water productivity. For soils that are naturally poor in nutrients, maintaining and enhancing soil texture and fertility will improve crop water productivity. A wide range of soil conservation measures is available. Soil fertility can be restored through integrated soil fertility management, including manuring and crop rotations. Inclusion of nitrogen-fixing legumes in the rotation improves the nutrient balance in the soil. Farmers may seek to further diversify their mixed farming systems with crop rotation, intercropping and agroforestry. This diversity will reduce risks and also allow restoration of soil nutrients. Chemical fertilizers can also play a role. To conserve moisture and prevent erosion through run off, farmers may also combine structural measures like terraces with vegetative or agronomic measures.30 Integrated soil, crop and water management Farmers can adapt and adopt any of the above techniques, and they will certainly blend them into an integrated approach to soil, crop and water management which will optimize productivity and obtain the highest income with manageable risk. Table 5.12 shows the choices that farmers can make and combine to improve water use efficiency and overall crop water productivity. What next? Given the importance of rainfed farming to agricultural production, rural incomes and poverty reduction, there needs to be a full focus on technology and institutions for improved productivity in rainfed farming systems. Possible next steps to help improve productivity and incomes include a focus on rainfed in the basin and watershed context, promotion of research and innovation, strengthening of land tenure, integrated development programmes for rainfed areas, monitoring of climate change trends and perhaps introduction of innovative sources of financing, such as Payment for Environmental Services (PES, on which see below). The most significant of the possible next steps are discussed in the following paragraphs. Watershed management programmes (see below) focus on rainfed in the basin and watershed context, integrating upstream resource management with downstream management of water quantity and quality. This approach offers a unique opportunity to combine rainfed agriculture improvement with poverty reduction and sustainable natural resource management. The watershed

Integrated soil, crop and water management

Source: adapted from IWMI 2007: 331, Table 8.3.

Improve water productivity by increasing productivity per unit of water consumed Increase proportion of evapotranspiration (ET) flowing as productive transpiration and so obtain ‘more crop per drop’

Mitigate dry spells, protect springs, extend growing season, enable off-season irrigation Reduce non-productive evaporation

Water harvesting

Evaporation management

Concentrate rainfall around crop roots Maximize rainwater infiltration

Soil and water conservation

Improve water use efficiency by increasing water available to the plant roots

Purpose

AWM strategy

Dry planting, mulching, conservation agriculture, inter-cropping, windbreaks, agroforestry, early plant vigour, vegetative bunds Increase plant water uptake capacity through conservation agriculture, dry planting (early), improved crop varieties, optimum crop spacing, soil fertility management, optimum crop rotation, intercropping, pest control, organic matter management

Terracing, contour cultivation, conservation agriculture, dead furrows, staggered trenches Surface dams, subsurface tanks, farm ponds, diversion and recharging structures

Planting pits

Techniques

Agricultural water management (AWM) strategies and techniques for improving rainfed productivity

Aim

Table 5.12

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management approach in Morocco’s Oued Lakhdar (see below) provides an example at a pilot scale of how this can be effected, building on bottom-up community-based approaches and technological and institutional innovation.31 An important boost to rainfed productivity could be given by promoting research, innovation and ‘adaptive adoption’. This can be a fruitful two-way process, with research bringing new elements and local indigenous knowledge feeding back into the system. In this way, knowledge development and sharing become an iterative process between local people and technical staff and researchers. Part of the research could comprise joint monitoring of climate change trends and the development of adaptive strategies and investment programmes at the local and regional level. Institutional adaptation needs to accompany technological innovation. Some of this institutional adaptation can occur spontaneously at the local level, for example farmer organization for better catchment management, collaborative approaches to spate, spring or groundwater management, or community management of pasture. Some adaptation and adoption requires partnerships with public agencies – research and technology transfer, adjudication and regulation of land and water rights, decentralization of management of common assets or public goods such as water, forest and rangeland, resource management at the watershed scale, or payments for environmental services to compensate for externalities. This research and development and institutional adaptation can feed into integrated development programmes for rainfed areas. These programmes typically incorporate both cropping and livestock with research, technology development and transfer; farming services such as extension and strengthening of input and product marketing chains; rural finance; and rural infrastructure development, particularly farm to market roads and water infrastructure. Programmes need to be matched to local conditions. They might, for example, help to strengthen land tenure jointly with local people through land consolidation, land tenure confirmation, and co-management arrangements for common or state land (typically forests or rangeland).

Watershed management and water management in the region’s drylands Watershed management Watershed management is the integrated use of land, vegetation and water in a particular drainage area. Watershed management programmes typically target land and water management in the upper catchments of river basins in order to improve both upstream livelihoods and the quantity and quality of water resources downstream. Programmes are usually planned at the basin

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or sub-basin scale and have twin inter-related objectives. The first objective is to improve water resources quantity and quality in the basin by increasing infiltration, reducing floods and erosion, enhancing orderly runoff and stream flows and minimizing damage to water quality. The second related objective is to improve land and water management and farming practices in the upper catchment to the benefit of the inhabitants and of natural resource sustainability. Typically programmes have been conceived within some structured land and water management plan or basin plan, and have often had downstream goals such as reducing siltation of reservoirs or enhancing water for downstream uses, such as municipal water use. Watershed management interventions typically have also had povertyreducing objectives because of the links between resource depletion in the upper catchment and poverty. The challenge has been to find packages that achieve the downstream objective and are also profitable enough to make it worthwhile for upstream farmers to sustain the practices adopted and assets created. After a false start with a top down, engineering approach in the 1970s and 1980s, approaches to watershed management from the 1990s emphasized farming systems and demand-driven approaches implemented at the decentralized level. Although these approaches were attractive in terms of poverty reduction and ‘putting people first’, they were confronted by two dilemmas. The first dilemma was whether packages could be found that achieved the soil and water conservation objectives in the upper catchment that were also attractive enough for farmers to adopt them and – more importantly – to sustain them once outside support ended. The second dilemma was whether the combination of investments adopted by the demand-driven approach would actually achieve the downstream objectives of improving hydrological services and reducing negative externalities.32 Experience globally has been mixed. Projects have generally succeeded in improving livelihoods upstream, but downstream results are questionable – and the approach is costly to replicate. A 2008 review of 15 years of experience of watershed management projects concluded that projects had been by and large successful in the upper catchments in improving integrated management of land and water, in improving local people’s incomes and in laying the ground for sustainability of the conservation actions. However, little evidence could be found that the downstream objectives had been met, although this was in part due to the lack of proper baseline and monitoring.33 The challenge of matching community expectations and programme objectives is illustrated by an experience in one country in the region, Morocco, where problems of erosion and siltation have been particularly

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acute, threatening half the area of watersheds in the country. The Morocco Lakhdar Project was developed to test in one watershed the feasibility of a broad national watershed management approach aimed at the twin objectives of improving livelihoods in the poor upland areas through a communitydriven development approach, and reducing the rate of siltation of Morocco’s important reservoir system. A menu of intensification and conservation measures was offered to the communities. Initially communities opted entirely for the intensification components, particularly for irrigation improvement. A balanced programme had to be negotiated, with the financial allocations to the intensification measures capped and with agreement from the communities that they would implement the conservation measures – but only in the latter years of the project. In the event, many of the conservation measures – terracing, check dams, fruit tree planting – were designed to be economically attractive, so that by the end of the project some degree of sustainable momentum for the conservation measures could be detected. At the broader scale, however, there was no monitoring that could demonstrate an impact on downstream objectives. The Lakhdar project did not lead into a generalized watershed management approach either in the Oued Lakhdar or in the country as a whole. It was essentially a successful community-driven development pilot project which proved too costly and demanding to replicate on any scale. Although a wide range of interventions is practised in watershed management programmes, five components are most typically found, which combine objectives of conservation, natural resource use and livelihoods improvement. These components are: increasing water availability through water harvesting and storage; crop production; rangeland management; the planting of both fruit and fuel trees; and diversification into off-farm and downstream value-added activities. The lessons of experience are thus that watershed management programmes work well when they adopt participatory approaches and balance intensification and conservation. More sustainable results come where there are conservation techniques that are also profitable for farmers, and where participatory approaches are used that create ownership amongst the local community. Current best practice in watershed management approaches therefore emphasizes watershed management as part of local socio-economic development processes, involving all stakeholders in design and implementation. Programme design is typically demand-driven, with built-in flexibility and with a long term planning horizon and long term financing. Community institutions are typically mobilized to take the lead in programming and implementation, with official agencies and projects

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playing a subsidiary and facilitating role. Programmes therefore typically support social capital building and institution building to deal with questions of access, tenure and social conflict. Constant action-research is a hallmark of a good programme – to find out what works, and particularly what contributes to both the upstream and the downstream objectives, and what is likely to prove sustainable. An essential but very challenging aspect is to define the upstreamdownstream linkages and to make sure that the local actions implemented contribute to the targeted basin-level outcomes. A baseline and targets for the downstream parameters need to be established, and monitoring set up to measure outcomes against targets – a typically neglected component of watershed management programmes.34 Payment for Environmental Services (PES) One approach to aligning incentives between upstream and downstream interests that has been used with some success elsewhere in the world and which could be piloted in the Middle East and North Africa is the approach of payment for environmental services (PES). Under this approach, downstream beneficiaries value the services they receive from the upstream and contract with the population upstream to remunerate them for maintaining or enhancing those services. A typical example is a downstream water utility which contracts with upstream farmers and pays them to reduce erosion, enhance run-off and not to allow nitrates and chemicals to enter the streamflow. This approach has the advantages of efficiency, sustainability and an automatic self-financing mechanism. It is efficient because it conserves only what is considered worth conserving from the economic standpoint. It can make differentiated payments according to the degree to which services are provided. Sustainability is built in because PES generally requires that service providers be paid indefinitely for the services they provide. This requires that service users be satisfied that they are receiving the services they are paying for. Hence, sustainability depends on an objectively verifiable quality of service. It has an automatic self-financing mechanism because the downstream beneficiary pays, so the system generates its own funding without requiring government budgetary outlays. However, there are strict limits to the feasibility of the system. Because PES has to be based on valuation of services provided by upstream management interventions, it requires a detailed knowledge of cause and effect, and a capacity for monitoring and measuring outcomes, both of which pose technical challenges. The system also needs continuous readjusting, as changes in market conditions may make a PES payment that is acceptable

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today insufficient tomorrow. PES is also narrowly defined by its market-based approach. It can only value quantifiable services which can be priced and where beneficiaries willing to pay can be identified. Externalities that cannot be quantified or priced – biodiversity, for example – are difficult to fit into the approach. PES may also be quite expensive. Transaction costs for setting up and administering the payment mechanism may be high, especially if beneficiaries are not already organized or if the watershed is large and densely populated. From the social viewpoint, the payments may not necessarily function as a poverty reduction mechanism upstream. It is true that in many upper watersheds, a large proportion of the population is likely to be poor. However, even within watersheds with primarily poor populations, there is no guarantee that payments will reach the poorest as the payments will predominantly flow towards owners of land and water rights. Finally, with the best will in the world, there will remain an irreducible role for governments. Because of externalities, there is likely to still a need for public financing, and financing for research and monitoring is also a clear role for governments. Governments also have to help develop and supervise the institutional and regulatory framework.35 Despite these hurdles, there are many successful examples of PES worldwide, principally in Latin America. In Colombia, irrigation water user groups and municipalities in the Cauca valley are paying to conserve the watersheds that supply them with water. In Ecuador, the city of Quito has created a water fund, FONAG, with contributions from the water utility and the electric power company to pay for conservation in the protected areas from which it draws its water. In Costa Rica, the town of Heredia has established an ‘environmentally adjusted water tariff’, the proceeds of which are used to pay landholders to maintain and reforest watershed areas. The approach could be very suitable for the many basins in the region where there are problems of upstream soil and water conservation which affect downstream water quantity and quality and environmental services.36 Water and forestry Countries in the Middle East and North Africa are joining the world-wide trend towards reforestation, particularly on arid and degraded lands, but also in peri-urban tree planting using treated wastewater, and in agro-sylvopastoral farming systems. Regional success stories include afforestation programmes using treated wastewater in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia; and widespread reforestation in mountain areas under the Lebanon National Forestry Programme. The Tunisia National Strategy for Development of the Forest Sector has targeted the rehabilitation of 500,000 hectares of

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rangeland and afforestation on a further 320,000 hectares. In addition, there is a focus region-wide on urban and peri-urban forestry and the role of trees in cities, plus peri-urban protection of urban water sources, which is very important for the fast-urbanizing dry areas found in many of the countries of the region.37 Water in the drylands Drylands are continental areas of low rainfall and high evapotranspiration, and with restricted growing periods. Drylands are defined as regions having an ‘aridity index’ of 0.65 or less. Drylands are furthermore sub-divided into four zones: hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid. The Aridity Index ranges used to define these four zones appear in Table 5.13.38 Defined in this way on the basis of the Aridity Index, about 40 per cent of the earth’s land surface is drylands, but nearly all of the Middle East and North Africa (89 per cent) is classed as drylands. Drylands are characterized by high variability of precipitation between years and by frequent droughts. Storage of the scant rain is generally an expensive proposition. Progressive further drying is predicted as a result of climate change (Chapter 2). Where farming is possible, mixed pastoral/arable systems prevail in the semi-arid and sub-humid zones but activity is very sparse indeed in the 62 per cent of the region which is classed as arid or hyper-arid.39 Countries of the region have typically battled with aridity in the drylands through three sets of measures which are generally practised for improving productivity through agricultural water management: increasing water availability, increasing water use efficiency and reuse of wastewater or use of marginal water such as saline water or drainage water. Water availability can be increased in the drylands through water transfer, cloud seeding and – the only low-cost option – water harvesting to capture and direct rainfall onto fields (see the discussion of these techniques in the section Rainfed agriculture above). One more extreme and costly option has been implemented in several countries – water transfer. This has long been practised in the region – for example the Ghor canal bringing water from the Yarmouk to the Jordan Valley, the Nile water carriers taking water to the Table 5.13

Aridity Index ranges used to define drylands

Dryland zone

Aridity Index range

Hyper-arid Arid Semi-arid Dry sub-humid

0.00– 0.05 0.05– 0.20 0.20– 0.50 0.50– 0.65

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desert new lands in Egypt, and – the most ambitious of all – the Great ManMade River in Libya, originally intended to irrigate agriculture in the coastal region. Generally these are social rather than economic projects in the sense that their economic rate of return is often low or negative but they are undertaken to achieve other social goals such as reducing unemployment or sustaining agriculture. In fact, the agricultural use of water from the Great Man-Made River in Libya has been abandoned as the water is needed for municipal and industrial uses in the coastal cities. New lands development in Egypt has been halted since the fall of the old regime. Water use efficiency can be increased either by increasing the moisture in the soil profile, or by using soil moisture more efficiently, for example by improving soil conservation and fertility, or by adopting integrated agrosylvo-pastoral approaches, or simply by planting trees and bushes. These techniques are described in the section Rainfed agriculture where examples are given of their application in several countries of the region. Programmes for reuse of wastewater or use of marginal water such as saline water or drainage water to support water management in very dry areas have been implemented across the region, with some success, for example, at Matruh in Egypt.40 Another programme in the Umm al Ashtan watershed in Egypt used water harvesting and improved agronomic techniques to increase yields by 250 per cent. In this drylands area, an agrotechnical package of improved wheat and barley varieties was introduced, fed by harvested run-off. The seeds were soaked and coated with biofertilizer, and plots were tilled and fertilized with slow-release fertilizer. Grain and straw yields tripled. However, the economics and replicability were marginal. Clearly, substantial yield increases can be achieved but costs and risks are high.41 Water, pastoral systems and desertification Much land in the region is under threat from desertification, and much is lost each year. Some 9 million hectares are threatened in Algeria and about 7,000 hectares of arable land is being lost each year in that country. Some of this is simply a natural process, but much is due to changes in land use, for example, change from sustainable pastoral use of rangelands to crop production. Overstocking of rangelands is another common cause. In Morocco, the spread of cereals cultivation onto marginal bor lands during the times of high cereals procurement prices led to soil erosion and sand dune invasion. In the Dhofar region of Oman, camel numbers have doubled over the last decade and sheep numbers have gone up by more than half. This overstocking, often permitted or even promoted by government policies and in a context of eroding traditional communal management, has

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occurred in many countries of the region. The result has been increased pressure on rangeland, with consequent degradation and desertification. In the Oman case, economic pressures, the decline of traditional rangeland governance, and an ill-considered government programme to buy back camels have led to a steep decline in rangeland productivity and growing desertification. The spread of unpalatable invasive species into Omani rangelands has also been reported as a consequence.42 Experience in the region shows that these processes of degradation are not irreversible. For example, in the dryland Gabes area of Tunisia, increased stocking rates led to over-grazing and sand dune invasion into rangelands. To reverse this process, government undertook a programme using tree-bush combinations to stabilize sand dunes that were emerging in overgrazed areas. Using harvested water, drought- and salt-tolerant bushes and trees – including date palms and olives – were planted both as sources of cash and as dune stabilizers. By the end of the sixth year, which included years of drought, sand drift was totally arrested, natural vegetation was spontaneously emerging and range productivity increased fourfold. The programme was successful in demonstrating that desertification can be reversed, although only with considerable effort and cost.43

Salinization, waterlogging and drainage44 The discussion under Acting on the supply-side drivers of scarcity in Chapter 4 raised the challenge of drainage and the reuse of drainage water as a resource for agriculture. The present section examines in more detail the issues of drainage and the potential for reuse of drainage water. Much of the world’s irrigated land suffers from drainage problems, and an estimated 30 million hectares worldwide need improved drainage. The resulting waterlogging and salinity caused by the rise of water tables and the accumulation of salts are reducing productivity over wide areas. In fact, the problem of inadequate drainage and consequent waterlogging and salinization has dogged the Middle East and North Africa region for millennia. Today it is estimated that 45 per cent of Syria’s irrigated area suffers from salinization, and in Egypt 50 per cent. On the positive side, drainage water is a considerable water resource. At most only about 60 per cent of irrigation water is actually consumed in direct evaporation. The rest is returned to the hydrological system as drainage water, and much can be recovered for reuse. However drainage is often the poor relation, with attention and investment going to upstream irrigation and farming. Opportunities for increasing the water available to agriculture through drainage water reuse are being missed.45

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Reasons for neglect of drainage Few countries in the region have integrated drainage planning and investments within overall water resources management. Globally, there are many reasons why drainage is often a neglected area of planning, investment and management. Some of these are institutional, particularly in countries where there has been a lack of an integrated approach to agricultural water management and where drainage has typically been seen as a separate activity. Yet the experience of modern irrigation right from the time of the irrigated cotton revolution in Egypt in the nineteenth century has been that there should be no investment in irrigation without planning for drainage. The neglect of drainage at the planning stage is reflected in subsequent governance and institutional arrangements, where drainage is usually a subsidiary task of an irrigation agency – or of a separate but weaker drainage agency. Irrigation agencies serve primarily agriculture and emphasize resource development over integrated resource management. Sadly, this institutional failing is multiplied in the modern approaches to irrigation discussed in Chapter 4, even with the advent of decentralized water user associations – otherwise seen as such a good thing – as these associations are rarely called on to deal with drainage. Many countries even lack a legal framework for setting up drainage organizations, or for levying fees. The institutional shortcomings are mirrored at the economic level, as there are also budgetary reasons for the neglect of drainage and for the low levels of investment in drainage. In many countries, there is no financially sustainable system for investing in and managing drainage. Government investment budgets for drainage are low, and cost recovery is rarely properly factored in. Often, stakeholders do not understand why they should pay for drainage. In addition, drainage has been little considered in either water or agricultural policy. Many countries promote more and more irrigation, sometimes with low overall efficiencies, resulting in very large quantities of drainage water. With these policies may come also promotion of heavy fertilizer use but there is rarely any compensating consideration of drainage needs or downstream effects. Inattention to drainage also raises social issues of inequity. The impacts have fallen mainly on the poor, because the bad effects of lack of drainage are mostly on tail-enders and on the downstream population, who receive all the water flows and pollutants. The case for drainage in the region In the region there is a compelling case for more attention to drainage, as many examples show that not only does drainage mitigate negative

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downstream effects but it can also improve productivity at relatively low cost and bring good returns to investment. This is because properly designed and managed drainage improves land productivity, reduces the need for new land development and has positive impacts on health and the environment. Costs are low: from $100– 200/ha for on-farm surface drainage up to $1,000/ha for pipe drainage in arid areas. Production responses are good: in Egypt gross production increased with drainage by $500/ha each year and net income by $200– $375. With a good benefit stream and relatively low costs, drainage investments produce good rates of return. Drainage is particularly important where water is scarce or where there is a productivity problem related to waterlogging or salinization or where drainage can contribute to flood control, groundwater or wetland conservation, and so on. In the water-scarce countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the priority is mainly on salinity control, and on the potential for drainage water reuse. Good practice: policy issues and trade offs Drainage is a complex phenomenon with multiple impacts, positive and negative, on other functions of the resource system. It therefore needs an IWRM approach,46 serving all water sources and users. A legal and governance framework needs to be set up, and a participatory approach should be applied. As in all IWRM approaches, planning and decisions should be taken at the basin scale. Drainage also needs to be built into the design of irrigation systems from the start, along with consideration of reuse. An integrated planning tool should be used that can take account of all social, economic and technological aspects. One example is DRAINFRAME, developed and used in Egypt, which evaluates all the different functions of the resource system at the values society places on them and then optimizes investments. Planning and management require participatory approaches involving all upstream and downstream stakeholders. Because of the trade-offs involved – between upstream and downstream, between water uses and the environment – a multi-stakeholder governance and management structure is required that can arbitrate these trade-offs and seek compromises amongst stakeholders. The legal framework needs to provide for the levying of fees on an equitable basis, and here stakeholders need to be involved throughout, so that they understand why they may be asked to pay. Technology and investment choices Various technologies and innovations are available, which have to be adapted to the local situation. The best drainage investments are often very

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site-specific. Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia have all invested in drainage on a wide scale. There have been innovations in drainage technology in recent years that have reduced costs and increased functionality. One example is the use of controlled drainage to slow down the movement of water through the soil profile and so reduce loss of moisture and nutrients. Other approaches include evaporation ponds, and bio-drainage, especially using trees. The most widespread application of drainage technology in the region has been in Egypt. Beginning in the late 1960s, the National Drainage Programme developed over four decades to control waterlogging and salinity. The Programme has now equipped about 6 million feddan with sub-surface drainage, 70 per cent of Egypt’s total cultivated area of 8.5 million feddan. The Programme is one of the largest water management projects in the world, with investment exceeding $1 billion. The result has been reduction in salinity and increase in productivity. Cost recovery is reported to be good, in fact better than for irrigation. As a result of this successful programme, Egypt is now considered a world leader in drainage technology and practice.47 Drainage water reuse Drainage water represents a considerable water resource and with careful planning, participatory approaches and investment, it can add considerably to national water resources. Farmers can reuse drainage water for irrigation, either as a sole source, or mixed or alternated with fresh water from canals, groundwater or rainfall. Drainage water reuse requires a recovery loop system that can bring drainage water back into the system. Gravity systems that require low investment can typically be added on to existing systems. Typical infrastructure consists of pumps to lift water from drains to canals, construction of mixing basins, and so on. Farmers may invest themselves and pump water from the drains, but this has to be guided by a framework of rules. Egypt has the most advanced national system in the region – and perhaps in the world, reusing over 10 per cent of the annual freshwater withdrawal without deterioration of the salt balance. From the beginning of its drainage programme, Egypt invested in reuse on a broad scale as a way to increase overall system efficiency at the basin scale. Drainage water in the Nile valley may be directly reused for irrigation or be returned to the Nile for possible reuse downstream. In the Delta, drainage water may be pumped directly back into the canals for reuse or it may be pumped to the lakes or the sea. Where drainage water is directly reused for irrigation, it is reintroduced into the irrigation system at points where it can be economically mixed with fresh water. In Egypt, currently, up to 5 billion m3 is reused in this way, 10 per cent of Egypt’s total Nile resource of 54 billion m3, and reuse is practised on 90 per cent of the irrigated area. However, water quality

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problems have emerged which prevent further expansion of reuse. Water quality has deteriorated due to rising levels of poorly treated sewage and industrial effluent. It is estimated that these quality problems prevent the reuse of up to a further 3 billion m3 of drainage water that could be reused and for which the infrastructure is in place. Reuse of drainage water on a more limited scale is practised in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria.48 Egypt’s experience helps to define the features that characterise successful programmes for drainage water reuse. First, as for drainage itself, drainage water reuse has to be assessed at the level of overall basin efficiency and socioeconomic benefit. A particular issue is the downstream environmental effect: there may be less salt discharged but reduced return to watercourses. Second, a legal and regulatory framework is needed to control drainage water reuse. This framework would include regulation of water quality, particularly salt content and agricultural chemical residues that may have an impact on productivity. The framework would also have to provide for protection of human health – reintroducing drainage water into the hydraulic system may hold some dangers. Mechanisms are needed to monitor the volume and quality of drainage water and to provide management information for decision making. A third characteristic of successful programmes for drainage water reuse is that they need to be developed in association with users and to be the subject of explicit water entitlements in the same way as fresh canal water. Farmer awareness and training for this relatively saline water is essential. A final lesson from the Egyptian experience is that there are trade-offs that need to be managed. One is that, because reuse may reduce environmental flows, it needs to be assessed and trade-offs decided on in an overall basin framework. Another trade-off is that quality problems need careful control, or salts and contaminants will build up in the soil profile, and judgements have to be made – as in Egypt – about cut-off levels for the quality of water to be used.49

CHAPTER 6 ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENSURING FOOD SECURITY

Building on the assessment in Chapter 2 of the climate changes, risks and impacts likely to affect agriculture in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the present chapter assesses what farmers and countries – and the region as a whole – are doing, can do and are likely to do to adapt to climate change and to mitigate the causes. The chapter opens with an examination of adaptation options for farming systems and farming households, and follows this with an assessment of broader options for household-level livelihood strategies, including off-farm rural activities, exit from farming and rural to urban migration. Moving to the implications for policy and programmes, the next sections look at the kind of institutional arrangements and tools that are needed to help agriculture to adapt under climate change, including climate and resource monitoring and modelling and the preparation of adaptation strategies. Penultimate sections deal with high level policy issues for adaptation and the need for regional and international cooperation on climate change affecting agriculture and for climate change mitigation. Final sections look at the challenges to food security faced by the region, and at how food security may be restored in the Mashreq in the wake of the Syrian crisis.

How farmers may adapt to climate change Chapter 2 assessed the possible dimensions of climate change in the region and the likely impacts on the water resource. But what about the impacts at farm level, particularly in the vulnerable rainfed farming systems? Although impacts will vary greatly, overall conditions are expected to be hotter and drier with a general increase in aridity and drought, more floods, and increased variability within years and between years.

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Farmers will have to adapt to these new challenges. Risk management strategies will become more relevant, and in different systems a range of adaptations may be needed. How will farmers manage the new risks? One study1 looked at how Yemeni farmers were prepared for the challenge of adapting to climate change. The study found that most of the farmers (77 per cent) knew about climate change and thought that it could affect their farms (64 per cent). Most of these farmers thought that climate change would be manifested through increases in average temperature and in greater variability and irregularity of rainfall, and through higher frequency of extreme events such as droughts. These views coincide with those of climate scientists. Many farmers (37 per cent) said that they had changed their agricultural practices in the past to cope with adverse climate conditions, and more than half of farmers (54 per cent) thought they should now start to adjust their farm activity to cope with possible future adverse climate conditions. The options they proposed consisted of a mixture of traditional and modern farming practices, such as changing cultivation practices, rehabilitating terraces and spate irrigation systems, switching to higher value crops, and increasing the scale of farm operations. The researchers commented: ‘Farmers appear to take a dim view of climate change as a further curse on their already precarious livelihoods, but at the same time they seemed confident about their adaptation capacities, and in several cases even thought that climate change might offer positive opportunities (such as a longer growing season)’. The study concludes: ‘Climate change may be a fruitful source of innovation in that it inspires old and new remedies, more respectful of the environment, more preoccupied with recovering traditional land management techniques and plant varieties, and in general more attentive to the needs and the capabilities of rural communities’. In fact, responses of farmers to a changing climate are likely to be an extension of their current search for productivity improvements and risk management options. Combined changes in water availability and temperature under climate change may encourage farmers in the region to switch to better-adapted cropping patterns, to ‘conjunctive management’ of rainfall and surface and groundwater, and to efficient protected agriculture and pressurized irrigation. If aridity increases, farmers may switch to better-adapted crops. A first level of response in the region could be to switch between crops with differing responses to climate change within an agro-ecologically homogeneous ‘crop group’ – for example, switching between faba beans and lentils within the legume crop group. The most prevalent crop switch is likely to be from wheat to barley, accompanying a switch in farming systems from cereals production

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for human consumption to production of barley and straw as part of an integrated semi-intensive production of sheep and goat meat to satisfy rising domestic demand. The role of barley as an adaptation strategy is enhanced by the fact that even during very dry years when grain yields are minimal, straw production or ‘green grazing’ for flocks remain viable production alternatives. Alternatively, farmers might switch to a different crop group. For example, where temperate fruit yields are affected by failure to meet vernalisation requirements, farmers may begin to plant sub-tropical fruits like citrus in new zones and elevations that are less exposed to frost due to climate change. Growing salinization could prompt changes in cropping patterns and soil and water management. Salinization is likely to increase in coastal areas due to the effect of rising sea levels and seawater intrusion into aquifers. Farmers generally may also be obliged to use more saline water as depleting aquifers grow more salty and water scarcity drives development of more saline water sources. Farmers will then seek out more salt-tolerant crops, use fresh water to blend with saline sources and use off-season fresh water sources to leach salt residues in the soil profile. Where rainfall is higher, for example in highland mixed farming systems, warmer temperatures under climate change could improve yields, provided that adequate soil moisture is available. In Yemen, for example, where rain falls in the summer months, an increase in average temperatures of 28C could be expected to extend the growing season by about six weeks.2

Adaptation options for farming systems3 This section examines the range of likely farmer responses to specific climate change and variability impacts and the scope for technological and institutional adaptation by farming system. It deals in turn with highland and rainfed mixed systems; dryland mixed systems; pastoral systems; and irrigated agriculture. Highland and rainfed mixed (crops and livestock) systems In the highland mixed farming system found in upland areas throughout the region and particularly in Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria, soil and water management will become more important. Specific technologies likely to be taken up in these highland systems, and also in lowland rainfed mixed systems, include conservation tillage, soil contouring, terrace restoration and water harvesting. Wherever possible, supplementary irrigation and conjunctive management of all water sources will be applied. More generally, farmers in both systems are likely to manage risk and improve efficiency by

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better integration of crops and livestock, and by the adoption of available agronomic and post-harvest improvements to increase ‘income per drop’. Institutional adaptation measures for these rainfed farming communities in the face of climate change are likely to prioritize participatory approaches to natural resource management, for example to springs and wells. Watershed management programmes (see Chapter 5) are likely to be expanded, as these provide both a poverty reduction approach suitable for poor upland dwellers further affected by a changing climate, and integration of land and water management and conservation, to the benefit of both upstream and downstream water users facing climate change. Governments may also help upland communities derive compensation for externalities and downstream benefits arising from upstream soil and water conservation work. Payment for environmental services (PES) may be one approach (see Chapter 5). The research agenda for these rainfed systems would focus on technologies on crop-livestock integration, and more generally on risk management strategies and technologies. For the livestock component of mixed farming systems, communal action to reduce overgrazing and manage the commons more sustainably will require collaboration of communities with public agencies, with the objective of more equitable regulation, control and benefit sharing of common grazing resources. Governments can support community efforts both by infrastructure investments such as fencing and water points, and also by ensuring the incentive structure is conducive to rangeland conservation, for example, by eliminating subsidies on animal feed. Dryland mixed system In the already marginal dryland mixed system,4 climate change is likely to further increase vulnerability, perhaps driving farming further towards the margin of viability. The technologies available to farmers in this system include measures to stem wind erosion such as windbreaks. Ways to enhance water availability and eke out the quantum of water available include water harvesting and techniques of soil and water management and conservation such as zero tillage and mulching. Agronomic improvements require varieties with a shorter growing period, drought resistance and improved grain and straw quality, as well as adoption of more intensive production practices such as inter-cropping. Further research could well focus on systems as a whole – for example, on crop-livestock interaction and resource conservation, targeting risk reduction and sustainability. Institutional adaptation measures are likely to include a push towards communal land and water management (see Chapter 5). Governments can help with grassroots participatory research and development, and possibly

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with financial support mechanisms like payments for environmental services (PES). Pastoral systems Pastoral systems will face considerable challenges, as they are already in critical shape in many locations, with overgrazed and degraded rangelands, overstocking, and the breakdown of traditional management of the commons (see the section Water, pastoral systems and desertification in Chapter 5). There may be some further technological responses available that can increase value added sustainably, but the focus will be on institutional adaptation measures, particularly on how to restore communal grazing management sustainably and equitably whilst maintaining or increasing incomes. Irrigated agriculture In irrigated farming systems, technological responses are likely to focus on assuring and increasing the water supply, and on ever-more efficient use of water delivered. Water supply is unlikely to be much increased by further diversions or abstractions, but there may still be some extra available water in a few locations. Because of the pervasive scarcity and the fact that almost all water available to agriculture has already been developed, there will also inevitably be a focus on increasing (or substituting) supply through waste water and drainage water reuse, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. More importantly, all measures will be applied to improve water use efficiency and crop water productivity (see Chapter 5: passim) at both system level and field level. Farmers will aim at maximizing income per drop by all means, amending soil fertility by integrated nutrient management, improving water management to reduce salinity, introducing agronomic and postharvest efficiency improvements, and so on. To increase the range and effectiveness of farmers’ technological responses, the future research agenda should concentrate on further improvements in water use efficiency and crop water productivity, on sustainable land and water management techniques, on integrated nutrient management, and on increasing value-added and reducing losses post-harvest. Technological improvements in irrigated farming systems will need to be complemented by institutional adaptation measures to improve the efficiency of water management. These may include further decentralization of irrigation and drainage management to water user associations. Demand management measures such as quotas and water pricing may become more necessary and acceptable. There may be more emphasis on participatory approaches to groundwater management.5

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Household-level livelihood strategies In most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, agricultural income is the largest source of overall rural household income, and adaptation in farming will be the principal concern of rural households. But how will climate change affect overall rural household-level livelihood strategies? This section looks in turn at how household-level livelihood strategies will cope with changes in farm incomes, at the scope for complementary or replacement off-farm rural activities, and at how households may plan for exit from farming and for rural-to-urban migration. Farm incomes Under climate change, what is likely to happen to farm incomes – and how will farmers respond? In a sense, these questions have been answered in the preceding section – under climate stress, farmers will push their production to generate the maximum revenue subject to adequate management of risk. If increased aridity is the challenge – as it is likely to be for many farmers – farmers will seek every means to maximize returns per drop of available water. This means that, where the policy environment, technology and natural resources give the opportunity, farmers will produce more of the higher-value products. Where water, working capital and markets are available, farmers are likely to continue the trend away from production of staples towards higher-value crops like fruit, vegetables and flowers which give the highest return to the scarcest factor: water. Fortunately, markets for these products expand with urbanisation, demographic growth and rising incomes. However, rising preference for meat and dairy products will pose a challenge, as these are water-intensive. As farming becomes a more high value and fully commercialized activity, more emphasis on good quality harvest and post-harvest activity will pay big dividends. In some fruit and vegetable operations there may be a chance to increase value added by up to one half by improvements at this stage. The case of Oman, where up to one third of value of fruit and vegetables is lost through poor post-harvest practice, is a case in point. Similarly, developing access to markets and improving marketing will become ever more important. Egypt, Morocco and Jordan have found what a huge return they can gain from accessing European rather than domestic or regional markets. A further dimension is added by the possibility of moving to more integrated, agroindustrial type operations in order to reduce transaction costs and align production and market potential. As climate change threatens, the reaction of many governments in the region has been to fear for food security and, by an ill-founded leap of faith, to

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call on farmers to produce more food, particularly cereals. However, the corollary of farmers’ motivation to choose crops with high returns to water is that governments should not promote production of crops such as cereals which have lower financial returns to water, as this would have an impoverishing effect on both farmers and the nation, and would actually reduce food security.6 As markets develop, commercial farmers should be able to manage risks and to maintain – or even increase – their incomes, but smaller farmers and food deficit households may be negatively affected. The challenges will be for smaller farmers to become commercial farmers and to link into market circuits. The many millions of rural households that are food deficit may be negatively affected if food prices rise (see Food security and climate change below), and they will need coping strategies. Off-farm rural activities Clearly, not all farmers will be able to maintain their income from farming, and many non-farm rural households will also be vulnerable, so diversification of livelihoods will be an important adaptation option. Developing new sources of income that are less climate-dependent and increasing access to alternatives can improve household resilience and reduce risk. These sources might include adding value to agricultural production by processing and marketing, as well as new household industries, such as crafts or tourism, or light manufacturing. These options may encounter barriers: low rural demand for products and services; difficulty of access to markets and information; poor infrastructure base; and inadequate access to finance. Public policy needs to lift these barriers and create an enabling environment. Education and skills development will also be key to support off-farm employment. Governments will need to expand educational opportunities and support attendance at schools and other learning opportunities. With the media and telecommunications revolutions, vast possibilities open up for rural enterprise, and governments will have to support the extension of broadband to rural areas.7 Exit from farming and rural-to-urban migration In areas where rural livelihood options are inadequate, people are likely to migrate, particularly during periods of climate stress like droughts and floods. The case of migration during the protracted droughts in Syria, which was discussed in Chapter 3 above, is a case in point. Households will need to adapt roles and responsibilities and to strengthen local social networks in both the receiving and exiting communities. Households will have to invest in skills and education to prepare, and it will be the role of public policy and programmes to ease the transition, for example, through ensuring availability

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of serviced land for low cost housing near centres of employment. Here again government investment in education and communications will be critically important.8

Strategies for adapting agriculture under climate change Complementary to the discussion above about how rural households can and will adapt to climate change effects are questions of the implications for public policy and programmes. These are now considered, looking in turn both at the design and implementation of adaptation strategies to complement farmer efforts at responding to climate change and at broader interventions for sustaining rural livelihoods and facilitating inevitable processes of transition. Climate modelling and resource monitoring In order to plan for climate change adaptation in agriculture, countries in the Middle East and North Africa need access to good data. At the highest and most long term level, there is a need to understand and to project the implications of climate change by interpreting global and regional climate modelling at the level of individual countries and areas within countries. For the countries of the Mashreq, for example, there is a generalized understanding that the climate will become hotter and drier and less predictable, but actual impacts will vary widely by country and within countries. It is likely, for instance, that warming will be greater and more rapid as elevation and distance from the coast increase, whilst the greatest reductions in rainfall are likely to be experienced in the coastal zones and nearby inland valleys such as the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. To detect indices of change which are useful for planning purposes at the national and local level, processes of statistical downscaling are needed. Statistical downscaling models have been developed to evaluate site-specific outcomes of likely changes in atmospheric conditions in Jordan and Lebanon. Based on this, it has been possible to forecast the likelihood of dry years, as well as the likely number of winter growing days and the expected length of the dry season, all key parameters for planning future agricultural strategies. One case study for the Jordanian highlands around Amman showed that the chance of a dry year with rainfall of under 200 mm was likely to increase from one-in-three to one-in-two by the late 2020s, and that by the 2050s the dry season was likely to be up to 30 days longer. These predictions can allow planners – and farmers – to plan for adaptations in both cultivation and pasture management. At the level of local data gathering on actual trends and of evidence-based planning, investment is needed in hydro-meteorological monitoring and data

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acquisition, in water resources information systems, and in basin modelling and dynamic water resource assessments. Systems of weather forecasting and drought and flood forecasting need to be reliable, timely and accessible to all stakeholders by modern media, including via web portals and mobile apps. This should include digitalizing past climate records. Governments need to cooperate on a regional basis with open exchange of information to monitor changes in climate and to anticipate likely impacts on water availability and soil moisture. A start has been made on this. Lebanon, for example, has joined the European Climate Assessment and Dataset Project in collating, analysing and sharing daily meteorological observations. This cooperation would allow all stakeholders to learn what changes are likely, to plan in a participatory way for the correct balance of local initiative and topdown interventions, and to design appropriate support programmes. The same data would allow governments to manage food security and social protection programmes related to climate change-induced poverty and migration.9 New technologies, particularly remote sensing, are contributing to mapping and monitoring a wide range of natural resource parameters. Satellite imaging combined with GIS now has the capability to measure changes in land cover, forecast crop yields, monitor crop stress and quantify production and yields, measure stream flows, soil moisture and water storage and follow pollution plumes in water or in the soil. Using recent developments in information and geospatial technology, a number of international programmes are developing resource inventory and monitoring tools. The potential of these spatial technologies for improving land and water management is enormous, and many of these tools are open-access.10 Application of these tools has already begun in the region. One regionwide initiative of the FAO is a project for monitoring water productivity by remote sensing. Since 2015, FAO and its partners have been using remote sensing to develop a database for benchmarking and monitoring agricultural land and water productivity across the region. The idea is to highlight productivity differences and gaps and to develop programmes for raising productivity.11 Research on issues of agriculture and climate change As discussed in the section above on Adaptation options for farming systems, some key research themes on risk management, crop-livestock integration, and communal approaches to resource and risk management become ever more relevant as climate change stresses intensify. Intensive research is needed to increase the availability of technology and institutional options. At least some technology and institutional options that can help maintain productivity and livelihoods under climate change are known and are either accessible to

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farmers or could be made accessible. What is needed is further research to prioritize and adapt these options to the changing situation in varying locations and farming systems. Preparation of adaptation and mitigation strategies As discussed in Chapter 2, countries throughout the region have prepared plans anticipating climate change and many have developed climate-smart strategies to handle impacts on agriculture. In the Maghreb in Tunisia, a strategy12 has been in place since 2006: the National Strategy for Adapting Agriculture and Ecosystems to Climate Change (MARH, 2006). With fresh water availability of 500 m3/person/year, the country is confronting a chronic water shortage, reflected by an imbalance between water availability and agricultural needs. This shortage is exacerbated by growing changes in the climate. In particular, droughts where rainfall is 40 per cent below average now occur with a frequency of two every six years. Alerted to the risks, the country carried out studies to gauge the likely impacts of climate change on agriculture. These studies formed the basis for the National Strategy. The aim of this strategy was to move from crisis management, such as reactions to unpredictable successive droughts and floods, to a risk management approach. The strategy includes an early warning system so that farmers are forewarned and the government can undertake specific measures such as managing water available in dams or adjusting water quotas.13 In the Mashreq, Jordan and Lebanon have been actively preparing to manage climate change risks for agriculture, with both countries giving top priority to addressing agricultural water constraints expected to arise from increased aridity, less certain water availability and the risk of drought. In Lebanon, planned responses to irrigation and agricultural water management constraints include the development and adoption of new irrigation technologies such as drip irrigation and fertigation, and the harnessing of more water for agriculture through construction of small and medium-sized dams and water harvesting schemes. In Jordan, the responses for surface irrigated areas are similar but also more explicitly target increasing water efficiency in agriculture in general through both on-farm practices and broader integrated approaches to water management such as use of treated brackish and waste water and better governance and regulation of groundwater. Both countries give priority to research and technology transfer for development of crop varieties tolerant of drought and heat, and to evaluation of local genetic material likely to be adapted to the changing climate. Another priority in the action plans of both countries is integrated pest management as a response to the expected change and increase in risks from plant and animal disease. With its extensive rangelands, which are likely

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to come under increasing threat, Jordan is also reforming its laws governing land use and promoting sustainable range management practices.14 In the Arabian peninsula, the Sultanate of Oman commenced preparations for tackling climate change in 2005 with its National Action Plan on Desertification Control. In 2015, alerted to growing risks of extreme events and aware of inexorable sea level rise, the country commissioned studies to prepare for a climate change adaptation strategy. Economy-wide, this includes preparing for disaster risk reduction and management, proofing infrastructure against cyclone and flood risk and planning infrastructure and land use to take account of climate-related risks. For agriculture, the approach includes planning for management of risks of drought, warming, lower and less predictable rainfall, reduced groundwater recharge, and extreme events like cyclones. Best practice national adaptation strategies for agriculture may have several key characteristics. Typically, they work both top-down and bottom-up – from the top down, using climate models and data, and from the bottom up, basing strategy on the actual constraints, possibilities and incentives that shape farmers’ adaptation capacity. The strategies build on and refine existing improvements and trends in soil, water and crop management, which are already adapted to the water-stressed conditions of the region. Proposals for investing in further adaptation technologies are drawn from both farmer innovation and from adaptive research. Very importantly, best practice strategies prioritize ‘no regrets’ options – those that bring benefits whatever the outcome, but which are nonetheless robust given that variability is likely to increase. Wherever possible, good practice proposes solutions that integrate both adaptation and mitigation. An example of an innovative approach that satisfies all the above criteria, including integration of mitigation actions, would be the adoption of slow release nitrogen fertilizers that improve efficiency and reduce the amount applied, so that production costs are reduced, output and income increased, the greenhouse gas (GHG) cost of production is less, and the mobilization of nitrous oxide (a GHG) is reduced.15 Virtual water, trade liberalization and market development Extreme water scarcity already makes the Middle East and North Africa region heavily dependent on imported agricultural commodities, and the additional pressures exerted by climate change make it all the more vital that each drop of water earn the highest income. Regional agriculture, therefore, has good reason to specialize in the production – and often export – of high value commodities like cotton, fruits and vegetables, and so generate the resources needed to import lower value commodities like grains.

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This kind of sensible economic exchange has been conceptualized as ‘virtual water trade’. The concept of virtual water16 is that a well-functioning global trade system would induce countries to either export or import goods based on their natural resource endowment. Water and/or land poor countries would use their scarce resources to produce commodities for which they have a comparative advantage when water (or land) is priced at its economic scarcity value. These resource-scarce countries would not necessarily be net importers of agricultural commodities in terms of value but they would most likely be heavy importers of lower value products like cereals produced by land and water-abundant countries. This would help achieve good use of water and land resources, provided that the global trade system is well-functioning. Most countries in the Middle East and North Africa are already net importers of agricultural goods, therefore importing large volumes of virtual water. Jordan imports about 6 billion m3 of virtual water per year and withdraws only 1 billion m3 from domestic sources. The fact that Jordan also exports virtual water in the shape of high-value products shows how the concept of virtual water works. It is value per m3 of water which determines what countries produce and trade. For the future, economic policy in the region would best concentrate scarce water on encouraging the production of crops that have the highest returns to scarce water, and on ensuring that trade functions well, for example, by aligning with WTO requirements.17 Promoting poor people’s access to product markets In the higher and middle income countries of the region, rural and agricultural markets function quite well. The key policy action under climate change risk is to promote access of poorer and vulnerable producers to existing market channels by empowering them for the production of profitable crops for market – the approach, for example, of the Morocco Plan Vert. In the poorer countries, particularly Yemen, rural and product markets often function poorly, and the policy response should be to invest in rural infrastructure, particularly roads, and in promoting product chains which have potential for smallholders (e.g., coffee in Yemen) or labour-intensive crop production that can employ landless or underemployed rural people.18

Regional and international dimensions Global and regional cooperation on agricultural research International agricultural research has been one of the shining examples of successful global cooperation and has achieved significant impacts on livelihoods in the region. Coordinated by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the cooperation includes

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15 international centres of excellence. The work of ICARDA, based in Syria until the troubles, has been particularly productive for the arid conditions prevailing in most of the region and both ICARDA and the International Centre for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA) in the Gulf have been doing pioneering work on adaptation to climate change, particularly for marginal production systems.19 Coordinated policies and actions The countries of the Middle East and North Africa are linked by a number of regional and international cooperation institutions and networks connected to climate change. Several of these are tied together by or associated with FAO’s Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity for the Near East and North Africa, started in 2015. One of these cooperative platforms is the Regional Initiative for the Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources and Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the Arab Region (RICCAR). RICCAR’s objectives are to generate climate change scenarios, assess vulnerability and evaluate possible socio-economic consequences. RICCAR also aims to develop ‘tailored adaptation measures for the green sectors’, that is, for crop production, forestry, rangeland and fisheries-based systems. A second regional network initiated by WMO and UNCCD supports the adoption and implementation of national drought policies and integrated drought management programmes in the region. A third regional network under the League of Arab States supports the updating and implementation of national action plans under the UNCCD Strategy to Combat Desertification.20 New partnerships and mechanisms A number of recent initiatives and partnerships from the private sector such as Fairtrade and organic labelling can have positive effects on farm incomes and also on sustainable land and water management under climate change. Ecotourism, for which there is strong consumer demand, also has the potential to conserve the environment and simultaneously to create opportunities for local and rural poor communities. The key to sustainable ecotourism is sustainable ecosystem management with benefit sharing among local populations. A number of environmental interest groups are also actively engaged in partnerships to promote sustainable land and water management. They play both a financing and an advocacy role to promote policies and programmes to address climate change impacts and enhance biodiversity, water quality and quantity. Private foundations, such as the Rockefeller, Ford and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundations, are promoting sustainable agriculture under climate change.21

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Paris 2015 From 30 November to 12 December 2015, more than 30,000 people gathered in Paris around the meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC to negotiate a new global climate treaty. Despite some rather gloomy predictions, the Paris Agreement was a remarkable outcome, especially after the failures of Copenhagen. In fact, almost all participants seemed surprised at how positive the outcome was. In particular, the cooperation of the USA – which carefully excluded any agreement that would require approval by the US Senate – and of other major countries, proved considerable. The level of detail on each of the provisions was also a positive outcome, although there will inevitably be much work to be done in the coming years as the Agreement is put into practice. This is clearly true for the new mechanisms – both market and non-market – that have been established. By October 2016, the threshold for entry into force of the Agreement had been reached. In fact, 110 parties had by then ratified the Agreement, double the threshold of 55 parties. As a result, the Agreement became effective on 4 November 2016, in time for the first Meeting of the Parties held in Marrakech in conjunction with COP 22 in November 2016. The effect of the advent of a new administration in the USA from January 2017 remains to be seen. So what were the main points of the Paris Agreement? The headline objective of the global community is to limit warming to 1.58C, with global emissions to peak and taper off as soon as possible. The reduction proposed voluntarily by participants – the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – currently would bring likely warming down to 2.08C, so there is a ‘ratcheting provision’ to allow parties to increase their INDC over time, on a five-year cycle. The second main area of agreement is the improvement of carbon markets and carbon finance. This includes provision for linking carbon markets, the establishment of a new net mitigation mechanism and a framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development. Developed countries will continue to take the lead on providing and mobilizing financial resources. There is encouragement to conserve and sustainably manage forests, and there are strengthened provisions for national low greenhouse gas development strategies with a horizon of 2050. Finally, for the first time, there is ‘implicit inclusion’ of international aviation and shipping in the global carbon budgets and long-term goals. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa played an active role in Paris but their contributions to mitigation through the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are relatively minor – see Table 6.1.

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Several regional countries have proposed higher targets, largely conditional on receiving financial support for mitigation and adaptation programmes – Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. Egypt and Sudan made no commitment to reductions. Amongst the richer oil-exporting countries, several also made no commitment to reduction, others made relatively small commitments. Oman, for example, agreed to reduce national emissions below trend by 2 per cent by reduced flaring of gas and by some minor improvements to waste management. Markets in environmental services As discussed in Chapter 5, in the section Payment for Environmental Services (PES), the trade in environmental services through PES mechanisms has attracted interest and financing both within countries and from international investors. PES systems exist for a number of climate change-relevant initiatives, including watershed services, biodiversity conservation, benefit sharing in transboundary river basin development, and reduction in carbon emissions. PES could thus be a key instrument for supporting climate change Table 6.1 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for Middle East and North Africa countries Country Algeria Bahrein Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tunisia UAE Yemen

Annual CO2 emmissions (million tons)

Target for reduction below ‘business as usual’22

189 33 288 712 256 27 202 24

22% (7% firm) 5% No commitment 12% (4% firm) 15% (13% firm) 12% (1.5% firm) No commitment 30% (13% firm) Non-reporting

72 109 85 527 177

42% (13% firm) 2% No commitment No commitment No commitment Non-reporting

31 216 30

41% (13% firm) No commitment 14% (1% firm)

Source: CAIT Climate Data Explorer, consulted 29 January 2016.

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adaptation in the Highland mixed and Rainfed mixed systems as compensation for externalities and downstream benefits of watershed management, and could also support conservation investments like terracing, biodiversity conservation or the maintenance of traditional agricultural heritage in a number of systems, including Dryland mixed and Pastoral systems.23

Climate change mitigation and the agricultural carbon footprint The countries of the region make only a small contribution to factors causing climate change. The largest contributors in terms of annual CO2 emissions are the oil-producing states, largely through gas flaring, with the largest emitters being Iran (700 million tonnes) and Saudi Arabia (500 million tonnes). These CO2 emissions have steadily increased in recent years, with an acceleration of emissions in the last fifteen years or so. In Oman, for example, which currently emits about 100 million tonnes of CO2 annually, emissions in 2015 were more than four times those of the 1990s. Several of the oil producers, notably Iran, Iraq and Oman, made commitments in Paris to reduce their emissions below ‘business as usual’, although several of the biggest ones did not: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait (see above). Beyond the particular case of the oil producers and the emissions associated with oil and gas industries, there is scope across the region for changes in the agriculture sector which would contribute to reduced emissions. These include: (i) increasing efficiency in food production, processing and transportation; (ii) shifting to cleaner energy resources (solar and wind); and (iii) reducing the carbon footprint of land use and agriculture and increasing the carbon sink function through reforestation. There are real opportunities in agriculture to contribute to mitigation. In fact, many sustainable agricultural techniques that may help in adaptation to climate change can also help mitigation. For example, reduced tillage, agroforestry and other best practice soil and water management strategies improve resilience by increasing the ability of soils to hold moisture and better withstand erosion, and by enriching ecosystem biodiversity through the establishment of more diversified cropping systems. In addition to increasing resilience, these techniques contribute to soil carbon sequestration. Similarly, avoiding deforestation, improving techniques for forest conservation and management, and reforestation – for example in the Highland mixed systems of the Atlas, Mount Lebanon or Yemen’s escarpment – can not only lead to more resilient and healthy ecosystems, but also have important mitigation effects. These combinations may mean that countries of the region could attract financial support based on the carbon sequestration value of their sustainable land and water management strategies.24

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Food security and climate change Food security concerns have always troubled the region – remember Pharaoh’s dream of the seven lean kine in the Old Testament and Joseph’s building up of food security stocks. The relatively high level of dependence on food imports (see Chapter 1) and the volatility and price shocks administered through world markets in recent years – particularly the spikes of 2008 – have led policy makers to question simple reliance on markets to feed their people. These food security concerns have been sharpened by the spectre of climate change and by the troubles the region is experiencing. Since 2013, internal chaos and warfare have played havoc with the lives, livelihoods and food security of tens of millions of people across several countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is true that at the global level, climate change may affect crop yields, contributing to higher prices and price volatility. However, at least until mid-century, the production outlook is generally positive and the price projections are relatively stable. At the national level, most countries of the region have access to instruments to mitigate the effects of price hikes or market disruption, although there would certainly be an impact of price rises on the balance of payments, budget deficits and inflation. Most at risk in ordinary times are the poorer countries, particularly Yemen, but across the region climate risks may well have an impact on food production, particularly in rainfed areas, and also on agricultural incomes. There may thus be a structural risk to the food security of poorer households and households in remote areas far from markets.25 Risks vary across the region and within countries. As discussed in Chapter 1 (Food security and insecurity), nutrition status is worse in some poorer countries and in remote or very poor parts of middle income countries, particularly where markets are imperfect and households lack the income or information needed to maintain adequate diets. Many rural areas of Yemen, for example, have long suffered high rate of chronic malnutrition and stunting even prior to the conflict there. Most at risk are rural non-farm households which spend a higher share of their income on food, making them more vulnerable to price surges. Areas most at risk are remote mountain and arid regions characterized by a fragile natural resource base, poorly developed markets and frail institutional environments. Recent policy analysis has found little relation between national food security and the level of self-sufficiency in food production. In fact, policies favouring self-sufficiency may even reduce food security by reducing farmer incomes. One study in Morocco assessed trade-offs between self-sufficiency and food security. Findings were that the country could, in theory, achieve 85 per cent self-sufficiency in cereals at current yield levels, and that full

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self-sufficiency could be achieved if yields were to rise by 40 per cent. However, this self-sufficiency would come at a high cost – about $10 billion between 2008 and 2022 – through revenue forfeited by not producing higher value crops. If Morocco instead produced the high-value crops, the $10 billion could be used to purchase a much greater quantity of imported cereals. In addition, production of higher value crops would create far more agricultural employment for landless labourers than cereals production.26 Following the shocks of the 2008 food price rises, countries in the region have tried to strengthen capacity for evidence-based decision making. Countries have also been reassessing their social protection policies, seeking to protect vulnerable households nationwide. Safety nets are being strengthened, with cash transfers, labour-intensive employment programmes and health and nutrition interventions, with a particular focus on women and children. More investment is also being made in education and family planning. Several countries have also strengthened measures for protecting rural households by encouraging smallholders to move into higher value production for market. A new generation of rural livelihoods strategies such as Morocco’s Plan Vert is principally focussed on enhancing agricultural and off-farm incomes and production through investment in research and development, rural infrastructure and, above all, cash crops and market development to link smallholders into commercial market chains. At the macro level, countries of the Middle East and North Africa have been reducing exposure to market supply and price risks by strengthening trade and risk management measures. Countries like Egypt and Morocco are pursuing an export-led growth strategy to earn foreign exchange to import food. All countries are trying to improve supply chain efficiency by boosting trade in agricultural commodities through global, regional and bilateral agreements and by promoting efficient domestic food distribution and retailing. Countries in the region are also introducing cost-effective risk management instruments calibrated to the risk assessed, for example by establishing food reserves or buffer stocks to help to stabilize prices and smooth consumption fluctuations. Countries are also using market risk-management instruments, using forward contracting, employing financial hedging products, and building in risk-management provisions to bilateral and multilateral agreements. At a regional level, countries are promoting and supporting regional and global responses to protect against price volatility. A particular pressure point is to advocate the curtailment and reform of biofuel policies and subsidies. Countries have also been arguing for establishment of a regional or global grain reserve for rapid market intervention, and for the creation of an international working group to monitor trade and trigger action in case of possible supply shortages or price spikes.27

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The food security challenge in the region’s poorest country Before the conflict which arose in 2015, Yemen was already one of the ten most food insecure countries in the world. About 32 per cent of Yemenis – some 7.5 million people – did not have enough food even in normal times. Of these, the vast majority live in rural areas – 6.4 million people, 37 per cent of the total rural population. About 60 per cent of very young Yemeni children were stunted, and severe (life-threatening) stunting affected one third of all children in the country. The problem of stunting was also predominantly rural, affecting two children out of three in rural areas. The poor mountain agriculture of the highlands was a particular problem, with two thirds of all Yemen’s food insecure living in dry highland areas. Very reliant on food imports, with imports accounting for 73 per cent of cereals consumption, Yemen was also very vulnerable to external shocks. The global food crisis of 2007 –8 placed stress on the balance of payments. With the average Yemeni only 300 calories above hunger, the resultant domestic price rises pushed many more Yemenis into food insecurity. Food security strategies clearly have to be adapted to the nature of the risks. A poor country like Yemen, with a large vulnerable population dependent on farming, is already suffering from very high rates of rural malnutrition and there is even a risk of famine. This risk will intensify with climate change. In response to the alarming and deteriorating food security situation, the Yemeni government, through the National Food Security Committee, developed its National Food Security Strategy (November 2010). The key objectives were to reduce food insecurity by one third by 2015, to make 90 per cent of the population food secure by 2020 and to reduce child malnutrition by 1 per cent annually. In so poor a country the principal strategic responses inevitably cover both social security for the entire population – safety nets, education, family planning – and a rural livelihoods strategy focussed on agricultural productivity and risk management. Rising food import bills and a frail export base made it imperative that the Strategy provide for the state to seek bilateral and multilateral agreements for food aid. Sadly, the civil war that raged in the country periodically since 2013 dramatically worsened the food security situation. At the start of 2016, there were at least 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), plus a large number who had fled the country. The economy was in tatters. There had been a devastating effect on agricultural infrastructure and production. Livestock had been destroyed, crop production had plummeted and violence had destroyed agricultural infrastructure, displaced farmers and disrupted food and agricultural input trade. Agriculture in many areas was at a standstill as the cost of fuel for pumps reached ten times its pre-war price, even when it was available. Cereals production in 2015 was 30 per cent down on 2014 at

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275,000 tonnes, and an estimated 3 million tons needed to be imported in 2016. Government public debt and inflation were spiralling and safety nets that previously served 2.5 million people were no longer functioning. Damage to towns and rural infrastructure was enormous. The cost of damage in just four cities was estimated at $4 –5 billion. The consequent need for humanitarian assistance was overwhelming. At the start of 2016, more than four-fifths (82 per cent) of the population were classed as poor and 15 million had no access to medical facilities. Half of all children were out of school. As of January 2016, 56 per cent of the population was classed as food insecure, with 30 per cent classed as severely food insecure. Ten governorates were in the ‘emergency phase’ of acute food insecurity.28 As long as conflict in Yemen continues, the focus will remain on humanitarian assistance. When security returns to all or parts of the country, structured approaches will be needed to restore the nation’s shattered food security. Options for these approaches are explored below, in the section Coping with the food security crisis in Syria and other post-conflict countries in the region. Food security and the middle income Arab countries Most of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries clustered around the Mediterranean seaboard are middle income countries. Relatively urbanized, they nonetheless all have large rural populations and sizable agricultural sectors. They thus typically pursue policies that target both moderate food prices for all citizens and maintenance of a viable rural sector. Because incomes are relatively high, markets generally work well and there is active trade in food products, these middle income countries are on the whole food secure. Nonetheless, these countries are exposed to three sets of risks. The first set of risks stems from the fact that rural populations of these countries are often in relatively low-income rainfed farming households. Poorer rural areas and households are vulnerable to fluctuating conditions and yields in their agricultural production and may have problems both of access and affordability for buying food. These agricultural risks will certainly be intensified by climate change, bringing increased risk of reduced production and incomes for rural people. The second set of risks, faced by the whole population but particularly by the poor, for whom staples make up a large share of the budget, is the risk of price spikes such as that which occurred in 2007/8. Finally, these countries – most of which are net food importers – face the possibility of a long term increase in global food prices. This may not happen (see above) but nations are well advised to be on their toes. These two latter risks are not particularly sensitive to climate change.

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In terms of policy, the most effective risk reduction strategy for rural areas is a rural livelihoods strategy focussed on agricultural productivity and risk management and on off-farm diversification. For the population as a whole, safety nets are the best way of protecting the most vulnerable, together with long term investment in education, health and family planning. An exportled strategy to ensure there is the foreign exchange for imports is indicated, and domestically there may be scope for improving supply chain efficiency to ensure food availability and to keep costs down. Better-off countries and food security The region contains some of the most affluent countries in the word – the oilexporting countries of the Arabian Peninsula. These countries have largely urbanized populations and high levels of per capita income. Although they all have promoted domestic agricultural production, particularly of high value fruits and vegetables, most of their food needs are imported. Because almost all of the domestic food production in these countries is based on pumping out fossil groundwater, there is comparatively little risk from climate change (although there is a massive risk of resource depletion from over-pumping). Nonetheless there are likely to be impacts, particularly in countries where there is still considerable recharge and where there is a sizable agricultural area. Oman, for example, faces increased warming which is likely to increase effective aridity, with higher temperatures increasing evapotranspiration and producing hotter summers and shorter winters (see Chapter 2: Crop yields and production). Reduced and more variable rainfall, particularly in northern regions of the country, will further increase aridity and risk, including the risk of drought, and reduce recharge of the aquifers. In addition, extreme events, particularly destructive cyclones and an associated risk of flooding, will reduce production in the year of incidence. Plainly, even these rich dry countries need to do their agricultural planning and to factor in climate risks. The main food security objective of these very rich states, however, is simply to have secure assurance of food supplies. The principal threat is not production, markets or lack of finance but geopolitical risk, which threatens constantly to interrupt food supply. During the turbulent past three decades in the region, there have been examples of this risk, beginning with the Suez crisis of 1956, the two Arab–Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and the two Gulf wars. In particular, the countries of the Gulf are very aware that the Straits of Hormuz are just 29 miles across. One example of actual breach of food security was the disruption to shipments during the First Gulf War. The responses are clear. Better off countries requiring assurance of food supplies can reduce exposure to market supply and price risks not only by

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improving supply chain efficiency, but also by using risk management instruments like futures. In these countries, strategic food storage may also be an attractive option. Towards strengthened food security policies in the region: the selfsufficiency trade-off There is cost to aiming at food self-sufficiency, and a potential trade-off with productivity and incomes. A series of shocks since the First Gulf War have sharpened preoccupations in the region about food security and have led to calls for increased food production to achieve a higher level of self-sufficiency. As discussed in Chapter 1, no country in the region is self-sufficient in cereals, although three major countries are two thirds self-sufficient (Egypt, Iran, Morocco). National strategy may call for increases in levels of food selfsufficiency. This may sometime be in the interests of the nation on economic grounds as well as security grounds: Egypt, for example, is amongst the world’s most efficient producers of rice, and it may be that at the margin it is in the interests of both farmer and the nation that the choice of crop be rice. In other situations, the state may call for cereals production but the farmer won’t comply: in Yemen, for example, there has been from time to time a call to increase cereals production, both to increase food supply and also to reduce the production of the soft drug, qat. However, the farmer knows that he can get ten times the return per m3 of water if he produces vegetables (or qat) for market, and he has a family to feed from his half hectare plot. At the macroeconomic scale, the cost of the trade-offs involved can be massive. As discussed above, a recent study in Morocco on the trade-offs between self-sufficiency and food security showed that self-sufficiency would come at a high cost – about $10 billion 2008–22 – and that to produce higher value crops as an alternative would not only create more wealth for the country but would increase agricultural employment. The challenge of food security may be different at the local or household level, particularly in the remoter areas and in the semi-subsistence farming systems of poorer countries like Yemen. In these poor rural areas and farming systems, actions to raise the productivity of all crops would certainly improve household level food security. The most at-risk households are those of the landless and where women are the heads, but where poor households have land, food crop production is necessarily a priority unless there is a possibility of producing and selling high value cash crops. It is not only economics that drives the extensive cereals cultivation across the rainfed systems of the Middle East and North Africa – cereals cultivation accounts for two thirds of the region’s cultivated area. There is no doubt that investment in the productivity of rainfed cereals cultivation – and of all crops – alongside

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investment in rural infrastructure and services, would strengthen the food security of these poor households, and national food security policies need to align with agricultural and rural development programmes to this end. Towards strengthened food security policies in the region: alternative approaches Following the shocks of 2008, countries in the region have paid considerable attention to food security strategy (see above). Based on experience, the main goals of food security strategy in the region are: (1) improved data and strengthened capacity for evidence-based decision making; (2) protecting vulnerable households nationwide by strengthening safety nets (cash transfers, labour-intensive employment programmes, health and nutrition interventions, with a particular focus on women and children) and by investing in education and family planning; (3) protecting rural households and contributing to national food supply and price stability by a rural livelihoods strategy principally focussed on enhancing agricultural and off-farm incomes and production through investment in research & development, rural infrastructure and market development; (4) promoting the development of efficient and sustainable food systems and value chains; and (5) reducing exposure to market supply and price risks. Strategy elements aiming to manage supply and price risks include: an export-led growth strategy to earn foreign exchange to import food; improving supply chain efficiency; and introducing cost-effective risk management instruments (food reserves, buffer stocks, forward contracting, financial hedging products, etc.). Countries in the region have also discussed how to promote and support regional and global responses to protect against price volatility. Food security strategies clearly have to be adapted to the nature of the risks. A variety of strategic responses is possible for different groups of countries – see Table 6.2, which maps options for strategic responses onto the assessment of food security vulnerabilities in Chapter 1. Regional cooperation on food security has gathered pace. There are now annual Regional Multi-Stakeholder Workshops on Food Security and Nutrition, organized under the aegis of the FAO. There is also a Regional Network for Food Loss and Waste Reduction.

Coping with the food security crisis in Syria and other post-conflict countries in the region Starting recovery with the rural and agriculture sector As the home of a large proportion of the population of the conflict-affected countries, as the breadbasket and as a reserve of peace and a haven of refuge in

Price spikes Difficult access and affordability for poorer rural areas and households

Principally Yemen

Maghreb and Mashreq countries

Oil-exporting countries of the Arabian peninsula

Poorer countries with vulnerable populations dependent on farming

Middle income countries that want moderate food prices for their citizens and to maintain a viable rural sector

Better off countries requiring assurance of food supplies

Geopolitical risk

Rural malnutrition and famine

Examples

Main food security vulnerabilities

Food security strategy options for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Country characteristics

Table 6.2

† † †

† †

†

† †

Safety nets, education, family planning Rural livelihoods strategy focussed on agricultural productivity and risk management Bilateral and multilateral agreements for food aid Safety nets, education, family planning Rural livelihoods strategy focussed on agricultural productivity and risk management, off-farm incomes, etc. Improving supply chain efficiency. Improving supply chain efficiency. Risk-management instruments.

Principal strategic responses

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troubled times, the rural and agricultural sector has a prime role in helping populations weather the crises in the region and to emerge from them.29 Typically, agriculture is the first sector to recover from crisis, because the factors of production can be more rapidly mobilized. Agriculture is thus key to recovery. It is a first point of entry for mitigating the impact of conflict on food insecurity, poverty, employment and economic growth. Producing and selling food, generating rural incomes and employment, rebuilding household-level food security, and reconstructing social cohesion and institutions from the bottom up, agriculture is key to stabilization and ultimately to peace building. Building resilience as the basis for rural food security The key concept in rebuilding food security in the shattered rural economies of Syria and neighbouring areas is resilience, that is, the capacity of systems and people, in the face of shocks, to absorb, adapt and transform and to optimize well-being. The concept of resilience shapes the three lenses through which the Syria crisis and post-crisis situations can be viewed. The first lens focuses on the immediate crisis. This requires rapid interventions to support the food security of vulnerable populations, including displaced people, refugees and host communities. Beyond the simple provision of food aid, which is needed on a massive scale, rural people need to be able to get quickly back to farming and producing. This requires, for example, distribution of seeds and animal feed, and support to kitchen garden production for essential fruits, vegetables and staples. The second lens brings the focus onto the task of rebuilding resilient systems and restoring livelihoods, through investment in infrastructure, research, technology transfer, market development, and so on. The third lens looks further ahead to the task of undoing the systemic distortions in agriculture, natural resources and the rural sector in Syria and, to a lesser extent, in neighbouring countries. These distortions, described in Chapter 3, helped to fuel the crisis in Syria in the first place. They led to youth unemployment, migration and gender inequity; to vulnerable and food insecure populations; to water scarcity and natural resource degradation; and to an agriculture under stress and vulnerable to climate change. Through this third lens we see the long term challenge: to effect the structural and systemic changes that will bring the equity and sustainability that underpin peaceful prosperous rural livelihoods. Food security responses to the Syria crisis thus need to look beyond the humanitarian interventions to begin rebuilding resilience in rural areas as soon as political and security conditions allow it and even whilst humanitarian relief efforts are underway. This requires programmes targeting

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economic growth and employment with special attention to youth and gender; it requires a focus on equity and rebuilding social cohesion and institutions; and it requires a focus on the factors of resilience for systems and households and a focus on long term sustainable development. A strategic approach Building resilience in post-conflict agricultural systems, rural households and natural resources requires both the short term and the long term to be considered in planning from the very beginning, ‘bridging the humanitarian/ development divide’. Approaches need to fit within national policies. Because of the essentially local nature of the problems and the related interventions, community consultation, participation and ownership are vital, as is working with local government at all levels. Leadership and ownership are also essential at all levels. Strategies need to be constructed in the light of the political and security situation. Because of the complex nature of the challenges, building resilience requires multiple agencies to work together, with joint analysis and programming. Programmes need to be flexible in the light of experience and the evolving political and strategic situation. There need to be time, financing and mechanisms for analysis, evaluation, knowledge sharing and learning, so that interventions can be improved and adjusted. Harnessing the opportunities How, then, can resilient livelihoods, agriculture and food security be rebuilt in the countries affected by the Syrian crisis? And how can the longer term structural issues of equity and efficiency, employment, gender and the sustainable use of natural resource use in rural areas be corrected? There will be no one way to do this, especially as the situations in Syria and in the crisis-affected countries neighbouring Syria – Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan – are so different. In addition, the intensification of the conflict and the sustained migration flows have not only created short term crises but have also exacerbated some of the pre-existing structural vulnerabilities in all these countries. Interventions need to be tailored to each specific location and to address not just the short-term problems but also the long-term systemic issues. A first pathway would be to improve food security and nutrition through support to smallholder crop and livestock production. The immediate aim would be to reduce vulnerability, thereby contributing to easing tensions and peacebuilding. An example would be the FAO project in Iraq Increasing Profitability of Livestock Production, which targeted resilience to drought and

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market volatility by providing cash for work for both internally displaced people (IDPs) and the local people. The programme provided good incomes to support households through lean times, constructed useful communal productive assets to sustain the livestock economy, and helped rebuild community institutions and a sense of community. In the longer term, the objective would be to help develop efficient, equitable and sustainable food systems and food security for all, strengthen integration and efficiency along the value chain, reduce losses and wastage, and ensure that gender considerations are integrated. More broadly, the long-term goal would be to maximize the productivity and resilience of smallholder agriculture, and to get smallholders integrated into commercial value chains. A second set of approaches would aim at promoting sustainable livelihoods and employment opportunities. The immediate objective would be to ensure that small scale producers, communities and displaced populations have increased access to agriculture-based livelihoods and employment opportunities. An example of an intervention that achieved this short term objective but also contributed to other development goals was the FAO project in Jordan Improving rural livelihoods and the environment, which targeted communities that were experiencing environmental problems but which were also obliged to host a very large number of Syrian refugees. The concept was to use organic solid waste for the production of renewable energy and compost. The project promoted labour-intensive processes for generating renewable energy through adoption of sustainable ‘waste to energy’ and ‘waste to compost’. The project brought the multiple economic gains of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing the costs of solid and liquid waste disposal, providing low cost off-grid energy and generating green jobs. The effect, however, went beyond that, as the success of the project helped to weave the social tissue back together and create a positive relationship between local people and refugees. Beyond short term interventions such as this one, the longer-term goal is to ensure a more diversified rural economy with decent employment opportunities for all and especially for youth and women. Sustainable use of natural resources is a third axis. Beyond near-term objectives of restoring productive capacity – for example, rehabilitating canals and irrigation schemes or strengthening dams – the longer-term aims include decentralization and modernization of irrigation, sustainable and more equitable use of groundwater, maximum crop or dollar per drop of water through efficiency gains along the whole value chain, and the inclusion of women in decisions on natural resources. One FAO project in Jordan, Reducing Vulnerability in the Context of Water Scarcity, adopted a three-pronged approach to help both refugees and local would-be migrants in disadvantaged communities, including both refugees

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and hosts. The project used cash for work approaches and combined water harvesting, conjunctive use of groundwater, and solar power for lifting irrigation water, so spanning short term needs for household income and long term objectives of a more diversified rural economy and sustainable use of natural resources. Finally, all these changes need to be underpinned by strengthened capacity and institutions. A resilient, efficient, equitable and sustainable rural sector requires farmers who have the necessary knowledge; local participatory institutions that can act fairly in the interests of both society and the environment; and government that has the capacity to plan for the longer term for agricultural systems which are resilient to risks and shocks, and which provide optimal prosperity and employment equitably, efficiently and sustainably.

Conclusion Climate change as both challenge and opportunity Climate change, whatever its causes, is a reality for the Middle East and North Africa. There is, after all, a history of climate change in the region more extreme than anything in our current thinking. Little more than ten thousand years ago, the Arabian peninsula was covered in the dense vegetation that is the source of today’s hydrocarbon wealth. Yet, for now, these extremes are no more than a distant prospect. For the foreseeable future, climate change in the Arab region is likely to act as a ‘threat multiplier’ rather than as a ‘game changer’. It will increase many of the complex challenges that are already present, such as water scarcity, growing populations, environmental degradation and unemployment. Many governments have taken steps toward developing overall climate change adaptation strategies and more detailed strategies for the key areas of agricultural production, rural livelihoods and food security. Often strategies for climate change adaptation reinforce or complement programmes and projects already taking place. Adaptation plans will vary amongst countries, reflecting the region‘s varying environmental, socio-economic and political conditions. A range of policy measures (regulatory, financial, and information instruments) will be needed within strategic frameworks to address both the institutional and economic barriers to adaptation, as well as the changing natural environment. Transformation of the agricultural sector under adaptation strategies can yield important economic results as well as enhance food security. When allied with economic diversification programmes, the development returns might be substantial. There are thus important opportunities to be grasped as well as challenges to be faced in developing adaptation strategies.

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Given the current political complexities in the Middle East and North Africa region, responding to the impacts of climate change may seem daunting, but it is imperative that the agricultural production systems of countries in the region incorporate climate resilience if future social and economic risks are to be managed. Communities in this region have survived changing climates in the past, but current demographic and other pressures are so great that national governments need to be actively involved in adaptation plans so that people are able to sustain their existence in rural areas and food is available to all. If adaptation to climate change can be properly managed, the agricultural sector and the rural economy could not only cope with many of the risks of climate change but also strengthen the structure of the sector through more sustainable land and water management practices and a higher productivity agriculture.30 Food security and peacebuilding Actions to restore food security to the shattered populations and economies of the regions’ crisis-torn countries are an imperative. But could measures that would help build resilience and food security also help to build peace again?31 Support to economic revitalization, notably through agriculture, is one of the five priority post-conflict peace building areas identified in the 2009 UN report: Peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict.32 Combined with a mix of other interventions prioritizing the rural sector (such as education, health, infrastructure and social protection), a range of measures to help assure food security – building agricultural resilience into post-crisis rural economies, dynamizing agricultural value chains and developing off-farm activities – can certainly contribute to stabilization and peace. In particular, interventions aimed at food security in the short term can play a role in peacebuilding and make a contribution to a ‘peace dividend’ if they are timely and tangible. Chapter 1 gives examples: school feeding programmes, which support both education and nutrition; delivery of seeds and tools that help people to resettle back into their farms and communities; improving equitable access to land and water for poor households, for example, through providing irrigation water to groups or communities rather than to individuals; and cash for work, which provides income, builds infrastructure, and restores social cohesion. Well done, food security interventions also build capacity and can help restore the legitimacy of institutions. In the longer term, comprehensive and inclusive economic growth strategies that address the systemic issues and promote equitable and sustainable rural economies will help consolidate these gains and rebuild a peaceful society.

CHAPTER 7 WATER CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Options for managing and resolving water conflict Water conflict, in its broad definition as unresolved competition over water, has proved to be a normal stage in the evolution of water institutions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Emerging or actual conflict signals problems in water management, to which responses may range from polite discussion of a policy issue to extreme violence. Conflict is an indication that water institutions are failing to achieve the commonly agreed goals of water policy: social equity in terms of fair distribution of benefits, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability.1 If conflicts persist unresolved, outcomes risk being the opposite of those agreed goals: growing inequity and impoverishment; high costs and unpredictable supplies; and eroded and deteriorated environmental capital. These outcomes can lead to a variety of undesirable social and political impacts, from local level confrontations and violence to collapse of traditional institutions and social disintegration, through chaotic rural-urban migration, to broader disaffection, undermined trust in government and civil unrest. Although ‘water wars’ or ‘water civil wars’ are unlikely, unmanaged water conflict can certainly contribute to internal armed struggle or insurgency, as it may have in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, or it may fester as part of a set of long term, intractable grievances between nations, as between Israel and the Palestinians. Improvements in water governance are the key to water conflict resolution. If conflict is essentially a failure of water governance and institutions, it follows that the principal approaches to conflict resolution in the water sector have to be sought in improved water governance. In the broadest sense, water

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conflict resolution is no different from improved water governance. The path to allaying conflict lies through improving water institutions, accountabilities and programmes. Water conflict management is thus a process of adaptation that can resolve conflict by influencing policies, institutions, programmes, accountability and behaviour. Conflict management may range from very formal processes such as legislation or judicial suits, through a broad range of formal and informal institutional arrangements. Within the region, all points on this spectrum can be observed, from the very formal negotiations leading towards a cooperative agreement on the Nile, through the passage of water laws (in almost all countries of the region) or prosecution of government officers (as in Iran and Jordan), down to a myriad traditional institutions that work because they are respected. Experience in the region suggests that there are four factors which determine what is likely to be the form of conflict management most apt to resolve the issue and move to a new equilibrium. The first of these factors is the level of the conflict. Taking the analytical framework of Chapter 3, which distinguished between higher level conflicts at national or sectoral level, and local conflicts, it appears that these higher level conflicts at national or sectoral level are more likely to be managed through formal processes, while local level conflicts are usually managed by semi-formal or informal processes. The second factor determining the form of conflict management is the degree of confidence in the available institutions, and the legitimacy of those institutions. Disputants will favour the process which they trust to produce a fair or favourable outcome. In Egypt, one study of local level conflict resolution found that the stronger preferred the modern institutions that talked their language, and the weaker – the tail-enders on an irrigation scheme, the illiterate and women – preferred the more accessible informal mechanisms which worked through neighbours and community leaders.2 The severity and immediacy of the problem is a third factor that may drive the choice of conflict resolution methods. Those faced with a conflict that threatens their livelihood will look for a swift, decisive outcome and are more likely to turn to civil unrest or violence. The case discussed in Chapter 3, where Yemeni villagers drove off a government drilling team by force of arms, is a case in point. A final factor is the quality of overall governance in the country and the level of people’s confidence in governing bodies in society. Parties to conflict in well-ordered countries like Jordan are much less likely to opt for informal or non-licit responses than they are in generally unruly, low governance countries like Yemen.

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With this background, the chapter looks first in general at options for managing and resolving conflict. The discussion examines the reciprocal relationship between water conflict and water governance, assessing ways in which better water governance helps resolve water conflict – and the ways in which water conflict and conflict resolution can be a normal part of the process of adapting and improving water governance. There is then a discussion of the principles of transboundary water management and of how they may be applied to move from conflict to cooperation, with a detailed examination of three cases: the West Bank, the Nile and the Euphrates. The remaining sections of the chapter examine approaches to resolving conflict through good water management within national boundaries. A framework for conflict management and resolution As a guide to the organization of this chapter, Table 7.1 sets out a schematic framework for analysing conflict management and resolution, applied at the three levels distinguished in the typology worked out in Chapter 3: the transboundary level, the national or sectoral level and the local level. Transboundary-level conflicts essentially arise where there is competition in the absence of a cooperative framework. Conflict management at this level is likely to be through formal institutional processes between nations. An example of this is the agreement on the division of the resources of the Jordan river basin where the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, commonly known as the Johnston Plan, was agreed between Israel and Jordan. A brief review of this case will illustrate the processes and issues involved. In 1953, Israel had begun construction of a water carrier to take water from the Sea of Galilee to the populous centre and agricultural south of the country, while Jordan concluded an agreement with Syria, known as the Bunger plan, to dam the Yarmouk river near Maqarin and divert the waters to irrigate land in the east bank of the Jordan Valley. Military clashes ensued, and US President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched Ambassador Johnston to the region to work out a plan that would regulate water usage. The plan was based on principles similar to those embodied in the Marshall Plan – reducing the potential for conflict by promoting cooperation and economic stability. This ‘Johnston Plan’ was approved by technical water committees of all the regional riparian countries – Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Though the plan was subsequently rejected by the Arab League, both Israel and Jordan undertook to abide by their allocations under the plan. The US provided funding for Israel’s National Water Carrier after receiving assurances from Israel that it would continue to abide by the plan’s allocations.

Transboundary level: † Competition in the absence of a cooperative framework National or sectoral level: † Water allocation conflicts † Policy induced conflicts † Environmental conflicts Local level: † Technology-induced conflicts † Conflicts due to government intervention

Social equity

Environmental sustainability

Economic efficiency

Conflicts that arise from failures in water governance

Institutional and accountability change

Policy and programme change

Eroded and deteriorated environmental capital

High costs and unpredictable supplies

Inequity, impoverishment

Negative outcomes of inaction or failure

Range of possible results Improved water management

Informal institutional Behaviour processes change

Formal institutional processes

Conflict management processes

A framework for conflict management and resolution

Objectives of water governance

Table 7.1

Confrontation, local violence Collapse of traditional institutions Social disintegration Rural-urban migration Disaffection Undermined trust in government Mobilization of civil society Civil unrest Demonstrations, riots Insurgency

Possible itinerary of deterioration

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Similar funding was provided for Jordan’s East Ghor Main Canal project after similar assurances were obtained from Jordan. This example illustrates how negotiated and mediated cooperation can result in a peaceful agreement to mutual benefit. Later events in the region also illustrate what may happen in the case of breakdown, or if there is no forum for negotiation. In the mid-1960s, Syria, which was not party to the agreements on the Johnston Plan, attempted to reduce the operation of Israel’s National Water Carrier by diverting the headwaters of the Jordan. The diversion works would have reduced the water availability for Israel’s National Carrier by about 35 per cent, and Israel’s overall water supply by about 11 per cent. Israel responded with air raids into Syria, leading to a series of military clashes which played a part in precipitating the 1967 Six Days War. Likewise on the Nile, in the absence of a formal agreement amongst all three Blue Nile riparians, Egypt several times threatened hostilities against Ethiopia in the case of unilateral development of the Nile in Ethiopian territory. This, however, occurred before the establishment in 1995 of the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Resources (Nile-COM) and the agreement on the Nile River Basin Action Plan, since when discussions have been conducted within that framework without belligerency. The whole course of Nile cooperation is discussed in detail below in the section Cooperation on the Nile. Within a nation at the national or sectoral level, three typical classes of conflict were analysed in Chapter 3: water allocation conflicts, policy-induced conflicts and environmental conflicts. Where there is sound overall governance (including ways of contesting government decisions) and working water institutions in which people have confidence, formal institutional processes would clearly be the preferred approach to conflict resolution. Much, however, depends on the political economy and the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of formal institutions. If power relations are skewed within the country, or if governance and institutions are unsound, there may be disaffection and undermined trust in government. Mobilization of civil society may ensue. If these processes do not address the conflict, there may even be the civil unrest, demonstrations and riots documented in Chapter 3. At the local level, Chapter 3 sketched out a pre-lapsarian ideal of traditionally negotiated institutions. These traditional institutions have collapsed on a broad front in the face of the irruption of modern technology such as the tubewell and the Siren Song of the market and commercial agriculture. All across the region, modern technology has undermined traditional institutions on a broad front. As myriad springs dried up in Yemen, oases dried out in Saudi Arabia or aflaj ran dry in Oman, the traditional governance institutions disappeared along with the source they were intended to conserve and sustain. The end result has been rural pauperization,

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disintegration of rural society and culture and rural-urban migration to swell the slums of the cities. The case of Yemen’s Wadi Bani Khawlan discussed in Chapter 3 is an eloquent example. The locally powerful upstreamers have prospered but downstream areas have been left desolate and their populations angry. Most men from the lower wadi have migrated in search of work, joining a disaffected population in the slums of Ta’iz. Chapter 3 also described how government interventions are equally prone to disturb old equilibria and to provoke conflict. These changes can lead to local frictions, to confrontations and to local violence. Is conflict a help? The threat of conflict can give an impulse to reform, through ‘decisive moments’. When the risk of conflict becomes apparent, this may be a moment that will force change. Several examples have been described in this study of how conflict may trigger beneficial change by sudden, dramatic events. For example, the Algeria riots mentioned in Chapter 3 were a stimulus to acceptance of water reforms. Successive severe droughts in Morocco in the early 1980s stimulated water policy reform, including the passage of the 1995 Water Law. A long interruption in urban water supply in Ta’iz, Yemen in 1995 triggered a national debate and the start of water sector reform.3 Good practice in water management as a pathway to conflict resolution Through actions both from the top-down and at the local level, good practice in water management is the pathway to conflict resolution. Chapter 4 discussed the global consensus on best practice in water management which has emerged progressively over the last thirty years and which was built into the principles adopted at the Dublin Conference in 1992. Taken together, this suite of approaches, known as ‘integrated water resources management’ (IWRM), sets out the principles for improved water governance and management. These principles represent the tools required for conflict management and resolution. They require actions from the policy level ‘from the top’, and actions at the local level. The rest of this chapter summarizes how these tools can be applied to conflict situations through a series of approaches to improve infrastructure, governance and management both from the top and at the local level. Table 7.4 at the end of this chapter gives a summary.

From conflict to cooperation on transboundary waters Best practice in transboundary water management and conflict resolution seeks to achieve the goals of fair distribution of benefits, economic efficiency

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and environmental sustainability through agreement on some level of cooperation. The ultimate goal would be a comprehensive agreement between all riparians providing for: cooperative arrangements for development and management; agreement on how water or benefits are to be shared equitably; institutional mechanisms, rules and organizations for decision taking, conflict resolution and implementation; arrangements for mutual monitoring; and mechanisms for planning and investment optimized at the basin scale. These points essentially reflect the principles of cooperation enshrined in the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which requires equitable utilization of water and benefits from water, no significant harm to existing interests or to the resource, and a duty to cooperate in protection and development of the shared resource. The convention was approved by the UN General Assembly but has not been ratified by a number of states. Significantly, the states which have not ratified the Convention include the three strong regional riparians which have the whip hand over transboundary waters in the Middle East – Israel, Turkey and Egypt.

Transboundary cooperation in practice: the case of the West Bank aquifers In the region, there is at present no comprehensive cooperation agreement on transboundary waters. There are some semi-formal agreements, including the agreement of Israel and Jordan referred to above, based on the Johnston Plan. Surprisingly, the only formal agreement which partially covers transboundary waters is the ill-starred agreement between Israel and Palestine enshrined in Article 40 of the Oslo accords. Lessons for transboundary cooperation can be learned from this dismal experience. In 1995, Article 40 of the Oslo II agreement set up joint governance arrangements over shared water resources. The agreement contained provisions on water and sewage that recognized undefined Palestinian water rights and returned some West Bank water resources and services responsibility to the Palestinian Authority. The agreement established a Joint Water Council (JWC) to oversee management of the shared aquifers, with decisions to be based on consensus between the two parties. Article 40 allocated to either party specific quantities of the three aquifers underlying both territories – the share allocated to the Palestinian West Bank was about one quarter of the allocation to Israel and the settlements. Interim extra supplies (28.6 million m3) were also to be provided to the Palestinian Territories from new wells and from the Israeli water supply company, Mekorot.

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In principle, these arrangements appear clear, equitable and to provide a consensual governance framework for integrated management of the shared resource. However, in practice, this agreement has not brought the anticipated benefits to the Palestinian side. In fact, the outcomes have been quite negative for the Palestinians. Why? The failure of the Joint Water Council as a forum for integrated water resource management Although Article 40 provided for joint governance arrangements, in practice the Joint Water Council (JWC) has not fulfilled its role of providing a collaborative governance framework for joint resource management and investment. A first flaw is that the mandate of the JWC only deals with a part of the shared resource. Its remit covers only planning, investment and management for the parts of the three shared aquifers which lie within the West Bank. Whilst 85 per cent of the largest of these three aquifers, the Western Aquifer, arises in the West Bank, the gradient of the flow is towards Israel, where planning, investment and management are under the control of Israel alone. In practice, Israel extracts 94 per cent of the water from the Western Aquifer. Overall, three-quarters of abstractions from the three shared aquifers are not within the control of the JWC but fall under Israeli control and unilateral planning and decision taking. Thus, by definition, integrated management of the shared aquifers is not possible. A second flaw in the JWC governance arrangements is that the governance system established by Article 40 requires the approval by Israel of any proposed Palestinian management measure or infrastructure project within the West Bank. This arrangement, together with the way it has been implemented, has effectively given Israel control over the allocation and management of West Bank water resources. Israel essentially has a veto on Palestinian projects presented to the JWC. In practice, a high proportion of Palestinian projects has been rejected or long delayed in the JWC and stringent rules and controls exercised by the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank place additional constraints on planning and investment. Israeli projects drawing on the shared aquifers but on the Israeli side of the Green Line are not presented to the JWC – yet three-quarters of the water drawn from the aquifers is being extracted through these projects. Israeli occupation in Area C (60 per cent of the West Bank) consolidates this control, which makes integrated planning and management of water resources virtually impossible for the Palestinian Authority. A third point concerns lop-sided access to information. Palestinians cannot obtain information about Israeli-operated wells inside the West Bank, but the Israelis monitor the Palestinian wells. Yet information sharing is necessary for

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integrated management and for infrastructure planning. A case in point is the issue of climate change, where coordination across borders is essential as precipitation patterns change. The most obvious, visible proof of these risks is in the recent drought, during which the water level of the Sea of Galilee repeatedly dropped below the ‘red line’. Finally, the apparently consensual rules set out in Article 40 are undermined by the informal practices of decision-making and enforcement under which only the Palestinian party is compelled to follow the rules. Taken together, the operation of JWC, Civil Administration rules and movement and access restrictions have combined with Palestinian institutional weaknesses and with shortfalls in aid effectiveness to reduce the development of water resources and services for Palestinians well below levels expected at the time of Oslo. In reality, the JWC does not function as a ‘joint’ water resource governance institution because of fundamental asymmetries – of power, of capacity, of information, of interests – that prevent the development of a consensual approach to resolving water management conflicts. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the governance arrangements agreed at Oslo protect the interests of the stronger party at the expense of the weaker. Constraints to Palestinian water investment and services In addition to the flaws in the set-up which make integrated planning and management of the shared resource impossible, the Joint Water Council (JWC) has not been an effective mechanism for facilitating water sector investment and services. Politics and policy issues have made the process of considering projects very slow, and have limited the number of project approvals. Despite ambitious plans, little more than half of the Oslo II ‘immediate needs’ for water supply in the West Bank has been developed. Palestinian abstractions in the West Bank have actually dropped below the basic level recognized in Oslo II (104 million m3 in 2014 against 118 million m3 in Oslo). The main shortfall is in the North East Aquifer. Part of this is due to a drop in the water table because of over-extraction by Israel, and part to inadequate maintenance or impaired rehabilitation of wells. Israel has used its role as de facto regulator to prevent Palestinian drilling in the Western Aquifer, despite growing demand from Palestinian consumers and whilst increasing its own offtake from the aquifer above the levels agreed at Oslo. At best, the Palestinian Authority’s role is reduced to improving water and sanitation services to Palestinian communities within the constraints laid down. However, investment – and investment efficiency – in West Bank water supply and sanitation infrastructure have dropped to very low levels. Current

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investment in the West Bank water sector is one-tenth of planned levels. Few major investments are going ahead and more is being invested in small local emergency projects than in large infrastructure projects, such as those required for optimal integrated regional management of resources. In effect, emergency projects have become the norm. Only one quarter of wastewater generated in the West Bank is collected in networks, and only two thirds of the quantity collected is treated. One third of sewage (18 million m3) is discharged raw into wadis each year where it flows down the watercourses, most of it entering Israel.4 Sector investment is inefficient due to poor planning, implementation delays, political and security problems and the resulting costs. Many investments never get off the drawing board and when they do, they encounter multiple administrative hurdles for permitting and implementation that lead to higher costs. In any case, in the deteriorating political and economic climate, investment alone is not enough to improve service delivery. Who is really in control of West Bank water? Essentially, Israel, through the JWC, regulates Palestinian water investment and extraction from the shared resource – but Palestinians have no reciprocal right to regulate Israeli investment or extraction. In addition, there is asymmetry of information available to the parties, as the Israelis are able to monitor Palestinian extraction, but not vice-versa. Finally, Israeli military control over much of the West Bank reinforces its power over water decisions. In practice, Israel’s veto on Palestinian water projects and its power to limit Palestinian abstractions give Israel control over West Bank water resources. About 85 per cent of the recharge of the Western Aquifer is in the West Bank, but Israel does not have to drill in the West Bank mountains or to have wells on Palestinian land in order to exploit the aquifer. It is easier and more secure and economical for Israel if it extracts water from the Israeli-side foothills. Thus, 94 per cent of the Western Aquifer yields are pumped from west of the Green Line. In order to maintain control of the resource, Israel can prevent Palestinians from drilling in the West Bank, which it is effectively doing, as demonstrated by its application of Article 40. At the same time, the Western Aquifer is being over-pumped by Israel.5 Lessons from Article 40 and the West Bank In summary, asymmetrical power and flaws in the Oslo II agreement have undermined the joint management objectives of Article 40, to the detriment of the weaker party. The problems that underlie these failings are clear. The governance system set up under Article 40 does not facilitate rational planning and development of shared water resources. The investment environment creates huge costs and delays. Implementation constraints can

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make the movement of even one pipe a logistical and administrative challenge. The capacity of Palestinian institutions for planning, implementation and management is weak, in part due to the constraints imposed by this arrangement. Essentially, integrated resource management is impossible under current conditions, and the development effort has dwindled to a series of stop-gap coping strategies that preclude rational development of the resource and the provision of quality water services to the Palestinian population and for the development of the Palestinian economy. There is no mechanism – and no strong coalition for change – to work collaboratively to resolve current unsustainable water practices, particularly aquifer overdrafting. And while it seems these problems can only be solved on the political front, the path forward has until now been entrenched in the stagnating political process of peace negotiations. The lesson is that transboundary water management requires a political agreement based on agreed principles rather than on power relations. Parties which really want to cooperate could do worse than to think through and apply the principles in the UN Convention on International Watercourses: equitable utilization, no significant harm and a duty to cooperate in protection and development.

Cooperation on the Nile: experience and lessons The most ambitious programme of transboundary river basin cooperation in the region to date has been on the Nile. For over twenty years, the riparians have been working together to develop a cooperative mechanism that embodies most of the principles of cooperative management of transboundary waters. This has included the setting up of a governance framework, an intensive series of investments and activities to build capacity, trust and the patterns and tools of cooperation, and a vast programme of infrastructure investments to generate benefits from cooperation over the use of Nile waters. These activities have been paralleled by a ‘political’ track to develop and adopt a Cooperative Framework Agreement designed to establish a lasting basis for cooperation and benefit sharing. This two-decade-long experience is far from complete, but the itinerary has already brought significant gains and benefits, and is rich in lessons. The importance of cooperation on the Nile The Nile River is a major regional resource and global asset. It is the world’s longest river, travelling more than 6,700 kilometres from its most distant source at the headwaters of the Kagera Basin in Rwanda and Burundi to its delta in Egypt on the Mediterranean Sea. The river is shared by eleven

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countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The basin covers three million square kilometres – one-tenth of Africa’s land mass. For millennia the Nile River has played a central role in human settlement and in the development of a rich diversity of cultures and livelihoods. Its role in Egyptian history, economy and society for five millennia or more is worldfamous. Everybody knows Herodotus’ famous line Egypt is the gift of the Nile, but the river has played a vital role in all the riparian countries. The basin includes world class environmental assets, notably Lake Victoria, the secondlargest freshwater body in the world, and the vast wetlands of the Sudd, roughly the size of Belgium. Today, the basin is home to an estimated 238 million people, and more than 400 million people in total live in the eleven countries that share and depend on Nile waters. This total population is expected to increase to 648 million by 2030. All of these people rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on the waters of the Nile for their basic needs and for economic growth. Development challenges are considerable with many of the countries of the Nile basin characterized by extreme poverty. There is a history of tensions and instability in the region, both between states and internal to states. Increasing population and consequent pressure on resources are expected to worsen this situation. Past strategic concerns about the Nile are well-known. Nineteenth-century rivalries between Britain and France over control of the Upper Nile, which culminated in the famous Fashoda Incident and the British appropriation of most of the upper Nile basin, were driven partly by concern to ensure control over the development and management of the Nile. The Egypt–Sudan Nile agreements which divided up Nile flows between the two countries brought enormous benefits to those two countries based on the development of storage, hydropower, irrigation and water supply infrastructure. However, the unilateral rights to development which the two downstream riparians asserted underlay much forthright and sometimes belligerent diplomatic action in the second half of the twentieth century, which occasionally threatened to tip over into military intervention (see the section A fertile field for conflict in Chapter 3). The economic case for managing and developing the Nile at the basin scale In a seminal 2005 paper, Dale Whittington and colleagues argued that there was a strong economic case for cooperation amongst riparians to manage and develop the Nile at the basin scale rather than in segments determined by the decisions of each of the eleven riparians. The paper presented the results of an economic model designed to optimize the water resources of the entire Nile Basin, increasing the economic benefits from irrigated agriculture and

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hydropower generation, reducing risks and costs of floods, drought and sedimentation, and maximizing the availability of water for economic use the length of the river.6 The model tested a variety of scenarios, including a ‘cooperative full development’ scenario under which all proposed projects (Blue Nile reservoirs, wetlands conservation projects and White Nile power projects) are completed and operated to optimize economic benefits for the whole basin. Under this scenario, multipurpose dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Blue Nile watershed could allow better management of the Blue Nile flood, generate considerable hydropower income, reduce risks of drought, flood and sedimentation for Sudan and Egypt, and increase the total flow available for Blue Nile riparians. On the White Nile, over-year storage in lakes Victoria, Albert and Kyoga could generate hydropower and water supply for the White Nile riparians. A third set of investments could be to complete the Jonglei canal in Southern Sudan, which would conserve 50 per cent of flow reduction attributed to wetlands consumption and evaporation. Without accounting for the costs of building infrastructure, total potential annual direct gross economic benefits in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation were estimated to be on the order of $7 –11 billion annually. The annual net benefit would be of the order of $9 billion annually, $5 billion more than at present (see Table 7.2). All riparians would benefit, with the lion’s share going to the three Blue Nile riparians, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. The paper argues that cooperative, basin-wide development and management of the Nile would be an ‘enterprise of historic proportions’. Most Table 7.2 Economic value of cooperation: status quo v. full cooperation (current allocations grandfathered, benefit sharing not considered) Water allocation (billion m 3) Ethiopia Sudan Egypt Others Total

Status quo

Full cooperation

Change

1 12 54 2 69

10 17 55 2 84

þ9 þ5 þ1 0 1 15

50 723 3,204 186 4,164

3,332 1,046 3,191 1,343 8,911

4,748

Economic value ($ millions) Ethiopia Sudan Egypt Others Total

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economic benefits in hydropower would be generated in Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent in Uganda, and the majority of irrigation benefits in Sudan and Egypt. Action by Ethiopia to abstract water for irrigation upstream of the Blue Nile gorge would significantly reduce hydropower benefits; abstraction in Ethiopia for irrigation would be better near to the border with Sudan, once the water has generated substantial hydropower benefits. There is thus a strong economic case for cooperation. The challenge is to put in place the institutional mechanisms that would make cooperation on this scale possible. The Nile Basin Initiative described below is a bold attempt to create the necessary political agreements and patterns of cooperation. History of Nile cooperation In 1995, alerted to the benefits of cooperation and to the risks of noncooperation, and with the facilitation of neutral international agencies, the Nile governments established the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Resources (Nile-COM). In 1999, the Nile-COM adopted a long-term Shared Vision: to achieve ‘sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources’. To put this Vision into practice, Nile-COM designed the Nile River Basin Strategic Action Plan, which was based on two big ideas. The first idea was to develop knowledge, tools and ways of working that would provide the basis for cooperation. The second was to put cooperation into practice by investing in projects that would put facts on the ground and bring real benefits to the countries and their peoples. To implement the Strategic Action Programme, Nile-COM agreed in 2000 to establish the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as a regional partnership and transitional institutional arrangement. NBI was set up in 2002, invested with legal personality and recognized in Uganda as an international organization. At the same time, a parallel political process was launched to study how to draw up a multilateral agreement on cooperative development of the Nile, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The purpose of the NBI is to develop the river in a cooperative manner, to share socio-economic benefits, and to promote regional peace and security. Its mission statement is set out in the Policy Guidelines for the Nile River Basin Strategic Action Programme (NBI 1999): ‘to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources’. The Policy Guidelines set out the specific objectives of the NBI. These are: to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples; to ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources; to ensure

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cooperation and joint action between riparian countries, seeking win-win gains; to target poverty eradication and promote economic integration; and to ensure that the programme results in a move from planning to action.7 NBI governance The NBI governance structure is aligned with the basin and sub-basin structure of the Nile. Because of the number of countries involved and the complexity of relations and tasks, a very large number of bodies have been set up. The NBI is governed by Nile-COM, which brings together the ministers of water affairs from each member state. They are advised by the Nile Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) comprising two technical representatives from each member state. Nile-COM and Nile-TAC guide the basin-wide work of the NBI Secretariat. At the level of the Eastern Nile sub-basin, an Eastern Nile Council of Ministers (EN-COM) and an Eastern Nile Strategic Action Programme Technical Committee (ENSAPT) provide governance oversight to the NBI office for the Eastern Nile, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO). In the Nile Equatorial Lakes sub-basin, the Nile Equatorial Lakes Council of Ministers (NEL-COM) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Technical Advisory Committee (NEL-TAC) provide governance services to the NBI office for the subbasin, the Nile Equatorial Lakes Strategic Action Programme Coordination Unit (NELSAP-CU). Investments and results 2002– 15: what has been achieved? The achievements of Nile cooperation to date need to be measured against the goal of regional economic development based on equitable and sustainable use of the Nile resources. At the outset, there was a risk that vast amounts of time and money would be spent on ‘soft’ matters, and no real benefits would flow to the Nile populations. Yet it was recognized that unless palpable benefits were felt, there would be little adhesion to cooperation and the Nile governance structure would become an empty shell. This recognition underlay the 1999 Shared Vision (see above) of a Nile programme that would have a real impact on people’s lives and well-being by achieving sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of and benefit from the Nile water resources. Since the start of the programme up to 2014, NBI achievements have gone a long way towards achieving this vision. During this period, 58 new transboundary projects were implemented, and a further nine projects were approved and were at the pre-investment stage, giving an overall total of 67 projects. Of these projects, 27 were major infrastructure investment projects. At the end of 2014, a total of US$ 1.56 billion of financing was in place for

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these projects, and projects for a further US$ 4.9 billion were under preparation. A multi-donor trust fund set up to support Nile cooperation had mobilized and spent over $200 million for software projects to build capacity, tools, trust and practical cooperative activities. Infrastructure investments have been largely in power projects, water resources development projects, river basin management projects, flood preparedness, and irrigation and drainage. Few of these projects are yet in operation, but reliable estimates are that the current portfolio has or will have 28.2 million direct beneficiaries. As a result of the installation of 167 MW of generating capacity and 8,580 MW of transmission capacity, 9.9 million currently unconnected people and a number of businesses will access electricity. In addition, 28.7 million people are expected to benefit from more reliable access to electricity. About 3.1 million people will have access to clean water. Some 142,000 hectares of irrigation have been developed or are under construction, and further irrigation investments are under preparation with long term targets of 300– 500,000 hectares and four million beneficiaries. In addition, 1.6 million hectares are to benefit from improved watershed management. Gender and climate change considerations are being systematically factored into all of these projects. In addition to these infrastructure projects, NBI implemented around 30 ‘soft’ projects to the value of about $200 million 2002–14, largely financed by the Nile multi-donor trust fund. About half of these projects were designed to build capacity and knowledge and to generate confidence and trust in transboundary cooperation. The other half were essentially pre-investment projects to prepare the large portfolio of infrastructure investments. Institutional development: what has been achieved? Alongside the objective of infrastructure investment to bring socio-economic benefits was the objective of developing the institutional capacity for joint management of the shared water resource. Through the software projects implemented to build capacity, tools, trust and practical cooperative activities, the NBI has become an effective and sustainable river basin organization, promoting regional cooperation, as well as an effective vehicle for delivering project investments. Although measuring these results is difficult, levels of trust and cooperation between transboundary technical actors are clearly high. A large number of norms, policies and procedures for cooperative transboundary working have been developed and are being implemented. Examples include prior notification procedures of investments, a code of practice and procedures for data and information exchange, investment project preparation guidelines and standards, climate proofing guidelines, environmental and social management guidelines, and so on.

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Across the basin, policy and planning on water resource management and development today incorporate regional perspectives and cross-sectoral integration to a greater extent than before. The transboundary dimension is now written in to policy and strategy in most riparian countries. The benefits of regional cross-sectoral water resource planning are being experienced. For example, the agreements on the shared basins of Kagera, Mara and Sio-Malaba-Malakisi demonstrate an integrated treatment of regional issues. A decision support system (DSS) and other tools developed by NBI have been powerful factors in facilitating planning and in generating transboundary investments and benefits. The capacity of national partners has grown as a result of NBI work. A host of specialists and other stakeholders have been trained (a total of 14,200 people by 2014), and this training has created relationships amongst several thousand professionals. Formal and informal professional networks related to integrated water resource management (IWRM) have been set up and are still in operation to varying degrees in riparian countries. One example is the continuing network of national directors of the environment from all the riparians. Another example is that the permanent secretaries of energy ministries and the CEOs of the power utilities meet regularly to promote the extensive transboundary power development programme. A Nile Basin University Forum has been established, facilitated by the University of Bergen. Networks of parliamentarians, press, lawyers, women and NGOs which were set up over the years continue to function to varying degrees. Water resources management in the basin now incorporates regional and transboundary perspectives. NBI programmes played the major role in promoting catchment management planning, particularly for the key Eastern Nile group of countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt). An Eastern Nile planning model was designed and is in use. A major exercise has been conducted to identify and prepare the investments that would make the best economic use of the Eastern Nile waters. A watershed management operation prepared a framework for integrated management of Lake Nasser, and water resource management plans have been prepared for sub-basins of the Tana-Beles system. Integrated river basin management investment projects have also been prepared for the upper Nile, for the tributary basins of Sio-Malaba-Malakisi, the Mara and the Kagera, and catchment management plans have been prepared for the Lake Edward and Albert basin. Planning is now resulting in investment. An estimated 8.6 million people are already benefitting from transboundary water resource management and flood protection programmes. The use of flood forecasting models is now being generalized. An Eastern Nile Regional Flood Coordination Unit has been set up, linked with technical centres

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in Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Sixteen flood protection plans are in place in Ethiopia and Sudan, and a flood forecasting and early warning system is operational for the flood-prone areas around Ethiopia’s Lake Tana. Early warning messages now reach 350,000 vulnerable people in Ethiopia and Sudan. Finance for transboundary development projects has been mobilized on a considerable scale, and NBI has proved to be an excellent instrument for mobilizing finance. As mentioned above, by 2015 a total of 32 NBI investment projects had secured a total of US$ 1.56 billion financing, with projects for a further US$ 4.9 billion under preparation. The Nile Basin Trust Fund, a multi-donor trust fund set up to finance technical assistance and capacity building, mobilized $202.6 million, and a further US$ 62.3 million of co-financing was mobilized for the preparation of projects. The success of the Nile multi-donor trust fund has helped shape the Africa-wide trust fund which has been set to promote similar cooperation on international waters across the continent. Overcoming constraints As would be expected from such a complex and ambitious programme, there have been a number of challenges, which have been overcome to varying degrees. The political economy of the Nile Region has proved particularly challenging. Essentially, the entrenched downstream interests of Egypt and Sudan faced the weaker, poorer upstream riparians which had barely begun development of the Nile resources but were eager to do so. Through the processes and projects over the decade after the creation of the NBI and through the workings and intensive facilitated processes of NBI governance, the political economy environment in fact grew more favourable as implementation progressed. The previously faint voices of the weaker upstream countries have been strengthened and become more organized. There was a set-back in 2009/10, when the upstream riparians moved prematurely to adopt a Cooperative Framework Agreement designed to create a permanent river basin organization and set out the way in which Nile benefits were to be shared. Egypt and Sudan considered the time was not ready for this, and the two countries effectively withdrew from NBI for a spell. However, by that time cooperation was gathering momentum and tangible benefits were within sight. As a result, the set-back proved short lived. Egypt and Sudan have returned to the table and political support has, if anything, grown stronger. Transboundary cooperation requires commitment to and practise of planning and programming at the basin scale. This core IWRM concept – and its associated tenet that benefits of using the Nile could be better measured in economic terms rather than in volumes of water used – proved hard to convey to decision-makers, particularly those beyond the water

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agencies. However, the tools and knowledge products produced by the various projects – particularly the well-functioning decision support system, planning tools and well-designed project proposals – are available to all riparians and are beginning to reach a wide audience. Although there may seem to be an inordinate number of NBI governance structures, they have proved effective. Riparians are satisfied with them and remain committed to them. The organs set up were representative of all countries on an equal footing. There was a balance between the political level (Nile-COM) and the technical level (Nile-TAC). From the outset, technical support and facilitation were provided to ensure that decisions were evidencebased. Inevitably, not all has functioned smoothly. The organs have been at times quite unwieldy and costly, and their links to their countries through the NBI national offices have never functioned well. The rotation of executive director positions in the secretariats led to periodic interruptions and changes of pace and approach. The issue was replicated at the level of the numerous software projects NBI undertook. Each of these projects had its own steering committee representing each country for each project, and the siting of projects in six countries in order to strengthen country engagement brought its own complications. However, in practice, all these structures worked relatively well and strengthened cooperation and commitment, albeit at the cost of some efficiency in terms of time and money. Implementation of the numerous projects was facilitated by a number of positive factors. Despite the unwieldy governance and implementation structures set up, all the 30 ‘soft’ projects implemented were characterized by their representative and participatory nature, which strengthened country and professional engagement considerably. Commitment from riparian governments and populations to this vast programme was greatly strengthened by the high level of ownership shown at the professional and technical levels. At the political level also, implementation of the various projects received strong support because they were essentially seen to be fulfilling, step-bystep, the original Shared Vision of the Nile countries. Impact of cooperation on the Nile 2002–14 After fifteen years of implementation, the Strategic Action Programme has achieved considerable impact. Political support for transboundary cooperation has been strengthened at the country level and articulated through the NBI governance set-up. An institutional structure for cooperative engagement and investment has been built across the basin. NBI is a functioning and increasingly respected organization with an extensive set of guiding policies, procedures and practices that contribute to transboundary cooperation and investment. The NBI has introduced policies and strategies, planning guidance and tools that have

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facilitated cooperative engagement. Capacity and skills have been developed at regional, sub-regional and national levels. There have also been collateral gains. New norms and relationships have become common practice within NBI and this is leading to better cooperation on issues outside the NBI’s ambit. Previously sensitive issues are now on the table for discussion with civility and knowledge-based exchange. All this has created an environment attractive to investment. All of the impacts discussed above contribute to achieving the over-arching goal of regional economic development based on equitable and sustainable use of the Nile resources. The massive investment programme of US$ 6.5 billion now underway or in preparation is clear evidence that the Strategic Action Programme has translated the Nile vision into action, that cooperation is working, and that through the institutional capacity, plans and tools created, the goal is on the way to being achieved. Current risks and future risk management Achievements in so complex and challenging an environment cannot come without considerable risks. First and foremost, there are risks that political will to cooperate could dwindle or that political deadlock may arise, slowing the momentum for sustaining the basin-wide cooperation process. A key approach to risk management in Nile cooperation has been the separation of the political and technical tracks of the cooperation process. There has been a long-running political track begun in 2000 (see above) and designed to develop and negotiate a legal agreement – the Cooperative Framework Agreement – as the basis of formal cooperation and the establishment of a permanent institutional structure. In parallel, the technical track has comprised the activities aimed at achieving practical cooperation for managing and developing Nile water resources. Periodically, events outside the technical track have challenged these cooperative efforts. Most notably, the attempt by the upper riparians to accelerate signature of the Cooperative Framework Agreement precipitated a crisis. Egypt and Sudan withdrew from most Nile cooperation activities for a period. However, from 2014, all three Eastern Nile riparians have resumed cooperative activities, and a new strategic plan for the Eastern Nile has been approved. The experience showed the risk, but also the prospects that the risk can be managed. Essentially, all riparian representatives support continuation of Nile cooperation. The challenges are great but the tools, knowledge and capacity are in place for cooperative engagement. Nile countries have shown their commitment by the progressive increase of financing for NBI; and the rising flow of benefits to Nile populations will strengthen commitment to the process and help to reduce the risk of political deadlock.

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However, old ways of thinking die hard. Underlying the NBI approach has been the persuasive concept of benefit sharing, rather than water sharing. This concept lies at the heart of IWRM – that to get the maximum economic return from the basin, the water should be managed to generate the most benefit where that benefit can be obtained, and that it is the benefits rather than the water that should be shared out equitably. This might mean, for example, that hydropower benefits should be generated in Ethiopia and that if there is an impact on transmission of water downstream to Sudan and Egypt – for example a change in the timetable of flows or a reduction in quantity due to greater evaporation from impounded water upstream – then this can be compensated by sharing the economic benefits of hydropower. There is, however, a natural impulse of states to remain attached to the notion of quantified water rights as the basic principle of negotiation. The most striking case is the attachment of Egypt and Sudan to the quantum of Nile water they decided between them in the 1950s – 55 billion m3 to Egypt, 17 billion m3 to Sudan. In the popular imagination and in political rhetoric, this allocation of water is stronger than any talk of allocation of benefits, especially if the actual quantum of water appears threatened. Disagreement over water rights has always been an impediment to transboundary cooperation – and the main source of conflict. In the case of the Nile, it is precisely this question of prior rights to a specific quantum of water that is holding up the cooperative agreement on which there is otherwise consensus. Endeavours have been made to move the dialogue to questions of sharing of water-related benefits rather than water allocations on the logic that it is value the riparians are seeking, not water per se. A benefit sharing framework would underpin a more rational planning function based on economic value and would prioritize high-value, low consumptive uses such as hydropower. Nile countries accept the logic that the economic value of cooperation is not proportional to water diverted or consumed, but they are not yet all convinced by the technical and methodological work done on benefit measurement and sharing to quite abandon the ‘water rights’ mind-set. Clearly, persistence and time are required to arrive at a point where ‘benefit sharing’ replaces ‘water sharing’ as the concept that captures the public imagination. A second area of risk is that, with no permanent institutional structure, there is a persistent possibility that cooperation will falter. There are particular institutional risks to the financial sustainability of NBI, which has been heavily dependent on external development partner financing up to now. The tapering-off of external financing may jeopardize the sustainability of institutional capacity. Some of the gains to date are relatively secure: functioning networks of professionals, tools and systems for planning and

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management, and so on. Nonetheless, there is an ever-present risk that these intangible advances made through intensive external support and financing may dissipate. To date, the usefulness of these advances to the overall process of cooperation and the resulting tangible benefits have largely protected them. However, the sustainability of these outcomes will remain tributary to the overall performance of Nile cooperation. A related risk is that of patchy national commitment to cooperation. Here the problem is that Nile cooperation requires country commitment, yet to date much of the engagement has been confined to water ministries. Outside of the water agencies, there has been only sporadic uptake of the tools that NBI has developed. Some important decisions in countries about Nile water resources have been taken outside the NBI framework. At the level of governments overall, the brouhaha over the Cooperative Framework Agreement has raised issues outside of the competence of water ministries, including issues of national sovereignty, and has led to responses unconditioned by informed Nile dialogue. Despite the advances made, there is constantly the risk that mind-sets will return to reasoning within national boundaries and agendas. Lessons learned: lessons on the process of negotiating cooperation on transboundary waters It is essential to act early before the situation becomes critical and to take advantage of windows of opportunity. In the process, mediation and external support can be key. Time and stamina are clearly needed. In the case of the Nile, multilateral cooperation began tentatively as a low key technical process as long ago as 1967 (see Figure. 7.1), and only half a century later is that process gathering real momentum. Even today it is uncertain whether all riparians will ever be willing to enter into agreement on the legal and institutional basis for full cooperative management. Communications, transparency, and stakeholder inclusion are all vital to success. The Nile Basin

Figure 7.1

Timeline of cooperation in the Nile River Basin. Source: Cascao 2009.

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Initiative has invested massively in communications and stakeholder inclusion, and this has brought important dividends in terms of engagement and support. Transparency is essential. Lessons learned: how to tackle the substantive cooperation issues The Nile experience over the last two decades provides a host of lessons about developing transboundary cooperation. From the outset a strategic approach is needed, both at the level of the political economy of cooperation and at the level of development of cooperative institutions. The design of governance arrangements is critical from the outset, in particular how governance allows both separation and communication between the political and the technical tracks. In designing the programme to build cooperation, there needs to be a clear but flexible, adaptive sequence working from technical cooperation towards institutional and political cooperation which will allow confidence and habits of joint working to develop, whilst generating essential knowledge. There needs also to be a clear economic strategy, concentrating on sharing benefits rather than on sharing water. The programme has to bring tangible benefits as early as possible and to show in practice how cooperation can reduce risk and bring economically optimal investment for all riparians. There are lessons, too, on how the process can best be supported – the use of pooled funding in a multi-donor trust fund for development partner support, and the need for facilitation and institutional strengthening support into the long term. All of these lessons are discussed in the following paragraphs. There is a need from the start to analyse the political economy and to form strategies. Realistic and participatory analysis is required of the political economy of the riparian countries and of their actual and potential relations over the water source, together with other geo-political issues in the region, such as commerce, defence, and so on. Overall, the strategy has to take realistic account of power relations, and to embody mechanisms to empower the weaker riparians. The Nile process, for example, has taken account of Egypt and Sudan’s historic use of the Nile waters, but also gave a voice to the weaker upstream riparians through their systematic inclusion in all bodies and institutions with an equal voice. The process has enabled these upstream states for the first time to influence the regional water agenda and policies.8 A progressive and flexible institutional strategy is needed. Institutional mechanisms are the reflection of the state of agreement on cooperation at any point. A river basin organization can be set up even before agreement on cooperative water management. In fact, the case of NBI suggests that this is a good way to start, as agreement on cooperation would never have seemed either possible or desirable without the practice of cooperation and the preparation of tools and structures which NBI has successfully accomplished

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over the years. A flexible approach to institutional design is therefore required. The progressive establishment and development of institutions for the Nile, keeping pace with successive degrees of cooperation amongst the parties, is a good illustration of this step-by-step approach. Governance arrangements are critically important to express country objectives and allow interaction – but not interference – between the political and the technical tracks. The success of the NBI to date has been in part due to the governance structure. These structures were representative of country interests and intentions, and were empowered to make commitments on behalf of their countries. They acted as the interface between the political and technical tracks but the separation of the two tracks allowed the technical track to continue and to begin to deliver benefits even when the political track was encountering issues. One area for future consideration is how to ensure that river basin governance structures engage governments well beyond the water ministry, so that the whole government and nation are bound into active commitment to cooperation. Clearly, for river basin cooperation, it is essential to ensure strong leadership from riparian countries organized in permanent or transitional but representative and inclusive governance arrangements and institutions with strong riparian ownership. Governance arrangements should ensure that political support from countries can lend impetus but that political hesitation does not impede the process. The Nile experience shows that a sequence working from technical cooperation towards institutional and political cooperation can allow confidence and habits of joint working to develop, whilst generating essential knowledge. There is a virtue in starting with lower key technical cooperation which can act politically as a confidence building measure. If the cooperation proves beneficial, it can represent a first step towards integrated basin planning. Ideally, the economic strategy should concentrate on sharing benefits rather than water. Apart from the economic gains that can be made, benefits are less sensitive to negotiate than headline water quantities. Agreeing on an investment programme that brings benefits to all partners is politically easier than negotiating quotas of water. Early identification and implementation of joint investments is helpful. Cooperative engagement over water resources has to deliver tangible benefits – and building of the enabling environment and preparation of investments should be run in parallel if possible. From the outset, the goal of bringing tangible benefits to the people of the Nile was paramount, and the programme identified the need to advance infrastructure investment as rapidly as possible, while building the required enabling environment.

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By 2015, it was clear that the common basis for achieving this goal was in place and a massive programme of infrastructure investment was underway that will bring enormous benefits to large numbers of riparian populations: the 58 new transboundary projects implemented and nine projects in the pipeline for a total of over $6 billion, not to mention investment of over $200 million in building capacity, tools, trust and cooperation. The programme has to prioritize benefits from cooperation, showing in practice how reaching agreement on planning at the basin level will reduce risk, including from climate change, and encourage economically optimal investment for all riparians. As cooperation leads to joint planning at the basin scale, investment and management can be progressively optimized – for example to take account of climate change impacts or basin-wide externalities. Reaching agreement at this scale will reduce risk and encourage economically optimal investment for all riparians. Ultimately, basin level planning can maximize the aggregate value that a unit of water can generate as it moves through the river system before it is consumed or lost. The Nile experience shows that where poorer countries are concerned and there is dependence on development partner support, financing is best provided through a pooled fund with long term commitment. For the Nile, the multi-donor trust fund provided the financing for virtually all the software investments (over $200 million). The trust fund proved a flexible and comprehensive instrument that provided coordinated long term grant financing. The structured nature of the fund, the assurance that programmes would be well designed and their execution carefully supervised, the guarantee of safeguards and fiduciary compliance, and the leadership of an organization (World Bank) with convening power and technical expertise helped attract partners and maximized financing. The consolidated approach reduced transaction costs and the difficulties that can arise from multiple sources of finance. Where external financing is an important part of the mix, it is clear that, wherever possible, development partner support should be channelled through a single consolidated programme and instrument with clear arrangements for financing and facilitation. A further lesson from the Nile is that facilitation and institutional strengthening support are essential, particularly where new institutions are being set up. Facilitation services for institutional development and investment planning on the Nile were provided partly by development partners (notably the Word Bank) and partly through various institutional strengthening projects. This facilitation made an indispensable contribution to the development of NBI capacity. The Nile experience suggests that support needs to be long-term. Initially it should be flexible but, as in the case

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of NBI, institutional strengthening needs will crystallize after some time and structured support through projects can then be programmed. This kind of flexible, broad-ranging facilitation service is highly appropriate to the progressive development of institutions and delivery of programme results. Last word on the Nile In summary, the example of the Nile provides excellent lessons of the challenges and opportunities for river basin cooperation. The economic case for cooperation amongst riparians was strong but the political economy challenges were massive. After two decades of intensive work, cooperation is certainly happening and it is bearing economic fruits, but there is still no legal agreement or permanent institution, so risks remain. To get to this point has required sustained political commitment, intensive development partner support, broad and flexible facilitation, and the commitment and effort of a very large number of professionals and others from amongst the Nile populations. The most outstanding characteristic and factor in success has been the long term engagement of all parties, organized around the Vision and the Strategic Action Programme, which has essentially been carried out. The lesson is that a river basin cooperation programme that is facilitated and sustained into the medium term can eventually produce significant investment and substantial benefit flows for riparians. From the outset of river basin cooperation, it is advisable to develop a vision of the goals of cooperation and agree a structured but flexible long term programme to realize that vision. From the outset, too, programmes should provide for both development of the institutional basis of cooperation and for infrastructure investment to bring early benefits.

The problem of the Euphrates The Euphrates is a river shared between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Almost all the water arises in the upper part of the basin. In 2005, the natural flow arising in Turkey was 28.3 billion m3, 89 per cent of the total natural flow of 31.8 billion m3. The balance – 3.5 billion m3, 11 per cent – arose in Syria. The Euphrates is the main source of water for 27 million people across the three countries. Historically, Iraq, the downstream riparian, has received most of this water as river flow across its border, and has been the major user. However, in recent years this historical pattern has changed dramatically. For several decades, the volume of Euphrates water flowing into Iraq has decreased markedly. Inflows to Iraq have declined from an average of 30 to 35 billion m3 in the period 1932– 70 to an average of 19 –21 billion m3 1971–2003 – see Figure 7.2.

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Average Annual Discharge (Billion Cubic Meters)

70

60

50

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30

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10

Euphrates at Husaybah

Figure 7.2

2004

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0

Euphrates at Hit

Euphrates inflow to Iraq 1932 – 2003.

In several of the years since 1970, flows fell to as little as 10 billion m3, just 30 per cent of the previous average and below any annual level previously recorded. In 2013, flows had dropped to just 8.2 billion m3 (see below). Some of these low flows were in part attributable to poor precipitation in the watershed, but the most significant factor was upstream development, starting from the period 1972–5 which saw the initial filling of the Keban Dam in Turkey and the al Thawra dam in Syria. Between the 1960s and 2011, on the eve of the Syrian crisis, 32 new dams were constructed along the river, and water entering Iraq dropped to 40–45 per cent of the level of the 1970s. As the first phase of its Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP – see below), Turkey had constructed eight massive dams on the river to deliver over 5,000 megawatts of hydropower and to irrigate vast new areas. Once the current strife is resolved (see below), it is likely that the declining trend in water entering Iraq will continue as Turkey – and Syria, too – complete ambitious irrigation developments that will place a growing burden on the river. This decline in Euphrates water poses a number of problems for Iraq. Water available for irrigated agriculture has diminished and, although demand for water in Iraq has slackened in recent years due to the prevailing turmoil, it will certainly return to previous levels at some time in the future. Low water availability will become a constraint to farming, and degradation of agricultural land due to salinization could increase as lower water flows in the Euphrates reduce the water available to leach out salts. Falling water levels

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will also impact hydropower generation from the Haditha dam, Iraq’s main hydropower dam on the Euphrates (storage 8.5 billion m3, hydropower 660 megawatts) – a problem already experienced, for example, in December 2005. In addition, the ecological balance in the Euphrates basin will be further disturbed. Already in-stream flows are reduced and the marshes have largely dried up, and lower flows will make these problems worse. The quality of water in the Euphrates will deteriorate even further. Already, a large quantity of salts and farm chemicals are being washed into the river by return flows. Today, the three countries together use approximately three million tons of fertilizer in the basin, with Turkey contributing two-thirds of the total. As upstream irrigation consumes more fresh water and returns more drainage effluent, concentrations of contaminants and salts will increase steadily. Costs to agriculture and domestic water supply will mount, and health and environmental problems will worsen.

The cause and urgency of the Euphrates problem The primary cause of the Euphrates problem is Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym: GAP), begun fifty years ago and still under development. GAP is a massive hydroelectric and agricultural project which at full development would consist of 21 dams and 19 hydroelectric facilities. The water will be used both to generate 26 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity with an installed capacity of 7,500 megawatts and to irrigate 1.65 million hectares of land. Virtually all the hydropower units are completed and the huge reservoirs are filled – Ataturk Dam alone can hold over two years equivalent of the entire natural flow of the Euphrates. By July 2003, hydro production was 96 per cent of capacity. However, the major impact on downstream water resources will only be felt in coming years. The irrigation programme is years behind. The current irrigated area is at present only 215,000 hectares out of the 1.65 million hectares planned at full development. Current irrigation diversions from the Euphrates in Turkey are as yet only 20 per cent of the planned levels. Syria, too, has further major developments planned, to double the area irrigated from the Euphrates to 740,000 hectares, increasing net diversions from 5 billion m3 at present to 10 billion m3. By 2013, flows into Iraq had dropped to 8.2 billion m3. Already the dwindling quantity, exacerbated by drought conditions in the 2000s, has led to movement of peoples who depend on the river. Deteriorating water quality and related salinization of agricultural land has become a major problem in all of southern Iraq. Salinity at Hindiyah Barrage in the southern governorates has risen by four times since 1980 and water is now unfit not only for human consumption but also for irrigation and animal watering.

3

215 0 28.30 1.81 26.50

Turkey 345 26.50 3.50 4.83 25.16

Syria

Euphrates flows 2005 (billion m )

Euphrates flow

Irrigated area (thousand hectares) Inflow Natural flow arising Net diversions Passed downstream

Table 7.3

1,000 25.16 0 15.00 10.16

Iraq Irrigated area (thousand hectares) Inflow Natural flow arising Net diversions Passed downstream

1,444 0 28.30 12.10 16.21

Turkey

740 16.21 3.50 10.36 9.34

Syria

700?? 9.34 0 9.34 0

Iraq

Euphrates flows at full upstream development (billion m 3. Not accounting for climate change)

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16,900

15,941

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33,000 mcm Average Natural Flow of the Euphrates River at Hit. Irag – 33,460 Million Cubic Meters / Year

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5,701

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6,896

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1991

Share of River (Mill. Cubic Meters)

35

Estimated Year of Implementation / Depletion

Figure 7.3

Depletion of water from the Euphrates

Water stress in Iraq is likely to be further affected not only by upstream development but also by climate change. Predictions are that climate change will bring higher average temperatures and more extreme climate events, including droughts, which will threaten the availability and predictability of water resources even further. It is predicted that, by 2020, upstream Euphrates river flow in Turkey will have dropped by 15 –20 per cent compared to 1960– 90. The combined effect of upstream diversions and climate change are expected, in the long term, to reduce Iraq’s share of the Euphrates to a fraction of former levels. Even without taking account of climate change, inflows to Iraq, once the planned upstream developments are completed, are expected to be little more than one-third of 2005 levels – 9.3 billion m3, against historic levels (2005) of 25.2 billion m3 – and less in a drought year (see Figure 7.3 and Table 7.3). Iraq’s share of Euphrates water would drop from 75 per cent to 28 per cent. The 15 billion m3 of Euphrates water that Iraq currently uses would no longer all be available: irrigated land would go out of production and water quality would dwindle. Rations for the environment – either instream or marshland – would disappear and further environmental degradation would ensue. Outflows to the sea would drop from 10.2 billion m3 in 2005 to zero, with catastrophic environmental effect.9 No equivalent ‘Tigris problem’ The natural flow of the Tigris is 21 billion m3 per annum and tributaries within Iraq, including those arising in Iran, add 27 billion m3, for a total of

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48 billion m3. Assuming that Turkey and Syria eventually develop their irrigation projects in the Tigris basin to the full potential planned, the actual annual average flow into Iraq will reduce to 16.5 billion m3. This will reduce the water available to Iraq from an average 48 billion m3 to an average 44 billion m3. This is about one-and-a-half times current usage in the basin. Thus, even after full exploitation by upper riparian countries, there could be surplus water in the Tigris adequate to irrigate an additional 1 million hectares. There is, in effect, no ‘Tigris problem’ in view up to now. The failed history of cooperation on Euphrates waters Historically, the Euphrates and Tigris were domestic rivers within the Ottoman Empire. With the dissolution of the empire and the emergence of Syria and Iraq as independent countries, the rivers acquired international status and new treaties and protocols were established to govern the allocation of water resources. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 mandated the formation of joint committees between Turkey, France (for Syria) and Britain (for Iraq) to resolve problems of allocation and management of water resources in the Euphrates and Tigris, including issues such as construction of dams. The issues were to be resolved by mutual agreement, with arbitration resorted to only as the last option. The spirit of the Treaty was strengthened by bilateral protocols between Turkey and France in 1930. In 1946, Turkey and Iraq signed the Friendship and Neighbourly Relation Agreement which obliged Turkey to report to Iraq any plans to utilize the water of Euphrates and Tigris and also gave the right to Iraq to construct dams in Turkish territory to improve control of the flow of the Euphrates into Iraq. During the 1960s, both Turkey and Syria unilaterally conceived plans for significant water impoundment and diversion. In 1973, when Turkey and Syria began to fill the dams they had constructed, downstream water flow decreased significantly and Iraq protested. In 1974, Syria granted an Iraqi request and allowed an additional 200 million m3 a year to flow from the al-Thawra Dam. The following year, however, Iraq asked for Arab League intervention, asserting that the flow of water reaching Iraq had fallen from the normal 920 m3/s to an ‘intolerable’ 197 m3/s. The Syrian government responded by claiming that water flow into Syria had been reduced by more than 50 per cent by Turkey’s new impoundments. Syria withdrew from the Arab League discussions. Tension increased in May 1975 as Syria closed its airspace to Iraqi flights and both countries mobilized their armies. Saudi Arabian intervention, however, defused the situation with an informal agreement that Syria would keep 40 per cent of the Euphrates water that entered Syria and 60 per cent would be released to Iraq.

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A multilateral pollution abatement agreement was signed in 1978 but it has never been implemented. In 1980, a Joint Technical Committee on Regional Water was created by Turkey and Iraq on the basis of the 1946 protocol and Syria joined the Committee subsequently. In 1987, a bilateral Syria– Turkey protocol resulted in Syria being assured by Turkey of a minimum annual flow of water from the Euphrates at the Syrian border of 15.75 billion m3. This is about 60 per cent of the previous volumes of water that had flowed from Turkey into Syria. A Syria – Iraq discussion in 1989 resulted in assurance to Iraq of 58 per cent of the water resource of the Euphrates entering Syria while Syria retained 42 per cent, with a minimum average annual flow of 9.1 billion m3 guaranteed to Iraq. As the water promised to Iraq was well below prior Iraqi usage and would be inadequate to maintain even minimal environmental flows, these allocations could only be provisional. In January 1990, Turkey shut off the flow of the Euphrates altogether for 30 days by closing the gates of the Ataturk Dam. Tripartite talks of the Joint Technical Committee between Turkey, Syria and Iraq were held but quickly suspended due to the outbreak of the first Gulf War. Negotiations after the war in September 1992 also failed to reach an agreement. The Joint Technical Committee last met in 1996 at Damascus but made no progress. Subsequently Turkey refused to adopt the UN Convention on International Watercourses of 1997.10 All these various ‘agreements’ were bilateral, non-binding and largely ad hoc. The water sharing arrangements currently in force – Turkey will release to Syria a minimum of 15.7 billion m3, Syria will release to Iraq 58 per cent of the Euphrates water entering Syria, with a minimum of 9.1 billion m3 – are the subject only of bilateral protocols. Even if these protocols are observed, the minimum assured to Iraq – 9.1 billion m3 – is well below recent use levels in Iraq (15 billion m3 in 2005). The lack of cooperation between the three riparians has prevented the development of an integrated water management plan for the entire basin, and creates particular risks for Iraq as the downstream riparian of a diminishing and increasingly uncertain flow.11 Framework for action The threat to Iraq’s Euphrates water resource and hence to its people and its economy is real and is not negligible. Certainly international best practice on water resources management – for example, the Dublin Principles (see Chapter 4) – reinforce the case for a cooperative and joint approach to the development and management of the Euphrates basin. International law, to the extent that it is reflected in the UN Convention on International Watercourses,

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would also support cooperation between riparians, particularly the guiding principles that (1) riparians should not cause significant harm; and (2) riparians must use an international watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-a`-vis other states sharing the watercourse with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization. Both principles can positively support a cooperative approach. The ‘no significant harm’ principle would prevent the upper riparians from excessive exploitation of the resource to the detriment of Iraq. The ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ principle supports a joint approach based on optimizing and sharing benefits at the basin scale. The UN Convention would also signal a duty to protect the resource and the ecological services it provides. Is there a way forward for Iraq? Experience from around the world suggests a very uphill struggle as decisions on international waters tend to be highly political and to follow power relations. Nonetheless, there are some possible entry points. Developing a strategy and working with a facilitating partner would be a good start. In deciding on approaches to the problem, Iraq will need to consider options under a number of heads: the political economy of transboundary negotiations; the institutional mechanisms that are best suited; the role of technical cooperation; the economic role of the water resource and the role of demand management; and finally the environmental risk and options. Regarding the political economy, Iraq should realistically analyze the political economy of the upper riparians and should link water with other geopolitical issues in the region, such as commerce, defence, and so on, instead of isolated persuasion. Clearly Turkey’s attitude is key because of its upstream location. Turkey has generally been reluctant to discuss international watercourse issues with lower riparians and Iraq is poorly placed at present to draw Turkey to the negotiating table. However, from crisis may come solutions, as an equitable settlement on water may form part of a much larger political negotiation. As Iraq – and eventually Syria – attempt to rebuild their economies after a long period of war, water security will play a critical role in long-term development strategies. Transboundary cooperation on resource development and flows could make an important contribution to the recovery of these countries from war. Conversely, if this is not done successfully, water scarcity will feed grievances, pauperize the populations and contribute to continuing instability. Hence, international partners in the region and beyond have an interest in promoting transboundary cooperation. Even Turkey has an interest in having stable neighbours. Benefit sharing could be a part of an international effort to plan recovery in these countries. The example of Israel and Jordan in the Johnston Plan (see the section above: A framework for conflict management) shows how a combination of conflict

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resolution and the support of a powerful third party like the United States can lead to a positive outcome. The experience of the Nile also shows the value of lower-key facilitating partners, either bilaterals at the political level or multilaterals like the World Bank at the technical level. Of institutional mechanisms available to the riparians, the most immediate solution could be to reconvene the 1980 Joint Technical Committee as a starting point. This would have the merit of not requiring a new mandate at the political level, and there is a procedural and practical track record. Whether this Committee could ultimately develop into a permanent commission – or what form ultimate agreement and institutional mechanisms might take – is unknowable at present. The essential will be to get started, once political backing has been obtained. Agreements in equally challenging political circumstances have led to satisfactory outcomes – the case of the Indus between India and Pakistan, for example, which led to the Permanent Indus Commission.12 Regarding technical cooperation, the model of the Nile basin is highly relevant. Even if there is no agreement to set up a formal process, lower key alternatives can be pursued at first, such as simply sharing data on stream flow, precipitation, groundwater level and water quality measurements, with early warning systems in case of drought or flood. At the least, a joint research institution for scientific study of the Euphrates and Tigris river basins might be set up. These low key alternatives can act politically as confidence building measures and can be of collective benefit, helping improve water management and shaping future policy debates on water allocation. If the cooperation proves beneficial, it could represent a first step towards integrated basin planning. Technical cooperation could be institutionalized and this will improve the quality of studies and research. There is also a need for a mechanism to share technical findings with political authority. It is perhaps by this means that technical cooperation could grow into political cooperation, for example through high level conferences attended by ministers from all three countries. This itinerary from a technical start is illustrated by the case of the Nile Basin Initiative discussed above which began as a low key technical partnership, sharing data and conducting research, but which then developed into a framework of economic cooperation and joint investment. The economic strategy for managing the Euphrates could also be based on the Nile model, concentrating more on sharing benefits than sharing water. The opportunity cost will vary between locations, so a cubic meter of water does not have the same economic value at different points along the river, yet it is value the parties are seeking. In addition, benefits are less sensitive to negotiate than water quantities. Agreeing on an investment programme that

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brings benefits to all partners is politically easier than negotiating quotas of water. The benefits should be considerable, as reaching agreement over water will reduce risk and encourage economically optimal investment for all riparians. As cooperation leads to joint planning at the basin scale, investment and management can be progressively optimized – for example to take account of basin-wide externalities. Ultimately, basin level planning can maximize the aggregate value that a unit of water can generate as it moves through the river system before it is consumed or lost. Euphrates water is used in Turkey, Syria and Iraq for different purposes such as irrigation, hydroelectric power, domestic consumption, and so on. Each of these purposes has its own value to the country planning the use. But there could be different combinations of uses. For example, one combination could be a dam in Turkey, irrigation in Syria and irrigation in Iraq. A second combination could be a dam in Turkey, a dam in Syria and irrigation in Iraq. These, of course, are simplistic examples. The point is that the system value for the two combinations discussed above will be different and the one with higher value is preferable. If cooperation is to be won from the riparian which must make a sacrifice to achieve a higher overall system value, that riparian must be compensated for the loss it faces. Benefits agreed need not all be water-related benefits. For example, under a 1996 agreement around the Aral Sea, Kyrgyzstan stores Syr Darya winter flow for release in the spring when Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need irrigation water. The deal reduces Kyrgyzstan’s winter hydroelectric output, so Uzbekistan gives natural gas in return, and Kazakhstan gives coal. This international agreement was brokered by USAID.13 One contribution that Iraq can bring to discussion of Euphrates water is its potential for reducing water use through demand management. As discussed in Chapter 5, the water to irrigate the equipped area is not a fixed quantum but a function of water efficiency and crop water productivity. Iraq can contribute water saving through efficiency and productivity improvements to the discussions, and this could attract investment support from development partners. In addition, when planning can be done at the basin level, there may be scope to phase water demand in each part of the basin optimally through the year. There may also be scope for transfer between the Tigris and the Euphrates on a systematic basis, to take advantage of greater water availability in the Tigris and the availability of good quality irrigable lands on the Euphrates side. Finally, Iraq can certainly make a powerful plea for the environment, which would have world-wide resonance. The consumption of water in projects undertaken by Turkey and Syria is likely to leave little to maintain the

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2005

Full upstream development

Lake Van

Lake Van

Lake Van

Turkey

27.60 1.50

153

28.30 215

1.81

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Iraq

739

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10.36

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15.00

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9.34 ??

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0

Marshlands & Gulf of Arabia

Legend Lakes Euphrates River

27.60

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739

Figure 7.4

Irrigated Area (000 ha)

Schematic of diminishing transboundary flows in the Euphrates

marshes, which are of global importance, and nothing for outflows to the sea (Figure 7.4). This and the shrinking of environmental flows in the river have major social and environmental costs for Iraq. Iraq should highlight these long-term consequences of neglecting ecology in its negotiations with the upper riparians and may invoke international protocols. The 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses as well as other international protocols on environment place obligations on the governments of a country to preserve ecology within its territory and to cause no damage to the environment of its neighbours.

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The weaponization of international waters: effects of the crises in Syria and Iraq on the Euphrates and Tigris14 At the time of writing (2016), with the region wracked by conflict, consideration of long-term agreements and planning for the Euphrates and Tigris seems untimely. In fact, from 2013, as the effects of the internal crises in Syria and Iraq took on new dimensions of violence, major water infrastructure on both Euphrates and Tigris came under threat as different actors sought strategic strongholds along the rivers. Different sections of the Euphrates fell into the hands of various state and non-state actors, and control of major dams was contested. By 2016, in many places it was not even clear what entity was exercising control over different segments of the river. Where areas came under of the fundamentalist group ISIS15, the group did not hesitate to use control over water as a weapon in its fight. During the course of 2013 and 2014, ISIS seized control of key infrastructure on the section of the Euphrates that passes through Syria and Northern Iraq, including many of the water-storing, flow controlling and regulating structures. In early 2013, ISIS captured the Tabqah Dam in Syria, the largest dam and the main water storage and flow-regulating structure on the Syrian section of the Euphrates. This gave ISIS control over the water supply for the Aleppo governorate and parts of the Raqqah governorate and cut off access to bulk water supplies for over five million Syrians. Subsequently, the level of water in the reservoir behind the Tabqah Dam dropped considerably. It may be that Turkey cut off the flow of the Euphrates upstream at Jarablus in order to deprive ISIS of control over the river. ISIS announced that it was putting explosives in the body of the dam to be let off if there were an attack on the dam. As the breaching of the dam would represent a massive threat to downstream populations, settlements and infrastructure in both Syria and Iraq, the governments of both countries have treated this threat seriously.16 In Iraq, ISIS took control of the Fallujah regulator and used this control to halt the flow of the Euphrates. This had two serious consequences: the downstream governorates were deprived of water and upstream towns, including Abu Ghraib, were flooded. ISIS effectively ‘weaponized’ water.17 The governments of Iraq and Syria and their international supporters proved well aware of the risks and water infrastructure consequently become a focus for international intervention in the conflict. In August 2014, when ISIS seized the Mosul Dam on the Tigris in northern Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga ground forces and US airpower combined to fight the menace. After fierce battles, Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army recaptured the dam complex, with the support of airstrikes by US fighter jets, bombers and drones. Had the dam fallen, ISIS would have effectively seized control over all of Iraq’s water

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resources, giving them a strategic weapon of capital importance and allowing them to dominate water services downstream and to threaten a large part of the Iraqi economy.18 The menace did not end there. ISIS launched an assault on the Hadithah Dam, the second-largest dam on the Euphrates and Iraq’s second-largest generator of hydroelectricity. After bitter fighting, the Iraqi security forces managed to retain control of the dam. These events underscore the strategic importance of water in the region and the risks and vulnerability of the high rates of dependency on waters flowing in from upstream territories. Solutions to the ‘weaponizing’ of international waters plainly lie in the political and security fields and not in the governance field, but once a strategic security solution to the conflict in the region has been found, there will be a renewed interest in seeking sustainable governance solutions to the risks and challenges involved in developing and using the international waters involved.

Resolving conflict through good water management within the nation National level solutions from the top: infrastructure, institutions, accountability Within country borders, the challenges of conflict management and resolution are essentially the challenges of good water governance and management. At the national level, conflict typically signals an imbalance in infrastructure and institutions that needs to be resolved top-down through investment and institutional adaptation. Investment is required to adapt infrastructure to modern water use (and scarcity). Improved governance and management are required to allocate, use and manage the existing scarce resource more effectively and equitably. This combination of improved governance and management needs to be conducted through flexible institutions and organizations, and through accountability and inclusiveness. All these requirements are the hallmark of good practice water policies. Essentially, conflict signals problems that good water policy can resolve – and those same policies will contribute to the goals of equity, efficiency and sustainability. To discuss water conflict resolution is to discuss good water policy. Infrastructure A first means of resolving water conflict is to adapt infrastructure to modern needs and to scarcity, for example by investing in infrastructure to improve productivity or to facilitate water transfer. Just as technological advances have

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increased the risk of conflict – as with the tubewell in Yemen – technology also plays an important role in mitigating water conflicts. Specifically, technology that improves efficiency of water use and equitable distribution of benefits is a key component of efforts to prevent and manage conflicts related to water. As discussed in Chapter 5, coupled with good management practice, technological advances such as improvements in irrigation efficiency or agronomic innovation to raise productivity can increase the value per drop of water. Programmes to allow the reuse of wastewater or drainage water can increase the quantum of water available to farmers. New irrigation technology and improved management of irrigation schemes can make the distribution of water more timely and equitable, ensuring water arrives just in time and reaches fairly to the tail-enders. Higher productivity, more water and better irrigation service delivery spell less water stress, lower competition, higher incomes – and reduced risk of conflict. Institutions: integrated water resources management and legal water rights Developing institutions and organizations for good practice water management is a second part of the solution from the top. Key to good practice water management – and hence to conflict resolution – are adapted and flexible institutions (laws, values, rights) and capable organizations (management bodies, stakeholder groups). It will be clear from the argument throughout this book that the start of good water management is to adopt the principles and practice of integrated approaches to sector planning – integrated water resource management (IWRM). In fact, the principles and practices of IWRM which were discussed in Chapter 4 can be applied to head off and to resolve many conflict situations. Basic to the avoidance of conflict is to have a clear allocation of legal water rights within a system where contest and conflict can be resolved through transparent process. Within this framework of rights, water needs to be allocated efficiently, whilst taking account of existing rights. There thus needs to be a system of allocating water to its highest value use and of assigning and protecting individual water rights within that allocation. The overall allocation and the assignment of individual water rights needs to be based on water resources assessments and to be consistent with sustainable resource management and the needs of future generations. There needs to be provision for what happens if the quantum of water available is not sufficient to satisfy all rights. In case of drought, for example, are rights of each farmer reduced proportionally? The ‘needs of future generations’ essentially refers to nonrenewable groundwater or to actions that may permanently affect the quality of a water body. Is drawdown of fossil reserves allowed, on what conditions,

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and at what pace? A well-established system of water allocation and water rights, with institutions to regulate abstractions and mechanisms for contestation, will provide the environment for farmers to invest, and the institutional basis for limiting or avoiding conflict. Sadly, such transparent and contestable systems of water rights are few and far between in the region, and this is a major cause of conflict. One example from Yemen will be enough to illustrate the problem. This example concerns one cause of conflict – the drilling of deep wells by public agencies to supply urban consumers. Around Sana’a, the water corporation has drilled many deep wells into the sandstone aquifer, drying up shallower wells. One farmer, Abdulkarim, had private wells next to the old British Embassy in Hadda. In the 1960s, three shallow wells served his farms and nearby houses. Then the water corporation came, drilled to 950 m and pumped out the groundwater, most of it non-recharged fossil water reserves laid down millennia ago. Abdulkarim’s farm shrank from 500 libna to 50 libna (from 50 hectares to 5 hectares). As the corporation pumped out for all it was worth, the yield of Abdulkarim’s wells continued to plummet, ‘until the final days in 2002’. He blamed the water corporation for drilling deeper, ‘draining his wells’. He considered that the corporation competed unfairly, appropriating his water rights. Abdulkarim’s problem was that he had no registered water right, only a traditional right, and there was no legal framework for resolving his dispute. The conflict went unnoticed by anyone except his family. His water right was extinguished without recourse, and his farm and his livelihood disappeared.19 Water markets One way to resolve conflict over water, particularly the kind of conflict over transfer between users and uses discussed above, would be to make water marketable. If the Sana’a utility had bought water from Abdulkarim, or bought his wells, no conflict would have arisen. In addition, water markets bring two other advantages. One is that water markets allow farmers to know and reckon with the actual value of their water in near-economic terms, because a market will put a price on water which reflects its value in alternative uses. Once farmers can value their water, they will be encouraged to use it as efficiently as possible. The second advantage is that when water can actually be sold and transferred, this could achieve the economist’s dream of allocation to higher-value uses. Despite the problem of water’s bulk and the cost of transferring the resource from one location to another, local water markets already exist in very many locations in the region. In Yemen, for example, in the Ta’iz area, a widespread response to water scarcity has been the emergence of informal water markets. Local farmers

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needing water may purchase it from adjacent well-owners, or purchase tankers from farther afield to apply water sparingly to the highest value crops such as the Yemenis’ beloved soft drug, qat. The cost is high, and farmers are often charged more if the crop is qat. For Ta’iz city, a large fleet of private tankers lines up in the hinterland of the city at wells which have converted from agriculture to water supply. Domestic and industrial consumers, or the numerous bottling shops around town, then pay the tanker owners for supplies delivered to their door. These water sales underline that water has become an economic commodity, although this seems to run against Islamic principles. However, the fact that well owners sell at low prices to neighbours for agriculture and at higher prices for the tanker market reflects recognition of lingering traditional principles of local cooperation over water even while water is becoming a commercial commodity. The essential is that these water markets avoid the conflictual situations that would otherwise arise, such as that in Yemen’s Wadi Bani Khawlan described in the section on Conflict at the local level in Chapter 3, or the struggle between urban and agricultural users in Yemen’s Habir district described earlier in the same chapter. In Yemeni cities, the practice of private water supply is ubiquitous, and this is very often fed from agricultural wells or ex-agricultural wells. In the southern city of Ibb, for example, a private network supplies network water under contract with the water corporation and the municipality. The well and network are in a high-density, newly constructed area outside the current public network. The owner used to sell water in tankers to qat farmers. However, the well ran dry and the municipality and the water corporation refused him permission to drill a new well unless he converted to network water supply. He agreed and signed a contract under which the water corporation allows him a specific service area, supervises water quality, and agrees the tariffs. The well owner invested in a distribution network to 180 households. Each household had a meter fitted and paid a connection charge of 10,000 – 40,000 Yemeni rials ($50 – 200), according to the size of the building. The tariffs were set by the corporation after a study of costs at: 120 Yemeni rials /m3 up to 10 m3 a month, and 130 Yemeni rials /m3 above 10 m3 a month ($0.60 – 0.65/m3). Customers complained to the corporation, but the corporation replied, ‘It is up to you. We cannot serve you. The price is fair.’ In fact, although the price is six times the corporation’s lifeline rate, it is the same as the corporation’s average cost of supply, so is quite competitive. In the end, all households in the service area accepted and paid the connection fee. The well owner supplies the large adjacent mosque free and poor people access water at the mosque. Now everyone is happy. The corporation, the well-owner, the local council and

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the local residents all say they are satisfied with the arrangement. Residents especially like the seven-days-a-week, 20-hours-a-day service, almost unheard of in Yemeni cities. A market-based solution neatly avoided conflict, conserved water and gave good water service to satisfied consumers. When Jordan imposed metering, quotas and regulation on groundwater farmers in the Highlands, a conflictual situation arose. Farmers complained that their incomes were plummeting and the military were sent in. A market-based solution resolved the conflict. Jordan now permits farmers in the highlands to sell their water to tankers under licence, or even to hook up to a pipeline and sell their water into the public network. Urban consumers are satisfied because their water services have improved, the farmers are happy because their incomes have gone up, and all this within an orderly governance framework. Even the farmers in the Jordan Valley far below are happy, as the wastewater recycled through the treatment plant at al-Samra is then passed down for reuse in the Valley. The examples from Yemen and Jordan show that it is possible to design measures that will allow flexibility of allocation, for example market-based mechanisms to allow the progressive release of water from agriculture to higher-value municipal supply uses. Putting in place regulated voluntary schemes to allow farmers to realize the higher value of their water like this would be an excellent way to avoid the common current form of conflict where public agencies drill deeper and simply appropriate water and cancel off ageold water rights of farmers. Demand management: regulation A very frequent cause of conflict is when governments try to introduce demand management measures. Everywhere in the region, this has proved very hard indeed, as it imposes costs and constraints on people’s free use of water. In some cases, demand management has proved politically impossible, or has provoked widespread public outcry – see the examples from Jordan, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories in Chapter 3, in the section Conflict of policy with other interests. Two demand management measures have proved particularly contentious, and have provoked widespread confrontation between water users and the administration. The first is the imposition of a regulatory framework to monitor and control water abstractions. This is the logical and essential complement to the attribution of water rights, essentially controlling water abstractions in line with rights. Clearly this is in the public interest, but is usually fiercely contested by rights holders. In most countries, regulation of groundwater abstraction is a fearsomely difficult task, as it involves metering and inspection of hundreds of thousands

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of wells. Even in a high governance country this can prove problematic. In Oman, for example, the arrival of motor pumps and subsequently of the tubewell revolutionized water abstraction and drove the rapid expansion of irrigated agriculture. Farmers were quick to see the advantage of the new technology over both Oman’s traditional aflaj (canals or tunnels bringing water from the mountains to villages) and the traditional well technology. Motor pumps and tubewells tapping deeper into the aquifer provided an apparently unlimited year-round reliable source of high quality water right on the farm without the need to cooperate with neighbours. Today there are estimated to be more than 140,000 wells across the country. The downside of this groundwater boom was that wells proliferated without any clear basis for establishing the safe yield of the aquifer, for assigning water rights or for regulating abstractions. Without a working groundwater governance and regulatory framework, each farmer was able to pump from the shared aquifer without regard to others and with no incentive to manage the resource sustainably. As a result, a variant of the tragedy of the commons emerged, with a ‘race to the bottom’, rapid depletion, and seawater intrusion in coastal areas. In 2000, a regulatory framework for groundwater abstraction was adopted, and meters were installed on most wells in the country. However, there has never been a programme for setting water quotas or for monitoring and regulating abstractions. The government has neither the capacity nor the institutional partnership with farmers needed to implement regulation. At the level of farmers themselves, there is virtually no organization capable of cooperating with the government in a regulatory effort. However, a programme of Sultan Qaboos University in Muscat has shown that metering can work and that farmers are prepared to collaborate in a programme of quotas and regulation provided that it is fair and that it allows them to continue farming. Under the programme, which began in June 2013, ‘smart’ water meters were installed on farms on a voluntary basis. Meter reading was done online daily through a GPRS system. Results have shown that the metering of wells is technically feasible. There is a relatively high cost for acquiring and installing the meters but operating costs are minimal as daily readings are captured online and the meters are maintenance-free for twenty five years or more. By 2015, the readings had generated enough data to allow study of water use efficiency at farm level and established the feasibility of water quotas at both the well and aquifer level. Consultations with farmers show that the pilot initiative has won farmer acceptance by convincing them that managing groundwater is in their interests just as the sustainable management of traditional water sources has been. The university conducted a series of workshops with groups of farmers

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to gauge acceptance of the metering approach to groundwater management. The workshop took the example of the traditional aflaj as institutions where water rights are allocated in the form of perpetual property rights proportional to the sustainable supply. This example helped farmers understand the analogy between groundwater pumped from wells and groundwater distributed through horizontal channels. Farmers responded positively to the idea of groundwater governance once they saw it in this traditional cultural context rather than as an imported foreign idea of regulation. The programme established that farmers would collaborate with quotas and regulation provided that fair water quotas were established and regulated for all, and that no water charges would be levied.20 The lesson is that farmers generally have an interest in firm water rights and in regulation if it is seen to protect their interests. Regulation can be either top-down or delegated to the local level, for example to a farmer group or water user association. In either case, governance and consent are vital. If users do not agree with the rules or if they see the system as unfair, conflict emerges and myriad forms of evasion will quickly develop and undermine the system. In some countries, regulation is delegated to the local level, either de jure or de facto. How this may work is discussed below in the section on Integrating water governance from the bottom up. Demand management: the incentive framework The second demand management measure is to have in place an incentive structure that matches policy objectives. Incentives here are understood to be all factors which influence individual water management decisions. Incentives may be positive, like attractive prices, or subsidies for desired behaviours, or supportive services. They may also be negative, such as constraining regulations on water quantities or sanctions for overuse. It is important to assess the overall structure as incentives may pull in different directions. It is important, too, to recognize the weakness of subsidies designed to correct divergences between market signals and policy objectives. Subsidies tend to go to the wrong people and often do not produce the desired result. An example from groundwater management is that subsidies designed to save water by promoting use of water conserving technology tend to increase water use, as water use becomes more profitable (see the discussion of the Jevons paradox in the section on Groundwater depletion in Chapter 4). The challenge then is to be clear both on the policy goal and on the relevance and effectiveness of amendments to market incentives. It is also essential to think through the possible unintended consequences of policies. Policies do not operate in isolation, but taken together create

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incentives and produce outcomes that may be different from what was intended. For example, incentives to groundwater conservation in Yemen produced some counterproductive social impacts. A 2005 policy to conserve groundwater focussed on correcting distorted incentives by raising energy prices whilst promoting water use efficiency through subsidized equipment. This produced inequitable results as poorer farmers do not own wells and so cannot access the subsidy programmes, and landless labourers were made redundant by the new technology, which required less manpower to operate it than traditional water distribution systems. In this case, the public subsidy went to the better-off, and disfavoured the poorer rainfed producer, or the poorer groundwater producer who could not afford the new technology. Employment was reduced, especially for the poorest labourers. The energy price rise also put up costs nationwide for all consumers, as transport was a key component of consumer prices. The policy and its effects led to widespread protests in which 35 demonstrators were killed.21 Incentives in the water sector also cannot be understood in isolation from the broader national or macroeconomic policy environment. It is essential to consider how policies within other sectors or which affect the economy as a whole also influence incentives in the water sector. Policies directly affecting incentives in the water sector include agricultural pricing policy, trade policy, energy policy, fiscal policy, environmental policy and land policy. Even beyond that, other policies are also relevant, such as policies determining the investment environment. Adjustments may be required in many areas to support good management in the water sector and resolve conflict. The incentive structure may also help to prepare for the transition to a situation where water is less and less abundant. For example, where the imperative is to transition to a less water-intensive socio-economy, complementary adjustments may be needed to amend polices which restrict economic diversification and to ensure there are jobs and a social safety net for those negatively affected or displaced by adjustment or development. This calls for attention to social safety net policy, education policy, housing and urbanization policy, and labour market policy, all of which will form part of the framework of incentives which will influence behaviour in the transition. The characteristics of formal institutions adapted to good water management and to conflict resolution Much of the conflict over water that has arisen in the region can be attributed to institutional failure, and particularly to the failure of formal water institutions to meet the real problems on the ground. At the heart of this failure lie lack of accountability and lack of inclusiveness. What is required for good water management and for water conflict resolution is the development

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of flexible formal institutions which ensure accountability and inclusiveness. Key characteristics of such institutions are transparent and inclusive decisionmaking, access to justice, and intelligent and transparent planning and risk assessment and mitigation. An ideal transparent and inclusive decision-making process would involve a wide set of stakeholders in an open forum, where concerns and grievances and information on specific local circumstances can be conveyed and problemsolved without prejudice. Stakeholders to be involved might include those directly affected such as farmers, consumers or businesses, and other responsible stakeholders such as the private sector, parliamentarians, NGOs, CBOs, an informed press, and so on. Public relations and outreach functions are important, as is technical and environmental education. Means should be found to give voice to less organized and thus often silent constituencies, particularly the needs of the poor, of women, of other vulnerable groups, and of the environment. Access to justice is vital. There has to be an impartial and legitimate adjudication of disputes to help balance competing claims and resolve conflicts over water.22 Major problems of the past have stemmed from the top-down approach of water planning and investment agencies. Much of the conflict between citizens and the state over water described in Chapter 3 stemmed from the technical, inflexible and capital intensive approach taken by state agencies. What is needed is to develop in water planning and investment agencies capacities not only to carry out technical analysis and to implement projects but also the capacity to listen and to assess the local socio-economy and the flexibility to design and implement projects adapted to the local context and people’s expressed needs. Government planning agencies need to be able to carry out participatory risk assessment and mitigation. There needs to be an intelligent, proactive and upfront process using both impact analysis and political economy and conflict analysis tools to spot risks, grievances and emerging conflicts and to feed diagnostics back into the planning and decision-taking loop. Integrating water governance from the bottom up In improving water management and reducing conflict, promoting local governance is a vital complement to institutional reform from the top. Good water management typically requires decentralizing water management powers and responsibility to the lowest appropriate level. This decentralization to the local level (to utilities, to water user associations) can then be linked in with community-based water management approaches so that the local level joins with top-down policies in an integrated approach. In the jargon, the objective is to ‘realign accountabilities’ by combining the supply-

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side of governance (decentralization) with the demand-side of governance (community-based water management) into an ‘integrated accountability system’.23 The reasons for the superiority of local governance, where it is practisable, are many and persuasive. Information about rights and resources is better available locally. Local institutions such as rights systems and dispute resolution mechanisms have developed to fit the local socio-economic and political context. Local resolution will be much quicker and cheaper, and with greater legitimacy and sustainability. Most importantly, local people are the stakeholders and so there is community commitment to getting to practical solutions (both technically feasible and politically acceptable ones), and it is local people – not the government – who will implement them. Finally, local people in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa often have more confidence in local institutions than in government ones. Local governance can also build on existing social capital. As discussed above, traditional institutions have evolved over centuries to manage water at the local level, and these institutions have shown a remarkable capacity to respond to conflict. These responses to scarcity and conflictual situations have been seen as a test of ‘adaptive capacity’: the ability of a society to accommodate change by adjusting rules. For example, Turton and Lichtenthaler found that there is a vibrant indigenous culture in Yemen embodying a traditional value system, and that adaptive capacity may be present in a form capable of resolving conflict and reaching a new equilibrium if correctly harnessed.24 How far that adaptive capacity can respond to the extreme pressures of economics and technology is an open question: communities that rapidly adapted to the tubewell, for example, may have varying abilities to show a comparable ‘downside’ capacity to adapt to scarcity, but in most cases locally negotiated and trusted rules are likely to be superior to ones imposed from the top. Outside support provided on a partnership basis may be needed. Good community-based local water management – and conflict resolution generally – may require support from public organizations if it is to be effective. First, government may need to formalize the roles of local stakeholders within the legal and institutional framework in the country: for example, legal establishment of participatory basin committees (Yemen), water boards (Egypt) or water user associations (Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, etc.), or the consortia of village councils for water service provision in the West Bank. Second, government has to define the respective powers, relations and areas of cooperation between central government, local government and stakeholder organizations. Third, government may need to provide a clear and

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practical framework for water allocation and dispute adjudication. Fourth, government may have a role in ensuring that local organizations are able to acquire the capacity, knowledge and data on the resource, supply, and so on that they need to carry out their tasks. In Yemen, government undertook a project that provided technical and capacity building support to local communities to help them to manage their own groundwater and to resolve disputes. The objective of the Yemen Community Water Management Project was to help water users to organize associations to manage groundwater sustainably and to resolve disputes within a discrete groundwater management area. The project provided the capacity building, tools and knowledge needed for self-management and regulation. Project interventions included: quantification of the local aquifer; equipment and training for well owners to be able to monitor abstractions and groundwater levels; support to preparation of a groundwater management action plan under which water abstractions were collectively managed, monitored and reduced; and investment and software support to improve water productivity in agriculture with the objective of supporting incomes as groundwater consumptive use reduced.25 The case of water user associations It will be recalled from the discussion of integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Chapter 4 that one of the three basic principles of good water management is the institutional principle which provides for the participation of all stakeholders and for management of water at the lowest possible level (‘subsidiarity’). All countries in the region have tried out this agenda of subsidiarity, decentralization and participation, and it has proved a powerful mechanism for preventing and resolving conflict. One particular example is the development of water user associations which have been introduced in most countries of the region as the lowest level of irrigation governance. As discussed in Chapter 4, these associations represent the ‘bottom-up’ participatory approach at the heart of implementation of IWRM’s ‘subsidiarity’ principle. They have generally proved effective organizations for grass roots self-management, especially when they work on a partnership basis with formal agencies. In recent years, where there has been outside involvement (for example, in a project) or when traditional governance structures have faltered, the water user association has been the favoured form of new local governance structure. The range of activities of water user associations varies from basic tasks like monitoring to full-fledged management of the water resource. In Tunisia, for example, a local association in the El Bsissi aquifer monitors quantity and quality of the resource as part of a joint government/user association

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management plan. The El Bsissi coastal aquifer was suffering overexploitation and seawater had begun to intrude, salinizing and destroying the aquifer. This was leading to hot disputes amongst farmers and with government about who was responsible and what should be done. The association, which represents all water users, was established to monitor abstractions and salinity levels and to help manage the aquifer for sustainability.26 Empowerment of water user associations typically requires a supportive role of government. This would normally include government support to community self-management initiatives through information sharing, education, training and cost-sharing. Help would also be provided to develop capacity for joint resource management, water use efficiency and monitoring and evaluation. There may also be a need for support on engineering and technology to help increase supply of water and the efficiency of its use. At some stage, most governments also seek to formalize water user associations and their role, giving them legal status, powers and obligations of accountability and regulation or self-regulation. Governments also have to ensure that their own interventions are technically well-prepared, demanddriven, and negotiated to take account of local social set-ups, institutional patterns and patterns of water rights. Suitably empowered, water user associations may indeed be able to act as the lowest building block in integrated water management. Associations can help farmers not only to access public programmes or act as a solidarity mechanism but they can also serve as the lowest level of water management. One approach is to combine water user associations (or informal, traditional community-managed systems) with formal, new decentralized systems: for example, with local water supply utilities, or decentralized public agencies for IWRM, rural water or irrigation.27 The potential of local water user associations to take on the role of water resources management can be illustrated by an example from Salheia in Egypt. Here a local groundwater association developed a large range of measures to achieve efficient, sustainable and profitable management of a groundwaterirrigated perimeter. At the Salheia site, which is in the East Delta, recharge of groundwater was limited, and well yields and reliability were going down. Seawater had started to intrude. There was general consternation and a potentially conflictual situation arose, with livelihoods affected and each blaming the other. In 1993, one farmer organized a get-together of the 400-odd farmers on the perimeter to assess the problem. The farmers decided to start by determining safe yields and to look at the possibility of establishing a common management system. Following a hydrogeological survey, the farmers decided to continue pumping only from a limited number of wells and to develop a common network of pipelines. The investment in the network was some $300

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per hectare, which was to be recouped from water charges. The individual system was thus transformed into a collective asset. The agreement between the farmers led to the establishment of the Omar Ben al Khattab Water Users Association. The association also decided on a ban on new wells in the area. The Salheia case thus moved beyond individual responses to groundwater problems to collective groundwater management by linking all lands to a common pipeline network. This example shows how a local groundwater association opens up a large range of management options that might otherwise never have been thought of.28 However, care needs to be taken to ensure that these newly negotiated institutions fit the local context and that power asymmetries are neutralized. A case from Yemen’s Wadi Kabir in Lahej shows how modern conflict management may prove frail when confronted with traditional ‘hard power’. A young farmer in the wadi, Yahya Mohammad Ali, had adopted modern irrigation on his farm, which depended on groundwater, on base flow in the wadi and on periodic flows of water from ‘spate’ floods. Yahya became very concerned about excessive upstream water diversion. He received no spate water on his land for several years. He claimed that upstream farmers were ‘taking twelve irrigations’, whilst he got none. He went with his water user association to try to talk to the Complaints Committee of the Lahej Irrigation Council. However, the upstreamers – from the powerful villages of Khalaf, Hussein and Habil – met the user association on the road and shot at them. Yahya and his colleagues turned back. Yahya concluded that the rules on management of water need to be backed up by the police and the courts, but he had little confidence that this would happen.29 These local participatory actions can be scaled up so that the local level interests are integrated with national level interests – an ‘integrated accountability system’ combining accountability from the top and from the bottom, and from public agencies and private users. Examples within the region can be furnished by Kuwait and Jordan. In Kuwait, farmers occupy two main areas, Abdally in the north and Wafra in the south. The lithological and hydro-geological dip in Kuwait is from southwest to north-east. Wafra farmers developed a number of illegal wells but, because of the natural incline, this resulted in overflow of water which damaged downstream farms and adjacent areas including roads. After much bad blood, an inclusive national committee of all stakeholders was established to solve the problem. Regulations against illegal drilling were enforced and all unlicensed wells were closed. Because of this transparent approach and because of the joining together of government and stakeholders, the resolution was accepted as fair and was implemented.30 In Jordan, the Highland Water Forum has created an inclusive participatory platform for identifying groundwater challenges and for agreeing and

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implementing solutions. The Forum, set up in 2009, offers stakeholders a platform to discuss and agree on concrete measures to achieve sustainable groundwater management. The Forum brings together stakeholders including the government, farmer representatives, civil society groups and academia. The objective is to discuss the causes of dwindling groundwater resources, and to collectively think of creative solutions and develop an action plan for sustainable management of groundwater resources.31 Implementing reforms to improve water management and resolve water conflict This chapter has set out a series of possible improvements to water management that could help reduce or resolve conflict. These improvements could constitute a conflict-sensitive reform agenda which can be tailored to the specifics of each national or local water economy in the region, and can be targeted to specific conflict-generating problems. The table at the end of this chapter, Water conflict and approaches for conflict resolution in the Middle East and North Africa, indicates priority measures which may be appropriate to each conflictual situation. Inevitably, however, resistance to change will be encountered. Carrying through water sector reforms requires targeted action plans and tactics to deal with the political economy constraints that are certain to arise. Experience in the region and globally shows the best ways and entry points to push forward a change agenda. These include: ensuring intelligent analysis and design of water sector reform programmes; taking a strategic approach to engagement; building constituencies; developing capacity; and keeping to policy objectives. Intelligent analysis and design of reform programmes requires consideration of political and power relationships, analysis of policies, particularly those affecting incentives, and their intended and unintended consequences, and an understanding of the socio-economic context at national and local levels. Thus the design of water sector reform programmes requires analysis of the internal political context and power balance of different stakeholder interests and influences as well as of institutional structures and processes. ‘Implementing policy change that threatens deeply-rooted practices and interests requires a good understanding of the power relations that sustain them.’32 There needs to be a thorough analysis of the incentive structure and study of how incentives can be rebalanced to influence positive change. At the local level, understanding is needed of the adaptive capacity that exists in every community, and of how that adaptive capacity can be built on as the key to predicting and promoting change and resilience. A vital part of this process is to ensure access to, and comprehension of, information

Conflict over access

† † † †

National or sectoral level Equitable mechanisms for water transfer Consultations, resettlement and compensation Access to justice Demand management, regulatory framework, allocation of water rights, decentralization † Climate change preparedness † Pro-poor agriculture and rural development policies † Social safety net

† Transboundary cooperative framework for development and management † Equitable benefit sharing arrangements † Institutional mechanisms for decision-taking, conflict resolution and implementation † Arrangements for mutual monitoring † Planning and investment optimized at the basin scale † Hydrological and water management data and information sharing

Resolution measures from the top International level

† Local governance, especially water user associations and self-management † Support and partnerships between public agencies and local organizations † Local reporting on water management, investment, use and disaggregated impacts

Local water governance measures

Water conflict and approaches for conflict resolution in the Middle East and North Africa

Transboundary conflict

Conflict

Table 7.4

Conflict of water development and use with environmental needs or sustainability of the resource base

Conflict of government water-related policy with other interests

† Public information on water management, access and related policies and investment, and on mitigation methods and policies to reduce negative impacts † Management of the political economy of change † Market-based approaches and efficiency pricing with protection for the poor † Demand management † Adjustments to the incentive framework (including beyond the water sector) † Integrated programmes for waste water treatment and reuse † Management of the political economy of change † Pro-poor agriculture and rural development policies † Support to local governance † Transboundary cooperative management framework † Public information on water management, access and related policies and investment † Management of the political economy of change † Public and private investment † Regulatory framework † Incentive structure to encourage sanitation and discourage pollution † Incentive structure to encourage water conservation † Management of environmental assets and processes † Social and economic analysis to determine a managed and equitable groundwater mining strategy † Local governance, especially water user associations and self-management † Support and partnerships between public agencies and local organizations † Paid environmental services † Self-managed watershed management programmes † Local reporting on water management and use and environmental change and disaggregated impacts

† Local governance, especially water user associations and self-management † Support and partnerships between public agencies and local organizations † Local reporting on water management, investment, use and disaggregated impacts

Continued

Source: Authors

Local conflict provoked by state intervention

Local conflict arising from adoption of new technology

Conflict

Table 7.4

Local level † Regulatory framework † Incentive structure to encourage water conservation † Social safety net † Management of the political economy of change † Public information on mitigation methods and new policies to reduce negative impacts † Integrated planning, allocation of water rights † Transparent and inclusive decision taking, access to justice † Resettlement and compensation, social safety net † Decentralization, access to justice † Pro-poor agriculture and rural development policies † Public information on water management, access and related policies and investment

† Public information on environmental sustainability of water policies, investments and consumption † Management of the political economy of change

Resolution measures from the top International level

† Local governance, especially water user associations and self-management † Support and partnerships between public agencies and local organizations † Local reporting on water management, investment, use and disaggregated impacts

† Local governance, especially water user associations and self-management † Support and partnerships between public agencies and local organizations † Local reporting on water management and use and disaggregated impacts

Local water governance measures

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and knowledge about resources, rights, and so on, as this will empower stakeholders to participate, increasing the legitimacy and equity of the policy making process. A strategic approach to engagement requires a targeted engagement strategy for identifying conflict proactively, and for influencing and challenging power asymmetry. Such a strategy would include policy analysis, public relations campaigns, public education, establishing dialogue platforms etc. Very important will be demonstrating and publicizing persuasive successes. Discussion of ideas might possibly influence ministries and academics but evidence of success or changes in incentives are needed to change things on the ground. It will be essential to build constituencies. Reform requires a constituency – a coalition for change – and time is needed to develop this. The role of leaders, catalysts and educators in promoting change is important. Change agents will need to think for the long term and to invest in a learning process. A long term strategy is required, and principal partners in government and civil society will need to be aware that they must retain the stamina needed. At the same time, change agents will need to be on the qui vive and ready to capitalize on ‘decisive moments’. Capacity building is key. At the top and within the public sector, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of water authorities, and so on, with particular emphasis on accountability of government and public agencies and on improving perceptions of their legitimacy amongst constituents. At the local level, water user associations and other weaker interest groups need to be empowered and their negotiating capacity needs to be enhanced. The final must is to keep to the main idea, with the essential policy objectives always in view. The fundamental policy goals are social equity in terms of fair distribution of benefits, economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability. Within these broad ‘apple pie’ goals there may be particular policy targets such as building in a pro-poor bias to all measures, increasing the role of women and other vulnerable groups, placing a particular emphasis on participation, accountability, transparency, and so on. If programmes are not transparently pro-poor, the powerful will probably reap the benefits.

Conclusion This chapter started from the finding of Chapter 3 that the proliferation of water-related conflict is a useful indicator of priorities in water sector reform. Conflicts left unmanaged can deteriorate, even into violence, but when handled constructively, conflict can be an important force for beneficial change.

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Chapter 3 had argued that conflict at the national or sectoral level typically arises over water allocations and rights, or when government water policy conflicts with other interests, or when development is at odds with the environment or with sustainability. At the local level, the sources of conflict assessed in Chapter 3 included adoption of new technology and – more surprisingly – government interventions which, however well-intentioned, were also found to lead to an unexpected rash of conflict situations. Despite adaptive capacity, traditional institutions were often overwhelmed or undermined by economic, technological and social change, whilst modern institutions proved slow to develop and adapt. The present chapter has built on this analysis to propose that water conflict management is essentially through pragmatic and prioritized application of good water resource management principles. At the national and sectoral levels these principles target equity, efficiency and sustainability through infrastructure investment and institutional change. At the local level, the solutions discussed are in ‘subsidiarity’, in delegating to the local level, supporting local governance, and aligning accountabilities between the local and the central levels, and between public and private interests. If conflict management is well done, as part of an integrated approach to water governance, development and management, it can move the water sector towards its objectives of social equity, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. This chapter has also looked at some of the challenges faced by those who want to push through reforms in the water sector, including the risks of opposition to reform by the powerful. This theme of the political economy of reform is taken up again in Chapter 9. First, however, the discussion turns to one of the most remarkable questions to be addressed in this book – whether conflict resolution and improved water governance may actually be able to promote peace in the Middle East. This is the subject of the next chapter, Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 8 BEYOND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PEACEBUILDING THROUGH WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1

Practical experience and analysis have generated broad debate around the potential for competition over increasingly scarce water resources. As access to water changes, risks grow for overlapping water claims to escalate into conflict and violence (see Figure 8.1). And as the examples in the chapters above explain, social and environmental changes, including power dynamics, can manifest a perception of relative scarcity and inequity. In locations where residual or latent social tensions exist, instability can emerge as changes in access fuel grievance and frustration. As contentious social interactions escalate into conflict, and as water becomes scarcer due to quantity and quality issues, further differentiation in access and social cleavages between user groups can deepen. If unchecked, this can perpetuate a downward spiral of violence. As examples in this book explain, governance, and capacity to govern effectively, is often at the crux of the water access dilemma. As Giordano et al. explain: Conflict is most likely to occur where there exist both resource scarcity and insufficient institutional capacity to deal with it. In particular, conflict is most likely to emerge in those areas where (1) resource sovereignty is ill defined or non-existent, (2) existing institutional regimes are destroyed by political change, and/or (3) rapid changes in resource environments outpace the capacity of institutions to deal with change.2

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Figure 8.1

Water Access-Conflict Trajectory

Chapter 7 describes a range of experiences from which we draw lessons on how to improve methods of water conflict resolution. And what about the long term? Can water governance actually promote peace in the Middle East and North Africa? Yes. However, there are few published resources available that explain the process of building peace through water management interventions. By looking at water projects more closely through a ‘peacebuilding’ lens we can break down the strategic elements: how to design water interventions that promote peace for the longer term.

Peace, peacebuilding and ‘environmental peacebuilding’ What is the ‘peace’ we are working toward? Clearly, inequity is a major driver of conflict over water. And structural conditions that generate inequity fuel water conflict. Peacebuilding, by definition, addresses structural causes of conflict to build sustainable and peaceful communities. The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to promote positive peace: the absence of structural conditions – laws, institutions and social structures – that lead to physical harm, prevent parties from satisfying their basic needs and limit human potential.3 John Paul Lederach explains the concept of peacebuilding as follows (emphasis added): Peacebuilding should be understood as a process-structure [. . .] characterized by just and interdependent relationships with the capacity to find non-violent mechanisms for expressing and handling

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conflict [. . .] The Goal [of peacebuilding] is not stasis, but rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes that maintain form over time and are able to adapt to environmental [contextual] changes over time.4 Peacebuilding is both an action and an outcome. It builds parties’ capacities to prevent and resolve conflict over time and, because it champions interdependencies, it motivates those parties to utilize those capacities for the long term. Peacebuilding creates a foundation for sustained collaboration. ‘Environmental peacebuilding’ proposes that there are opportunities to capitalize on ecological interdependencies and to promote economic and political relationships through joint resource management and benefit sharing.5 Environmental peacebuilding reforms structures and fosters positive peace by building organizational and institutional capacities that operate together to promote collaborative resource governance and environmental sustainability. In turn, these activities foster positive peace. Environmental peacebuilding is not simply reactive – responding to active conflict – but it is also proactive and preventative, as it builds capacity to mitigate the escalation of latent conflict and manage the risk of conflict relapse. And furthermore, success in environmental cooperation can be a conduit for peacebuilding in other areas of a society, extending benefits beyond systems of resource governance. There have been no major, large-scale successes in environmental cooperation that have yielded comprehensive peace and longstanding social cohesion between conflict parties. However, there is a variety of little victories that have been observed in previous water interventions, and from these cases we can draw lessons – see Box 8.1. So, how do we build toward peace through a water intervention? Collaborative water resource governance is a prime example of environmental peacebuilding. Collaborative governance initiatives can be constructively designed to engage conflict parties (‘first parties’) and to build their capacity to work together, productively, for mutual benefit. As this book explains, many parts of the Middle East and North Africa have experienced tension and conflict due to increasing water stress. But conflict is not an inherently negative phenomenon (Chapter 7). It becomes a social risk when the parties lack the capacities needed to respond constructively. In fact, conflict can build capacity, as it prompts innovation for addressing problems, creates incentives to find long-term solutions and rectifies power imbalances and social injustices. Constructively designed interventions, such as water sector investments and reforms, that foster capacity for collaborative governance can capitalize on these opportunities – and build peace.

Box 8.1 Good Water Neighbours Project and Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study There are two water initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa region that are commonly used as examples of inter-party cooperation and peacebuilding: the Good Water Neighbours Project and the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study. In this chapter, these projects provide several examples for environmental peacebuilding. Background on these initiatives is provided below. The Good Water Neighbours Project (GWN), launched in 2001, is an ongoing initiative of EcoPeace Middle East (previously known as Friends of the Earth Middle East). EcoPeace is a tripartite organization, with offices and representation from Israel, Palestine and Jordan. The objective of EcoPeace, and in turn GWN, is to promote peace through supporting good management of the region’s shared ecosystem. On local and regional levels, GWN promotes sustainable water management through information sharing, dialogue, and cooperative ventures. It supports collective action on common water issues through transboundary partnerships between Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian communities. In 2006, EcoPeace began cooperatively mapping out environmental problems and sustainable solutions in collaboration with local communities. Today, the project uses public seminars and workshops, and implementation of small infrastructure investments (e.g., rainwater harvesting schemes) as ways to achieve its goals. GWN receives financial support from multiple sources, including: Australia, Belgium, Canada, European Union, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States, and from non-governmental organizations such as Caritas and the Ford Foundation. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study (RDCS), launched in 2006 and concluded in 2013, is a series of environmental and social assessments of a proposed plan to process and transfer water from the Red Sea to replenish the falling Dead Sea. The scheme would incorporate a multi-faceted trans-border infrastructure and economic development plan that would include desalinating water for human consumption and construction of tourism facilities. The project included five studies: (1) overall feasibility study of the proposed infrastructure; (2) environmental and social assessment; (3) Dead Sea modelling study; (4) Red Sea modelling study; and (5) study of alternatives to the infrastructure proposal. The heads of the Israeli Water Authority, Jordanian Water Authority and the Palestinian Water Authority were the primary parties to the programme, and a panel of local technical experts supported each team. These teams met several times a year to discuss the project and its progress. According to project documentation the parties were unified in their ‘shared vision’ of the study, which focused on: 1. saving the Dead Sea from environmental degradation; 2. desalinating water and generating energy at affordable prices; and 3. building a symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East. The study series was coupled with a detailed communications and consultation plan, including broad annual public consultation meetings and targeted presentations to specific interest groups. The World Bank acted as third-party facilitator for the project and managed the multidonor trust fund that financed the programme.

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Environmental peacebuilding strategy The environmental peacebuilding process is pictured in Figure 8.2. The model is based on previous research and practical experience in implementing water initiatives in situations of fragility and conflict. This model can serve as a ‘toolbox’ for incorporating peacebuilding strategies into water interventions, including infrastructure and institutional investments. This model illustrates two major components of the environmental peacebuilding process that can be incorporated into water interventions: (1) practicalities and (2) capacity building. Capacity building (2) is the ‘what’ – what collaborative governance capacities are being built by the intervention. These capacities can be used as indicators of success for evaluating the peacebuilding effort. The capacity building process – from initial engagement to Stages 1 and 2 in the model below – signals growth in collaborative governance capabilities and stronger inter-party relationships. With these achievements comes conflict de-escalation, improved water resource management and less reliance on third party intervention. Practicalities (1) are the ‘how’ – how are those collaborative governance capacities being built. Once the capacity building plan for an intervention has been laid out, the practicalities itemized in this framework can guide the implementation strategy in order to maximize outcomes toward a goal of positive peace.

Figure 8.2

Environmental peacebuilding model

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Table 8.1

Capacities that promote collaborative governance Stage 1

Stage 2

Institutional Capacities

Organizational Capacities

Public awareness

Knowledge-sharing Volunteerism mechanisms Open dialogue Champions Political will Representative joint organizations Social resilience

Acknowledgement of a shared goal Confidence

Institutional Capacities

Organizational Capacities Coalitions for change and cooperation Operationalized shared goals Operating standards for equity

Cooperative agreements

Capacities for collaborative governance At least fourteen capacities can promote collaborative governance and, in turn, the peacebuilding process (see Table 8.1). Capacities can be outcomes of the intervention, and so can be planned for when designing the intervention. These capacities can be divided into two types: institutional capacities (norms and values, perceptions and knowledge) and organizational capacities (functional capabilities and explicit rules and roles). Representative of positive peace, these capacities promote principles of equity and representation, and collectively they reinforce one another. However, it is worth noting that organizational capacities are generally more straightforward to develop, as institutional capacities are more closely associated with hard-to-understand psycho-social processes. Engagement Initial engagement – when parties come together and explore a collaborative relationship – is the first step for capacity building in all peacebuilding initiatives. Through an intervention, initial engagement may be (1) required (top-down: e.g., parties are required by international water law or a third party’s policies) or (2) voluntary (bottom-up: e.g., parties opt into a process). Either way, it can be viewed as a first round win when parties convene, as it signals their consideration of a joint initiative. However, practitioners often mistake initial engagement for ‘success’ – when it is only the first baby step in a peacebuilding process toward change. Sustained engagement between the parties over time is necessary to maintain collaborative governance and build durable capacities in Stage 1 and 2 (see Figure 8.2).

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Building Capacities in Stage 1 Collaborative governance capacities are built in stages over a period of sustained engagement. After parties initially engage, they enter a stage of building new capacities (Stage 1) that challenge the barriers that limited engagement in the past. Stage 1 reforms to institutional and organizational capacity lay the foundation for parties to work together over the longer term. Stage 2 is a second stage of growth, where from that foundation parties’ collaborative interests and capabilities grow and strengthen. When conflict is entrenched, capacity building may need to be initiated by a third party. When tension is high, when power imbalances and the risk of violence prevail, parties can be unwilling to begin collaboration on their own and without a sense of protection. So, when conflict is heightened, first parties often characterize externally-driven interventions as necessary for facilitating engagement. Third parties can change the rules of engagement, enabling parties to build constructive relationships. When inter-party relations are dysfunctional due to a legacy of conflict, their capacity to collaborate is stunted, and third parties can strategically plug those capacity gaps. For capacity building in Stage 1 to be effective, capacities that are initiated by third parties need to be rooted in the context and fuelled by party interest and momentum. This improves sustainability of the effort toward long-term change. Stage 1: Institutional capacities Institutional capacities are evidence of a growing understanding of an interdependence and shared benefits which can motivate improved working relationships between first parties. Public awareness Awareness – of environmental challenges and their human causes and effects – is critical to facilitating change. Lack of public awareness constrains stakeholder action and willingness to engage in collaborative governance. By contrast, improved awareness of environmental issues and understanding of the benefits of collective action can empower stakeholders. Further, building awareness can rectify power imbalances that can result from parties having different levels of knowledge of environmental issues. A staff person from EcoPeace Middle East describes the significance of awareness building in the context of the Good Water Neighbours Project (GWN), the cross-border initiative that brings together Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian communities for collaborative water management (see Box 8.1 for background): ‘It begins with awareness raising, learning about your own environment and the state of your water resources, how they are contaminated, planned, consumed, etc. Then you ask “What is

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happening to my neighbour?” Through this awareness raising you empower people that they can make the change themselves. Peacebuilding is empowerment that you can make a difference, bringing self-confidence back to the community.’6 In initiatives such as GWN, public education and learning through exposure to the water behaviours and needs of others builds a common understanding of stakeholder interdependencies and the necessity for cooperation in managing water resources. With better awareness of how water and human systems affect one another and the consequent need for group response, stakeholders challenge their own negative perceptions of engaging competitors and they engage adversaries more constructively. Improved public awareness of environmental and natural resource issues can be catalytic at multiple levels of society – from high-level decision-makers to grassroots organizations. At the micro level, the GWN project observed normative and behavioural change as knowledge and information about participating water user communities improved. As neighbours became more aware of how their socio-ecological systems were integrated, their interest in collective action increased. Acknowledgement of a shared goal When stakeholders have identified a common goal, for example an infrastructure investment or management scheme to improve water sustainability, this can help reinforce understanding of interdependency and forge bonds to facilitate joint action. For example, over-pumping of groundwater may be affecting well productivity in a location, and so the water users realize their actions are increasing scarcity – and hence collectively they have an interest to moderate the trend. Adversarial parties’ perceptions of one another can be improved as they understand their interdependencies with regard to achieving their common goal. But a third party (e.g., one financing an intervention) often facilitates the ‘coming together’ of the parties and facilitates their understanding and acknowledgement of that shared goal. For example, the goal can be formally recognized in an announcement of a joint assessment, such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance Study, or in a transboundary river basin management plan, such as those prepared for the Danube and NeretvaTrebisnica. As parties build complementary roles and responsibilities to achieve their shared goal, this can address exclusionary and preferential governance practices and power imbalances that fuel conflict. Confidence In order for a peacebuilding process to achieve momentum once competing parties engage, the parties should gain confidence in the concept and procedures of the engagement. In best case scenarios, parties develop

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confidence that they will benefit from collaboration, and in less ambitious scenarios they are confident that the effort will do them no harm. Confidence also implies that participants have a positive view of themselves and, over time, their counterparts. For example, they may be satisfied with their roles in the governance system, feeling that they are secure and that the other party is accountable. Third parties play an integral role in building the confidence of the parties, for example in the way that they introduce new water governance initiatives and facilitate first party interaction. Confidence facilitates longterm engagement and, eventually, trust. Trust, a more durable social phenomenon, enables individuals to maintain fair relationships that may have previously been tainted by scepticism and inequity. Stage 1: Organizational capacities Organizational capacities are operations and policies that enable more equitable representation, power and benefit distribution. Because they are more tangible and quantifiable than institutional capacities, organizational capacities can be accounted for in in the design of an intervention, easily included in monitoring plans, and upheld by third party business processes (e.g., requirements for stakeholder representation). Knowledge sharing mechanisms Policies and information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure for improved information flow and sharing are an important part of knowledge development, governance – and peacebuilding – processes. Policies of transparency that allow stakeholders to have more equitable access to data resources and other information regarding water governance and development opportunities can improve the level of informed participation and collaboration in management processes. Furthermore, improved information management can support intellectual, social and human resources required for joint governance, reducing structural inequities and risks of conflict and violence. Knowledge sharing mechanisms can range from online data portals to open public consultations. Knowledge sharing and transparency can also foster confidence and trust, mitigate elite capture and build perceptions of equity and fairness – in turn promoting conditions for positive peace. Websites such as those for the Nile Basin Initiative and the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program serve as information portals for stakeholders to share information related to water management. Champions Champions are not simply leaders with a management title, but rather they are charismatic or influential ‘doers’ with conviction for the cause of

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collaborative governance and the ability to motivate others to act. Champions can be driven by a number of factors – from altruistic to social to political reasons – and can come from the top, middle or bottom of an organization. An individual who perceives sustained engagement as beneficial can rise as a champion, thereby taking on a progressive role to build support, broaden participation and ultimately promote collaborative governance. Cooperative agreements New joint initiatives are generally established in written agreements that formalize the nature of collaboration between stakeholder parties. These can range from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to a set of laws to administrative documents from a development institution that is financing a development initiative that requires collaborative governance. In GWN, MOUs were signed by the mayors of partner communities in order to lay the administrative foundation for cross-border cooperation. Parties to the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program (see Box 8.1 for project background) were also committed under MOUs and co-designed Terms of Reference for a feasibility study of the water transfer scheme to replenish the drying Dead Sea. While these agreements may seem small relative to a treaty, in the early days of collaboration they do provide parties with a basic framework for understanding the nature of engagement, moderating insecurities of ‘the unknown’ as parties engage with erstwhile opponents. Representative joint organizations Joint governance bodies are intended to institutionalize and operationalize cooperative agreements and alliances within and between involved stakeholder groups. However, the indicator of peacebuilding progress is not the existence of a representative joint organization, but rather it is the quality of the relationships within it and their ability to mitigate structural violence. These organizations can foster relationships on which the members can capitalize throughout the environmental management process, and they can generate new ancillary relationships. To achieve this, these entities need to represent the variety of stakeholder concerns that relate to executing their mandate in order to ensure equitable and positive benefits for all. Third parties often, at least originally, define the parameters of these bodies, and these may be established by way of a written cooperative agreement. Driven by internal commitment, these bodies can later be expanded in terms of representation and mandate, thus broadening the scope of peacebuilding as well. In RDCS these bodies are consortia of government officials, with secondary informal fora consisting of civil society/nongovernmental organisation representation. In GWN, community groups

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were established to provide input into cross-border plans and to take part in co-learning opportunities. Building Capacities in Stage 2 Stage 2 indicates progressive growth in first party relationships and the parties’ capacities to govern collaboratively. Stage 1 capacities remain at play in Stage 2, becoming components in the ‘process-structure’ that continue to encourage change and create new opportunities and incentives for sustained engagement. Stage 2: Institutional capacities Volunteerism Volunteerism among stakeholders is foundational to sustaining cooperation. Volunteerism is when individuals self-select and opt into the collaborative process. In the early stages of collaborative governance initiatives, third parties may have to provide external motivation for collaboration between parties. However, when volunteerism emerges it provides evidence that parties are internally motivated. This is a sign of normative change and support for partnership. For example, when the Good Water Neighbours Project was launched in 2001, it began with five transboundary partnerships between Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian communities. Over the past 15 years, new village partnerships have emerged, and now more than 28 communities are involved in the programme. Open dialogue Transparency and confidence support open, internally-driven dialogue and normalize party discussions of risks and opportunities associated with collaboration. More free exchange can counter negative perceptions and rumours between the parties, promoting more constructive debate about solutions. Open dialogue, particularly outside of formal settings, has been associated with the growth of ancillary relationships between high-level water officials in the Red Sea-Dead Sea conveyance negotiations and in the Nile Basin Initiative (Chapter 7), for example. In the Good Water Neighbours project, communities that voluntarily engaged in the programme normalized a discourse of peacebuilding against the grain of norms that discouraged engagement – opening the door for joint investment plans. Political will As they gain perspective on their interconnected socio-environmental problems and consider joint solutions, stakeholders can develop an understanding of the mutual benefit of collective action. Policies and

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institutions need to be reformed to unify divided systems and facilitate collaborative governance. But to make any of this happen there needs to be political will among authority figures to enable it. There are still obvious costs to working with a competitor or adversary, including reputational risks, but the trade-off could be the development of new infrastructure and services to meet constituent needs. However, it can be a major struggle to build political will in contexts where water management is highly politicized, as is the case in many parts of the MENA region (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 7), and this is a primary constraint to building collaborative governance in these locations. Perception of collective benefit for the greater good and the will to pursue this benefit can be underpinned by an ethos of public service. Starting in 2006 under GWN in Wadi Fukhin (West Bank) and Tzur Hadassah (Israel), political will was mobilized to stop the construction of the West Bank Wall between the two villages (at the time of writing, 2016, construction of the wall in this area was still delayed). An EcoPeace Middle East staffer summarizes the programme’s approach to peacebuilding which enabled this to happen: ‘GWN builds a constituency at a local level, and political will to problem-solve.’7 Social resilience Tension and violence can slow or even derail projects in locations where the parties are not resilient to these pressures. Resilience marks the ability of parties to proactively intervene upon potential disputes and conflict escalation. Experience preventing and resolving differences over water resources can build tolerance among stakeholders and the capacity to bounce back from disruptive environmental, economic and political events. Resilient communities are capable of resisting spoilers to peace and the lure of violence, as parties have esteem for collaborative engagement. Stage 2: Organizational capacities Stage 2 organizational capacities are characterized by the parties’ motivation to work together, and by increased self-sufficiency and sustainability of these systems. Coalitions for cooperation and change Champions build coalitions for change. These ‘coalitions’ represent multistakeholder support for cooperation; champions grow and sustain these types of coalitions by improving stakeholders’ awareness of environmental issues and political will for collective action. In GWN, some communities showed dramatic expansion of these coalitions, such as in Wadi Fukhin and Tzur Hadassah. As these pilot initiatives scaled up, and new pairs of communities came forward, the coalition for change that supported joint environmental management across

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the 1949 Armistice Line (the Green Line) grew. It should be noted, however, that to determine the strength and effectiveness of a coalition and its potential to reduce structural violence and promote positive peace, the quality (and not simply the existence) of relationships within that coalition should be assessed. Operationalized common goal When parties come together to operationalize their common goal – by implementing a joint strategy, joint management policy or joint investment activity, for example – this signals that they have shifted from a process of envisioning to a process of implementing a reform or investment that will promote shared benefits. Some of the GWN communities, for example, have achieved progress in this way, having gone through consultative processes to define shared goals, and then operationalizing those by way of joint management plans. Operating standards for equity To effectively uphold standards of equity and representation that promote collaboration, governing organizations need to demonstrate these principles in their work programmes and policies. For example, water agencies need to design and monitor good practices that promote collaborative governance. These practices would include policies and action plans, business processes, budget and financing, and capacity building and human resource management. While having these standards in writing is an indication of progress, to effect change they need to be promoted in the business culture. At first, these standards might be externally enforced by a third party, but subsequently, when these standards are driven by motivations internal to the party, it is a sign that collaborative governance has grown. Furthermore, when the benefits of collaborative water governance are distributed equitably, this can motivate parties to continue their cooperation.

Practicalities: taking advantage of the context Institutional and organizational capacities described above can be built in several different ways in order to promote environmental peacebuilding. Interventions benefit from taking several practicalities into consideration with regard to context and operations (see Table 8.2). Context factors are characteristics of the circumstances in which an intervention is conducted. In the context where an intervention is planned, there exists potential to capitalize on opportunities in the areas of security, ecology and public relations. Operational approaches are the strategic methods and mechanics of the water management initiative. Peacebuilding potential can be maximized

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Table 8.2

Intervention practicalities that enable peacebuilding

Context Security Ecology

Public relations

† † † †

† †

Low violence intensity Less intrusive security regime Owned environmental imperative Environmental resource governance capacity ˚ Holistic vision of water management ˚ Human capacity ˚ Accountable organizations Public image and strategic relations Public concern

Operational approaches Third party influence

First party empowerment

† † † † † †

†

Enabling tactics

† † † † †

Financing Neutrality/non-neutrality Standards of equity and inclusion Convening power Knowledge and information management Involvement of leadership ˚ Responsive leaders ˚ Government-grassroots linkages ˚ Ancillary relationships Public participation ˚ Representativeness ˚ Electiveness ˚ Accessibility ˚ Countering social pressures Constituency building Technological approach Demonstrating peace dividends Extended time horizon Peacebuilding explicitness

through strategic operational approaches, including third party influence, first party empowerment and a selection of enabling measures. Interventions aimed at fostering peace through collaborative governance should begin by examining and determining how to maximize enabling characteristics of the context. Then the intervention can be strategically planned to build on contextual opportunities and mitigate risks to the peacebuilding process. Context factors are important to consider in intervention design, as the intervention is nested within and should respond to the context. For example, operational approaches can capitalize on

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opportunities and mitigate risks associated with context, such as politics and power dynamics.8 Characteristics of the context and intervention can affect institutional capacities (e.g., behavioural and attitudinal transformation by impacting norms and values and belief systems) and organizational capacities (e.g., policies) for collaborative governance. Practitioners need to consider these system dynamics as they design water management interventions, as this will improve effectiveness to promote collaboration and peace, particularly in complex, conflict-affected situations. Security In the security context, two factors commonly improve the potential for collaboration and long-term peacebuilding: low violence intensity and a less intrusive security regime. These factors are associated with public safety and mechanisms for maintaining it, and frequently they impact parties’ initial engagement and their level of confidence in collaborative governance. Low violence intensity A context that is characterized by ‘low violence intensity’ features: (i) low levels of physical violence between the parties that are engaging in the intervention, and (ii) history of a ‘cooling off’ period from the most intense period of physical violence between the parties. Lower violence enables initial and sustained engagement, as parties are less preoccupied by the physical threat of violence from one another, and they may have other existing channels of engagement (e.g., other investments or intergroup organizations) on which collaborative water governance initiatives can be built. Examples in Israel/West Bank show how high intensity conflict can constrain collaborative governance and peacebuilding. Despite apparent progress that was seen in the establishment of the Oslo Accords, the parties have yet to achieve positive peace of any kind. Violence continues to be perpetuated by both parties, resulting in negative economic impacts, particularly for the Palestinian population, as jobs and infrastructure suffer the consequences. One locally-based expert reflects: ‘Outbreaks of violence stop momentum and polarize the groups. For example, [an American scholar] did all of this training with environmental mediators over several years, then, boom, with the 2000 intifada it all fell apart. No one wanted to continue. It was a big waste.’ Another recalled: ‘As the intensity of the conflict increases, it is like poison. It kills the atmosphere, the trust, and people cannot work together.’ Thus, in these cases individuals are more sceptical about initial engagement. Furthermore, it constrains sustained engagement, limiting or even pre-empting the development of any capacities for collaborative governance that can promote positive peace.

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Less intrusive security regime An intrusive security regime can perpetuate poor environmental management and environmental problems, which hinders progress toward peacebuilding. A security regime includes a long list of legalities, including peace agreements, permit and visa systems, police and military mandates, and other related forms of bureaucracy. Just as low violence intensity enables peacebuilding, as it constructs the emotional space to enable engagement, a less intrusive security regime creates the physical space. An intrusive security regime is visible (e.g., physical presence of security forces) and it includes bureaucratic restrictions (e.g., regulations and permitting requirements). Consequently, intrusive security negatively affects the parties’ perceptions of the feasibility of interparty engagement. While some sort of security characterizes virtually all contexts, experience shows that when that regime is less intrusive it enables both initial and sustained engagement. An intrusive security regime is also characterized by a strong security discourse. The security discourse can maintain a ‘security caveat’ that hinders long-term engagement. Furthermore, an intrusive regime can limit third-party willingness to be involved in the context if that party views security as a risk to the intervention they are supporting and the outcome objectives they have established.9 For example, the security regime in place in West Bank/Israel is generally perceived as intrusive, and is dominated by the presence and control exercised by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). One affiliate of the Good Water Neighbours Project explains: ‘Military occupation is an obstacle to our objectives. Permits are time-consuming and last minute, people are not getting permits and the wall [the security barrier] prevents people from moving around – these all have negative impacts on the environment, and on progress toward peace.’10 Restrictions within a security regime can reinforce obstacles to engagement. Paradoxically, while the intent of a security regime is to keep violence down, security regimes and the restrictions that are associated with them can have the effect of constraining peacebuilding. For example, in the West Bank/Israel case, movement into and around the West Bank has been characterized by numerous limitations. That has meant that the parties cannot meet without overcoming significant administrative hurdles (e.g., a permit regime) that are associated with the security regime. These conditions impact perceptions of feasibility of any collaborative effort and willingness to engage. Restrictions on movement and access, and consequently party interaction, create logistical and psychological obstacles that hinder capacity building in Stages 1 and 2. Easing security can have an enabling effect on peacebuilding. An intrusive and unbalanced security regime, when it becomes the locus of a system of party grievances or an obstacle to implementing a cooperative governance

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endeavour, constrains peacebuilding. Peacebuilding intervention design can be impeccable, yet barriers encountered in the security regime can impede engagement, both perceived and actual. Furthermore, a security discourse, which is highly institutionalized in the Israeli case, can be considered an acceptable reason for military and government action and prohibition of social activity between adversaries. When restrictions associated with this security regime are eased, such a gesture can be interpreted as ‘good will’, subsequently building confidence, enabling collaborative governance initiatives to progress, and hence facilitating peacebuilding. Surprisingly, problematic security restrictions can also foster an imperative for parties to cooperate. For example, the public’s frustration with security restrictions can motivate people to force change in security policy. In the case of one pair of Good Water Neighbours communities, Wadi Fukhin and Tzur Hadassah, the mutual frustrations fuelled by the security restrictions created a rallying point for joint resistance to the construction of the barrier that divides Israel and the West Bank.11 The communities determined the wall that would be built between them as hurting their environment and their livelihoods, thus leading them to join together to resist its construction. The communities protested and have stalled the construction of the wall based on two premises: environmental impacts to an important biodiversity site, and economic impacts as the communities historically traded agricultural goods. For several years the communities have pursued the case in the Israeli court system, effectively stalling construction in the interim. Ecology In the context of the environment, two factors can impact potential for collaboration and peacebuilding: owned environmental imperative and environmental resource governance capacity. These factors are integral to building several capacities: awareness, recognition of a shared goal, representative joint organizations, perceptions of mutual benefit, the operationalization of common goals and coalitions for cooperation and change. Owned environmental imperative Experience confirms that parties often engage in collaborative governance because they have identified some imperative for environmental action. Such an imperative grows from a sense of responsibility, as parties take ownership of the environmental conditions with which they live. An environmental imperative may be the result of longstanding water challenges or a triggering event, such as extreme weather. Environmental conditions, and notions of ownership and responsibility associated with those conditions, are perceived through historical and

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socio-cultural lenses. Communal memory and perception of environmental history (e.g., climatic trends and recent environmental events) frame environmental norms and values, but as the socio-political context changes so too can a sense of urgency for good environmental management to develop. And, when an environmental imperative is owned by a party, this can foster capacity building in two primary areas: awareness and acknowledgement of a shared goal with another party. For example, in the West Bank and Israel, water and environmental resources have significant social and cultural value – leading both to conflict and cooperation. This is because of the semi-arid climate, political positioning in final status negotiations, increasing water scarcity and pollution problems, and strong cultural references and attention to environmental history in highly traditional societies. Water is of high cultural value in both the Israeli and Palestinian contexts, for example, (i) as an ideological factor in the establishment of the Israeli state (e.g., efforts to ‘green’ the Negev Desert, nation-building through the kibbutzim), and (ii) as a key symbolic factor in Palestinian folklore and traditional livelihoods, which are historically centred around agriculture in semi-arid village environments. Indeed, both the Israeli and Palestinian cultures are rooted in agrarian traditions, making access to land and water of historical importance to constituent communities. These factors combine to perpetuate a sense of ownership over the resources and responsibility to protect them. Numerous factors have increased tensions between Israeli and Palestinian water users: (i) an extended period of drought, (ii) a history beginning in the early 1960s of transferring water out of the Jordan Basin via the National Water Carrier of Israel, and (iii) a water allocation policy that gives preference to more affluent coastal Israeli areas. Then in 1995, as part of the Oslo II Accord, joint governance arrangements over shared water resources were set up under the famed ‘Article 40’. While these arrangements appeared to be clear and equitable and to provide a consensual governance framework for integrated management of the shared resource, benefits to the Palestinians were not as anticipated. The agreement established a Joint Water Council (JWC) to oversee management of the shared aquifers, with decisions to be based on consensus between the two parties. However, the JWC has been characterized by fundamental asymmetries – of power, of capacity, of information, of interests – that prevent the development of a consensual approach to resolving water management conflicts (See Chapter 7 for more detail on this case). Since then in Israel and amongst Palestinians, environmental issues and environmental peacebuilding have figured prominently in the conflict dynamics and associated peace processes due to

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the region’s water scarcity problems and strong associations with land and water resources. Environmental resource governance capacity Sound environmental administration focuses on the management regime’s ability to engender sustainable water use by way of policies and manpower. Social ecology literature suggests that environmental sustainability and social stability are co-created. Therefore, strong environmental management can simultaneously promote a healthy environment and a positive social context. Especially in countries affected by fragility and conflict, it can be challenging to maintain technical know-how and appropriate policies. In these cases, environmental administration can be part of larger recovery efforts to rebuild governance systems. Holistic vision for water management. As described in Chapter 4, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa have embarked on a progressive transition from supply augmentation and direct provision of water services toward a greater focus on water management, decentralization and inclusion. A holistic vision of water can enable peacebuilding by reinforcing principles of integrated water resource management, by including different users, emphasizing their interdependence and explicitly defining their collective long-term objectives of sustainability. These standards may be promoted through regional and national levels, laws, policies, and sector strategies, for example. These institutions, when they promote principles of environmental and social sustainability, can reinforce notions of equity and enable collaborative governance capacities. Human capacity. Human resources and technical capabilities are key to environmental administration. Deficiencies in this area can constrain peacebuilding. In rural locations, for example, a poor field presence, low regulatory enforcement and weak constituency relations combine to create ineffective and insufficient field capacity. Brain drain of technical and policy knowledge – for example due to outmigration in the midst of violence – can affect human resource power imbalances and limit capabilities to govern collaboratively, thus constraining peacebuilding potential. Related concerns have been expressed by Palestinian academics of their Palestinian students, as one Palestinian academic explains, for example: ‘Those that do graduate from my [engineering] department get jobs in the Gulf before they are even handed their diplomas. The money is much better there. The way of life, the standard is better.’ In contrast, Israel offers professional opportunities to new graduates in a lucrative water technologies industry where Israel is generally seen as a world leader. Consequently, there is a serious imbalance in technical capacity between Israel and the West Bank, which undermines confidence and the perception of mutual benefit in collaborative water governance efforts.

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Accountable organizations. Water governance organizations that are held accountable for their actions and policies can contribute to peacebuilding when they (1) have clear organizational mandates and (2) manage the risk of corruption. Practitioners describe how accountable organizations can enable collaborative governance by improving confidence and open dialogue. Diffuse water management capabilities and unclear delineations of responsibility make governance and promoting cooperation difficult. Overlapping bureaucracies confuse cooperative bodies such as knowledge sharing mechanisms and representative joint organizations. A proliferation of departments within the Palestinian Water Authority in the decade following the Oslo Agreement arguably caused debate over who has the authority to do what. As one official explains: ‘Who does what, and the division of responsibility, is a problem. People do not know who is responsible for what, and this means weak upholding of regulations. This means a lack of cooperation across administrative lines.’12 In addition to challenges in fostering cooperation in the midst of organizational confusion, bloated and unclear structures affect decision-making, money does not go to infrastructure, and this scares off investors, as murkiness benefits favouritism and corruption over principles of equity. A culture of corruption infects governance systems, fosters distrust, breeds inequity and reduces development intervention effectiveness. And unfortunately, though intervention may be critical to peacebuilding, donor third parties will be deterred from engaging in these circumstances. Public relations All parties have objectives for managing constituent and external relations. In the context of public relations, there are two factors that can impact potential for collaboration and peacebuilding: public image and strategic relations and public concern. Generally, interventions can capitalize on these conditions in order to enable parties’ perception of mutual benefit, political will, and the promotion of champions. Public image and strategic relations A party’s objectives to improve public image and strategic relations are largely driven by their political motivations and reputations. Participants in collaborative governance initiatives describe political incentives and reputational benefits, including valuable external partnerships and positive public image, as being among the most powerful factors to incentivize interparty engagement. Political incentives are determined by the dialectic relationship between politicians and an electorate and are associated with their collective aspirations. Theoretically, when water is regarded as an

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important political issue among the target audience for the party’s public image and strategic relations interests, then it can be leveraged as a convening issue for that group to support engagement and collaborative governance. Reputational benefits can also incentivize cooperation from a stakeholder who seeks to change his/her image as a resister or a spoiler in a peacebuilding process. For example, an incentive to improve public image by demonstrating morality and cooperative behaviour has seemingly affected Israeli engagement on rehabilitation of the Dead Sea. In the Middle Eastern context, perception of Israeli domination of regional water sources, particularly the Jordan River Basin, is controversial, and this creates enduring reputational risks to Israel. As one regional expert suggested, the need to manage public perception and associated political costs has incentivized Israeli engagement on RDCS: ‘Rejecting the study means they need to take responsibility for the dropping Dead Sea.’ Such implications carry significant risk, and Israeli authorities may be better positioned by engaging cooperatively and seeing through a technical solution to the environmental problem. The desire to build relationships for other purposes – with the other party or with their allies – can also create political incentives for inter-party engagement. For example, in Europe, countries seeking to join the European Union are motivated to reform their environmental policies and practices to align with those of the EU. This has promoted transboundary water cooperation in countries in the Balkan region. Whether for economic purposes or due to military and security interests, aspirations to grow special relationships can empower champions and foster political will for collaboration. Public concern When there is concern among the public with regard to the environmental dilemma at hand, this can provide the context for inter-party engagement. Experience shows that broad interest among the public enables wider engagement and facilitates farther-reaching coalitions for cooperation and change. Generally, modern development policy supports stakeholder involvement as a critical component of sustainability (e.g., empowering and building ownership) and assumes that without public involvement there can be only short-term success. If public concerns are not addressed, then a development initiative can face dissent from those who were not consulted. Addressing public concerns can foster a respectful and open dialogue and an inclusive process of building solutions toward collaborative water governance. To effect change, public concern for environmental issues has to be accompanied by a sense of priority. An Israeli wastewater specialist reflects on the limitations on public interest and collective action on water management

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in that local context, which he attributes to the structure of priorities for negotiating final status issues in the peace process with the Palestinians: Cooperation in water supply and sanitation is critical to peace. We need to solve water and sanitation problems where there are joint environmental problems. The general feeling among Israeli technical specialists is that this is feasible. It is a much simpler problem to solve [than Jerusalem, the settlements and other final status issues]. It is less interesting to the public. They feel that if other problems [with the Palestinians] are solved, then environment can be solved [. . .] It is not a priority now [. . .] Therefore, when there is cooperation on water, environment and sanitation it touches [the interests of] a very small group. There is no doubt that building a sustainable collaborative governance system for water in Israel and the Palestinian Territories would be an extremely difficult and complex task. However, this somewhat optimistic official suggests the problem is known and solutions are feasible – but that negotiations on ‘more difficult’ issues are holding back a final solution on water. Thus, knowledge of an environmental dilemma is not sufficient for change to happen in this case – it needs to be combined with a greater sense of priority for collaborative governance.

Maximizing operational approaches There are three major issues to consider when designing an intervention to facilitate environmental peacebuilding: third party influence, first party engagement, and enabling tactics. Similar to particularities of the context reviewed in the previous section, operations tactics can be utilized to build capacities that promote environmental peacebuilding. Third party influence A third party’s ability to influence first parties’ opinions and behaviours can determine whether an intervention will build capacities for cooperation and facilitate environmental peacebuilding. The third party is the convenor for collaborative governance efforts – but can it actually convene, and what effect can it have on those that it convenes? The interventions reviewed in this chapter are development projects, which invest in infrastructure and institutional reforms. In these cases, international development agencies and the organizations funded by those agencies to implement a programme are the dominant third party actors, and lessons from their experience are reviewed here.

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A donor third party can influence the behaviours, attitudes and priorities of first parties by intervening on systems of power and altering incentives. Donors can do this – intentionally and unintentionally – by drawing on their own political and financial resources. Donors’ organizational mandates and operational standards determine the way that they approach an intervention and facilitate collaboration. When first party willingness to collaborate is weak they can use their influence to incentivize engagement and capitalize on a party’s environmental and public relations interests, for example by offering infrastructure financing and technical support. For investments that can yield shared benefits, third parties can also help to negotiate security restrictions that would otherwise limit collaboration. For example, Gaza is plagued with enormous health, environmental and safety threats due to a massive deficit in sanitation infrastructure. And these problems have transboundary implications, including contamination of the Coastal Aquifer, which is shared by Israelis and Palestinians, and transboundary pollution of coastal areas, which is impacting fisheries and endangering supplies for desalination. Consequently, in 2004 the North Gaza Emergency Sewage Treatment Project, which was partly financed by the World Bank, was launched. Since its inception, the project has required intensive effort from Bank management and high-level political intervention in order to manage restrictions limiting the movement of construction equipment, materials, fuel and maintenance staff into and around Gaza so that the sewage facility can be built.13 The transboundary benefits of this investment are often overtaken by security policy, but third party intervention, including by Tony Blair, has helped to push things along, even when the project has come to the brink of shut-down on multiple occasions. At the time of writing, after many years of negotiating an extremely complex set of logistics, this project is nearing completion; at the time of writing it had been projected by the World Bank that the wastewater treatment plant will finally be commissioned around the end of 2016. There are four main tools a third party donor can employ: financing, neutrality/non-neutrality, standards of equity and inclusion, and convening power. Financing Access to and authority over financial resources can elevate a third party’s influence. The principle is simple: financing is required to make complex interventions happen, whether they have the intent of peacebuilding or otherwise. It is needed for hardware (pipes, wastewater treatment facilities), and it is needed for organizations (offices, meetings). Financial resources can impact the balance of power and increase the relative authority of a third party over the recipients of funds. Funding can make initiatives happen in areas that

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donors find important, such as collaborative governance, and thus through their activities donors can elevate public awareness and political will for these activities. In sum, third party funding priorities directly impact the norms and behaviours – and the organizational capacities – of parties who depend on donor funds. When first parties see the opportunity to acquire funding for constituent needs, and when these funds are tied to collaborative governance, this creates an incentive for engagement. Significant de facto power and authority can be possessed by the donors, which for example can be used to promote political will for engagement between spoilers and those interested in sustained engagement. In the RDCS case, several official participants pointed out that the incentive for the parties to engage was not necessarily an environmental imperative of the declining levels of the Dead Sea, but rather it was the need for financing for water desalination infrastructure. One water expert explains: In Jordan they have to solve the problem of water scarcity. If they see the [RDCS] project is going to end, then they will push for feasibility to examine a pipeline just for Amman [. . .] Jordan needs a solution. If [desalinated] water will not come from the Red-Dead [project] then they need to desalinate [in other ways] [. . .] This needs collaboration and financing [. . .] Under the terms of this project, collaboration between Israel and Jordan is to save the Dead Sea. International donors will pay to save a global heritage site. They want to save the Dead Sea first. Desalination and energy are secondary. But if they refuse to finance the project, then Jordan will have to find another solution. In short, the engagement of the government of Jordan in RDCS is incentivized by the potential for financing for infrastructure to desalinate the water that it needs to augment domestic supplies. In the case of the Nile Basin Initiative there have been several financial incentives for cooperation: a US$ 200 million trust fund for institutional support and over US$ 6 billion in infrastructure investments has helped to promote collaboration among riparian parties (see Chapter 7). Donors can – and do – use this carrot to mandate participation and foster support among leadership and constituencies, as has been the case in the early stages of various contentious transboundary initiatives, including RDCS and the Nile. And in both cases, powerful and poorer parties are more inclined to engage in collaborative activities. However, this method does not have the same effect on all parties. When wealthier and more powerful stakeholders, such as Israel, do not require external financing from these donors, they are not so obliged to cooperate, and therefore their engagement needs to be incentivized in other ways.

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Neutrality and non-neutrality Third parties perceived as ‘neutral’ or ‘apolitical’ can sometimes more effectively influence first parties. For example, the World Bank can be presented as a ‘neutral’ third party because of its governance structure (accountable to a board of directors representing all member states) and in its mandated position as an international financial institution it is not a political entity. This position can be particularly valuable in heated political situations. In the case of RDCS, perceived political neutrality of the World Bank, the key facilitator, was critical to bringing the parties together for a sustained period of engagement. Similarly, the World Bank has played a significant role facilitating activities around the Nile Basin Initiative (see Chapter 7). While some might argue otherwise, it remains that the Bank continues to strategically assert its neutrality in cases where it helps it to maintain a third party role. This position provides the organization the leverage required to facilitate policy discussions around representative joint organizations and cooperative agreements. Sometimes other international development agencies, such as those within the United Nations system and regional development banks, also have some ability to position themselves as ‘neutral’. However, bilateral donor agencies, because of association with their national governments, are less likely to be perceived as neutral and more likely to be seen as biased toward promoting their country’s foreign policies. Alternatively, collaborative governance, and hence peacebuilding, can sometimes be promoted when the third party takes a position. EcoPeace Middle East, the implementer and third party facilitator for the Good Water Neighbours Project, has a clear political position defined in its mandate. EcoPeace opposes the Israeli government’s occupation policies, arguing that these are not environmentally sustainable. Thus, environmental sustainability is closely associated with ending the occupation and establishing a peaceful Israeli – Palestinian solution. This position is needed to facilitate Palestinian engagement; political neutrality with regard to the occupation would not have the same leverage with this constituency. The antioccupation position is key to EcoPeace’s approach. One staff person explained: ‘People can tell if [EcoPeace] is good or not, and they will not cooperate if they think it is not. The communities need to know that [our organization] wants to end the occupation, which is a barrier to environmental sustainability.’14 Public perceptions of field staff are also important, as the interviewee described: ‘Field staff are an important bridge. The background of a person, not just an environmentalist, but a school or social worker. This is grassroots. [. . .] Communities need to have trust in field staff and their positions.

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For example, because parents worry about security of their children [who participate in the project], [. . .] and we need their consent to work with the children.’15 With this position, EcoPeace is successful in engaging communities on both sides. Standards of equity and inclusion When a third party’s operating policies promote equity, this can build confidence among parties that they will be treated fairly in an intervention. For example, a Palestinian official asserted the value of World Bank policies and procedures in RDCS: ‘There is pressure for the studies to come out with certain results. That’s why environmental and social studies are important to keep fair [. . .] The only benefit of RDCS is that because it is World Bankfinanced. The World Bank’s own procedures and guidelines are the only means of keeping the process fair.’16 He perceived that the World Bank’s business procedures and analysis were equitably addressing the party’s interests and concerns. Feeling that their needs were being acknowledged, he said: ‘It does not hurt to go through the process.’17 His perception that World Bank policies promoted equity validated his official engagement in the RDCS consultative process. Standards initially introduced by a third party – such as inclusion of all riparian parties and utilization of integrated water resource management principles (IWRM, see Chapter 4) – can over time be institutionalized as capacities for collaborative governance are built. Another example can be drawn from a USAID-financed project in Yemen, where rural conflict over water distribution is a common source of tension (see Chapter 3). Partners for Democratic Change (PDC) implemented the Community-Based Conflict Mitigation Program, which financed water infrastructure improvements to benefit community members and migrant families in Shabwa Province. By consulting these parties, who were clashing over insufficient water supplies and inequitable distribution, PDC was able to design and finance the construction of a more conflict-sensitive water system. Convening power Third parties are stronger convenors when their procedures are viewed as fair and inclusive. Third party policies determine which stakeholders are incorporated into consultative bodies and who opts to participate. As one Israeli NGO worker said simply: ‘Donor involvement is critical to any success’ because it generally guarantees Palestinian involvement, which could not be achieved otherwise.18 When parties are confident in a convenor and their standards, this fosters engagement, builds confidence and increases the potential for environmental peacebuilding.

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In the case of RDCS, for example, the World Bank’s third party role was considered integral to moving the project forward. Several individuals on the Palestinian side had much trepidation about becoming involved, and yet they engaged because they trusted the Bank team facilitating the process. These Bank staff were reputedly handpicked for the facilitator/convener role by the three governments and by World Bank management. The selection was based on their pre-existing relationships with the parties, and party perceptions of them as having no personal ties to the region. Capable as facilitators, the Bank staff used their influence to convene the parties, eventually building organizational capacities to promote collaborative governance (cooperative agreements and representative joint organizations for consultations and studies). And in the course of the study they promoted recognition and operationalization of a common goal – two more key capacities for bonding parties in a collective effort for water management. First party empowerment First parties need to be directly empowered through an intervention in order for collaborative governance and conditions for peace to be effectively built. Discussed below are four dimensions of ‘first party empowerment’ that can be leveraged through an intervention and to lay the groundwork for collaboration: knowledge and information management; involvement of leadership; public participation; and constituency building. Knowledge and information management Information is power. It is also a necessary input for sustainable water management systems. Equal public access to water data and information is required in order to facilitate equitable access to water resources. In interventions, knowledge and information management activities promote transparency, participation and civil action to improve water governance. Improved knowledge and information management are foundational to two capacities that enable collaborative governance: raised awareness and interparty knowledge sharing mechanisms. It can also build confidence in cooperation. Providing information on water governance for public discussion can enable more constructive open dialogue. To promote collaboration effectively, knowledge and information management need to uphold third party standards of data access and consultation. GWN experience shows how knowledge and information management can play an important role in building awareness and shifting perceptions within constituencies and fostering change among policy makers. The project is designed so that interventions begin with public education, in which community members learn about their natural environment and the state of

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their water resources: about how they are contaminated, and about consumption patterns, projected impacts on their communities and options for the future. As discussed above, one project staff person explained: ‘This is a gateway to the cross-border portion. People ask: “What is happening with my neighbour?” Through that process people are empowered and see that they can make the change themselves. Peacebuilding is empowerment that you can make a difference, bringing self-confidence back to the community. Knowledge is an important part of that.’19 Under GWN, knowledge of transboundary water problems facilitates peacebuilding by leading mayors to become champions of the initiative and leading them to establish coalitions of cooperation and change, which were formalized in jointly signed memorandums of understanding between Israeli and Palestinian communities (collaborative agreements). When parties need information, and access is achieved through collaborative governance, inter-party engagement is incentivized. Historically, adversaries may not share water data. The motivation for parties to engage through an initiative may be because they seek information for its own purposes, for example, economic strategies, food and energy production or disaster mitigation. In the case of the Palestinian Authority’s participation in RDCS, to improve their water management plans in the lower elevations of the West Bank, the Palestinians sought hydrologic and other physical data for the Rift Valley. Mechanisms in the study showed potential for gaining Palestinian access to this information. Involvement of leadership First party leadership can heavily influence the perceptions of other policy makers and constituents. This means they have the potential to bring attention to opportunities and deficiencies in collaborative governance and to support peacebuilding efforts. There are three areas where initiatives can capitalize on leadership: (1) responsive leaders, (2) government-grassroots linkages, and (3) ancillary relationships. Initiatives that empower political authorities in favour of collaborative governance can consequently lead to: champions, cooperative agreements, political will and constituencies for cooperation and change. Responsive leaders. Initiatives benefit from partnering early with leaders who are capable and committed to building capacity and effecting long-term change in support of collaborative water resource governance. Leaders who are amenable to collaboration can promote champions who can perpetuate broader change. When influential personalities become advocates for collaborative governance, they can endorse shared benefits and inspire others to engage. They can also be important in affecting opinions and building support

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through political channels, building coalitions for cooperation and change, as leadership can both mirror and influence perception and opinion. Engaging leadership at different levels has the utility of engaging constituents and affecting change from different angles (see Figure 8.3, for a description of three types of leaders). For example, one person involved in RDCS said that: ‘Commitment is at a high level, but not the very highest level. This allows the right balance of influence and sustainability without getting hung up in the highest level of politics.’20 Project implementers have said that successful leaders in collaborative governance initiatives build on their parties’ common interests, whether or not that third party’s explicit objective is to build peace. Government-grassroots linkages. When leaders have good constituent relations they can have more impact on attitudinal change at the grassroots level. This perspective underpins GWN’s approach: ‘GWN builds a constituency at a local level, and the political will to problem solve, bridging between the two levels.’21 A GWN project administrator describes how these linkages have also yielded cooperative agreements: ‘Through the project we have facilitated MOUs [signed memorandums of understanding between the

Few

Affected populations

Level 1 Top Leadership military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

Level 2 Middle Range Leadership Leaders respected in sectors Ethnic/Religious leaders Academics/Intellectuals Humanitarian Leaders (NGOs) Level 3 Grassroots Leadership Local Leaders Leaders of indigenous NGOs Local health officials Refugee camp leaders

Many Figure 8.3

Lederach’s Peacebuilding Hierarchy. Source: Lederach 1997: 39.

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communities on both sides of the Green Line stating an agreement to cooperation], which are manifestations of peacebuilding and political will at multiple levels in the communities.’22 For example, communities in the Iraqi Marshlands faced a history of problems associated with upstream water diversion – including destroyed livelihoods and a lack of safe water supplies and sanitation. The reason for the diversion is often attributed to politics under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. After the fall of that regime in the Second Iraq War, the UN Environment Programme implemented the Iraqi Marshland Project in an effort to restore the wetlands, rebuild livelihoods and provide services to those who had been affected or displaced by previous water management activities. Additionally, the initiative sought to improve relations between these communities and the post-Saddam leadership. Though the long-term effects of this project are uncertain, in large part due to continuing instability in the country, the effort provides a reasonable example of a water initiative that was designed with an objective to promote the social contract between government and constituents. Ancillary relationships. Projects can achieve ‘quick wins’ by capitalizing on ancillary relationships between members of adversarial groups. A Palestinian party involved in GWN states: ‘Political support and relationships take time to build. Previous relationships are important support for this type of programme. It helps build momentum early.’23 Sometimes, time is of the essence, parties want to see the immediate benefits of engagement, and they need reassurance. Ancillary relationships assume some pre-existing confidence in first party empowerment and therefore they can more quickly build momentum for new efforts in collaboration. Ancillary relationships are uniquely catalytic, as they can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of representative joint organizations. They also enable open dialogue, as was the case with country officials involved in RDCS. Public participation Interventions that incorporate activities for public participation, particularly for planning and decision-making, can widen the level of engagement. Also, fostering ownership of the process among those participants can ensure more sustained engagement over time. Often, donor third parties implementing development interventions mandate public participation, and practitioners often assume that ‘face time’ between adversaries alone constitutes peacebuilding. However, the peacebuilding process does not happen automatically through contact, and newly forged linkages as a consequence of third party requirements do not automatically translate into meaningful relationships. In fact, this can be a false assumption claimed by donors seeking to promote their programmes as

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‘peacebuilding’. However, these requirements can at least force open the door to change. The quality of participation over time, judged by representativeness, electiveness, accessibility and countering of social pressures can address political constraints and build momentum for collaborative governance and sustainable, positive peace. Representativeness. First party representation required for collaborative governance initiatives should be specified in the intervention design. According to one practitioner, in development projects involving Israel the ‘EU insists on a Palestinian partner’, such as happened in the case of RDCS, contributing to the formal engagement of the Palestinian Authority in that process.24 Furthermore, in the case of RDCS the World Bank reportedly ‘froze the project until the approval of the Palestinians was achieved in 2003.’25 These standards of inclusion that were maintained by the donors empowered the Palestinians and ensured representation of regional stakeholders in the project process. Representative public participation is generally associated with building knowledge sharing mechanisms and, of course, representative joint bodies. Electiveness. When public participation is elective it fosters a sense of selfempowerment among the parties. Allowing participants to opt into a collaborative process can ensure they are driven by their own interests to engage. And when participants voluntarily decide to remain engaged over time, it can demonstrate willingness to promote established procedural standards and the norms and values that those endorse. Elective participation and representation, however, are not complementary. While voluntary engagement can signal ‘deeper’ commitment to change, representation can enable ‘wider’ support among varied party representatives. Furthermore, voluntary participation can mean spoilers may opt out and consequently will not support collaborative governance reform. In fact, they might even develop the perception over time that they have been excluded from the initiative, even if this is the consequence of their own volition. Interventions that use a mixed methods approach that ensures representation combined with voluntary participation better ensure that a spectrum of stakeholders is engaged and that they also buy into the process. Accessibility. How accessible are public fora, for example with regard to timing and pre-event advertising? Project administrators often highlight accessibility as key to enabling engagement and participating in peacebuilding. For maximum impact, interventions that have opportunities for structured public participation should be advertised, timed sensitively, and should be made physically accessible to the intended audience. A Palestinian NGO representative reflects, for example, on the RDCS process: ‘An obstacle [to peacebuilding] is when consultation is not done well, and an opportunity for productive dialogue to take place is missed [. . .] The consultation process

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is weak. It is poorly prepared, they have poor advertising, and poor timing.’26 Making participation accessible is a salient issue, especially in violent conflict situations, where representative public participation is consistently constrained by the security regime. In GWN and RDCS, many logistical issues, particularly visas and permits, bring plans to convene down to the last minute. This limits planning for attendance, advertising, and so on. Consequently, potential participants may be excluded or they may opt out, which may have a negative effect on intervention outcomes. Countering social pressures. To encourage public participation an intervention needs to counter social pressures such as hostile politics that deter parties from engaging and collaborating. At the local level in the West Bank, for example, GWN challenges the social standard of ‘no normalization’ – a common Palestinian position against normalizing relations with the Israelis in lieu of a long-term political solution. A party involved in GWN reflected: ‘There are challenges at the local level. Participants can be viewed as traitors, so we need to be very careful how we frame projects and talk with people to ensure the protection of members of the community from attack. To overcome these challenges, we need to show we are doing something good for their own community. We need to press: “why not?” We challenge these pressures from within and outside the community.’27 Another third party to GWN suggested the need for a paradigmatic shift: ‘It is better to influence from within than to just boycott’, which is a common mode of expressing political dissent in Palestinian culture.28 GWN faces particular challenges in this regard, as fear of retribution and intimidation of participants also limits involvement. A project administrator says: ‘The peacebuilding aspect [is limited] because it is condemned by other members in the community. We empower [the participants] to defend themselves [. . .] We counter this [opposition] by helping people learn on a local level how their livelihoods and environment benefit from working with their Israeli neighbours.’29 Another EcoPeace Middle East staff member clarifies: ‘People can see on all levels that they are better off cooperating with each other. The objective is not just peace. First the people. People first need to see physical improvements in their communities. Then other changes can happen [. . .] Environment helps people work together and makes people feel better off. Peace is only sustainable if people have a way of living. People want to live a normal, healthy life.’30 Thus through GWN, social norms around the ‘no normalization’ position are circumvented by empowering community members and demonstrating how local conditions can be improved through working together to improve livelihoods alongside regular Israeli citizens. In another case, the USAID-funded Community-Based Water Demand Management Project implemented in Northern Jordan confronted social

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pressures at a critical point during the refugee crisis in the wake of the Syrian war. Starting in 2012 as part of the project, Mercy Corps conducted conflict training to improve the skills of Jordanian citizens and Syrian refugees. Members of these communities were clashing over jobs, services, prices – and water access. The conflict trainings improved community members’ abilities to discuss each other’s needs. Consequently, after building a common understanding of these communal needs, they could more effectively build consensus on community grant investments for local infrastructure, which Mercy Corps then provided. Constituency building When an initiative establishes a platform for collaborative environmental governance, constituencies can convene to solve shared water problems. And the collaborative process in turn defines the constituency. An EcoPeace Middle East staff person explains the impact of constituency building in the context of GWN: ‘The theory is to foster peacebuilding through environmental work, to cross borders and foster cooperation, [. . .] to build a common aim, working on it together to motivate people to improve their situation together [. . .] Because dialogue is not enough. Working physically and experiencing joint work is important. The aim is to have a physical result so that people see the real benefit of coming together.’31 Collaboration becomes part of the identity of the group. Experience reveals the galvanizing effect of environmental disasters. For example, drought or pollution can lead to a tipping point where the affected population demands change. These events can also help build constituency groups. A case in point: hydrological studies have shown that the security wall planned between Tzur Hadassah (Israel) and Wadi Fukhin (West Bank) threatens the recharge of the aquifer in that area, and poses environmental risks to the valley ecosystem. Joint community activism has delayed the construction of the wall, bringing the case to the Israeli court system. An EcoPeace Middle East staff person describes: ‘This kind of victory empowers people, including those who object to spoilers.’32 Momentum and support for collaboration can be strengthened when a constituency engages in real physical problem solving. Constituency building capitalizes on the notion of interdependence, motivated by a perception of mutual benefit when making change together. GWN accomplishes this, for example, by engaging and building awareness of their youth ‘water trustees’. A project administrator explains: ‘We show that we need to cooperate to share our resources and build peace. We work with people to build this strategy, and demonstrate how we can do something good for the collective [. . .] We need to be demonstrative. To build peace we

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need environmental justice. Environment includes all of this. It promotes the idea that I am not only working for my neighbour, but for myself.’33 From the bottom up, either through implementation with communities in GWN, or through consultation in RDCS, stakeholders are empowered to build coalitions based on their vision and mutually recognized needs, and the ability to do it collectively in a political and security context that might suggest otherwise. Enabling tactics Experience has revealed a selection of miscellaneous tactical methods that can enable peacebuilding and can be considered in the design of a water intervention. These techniques are particularly helpful for ‘greasing the wheels’ for initial and sustained engagement between parties. Technological approach Practitioners who work in locations characterized by resource conflict echo the sentiment of one participant that ‘We need to make decisions in a technical way, rather than a political way’. They cite development interventions in environmental sectors as a true opportunity for peacebuilding. Many posit that a technological approach that focuses on the physical aspects of the environmental problem can, in fact, counter political constraints. A technological approach creates the space for solution-building, galvanizing beneficiaries around an environmental imperative. It promotes a greater, common objective that focuses on resolving water-related problems. However, a technical approach is not a panacea, as politics – which can define policies and perspectives on scientific data – can also pervade responses to even the most technical questions. The ways in which third parties facilitate joint technological work determines peacebuilding potential. As with all elements of the intervention, technical work needs to uphold principals of equity. Because the technological approach requires technical capacity, it can also be used to build capacity in the parties – and this should be done in a way that promotes the balance of skills and abilities among the representatives. A Palestinian interviewee explains how technical approaches to water management challenges can reinforce inequities between Israelis and the Palestinians: Most regional cooperation projects treat Palestinians as recipients [not as decision-makers] – even in research. Donor policies like the Americans’ limit Palestinian engagement, and the ‘no terrorism’ paperwork they require is socially and logistically difficult for us. Those willing to take that role get more projects. Palestinians have far less

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resources; they are used to installing measuring devices while Israelis do analysis; Palestinians do data collection but not analysis. US funding agencies support this kind of regime. The Israeli partner is the primary partner in practice, but not in writing.34 Technical activities are integral to building governance capacity. However, balance and collaboration cannot emerge in the long run when capacity building does not ensure that capabilities are built in an equal way. Demonstrating peace dividends When tangible benefits of collaboration are modelled, and they are promoted to the parties as peace dividends, they have the potential to mitigate scepticism and promote engagement. A pilot intervention can pave the way for future projects by setting a precedent and showing a peace dividend. An Israeli expert explained: ‘Water is a window of opportunity that shows that there is cooperation, relationships. This has demonstrative power. Moving settlements, there is a discourse that there will be “civil war”. [. . .] God only knows how it will be done. There are limitations, but water can be demonstrative [of the opportunity for peace].’35 An EcoPeace Middle East staff person expressed the power of demonstration simply in the context of the GWN: ‘The strategy is to show this [cooperation] is something we can do in the middle of a conflict.’36 Another EcoPeace Middle East staff person explained: ‘In Israel-Palestine there is no peace agreement, but there is a frustrating peace process. There is progress through GWN, one of only a few examples of cooperation during conflict [in this context] [. . .] Once people have built trust on one issue they can work toward others.’37 There were similar expectations of RDCS, as one Israeli environmentalist expressed: ‘They say this will lead to peace, beginning with agreement that we [Israelis and Palestinians] need this, and that with it will be easier for governments to contribute to cooperation.’38 While demonstration can enable engagement and foster confidence, its impact depends on whether momentum is captured and built into larger scale collaborative environmental governance reforms. Extended time horizon A longer timeline for a water intervention serves as insurance against political volatility and helps maintain a safe space for first party engagement. All thirdparty engagements must come to an end, and those timelines are generally dependent on funding (and in turn, donor funding cycles).39 Some donor and development agencies traditionally use 2–5 year timelines, while others use 5– 10 years. Extended timelines are important for projects during active conflict, where the context is extremely volatile.

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Furthermore, a longer term commitment encourages confidence, and a longer time horizon allows more time to manage the complexities of building necessary capacities and growing meaningful relationships between the parties. A longer time horizon compensates for volatility of contextual factors, such as conflict intensity, security, and public image and strategic relations incentives. Long-term third party engagement is particularly important for supporting relationships between the parties during politically and emotionally difficult times. For example, in administering GWN, EcoPeace Middle East has helped to maintain Israeli – Palestinian cooperative relationships (even if at times they were strained) in the wake of violent flare-ups and divisive political events. In these cases, participants observed, the project provided an alternative social space, otherwise called a ‘safe space’, where engaging on a personal level was sanctioned, and which was at least one step removed from the socio-political context where relationships were more adversarial. Long-term engagement also supports organizations that are explicitly engaged in peacebuilding activities – the ‘peace camp’ – and mitigates the social risk and isolation that those affiliates often face in the context of tension and violent flare-ups. Peacebuilding explicitness In the local context, sometimes ‘peacebuilding’ brings hope, and sometimes it is branded a taboo. While this issue is often overlooked by donors and practitioners, a lot of weight is carried in whether an intervention explicitly features the term ‘peacebuilding’. Utilizing the concepts of peacebuilding internally within a team, in practice and to publicly label an intervention as a ‘peacebuilding’ effort can have both intentional and inadvertent effects. And so, practitioners should give careful consideration to the utility of the word in their work. When a project is explicitly associated with peacebuilding, it can both enable and constrain the process. In design, peacebuilding is often conveyed by the architects of the intervention, for example through objectives, peace/ conflict assessments, and by incorporating peace/conflict expertise into staffing plans. Explicitness can also create funding opportunities when donors have prioritized the concept. Public use of the term ‘peacebuilding’ during implementation can be sensitive. Labelling an initiative with the term ‘peacebuilding’ makes the intention of dialogue and cooperation clear to those who engage, and yet first parties may negatively associate the concept with the politics of compromise. One practitioner in the Middle East argues that explicitness during implementation can enable normalized notions of peacebuilding and open dialogue by bringing into public discourse concepts, risks, and opportunities

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associated with collaboration. He explains: ‘Talking about peace makes it more socially acceptable to discuss issues that otherwise were off limits.’40 Explicitness, he went on, establishes and reinforces norms that can perpetuate transparency and general openness in relationships. But, as some practitioners say, sometimes ‘reconciliation happens best when we don’t call it that’. If the word is taboo, then you can do the practice, but the tactical approach is to euphemize the concept so that it does not become counterproductive. Another controversy in using the term ‘peacebuilding’ is when conflict is latent. First parties may refuse the concept, because to label an initiative as ‘building peace’ is to admit that there is conflict. And if conflict is not manifest and there is no violence, then parties may refute the utility of peacebuilding activities – regardless of the tensions simmering below the surface. Consequently, explicitness can affect volunteerism – who opts into an initiative and who does not. And this can mean that, due to self-selection, an intervention may be ‘preaching to the choir’.

Conclusion There have been no major ‘outbreaks’ of peace in any location due to improved water governance. However, experience reveals a plethora of little victories from which we can draw lessons for promoting peace through future water initiatives. Past progress has sometimes been intentional and at other times serendipitous. With these lessons, practitioners can more readily target the building of peace through their work in the water sector. The Environmental Peacebuilding Model presents the ingredients for building collaborative governance systems that promote sustainable, positive peace. In fact, with or without the label of ‘peace’, elements of this model can be used to incorporate peacebuilding strategies into future water interventions and with the hope that those interventions will catalyse peace – on a larger, long-term scale, and ultimately beyond the bounds of water.

CHAPTER 9 AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE

After the long discussions about the challenges of water scarcity, climate change and conflict over water in the previous chapters, this final chapter asks the obvious question: What is the agenda for change? What should be done differently by farmers, citizens and governments in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa to face up to water scarcity, to adapt to climate change and to move forward from conflict over water towards more evolved and better adapted systems of water governance? The chapter looks first at the key question of agriculture and water. Using over 90 per cent of the region’s water resources, the source of livelihood for over half of the region’s population, the cornerstone on which food security strategies are built from household level up to national and regional levels, agriculture faces stunning challenges of water scarcity. This book has argued throughout for better water governance, more integrated water management and a keen focus on ‘more income for less water’ – higher water efficiencies, greater crop water productivity, much higher post-harvest returns. But what exactly should farmers and nations do to achieve these beckoning goals? What are the practical steps involved? Early sections of this chapter provide, if not complete answers, at least some options. The effects of climate change are already manifest throughout the region, in declining yields, in increased demand for irrigation water, in loss of life and livelihoods. Farmers are adapting as best they can, but largely in the dark about what may happen next and about how best to adjust their farming systems. Countries are preparing adaptation and mitigation strategies but these are quickly overtaken by new science and by new, unpredicted events. A section of this chapter highlights options for next steps as climate change evolves from a debate into a certainty.

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The role of conflict over water in moving water governance forward towards new equilibria has been a passage in the history of the region since time immemorial. Today, however, new challenges have emerged. Globalization, regional cooperation and modern technology have turned cooperation over international waters from a desideratum into a must. Throughout the region, nations are struggling to project modern ideas about optimizing value at the basin scale and equitable and sustainable water management onto a rugged, often hostile political landscape. Into this landscape, violent non-state actors have irrupted to use water as a weapon. The need for international cooperation over water has never been greater but never has it seemed a steeper challenge. Within nations, more intensive water use and growing resource scarcity are causing constant frictions which need to be interpreted in improved governance and management with priority to the local voice if water is to strengthen the socio-economic development of nations and not undermine it. A section of this chapter gives pointers on how these massive challenges may best be addressed within and amongst the nations of the region. This book may be full of fine notions but these notions need to get beyond the page and into action. Therefore, two penultimate sections of this chapter look at the thorny questions of trade-offs and the political economy of change. Reforming governance and institutions and making changes in investment strategies will call for trade-offs, including between productivity and food self-sufficiency, and between free trade and protection. The section discusses these trade-offs, and also the mechanisms and processes that are required to arbitrate between the incentives the farmer faces and the perspectives of society. On political economy, the key question is how to create momentum for change. The section discusses how to assess the drivers of change and evaluate the interests of different constituencies. It also looks at the context, particularly at the role of imperatives such as severe water shortages and disputes amongst sectors, and at how change may be helped by ‘decisive moments’. The need for an inclusive process of study and debate leading to consensus on a national water reform agenda and coherent policies is highlighted and the ‘blue skies’ scenario is identified: adapted but flexible water governance arrangements, with well-designed institutions having clear authority, the necessary resources and stability. The final section of the chapter – and of the book – looks forward to an unexpected future in which water is not the trigger of discord but a vector of peace, to a world in which concern for the conservation of water for the good of humankind is not a relegated choice but an over-riding necessity, and in which agreement on natural resources is the key to the door that opens onto a much larger harmony.

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Managing water resources for agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa: gaps and options Governance and institutions Chapter 4 highlighted the progress that has been made in water resources management in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa over the twenty-five years since the Dublin conference. All countries of the region have adopted at least some of the best practice guidance for integrated water resources management (IWRM) disseminated after that conference. Many countries in the region have made great strides in improving their water resources management in pursuit of the goals of social equity, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. Most countries have embarked on a progressive transition from supply augmentation and direct provision of water services toward a greater focus on water management, decentralization and inclusion. Steps have been undertaken at various paces in different countries to strengthen water management institutions and to apply principles of decentralization and participation. The objective of bringing IWRM to bear on agricultural water management is to achieve higher and more sustainable levels of efficiency and productivity: allocative efficiency between and within sectors, water use efficiency and water productivity, together with social equity and environmental sustainability. Already much progress has been made: water institutions in the Middle East and North Africa have been rated as ‘better on average than in other regions’ on these criteria. Irrigation agencies are progressively decentralizing and, although there remains a legacy of capitalintensive, supply-driven investment and a ‘top-down’ engineering approach, the quality of public investment has improved considerably. So what could be the next steps for the countries of the region to further improve water governance and institutions? The key objective will be to strengthen efficiency and accountability. In the investment planning process, for example, this would translate into more adoption of participatory approaches combined with strengthened economic analysis. More generally, a critical area for further development of overall governance and institutions is the shift in the role of the state from The Great Provider to a regulatory and support role. This has, of course, already begun. Most countries in the region have embarked on the transition from centralized management and capital intensive engineering approaches to approaches where public agencies delegate, regulate, monitor and support, and invest more sparingly and efficiently. Completing this process, and ensuring it is accompanied by a raised level of transparency and accountability would bring the water institutions of the region to a new equilibrium.

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Specific actions will vary by country but would follow a general pattern. Everywhere there is scope to improve the accountability of public agencies and strengthen incentives for their good performance and for transparency. Second, there is a need everywhere to reinforce the regulatory function of the state, strengthening management and execution capacity for implementing legislation and enforcing regulations. Third, the quality of public investment can be further raised by more participatory and local-level approaches to investment planning and by improving the quality of economic analysis. Finally, the responsibilities of water users need to be strengthened and the energies of the private sector need to be tapped. Increased delegation and costsharing and further use of public/private partnerships (PPP) are ways to improve efficiency and accountability whilst reducing the fiscal burden. IWRM and the basin approach As illustrated in Chapter 4, several countries of the Middle East and North Africa have embarked on integrated water resources planning anchored at basin level. Basin planning has improved allocative efficiency and helped to integrate investment programming. Setting and enforcement of environmental regulations have been strengthened. The basin approach has the advantage of confirming sectoral allocations, which provides certainty and transparency even if allocations are reduced. This has been a driver of greater efficiency in irrigation. The extreme and growing water scarcity in the region creates a critical need for orderly water resources allocation and management as demand pressures grow. In fact, as demand from other sectors rises, basin-level institutional mechanisms for transfer of water between uses will become increasingly necessary. The basin planning approach thus appears ideally suited to the need for efficient allocation, investment and management under conditions of growing scarcity. That there is an emerging consensus on this within the region is confirmed by the plan of action for the 2012 Arab Strategy for Water Security1, where the IWRM programme adopts a basin approach. Next steps could include the generalization of the basin approach, both within countries and across borders, further decentralization of decisions on investments and allocations to the basin level, and an increase in accountability by giving more voice to non-state stakeholders at the basin level. Given the varied nature of the experience with basin planning both in the region and worldwide, one possibility would be to conduct a regional review of past experience, drawing pointers and guidance for the future, and to set up a mechanism at the regional level for sharing data, information and knowledge on basin planning, particularly with respect to provisions for and impacts on the major water user, agriculture. The review and the sharing

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process could help consolidate and improve approaches to basin management in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Subsidiarity, decentralization, participation Chapter 4 discussed a leading principle of integrated water resource management – ‘subsidiarity’, that is, the delegation of responsibility for water management to the lowest practisable level – basin, catchment, tributary, spring. This principle of subsidiarity has underpinned initiatives in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa towards decentralization and community collaboration on natural resources and environmental management. The approach has been extensively applied on irrigation schemes in the shape of water user associations (WUAs), but the same community-based collaboration has been applied in the region to watershed management, groundwater management and conservation of ecosystems and environmental services. All across the region, water user associations (WUAs) have developed as the lowest level of irrigation governance, taking on tasks ranging from simple representation right up to management at branch canal level. However, WUAs in the Middle East and North Africa are considered weaker than in other regions (see the section Emerging constraints and opportunities: WUAs in Chapter 5), largely because they are not sufficiently empowered, for example in water distribution. Yet irrigation managers and professionals are unanimous that empowered WUAs have an important role to play in improving water service and also in sustaining scheme operations through cost recovery. The general pathway is clear – to strengthen the capacity of water user associations in the region and to empower them so that they are better able to influence outcomes. The basic conditions for a WUA to work are well known – legal framework and mandate, empowerment with responsibility, capacity building, but how these are applied and in what sequence, what are the accompanying measures – these issues will vary by country, and each country needs to formulate its own action plan. The question of how best to organize with communities and public programmes to support local-level natural resource management is relevant for many aspects of agricultural water management – including local level small scale irrigation, groundwater management, and watershed management. Much has been done in the region, but scaling up has proved challenging. The regional experience discussed in Chapter 5 shows that there are difficult trade-offs, particularly the cost of support programmes and the difficulty of organizing the needed cross-sectoral support. Nonetheless, bottom-up community organizations, supported by top-down ‘convergent’ public services and community development funds, have achieved substantial

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impact on sustainable resource management and also on rural livelihoods. The approach is becoming more relevant with the likelihood of climate change and growing pressure on natural resources. There is a broad case for scaling up the approach, despite the difficulties. Countries in the region should conduct stock-taking, evaluate results and plan for structured next steps. Acting on the supply-side drivers of scarcity Although most water resources are fully developed (Chapter 4), there may be some potential to develop further storage and to optimize releases on existing storage. However, the economic and environmental tests for new development will be hard to pass. Any new storage projects will have to cope with more variable and extreme flows, and are likely to be set in an environmentally more sensitive landscape. Options will need to be flexible and have low capital and operating costs. Local hill dams, water harvesting or on-farm water storage may prove to be the most economic solution, particularly in hilly areas in Lebanon, Yemen and Morocco. But all such impoundments require social, economic and environmental assessment of the trade-offs involved, and projects need to be studied within a basin planning framework. With the limits to expansion of the use of conventional fresh water resources, much attention has been turned in the Middle East and North Africa to non-conventional sources, including wastewater reuse on which there is good experience in the region. As cities grow and invest in treatment plants, the resource will increase and can provide a useful – if relatively modest – new source for agriculture. There are barriers of cost, location and incentives to overcome, and a regulatory framework and a workable incentive structure are required. Similarly, salinized and sodic drainage water and groundwater can be reused, again with restrictions. Potential and issues vary by country and location, and each country needs a legal, regulatory and incentive framework. Tackling groundwater depletion Groundwater has proved a bountiful resource which has revolutionized agriculture and the lives of farmers in many locations in countries of the region – eight of the world’s top twenty groundwater irrigating countries are in the Middle East and North Africa. Groundwater has proved very popular as an easily developed, flexible source of just-in-time water under the farmer’s direct control. Groundwater also plays a key buffer role in maintaining optimal soil moisture during dry spells, and this role will grow with increasing climatic variability. However, the ‘open access’ characteristic of groundwater has led to unregulated development, inequitable access and competitive over-pumping,

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resulting in mining of non-renewable resources and rapid depletion in many locations. Depletion has been accompanied by deterioration of water quality and saline intrusion. Future development pathways need to promote a more robust governance conducive to higher levels of productivity coupled with sustainability of groundwater quantity and quality and with equitable access. Country programmes to improve productivity could include technical, economic, institutional and social measures. Technical measures can include ever more efficient and water-saving technology, especially pressurized and localized irrigation and protected agriculture, a switch by farmers to higher value or more water-efficient crops, and improvements in water management, crop husbandry and post-harvest practices. Complementary supply-side measures such as recharge infrastructure to increase water availability may be available. Economic measures could address the incentive framework which influences the revenue side (e.g., trade policy) and the cost side – the cost of pumping (e.g., energy policy) and the cost of technological upgrading (e.g., tariffs on equipment or cost sharing programmes like those in Saudi Arabia and Morocco). Institutional measures set the regulatory framework, which may comprise the application of laws (as in Jordan); or the decentralization of resource management on a partnership basis to the local level (as in Yemen). Social measures can help, through targeted programmes to remove barriers to entry or improvement for those with difficult access (e.g., the poor, women). Country programmes to improve sustainability have to recognize that establishing a governance framework for groundwater is exceptionally hard once the resource has been fully developed. This is true whether top-down or bottom-up approaches are selected – or a blend. In practice, options for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa to manage groundwater demand are: adopting a rights and regulation approach; changing the incentive structure to favour conservation and efficiency; and decentralizing groundwater resource management to the local level. All three approaches need to be supported by monitoring, information, education and communications. The incentive framework for water use efficiency and water productivity in agriculture The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have long recognized the need for demand management in irrigation through adjustment to the incentive structure to encourage water conservation and more efficient use. Cost recovery also ensures financing of services and reduces the fiscal burden. For these reasons, all countries in the region have implemented reform of the incentive structure along these lines. The picture is one of real progress but with still some way to go to eliminate lingering distortions.

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Most regional countries have revised the basis for charging farmers for irrigation water, and fees have been increased everywhere. Best practice would suggest water prices should reflect scarcity and opportunity cost, but this does not happen in practice except in private water markets. As a proxy, governments in the region have generally sought to recover management, operation and maintenance costs, and sometimes also a share of the capital costs. However, there is a shortfall on many schemes and fees paid by users do not cover full costs, which limits autonomy and may impair services. Not recovering costs also limits the scope for private sector participation. Yet in general, irrigation farmers’ incomes in the region are relatively high because of the higher-value cash crops grown, and recent FAO studies show that farmer incomes in the region are high enough to allow them to pay full management, operation and maintenance costs. Often the incentive structure is highly complex and comprises elements from not only the agricultural sector and water sector policies but also elements of broader macroeconomic policy. Regarding this broader incentive framework, countries in the region have moved progressively towards free trade and compliance with their commitments under the WTO. Nonetheless remaining protection of domestic production still keeps farm gate prices high in many countries, distorting incentives and encouraging uneconomic use of water. Energy prices below border parity continue to drive groundwater depletion in several countries. The incentive structure is thus often a complex web of elements from not only the agricultural sector and water sector policies but also elements of broader macroeconomic policy. An objective basis is required for countries to revise the incentive structure. Next steps could therefore begin with a country-level review of the components of incentive structures for agricultural water use and of the results from adjustments to date – to know what are the components of incentive structures for agricultural water use that drive farmer behaviour, how well does the incentive structure support household level food security, and what are the results from adjustments to date. Evaluation should assess what happens to the use of the resource and to the people who use it when the incentive structure is changed, and how closely incentives are aligned with the underlying economics, how well value chains function and how barriers to access are removed. This review could form the basis for an evidence-based set adjustments that reflect a country’s objectives in the water sector and are also consistent with broader policy objectives such as growth, employment, rural poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. An accompanying focus on awareness raising on the reasons for adjustments to incentives could be helpful.

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Improving water use efficiency and crop water productivity Water use efficiency and water productivity Overall, water use efficiency and crop water productivity are relatively high in the Middle East and North Africa, as expected in so arid a region. There is, nonetheless, considerable scope for further increase. Water use efficiency (WUE) is the measure of how much of the water consumed or abstracted is beneficially used for plant growth. The objective of irrigation and water management is to increase WUE to the maximum whilst taking account of the cost of improvement at the margin. WUE can be improved by improving water service to the field through minimized canal losses, by timely delivery, correct quantity and quality and by ensuring that all areas are served including the tail end. In-field water management can also help improve efficiency, conveying water efficiently to the plant root zone at the right time and in the right quantity and minimizing non-productive evaporation from the field. Crop water productivity (CWP) is production or net income per unit of water consumed by the plant. CWP can be improved by soil, crop and water management and by post-harvest and marketing practices. Parameters include crop and varietal choice, soil and water management, irrigation water management, nutrient management, weed and pest management, and harvest, post-harvest and marketing management. Despite the relatively high levels of efficiency and productivity in the region, there is nonetheless scope in most countries for improvement, particularly in progressive conversion to pressurized irrigation and protected agriculture, in switching to higher value crops, and in improving all aspects of irrigation and of land, crop and water management. Improvements later in the value chain, from post-harvest onwards, could also have considerable impact on value added per unit of water. There is a key role for technology development to increase productivity. Plant breeding and biotech can develop planting material to increase the harvest index and strengthen drought and pest resistance, or to allow earlier planting or maturing or extend the growing period, and so on. There is also scope for research on water management and on integrated land/crop/water management. In order to assess the scope for improving efficiency and productivity, benchmarking is also needed. A regional approach to this research and benchmarking is highly desirable, with a partnership of international, regional and national agencies working on a combination of basic research, applied and adaptive research and farming systems research, together with benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation.

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Surface irrigation: increasing water use efficiency and closing the yield gap through modernization The countries of the Middle East and North Africa region have practised irrigation for more than five millennia. Recent global benchmarking studies have shown that irrigation schemes across the region are relatively efficient overall at delivering a timely, quality water service. Irrigation infrastructure and operating systems generally compare favourably with those elsewhere, and water delivery service is rated higher in the region than elsewhere at all levels of the system. In addition to site-specific factors, the overall political environment has favoured irrigation, and management and staff are generally effective and motivated. The resulting generally good water service translates into yields per hectare and yields per m3 which are well above global averages. Financial returns per unit of water can be as much as five times those on schemes in other regions. There is nonetheless a wide variation between schemes, particularly in overall irrigation efficiency. Predictably, the most water-scarce schemes are the most efficient. There is also wide variation in performance amongst farmers on the same scheme and a considerable ‘yield gap’ which improved agricultural water management could help to close. There is thus scope to improve crop water productivity. The best approach to improving the efficiency and productivity of irrigation schemes is integrated modernization, incorporating physical improvements to the delivery system, along with economic, institutional and agronomic improvements. Within a country’s irrigation sector, a multitude of site specific conditions will exist. The first step in planning modernization is identification of objectives and prioritization of schemes and measures according to those objectives. Each scheme is different and work is required at the scheme level to define specific modernization objectives and to draw up modernization programmes. Integrated rather than single solution approaches are needed. Modernization of a scheme in the region should typically cover: (1) infrastructure, software and management changes to raise water use efficiency by improving the flexibility, equity and reliability of water delivery services; (2) investments, technology transfer and capacity building to improve water productivity; and (3) institutional changes to ensure user participation in modernization strategy, system management and full cost-sharing. Given that most countries in the region share similar challenges, it would be helpful to the development of national improvement programmes to conduct a regional process to share data, information and knowledge on modernization and best practices. What could also be envisaged is regional technical cooperation on methodologies, benchmarking, capacity building, and so on.

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Actual investments may include: upgrading of physical infrastructure; measurement, control and monitoring of system operation and of irrigation delivery services; accountable contracting for water service; establishment or strengthening of empowered WUAs; capacity building for managers, operators, WUAs and farmers; infrastructure and management measures to increase water use efficiency; advisory and extension services to improve crop water productivity; and introduction of systematic periodic benchmarking. To prioritize investments amongst and within schemes, a planning tool is needed. There has been success region-wide and globally with MASSCOTE (Mapping Systems and Services for Canal Operation Techniques) developed by FAO, and which can be applied not only to conventional gravity schemes but also to lift and pressurized systems and to multi-functional schemes. There is already demand from within the region for further application of MASSCOTE, which can be applied to both large and small schemes. An option would be to standardise the use of this tool, and to develop regional centres of excellence that can help countries and schemes to apply it. Already, Tunisia has proposed to adopt MASCOTE as its standard methodology for evaluating any pumped system. The energy/water nexus Long-term trends in energy costs are relatively high in the region, particularly on pressurized or lift schemes, and this makes for high operation and maintenance costs. As a result, investments to raise irrigation efficiency may not always be cost-effective. In many countries, farmers have been protected by what are in effect energy subsidies, but this has introduced its own distorted incentives. On the cost side, any rise in energy prices would create a new reality for pump-based irrigation, which needs to be factored into planning and infrastructure. There are significant trade-offs involved in decisions about whether to pass on the real cost of energy to farmers. Low energy prices keep agricultural employment and incomes up but create incentives to overuse and misapplication of water. Economic pricing is politically difficult. It can lead to impoverishment of farmers, and it will have knock-on effects throughout the economy. There are no easy choices here. Governments have to consider the impact of cost on productivity and resource conservation on the one side, and the potential impact on farmers’ incomes and prices in the economy on the other hand. For poorer countries which can ill-afford to under-price energy, the choice is easier but it will always be a political choice.

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Pressurized irrigation The Middle East and North Africa region is a global leader in pressurized irrigation, which can lead to significant positive results, saving water and increasing returns per m3. However, pressurized irrigation also leads to higher levels of cost and risk and to vulnerability to energy prices. Pressurized irrigation demands a relatively high investment, and poorer farmers may not have access to the resources to finance the investment. Interventions may be needed in country programmes to reduce barriers to entry for poorer people. This could include encouraging the development of lower cost technology, and improving the efficiency of the supply chain (for example, training of stockists). Programmes to make credit available may also help: for example, hire purchase, leasing and micro-finance, or capital cost sharing. Interventions may also be needed to ensure profitable market outlets and help farmers manage price risk: price information, promoting increased competition among buyers, promotion of cooperative marketing institutions, storage to allow sales to be spaced out, outgrowers contracting, and so on. Research may also develop packages that can help farmers manage risk. Given the shared nature of the technology, a regional programme of research and development, capacity building, and technical cooperation could be envisaged. Rainfed agriculture Across the countries of the region, the three farming systems that are wholly or predominantly rainfed – Highland mixed, Rainfed mixed, and Dryland mixed – support almost two-thirds of farming households (62 per cent). Incomes are generally low and poverty is prevalent in many communities. Raising the productivity of these systems, including through improved water management, would have a significant impact on reducing poverty. There are a number of possibilities for improved productivity and risk management through agricultural water management, generally combined with other factors. Productivity can be improved by a combination of soil moisture management and choice of crops and varieties. Farmers may use rainwater harvesting techniques to increase soil moisture, which can boost yields by two to three times over conventional rainfed agriculture, especially when combined with improved varieties and minimum tillage methods that conserve water. Where supplementary irrigation is available, it provides famers with a range of risk management options. Farmers can manage crop water risk by choosing the right crops and varieties. Maintaining soil texture and fertility will improve crop water productivity. All these elements can be combined together in integrated soil, crop and water management. However, rainfed farmers face multiple constraints and barriers to adoption of improved techniques, including low and variable water availability; and

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environmental and soil problems of salinity, temperature and lack of nutrients. Risks are prevalent – climatic and hydrological risk, including drought and floods, intensified by climate change; market risk; and land and water tenure risk. Farming strategies are naturally characterized by risk aversion and low levels of investment. In addition, there has never been a Green Revolution for rainfed agriculture, and the technical solutions available are inherently quite low yielding. The need for new solutions is pressing, all the more so because of the prospect of climate changes which are likely to be drying and warming and to herald increasing unpredictability and extreme events. Given the importance of rainfed farming to agricultural production, rural incomes and poverty reduction, there needs to be a full focus across country programmes on technology and institutions for improved productivity in rainfed farming systems. A number of steps can be taken towards this. First, countries (and regional bodies) can promote research, innovation, ‘adaptive adoption’ and strategies for risk reduction through knowledge development and sharing as an iterative process between local people and technical staff and researchers. Second, institutional adaptation needs to accompany technological innovation. Some of this institutional adaptation can occur spontaneously at the local level, for example farmer organization for better catchment management, collaborative approaches to spate, spring or groundwater management, or community management of pasture. Some adaptation and adoption requires partnerships with public agencies – research and technology transfer, adjudication and regulation of land and water rights, decentralization of management of common assets or public goods such as water, forest and rangeland, resource management at the watershed scale, or payments for environmental services to compensate for externalities. A third area of focus could be on rainfed agriculture in the basin and watershed context, integrating upstream resource management with downstream management of water quantity and quality. The watershed management approach provides an example of how this can be effected, building on bottom up community-based approaches and technological and institutional innovation. Along similar lines, a fourth approach is to implement integrated development programmes for rainfed areas. These programmes could incorporate both cropping and livestock, with research, technology development and transfer; farming services such as extension and strengthening of input and product marketing chains; rural finance; and rural infrastructure development, particularly farm to market roads and water infrastructure.

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Other possible approaches which may be applicable in some contexts within the region include: strengthening land tenure jointly with local people through land consolidation, land rights confirmation, and co-management arrangements for common or state land (forests, rangeland); joint monitoring of climate change trends and the development of adaptive strategies and investment programmes at the local and regional level (see the section on climate change below); and the introduction of innovative sources of financing, such as payment for environmental services (PES). Although all countries in the region have worked extensively on the above agenda, there would be multiple benefits from synergy and joint work across the region in research, exchange of best practice, mutual farmer visits, and so on. Watershed management Watershed management typically targets land and water management in the upper catchment with twin objectives: improved upstream livelihoods, and improved water resources downstream. The challenge has been to find packages that achieve the downstream objective and are also profitable enough to make it worthwhile for upstream farmers to sustain them. This challenge has been partly met – programmes in the region have succeeded in improving livelihoods upstream, but downstream results are questionable – and the approach is costly to replicate. The best results come where there are conservation techniques that are also profitable for farmers, and where participatory approaches are used that create ownership amongst the local community. In addition, the approach of PES (payment for environmental services) has been used with some success elsewhere in the world, and could be piloted in the Middle East and North Africa. Water in the drylands and anti-desertification Three sets of measures are generally practised for improving productivity in the region’s drylands through agricultural water management. The first has been to increase water availability through water transfer, cloud seeding and – the only low cost option – water harvesting. The second, complementary measure has been to increase water use efficiency, either through increasing the moisture in the soil profile, or using soil moisture more efficiently. The third approach – reuse of wastewater or use of marginal water such as saline water or drainage water – is limited to certain largely peri-urban sites. Using these techniques, programmes to support water management in very dry areas have been implemented across the region, with some success.

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The challenge is a growing one. Much land in in the Middle East and North Africa is under threat from desertification, and much is lost each year. Some of this is simply a natural process, but much is due to changes in land use, for example, change from sustainable pastoral use to crop production or increased stocking rates leading to over-grazing and sand dune invasion. Given the extensive experience in the region on these themes at the pilot scale, and the ongoing larger scale programmes in some countries, scaling out of these approaches is justified, and this could form a valuable component of programmes to combat the effects of climate change (see below). This too is an area where regional collaboration could bring major benefits, including in particular: sharing of data, information and knowledge; establishment of best practices; and research and development. Water and forestry Water management and forestry go hand in hand, in reforestation on degraded lands, in peri-urban tree planting using treated wastewater, and in agro-sylvo-pastoral farming systems. For the future, and in particular in areas threatened with aridification under climate change, programmes could be launched in many countries to develop forests and trees on degraded lands, around cities, and for anti-desertification. Forestry or trees should be factored in to all planning for wastewater reuse, and the role of trees in both rainfed and irrigated farming systems should be considered. Drainage and drainage water reuse Waterlogging and salinity due to the rise of water tables and the accumulation of salts are reducing productivity over wide areas in the Middle East and North Africa. It is estimated that 45 per cent of Syria’s irrigated area suffers from salinization, and in Egypt 50 per cent. On the positive side, drainage water can be collected and reused, so that drainage gives the possibility of increasing usable water resources. Few countries in the world have integrated drainage planning and investments within overall water resources management. The reasons are in part institutional, but also economic, as investment in drainage has been thought to be low return, and cost recovery has proved problematic. As a result, drainage has been little considered in either water or agricultural policy. Yet drainage can improve productivity at relatively low cost, and investments in fact bring good returns. In the water-scarce countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the priority is on salinity control, and on the potential for reuse. Across the region, drainage should be seen as a multifunctional investment within an IWRM approach, serving all water sources and users. A legal and governance framework needs to be set up, and a participatory approach should

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be applied. Various technologies and innovations are available, which have to be adapted to the local situation. Reuse of drainage water represents a considerable water resource and with careful planning, participatory approaches and investment, it can add 10 per cent or more to national water resources, as in Egypt. As for drainage, drainage water reuse has to be assessed at the level of overall basin efficiency and socio-economic benefit. A legal and regulatory framework is needed to control reuse, and programmes for drainage water reuse need to be developed in association with users and to be the subject of explicit water entitlements in the same way as fresh canal water. There are trade-offs that need to be managed. A particular issue is the downstream environmental effect. Reuse may reduce environmental flows, with less salt discharged but reduced return to watercourses. Reuse thus needs to be assessed and trade-offs decided on in an overall basin framework. A second issue is that soil and water quality problems need careful control, or salts and contaminants will build up in the soil profile. Judgements have to be made – as in Egypt – about cut-off levels for the quality of water to be used. Given the uneven levels of experience with both drainage and drainage water reuse, regional collaboration amongst the countries and institutions of the region could be very helpful, including in particular: sharing of data, information and knowledge on drainage and reuse; establishment of best practices; benchmarking; and capacity building.

Are these new approaches to agricultural water management? The sections above attempted to set out an agenda for change in agricultural water management for the Middle East and North Africa region. The options highlighted build on experience over recent decades, and much of the material has long been common currency in strategies in the region. So a reasonable question is – how do the approaches suggested differ from previous sets of recommendations? The answer is not so much in the measures suggested as in the ways in which they are approached – in innovative approaches to preparing national agendas and in new ways of mobilizing the contributions of regional and international collaboration. New approaches Clearly countries in the region have progressed on many fronts to improve agricultural water management and this has raised productivity, supported a shift to higher value cropping, brought many more farmers into the market, and strengthened household level food security through higher incomes, reduced dependence on subsistence crops, and improved market functioning.

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Growing water scarcity, climate change, rising farmer expectations and the needs of the two-thirds of the region’s farmers dependent largely on rainfall imply that further improvement in sustainable agricultural water management is imperative. The list of options highlighted in the preceding sections and throughout this book is long. Many of the options are a continuation and scaling up of existing changes – the governance and institutional measures, IWRM and the basin approach, supply and demand management, measures to improve water use efficiency and crop water productivity. What is new for the coming years is not so much the lists of measures but the approaches suggested for applying them. Four linked and innovative approaches could be adopted in the preparation of national agendas in agricultural water management in the countries of the region. The first of the suggested innovations is to systematically adopt evidence-based approaches employing benchmarking, monitoring, evaluation and reporting to assess the results of measures applied and to feed the knowledge gained back into adjustments. The evidence-based approach can apply across the whole range of measures: policies and strategies; changes to institutions and incentives; and technical and socio-economic interventions. A second suggested new approach is to take farmers on as full partners in building policies and programmes that correspond to the farmers’ needs and constraints. Innovative approaches to farmer involvement can go beyond consultation to recognizing their status as commercial operators in the value chain, as businesses not beneficiaries. This has implications both for the value chain – farmers and farmer organizations working directly with suppliers and buyers – and for farmer/public agency accountability: for example, the public/private partnership of a public irrigation scheme supplying water to farmers involves a commercial contract of water services in exchange for client payment for the value of those services. A third innovation is to seek out effective synergies in innovation and learning. In so complex a field as agricultural water management, and in the enormous diversity of situations across the Middle East and North Africa region, there is a strong advantage in seeking structured mechanisms beyond the national level to understand challenges and potential, to learn from experiences, and to innovate and scale up successful innovations. The process is founded on the evidence-based approach and on the primacy of the farmers’ viewpoint, but it needs to bring together institutions and programmes at all levels, from the local to the regional and global, and it needs to forge more effective partnerships and ways of collaborating, from farmer-to-farmer exchanges in, for example, farmer field schools, to exchanges of solutions amongst practitioners rather than through conventional capacity building, to

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region-wide partnerships like the Arab Strategy for Water Security or FAO’s Regional Collaborative Strategy on Agricultural Water Management, and to global partnerships such as the CGIAR network. A final suggestion on a new approach is more socio-political than economic or technical – it is to adopt an inclusive approach to change. Recent years have seen the emergence of new ways in which change comes about across the Middle East and North Africa. Education and social changes have heightened awareness of water issues across broad constituencies, and a new political openness has encouraged inclusive debate. Water sector objectives of efficiency, equity and sustainability are commonly understood and accepted. Women and young people have found a voice, and environmental concerns are now taken seriously by very many. There is broader understanding that objective problems of scarcity, intersectoral competition and climate change are worsening, and that water institutions are not always well-adapted to this changing context. Future programmes for improving agricultural water management can thus be founded on inclusive processes of study and debate leading to consensus amongst stakeholders. The contribution of regional collaboration One characteristic of the Middle East and North Africa has always been a certain solidarity and tendency towards exchange and alignment of views, if not consensus. This has driven regional collaboration over many years, to which the existence of numerous regional programmes and exchanges bear testament. A wide range of further opportunities for regional, sub-regional and country-to-country collaboration has been identified in this chapter and throughout this book. This kind of collaboration can add enormous value given the commonality of issues, policies and institutions across the region and the synergy that can be generated by a cross-country sharing of knowledge and effort. In adopting this approach, strategic focus and prioritization are essential, for which criteria are needed. Decision makers contemplating regional collaboration need to ask, first, whether the topic addresses issues of economic importance relevant to improving sustainable water management. Second, there should be scope for evidence-based change and for benchmarking, monitoring and evaluating progress. Third, there should be scope for involving farmers and building in a farmer perspective. Finally, the expected benefits from cross-country collaboration at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional level should be clear and important. Most of the areas for regional collaboration highlighted in the preceding sections would meet all of these criteria.

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Scope to adapt to climate change Chapter 2 described how farming systems in the very water-scarce Middle East and North Africa region are vulnerable to climate change, with mixed, largely negative impacts anticipated until mid-century, and more pronounced negative impacts thereafter. Farming systems in general across the region are likely to be negatively affected by increasing aridity, greater unpredictability and growing water scarcity. However, some farming systems may benefit from warmer temperatures to extend the growing season or increase productivity of winter crops. Despite these negative impacts, output and incomes may still rise, at least until mid-century. Favourable terms of trade and the availability of productivity improvements and adaptation strategies could allow continued increases in output in most systems if the institutional and incentive frameworks are favourable. Thereafter, negative climate change impacts may override these potentials and production may decline. Marginal farming systems in drylands and pastoral systems are particularly vulnerable and some lands may shift to less intensive production or go out of production altogether. To counter these negative impacts, a wealth of adaptation options exists, which can also contribute to sustainable and equitable agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction. Nonetheless, more marginal systems have fewer options, and some may become less productive or in the longer term simply disappear. Therefore, governments need to support complementary rural livelihoods and to prepare segments of the rural population for transition to alternative livelihoods. This same agenda of support to adaptation can strengthen household-level food security for many and, combined with improvements in markets, safety nets and risk management, can help meet broader concerns about food security. Farmer responses As discussed in Chapter 6, farmers are likely to respond with spontaneous adaptations, managing risks as they always have in the face of an eternally uncertain climate. Farmers are likely to respond to rising temperatures by a mix of changes in varieties or crops and – where available – by recourse to supplementary irrigation. In predominantly rainfed systems, farmers may use rainwater harvesting techniques to compensate for reduced soil moisture. Increasing unpredictability of rainfall suggests farmers may, in addition to using supplementary irrigation, switch to growing drought tolerant or shorter cycle crops, or lengthening the growing season. Where rain events become more concentrated, farmers may practise more surface irrigation and water harvesting. Climate change impacts may reduce soil fertility and

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increase soil erosion, but farming practices can mitigate these impacts and maintain soil health. Declining water availability and unpredictable rainfall may sharpen the need for efficient groundwater and surface irrigation, especially supplementary irrigation. However, declining groundwater availability may cause farmers to return to traditional agricultural and water harvesting techniques. Combined changes in water availability and temperature may encourage farmers to switch to better adapted cropping patterns, to conjunctive management of rainfall and surface and groundwater, and to efficient protected agriculture and pressurized irrigation. Growing salinization will prompt changes in cropping patterns and soil and water management. These kinds of spontaneous adaptations are already underway, but institutional adaptation needs to accompany technological innovation. Some of this institutional adaptation can occur spontaneously at the local level – farmer organization for better catchment management, collaborative approaches to groundwater management, community management of pasture. Some of it requires partnerships with government – decentralization of irrigation management to water users associations, water demand management, payments for environmental services to compensate for externalities, or land consolidation. In general, outcomes are likely to improve where government, communities and farmers work together on both technology and institutional agendas. Government role in supporting farmers A wide range of both technological and institutional adaptation measures is thus available for most farming systems. Farmers are already applying many of these measures. The challenges will be to ensure knowledge-based approaches that combine government’s ability to guide adaptation through the incentive structure, research and technical and institutional support with farmer knowledge, skills and adaptive capacity. Responses to climate change should generally coincide with best practice agendas on integrated water resources management, sustainable land and water management, and institutional decentralization and empowerment of local stakeholders. Because aridity will increase and water is the binding constraint to agriculture in the region, governments will need to evaluate trade-offs between supporting climate change responses in agriculture and preparing parts of the rural economy for transition away from agriculture. Key areas for government action include: (i) developing climate modelling and adaptation strategies, emphasizing robust ‘no regret’ options, especially those that combine adaptation and mitigation; (ii) adapting water management and agricultural services; (iii) decentralization and

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strengthening local participatory governance, land tenure and environmental stewardship; (iv) trade liberalization and market development; (v) strengthening cooperation on climate change; (vi) combining adaptation with mitigation measures; and (vii) working out options for financing adaptation, especially through global funds. At the regional and national level, climate modelling and resource monitoring are essential to preparing responses to climate change. Technologies for this are now well developed and are freely available. For the preparation of adaptation strategies, experience shows that an iterative top down/bottom up approach based on evidence, research and farmer experience yields best results. The responses need to clearly target agricultural productivity and environmental protection. Research, extension and information are critical components in adaptation strategies, and learning from and with farmers will be vital, including from traditional farmer knowledge. For implementation, policies and programmes will be needed to support farmers in adapting agricultural practices based on a practical partnership between farmers and public agencies. At the limit, support may be required for a change of farming system, or even out-migration. Household-level livelihood strategies Agricultural income is by far the largest source of overall rural household income, and adaptation in farming will be the principal concern of rural households all across the region. But farm income needs to be supplemented by other income within overall livelihood strategies. In particular, not all farmers will be able to maintain their income from farming, and many nonfarm rural households will also be vulnerable. Existing rural community resilience will be impaired by climate change impacts on natural resources and on financial and social capital. Adaptation strategies at the household level need to develop income opportunities less dependent on natural resources, alongside programmes for agricultural intensification. Diversification of livelihoods will be an important adaptation option, including adding value to agricultural production by processing and marketing, as well as new household industries, such as crafts or tourism, or light manufacturing. Governments have a major role to play in developing and implementing rural livelihood adaptation strategies including: (i) putting in place a policy and incentive framework favourable to diversified rural enterprise and livelihoods; (ii) supporting integrated rural development programmes, especially for infrastructure, health and education; (iii) decentralizing public services, empowering local government, and empowering CBOs and NGOs; (iv) facilitating the inevitable rural/urban migration; (v) ensuring social

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safety nets are in place in rural areas; and (vi) developing disaster reduction and risk management systems. In areas where rural livelihood options are inadequate, people are likely to migrate, particularly during periods of climate stress like droughts and floods. Households will need to adapt roles and responsibilities and strengthen local social networks in both the receiving and exiting communities. They will have to invest in skills and education to prepare, and it will be the role of public policy and programmes to ease the transition, for example through ensuring availability of serviced land for low cost housing near centres of employment. Food security under climate change A major concern of many countries facing climate change is the anticipated impact on food security. In some policy analysis, food security is confused with food self-sufficiency, but in only a few poor or isolated areas of the region does this equivalence have much meaning. In most areas, it is a combination of adequate income and adequate availability of food that is important. The challenge is not necessarily to produce more food but to ensure that markets make adequate food available and that people have the incomes to buy it. Countries in the region with vulnerable populations dependent on farming can thus improve food security by a rural livelihoods strategy principally focussed on enhancing agricultural and off-farm incomes and production that will help rural household food security by increasing household incomes. If food crops are the most profitable, their production would also contribute to national food supply and price stability, but farmers should not be encouraged to grow food crops if other crops would bring them a higher income. In evaluating the trade-offs between promoting domestic food production and promoting production that gives the highest return to water, governments will need to take account of the realities of food security at both household and national level. At the household level, farmers will need to maximize their income to ensure household level food security and escape from poverty. At the national level, governments will need to facilitate trade and export as much as possible to be able to import the food commodities they depend on. All countries in the Middle East and North Africa can work to improve supply chain efficiency and to cooperate with global efforts to stabilize food markets and prices. Poorer countries may also seek bilateral and multilateral agreements for food aid. All countries in the region can also strengthen safety nets (cash transfers, labour-intensive employment programmes, and health and nutrition interventions), education, and family planning.

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Better-off countries requiring assurance of food supplies can reduce exposure to market supply and price risks not only by improving supply chain efficiency, but also by introducing cost-effective risk management instruments calibrated to the risk assessed. Implications for policy and programmes Farmers and rural households will clearly adapt to climate change effects, but spontaneous adaptation responses need to be supported by proactive public services. Agricultural adaptation strategies need to be designed and implemented to complement farmer efforts at responding to climate change. For the preparation of adaptation strategies, experience shows that an iterative top down/bottom up approach based on evidence, research and farmer experience yields best results. The responses need to clearly target agricultural productivity and environmental protection. Research, extension and information are critical components in adaptation strategies, and learning from and with farmers will be vital, including from traditional farmer knowledge. For implementation, policies and programmes will be needed to support farmers in adapting agricultural practices based on a practical partnership between farmers and public agencies. At the limit, support may be required for a change of farming system, or even out-migration. Governments need to devise broader interventions for sustaining rural livelihoods and facilitating inevitable processes of transition. Governments need also to anticipate the implications of climate change for food security. The strategies developed will need to combine many different interventions ranging from local initiatives to advances in national infrastructure and developments in governance and institutional arrangements. At the regional and country level, climate modelling and resource monitoring are essential to preparing responses to climate change. Technologies for this are now well developed and are freely available. Countries in the region have good experience in preparing adaptation strategies. There could be substantial benefit in sharing this experience amongst countries and regional technical cooperation on modelling and monitoring and on aspects of implementation such as research and technology development would bring substantial benefits.

Resolving conflict over water All conflict, in its broad definition as unresolved competition over water, has proved to be a normal stage in the evolution of water institutions in the region. Water conflict management is a process of adaptation that can resolve conflict by influencing policies, institutions, programmes, accountability and

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behaviour. Improvements in water governance are the key to water conflict resolution. From conflict to cooperation on transboundary waters Best practice in transboundary water management and conflict resolution seeks to achieve the goals of fair distribution of benefits, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability through agreement on cooperation. In the region, there is at present no comprehensive cooperation agreement on transboundary waters. The only formal agreement which partially covers transboundary waters is the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians enshrined in the Oslo accords. However, the agreement has largely failed to deliver on its promise of the integrated water resource management principles of equity, sustainability and efficiency. The most ambitious and successful programme of transboundary river basin cooperation in the region to date has been on the Nile. For over twenty years, the riparians have been working together to develop a cooperative mechanism that embodies most of the principles of cooperative management of transboundary waters. Across the Nile basin, policy and planning on water resource management and development now incorporate regional perspectives and cross-sectoral integration. Infrastructure investments costing over $6 billion are being implemented, generating benefits from cooperation over the use of Nile waters. These activities have been paralleled by a ‘political’ track to develop and adopt a Cooperative Framework Agreement designed to establish a lasting basis for cooperation and benefit sharing. Even after two decades, there are risks that political will to cooperate on the Nile could dwindle or that political deadlock may arise. There has been persistent reticence about accepting the underlying approach of benefit sharing, rather than water sharing, with states attached to the notion of quantified water rights. The fact that after so long there is still no agreement on a permanent institutional structure leaves open the constant possibility that cooperation will falter. This two decade-long experience is far from complete, but the itinerary has already brought significant gains and benefits and provides a host of lessons about developing transboundary cooperation. A more intractable case is that of the Euphrates. Despite nearly a century of discussion, there is no formal agreement on joint management. A series of informal bilateral protocols aimed at assuring minimum flows have been frequently breached. Now Turkey, and to a lesser extent Syria, have unilaterally embarked on massive developments of hydropower and irrigation which, when fully operational, will reduce Iraq’s share of water to well below its historical use levels and deliver water of execrable quality. In addition, climate change is expected to reduce inflows to the system by 20 per cent in

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the foreseeable future. Already there are highly negative impacts on downstream land and water, and considerable lost production. Added to this is the current political and strategic crisis in the region. Different groups have seized control of major water infrastructure and water is being ‘weaponized’. At present the outlook is very bleak. In the future, it will be imperative to work out mechanisms for institutional cooperation and for equitable and sustainable benefit sharing. Despite the challenges, global experience shows that cooperative development of transboundary resources results in win-win outcomes and reduced conflict. Cooperative development can greatly increase economic benefits and can preserve ecosystems, increasing sustainability and enhancing environmental assets. Cooperation on international rivers increases water security, reduces risks of water-related conflict and increases the chances that conflict can be turned to good account. Cooperation can even help promote broader patterns of cooperation. Much of these benefits can already be demonstrated within the region, in the cooperation over the Nile basin. Nonetheless, the nations of the Middle East and North Africa have been reluctant to cooperate, and there are reasons for this: essentially, entering into a cooperative framework entails a loss of sovereignty of decision, and may entail either a real or perceived loss of some ‘historic rights’. Politically this is very difficult to accept. A second, related factor is ‘power asymmetry’. It is the powerful states that tend to have the largest share of transboundary waters, and they are also the least ready to cooperate simply because they do not need to. By contrast, the weaker states are generally eager to cooperate: in the case of the Nile, for example, the ‘weaker’ upstream riparians have been eager to proceed with a cooperation agreement even if Egypt and Sudan do not join. Factors that may change positions include imposition or inducement, for example in the case of the Palestinians and Israel. Or the encouragement of the international community, which applies to the Palestinians and Israelis again, but also to the Nile. In some cases, country-specific factors or larger geopolitical considerations may be important, for example for Turkey, Syria and Iraq. For the Nile, the likely impact of climate change introduces an element of risk that would best be managed at the basin level. Options for managing transboundary conflict The fundamental truth about transboundary water is that it is ultimately a question of power relations. This overrides all economic and technical aspects. It is no surprise that the countries calling the water shots on the three transboundary resources assessed – Israel on the West Bank aquifers, Egypt on the Nile, and Turkey on the Euphrates – are the most powerful of the concerned riparians. All other considerations – equity, ‘no harm’, upstream or

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downstream rights, historic usage – dwindle into insignificance alongside this blunt fact. Nonetheless, political approaches exist to mitigate the brute exercise of power. Even in the case of Israel and the Palestinians, the political process was able to conclude in some sort of agreement, even if it turned out during implementation to be a slanted one. The lesson is that transboundary water management ultimately requires a political agreement, and that political agreement has to be based on agreed principles rather than on power relations. The Nile case provides excellent lessons on how, even in unpromising circumstances, a clear strategy can inch apparently reluctant partners towards a political agreement. The first lesson is that a strategic approach is needed from the outset, both at the level of the political economy of cooperation and at the level of development of cooperative institutions. The design of governance arrangements is critical, in particular how these arrangements negotiate between the political and the technical tracks. In designing a programme to build transboundary cooperation, there needs to be a clear but flexible, adaptive sequence. In the Nile case, this itinerary started from technical cooperation and has worked progressively towards institutional and political cooperation. This approach has allowed confidence and habits of joint working to develop, whilst generating essential knowledge. There needs also to be a clear economic strategy, concentrating on sharing benefits rather than water. The programme has to bring tangible benefits as early as possible and to show in practice how cooperation can reduce risk and bring economically optimal investment for all riparians. There are lessons too on how the process can best be supported – the use of pooled funding for development partner support, and the need for facilitation and institutional strengthening support into the long term. In all this, time and stamina are needed. Monitoring of success is as much an art as a science and needs to feed back into a flexible process; and communications, transparency and stakeholder inclusion are vital throughout. Resolving conflict through good water management within a country’s borders Within a country’s borders, the challenges of conflict management and resolution are essentially the challenges of good water governance and management. At the national level, conflict typically signals an imbalance in infrastructure and institutions that needs to be resolved top down through investment and institutional adaptation. Investment is required to adapt infrastructure to modern water use and scarcity. Improved governance and management are required to allocate, use and manage the existing scarce

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resource more effectively and equitably. This combination of improved governance and management needs to be conducted through flexible institutions and organizations, and through accountability and inclusiveness. All these requirements are the hallmark of best practice water policies. Essentially, conflict signals problems that good water policies can resolve – and application of those same policies will contribute to the goals of equity, efficiency and sustainability. In improving water management and reducing conflict, promoting local governance is a vital complement to institutional reform from the top. Good water management typically requires decentralizing water management powers and responsibility to the lowest appropriate level. Local governance can build on existing social capital but community-based local water management – and conflict resolution generally – may require support from public organizations if it is to be effective. Intelligent analysis and design of reform programmes requires consideration of political and power relationships, analysis of policies, particularly those affecting incentives, and an understanding of the socioeconomic context at national and local levels. A strategic approach is required which identifies conflict proactively, builds constituencies and challenges power asymmetry. The final must is to keep to the main idea, with the essential policy objectives always in view.

Syria and other crises in the region Water, food security and conflict in the region This book has reflected the situations of conflict in the region and the appalling consequences of those conflicts for the populations of too many countries. The human impact is catastrophic for the more than ten million displaced people. Syrian children have forfeited their childhood, growing up knowing only war, displacement, lost schooling and hunger. The consequences for food security have been overwhelming – the need for humanitarian assistance, the devastating effect on agricultural infrastructure, production and rural incomes. Even when peace returns, recovery is likely to be slow. Syria, Iraq and Yemen have already been in crisis for half a decade or more. Rebuilding food security and a productive economy is infinitely harder than destroying one. These troubles were triggered by a series of social, economic and political factors. Natural resource scarcity or degradation or food insecurity have rarely by themselves been causes of conflict, but they have certainly been threat multipliers, for example in the mishandling of the aftermath of the Syrian droughts of 2008– 11 and the resulting increase in food insecurity and

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malnutrition. It was not the drought or the decline in production or even the rise in food insecurity which contributed to the disaffection of the Syrian people from their government. It was the lamentable failure of that government to respond with adequate humanitarian assistance or to help farmers to ride out the drought and restore their productive capability. Coping with the food security crisis in Syria and neighbouring countries In the dire food security crisis in the countries affected by the Syria conflict, the fastest way to recovery is to start by helping rural people get quickly back to farming and producing. The focus then needs be on rebuilding resilient systems and restoring livelihoods through investment in infrastructure, research, technology transfer, market development, and so on. In the longer term, there is a need to undo the systemic distortions in agriculture, natural resources and the rural sector that helped fuel the conflict. A first pathway is to improve food security and nutrition through support to smallholder crop and livestock production, and in the longer term to maximize the productivity and resilience of smallholder agriculture and to integrate smallholders into commercial value chains. At the same time, actions are needed to promote sustainable livelihoods and employment opportunities, increasing access to agriculture-based livelihoods and employment opportunities. The longer term goal is to ensure a more diversified rural economy with decent employment opportunities for all and especially for youth and women. Sustainable use of natural resources is a third axis, restoring productive capacity in the near term and ensuring more equitable access and sustainable use in the longer term. All changes will need to be underpinned by strengthened capacity and institutions. Support to economic revitalization, notably through agriculture, will contribute to stabilization and peace. Well done, these interventions build capacity, help restore the legitimacy of institutions and make a contribution to peacebuilding. In the longer term, comprehensive and inclusive economic growth strategies that address the systemic issues and promote equitable and sustainable rural economies will help consolidate these gains and maintain a peaceful society.

Peacebuilding There have been no major ‘outbreaks’ of peace in any location in the Middle East and North Africa due to improved water governance. However, experience reveals a plethora of little victories from which we can draw lessons for promoting peace through various types of water initiatives. We know that improved water governance, which addresses inequity and perceptions of

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relative scarcity, is the key to water conflict resolution. The next question is how to sustain and expand upon these gains, and foster peace in the region. When planning and implementing new water investments and reforms, we can apply the practical lessons of the past to create a more intentional peacebuilding effort. Structural conditions fuel water conflict. And so the objective of peacebuilding is positive peace: the removal of structural conditions –laws, institutions and social structures – that lead to physical harm, prevent parties from satisfying their basic needs and limit human potential. Peacebuilding is self-perpetuating: it is both an action and an outcome. Environmental peacebuilding is not simply reactive – responding to active conflict – but also proactive and preventative, as it builds capacity to mitigate the escalation of latent conflict and manage the risk of conflict relapse. Environmental peacebuilding activities aim to reform structures and foster positive peace by building organizational and institutional capacities that together promote collaborative resource governance and environmental sustainability. Constructively designed water interventions, including infrastructure investments and reforms, when developed strategically, can promote environmental peacebuilding. And furthermore, success in environmental cooperation can be a conduit for peacebuilding in other areas of a society, extending benefits beyond systems of water resource governance. There are two ways to incorporate peacebuilding strategies into water interventions and to integrate water governance into broader efforts to build peace. First is to build capacity for collaborative water governance. Capacities can be divided into two types: institutional capacities (norms and values, perceptions and knowledge) and organizational capacities (functional capabilities and explicit rules and roles). These capacities promote principles of equity and representation as parties work together. These capacities build on one another, create momentum and strengthen inter-party relationships over time. These capacities can be the outcomes of any water intervention, and so can be planned for during programme design and can be included as peacebuilding indicators in monitoring and evaluation plans. The second part of the peacebuilding strategy is to manage the practicalities of implementation. This includes confronting contextual factors, such as security, ecology and public relations, which can represent opportunities as well as hindrances to collaborative governance. It also includes operational approaches for working with the conflict parties: maximizing third party influence, empowering first parties, and utilizing practical tactics for enabling peacebuilding progress. With or without the label of ‘peace’ or ‘peacebuilding’, these strategies can be incorporated into

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water interventions in order to help catalyse peace – on a larger, long-term scale, and ultimately beyond the bounds of water.

Difficult policy choices and deciding on trade-offs The countries of the Middle East and North Africa are faced with massive challenges of water scarcity, rising demand and the consequences of a deteriorating climate. Major policy choices need to be confronted: what to do about agriculture and agricultural incomes on which more than half the population rely? How to ensure food security in nations, both rich and poor? How to meet the conflicting demands of agriculture, drinking water, commerce and industry for a limited and often dwindling resource. How to persuade groundwater users to accept governance for sustainability and equity? And so on. Every policy choice involves a trade-off to some extent: there is always a ‘road not taken’. Nations balance the pros and cons and make the best choices they can in line with their objectives. In recent years in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa the mechanisms for dealing with trade-offs have become more transparent and participatory. There is a more open discussion in the press, national debates take place around water-related topics, and in many countries the people have a voice that has grown louder since the Arab Spring. It is therefore all the more important that the major trade-offs involved in policy choices over water in the face of water scarcity, conflict and climate change be clearly set out, and particularly those choices concerning the preponderant and residual user of water – agriculture. This section discusses just three of these trade-offs, but analysis of others is implicit or explicit throughout this book. Productivity v. food self-sufficiency As discussed in all through this book, there is a cost to aiming at food selfsufficiency, and a potential trade-off with productivity and incomes. Economically and socially, the optimum food security situation at the household level is adequate incomes and access to reliable food markets, and at the national level a trade and food supply policy founded on the principles of comparative advantage and virtual water. Wise governments would try to ensure an incentive structure where farmer incentives are aligned with economics, and where the value chain in which the farmer operates is efficient with no insurmountable barriers to access. In this situation, the farmer can farm efficiently and make an income sufficient to meet family needs and ensure household-level food security, and also pay the fair cost of services. However, often governments are tempted to adjust the incentive structure in

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pursuit of non-economic goals such as higher rates of self-sufficiency in food production. A series of shocks since the First Gulf War have sharpened preoccupations in the region about food security and have led to louder calls for increased food production to achieve a higher level of self-sufficiency. As discussed in Chapter 1, no country in the region is self-sufficient in cereals, although three major countries are two-thirds self-sufficient (Egypt, Iran and Morocco). National strategy may call for increases in levels of food self-sufficiency. This may sometime be in the interests of the nation on economic grounds as well as security grounds: Egypt, for example, is amongst the world’s most efficient producers of rice, and it may be that at the margin it is in the interests of both farmer and the nation that the choice of crop be rice. In other situations, the state may call for cereals production but the farmer won’t comply: in Yemen, for example, there has often been a call for farmers to abandon higher value cash crops and to return to cereals production. Such calls have consistently been ignored by the farmer, who knows that he can get ten times the return per m3 of water if he produces vegetables (or qat) for market. He has, after all, a family to feed from his half hectare plot. At the macroeconomic scale, the cost of the trade-off involved can be massive, as the study on Morocco cited in Chapter 6 shows – self-sufficiency would come at a high cost – about $10 billion 2008–22 – resources that could be used to purchase a much greater quantity of imported cereals. The challenge of food security may, however, be different at the local or household level, particularly in the remoter areas and in the semi-subsistence farming systems of poorer countries, notably Yemen. Here food crop production may be the best food security strategy, particularly where viable markets for cash crops are absent. Food security policies for the countries of the region need therefore to take account of the local and household level choices, whatever the national strategic objectives. Where food security is best assured by producing for market and earning incomes, this is the optimal strategy, even if national strategy is aiming at a higher degree of self-sufficiency in food crops. Where food security is uncertain at the local level, either because of the absence of cash crops and viable product markets, or because of weak markets in food, production of basic food crops may be the farmer’s choice, even if national strategy is for cash crop production, for export for example. Food security strategies need to be modulated to support farmers across a range of possibilities, even if this means giving primacy to local strategies at variance with national priorities. Following the shocks of the food price rises of 2008, there was an immediate call from policy makers throughout the region for policies to

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protect countries and peoples from such risks. Considerable analytic work was devoted to this topic, from which four key requirements emerged. The first was better information – the generation of improved data and strengthened capacity for evidence-based decision making. The second was strengthened social protection measures for the vulnerable. Measures were proposed to protect vulnerable households, particularly in the poorer nations and those where income disparities were greatest, by strengthening safety nets (cash transfers, labour-intensive employment programmes, health and nutrition interventions, with a particular focus on women and children), education, family planning. The third set of requirements concerned the rural and agricultural populations, seen as most at risk but also major contributors to national food supply. The goals were twofold – to protect rural households and to contribute to national food supply and price stability. The mechanism was to strengthen rural livelihoods strategies, focusing on enhancing agricultural and off-farm incomes and production through investment in research and development, rural infrastructure and market development. The fourth requirement was to reduce exposure to market supply and price risks. Amongst the mechanisms proposed to manage supply and price risks were: an export-led growth strategy to earn foreign exchange to import food; improvements to supply chain efficiency; and the introduction of costeffective risk management instruments – food reserves, buffer stocks, forward contracting, financial hedging products, and so on. Countries in the region have also discussed how to promote and support regional and global responses to protect against price volatility. Food security strategies clearly have to be adapted to the nature of the risks. The key message is that a variety of strategic responses is possible for different groups of countries, and that within each country different regions and target groups face very different food security challenges. Table 6.2 illustrates how different strategic responses are appropriate for different country and socioeconomic situations. Free trade v. protection The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have moved progressively towards free trade and compliance with their commitments under the World Trade Organization. Nonetheless, there are arguments for keeping a measure of protection of domestic production – to prevent dumping, to counteract the effect of subsidies in major exporting countries, and to ensure that local production, on which the livelihoods of the poor depend, remains profitable. The contrary arguments are also strong. Distortions in the incentive structure induce choices which are wasteful for the economy, create a pattern of agricultural investment and production that will ultimately not be

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sustainable, with negative repercussions for the farmer, and encourage overuse of water and land resources. Extreme water scarcity makes the region heavily dependent on imported agricultural commodities, and also makes it vital that each drop of water earn the highest income. The agriculture of the Middle East and North Africa, therefore, has good reason to specialize in production – and often export – of high-value commodities like cotton, fruits and vegetables, and so generate the resources needed to import lower value commodities like grains. This kind of economic exchange helps achieve good use of water resources, provided that the global trade system is well-functioning. It is a prime case of the concept of ‘virtual water trade’. This concept, developed by Professor Tony Allan of SOAS and King’s College, London, is that a well-functioning global trade system would induce countries to either export or import goods based on their natural resource endowment: water and/or land poor countries would be net importers of agricultural commodities produced and exported by waterabundant countries. Most countries in the Middle East and North Africa are already net importers of agricultural goods, therefore importing large volumes of virtual water. Jordan imports about 6 billion m3 of virtual water per year and withdraws only 1 billion m3 from domestic sources. For the future, economic policy in the countries of the region could concentrate scarce water on encouraging the production of crops that have the highest returns to scarce water, and on ensuring that trade functions well, for example by aligning with WTO requirements. Each country will make its own choices, depending on its policy objectives. If the choice is to follow the logic of virtual water, socioeconomic surplus will be maximized. The essential is that countries opting for another path do so in the light of knowledge about the relative costs and benefits of the trade-offs involved.2 Managing trade-offs and aligning incentives Throughout this book, arguments have been advanced that for the waterscarce countries of the Middle East and North Africa there is an imperative to maximize the efficiency and productivity of the use of every drop of water, the scarcest factor of production. Economic logic would therefore suggest that each country would put in place an incentive structure to encourage adoption of techniques to improve water use efficiency and water productivity sustainably and equitably. This requires an enabling policy and institutional environment that aligns the incentives of producers and society as a whole. Choices about the different components of the incentive structure require trade-offs that inevitably arise from the differing interests of farmers and the rest of the nation. Table 9.1 highlights how the individual farmer wants to

Government and consumers want more production Water is short and the nation wants efficient use of scarce water resources Society sets the goal of equity

More production leads to price drop, reducing the farmer’s incentives

Farmer is reluctant to improve water use efficiency as this increases risks

New technology is costly and there are barriers to entry, particularly for the poor and for women

Source: Author’s compilation based on IWMI 2007: 280 –1.

Producer has little incentive to conserve a common pool resource like groundwater

Society has an interest in environmental conservation Society may have higher value uses for that water There may be downstream uses for the water Society may wish to conserve groundwater for the future

Consumer wants lower prices

Farmer needs a high price to encourage investment and risk taking

More efficient or more influential farmers may obtain a larger share of resources or subsidies Farmer may increase production at the expense of the environment Producer wants as much water as possible

Society’s perspective

Identifying misaligned incentives and deciding on trade-offs

The farmer’s perspective

Table 9.1

Provided that there are no major distortions like producer subsidies, probably best handled through the market, with income support to the poor. Align social protection and agricultural policies Probably best to leave it to the market, again provided that there are no major distortions. Align trade and business policy with agricultural policy Government may develop markets or provide limited support to investment in, for example, drip irrigation. Align agricultural and water policies Government may provide support targeted to the poor and marginal for investment, may help credit mechanisms to develop, and so on. Align agricultural and water policies Government may refine targeting mechanisms and adopt pro-poor approaches. Align agricultural and water policies Environmental laws and regulations implemented in consultation with farmers Water resource management strengthened in partnership with farmers

How is trade off decided?

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maximize his or her benefits, whereas society frequently has other perceptions. Trade-offs decided by policy makers are required, either to better align incentives with underlying economic realities, or to pursue some other policy objective.3

Creating momentum for change Drivers of change in the water sectors of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa Responding to the challenges of water scarcity and climate change will require many changes of policy and programmes. These changes will need to be introduced by policy makers, but will only be feasible if there is popular support for the sometimes tough measures required. Is there likely to be the basis of support required? Several decades ago, all such things were decided top-down by governments and agencies, but in recent years almost all countries of the region have seen the rise of more participatory, consultative and sometimes democratic approaches. Although each country context is different, it is possible to identify a number of changes in attitudes, in awareness of problems, and in institutions and power relations that, taken together, have created a context favourable to change in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The thinking about water amongst different constituencies in the region has changed. Demographics and economic growth have led to a rapid urbanization and to increased consumption of water and of water-intensive food products. As a result, urban constituencies across the region are now an important voice in water. Accompanying this change, education and broader social change, including in the status of women, have led to more emphasis in the region on potable water and safe sanitation, and less emphasis on water for agriculture. Government thinking has evolved, too, and policies which in the past favoured supply increase and tended to skew demand through subsidies and protection have moved more towards concerns for efficiency, environmental protection and reduction in the fiscal burden. These changes in attitude have been accompanied by the emergence across the Middle East and North Africa of serious water problems that are now the subject of open discussion. The groundwater revolution has led to unmanageable over-exploitation. The rapid expansion of supply investments has created an inflexible pattern of rights and expectations. Climate change is introducing costs and risks that are hard to manage. There is awareness that management of environmental degradation has been neglected. Public and private investments in water infrastructure are altering existing water rights, in some cases increasing inequity.

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There is an awareness too that water sector institutions are not always adapted to this changing context. New technology and the development of resources, particularly groundwater, have outstripped the governance mechanisms that should have regulated them. More generally, there is a sense that governments have developed the resource and allocated water between sectors and to users but have not fostered the flexible and participatory institutional mechanisms and accountability structures needed to respond to changing demand, create accountability or resolve conflicts. There is an awareness too that access to water is not always equitable, and that vulnerable and marginalized groups are most at risk as they lack the resources to manage the systemic factors that contribute to poverty. All these developments create a climate receptive to change, and this may be given an impulse by some ‘decisive moment’. Crisis can focus attention on lingering problems and trigger beneficial change by sudden, dramatic events. For example, riots in Algeria in 2002– 4 were a stimulus to acceptance of water reforms. Conflict in Iran has demonstrated the need for a more consultative approach to relocation issues. Successive severe droughts in Morocco in the early 1980s stimulated water policy reform, including the passage of the 1995 Water Law. A long interruption in urban water supply in Ta’iz, Yemen, in 1995 triggered a national debate and the start of water sector reform.4 Introducing best practice water policies: lessons from Australia5 Experience from elsewhere in the world can show how a programme of best practice changes in the water sector can be decided and implemented by consensus. Australia has many characteristics similar to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in terms of aridity, water shortages and stresses between sectors competing for water. Over a decade, Australia debated its water problems and developed a comprehensive reform programme of water management. Lessons from both the content and the process of the Australian reform programme provide indications of how similar processes of policy debate and reform may be conducted in the Middle East and North Africa. Beginning in the 1990s, Australia conducted an inclusive process of study and debate to arrive at consensus on a national water reform agenda, the National Water Initiative. This comprehensive reform plan sets three goals for water resources management which find echoes in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa – to return all water systems to sustainable levels of extraction, to manage groundwater sustainably, and to respect needs for environmental water. Three goals were also set to improve water allocation – providing secure water entitlements for irrigators, securing water entitlements for the environment and introducing water sharing plans with

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legal force. The provisions for demand management encourage open trading of water rights, introduce water pricing based on economics, and ensure support for affected communities where irrigation supplies are reduced. Strengthened governance and institutions play a key role, with investment in knowledge about water, building of capacity for good water management, and improvement of water data collection and water accounting. Finally the Initiative provides for better water services, particularly in improved management and security of urban water supplies. With a coherent national narrative for water reform, the Initiative has led to greatly improved water management. The changes have created certainty for water investors and communities, built up markets in the water sector, and opened the door for the private sector in water. Science and evidence and the requirements of the environment are now integrated into water management. Capacity for good water management is being built, and water is now fully integrated into the national infrastructure programme. The question is: what were the elements in the process which enabled Australia to bring about such sweeping reforms. The key factors in this success have been five. First, there was an imperative for reform: Australia was experiencing severe water shortages and over-allocation to agriculture and the situation was worsening with climate change. These realities became ‘drivers of change’ – the triggers that drove policy action and led to consensus that something had to be done. Second, an inclusive process was conducted which led to consensus on a national water reform agenda: a long process of study, national debate and political discussion led to agreement on objectives and on the National Water Initiative, which acted as a blueprint for the changes. Third, taken together, the policies were acknowledged to be coherent. The National Water Initiative contained the right suite of policies to achieve the policy objectives and the right measures to tackle the many water challenges within a coherent, integrated national plan. A fourth factor was the good water governance arrangements. The reforms established the right institutions, with clear authority, the necessary resources, and stability (see below). Finally, the process was transparent and evidence-based. The National Water Initiative was based on the systematic use of data, science and knowledge, and on the practical application of economics, taking account of key concerns like property rights, and introducing the discipline of markets. One clear lesson from the Australian experience is that governance and institutions matter. In fact, from the outset, the Initiative adopted the principle: Governance and institutions are always critical to good water management and to the success of reform. As a result, institutional change and strengthening were at the heart of Australia’s water sector reform. Reform of government agencies comprised: creation of a federal water department and legislation

AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE

313

where there previously was none; establishment of a new independent authority for the Murray Darling Basin; inter-governmental coordination committees; oversight by the Council of Australian Governments (Prime Minister and State Premiers); and an independent public assessor of progress (the National Water Commission). This National Water Commission is required by law to report on reform progress. It reports to the Prime Minister and publishes independent assessments and reports. It can suggest new reform needs – and has done so, for example on groundwater, water data and water science. The Commission can advocate further policy and institutional change and it invests in studies and promotion of further reform. The institutional reforms were comprehensive, all across the water sector. Specialist institutions were set up or strengthened: catchment management authorities; environmental water managers; irrigation and urban supply utilities; environmental regulators; health regulators; and water market regulators, all of which were administratively separate. There was also emphasis on institutions to build capacity for data, information and knowledge. A new agency – the Bureau of Meteorology – was set up. There were major investments in water science and water data. A massive public communications programme was undertaken under the aegis of the National Water Commission to promote public debate and understanding about water. Although it is unlikely that any one country of the Middle East and North Africa could precisely replicate the Australian success, there are many lessons for both the content of reforms and for the process by which they may be brought about. The five key elements that underwrote the Australian process are relevant or possible in many situations in the region. Many imperatives for reform exist, as evidenced by the discussion throughout this book. It is not only conflict (Chapter 3) that indicates the need. Scarcity and climate change create a whole host of such challenges. The inclusive process that was helpful in Australia in getting to consensus on the water reform agenda is practised already in many countries of the region: recent examples include Jordan and Yemen. Some of these processes have satisfied the Australian condition of being transparent and evidence-based, employing data, scientific knowledge and the practical application of economics. If these processes have not always produced the optimal result, they do at least show that the processes are politically and socially acceptable ways of diagnosing problems and highlighting solutions. Two elements of the Australian experience may be harder to replicate in the Middle East and North Africa. One has been relatively weak so far in the region – coherence of policies. Yet knowledge is good and the need is pressing – and as Maynard Keynes said, In the end we will do the right thing, even if only after exhausting every possible alternative. Second, the Australian

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experience benefited from strengthened water governance arrangements. Although institutional change in water in the Middle East and North Africa has been impressive in recent years (see Chapter 4), there is still some way to go to make the kind of creative, rapid and costly institutional reforms introduced in Australia occur in the region. Nonetheless this kind of reform remains a long-term must, and the itinerary is clear, so that all incremental reforms are steps towards the long-term goal.

NOTES

Introduction

Background on the Middle East and North Africa Region

1. Sudan and Mauretania are also extremely poor. 2. World Bank 2013. 3. This issue is discussed in Chapter 1, and the trade-offs involved for policy makers are discussed in Chapter 9. 4. World Bank 2013; FAO 2001. 5. How far this environmental demand influences decisions, and what conflicts emerge, are subjects of discussion in later chapters. 6. Global warming and its effects on climate have become a major challenge for humanity. At the recent COP meeting in Paris, countries agreed to work towards a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases to limit the rise in temperature by 1.5 degrees Celsius. Achieving this goal will depend on the individual actions of all countries and in particular the major emitters such as China and the US. Climate change and its expected impacts in the region are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 7. Water scarcity issues are discussed in depth in chapters 1 and 2, and ways of improving water management and use and adapting to climate change are the subjects of chapters 4–6. 8. Water and conflict issues are discussed in full in Chapter 3. Conflict resolution is discussed in Chapter 7, and how water governance can promote peace in the region is the subject of Chapter 8. 9. See especially Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014) ‘The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution’, Middle Eastern Studies, 50:4, 521 – 35, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.850076.

Chapter 1 The Challenge of Water and Agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa and the Drivers of Water Scarcity 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

FAO 2013b: 2, 7. FAO 2001: 83-4, 87-91. FAO/IFAD 2007: 47, 49. FAO 2001: 83, IFAD/FAO 2007: 70, FAO 2010; CC1A. FAO 2013b: 2, 3. FAO 2001: 87, FAO/IFAD 2007:72; World Bank 2013: 2.

316 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

NOTES TO PAGES 20 – 41 FAO 2001: 91ff. FAO 2001: 91. IFPRI 2010. Issues of climate change and expected impacts on the farming systems of the region are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Adaptation and mitigation options and strategies are the subject of Chapter 6. This sounds a tall order, but these diversions have already begun in some countries. Jordan, for example, faced a storm of protest at the end of the 1980s when the government decided to pump fresh water from the Yarmouk/Jordan river confluence up to the highlands in order to supply water to Amman, and to compensate farmers in the Valley with a mix of fresh water and treated wastewater. This shows that it can be done – What has happened, can happen – but the move proved highly contentious and protests rumble on to this day. An accident in the 1990s that led to a dose of untreated sewage in the mix cost the Minister of Water his job. FAO 2001: 84, IFAD 2010, FAO/IFAD 2007: 67, 73. World Bank 2013. Yemen Food Security Update, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation; FAO/IFAD 2007: 66, IFAD 2010a; World Bank 2013: 2B; www.ipcinfo.org. See also Shanta Devarajan, Lili Mottaghi (2016) ‘The economic effects of war and peace’ Middle East and North Africa Quarterly Economic Brief, January, Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank 2013: 3. World Bank 2013: 19– 20. McDonnell and Ismail 2011. IFPRI 2010. Mauretania and Sudan would also fall in this category. Much of the discussion of food security and conflict is based on two key sources: (1) ‘Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks’ Cullen Hendrix, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, College of William and Mary; and Henk-Jan Brinkman, Chief of Policy, Planning and Application of the Peacebuilding Support Office in the United Nations (2015); and (2) Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014) ‘The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution’, Middle Eastern Studies, 50:4, 521 – 35, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.850076. In addition to the seminal paper by de Chaˆtel (2014), we have also used for this discussion FAO 2016. The 2009 report of the UN Secretary General Peace building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict identified five priority peace building areas: (1) basic safety and security; (2) credible and effective political processes; (3) restoration of basic services; (4) restart of core government functions; and (5) economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (e.g., in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth.

Chapter 2

Climate Change and its Expected Impacts

1. This is the key message of the Word Development Report 2010. 2. Source: World Bank (2013), Climate Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank). 3. FAO 2010a: x; FAO 2011: 5.2.4. 4. IPCC 2007; FAO 2011; FAO 2010a. Of course, whether these extra withdrawals take place depends on policies and investments.

NOTES TO PAGES 41 –78

317

5. IFPRI 2010. 6. World Bank 2007b, IFPRI 2010. IFPRI’s comprehensive series of global crop models support this assessment. See http://www.ifpri.org/publication/food-security-farming-andclimate-change-2050. 7. The projections for Syria and Iraq do not take account of the turmoil that has affected those two countries since 2013. 8. Zaman 2014; FAO 2016.

Chapter 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Water and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa

Ward 2014: Water Crisis in Yemen. Shatanawi 2005: 21. World Bank 2007:23. Shatanawi 2005: 22– 3; Bingham 1994. These perverse incentives are essentially created by the conditions of common resources: non-excludability and rivalry in consumption (Ostrom 1990, 1992). See the section on groundwater depletion in Chapter 4. World Bank 2009a Box 3 and para 140; Allan 2000; Bingham 1994: 10.74, 10.75. Ward 2010a (Nile Case Study); Yetim 2002: 313, 316. World Bank 2006; Bingham 1994: 10.67. Yetim 2002: 319. Yetim 2002: 307– 12. World Bank 2009: 12, and the Jenin case study in Annex 7 of that report. Piran 2006: 30. Ward and al-Aulaqi 2008. Piran 2006: 29. Shatanawi 2005: 22– 32. Ward, Beddies et al. 2007. World Bank 2009: 11. World Bank 2007: 16, 41. Some of the reasons why the development of sewage treatment plants has been so delayed in the Palestinian territories are explored in Chapter 7. World Bank 2009. World Bank 2007: 16; FAO Oman 2016. Shatanawi 2005: 22, 34. Mundy 1995: 23, 62, 116; Ward 2014. Ostrom 1990, 1992. Note that with groundwater, the upstream/downstream balance of power and incentives can be the opposite of that for surface water, as in this case. With groundwater, depending on the gradient and thickness of the aquifer, it may be the downstreamers who are able to appropriate water rights at the expense of upstreamers. Piran 2006. Moench 1997 in Ward and Al-Aulaqi 2008. Note that here it was the upstreamers who were able to pump out the resource at the expense of the downstreamers. Piran 2006. Ward 2009. CEDARE 2006: 18, 25. CEDARE 2006: 6, Shatanawi: 21. World Bank 2007a: xxv. World Bank 2007a: 16.

318

NOTES TO PAGES 78 –107

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

World Bank 2007a: 16. World Bank 2007a: xx1, 75, CEDARE 2006: 6. CEDARE 2006: 5 – 8. Reisner (1993). CEDARE 2006: 7 – 8. As with other discussion of the Syrian crisis in this book, much of the assessment in this section is based on the excellent work of Francesca de Chaˆtel. See Francesca de Chaˆtel (2014) ‘The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution’, Middle Eastern Studies, 50:4, 521 – 35, DOI: 10.1080/ 00263206.2013.850076. 41. de Chaˆtel 2014. 42. de Chaˆtel 2014.

Chapter 4 Policies and Institutions for Managing Water Resources for Agriculture in the Middle East and North Africa 1. On IWRM approaches to climate change adaptation and mitigation, see the detailed discussion in Chapter 6. 2. World Bank 2007a: 24; xxii; xxiv. 3. World Bank 2007a: 43– 5; World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Database. 4. World Bank 2007a: 47. 5. World Bank 2015; World Bank 2007a: 105– 106. 6. World Bank 2007a; FAO 2013b: 10. 7. This is particularly important in view of the rising level of disputes about water – see chapters 3 and 7. See also World Bank 2007a: 101. 8. FAO 2001: 121. 9. FAO/IFAD 2007: 61. 10. FAO 2003: 140 Table 4.10; FAO 2013b: 8, Doc 9. 11. Whittington, Xun and Sadoff 2005. ‘Water resources management in the Nile Basin: the economic value of cooperation’. Water Policy 7 (2005) pp. 227 – 52; World Bank 2006a; FAO 2011. 12. FAO 2010a: x, FAO 2011: 5.2.4. 13. FAO 2016. 14. Further examples of the use of treated wastewater for forestry are given in Chapter 5. See FAO 2009:5a. 15. ICARDA 2007: 80–5; World Bank 2009. 16. Issues of drainage and drainage water reuse are discussed in full in Chapter 5. 17. McDonnell and Ismail 2011; Taha and Ismail 2010, Taha et al. 2005; FAO 2011a; World Bank 2006a: 177; Abou-Hadid 2007: 62A; ICARDA 2007: 86 – 90. 18. World Bank 2006a: 110. 19. World Bank 2006a: 108– 14. 20. See Steven Plant: ‘Water policy in Israel’, Policy Studies, Vol. 47, July 2000. Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, and Nir Kedmi; Discussion Paper ‘Integrated water resources management’, Economics and Standard Division. Ministry of the Environment (undated). 21. World Bank 2006a: 13. 22. World Bank 2007a: 71– 2. 23. World Bank 2007a: 13.

NOTES TO PAGES 108 –147

319

Chapter 5 Water Use Efficiency and Crop Water Productivity in Agricultural Water Management in the Middle East and North Africa 1. This measure, just one of several ways to express water use efficiency, is sometimes called, in the opaque lexicon of specialists, ‘effective efficiency’. See IWMI 2007: 139. 2. IWMI 2007: 119, 295. See also the Morocco water accounting case study conducted as part of the FAO Regional Initiative; Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Morocco Case Study: 25, Table 2. 3. FAO 2013a. Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity: Case Study for Morocco. 4. FAO 2013a. Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity: Tunisia Country Paper: 6 – 7, 33 – 5. 5. IWMI 2007: 301, 280; FAO 2016 (Oman). 6. CIHEAM/FAO 2013. 7. WaterWatch 2011: Doukkala local study on yield gaps. 8. The measure ‘CWP irrigation water’ measures productivity attributable to irrigation water only, after removing rainfall. 9. CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 29. 10. WaterWatch 2011. 11. See below, Planning for irrigation modernization, for a discussion of what modernization may entail. 12. CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 22. 13. FAO 2012b: 11– 13. 14. CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 29, 34. 15. CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 34ff; World Bank 2006a: 157. 16. FAO 2012b: 13. 17. CIHEAM/FAO 2013: 35. 18. Abou-Hadid 2012: 60, 116. 19. World Bank 2006a: 165. 20. World Bank 2006a: 136; van Steenbergen 2002. 21. FAO 2012a. 22. FAO 2012a. 23. Abou-Hadid 2012: 61. 24. The governance and incentives issues and options are also discussed in Chapter 4. 25. This section assesses the situation in Yemen prior to the crises which have wracked the country over the last several years. For more detail on Yemen and groundwater see Christopher Ward: The Water Crisis in Yemen (2015). 26. For renewable energy in Oman, see FAO 2016. 27. FAO 2001: 82– 4. 28. IWMI 2007: 336– 7; Oweis and Taimeh 1996. 29. FAO 2011: 5.3.4. 30. FAO 2011: 5.3.1. 31. IWMI 2007: 344. 32. World Bank 2008b. 33. FAO 2013b (Regional Initiative: Morocco Country Paper: 26); World Bank 2008b. 34. FAO 2006. 35. World Bank 2008b: Box 41; Pagiola and Platais 2006. 36. World Bank 2008b: Box 42; Pagiola and Platais 2006. 37. ICARDA 2007: 16. 38. ICARDA 2007: 11–14. 39. ICARDA 2007: 18.

320

NOTES TO PAGES 148 –171

40. See the section in Chapter 4 on Non-conventional sources of water for some of the techniques involved and their application in the region. 41. ICARDA 2007: 70. 42. FAO 2016. 43. ICARDA 2007: 73; Abou-Hadid 2012: 66–7. 44. The discussion on drainage is based largely on a study Christopher Ward wrote for the World Bank – World Bank 2006a – and draws extensively on the work of the doyen of Egyptian drainage practice, Dr Safwat Abdel Dayem. 45. Abou-Hadid 2012: 67; FAO 2011: 155. 46. For a full discussion of the IWRM approach, see Chapter 4 passim. 47. Abou-Hadid 2012: 62. 48. World Bank 2006a: 174– 5; Abou-Hadid 2012: 62. 49. World Bank 2006a: 167– 70.

Chapter 6 Adapting to Climate Change and Ensuring Food Security 1. Scandizzo and Paolantonio 2010. 2. World Bank 2013: 6 – 9. 3. This discussion draws on a paper written by Christopher Ward for FAO’s 2011 publication The State of Land and Water. 4. See the discussion in Water in the drylands in Chapter 5. 5. FAO 2001: 87– 91; FAO/IFAD 2007; World Bank 2013. 6. On this thorny topic, see the discussion below in the section Food security and climate change. 7. FAO/IFAD 2007: 50. 8. McDonnell and Ismail 2011; IFAD 2008; IFAD 2010a. 9. FAO 2010a. 10. FAO 2011a. 11. FAO 2013b. 12. See Strategic preparedness in Chapter 2. 13. FAO 2013b: Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Tunisia Country Paper: 5 – 6. 14. The climate change agenda in Lebanon and Jordan is well described in Increasing Resilience to Climate Change in the Agricultural Sector of the Middle East: The Cases of Jordan and Lebanon (World Bank 2013) on which this discussion is based. 15. FAO 2010a; Clements et al. 2011; FAO 2010a; FAO 2013b Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity – Tunisia Country Paper. 16. Allen 2000. 17. FAO 2001: 117– 18; McDonnell and Ismail 2011. 18. FAO/IFAD 2007: 58. 19. FAO 2011; McDonnell and Ismail 2011. 20. FAO 2011; FAO 2015. 21. FAO 2011. 22. Note that ‘business as usual’ incudes a trend increase in emissions, so that some small reduction targets may still imply an increase in emissions. 23. FAO 2011. 24. FAO 2011: 44 5.5. 25. IFPRI 2010. 26. Magnan, N et al. 2011, Lampietti et al. 2011. 27. Lampietti et al. 2011; McDonnell and Ismail 2011; IFPRI 2010.

NOTES TO PAGES 173 –226

321

28. Yemen Food Security Update January 2016, Yemen Food Security Information System, MoPIC. 29. Although this section focusses on Syria and its neighbours, much of the discussion could apply to other conflict-torn countries in the region, particularly Yemen. 30. McDonnell and Ismail 2011. 31. Chapter 8 of this book will discuss how actions on natural resources, particularly water, may contribute to peace building. In anticipation of that discussion, this section touches briefly on some of the issues involved. 32. The others are: basic safety and security; political processes; basic services; and core government functions.

Chapter 7 Water Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20.

These are key messages from the discussion of water-related conflict in Chapter 3. CEDARE: 18. World Bank 2007a: 74; Ward 2014. As of 2016, construction of a new Hebron wastewater treatment plant is being financed by the World Bank. Source: World Bank 2009a. ‘Water resources management in the Nile Basin: The economic value of cooperation’, Dale Whittington, Xun Wu and Claudia Sadoff. Water Policy 7 (2005), pp. 227 – 52. Much of this discussion is based on the excellent paper by Ana Cascao (Cascao 2009), and also on Ward 2010 (Nile Case Study). Cascao 2009. Ward 2010. See World Bank 2005 Strategic Framework for Managing International Watercourses in Iraq. Ward 2010. The Permanent Indus Commission consists of two Commissioners, one appointed by Pakistan and the other by India, who are the unique supreme representatives of their governments. Decisions can only be taken by joint agreement. Differences and disputes are referred to experts for advice or to a Court of Arbitration. Postel 2001; World Bank 2006a. Much of this section is based on the excellent Chatham House research paper The Euphrates in Crisis: Channels of Cooperation for a Threatened River by M. Nouar Shamout with Glada Lahn, April 2015. ISIS: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’. Wakala News (2013), ‘Risks resulting from blowing the Euphrates dam’, http://www. shahbapress.com/news/521; Almayadeen News Agency (2014), ‘Information about the intention of ISIS militia of blowing AlBaath and AlForat Dams on the Euphrates in north Syria’, 13 September 2014, http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/news quoted in Shamout 2015. Alalam News Agency (2014), ‘Dehydration and flooding are the new weapons of ISIS in Iraq’, 7 April 2014. http://www.alalam.ir/news/1583141 quoted in Shamout 2015. Dearden, L. (2014), ‘Iraq crisis: Why is the Mosul dam so important and how could it kill half a million people?’, Independent, 19 August 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/middle-east/iraq-crisis-why-is-the-mosul-dam-so-important-and-how-couldit-kill-halfa-million-people-9677923.html quoted in Shamout 2015. World Bank 2007a: 22ff, 43– 55. FAO 2014b: 19– 21; Zaman 2014; FAO 2014a: 19 –21; Zekri 2008.

322

NOTES TO PAGES 227 –241

21. Ward, Beddies et al. 2007; Zeitoun 2009: 39, World Bank 2007: xxvi, 12; Ward 2014: 107. See also Chapter 4 on this case. 22. See World Bank 2007: 22– 3. One approach is to set up water courts. These exist in a number of countries, including the specialized water courts of Colorado in the US, and the Water Tribunal of the plain of Valencia in Spain. 23. World Bank 2007: 22ff, 43– 55. 24. Turton and Lichtenthaler 2002. 25. Ward and Al-Aulaqi 2008. 26. Tutundjian, S. 2012. Groundwater Governance Project: A Global Framework for Action. Third Regional Consultation, Arab States region, 8 –10 October 2012, Amman, Jordan. Regional Consultation Report, [email protected]. 27. Ward, Beddies et al. 2007: 27, Zeitoun 2009: 27. 28. van Steenbergen, 2002; World Bank 2006a. 29. Ward, Beddies et al. 2007. 30. Tutundjian, S. 2012. Groundwater Governance Project: A Global Framework for Action. Third Regional Consultation, Arab States region, 8 –10 October 2012, Amman, Jordan. Regional Consultation Report, [email protected]. 31. Tutundjian, S. 2012. 32. Zeitoun 2009: 5.

Chapter 8 Beyond Conflict Resolution: Peacebuilding Through Water Governance in the Middle East and North Africa 1. This chapter is an adaptation of Sandra Ruckstuhl, Enabling Environmental Peacebuilding: An Analysis of Products and Factors in Four Project Cases, (PhD diss., George Mason University, 2010). The discussion builds on the data, preliminary findings, models and typologies that were developed from that research project. Subsequent research and analysis on environmental peacebuilding and development operations in the water sector were also used to refine the original findings. 2. Giordano, et al. 2005: 47. 3. Johan Galtung defines violence as ‘avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible’ (1990: 292). Direct violence is infliction of physical harm. Structural violence is inflicted through institutions, laws and social structures that prevent people from reaching their potential. Cultural violence are those ‘aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence’ (1990, p. 291). Having distinguished between direct and structural violence, Galtung developed parallel conceptions of positive and negative peace (1969). Negative peace represents the absence of direct violence. Positive peace is the absence of structural (and cultural) violence, a state of social justice. Negative peace can exist without positive peace. According to Galtung’s models of violence, conflict and peace, we end direct violence by ending conflict behavior, cultural violence by changing attitudes, and structural violence by removing structural contradictions (actual or perceived incompatibility of goals) and injustices. 4. Lederach 1997, 84. 5. Wolf, et al. 2005; Sadoff and Grey 2002 and 2005; Carius 2007. Conca and Dabelko (2002) have used the term ‘environmental peacemaking’ in their book, while Carius (2007), Ali (2007), and Kyrou (2007), in addition to organizations such as EcoPeace

NOTES TO PAGES 241 – 270

6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

323

Middle East, have used the term ‘environmental peacebuilding’. The two concepts are used to mean the same thing, and are used interchangeably in follow-on literature. Subsequently, we consider them part and parcel of one another, though we prefer to use the term ‘environmental peacebuilding’ in our writing. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Context factors are significant to project design in that because they are exogenous they are less in the control of project designers and implementers, and thus their consideration in project planning may be interpreted as ‘risk management.’ A difficult security regime can mean a difficult working environment, which can deter third party engagement. For example, the evolving security regime in the West Bank has created multiple layers of bureaucracy that constrain engagement and can slow or even prevent investments and project implementation. High transaction costs associated with managing complex logistics within the security regime create a disincentive to third party engagement, and can reduce the perceived value of environmental resources. Programme staff working on the implementation of the Good Water Neighbours project said: ‘Delays make things harder. Some projects need authorization from Israelis or the Palestinian Authority, and others can have the OK from mayors [. . .] The security regime becomes an obstacle, a deterrent for donors who are looking for “quick wins” and good stories to take back home to their budget offices. This means environmental problems are not the donor’s priority. As the security regime gets harder, the projects focus on the easy issues. “Environment” here is not easy’ (Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008). Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. The barrier, also referred to as ‘the wall’ or the ‘security fence’, is a barrier constructed by the Israeli Defense Force to ‘provide security to Israelis’, according to Israeli policy makers, by preventing the movement of Palestinians into Israeli territory. The barrier’s construction has social, economic, political and environmental implications, and thus is controversial for several reasons. Among these is that the wall cuts into Palestinian Territory in the West Bank (referencing the 1949 Armistice Green Line) and thus by default annexes approximately 9.5% of Palestinian West Bank land to Israel (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2009, 4). Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Water Sector Development, Washington, DC: World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, Sustainable Development Department, 2009. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. July 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008.

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28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008. Donors set time limits for funding, which can impact opportunities for funded interventions to enable peacebuilding. An EcoPeace Middle East staff member explains: ‘Donors have different timelines and guidelines. Peacebuilding is longer term than 1 – 2 years, which is the funding cycle for some of the donors and many foundations. This is not enough time to change the attitude of locals and to build trust. The EU has a longer-term timeframe, which is better for peacebuilding’ (Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008.). However, a long time horizon is also understood as a double-edged sword in which donor dependence can result, particularly if the parties are not sufficiently empowered to work together independent of a facilitating party, or if first party capacity is not built to ensure collaborative efforts are financially sustainable. 40. Ruckstuhl, Sandra. Interview. August 2008.

Chapter 9

An Agenda for Change

1. In 2009, the Arab economic summit in Kuwait requested the Arab Ministerial Council for Water (AMCW) to develop a water security strategy to meet the challenges and future needs for development. The Arab Centre for the Study of the Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD) worked with the Technical Secretariat of the AMCW to prepare a draft strategy in coordination with member states and regional and international organisations. The resulting Arab Strategy for Water Security was adopted by a special session of the AMCW on 15 – 16 June 2011, and was approved as a guidance document by the Arab Summit in Baghdad on 29 March 2012. The Arab Strategy for Water Security aims at three objectives: (1) improving water services for drinking, agriculture and sanitation; (2) protecting shared water rights, promoting cooperation on shared water, and supporting implementation of MDG and SDG commitments on water; and (3) institutional development and capacity building, research, awareness and participation. 2. FAO 2001: 117– 18; McDonnell and Ismail 2011. 3. IWMI 2007: 280– 1. 4. World Bank 2007a: 74. 5. This section draws heavily on the work of Ken Mathews AO, former Chairman and CEO, Australian National Water Commission and is adapted in part from his presentation Water Reform in Australia – the Key Success Factors, a presentation by Ken Matthews, 8 June 2011, [email protected].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

aflaj, 29– 31 agricultural heritage 29– 31, 169 agriculture carbon footprint of, 169– 70 and climate, 16– 18 and climate change, 154–82 crop water productivity, 104, 108, 284– 90 economic contribution of, 18– 20 and farming systems, 16 –18 heritage and conservation, 29 –30 high value, 125– 8 irrigated agriculture, 26 – 9 and irrigation, 26– 9, 114–24, 291– 4 managing water for, 278–83 and pressurized irrigation, 125– 9 rainfed, 137– 41 under stress, 20– 3 and water, 23– 6 water use efficiency, 104, 108, 114, 284– 90 yield gap, 114 Ain Bou Marra, 115 Aleppo, 36, 219 Amman, 68– 9, 94, 161, 262 Arab Strategy for Water Security, 279, 293

Arrabona, 62 Article 40 (Oslo Accords), 189–93 Ataturk Dam, 210, 214 Australia water reforms, 311–14 Azraq Oasis, 68 Bardala, 66 basin management, 94–6, 198, 199, 246, 280 al Batinah, 42, 68, 104 El Bsissi, 230–1 Chad, 52 change management creating momentum, 310–14 deciding trade-offs, 305–10 CIHEAM Bari, 124 climate change, 38–45 adaptation, 154–82 farmer adaptation, 154–5 and farming systems, 156–8 and food security, 176–81 and livelihood strategies, 159–60 mitigation, 169–70 regional and international dimensions, 165–8 strategies for, 161–4 and Syria, 176–81

336

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

conflict, water, 46– 84 causes of, 239 conflict trajectory (conflict escalation), 240 example of, 46 factors exacerbating, 76– 9, 239 local level, 70 –5 national level, 60– 9 nature of, 47– 8 reasons for, 49 – 51 structural violence, 248, 251, 322 Syrian crisis, 80– 4, 302 transboundary water, 57 – 60 typology of, 52– 6 conflict resolution, water, 183–238, 298– 301 the Euphrates, 210–19 the Nile, 193– 207, 247, 249, 262, 263 transboundary waters, 188–219 West Bank aquifers, 189–92, 256, 271 within nations, 220– 37 cost recovery, 106, 122 country profiles, 2 – 4 crop water productivity (CWP), 111, 116, 284 Cyclone Guno, 42 Damascus, 36, 80, 214 Dara’a, 36 Dardara, 115 Dashta, 72 Dead Sea, 68, 242, 259, 262; see also Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasability Study demand for water, 77, 224 demand management, 40, 105, 144, 176, 215, 217, 224, 226

incentive framework, 104 demographic pressures, 7 desalination, 97 desertification, 148, 289–90 Dez, 115 Dhofar, 136, 148 al Dhunaib, 74 Disi Aquifer, 52, 69 Doukkala, 115, 117, 127 drainage, 100, 149–53, 290–1, DRAINFRAME, 151 drought, 81–3, 148, 312 drylands, 18, 24, 45, 137, 139, 147–8, 156, 166 Dublin Principles, 89, 92, 188, 214, 278 Egypt agriculture, 18–25, 41 –2 climate change, 168 conflict, 6, 52, 58 –9, 184–9, 193–208 cost recovery, 122 country profile, 2–4 drainage, 100, 150–3, 290–1 drylands, 147 farm incomes, 159 food security, 25, 31–5, 171, 175, 306 forestry, 147–8 integrated water resource management (IWRM), 92 –3 irrigation, 26 –30 modernization, 115–20 pressurized irrigation, 125–30 rainfed, 139 reuse of water, 98, 150–3, 290–1 transboundary, 7, 28, 97, 193–208, 300

INDEX

water governance, 92 water resources, 7, 14– 19, 29 water user associations (WUAs), 95, 104, 229– 31 Eisenhower, Dwight, 185 Euphrates, 208– 19, 299– 300 European Union (EU), 22 Fallujah, 219 farming systems, 18 food security and agricultural water management, 31– 6 and climate change, 170–81, 303– 6 food self-sufficiency, 305– 6 forestry, 147– 8, 290 GARWSP, 75 Gaza, 68, 261 Gharb, 92 Ghom, 74 Ghor Canal, 147 Global Water Partnership (GWP), 88 groundwater depletion, 100– 3 outlook, 229– 30 sustainable irrigation, 129–36 Hadda, 222 Hama, 82 Hamadan, 72 ICARDA, 139, 166 Idleb, 82 IFAD, 100 incentives, 105– 7 INDH, 96 integrated water resource management (IWRM), 88–93

337

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 167 International Centre for Bio-saline Agriculture (ICBA), 100, 166 intifada/sewage intifada, 67 Iran agriculture, 18–25 climate change, 168–9 conflict, 62 –3, 74, 311 country profile, 2–4 food security, 31, 175, 306 groundwater, 72 irrigation, 26 –30, 92, 97 modernization, 115–20 pressurized irrigation, 126–36 rainfed, 28 transboundary, 52, 212 water governance, 92, 184, water resources, 14 –19, 28 Iraq agriculture, 29 climate change, 42, 168–9 conflict, 6, 34, 183 country profile, 2–4 drainage, 152 drought, 81, 83 Euphrates, 208–19, 299–300 food security, 179, 302 incentives, 105 irrigation, 30 marshland, 268 peacebuilding, 268 post-conflict, 179, 302 refugees, 6 transboundary, 7, 28, 52, 58 –9, 69, 153, 208–18, 299–300 water resources, 14 –19, 29 ‘weaponization’, 219–20 irrigation modernization, 114–24 new approaches, 291–4

338

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

pressurized irrigation, 125– 36 in the region, 26– 8 and water efficiency, 114 and the yield gap, 114, 116– 18 ISIS, 219– 20 Israel governance, 104 Mekorot, 189 National Water Carrier, 187 transboundary, 52, 57 – 62, 66– 8, 99, 183, 185– 93, 216 Jabal Sabr, 46 Jenin, 61 Jevons paradox, 104 Johnston Plan, 185–9 Joint Water Council (JWC), 190– 3 Jordan agriculture, 18– 25, 282 climate change, 161, 163 climate change adaptation, 164, 168 conflict, 6, 52, 66, 68, 69, 184 cost recovery, 122 country profile, 2 – 4 demand for water, 77, 224 drought, 82– 3 drylands, 147 farm incomes, 159 groundwater, 101– 3, 136, 224, 232 irrigation, 115– 120 peacebuilding, 242, 245, 249, 256, 270– 1 post-conflict, 180 pressurized irrigation, 125– 30 rainfed, 138 ‘Red-Dead’, 262 refugees, 69 reuse of water, 66

transboundary, 52, 59 –60, 184–9, 215 virtual water, 165, 308 water governance, 92, 94 water pricing, 65, 105–6 water resources, 14 –19, 29, 66 Jordan River, 68 Kajbar Dam, 58 al Kareefah, 74 Keban Dam, 57 Khabur River, 68 Kuwait, 232 agriculture, 18–25 climate change, 168 country profile, 2–4 water governance, 242 water resources, 14 –19 Kyrgyzstan, 217 Lake Nasser, 40 Lausanne Treaty, 213 Lebanon agriculture, 18–25, 105 climate change, 40 –2, 156, 161–2, 168–9 climate change adaptation, 156 country profile, 2–4 drought, 81 food security, 31 –5 forestry, 146 modernization, 115–20 refugees, 6 reuse of water, 99 transboundary, 185 water resources, 14 –19, 97, 281 Libya climate change, 168 conflict, 4, 6, 52, 60 country profile, 2–4 food security, 31

INDEX

Great Man-Made River (GMMR), 148 groundwater, 130 transboundary, 60 water resources, 14 –19 Loukkos, 92 marshland, 268 al Marzooh, 46 MASCOTTE, 123– 5, 286 Matruh, 139, 148 Merowe Dam, 58 Middle East and North Africa country profiles, 1 – 4 trends, 2 – 5 water resources and management, 6 – 10 Mit Yazid, 115 modernization, 114– 25, 286 Monshahat, 115 Morocco agriculture, 18– 25 basin management, 94– 6 climate change, 40 –2 climate change adaptation, 156, 168 conflict, 188 cost recovery, 106 country profile, 2 – 4 crop water productivity, 116 desertification, 148 drought, 312 farm incomes, 159 food security, 31 –5, 170– 1, 175, 306 groundwater, 101– 3 irrigation, 26 – 28 modernization, 114– 20 Oued Lakhdar, 142– 4 participation, 96 pastoral, 148

339

Plan Vert Maroc, 165, 172 pressurized irrigation, 126–36 public/private partnership, 106 rainfed, 30, 115 reuse of water, 98 supply side measures, 281 water resources, 14 –19, 29 water savings, 109–10 watershed management, 142–4 Mosul Dam, 219 Mountain Aquifer, 59 Mubarak, Hosni, 58 New Delta Project, 58 Nile, 193–208 Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, 52, 60 Oman aflaj, 29– 31 agriculture, 97, 112, 159 agricultural heritage, 29 –31 climate change, 42, 174 climate change adaptation, 164, 168–9 country profile, 2–4 desertification, 148 drought, 148 groundwater, 68, 136, 187, 225 Jevons paradox, 104 pastoral, 148–9 pressurized irrigation, 136 rainfed, 138 reuse of water, 98 –9 transboundary, 52 water governance, 136 water resources, 14 –19 ORMVA, 65 Oued Lakhdar, 96, 142–4 Palestine agriculture, 18–25

340

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

conflict, 47, 183 country profile, 2 – 4 drought, 81, 83 food security, 31 –5 transboundary, 15, 52, 57, 59 –62, 66, 67, 189– 93, 299– 300 water governance, 242 Paris Agreement, 167 participation, 95 – 6, 107, 227 pastoral, 148– 9 Payment for Environmental Services (PES), 140, 145– 6, 157, 168 peacebuilding, 239– 75, 303– 5 capacities (that promote), 243– 51 and collaborative water governance, 237– 75 context (that promotes), 251– 60 definition, 240– 2 engagement between parties, 243, 244 environmental peacebuilding, 240– 2 explicitness about peacebuilding, 274– 5 Good Water Neighbors Project, 242, 244– 75 institutional capacities (that promote), 245– 7, 249–50 Lederach’s Peacebuilding Hierarchy, 267 operational approaches (that promote), 252, 260– 75 organizational capacities (that promote), 247– 9, 250– 1 peacebuilding strategy process, 243

positive peace, 240–1, 243, 244, 247, 251, 253, 269, 275, 304, 322 practicalities (of promoting), 243, 251–60 Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study, 242, 244–75 water conflict escalation, 240 water conflict trajectory, 240 ‘Pepsi’, 127 Plan Maroc Vert, 128, 145, 165, 171 post-conflict, 34–6, 176–81, 302–3 poverty, 24 –6 protection (trade), 307 public/private partnership (PPP), 93, 106, 223–4, 279 qat, 134, 175, 223, 306 Quradah, 46–7 rainfed, 30, 115, 138–9, 281 Ramsar Convention, 68 Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Feasibility Study (RDCS), 246–9, 262 refugees, 6, 69, 271 regulation, 224 reuse of water, 66, 98–9, 150–3, 290–1 RICCAR, 166 Roseires Dam, 58 Saiss, 101, 103 Salaam Canal, 58 Salheia, 104, 231–2 salinization, 149–53 Sana’a, 94 Saudi Arabia (KSA) agriculture, 106, 133, 282

INDEX

climate change, 169 country profile, 2 – 4 drainage, 153 groundwater, 28, 129– 32, 187 incentives, 107 irrigation, 30 pressurized irrigation, 126 transboundary, 52, 58, 213 water resources, 14 –19, 28 Sharon, Ariel, 67 Sirjan Project, 63 Souss, 101, 103 South Asia, 14 South-East Anatolia Project (GAP), 210 Sudan climate change, 168 conflict, 58, 97 country profile, 1 – 4 transboundary, 97, 195– 6, 199– 201, 205, 300 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), 121 supply management supply-side measures, 96, 281 Syria agriculture, 18– 25, 29 climate change, 42, 169 climate change adaptation, 156, 160 conflict, 4, 6, 9, 34– 6, 58, 80– 3, 183, 302 country profile, 2 – 4 drainage, 149, 153, 290, drylands, 139, 166 food security, 31, 34, 176–81, 303 irrigation, 30 modernization, 115, 123 post-conflict, 34 – 6, 176– 81, 302– 3

341

pressurized irrigation, 126, 130 prospects, 302 rainfed, 138 refugees, 6, 69, 271 transboundary, 7, 15, 52, 57 –60, 185–218, 299–300 water resources, 14 –19, 97 water use efficiency, 120 ‘weaponization’, 219–20 Ta’iz, 62, 73, 74, 94, 188, 222–3, 311 terms of trade, 23 terrorism, 6 al Thawra Dam, 57, 213 Tigris, 36, 40 Tishrin Dam, 80 trade-offs, 305–10 transboundary water and conflict, 7, 28, 52, 58, 97, 189–219, 299–300 Euphrates, 210–19 Nile, 193–207 West Bank aquifers, 189–92 Tubas, 66 Tunisia agriculture, 18–25 climate change adaptation, 163 cost recovery, 106 country profile, 2–4 desertification, 148 drainage, 152 forestry, 147 GDP contribution, 25 irrigation, 26 –8 modernization, 114–20, 125, 286 participation, 95–6 pastoral, 148 pressurized irrigation, 126–36 terms of trade, 23 terrorism, 6

342

WATER SCARCITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

reuse of water, 98 water resources, 14 –19 water savings, 109– 11 water use efficiency, 110– 11 water user associations (WUAs), 230 Umm al Ruduma Aquifer, 52 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 189, 214, 218 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 69 virtual water, 165, 308 Wadi Bani Khawlan, 52, 60, 72, 188, 223 Wadi Dahr, 71 Wadi Fukhin, 250, 255, 271 Wadi Kabir, 232 water efficiency, 104, 108– 13 improving efficiency, 284– 90 surface irrigation, 114– 24 water governance, 91– 4, 136, 229– 30 collaborative governance, 244– 51 peacebuilding, 239– 75 water pricing, 65, 105–6 water productivity, 104, 108– 13 closing the yield gap, 114– 24 improving crop water productivity, 284– 90 water resources, 6 – 10, 13– 19, 28– 9, 66 basin approach, 93– 4 and decentralization, 94 drivers of scarcity, 36– 7 and dryland agriculture, 18, 24, 45, 137, 139, 147– 8, 156

groundwater, 100–3, 129–36 integrated water resources management (IWRM), 88 –90, 93 and participation, 94 and subsidiarity, 94 water savings, 109–11 water use efficiency, 108–11, 120 water user associations (WUAs), 78, 95, 104, 229–31 waterlogging, 149–53 watershed management, 142–8 ‘weaponization’ of water, 219–20 al Wehda Dam, 57 West Bank, 99 peacebuilding, 242, 244–75 World Trade Organization (WTO), 20–1, 283 Yarmouk, 15, 52, 57, 59 Yemen, agriculture, 18–25 basin management, 94–6 change management, 311 climate change, 155 climate change adaptation, 155–6, 168–9 conflict, 4, 6, 34, 46 –50, 57, 62, 65, 68, 71–2, 74–5, 183–4, 188, 221–3, 232, 264 country profile, 1–4 farm incomes, 165 food security, 31 –3, 170–6, 306 groundwater, 101, 130–6, 229–30, 282 irrigation, 26 –30 participation, 107, 227 peacebuilding, 264 post-conflict, 302 poverty, 24 –6

INDEX

pressurized irrigation, 126 public/private partnership, 223– 4 rainfed, 138, 281 refugees, 6 regulation, 224 reuse of water, 99 transboundary, 52

343

water conflict, 46 water governance, 92, 229–30 water pricing, 105 water resources, 14 –19 water user associations (WUAs), 78 Zarqa, 68–9