Was there a Lutheran Metaphysics?: The interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism 9783666550379, 9783525550373, 9783647550374

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REFO500 Academic Studies

Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis In co-operation with Marianne Carbonnier, Günter Frank, Bruce Gordon, Ute Lotz-Heumann, Mathijs Lamberigts, Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer, Tarald Rasmussen, Johannes Schilling, Günther Wassilowsky, Siegrid Westphal Volume 2

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2012, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550373 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550374

Joar Haga

Was there a Lutheran Metaphysics? The interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2012, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550373 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550374

MF Norwegian School of Theology Gydas vei 4 PO Box 5144 Majorstuen 0302 Oslo NORWAY

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-525-55037-3 ISBN 978-3-647-55037-4 (E-Book) Ó 2012, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen/ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht LLC, Bristol, CT, U.S.A. www.v-r.de All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Printed and bound in Germany by e CPI BuchBücher.de, Birkach Printed on non-aging paper.

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Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Choice of theme and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some definitions and reflections on method . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 13 17

Luther’s new interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The role of Christology in Luther’s understanding of salvation The great Christological disputations 1539 – 1540 . . . . . . . Summary : Luther’s Christology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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21 21 64 88

Melanchthon’s diverging solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . Melanchthon’s dismissal of communicatio idiomatum Melanchthon’s method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Melanchthon’s interpretation of Colossians 3:1 – 5 . . . Melanchthon’s notion of presence . . . . . . . . . . . Summary : Melanchthon’s alternative . . . . . . . . . .

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. 91 . 91 . 93 . 94 . 96 . 112

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Communicatio idiomatum in Lutheran thought between the reformer and the Formula of Concord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidation on the left: “Consensus Tigurinus” (1549) . . . . . . Lutheran critique of the “Consensus Tigurinus” . . . . . . . . . . . Christology and cosmology : The definition of presence by Brenz . Jacob Schegk: a philosophical evaluation of the Württemberg Christology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Martin Chemnitz and his voluntary ubiquity . . . . . . . . . . . . The Formula of Concord – a hybrid construction? . . . . . . . . . Critique of the Formula: The Helmstedt theologians and Johannes Kepler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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115 115 116 121 130

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145 154 156 171

. 178 . 209

The controversy between Giessen and Tübingen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

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Contents

Prelude: A report from Saxony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Balthasar Mentzer and his view of the presence of Christ The response from Tübingen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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216 218 239 267

Was there a Lutheran metaphysics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Index rerum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Index personae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

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Acknowledgements The present work is a slightly altered PhD thesis, submitted on October 2010 to The Lutheran School of Theology, MF (Oslo), and defended April 2011. Günter Frank, Oddvar Johan Jensen and Jan Schumacher formed the examination committee. Thank you for your effort! Thanks to my institution, The Lutheran School of Theology, MF. It has a supportive academic environment and a flexible administration which provided me an excellent place for research. Some people have been particularly important for my work: Oswald Bayer suggested the theme. Ivar Asheim and Oddvar Johan Jensen read an early outline. A special word of thanks goes to my external supervisor and Doktorvater, Walter Sparn – that brilliant mind – who taught me theology and shared of his vast knowledge of Early Modern thought. My supervisor Bernt Oftestad deserves a special word of gratitude. After all, he understood what I needed: Some vital suggestions, a critical reading and above all, freedom. That old champion of orthodox Lutheranism, Jörg Baur, read the final chapter. Marius and Angela Mjaaland, provided me hospitality during the many visits to Oslo. Marius Mjaaland read a few pages, too. Sivert Angel and B”rd Norheim read parts of the manuscript. Sascha Salatowsky shared with me his profound knowledge of Early Modern theology and philosophy. Thanks to the librarians at various libraries in Norway and Germany : The Lutheran School of Theology in Oslo, the School of Mission and Theology in Stavanger, Erlangen Universitätsbibliothek, Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Frankesche Stiftungen in Halle, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität in Jena, Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen and Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen. Finally : The work would not have been possible without a large effort from my closest Family : My father who looked – and looks – after my cows and the rest of my farm, and my mother who took more than her fair share of our labor. Most of all, thanks to my wife Britt Marit. In times full of other things to do, she held that free-wheelin’ space needed for research open for me. Oslo, November 2011

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Joar Haga

© 2012, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550373 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550374

Preface An intensive study of the Christology of Luther and the Lutheran theologians of the early modern period is still controversial, at least if one expects relevant theological insights. Although hardly anyone would seriously repeat Harnack’s judgement on Luther’s “horrible speculations about the ubiquity of the Body of Christ”1, it is nevertheless undeniable that in the so-called “Luther Renaissance” of the 20th Century, the Christological expressions of the Reformer were only hinted at by one of its last proponents.2 Not to mention the reservations blocking any fruitful reception of “the complete nonsense”3 of Christology in High Orthodoxy. Even the praiseworthy study by Marc Lienhard avoided what was commonly regarded as a suspect form of Docetism by Luther.4 Instead, he presented a picture of Christ which was adapted to common sense and Christian normality. The difficulties alluded to here, namely to represent the breadth and radical meaning of the Christological insights of Lutheran Christology in a nonattenuated way, are to be taken seriously. The severity of the problem F. Ch. Baur 1843 formulated as follows: “The Godman as taught by the Church includes an irresolvable contradiction in itself”5, since the contrast “between reason and faith” is stated as insurmountable.6 This implies, however, “the decision to return to” a historically superseded “position.”7 According to this verdict the only possible solution would be either the Hegelianizing change of Christology – “in the reasoning of the subject, a unity between finitude and infinity is formed, because the subject is just as knowing an infinite”.8 Or : a variety of idealized “Jesuslogies”, which turns the poor rabbi from Nazareth into the standard-bearer of their own humanitarian enlightenment. 1 Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 3, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1932), 875. 2 Gerhard Ebeling, Art. Luther II. Theologie, in RGG3, Band 4, 1960, Sp. 513, at the bottom; Sp. 516, last paragraph. 3 Friedrich Loofs, Art. Kenosis, in Protestantische Realenzyklopedie, Band 10, 1901, 262, 25 f. 4 “Il faut ¦galement se demander dans quelle mesure il peut ¦viter l’accusation de doc¦tisme, si une propri¦t¦ divine telle que l’ubiquit¦ est attribu¦e — la nature humaine.” Marc Lienhard, Luther Temon de J¦sus-Christ, (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1973), 357. 5 F. Ch. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes, Dritter Theil, (Tübingen: C.S. Osiander, 1843), 999. 6 op.cit. 7 op.cit. 8 op.cit.

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Preface

In the present work, Joar Haga documents for an English speaking audience that F. Ch. Baur’s claimed decision must not lead into the cul-de-sac of pious fantasies, or to the rocky desert of orthodox hard heads.9 For the rock of contradiction, that stumbling block of reason’s possibilities, is not an irrational revelation phenomenon which in turn is streamlined into dogma. It concerns the fact that finite subjects cannot be constituted through themselves, either as individuals or as a collective. Although this is evident to modern consciousness, it is still a disputed circumstance. The Lutheran Christological tradition – even in its diversity of internal tensions – would have a particular offer, namely to be read as the determination of the person and story of Jesus Christ as the new location of human constitution by the executive unreserved communication. Göttingen, Oktober 2011

9 op.cit.

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Jörg Baur

Introduction In his influential systematic theology, the father of modern Protestant theology, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834), stated that Martin Luther’s interpretation of Christ’s two natures was “alien” to genuine Reformation thought. According to him, Luther’s account of the Chalcedonian dogma should be left behind to history.1 Around one hundred years later, the towering figure of the history of dogma, Adolph von Harnack (1851 – 1930), could even claim that parts of Luther’s Christology equalled “the worst phantasies of the nominalist sophists” and had set the Reformation back by two hundred years.2 What appalled these thinkers the most was Luther’s doctrine of Christ’s omnipresent body, the so-called ubiquity. They followed Immanuel Kant in his rejection of metaphysics – and theology, for that matter – as having any role outside the moral sphere. Luther had, after all, rejected the scholastic theology with its implied Aristotelian metaphysics, and replaced philosophy’s role in theology with the teaching of the Bible. Luther did indeed reject some aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics and its role in theology. But in his work as a theologian of Holy Scripture, Luther did not leave the metaphysical problems unanswered by confining himself to an otherworldly fideism. Instead he grappled with the hard questions of reality. In many ways, it is possible to claim that, as a theologian of Scripture, Luther sharpened these problems. He insisted on the enduring presence of an incarnated God in Christ as a theological given fact. This reality of the incarnation could not be taken away or abstracted, as the Eucharistic controversy with Zwingli revealed. When challenged, it needed a careful theological and philosophical treatment. Moreover, Luther’s fervent rejection of Zwingli’s solution showed the existential nerve of the question. After the controversy, at the theological negotiations of Marburg in 1529, Luther claimed that Zwingli and his followers had a different spirit. This raises the first question of this thesis: Is it really possible to claim that the questions concerning Christ’s presence are alien to the thought of Luther and of the subsequent generations of “Lutheran” theologians? That question is closely connected to the second main question of this thesis, namely how Christ is present in the world? It seems that the sheer complexity of the verb “to be” in its present tense, when applied to Christ in connection with the sacrament, places Luther under an obligation to reveal 1 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube: Nach den Grundsatzen der Evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange Dargestellt (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1999), §97,5. 2 Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1932), 3,875.

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Introduction

some of the philosophical tenets of his understanding of divine presence in this world. For Luther, the interpretation of how the two natures of man and God are united in Christ was a particularly important doctrine in that respect. Paramount to the understanding of that relation was a concept of the ancient Church, namely communicatio idiomatum. It meant that the divine and human nature mutually exchanged or shared their properties, and it characterised the unionist profile of Luther’s Christology. The concept of communicatio idiomatum proved to be fruitful for the metaphysical concerns of the Reformation, too, such as the understanding of God and God’s nature: Could the divine nature share the almighty God’s most extreme properties, such as omnipresence, to a human being? Could the holy and exalted God receive the lowly properties of human nature? At the same time, communicatio idiomatum raised profound anthropological concerns: Was the finite, sinful human nature capable of receiving divine properties? In what kind of preconceived anthropological structure is Christ to be placed in? After all, the incarnation implied at least some kind of connection between heaven and earth, between divine thought (or will) and human imagination on one level or another. The concerns about the nature of humanity and divinity respectively pointed to an underlying problem of a more philosophical nature, namely how revelation is understood in a world of reason: How are theology and philosophy related? What are the conditions for a rationality which includes both sciences? As soon as the question of God and man in Christ was asked, the philosophical framework was activated too. One could argue that these concerns are always at hand when Christological core questions are asked. True as that may be, many of the figures of the Reformation had extensive training and profound understanding in philosophy, in addition to their theological abilities. Therefore we can expect a certain acquaintance with the profound problems at hand. These questions – and the responses to them – were interwoven with a wider cultural break with the heritage of the Middle Ages. The profound social, economic and political changes which accompanied the Reformation not only led to a more profound individualism and self-reflection, but it also changed the image of what a human being was, or could be. Throughout the Middle Ages, there was a sense of a common nature between the species made in the image of God. The anthropological substance was a premise which the Middle Ages shared with ancient philosophy, but that premise was replaced by the notion of subjectivity in the Reformation. The notion of self and selfhood pushed the question of the human make-up to the fore and Christology played a role in that new construction of the self. Christ was, after all, the new man. One could perhaps say that Christology was intimately correlated with anthropology, and that changes in the understanding of Christ led to changes in the understanding of man too. In addition, the reformulation of dogma was highly political in itself: The

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Choice of theme and structure

13

Roman Empire, Imperium Romanum Sacrum Nationis Germanicæ, as it were, was “holy”. It means that its political unity and stability rested on an ecclesiastical unity, and that – ultimately – dogma was the basis of that unity. To challenge Church doctrine was therefore a political threat, too. This is important to bear in mind as a horizon for the arguments we can find among the reformers.

Choice of theme and structure In order to gain an understanding of how Luther’s Christology and its metaphysical aspects were interpreted in that larger context of theologians whom we now call “Lutheran”, we will trace how some important figures of the next generations responded to these problems. Many of those who regarded themselves as followers of Luther were trained by his colleague, Philipp Melanchthon. He is a particularly important figure in this respect, because his solution to the metaphysical problems of Christology portrayed some important differences from that of Luther. The following generations had to come to terms with these differences, and develop further on their – partly differing – foundations. “The presence of salvation” has recently been singled out as the most characteristic notion of Lutheran post-Reformation Christology.3 Compared to the main confessional alternatives, the Lutherans stand out in their interest in preserving the unity of the natures. Both the Thomist interpretation of Christ in post-Tridentine Catholic theology and the emphasis on the instrumental role of Christ in his salvific activity in the reformed tradition have a stronger concern of keeping the natures apart, not mixing or confusing them, as the four negative adverbs of Chalcedon underline.4 The “Cyrillic” flavour of Lutheran Christology – as opposed to the other’s more “Nestorian” versions – is particularly visible in the interpretation of the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum. The exchange of properties of the respective natures, particularly the human nature receiving everything that the divine nature has: Omnipotence, omniscience and – alas – the difficult omnipresence. Although it makes sense, both from a historical and a systematical viewpoint, to describe the broad confessional Christology in the wake of Luther as held together by a “unionist” continuity, a closer look reveals both a tension between different positions and a development within that confes3 Walter Sparn, “Jesus Christus V. Vom Tridentinum bis zur Aufklärung,” Theologische Realenzyklopedie 17 (1988): 4. 4 The four adverbs from the Council of Chalcedon (451) are describing the relation between the two natures in Christ: “[…] without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation.”

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Introduction

sional camp. The doctrinal development, whether it may be labelled wholly “new”, or rather as a refinement of an original doctrine,5 nevertheless occurred due to changing intellectual circumstances towards the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The new interest in Aristotelian philosophy originating in the reception of Aristotle’s works in Italy and Spain, but also in Protestant Germany through Melanchthon’s work in philosophy, brought about a new emphasis on intellectual rigour which was arguably new to the kind of theology that was originally propagated in Wittenberg. The growth of philosophy, culminating in the introduction of metaphysics to the students in the philosophical faculty – less than hundred years after the subject matter was banned from the curriculum – was in some ways alien to the straightforward Bible-interpreting theology of Luther. But the theologians of the second, third and fourth generations in the tradition of the Augsburg Confession, as it were, had to get to grip with a new set of problems. Perhaps more precisely for this work, they had to answer the old questions of Christology in new situations, qualified through a much more intense work on how the relation between theology and philosophy was interrelated, and what consequences their answers had for the person of Christ. At the same time, in order to explain the “controversy of concord”, as a modern interpreter labelled the conflict within the camp of Lutheran theologians,6 it is necessary to look for the cause of that controversy, not only depicting the solutions between the confessional alternatives. Indeed, it is easy to neglect that there were Christological models with substantial differences at work among the two main reformers working in Wittenberg, namely Luther and Melanchthon. This work tries to identify some of the main theological differences between the two: How can these differences throw light 5 Jörg Baur and Theodor Mahlmann stand out as two modern representatives of each tradition. One should be aware of the implications for Church policy in these traditions, particularly for Protestant Germany : Baur emphasises the differences between Luther and Melanchthon, and makes it thereby difficult to speak of a doctrinal union between Lutheran and Reformed Churches, an idea which was paramount for the Neo-protestant movements in the 19th and 20th Century. Mahlmann, on the other hand, takes the mature Melanchthon and his interpretation of Eucharist and Christology as the established norm among theologians of the Augsburg Confession. By labelling the intellectual rationale behind the protest against Melanchthon’s Christology as new, Mahlmann strenghtened the forces which will stabilise a Protestant union. Jörg Baur, “Auf dem Wege zur klassischen Tübinger Christologie. Einführende Überlegungen zum sogenannten Kenosis-Krypsis-Streit,” in Luther und seine klassischen Erben (1977; repr., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993), 204 – 89; Theodor Mahlmann, Das neue Dogma der lutherischen Christologie. Problem und Geschichte seiner Begründung ([Gütersloh]: Gütersloher Verlagshaus G. Mohn, 1969). 6 She thereby balanced the attack on the Formula of Concord from the Reformed critic Rudolf Hospinian, who labled it a document of discord (Concordia Discors), and the response from the Lutheran theologian Leonard Hutter defence of the project as a real concord (Concordia Concors). Irene Dingel, Concordia controversa: die öffentlichen Diskussionen um das lutherische Konkordienwerk am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts (Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte, 63; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996).

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Choice of theme and structure

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on the later development among Lutheran theologians? Whereas Luther sharply formulated the problem of integrating Christology within a metaphysical framework with a fixed rational anthropology, and even called for a “new language”,7 Melanchthon tried to preserve a bridge between theology and philosophy by offering an interpretation of Christ within his rather Neoplatonic anthropology, combining elements of philosophy and theology in a higher synthesis. How does the difference between them shed light on the controversy in the coming generations? Is it possible to discern a double line of Christological thought in Wittenberg, some sort of diastatic notion which continued to erupt as new controversies? Or is the difference between Melanchthon and Luther just a matter of nuances within the same train of thought? Melanchthon operated in many ways in a different communicative space than Luther. Whereas his older friend and colleague at the University of Wittenberg was a dramatic figure, occupied with existential questions of life and death, Melanchthon was a balanced political figure. His reputation as the “teacher of Germany” [praeceptor Germaniae] not only acknowledges Melanchthon’s immense erudition, but it describes his work in reforming the curriculum for a new institution, the Protestant University. Whether this difference necessarily would lead to different solutions to the questions which are treated in this thesis is perhaps an overstatement, but it is nevertheless important to have these differences in mind. As it has already been noted, Christology among the Lutherans was not only occupied with presence itself, but the presence of something, namely the presence of salvation. The questions of Christology had not only theoretical interest, but also were deeply embedded in the soteriological concern of Luther’s Reformation of theology. To understand the historical development and controversy over communicatio idiomatum and the presence of Christ, it seems fruitful to elaborate on Luther’s own interpretation of the locus. It was, after all, commonplace for later generations to refer to him as a point of reference, particularly when the Formula of Concord was established as ecclestiastical law. How does the soteriological embedment of Christology, stated in Luther’s 1520 essay on Christian freedom affect the understanding of presence? To answer that, we will examine Luther’s great treatise on the Eucharist, the Confession concerning Christ’s Supper (1528). Here, the profile of his Christology reaches a dramatic level as an alternative to the scholastically trained Swiss reformer, Ulrich Zwingli. Last, but not least, I will consider the great disputations on Christology from 1539 and 1540 in order to further elaborate on the philosophical implications of Luther’s Christology. Why did Melanchthon promote a different interpretation to that of Luther? 7 Stefan Streiff, “Novis linguis loqui”. Martin Luthers Disputation über Joh 1,14 “verbum caro factum est” aus dem Jahr 1539 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).

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Introduction

To answer that question, it is necessary to probe the actual theological writings where he publicly revealed his view, namely in the responses to the Bremen controversy and the relevant passages in his commentary on the letter to the Colossians. But the problem of Christology is not only tied to theological views, it is part of philosophy, too, particularly anthropology. How can Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul explain the choices he made in Christology? In order to answer that question, we will turn to his interpretation of Aristotle on the soul, too. How did the next generation of theologians respond to the metaphysical challenge of Christology? By investigating how the – arguably – main suppliers of Christological ideas to the Formula, Johannes Brenz and Martin Chemnitz, develop their solutions in light of Luther and Melanchthon, an important question is posed: Could the different Christological elements from Luther and Melanchthon be reconciled in the Formula of Concord? The problem could also be solved differently, as the critics of the Formula showed. They all belonged to the same tradition of the Augsburg Confession, and Tileman Heshusius, Daniel Hofmann and Johannes Kepler were important figures, too. By their opposition, they expose that the options for the theologians were not confined to the alternatives given by fathers of the Formula of Concord. The third and last main chapter concerns what we may label the last flowering of Christological controversy between the Lutheran theologians, namely the controversy between members of the theological faculty in Giessen and their colleagues in Tübingen in the late 1610 s and early 1620 s. The controversy reflects the problem of how union between the natures of Christ should be understood in an intellectual environment that, more thoroughly than before, was trained in philosophical questions, and therefore reflected the metaphysical tenets more profoundly in their theological reasoning. Whereas the theologians in Giessen, with Balthasar Mentzer as the leading figure, considered the kenotic notion of Philippians 2 to be a real refrain of Christ’s divine properties in the assumption of flesh, the theologians in Tübingen, with Theodor Thumm as the key thinker, regarded the kenotic notion to be merely a hidden reality which was always there. In the vast material which their dispute sparked off, this controversy reveals how their arguments reflect a more general understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. How did they qualify the concept of praesentia in the relationship between Creator and Creation? This becomes acute in the understanding of growth and development: When chapter 2 in the Gospel according to Luke said of the child Jesus that he “grew in wisdom”, how should that be understood with regard to the relation between the natures? Last, but not least, which particular words of Scripture function as regulative to the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum?

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Definitions and reflections on method

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Some definitions and reflections on method Communicatio idiomatum is not a concept of the Reformation, but has its roots in the ancient church. Already Gregory of Nazians (325/329 – 390) mentions mutual interpenetration between the natures in Christ (perichoresis) in one of his letters.8 For the western tradition throughout the Middle Ages and in the Reformation, too, the classic reformulation from John of Damascus (650–?) played an important role in defining the concept. In the third book of his De fide orthodoxa, as his writings were known in the West, he uses the understanding of communicatio idiomatum developed by Maximus Confessor (580 – 662) to defend the adoration of Christ’s humanity.9 A particularly important work for the transmission of the unionist Christology in the universities was the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1100 – 1160).10 This collection and evaluation of Patristic texts – mostly from Augustine – was arranged thematically and used as material for disputations and discussions. In book three, which concerns the incarnation and relevant discussions, there is extensive material which reflects the concerns of this dissertation. Luther lectured on Lombard’s Sentences from 1509 to 1511, and was familiar with the scholastic setting of the term.11 The long history of the concept, or what it refers to, is important for the present work. First of all, there is a cluster of dogmatic themes attached to it. A quick look on Peter Lombard’s table of contents, for example, reveals that the two-nature doctrine of Christ involves questions of Mariology, moral theology and the like. It seems important therefore to consider the scope and intent of the use of communicatio idiomatum on the chosen material. Luther’s use of the term is not general in the scholastic sense of the term; it has a specific target, even if it may have more general implications. I would therefore argue that the material itself helps the interpreter to narrow the scope of the term. Formally, when a concept such as communicatio idiomatum is chosen as the starting point and thematic focus for an investigation into Church history in the Reformation, one can assume that it is to be placed in the tradition labelled 8 It is found in letter number 101, MPG 37, 181C. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man (London: The Westminster Press, 1968), 297. McGuckin does not only underline Gregory’s reference to the dance perichoresis allegedly eludes to, but also to his apophatic framework: Perichoresis “exceeds anything that corporeality con conceive of as a complex union.” John Anthony McGuckin, St. Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 306 – 7. 9 Rowan Williams, “Jesus Christus II,” Theologische Realenzyklopedie 16 (1987): 742. 10 For the importance of John of Damascus to Peter Lombard, see Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 1,418 ff. 11 Cf. Josef Wieneke, Martin Luthers Notizen anlässlich seiner Vorlesung über die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus Erfurt 1509/1511 (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1994). See also Dorothea Vorländer, Deus incarnatus. Die Zweinaturenchristologie Luthers bis 1521 (Untersuchungen Zur Kirchengeschichte; Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1974).

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Introduction

the history of doctrine, or perhaps more narrowly the history of dogma. To a large degree, the present work should be placed in that tradition, too. The actual concept is a dogmatic construction, used to summarise central concerns in the Christian faith. It does not rely much on political history, or practical aspects of Church history itself, such as private piety, liturgy and ecclesiastical concerns. It is perhaps closer to the tradition called intellectual history, because it searches to place the interpretation of that Christological term within the wider development of philosophical ideas in Early Modern Europe. The setting among the larger traits of European intellectual history – the horizon, so to speak – and its heuristic ambition has some consequences for the methodology used in the present work: It draws heavily upon the hermeneutical tradition.12 Communicatio idiomatum by the Lutherans is interpreted in the horizon of the common Christian and philosophical tradition. Although the dissertation does not intend to research the relationship between the intellectual world and its correlation with the practical concerns of society, it is necessary to be aware of the concrete cultural environment in which the interpretation of the concept takes place. This might be self-evident for a historian, but here I want to point out how the rather lofty discussions on the subject have an acute ecclesiastical relevance: For Luther, the question of Christology is intimately connected with the question of real presence in the Eucharist, and the conditions for faith at all. This proximity to the central concerns of soteriology indicates a more far-reaching relevance to the discussions than what their lofty distinctions may convey. What does such a relevance to the ecclesiastical state of affairs imply methodologically? One implication is that the concept at stake has a wider significance than a mere intellectual one, it affects other areas of life than discussions between philosophically trained theologians. Therefore, it is not merely conceptually relevant, but socially embedded, too.13 As it has already 12 This complex is touched upon by Gadamer in his discussion on how the text should be protected from misapprehension, and is profoundly ethical: The reader must be ready to be told something from the text: “Wer einen Text verstehen will, ist vielmehr bereit, sich von ihm etwas sagen zu lassen”. This “etwas” is stabilised through his striking belief in the possibility to isolate the content: “Die hermeneutische Aufgabe geht von selbst in eine sachliche Fragestellung über und ist von dieser immer schon mitbestimmt”. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960), 253. 13 For the social relevance of intellectual concepts, I am indebted to the analyses of Koselleck. As Koselleck observes, there is a different attitude to the sources as texts between the two disciplines. While the concentration on texts is obvious in Begriffsgeschichte by its emphasis on philosophical terminology, Sozialgeschichte only uses texts to get to grips with the “facts” behind the texts: Social structures, the relation between different groups and classes within society etc. The concepts are embedded in political systems, and cannot be abstracted into mere linguistic games. Through an analysis that is focused upon the pragmatic aspect of political terminology, Koselleck displays how some economical, political or sociological structures are necessary preconditions for understanding the semantic of the concept. The concept is thereby

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been mentioned, due to the dependence of the Holy Roman Empire’s on dogmatic unity, a break away would simply mean to call for a war. This perspective makes it necessary to be aware of the institutional aspect when communicatio idiomatum is discussed. The world in which the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth Century inhabited was a profoundly religious world. Their opinions – at least their public ones – were never mere opinions, but always interwoven with the political and judicial realities of that world. To be vigilant of that simple fact is an important virtue in the work of a historian. That is true even when a rather theoretical concept is considered.

not only indicating political and social relations, but it is itself an element in producing these relations. Reinhard Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte,” in Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), 107 – 29.

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Luther’s new interpretation The role of Christology in Luther’s understanding of salvation To understand how crucial Christology is for the theology of Luther, it seems fruitful to consult its role in soteriology, namely as a basis for the salvation of humankind and the role it plays for the practice of the Church. The question of human salvation was raised very early in Luther’s engagement with Christological themes.1 A very dense and mature account of his early Christology – especially with regard to soteriology – is presented in 1520 with his “On the freedom of a Christian”. In the controversy with the reformer of Zürich, Ulrich Zwingli, the implications of Luther’s interpretation of Christ are considered with regard to the sacraments. The conflict between them was ignited as early as 1525, but the most interesting writing for the present work concerns Luther’s final work in their debate, namely “From the Eucharist of Christ” (1528). Here, the intimate connection between Christology and the Eucharist is stated most clearly. Of particular interest are the categories of presence, borrowed from the first professor of theology at the University of Tübingen, Gabriel Biel. It is among Luther’s later writings, especially in the Christological disputations at the end of his life, however, that we can find some of his most far-reaching statements concerning theology’s place among the sciences. Here, some of the thoughts from the important Heidelberg theses (1518) are brought together with his mature interpretation of Christ’s person, particularly in the “Disputation on John 1:14” (1539) and the “Disputation on the divinity and humanity of Christ” (1540).

1 Dorothea Vorländer has in her study shown how early the particularities of Luther’s interpretation of Christ are shown: It does not only point towards the union of God and man, but sees that union as important for man’s salvation. Already in the glosses on Peter Lombard’s Sentences 1509 are signs of a more soteriological understanding of Christ present. She shows for example how the speculative question “is it possible to unite finite and infinite being in Christ?” is omitted, a question one could expect was raised from a theologian in the Occhamist tradition. Instead, Luther asks “how is it possible to see God in man Jesus?” (p.46). In Luther’s Dictata super Psalterium 1513 – 1514, the question is turned into an epistemological rule: The humanity of Christ is crucial, because that is the place where God can be found (p. 86). In the first lecture on the Romans 1515 – 1517, the doctrine of Christ’s two natures is connected to the understanding of satisfaction. The flesh of Christ may be without sin, but by his incarnation, his suffering and death, he has “become sin” and taken on himself our punishment (p. 123). Vorländer, Deus incarnatus. Die Zweinaturenchristologie Luthers bis 1521.

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On the freedom of a Christian (1520) One of the most profound expressions of how deeply salvation and Christology are intertwined is given in Luther’s essay on freedom from 1520. Here we can find a dense, Christological interpretation of what Luther later formulated as theology proper in a classic statement: To know God and man is divine wisdom and what characterises proper theology […] therefore the proper subject of theology should be the guilty, desperate man and the justifying God or saviour.2

The concentration on the act of justification as the center of theology is given a Christological rationale in Luther’s treatise on the freedom of a Christian (1520). His interpretation of Christ in this writing is not only “the most perfect expression of a Reformation understanding of the mystery of Christ”,3 but forms an indissoluble connection to God’s justification of the sinful man.4 2 Cognitio dei et hominis est sapientia divina et proprie theologica […] ut proprie sit subiectum Theologiae homo reus et perditus et deus iustificans vel salvator. WA, 40II, 327. Cf. Althaus poignant expression: “[…] die theologische Erkenntnis Gottes und des Menschen ist “relative” Erkenntnis, das heisst Erkenntnis beider in ihrer Beziehung zueinander, ihrer sowohl ontologischen wie personalen relatio. Es hat den gleichen Sinn, wenn Luther sagt: Das Thema der Theologie ist Christus.” 3 Wilhelm Maurer, Von der Freiheit Eines Christenmenschen. Zwei Untersuchungen zu Luthers Reformationsschriften 1520/21 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1949), 25. 4 The position of the treatise as an authoritative expression of central elements in Luther’s theology, is seen from the circumstances it was written in. Luther had already received the threat of excommunication from Rome, but on recommendation from the papal nuncio Karl von Miltitz (1490 – 1529) he agreed to write a letter to the Pope and date it prior to receiving the threat. Together with the letter, the treatise was attached as an explication of the central teachings of Luther. It does not have the polemical attitude of the later Reformation writings, although both its style and content suggest anything else than humility before the papal authority. Luther addresses the Pope as if he was of the same rank, and underlines the inner freedom as the core of Christian life. This does not, however, blur the status of the treatise as a positive summary of Luther’s theological development at that point. Cf. Martin Brecht, Martin Luther (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1983 – 87), 382 – 90. Luther wrote a German version, too, which Maurer (and Brecht) regarded as the original. Birgit Stolt, on the other hand, argued quite convincingly that the Latin version was earlier. Her argument rests on an analysis of the formal rhetorical composition of the Latin version: Birgit Stolt, Studien zu Luthers Freiheitstraktat : Mit Besonderer Rücksicht auf das Verhältnis der Lateinischen und der Deutschen Fassung zu Einander und die Stilmittel der Rhetorik (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969), 114 – 17. In his thorough presentation of the arguments of both Maurer and Stolt, Reinhold Rieger summarises the discussion by giving the German text priority. Reinhold Rieger, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen. De libertate christiana (Kommentare zu Schriften Luthers; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 5 – 12. I must admit that I regard the outcome of the discussion to be quite limited with respect to the subject matter of the treatise. Should an earlier version be given priority because of its alleged originality? Or is the later version to be seen as a more accomplished work? It is even more difficult if one considers the bilingual ability of Luther : In the faithful transcripts of Röhrer, where the supposedly true mixture of German and Latin is presented, it gives a much more precise impression

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At the outset, Luther states that a Christian man has two contradictory natures, which Luther labels freedom and servitude, but also spiritual and corporeal, interior and exterior : A Christian is a free master of everything, subject to none. A Christian is a dutiful servant of everything, subject to everyone.5

What is the cause of this double identity? Although Luther refers to Paul, who declares a Christian to be a free man – subject only to love – it is clear that it is Christ who has merited and given it. There exists a similarity between a Christian and Christ, according to Luther. Christ is lord over all and has a divine form, at the same time [simul] he is born of a woman, is under the law and has the form of a servant.6 Luther sees the double identity of a Christian as a parallel structure to the identity of Christ. How is this structure transferred from Christ to the believer? Following St Paul’s description and the Platonic tradition,7 Luther insists on the interior aspect of man, the soul, as the place where the new man and true freedom is found. The exterior, man according to flesh and blood, belongs to the old world.8 That principle has an important negative aspect: Man cannot become free through external deeds, such as holy clothes and fasting.9 It is important to underline that the distinction between external and internal is a strict

5

6 7

8

9

of Luther’s theological imagination than does, say, the harmonized versions of Veit Dietrich. Given the temporal proximity, it could be argued that the two versions should be regarded as a unity. For these problems, cf. Birgit Stolt, Martin Luthers Rhetorik des Herzens (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). Christianus homo, omnium dominus est liberrimus, nulli subiectus, Christianus homo, omnium seruus est officiosissimus omnibus subiectus. Martin Luther and Hans-Ulrich Delius [ed.], Studienausgabe, vol. 2 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1979), 264, 17 – 18. The German translation reads: “Eyn Christen mensch ist eyn freyer herr / uober alle ding / vnd niemandt vnterthan. Eyn Christen mensch ist eyn dienstpar knecht aller ding vnd yderman vnterthan.” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 265, 6 – 9. […] sic Christus, quanquam omnium dominus, factus tamen ex muliere, factus est sub lege, simul liber et seruus, simul in forma dei, et in forma serui. Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 264, 23 – 25. Jüngel traces the origins of the dualistic concept “man in man” to Plato’s description of how of man’s inner thing [b 1mt¹r %mhqypor] rules the other parts of man. Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, Zur Freiheit Eines Christenmenschen. Eine Erinnerung an Luthers Schrift (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1978), 116 – 20. Homo enim duplici constat natura, spirituali et corporali, iuxta spiritualem, quam dicunt animam, vocatur spiritualis, interior, nouus homo, iuxta corporalem, quam carnem dicunt, vocatur carnalis, exterior, vetus homo, de quo Apostolus. 2. Cor. 4. Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 264,18 – 20. The German reads: “[…] sollen wir gedencken / das eyn yglich Christen mensch ist zweyerley natur / geystlicher vnd leyplicher. Nach der seelen wirt er eyn geystlich / new / ynnerlich mensch genennet / nach dem fleysch vnd blut wirt er eyn leyplich allt vnd eusserlich mensch genennet.” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 265,17 – 20. […] et constat, nullam prorsus rerum externarum, quocunque censeantur nomine, aliquid habere momenti ad iustitiam aut libertatem Christianam […] Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 266,6 – 8 The German translation is perhaps more to the point here: “So ists offenbar / das keyn eusserlich ding mag yhn frey / noch frum machen […]” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 267,5 – 6.

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theological distinction for Luther. He does not follow Augustine in attributing the external to the sensory, lower faculty of man, and the inner to the rational, higher faculty of man. On the contrary, he forms the whole argument after St Paul, as it is stated in 2 Corinthians 4:16 and Galatians 5:17.10 It is the whole man who is either relying on his external deeds in the presence of God, the homo carnalis, or the whole man relying on his internal justification in the presence of God, the homo spiritualis.11 This marks a distance from the interpretation of Andreas Karlstadt and the later radicals, who saw Augustine’s De spiritu et littera12 as an attempt of explaining how the Spirit was given to man in order that he may fulfil the law. Luther, on the other hand, pointed to the imputation of a foreign justice outside man.13 It is only through the Word of God, the gospel of Christ,14 that man is made free. Christ preached is an external – even liturgical – act too, it could be argued, but it enters the hearer in a different way than exercises of the body.15 Luther claims that the centre of man is struck with Christ through faith in the external word, which he labels with a polyphony of biblical expressions: The soul, the heart, inner man, new man etc.16 The act itself happens as if “you hear your own God speaking to you”,17 as Luther expresses it. 10 Karin Bornkamm, Christus – König und Priester. Das Amt Christi bei Luther im Verhältnis zur Vor- und Nachgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 168 ff. 11 Karl Heinz Zur Mühlen, “Innerer und äusserer Mensch. Eine theologische Grundunterscheidung bei Martin Luther,” in Reformatorisches Profil (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 199 – 207. 12 Augustine’s treatise was even included in the obligatory lectures of the second professor in Melanchthon’s University reform of 1536. No other extra-biblical books are mentioned. Helmer Junghans, “Die Geschichte der Leucorea zwischen 1536 und 1574,” in Georg Major (1502 – 1574) (ed. Irene Dingel and Günther Wartenberg; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2005), 16. For the difference between Carlstadt and Luther in the interpretation of De spiritu et littera, cf. Bernhard Lohse, “Zum Wittenberger Augustinismus. Augustins Schrift De Spiritu et Littera in der Auslegung bei Staupitz, Luther und Karlstadt,” in Augustine, The Harvest, and Theology (1300 – 1650): Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday (ed. Kenneth Hagen; Leiden: Brill, 1990), 89 – 109. 13 Bernhard Lohse, Luther Theologie in ihrer historischen Entwicklung und in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 162. 14 “[…] das wort gottis von Christo geprediget [my italics].” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 267,27. 15 Roger Jensen summarised it as such: “The body does not constitute the soul” (kropp virker ikke konstitueren[d]e p” sjel). Roger Jensen, Subjektkonstitusjon Og Gudstale. Drøftelse Av Konstitusjonen Av Det Etiske Subjekt i Moderniteten Med Særlig Vekt P” Martin Luthers Antropologi Og Etikk. (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2004), 171. 16 The absence of locating that centre within a philosophical anthropology is striking. An expression of Luther’s engagement with the question of how man is constituted is later found in his controversy with Erasmus (1525). Here, human will [voluntas] is the organising centre of man, but not in the traditional philosophical sense. Instead, the will is regarded as an animal, a mule, which can be controlled by either God or Satan. Luther is insisting on an ongoing fight between the powers in the core of man, and he strongly refuses any kind of free choice over against itself as self: Sic humana voluntas in medio posita est, ceu iumentum, si insederit Deus, vult et vadit, quo vult Deus, ut Psalmus dicit, Factus sum sicut iumentum et ego semper tecum. Si insederit

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One tenet, important as it was for classical Christian anthropology, is left out of Luther’s interpretation. This is not only due to the list itself, but has its reason from the dual structure in Luther’s understanding of man. By framing anthropology as a relation between spirit and body, he omits the soul as being the middle part in a trichotomy. Traditionally the soul was considered a middle part, partaking both in spirit and body. It comprised the whole of man. This is particularly visible in the moral implications of the doctrine of grace via moderna, at least as Gabriel Biel understood it.18 The new reality of Christ created within man is captured by Luther first and foremost captured by the word faith. Due to the deprived nature of man, one should not consider the deeds, but rather concentrate on strengthening faith, he claims.19 Luther is not trying to eradicate good works from the life of a Christian, only to place them as consecutive to faith, as fruits of that new reality. He qualifies faith in terms well known in the mystical tradition of his monastic training: The soul clings to the words of God’s promises in a way that it is unified with them, to the extent of being absorbed by these words. Luther underlines that the union is not solely participation, but through the union, the power of the words makes the soul satisfied and “drunk”.20 In addition, Luther applies classic Christological imagery to describe the union between the Word and the soul: The soul becomes exactly like the Word, just as the iron becomes red like the fire in their union.21 It becomes clear that the highest grace [gratia] does not consist in the freedom from the yoke under the law, or enabling the believer to show God his

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Satan, vult et vadit, quo vult Satan, nec est in eius arbitrio, ad utrum sessorem currere aut eum quaerere, sed ipsi sessores certant ob ipsum obtinendum et possidendum. Martin Luther, Studienausgabe (ed. Hans-Ulrich Delius; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1979), 208,2 – 7. For a thorough discussion on the implications of such a possessed middle, cf. Thomas Reinhuber, Kämpfender Glaube. Studien zu Luthers Bekenntnis am Ende von De servo arbitrio (Berlin New York: De Gruyter, 2000), 43 – 55. “[…] das du hoerist deynen gott zu dir reden” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 269,12 – 13. As Oberman points out, the battle between a sinful life and a life obedient to God is located within the rational soul by Biel. It is the two faculties of the soul that are in war with each other. Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 58 – 59. Biel’s understanding was in concord with a Christian (neo-)Platonism prevailing in the Middle Ages. The soul was understood as a spiritual substance, composed of a superior part [ratio superior] which was directed toward the spiritual world, and an inferior part which was directed toward lower beings. Zdizislaw Kuksewicz, “The Potential and the Agent Intellect,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (ed. Normann Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 596. Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 268, 34 – 270,3. Cum autem, haec promissa dei, sint verba sancta, vera, iusta, libera, pacata et vniuersa bonitate plena, fit, vt anima, quae firma fide illis adheret, sic eis vniatur, immo penitus absorbeatur, vt non modo participet, sed saturetur et inebrietur omni virtute eorum […] Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 272,12 – 15. “[…] Wie das wort ist / sso wirt auch die seele von yhm / gleych / als das eyssen wirt gluttrodt wie das fewr auss der voreynigung mit dem fewr” Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 273,23 – 24.

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rightful honour. The highest grace is the intimate conjunction of the soul with Christ, which is an act Luther insists cannot be equated with anything else [incomparabilis est].22 He employs the vivid marital imagery of Paul’s letter to the Ephesians, chapter 5, and claims that the soul and Christ are united just as man and wife. It is within this image that the famous joyous exchange is realised. Christ is full of grace, life and salvation. The soul is full of sin, death and damnation. When faith intercedes, it will make sin, death and hell Christ’s. Grace, life and salvation will be the soul’s. If Christ is a bridegroom, he must receive everything the bride has got as his own and bestow upon her everything he has. When he gives her his body and himself, how can he hold back anything? And when he receives the bride’s body, how can he refuse anything? Thereby the most beautiful play is created, one not only about communion, but one about a salvific war, victory, salvation and redemption. Christ is God and man in the same person [eaque persona]. He has neither sinned, nor died, and he is not condemned. He cannot sin, die or be condemned. Since his justice, life and salvation are unconquerable, eternal and omnipotent; […] everything is swallowed up by him in the mighty duel.23

Here, Chalcedonian Christology is interpreted on the basis of the doctrine of justification. The communication of properties is not only restricted to the person of Christ, but it is extended to be valid pro nobis, too. Luther’s soteriological interpretation of Christology not only brings the divine nature close to human beings, but God becomes what the human beings are themselves. The joyous exchange points to the exaltation of the humans, caused by Christ’s kenotic movement down from heaven to save them. This does not only point to the salvific communion between God and human beings, but gives a hint of how Luther interprets the exchange of natures within Christ as well. There is a flow between the natures, which could be described as an event: Unlike the ancient Christology which departed from an impassible God, the hope for a corruptible world – which found its way through the metaphysical taxonomy of the Middle Ages24 – Luther departs 22 Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 274,37. 23 Christus plenus est, gratia, vita, et salute, Anima plena est peccatis morte et damnatione, Intercedat iam fides, et fiet, vt Christi sint peccata, mors et internus. Animae vero gratia, vita et salus, oportet enim eum si sponsus est, ea simul quae sponsa habet, acceptare et ea quae sua sunt, sponsae impartire, Qui enim corpus suum et se ipsum illi donat, quomodo non omnia sua donat? Et qui corpus sponsae accipit, quomodo non omnia quae sponsae sunt accipit? Hic iam dulcissimum spectaculum prodit non solum communionis, sed salutaris belli et victoriae et salutis et redemptionis. Cum enim Christus sit deus et homo, eaque persona, quae nec peccauit, nec moritur, nec damnatur. sed nec peccare, mori, damnari potest, Eiusque iustitia, vita, salus insuperabilis, aeterna omnipotens est […] necessario in ipso absorpta sunt, stupendo duello. Luther and Delius [ed.], StA 2, 276,2 – 20. 24 Cf. the thorough analysis of Schwarz, Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch,” Zeitschrift Für Theologie und Kirche 63 (1966): 289 – 351.

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with the premise that Christ is the “mirror of the fatherly heart of God”, that he will save mankind from their sins.25 Christ as primarily the gospel, which a modern interpreter in a comment on Scripture aptly labelled as a “cry of God’s mercy”,26 relates to human beings in another dimension than the law. Exactly how realistically the transport of man’s sins to Christ is understood by Luther is perhaps most extensively treated one year later, in his treatise against Jacob Latomus (1521).27 In one of the crucial paragraphs, Luther makes some comments concerning 2 Corinthians 5:21: “For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him”.28 What does it mean for Christ slightly “to be sin”? As we will see, Luther qualifies this key concept in light of the rhetorical tradition. But at the same time, the concepts are qualified anew by the theological content. To a certain degree, they lose some of their core meaning in their original setting when they are used theologically. It points to an important principle, namely the subordination of words to the thing, or in the later methodological language: The qualification of logic as instrumental to res, the subject matter. At the heart of Luther’s argument is his interpretation of metaphor, which literally means transferring or carrying something to something else. When Christ was sacrificed for us, he was made sin for us in a metaphorical manner [metaphorice]. There is no real difference between Christ and the sinner, 25 “Das alte griechische Christentum war vor allem bewegt von der Frage nach dem unsterblichen Leben Gottes, das von der Verweslichkeit, vom Tode erlöst. […] Das ist das der neue Sinn und Ernst des Gottseins Jesu Christi für Luther: Christus ist “Spiegel des väterlichen Herzens Gottes”, der, in dem wir Gott selbst haben. Man kann sagen: vor Luther fragten Kirche und Theologie überwiegend nach dem Göttlichen in Christus, suchten göttliche Natur, göttliche Lebendigkeit, göttliches Gewicht der Genugtuung. Luther sucht und findet in Jesus Christus Gott selbst, den Vater in Person.” Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1962), 161 – 62. 26 Ratschow points to the difference between the ‘cry’ of God’s gospel on the one hand, and the ‘reading’ and ‘take-it-to-the-heart’ practices of the law, for example the ten commandments. The correct distinction, according to Ratschow, lies exactly in his insistence of the different use of the law and Gospel: The cry of God in the gospel is God’s call to life, reaching to the depths of human existence. The law, on the other hand, can be learnt and preserved, more or less regarded as true, more or less followed in life. Ratschow’s distinction points to the event-character of the person of Christ as a gospel. In Luther’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, the perichoretic flux of Christ’s person omits the fixed content, the “stuff” of a transferred something. Carl-Heinz Ratschow, “Heilige Schrift, V. Systematisch-Theologisch,” TRE 30 (1999): 429. 27 For the historical background of the treatise, cf. Anna Vind, Latomus og Luther. Striden om, hvorvidt enhver god gerning er synd : en teologihistorisk afhandling (København: Københavns Universitet, Det teologiske fakultet, 2001), 1 – 155. Of particular interest is Vind’s elaboration of Latomus’ rationalistic understanding of peccatum, where she shows how Latomus can see the soul [anima] as having the possibility to control [regi possunt] sinful passions (p. 129). 28 For the following, cf. Vind, Latomus og Luther, 232 ff. Some of these observations can be found in her article Anna Vind, “‘Christus factus est peccatum metaphorice’. Über die theologische Verwendung rhetorische Figuren bei Luther unter Einbeziehung Quintilians,” in Creator est creatura. Luthers Christologie als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation (ed. Oswald Bayer and Benjamin Gleede; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 95 – 124.

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except that Christ was not himself the cause of the sin.29 Luther underlines that the relation between the sinner and Christ as sin is not an identity [identitas], but more similar to the rhetorical understanding of similarity [similitudo], where there is a difference within the metaphor. If the difference had not been there, a translation would not have been possible.30 The important theological qualification Luther uses in his understanding of metaphor consists in his insistence that the translation of sin from the sinner to Christ is not merely a translation of words, but a translation of things [re vera].31 But what are the things translated? In order to grasp Luther’s profile, it seems fruitful to compare his understanding of metaphor with the rhetorical tradition. Luther, who was a great admirer of Cicero and Quintillian, received important impulses from the antique school of oratory.32 Although Quintillian points out that “every speech consists of things and words”,33 the relation between words and things are qualified by the ternary natura, ars and usus in this tradition. The antique rhetorician considers natura to be the given, which can be experienced by observing nature and its inherent order. In order to utilise, systematise and to a degree make nature’s rational structure operative, the speaker has to employ ars, a concept which is loosely analogous to science. The object of natura and the mind’s power in employing ars has to be practised, that is the aspect of usus. Usus happens when the thing is translated into words, in accordance with the language norms of the literate.34 The basic semantic relation between things and words is regulated by this ternary structure: There is a proper word for each and every thing, which is normally expressed in the habit [consuetudo] of the speaker. But when he chooses to break with that established relation by using a trope or a figure, Quintillian labels it an improper use [improprietas]. He stresses that it is the similarity [similitudo] of the thing signified by the proper word on the one hand, and that signified by the improper word on the other, which justifies the change. Similarity between the two things implied in a metaphor is underlined by Luther, too. When he applies Romans 8:3 “God sent his son in the likeness of 29 Christus dum offerretur pro nobis, factus est peccatum metaphorice, cum peccatori ita fuerit per omnia similis, damnatus, derelictus, confusus, ut nulla re differret a vero peccatore, quam quod reatum et peccatum, quod tulit, ipse non fecerat. WA 8, 86, 31 – 34. 30 Oportet autem in metaphora aliquam differentiam esse a re vera, quia similitudo (ut aiunt [i.e. the Rhetoric teachers]) non identitas est. Et quae transferuntur, secundum similitudinem se transferunt, alioqui ne translatio quidem esset. WA 8, 87. 31 Et in hac translatione non solum est verborum, sed et rerum metaphora. WA 8,87. For a densely argued study on how important Christology is for Luther’s understanding of metaphor, and how his understanding of metaphor is crucial for the whole of Luther’s theology, cf. Jens Wolff, Metapher und Kreuz: Studien zu Luthers Christusbild (Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), part. 590 ff. 32 Cf. for example Stolt, Rhetorik des Herzens. 33 oratio…omnis constat rebus et verbis. Cited from Vind, Latomus og Luther, 235. 34 Vind, Latomus og Luther, 235, note 845.

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the flesh” and Hebrews 4:15 “One who has been tempted in every aspect as we are, but without sinning”, there is established a similarity between the two things in Luther’s metaphor of sin.35 But that similarity is not based upon the same order as Quintillian would have seen it. On the contrary, one can hardly imagine more different entities than Christ and sinful man, if they are considered in the light of Quintillian’s ternary.36 We will see that complex unfolded more explicitly later, when Luther considers the incarnation as a violation of the order of nature (the Porphyrian tree).37 To establish an exchange of realities between such disparate things as sinfulness and holiness, it is necessary for Luther to make use of a theological qualification to establish the necessary similarity required for a metaphor, an exchange of meaning. Sin and holiness are, after all, the properties of man and God which cause the deep existential problems in Luther’s radical anthropology. It seems, however, as if Luther has reached a limit where no rhetorical or literary theory can carry the arguments further. By considering this limit, however, we can glimpse an important theological premise of Luther : He submits the words under things, by making the theological content the yardstick which the use of the words must serve.38 What is that theological content under which the words are subordinated? One problem of suggesting that what is meant is a rational, metaphysical understanding of an objective thing lies in Luther’s radical interpretation of peccatum, his “second difference”, as a modern interpreter labelled it.39 Although peccatum in its theological sense refers to the same thing as in its grammatical sense, the theological sense stands in a metaphorical relation to the grammatical sense.40 In the new theological qualification of sin, however, there is no “stuff” transferred, rather Christ himself has become sin.41 Or 35 Et quae transferuntur, secundum similitudinem se transferunt, alioqui ne translatio quidem esset. WA 8,87. 36 ”For the human mind, which mirrors nature and uses ars expressed in its usus among the literate, it does not seem to be evident at all to be a likeness between the Son of God and sin. Sin is rather God’s contradiction; therefore there is no justification for a metaphor. It looks rather to be a contradiction between the two things implied in the oration”. [my translation] Vind, Latomus og Luther, 240. 37 See below, page 68. 38 Vind cites Siegfried Raeder’s conclusion after considering Luther’s exposition of Psalm 22:17: “The words are subitted under the reality of things [rebus].” Vind, Latomus og Luther, 241, note 870. 39 Rudolf Malter makes a fruitful distinction when he qualifies how Luther understands knowledge, what Malter as a Kantian interpreter lables as practical metaphysics: Luther’s reluctance of seeing God as an object among other objects of science. Rudolf Malter, Das Reformatorische Denken und die Philosophie. Luthers Entwurf einer Transzendental-Praktischen Metaphysik (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1980), 9. 40 Risto Saarinen, “Metapher und biblische Redefiguren als Elemente der Sprachphilosophie Luthers,” Neue Zeitschrift für Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 30 (1988), 36. 41 See for instance Ebeling’s lucid remarks to Luther’s distinction of peccatum in verum and metaphoricum. Although sin in both cases is defined simplex vocabulum in Scripture and as

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perhaps it would fit even better to adopt the participle: Christ is in the becoming of sin, not only by being a tertium quid, a third place where the communication of sin and holiness is stabilised and fixed. Christ is described by Luther as being in a constant state of flux, hovering between the receiving of sin and the giving of forgiveness.42 The content under which the words are subordinated is therefore not something else, but rather a new language where the reality of the exchange of divine and human properties is inscribed in the structure of predication.43 such is sin, there is a “fight” [ein Widereinander] inside the concept itself when sin is grasped in the horizon of Christ, and Christ is grasped in the horizon of sin, according to Ebeling. Ebeling compares the change from our sin (peccatum verum) to Christ’s sin (peccatum metaphorice) to Luther’s treatment of death (mors) as the death of death (mors mortis). The fundamental interpretation of Luther’s non solum verborum, sed et rerum metaphora is restricted vis–—–vis a common hermeneutic theory by Ebeling’s underlining of a translatio solely inside Christ. In addition, the danger unio cum Christo poses against Ebeling’s relational ontology is balanced through an insistence on the remaining distinction between God and man, between Christ and the sinner, and – alas – between law and gospel. Gerhard Ebeling, “Christus.. factus est peccatum metaphorice,” in Wort und Glaube, Bd. 4 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 603 – 9. In the end, it seems as if Luther’s logic of metaphor breaks apart for Ebeling, and he retracts to the categories of distinction. But is it necessary to introduce them as “in spite of” [trotz] the union in Christ? If one considers de libertate christiana as a commentary to the Anti-Latomus, as Ebeling suggests, the joyous exchange is between Christ and the sinner is placed within the image of a marriage. Although this marriage has a singular legal basis, the exchange itself involves two persons. For a more precise and fruitful interpretation of Ebeling’s distinctio-unio problem, namely in the critique of human participation in (Neo-platonic) grades of grace, cf. Gerhard Ebeling, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” in Wort und Glaube, Bd. 4 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 471 – 72. 42 Ringleben correctly underlines the avoidance of an ontic hiatus between language and reality by Luther. And the translatio of sin or metaphora rerum is not doubled in a diastatic relation between time and eternity, but is rather the living start [“Einstand”] of time and eternity, the Word of God and human word, human speech and divine words of creation (p. 347 – 48). On the other hand, when Ringleben points to the communicatio idiomatum as the explication of how the person of God’s absolute metaphor is constituted (p. 352), an unclear Christological term appears: “Wird die Idiomenkommunikation als für Christi Person-Sein konstitutiv aufgefasst, dann ist die Person Christi selber schon soteriologisch als die Vermittlung von Gott und Mensch. Diese Vermittlung ist kein Geschehen an ihm, sondern sein Selbst ist an sich selber dieser Übergang und “fröhliche Wechsel”. Im Blick auf den sündigen Menschen heisst das, Christus ist an ihm selber das Ereignis der Übertragung der Sünde auf den Gottessohn. In diesem Sinn ist er stellvertretend, tritt er ein für uns und ist in Person der Mittler […]” Does that mean that the event of the salvific exchange between the natures is transcended – in the Hegelian sense of ‘Aufhebung’ – and stabilised in the concept of a mediator? Joachim Ringleben, “Luther zur Metapher,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 94 (1997): 336 – 69. 43 Jüngel’s interpretation that the grammatical figure letavoq² should have an ontic relevance seems to be correct, insofar as a mere verbal expression thereby is avoided. But to label it as an event of Being [Ereignis des Seins], or an ontological reduplication [Die grammatische letavoq² wird sozusagen ontologisch redupliziert], seems to be quite far from – and even contrary to – Luther’s understanding of sin and forgiveness in this respect. When Jüngel points to the creatio ex nihilo as the foundation for the new language, the analogy breaks apart. Although Luther points to the liberation from sin and death, the latter is only parallel to the former as the dominion of Satan, due to the biblical reference of Rom 8:2. Jüngel, Zur Freiheit, 47 – 49. A more fruitful “rooting” of Luther’s understanding of metaphor would be Luther’s own rejection of

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The other problem concerns Luther’s change of the interpretation of the person of Christ from the logic of supposition to a strict perichoretic exchange of properties between the natures. In the former theory of supposition, integrated and used in the Christological theories of the nominalists Ockham, d’Ailly and Biel, a main theological intention was to restrict the semantical width, say, of the predication “God is man” in order to integrate Christology in the old logic of identity. When the Son of God assumes human nature in Christ, the latter receives an accidental status of the former’s being as person by being carried [sustentans] by the Son of God. The Son of God becomes a suppositum of the assumed humanity, and thereby the true substance or subject of the thing itself.44 The theory of supposition inevitably forces the flowing of natures’ properties within Christ into a fixed identity in a stabilised worldview. Luther’s biting irony in a letter written twenty years later, namely that his adversaries changed the traditional vocabulary of theotokos – or God in Mary’s womb, as he says – for a poor philosophical concept is telling. The problem is not only that the theological qualification is severely damaged through the adoption of the theory of supposition, but that it reflects a wrong interpretation of philosophy, too. If Aristotle were alive, he would have asked who changed his doctrine, Luther claims.45 The implied philosophical critique placing the term iustitia within human forms. Instead it should be placed in the misericordia Dei. By locating the translation of sins in baptism, the reality [substantiam] and all of its powers [vires] are completely removed, as is the reality daily removed: Quid ergo? peccatores sumus? imo iustificati sumus, sed per gratiam. Iustitia non est sita in formis illis qualitatum, sed in misericordia dei. […] Non ergo dicendum, quod baptismus non tollat omnia peccata, vere omnia tollit, non secumdum substantiam, sed plurimum secundum substantiam et totum secundum vires eius, simul quottidie etiam tollens secundum substantiam, ut evacuetur. WA 8,92 – 93. Note the participle tollens which presupposes a present activity : Christ is removing real sins according to their substance, not only according to their accidents. 44 Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch,” 295 f. 45 In a letter from 1541, Luther comments on the consequences for using the theory of supposition in the doctrine of Christ and in the doctrine of the Eucharist. At the colloquy of Regensburg the same year, the Evangelical wing and their counterpart reached consent on a text concerning the Eucharist. But in the final draft, Contarini added that it was in concord with the doctrine of transubstantiation. The German princes wanted to hear Luther’s opinion on the problem of such an understanding. Luther claims that the unionist solution is not only a destruction of Aristotle’s philosophy, but a violation of the correct understanding of the incarnation, too: “Vnd ist hie das ergest, das solch lose geticht komen vnd gegrundet ist ynn der philosophia, ia ynn der falschen vnuerstandenen philosophia, Denn Aristoteles 6. Metha. spricht (hab ichs recht ynnen): ‘Ad propositionem affirmatiuam requiritur extremorum compositio, ad Negatiuam Diuisio &c…’, das ist, Wenn zwey wort ein Ding deuten oder sprechen sollen, mussen sie zusamen gefugt werden, Als Got ist Mensch, Solchen text haben sie also gemacht: ‘Subiectum & predicatum supponunt pro eodem.’ Das lasse ich vnuerdeuscht yhnen vorbehalten, Jst aber die Meinung, das die zwey, subiectum vnd praedicatum, id est, res significata, mussen ein ding sein. Als ‘Hoc est corpus meum’. Hie kan Hoc nicht brod heissen, darumb dass Corpus ein leib heisset. Darumb musse Hoc auch ein leib heissen. Also Hoc est corpus meum: Dis (vernim: Mein Leib) ist mein Leib. Hie mus vnter dem wort ‘Hoc’ oder ‘Dis’ das brod sich verlieren oder transsub-

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shows that Luther – in his own understanding – did not want to be regarded merely as a supplier of soteriological arguments, but as one who tested (Aristotelian) philosophy’s limits on the basis of its own rationale and its legitimate function in theology. To sum up: As early as 1520, then, Luther is not only giving a Christological rationale for the act of justification, but interprets it as a consequence of Christ’s two natures, and their union in the one person.46 It is not possible to extract a kernel of salvation from an alleged husk of Christology from the history of dogma.47 The doctrine of Christ in its Chalcedonian form – but stantiari, nach solcher hohen kunst. Wenn aber Aristoteles solt lebendig solchs gehoret haben, wurde er gesagt haben: ‘Welcher teuffel hat solche grobe esel vnd narren vber mein buch gefuret? Wissen doch die tolpel nicht, was ich substantia, subiectum oder praedicatum heisse.’ Vnd das ist war. Also haben sie auch solche falsche philosophia gebraucht ynn dem artikel incarnationis, Als, wenn ich spreche: Dieser mensch ist Gott, dis kind Marie ist schepffer der welt, oder Dis ist mein lieber son &c.., Solche rede lassen sie nicht bleiben, das Gott vnd Mensch ein ding, oder Marie kind vnd schepffer ein ding sey, Sondern so sagen sie, vnd viel besser: Homo est Deus, idest filius Dei, sustentans humanam naturam, est Deus, Quia necesse sit subiectum & praedicatum pro eodem supponere. Hic filius Deiq, sustentans humanam naturam, est filius meus dilectus. Hic filius Dei, sustentans humanam Natüram in pueritia sua, est creator mundi. Das sol kostlich geredt sein vnd den Christlichen glauben aus der philosophia verteidiget heissen. Aber wenn die Menscheit Christi so verborgen oder vnbekant were, als des brots wesen vnter seiners gestalt, so hette sie sich nach art solcher rede vnd philosophia eben so wol mussen verlieren vnd transsubstantiren lassen als das brot. Denn es ist einerleyt rede vnd regel zureden, Vnd Eutyches, ia der Juden glauben blieben. Aber nu die menscheit Christi bekant vnd da ist, flicken sie die wort Homo, Hic, puer &c.. mit diesem zusatz: Sustentans humanam naturam. Welchs ein fast vngeschickte rede ist, die man dem volck weder sagen noch leren kan, Dazu vnchristlich ist, Quia negat filium Dei Esse hominem actu primo. Sed fingit eum sustentare humanam naturam velut actu secundu, quod est hereticissimum dictum. Solche portenta haben geleret, die vns wollen nu zu ketzern machen. Darumb bleiben wir bey der gemeinen rede, Vbi componuntur Extrema: Homo est deus, Mensch vnd Got ist ein ding.” WA, Br.9, 444 f. 46 ”Das Rechtfertigungsgeschehen im “fröhlichen Wechsel” wird nicht anders begründet als mit der Zweinaturlehre!” Oswald Bayer and Benjamin Gleede, eds., “Das Wort ward Fleisch. Luthers Christologie als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation,” in Creator est creatura. Luthers Christologie als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 8 – 9. 47 Albrecht Ritschl – and perhaps even more his disciples – is one of the most important Protestant theologians in the 19th Century who rejects the connection between metaphysics and theology. The problem for Ritschl is first and foremost found in the question of metaphysics after being itself. According to Ritschl, this presupposes a common epistemology (p. 6). Due to Aristotelian metaphysics, however, it is not possible to draw the most important theological distinction, namely that between spirit and matter, between God and world. The soul of the world lays in the closed succession of cause and effect (p. 7). The problem of the “practice of Neo-platonic metaphysics”as Ritschl labels mystics, is seen in the impossibility to distinguish between being and God, too (p. 25). As a consequence, he calls for a new epistemology without the a priori problems of scholastic theology (p. 60). What is this new epistemology for Ritschl? It is found in Ritschl’s doctrine of God, where he claims that God can only be experienced through his activity [in seinem Wirken]. This activity is not to be found in dialectics or rational thought, but in practical life (p. 15). The influence from Kant is obvious here: The moral cognition of God is not possible before it becomes affected by Christianity. Albrecht Ritschl, Theologie und Metaphysik: zur Verständigung und Abwehr (Bonn, 1881) Cf. Karsten Lehmkühler, Inhabitatio. Die Einwohnung Gottes Im Menschen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2004), 199 – 216, and

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interpreted differently by Luther – is indissolubly interwoven with justification, and the former cannot be separated without destroying the latter.48 From the perspective of this study, it is of interest how Luther qualifies the divine adjectives of Christ: His presence, power and wisdom are not only seen as unconquerable, but as eternal and omnipotent too.49 Luther does not put forward a “milder” version of Christ’s divinity in its exchange with the human nature. He does not promote an ethical tempered anthropology, either. Communion between divine and human nature – even in their extreme disparity – is made possible due to the hypostatic union in the incarnation. Soteriological statements are therefore dependent on a correct Christology by Luther. They cannot be reduced to being merely an imputation from outside, the tendency by Melanchthon which Andreas Osiander famously labelled as “frigid and icecold”.50 Confession concerning Christ’s supper (1528) After 1520, Luther did not further expose his interpretation of the two-nature doctrine and its relationship to the doctrine of justification further, at least not in extenso. In the years that followed, Christology was not an explicit part of the response Luther gave to the other reformers of Wittenberg, such as Andreas Karlstadt, on the question of the Eucharist. That changed, however, with Luther’s treatise of 1527 That these words of Christ, “This is My Body”, still stand against the fanatics. In his treatise against Karlstadt of 1525, Against the Heavenly Prophets, Christology had only played a minor role. But from 1527 and onwards it governed the tenor of Luther’s arguments. Although it could have been fruitful to offer some close reading of That James Richmond, Albrecht Ritschl: Eine Neubewertung (Göttinger Theologische Arbeiten 22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982). 48 As Risto Saarinen has shown, many of the 19th Century interpretations of Luther’s theology were influenced by the German philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817 – 1881), a feature which is particularly visible in their interpretation of how Christ is present. According to Saarinen, Lotze refused any being-in-itself. The primary meaning of a thing is not that it takes up space on earth – and can be understood as an individual – but that it is related to other beings. An important aspect of that relationship is that things affect each other, a thinking which is labled Wirkungsdenken by Lotze. Risto Saarinen, Gottes Wirken auf Uns. Die Transzendentale Deutung Des Gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989), 12. With these ontological presuppositions, it becomes difficult to regard Luther’s insistence on classic Christology as an integrated part of salvation as a credible option. We will see that it is not without precedence, however, particularly in the Christology of Giessen. 49 Kjell Ove Nilsson, Simul. Das Miteinander von Göttlichem und Menschlichem in Luthers Theologie (Forschungen Zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 192ff, esp. 207. 50 […] glacie […] frigidiora […] Andreas Osiander, “Disputatio de Iustificatione,” in Schriften und Briefe 1549 Bis August 1551 (ed. Gerhard Müller and Gottfried Seebass; vol. 9 of Gesamtausgabe; 1551; repr., Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994), Thesis 73.

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these words… seen from the perspective of this study, most of the important arguments are repeated and to a certain extent developed more fully in Luther’s final word in the debate, namely the Confession concerning Christ’s Supper (1528). Given the time limited space available, it seems most fruitful for this study to concentrate on this latter text. Thereby a strategically important internal division among the reformers is treated: That between a more conservative – at least in some respects – Wittenberg theology, the “right wing” of the Reformation, and the more radical “left wing” Reformation connected with the oberdeutsche cities like Geneva and Zurich. The arguments have to be seen against a background where some of the most fundamental questions of the relationship between God and man are raised. If we look at the three classical themes of metaphysics – (a) God, (b) the soul and (c) the world – all of them are touched upon in the course of the debate. (a) Concerning the question of God, it is vital for both Zwingli and Luther to preserve the correct balance between the divinity’s transcendence and immanence. How great a proximity can there be between the Creator and creation? How is God’s presence in the world to be understood? (b) As far as the soul is concerned, one aspect especially stands out. It concerns the epistemological capacity of grasping divine content. Is it possible to attribute any soteriological significance to normal sensory experience? Or should the physical entities such as the elements in the Eucharist be deprived of any spiritual content as elements? (c) Lastly, the debate raised the question of how the relation between philosophical axioms and theological content should be negotiated. For example, one of Aristotle’s central rules of physics – that a physical entity only can occupy one spatial point at a time – was challenged through Luther’s interpretation of Christ’s omnipresent body.

Zwingli’s Commentarius de vera et falsa religione (1526) Through the controversy with Huldreich Zwingli (1484 – 1531), Luther was exposed to a man of considerable philosophical abilities. Together with John Oeclampadius, Zwingli publicly supported the views of Andreas Karlstadt when the latter published his infamous pamphlets against the real presence in 1524.51 However, in contrast to Karlstadt and the group of radicals which has 51 Cf. the interesting use of the heavenly bread in John, chapter 6, by Karlstadt: “Christus verzelet Joan.6. Wie das er eyn hymelisch brodt sey / von oben herraber gekommen / ein warhafftigs Brodt des lebens / ein fleisch / welches für der welt leben solt gegeben werden / das auch alle die jhene lebendig / vnn in Christo bleyben / die sein fleysch essen würde. Das sacramentlich Brodt ist ein irdisch brodt / von vnthen herrauffer gekommen / das kein leben geben magt zc.” Andreas von Bodenstein Karlstadt, Auszlegung Dieser Wort Christi (Basel, 1524), c2b.

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been labelled “Schwärmer”, Zwingli had a more solid philosophical underpinning for his rejection. The break with Luther was made manifest in Zwingli’s Commentarius de vera et falsa religione of 1526; his central theological work where the main features of his theology are presented.52 In this treatise, Zwingli states his sacramental doctrine by referring to how the ancient Roman author Varro uses the word sacramentum. It referred to the pledge which the soldier left on the altar before a battle or a fight. If he won, he would demand it back again. Hence, sacramentum is an oath, which later gains a military-political aspect, too. Soldiers are thereby committed to their empire, both legally and in battle. Although Zwingli states that he does not want to copy the Roman understanding, he nevertheless maintains that a Christian sacrament like baptism is an initiation. There is a strong moral aspect tied to his view: By initiation, he underlines that the initiate is bound to keep the legal prescriptions and then receive the reward [arrabonem] when he or she has completed the race. Initiation is temporally qualified, too: it only applies to the beginning, and therefore man is not perfected or justified by it.53 Baptism is just the start of a longer journey. It is not an existential dimension of the Christian life, which is realising the divine drama of sin and redemption in the believer’s life, as Luther presents it in his great catechism.54 Zwingli’s understanding shows some similarity to the biographical framework found in the traditional scheme of the sacraments, where grace is infused 52 The Commentarius is Zwingli’s attempt of writing a comprehensive presentation of Christian faith, according to a recent interpreter. Martin Sallmann, Zwischen Gott und Mensch. Huldrych Zwinglis theologischer Denkweg im De vera et falsa religione commetarius (1525) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 47. 53 Sacramentum Varroni pignus est, quod litigantes nescio ad quam aram deponebant: & qui vicisset, pignus aut pecuniam suam repetebat. Rursus Sacramentum iusiurandum est, qui usus vocabuli etiamnum apud vulgum Galliarum & Italiae durat. Postremo dicitur & Sacramentum militare, quo milites duci adstringuntur ad imperium eius, iuxta belli ius aut leges. Habent enim & bella leges, sed suas quasdam: iustae enim leges inter arma silent. Nam pro re sacra & arcana apud veteres accipi, non constat. Unde huic acceptioni locum non dedimus. Neque ei, ubi antiqua novi Testamenti translatio pro mysterio sacramentum habet: nam haec vox istam non exprimit, neque scio ut Latina ulla vox lust¶qiom probe exprimat: nam arcanum ad plura extenditur, quam lust¶qiom , sacrum paulo angustius est. Unde adducimur, ut Sacramentum nihil aliud esse videamus, quam initiationem aut oppignorationem. Sicut enim qui ligaturi erant, certum pecuniae pondus deponebant, quod auferri non licebat, nisi vincenti: sic qui Sacramentis initiantur, sese adstringunt, oppignorant, ac velut arrabonem accipiunt, ut referre pedem non liceat. Non dicam hic quam foede ignoraverit quidam quid etiam haec vox initiatio significet, qui ad Epistolam meam, qua dixeram Baptismum initiationem esse, sic respondit, Et si est initiatio, tamen non est perfectio vel iustificatio. Ulrich Zwingli, De Vera et Falsa Religione (Zurich, 1529), 197b. 54 Cf. Luther’s understanding of baptism in his Great Cathecism: “Darümb hat ein iglicher Christen sein Leben lang gnug zu lernen und zu uben an der Taufe; den er hat immerdar zu schaffen, dass er festiglich gläube, was sie zusagt und bringet: Überwindung des Teufels und Tods, Vergebung der Sunde, Gottes Gnade, den ganzen Christum und heiligen Geist mit seinen Gaben.” BSLK, 699, 27 – 34.

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in baptism and the sacramental life of the church is stationed as supporting that basic sacrament. The significant difference, however, lies in Zwingli’s rejection of the sign as transporting some other reality into the receiver’s life. He claims that the sacrament does not have the power to liberate the conscience; it is solely reserved for God.55 One of his main reasons for refusing the sacraments as instruments of God’s grace lies in his effort to preserve God’s freedom. Zwingli locates it to the cold opinion which holds that the sacraments are signs of such nature, that they exercise in man – even create inside man – what the sacraments signify. By this token, the freedom of God’s spirit is restricted. It divides his singular will, that is, to be how, where and when he wants.56

When Zwingli singles out the interior of man as the most problematic sphere where the sacraments are thought to exercise their power, he portrays his convictions about a fundamental difference between the visible and invisible nature. If God is present with his liberating powers in men, he is present in the interior of man. The exclusiveness insisted upon in God’s soteriological work is paralleled with a more fundamental dichotomy between the created things and their relevance for man’s mind. In order to disregard or minimise the element of water compared with God’s spiritual work, Zwingli lists it along with fire, oil, milk and salt. Their rude [crassae] character makes them unable to exercise any liberating power over the mind.57 The strong contrast between mind and matter in Zwingli’s interpretation of the sacraments has been labelled as “platonic”, since the earthly things do not have any spiritual efficacy.58 Although Zwingli repeats the notion of man becoming carnal as opposed to spiritual in his dogmatic exposition of Adam’s fall,59 he nevertheless claims that the soul participates in the sinful state of human being.60 55 Sacramentum ergo, quum aliud porro nequeat esse qu—m initiatio aut publica consignatio, vim nullam habere potest ad conscientiam liberandam. Eam enim solus deus liberare potest, soli enim nota est, solus enim ad eam penetrat: quod satis probatum est in consideratione hominis & Evangelii. Zwingli, De Vera, 128a. 56 Friget ergo ista opinio secunda, quae putat Sacramenta talia esse signa, ut cum exerceantur in homine, simul intus fiat, quod Sacramentis significetur : nam hac ratione libertas divini spiritus alligata esset, qui dividit singulis ut vult, id est quibus, quando, ubi vult […] Zwingli, De Vera, 198a-b. 57 Qui ergo fieret, ut aqua, ignis, oleum, lac, sal, & crassae istae res ad mentem usque pervenirent, quod dum non possunt, quo pacto mundare poterunt? aut quid tandem est mentis mundatio? an aliqua mundae rei contrectatio? sed quid tangere potest mens, aut quid mentem? Quum ergo creatura nulla possit hominem intus & in cute nosse, sed deus solus, relinquitur, quod conscientiam purgare nemo potest, nisi solus deus. Zwingli, De Vera, 198a. 58 Joachim Staedtke, “Abendmahl III/3. Reformationszeit,” in TRE 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977), 113. Staedtke still claims that Zwingli does not offer a strict dualistic option [reinen Dualismus], due to his understanding of the sacraments as signs that witness God’s action. 59 Quod si homo totus caro est, quid quaeso cogitat, qu—m quae carnis sunt? si vero haec solummodo

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Zwingli touches the relation between the Eucharistic doctrine and the doctrine of Christ’s two natures in his exposition of the gospel of John, chapter 6. He takes “the bread from heaven” as the point of departure for his interpretation of the Eucharist, after he has dismissed the adoration of the sacramental elements as abuse.61 The bread comes down from heaven and brings salvation to those who eat it.62 Zwingli underlines, however, that this eating is not sacramentally understood, but solely understood as “believing in the gospel”.63 The bread Christ is speaking about cannot be sacramentally eaten. That is only possible due his status as our salvation, insofar as he is sacrificed [mactatus est] for us. But Zwingli claims that it is not possible to join these aspects of Christ, since it is only possible that Christ has suffered according to the flesh, and saved us according to the divinity.64 The impossible conjunction of the divine nature with the flesh makes it necessary for him to call the bread from heaven a spiritual thing. If one eats that thing, it is solely a foodstuff for the soul.65 Here we are at the heart of the difference between Luther and Zwingli. The problem for Luther with Zwingli’s position is perhaps not so much the concrete interpretation of the bread of the Eucharist as (spiritual) food for the soul, as it is with the Christological rationale lying behind it: In Luther’s perspective, Zwingli’s dualistic notion of spirit and flesh threatens the union of Christ.66 Although it has recently been argued that Zwingli’s doctrine of Christ should be regarded as the pneumatological side of Christology,67 there are

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cogitat, quid aliud qu—m hostem dei agit? Spiritus enim concupiscit adversus carnem, caro autem adversus spiritum. Haec enim sibi mutuo adversantur. Zwingli, De Vera, 167b. Mala igitur mens, malusque est animus hominis ab ineunte aetate: quia caro est, quae sui amans est, gloriae, voluptatis, reique cupida, utcunque dissimulet, quaecunque praetexat. Zwingli, De Vera, 167b. Veremur enim, quod si uspiam perniciose erretur in veri uniusque dei tum adoratione tum cultu, hic fiat in Eucharistiae abusu, quae si germanum, iuxta institutionem Christi, usum servavisset, non irrepsissent tam atrocia scelera in populum dei, Ecclesiam. Zwingli, De Vera, 202b. Panis iste est, qui de caelo descendit, ut qui ex eo edat, non moriatur. Zwingli, De Vera, 204a. Est ergo haec secunda nota, quod Christus hoc capite per panem & edere, nihil aliud, qu—m Evangelium & credere intelligit, quod, qui credit eum pro nobis immolatum, eoque nititur, habeat vitam aeternam, & quod prorsus non loquitur de Sacramentali esu. Zwingli, De Vera, 204a. Christus hic non loquitur de sacramentali esu, nam hactenus tantum est nobis salutaris, quatenus pro nobis mactatus est: at secundum carnem mactari tantum potuit, & secundum divinitatem tantum salutaris esse. Zwingli, De Vera, 204a. Spiritualis res est de qua loquor, non geritur rebus corporeis, sed spiritus spiritum docet: spiritus inquam dei miserum hominis spiritum dignatur ad se trahere, sibi iungere, alligare, ac prorsus in se transformare. Ea res mentem pascit, laetificat, certamque salutis reddit: quod quid aliud est qu—m animae cibus? Zwingli, De Vera, 205a. Cf. Sallmann’s evaluation: “Diese Passage [i.e. Zwingli’s comments to John 6] zeigt eine Grundstruktur von Zwinglis Denken auf, nämlich die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Äusseren und Inneren, dem Rohen und dem Geistlichen.” Sallmann, Zwischen Gott und Mensch, 167. Cf. for instance Locher’s summary “We are bound through the Spirit of God, but God’s Spirit is free. In Christ is he fully at work, in heart of the believers, too. But he is at work elsewhere, too.

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good reasons, drawn from Zwingli’s own writings, to characterise his understanding of reality as spiritualistic.68 In his Antibolon, written against Hieronymus Emser in 1524, Zwingli brings his dualism so far that even the external side of Scripture is disregarded.69 In the exegesis of John 6, Zwingli not only underlines how the disciples of Jesus clung to the visible flesh as Jesus’ enemies did. He even argues that the spiritual things Christ is talking about have nothing to do with corporeal things. The spiritual things are instrumental to man’s transformation into union with the Spirit of God himself.70 Why does Zwingli not allow that kind of intimacy between the divine nature and the flesh? In his exposition of the doctrine of God, which is placed at the outset of the treatise and therefore is the key of his doctrinal system, Zwingli draws his main argument from the story of Moses and the burning bush.71 The revelation of God’s name means that God alone is the being of all things, according to Zwingli.72 He underlines the problems theologians meet when philosophy

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We will see how this interpretation of Pneumatology is closely connected to the character of Zwingli’s Christology” [my translation]. Gottfried W. Locher, Die Theologie Huldrych Zwinglis im Lichte seiner Christologie (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag Zürich, 1952), 61. Cf. further Fritz Schmidt-Clausing, Zwingli (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), 84 f. Leppin suggests the more neutral term “Ontology of the Spirit” [Geist-Ontologie], but the meaning of the term is the same as Spiritualism, as far as I can see. Volker Leppin, “Zwingli, Ulrich,” TRE 36 (2004): 802. In his comments on the Church, De Ecclesia, Zwingli already at the outset underlines the difference between a carnal and a spiritual understand of ecclesia in the Old Testament. In the conclusion of the section this distinction between a carnal and a spiritual side of the Church is the main argument against Rome. The mode of the Word – which defines the Church for Zwingli – is placed in the minds of the believers: Si inquam in ecclesia de clavibus fiat dissensio, ut Pontifices sibi vendicent, sacerdotes item sibi, verbum autem ad hunc modum expensum, soli deo vendicet: quis erit in ecclesia fidelis, qui non aperte videat hanc sententiam esse & verissimam, & certissimam, si claves solius verbi esse cognoscantur, & eius modo verbi, quod creditum in mentibus fidelium sedet: & quod Apostoli nihil aliud faciunt, quam quod claves adferunt, hoc est verbum dispensant? Nam aliae duae sententiae carnem resipiunt, quamvis altera magis altera. Pontificis enim sectatorum ita carnem resipit, ut ea non modo mentem, sed & penerem omnium fidelium circumscripserit. Sic ergo iudicat quaevis ecclesia de verbo, quod coram se proponitur. Sed quo iudicat? Verbo fidei, quod intus per spiritum doctum est in animis fidelium. Iudicium ergo hoc peculiaribus ecclesiis non ita tribuitur, ut solis tribuatur : est enim ecclesiae Christi sponsae. Ulrich Zwingli, Adversus Hieronymum Emserum Canonis Missae Adsertorem Huldrychi Zuinglii Antibolon (1524; repr., Zurich: Christoph Froschauer, 1545), 197a. Spiritalis res est de qua loquor, non geritur rebus corporeis, sed spiritus spiritum docet: spiritus inquam dei miserum hominis spiritum dignatur ad se trahere, sibi iungere, alligare, ac prorsus in se transformare. Zwingli, De Vera, 205a. Neuser underlines that the revelation of God’s name plays a less important role in the definition of God in the later systematic works of Zwingli, but they still retain De Deo as the part of departure. Wilhelm Neuser, “Dogma und Bekenntnis in der Reformation: Von Zwingli und Calvin bis zur Synode von Westminster,” in Die Lehrentwicklung im Rahmen der Konfessionalität (ed. Carl Andresen; vol. 2 of Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 180. […] quo verbo [i.e. the tetragram] indicavit se solum esse rerum omnium ESSE Zwingli, De

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serves as premise for their doctrine of God, and frames the argument as a difference of proportions: To measure the infinite and eternal God with the worldly tools is compared with believing a beetle could explain what man is.73 At the end of the chapter on God, Zwingli assures the reader that he has not based his views upon human persuasions, but solely upon divine utterances.74 Nevertheless, he does not distinguish profoundly between faith and notitia Dei, but sees truth as a unity, regardless of the kind of religion. As a consequence, the fourth chapter of the outline on Christian religion follows immediately after the chapter on religion in general. Although an evaluation of Zwingli’s understanding of God as a mere “logical deduction of a philosophical concept of God”75 may be an exaggeration of the older research tradition on Zwingli, the understanding of an apathetic God is part of the premise for theological rationale in this period.76 In his treatment of Christology, Zwingli investigates why Mary had to be a virgin when she gave birth to Christ. First, Zwingli points to the divine nature of Christ which could not be united with anything sinful.77 There is no reflection on whether Mary herself could be a problem in that respect. Zwingli

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Vera, 163a. Zwingli says that this interpretation of the tetragram is plausible over against his alternative interpretation, a mere “He that is” [qui est]. The alternative would not justify the need for distinguishing God from the other beings: Qui est, ut is sit ESSE rerum omnium, & solus sit, non distinxisset se dominus ab aliis quae sunt: quamvis ex ipso sint, & per ipsum, adhuc tamen sunt Porro, quid deus sit, tam ex nobis ipsis ignoramus, quam ignorat scarabeus quid sit homo: imo divinum hoc infinitum & aeternum longe magis ab homine distat, qu—m homo a scarabeo, quod creaturarum quarumlibet inter se comparatio rectius constet, quam si quamlibet creatori conferas. Zwingli, De Vera, 162b. Unde nemo sic obiicere potest, quasi humanis persuasionibus nixi, cognitionem dei. Zwingli, De Vera, 166b. Paul Wernle, Der evangelische Glaube nach den Hauptschriften der Reformatoren. Bd. II. Zwingli (Tübingen, 1919), 304. Locher’s point, that “ein philosophischer Gottesbegriff kann nicht Mensch werden” and therefore should be regarded as useless for a description of Zwingli’s Christology, misses the mark. The notion of an apathic God is shared by most theologians of the Reformation. The question is whether God’s incapability of suffering is overcome by the sending of the Son. Locher, Theologie Zwinglis, 43 – 44. See for example Luther’s admonition to affirm both the apathy of the divine and the exception due to the personal union in Christ: “Ob nu hie die alte wettermecherynn fraw vernunfft / der Alleosis grosmutter / sagen wu(e)rde / Ia die Gottheit kan nicht leiden noch sterben / Soltu antworten / Das ist war / Aber dennoch weil Gottheit vnd menscheit ynn Chrsto eine person ist / so gibt die schrifft / vmb solcher personlicher einickeit willen / auch der Gottheit / alles was der menscheit widderferet / vnd widerumb […] Martin Luther, Studienausgabe (Hans-Ulrich Delius; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1979), 82,21 – 83,2. Primo quod ipsius divinitas nullam peccati labem sibi iungi ferre potuit, quemadmodum superius dictum est. Deus enim tanta lux est, puritas, innocentia, bonitas, ut secum tolerare nequeat, quicquid aliqua parte tenebricosum, impurum, contaminatum, aut malum est: mundissimam ergo ab omni labe nativitatem eius esse oportuit, quod is qui nascebatur, deus quoque esset. Zwingli, De Vera, 175b.

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has a strong reading of Psalm 51 as a normative statement on the sinful status of a Christian. It suggests that sexual intercourse was the prime transmitter of Adam’s original sin. Secondly, Christ had to be born of a virgin due to his status as a sacrificial lamb. It is necessary for him to be spotless, not only in the fleshly manner, like the priests in the old covenant, but according to the spirit, too.78 This marks a different accent of the interpretation of Christ than Luther’s view. Whereas Luther points to the salvific presence of the almighty God in the form of a human being, Zwingli is rather presenting Christ as the one sent to free the fleshly bound souls and make them spiritual beings.79 In his exposition of the Eucharist, Zwingli accentuates the disparity between spirit and flesh by underlining that “the flesh profits nothing” in refusing the bodily presence of Christ.80 These words from the gospel of John 6:63 are repeated so often that it is tempting to label his use as a recurring mantra. On the other hand, Zwingli attributes soteriological significance to the flesh of Christ, but that applies solely to his sacrificial death.81 The Jews have the dubious honour of having the habit of always “clinging to the visible flesh”,

78 Secundo, propter hostiae naturam: eam enim alienam esse oportebat ab omni macula, ut Moseos lex habet, quae tamen ad carnis emundationem solummodo valebat, Heb. 9. quanto magis eam, quae pro peccatis omnium, tam qui fuerant quam qui venturi erant, perlitavit, illibatissimam esse oportuit? Zwingli, De Vera, 175b-176a. Neuser underlines the importance of Anselm’s theory of the atonement for Zwingli, but points out that the solution between iustitia Dei and misericordia Dei is solved in the concept of God himself. As summum bonum is God both just and merciful, and Zwingli summarizes law and gospel under the concept of God’s will. Neuser, “Handbuch,” 187 – 88. 79 […] spirituales ex carnalibus facere mittebatur. Zwingli, De Vera, 175b. 80 By that interpretation, Zwingli sees himself in line with Berengar of Tours (998 – 1088), who was forced to state that the corporeal and essential body and blood of Christ was present in the Eucharist. Zwingli, De Vera, 205a-b. Berengar claimed – wrongfully, it appears – that Ratramnus taught a mere “symbolical” understanding of Christ’s body’s presence in the Eucharist. According to Roger Beraudy’s study from 1953, Ratramnus’ wanted to state a more nuanced interpretation of the presence of Christ than Paschasius’ claim. Whereas Paschasius taught a straightforward identity between the Eucharistic body of Christ and the historical body of Christ, Ratramnus insisted on a difference in the mode of appearance. He claimed that in the historical appearance, Christ was present in veritate, while the Eucharistic presence was in figura. This was not be merely “symbolically” understood by Ratramnus, but more as a veil, hiding the real present Christ. Jean de Montclos, “Berengar von Tours,” in TRE 5 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980), 598 – 601. Even if that may be a historically correct interpretation, Berengar’s main issue was the same as the intention of Ratramnus: To challenge the identification of the historical body of Christ with the body in the Eucharist, even if Berengar went further in emphasising the spiritual element. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600 – 1300) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 192. Pelikan shows how Berengar contrasted the resurrected Christ as immune against change with the chewing of the communicants’ teeth. As a main biblical reference, Berengar used Paul’s statement in 2 Cor 5:16 to show that Christ is no longer known according to the flesh. 81 Caro Christi omnimodo plurimum imo immensum prodest, sed ut diximus caesa, non ambesa. Caesa nos servavit a caede, sed comesa penitus nihil prodest. Zwingli, De Vera, 205a.

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instead of coming to grips with what Jesus said, according to Zwingli.82 On the other hand, the Jews are offended by the thought that visible flesh should be eaten, but their alleged legitimate rejection is met by Christ’s exposition of the flesh as not important to the interior, according to Zwingli. It is only the Spirit which vivifies the mind.83 Another mark of continuity with Jewish thought lies in Zwingli’s insistence on divine election of man in order to be saved.84 That insistence is at the same time a critical instance against applying faith in anything which rests upon our decision or election. Our election comprises the Eucharist, too, since faith is defined as hope, which is removed from the senses. Zwingli sees the Eucharistic practice as problematic if any kind of certainty is promised through that human practice, since it relies on the senses. Therefore there is an essential disparity between believing without and perceiving by the senses.85 As Zwingli interprets it, the Eucharist seems to be more of a problem for faith because of its material visibility. These arguments rely on a strong dual notion of the human make-up, where spirit and body are kept strictly apart, even to the extent that they are mutually exclusive.86 We will later see how Luther will continue to distinguish between visibility and invisibility to portray the fundamental difference between faith and disbelief. Luther does not parallel it to the difference between material and spiritual content, as Zwingli does. He rather sees the invisibility in line with Hebrews 11:1, as an inner conviction of the content of hope, whereas visibility points to the rejection of that content because of its lack of appearance to the senses.

82 Iudaei enim, cum semper haererent ad visibilem carnem, Christum potius deserebant, quam benigne docentem vellent intelligere […] Zwingli, De Vera, 205a. 83 Nihil enim aliud Iudaeos offendebat, qu—m quod corpoream visibilemque carnem edi oportere arbirrarentur : at errori eorum occurrit Christus, & dicit carnem penitus nihil prodesse, spiritum esse qui mentem vivificet […] Zwingli, De Vera, 207b. 84 Neuser sees the doctrine of predestination as the root [Wurzel] of Zwingli’s spiritualistic attitude. Neuser, “Handbuch,” 179. 85 Ubi tamen bis falluntur : Primo, quod fidem putant ab hominis iudicio & electione proficisci. Falluntur ergo hic: nam tametsi fides sit spes & fiducia in res quasdam a sensu remotissimas, non tamen constat nostro iudicio aut electione: sed hae res, quibus adferimus spes nostras, ipsae faciunt ut in se spes omnes referamus: nam si nostra electione aut consilio fideles red deremur, possent omnes homines propriis viribus fideles fieri, etiam impii. Cum ergo fides nec a sensu aut ratione proficiscatur nec in res sensibiles tendat, facile deprehenditur quomodo secundo loco errent. Secundo ergo sic errant, quod fidem ad res sensibiles trahunt, & per istas certitudinem adferre perhibent, cum nihil sit opus […] Disparata igitur sunt, credere & sentire. […] Zwingli, De Vera, 206a. 86 […] sic enim diversa sunt Corpus & Spiritus, ut utruncunque accipias, non possit alterum esse. Zwingli, De Vera, 206b.

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The Christological questions involved in the controversy with Zwingli Luther developed his interpretation of Christ’s unio personalis during the Eucharistic controversy with the enthusiasts and the Swiss theologians.87 As early as 1518, however, in his exposition of Psalm 110, Luther underlined that the ascended and elevated Christ reigned according to his human nature, too.88 In his “Sermon on the body and blood of Christ” (1525) it is repeated,89 but the context is changed, and the connection between external word, sacrament and incarnation is underlined. Luther explains that Mary was pregnant by hearing God’s Word and believing it. The philosophically determined opposition between the divine, spiritual sphere and the human, fleshly element is thereby challenged.90 87 Gottfried Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk. Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus. Zweiter Theil. Die Person des Mittler. (Erlangen: Theodor Blaesing, 1857), 309. It should be noted that the author, Gottfried Thomasius, was one of the key figures in articulating a kenotic Christology in the middle of the 19th Century. Although he was a part of the neo-confessional Erlangen-school, he maintained a preference for the Giessen solution. Thomas R. Thompson identifies three strategies for doing that: First, Thomasius insisted on a personal mode of the divine being, where the divine essence is compatible with self-abandonment. Secondly, Thomasius distinguished between a divine potentiality in Christ, which, at the time of self-emptying is stripped of its divine actuality. Thirdly, Thomasius claimed that the relative attributes of divinity which were present in the incarnated Christ, were (essentially) the same as the immediate attributes. Thomas R. Thompson, “The Waxing of Nineteenth Century Kenoticism,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God (ed. C. Stephen Evans; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 78 – 85. 88 ”Und also sitzt und regieret Christus nach der menschait biß an den jungsten tag, biß an denselben legt got sein feind on underlaß nider, Aber denn wirt Chritus sein regiment übergeben dem vater, und got wirt selber regiern ewig, und wirt sein in ainem yeglichen allerlay. Das ist nitt anders nach außlegung sant Augustins, dann das Cristus yetz nach der menscheit regiert im glauben, aber denn wirt der glaub aufhoern, und offenbar werden got selber, in woechs beschawung die saeligkait ewig weren wirt.” WA 1, 693. 89 ”Item wir glewben, das Jhesus Christus nach der menscheit sey gesetzt uber alle creaturen und alle ding erfulle, wie Paulus sagt Ephe. 4. Ist nicht allein nach der Gottheit sondern auch nach der menscheit ein Herr aller ding, hat alles ynn der hand und ist uberal gegenwertig. Sol ich nu den geistern folgen, die da sagen, es schick sich nicht, so mus ich Christum verleugnen. Wir lesen von Stephano Acto. vij., das er sprach: ‘Ich sehe die hymel offen und Jhesum stehend zur rechten des vaters’. Wie sihet er Christum? Darff die augen nicht hobe empor werffen. Er ist umb uns und ynn uns an allen orten. Davon verstehen yhene nichts, sprechen auch, Er sitze zur rechten Gottes; was es aber ist, Christum gen hymel faren und sitzen, wissen sie nicht. Es gehet nicht also zu, wie du auf steigest auff einer leitern yns haus, sondern das ists, das er uber alle creaturen und yn allen und ausser allen creaturn ist. Das er aber leiblich hinauff genomen ist, ist geschehen des zum warzeichen.” WA 19,491b. 90 “Wie kumpt nu die Muter dazu? Sie weis von keinem man und ist yhr gantzer leib beschlossen, noch entpfengt sie ein recht natuerlich kind mit fleisch und blut ym leib. Ist da nicht mehr wunder denn ym brod und wein? Wo kompt es denn her? Gabriel der Engel bringt das wort ‘Sihe du wirst schwanger werden ym leibe und einen son geperen’ etc. Mit diesen worten kompt Christus nicht allein yn yhr hertz, sondern auch yn yhren leib, als sie es horet, fasset und glewbet.” WA 19,490b.

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Zwingli’s Amica exegesis (1527) Zwingli opened the literary controversy with his Amica exegesis of 1527. Zwingli’s main intention is to mark the difference between the reference of the words of institution to the visible and sensible body and blood of Christ, on the one hand, and the lack of that visible-sensible reality in the liturgical practice of the Church, on the other. This alleged disparity between the words’ reference and their possible meaning causes Zwingli to develop his symbolic interpretation of the words of institution.91 Zwingli states that such a symbolical interpretation can be found in Scripture itself, such as the recollection of Pharaoh’s dream of seven fat and seven meagre cows. The phrase “This is my bread” is a sign, signifying him who was surrendered for our sake.92 Hence, Zwingli uses a narrative framework to weaken the intimacy between word and thing. Christ is therefore not transported to those participating in the Eucharist in any physical sense, but their minds are given a referential story.93 Here, Zwingli makes an interesting distinction concerning epistemology. The sensual and visual way human beings experience the world makes it necessary for the intellect to aggregate an understanding of sacramental bread as the body of Christ. If one solely digests the bread, only the reference to the empirical things remains. This observation is supported with a reference to the temporal aspect of the elements: They have a tendency to fade away, and are therefore not able to preserve the believer in Christ.94 By this comment, 91 Si enim verba haec simpliciter & absolute citra omnem tropum intelligi debere contendemus, iam Christi corpus visibiliter & sensualiter manducandum erit. Nam HOC EST (inquit) CORPUS MEUM, QUOD PRO VOBIS TRADITUR. Atqui nullum invisibile & sensu carens corpus, sed visibile illud & sensibus praeditum, pro nobis traditum est: idem ergo hoc & tale omnino manducari necesse est, cum illud ipsum corpus esse dicat, quod pro nobis tradendum sit. Ulrich Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, Id Est, Expositio Eucharistiae Negotii (1527; repr., Opera D. Huldrychi Zuinglii, Vigilantissimi Tigurinae Ecclesiae Antistitis; Zurich: Christoph Froschauer, 1545), 368b. 92 HOC […] EST CORPORIS MEI signum, quod pro vobis in mortem traditur &c. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 369a. 93 For a detailed study on the commemoration of Christ in the Eucharist, cf. the chapter on Zwingli in Dorothea Wendebourg, Essen zum Gedächtnis: Der Gedächtnisbefehl in den Abendmahlstheologien der Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 70 ff. Interestingly, she claims that the statements concerning the Eucharist are so few and scattered as notes in the margin, that it hardly plays any important role in his theology before the controversy against Luther. Still, commemoration [Gedächtnis] is the main category of his interpretation of the Eucharist (p. 73). As opposed to Luther’s understanding of the Eucharist as promissio, instrumental to present salvific communication, must the communicant in Zwingli’s interpretation be satisfied with a reference to the historical event on the cross (p. 80). 94 Verba enim haec, HOC EST CORPUS MEUM, illud omnino dicere videntur, ut panem hunc Christi corpus esse intelligamus. Quod si vero hunc sensum recipere convenit, ut panis substantia permaneat fieri nequit, & Roman pontificem bene sentire fatendum erit, quod manifeste falsum

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Zwingli widens the gap between the invisible, eternal world and the fluctuations of the visible world. Zwingli sees only two possible solutions for the problems that he claims are connected with Luther’s position. Either he will acknowledge the Papist solution of transubstantiation – which follows from the simple, absolute interpretation of the words95 – or he must defend that the “hoc est” refers both to bread and body. The last option is deemed untenable, both for philosophical and scriptural reasons.96 Presented with Luther’s Eucharist doctrine, Zwingli wants to discuss what kind of “thing” faith brings about, that is, the nature of presence.97 Luther’s Christology was already challenged in the introduction. Zwingli claimed that the insistence on an external element would jeopardise the doctrine of justification. To him, the connection between Christology and Eucharist would mean the destruction of the Reformation slogan “faith alone” and a return to the old understanding of the role of human deeds. Any external location of power [vis] would blur the biblical understanding, according to Zwingli. This is highlighted by a reference to Luther’s interpretation of the gospel of John, where he is attacked for not sticking to the rules of Christology. Interestingly enough, Zwingli points out that these are alleosis, Christ’s natures and even the exchange of properties [idiomatum commutationem]. Zwingli claims that Luther and his followers predicating things that belong solely to divinity to humanity, and things that belong to humanity to divinity, is a grave mistake. According to Zwingli, this does not only blur the gospel of John, but downright despises it.98 If Zwingli even accepts the exchange of properties, how can he criticise Luther for blurring the line between humanity and divinity? One of the main problems for maintaining too close a proximity to Christ’s natures lies in the

95 96 97 98

& vanum est. Panem enim hic, non carnem, subesse & visu & reliquis sensibus in universum percipimus. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 269b. What Zwingli means by simplex & absolutus is not quite clear. It seems to me that Zwingli understands simplex as identical to sensus literalis in the fourfold interpretation, and that absolutus serves to point out the exclusiveness of that sense. Deinde altera illa propositio, qua hoc idem panem simul & Christi corpus esse dicunt, nec divini verbi testimoniis, nec philosophicis rationibus probari & defendi potest. Ut enim duae substantiae diversae res eadem sint fieri nullo modo potest. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 369b. Primum, putant de quacunque re fidem habeas, aut pkgqovoq¸am eam esse natura praesentem […] Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 328a. Si enim sola fides non absolute beat citra omnem exterorum vim, iam ad opera reciditur. Ubi tot prodeunt, qui scripturae, vi, cui tamen vim interim non parvam faciunt, perfecturos promittunt, quod si efficerent, de nobilissima novi testamenti parte actum esset. Tolle enim Ioannis Evangelion, solem mundo abstulisti. Porro qui naturas in Christo confundunt, non iam per alloeosim, naturarumque & idiomatum commutationem, sed vere de humana praedicare volentes, quod divinae modo est: & de divina, quod humanae tantum: hi Ioannis evangelium non iam obscurant & foedant, sed conculcant, quemadmodum processu ostendemus. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 324b.

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question of adoration.99 Zwingli is concerned with protecting divinity as the sole address of worship. Although he explicitly rejects any sympathy with Arius (Christ is both human and divine),100 he distinguishes between the Christ whose seat is in heaven, and the Christ who is present in believers. One cannot worship the Christ as present in the believers’ hearts, because he is inferior to the Christ sitting at the right hand of God.101 Zwingli’s solution is an interpretation called alleosis. He traces the concept [tropus] back to Plutarch, and claims that it covers his interpretation of Christ’s two natures and their relation.The use of alleosis, Zwingli claims, signifies that the violence done to the peculiar artefacts of each nature would be kept at a minimum in the exchange of properties.102 As an example of how it works as a hermeneutical tool, Zwingli points to John 6:51, where Jesus says that the bread that he will give to the world, is his flesh. Using alleosis, flesh refers to the human nature alone. Insofar as the divine nature is meant by Jesus, it is restricted to the spiritual bread.103 The two natures are connected and united to the extent that they have become two perpetual qualities [ingenium] of the person of Christ, except for the sinfulness, of course.104 Through the ages, God’s holy men have left traces of how they imagined the union of the natures to be. Among them, it is particularly the comparison to the image of iron and fire that occupies Zwingli. He admonishes the reader to stick to them, rather than following the claim of Luther that (Christ’s) flesh is in the bread.105 The divinity of Christ in human clothing is like the fire that consumes the sword. It is the divine nature that enters the mind [mentem] and dwells there, whereas the human nature is 99 Cf. the headline of one of Zwingli’s main sections: AD EA QUAE IN LIBRO DE ADORATIONE SACRAMENTI SCRIPSIT LUTHERUS. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 343b. 100 Nunc autem nemo omnium praeter Arrium docet Christum solummodo hominem esse, sed deum & hominem. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 345a. 101 […] discrimen facis inter Christum, qui ad dexteram dei sedet, & inter eundem, quum in mentibus fidelium est: atque adseris superne ad dexteram hac lege esse, quo magis: inferne autem in cordibus fidelium, quo minus adoretur, tot absurda sequuntur, quot hic sunt apices. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 345a. 102 Habent enim hoc omnes peculiare artifices, ut ei sint paulo iratiores, qui suae artis voces non probe tenent. Est ergo \kko¸ysir quantum huc attinet, desultus aut transitus ille, aut si mavis permutatio, qua de altera in eo natura loquentes, alterius vocibus utimur. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 350b. 103 Ut cum Christus ait, Caro mea vere est cibus, Caro proprie est humanae in illo naturae, attamen per commutationem hoc loco pro divina ponitur natura. Quatenus enim filius dei est, eatenus est animae cibus: ait enim, Spiritus est qui vivificat. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 350b. 104 Has autem duas naturas sic in unam hypostasim aut personam iunxit & univit, ut tamen utraque ingenium suum perpetuo servet: hoc uno excepto, quod illa ad peccandum propensio longissime ab eius humanitate abfuit: non enim e vitiato semine prognatus est, sed spiritu sancto matrem virginem foecundante. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 351a. 105 Alii ferrum igne inflammatum: eo enim si lignum aut aliud corpus caedas, simul vulnus infligi & adustionem: utriusque naturae vim, vitam, naturam, ingenium, operationem isto simili ostendere volentes. Quam tu ab eis similitudinem, si fateris, accepisti: si negas, surripuisti: atque ad adserendam carnem in pane, detorsisti Luthere. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 351a.

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hungry, suffers and dies. Drawing the anthropological consequence, Zwingli asks what the bread could possibly exercise in the soul.106 Although this may not be one of Zwingli’s best illustrations, I will argue that it pinpoints the dualism underlying his theological arguments: By localising the divine nature solely in the mind, he preserves that nature from being touched by the incompatible artefacts of human life, such as hunger, suffering and death. It is perhaps even more striking that such a dualism is seen as a feature of Zwingli’s more general anthropology, where the distance between mind and body is underlined. The sharp distinction between the natures corresponds to Zwingli’s understanding of the relation between mind and body. In every respect, Zwingli leaves open the question of what communicatio idiomatum means, if the two natures of Christ are placed with such a great distance between them. As mentioned before, it is the understanding of central passages of Scripture that supplies Zwingli and Luther with their respective theological arguments. The key of interpretation called alleosis distributes the different Christological description in two directions, but confronting Luther it seems only to work as a restriction on applying divine properties to the human nature. When a mighty deed is reported, for example, when Christ says that he has the power to put down his life for mankind, it is solely attributed to his divine nature. The same applies to the sayings about the oneness between the Father and the Son.107 Zwingli claims to have support from the confession of Athanasius in this respect, particularly the understanding of the incarnation as God assuming human nature into him.108 By sticking to Athanasius, each nature retains its specifics, without being violated by the other. Zwingli not only interprets the assumption of the human nature from a chronological perspective – that the incarnation was an initiative from the divine nature –, but regards the divine nature as the remaining principal agent in the union of the two natures. When Luther attributes the divine properties to humanity, he brings disorder into everything [omnia confundere], according to Zwingli. This argument is used against Luther’s interpretation of Christ’s body, particularly his interpretation of this body as omnipresent. It follows from that, according to Zwingli, that the elect fill everything.109 Why this is a 106 Quamvis parum prudenter : gladius enim incensus ut secat & adurit, sic Christi divinitas miracula facit, mentem intrat, isthic habitat: & humanitas esurit, dolet, ac moritur. At quid oro panis operatur in anima? Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 351a. 107 Ioan 10. Potestam habeo ponendi animam meam, atque iterum sumendi eam, Divinitatis est, non humanitatis: illa enim dicebat, Si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste. Ibidem, Ego & pater unum sumus, ad divinam naturam pertinet. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 351b. 108 Non enim sic deus est homo factus, ut qui deus erat, in hominem sit conversus: sed qui prius homo non erat, hominem adsumpsit. Dicimus ergo deum esse hominem factum, qui & eundem quem adsumpsit hominem, fecit pro eo quod est, Adsumpta est humana natura a filio dei. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 351a. 109 Et tu dicis Christi corpus esse ubique? Sequetur igitur, quod ubicunque Christi sit humanitas,

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necessary consequence of the omnipresence of Christ’s body points to an interesting feature which distinguishes Zwingli’s Christology as compared with Luther’s, namely the inability to make a distinction between meritum, which applies only to Christ and his work, and distributum, which applies to the grace which is distributed.110 Zwingli’s soteriological framing of the person of Christ seems to include all believers in his human nature. Such an interpretation is possible due to the strict rejection of all divine properties ascribed to human nature. Christ is, Zwingli asserts, according to his human nature, not more than the rest of us. One of the difficulties Zwingli faces in the gospel of John concerns the idea that death will lead to a glorification. In Zwingli’s system, death pertains only to human nature but it is only the divine nature that can receive glorification. How does Zwingli interpret the glorification of the Son of man, then?111 He warns against interpreting the glorification as pertaining to the divine nature. That would only lead to an impossible conclusion, namely to negate for Christ the possibility to die. The concept of alleosis, however, allows Zwingli to recommend an interpretation implying that the human nature alone was glorified.112 The ancient liturgical formulas “God’s son has been killed” and “The Lord of glory has been crucified” do not take into account that death is reserved for human nature, and that an implication of the divine nature as participating in death would contradict the very essence of such a nature.113 Therefore, the old apathetic notion of God is not overcome by the union of God and man in Christ, according to Zwingli. At the same time, he states that it is impossible to ascribe a reign to the human nature. When Luther breaks these rules, Zwingli claims that he is destroying the intellect.114 Alleosis helps Zwingli to soften other implications – which he considers excessively harsh – of the unionist Christology. When Jesus is reported to claim that “he that seeth me seeth him that sent me” (John 12:45), Zwingli

110 111 112

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isthic sint etiam electi. At ista secundum te est ubique, omnia implet. Oportebit ergo electos quoque ubique esse. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352a. For Luther’s response to this lack of distinction, see below. Zwingli notes the question himself: Et quomodo tu dicis, Oportet exaltari filium hominis: Quis est iste filius hominis? Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352a. Vide ut pinguiculi isti, ad tropum tamen capiendum sint nobis ingeniosiores: intelligunt enim ipsum per exaltandi verbum de moriendo loqui. Isti ergo cum negent posse mori Christum, ipse vero adserat, fit manifestum eum quam celerrime de una natura ad aliam translire. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352a. Sicut ergo, etiamsi sexcenties dicatur : Dei filius occisus, aut: Dominus gloriae crucifixus, nunquam tamen intelligitur deitas quicquam esse passa, sed sola humanitas […] Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352a. Perinde enim nequit humanitas regnare, atque divinitas mori: etiamsi is, qui regnat, homo sit, & is qui moritur, deus: facileque admittamus, Filius hominis sedet ad dexteram & regnat: ac, Dei filius est pro nobis mortuus, propter naturarum unionem: intellectus tamen ista nunquam confundit. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352a.

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claims that seeing should be interpreted as a cognitive act.115 By using alleosis he claims that such a statement refers to the divine nature alone, which remains accessible through a mental process of cognition and is excluded from any direct sensorial experience. Zwingli’s interpretation of seeing as a reference to an isolated mental process corresponds to his understanding of the Holy Spirit. He does not have any visibility, but replaces the presence of Christ with his invisibility. If consolation should be assigned to the corporal presence in the Eucharist, what is left for the Spirit? Zwingli asks rhetorically.116 Had Christ not departed, would the Comforter not have arrived?117 The interpretation of Christ’s ascension is seen under the perspective of alleosis, too. Zwingli underlines that the report of the ascension in Acts 1 only pertains to the human nature of Christ, because the divine nature cannot depart.118 Zwingli underlines the spatial narrowness of the seat “at the right hand of God” which excludes Luther’s idea of Christ’s body filling everything. It is necessary that the assumed human nature of Christ remains in one place [uno in loco esse], and Zwingli denies the possibility of the human nature to be anywhere else.119 Zwingli lists five arguments [probationes] for his view. First, sound philosophy would agree with the necessity of the circumscriptive nature of a (human) body.120 Secondly, he affirms that philosophy or the order of things is valid from a Christian understanding of God and his relation to creation. 115 Deum em nemo vidit unquam. Quomodo igitur viso Christo videtur pater? Cognito Christo cognoscitur pater: non secundum hominem sed secundum deum. Non est enim nisi unus deus. Sive ergo patrem, filium, aut spiritum sanctum cognoscas, deum cognoscis. Hinc fit manifestum quo modo superius verbum, Si cognovissetis me & patrem meum utique cognovissetis, non possit de cognitione humanae naturae intelligi. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352b. 116 Spiritus autem non habitavit visibiliter inter eos, iam suapte sponte sequitur eum tam de visibili quam invisibili corporis abitione locutum esse. Et nos consolationem corpori tribuimus, quae spiritus modo est? Quid spiritus missione opus erat, si corporea praesentia & coenitatio omnia praestat. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 352b. 117 Si enim non abiero, paracletus non veniet. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 353a. 118 At ipsa divinitate deserere non potest, qui dixit, Ego vobiscum sum usque ad consumationem saeculi. Restat ergo quod humanitas sola sit ablata. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 354b. 119 Adsumptus est igitur Christus homo in caelum, qui deus nunquam illinc abierat. Sedet autem — dextris dei. Hoc tu Luthere inter miracula numeras, quum nihil miraculi debueris pati: ex sequela enim (quam tu negas, nimirum quod isti eam parum Latine concomitantiam vocent) quum dicis, Corpus eius ubique esse: omnia implere, potuisti intelligere nullo stupore dignum esse, quod etiam ad dexteram dei sedet. Breviter nos eum scimus isthic sedere, hoc est versari, esse, vivere, laetari, exhilarare fratres adoptivos: & sic esse sive situm sive circunscriptum, ut uno in loco esse oporteat. Unde negamus aliubi esse posse […] Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 354b355a. 120 Christus ipse tot locis, quorum non paucos iam adduximus, corpus suum circumscripsit, sive abitione, sive ad dextram sessione, ut circumscriptum esse, nullus magister melius docere ulla philosophia potuerit. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 355a. It is not quite clear whether Zwingli was aware of the Aristotelian background of that doctrine, but I assume that as Magister of philosophy from Basel he would have known the questions implied through his training as a scholastic philosopher.

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Whereas God alone can be thought of as infinite, angels and human beings are by nature circumscriptive.121 Third, Zwingli rejects an interpretation of Christ’s body as entering into divine omnipresence as a consequence of the resurrection. It is Luke’s report of what the angels said to the women at the empty grave which serves as proof: “He is not here, but risen”. This is incompatible with any notion that the circumscriptive characteristics of the human body should be annulled, says Zwingli. Fourth, all of the appearances of Christ after his resurrection never suggest that he was present in more than one place at a time. Considering both reports, in the gospel of John and in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, Zwingli underlines the successive order of his appearances. Jesus standing on the shore when the disciples came back from fishing is mentioned as an example of his body occupying only one place.122 Fifth, the promise of Christ that “where I am, there ye may be also” (John 14:3) is interpreted as pertaining to the human nature of Christ. In Zwingli’s opinion the divine nature by necessity implies a lack of a circumscriptive aspect, which without the promise would not be understood. It seems that unless the spatial distance between the men of Galilee and theined future place of Christ serves as a premise, the promise would have no meaning, according to Zwingli.123 In other words: Since circumscription is necessary for interpreting the promise of Jesus, it pertains solely to the human nature. To sum up Zwingli’s attack on Luther : The arguments of the reformer of Zurich follow from his fundamental distinction between spirit and matter. A main corollary of that distinction is his conception of a faith which does not depend on the senses, but is accessible through mental cognition. The same applies to the interpretation of the elements in the Eucharist. If the Eucharist is not observed strictly according to the boundary between divine and human, both theology and sound philosophy will suffer. As the fundamental Christological tool, Zwingli uses the concept alleosis as a key for distinguishing between the natures in Christ.

121 Nam & si divinitas sit ipsa infinitas, quae nimirum nulla circumscribi ratione potest, adhuc tamen circumscriptae sunt omnes intellectuales creaturae, quae apud eum sunt, alio modo quam hic simus in ipso. In isto igitur loco aut modo, ubi se deus infinitus, finitissimis intellectualibus creaturis fruendum & pascendum praebet, agnoscimus Christum secundum humanitatem ad dextram patris sedere: circumscriptum perinde atque angeli & homines circumscripti sunt. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 355a. 122 Quarto, probant hoc omnes apparitiones eius, quibus se post resurrectionem manifestavit. Constituit a mortuis excitatus, sese visibilem quidem atque contrectabilem praebere discipulis, nunquam tamen istud taliratione fecit, ut simul in diversis locis appareret: quemadmodum apud Lucam ult. Ioan. 20. & Paulus 1. Cor. 15. videre licet, ubi omnes apparitiones succedente tempore leguntur esse factae. Et istud quod Ioan. ult. scriptum est, quomodo in littore stetit, cum discipuli tota nocte verriculum inane verrerent usque sub auroram, circumscriptionis nota est. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 355a. 123 Viri Galilaei quid statis adipicientes in caelum? Hic Iesus, qui adsumptus est a vobis in caelum, sic veniet quemadmodum vidistis eum euntem in caelum. Zwingli, Amica Exegesis, 355a-b.

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Luther’s response in Confession concerning Christ’s Supper (1528) Luther faced an important political challenge with the writings of Oecampladius and Zwingli. Whereas the conflict over baptism with the prophets of Zwickau and Karlstadt just concerned a small group, the problems of the Eucharist involved major parts of the Reformation movement, particularly those inclined to humanism.124 The term “humanism” refers to a broad literary movement, as seen in the standard curriculum known as the studia humanitatis,125 but its affinity to a philosophy with strong spiritualistic strains is hard to neglect. Luther’s controversy with Erasmus and the views stated in De servo arbitrio (1525) did not strengthen his reputation among the humanists.126 Zürich did not have a university, but its reformers exercised a considerable influence in the areas that were part of the Reformation movement but were inclined to a more spiritualistic understanding of the Eucharist than were the reformers of Wittenberg. Among the former was the important imperial city of Strasbourg, where Martin Bucer (1491 – 1551) and Wolfgang Capito (1478 – 1541) were the leading – and humanist inclined – theologians. In addition there was a shift in popular understanding of Luther, particularly after his comments on “the most massive and widespread popular uprising before the 1789 French Revolution” in Europe, namely the Peasants’ War of 1524 – 5.127 His vehement reaction against the peasants and their rebellion had tempered his reception among the “common” men and women, to say the least. Even if the intention of Luther was – as one of his recent biographers observed – to preserve the gospel free from being applied

124 Brecht, Martin Luther, 2, 286. 125 Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Humanism,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner ; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 113. Studia humanitatis consists of grammatica, rhetorica, poetica, historia and philosophia moralis. In other words, it omits logica from the medieval trivium, the whole quadrivium, and adds litterature, history and ethics to the standard curriculum. For a thorough summary of the debate of the concept ‘humanism’, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), particularly chapter 1 and 5. 126 Luther’s attempt to obliterate choice or will as a fundamental anthropological category coram Deo must have been a particular hard case to sell to the humanist movement, at least of the Erasmian sort. This is perhaps at best illustrated by the image of human being as a mule or pack animal, rid either by God or the Devil: Sic humana voluntas in medio posita est, ceu iumentum, si insederit Deus, vult et vadit, quo vult Deus, ut Psalmus dicit: Factus sum sicut iumentum et ego semper tecum. Si insederit Satan, vult et vadit, quo vult Satan, nec est in eius arbitrio ad utrum sessorem currere aut eum quaerere, sed ipsi sessores certant ob ipsum obtinendum et possidendum. WA 18, 635 For a thorough interpretation of the wide ranging consequences of that view, see the study by Reinhuber : Reinhuber, Kämpfender Glaube. Studien zu Luthers Bekenntnis am Ende von De servo arbitrio, 31 – 61. 127 Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation (New York: Viking, 2004), 158.

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through violence,128 this was not how it was perceived. Through his pamphlet “Admonition to peace” Luther denied the peasants the theological justification of their social upheaval, although he supported their claims for social justice by appealing for moderation among the princes.129 When the peasants executed Count Ludwig of Helfenstein outside the gates of Weinsberg on Easter Sunday, 1525, it spread shock and panic throughout Germany.130 In Luther’s response, the infamous pamphlet “Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants”, Luther demanded the princes to use force against the rebellion.131 Apart from these strategic matters, Luther had an opportunity to clarify the philosophical implications of his Eucharistic doctrine and the presence of Christ. Although personal problems and occupation with other duties delayed its completion, he was able to have his book printed in time for the important Frankfurt book fair in the spring of 1528. An appeal to rationality One of the basic assumptions of Luther is not only the possibility to state a biblically founded doctrine for the Church, but to claim public validity for that claim as a truth. Scriptural truth is evident, removed from any autonomous sphere of subjective believers and given to the Church Catholic for it to keep.132 128 Brecht, Martin Luther, 2,176. For a similar analysis, cf. Gottfried Maron, “Bauernkrieg,” TRE (1980): 328. 129 “Die ander artickel, so leybliche beschwerunge anzeygen, alls mit dem leybfall, auffsetze vnd der gleichen, sind ia auch billich vnd recht, Denn oberkeyt nicht drumb eyngesetzt ist, das sie yhren nutz vnd mut willen an den vnterthanen suche, sondern nutz vnd das beste verschaffe bey den vnterthenigen, Nu ists ia nicht die lenge treglich, so zu schetzen vnd schinden, Was hulffs, wenn eyns bawrn acker so viel gulden alls hallmen vnd korner trüge, so die oberkeyt nur deste mehr nemen, vnd yhren pracht damit ymer grosser machte, vnd das gutt so hyn schlaudert, mit kleyden, fressen, sauffen, bawen vnd der gleichen, als were es sprew, Man muste ia den pracht eynzihen vnd das ausgeben stopffen, das eyn arm man auch was behallten kunde?” WA 18, 299. 130 Erich Weismann, Die Eroberung und Zerstörung der Stadt Weinsberg und des Schlosses Weinsberg im Bauernkrieg. Eine Rekonstruktion der Vorgänge nach zeitgenössischen Augenzeugenberichten (Weinsberg: Verlag des Nachrichtenblattes der Stadt Weinsberg, 1992). 131 Perhaps the most interesting point Luther made, was describing the Prince not only as the bailiff of God, but also as a servant of God’s wrath: “Denn eyn Fuerst und herr mus hie dencken, wie er Gottes amptman und seyns zorns diener ist Ro. 13, dem das schwerd uber solche buben befolhen ist.” WA 18, 360. Given the apocalyptic description which Luther regarded fitting of the chaos society was facing, his famous and problematic call for violence is perhaps understandable. It was, after all, a request which had protection for the weak as the ultimate goal: “Drumb, lieben herren, loset hie, rettet hie, helfft hie, Erbarmet euch der armen leute, Steche, schlahe, wu˚ge hie, wer da kan, bleybstu dru˚er tod, wol dyr, seliglichern tod kanstu nymer mehr uberkomen, Denn du stirbst ynn gehorsam goettlichs worts und befelhs Ro. am 13. und ym dienst der liebe, deynen nehisten zurretten aus der hellen und teuffels banden.” WA 18, 361. 132 In an important article, Hägglund distinguishes between two different types of evidence by

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This community presupposes a rational acquisition of doctrinal statements, according to Luther. On the subject at stake, he is not offering his own version of the interpretation of the words of institution, but claims it to be the only possible interpretation. The text is clear, so is the interpretation of it. The words are there for cognition just to be harvested.133 If a central passage in Scripture should be interpreted contrary to the ordinary rules of language, the burden of proof is placed upon those who introduces the new interpretation. When Karlstadt, Oecolampadius and Zwingli disagree over what the pronoun “this”, in the sentence “this is my body”, refers to, Luther claims that the rationality of an ordinary use of language is at least threatened, if not broken.134 Logic’s principium contradictionis135 serves for Luther as a restriction on the possible plurality given in central theological texts. Although Luther acknowledges the right to speculate on the Eucharist at Luther, the evidence of trustworthiness and the evidence of interpretation. Hägglund points out that Scripture itself is evident as source and principle of all doctrinal statements for the Church. The evidence of trustworthiness is evidence which is accessible for all. When Luther cites Augustine in his Captivitate Babylonica (1520) as such: […] veritate ipsa sic capitur anima, ut per eam de omnibus certissime iudicare possit, sed veritatem iudicare non possit, dicere autem cogatur infallibili certitudine, hanc esse veritatem, it is the old school of rationality which is quoted, namely the object as primary in the act of accessing truth. Scripture is evident because it has an axiomatic nature, prior to any subjective evaluation of the object. The object creates understanding by being presented to the observer. Luther understands this in analogy to an arithmetic rule, as, say, 3+7=10. Another analogy is the principium primum, the first principles of philosophy. But that type of evident does not suffice to describe the evidential character of Scripture. The appeal to “Schrift und helle Vernunft” [Scripture and clear reason] has to be complemented by the work of the Holy Spirit. It does not leave faith as a mere opinion. One can have opinions about many things that are not evident. A Christian needs to know, however. A Christian needs to know that faith is grounded in the Word of God, particularly in extreme situations, such as on a death bed. Luther avoids the threatening plurality of interpretation by referring to the “the natural order of language”. The use of the tongue, usus linguae, or the grammatical structure of any language is based on an assumption that there exists a common understanding which makes communication possible. This applies to matters of faith, as well. Language’s natural order marks the limit for investigation. Here one meets hard ground. If the rationality of his contenders is used, it will not only be problematic due to the doctrinal implications, but would also lead to a breakdown of human communication. Cf. Bengt Hägglund, “Evidentia sacrae scripturae. Bemerkungen zum ‘Schriftprinzip’ bei Luther,” in Vierhundertfünfzig Jahre Luth. Reformation. FS Franz Lau (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 116 – 25. For Luther’s citation of Augustine, cf. WA 6, 561. 133 “Denn Christus wort / mu(e)ssen gewis vnd klar sein / sonst hat man sie freylich nicht / Wir aber haben ia gewissen text vnd verstand / vnd einfeltige wort / wie sie da stehen / vnd wir sind nicht vneins dru(e)ber.” Luther, StA4, 28, 15 – 17. 134 “Als Carlstad spricht. Tuto zeige auff den sitzenden leib. Zwingel sprich / dasselbige Tuto zeige auffs bord. Nu kans beydes nicht war sein / Einer mus liegen vnd des teuffels lerer sein / Denn ynn einerley rede / kans nicht sein / das einerley namen odder wort zugleich zween widderwertigen verstand vnd deutunge habe.” Luther, StA4, 30,6 – 10. 135 H. Kolb and Joachim Ritter, ed., “Satz vom (ausgeschlossenen) Widerspruch,” in Band 8 (Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie; Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1992), 1202 – 6.

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will in other circumstances, the liturgical implications of the words of institution make it necessary to tighten the limits of interpretation. It ought to be simple, single-minded, straightforward, and secure. If not, the church is threatened with schism.136 One could argue that academic freedom, understood as the right of the individual to speak freely, is here confronted with the need for ecclesiastical clarification. It is important, however, to be aware of the instrument by which that clarification is reached, namely by an appeal to rationality, which in this case means the given structure of an ordinary language.137 How crucial this structure is to Luther can be seen from his insistence on human words as carriers of God’s decree. God “ties” his word to our use of language, Luther claims. He even ties the content of his revelation, namely his promise, to this ordinary language.138 It is therefore possible to appeal to a given, an external clarity, which it is not possible to reduce to subjective opinion(s).139 It seems important to underline this aspect at the outset, because Luther frequently uses the word reason [Vernunft] as a polemical word in this treatise.140 For Luther, as we shall see, it points to the use of certain philosophical arguments where it is necessary for theology to retain its autonomy, and to rely solely on the witness of Scripture. A constructive element – which may be the most important hermeneutical achievement of the Reformation – concerns the implied empowerment of all

136 ”Wir go(e)nnen yhn wol / das sie auch anders wo vom sacrament reden / wie sie wo(e)llen odder ko(e)nnen. Aber den text ym abendmal wo(e)llen wir eynerley / einfeltig / gewiss / vnd sicher haben ynn allen worten / syllaben vnd buchstaben. Weil sie das nicht thun / So schliesse ich frey / das der teuffel aller vneinigkeit vater / sey yhr lerer.” Luther, StA4, 33,9 – 13. 137 See for instance Luther’s response to the accusation of a “symbolism”, where the common aspect of language use is fixed as tradition. There are exceptions to these rules, of course, but the exceptions have to be carefully argued for : “[…] die grammatici / dazu auch alle Christliche lerer verbieten / man solle nymer mehr von gemeiner alten deutunge eins worts tretten vnd newe deutunge an nemen / Es zwinge denn der text vnd der verstand / odder werde aus andern orten der schrifft mit gewalt beweiset / Sonst wu(e)rde man nymer mehr keinen gewissen text / verstand / rede noch sprache behalten […]” Luther, StA4, 44,9 – 14. 138 ”Wenn sie nu fragen / Wo ist die krafft / die Christus leib ym abendmal mache / wenn wir sagen / das ist mein leib? Antwort ich / Wo ist die krafft / das ein berg sich hebe vnd yns meer werffe / wenn wir sagen / Heb dich vnd wirff dich yns meer? freylich ist sie nicht ynn vnserm sprechen / sondern ynn Gottes heissen / der sein heissen an vnser sprechen verbindet.” Luther, StA4, 54, 15 – 19. For this complex, cf. Thomas Wabel, Sprache als Grenze in Luthers theologischer Hermeneutik und Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 268 ff. 139 Friedrich. Beisser, Claritas scripturae bei Martin Luther (Forschungen Zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1966), 84 – 86. 140 Cf. where Luther tracks the origin of alleosis to (a particular kind of) reason. “Ob nu hie die alte wettermecherynn fraw vernunfft / der Alleosis grosmutter / sagen wu(e)rde / Ia die Gottheit kan nicht leiden noch sterben / Soltu antworten / Das ist war / Aber dennoch weil Gottheit vnd menscheit ynn Christo eine person ist / so gibt die schrifft / vmb solcher personlicher einickeit willen / auch der Gottheit / alles was der menscheit widderferet / vnd widderumb / vnd ist also in der warheit […]” Luther, StA4, 82,21 – 83,3.

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people to study the Bible.141 Due to the clarity and public nature of Scripture, everyone can take part in assessing the content – there is no need for an additional gift of the Spirit.

The definition of Christ’s body To support his understanding that Christ’s body is absent from the Eucharist, Zwingli pointed to the ascension and the different parts of Scripture as referring to the absence of Christ. An absence of the body raises a problem for the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, and Luther accuses him of making a logical fallacy here. According to Luther, one has to differentiate between the mode of presence Christ had when he was walking around in Palestine, and the mode of presence he has in the Eucharist. His syllogism would probably be as follows: Major premise: All human bodies are visible to the senses. Minor premise: Christ’s body is not visibly present to the senses in the Eucharist. Conclusion: Christ’s body must be present in another mode in the Eucharist.

If a distinction between the modes of presence is missing, we will end up with a four-term fallacy, according to the Wittenberg professor. Luther claims that Zwingli’s alleged fallacy is caused by the fact that he subsumes the substance of the term – that is, the bodily aspect of Christ’s presence – under an accidental mode. We will return to what that differentiation actually means. Let us first see how Zwingli’s argument goes, as Luther sees it: Major premise: All human bodies are visible to the senses. Minor premise: Christ’s body is not visible to the senses in the Eucharist. Conclusion: Christ’s body must be absent in the Eucharist.

What has happened here? Zwingli’s basic assumption is that it is possible to exclude the bodily dimension but still retain Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. The problem, then, is that the body is regarded as accidental to his presence. It can be removed without taking away the substance or reality of the thing. Hence, Zwingli ends up with four terms by splitting up Christ into his bodily presence and his spiritual presence. Luther, on the other hand, regards the body as a substantial aspect of Christ’s presence. The only solution to the problem seems to be different modes of appearance: 141 Walter Sparn, “‘... hinein, hinein, liebe Christen’. Ein bibelhermeneutischer Aufbruch,” in Aufbruch zur Reformation. Perspektiven zur Praxis der Kirche 500 Jahre danach (ed. Alexander Deeg; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007).

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[…] “This is my body which is given for you.” It is not true that his body is in the form in which it was given for us, for it was given visibly for us. This we answered above, showing that this spirit makes a quality out of a substance, by a very faulty syllogism in which there are four terms, no universal premise, no essential predication, no distributed middle, and many other faults, for logicians know full well that “an accidental term cannot be subsumed under a substantial term […] We do not say that Christ is present in the same form [Gestalt] in which he was given for us […] but it is the same body which was given for us, not in the same form or mode [Weise], but in the essence [Wesen] and nature.142

To maintain continuity in essence or nature between the historical body of Christ and the body which is consumed in the Eucharist, Luther regards it not only as possible, but even essential to state the fleshly presence of the latter. To regard the flesh of Christ as a substantial element of his person is indirectly suggested by the reference to the logical mistake in subsuming accident under substance. The modes which Luther proposes for Christ’s presence are three scholastic modes which Biel refers to in his Collectorium, namely circumscriptive, diffinitive and repletive.143 Gabriel Biel (1420 – 1495) was an influential 142 “[…] Das ist mein leib / der fur euch gegeben ist / Nu ists nicht war / das sein leib sey / wie er fur vns gegeben ist / denn er ist sichtbarlich fur vns gegeben. Hierauff ist droben geantwortet / wie der geist aus Quod / quale macht / viciosissimo syllogismo / in quo quatuor termini / nullu(m) dici de omni / nulla predicatio in quid aut distributio / vnd viel ander vicia wie die logici wol wissen / das sub termino substantiali non potest subsumi accidentalis […] Wir sagen nicht / das ym abendmahl Christus leib sey / wie odder ynn welcher gestalt er ist fur vns gegeben […] sondern es sey der selbige leib / der / odder welcher fur vns gegeben ist / nicht ynn der selbigen gestalt odder weise / sondern ynn dem selbigen wesen vnd natur”. Luther, StA4, 65,10 – 20. (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt), 1979. 143 Supponitur etiam ex Textu quod aliquid tripliciter contingit esse in loco: Scilicet commensurative sive circumscriptive, cuius scilicet partes commensurantur partibus loci. Quo modo corpus quantitative est in loco. Secundo modo terminative sive definitive, quod scilicet est realiter, ubi est locus, non natum simul esse alibi indifferenter ; sive quod sic certo loco terminatur, quod existens in illo non est simul aptum natum esse in alio loco distanti ab illo. – Dicitur notanter “aptum natum”, quia etsi corpus vel spiritus per potentiam Dei possit replicari in diversis locis, ut corpus Christi in sacramento, hoc tamen non est secundum propriam aptitudinem, quia potentia supernaturalis non confert aptitudinem in natura. Hoc modo spiritus angelici et animae rationales sunt in loco. Et iste modus est superior ad primum. Tertio modo repletive, quod scilicet, licet realiter sit in certo loco per indistantiam, non tamen terminatur illo loco, quin simul sit in omni alio loco, etiam secundum propriam naturam. Quod altero primorum duorum modorum est in loco, dicitur locale et secundum locum mutabile; sed non quod est in loco tertio modo. Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. Hanns Rückert; Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), 1,677. Peter Lombard had originally classified the presence of God in a threefold manner, too: Quod Deus in omni re est essentia, potentia, praesentia, et in sanctis per gratiam, et in homine Christo per unionem. Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), 263. His definition of the modes of presence was structured according to a binary logic scheme of body and spirit, however : Quibus modis aliquid dicatur locale vel circumscriptibile. Duobus namque his modis dicitur in Scriptura […] quod secundum alterum

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professor of theology and a follower of William Ockham. He was considered the principal representative of the via moderna,144 and his work was thoroughly read by Luther.145 In one of Luther’s first major published works, his Disputation against the scholastic theology of 1517, Gabriel Biel was the major target of his critique. It should be pointed out that Luther first and foremost presents the scholastic modes because of the alleged ignorance of those whom he labels “Sacramentarians”, who apparently only know of one mode of presence. The three modes are not absolute in a strict sense, but are possible explanations of how God is present.146 When Luther subsumes the modes of presence under the concept of God’s freedom, does it mean that the cosmological implications of his Christological doctrine are alien to his soteriological concern? The interpretation of Luther in Neo-Protestantism,147 with its focus on the diastatic notion on a metaphysical theology (scholasticism) on the one hand, and the personal relatio on the other hand, seems to affirm such an interpretation.148 First of all, circumscriptive or localiter presence corresponds to the place a body occupies when it is located at a certain spot. Luther gives this example: When you hold a piece of wood in a barrel of water, it displaces the water according to its size.149 This is, in other words, in accordance with the principle of bodies laid down by Aristotle in his Physics, and can be used to describe a

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modum nec localis nec circumscriptibilis est, secundum alterum vero est; corpus vero omnino locale et circumscriptibile; Deus vero omnino inlocalis et incircumscriptibilis. Lombard, Sententiae, 1, 270, 12 – 13. Biel studied at Heidelberg, Erfurt and Cologne, and had a profound knowledge of both viae, although his preference for the moderna is repeated so often that it has become a truism. Still, he held Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great in high esteem cf. Oberman, Harvest, 10 – 12. In fact, several studies of the intellectual climate in the early sixteenth century suggest that the differences between the two viae are minimal, if they exist at all. Cf. Johannes Haller, Die Anfänge der Universität Tübingen 1477 – 1535 (Stuttgart, 1927), 1,173. Luther had quite early written down his marginal notes on Biel’s Collectorium after he got hold of the 1514 Lyon edition. Leif Grane, Contra Gabrielem. Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam, 1517 (Acta Theologica Danica; Kopenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 14. ”Solchs alles habe ich darumb erzelet / das man sehe / das wol mehr weise sind / ein ding etwo zu sein / den(n) die einige begreiffliche leibliche weise / darauff die schwermer stehen […]” Luther, StA4, 90, 1 – 3. Cf. Hartmut Hilgenfeld, Mittelalterlich-traditionelle Elemente in Luthers Abendmahlsschriften (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1971), 218. Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit (ed. Volker Drehsen and Christian Albrecht; Kritische Gesamtausgabe / Ernst Troeltsch; Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 9. Althaus, Paul. Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 22 – 23. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1962. “Erstlich ist ein ding an eym ort circumscriptiue odder localiter / begreifflich / das ist / wenn die stet vnd der corper drynnen sich mit einander eben reymen / treffen vnd messen / gleich wie ym fas der wein odder das wasser ist / da der wein nicht mehr raumes nympt / noch das fass mehr raumes gibt / denn so viel des weins ist / Also ein holtz odder baum ym wasser nicht mehr raumes nympt noch das wasser gibt / denn so viel des bawmes drynnen ist.” Luther, StA4, 88, 2 – 7.

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human being occupying space. Luther claims that Zwingli’s mistake is his reduction of the modes of presence to this principle.150 Luther follows Thomas Aquinas, too, in the rejection of any use of this quantitative dimension of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. But the important difference between them concerns the function it has in the argumentative structure: Whereas Thomas considers circumscriptive presence to be the permanent accident in the Aristotelian scheme,151 Luther asserts that it cannot be applied to Christ post mortem, according to the biblical report. For Luther, a qualification of the presence of Christ as circumscriptive would limit the freedom of being everywhere.152 It is not possible to understand Christ’s body after the resurrection as restricted to a singular place. Therefore, the normal spatial restriction on bodies does not apply to this particular body of Christ. These two aspects are of vital importance and must be held together. On the one hand, there is the biblical report that Christ’s presence breaks the rules of physics. However, it cannot be integrated and harmonised in the old scholastic scheme of substance and accident, according to Luther, as that would lead to a new restriction of the content. What does that imply for the understanding of communicatio idiomatum? Theologically interpreted, the body’s circumscriptive presence does not belong to the essential properties of humanity in a restrictive, philosophical sense. When the properties are exchanged in the person of Christ, this – which for Luther is a nonessential aspect – is omitted. But that does not imply that Luther defines the body as foreign to the essential features of humanity. On the contrary, it is the integration in the place, in loco with the creatures, which is the point of Luther’s rejection of the Swiss spiritualism.153 If Luther wants to retain the spatial sense of a bodily presence without submitting it to a restrictive, philosophical sense, what is his alternative? It seems as if his theological definition of Christ’s body is rather characterised by what could be called a fluid quality. It is not bound to a particular place but is 150 “[…] das er [sc. Zwingli] von Gott vnd Christo nie nicht anders gedacht habe / denn nach der ersten leiblichen / begreifflichen weise […]” Luther, StA4, 95,20 – 22. 151 Hilgenfeld, Mittelalterlich-traditionelle Elemente, 184 – 86. 152 “[…] Was gauckelt er [Der Geist, Zwingli] denn von dem aller ho(e)sten wesen und weise / da Christus mit Gott eine person ist / das daselbst sich die menscheit muste ausdenen vnd Gott vmbzeunen / wo sie solt mit Gott allenhalben sein? on das er damit seine grobe / fette /dicke gedancken anzeigt / das er von Gott vnd Christo nie nicht anders gedacht habe / denn nach der ersten leiblichen / begreiffliche weise” Luther, StA4, 95,17 – 21. 153 Cf. “Darnach ficht er [i.e. the Swiss spirit] an / das Christus nicht an o(e)rten sich verbunden hat / noch hie odder dort wil gefunden sein / sondern ym geist erkennet werden. Da rausschen sie abermal vber hin / vnd sehen nicht was ich schreibe widder sie. Ku(e)rtzlich / Wer bindet Christum an sonderliche o(e)rt? Thuns nicht die schwermer selbs / die vns Christum ym hymel an sonderlichen ort setzen / vnd zwingen vns zu sagen / Sihe hie / sihe da ist Christus? Vnd wie thun sie selbs / wenn sie die leute zum Euangelio vnd zum nehisten weisen? Ist nicht der nehest vnd das Euangelion an sondern orten auff erden?” Luther, StA4, 161, 7 – 10.

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rather in a state of flux, an apt description for the event of communication which happens between the two natures in that person. That fluid state of being leads us over into the second mode, the diffinitive mode. Secondly, when a thing has diffinitive presence, it refers to a place [Ort], but that which fills it [drynnen ist] does not have any dimensions in traditional physical understanding. It is therefore beyond comprehension [unbegreifflich]. Luther refers to the angels and demons, and to the peculiar mode of presence Christ had after his resurrection, as it is reported in the gospels. One should note the reference to the scriptural witness at this point, because Luther is trying to draw some metaphysical implications which function as a necessary support or basis for the biblical narrative. Perhaps one could say that the six thousand devils occupying a man, as reported in Matthew 8, demanded some reflection on the spatial basis of their location. The concept provides Luther with continuity between the two spheres: It belongs to the creature insofar as it is a body, but as a glorified body it transcends the limitations which a normal body has.154 It is characterised without quantity [Quantitätslosigkeit], as a modern interpreter aptly pointed out.155 The place retains its normal quality ; however, it is qualified quantitatively, unlike the thing that fills it. The door of Christ’s grave, which Christ passed through, did not expand, nor did the body of Christ shrink. A significant feature of how dependent Luther is on the biblical narrative can be observed from his conclusion: If this happened, why should there be any obstacles to understanding Christ’s two natures according to another scheme of presence than the diastatic divinity=everywhere and humanity=somewhere? Did humanity expand and divinity shrink when Christ passed the stone? Luther rhetorically asks.156 It points to a more fundamental function of the theology by Luther : His 154 Jensen places the diffinitive and the circumscriptive modes on the side of creature, whereas the repletive mode is regarded as being on the Creator’s side. The structural reason for this sharp distinction is Luther’s “axiomatic difference” between Creator and creation. It seems to miss the point, however : The glorified body functions as a bridge, precisely to avoid the diastatic notion of a Creator at distance with his creation. A distinction between Creator and creator is more a point of departure for the theological tradition of Luther. In Christology, the main problem for Luther’s unionistic interpretation is rather the enormous gap created by the nulla proportio assumption of Ockham’s Christology. A solution of the natures’ communication in Christ as paradoxical might have been possible for the existential theologians of the 20th Century, but hardly tenable for a Luther of the 16th Century. Oddvar Johan Jensen, Kristi person. Til betydningen av læren om Kristi person i Martin Luthers teologi 1520 – 1546 (Bergen, 1987), 172 – 73. 155 Hilgenfeld, Mittelalterlich-traditionelle Elemente, 219. 156 “Gieng doch Christus durch verschlossene thu(e)r mit seinem leibe / vnd die thu(e)r ward dennoch nicht ausgedenet /noch sein leib eingezogen / wie solt denn hie die menscheit ausgedenet / odder die Gottheit eingezeunet werden / da viel ein ander vnd ho(e)her weise ist?” Luther, StA4, 93,20 – 24.

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interpretation of the incarnation has fundamental philosophical implications or premises, as his opposition to Zwingli reveals. Compared with Gabriel Biel, Luther omits the reference to the rational soul as an example of this mode of presence. That is understandable, if we consider Luther’s insistence on the body as a substantial element in the human makeup.157 Christ could walk through closed doors, but also appear comprehensible [begreifflich] in particular places. This is finally connected with Christ’s voluntary ability to be at the place he prefers.158 But the argument of omnipotence does not function as an alternative to the omnipresence of Christ. The argument of Christ’s voluntary action does not seem to be restrictive towards his repletive presence, as if Luther thought of doubling its ontological status or intensifying his presence at a given time and place. It rather has an epistemological function: Through his will, Christ makes his omnipresence accessible to human senses. This is regulated through his promissio in the Eucharist, but his freedom towards creation opens up a possibility, namely a revelation of Christ to the senses in addition [daneben] to that of liturgical regulation.159 Thirdly, a thing can have repletive presence, which is everywhere. This is not possible to grasp by reason and is qualified as supernatural [übernatürlich]. Luther reserves it for faith in the Word alone, referring to Jeremiah 23:24, where God is said to fill heaven and earth.160 Whether it should be understood

157 Hilgenfeld refers to Pierre d’Ailly who considers the rational soul (anima intellective) as an example of modus diffinitiue. Hilgenfeld, Mittelalterlich-traditionelle Elemente, 195, n. 51. 158 “Zum andern ist ein ding an eim ort diffinitiue / vnbegreifflich / wenn das ding odder co(e)rper nicht greifflich an eim ort ist / […] Der ort ist wol leiblich vnd begreifflich / vnd hat seine masse nach der lenge / breite vnd dicke / Aber das so drynnen ist / […] ia es hat gar keine lenge odder breite / So lesen wir ym Evangelio / das der teuffel die menschen besitt vnd ynn sie feret / vnd furen auch ynn die sew / Ia Matth. 8. stehet / das ein gantz Legion ynn einem menschen waren / das waren bey sechs tausent teuffel / Das heisse ich vnbegreifflich an eym ort sein / Denn wir konnens nicht begreiffen noch abmessen / wie wir die Co(e)rper abmessen / vnd es ist doch wol an dem ort / Auff solche weise war der leichnam Christi / da er aus dem verschlossen grabe fur / vnd zu den iungern durch verschlossene thu(e)r kam / wie die Euangelia zeigen / Denn da ist kein messen noch begreifen / an welchem ort / sein heubt odder fusse sind gewest / da er durch die steine fur / und muste doch ia herdurch / da nam er keinen raum / so gab yhm der stein auch keinen raum / sondern der stein bleib stein / gantz und fest / wie vor / vnd sein leib bleib auch so gros vnd dick / als er vor war / Er kondte doch daneben / wie er wolte / sich auch begreifflich an o(e)rten / sehen lassen / da er raum nam von dem ort vnd sich abmessen lies / nach seiner gro (e)sse / Eben also ist vnd kan auch Christus ym brod sein / ob er gleichwol daneben / sich kan begreifflich vnd sichtbarlich zeigen / wo er wil […]” Luther, StA4, 88,13 – 89,22. 159 The epistemological function is underlined by Staedke, too, cf. Staedtke, “Abendmahl III/3. Reformationszeit,” 112 – 13. 160 “Zum dritten / ist ein ding an o(e)rten Repletiue / vbernatu(e)rlich / das ist / wenn etwas zu gleich gantz vnd gar / an allen o(e)rten ist vnd alle o(e)rte fullet / vnd doch von keinem ort abgemessen vnd begriffen wird nach dem raum des orts / da es ist. Diese weise wird allein Gotte zu geeigent / wie er sagt ym Propheten Ieremia / Ich bin ein Gott von nahe vnd nicht von ferne Denn hymel vnd erden fulle ich (et)c(etera). Diese weise ist vber alle mas vber vnser vernunfft

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as a higher level attained gradually from diffinitive presence is perhaps true,161 but of more importance for this study is the understanding of God as defined as of the utmost closeness to and distant from the creatures, a definition which is applied to the body of Christ, too:162 You must place the essence of Christ, insofar as he is one person with God, far away from the creatures, as far as God is above creation. At the same time you must place him as deep and close in all creatures as God is in them, because he is an inseparable person with God. Where God is, there he must be, too. If not, our faith would be false.163

God is not only present in all reality with his creational activity164 and above it, but the body of Christ must be placed there, too. The last remark shows how central the intimacy between God and the assumed body of Christ is for the theology of Luther,165 and can perhaps explain the dramatic dogmatic consequence which Luther drew at the Colloquy of Marburg – even to the more moderate theologians of Strasbourg – a year later : “Our spirit is not the same as yours”.166 Of crucial importance for all the different modes, however, is Luther’s insistence on the freedom Christ has in relation to the laws of physics.167 It seems as if the cosmological argument of the different modes forms a possible explanation of the presence of Christ. Its function within the controversy with Zwingli seems to be restricted to offering some philosophical plausibility to his, but the main argument is theology’s freedom from a fixed cosmological framework at the same time as a real corporal presence of Christ is underlined.168 When Zwingli regards the gap between Christ in heaven and his

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vnbegreifflich / vn mus allein mit dem glauben ym wort behalten werden.” Luther, StA4, 89,27 – 90,1. Hilgenfeld, Mittelalterlich-traditionelle Elemente, 223. “So hat nu Christus einiger leib dreyerley wesen odder alle drey weise etwo zu sein /”. Luther, StA4, 95, 27 – 28. “Denn du must dis wesen Christi / so er mit Gott eine person ist / gar weit weit ausser den Creaturn setzen / als Gott drynnen ist / Denn er ist ein vnzertrennete person mit Gotte / Wo Gott ist / da mus er auch sein / odder vnser glaube ist falsch /”. Luther, StA4, 96,22 – 97,2. Cf. Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 99 ff. Cf. Senn’s apt conclusion: “What ultimately concerned him [Luther] in his conflict with the “fanatics” was the fact that “they divide the two natures of the person of Christ”.” Frank C. Senn, Christian Liturgy : Catholic and Evangelical (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), 309. “Ich bin euer Herr nicht, euer Richter nicht, so reymet sich unser gayst und euer gayst nichts zusammen, sonnder ist offenbar, das wir nicht ainerley gayst haben […]” Walther Kohler, Das Religionsgespräch zu Marburg 1929 ([N.p.], 1929), 129. “Vnd gewaltiglich aus der schrifft erzwungen ist / das Christus leib nicht mu(e)sse allein begreifflich odder leiblich an eym ort sein / da er raum nympt vnd gibt / nach seiner gro(e)sse / […]” Luther, StA4, 90,4 – 6. Luther’s insistence on the freedom from physics is connected with the problem of images and anthropomorphism, as he exposes in the 1527 That these words of Christ “This is my body” etc.

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presence in the Eucharist on earth as impossible to bridge, Luther responds that it is correct, but only according to its human mode of visibility [sichtbarliche weise]. The word and work of God, however, do not follow the laws of that mode. It is rather impossible for reason to fathom, even for the angels, he adds almost hyperbolically.169 What does such a freedom imply in the question of Christology? Luther departs from an intimacy between Christ and creation. Due to his understanding of God as more internal to his creation than creation itself – which Luther contends is somehow contrary to reason170 – humanity is closer to God than our skin is to our bodies. Luther even asserts that this intimacy supersedes the union of body and soul.171 The humanity of Christ is not a coat in which the divinity dresses itself and then undresses.172 Such an instrumental “use” of humanity is not compatible with Luther’s interpretation of the

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still stand against the fanatics: “Wenn wir sie nu hie fragen was sie Gottes rechte hand heissen, da Christus sitzt, acht ich, sie werden uns daher schwermen, wie man den kindern pflegt fur zu bilden einen gauckel hymel, darynn ein guelden stuel stehe und Christus neben dem vater sitze ynn einer kor kappen und guelden krone, gleich wie es die maler malen. Denn wo sie nicht solche kindische fleischliche gedancken hetten von der rechten hand Gottes, wuerden sie freylich sich nicht so lassen anfechten den leib Christi ym abendmal odder sich so blewen mit dem spruch Augustini (welchem sie doch sonst nichts gleuben noch keinem andern) ‘Christus mus an einem ort leiblich sein, aber seine warheit ist allenthalben. Aus welchen kindisschen gedancken mus denn weiter folgen, Das sie auch Gott selber an einem ort ym hymel auff den selbigen guelden stuel binden, weil ausser Christo kein Gott ist, Und wo Christus ist, da ist die Gottheit gantz und gar, wie Paulus sagt: ‘Es wonet ynn yhm die gantze Gottheit leibhafftig’.” WA, 23,13 f. “Denn die sichtbarliche weise / das der hymel nach den augen / hoch droben /vnd das abendmahl hie nydden auff erden ist / du(e)rfften sie vns nicht leren / wir wissen selbs wol / das den augen nach zu rechen / nicht kan droben sein / was hie nydden ist / vnd widderumb / Denn das ist ein menschliche / sichtbarliche weise / Aber Gotts wort vnd werck gehen nicht / nach unser augen gesichte / sondern vnbegreifflich aller vernunfft / ia auch den Engeln / So ist Christus auch widder ym hymel noch ym abendmahl / sichtbarlicher weise / vnd die fleischlichen augen etwas hie vnd dort zu sein vrteilen.” Luther, StA4, 79, 25 – 33. “[…] wenn die schwermer begonnten mit der vernunfft vnd augen hie her zu komen, solten sie bald dahin fallen vnd sagen, Es were nichts, vnd wie der gotlosen tugent ist zu sagen, Es ist kein Gott ps.12. Denn wie kan doch hie vernunfft leyden das die gottliche maiestet, so klein sey, das sie ynn eym kornlin, an eym kornlin, vber eym kornlin durch ein korlin, ynnwendig vnd auswendig, gegenwertig vnd wesenlich sey? […] Hie mus die vernunfft stracks schliessen, Ey das ist gewislich nichts vnd mus nichts sein Hat er nu die weise funden, das sein eigen gottlich wesen kan gantz vnd gar ynn allen Creaturen vnd ynn einer iglichen besondern sein tieffer, ynnerlicher, gegenwertiger, denn die Creatur yhr selbs ist” WA, 23,137. “Die menscheit ist neher vereiniget mit Gott / denn vnser haut mit vnserm fleische / ia neher denn leib vnd seele” Luther, StA4, 92, 15 – 17. “Also kanstu auch nicht die Gottheit von der menscheit abschelen / vnd sie etwa hin setzen / da die menscheit nicht mit sey / Denn da mit wu(e)rdestu die person zu trennen vnd die menscheit zur hu(e)lsen machen / ia zum rock / den die Gottheit aus vnd anzo(e)ge / darnach die stet odder raum were / Vnd solt also der leibliche raum hie so viel vermu(e)gen / das die Gottliche person zurtrennet / welche doch widder Engel noch alle creatur mu(e)gen zutrennen.” Luther, StA4, 92, 23 – 93,3.

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relation between the natures. To undo Christ’s humanity and claim Christ’s divinity apart from humanity, say, in claiming solely a divine presence at the Eucharist, would imply a reversal of the event of incarnation, according to Luther. The most significant aspect of Luther’s Confession concerning Christ’s Supper is arguably the interpretation of the death of Christ. He not only places the natures in a proximate relation when Christ is living, but extends that proximity even to the point of death. At the outset, Luther seems reluctant to admit the radical implications of his unionist Christology. The refutation of Zwingli’s alleosis – and its confirmation of the impassibility of God – only leads to a reference to the person of Christ: If now the old witch Mrs. Reason, the grandmother to alleosis, would say : Divinity can neither suffer, nor die, then you shall respond, it is correct. However [aber dennoch], due to the fact that divinity and humanity is one person in Christ, Scripture attributes everything which humanity experiences to divinity and vice versa. This is true. The person, that is Christ, suffers and dies. Now, this person is true God, therefore it is correct to say “God’s Son suffers”. But even if the one piece – if I may say so – namely divinity, does not suffer, the person, who is God, nevertheless suffers with the other piece, namely humanity.173

What has happened here? Is the suffering and death, indeed some of the most fundamental properties of human nature, limited from their communication to the divine nature? The problem for Luther’s unionist Christology is that the person of Christ can now be understood as a fixed tertium, an alternative to the communication of the natures themselves.174 He even repeats the ancient formula, “the person is crucified according to humanity”.175 The unsteady argumentation underlines the character of development in Luther’s interpretation of the Chalcedonian Christology. Compared with the great Christological disputations of 1539 and 1540, he does not seem to have 173 “Ob nu hie die alte wettermecherynn fraw vernunfft / der Alleosis grosmutter / sagen wu(e)rde / Ia die Gottheit kan nicht leiden noch sterben / Soltu antworten / Das ist war / Aber dennoch weil Gottheit vnd menscheit ynn Christo eine person ist / so gibt die schrifft / vmb solcher personlicher einickeit willen / auch der Gottheit / alles was der menscheit widderferet / vnd widderumb/ Vnd ist auch also ynn der warheit / Denn das mustu ia sagen / Die person leidet / stirbet / Nu ist die person warhafftiger Gott / drumb ists recht gered / Gottes son leidet / Denn ob wol das eine stu(e)ck als die Gottheit / nicht leidet / so leidet dennoch die person / welche Gott ist / am andern stu(e)cke / als an der menscheit.” Luther, StA4, 82,21 – 83,7. 174 Cf. Jörg Baur, “Ubiquität,” in Creator est creatura. Luthers Christologie als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation, vol. Bd. 138 (ed. Oswald Bayer and Benjamin Gleede; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 205. 175 “Denn ynn der warheit / ist Gottes son fur vns gecreutzigt / das ist / die person / die Gott ist / Denn sie ist / Sie die person ist gecreutzigt nach der menscheit.” Luther, StA4, 83,14 – 16.

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fully grasped the implications of his views. In addition, it shows his reverence for how the Fathers of the ancient Church conceptualised Christianity.176 These muddled passages are clarified later in the treatise, however. When Luther discusses the implications of the different modes of presence, he underlines the spatial principle that follows from his Christology, namely “where God is, there is man, too”. Immediately after, he contends What man suffers, God suffers, too

The theistic concept of an impassible God can, in the end, not separate the union of the natures, and their mutual exchange. Even death is not strong enough to tear them apart, at least not according to this passage. In the end, if a divisive element was imported here, in the midst of Christ’s person, the whole salvific work of Christ would have been in vain.177 Why can we find these seemingly different accentuations to the problem of Christ’s death? First of all, it seems as if Luther is reluctant to bring his preaching language directly into a theological discussion. In a sermon on the passion of Christ from 1525, for example, he does not hesitate to say that it is the Son of God [filium Dei] – who is everywhere – who utters the cry of being murdered [Mordschrey].178 But when Luther meets the arguments from Zwingli, this implication of Luther’s Christology seems to be downgraded when confronted with an overwhelmingly sceptical attitude towards patripassianism in the tradition.179 There are, after all, some features of the idea that God is impassible which seem important to for Luther’s theology, too. As a theologian of Scripture in general, and the Old Testament in particular,180 Luther confirms that God as the living God is not surrendered to the decays and sways of this world, but faithful to his promises. To label the suffering of God – or even patripassianism – as being “axiomatic” to the theology, as one modern interpreter claimed, is perhaps tempting to state, but ultimately misleading.181 It is not a deducible principle 176 As Barth points out, this is more due to a positive evaluation of the content, as if it represented a golden age, cf. Hans Martin Barth, “Apostilisches Glaubensbekenntnis II. Reformations- und Neuzeit,” in TRE 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1978), 554 – 55. See further Werner Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1965), 1,176 – 179. 177 Cf. Martin Brecht, Martin Luther (Philadelphia Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985), 310. 178 “Si homo cogitet hoc, certo cor entsprung: gots sun, qui omnia condidit, lest ein mord schrey, qui uber all sin und witz ist.” WA 17I, 70. 179 Whether it is possible to distinguish between an affirmative “deipassianism” and a dissenting “patripassianism” by Luther, as Althaus does, is perhaps formally true. The “Fatherness” – whatever that should mean – is not included in the Son, as the Son would not be the Son without the Father. On the other hand, in Luther’s interpretation of the incarnation, all of the divine attributes are included. Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 174. For a recent contribution which builds on that notion, cf. Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther’s ‘Theologia Crucis’ (Vancouver : Regent College Publishing, 2005). 180 Cf. Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther und Das Alte Testament (Tübingen: Mohr, 1948). 181 Cf. “Dass Gott leidet, nicht das Apathieaxiom, ist die geradezu axiomatische Voraussetzung

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which Luther applies; it is rather the story of God which reaches an unprecedented level in the person of Christ. In that person God even participates in death, and its consequences are felt at the heart of God’s being, too. Secondly, there is an element of development in the theology of Luther, at this point, too. By such a characterisation, no criticism of Luther as a systematic theologian is meant. One cannot reduce his theological contribution to a collection of occasional writings, as is so often done in Neo-Protestant reception of his thought.182 There is a systematic mind at work, but the full implication of his intimate Christology might be said to blossom fully a decade later.

The great Christological disputations 1539 – 1540 Although Luther may have developed his specific Christological doctrine in the Eucharistic controversy with Zwingli,183 one may say that it reaches its matured stage towards the end of his life. Communicatio idiomatum occupies a particularly important place in the two great Christological disputations of Luther, namely “The Word became Flesh” (1539)184 and “On the divinity and humanity of Christ” (1540).185 “The Word became Flesh” (1539) Already in the full title of the disputation “The Word became Flesh”, the theme is indicated by the question: “To what extent is this proposition [i.e. the word became flesh] true in philosophy”?186 In other words, Luther takes one of the

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von Luther patripassianisch-soteriologischem Gottesbild: Kein anderer Gott ist, als der, der sterben und ein toter Mensch sein wird.“ Wolff, Metapher und Kreuz: Studien zu Luthers Christusbild, 426. Cf. the critical remark already by Holl: “Die jetzt sprichwörtlich gewordene Redensart ’Luther war kein Systematiker’ deckt zumeist nur die Bequemlichkeit, es ernsthaft mit dem Nachdenken über Luthers verschieden klingende Aussagen zu versuchen.” Karl Holl, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1923), 117, note 2. Thomasius, Christi Person 2, II, 309. WA 39II, 6 – 34. We have three different transcripts of the disputation which are labled A, B and C in the Weimar edition. For a thorough treatment of the disputation, cf. Bayer and Gleede, “Das Wort ward Fleisch. Luthers Christologie als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation”, and Graham White, Luther as Nominalist. A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther’s Disputations in the Light of Their Medieval Background (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994), 124 – 80. WA 39II, 92 – 121. When Luther refers to philosophy in this disputation, he is particularly occupied with Aristotle’s logical writings found in the Organon. Consider these 10, where the philosophical

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most important biblical statements on the incarnation as a proposition of truth, and asks whether this statement is true in another scientific area. It is clearly directed against the theologians of Paris, who – according to Luther – teach that “what is true in theology is true in philosophy, too, and vice versa”.187 Luther refers to Paul and his distinction in Romans 8 between what is believed and what is known [esse intelligere]: the former refers to the realm of hope (and theology) where things are invisible, and the latter refers to the realm of philosophy where things are visible. Instead of underlining the oneness of both realms in a singular world view, Luther’s emphasis is that what is true in an empirically grounded philosophy is not – and cannot be – true in theology and vice versa. Therefore he claims that philosophy and theology are different.188 This rather bombastic principle is underpinned with arguments concerning the signification of Christ. Luther considers the problems of “placing God under reason and syllogism”.189 He locates the problem to the consequences of placing theological content in a syllogistic form on philosophical premises. The example he uses is a philosophical maior with a theological minor bound together in the same syllogistic reasoning: Every man is a creature. Christ is a man. Therefore Christ is a creature.190

The conclusion which follows from the maior “every man is a creature” is false, judged in theological terms. At one point, Luther claims that the fault of the Parisians consists in accepting an equivocation of the term “man”. According to Luther, man signifies different things in theology and philosophy. While man in the qualified theological sense signifies a divine, incarnate person, it

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arguments concerning the incarnation of God are collected directly from the Categories. [Ex praedicabilium doctrina sequeretur pulchre: Deus est homo, ergo est animal rationale, sensitivum, animatum, corpus, substantia scilicet creata.] WA 39II, 4. Itaque hic disputabimus contra Parrhisienses, quod etiam sint vera in theologia, quae in philosophia vera sunt et e contra. WA 39II, 7 and 24 – 25. Cf. also these 4: Sorbona, mater errorum, pessime definivit, idem esse verum in philosophia et theologia. Graham White argues that Luther collects his arguments from Melanchton’s apologetic for Luther against the Sorbonne faculty. According to White, Luther combines “sixteenth century Parisians logic books together with the Oxford condemnation of 1277”, and thereby refers to problems of equivocation and problems of Christology as coming from the same author(s). White, Luther as Nominalist, 367 – 76, here: 372. Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society. Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994. Itaque hic disputabimus contra Parrhisienses, quod etiam sint vera in theologia, quae in philosophia vera sunt et e contra. Neque enim possunt eadem omnia vera esse in diversis professionibus. Scitis autem, longe aliud esse credere, aliud intelligere, ut Paulus ait: Video non, spero, aliud etiam invisibilis, aliud visibile. Hic theologia et philosophia differunt. WA 39II, 7 – 8. […] causa est disputationis huius et summa, quod Deus non sit subiectus rationi et syllogismis, sed verbo Dei et fidei. WA 39II, 7 – 8. WA 39II, 10, 4 – 5.

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signifies just a fictive person in philosophy.191 Such a person does not exist. This equivocation inevitably leads to the four-term fallacy,192 and hence it seems as if Luther claims that importing a theological argument – i. e. insisting on the signification of “man” to the second person of the Trinity – would be a problem for philosophy, too. Luther strictly follows the rules of logic he has learnt: One can not use equivocations in syllogistic reasoning; it would destroy a stringent, logical reasoning. One has to stick to univocal signification. Luther does not ponder further on the philosophical implications, but rather he restricts himself to the theological problem: If man is taken univocally – which is necessary to make the syllogistic logic valid – it is true in philosophy, but false in theology. Such a univocal understanding of “man” would exclude the possibility of theological content, that is, “man” as in the assumed humanity of Christ. There is, in other words, no place in philosophy for signifying the term “man” as anything else than what reason can establish as credible for that term. In fact, the Parisians are distinguishing between philosophy and theology, too, but they are ignorant about it. In order to “make space” for the theological content of Christ,193 this ignorance leads to too great an accommodation of the specific theological content to speculations of reason, according to Luther. Luther wants to distinguish between philosophy and theology because of the inability of philosophy to admit the mysteries of faith and theology. Luther interprets philosophy as completely bound by the syllogistic method. Man, philosophically understood, does not signify the son of God or a divine person. Man, taken theologically, however, signifies precisely such a “thing”. What is the theological understanding of man as predicated of Christ which philosophy cannot reach? Luther gives a simple answer of the pivotal subject 191 Omnis homo est creatura. Non est verum, quod est aequivocatio et 4 termini. Homo in maiore ponitur in medio. Christus homo significat personam divinam incarnatam, sed in philosophia significat fictam personam. Sic ipsi solvunt. Univoce homo sumptum non verum est in theologia, sed in philosophia. WA 39II, 10 – 11. 192 A valid syllogism will only have three terms. If a syllogistic term has two meanings, the syllogism is not valid, because of the doubling of one term which leads to. Example: (Major) No Democrats are Republicans. (Minor) All conservatives are Republicans. (Conclusion) Therefore, no conservatives are democrats. The dual meaning of democrat, both a member of a political party and a supporter of a particular form of government constitutes the logical fallacy of the fourth term. Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic (New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1998 [10th Ed.]), 274 – 75. 193 Univoce homo sumptum non verum est in theologia, sed in philosophia. Quando vero aequivoce non subsistit syllogismus 4 terminorum, sic ipsi Parisienses distinguunt, et tamen dicunt, idem esse verum in philosophia et theologia. Cur ergo distinguunt? Si esset idem, deberet etiam esse univocatio, idem verbum, eadem significatio. Nescientes ergo, quid dicant, tamen distinguunt a philosophia theologiam. Alii sumpserunt hominem univoce, ut Gabriel, ille incurrit in hunc syllogismum: Omnis homo est creatura. Occam voluit, non esse univocum, sed aequivocum, ut aliud sit humanitas in Petro, aliud in Christo nescientes ergo, quid dicant, tamen distinguunt a philosophia theologiam. WA 39II, 11 Cf. White, Luther as Nominalist, 131 – 32.

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matter : It is the communicatio idiomatum.194 One could be tempted to elaborate on the argument here, because theology is capable of more than the double reference of “man”. The term does not only make a double reference to divine and human nature, but its theological use points to the exchange of properties between them. Theology’s nature, as it becomes apparent in its Christological use, is the new qualification of man and human nature: Humanity participates in the salvific communication with God. The communication between two things does not constitute an opposition to philosophy, of course, but it is the communication between two natures which philosophy (correctly) considers as incompatible which makes theology stand out from philosophy.195 It is important, however, to underline that the principle of different perspectives of philosophical and theological truths does not elude the principle that contraries should be about the same thing. Christ is not a different thing in theology and philosophy.196 Therefore it cannot be said that Luther advocates a radical opposition between theology and philosophy.197 Rather, there is a different – and sometimes contradictictory – element between the perspectives. It would not do justice to the general outlook of theology, however, if one reduced the contrast between philosophy and theology by solely restricting it to the singular “Christ-thing”. The tension between philosophy and theology is not kept within the strictly defined limits of the individual from Nazareth. There is a wider horizon – perhaps with cosmological implications – of the paradoxical status of the relation of the natures.198 In thesis 8 of the disputation, Luther cites Paul (2 Cor 10:5):

194 Homo in philosophia secundum naturam suam non significat filium Dei aut personam divinam. Hoc idem est, quod nos dicimus: communicatio idiomatum. Syllogismus non admittur in mysteriis fidei et theologiae. Philosophia est error in theologia. WA 39II, 12. 195 This is correctly emphasised by White when he considers the predicatio identica, although his criticism of Jörg Baur seems a bit enforced. White, Luther as Nominalist, 58. 196 White, Luther as Nominalist, 143. 197 Consider these 20, where Luther confirms the validity of a correct syllogism, but the character [virtute] and the majesty [maiestate] of the subject matter can not be disclosed, due to the narrowness of reason or syllogism. [Non quidem vitio formae syllogisticae, sed virtute et maiestate materiae, quae in angustias rationis seu syllogismorum includi non potest], WA 39II, 4. Cf. Bengt Hägglund, Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Ockhamistischen Tradition (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955), 90. 198 The implication of this aspect of Luther’s Christology is made more explicit in his doctrine on ubiquity, stated in the essay on the Eucharist from 1528. We will later on see how the communicatio idiomatum as the unsolved tension between theology and philosophy propels theological controversy, both internally among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession and externally in disputes with Calvinists and Papal theologians.

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St Paul on the other hand, teaches that all intellect is taken captive in the bosom of Christ.199

Whether such a statement indicates that theology should be placed on top as the queen of the sciences is perhaps to press the interpretation too far, but it does point to a possible tension where a specific form of reason would put restraints on the theological subject matter, the content or res. Within the form of logic, the syllogism, Luther wants to secure the place of that content. The following thesis 9 of the disputation indicates the possible range of such obedience by philosophy, namely the apostolic doctrine.200 It comprises the doctrine of God (these 18) and the person of Christ (theses 22 – 25). This is perhaps one of the most interesting notions of Luther, so far as the metaphysical implications of the communicatio idiomatum is concerned – the notion of what the human person is and what the human person may be. This notion is other [aliquid] and outside [extra] the Arbor Porphyriana.201 The medieval textbooks used Porphyry’s taxonomy of different classes of being as a tool to comprehend the structure of the world. Porphyry starts with the most general concept [oqs¸a/substantia] and proceeds to the most singular concept [%mhqypor/homo] and its representatives Socrates and Plato.202 Although this system had its internal philosophical problems in integrating Aristotelian taxonomy into Porphyry’s Neo-Platonist view of the world, the problem I think Luther addresses here concerns how embedded the word “man” is in that specific hierarchy. “Man” is placed at the bottom of the chain of being, and was as such only able to receive the divine attributes passively, by gaining a new status from a category higher up in the hierarchy.203 This points to a difficulty which is not explicitly commented upon by Luther, but one that seems to be implied by the very notion of Porphyry’s tree: If the proposition “‘God is man” should be true according to philosophy, it would have consequences for the philosophical metaphysics. God, who would be regarded as the highest being within such a philosophical structure, would 199 8. Cum contra Paulus doceat, captivandum esse omnem intellectum (haud dubie et philosophiam) in obsequium Christi. WA 39II, 4. 200 9. Facessant, dixit recte S. Ambrosius, dialectici, ubi credendum est piscatoribus apostolis. WA 39II, 4. 201 Notate vobis hoc, quod homo est et sit aliquid extra arborem Porphyrianam, etsiamsi vere dicatur, quod Deus sit homo factus, ut hi et ego. Nam hic aliquid maius et amplius significat. WA 39II, 12. 202 H.M. Baumgartner and Joachim Ritter, ed., “Arbor porphyriana, porphyrischer Baum,” in Band 1 (Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie; Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1971), 493 – 94. 203 Graham White rightly warns against the tendency of making all nominalist logic dependent on a certain axiomatic necessity, as found in the Aristotelian demonstrative science of the Posterior Analytics. Still, it is clear that Luther is aware – and critical – of the implied Aristotelian taxonomy would have in theology. White, Luther as Nominalist, 86 – 88. On the other hand, as White quite strikingly unfolds, the practical application of holding philosophy and theology apart is more difficult than stating the theory of their different spheres, particularly in the area of Christology. White, Luther as Nominalist, 158.

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be transferred to a lower ontological level. It would imply a violation of the Aristotelian prohibition of crossing over to another category, the so-called metabasis.204 One of the arguments against the distinction between theology and philosophy concerns a particular understanding of philosophy as sapientia Dei. According to this understanding, God as the ultimate guarantor of truth for both philosophy and theology cannot contradict himself. Luther claims that it does not apply to his case, however. On the contrary, he says, pointing to the second half of the legal tablets, which are supposed to be in perfect harmony with judicial and philosophical rationality. The sphere of reason applies to most areas of human life, such as matrimony, obedience, freedom and other virtues.205 Again, Luther is sceptical towards the idea of putting the central matters of faith such as forgiveness of sins and the incarnation under the light of reason as represented in law and philosophy. The main theological content, such as justification and the remission of sins, is not possible – we are even not allowed to grasp [nec debemus ferre] it – without its givenness in Scripture.206 Is philosophy incapable of gaining any proper knowledge of God, then? In responding to the argument of sapientia Dei as guaranteeing the unity of truth between philosophy and theology, Luther admits that philosophers concede to God’s omnipotence over the created things.207 It could be argued that Luther’s argument has to be understood solely as a report of what the philosophers actually are doing, but it seems as if some limited knowledge of God can be deduced from the created things: Luther accepts certain innate qualities in men as not subject to the fall. It is, alas, underlined that these qualities cannot be used to attain grace.208

204 For example, Oqj %qa 5stim 1n %kkou c´mour letab²mta de?nai […], in Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, 1, 7, 75a, 38. 205 Hoc argumentum est principale in hac causa, et maior est explicanda. Sapientia non pugnat sibi ipsi, hoc nos quoque dicimus. Ergo nostrum argumentum non pugnat contra vos. Nam ideo diximus infra in secunda propositione et concedimus illam sapientiam legalem, de qua loquitur Paulus, et multa alia concedimus, ut totum decalogum, quem et iura et aliae doctrinae et artes philosophiae quasi explicant, maxime quod ad secundam tabulam. […] Hoc dicimus, quod non contradicit theologia philosophiae, quia tantum loquitur de matrimonio, obedientia, castitate, liberalitate et aliis virtutibus. WA 39II, 13 – 14. 206 Quod vero haec summa, propter quae vel sola data est scriptura, theologica, videlicet de iustificatione, de remissione peccatorum, de liberatione a morte aeterna tribuerunt philosophiae et viribus humanis, hoc non possumus nec debemus ferre. WA 39II, 14. 207 Philosophi concedunt Deo omnipotentiam extra se in rebus conditis. WA 39II, 14. 208 Est quidem innatum hominibus, non esse occidendum etc., sed quod ista deberent iustificare absque gratia, illa vero est blasphemia. WA 39II, 14.

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“Disputation on the Humanity and Divinity of Christ” (1540) The elaboration on the consequences of communicatio idiomatum is taken a step further in the disputation which took place the following year in Wittenberg, namely “On the divinity and humanity of Christ” (1540). Luther’s inducement was the Christological speculations of Caspar Schwenckfeld (1489 – 1561),209 a theologian with a spiritual understanding of the Eucharist and a corresponding tendency to stress the separation of humanity and divinity in Christ.210 At the same time, Schwenckfeld was concerned with preserving the union of the natures in Christ. Like Luther, he attacked Zwingli for separating them. Nevertheless, his solution was very different from that of his teacher. Schwenckfeld, who had studied in Wittenberg, found himself increasingly at odds with the understanding of Christ promoted by Luther. In his 1538 treatise “From the incarnation of Christ”, Schwenckfeld went so far as to claim that “the man Jesus Christ is not a creature, but should be called a Son of the Highest, a Son of God and Emanuel, according to the Gospel”.211 His intention in adopting this rather spiritualistic view was not very far from Luther’s programme.212 Schwenckfeld’s aim for his Christology was 209 Schwenckfeld was born in Osiek, in the south-east of present Poland, was converted to the Wittenberg movement in 1519. In the second half of the 1520 s, Schwenckfeld was troubled by the morality of the congregations, or more precisely : The lack of it. This leads to a doubt concerning the doctrine of Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist. Schwenckfeld came to Wittenberg in December 1525 to present his new interpretation of the words of institution, namely that “This is my bread” should be read in light of John, chapter 6. Schwenckfeld’s alternative was Corpus meum quod pro vobis datur, est Hoc, Panis scilicet, where the body given is figuratively seen as the bread. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Luther rejected this doctrine as heresy. Horst Weigelt, “Schwenckfeld, Kaspar von,” TRE 30 (1999): 712 – 19. 210 Luther sees the arguments of Schwenckfeld as an attack on the Church. Therefore he wants to instruct and safeguard the Church through the disputation: Causa huius disputationis est haec, quod volui, vos esse instructos et praemunitos ad futuras insidias diaboli, quia edidit quidam cavillationem quandam contra Ecclesiam. Luther’s intention is to admonish them to preserve the simple article of Christ as true God and man in one person, in order to exclude any strange thing [aliam rem] from the doctrine. […] Si servaveritis autem vos hunc articulum simpliciter, quod in Christo sit divina et humana natura et illas duas naturas in una persona, ita ut nullam aliam rem coniunctas esse, et tamen quod humanitas non sit divinitas, nec divinitas sit humanitas, quod neque illa distinctio quicquam impediat, sed potius confirmet unitatem! WA 39II, 97. For the Christology of Schwenckfeld, cf. R. Emmet McLaughlin, Caspar Schwenkfeld von Ossig (1489 – 1561). Nobility and Religious Commitment. Crisis and Decision in the Early Reformation. (1980). 211 “der Mennsch Jesus Christus nicht ain Creatur / sonder nach dem Euangelio ain son des allerhöchsten / ain Son gottes vnnd Emanuel soll genannt werden”. Citation from Weigelt, “Schwenckfeld,” 715. 212 See Dorner’s interesting comparison of Schwenckfeld with Andreas Osiander. The divine inhabitation of Osiander was not enough, because Schwenckfeld’s Christ was fused together in a union were both divinity and humanity did partake. Isaac August Dorner, Entwicklungsge-

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namely to preserve the intimacy between the natures of Christ, a problem he solves by applying a deification process within Christ. Together with his friend, Valentine Krautwald (1490 – 1545) from Krakow, he developed a Christology which distinguished sharply between the flesh of Christ and the rest of the humanity.213 At the end of Christ’s presence on earth, that is, at the resurrection, the divine nature had assumed the human nature to the extent that it disappeared.214 When the doctrines of Schwenckfeld became known in the city of Ulm, where he served as a pastor, the reactions of his colleagues were harsh. They threatened the magistrate of the city they would leave their offices if nothing was done to stop Schwenckfeld. Therefore, it is no wonder that Luther chose Schwenckfeld’s notion of Christ as creature as the subject matter of the disputation. Let us turn to the disputation itself. Already at the outset of his presentation of the theses, Luther firmly confirms his unionist Christology. In the third thesis in that disputation, Luther states the consequences which follow from communicatio idiomatum, namely that the things [i.e. properties] said of human beings, are properly predicated of God, and the things said of God are properly predicated of humanity215 schichte der Lehre von der Person Christi von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die neueste dargestellt (Berlin: Gustav Schlawitz, 1851), 2,624 – 636. Here: 625. 213 “dass das Fleisch Christi, das in dem Logos wie in einer “Hülsen vnd Hutten” partiell gewohnt habe, nicht mit dem übrigen Menschen identisch sei.” Horst Weigelt, Spiritualistische Tradition im Protestantismus: die Geschichte des Schwenckfeldertums in Schlesien (Arbeiten Zur Kirchengesschichte; Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 162. Cf. the argument of Schwenckfeld himself in his 1539 exposition of Christology : “Die weil aber ettlich fürneme Leerer nu zu unseren zeitten / Christum den menschen / nit alleyn seiner ersten geburt nach / wie er hie auff erden gewandlet / sunder auch noch seiner verklärung odder gottwerdung / für ein Creatur halten vnnd ausschreien. So wils je vonnötten sein / das man obgedachten Artickel / vom ursprung vnnd ankunfft des menschens in Christo / der empfangen ist vom heyligen geyst / Dessgleichen auch von seiner in Gott volkummen aussbereytung / Hebr. 2.5. recht verstehen / vnnd zwischen den zweierley menschen / Als dem ersten alten Creaturischen / verdorbenen Adam / vnd seiner sipschafft / vnd dem andern Newen / himmlischen / auss Gottgebornen Adam / der den Ersten /jha vns arme / verlorne / Creaturische menschen / wider mit Gott solt versunen vnd widerbringen / wol vndersheyde / vnd ein recht geystlich urtheyl halte”. Caspar Schwenckfeld, Ermanunge Zum Waren Vnd Selig Machende Erkanthnus Christi. Das Sich ein Jeder Christ Vmbs Erkantnus Seines Herzen / Erlösers Vnd Seligmachers Jesu Christi Billich Bekümmern / Annemen / Vnd dem Selben Fleissig Soll Nachtrachten. (1539), A4b. And further: “Ja es ist das aller nöttigste / das man wisse vnd erkenne / dass Christus auch nach seiner menscheyt / kein Creatur /sunder der Sun gottes / der Herr aller Creatur / erhöhet über alle himmel […] (B3a). 214 Weigelt, “Schwenckfeld”, 715. Interestingly, Weigelt refers to a peculiar element in Schwenckfeld’s interpretation of the Eucharist. The manducatio spiritualis was seen as receiving medicine for eternal life, and its fruit was deification. Weigelt, Spiritualistische Tradition im Protestantismus: die Geschichte des Schwenckfeldertums in Schlesien, 58 – 59. 215 Ut ea, quae sunt hominis, recte de Deo et e contra, quae Dei sunt, de homine dicantur. WA 39II, 93.

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Hence, the proximity of man and God in Christ is taken as far as possible, but without the deification process as indicated by Schwenckfeld. Even if Luther distinguishes between predicating abstract and concrete idioms from one nature to the other – and thereby seemingly avoids the Eutychan heresy –, there is hardly any theologian in the tradition of Chalcedon who has expressed such a radical interpretation of the union of the natures. His interpretation of the intimacy of the natures in Christ is perhaps closer to that of Cyril of Alexandria than to the actual wording of the council of Chalcedon itself.216 In Cyril’s Christology one can find some of the same soteriological concerns and notion of extremes as in Luther,217 although the similarity between a theologian from Alexandria of the fifth century and a theologian from Wittenberg in the sixteenth century should not be overstated. One can legitimately say that this man created the world and that this God suffered, died, and was buried, according to Luther.218 These concrete and accepted predications are distinguished over against some features Luther considers as abstract features, and therefore unacceptable. As an example of the latter, Luther mentions that one cannot conclude from the concrete predication “Christ is thirsty, a servant, dead” to an abstract predication that he plainly is thirst, servitude, death.219 Although it has become commonplace to regard Luther’s Christology as containing a certain “monophysitic” strain,220 the distinction between abstract 216 Asendorf has an interesting remark concerning Luther’s recurring polemic against Arius. According to Asendorf, it indicates Luther’s firm rootedness in the line of though which is found in Nicea – Cyrill – Chalcedon. Ulrich Asendorf, Die Theologie Martin Luthers Nach Seinen Predigten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 195 – 96. Peters has also shown how the central elements of the apostolic faith (particularly in the Symbol) have been received and interpreted by Luther through a particular perspective, namely the “for us”, cf. Albrecht Peters, Bd 2. Der Glaube. Das Apostolikum (Kommentar zu Luthers Katechismen; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990 – 94), 116 – 74. 217 As Hardy points out, the main concern for Cyril – as it was for Luther – was his insistence on a meeting with a divine redeemer in the encounter of Christ. Edward R. Hardy, “Cyrillus von Alexandrien,” TRE 8 (1981): 258. Cf. the notion of McGuckin, who underlines Cyril’s preference for stating paradoxes, such as “The Logos suffered impassibly”. Cyril stated these paradoxes without recurring to the doctrine of Apollinaris, that the Logos had substituted the soul of Christ. John A. McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy : Its History, Theology, and Texts (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 181 – 85. 218 4. Vere dicitur : Iste homo creavit mundum et Deus iste est passus, mortuus, sepultus etc. WA 39II, 93. 219 Non enim dicere licet, Christus est sitiens, servus, mortuus, ergo est sitis, servitus, mors. WA 39II, 93. 220 Cf. the interpretation of Holl, who finds it paramount to Luther’s thought that God’s will was found in the humanity of Christ. The alleged mistake of Luther which leads to monophysitism, in his choice of expressing these thoughts through the concept of the old Dogma, according to Holl. Contrary to the voluntaristic core of Luther’s theology, his Christology became mixed with concepts which came from the old metaphysics of nature, namely “substance” and “nature”. Holl claims that the unionist view leads to modalism. Holl, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, 71 – 72. Cf. the similar view by Holl’s student, Reinhold Seeberg. Although a

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and concrete predications points in another direction: There remains a distinction within the union of Christ. One could rightfully ask whether an exchange of properties is possible without a distinction between the natures. Due to the role they play in the later development of the Lutheran dogma, particularly in the theology of Melanchthon, a further inquiry into this matter seems rewarding: What does Luther actually mean by distinguishing between concrete and abstract predications?221 In order to place that important question in a fruitful historical perspective, an assessment of Gabriel Biel’s profound investigation into this matter will be given. Concrete and abstract predications before Luther Gabriel Biel stands firmly in the Occamist tradition in interpreting the communicatio idiomatum.222 In his Collectorium, Gabriel Biel notes that the abstract natures are not predicated in the communicatio idiomatum, because he claims it would violate the Chalcedonian rule of keeping the natures distinct and not confusing them. He does, however, extend the implications to some sort of an unbridgeable divide between humanity and divinity on an ontological level. The temporal, corruptible and destroyable humanity cannot per consequens have the possibility of being the eternal, infinite and immutable God. As a solution to the problem which nevertheless arises in the communication of properties, Biel refers to the Master Peter Lombard: The thing [id] which subsists in human nature, is God, eternal etc.223 modalism expressis verbis by Luther is rejected Seeberg, he still maintains that Luther’s thought retains an unexpressed modalist element. Reinhold Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1959), 4,236. This critique has not survived closer inspection, however. As Regin Prenter points out in his attack on the idealistic presuppositions of Holl and Seeberg: Apart from the meagre evidence Holl is bringing to the fore – sources which do not treat the problem of monophysitism or modalism -, there are good factual reasons for Luther to be conservative towards the ancient dogma of Christ. A real distinction is necessary for a belief in the real soteriological presence of Christ. If not, one is left with a relation to an idea, an experience or the historical Jesus lying in his grave. Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator studier i Luthers theologi (København: Samlerens forlag; Oslo, Land og kirke, 1946), 189 – 93. For further arguments with the conclusion that Luther more or less promotes monophysitism, cf. Yves Congar, “Regards et R¦flexions sur la Christologie de Luther,” in Das Konzil von Chalkedon III (ed. Aloys Grillmeyer and Heinrich Bacht; Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1954), 457 – 86, who argues for a lack in Luther’s Christology, namely that the humanity does not contribute to the salvific activity. 221 We will see how important this distinction will be in the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum by Melanchton. 222 Streiff, Novis linguis loqui, 56 ff. 223 […] quia humanitas est pura creatura temporalis, corruptibilis et annihilabilis, et per consequens non potest esse Deus, aeternus, infinitus et immutabilis. Si autem aliqua talium reperitur in Scriptura, exponenda est secundum Magistrum: id est subsistens in natura humana est Deus, aeternus etc. Biel, Collectorium, III d. 7 q. un. art. 1 not. 1 (A).

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Hence, the logic of identity is weakened through the traditional logic of subsistere. There are three different ways the concrete properties can be understood, according to Biel. First, there are predicates which are immediate and primary, without any precise reasoning about them.224 This is the most general level of an object, which Biel exemplifies by listing predicates which distinguish what is actually there as an individual thing [illo circumscripto] and what is not: “the same”, “different”, “being partial”, “being whole”, etc.225 It corresponds to his general epistemology where cognition is always considered in relation to the empirical, individual object. Biel follows via moderna in reducing the role of the intellect as a cognitive organ on its own, and introduces instead the term “intuition”. By intuition, Biel is not referring to grasping of the essence of things. He simply refers to the first and immediate apprehension of an object, which appears to be conditio sine qua non of the epistemological process.226 It is very important to underline Biel’s understanding of intuitive cognition as evident cognition. The intellect cannot doubt the real existence of the object of an intuitive cognitive act. Even if the nominalist tradition of Biel points to a certain contingency about the words describing cognition, there exists a causal connection between the object and the intuitive understanding in Biel’s thought. In a sense, the object creates intuition, according to him.227 Therefore, there can be nothing in the intuitive cognition which is not proper to the res of cognition. Further, intuition grasps everything which belongs to the res. Due to the power of discerning the thing from other things, Biel labels intuition as a notitia distincta.228 The dependence on the external object is in direct opposition to his teacher Ockham, who insisted that “the substance of an external object is not possible for us to know”.229 Secondly, Biel mentions predicates which are not immediate, but mediate to 224 Biel labels them idiomata primi ordinis, too. Cf. Biel, Collectorium, III d.7 q.1 D. 225 Nam quaedam non praedicantur nisi de his, quibus immediate et primo conveniunt, id est quibus conveniunt non ratione alicuius distincti aut ratione alicuius partis praecise, sive quia praedicantur de illo omni alio circumscripto et de nullo illo circumscripto; ut sunt ‘idem’, ‘diversum’, ‘inhaere’, ‘informare’, ‘subiici’ sive ‘esse subiectum’, ‘esse partem’, ‘esse totum’ […] Biel, Collectorium, III,d.7, q. un. art. 1 not. 2 (B). 226 Prima noticia singularis est intuitiva… quia nisi sic nulla veritas contingens posset evidenter cognosci ab intellectu. Biel, Collectorium, 1 d. 3, q. 6, E, art. 2, concl. 2. For an elaboration of this argument, cf. Franz Joseph Burkard, Philosophische Lehrgehalte in Gabriel Biels Sentenzenkommentar unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Erkenntnislehre (Monographien Zur Philosophischen Forschung; Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1974), 58 – 59. 227 […] visio intuitiva dependet causaliter ab obiecto in fieri et esse. Biel, Collectorium, Prol. q. 1, F. 228 Cognitio rei distincta est, qua quidquid est cognito, essentiale patet potentiae. Biel, Collectorium, 1 d.3, q.5, B. 229 Nulla substantia corporea exterior potest a nobis in se naturaliter cognosci. Citation taken from Burkard, Philosophische Lehrgehalte in Gabriel Biels Sentenzenkommentar unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Erkenntnislehre, 62. Cf. White, who sees the application of immediatemediate distinction as a logical invention of Biel, White, Luther as Nominalist, 270.

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cognition. He explains them as accidental to the things observed. The mediated predicates do not follow from the essence or nature of things themselves, but are imposed [imposita]. Examples Biel states are colours, temperature, and different categories of men such as “philosopher” and “logician”.230 Thirdly, there are predicates which are irrelevant to the distinction between immediate and mediate. These are partially immediate and partially mediate. The word “heating” [calefactivum] refers both to the immediate “heat” [calore] and the mediate (adjective) “being hot” [calidum]. Biel contends that if whiteness is going to be imposed on a thing, it follows that it has not gained the whiteness from itself, but from an extrinsic thing. This in turn makes the signifying thing – i. e., the whiteness – dependent on something else, and therefore accidental. It does not have the possibility or power to exist naturally itself.231 How did these distinctions of Biel come about in the first place? Terminist logic regarded terms to have two semantic properties. First, signification covered the process by which the word “Socrates” brings the idea “Socrates” to mind, which in turn signifies the person Socrates. Secondly, supposition refers to the capacity of substantive terms to “stand for” or pick out something in a particular context. Supposition was divided into two groups, proper and improper suppositions. The former referred to the (alleged) typical use, and the latter to some metaphorical meaning. But whereas traditional logic – including Ockham – divides proper suppositions into three, Jean Buridan232 saw no reason for keeping more than two versions of proper suppositions, namely the personal and material. A personal supposition refers to the human being Socrates in the sentence “Socrates is a man”, whereas the material supposition refers to the word “Socrates” in “Socrates has eight letters”. What Buridan left out was the notion of simple proper suppositions. Tradition, in line with a realist interpretation of the universals, had singled out these as describing some concepts. In the sentence “Man is a species” the word man

230 I think Biel would consider the predicate “man” in “Socrates is a man” as belonging to the essence of manliness or a human being, and therefore would interpret it as an immediate predicate. The predicate “philosopher” in “Socrates is a philosopher” is mediate, because Biel qualifies it as accidental to the subject. Hence, Biel does not restrict himself solely to a formal judgement of the logical status, but proceeds to making more material claims with metaphysical implications. 231 […] eo quod habere albedinem sibi inhaerentem non convenit rei ex seipsa, sed per albedinem, quae est rei extrinseca. Et eo ipso quod ‘inhaerere’ significat rem inhaesive dependentem ab alia, et ‘accidentale’, id est esse accidens, significat rem non potentem per se naturaliter existere, non praedicatur nisi de eo, cui immediate convenit. Biel, Collectorium, 3 d.7, q.1, B 45 – 49. 232 Jean Buridan (1300 – 1358) was one of the most influential philosophers at the University of Paris in the fourteenth Century. His work was, with the exception of Summulae Dialecticae and a few polemical writings, entirely dedicated as commentaries on Aristotle’s works. He counts to the few who did not proceed to one of the higher faculties, but remained in the Faculty of Arts.

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could not signify Socrates, because it denotes a particular thing, not a common concept.233 How did this line of reasoning come about? The medieval theory of language was an attempt to “formulate, on metalinguistic level, the syntactical and semantical presuppositions of the Aristotelian form of logic” as one modern interpreter had it.234 Another interpreter traced one core element of that history, namely the concentration on cognition, to a particular choice in the history of translation. In his famous remark in De Interpretatione, Aristotle underlined the similarity between verbs and nouns: Therefore, a verbs said just by itself is a name and signifies something, since the speaker stops in his thinking [dianoia] and the hearer pauses […] (3,20)

Boethius, whose translation of Aristotle probably served most interpreters ignorant of Greek during the Middle Ages, translated the word thinking [dianoia] as “understanding”. As a result, the second part of Aristotle’s sentence gained meaning as “the speaker constituting an understanding”. A man who utters a verb constitutes an understanding. As a result, there was a strong emphasis on the cognitive aspect of signification. Abelard, for example, criticised the validity of universal terms because they did not signify anything, that is, they did not establish any understanding of any thing.235 This constituit intellectum is picked up by Jean Buridan, an important figure in the development of late medieval logic. In the first chapter of his Sophismata – which is a collection of counter-examples of logical truths – he discusses the nature of signification.236 Of importance for the topic considered her, is what Buridan claims in his conclusiones: Written letters signify spoken utterances, and they do not signify anything outside the mind, such as asses or stones, unless by means [mediante] of the signification of the sound237

Hence, the privileged position of speech over writing constitutes two levels of language, which relate to each other as signs.238 Buridan’s restriction is 233 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buridan/#5, retrieved 28 January 2008 234 Ernest Addison Moody, “The Medieval Contribution to Logic,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic: Collected Papers, 1933 – 1969 (University of California Press, 1975), 385. 235 Paul Vincent Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory (Indiana University, Bloomington: PV Spade, 2002), 65. 236 Most of the arguments of the following section is taken from Spade’s account, cf. Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things. 237 Et est prima conclusio quod litterae scriptae significant voces prolatas vel proferendas, et non significant aliquas res extra animam puta asinos aut lapides nisi mediante significatione vocum. Johannes Buridan, Sophismata (ed. T. K. Scott; Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977), 24. 238 For an excellent overview of Scotus’ contribution to the development of transcendental metaphysics and the tradition that followed, cf. Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia Transcendens. Die

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probably not a restriction of the extra-mental reference, but rather a limitation in scope or intention: The written word signifies nothing else than what the spoken word signifies. The logic goes like this: If you read “man”, you (immediately) think of the spoken word “man”. But the written “man” signifies something by the means of signification, which is indirectly. Hence, the written word “makes use” of the spoken word in order to signify the thing. This makes the relation between the written word and the thing an indirect one.239 But what about the relation between the spoken “man” and the thing it signifies? In the second of his conclusions on the Sophisms, Buridan states that the vocal utterances by means of the signification of concepts signify passions or feelings [passiones], which Buridan explains as concepts of the soul.240 As a consequence, a third level of a language of concepts is established, namely what the medieval philosophers labelled a natural language. This was called a natural language in contrast to the written and spoken “national” languages, such as English, Latin or Greek. Natural language had an inherent quality of having been established by nature to all people, not by chance and convention as were the national languages.241 As a consequence, it enjoyed a special relation to the thing it signified, namely what Buridan labels as passions of the soul. The spoken word ‘man’ signifies man – that is, it establishes an understanding of man for the soul – by means of the natural concept “man”.242 A natural or mental language is important to the Nominalist theory of relation between the interlocutors, because it presupposes that we all think in

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Formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik Des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suarez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990). Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 67. […] voces significativae significant passiones, id est conceptus animae et non alias res nisi mediante significatione conceptuum. Buridan, Sophismata, 25. Cf. the notion of silent reading by Augustine’s depiction of Ambrose, where the national language – although apparently present in the text itself – is not spoken. The heart, the inner man, captures the meaning: sed cum legebat, oculi ducebantur per paginas et cor intellectum rimabatur, vox autem et lingua quiescebant “But when he was reading, his eye glided over the pages, and his heart searched out the sense, but his voice and tongue were at rest.” Augustine, Confessions (E. Pusey ; Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1853), 6.3.3. Boethius translated both Aristotelian concepts of symbols [s¼lbokom] and [sgle?ºm] into mark [nota]. The possible distinction in Aristotle’s vocabulary is therefore conflated and streamlined. Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 74 – 76. The original text by Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 1, 16a3 – 8: “Esti l³m owm t± 1m t0 vym0 t_m em t0 xuw0 pahgl²tym s¼lboka, ja· t± cqavºlema t_m 1m t0 vym0 ja· yGspeq oqd³ cq²llata p÷si t± aqt², oqd³ vyma· aR aqta¸. ¨m l´mtoi taOta sgle?a pq¾tym, taqt± p÷si pah¶lata t/r xuw/r, ja· ¨m taOta bloi¾lata pq²clata Edg taqta” The translation by Boethius reads as follows: Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem, sic nec voces eaedem. Quorum autem haec primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eaedem. Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis. PEQI EQLGMEIAS (Leipzig: Karl Meiser ed., 1880), 1, 3.5 – 11.

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the same conceptual language which is not affected by convention. If two statements of conventional languages are subordinated under the same mental proposition, they express the same “thing” and can be said to be correct translations. What is the impact of mental language for the subject of this thesis? At least two things could be mentioned in this respect. First of all, it shows the importance of concepts and conceptual thinking for grasping reality. The allegedly unchanging concepts had a privileged status vis-—-vis the fragile and changing meaning of the natural languages. Even for a nominalist such as Ockham, in whose tradition Gabriel Biel is firmly placed, the rational character of logic is evident.243 Despite the criticism of universals, Ockham did not hesitate to state that logic was about second intentions. Second intentions are beings of reason, entia rationis, even if their ontological status entails serious problems, including the recurring question of universals. Secondly, due to its privileged ability to grasp reality, the status of syllogism – the preferred tool of rationality – becomes of utmost importance to consider for theologians: It had the power to distinguish between true and false propositions. The rather extreme implication for (nominalist) speculative theology on God’s power and possibilities, the so-called potentia absoluta, is a clear witness to the centrality of the rule of non-contradiction implied therein. Both Ockham and Biel affirm the notion of an asinus-Christology, as it were, namely that God could have assumed the form of an ass, if God had wanted to do so.244 But the unrestricted possibility of God expressed in the potentia absoluta does not infer the factual events of history. It merely points to the contingency of the present world order.245 Divine freedom does have one “restriction”, it must not entail a self–contradiction.246 243 As Spade points out, the logic of Ockham is cannot be reduced to modern semantic logic. Ockham’s significatio is not covered by Frege’s “Sinn”, or the syntaxes of contemporary formal logic. It is rather based on mental understanding. Paul Vincent Spade, “Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute,” Franciscan Studies 35, no. 13 (1975): 212 – 23. 244 Biel does not, in fact, go further than comparing “God is man” with “man is [an] ass”: […] qualis sit praedicatio: ‘Deus est homo’. Pro responsione notandum quod apud Philosophum ‘Deus’ et ‘homo’ sunt termini disparati, quia diceret illam esse impossibilem: ‘Deus est homo’, sicut illam: ‘Homo est asinus’. Et sic illa: ‘Deus est homo’ est praedicatio disparata, nec essentialis nec accidentalis. Biel, Collectorium, 3 d.7 q. un d.3 P. 245 As Grane points out, the possibility of God to have made a different world does not compete with the notion of how God made the world. Grane, Contra Gabrielem. Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam, 1517, 56 Cf. Wilhelm Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation; eine Untersuchung zur Moralphilosophie und -Theologie bei Gabriel Biel (Erfurter Theologische Studien, 28; Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1972), 79 – 81. 246 As Biel points out in his Centiloquium theologicum: Sexta conclusio … probatur : Deus assumpsit aliquam naturam in unitatem suppositi, ergo Deus potest assumere omnem. Item: non includit contradictionem Deum assumere naturam asininam; igitur Deus illud potest facere. Citation from Oberman, Harvest, 250. Oberman notes later that Biel in his commentary on Lombard’s Sententiae prevents Christology by adding that God de facto – according to potentia

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Let us now move back to the problem of mediate and immediate propositions by Gabriel Biel. Biel uses the propositions “Socrates is white” and “white(-ness) is Socrates” to demonstrate how the accidental feature can be predicated to the subject and vice versa. This is seen as a pattern in which the proposition “The word is man” is to be understood: Just as Socrates contingently is white, so the Word contingently is man. And just as Socrates was Socrates before he became white, enabling whiteness to be carried [suppono], so the Word was the Word before it was man in time. According to the rule, ‘whiteness’ is related to ‘man’ or ‘Socrates’, just as ‘man’ is related to ‘God’ or ‘the Word’.247

What are the Christological results of such a logic? Two obvious implications can be underlined. First of all, the temporal qualification of “before” and “after” the incarnation places the speculation firmly in the history of salvation. Biel underlines that the immediate properties of the Word such as “God” or “infinite” can not be attributed to man. They can only be attributed to Christ temporaliter, that is, after the incarnation.248 This is essentially the same thing as Luther says about the passibility of God, namely that it is possible only after the incarnation.249 Secondly, the Word’s accidental250 human nature is “carried” by the word.

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ordinata – could only assume the nature of a human being or an angel. That may be true, but more important in the citation of Biel is his soteriological qualification of that probability, invoked by the word redemptione: Tametsi omnem entitatem absolutam, creatam suppositum divinum possit assumere; quia tamen solam naturam rationalem de facto assumpsit pro humani generis redemptione posset probabiliter et humili cum submissione teneri quod de facto sola illa natura assumi potest a verbo que est capax gratie unionis aut tali unita. Citation from Oberman, Harvest, 261. One could regard Biel’s insertion of soteriological terms as his explication of the rule of the Early Church: That which is not assumed, is not saved. Sicut enim Socrates contingenter est albus, ita Verbum contingenter est homo. Et sicut Socrates prius fuit Socrates et post factus est albus, ut suppono, sic Verbum prius et ab aeterno fuit Verbum et factum est homo in tempore, postquam non fuit homo. Et regulariter sicut habet se ‘album’ ad ‘homo’ vel ‘Socrates’, sic se habet ‘homo’ ad ‘Deus’ vel ‘Verbum’ […] Biel, Collectorium, Liber III, d. 7, q. 1, art. 1, c 31 – 32. The word “contingenter” should probably be read as an opposite to “necessario”. […] Idiomata primi ordinis naturae divinae de supposito divino dicta de supposito naturae humanae eiusque concretis praedicantur, non autem de natura humana. Huiusmodi idiomata sunt ‘Deus’, ‘creator’, ‘infinitus’, ‘aeternus’, impassibilis’, incorruptibilis’, ‘immutabilis’. Illa omnia dicuntur de Christo temporaliter genito ex Virgine, crucifixo, mortuo, passo, resurgente etc. Biel, Collectorium, Liber III, d.7, q.1, art. 2, D 22 – 25. Obiectio: At Deus non potest crucifigi aut pati. R. Scio, cum nondum esset homo. Ab aeterno non est passus, sed cum factus est homo, est passibilis. Ab aeterno non erat homo, sed iam conceptus ex Spiritu sancto scilicet, natus ex virgine fit Deus et homo una persona et sunt eadem praedicata Dei et hominis. Hic facta est unio personae. Da gehets ineinander humanitas et divinitas. WA, 39II, 101, 24 – 102, 1. For a survey of the different possibilities of how substance and accident could relate, cf. Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 34 ff.

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One should not regard the supposition as establishing a relation between the term and the thing itself. Such a syntactic theory corresponds to the attempt of the realists.251 As nominalist and a disciple of Ockham, Biel would probably rather regard the supposition as establishing a semantic reference to the thing it stands as a supposition for. The lack of universals means that there is no direct link from the terminist theory of logic to the real thing itself.252 But what does a comparison between the whiteness of Socrates and the human nature of God mean, then? A strict logical analysis of the terms involved in the analysis of the natures of Christ does not prevent it from having a profound impact on the truth claims, however. The logic regulates how the predications should be understood: It is not reasonable to say that humanity is God, just as “whiteness is Socrates” is prevented. The whiteness of Socrates is a concrete, mediate property as we saw above.253 Likewise, the human nature of Christ is a concrete, mediate idiom. But that does only regulate the properties of the human nature in the union. The real problem for Biel is found in his second conclusion, namely that the immediate properties of the divine nature are said of the divine supposition, they are in turn predicated of the supposition of the concrete human nature, not the human nature itself. These properties are ‘God’, ‘Creator’, ‘infinity’, ‘eternity’, ‘impassible’, ‘incorruptible’, ‘immutable’. They are said of Christ in a temporal sense, born of Virgin Mary, crucified, died, suffered, resurrected etc.254

He asks whether the predication might lead to an understanding of an imperfect God, due to the incompatible notion of contrary qualities.255 Biel responds to that problem with a reference to the story of Daniel 3 where Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego were preserved in the flames of king Nebuchadnezzar. The divine power can keep one quality (cold) in the midst of its contrary quality (heat).256 251 On this metaphysical – and not only logical – question of the quidditas suppositionis, MeierOeser refers to a standard expression of the realist position: Suppositio est relatio termini supponentis ad rem suppositam. Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Supposition,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (ed. Joachim Ritter; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 655. 252 Cf. the statement of Celaya: Suppositio non est quidam respectus sicut reales somniant sed est terminus supponens. Citation from Meier-Oeser, “Supposition,” 656. 253 Cf. page 75. 254 […] Secunda conclusio: Idiomata primi ordinis naturae divinae de supposito divino dicta de supposito naturae humanae eiusque concretis praedicantur, non autem de natura humana. Huiusmodi idiomata sunt ‘Deus’, ‘creator’, ‘infinitus’, ‘aeternus’, ‘impassibilis’, ‘incorruptibilis’, ‘immutabilis’. Illa omnia dicuntur de Christo temporaliter genito ex Virgine, crucifixo, mortuo, passo, resurgente etc. Biel, Collectorium, III d.7 q.1 D. 255 […] sequitur quod contraria aut privative opposita de eodem praedicarentur, ut ‘temporale’ – ‘aeternum’, ‘mortale’ – ‘immortale’, ‘passibile’ – ‘impassibile’. Biel, Collectorium, III d.7 q.1 E. 256 Ad secundum de conrrariis [contrariis?] posset concedi secundum potentiam divinam, quod possunt praedicari de eodem, quia nullam contradictionem implicat contrarias qualitates, puta caliditatem et frigiditatem, inesse eidem praecise. Non enim magis impossibile caliditatem non

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Therefore, the opposite predicates do not lead to a contradiction. No contraries are simultaneously predicated of Christ, Biel claims. The only problem he can see, concerns ‘time’ and ‘eternity’, but these are rather to be understood as being mutually privative.257 The privative aspect enables the term to include a negation of the whole or part of the subject’s nature without having to define the whole proposition as a contradiction.258 Here we are at the heart of Biel’s system. He cannot let the two natures come too close, because it would violate both reason and the tradition from Chalcedon.259 The natures should rather be kept at a distance within the same union, according to Biel. How can a predication of the divine properties to Christ – and not to man – remain protected from being mere Nestorianism, then?260 Biel says that everything which come together [conveniunt] in divine supposition, come together in human supposition as well. Hence, there is no distinction in modes between the divine and human nature in the person of Christ. He even goes so far as to say For Christ, who is a divine supposition, as Word, is the same person [ipse] and the same thing [idem] realiter and formaliter as the human supposition, that is man.261

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expellere frigiditatem quam caliditatem non calefacere; secundum est possibile, ut est de tribus pueris in fornace, Dan. 3; ergo et primum. […] Biel, Collectorium, III, d.7 q.1 E. Nec praedicata contraria inferunt contradictoria. Sed propositiones contrariae inferunt formaliter contradictorias. Contraria autem esse simul non infert propositiones contrariae, quia non participant utroque termino. – Puto tamen quod nulla contraria de facto praedicantur simul de Christo. Maxime enim ‘temporale’ et ‘aeternum’; sed haec non sunt contraria, sed magis privative opposita; quia aeternum est, quod non est temporale. Biel, Collectorium, III d.7 q.1 E. Biel distinguishes between “a suppositum which does not have the nature to suffer” on the one hand, and “a suppositum which has the nature not to suffer”. The former is considered as contradicting, whereas the latter is possible per potentiam divinam to receive passibility without being a contradiction within the proposition. Biel, Collectorium, III d.1 q.1 E. When Streiff summarises Luther’s critique of Biel as only a question of philosophical principles, he underscores the genuine theological interest in distinguishing between the natures: “Letzlich ist Luther darum bemüht zu zeigen, dass christologische Aussagen nicht den philosophischen und sprachlogischen Regeln und ihrer Methodik unterworfen werden können”. Streiff, Novis linguis loqui, 58. As White points out in his critique of Reinhard Schwarz, in Ockhamist Christology one has to distinguish between two levels of predication. There is the conceptual level and there is the reality level. The latter refers to factuality of Christ’s two natures, the former to the conceptual treatment of that fact. White points to the difficulty of coming to grips with the univocity of ‘man’ and ‘human nature’. Even though they have the same reference, they are not univocal in a stronger sense of the term: Some titles are reserved for Christ and not extended to the whole human race (p.274). White, Luther as Nominalist, 271 – 80. Christus enim, qui est suppositum divinum, quia Verbum, ipse idem realiter et formaliter est suppositum humanum quia homo. Biel, Collectorium, Liber III, d.7,q1, art.2, D 29 – 31.

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Therefore one can conclude that there is a strong insistence on the union between the natures in Biel’s theology, but that the natures are kept apart within that union.262 Luther’s understanding of abstract and concrete predications Is the distinction of abstract and concrete predications similarly used by Luther? To a large degree, Luther seems to follow the same grammar as Biel. There are some profound differences between them, however. The concept ‘person’ has a double status for Luther, one philosophical and one theological. If the disputation on John 1,14 underlined the impossibility for philosophy of defining “person” as one of the Trinity, this disputation concerns the impossibility of philosophy to give a true account of Christ’s person. Due to the divine nature involved, Luther claims that this is only possible for theology. A philosophical description of (a Christian understanding of) Christ would necessarily violate the Aristotelian hierarchy of being. It would commit a metabasis, by taking a property belonging to one class of being and transferring it to another class. Closely related to this problem is the formal logical solution to the problem of relating two members of different categories of being to the extent that they exchange properties. Luther gives an important comment to the metaphysical problem at stake in his argumentum 20: Argument: The same thing cannot be predicated of God and man. Therefore, etc. Response: This is a philosophical argument. There is no relation between the creature and the Creator, between the finite and the infinite. But we not only establish a relation, but a union of the finite and the infinite. Aristotle, if he had heard or read this, would never have been made a Christian, for he would not have conceded this proposition, namely that the same relation belongs to the finite and the infinite.263

Due to the non–proportion between the Creator and creation, there is an ontological barrier between the spheres of Arbor Porphyriana in the old language. It “signifies a thing separated from divinity by infinite degrees”, as Luther puts it in the theses.264 In the new language, Luther not only underlines 262 One must also keep in mind that the conceptual language in which Biel operates does not necessarily entail a judgement on things in the real world. 263 [the A-version] XX. Argumentum. Non potest idem praedicari de Deo et homine. Ergo etc. R. Est philosophicum argumentum. Nulla est proportio creaturae et creatoris, finiti et infiniti. Nos tamen non tantum facimus proportionem, sed unitatem finiti et infiniti. Aristoteles, si hoc audisset vel legisset, nunquam factus esset christianus, quia ipse non concessisset illam propositionem, quod eadem proportio sit finiti et infiniti. WA 39II, 112. 264 21. Nam creatura veteris linguae usu et in aliis rebus significat rem a divinitate separatam

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the union (and the therein implied exchange) of the natures, but an established relation between the infinite and the finite, too. This is important to notice, because a reference to the proximity of Creator and creation at this point prevents the interpretation of the union in Christ as a paradoxical relation, as if it was overcoming a fundamental divide. To put it more precisely : To qualify God’s relation to his creation as the philosophical relation between the infinite to the finite is theologically problematic, because God the Creator is intimately present to his creation.265 The distinction between abstract and concrete predications is closely connected to the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid.266 The logical problem at stake is that “creature” in reason simpliciter, or in an absolute sense – or in the old language, as Luther says – signifies what is not divine. Christ is not simpliciter the idioms of human nature – thirst, servitude, death. In Luther’s understanding – as well as in orthodox Christian understanding – these idioms are not predications in an absolute sense. In the topic considered here, it means that they do not refer to the whole Christ.267 They are only idioms secundum quid, and as such referring in a specific way to Christ’s nature. Christ is creature secundum humanitatem, which is a part of Christ. Hence, the word “Christ” stands for the composition of the two natures, and as a composition it cannot be said to have any property which is valid solely for its parts. If that is the case, the logical fallacy of composition and division is evident. Luther’s train of thought is indissolubly bound with the rules and use of infinitis modis. WA 39II, 94. The nulla proportio axiom is present in the writings by Biel, too. In his Sacris canonis missae expositio, Biel imports it in the discussion of the meritum of the mass, and thereby highlights the profound soteriological consequences of the doctrine. Although the problem Biel discusses concerns the problem of how Christ’s merit ex opere operato relates to the merit of the mass ex opere operante, Biel qualifies the former as infinite grace and the latter as finite grace. They are non-proportionate, therefore the problem of transfer of grace from that infinite, uncreated realm which Christ represents to the finite, created realm of this world: Quod sic probatur, quia omni merito finito secundum plenam iustitiam, correspondet adaequare aliquod praemium determinatum ad certum gradum sed meritum celebrationis missae est finitum, ergo sibi correspondet in praemio bonum finitum & ad certum gradum determinarum. Consequentia est, in tertio prime. Maior nota quia secundum iustitiam retributiuam oportet esse proportione praemij ad meritum. […] Ergo finito merito non correspondet infinitum sed determinatum praemium. finiti non ad infinitum nulla unquam est proportio […] Gabriel Biel, SACRI CANONIS MISSAE LVCIDISS. EXPOSITIO PROFVNDISSIMI (Brest: Thomas Bozzola, 1626), 180. 265 It could be argued that it is exactly Luther’s insistence on how intimately present God is to creation that radicalises his hamartiology and his understanding of human misery. The sin of human beings does not consist in violating the established laws of a distant lawmaker, but it puts him or her in the position as God’s enemy. 266 White, Luther as Nominalist, 236 – 38. 267 Or, as Luther expresses it, the creature is separated from Christ: 27. Qui enim dicunt, Christum esse creaturam, veteris linguae usu, id est, separatam, nulli unquam fuerunt christiani. WA 39II, 94.

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language in the Nominalist tradition.268 He is careful not to refute arguments based solely on evaluation of the terms involved, because the thinking behind an inadequate expression may be correct. For example, Luther points out that Here, therefore, in these ineffable matters it is important to interpret the Fathers appropriately (which indeed is the task). It is wicked to attribute an error from words which are spoken inappropriately, if you know that the speaker is pious and sensible.269

Therefore, one has to pay attention to how Scripture and the Church Fathers use the language, in order to extract the proper meaning they contain, Luther asserts.270 The moderni for example, are to a certain extent excused for their “stupid” [insulsius] expressions, because Luther claims that their thinking is catholic and correct.271 Luther says that these hopelessly inadequate words refer to an ineffable thing [rem], which points to a more principal feature in the expressions of the moderni.272 The relation between word and thing – which is qualified as similitudo by Luther at this point – opens the way for what he considers a legitimate diversity in the verbal expressions. These could be judged as more or less apt descriptions of the thing itself, due to the words’ – in this descriptive use of language – iconic status. Luther criticises not only the scholastics but the Church Fathers too when he judges the seemingly orthodox fire–iron image to be unsuitable for the relation of God and man in Christ.273 Even Athanasius and his rational soul–body metaphor is doomed inept,274 probably because of the lack of a potential exchange of properties by that metaphor. But Luther’s argument cannot be reduced to the language alone. A correct doctrine is not identical with a repetition of some verbal expressions, but resides in its own right. There is an important qualification as different from the mere grammar, from the more or less apt description. Luther singles out 268 For the following arguments I am particularly indebted to Graham White and his effort to place these arguments of Luther within the framework of Nominalist philosophy. White, Luther as Nominalist, 299 ff. 269 33. Hoc igitur in his rebus ineffabilibus praestandum est, ut patrum dicta (sicuti opus est) commode interpretemur. 34. Sceleratum est, cum noveris, pium et sanum esse alicuius sensum, ex verbis incommode dictis statuere errorem. WA 39II, 95. 270 In the 15. these, following the citation of John 1,14, Luther points out: 15. Recte docetur, in hac causa valere usum loquendi in scripturis et patribus orthodoxis servatum. WA 39II, 94. 271 Cf. these 46: Nulli vero insulsius loquuntur, quam Moderni, quos vocant, qui omnium volunt subtilissime et propriissime loqui videri. And further 49: Sed omnes [i.e. the Moderni] illi recte et catholice sapiunt, ideo condonanda est illis incommoda locutio. WA 39II, 95 – 96. 272 50. Quia rem ineffabilem volebant effari, deinde omnis similitudo claudicat nec unquam (ut dicunt) currit quatuor pedibus. WA 39II, 96. 273 43. Neque illa consisteret, ubi divinitatem igni et humanitatem ferro similant, etiamsi sit pulcherrima similitudo. WA 39II, 96. 274 44. Neque illam ferre liceret, quam Athanasius ponit: Sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. WA 39II, 95.

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sensus – and not the words – to be the point where heresy is located.275 Correspondingly, Luther can even go so far as to claim that the persons endowed with the gift of the Holy Spirit can speak the truth according to the sensus, even if they speak falsely according to the grammar276 What does Luther’s reference to sensus as different from grammatice mean? A modern interpreter has pointed to similar distinction found in the logical writings of the Nominalists, such as William of Ockham and Peter D’Ailly. They allegedly underline that the logicians need to interpret the terms found in the Fathers according to de virtute sermonis, that is, how the terms involved are actually used. It is not enough solely to refer to the rules, the intention of the writer should be taken into account, too, for example. Another important aspect to consider is the context.277 Although Luther’s philosophical background might explain some of the more subtle aspects of his understanding of the relation of sensus and grammatice, a look at his principles of translation of the Bible confirms the primacy of the sensus. Luther’s defence of the word “only” [allein; Latin, sola] in his “Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen” (1530), which he added to “faith” in Romans, chapter 3,278 points to a wider context for grasping the meaning than a mere adherence to the letter.279 That is not the only thing, however. Apart from Luther’s emphasis on knowing your own language as a condition for doing translation, he insists on keeping close to the letters, however.280 When St Paul himself is referred to as having caused Luther’s word “only”, the professor of Wittenberg mentions both the text and the meaning of St Paul. They “demanded and compelled” Luther with so much force that he apparently had to give in.281 In addition to the isolated letter, letter and (immediate) meaning, there is a wider context which has to be taken into consideration. The word “alone” 275 57. Igitur in sensu, non in verbis est haeresis, ut dixit recte S. Hieronymus a suis calumniatoribus exagitatus. WA 39II, 96. 276 61. Tanta est simplicitas et bonitas Spiritus sancti, ut homines sui, dum falsa loquuntur grammatice, vera loquuntur sensu. WA 39II, 96. 277 For these arguments, cf. White, Luther as Nominalist, 306 – 12. 278 ”Dise vier buchstaben sola stehen nicht drinnen / welche buchstaben die Eselko(e)pff ansehen / wie die kue ein new thor / Sehen aber nicht das gleichwol die meinung des text ynn sich hat / vnd wo mans klar vnd gewaltiglich verteutschen / so gehoret es hinein” Luther, StA 3, 486, 10 – 13. 279 Those who stick to the literal meaning – in the strong sense of the term – are deridingly labled “buchstabilisten” by Luther. Luther, StA 3, 487, 11 – 12. 280 “Doch hab ich widerumb nicht allzu frey die buchstaben lassen faren / Sondern mit grossen sorgen sampt meinen gehülffen drauff gesehen / das wo etwa an einem ort gelegenn ist / hab ichs nach den buchstaben behalten […] ich habe eher wo(e)llen der deutschen sprache abbrechen / denn von dem wort weichen.” Luther, StA 3, 490, 6 – 8 and 11 – 12. 281 “Aber nu hab ich nicht allein der sprachen art vertrawet vnd gefolget / das ich Roma .3. solum Allein hab hinzu gesetzt / Sonder der text vnd die meinung S(ankt) Pauli foddern vnd erzwingens mit gewallt / denn er handelt ja daselbs das hauptstu(e)ck Christlicher lere […]” Luther, StA 3, 490, 21 – 25.

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raises an apocalyptic concern282 about the meaning of justification, what we could call the sensus of Christianity. If it was omitted, one should ask why the most obvious content, namely that “faith alone justifies”, is correct according to the subject matter, but not according to the literal expression.283 Why should it not be possible to stick to “alone” if it is a central matter of faith, Luther asks? Is it a denial of the sensus, with a hollow reference to the grammar?284 It is important to have in mind the existential hermeneutic at work in Luther’s work with words. The kernel of Luther’s theology, the inner core of sensus, appears when Christ’s role in theology is raised through the denial of that minor word “alone”. With theology in general and translation of the Bible in particular, the art is a matter of public discussion and exists as such in the “field of reason”. It is necessary to supply good arguments for all theological decisions, and Luther does not hesitate to support his choice of grammar with quite striking linguistic examples. However, Luther claims that his critics are attacking Christ’s role in theology, and thereby transforming the dispute about grammar into a dispute between incommensurable theological systems.285 How can these observations from the Bible translation shed light on the relation between sensus and grammatice in the disputation? Towards the end of the arguments and responses, Luther touches on the difficult issue of divine suffering. If somebody should say that Whatever is subject to death, is not God. Christ was subjected to death. Therefore Christ is not God.286

Luther responds simply by referring to the communication of attributes. This is the sensus of his doctrine of Christ, the heart of the subject matter. The argument presented is a philosophical one. By “philosophical” it seems as if Luther is referring to the metabasis of Aristotle. What follows is of primary importance, namely, if extra–biblical expres282 “D(as) wer so vil gesagt / d(ass) nicht allein Christus tod vnser sunde weg neme / sondern vnsere werck ym hulffen / vn(d) ko(e)ndte(n) das auch thun das er thut / auff das wir yhm gleich gut vn(d) starck weren. Es ist der Teuffel / der das blut Christi nicht kan vngeshendet lassen.” Luther, StA 3, 492, 28 – 29. 283 As Sauer-Geppert points out, it was common in the older translations to add extra words for the sake of explanation simply because they had richer nuances of meaning (or less precision). The outstanding factor with the word “alone” is the importance for the subject matter. Waldtraut Ingeborg Sauer-Geppert, “Bibelübersetzungen III/1,” TRE 6 (1980): 239. 284 “Sind sie nit toll / to(e)richt vn(d) vnsinig? die sache(n) beken(n)en sie fur recht / vnd straffen doch die rede vo(n) der selbigen sache fur vnrecht […]” Luther, StA 3, 492, 15 – 17. 285 If Luther had been a Norwegian, he would perhaps said that the critics “sl”r p” sk”ka, men meiner merra”, which translates something like “hitting the shaft of the carriage but intending to hit the horse”. 286 XXXIII. Argumentum. Quicquid est subiectum morti, non est Deus. Christus est subiectus morti. Ergo Christus non est Deus. WA 39II, 121.

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sions or idioms like “This man created the world” or “God suffered” should not be used. Luther’s response is as enlightening as it may be surprising: The error does not reside in verbis, but in sensu.287 Even if the Bible does not contain these words, it contains the subject matter, and can be expressed by the rather unusual words. Even though these expressions have been coined by a modern interpreter as “hymnological theology of the congregation, whose characteristic it is to revel in contradictions”,288 Luther confirms it as an explication of the biblical witness of Christ. Contradiction or not, at least Luther does not see the language of identity between God and man as inconsistent. Luther’s doctrine of Christ may be considered in line with the greater nominalist tradition,289 but his extreme insistence on the proximity of Creator and creature in Christ marks a break with the past insofar as the change of grammar is necessary : We do not depart [from the formulas prescribed by the Holy Spirit] without necessity, for the subject is ineffable and incomprehensible. A creature, in the old use of language, is that which the Creator has created and distinguished from himself, but this meaning has no place in Christ the creature. There the Creator and the creature are one and the same [unus et idem].290

In other words, it is the salvific communication between God and man which is the content Luther above all wants to preserve. Due to the lofty subject at hand, there is a freedom in expressing this union, but it is an aspect of the faith which is constantly under attack from the devil, as Luther reminds his readers quite often. Although the words are important – Luther would only depart if necessary –, they have a limited potential of grasping the essential meaning of the doctrine as instruments of human thought.

287 Scriptura non dicit: Iste homo creavit mundum. Deus est passus. Ergo non est utendum his idiomatis. R. Error non est in verbis, sed in sensu, quamvis scriptura has voces non ponit, tamen habet eandem sententiam. WA 39II, 121. 288 Wilhelm Bousset in his 1913 published “Kyrios Christos. Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenaeus”, p. 312. Cited from Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100 – 600) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 177. 289 White rightly traces the logical consistency of Luther’s thought, and shows the weakness of earlier attempts to scoff at the nominalist position. White, Luther as Nominalist, 344 ff. 290 Non exeamus absque ulla [which refer to formulis praescriptis Spiritus sancti] necessitate, quia res est ineffabilis et incomprehensibilis. Creatura est in veteri lingua id, quod creator creavit et a se separavit, sed haec significatio non habet locum in creatura Christo. Ibi creator et creatura unus et idem est. WA 39II, 105.

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Summary : Luther’s Christology Luther’s understanding of communicatio idiomatum and the proximity of the natures implied therein is of utmost centrality to his interpretation and conception of Christ. Already in 1520, the marital imagery of the joyous exchange – which expressed the core of his soteriological concern – had the intimate relation between man and God in Christ as a premise. This relation is not seen as a static thing within a particular metaphysics. It is rather an event where there is a continuous exchange of properties. This radical perichoretic291 understanding of the relation between the natures is mirrored in the understanding of metaphor, where sin and holiness are exchanged in Christ. When it is perceived as a corollary for the forgiveness of sins, it shows how important this doctrine is for Luther’s understanding of salvation. The Christology of Luther was not restricted to dogma alone, but had implications for the interpretation of religious practice, particularly how the gifts of grace were communicated to the believers. When Luther underlined the significance of the bodily aspect of the Eucharist, the reformer of Zurich, Ulrich Zwingli, protested. According to Zwingli, there is a fundamental difference between the visible and invisible nature. His inability to keep spirit and flesh in an intimate union makes him a threat towards the Christology of Luther. Whereas the latter is concerned about the significance of Christ’s salvific presence, Zwingli’s Christ is rather sent to liberate man from fleshly bondage to freedom in the spirit. The spiritualism of Zwingli downgrades the external element in the experience of faith, and places the risen Christ in heaven. By the figure alleosis, Zwingli restricts the divine properties as applied to human nature; particularly the death of Christ is restricted to the human nature. In Luther’s view, these premises lead Zwingli to destroy the union between the natures. One of the most significant aspects of Luther’s response to Zwingli is to affirm that the body and flesh of Christ is essential to his humanity. This is a consequence of the incarnation, although Luther admits that there might be different modes of presence. Luther’s distinction between Christ’s modes of appearance enables him to retain the flesh of Christ, even if the relation to the order of nature may vary. There is the historical, limited circumscriptive mode, which follows the rules of Aristotle’s physics, and there is the transcendent repletive mode. Between them, the diffinitive mode is located, where Christ can be present – according to his humanity, too – without changing the physical quantity of the space where he appears: The genesis of the so–called doctrine of “consubstantiation” of the Eucharist. These modes enabled Luther 291 As we have seen, the Greek concept of mutual penetration, peqiw¾qgsir is frequently used by Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus, but its use in Christology can be traced back to Gregor of Nazianz. Williams, “Jesus Christus II,” 741.

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to give a closer explanation of the principle “where God is, there is man, too”, without loosing any features of Christ’s humanity. If some philosophical implications of Luther’s unionist Christology were touched upon in his writings from the 1520, the fullest treatment is found in the great Christological disputations of 1539 and 1540. The argument is a plea for a strict division between the perspectives of philosophy and theology. As in the nominalist tradition, Luther insists that both sciences are concerned with the same object, but they qualify it differently. One of the most important differences concerns the understanding of “man”, “creature” or “person”. In philosophy there is a (correct) ontological gap between them and the divine nature, but in theology man is in communion with God, according to Luther. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to distinguish between the perspectives of the old philosophical language and the new theological language. Only the latter has the possibility to state the necessary communication of properties between subjects on different levels within the hierarchy of Being.

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Melanchthon’s diverging solution Melanchthon’s dismissal of communicatio idiomatum Melanchthon’s 1559 commentary on Colossians shocked the Lutherans deeply, and equally cheered their opponents, due to the Christological content in general and Melanchthon’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in particular.1 Before the commentary was published, the reformed theologian Peter Vermigli wrote enthusiastically to his friend John Calvin: I have read fragments of a book where Melanchthon exposes an orthodox doctrine of the human nature of Christ. It is really supposed to be in a real and proper heaven [in coelo vere ac proprie]. According to its corporeal substance, it is supposed to have a fixed place. He does not treat heaven allegorically. This should refute the errors of the Ubiquitarians.2

What caused such an enthusiasm in the reformed camp? Vermigli points to the core of the question at stake: If heaven is a local, circumscriptive place, the body of Christ would have been transported there. It could not be bodily present in the world, but restricted to that place. A modern reader may ask: Why did Melanchthon restrict the presence of Christ’s body to a local heaven? It was known that Luther and Melanchthon differed on a number of important issues, but it was seen as a possible plurality within the Reformation movement, not threatening the unity between them.3 However, there are signs of disagreement, too. 1 “[…] veröffentlichte der Praeceptor Germanie zwei Schriften, die wie Paukenschläge wirkten, bei den Lutheranern für Schrecken sorgten und bei den Eidgenossen für Jubel.” Hans Christian Brandy, Die späte Christologie des Johannes Brenz (Beiträge Zur Historischen Theologie; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), 1991), 37. The second essay was Melanchthon’s expert opinion on Heidelberg controversy, his Iudicium de coena Domini from 1. November 1559. 2 CR, 44, 586 f. 3 Luther did not only tolerate the substantial difference between him and Melanchthon concerning the doctrine of the Eucharist, he even permitted ecclesiastical rituals to follow Melanchthon’s doctrine. Albert Herrlinger, Die Theologie Melanchthons in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Zusammenhange mit der Lehrgeschichte und Kulturbewegung der Reformation (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1879), 144. Cf. Frank’s comment, reflecting the confessional movement in the 19th Century and its sharp view of the implications of the difference: “Man mag es eine providentielle Fügung nennen und Gott dafür danken, dass Melanchthon bei Lebzeiten Luthers seine Differenz von ihm unter allgemeinen Ausdrücken verhüllte, dass so der offene Bruch zwischen beiden Männern und damit unsägliches Unheil verhütet wurde […]”. Fr. H. R. Frank, Die Theologie der Concordienformel historisch-dogmatisch entwickelt und beleuchtet. Band III: Die Artikel vom heiligen Abendmahl, von der Person Christi und von der Höllenfahrt Christi. (Erlangen: Theodor Blaesing, 1863), 5.

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During the intense negotiations at the diet of Augsburg during the summer of 1530, for example, Luther was so upset with the reported results, that he refused further postal communication with Melanchthon. His silence while staying at the castle of Coburg may be a result of Luther’s “sentiments”,4 but one can nevertheless clearly see the different approach between the politically conscious and ecumenically sympathetic Melanchthon on the one hand, and the more apocalyptically-oriented Luther, who only wanted an appeal to what he regarded as theological truth.5 This political awareness of Melanchthon can be seen through his reservations about Luther’s portrayal of the pope as Anti–Christ. According to Melanchthon, it was possible to justify the office of the pope jure humano for peace-keeping purposes.6 After Luther’s death and the catastrophic military defeat of the Schmalkaldic League in 1547, Melanchthon negotiated on behalf of the Protestants. Due to his acceptance of the terms demanded by the emperor through the Leipzig interim, a division occurred among the followers of Luther. Whether he had any real choice, given the political circumstances, is another question. Through the interim, Melanchthon allowed the celebration of Roman masses in the Protestant cities, as long as the pastor was able to preach freely from the pulpit.7 By restricting doctrine solely to preaching, Melanchthon interpreted the liturgical imposition from the emperor as pertaining merely to external things, as “adiaphora”, which could be negotiated.8 His adversaries among the Lutherans, notably Flacius and Amsdorff, understood the use of force as bringing about a status confessionis for the Church, in which there was no room for negotiation.9 In addition, there was the question of Christology, particularly how Christ 4 “[…] eine Quelle für Luthers Stimmung.” Heinz Scheible, Melanchthon. Eine Biographie (München: C.H.Beck, 1997), 156. 5 Philosophia tua ita te vexat, non theologia […] Martin Luther, Briefwechsel (G. Bebermeyer; Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1930), 5,399. Cf. Brecht, Martin Luther, 2,376. A striking observation about the literary genres used by Luther and Melanchthon in this letter correspondence is given by Johanna Loehr: Luther seems to be writing a comedy with a happy ending, whereas Melanchthon is more inclined to a tragedy. Johanna Loehr, “War der Augsburger Reichstag von 1530 eine Komödie? Zur Verwendung dramentheoretischer Begriffe in den Briefen Luthers und Melanchthons,” ARG 91 (2000): 44 – 86. 6 BSLK, 463 – 64. 7 Joachim Mehlhausen, “Interim,” TRE 16 (1987): 234. 8 The doctrinal profile of the interim was somehow peculiar, however, at least if one compares some key notions the Leipzig interim to that of the Augsburg confession. Faith is qualified as a Christian virtue [Tugend], for example. But perhaps is the qualification of the ordained ministry the most striking feature of the text: Melanchthon interprets clergy as “church-servants” [Kirchendiener] who are obliged to obey the bishops. Paul Tschackert, Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Krichenlehre samt ihren innerprotestantischen Gegensätzen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910), 507 – 8. 9 Bernhard Lohse, “Von Luther Bis Zum Konkordienbuch,” in Die Lehrentwicklung im Rahmen der Konfessionalität (ed. Carl Andresen; vol. 2 of Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 108 – 13.

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should be understood as present in the world. Through the Eucharistic controversy in Bremen in the 1550’s – which was decisive for the development of the Lutheran Christology – the question was raised of how Christology functions as a framework for a Eucharistic rationale. A fundamental issue was brought to the fore: How does the philosophically determined understanding of cosmology affect the union of God and man in Christ? One important parameter for answering that question was the understanding of heaven: If Christ had departed to a circumscriptive place at the ascension, how could one understand his presence in the world? This raised even more far–reaching problems, epitomised through the Christological version of the philosophical body–soul relation: How is divine and human nature united in one person? By insisting on a circumscriptive heaven, Melanchthon was understood by some as supporting the Calvinist camp, as the joyful letter of Vermigli and the reports of sorrow in the Lutheran camp bear witness.

Melanchthon’s method If this doctrine was of such importance for Christology and soteriology, why did Melanchthon reach another conclusion than Luther on the question of communicatio idiomatum? To reach an understanding of the differences between the Wittenberg reformers it seems useful to grasp the arguments of Melanchthon’s rejection of the doctrine of ubiquity, which followed as a consequence from Luther’s Christological rule: “Where God is, there man is, too”. Melanchthon’s contrasting Christology was first expressed towards the end of his life, in his commentary on Colossians and further expanded on in his expert opinion of the Eucharistic controversy in Bremen.10 The question arises: How does his break with central parts of Luther’s Christology fit into the larger horizon of Melanchthon’s theology? He is, after all, not a theologian without a thorough systematic consistence. But which sources should be consulted to supply us with some relevant coordinates for Melanchthon’s conception of theology in which his doctrine of Christ should be placed? One could consult “the metaphysical elements of Melanchthon’s dialectics”,11 or analyse how the Christological language fit into Melanchthon’s logical writings.12 Indispensable as the results of these approaches may be for the present work, I would argue for an analysis of Melanchthon’s understanding of the soul as a framework around his Christology. Such an analysis would not only expose Melanchthon’s anthropology and give us a 10 Cf. Heinz Scheible, “Melanchthon, Philipp,” TRE 22 (1992): 384. 11 Ulrich Gottfried Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik (Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985), 11 ff. 12 Mahlmann, Dogma, 62 ff.

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glimpse of how he interprets the humanity of Christ. Hopefully, it would also uncover some of Melanchthon’s metaphysical premises. After all, Melanchthon wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s psychology, which he later revised and expanded.13 It has recently been argued that Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul should be understood in the light of Luther’s teaching, due to the embedment of the soul in the human body.14 True as that may be, it is hardly possible to separate Melanchthon’s teaching completely from some basic elements common to the Wittenberg reformers. The intention for the present work, however, is to find arguments which can explain the difference between Luther and Melanchthon on such an important topic as Christology.

Melanchthon’s interpretation of Colossians 3:1 – 5 Commenting upon the first five verses of Colossians 3, Melanchthon exposes an important problem of any Christian anthropology : How is the difference between our mortal bodies and our participation in the immortal Christ to be understood? Melanchthon begins with a distinction between the old nature, which is dead, and the new life, which is in Christ. The new life is efficient, and sown inside us as an ongoing work.15 But then a problem arises: How could it be that we who are raised up with Christ are still under the yoke of death? Melanchthon refers to the postponement of eschatological fulfilment; our life in Christ is hidden. It is established as a reality, but not yet visible. He sees an analogy in the glory of the Church, which is not yet [nondum] seen, but is to be revealed when Christ appears again.16 The problem of having a Christ–filled body both mortal and immortal, leads Melanchthon to make a distinction 13 For the doctrine of the soul as a key to understanding important structural differences for the role of philosophy in theology between Luther and Melanchthon, I am particularly indebted to the philosopher Sascha Salatowsky. Cf. Sascha Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Bochumer Studien Zur Philosophie; Amsterdam Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner, 2006), 35 – 131. 14 Kusukawa claims that the novelty of Melanchthon’s psychology lies in the necessary “knowledge of human anatomy that is divinely ordained” (p. 88). This is read as an implication of Luther’s teaching that “the whole human being, including body and soul, was the subject of grace”. As a result, “Melanchthon’s Christian soul in the Commentarius de anima should be understood in the light of this teaching of Luther’s” (p. 89). Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon (Ideas in Context; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 75 – 123. 15 Viuit autem in uobis Christus, Ergo sit efficax, & inserta est occupatio. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio Epistolae Pavli Ad Colossenses Praelecta Anno M.D.LVI/A Phillippo Melanthone (Wittenberg: Iohannes Crato, 1559), H2b. 16 Vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo, id est, etsi inchoata est cum Christo in Deo, id est, etsi inchoata est vita, tamen nondum gloria Ecclesiae conspicitur, conspicienda tunc cum Dominus rursus apparebit. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H2b-H3a.

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between body and spirit: Due to sin, our bodies are mortal, due to justice, the spirit is alive.17 That glorious body of Christ is in heaven, according to Melanchthon. What does heaven mean to him? In a crucial paragraph, he writes: Just as in the third chapter in the gospel of John, the Son of Man is said [in Col 3:1] to be in heaven, I respond: In the confession of faith it is to be understood literally, just as the words sound, according to the body and the bodily space. When he has ascended, it is certainly understood according to the bodily and physical spatiality. “In heaven” means that it is in a heavenly space […]18

The symbol should be taken literally concerning the body and the body’s extension in space, namely that the ascension should be interpreted as a transport of Christ’s body. By this token, any interpretation of the ascension as transcending the old categories of physics is excluded. On the contrary, it is underlined that this transport is conceived according to the normal categories of man, “in order to avoid allegorical speculations”.19 Seeing an object and placing it within the world–view of the senses seems crucial for Melanchthon: He has ascended visibly and corporally, and Christ is always omnipresent when he wants, according to the antique authors. His body ascended and was lifted up.20

Here, omnipresence is qualified as a voluntary action.21 Christ’s presence in everything does not follow from his partaking in the divine nature, but rests on a voluntary decision on behalf of Christ. We will see how the notion of the will is further developed by Martin Chemnitz in the next chapter. At this point, a more acute question can be raised: How does Melanchthon interpret the world(s) which Christ is travelling through? Is there a map in which the Lord’s journey can be traced?

17 Si Christus est in uobis, corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, Spiritus autem uita est propter iusticiam. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3a. 18 Item Iohan.3. Filius hominis qui est in coelo. Respondeo. In Symbolo intelligatur dictum ut sonat litera, & de corpore & corporali locatione, Ascendit, scilicet, corporali & physica locatione, in coelum, id est, in locum coelestem […] Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3a. 19 […] quia hic non sunt fingendae allegoriae. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3a. Does this mean that Melanchthon considers coelum to be identical with the heaven of physics? In his definition of 1547, he defines heaven univocally as a finite and corporeal substance: Quid est Coelum? Est substantia finita, corporea, simplex, lucida figurae circularis, dissimitis elementis nec obnoxia corruptioni, ut elementa, circundans omnia reliqua mundi corpora. CR, 13, 531. 20 Ascensio fuit uisibilis & corporalis, & semper ita scripsit tota antiquitas Christum corporali locatione in aliquo loco esse ubicunque uult, & ascensio corporalis facta est sursum. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3a. 21 Thilo Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht. Die Christologie Tilemann Heshusens (1527 – 1588) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 47.

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Melanchthon’s notion of presence Commenting on Col. 2:9, “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily”, Melanchthon identifies that God is present in four modes. First, there is the universal presence praesentia universalis. Here, the individual substances are preserved through God’s presence [adest] in evil and good creatures. Melanchthon refers to Jereremiah 23:24 as a proof for the universal presence, thereby reflecting Luther’s scriptural proof for the repletive understanding of the presence of Christ in his Confession concerning Christ’s Supper of 1528.22 Secondly, Melanchthon refers to the special presence, praesentiae specialis, in which God himself [sese] communicates with the believers. Here God gives them his light and justice, and vivifies them for eternal life. According to the special presence, God will not be withdrawn from them, but remain in community with them, even if he is by nature of the matter [reipsa] separated from them.23 The third modus is called special presence, too, and concerns not only the conservation, but the effective renewal of the saints by his word. Hence, he aims at a more strict soteriological definition of this modus, than in the previous one. It is not easy to find an equivalent in Luther, rather a very different understanding of the most important mode of presence is found here. Where Luther on the basis of the personal union between the natures interprets the presence of the risen, but not yet ascended Jesus as one and the same Christ as is present in the Eucharist, Melanchthon divides it into two. The fourth mode is restricted to how the divine relates to the personal union, where the second person of the divinity takes upon [assumpsit] human nature. Melanchthon underlines that they are not only inseparable, but unified as rvist²lemom. This Greek term is interpreted elsewhere by Melanchthon as an equivalent to the Latin term subsistentia. The natures are united in this rvist²lemom as soul and body are united in other human beings.24 22 CR, 15, 1253. In an interesting response to some questions concerning omnipresence and the different grades of God’s presence, Melanchthon underlines how God sustained the substance of Pharao as long as God wanted. But even though God is omnipresent to the extent of evil human beings, his presence does not stretch to the things. They can be destroyed: Sic adest [sc. Deus] coelo, terrae, angelis, plantis, hominibus bonis et malist, sustentat Pharaonis substantiam, donec vult, et ostendit in illius poena iudicium et iram suam. De hac universali praesentia inquit, Coelum et terram ego impleo, Ierem. 23. Ac separabilem esse hanc praesentiam, manifestum est, quia Deus potest res destruere. CR, 8, 638. 23 Secundus modus praesentiae nominatur specialis, qua Deus est in beatis, scilicet, ita ut non tantum servet substantias, sed sese eis communicet, complens eos sua luce et iusticia, et vivificans eos vita aeterna, et immediate conspicitur ab eis. Et quanquam non discedit ab eis, tamen adest tantum societate, et reipsa est separabilis. De hoc modo dicitur : Deus erit omnia in omnibus, scilicet in beatis, id est sic erit in eis, ut non sit simul peccatum. CR, 15, 1253. 24 Quartus modus praesentiae est unio personalis, qua scilicet secunda persona divinitatis assumsit

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Melanchthon is very conscious to reserve this modus solely for the historical “event” of the personal union. By that token, the argument of transference of the divine properties to other areas is isolated and cannot be used outside strict Christological sentences, i. e. with Christ as the logical subject. One should note the hermeneutical method which characterises Melanchthon’s interpretation of Colossions 2:9: The meaning of the given biblical text is secured and filtered through the concept rvist²lemom on the relation between Christ’s two natures.25 The literal expression is tempered, not through arguments which are formally biblical in content, but through a filter which belongs to the received tradition of the ancient Church.26 When Melanchthon interprets Colossians 3:1, he refers to the symbol: “He ascended into Heaven, sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty”. But this creates a problem; he has just cited Rom 8, where Christ is said to be in the believers. How can the son of Man be present in the believers at the same time as he is seated beside the Father/seated in heaven? Melanchthon’s solution does not alter the interpretation of heaven by Augustine. He retains the definition from the old Church by defining heaven for the body of Christ as a physical place. Instead of defining the ascension of Christ as a participation in the immanent activity of the omnipresent Father, as Luther does, heaven represents for Melanchthon a kind of transcendental space for the human nature of Christ. His divine nature on the other hand, is not restricted to this spatiality. Referring to the voluntarily possibility of Christ’s corporeal presence at many places at once, Melanchthon is perhaps trying to secure a certain presence in the Eucharist. His multivolipresence, however, does not solve the inherent tension between the human nature of Christ localised in heaven and the question of how Christ is present in the Eucharist, as we shall see. Melanchthon interprets communicatio idiomatum as a solution to the tension between the spatially confined body of Christ and the ecclesiastical demand for a presence of the whole Christ in the Eucharist. To explain this, Melanchthon uses an example from the earthly life of Jesus Christ. During the event of the incarnation, the Logos, the second person of the Trinity, remained in (the non–spatial) heaven while the body of Christ was in the womb of the virgin. The natures are united, because the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum serves as a cure for the threatened unity between the natures. Melanchthon has reasons from Chalcedon to pursue the issue, however. His humanam naturam, non solum inseparabiliter, sed ita, ut sit unum completum rvist²lemom illa natura humana, et kºcor assumens humanam naturam propemodum, ut in caeteris hominibus copulatione animae et corporis fit unum completum rvist²lemom. Hac similtudine usi sunt Athanasius, Cyrillus et Iustinus. CR, 15, 1253. 25 Cf. Theodor Mahlmann, “Personeinheit Jesu mit Gott. Interpretation der Zweinaturenlehre in den christologischen Schriften des alten Brenz,” Blätter Für Württembergische Kirchengeschichte 70 (1970): 221. 26 This sheds light over the distinction between meaning and literal expression by Melanchthon, cf. page 98 f.

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interest lies in balancing the Christological dogma by stressing that the natures should not be confused. It was, after all, the first of the four adverbs of Chalcedon: “[…] in two natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation”.27 Melanchthon admits that the Son who is in heaven is said to exchange the properties [communicatio idiomatum], but that proposition has to be regulated according to its use.28 Here, Melanchthon supports his view of the glorified body of Christ with a specific theory of the incarnation. Even if it is true – on the basis of communicatio idiomatum – to say that Christ is everywhere,29 Melanchthon underlines the difference between the divine Logos and Christ’s body. He refers to Athanasius who said that the Logos has not been tied [colligatus est] to the body, but that the body contained [continet] the Logos.30 Here, a crucial element in Melanchthon’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum can be observed: It is not possible to apply all the divine features to the humanity of Christ, the divine features should rather be applied solely to the whole person. Melanchthon refers to the distinction between totus and totum,31 found in Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Lombard claims that Christ is totus, everywhere, that is, in the person or hypostasis, but he is not totum, everywhere, according to the nature.32 Melanchthon’s application of the totus–totum logic is closely related to how he qualifies the grammar of Christological expressions. The rule for how statements of an obscure nature should be understood is stated by Melanchthon in his exposition of rhetoric, Elementa rhetorices (1542). One of the problems he considers is the understanding of obscure texts. He refers to the sayings of Jesus such as “Go, sell everything you own and give it to the poor” or “You shall not swear”. Are these words to be understood literally, as the so-called Anabaptists do? No, Melanchthon claims. In situations where the text is obscure, an 27 The words are adverbs in Greek: !rsucw¼tyr, !tq´ptyr, !di²iqetyr, !wyq¸styr. Cf. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100 – 600), 264. 28 Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3b. 29 Alii concinnius locuti sunt: Propositio vera est communicatione Idiomatum. Christus ubique est. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3b. 30 Athanasius sic loquitur de incarnatione uerbi: kºcor non colligatus est corpori, sed ipse corpus continet, ut & in eo sit, & extra omnia, & in sinu Patris, neque cum sint in omnibus, sit pars aliorum, sed omnia uitam, sustentationemque ab ipso accipiunt. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3b. 31 Deinde additur forma sermonis, Vbique totus est, sed non totum. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H3b. 32 Peter Lombard discusses problems concerning how Christ is present in death and hell: Ex his apparet quod Christus eodem tempore totus erat in sepulcro, totus in inferno, totus ubique; sicut et modo totus est ubicumque est, sed non totum. Nec in sepulcro vel in inferno totum erat, etsi totus: sicut Christus totus est Deus, totus homo, sed non totum, quia non solum est Deus vel homo, sed Deus et homo. ‘Totum’ enim ad naturam refertur, ‘totus’ autem ad hypostsim; sicut ‘aliud’ et ‘aliquid’ ad naturam, ‘alius’ vero et ‘aliquis’ ad personam referuntur. Lombard, Sententiae, 2, 139, 13 – 19.

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interpretation is needed to retain the meaning.33 This is done by directing the meaning [di²moia] against the literal expression [Ngtºr] of a given text. Melanchthon is careful not to extend this rule too far, however. He warns against ruling out the literal expression in the dogmatic books of the Bible or an evident locus of Scripture, unless an absurdity should rule out an article of faith.34 For Melanchthon, the main point is to consult clearer testimonies of Scripture for confirming or refuting doctrines in ecclesiastical negotiations.35 The expressions of Scripture are placed according to a specific classification, where the understanding of predication [propositio] plays an important role. In his Erotemata Dialectices (1547), Melanchthon lists three types of true predications. These are called regular, figural and unusual predications. A regular predication is to unite the subject with another expression of the five predicaments.36 A figural predication comprises all kinds of improper predications, such as similitudes, synechdoches and metaphors. As an example, Melanchthon says “The tyrant is a wolf”. An unusual predication, on the other hand, is solely reserved for the Christological propositions such as “God is man” and “The word was made flesh”. Melanchthon wants, on the one hand, to prevent the classical Christological propositions to be classified as figural predications, and as such subscribe to the reformed doctrine. On the other hand, he does not want to violate the “Nestorian” adverbs of the formula of Chalcedon. Therefore, it can not be said that divinity itself can suffer, because the subject – i. e. divinity – signifies the opposite. When the sentence “God has suffered” is properly interpreted, the predicate should be attributed to the

33 This is obviously the problem of the radical Anabaptists, according to Melanchthon: Nam anabaptistae urgent uerba, nec recipiunt ullam interpretacionem. Nos addimus interpretacionem, ut sententiam retineamus […] Philipp Melanchthon, Elementa rhetorices, mit den Briefen Senecas, Plinius’ d.J. und den “Gegensätzlichen Briefen” Picos della Mirandola und Franz Burchards (Berlin: Weidler, 2001), 108. 34 Sed in sacris literis hoc obseruandum est, ut in dogmatibus et praeceptis retineatur t¹ Ngtºm, nisi impingat in aliquem articulum fidei, seu manifestum scripturae locum. Philipp Melanchthon, Elementa Rhetorices, 108 – 10. 35 Confirmationes et confutationes in Ecclesiasticis negocijs ducuntur ex testimonijs scripturae clarioribus. Philipp Melanchthon, Elementa Rhetorices, 110. This principle was used in GnesioLutheran circles, too, and gives a hint just how influential the hermeneutical thought of Melanchton must have been. As late as 1559, Schnepff, Flacius and Musäus used these words in their Confutatio: In doctrina coelesti, ubi to Ngtºm parit absurditates, confugiendum est ad di²moiam. [Where absurd literal statements occur in divine doctrine, a refuge is given by holding on to meaning]. Wilhelm Preger, Matthias Flacius Illyricus und seine Zeit (Erlangen: T. Bläsing, 1859), 2, 77f. and 119, note 2. 36 Predicaments are classifications of the common terms from Aristotle’s Categories. Although the list of Aristotle encompasses ten categories, Porphyry’s reduction of that list into quinque universalia became a standard part of Middle Age logic. Peter Abelard contributed substantially to this development. H.M. Baumgartner and P. Kolmer, “Prädikabilien, Prädikabilienlehre,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 1178 – 86.

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person who is God and man. A Christological proposition has its restriction to the concrete person, and does not pertain to the abstract properties.37 This concentration of the person – and not the natures – as the receiver and giver of the properties correlates with a decisive element in Melanchthon’s theology. His hierarchy of doctrinal expressions is built on the established consensus of meaning found among the Church Fathers. Antiquity “becomes a formula for certitude”, as a modern interpreter observed.38 Therefore, the classical statement of Irenaeus, “the Word rested when Christ was crucified and died”, is recalled and given a key role in Melanchthon’s method of Christological propositions. The most extreme consequences of Luther’s unionist theology is thereby avoided. Melanchthon makes an interesting comment on how the Word did not stretch forth [exerente] its powers, in order that death might not be pulled back.39 The distinction between the presence of divinity and its actual use anticipates a very important point in the later discussions on communicatio idiomatum. Melanchthon confirms his “new” cosmology by interpreting the New Testament’s insistence on Jesus being exalted higher than angels as a cosmological utterance: Christ is fixed in a circumscriptive place above the angels, in “that mysterious light of God”.40 From these considerations, Melanchthon refers to John 14:23 where the indwelling of the Father and Christ is promised to the one who loves Christ. This is the definition of communicatio idiomatum.41 Thereby Melanchthon accentuates his characteristic moral aspect of Church and salvation, even in the middle of Christology : Concerning the Son’s presence in the proclamation of the gospel and in the holy people, it is necessary that the Church is being taught faithfully, so that we may discern our Lord Jesus Christ being present in the Church […]42 37 Tertius modus est inusitatus, videlicet, in propositionibus de filio Dei, quarum non sunt alia exempla in tota rerum universitate, ut: Deus est homo, Verbum caro factum est. Haec non congruunt ad regulares, ut alioqui non coniungimus species disparatas, ut: Aper est cervus, Albedo est sonus. […] Non dicimus in abstracto: Divinitas est passa, quia hic naturae seorsum consideratae significantur. […] Sed in concreto persona significatur, Deus est passus, id est, haec persona, quae est Deus et homo, est passa. CR, 13,524 – 525. 38 Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum. The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneve: Libraire E. Droz, 1961), 227. 39 […] vox Irenaei digna est memoria: Christum crucifixum et mortuum esse, requiescente verbo, ut crcifigi et mori posset, id est, verbo non exerente suas vires, non tunc repellente mortem. CR, 13, 525. 40 […] [Christus] exaltatus supra angelos in illa arcana luce Dei regnans cum Patre, & tamen corpus localiter alicubi est secundum veri corporis modum […] Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H4a. 41 Et hae propositiones: Christus in uobis est, Ego in eis, veniemus ad eum & mansionem apud eum faciemus & c. intelligantur communicatione Idiomatum. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H4a. 42 Et de hac praesentia Filij in praedicatione Euangelij & in sanctis, necesse est Ecclesiam fideliter erudiri, ut agnoscamus Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum adesse Ecclesiae […] Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H4a.

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Melanchthon is careful to qualify this presence of Christ. From Romans 6 – and in line with the localisation of the risen Christ in a circumscriptive heaven – he draws a sharp line between a dead, not effective nature on the one hand, and a living, effective body on the other. As a consequence, Melanchthon advocates a rather strict eschatological postponement of salvation.43 Our participation in eternal life is likened to that of the repentant robber hanging on the cross. Melanchthon sees the content of faith mainly as consolation of a salvific act in the future when the glory of the Son and the church shall appear. The consolation encourages us to persevere the effectus Christi, which is mortification of the flesh and vivification of the spirit.44 Unlike Luther’s sharp rejection of a peaceful co–existence of the rules of predication between philosophical logic and a theology informed by the incarnation, Melanchthon places Christ within a hierarchy of God’s presence. But that integration into a philosophically qualified creation is done by importing the communicatio idiomatum as a supra–natural additum. The doctrine which is “the centre and engine of Luther’s theology”45 is not integrated within the system of Melanchthon itself. It is rather placed on the fringes, with no real influence over Melanchthon’s theological profile. We will therefore see that his Christological views are consistent or correlated with his theological structure as a whole.

“Iudicium de Coena Domini” (1560) The other shock came with Melanchthon’s publication of “Iudicium de Coena Domini” in 1560. Melanchthon was asked to give an expert opinion in the Eucharistic controversy in Heidelberg between his student, the famous superintendent Tileman Heshusius (1527 – 1588)46, and a deacon called Wilhelm Klebitz (1533 – 1568).47 43 Mortua natura non sit efficax, uiua sit efficax, Estis autem uiuificati uita, luce & iusticia, quam dat Filius Deis resuscitatus ad hoc, ut uos fesuscitet & uiuificet. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H4b. 44 Respondet. Viuitis & habetis initia uitae aeternae, sicut habebat Latro pendens in cruce. Sed haec initia adhuc tecta sunt, ut erant in latrone tecta, qui tamen sentiens consolationem, […] Hanc consolationem intexit argumento, quo hortatur ut in inchoata mortificatione & uiuificatione perseueremus, non amittamus hos effectus Christi, ruentes contra conscientiam in noua scelera. Philipp Melanchthon, Enarratio ad Colossenses, H4b-H5a. 45 Cf. Steiger’s instructive overview of the doctrine’s centrality to the overall scope of Luther’s theology : Johann Anselm Steiger, “Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers: Die ‘fröhliche Wechsel’ als hermeneutischer Schlüssel zu Abendmahlslehre, Anthropologogie, Seelsorge, Naturtheologie, Rhetorik und Humor,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische theologie und Religionsphilosophie 38, no. 1 (1996): 1 – 28. 46 Cf. below, p. ff. 47 Krüger underlines that Klebitz was only used by more important forces in the electorial Pfalz, such as the professor of theology, Pierre Boquin. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 31 – 34.

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For Melanchthon, the key is to retain the words of Paul in 1 Cor 10:16.48 Of particular importance is the meaning of koinonia. He distances himself from the papist doctrine, as one could expect, where consecrated bread is changed according to its nature. More surprising, however, is the rejection of the bread as substantially [substantiale] the body of Christ, which he localises as the position of the Bremen preachers. In addition, Melanchthon attacks Heshusius’ position, which teaches the bread as the true body of Christ. Instead, it should be taken as koinonia, which realises fellowship [consociatio] with the body of Christ.49 Melanchthon claims that the Son of God is present [adest] through the ministry of the Gospel. It is not because of the bread, however. Instead, he fixes the presence as a consequence of Christology : Christ is there because of his humanity, and as such, he vivifies our bodies.50 Melanchthon even attacks Heshusius for not having taken into consideration the Church Fathers’ labelling of blood and wine as s¼lbokom and !mt¸tupor of the body.51 Melanchthon’s attitude can be found elsewhere, too. In a letter to Crato from Crafftheim dated 21 March 1559,52 Melanchthon reports how Luther could calmly recite ancient Church Fathers in spite of their Eucharist theology. They even labelled bread and wine to be s¼lbokom and !mt¸tupor, words which Melanchthon by the way translates to signum and figuram.53 These words are contrasted with an attitude which is more carnal, and as such very dangerous

48 Panis quem frangimus, joimymia ersti tou sylator Phillip Melanchthon, Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl. Studienausgabe (Robert Stupperich [editor]; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1955), 6, 484, 21 – 22. 49 Non dicit, mutari naturam panis, ut Papistae dicunt. Non dicit, ut Bremenses, panem esse substantiale corpus Christi, sed esse joimymiam, id est hoc, quo fit consociatio cum corpore christi: Quae fit in usu, et quidem non sine cogitatione, ut cum mures panem rodunt. Phillip Melanchthon, Studienausgabe, 6, 484, 25 – 32. 50 Adest Filius Dei in ministerio Evangelii, et ibi certo est efficax in credentibus, ac adest non propter panem, sed propter hominem, sicut inquit: “Manete in me, et ego in vobis.” Item, “Ego sum in Patre meo, et vos in me, et ego in vobis.” Et in his veris consolationibus facit nos sibi membra et testatur, se corpora nostra vivificaturum esse. Sic declarant veteres Coenam Domini. Phillip Melanchthon, Studienausgabe, 6, 485, 12 – 18. Note the returning reference to the ancient church as source and norm for his theological reasoning. 51 Negat Heshusius, se assentiri Origeni, qui nominat panem et vinum sulboka tou sylator jai ailator. Reiicit contumeliose Clementem Alexandrinum. Pronunciabit eodem modo Augustino, Ambrosio, Prospero, Dionysio, Tertulliano, Beda, Basilio, Nazianzeno, qui nominant amtitupom syla, Theodoreto, qui ait de pane, vqsim our letab!kkym. Phillip Melanchthon, Studienausgabe, 6,485,27 – 33. 52 CR, 9,784 – 786. 53 Memini me Luthero ante annos 20 in itinere cum et placidior et hilarior esset, recitare veterum Graecorum et Latinorum dicta, quae expresse dicunt, panem et vinum sulbok², item !mt¸tupa esse; item signum; item figuram. CR, 9,785. For an analysis of the development of Melanchthon’s Eucharistic doctrine as a deviation from Luther 1543 – 1560, see Wilhelm Neuser, “Melanchthons Abendmahlslehre und Ihre Auswirkungen Im Unteren Donauraum,” Zeitschrift F*ur Kirchengeschichte 84 (1973): 49 – 59.

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and problematic, according to Melanchthon.54 There is a line from such carnal reasoning on the Eucharistic elements to the comments Melanchthon makes about the ongoing controversy concerning communicatio idiomatum. He considers the problem to be a confusion of theological terms with natural physics.55 Luther is himself a part of the problem, due to his geometrically oriented interpretation of the words of institution: “This is my body”.56 Melanchthon, on the other hand, embraces what he believes to be the ancient ecclesiastical doctrine, namely the logic of the sign. This reference to Augustine’s hermeneutics places him close to the Swiss doctrinal position on that matter.57 Melanchthon’s understanding may be seen as a reflection of his metaphysical outlook, too. In his Erotemata of 1547, for example, he criticises the scholastic understanding of universals. According to Melanchthon, the “thing” of the universals, [res], is considered to be within the act of cognition, and not – as the scholastics teach – outside that act. Through cognition [cogitationes], the common elements of the things are gathered and formed as an image in the brain, Melanchthon claims.58

Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul For Melanchthon, the doctrine of Christ must not only adjust to his cosmology where heaven is seen as a circumscriptive place. In addition, he seeks to adjust the doctrine of Christ to a uniform system of theology and philosophy in his anthropology. Christ must – as part of that system – conform to the inherent logic of identity, not unlike the scholastic logic of suppositio. Man needs a univocal identity in order to obtain a fixed place within a rather Neo-Platonist scientific taxonomy. Luther’s understanding of the total communication of properties as the inner core of Christology makes such an identity problematic, due to its simultaneously qualified double status. Instead of Luther’s 54 Scio carnificinam non solum saevam, sed etiam periculosam esse dubitationem. CR, 9,784. 55 Quod noster amicus [i.e. probably Tileman Heshusius] de communicatione idiomatum disputat, miror, eum intelligere communicationem idiomatum confusionem physicam naturarum. CR, 9,786. 56 Augustinus contra Adamantum expresse inquit: non dubitavit dominus dicere: hoc est corpus meum, cum daret signum corporis. Tertullianus expresse inquit: hoc est corpus meum, id est figura corporis. Id Lutherus interpretatur figuram geometricam. CR, 9,785. 57 The views of Melanchthon are picked up by the other important Wittenberg theologians after Melanchthon’s death, Caspar Peucer and Paul Eber. Wim Janse, “Wittenberg Calvinizans: The Involvement of Melanchthon, Peucer, and Eber in the Bremen Sacramentarian Controversy, 1560,” in Ordenlich und Fruchtbar. Festschrift Für Willem Van’t Spijker. Anlässlich Seines Abschieds Als Professor der Theologischen Universität Apeldoorn (Wilhelm H. Neuser and Herman J. Selderhuis [eds.]; Leiden: J. J. Groen en Zoon, 1997), 60 ff. 58 Philipp Melanchthon, Erotemata Dialectices (vol. 13 of Corpus Reformatorum; C.G. Bretscheider ; 1547; repr., Halle: C.A. Schwetschke et filium, 1855), 519.

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terminus ad quem, where the main emphasis is laid upon both natures and their common exchange of properties, Melanchthon retreats to the terminus a quo, where Christ is defined from his personal unity. That person is, as we shall see, the second person of the Trinity who has assumed human nature, but who remains essentially the same post incarnationem.

Commentarius de Anima (1540) Melanchthon’s anthropology rose out of his work with Aristotle’s Physica.59 In the dedication of Commentarius de Anima, Melanchthon underlines the usefulness of all good (and secular) will among men.60 That utilitarian attitude is paired with an outspoken theological interest. Through the study of the soul, it will become evident that it is not brought forth by chance, but is the result of a divine architect’s work.61 Overall, it seems as if Melanchthon will keep the natural “light” as serving religion, by framing it as the tool to explicate the doctrines insofar as it is restrained to harmony between theology and philosophy.62 Although Melanchthon underlines his preference for the Word of God as his guide – and he does mention that his doctrine occasionally deviates from Aristotle –, he nevertheless openly retains a great deal of Aristotle’s teaching.63 It should not come as a surprise, however, that Melanchthon preserves a solid bulk of Aristotle, as his work is a philosophical 59 Günter Frank, Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (1497 – 1560) (Leipzig: Benno, 1995), 90, note 160. 60 Quare laudanda est uoluntas bonorum uirorum, qui pro uirili operam conferre student ad hanc rem maxime utilem uitae. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima (Wittenberg, 1540), a3a. 61 Et cum Deus tantum adhibuerit artis in fabricando humano corpore, voluit profecto, tam mirum opus conspici, ut cogitaremus tam artificiose fabricatas & distributas machinas nequaquam casu ortas esse, sed esse mentem aeternam architectatricem. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, a3b. 62 Iam in explicatione religionis maxime opus est tenere erudita discrimina uirium animae, quae si retinuisset eam lucem ac harmoniam, quae in conditione ei diuinitus attributa est […] Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, a3b. 63 Lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum. Retineo autem plerunque sententias in scholis receptas & usitatam docendi formam, Cunque nobis in Ecclesia quaedam paulo aliter dicenda sint, quam dicuntur ab Aristotele, peto mihi veniam dari, si interdum ab Aristotelica phrasi discessi. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, a5b. Melanchthon describes his preoccupation with Aristotle in a humanist fashion. For Melanchthon, it is the most eloquent discussion on the topic: […] non enim sentio has res eleganter dici non posse. I suppose “elegant” in this context suggests more than a lucid style or rhetoric, and includes the content, too. In the opening of the essay itself, Melanchthon claims that although Aristotle has not been able to state a satisfactory doctrine of the soul’s substance, life [!] has verified that his thoughts about the soul’s action were more valid. Etsi enim substancia Animae non satis perspici potest, tamen uiam ad eius agnitionem monstrant actiones. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, A1a.

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genre of anthropology. It is rather the heavy load of theology he imports into philosophy that is surprising.64 Melanchthon appeals to Hieronymus Baumgartner, the man to whom the essay is dedicated, and claims that it is important to include the study of De Anima in the schools’ curriculum. To soften the possible offence of suggesting such a scholastical topic, Melanchthon points to the other [aliae] schools, where the nature of the soul would be taught by God himself. That eschatological notion has a double meaning, worthy of the skilled rhetor Philippus: It not only excludes Democrit and Aristotle from defining the soul, as Melanchthon explicitly says, but it affirms the soul’s immortality by its very setting, too.65 Thereby a solution of the main problem of a Christian apprehension of Aristotle’s psychology is indicated, namely his doctrine of the soul as mortal. Already at the outset it becomes clear that Melanchthon is not going to restrict his commentary to the soul alone, but wants to discern the powers and organs of man which at the same time involve the whole body. Thereby, the enterprise is defined as a full scale philosophical anthropology, expressed in the quest for the nature of man.66 Still, it is in the soul where one can find the most significant traces of God.67 Nothing can be compared to the soul when it comes to the expression of the vestigia Dei, and its origin in the infinite and eternal mind is even found in divine testimony.68 How does Melanchthon define the soul? At the outset, Melanchthon defines the soul according to Aristotle’s own understanding: 64 Günter Frank aptly labels it as a “Neo-Platonist philosophy of mind.” Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart- Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003), 58 ff. Frank claims that the originality of Melanchthon’s interpretation of the soul is to be found in his concept notitioae naturales. Due to the familiarity [Wesenverwandtschaft] between human and divine Spirit, where the human Spirit participates in the divine light, a real divine knowledge is possible for human beings. Frank claims that it is to be placed in the Platonist and Neo-Platonist tradition, where the idea of methexis implies that mens hominis is regarded as the premise for scientific unity (p.61). 65 Restant autem nobis aliae Scholae, mi Hieronyme, in quibus iterum de Anima philosophabimur una, cum fruemur aeterna consuetudine Christi & illius augusti coetus Angelorum, Prophetarum ac Apostolorum & caeterorum piorum. Hic non quaeremus a Democrito, an sit ex Atomis anima, nec ab Aristotele, an sit emtekeweia, sed architectus ipse monstrabit nobis naturam Animae, & simul archetypum & exemplar, suam uidelicet naturam ostendet, cuius effigiem esse humanam mentem uoluit. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, A7b. 66 Itaque cum de actionibus dicendum erit, potenciae seu uires discernentur, describentur organa, qua in re simul tota corporis, ac praecipue humani, natura explicanda est. Itaque haec pars, non solum de anima, sed de tota natura hominis, inscribi debebat. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, A1a–b. 67 Denique nullum est dei uestigium expressius quam anima, haec monstrat duinitatem, & suo testimonio confirmat esse aliquam mentem aeternam & infinitam, a qua orti sumus. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, A2b. 68 Denique nullum est Dei uestigium expressius quam anima, haec monstrat diuinitatem, & suo testimonio confirmat esse aliquam mentem aeternam et infinitam, a qua orti sumus. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, B2a.

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The soul is the perfection or first act of a physical–organical body having the power of life.69

This hylemorphic qualification of the soul seems to be too general for the Wittenberg scholar, however, since it can be extended to all kinds of created things. In order to overcome the problem of “Beseelung”, to attribute a soul to more things than living creatures, Melanchthon looks for a more restricted understanding of the soul by Aristotle. According to Melanchthon, Aristotle made therefore a distinction between a more general form of all created things, and the more specific 1mdek´weia for living creatures.70 By that concept, particularly as used by Cicero,71 Melanchthon suggests that it was possible for Aristotle to understand the living creatures as different from the nature in general.72 What is changed in the definition of the soul, when Melanchthon adds 1mdek´weia to the definition? It leaves the soul of the living with a deficit, because it points to a continuing movement, a movement towards form, closer to the j¸mgsir as Aristotle defines it in his Physica, book III. There j¸mgsir is defined as the fulfilment of what exists potentially, insofar it exists potentially.73 69 Anima est actus primus, corporis physici, organici, potenia uitam habentis. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, B5a. 70 Cf. Melanchthon’s refusal of the stoic (and scholastic) doctrine of an infusion of 1mdek´weia in the created things. Instead of the materialistic danger which follows such a doctrine, Melanchthon will reserve the term for living creatures. According to his praesentia universalis, God is essentially present in all things: Nec est Deus emdekeweia infusa rebus, et alligata, sicut Stoici somniabant: Sed est essentia alia a creaturis. CR, 8,638. 71 Ac prudenter uidit Cicero, quo consilio Aristoteles transtulerit nomen Endelechiae ad formas uiuentium, eiusque interpretationi multa suffragantur, primum consuetudo sermonis, a qua non temere discedendum est. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, C1b. Cf. Cicero’s Tusculan letters: Aristoteles longe omnibus (Platonem semper excipio) praestans & ingenio & diligentiam, cum quatuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orientur, quintam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens. Cogitare enim, & providere, & discere, & docere, & invenire aliquid, & tam multa alia, meminisse, amare, odisse, cupere, timere, angi, laetari: haec & similia eorum in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat. Quintum genus adhibet, vacans nomine: & sic ipsum animum, 1mtek´weia appellat novo nomine, quasi quandam continuatam motionem & perennem. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Opera (Geneve: Fratres Cramer, 1758), 2,300. 72 Hanc [that is exaedificatione] generaliter in omnibus rebus Aristote. nominat formam, sed in uiuentibus peculiariter nominat formam substantialem edekeweia, quia illud, quo uiuens est tale, est uaedam agitatio continua, sed uita. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, B7a. 73 “D toO dum²lei emtor 1mtek´weia Ø toioOtom j¸mgs¸r 1rstim […]” Aristotle, Phys. iii 1, 201a27 – 29. The instrumental, functional aspect of the soul is emphasised by Jennifer Whiting in an essay which addresses a concern raised by John L. Ackrill. Ackrill underlined a fundamental problem in Aristotle’s hylemorphic conception, particularly in the Stagirite’s insistence on a “homonomy” between the human body without a soul and, say, a lump of bronze. Aristotle’s position is expressed in his psychology, De Anima ii 1, 412b, 10 – 24. But if the dead body has lost its soul, it ceases to be a body and returns to mere matter. Matter can not be dismissed as lack of form, however. It is contingently re-formed, just like the bronze of a former statue of Hermes could be

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Melanchthon’s problem of giving a plausible reason for qualifying the soul as a not finished, being–in–process thing, can be seen from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book IX. Here, it is explicitly stated that the 1mtek´weia encompasses more than the j¸mgs¸r. Aristotle gives an example of building a house, which does not only signify the building process, but contains already the purpose, the goal of that activity, insofar as it is work 5qcom. The realisation of the t´kor is not only present in the future, but exists in the building itself. The teleological quality of the activity cannot solely be temporarily suspended. Melanchthon’s adoption of 1mdek´weia – with its greater suspension of realisation – stands in a certain contrast to what it was supposed to explain, namely 1mtek´weia, because the latter is already realised as perfect.74 The inherent lack of perfection of the soul as 1mdek´weia, however, enables Melanchthon to qualify the intelligent soul as spiritus intelligens. It gives him the necessary philosophical space to insert a theological definition in the middle of the Aristotelian anthropology, because of the alleged lack of perfection,75 and from now on, immortality is understood as an essential part of such perfection. In Melanchthon’s view, therefore, philosophy lacks a theological supplement, the notion of immortality in particular. The insertion of the soul is understood as a singular repeated act of God in the creation of every new being. In the moment a new child is conceived, God supplies the child with a soul in a special, creative act. Any kind of Traducianism is rejected, contrary to what eventually became standard Lutheran doctrine. Melanchthon seems to be sceptical of the idea, at least in this book, due to the problems that would arise if God had to make all the souls

enformed as a military helmet. So how does the dead body fit into the overall picture of instrumental hylemorphism, Ackrill asks? Cf. John L. Ackrill, “Aristotle’s Definitions of Psuche,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (1972 – 73): 119 – 33. In a response to Ackrill’s concern, Whiting suggests that Aristotle holds two different accounts of flesh according to the essence, one compositional (matter) and one functional (form). The problem of homonomy is apparently only a nominal one, according to Whiting. Cf. Jennifer Whiting, “Living Bodies,” in Essays (Martha C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 81, note 20. Bos on the other hand claims that the problem of Ackrill and Whiting is a pseudo-problem of Aristotle’s psychology. Bos sticks to Aristotle’s example of the axe and its “axeness” in De Anima ii: Just as the axeness of the axe is inseparable of the material axe, so the soul is necessarily connected to the body. When the natural body, the instrumental soul-body, disconnects from the soul, it ceases to be such a natural body, just like a ball of beeswax returns to beeswax after it has lost the form of a ball. A.P. Bos, The Soul and Its Instrumental Body : A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 112; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 102. 74 For the argument here, cf. Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 69 – 128. 75 Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, qui est altera pars substantiae hominis, nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est. Haec definitio non habet Physicas rationes, sed sumptae est ex Sacris literis, Nam in Genesi dicitur, Inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum uitae. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, C3a.

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simultaneously and distribute the souls successively as the bodies came into being.76 One could make many interesting observations on Melanchthon’s theologically-qualified anthropology, but it is necessary to stick to the subject matter of this investigation: How does Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul shed light on his rejection of ubiquity, that Christ is bodily present everywhere? First of all, it sheds light on Melanchthon’s effort to combine (some) anthropological tenets of Aristotle with his theological anthropology. This is hardly surprising at all, but if we compare them with the reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology by Luther, a very different theological conception becomes apparent. Unlike Luther, the mature Melanchthon tries to construct a doctrine of the soul which does not imply a split between the perspectives of philosophy and theology. Instead, Melanchthon imports theological arguments in the middle of philosophy and philosophical arguments in the middle of theology. The interpretation of the Aristotelian rational soul as spiritus intelligens correlates to Melanchthon’s focus on Christ as the second person of the Trinity within the union of God and man. Just as the body is left out of the core definition of the soul in the reception of Aristotelian anthropology, human nature is solely understood as grid [massa], and adopted into the divine Word in Melanchthon’s Christology. It seems as if the Praeceptor Germaniae constructs a hierarchical relation between the divine and human nature in Christ, and between the mind and body in man. The impact this hierarchical aspect of Melanchthon’s anthropology had on his doctrine of Christ is perhaps best seen in a 1553 response to the Stancari controversy, a quarrel between two theological professors in Königsberg, Fransesco Stancaro and Andreas Osiander. The issue at stake was the doctrine of Christ.77 Melanchthon’s expert opinion to Duke Albrecht criticised both of the participants in the controversy. He insisted that it was the concreteness of 76 […] An anima rationalis sit ex traduce, sic enim loquuntur, hoc est, an propagetur a parentibus, et oriatur ex ipsa seminum natura. Quidam fanatici finxerunt ab initio mundi, simul creatas esse animas, et postea mitte eas in corpora. Haec absurda opinio repudianda est. Caeterum sententia recepta est, & probata pijs omnibus, animas rationales diuinitus tunc nouas creari, & inferi corporibus […] Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, C4a. 77 Francesco Stancaro (1501 – 1574) was a Protestant scholar from Mantua who was called to a position as professor of Hebrew at the University of Königsberg in 1551. Soon after, a controversy broke out between Stancari and Andreas Osiander, the leading theologian at the University at the time. Stancaro opposed Osiander’s Christological formula “Christ is our justice according to the divine nature” by claiming that only the human nature participates in the mission of Christ. The difference between the divine and human nature is found in his interpretation of the salvific economy : The divine nature is one, apart from the difference of the persons, and this divine nature sends the human nature on a redemption path to the cross. Stancaro did not have the soteriological interest of Osiander, but was more inclined to protect the divine nature from suffering. Tschackert, Entstehung, 497 – 501. Cf. Waclaw Urban, “Stancaro, Francesco d. Ä,” TRE 32 (2001): 111. Melanchthon’s response to the Stancari controversy was later included in the Latin edition of his Examen ordinandorum.

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the natures within the one person which made suffering possible for God.78 He refers to the famous expression of Irenaeus, namely that the divine nature “rested” [quiescere] at the time of death, and sees refraining from the exercise of power as the possibility to suffer for the human nature.79 When Christ is included in Melanchthon’s levels of divine presence,80 he explains how the hypostatic union – the fountain [fons] of communicatio idiomatum – is structured: Human nature is “held” [sustentetur] by the Logos, as if it were carried [gestetur]. To be held is essential for Christ’s human nature. If his human nature was not upheld by the Logos, it would just fall back into nothingness. This view has an interesting similarity : It is compared to the relation between the human soul and the body. The point is not only to unite them in a human make–up, however. By stressing that the soul dissolves from the dead body, Melanchthon implicitly opens the way for an existence of the Logos without human nature.81 Towards the end of the Commentarius de Anima, after Melanchthon has considered the different physical features of the human body, he asks what the imago Dei in man should be. The doctrine of sin is preserved by interpreting the image as deformed, and by underlining the need for renewal. This renewal, however, is strictly theologically qualified. We can only become renewed if the Son is poured out in us, because only then can we be able to grasp and retain the image of God.82 What does the imago Dei consist of, then? For 78 Ut igitur discernatur hic Filius ab aliis sanctis, et aliquo modo conspiciatur discrimen inter hypostaticam unionem in Christo et societatem seu auxilium Dei in aliis sanctis, recte tradita est doctrina de communicatione Idiomatum, quae est forma sermonis, in qua proprietas uni naturae congruens dicitur in concreto de persona, ut vulnerari posse mori. Philipp Melanchthon, “Responsio Philippi Melanthonis de controversiis Stancari,” in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl (ed. Robert Stupperich; 1553; repr, Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1955), 262, 28 – 34. 79 Quiescente verbo, id est, tunc non exercente suam potentiam in repellenda passione et morte, sicut ad Philippenses dicitur: “Exinanivit sese” etc. Non ait, naturam divinam mortuam esse, sed quievisse, ut natura assumpta mori posset. Philipp Melanchthon, “Stancari,” 264, 11 – 15. 80 Melanchthon repeats the same classification of the 4 levels of divine presence: 1. The universal presence of God towards the creatures, where the three persons conserve the substance of all creatures. 2. The presence of God towards the angels and saved human beings, where not only the substance is conserved, but God has made his light available so they can see [cernere] God with their hearts etc. 3. The presence of God in the reborn believers of this life, where Christ and the Holy Spirit have started their sanctifying work in the believers. They do not see [cernere] God as in life eternal, but they know [agnoscere] him in faith by the word. Philipp Melanchthon, “Stancari,” 265,14 – 36. 81 Sicut anima hominis et corpus sunt unum uvistalemom completum et corpus dissolvitur desertum ab anima: Ita kocor et assumpta natura, sunt unum uvistalemom et redigeretur in nihilum humana natura, si non sic gestaretur in kocy. Philipp Melanchthon, “Stancari,” 266, 9 – 11. Cf. Brandy, Christologie, 32 – 33. 82 […] quia imago Dei deformata est. Clamitat igitur Paulus ac iubet renouare imaginem Dei, agnitione ipsius, iusticia ac ueritate. Et alibi sic renouari inquit, cum transfundit Christus in nos, tanquam in specula, agnitionem sui, ut uera ipsius noticia luceat in nobis, & statuamus eum non esse ociosum, sed nos uere ei curae esse, propter Filium, nos uere exaudiri ac seruari. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, T2a.

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Melanchthon it is the mind [mentis], insofar as the notitia Dei – a central anthropological concept for Melanchthon – shines in it, and its will is a true obedience, which he describes as a glowing pleasure in God and confidence in him.83 Melanchthon’s theological (or platonic) supplement to his anthropology reaches its climax in his description of the soul’s immortality which concludes the Commentarius.84 Although immortality is a heavenly prophecy, and as such out of reach for philosophical arguments, it shines through man as notitia, due to the integrity of the whole man.85 In other words, one should not distinguish too sharply between philosophy and theology in this respect, either. There is an eschatological postponement of enjoying the perfect notitia, but it is, after all, possible to behold it already here.86 Melanchthon is not pleased with Aristotle’s discussion of the soul’s immortality. The alleged lack of perspicuity leads apparently to an ambiguous state of affairs. It seems as if Aristotle sometimes considers the soul to be tightly connected to the body as its cause, whereas on other occasions it seems as if the soul is added to the body from the outside, Melanchthon contends.87 Thirteen years later, this ambiguity seems to be solved, however. In the revised version called Liber de Anima, Melanchthon opts for the latter version alone. In an important paragraph, Melanchthon writes: In my understanding, Aristotle, together with many other erudite and modest people, consider the human soul not to be destroyed after the destruction of the body, even though his thought is a bit confused on the subject. Aristotle speaks in the third book of de anima in such a way, that one could think he would rather regard the outstanding flame [igniculum] of the soul to survive the body.88

83 Est igitur imago Dei ipsa mens, sed quatenus in ea lucet uera noticia Dei, & in uoluntate uera obedientia, hoc est, ardens dilectio Dei & fiducia acquiescens in Deo […]. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, T2a. 84 Melanchthon specifies the difference between Plato and Aristotle as such: The latter does not ask for the soul as the mover within the body, that is, as if he was shipper on a ship. Nunc igitur haec coneramus Aristotelis definitionem, cuius longe aliud est consilium, non quaerit rem mouentem ut caeteri, quae sit in corpore, ceu in naui gubernator, sed aliud quiddam spectat ut postea dicam. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, B4b–B5a. 85 Haec [the judgement and life eternal] discimus ex coelestibus oraculis, non ex Philosophorum disputationibus, sed tamen si natura hominis mansisset integra, fulsisset in nobis quaedam illustris noticia de perpetua uita. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, V5b. 86 Vidisset enim natura integra mentem esse imaginem Dei & futurum ut archetypi perfecta noticia fruemur. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, X2b. 87 Verum ut redeam ad Aristotelem, etsi in his libris, qui extant, non satis perspicue dicit, quid sentiat, nec integre tractat hanc causam, tamen & ipsum apparet in hanc sententiam inclinare, cum dicat mentem extrinsecus accedere, & diuinum quiddam esse. Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima, X3a. 88 Aristoteles existimo ut alios plurimos, eruditos et modestos homines magis hoc sensisse: animas hominum non prorsus extingui post corporum interitum, etiamsi multae dubitationes ceu venti hanc eius cogitationem turbarunt. In tertio libro de Anima sic de intellectu agente loquitur, ut

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This is indeed a different attitude towards the relation between philosophy and theology than Luther’s more strict distinction. Melanchthon searches for an integration of philosophy and theology through a common perspective. The difference from Luther is particularly obvious if we compare Melanchthon’s interpretation of De Anima with that of Luther. In the latter’s famous Heidelberg disputation, his argument is exactly the opposite of Melanchthon: A theologian must “become thoroughly foolish” in Christ in order to philosophise safely with Aristotle.89 The Christ–foolish believer will know the difference between the perspectives of theology and philosophy, according to Luther. It is not just a cognitive difference between sapientia mundi and sapientia Dei, but more a “change of existence”.90 Luther’s approach has consequences for philosophy, too. In the probationes which followed the philosophical theses, Luther comments on Aristotle’s doctrine of the mortal soul, and he divides them into arguments of principles and of reception. According to the principles of Aristotle, Luther points to eight arguments for the soul’s mortality. In one of them, Luther referred to Aristotle’s Physica, book 1, where the philosopher underlines that every composite of form and matter – and not only the latter part – is corruptible.91 Aristotle’s argument for the soul’s immortality is located by Luther in De Anima, book 2. But even if Aristotle speaks about a “very different kind of soul” resembling the eternal’s relation to the temporal when he mentions the mind or the power to think,92 Luther claims that it cannot be anything else than a similarity. And when the Stagirite refers to a separation of the intellect in book 3 of the same treatise, this is only interpreted as a separation secundum operationem, and not according to the substance or the subject matter itself.93

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existimari possit, maluisse eum hoc sentire, illum praestatiorem igniculum in anima hominis non extingui cum corporibus. CR, 13,178. 29. Qui sine periculo volet in Aristotele Philosophari, necesse est ut ante bene stultificetur in Christo. WA 1, 355. Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 42. Cf. the strong soteriological argument of the probatio to these 29: Secunda [sc. ratio], quodsecundum apostolum ‘scientia inflat’, ideo nisi sciatur, quod omnis scientia est de numero rerum, quae non prosunt ad salutem nisi his, qui sunt in gratia, omnino inflatur animus scientis. Sicut enim electis ‘omnia cooperantur in bonum’, ita illis omnia in malum. WA 59, 409. For a similar account of the difference between philosophy and theology, cf. Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles. Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin New York: De Gruyter, 2001), 437 – 38. Secundo, quod secundum Aristotelem 1 Physicorum compositum corrumpitur, at anima et corpus sicut materia et forma faciunt corruptibile continuum vel compositum unde et definitio animae exprimit materiam et formam hominis, ut patet. WA 59, 412. Cf. Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 55. “peq· d³ toO moO ja· t/r heyqgtij/s dum²leyr oqd´m py vameqºm, !kk’ 5oije xuw/r c´mor 6teqom eWmai, ja· toOto lºmom 1md´weshai wyq¸fesha¸ jah²peq t¹ !ýdiom toO vhaqtou.”Aristotle, De Anima, ii, 2, 413b 24 – 27. Secundo libro 3 De anima: “Separatus [sc. intellectus] vero id solum est, quod est, atque id solum est immortale atque perpetuum”. Et haec quoque authoritas una de principalibus adducitur. Sed

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Unlike Melanchthon, Luther considers Aristotle’s – and as such philosophy’s – anthropology as consistent with its own non–theological principles. Melanchthon, on the other hand, constructs a “philosophical theology” in which elements of his theologically qualified anthropology were imported into a harmonised unity of both sciences.94 Although he never wrote a commentary of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the Neo-Platonist characteristics of Melanchthon’s metaphysical outlook are particularly evident in his explanation of the soul’s immortality. In this unified conception of theology and philosophy there seems to be no place for the consequence of Luther’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, namely the ubiquity of Christ’s body.

Summary : Melanchthon’s alternative By his insistence on a spatially defined heaven, Melanchthon rejected an important aspect of Luther’s doctrine of communicatio idiomatum, namely the ubiquity of Christ’s body. Melanchthon’s interpretation of a literal transport of Christ’s body away from this world in the ascension revealed another understanding of the notion of presence in his theology. In his system, the person union of Christ is qualified solely as an additum, and does not occupy a central place in his understanding of presence. The doctrine of a bodily presence of Christ is interpreted as a dangerous “carnal reasoning” by Melanchthon, and does not fit into his cosmology. Connected to that rejection is Melanchthon’s subordination of the human nature under the divine nature. There are both theological and philosophical reasons for Melanchthon’s difference from Luther’s understanding of communicatio idiomatum. When Melanchthon claims that the predication “God is man” should be understood as merely referring to the composite person of Christ, he is underlining the difference between the natures of Christ. It mirrors his reluctance to regard the divine nature as too close to human nature, an attitude which he finds confirmed by theologians of the ancient church. But his theological understanding of the difference between the natures correlates with the perception of a unity between theology and philosophy. His arguments against the geometrically qualified Christ are philosophical in character, especially his adherence to Aristotle’s physical axiom: A body can only be in one place at a time. This mixture of philosophical and theological arguments is not only visible in his cosmology, but pertains to his anthropology, as well. certum est, quod non loquitur de intellectu substantialiter, sed ut est passivus et agens, ut supra in textu, quo modo de motu quoque garrit libro 3 faciens eum actum, qui est potentia, imo privatio. Ita hic facit intellectum, non ut rem, sed in ordine ad intellegibilia. WA 59, 414. 94 Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 57.

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Melanchthon’s commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima reveals his treatment of the soul without the same sense of a necessary difference between the philosophical and theological perspective as Luther had. Without much hesitation, Melanchthon supplies the shortcomings of Aristotle’s psychology with theological arguments, particularly concerning the notion of the soul’s immortality. Hence, there is a systematic coherence in the rejection of Christ’s omnipresent body : It does not fit into Melanchthon’s unified system of theology and philosophy. He solved the challenge of Christology in a manner comparable to the scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages, but lacked the tools sharp enough for his endeavour.

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Communicatio idiomatum in Lutheran thought between the reformer and the Formula of Concord Introduction For the theologians following in the wake of Luther and Melanchthon, the diverging solutions to the Christological problem posed a challenge of continuity : Most of the theologians – at least those who had been educated at Wittenberg – had been thoroughly influenced by the theological method of Melanchthon. At the same time, they wanted to remain true to the main insights of Luther’s biblical theology. The difference between the reformers in Wittenberg had consequences far beyond their theological accentuations. A decisive turning point in the history of the “churches of the Augsburg confession”, as it were, was the defeat of the Schmalkaldic league in 1547. Melanchthon’s compromises and acceptance of the conditions for peace radicalised the differences between the theologians of these churches. Although a reduction of complex theological questions to a simple division between a Gnesiolutheran and a Philippist camp has been correctly criticised by modern researchers,1 the division points to real differences that concern the subject matter of the present work: Through the encounter with Calvinist-inspired theology, many Lutherans felt that a clarification was needed for preserving a sound doctrine of the Eucharist and its Christological component, too. The Formula of Concord was the outcome of the endeavour to unite the different theological schools which had developed in the aftermath of the Augsburg confession. How did the different Christological accents – the understanding of communicatio idiomatum – of Luther and Melanchthon find their place in the final document? How is Christ’s presence defined? And how is that presence qualified in light of the tension between theology and philosophy? In order to understand how the different solutions to the Christological questions were – or at least attempted to be – reconciled in the Formula of Concord, it is important to consider the “tendency of confessionalisation”,2 1 For an overview, cf. Matthias Pohlig, Zwischen Gelehrsamkeit und konfessioneller Identitätsstiftung: lutherische Kirchen- und Universalgeschichtsschreibung 1546 – 1617 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation, 37; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 33 – 35. 2 Gunther Wenz, Theologie der Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. Eine historische und systematische Einführung in das Konkordienbuch. Band 1+2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 2, 471.

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apparent from the 1550’s. Through recurring polemics which more and more followed patterns along the later confessional lines, hopes of a united Protestant movement gradually disappeared. A particularly important step in that direction was the theological consolidation of Zurich and Geneva, which strengthened a more univocal approach towards the questions of the Eucharist and Christology. Secondly, the Eucharistic controversy in Bremen – and Melanchthon’s negative assessment of the Christological arguments used to defend the bodily presence of Christ – sharpened the conflict and brought about Christology as a defining issue in order to preserve doctrinal unity. Whether the incident of using Christology in order to define Eucharistic bodily presence was a “new dogma” – foreign to the more original words of institution – as one distinguished modern scholar argued,3 or it was an explication of an already intimate connection between them, as another claimed,4 is an important question: This work, however, does not seek to enter that discussion as such, but traces the two answers as different solutions to one problem of metaphysics within theology, namely how Christology is given its rationale. Thirdly, the two main theological influences in the drafting of the Formula were Martin Chemnitz and Johannes Brenz, although the latter was represented by his friend Jacob Andreae. According to the older research, Chemnitz represented a continuation of Melanchthon’s train of thought, while Brenz represented Luther.5 Although there might be some truth in such a diastatic notion, the opposite conclusion of a modern scholar – it is rather Chemnitz who is the true successor of Luther6 – points in another direction: The theologians in the wake of Luther and Melanchthon had to get to grips with a new set of questions, formulated in a new intellectual climate. Both Chemnitz and Brenz wanted to be true to their inheritance, but their response to how the Christology – and communicatio idiomatum – should be interpreted in this new situation varied, as we will see.

Consolidation on the left: “Consensus Tigurinus” (1549) Agreement was reached among Swiss theologians in Zurich 1549 and published as the “Consensus Tigurinus”.7 The outcome was mainly influenced by John Calvin and Heinrich Bullinger, and effectuated a closer relationship 3 4 5 6 7

Mahlmann, Dogma. Brandy, Christologie, 255 – 69. Cf. Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 342. Mahlmann, Dogma, preface, XIII. Ulrich Gäbler, “Das Zustandekommen des Consensus Tigurinus im Jahre 1549,” Theologische Literaturzeitung 104 (1979): 321 – 32. By explaining the military and political realities behind the Consensus, Gäbler has downgraded the pious, ecumenical intentions referred to in earlier rese-

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between the followers of Zwingli and the theologians associated with Calvin. After this, it is possible to speak of a unified Swiss reformed movement.8 From the perspective of the followers of Luther, however, the theological content of the “Consensus Tigurinus” was challenging. The text portrayed a stronger Zwinglian understanding of the Sacraments and Christology, compared with earlier texts on the matter from the hand of Calvin.9 The “Consensus Tigurinus”10 begins by stating the ecclesiastic duty of leading us to Christ, how the sacraments are appendages to the gospel effectuating the cognition of Christ.11 A short Christology is then presented: Christ, the eternal Son of God, of the same essence and glory as the Father, assumed12 our flesh for the sake of our transformation to becoming sons of God. The natures of Christ first and foremost signify his redemptive act. The readers are instructed how the different natures are to be qualified. Christ is human; he is our priest, who by his sacrifice allows us access to God. He is

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arch. Gäbler underlines that Bern (and thereby Zurich) gained military and political control over the city of Waadt, which adhered to the spiritual rule of Calvin. The French reformer had a critical attitude toward political control over ecclesiastical matters, due to his first-hand experiences from Protestant France. He wanted ecclesiastical control over dogma and liturgy. For Bern/Zurich, political control meant spiritual control. The problem was evident in the different liturgical habits, such as inventory of the Churches and the power to anathematise members of the Church. But the greatest problem was the theology and use of the Eucharist. Ulrich Gäbler, “Consensus Tigurinus,” TRE 8 (1981): 189 – 92. Since the 19th Century, it is commonly attributed as the starting point of the reformed Protestant movement. Cf. MacCulloch, The Reformation, 251. Jean Calvin, Institutio Christianae Religionis (Berlin: Gustav Eichler, 1834), IV,17,7. Here, Calvin uses the arguments of the monastic polemics against scholastic dialectics in sacris: An explication of how the earthly elements may contribute to the faith that is nourished through the meal destroys Calvin’s understanding of the dignified character of the Eucharist, its character of being a mystery. IV,17,10 states the spatial distance between the Eucharistic receiver and the flesh of Christ. In the same paragraph, however, the reality of the symbol is underlined. Calvin claims that God does not assign empty symbols. Even the corporal presence of Christ can be underlined (IV, 17,11). The logic of res and signum (IV,17,1) is not (yet) cosmologically fixed in the Institutio, but serves as a hermeneutical tool for balancing the accounts of the sacramental elements between Luther’s «carnality» and Zwingli’s nominalism. Citations refer to this page: http://www.creeds.net/reformed/Tigurinus/tigur-latin.htm [retrieved 28 January 2010] As an interpretation of the Eucharistic doctrine of Calvin, “appendage” has to be balanced by other accounts. Gerrish claims that Calvin understood the Lord’s supper as “a dramatic presentation of all that the gospel proclaims”, B. A. Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude the Eucharist in John Calvin’s Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 158. The writers do not use the word from the Athanasian creed, adsumptio, to describe the assumption of the flesh, but rather the arguably weaker induere. The latter has a semantic field which seems to be a bit more “Nestorian” in its outlook. But it is used interchangeably, as Zwingli does in his De vera et falsa religione. Farren underlines that Hafenreffer used the picture of the prince travelling incognito: Christ was hiding his divine majesty. John Aquinas Farren, The Lutheran Krypsis-Kenosis Controversy: The Presence of Christ, 1619 – 1627 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfils International, 1985), 88 – 89.

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redemptive victim by whom God’s relationship to the earth is soothed, he is brother and repairer. All these Christological titles avoid the properties usually ascribed to divinity, except perhaps the last one. As a repairer, Christ, according to his flesh, comes close to being an agent for a divine act, as he reforms the vicious things in human beings. However, this activity is qualified by an insertion of the agent being the Holy Spirit,13 which softens the attribution of a divine act to the human nature of Christ. Christ as king14 covers his office as the giver of blessings, as governing and defending us by giving us spiritual weapons. He frees us from the devil and the invincible world of which we are part. The last effect does not have a title, but concerns the consummation of the world: Christ will lead us himself as true God and God will be all in all. The soteriological content is seen as a communication and imputation of Christ’s nature onto man which effects an adoption de iure.15 How are the gifts of Christ transferred to man? This is understood as a grafting into his body by preaching the gospel, baptism and the Eucharist. The sacraments, however, are qualified by their ends, which are twofold; signs binding us to the Christian fellowship and instruments of his grace. It is underlined that the sacraments do not convey more than the preached word has already done, but they have a pathetic – in the rhetorical sense of the term – advantage: The sacraments are giving the eyes [!] impressions like living images which make a deeper impression on the senses.16 By bringing the object directly before the senses, a remembrance of Christ’s death and benefits is revoked. The word that was preached is confirmed and ratified as with seals. The connection between the exposure of the senses to the sacrament and the innate work of the Holy Spirit is hold together by the spoken word, the verbal promise, since any transference of “goods” to the receiver of the sacrament is omitted. In the distinction between things and their signifiers, it is claimed that reality is not disunited from reality. However, no rationale is given of how these two are unified, except with a reference to the effect the spiritual Christ has in the believer.17 On the contrary, it is stated that the grace of God is not 13 Art. 4: […] Considerandus est [Christus] reparator, qui spiritus sui virtute reformat quicquid in nobis est vitiosum […] 14 “The divinity of Christ” is not seen in the text, but the structure of article leads the interpretation in this direction: Christus sacerdos. Christus Rex. Hence, the titles between sacerdos and rex seem to fall in the category of Christ’s carnality (humanity). 15 Art 3: […] ut iure adoptionis, id quod natura proprium habebat, nobis communicaret […] 16 The understanding of the sacrament – and its impression on us – as an image which makes an impression in the mind, is repeated in the controversy with Joachim Westphal: Sunt quidem [i.e. baptism and the Eucharist] & hi Sacramentorum fines, vt notae sint […] Nam etsi nihil aliud significant, quam quod verbo ipso annuntiatur: hoc tamen magnum est, subiici oculis nostris quasi viuas imagines, quae sensus nostros melius afficiant, quasi in rem ducendo […] Jean Calvin, Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de Sacramentis (Geneve: Oliua Roberti Stephani, 1555), 14. 17 Art 9: Quare, etsi distinguimus, ut par est, inter signa et res signatas, tamen non disiungimus a

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bound to the sacrament in a way which causes the receivers of the sign to get hold of the thing. .18 Generally speaking, an Augustinian theory of signs becomes visible in the document: Signs are distributed to everyone, but reality itself only reaches the elect.19 Reality is not “created” within the elect; the distributional distinction is rather caused by incapacity of receiving sacramental reality on behalf of the reject. The “signal” is there, but passes all except the elect. By integrating the doctrine of predestination into the interpretation of the Eucharist, a new stage in the development of the reform reached. This is particularly beneficial seen from Bullinger’s viewpoint, as it comes structurally closer to his emphasis on faith as being the premise for a real reception of the Eucharist. The cosmological argument is touched upon from two sides. On the one hand, no local presence can be imagined. Christ as man is situated in heaven.20 On the other hand, philosophically speaking, heaven is not a place above. It is the body of Christ, which, according to its human nature, is finite. As a consequence, the body is contained in heaven, in a place far from the earth.21 The Zwinglian concept of Eucharistic interpretation is softened in a direction towards Calvin in at least two ways: First, the “Consensus Tigurinus” does not employ the idea that the Eucharist is solely a memory of the redemption which is located in the soul. Through the Eucharistic meal, the believer renews and adds his knowledge of Christ’s redemption. Secondly, Bullinger acknowledges sacraments as “sealing” the invisible work of the Holy Spirit.22 Calvin even understands himself as being in concord with Melanchthon’s Confessio Augustana – that is, Melanchthon’s revised text CA variata – in the understanding of the sacrament.23 The two main writers of the document, Bullinger and Calvin, were not in agreement concerning the relation between signum and res in the interpre-

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signis veritatem: quin omnes, qui fide amplectuntur oblatas illic promissiones, Christum spiritualiter, cum spiritualibus eius donis recipere, adeoque et qui dudum participes facti erant Christi, communionem illam continuare ac reparare fateamur. […] Praeterquam enim quod in sacramentis ni nisi fide percipitur, tenendum quoque est, minime alligatam ipsis esse Dei gratiam, ut quisquis signum habet re etiam potiatur. Art 17: […] Nam reprobis peraeque ut electis signa administrantur, veritas autem signorum ad hos solos pervenit. Art. 21: Praesertim vero tollenda est quaelibet localis praesentiae imaginatio […] Christus quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in coelo, nec aliter quam mente et fidei intelligentia quaerendus est. Cf. the first part of Art. 25, too. Art. 25: Tamesti enim, philosophice loquendo, supra coelos locus non est, quia tamen corpus Christi, ut fert humani corporis natura et modus, finitum est, et coelo, ut loco, continetur, necesse est a nobis tanto locorum intervallo distare, quantum coelum abest a terra. Gäbler, “Zustandekommen,” 327. In conensu nostro reprient lectores, quicquid continet edita Ratisbonae confessio, quam Augustanam vocant. – Verba sunt: “In sacra coena cum pane et vino vere dari Christi corpus et sanguinem.” Citation from Heinrich Heppe, Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus in den Jahren 1555 – 1581, Band I-IV (Marburg: Elwert’scher Druck und Verlag, 1852), I, 62.

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tation of the Eucharist.24 Bullinger wants to distinguish sharply between these,25 and he does not attribute an activity on behalf of the Holy Spirit during the sacramental act. Calvin wanted to place stronger emphasis on the unity with Christ in the sacrament, and according to his understanding of the Trinitarian being of God, the Holy Spirit could not be omitted from the sacramental act. In Calvin’s interpretation of the sacraments, their nature is opposed to any profane distance between signum and res, they are united in the Trinitarian act of God.26 Where Bullinger just wanted to go so far as to state 24 Gäbler, “Zustandekommen”, 325ff; Fritz Büsser, “Bullinger, Heinrich,” TRE 7 (1981): 376. In his 2-volume study on Bullinger, Büsser underlines the theological richness (or – in a less hagiographic manner – the lack of stringency) of the Zurich reformer. This is particularly evident in the understanding of the Eucharist. Büsser mentions the different kinds of how Christ is real [vere] present. Cf. Fritz Büsser, Heinrich Bullinger (1504 – 1575). Leben, Werk und Wirkung (Zürich: TVZ, Theologischer Verlag, 2004), 156 ff. When exposing the Confessio Helvetica Posterior of 1562, Neuser claims that Bullinger is not capable of integrating verbum in his Eucharistic doctrine, as Augustine was. Carl Andresen and Gustav Adolf Benrath, Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 234. 25 Bullinger does not want to go as far as Zwingli, however. In the later Confessio Helvetica Posterior, Bullinger employs a functional definition in his definition of a sacrament: Sunt autem sacramenta symbola mystica, vel ritus sancti aut sacrae actiones, a Deo ipso instutae, constantes verbo suo, signis, et rebus significatis, quibus in ecclesia summa sua beneficia, homini exhibita, retinet in memoria, et subinde renovat, quibus item promissiones suas obsignat, et quae ipse nobis intenus praestat, exterius repraesentat, ac veluti oculis contemplanda subijcit, adeoque fidem nostram, spiritu Dei in cordibus nostris operante, roborat et auget: quibus denique nos ab omnibus alijs populis et religionibus separat, sibique soli consecrat et obligat, et quid a nobis requirat, significat. The substance of a sacrament is Christ: Caeterum praecipuum illud, quod in omnibus sacramentis proponitur a Deo, et attenditur a pijs omnibus omnium temporum (quod alij nuncupant substantiam et materiam sacramentorum) Christus est servator, hostia illa unica […]. In the consecration, an external and visible thing [res] is taken out of its normal use [ex usu vulgari], paired with the word of God and given a soteriological function: Et quoniam verbo Dei discimus, quod signa haec in alium finem sint instituta a Domino, quam usurpentur vulgo, ideo docemus signa nunc in usu sacro usurpare rerum signatarum vocabula, nec appellari amplius aquam tantum, panem et vinum, sed etiam regenerationem vel lavacrum renovationis, item corpus et sanguinem domini. It is underlined that the symbol [symbolum] of the signified thing does not change, but retains their natural substance. Non quod symbola mutentur in res significatas, et desinant esse id quod sunt sua natura. […]. The signs take up the names of the things, because the sacramental things are mystical symbols. The signs and signified things are united in the sacramental act, which is according to the divine act: […] sed ideo usurpant signa rerum nomina, quod rerum sacrarum sunt symbola mystica, et signa et res significatae inter se sacramentaliter coniungantur, coniungantur inquam, vel uniantur per significationem mysticam, et voluntatem vel consilium eius, qui sacramenta instituit. Non enim aqua, panis et vinum, sunt signa vulgaria, sed sacra […] (Caput XIX), citations from: http://www.solideogloria.ch/Bul linger/confessiohelvetica.htm [retrieved January 20, 2010] 26 Gäbler, “Zustandekommen,” 326. A systematic outline is offered by Brian Gerrish in Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude the Eucharist in John Calvin’s Theology, 157 ff. Gerrish is occupied of minimizing the gap between Calvin and Luther in the area of Eucharistic thought, which he thinks tradition has thorn too widely apart. This is particularly evident in the theories of signs, of which Gerrish claims there are three. He coins them symbolic memorialism, symbolic parallelism and symbolic instrumentalism, see further. B. A. Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). On the

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that the outward, physical eating went along with “inward, spiritual eating that is occurring at the same time”, Calvin wanted to state that the eating of the elements brought about a feeding upon Christ’s body and blood about.27 Still, the inability of the “Consensus” to locate Christ’s body in the elements – or in the distribution of the elements – was deeply problematic for those who cared for an indissoluble union of humanity and divinity in Christ. But it was the implication that it had for Eucharist theology and practice which received attention first.

Lutheran critique of the “Consensus Tigurinus” Three years after the publication of the “Consensus Tigurinus”, in 1552, the Lutheran superintendent of Hamburg, Joachim Westphal, reacted fiercely with his Farrago, and stated his own Eucharistic doctrine in Recta fides de Coena Domini the following year, with a lot of space devoted to portraying the teaching of Calvin.28 Through Westphal’s critique, a new stage in the development of Christology and Eucharist became apparent. From that moment it was impossible not to consider the distance between Calvinistic and Lutheran doctrine in these matters, and to ask whether a closing of that distance would imply a defect in the correct interpretation of Scripture.29 Westphal’s intention was to avoid a specific understanding of Christology as a necessary precondition for Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist. Rather, he would solely affirm that faith in the institutional words was sufficient for guaranteeing that presence. In Westphal’s Recta fides, he referred to the omnipotent Christ as the basis question of the relation between the strict metaphysical thought of Calvin and the content of the reformed confessions, cf. Heppe’s interpretation: “Im schlagendsten finden wir die kirchliche Unbrauchbarkeit des Calvinischen Systems in den Bekenntnissen der reformierten Kirche beurkundet. Denn wenn auch diejenigen unter ihnen, welce das decretum mere absolutum enthalten, meistens die Prädestinationslehre an die Spitze ihrer dogmatischen Explicationen stellen, so finden wir doch die reine und consequente Metaphysik Calvins fast in keinem reformierten Symbol ausgesprochen. Die allermeisten lassen den Ratschluss der Prädestination – infralapsaristisch – erst in Folge des Sündenfalles eintreten, wodurch die gesammte Anschauung Calvins aufgehoben und dem Prinzip desselben der eigentliche Lebensnerv durchschnitten wird.” Heppe, Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus in den Jahren 1555 – 1581, Band IIV, I,23. 27 Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude the Eucharist in John Calvin’s Theology, 166. 28 Westphal quotes Calvin’s “Short Treatise on the Lord’s Supper” (1541), “Commentary on 1 Cor 11” (1546), “Mutual Consent” and “Catechism” (1542). For a historical record of the subsequent development of the Westphal-Calvin controversy, see Joseph N. Tylenda, “Calvin-Westphal Exchange: The Genesis of Calvin’s Treatises Against Westphal,” Calvin Theological Journal 9, no. 2 (1974): 182 – 209. 29 Irene Dingel, “Westphal, Joachim,” TRE 35 (2003): 713 – 14.

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and foundation for his Eucharistic doctrine.30 The insistence on Christ’s power, and the implied voluntaristic corollary, is found throughout Westphal’s essay : The human intellect as such [humana ratio] does not have the ability to comprehend the signs of grace, but must let God declare his will through the signs.31 Westphal does not leave out every reference to the Christological dogma, however. In explaining how the sacraments are instruments conveying forgiveness of sins, justice and salvation, Westphal claims that only God can have the power to institute such instruments, “and his only begotten Son who is true God and man”, given power in heaven and on earth.32 It has to be noted that the Christological reference only supported the implied power which is necessary for the institution. Later in the same essay, Westphal explains the verba of 1 Cor 11. Here he draws heavily on Christological imagery as it was conceived by Luther : The holy flesh and divine blood which is distributed with the words “take and eat” is not only inseparably united with Christ, but it is the flesh of the Son of God.33 By pondering upon the words of institution and their different interpretation, the question of a Christological rationale of the interpretation of the Eucharist was inevitably raised. But Westphal did not himself advocate that Christology should serve as a doctrinal framework for the Eucharist. On the contrary, he opposed Timann’s later attempt to do so,34 perhaps partly due to the experience from the controversy surrounding Andreas Osiander. Calvin and the Swiss theologians ignored Westphal’s first treatise, the Farrago, but when Westphal published his Recta fides the next year, in 1553, Calvin responded with his Defensio. The very fact that Westphal’s name is not mentioned in Calvin’s treatise gives a hint about the hopes for a unified Protestant confession. The leading Reformation theologians were probably living in the shadow of the Wittenberger Concord (1536), in which the 30 Totius autem aedificij & munitionis inuictae firmamentum & robur consistit in Christo Domino omnipotente, is est petra fortis, & immobile munimentum suae Ecclesiae, illius urbum, solidum est fundamentum, basis & columna fidei […] Joachim Westphal, RECTA FIDES DE COENA DOmini, ex uerbis Apostoli Pauli, & Euangelistarum demonstrata ac communita (Magdeburg, 1553), A4a. 31 Humana ratio caeca in diuinis rebus non nouit, neque intelligit Dei consilium & voluntatem. Ideo non est situm in hominum arbitrio aut potestate sancire signa gratiae, sed ipsummet Deum oportet ea instituere, ad declarandam voluntatem suam. Westphal, Recta Fides, A7b. 32 Sacramenta organa sunt, quibus Deus offert, distribuit, & exhibet beneficia redemptionis, quibus obsignat & confirmat promissionem remissionis peccatorum, iustitiae, & salutis. Talia media instituendi potestatem solus Deus habet & unigenitus filius eius uerus Deus & homo, cui data est omnis potestas in coelo & in terra. Westphal, Recta Fides, A7b. 33 Nam cum illa sancta carne & sanguine diuinitas est inseparabiliter coniuncta, caro est filij Dei, plena Deo & spiritu, efficax et uiuifica, quae membra Ecclesiae nutrit, fouet, & arctius cum capite Christo & corpore eius conglutinat, ut sint caro de carne eius & ossa de ossibus eius. Westphal, Recta Fides, C3a. 34 Mahlmann, Dogma, 46 – 47.

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Strasbourg reformer Bucer and Luther managed to present a common statement of a Eucharistic doctrine.35 In Calvin’s Defensio, he largely repeats the Christology which was propagated through the Consensus Tigurinus, but is more explicit about the connections between the sacraments and Christology. He underlines that the communication between man and Christ is a spirtual communication,36 and labels the sacraments as signs [sigilla]. They are said to nourish, confirm and forward faith, but Calvin underlines that it is only the Spirit which finally is the proper sign. An immediate consequence of the insistence on a merely spiritual aspect is a renunciation of manducatio impiorum/indignorum, the participation in God’s power for all the congregants. Only the elect are exposed to the effect of the sacraments.37 Moreover, faith has received the communication of Christ prior to the eating and drinking in the Eucharist. That temporal qualification does not annul the usefulness of the sacrament, but it weakens the constitutive function of the sacraments which can be found in the Lutheran tradition. Finally, Calvin underlines the problem of interpreting the sacrament as locally present. His argument for refraining from such a presence is significant for our theme, because it highlights how intimately his understanding of the sacrament is bound to the Christological features of his theological concept: Christ, insofar as he is a human being, is not to be sought elsewhere than in heaven, and he is not to be sought differently from how intelligent faith perceives him to be in the mind. It is therefore perverse and an impious superstition to include Christ under the elements of this world.38

35 Although it could be said that Luther’s influence on the Wittenberg Concord’s final draft was profound with regard to the disputed claims in Marburg 1529, prominently among was the manducatio indignorum, but still it is to be interpreted a compromise. As Kittelson points out, back in Strasbourg in the aftermath of the publishing of the Concord, Bucer regarded the response to the gift in the Eucharist to be of vital importance for the efficacy of the Eucharist in the believer. This is in conflict with Luther’s insistence on the Eucharist itself as the effective source in the encounter. James M. Kittelson, “The Curious Histories of the Wittenberg Concord,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 50, no. 2 (April 1986): 124 – 27. 36 Haec spiritualis est communicatio […] Calvin, Defensio, 13. 37 Sic interdum Scramenta vocantur sigilla, dicuntur fidem alere, confirmare, promouere: & tamen solus Spiritus proprie est sigillum: & idem fidei inchoator est & perfector. Nam haec omnia Sacramentorum attributa inferiore loco subsidunt, vt ne minima quidem salutis nostrae portio ab vnico authore ad creaturas vel elementa transferatur. Praeterea sedulo docemus, Deum non promiscue vim suam exerere in omnibus qui Sacramenta recipiunt: sed tantum in electis. Calvin, Defensio, 17 – 18. 38 Praesertim vero tollenda est quaelibet localis praesentiae imaginatio. Nam quum signa hic in mundo sint, oculis cernantur, palpentur manibus: Christus quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in caelo, nec aliter quam mente ac fidei intelligentia quaerendus est. Quare peruersa & impia superstitio est, ipsum sub elementis huius mundi includere. Calvin, Defensio, 20

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There is a difference in principle between the spiritual reality of faith, and the spatially conditioned world which excludes the possibility of any local presence of Christ’s body. Crypto–Calvinism? The Bremer Eucharistic Controversy The inherent Christological problems in the wake of Westphal’s critique of Calvin was furthered and strengthened when a pastor in the important city of Bremen, Johannes Timann, published his Farrago Sententiarum (1555). Timann had read Westphal’s Farrago and must have felt that light was shed over his previous controversies with his fellow pastor in Bremen, the Cathedral preacher Albert Hardenberg.39 Timann suspected that Hardenberg was inclined towards a Zwinglian doctrine of the Eucharist,40 and Hardenberg was in 1548 forced to write a Sententia in which he explicitly stated that “the whole Christ, God and man, was present with all his gifts as content and substance [materia et substantia]”. But even if the controversy was formally resolved, “it just slumbered, and only a match would ignite it again”, as a modern interpreter pointed out.41 That was exactly what Timann eventually did. When the Friesan superintendent John a Lasco,42 who counted among 39 Albert Hardenberg (1510 – 1574) was influenced by the humanists in Groningen, Holland, in his early years, particularly Goswijn van Halen, a follower of the devotio moderna. He studied in Wittenberg one semester in 1543, and was seen as a follower of Melanchton. On Melanchton’s recommendation, Hardenberg was a theological counsellor at the Diet of Speyer 1544. He was a close friend of a Lasco, Blarer, Bullinger and Bucer, and served as Domprediger in Bremen 1547 – 1561. Within the order of preachers at Bremen, he felt the Eucharistic controversy quite strongly. As an act of sympathy towards the Wittenberg camp, he supported Melanchton’s candidacy as superintendent in Ostfriesland at the cost of a Lasco. For the following historical events, cf. Wim Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers (Studies in the History of Christian Thought; Leiden New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 5 – 109. 40 Hardenberg’s modern biographer, Wim Janse, makes an amusing observation concerning the alleged genesis of the controversy : In a tabletalk, Hardenberg proposed that a citation of Augustine originally came from Socrates, a statement Timann interpreted in line with what he considered a great problem by Zwingli, namely the election of (a few) heathen to salvation. From that moment, Timann regarded Hardenberg as Zwingli’s agent in disguise. Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 32 – 33. 41 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 33 – 34 and 45 ff. 42 The polish born Joannis a Lasco/Jan Łaski (1499 – 1560) was a considerable figure among the theologians of western Europe in the mid-16th Century. A personal friend of Erasmus and Zwingli, he brought his humanistic ideals to Emden, where he was superintendent for the Friesan Church. He had a profound impact on the English Reformation, and was on Hugh Latimer’s request invited to London where he started a congregation for German speaking Protestants. The members of this congregation was expelled from England under the reign of bloody Mary (1553), and sought temporary shelter in Danish and German cities. Due to their alleged doctrinal defect, Westphal was hostile towards offering them a place to stay. Cf. Jan Utenhove, Simplex et fidelis narratio de instituta ac demum dissipata Belgarum, aliorumque

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Hardenberg’s friends, republished his spiritualistic doctrine of the Eucharist in 1554,43 Timann wrote to Bugenhagen in Wittenberg with a copy of Lasco’s publication and his own response to it, namely his Farrago.44 By labelling it with the same title as Westphal had chosen for his attack on the “Consensus Tigurinus”, Timann gave an impression of conflict from the outset, even if his 600–page book mostly contained excerpts from the older reformers. That impression was affirmed by reading the content, as well. Timann warns in his preface about the spread of “new satanic opinions” from a nest of seemingly peaceful people.45 It was perhaps not a direct attack on Hardenberg, but it was clearly indirectly aimed at confronting him. The apocalyptic tone which resonates throughout the Farrago is not matched by a similar clarity in content, however. Still, some of his observations are interesting for the present work. Timann underlines the external aspect of the Eucharist: The gifts are not objects of contemplation, but the Spirit’s effective instruments in sanctification.46 Timann’s adversaries, on the other hand, are said to neglect that God wants to be in his Church, standing still in a corner, waiting for the Spirit. The Spirit exists in different grades [per certos gradus], in contrast to the direct communication through the public distribution of sacraments, as taught by Timann.47 Whether Timann thereby discerns the philosophical implications by his adversaries’ doctrine is not quite clear, but he nevertheless points at the problems of regarding ecstasy as the Spirit’s preferred mode of communication,48 or despising the ministry of the Word in order to become holy by

43 44 45

46 47

48

peregrinorum in Anglia, Ecclesia et potissimum de susceptis postea illius nomine itineribus (Basel: Oporinus, 1560). Confessio de nostra cum Christo Domino communione, et corporis sui item in Coena sua exhibitione: ad Ministros Ecclasiarum Frisiae Orientalis, in: Jan Laski and Abraham Kuyper, Joannis a Lasco opera recensuit vitam auctoris (Amsterdam Hague: F. Muller M. Nijhoff, 1866), 235 – 41. Joachim Westphal, Farrago confusanearum et inter se dissidentium opinionum de Coena Domini ex sacramentarioru[m] libris congesta (Magdeburgi: Execudebat Christia. Rodius, 1552) Cf. Mahlmann, Dogma, 44 ff. […] nidulari incipiant homines quidam leues & ociosi, qui Satanica audacia nouas quasdam opiniones […] Johann Timann, Farrago SenTENTIARVM CONSENTIENTIVM IN VERA ET CAtholica doctrina, de Coena Domini, quam firma assensione, & uno spiritu, iuta diuinam uocem, Ecclesiae Augustanae confessionis amplexae sunt, sonant & profitentur : Ex Apostolicis scriptis: Praeterea ex Orthodoxorum tam ueterum, quam recentium perspicuis testimonijs, contra Sacramentariorum dissidentes inter se opiniones, diligenter & bona fide collecta. (Frankfurt: Petrus Brubacchius, 1555), 3. Non enim nuda aut ociosa spectacula sunt, sed instrumenta, per quae Spiritus sanctus in nobis efficax est, & sanctificat nos. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 29. Hi [the sacramentarians] enim neglecto ministerio, quod Deus in sua Ecclesia esse uoluit, abdebat se in anulos, & uacabant contemplationibus, nescio quibus, eoque modo expectabant promissionem spiritus, per certos gradus, quos portentosis nominibus appellabant. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 30 – 31. His rationibus tantum profecerunt ut non modo sancto spiritu destitueretur, sed & alio, malo scilicet spiritu implerentur, qui attonitos eos, & tantum non fatuos reddebat. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 31.

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illumination.49 Any philosophical problem concerning Timman’s own stance on the matter is cleared solely with a reference to the connection between the will of God and the necessary execution of that will.50 In addition to a collection of witnesses throughout the history of the church to the authority of the Scripture, Timann published some letters which seemed relevant for his concern with a Lasco’s Eucharist theology. One of these letters came from Johannes Westphal in Hamburg, giving support and advice.51 Interestingly, he recommends Timann not to push any question on Christ’s omnipresent body any further. Westphal claims that Luther has never dwelled on any questions involving “physical arguments”, but limited his argument to refuting the alleged impossibility of such an ubiquity. Timann should instead be concerned with the simpler arguments – which probably mean the Words of institution – rather than rushing into difficult questions, such as the unity of the person and the properties of Christ’s two natures.52 In spite of the recommendation of Westphal, Timann argues that the arguments concerning the properties of the body should not be regarded as valid. Although it could be argued – as one modern interpreter has done – that Timann’s lack of a consistent theoretical framework of the relation between the Eucharist and Christology is a sign of his failing skills,53 it might be interpreted as a response to what he understood as a problematic anthropological axiom for that relation. Timann devotes a whole chapter in his Farrago to citations on the question of the ubiquity of Christ’s body,54 where even Joachim Westphal is represented with a citation.55 Timann must have seen both the intimate connection between Christology and the Eucharist on the one hand, and Melanchthon’s sceptical attitude, whose comments on the matter he added among the voices. Hardenberg was advised by Melanchthon to be silent for the sake of peace, but Timann pushed his pro–ubiquitarian polemics against him publicly. On Hardenberg’s question to Timann, whether the ubiquity of Christ’s body could

49 […] adversus fanaticos spiritus, qui contempto ministerio uerbi, uolunt sanctificari per alias, nescio quas, illuminationes. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 36. 50 Quae ergo Deus voluit, fiunt necessaria: Dei uoluntas, est necessitas. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 38. 51 Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 186 – 97. The date is June 11, 1554. 52 Dedita opera praeterij, uel certe parce attigi disputationem, que corpus ubique sit. Nusque magis tumultuati sunt aduersus Praeceptorem nostrum D. Lutherum, nusquam gloriosius iactauerunt suos triumphos, quam in physico argumento urgendo, sumpto a proprietate corporum, quae non possint esse ubique. Ego oppono, quod & illum fecisse, ac plerunque facere uideo errorem istorum infringentes, & quod longe ualidissimum simplicissimumque est, minusque remoratur non ita acutos et armatos in difficilioribus istis quaestionibus de unitate persone, & proprietate dua naturarum in Christo. Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 191. 53 […] beweist, dass Timann kein Denker war […] Mahlmann, Dogma, 48. 54 Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 236 – 99. 55 Timann, Farrago Sententiarum, 255.

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be found in Holy Scripture, Timann replied with a reference to Brenz’s Christology, a doctrine with which he was already familiar with. This provided the opportunity to attack the premise of Timann’s Eucharistic rationale. From then on, Hardenberg started to utter protest not against the doctrine of the real presence, but against the doctrine of ubiquity. In his essay, Hardenberg stated that the two natures of Christ were inseparably united, but the natures were not confused. Although it could be said, according to the apostle, that God was born, that the Son of God died, the Lord of glory was crucified, this is not the same as asserting that divinity per se can suffer, but it is Christ who suffers. Like Melanchthon, Hardenberg insists that the communicatio idiomatum must be in concreto.56 Hardenberg claims that anyone who interprets the sentence “God has suffered” as “divinity has suffered”, has committed the Eutychian heresy.57 What is said concretely is not allowed per abstractum to be assigned to each nature outside the concreteness of the person. Any abstract predication in this matter would therefore be regarded as false. The Nestorian argument of Christ’s passable possibility as confined to the human nature is therefore repeated by Hardenberg.58 Instead, a version of the “extra calvinisticum” is stated and related to his sacramental theology.59 Hardenberg sees the arguments on ubiquity from Timman as similar to the logic of Eutychian one–nature dogma: God suffered, hence divinity suffered. He draws a parallel between this logic and the Christology of the Anabaptists, who underline Christ’s heavenly origin to the degree that his body is predicated as heavenly, too.60 Hardenberg localises the problem as a logical one: It is wrong to draw a conclusion a persona ad naturam.61 The cosmological premise for Hardenberg’s understanding of the Eucharist is Christ’s spatial existence in an extra-terrestrial heaven.62 This seems to be the consequence of Hardenberg’s insistence that Christ’s words of institution do not destroy any spatial presence, which he emphasises in a discussion with another of the Bremen preachers, Eliardius Segebade.63 It seems fair to say that Hardenberg’s doctrine of the presence of Christ is built upon Melanchthon’s teaching, from whom he draws this cosmological 56 Albert Hardenberg, DE VBIQVITATE, SCRIPTA DVO ADVERSARIA Doct. Alberti Hardenbergij & Elardi Segebadij, concionatorum Bremensium (Mylau: Petrus Fabricius, 1564), 5a. 57 Quam ergo absurde colligebant Eutychiani, Deus passus est, ergo diuinitas passa est […] Hardenberg, De Ubiquitate, 6a. 58 Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100 – 600), 231. 59 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 124. 60 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 125. 61 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 126, note 17. 62 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 311. Janse points out that it is Christ and his body, massa Christi, which is placed in heaven. 63 Quod aut uerba illa Christi, Hoc est corpus meum, non tollant localitatem, uel dimensione corporis Christi […] Hardenberg, De Ubiquitate, 27b.

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premise. Still, important differences can be found.64 Hardenberg sees the faith of the receiver as necessary for receiving the substance of the sacraments, and he is thereby firmly placing himself closer to the tradition of the reformed party. The participatio substantiae corporis is only a reality for those who have received the element fideliter, it is not received by the impious. Therefore, Hardenberg’s interpretation of Christ’s presence differs from the perspective of Melanchthon. It is neither Multi– or Ubivolipresence, but merely a spiritual presence. The Stuttgarter Synode The tensions between different interpretations of Christ’s presence and the relation to the doctrine of the Eucharist were not restricted to Bremen. Due to existing Calvinistic tendencies in Württemberg, a process in Stuttgart against the alleged Swiss inclination of the teaching of a certain Bartholomeus Hagen concerning the Eucharist, ended in 1559 with a synod and a confession. To understand the political horizon of these theological debates, it is important to keep in mind the unclear situation in Württemberg. When Prince Ulrich died in 1550, the Interim of 1548 was the official religious policy of the duchy. Even though the Protestant princes gained a formal recognition in the Passau agreement of 1552, it had only limited significance for Christoph, duke of Württemberg. He was deeply financially indebted to the emperor, and could only allow himself limited freedom in ecclesial matters, at least until the end of the 1550 s. Therefore, the question of which type of Reformation theology Duke Christoph would pursue was not yet settled. As Duke Christoph’s close adviser in theological affairs and provost of the Stiftskirche, Johannes Brenz had a profound influence on the synod. On Brenz’s recommendation, Pastor Hagen was given a month to write an apology. The apology was then handed to the duke, who commissioned an expert opinion from the theological faculty and some pastors in the duchy. Hagen had based his argument on the consensus of the (Church) Fathers and the old Church, but his most prominent reference was perhaps to Melanchthon himself, and his newly published commentary on Colossians. Although the expert opinions were negative from faculty and pastors alike, Hagen was asked to act in a disputation against Jacob Andreae. Hagen argued in the disputation that it was possible to distinguish between corporal and spiritual eating in interpreting the gospel of John, chapter 6, as Brenz had done before. In his Syngramma (1525), Brenz had distinguished between a reception of the bread with the bodily mouth, and the body of Christ which was received by the mouth of faith. Hagen referred to that imagery in

64 Janse, Albert Hardenberg als Theologe. Profil eines Bucer-Schülers, 312 – 14.

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order to explain his “Swiss” inclinations.65 This was not accepted by Brenz, who was present in persona. Hagen admitted his alleged failure of interpretation, and stood in need to recant his doctrinal errors before the synod. In the public outcome of the synod, the confession which all the participants signed, Brenz’s doctrine of Christ as a premise for the real presence was made known for the first time, and the duke included it in his new Church order. As a result, the late Christology of Brenz became normative doctrine.66 The “Stuttgarder Synode” consisted of six parts: 1. Through the Verba Christi the true body and blood of Christ is given to all human beings who partake in the Eucharist. 2. The substance of the bread and wine is not changed. The blood and body of Christ are not only a shadowy presence in the bread and wine, but truly presented and received [cum symbolis vere exhiberi et accipi]. 3. The sacramental union is not a blending of bread and wine with body and blood in a spatial oneness, but its mode of presence is described in the word of Christ. As a consequence, there is no sacrament outside its use [extra usum non esse sacramentum]. 4. If opponents should argue against the presence of Christ by reference to the ascension of Christ, we declare that Christ is above all heavens in order to fill everything. Christ is not in a place, but is gone to majesty and glory. This pertains not only to his divine nature, but the man Christ too fills everything in an ineffable way. Through the glory of the Father, Christ is present to all things, and they are present to him. This is not possible to understand with reason, only faith can grasp it. 5. The impious receive the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, but due to their lack of faith, they are judged. 6. This is the true confession of the Eucharist, not due to human reason or sophistry, but according to the witness and words of Scripture. It is in concord with the Confessio Augustana and the Confessio Virtembergica.67 From the structure of the confession, it is to be noted that the Christology is not activated as a precondition for the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The Christological argument is only used indirectly, supporting the correct understanding of the verba testamenti.68 It is referred to and employed when the presence of the human nature of Christ is disputed because of the Swiss 65 Heinrich Schmid, Der Kampf der lutherischen Kirche um Luthers Lehre vom Abendmahl im Reformationszeitalter (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1868), 239, note 1. 66 Brandy, Christologie, 53. 67 Heinrich Hermelink, “Stuttgarter Synode,” in Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1907), 116 – 19. 68 Dorner, Person Christi, 2,666 – 7.

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Christology, because it inevitably leads to a cosmological fixation of the body of Christ. For Brenz, the constitutive function of the words of institution for the Eucharist, was at hand already in the 1525 Syngramma Suevicum. There, Brenz states that “it remains true that the bread of the Eucharist is the body of Christ, due to the word of Christ”.69 This is repeated in the three important sermons he published in 1556. Here, however, there is a stronger focus on the authority of the speaker of the words of institution, but not at the expense of the words of institution. Brenz underlines the truth of the reception and eating of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, even if it is contrary to reason, “but due to the Word, which stands there and says ‘this is my body’, we should and must believe it”.70 The trustworthiness of these words are strengthened due to the speaker who utters them, “not a normal man, but true man and God in one person”. As divine, it follows that he cannot lie (!). His word is so powerful that it performs what it says.71 Therefore, Brenz regards the Christological framework as a support for the words of institution, not a theme on its own right at this stage. But as time goes by, Christology as a personal union of the two natures of Christ becomes emancipate from its inextricable relation with the Eucharist and becomes a proper systematical-theological locus on its own.72 In an important preface to the Formula of Concord, the student and collaborator of Brenz, Jacob Andreae, will even claim that it is the most important of the articles of that work.73

Christology and cosmology : The definition of presence by Brenz74 Johannes Brenz was considered an ecumenical figure in the Reformation movement. He did not belong to the Gnesiolutheran party of the Ernestine Saxony, the group of theologians who had Matthias Flacius as their main 69 Adhuc stabile manet, panem coenae esse corpus Christi, iuxta verbum Christi. Johannes Brenz, et al., Frühschriften. Teil 1 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970), 239,5 f. 70 “Aber weil das Wort da steht unn sagt ’Das ist mein Leib’ sollen und müssen wir es glauben”. Johannes Brenz, Von dem Hochwirdigen Sacrament des Abendmals unsers Herrn Jesu Christi. Drey Predig uber die Wort S. Pauli 1. Corinth. XI (Frankfurt, 1556), 19. 71 Brandy, Christologie, 117. 72 Cf. the apt commentary by Donnelly : “By stressing arguments based on the communication of idioms, Brenz changed the centre of gravity of the Eucharistic controversy” Peter Martyr Vermigli, Dialogue on the Two Natures in Christ (translated and edited with introduction and notes by John Patrick Donnelly ; Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies 31 The Peter Martyr library ;; ser. 1; Kirksville, Mo.: Thomas Jefferson University Press: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1995), xxi. 73 Brandy, Christologie, 134. 74 Tese are many documents one could consult in order to analyse Brenz’s Christology, and it is a

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figure. Brenz is a figure who is difficult to place within the standard scheme of Philippists and Gnesiolutherans. In addition, he cultivated contact with Swiss theologians during the 1550 s, among them Zwingli’s successor in Zurich, Heinrich Bullinger. He had supported Andreas Osiander during the controversy which came to bear the latter’s name, but at the same time maintained close relations with Melanchthon. As late as 1558, Brenz named his new-born son Philipp after Melanchthon, and their friendly exchange of letters continued the following year, too.75 The ecumenical attitude of Brenz faced a difficult task, however, when Christoph duke of Wittenberg asked him for an expert opinion on a work by Heinrich Bullinger. Philipp of Hessen had hoped that Bullinger’s Tractatio (1561) could serve to promote the unity among the Protestants, a unity which was painfully severed after the colloquy of Worms (1557). However, it displayed the internal problems in the Protestant camp. Once again, the Catholic theologians claimed – not without justification – that the Confessio Augustana was insufficient as a doctrinal foundation for a church.76 Bullinger’s Tractatio: A circumscriptive heaven Bullinger’s work is an exegesis of John 14, where Jesus talks about “the many rooms in my Father’s house”. Bullinger attacks the doctrine of ubiquity, arguing that it leaves the simplicity of the ancient doctrine behind, and creates uncertainty whether Christ has a specific place for the believers in heaven.77 In other words, Bullinger claims that the spatiality which is implied in the metaphor of the room must be interpreted according to the earthly laws of nature. These are, as we shall see, in agreement with Aristotle and his challenge to pick out the relevant material for the limited space available in a study like this. But the mature Christology of Brenz as it is found in the four great Christological treatises are the basis of this study, namely De personali unione (1561), Sententia de libello D. Henrici Bullingeri […] (1561), De maiestate Domini nostri Iesu Christi […] (1562), and Recognitio prophetica […] (1564). Together they reveal the most important aspects of Brenz’s criticism of the reformed position in the context of Eucharist controversy. Cf. the instructive list of the most important books from Brandy, Brandy, Christologie, 69. 75 Brandy, Christologie, 41, 54 ff. 76 Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, Lehrbuch der Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Bd.2, Reformation und Neuzeit (Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2001), 158. 77 Reducentur hac Christi doctrina & illi in uitam ueritatis ac iustitie simplicem, qui dicunt coelum, in quod ascendit Christus, nullum esse locum certum, neque quenquam explicare posse ubi aut quid sit coelum. Cum enim Christus receptus in gloriam, iam nullo in loco, sed ubique sit, consequens esse coelum, in quo sit Christus, nullum esse certum locum, qui a nobis comonstrari possit. Heinrich Bullinger, Tractatio verborvm domini, in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt, &c. ex XIIII. cap. Euang. secundum Ioan Qua demonstratur spem salutemque fidelium, certissimam esse, & Coelum, in quod ascendit Christus, & in quod suscipiuntur electi omnes, locum esse in excelsis certum: ubi & de dextera Dei, & de Vbiquitate corporis Christi disseritur (Zurich: Froschouerus, 1561), a5a.

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philosophy of nature. Bullinger’s appeal for a simple, straightforward meaning to the biblical text can at least formally be said to resemble one of Luther’s central exegetical practices, and must have seemed tempting to use for Philip, duke of Hessen, who was seeking Protestant consensus for political reasons. Morality plays an important part in Bullinger’s theology : The meaning of faith in eternal life is closely connected to the moral obligations of the believers. When they firmly believe in life everlasting, the believers are ready to sacrifice the pleasures of this life. It is therefore important for Bullinger to avoid any doctrine which may undermine that motivation.78 He resembles Augustine in a sharp distinction between this fading era and the coming era. He refers to Jesus’ words to the disciples about his disappearance from their eyes now, but that the future will be greater. Happiness and salvation is situated after this life.79 Central to Bullinger’s distinction is an ascetic emphasis on the immortal souls, and how a delight in this world’s luxury, eating and drinking, would reduce confidence in the coming world.80 The very foundation of maintaining a doctrine of a coming world is shaken by the denial of heaven as a fixed place [locum certum], which the idea of Christ’s ubiquitous nature is effectively doing. Bullinger is not ready to start a discussion on whether spatiality is a fitting category for the divine Christ, however. His argument is rather to portray the doctrine of Brenz as a hermeneutical problem: Does the interpretation of Christ’s place as everywhere lead to a thought where all the words of Christ are to be doubted as conveying simple meaning?81 Bullinger admits that there are certain anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture concerning God and God’s place. Castle and chair are to be taken as expressions of God’s power,82 but this fact does not alter his critique against Brenz. Bullinger’s cosmological speculation is marked by the interpreting heaven as spatial extension, which is supposed to reflect the content of Scripture. Even though he quotes John of Damascus, who is pointing to the useless investigation of heaven’s substance, Bullinger himself distinguishes between four spheres of heaven: 1. The lowest level, where the birds, clouds and rain are located 2. Where the stars reside 78 […] Credo uitam aeternam. Docebunt item eadem illa indubitatam esse salutem fidelium, atque adeo paratam esse pijs uitam beatiorem hac mundana uita, illamque migrantibus ex hoc mundo per Christum donari. Bullinger, Tractatio, a4b. 79 […] non tantopere spectanda esse praesentia, sed magis futura. […] demonstrat Dominus noster verbis iam recitatis, esse post hanc vitam aliam, esse locum felicitatis certum, & salutem indubitatam. Bullinger, Tractatio, A3b. Brandy underlines the eschatological aspect of Bullinger’s insistence on a circumscriptive heaven, cf. Brandy, Christologie, 103 – 4. 80 Bullinger, Tractatio, A4b. 81 Cum vero singula Domini verba suum habeant pondus […] Bullinger, Tractatio, a5a. 82 Bullinger, Tractatio, a6a.

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3. Over the stars, a transparent heaven 4. On the top, eternal heaven, with perpetual light and glory.83 When Christ ascends, he travels through the spheres and resides over all heaven. Therefore he is everywhere only according to his divine nature. Christ’s divine nature does not remove the spatial character of heaven, or cause heaven to be present everywhere. Heaven’s place is clearly distinguished and separated from the earth. Bullinger underlines this aspect by insisting on a literal reading of the ascension as Christ being lifted up over the clouds and the upper air. Given the premise of a body’s circumscriptive nature, Bullinger seems to suggest that Brenz gives a very problematic interpretation of the two–nature doctrine of Chalcedon. If Brenz is not ready to admit Christ’s transport to a local heaven, Bullinger claims that the story of the ascension needs to be interpreted as a mutation or conversion of Christ’s body into a spiritual substance.84 On the other hand, the nature of the corporal person which Christ remains to be – even after the resurrection and ascension – is not ubiquitous, but demands a place proper.85 Bullinger is careful to underline the actual disappearance of Christ’s body from the disciples. He refers to Jesus’ utterance in John 16:7: It is necessary for him to ascend in order that the Holy Spirit can be sent. What remains is his divine grace and power.86 Bullinger’s main argument, however, lies in the recorded statement of the angels who appear to the disciples after the ascension. He understands them as having explained the whole mystery clearly and truthfully, which is not different from what Bullinger himself has claimed: Christ really has ascended into heaven, according to his body. This explanation excludes the possibility of his body being present or ubiquitous, as it was at the time of his assumption.87 Whether the duke of Hessen was aware that Bullinger’s Tractatio was a response to Brenz’s De personali unione Christi is not quite clear, but Bullinger was not particularly fortunate to have Brenz as referee. Although Brenz had underlined the simplicity of the words of Christ, he added that the

83 Bullinger, Tractatio, a6b-a7a. 84 Adhuc vero significantius modum ascensionis exponens, nubes, inquit, suscepit eum ab oculis ipsorum. Supra nubes ergo & aethera euectus est Dominus noster, & quidem vero suo corpore, quod adeo mutatum ac conversum in spiritum non est, ut nisi nubes hoc obtexisset, visibile adhuc oculis discipulorum, contuendo euntem prosequentibus, mansisset. Bullinger, Tractatio, 9a-9b. 85 […] immensitas Dei, coelum non reddit immensum, aut facit ut sit ubique ita glorificatio Christi, & quod ascendit supra omnes coelos, ac iuxta divinam suam naturam ubique est, non eximit coelum loco, aut efficit, ut et coelum sit ubique, cum iuxta humana natura corporisque ingenium non sit ubique sed in loco. Bullinger, Tractatio, 8a. 86 Bullinger, Tractatio, 8b-9a. 87 Non erat hoc corpus amplius in terra praesens aut ubique, quia assumptum erat. Bullinger, Tractatio, 10a.

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omnipotence of God was acknowledged, too.88 The reference to the unlimited power of God countered any argument that would confine the spatial presence of Christ to a local heaven. In addition, Brenz had made explicit the necessary ubiquitous implications of a unionist insistence on the relation between Christ’s natures: If the humanity of Christ was indissolubly connected to the divine nature – which by its very definition is everywhere –, it followed that it was everywhere, too.89 Even though Brenz was reluctant to construct an alternative cosmology based on the union, he did add that one could not find any spatiality which could possibly separate the two natures within Christ’s union.90 When Brenz pushed his insistence that the whole divine majesty participated in the person of Christ, the question of anthropology became acute: If Boethius’ standard definition of man as an individual substance is adopted, how could one retain person in its theological meaning, that is, Christ as one of the persons of the Trinity? For Brenz, the answer cannot be found by human reason, but the Holy Spirit has to supply the words.91 It is to be noted that Brenz qualifies this as sermo, speech, perhaps as to underline the proximate relation between the words of Scripture and the content these words convey. Brenz claims that there exist two levels of interpretation: According to nature or natural reason, there is only one infinite power, infinite wisdom etc., namely God himself. But according to grace, there cannot be any obstacle if God really wants to pour out his whole majesty in the incarnation. And this is exactly what God does, Brenz claims, with a reference to Colossians 1.92 The 88 Nos quidem ab initio contenti eramus simplici uerborum Christi interpretatione, & uoluntatis ac omnipotentiae Dei agnitione. Johannes Brenz, DE PERSONALI VNIONE DVARVM NATVRARVM IN CHRISTO, DE REALI IDIOmatum Communicatione, De Ascensu Christi in coelum, & sessione eius ad dexteram Dei patris. QVA UERA CORPORIS ET SANGVINIS CHRIsti praesentia in Coena explicata est, & confirmata. (Tübingen, 1561), A3a. 89 Quid ergo hinc sequitur? quid dicemus? An non perspicuum est, quod cum Deitas & humanitas in una persona Christi inseparabiliter, & indiuulse coniunguntur, necessarium sit, ut ubicunque est Deitas, ibi etiam sit humanitas Christi? Johannes Brenz, De Personale, A5b. 90 Certi Deitas & humanitas Christi sunt una & inseparabilis persona, quemadmodum supra dictum est. Negari antem [autem?] non potest, quin quaecumque sunt unit inseparabiliter, ubicunque unum est, ibi sit & reliquum, nec sit ullus locus, aut locorum spacium, quod ea possit separare. Johannes Brenz, De Personale, A6b. 91 Si persona est substantia indiuidua, quomodo diuinitas Christi non haberet secum humanitatem, quam in unitatem personae assumpsit, ubiqunque esset, unitam? Sciamus igitur quod in Christi persona, non sit consulenda ratio hominis, sed sententia spiritus sancti […] Non capit hoc mysterium [i.e. the ineffable union of the natures] humanus intellectus per suas rationes, capit autem fides per spiritum sanctum. Johannes Brenz, De Personale, A6b. 92 Dicemus ne duo esse infinita, potentia, sapientia, bonitate, & iustitia? siquidem sermo est de natura: unum certe tantum est infinite potens, sapiens, bonum & iustum, quod est Deus ipse. Si autem sermo est de gratia, profecto fieri non potest, quin filius Dei effundat omnem suam maiestatem in filium illum hominis, quem in unitatem personae unione hypostatica ex imperscrutabili suo consilio, & gratuita clementia assumpsit, ut quod ille est per se, & natura, hoc iste

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double access to reality through nature and grace simultaneously protects the insistence on the ubiquity of Christ’s flesh from the laws of physics.93 If philosophical issues – meaning geometrical and physical concerns – are imported into theology, they tend to dissolve the mystery of the two natures of Christ. Brenz sees in other words the intention of theology as naming the mystery of faith, namely the ineffable conjunction of the natures in Christ.94 A reserved sphere of mystery for the theological science raises a new problem, however: The implication of a double truth. This problem becomes acute during the re–introduction of Aristotle and metaphysics in the Philosophy faculties of the Lutheran universities some decades later, and finds its peak in the controversy surrounding Daniel Hofmann.95 Brenz’ alternative: Heaven in light of the ineffable union Brenz did not wait long before he responded to Bullinger’s Tractatio. In his Sententia de libello D. Henrici Bullingeri, Brenz claims to have found a Zwinglian doctrine of the Eucharist in Bullinger’s book. One of the most important points for the present work is Brenz’s critique of the cosmological premise of Bullinger : Brenz claims that it represents a “new heaven” [novum coelum], not only considered to be contrary to Scripture. The circumscribed, local presence of the risen Christ corresponds to the structural errors [errorem architectur] of the scholastic theologians, which in turn are visible in the interpretation of Christ’s human nature.96 Bullinger has done what the scholastic theologians did, according to Brenz, namely to import the laws of physics into theology. Brenz himself is more concerned about guarding the line between Creator and creation, as a modern scholar noted.97 As a result, Brenz contends, Bullinger interprets the right hand of God, dextra Dei, differently from that to which the Scriptures give witness. Instead of insisting on the majesty and omnipotence, as Scripture does, Bullinger gives way to a peculiar local–spatial place. Brenz’ point of departure in Christology is the individual, inseparable

93 94 95 96 97

sit per accidens (hoc est) alieno beneficio & gratia, propter hypostaicam Johannes Brenz, De Personale, A7b. There is a principle difference between the school of Aristotle/common reason on the one hand, and the school of Christ/faith on the other. Brandy, Christologie, 146. Sinamus igitur & nos Philosophos garrire, & videamus Physicas & Geometricas ipsorum argumentiones, quas ad refutandum & dissoluendum summum illud mysterium hypostaticae duarum naturarum unionis in Christo, recitare solent […] Johannes Brenz, De Personale, A8a-b. See below, p.189 ff. Johannes Brenz, Die christologischen Schriften. In drei Teilen hg. von Theodor Mahlmann, Teil 1 (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1981), 114,36. Matthias A. Deuschle, Brenz Als Kontroverstheologe: Die Apologie der Confessio Virtembergica und die Auseinandersetzung Zwischen Johannes Brenz und Pedro de Soto (Beiträge Zur Historischen Theologie; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 254.

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personal union of God and man in Christ. One cannot abstract the human nature from the divine nature, and make the former dependent on a scientific law which does not apply to the latter, too. Due to the communicatio idiomatum, the divine properties are transferred to the human nature, which qualifies it anew. A scientific physical restriction on the human nature of Christ would not take into account the intimate union of the two natures. Or even worse, as Brenz sees it, it would lead to a defective understanding of the divine nature. Due to his insistence on the union to such a high degree, a doctrine which emphasises the physical limitations of the human body would also imply limitations on divine nature if they are applied after the glorification of that body. These limitations would in turn contradict how Brenz interprets the presence of God, namely with Scriptural evidence which underline how God fills the different parts with his presence. Jeremiah 23:24, “Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord”, serves as the main supplier of divine attributes.98 If God fills heaven and earth, what is the difference between the presence of God in Christ and the presence of God in all human beings?, Brenz asks.99 God inhabits Christ, not only according to his presence, essence, potency and grace, but according to his person.100 This mode of divine inhabitation is not found in any other creature personally, but Jesus Christ. This personal presence is further explained by Brenz in his interpretation of Colossians 2:9: “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily”. Bodily is understood as an antonym to shadow [umbra]. To help his readers to understand that image, Brenz employs the practice of a painter to crayon who sketches in crayon [adumbro] before the paint is applied. Hence, bodily means that the divine nature cannot be erased from the person of Christ such as the crayon is removed from the painting.101 In other words, Brenz would emphasise the divine nature in its fullness plays a constitutive and nonremovable role for the person of Christ because it is bodily present in him. This is also a criterion by which the person of Christ can be distinguished over against other creatures, which do not have the deity bodily present, and therefore could not be considered perfect.102 This is a more important aspect of Brenz’s Christological reasoning than it 98 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 120,29. The other scriptural references are: Isiah 66:1; Psalm 138 [139]:8; Job 11:8 – 9. 99 Quod ergo est hic divinae inhabitationis discrimen? Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 122,7. 100 Hanc difficultatem veteres ita explicuerunt, quod Deus sit et habitet in homine Christo non tantum sua praesentia, essentia, potentia et gratia, sed etiam sua persona; videlicet quod filius Dei verus et aeternus Deus ita se cum homine, quem ex Maria virgine assumpsit, univerit, ut non quidem divina natura mutata, sit in humanam, sed quod ex Deo et homine facta sit una et individua persona. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 122,11. 101 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 124,28. 102 In solo autem autem Domino nostro Iesu Christo habitat tota plenitudo deitatis corporaliter. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 126,33.

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might appear in the first place, due to the critical function it has vis-—-vis Melanchthon’s gradual system of presence.103 When Melanchthon places the inseparable natures of Christ within the framework of God’s creation and conservation, Brenz sees the union of the natures as threatened. The basic condition for the doctrine of creation is that God can withdraw from the creatures, according to God’s will. According to Brenz, Melanchthon’s interpretation of the Logos as upholding the human104 nature is perhaps in line with a general doctrine of man, but it does not suffice for a doctrine of Christ. Such a voluntary qualification of the constitution of Christ – depending on the will of God as the other human beings – violates the idea of the natures’ inseparable union. As a modern interpreter has it, Brenz regards Melanchthon’s doctrine of Christ “as hardly overcoming the limits of the doctrine of conservation”.105 How then should the difference between Adam and the new Adam be expressed within Brenz’ Christological framework? As a tool to distinguish between the uniqueness of Christ and the other human beings, Brenz qualifies the latter as umbraliter.106 This is in contrast to the divine fullness of God, which Col. 2:9 attributes as inhabiting Christ corporaliter, as we have seen above. The distinction between bodily and shadowy presence is also helpful to avoid the extreme pantheist consequences of the doctrine of the body of Christ’s ubiquitous nature, – as if Christ would physically exist “in Stein und Holz”, as Melanchthon sarcastically had put it.107 On the other hand, Brenz insists that God is intimately close to the world in his creational activity. That God is present to the highest degree (praesentissimum) in all that exists that is fundamental to Brenz’s theological imagination.108 Nevertheless, Brenz retained his insistence on the Christ event as an exaltation of the human “substance” to the majesty of God.109 In line with the Christology of Luther, this exaltation was not restricted to the resurrection of Christ, but was already present from the moment when the Son of God 103 See above, page 95 ff. 104 This is repeated in the last great Christological treatises of Brenz, his Recognitio of 1564: […] corporaliter, hoc est: non umbraliter sicut in aliis creaturis. Cited from Mahlmann, “Personeinheit,” 222. 105 Mahlmann, “Personeinheit,” 214 – 15. In the rest of his article, Mahlmann analyses Brenz’ attempt to root Christology on a more firm basis than the four-graded system of presence which Melanchthon provided. 106 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 126,19. 107 CR, 9,470. 108 Hans Christian Brandy, “Brenz’ Christologie und ihre von Jakob Andreae vertretene Form,” Blätter Für Württembergische Kirchengeschichte 100 (2000): 61. 109 Consideramus igitur initio, quod certum sit Paulum in his dictis loqui de exaltatione humanae substantiae in Christo. Deinde videtur quidem, quod Paulus loquatur tantum de ea maiestate, quae collata est in Christum post resurrectionem eius, nec verba Pauli intelligenda sint de personali unitate divinae et humanae naturae in Christo, sed tantum de potestate, quam Christus habet super omnem creaturam, etiam si iuxta humanam naturam sit in uno certo et spaciis suis distincto loco coeli. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 122,30.

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assumed human nature in Mary’s womb.110 It is one of the peculiar features of Brenz’s writings: Even though he might explain the person of Christ through different metaphors, they are in the end always qualified by an insistence on the presence of God in crib and cross. That God is not the kenotic, powerless divine who is stripped of his properties, but God in his full–fledged majesty. Before the resurrection the majesty is not yet revealed, but its real presence should not be doubted.111 How does Brenz base his doctrine in relation to Scripture? Brenz gives three reasons why the third chapter in the gospel of John should be considered as support for the ubiquity of Christ: 1. Theology as radically separated from worldly philosophy. 2. Christ has not ascended to a circumscriptive heaven, because that would destroy the personal union. 3. There is a distinction between the substance of one of Christ’s natures on the one hand, and the properties on the other. The first and last of these reasons are particularly interesting. Concerning the separation of theology and philosophy, Brenz underlines that it is not possible for human reason to understand the mode of that communion. As a consequence, Brenz distinguishes between an earthly wisdom [terrena academia] and a heavenly wisdom [coelesti academia]. The mode of presence does not rest on any earthly wisdom, but is qualified anew in light of the assumption.112 Brenz gives a more detailed explanation of how these two traditions are opposed in his great 1562 treatise, De maiestate, a work which was directed against Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499 – 1562).113 Here, the academies are 110 […] statim etiam collocaverit eum in sua maiestate […] Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 124,12. 111 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 124,13. It is important to note that although there is an eschatological reservation of how the reality of Christ’s presence might be realised in the par-ousia, Brenz does not leave any doubt that Christ has brought an enduring bodily fullness of God about. As Mahlmann has shown, it is exactly the outcome or result of the radical eschatological alternatives which leave the believer in despair : The uncertainty of Melanchthon and the plain rejection of the bodily presence of the Swiss prompted Brenz to develop an alternative interpretation of presence. Cf. Mahlmann, “Personeinheit,” 220. 112 […] retinebimus divina clementia adiuti totum Christum eumque indivisum nobiscum in terra et in coena, non autem terreno aut crasso modo, qualem humana ratio fingit, sed qualem novit ille, qui non dedignatus est cum homine una individua persona fieri et in hunc assumptum ac sibi unitum hominem totam deitatis suae plenitudinem sylatijor effundere. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 140,32. 113 Brenz’s third of his four large Christological theses was a defence against the Italian Protestant, Peter Vermigli. Peter Vermigli was born in Firenze, joined the Augustinian order at an early age, and studied at the University of Padua. There he was above all educated by Marcantonio de Passeri (1491 – 1563), the teacher of the famous interpreter of Aristotle, Jacobo Zabarella (1533 – 1589). As part of the emerging Italian reform movement, he was sent to negotiate with the Protestants at the colloquy of Worms in 1540. Shortly before that incident, he was introduced to Protestant literature and embraced the doctrine of justification by faith alone. He left Italy because of his theological convictions and embarked on a career in Protestant Universities, in Strasbourg, Oxford and Zurich. Due to his vast knowledge of recent scholarship on

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renamed as two different schools, the school of Aristotle and the school of Christ. The former is based on the axiom of the impossible conjunction between finite and infinite, and Brenz sharply identified Aristotle’s axiom with the nominalist nulla proportio doctrine.114 The latter is based on the axiom of the dictum of John 1:14, namely that God was made flesh. When it is asked how the infinite can join the finite, Brenz responds: “How can God become man or man become God?”115 It points to an important difference between the concept of persona in the Christology of Brenz and that of his adversary in De Maiestate, Peter Vermigli: Whereas Vermigli interprets the concept of person as a tertium quid, a singulare holding the divine and human natures,116 Brenz sees the person as a unity, a fellowship between the two natures.117 Although it has been argued that Vermigli has the same goal in his Christological reasoning, namely the constitution of Christ’s person out of both human and divine nature,118 there is a major difference in the constitution of the person. For Vermigli, persona – understood as oneness – has two functions: In an ontological perspective, it singles out Logos, the second person of the Trinity as the carrier of both natures. In a logical perspective, it becomes the subject of the two natures, the predicates.119 At the heart of the problem, there is a diverging interpretation of how the classical definition of individuum from Boethius should be applied to Christ. Brenz points out that the Boethian definition of persona as an “individual

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Aristotle from Padua, he provided important philosophical premises for the development of a reformed doctrinal tradition. Cf. Frank A. James III, “Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499 – 1562),” in The Reformation Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Early Modern Period (ed. Carter Lindberg; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 198 – 212 and Christoph Strohm, “Vermigli, Pietro Martire,” TRE 34 (2002): 726 – 29. See the role of that late medieval concept in relation to the development of potentia relata and potentia absoluta in Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism, with Attention to Its Relation to the Renaissance,” HTR 1960 (1960): 56 – 62. Unde ergo haec Dei voluntas probabitur? Non certe probabitur ex schola Aristotelis, cuius axioma est: kocor de ourdeir eti tou arpeiqou pqor to pepeiqaslemom, “finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio”, sed e schola Christi, cuius axioma est: Verbum factum est caro, hoc est: Deus factus est homo et homo factus est Deus. Itaque cum quaeritis, quomodo infinitum possit esse finitum et finitum possit esse infinitum, vicissim et ego quaero, quomodo Deus possit esse homo et homo possit esse Deus? Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 308,30 – 310,6. Brandy, Christologie, 77 – 78. Brandy, Christologie, 156 ff. This is aptly captured by the explanation of Mahlmann: Brenz exploits the double definition of individual substance by Boethius, namely that an individual Socrates carries the characteristics of mankind on the one hand, and that he on the other hand represents a synthesis of characteristics which only can be attributed to Socrates. Mahlmann, “Personeinheit,” 211. Mahlmann, “Personeinheit,” 212. Mahlmann claims that the reason for Brenz’ rejection of Vermigli’s understanding of Christ’s person is his problem with the late Christology of Melanchthon (p. 213ff). True as that may be, an indirect attack on Melanchthon does not exclude Vermigli from being hit from his arguments. Brandy, Christologie, 79.

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substance of a rational nature” must have a particular meaning for Christ, and perhaps for the concept of person as such: The individuality of the person refers to the impossibility of dividing the parts which constitutes persona.120 For Christ, that means the concrete fellowship between the human and divine nature. Although he was denounced with the charge of heresy, Brenz does underline a distinction between the substances of the natures on the one hand, and their properties or actions of the other. Whereas the substance remains the same forever, the properties or actions of the natures can be changed. For the divine nature, the unchanging substance consists of the spiritual essence, its uncreated status and its eternal being. For the human nature, the unchanging substance consists of the opposites: It is bodily, of body and soul, created in time by God. These substances are not exchanged in the communicatio idiomatum, but are kept alongside each other in the unity of the person of Christ. The radical notion of Brenz consists in his doctrine of these properties and that the actions of the natures are both communicating their opposing properties with the other nature.121 Therefore, there is an important difference between the ante and post incarnationem. Brenz cannot accept that the rules of distinction should exclude the traffic between the natures. Brenz offers an example: How can one speak properly about Christ, regarding his mortal or immortal status?122 Concerning human nature, Brenz underlines the act of sin which caused death to enter human beings. Christ, who has not sinned, is not under the rule of death.123 As a consequence, Brenz qualifies the mortality of Christ differently : It is not a necessity which follows from his human nature, but a voluntary act Christ does with the intention of freeing humanity.124 The immortal divine nature participates in the voluntary passion of Christ to the degree that such a statement can be uttered: “God himself suffered and died”. Brenz turns that statement around and applies it to 120 Nam quod in definitione personae, qua dicitur, personam esse individuam rationalis naturae substantiam, pro individuo intelligit, quod on possit dividi in singularia, quid hoc ad institutum? Si enim persona sic individua substantia dicitur, quod non diducatur in singularia, quemadmodum genus & species, certe etiam sic individua dicitur, quod non possit, manente unitate eius, in varias partes dissecari, & in varia loca dispergi, ut alicubi duabus partibus, alicubi una tantum constet. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 232. 121 Substantiae enim manent perpetuo in suo statu inviolatae nec altera mutatur in alteram, quippe quod deitas sit substantia seu essentia spiritualis, quae non sit creata, sed fuerit ab aeterno, humanitas autem sit essentia corporalis, constans ex anima et corpore, nec fuerit ab aeterno sed suo tempore a Deo creata. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 132, 5. 122 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 132, 15. 123 Brenz seems to interpret sexual intercourse as the “hub” for transmitting original sin: Nam quemadmodum Christus non fuit mortalis humana sua natura, quippe quae in utero matris concepta erat de spiritu sancto et nullum peccatum (ex quo mors originem suam trahit) fecerat […] Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 136,2. 124 […] tamen sua sponte factus est mortalis et suscepit mortem, non sua causa, sed tantum propter liberationem humani generis […] Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 132,20.

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human nature’s participation in the resurrection. Due to that participation, human nature is everywhere and fills everything.125

Holy space – everywhere Although Brenz is concerned to follow the Chalcedonian Christological formulations, it is his insistence on two perspectives on a unified world which is most interesting at this point. Brenz does not interpret the world as a building with floors where God resides in the fires on top, the angels in the middle, and the mortal beings below. Instead, he develops the doctrine of divine bodily presence in light of Luther’s doctrine of ubiquity. Brenz refers to two cosmological-temporal spheres which he claims are mentioned by the Scriptures, one corporal and one spiritual. The corporal sphere is typically referred to in the book of Genesis, while the spiritual is present in Psalm 148:4.126 When Jesus became transfigured and met Moses and Elijah, Brenz claims that they were in heaven, even if their external form was located at Mount Tabor. This heaven is relieved [exempto] from being bound by time and place, Brenz claims. It is the place where God, the angels and the saints are.127 Human reason cannot comprehend and human tongues cannot utter these things, but the Scripture gives a witness to it. Brenz gives a rather harsh evaluation of the scholastic doctrine of the coelum empyreum, due to the use of that term by his adversaries. He refers among others to Lyra, who underlines the uncertainty of how the coelum empyreum has been interpreted. Some claim it is a corporal location, others disagree. Some claim it is mobile, others claim it is passible and possible to distinguish from the air.128 Hence, even among the scholastics there are divergent opinions concerning the circumscriptive character of heaven. 125 […] divina natura per se est immortalis, tamen, quia est in Christo cum humana natura in individuam personam unita, non fuit tantum cum ea praesens in passione et morte sicut cum aliis sanctis, verum etiam facta est earum tam personaliter particeps, ut vere dici potuerit: Deus ipse passus est et mortuus. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 132, 26. 126 Scriptura enim ponit duplicem mundum seu duplex saeculum. Unum saeculum est corporale, quod constat locis, spatiis et temporibus et suo divinitus definito tempore transibit, sicut Christus dicit, et mutabitur; alterum est spirituale, quod ab omni tempore et loco absolutum est et perpetuo constat. Sic et duplex est coelum: unum corporale, de quo in Genesi, sicut iam dictum est; alterum spirituale, de quo illud Psalmi: Laudate eum coeli coelorum! Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 146, 22. 127 In hoc coelo ab omnibus locis et temporibus exempto sunt Deus, angeli et omnes sancti, qui in Christo obdormierunt. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 146, 32. 128 Scribit etiam Lyra (qui et ipse magnam apud id genus homines autoritatem habet), quod “doctores dubitent, num coelum empyreum sit corporalis locus an non”. Nonnulli scribunt “hoc coelum stare immotum”. Alii scribunt “esse passibile et mobile ac deinde sicut partes aeris dividi posse”. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 148, 22.

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For example, the report from Acts 7 concerning the vision of the dying Stephen is not interpreted as Jesus Christ in his glory and majesty, sitting on a circumscriptive spot in a coelo empyreo. Brenz explicitly rejects that Christ appears as he really is. Instead, Brenz claims that Stephen is having a spiritual vision and revelation, which served as consolation in his particular need. Christ is supposed to have only partly revealed himself, in the same mode as when he was walking around in his earthly life. Stephen does not see Christ as he perfectly is, but as the patriarchs and prophets saw God, i. e., accommodated to the fragile perception of human beings.129 Brenz is not without humour, however. At one point, he ridicules his adversaries’ arguments by pointing to a rather comic implication.130 Given the physical cosmology of the Swiss as a precondition for locating the right hand of God, Brenz points to the problem of a time–consuming transport of the body of Christ. He refers to some Ptolemaian mathematicians who had calculated the distance between the surface of the earth and the stars to be 16 338 562 German miles. Since the throne of Christ is above the firmament, according to Bullinger, the distance of Christ’s physical ascension must at least have been that much, if not more. Well, Brenz asks, how long does it take to move a body that far? The ascension of Christ was visible to the people gathered, – he was slowly [tarditate] taken away. As Christ first flew through the clouds, then the next spheres, he probably had not yet reached his seat at the time of Reformation! In support, Brenz refers to the supposed time a lead ball would take to fall from the stars to the earth: 500 years. The constructive argument behind Brenz’s biting irony is to show how futile any discussion based on a physical location of Christ must be. Brenz does not know whether Aristotle and the physicians would prefer an explanation where Christ by the ascension divided [diviserit] the spheres of heaven, as if a hole was left after him, or whether his ascension was more like the rising from the grave, where the stone was left unaltered after his passing [pertransiit].131 Responding to the questions what and where heaven may be, Brenz points to the Kingdom of God. A geographical or temporal location of that Kingdom, like Jerusalem or Rome, is not possible. Rather, it consists of justice, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.132 These qualities do not need a physical extension to exist, according to Brenz. Where God is present with his mercy and beatitude,

129 […] qua Christus semper in se vere ornatus est, sed tantum aliqua ex parte et modo, quatenus Stephanus, qui adhuc in hac corporali vita existebat, comprehendere poterat et ad consolationem eius in praesenti periculo sufficiebat; sicut et maiestas ipsa Dei peculiaribus visionibus patefacta est patriarchis et prophetis ac praesertim Esaiae, Ezechieli et Danieli, non quidem perfecte, qualis ipsa in se est, sed aliqua ex parte, quantum humana imbecillitas in hac terra ferre potuit. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 154, 12. 130 Baur characterises it as “acidly ironic”. Baur, “Ubiquität,” 242. 131 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 158. 132 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 160, 22.

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they are there, too. The definition of paradise is taken from Gerson, and its content is the beatific vision: It is to see God, face to face.133 But if the idea of spatiality or any circumscriptive aspect is completely removed from the interpretation of Christ’s bodily presence, how is Brenz’s ascended Christ related to the historical Jesus, who, in his bodily presence, shared our conditions as being placed on earth? Is it possible to promote a diastatic notion of a circumscriptive conditioned historical Jesus, on the one hand, and a repletive qualified ascended Christ, on the other, without falling into a paradoxical nature of God’s relation to the world? Would it not be contradictory to refute the geographically qualified heaven to the extent that space is not filled up with God at all? One advantage by Luther’s use of the three modes of Biel – particularly the middle term diffinitive – concerns the preservation or continuation of the aspect of location: Even if Christ’s bodily presence everywhere is qualified as a heavenly mode, it is nevertheless present in loco.134 Brenz, however, is not using the middle mode of presence from Biel, but operates only with the circumscriptive and repletive mode. This could be the structural framework which explains Brenz’s sharply distinguished – if not diastatic – notion between the circumscriptive and the repletive sphere. Perhaps the recurring insistence on a God non esse in loco135 reveals Brenz’s inherent admiration for Plato.136 Although few concrete references to platonic thought are found in Brenz’s work, one of his modern biographers remarked that “platonic influence is occasionally found”, but remained silent as to what these influences should be.137 Another modern biographer underlines his adherence to the Neo-Platonist strain within the theological tradition, particularly Augustine and Dionysios Areopagita.138 When Brenz through his critique of Peter Vermigli’s Dialogus in the treatise De maiestate of 1562, underlines that the humanity of the exalted Christ is not only to be interpreted non-physically, but exempted from any earthly location, references to NeoPlatonist thought does not seem farfetched: The body of Christ exists above

133 Paradisus est clare videre Deum facie ad faciem, summe eum amare et de visione et amore eius inaestimabiliter laetari, absque quacunque invidia habere perfectam securitatem sic perpetuo permanendi. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 162, 32. 134 Baur, “Ubiquität,” 253. 135 Brandy, Christologie, 249. 136 See for example the enthusiastic – and moving, I must admit – letter the 15-year old Brenz wrote to the famous humanist and lawyer in Nuremberg, Willibald Pirckheimer (1470 – 1530), begging for books by Plato and Suidas: […] Velim tamen interim Platonem et Suidam mitteres cum hoc nuncio, qui et pecuniam numerabit. Theodor Friedrich Freytag [ed.], Virorum doctorum epistolae selectae, ad Bilib. Pircheymerum, Joach. Camerarium, Car. Clusium et Julium episc. Herbip. datae, nunc primum ed. et illustr. T.F. Freytagius (Leipzig, 1831), 3 – 4. 137 Martin Brecht remarked “Auf platonischem Einfluss stösst man gelegentlich”, cited from Brandy, Christologie, 172. 138 Brandy, Christologie, 251 – 53.

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[super] everything,139 a feature of Brenz’s Christology which was observed early by Chemnitz in his Repetitio.140 One could argue that some of Brenz’s ferocity was caused by his opponents. When he refuses to accept that the body of Christ is expanded or stretched to cover everything until the end of the world,141 for example, that rejection must perhaps be understood in light of the accusation of Vermigli: Brenz propagates a body of Christ which extends according to a physical mode.142 Such a characterisation is unacceptable for Brenz, of course, but one wonders whether Brenz has understood the implications of refusing every spatial reference for the body of Christ. As recent scholarship has noted, it leads to a problematic relationship between the humanity of Christ and the world. The distance between an incarnated, suffering God, circumscribed in Jesus, on the one hand, and the majestic, exalted, extra–mundane repletive humanity of Christ, on the other, principally threatens the unity of the person with its paradoxical status.143 Brenz adopts more of the same loftiness which characterises his interpretation of the space of Christ’s exalted body in the understanding of that body’s temporality. Time is for Brenz stretched between the incarnated God-man which is confined to the earthly life of Jesus on the one hand, and the eternal time of the exalted humanity of Christ. Departing from Psalm 90:4, where “a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past”, Brenz considers the effect of God’s eternal being on human nature. It soon becomes clear that the whole temporal–spatial continuum is not applicable to God. It is therefore not possible to “count” the time of God. God is much more a dwelling presence, Brenz claims.144 Even if the futuristic eternity is labelled as time, it is not to be understood as a fading time [tempus 139 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 278,29 – 32. 140 Martin Chemnitz, REPETITIO SANAE DOCTRINAE DE VERA PRAESENTIA CORPORIS ET SANGVINIS DOMINI IN COENA. (Leipzig, 1561), 17. 141 This is best rendered in the German version, originally published simultaneously with the Latin text: “Dieweil wir dann nie gelaugnet, sonder frey lediglichen je und allwegen bekennet und noch, wir glauben, das der leib Christi nicht aussgespannen werde in alle ort oder ausgedehnet […]” Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 509,8 – 11. Cf. further : Divinitas enim res est simplicissima, et ubicunque est, ibi tota est, ut nequaquam crasse aut localiter extendatur et diffundatur. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 234, 9 – 11. 142 […] dicitis [Brenz & co.] corpus Christi tanquam alutam in omnia loca Geometrice ex tendere ac diffundere. Petrus Martyr Vermigli, DIALOGVS DE VTRAQVE IN CHRISTO NATVRA, QVOmodo coeant in unam Christi personam inseparabilem, ut interim non amittant suas proprietates: ideoque humanam Christi naturam propter personalem unionem non esse ubique. Respondetur item benigne ad argumenta doctorum uirorum, contrarium asserentium: illustratur & Coenae dominicae negotium, perspicuisque scripturae & Patrum testimonijs demonstratur, Corpus Christi non esse ubique (Zürich: Christoph Froschauer, 1561), A2b. 143 Baur, “Ubiquität,” 252. 144 […] coram Deo sit aeternus et immutabilis rerum status nec ibi numeretur praeteritum, praesens et futurum sicut in hoc saeculo, sed sit sempiterna et immutabilis praesentia. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 127.

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caducum] in the Aristotelian sense, but as a perpetual and divine time. Therefore, Brenz concedes, one has to understand “divine” time as one understands the spatiality of the glorified body of Christ, namely as a metaphor [jatawqgtij_r] and not according to its proper sense.145 Does that mean that Christ’s body in its exalted and glorious is timeless? This is perhaps to stretch the interpretation too far. Brenz emphasises the need for teaching the presence of Christ’s humanity on the earth, too, and not only in heaven. But whether that presence has any locating features outside the Eucharist, is not quite clear.146

Jacob Schegk: a philosophical evaluation of the Württemberg Christology Although it was commonplace among those who sought to follow Luther’s Christology to characterise their opponents as those who mingled philosophy into the realm of theology, they needed too some kind of philosophical underpinning for their theological doctrine. That need was, ironically enough, met by one of the most famous Aristotelian philosophers in Germany, namely Jacob Schegk (1511 – 1587),147 Brenz’s colleague at the Faculty of Philosophy. 145 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 166, 10. 146 Idem dicendum est de praesentia humanitatis Christi in coelo et in terra. Etsi enim solius divinae naturae est implere coelum et terram, tamen quia haec natura univit sibi in Christo per incarnationem humanam naturam personaliter, idcirco etiam humana natura vere dicitur coelum et terram implere, non quidem ex se ipsa, sed propter personae unitatem. Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 240, 15 – 20. It is to be noted, however, that the hovering between the lowliness of the incarnated God and the sublimity of Christ’s exalted body is visible in the text which precedes the quotation: On the one hand, with a reference to the death of Stephen, God is said to have truly [vere] died. On the other hand, by referring to the humanity-copulated Son of God, Christ is said to be more present than anybody. Therefore, a certain tupsy-torvy logic remains in Brenz’ interpreation of the low-God and the high-man. It adds up to an understanding of God’s relation to the world as paradoxical. 147 Jacob Schegk received primary schooling from Johann Thomas, a student of the (arguably) most famous humanist at that time, namely Johann Reuchlin (1455 – 1522). He became Magister of Philosophy 1530, Baccalaureus in Theology four years later. Due to the unpredictable confessional future, he dropped the planned dissertation, and switched to medicine instead. In 1539, he became doctor of medicine. This was not unwise, due to the experience he had with the physics of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. A chair in medicine was created for Schegk in 1553, but Duke Christoph was not satisfied with the philosophical teaching at the lower faculty, and appointed Schegk to read the Organon for the students in addition to his medicine lectures. His preference for Aristotle is visible already in his first treatise, where he praises the Stagirite as the “highest perfection of the human spirit”. This applies particularly to Logic, whereas his subordination under the truth of divine revelation hinders Schegk in being equally panegyric about Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Although Schegk tries to unite a Christian doctrine of the soul with Aristotle’s psychology, the world could not be seen as eternal, Schegk claims. He fought against Peter Ramus and the merge of inventio and dispositio, the rhetorical tradition

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It was Duke Christoph himself, however, who asked for an assessment of the conflict between Brenz and the Swiss theologians. Schegk wrote an expert opinion and read his De una persona et duabus naturis Christi in the presence of theologians at Bebenhausen, an abbey 3 km north of Tübingen. The duke wanted to expose the treatise to the public, and it was published 1565.148 The importance of Schegk’s contribution does not only concern the (possible) philosophical support of Brenz’s Christology, but it sparked a profound debate, namely how the theoretical framework of the doctrine of ubiquity was evaluated from a philosophical perspective. A student of the professor in metaphysics at the University of Padua, Fransesco Piccolomini (1520 – 1604),149 opened a controversy after having read De una persona by Schegk. His name was Simon Simonius, generally considered as the enfant terrible of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, due to his notorious Averroism and religious unrest.150 In his attack on Schegk, Simonius claims that the Tübingen philosopher is only repeating the fundamental protest of the Swiss theologians, namely Aristotle’s axiom that a body cannot simultaneously be in multiple places. One cannot use an argument from God’s will, because it is not clearly stated [constat] in Scripture. On the contrary, Simonius argues, what is clearly said is not the will of Christ’s body to be many places, but rather that everything is and remains in his body.151 This spiritualised view is even repeated by the

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which tended to eradicate the – for Schegk – important distinction between subject matter and presentation, and merge the two into a unified system. Schegk’s most famous student was Nicolaus Taurellus (1547 – 1606), who eventually became professor of medicine at the University of Altdorf. Christoph Sigwart, “Jacob Schegk. Professor der Philosophie und Medicin,” in Kleine Schriften der Philosophie. Biographische Darstellungen (Freiburg: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1889), 256 – 91. Sigwart, “Schegk,” 274. Piccolomini is generally considered to hold a mediating position between Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist ideas. Concerning his doctrine of the soul, he changed his view from an earlier Averroist rejection of any implied immortality in Aristotle’s concept of the soul, to a more tempered Scotist position. As Kessler points out, his early critique of Simplicius for mixing Platonic innate elements into the clean physics of Aristotle, was made his own, in the end. Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (ed. Charles B. Schmitt, et al.; 485 – 534: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 527 ff. For additional biographical information, cf. Günter Frank, “‘Averroistischer Aristotelismus’ und die Dissoziierung von Philosophie und Theologie in der frühen Neuzeit. Der Fall ‘Simon Simonius’ (1532 – 1602). Mit einer Bibliografie,” in Konversionen im Mittelalter und in der Frühneuzeit (ed. Friedrich Niewöhner and Fidel Rädle; Hildesheimer Forschungen 1; Hildesheim ; New York: Georg Olms, 1999). At essentiam corporis Christi negat D. Scheckius in pluribus esse locis quam vno tempore scilicet vno, posse […] Quae voluit, fecit Deus, testificante Scriptura. Non a potentia ducere argumenta licet nobis, cum de voluntate non constat. Quocirca cum nullibi ostenderit se corpore suo velle pluribus simul in locis existere, sed contra docuerit, se velle in suo corpore omnia inesse & permanere, quae ad veri corporis modum pertinent, frustra omnipotentia adducitur ad probandum corpus Christi vbique esse. Simon Simonius, DECLARATIO EORVM, QUAE IN LIBELLO D.D. IACOBI SCHEGkij, summi & clarissimi Philosophi, De vna Persona, & duabis

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meagre scholarship which exists – both Schegk’s somewhat dated biographer,152 and a more recent study,153 basically support Simonius’ critique. But can this be true? Does it seem plausible that the perceived support actually was a support for Brenz’s opponents? If we turn to the sources, one thing seems clear : The crux of Simonius’ argument is Schegk’s interpretation of Christ’s presence as personaliter. What does it mean that Christ is present personaliter, according to Schegk?154 In the preface of his work on the person of Christ, Schegk states ten important premises for understanding Christ. They are intended for a readership acquainted with the scheme of Aristotle’s categories. In his categories, Aristotle distinguishes between ten different kinds of predication,155 and Schegk responds to the challenge that they pose to the doctrine of the hypostatic union. The fourth, the category of relation, is particularly interesting for this investigation.156 Here, the problem of combining Aristotle’s anthropological premises with a Christology of Luther becomes visible. Schegk follows the late medieval thinkers, and subordinates the humanity of Christ to the Word, placing the natures according to their status in the metaphysical scheme: The divine nature has the form, whereas the human nature has the potentiality. It is the divine nature which exercises the perfecting work, whereas the human nature

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Naturis Christi, nonnullis obscuriora, & Vbiquitati corporis Christi patrocinari sunt visa. (Geneve: Johannes Crispin, 1566), 3. Sigwart even suggests that Schegk is promoting a Zwinglian view. Sigwart, “Schegk,” 275. Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 95. Frank claims that personaliter is an indirect critique of Luther, and his alleged qualification of ubiquity as localiter and naturaliter. But Frank’s case seems rather improbable. First of all, there are no references to Luther in Schegk’s account. Secondly, Luther did not refer to the normal (bodily, localiter, naturaliter) mode of presence as a fact, but rather held it as a possibility. Instead, it was the supernatural, repletive mode of presence which necessarily had to follow from the incarnation, according to Luther. Thirdly, his audience of theologians have recently experienced the controversy between Brenz and the Swiss, and they still take him as confirming their position. Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 95. Aristotle, The Categories (350 B.C.), 1b25 – 2a4 cf. Aristotle, Topics (350 BC), 103b20 – 25. These are the first three kinds of predication which Schegk mentions: Following Aristotle, he first considers the definition. By Aristotle, this concerns the substance [substantia] of the matter, its being [oursia]. The word Christ [vocabulum Christi] is considered constituted as a single thing [rem unam] out of two natures. Secondly, the “Christ-thing” is a primary substance, a tode ti, which implies the notion of incommunicability, found in Boethius’ famous definition of persona. Thirdly, Schegk considers the personal oneness as “quasi-accidental”. Such a word is difficult to interpret, and it recurs throughout the text, but it seems to be Schegk’s attempt of qualifying the Aristotelian terminology to fit the subject matter. Jacob Schegk, DE UNA PERSOna, & duabus Naturis Christi, Sententia Iacobi Schegkij D. Medici et philosophi clarissimi, professoris scholae Tubingensis, ex fundamentis quidem Scripture Sacrae, analysi autem Philosophica, & pie & erudite explicata (Frankfurt: Petri Brubachii, 1565), A3b.

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is being perfected to that form.157 One should note, however, that the accidental status of humanity is ambivalent: Humanity is moving [accidat] towards fulfilment of the form, it is not only – or perhaps not at all – a lack in participating in the essence of the thing.158 Schegk underlines that the mode of the union is different from the body/soul analogy, due to a divine logic which sets the participation of the human nature apart from what his Aristotelian vocabulary would normally allow.159 What is this divine logic, according to Schegk? First of all, the humanity of Christ does not cause any imperfection to the divine nature. Secondly, the same omnipresence which is attributed to divinity is predicated of Christ’s humanity, too, but per accidens. The question is what per accidens means. If it means that the humanity is not partaking in the essential divine omnipresence in a real sense of the term, Schegk’s defence of the Tübingen Christology could easily be dismissed. From the context, however, it seems more plausible to understand it as a protection against the Eutychian error, namely not to confuse or mix the natures. On the other hand, Schegk underlines that even if Christ’s divinity is omnipresent by essence, humanity is only omnipresent personaliter, that is, not according to the essence, [oqs¸a] but by virtue of its power [1no¼sior].160 Towards the end of the treatise, Schegk is even clearer about the rejection of that essence:

157 Quarto, constituentes naturae unum tode ti, seu Personale, sic se habent, ut una habeat, ut una habeat rationem emtekeweiar, et altera, rationem dumaleyr, nempe gratia quarum, constituti una natura perficiens, altera perfecta dicatur. Schegk, De Una Persona, A3b. 158 The accidental status of the humanity of Christ is underlined in Frank’s account. Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 99. 159 Quoniam humanitatis causa nulla diuinitati Filij accidit imperfectio, quum subiecti & materiae imperfectio non redundet in formam, quae ukijyr dumaleyr est expers, aut si cui extra materiam accidat, composito ex utrisque; accidat. Sed contra, ratione diuinitatis, tanquam eneyr cuiusdam, summa humanitati accidit perfectio: quae & ipsa redundat in compositum, nempe in personam Christi, & hac ratione dicitur haec personalis Christi hominis omnipotentia, item omnipraesentia, & relitua, quae simili modo dicuntur, quae quomodo per accidens humanitati adscribantur, diximus in Diexodo. Schegk, De Una Persona, A4b. 160 Schegk, De Una Persona, B3a. Frank claims that Schegk could only partly claim to be in line with Melanchthon’s understanding of the Eucharist, as the latter kept the doctrine that Christ was present according to his substance [substantia], although Melanchthon does not offer any closer description of that presence. Schegk, on the other hand, only allows Christ to be present according to his power (or effect [Wirkung], as Frank translates the term). Frank’s comparison is not valid, however, because the question of Schegk concerns how the humanity of Christ is present, not the hypostatic union, who all in the tradition of the Augsburg Confession agree is present in the Sacrament. Secondly, the question at stake here does not only concern whether Christ is present in the Sacrament (celebrated many places simultaneously) or not, but whether Christ’s humanity is present everywhere or not. Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 95, note 31.

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Jacob Schegk: a philosophical evaluation ofthe Württemberg Christology 149 Therefore, Christ as human, that is according to his natural mode or his essence as a human being or according to nature, he is not present everywhere.161

Does this personal ubiquity cut Christ’s humanity off from real omnipresence? Simonius claims so, and in his response to Schegk he compares Schegk’s description with the relation between “heat” and “water”. Unlike “fire”, in which heat is an essential feature, heat is only accidental to water. Likewise, “omnipresence” is an essential feature of “divinity”, whereas it is only accidental to the human nature of Christ.162 Schegk, however, protests against the implied premise, namely making all the bodies subject to the physical rule of Aristotle, as Simonius does.163 Schegk explains the aforementioned power by referring to the personal mode, the mode of majesty and the mode of Christ’s sitting at the right hand of the Father, but frankly, it does not seem to lead the argument any further.164 Nevertheless, he confirms that the personal logic [ratione personae] of the humanity of Christ is really present in all things, and should be extended to the logic which is expressed in the famous dictum from Paul’s letter to the Colossians, namely that divinity bodily inhabits Christ.165 Furthermore, a negation of the presence of Christ’s humanity where Christ’s divinity should be, would separate Christ into two parts.166 There is another function of the personaliter which Schegk considers, 161 Schegk, De Una Persona, K2b. 162 Caliditas per se inest igni: aquae inest per accidens, quia ab igne generatur similis caliditas in aqua. Sic vbique praesentem esse per se conuenit Diuinitati, sicut caliditas (exempli causa) per se conuenit igni. Ea per vnionem personalem communicatur humanitati, cui per se non inest, sed per accidens. Simonius, Declaratio, 9 – 10. 163 Itaque sic sentiens, Simon ex Physicis Aristotelis e doctus, statuit corpus omne, aut esse Physicum, aut Mathematicum. Jacob Schegk, IACOBI SCHEGKII SCHORNDORFENSIS ANTISIMONIVS, QVO REFELLVNTVR SVPRA TRECENTOS ERrores Simonij, quibus suum librum putidissimum Antischegkianorum refersit, & vniuersam Philosophiam conspurcauit, male disputando. Omnis autem generis graues & difficiles Disputationes cum hoc Libro contineantur : omnem harum materiam, & multitudinem, distribuimus in decem Sectiones: quarum versa pagina Tituli sunt perscripti. (Tübingen, 1573), 4. 164 Hanc 2nous¸am partim personalitate, partim modo Maiestatis, partim sessionis epitheto ad dextram omnipotentis exprimunt nostri Theologi, qua ratione totus Christus, non sit praesentior ei loco in quo causa humanitatis glorose dicitur esse, (siquidem locus est, ubi consistit ipsius gloriosum corpus) quam omnibus locis, siquidem non localiter, & naturaliter, sed Personaliter humanitatem ubique dicamus esse. Schegk, De Una Persona, B3a. 165 Quemodo autem ratione Personae (quae Christus dicitur) ipsius Huamnitas ad omnibus rebus, in Diexodo ostendimus, nempe hac ratione, qua dicitur in ipso Diuinitas inhabitare corporaliter […] Schegk, De Una Persona, B3a. 166 Qui ergo sic sentiunt, ut alicubi esse Diuinitatem Filij Personaliter, ubi non sit humanitas assumpta, nec ubique totum Christum, quia Christus, personaliter esse opinantur,id est, Qui negant, ubicunque sit per seentiam persona filij Dei, illic etiam personaliter assumptam ipsius humanitatem esse, his necesse est, ut & naturam diuinam partibus diuiduam dicant esse, & aliam praeterea personam filij Dei statuant, & aliam Christi personam, diuidentes scilicet Christum non tam in naturas, quam Personas duas, quo sane nihil absurdius, & scripturis sacris minus consentaneum aliquid dici potest. Schegk, De Una Persona, B4a.

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namely the difference between Christ and other human beings. At one point, he discusses how the presence of the Son is present by the humanity of the apostle Peter, and how the Son is present by the humanity of Christ: The former does not “have” it personaliter. When Peter wakes the dead, he is still separated from divinity personaliter. Christ, however, wakes the dead due to his personal union with the divine. Schegk probably understands the divine presence by Peter in analogy to the common interpretation of knowledge by the angels: As separated from divinity, Peter can only exercise divine power as a concomitant or accidentally [jat² sulb´bgjyr], it does not flow from his being [oqs¸a].167 In addition, Schegk points out that the person of Christ is indescribable, and a mystery, first of all due to its uniqueness. That mystery cannot be fully comprehended by the limitation of our cognition, but Schegk does not end in a opaque description of the inner coherence of the person of Christ, due to the apparent epistemological deficit. On the contrary, he claims that his description is enough.168 It is enough for a particular goal, however, and this goal is arguably his main statement: If a place can be found, where the divinity of the Son personaliter – i. e. after the assumption – is, and the assumed humanity is not, the natures are divided. Schegk is explicitly clear about the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity, and confirms Luther’s rule: “where God is, there is man, too”. Those who deny the ubiquity to be an essential feature of the person of Christ introduce a doctrine of two persons of Christ, Schegk claims.169 The divine nature of the Son of God is one with the human nature insofar it has merged with it. Schegk underlines that personaliter therefore refers to the two “Cyrillic” notions of Chalcedon, namly that the natures are without division and inseparable. The divine essence is nowhere where the humanity is not personaliter, too. This is explained to be according to the logic [ratione] of the person’s majesty, and not according to the logic of the glorious state of the 167 Ex quo perspicitur etiam quod essentia Filij eodem modo non sit in humanitate Petri, quo est in humanitate Christi, siquidem Petri humanitas, non habet personaliter diuinitatem Filij, quo modo eam habet humanitas Christi, quum habere diuinitatem, nihil aliud sit, quam habere upostatijyr seu personaliter omnipotentiam, & omnipraesentiam, quam paulo post enousiam etiam diuinitatis in humanitate Christi appelauimus, & in Diexodo, loqvgm Heou, & Deiformitatem quandam recte dici ostendimus. Schegk, De Una Persona, A4b-B1a. 168 Perfectio Christi Personalis inenarrabilis est, quu neque; in coelo, neque; in terra undiquaque; simile quiddam habeat, & utcunqe; a nobis tamen sacrarum literaru testimoniis apprehendatur, quae cosentanee si interpretemur, mysterii huius cognitionem pro captu nostro nos perfecta satis habere arbitramur. Schegk, De Una Persona, B4b. 169 Qui ergo sic sentiunt, ut alicubi esse Divinitatem Filii Personaliter, ubi non sit humanitas assumpta, nec ubique; totum Christum, quia Christus, personaliter esse opinantur, id est, Qui negant, ubicunqe; sit per essentia persona filii Dei, illic etiam personaliter assumptam ipsius humanitate esse, his necesse est, ut & naturam divinam partibus dividuam dicant esse, & aliam praeterea persona filii Dei statuant, & aliam Christi personam, dividentes scilicet Christum non tam in naturas quam Personas duas, o sane nihil absurdius, & scripturis sacris minus con sentaneum aliquid dici potest. Schegk, De Una Persona, B4b.

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person.170 Due to Christ’s omnipotence, this property is a property of the human nature, too. Schegk does not only explain this as an effect of the personal union, but to the plenitude of the divine nature, as well: It is as if “actuality” [quasi 1mtek´weia] flows from the divine nature to the human nature in Christ. This is different from the knowledge which falls upon Peter, due to his different status as a physical creature [alterius creaturae v¼sim].171 The insistence on the Aristotelian concept “actuality” as the proper metaphysical concept for the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity underlines the character of the whole Christ as praesentia, present in the whole creation. By labelling the eschatological, glorious state as accidental, Schegk manages to limit the possible deficit by the remaining fulfilment to an ontological minimum: Christ is already here according to the most profound metaphysical category he knows, namely Aristotle’s actuality 1mtek´weia. Schegk marks that as a friction between theological and philosophical language remains by naming the concept quasi–actuality. It is on the other hand not limited to the divine nature, but flows to the human nature in the hypostatical union. It follows from these considerations, says Schegk: The right hand of God – which he regards as synonym to omnipotence – can not be a particular place [localis]. Schegk underlines that the prophets and apostles refer to different entities than the philosophers. Aristotle himself sometimes understands the whole corpus universum by the word heaven, other times as the celestial circles, or just as the largest circles. By heaven, Schegk refers to the divine eminence who governs all things. It is what we mean when say “God is in heaven”. It is underlined, however, that heaven is not able to circumscribe God, but our heaven reveals God as the creator and sustainer of everything. When the Son of God is said to come down from heaven, it does not mean descending from a local place, but that he has assumed humanity. When Jesus is said to ascend to heaven, he is not seated at the right hand of omnipotence [!] as a local and definite space, but as the person’s eminence to be everywhere in order to rule over everything. This is not possible to understand physically. It reveals the majestic omnipotence of Christ’s humanity, but Schegk is careful to dismiss the reception in heaven of a glorious body.172 170 Referred to as accidental perfection above. 171 Qua ratione equidem ubique; eundem, & totum Christum esse dicimus, qua nimirum nusquam est divinitas essentialiter, ubi non sit humanitas etiam personaliter, id est, no sub ratione gloriose perfectionis, sed sub ratione maiestatis personalis, qua unum quoddam hypostaticu dicitur Christus, qua unum quoddam hypostaticu dicitur Christus, & qua seipso dicatur omnipotens, quod proprie habeat ipsius humanitas, non seipsa personaliter existente aliquid humanitate ipsius, sed personante eam divinitate, quam divinitate in se plenissimam habet: quasi emtekeweiam quandam, quae ratio in humanitate Petri non cadit aut alterius creaturae vusim. Schegk, De Una Persona, B5a. 172 Acendisse autem in coelum, nempe locum quendam beatoru IESUM ratione corporis glorosi dicimus. At illic sedentem causa maiestatis ad dextram omnipotentis, non sic interpretamur, ut locale & definitu quiddam eo significetur, sed eminentiam personae ipsius super omnia, ut nimirum omnibus dominetur, non ut loci sublimitate quada omnes superet, significari arbi-

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An exposition of the epistemological condition is offered by Schegk in relation to his exposition of the doctrine of God. God is defined as the true light, but the size of our optical possibility to receive that light makes it necessary to restrain reason within the limits of faith.173 A person who wants to know the mysteries of God must first believe. If not, one attributes more to the human reason than the word of God allows.174 Schegk does not see a fundamental contradiction of theology and philosophy in the doctrine of the hypostatic union. On the contrary, theology is supported by philosophy in the exposition of the two natures of Christ, Schegk claims. The thereby implied Neo–platonic assumption of integrating theological premises, such as the Lutheran understanding of the incarnation, into a philosophical system stands in a certain tension to Luther’s conclusion of the need for a separate, “new language” of theology. Schegk is not without concern for the necessity to distinguish between the spheres, however. Even if the human reason as shadow [umbra] is opposed to the splendour and light of the word of God, this philosophy follows principles which do not violate their proper places by mixing heaven and earth.175 As an example of such a philosophy, Schegk mentions Aristotle. Through knowledge the Stagirite’s writings, the erudite has a proper instrumentarium or method to make formal judgements of what is right and what is false. In Schegk’s analysis, this method does not bring new material arguments to the subject matter under scrutiny. This would have been regarded as a transgressive interpretation of philosophy’s limit over against the property of revelation. Philosophy merely proposes an order of dissemination and arrangement of tremur hac sessione, quae vusijyr non sint intelligenda, quum declarent maiestatem omnipotentem hominis Christi, non gloriosi corporis duntaxat in coelum receptum. Schegk, De Una Persona, B6a. 173 In utroque clarissimum quidem est veritatis lumen, sed tale quod rationis nostrae oculos magnitudine & claritate sua perstringat, fidei autem humili obedientia & credulita te apprehensum illuminet omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Schegk, De Una Persona, C2b. 174 Multi certe sunt qui prius scire volunt mysteria Dei, quam credere, quae tamen, nisi credantur vera esse/cognosci nequeunt, & upientem scire, id est, causas cognoscere mysteriorum, & inquirentem eas sine fide superbe & insolenter, prius contingat opprimi a gloria sulimitatis, quam scrutando ad causarum notitiam pervenire, quas equidem causas velle apprehendere non praelucente fide, & verbo Dei, non pietatis est, sed incredulae cuiusdam curiositatis, plus rationi humanae, quam Dei oraculo tribuetis. Schegk, De Una Persona, C2b. 175 Iungemus autem in hac disputatione, Theologie, quedam Philosophiae adminicula, quod nuper etiam fecimus […] Neque vero hoc loco philosophiam appello, que rationis humanae umbras consectas, lumini & sple[n]dori verbi Dei sese opponit, quam non modo D. Paulus, sed nos etiam omnes qui Deum colimus ex praescripto verbi Dei, damnare debemus: sed hanc philosophiam, quae principia disciplinarum non confundat, non sacra prophanis, id est, quod proverbio dici solet, Coelum terrae non misceat, sed consentanee accurate, exquisite de rebus divinis ex verbo Dei disputet, non prophanas & humanas admiscens pha[n]tasias, quod ipsum sane veram philosophia ese dicimus, & sine qua de rebus obscuris & difficilibus ad intelligedum, disputari plane & aperte non possit. Schegk, De Una Persona, C3b.

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the argument. Schegk describes philosophy’s role as helping to empower reason to recognise the truth, as it is revealed in Scripture.176 An understanding of philosophy which ignores this limit is disregarded as sophistry by Schegk. In the end, then, does Schegk support the Christology of Brenz and Andreae? There are arguments that make it a probable claim. First of all, Schegk supports the “Cyrillic” interpretation of Christ’s person, as Brenz does, where the intimacy between the natures is a primary concern. Secondly, the rejection of any (post–ascension) physical understanding of Christ’s body makes it easier to integrate Brenz’s insistence on ubiquity with Schegk’s philosophical premises. Thirdly, the insistence on a non–spatial, non–local heaven does not bring the problem of a transport involved in the ascension to the fore. The scope and intention of Schegk’s work should not be pressed too far, however, at least not if the author’s own intentions should be taken into consideration. He was, after all, only asked to evaluate Brenz’s Christology, and it seems as if Schegk has done that by asking whether Brenz’s solution is possible from his own philosophical perspective. That possibility rested on an understanding of a very close proximity between the spheres of philosophy and theology, conveyed through a concept which hinged on God’s freedom. In that respect, Schegk had a more optimistic understanding of a peaceful coexistence for the two sciences than either Luther or Simonius had, and it is difficult to see that he brought the theological understanding of the presence of God in Christ any further. On the contrary, when Schegk underlines the human nature’s dependence on the divine nature, he merely repeats the scholastic doctrine of subordination.177 It does not, after all, fit his aim of a peaceful coexistence between the same framework without a sharp distinction between the perspectives between theology and philosophy. Perhaps it explains why Schegk did not offer a clear–cut answer to Simonius’ critique concerning the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity : Schegk claimed that Christ’s humanity was omnipresent “insofar it was homonymic” to Christ, the person. A modern interpreter pointed out: It is difficult to pinpoint what the factual reference should be for such a sharing of the same name.178 Schegk’s explanation of omnipresence as

176 Ide Aristoteles philosophiam hanc, alias appellat paideim & eruditionem, qua videre quispiam possit quid in quaque re, de qua disputatur, insit veri aut falsi, quae nihil aliud est, quam disciplinarum omnium communis Methodus, quae no[n] affert materiam, sed proposita rite digerit & disponit, in omnes partes animi aciem non hallucinantem intendens. Schegk, De Una Persona, C4a. 177 Ergo uniri unam naturam alteri, hypostatice, non est hanc permutari in illam, sed hanc dependere ab illa. Schegk, De Una Persona, F1a. 178 Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 100.

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an effect [6nim]179 is interesting for the present work, however, particularly for the development of Baltasar Mentzer’s insistence on omnipresence as activity.180 But it does not solve the question of ubiquity for Schegk. All in all, the work on Christology by Schegk gives a glimpse into the difficulties one can experience in trying to combine the theological insistence of Luther’s dictum “where God is, there is man, too” with the scientific principles of (Renaissance) Aristotelianism within a unified scientific framework. As the later controversy with Simonius revealed: Schegk’s concern was not only – perhaps not even primarily – a defence of Brenz’s Christology. It was an apology for a Thomist understanding of metaphysics, namely as a science which included God as subject, insofar as he was the ultimate principle and cause for everything.181

Summary Joachim Westphal’s reaction to the Consensus Tigurinus opened “the second Eucharist controversy” in the Reformation. It revealed the difference between Calvin and Westphal in the interpretation of the institutional words of Christ in the Eucharist, but Westphal did not require more than a possibility of carrying out the will of Christ, namely to be bodily present in the Eucharist. It was Johannes Timann who added a speculative element to the mere biblical explanation of Westphal, because of his insistence on the omnipresence of Christ’s body. He did not expand that insistence into a proper doctrine of 179 Humanitas igitur non se ipsa (ut divinitas) omnipraesens est, sed ty enim omnipraesentem dicimus. Citation from Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 100, note 47. 180 See below, page . 181 Schegk saw that the attack of Simonius implied that metaphysics would be regarded as an inferior science: Quod Metaphysica contineat sub se upakkgkyr i. sub alterne, omnes inferiores scientias, & diuidua sit etiam sua communitate in omnes scientias, tanquam in species quasdam, falissimum est, & Aristotelis sententiae oppositissimum. According to Schegk, metaphysics must retain its place above the species if not the general character shall be lost. It includes all the principles of the other sciences, including the one principle, namely God, the ultimate rationality and goal: Idem Aristoteles Metaphysicae libro x. […] manifestum quod tria sint Genera contemplatuarum scientiarum, qua enumerans genera, dicit esse Physicam, Mathematicen, & Theologicen seu Metaphysicen. Quod si Metaphysica est Genus, reliquas duas, non pro generibus, sed pro speciebus numerari oportuit. Ex quibus perspicitur, Metaphysicen, non hoc modo jahokou scientiam, respectu inferiorum, aut non eo scentiam scientiarum, appellari, quia se tanquam genus communicet reliquis scientiis, sed quo tanquam principatum hunc contemplationis veri, omnium principiorum quasi fastigia considerans, & ad vnum principium, nempe Deum ipsum (qui sit principium principiorum) omnia reuocans, finis cuiusdam rationem & perfectionis, respectu omnium Scientiarum, obtineat. Jacob Schegk, Responsum IACOBI SCHEGKII SCHORNDORFENSIS, AD SIMONIS SIMONII Libellum Vanissimum, Quo Conatus Est Veritatem Libri de Vna Persona & Duabus Naturis in Christo Refellere (Tübingen: Ulric Morhard, 1568), 9 – 10. Cf. Günter Frank, Die Vernunft des Gottesgedankens. Religionsphilosophische Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, 104.

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ubiquity, however, but merely collected some citations from different authors to support his view. That changed when Johannes Brenz used his theoretical abilities to elaborate on the dogmatic implications of Christ’s bodily omnipresence. Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s successor, used a four-level cosmology to place – and indeed restrict – the body of Christ firmly on the highest supralunar level. Although Brenz was reluctant to construct an alternative cosmology where the body of Christ could fit in, he accentuated the impossibility for spatiality to separate the two natures in Christ. Brenz’s unionist interpretation of communicatio idiomatum leads him to include God in the act of passion, and a rather mystical understanding of a non-spatial divine presence appears. That notion contained a rather problematic element for the Lutherans, because it removed God too far from us. The negation of any physical features of the divine presence hinted at a diastatic cosmology, a divine being too lofty for the temporal-spatial conditions of the world: His whole conception threatens the possibility of a real meeting – that there is a place – for a divinity too transcendent for this physical world, and humanity. However, when the famous Tübingen interpreter of Aristotle, Jacob Schegk, tries to explain how the omnipresence of Christ’s humanity can be understood philosophically, the difficulty of combining Luther’s Christology with Aristotelian philosophy becomes apparent. On the one hand, Schegk emphasises the freedom of God through the doctrine of omnipotence, but in the concrete case of integrating the ubiquitous body of Christ into the cosmological framework he enters into the same kind of problems as Melanchthon did. He affirms the existence of a personal ubiquity on the basis of the revelation, but cannot elaborate more closely on what it means for the question at stake. There was, in other words, need for further development and refinement of Christology and its embedment in science within the Lutheran tradition.182

182 If one would place Martin Chemnitz as one of the leading theologians among the Gnesiolutherans, as a recent interpreter did, it could be argued that the present work is too narrow, only treating Brenz and Chemnitz as the two options in the wake of Luther and Melanchthon. Irene Dingel, ed., Die Debatte um die Wittenberger Abendmahlslehre und Christologie (1570 – 1574) (Controversia et Confessio; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 8. But the strategic choice of excluding the left-wing party at Wittenberg can be defended through its exclusion through the Formula of Concord. When the radical followers of Melanchthon had their solution labelled as “Crypto-Calvinism”, their fate were sealed.

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Martin Chemnitz and his voluntary ubiquity If Brenz sought to develop Luther’s Christology with a preference for some aspects of Plato’s thought, Chemnitz’s work was to a greater extent influenced by Melanchthon, his teacher, and the methodological framework he developed. Unlike the radical disciples of Melanchthon at Wittenberg in the 1570 s, Chemnitz played an important role in the construction of the Formula of Concord. His views are not at odds with the Christology of Brenz, but they had a different accentuation. Christ’s bodily omnipresence is dependent on the will of Christ, it is not (solely) caused by the exchange of properties. As an influential modern scholar observed, Chemnitz is formally a scholar of Melanchthon, but remains closer to Luther as a true recipient and refiner of his Christology.183 Due to the perspective of this work, however, it seems fruitful to consider to what extent the formal aspect of Chemnitz’ Christology points in a specific direction for his interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, particularly how it is described in Chemnitz’s magnum opus on the subject, De duabus naturis.184 The modes of divine presence Chemnitz shares one of the characteristics of Melanchthon’s characteristics, namely the placement of Christ within a system of different modes of presence.185 In Chemnitz’s first treatise on the Eucharist, the Repetitio from 1561, he just mentioned the differences of defining the modes of presence between the theologians.186 183 “Was Chemnitz betrifft, ist er in formaler Hinsicht, d. h. in der Darstellungsweise und Lehrmethode, eher als ein Schüler Melanchthons als Luthers zu bezeichnen. […] In theologischer Hinsicht schliesst er sich bewusst Luther an.” Bengt Hägglund, “‘Majestas hominis Christi’. Wie hat Martin Chemnitz die Christologie Luthers gedeutet?” Luther Jahrbuch 47 (1980): 73. 184 One could have consulted other works as the sources for portraying Chemnitz’ Christology, but the 1561 Repititio does not have the conceptual clarity and depth as De duabus, which is written nine years later. The 1565 – 73 Examen, which Chemnitz wrote in the aftermath of the council of Trent, has some valuable assessments of Tridentine Christology, but it does not treat Chemnitz’ own position at any great length. 185 For Melanchthon’s modes, see page 186 Under the heading De modo praesentiae, Chemnitz is presenting the scholastic view of transsubstantiation, and Zwingli’s doctrine of Christ’s bodily absence. In addition, he notes the difference between the reformers. The basis is Luther’s rule Non cogitamus […] simplicissime retinemus ipsius uerba, but ironically, Luther’s refrain from thought must be given a thoughtful explanation. Another problem is that the citation does not come from Luther at all. Luther claims that the sacraments are not present localiter, but rather definitiue. Brenz is said to underline the sacraments as present according to a supernatural, heavenly mode [super naturali & coelesti modo adesse], and Johannes Bugenhagen is said to believe that it is not

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Where Melanchthon had four of these modes, in De duabus naturis Chemnitz presents seven modes where he explicates the difference between the hypostatic union and other modes of divine presence: 1. Universal presence, where Chemnitz in light of Jeremiah 23 claims that the whole divine Trinity fills everything in heaven and earth with its essence. In addition, Acts 17 supplies him with support for the efficacious nature of that presence. Interestingly, Chemnitz does not contrast the dwelling presence of Deus nudus with the efficacious, operative aspect of God’s creational work. He sees both these modes subsumed under the category of universal presence. Later, in the controversy between Tübingen and Giessen, we will see that these aspects are not only crucial to the debate, but they function as two different interpretations of the God’s presence in Christ. How does Chemnitz qualify the difference between God’s universal presence in the world and God’s presence in the ubiquitous Christ? It is contained in the statements “The word became flesh” and “God is man”. These statements signify a mode far beyond the art and manner of the universal presence.187 One should be aware how Chemnitz qualifies the special status of Christ: The literal wording of John 1:14 not only have a referential function to a subject matter – the Logos’ assumption of flesh –, but creates as a theological statement its own reality. Here we are at the heart of Chemnitz’s method: He picks central statements from Scripture and tradition, and uses them as departure for constructing a theological system188 – and the system he mirrors, is the system of Melanchthon. 2. Presence in the saints points to the special presence God has in the possible to understand the sacraments’ mode [credo neminem scire posse]. Martin Chemnitz, Repetitio, 15 – 19. 187 Est igitur primo, Praesentia vniversalis, qua tota Trinitas diuinitatis suae essentia implet omnia in coelo & in terra, Isa. 60. [chapter 6 is probably meant here] Ierem. 23. Et efficacia seu operatione sustentationis conseruat substantias separabiliter, hoc est, donec vult es conseruatas. Non enim absens haec operatur, sed tam prope adest, vt pene manibus contrectari possit, quia in ipso sumus, viuimus, & mouemur, Actor. 17 […] Certum autem est, hypostaticam in Christo vnionem, non posse nuda hac praesentia diuinitatis, & sola efficacia sustentationis definiri, quasi tantum sustentet & foueat assumptam naturam. Longe enim alio modo Deus est in Christo quam est vbique. Non enim dicitur, fieri & esse quidquid essentia sua implet, sicut dicitur, Verbum caro factum, & Deus esse homo. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus naturis in Christo. De hypostatica earum unione. De communicatione idiomatum, et de aliis quaestionibus inde dependentibus. Libellus ex Scripturae sententiis, & ex purioris Antiquitatis Testimoniis (1570; repr., Leipzig, 1578), 47b. 188 Mahlmann’s remark that Chemnitz wants to reduce the controversy concerning the Eucharist to a purely formal question of the exegesis of the verba seems to be correct according to the intention, even in the more mature De duabus. That intention, “[die] Strenge seiner methodischen Grundlage”, must be evaluated against the concrete philosophical questions which are connected to the stated biblical basis, however : Already in his insistence on a voluntary power of Christ, the problem of the relation between will and being is raised. My point is: Chemnitz cannot transcend the underlying philosophical questions raised by his statements. Mahlmann, Dogma, 209 – 10.

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believers in this life. Chemnitz refers to St Paul’s notion of being “a temple of the living God”, and lists the different fruits of the Holy Spirit. He qualifies God’s inhabitation as the motion with which God has started the process of sanctification. But this kind of sanctifying presence is temporally limited; death means the withdrawal of God’s presence. Chemnitz uses the word separatio, which points to the separation of body and soul. The important issue for Chemnitz to underline is exactly the possibility for God to withdraw his presence. By doing so, Chemnitz places the presence of God within the sphere of God’s will. If the Holy Spirit is present in the believers, it is caused by God’s will, a will that may be changed.189 Christ’s divinity, on the other hand, is not qualified as part of God’s will. His divine nature does not fade at the time of death. In Christ, the divine nature is an inseparable part of his personal make–up.190 3. Presence in angels allows Chemnitz to isolate another feature of Christ’s divine nature, namely the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity. In the angels, Chemnitz considers the presence of God to be a realisation of the eschatological promise where God is “everything in everybody”. But he underlines that the angels lack the quality of being in a personal union with the divine nature, as it is in Christ.191 4. Visions and appearances of God are regarded as forming a particular class by Chemnitz, and this reveals a typical feature of his theology : Due to the reports in Scripture of people like Jacob and Daniel who saw the – by definition – invisible God, Chemnitz seems to be forced to include them in his structure of divine presence. The forms God takes on in these appearances are not assumed by God in the same way human nature was assumed by Christ. They were only used in the temporal sphere in order to reveal something.192 5. The external word and sacraments are considered as a particular class, too, separated from the class of divine presence in the believers. Chemnitz describes them as media, through which God acts with us. God is not inseparably present in them, but is present out of an agreement [pacto] according to his word. The divine presence is therefore strictly bound to the use of the word and sacraments.193 189 Certum autem est, Spiritum Sanctum in hac vita posse amitti, & dona excuti. Est igitur inhabitatio haec separabilis in hac vita, nec constituit cum sanctis vnum uvistalemom. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 48a. 190 In Christo vero inhabitatio diuinitatis tou kocou est perpetua & inseparabilis, ac hypostatica, neque tales sunt diuitiones gratiarum in Christo, sicut in renatis in hac vita, sed tota plenitudo Deitatis in ipso inhabitat corporaliter. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 48a. 191 Sed tamen hac inhabitatione, Angelus & Deus, Homo beatus & Deus, non fiunt vnum uvistalemom, sicut in Christus Deus & homo. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 48a. 192 Non enim species illas [i.e. the visions and appearances of God] Deus ita assumpsit, vt cum illis fieret & esset vna hypostasis, sed tantum ad tempus in vsum patefactionis. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 48b. 193 Quinto, Externo ministerio Verbi & Sacramentorum in Ecclesia Deus vere adest, agens per illa media nobiscum, ac efficaciter in nobis operans: & externis etiam symbolis Sacramentorum in

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6. Other media of God. There are other means which God uses other human beings to accomplish things, where and when God wants. As an example, Chemnitz refers to the prophets and apostles. They are persons/hypostases in their own right, and not dependent on the assumption of flesh for their status as persons, such as Christ is dependent on this event. 7. Divine presence in Christ is seen in light of John 14, where it is reported that the Father is in the Son and vice versa. As a consequence, there is one completely simple essence between them. But Chemnitz indicates a clearer distinction between the persons of the Trinity in the hypostatic union. Even though the Father and the Holy Spirit is present in Christ, it is only the Son who is incarnated and hypostatically united with the human nature. This seems more or less obvious, but it is worth noting Chemnitz’s insistence on “protecting” the Father and the Spirit from the incarnation. Brenz – although in agreement with this rather orthodox distinction – is more inclined to underline that the incarnation implies the whole divine essence as present in Christ.

The core of communicatio idiomatum within the hypostatic union The divine presence in the man Jesus Christ is the starting point of Christology for Chemnitz. It means that the hypostatic union is logically prior to the communication of properties, it is a place where the exchange can take place. Thereby, Chemnitz can prevent the suspicion hanging over many theologians in the wake of Luther, namely changing or confusing one of the natures with the other. “The union took place leaving the difference of the natures intact”, Chemnitz underlines. He follows Luther when he says that it is allowed to state a predication like “God is man” due to its concrete nature, whereas a predication like “divinity is humanity” is not allowed.194 The concept “divinity” is an abstraction, and the predication is therefore regarded as false. Within the hypostatic union, the communication of properties happens. Chemnitz uses John of Damascus to supply the terms, and distinguishes between three kinds or classes of the predications related to the doctrine of vsu Deus adest, dispensans & communicans, per visibilia illa signa, inuisibilem suam gratiam, iuxta verbum. Ipsa vero symbola per se nihil cooperantur ad ipsam gratiam. Et Deus illis non adest inseparabiliter, sed ex pacto, iuxta Verbum: nam extra vsum non sunt talia Sacramenta, & peracto vsu vel transeunt, sicut Augustinus inquit, Vel a Sacramentali illa vnione separantur. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 48b. 194 Primo igitur, licet per hypostaticam unionem, una natura in Christo non mutetur in alteram, nec confundatur in altera, unde etiam una non praedicatur de altera, neque enim dicimus: Divinitas est humanitas, vel Humana natura est divina natura, unio enim facta est salva naturarum differentia. Ex unione tamen oritur & sequitur talis [joimymia], quod concretum unius naturae recte praedicetur de concreto alterius naturae, ut Deus est homo, Homo est Deus, Filius hominis est Filius Dei vivi. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 32b.

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communicatio idiomatum. These distinctions found their way into the final draft of the Formula of Concord, and have therefore been assessed as one of Chemnitz’s major contributions to this theological tradition: 1. Genus idiomaticum, 2. Genus apotelesmaticum and 3. Genus maiestaticum.195 1. Genus idiomaticum. The first class comprises those predications where the person is the subject of the natures’ attributes. Following Melanchthon, he underlines the necessity of limiting the predication to the concrete.196 What does he mean by that? Chemnitz explained his interpretation of the terms “concrete” and “abstract” at the beginning of his essay, due to the alleged confusion about the terms. He refers to the scholastics when he is explaining the meaning, and claims that they are simply aimed at distinguishing between person and nature. “Divinity” is abstract vocabulary, for example, whereas “person of Christ” is concrete vocabulary.197 When the person is considered as subject to the different attributes of the natures, it means that if the flesh suffered, the person of Christ suffered, too. And this involves God “who dwells bodily” in that person, even to the extreme, which enables Chemnitz to state: God suffered.198 This indicates a very important point of Chemnitz, namely that the use of the terms is at least as important as their meaning. Characteristically, they should be used according to the grammatical and etymological rules199 which seem to be as close as possible to the verbal structure of Holy Scripture. These verbal rules do not hinder an interpretation of communicatio idiomatum as a real exchange of the natures, however. It is not restricted to the verbal logic, as the tendency is in Melanchthon, but involves a reality.200 195 Robert Kolb, “Martin Chemnitz,” in The Reformation Theologians (Carter Lindberg [ed.]; Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 145 – 46. 196 Et idem dicit vsitata Philippi definitio, Communicationem Idiomatum esse praedicationem, in qua proprietas vni naturae conueniens, tribuitur personae in concreto. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 82b. 197 Vocabula igitur, quae ipsas naturas in Christo notant, vocant abstracta vocabula. […] Concreta vero vocabula appellant, quae personam Christi subsistentem in duab. naturis, seu constantem duabus naturis, significant & denotant. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 2b. 198 Eodem modo verum est, naturam verbi, hoc est, ipsam diuinitatem, non esse flagellis laceratam, clauis perforatam, lancea vulneratam & c. […] Sed inde tanta est praestantia & efficacia mortis & passionis Christi quia persona Filij Dei eam & voluit & sustinuit, in illa carne quam hypostatica vnione sibi propriam fecerat, quam etiam ita roborauit, vt posset immensum illud onus sustinere, Atque ita Deus vere dicitur passus, quia illa caro passa est, in qua tota plenitudo diuinitatis habitabat corporaliter. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 103b-104a. 199 Deinde vero alia horum vocabulorum significatio & alius usus est, iuxta Grammaticam seu Etymologicam rationem […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 3a-b. 200 J.A.O. Preus, The Second Martin: The Life and Theology of Martin Chemnitz (St. Louis, MO: CPH, 1994), 267 and 271. See for example the rejection of the Wittenberg Catechism from Georg Major & al.: “[…] da sie [i.e. the Wittenberg theologians] von der persönlicher Vereinigung beider natur in Christo schreiben / reden sie nicht auff Lutherisch / sondern auff gut Caluinisch daruon / denn sie sehen auff ire des vergangenen jars disputationes vnn Orationes / das nur eine verbalis vnd gar keine realis communicatio der menschlichen atur in der person

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2. Genus apotelesmaticum. The second class gathers the predications where the subject is one of the natures – not Christ, as the first class – and the predicate concerns one of Christ’s salvific effects, what John the Damascene labelled !potek´slata. Chemnitz tries to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of Chalcedon by stressing two arguments. First, the actions are not performed with only one of the natures involved. The other nature is not unoccupied, doing nothing or doing other things. On the contrary, when the salvific actions proper to one nature are done in Christ, they are done in communion with the other nature. Second, the difference between the natures is still maintained. When Christ’s human nature suffers and dies, for example, it does not lead to the death of the divine nature, even if the latter is participating in the communion.201 How is the divine nature present in the suffering, then? At this point, Chemnitz has some interesting suggestions. In the salvific act of suffering – a property of the human nature – the divine nature wants and permits the human nature to suffer and die. In the act itself, Chemnitz describes the divine nature as supporting and strengthening the human nature in order to endure the sins of the world and the wrath of God.202 Whether such a participation can be called real is questionable, but it comes as an attempt to avoid any change or confusion of the natures. Nevertheless, Chemnitz tries to exclude any interpretation of the redemption work which leaves out the participation of divine nature, for example, that the divine nature was inactive [ociosa] during the work of our redemption.203 The famous expression of Irenaeus that the Logos remained quiet at the time of death is not to be understood as an inactivity. The Church father is much more erudite and Christi durch die persönliche vereinigung mit der Göttlichen widerfaren sey / damit sie Lutherum vnd Brentium verdamnen / vnd den Caluinisten hofieren / das Christus ja nicht vermügen sol / mit seinem Leib vnd Blut allhie bey vns auff Erden in seinem Abendmal gegenwertig zu sein […]” Martin Chemnitz, Bedencken Der theologen zu Braunschweigk / von dem newen Wittenbergischen Catechismo gestellet / Der gantzen Christenheit zur Warnung ausgegangen. (1571), B1b. 201 […] Quando vna in Christo natura id, quod sibi proprium est agit, aut quando Christus secundum proprietatem vnius naturae aliquid agit, quod tunc in illa actione seu passione, altera natura, non sit ociosa, vt vel nihil, vel aliud agat, sed quod & hoc, quod vnius naturae proprium est, fiat & agatur in Christo cum communione alterius naturae, salua differentia illa, quod cuiusque proprium est, vt quoando Christus humana sua natura patitur & moritur, quod & hoc fiat cum communione alterius naturae, non vt diuina etiam natura in sese patiatur & moriatur, hoc enim humanae naturae proprium est […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 108a-b. 202 […] Sed quia Diuina Christi natura, adest personaliter naturae patienti, ac vult illam humanae suae naturae passionem, non auertit eam, sed permittit humanitatem suam pati ac mori, corroborat ac sustentat eam, vt possit sustinere immensum illud onus peccati mundi, ac totius irae Dei, & efficit passiones illas, coram Deo preciosas, ac mundo salutares. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 108b. 203 Errant igitur & peccant, qui officium Redemptionis, soli humanae naturae in Christo tribuunt, & ab eo officio divinam naturam excludunt, ita, ut eam patiente humana natura ociosam fuisse in officio Redemptionis fingant. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 112a.

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distinct. According to Chemnitz, Irenaeus wanted to state that the Logos refrained from using divine power for a specific purpose, namely to keep suffering and death at bay. In other words, Christ does not use his power for himself, with the intention of being protected from the violence which occurred. When the Logos or divine nature is quiet during Christ’s death, it refers to the attitude of Christ which is captured in his expression “let it happen to me”.204 This explanation was used similarly by Theodor Thumm in his interpretation of Christ’s retractio, as we will see in chapter 4.205 3. Genus maiestaticum is the most disputed of Chemnitz’s classes. Here, the properties of the divine nature are communicated to such a degree that the human nature is made their logical subject. Chemnitz underlines that the human nature does not possess them by virtue of their nature, only due to the union in Christ’s person. In a cumbersome explanation,206 he states the nonreciprocal activity covered by the genus maiestaticum, unlike the genus idiomaticum: The human nature receives the divine attributes.207 It included the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ, but not (solely) because of the incarnation, but due to the will of Christ. The concept which is connected to Chemnitz’s interpretation of ubiquity as a voluntary presence came originally from Theodore Beza, namely “multivolipresence”.208 But which divine attributes are communicated to the human nature? A look into Chemnitz’s theology in the strict sense might provide an answer. In his doctrine of God, Chemnitz distinguishes between an absolute and a relative sense of divinity. The absolute sense of divinity refers to the common attributes of all the persons of the Trinity. The relative sense of divinity refers to the specific attributes of each of the persons. As an example, Chemnitz points to the Father, in whom there is unbegotten power, whereas the Son has 204 Ita elegans est Irenaei sententia lib. 3. cap. 21. Christum crucifixum & mortuum esse, requiescente Verbo, ut posset crucifigi & mori. Hanc sententiam quidam insulse & impie ita depravant, quasi in passione ac morte, Divina natura quieverit, hoc est, prorsus ociosa fuerit, sola humanitate in illo opere passionis laborante. Sed Irenaeus erudite & distincte loquitur, Non enim dicit, kocom in officio Redemptionis patiente humana natura ociosum fuisse, & solam humanam naturam vicisse mortem & Diabolum. Sed dicit kocom quievisse, in hanc sententiam, quia enim tota plenitudo Divinitatis, corporaliter inhabitans in Christo, facile potuisset propulsare omnes iniurias, passiones, atque ipsam adeo mortem, ne incurrere possent in illam massam assumptae humanae naturae, in qua tota illa plenitudo Divinitatis personaliter inhabitabat. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 111a. 205 See below, page 239. 206 Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 386. 207 Et est mutua ac reciproca, in hoc primo genere, alternatio seu communicatio, qua tam Deo, quae sunt hominis, quam homini quae Dei sunt tribuuntur. In tertio vero hoc gradu, agitur de hyperphysicis, quae non personae tantum, sed ipsi assumptae naturae, vel personae secundum assumtam naturam, donata vel communicata sunt, Et illa communicatio non est mutua seu reciproca, sed humanitati tantum communicantur a Divinitate, non econtra, Quae differentia manifesta est. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 123a. 208 Inge Mager, Die Konkordienformel Im Fürstentum Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Entstehungsbeitrag – Rezeption – Geltung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 100 – 101.

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begotten wisdom. In the Holy Spirit, there is proceeding life. It is important for Chemnitz to underline that the persons thereby are realiter distinct hypostases and characteristics.209 He therefore adheres to a scholastic definition, which interpreted the attributes of absolute divine essence to be some sort of a circular argument which only refers to itself, as oneness and sameness within the Trinity. These attributes correspond to the attributes of the classical interpretation of person, namely that it is in-divideable.210 As a result, Chemnitz uses the distinction from John of Damascus to prove that only the relative attributes are communicated ad extra. Chemnitz thereby tries to get rid of the suspicion that a Lutheran doctrine may imply an incarnation of the whole Trinity. On the other hand, nothing of the deity is left without being communicated. There is no divine “stuff” which remains in a supra–lunar heaven after the incarnation, due to the fact that the whole fullness of the deity dwells personally in the assumed human nature of Christ.211 If the persons within the Trinity were distinct realiter, this applies for the communication of attributes, too. Chemnitz even claims that reale is semantically similar to the Greek word for actuality or being.212 How does Chemnitz solve this tension between an understanding of the persons of God as having incommunicable properties, on the one hand, and a communication of the fullness of the Deity to the human nature, on the other hand? First of all, Chemnitz is anxious of any trespassing of the limits of knowledge, and warns against investigating the depth of the doctrine, that is, into the mystery. This anti-scholastic notion resembles Melanchthon’s famous remark in his Loci communes (1521),213 and enables Chemnitz to avoid probing into the difficult questions. A large bulk of the dedication epistle of Chemnitz’s De duabus underlines the importance and the implications of 209 Ac summa est, ipsam essentiam diuinam, & essentialia diuinitatis Idiomata, considerari, vel absolute, sicut toti Trinitati communia sunt, vel relate, sicut sunt in vna aliqua hypostasi, quae hypostaticis & characteristicis proprietatibus, a reliquis realiter distincta est. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 159b. 210 Scholastici scriptores, & alij eruditi recte dicunt: Idiomata essentialia in Diuinitate esse simpliciter ipsam absolutam Dei essentiam, cum qua vnum & idem sint. Et essentiam iliam [illam?] Dei in sese consideratam, esse aleqistom, indiuiduam […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 160b. 211 Quaedam idiomata seu attributa Diuinitatis, esse sucjoimymgta communicabilia, Quaedam arsucjoimymgta incommunicabilia, Qua relatione seu consideratione, nulla fit partitio seu distractio attributorum Diuinitatis in sese, sed relatione ad extra, in creaturis, distinctionem illam ita consideramus. Et tamen quia kºco* totam plenitudinem Deitatis suae, personaliter hypostatica vnione communicauit assumptae naturae, nihil certe praetermisit incommunicatum, qui se totum & omnem plenitudinem Deitatis suae, personaliter communicauit assumtae naturae […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 161a-b. 212 In vulgari sermone vocamus reale quod Graci vocant omtyr jai ty omti, quod non est fictum, imaginarium aut verbale, seu nudus & inanis titulus, sed quod vere est […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 163a. 213 Mysteria trinitatis rectius adoraverimus quam investigaverimus. Philipp Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1521; repr., Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993), 18 – 19.

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keeping human knowledge at bay, within the confines of divine revelation. According to Chemnitz, the correct knowledge of this doctrine has a soteriological scope; it is restricted to what one needs to know for salvation.214 Perhaps even more important than the qualification of the communication of attributes as a mystery is his reference to John of Damascus, and the distinction between the mode of divine presence ad intra and ad extra: The attributes ad extra are qualified as activity [1m´qceia]. Chemnitz explains that John of Damascus is using it to reserve a certain presence for the divine itself. The creatures are, after all, not partakers in the divine nature, only in divine activity.215 If this mode of activity had been restricted to God’s relationship to the world, it would probably not have been very interesting as a contrast to the theology found in Wurttemberg. But Chemnitz applies this mode to how God is present in Christ, too. He does not regard the mode of divinity in Christ to be on par with how God is present in his creatures. The difference is that divinity itself [suas] is present in Christ, a difference which corresponds to the reservation of a special category of presence for the person of Christ within Chemnitz’s system. Still, divinity is not only seen as 1m´qceia, but as divine work [operationes], too.216 For Chemnitz, it is of primary importance to avoid an understanding of divinity and humanity as dwelling or resting [attributum quiescens].217 Through the concentration on the divine activity and work within Christ, Chemnitz tries to preserve the divine essence as an untouched quality common to all the persons of the Trinity. It should therefore not surprise the reader that he adheres to the scholastic understanding of the divine gifts in Christ as apart from the essential properties of the divine nature itself. It is an infused gift, according to Chemnitz, an effect given to the human nature of Christ, but caused to inhabit the person formally and habitually. Interestingly, Chemnitz sees this flow of gifts as the condition by which the divine majesty 214 […] Quod doctrina illa rationi humanae natura non sit nota, ne quidem praestantissimis ingeniis. Addit autem Deum de mysterio illo per Spiritum suum in Verbo nobis patefecisse, quantum ad veram ac salutarem Christi Saluatoris nostri cognitionem, in hac vita, utile ac necessariuim nobis iudicauit. […] 1. Ut de hoc mysterio sentiamus & loquamur non sermonibus, quos humana sapientia docet, sicut Paulus inquit, sed quos docet Spiritus Sanctus, hoc est, Ne ea, quae de hac doctrina in Scripturis tradita & patefacta sunt, ad rationis principia, normam ac iudicium exigamus ac conformemus, sed ut spiritualia spiritualibus comparemus, quae homini xuwijy stultitia sunt. 2. Ut sollicite nos intra terminos Divinae patefactionis contineamus, nec aliquid in hac doctrina, de quo non extant expressa in Scriptura testimonia ex nostris, vel cogitationibus, vel nudis consequentiis constituamus. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, a3b-a4a. 215 […] hoc est quod Damscenus in libello de duabus operationibus inquit: Diuinitas emeqceiar suae, non naturae participes facit creaturas. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 161a. 216 Cum igitur Communicatio illa maiestatis in Christo, de qua hoc loco agimus, definiatur emeqceia, Quod Diuina potentia kocou, non tantum qualitates quasdam, vt in reliquis creaturis efficiat, sed diuinas suas operationes in assumta natura, & per eam exerat, Manifestum est, in quam sententiam, quidam non male dicant. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 161a. 217 “[…] nicht als ein ruhendes Seinsverhältnis.” Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 392.

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makes his works possible: The human nature of Christ becomes more or less instrumental to the operations of the divine, the place where the majesty can act and perfect human nature.218

The impact of Chemnitz’ doctrine How does this system affect the understanding of where Christ is present? On the surface, it does not seem to be in opposition to the implications of Brenz’ Christology. Chemnitz’ De duabus naturis was not directed against Wurttemberg, but against the disciples of Melanchthon at Wittenberg.219 There is, however, an important difference in the understanding of the implications of the doctrine of Christ by Chemnitz. Instead of preserving the intimate connection between the two natures, he tries to find a middle way between his biblically inspired system of presence on the one hand, and a unionist Christology on the other hand. In a brief, but telling comment, Chemnitz underlines that some questions cannot be considered or asked without blasphemy. This concerns particularly the extreme consequences of the doctrine of ubiquity. He repeats Melanchthon’s argument against the doctrine, as if Christ’s body should be in trees, stones, animals etc. He does not present the argument as ridicule, as Melanchthon did. But Chemnitz sees a profound difficulty if the divine nature should be found “in excreta and sewage”.220 Chemnitz is – perhaps understandably – not comfortable with such a low localisation of the lofty divine nature. How does he save divinity from the mud? At this point, Scripture comes to instruct the reader in his hermeneutical praxis, if Chemnitz is to be believed. The reader is recommended to refrain from asking questions of such a kind, because we do not have firm words or clear promises that Christ wants us to search for him there.221 The lack of concrete recommendations in Scripture is made into a prohibition for the believer. This has an immediate consequence for the topic at hand. The ontological question of where the body of Christ is located is made into a 218 Illa vero dona infusa, non sunt ipsa essentialia idiomata Diuinitatis, sed sunt effecta eius extra Diuinitatem in humanam Christi naturam, ita infusa, vt in ea formaliter, habitualiter, & subiectiue, sicut Scholae loquuntur, inhaereant, quibus ipsa amhqypotgr Christi in se, & secundum se, informatur & perficitur, possit esse organon habile, idoneum, ac sufficienter dispositum, per quod, & cum cuius communione ac cooperatione Diuina potentia kocou, Diuinae maiestatis suae operationes excercere ac perficere possit. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 124b. 219 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 210 – 11. 220 Teigen seems to regard Chemnitz’ negation as a response to stupid questions. This is an analysis which neglects the question at stake, however : How low can the divine nature be located? Even if Teigen regards it as stupid, it involves the range of the incarnation. Bjarne Wollan Teigen, The Lord’s Supper in the Theology of Martin Chemnitz (Brewster, Massachusetts: Trinity Lutheran Press, 1986), 46. 221 Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 255b.

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voluntary problem of the interpreter : Christ should not be sought among the “lower” physical things. The astonished reader even finds that Chemnitz is theologically satisfied with a prohibition as a solution to the problem. Chemnitz’s focus on the literal word of Scripture, and his inclination to soteriologically adapt that word to the believer, can to a certain degree explain his “disinterest” in the metaphysical consequences of his Christology.222 He was, after all, keen on restricting the Christological rationale for the Eucharist, and keep it tied to the words of institution.223 But the refrain from giving clearcut answers to what these aspects of the doctrine of ubiquity may imply, points to the specific understanding of revelation by Chemnitz. Unlike Brenz’s understanding, it does not first and foremost concern Christ’s presence as the incarnated God, but the application of the heavenly doctrine which Christ brought about.224 For Chemnitz this means keeping close to the divine instruction, because that is where we can find out what God wants. What should one do if there is no relevant instruction found in Scripture? Perhaps aware of the need for consensus among the followers of the Augsburg Confession, Chemnitz suggested a certain freedom in the question of the mode of ubiquity. The ubiquity was, after all, of an ineffable nature.225 Interestingly, the radical party of Melanchthon disciples in Wittenberg criticised Chemnitz severely for allowing freedom on this issue, due to the alleged implication of pan(en)theism. If the principle of freedom was accepted on this doctrinal issue, one would simply have to acknowledge that all cognition would lead to God.226 The voluntary aspect concerns the instruction of the believer: No soteriological confidence can be gained from searching Christ in these things; it will only offend the simple believers.227 The presence of Christ’s body should be sought in the Eucharist, where we have “a clear word and a specific 222 Bernt Oftestad, “‘Historia’ und ‘Utilitas’. Methodologische Aspekte der Abendmahlstheologie bei Martin Chemnitz,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 77 (1986): 189. 223 Mahlmann, Dogma, 207. 224 For a convincing interpretation of doctrina coelesti as a main perspective of Chemnitz’ view of Scripture, cf. Bernt Oftestad, “Traditio und Norma. Hauptzüge der Schriftauffassung bei Martin Chemnitz,” in Der zweite Martin der Lutherischen Kirche. Festschrift zum 400. Todestag von Martin Chemnitz (Wolfgang A.[ed.] Jünke; Braunschweig: Ev.-luthe. Stadtkirchenverband und Propstei Braunschweig, 1986), 175. 225 Licet argumenta illa de Ubiquitate refutari non possint, se tamen cum nemine velle contendere, An per modum ubiquitatis, corpus Christi in Coena adsit, cum Divina sapientia & potentia possit alio, nobis ignoto, & ineffabili modo illud, quod certo verbo & expressa promissione tradidit, efficere, Ac rationem addit, Quod adversarii inde arripiant occasionem, digrediendi in alias in explicabiles disputationes, ut interim ferias habeant, ne ad verum controversiae statum, qui in verbis institutionis propositus est, respondere cogantur. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 256a. 226 Johannes Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch. Eine systematisch-theologische Untersuchung zur Debatte um die Wittenberger Christologie und Abendmahlslehre in den Jahren 1567 bis 1574. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 358. 227 […] simpliciores offendant […] Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 255b.

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promise”.228 But by restricting the scope of correct investigation, Chemnitz omits the difficult question: Whether the doctrine of ubiquity necessarily implies that the divine nature has descended to the dirt. The structure is similar to the prohibition of investigating into the Trinity, as Melanchthon claims in his Loci. Although Chemnitz is referring to the arguments of Luther, as it is stated in the latter’s Confession concerning Christ’s Supper (1528) , the actual words are taken from Melanchthon. As a user of the Jena edition of 1558, Chemnitz was probably not aware that the words do not belong to Luther.229 But the accident is telling: When Chemnitz wants to quote Luther concerning ubiquity ; he ends up with a statement from Melanchthon. Although Chemnitz is concerned about refuting the arguments of Georg Major and his circle of radical disciples of Melanchthon at Wittenberg, it is a witness to a striking similarity with one of main concepts of Melanchthon’s theological foundation, namely the will of God.230 This will does not only correspond to the lack of free will on the part of human beings, as Melanchthon states in his early, radical writings,231 but is an integral part of his doctrine of God. Perhaps it would lead us too far to interpret Chemnitz as promoting some sort of sanctification process within Christ. However, immediately following the presentation of the human nature as a passive agent of the divine majesty, Chemnitz underpins his findings with one of the most problematic statements for Christology from the gospel of Luke, namely that the boy Jesus “grew in wisdom”.232 Chemnitz does not seem to understand the possible implications of this reference. His Christological taxonomy allows him to restrict this growth to the human nature, since any anthropology comprises cognition. But the human nature which is said to be ignorant of certain things, to have “natural infirmities” – without sin, of course – is at the same time the assumed nature. Certainly, Chemnitz refers to scholastic opinions which overruled Luke’s report, by stating that the person of Christ was perfect from the beginning. But 228 Quod in coena Dominica cum suo corpore, sicut & in Ecclesia cum assumta sua natura adesse velit, certo verbo & peculiari promissione nobis tradidit. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 256b. 229 “Altenburg hat dazu die kritische Randbemerkung am Ende bei den Worten ‘Vom Allenthalben’ usw. [sie bezieht sich aber tatsächlich auf den ganzen Abschnitt]: Haec verba non esse Lutheri, sed Philippi Melanchth., prolixe probat Hutterus in Concord. Concord. (so! Druckfehler für : Concors) cap. 1 fol. 9.” WA, 48,236 – 237. Cf. Mager, Die Konkordienformel, 47, note 66. 230 Günter Frank, Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (1497 – 1560), 65. 231 The classical statement from the first Loci-edition, where predestination is a premise for the enslaved will: Respon. Quandoquidem omnia quae eveniunt, necessario iuxta divinam praedestinationem eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostrae libertas. Philipp Melanchthon, Loci Communes, 28. 232 […] Divinam vero sapientiam, quae tota plenitudine personaliter in assumpta humanitate habitebat voluit & prout voluit, subinde magis magisque per carnem se manifestasse. Et hoc Lucam velle, quando dicit: Profecit sapientia. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 126a.

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because of his pious view of the Scriptures, the only option open for Chemnitz to find a reference which is plausible within the scope of the text. His solution is to combine an insistence on the complete fullness of divine wisdom in the assumed humanity with an increasing manifestation, according to his will. Two aspects of this solution seem worthy of comment: Chemnitz’s reference to an augmented manifestation of wisdom, and his voluntary framework. To begin with the first aspect, what does Chemnitz mean by manifestation? Does it imply a real increase in the bestowed divine wisdom, or is it rather an increase in the appearance to the others? Chemnitz is firm in underlining that Christ did not only augment his wisdom coram hominibus, but coram Deo, as well.233 Chemnitz does not therefore develop a difference between Christ’s relation to himself from Christ’s relation to the creatures. But this compact unity of the person of Christ means that there was a real development within Christ in his state of humiliation. It should be noted that Chemnitz refers to the biblical statement as the cause for the development, and not an anthropological necessity of change. However, the effect remains the same: Chemnitz was not criticised for replacing the temporal scheme of the credo with a new figure of thought, as the radical Melanchthonian disciples claimed was done in the Christology of Brenz.234 The second aspect concerns Chemnitz’s reference to Christ’s will as the regulating instance of the growing wisdom. In a central paragraph, Chemnitz states his adherence to John of Damascus and his orthodox refusal of the monothelethic arguments. As a main view, the unionist Christology does not allow the individual natures to act separately. Chemnitz underlines that the human will wills what the divine will wishes it to will. In the person of Christ, the human nature wills what the Logos wills. As a consequence, a hierarchical relation is crucial to the make–up of Christ’s person. This points to the soul as governing the flesh, and the divine Logos in turn governing the soul, in accordance with the threefold hierarchy of John of Damascus.235 233 Ut ita tempore exinanitionis habitu inventus sit, ut alius homo, atque ita in rei veritate, non coram hominibus tantum, sed & coram Deo profecerit sapientia & gratia. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 126b. 234 Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch, 347. 235 Humana enim Christi voluntas ea vult, quae diuina voluntas vult eam velle, sicut inquit Damascenus Cap. 28 Nam in Christo animae quidem est gcelomijg carnis, sed tamen gcelomeuolemg a verbi Deitate, ita Damascenus. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 118b-119a. It is tempting to refer to a possible analogy in Chemnitz’ social theory. According to Chemnitz, the people are subject to double authority, both secular and ecclesiastic. Their being subject to authority and the appointed ministers is partly explained as a lack of understanding, as the Acts of the Apostles allegedly can tell us: “Weil aber die Gemeine offt des verstandes nicht ist / das sie könne oder wisse / tüchtige Personen fürzuschlahen. So haben die Apostel offt selbst tüchtige Personen genennet / vnnd der Kirchen fürgeschlagen […]” Martin Chemnitz, Handbüchlein Der Fürnemsten Heuptstücke der Christlichen Lehre / durch Frag vnd Antwort auf Gottes Wort einfeltig vnd gründlich erkleret. Anfenglich gestellet zum unterricht der Pastorn in der Visitation des Fürstenthumbs Braunschweig. (Magdeburg: Johan Francken, 1579), c4a. Cf. Theodor Mahlmann, “Chemnitz, Martin,” Theologische Realenzyklopedie 7 (1981): 718.

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Chemnitz’s emphasis on the voluntary aspect correlates with a notion pointing ahead to a later development in the history of dogma, namely a stronger concentration on the relation between God and the Church. Whereas Brenz saw his Christological interpretation as an explication of the relation between God and the world, particularly how God is present in the world, Chemnitz concentrates his understanding of communicatio idiomatum as an explication of how God is present in his Church. Thereby the characteristic soteriological scope of his Christology becomes visible: He tries to avoid (Brenz’s) speculation of ubiquity by restricting God’s omnipresence in Christ to a possibility, and uses it as a guard against the attacks of the Calvinists. The real constructive arguments for Christ’s bodily presence must be searched within the confines of the Church, namely in the Eucharist, because the general ubiquity requires a voluntary act, namely the (biblically) stated will of Christ. What does this mean for the understanding of communicatio idiomatum? For Chemnitz, one cannot conclude from a possibility to a reality. It requires a safe and clear word of Scripture, not speculative dogmatic possibilities. This is perhaps most clearly uttered in his examination of the Council of Trent: There is a simple and truthful rule to be followed in these questions […] and they are established on the word of God, not on arguments of whatever could be possible.236

Although Chemnitz wrote these words in order to criticise the Tridentine doctrine of baptism, they are representative of Chemnitz’s general approach to theology, too. For Christology, it means that the strict “inextricable connection between the union of the natures, omnipresence and sacramental presence”237 which characterised the Christology of Brenz is not promoted by Chemnitz, a lack which makes room for the opposition against the Wurttemberg Christology, as we shall see Heshusius formulated it.

236 Simplex enim et vera regula est: […] statuendum esse ex verbo Dei, non ex argumentationibus a possibili. Martin Chemnitz, Edmund Preus, ed., EXAMEN CONCILII TRIDENTINI (1578; repr., Berlin: Gustav Schlawitz, 1861), 114b. See further his rejection of Scotus and his doctrine of Mary’s sinless conception: Cumque iam in duabus de Maria virgine quaestionibus, extra scripturae limites excessum fuisset, in scholis quidam disputare coeperunt, Mariam virginem etiam conceptam fuisse sine peccato originali. Cuius opinionis patronus Scotus postea factus est. Nullo verý verbi Dei testimonio, hoc ostendere potuerunt, imo ne conati quidem sunt, sed ratiocinabantur a possibili, Christum potuisse matrem suam in ipsa conceptione, ab omni originalis peccati contagio praeservare: & hoc convenire dignitati & honori matris Domini. Martin Chemnitz and Edmund Preus, Examen, 121a-b. A representative utterance concerning the problem of constructing Christ’s presence solely on the basis of his possibilities is given here: Talis autem regula non est, si absque scripturae testimonio, argumentemur a potentia Dei absoluta, sive a possibili ad inesse, nostro arbitratu quidvis de corpore Christi imaginemur. Scriptum enim est, Omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. Martin Chemnitz, De duabus, 265b. 237 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 212.

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Summary Chemnitz developed Luther’s metaphysical Christology further, but he accentuated other aspects than Brenz. Chemnitz’s attempt to construct a Christology solely on the basis of Scripture and Christ’s will tempered some of the extreme implications of Luther’s doctrine of ubiquity. The pattern in which Chemnitz places communicatio idiomatum follows the pattern of Melanchthon, namely in distinguishing between different modes of divine presence. The rules of language occupy a central role in Chemnitz’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, particularly the distinction between abstract and concrete predications. That does not lead to a restriction of the language to mere logical operations, as was the tendency of Melanchthon. As an example, the divine nature does not “rest” in Christ’s dying on the Cross, but participates in death. On the other hand there exists a limit: The divine nature’s participation in Christ should not lead to dragging it down in the dirt. An important concession to the human nature is given, too, namely that there is a real growth of wisdom in the young Jesus, as Luke reports. Chemnitz is careful to avoid more philosophical speculation than necessary, labelling the depth of the doctrine as a mystery. The soteriological scope of his subject matter should not be disturbed by scholastic inquiry, but kept closely in line with the testimony of Scripture. The biblical restriction is particularly important in the question of ubiquity. If Chemnitz has a philosophically qualified category for his treatment of Christology, it must be of a voluntaristic aspect. Christ wants to be everywhere; it is a multivolipresence, as Chemnitz’s understanding has been labelled. The omnipresence of Christ is not a necessary consequence of the incarnation, as Brenz argued, but an effect of Christ’s will. That strong voluntary framework might explain Chemnitz’s hierarchical relation between the soul and body in Christ, too. Chemnitz’s insistence on a soteriologically restricted ubiquity which had its basis in the will of Christ did not come without costs, however. It led to an uncertainty of whether Christ was really present everywhere, according to his human nature, or if he was merely potentially omnipresent, a potentiality which had to be activated. This structural ambiguity between possible and necessary consequences of the personal union had large consequences for the history of communicatio idiomatum and its embedment in the Formula of Concord, as we will see in the next chapter.

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The Formula of Concord – a hybrid construction? The Christology of Chemnitz and Brenz accentuated different aspects of the metaphysical Christology of Luther. In the making of the Formula of Concord, these two conceptions were paramount to the outcome. The effort to develop different interpretations of Christology in general, and communicatio idiomatum in particular, is one thing, but to integrate them in a work which aimed to display the correct interpretation of the Augsburg Confession is another. How does the Formula of Concord reflect the different accentuations of these interpretations of Christology? In the Epitome of article eight, on the person of Christ, the Formula presents the controversial doctrine concerning the person of Christ: The “Sacramentarians” are claiming that there is no communication of attributes between the natures in Christ realiter, it is only a name.238 The Solida Declaratio239 mentions the Christological programme of the Wittenberg theologians, the “Grundfest”, as the main document of the Sacramentarians.240 This gives a hint about the context in which the Christology of the Formula is developed, namely with a front against the group of theologians who promoted a solution of the Christological problem which was similar to that of Melanchthon. Chemnitz and Joachim Mörlin241 had at the outset of the debate which was ignited by the publication of the Wittenberg Catechism (1571), attempted to warn their fellow believers through the so-called Treuherzige Warnung (1571). One of Chemnitz’ main objections to the Wittenberg Catechism is the understanding of the communicatio idiomatum as merely a verbal event.242 Although Chemnitz supports the Wittenberg theologians’ rejection of any change or confusion between the natures, he strongly attacks their conclusion: 238 BSLK, 804, 20 – 805,5. 239 The Formula of Concord is divided into Epitome which presents the main arguments of the Formula, and the Solida Declaratio which is a more developed theological argumentation. 240 BSLK, 1018, 24. 241 Joachim Mörlin (1514 – 1571) was one of the hardliners in the Gnesiolutheran opposition against the imperial edict of the Augsburg Interim. He was also among the fiercest critics of Andreas Osiander and his doctrine of justification, and was arguably the main reason for Osiander’s exit from Königsberg. His career was crowned by the position as superintendent in Braunschweig. Mörlin was in other words geographically close to Chemnitz, and the latter served as his deputy, too. Cf. Inge Mager, “Mörlin, Joachim,” in BBKL 11, 8 – 11. 242 “Es ist auch in demselbigen Catechismo noch anders mehr versteckt, als das allein ein uerbalis communicatio sey, item dass das Ampt des Mittlers Christo allein nach der Göttlichen natur zugeschrieben wird […]” Martin Chemnitz, Treuhertzige Warnung des Gottgelerten frommen Dieners Christi / zu Braunschweig / Doctoris Martini Kemnitij. Wider den Newen Caluinischen Catechismum / der Theologen zu Wittenberg (ed. Irene Dingel; vol. 8 of Die Debatte Um die Wittenberger Abendmahlslehre und Christologie (1570 – 1574); 1571; repr., Controversia et Confessio. Theologische Kontroversen 1548 – 1577/80; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 303,10 – 12.

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The human nature cannot be said merely to receive support or preservation from the divine nature.243 Therefore, it is the programme of the Formula to develop a Christology which supports a real communication of attributes. But the problem at stake here is exactly how the Christology of the Formula of Concord enables it to integrate the perspectives outlined in the tension between the Tübingen and Braunschweig solution. There is an intention of stating a concord against the Wittenberg solution, but the problem they face is the integration of the main premises from Brenz and Chemnitz.244 The Formula tries to develop what it labels a divine rationality in opposition to the worldly, circumscriptive mode, but in accordance with the understanding of the right hand of God as everywhere. Strangely enough, this is not labelled the omnipresence but the omnipotence of God.245 It seems as if the mere presence through the incarnation of God in Christ is not enough to 243 “Zum andern, das sie disputiren von der personlichen vereinigung beider naturen in Christo, quod non sit transmutatio nec confusio naturarum aut proprietatum inter se, ist recht. Das sie aber der menschlichen natur in Christo aus der personlichen vereinigung mit der Gottheit von der Maiestet vnd krafft, zu welcher rechten sie gesetzt ist, nichts anders mitteilen, denn das sie getragen vnd erhalten wird von der Göttlichen natur […]” Martin Chemnitz, Warnung, 301, 9 – 14. The critical passage is found in the Wittenberg Catechism’s interpretation of Christ, the second article of faith. The relation between the natures are ineffable, and indeed inseparable, but subordinated the Word’s carrying human nature: Quomodo copulatae sunt naturae duae in Christo? Ecclesia nominat vnionem personalem, quae non est transmutatio nec confusio naturarum aut proprietatum inter sese, sed copulatio vere ineffabilis, qua secunda persona diuinitatis massam certam ex genere humano in vtero virginis a Spiritu sancto sanctificatam assumit et sibi copulat non solum inseparabiliter, sed etiam secundum hypostasin videlicet, vt vna in Christo persona sit ac maneat, ipsius nimirum verbi propria, quae humanam assumptam gestet, sustentet ac foueat. CATECHESIS CONTINENS EXPLICATIONEM SIMPLICEM, ET BREVEM, DECAlogi, Symboli Apostolici, Orationis Dominicae, Doctrinae de Poenitentia, & de Sacramentis, contextam ex CORPORE DOctrinae Christianae (ed. Irene Dingel; vol. 8 of Die Debatte Um die Wittenberger Abendmahlslehre und Christologie (1570 – 1574); 1571; repr., Controversia et Confessio. Theologische Kontroversen 1548 – 1577/80; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 180,9 – 16. 244 One should be aware of the advantage Chemnitz had in the question of Christology, due to his close relation with Joachim Mörlin. The latter had fought for a iustitia formalis against Osiander’s Christology (and the prince’s sympathy). According to the evaluation of Martin Stupperich, Osiander’s immediata divisio – namely that Christ’s natures corresponded to different activities – annulled the role of communicatio idiomatum. Christ’s human nature did not have any role in the justification process, apart from its instrumental role. Martin Stupperich, “Zur Vorgeschichte des Rechtfertigungsartikels in der Konkordienformel,” in Bekenntnis und Einheit der Kirche. Studien Zum Konkordienbuch (ed. Martin Brecht and Reinhard Schwarz; Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1980), 181. 245 Haec autem [the ubiquity] non terreno modo, sed, ut D. Lutherus loqui solet, pro modo et ratione dexterae Dei facta sunt, quae non est certus aliquis et circumscriptus in coelo locus (ut Sacramentarii sine testimonio sacrae scripturae fingunt), sed nihil aliud est nisi omnipotens Dei virtus, quae coelum et terram implet, in cuius possessionem Christus iuxta humanitatem suam sine confusione tamen et exaequatione naturarum, et in essentia, et in essantialibus proprietatibus, realiter seu revera venit. BSLK, 1026, 3 – 13.

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qualify the ubiquity. In addition, the power of God, God’s possibility of being everywhere through his omnipotence, is needed. Another example of how the Formula oscillates between the two alternatives concerns the participation of the divine nature in the death of Christ. On the one hand, the authors reject that the passion was restricted to the human nature of Christ, whose properties are suffering and death. It applies to the Son of God, too, it is said. On the other hand, immediately after that statement, there is an injunction which qualifies that application to the assumed human nature: Due to this hypostatic union (which cannot be thought or have the possibility to exist without the communication of natures) and not the naked human nature alone – whose property it is to suffer and die – has suffered for the whole world’s sins, but the Son of God himself has truly (according to the assumed human nature) suffered, and – as our Apostle’s Creed testifies – truly died, although the divine nature neither can suffer, nor die.246

The strong apathy of the divine nature – stressed even to the point of a lack of possibility – infers the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum: The participation of the divine nature in death is more or less paradoxically qualified. When the Son of God is said to have truly suffered, apathy is applied to the divine nature when the suffering is restricted to the human nature. The same oscillation is stated when it is said that Christ had the fullness of his divine majesty already in the state of humiliation secretly on the one hand, but on the other there is a restriction on the temporal duration of that majesty. In the Epitome, for example, the reality of Christ’s increase of age, wisdom and mercy is underlined. Is it possible not to presuppose a lack of wisdom and mercy when Christ was in an earlier stage of his earthly life? One could perhaps interpret the temporal motion of lack and increase as merely an external aspect, but that would run counter to the insistence of the real [Wahrhaftig] character of that development.247 Nevertheless, a disparate answer is given in the Solida Declaratio, where the difference between Christ’s human nature and other human beings is accentuated. Due to the personal union, Christ as a man did not only know certain things according to the creational order, but the spirit of intellect and 246 Propter hanc hypostaticam unionem (quae sine vera illa communicatione naturarum nec cogitari nec subsistere potest) non nude et sola humana natura, cuius proprium est pati et mori, pro totius mundi peccatis est passa, sed ipse filius Dei vere (secundum tamen naturam humanam assumptam) passus et, ut Symbolum nostrum Apostolicum testatur, vere mortuus est, etsi divina natura neque pati neque mori potest. BSLK, 1023, 32 – 42. 247 Here is the German version more precise: “11. Welche Majestät er nach der persönliche Vereinigung allwegen gehabt und sich doch derselben im Stande seiner Erniedrigung geäussert und der Ursach wahrhaftig an Alter, Weisheit und Gnad bei Gott und den Menschen zugenummen […]” BSLK, 807, 33 – 8,19.

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wisdom rested in him.248 One could perhaps ask whether such a word implies a reality, as we have seen elsewhere, but when the same block of text states that the fullness of the Spirit due to the hypostatic union is communicated to Christ secundum carnem, there is reason to believe that a reality is implied.249 The oscillation arises as a consequence of an unresolved understanding of how the anthropological notions from philosophy should be integrated in Christology. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to see the Formula as an attempt to resolve the tension between two competing doctrines of the subject: The de–centred self in the tradition of Brenz, where the event of the natures’ communicatio idiomatum opens up a space between God and human beings, and the more traditional emphasis on the will of the Christ–agent by Chemnitz. That understanding of man correlates with the metaphysical premises of their systems, between omnipresence and omnipotence. Brenz’s Christ is everywhere, but Chemnitz’s Christ needs an agent with a will to realise the presence of which Christ is capable. It seems as if this difference can be traced to two themes particularly : How could Christ grow if he was a personal union of God and man at the beginning? How could suffering be attributed to God? When the Epitome raises the question of the temporal development of Christ, Chemnitz’s retraction from the communicative event of the natures to a fixed personal identity at that point makes it almost necessary to integrate the theological concerns within a preconditioned anthropological structure. To state that Christ is both theologically qualified as full of wisdom on the one hand, and that he is growing in insight, philosophically speaking, on the other hand, seems blocked. When the wisdom of Christ is commented upon in the Solida Declaratio, it is the tradition of Brenz which is reflected. The problem of human development is not mentioned, but the question is solely theologically qualified by referring to the communicative event of the natures within the union. Here, an important difference becomes visible. The two methods attribute the full divine majesty at different places in Christ’s earthly life. Whereas Chemnitz sees the glorification of Christ through his installation at the right hand of the Father as the realisation of Christ’s majestic power, Brenz regards the hypostatic union as the place where the communication of the majesty to the human nature already takes place. In other words, Brenz sees 248 Credimus autem, docemus et confitemur, quod Deus pater spiritum suum dilecto filio suo Christo ratione assumptae humanitatis eo modo dederit (unde et Messiae, hoc est, uncti, nomen accepit), ut ille non ad mensuram (quemadmodum alii sancti illius spiritus dona acceperit. In Christo enim, Domino nostro, (cum secundum divinitatem unius sit cum spiritu sancto essentiae) requiescit (ratione humanae naturae) spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis. BSLK, 1041, 23 – 1042, 2. 249 […] certe Christo, secundum carnem, quae cum filio Dei personaliter unita est, tota plenitudo spiritus (ut patres loquuntur) per hypostaticam illam unionem communicata est. BSLK, 1041,46 – 1042,2.

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the incarnation as the decisive event. This theological qualification of the temporal aspect correlates with their views on the role of philosophy in theology. In Chemnitz’s solution, the identity of the self of Christ – stabilised “above” as the concrete communication within the hypostatic union – is strengthened through the insistence on the voluntary aspect of realising the majesty. Brenz’s insistence on the events of the communication of attributes as the place where the person of Christ is constituted makes him insist on the real participation of the human nature in the divine nature from the conception. In order to follow the understanding of an unchangeable God, as it is stated in the letter of James, the Formula underlines that nothing was added to or subtracted from God through the incarnation. The divine nature of Christ is not emptied through the communication of attributes, but keeps its features intact.250 Obviously, the tradition of God’s apathy is too strong to be modified through the movement or event of communicatio idiomatum. Again, it is the logical identity of the person which prevents the real communication of the natures. This does not mean, however, that the human nature of Christ retains solely its natural properties. In the third of Chemnitz’s modes – Chemnitz’s modes are all included in the Formula –, the human nature is ineffably endowed with heavenly prerogatives, such as majesty, glory, virtue and power over everything.251 These are of course qualified as different from the properties of humanity which are given in creation, the creatis donis. Although the communication of properties is always understood as a communicatio realis [German: “Tat und Wahrheit”], it is important for the writers to avoid any physical interpretation.252 Still, the divine majesty in human nature is qualified as “corporal”, in line with the Christological hymn in the letter to the Colossians. The Formula juxtaposes such a corporal presence with the mere spiritual presence of the angels. Between the Scylla of physics and the Charybdis of spiritual beings, the corporal presence of the divine majesty is placed with a specific intention: It is there to light in, by and through the human nature according to Christ’s free will, that is, where and when he pleases.253 250 Quantum ergo ad divinam in Christo naturam attinet, cum in ipso nulla sit (ut Iacobus testatur) transmutatio, divinae Christi naturae per incarnationem nihil (quoad essentiam et proprietates eius) vel accessit vel decessit, et per eam in se vel per se neque diminuta neque aucta est.Communicatio autem illa non facta est per essentialem aut naturalem effusionem proprietatum divinae naturae in naturam humanam, quasi humanitas Christi eas per se et a divina essentia separatas haberet […] BSLK, 1032, 9 – 16 Communicatio autem illa non facta est per essentialem aut naturalem effusionem proprietatum divinae naturae in naturam humanam, quasi humanitas Christi eas per se et a divina essentia separatas haberet […] BSLK, 1036, 36 – 41. Cf. Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 2, 413. 251 BSLK, 1033, 4 – 10. 252 Et quidem his vocabulis (realis communicatio, realiter communicari) nunquam ullam physicam communicationem vel essentialem transfusionem […] BSLK, 1037, 19 – 23. 253 […] cum tota divinitatis plenitudo in Christo habitet, non quemadmodum in sanctis hominibus

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But the introduction of the will in the understanding of that presence raises at least one substantial problem. If the majestic presence in Christ’s human nature is a possibility which can be activated through a voluntary act, would it be correct to interpret it as real in a hard, ontic sense? Or should the lightening rather be interpreted as a visualisation of a hidden reality within Christ, like a curtain that is sometimes pulled open? If the latter is meant, it would have been in line with the thoughts of Luther and Brenz, that is, regarding the presence of divine majesty in the human nature as a consequence of the incarnation. If the former is meant, Christ’s presence would be in line with the thought of Chemnitz, namely as activated through the will. Perhaps both are meant, as one of the most distinguished interpreters of the nineteenth century pointed out, due to the impossibility of coming closer to an agreement between the Württemberg and the Brunswick traditions.254 The authors of the Formula of Concord simply stated central elements of the two traditions, which they considered enough for opposing the Theology Faculty of Wittenberg, and the left–wing Melanchthonians there. It was generally acknowledged among the contemporary theologians, at least in Württemberg, that the difference between Brenz and Chemnitz was first and foremost a methodological one.255 The Formula claims that one of the distinguishing factors between Christ and the rest of the holy people is that the Spirit is poured out in the former, which in turn is said to be “resting” [requiescit] in Christ. This is said to explain the increase of the powers which exceeds that which Christ’s human nature is capable of, at least if it is judged by its gifts of creation. Therefore, Christ is not only endowed with the gifts common to all believers, but with the knowledge of the second person of the Trinity.256 The authors do not explain how this knowledge is integrated within the Godman; however, they are only claiming that the human nature participates in the divine nature. One peculiar effect of the human nature’s participation in divinity is the understanding of the flesh of Christ as vivifying. The Eucharist, which serves as the underlying ecclesiastical problem, is understood in line with that

et angelis, sed corporaliter, ut in proprio suo corpore, etiam omni sua maiestate, virtute, gloria, operatione in assumpta humana natura, liberrime (quando et quomodo Christo visum fuerit) luceat et in ea, cum ea et per eam divinam suam virtutem, maiestatem et efficaciam exerceat, operetur et perficiat. BSLK, 1038, 14 – 24. 254 Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 417. 255 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 211. 256 In Christo enim, Domino nostro, (cum secundum divinitatem unius sit cum spiritu sancto essentiae) requiescit (ratione humanae naturae) spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis. Id vero non eo certe modo fit, quod ille, quatenus homo, aliqua tantum norit et praestare possit, quemadmodum alii sancti virtute spiritus sancti (qui tantum dona creata in ipsis efficit) quaedam norunt et praestare possunt. Cum enim Christus divinitatis ratione secunda sit persona in sacrosancto trinitate […] BSLK, 1041,28 – 42.

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vivifying body.257 Characteristically, the presence of Christ’s humanity is interpreted to oscillate between a sheer affirmation and a statement of the possibility of that presence: We believe that the superior witnesses of Holy Scripture declare the majesty of Christ’s human nature. Christ – according to his human nature – was given divine majesty and virtue by receiving the place by the right hand of God, in order to have the possibility to be present according to his human nature, and indeed be [sit] present, wherever he wills.258

It is not easy to see whether this sentence affirms the corporal ubiquity of Christ, or if it merely states the possibility of being present, as a precondition for realising the presence through his will.

Summary The Formula of Concord confirms a real communication between the divine and the human nature in Christ, but the interpretation of how that communication takes place oscillates between the two conceptions of Brenz and Chemnitz. In the interpretation of how the natures participate in death, divinity is included, but is strongly qualified as apathetic. Chemnitz’s notion of possibility accentuates that notion. On the one hand, divinity truly participates in the death of Jesus, but on the other hand, the Formula states that in death Christ participates (only) according to the human nature. Concerning the question of the development of Christ, the child Jesus is confirmed as truly “growing in wisdom”, but Jesus is also said to be bestowed with the divine fullness at the time of conception. Both interpretations are considered in the Formula, because Chemnitz sees the instalment of Christ at the right hand of the Father as the realisation of his divine power, whereas Brenz regards the incarnation to be the decisive event. It means that the “multivolipresence” of Christ’s body by Chemnitz, where Christ has voluntarily decided to break through the layers of divine presence, demands a larger degree of a stabilised subject to execute that will here on earth. For Andreae, who promotes the understanding of Brenz, the presence is already at hand in the incarnation. 257 […] Verbi gratia: carni Christi recte adscribitur, quod sit vere vivificus cibus et quod sanguis eius vere sit vivificus potus. Sic enim ducenti patres Ephesini concilii pronuntiarunt carnem Christi esse vivificam seu vivificatricem […] BSLK, 1043, 1 – 4. 258 Credimus vero superioribus scripturae testimoniis maiestatem hominis Christi declarari, quam Christus secundum suam humanitatem ad dexteram maiestatis et virtutis Dei accepit, ut videlicet etiam secundum illam suam assumptam naturam et cum ea praesens esse possit et quidem praesens sit, ubicunque velit […] BSLK, 1043,23 – 31.

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Critique of the Formula: The Helmstedt theologians and Johannes Kepler Although the tradition of Lutheran theology was to be defined and framed by the rise of the Formula of Concord in the coming generations, the picture would not be complete without the internal critique. The most interesting theologians for this work are the two prominent theologians at Helmstedt, Tilemann Heshusius and Daniel Hofmann, and the famous scientist from Tübingen, Johannes Kepler.259

Tilemann Heshusius: Christ’s possibility and power Tilemann Heshusius, one of the most prominent theologians of the Augsburg Confession, reacted against Melanchthon’s restrictive Christology. Although Heshusius emphatically underlined Christ’s power to be wherever he wants, Heshusius was unable to join the group of theologians who formed the Formula of Concord, due to his interpretation of communicatio idiomatum. What was the cause of his critique? As one perhaps could expect, some of the theologians who refused to sign the Formula dissented from the Formula’s Christology. It was an important reason for their refusal. One of the critics was Tilemann Heshusius (1527 – 1588), one of Melanchthon’s pupils and closest friends. On Melanchthon’s recommendation, Heshusius was offered prestigious offices, including the highest ecclesiastical position (as Generalsuperintendent) in the Electoral Palatinate. Towards the end of the 1550 s, however, Heshusius felt the need of a clear break with Melanchthon, a break which ended his office in the Palatinate. 259 One could argue that the main resistance against the Christology contained in the Formula of Concord came from the radical disciples of Melanchthon. This group, with Georg Major as the leading theologian, published its alternative solution in their 1571 Grundfest. But it is thoroughly examined in a recent study : Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch, 311 – 92. In addition, the Wittenberg solution does not seem to add substantially to the Reformed solution, at least not from the perspective of this work. Cf. the critique of the Formula’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in the Grundfest: “Geminiglich aber verwechselt man die eigentschafft beider naturn also / das / was einer jeden Natur in sonderheit eigent vnd gebüret / man nicht den Naturn fur sich / sondern der Person zuschreibet / welches man in Schulen nennet in concreto reden / Vnd haben diese weise zu reden die alten Lerer genennet Communicationem Idiomatum, oder permutationis tropom antidoseos, Als das man sagt / Christus / Oder des menschen Son ist allmechtig / vnendlich etc. Item / Christus oder Gottes Son ist gestorben / begraben / wideraufferstanden / Die Juden haben den HERRN der Ehren gecreutziget / Gott hat mit seinem blut seine Kirche erlöset / Solche reden zeigen auff die gantze Person […]” Wttenberg theologians, Von der Person Vn[d] Menschwerdung Vnsers Herrn Jhesu Christi Der Waren Christlichen Kirchen Grundfest Wider die Newen Marcioniten, Samosatener, Sabellianer, Arrianer, Nestorianer, Eutychianer Vnd Monotheleten (Wittenberg, 1571), e4a-b.

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The famous Prince Otto-Henry had appointed him, but his successor Frederick III the Pious dismissed both Heshusius and one of his main opponents in Bremen, the deacon Wilhelm Klebitz (1533 – 1568).260 The prince probed the matter thoroughly through theological study, and found himself more inclined to the reformed stance on Christology. After the Naumburg convention in 1561, the reformed doctrine was officially adopted in his state and the famous Zacharias Ursinus installed as professor of theology in Heidelberg. Heshusius’ responsio (printed in 1560) was directed against Melanchthon’s judgement in the Bremen controversy, but the responsio did not explicate Heshusius’ own Christology in any detail. In his polemic against the “reformed” circle of theologians in Heidelberg and Calvin, Heshusius clarified his main stance on the matter, as we shall see. For the scope of this study, it is Heshusius’ rationale for rejecting the ubiquity of Christ which is particularly interesting. Heshusius neither embraced the interpretation of Brenz, nor that of Chemnitz, but remained critical towards the understanding of ubiquity in both of these conceptions. How then did he solve the riddle of being caught between the theology of Luther and the method of Melanchthon? At the beginning of the third part of his De praesentia corporis Christi, Heshusius discusses the objections to the doctrine of Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist. The primary objection is considered to be Aristotle’s physical axiom, referred to in the form of a syllogism: [Major]: A real and physical body cannot, according to its substance, be present simultaneously in many and different places. [Minor]: Christ has a real and physical body, which visibly ascended into heaven after the resurrection, sits at the right hand of God, in a fixed and definite place, from where Christ will come to judge the quick and the dead. [Conclusion]: Therefore this body, which is circumscribed in a fixed place in heaven, cannot be present in the Eucharist according to its substance.261

For Heshusius, as for Brenz, the problem concerns a specific interpretation of the humanity of Christ: Whether Christ’s body can be subordinated under the laws of physics. What becomes particularly visible in the above syllogism is the close relationship between the circumscription of the man Jesus who lived in 260 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 27 – 96. 261 Verum ac Physicum corpus, non potest, simul, eodem tempore, quo ad substantiam, in pluribus et diuersis locis esse. Christus habet uerum & Physicum corpus, quod resuscitatum in coelum ascendit uisibiliter, sedet ad dexteram Dei, certo & definito loco, unde uenturus est Christus iudicare uiuos & mortuos: Ergo hoc corpus, quod in coelo certo spacio cirumscribitur, non potest esse in coena domini, quo ad substantiam. Tileman Heshusius, DE PRAESENTIA CORPORIS CHRISTI IN COENA DOMINI, CONTRA Sacamentarios (Nuremberg, 1561), K2a-b. Cf. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 70 – 71.

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the Middle East, and the circumscription of the glorified Christ at the right hand of the Father. Heshusius claims that the correct assumptions or premises for framing Christology are not taken from the school of Euclid or Archimedes, but from the Church of God, the academy of the Holy Spirit, as it were. Contrary to the axioms of Greek philosophy, Heshusius claims Christian theology should underline God’s possibility of doing everything,262 not only the possibility, but the will to realise Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, too.263 Heshusius claims that his adversaries criticise the presence of Christ by referring to the Aristotelian axiom of restricting bodies to one place at a time. This is to import profane philosophical concepts into the Church of God, according to Heshusius. The testimony of the Holy Spirit indeed attributes an unlimited omnipotence to God, Heshusius remarks in a core statement.264 But how does God use this unlimited omnipotence in the relationship between the natures in the person of Christ? For Heshusius, the ineffable and admirable features of Christ’s flesh is not only per communicatio idiomatum, in concreto or according to the person, but according to the human nature, too.265 From the qualification in concreto, it seems obvious that Heshusius has Melanchthon’s interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in mind as the address of his critique. Heshusius reserves the communication of divine attributes within the confines of the personal union, portraying his understanding of the core question at stake, as early as 1559. His explicit extension of the divine attributes to the human nature breaks the rules of Melanchthon’s praedicationes unusitata, as a modern commentator had it.266 262 Fremant hic omnes Physici & Mathematici, & queritentur, me pricipia physices delere, & negare naturae ordinem, tamen adfirmo contra omnes Philosophos falsam esse maiorem propositionem. Non enim in Schola Euclidis, aut Archimedis officina controuersia uertitur, sed in Ecclesia Dei, quae est spiritus sancti Academia, in qua alia habemus Theoremata, uidelicet: […] Lucae primo: Deo omnia sunt possibilia. Heshusius, de praesentia, K2b. 263 […] velit Deus, ut corpus Christi nobis in Coena detur. Heshusius, de praesentia, K3a. 264 Si negas posse Deum praestare, ut unum corpus si in diuersis locis, quis te profanum & sacrilegium Philosophum in Ecclesia Dei, contra expressum spiritus sancti testimonium, quo immensa Deo potentia tribuitur […] Heshusius, de praesentia, K3a. 265 Hanc veram Christi carnem admirandis & ineffabilibus quibusdam facultatibus & praerogatiuis, prae alijs humanis corporibus ornatam atque instructam esse, quae non solum personae, per communicationem Idiomatum, ut loquuntur in concreto, sed etiam humanitati, quae a kocy separari non potest, recte tribuuntur, tum quod unione hypostatica kocy omnipotenti unita, & in dissolubili foedere copulata est, tum quod in regno ad dexteram Dei exaltata est. Heshusius, de praesentia, K4a. 266 “Um das Wesen des Mitteilungsgeschehens zu erfassen, reicht es nämlich nicht aus, sich nur darauf zu beschränken, das Person-Konkretum zum logischen Subjekt für Prädikationen der Naturen zu machen, vielmehr ist es ebenso notwendig, über die Reduzierung der Communicatio idiomatum auf einen verbalen Prädikationsvorgang hinauszugehen und eine Kommunikation zwischen den Naturen selbst auszusagen. Der Menschheit selbst werden vom Logos besondere Fähigkeiten mitgeteilt, so dass an die Stelle austarierter Abständigkeit der Naturen eine Gemeinschaft tritt, durch die das melanchthonische Verständnis der Communicatio idiomatum gesprengt wird [author’s italics]”. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 73.

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Among the many biblical references Heshusius uses to prove his case, Psalm 8 is cited. According to Heshusius, the biblical witness proves that not only the Logos is glorified, but the same humanity of Christ which is born of Mary is truly glorified.267 Again, it seems to be Melanchthon’s restriction of the divine properties within the person union, the Logos, which is the target of Heshusius’ critique. There is, in other words, something more than the forma loquendi of Melanchthon, where the predications are subordinated under the logical subject of the person.268 After this evidence, all the intellectual obstacles seem paved over for Heshusius, enabling him to embrace the omnipresence of Christ’s flesh. One might wonder : Why did Heshusius nevertheless refuse to accept the ubiquity of Christ’s assumed flesh, and thereby the solutions of both Chemnitz and Brenz? Why did Heshusius fight against the doctrine of the omnipresence of Christ’s body? One might gain a hint of Heshusius’ position by considering his comment on the famous dictum of Jeremiah, chapter 23, where the Lord says that he fills [impleo] heaven and earth. Defending Luther’s position against Zwingli and Calvin, Heshusius repeats that it is impossible to define the right hand of God as a circumscriptive place in heaven. But his alternative has a strikingly feature which is not defined as omnipresence, but as immensity and infinite power. Heshusius states God’s possibility of transcending the limits of physics, but he neither states the reality of divine bodily presence,269 nor does he regard Christology to be the premise of sacramental presence.270 267 Psalm. 8. Constitues eum eum super opera manum tuarum. Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. Nec kocor tantum, sed ipsa natura humana quoque de uirgine genita uere gloriatur. Heshusius, de praesentia, K5b. 268 This feature is underlined in Calvin’s response to Heshusius, in the ferocious Dilucida (1561). Here, the reformer of Geneve refers to Melanchthon as his witness against Heshusius. Among them is Melanchthon’s anxiety of allowing an “adoration of the bread”, which Calvin uses to portray the perceived consequences of a too tight relation between the Eucharistic bread and the body of Christ: Octavam obiectionem peqi tgr arqtokatqeiar, etsi non fideliter recitat, nimis tamen frigide ac dilute solvit. Panem adorandum esse negat: quia unione hypostatica non est Christi corpus. Certe Philippus Melanchthon non tam rerum & verborum ignarus erat, quin distinctionem hanc teneret. Vidit tamen, quod res erat, si panis esset corpus, sine ulla exceptione esse adorandum. Jean Calvin, “DILUCIDA EXPLICATIO SANAE DOCTRINAE DE VERA PARTICIPATIONE CARNIS ET SANGUINIS CHRISTI IN SACRA COENA, Ad discutiendas HESHUSII nebulas,” in Ioannis Calvini Noviodunensis opera omnia, in novem tomos digesta (Amsterdam: Johannes Jacob Schipper, 1671), 742. 269 Krüger considers Heshusius’ interpretation of Jer 23:24 to be an affirmation of omnipresence, where God’s powerful dominion is exercised. I can not see that omnipresence is presupposed here. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 82. Elsewhere in Heshusius’ De praesentia, the category of presence is refused as a proper key of interpretation. Heshusius explicitly refuses any reference to a dwelling presence [praesentia ociosa] in the letter to the Ephesians, chapter 3, where Christ is said to inhabit the hearts of the believers through faith. Heshusius, de praesentia, F3b. 270 Coelum & terram ego impleo, dicit Dominus. Item: Ceolum sedes mea, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum, quae dicta manifestissime demonstrant, Dexteram Dei non posse intelligi

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Why does Heshusius restrict his statements to Christ’s possible presence? For Heshusius, it is of prime importance to avoid the Eutychian heresy, which he describes as defining the body of Christ as infinite. Therefore he must refute, as Melanchthon did before him, that the human body of Christ could be everywhere, in stones, grains and plants. The principle that seems to prevent him from supporting the doctrine of ubiquity is his view of Scripture. Heshusius requires a clear witness of Scripture affirming the omnipresence of Christ’s body, and when it fails to be affirmed, he is not ready to enter any claim of this sort.271 One of Heshusius’ motives for rejecting bodily omnipresence can be found in his insistence on preserving faith’s most profound subject matter as an arcane mystery, impossible even for the sharp mind to grasp. He compares the mystery with an analogy which reminds us of Melanchthon’s opening of his 1521 work Loci communes. Whereas Melanchthon underlines the futile (scholastic) exploration of the Trinity, arguing that one should rather stick to Christ’s benefits, Heshusius claims that ratio cannot grasp how the one and simple divine essence is the same as three divine persons, and how they are truly distinct from each other. As a second analogy, Heshusius mentions the problem of a bodily resurrection. According to him, it is impossible for the mind to grasp that a body which has been dead for thousand years could be recollected in a bodily resurrection. Heshusius claims that the mode of Christ’s omnipresence is not found in sacred letters,272 and we should therefore respect that silence of the mystery as a limit which the human mind – for fear of theological hubris – should not cross. Therefore, Scripture marks a limit for tolerable expressions concerning the person of Christ and the communication of properties. This leads him, in the end, to allow only the ubiquity of the person of Christ, not the human circumscriptum aliquem locum in coelo, sed potius immensam atque infinitam potentiam. Heshusius, de praesentia, L1b. 271 Hic sine dubio interpellabit me aliquis Caluinista, ac rogabit: An existimemus, Corpus Christi alterum esse infinitum, & an sit ubique, quemadmodum diuina essentia? Responsio. Non est alterum infinitum. Nam ad essentiam creaturae pertinet, ut sit infinita substantia. Quare cum caro Christi maneat creatura, nec conuertatur in diuinitate, non est infinita. Nec adfirmo corpus Christi considerata per sese humanitate eius, ubique esse, in lapide, in grano, in plantis, ut falso quidam seductores de nobis confingunt: Id enim cum scriptura sacra nullabi de carne Christi expresse dicat, non ausim adserere. Heshusius, de praesentia, L1b-L2. Nuremberg, 1561. 272 […] ut kocor, cui caro Christi unione hypostatica unita est, ubique sit essentia, & omnia impleat, & tamen hoc de carne non dicatur, ingenue fateor me tam arcanum mysterium acie mentis non adsequi. Vt enim ratione intelligere nequeo, quomodo unica & simplicissima essentia sint tres personae realiter distinctae, et rursus quomodo tres hypostases sint una essentia, Nec ingenio comprehendo, quomodo conditor et creatura sint una persona, aut quomodo ante mille mortui, & in nihilum redacti una cum corporibus sint resurrecturi: Ita fateor me hoc quoque mysterium non posse exhaurire: Quomodo persona Christi sit ubique quod de carne Christi pij homines adfirmare uerentur, cum non sit expressum sacris literis. Heshusius, de praesentia, L2a.

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nature or the flesh. Here, he is in accord with Melanchthon and his interpretation of communicatio idiomatum. But he neither follows the latter’s insistence on the so–called extra–calvinisticum, nor does he regard the Logos as able to act without humanity outside the personal union.273 Instead of Andreae’s insistence of a bodily omnipresence, Heshuius emphasises Christ’s power. This power makes his presence possible everywhere, but it is realised only through his word.274 The presence of Christ is not restricted to any philosophical boundaries, but is theologically (and voluntarily) bound to the word.

Heshusius’ refusal of ubiquity In his second great treatise on Christology, the Defensio of 1561, Heshuius is careful to draw the line between the things revealed and the things which remain enigmatic, hidden and mysterious.275 It is clear that he considers the doctrine of ubiquity to be alien to the revelation, a kind of speculation which cannot be drawn from Christ’s institution of the Eucharistic. Due to the ascension of Christ to the right hand of the Father, and Christ’s hypostatic union, Christ has the possibility of being present in the Eucharistic meal. That possibility finds its realisation through Christ’s voluntary act, as it is given witness to in Scripture, not through the two natures in Christ.276 Heshusius sees the danger of speculation implied in any assertion of how God is present everywhere. Although it must be stated that God is omnipresent, a closer description of the mode of omnipresence would only lead into errors. The example of the body’s substance, which is poured out to different locations like the ocean, illustrates the futile attempts of extending the presence of Christ’s body outside the Eucharist.277 Augustine’s comment from De Civitate Dei about the resurrection of bodies 273 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 77. 274 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 90 – 91. 275 Nos vero ingenue agnoscimus in illis arcanis, & non reuelatis rebus inscitiam nostram & spe laeta expectamus illum diem, quo pandentur ista admiranda mysteria, quae nunc quasi in aenigmate videmus. Tileman Heshusius, VERAE ET SANAE CONFESSIONIS: DE PRAESENTIA CORPORIS CHRISTI in Coena Domini, pia Defensio (Erfurt, 1583), Z4b. 276 Facultas quidem, atque omnipotentia Christi ex Ascensione in coelos patet, praerogatiuae carnis Christi ex hypostatica vnione demonstrantur. Atque hinc recte colligitur, non esse impossibile Christo carnem suam vere praebere in Coena cum pane. Quod vero praebeat, potiore fundamento eget, Non solum quid possit, verum etiam quid velit, aduertendum est: Quae Christi voluntas de pane Eucharistico & tota Coena, non ex vnione duarum naturarum in Christo, sed ex perspicua ipsius reuelatione est aestimanda. Heshusius, Defensio, Z5a. 277 […] Coelum & terram ego impleo. Nec admittendae sunt crassae rationis imaginationes, de corporali extensione vel diffusione substantiae: Sicut mare corporis sui immensitate diffunditur in multa loca. Huiusmodi enim commentum varios de Dei essentia errores gigneret. Atque ideo Patres, licet modum quo Deus est vbique effari non possent […] Heshusius, Defensio, Z6a.

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serves as a model for Heshusius’ call for modesty. Commenting on St Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians, Augustine underlines that according to faith, a bodily resurrection will indeed take place, but the mode of that resurrection is hidden in this life.278 Similarly, Heshusius wants to preserve that Christ’s body is many different places, if the Eucharist is celebrated simultaneously at these places. But he rejects any explanation of how such a multi–locational presence can take place. What remains in the explanation, however, is the qualification of Christ’s person as omnipotent. In other words, Christ has the necessary power to execute his will, as it is stated in Holy Scripture. In a central passage, Heshusius professes the impossibility of confirming any manner of ubiquity. He scoffs at the personal ubiquity as it is labelled, and I cannot find any firm foundation in Scripture which undoubtedly would affirm that Christ’s body is everywhere, or that it fills heaven and earth.279

As Heshusius’ modern biographer points out, this is in direct opposition to Brenz’s solution of the localisation of Christ’s humanity.280 In his De personali unione Brenz suggested a triple interpretation of ubiquity, namely that the sentence “Christ’s humanity is everywhere”, should be understood locally, repletively and personally.281 The reaction against the doctrine of Brenz was repeated over 20 years later, when the four theologians of Helmstedt, Heshusius, Basilius Sattler, Daniel Hofmann and Heinrich Boethius, critically examined the genesis and redaction of the Formula of Concord. For the Helsmstedt theologians, it was important to underline the Formula’s lack in stating the omnipresence of Christ’s humanity. It was open for an eisegesis of such a kind, they admitted. The doctrine of ubiquity could be read into it, but it was never a part of the confessional basis which there was agreement on. It would therefore be wrong to use the Formula as a proof for that doctrine.282 A prominent reason for Heshusius’ rejection was the famous Melanchthon citation which was falsely attributed to Luther in the eight volume of the Jena edition of his works (published 1555 – 1558). Chemnitz confirmed the (false) 278 De Civitate Dei book XX, chapter 20: Sic ergo ibunt in terram, quia ex uiuis hominibus terra erunt, quem ad modum it in cinerem, quod fit cinis; it in uetustatem, quod fit uetus; it in testam, quod ex luto fit testa; et alia sescenta sic loquimur. Quo modo autem sit futurum, quod nunc pro nostrae ratiunculae uiribus utcumque conicimus, tunc erit potius, ut nosse possimus. Resurrectionem quippe mortuorum futuram et in carne, quando Christus uenturus est uiuos iudicaturus et mortuos, oportet, si Christiani esse uolumus, ut credamus; sed non ideo de hac re inanis est fides nostra si, quem ad modum futura sit, perfecte conprehendere non ualemus. 279 […] quae vel qualis sit haec, quae dicitur Personalis Vbiquitas, neque etiam satis firma scripturae fundamenta inuenio, ex quibus indubie colligere ausim Corpus Christi esse vbique vel replere Coelum & Terram. Heshusius, Defensio, Z8a. 280 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 162. 281 Johannes Brenz, Die Christologischen Schriften, 42, 33 – 44, 2. 282 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 279.

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authencity of the citation in his Repetitio already in 1561, when he wanted to restrict the omnipresence of Christ to rely solely on the words of institution, and not on the personal union. According to the alleged citation of Luther, the multipresential restriction of Aristotelian physics was overcome through Christ’s stated will of being bodily present in the sacraments. A main point here is Heshusius’ negation of any investigation into the ratio of the presence, not unlike Melanchthon’s prohibition of investigating into the nature of the Trinity in his 1521 Loci. It is the words – and not the personal union – which necessarily bring about the presence. The rational framework is totally different for the question at stake, it is not possible to grasp for philosophy or human reason. Therefore, the question of ubiquity is not a matter of dispute, Chemnitz has Luther to say.283 Heshusius, together with the theologians of Helmstedt, used this alleged citation of Luther as one of their main authoritative supports in their controversy with the Tübingen theologians in the 1580 s, and they also felt strengthened by Chemnitz’s use of it in his Repititio.284 The colloquy of Quedlinburg, where Duke Ludwig of Württemberg was under pressure from Duke Julius of Helmstedt to gather the theologians again in the hope of a consensus, was depressing in its outcome.285 Ludwig refused, 283 DE VBITVITATE. DE hac quaestione multa sunt disputata, & sicut solet fieri, peregrinis disputationibus simpliciorum animi perturbantur, & principale negocium obruitur, Asscribam igitur breuem & planam Lutheri sententiam de hac quaestione, quae extat in octauo Tomo Ienensi, fol. 375. quam ad uerbum simplicissime ita conuerti. Verum corpus manducandum, & uerus sanguis Christi bibendus exhibetur, in pane & uino. Quaestio iam oritur, quomodo Christus potest corporaliter esse in Sacramento, cum unum corpus non possit simul in pluribus locis esse? Ad illam quaestionem ita respondeo, Christus dixit se uelle ibi adesse, ideo uere adest in Sacramento, & quidem corporaliter. Nec quaerenda est alia ratio illius corporalis praesentiae, quam haec uerba ita sonant, ergo necesse est ita fieri, sicut uerba sonant. Quod ad corpus attinet, Christus quando tantum uult, potest esse ubique uel in omnibus locis, quare alia est ratio sui corporis & nostri. De Vbiquitate non est disputandum, in hac controuersia longe alia res est, nec scholastici doctores hic quicquam dicunt de Vbiquitate, sed retinent simplicem sententiam de corporali praesentia Christi, haec Lutherus. Martin Chemnitz, Repetitio, 13 – 15. Cf. Mahlmann, Dogma, 219 – 22. 284 Chemnitz had, according to the Helmstedt theologians, “fürnehmlich an der Formula Corcordiae gearbeitet/vnd grosse mühe damit gehabt […] in seinem Büchlein de Coena Domini [the Repititio] dem raht Lutheri gefolgt, und auf dessen wort tomo 8. Ienensi die Vbiquität beyseits gesetzt.” [My reconstruction]. Cited from Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 279. 285 The Helmstedter theologians criticised the Apology for the Formula of Concord severely. As a solution to the tensions, their duke, Julius II, suggested that the authors Kirchner, Chemnitz, Selneccer and Chyträus should come to Helmstedt. But Heshusius feared the numerical advantage of the apologists of the Formula would lead to unwanted conclusions, and Julius acted accordingly : He called for a colloquium of Quedlinburg in January 1583, in order to save the Concord, and sent a large delegation. The three electors were also present with their theologians. Heshusius criticised the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity to the extent that there was no possibility for an agreement with the other side. Responding to his arguments, they claimed he argued as a Calvinist and put the Concord at risk. Although Heshusius claimed that his arguments did not attack FC as such, but only the interpretation of FC VII and FC VIII, it was not possible to reach a consensus. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 223 – 56.

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but opened the way for an exchange of views in a scriptural form. It resulted, as one may have expected, in quite a few polemical pamphlets.286 One could perhaps expect that the insistence on the omniscience and omnipotence – and the rejected omnipresence – of Christ’s humanity would lead Heshusius and the Helmstedter theologians closer to the voluntaristic understanding of ubiquity associated with Martin Chemnitz.287 But the controversy surrounding the Quedlinburg colloquy, ended any hope for a consensus between Heshusius and Chemnitz. As a response to the critique of the Formula of Concord from Pfalz,288 Anhalt289 and Bremen,290 three of the authors of the Formula, namely Chemnitz, Selnecker and Kirchner, wrote an apology. The apology was particularly concerned with Christology,291 and

286 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 278. 287 Cf. Dingel’s precise rendition of Heshusius’ position, which concurs with that of Krüger : “Heshusius liess zwar Allwissenheit und Allmacht der menschlichen Natur Christi als Resultat der communicatio majestatis gelten, nicht aber die zugleich gelehrte Omnipräsenz.” Dingel, Concordia controversa: die öffentlichen Diskussionen um das lutherische Konkordienwerk am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts, 423. 288 This is particularly visible in the Admonitio Neostadtensis, written by the reformed theologian Zacharias Ursinus (1534 – 1584), a pupil of Melanchthon. He had been impressed by the reformed environment in Heidelberg, where he resided for a while during a study travel. He became the first rector of Johann Casimir’s famous Collegium Casimirianum in Neustadt, and finally succeeded Olevian as professor of Dogmatics in Heidelberg. Ulrich Hutter-Wolandt, “Ursinus, Zacharias,” in BBKL 12, 953 – 60, in the Admonitirs Ursinus points out the problem of basing the real presence of Christ on Scripture and the Church Fathers. According to Ursinus, the communicatio idiomatum realis is only an appendix, or secondary compared to the more fundamental words of institution. The problem happens when this secondary doctrine is used as an attack against the Calvinistic understanding of Christ’s presence in the Sacrament. Further, Ursinus underlines the irenic tradition – alive even when Luther lived – where the tradition of Melanchthon and Bucer could coexist together with the radical views of Luther. This includes prominently the Wittenberg Concord of 1536 and the CA variata, but also the religious talks at Regensburg 1540 – 41, Confessio Saxonica 1551, Frankfurter recess 1558 and the Naumburg convent 1561. Dingel, Concordia controversa: die öffentlichen Diskussionen um das lutherische Konkordienwerk am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts, 101 – 60, part. 143 ff. 289 The theologians of Anhalt, among them Wolfgang Amling (1542 – 1606), wrote a critique of the Formula of Concord in 1579. Here, it was underlined that it was Brenz who had brought the dangerous problem of the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature in the Church, contrary to his earlier writings such as the Syngramma of 1525. One of the problems, the Anhalt theologians point out, lies in the fact that many pious people in the Schwabian Church died in the faith which is now considered as heretical. The problem lies, in other words, in the limitation of the tradition of the Augsburg Confession. Jacob Andreae, Martin Chemnitz, and Wilhelm Zimmermann, Der Anhaldinischen Theologen Bedencken uber die Prefation / des newlich ausgangenen Concordienbuchs / Sampt Refutationschrifft der dreien Weltlichen Churfürsten Theologen / wider gemeltes Bedencken / Und APOLOGIA der Anhaldischen Theologen / wider gemelte Refutation. (Neustadt an der Hardt: Mattheus Harnisch, 1581), 5. 290 Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 200 – 201. 291 It is called: “APOLOGIA, Oder Verantwortung dess Christlichen Concordien Buchs/Jn welcher die ware Christliche Lehre/so im Concordi Buch verfasset/mit gutem Grunde heiliger Göttlicher Schrifft vertheydiget: Die Verkehrung aber vnd Calumnien/so von vnrühigen Leuten

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included Kirchner’s personal refutation of the 42 (!) arguments of the Anhalt theologians. Although the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature is qualified as voluntary possibility, there is no doubt that the apologetes understands Ephesians 4:10 as stating a real presence everywhere. It is not said whether this presence is caused by the incarnation of Christ, and the communication of properties which follows that event.292 It is clear, however, that it is not a dwelling presence they have in mind: The whole Christ is not resting, but indeed at work, he governs everything. On the other hand, Chemnitz, Selnecker and Kirchner make their exegetical notes on Philippians 2:7, where the kenotic movement is understood as a concealment of Christ’s power. It is a secret [heimlich] which is not revealed before the resurrection.293 But the presence has some limits, however, and cannot be used to profane divinity. It is therefore, as Melanchthon said, not possible to locate the presence in trees and stones, or in dirty and lowly places.294The same logic can be found in the refutation of Andreae, Chemnitz and Zimmermann to the Anhalt theologians.295 The concentration is on our real brother, in flesh and blood, the Son of Mary, who through his omnipotence of the divine majesty is present in all things, and as man reigns in everything.296 Still, Heshusius could not accept Chemnitz and the Formula authors in the voluntarily qualified ubiquity of Christ’s human nature. It becomes clear in the “General– und Spezialnotationen” response to the above cited apology, which the Helmstedt theologians wrote for Duke Julius, that there is no connection between “the exercise of divine omnipotence on the one hand, and the immediate presence of the Omnipotent on the other hand”.297 Why cannot Heshusius connect the doctrine of (ubiquitous) divine activity with the

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wider gedachtes Christlich Buch im Druck ausgesprenget/widerlegt werden […]”. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 202. It is pointed out that Christ “[…] mit seinem Leib sey vnd sein könne wo er wöll/an allen Orten/ da er in seinem Wort sagt/das er da sein wölle/Als bey seiner Kirchen/Mat. 18 vnd 28. […] das der gantze Christus/auch nach seiner angenommenen Menschlichen Natur (dann nach derselben ist er auffgefahren) alles erfülle/vnd vber alle Creaturen gegenwertig/und nicht abwesend herrsche”. Cited after Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 211. The “Kindelein Jesus” has already at the time of conception “alle Macht vnd Gewalt im Himel vnd Erden/auch nach seiner Menschlichen Natur/von wegen der persönlichen vereinigung/vnd nach art derselbigen empfangen vnd gehabt”. Cited from Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 212. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 211. For an introduction, see Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 196 – 200. “Denn das ist vnser einiger vnnd höchster trost/dass vnser Fleisch vnd Blut/Christus Marien Sohn/inn alle Ewigkeit ein warhafftiger Mensch/vnser Bruder realiter, in die Göttliche Maiestet/die Gottes eigen ist/vnd die er von ewigkeit gehabt/vnd nit in eine erschaffene Allmechtigkeit mit der that vnd warheit eyngesetzt/himmel vnnd Erden inn seiner Handt vnnd gewalt hat/allen dingen gegenwertig ist/alles regiert/der auch als Mensch/die gedancken vnser Herzen vnnd innersten anfechtung weis/vnd mit vns derhalben ein mitleiden inn vnsern anfechtungen haben kan […]” Andreae, Chemnitz, and Zimmermann, Bedencken Uber die Prefation, 65. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 218.

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doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum in the union of Christ? Perhaps Heshusius embodies the difference between the Melanchthonian method and Lutheran theology at its most acute: The difficulty of combining philosophically rules of a communicatio dialectica298 inside the frames of a logical concept of person as Melanchthon does,299 with Luther’s understanding of the communicatio realis transcending many philosophical problems of Christology. What is the alternative understanding of Christology for Heshusius, then? At Quedlinburg in 1583, where the “General– und Spezialnotationen” of the Helmstedt theologians were to be discussed “in a friendly and Christian manner”300, the Christology of Heshusius becomes particularly clear. In the preface, three different positions on the question of ubiquity are presented: (1) General ubiquity, the position of Tübingen, where the body of Christ always [je vnd allweg] is present in the bread of the Eucharist, even before the words of institution are read.301 (2) The other form of ubiquity, as taught in Brunswick and Niedersachsen, where Christ is bodily present in his church and in his sacraments, and which has Christ’s promise of being present as the foundation.302 (3) “That old Lutheran doctrine”, where the body of Christ sits at the right hand of the Father, but that he is at the same time is in the bread and wine wherever the Eucharist is celebrated, but nowhere else. This doctrine, which is Heshusius’ preferred option, rests on the words of institution.303 When Heshusius points out the allegedly failing premises of the doctrine of ubiquity, he points at four arguments which are used by the ubiquitarians. 298 299 300 301

Mahlmann, Dogma, 192. Mahlmann, Dogma, 79 – 80. Cited from Mager, Die Konkordienformel, 433. “[…] Erstlich/was die General Ubiquität betrifft/dass der Leib Christi vberal/vnnd in allen Creaturen/von wegen der Persönlichen vereinigung mit der Gottheit/vnnd sitzen zur Rechten Gottes/seyn soll. Krafft welcher er je vnd allweg im Brot dess Abendmals/auch ehe man die wort der Einsetzung darüber spricht/gegenwertig sey. Diss ist der Tübingischen vnd Oberlendischen Vbiquisten Opinion vnnd Lehr. Wie solches dess Brentij/Jacobi Andreae vnd Osiandri SChrifften bezeugen.” Tileman Heshusius, Bericht von dem COLLOQVIO Der zu Quedelburg versambleten Theologen: Vber dem Artickel von der Vbiquität vnd allenthalben gegenwertigkeit dess Leibs Christi/wie dieselben in der newen Concordi formul vnd darob zu Erfurt vorfasten Apologien gelehrt wirdt. (Neustadt: Mattheus Harnisch, 1585), preface, B1a-b. 302 “Die ander Opinion von der Vbiquität/Ist deren/die da allein wollen/dass Christus/in seiner Kirche/vnnd seinen Christen/auch den Sacramenten/mit seinem Leib/Fleisch vnnd Gebein/ wesentlich gegenwertig sey/ Wie solches der Spruch Christ vermögen soll: Ich bin bey euch biss an das ende der Welt.” Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, preface, B1b. 303 “Die dritte Opinion/Ist deren/so der alte Lutherischen Lehr/wie sie auss dem Bapsthumb herkommen/sein wollen/nemtlich/ dass der Leib Christi alleine zur rechten seines Vaters im Himmel/aber daneben auch leiblich vnnd wesentlich im Brot vnd Wein dess Abendmals/an allen orten/da es gehalten wird/sonst aber nirgends anderswo hieniden auff Erden gegenwertig sey/vnd diese Opinion gründet sich auff die wort dess Abendmals: das ist mein Leib/das sol so viel heissen/als/unterdiesem Brot/oder gestalt dess Brots/ist mein vnsichtbarer Leib verborgen/wesentlich gegenwertig.” Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, preface, B1b.

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Three are biblical dicta probantia; Ephesians 1:22; Ephesians 4:10 and Psalms 8:7, and the fourth argument is the unio personalis. In an exegesis of the first three, Heshusius tries to show that they do not provide a sufficient basis for a doctrine of ubiquity.304 One cannot use the texts from Ephesians such as “everything is put under his feet”, according to Heshusius, because they refer to the power Christ has over creation, not his presence in the created things.305 The major argument is, of course, the unio personalis. Here, Heshusius displays some of the characteristic features of his Christology. An irony of the stated consensus of the colloquium, however, is its unmistakably Melanchthonian reservation of not extending the substance of Christ’s body to sticks and stones.306 This line of thought is tightened when Heshusius reiterates Loci 1521 and warns against making consequentias from a mystery which is not clearly revealed through the word of God. Just like the Trinity, the two natures of Christ should not be investigated. Heshusius even invokes the old nulla proportio axiom, where the distance between the infinite (divine) and the finite (man) is not lessened during any movement of the former,307 and it is hard to see the difference to the Calvinist understanding of the relation between God and the world, a difference which Heshusius was careful to point out himself, however.308 The problem of reconciling the doctrinal position of Luther with the method of Melanchthon by the concept of omnipotence is sharpened, almost to the extent of stating a paradox: On the one hand, Heshusius claims that Christ was not bodily in Athens or Rome simultaneously when he hung on the cross in Jerusalem, because his body occupied only one space. On the other 304 For a thorough analysis, cf. Krüger, Empfangene Allmacht, 230 – 32. 305 “[…] Hie wirdt nun gefragt/was das heisse: Alles vnter den Füssen haben? Ob es heisse: Allenthalben sein: oder aber : vber alles gewalt haben. Wer nun den ganzen Spruch ansihet/der wird den rechten verstand finden. Constitues eum super omnia, du wirst ihn setzen vber alle Werck deiner Hendt/das heist ja die gewalt/Macht/Herrschafft/Regierung/vber alles/einraumen/vbergeben vnd aufftragen. […] Wer alles vnter seinen Füssen hat/der ist auch allenthalben. Da sagen wir nein zu/das müste in Gottes Wort aussgedruckt sein. […] Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, C3a. 306 “[…] sie [i.e. Chemnitz & co.] sprechen nit/dass Christi Leib im Laub/Grass/Holtz/Steine sey.” Although, it can be added, Heshusius correctly sees a problem in such a statement. Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, C1b. Cf. the common doctrinal rejections of the two parties, namely the spatial extension of Christ’s body in all creatures, and the presence in threes, stones and grass. Mager, Die Konkordienformel, 455. 307 “In denen Sachen/die vnsere vernunfft nicht kan begreiffen/vnd die in Gottes Wort nicht aussgedruckt sein/als im mysterio Trinitatis: gebürt vns nit consequentias zu machen/Also ist es auch in diesem mysterio de vnione personali. Alle gläubige vnnd verständige Christen bekennen/dass die vereinbarung beyder Naturen in Christo ein vnerforschlich vnnd vnbegreifflich gemeimnuss sey. Darumb kan man nit also schliessen: Wo eine Natur ist/da müsse die ander auch sein. Infiniti ad finitum nulla est proportio. Vnd dennnoch glauben wir/dass die beyden Naturen sind vereiniger.” Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, C3b. 308 Johannes Hund has forcefully underlined the nulla proportio doctrine as the most characteristic feature of the Wittenberg Christology 1570. Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch, 200 – 204.

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hand, there is no development or change of Christ from the status exinanitionis to his status exaltationis, due to the “strong” [starck] personal union.309 Heshusius refuses that the doctrine of Christ sitting at the right hand of God would be a sufficient basis for the ubiquity of the body. He renders the argument of the adversaries in a syllogism: Major : The right hand of God is everywhere. Minor : The body of Christ sits at the right hand of God. Conclusion: The body of Christ is everywhere.

The problem here, according to Heshusius, is the logical fault of four-term fallacy which is introduced due to the double meaning of “the right hand of God”. One thing is the right hand of God itself, another thing is to sit there: Whereas the former is omnipotence itself, the latter signifies the use of that omnipotence in participating with the other persons in the Trinity in governing the world. If these two meanings of the word are not kept apart, it will result in the Eutychian error of mixing the two natures into one, Heshusius claims.310 Heshusius retreats to stating the omnipotence of Christ, and thereby escapes the question signalled of a realised omnipresence.311 Christ has a possibility to become present, but due to Heshusius’ insistence of sailing between Luther’s philosophical Scylla and Melanchthon’s theological Carybdis, the answer to whether Christ is omnipresent does not appear. On the 309 “Als Christus am Creuz gehangen / vnd sein Blut für unsere Sünde vergossen / ist er mit seinem Leib nicht zu Rom / oder zu Athen gewesen. So nun die vnio personalis nicht wirdt auffgelöset / noch infringirt / ob gleich die Gottheit allenthalben ist gewesen damals: Der Leib Christi aber nit allenthalben / sondern nur an einem ort gewesen. Ergo so kan auss der Persönlichen vereinigung die Vbiquität nicht statuirt. Dann wann die Vbiquität folgen solte auss der vnione personali, so müste stets vnnd allezeit der Leib Christi sein / da die Gottheit ist / vnnd köndte hie keine exceptio stat haben. Das nun gesagt ist worden / es were damals tempus exinanitionis gewesen / thut aller ding nichts zur Sach. Denn die vnio personalis ist so starck in exinanitione, als in glorificatione & exaltatione.” Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, C4a. 310 “Die Herrn Collocutiores haben auch diss Argument de dextera Dei eingeführt / Aber wir könen nicht sehen / dass auss dem Artickel de Dextera Dei die Vbiquität folge. Dextera Dei est vbique. Corpus Christi est ad dexteram Dei. Ergo est vbique. Resp. Consequentia non valet, quia sunt quatuor termini. Aliud est esse dexteram Dei, aliud ad dexteram sedere. Dextera Dei est ipsa omnipotentia: sed ad dexteram sedere significat pari potentia regnare cum Patre;& Spiritu sancto, & cum tota diuinitate. Diuinitas tou kocou est ipsa dextera Dei, sed corpus Christi non est ipsa dextera Dei, alioquin esset diuina natura, quod non est. Heshusius, Bericht von Quedlinburg, C4b. 311 Interestingly, Mager interprets the “personalistic-voluntaristic-biblisistic” position of the Helmstedt theologians as a kind of absence: It reflects their concern of keeping the exalted Christ away from the world: Reign implies distance, whereas presence implies nearness. Mager, Die Konkordienformel, 459.

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contrary, it is underlined that the question cannot be answered, due to the allegedly failing dicta probantia.

Daniel Hofmann and the problem of double truth Heshusius’s younger colleague, Daniel Hofmann was called to Helmstedt to become professor of Logic and Dialectics in 1576. Duke Julius wanted to strengthen the confessional profile in his new university, the well-known Academia Julia. The first three years he served as a philosopher, thereafter a theologian. In the late 1590’s, he attacked the understanding of reason which was prevalent at the Philosophy Faculty, particularly the turn to Aristotelian philosophy which became visible through the logic of the Helmstedt philosopher Cornelius Martini (1568 – 1621). Hofmann’s qualification of how philosophy related to theology launched the famous controversy which bore his name and sealed the “return of metaphysics” as a permanent state of the Lutheran universities.312 Although Christology is not always considered central to that controversy,313 it is vital for the present work, due to the central issues he touched upon. It has even recently been argued that it was precisely the Wurttemberg doctrine of Christ’s presence which is implied in Andreae’s understanding of ubiquity that triggered the attack of Hofmann.314 If Tilemann Heshusius embodied the reluctance to state an answer to the theological problem involved in the Christological controversy, his colleague at the University of Helmstedt, Daniel Hofmann, radicalised the implication of the Christological doctrine for philosophy. Luther’s own limited attempt to find an adequate answer to his sharply formulated question in the late 312 Walter Sparn, Wiederkehr der Metaphysik. Der ontologische Frage in der lutherische Theologie der frühen 17. Jh. (Calwer Theologische Monographien.; Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1976). 313 Indeed, in the new historical standard work, Eucharistic doctrine – and implied Christology – is willingly pushed to the margins. Markus Friedrich, Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Theologie, Philosophie und gelehrte Konflikte am Beispiel des Helmstedter Hofmannstreits und seiner Wirkungen auf das Luthertum um 1600 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 244, n. 17. There are, however, reasons for keeping it more central to the narrative. For one, Luther’s reason for stating the problem of a double truth was embedded in the Christological doctrine itself. In addition, as Friedrich mentions, Hofmann entered into controversy with both Andrea and Hunnius on the question of the presence of Christ not solely because of a divergent doctrine. Hofmann connected Christology with the double truth question in mind. 314 Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter, eds., “The University Philosopher in Early Modern Germany,” in The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity (Ideas in Context; Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 59 – 60. Hunter’s idea that it was Andreae’s reliance on the metaphysics of Christian Aristotelianism that led Hofmann to target metaphysics itself as the prime source of this heretical confusion of the ‘two truths’” is misleading, however. Perhaps there are reasons to believe that Hofmann conceived Wurtemberg Christology to be some sort of Christian Aristotelianism – whatever that means –, but Andreae’s support of his doctrine of ubiquity from the philosopher Jacob Schegk can hardly be taken to propagate some sort philosophical-theological unified truth.

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Christological disputations is pursued further by Hofmann in an attempt to split the scholastic unity of truth, and make room for the language of faith.315 Hofmann criticises ubiquity In 1586, Hofmann attacked the Christology of Jacob Andreae. According to Hofmann, Andreae had made a new distinctio communicationis of the natures in Christ in his Disputatio Wirtenbergensi. Instead of the three genera of the Formula of Concord, Andreae made four classes, according to Hofmann: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Ipsam Diuinitatem (thesis 113) Personam (thesis 116) Maiestatem (thesis 123) Actiones diuinitates proprias.316

Whereas Andreae asserts that the divinity has received the communication of humanity [die Gottheit sey der Menscheit mitgeteilet], Hofmann maintains that the Formula of Concord clearly states that there is only one person of Christ. The problem Hofmann identifies lies in his understanding of Andreae’s concept of communicatio idiomatum. Andreae, Hofmann contends, distinguishes between nature (1) and person (2). This is a distinction that Hofmann cannot find in the Formula, and which he claims to be wrong, as long as communio naturarum and unio personalis refers to the same thing. As a result of Andreae’s concept of communication of the divine properties to the human nature, there is no distinction between the first and the third genera, and the suffering God and the vivifying human nature of Christ is put at the same level.317 315 Walter Sparn, “Dobbelte Wahrheit? Erinnerungen zur theologischen Struktur des Problems der Einheit des Denkens,” in Zugang zur Theologie: Fundamentaltheologische Beiträge. Wilfried Joest zum 65. Geburtstag (ed. Friedrich Mildenberger and Joachim Track; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 58 – 59. Cf. the fourth argument in Hofmann’s explication of the double truth in a 1600 disputation on the theme: After citing 2. Cor 6,14 and Eph 2,12, Hofmann regards there are no connection [communionem] between a person outside Christ and spiritural things. The consequence is the following: Vana est Identitas veri in cognitione Dei Ethnicorum & Christianorum, seu extra gratiam Christi relictorum & gratia Christi renatorum. Hunc igitur liquet necessario, nisi videlicet fundamentum Christianismi evertere velimus distinguendum esse accurate inter veritatem Philosophicam & veritatem Theologicam, seu inter carnalam & spiritualem veritatem […] Daniel Hofmann, PRO DVPLICI VERITATE LVTHERI A PHILOSOPHIS IMPVGNATA, & ad pudendorum locum ablegatam (Magdeburg: Andreas Dunckerus, 1600), B1a. 316 Daniel Hofmann, Errores XVII. JACOBI ANDREAE DOCT. CRASSIORES (Helmstedt, 1588), A3a-b. 317 Hofmann refers to Andreae’s Refutatione Orthodoxi consensus (fol. 351): Humana Christi natura Diuinae suas passiones communicat, & Diuina natura quam ipsius propria sunt, videlicet vim viuificadi, omnipotentiam, omni scientiam, & omnipraesentiam, adeoque Diuinam

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Hoffman sees this as a preparation for Andreae’s claim that the human nature (of Christ) is eternal.318 As a consequence, Hofmann points to the Apology where it is explicitly said that the eternal aspect of God is not communicated (in the personal union) as is the omnipotence.319 The property “eternity” belongs to the properties which is not possible to communicate, according to Hofmann, because it is incompatible with the human nature. The main problem of Andreae’s understanding of the bodily ubiquity, Hofmann contends, is the theologically defective interpretation of Christ’s body. The philosophical understanding, in light of Aristotle’s rule of bodies, is not considered. Still, if the body of Christ is omnipresent, Hofmann inquires, it either has to be present according to the communicated omnipotence, which is without bodily essence, or solely according to the body’s essence, or according to both natures.320 By choosing the last option, Hofmann claims that Andreae is at odds with the Formula of Concord. The Helmstedter theologian is critical of what he claims is a lack of use or the character of event in the Württemberg interpretation of Christ’s presence on earth today.321 Andreae’s option is labelled by Hofmann as an abstractiu locutio of the essence of Christ’s body or flesh, a necessary consequence of the Christology which attributes the divine majesty’s omnipresence to the glorified humanity. But Hofmann claims that such a doctrine is refused in the Formula of Concord, where it is said that the human nature does not “have” the divine nature in itself. The concern for Hofmann is to warn against a mixture of the natures by Andreae’s use the word essentialiter.322 If the divine properties omnipotence, vivification and omnipresence are understood as properties of Christ’s body by the communicatio idiomatum, Hofmann would regard the properties as essential properties of the flesh of Christ. This is enough for Hofmann to draw the conclusion that Andreae portrays the aforementioned divine properties as properties of the human nature, not only in communion with the divine nature, but on its own, as well.323

318 319 320 321 322 323

Maiestetam solius diuinae naturae propriam assumptae naturae communicauit. Hofmann, Errores, A4b. Humanitas est ab aeterno. Hofmann, Errores, A7b Hofmann ridicules Andreae for referring to the uncorrupt and orthodox fathers of the Church without any namedropping [nennet aber keinen]. “Aber Apologia sagt: das die Ewigkeit nicht wie die Allmechtigkeit Communiciret sey […]” Hofmann, Errores, A8a. “Ist der Leib CHRISTI allgegenwertig / so ist Er es entweder nach der mitgeteilten Allmechtigen Krafft / die nicht ein Leiblich Wesen ist / oder alleine nach seinem Wesen oder nach allen beyden”. Hofmann, Errores, B1b. Hofmann, Errores, B1a. “[…] die Menschliche Natur habe die Göttliche nicht / an vnd vor sich selbst / auch in der Persönlichen vereinigung essentialiter […]” Hofmann, Errores, B2b. “Wie offt sagt nun D. Jacob omnipotentia, viuificatio, omnipraesentia sind proprietates corporis Christi worden / per communicationem, setze nun das Corporaliter und Essentialiter / so ist so

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It seems as if Hofmann interprets an attribution of divine properties to the body and the flesh of Christ as necessarily implying a location of the human nature as the source of these properties, as well. Andreae did not make such a doctrinal claim, but Hofmann considers it to be the result of an inherent logic. If a contemporary report is to be believed, nobody opposed the Wurttemberg doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ’s body, except the Calvinists.324 What interests Hofmann is not to affirm the Calvinist’s insistence on the impossibility of Christ’s body being in more than one place at the same time,325 but to prevent that Christ’s body being defined in another way than our bodies. For Heshusius, the non–temporal, abstract concept essentialiter [wesen] seems to be singled out as a problematic alternative to the strict insistence on usus, the liturgical application of Christology in the Eucharist: Those who cling to the former, reject the latter.326 But the internal Christological problem is evident, too. Due to the crucial role the assumed body has in affirming the incarnation, Hofmann is suspicious about whether Christ’s humanity is sufficiently affirmed. A negative answer to such a question would have serious soteriological implications: If Christ’s body is given a different definition than the human body ; we will have a double body [duplex corpus]. Given such a double status, Hofmann argues, one part of the body of Christ would belong to the truth of humanity [veritatem nostram] and the other part the wholly other [veritatem longe aliam]. Together they will be an individual. But according to Hofmann, this contradicts the principle of individuality : Each and every thing is what it is, and it is so from its own truth. If it has two truths, it is dual and not one, or simply a monster against the simplicity of truth.327

324

325 326 327

omnipraesentia worden Essentiale proprium carnis Christi […] Dann D. Jacob und andere meinen / Es habe die Menschliche Natur / denn alleine die Göttliche Natur nicht wie Gott / wenn sie abgesondert verstanden / und nicht von Gott / sondern von sich selbs die Maiestet haben sollen.” Hofmann, Errores, B3b-B4a. “[…] dass der Würtenbergischen Theologen Lehr von dess HERRN Christi nach seiner Menschlichen Natur Allgegenwart / hievor (ehe denn die Helmstadischen diesen Riss zu machen angefangen) von niemand angefochten worden / ohne allein von den Sacramentierern […] Aegidius Hunnius, Widerlegung der Ungegründten Aufflagen / DARmit D. Daniel Hoffman in Seiner Ohlangst zu Stech Dess Ersten Mals / Nun Aber zu Herbst Dess Andern Mals Getruckten / Vnnd von Den Caluinisten mit Sonderlichen Grossen Frewden und Jubilieren Auffgenommener Apologia, Neben Ettlicher Anderer Reinen Theologen / Auch Meine (D. AEGIDII HVNNII) Bis Daher Auss Gottes Wortgeführte Christliche Bekandniss in Irriger Lehr Verdächtig zu Machen Sich Vnterstanden (Frankckfurt am Mayn: Johann Spiess, 1597), 15 One should be aware of the close friendship between Jacob Andreae and Aegidius Hunnius, though. Cf. Hofmann’s definition of the Calvinist resistance: Corpus Christi non potest esse in plurisbus locis simul. Hofmann, Errores, B6b. “[…] welche praesentiam Christi secundum utramque naturam in verbo praedicato & legittimo Sacramentorum usu leugnen […]” Hofmann, Errores, B1b. “Denn / Jedes ding was es ist / das ist es sua veritate / unnd so es duas veritates hat / so ist es

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Hofmann isolates the essence of the thing from everything else. Hoffman’s drive towards defining a static essence of Christ’s body has an important consequence for his interpretation of communicatio idiomatum: It excludes the possibility of interpreting the body as a process of becoming, a becoming that is caused by the constant exchange of the natures’ properties within the union. Instead of the unbridgeable divide between human and divine reality taught by the Calvinists, Hofmann regards the individuality of the thing as an obstacle to the omnipresence of the body of Christ. Hofmann defines the body of Christ almost as an atomic and self-sufficient body-thing, which apparently is unable to receive divine glorification to the extent of making it omnipresent. The spatial expansion of the body implicit in the Christology of the Wurttemberg theologians is incompatible with Hofmann’s definition of a body. Andreae’s refusal to distinguish between abstract and concrete predications inside the personal union inevitably leads to contradictions, Hofmann writes, and it concerns both the difference between God and divinity and the difference between man and humanity.328 The word “God” is not a concretum if it stands alone outside the personal union, according to Andreae, but has a meaning similar to that of divinity. Similarly, the word “man” is not a concretum, unless Christ is the subject of the proposition.329 Hofmann’s critique is concerned about the alleged abstraction from the normal use of language. Such an abstraction leads to an expansion of the meaning of Filius hominis, beyond what “man” stands for, Hoffman claims. If Andreae’s rule of interpretation should be a guideline, Filius hominis will include the Son of God, too. Andreae’s intention is to protect the union of the natures in Christ, even when he suffers and dies. He will include the Son of God in the meaning when it is said “man has suffered” [homo passus est] exactly by expanding the meaning of the term “man”. Hofmann judges such an understanding as “unknown among educated people in the tradition of the Formula of Concord”.330 gezweyet / und nicht eins / oder aus ein monstrum sein contra simplicem veritatem.” Hofmann, Errores, B7b. 328 Hofmann is citing Refutatio Orthodoxi concensus, page 343: Naturam assumptam quatenus cum Filio Dei vnita est, in Concreto considerari dicimus. Quando vero in se & per se, ratione suae propriae naturae, & naturalium proprietatum consideratur, in abstracto considerari dicimus. He interprets it as if the word abstractum only should be used to describe the natures when they are considered outside the personal union. Hofmann, Errores, A5a. 329 Andreae claims in his these 170 of Disputatio Wirtenbergensi: Vocabulum (Deus) absolute positum minime est concretum vocabulum, quod Deum homini mutum significat, sicut & vocabulum (Homo) nisi addas vocabulum (Christus). This is by Hofmann interpreted thus: “das ist dass wort Gott wenn es allein stehet / ist kein Concretum / sondern allein so viel als Gottheit / wie auch dass wort (Mensch) wenn nicht (Christus) dabey stehet / kein Concretum ist.” Hofmann, Errores, A4b-A5a. 330 “Es sey mehr unter den worten Filius hominis zu verstehen / nemblich auch Gottes Sohn / in einigkeit der Person / dann in dem wort Mensch. Quando enim filius hominis passus esse

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The rules of language are further dealt with when Hofmann criticises how Andreae interprets the words of institution. Hofmann claims that there is a homonym implied in Andreae’s definition of the body (and blood), since it refers to genera which are not subordinated, but simply different. Hofmann softens his appeal to Aristotelian logic by referring to the Church Fathers Athanasius and John of Damascus. Christ’s body is of a different kind than our own, since it is omnipresent. This failure of logic jeopardises the words of institution in their true sense, according to the Helmstedter theologian. Instead of standing in the proud Lutheran tradition of defending real bodily presence in the Eucharist, Andreae is placed in the same camp as Zwingli by Hofmann. By introducing a tropus, he follows an interpretation which departs from the proper sense of the word “body” (or “blood”).331 The old antithesis between necessity and contingency reappears in Hofmann’s critique of Andreae: Andreae fixes the conception of Christ as the temporal start of the ubiquity of Christ’s body and makes the ubiquitous nature a necessity.332 On the other hand, Hofmann appeals to the Saxon confession, where the voluntary act of God is underlined. An interesting methodological problem by the Wurttemberg speculations is highlighted, too: One is not allowed to make judgements concerning Christ’s body based upon anything else than His revealed word.333 An alternative to the omnipresence of the body stated by Andreae lies in the omnipotence of Christ, a feature which Hofmann frames voluntarily : Christ can, as receiving the majesty and power of God, be present where he pleases, according to the human nature, too.334 The methodological problem of how Scripture’s ipsissima verba should be understood in relation to its alleged content [res], is further dealt with in Hofmann’s critique of Andreae’s Eucharistic rationale. The Wurttemberg theologian regards the omnipresence of Christ’s humanity as the basis of

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dicitur, plus dici certum est, quam si dicat: Homo passus est, quod sub vocabulis, Filius hominis etiam Filius Dei, in unitate personae intelligat. Ein solch discrimen ist bey den gelarten / welche die formulam allegiren unbekandt […]” Hofmann, Errores, A6b. “Nun ist nicht allein ex Aristot. bey allen rechtgelerten / sondern auch ex Athanasio vnd Damasceno kundbar / quod quae nomine communicent, non autem definitione sint homonyma. Nun sagt aber D. Jacob / unsere Leiber vnd des Herrn Christi Leib im H. Abendmahl / sind so viel die Warheit belanget diversam deinitionum, derwegen setzet er Corpus homonymum, rursus autem homonymum est Tropicum. Derowegen ist nach D. Jacobs fürgeben ein Tropus in dem worten leib vnd blut / wenn Christus sagt: das ist mein Leib / das ist mein Blut / vnd bleibet also nicht der eigendliche ware verstand.” Hofmann, Errores, D1a. […] ubiquitatem a momento conceptionis Christi vniuersaliter & perpetuo necessariam. Hofmann, Errores, C1b. “Die Sächsische Bekentnus weiset vns auff Gottes willen und spricht ferner von seinem willen / aber wo er mit seinem leibe sein / was Er damit schaffen vnnd wircken wölle / Urteilen wir nicht nach unsern gedancken / sondern aus vnnd nach seinem worte / welchs Er vns dauon offenbaret hat.” Hofmann, Errores, C1a-b. “[…] die Christus nach seiner Menscheit zur rechten der Maiestet vnnd Krafft Gottes empfangen / das Er nemlich auch noch vnnd mit derselben seiner angenommenen menschlichen Natur gegenwertig sein könne / vnd auch sey wo Er wolle.” Hofmann, Errores, C3b.

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sacramental presence.335 The problem, then, is that the body of Christ is present before the act of institution has happened, and to a certain degree makes the Eucharistic liturgy superficial and even unnecessary in establishing that presence.336 Hofmann, on the other hand, claims that Luther “relies on the words of institution alone”,337 and that Luther teaches a bodily absence of Christ outside the use [ausser dem brauch].338 For Hofmann, as it was for Heshusius, it is the omnipotent power of God which is released when the words of institution reverberate. The sacramental usus is temporarily fixed as a beginning, Hofmann claims, and that act cannot be annulled by a presence which was there already [zuvorn]. As an acoustic happening, where the minister says the words of Christ, it is not fitting to understand it magically. Hofmann locates the core of the sacramental act in the “locution of Christ, the founder”. Based on Christ’s will, it is ultimately he, the founder, who creates the presence of his body and blood.339 Hofmann does not argue that the general ubiquiter in itself is against the three modes of presence which Luther presents in his great essay on the Eucharist, Confession concerning Christ’s Supper (1528). Still, he did not regard the Eucharistic presence as secured solely by that ubiquity. Hofmann refers at this point to Luther’s sceptical attitude towards speculation: He warns against attributing more knowledge of Christ’s body to Christ himself than what normal human beings can comprehend.340

335 […] omni praesentia humanae naturae, est fundamentum Sacramentalis praesentiae. Hofmann, Errores, C4b. 336 “[…] [D. Jacob lehret] das der leib Christi mit dem brot zuuorn da sey / ehe den es im Abendmahl gesegnet worden / vnnd thut das wegen der ubiquitet. [my accentuation]” Hofmann, Errores, D3b. Hofmann cites Andreae: Verba enim certe Dominicae Coenae tantum sunt verba dispensationis Corporis & sanguinis Christi, iam ante & ex alia causa communicatae videlicet Divinae proprietatis, per vnionem essentialiter in pane vino, sicut in alia quamuis Creatura praesentis. The problem, according to Hofmann, is the interpretation of the institutional words as mere dispentiational. As the last part of the sentence shows, it is the divine properties which are transferred through the communicatio which solely provide the premise for the bodily presence of Christ. Hofmann, Errores, D4a. 337 “[…] haec Lutherus / der allein den worte der einsetzung die krafft zuschreibet /” Hofmann, Errores, C5a. 338 Hofmann, Errores, D3b. 339 “[…] durch das sprechen Christi des Stiffters alleine wircket / und schaffet die gegenwart seines leibes vn bluts.” Hofmann, Errores, C6a. 340 “Dis aber [sc. ubiquity] ist nicht alleine dem zuwieder / das Lutherus drey weisen erzelet / vnnd doch keine im Abendmal für gewiss setzet / sondern wiederstrebet fürnemlich der köstlichen Regel D. Lutheri vnd Form. [Formula of Concord] pag. 307: Christus wisse vnnd habe mehr weisen / wie sein leib etwa sey / als wir Menschen.” Hofmann, Errores, D3a.

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Hofmann’s radical distinction between philosophy and theology In 1598, Hofmann published a disputation in which he himself presided and his student, Caspar Pfaffrad, was the respondent. Here, the intimate connection between a Christology, mainly built on Luther’s late Christological disputations, and the rejection of philosophy’s role in theology is displayed in its most radical version. On the basis of Colossians 2 and Galatians 5, Hofmann singles out the philosophers as the patriarchs of heretics, and claims to be in accordance with the early Church.341 Hofmann’s use of Tertullian’s negative assessment sharpens the potential problem in the wake of Luther, namely how to relate philosophy as natural cognition to theology as revelation. Even if Melanchton had not reserved a place for treating philosophy in his Loci, the polemics against Flacius and his sin–oriented anthropology created a consensus among the theologians: It was necessary to give the natural cognition of God some status. On the other hand, Hofmann could rely on some very critical remarks of Luther against reason and its role in theology.342 According to Hofmann, the philosophers deserve Tertullian’s description due to the temptations [tentationibus] they create, by presenting the power of human wisdom before the pious. Nothing is more dangerous for the spirit than this appeal to the flesh, Hofmann warns with a reference to Ephesians 6.343 Hofmann’s anxiety for the power of reason is propelled by what he regards as a tendency of his contemporary theologians, namely to revoke the articles of faith in order to embrace philosophical reasoning.344 This is Christologically explicated, too: The humanity of Christ is in the presence of all creatures. But in order to understand this mystery, Hofmann observes that the same human nature is given names loaded with philosophical problems. Christ’s humanity 341 Unde Paulus ad Coloss. 2. Philosophiam depraedantem discipulos Apostolorum agnovit, & ad Gal. 5. inter opera carnis reiecit haereses, quod primitiva Ecclesia per experientiam edocta sic explicavit: Philosophos esse haereticorum patriarchas. Daniel Hofmann, PROPOSITIONES DE DEO, ET CHRISTI TUM PERSONATUM OFFICIO: Asserentes puriorem confessionem D. Lutheri feces Scholasticas expurgantis, oppositae Pontificiis & omnibus cauponantibus verbum Dei. (Helmstedt: Iakob Luci, 1598), A2a. The citation from Tertullian is localised by Friedrich, and Friedrich has suggested that it was perceived as directed against the two philosophers in the Faculty of Arts, Johannes Caselius and Cornelius Martini, even though the direct reference is missing. Friedrich, Die Grenzen der Vernunft, 28 ff. 342 Friedrich, Die Grenzen der Vernunft, 222 ff. 343 Vis autem sapientiae humanae in tentationibus piorum sentitur grauius, cum non sint acriores tentationes quam cum caro semper aduersus spiritum concupiscens subtiioribus suis spiculis infestat animas, quae Apostolus ignita tela tou pomgqou appellat Eph. 6. Hofmann, Propositiones, A2a-b. 344 Cum vero hodie circumferimus oculos in orbe Christiano, statum eius inde miseriorem cognoscimus, quod multi Theologorum ad sapientiam carnis sublimes articulos fidei revocant, & iuventutem assuefaciun ad disputationes quibus ad Philosophiae calcuos exigitur sensus sacrarum literarum. Hofmann, Propositiones, A2b.

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has become ousia, substance. Thereby the way of speaking has departed from the sense in which it was used in relation to the Eucharist and how Christ’s presence in the Church is described. Instead of the “vicious” syllogistic reasoning, Hofmann would rather prefer to judge the problems concerning Christ’s omnipresence in light of the specific theological – and not philosophical – doctrines, namely the personal union of Christ and Christ’s sitting at the right hand of God.345 Proceeding from the incarnation and its wisdom, which is not of this world, Hofmann cites Dominus Lutherus and his disputation on John 1:14 from 1539. He is particularly concerned with Luther’s thesis 4, and the problem of philosophy taking the article of faith captive in the human ratio. This stands opposed to the apostolic prescription of being obedient to Christ, Hofmann contends.346 The consequence of opposing Luther’s understanding of the intellect is visible in the Christological logic, according to Hofmann. He points to the interpretation of mystical phrases as uncommon [inusitates], as Melanchton did in the Erotemata Dialectices. Hofmann thereby sees the theological content reduced to logic.347 The taxonomy underlying the inusitata praedicatio is interpreted as an attempt to gather everything under the concept of Logica. But this is not only a problematic totalitarian concept, Hofmann contends, it is even against the clear instruction of the apostle in 1 Corinthians, chapters 1 and 2, upon which Luther made his famous statement from the Heidelberg theses of 1518: It is necessary for he who wants to do philosophy by Aristotle, that he first of all is made a fool in Christ.348 345 Christum sua humanitate adesse omnibus creaturis, velit id intelligi, de ipsamet humanae naturae ousia, substantia & essentia, & sic adhibeat particulas hasce (substantialiter quoad substantiam) hoc profecto sensu, ut in Coena Domini, & in praesentia rescpectu Ecclesiae descripta: cohortamur ingeniosos logicos ut coram nobis experiantur, num Sylogismo necessitatem consequentiae tuente, & vitium quaternitatis terminorum ulla deflexione declinante, ex personali unione vel sessione ad dextram Dei Conclusionem illam directe elicere queant. Hofmann, Propositiones, A3c. 346 (these 15) Dominus Lutherus tum erudite tum pie scripsit: Sorbona mater errorum pessime definuit, idem esse verum in philosophia & Theologia, impieque damnauit eos qui contrarium disputauerint. Nam hac sententia abominabili docuit captiuare articuos fidei, sub iudicium rationis humanae. Hoc erat aliud nihil quam coelum & terram includere in suo centro aut grano milij. Cum contra Paulus 2. Cor 10. ver. 5. doceat, captiuandum esse omnem intellectum (pam to mogla) haud dubie & philosophiam in obsequium Christi. Haec scite & sancte Lutherus. Hofmann, Propositiones, B2b. 347 Constat istud graue Lutheri iudicium contra Sacramentarios philosophos, qui Caluinismo Theologice pudefacto & exploso, Logice palliato & reducto, applausum in Scholis conciliare conantur, contendentes, quod enunciationes mysticas seu inusitatas, oporteat per tropum reduci ad Logicas. Hofmann, Propositiones, B2b. 348 (these 19) Nec declinat iudicium istud Epicureus argutator quod inusitatam praedicationem, oporteat esse akocom nisi sit kocijg: Nam Logica non est omnis nec summa sapientia, vt quae se illi non attemperet, sit akocor & bruta, sed alia est sapientia huius seculi, principumque huius seculi qui abolentur 1. Cor 2. ver. 6. cui competit kocor quem docet sapientia humana ver. 13. alia vero sapientia DEI latens in mysterio v. 7. cui competit kocor Spiritus v. 13. ista, illis qui

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Luther’s conclusions, Hofmann asserts, have to be that dialectics or philosophy is left in its own sphere, and that we should learn to let the speaking of a new language [loqui nouis linguis] reign in the matters of faith, totally outside its sphere.349 Such a radical interpretation of Luther’s distinction between theology and philosophy paves the way for an understanding of a double truth by Hofmann. One of the problems Hofmann singles out is the fallback in the doctrine that God should be a universal, while person is a particular. This is a doctrine which allegedly comes from John of Damascus. To some extent, Bellarmine shows the same structure of thought when he says that divinity is in many suppositions, and therefore it has universal strength.350 Another accusation Hofmann makes against Bellarmine concerns his “numbering” God, which is fixing the essence of God in a numerical system. Taking departure from Psalms 147:5, where God’s magnitude is described as without end, Hofmann sees this – together with other Scriptural dicta – as a restriction on investigating the nature of God. Still, Bellarmine is not ashamed of stating that the infinity of God is essence, potentiality and wisdom, concluding that God is one. For Hofmann, it seems as if the oneness is to be taken in a numerical-mathematical sense. The problem of this qualification, however, is the implied induction from the human intellect to the divine that the unity of God is not possible to investigate from a philosophical viewpoint.351 This is in line with the more general accusation Hofmann makes of the pontifical theology, or perhaps more exactly rendered, of pereunt stultitia est 1. Cor. 1. ver. 18. vocatis autem filijs Dei sapientia ver. 24. Cum altera iudicio Dei non solum infatuetur ver. 20. sed etiam aboleatur ver. 19. Hinc Luciano isti respondet Lutherus: Qui sine periculo volet philosophari in Aristotele, necesse est vt ante bene stultificetur in Christo. Hofmann, Propositiones, B2b-B3a. 349 (These 20) Tenemus itaque rursus, quod Lutherus concludit inquiens: Recte ergo fecerimus, si dialectica seu philosophia in sua sphaera relictis, discamus loqui nouis linguis in regno fidei, extra omnem sphaeram. Alioqui futurum est, vt vinum nouum in vteres veteres immittamus, & vtrumque perdamus, vt Sorbona fecit. Hofmann, Propositiones, B3a. 350 (These 36) Eodem recidit opinio quorundam ex Damasceno inuenta, quod Deus sit vniuersale, persona particulare. Et quamuis Bellarminus hunc scopulum nonnihil refugiat, quia tamen non sincere agit, alliditur tandem ad eum cum lib. 1. de Christo cap. 17. scribit: Tametsi Deitas non est quid vniuersale vt humanitas, tamen est in pluribus suppositis, & ideo vim habet vniuersalis. Si vero prius vitandum est, reprobandum est & posterius, cum in recessu idem largiatur haereticis. Hofmann, Propositiones, B4b. 351 (These 41) Vetus versio Psal. 149. habet: Magnitudinis Domini non est finis LXX. ouj etsi peqar. Bellarminus autem sic citat: Magnitudinis eius non est numerus (Psalm. 147. vers. 5. Sapientiae Iehouae non est numerus. Conuenit Hebraeo & septuaginta.) Nec tamen erubescit ex eo quod Deus infinitus sit in essentia, potentia, sapientia concludere, Deum vnum esse numero. Hebraice in Psal. 45 negatur inuestigatio magnitudinis Dei, sicut scrutatio sapientiae Dei. Esaiae 40. vers. 28. & Iobi 11. vers. 7. Num in inuestigatione Deum inuenies? Recte igitur Spiritus sanctus collineat ad nostrum scopum, quod definitio vnitatis Dei sit imperuestigabilis, itaque avikosovor. Si quis vero hic sumpserit sibi philosophicam definitionem, is probare debet se in inuestigatione abyssi ambulasse Iobi 38. vers. 16. Hofmann, Propositiones, C1a.

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scholastic theology : They misuse philosophy and thereby make the doctrine of God corrupt. Hofmann seems to consider Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus as being on the same level here, and attacks their alleged univocity of philosophical and theological truth.352 The semantic theory of Scotus implies a subordination of “God’s wisdom” and “man’s wisdom” under the concept of wisdom itself, in order to preserve a certain possibility of pursuing scientific theology,353 and thereby affirming a certain natural cognition of God: It presumes a quid est Deus, and Scotus localises this in the ability of abstraction, the transcendence of the sensuous experiences.354 This seems to be rejected by Hofmann as an intolerable induction of human wisdom into the realm of the divine. Aquinas’ attempt at putting analogy as a proper middle way for theology between the Scylla of univocal predication and the Carybdis of equivocal predication, is not – as one could expect – regarded as a valid option for Hofmann. Hofmann points at the philosophical predicaments of the Jesuits in their Christological writings, too. It is the description of human nature in the person of Christ as not having a proper subsistence that gives rise to Hofmann’s critique. As a result, the assumption is understood as the flight of the eternal Word to the same Word’s subsistence. Therefore, the real union between the natures in the person is excluded, as is the incarnation of the whole deity in one person.355 We should not wonder that Bellarmine sees the communicatio idiomatum merely as an art of speaking [modo loquendi], not containing any reality [res], according to Hofmann.356 352 (These 26) Abusu Philosophiae Pontificij omnem veritatem doctrinae de Deo corrumpunt. Scotus lib. 1. sen. dict. 3. censet nomina communia Deo & creaturis dici de Deo & illis vniuoce. Thomas autem 1. parte summae q. 13. art. 5. neque vniuoce ea nomina de Deo & creaturis praedicari, neque pure aequivoce, sed analogice secundum analogiam proportionis vnius ad alterum, docet. Hofmann, Propositiones, B3a. 353 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology ; Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2005), 109. 354 This is particularly visible in his metaphysics, as Honnefelder points out: “Da der Verstand den erkannten Inhalt, der in dem ihn bewegenden Gegenstand enthalten ist, von diesem Gegenstand abzulösen (abstrahere) und als solchen für sich zu betrachten (considerare) vermag, zeigen sich die Begriffe einiger Bestimmtheiten, wie “Seiend”, “eines”, “wahr”, sowie die Begriffe von Vollkommenheiten wie “weise”, “gut” usf. als solche, deren formaler Inhalt von sich her unbestimmt (indifferens) ist zu jeder näher determinierten Weise und die darum vom Sinnlichen wie vom Nichtsinnlichen univok gemeinsam ausgesagt werden können. Für die Frage der Gotteserkenntnis bedeutet dies, dass Gott zwar nicht “unter dem Sinngehalt seines besonderen Wesens”, wohl aber “unter dem Sinngehalt des Seienden” erkennbar ist.” Honnefelder, Scientia Transcendens, 159. 355 (These 45) De persona vero Christi & duabus in ea naturis videatur quid philosophetur Iesuita. Lib. 3. cap. 8. vniri hypostatice Deu & hominem nihil aliud esse dicit, quam naturam humanam non habere propriam subsistentiam, sed assumptam esse a verbo aeterno ad ipsam verbi subsistentiam. Hic si excludit, quod de ipsarum naturarum in persona tou kocou vnione alias docetur, & quod tota Deitas in vna personarum incarnata sit […] Hofmann, Propositiones, C2a. 356 Eodem lib. Bellarm. cap. 19. communicationem idiomatum non de re, sed de modo loquendi

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Instead of such philosophical speculations, Hofmann acknowledges the description of the Formula of Concord, where the personal union of God and man is referred to as a koinonia of two natures. He is careful to refute an interpretation of koinonia as the effect of the union, however. Bellarmine came close when he saw the koinonia as flowing from the unio hypostatica. According to Hofmann, the koinonia of the natures is rather to be described as constituted upon the union.357 A main point for Hofmann is that every aspect of the union of the natures in Christ is different from that of philosophy, which is valid for the term omnipresence, too.358 Hofmann tries to draw a circle around the mystery of Christ’s presence and frames that mystery within a soteriological understanding of the sacraments in usum.359 Johannes Kepler The renowned mathematician and astronomist Johannes Kepler (1571 – 1630) was a theologian, too, educated in Lutheran Tübingen. Although he was born, raised and trained as a Lutheran, he did not want to sign the Formula of Concord. Kepler’s refusal to sign was due to the doctrine of Christ and Eucharist which were proposed in it, particularly the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ’s body. That disclaimer cost him the possibility of becoming a pastor in Würtemberg, which made signing the Formula one of its prerequisites for holding an ecclesiastical office. What was the reason for his rejection? Kepler understood himself as committed to Scripture, as it was witnessed to in the ancient church and the Confessio Augustana.360 It may therefore not be a

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intelligit, itaque verbalem statuit, quod ut in Sacramentarijs ita & in hoc Iesuita culpandus ducimus. Hofmann, Propositiones, C2a. (These 47) Nos retinemus confessionem harum Ecclesiarum repetitam in Formula concordiae, quod ad constitutionem personae, quae sit Deus & homo ex vnione personali, duarum naturarum joimyia referenda sit. Ne si haec joimymia effectum sit vnionis, haec praeter illam constituta cogitetur ; sed decet causam citra effectum integram esse, quod negatum a Samosateno reprehendit Form. concordiae. Hofmann, Propositiones, C2a. [These 56] Extorsit autem hanc concessionem Ecclesiarum nostrarum confessio, quam cum Dominus Chemnitius in eo vrgeret, quod vnitissima praesentia humanitatis assumpta in & cum kºc\, toto genere differret ab omnipraesentia, senserunt dissentientium conscientiae vim scientiae, quod perperam ex vno alterum necessario eliceretur, si & quatenus toto genere differrent sic collata. Hofmann, Propositiones, C3a. [These 90] Idcirco & hoc reprobamus, quod quidam in regno Christi, tum quo ad Ecclesiam, tum quo a Dominum, super omnes creaturas, vtramque naturam Christi postulant, sed ita, ne humana agat quod sibi proprium est, sed vt merae actiones diuinae edantur, quod ex illa veritate carnis Christi, quae a nostra est alia, facile inferri potest. Hofmann, Propositiones. I find Krafft’s indexation of Kepler as “Überkonfessioneller Christ” insofar fitting, as it points to the problems of limiting Kepler within one tradition. The signs point, however, clearly in direction of a humanistic, left-wing Protestantism. Fritz Krafft, “Johannes Kepler,” Theologische Realenzyklopedie 18 (1989): 101. Although there are many expressions which definitely

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surprise that he argues with Scriptural arguments and claims the Formula to be contrary to the “clear Word of God”.361

The book of Scripture In a letter written in 1609 to Johann Friedrich, duke of Württemberg, Kepler explains his reluctance to sign the Formula as a problem with the “circumscription of all further peaceful negotiations”. The status of the document is only conditionaliter to interpret, according to Kepler. He underlines the problematic ecumenical implications it would have for the relation to the Calvinists as an argument against signing, but the letter shows that a substantial critique of the theological profile of the Formula is involved, too.362 The diverging theological questions, which are seen to be fundamental articles of faith in the Formula of Concord, do not represent a threat to the unity of the Church, Kepler points out. Kepler regards the ecclesiastical unity as qualified by Scripture and the Church Fathers because the faith rests upon these antique sources. Theological opinions may differ, however. This distinction between faith and theology represents a major difference between Kepler and his adversaries.363 Whereas the propagators of being faithful to the Formula of Concord regards the disputed doctrinal questions as constitutive for faith, are ecumenical in nature, Kepler regarded himself as an – although liberal – adherent to the Confessio Augustana. Cf. his “Glaubensbekenntnis”, where he states in the defense of his rejection to sign the Concord: “So nun heutiges Tags einige Parthey oder liber Symbolicus oder Confession auffkommen / welliche sich nach ebenmässigen fundamenten richtet / so fern und in welchen articulis sie diss helt / so fern und in denselbigen articulis mag ich leiden / das ich nach dem Meister oder Namen des Buchs genennet werde. Wie dann ich nicht in abred bin / das ich die Augspurgische Confession, ohne underscheid der underschiedlichen Editionen, alle und jede dieselbige hiemit gemeinet / weil sie nicht in Ja und Nein / sondern nur in magis et minus differirn, für ein solliches Buch halte”. Johannes Kepler, Gesammelte Werke (ed. Walther von Dyck; München: C.H. Beck, 1937), 12, 24. As Wollgast points out, this sovereign subjective freedom vis-a-vis the communities of faith prepares the ground for Spinoza, who does not need to belong to any religious community. Siegfried Wollgast, Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, 1550 – 1650 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1988), 226. 361 Wollgast, Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, 1550 – 1650, 227. 362 “[…] der formulae Concordiae nit anderts als conditionaliter, de non oppugnandam, vnd cum exceptione tractanae Pacis nachmahlen zu vnderschreiben. In sonderlichen bedenckhen, das jch auch sonsten von Jugend auff in articulo de Coena nie befinden khönden, das ainer der Calvinischen mainung beygethan (so doch das er vnserer Kirchen mainung nit lestere, oder für gefahrlich halte, auch sich kainer behelffe gebrauche, als sensus verborum Christi) von dieser vngleichen Mainung wegen nit sollte vnser Bruder in Christo genennet oder gehalten werden, wan er auch gleich ein Lehrer wär.” Cited in Jürgen Hübner, Die Theologie Johannes Keplers zwischen Orthodoxie und Naturwissenschaft (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, 1975), 108, n.2. 363 “Der Divergenz der theologischen Streitfragen geht die Einheit des gemeinsamen Glaubens voraus, wie er in Schrift und kirchlichem Altertum begründet ist.” Hübner, Theologie, 109.

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Kepler regards them as legitimate theological opinions within an academic discourse. This applies particularly to Christology. Kepler’s understanding of persona Christi shares the premise of the Lutheran orthodoxy, namely that the Son of God assumed human nature in Mary’s womb. In a letter to his former student, the old Tübingen theologian Matthias Hafenreffer admonishes Kepler to ponder upon John 1:14 – “The Word became flesh”. Hafenreffer underlines Kepler’s orthodoxy regarding the properties of the eternal Word and the flesh, but accuses Kepler for not paying enough attention to the event contained in the word ‘became’ [factum est].364 Kepler replies in his notes on the letter365 that the whole, omnipresent Word has become flesh, namely that the infinite Word have entered [intraverit] the finite thing without restricting itself and without returning to separated infinite and finite entities. It has not left the creatures, either.366 But this is as far as Kepler could go without evolving into what he considers as futile speculation. Kepler regards the “contemplation of the flesh” and the contradiction between infinite and finite being involved in such contemplation as wrong. Instead, one should rather be occupied with the Word of God itself. With a reference to the weakness of our nature, Kepler warns against some sort of intellectual hubris which believes it can comprehend what he labels “divine laws”.367 He does not give a precise definition of what he means by this concept, however, but the context seems to evoke a diastatic notion of the relationship between theology and the other sciences. As a consequence, Kepler strictly keeps the domain of faith apart from the domain of physics and geometry : From a geometrical point of view, it seems absurd that the infinite Logos can be placed under the conditions of circumscriptive spatiality as Mary’s womb or on the cross.368 Hafenreffer concedes to the notion of two different spheres, and underlines that there exists no real likeness between infinite disparate things,369 but that difference in the ratio of the spheres does not prevent Hafenreffer to 364 Quod dum in responsoria tua tentare adnisus es, in duobus quidem prioribus vocibus non improbo, quae es meditatus, sed in tertia (factum est) vel combinando (verbum) caro factum est (ignosce singularis Amici integerrimo candori) haud parum es hallucinatus. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 41, 30 – 36. 365 Jo. Kepleri notae ad epistolam D.D. Matthiae Hafenreffi, quam is ad Keplerum scripsit, Anno 1619. ultimo Julii […] The “notes” were published in Acta Mentzeriana 1625 366 […] quod Verbum totum, quantum est, totum cum omni sua Omnipraesentiam, non deserens creaturas, totum inquam sit Caro factum, id est quod infinitus intraverit rem finitam nec ipse coartatus, nec finitam infinitam reddens […] Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 52, 30 – 33. 367 quod hodie occuperemur perperam in contemplatione carnis, miracula in ea contradictionem involventia suspicientes, cum rectius occuparemur in Deo verbo ipso, in quo etsi aliqua nobis videntur contradictoria, ea tamen omnium confessione tutius credi possunt et debent, quia naturae nostrae imbecillitas divinitatis leges non capit, cum capiat humanitatis. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 52. 368 Hübner, Theologie, 54. 369 […] ratio nullam verisimilitudinem prius habitura est, quam rerum infinitis modis differentium eandem rationem esse tibi fueris imaginatus. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 42, 44 – 46.

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contemplate the incarnated word as the flesh it has assumed. He refers to the doxological notion of 1. Tim 3:16, where it is stated that “God is manifest in flesh”370, and claims that the opposition of Kepler is based on a (Aristotelian) physical and geometrical imagination. It is the restriction of Christ’s body to a particular, circumscriptive place which causes Hafenreffer to classify Kepler’s view as representing a mere secular perspective.371 From his Loci Theologici (1600), however, it is evident that Hafenreffer struggles with the anthropological implication of the strong unionist Christology. At the time of death, even though Christ’s body and soul are separated at the time of death, the natures remain unified within the Logos.372 There are weak sides to this argument, however, particularly if it is asked whether the indissoluble union has to conform to the understanding of death as the separation of body and soul. Another problem concerns the interpretation of the Logos as the only life–giving donor after the incarnation, leaving the human nature behind in death, even if the human nature is communicating its properties with the Logos. Replying to Hafenreffer’s accusation of doing theology on the basis of reason, Kepler questions if any mode of carnal presence can be drawn from the personal union of Christ.373 He is content with the traditional accounts of the subject matter, witnessed to by the ancient Church: It is the Württemberg theologians, who are teaching a doctrinal newness, which the patriarchs condemn.374 If the traditional accounts are taken as they sound [de simplici sono], they refer usually to a gratious presence of a voluntary mode, Kepler insists. As examples, the promise of Matt 18:20: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them” and the sending of the disciples Matt 28:18 – 20: “I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world”. The option of a voluntary presence of Kepler excludes an understanding of “the narrowness of the flesh” [carnis angustiis] and the reign of 370 This is the general notion under which Hafenreffer subsumes the interpretation of the two antiEutychian adverbs of the Chalcedonian confession. Matthias Hafenreffer, “Loci Theologici,” in Loci Theologici, Certa Methodo Ac Ratione, in Tres Libros Tributi. (1600; repr, Tübingen: Georg Gruppenbach, 1603), 315, 317. 371 […] Si cogitationes tuas ad contemplationem Mysterij, quod Johannes tribus verbis complexus est, dirigere velis: o kocor saqn ercemeto, verbum caro factum est: nihil opus est, ut uterum virgineum, in quo Incarnationis Mysterium inceptum perfectumque est, aut crucem Golgathaeam, in qua kocor, vita aeterna, exaltatus pependit dimetiare. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 43, 3 – 7. 372 Quanquam igitur in morte Christi Anima a Corpore vere dissoluta fuerit: neutrum tamen illorum dissolutum fuit a kocy. Adeoque naturalis tantum Animae & Corporis, non Personalis Tou kocou Unio per mortem dissoluta fuit. Hafenreffer, “Loci,” 319. 373 Quot modis rebusque caro praesens sit, quaestio non fuit; sed quinam modus qui rerum numerus ex unione personali cum kocy infinito consequatur. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 56, 10 – 12. 374 Cum igitur neque evinceretur carnis omnipraesentia argumento novitio, et patrum consensus eam repudiaret […] Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 56, 35 – 36.

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our body in heaven, which is proposed by Hafenreffer. Kepler thereby turns the argument of Hafenreffer on its head: According to Kepler, it is rather the opponents who are arguing sensu Geometrica et physica by using the flesh of Christ as the premise of their Christological reasoning. Arguably, we are at the heart of Kepler’s opposition here. It is the Lutheran insistence on the omnipresence of Christ’s flesh, which Kepler is unable to accept. This is a problematic rationalization of the truth of faith into a simple propositional truth [Für–wahr–halten] in a philosophical understanding, Kepler claims. He sees the subscription of divine properties to the human nature in Christ as destroying the very understanding of what a human being is, as a particular being–in–the–world. When the Lutherans in Württemberg claimed the body of Christ to be omnipresent, Kepler claims that it represents a logic which opens for rather awkward statements. How is it possible to understand the womb of Mary as restricted to the single woman of ancient Palestine, as long as the God–man within her bodily fills heaven and earth?375 Hafenreffer refutes that the omnipresence of Mary’s womb would be a necessary consequence of the Damascene’s doctrine. For him, a distinction between the place in which [in quo] the infinite Logos assumes flesh, and the mystery in which the Logos assumes personal unity within [intra] its own infinity, has to be drawn. Crucial to Hafenreffer is the qualification of the unity as personal, signified by the Greek word hypostasis.376 Further, Hafenreffer underlines that it was not finite flesh which was made omnipresent, but the infinite Logos, which in turn assumed flesh and was personally united with the flesh.377 He regards the omnipresence of Christ’s body as a secondary consequence of the union, not the primary act itself. If Kepler’s geometry in principle denies the Logos to spatially expand and attain omnipresence after it had assumed flesh, Hafenreffer wonders if only a part of the Logos is incarnated, then? Would not that imply a division within the Logos itself ?378 As a proper description, Hafenreffer cites Luther’s Christological rule after the incarnation: “Where God, there man.”379

375 This argument is repeated in the notae: […] ex locutione Damasceni sequi, si ratio argumentandi Theologis usitata locum habeat, ut uterus fiat omnipraesens, ut Mariae Schoss über aller Welt Kraiss all gegenwertig werden. Descendit, inquit, ut incarnaretur. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 53 – 54. 376 […] primum intellige, quam infinita sit differentia inter uterum virgineum, in quo kocor carnem assumpsit: et inter ineffabile illud Mysterium, quo infinitus kocor intra infinitae suae upostaseyr unitatem, finitam carnem assumpsit. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 42. 377 Itaquoque finita caro non facta est omnipraesens, licet infinito assumenti kocy in unam et infinitam eiusdem upostasim sit personaliter unita. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 42. 378 Magnum illud citra controversiam Mysterium, carnem assumptam non ita adsumpsit, ut etiam EXTRA illam esse velit, quod tuae Imaginationes somniant: in uno quidem loco esse, in carne, ut in utero virgineo, in cruce, in Galilea, Judaea, in caeteris infinitis locis (quia kocor infinitus) esse extra carnem. Ergo re non totus kocor erit incarnatus! Ergo kocor partem habebit extra partem. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 43, 22 – 36.

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Kepler admits that he disagrees with Luther concerning the ubiquity of the flesh of Christ, and ask if not the inept way of talking of God must be seen in light of the aggressive rhetoric used against the opinions of Zwingli?380 He refers to the ancient Church and its doctrine of God being above [supra] the flesh, and it paves the way for an important argument for Kepler’s resistance against the Formula of Concord: In God proper [in Deum proprie] there is neither “where”, nor “when”, nor “descend insofar”. Qualified as actions ad intra, Kepler underlines that they correspond to God’s actions ad extra.381 This premise is shared by both. But where Hafenreffer is willing to let the communication within the personal union transfer the infinite idioms to the flesh of Christ – and therefore be present everywhere –, Kepler does not see such a conclusion possible. To explain his reluctance, he cites Aristotle: If the thing is nowhere, it does not exist,382 geometrically speaking. It does not mean that it cannot be qualified theologically, however. But a theological qualification would have to regard solely the divine nature of Christ as omnipresent. An acceptance of Hafenreffer’s argument would inevitably lead to embracing the Eutychan heresy of mixing the natures, according to Kepler.383 The book of nature Kepler’s theology of nature and the larger metaphysical framework is not isolated from his work as an interpreter of Scripture and the confessions. How can his resistance against the Christology in Württemberg be understood against his general scientific outlook? Could his Platonic–pythagorean notion of the universe as constructed from few mathematical shapes and patterns offer a clue?384 If the advocated cosmology – God’s intervention in Christ included – is reduced to its constitution on natural laws, or expanded to a self–sufficient participation of the finite nature in the infinite wisdom and 379 Lutherus ait; Wo du mir CHRISTUM GOTT hinsetzest / da mustu mir auch CHRISTUM den MENSCHEN hinsetzen. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 43, 32 – 34. 380 […] ne videantur temere secuti errantem, an denique motus humanus in rebus Dei ineptissimus, ne coelum ruat, si appareat, Lutherum caput factionis ab adversariis habitum, in tanta pkgqovoqia, tanta contentione contra Zwinglium, impegisse […] Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12, 58, 21 – 25. 381 Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12,59. 382 […] Quod nuspiam est, id ne est quidem. Kepler, Gesammelte Werke, 12,59,14. One of Aristotle’s most important premises is that every entity must have a spatial extension. All things that are, are somewhere (Phys. IV 1, 208a29). A thing x exists if, and only if, there is somewhere x is. Cf. Benjamin Morison, On Location: Aristotle’s Concept of Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), particularly page 17. 383 Hübner, Theologie, 64. 384 R.S. Westman, “Kepler’s Theory of Hypothesis and the ‘Realist Dilemma’,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3, no. 3 (November 1972): 233 – 64.

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power of the Creator, it would be difficult for Kepler to accept the Württemberg doctrine of praesentia Christi.385 What kind of theological features are found in the cosmology of Kepler, then? As an astronomer, Kepler sees himself as a priest [sacerdos] of the book of nature. He does not isolate the innate quality of nature itself, but regards it as a revelation of God’s glory.386 In line with Melanchton, Kepler underlines that divine truth is not restricted to the Bible, but can be recognized in the book of nature, too.387 In his first astronomical work, Mysterium cosmographicum, Kepler holds the view that God has revealed the universe as a perfect image of God.388 Summary The resistance against the Christology of the Formula of Concord is formulated in three different ways by Heshusius, Hofmann and Kepler. For Heshusius, the main concern is to restrict the range of the Christological predications to Melanchthon’s logical qualifications. Christology is a matter of faith, a mystery, and it would be a sacrilege to adopt philosophical explanations into that department. The real presence in the Eucharist is rather underpinned with a notion of Christ’s possibility to transcend or overcome the physical limits of a bodily presence. Therefore, he bases his interpretation of communicatio idiomatum on the omnipotence of God. For Hofmann, there is a similar attitude towards the thought of ubiquity. But his resistance highlights a more fundamental problem of the relation between theology and philosophy. Hofmann considers them to be in radical opposition, and some of his expressions points to an adoption of a double 385 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 200. 386 In a letter to Herwart Hohenburg 1598, Kepler states: Ego vero sic censeo, cum Astronomj, sacerdotes dej altissimj ex parte librj Naturae simus: decere non ingenij laudem, sed Creatoris praecipue gloriam spectare. Cited from Charlotte Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen Stimulus to a Theological Mathematics (St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History ; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 22. 387 Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen Stimulus to a Theological Mathematics, 207. 388 Kepler’s theological convictions have often been dismissed as mere mysticism or Neoplatonism. Barker and Goldstein, however, have recently argued that Kepler’s theological ideas do not only serve as horizon for his astronomical convictions, but are crucial in solving theoretical problems of the Copernican cosmological theory. They point to the methodological problem of Copernicanism, namely Aristotelian theories of demonstration. Because of – and not in spite of, as it is often assumed – his theological training, Kepler was able to skip a large part of the obligatory regressus in favour of a simple retraction of demonstration solely to the a priori. Barker and Goldstein explain this new feature by referring to the natural theology of Melanchton and the educational system he founded. His conviction of the possibility to trace the laws of nature back to the will of God – especially in Initia doctrina physicae (1549) – paved the way for an observation of empirical phenomena directly to one true cause, and from there on a demonstration of the original phenomenon a priori. Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler’s Astronomy,” Osiris, 2nd Series 16 (2001): 88 – 113.

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truth. Hofmann is not a simple fideist, however, and he served as a professional philosopher before he moved to the theological faculty. One of his main points is that the character of event between the natures of Christ disappears if an omnipresence of Christ’s body is taught. In his rejection of the doctrine of Christ in the Formula of Concord, Kepler shares some concerns with the Helmstedt theologians. He emphasises Scripture as giving the only verbal rules – and not only some content – for the doctrine of Christ. But his systematic problem with ubiquity is a different one, which resembles the concern of Calvin and his followers: Kepler distinguishes radically between infinite and finite being. The infinite Logos can not be placed under the finite, physical conditions of our world, a view Kepler finds supported by the Early church, too.

Summary of the chapter From Westphal’s reaction to Consensus Tigurinus to Kepler’s critique of the Formula of Concord’s Christology, many Christological problems of the second Lutheran generation have been highlighted. Is it possible to point to some general lines in the theological development? It is worth noting that Westphal does not involve himself in speculations on the body of Christ or its modes of presence, but is only interested in retaining the bodily significance of the words of institution, the verba of 1 Cor 11. This strict biblically grounded Christology – at least in its function as defence of the real presence in the Eucharist – was expanded already in Timann’s response to Hardenberg in the Bremen controversy on the Eucharist. In his response, Timann did not only ignore Westphal’s advice of not involving any “physical” arguments in the debate. He responded with a Farrago, too, just as Westphal did, but with explicitly adding the omnipresence and omnipotence of the body of Christ – through the incarnation and exaltation to the right hand of God – as a rationale for the real presence in the Eucharist. Timann added a number of citations from authorities, who, according to Timann, had taught the ubiquity of Christ’s body. It is difficult to say why the argument of ubiquity becomes prominent at this point. Perhaps it was a doubt that the words of Scripture could be sufficient for rejecting doctrinal errors. The interest in the Early church is manifest at the time, and is used by contemporary Lutherans to support their claim of a correct interpretation of Scripture. One such example is the Magdeburg Centuries of Matthias Flacius and his collaborators. Another possibility is simply the strong influence of Johannes Brenz, whose Christology Timann made use of. Timann’s adversary in Bremen, Albert Hardenberg However, Brenz did not develop his Christology fully until the late 1550’s and early 1560’s. But when he did, the intimacy between the natures was

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taken as far as Luther did. The latter’s dictum “where God, there man” was taken to the extremes by Brenz, too, as it is visible in his doctrine of ubiquity. Due to the union of the natures, God participates in death to the extent that Brenz can state the God himself [Deus ipse] died on the cross. The person of Christ is not a tertium quid, but is the event of communication of the natures itself. Communicatio idiomatum was the ultimate theological premise he relied on in the polemic against the Aristotelian cosmology of Bullinger. His understanding of the Christological concept is far from a mere repetition of Luther’s interpretation. It marks a profiled expansion of the metaphysical implications already present in Luther’s Christology. Where Luther qualified Christ’s bodily presence by appealing to the different perspectives of theology and philosophy, Brenz appealed to the different “schools” of heaven and earth. Although the position of Brenz may seem similar to that of Luther in structure, there are differences or development in Brenz’ conception. When Luther used the three modes of presence of Gabriel Biel, it corresponded to the three main stages of Christ’s lives and remained restricted in its application to that area of theology. For the Eucharistic use, Luther explicitly stated the diffinitive mode as correlating to Christology. In Brenz’ thought, this mode is left out. This leads to a weaker conception of place. The diastatic notion of a body stretched between a repletive and a circumscriptive mode threatens the “room” for Christ, so to speak. There is in other words an internal systemic friction between the ubiquity of Christ and his presence on the altar. On the other hand, the qualification of the body of Christ as elevated above all space opens up for a more speculative approach which “reconnects” theology to philosophy in a creative way : When the presence of Christ is taken out of space as a qualified by Aristotelian physics, it enables the theologian to extend that body to everything. When our temporal – spatial categories are unable to interpret the presence of Christ, the theologian can qualify the world anew as long as the premise of the indivisible union of natures in Christ is kept. This speculative force was probably too much for the less metaphysically inclined Martin Chemnitz. Although he contended to the unionist cause of Brenz, he tried to restrict his Christology to a more biblical foundation. But the necessity of situating Christology within a rational framework is not omitted with an insistence on retaining a scriptural premise: Chemnitz places his understanding of Christ within different classes of divine presence. The classes are marked with a graded presence of God, most importantly connected to the voluntary decision of God. Chemnitz’ lasting contribution to the development of Christological thought remains his three classes or genera of Christological predications. Unlike his teacher, Melanchthon, Chemnitz does not restrict these predications to logic, but insists that their character is real. This is valid for the most famous of the Christological classes, too, namely the genus maiestaticum. But the transfer of divine properties to the human nature is marked by an

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important feature of Chemnitz’ theological thinking, namely the preoccupation with omnipotence and its corollary ‘possibility’: Christ can be bodily present everywhere. It is not always clear whether Christ’s body actually is omnipresent or not. The same problem appears from the other nature of Christ, when Chemnitz refuses to locate divine nature in less lofty spheres, such as dirt and mud. That said, his focus is of a soteriological and ecclesiastic nature: God wants to be found where his promises apply. The ambivalence between Brenz’ and Chemnitz’ solutions is mirrored in the Formula of Concord. The Formula tries to balance the two aspects, but as a result, it is difficult to know if it teaches a real omnipresence or if it just states that Christ’s body has the possibility of transcending the limits of physics. This is particularly visible in the understanding of the critical ontological questions concerning Jesus’ life and death: Was there a real increase of wisdom in Jesus? Did divinity participate in the death on the cross? There is a certain uneasiness in giving a clear–cut answer to these questions, but its very inconclusiveness points to the difficult problems involved. Further development and different answers to the Christological problem can be seen in the Lutheran critiques of the Formula of Concord. The two Helmstedt theologians Tilemann Heshusius and Daniel Hofmann sharpen the eyes for the metaphysical problems involved, insisting on a strong demarcation from the “mystery of faith” over against rationalistic tendencies. Heshusius insists that it is not possible to state more than the possibility of Christ to transcend the limits of physics, and therefore hardly states more than Melanchthon’s subjugation of Christological predication under logic. One should not, as Melanchthon said, expand Christ’s body to sticks and stones. Hofmann is more concerned about the principal difference between philosophy and theology. In his critique of Jacob Andreae, Hofmann sees a number of problems arising from the imported philosophical terminology, particularly the former’s notion of essence. For Hofmann who used to be a professor of philosophy in Helmstedt, bestowing the essence of humanity with divine properties must imply a flight from the concrete (in the person) to the abstract. That would lead to mixing the natures. Another problem which Hofmann underlines concern the temporal problem of first stating the presence of Christ everywhere, then reading the words of institution of the Eucharist. But Hofmann’s most infamous attack on the Christology of Andreae was his interpretation of Luther’s disputation on John 1,14. There the contrast between philosophy and theology is taken to its most extreme, where dialectics is banished to remain in its own sphere. Any involvement of Aristotle would destroy the doctrine of Christ. As a result, Hofmann seems to have taught a kind of double truth. Thereby he highlights a suspicion felt by both Calvinists and Jesuits: The Lutheran doctrine of Christ rests on some sort of fideism. Johannes Kepler, perhaps more famous for his work as a astronomer, was a theologian who rejected the doctrine of Christ in the Formula of Concord. For

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Kepler it was wrong to state a doctrine which there was weak foundation for in the Bible and Early church, especially if one considered the ecumenical implications. A Christology of the sort which is promoted in the Formula would inevitably lead to a devotion to the flesh of Christ, a problem felt due to Kepler’s acceptance of the nulla proportio doctrine: The finite flesh has no proportion to infinite being. But even the method itself represents a big problem for Kepler, because it reduces faith to a set of propositional truths. Instead, Kepler invokes what he regarded as Luther’s method: To stick to the words as they sound.

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The controversy between Giessen and Tübingen Introduction Even if the Formula of Concord – not without success – tried to unite the different approaches to Christology within the conservative circles in the tradition of the Augsburg Confession, the basic questions were not settled. A severe controversy broke out between two important faculties of theology in the Lutheran tradition in the middle of the second decade of the seventeenth century. The conflict between theologians at the University of Giessen on the one hand, and theologians at the University of Tübingen on the other, exposed what may seem subtle – but important – differences in the interpretation of Christ’s person. It is important to have in mind the intellectual circumstances of the Giessen-Tübingen controversy, namely that it happens on the verge to early orthodoxy. When Jakob Martini (1570 – 1649), the professor of philosophy in Wittenberg since 1602, declared in his Vernunfftspiegel (1618) that metaphysics was a “true mark of Lutheran thought”,1 it was not only the fears of Daniel Hofmann and his sympathisers which became reality. It was the sign of a change in the mentality that dominated the Lutheran universities. From now on, the reception of science within the area of the Formula of Concord pointed in a direction where the dialectics of Melanchthon was transformed in two directions: First, logic treated the known as such (conceptus formalis), and metaphysics treated what was known (conceptus obiectivus). The latter was theologically less “charged” and “weaker” than its Calvinist counterpart; it opted for a science stripped of (Christian) revealed content.2 The Lutherans

1 Cited from: Sparn, Wiederkehr, 5. 2 A typical rejection of the reformed/Calvinist view, was that the Trinity should be a cognitive necessity outside the revealed content of Scripture: Atque hic est iste discursus Keckermanni, quo Trinitatem personarum invicte demonstrari posse existimat, ita quidem, ut tam necessarium sit in Dei essentia tres personas agnoscere, quam necessarium, hominem esse rationalem. […] I. Manifesta Scripturae testimonia, quae leguntur Matth. 11. vers. 27. Nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater, neque, Patrem novit quisquam, nisi Filius, & cuicunque voluerit Filius revelare. Ioh. 1. v. 18. Deum nemo vidit unquam, unigenitus ille Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse nobis enarravit. 1. Corinth. 2. v. 11. Ea quae sunt Dei, nemo novit, nisi Spiritus Dei. Hinc colligo: Si SS. Trinitatis mysterium non nisi ex revelatione divina cognosci potest, sequitur, nulla ratiocinatione humana illud firmiter demonstrari posse. Balthasar Meisner, Philosophia sobria, hoc est: Pia consideratio quaestionum philosophicarum, in controversiis theologicis, quas Calviniani moverunt orthodoxis, subinde occurrentium (Giessen: Nicolai Hampelius, 1611), 1137 – 39.

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came to understand their newly adopted metaphysics gradually as ontology, reigned by reason. It was a science about being as being, ens qua ens.3 Although that methodological clarification prevented the fideist notion that reason (as Aristotelian philosophy) should be alien to a theological treatment of Christ, it did not solve how the presence of Christ should be theologically qualified. Some influential historians of the Christian dogma of the nineteenth century considered the theme of the controversy to be little more than a new scholasticism in the worst sense of the term, but it was not regarded as a flight from religious concerns by the participants themselves. On the contrary, a false doctrine would attack the core of the Gospel, the treasure of the Church. As one of its most active defenders of the Tübingen position said in a sermon towards the end of the sixteenth Century, the doctrine of ubiquity “was in the end in the interest of eternal salvation”.4 The reason for such a harsh judgement over any heretical tendency was the same as it was for Luther, at least for the theologians of Tübingen: It could lead to a weakening of the salvific union between the natures in Christ. The different theoretical solutions to Christology and their implications always had at least one element transcending theological subtlety in the second half of the sixteenth Century and the first half of the seventeenth Century, namely the ever ongoing confessional polemic between the followers of the Augsburg confession of 1530 and other Protestant groups, particularly those influenced by Calvin. An important legal aspect of the empire’s religious policy is to be remembered, too: As the only religion after 1555 which was legally recognised within the empire besides the “Papists”, as it were, the Augsburg confession remained the only religious option for Protestants seeking more than local political guarantees. Before the peace of Westphalia in 1648, false adherents of the Augsburg Confession were foes of the empire. Amidst the heated discourse over dogma and doctrine, the quest for religious purity had a political component to it. Whereas the first and second of the Christological controversies – involving Zwingli and the Philippists – both had Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist as the underlying problem of the discussion, the controversy at stake between Giessen and Tübingen does not directly relate to a particular church 3 Walter Sparn, “Die Schulphilosophie in den lutherischen Territorien,” Schulphilosophie in Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts (ed. Jean-Pierre Schobinger; Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie; Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 487 – 88. Further : Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Heidelberger Abhandlungen Zur Philosophie und Ihrer Geschichte; Tübingen: Mohr, 1939), 102,107 ff. . and Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Ideas in Context; Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 44 – 45. 4 Philipp Nicolai in a sermon from 1590: ”[…] es sei aber schliesslich um das ewige Heil geschehen, die hartnäckig und mit unversönlichen Sinn die von Luther verfochtene Ubiquitas nicht aufgeben wollen”. Citation from Jörg Baur, “Die lutherische Christologie im Kontext der Gestaltwerdung lutherischen Christentums,” in Luther und seine klassischen Erben (1981; repr, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993), 164.

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practice, at least not at first sight. Nevertheless, it was perceived to have far–reaching theological implications for one of the most important issues of theology, namely the understanding of salvation. The Giessen faculty made a new distinction on how Christ is present in the world. This distinction, introduced by Balthasar Mentzer, led to doubts about the interpretation of the event of the incarnation. According to Mentzer, God’s presence in Christ was not qualified as a dwelling presence; it was solely to be understood as an active presence. Mentzer claimed that the copula of any Christological predication – i. e., the verb in “God is man” – should be interpreted as necessarily implying a movement. We will see how the idea of a divine activity marks the line against the philosophical–worldly notion of dwelling.5 The novelty here is the distinction between the two, but even more importantly, Mentzer opted for “action” as the defining term of divine presence. He had hoped that an exclusion of the “metaphysical” qualities of the divine being would open the way for a more true biblical notion of divine presence, both strengthening the Lutheran defence of the bodily presence and enabling a more effective persuasion of the reformed camp. In other words, Mentzer thought that an exclusion of a “dwelling” presence would clean the metaphysical features from covering a more fundamental biblical concept. But the distinction between God’s dwelling and active presence left acute questions unanswered, however. Would it imply that something of the divine essence was left back in (a far away) heaven, leaving the incarnated person with something less than true divinity? This was epitomised in the interpretation of the humiliated Christ: Did Christ’s divinity refrain from being a part of the experience of non–action, namely dying? Or could it be said that there was a time when Jesus did not feed the birds? The Tübingen camp claimed that if these questions were answered with a “yes”, it would have serious implications for the faith, and they acted correspondingly : A cascade of books were published from both theological faculties, causing a “verbal slaughter, where streams of ink–blood were shed”, as a distinguished modern interpreter notes.6 Although the focus of this work will be on the relation between theology and philosophy, it is important to have in mind the dramatic nerve which is implied in the rather lofty theoretical discussions. The fervent controversy caused such a stir among the Lutherans that the Church consistory in electoral Saxony – with Matthias Hoe von Hoenegg (1580 – 1645) as its leading theologian – felt it had to clarify the matter. Its summary of the state of affairs towards the end of that controversy seems to be a good place to start for an overview of the arguments involved. However, the members of the Synod did not only see the clash of two 5 It should be noted that the activity mentioned here is not the event between the natures in the communicatio idiomatum. It is more a characteristic feature or aspect of the divine nature. 6 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 275.

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versions of Christology. The dispute uncovered tensions which were latent in the official text of the Formula of Concord, namely the different solutions to the important Christological problems of Brenz and Chemnitz from the previous chapter. Let us turn first to the events in Electoral Saxony, where the effects of the Schwabian controversy were deeply felt.

Prelude: A report from Saxony In the city of Dresden, a Decisio was written in December 1623 and published at the beginning of 1624. The author was the consistory of Elector Johann Georg, and its stated intention was to decide on four questions which were said to capture the main issues of the ongoing controversies between “some theologians of the Augsburg Confession”.7 The synod complained over the state of affairs in the church, and the theological disputes which never seem to end, despite the Formula of Concord. It even threatened to break the doctrinal union which the Formula established.8 The consistory identified four main arguments in the debate. First of all, it is a question of how God is present before [apud] his creation. When it is written “I will be with you”, does that promise include God’s nuda adessentia? the synod asks. Does his operational mode, his work on creation, by necessity include the essence of God?9 Secondly, it concerns the relation between Christ’s omnipresence and his flesh.10 The third area of controversy identified by the synod, asked whether it was appropriate to subscribe divine properties to Christ in the state of humiliation. Could one state that according to the flesh – in the state of humiliation – Christ was always and without pause able to govern heaven and 7 Johann Georg’s consistory, SOLIDA Verboque Dei & Libro Concordiae Christianae congrua DECISIO Quatuor illorum inter aliquos Theologos Augustanae Confessionis, nuperrime Controversorum capitum principaliorum, de vera descriptione & fundamento Praesentiae DEI, Ejusque Filij JESU CHRISTI apud creaturas, nec non de incenssante & plenario dominio Christi, secundum humanam naturam in statu humiliationis, & quid humiliatio, exinanitio, ac evacuatio Christi sit? (Leipzig: Thomas Schürer, 1624), A1a. 8 In propatulo tamen est, quanto conatus juratus ille Dei, & hominum adversarius hoc agat, ut alibi noxias, & cum scandalo conjunctas dissensiones, ac schismata excitet, quo vinculum caritatis & Concordiae Christianae solvatur & dirumpatur […] Georg’s consistory, Solida, A3a. 9 Cum in Scriptura Sacra de paqousia Dei apud creaturas modificata agitur, an per verba, in coelis esse, coelum & terram implere, ego tecum ero, & similia dicta, nuda Dei adessentia, an vero simul efficax operatio innuatur? Adeoque num ad accuratam definitionem praesentiae Dei apud creaturas, semper etiam operatio efficax divina, ceu pars essentialis necessario requiratur? Ubi pars una Affirmativam, altera Negativam, magna contentione tuetur. Georg’s consistory, Solida, 2. 10 […] quod sit omnipraesentiae CHRISTI JESU juxta carnem, fundamentum proprium & proximum? Georg’s consistory, Solida, 19.

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earth as King?11 Lastly, the consistory referred to the question of how to localise the subject who was emptied as an area of conflict. This meant an interpretation of the famous expression of Paul in Philippians 2: Was it only the human nature who had been emptied, or did it pertain to both natures in Christ? What has Christ done in status exinantionis? It touches the central question of how God’s suffering in Christ should be understood, and the problem of how far the human nature of Christ can be said to govern heaven and earth. This again raises the whole complex of how Paul’s expression of a kenosis should be interpreted. Should the divine properties solely be reserved to status exaltationis, or should one rather interpret Christ’s bodily indwelling divine properties as always remaining, implying that the kenosis only portrayed a hiding [occulte] of these?12 If we leave aside the answers which the consistory offered for a while, one might be prompted to ask: How did these questions come about? Why did the Elector’s consistory engage in trying to define these subtle Christological definitions? After all, Saxony was remote from the areas involved, and the theoretical discussions do not seem to have any immediate relation to church politics in its strict sense. Still, it seems as if the questions involved concerned core issues which had to be solved even far away. Perhaps it confirms the hypothesis of this work, namely the crucial role the interpretation of Christ plays for the Lutheran tradition. Moreover, the princes regarded their theologians as part of their sphere of interest, and they therefore took an interest in promoting the theologians of their university, just as any political leader nowadays would support the football team of his or her district. The princes of Darmstadt and Stuttgart were not ready to become dishonoured through having their theologians lose the controversy. The consistory’s report is therefore already an interpretation of the controversy, and should only be seen as the biased votum it is. It is, in other words, important to examine critically the original documents, in order to find the difference between the adversaries. 11 An commode de Christo JESU dici possit, quod secundum carnem, in ipso statu humiliationis, quin secundum carnem, in ipso statu humiliationis, quin in ipsa Morte, SEMPER ET INCESSANTER coelum ac terram, ut Rex, gubernarit, & potenter quidem, occulte tamen, dominatus sit. Georg’s consistory, Solida, 30 – 31. 12 […] An CHRISTUS JESUS secundum utramque naturam, an vero tantum secundum humanam se exinaniverit? Adeoque an omne illud, quod in statu Exinantionis fecit, sustinuit juxta utramque naturam Ille fecerit, & perpessus fuerit? Ita quidem, ut & recte affirmari queat; divinitatem esse passam: & humanitatem coelum & terram gubernasse & conservasse? Deine acerrima quoque est disceptatio, quid sit proprie Exinanitio? an per eam innuatur quod CHRISTUS JESUS secundum assumtam carnem, quo ad plenarium & incessantem usum divinae majestatis, realiter & akghyr, voluntarie tamen, & tantum usque ad statum Exaltationis, se exinaniverit? vel an Exinanitio illa hoc solum intendat, Christum in statu jemyseyr aeque, ac jam ad dexteram DEI qua homo fuit, inhabitantem suam plenitudinem totam Deitatis plenarie ac incessanter, sed tamen occulte & latenter in regimine totius universi, usurpasse & exercuisse? Georg’s consistory, Solida, 66.

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One of the questions that have to be considered is why the problem was radicalised and fought with such a growing fervour after 1616. The parties shared the premises stated by the Formula of Concord. Still, the controversy revealed fundamental differences among the followers of the Formula of Concord concerning the understanding of Christ and his presence. The controversy revealed that the attempt of the Formula to reconcile the differences within what we could label right–wing Lutheranism was at least in need of further elaboration.

Balthasar Mentzer and his view of the presence of Christ Although the discussion between Giessen and Tübingen did not break out in public until 1616, its genesis can be traced further back in time. The arguments which Balthasar Mentzer used earlier in a dispute with the Calvinist Matthias Martini, were the cause of the controversy between Giessen and Tübingen. To understand how Mentzer’s interpretation of the divine presence in Christ developed, it seems fruitful to reconsider some main elements in their controversial exchange. Mentzer’s dispute with Matthias Martini Balthasar Mentzer published in 1597 his essay Anti–Martinius, an attack on the Christology of the reformed Matthias Martini (Anton Sadeel, 1572 – 1630),13 a scholar in Herborn. Martini had defended Calvin’s pupil Antoine de Chandieu (1534 – 1591) as a correct interpreter of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. This is particularly visible in his Methodus Sacro Sanctae Theologiae (1603), where Martini – following Chandieu – agrees with Zwingli on the methodological position of the Bible as the only source of theological knowledge. In Martini’s view, this expressed biblical view allegedly excluded 13 Matthias Martinius was a highly regarded reformed Theologian and Philologist. His main teacher in Herborn was the Ramist inclined Johannes Piscator (1546 – 1625), who had been professor of theology in Strassbourg and professor of philosophy in Heidelberg. At the age of 24, Martinius was “considered the mentor of Johann Amos Comenius and Johann Heinrich Alsted”, and one reason for their art encyclopaedic science can be found in Martini’s Ramist ideas. From 1610 he became rector of the Herborn Academy, a place regarded as one of the important places of the reformed process of confessionalisation in Northwestern Germany. Martinius was one of the key figures at the synod of Dort (1618 – 1619), and fought the supra-lapsarian view successfully. Besides some doctrinal works and confessional polemics, his Lexicon philologicoetymologicum (1623) of more than 4000 pages remains a lasting witness to his immense erudition. Wim Janse, “Reformed Theological Education at the Bremen Gymnasium Illustre,” in Bildung und Konfession (ed. Herman J. Selderhuis and Markus Wriedt; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 38 ff.

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any bodily eating in the Eucharist.14 This is important to notice, because it correlates with to a significant trace in Mentzer’s theology : like Martini, he wants to be a biblical theologian. Many questions are raised in this debate and they mostly concern the standard problems of the confessional polemic between Lutherans and Calvinists. The significant aspect for this study, however, concerns how Balthasar Mentzer developed his definition of Christ’s person. To do that, it is necessary to grasp some of the features of the Christology of Martini, Mentzer’s Calvinist opponent. Matthias Martini received the main features of his Christological doctrine from Chandieu. In his Methodus, Martini states that the infinite is in the finite, but that it is not confined [comprehensum] to the limits of the finite. It exists outside, too. This version of the extra–Calvinisticum corresponds to reason: It is a fact revealed in nature and it is not altered by Scripture, Martini claims, even if it has been mocked as one of Aristotle’s axioms.15 As a support for his cause, Martini appeals to Chandieu’s treatise de veritate humanae naturae Christi.16 Mentzer had criticised this treatise of Chandieu in his Elenchus primus errorum Antonii Sadeelis of 1596. He directed more or less the same critique against Martini the next year in his Anti–Martinius, but Mentzer was this time more explicit about the implications of his Christology. The description of the presence of Christ was the main reason for the outbreak of the controversy between the theologians in Tübingen and Giessen, even if it was first protested against in a dispute in Giessen ten years later.17 In his historical account of the polemic with Mentzer in 1617, Martini claims that the reformed position he represents believes in a real presence. The Lord has, after all, ordered the eating, and promised the believers to be in that eating. If he was utterly absent, there would be no reason for the described joy.18 But the reformed theologians (and philosophers) refute that Scripture 14 Quare recte monet Zuinglius, tota potius & prius Biblia fuisse percurrenda, omnesque eorum angulos excutiendos, qu‚m illam de corporali praesentia & manducatione opinionem stultam credulitate, utpote nullo Dei verbo nixa, recipiendam. Matthias Martini, Methodus S.S. Theologiae (Herborn, 1603), 193. 15 Certe infinitum est in finito, & tamen in eo non comprehensum, sed & extra illud. Haec est veritas in natura patefacta, in scriptura non mutata, utut sub odioso nomine Philosophici Aristotelici axiomatis derideatur. Martini, Methodus, 496. 16 I must admit that I have not been able to find this book. They had it at the University library of Göttingen when I was there, but it took a few days to get it, days I did not have. 17 Theodor Mahlmann, Art. Mentzer, Balthasar in BBKL 5, 1273 – 85. 18 Corpus Christi Domini nostri in sacra coena praesens esse credimus: quia id in ea Dominus jubet edere, & ejus manducationem credentibus promittit. Quod autem prorsus absens est, eo vesci & frui non licet. Matthias Martini, Institutio MATTHIAE MARTINII DE PRAESENTIA DOMINI NOSTRI JESU CHRISTI, DEI ET HOMINIS, in sacra coena, in ecclesia & in medio inimicorum: Pro confessione orthodoxa, Contra D: BALTHASARIS MENTZERI vanas objectiones, In elencho adversus Sadeelem & antimartinio. (Bremen: Thomas de Villiers, 1617), 41.

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gives witness to any substantial presence. Instead, Martini claims that Christ’s presence must be understood as a mystical, spiritual presence.19 Instead of having Christ in the external reality, he is made present through the narration of Christ’s passion. We have Christ’s body in our mind by assenting to and believing his promises, he who has suffered for us, and whose blood is poured out for us, according to Martini.20 Accordingly, there is no other eating than in non–bodily words, he says with a reference to Augustine.21 On all these doctrinal issues, Martini is at odds with Mentzer. Martini does seem to concur with Mentzer on one issue, however : The understanding that Christ is first and foremost considered in his presence in the Church.22 Such a narrow conception of Christology is structurally similar to the argument that Christ is not substantially active everywhere, but only immediately active in heaven.23 This structure should be noted, because some important features are taken over by Mentzer : The latter not only qualifies Christ as leaving some of his essential, divine features back in heaven, – according to Mentzer, Christ is only immediately present to the Trinity. In addition, Mentzer qualifies the presence itself as an active presence. We will see how the import of the operational category into the definition of presence is one of the main differences between Giessen and Tübingen.

The definition of presence The controversy between Reformed and the Lutheran theologians of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in many ways repeated the positions from the beginning of the second half of the sixteenth century, but the arguments became increasingly more subtle. During the renaissance of Aristotelian philosophy, a thorough understanding of philosophical terms played a more important role as support for the dogmatic claims, thereby raising the level of subtlety. Or perhaps one should rather see the changing discussions in light of the different intellectual condition, and its demand. The underlying question was still whether Christ was present bodily in the 19 Eam tamen praesentiam substantialem esse sacris literis convenienter negamus […] Est vero & alia praesentia mystica ac spiritualis, quae in sacramenti mysterio & spirituali negocio locum habet. Martini, De Praesentia, 41. 20 Huic autem narrationi assentientes & promissioni credentes, nostris mentibus praesens habemus corpus illud, quod pro nobis passum est, & sanguinem, qui pro nobis fusus est. Martini, De Praesentia, 42. 21 Imo, si rem spectes, non aliter editur corpus Christi in sacra coena, quam in verbo. Martini, De Praesentia, 52. 22 Non sunt autem confundendae hae phrases, Esse praesentem ecclesiae & in ecclesia. Martini, De Praesentia, 205. 23 […] ideoque, dum in coelo adest, a terris abest; quippe quum in unione ipsa semper retineat finitam quantitatem suam. &, quia secundum substantiam suam nunc non est in terra, neque ubique, ideo nec ubique operatur: sed immediate operatur in coelo. Martini, De Praesentia, 206.

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Eucharist, and – if he indeed was, – how that bodily presence should be understood. Any presence of Christ involving his humanity, the reformed theologians claimed, necessarily implied a praesentia secundum sensum carnis. Such an implication, however, would place Christ within the realm of physics, hardly tenable for any of the confessional groups. Responding to Martini’s claim that the physical body (of Christ) cannot be present everywhere due to the inability of human nature to be present everywhere,24 Mentzer rejects that theology rests on geometrical and physical axioms of Aristotle.25 Christ is really present bodily in the Church and in the Sacraments. But there is a restriction on that presence, Mentzer claims with a reference to Melanchthon: Christ is not present in trees, stones and bees.26 Already here, Mentzer reveals a different attitude to the relation between creation and Creator, than that of Luther and Brenz. Instead of pointing at the union between God and man in Christ – “where God is, there is man, too” – Mentzer seems to claim a difference between the intensity of Christ’s human presence. This is perhaps done in order to protect Christ’s human nature from the profanation of “lower” nature: Christ’s human nature is perhaps omnipresent, but that omnipresence is much weaker than his presence in Church and sacraments. With reference to Luther, Mentzer explains that there is a difference between Christ being present in general [adesse] and Christ being present for me [mihi adesse]. A similar distinction is made with regard to the three persons in the Godhead. Even if Christ is known as the Word – that is, the second person of the Trinity – it does not follow that he has brought infinite essence near in his person. In the incarnation, therefore, some of Christ’s majesty has been left behind. One cannot infer an absolute essence of the human presence from the hypostatic union and communication of properties, Mentzer insists. By reconsidering the Bible, however, it becomes obvious how that presence is promised and confirmed to us.27 24 Corpus physicum non potest esse ubique, quam corpus humanum non potest esse ubique. Balthasar Mentzer, “ANTI-MARTINIUS, SIVE MODESTA ET SOLIDA RESPONSIO Ad Futiles Objectiones MATTHIAE MARTINII, Praeceptoris in Schola Herbornensi, Quibus ANTONIUM SADEELEM Vindicare Infeliciter Conatus Est,” in ANTI-MARTINIUS, SIVE MODESTA ET SOLIDA RESPONSIO Ad futiles objectiones MATTHIAE MARTINII, Praeceptoris in Schola Herbornensi, quibus ANTONIUM SADEELEM vindicare infeliciter conatus est (vol. 2 of OPERUM LATINORVM, AB IPSO, DUM VIVERET, DIVERSIS TEMPORIBUS SEORSIM EDITORUM, Nunc vero, Ecclesiae Bono in unum Corpus congestorum; 1604; repr., Frankfurt: Officina Zunneriana, 1669), 10. 25 Propositio major est Aristotelis Philosophorum principis. At nos versamur in schola Theologica cui ancillari, non dominari debet Philosophia. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 11. 26 […] veram ejus praesentiam, in Ecclesia & Sacramentis. Non est, quod vociferentur de praesentia in arboribus, in lapidibus & cantharis. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 11. 27 Diligenter distinguo, cum de praesentia Christi sermo est. Aliud enim est, (ut ex D. Luthero hoc repetam) Christum adesse, aliud est mihi adesse. De ipso etiam Deo Patre & Spiritu Sancto sic cogito, sic loquor, ut ex sancto ipsius Verbo didici; non necto consequentias, ex essentiae infinitate […] Quare sic censeo; quando de Christi Hominis praesentia, vel in Sacramentis, vel in Ecclesia,

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Mentzer applies Luther’s “existentialist” difference between the objective reality of Christ and its meaning for the believer to solve the question of how God is present in the world. Thereby he highlights some of the most difficult epistemological questions of the Lutheran tradition, namely the role of subjective faith – fides qua – in relation to that which is believed – fides quae. Without the Word as promise, Christ is not present to me, Mentzer claims. Mentzer ties that experienced, “personal” Christ to the event of liturgy : It is not possible to grasp [apprehendere] Christ without faith, which again is bound to the Word which draws near in preaching. As a good Lutheran, Mentzer underlines that this event does not only affirm Christ’s presence, but it actually makes it real for me and comes upon the believer. But the category of the will, which is used in connection with the words of institution of the sacraments, and the voluntary character of that action, is to be noted.28 In the response from the Tübinger theologians, we will see a stronger emphasis on the category of presence. Mentzer distinguishes between different levels [gradus] of the presence of Christ’s humanity, which he also calls modes [modo]. 1. The body or human nature of Christ. 2. In the Logos, in the hypostatic union. 3. In heaven, 4. In the Eucharist, 5. In the Church. 6. In the non–believers, particularly with respect to God’s power.29 The list is not based on the hypostatic union, but stated on the basis of Scripture, Mentzer claims.30 In his history of the controversy, Mentzer regards the different modes of God’s presence as a necessary interpretative tool to accommodate the different ways Scripture describes the presence of Christ.31 The theological method of classifying the different aspects of Christ’s

28

29

30 31

vel in medio inimicorum quaeritur, non esse absolute concludendum, ex Unione hypostatica & communicatione Idiomatum; sed semper respiciendum in Verbum Dei, quo illa praesentia nobis promittitur & confirmatur. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 14. Ratio est: Qua sine Verbo, id est, promissione, Christus mihi non prodest. Non enim apprehendere eum possum sine fide, quae fides esse non potest sine verbo. Accedente autem verbo, affirmo Christum non tantum adesse, sed & mihi adesse, velle ibi quaeri, velle & inveniri. Mentzer, “AntiMartinius,” 14. Nam Corpus seu Natura humana Christi, alio modo est in kocy, nempe hypostatico; alio in coelo, scilicet per veri corporis modum; alio in Coena, nempe Mystico & Sacramentali; alio in Ecclesia, scil. gratioso; alio modo in medio inimicorum, nimirum respectu potentiae seu gubernationis. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 14. […] modi propriam rationem ex Scripturis annotemus. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 15. Qua ratione existimabat, non modo plane exterminari posse […] [the Calvinists’ and Jesuits’] usum reduci necessariam Doctrinam de distinctis divinae praesentiae modis, quae utiliter accommodari potest multis scripturae dictis recte & perspicue interpretandis. Balthasar Mentzer, NECESSARIA ET JUSTA DEFENSIO CONTRA INJUSTAS CRIMINATIONES D. LUCAE OSIANDRI, D. MELCHIORIS NICOLAI, & D. THEODORI THUMMII IN QUA MULTI DE PERSONA ET OFFICIO CHRISTI ERRORES DETEGUNTUR ET REFUTANTUR. (vol. 2 of D. BALTHASARIS MENTZERI, Senioris, b.m. OPERUM LATINORVM, AB IPSO, DUM VIVERET, DIVERSIS TEMPORIBUS SEORSIM EDITORUM, Nunc vero, Ecclesiae Bono in unum Corpus congestorum; 1622; repr., Frankfurt: Officina Zunneriana, 1669), 1258.

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presence within a theologically framed cosmology is noteworthy. Unlike the Christology of Luther and Brenz, which more or less applies the theological implications of the God–man to other spheres of a theologically qualified world, Mentzer uses a more universal approach, following Melanchthon’s impetus. He is concerned about framing the theological system, where the different parts of Christology can be placed. The modes of Christ’s humanity are not the same as the modes of God’s presence, however, and the latter differs from Melanchthon’s taxonomy as well.32 Whereas Melanchthon also divided God’s presence into four, but reserved the second class for the angels and the blessed,33 Mentzer emphasises the aspect of salvation history by leaving two modes for the Church, but he leaves out the notion of angels in this respect: 1. The universal presence of God, where the infinity and immensity of the divine essence is included, 2. The gracious presence in the communication of his goodness and mercy, 3. The glorious presence of the church triumphant, 4. The singular presence of the Logos’ inhabitation in the human nature of Christ.34 Of particular interest for this study is the Giessen theologians’ concentration on the second class, the gracious presence. Through the universal presence the world is sustained, but that world is more or less something which the believers would be saved from, through the gracious presence.35 That leads to a double interpretation of presence, and a different understanding of reality which now seems to fall into two parts. This has serious consequences for the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum: Instead of providing an opening between God and man in the healing traffic of divine and human properties within the world, the acting Christ draws the believers out of the world. Christological predications In line with common Calvinist thought, Martini claims that it is not possible to interpret predications like “God has been born” or “God has suffered” or “Man is eternal” as synechdoches, a mere rhetorical reference without substance. According to him, one cannot regard the subject of such 32 For Melanchthon’s modes, see page 95 ff. 33 Ac ad declarationem prodest considerare quatuor gradus praesentiae Dei. Primus est praesentia conservationis, qua Deus omnibus creaturis adest, ita ut conservet eas tantisper, donec vult eas conservare, de quo gradu dicitur Ieremiae 23. […] Et manifestum est, Deum sic separabiliter rebus adesse, quia destruit naturas, quas vult destruere, ut Pharaonem, et maximam partem generis humani in diluvio. Secundus gradus est, quo adest beatis Angelis et hominibus […] Tertius gradus est, quo adest in hac vita renatis […] Quartus gradus longe alius est, quo sola haec persona kºco* assumit humanam naturam […] Philipp Melanchthon, Examen Ordinandorum (vol. 23 of Corpus Reformatorum; C.G. Bretscheider ; 1547; repr, Halle: C.A. Schwetschke et filium, 1855), 5. 34 Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 15. 35 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 267.

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predications to be Christ. That would be to alter the person into the properties, which is reserved for only one of the natures.36 Mentzer, on the other hand, does not only regard this as a Nestorian dissolution of the personal union of the natures. He refers to Aristotle’s view of the person, where the whole person [compositae substantiae] is the subject of all actions and passions.37 The use of Aristotle by Mentzer is important to note, because it shows how Lutheran theologians were able to make use of a part of Aristotle’s doctrines in Christology, too, prior to the Aristotelian “turn” of the age of orthodoxy.38 Mentzer does not regard the interpretation of heaven as a circumscriptive place as the main problem in the cosmological assumptions of Martini’s Calvinist Christology. Far more important in the critique of Mentzer is Martini’s understanding of heaven as a place where Christ and his body is “captured” [capitur]. Such a confinement of Christ within the limits of heaven would not only be a violation of Christ’s human nature, but of his divine nature, too, namely in what Mentzer regards as a commonplace: The possibility of the divine nature to transcend the restrictions of the creatures.39 Mentzer’s defence of the freedom of Christ’s will corresponds to the voluntaristic interpretation of his presence in the world, as it is emphasised by Melanchthon and Chemnitz. If Christ wants to be present in the Eucharist, no confined heaven can hinder his will to be executed. In his polemical writings against the reformed tendency of protecting the Godhead from being too closely connected to creation, Mentzer insists on the real distinction between the persons in the Trinity. God is not a compact principle, from which the persons have emanated. Although one cannot distinguish between the persons according to their essence – which they have in common – Mentzer insists on the primary plurality within the Trinity.40 Thereby he lays another foundation for Christology in the doctrine of God

36 Synechdochen non esse in illis formulis: Deus est natus: Deus est passus: Homo est aeternus. Quis est, qui mihi peruadeat, contra tam perspicuam lucem? De Persona, quod dixerat Apostolus, ad alteram Naturam, cui proprium, restringit. Cur igitur Scriptura, quod dixit de Toto, deinde ad Partem redigit? Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 15. 37 Compositae Substantiae insunt omnes actiones & passiones, sed propter Naturas, e quibus est composita. Arist. lib 1. de anima cap. 3. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 16. 38 “Der Rezeption der Metaphysik des Neuaristotelismus gerade bei seinen Schülern stand M [entzer] zurückhaltend gegenüber […]” Mahlmann, Mentzer. Mahlmann’s judgement seems to be a valid one, seen from a limited and narrow understanding of metaphysics in general, and the Aristotelian concepts in particular. But seen in a wider perspective – including the scope of this study, indeed – it seems like a hard case to place Mentzer outside the “return of Metaphysics”, given his extensive use of philosophically charged distinctions in the midst of theology. 39 Martini: Christus coelo capitur. Rursus: Christus non est in terris. Quare? quia coelo capitur, ut extra coelum esse non possit alibi. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 17. 40 Inter sese vero distinguuntur Personae, non quidem tg ousia, sed tamen realiter, nempe tqopy upaqneyr, ut alibi docetur. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 98.

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than his adversaries in the reformed camp, who generally show more eagerness to preserve the unity of the Trinity.41 Nevertheless, Mentzer finds an opportunity or opening to meet some of the arguments of Martini, mainly due to the strong interpretation (and criticism) of omnipresence Martini brings into the discussion in his response to Mentzer, published in 1615. Calvinists and Jesuits alike claim that the Lutheran “monstrous” doctrine of ubiquity is an offence to faith, and that it is necessary to distinguish between different modes of Christ’s presence. Mentzer claims that such a distinction is necessary due to the varied witness of Scripture on the matter.42 The motivation of being faithful to Scripture and its witness is a recurring reference in Mentzer’s writings. For Mentzer, the identity of being a theologian of Scripture seems to regard philosophical notions in general – and metaphysical notions in particular – as alien to the content of Scripture. He is cautious about identifying Christ’s presence before the creatures strictly along the lines of Scripture. In this respect, there is a difference between Mentzer and his most famous students, the philosopher Balthasar Meisner (1587 – 1626) and the theologian Johann Gerhard (1582 – 1637), who both considered the relation between theology and philosophy as dialectical in nature. For theology, this meant that it had to make use of philosophical concepts, but that their validity could not be secured a priori, or formaliter, that is before the treatment in concreto. Indeed, the relation between

41 This is partly an effect of a stronger theistic notion in the Reformed tradition, if we compare it to the Lutheran: God is placed outside the world, as the interpretation of a spatial transport of Christ’s body in the ascension gives witness to. The Trinity as a unity confirms the structural difference between God’s relative presence here, and his absolute presence in heaven. In the Lutheran tradition, however, there is an insistence of the Creator as being placed in and with the creatures. There is no spatial distance between creation and Creator, as the interpretation of a non-spatial heaven affirms. But if the Creator’s presence among the creatures is seen as absolute, the existential misery caused by sin is radicalised: The Creator is not only a judge, but an adversary. That misery is overcome by the merciful Trinitarian difference – and not a unity – which opens up between God and God’s Son in the incarnation, namely the difference between the Sender and the One being sent. The Lutheran tradition of Dreifaltigkeit – Trinity as diversity – reflects that dogmatic point. Cf. Jörg Baur, “Das Reformatorisch-Lutherische Rechtfertigungsglaube Angesichts der Herausforderung Durch das Neuzeitliche Selbstbewusstsein,” in Lutherische Gestalten – Heterodoxe Orthodoxien: Historisch-Systematische Studien (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2010), 356 ff. 42 Qua ratione existimabat, non modo plane exterminari posse insanum illud commentum Calvinianorum & Jesuvitarum, de portentosa ubiquitate, & corporis Christi per totum mundum, & omnes creaturas locali extentione, sive expansione, de qua passim (nulla facta mentione illocalis praesentiae divinae & gubernationis,) in suis libris loqui illi solent, non sine maxima piorum offensione: verum etiam in frequentiorem usum reduci necessariam Doctrinam de distinctis divinae praesentiae modis, quae utiliter accommodari potest multis scripturae dictis recte & perspicue interpretandis. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1258.

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philosophy and theology was a part of the solution to the tasks which the Formula of Concord posed.43 Omnipresence as actio, apart from essentia How does Martini interpret omnipresence, then? Of the twelve points Mentzer lists as a summary of Martini’s interpretation, the most important is the proximity of God’s essence to the term: It has the character [proprietas] of God’s essence. To protect the Godhead from profanation, Martini suggests that Christ’s divine presence must be categorised under the term actio.44 This argument had solid support among the medieval scholastics. To state an orthodox theory of the Trinity, they underlined the difference between God, the Son, who became incarnated, and the divine essence shared by all the persons in the Trinity.45 Thomas Aquinas, for example, is careful to reject the notion of any bodily or local action when he defines the procession between the persons of the Trinity.46 He suggests that the inner life between the persons should be understood as intelligible emanation, and he compares the trinitarian procession to the speech which at the same time reaches the listener while still remaining with the speaker.47 To be a person or a subject, however, implies the capacity to act, valid for each of the persons of the Trinity, too. As a result, there is a difference between the concept of the nature of a person (of the Trinity) and the concept of essence. As one modern scholar observes, essence and nature “overlap but do not coincide” in Aquinas’ thought.48 It follows that there is a sense of divine essence which is difficult to integrate in the incarnated Christ. In many ways, Martini reflects the doctrine of God as found in Thomas Aquinas, just like the later reformed orthodoxy. The divine 43 Walter Sparn, Wiederkehr Der Metaphysik: Die Ontologische Frage in der Lutherischen Theologie der Frühen 17. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1976), 206. 44 Omnipraesentia, inquit [Martini], 1. Est proprietas Dei essentialis, atque ita Dei essentia. […] Contra: Christi praesentis divina in creaturis actio. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1258. 45 Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus, 147 ff. 46 The divine essence is qualified as simplicitas, in line with Augustine and his tradition, as an essence above the activity of the different persons. cf. Respondeo dicendum quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis, manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex. ST Ia q. 3 a. 7 co. 47 Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. ST Ia q. 27 a. 1 co. 48 Aidan Nichols, Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to His Life, Work, and Influence (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), 69.

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attributes of Aquinas’ via negationis such as simplicitas, immutabilitas, aeternitas etc. are not incarnated. They reflect the Neo-platonic notion of divine essence,49 and are as such different to the suppositum of the person which has the ability to act as one of its most important features, in accordance with Aristotle’s anthropology.50 The advantage of such a restriction on the communication of divine attributes was to mark a difference between the Creator and the creatures. The cost of applying a fixed, theistic concept of the divine into Mentzer’s theology, however, is that it stabilised the relation between God and the world, making impossible to understand Christology as an event of communication of the whole divinity.51 The hallmark of Lutheran theology had been the unrestricted communication of attributes between the Trinity and the God–man Christ, which probably rested on Augustine’s principle of opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa.52 Mentzer accepts Martini’s axiom by refusing to extend the traditional scriptural proofs of the Lutherans for the ubiquity – such as Jeremiah 23:24 – as describing something close to the substance [substantialis propinquitas] of the divine. He limits the scope of these expressions by applying them merely to the providence and governance of God.53 The most exclusive properties of God, such as infinity or absoluteness, are not involved, he states. Instead, the presence is qualified as action. By that qualification, Mentzer claims to have narrowed the dispute between Reformed and Lutheran theologians over the issue of ubiquity. He seems to claim to have found the sweeping argument against the reformed critique of that dogma.54 How does Mentzer elaborate the distinction between God’s substance by himself and Christ’s action–like presence towards his creatures? After Martini had published his attack on Mentzer and the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity in 1615,55 Mentzer used Martini’s response as subject matter in some disputa49 Wilhelm Metz, Die Architektonik der Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin: zur Gesamtsicht des thomasischen Gedankens (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1998), 126 ff. 50 Bruce D. Marshall, “Putting Shadows to Flight: The Trinity, Faith, and Reason,” in Reason and the Reasons of Faith (ed. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter ; 2005), 55. 51 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 245. 52 Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums, 1,190. 53 Ubi igitur scriptura dicit Deum implere coelum & terram, omnia in ipso consistere, nos in ipso esse, vivere & moveri, Christum implere omnia, prope esse invocantibus ipsum, in nobis habitare per fidem, & fore nos cum ipso, & quae sunt ejusmodi, demonstrabat Mentzerus, non ibi duntaxat propinquitatem substantiae describi, sed & providentiam & gubernationem divinam comprehendi. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1259. 54 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 251. 55 Baur dates Martini’s publication to the Frankfurter bookfair 1616. Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 240. In the copy I have consulted on Mentzer’s disputations, however, Matthias’ writing is dated 1614 in the first of these, where Johannes Beyer Homberg was the respondent. Balthasar Mentzer, DISPUTATIO I. ADMONITIO BREVIS, DE LIBRO MATTHIAE MARTINII; DE PERSONA CHRISTI, Contra Vbiquitarios, & Nominatim D. BALTHASAREM MENTZERUM, Braemae Edito, ANNO 1614. (vol. 2 of D. BALTHASARIS MENTZERI, Senioris, b.m. OPERUM LATINORVM, AB IPSO, DUM VIVERET, DIVERSIS TEMPORIBUS SEORSIM EDITORUM, Nunc vero,

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tions towards the end of the year 1616. The question is, according to Mentzer in his first disputation:56 What is meant by the term “Christ’s omnipresence” or the presence of his flesh everywhere?57 He considers the status controversiae – seemingly – to be the classical divergence between Lutherans and Calvinists, namely whether Christ is present to the believers solely according to his divinity, or according to his humanity, too.58 But an important qualification has happened here: It is not the relation between God and world which is to be answered in the question of how Christ’s presence is to be understood, but the relationship between God and the believers. Thereby, Mentzer is narrowing the traditional Christological scope and horizon from a problem concerning creation, to only a part of that creation. Interestingly, Mentzer’s narrowing of the problem corresponds with his structure of the grades of God’s presence, as it was presented above in this chapter. The main mode of presence is the gracious presence, not the universal or general presence. The arguments used by the Lutherans are phrased as rhetorical questions by Mentzer : 1. How can one exclude the humanity from the promised presence of Christ, when humanity is indissolubly united with the Son of God? 2. Is it really possible to understand presence in a way which does not include both natures in Christ’s office? 3. How can Christ’s body and blood be bodily present in the Eucharist?59 Mentzer sees the main argument of the Calvinists in their anthropology : A presence in more than one place excludes any notion of true humanity.60

56 57 58 59

60

Ecclesiae Bono in unum Corpus congestorum; 1616; repr., Frankfurt: Officina Zunneriana, 1669), 354. In Mentzer’s own story, a Bremen edition is dated 1615. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1258. Baur dates the disputation to the 4. of October 1616, cf. Baur, “Ubiquität,” 294 – 95. 15. Quaestio est, de Omnipraesentia Christi: Qua ille vocat, ubiquitatem corporis sive carnis Christi: & definit, praesentiam humanae Naturae Christi, in omnibus locis. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 355. Status igitur Controversiae sic est: An Christus suis fidelibus adsit, secundum solam Deitatem, quod affirmant Calvinistae, nos negamus: an etiam secundum Humanitatem, quod affirmamus nos, Calvinistae negant. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 356. 26. Pro confirmanda nostra sententia, argumenta proferimus. 1. Expressam literam: Qui enim praesentiam suam promittit Christus, est Heamhqypy, Deus & Homo. Nec ulla potest afterri solida ratio, cur ab ea praesentia, excludenda sit Humanitas, indissolubili vinculo, nempa personali, unita Filio Dei, & exaltata ad Dextram Majestatis in coelos. 2. Quia haec praesentia pertinet ad Christi Officium? in quo non agit Natura una sola separatim, ama leqy, sed utraque Natura agit quod sibi proprium est, cum communicatione alterius: ut habet Canon Chalcedonensis. 3. Confirmatur gratiosa haec praesentia, in usu sacrae Coenae: in qua expressa sit mentio, Corporis & Sanguinis Christi. Qualia argumenta multa, cumulari possunt ex fundamentis Scripturarum divinarum. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 356. 27. Contra inferunt Calviniani: praesentia in pluribus, vel omnibus locis, (pari enim loco ista habent: firmiter tenentes suum axioma: Corpus Christi non nisi in uno loco esse potest) repugnat veritati naturae humanae, quae est quanta, finita, terminata, circumscripta, habet partem extra partem, abit, adit, ascendit in coelum, reditura ad judicium, &c. Quare prmissio illa de praesentia

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Contrary to that, Mentzer claims that the different modes or grades of presence, as he noted earlier, are the most fitting expressions of how Christ’s presence is witnessed in Scripture. As it will become apparent during this work, Mentzer’s departure from a Christian “cosmology” of differentiated modes of Christ is different from the departure of the God–man’s implications for theological language which characterises his future adversaries in Tübingen. On the basis of the different modes of presence, Mentzer interprets Christ’s presence to the creatures as not involving his metaphysical divine attributes, such as infinity and immensity. He regards the qualification “dwelling” [otiosum] as particularly important, especially when it is paired with the charged term nudum. Instead of being qualified as standing still, Christ is present in an action–like manner towards the creatures.61 The consequence of this concentration on agency instead of being might, as one of the commentators of the growing controversy remarked, lead to a new emphasis for theology made in the tradition of the Augsburg confession: Instead of the former concentration on formulating a Christology in line with Reformation and classical principles, the main effort is now to state a doctrine of affected Christian persons.62 This turn from the person of Christ to the reception in the believer is a step in the development towards Pietism at the end of the seventeenth Century. How important such a change might be, however, it will falls outside the scope of this study. Why does Mentzer leave out the “metaphysical” features of the divine nature when he explains Christ’s presence? First of all, it has to do with the understanding of God and Mentzer’s attempt to qualify the divine being without using pagan philosophical notions. The insistence on the necessary activity of God does not only reject Aristotle’s notion of an “unmoved mover” in Metaphysics XII, but it also has an affinity to Luther’s “Deus semper actuosus” from his De servo arbitrio,63 although Mentzer does not seem to elaborate on that notion elsewhere, and he has not explicitly noted any relation to Luther. Be it a reference to Luther or not, Mentzer seems at least to use the gratiae, est restringenda ad solam Deitatem. Humanitas enim capitur coelo: Act. 3.v.21. Quare in terris esse non potest. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 356 – 57. 61 31. […] praesentiam illam apud creaturas, non esse absolutum aliquod Dei attributum, quale est infinitas, sive immensitas: neque nudum & otiosum situm, sive adsistentiam apud creaturas: neque localem aliquem positum: Sed Christi praesentis divinam in creaturis actionem. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 357. Cf. Baur, “Ubiquität,” 294 – 95. Thomasius subsumes it under the concept omnipraesentia operativa, which he takes from the Sciagraphias Theologiae. Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 430. 62 Baur, “Ubiquität,” 295. 63 Hoc enim nos asserimus et contendimus, quod Deus, cum citra gratiam spiritus operatur omnia in omnibus, etiam in impiis operatur, Dum omnia, quae condidit solus, solus quoque movet, agit et rapit omnipotentiae suae motu, quem illa non possunt vitare nec mutare, sed necessario sequuntur et parent, quodlibet pro modo suae virtutis sibi a Deo datae, sic omnia etiam impia illi cooperantur. WA, 18, 753.

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notion of God’s extreme activity – implicitly against the “dwelling” metaphysics – of to support his self–understanding as a biblical theologian. Luther used the notion of extreme activity to oppose what he considered the “ice–cold” rationality of Erasmus, namely to interpret God without his salvific trinitarian connection to the two other persons of the Deity. Mentzer, however, concludes that this has to be interpreted exclusively in accordance with a logic of action, namely that God can not be correctly qualified to be without “operation”, nude or plainly dwelling. It is to be noted how this presence of action is rooted, however: Mentzer’s insistence of a scriptural basis of action strengthens the impression of a critical attitude towards a philosophical qualification of God.64 He even considers a notion of a dwelling God – and, correspondingly, an ineffective presence – to be a downright childish notion.65 We will later see how the theologians from Tübingen criticised the exclusive position of action in characterising the presence of Christ. Secondly, Mentzer introduces a new element from salvation history. In the scheme of the grades of God’s presence which Mentzer uses, there is an important temporal gap between the second and the third grade. Instead of distinguishing between the presence of God to the angels and to the born–again Christians as Melanchthon did, Mentzer makes the demarcation line between God’s gracious presence and his glorious presence, where the latter refers to the eschatological reality. Thereby, he inserts a notion of salvation history into the rather metaphysically qualified scheme of presence. Mentzer stresses that the importance of grace is not only logically prior to the presence of glory in the eschaton, but historically prior, too.66 The insertion of this temporal notion seems to be Mentzer’s attempt to draw the main principles in the understanding of Christ’s person from theology, which – according to Mentzer – differs from an anthropology which rests on philosophical axioms. For him, it is important to underline that a theological foundation of Christology does not destroy Christ’s true humanity, however.67 At the end, Mentzer frames the question of how Christ is present in the world as a question of the possible: He criticises the reformed solution for negating 64 41. […] 1. divinam praesentiam definiri in Scripturis, & schola Theologica, per praesentis Dei operationem. 2. Neque uspiam Dei praesentiam nudam, sive inanem atque otiosam ostendi posse. 3. Adeoque nec sine operatione Deum, neque divinam operationem sine Deo inveniri. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 358. 65 44. […] Ubi intelligere velle otiosam, & inefficacem praesentiam […] nimis puerile esse, cordati agnoscunt. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 359. 66 39. Quemadmodum igitur ad Regnum gloriae non pervenitur, nisi per Regnum gratiae […] Ita fatendum est, gloriam ante se requirere gratiam. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 358. 67 73. Non igitur est humanae naturae veritas, opponenda personali Unioni; neque naturarum proprietates tollunt, vel impediunt Idiomatum communicationem: multoque minus axiomata Philosophica de corpore physico, quanto, & loco terminato […] 74. Quare ut de rebus Theologicis, ex principiis Theologicis (quod ratio & lex verae disputationis postulat) differamus, luculenta Scripturae dicta in medium afferenda sunt, quibus affertiones nostrae confirmentur. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 362.

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Christ’s possibility of being where he wants, not only spiritually, but as a whole person consisting of both natures.68 There is no doubt that Mentzer defends the presence of Christ as a bodily presence. But the problem, at least as seen from Tübingen, concerns his dependence on Christ’s will. Due to that will, Christ can withdraw his presence. This structure of the promise can be observed when Mentzer, immediately after his critique of the reformed spiritualism, states that the following can be said of Christ: We admit that the following can be said about Christ in his state of humiliation: In his flesh [juxta carnem] he was not near [adfuerit] the dying Lazarus.69

There is a difference in presence between Christ’s state of humilitation and his state of exaltation. But that poses an acute question: How does Mentzer bridge the two states within his concept of presence? Compared with the treatment of Lazarus by the main proponent from Tübingen, Theodor Thumm, it becomes clear that it was not the distance between Christ and the dying Lazarus that made up the difference, but how that distance was qualified. Thumm underlines that it is the physical mode of local presence which is refuted, the actu naturali. What is retained, according to Thumm, is the personal mode, qualified a priori in the fluent [fluente] union of the person.70 From this mode, then, from the personal union, is it possible to qualify Christ’s presence by the dying Lazarus secundum actum naturae humanae. Does not Mentzer’s position imply a split between the natures? Mentzer claims the opposite, and illustrates his point by referring to the spatial distance between Jerusalem – where Jesus died – and the capital of the empire, Rome. Although the human nature is present to Rome due to its presence to the Logos in the hypostatic union, the human nature is not governing Rome, because the human nature has not been exalted yet. And here we are at the kernel in Mentzer’s argument: The temporal restraint of humanity’s government is necessary in order to make suffering and death possible. Therefore, Mentzer

68 […] alienum a Christiana modestia esse, negare illud Christum posse, quod praestare se velle, tam diserte affirmat. Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 363. 69 84. Fatemur etiam, in statu Exinanitionis de Christo juxta carnem, vere dictum esse, quod non adfuerit Lazaro morienti […] Mentzer, Disputatio 1, 363. 70 Confundit modum localem praesentiae physicum, qui ut accidens separabile ex natura corporis, a superficie ambiente corporis contenti, ebullit cum illocali & hyperphysico, non ex proprietate vel actu naturali, sed personali fluente; priori modo, non posteriori loca allegata intelligenda sunt. Hic ergo & non ibi fuit Localiter. Vere enim & non simulate suo corpore de loco in locum progressus est, ita, ut localiter vere in Bethania, Lazaro morienti, ratione assumptae naturae, actuque naturali non adfuerit. Theodor Thumm, MAJESTAS JESU CHRISTI heamhqypou, IN DISTINCTIS DISPUTATIONIBUS publicis A corruptelis & vkuaciair Photinianorum, Calvinistarum & Jesuitarum praecipuis vindicata (Tübingen: Eberhard Wild, 1621), 238.

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adopts the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature, but not its (“philosophically” qualified) omnipresence.71 Mentzer’s colleague (and son–in–law) in Giessen, Justus Feuerborn (1587 – 1656), agrees with Mentzer. In a disputation devoted to the theme of omnipresence, his theses first expose God’s nearness and propinquity to all that exists. The definition of omnipresence, according to Feuerborn, is presence, which fills heaven, earth and everything, without distance, but with nearness, in which everything consists in God, and we exist, live and move us in the same God.72

Hence, there is a strong emphasis on God’s presence as conservation. In his explication of this definition, Feuerborn points out that omnipresence is not only without place, impartial and incomprehensible. In addition, there is an opposite definition of God’s presence, namely the essentiae divinae distantia, the abstract divine concepts. Feuerborn, on the other hand, does not want to admit any distance between God’s infinity/immensity and his presence in all creation. It is the others – allegedly the reformed – who are claiming that there is a distance between God in and for himself and God in creation. Instead of an opposition between God being far and near, Feuerborn even claims that God’s nearness flows from his divine infinity and immensity.73 According to Feuerborn, death does not mark the end of God’s presence, although it is the consequence of God’s absence. When Lazarus dies, the absence of Jesus is at the same time a potential presence which can restore 71 […] Quare cum kocou gubernaret Romam, ty kocy Romae existenti in media Exinanitione, aderat sua Humanitas, quippe personaliter ei unita, ac proinde longe praesentior illi, quam ulla creatura, in toto mundo, sed tamen non regnabat Romae cum kocy, quia nondum exaltata erat, ad coeleste Imperium: sed tunc exinanita, ut posset pati & mori. ty kocy ergo adfuit Romae, & ubicunque erat, sed creaturis non adfuit, hoc est, definient Scriptura, creaturas non gubernavit. Balthasar Mentzer, DISPUTATIO 3. Consideratio Novi Libelli Matthiae Martinii, Cui Titulus: EXAMEN QUERELARUM & Admonitionis BALTHASARIS MENTZERI, & c. Anno 1615. Resp. M. Jano Dionysio Ersino Dano. (vol. 2 of D. BALTHASARIS MENTZERI, Senioris, b.m. OPERUM LATINORVM, AB IPSO, DUM VIVERET, DIVERSIS TEMPORIBUS SEORSIM EDITORUM, Nunc vero, Ecclesiae Bono in unum Corpus congestorum; 1616; repr., Frankfurt: Officina Zunneriana, 1669), 407. 72 25. Omnipraesentia seu generalis praesentia Dei, est praesentia, qua ipse coelum & terram, & omnia replet, neque est de longinquo, sed de propinquo, qua omnia in Deo consistunt, & nos in ipso sumus, vivimus, & movemur. Justus Feuerborn, “INCHOATA CONFVTATIO SECUNDAE DISPUTATIONIS APOLOGETICAE D.PHILIPPI CAESARIS, Calvinistae Bremensis, Complectens SUCCINCTAM OMNIPRAESENTIAE DIVINAE Definitionem, Explicationem & Defensionem. Respondente Johanne Cothmanno, Hervoriam-Westphalo,” in OPERA THEOLOGICA (Giessen: Hampellana, 1621), 53. 73 Praesentia Dei, etiam generalis, admittit oppositum. Quod tamen cum distinctione est dicendum. Nam praesentia, quatenus pro ipsa indistantia Dei, nude, abstracte, & seorsum sumpta, ab aliis accipitur, non admittit tale oppositum, quod sit essentiae divinae distantia. […] loquendo nimirum de distantia, quae est opposita ipsi Dei indistantiae, fluenti quasi ex infinitate & immensitate essentiae divinae. Feuerborn, “Succinctam Omnipraesentiae,” 58 – 59.

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Lazarus’ life.74 It seems to me that the concept of potentiality is the key for Feuerborn to justify the difference between Christ as humiliated and Christ as exalted. That potentiality follows the temporal logic of salvation history, namely that death is an instance where divine presence is realiter taken away, but carries the promise of a future resurrection as potentialiter. Thereby is it easier to qualify the presence as a voluntary act, too, not just a necessity flowing from the factuality of the incarnation. There is no opposition between the two concepts of presence, the substantialis propinquitas and the operatio efficax, if Feuerborn is to be believed. They rather form two different stages of the gradual presence of God towards the creation.75 Should he be believed? There are signs that indicate something else, particularly if we consider other aspects of his interpretation of the God-world relation. The gradualism he promotes is at the end consumed by the good old non proportio doctrine, namely that the finite has no proportion towards that infinite, simple divine being.76 Feuerborn’s distinction between an infinite God and a finite world has some important Christological consequences, as well. Perhaps it would be going too far to say that God is placed above the stars, but Feuerborn claims that it is necessary to distinguish between two modes of presence. On the one hand, there is the omnipresence of God’s Son who – as true man – subsists in the infinite person of Christ. On the other hand, there is the existence of God’s Son at the right hand of the immense and illocali God Father.77 Feuerborn underlines that the difference between infinite and finite being should not be equalised within Christ, but remain as the opposition between uncreated and created being, eternity and time. That disparity is used to portray the relation between the deity and humanity in the hypostatic union, too: The difference between them is constant and remains so.78 With these premises, one could 74 Nam Johan.11.v.15. inquit Christus: Gaudeo propter vos (ut credatis) quod non fuerim ibi. Sensus enim Christi hic non solummodo est; gaudeo, quod Bethaniae, ubi Lazarus est mortuus, visibiliter & localiter non fuerim: Sed etiam hic; gaudeo, quod ibi non fuerim, scilicet praesentia potentiae, qua Lazarum a morte praeservassem. Feuerborn, “Succinctam Omnipraesentiae,” 59. 75 44. Praesentia universalis ipsius Dei non est nuda Dei propinquitas substantialis: neque nuda & sola operatio universalis: sed & illam & hanc definitive & indivise comprehendit. Quare crassum oppositorum Elenchum committit is, quicunque sic argumentatur ; Deus ubique est praesens sua operatione. Ergo non substantiali propinquitate: Et contra. Item: Christus qua homo, praesens est (divina praesentia) ubique substantiali propinquitate. Ergo non operatione: Et vicissim. Nam ista duo: substantialis propinquitas, & operatio efficax: sic definitive insunt in quolibet praesentiae divinae apud creaturas gradu, ut separari & dirimi neque debeant, neque a nobis queant. Feuerborn, “Succinctam Omnipraesentiae,” 59. 76 46. […] Nam finitum ad simpliciter infinitum non habet proportionem essentiae. Totum Universum cum omnibus creaturis est finitum: Deus est simpliciter infinitus. Feuerborn, “Succinctam Omnipraesentiae,” 60. 77 Quae observatio locum etiam habebit, cum disseremus de omnipraesentia filii Dei, ut verus homo est, subsistens in suam infinitam personam, & existens in immensam & illocali Dei patris dextram. Feuerborn, “Succinctam Omnipraesentiae,” 61. 78 20. […] Et quia non per naturam, sed per unionem hypostaticam, caro assumpta est particeps

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perhaps ask whether there has been a change in the relationship between divinity and humanity with the event of incarnation. If the opposition, the distance between the natures remains that way for ever, perhaps it is only possible to state the relationship in paradoxical terms. Let us move on and ask our basic question again: What do these general remarks of Feuerborn’s Christology mean for the question of Christ’s humiliation, for the interpretation of kenosis? Feuerborn characterises Christ in the status exinanitionis as not yet – in a real sense [vero] – exercising his total and universal divine government and lordship, but has emptied and withdrawn the use of that universality by assuming the form of a servant, humbled below angels, human beings and sheep, Phil 2.79

Humbleness means that Christ does not actively use his power to exercise his conservational power over creation. In fact, it is impossible to exercise lordship at the time of humiliation. They are opposites, and cannot be applied to the same subject simultaneously.80 Let us sum up the understanding of Christ’s humiliation, as we see it in the work of the Giessen theologians Mentzer and Feuerborn. There is a distinction between a dwelling mode of presence God has ad intra, on the one hand, and an active mode of presence God has ad extra, on the other hand. When the Creator is present towards creation, the divine nature is not brought about as such, but relates to creation in a relative, weaker mode. It correlates to a narrower scope of presence. Instead of the relation God-world, it is now more concentrated on God’s presence towards the pious. There is a temporal aspect to this Christology, too: There are times when Jesus Christ is not ruling the world, when he has withdrawn.

facta divinae majestatis tou kocou, ideo ei non est exaequata sive quoad vusim, sive quoad dumalim, sive quoad ousiam, sive quoad enousiam : sed quanta distantia manet inter infinitum & finitum, inter increatum & creatum, inter aeternum, & temporale: tanta disparitas & differentia constanter & semper manet inter deitatem & humanitatem Christi. Justus Feuerborn, Skiagraphias Theologicae Dissertationes novem, De Divinae Et Infinitae, Christo Jesu, Iuxta Humanam Naturam: in ipso primo unionis hypostaticae momento, vere & realiter communicatae, Maiestatis & gloriae, exsertione & usurpatione (Giessen: Peter Lucius, 1621), 9. 79 15. Nondum vero tempore suae humiliationis officium suum Regium & dominatum divinum totaliter & universaliter exercuit, sed usum istius (non omnem omnino, sed) universalem vere vacuavit & retraxit, sumpta forma servi, infra angelos, homines & pecudes abjecti, Phil.2. Feuerborn, Skiagraphias, 15. 80 […] plenus dominatus, & profundus famulatus sunt opposita, quae uni & eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem non possunt. Feuerborn, Skiagraphias, 26.

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Mentzer’s understanding of Christ’s humiliation and exaltation Mentzer’s solution of an action-like, dynamic presence of Christ raises further important questions of Christology. One of the most crucial among them concerns the temporal framework in which Christ’s person is placed, particularly how his lowliness in the cradle and on the cross relates to his exaltation in the resurrection. The main question could be framed thus: Does the difference between Christ as humilitated in the cradle and on the cross imply a difference in divine presence from Christ as exalted? The interpretation of the word “emptied” [jemºy] from Pauls letter to the Philippians 2:7 played an important role here, because it defined the nature of Christ’s humiliation. In the third disputation held by Mentzer over Martini’s book,81 the distinction between Christ’s different states of humiliation and exaltation is elaborated. Indeed, the relationship between them is seen as defining the controversy between Martini and Mentzer. How far can Christ’s being as exalted remain in his process of humiliation? Mentzer asks. Can that which pertains to Christ’s human nature – suffering, death and resurrection – be attributed to his divine nature, too?82 This question was slightly differently stated in this period, than it was in the classical discussion about God’s apathetic nature in the Early Church. The notion of divine presence brought a stronger soteriological perspective to the discussion, whereas the philosophically trained theologians of the ancient world seem to have adopted a more abstract, platonic notion of divinity.83 Mentzer locates Paul’s understanding of Christ’s self–emptying as defining for the issue at stake between himself and Martini. Humiliation [exinanitio] is Jesus Christ in the form of a servant, subjected to lowliness and obedience, up to the point of his death on the cross. Exaltation [exaltatio] is Christ resurrected from the dead, as if he was inaugurated and enthroned to the perfect and full use of the heavenly kingdom, including governing heaven and earth.84 The problem is, however, that the divine nature cannot die, as Martini points out. Martini’s Calvinist solution is to distinguish between two concepts of 81 Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 388 – 409. 82 5. Sed haec controversa quaestio est: Num exaltatio secuta Exinanitionem, ut eam sanctae Literae describunt, tribuatur Christo duntaxat secundum Naturam humanam, passam mortuam & resuscitatam, quod nos affirmamus, Martinius negat. Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 388. 83 Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 166 ff. 84 7. Assumptum probatur ex definitione Apostolica Phil.2.v.7.8.9. Exinanitio seu evacuatio, (jemysir) est Jesu Christi in forma servili, humilis subjectio & obedientia, usque ad mortem crucis. Exaltatio est Jesu Christi ex mortuis resuscitati, quasi solennis inauguratio & inthronisatio, ad perfectam & plenariam coelestis imperii usurpationem, & gubernationem coeli & terrae. Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 388.

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personhood, between persona simplex and persona composita. The former is a person where only divinity exists, while the latter contains both God and man. As divine, persona simplex, Christ is not subject to humiliation. According to Mentzer, this solution is problematic both philosophically and theologically, because Martini does not distinguish between exaltans and exaltata of the divine nature (the Word).85 By distinguishing between the effect of an already achieved exaltation contained in the perfect passive tense exaltata, and the ongoing exaltation of the present participle exaltans, we can see how Mentzer inserts the temporality into Christ, namely the temporality which salvation history brings about: According to him there is a development, an act [actus] within the person of Christ, not just the development of adding flesh to the Word in the incarnation. To make conceptual space for that development, it necessary for Mentzer to distinguish between a absolute, proper exaltation which the divine nature has in itself on the one hand, and the derivative, relative form of exaltation on the other hand.86 Is he thereby doubling the personal union in Christ? No, Mentzer claims.87 The distinction between two forms of divine presence is commented upon by Mentzer in the section where he criticises Martini for subjecting omnipresence under the same category of reason as philosophy,88 a common Lutheran objection to Reformed solutions. For Martini, Christ’s human nature cannot be truly human and ubiquitous at the same time, since the spatial restriction belongs to the definition of a true human, but this is to turn the argument upside down, according to Mentzer. Mentzer’s point is the impossibility of subjecting God’s will to any philosophical axiom. If there is substantial scriptural support for the assumption that Christ’s body is omnipresent, no anthropological definition can restrict that will.89 On the one hand, Mentzer defends that which had established itself as an orthodox view where the Formula of Concord was received, namely the 85 13. Vitia sententiae Martinii numerare omnia non est opus. Nam violantur multa principia Philosophica & Theologica, dum Natura una eademque (nempe divina tou kocou) in uno eodemque actu (Exaltatione) simul & semel exaltans dicitur, & exaltata. Quod indice digito significasse sat esto. Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 389. 86 14. Neque evadit Martinius distinctione sua, inter Exinanitionem & Exaltationem absolute, proprie, & per se dictam, & Relate. Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 389. 87 20. […] sophisticatione de Exinanitione & Exaltatione relate dicta? cum tota quaestio sit, de absoluta sive proprie appellate uti liquet ex Elencho & Anti-Martinio. Mentzer, Disputatio 3, 390. 88 OBIECTIO X. SOLIS CURsus inhibitus. […] Non igitur ex naturae legibus, sed ex ipsius Creatoris, & Domini naturae omnipotentia, judicandum esse de Filii Dei Natura humana: ac proinde simplici fide accipienda, quae de Carne in Scripturis proponuntur. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 259. 89 Non potest Deus velle, inquit [Martini], ut humana Natura sit vere humana natura nobis similis, excepto peccato, & tamen etiam sit ubique. Quid audio? Unde vero tibi constat, Martini, de ista Voluntate Dei negata? Ex Scriptura enim, quod huc proprie faciat, nihil poteris proferre. Quicquid autem de Dei Voluntate, extra & praeter Scripturam dicitur, id schola Christiana vocat mendax, adulterinum & perversum. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 259.

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rejection of Christ’s body being subjected to any possible predication of that human nature. On the other hand, his conclusion in this syllogism resembles Reformed more than Lutheran Christology : Major : Nothing which is divine essence can possibly communicate with any creature. Minor : Omnipresence is divine essence. Conclusion: Omnipresence can not communicate with any creature, including the body of Christ.90

There is a difference between the Trinity taken as a whole, as an absolute God, and that which is specific for the different persons of the Trinity.91 Mentzer labels this as omnipraesentia absolute and omnipraesentia relate. It is not the distinction between unity and plurality within the Godhead that is striking here, but the application of that distinction ad extra. The absolute omnipresence comprises the immensity and infinity, when omnipresence is considered in relation to itself [respectu sui ipsius], namely as the highest form of presence [praesentissimum]. When omnipresence is considered in relation to the creatures [respectu ad aliud], it is of a different grade and relative to that which it encounters.92 Mentzer adopts this differentiating attitude as a formal procedure which enables new differentiations: The presence of Christ’s human nature considered in relation to the Logos is to be distinguished from the presence it has vis–—–vis the creatures. In the personal union the presence of Christ’s human nature is most intimately qualified [intime et arctissime], whereas outside the union, before the creatures, it is either present or absent.93 The response from the Tübinger theologians will show how difficult it is to maintain this distinction between the human nature of Christ within the personal union while still insisting on communicatio idiomatum. These two elements, then, the temporal difference between divine presence in grace and in glory on the one hand, and the concentration on the will of 90 Nihil quod est Essentia divina, potest communicari ulli creaturae. Omnipraesentia est Essentia divina. Ergo omnipraesentia non potest ulli creaturae, ac proinde nec Corpori Christi communicari. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 260. 91 Essentia divina dicitur; vel absolute de tota Trinitate, vel determinate in singulis Personis. Determinate acceptam falsum est, non communicari ulli creaturae. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 260. 92 Jam de omnipraesentia potissimum nobis sermo est. Quae vel absolute accipitur, vel relative: Absolute quidem, & per quandam jata wqgsim, pro ipsa essentiali immensitate & infinitate, ut dicatur omnipraesens, respectu sui ipsius, quod sibi semper est praesentissimum: idque infinite. Relate, autem omnipraesens, dicitur respectu ad aliud. Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 260. 93 Quae relativa praesentia, rursum distinguitur in eam, quae est humanae naturae ad tom kocom ; Et illam quae est humanae Naturae ad Creaturas. Vere enim hanc ab illa distintam esse, inde est hoc sole clarius: Quia haec Caro personaliter est unita ty kocy, ideoque illi praesens est intime & arctissime, sicut oussia sua urpostasei, Creaturis autem non est unita personaliter ac proinde sive adsit illis, sive absit […] Mentzer, “Anti-Martinius,” 260.

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Christ and its divine possibility on the other hand, seem to be the main premises on which Mentzer bases his understanding of the communicatio idiomatum. Summary Balthasar Mentzer followed Melanchthon in his Christology, where Christ’s presence was differentiated between different modes or grades of presence. Mentzer insisted on understanding this presence solely according to its dynamic character, using the terminology of actio. By avoiding any metaphysical, “dwelling” descriptions of how Christ relates to the creatures, Mentzer wanted to be true to the scriptural witness of God: God is always creative and active coram mundo. It is only coram seipso – i. e., ad intra – that God can be said to be dwelling. As a result, Christ is only displaying the active side of God as the incarnated second person of the Trinity. One of the most interesting systemic results both of Mentzer’s distinctions within the Trinity, and his adoption of action into the definition of presence, is the result it has for Christology : Instead of a univocal attribution of divinity to either of the persons in the Trinity, as Luther had done, Mentzer inscribes a difference which could be said to balance his understanding of the person of Christ. Instead of doubling the core–structure of Christ, as was done in the communication of attributes, Mentzer reverts to the logic of identity in his concentration on the divine nature of Christ. In the end, his firm univocal definition of Christ is found in the hypostatic union as such, not in the doubling of Christ’s person through the traffic of communicating attributes within the person. As a Lutheran response to the Calvinist reasoning, Mentzer’s solution of a “biblical personalism” threatened the union of Christ’s person, at least as the Tübingen theologians interpreted it. Mentzer’s new distinctions brought one of the old Christological problems to the fore, in the midst of what the Lutherans (or at least some of them) considered their most central concern: Are some of the divine properties excluded from the salvific communication between God and man in Christ?

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The response from Tübingen Introduction Theodor Thumm (1586 – 1630),94 Lucas Osiander II (1571 – 1638)95 and – after a while – Melchior Nicolai96 formed the group of theologians from Tübingen who found themselves in controversy with the theologians at the University of Giessen. In an extremely large body of writings,97 with Thumm as the leading figure, they formed the opposition to the Christology of Giessen. Instead of interpreting Christ’s presence as actio, they emphasised the broader term praesentia as the correct interpretation of the person of Christ. This difference in terminology not only implied an inclusion of the dwelling features of God’s essence in the person of Christ, but pointed to an alternative theological methodology : Whereas Mentzer in his conception of Christological modalities started with a theistic concept of God and a static relation of that God to the world, Thumm starts his Christological reasoning with the implications of the God–man in Christ. For Thumm, these implications are strictly connected to the communicatio idiomatum, understood as removing any theoretical obstacles which may hinder an exchange of the totality of the implied properties. What does such a methodological difference mean for the understanding of Christ’s person? In his summary of the conflict, written in 1625, Thumm lists three areas of conflict between Giessen and Tübingen: 1. the understanding of 94 Thumm, who was the front figure of the group, was one of the brightest heads of his time. He became superintendent 1614, and professor in Theology 1618. His production of scholarly books was immense, not only against the Giessen Christology, but also against the Weigelians and the Socinians. Thumm was imprisoned after having accused the pope of allowing incest, one between the Archduke of Austria and his niece, Anna of Bayern. Thumm’s political problem was that he was thereby accusing the parents of the reigning emperor at that time. Cf. Christian F. Kielman, Versuch Kurzer Lebens Beschreibungen Berühmter Wirtemberger (Stuttgart: Erhard & Löflund, 1791), 58 – 62, Herman Ehmer, “Thumm, Theodor,” in BBKL 11, 1527 – 30 and Jörg Baur, “Glanz und Elend der Tübinger Ortodoxie,” in Luther und seine klassischen Erben (1986; repr., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993), 295. 95 Lucas Osiander II was the son of the well-known pastor Lucas Osiander, and grandson of Andreas Osiander. He was 1620 appointed professor in Theology at Tübingen, and Thumm’s collaborator. Herman Ehmer, “Osiander, Lucas d.J,” in BBKL 11, 1304 – 6. 96 Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 257 – 59. 97 One of the most skilled interpreters of the 19th Century research confessed that he had enough with the main writings of the controversy. According to his prejudices, the polemics had significant drawbacks: The arguments were divided into numerous scholastic distinctions, and as a result they were treated abstractically, in logical syllogisms and conclusions with an endless breadth. [Zersplitterung in zahlreiche scholastische Distinctionen und in Folge davon eine abstracte Behandlungsweise, die sich in Logischen Syllogismen und Conclusionen bewegt, und in endloser Breite sich ergeht.] Although it would lead to far to consider it as a Lutherus redivivus, his legacy is noticeable. Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 429 – 30.

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Christ’s humiliation, 2. Christ’s renunciation of his offices, and finally 3. Christ’s death. First, he points to the Giessen theologians’ interpretation of Christ’s state of humiliation – as a real kenosis of the divine properties – and the problem it has caused by inserting an absence [habe abwesend gemacht] between Christ as divine and the other creatures.98 Thumm regards this as an attack on the reciprocal relation between the natures in the personal union, and causing an alien hierarchy within the union. That would in turn open the way for an extraCalvinisticum, namely the Word of God to be present by all the creatures independently from the human nature of Christ post incarnationem. He returns the accusation from Giessen: It is the crypto-Calvinist solution of Mentzer that doubles the divinity, Thumm claims.99 The second area of conflict concerns the problem of Christ’s renunciation of the offices [Ambtsverzichtungen] during birth and suffering, which is implied in the kenotic Christology of Giessen. In his response to the Giessen solution, Thumm draws upon one of the most central motives of the Christmas hymns of Luther, namely the child in the cradle as King: Hie ligt es in dem Krippelein ohn End so ist die Herzschafft seyn.100 98 Theodor Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht/ Etlicher Strittigen Fragen/ so ober der Gegenwart dess Menschen Christi zwischen etlichen der Augspurgischen Confession verwanten Theologen entstanden (Tübingen: Dieterich Werlin, 1625), 4. 99 Wann zur Zeit der Ernidrigung die angenommene Menschliche Natur nicht allen Creaturen gegenwertig gewesen/ denen der Sohn Gottes zugegen war/ sondern von dem grösten theil derselben abwesend/ denen doch der Sohn Gottes gegenwertig verbliben/ so muss folgen dass bey allen denen Creaturen/ welchen der Sohn Gottes gegenwertig/ die angenommne Menschliche Natur aber abwesend/ der Sohn Gottes ausser seinem angenomenen Fleisch müsse gewest seyn/ welches nichts anders ist/ dann auff Nestorianische und Calvinische Weise die beide Naturen von einander aufflösen/ die Person zertrennen/ und zwen Söhn Gottes machen/ deren der ein ohne sein angenommne Menschliche Natur allein Creaturen/ der ander aber mit deroselben allein ettlichen wenig gegenwertig gewesen/ welches ungereimt/ und den Grund unser Seeligkeit umbstost. Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 7 – 8. 100 Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 10. Cf. the other hymn of Luther cited: Er lag im hew in Armut gross die Krippen hart ihn nicht verdross es war ein kleine Milch sein Speiss der nie kein Vögelein hungern liess. Den aller Welt Kraiss nie beschloss der ligt in Marien Schoss er ist ein Kindlein worden Klein der alle ding erhält allein. So mercket nun das Zeichen recht die Krippen Windelein so schlect da findet ihr das Kind gelegt das alle Welt erhält und trägt. Und wer die Welt vil mahl so weit von Edelgestein und Gold bereit

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Thumm claims that Christ must have been a King in the state of humiliation, as well, referring to the adoration of the wise men from the Orient and Christ’s acceptance of the title “King” during his passion. Thumm employs the soul/ body image to support his claim of unity between the natures.101 Clearly, Thumm did teach a usus retractio of Christ’s majesty, but this retraction was not seen as an abdication of his munus regium. During the time of his passion he had similarly [simul] ruled heaven and earth, and fed the birds and the animals. There was no time when he did not share in the divine creatio continua. But Christ “unused” his majesty by refraining from using it for himself while in the state of humiliation. By refraining from a reflexive, ad se ipsum use of the majesty, Thumm sees the possibility of his sacerdotal office to reach the depths of human misery. A retraction of the use of majesty within the person of Christ does not cause the same restraint of Christ’s majestic office ad creaturas.102 Christ is still upholding the world, feeding the birds and bees, during his step–back from the use of majesty. It is important to be aware of the precise point of retraction, namely that the distinction is not drawn between Christ and creation, but only the use of that majesty to vivify himself. The latter is necessary, according to Thumm, to make space for suffering. What is important in Thumm’s stress on a limited retraction is his unwillingness to let go of the double identity of Christ, as both God and man in communion. The communication of attributes is not stopped due to the retractio. Here, an important difference is found when we compare it with the Giessen solution. By claiming Christ’s renunciation of his majesty during his state of humiliation, the Giessen theologians made Christ’s person conform to the logic of identity. The third area of dispute concerns the interpretation of Christ’s death. Against the solution suggested by the Giessen theologians, Thumm regards it as necessary that the whole Christ [dem ganzen Christo] is considered subject to the suffering and death. If Christ has suffered solely according to his so wer sie doch dir vil zuklein zu seyn ein Enges Wiegelein 101 Wie in einem Menschen (der seinem Beruff und Ambt abwartet) nicht die Seel ohne den Leib/ nicht der Leib ohne die Seel/ sondern der GANTZE MENSCH/ der auss Leib und Seel bestehet/ schaffet und würcket. Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 15. 102 Retractio namque respicit officium Sacerdotale seu Finem Incarnationis, & Carnem in actu reflexo seu reciproco: AT USURPATIO UNIVERSALIS respicit officium regium & actum Carnis Christi directum […] NON USURPARE potest, quoad SE reflexive seu reciproce, suum defraudare genium, strenue esurire & sitire, nudus discalceatus, aut laceris pannis obsitus incedere: USURPARE autem potest vicissim erga pauperes, omnem ipsis benevolentiam exhibendo, eos cibando, potando, convestiendo, & omnia necessaria subministrando. Nulla hic oppositio nulla contradictio […] Theodor Thumm, Tapeimosicqav¸a SACRA, HOC EST, REPETITIO SANAE ET ORTHODOXAE DOCTRINAE DE HVMILIATIONE CHRISTI NEAMnqypou, IN QUA DEMONSTRATUR, VERISSIMAM, REALISSIMAM ET PROFUNDISSIMAM HUMILIATIONEM HOMINIS IN DEUM assumpti, cum eiusdem omnipraesente, omnisapiente, omnipotente, &c. Ecclesiae ac totius universi regimine, actu revera constitisse. (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1623), 98.

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humanity, he cannot be a saviour [Erlöser], but is incapable of saving man. He would rather need salvation himself, Thumm adds.103 The divinity of Christ is indeed an impassable nature, but the consequence of the personal union is the divinity’s partaking of the suffering and death. If not, the personal union would be divided.104 Similar to the understanding of Christ’s offices, Thumm points to the similarity between Christology and anthropology. Just like the impossibility of the body existing without the soul and impossibility of the soul existing without the body, Christ cannot be said to be suffer solely according to one of the natures.105

The genesis of the controversy The historical circumstances surrounding the genesis of the controversy is not quite clear, according to one of the authoritative modern accounts.106 Most of the common sense Christology written by Lutherans was more or less in line with the quite imprecise Württemberg report – imprecise at least compared with the sharpness of the coming controversy – from Maulbronn (1564). Mentzer had been publicly criticised by his colleagues in Giessen, Johannes Winkelmann (1551 – 1626)107 and Johannes Gisenius (1557 – 1658)108, for having introduced a new vocabulary in the definition of Christ’s omnipresence.109 The Church authorities tried to find a solution to the controversy – which was at that point a matter confined to the Theology Faculty – through the so-called Darmstadt recess of January 1617. In the outcome of this recess, the disputed meaning of praesentia Dei apud creaturas was defined to cover not only the operational works of God, but his substantial and essential presence, too. It would be wrong, however, at least if the output of the recess is Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 12. Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 14. Thumm, Kurtzer und Einfältiger Bericht, 15. Baur, “Ubiquität,” 295. Johannes Winkelmann studied under Aegidius Hunnius in Marburg. Winckelmann replaced Hunnius, when Hunnius was appointed to Wittenberg. Johannes Himmel, “MEMORIA, Viri admodum Reverendi, Clarissimi & Excellentissimi, DN. JOHANNIS WINCKELMANNI,” in Memoriae theologorum nostri saeculi clarissimorum renovatae decas prima – sexta (ed. Henning Witte; Königsberg: Hallervord, 1675 – 75), 206 – 13. 108 Johannes Gisenius was as a student of Aegidius Hunnius and Polycarp Leyser in Wittenberg, and had taught at the same place from 1605 – 1607. After serving as a rector in Lemgo Gymnasium, he came to Giessen as a professor of Theology 1616. Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz, Art. Gisenius, Johannes in BBKL 2, 251 – 52. 109 Theodor Thumm, Tapeimosicqavia SACRA, HOC EST, REPETITIO SANAE ET ORTHODOXAE DOCTRINAE DE HVMILIATIONE CHRISTI NEAMhqypou, IN QUA DEMONSTRATUR, VERISSIMAM, REALISSIMAM ET PROFUNDISSIMAM HUMILIATIONEM HOMINIS IN DEUM assumpti, cum eiusdem omnipraesente, omnisapiente, omnipotente, &c. Ecclesiae ac totius universi regimine, actu revera constitisse. (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1623), 3 – 4.

103 104 105 106 107

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to be believed, to assume Christ’s presence to his creatures as operational without his substantial and essential presence.110 The recess did state, however, that the whole question concerning omnipresence seemed to be qualified – in its accurate description – as more scholastic than theological. This subtle critique of any mixture of philosophy and theology is epitomised in the dubious reference to the quidditate, even though it was made clear that the omnipresence should still concern the matter itself, the re ipsa. The recess doubled that meaning by adding that the action was covered, too, “und der That”. This has an interesting methodological component to it, namely how important it was for the theologians to consider Scripture’s verba as a source for determining these questions. One would perhaps have expected a more nuanced reflection on the theological res at stake. An appeal to the divine word – quo ad sensum – was still used as an attempt to solve the underlying questions of a more fundamental nature, namely how a specific theological qualification of the category of personal presence related to philosophically qualified anthropological assumptions. An incident which might have contributed to the continuing debate was the explicit affirmation of Mentzer’s right to publish his controversial theses. That was perhaps done in order to calm the adversaries,111 but the effect of stating a controversial point of view is difficult to control. The freedom to print the views which Mentzer had uttered was also used by Justus Feuerborn. It was therefore hardly surprising that the colleagues in Tübingen stated their discontent in a letter in September 1619.112 110 “1. Dass praesentia Dei & Christi heamhqypou apud creaturas in sich begreiffe / so wo die substantial und wesentliche Gegenwarth Gottes / und des HErrn Christi selbst / also auch die Operation. […] dass dahero irrig und verwerfflig seye / […] da man sagen würd / GOtt / oder aber sein lieber Sohn Jesus Christus hätte zwar bey uns / und den Creaturen seine Wirckung / aber ohne alle substantial oder wesentliche Gegenwertigkeit.” Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1259 – 60. 111 “Und wird Mentzero ausstrücklich vorbehalten / seine Streittsach gegen die Calvinisten auszuführen / mit diesen Worten: In zwischen aber / erheischender Notthurfft nach / Doctori Mentzero zugelassen seyn soll / seine gegen Martinium und andere Adversarios zu druck gebrachte / und vom selbigen angefochtene Theses / doch bescheidentlich / und ohne irritation oder offension seiner collegen, in diesen / in streit gezogenen quaestionibus nach GOtts Wort zu beantworten und zu widerlegen.” Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1260. Cf. Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 248 – 49. 112 Among the subscribers was the famous professor Matthias Hafenreffer (1561 – 1619), who is not regarded as belonging to the Tübingen-Giessen controversy. He was much older than Osiander and Thumm, but his interest seems to have been drawn in the direction of the theological questions concerning Christology, as one of his latest writings gives witness to. This is a disputation held in September 1618, with Johannes Geilfusius as respondent. Here, he stated the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ in line with the younger theologians: (Thesis) 101. Caro Christi itaque est Omnipraesens, non in se, subjective & per essentiae infinitatem, multo minus per quandam diffusionem, & expansione, sed ubique est ratione personalitatis sibi communicate. Matthias Hafenreffer, Disputatio Theologica DE PERSONA CHRISTI, QUAM Auspicante Christo (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1618), 11.

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Direct confrontation between Tübingen and Giessen The theologians from Tübingen singled out four areas which the theses of Feuerborn were supposed to raise: (1) The assumption that the personal union of Christ should not be the foundation of the omnipresence of Christ’s flesh, but rather (2) Christ’s promise of his presence should form that foundation. (3) An attempt to state that the omnipresence of Christ’s flesh should only pertain to the state of exaltation, and not the state of humiliation. (4) The understanding that omnipresence should only pertain to the attribute, and not the absoluteness of God, and only to the relative, operational character of God, and not God’s real presence.113 From these considerations, three areas will be focused upon in the following. First, Tübingen’s interpretation of the person’s infinity as the basis of Christ’s omnipresence will be compared with Giessen’s insistence on promissio as the basis of omnipresence. Second, the question whether the ontic status of Christ’s omnipresence should be temporally differentiated in a state of humiliation, on the one hand, and a state of exaltation, on the other. Third, the difference between an absolute and a relative divinity in Christ’s relation to the creatures will be explicated. At this point, it seems to be most fruitful to leave the strict chronology of events, and enter a more systematically ordered presentation.

The space of Christ’s omnipresence: Infinity of the flesh or the promise of Christ? If we consider the arguments for regarding the personal union of Christ as the foundation for Christ’s omnipresence, they can be summarised thus: The theologians from Tübingen, including Hafenreffer, are insisting that in Christ the infinite word of God has been united with a human nature consisting of both body and soul. In addition, they have a traducian anthropology, where the soul cannot be dissolved from the body without losing its very character of being a human nature. This seemingly impossible structure isolated the Tübingen Christology from having a philosophical underpinning. Their understanding of the connection between God and man must therefore solely 113 Percurrimus autem tuas ut & D. Feurbornii, de Omnipraesentia carnis Christi theses, & praeter non paucas dubias & periculosas phrases, quatuor potissimum conclusiones, quae tecum & Orthodoxia, non concordant, deprehendimus: 1. Assumptionem, nimirum unionem personalem fundamentum omnipraesentiae carnis Christi remotum, 2. Promissione vero fundamentum adaequatum & proximum (non modi praesentiae, sed ipsius) praesentiae, qua talis, esse. 3. Omnipraesentiam carnis Christi non ad Exinanitionis, sed Exaltationis solum statum pertinere. 4. Omnipraesentiam denique, prout infinitatis Dei imediatum consequens, ac in Deo attributum, non absolutum, sed relativum est, non per adessentiam, sed per operationem esse definiendam. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1263 – 64.

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rely on the “ineffable power of the personalisation” which Christ represents.114 Although this tenet did not exclude the affirmation of a divinely inspired reason, separate from the revelation in Christ, one will search in vain for a supposedly “biblical” qualified system of divine presence, as did the Giessen version. Here we are already at the heart of the method of early seventeenth-century theology in Tübingen. In line with the Christology of Luther and Brenz, they are making the communication between an immense God and a suffering man in Christ the starting point and yardstick of all Christological reasoning. The new problems Mentzer posed pushed it one step further. It is, in other words, the concrete, historical person which is the place where the communicatio idiomatum happens.115 The implications of that exchange provide the framework for Christology. This is a clear methodological difference between the line of thought which we have traced from Melanchthon, through Chemnitz, culminating with Mentzer, to the line of thought which originated with Luther, over Brenz and now Thumm. Whereas the latter has the communication itself as an event with two implied natures as the very definition – and therefore avoids the logic of idem–identity –, the former does not place its main emphasis on Christ’s ad quem – namely the communication of the natures, but relies on Christ’s a quo: His personal identity, exemplified with the general renunciation of the divine office in the state of humiliation. What is the result? The relation between Creator and creation is paralleled to the relation between God and man in Christ, making it “fluently nondistant”, as Thumm later framed it.116 Thumm and his companions in Tübingen fervently attacked any attempt to pose a spatial distance between God and the world, because it would ultimately hinder an unrestricted communication between God and man in Christ. How did Mentzer respond to the Tübingen theologians attempt at clarification? In a letter written in October the same year, 1619, he refuted 114 Ex unionis termino demonstramus, qui non est finita, sed infinita Fili, Dei upostasir, in cujus ipsissima tou kocou upostaseyr infinitae unitate humana natura anima & corpore immediate, intime & realissime inserta, apeqicqaptyr upeqgsato ac jatepieto, in qua velut jokpy totali & infinito, non nisi infinite subsistere potest cujus ineffabilis personationis vi, Christus ambabus naturis, non quidem formaliter […] praesentia non tantum swetijg, (quae a nonnullis per to ; habere describitur,) aut qua res ipsi, verum reali, & qua ipse rebus omnibus in coelo & in terra praesentissimus adest. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1264. 115 When Weber refers to Thumm’s interpretation of the omnipresence of Christ’s humanity as solely relying on a “metaphysical qualification of immensitas”, he does not consider that dynamic element – the event, so to speak – of the communicatio idiomatum. The divine infinity in its entire substance and action is being communicated. Hans Emil Weber, Der Einfluss der Protestantischen Schulphilosophie auf die Orthodox-Lutherische Dogmatik (1908; repr, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 96. 116 […] praesentiam Dei, juxta tenorem Sacrae Scripturae & sobriae rationis, formaliter nihil esse aliud, quam solam adessentiam sive indistantiam seu propinquitatem substantialem, ex immensitate Dei fluentem. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 393.

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the arguments from Tübingen by claiming that the presence of God towards the creatures is different than it is in the personal union. Mentzer’s modes of divine presence supplied him with an alternative premise: God can be thought of as restraining his presence to some degree. The infinite divinity which is present in the personal union does not affect [pertingere] the other creatures, but is restricted to that union.117 The Giessen theologians see no changed relationship between God’s essential attributes and the creatures after the incarnation, as the theology from Tübingen suggests. The theologians from Giessen do not solely rely on the hypostatic union as their theological method, but let the modal nature of God’s presence restrict the implications of that union. It is to be noted that Mentzer does not appeal to any philosophical necessities, but points to the witness of Scripture itself as “tempering” the implications of an extreme interpretation of the hypostatic union. Thumm, on the other hand, is able to integrate the whole majesty in the exchange of properties. How? It seems as if he poses a strict theological qualification of the person of Christ. He regards the Giessen position as a result of a philosophical understanding of persona, namely that it is necessary to imply a sameness or essence unique to the person’s nature. This “thing” is unable to be communicated to another nature. It is only the dynamic properties, qualified as actions and passions that are communicated from the divine to the human nature.118 Thumm, however, points to a different understanding. In his exegesis of Colossians 2:9, Thumm underlines that it is not sufficient to understand the indwelling Logos as an act of speech. Thumm interprets the divine, indwelling thing [res inhabitans] not only as a feature restricted to Christology, but as an integrated part of his understanding of God’s participation in the creation. In Thumm’s understanding of praesentia generalis, God is not only present to the things created and sustained according to his power or efficacy. Instead, Thumm bases his interpretation on Jeremiah 23:24, which should prove that God himself is present, even according to his essence, his ausia.119 In Thumm’s

117 Unio tou kocou & carnis personalis, non est omnipraesentia, hoc est, apud omnes creaturas praesentia. Nam haec ad omnes creaturas refertur, ut patet vel ex ipso nomine. Unio vero est inter solum to kocom & carnem, in infinita persona tou kocou ad quam nulla alia creatura pertingere potest. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1266. 118 Quidquid proprium unius Naturae est, ita, ut alteri per se non conveniat, illud vocatur idioma in Theologica, quidquid aliud vel eandem sit: Atqui actiones & passiones sunt alterutrius Naturae vel divina vel Humana ita propriae, ut quae humanae est, divinae jah( autgm non sit qua vicissim Divinae est, illa humana per se non conveniat: Ergo actiones & passiones & sunt & vere dicuntur in Theologicis idiomata. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 128. 119 Inhabitandi verbum non uno modo de Deo dici. I. enim inhabitat Deus generaliter omnibus rebus a se productis, non solum virtute & efficacia, sed ipsa etiam ousia, qua Jeremiae 23. vers. 24. coelum & terram implet […] Theodor Thumm, ENGCGSIS DICTI PAULINI Coloss. 2. v. 9. In ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo Deitatis corporaliter ; IN QUA Praecipua Photinianorum,

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theological reasoning, God’s infinity is among God’s relative attributes. Unlike his omnipotence, by which God acts, and which therefore belongs to his absolute attributes, the infinite presence is necessary to sustain the creation.120 The prime importance for Luther and Brenz is continued by Thumm and his colleagues in Tübingen, namely to keep the presence, even his infinite presence, of God intimately, without distance [indistanter] directed towards the creatures. This intimacy is threatened, not only if God’s immensitas can be excluded from God’s presence towards the creatures. A similar threat occurs, too, if a spatial distance can be inserted between God and the creatures. If we turn from the relation between Creator and creation to the relation between Christ and the creatures, a similar structure can be found. The restriction on God’s whole majesty in his presence towards creation is similar to the restriction the Giessen theologians make between Christ’s presence towards himself, his praesentia intima, and Christ’s presence towards creation, his praesentia extima. This distinction can be traced back to Aegidius Hunnius, who used the scholastic distinction between actus primus and actus secundus to explain the participation of the majesty in the kenotic movement of Christ.121 Actus primus can be thought of as a baby who indeed has feet; if he could use them, it would be according to actus sedundus. In the same manner, Christ has his majesty only according to actus primus. He has not made use of it during the time of his humiliation, just like the baby who is not using his feet.122 To what extent Hunnius’ distinction must be seen as in conflict with the later unionist Christology of Tübingen,123 or rather in harmony with it,124 is not

120

121 122

123 124

Calvinistarum & Pontificiorum contra Incarnationis mysterium sophismata, ex verbo Dei deteguntur & solide refutantur (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1621), 21. Deum solari pios per praesentiam, & terrere impios; quia tamen universalis illa ad Creaturas praesentia, ceu attributum quoddam relativum, non omnipotentiae (secundum quam Deus agit) sed infinitatis seu immensitatus Dei (secundum quam Deus creaturis per indistantem adessentiam non potest non semper actu adesse) consequens est, illam non per actionem, emeqciam aut operationem, sed proprie & accurate loquendo, tantum per indistantem ad creaturas adessentiam definire & describere possumus. Thumm, Exegesis, 21. Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 217 – 18. Si euacuauit, ergo non habuit? [Hunnius has framed his work as questions with answers] Habuit Maiestatem ipsam actu primo, sed actu secundo eam, quam habuit ac retinuit Maestatem, non usurpauit exinanitionis tempore, nisi interdum duntaxat in edendis miraculis, quando Dei gloria & confirmatio doctrinae coelestis requirebat, sicut hanc exinanitionis statum discribit Apostolus ad Phil. 2. Aegidius Hunnius, Libelli IV de persona Christi ejusque ad dextram Dei sedentis divina majestate (Frankfurt, 1590), 61. Baur traces the intima-extima distinction back to Martin Chemnitz. Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 212 and 265. Markus Matthias claims that Hunnius’ distinction aims at bringing “the relation of action” [Wirkungsverhältnis] between the human nature of Christ and the creatures to the fore, not – as Baur claims – in isolating a spatial presence of Christ’s divinity on the one hand, and a supernatural ubiquity on the other (p. 214). According to Matthias, Hunnius tried to preserve “the specific interpretation of the Lutheran unio personalis with the biblical history of Jesus

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agreed on by contemporary interpreters.125 For this work, however, it suffices to say that the distinction isolates a presence Christ had in and for himself. This presence is, according to the theologians of Giessen, without the element of actio which characterises the praesentia extima. In his Consideratio Hypothesium Tybingensium, Mentzer considers this hypothesis, which seems a plausible rendition of the Tübinger position: The infinite flesh subsists in the infinite person, the Son of God, which is non–distant present to all creatures from his divine, immense essence.126

For Mentzer, however, this is not sufficient. He claims that one has to distinguish between the presence the Son of God has towards his own flesh, and the presence of that same flesh to the creatures. When Christ was on earth, he moved visibly between different spaces, before he finally ascended to heaven. At this point, he exercised the omnipresent majesty according to its use [usurpationem]. Although Christ had assumed human nature – the nature shared by all human beings – this was prior to the praesentia apud creaturas.127 From the perspective of the Tübingen theologians, Giessen’s solution creates a spatial rupture within the union. The theologians of Giessen refer to the Colloquy of Maulbronn (1564) to make that distinction and draw on Luther, too, but Thumm claims the opposite. In a response, Thumm refers to Luther’s insistence on a humanity which cleaves [klebt] to God, and therefore has to be everywhere, where God is. Thumm’s reference is quite striking due to

even in the state of humiliation” (p. 217). Hunnius’ solution is to introduce a non-operative omnipresence, which indeed is present towards the creatures, but distinguished from the omnipotence, which causes the gubernatio mundi. Markus Matthias, Theologie und Konfession: der Beitrag von Ägidius Hunnius (1550 – 1603) zur Entstehung einer lutherischen Religionskultur (Leucoreastudien zur Geschichte der Reformation und der Lutherischen Orthodoxie 4; Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004), 206 – 23. 125 Cf. Sparn, “Jesus Christus,” 6. Older research, as done by Dorner for example, regards Hunnius’ interpretation of praesentia intima as a continuation of the old late medieval subsistencetheory. The person of Christ, containing the person of the Word and humanity within it, is elevated [erhaben] over the world and its inherent spatiality. The effect is non-spatial intimacy between God and an abstract construction of human nature. In other words: By refraining from contact with the outside world, the seemingly unavoidable distance between the natures is overcome. Dorner, Person Christi, 2, 776 – 777. 126 CARO infinite subsistens in infinita persona Filii Dei, ex immensitate divinae essentiae indistanter praesens adest singulis & omnibus creaturis. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1330. 127 Quare certum est, longe aliud esse, Filium Dei habere SIBI in seipso praesentem suam propriam carnem, unione & peqiwyqgsei personali: aliud vero eandem carnem sistere praesentem creaturis: idque vel juxta verum humani corporis modum, sicut tempore Exinanitionis ordinarie factum fuit in tota conversatione visibili cum hominibus in his terris, juxta quam modum de uno loco progressus venit in locum alterum […] Prior illa praesentia vocatur humana, & est omnibus hominibus communis. […] Posterior appellatur praesentia apud creaturas […] Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1331.

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the explicit rejection of the Eutychian mingling of the natures: Humanity can never substantially [wesentlich] become God. However, the distinction between praesentia extima and intima inevitably led to a diastatic notion of the communication of properties. In Thumm’s Christology, a praesentia intima necessarily implies an extima, and the distinction is therefore meaningless.128 In an important paragraph, Thumm defines the place of the communication thus: In the place where the Logos is, there, in that place, he himself has the presence of the flesh towards the creatures. Wherever there is a place where the Logos is, in that place he has an intimacy of his flesh towards the creatures. Wherever there is a place where God is located, it is necessary to locate his humanity there, too. It is not possible to locate divinity at any place where the humanity should not simultaneously be at hand.129

This spatial union is extended to the depth of Calvary, too: If Christ is hanging on the cross according to the laws of physics [actus naturalis], he cannot be personally [actus persona] present in Rome and Athens at the same time. The natural laws, however, do not take into account the double qualification of Christ as God and man. Christ cannot be in two places secundum carnem, but secundum actum naturalem he can be everywhere, due to the communication of attributes. And that event of communication cannot be interrupted without destroying the person itself. Therefore, the incarnated person, the divine nature itself, has to be included here, even to the point of death. Thumm claims that this is the inevitable solution to the problem. If not, the union would be torn apart, as supposedly occurred with the interpretation of the divine nature as “resting” [quievit]. 128 Verba Apologiae a Sciagrapho [namely that the intima-extima distinction can be theologically justified] citata, descripta sunt e Tom. 3. Jenens. Germ. p. 462. b. quorum sensus & scopus non est, uti sine pudore fintig Sciamachus, kºcom praesentia intima SIBI tantum habuisse praesentem suam carnem, non vero praesentia extima, id est, hominem Christum propinquitate substantiali creatura ad extra non adfuisse; hoc enim Luthero ne per febrem quidem unquam in mentem veni verum eundem praesentiam extimam intellexisse, cohaerentia verborum clare innuit. In immediate enim antecedentibus verbis pro praesentia Christi hominis ad creaturas hoc profert argumentum: Ausser den Creaturen ist nichts dann Gott; die Menschheit (in kocy subsistens) ist ausser den Creaturen / so muss sie sein / das Gott ist / das fehlet nimmer mehr / wesentlich aber kan sie nicht Gott sein. Aber weil sie oben auss uber alle Creatur an den wesentlichen Gott reichet vnnd klebt / vnd ist da Gott ist / so muss sie persönlich Gott sein /vnd also auch an allen Orten sein / da Gott ist. Confestim vero per occupationem subdit: Wol ists wahr / das unser Vernunfft sich hie närzisch stellet / zc. Ex quibus liquet Lutherum non tantum praesentiam duarum naturarum adstruxisse INTIMAM, sed EX praesentia INTIMA & earundem peiwyq¶sei profundissima, necessario EXTIMAM quoque ad creaturas realem, contra caecae rationis judicium, docuisse & demontstrasse. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 368 – 69. 129 Vbi, ubi est o Kocor, ibi, ibi sibi & secum ad creaturas habet praesentem carnem: In quocunque loco est o Kocor, in illo a se indistantem habet suam carnem ad creaturas: Quocunque locorum collocaverit Deum, eo etiam humanitatem eius collocare oportet: Non poteris Deitatem aliquo locare, ubi non simul praesto sit humanitas. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 421.

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This view was heavily attacked by the Jesuits, because it combined a Scotist view of God’s immense and infinite being with an insistence on an almost empirical presence in the flesh of Christ, without taking into account the Aristotelian principles of physics. The Jesuits’ arguments differ from Mentzer’s, but their results represent a similar threat to the union, at least as seen from Tübingen. The Jesuit Gaspar Lechner, for example, claims that Christ’s hanging on the cross can only be understood according to his human nature – actus naturae, that is, restricted from his divine nature –, whereas Christ’s person – actus personae – as alive, rich and omnipotent subsists in the divine nature, which in itself is life, riches, omnipotence etc.130 According to Lechner, Christ’s person as alive can not be in the same place as death, which would be contradictory, or at least contra usum loquendi.131 Lechner is aware that Aristotle’s principle of contradiction cannot be pressed too far as a theological yardstick, but considers the absolute element of God – life itself – necessarily to be placed outside “not–life”, death. Another professor of philosophy at the University of Ingolstadt, Laurenz Forer SJ, pointed to the problem of local motion, which he claimed lacked a solution in the Lutheran interpretation of the person of Christ. In his critical assessment of the Giessen-Tübingen controversy, the Bellum Ubiquisticum Vetus et Novum (1627), Forer presents a syllogism taken from the sacramental theology, but applicable to Christology, too:132 Major : If Christ is not always sacramentally present in any bread and wine, it is necessary that he aquire this presence at some time, and that he do so by a real action (since they [the Lutherans] call this presence real, and it can not be had except by a real union). 130 Vltro profitemur Christum actu naturae humanae, vt loqueris, mortuum, pauperem, infirmum, non vivuum fuisse. Sic etiam actu personae idem Christus dici potest viuus, diues, Omnipotens, quia subsistit in natura diuina, quae ipsa Vita, potentia copia est. Gaspar Lechner, EVTYCHINESTORIANAVBIQUITAS THEOL. DISPVT. IMPVGNATA In Celebri ac Electorali Vniuersitate Ingolstadiensi, CONTRA THEODORVM THVMMIVM, NOVVM EVTYCHI-NESTORIANVM, Academiae Tubingensis Theologum (Ingolstadt: Gregor Haenlin, 1624), 58. 131 Christus absolute dicitur mortuus in scripturis passim: vere, & non phantastice tantum vt Manichaei putabant; ergo non potuit vere esse simul viuus. Lechner, Ubiquitas, 59. 132 Cf. Farren’s statement on the intimate relation between the doctrine of transsubstantiation and the doctrine of Christ in its Catholic-scholastic version sheds light on the importance of the Aristotelian idea of movement for theology : “If the power of God is applied to the sacramental elements (as faith confesses it is), then the elements must be really affected and in some way become the body and blood in accord with the words of Christ. But the only way this is possible is that the bread and wine be changed [my underlining] into the body and blood. In the fleshly body of Christ, the human nature is not capable of receiving the divine quality of omnipotence or omnipresence without making a similar change, – but no such change is permitted in the human nature of Christ, as the faith of the Church has insisted for centuries. To attribute such a quality to the flesh of Christ is to make it into something which it is not, and is not capable of becoming without the implied change of its essential character as human.” Farren, The Lutheran Krypsis-Kenosis Controversy: The Presence of Christ, 1619 – 1627, 341.

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Minor : The consequent cannot be stated. Conclusion: There cannot be an antecedent, either.133

Just as the elements require an impetus from outside to become a sacrament, so the human nature of Christ requires an action from outside to become the person of God in the place of death. This, however, will be to mutate or confuse the natures of Christ, and be at odds with the Chalcedonian principles. (2) The reference to the promise of God as the basis for Christ’s presence represents a problem for the Tübingen view, especially if it replaces a necessary consequence of the incarnation. Instead, they will qualify, say, Christ’s promise to be “with you always” in the Mission commandment as a mode of presence. It is therefore consecutive [proximum] to the fundamental cause, the hypostatic union.134 Mentzer, however, points to the problem of the static character [invariabilis] of a presence based on the hypostatic union. It cannot be retracted, a problem which particularly pertains to the gracious presence, because it is contrary to its very definition. Mentzer sees this as a result of the voluntaristic framework required for speaking about salvation. Divine presence cannot become a reality solely because of a Christological necessity. Christ must have the will to be present, a gracious presence Christ eventually can withdraw from the world.135 If this is not the case, a kind of Christological secured automatic healing of sin is inevitably inscribed in the relation between man and God, and its soteriological tension would be suspended. Mentzer probably sees a threat for a possible Protestant version of ex opere operato if the voluntary aspect of presence is reduced. Although Thumm would not understand promise as alien to Christ’s presence, for the Giessen theologians it implies an exclusive insistence on the will as the basis for that presence. Correspondingly, Feuerborn underlines the possibility for Christ to be everywhere as the precondition for his presence. Thumm traces this voluntaristic framework to a strong reading of some statements in Leonard Hutter’s apology for the Formula of Concord.136 133 Si non in quolibet pane et vino semper Christus Sacramentaliter est praesens, necesse est, ut aliquando acquirat hanc praesentiam, et quidem actione reali; cum praesentiam illem dicant esse realem; eamque non nisi mediante unione reali. Sed consequens non potest dici, ergo nec antecedens. P. 252, cited from Farren, The Lutheran Krypsis-Kenosis Controversy : The Presence of Christ, 1619 – 1627, 153. 134 Promissione divinam […] non praesentiae […] sed modi solum praesentiae: […] causam fundamentumque proximum esse. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1265. 135 Gratiosae praesentiae fundamentum adaequatum & immediatum sola unio esse non potest. Nam unio est semper, & simpliciter invariabilis. Praesentia autem gratiosa est variabilis: Potest enim subtrahi: Et non pertinet ad omnes creaturas, sed tantum ad homines pios. […] Praesentia autem gratiosa est liberae voluntatis, & potest mutari. Adest enim Christus piis in hac vita separabiliter. Ergo sola unio fundamentum ejus adaequatum vel solitarium esse nequit. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1267. 136 Ad Apologiam ergo Form. Concordiae quod attinet, illa nihil aliud vult aut docet, quam hoc: Rationem quidem nostram capere non posse, quomodo corpus Christi nobis personaliter adsit,

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Thumm claims that Hutter interprets Christ’s presence on the basis of John 1:14 elsewhere. Similarly, Thumm claims that Martin Chemnitz and his voluntaristic perspective is not at odds with his view. The interpretation of Christ’s presence as “multivolipresence” should be considered only as an amendment to the principles laid down by Johannes Brenz and Jacob Andreae, according to Thumm.137 Unlike Mentzer and Feuerborn, who see the divine will as an alternative to the presence caused by the incarnation and communicatio idiomatum, Chemnitz is only including the concept of will in Brenz’s concept of presence. In other words, Thumm seems to be saying that Chemnitz is only making a fuller statement of the divine presence. This is indicated by Thumm, who is subsuming both will and presence under the category of God’s power [potentia Dei]. Of all the arguments for a similar approach between them, there is one aspect which is especially interesting for this study : Chemnitz does not base his interpretation on dialectical arguments, spatial cognition, or any other this–worldly rational condition. On the contrary, Thumm claims, Chemnitz qualifies presence as a mystery, following nothing but the expressions of Scripture. That presence does not need an extra promise, but is rather an explication of the presence of the incarnation of Christ.138 Christ’s promise does not bring about anything new in this respect.

& tamen finitum maneat? nobis tamen in voluntate Christi, verbo promissionis expressam, acquiescendum esse: verba pag. 66.b. ita habent: Das Cocordienbuch sagt ausstruckenlich / das Christi Leib nach Art vnd Eigenschafft der Natur endtlich sey / zc. Es sagt aber beneben auch / dasswann wir von seinem WILLEN Zeugnus haben / dass Er mit seinem Leib ettwa sein wölle / so seye Er nicht gebunden an die raumliche oder begreiffliche Weiss / als köndte Er sonst nicht wesentlich da sein / da Er seine Gegenwertigkeit in seinem Wort vns VERHEISSEN vnd versprochen hat […]” Cited from Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 376 – 78. 137 D.D. Chemnitius sententiae nostrae nil officit […] D. Chemnitius contra Brentium & Schmidlinum non statuerit, Christi corpus ubique esse, sed tantum esse, UBICUNQUE & QUANDOCUNQUE VELIT, quam quidam multivolipraesentiam appellitent. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 382 – 83. 138 Loca e Dn. D. Chemnitio allegata, causam Sciagraphi non juvant, sed evertunt. Chemnitius enim (uti ex antecedentibus & consequentibus verbis liquet) hoc solummodo vult, 1. magnum, incomprehensibile & inenarrabile incarnationis & omnipraesentiae carnis Christi mysterium, sine Dei verbo, nec 2. praesentiam Christi vel sacramentalem in coena, vel 3. gratiosam in Ecclesia, sine speciali promissione […] ex Dialecticis argumentationibus & consequentijs, aut cogitationibus de localitatibus, rationibus & conditionibus praesentiae hujus seculi […] tractandum non esse […] Simpliciores Ecclesiae filij, modestam ac sollicitam hanc simplicitatem omnium tutissimam & rectissimam esse judicant, ut de hoc mysterio ex nostris consequentijs & argumentationibus, sine expressis Scripturae testimonijs, nihil statuamus, sed potentiam Dei […] referamus. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 384.

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The time of Christ’s omnipresence: His humiliation and exaltation Turning now to the third area of controversy the Tübingen theologians singled out: The theologians from Tübingen underlines that omnipresence does not only apply to Christ in his state of glory, but to his lowest [infirmum] state of humiliation, too.139 The Lutheran tradition has a characteristic way of phrasing that in order to underline the range of the divine presence in Christ, even to the limits of human existence: God present in crib and cross.140 But in addition to birth and death, there is the problem of development or growth. Mentzer does not refute that Christ’s human nature is omnipresent perpetually after the incarnation, but he distinguishes between different modes of omnipresence. He claims that the witness of Scripture insists on an actual presence [actuali praesentia], which is the biblical background of how the three modes of presence before creation should be understood: God’s general, gracious and glorious (i. e. eschatological) presence.141 According to Mentzer, the Tübingen theologians do not distinguish between these modes, but are mixing all of them into one category.142 The Giessen theologians interpret the kenosis of Philippians 2:7 as a retraction or an abdication of the use of the majesty. It is not merely a hidden quality within Christ, as the Tübingen theologians claim, but a real retraction of the divine properties such as omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience.143 This refrain did not touch his being, though. Christ was indeed omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient, but he did not always and 139 Omnipraesentiam, non ad Statum solum gloriae: […] sed ad infimum quoque Exinanitionis gradum pertinere. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1265. 140 Cf. for example Oswald Bayer, Zugesagte Gegenwart (Tübingen: Mohr Sibeck, 2007), 161. 141 Baur claims that the modes of presence by Mentzer are not merely modes, but different presences. I think he is right, because the participation of the human nature of Christ in the praesentia generalis is obscured. As Baur poins out, the creation is something to be saved from. Christ remains as supranatural subject in the praesentia gratiosa. Baur, “Auf dem Wege,” 267. 142 Ego igitur Scripturarum testimoniis insistens, accipro pro actuali praesentia: Qualis definitur in tribus illis modis praesentiae apud creaturas, generalis, gratiosae, & gloriosae. Ubi vos mihi videmini velle definire tres modo actionum in una eademque praesentia sive indistantia, non ipsius praesentiae distinctos modos. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1267. 143 Cf. how Feuerborn’s modus loquendi reminds one of the classical defence of the Lutheran arguments for the real presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist. His scoffing at the argument of a hidden divinity is striking: The Tübingen option is characterised by Feuerborn as Marcionite, probably alluding to the fifth book of Tertullian’s Adversus Marcionem: […] Christus, ut homo est, in statu suae humiliationis, verissime seipsum vacuaverat universali & plenariam wqgsei & usurpatione communicatae sibi divinae virtutis & majestatis. Verissime, inquam, se ita vacuaverat. Absit enim, ut Marcionicicas larvas, & jemosidojgtym inania spectra, & fallaces vamtasia ex orco revocando […] hanc Christi Jesu profundissimam jemysim, quam nec angeli, nec homines plene intelligere, ve exprimere queunt, revera definiamus (non enim sufficit hoc verbis tantum fugere, sed & reipsam) per nudam, & solam jqupom occultationem universalis usurpationis & exsertionis divinae majestatis in assumptam a filio Dei carne […] Feuerborn, Skiagraphias, 25 ff.

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everywhere make use of it. The use was activated when his work as a redemeer made it necessary, but in order to suffer and die for mankind, he had to withdraw [retraxit] the divine properties from their use ad extima.144 For Thumm, on the other hand, it is important to qualify Christ’s humiliation as part of the reality of the incarnation from the moment of conception to the moment of resurrection from the dead.145 Any interpretation of the kenotic movement as resulting in a real voidness, or a retraction of the use of divinity, will possibly hinder the work of redemption.146 After the incarnation, the person of Christ must be considered according to its status as a composite, as a person consisting of both natures. Commenting on Philippians 2:7, Thumm claims that Paul’s scope is not only to describe the kenotic movement of Christ in specie, but rather in genere, as an example of imitation. Thumm enfolds his argument further by referring to medieval moral tradition: He considers what might have been the intentional cause for Christ to be subordinated from his divine status. It was not a human being in his or her pride [superbia], but rather a human being devoid of that original and most serious of the deadly sins. To achieve such a status, a humiliation from that pride was required.147 Could Thumm regard a person other than the Logos, the pre-existent Son of God, as the subject of the kenotic movement? That would be a hard case to argue. Rather, it seems as if Thumm regards kenosis as a psychological feature. By removing the obstacle of pride, and thereby avoiding a moralistic view of a “strong” human nature, Thumm can keep the ontological status of the Logos unchanged. Christ thereby keeps all the divine properties in the incarnation. 144 Thomasius, Christi Person 2, 434. 145 In one of his great disputations, Thumm – who presided and wrote the theses – underlined the importance of Christ’s conception as the time when omnipresence was a reality for the incarnated Son, even so far that he was present for every creature: OMNIPRAESENTIAM; Duas enim naturas in persona Christi non tantum SIBIA puncto conceptionis fuisse intime unitas (ex qua assumpta caro indistanter creaturis adessendi majestatem consecuta est) sed totum Christum a puncto conceptionis omnibus & singulis etiam creaturis (exinanitione non obstante, quae existentibus creaturis in omnipraesentia actum indistanter adessendi suspendere minime potest) revera indistanter (non quidem ex proprietate naturae, sed ex actu personae) adfuisse & adhuc adesse […] Theodor Thumm, Assertio SANAE ET ORTHODOXAE DOCTRINAE DE EXINANITIONE CHRISTI heamhqypou, In Qua e Scriptura Sacra & Orthodoxo Ecclesiae Consensu Demonstratur, Christum heamhqypou in Exinanitionis Statu & Servum & Dominum Fuisse (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1621), 6 – 7. 146 Humiliatio Christi Heamhqypou, complexim seu collective sumpta, quae initium sumbsit a primo puncto conceptionis, atque duravit usque ad punctum fyopoigseyr in sepulchro, FUIT 1. Vera & realis Exinanitio seu Evacuatio reflexiva usus illius divinae Majestatis, qui Finem Incarnationis, opus videlicet Redemptionis, potuisset impedire. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 207 – 8. 147 Hunc vero Scopum ut obtineat Paulus, non tantum jemysim in specie, sed tapeimysim seu Humilitatem Christi in genere ipsis PROPONIT, vers. 8. quam vult ipsos imitari. […] etiam manifestum est ex CAVSSA, ob quam Christus Heamhqypou hanc primam conditionem subire voluit. Fuit autem ea superbia & elatio, quando primus homo, non contentus sua sorte, Deo assimilari volebat. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 212.

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The reference to humiliation as depressio supports this theory, too.148 When Thumm explicates the goal of the humiliation as soteriologically qualified, as lifting the miserable, small human beings [homunciones] from their depressed state of being to the heavenly sublime state,149 it becomes clear that he needs (at least) two features: Both a radical understanding of the lowliness of Christ’s humanity and a fully-fledged divinity with all features intact. On this background, Thumm rejects any assumptions that the kenosis should not be real,150 it is just wrong to regard the majesty – both its status and its use – as altered through the kenosis. Such an alteration would perhaps not hinder an understanding that the properties were communicating themselves mutually, but for the Tübingen theologians it implied that the divine nature would be understood as less than God. If we leave the Christological problems at the beginning of Jesus’ temporal life and turn to the problem of development, one of Chemnitz’s interpretations151 becomes apparent as a problem for the Tübingen solution: To argue for a fully-fledged divinity would imply a notion of omniscience from the beginning of the act of incarnation. But how was it possible to combine that notion of complete knowledge with St Luke’s report that the child Jesus “grew in wisdom”? Lucas Osiander II describes his adversaries, the Calvinists, and their attempt to reduce the fullness of knowledge as an interpretation of progress: Jesus has gone from possessing an imperfect knowledge to a perfect one, from an inferior fullness to a greater one.152 Osiander places their concern under the more general notion of denying a communicatio realis of omniscience.153 Osiander’s strategy is on the one hand to admit the lack of knowledge in Christ, but on the other hand to stick to the Logos’ divine fullness. He was created like us, and there is no particular knowledge endowed in his soul from creation. Christ as a man, who has been assumed by the Logos, retains everything from the finite and created world, even when it comes to science.154 148 […] At huic proprie opposita [the opposite of exaltation] est non jemysir tantum, nisi partialiter, sed tapeimysir, Humiliatio seu depressio, uti constat. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 212. 149 Finis huius suscepti status idem ostendit, quod videlicet Humiliatio commodissime illum explicet: Iserat, nos miseros homunciones, per superbiam primorum nostrorum parentum humiliatos, & ad infirmum usque infernum depressos, ad coelestem sublimitatem denuo evehere & exaltare. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 213. 150 Non donastijg aut vamtastijg, id est, APPARENS duntaxat & imaginaria […] Quicunque vere & realiter superexaltatur, ille prius vere & realiter fuit depressus & humiliatus & per consequens etiam exinanitus: Atqui Christus realiter fuit exaltatus: Ergo & realiter exinanitus. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 214. 151 For this problem by Chemnitz, see above, page 165 f. 152 Porro, obijciunt Christi hominis in Cognitione & Sapientia profectum, quo scilicet, progressum fecisse scribitur a Sapientia & Cognitione imperfectiore ad perfectiorem, a minus plena ad pleniorem […] Lucas Osiander, Disputatio De DIVINA ET INFINITA HOMINI CHRISTO COMMUNICATA OMNISCIENTIA (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1621), 17. 153 Lucas Osiander, Omniscientia, 14. 154 Lucas Osiander, Omniscientia, 18.

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At the same time, however, the finite knowledge, marked as it is with the imperfection of this life, is communicated with the infinite knowledge of the Logos.155 Here, we get a glimpse of the strategy of the Tübingen theologians in their reading of what at the outset may seem like a problem for their position. Due to Christ’s human nature, he shares the conditions of life with human beings. The Tübingen theologians do not take an argument from Scripture by fusing it into a common tertium concept in a (pre–) Hegelian manner. Instead, the difference is kept as properties which are being put into play in the communicatio idiomatum. The theosis potential of such a scheme is seen in the soteriological qualification of the finite, worldly knowledge: Osiander claims that the worldly science is renewed.156 How then does Thumm understand the death of Christ? In line with his unionistic reasoning, he underlines that the separation of body and soul is not locally separated, only loosened [solutionem], and Thumm explains it to be according to its form.157 It is possible for two “things” to be most intimately unified, even if such a loosening has occurred.158 Thumm selects the saying of Christ in John 2:19, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up” as a proof for his understanding. In his grave, Christ is understood to be confronted with death as a reality [rem], but not with the mode of death as human beings experience it.159 In other words, Thumm keeps the normal scholastic definition of death as a separation of soul and body, but adds a new mode of death for Christ in order to preserve the unity between the natures in that person. In addition, to make the definition of death instrumental to his soteriological interest – that is, in line with the Patristic rule “what is not assumed is not healed”160 – it is 155 Ultra hanc finitam & creatam Scientiam, alia quoque multo amplior augustior & divinior homini Christo, adscribitur in Sacris Scripturis Scientia […] quae nimirum homini Christo, ab assumente kocy, in ipsa Personali unione realiter fuit in ipso Concceptionis momento collata & communicata, ipsissima nimirum tou kocou infinita Sapientia & Scientia divinissima: quam negant quidem Adversarij […] Lucas Osiander, Omniscientia, 18 – 19. 156 […] imperfectiones & infirmitates (citra peccatum tamen) in Exinanitionis statu residuae manserunt, quibus non modo non renatos, sed & renatos gravatos scimus. Lucas Osiander, Omniscientia, 18. 157 Mors autem [Christ’s death, that is], ut supra evictum, non per localem separationem, sed anima a corpore solutionem, formaliter, praecise & quiditative definienda est. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 476. 158 In locali enim separatione semper Diastglata & intervalla locorum sunt, non autem in solutione, duo possunt esse coniunctissima, inter quae tamen nulla intercedit unio, ita anima & corpus etiam in ipsa morte actu personae coniunctissima sunt & manserunt […] Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 479. 159 Christus in omnibus infirmitatibus nobis est similis factus; Ergo & in sepultura quoad ipsam rem, non autem quoad ipsum modum sepultura, quia corruptionem non vidit, Psal. 16. 10. Act. 2. 31. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 477. 160 Thomas Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Scholars’ Editions in Theology ; London; New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 27 – 30.

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important for Thumm to integrate an experience of real death in the person of Christ. To portray the difference of death modes, Thumm compares two other reports from the New Testament, namely Philippians 1:23 with 2 Corinthians 5:6 – 8. In the former which Thumm takes to be a dissolutio, St Paul describes his death as “having a desire to depart and to be with Christ”. Here, Thumm implies another relation than the opposition between life and death, namely the opposition between the temporal and eternal life. The latter of the biblical citations implies a local separatio, where St Paul describes a willingness to be “absent from the body, and present to the Lord”.161 This is the classical Christian understanding of human death, where the soul and body are separated. But it is not correct to apply this understanding to Christ’s death, according to Thumm. Thumm’s introduction of a distinction between the temporal and the eternal is one of the most interesting aspects for the present work. The intention is to overcome the Calvinist threat of a separation of the natures at one of the most crucial moments: the moment of death. It is not a denial of the traditional Christian doctrine of death as a separation of body and soul, but a strict theological – but Christologically qualified – definition of their enduring relation through death: It is the dissolutio of body and soul which constitutes the experience of death, whereas separatio is only the consequence of dying.162 And a dissolutio, as mentioned before, does not hinder the intimate conjunction of Christ’s nature. What does this distinction mean for the understanding of man? In a crucial paragraph, Thumm points out that […] the soul does not inform its body, because […] it is not possible for the soul – due to its position – to be absent from the body […]163

What does Thumm mean by the denial of the soul as forma informans? First of all, it is clear that he belongs to the tradition of Lutheran philosophers and theologians who considered the soul as passed down from the parents. In his essay Controversia de traduce sive ortu animae rationalis from 1622, Thumm

161 Concedimus, Paulum Phil. 1. 23. mortem suam (formaliter) 2. Cor. 5. v. 6. 8. concomitanter & consecutive describere, ibi, per solutionem, hic, per localem separationem ut pote quae alias epousi_de* quoddam ipsius mortis est, formalem autem eius rationem nullo modo ingrediens; dequa nec Paulus loquitur. Nec praesise sit oppositio (licet possit subintelligi) inter mortem & vitam, sed inter vitam hanc temporalem & aeternam, vel gaudiam vitae aeterna. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 478. 162 […] mortem proprie esse solutionem, non separationem; vero esse mortis consequens; hoc autem in morte Christi ob infinitam hypostasin, in qua corpus & anima subsistant, fuisse impeditum. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 479. 163 […] anima enim corpus suum non informavit, quia, ut supra probatum, non oportet animam realiter a corpore secundum situm abesse […] Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 479.

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identifies three groups of theologians who have responded to the problem of the soul’s origin. One group was the earlier theologians (including Augustine) who were ignorant about the problem, due to uncertainty of what the position of Scripture was on the matter.164 A second group, including both the main Catholic theologians and philosophers (Bellarmine, the Conimbricenser) and the main Reformed theologians (Martyr, Beza, Keckermann, Timpler), are creationists. These theologians distinguish between the body which comes about by human production, and the soul which is the immediate creation of God.165 Thumm, together with “the Wittenberger Tradition”,166 regarded the soul as transmitted through the parents to the child, although God created the souls for the first human beings.167 Defending the Lutheran position, Thumm points out that the Lord’s benediction pertains to both body and soul.168 Genesis 9:1 serves as a scriptural reference, and Thumm claims that the benediction is not restricted to human beings, but is extended to all animals or souls. His argument can be represented as a syllogism, thus: Every soul is begotten from body and soul. Man is soul. Therefore, the begotten (man) comes from body and soul.

It follows that the body should be regarded as the source from which potential being flows.169 But does that mean that Thumm – philosophically speaking – 164 Thumm refers expressis verbis to Augustine’s De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum (412), where the bishop of Hippo labled the matter totally obscure [re obscurissima] in light of the biblical witness on the matter. 165 Altera Classis est eorum, qui singulis Hominibus novas creari Animas, & nascentium corporibus divinitus infundi statuunt, adeoue Hominis productionem, quoad Animam, immediate DEO tribuunt. Theodor Thumm, Controversia De TRADVCE SIVE ORTU ANIMAE RATIONALIS EXPLICATA Theologice pariter & Philosophice. (Tübingen: Theodor Werlin, 1622), 2. 166 Martin Mulsow, “Säkularisierung der Seelenlehre? Biblizismus und Materialismus in Urban Gottfried Buchers Brief-Wechsel vom Wesen der Seele (1713),” in Säkularisierung in den Wissenschaften seit der Frühen Neuzeit (ed. Lutz Danneberg, et al.; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), 153 – 54. 167 Salatowsky lists seven arguments which the Lutherans use to support their traducianism: 1. God’s rest on the seventh day of Creation. 2. The effect of the blessing of offspring can only happen through concrete reproduction. 3. A child is conceived from her corporal parents. 4. Through conception becomes the child the same nature as the parents. 5. If the parent did not conceive the form of a human being, it is not regarded as conceiving at all, since all conceiving is production of form. 6. A human being becomes a human being as a composite of body and soul, as Aristotle says in his Physics. 7. If a human being did not produce the soul, the offspring would be less than an animal. Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 329. 168 Terminus AD QUEM Benedictio illa fuerat directa, & facta, non erat pars tantum Hominis aliqua: sed totus Homo, & Anima & corpore constans. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 3. 169 Omne Animal generando rei genitae tribuit ex se corpus & Animam, qualem habet: At Homo est

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regards the soul as a material substance? Does the soul suffer death together with the body, as Aristotle taught? Does he want to distinguish between the modi considerandi – as Luther did – by radically denying philosophy’s ability to state the content of theology proper, namely the soul’s immortality? His critique of Martini, Mentzer’s Calvinist opponent, could be regarded as a support for that radical distinction. According to Thumm, it was due to his understanding of anima rationalis as a spiritual substance which caused the error of anthropology, and subsequently the doctrine which could destroy the union of the natures within the person of Christ, too: Since a spiritual substance is not dependent on the body, it cannot be brought forth [educitur] from a body.170 But, on the other hand, Thumm rejects the opinion that the soul is produced or born out of the semen, like the beasts. He does not want to go further than stating that the soul is brought forth [educitur] from matter. Although Thumm explicitly warns against the sophistic notion of any spiritual substance, nevertheless the soul is somehow connected to the propagation of man.171 The problem which Thumm tries to take into consideration is how to integrate a theological insistence on the continuation of man’s true nature – as it was created in the image of God – beyond the earthly life as we know it. One thing is to state it as two different principles of theology and philosophy. It is far more difficult to phrase a solution in concreto where both aspects of truth are taken seriously, that is, in their own modi considerandi. Due to the outcome of the controversy between theologians and philosophers in the Hofmann controversy at the university of Helmstedt, any solution implying a duplex veritas would eventually be banned. Does Thumm regard the soul like a pilot in a ship,172 which leaves the body when it dies? This was a common Lutheran solution to the body/soul problem in the beginning of the seventeenth Century, following the Neo–scholastic interpretation of Aristotle in Catholic philosophy and theology. In the case of Thumm, there are many hints to this solution. In his critique of Robert Bellarmine’s insistence that the soul is subsisting apart from the body,173 for

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Animal. Igitur generando tribuit rei genitae ex se corpus & Animam, in quo majorem ita limitat. Omne Animal, cum generat, rei genitae dat corpus & Animam, eam scilicet, quae, cum corporeae sit Naturae, e potentia Materiae educitur. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 3. At Anima Rationalis est Substantia Spiritualis, quae e Materia non educitur, nec dependet a corpore, quantum ad Essentiam suam, sed plurimum eminet supra ejus conditionem. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 4. [Thumm’s response] Assumptio partim sapit calumniam, quasi Animam ex semine generari atque consequenter, e potentia materiae, sicuti brutorum animae, educi statueremus: partim vero alit Sophisticen, quasi esse spiritualem, seu immaterialem substantiam: & nihilominus propagari, seu potius beneficio spermatis ceu vehiculi, transvehi sese mutuo perimerent, & amtivatijyr dicerentur. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 4. Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 77. PRIMA ratio, animas hominum esse immortales principium est fidei, & quidem primarium, &

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example, Thumm refuses Bellarmine’s creationism by distinguishing between pure and impure form. The pure forms exist simpliciter ; they are independent and are not received in any matter. They are complete spirits, and do not lack anything in their perfection. Thumm supplies examples of logic and angels, since they are complete spirits.174 The impure forms are not withheld from material objects in history, but reside in matter.175 The souls are incomplete spirits, because they have not reached their perfection until they are joined with the bodies. Thumm does not qualify the souls as beings on their own [non ens per se], however, they are only a part of the human make–up, which can only be understood as a composite.176 Here we are at the heart of Thumm’s anthropological workshop: The souls as incomplete spirits cannot remain in the sphere of angels, due to their designation of becoming united with the bodies. Their conjunction with the bodies is a realisation of God’s creational act, the conditio sine qua non for becoming a human being in God’s image, that is, in its status integritatis. At the same time, however, the conjunction inevitably means involvement with sin and death, not only to a part of the composite, but to the whole thing, including the soul. Unlike the Reformed and Jesuit creationists, there is no part of a human being that can be singled out as a place for God’s action. The soul’s conjunction with the body is not regarded as a fall by Thumm, due to the lack of completeness prior to its conjunction. But what happens to the composite of body and soul at the time of death, when the body fades away? The important contribution of Thumm lies in his certissimum, & in Scripturis sanctis omnium consensu luculenter expressum. AT si animae hominum sunt immortales, necessario per se subsistunt. Nam si non per se subsisterent, sed penderent — corpore, ut animae pecudum, illo pereunte, & ipsas interire necesse esset. RURSUS si animae hominum per se subsistunt, certe etiam per se producuntur. Illa enim per se producuntur, quae per se subsistunt, illa producuntur ad productionem alterius, quae ad existentiam alterius existunt. DENIQUE si animae hominum per se producuntur, id manifestÀ sequitur, ut non fiant ex propagine, sed creentur ex nihilo. Roberto Bellarmini, Disputationum De Controversiis Christianae Fidei Tomus Tertiae (1586; repr., 1593), 311. Thumm refers to Bellarmin’s insistence in the form of this syllogism: Omne Immortale per se subsistit: Anima est immortalis: Ergo per se subsistit. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 24. 174 Propositionem non esse universaliter veram: procedit enim solum de Forma purissima, & puris: non autem de impuris (Logicis, Forma PURISSIMA, est independens, seu ipsum esse simpliciter, quod non accipit esse ab alia causa superiore, nec recipitur ab alio inferiori: Formae autem PURAE sunt, quae quidem recipiunt esse aliunde, sed non recipiuntur in Materia: Tales Formae sunt Angeli […] Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 24. For an explication of the scholastic terms used here, see Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church [Philadelphia: Lutheran publication society, 1889], 675. 175 Formae IMPURAE sunt, quae in materia upaqnim completam obtinent. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 24. 176 Quod autem anima sit incompletus Spiritus, patet ex eo, quia a Deo creata est, ut naturaliter in corpore suam habeat subsistentiam, eique, ut forma formato, vel, ut altera pars hominis substatialis insit; inde sit, ut non sit sibi Ens, sed Totius, nempe Hominis Ens, neque etiam per se, totam & integram speciem constituat. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 25.

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understanding of their separation as strictly theologically qualified:177 As a separated composite, the soul cannot be predicated as a being out of itself [j²h( aqto], only according to the other [jat( ûkko], which is in line both with a theological understanding of creation and with the radical, Alexandrinic interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul. In other words, the soul is not recognised as having the right to a place within the cosmological scheme – it does not subsist. Due to original sin and intervening death, however, body and soul are separated, still, and thus separated; the soul is released from its “prison” [ergastulo]. Nevertheless, Thumm underlines, the soul retains many of its physical functions after death, such as its appetite and its inclination to inform the body.178 Thumm cites Revelation 6:9 – 11, where the heavenly souls of the persecuted cry out for the Lord’s judgement, as a biblical foundation for this view. The crying souls indicate a lack of something; they have not yet reached their perfection.179 Indeed, Thumm defines the soul’s activity as perfecting the body. This is done as part of a critique of Aquinas, who is said to make an equivocal definition of the soul as the form of the body. According to Thumm, it must be underlined that the soul cannot make or change the body, only perfect it.180 Accordingly, the definition of Christ’s death is the freeing of the soul from the body,181 but not their separation. The impossibility of a separation of soul and body is understood by Thumm as past and parcel of Christology : Together they form the composite which makes up Christ’s human nature.182 Thumm’s argument for the impossibility of a spatial division between them 177 Thumm insists on a rationibus ex analogia fidei. Scripture is the leader [duce], but philosophy – not only as philosophy, but even as Christian philosophy [Philosophia Christiana] – is Scripture’s soldier [comite]. That could refer to a more general view of the assumed rationality of Scripture, but it could be taken as a reference to a Christian philosophy, that is, as theology’s appropriation of philosophy. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 99 – 100. 178 Peccat etiam THEOLOGICE: Nam to per se subsistere, & quidem separatim, non jah( auto praedicatur de Anima Rationali, sed jat( akko, nimirum, propter interventum mortis, & peccati primi, absque his si fuissent protoplasti, Anima Rationalis nunquam fuisset separata a corpore, & per consequens, nunquam subsistentiam habuisset propriam: quod adeo verum est, ut Anima etiam corporis ergastulo exempta, nihilominus retineat appetitum tum innatum, tum elicitum ad informandum corpus […] Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 25. 179 Nondum enim Animae beatae in eo perfectionis statu sunt. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 26. 180 Obiter quoque hic notanda est locutio Thomae parum accurata, dum animas nostras formas corporum appellat: & ita Formam Partis & Formam Totius pro aequipollentibus habet: cum tamen in animatis corporibus duplex sit spectanda Forma, quarum altera est Naturalis, quae corpus facit similare, vel dissimilare: Carnis haec forma est vel oculi. Alia est forma, NON FACIENS corpus: sed PERFICIENS: qualis est Anima: Haec itaque corpus informans humanam naturam ejus nec facit, nec mutat, sed perficit. Thumm, Animae Rationalis, 32. 181 MORS; quam […] reliquis cruciatibus & passionibus tanquam colophonem non putative, sed vere & reipsa, anima a corpore SOLUTA, & Deo Patri in manus commendata […] Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 203. 182 Nam & tunc corpus & anima secundum idem a principio in verbi upostasei habebant existentiam […] Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 471.

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consists in their participation in the infinite hypostasis. Any spatial division would imply a contradiction of that infinity.183 Thumm distinguishes between three parts of the body where the human spirit is given and located. This is done in order to explain Christ’s words on his cross, “into your hands I commend my spirit”, and goes as follows: The natural part in the liver, the vital part in the heart and the soul in the head. When Christ gave up his spirit, as the gospels report, it was only the vital part which was leaving the heart. The other aspects of the spirit remained intact.184 Thumm’s rejection of any physical, circumscriptive paradise – as Luther and Brenz rejected, too – makes it easier for him to insist on the unity of the two.185 Gaspar Lechner, the Jesuit professor in Ingolstadt claims that the words necessarily imply a separation of the soul,186 and ridicules Thumm’s philosophical abilities [!]. Whether that is true or not, in all cases it seems as if Thumm has adopted some of the premises of Scheibler’s solution concerning the problems of the relation between body and soul.187 In the discussion of ens completus in his Metaphysics, Scheibler considers the soul to be an ens incompletus, due to the lack of natural dispositions, present solely in the soul’s conjunction with the body. The organic relationship between them refers to the use the one part has of the other.188 183 Praemitto; Corpus & animam Christi non acquisivisse tempore tridui in morte propriam subsistentiam, sed substitisse in infinita hypostasi: argumentor: Quaecunque in infinita hypostasi subsistunt, illa quoad diastglata locorum non posse a se invicem separari: Ratio; Si enim locorum spacijs essent sejuncta, in infinita hypostasi vel non subsisterent, vel duo infinita, locorum spacijs disjuncta, essent, quod atopom. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 473. 184 Sicut in quolibet homine triplex datur spiritus, naturalis in hepate, vitalis in corde, animalis in cerebro, it & in homine Christo: quando ergo Christus dicitur ejpmeusai, per ejpmeusim non ipsa anima, sed spiritus vitalis, quem efflasse dicitur, intelligendus est. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 475. 185 Paradisus proprie nequit dici terminus ad quem, cum non locus quidam physicus & circumscriptivus sit: sumitur enim duntaxat pro statu & conditione beatorum, & ita anima Christi fuit in Paradiso. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 476. 186 Dic mi Doctor [Thumm] cum eodem loco apud S.Luc. Christus dixit, Pater in manus tuas commendo Spiritum meum, quem Spiritum intellexerit, animalem, an vitalem, an naturalem, an animam? & quid iam animam comendat, si non est exitura a corpore? Lechner, Ubiquitas, 57. 187 Thumm refers to a disputation from Scheibler on death [disputatio de morte] which is not available to me. However, his general remarks in his Opus Metaphysicum seems to concur with Thumm’s view. 188 Idque est propterea, quia cum sit forma, necessarium est, ut naturalem habeat aptitudinem, seucndum quam conjungi possit idoneae materiae ad componendum aliquod compositum. At quod naturali destinatione complet esse alterius, id simpliciter est quid incompletum, esto, possit habere aliquam separationem. Nam eadem de causa etiam manus abscissa, vel pes, vel auris, est Ens incompletum, quia tales partes naturali destinatione complent esse alterius, cujus rei indicium in illis est quod habent dispositionem organicam. Organum autem, sive instrumentum naturali destinatione refertur ad usum, quem tales partes habere non possunt, nisi coniungantur animae. Christoph Scheibler, METAPHYSICA, DUOBUS LIBRIS Vniversum hujus scientiae Systema comprehendens: OPUS TUM OMNIUM FACULtatum: tum inprimis Philosophiae & Theologiae Studiosis utile & necessarium. PRAEMISSA EST SUMMARIA

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In the interpretation of the exaltation of Christ, Thumm does not see any development in the status of Christ. The divine majesty has been communicated to the human nature of Christ, but it is hidden [occultata]. When Christ is exalted, this hidden status becomes manifest. Is divine presence dwelling or moving? Omnipresence is not to be described as an operational mode, according to the Tübingen theologians. God’s presence should be understood according to God’s absolute properties, not according to God’s relative properties.189 Mentzer, however, claims that his interpretation is not solely according to its operation, a description more fitting for the Calvinists and Socinians. Both elements which are contained in the witness of Scripture have to be covered in any correct description of omnipresence: (a) The nearness [propinquitatem] or God’s substantial presence, and (b) the divine government [gubernationem] of the world.190 Thumm interprets the divine property immensitas as belonging to the presence God, whereas properties like will, wisdom and omnipotence are the properties by which God acts [agit].191 Thumm has an interesting critique of Feuerborn and his difference from the metaphysics of Christoph Scheibler (1589 – 1653)192 on the question of the location of being. Scheibler was Feuerborn’s teacher, but gave a different answer on how to interpret the relation between praesentia and actio.

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METHOdus, sive dispositio totius Scientiae. (1617; repr., Oxford: Guilielmus Turner, 1637), 163. Omnipraesentiam per operationem non esse describendam […] quae in Deo non absoluta proprietas, tanquam infinitatis immediatum consequens, & attributum solummodo relativum est […] Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1265. Me unquam definire omnipraesentiam divinam per solam operationem sine substantiali adessentia non memini. […] oracula Spiritus Sancti in Scripturis divinis, praesentiam divinam apud creaturas describentia, complecti duo, nempe. 1. Propinquitatem, sive, ut ita loqui liceat, adessentiam substantialem. 2. Divinam gubernationem sive operationem. Mentzer, Necessaria et Justa Defensio, 1267. Deus non AGIT secundum immensam suam hypostasin, perquam creaturis suis indistanter solum propinquitate substantiali praesens est, sed secundum sapientiam, voluntatem & omnipotentiam; sicut autem ALIVD in Deo est immensitas, a qua dependet praesentia seu propinquitas substantialis ad creaturas indistans, ALIVD sapientia, voluntas & omnipotentia, a qua promanat actio, adeo ut formaliter unam definitionem non constituant; ita aliud est Deus creaturis propinquitate substantiali praesens, aliud Dei indistanter praesentis actio, adeo ut formaliter definitionem unum constituere nullo modo possint. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 309. The philosopher in Giessen, Christoph Scheibler, was known as “the protestant Suarez” due to the immense influence of his metaphysics. He had studied in Marburg and Giessen, and followed 1610 his vocation as professor of Logic and Metaphysics, where he remained until the university was closed. He combined a Ramistic method in logic with a distinction between intstrumental and real disciplines. Logic is a part of philosophy, but not as science, since the concepts it treats are only notiones secundae, according to Scheibler. Sparn, “Die Schulphilosophie in den lutherischen Territorien,” 538 – 40.

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According to Scheibler, divine presence is not understood as action,193 and thereby he agrees with Thumm. In Thumm’s view, the personal presence of the divine essence ad creaturas is prior to the notion of action. The latter should not be considered as a precondition of the former. Logically considered, therefore, action should be a connotation of presence, i. e., presence as the term by which action is one of the attributes. As an example, “cosy” could be a connotation of the term “home”194 In Feuerborn’s case, however, he turns the definition on its head by making presence a connotation of action. How did Scheibler, Giessen’s teacher of metaphysics, understand the relation between presence and action? In his Metaphysica, which is intimately connected to the problems of the present work,195 Scheibler considers the spatiality of being [esse alicubi]196 in light of Biel’s three categories of Christ’s presence, which were used by Luther in his 1528 Confession concerning Christ’s Supper. Alicubi repletive, the spatial definition of ubiquity, is defined

193 Baur, “Ubiquität,” 187. 194 Breviter: propinquitas Dei substantialis (natura prior) & operatio (natura posterior) se mutuo quidem arguunt, unum autem definitum oqistijyr (natura enim simul non sunt, sed vusim & principio ordinis differunt) non constituunt: actio proinde per praesentiam connotatur, non denotatur, consignificatur, non designatur, atque consequenter, pars formalis divinae praesentiae non est, sed eiusdem saltem consequens seu connexum […] Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 306. 195 In his epistola dedicatoria to the Landgrave of Hessen, Scheibler refers to Boethius’ amusing comment of the Nicene Council, where everybody said that Christ was one person and two natures, but nobody knew what a person was. This fact made them unable to grasp the three persons of God. In other words, it is necessary for Christian doctrine – and not only theology – to be rooted in metaphysics: Memorabile est, quod Boethius narrat, cum in Nicaeno concilio omnes dicerent, duas naturas & unam personam Christi, neminem tamen scivisse, quid persona sit. Ex quam etiam ignorantia factum est, ut cum aliqui dicerent, tres esse personas divinas, alii tamen nollent ita loqui. Apparetque adeo satis necessariam esse doctrinam in Metaphysicis, quam, quid in communi suppositum sit, vel persona, dilucidatur. Ita frequenter quaeri solet, de personarum divinarum distinctione. Damascenus ait eas ratione distingui, aliunde non, quam ex Metaphysicis sciri potest. But Scheibler claims that metaphysics has confessional relevance, too. Against the Jesuits, he considers the difference between necessity and contingence to be of vital importance, against the Calvinists the difference between signification and bare signs is at the heart of the matter : Cum de divina providentia disputatur, saepissime incidit mentio necessitatis & contingentiae: quibus terminis non recte cognitis, satis difficulter explicatur divinae praescientiae infallibilitas, & humanorum actuum libertas atque contingentia. Contra Pontificios celebris est disputatio de notis Ecclesiae. At quae notarum sit natura & conditio, solus praescribit Metaphysicus. In doctrina de Sacramentis, frequentissima est signorum mentio, quorum doctrina ex Metaphysicis petenda est. Indeque eam cognitam, facile istae Calvinianorum ineptiae cadunt, quod Sacramenta non sint signa nuda, quia significant: Item quod ob rationem signi quae intervenit, aliquo modo loquendi, inter panem Eucharisticum & corpus Domini, censendum sit, corpus Domini esse praesens, cum solum opinione illorum in coelo sit. Scheibler, Metaphysica, A2a-b. Cf. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, 43 – 44. 196 Esse alicubi, est nihil aliud, quam spatio adesse. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 233.

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as an imaginary – but presumably real – space, due to its existence before the creation before the world was created.197 Before Scheibler proceeds to the definition, however, he rejects the erroneous assumptions concerning esse alicubi. After having dismissed the proposition that esse alicubi is merely an extrinsic name and not a formal quality,198 Scheibler underlines that it does not consist formaliter in operatione. If presence was defined according to its action, it would imply that it had to change to something else. The transition would make the primary proposition dependent on the extrinsic thing that it would change into.199 This is of particular importance if we apply the definition of esse alicubi to God. According to Scheibler, God is present in infinite spaces outside heaven,200 and it is indeed possible for him to be actively present. Scheibler is careful to qualify that presence as an accidens. In other words, it does not automatically follow from the definition of presence that he is present according to action. It is indeed possible that God is present esse alicubi, as non-active or dwelling. Scheibler is more inclined to label esse alicubi as a prerequisite to act, just as the physics of Aristotle requires contact to be able to act.201 What about the sayings of Scripture, which almost unanimously define God’s presence as an active presence? Scheibler mentions first the scriptural witness of how God is present in Jerusalem, and then he considers the acts God does, namely his speciales Dei operationes. As examples, Scheibler points to what God performs in the Church, in the soul of the elect and in heaven. Scheibler’s point is that these actions are secondary to the primary (ubiquitous) presence of God.202 197 Eadem est ratio divinae aeternitatis, & ejus praesentiae. At illa definitur etiam per extensionem (ut sic loquamur) ad illa momenta, quae fuerunt ante creationem mundi. Ergo praesentia divina definienda est per extensionem (ita enim loqui liceat) ad spatia imaginaria, quae sunt extra mundum. Ergo alicubitas repletiva, de qua nunc lquimur, requirit omnino existentiam & praesentiam in imaginariis spatiis extra mundum. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 239. 198 1. Esse alicubi non consistit formaliter & solum in denominatione extrinseca. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 235. 199 Quia talis operatio supponitur esse transiens, ideo requirit aliquid extrinsecum, ad quod scilicet transeat. At illud extrinsecum vel oexistens non requiri ad ipsum esse alicubi, ad primam propositionem patuit. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 235. 200 […] Deus praesens est infinitis spaciis extra coelum […] Scheibler, Metaphysica, 236. 201 Patet igitur, ad praesentiam per accidens esse, operari, atque adeo, posse quid esse alicubi, ubi non operatur. Unde porro non incommode dicitur, quod esse alicubi sive ipsum adesse, sit conditio in agente praerequisita ad agendum: quod in corporibus est evidens, ad quorum actionem praesupponitur, ut sint alicubi, & specialiter quidem ita, ut per talem praesentiam habeant contactum ad patiens, de quo Arist. ait 1. de gener. & corrupt cap. 6.t.44. seqq. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 236. 202 Quia tamen Scriptura loquitur per ea, quae sunt notiora nobis, ideo frequenter solet ipsum alicubi esse, sive praesentiam Dei, describere per operationem, tanquam notam vel indicium praesentiae. Ita Ps.76. dicitur : in Salem esse tabernaculum eius, & in Sion eius habitatio. Et Esa.31. dicitur: ignis eius esse in Sion, & clibanus in Hierusalem. Ita cum justo dicitur Deus

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Scheibler’s rejection of action as a formal part of the concept of presence raises a question: If God is merely present, should God not be present somewhere (alicubi)? Applied to the question of ubiquity, which after all is the underlying problem here: If God is said to be present somewhere, how can God be present everywhere? After all, there cannot be a variable notion of essence. Scheibler is aware of this problem, and shows his confessional inclination by claiming that the distinction between everywhere and somewhere is indifferent to the distinction between empirical things and rational things. A divine “somewhereness” does not indicate a lack of God elsewhere. This metaphysical conception correlates to the theological distinction between a just God and a justified human being, Scheibler explains. A divine justice from God is only grasped according to reason [sola ratione], whereas the justified human being “has” it realiter, just as quality is distinguished from substance.203 The last comparison is of vital importance for the identity of the Lutheran metaphysics, because it locates the substance to ratio in more or less a Scotist fashion. Although the empirical world is in many ways critical to presence, the system’s core is unmistakably transcendent in character.204 Scheibler’s notion of divine presence is similar to that of Thumm. Even though Thumm regards action as a part of the divine presence, he cannot accept an inclusion of action in the formal definition of divine presence. Actio and praesentia are two different categories which must be distinguished from each other.205 Actio is defined as a mode of res, and this modality is secondary to the thing itself, namely the divine presence.206 When Feuerborn claims that

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coenare, & intrare ad illum. Apoc.3.v.20. & mansionem apud illum facere, Joh.14.v.23. tanquam in templo suo, 1 Cor.6.v.19. Rursus, sic coelum vocatur sedes Dei, Esa.66.v.1. quae omnia dicuntur propter speciales Dei operationes, quas exercet in Ecclesia, anima justi, & in coelo. Unde per defectum alicujus operationis prius alicubi exercitae, Deus, alias revera manens alicubi, dicitur tamen inde recedere: & accedere, cum incipit aliquid operari, quod antea non erat operatus. Quae tamen omnia indicant, hoc ipso, praesentiam Dei non consistere in operatione. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 236. […] quomodo alicubitas differt a re quae est alicubi? Respondeo, distinctionem eorum esse indifferentem ad distinctionem realem, & rationis. Nam alicubitas divina, nullo indicio patet distincta esse a Deo. Et proinde in hac specie adessendi, est distinctio rationis. Ubi autem creatum patuit ex natura rei distinctum esse ab ipsa re creata quae alicubi esse dicitur. Ergo hac in specie adessendi non est distinctio rationis. Simile est in aliis attributis multis, quae de Deo & rebus creatis dicuntur. Veluti quid differt sapientia a sapiente, aut justitia a justo? Respondeo, ea ut sic praescindere a differentia reali & rationis. In specie autem: Justitia divina a Deo sola ratione, ab homine autem justo, realiter, tanquam qualitas a substantia distinguitur. Scheibler, Metaphysica, 237. For the development of this tradition, cf. Honnefelder, Scientia Transcendens. Absurdum est, duo, propinquitatem scil. substantialem & actionem, ceu summis generibus seu praedicamentis, relatione videl. & actione distincta, in uno convenire definito, formaliterque unam constituere definitionem. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 309. […] quis hoc unquam vel fando audivit, modum rei formaliter & definitive constituere rem; aliud certe in omni Philosophia & Theologia est RES, definite ex principijs seu causis suis iam

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the non–distant presence of Christ was interpreted solely according to its use [usurpatio] among the Fathers,207 Thumm replies that it is necessary to distinguish between the thing itself [res] and its mode [rei modum]. The former refers to the reality of the non–distance itself – the communication between God and man –, whereas the latter refer to the mode of that non–distant presence, namely to the Logos.208 Although Thumm explicitly mentions the implicit problem of attributing a modal reference to the person of Christ, his intention is to underline the real divine nature in the communicatio idiomatum, and avoid the reference to the modality of that reality in the discussion over how to interpret actio within praesentia. All the theologians of the mainstream confessions, except for the Socinians, agree on the divine presence in Christ. In Thumm’s view, however, the problem occurs if divinity – the thing itself – is reduced into something less than the immensity of the triune God. Actio – as a definition of presence – is reducing the divine presence into something less than it is.

Summary The Giessen theologians wanted to affirm a truly biblical notion by the rejection of any dwelling quality of divine presence. Instead, the purified model of actio was chosen. But even if this was done with the best confessional intentions, that distinction was not without costs, as the theologians of Tübingen discovered. In their opinion, a cleavage in the salvific communication between God and man in Christ was the result of the new understanding of presence. First, it changed the relation between Christ and the creatures, because Christ was not interpreted as the place where divine and human nature coincided in the communicatio idiomatum. The formal definition of presence as action created a rift between Christ and the creatures, it isolated the Godman because the activist presence demanded a subject with a will: The openness of Christ as the salvific coincidence of the duality of divine and human nature was reduced to a tertium quid outside the communication itself, as a homogenised agent with a fixed identity and a clear will. The flow between constituta, aliud rei iam constitutae MODVS, nisi quis arpaideutyr asserere velit, idem modificare seipsum, modumque rei esse rem ipsam. Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 325. 207 Patres in describenda solummodo unione & praesentia duarum naturarum Christi hypostatica, particulam adiastatyr usurpasse, illam ergo praesentiae Dei ad creaturas generali quoad propinquitatem substantialem accomodari haud facile posse. Feuerborn, Skiagraphias, 389. 208 Distingue inter rem & rei modum, inter indistantiam ipsam, ac indistantiae modum, & inanis ac superflua erit Sciagraphi admonitio. Quae enim ratio connexi: Kocy peculiari modo adiastatyr adest carni assumptae, sibique realiter appropriatae: Ergo Deus vi immensitatis suae creaturis indistanter adesse, non sine periculo dici potest! Thumm, Tapeinosigrafia, 389.

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the natures, implied in the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum, would stop according to this model of thought, if the Tübingen theologians are to be believed. But there is a consistency in the Giessen option which is compelling. The construction of the self is balanced with a stabilisation of coordinates within the person, just as it would be for a normal human being. In Christ, according to the Giessen theologians, there is a vital difference between his relation to himself, and the relation to the creatures. This correlates to the definition of divine presence, where God is different in his – I am tempted to say – aseity, from how he is in his relation to his creatures. That is a problem which the Tübingen theologians addressed strenuously. If God’s relation ad extra was different from God’s relation ad intra, it would imply that some of the substantial properties of divinity remained in heaven post incarnationem. If that is the case, the divinity encountered in the person of Christ – where the human nature’s is exchanging properties with the divine nature – would only be a half–God. Therefore, the question has serious soteriological implications. Perhaps the most serious problem for the question of metaphysics, however, is the doubling of presence to which the Giessen position inevitably leads. Their stress on distinguishing between a praesentia intima on the one hand, where Christ is a dwelling presence towards himself, and a praesentia extima on the other hand, where Christ is actively present towards the creatures, has a structural correlate with the Trinitarian distinction between opera ad intra and opera ad extra. The ancient tradition in general and Augustine in particular, regarded the latter distinction as affirming an identity between the experienced works of God’s work in creation and salvation on the one hand, and God’s essence on the other. In the Giessen interpretation, however, God’s essence, God’s dwelling presence ad intra, is restricted to a closed self. The Tübingen theologians affirm the presence of all the properties of the divine nature in the world – including God’s immensity and infinity – as an aspect of the Creator’s closeness to his creation. That made the soteriological importance of Christology acute: In Christ, the radical consequence of sin, namely that man is standing face to face with his Creator, now his enemy, was healed in a specific way. Through the communicatio idiomatum, understood as a fluid event, Christ is the place where the enmity of God and man is healed. This happens exactly because the self of Christ is not closed around it–self. The Giessen solution insists on the promise as the basis of Christ’s presence. Due to his divine nature, Christ has the possibility of being where he wants. This implies that Christ can withdraw his presence, just as the story of Lazarus’ death reports. Seen from the Tübingen view, the Lazarus story has to be interpreted according to their Christological logic. It was solely the physical mode of Christ’s presence which was absent, although they do not want to exclude the promise as a mode of presence, resting on the more fundamental union of the incarnation. To state it metaphysically : For the Tübingen

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theologians, Christ’s presence does not have a voluntary basis, although it has a voluntary mode. It is ontologically grounded. The kenosis movement which the Logos performed in the act of incarnation implies just a retraction of the use of these properties for Christ himself. It is not an ontological retraction, because Christ has kept the office as King throughout his life on earth, according to Thumm – he has fed the birds and the animals. But perhaps most important of all, Thumm extends the fullyfledged divine presence to participating in the death of Christ.

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Was there a Lutheran metaphysics? In this dissertation I have explored the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in some important (and some remote) figures of the first generations of Lutheran theologians. I have done this with a specific intention, namely to shed light on the relationship between theology and philosophy. Now it is time to ask: What are the results? First of all, the doctrine of the two natures of Christ and their mutual exchange is at the heart of Luther’s soteriological concern, his doctrine of justification. It is simply not possible to grasp the inner core of Luther’s conception of fides quae without a solid knowledge of his interpretation of that classic Chalcedonian doctrine. It is not just the premise for his doctrine of the Eucharist, although that is important enough. It is also an implication of his central theological idea about Christ “present in crib and cross”, and its relevance for believers – and perhaps even non-believers – in his own time. It is not possible to regard Luther’s Christology as an alien, metaphysical addition to a more original simple gospel, as Harnack argued was the case with Luther’s consequences of ubiquity. On the other hand, Luther’s interpretation of the two-nature dogma is not merely a repetition of the tradition. His particular contribution lies in the (Cyrillic) insistence on the proximity between the natures. Even death cannot dissolve the ongoing exchange of properties, as Luther underlines in his 1528 Confession concerning Christ’s Supper. Thereby Luther is repeating the paradoxical formulas of the ancient liturgies, such as “they crucified the Lord of Glory”, but with an important qualification – the formulas are not seen as paradoxical. This does not mean, however, that the distinction between the natures is blurred. Divinity does not become humanity’s property, but it remains in a constant flow of exchange of its properties to the human nature. This is not particularly innovative, and it can be found in most balanced accounts of the Chalcedonian Christology throughout the Middle Ages. Luther’s significance, however, lies in his rejection of an anthropological pattern as a “form” in which Christ should be placed. Normally, the category “man” had a very consistent meaning in the philosophical tradition in which Luther was trained. Every entity in the hierarchy of beings had its place, and ‘man’ was below God (and angels), but above animals and plants. To be very general, the theological tradition tried to fit into the framework of this “Porphyrian tree”, as it were, and reserved an extra category for Christ. A particularly influential category was created by a strong reading of Athanasius’ assumptio theory : The Word (Logos) assumed humanity, and was granted a univocal place in the system by upholding [sustentans] humanity.

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Luther’s theological problem with this logic of identity – and its metaphysical structure – is that the doctrine of Christ for him implies exactly the opposite of the regulative framework of the philosophical hierarchy of being. The incarnation is not only an event which provides the Logos with some flesh to integrate. For Luther, the traffic between the natures in Christ points to a more serious theological break from this philosophy. Communication – even proprietates essentiales – between the different classes of that hierarchy is at the heart of theology. Indeed, one can be tempted to say that it is the thing of theology for Luther. In other words, theology brings together what philosophy keeps at a distance. There is a wider cultural side-effect to this principal stance of Luther, apart from the obvious challenge it creates for a university with a theological faculty. The strong insistence on Christ as not belonging to the traditional scheme of anthropology but as a new entity, a tertium quid, is a contribution to the emerging understanding of man in the Renaissance. The transfer from an anthropology based on a fixed substance to a more “to–be–defined” subjectivity is not irrelevant in this respect, but it has some interesting parallels to Luther’s view of Christ. Christ’s identity is not possible to fix as a substance, but exists as the exchange, an event between two natures. To borrow the title of a book of Paul Ricoeur, a French philosopher in the twentieth Century, Christ is for Luther “oneself as another”. The subsequent history shows how difficult it was to interpret Luther’s Christological concern in practice. The portrayal of Melanchthon given in this work reveals how different their conceptions were. Although he affirms Christological predications such as “God is man”, they only function as logical additions and play no central role in his late theological thinking. Therefore, Melanchthon’s rejection of Luther’s doctrine of ubiquity and his affirmation of a circumscriptive heaven is consistent and in line with his general theological thinking. But the great upheaval it stirred can be read as a strike felt in the very heart of the soteriological concern by many theologians of the Augsburg confession. In many ways, Melanchthon adopts an attitude to Christology similar to that of the scholastic theologians. In his outline of anthropology, he integrates theological ideas as supplying the alleged shortcomings of Aristotle and Galen. Thereby he rejects the strong division between the disciplines in Luther’s understanding of the relation between the sciences, and he constructs a more unified system where the sciences are in harmony. In addition, the hierarchy between body and soul by Melanchthon correlates with an important aspect of his Christology, namely the strong subordination of the human nature. In the controversies leading up to the Formula of Concord and beyond, different traits of the towering figures of sixteenth-century Wittenberg theology are accentuated and developed further in the area of Christology. From the material, it is clear that the second half of the century is witnessing a

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push in the direction of clearing metaphysical questions of Christology. In theology and ecclesiastic life, the unsolved questions of how Christology relates to the Eucharist and its constitution created controversies in the 1550 s. The responses to them not only widened the difference between a more Calvinist inclined group of Protestant theologians and the Lutherans, but it led to a division among the latter, too. Even the two most important suppliers of Christology to the Formula, Brenz and Chemnitz, have different concepts on some fundamental aspects in their interpretation of communicatio idiomatum. In many aspects, Brenz resembles Luther’s Christological vision most faithfully through his consistent preservation of the unity between Christ’s natures. A main feature of his mature interpretation of communicatio idiomatum is the univocal acceptance of the omnipresence of Christ’s body. His mature Christology is developed in a controversy with Bullinger and Vermigli concerning spatiality : Should the body of Christ be subsumed under Aristotle’s physics? Chemnitz is a more careful biblical theologian who wants to keep a distance from a theology which claims that Christ’s body by necessity is everywhere. Instead, Chemnitz teaches a possible presence, whenever God wills. Although Chemnitz states his adherence to the ubiquity of Christ, it is a willed presence, not (only) a result of the incarnation and the communicatio idiomatum, as Brenz taught. This tension between the real and the possible is reflected in the Formula of Concord, in questions such as: Is the divine nature really participating in Christ’s death, or is it only a possibility? Does Jesus really have an increase in wisdom, or did he have all the divine properties in Mary’s womb? The critiques of the Formula from the Helmstedt theologians Heshusius and Hofmann, and the famous scholar Johannes Kepler represent particularly interesting alternatives to the interpretation of communicatio idiomatum, and they portray some of the breadth of Lutheran thought on the matter in the late sixteenth century. Taken together, they show that a mere diastatic historic notion of two lines of thought, like Luther-Brenz-Tübingen and MelanchthonChemnitz-Giessen, is too simplistic. The Christological problem is not solved once and for all, and there are continuous developments on the matter. The final development of the Lutheran interpretation of the communicatio idiomatum in this period is the controversy between the Theology faculties of Giessen and Tübingen. Through this controversy, a further development or refinement of the argument is made. If the Christological controversies between Lutherans of the second half of the sixteenth century concerned spatiality, theologians of the next century entered into a debate concerning temporality. For the Giessen theologians, their reading of the Bible was a witness to a constant operative God whenever God’s omnipresence was mentioned. According to Balthasar Mentzer, this excluded any theory of a dwelling presence of God when God was considered ad extra. God was only dwelling in his internal relations between the persons of the Trinity.

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Instead, Mentzer’s introduction of the category of action to the definition of the presence of God caused a great controversy. Why? A split between God’s dwelling relation ad intra and his active relation ad extra posed the question: Have some divine properties been left back in heaven in the incarnation? Mentzer’s reading of the crucial kenosis motive in Philippians 2 gave him a biblical rationale, and he claimed that there was a real retraction of divine properties in the incarnation of the Word. In other words, there was a time when Christ did not rule the world or feed the birds. Theodor Thumm and his colleagues at the Theology faculty of the University of Tübingen reacted to several aspects of the suggested definition of presence from their counterparts at Giessen. Instead of the biblically inspired Christology of the Giessen theologians, they presented a fully-fledged ontology on the basis of Luther’s rule “Where God is, there is man, too”. Thumm claimed that the action implied in divinity’s relation to creation implied a distance between Christ and creation. The kenosis does not mean an ontological retraction from the office of King, as Mentzer claimed. According to Thumm, Christ refrains from using his force for himself. This is particularly visible in the interpretation of the death of Christ, where Thumm claims that the divinity – with all its attributes – participates in death. The definition of Christ lies exactly in the fluency of the communication. This ontological implication of communicatio idiomatum points forward to the “speculative Good Friday” by Hegel, although it by no means coincides with it. The operative presence of Mentzer points towards the location of God’s work through Christians – and not in the world as such – in pietism and its modern, liberal morality. But that it is, indeed, another story.

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Index Index rerum Anthropology 25ff, 46, 93ff, 103ff, 132, 196, 225, 255ff Being, the hierarchy of 68f, 73, 82ff, 153, 223 n.41, 268f Body of Christ 11, 26, 43ff, 54ff, 93ff, 117, 122ff, 140ff, 152f, 180ff, 207ff, 218f, 222, 226, 235, 251 n.143, 259, 270 Christ, divinity of 12, 16, 26, 33, 39, 45ff, 61f, 71, 80, 96ff, 125, 131f, 156ff, 163, 173f, 191, 205, 224, 247f Christ, humanity of 12, 41, 67ff, 90ff, 117, 121, 132, 134, 138f, 145ff, 159f, 173ff, 182, 190ff, 204, 219ff, 233ff, 247ff Contradiction 9, 23, 47, 67, 69, 78, 81, 87, 150, 192, 202, 248, 260 Cosmology 56, 60f, 67, 92, 99, 103, 117, 125, 128ff, 205f, 221, 227, 259 Confession 13, 33, 46, 50ff, 94, 113f, 120, 126f, 189, 194, 264f Creature 57f, 60, 66, 70f, 83, 87, 105, 135, 149, 162, 196, 202, 222f, 225, 227, 235, 238, 241f, 244ff, 265f Divine essence 42 n.87, 47, 60, 115, 134, 146ff, 155, 157, 161f, 180, 198, 213f, 219, 221ff, 237, 245, 262, 264 Doctrine 11ff, 17ff, 37ff, 51f, 68, 85, 91, 98, 114, 119, 136, 151, 161, 177, 192, 197, 201, 212, 214, 231, 257 Eutychianism 32 n.45, 72, 125, 146, 180, 188, 203, 247

Gnesiolutheran 98 n.35, 113, 128f, 153 n.182, 169 n.241 God 12, 26f, 36ff, 48f, 63, 69, 83, 95, 130, 150, 160ff, 171, 198f, 220, 222, 228, 230f, 243ff, 261 God-world, relation 141, 162, 167, 187, 220ff, 237, 244 Heaven 26, 90, 94ff, 117, 129ff, 133ff, 149, 177, 204, 222, 263, 271 Humiliation 166, 171, 213ff, 229, 231f, 233f, 238f, 242ff Hylemorphism 105f Incarnation, doctrine of the 11f, 17, 29, 42, 59, 65ff, 79, 97, 132, 138, 150, 157, 161, 173f, 192, 197, 203, 219, 234, 244, 249ff Infinity 9, 80, 198, 204, 221, 225, 227, 230, 235, 242, 245, 260 Interpretation, rules of 15f, 22, 24ff, 31, 33, 36f, 40, 43ff, 53, 70 n.209, 76ff, 94, 96ff, 102, 110, 118ff, 126, 132, 145, 158, 171, 193, 197f, 213, 221, 233, 242, 252 Kenosis

215, 232, 251ff

Language, use and understanding of 27, 30, 52f, 76ff, 82ff, 149f, 193, 198, 227 Location 44, 58, 94, 139ff, 181f, 262 Logic (in a broad sense) 27,31, 65ff, 73ff, 97, 100, 102f, 146ff, 192, 194, 197, 204, 211, 228, 231, 239, 243, 258, 261 n.192

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Index

Mary/Mariology 39, 42, 179, 204 Metaphysics 11ff, 26, 32 n.47, 34, 56, 68f, 82, 92f, 102, 106ff, 145, 149, 164, 172, 189, 205, 211ff, 223, 227f, 260ff Metaphor 27ff, 98, 129, 136, 143 Omnipotence 33, 59, 120, 132f, 149, 170ff, 180, 184ff, 245, 248, 251f, 261 Omnipresence 13, 34, 46f, 49, 59, 94, 124, 146f, 151f, 160, 167, 170, 172, 179ff, 188, 191, 193f, 197, 204f, 207, 214, 219, 223ff, 230ff, 234f, 240ff Omniscience 13, 184, 251ff Paradox 58 n.154, 67, 83, 142, 171, 187, 232, 268 Patripassianism 63 Philippist 113, 129, 212 Philosophy 11ff, 31f, 48f, 65ff, 82, 89, 103f, 107, 109ff, 130, 136, 150f, 172f, 178, 183, 189, 196ff, 208, 212, 218, 234, 257, 259 n.177, 269

Platonism/Neo-Platonism 15, 23, 36, 68, 103, 109, 141, 150, 205, 225, 233 Presence, modes of 21, 54ff, 63, 95f, 108, 117, 125ff, 132ff, 153ff, 162, 173, 195, 203, 213, 218, 220f, 224ff, 233ff, 241, 244f, 249ff Proposition 65, 69, 78ff, 97, 99, 193, 263 Soul/Psychology 23ff, 59, 77, 92f, 103ff, 166, 203, 239f, 254ff Subjectivity 12, 269 Substance 12, 31, 54ff, 75, 90, 111, 122, 127, 131f, 138, 177, 187, 197, 221, 225, 257, 264, 269 Taxonomy 26, 68, 103, 165, 197, 221 Trinity 118, 155, 160f, 165, 180, 183, 188, 218, 222ff, 235 Will 36, 59, 120, 124, 135, 154, 156, 165ff, 172ff, 183, 220, 222, 229, 249f

Index personae Andreae, Jacob 114, 126, 175, 185, 190ff, 250 Augustine of Hippo 17, 24, 51 n.132, 96, 122 n.40, 181f, 218, 225, 256 Aristotle 31, 34, 57, 76, 82, 87f, 93, 103ff, 129, 140, 144ff, 177, 191, 205, 217, 222, 225, 248, 257ff Athansius 46, 84, 97, 194

122, 126, 177, 179, 193, 201, 207, 212, 216, 223, 226, 233, 238, 253 Chandieu, Antoine de 216f Chemnitz, Martin 94, 114, 142, 154ff, 172ff, 182ff, 222, 243, 250 Cyril of Alexandria 13, 72, 148

Bellarmine, Robert 198ff, 256, 258 Biel, Gabriel 25, 31, 55ff, 73ff, 141, 263 Brenz, Johannes 125ff, 151, 157, 166f, 169ff, 219, 243, 245, 260 Bullinger, Heinrich 114, 117f, 129ff Buridan, Jean 75ff

Flacius, Matthias Feuerborn, Justus 262 Forer, Laurentius

Calvin, John/Calvinism

90, 114ff,

Duns Scotus

144 n.149, 199, 248, 264 91, 128, 196 230ff, 241, 250, 248

Gisenius, Johannes

240

Hagen, Bartholomew Hardenberg, Albert

126f 122ff

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Index Harnack, Adolph von 11 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 9, 254, 271 Heshusius, Tileman 101f, 176ff, 195 Hoe von Hoenegg, Matthias 213 Hofmann, Daniel 182, 189ff, 257 Hunnius, Aegidius 245f Irenaeus

99, 108, 159f

John of Damascus 17, 130, 157, 159, 161f, 166, 194, 198, 204 Karlstadt, Andreas von Bodenstein 24, 33f, 50, 52 Kepler, Johannes 200ff Klebitz, Wilhelm 101, 177 Koselleck, Reinhard 18 n.13 Lasco, John 122ff Lechner, Gaspar 248, 260 Lombard, Peter 17, 55 n.143, 73, 97 Luther, Martin 21ff, 111, 120, 145, 174, 182f, 195f, 205, 219, 227f, 238, 243, 257, 260 Major, Georg 165 Martini, Cornelius 189 Martini, Jacob 211 Martini, Matthias 216ff, 233f Melanchthon, Philipp 13, 15f, 33, 90ff, 113f, 124ff, 129, 135, 154f, 163ff, 169, 179ff, 211, 219, 221f, 228, 243, 269 Mentzer, Balthasar 16, 213, 216ff, 238, 240f, 243f, 246, 249ff, 261, 270f

Nestorius 13, 81, 98, 125, 222 Nicolai, Melchior 237 Ockham, William 80, 85 Osiander, Lucas II Osiander, Andreas 120,129

31, 56, 75, 78, 237, 253f 33, 79 n.212, 108,

Plato 23 n.7, 68, 109 n.84, 141, 154 Porphyry 29, 68f, 83, 268 Schegk, Jacob 143ff Scheibler, Christoph 260ff Schleiermacher, Friedrich 11 Schwenckfeld, Caspar von 70ff Simonius, Simon 144ff Tertullian 196, 251 n.143 Timann, Johannes 120ff, 152, 207 Thomas Aquinas 56 n.144, 57, 199, 224f, 259 Thumm, Theodor 16, 160, 229, 237ff Vermigli, Peter Martyr 141f, 270

90, 136f,

Westphal, Johannes 116 n.16, 119ff, 152 Winckelmann, Johannes 240 Zwingli, Ulrich 11, 15, 21, 34ff, 50ff, 70, 88, 115, 117, 122, 129, 133, 179, 194, 205, 212, 216

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