War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions 3031376072, 9783031376078

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War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions Edited by Agnieszka Turska-Kawa · Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka · Karolina Pałka-Suchojad

War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions

Agnieszka Turska-Kawa · Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ · Karolina Pałka-Suchojad Editors

War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions

Editors Agnieszka Turska-Kawa Political Psychology University of Silesia Katowice, Poland

Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ Political Science Jan Kochanowski University Kielce, Poland

Karolina Pałka-Suchojad International Relations Jan Kochanowski University Kielce, Poland

ISBN 978-3-031-37607-8 ISBN 978-3-031-37608-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1

Introduction Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka, ´ and Karolina Pałka-Suchojad

1

Part I Media as a Carrier of Information 2

3

4

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Old Front Lines of New Wars. The Role of the Media as a Carrier of Information About the War in Ukraine Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ and Karolina Pałka-Suchojad Information and Information Technologies in the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian War Adam R. Bartnicki, Elzbieta ˙ Kuzelewska, ˙ and Michał Ozóg ˙ Conspiracy Theory Mobilisation Mechanisms in the Context of the War in Ukraine: A Study of Polish Twitter Agnieszka Turska-Kawa and Natalia St˛epien-Lampa ´

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Online Frontline: Analysis of Contents of Polish Memes Related to War in Ukraine Monika Góra and Natalia Moczoł

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A Redefinition of the Essence of Social Media in Ukraine in the Era of Russian Aggression of 2022 Maryana Prokop

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v

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CONTENTS

All the Faces of the First Lady: The Media Coverage of Olena Zelenska in Poland and Ukraine During the War Yuliana Palagnyuk and Monika Kornacka-Grzonka

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Part II Emotions as a Carrier of Information 8

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Emotions During the War: Interplay Between Emotions and Information Zuzanna Sielska My Home, My Ukraine. The Patriotic and Civic Attitudes of Young Ukrainians Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Antonina Kozyrska, and Danuta Plecka Emotions and Political Knowledge and Their Role in the Mobilization of the International Community on the Example of the War in Ukraine Danuta Plecka and Agnieszka Szpak Courage, Coincidence or Intricate Plan? Conditions for the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Political Leadership Bozena ˙ Dziemidok-Olszewska and Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło The Need for Knowledge and the Fear of War: Ukrainian Students and Lecturers in the Face of War Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk, Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, and Yaryna Turchyn

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151

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Conclusion

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Index of Names

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Subject Index

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List of Contributors

Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland Adam R. Bartnicki University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland Bozena ˙ Dziemidok-Olszewska Maria Lublin, Poland

Skłodowska-Curie

University,

Monika Góra University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ Jan Poland

Kochanowski

University,

Kielce,

Monika Kornacka-Grzonka University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Antonina Kozyrska Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, ´ Poland Elzbieta ˙ Kuzelewska ˙ University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland Joanna Marszałek-Kawa Nicolaus Poland

Copernicus

University,

Torun, ´

Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło Maria Skłodowska-Curie University, Lublin, Poland Natalia Moczoł University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Michał Ozóg ˙ University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Karolina Pałka-Suchojad Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland Yuliana Palagnyuk University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Danuta Plecka University of Gdansk, ´ Gdansk, ´ Poland Maryana Prokop Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland Zuzanna Sielska University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Natalia St˛epien-Lampa ´ University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland Agnieszka Szpak Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, ´ Poland Yaryna Turchyn Lviv Polytechnic National University, Lviv, Ukraine Agnieszka Turska-Kawa University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 4.4

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 8.1

Chart 6.1

Time distribution of the reach of the words and word clusters analysed (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/ 2022–5/23/2022) Top ten users publishing in total the largest number of tweets containing the words or word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022, own analysis) Ten users that published the largest number of retweets containing the words or word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022, own analysis) Ten users who published the largest number of original tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022, own analysis) Number of press publications in Polish and Ukrainian daily newspapers (February–September 2022) (Source Own study) Impact of information on emotions and social behaviour (Source Own elaboration) Social media in Ukraine as a source of information (Note Own compilation based on OPORA research [OPORA Report, 2022, p. 13])

53

56

60

62

124 138

104

ix

x

LIST OF FIGURES

Chart 6.2

Chart 6.3

Use of social media in Ukraine for obtaining information by age (Note Own elaboration based on OPORA research [OPORA Report, 2022, p. 14]) Social media as sources of information for Ukrainians in 2019–2022 (Note Own compilation based on Report Internews, 2020, p. 20; 2022, p. 25)

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5

Table 4.6

Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3

Table 9.4

Distribution of tweets containing the analysed words and word clusters per user Length distribution of tweets containing the analysed words and word clusters per user Distribution of followers of the users who published tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed Age distribution of the accounts publishing tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed Characteristics of the ten accounts that published in total the largest number of tweets containing the words or word clusters analysed Characteristics of the ten accounts that retweeted in total the largest number of tweets containing the hashtags analysed The individual significance of the particular values on the scale from 1 to 10 (lowest-highest) The assessment of the relevance of patriotism manifestations on the scale from 1 to 5 (lowest-highest) Correlation coefficient r for the individual weight of civic attitudes, a sense of patriotism and the evaluation of the need for defending the home country Correlation coefficient r for the assessment of the manifestations of patriotism, a sense of patriotism and the evaluation of the need for defending the home country

50 51 54 54

57

63 163 164

166

167

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Agnieszka Turska-Kawa , Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ , and Karolina Pałka-Suchojad

For the first time in several decades, the war began so close to Poland, in modern Europe, where borders have been disappearing for a long time and people are starting transnational cooperation. In a few moments, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine became an extreme situation. On 24 February 2022, time in Poland seemed to stop for a moment and everything that filled everyday life became less important. Unfamiliar emotions appeared, of powerful intensity. The territorial proximity of the war also made many people awaken to existential fear—for their own lives and those of their loved ones. Information about the war hit the damaged condition of Polish society. The last few years have not been kind. The

A. Turska-Kawa University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ · K. Pałka-Suchojad (B) Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_1

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number of events that Poles faced for the first time in their lives overwhelmed many of them. They disturbed the basic need, which is a sense of security. The pandemic, the war, and people seeking shelter in other countries have been known only from the pages of history and movies until then. The uncertainty of tomorrow triggered the worst scenarios in the imagination. Importantly, emotions were not confined to small social circles. This effect was reinforced by images transmitted by the media or often uncontrolled discussions in social media. The book consists of two parts that deal with the spread of information about the war, from two separate but intersecting perspectives—media and emotions. These two factors have been conceptualized as carriers of information, which, however, mobilized and shaped attitudes towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in different ways, along different paths and with different results. Information from the first days of the war generated various emotions, which translated into individual feelings, but also triggered a broadly understood movement—in the area of spreading (dis)information, as well as direct behaviour. This movement was multi-level—we can recognize the mobilization of people in the field of conspiracy theories, the expression of difficult emotions in memes, as well as the test of strength in the information war between Russia and Ukraine. Importantly, much of this communication has moved online, involving ever-larger audiences in the “movement”. The book was prepared in the first months of the war, which allows you to look at it from the perspective of its duration and at the same time opens up new fields of analysis for the reader through the prism of the passing time. The authors’ assumption is that the book is to encourage reflection and provoke discussion, especially among younger readers. It is to show the dangers of using the media in armed conflicts. It is to discover manipulations based on emotions. It is to show the power of the media in the area of mobilization and shaping attitudes. It is to shape attitudes of conscious use of information based on credible sources and trusted senders. It is to draw attention to the emotional dimension of war, i.e. sensitize to the situation of the victims of the conflict and show the importance of emotions in shaping social behaviours. As noted, the book consists of two parts, which separately analyse two carriers of information about the war—the media and emotions. Each part begins with a separate general chapter that subjects the problem to a

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INTRODUCTION

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specific conceptualization, thanks to which the reader will have no problems interpreting the empirical considerations in subsequent chapters. The book covers the situation of Polish society and the Polish media space in the context of the war, but in order to broaden the analysis, each part of the book closes with a chapter that presents the problem in Ukraine in a similar way, and its authors and co-authors are of Ukrainian nationality. Inviting researchers from Ukraine to the project enriched the analyses and interpretations with a slightly different perspective, inaccessible only to the “observers” of the war. Thanks to long joint discussions on the research material, the final conclusions are definitely more comprehensive. The first part consists of 6 chapters. It opens with the chapter Old fronts of new wars. The role of the media as a carrier of information about the war in Ukraine (Agnieszka Kasinska, ´ Karolina Pałka-Suchojad). Its main objective is to identify trends in reporting armed conflicts by the media, both traditional and new. The researchers undertook to indicate changes and dynamics in the manner and frequency of media coverage of the war in Ukraine in Polish media, but also referring to Western media. The main focus of the chapter is on the issue of “fatigue” with the war theme in the media. The aim of the article Information and information technologies in the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022 (Elzbieta ˙ Kuzelewska, ˙ Adam R. Bartnicki, Michał Ozóg) ˙ is to show the place of information warfare in Russia’s military doctrine, the main strategies undertaken in the infosphere and cyberspace, and the consequences of the narrative imposed by Kiev about the war. Information warfare is a new dimension of the modern armed conflict. Russian efforts to distort reality in the 2022 war met with a determined and quite effective counteraction from Ukraine. Russia has lost not only the war for language, but also the sympathy of world public opinion. The defeat resulted in an attempt to impose the nomenclature created by the Kremlin on war—a “special operation”, or presenting the world public with a vision of “fight against Nazism”. This is all even more surprising as activity in cyberspace and information warfare are domains that have so far been widely recognized as the source of Russian strength. A particular type of media narrative was presented in another article entitled Conspiracy theory mobilization mechanisms in the context of the war in Ukraine. A study of Polish Twitter (Agnieszka TurskaKawa, Natalia St˛epien-Lampa). ´ The authors attempt to analyse social and psychological mobilization mechanisms used in the conspiracy-type

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content on Twitter during the first phase of the war in Ukraine. Research proves that disinformation on Twitter can spread much more widely than true information, depending on the depth of the tweet cascades, the users involved in sharing, and the time of sharing. The study is both quantitative and qualitative in its attempt to point out mobilization mechanisms used to attract supporters of conspiracy theories. The next chapter entitled The web front line - content analysis of Polish memes about the war in Ukraine (Monika Góra, Natalia Moczoł) presents the research results based on content analysis of memes with themes related to the war in Ukraine. The research material consisted of 310 memes published on the Polish website Demotworatory.pl in two periods. The presented analysis was carried out using the author’s categorization key and taking the concept of the mediatization of war into account, as well as the theory of compassion fatigue by Susan Moeller. The research showed that memes related to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict often serve an informational and conversational function. The authors of these memes were also most likely to address topics related to aid and support for Ukraine. The image of Ukrainian society played an essential role in the research material. In the chapter entitled A Redefining the essence of social media in Ukraine in the era of Russian aggression in 2022, Maryana Prokop undertakes to examine the role of social media in Ukraine used to inform about Russian aggression against Ukraine. The main research problem concerns the question of whether and to what extent the nature of social media in Ukraine has changed after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. The part about the media ends chapter All the faces of the First Lady. The media coverage of Olena Zelenska in Poland and Ukraine during the war (Yuliana Palagnuk, Monika Kornacka-Grzonka). The main purpose of the chapter is to analyse the specifics of Olena Zelenska’s media coverage in Poland and Ukraine after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By applying the qualitative content analysis to selected media, the authors determine how Zelenska is portrayed in Polish and Ukrainian media, and they also analyse if there have been changes in media coverage of Zelenska’s roles since 24/02/2022. The study proved significant differences in presenting the image of Olena Zelenska in the Polish and Ukrainian media. Zelenska enjoyed relatively little interest in the Polish media. Her role was quite stereotypical and very marginalized. In turn, the portrayal of Olena Zelenska during Russia’s war in Ukraine is evolving in the

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Ukrainian media: from the wife of President Volodymyr Zelensky, the First Lady, to a strong personality. The armed conflict (especially the Russian aggression against Ukraine) evokes strong emotions and extreme feelings, which is emphasized in the second part of the book. It consists of five chapters. It opens with the chapter Emotions during the war: interplay between emotions and information ( Zuzanna Sielska). The relationship between information and emotions and the feedback between these two phenomena are described by the author. Also, she tries to answer several questions, such as, how do the emotions that appear during the war influence decision-making and other actions in society? Are they responsible for the creation of trust among social actors? Can information, by creating emotions, influence certain attitudes? Emotions as an integral component of patriotic attitudes are taken up in the next chapter of My Home, My Ukraine. The Patriotic and Civic Attitudes of Young Ukrainians (Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Antonina Kozyrska, Danuta Plecka). The last eight years of the war on Russia have led to the consolidation of the national identity of young Ukrainians who, not only in the declarative sphere, but also through their daily actions and struggle, strongly identify themselves with their homeland. Russian aggression against Ukraine has revealed the great strength and determination of Ukrainian citizens in the fight for their freedom. In the course of the quantitative research, the authors seek answers to the questions about the most important values and civic virtues for young Ukrainians, as well as about their readiness to sacrifice in the fight for the independence of their country. In the chapter Emotions and political knowledge and their role in the mobilization of the international community on the example of the war in Ukraine (Agnieszka Szpak, Danuta Plecka), the authors analyse the connection between emotions and political knowledge as mobilizing factors. The field of research will be the armed conflict, which allows for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the indicated variables. Taking into account the activating power of political knowledge and emotions in difficult situations, one of the important research questions is to verify their strength and range as predictors of social mobilization. What are the conditions for their activation? Which of the indicated variables is stronger and/or faster? Are they really—as some authors argue—contradictory or self-reinforcing?

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The article Courage, Coincidence or Intricate Plan? Conditions for the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political leadership (Bozena ˙ DziemidokOlszewska, Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło) aims to list and critically analyse the main factors behind the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership. It describes emotions from the perspective of struggle, strength, and courage. This description is followed by the discussion of the 2019 presidential election won by V. Zelenskyy, his political career, the president’s political personality, and his governance style. The second part of the book ends with the article The need for knowledge and the fear of war. Ukrainian students in the face of war (Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk, Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Yaryna Turchyn). Despite the ongoing warfare and the emotions it evokes, Ukrainians try to fulfil their duties, including conducting the educational process at all its levels. The aim of this paper is to show whether the need for knowledge is stronger than the dread of war and how the war incites fear among Ukrainian students and academic teachers. In conclusion, the publication is an attempt to explain selected aspects of the war in Ukraine, with particular emphasis on two areas of influence: the media and emotions, immanent areas of armed conflicts. The monograph will be useful for the first and second cycle students and doctoral students as a source of basic knowledge in the field of media science and political leadership. The monograph can provide some kind of study aid in which interested students and researchers will find useful information or inspiration for further research on the topics covered. The book will also be of interest to members of international organizations, e.g. scientific societies. The book is an empirical study; all chapters are based on the authors’ own research, which is an invitation to discussion by other researchers and will certainly be used in further studies on the next stages of aggression against Ukraine. It is worth emphasizing that the book is of interdisciplinary value; the analyses concern such disciplines as political science, social communication and media, law, and psychology.

PART I

Media as a Carrier of Information

CHAPTER 2

Old Front Lines of New Wars. The Role of the Media as a Carrier of Information About the War in Ukraine Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ and Karolina Pałka-Suchojad

Introduction Armed conflicts are part of the history of humankind, they have always generated emotions and focused attention, which can be explained by the “disturbance of the status quo”, that is the uniqueness and importance of events. However, while the past wars and minor conflicts affected a limited number of people, and knowledge about them was passed on orally or in books (vide Herodotus), now the mass media have become a significant subject of influence, and one can even risk the thesis that a participant in conflicts. Politicians have long noticed how media coverage

A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ · K. Pałka-Suchojad (B) Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_2

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of conflicts can have a significant impact on them, and various types of relationships between the rulers, the media and the ruled have developed on this basis. On the other hand, communication with the media in recent decades has been part of military strategy. It is enough to recall the era of television wars, including the two crises in the Persian Gulf, to see that the media was a powerful weapon in the hands of military strategists and government administration. The weapon that shaped the image of the conflict, often far from the reality of the battlefield. More than 30 years after the war in Iraq, the role of the media has not diminished at all, and television wars have entered a new era, the era of real-time warfare. The turning point for this type of communication was the Arab Spring, when the global media and press agencies showed amateur coverage of the protesters in their first media materials (Sawicka, 2017). The last armed conflicts of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century are mostly barracked journalism. On the other hand, contemporary conflicts and crises do not require the presence of war correspondents walking with troops to collect the desired media material. The Ukrainian conflict, now referred to as the “war on tablets”, is changing the media instruments; it is no longer a TV camera but a smartphone—a tool for citizen journalism (Mahamed et al., 2021; Suárez Villegas, 2017). As a result, traditional media, along with their online editions, use materials from residents affected by crises. Armed conflicts should be considered as critical factors that change the vectors of the global flow of information. In a classic arrangement, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not have a significant representation in the global media, which is dominated by the countries of the Global North. Armed conflict causes that the centre of gravity of the media’s interest shifts towards the territories where the war is taking place. This trend was seen in events such as the conflict in Donbass in 2014, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing full-scale war in Ukraine. It is widely known that the functions of the media are changing rapidly, but regardless of the vectors of their impact; they still affect the knowledge, judgments and attitudes of the recipients. Eric Louw, describing the relationship between the media and political processes in the United States (Louw, 2010, p. 4), proposed a periodization of the way of communicating about the war, i.e. the time of propaganda (until the Vietnam War), the period of the so-called television war (Vietnam

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War) and the period of image management of warfare. The first of the distinguished time periods was characterized by a propaganda message aimed at building patriotism and at the same time strengthening morale in the army. The next one brought a significant change in communicating about conflicts, because journalists went to the front and, in a sense, becoming participants in the events, reported their course more independently. The third period, i.e. the time after the end of the Vietnam War, was distinguished by the intensification of PR activities, i.e. the strategy of informing journalists in connection with political goals. Journalists may have participated in some of the hostilities, but this is integrated into the politically planned media coverage of the conflict. The development of new media has led to a kind of revolution in terms of the form and content of conveying information about conflicts. Strategic management of the image of the conflict in the media has become impossible to fully implement due to the increase in the number of broadcasters, i.e. the possibility of posting amateur materials on the Internet—films, photos, reports and comments. The changing media practice in reporting wars and other conflicts is accompanied by the development of scientific research on the mediatization of conflicts. The impact of the media in conflict conditions is relatively well described, primarily in American and Western European literature. As the most representative one can recall: Susan L. Carruthers’ The Media at War. Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century’, Stephen Hess “The Media and the War on Terrorism” or the collective work “The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence” edited by Tim Allen and Jean Seaton. The war in Ukraine also surprisingly quickly found its way into the research spectrum and publications on it appeared just a few months after the start of the conflict. In this chapter, we want to ask questions about the influence of the media on the image of war, which is created in the minds of recipients through the information provided. It is particularly interesting to look at the activities of traditional media in comparison with new media, both in terms of content management and the time when information about the war appears and the frequency of transmission. Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, is a current field of research due to the ongoing military operations, but on the other hand, the situation in statu nascendi also introduces limitations, especially in terms of formulating forecasts. The period of analysis

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adopted by us covers the first year of the armed conflict, as it is a long enough time to notice the repetitive mechanisms that build trends. The media is a key element of any conflict today. The war could not resist the progressive processes of mediatization, as a result of which the “mediatized” conflict refers to the active involvement of the mass media in military operations (Pantti, 2016).

Media About War---from Information to Entertainment Taking up the topic of war in the media, the first associations are beliefs about the information mission of the media. However, it should be borne in mind that the issue of war also appears in other scenes, including— which at first may seem shocking—in the form of entertainment. The media present films about war, memes referring to current events appear on the Internet, and even strictly entertainment forms, such as stand-ups. With the lengthening of the duration of hostilities, their unusualness is weakened, and the interest of the public opinion weakens. The boundary of the correctness of messages is also blurred, i.e. while at the beginning of the hostilities, the media, mainly traditional ones, were dominated by messages marked axiologically (good Ukrainians vs. bad Russians) and affectively (compassion, help, solidarity, community), over time (mainly in on the Internet) there were both critical elements towards refugees and humorous ones. The latter are of a marginal nature, but they testify to the “domestication” of the subject and the already mentioned mechanism of lack of full control of political entities over the way of informing about the war. Media interest in armed conflicts should be embedded in the BlochElkon (2007) model used to report international crises; the media cycle about the war in Ukraine can be divided into four phases: beginning— escalation—de-escalation—impact. The intensity of coverage in the media after a year of ongoing conflict now seems to be reaching Phase 3 (that is de-escalation) when it comes to the evening editions of news services in Poland. Focusing on the information impact, it should be recalled that in the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine; the first information about the attack was reported by the RMF FM radio, and a few minutes later a special edition of the “Fakty” television programme took place. The following hours and days brought an escalation of the message, as

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well as the reaction. The scheduling changed, special thematic services appeared, the emission of Russian series was suspended, and Ukrainian music was more often used. In the case of the printed press, thematic supplements appeared, or, for example, a printed flag of Ukraine was attached. It is therefore possible to propose a typology according to which it was a period of “information arousal”. It was characterized by a kind of outdoing each other by broadcasters in ideas for presenting content. Many of them involved the recipient in fundraisers, aid campaigns and cultural events announced in the media. At the same time, it was during this period that the recipients most often searched for information on the Internet “on their own”. It is worth asking a rhetorical question at this point, how many users of new media were aware of the spread of fake news. This is not only about organized propaganda campaigns, but also about placing sequences from computer games as alleged scenes from an ongoing conflict. Other ways of spoofing include using material from past events (e.g. military shows) or elsewhere. Other ways of disinformation on the web are, for example, posting photos of press covers that did not actually exist or posts written with the use of a translator. Despite many opinions and studies indicating a crisis of trust in traditional media, especially television (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), in the event of crisis situations and armed conflicts, the audience turns towards this type of media. Valuable in this respect are the results of the study conducted in 2022 (Eddy & Fletcher, 2022) on the priority source of information on the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. In the group of countries surveyed (Brazil, USA, Great Britain, Germany and Poland), television ranks first in Brazil and Germany. The credibility of traditional media can be assessed as greater at this stage, which translates into maintaining social trust. It was the traditional media that performed the function of documenting the war to the greatest extent through, e.g. diagnosing (the facts), accusing (the state, specific groups) and “giving witness to the times and their truth” (Jarecka, 2008, p. 20). As the months elapsed from the beginning of the war, information about its course lost its freshness, and the importance of military operations was confronted with current problems resulting from the presence of refugees in Poland. In July 2022, research conducted by CBOS indicated the direction of attitude change—the vast majority of respondents believe that refugees should receive support in the first months of the war (87%) and in finding a job in Poland (85%). When it comes to assistance

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in settling in Poland permanently, opinions are already divided, although the prevailing opinion is that the state should not provide it (47% against 36% of favourable votes). The majority of Poles (56%) also believe that the state should not support Ukrainian refugees in sustaining themselves throughout the war (with 31% of respondents of the opposite opinion) (CBOS, 2022, p. 9). It is interesting that the willingness to extend assistance to war refugees was declared to a greater extent by older people than by younger respondents. Perhaps this is due to their own experiences of the period of World War II, as well as the lack of a sense of a direct threat of “displacement from the labour market”. In this phase of reporting on the conflict (which can be described as “moderate stabilization”), issues that caused Poles’ dissatisfaction were raised much more often in social media than in traditional ones. Starting with the presence of the Ukrainian language in shops, offices, public institutions, through the cultural differences attributed to Ukrainians, as well as historical events between nations. Our research shows that the media significantly contributed to the “awakening” of the Ukrainian stereotype (Kasinska-Metryka ´ & Pałka-Suchojad, 2023). The first anniversary of the outbreak of the war can be regarded as the beginning of the third stage of its coverage in the media (“the erosion of presence”). Polish media have become the objects of interest of journalists from around the world who are looking for messages summarizing the conflict from the position of a neighbouring country. The presented summaries were synthetic in relation to the most important events, but it was noticeable that the war ceased to be the leading topic and evoking such hot emotions as in the first months of the conflict. According to the logic of the media, current topics overshadowed the coverage of events in Ukraine, and the reality, i.e. the outflow of refugees (further to the West or return to Ukraine), blurred the visibility of the problem. Taking into account the amount of time devoted to war materials in relation to all other topics that were discussed during this period, one can notice a clear “phasing” in media coverage (the analysis covered the evening news services of Polish mainstream media). The first phase is the beginning of the war, in which the “war share” exceeded 60– 70%. The second phase has been observed since August 2022, where the share of materials about the war has clearly decreased and remains at the level of 20–25%. These data can be treated as a trend in research on coverage of armed conflicts in the media; Carpentier (2005) came to

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similar conclusions when analysing media coverage of the Gulf War in 2003. Persuasion, propaganda, exerting influence were and are present in all phases of conflicts. Before the conflict begins, the media are used to mobilize, convince of the legitimacy of actions, when the conflict continues, they help in concealing, but also unmasking, inhibiting but also stimulating, to later legitimize actions, shape—at least in the information sphere—victory and elimination of any criticism (Mercier, 2005). Media perceived in this way assume a strictly instrumental character. One of the main goals of the media during armed conflicts is to create an image of the enemy. Groebel (1995, p. 14.) indicates that this mechanism takes place according to the following scheme: the description distinguishes between intention, message, target, means, process, effect: to reach acceptance of or trigger an attack against another (intention), a stereotyped, simplified and negative image (message) of the characteristics, motives, intentions and behaviour of the other person or group (target) is created in which emotional or pseudo-informational mass media elements (means) apply selection, exaggeration and fake ( process), with the consequence that the social distance between the two sides is increased (effect). Such a pattern is visible both in Ukrainian, Russian and Western media, with the difference that the optics of perceiving the enemy is completely different. The progressing processes of information and media globalization make dualism in information impossible. Today, the tactic of developing information in one version for citizens and another for the external audience is impossible even in such hermetic information systems as Russia, China and Iran; it is impossible to completely eliminate objective information that is at the same time contradictory to the official narrative, in the conditions of social media. In the case of a conflict in Ukraine, there are two parallel images of war, the Kremlin one (replicated or strengthening authoritarian regimes by the media) and the Western, democratic media relations. The first media image of the war was talking about a “special military operation” against the Nazi regime in Kiev. The Kremlin’s image of the conflict was undergoing a transformation; initially, the Russian media (Rossija, Channel One) legitimized the invasion by defending the Russian-speaking minority in eastern Ukraine and the need to overthrow the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev. Subsequently, a “special military operation” was presented as a response to the threat posed by NATO to the Russian Federation.

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The regime’s control over the national media allowed for the elimination of independent, fact-based information, instead Russian and Ukrainian society in the occupied areas receive official, centrally scheduled news. The systemic rationing of the information space results not only from the decades-long mechanisms of state interference in a wide spectrum of life spheres of Russian society, social or rather historical consent, but also from the still living myth on which the Russian media propaganda machine is based, namely the “myth of community of all post-Soviet states” (Saran, 2016, p. 740). Roskomnadzor, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, announced that all media organizations operating in the Russian Federation may publish information on the war only from official government media (OECD, 2022). With the Russian aggression against Ukraine, most European countries took steps to limit the impact of Russian media propaganda (Cabrera Blázquez, 2022) on the native information environment and public opinion. Despite this, traditional and online media are not free from the influence of Russian propaganda. The Ukrainian propaganda present in the Western media also deserves special attention. Frequent information from the Ukrainian Military Command on the constantly real threat of an invasion by A. Lukashenka’s troops can be considered as such. It remains debatable whether these are still activities in the field of “pre-information” or deliberate propaganda activities aimed at focusing the attention of the West on Belarus, as a state completely dependent on the Kremlin. Each side of the conflict presents its facts and myths, censor for different reasons, Russia—to prevent objective media from speaking, Ukraine—to prevent military data from being declassified. From the point of view of this chapter, the results of a study conducted by the Laboratory of Media Studies (Ł˛aczynsk ´ et al., 2022) are interesting, concerning, among others, the media representation of the war in Ukraine in the Polish media. According to them, every third Pole (31% of respondents) expresses the opinion that Polish media pay too much attention to the ongoing war, while 54% of respondents are of the opposite opinion. The phenomenon of “war fatigue” in the context of media coverage was clearly visible in the group of young and less educated respondents. The media in conflicts are not only catalysts, but also an important peace-building actor. Taking into account the classic roles of the

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media, some of them are particularly important from the point of view of reporting armed conflicts. Among them are: Bridge builder: the media promote positive relations between groups, especially in the context of national, ethnic and historical conflicts. The role of the media as a bridge-builder is exemplified by the Polish traditional mainstream media, especially public television (TVP1, TVP2, TVP INFO) and commercial TV stations (including Polsat and TVN), which since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine “silence negative stereotypes about Ukrainians and Ukraine, which have taken root in Polish society” (Kasinska-Metryka ´ & Pałka-Suchojad, 2023). Media as Watchdog: in this aspect, the importance of the media in documenting war crimes is significant. Information provider in conflict conditions: on the one hand, access to information is crucial for making political decisions, but on the other hand, it is associated with the risk of incomplete information, fake news, disinformation, especially in social media. Early warning system: covering media reports (within the limits allowed by the intelligence services) about actions taken by the parties to the conflict even before the start of hostilities. Western media, including Polish, from the beginning of November 2021 reported on the concentration of significant Russian armed forces on the border with Ukraine; about the construction of field hospitals in the border areas—these were symptoms of the impending invasion.

Summary The conflict in Ukraine is an illustration of Hiram Johnson’s words that the first casualty when war comes is truth. On the media front (traditional media, but especially social media), the Russian Federation is losing the war with Ukraine. The media landscape—both in the parties to the conflict as well as in Western countries—which has been crystallizing since February 24, 2022, will become a permanent part of the inventory of modern armed conflicts. “Fighting for the rule of minds” is not just an empty phrase, but a real way to build your advantage on the information battlefield.

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The conducted analysis leads to the conclusion that the role of the media in reporting conflicts has changed, and the main reason is the inclusion of social media in the information “transmission belt”. As shown in the text, traditional media can build alternative versions of presenting a conflict, depending on the target audience, and thus become a party to the dispute. However, the emergence of the subject of war in the social media space has meant that the accounts posted there are considered more credible by the recipients, because they come first-hand, i.e. without intermediary links, with specific goals of influence. Of course, the image of war in social media is also not free from manipulative influences, and the conflict in Ukraine showed how easy it is to influence emotions in conditions of security threats. Summing up, the thesis can be positively verified that the media can play the role of a party to armed conflicts, and the means of influence they have are equivalent to traditional weapons. Traditional media report conflicts in accordance with their logic, i.e. from the phase of very increased interest, through gradual reduction of information, to its marginalization. On the other hand, new media, due to their associative nature, are perceived as less dependent on political centres and their concept of “how to show war”, but on the other hand, they generate negative messages more easily than traditional media.

References Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. Allen, T., Seaton, J. (Ed.). (1999). The media of conflict: War reporting and representations of ethnic violence, Zed Books. Bloch-Elkon, Y. (2007). Studying the media, public opinion, and foreign policy in international crises: The United States and the Bosnian crisis, 1992–1995. Harvard International Journal of Press/politics, 12(4), 20–51. Cabrera Blázquez, F.J. (2022). The implementation of EU sanctions against RT and Sputnik, European Audiovisual Observatory. Carpentier, N., & Terzis, G. (Eds.). (2005). Media representations of war and conflict. A workshop organized on March 18, 2005 by the KUB-Center Communication for Social Change, the Communications Department of the Vesalius College (VUB), Brussels and the Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from http://nicocarpentier.net/war&media_finalr eport.pdf. Carruthers, S. L. (2000). The media at war. Communication and conflict in the twentieth century, Palgrave Macmillan.

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CBOS. (2022). Jak polskie panstwo ´ powinno wspiera´c ukrainskich ´ uchod´zców? https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/news/newsletter_ver3.php?news_r= 2022&news_nr=25 Eddy, K., & Fletcher, R. (2022). Perceptions of media coverage of the war in Ukraine. Retrieved from https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digitalnews-report/2022/perceptions-media-coverage-war-Ukraine, Groebel, J. (1995). The role of the mass media in modern wars. https://dspace. library.uu.nl/bitstream/1874/25493/1/c1.pdf. Hess, S. (2003). The media and the war on terrorism, Brookins Inst. Jarecka, U. (2008). Propaganda wizualna słusznej wojny. Media wizualne XX w. wobec konfliktów zbrojnych, Wydawnictwo PAN. Kasinska-Metryka, ´ A., & Pałka-Suchojad, K. (2023). New and old stereotypes of Ukrainians in polish society. In A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ & K. Pałka-Suchojad (Eds.), The Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 (pp. 79–93). Routledge. Louw, E. (2010). The media and political process (2nd ed). SAGE Publications. https://www.perlego.com/book/1431454/the-media-and-politicalprocess-pdf (Original work published 2010) Ł˛aczynski, ´ M., Sztyber, M., Kowalczyk, G., Gackowski, Th., Brylska, K., & Mierzecka, A. (2022). The war in Ukraine in the opinion of poles. LBM UW CATI Survey. https://www.lbm.uw.edu.pl/en/18-publikacje/raporty-empiry czne. Mahamed, M., Zobidah Omar, S., & Eric Krauss, S. (2021). Understanding citizen journalism from the perspective of young journalists in Malaysia. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 26(1), 133–143. https://doi.org/10. 5281/zenodo.4556190 Mercier, A. (2005). War and media: Constancy and convulsion. International Review of the Red Cross, 87 (860), 649–659. OECD. (2022). Disinformation and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: Threats and governance responses. OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/37186b de-en Pantti, M. (2016). The Ukraine conflict and the media. An introduction. In M. Pantti (Ed.), Media and Ukraine crisis, Peter Lang. Saran, V. (2016). Media manipulation and psychological war in Ukraine and the republic of Moldova, CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, 8(4), 738–752. Sawicka, Z. (2017). Wpływ nowych mediów na przemiany polityczne wybranych panstw ´ Bliskiego Wschodu na przykładzie Arabskiej Wiosny, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Wyzsza ˙ Szkoła Informatyki i Zarz˛adzania z siedzib˛a w Rzeszowie. https://doi.org/10.31338/uw.9788323529958 Suárez Villegas, J. C. (2017). Citizen journalism. Analysis of Opinions of Journalists from Spain, Italy and Belgium, Convergencia, 24(74), 91–111.

CHAPTER 3

Information and Information Technologies in the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian War Adam R. Bartnicki , Elz˙ bieta Ku˙zelewska , and Michał Oz˙ óg

Winning the information war in the face of the realities of the world is often more important than winning the classic war with the use of weapons. (…) Today, the information confrontation is coming to the fore, there is a war going on for people’s minds and mass consciousness. Shoigu, 2017.

A. R. Bartnicki · E. Kuzelewska ˙ (B) · M. Ozóg ˙ University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. R. Bartnicki e-mail: [email protected] M. Ozóg ˙ e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_3

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Introduction The ‘information war’1 is an important dimension of the modern armed conflict. Russian efforts to distort reality regarding the aggression of February 24, 2022 met with strong and vastly effective opposition from Ukraine. Russia has suffered many spectacular defeats in the information domain: it lost not only the war on language, but also the imposition of its version of the causes of the war on the world. An attempt to impose the nomenclature created by the Kremlin on the war ended in defeat—a ‘special operation’ or presenting the world public opinion with a vision of ‘fight against Nazism’. This is surprising as the activities in cyberspace and information war are domains that have so far been widely recognized as the source of Russian power. However, it ought to be remembered that information war is not an end in itself, but one of the elements supporting military action (Molander et al., 1996, 1–3; Joyner & Lotrionte, 2001, 826–827). What is more, it is fought on many fronts, and on each of them the right tools and narratives are used. Therefore, determining what is a success and what is a failure may not always be unambiguous. It depends on the assumed political and military goals. In this context, several fronts of the ‘information war’ waged by Russia can be identified: 1. Shaping Russian public opinion by instilling patriotic attitudes, trust in the authorities and the armed forces, pointing to security threats in the event of no military action; creating extremely negative images of Ukraine and the Ukrainian army. 2. Modelling Ukraine’s public opinion by trying to show the futility of resistance and the lack of an alternative to an agreement with Russia, creating an image of a country used by the West (the USA, Poland) to achieve its own anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian goals, undermining trust in the attitudes of the political authorities and the Ukrainian armed forces, provoking conflicts between Russianspeaking and Ukrainian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.

1 In military terminology, but also in analytical terminology, it is spoken of ‘information warfare’. In this study, the authors use the term ‘information war’ because it was assumed that it is one of the elements of the actual warfare in Ukraine.

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3. Shaping the attitudes of the broadly understood West by preventing Ukraine from getting closer to the EU and NATO, creating attitudes negating the sense of helping Ukraine, causing conflicts within Western countries. 4. Shaping the attitudes of states not involved in helping the parties to the conflict by imposing the perception of Moscow, which defines the war in Ukraine as an element of the global geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West, but also as a kind of ‘decolonization’ led by Russia from the domination of the USA/the West. Each of these elements should be assessed separately, with Russia clearly dominating only in the first of them. However, it was the easiest task to accomplish. The media market in Russia was formed in the 1990s, but at the beginning of the twenty-first century it had some elements of pluralism (Bartnicki, 2007, 237–251). The consolidation of power by Vladimir Putin also closed the information domain, which is now basically completely controlled by the authorities or oligarchs associated with the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the wave of war enthusiasm began to subside there as well, especially after the Kremlin announced limited mobilization. The reasons for Ukraine’s success in the information sphere are complex. They resulted firstly from Russia’s clear disregard for information warfare at the first stage of hostilities; secondly, with the decision taken by Western countries quite quickly to cut off access to Russian news channels (e.g. Russia Today); thirdly, from the brutality of the Russian army; fourthly, from the attitude of President Volodymyr Zelensky, who perfectly understood the role of the media in consolidating the war effort of the Ukrainians and mobilizing aid from the West. Finally, Kiev’s success resulted from Ukraine’s creation of its own myths, such as the ‘Spirit of Kiev’ or ‘Professors of the Snake Island’ and its own image of the aggressor. An important role in shaping the information perception of the war after 24 February 2022 was also played by social networking sites, actions taken spontaneously by Ukrainian citizens, photos showing destroyed Russian military equipment, recordings of street protests in cities occupied by Russians or films showing war preparations of ordinary Ukrainians, etc. The purpose of the article is to analyse the activities carried out by Russia and Ukraine in the infosphere, which the authors perceive as one of the elements of political and military activities. The objective of the

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article is also to show the place of ‘information war’ in the Russian military doctrine, the main phases of competition, strategies and goals of battle in the infosphere. An attempt was also made to discuss the reasons for Ukraine’s victory in this domain, as well as the military and political consequences of Kyiv’s imposition of a war narrative.

Information War in the Russian Doctrine The Russian concept of information and network warfare is one of the political technologies inherited from the USSR (Ajir & Vailliant, 2018, 72–74). It is a continuation of the techniques of exerting influence and social control; the aim of which was to imperceptibly subordinate one’s own society and foreign countries. It specialized in information and psychological operations, consisting in inventing and implementing various types of projects to change the image of the world in the minds of recipients (cognitive war). Contemporary assumptions continue these patterns, taking into account new media tools (the Internet) and innovations regarding online activities. The ‘information war’ in Russian doctrine and military thought has two dimensions: the wider and the narrower. The wider is understood as an independent type of fight conducted on various levels. The narrower one is treated as an element of military support. As a consequence, it is possible to distinguish the external and internal planes, i.e. military and civil ones. However, the Russian doctrine deliberately blurs the boundaries between internal and external threats. This concept is a manifestation of the progressive militarization of the Kremlin’s policy (Jach, Kuzelewska, ˙ Legucka). It makes it possible to mobilize society and, through manipulation, legitimize Russia’s actions on the domestic and international arena. For this reason, the doctrine has a significant practical value: it prepares the ground for potential military interventions and creates pretexts for the use of the Russian army (Darczewska 2015a, 59; Darczewska 2015b, 7). Both spheres cover all activities aimed at achieving information advantage. They are conducted in the following areas: military, political, economic, information, humanitarian and social. Information warfare techniques are also used as a tool in the field of psychological operations. Their goal is to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behaviour of other governments, organizations, groups and individuals. These include psychological pressure in the energy sector,

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blackmails, undermining trust and credibility in the eyes of foreign partners, increasing panic or a sense of threat, discrediting the authorities and elites, etc. Their result is to be decisions and attitudes outlined by the administrators of the ‘information war’ strategy (Legucka & Kupiecki, 2022). The aim of Russian military operations is not so much to take control of the area as to prevent the enemy from conducting defensive operations. This can be achieved by undermining the morale of the armed forces, discouraging the society from waging a defensive war and minimizing the economic capabilities of the state that is the target of aggression (Dulnev et al., 2011, 3–8). The result of parallel political and information activities may be the diplomatic isolation of this country from the international community. For example, in 2008, Russia fully succeeded in convincing the Russians, as well as the world public opinion, that the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 was the result of the aggressive attitude of the Georgian President Michel Saakashvili and the Georgian offensive against peaceful Russian citizens. The prevailing opinion in the media was that the Georgians had invaded South Ossetia and Abkhazia and that the Russians had only been conducting peacekeeping activities there (Wojnowski, 2015, 23–30). The ‘information war’ is the outcome of the policy of strengthening the state and rebuilding Russian spheres of influence, which has been implemented since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s rule (1999/2000). It intensified after 2014, both in the doctrinal layer (the ‘War Doctrine’ of 2014) and in the sphere of real activity. The framework was already outlined in the ‘War Doctrine’ of 2000 and the ‘Information Security Doctrine’ of 2000. According to the then ‘War Doctrine’, the main external threats included ‘information activities hostile and harmful to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies (informativetechnical and informative-psychological)’ (Sect. 3.5). The basic features of modern war, on the other hand, include ‘active information rivalry, disorientation of public opinion in individual countries and the entire world public opinion’ (Sect. 3.3). In the ‘Information Security Doctrine’ of 2000, the main threats included, among others: dissemination of untrue information about Russia and the activities of federal state authorities, the influence of foreign entities, including foreign media, which seek to present an unfavourable image of Russia and its actions, intensification of international competition for possession of technology and information resources and the development of a concept of wars by a number

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of states information (Doktrina infopmacionnoN, 2000). The 2010 ‘War Doctrine’ lists among the main internal threats to military security (Sect. 9C (W)) ‘disorganization of the functioning of state authorities, important state and military facilities, and the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation’. Section 41G concerning the tasks related to equipping the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with armament and military equipment indicated the need to ‘improve (…) the common information space of the armed forces and other troops as part of the information space of the Russian Federation, as well as the development of information warfare forces and means’. The document of 2010 introduced most of the terms used today in the Russian literature on the subject (‘information warfare’, ‘information weapons’, ‘masking information countermeasures’). The assumptions of Russia’s information security policy were also indicated in the ‘War Doctrine’ of 2014 (VoennaR doktpina, 2014). The catalog of threats was extended to include ‘the use of information and communication technologies for military and political purposes to conduct activities contrary to international law, directed against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states and threatening international peace, security, global and regional stability’ (I2M), ‘activity in the field of information impact on the population, primarily on young citizens, aimed at undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions of defending the homeland’ (13C (W)). The doctrine presented the military nature of the information environment, recognizing the information space as a field of war equivalent to the traditional operational space of the land army, and information weapons were included in the defensive and offensive catalog of military capabilities of the Russian Federation. A direct reference to information war is also found in the ‘National Security Strategy’ of 2015 and the ‘Information Security Doctrine’ of 2016, which states that ‘the information sphere plays an important role in ensuring the implementation of strategic national priorities of the Russian Federation’ (item 2/7). Russia has included information weapons in the defensive and offensive catalog of military capabilities of the Russian Federation (Rumer, 2016, 25). In turn, the presidential decree entitled ‘The guidelines of the Russian Information Security Policy’ of 2021 (Ukaz, 2021) stated that ‘The purpose of the state policy in the field of international information security is to support the creation of an international legal regime in which conditions are created to prevent (settle) interstate conflicts in global

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information space, as well as to create, taking into account the national interests of the Russian Federation, a system for ensuring international information security’ (Article 3/9). The Russian authorities did not see the need to protect human rights in the cyberspace; on the contrary, they emphasized the sovereignty of the information space, i.e. state control of network traffic and media messages. Meanwhile, the ‘War Doctrine of the Union State’ of 2021/2022 (O VoennoN doktpine, 2021) indicates that the two federal states of Russia and Belarus—in relation to the entities indicated as a source of threats—will use tools such as ‘information war’. A tangible example of Russia’s militarization of the information space is the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’. Gerasimov reached for tactics developed in the times of the Soviet Union, combining it with strategic thinking about total war. On this basis, he created a theory of warfare, based more on behind-the-scenes influence on the enemy’s society than on open military operations. Gerasimov wrote: ‘In the twenty-first century there is a tendency to blur the distinction between a state of war and a state of peace. Wars are no longer declared, and once started, they do not follow the pattern to which we are accustomed. (…) The role of non-military methods in achieving political and strategic goals has increased, which in many cases have significantly exceeded the effectiveness of armed forces’ (Gerasimov, 2013). In this context, he noted that information confrontation opens wide asymmetric opportunities to reduce the enemy’s combat potential. Gerasimov created a vision of the strategy currently used by Russia. It is a total war that includes all possible actions—the entire spectrum of activities hitherto considered political, informational, ideological or economic—and in Gerasimov’s understanding, having a military dimension (Schmid, 2019, 10–12; Valle & Guerrero, 2022, 2). It is a war waged on all fronts using all possible tools and people: hackers, media, businessmen, disinformation, ‘fake news’, but also traditional, 2019, 175– conventional and asymmetric military means (Rogozinska, ´ 176). Gerasimov’s doctrine states that non-military actions are the basic methods of achieving victory and in this sense they are war, because chaos, achieving a state of permanent anxiety and conflict in the enemy’s society makes it possible to gain a military advantage over it. The first practical application of the strategy presented in the Gerasimov doctrine took place in the autumn of 2013 during the political

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crisis in Ukraine, and then in hybrid activities undertaken by the Russians in 2014.

The First Phase of the War 2014–2016 Even before 2014, Russia began an intensive process of reinterpreting its geopolitical position by expanding the catalog of tools to influence and press on Ukraine. In addition to the traditional methods of pressure: economic (trade preferences, diplomacy of pipelines) or cultural (Russian-language education and pop culture), a wide range of tools has also appeared, including propaganda and disinformation activity or the management of ethnopolitical conflicts. In 2014, military pressure also appeared, initially of a ‘hybrid’ nature and gradually turning into an open military conflict, albeit without an official declaration of war or even an admission of direct involvement in warfare (Wither, 2020, 7–8). At the end of 2013, social protests called the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ broke out in Ukraine. As a result, the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power (Schneckener, 2021, 28–29). In response, Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula and then part of eastern Ukraine. The operation was ‘hybrid’. Russian soldiers in unmarked uniforms and unmarked vehicles blocked Ukrainian army and police bases on the peninsula (Oliphant, 2014). The building of the Crimean parliament was occupied on 27 February 2014. A similar situation took place in Donetsk, where the regional state administration office was seized in April 2014. All the while, Russian politicians and the Russian media consistently denied the involvement of Russian soldiers in the operation, stating that it was led by members of the ‘opposition’ or ‘resistance’ (Zarembo & Solodkyy, 2021). The first phase of the war in Ukraine in 2014–2015 was not only a series of military successes for Russia, but also a demonstration of Moscow’s potential and ability to conduct an ‘information war’ (Iasiello, 2020, 15). Its purpose was to impose a narrative on the world public opinion regarding the course, the nature and ‘grounds’ of the actions taken, which were explained, among others, by counteracting plans to continue the disintegration of the USSR and Russia (Egopov, 2014), the risk of Russia being encircled by NATO and the USA (Putin, 2022), and defending Russia and its surroundings against the Russian occupationlike rule. The subject of Crimea’s historical belonging to Russia was

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exploited, and the Crimea’s remaining outside Russia as a ‘gross historical injustice’. The main purpose of info-aggression, however, was to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, undermine trust in the political leadership of the state, the West, and the pro-European orientation declared by the authorities as well as to put pressure on the authorities and the society, to which an alternative was formulated—chaos/war or the adoption of a model of political reform imposed by Moscow. The scale of the disinformation campaign was unprecedented. In Ukraine, all of the Russian TV and radio channels, newspapers and Internet resources have been launched (Helmus et al., 2018, 14–16). These activities were supported by diplomats, politicians, analysts, experts and representatives of science and culture. They were largely successful because Ukrainian society was confused and antagonized, especially along the linguistic lines. Part of the Russian-speaking population actually supported the aggressor by facilitating Russia’s military operations. In the display of the official Russian media, the authorities in Kiev were almost the successors of collaborators from the times of World War II; radical nationalists ready for ethnic cleansing, murdering people who favoured Russia. The mentions of the Ukrainian nationalist organization ‘Right Sector’ in the Russian media far exceeded those of Putin’s ‘United Russia’ party, even though ‘Right Sector’ gained less than 2% in the elections in Ukraine. After the escape of Viktor Yanukovych, Russian TV stations began to refer to Ukraine’s new leaders as the ‘Kiev junta’. In the rhetoric of Kremlin propaganda, the Ukrainian government became ‘Banderian’ and ‘Nazi’ while Russia was forced to ‘fight the Nazis’ and strive for Russkiy mir—Russian World (Wynnyckyj, 2019, 16). This narrative was featured in the documentary entitled ‘Crimea. The Way Home’ broadcast by the Rossiya-1 channel in March 2015. In the film, Putin revealed the pattern of his attitude towards Ukraine, which is also valid in 2022, describing it as an anti-Russian branch of the USA. He stated that the ‘real animators of the state coup’ in Ukraine were the United States, and it was the Americans who ‘helped in the training of nationalists, combat troops (…) in the west of Ukraine, in Poland and partly in Lithuania’.2 The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly become a testing ground for the Russian ‘hybrid war’. In February 2017, the Minister of

2 KPym. Pytb na [accessed 02.11.2022].

Podiny,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGGNXIQXlcU

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National Defense, Sergei Shoigu, at a meeting of the State Duma, officially confirmed that special military units had been created in Russia for ‘information operations’. The problem of the Ukrainian media market at that time was the fact that the local mass media functioned primarily as private investments of oligarchs described as ‘pro-Russian’. They were not calculated for profitability, but treated as tools of influence. The recipients of the Russian information war against Kiev were not only the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. The message was broader and, on the one hand, ridiculed the Ukrainian authorities and their reformist activities. Russia achieved much less success in the field of ‘information war’ in the area of shaping attitudes towards war in the West. Especially after the Malaysia Airlines plane was shot down (July 17, 2014). This crime significantly contributed to the internationalization of the war in Ukraine at the diplomatic level (Reginia-Zacharski, 2015, 42), but it was also a shock to European public opinion.

The Main Directions of the Warfare in the Information Domain After 24 February 2022 Russia, as in the 2014–2015war, created four images: one to its own public opinion, the second to Ukrainians, and the third to Western countries and societies (with the proviso that this time there was a clear distinction between the infosphere campaign and less willing to help Ukraine). The fourth message was addressed to countries that were neutral and favourable to Russia. The Kremlin’s propaganda became complete. The news of the government media was entirely devoted to the war and coordinated with the message of the state administration and major institutions, such as the army or the Orthodox Church. Already a few weeks before the invasion, the Russian media intensified the coverage of relations with Ukraine. The language became more aggressive towards both Ukraine and the West. Until the last moment, however, the belief was maintained that Russia did not seek escalation and would not attack Ukraine first. After the invasion, television coverage focused on the war and included several theses: (1) Russia is conducting a ‘military special operation’ in Ukraine, not a war. (2) Russia’s goal is to defend the Russian-speaking population in Donbass, who have been persecuted. (3) The real enemy of Russia, responsible for

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the escalation of the situation in Ukraine, is the West, i.e. NATO along with the USA, which in Ukraine has been trying to ‘bleed out’ Russia and bring to its disintegration. (Chawryło, 2022, 3)

Television is the main carrier of Russian propaganda. Of particular importance here are the Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 channels, owned by the WGTRK holding, as well as the state-owned ‘Pierwyj Kanał’ and the NTV channel, remaining in the hands of Gazprom Media. The role of the television broadcast is so important that it still remains the main source of information for the majority of Russians. According to the decision of the media supervision agency Roskomnadzor, state television presents the war in Ukraine only and exclusively based on state sources. After the outbreak of the war, the schedule was changed, the broadcasting of entertainment content and series was limited; the duration of news and publicist programs was extended. An important change was the extension of the propaganda broadcast on the ‘Rossiya’ channels, including ‘The news of the week’ hosted by the leading propagandist and journalistic celebrity Dmitry Kiselov. However, the main driving force for the interpretation of the events in Ukraine became the official messages of the Russian Ministry of National Defence, the spokesman for the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov or Vladimir Putin himself. The Kremlin has managed to instil in Russian citizens its own vision of the causes of the war. The Russians treated the presented message as ‘coherent’ and ‘true’, i.e. consistent with the vision of reality that had been shaped previously by the regime. As a consequence, in the first weeks of the war, public opinion polls showed great enthusiasm among the Russians. According to a March 2022 study by the Levada Center, 81% of respondents supported the hostilities, only 14% were against. High support for the war (Levada, October 2022) has been maintained despite a series of military defeats. This clearly shows that Russian propaganda is still able to effectively mobilize Russians around political leadership and the goals set by it. Propaganda remained the main tool for disseminating information, recognizable in terms of language (the language of emotions and assessments, not facts), content (in line with the Kremlin’s official propaganda) and function (discrediting the opponent). In the survey of March 2022, the respondents’ indications of the causes of the war were quite interesting: 43% indicated the defence of the Russian and Russian-speaking population of the so-called People’s Republics; 25%—anticipation of

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attack, defence against Ukraine’s aggression; 21%—‘denazification’, the fight against fascists and Banderites, the establishment of order; 14%— preventing NATO enlargement, moving NATO away from Russia’s borders. The level of trust in Putin himself has increased. At the end of 2021, support for the president fell to 49%, and in June 2022 it increased to over 80%. All the data was taken from the Levada Public Opinion Research Centre. Initially, Russian propaganda attempted to separate ‘ordinary Ukrainians’ from ‘fascists’ from Kiev. However, failures at the front forced a change in Russian disinformation rhetoric. There was talk of the need to physically eliminate the ‘Nazis’. Particularly, shocking was the statement by the head of the government agency RT, Margarita Simonian, who stated on the NTV channel that ‘there are more Nazis in Ukraine than the Russians assumed’ (PocciNckaR ppopagandictka 2022). The main challenge for Russian propaganda, however, was to explain the military failures to the public. Immediately after the attack, it was argued that the ‘operation’ would proceed quickly and bring victory to Russia. The triumphalist message about the invincibility of the Russian army violently collided with the reality of the front. In this case, the authorities lied to both society and themselves, i.e. they believed in the image of the second world army they had created (Alimov, 2017; KorRkin, 2021). Failures at the front launched an operation to protect Putin’s image by pointing to situations outside the Kremlin as the culprits and creating a vision of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’. Failures at the front did not result from mistakes or weaknesses of the Russian armed forces, but from the scale of threats. The ‘special operation’ gradually turned into a ‘war against NATO and the USA’ (PocciR de-fakto voOet, 2022) and against ‘Polish mercenaries’ in Ukraine (Polbckie naemniki, 2022). Interestingly, in this context, the topic of ‘Polish-Ukrainian conflicts’ was also exported, which included clashes between Poles and ‘Ukrainian nationalists’. It should be noted here that ‘conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians’ are a permanent element of Russian propaganda, addressed both to recipients in Poland and Ukraine. The second area of the Russian infosphere campaign was Ukraine. There the Russians encountered not only effective resistance, but also effective opposition from Kiev. It was a surprise for Moscow, because they completely ignored the mental, cultural and political changes in Ukraine. They missed the moment when ‘Western’ content became more attractive to Ukrainians than the message coming from Russia. Also, the authorities

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in Kiev, aware of the threats, carried out several spectacular actions against Russian disinformation, which, although troublesome from the point of view of democratic standards and free speech, became an important aspect of Ukraine’s success in the infosphere. In February 2021, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) decided to introduce 5-year sanctions against MP Taras Kozak and several TV stations associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the pro-Russian Opposition Platform-For Life. Sanctions were imposed on eight companies that managed TV stations 112 Ukraine, ZIK, NewsOne (TeleviziNna ckpinbka, 2021). Oligarchs with powerful media background—Vikor Miedwienczuk, ´ Viktor Pinchuk (son-in-law of a former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma) and Renat Akhmetov were supporters of former President Viktor Yanukovych, and thus directly also of Russia. In July 2022, Renat Akhmetov announced that his company SCM was leaving the media market. All licenses for print media and TV channels will be transferred to the Ukrainian state. In March 2022, President Zelensky signed a law prohibiting the preparation and dissemination of information promoting the activities of the Russian Federation. It prohibits the press, television and radio from justifying, recognizing as legal or denying Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014. It prohibits referring to this aggression as ‘internal conflict’, ‘social conflict’ or ‘civil war’ as well as denying the temporary occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory. It also prohibits the glorification of persons who participated in Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014 (Bepxovna Pada Ukpa|ni). The activity of Ukrainian television is now an important element of Kiev’s success in the information domain. Both the structure of the message, the quality of audio-visual materials and the ability to consolidate society around the goals of the state are at a very high level. On an ongoing basis, information about the information war is broadcast. Ukrainians are kept informed about Russia’s propaganda narratives. Concise messages about the methods of Russian disinformation are presented. There are domains in the network, e.g. ‘Detector Media’, which constantly monitor and expose Russian disinformation messages. At the same time, the fight against pro-Russian content online (CBU neNtpalizyvala) continues. Social media has become an important carrier of information, and thus the ‘information war’. Between 2020 and 2021, the number of Ukrainians using social networks increased from 19 to 26 million (Za pik kilbkictb ykpa|nciv). In 2016, among the top five most

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popular social networking sites in Ukraine, influences from the Russian market were more pronounced than from the West. My.mail.ru, Ok.ru and Vk.com, originating from Russia, dominated here. Vk—which is the Russian equivalent of Facebook—was used by 70% of Ukrainian Internet users. At the beginning of 2020, the most popular social networks in Ukraine were already Facebook (58%), YouTube (41%), Instagram (28%) and Telegram—14% (Ukpa|nci nazvali). In 2022, the most popular news channel was Telegram, associated with the Russian broadcast— 66%, but also YouTube—61% and Facebook—58% (HaNpopylRpnixi cocmepeki). Such great popularity of the Telegram application is mainly due to the fact that it is the platform on which it is easiest to follow the course of war. Ukrainians operating online actively and spontaneously joined the campaigns discrediting Russia and the Russian army. A huge role in the undoubted success of Ukrainians in the ‘new media’ was played by the delivery to Ukraine of Starlink terminals created by Elon Musk’s company. Each device connects to one of Musk’s SpaceX satellites, allowing access to the internet. Ukrainians were able to upload photos and videos of Russian artillery attacks on civilian targets, acts of resistance, broken columns of Russian troops, common war crimes and looting. At the same time, it was possible to minimize the exposure of these recordings, which would put Ukrainian forces in a bad light. Care was taken not to publish materials showing the losses in people and equipment of the Ukrainian armed forces. World public opinion throughout the war enjoys the respect of defenders and aggressors provided by the Ukrainian command. It should also be noted that much of the content posted by Internet users was of a professional nature. And this proves that Kyiv is able to conduct an effective campaign not only to counteract Russian disinformation, but also to impose its own picture of events. After the occupation of parts of southern Ukraine began, Russia expanded the broadcasting of its TV channels ‘First Crimea’ and ‘Krym 24’ to the captured settlements of the Kherson region. A separate, socalled information project ‘Kherson 24’ was also launched. In August 2022, in Melitopol in Zaporizhia, the Russian-created TV channel ‘ZaTV’ (Potykna i tokciqna ppopaganda) started broadcasting. The Russian occupation forces, based on the captured premises of the Public Television in Kherson, also opened the local TV channel ‘Tavria’. Kateryna Gubareva, the head deputy of the military-civil administration of the occupied part of the Kherson region, stated that this channel would counteract the Ukrainian media (MownaR i tokciqnaR ppopaganda).

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Propaganda programs broadcast by Russian-controlled television channels primarily tried to convince the inhabitants of the occupied territories that life was returning to normal, and that the authorities were providing the media and provisions necessary for life, paying pensions and other benefits. The improvement of the living conditions of the inhabitants of Crimea after the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia was also widely reported. Propaganda channels widely report about fictitious victories of the Russian army, hundreds of downed ‘Bajrakt’ drones and thousands of destroyed HIMRAS systems supplied by the USA. An important element of the propaganda was convincing the Ukrainians that the areas controlled by the Russians would remain Russian ‘forever’ (PocciR zdecb navcegda). Countering Russian disinformation in Russian-controlled areas is extremely difficult. The attempts made by the Ukrainian side are successfully blocked by the Russians. One of the crucial frontlines of the war in the information domain is the public opinion of countries that support Ukraine’s war effort, but also of countries not involved in it. It is worth noting here that in almost all EU countries there is some significant political force that is on the side of Russia’s narrative. Their activity is valuable—from the Kremlin’s point of view—as it allows Russian propaganda and disinformation to pass through the mental and administrative barriers of the West. Russia is unable to create reality and create real, structural divisions in the West. However, he tries to achieve his goals by using really existing problems—the energy crisis or fears (fear of war, the use of nuclear weapons). By multiplying them, but also appropriately preparing the accompanying narrative, he tries to influence societies that in a democracy can force specific solutions on the political authorities. Russia’s failure in the information domain of the broadly understood West resulted from several reasons. Firstly, a decision was quickly taken to cut off access to Russian TV channels in EU countries. Already on March 1, 2022, the Council of the EU decided to suspend the possibility of disseminating, facilitating the dissemination and other distribution of RT channels—‘Russia Today’ and ‘Sputnik’. In subsequent sanctions packages, the channels ‘Rossiya’ RTR/RTR Planeta, ‘Rossiya 24’ and ‘TV Center International’ were blocked. Private corporations also joined the embargo. For example, YouTube blocked channels related to RT and ‘Sputnik’. Secondly, Western societies managed to develop a certain resistance to the Russian propaganda machine. This was mainly due to the fact that the issue ceased to be taboo around 2014, and subsequent analytical

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institutions warned against Russian disinformation. The third element of Ukraine’s success was avoiding defeat in the first days of the war. Skilful shaping of the information space played an extremely important role in the perception of the chances of successfully countering Russian aggression both in the internal and international dimensions. President Zelensky not only refused to evacuate Kiev, which was a real symbol of the fight, but also made sure that his presence in public space (thanks to the films recorded by him, his wife and members of the government and made available on television and social media) not only struggle, but also forced the reaction of Western countries expected by Kiev. The spectrum of Russian tools in the 2022 war, however, is much wider than simply interfering with the message about the war and its effects on Western societies. Equally effective is the use of ideological inclinations, attitudes or orientations of many social groups ‘whataboutism’, i.e. a mechanism whereby a critical question is not answered, but accuses the questioner. The carriers of Russian propaganda and social influence therefore ask about colonialism. Putin even places himself in the role of a world leader who fights for a kind of new decolonization, American intervention in Afghanistan or recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the West. All this is to justify or at least relativize Russia’s guilt in the eyes of public opinion. The second mechanism used by Russia is ‘westplaining’ that is the ideological naivety of some Western thinkers and journalists who use anti-imperial and anti-Western rhetoric to assess the situation in Ukraine, while failing to understand the specifics of the political and social conditions of Eastern Europe. In this context, one can quote the statements of Pope Francis II, which in Ukraine were perceived as pro-Russian (Gepacimenko, 2022). The Kremlin’s disinformation machine is also present in non-European information spaces. This is due to the specific view of the Global South on international relations, in which an important element is the fight against capitalism and the West, which is narratively supported by Russia. The increased activity of pro-Russian accounts in many languages of these regions; the use of digital propaganda tools and social media allows them to take over the tone of the discussion and impose their own narratives. Even in a potentially favourable environment, Russian propaganda is having the intended effect. Much depends on the attitudes and goals of individual governments. For example, the Chinese internet is full of fake news, according to which mercenaries and a handful of ‘fascists from Ukraine’ barely hold back the advance of Russian troops. Despite this,

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anti-Russian voices, which are growing in strength, are also tolerated (Chinschan, 2022).

Conclusions The effective actions of the Ukrainian side in the information domain may give the impression of full dominance of Kiev. After several months of war, however, it is difficult to identify the prevailing side. Narrative rivalry is supra-regional; it touches all continents and both sides record successes and failures. The effectiveness of activities in the infosphere should be measured from the perspective of its goals, including long-term ones. It is not just about who is ‘right’ today, but also about ‘whose right’ will persist in the long run. One should also be aware that Ukraine—although it conducts a narrative war perfectly—will not be able to achieve a final victory thanks to it. With all this in mind, the reasons for the failure or limited effectiveness of the Russian ‘information war’ can now be identified. The Russians have not been tempted to build an extensive and at least moderately credible narrative ‘explaining’ to the West the need to strike at Ukraine. They decided on a completely primitive and absolutely unbelievable message, such as the issue of fighting the ‘Nazis’, ‘NATO expansion’ and ‘threat to Russia’s security’. It should also be added that Russian propaganda is simply primitive and in this sense it does not appeal to the educated recipient of the West. Stories about ‘battle bats’ and ‘battle mosquitoes’ (Pocle ‘gpRznoN bomby’) being dropped from drones on Russian troops became a reason for ridicule. Also, Russian narratives about a Ukrainian ‘dirty bomb’, American ‘labs studying forbidden viruses’ to suggestions that Russia attacked because it feared that Kyiv could produce an atomic bomb (Hypieva, 2022) had no credibility effect. The genuine fears of Europeans about the possible escalation of the war or the ‘freezing of Europe’, fuelled by Russian narratives, have not had much success. An important problem of the Russian ‘information war’ was the resignation from the cover of its activities in the first stage of the war. The Kremlin probably calculated that, as the aggressor, it would not gain an advantage in this domain anyway, but at the same time assumed that it was not particularly important considering the planned rapid breaking of Ukraine’s resistance. In such a situation, Russia would put world public opinion in front of a fait accompli and, as the winner, could impose its narratives. The defeats on the fronts intensified the failures

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in the infosphere, and the revealed war crimes of the Russians additionally strengthened the sympathy and support of Western societies towards Ukraine. In the Ukrainian direction, the Russians suffered an even greater defeat. Their messages do not cause panic; Russian narratives are ‘inauthentic’ for Ukrainians. The mere fact of stopping the Russian offensive deconstructed Russian myths. It also turned out that the Russian propaganda message is not only unreliable, but above all easy to verify in the era of new information technologies. The propagated ideas of security and prosperity alongside Russia or the abandonment of Ukraine by the West also turned out to be unattractive and untrue. In Russia and the countries of the Global South, ideological newspeak based on disinformation still finds fertile ground. In these directions, the Russian disinformation message is successful.

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CHAPTER 4

Conspiracy Theory Mobilisation Mechanisms in the Context of the War in Ukraine: A Study of Polish Twitter Agnieszka Turska-Kawa

and Natalia St˛epien-Lampa ´

Introduction After the extremely difficult time of the pandemic, which upset people’s sense of security on numerous levels (e.g. Babicka-Wirkus et al., 2021; Turska-Kawa et al., 2022), Poles have been put to another tremendously difficult test. On 24 February 2022 at 3:45 a.m., Russian television broadcast an address by President Vladimir Putin, who announced that Russia was launching a “special military operation” in defence of the selfproclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine, whose independence Russia had recognized a few days earlier. At 5 a.m., the Russian army commenced military activity on Ukrainian territory. Almost immediately, movement of Ukrainians started towards Poland, which became the main direction of escape from the war. The situation triggered a wave of help from Poles, who rushed to the eastern border with food and other staples, as well as

A. Turska-Kawa (B) · N. St˛epien-Lampa ´ (Deceased) University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_4

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with information on staying in Poland. Numerous communities began to form in social media, with Poles offering for instance to take care of mothers with children who were seeking a safe shelter. At the same time, other groups began to emerge denying the war. The content they published sought to prove that there were no hostilities, and that the influx of Ukrainians into Poland was yet another part of the “grand plan”. The war in Ukraine and its direct social, political and cultural impacts on Poland undoubtedly caused the order slowly being restored in the post-pandemic world to fall apart again, eliminating the prospects of returning to a peaceful and predictable life. At the same time, however, they made some people concentrate on certain conspiracy theories that had been flooding the Internet in great numbers, which now gained a new focus. As a result of that, the impact of the widespread theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic, which had already gained a stable place in society, also intensified. Conspiracy theories are not a new phenomenon. However, the time of the pandemic, when, on the one hand, people would look for an explanation of the new situation and, on the other hand, most social activity was transferred to the Internet, increased this phenomenon’s role in spreading false information. Although some sceptical analyses exist indicating a lack of evidence as to the Internet being a tool that would enhance the spread of conspiracy theories beyond those already interested in them (Uscinski et al., 2018), the pandemic, by increasing the number of studies in this area, reinforced the assertions that the ubiquity of social media lowered barriers to access, exposing potential believers directly to conspiracy theories through services such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit and YouTube (Douglas et al., 2017; Stano, 2020). Although many factors may influence the endorsement of conspiracy theories (Bowes et al., 2021; Constantinou et al., 2021; Enders et al., 2020; Miloševi´c Ðord-evi´c et al., 2021; Pilch et al., 2023), researchers are fairly consistent in pointing out that such trends become more widely activated in times of crises (Bavel et al., 2020; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017, 2018). This is because this type of thinking clearly works in situations that are hard to explain, and which do not offer acceptable solutions to an overwhelming situation in the foreseeable future (Oleksy et al., 2021). They provide an illusory perspective and false knowledge that silences uncertainty, putting the blame for the situation on influential people colluding in secret to achieve selfish or malicious goals (Bale, 2007; Sullivan et al., 2010). Previous research shows that individuals who lost

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their sense of control are more likely to perceive illusory patterns and to endorse conspiracy theories (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), although these findings do not always find empirical support today (Nyhan & Zeitzoff, 2018). As already pointed out, many studies confirm that conspiracy theories are far more likely to emerge in situations that are difficult to explain, but in particular in ones that generate anxiety and other negative emotions (Bale, 2007; Darius & Urquhart, 2021; Horvat, 2021; Lantian et al., 2018). However, traditional research emphasizes that such negative emotions have a social character—they are socially constructed and must be framed and re-framed (Mouffe, 1992), in ways that resonate with potential participants and, in effect, re-draw boundaries in social life (Melucci, 1996). This encourages searching for factors that might serve as specific triggers for mobilization. Among these, our attention is drawn to Twitter, a social medium allowing users to rapidly post short messages (up to 280 characters), which can either be autonomous or comment on an attached photo or video. The aim of the paper is to explore the mobilizing nature of accounts and tweets with conspiracy content. Through the analysis presented herein, the authors seek the factors that give a mobilizing load to these very particular forms of communication in the Internet space.

Twitter as an Attractive Space for Mobilizing Conspiracy Theory Supporters Although the phenomenon of conspiracy theories did not emerge in recent years, it is beyond any doubt that never before has it had so many proponents or so much widespread progress. On the one hand, this conclusion is confirmed by scientific research (Bertuzzi, 2021) while on the other hand, the social engagement of conspiracy theorists is becoming increasingly visible. Supporters of conspiracy theories have been taking to the streets to collectively express their beliefs, protesting against the authorities who, during the pandemic, introduced a series of restrictions limiting citizens’ freedoms (Grignolio, 2018; Hornsey et al., 2021; Pivetti et al., 2021; Turska-Kawa & Pilch, 2022). Research confirms that belief in secret conspiracies reduces normative political engagement, at the same time increasing nonnormative engagement (Imhoff et al., 2021; Kim, 2022). Increased activity of conspiracy theory proponents can also be observed online. The Internet space, due to its particular nature (for

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instance, due to anonymity and lack of direct responsibility for the content shared), generates much more opportunity to spread false information. Social media collaborative filtering algorithms have enabled the formation of what is referred to as echo chambers, where conspiracy theories proliferate intensively, widening the circles of their supporters (Gupta et al., 2022; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016; Shane et al., 2022). Social media users tend to promote their favourite narratives. This bias consequently leads to the dissemination of content, creating information cascades within identifiable communities. At the same time, the aggregation of preferred information in such communities reinforces the selective exposure and polarization of groups. Research shows that this focus on preferred narratives makes users inclined to assimilate only those assertions which bring confirmation, and to ignore contradictory content (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). The virtual community of conspiracy views creates a particular kind of social identity. On the one hand, such a sense of belonging helps to build a certain kind of imagined community, united in disposition if not in history or tradition (Reid, 1985). Its imaginary nature allows the individual to build it in line with their expectations, and the difficulty of realistically verifying identification with the respective movement reinforces the sense of attachment. On the other hand, the widespread stigmatization of conspiracy theory supporters, by accusing them of paranoia and lack of rational thinking, or by ridiculing their views, helps to define this community and to actually reinforce it by way of feedback. Conspiracy beliefs, understood as “stigmatized knowledge”, can lead to having a minority status, which in turn consolidates the sense of belonging (Lowe, 2020). Twitter is also a particular tool supporting conspiracy narratives, due to the brief nature of the messages published on the platform. In the context of conspiracy narratives, users tend to speak and write in a less complex way, using fewer words and fewer complete sentences (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Text complexity may be reduced in conspiracy narratives because of the cognitive load required to maintain a story that contradicts experience, and of the effort required to persuade others. This communication method gives little room for discussion, does not generate cognitive dissonance and allows conspiracy beliefs to be consolidated. As Marco Visentin et al. (2021) argue, it can be assumed that the more complex the text, the less convincing it is. The team found in their research that the complexity of the language used had a negative effect on retweeting.

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Research Framework Twitter is currently the most widely used social network, employed for political, social as well as economic communication (Hussain et al., 2021). Research proves that disinformation on Twitter can spread much more widely than true information, depending on the depth of the tweet cascades, the users involved in sharing and the time of sharing (VillarRodríguez et al., 2022). Soroush Vosoughi et al. (2018) investigated the differential diffusion of all of the verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017. It turned out that fake news was indeed more inventive than real news, which may indicate that people are more willing to share the former. Interestingly, robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that fake news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it. Furthermore, algorithms can be driven by interaction variables such as the number of likes of a post to detect if it is true or misleading (Tacchini et al., 2017). The mobilizing potential of Twitter encouraged us to investigate its role in the spread of conspiracy content related to conspiracy theories about the ongoing war in Ukraine. The study was conducted on Polish accounts, as due to its geographical location, Poland became almost immediately a migration hub for Ukrainians seeking a safe shelter and became involved in helping them from the very first days of the war. In the course of the analysis, we used Twitter analytics tools whose results complemented each other towards the achievement of exploratory objective. The words and word clusters obtained in the first stage of the study provided the content for the subsequent steps of the research carried out using Twitter analytics tools. Using Tweet Binder, we conducted a multivariate analysis of the reach of words and word clusters. We then used foller.me to analyse the accounts. In particular, we were interested in when they were set up, how many tweets had been published there, how many followers they had, how many accounts they followed, whether they posted some bios, and if so, what the bios contained. foller.me makes it possible to perform real-time analyses, so the quantitative study of the accounts in our paper is dated 3 June. Subsequently, we analysed tweets using Twitter Advanced Search. We were interested, among other things, in whether the users we had selected posted anti-COVID-19 and antivaxxer content, apart from anti-Ukrainian content. Our study covered the period from 24 February to 3 May 2022, i.e. the first three months of

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the war in Ukraine. The use of the tools indicated enabled us to perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis on the mobilizing role of conspiracy theories related to the war.

Results Findings Preliminary Analysis The first stage of the analysis involved selecting words/phrases that would serve as content for the analytics tools used. For this purpose, we conducted non-standardized interviews (N = 10) with open proponents of conspiracy theories about the war across Poland’s eastern border. Snowball sampling was used to select them, with the total anonymity of the interviewees. The interviews were only supposed to provide data for further investigation, and their form was that of free conversation. This is because we wanted to make sure the respondents were comfortable, which in our opinion would contribute to uninhibited narration on their part. According to their declarations, the invited respondents turned out to be supporters of conspiracy theories according to which the Polish society was currently undergoing Ukrainization, while the Ukrainians had come to Poland to destroy it and to build a new state called Ukropolin on its ruins, together with the Jewish people. This state would be inhabited by Ukrainians and Jews. Supporters of these theories also recalled the difficult history of Poland and Ukraine, calling the Ukrainians Banderites. During World War II, the Banderites were members of a faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) led by Stepan Bandera. The OUN-B together with the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army, formed in 1942) were responsible for the genocide of Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Lesser Poland. In addition, supporters of this conspiracy theory also pointed out that Ukrainians were receiving cash benefits in Poland, paid for by Polish taxpayers. Interviewees used the term “ukrainiecplus” [Ukrainianplus], referring to programmes introduced by the Law and Justice party government that included the plus sign, such as 500+ or 300+, meant to suggest that the arrival of refugees from Ukraine to Poland was yet another social programme financed from the state budget. They also pointed out that Poles found it harder to access healthcare services, offices or kindergarten care due to the priority given, in their opinion, to Ukrainian citizens. It should be emphasized that the discussions on the granting of benefits took place in the context of granting

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Ukrainians further civic rights so that they could eventually take over Poland’s territory. On the basis of the interviews, we selected the words and phrases used most frequently by supporters of the conspiracy narrative related to refugees from Ukraine and to the war. They were the following: (1) stop ukrainizacji [stop Ukrainization], (2) nie dla ukrainców ´ [no to Ukrainians], (3) Ukrainiec plus [Ukrainian plus], (4) banderowcy [Banderites], (5) upaina [UPAine], (6) upadlina [Ukraine = UPA scum] and (7) ukropolin [UkroPolin]. In the study, we used them as the content for the Twitter analytics tools. Due to the specific nature of Twitter, word clusters were analysed in continuous form (written without spaces), which was reflected in practice in hashtags included in the tweets (e.g. #stopukrainizacji). Using hashtags simplifies communication in a way, by labelling the respective message with an indication of an important topic or channel, or the fact of belonging to a specific group. Reach In the analysed period, the words and word clusters: stopukrainizacji, niedlaukrainców, ´ ukrainiecplus, banderowcy, upaina, upadlina and ukropolin appeared in a total of 25,508 tweets. Of these, 465 (1.82%) contained only text, 11,292 (42.27%) were replies to tweets containing the words and word clusters indicated, 12,172 (47.72%) were retweets (shares) of such content, and 2,491 (9.77%) contained links or images. The potential impact, i.e. the potential number of unique users that could have seen the words and word clusters—the audience—was 23,716,435. The impact has to do with how many times the words and word clusters could have been seen by Twitter users. Potential reach, i.e. the potential number of unique users that could have seen the words and word clusters, amounted to 6,309,125. Reach refers to how many Twitter users could have seen the words and word clusters. Total contributors, i.e. the number of unique users that had shared content with the analysed search terms, were 7,320, while original contributors, i.e. the number of users that had shared original tweets with the words and word clusters, amounted to 4,336. The average amount of followers per contributor was 861.9. The average number of original tweets per contributor was 3.48. In turn, the average number of original tweets per original contributor was 3.08. The users wrote 13,336 original tweets containing the indicated words and word clusters. This figure does not include retweets. It is also

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worth adding that the economic value of the words and word clusters we analysed that had been posted on Twitter was estimated at $32,700,000. The distribution of the number of tweets published by a single user was not a normal distribution (see Table 4.1.). The majority of users (59.78%) posted just one tweet, 14.45% posted two, while 10.2% of the accounts generated seven or more tweets. This last group was not only the most active one on Twitter, but also the most influential one in that social medium in terms of spreading conspiracy content related to the war in Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that the analysed words and word clusters were used not only by conspiracy theory supporters. Their opponents also did so in order to discredit and ridicule the theories themselves and the people believing in them. The Tweet Binder application we used for our analysis did not make it possible, however, to distinguish between tweets published by supporters and opponents of conspiracy theories. The following tweets are examples of content aimed at discrediting conspiracy theories (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/ 2022): @MAKowalczyk: I turned on Russian TV. Psychiatric-level propaganda. There are American laboratories in UA, preparing epidemics, there are birds supposed to carry germs to Russia. The US is moving laboratories to PL. The Russians took control of the nuclear power plants because the Banderites wanted to blow them up. @gromotapl: What are these colours? Is this still Poland or already Ukropolin? A true Polish party should be white and red https://t.co/mTi vYZbdOI

Table 4.1 Distribution of tweets containing the analysed words and word clusters per user

Tweets 1 2 3 4 5 6 ≥7

Contributors

Total (%)

4376 1058 496 317 205 121 747

59.78 14.45 6.78 4.33 2.8 1.65 10.2

Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022

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The tweet was accompanied by a picture containing the logo of the conservative KORWIN party, whose supporters have often posted antiUkrainian content. The logo uses the colours blue and yellow, i.e. the national colours of Ukraine. @pankempa: How is it going, national defenders of civilization? Are you bothered by the “allah akbar” with burnt down buildings in the background? Or is it still a bigger problem when Red Viburnum is sung in church, and generally “it’s not our war, Banderites, let’s help, but let’s be reasonable”?

The tweet was accompanied by a video showing Chechen soldiers in the destroyed Mariupol, praising Allah, among other things. The tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed varied in length, with the average tweet length being 155.65 characters. Those with at least 240 characters accounted for 23.94% of all the tweets published. Tweets of 40–79 characters or more accounted for 19.29%. The top of the list also included tweets between 80 and 119 characters, accounting for 18.5% of all tweets (see Table 4.2). We also analysed the distribution of the process of generating the selected words and word clusters over time (see Fig. 4.1). The largest number of tweets (1752) and retweets (1058) was published on 5 May. At that time, also the largest number of users (1058) published or shared content containing the selected words or word clusters. In turn, on 11 May, 1337 tweets and 563 retweets were published, and 828 users shared the respective content. The high popularity of the analysed words and word clusters can also be observed on 1 March (1139 hashtags, 556 retweets and 879 users). This distribution can be traced with Table 4.2 Length distribution of tweets containing the analysed words and word clusters per user

Characters

Tweets

Total (%)

XXS (0–39) XS (40–79) S (80–119) M (120–159) L (160–199) XL (200–239) XXL (240 and more)

808 2573 2467 1727 1350 1219 3192

6.06 19.29 18.5 12.95 10.12 9.14 23.94

Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022

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a high degree of likelihood back to certain events preceding the indicated “popularity surges”. On 5 May, media in Poland reported on the critical situation at the Azovstal metallurgical plant in Mariupol, where soldiers of the Azov Regiment, associated with Ukrainian nationalists, were still defending themselves. This may have prompted supporters of conspiracy theories to publish anti-Ukrainian content on Twitter in the Polish language. On 11 May, the Polish embassy in Moscow was splattered with red paint, probably in retaliation for the dousing of the Russian ambassador to Poland, Sergei Andreev, with a similar substance. The paint was thrown at the ambassador on 9 May by a Ukrainian woman participating in a protest outside the Soviet Military Cemetery in Warsaw. The delegation led by the ambassador was going to lay wreaths at the Cemetery as part of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations to commemorate Soviet soldiers killed during World War II. The incident was widely commented on, and conspiracy theory advocates used it to criticize Ukrainians. In turn, 1 March can be associated with a substantial influx of refugees into Poland. In fact, it was in the first phase of the war (late February/early March) that the largest number of Ukrainian citizens (mainly women with children) decided to flee to Poland. Accounts The subsequent part of the study involved analysing the accounts of the users who had been using the words and word clusters we selected most frequently. Most of them (57.35%) were small accounts with less than 200 followers. Between 200 and 499 followers was the number recorded for 16.91% of the users, 9.52% had 500–999 followers, 13.8% had 1000– 4999, and 2.4% had at least 5000 (see Table 4.3). Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the time of existence of the accounts publishing the indicated words and word clusters (see Table 4.4). Of these accounts, 28.9% had a history of at least six years, while 26.35% were accounts that had been active on Twitter for less than one year. Interestingly, accounts set up during the COVID-19 pandemic, and consequently active for less than three years, accounted in total for 49.24% of all the accounts. The further analysis concerned the accounts of the ten most active users, i.e. those who had published the largest number of tweets between 24 February and 23 May (Fig. 4.2). Three of the most active users commenced activity on Twitter after 24 February, i.e. during the Russian

Fig. 4.1 Time distribution of the reach of the words and word clusters analysed (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/ 2022–5/23/2022)

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Table 4.3 Distribution of followers of the users who published tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed

Followers

Tweets

Total (%)

XXS (0–9) XS (10–49) S (50–199) M (200–499) L (500–999) XL (1000–4999) XXL (5000 and more)

1184 1395 1620 1238 697 1010 176

16.17 19.06 22.13 16.91 9.52 13.8 2.4

Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022

Table 4.4 Age distribution of the accounts publishing tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed

Years

Tweets

Total (%)

XXS (less than 1) XS (1–2) S (2–3) M (3–4) L (4–5) XL (5–6) XXL (6 and more)

1929 993 682 510 615 474 2117

26.35 13.57 9.32 6.97 8.4 6.48 28.92

Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022

invasion of Ukraine. The first of these was the @UkroPolin account, whose very name is indicative of the content published there. This user posted the largest number of tweets containing the indicated words and word clusters of all accounts in the analysed period. The account was created on 31 March, and by 3 June, it had published 777 tweets, 421 of which contained the words and word clusters analysed. The account had 115 followers and was followed by 52 users. The second user who started activity during the war was @jacol2601. The account was set up on 27 February, and by 3 June, the user had posted 13,062 tweets there. It had 111 followers and was followed by 68 users. The third user, @garmonbozja, started activity on 18 March and had posted 6209 tweets by 3 June, gaining 293 followers and following 542 people. The creator of this account included the following information in their bio: “Mum/Catholic/Patriot/Traditionalist/Journalist/Media Scientist/Rebel – allergic to lies and aggressive propaganda”, presumably intended to increase their credibility and impartiality in the eyes of other

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Twitter users. Nevertheless, the tweets posted by @garmonbozja were full of aversion to Ukrainians. Some reproduced Russian propaganda content, for example (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022): @garmonbozja: replying to @PolsatNewsPL and @michaldworczyk Thanks to you and the Nazis from Ukraine, Poland is only now under threat of armed conflict, and not just from Russia you dimwits, but from an armed Nazi Ukraine. And you have disarmed our country you sick fucks!

The other users who were among the ten most active accounts, i.e. @Mandaryn62, @bet25476329, @SzymekZLazarza, @WESLEYROBERTART, @HanterPoen, @PolitWerkstatt and @JerzySchabowicz, had been present on Twitter for a longer or much longer time. After the analysis of the tweets these seven users had posted to their Twitter stream, it turned out that all of them, in addition to anti-Ukrainian content, also included anti-vaccine content as well as content denying or ridiculing the COVID19 pandemic and the measures taken to curb its effects. Detailed data on the group of most active accounts is presented in Table 4.5. The following are examples of tweets denying and criticizing the pandemic or vaccination, shared by accounts already active before the outbreak of war in Ukraine (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/ 23/2022): @Mandaryn62: The Pfizer oligarchy tacitly admits that it will NEVER produce the covid vaccine [as a safe product], conditionally approved on an experimental basis by the minister of health FDA tacit-update-or-what-arelicences-about/. @bet25476329: Heart failure: the main effect of vaccinations against covid 19. @SzymekZLazarza – this account was deleted, but included anti-COVID content before. @WESLEYROBERTART: Polish health care was already at an outrageously low level before the Fake Pandemic of the #tests for idiots. Pathological lack of good doctors. Huge queues to see the good doctors. 5-minute visits. Another patient and then the tired doctor runs to work in private practice. As many as 15 minutes per patient there!

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Fig. 4.2 Top ten users publishing in total the largest number of tweets containing the words or word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/ 24/2022–5/23/2022, own analysis)

@HanterPoen: Poles, I call upon you to start thinking and analysing! #WeAreNotGettingVaxxed against #Covid_19 #youknowmore #Iknowbetter. @PolitWerkstatt: The figures speak for themselves! Athletes are dropping like flies after these damned #Vaccination-s! #WeAreNotGettingVaxxed #suddenly #suddenly21 #COVID19 #depopulation #Genocide #NWO. @JerzySchabowicz retweeted, among others, the following tweet by @Juna 2626: Have you noticed that the opponents of mRNA preparations and

@WESLEYROBERTART

@SzymekZLazarza

@jacol2601

@bet25476329

@Mandaryn62

34,945 Jun 2021 13,062 Feb 2022 13,650 Mar 2017 40,023 Mar 3015

777 Mar 2022 314,805 2014

@UkroPolin

Date of creation

Posts until 3 June

User

1324

467

111

311

1283

115

Followers as at 3 June

799

1116

68

248

1278

52

Followed as of 3 June

(continued)

‘Lugol’s iodine addict, vaccinated with Sputnik V, Cyrillic illiterate but savvy, always Spetsna “Z”’ ‘Chairman of the Real Politics Union, Opole District. Pioneer and lone leader in exposing the #plague hoax as early as March 2020’

Bald blonde guy

‘“The more you have, the more you want to have.” Nationalist, extreme anarchist, Russophile, anti-vaxxer, white racist, chauvinist, not a patriot, radical loony, tinfoil hat’ I have Poland in my heart

Republic of Friends

Bio

Table 4.5 Characteristics of the ten accounts that published in total the largest number of tweets containing the words or word clusters analysed

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Note Twitter, own compilation

@JerzySchabowicz

7251 Jan 2022

6209 Mar 2022 216,426 Jul 2017

@garmonbozja

@PolitWerkstatt

150,342 Apr 2015

@HanterPoen

Date of creation

Posts until 3 June

(continued)

User

Table 4.5

219

3550

293

2672

Followers as at 3 June

159

4012

524

2311

Followed as of 3 June

‘Be faithful, Go Zbigniew Herbert #KLWarschau #Jedwabne #Smolensk #PoliticalMurdersintheThirdRepublicofPoland #StopJudaizationofPoland #NaturalResources #copper’ Mum/ Catholic/ Patriot/ Traditionalist/ Journalist/ Media Scientist/ Rebel—allergic to lies and aggressive propaganda ‘#IDontSupportUkraine of the Banderites! #WeRememberVolhynia! The operation of resettlement of Ukrainians to Poland is in progress. Stop the Ukrainization of Poland!’ The heart of this land beats among the roots, and the wind with the rain forges history fifth-generation descendant of members of the Great Sejm http://sejm-wielki.pl

Bio

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of coercion are usually willing to engage in discussion, they have a lot of reasonable arguments and studies prepared. The supporters, in turn, refrain from discussion, disable comments, and are closed to other opinions? This phenomenon speaks for itself.

Important activity when it comes to disseminating narratives via Twitter includes retweeting, i.e. passing on content found on other accounts using one’s own account. Among the ten users who had most frequently retweeted tweets containing the words and word clusters we selected, two also appeared in the most active user group: @PolitWerkstatt and @HanterPoen (Fig. 4.3). All ten accounts were created before 24 February and all simultaneously shared content denying the COVID-19 pandemic or criticizing vaccinations against the disease. The following are examples of tweets from individual accounts with the above type of content (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022): @bozena_z58: In the United States, the Supreme Court has cancelled universal vaccinations. Bill Gates, the chief US specialist for infectious diseases Fauci and Big Pharma lost the lawsuit before the US Supreme Court. @ViolaNewYork: Covid-ianism has gone to fuck itself, so now they need to scare people (to keep them under control) with other diseases, and they will readily accept more NEEDLE-PRICKING while non-professional virologist Bill G. will just count the cash. @bogdan1409: Covid is a disease of rabid brains!!! @Biay83318359: A guy I know in Stary Sacz, ˛ aged 65, in good health, had problems with his heart and veins after getting vaccinated. He keeps going to doctors and curses the day when he received the preparation. @zelsta5312: Maybe this whole #Plandemic is a trial balloon to check how societies will react. Today they will use a placebo for vaccination. The people will trust it. And after a few years, when it turns out that the vaccine was “good”, a new virus will break out. And then the vaccine proper will be used. @MruczinoM: All COVID vaccinations should be stopped. This will prevent further damage to the human immune system. Without this protective barrier, more people will be vulnerable to disease and death! Don’t you see what goes on in hospitals and outpatient clinics after the vaccinations! @JJackFlash01: A campaign to vaccinate children to gain more children’s organs for transplantation. Snap! And all is clear!

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Fig. 4.3 Ten users that published the largest number of retweets containing the words or word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/ 23/2022, own analysis)

@Teresa12369786: My co-worker at the office ended up in hospital on Thursday after 3 doses. Left leg swollen – thrombosis. A threat to life or amputation. My daughter’s roommate got 3 doses and is going through covid for the 4 th time. My daughter’s furious as she can’t leave home again. I don’t know why I should take the bloody vaccine(Table 4.6).

Of the ten accounts posting original tweets most often, only two (@AgaNagrodzka, @torre41617510) were not included in the above lists

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(Fig. 4.4). The user @AgaNagrodzka had been active on Twitter before 24 February (from March 2018), and at that time published, among other things, anti-pandemic and anti-vaxxer content. By 3 June, it had posted 89,552 tweets, gained 4,331 followers, and followed 4,899 other users. No bio was posted. In turn, the account @torre41617510 (bio: “journalist”, written in English) was created on 27 February 2022; by 3 June, it had posted 3,698 tweets, gathered 29 followers and followed 42 users. In total, the unique accounts included in the above lists had 27,496 followers, the latter not being unique. Some Twitter users followed several of the accounts indicated, thus forming a community of people promoting conspiracy theories related to the war in Ukraine. The @AgaNagrodzka account, similarly to other accounts operating before 23 February, published anti-COVID content (Source Tweet Binder report 2/24/2022–5/23/2022): @AgaNagrodzka “Please think and see. Does this ‘pandemic’ really exist? Where are all the dead then? They lie everywhere, right? Please stop, they’ve turned people into slaves, destroyed the economy, tourism. All the hospitals are waiting for covid, while cancer patients are supposed to croak at home – nice, isn’t it?

Tweets The most retweeted tweets included those by the following users: @PiotrAposto, @Spychacz2 and @MarianWiacek69. The first of these published a tweet that was retweeted 317 times and contained criticism of Polish President Andrzej Duda: @PiotrAposto: Duda the traitor the worst president in Polish History announces ukropolin. https://www.tiktok.com/@pan_rekawica/video/709 3459964387200262

In turn, a tweet by user @Spychacz2 was retweeted 253 times: @Spychacz2: They seared them, threatened them with pitchforks. A trial of young Ukrainians has started in Lublin. Here are the darlings of @AndrzejDuda and again PITCHFORKS – I keep writing, the Banderites have MURDER, pitchforks and axes in their eyes! Well done Duda! http….

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Fig. 4.4 Ten users who published the largest number of original tweets containing the words and word clusters analysed (Note Tweet Binder report 2/ 24/2022–5/23/2022, own analysis)

The above post contained a link to an article published in the digital edition of the paper “Dziennik Wschodni”, reporting on the commencement of a trial of three Ukrainians accused of a series of brutal attacks in Poland. Calling Ukrainians Banderites and indicating that they had “murder, pitchforks and axes” in their eyes were meant to refer to the Volhynia crime.

79,481 Jul 2017 150,342 Apr 2015

@Biay83318359 @HanterPoen

384,192 May 2015

40,801 Nov 2021

@MruczinoM

@JJackFlash01

@zelsta5312

Nov 2015

244,842 Jul 2017 358,217 Dec 2010 351,604 Aug 2014

@bozena_z58 @ViolaNewYork

@bogdan1409

216,426 Jul 2017

@PolitWerkstatt

Creation date

Posts until 3 June

User

363

3052

2085

1335 2672

1161

1334 1994

3550

Followers as at 3 June

672

3586

1914

1105 2311

1169

1110 855

4012

Followed as at 3 June

CONSPIRACY THEORY MOBILISATION MECHANISMS …

(continued)

‘#IDontSupportUkraine of the Banderites! #WeRememberVolhynia! The operation of resettlement of Ukrainians to Poland is in progress. Stop the Ukrainization of Poland! Patriot! I love Poland! ‘I think independently, that’s why they call me #RUSSKI #LACKEY’ I expose the stupidity of people in prominent positions, the denial and hypocrisy—of those I disagree with (no matter what armour they wear). Commies, thieves, secret services collaborators—their place is in jail Nationalist ‘Be faithful, Go Zbigniew Herbert #KLWarschau #Jedwabne #Smolensk #PoliticalMurdersintheThirdRepublicofPoland #StopJudaizationofPoland #NaturalResources #copper’ AN NESCIS, MI FILI, QUANTILLA PRUDÉNTIA MUNDUS REGATUR. “Do you not know, my son, with how very little wisdom the world is governed?” Axel Oxenstierna #CWP [Glory to Great Poland] #BHO [God, Honour, Fatherland] #Confederation Christian Lechite FORBIDDEN PRE-966 POLAND? Monuments to our greatness are important! Humans need very little to live. What people show off is the result of an ego driven around on a dumper truck. Caution! A satire account!

Bio

Table 4.6 Characteristics of the ten accounts that retweeted in total the largest number of tweets containing the hashtags analysed

4

63

Note Twitter, own compilation

141,736 Aug 2020

@Teresa12369786

Creation date

Posts until 3 June

(continued)

User

Table 4.6

1467

Followers as at 3 June 219

Followed as at 3 June

L.A. and Education: photographer, ORT and clinical psychologist. Currently finance and international business. The soul is the ship, reason is the helm and truth is the harbour

Bio

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The third tweet, published by @MarianWiacek69, was retweeted 241 times: @MarianWiacek69: It happened on 2 May 2014 in Odessa. The perpetrators of this murder were Banderites. Since that time, Banderites have murdered 14,000 Russians and are you still surprised why Russia invaded the UPA scum country? This was one of the reasons. Another one are the dozens of laboratories carrying out research on BB [biological weapons]. http://t.co/ pPFhuVbVrx

The post suggested that Russians were dismantling laboratories working on biological weapons (BB) in Ukraine. The tweet was accompanied by a photo showing a dead woman probably in her own flat in Odessa. The tweets that received the largest number of likes were published by the following users: @jakubwiech, @MiroKa30045644 and @GrzegorzBraun_. A tweet posted by @jakubwiech received 2368 likes and concerned events important in the user’s opinion: @jakubwiech: Act 447, fungal lung infection after wearing masks, “plandemic”, “segregation”, discouraging vaccinations, Banderites. How much can one possibly stand.

Among other things, it highlights so-called Act 447, whose aim to have the US administration support efforts in international forums to settle the legal status of property left behind by Holocaust victims. Some opinion journalists believe that the act opens the way to the restitution of property that belonged to Jews before World War II. In a single sentence, reference was also made to the pandemic and to vaccinations as well as to the flight of Ukrainians to Poland before the war. The following tweet by @MiroKa30045644 received 1469 likes: @MiroKa30045644: So, dear residents of the land of Polin, you have 3 options to choose from. Option 1. Union of European Socialist Republics. Option 2. Ukropolin. Option 3. Break up the whole fucking lot, put them to trial, and hang the guilty. The choice is yours. The fuse is ticking faster and faster…

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The post contained, among other things, criticism of the European Union, which the author of the tweet called the Union of European Socialist Republics. The tweet also referred to Poland as Ukropolin. In turn, user @GrzegorzBraun_ published a tweet that had 1088 likes: @GrzegorzBraun_: This is unthinkable! @RepublikaTV denies viewers intelligence. @CONFEDERATION_ has not supported the #UkrainianPlus bill.

Grzegorz Braun is a member of the Polish Sejm of the ninth term and chairman of the political party Confederation of the Polish Crown, as well as a member of the Confederation Liberty and Independence Party. These parties are right-wing and Eurosceptic. In his tweet, Grzegorz Braun used the phrase Ukrainian plus and criticized the policy of the ruling party in Poland. A qualitative analysis of the accounts and tweets collected as a result of the study makes it possible to highlight two themes, in addition to the leading Ukraine-related and anti-COVID-19 content. These themes involve anti-Jewish and anti-government narratives, very often combined in the narration. Accounts publishing conspiracy theories related to the war in Ukraine would often also post content critical of the Polish President, of the ruling party, of the government and of its main politicians. President Andrzej Duda was criticized in particular for sympathizing with Ukraine and with Ukrainians. This is why conspiracy theorists often accused him of wishing to create Ukropolin, of wanting to become the president of UPAine or of supporting the Banderites. Some tweets included information about the alleged Jewish roots of Law and Justice party chairman Jarosław Kaczynski. ´ The politician was also compared, for instance, to Lenin. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki was often referred to as “Mateusz the liar”. He also came under criticism for supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians. He was described as a “pro-Banderite anti-Pole”. Interestingly, accounts active before 24 February, in addition to denying the pandemic, also slandered the Minister of Health, Adam Niedzielski, and other politicians with different opinions on the pandemic from those of conspiracy theory supporters. At the same time, sympathies could be noticed for the right-wing Confederation party and for its MPs, whose tweets were often retweeted by the users indicated above.

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Discussion and Conclusions The aim of the study was to analyse the mobilizing potential of Twitter in the context of disseminating conspiracy content concerning the war in Ukraine. In the course of the preliminary study, we identified the seven most popular words and word clusters (written without spaces) that constituted the dominant and recurring elements of the narrative pursued by conspiracy theory proponents during the interviews. They were the following: (1) stopukrainizacji, (2) niedlaukrainców, ´ (3) ukrainiecplus, (4) banderowcy, (5) upaina, (6) upadlina and (7) ukropolin. They provided the input material for the subsequent tools used in the Twitter analysis process. Taking into account the characteristics of this social medium, we analysed the popularity of the words and word clusters, the distribution of the tweets containing them over time, the accounts of the users who published them most often in the form of original tweets or retweets, and the most popular tweets. The analysis performed makes it possible to distinguish several mechanisms that have mobilization potential in the process of spreading conspiracy theories and gaining new supporters. The most distinctive ones include the following: an actively pursued narrative, the co-occurrence of various conspiracy theories and reinforcement of so-called echo chambers. The patterns of conspiracy communication show that it is not tantamount to autonomous expression or spontaneous individual statements, but rather represents dynamic communication in which the subsequent posts provide stimuli for other users. Almost half of the tweets collected, in fact, shared content previously posted on other accounts, with only a slightly smaller number of replies to other publications. One in every ten tweets contained an element making the post more appealing, and potentially drawing the attention of the audience, namely a link or picture. The content was also relatively long, with most tweets almost reaching the character limit (one in four). What is worth emphasizing is that the tweets remained closely connected to actual events, giving them a suitable interpretative context in line with the conspiracy narrative. Potential impact, i.e. the potential number of unique users that could have seen the words and word clusters amounted to 23,716,435. The interactive nature of the communication is emphasized by the fact that the accounts of users spreading conspiracy content about the war in Ukraine are numerous, but tend to be rather less popular: most of them had less than 200

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followers. Nearly half of them were created after the start of the COVID19 pandemic. It can be assumed that the comparatively high share of relatively new accounts may result from a certain infection with the narrative, characterized by an explicit impulse represented by the desire to share the knowledge which one has just acquired. These accounts are also undoubtedly extremely active in disseminating their own observations and views. The ten most active accounts were analysed in detail. As many as three of them were created after the start of the war in Ukraine. This group included the most active user, @UkroPolin, posting more than 400 tweets in two months related to the subject matter covered by the analysis. Two of the ten users were also among those most actively retweeting conspiracy content. This group is composed entirely of more experienced users whose accounts had been created before the war. The most recent account is dated November 2021, and the author had published over 40,000 tweets there by 3 June 2022. Analysis of the content of the most popular accounts and tweets demonstrates that conspiracy narratives connect and interact with each other. Almost all the accounts analysed shared anti-COVID-19, antipandemic and anti-vaccination content, as well as anti-Jewish or antigovernment content. This is consistent with other studies whose findings show that various constructs of conspiracy functioning interact (e.g. Federico et al., 2018; Furnham, 2021; Hart & Graether, 2018). Many studies confirm the consistent direction of conspiratorial thinking in the area of specific dissenting theories (e.g. Andrade, 2021; Freeman et al., 2022; Hornsey et al., 2018; Nera et al., 2021). The narrative dynamics and the co-occurrence of parallel conspiracy content support the creation of what is referred to as echo chambers in the Twitter space. The Internet has undoubtedly increased access to information and its diversity. On the one hand, this can have a positive impact on public debate due to access to different arguments. On the other hand, however, it can lead to selective contact with ideologically supported communication channels, as the individual is incapable of assimilating so many narratives. In the material analysed, it is clear that published content is passed on many times. The promotion of favoured narratives makes the cascades of conspiracy information reach increasingly wide circles of conspiracy theory believers. The opinions of echo chamber members keep coming back to them in a different form, reinforcing their individual belief systems due to the diminishing exposure to the opinions of others (Mutz, 2006). It is worth noting that people participating in

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echo chambers often do so because they feel more confident about their opinions and believe that they will be more easily accepted precisely in such spaces (Hampton et al., 2017). Echo chambers are also supported algorithmically, through the suggestions of subsequent users expressing similar opinions (Hosanagar, 2016). The recent years have been a hard period for the Polish society, put to the test (just like other countries) by the pandemic and, subsequently, by the war taking place just across its eastern border. These crisis events undoubtedly influenced the spread of conspiracy theories. Social media allowed the latter to gain more followers within a shorter time. Because of its nature, Twitter was particularly important in this process. It was on Twitter that content related to conspiracy theories was published and shared with other users relatively frequently. From 24 February, high activity could be observed of accounts presenting anti-Ukrainian content or reproducing the Russian narrative related to the war. As we have proven, they also published other conspiracy theories, thus creating a system of interrelations between them. Supporters of conspiracy theories constituted a community of sorts in social media. On Twitter, they followed each other, retweeted each other’s tweets and commented on them. Thus, they confirmed their belief that they had special knowledge about the world around them, unavailable to the majority of the population. However, it is worth noting in conclusion that despite the significant involvement of supporters of conspiracy theories in the publication of content related to them on Twitter, they still constitute a minority. Since 24 February, Twitter has been filled with sympathy for Ukrainians rather than with aversion, and the majority narrative has been condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Funding This research was funded by National Science Centre, Poland (Grant No. 2020/39/I/HS5/00176).

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CHAPTER 5

Online Frontline: Analysis of Contents of Polish Memes Related to War in Ukraine Monika Góra

and Natalia Moczoł

Introduction When Russia attacked Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, the social and political reality in Poland was also affected dramatically. Media were reporting on all rocket attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities and also on the escape of hundreds and thousands of civilians from the threatened areas since the first hours of the war. During that period, the conflict in Ukraine dominated not only the medial agenda but also the actions of Polish politicians and citizens, for whom this event constituted source of fears for preservation of stable situation in their country (Badora, 2022; Feliksiak & Roguska, 2022; Scovil, 2022). While mainstream media published photographs and recordings depicting the brutality of war reality, the very same pictures, frequently free from censorship, filled the

M. Góra · N. Moczoł (B) University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland e-mail: [email protected] M. Góra e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_5

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space of the Internet in a totally uncontrollable manner. Simultaneously, social media served their users as the main platform to express their opinions on current events but also to organize grassroots aid. Through Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, Poles were offering shelter to refugees in their own home. They started fund-raising and medical supplies collection campaigns for the Ukrainian army, while first need products obtained thanks to, among others, online appeals were transported to PolandUkraine border crossings, where volunteers distributed them among individuals who finally found a safe shelter, frequently after many days of dramatic escape (Baszczak et al., 2022). Journalists witnessed these events and made sure to inform their readers and audiences not only on the course of events on the frontline but also on the overwhelming scale of solidarity of Polish citizens (Lace-Evans, 2022). The media depiction of war has constituted the subject of interest for scientists for many years. The appearance of war reality in social media is of huge importance nowadays in the context of, among others, the level of legitimation of conflicts and creation of narration by different war actors. The analysis presented in the hereby chapter focuses on the aspect of war in Internet memes, thus on the surprising combination due to the fact that this type of messages is commonly considered as entertaining and humorous in their nature. Research analysing the question of memes in relation to various issues such as coronavirus pandemics (Nørgaard Kristensen & Mortensen, 2021; Skórka et al., 2022), social movements (Dynel & Poppi, 2021; Foustad Harbo, 2022), their role in political discourse (Al-Rawi, 2021) or political participation has already appeared in scientific literature (Ross, 2021; Ross & Rivers, 2017). Researchers also deal with the issue of war (Coker, 2008; Silvestri, 2016), including the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continued since 2014, which eventually evolved into the Russian aggression commenced in February 2022 (Gackowski & Brylska, 2022; Makhortykh & González Aguilar, 2020; Makhortykh & Sydorova, 2017; Pavlyuk, 2019; Wiggins, 2016; Yekelchyk, 2022). The study of memes related to this conflict which appeared in Polish Internet space constitutes an issue well worth of attention due to the Polish involvement in aid for Ukraine and also due to the significant social context. This war has been reported not only in traditional media broadcast. Common Internet users also started commenting on the war, individuals without professional competences who thus transformed into representatives of participatory journalism. Another manifestation of such

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involvement in events in Ukraine was through creation of online memes. The objective of the presented research is to depict the online image of war in Ukraine shaped in materials published in the portal demotywatory.pl. The hereby analysis has been conducted on the basis of features of such memes (demotivators) organized according to the author categorization key and of verification of the level of interest in the theme of conflict in the context of compassion fatigue.

Memes as Communication Phenomenon Development of communication technology and easiness of access to the Internet influence changes occurring in the area of functioning of mass media and also in the manner of usage thereof. The effect of these changes is also the gradual disappearance of the frontier in relations between the publisher and the recipient of media content, which is the characteristic feature of Web 2.0 philosophy. Growth of new media, live broadcasts held through mobile devices and more and more efficient capacity of connection all contribute to the fact the Internet is available to unlimited number of potential creators. Thus, the level of participation of non-professionals in the creation of the Internet content increases (Sroka, 2014), which may in turn determine the so-called participatory journalism. Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis define this phenomenon as: ‘The act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analysing and disseminating news and information. The intent of this participation is to provide independent, reliable, accurate, wideranging and relevant information that a democracy requires’ (Bowman & Willis, 2003). Creation of memes may also be perceived as one of the forms of manifestation of this phenomenon, as they have become crucial in public and media discourse as well as colloquial communication due to popularity and growth of the Internet (Dojwa-Turczynska ´ & WolskaZogata, 2020). These messages comment on current social, political and cultural event thus confirming the involvement and need of Internet users to discuss facts with the use of various templates. Memes reflect the events from the recent past that constitute an interesting and important theme for Internet users (Wójcicka, 2019). They are characterized by their dialogue nature which means that they may constitute independent opinions in a discussion, but also a supplementing voice for opinions expressed verbally. Memes have the power to imitate debates on a given

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topic; they function as arguments and counter-arguments and additionally are able to summarize an issue very effectively and release tension (Niekrewicz, 2015). Although contemporary memes seem to be inseparably connected with the sphere of media, in fact they originate from biological sciences. It was Richard Dawkins who introduced the notion of memes in 1976, when he used this very term to define a new type of replicators in his book ‘The Selfish Gene’. In his deliberations, Dawkins noticed an analogy between the genetic and cultural evolution, and hence, the equivalent of a gene in the field of culture is a meme (a shorten form of Greek ‘mimeme’ meaning copying or English ‘memory’) (Dawkins, 2016). R. Dawkins explained in what manner certain behaviours or customs and traditions are passed on and modified with time (Peters & Allan, 2022). According to Dawkins, memes included ideas, melodies, customs, symbols or gestures (Dawkins, 2016). The notion of cultural replicators was also developed by other researchers (Blackmore, 2000; Brodie, 2011), while the idea of memes as such successfully migrated into the field of social sciences, including those related to social communication and media, where it adapted to the online sphere and has undergone numerous attempts of analysis and definition. One of such attempts was presented by Lenor Shifman, who defined memes as: ‘units of popular culture that are circulated, imitated, and transformed by individual Internet users, creating a shared cultural experience in the process’ (Shifman, 2013). On the other hand, Agnieszka Anna Niekrewicz describes Internet memes as compositions created by verbal and visual signs which are transmitted and altered through the Internet (Niekrewicz, 2015). Their ‘viral’ manner of spreading constitutes their typical feature (Sroka, 2014) and this is possible thanks to, among others, content aggregators—services functioning as message boards or blogs. Platforms of this type allow for collection and exchange among their users of data such as films, photographs or pictures (Piskorz, 2013).

Mediatization of War Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine the world without the existing media which have penetrated practically every single area of our daily lives. Journalists present events from the political scene, reveal instances of injustice and scandals and report on disasters. Mediatization, which Stig Hjarvard defines as a long-lasting process leading to change of institutions and

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manners of interaction under the increasing influence of media (Hjarvard, 2008), encompasses war as well. The image of conflicts, which only decades ago was not so commonly accessible to society, today reaches recipients almost instantly, and media have become an important actor in the war reality. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin focused their attention on these complicated relationships between media and war. They perceive the mediatization of war as a phenomenon relying in the ever-growing penetration of this sphere by media. They have divided this continuous process into three stages, which are particularly visible in the context of comparison of earlier conflicts with the war in Ukraine. The first stage was described as ‘broadcast war’ defined by the researchers through the prism of stable situation for the groups representing the conflict. This stage resulted from the existing ecosystem of media whose unidirectional and limited manner of broadcast enabled control. However, a dramatic change was brought by the second stage, so-called diffused war which arrived together with the development of digital media at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). In this case, Sebastian Kaempf emphasizes the appearance of ‘a heteropolar global media landscape’, which was connected with the structural change and growing number of media actors (Kaempf, 2013). In the new media reality created by, among others, social media, the previous war actors found it difficult to maintain their position and control the overflowing wave of information not to mention the opinions of users of this network, which very often expressed severe criticism of war. Despite the fact that the period of ‘diffused war’ appears to be a proper earthquake, and the research on war mediatization enabled us to depict how this process affects the legitimation of conflicts (Shim & Stengel, 2017), the very same phenomenon has already managed to transform into the next stage described by Hoskins and O’Loughlin as ‘arrested war’, a stage in which military commanders, state institutions and media have stopped to criticize transformations resulting from mediatization and simultaneously learned how to use the tools it offers (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). Today, politicians and the army create their own image of the war, communicating with their recipients through tweets or posts on Facebook. This process is presented by war in Ukraine in very clear focus. Ukrainian army regularly provides news on their progress on the frontline in social media publishing professionally prepared audio-visuals then shared by other users but also exploited by professional editors. This process does not solely constitute an example

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of flow of information and content though the Internet as ‘arrested war’ signifies also ‘the mainstream media have appropriated social media’ wishing to report on the conflict in this manner simultaneously defining the agenda and influencing public opinion (Zhang, 2021).

Compassion Fatigue War, even when experienced only indirectly through media reports, still may evoke very strong emotions. In spite of the fact that this assumption may seem obvious, Denis McQuail emphasizes that the hypothesis of ‘potentially strong influence on public opinion’ still generates a lot of doubts (McQuail, 2006). In the context of catastrophes, natural disasters or conflicts depicted by mass media researches have been describing the phenomenon of compassion fatigue for years, a phenomenon originally observed only among representatives of social professions such as healthcare workers, to be later applied also to newspaper readers, television viewers and social media users. This concept assumes that under the influence of negative broadcasts depicting human tragedies recipients grow tired and lose the sense that these difficult situations may be altered (Kinnick et al., 1996; Tester, 2001). Moreover, Susan D. Moeller describes a specific desensitization and cynicism generated in response to repeated and prolonged narration on needs and harm of others (Moeller, 1999). The previously mentioned doubts related to the influence of war media coverage encompass compassion fatigue as well. The fact that empiric study of this phenomenon is very problematic not only due to the dynamics of events as such, but also due to the specific nature of the relationship between media and their recipients is well worth mentioning. An additional factor here is the involvement resulting from the proximity of reported events (Maier, 2015). It has been proven that the existing results of research including this notion differ depending on the analysed medium (Höijer, 2004; Kim et al., 2022; Thomas et al., 2018). Taking into account all ambiguities, the superior function of all media as war actors relying in publicizing and depicting of human suffering should never be omitted.

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Methodology Research on the Internet image of Russia-Ukraine conflict based on memes published at Polish humorous portal demotywatory.pl has been conducted on the basis of content analysis. From the perspective of the hereby research, the method enables examination and methodical, objective and quantitative analysis of the measurement of variables (Kerlinger, 2000), which may shape the current narration present in Polish media in connection with the events in Ukraine. The objective of the research is thus to provide answers to the following questions: 1. What types of topics related to Russia-Ukraine conflict are presented in Internet memes? 2. What is the overall tone of memes related to the issue of war in Ukraine? 3. What function do the war memes serve? 4. What form is selected by Polish online creators for war memes they publish? 5. Have the frequency of publication of war memes and their main themes changed during the ongoing conflict? The basic research unit is constituted by Internet memes published on the platform demotywatory.pl described at the platform as ‘demotivators’ (both these names will be used interchangeably in the research). Demotivators stem from the idea of mocking motivation posters which were popular especially in the United States of America (Miltner, 2017). Materials of this kind are created on the template of a dark square filled with large graphics accompanied by a comment in the form of a caption or additional text (Niekrewicz, 2015; Sroka, 2014). The said analysis conveys 310 messages gathered within two periods: from the 24th of February (outbreak of war in Ukraine) to the 2nd of March 2022 and between the 27th of June (the beginning of summer break at schools and holiday season in Poland and simultaneously the 124th day of war in Ukraine) and the 3rd of July 2022. During the first analysed period, as many as 282 memes were published in comparison with modest 28 memes during the second period. The reason for comparison of these two period of time was the desire to verify whether war in Ukraine as the theme for memes would lose its popularity as subject of publication in the studied period and whether it may thus be concluded

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that Polish creators and Internet users started experiencing compassion fatigue in relation to this conflict. The presented research results provide reflection on the image of war in Ukraine shaped by memes from demotywatory.pl portal. This portal is one of the three most popular content aggregators of humorous nature in Poland (Wirtualnemedia.pl, 2022). Any site user can create memes, but logged on Internet users have the privilege of an easier publishing path and more options for further editing. The site features a form where users design their demotivators within the rules stipulated by moderators. Then, the memes created by users go to the lobby and waiting for potential existence on the main page where are published ready memes compliant with the regulations of the portal (demotywatory.pl). The research material published at demotywatory.pl has been obtained with the use of the search tool available on the main website with the key word ‘Ukraine’ typed in. The next step was to define the following search filters: ‘main’—category describing memes already published and available only at the main site—and ‘all types of memes’ including classic memes as well as those containing photo galleries, videos and GIFs. Additionally, the search tool enables users to show memes in chronological order, which is very convenient for identification of memes published within selected periods of time. It is worth emphasizing that information on memes was collected in June and July 2022, which means that the amount of users’ responses to these messages might have changed since the moment when the process of obtaining data finished. A dedicated categorization key of demotivators has been created for the need of this analysis and it accounts for the following categories: • Publication date; • Theme—11 categories determined in the process of gathering of the research material on the basis of the first stage of analysis conducted by the authors independently; • Overall tone—interpreted as emotionally charged message divided into the following subcategories: critical (negative attitude to the theme, the message presents events, individuals in negative way); approving (positive attitude to the theme, the message presents events, individuals in positive way); mixed (impossible to determine the dominant emotional charge) (Klepka & Idzik, 2019); and finally, satirical and ironic, which emerged during the first stage of the analysis;

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• Function—among Internet users memes are associated predominantly with contents which jokingly comment on certain areas of life, events or objects well known to the users (Wójcicka, 2019). Thus, the main role of this type of messages may be described as providing entertainment. However, for the needs of this research, more detailed functions have been differentiated: informative, humorous (Wołoszyn, 2019), conversational (response to behaviour or message of others) (Marak, 2013) and finally reflective-educational function (forcing recipient to reflect on the meme and draw conclusions) on the basis of analysis of the messages related to war in Ukraine; • Multimedia as one of components (graphics, video, gallery of photographs, infographics, GIF); • Number of responses generated by service users. On the basis of the research material categorized as described above, proper quantitative analysis of the contents has been conducted with the use of IBM SPSS Statistic Data software. It is worth emphasizing that interpretation of the research material has been conducted by each of authoresses separately. In case of materials where differences in coding occurred, this procedure was first discussed and subsequently repeated independently by both authoresses.

Themes of Memes The collected research material allowed researchers to differentiate the following main themes: help and support for Ukraine (28.1%), military operations (13.2%), Ukrainian civilians (20.6%), Russian citizens (3.5%), the president of Ukraine (3.5%), Russian president (1.6%), Russian politics (1.3%), Ukrainian politics (1.3%), Polish politics (2.9%), international politics (3.2%) and ‘other’ themes (20.6%). Contrary to the initial assumptions based among others on observation of media contents, the results have manifested above all visible dispersion of themes, manifesting itself in lack of clear domination of any of the groups of themes. Within the gathered research material, memes related to providing assistance and help to Ukraine constituted the largest group (28.1%). Users exchanged info regarding organized fund-raising or presented acts of solidarity or protest against war. Buildings lit with national colours of Ukraine, gestures of sportspeople and above all the actions of companies representing various industries, and of average, Poles constitute in

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this case a direct reflection of social moods prevailing at that time in the country. Another outstanding group in this category is memes related to the situation of the Ukrainian society. This part of material deals with civilians and the picture of the suffering brought about by war. Users were sharing contents previously broadcast on numerous occasions by the media depicting the conditions of living in the occupied country, direct victims of the conflict or the separation of families. Although Birgitta Höijer (Höijer, 2004) pointed to children as ‘perfect’ victims of war in the context of television coverage of war in Kosovo, this method of creation of the picture of the conflict has not changed considerably in case of Internet memes. One of the reasons why this change could not occur is the fact that journalists and photographers are eye witnesses of this war, and they follow the rules for functioning of professional agencies, and simultaneously, they still provide recipients with the substantial amount of audio-visual materials. At the same time, it may be concluded on the basis of these two groups that authors of memes focused above all on the social dimension of war. This fact is also confirmed by other results within the discussed category, which are not similar to the method of reporting on conflicts preferred by mainstream media. In spite of the fact that military activities constitute an inseparable element of war, this theme was depicted in solely 13% of the research material. At the same time, the analysis has proven a marginal percentage of contents related to presidents of both Ukraine and Russia regardless of high level of activity of Volodymyr Zelensky in social media. Due to anonymity of authors and large numbers of users creating this type of content, memes are difficult to classify also because of the fact that this type of communication requires the knowledge of the context (Piskorz, 2013), and also an attempt at interpretation of author’s assumptions. This is proven by over 20% of memes related to the ‘other’ themes. These are research units which have not been assigned to the main elements of this key category, due to the fact that majority of them did not relate to the conflict in Ukraine directly. In this context, authors of memes dealt with topics connected with warning against disinformation and fake news, and they also expressed their opinions and reflection of the history of the Second World War or the Catholic Church. These materials mentioned among others the Warsaw Uprising and memories of the generation which witnessed war in the territory of Poland and Ukraine.

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Calling upon war experiences of Poles may indicate high level of identification of Polish society with Ukrainians. What is more, despite the main entertaining function of memes, content discussed in this theme group could potentially frequently aim at educational quality and increasing of awareness among the users of the portal demotywatory.pl. The picture of war in memes is also not identified with a political context, which is proven by a small percentage of memes in the research material. In spite of the fact that conflicts like the one in Ukraine very frequently result from political goals and ambitions later discussed by the media, authors of demotivators do not create such a deep picture of the war. It seems that, on the one hand, the portal users refer back to history to share their reflexions on the senselessness and harmfulness of wars, while on the other they are focused above all on current events and prevention of their future consequences. Among the materials published on the portal demotywatory.pl, one may occasionally come across contents regarding Russia and its society. When analysing the research material, an observation could be made that users were not interested in this aspect of online narration. Individual memes classified as belonging to this group are concerned above all with the consequences of sanctions imposed on the aggressor and marginally occurring examples of protests of Russians against war in Ukraine in the form of memes.

Tone of Memes The presented analysis of themes of memes and the previously mentioned main entertaining function of such messages affect also the results obtained in the category focused on the tone of individual components of the research material. As much as 42.9% of memes gathered during this research is of approving character. These are above all memes depicting help and solidarity with Ukraine. Simultaneously, despite the negative context of war, authors of memes manifested moderate criticism (17.7%). In this case, it should be emphasized that such tome frequently accompanied materials related to military operations or Ukrainian civilians. However, this negative attitude does not refer to society itself, but rather to the harm this society suffered because of military aggression of Russia. In the context of this key category, memes of satirical character have also become an interesting aspect (10.6%). As many as one-third of presented materials referred to military actions of the Russian army in

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this very manner. Authors of memes laughed at the attitude of soldiers and also exposed their lack of ability and incompetence. Internet users also occasionally created content of an ironic nature (3.2%). The presented results may also hint at extreme emotions accompanying users of the analysed platform such as positive attitude towards actions supporting the attacked country and simultaneous condemnation of war or satirical presentation of the picture of the war actors with simultaneous criticism of their actions. Moreover, it seems that memes constitute a specific form of expression for their authors and they cannot be characterized by neutrality required of mass media. The mixed tone classified within 25.5% of the research material may simultaneously suggest mismatched carrier in the form of memes to discuss war. The general picture of this category also directs at the conclusion that the picture of war created in memes is not obvious. The inseparable elements of the conflict are frequently contextualized, which changes the tone of the whole message completely. Although the satirical presentation of the real armed conflict may seem to constitute an action directed at depreciation of war, authors are probably trying to soften the negative dimension of war or even lower the level of negative emotions connected with this event.

Forms of Memes Another analysed aspect was the form of online memes. Those related to war in Ukraine used the classic structure of demotivators and differences occurred at the level of multimedium. Dominating form was memes constituting of a photograph or another graphics and accompanied by a comment (83.5%). The next most numerous groups were examples of memes in which the main role belonged to a video (14.8%), occurring marginally galleries of photographs (1%) created by a compilation set of photos or graphics connected by the common theme (examples of support for Ukraine or photographs originating form the Second World War, which depict the tragedy of war) and infographics (0.6%) presenting, among others, data reporting war losses on the Russian side. Moreover, a small amount of infographics detected within the research material may indicate that instead of analytical contents, authors tend to use forms which are more attractive for recipients such as photographs or videos. The conducted observation suggests that the most popular channel for

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numeric data is Twitter. This confirms the assumption that memes are inseparably connected with the sphere of entertainment.

Functions of Memes The conducted analysis has shown that as little as 14.2% of messages possessed a humorous function, which determines their position in statistics and simultaneously confirms that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict does not constitute a subject of numerous jokes for Polish memes creators. The dominating function displayed by analysed memes was the informative function (51.3%), which may prove that memes have become a specific channel of providing information on the progress of this conflict—a space for updating news on the topic, a peculiar journal of war. The second group in the statistical ranking was the conversational function (21.6%). Not only did memes provide information, they also commented on reality in relation to opinions, behaviours and activities of other entities such as private individuals (other Internet users), public figures such as politicians, celebrities, artists but also in relation to institutions (the Catholic Church) and representatives thereof. On the other hand, the reflexive and educational function detected in 12.9% of all memes was related to the theme category. This function was displayed by memes related, among others, to the events of the Second World War and reflexions on that topic presenting for instance the images of destroyed Warsaw or comparing modern-day Odessa and the same city in 1941.

Discussion and Conclusion Within Polish Internet space, memes constitute a specific element of narration on war in Ukraine. The themes of analysed materials are characterized by a considerable dispersion which may result both from the big number of authors, who do not follow any imposed rules for leading narration, and also from the nature of memes itself. For users of the service demotywatory.pl, war has above all a social dimension. Through this channel, users forwarded information on organized charity fundraising, but they also presented the image of Ukrainian society bravely facing the brutal aggression of the Russian Federation. Contrary to professional journalists, authors of memes did not pay any special attention to the political aspect of war. They treated themes connected with

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political events in a selective manner simultaneously focusing on references to the history of their own country. Both in case of mainstream media and the selected online service the presented image of this conflict contains a military context. However, despite the intense frequency of publication of materials related to the ongoing fights, authors of memes seem to refrain from shocking with brutality and overwhelming images of destruction. The analysed themes suggest the conclusion that the war coverage with the use of demotivators is of emotional character, and individuals creating memes create their own agenda of importance of information, which is not always the same as the reports of professional journalists. The abovementioned emotional attitude to war manifested by memes is also visible in the context of tone of the analysed materials. Users of the selected online service focused on the positive contents related to help and solidarity. Additionally, in spite of the fact that memes are predominantly a tool used for entertainment and also free evaluation of reality, the satirical tone does not constitute an important element of the analysis. However, the emphasized characteristics of memes may be manifested by the 25.5% participation of memes with mixed tone. In this case, it seems that memes do not constitute information carrier which may be appropriately adjusted to the sphere of war news. The hereby research has also proven that memes gathered during analysis serve above all the informative function. As mentioned before, this type of online messages is associated above all with entertainment and humorous content. The detected limited amount of memes with humorous function implies a low level of humour used as medium of expression and trivialization of Russia-Ukraine conflict in the service demotywatory.pl. In majority of cases, memes reported on the progress of war in Ukraine and commented on it, which potentially implies the Internet users’ need to be involved in this crucial issue. All of the gathered research material consisted of classical examples of demotivators—type of memes characterized by their graphic design (presentation of contents against the background of a dark square). The dominating element of all analysed memes was either a photograph with an accompanying comment, yet there were also examples of memes containing videos. Different multimedia forms accounted for a minimal percentage of memes (less than 2% of the gathered material), which shows that visual elements such as infographics are not an attractive form of

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expression for authors of online memes. They lose in competition with photographs or films. As assumed, the frequency of publication of memes in the service demotywatory.pl has considerably decreased during the second studied period of four months. In comparison with the first analysed period at the turn of June and July, the amount of published materials decreased tenfold. Analogically, the amount of responses generated by the users of this website also dropped by 26%. These facts may hint at a reduction of interest in war in Ukraine potentially resulting from the occurrence of compassion fatigue. In this perspective, it is also necessary to stress the change of narration presented by the authors of demotivators. After several months of the conflict, the number of memes presenting military activities has decreased significantly. In the same period, no contents regarding the presidents of Ukraine and Russia have been published in spite of the fact that they may be defined as main actors of this war. Moreover, the theme presenting support and providing information on existing forms of help for Ukrainian citizens has lost its importance. On the other hand, this decrease of the need of active, online activities for the sake of refugees may also result from other social and political factors occurring in Poland at that time. The period when the second part of research material was created coincided with the beginning summer holidays and tense political and economic situation. In this context, mainstream media reported on subsequent increases of interest rates announced by the National Bank of Poland and data on growing inflation. Another fact that should be accounted for is that users of the service demotywatory.pl were also the audience of mass media which could increase the sense of being overburdened with negative news through the constant war reports. Despite the considerable change of narration in memes regarding war, the most important topic for memes creators was still Ukrainian civilians. In the perspective of previously mentioned compassion fatigue, this element becomes unclear and problematic at the level of interpretation. On the one hand, the independence of users in the scope of creation of memes allows them to avoid the overwhelming and depressing images of war; on the other, this freedom in the use of materials may lead to the conclusion that the human dimension of this conflict has moved the users to the greatest extent and was of superior importance to them. Although the conducted analysis may suggest the occurrence of compassion fatigue, the preformed research does not account for the perspective

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of the users. Lack of this element means that in course of interpretation it was not possible to consider numerous social and psychological factors. Despite these limitations, war memes still seem to constitute an interesting research material, and the aspects not included in the hereby analysis imply the need to continue works in this area.

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Retrieved November 19, 2022, from https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/ 2022/K_038_22.PDF Foustad Harbo, T. (2022). Internet memes as knowledge practice in social movements: Rethinking Economics’ delegitimization of economists. Discourse, Context & Media, 50, 100650. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2022. 100650 Gackowski, T., & Brylska, K. (2022). ‘Machiavellian Russia’ in the Crimean conflict: Clarification of strategic narratives analysis method. Journalism, 23(4), 773–788. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920928157 Hjarvard, S. (2008). The mediatization of society: Theory of the media as agents of social and cultural change. Nordicom Review, 29(2), 105–134. https:// www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/269_hjarvard.pdf Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: The third phase of mediatization. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1321–1338. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1068350 Höijer, B. (2004). The discourse of global compassion: The audience and media reporting of human suffering. Media, Culture & Society, 26(4), 513–531. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443704044215 Kaempf, S. (2013). The mediatisation of war in a transforming global media landscape. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65(5), 586–604. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.817527 Kerlinger, F. N. (2000). Foundations of behavioral research. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Kim, J., Kim, Y., Cho, A., Shin, E., & Kwon, Y. (2022). How do social media affect people’s compassion and civic action? The case of the Sewol Ferry disaster in Korea. Asian Journal of Communication, 32(6), 469–486. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2022.2061541 Kinnick, K. N., Krugman, D. M., & Cameron, G. T. (1996). Compassion fatigue: Communication and burnout toward social problems. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(3), 687–707. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 107769909607300314 Klepka, R., & Idzik, J. (2019). O analizie zawarto´sci, czyli jak bada´c medialne obrazy s´wiata? In R. Klepka & J. Idzik (Eds.), Medialne obrazy ´swiata. Tom 2. Polityka i bezpieczenstwo ´ w relacjach medialnych (pp. 11–31). Wydawnictwo Naukowe UP. Lace-Evans, O. (2022, March 1). Ukraine: Polish communities help people fleeing war. BBC.com. Retrieved November 20, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/ news/av/world-europe-60577667 Maier, S. R. (2015). Compassion fatigue and the elusive quest for journalistic impact: A content and reader-metrics analysis assessing audience response. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 92(3), 700–722. https://doi. org/10.1177/1077699015599660

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Makhortykh, M., & González Aguilar, J. M. (2020). Memory, politics and emotions: Internet memes and protests in Venezuela and Ukraine. Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 34(3), 342–362. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10304312.2020.1764782 Makhortykh, M., & Sydorova, M. (2017). Social media and visual framing of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Media, War & Conflict, 10(3), 359–381. https:/ /doi.org/10.1177/1750635217702539 Marak, K. (2013). Mem internetowy. Informacja i transformacja w sieci. In P. Grochowski (Ed.), NETLOR. Wiedza cyfrowych tubylców (pp. 133–164). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. McQuail, D. (2006). On the mediatization of war: A review article. International Communication Gazette, 68(2), 107–118. https://doi.org/10.1177/174804 8506062227 Miltner, M., K. (2017). Internet memes. In. J. Burgess, A. Marwick, & T. Poell (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of social media (pp. 412–428). Sage. Moeller, S. D. (1999). Compassion fatigue: How the media sell disease, famine, war and death. Routledge. Niekrewicz, A. A. (2015). Od schematyzmu do kreacyjno´sci. J˛ezyk memów internetowych. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Panstwowej ´ Wyzszej ˙ Szkoły Zawodowej. Nørgaard Kristensen, N., & Mortensen, M. (2021). ‘Don’t panic people! Trump will tweet the virus away’: Memes contesting and confirming populist political leaders during the COVID-19 crisis. Information, Communication and Society, 24(16), 2442–2458. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.197 2127 Pavlyuk, L. (2019). Memes as markers of fakes and propaganda topics in media representations of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Bulletin of Lviv Polytechnic National University. Series: Journalistic Sciences, 3(910), 87–94. https://doi. org/10.23939/sjs2019.01.087 Peters, C., & Allan, S. (2022). Weaponizing memes: The journalistic mediation of visual politicization. Digital Journalism, 10(2), 217–229. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21670811.2021.1903958 Piskorz, K. (2013). Internetowe memy – hieroglify XXI wieku. In I. Hoffman & D. K˛epa-Figura (Eds.), Współczesne media. J˛ezyk mediów (pp. 227–237). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie. Ross, A. S. (2021). The delegitimizing potential of Internet memes in political communication: A case study of the 2020 US election. In J. Morrison, J. Birks, & M. Berry (Eds.), The Routledge companion to political journalism (1st ed., pp. 330–342). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429284571 Ross, A. S., & Rivers, D. J. (2017). Digital cultures of political participation: Internet memes and the discursive delegitimization of the 2016 U.S. Presidential candidates. Discourse, Context & Media, 16, 1–11. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.dcm.2017.01.001

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Scovil, J. (2022, October 4). Polacy o wojnie na Ukrainie. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) (Report No. 123). Retrieved November 18, 2022, from https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_123_22.PDF Shifman, L. (2013). Memes in a digital world: Reconciling with a conceptual troublemaker. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 18(3), 362– 377. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12013 Shim, D., & Stengel, F. A. (2017). Social media, gender and the mediatization of war: Exploring the German armed forces’ visual representation of the Afghanistan operation on Facebook. Global Discourse, 7 (2–3), 330–347. https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1337982 Silvestri, L. (2016). Mortars and memes: Participating in pop culture from a war zone. Media, War & Conflicts, 9(1), 27–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/175 0635215611608 Skórka, P., Grzywacz, B., Moron, ´ D., & Lenda, M. (2022). COVID-19 in memes: The adaptive response of societies to the pandemic? International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19(19), 1–24. https:/ /doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191912969 Sroka, J. (2014). #Obrazkowe #Memy #Internetowe. Wydawnictwo CeDeWu. Tester, K. (2001). Compassion, morality and the media. Open University Press. Thomas, E. F., Cary, N., Smith, L. G., Spears, R., & McGarty, C. (2018). The role of social media in shaping solidarity and compassion fade: How the death of a child turned apathy into action but distress took it away. New Media & Society, 20(10), 3778–3798. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818760819 Wiggins, B. E. (2016). Crimea River: Directionality in Memes from the Russia– Ukraine Conflict. International Journal of Communication, 10, 451–485. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4103/1548 Wirtualnemedia.pl. (2022, May 1). Jbzd.com.pl przyciaga ˛ na dłuzej ˙ niz˙ Joemonster i Demotywatory, Besty liderem zasi˛egowym (TOP serwisów z humorem). Wirtualnemedia.pl. Retrieved June 18, 2022, from https://www.wirtualne media.pl/artykul/jbzd-com-pl-joemonster-demotywatory-besty-liderem-zas iegowym-top-serwiso-z-humorem?fbclid=IwAR3W9jl4PnYPexMqAlAPIUrge weIiPZndolmI1EDeKXI24-ZUoMpukOgNQo Wołoszyn, M. (2019). Czy memy s˛a tekstami kultury? Torunskie ´ Studia Bibliologiczne, 1(22), 9–28. https://doi.org/10.12775/TSB.2019.001 Wójcicka, M. (2019). Mem internetowy jako multimodalny gatunek pami˛eci zbiorowej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie. Yekelchyk, S. (2022). Naming the war: Russian aggression in Ukrainian official discourse and mass culture. Canadian Slavonic Papers, 64(2–3), 232–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2106688 Zhang, S. I. (2021). Mediatization of conflict in the social media era: A case study of Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. Journalism, 22(10), 2618–2636. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884919870329

CHAPTER 6

A Redefinition of the Essence of Social Media in Ukraine in the Era of Russian Aggression of 2022 Maryana Prokop

Introduction The functioning of traditional media and social media has a significant impact on the involvement of citizens in socio-political life and, in crisis situations, the media play an important role in the process of spreading ideas, coordinating activities and efforts as well as in organizing events (real and virtual). Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, there have been significant changes in the functioning of these media in both the attacking and the attacked state. It is worth noting that these changes were not a sudden phenomenon, as the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 was a culmination of what happened in the preceding years (since 2014), including the “Revolution of Dignity”, the annexation of Crimea, the hybrid war and the fighting in the east of Ukraine after the creation of the self-proclaimed areas of the Donetsk People’s

M. Prokop (B) Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_6

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Republic (DNR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR) (Bodotika and Magda, 2016; Magda, 2015; Prokop, 2023). In times of military threat, social media play an extremely important role. This includes reporting major events, facilitating communication (both internationally and nationally) and conducting all kinds of support and assistance to victims of war. Furthermore, social media such as Facebook, Instagram, Viber, Twitter and Telegram have been used by the Ukrainian government for official announcements regarding top military events and actions, as well as spreading information around the world on the consequences of Russian military aggression. This investigative article is an examination of the role of social media in Ukraine used for reporting on the Russian aggression against the country. The main research problem addresses the question of whether and to what extent the nature of social media in Ukraine has changed after the Russian aggression against Ukraine of February 2022. The problem will be examined based on the hypothesis that the military threat from Russia has largely led to a change in the way that social media operate in Ukraine, switching to the dominance of news content over entertainment content. Russia is not only shelling Ukrainian cities with rockets but also waging war in cyberspace and conducting aggressive disinformation spreading propaganda, intercepting the frequencies of Ukrainian TV and radio channels. According to the Ukrainian State Special Service for Communications and Information Protection, since the Russian aggression in February 2022, more than eight hundred cyber-attacks have been carried out on various objects: including state offices and institutional websites, defence, financial, energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure and mass media. It is also worth mentioning that the first such mass attacks were carried out by Russia even before the military aggression in January and February 2022 by blocking state official websites and disrupting information, telecommunications and banking systems of Ukraine (Depkavna clykba, 2023).

Legal Regulations vis-à-vis Functioning of the Media During Wartime The first regulations on the functioning of the state, society and institutions, including the media, were introduced after the invasion of the Russian army on February 24, 2022, under the bill “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” of 2015. Martial law allows the military command

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and military administration to regulate, in a manner determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the work of providers of electronic communications networks and/or services, print shops, publishing houses, television and radio organizations, television and radio centres and other enterprises, institutions, cultural organizations and bodies, and the media, as well as allows for the use of local radio stations, television centres and print shops for military purposes, and to carry out explanatory work among soldiers and the population; it may also provide for prohibiting the reception and broadcasting of radio stations for personal and collective use and the transmission of information through computer networks (Zakon Ukpa|ni, 2015). Another legal act is the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valeriy Zaluzhny, “On the organisation of interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defence forces and media representatives for the duration of the martial law regime” dated March 3, 2022, supplemented by provisions dated July 12, 2022. The order establishes the method of interaction with the media for the military and a list of information data that cannot be disclosed in the public space (Hakaz, 2022). Appendix One to the Order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine introduces an algorithm for cooperation with accredited media representatives during martial law (Algopitm, 2022). Then, Appendix Two establishes a list of information data, the disclosure of which may lead to the transfer of information to the enemy on the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces and negatively affect the tasks during the martial law regime. It is forbidden to make public through various mass media and the civilian population, among others, information on: the names of military units and other military facilities in areas of combat or special tasks; the geographical coordinates of units location; the number of personnel of military units; weaponry and military equipment, logistics, their condition and places of storage; descriptions, images and symbols that identify or may identify facilities; information on operations (warfare) that are being conducted or planned; information on the system of protection and defence of military facilities and measures for the protection of persons, weapons and military equipment used; procedures for the engagement of forces and resources in the performance of combat or special tasks; information on intelligence gathering (methods, ways, purpose and means); information on the movement and deployment of

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troops (name, number, places, districts, routes of movement); information on military units, forms, methods, tactics of their operations and their deployment according to the intended purpose (Pepelik, 2022). Appendix Three sets out the order of accreditation of media representatives during the martial law regime (PopRdok, 2022). Appendix Four sets forth the rules for the work of a media representative in the area of warfare (Ppavila, 2022). On April 1, 2022, the Law “On Introduction of Amendments to Article 114-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine on Increasing Liability for Unauthorised Dissemination of Information on Measures to Counter Russian Armed Aggression” was adopted. This act introduces criminal liability for unauthorized dissemination of information on the routing, movement of arms, weapons and military supplies in Ukraine, movement, relocation or deployment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, committed under conditions of martial law or state of emergency (Zakon Ukpa|ni, 2022). Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (2001), as amended on March 3, 2022, and Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code (Zakon Ukpa|ni, 2022) present provisions on intentional actions and penalties for them aimed at assisting the aggressor state, armed formations and/or the occupation administration of the aggressor state. The Code also defines the concept of collaborative activities with the aggressor state by organizing and conducting political events, carrying out information activities in cooperation with the aggressor state and/or its occupation administration aimed at assisting the aggressor state, its occupation administration or armed formations and/or avoiding responsibility for armed aggression against Ukraine. Such activities are punishable by imprisonment of ten to twelve years (Zakon Ukpa|ni. Ppo vnecennR zmin, 2022). In the third part of Article 436-2 of the CCU, we find that supporting, recognizing as justified, denying the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, denying the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine, as well as glorifying those who carried out the armed aggression, the production and distribution of materials and using the media for such purposes fall under the category of criminal liability and are punishable up to 8 years (KpiminalbniN kodekc Ukpa|ni, 2001). The above-mentioned documents impose a number of restrictions on the traditional media and, above all, the social media in terms of providing

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information that may be useful and used by Russia to target Ukrainian military units or establishing whether a particular attack was successful, and if so, to what extent. Thus, despite the general accessibility of social media, the speed of the transmission of information and its reach have been restricted for the sake of the highest value, i.e. the security of the State, its population and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Importance of Social Media in Ukraine During the War Following the commencement of the Russian Federation’s aggression on Ukrainian territory in February 2022, the Ukrainian public constantly monitors information on the subject, including updates on events at the frontline, official statements from the authorities and reports on anti-aircraft alerts.1 The Ukrainian authorities are trying to control the resulting demand for information, mainly because the independent search for content from unverified sources may lead to disinformation and provide ground for Russian propaganda aimed at spreading panic. To this end, initiatives have been created to provide reliable information on events from the country (including the frontline). Thus, for example, United News (Ukr. mdini novini) and UA emerged; together, it is a joint so-called news marathon, which was launched on February 24, 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The telemarathon was joined by the most important TV stations: including Pershyi, 1 + 1, ICTV, Inter, RADA and Ukraine. The project also enables the dissemination of reliable information and channels of official authorities on Telegram,2

1 Although in this case there are many other websites including www.alerts.in.ua, www. alarmmap.online or Google Play apps. 2 The most popular channels on Telegram are: Tpyxa Ukpa|na; Ukpana CeNqac:

novocti, voNna, PocciR; Ukpaina Online; IncaNdep UA; PealbnaR BoNna | Ukpaina; Telegpamna clykba novin - Hovini Ukpa|na BiNna | novocti Ukpaina voNna; BcevidRweee OKO Ukpaina Top News | (BiNna, Ukpa|na, Hovini); Zelensky/Official; Ukraine NOW, as well as channels with the name of the locality providing information for a specific city or region: e.g. Lviv, Kyiv, Harkiv.

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YouTube3 and other platforms,4 and calls for the blocking of Russian propaganda (Telemapafon “mdini novini”, 2022). Trust in the information presented by the online telemarathon was confirmed by 84% of the respondents surveyed, and only 16% of the respondents do not find the news reliable. Respondents were positive about the initiative, noting as an advantage the 24-hour news coverage, the protection of the viewer in terms of drastic framing (which can be encountered, for example, in information found online); the majority of respondents did not pay attention to which station was broadcasting, so a conviction was formed to merge all stations into one to create a unified television programme (Report Internews, 2022, pp. 22–23). The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, commissioned by OPORA,5 from May 3 to May 26, 2022, conducted a study on what sources Ukrainians take their information from in time of war.6 The research confirmed the trend of recent years, i.e. the use of social networks not only for communication and entertainment, but also for receiving the most relevant news and information. In Ukraine, the share of users searching for news on social networks has increased from 45 to 63%. In the OPORA survey of May 2022, presenting the results of the previous two months, social networks were the most popular source of information, reaching the number as high as 76.6%. Ukrainians used them to receive the most important news. In second place was television with 66.7% of votes, followed by the Internet (excluding social networks) with 3 The most popular channels on the highlights of the war on YouTube: Ukrainian Witness, Azov Media, UkpOtobPpopkt mvgena Cinelbnikova, YouTube-kanal imeni T.G. Xevqenka, U goctRx y Gopdona, OlekciN Apectoviq, OlekciN Dypnpv, Bolodimipa Zolkin, Poman Uimbalok. 4 On Instagram and Facebook, the accounts of President Zelensky, President Poroshenko, Dmytriy Gordon, Serhiyy Prytula and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk are very popular. 5 OPORA, one of the leaders of non-governmental and non-partisan all-Ukrainian social control and advocacy organizations in the fields of elections, parliamentarism, education, joint property management, energy efficiency and local government. As they point out on their website, they strive for sustainable development of society, changes that can be ensured through qualitative institutional reforms, positive social and cultural changes (OPORA). 6 The survey was conducted among adult citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine (within the borders controlled by the Ukrainian authorities until February 24, 2022). The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily occupied by Russia (Crimea, Sevastopol, some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions), as well as citizens who travelled abroad after February 24, 2022.

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61.2% of users. In contrast, only 28.4% of respondents obtained information by listening to the radio and only 15.7% by using the press (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 3). In contrast, research conducted by GlobalLogic finds out that the number of social media users increased in Ukraine in 2022 compared to 2021—from 60% of the population to 76.6% in July 2022. In the era of Russian aggression against Ukraine, many Ukrainians have started to use social networks as a source of information, due to the general accessibility of information and the speed of its dissemination. Telegram has become the most popular, as 66% of users say they look for the latest information there. Paradoxically, one of the creators of Telegram, Pavel Durov, is a Russian entrepreneur, programmer and billionaire, who created it with his brother Nikolai. They are responsible for the huge success of the social network VK, popular in Russian-speaking countries and deceptively similar to Facebook. Through VK, Durov exposed himself to the Russian authorities, as through VKontakte opposition groups were calling for demonstrations, which the Kremlin naturally did not like, so it ordered Durov to shut it down. He objected, which resulted in armed police special forces showing up at his door three days later. It was then that Durov realized he needed a secure channel to communicate with his brother, and since he did not have one, he started working on one. As a result, in 2013, Telegram emerged. The owner of Telegram appealed to Ukrainian users assuring them that using it will be safe for them. Telegram provides unlimited space for files uploaded to the cloud and the ability to automatically sync across all platforms. The second and third places in terms of informativeness were taken by YouTube (61%) and Facebook (58%) (Mezha, 2022; Padio Cvoboda, 2022). USAID-Internews,7 on the other hand, conducts a survey every November on the population’s attitudes towards media and the use of different types of media, the level of media literacy and the ability to distinguish false narratives. The latest 2022 report shows that social networks serve as a source of information for 74% of respondents, compared to 62% using social media for this purpose in 2020 and 51% in 2015. The increased relevance of online media has had an impact on the decline in the use of television sourcing news, more than doubling 7 The research was conducted by InMind on behalf of the international organization Internews, which is implementing the ‘Media Programme in Ukraine’ with financial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

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in 2022 (42%) compared to 2015 (85%), while in 2020 it accounted for 52%. For radio, there was a threefold decrease in respondents searching news from this medium in 2022 (13%) compared to 2015 (35%), and 2020 was 13% (Report Internews, 2020,8 p. 7; 2022, p. 14). The data results evidence that since 2015, there was a clear trend of a decrease in the use of traditional media for obtaining information in Ukraine compared to online media, and the outbreak of war in 2022 only strengthened this trend, ranking social media among the most important information providers. The matter of trust and credibility of information obtained from specific types of sources were also of importance. According to the OPORA report, it turned out that Ukrainians trust TV the most—60.5% of respondents, social networks circa 54% and the Internet, excluding social networks, 49%, radio 34% and print media only 23%. Around 5% of respondents do not trust any of the information sources (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 8). The lower level of trust in the Internet than in television is mainly due to the activities of Russian propaganda, the posting of “fake news” and the distortion of content. Any information on the web is exposed to this threat, so it is important to obtain information from trusted sources, e.g. official websites, or to check and compare information from several sources. The cyclical Internews report gives an excellent overview of the trends in trust in traditional and online media. So in 2015, trust in online media was 47%, in 2020 it was 48%, and after the outbreak 60% for social media and 54% for the Internet overall. In the case of TV, trust in 2015 compared to 2020 fell by 20% from 61 to 41%, rising to 48% in 2022. Radio also saw a nearly double decline in trust in the credibility of information, accounting for 39% in 2015 and 21% in 2020, noting a slight increase after Russian aggression in 2022, 23% (Report Internews, 2020, p. 7; 2022, pp. 8–9). Thus, the process of social media growth in Ukraine began even before the Russian military aggression, as it was driven by the trend of social media popularity worldwide. Yet, it is undeniable that the Russian attack contributed significantly to the growth of trust in social media and the redefinition of the essence of media for the statistical user, for it no longer is reduced only to a tool that broadcasts entertainment, but it also provides information. 8 The 2020 report presents a comparison of the research results to previous years, including 2015.

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Among media users, there is a differentiation in the context from which source they obtain the most important information by age category. Thus, more than 92% of respondents aged between 18 and 39 obtain essential information via social media, as do more than 64% of consumers aged between 40 and 69. In the case of the elderly, more than 78% of users over 60 years of age give advantage to television while radio is favoured by more than 36% of users over 60 years of age. The Internet, excluding social networks, is favoured by more than 60% of users aged 30 to 59 to receive news, and more than 20% of users over 60 use print media (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 4). Considering which social media are used to obtain the most important information by the respondents of the OPORA report (see Chart 6.1), the largest number of them, as many as 65.7%, indicated Telegram, YouTube, 61.2%, while 57.8% use Facebook as a source of information, just under fifty per cent of the respondents (48%) used Viber, 29.1% Instagram, 19.5% TikTok and 8.9% Twitter. About 2% of respondents used other social networks (WhatsApp, Signal, etc.) (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 13). The survey confirms the Ukraine-wide trend of the popularity of the Telegram network for obtaining information, similarly with YouTube, to which we can add, among other things, the previously televised 24hour news, bloggers’ channels, volunteers or amateur videos on events (places of attacks or analyses on the course of the war). However, it is not entirely clear through the prism of which information the study was done, as Viber, Instagram, TikTok or Twitter scored very high against other studies, mentioned further on. If the survey covered general information seeking including entertainment, then the result may be justified, but considering only strictly information it is difficult to talk about such popularity of these media. In terms of age category, sourcing news from various social media was as follows: Telegram has the highest support among the 18–49 age group, where it accounts for 72.4% of respondents aged 30–39, 72.3% of those aged 40–49 and as much as 86.7% of respondents aged 18–29. The second most popular medium is YouTube, which was used by 58.5% of respondents aged 18–29, while in other age categories the result was more than sixty per cent, e.g. 50–59, 64.9%; 60–69, 67.7%. In the case of Facebook, it was the interest in obtaining information among the group up to 29 years that accounted for more than forty per cent, as in the research group 70 + , while in other categories the result oscillated between 59 and 64% (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 14).

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Other I don't know Twitter Tik-Tok Instagram Viber Facebook Youtube Telegram 0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

Chart 6.1 Social media in Ukraine as a source of information (Note Own compilation based on OPORA research [OPORA Report, 2022, p. 13])

Viber was less popular, with both the youngest and oldest age categories accounting for more than thirty per cent (35.5% and 33.5%); it was most popular for obtaining information in the 50–59 and 60–69 age categories of respondents, accounting for 57% and 59.6%, respectively. In the case of Instagram, treating it as a source of information was most common among respondents 18–29 with 48.6% and 30–39 with 32.4%. An interesting phenomenon is the indication of TikTok by respondents as a source of information, which is mainly perceived through the prism of entertainment; such is the case for 24.2% of respondents aged 18–29 and by 23.4% of respondents aged 60–69; in other age categories, the result closed at about a dozen per cent. The least interest in terms of obtaining information was gained by Twitter; here, one can observe a steady trend, as it was used as a source of information by all age categories at a level of between 7 and 10% (Report OPORA, 2022, p. 14). The more detailed results of the study are presented in Chart 6.2. Thus, in terms of sourcing information from the web, Telegram and YouTube definitely lead the way. In the former case, it is the preferred choice for the 18–49 age group, while in the latter it is favoured by those aged fifty and upwards. Facebook and Viber rank third and fourth, respectively, as information-seeking tools, and the least belief in this plan

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I don't know Other Twitter Tik-Tok Instagram Viber Facebook Youtube Telegram 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00%

23.90%

61.40%

43.30%

33.50%

12.30%

12.20%

8.50%

0.50%

I don't know 21.40%

60-69 40.20%

67.70%

59.30%

59.60%

18.60%

24.30%

8.40%

1.20%

1.40%

50-59 58.70%

64.90%

64.20%

57.00%

19.40%

19.90%

7.20%

2.70%

2.30%

40-49 72.30%

60.50%

62.20%

52.10%

26.30%

17.90%

6.90%

1.40%

1.50%

30-39 72.40%

57.60%

64.70%

45.50%

32.40%

16.50%

10.90%

2.80%

0.60%

18-29 86.70%

58.50%

42.60%

35.50%

48.60%

24.20%

10.70%

1.90%

1.90%

Telegram Youtube Facebook 70+

Viber

Instagram Tik-Tok

Twitter

Other

Chart 6.2 Use of social media in Ukraine for obtaining information by age (Note Own elaboration based on OPORA research [OPORA Report, 2022, p. 14])

is for TikTok and Twitter. In the case of TikTok, the situation is obvious, as it was primarily created for entertainment and, despite a lot of valuable content, it is very difficult to get through the huge amount of entertainment content to find the news. The Internews report presents a slightly broader scope of research on the importance of social media, due to the cyclical nature of the research; the report compiled social media in terms of general use (for communication, among other things) and for obtaining key information. In 2019–2020, more than 70% of respondents used Viber instant messaging, although only 18% indicated that they also used it to get key messages. In 2021–2022, 66% and 56% were users of the medium, respectively, and only 13% sourced their most important information from the instant messenger. Facebook was used by 74% in 2019, 69% in 2020, 65% in 2021 and 51% in 2022. In contrast, the result for respondents

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who indicated Facebook as a source for obtaining information respectively represents 2019—49%, 2020—47%, 2021—43% and 2022—25%. Instagram was used by 40% in 2019–2020 and 48% in 2021—45% and in 2022—33%; the use of the medium for sourcing information was indicated by 10% in 2019, 18% in 2020, 17% in 2021 and just 8% in 2022 (Report Internews, 2020, p. 20; Report Internews, 2022, p. 25). Researchers at the marketing agency Webpromo, analysing the downward trends of Facebook and Instagram, indicate that the fluctuations may be influenced by factors such as the fact that, after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, some of Facebook’s and Instagram’s target audience went abroad and that Ukrainians began to allocate less time on social media in the context of entertainment. Another presumption is that Facebook has started to calculate a user’s geographical reference in a different way than Instagram. For example, if a person went to Poland, Facebook may identify them as a Ukrainian audience, while Instagram may have already indicated them as a Polish recipient (Webpromo, 2022). For YouTube, around 60% of respondents indicated use of the medium in 2019—2020, 50% in 2021 and 34% in 2022. The use of YouTube for sourcing information accounted for 2019—25%, 2020—30%, 2021—25% and 2022—16%. Twitter was marginal compared to other social media, used by 11% in 2019–2020 and 5% in 2022, and was employed as a source of information by only 1% of respondents. By contrast, in 2021 and 2022, Twitter user levels were maintained at 5% and 4%, and it was a source of information for 1%. Telegram was used by 24% and 38% of respondents in 2019–2020, with 40% in 2021 and an increase to 60% in 2022. When it came to obtaining information, 2019 saw only 6% declaring it, 2020 21% and 2021 40%, and after the outbreak of war with Russia, the use of Telegram for the most important information was declared by 66%.9 9 In previous reports, we could also find Vkontakte (VK), which was considered an Eastern European version of Russian Facebook. In 2017, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree that implemented the decision of the National Security and Defence Council on sanctions against Russian companies. The decree ordered Ukrainian ISPs to block popular Russian websites and services including Yandex, Mail.ru, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki (Ukaz Ppezidenta Ukpa|ni, 2017). It is worth mentioning that the VK service was used by approximately 15 million Ukrainians and Odnoklassniki by about 9.5 million. It is quite a paradox that, against the backdrop of President Poroshenko’s 2017 decree to close access to Russian services, in 2022 the most popular social medium in Ukraine for obtaining information turned out to be Telegram. Telegram was created in 2013 by Russian brothers Nikolai and Pavel Durov, founders of VKontakte (among others, access to which was blocked under the ordinance).

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In contrast, despite the global popularity of TikTok, only 12% and 14% of Ukrainian respondents declared using it in 2021–2022, for obtaining information it was used by 2% in 2021 and 1% in 2022 (Report Internews, 2020, p. 20; 2022, p. 25). Chart 6.3 shows which social media were used by Ukrainians to obtain information in 2019–2022. The survey data shows how the number of respondents seeking information via online media has changed over the four years. The undisputed leader, as in other reports, is Telegram, which became the source of information for 66% of Ukrainians after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Facebook is second in this respect, albeit the reports show that the percentage of users is declining: 2021 (65%), 2022 (51%). Similarly, against Telegram in 2022, YouTube lost 16%, Viber 13% and Instagram 8%. Therefore, TikTok (1%) and Twitter (1%) are to be considered only marginal.

TikTok Telegram Twitter Instagram 2022

YouTube

2021 Facebook

2020 2019

Viber 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2022

Viber 13%

Facebook 51%

YouTube 16%

Instagram 8%

Twitter 1%

Telegram 66%

TikTok 1%

2021

13%

65%

25%

17%

1%

40%

2%

2020

18%

47%

30%

18%

1%

21%

2019

18%

49%

25%

10%

1%

6%

Chart 6.3 Social media as sources of information for Ukrainians in 2019–2022 (Note Own compilation based on Report Internews, 2020, p. 20; 2022, p. 25)

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Conclusion The Russian aggression in Ukraine in February 2022 has undoubtedly changed the functioning of the Ukrainian State. Traditional media and social media are keeping the public informed about the course of the war. While in the case of traditional media it is their most important role, in the case of online media, there is a significant change in the essence of their functioning. The presented results show that social media undoubtedly constitute an important source in obtaining information in Ukrainian society, against the background of the declining tendency to use television and radio; it is Telegram, YouTube and Facebook that fill the demand in sources of information. One can observe that it is not only young people who search for information to the latter category, and the fraction of people who obtain the most important information from the web can be found in every age category. After the outbreak of the war, Telegram gained a significant advantage, as it became the undisputed leader among other media through the creation of chat rooms enabling the transmission of the most important and up-to-date information with attachments (photos and videos). Many official channels for information in this medium have emerged, including official government offices, public officials and specific regions (where we can find information about attacks in the region, destruction wrought or victims of Russian attacks). Answering the research question posed in the introduction as to whether and to what extent the nature of social media in Ukraine has changed after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, it should be stated that indeed the effect of the Russian aggression has been to a large extent a redefinition of the role and essence of social media in Ukraine, which transformed from a carrier not only of entertainment but also of information. However, it is worth adding that this is not solely due to the Russian war; this process is part of an overall trend with online media gaining popularity year by year, replacing traditional media. However, it is worth adding that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has reinforced the demand for publicly accessible social media thereby accelerating the popularity of these media significantly in 2022.

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Bibliography Algopitm. (2022). poboti z akpeditovanimi ppedctavnikami zacobiv macovo| infopmaci| pid qac di| ppavovogo pemimy vopnnogo ctany, Dodatok 1 do nakazy Golovnokomandyvaqa ZbpoNnix Cil Ukpa|ni 03.03.2022 N 73. https://ips.ligazakon.net/document/view/MUS36785?an=2&ed=2022_ 03_03 Bodotika, T., & Magda, m. (2016). Igpi Bidobpamenc. U poxikax vlacnogo obpazy. Rkoo baqitc Ukpa|ny cvit. Xapkiv, Bivat. Depkavna clykba. (2023). Cpecialcnogo zv’Rzky ta zaxicty infopmaci| Ukpa|ni. https://cip.gov.ua/ua Zakon Ukpa|ni. (2015) Ppo ppavoviu pemim vopnnogo ctany. Bidomocti Bepxovno| Padi (BBP), 2015, № 28, ct.250. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/389-19#Text Zakon Ukpa|ni. (2022). Ppo vnecennR zmin do ctatti 114-2 Kpiminalcnogo kodekcy Ukpa|ni wodo ydockonalennR vidpovidalcnocti za necankcionovane pozpovcodmennR infopmaci| ppo zacobi ppotidi| zbpouniu agpeci| Poci|. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2178-20?fbclid=IwAR00fmELVyB8_ RVdA82_UgR05SERydmnJVhF9TendS2oekX14KpwVkSFdgY#Text Zakon Ukpa|ni. Ppo vnecennR zmin. (2022). do Kpiminalcnogo kodekcy Ukpa|ni wodo pocilennR vidpovidalcnocti za zloqini ppoti ocnov nacionalcno| bezpeki Ukpa|ni v ymovax di| pemimy vopnnogo ctany, № 2113-IX vid 03.03.2022. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2113-20#n7 Hakaz. (2022). Golovnokomandyvaq ZbpoNnix Cil Ukpa|ni Bid 3 bepeznR 2022 poky N 73 Ppo opganizacio vzapmodi| mim Zbpounimi Cilami Ukpa|ni, inximi ckladovimi cil oboponi ta ppedctavnikami zacobiv macovo| infopmaci| na qac di| ppavovogo pemimy vopnnogo ctany Iz zminami i dopovnennRmi, vnecenimi nakazom Golovnokomandyvaqa Zbpounix Cil Ukpa|ni vid 12 lipnR 2022 poky N 196. https://ips.ligaza kon.net/document/view/MUS36785?an=2&ed=2022_03_03 Pepelik. (2022). Infopmaci|, pozgoloxennR Rko| mome ppizvecti do obiznanocti ppotivnika ppo di| Zbpounix Cil Ukpa|ni, inxix ckladovix cil oboponi, negativno vplinyti na xid vikonannR zavdanc za ppiznaqennRm pid qac di| ppavovogo pemimy vopnnogo ctany. Dodatok 2 do nakazy Golovnokomandyvaqa ZbpoNnix Cil Ukpa|ni 03.03.2022 N 73. https://ips.ligazakon.net/document/view/MUS36785?an=2&ed=2022_ 03_03 PopRdok. (2022). Akpeditaci| ppedctavnikiv zacobiv macovo| infopmaci| pid qac di| ppavovogo pemimy vopnnogo ctany. Dodatok 3 do nakazy Golovnokomandyvaqa ZbpoNnix Cil Ukpa|ni 03.03.2022 N 73. https:/ /ips.ligazakon.net/document/view/MUS36785?an=2&ed=2022_03_03 Ppavila. (2022). Poboti ppedctavnika zacoby macovo| infopmaci| y pauoni vedennR bouovix diu. Dodatok 4 do nakazy Golovnokomandyvaqa

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ZbpoNnix Cil Ukpa|ni 03.03.2022 N 73. https://ips.ligazakon.net/doc ument/view/MUS36785?an=2&ed=2022_03_03 KpiminalbniN kodekc Ukpa|ni. (2001). (Bidomocti Bepxovno| Padi Ukpa|ni (BBP), 2001, № 25–26, ct.131). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 2341-14#Text Magda, m. (2015). Gibpidna Biuna. Bimiti i pepemogti. Xapkiv, Bivat. Mezha. (2022). HaNpopylRpnixi cocmepeki v Ukpa|ni pid qac viNni – doclidkennR. Global Logic. https://mezha.media/2022/08/06/naypopuli arnishi-sotsmerezhi-v-ukraini-pid-chas-viyny-doslidzhennia-global-logic/ OPORA, website. https://oporaua.org/aboutSection1 Padio Cvoboda. (2022). Pavel Dypov obpatilcR k ykpainckim https://www.svoboda.org/a/osnovatelj-tel polbzovatelRm. Telegram. egram-pavel-durov-obratilsya-k-ukrainskim-poljzovatelyam/31741795.html Prokop, M. (2023). Russia-Ukraine: Difficult neighbourly relations. In A. Kasinska-Metryka ´ & K. Pałka-Suchojad (Eds.), The Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 (pp. 6–21). Routledge. Report Internews. (2020). Уopiqne opityvannR USAID-Internews «CtavlennR nacelennR do ZMI ta cpokivannR piznix tipiv media y 2020 p.» https:// internews.in.ua/uk/our-works/media-consumption-survey-uk/ Report Internews. (2022). Ukpa|ncbki media, ctavlennR ta dovipa y 2022 p. https://internews.in.ua/uk/our-works/media-consumption-survey-uk/ Report OPORA. (2022). MediacpokivannR ykpa|nciv v ymovax povnomacxtabno| viNni. OpityvannR OPOPI. https://oporaua.org/ report/polit_ad/24068-mediaspozhivannia-ukrayintsiv-v-umovakh-povnom asshtabnoyi-viini-opituvannia-opori Telemapafon “mdini novini”. (2022). OnlaNn. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA Webpromo. (2022). Rk zminivcR peNting cocialbnix mepek v Ukpa|ni ta cviti: aktyalbna ctatictika piclR 24 lotogo 2022 poky. https://webpromo.ua/ua/blog/kak-izmenilsya-rejting-soczialnyh-setej-v-ukraine-i-mireaktualnaya-statistika-posle-24-fevralya-2022-goda/ Ukaz Ppezidenta Ukpa|ni. (2017). Ppo pixennR Padi nacionalcno| bezpeki i oboponi Ukpa|ni vid 28 kvitnR 2017 poky “Ppo zactocyvannR pepconalcnix cpecialcnix ekonomiqnix ta inxix obmemyvalcnix zaxodiv (cankciu)”. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/133/2017#Text

CHAPTER 7

All the Faces of the First Lady: The Media Coverage of Olena Zelenska in Poland and Ukraine During the War Yuliana Palagnyuk

and Monika Kornacka-Grzonka

Discussion of the Roles of First Ladies in the Literature For our research, we analyze the studies on media coverage of presidential wives to outline the main roles of first ladies. Researchers Erickson and Thomson (2012) examined the international diplomacy of first ladies from the perspective of gendered representations. As a result, the scholars define these roles of first lady diplomacy as: – gendered female (escort, aesthete, and surrogate diplomacy roles); – gendered masculine (social advocacy performances);

Y. Palagnyuk · M. Kornacka-Grzonka (B) University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland e-mail: [email protected] Y. Palagnyuk e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_7

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– gender-neutral (cultural and goodwill performance). While arguably gender-neutral, they still require first ladies to display a feminine performance style. The White House rarely allows first ladies to be involved in foreign policy. Thus, US first ladies are portrayed primarily as dutiful spouses or perfunctory goodwill ambassadors. Erickson and Thomson (2012) conclude that the title “first lady” evokes expectations of fidelity to feminine performance standards, although the performance of feminine normativity may pigeonhole first ladies as gendered political actors. Ukrainian scholar Chekaliuk (2015), who focuses on the creation of the state’s image through mass media, suggests that the role of the first lady depends on mentality. For example, the standard for the first lady in Ukraine is a faithful, caring wife and mother, a feminine, loving, and sincere patriot. The same qualities seem to be required of first ladies in most democratic countries. In sum, “being a First Lady, then, requires a woman to act, if she would succeed, as a mixture of queen, club woman, and starlet” (Gould, 1986). On the contrary, Sulfaro (2007) is confident that the role of the first lady in society has evolved along with the role of women in society. She emphasizes that first ladies have always been political symbols. Therefore, Sulfaro argues that first ladies “are evaluated in the same manner as other political candidates, policies, and events, based on voters’ opinion analysis” (Sulfaro, 2007, p. 486). O’Connor et al. (1996, p. 849) conclude, “…most first ladies have exerted political influence and have thereby affected the course of the nation”. However, as Loizeau (2015, p. 10) points out, “the (…) public is not ready to accept power-sharing in (…) and that the First Lady, visible and influential though she might be, should not play the role of a co-president”. In addition, scholars examine the roles and media coverage of first ladies. Combs examines media coverage of the first ladies from 1980 to 2010. She finds that the First Lady of the USA “oftentimes has overlapping roles that realistically would stress anyone - wife, mother, hostess, advocate, homemaker, career woman and ideal American woman” (Combs, 2013, p. 279). Combs sums up, “…especially today, the First Lady is doing all of this in a 24 news cycle” (Combs, 2013, p. 279). Zeldes (2009) analysed the coverage of the candidates’ wives on two cable networks and one traditional network during the 2004

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and 2008 presidential campaigns. His findings show that one dominant frame prevailed—that of a “supportive” wife, “surrogate” or “escort” of the husband. The mentioned frame means “(…) the spouses were largely seen rather than heard” (Zeldes, 2009, p. 208). Correspondingly, the analysed media showed “(…) a more traditional role of First Lady, maintaining our traditional view of gender and power” (Zeldes, 2009, p. 210). Mortensen (2015) emphasizes that Michelle Obama, as First Lady of the USA, is one of the first presidential wives to use social media accounts to promote herself by disseminating her image without journalistic intervention. Furthermore, his study shows that “the White House portrays Michelle Obama in a more traditional light than journalists” (Mortensen, 2015, p. 62). The findings of Paul and Perreault (2018) show that Michelle Obama’s Twitter images as well as other social media portray her as an activist mother in the traditional role of first lady. Overall, we summarize that scholars mainly recognize two prominent roles of first ladies: the traditional role (wife, mother, woman) (Brzoza, 2019; Chekaliuk, 2015; Kluczynska, ´ 2009; Secler, 2009) and the professional role (socio-political actions/statements) (Butler, 2013; Scharrer & Bissell, 2000; Sulfaro, 2007). Primarily, scholars study the role and media coverage of the first lady because of their interest in this institution.

Status of the First Lady in Ukraine After analysing the discussion of the role of first ladies in the literature, we intend to define the status of the First Lady in Ukraine to better understand what is expected of her in Ukrainian society. Regarding the First Lady’s status in Ukraine, Ukrainian political scientist Fesenko emphasizes, “The First Lady is just a status. The first lady has no powers, only ceremonial functions” (Lebid, 2021). Another Ukrainian political scientist Petrenko also points out: “the role of the wife of the president is … more symbolic and educational” (Lebid, 2021). In conclusion, the traditional role of the First Lady is generally accepted in Ukraine. One of the explanations for the above is that the position of the wife of the president is not institutionalized in Ukraine. In 2020, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, proposed to adopt a law establishing the functions of the First Lady. He explained that his wife received a lot of criticism and hateful comments because people did not understand what the First Lady does or should do (Lebid, 2021). Olena Zelenska

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also complained that the status of the First Lady is not legally established in Ukraine. She wanted to have a small team of professionals (Taran & Kovalchuk, 2021). However, we assume that the lack of money in the Ukrainian budget to finance the office of the First Lady and the dissatisfaction of Ukrainians with spending on the state apparatus in times of war and economic crisis are the main reasons for not institutionalizing the status of the First Lady in Ukraine. Notably, the official website of the President of Ukraine (president. gov.ua) has a section about the “President’s Wife”. Thus, the official source presents Olena Zelenska as the president’s wife in her traditional role. It is worth noting that the news titles about Zelenska refer to her socio-political activities and initiatives. We should emphasize Olena Zelenska’s activity on social media, as it is quite common for first ladies of the last decade to use social media. Since Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected President of Ukraine in 2019, his wife has been promoting herself extensively, including on social media. Olena has Facebook, Telegram, and Instagram accounts (@olenazelenska_ official), where she popularizes herself and her foundation (Zelenskaf oundation.org). Let us emphasize that Olena Zelenska has 3.1 million followers on Instagram as of September 2022. For comparison, her predecessor, the wife of the fifth President of Ukraine, Maryna Poroshenko, has only 14.6 thousand followers on Instagram; Yulia Tymoshenko, a famous Ukrainian politician and former Prime Minister of Ukraine, has 133 thousand followers. It is worth mentioning that famous Ukrainian female pop stars Tina Karol and Olya Polyakova have 1.5 and 2.7 million followers on Instagram, respectively. Therefore, the popularity of First Lady Olena Zelenska among the public is more like a celebrity than a politician/ activist. It is possible to note the great interest of the public in Olena. However, it is difficult to make assumptions about the extent to which the war in Ukraine influenced Zelenska’s popularity on social media in 2022. Thus, the First Lady of Ukraine is an unofficial title used for the wife of the President of Ukraine. The position of the President’s wife is not institutionalized in Ukraine.

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Methodology The main goal of this study is to find out the peculiarities of the media coverage of Olena Zelenska in Poland and Ukraine after the full-scale military invasion of Russia into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Based on the literature review and the primary objective of the study, the authors formulate the following research questions. RQ1: How is Olena Zelenska portrayed in the Polish and Ukrainian media? What are the key issues highlighted by the media in Poland and Ukraine in relation to First Lady Olena Zelenska? RQ2: Have there been changes in the media coverage of Olena Zelenska’s role in Poland and Ukraine since 2/24/2022 (the start of Russia’s fullscale military invasion of Ukraine)? RQ3: Are there differences in the media coverage of First Lady Olena Zelenska in Poland and Ukraine during the war?

The authors use the method of qualitative content analysis (Flick, 2012; Gibbs, 2022; Michalczyk, 2008; Pisarek, 1983) of the selected media in Poland and Ukraine to define what roles of Olena Zelenska the media present after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. For our research, we apply the model of roles of first ladies created by Erickson and Thomson (2012). The unit of analysis is the press material about Olena Zelenska (study of titles, main thematic thread, and graphic material). The authors analyze the titles separately from the material of the articles because the headlines are essential for the whole material. The headline defines the press statement. It is one of the most critical strategic items; no journalistic text ´ 2008, p. 117). Titles can be objective (informais without it (Slawska, tive), summarizing a given material, or subjective (journalistic), when the editorial opinion comes to the fore (Pisarek, 1975, p. 181). The authors define such coding categories for the study: 1. The dominant tone of the material/headlines directly or indirectly expressed: – negative (negative perception of Olena Zelenska); – approving (positive attitude towards Olena Zelenska); – neutral (opinion about Olena Zelenska is not expressed directly or indirectly; informative tone);

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– mixed (elements of positive and negative attitude towards Olena Zelenska). 2. Main topics of the publication (the zone of life to which the analysed material refers): – political (Olena Zelenska and politics, her activities in the political arena in connection with the war and other issues); – private (issues related to the private life of Olena Zelenska, showing her as a wife, mother, and woman); – mixed (the material contains elements of the private life and public activity of Olena Zelenska). 3. The portrayal of Olena Zelenska (who is she in the analysed materials): – wife/ mother/ woman; – independent politician; – First lady. 4. Illustrativeness (the presence of materials other than the text and how/with whom Olena Zelenska is shown in the photos). The authors search the materials for the research by keywords (tags): “Ukrainian First Lady”, “Olena Zelenska”, “Wife of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy”, and publication date in the three most widely read online versions of Polish (PBC, n.d.) and Ukrainian daily newspapers (Maxkova, 2022; Dev’Rtb onlaNn-media…, 2022). Due to the war and the economic crisis in Ukraine, there are no nationally popular printed dailies. Thus, we chose the three most widely read online dailies in Ukraine and Poland. The period of the analysis is from February 24, 2022 (the beginning of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine), to the end of September 2022. In total, the number of texts meeting the criteria of our analysis is “Fakt” (Fakt.pl)—14 texts, “Super Express” (se.pl)—20 texts, and “Gazeta Wyborcza” (Wybcza.pl)—12 texts, “Ukrainska Pravda” (pravda. com.ua)—18 texts, “Censor.net” (censor.net)—29 texts, and “Obozrevatel” (obozrevatel.com)—37 texts. We analysed 46 articles in the Polish press and 84 in the Ukrainian press.

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Olena Zelenska in the Polish Newspapers In the case of the analyzed materials from Polish newspapers, the headlines were overwhelmingly summarizing (War in Ukraine. Olena Zelenska thanks the doctor from Gdansk (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2022c)), less often subjective (journalistic) (There was nothing to collect! The famous musician wrote to Zelenska. A knockout answer! It hurt us (Super Express, 2022d)). Largely, the analysed headlines were emotionally charged (Olena Zelenska took the floor. The appearance of the First Lady of Ukraine breaks the heart (Fakt, 2022a)), and some can even be described as melodramatic in the tone of the statements. They presented Olena Zelenska in the context of her official role (First Lady infected with coronavirus (Fakt, 2022b)), but also through the prism of her husband (Zelenskyy’s wife talks about Poland. She revealed what Agata Duda had told her (Fakt, 2022c)). In the initial phase of the free period, it was undoubtedly intended to introduce her person to Polish readers who probably did not know who Olena Zelenska was. However, it is worth paying attention to the differences in this respect, especially between “Fakt” and “Super Express”. Although both dailies are informative and sensational, Olena Zelenska was presented in the former almost exclusively through the prism of her role (first lady, wife of the president). In “Super Express” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” largely, the headlines showed her as an independent entity; no descriptions of her social role were attached to her name. In a few cases, the headline shows Olena Zelenska as a politician, as a woman who takes the initiative and independently participates in the political scene (The first ladies of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine organized their meeting at the summit. What did they talk about? (Fakt, 2022d); Give us weapons, join the EU. Zelenska speaks like a real politician in Madrid (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2022a)). In the analyzed titles, the opinion of the editorial office/journalist was rarely expressed directly. They were mainly informative (they informed about the activities of Olena Zelenska), although most of them were axiologically characterized by the use of appropriate vocabulary (Olena Zelenska showed shocking photos (Super Express, 2022b)); the evaluation in the headlines was rather direct. The headlines were mostly positive or possibly neutral. In the linguistic level of the titles, there are no colloquial phrases or controversial, vulgar expressions; nor do we will find antonyms, oxymorons, wordplays, or neologisms that editors like so much. However,

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the headlines often contained quotations, indicating that the editors perceived the dialogic as a way to attract the recipient’s attention. The headlines were rarely formulated as questions to which the text of the material was supposed to answer (Olena and Volodymyr Zelenskis have not seen each other for over a month. Where is the First Lady? (Super Express, 2022a)). In general, the headlines appeared most often in phrases or single sentences (Olena Zelenska: The Russians are committing mass murder. On Ukrainian women and children (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2022b)). More than half of the material about Olena Zelenska concerned her official role as the First Lady. They include a description of her current activities—what she did, whom she met, or what she posted on her social media. At the beginning of the war, much of the information was a reprint of Zelenska’s appeal from her Instagram or Facebook with an editorial comment or scratching the background for her drawing. Journalists placed a strong emphasis on highlighting the emotions associated with the situation. They often used adjectives such as “dramatic”, “moving”, “shocking”, and “tear-jerking” to refer to Zelenska’s words. It was also characteristic of the early months of the conflict that the person of the First Lady was merely an excuse to write about the war. Even the materials devoted to her person mainly described the background of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In extreme cases, the information to be included in the article (the title implied it) was in the last paragraph of the material (e.g. Olena Zelenska took the floor. The appearance of the First Lady of Ukraine breaks the heart (Fakt, 2022a)). As time passed, however, journalists began to focus more on the First Lady. Polish dailies strongly emphasized Zelenska’s relations with Poland—they focused their attention on her thanks to Poles, and conversations with the Polish First Lady. Almost a quarter of the texts were of a mixed nature. They often discussed Zelenska’s current activities and added content from her personal life. For example, the paragraph “Who is Olena Zelenska” appeared several times in various publications, in which her life was briefly presented. Such materials appeared especially at the beginning of the war and were intended to familiarize the Polish reader with the person of Zelenska. Apart from that, the materials classified as mixed included those in which we could read about the private account of the Ukrainian presidential couple but in the context of current political events (e.g. This is how Zelenskyy said goodbye to his wife on February 24, his heart was breaking (Super Express, 2022c)). Few materials focused on the

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more feminine aspects of Zelenska’s image (only one text was devoted to analysing which of the first ladies: Ukraine or Poland, dressed better at an official meeting). The smallest part of the studied materials were those concerning the private zone of Olena Zelenska’s life, showing her as a woman, a mother, or a wife. Let us note that they were present only in “Fakt” and “Super Express”, which focused more on the socio-sensational content. The tone of the publications devoted to the First Lady is overwhelmingly positive. Although the materials themselves are rather informative due to the press genre, the linguistic level and vocabulary leave no doubt about the opinion of the press. The only situation in which we noticed mixed opinions about the actions and the person of Olena Zelenska was the comments that appeared after the publication of a photo session for “Vogue”. Both the text and the photos were criticized as “war PR”, but at the same time the journalists emphasized that, the motivation was understandable to them—the desire to attract attention when the international public was tired of hearing/reading about the war. Apart from this situation, there were no criticisms or negative voices about Zelenska in the Polish press. To sum up, the tone of the published materials is positive and invites to take a specific position on the presented content. When analyzing the material illustrating the press articles, we noticed that it is weak. Often the same photo serves as a background for several publications (most such cases were in “Super Express”—one photo was repeated up to five times). Alternatively, it is recycled (e.g. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is added to the already repeated photo of Olena in the information about how they got along as a couple during the war). In general, Zelenska is shown in the photographs rather alone and in official situations. The exceptions are events connected with foreign persons (such as Jill Biden’s visit to Ukraine or the funeral of Elizabeth II). It is worth noting that some materials did not contain photos of the First Lady (e.g. War in Ukraine. Olena Zelenska thanks a doctor from Gdansk (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2022c)—the text is illustrated with photos of a doctor whom Olena thanks).

Olena Zelenska in the Ukrainian Newspapers The publications about Olena Zelenska after the whole-scale war in Ukraine resumed only at the beginning of March 2022. Moreover, two analysed online media (“Censor.net” and “Ukrainska Pravda”) published

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the same first information about the wife of the President of Ukraine: Zelenska launched a telegram channel on how to live in wartime (Ukrainska Pravda, 2022a); Zelenska launched a telegram channel “with verified answers” : How to act and live in the time of war (Censor.net, 2022a). This was the introduction of Olena Zelenska under new circumstances connected with her role as the First Lady of Ukraine. The analysis of the titles in the Ukrainian online media about Olena Zelenska shows that they are mainly informative, summarizing the material in the articles (Olena Zelenska met with the first ladies of Poland and Lithuania in New York (Ukrainska Pravda, 2022b). In general, there are no emotionally coloured, evaluative headlines about Olena Zelenska, especially those containing exclamatory or interrogative sentences. However, at the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, some headlines appealed to people’s emotions (If coffins do not convince women in Russia, then I have nothing to say to them,—Zelenska (Censor.net, 2022b), Olena Zelenska addresses the first ladies of the world: Ukraine does not need to be saved, tell people the truth! (Obozrevatel, 2022a). Later, in the summer and autumn of 2022, there were almost no emotional, mainly neutral, headlines in the Ukrainian media regarding the First Lady of Ukraine. It is necessary to note two other features of the titles of the articles about Olena Zelenska. First, all three analysed media in Ukraine often use quotations from Olena Zelenska’s interviews in the headlines of articles (Olena Zelenska in the US Congress: I am asking you for something that I would never ask for—Weapons to protect our home (Obozrevatel, 2022b). Second, the media often refer to the wife of the President of Ukraine only by her surname—“Zelenska” (Zelenska: While Britain counts pennies, we count victims (Ukrainska Pravda, 2022c). Moreover, the headlines in the analysed Ukrainian media do not contain any references to Olena Zelenska as the wife of the president or the first lady. We explain that readers of the Ukrainian online media know who Olena Zelenska is. After all, 2022 is Olena Zelenska’s fourth year as First Lady of Ukraine. Therefore, the headlines of the articles in the Ukrainian media mainly present her as “Olena Zelenska” or “Zelenska”. In “Ukrainska Pravda”, the main topic of publication about Olena Zelenska is political; there are no mixed topics. The same situation is in “Censor.net” with only two publications on private topics (Zelenska said that she had not seen her husband for 2.5 months (Censor.net, 2022c). The above is connected with mainly socio-political topics of analyzed online

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media. In general, we assume that the personal life of the First Lady is not of public interest during the war. In contrast, the popular online media “Obozrevatel” has more articles about Olena Zelenska’s private life due to its chapters “Lady”, “Life”, and “Show” (Olena Zelenska told where her graduate daughter Oleksandra will enroll: It was her decision (Obozrevatel, 2022c). Therefore, “Obozrevatel” also has mixed topics of publication; that is, the material contains elements of the private life and public activity of Olena Zelenska. Thus, the portrayal of Zelenska as Olena-wife, Olena-woman, and Olena-mother is more in “Obozrevatel” than in other media of analysis (Olena Zelenska spoke about her husband’s character: He always finished what he had started and he could inspire other people (Obozrevatel, 2022d). Nevertheless, this presentation is mixed, as it is presented in the context of Zelenska’s patriotism, support for her husband, and the goals of policy in the state of war (Olena Zelenska admitted for the first time that she is afraid for her husband: He will protect Ukraine and his family until the end (Obozrevatel, 2022e). Even if there is attention to Zelenska’s looks, it is mainly through the symbolism of her clothes, patriotism aesthetics, not entirely glamour (Olena Zelenska and Jill Biden came to the meeting wearing shoes in the colors of the Ukrainian flag (Obozrevatel, 2022f). Some of these articles are reprints of Zelenska’s information in social media (Olena Zelenska in wide jeans and Ursula von der Leyen in a blue and yellow outfit caused admiration among Internet users ( Obozrevatel, 2022g). Let us note that at the beginning of the whole-scale Russian war against Ukraine, the journalists often took the materials for the articles and illustrations to them from the posts of Olena Zelenska’s social media accounts. Olena was not visible in the information space because she did not participate in social and political events at the beginning of the war. As a result, journalists did not have new, recent photos of her. Therefore, journalists used previously published photos of Olena to illustrate articles about the First Lady of Ukraine. Moreover, the same portrait of Olena Zelenska serves as a background for seven publications on “Censor.net” in the early spring of 2022, which we explain by the lack of actual illustrative material. In general, our analysis of the illustrative material of the articles shows that the media rarely show Olena Zelenska with her husband—the President of Ukraine. The same is true for her family. There are photos of her with people and first ladies of other countries. However, most often Zelenska has photos alone or with Ukrainian politicians and world leaders.

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It is important to emphasize that Olena Zelenska is shown in the photos with top world leaders and politicians such as Joe Biden, the President of the USA, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, Charles III, the King of Great Britain, and Catherine, the Princess of Wales. There are few photos of Olena Zelenska with the President of Ukraine in the period under study because there were almost no joint events or diplomatic missions of the couple during the war in 2022. It helps Olena to distance herself from her husband during the war and from her role as the president’s wife. In other words, the new circumstances allow Zelenska to come out of the “shadow” of the president and to become more independent in her media portrayal as a politician/activist. The dominant tone of the materials about Olena Zelenska in the Ukrainian media is positive and approving as there are no negative or mixed materials about the wife of the President of Ukraine during the whole-scale war of Russia against Ukraine. Moreover, some materials portray Zelenska with pride for her achievements, and for the high level of Ukraine’s presentation in the international arena by her. For instance, “Olena Zelenska became the first wife of a foreign president to address the US Congress ” (Censor.net, 2022d). It should be particularly noted that the portrayal of Olena Zelenska in the analyzed materials of the Ukrainian media changes over time. The media in Ukraine mainly portray Zelenska as the first lady at the beginning of the whole-scale war in the spring of 2022. She asks for help to stop the war, appeals to women and the international community to stop the deaths of children in Ukraine, expresses support for the victims of the war, and meets with first ladies of other countries (e.g. Occupiers kill children. Humanitarian corridors are needed—Zelenska (Censor.net, 2022e). Later, in the summer and early autumn of 2022, Ukrainian media portray Olena Zelenska mainly as an independent politician. Her activities, speeches, and visits abroad go far beyond the functions of the First Lady. Sometimes she takes over the functions of the president in the sphere of foreign relations. The tone of her speeches and the quotes presented in the articles are political statements rather than socio-humanitarian ones (e.g. Olena Zelenska urged the EU to grant Ukraine candidate status (Censor.net, 2022f). Moreover, some articles have already hinted at Zelenska’s political role (Obozrevatel, 2022h). Therefore, the portrayal of Olena Zelenska as an independent political

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figure in Ukraine and in the international arena has been growing since the summer of 2022. It should be noted that Zelenska’s controversial “Vogue” photo session with the world-famous photographer Annie Leibovitz in July 2022 did not receive much attention from the analysed media. Her photo on the cover of “Vogue” caused much criticism due to the inelegant masculine pose of the First Lady. It is important to note that besides the “Vogue” cover, in July 2022 the media also published materials about Olena on the cover of the influential “Time” magazine with the story of how she survived the first months of the war. The portrayal of Olena Zelenska as an independent politician rather than a first lady in the summer and early autumn of 2022, as explained above, shows tendencies in Ukrainian society, through the prism of the media, for more equality in gender roles, various, not only traditional activities of women during the war. The view in Ukraine that “the mission of the first lady is to be a contrasting background for her husband, not to weaken his masculinity, but to strengthen it” (Chekaliuk, 2015) is not so relevant in times of war. Consequently, the photo of Olena Zelenska on the cover of “Vogue” drew attention to the role of women in Ukraine in general and during the war in particular, which is more than a traditionally feminine role of women in society as well as of the first lady.

Conclusions Let us summarize the number of publications devoted to Olena Zelenska in selected Polish and Ukrainian dailies after Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to show the level of press interest in her person and to illustrate when she attracted the attention of the press. In the case of the Polish press, there are two peaks in the number of publications about Zelenska: first, at the beginning of the war and, second, after the publication of the photo session in the “Vogue” (Fig. 7.1). However, we would like to emphasize that Olena Zelenska attracted relatively little interest in the Polish media compared to the number of materials about Russia’s war in Ukraine and her husband, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Therefore, it is not as suggested by “Vogue”: “Now, in a crucial new phase, with Ukraine battling for international support and fresh military aid, the first lady’s role is no longer minor or ornamental. (…) Zelenska (…), has emerged into

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public view to become a face of her nation – a woman’s face, a mother’s face, an empathetic human face” (Donadio, 2022). There is also significantly less material about Olena Zelenska in the Polish press than in the Ukrainian dailies (Fig. 7.1). In the Ukrainian press, there are three peaks in the number of publications: March, July, and September 2022. As we explained in our research, these peaks correlate with the beginning of the war (March) and significant international events in which Olena Zelenska took part (July and September). Overall, the portrayal of Olena Zelenska in both the Polish and Ukrainian press is positive. Although the material about the First Lady is relatively informative, there are more emotionally charged headlines and articles in the Polish media than in the Ukrainian. The Polish press portrays Olena Zelenska most often in the context of her role as First Lady. Her image does not change over time. We do not see Olena-mother and Olena-woman. We rarely see Olena-wife (and then only in a schematic, superficial way). She is portrayed somewhat stereotypically and trivially; her role in the Russian-Ukrainian war is marginalized in the Polish press. Zelenska does not seem to aspire (or at least this is how 25 20 15 Polish Press Ukrainian Press

10 5 0

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

Fig. 7.1 Number of press publications in Polish and Ukrainian daily newspapers (February–September 2022) (Source Own study)

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she is portrayed in the Polish media) to the role of an independent politician who takes an initiative that goes beyond the duties associated with the role of the first lady. The actions of Olena Zelenska fit into the model of the roles of first ladies created by Erickson and Thomson (2012). Even during the war, she managed the president’s credibility (escort, surrogate), promoted international relations (goodwill), and engaged in social activism (human rights); her roles were predominantly gendered female throughout the period analysed. In contrast, the portrayal of Olena Zelenska in the Ukrainian media during the whole-scale Russian war in Ukraine is developing: from the wife of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the first lady, to the strong and smart personality, the patriot with the well-known name “Olena Zelenska”. First lady diplomacy, “especially solo excursions” (Erickson & Thomson 2012) of Zelenska in July and September 2022, when Olena attended various international political events without her husband, shows her role in dealing with foreign policy. Therefore, the media coverage of Olena Zelenska’s role during the war in Ukraine fits into the model of first ladies’ roles created by Erickson and Thomson (2012). However, if her roles at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine were mainly gendered as female and gender-neutral, the media portrayed the First Lady’s roles in the summer and early fall of 2022 as more gendered as male and gender-neutral. As we point out, the portrayal of Olena Zelenska as an independent political figure in Ukraine and in the international arena has increased since the beginning of the summer of 2022. We assume that various political events she attended without her husband became the basis for such a portrayal of her. For example, in July 2022, Zelenska visited the USA where she had meetings with top US politicians and made a speech in the US Congress asking for weapons for Ukraine. In addition, in the same month, Olena initiated and hosted the Second Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen titled “Ukraine and the World: the Future We (Re) Build Together”. In September 2022, Olena Zelenska was the guest of honour at the annual State of the European Union keynote address at the European Parliament, visited the UN General Assembly, met with the UN Secretary-General, and attended the funeral of Queen Elizabeth II as a member of the Ukrainian delegation. It should be noted that the well-known Ukrainian magazine “Focus” placed Olena Zelenska in 20th place in the magazine’s rating “100 most influential Ukrainians according to Focus magazine” in 2021 (Babenko

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et al., 2021). In our opinion, the positive portrayal of Olena Zelenska in the Ukrainian media during the war, with her evolving roles from first lady to a politician, will either lead to her political success in the near future, or contribute to the continuation of the political success of her husband, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine.

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the end [Press release]. https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/show/people/ olena-zelenska-vpershe-ziznalasya-scho-boitsya-za-cholovika-vin-zahischatimeukrainu-ta-svoyu-simyu-do-kintsya.htm Obozrevatel. (2022f, July 20). Olena Zelenska and Jill Biden came to the meeting wearing shoes in the colors of the Ukrainian flag [Press release]. https:// news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/lady/fashion/olena-zelenska-ta-dzhill-bajden-nezgovoryuyuchis-pidibrali-vzuttya-simvolichnogo-koloru-na-zustrich-v-bilomudomi.htm Obozrevatel. (2022g, September 16). Olena Zelenska in wide jeans and Ursula von der Leyen in a blue and yellow outfit caused admiration among Internet users [Press release]. https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/lady/olena-zel enska-v-shirokih-dzhinsah-ta-ursula-fon-der-lyaen-u-sino-zhovtomu-vbrannizahopili-merezhu-foto.htm Obozrevatel. (2022h, September 16). Conversation with Zelenska impresses the Japanese journalist: Olena is more than just the first lady. This is one more President [Press release]. https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/show/people/ yaponsku-veduchu-vrazila-rozmova-z-zelenskoyu-olena-bula-bilshe-nizh-per shoyu-ledi-tse-ische-odin-prezident.htm O’Connor, K., Nye, B., & Van Assendelft, L. (1996). Wives in the White House: The political influence of first ladies. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26(3), 835–853. PBC. (n. d). Wyniki prasy za II kwartał 2022. https://www.pbc.pl/wyniki-prasyza-ii-kwartal-2022-dzienniki/ Pisarek, W. (1975). Retoryka dziennikarska. RSW. Pisarek, W. (1983). Analiza zawarto´sci prasy. Biblioteka Wiedzy o Prasie. RSW. Secler, B. (2009). Miejsce i rola Pierwszej Damy w polskim zyciu ˙ społecznopolitycznym. In M. Musiał-Karg (Ed.), Kobiety we współczesnej Europie. Rola i miejsce kobiet na rynku pracy, w polityce i społeczenstwie ´ (pp. 155–172). Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Sulfaro, V. A. (2007). Affective evaluations of first ladies: A comparison of Hillary Clinton and Laura Bush. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 37 (3), 486–514. Super Express. (2022a, April 13). Olena and Volodymyr Zelenskis have not seen each other for over a month. Where is the First Lady? [Press release]. https:/ /polityka.se.pl/wiadomosci/olena-i-wolodymyr-zelenscy-nie-widzieli-sie-odponad-miesiaca-gdzie-jest-pierwsza-dama-pmu-aa-3EnZ-QB7p-6FxA.html Super Express. (2022b, April 14). Olena Zelenska showed shocking photos [Press release]. https://polityka.se.pl/wiadomosci/olena-zelenska-pokazala-wstrza sajace-zdjecia-wsrod-nich-widac-15-letnia-masze-aa-FTLs-7iBK-XZfj.html Super Express. (2022c, July 8). This is how Zelenskyy said goodbye to his wife on February 24, his heart was breaking [Press release]. https://www.se.pl/wia domosci/lekkie/tak-zelenski-pozegnal-zone-24-lutego-serce-peka-na-jegotwarzy-nie-widzialam-strachu-aa-iieK-yW4D-1p9r.html

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Super Express. (2022d, September 07). There was nothing to collect! The famous musician wrote to Zelenska. A knockout answer! It hurt us [Press release]. https://polityka.se.pl/wiadomosci/slynny-muzyk-napisal-dozelenskiej-nokautujaca-odpowiedz-az-nas-zabolalo-aa-jYbE-cJ4z-4WU4.html ´ Slawska, M. (2008). Tytuł: najmniejszy tekst prasowy. Rocznik Prasoznawczy, 2, 117–126. Taran, S., & Kovalchuk, H. (2021, August 6). Olena Zelencbka ppo camit pepxix ledi, kpocivki y Bepcali ta diplomatio m’Rko| cili. https:// focus.ua/uk/politics/489703-elena-zelenskaya-intervyu Ukrainska Pravda. (2022a, March 3). Zelenska launched a telegram channel on how to live in wartime [Press release]. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/ 2022/03/3/7327964/ Ukrainska Pravda. (2022b, September 21). Olena Zelenska met with first ladies of Poland and Lithuania in New York [Press release]. https://www.pravda. com.ua/news/2022/09/21/7368380/ Ukrainska Pravda. (2022c, September 4). Zelenska: While Britain is counting pennies, we are counting victims [Press release]. https://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2022/09/4/7366011/ Zeldes, G. A. (2009, September). Maverick, escort, or style setter—TV news framing of candidates’ spouses during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. Electronic News, 3(4), 193–213. Babenko, M., et al. (2021, December 13). ZelencbkiN vs Axmetov. 100 naNvplivovixix Ukpa|nciv za vepcipo kypnaly “fokyc”. https://focus. ua/uk/ratings/500292-rejting-samyh-vliyatelnyh-lyudej-ukrainy-top-100 Dev’Rtb onlaNn-media, wo ctali naNRkicniximi: monitoping ZMI. (2022, September 26). https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/dev-yat-onlajn-media-shhostaly-najyakisnishymy-monitoryng-imi-i47998 Maxkova, R. (2022, October 21). U bilbxocti ykpa|ncbkix onlaun-media ppocila kilbkictb ayditopi| – dani Similarweb. https://imi.org.ua/monito rings/v-bilshosti-ukrayinskyh-onlajn-media-prosila-kilkist-audytoriyi-dani-sim ilarweb-i48514 Scharrer E. & Bissell K. (2000). Overcoming traditional boundaries: The role of political activity in media coverage of First Ladies. Women & Politics, 41(1), 55–83.

PART II

Emotions as a Carrier of Information

CHAPTER 8

Emotions During the War: Interplay Between Emotions and Information Zuzanna Sielska

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to present the relationship between information and emotions as well as the feedback between these two phenomena during the war. I will try to clarify the basic concepts by analysing the available literature and research in these areas. It seems reasonable to introduce concepts such as social emotions, but also to explain how conflict or war can affect them. In addition, I will analyse research on the behaviour that a society may experience during, after or under the influence of strong emotions related to war. At the very end, I will describe the issues related to the transmission of information during war and its impact on behaviours in society. In order to better present the results of the theoretical research in the conclusion, I will use the example of the current war in Ukraine. Although the conflict in this country started in 2014, it was only the Russian aggression of 24 February 2020 that intensified the intensity leading to an open war between the two

Z. Sielska (B) University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_8

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countries. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2023), from the time of the invasion until 12 February 2023, there have been 18,955 civilian casualties, including 7,199 killed and 11,756 injured. In addition, the war has generated a very large number of refugees, as based on data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2023), more than 19,000 people have crossed the border into Ukraine. The high intensity of the conflict has had a significant impact on a society at war. Both Ukrainian society and Polish society were exposed to many factors related to the transmission of information during the war. In addition, the events were accompanied by varying emotions as well as social behaviour and attitudes. Also, I will try to answer the questions, such as, how do the emotions that arise during conflict affect the creation of community and the taking of collective action in a war-affected society? Does the information given during the war differentiate certain emotions and social attitudes?

The Impact of War on Social Emotions Emotions as a subjective mental state are a response to the reality around us (LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). They are triggered by the subject’s conscious or unconscious valuing of a certain event or situation (Oatley et al., 1996). According to Deonna and Teroni (2012), different emotions consist of a specific attitude experienced towards different objects, states of affairs or situations. Emotions are divided into positive and negative emotions. Positive emotions (joy, pleasure, satisfaction) stimulate the subject to sustain a particular activity or a particular contact with the situation or object that triggered the emotion. Negative ones (anger, despair, fear) are designed to provoke the subject to stop the activity that elicited that emotion (Folkman, 2008; Lindebaum & Jordan, 2012). Most often, emotions are preceded by an event, which is why some emotions evoke positive and negative and some also evoke both types of emotions. Emotions can be experienced as internal experiences of the individual, but also as social interactions involving social actors (Gordon, 1990; Sawicka, 2015). Do emotions derive from the nature of human beings or from the culture in which they function? Research conducted by Ekman and Friesen (1971) showed that people from different cultures interpret facial expressions similarly and express basic emotions such as joy, sadness and anger in similar ways. However, theories explaining the

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functioning of intergroup emotions suggest that the reactions and experiences of emotions of certain social groups will depend on the cognitive appraisal of these collectives (Cuddy et al., 2008). In this perspective, the emotional impulse felt by an individual or social group is ‘filtered’ through the norms governing the expression of emotion in a given situation (Gergen, 2009). Normative expectations about emotions and beliefs about them create together a social ‘emotional imaginarium’, i.e. a sphere of ideas about emotions and the values attributed to them. They shape emotional experience, influencing the process of emotion identification and expression (Hochschild, 1979; Sawicka, 2015). Emotions are a creation of human interactions that are expressed and directly experienced in connection with the social and cultural. They are linked to the experiences of the individual and the collective as a whole, their feelings and reactions. As a social construct, they are linked to norms and customs that determine how we are to experience and live emotions (Hochschild, 2019; Simlat-Zuk, 2012). Intergroup emotion theories, like cognitive appraisal theories, assume that specific emotions result from the interpretation of an event as being important for an individual’s goals and concept of self. In this context, the sense of social identity (the identity of a community or collectivity) seems to be an important aspect. For example, an individual’s sense of fear or insecurity may be caused by a threat to the identity or cohesion of a social group (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Currently, the distinction between war and armed conflict is blurred in the literature. For the purposes of the chapter, I will define war as a larger armed conflict between states, blocs of states and collectivities, which includes elements such as politics, tactics, strategy and purpose (Prokopczuk, 1987). War can be a consequence of social conflict, which is why conflict is a broader concept than war (Roman, 2017). Conflict is both a dependent variable—a process triggered by other forces—and an independent variable—a force that triggers changes in other processes (Turner, 1985, p. 196). Armed conflicts affect the state and society in different ways depending on the duration, the involvement of the parties and the intensity of the fighting. It is increasingly emphasized that modern wars are far more dangerous and destabilizing, and consequently affect far-reaching demographic, social, economic and political transformations in the state, as well as the human psyche (World Health Organization, 2019). Conflicts can find their origin in social tensions, which consist of emotions. According to Coser (1964), emotions are

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an essential component of conflicts and their strength determines their intensity and length. Conflicts can produce both negative emotions (fear, anger, sadness) and positive emotions (hope, concern) and thus can influence people’s behaviour. Emotions in society can contribute to the breakdown of communities or their greater integrity (Turner, 1985); they can increase trust in a community, as well as increase or decrease a sense of security.

Impact of War on Society and Social Behaviour The impact of war on society has interested researchers for years. Man is a social being, for he must live among and cooperate with other people, for example by making choices together, discussing, making treaties and participating collectively in battles. Therefore, conflict is an inherent part of society that influences social behaviour. Using experimental games, it has been found that people who have been exposed to conflict or war are more altruistic towards their neighbours, risk-seeking and impatient (Bellows & Miguel, 2009). To address the endogeneity of exposure to violence and altruism, Maarten J. Voors and colleagues (2012) examined exposure to violence in Sierra Leone and found that individuals whose households directly experienced more intense war violence were significantly more likely to attend community meetings, more likely to join local political and social groups, and more likely to vote in elections. Michael J. Gilligany et al. (2011) found that participants in experimental games who were more exposed to violence and conflict during the war in Nepal were more likely to have higher levels of social capital, as measured by trust for the public good. Additionally, conflict may influence individuals’ stimulation to interact with others, but also to seek and provide help (Sielska & Lonˇcar, 2022). Communities that have experienced conflict adopt more pro-social norms. Other researchers show that older children who have been more affected by conflict and war are more likely to act in an egalitarian way towards members of their own group. This may be related to the fact that during conflict people often rely on and help each other which is associated with the ability to mobilize more, seek help and engage in groups (Bauer et al., 2013). Conflict can also have the effect of strengthening bonds between individuals in a community, especially with regard to religion and religious identity (Sielska & Lonˇcar, 2022). Research in Uganda, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan found that the more often respondents were confronted with armed conflict and

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violence, the more often they practised religious rituals identifying with religious communities, even long after the conflict (Henrich et al., 2019). Conflict, especially armed conflict, has a strong impact on individuals who were directly involved in it, witnessed it or grew up in a post-conflict environment. Research shows that individuals who have experienced prolonged conflict may consequently face depressive states, anxiety and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (World Health Organization, 2001). Osman Sinanovi´c et al. (2000) and others surveyed students at the University of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina seven years after the war and concluded that most of the respondents carried symptoms of PTSD, particularly conditions such as feelings of anxiety, depression and substance abuse. In addition, many researchers emphasize that individuals who have lived through intense and prolonged armed conflict and thus face post-traumatic stress syndrome have a significant impact on the state of the ‘mental health of the nation’; consequently, young society inherits a pattern of categorization, aggression and violence (Hasanovi´c, 2011; Klari´c et al., 2007). Confirmation of how conflict negatively affects society we can find in results of analyze of Anne Abaho et al. (2019) who stated that conflict destroys various forms of social cohesion, changes social values and deeply disorganizes old and new generations. Furthermore, referring to the situation in Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, they note that conflict undermines trust in people, communities and government institutions and undermines social cohesion. Similar findings have been demonstrated in studies with the results obtained by Brian K. Barber (2001), who confirmed direct links between the experience of violence associated with armed attacks on young people in Palestine and the antisocial behaviour of respondents. This is likely to be related to the fact that people who have not experienced traumatic events are more likely to have a sense of influence and empowerment over what happens in the state and society. Nicholas Sambanisa and Moses Shayo (2013) were of the opinion that ethnic conflicts (i.e. usually of high intensity) influence later polarization and thus strong identities of closed social groups and have a negative impact on social trust. Prolonged high-intensity conflict on many levels negatively affects the state and society and is often destructive. During conflict, the overall social order and thus the sense of security break down. According to research by A. Kadir et al. (2019), many children who have experienced armed violence during conflict are unable to find peace. Security is included as a social phenomenon and is an attribute

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of sorts, for in its absence and thus in an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, the individual is unable to function properly in social structures. This thesis is confirmed by Sara Kijewska and Markus Freitag (2016) in their study of society in Kosovo after the war. They conclude that war is negatively related to social trust, further increasing distrust, uncooperativeness and hostility towards others.

Impact of Information on Society Information is now the most coveted commodity of the twenty-first century. Among other things, modern societies are called information societies because more and more manifestations of social life have moved into virtual space, unconstrained by barriers of time and place (Skarbacz & 2022). The global world allows the transfer of ideas, Lewinska-Krzak, ´ culture and social emotions on an unprecedented scale. Information is transmitted at the speed of light and cross-border communication has removed all barriers (Chuang & Zhang, 2014). The social actor is both a sender and a receiver of information and, through its accessibility, can influence public opinion around the world. Information provided by traditional media as well as social media stimulates emotions, and these emotions influence social attitudes and behaviour (Fig. 8.1). Specific information is conveyed through an information medium, which may be traditional media or (nowadays most often) social media.

Fig. 8.1 Impact of information on emotions and social behaviour (Source Own elaboration)

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The recipients of the information are social actors, in whom the information usually evokes some kind of emotion—either positive or negative. Emotions influence social actors, triggering a certain social behaviour in them. Nowadays, the media as a technology and as a form of information circulation have become an essential component of modern social life. Social media are increasingly important, not only in communication between actors in society, but also, it is through the modern medium that political debate, election or referendum campaigns take place. Citizens, politicians, ministers, great leaders, but also state organisms have their own Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts (Twiplomacy, 2022). Social media can also be a platform within which conflicts concerning the social and political sphere in the state are created. The public, through newsgroups and instant messaging, exchanges views, agreeing or boycotting certain demands. M. Castells (2013) argues that these disputes dynamise society by engaging it intellectually. These days, it is on the Internet that ideas for demonstrations, expressions of support and opposition arise, involving users and often leading to active participation in protests and strikes in the state. An example is the Facebook event (pol. Ogólnopolski strajk kobiet! Polish women on strike), which was related to the attempt to tighten the anti-abortion law in Poland. The dissatisfaction shown online spilled over into the streets of Poland, as about 98,000 protesters actively participated in the strike, consequently leading to the rejection of the draft (Sielska, 2020). In 2020, in response to a Constitutional Tribunal ruling that the possibility of abortion due to severe and irreversible foetal disability or incurable life-threatening disease was unconstitutional (Fr˛acowiak-Sochanska ´ et al., 2022). Around 430,000 people took to the streets across Poland giving vent to their emotions and discontent. Not only in Poland does social media have an impact on the formation of social movements. In France, there was the ‘yellow vest’ protest, which was also born on Facebook and took its toll on the streets of that country, in Serbia the street movements #1od5miliona (one out of five million) (Sielska, 2020) or the current strikes in Iran over the situation of women, which also have their translation from social media. Social media is a tool that enables large-scale association, collective action and the achievement of specific goals and benefits both the individual and the collective as a whole. Through access to information, people can engage socially by helping others. In 2017, Facebook introduced birthday collections, where everyone could donate money to a

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good cause of their choice instead of a gift. During its first year of operation, it managed to raise around $300 million for charity. It is worth mentioning that the collections continue to be very popular among social media users. Money is raised for sick children, to help animal shelters, for people with disabilities and those who require expensive medical treatment (Sielska, 2020). The more an event contains information that evokes simple emotions such as delight, disbelief/surprise (positive), fear, sadness and anger (negative), the more the audience will want to take action towards the community.

Use of Information During Wartime Nowadays, it is impossible to function without access to information, not only for societies but also for states. With the help of the new media, states conduct their politics both internally and externally. In the future, the significant and strongest international actors will not be those with the strongest armies, but those with the most extensive digital networks. The use of cyberspace by international actors opens up new opportunities to pursue interests in the international arena. States can increase their power, influence international security and compete in cyberspace (Lakomy, 2015). Through technical and operational solutions, states can achieve a new quality of war-fighting by exploiting the knowledge created by access to up-to-date data (Olszyk, 2019) and, consequently, immediate response (Kopp, 2005). Increasingly, states and their armies are focusing on information warfare, or ‘actions taken to achieve information superiority by influencing adversary information, information processing-based processes and information systems’ (Lewis, 2023). The aim of information warfare is to attack an adversary’s resources and infrastructure, both through cyber-attacks and the use of psychological influence tools (Alger, 1996; Lelonek, 2016). With the increasing popularity of social media, the latter appear to be increasingly dangerous. Psychological operations are defined as the deliberate and planned use of varied means of communication that aim to convey specific information and data to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives and social behaviour (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2005). Such actions can be directed either at creating fear or at gaining sympathy with the opponent. Generating fear most often involves an attempt to destabilize

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society. An important aspect of information warfare is also the operation of cognitive weapons, i.e. the introduction of false scientific theories, paradigms, concepts and strategies into the attacked environment, which can significantly affect the defence potential of the target (Wojnowski, 2015). However, information warfare, and psychological warfare at that, can also lead to greater sympathy and support for the actions of the attacking side. In this case, the information conveyed will evoke emotions such as sympathy, admiration or, for example, emotion. All the actions of the adversary are more effective the greater the emotions they evoke in the recipient.

Conclusions or Information Warfare During the Armed Conflict in Ukraine---Emotions and Social Behaviour Among Ukrainians and Pole The aim of this chapter is to present the relationship between information and emotions as well as the feedback between these two phenomena during the war. In the course of conducting the theoretical research, I posed two research questions. Q1: How do the emotions that arise during conflict affect the creation of community and the taking of collective action in a war-affected society?

Emotions are inherent in any conflict (Coser, 1964). They push people to react quickly to threats and to act together for a specific purpose. The literature and research clearly show that conflict affects social behaviour, especially in terms of strong integration and support within conflictaffected groups (Gilligany et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012). Studies shows that emotions related to the individual’s sense of fear or insecurity in particular can cause a sense of threat to identity or social group cohesion (Mackie & Smith, 2002). During the conflict in Ukraine, and especially after Russia’s attack on the country in February 2022, the national identity of Ukrainians was threatened. The fear associated with the loss of community cohesion and the loss of national subjectivity led to an increased awareness towards the national identity of Ukrainians (Fomenko, 2022; Oleksandrovych, 2022). The public emphasized their identity using emblems of the Ukrainian nation. During the war, Ukrainian flags were hung in cities across Ukraine, and patriotic Ukrainian songs were increasingly sung at ceremonies, but also in social

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media videos. Emphasizing one’s national identity was a response to the sense of threat concerning the breakdown of the nation’s cohesion. However, following the literature cited in the chapter, conflict and its associated emotions not only integrate social groups, but can also divide. High-intensity conflicts influence polarization and thus strong identities of social groups and divide into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ groups, especially when both groups (ethnicities, nations) are involved in a war on two sides (Abaho et al., 2019; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In Ukraine, the division into two groups, those identifying themselves as Ukrainians and those identifying themselves as Russians, was already noticeable since 2014; however, after the intensification of the 2022 armed conflict it is all the more apparent. The war and related emotions such as fear significantly affect the division, leading to antagonization and alienation of the two groups. Additionally, the prolonged conflict and the high number of war dead on both sides intensify the sense of injustice towards the opposing side. Q2: Does the information given during the war differentiate certain emotions and social attitudes?

Information provided by traditional media, as well as social media, stimulates emotions, and these emotions influence public attitudes and behaviour (Castells, 2013; Sielska, 2020). In particular, information conveyed during war influences public emotions (Alger, 1996; Lelonek, 2016; Wojnowski, 2015). All actions of the enemy are more effective, the greater the emotions they evoke among the recipients. During the conflict in Ukraine, information warfare is carried out by both the Ukrainian and Russian sides, using psychological aspects that stimulate public emotions. We could see increased activities by the Ukrainian side in the use of information during the war after the Russian invasion in 2022. First of all, they consisted of gaining more sympathy and support for the actions of the Ukrainian side. In this case, the information conveyed evoked emotions such as sympathy, admiration or, for example, emotion. A large role was played by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski, who used traditional and social media such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook to convey information to the audience. The first posts of the president, in which he spoke to citizens informing them of the situation in the country and indicating that he would not leave his homeland fighting alongside his citizens, seem particularly symbolic. The president’s first Twitter post published after the Russian attack on 26 February 2022

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had 19 million views depicted him speaking against the backdrop of a government building in Kiev talking about fighting for the homeland and the subjectivity of Ukraine (Zelensky, 2022). The information was intended to stimulate patriotic attitudes and integrate the population under the banner of fighting against the enemy. These and other postings by V. Zelensky circulated throughout the world. For many, he became an example of a true statesman who can brilliantly integrate and galva2022). It was not only the president who nize his people (Narozna, ˙ influenced the opinion and emotions of Ukrainians, but also the citizens themselves. They were recording videos, as well as taking pictures, and sharing them on social networks. Captured moments shows Ukrainian soldiers in a good light, through actions such as feeding stray dogs or cats, helping an old lady repair her house, or rescuing children and others during shelling. This information was intended to generate sympathy and positive feelings towards the fighting Ukrainians. In addition, representatives of the Ukrainian pop culture world joined in. For example, a video uploaded by rock star Andriy Khlyvnyuk, who has joined the ranks of Ukraine’s territorial defence, in which he sings the more than 100-yearold Ukrainian song ‘Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow’ (Khlyvnyuk, 2022), has gained fame. The original version and various versions of this song have already had at least several million views. The patriotic nature of the video excited the emotions of Ukrainians as well as viewers from other countries. Many Ukrainians shared experiences and integrated through social media, feeling part of a larger community. Examples of such actions stirred the emotions of the audience, but also spurred action, joining the fight to oppose the occupying forces or getting involved in helping those in need during the conflict. Of course, not only information was created to arouse positive emotions, but also to stimulate negative ones, such as sadness, fear and indignation. From the very beginning of the war, the Ukrainian as well as the Russian side showed the atrocities of the war in order to make the other side paralysed, weakened but also panicked, for example, videos of the capture of prisoners of war or photos and other postings of the destruction wrought on the enemy. In addition, the Russian side used cognitive weapons, i.e. introducing false theories into the environment under attack, for example regarding the purpose of the war. According to these ideas, Ukrainians were not fighting against the Russian invaders but, as representatives of left-wing, ‘Western’ or LGBTQ circles, were fighting against the Christian ideology that Russia was defending (Moskalenko,

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2023). There was a lot of fake news, i.e. false information aimed at undermining authorities and dividing and destabilizing society, on social media. Moreover, the aspect of the globalization of information, i.e. the penetration beyond national borders, seems particularly interesting (Sielska, 2020; Skarbacz & Lewinska-Krzak, ´ 2022). Poland, as one of the countries bordering Ukraine, was involved from the very beginning of the war, both as a recipient of information of Ukrainian actions and also creating its information network. Both traditional media and social media provided news about the war and the situation of the Ukrainians themselves. This information aroused both negative emotions, such as fear or sadness, and positive ones, i.e. sympathy for the fighting Ukrainians. Fear was primarily motivated by threats from the Russian side to attack Poland. According to the Media Research Laboratory (2022), as many as 70% of surveyed Poles were worried about the future in relation to the war in Ukraine. Sadness and sympathy, on the other hand, were directed towards the Ukrainian population, both those remaining in their own country and those fleeing the war. These emotions motivated the Polish community to act and get involved in helping Ukraine. Between 24 February and the beginning of March, around 900,000 posts calling for help for Ukrainians were recorded on social media, under the hashtags: #solidarnizukraina (#solidaritywithukraine), #NAPOMOCUKRAINIE (#HELPFORUKRAINE), #PomagamUkraina (#iamhelpingukraine) or #pomocdlaukraina (#aidtoukraine). In addition, during this period, 27,085 publications on helping Ukrainian refugees appeared in the press, radio and television, with a reach of more than 268 million (Brief.pl, 2022). However, public involvement in aid was not limited to the media. Many Poles organized themselves by helping to transport refugees, providing accommodation in their homes, distributing food, etc. Emotions, both positive and negative, stimulated by the information provided laid the foundation for the community to integrate and work towards a common goal. In conclusion, it can be said that information, and especially those transmitted during war, has an impact on the creation of emotions and social attitudes and behaviour. Above all, armed conflict is a situation in which emotions are particularly intense and the information transmitted further intensifies differentiated social feelings. Intense emotions associated with the high intensity of the conflict influence people to interact more often with others, but also to seek or organize help. Thus, it

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can be stated that high levels of conflict can have a positive impact on the building of social networks. In this context, it is worth noting that the more threatened the components of a national identity, the more often this identity appears to be stronger. However, as pointed out, highintensity conflicts also influence polarization and division into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ groups, which is also evident in the war in Ukraine. This negative aspect of the conflict is worth deepening in the empirical research, because with the apparent deepening of the antagonization of groups, a resolved armed dispute in the future may leave a social conflict in the country. In addition, social media has an important impact on the creation of emotions through information, providing information in a quick way and allowing the community to participate in the cyber-community. Through social media, the community can integrate and mobilize for a specific purpose. Additionally, information can permeate beyond national borders, allowing people in different corners of the world to experience together and experience the same emotions about an event, but also to build communities, social networks and engage in helping others.

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CHAPTER 9

My Home, My Ukraine. The Patriotic and Civic Attitudes of Young Ukrainians Joanna Marszałek-Kawa , Antonina Kozyrska , and Danuta Plecka

We will teach the world to be as courageous as Ukrainians. —Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Introduction Patriotism is the value that is close to such notions as justice, freedom, democracy and nation. As Izabela Plieth-Kalinowska points out, it contains complicated ethical, socio-political and cultural issues, which makes it difficult to define this concept in a few short words (2018, pp. 339–340). There is no doubt that it is essential that we study the patriotic attitudes of the young generation, which becomes even more

J. Marszałek-Kawa (B) · A. Kozyrska Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, ´ Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Kozyrska e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_9

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important in the face of threats to the security of the state. The Russian invasion of Ukraine created a special perspective for the analysis of young Ukrainians’ civic and patriotic behaviours. The outbreak of the war on 24 February and the related tragical experiences affected Ukrainians’ emotional attitude to their home country and defined their patriotic behaviours, manifested in the heroic battle for independence and for the right to self-determination. The paper is an attempt to reflect on the young generation of Ukrainians and their attitude to their home country. Based on the obtained empirical data, we undertake to analyse how young Ukrainians define patriotism and to show the prevailing patriotic attitudes. Moreover, we examine the changes that have taken place since 2014, i.e., since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation army and the outbreak of the war in Donbas. Another question that needs to be answered concerns the civic values and virtues that are the most important for young Ukrainians and whether they are ready for sacrifices in their struggle for country’s independence and why.

Literature Review The category and phenomenon of patriotism has been the subject addressed by scholars representing a variety of scientific disciplines: political science, social science, psychology, philosophy, education studies or even security science. The definition of the notion of patriotism should take into consideration both its dictionary meaning and the way it is understood by individuals and groups, and scientific constructs. According to the authors of International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008), the word patria originates from Latin and means “the country.” The word patriot, in turn, derives from the Greek patrio ¯´ t¯es, meaning a “fellow countryman or lineage member.” Patriots are citizens joined by a love of country and the readiness to sacrifice, perhaps even die, for their country. The root of this word means “fatherland” (“‘Patriotism’ vs. ‘Nationalism’”, 2020).

D. Plecka University of Gdansk, ´ Gdansk, ´ Poland e-mail: [email protected]

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Patriotism can be described as being loyal to the sovereign. The notion of patriotism has a number of levels and can be defined in many aspects (Marz˛ecki, 2020, p. 3) and from the variety of perspectives, involving the presentation of its characteristic traits. The most common definitions of patriotism take into account its emotional connotations. Patriotism is explained as a specific state of mind meaning “the love of the country,” “pride” (Federico et al., 2005; Gangl et al., 2016, p. 865), “rational love, a virtue that helps to safeguard the order and the rule of law, which are the conditions of our freedom” (Viroli, 1997), “loyalty and attachment” (Druckman, 1994), “readiness to fight and die for the good of the homeland” (Kateb, 2000, p. 907). For some researchers, patriotism is a value that helps to strengthen social ties within a community and to enhance national loyalty (SpinnerHalev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). Bar-Tal and Staub define patriotism as “a group’s loyalty towards their members and the land they share in living” (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). Daniel Bar-Tal indicates that patriotism is about “devotion and loyalty, which implies possible action for the sake of the society and country” (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. 75; Marz˛ecki, 2020, p. 5). The concept is also sometimes understood as “the love of the home country, respect of and dedication to its culture and heritage, serving its interests and a sense of bond with the history of the country” (Kos et al., 2016, p. 116). In the scholarly literature, a number of types of patriotism are distinguished. Staub (1997) refers to the concept of two kinds of patriotism— “blind patriotism”, which means dogmatic acceptance of and loyalty towards the country’s policy and actions and “constructive patriotism”, opposed to maintaining status quo at any cost, recognizing citizens’ right to criticize and introduce changes that take into consideration the rule of law (Schatz & Staub, 1997). Sommerville (1981), in turn, distinguishes between ignorant and irrational patriotism, and oppositional and rational patriotism. Andrew Oldenquist writes about three types of patriotism: “impartial patriotism, appealing only to universal principles, which first arises from the demands of wider loyalties; sports patriotism, similarly affirming universal principles, valid for each ‘particular team’, which emphasizes universal patriotic judgements; and, finally, loyalty patriotism, which is the real patriotism, being similar to loyalty to one’s family. A nation is a moral community whose members are bound together by a common good that is not instrumental” (Oldenquist, 1982). Aziz et al. (2017,

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p. 845), in turn, distinguish between personal patriotism, which refers to spirit and voluntariness, and official patriotism, which “is fostered by the government and is very symbolic and customary.” Stephen Nathanson makes a distinction between three fundamental forms of the concept: excessive (Scruton, 1990, 2004), moderate (Nathanson, 1989, 2017) or constructive (Davidov, 2009; Schatz et al., 1999). It should be noted that the discussion on patriotism, which has continued for years now, shows that “critics typically have in mind the high-profile version, and the defenders the low-profile, moderate version of it” (Miscevic, 2019). Stephen Nathanson (1993, pp. 34–35; 1997, pp. 311–326) points out that patriotism should be defined with reference to four attitudes: special attachment to one’s home country, a sense of personal identification with the country, particular concern about its well-being and the readiness to sacrifice for the good of it. It is theoretically assumed that the word “patriot” is synonymous with being “a good citizen.” The modern definitions of patriotism refer to the feelings of pride, dedication and attachment to one’s homeland and a sense of community with fellow citizens. Patriotism is not confined to the sphere of emotions. It also involves political (Bar-Tal, 1993, p. 59) and social (Marz˛ecki, 2020) activity and participation. The concept and forms of patriotism have evolved through ages, affected by public sentiment and citizens’ attitude towards the state. Patriotism has not always been defined in terms of civic values (Klampfer, 2000). The critics (Gomberg, 1990; Keller, 2005) still emphasize that it is “an entirely irrational attitude” (Anderson, 1991; MacIntyre, 1984, p. 13), which is characterized by egoism, violates universal values and the principle of solidarity, influences the level of tensions between countries and contributes to the growth of their militarization. Berger and Luckmann (1966) perceive patriotism as “a social construct that develops gradually according to people’s cultural activity.” It should be added here that although the adoption of patriotic attitudes is conducive to the building of a community, it may lead—in some circumstances, especially when those in power make it a doctrine—to social and political conflicts (Longley, 2020). Schatz indicates that blind patriotism adopts the attitude “I would support my country right or wrong.” Constructive patriotism, in turn, allows combining the love of and loyalty to the home country “with the capacity and willingness to question, criticize, and work for change” (Schatz, 2003). Blind patriotism, as the

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opposite of constructive patriotism, may contribute to the growth of fanaticism, chauvinism and, thus, to limiting the rights of minorities (Kateb, 2006). Unlike nationalism, the acceptance of such universal values as freedom, equality and justice creates the positive image of critical patriotism. In line with the assumption made by Schatz et al., constructive patriotism makes it possible to oppose the discrimination of minorities and reinforces the processes of positive changes in this sphere (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153). As a civic attitude, patriotism is usually positively perceived, evoking the feelings of love to the homeland and being associated with activities undertaken for the common good (Marz˛ecki, 2020). Maurizio Viroli points to the differences between nationalism and patriotism, stressing the positive aspects of the latter, arising mainly from its significance for the development of state institutions. In this context, nationalism appears to refer to the attachment to the ethnic, cultural and spiritual homogeneity of a nation. Patriotic attitudes, in turn, are open and embody universal freedom that is rooted in the specific culture and history of a particular people (Viroli, 1997). Altıkulaç makes a similar distinction (2016), emphasizing that “patriotism has a nature of both military and cultural protection. On the other hand, nationalism cannot be separated from the desire of authority. All nationalistic views have a common aim, i.e., providing reputation and power for the nation is more important than the individual himself.” George Orwell also had a positive view of patriotism. In his essay Notes on Nationalism, published in 1945, he defined it as “devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally” (Orwell, 1945). Bar-Tal (1993, pp. 55–58) distinguishes between two principal functions of patriotism: (1) performed in the life of individuals; its aim is to strengthen their sense of belonging and support their social identity; (2) implemented in social groups; it contributes to social integration, strengthens group cohesion, mobilizes members of the group to act on its behalf and encourages them to make efforts and devote their time and money to the group. According to Mason (1997), patriotism assumes that we have our duties to other citizens and to members of our families. Social and political reality, activity in the sphere of culture, economic conditions, historical experience and the state of a threat to the security of the state have all a real impact on the values people share, including the

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growth or drop of popularity of patriotic attitudes among citizens. Referring to Marz˛ecki, it should be noted that in a number of post-Communist countries, the concept of patriotism may be instrumentally used by some political parties for their own goals. By becoming an element of the ideology of some groups, it can be used for marginalizing minorities and discrimination, and it can influence voters’ political preferences (Marz˛ecki, 2020, p. 4). What appears to be an effective tool in the hands of populists are positive and negative emotions, which not only serve the purpose of seeking the solutions to the current problems and potential challenges, but also contribute to the emergence of divisions in the society, into so-called bad and good patriots (Marz˛ecki, 2020). There is a strong link between patriotism and a sense of national identity. According to Tonga and Aksoy, “the national identity is dependent upon the myths, the history shared, common cultural values, and cooperation between people” (2014, p. 173). At present, the notion of patriotism is sometimes misinterpreted and, thus, it is often depreciated. Research shows that young generations raised in the post-Cold War era did not associate patriotism with the military narrative (Müller, 2020, p. 45). It was also observed in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. A shift from the individualistic to collective definition of freedom practically translated into the high level of distrust of state institutions, additionally strengthened by increasing disappointment with the reforms carried out in the 1990s. The lack of sufficient intellectual capital also played a part, especially because the Western models that liberal political elites used deviated from the traditional values that the society was based on. The fast pace of economic and social transformations, with the well-being of the society still at a relatively low level, led to a wave of disappointment and the reduction of support for the implemented institutional reforms. It was also the underlying cause of the lessening popularity of patriotic attitudes and values among young citizens. This is pointed out by, among others, Altıkulaç (2016), who emphasizes that contemporary “youth do not want to be blindly bounded as citizens.” Kos et al. (2016), examining changes of patriotism in Poland, come to the conclusion that “what disturbs the modern sense of patriotism are the advancing globalization processes and a kind of fascination with the West - its culture, technology and modernity. This leads to the crisis of patriotic attitudes among young Poles.” According to the authors, this phenomenon is reinforced by the crisis of

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values shared, lowering the level of education, and the economic condition of the country, including the high inflation and unemployment rates (Kos et al., 2016, p. 120). It must be indicated that in the case of Poland, which, starting from the first free parliamentary election in June 1989, set a Western course, declaring its respect for the democratic principles of the rule of law, after three decades scholars observed the gradual erosion of patriotic attitudes, especially among young Poles. There is no doubt that the same trends will be visible in the societies of other Central and East European countries. The events of the Orange Revolution and the 1st Maidan exerted an enormous impact on the Ukrainian society, initiating the process of the conscious construction of a new national identity. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing bloody war in Donbas, which the Western world seemed to ignore, only accelerated the pace of changes. The vast majority of Ukrainians decided that they want to live and work in a sovereign and independent country, which respects human rights, i.e., the principles of equality and justice and the rule of law. It would be a truism to say that the future of a country belongs to the young. In the face of the war and the heroic defence of the homeland, these words have taken on a stronger meaning. It is the young Ukrainians who, quoting John F. Kennedy, “ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country” (Kennedy, 1961), will be rebuilding the political, social and economic strength of the country.

Methodology The empirical research looks into the perception of the concept of patriotism and patriotic attitudes and ideas among young Ukrainians, which is a significant factor in the building of national identity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We used both the quality and quantity analysis to interpret the findings of our study. The article uses such research methods as comparison, observation and text analysis. Moreover, from 15 March to 15 April 2022, we conducted 500 interviews in the reference group consisting of young Ukrainians. We also uploaded a questionnaire survey in Ukrainian on the Internet. It was specially designed to meet the needs of our study. We analysed the responses from 160 selected questionnaires, taking into consideration the profile of the research group. We sought, among others, the answer to the question what values were the most important in the life of young Ukrainians. The additional goal of the study was to compare the results of studies of patriotism carried out

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after the annexation of Crimea by Russia—by Sociological Group “Rating” in July 2014 and Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiative” Foundation at the end of 2019—with the data we collected a month after the Russian invasion of independent Ukraine. An important aim was to determine whether the tragic events related to the outbreak of such a large-scale war had led to fundamental changes among the young generation with respect to a sense of patriotism and civic values shared.

Findings The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the beginning of the armed conflict in Donbas stimulated the growth of patriotic sentiment in Ukraine. The survey of Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine), conducted on 10–18 July 2014,1 reveals that 86% of Ukrainians felt the patriots of their home country. This represented an increase of 10% from 2010. In the same period, the percentage of those who did not feel patriotic dropped from 15 to 6%. Patriotic attitudes prevailed in all the regions of the country, with the West, North and Centre showing the highest level. They were the most common among better educated, higher earning and Ukrainian-speaking citizens. What can be considered the measure of patriotism is the attitude to the issue of Ukraine’s independence. Within one year, we observed a significant increase in the number of its supporters—by 15% across the country (from 61 to 76%). The indicator was still on the low level only in Donbas (34%), although the number of the opponents of independence considerably decreased as compared to the study of 2013 (from 57 to 34%). It was the younger generation of Ukrainians that showed the highest degree of support for the idea of Ukraine’s independence. Within five years, the level of self-identification as “the citizen of Ukraine” rose by 7% (from 57 to 64%). With the exception of Donbas, it prevailed over other types of identity, e.g., regional (30%), ethnic (21%), European (8%—an increase of 3% from 2010) or Russian (4%—an increase by two and a half times from 2012). In just a few years, some changes have occurred in the perception of what is the subject of national pride. People have become prouder of their land (35%), state (29%), native tongue (23%) and national symbols, 1 The study, conducted with the application of face-to-face interview method in the group of 2,000 respondents at the age of 18 or older, was not conducted in occupied Crimea.

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such as an anthem, an emblem or a flag (14%—an increase of 10% from 2012). The less significant elements included songs, festivals and customs, the nature of the country and the achievements of its athletes (a drop to 19%, 14% and 6%, respectively). The young, who are of particular interest to us, showed the largest support for the idea of Ukraine’s independence (82% of people aged 18–29 and 80% of those aged 30–39). They also ranked first as regards their self-identification as “the citizens of Ukraine” (67 and 68%, respectively) and as Europeans (14 and 9%) (Sociological Group “Rating,” 2014). The above findings reflect the evolution of social awareness accompanying generational change. Young people, born and raised in the new political reality and free of Soviet indoctrination (“the generation of independence”), feel more bonded with the Ukrainian state. The Revolution of Dignity revealed the advanced stage of this internal transformation and the war of Donbas further intensified it. On the other hand, remaining faithful to patriotic values, this group is more open to the 2016). Owing world, the Western lifestyle and liberal views (Olszanski, ´ to the growing popularity of the new media and globalization processes, young Ukrainians aged 15–24 were even closer to their European peers than to their older countrymen (Gpicak, 2014, p. 96). However, the hybrid nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict posed a challenge to the Ukrainian government as it had to work out a comprehensive model of patriotic education. To this end, the 2016–2020 Strategy of the National and Patriotic Education of Young People was adopted in 2015. This problem was also addressed in the 2016 Concept of the Development of Ukraine’s Security and Defence Sector (Cbomin, 2016, pp. 101–102). The abovementioned survey of 2014 analysed the level of patriotism in the quantitative aspect mainly. As regards the qualitative approach, the study of Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiative” Foundation, conducted jointly with the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in December 2019,2 provides more details concerning the understanding of the notion of patriotism. According to the respondents, three most important elements of patriotism are: the love of the home country ( 80%), readiness to defend it, including defence with arms (64%) and respecting the national law (56%). Moreover, they understood patriotism as raising 2 The survey was conducted from 13 to 18 December 2019 among people aged 18 or above in all regions of Ukraine, except for occupied Crimea and those parts of Donbas which were not controlled by Kiev.

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children in the love of and respect for the home country (58%), the knowledge of the history and culture of one’s country (51%). Among less important indicators were participation in elections (38%), the conscientious performance of one’s duties (36%), the skilful use of the native tongue (35%), paying taxes (30%), participation in the public life (28%) and respect for the authorities (26%). The smallest number of the respondents correlated patriotism with one’s involvement in combatting corruption and other failures of the state (21%). The survey distinguished the groups of respondents on account of the regional instead of age criterion. For example, in the Western region, more attention was paid to the knowledge of the native tongue (60%), while in the East—to the respect for the authorities (42%). The study confirmed the increasing trend of self-identification as the citizens of Ukraine (75%) and a drop of regional self-identification (16%) (“Patpiotizm, mova ta zovnixnbopolitiqni ppiopiteti”, 2020). The invasion of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 came as another shock, which stimulated social mobilization in Ukraine, including the strengthening of patriotic values. Our study showed that 90% of the respondents considered themselves to be patriots (an increase of 4% from 2014). Just like in the survey of 2019, the majority perceived patriotism, first of all, as the love of the home country. In a wider sense, this feeling was associated with dedication to and faith in the country, the respect of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and tradition and of national emblems, and with the knowledge of the Ukrainian language and history. A strong and emotional bond of Ukrainians with their home country is reflected in the responses about “the limitless love of the homeland”, the statements such as “its pain is my pain, its happiness is my happiness” or those referring to the lyrics of the Ukrainian anthem: “we’ll not spare either our souls or bodies to get freedom.” The last thread, concerning the readiness to defend the interests of the home country, its sovereignty and territorial integrity at any cost, frequently comes up in the respondents’ answers. They are willing to make huge sacrifices (including the loss of life) in return for the freedom, well-being and future of their country and nation, especially in the current war circumstances. What they believe to be a manifestation of patriotism are

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different forms of aid (mainly voluntary activities,3 but also as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—AFU), to support fellow countrymen and the state. This is accompanied by faith in the victory in the war against Russia and the feeling of pride of the state’s actions in the face of the current threats. The respondents are proud to be Ukrainian, and affiliation with the Ukrainian nation is perceived in terms of citizenship (a political nation) rather than a genetic bond (an ethnic nation). For some, physical proximity to their home country was important (e.g., staying in the country, the choice of studies in Ukraine), respecting law regulations. The respect for the authorities and the institution of the state itself were mentioned quite rarely, though. As the examples of patriotic attitudes, the people under survey indicated actions aimed at defending the country and helping war casualties (e.g., voluntary conscription and service in the army and the territorial defence, “fighting against the Russians on all sections of hybrid confrontation,” giving up the idea of emigration to a safe place and resisting the aggressor instead, volunteering, humanitarian aid). Given the hybrid character of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it must be stressed that the respondents recognized the importance of activities in the information field (e.g., counteracting disinformation, shaping the positive image of the country and nation in the world). What was seen as patriotic were also such civic attitudes as taking part in demonstrations, patriotic campaigns and elections, the integration of the society despite past differences, citizens’ participation. Another group includes attitudes supporting the development of the national economy, raising people’s living standard and enhancing human capital (e.g., the purchase of local products, new investment projects, start-ups, financial aid to fellow countrymen, paying taxes, the conscientious performance of one’s professional duties and the development of education and culture). Some specific examples of patriotic attitudes were given (Ukrainian border guards defending Snake Island on 24 February 2022, and the defenders of the Donetsk Airport—so-called cyborgs—or members of the respondents’ family). The role models of a collective patriot most often include soldiers, men who volunteered to the AFU and the territorial defence, volunteers and medics who help them and the political leaders. This group is sometimes 3 The events of 2014 stimulated the dissemination of the institution of volunteering in Ukraine, especially the activities related to supporting the Ukrainian military troops fighting in Donbas and the aid to refugees from this region (see Olszanski, ´ 2016).

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expanded to include the whole Ukrainian nation, priests who organize humanitarian aid, teachers and scholars who disseminate the Ukrainian national narrative and the population of occupied cities, who refuse to collaborate with the aggressor. Who is the personalized role model of a modern patriot is the current President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He rejected the idea of being evacuated from Kiev despite a huge risk; he exhibits determination and courage in defending the home country against the Russian invaders and in representing the state’s interests abroad; he is the real leader of the nation, etc. The growth of his popularity is confirmed by sociological studies. While only 24% of Ukrainians would have voted for Zelenskyy in January 2022,4 after a week of the war against Russia, the president’s activity was supported by 93% of the society (Sociological Group “Rating”, 2022). None of the respondents, however, mentioned the name of the current Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, whom Ukraine owes its military successes. His merits are promoted by Ukrainian social media users, though. As other role models of patriotism, the people under survey mentioned contemporary and historical figures from the political and cultural life of Ukraine (e.g., Ivan Mazepa, Mychajlo Hruševskyj, Viacheslav Chornovil, Leonid Kuchma, Stepan Bandera, Andrey Sheptytsky, Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, Vasyl Stus, Lina Kostenko, Bohdan Stupka, Andriy Kuzmenko, Serhiy Prytula), and other countries (Golda Meir, Dzokhar Dudayev, Che Guevara), and people from their immediate surroundings. Among universal values, the home country was ranked third, after the family and respect for other people (Table 9.1). The notion of a home country was understood as the place of birth, growing up and education, often referred to as home. This is the homeland, the place where the family, friends and family graves are, the place where people want to return to and which provides a sense of security, freedom and happiness (“my castle”). It evokes warm associations (“a part of the heart,” “a part of the soul”), it is idealized (“the most beautiful nature and landscapes in the world,” “it has exceptional air that you breathe deeply with”), or even sanctified (“holy land,” “life,” “everything”). This shows the perception of a home country on a largely emotional level. There were also attempts

4 As compared to 2021, the support dropped by 2%, with the simultaneous growth in the ratings of the main opponent, Petro Poroshenko (from 17 to 21%) (por. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2022).

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to define the notion of a home country in scientific terms (“the territorialpolitical, socio-cultural community of people sharing the same values”) and a distinction was made between the “small homeland” as the place of birth (a town or a region) and the “big homeland” as the country of origin and residence (Ukraine). In both senses, the Homeland is thus perceived as not only a place, but also a community of people. Because of the high rank of a home country in the hierarchy of values, it comes as no surprise that in the current political situation of Ukraine as many as 96% of the respondents (77% definitely yes, 19% yes) are ready to fight for it no matter what the costs and losses will be (about 4% were hesitant). The readiness to fight for the home country during the war was recognized as the biggest manifestation of patriotism (4.57 points on the scale from 1 to 5), followed by—the respect for the law (4.30) and the knowledge of the history of the state (3.99) (Table 9.2). The need for making such huge sacrifices was perceived as, first of all, the cost of freedom, as well as the right to learn one’s native tongue and history, and the rights to one’s identity, the future of the nation, the Table 9.1 The individual significance of the particular values on the scale from 1 to 10 (lowest-highest) Value Good Justice Family Friendship Religion Home country Home Job Power Money Sincerity Conscientiousness Keeping one’s word Respect for the law Respect for other people Source Authors’ own work

Arithmetic mean (M) 7.62 7.97 8.44 7.32 6.05 8.19 7.76 6.36 5.43 5.73 7.72 7.63 8.17 7.85 8.32

Median 9 9.5 10 8 7 9 9 7 5 6 9 9 10 9 10

Mode

Standard deviation (SD)

10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10

2.842 2.933 2.802 2.688 3.032 2.634 2.833 2.724 2.911 2.702 2.746 2.697 2.833 2.782 2.628

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civilization choices and geopolitical priorities. Ukrainians’ historical experience was often referred to when justifying the need for continuing the battle for an independent country to the end. The respondents explained that the home country must be defended because it is the highest value, the sovereign and democratic state, fertile land, and “losing it means losing oneself.” Although the responses were full of pathos, they exuded sincerity, the genuine love of and concern about the country which started an uneven fight for its survival and the right of self-determination. The study also shows that among civic attitudes, the highest value is attributed to the “responsibility for one’s actions,” as it is significantly correlated with the “responsibility for one’s words” (≤0.922). The “responsibility for one’s words” to a large degree correlates with such values as “self-discipline” (≤0.745) or the “respect for the rights of people of different religions or traditions” (≤0.797). The respondents Table 9.2 The assessment of the relevance of patriotism manifestations on the scale from 1 to 5 (lowest-highest) Manifestations of patriotism Knowledge of the national anthem Readiness to defend the home country in case of war Knowledge of national history Raising a flag at national holidays Emotional bond with state symbols Sufficient knowledge of the Ukrainian language Voting in elections Paying taxes Impeccable manners in contacts with foreigners Supporting Ukrainian sports teams Participation in the life of a local community Respect for the law Participation in the celebration of national holidays Source Authors’ own work

Arithmetic mean (M)

Median

Mode

Standard deviation (SD)

3.46 4.57

4 5

5 5

1.347 0.910

3.99 2.99 3.38

4 3 3

5 3 3

1.077 1.223 1.203

3.86

4

5

1.105

3.75 3.93 3.85

4 4 4

5 5 5

1.224 1.232 1.136

3.08 3.60

3 4

3 3

1.218 1.066

4.30 3.38

5 3

5 3

1.030 1.138

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also stressed the importance of “acting for the common good”, indicating its relationship with the “responsibility for one’s words” (≤0.729) and “actions” (≤0.728), also relating them to “solidarity and cooperation with other community members” (the significance of correlation on the level of ≤0.796). Moderate correlation was observed in the relationship between the attitude of “socialization and activity in the non-state sphere” and “self-discipline” (≤0.510), “criticism of the authorities and civil courage” (≤0.508). No interrelationship was found between a “sense of patriotism,” “defending the home country” and other values (there is no correlation here or it is negligible). The attitude of “defending the home country” and a “sense of patriotism” are weakly related to each other (≤0.364). It can be noted that the respondents were not quite convinced that the defence of the home country requires defined patriotic attitudes. These data are illustrated in Table 9.3. Furthermore, they do not associate patriotic attitudes with the qualities that traditionally define them. There is only a slight relationship between a sense of patriotism and expressing it through “the knowledge of the national anthem” (≤0.133), “the knowledge of national history” (≤0.194), “raising a flag at national holidays” (≤0.084) or other symbolic behaviours, such as “supporting Ukrainian sports teams” (≤0.094), “participation in the celebrations of national holidays” (0.039) and “emotional bond with state symbols” (≤0.002). The most significant correlation coefficient was recorded in the recognition of patriotic attitudes expressed through “the respect for the law” (≤0.245) and “paying taxes” (≤0.174). It should be pointed out, however, that the symbolic manifestation of patriotic behaviours has little or even negligible importance for the people under survey (Table 9.4). The overwhelming majority of the respondents consider themselves to be patriots: as many as 92.19% of women and 81.25% of men. It should be added here that the difference between the examined age groups is statistically significant. In the age group of up to 35, a sense of patriotism is expressed by 86.02% of the respondents, while in the age group of 36 and above, this percentage is 95.52%. The sense of patriotism is not affected by political views, which is certainly related to the time at which the study was conducted—after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What should be emphasized is the fact that 93.91% of people with higher education perceive themselves as patriots, while the figure is 80% in the group with the lower level of education. The readiness to defend the

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Defending the home country Self-discipline Respect for the rights of people of different religions or traditions Criticism of the authorities and civil courage Responsibility for one’s words Responsibility for one’s actions Activity in the political sphere Socialization and activity in the nonstate sphere Solidarity and cooperation with other community members Activity for the common good

0.364*

–

−0.063

−0.001

–

0.007

−0.009

0.729*

–

−0.146

−0.079

0.361*

0.470*

Solidarity and cooperation with other community members

Socialization and activity in the non-state sphere

Activity in the political sphere

Responsibility for one’s actions

Responsibility for one’s words

Criticism of the authorities and civil courage

Respect for the rights of people of different religions or traditions

Self-discipline

Defending the home country

Sense of patriotism

Table 9.3 Correlation coefficient r for the individual weight of civic attitudes, a sense of patriotism and the evaluation of the need for defending the home country

–

−0.029

−0.027

0.745*

0.797*

0.487*

–

−0.024

−0.048

0.726*

0.755*

0.391*

0.922*

–

−0.088

−0.024

0.500*

0.486*

0.487*

0.575*

0.534*

–

−0.047

−0.026

0.510*

0.566*

0.508*

0.686*

0.641*

0.695*

–

0.026

0.017

0.570*

0.598*

0.399*

0.682*

0.672*

0.603*

0.722*

–

−0.031

0.015

0.569*

0.618*

0.338*

0.729*

0.728*

0.522*

0.688*

0.796*

Note *Significant result for p < 0.001, ** for p < 0.01, *** for p < 0.05 Source Authors’ own work

home country at any cost is the most strongly declared by the respondents with higher education.

Conclusions The research we conducted and the observation of the current situation confirm the thesis that eight years of the war against Russia have solidified national identity among young Ukrainian citizens, who not only declare, but also show attachment to their home country through their everyday activity and struggle. The events of 2014, followed by the Russian invasion in 2022 constituted the factors that stimulated the significant growth of patriotic

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Table 9.4 Correlation coefficient r for the assessment of the manifestations of patriotism, a sense of patriotism and the evaluation of the need for defending the home country

Note *Significant result for p < 0.001, ** for p < 0.01, *** for p < 0.05 Source Authors’ own work

sentiment. In the very period between those two events, the level of patriotism rose by at least few per cent. While two years ago Ukrainians found the love of their home country to be the biggest manifestation of patriotism, they now believe it is the readiness to defend one’s country no matter what the costs and possible losses are. If we also include fighting with arms, we can see the clearly growing trend of this form of patriotism. Ukrainian people still believe that the respect for the law is a significant expression of patriotism.

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Therefore, in the war circumstances, the Ukrainian patriot is ready to defend their home country and its freedom, even at the cost of their own life. The notion of patriotism itself is associated with the love of and dedication to the home country, and the respect for the culture, history and tradition of the country. The home country, in turn, is perceived as the place of birth, home and homeland. What is more, although—in the conditions of the war against Russia—Ukrainians see the concepts of patriotism and home country with a large dose of emotions; these feelings and manifestations of patriotism cannot be deemed to be “blind patriotism.” Ukrainian people are driven by the readiness to sacrifice in the battle for the sovereignty and freedom of their country, as well as by the willingness to build a democratic, lawful and prosperous state, which testifies to attitudes from the sphere of constructive patriotism. The higher level of education still translates into the stronger sense of patriotism. As far as the age is concerned, these proportions turned out to be reversed. At present, more people in the age group of 36 and above consider themselves to be patriots. The role models of a collective patriot include soldiers of the AFU, members of the territorial defence, volunteers and medics. In the individual dimension, it is President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy who is the “face” of a modern patriot. This is owing to his personal courage and high media and political-international activity after the Russian invasion in February 2022. His frequent speeches addressed at the nation heat up the spirit of patriotism, while his appeals to and meetings with state leaders and representatives of international organizations keep the “Ukrainian issue” in the centre of global attention. Zelenskyy is seen as the voice and personified image of a valiant state and a suffering nation. On the other hand, the results of the study may reflect the continued perception of the important role of the head of state in the political system of Ukraine, which is typical of post-Soviet countries. Both the willingness to defend the home country in the situation of the biggest threat, loyalty to the law and activities taken for the common good form a sense of national community, to which representatives of various ethnic groups belong. In this sense, this view is close to the modern, positive vision of patriotism, which is different from nationalism. Nevertheless, we need a long-term perspective to assess how the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict will influence the perception of the Russian minority in Ukraine and what impact it will have on respecting its rights.

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This aspect, as well as the level of patriotism in the post-war era, will require further research. The rise of patriotic sentiment is not only the effect of the personal reflection of the people under survey based on their own thoughts or the opinions of experts and Internet users. It is also the result of propaganda activities, including those taken by state authorities, institutions and Ukrainian mass media. They are becoming actively involved in the shaping of patriotic attitudes in order to sustain the fighting spirit in the nation. A good example of this is a series of TV spots entitled “Ukraine – the nation of heroes,” produced as part of a nationwide media campaign launched jointly by Ukrainian TV broadcasters. In turn, the narrative of “Ukraine – the Shield of Europe”, defending the borders of the European Union and the Western civilization, is targeted at the decision-makers and inhabitants of the West. The aim is to motivate them to help Ukraine in the ongoing war against Russia and to intensify efforts towards its accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

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Cbomin, C. (2016). Ppoblemi patpiotiqnogo vixovannR v Ukpa|ni: teopetiko-metodologiqniN ta ppavoviN acpekt. Ctpategiqni ppiopiteti, 2(39), 96–105. Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine). (2014). Dynamics of patriotic moods. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/dinamika_pat rioticheskih_nastroeniy.html Sociological Group “Rating” (Rating Group Ukraine). (2022). National poll: Ukraine at war (March 1, 2022). https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukr aine/obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_1_marta_2022. html Sommerville, J. (1981). Patriotism and war. Ethics, 91(4), 568–578. Spinner-Halev, J., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2003). National identity and self-esteem. Perspectives on Politics, 1(3), 515–632. Staub, E. (1997). Blind versus constructive patriotism: Moving from embeddedness in the group to critical loyalty and action. In D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), Patriotism: In the lives of individuals and nations (pp. 213–228). Nelson-Hall Publishers. Tonga, D., & Aksoy, B. (2014). Evaluation of the patriotic attitudes of the prospective teachers according to various variables. International Journal of Academic Research, 6(1), 172–178. https://doi.org/10.7813/2075-4124. 2014/6-2/B.24 Viroli, M. (1997). For love of country: An essay on patriotism and nationalism. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019829 3585.001.0001/acprof-9780198293583

CHAPTER 10

Emotions and Political Knowledge and Their Role in the Mobilization of the International Community on the Example of the War in Ukraine Danuta Plecka

and Agnieszka Szpak

Introduction Photos with brutal images of the war in Ukraine occupy the most important places on Internet portals every day, but also on the front pages of traditional press and television news services. They are not only supposed to be a vision of destruction and human tragedy, but they are supposed to trigger emotions, whose task is also to mobilize the international community to condemn the aggression of the Russian Federation, which is to be used to launch further aid packages. The situation in Ukraine constitutes

D. Plecka (B) University of Gdansk, ´ Gdansk, ´ Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Szpak Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, ´ Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_10

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an international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It began in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed the Crimea and started to support the separatist forces in Donetsk and Luhansk. With Russian military forces attacking the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, this armed conflict entered a new phase. Before the 2022 aggression, the events in the Crimean Peninsula could clearly be classified as an occupation, while the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine was at the least a non-international armed conflict. However, one could find convincing arguments that even before 2022, the conflict had been internationalized due to the participation of Russian military forces (see Reeves & Wallace, 2015, p. 364). The international community widely condemned the Russian invasion against Ukraine. The situation is still evolving but at the time of writing (February 2023), the international community responded in several ways as will be discussed in section “Mobilization of the International Community in Formal Activities”. This is related to media messages affecting the imagination of recipients, stimulating emotions, supplementing political knowledge about the war in Ukraine, and finally mobilizing the international community to take action to end the war and settle accounts with the aggressor.

Methodology The research aim of this paper is to show how emotions and political knowledge influence the mobilization of the international community in undertaking formal actions. The images of the destroyed cities of Mariupol (Balevic, 2022), Irpin (Ochab, 2022) and Kharkov (BBC, 2022) as well as the killings of civilians in Bucha (Amnesty International, 2022a) have shocked the conscience of mankind and raised the question of their legal classification. The structure of the article is as follows: after the introduction and background information on the armed conflict in Ukraine, the authors will examine the relationship between the stimulation of negative emotions, and political knowledge and how these phenomena influence the mobilization of the international community in order to end the war in Ukraine and bring the aggressor to account. As to the factual side, the authors necessarily rely on open-source research such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports as well as journalistic analysis. The situation is still unfolding and every

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day new allegations are arising. This main part will be followed by some concluding remarks.

Emotions and Political Knowledge Images of the war in Ukraine, like other violent images, evoke emotions that are often perceived as the opposite of political knowledge. At the same time, it is forgotten that “politics can be an expression of personal emotions” (Lasweel, 1986), and emotions themselves are not outside of political knowledge but they are its elementary component. First of all, because what is political is emotional—it concerns each of us, concerns matters that interest us, that we negotiate, defining the limits of individual freedom, the scope of cooperation with the community, autonomy and the system of power (Slaby & Bens, 2019). It is difficult to define emotions as individual phenomena, because they build “feeling rules” that are modelled by shared or conflicting values (Hohschild, 1983). Therefore, we will treat emotions as mental states with specific intentional content that are affectively directed at significant goals—for example, fear, jealousy or hatred (Slaby & Muhlhoff, 2019). Thus, political emotions will constitute a systematic relationship between the individual and the community and will be an expression of involvement in controversial political and social issues (Szanto & Slaby, 2000). Emotions, although rarely but systematically studied by political scientists, are the basis of the relationship between politicians and citizens. Despite prophecies of a crisis of democracy or its principle of representativeness, there is still a discourse between politicians and voters. Evoking emotions requires the use of specific language, which is usually dominated by negative emotions, which allow you to build a framework for conflict. The latter, for example, during election campaigns is intended to define the framework of the conflict and exclude political opponents’ narratives or emphasize the us-them dichotomy (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2007). Of course, they are addressed to a specific person to a small extent, as they are primarily intended to serve a wide audience and reach a wide spectrum of voters. Opponents, on the other hand, are supposed to be presented in an attractive light by the media, which in effect is a fairly carefully planned political strategy of the actors, intended primarily to mobilize society, especially supporters of a particular political option. Emotions are also an instrument used by populists, who usually by triggering their negative mechanism win with those who claim that

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proper management of the dynamics of emotions in democracies can lead to their development and consolidation (Richards, 2010). Disregarding emotions as the foundations of shaping political knowledge means that populists are able to use their negative manifestations to build social mobilization, which in turn contributes to a large extent to the victory of non-democratic forces. However, this does not fundamentally change the view that emotions are important for political rivalry. They contribute to building identity, strengthening cooperation, political community and involvement in social and political life. At the same time, this idealistic image is destroyed by the fact that emotions can also have negative consequences, contributing to the formation of radical or populist attitudes (Smirnov et al., 2010). Politicians willingly reach for instruments that trigger emotions, thanks to which they activate specific mechanisms of individual action of citizens or stimulate social mobilization. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa and Patryk Wawrzynski, ´ referring to the model of saving emotions by Eric Groneudyk and Antoin Banks (2014, p. 360), indicate that social mobilization is primarily driven by emotions of fear and anxiety. An emotional system sensitive to threats makes people ready to take action (Wawrzynski ´ & Marszałek-Kawa, 2022). Fear and anxiety are part of negative emotions (Plecka & Turska-Kawa, 2016), which mobilizes the desire to overcome the threat, striving to protect personal and other people’s interests. These predictors are also conducive to taking risky actions (Luxton, 2016). Fear and anxiety also increase the need to look for explanations of the situation, which is the basis for searching for information that is the basis of general knowledge, and in specific cases, political knowledge (Weeks, 2015). Positive emotions play a different role, as they are the basis for satisfying the curiosity of individuals, which in turn shape, develop and strengthen both human and social capital (Fredrickson, 2001). However, regardless of whether emotions have a negative or positive dimension, it should be noted that, firstly, their activation can change the political situation as well as political preferences. Secondly, they are triggered by such a simple mechanism as is commonly believed. Emotions are not in a psychological, social or political vacuum, quite the opposite. They are closely related to knowledge, including political knowledge, and to a large extent their activation in the political sphere depends on the level of political knowledge, both in the individual and collective dimension (Barrett, 2017). And finally, thirdly, emotions are a resource for social mobilization both within a society and in the international arena. It is

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difficult to separate emotions from political knowledge, because thinking and making decisions involve emotional feelings and processes. However, this is not quite an obvious statement, because separating emotions from political knowledge has a fairly long tradition related to the development of liberalism and its rationalist paradigm about the individual (Plecka, 2022). At the same time, in this context, it is necessary to distinguish sudden, clear and strong emotions from those that accompany us in the background and are quite difficult to notice, but constant. For political knowledge, constant emotions are quite important, also referred to as integral emotions, which result from the current judgement or choice and permanently strongly shape decision-making by individuals (D˛abrowski, 2014). On the other hand, intentional, violent and strong emotions are not conducive to make rational decisions and are not conducive to acquiring systematic political knowledge (D˛abrowski, 2014). Thanks to emotions, social mobilization is possible, i.e. specific rules that can be used to convince people to act (Rogers et al., 2018). Of course, social mobilization is an irrational phenomenon and therefore it combines well with emotions. Its irrationality consists primarily in the fact that an individual must incur relatively high individual costs in order to achieve minimal individual benefits, and very significant for the community. Therefore, political mobilization, also in the international space, must meet specific individual criteria so that people are convinced of the importance of the actions taken. First of all, it should give the impression of an individual relationship with other participants in the mobilization. In addition, the act or omission of action is subject to the judgement of others. Moreover, social mobilization also contains normative premises: it communicates what others think should be done in the context of what is actually done, and finally it is important for the identity of the individual. We adjust behaviour to how we perceive ourselves or how we would like to be perceived. All these elements serve the individual to appear in the network of connections (Noah, Goldstein, Fox 2018). The question arises, then, what is the relationship between emotions and social mobilization and political knowledge, and is it a necessary condition for participation or taking individual positions in relation to international events, e.g. the war in Ukraine? It is assumed that political knowledge is “a set of facts about politics stored in long-term memory” (Carpini & Keeter, 1993). A citizen acquires knowledge so that, as well-informed, he/she can participate in the life of the entire community. At the same time, the “set of facts” distinguishes political knowledge from unverified information or repeated

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opinions that cannot be verified in terms of their truth. Thus, political knowledge is based on facts, not unverifiable opinions appearing in the public sphere. Secondly, political knowledge is distinguished by “information” that is not identical with the values or attitudes represented. Nor can it be identified with the beliefs of individuals or the opinions expressed by them. Finally, the information that forms the basis of political knowledge is stored in long-term memory, which means that the citizen makes decisions based on information that is not in short-term memory, as it is very quickly rejected by him/her. It is also quite often noted that political literacy is “a measure of a citizen’s ability to correctly answer a specific set of factual questions” (Pastramadzhier, 2015). At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the basis for acquiring political knowledge is interest in specific phenomena, including political ones. Instruments that trigger emotions are most often used for this purpose, which results in a desire to acquire political knowledge. Knowledge about politics has specific functions to fulfil in every society. The most frequently mentioned is the belief that it has a significant impact on civic participation, which is an important element of the development, stability and consolidation of democracy. However, it should be noted that political knowledge is also an important element of social development and plays a very important role in both individual and group behaviour (Galston, 2011). Thanks to political knowledge, citizens become competent participants in political life. This applies, as numerous studies show, primarily to electoral participation, but narrowing the problem down to this issue is a significant limitation of the impact of political knowledge on social life. This overlooks the fact that political knowledge makes it possible to rationalize and understand the personal beliefs of individuals. In addition, it significantly increases the coherence of views on various issues over a long period of time. This, in turn, allows for the stability of political attitudes, and this translates into political behaviuor. It also allows for the identification of an individual in the processes of social mobilization. A high level of political knowledge is also important for understanding political events, their course and social consequences. Without even a basic knowledge of political institutions or processes, it is difficult to understand the mechanisms that govern politics. This causes the citizen to withdraw from participation, because he/ she does not understand the reasons for the necessity of his/her participation. He/she is unable to understand the course and meaning of the political debate, as well as consciously participate in political processes.

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Moreover, the citizen is unable to understand the causal link between personal expectations and political action. It becomes just an amoeba that can be easily controlled. Instead of a competent citizen, a gentleman in politics, a scared non-participant of social and political life appears. This translates not only into limiting civic participation in all spheres of politics, but also into increasing social and political distrust, and finally into political alienation. However, the greatest consequence for international relations and their quality is an increase in distrust towards other nations, as well as a lack of understanding for the actions of states and supranational institutions in the event of armed conflicts. This may lead to the inability to take action in the global sphere and the lack of mobilization of the international community. In this case, it is not enough to trigger emotions to mobilize the international community. An appropriate level of political knowledge is needed to underpin it. Lack of knowledge in this case will result in the development of an international crisis and escalation of the conflict. Conversely, a high level of political knowledge of a citizen contributes to the understanding of the need to engage in a conflict, as well as understanding of the operation of supranational institutions and the accompanying political processes. In addition, beliefs held by individuals are important in this approach. These are, as Brayan Caplan described them, “view preferences” (Caplan, 2017), and these depend on emotions, but also ideologies that do not allow for objectivity. Thus, the process of acquiring political knowledge is significantly limited and is a copy of our preferences and views. They are based on emotions, not the search for truth. Individual behaviour, contrary to appearances, is a threat to the entire society. It leads to building political order only on imagination and not facts, which is an easy prey for populists, but also interest groups and lobbyists. Acquiring knowledge about politics is an individual matter. Whether an individual has the predisposition to move from common knowledge (or even ignorance of politics) to substantive (or expert) knowledge depends on many factors. This remark is important because the acquisition of political knowledge shapes political thinking. It is based on a specific set of courts that form the so-called mind map or mind model. It is based on the formulation of diagnostic, explanatory, prognostic, evaluative and normative judgements (Reykowski, 2002). Although political thinking and the acquisition of political knowledge belong to individual actions of individuals, mental models created on their basis are created thanks to collective actions—as a consequence of socialization and obtaining information from others. A man who is deprived of

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a mental model is not able to think about politics independently and often makes decisions under the influence of emotions, temporary authority or pressure. He/she can be easily controlled, because his/her thinking about politics determines chaos and randomness. He also becomes very susceptible to populist slogans (Reykowski). For the mobilization of the international community during the war in Ukraine, emotions and political knowledge are equally important. In this case, the use of emotions is primarily to arouse fear, which will trigger the full readiness of the citizen to participate in political processes (Marcus, 2000). At the same time, anxiety contributes to increase the level of fear and closure of the individual to external stimuli, but at the same time it is a factor of social mobilization also in the international dimension (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2007).

Russian Violations of International Humanitarian Law as Emotional Images of War In Ukraine, numerous allegations of war crimes focus on indiscriminate attacks, with video footage of dead bodies and injured civilians, and damaged or destroyed civilian buildings. Such allegations were made, for instance, with reference to the air strikes on the preschool in Okhtyrka (Amnesty International, 2022b), the maternity and children’s hospital in Mariupol, the small public square in Chernihiv and the residential district in Sumy (Ukraine Crisis, 2022). There have been reports that on 3 April 2022, appalling crimes were perpetrated in Irpin and Bucha, with media showing the pictures of dead Ukrainian civilians lying on the streets of Bucha. According to Anatoliy Fedoruk, the mayor of Bucha, close to 300 residents were killed. There are reports that fifty-seven people were buried in a mass grave in Bucha (Ochab, 2022). On 4 March 2022, Russian soldiers in Bucha gathered five men and executed one of them. According to Human Rights Watch, one of the witnesses stated that soldiers forced those men “to kneel on the side of the road, pulled their T-shirts over their heads, and shot one of the men in the back of the head” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Russia is also accused of using cluster munitions in an illegal way. Although Russia is not a state-party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (and neither is Ukraine), again their use in populated areas is prohibited. For example, on the morning of 25 February 2022, Russia used cluster munitions to hit a preschool in north-eastern Ukraine while

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civilians were hiding inside. As a result, three of them, including a child, were killed and another child was wounded. It seems that the attack was carried out by the Russian army operating in the vicinity, and which has been known of “illegal and shameful” use of cluster munitions in inhabited areas (Amnesty International, 2022b). Amnesty International has verified that “a 220mm Uragan rocket dropped cluster munitions on the Sonechko nursery and kindergarten in the town of Okhtyrka in Sumy Oblast, where local people were seeking safety from the fighting”. Accordingly, and rightly so, Amnesty International concluded that this attack may constitute a war crime. “There is no possible justification for dropping cluster munitions in populated areas, let alone near a school”, stated Agnès Callamard, Secretary-General of Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2022b). As such, this strike breached the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks; it harmed a school which as a civilian object requires protection. On 28 February 2022, Russian soldiers used cluster munitions also in at least three residential districts in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city. Human Rights Watch obtained testimonies from two witnesses who were interviewed separately, and they both said that they had not known of any Ukrainian military activity in the area in Kharkiv prior to the attack. A map available online shows that the location of the impact of one of the rockets was approximately 400 metres from a site labelled as “military”. Satellite images of that place from 20 February showed a small compound with ca. 20 military vehicles in its vicinity, surrounded by residential areas. Other allegations refer to the indiscriminate use of booby-traps. In his speech, President Zelenskyy accused Russian forces of setting up boobytraps as they retreated. He claimed that “they are mining all this territory. Mining houses, equipment, even the bodies of killed people. Too many tripwire mines, too many other dangers….” (President of Ukraine, 2022). The allegations turned out to be true. According to the Ukraine’s emergency services, only in a single day 1,500 explosives were found in the village of Dmytrivka (CBC News, 2022). In the meantime, in Bucha Ukrainian soldiers had to use cables to pull bodies from the street as they were afraid that they might explode. So and as is clear, Russia has been accused of indiscriminate use of booby-traps (Schmitt, 2022). Russian forces also targeted hospitals that should be respected and protected from attack (Art. 19 of the Geneva Convention I; Leff & Wood, 2022). According to the WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health, as of 10 April 2022 there have been 88 attacks with the use of

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heavy weapons (https://extranet.who.int/ssa/Index.aspx). This conduct amounts to a war crime, and the perpetrators of the attack should be held criminally responsible.

Mobilization of the International Community in Formal Activities On 25 February 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe suspended Russia’s membership in that organization (Council of Europe, 2022). During its emergency special session, UN General Assembly deplored Russia’s actions in a resolution A/ES-11/L.1 (2022). Merely five States voted against (Russia, Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea and Syria), thirty-five States (including China) abstained and 141 voted in favour (Ukraine: General Assembly…, 2022). The emergency special session of the UN General Assembly had to be convened because the Security Council, the main UN body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, apparently could not play its part as it was blocked by the veto of a permanent member, the Russian Federation. The legal basis for such a session was the UN General Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled Uniting for Peace (1950). It stipulates that when the UN Security Council is blocked by a veto of a permanent member and is unable to act in order to maintain international peace and security, the UN General Assembly shall consider the matter and may recommend UN member-states to take collective measures, involving—when required—the use of military force. All of this is undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security. While not binding, UN General Assembly resolutions have political and moral as well as legal authority and may serve as legitimization of actions of states ready to oppose the Russian aggression. Another important step was Ukraine filing a case against Russia before the International Court of Justice on 26 February 2022, based on Russia’s allegations that genocide had been taking place in Donbass. Ukraine is obviously denying that accusation and claiming that by manipulating the definition of genocide, the RF created an excuse for the attack. According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), disputes between states-parties to the Convention and related to its interpretation or application, “including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide […], shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the

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parties to the dispute” (Art. IX). Russia asserts that Ukraine is committing genocide while Ukraine—rightly so—rejects such allegations; hence there clearly is a dispute within the meaning of the Convention. Another important international organ that took action is the International Criminal Court (ICC). On 28 February 2022, the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Khan decided to open an investigation into the situation in Ukraine. Even though Ukraine did not ratify the ICC Statute, it has twice declared its acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction with reference to crimes under the ICC Statute that might have been committed on its territory in case that the Court decided to exercise such jurisdiction. The first of these declarations related to crimes allegedly committed on Ukrainian territory within the time frame of 21 November 2013–22 February 2014, while the second one open-endedly extended the previous declaration to include crimes allegedly committed in the entire Ukrainian territory from 20 February 2014 (Statement of the ICC Prosecutor, 2022). In order to accelerate the investigation, the ICC Prosecutor invited state parties to refer the situation of Ukraine to the Office of the Prosecutor (otherwise the Prosecutor would need an authorization to proceed from the Pretrial Chamber, which would delay the start of the investigation). In an unprecedented move, on 2 March thirty-nine states-parties to the ICC Statute referred the situation in Ukraine to the ICC (Statement of ICC Prosecutor, 2022). This decision implies that there is reasonable basis to claim that at least war crimes are being committed in Ukraine by Russian troops. Thus, as clearly visible, Russia not only violated the prohibition on the use of force but also the rules on the conduct of armed conflicts, including war crimes. With the development of the conflict, even at this stage it is also reasonable to argue that Russian violations in Ukraine have already reached the level of crimes against humanity. The European Court of Human Rights’ decision on interim measures in a case brought by Ukraine against the Russian Federation (Ukraine v. Russia (X), application no. 11055/22) is another evidence of breaches of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts. The Court ordered the Russian Government to refrain from military attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including emergency vehicles, residential premises and other specially protected civilian objects such as hospitals and schools, and to ensure the safety of medical facilities, personnel and emergency vehicles in the territories attacked or besieged by Russian armed forces (European Court of Human Rights, 2022).

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On 4 March, the UN Human Rights Council decided to set up an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of human rights during the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (ReliefWeb, 2022). In this way, the Council in a way complemented the ICC investigation as its findings may be useful for the ICC. Moreover, in April 2022 Russia was suspended from the UN Human Rights Council (Freedman, 2022). It also has to be mentioned that the United States (US Department of the Treasury, 2022) and like-minded nations (Australian Government, 2022; Strangio, 2022) as well as the European Union as a whole (European Council, 2022) imposed sanctions on Russia. These include the EU’s and the US freezing the assets of the Russian Central Bank, of multiple companies (among them the VTB bank), and of numerous individuals. Russian financial institutions were also banned from the SWIFT system. President Putin is among those sanctioned, along with the members of Russia’s Security Council (Moiseienko, 2022).

Concluding Remarks Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, we have been accompanied by brutal images of its effects. In addition to the fact that it is intended to build awareness of the destruction of the nation and state, it is also a means of arousing emotions. Positive emotions: compassion, national pride of Ukrainians, but also negative ones, such as fear, starch, hatred of Russians. Emotions that accompany us during the speeches of the President of Ukraine or while following press reports are also the basis for building political knowledge about the war in Ukraine itself, but also the possibilities of individual countries in supporting Ukrainians defending their country. Emotions and political knowledge also mobilize the international community to help Ukraine fight the aggressor. These activities take the form of formal statements against human rights violations, but also practical actions for the benefit of the Ukrainian population undertaken by the international community. It was social mobilization that allowed for a wave of help at the civic level in the first stage of the exodus of Ukrainians to neighbouring countries. Of course, the help of the Czechs, Hungarians, Slovaks, but above all the Poles, was grounded in emotions of compassion, fear, anxiety and fears related to the escalation of the previously silenced war. At the same time, emotions were closely

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related to political knowledge based on the historical experience of individual societies that were satellites of the USSR in the years 1945–1989. This complexity of negative emotions and political knowledge triggered the mobilization of the international community to formally help Ukraine in its fight for independence.

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Pastramadzhier, D. (2015). Political knowledge: Theoretical formulations and practical implementation. Trakia Journal of Science, 13(1), 16–21. Popkin, S., & Dimock, M. (1999). Elements of reason: Knowledge, trust, and international reasoning. Cambridge University Press. Plecka, D., & Turska-Kawa, A. (2016). Anxiety determinants of populist attitudes among young people. Athenaeum. Polish Political Science Studies, 52, 256– 259. Plecka, D. (2022). The crisis of liberal democracy vs. political knowledge. Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, Sectio M – Balcaniensis Et Carpathiensis, 7 , 37–47. President of Ukraine. (2022). Europe has no right to react in silence to what is happening with our Mariupol—Address by the President of Ukraine. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yevropa-ne-maye-pravareaguvati-movchannyam-na-te-sho-vidbuv-74029. Reeves, S. R., & Wallace, D. (2015). The combatant status of the “little green men” and other participants in the Ukraine conflict. International Law Studies, 91, 361–401. Reliefweb. (2022). Human Rights Council establishes an Independent International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of human rights in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/human-rights-council-establ ishes-independent-international-commission-inquiry Reykowski, J. (2002). My´slenie polityczne. In K. Skarzy ˙ nska ´ (Ed.), Podstawy psychologii politycznej (pp. 110–140). Wydawnictwo Zysk i Spółka. Richards, B. (2010). The emotional deficit in political communication. Political Communication, 21(3), 339–352. Rogers, T., Goldstein, N. J., & Fox, C. R. (2018). Social Mobilization. Animal Review of Psychology, 69, 357–381. Slaby, J., & Bens, J. (2019). Political emotions in the routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotions. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds.), (pp. 340– 351). Routledge. Slaby, J., & Mühlhoff, R. (2019). Affect. In J. Slaby & C. V. Schore (Eds.), Affective societies: Key concepts (pp. 312–340). Routledge. Szanto, T., & Slaby, J. (2000). Political emotions. In T. Szanto & H. Landweeer (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotions (pp. 227–256). Routledge. Schmitt, M. N. (2022). Ukraine symposium—Russian booby-traps and the Ukraine conflict. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/booby-traps-ukraine-conflict/ Smirnov, O., Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., & McElreath, R. (2010). The behavioral logic of collective action: Partisans cooperate and punish more than nonpartisans. Political Psychology, 31(4), 595–616.

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Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation. (2022). https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=2022-prosecutor-sta tement-referrals-ukraine Strangio, S. (2022). Singapore announces sanctions on Russia over Ukraine invasion. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/singapore-announ ces-sanctions-on-russia-over-ukraine-invasion/ Ukraine Crisis. (2022). War crimes of the Russian Federation: As a result of an air strike on the residential sector killed 21 civilians, including 2 children. https:/ /uacrisis.org/en/voyenni-zlochyny-rf16 Ukraine: General Assembly Emergency Special Session—3rd Session | United Nations. (2022). You Tube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-MYe kTKGkQ US Department of the Treasury. (2022). Treasury sanctions Russians bankrolling Putin and Russia-backed influence actors. https://home.treasury.gov/news/ press-releases/jy0628 Wawrzynski, ´ P., & Marszałek-Kawa, J. (2022). Emotional dynamics of populism and its non-populist alternatives: Discussing the role of compassion and pride. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 51, 1–16. Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, partisanship, and misperceptions: How anger and anxiety moderate the effect of partisan bias on susceptibility to political misinformation. Journal of Communication, 65(4), 699–719.

CHAPTER 11

Courage, Coincidence or Intricate Plan? Conditions for the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Political Leadership Bozena ˙ Dziemidok-Olszewska and Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło

Introduction When Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the world focused its attention on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The politician—until 2018 known mainly for his TV appearances—made himself known as a true statesman from the first moments of the conflict. Thanks to his unyielding attitude towards the aggressor, he quickly won the respect of his compatriots and became Ukraine’s national hero and a symbol of the struggle for sovereignty and independence of the state.

B. Dziemidok-Olszewska (B) · M. Michalczuk-Wlizło Maria Skłodowska-Curie University, Lublin, Poland e-mail: [email protected] M. Michalczuk-Wlizło e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_11

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The purpose of the paper is to identify and critically analyse the main factors determining the political leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The term political leadership is understood as a sequence of interactions that consist in winning followers in order to satisfy the interests and achieve the objectives of both parties to the relationship ˙ 2013). Political leadership (Antoszewski, 2007; Easton, 1997; Zukiewicz, takes the form of a process that is shaped by the aptitudes and competencies of individuals, the model of government and the party system of the state, momentous events, and the behaviour of political actors in the public sphere. The most important determinants of Zelenskyy’s wartime leadership were considered to be the president’s constitutional position, the 2019 presidential election, his political career, the political situation, and the president’s personality and leadership style. This paper analyses each of those determinants. Because of the timeliness and dynamic changes in the research problem, it has not yet been presented in scientific publications. Consequently, the analysis uses mainly selected newspaper articles and journalistic works, as well as constitutional provisions and documents. The research used the analytical-legal method, the behavioural method, and text analysis (of documents and newspaper articles).

The Constitutional Position of the President of Ukraine In 2014, a system usually referred to by commentators as parliamentary2019b; Rohozinska & presidential was restored in Ukraine (Iwanski, ´ Shpak, 2019). But it conforms more to the rules of a parliamentary system, because the head of state has traditional, moderate powers. The position of the President is strengthened by the mandate obtained from the Nation as he is elected by universal and direct suffrage for a 5-year term (Article 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine). According to Article 106 of the Constitution, the president of Ukraine guarantees the independence of the state, represents the state in international relations, and is in charge of the foreign policy of the state. He is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, appoints and dismisses the supreme command of the country’s Armed Forces, and is in charge of national security and state defence affairs. The president signs laws passed by the parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) and has the power to veto laws (except for laws

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amending the Constitution of Ukraine). The parliament rejects presidential vetoes by a two-thirds majority of the statutory number of votes. In Article 113, the Constitution provides that The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is responsible to the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The prime minister is appointed by the Verkhovna Rada at the request of the president (the nomination is submitted by a parliamentary coalition). The president also requests the appointment of the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence, which is a manifestation of his leading role in this area. The president participates in appointments to various positions in the government, nominates, among others, one-third of the members of the Constitutional Court, a half of the members of the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine and the National Council for the Radio and Television, the chief of the General Staff, and the higher command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The president issues decrees and regulations, some requiring the countersignature of the prime minister of Ukraine and the relevant minister. The President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by way of the impeachment procedure if he commits treason against the state or commits a crime (Article 111). The full use of president’s powers is only possible on the condition of good cooperation with the parliamentary coalition and the government. In the absence of participation of the party associated with the president in the ruling coalition and in the cabinet of ministers, the influence of the head of state on the political life of the country is limited (Iwanski, ´ 2019b; Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019).

Zelenskyy’s Professional Career Volodymyr Zelenskyy was born in 1978 in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk region) in a Russian-speaking educated family of Jewish origin. He began his artistic activity in high school, being involved in a theatre club and the school’s music band. He graduated with a law degree from the Kryvyi Rih Economic Institute, but he never practised the legal profession. During his studies, he performed as a dancer in a comedy group. In 1997, he and his friends founded their own group, Kvartal 95, in which he performed until he became the president. Two years later, the group was invited to perform in a very popular television comedy show on Russian television and then began performing in many post-Soviet countries. At that time, Zelenskyy lived in Russia for six years. In 2003, after a conflict

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with the Russian show’s producers, he and his group returned permanently to Ukraine, where he continued his comedy activities and began a career as a comedy actor. Zelenskyy became very popular after his performance and victory in the Ukrainian version of “Dancing with the Stars” in 2006. At the same time, he developed a business in the entertainment industry, founding with friends the company Studio Kvartal 95, which was responsible for, among other things, subsequent productions of his comedy group. Zelenskyy worked with many producers and artists from Russia and regularly appeared on Russian television. As a media and show business shareholder and entrepreneur, and co-creator of cabaret shows and comedy films, he achieved spectacular success, including financial. In 2013, the Ukrainian version of Forbes gave Zelenskyy the first place in the ranking of 25 most expensive stage and sports stars in Ukraine and in 2010 he ranked fifth on the list of the most profitable show-business stars 2019b). At that time, according to the weekly magazine Fokus (Iwanski, ´ he worked closely with the billionaire oligarch and media magnate Ihor Kolomoisky. Zelenskyy declared his support for the Maidan demonstrators back in December 2013. After the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Studio Kvartal 95 broke off the cooperation with its Russian partners. Members of Kvartal 95 performed special shows for Ukrainian soldiers and became involved in collecting donations for 2019a). volunteer battalions (Iwanski, ´ In 2015, the first season of the series “Servant of the People” was released, with Zelenskyy playing the role of the protagonist, a history teacher Vasyl Petrovych Holoborodko who, as a result of a coincidence, was elected as the president of Ukraine. Zelenskyy, playing the role of Holoborodko, became the personification of the Ukrainian people’s dream of a modern-day Robin Hood, a commoner “who would chase away corrupt politicians and give Ukrainians the prosperity they crave” (Potocki, 2020b). The series became extremely popular, attracting 20 million viewers and making Zelenskyy famous. The series had two more seasons, the last of which aired just before the first round of the presidential election in March 2019. In December 2017, Zelenskyy, riding the wave of the series’ popularity, founded the Servant of the People party. As explained at the time, the party formed on the basis of the pre-existing Party of Decisive Changes was intended as a safeguard for the title of the series against political 2019a). However, with growing support exploitation by others (Iwanski, ´

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shown in election polls, the marginal party began to be seen as a viable political project. Zelenskyy was first mentioned as a possible candidate in the presidential election in mid-2018. Early polls assessed his support 2019a). He officially announced his candidacy on at 5–6% (Iwanski, ´ December 31, 2018—the New Year’s Eve. He did it in the form of a short video, combined with New Year’s greetings, broadcast on the 1+1 TV owned by billionaire Ihor Kolomoisky, who was in conflict with the Ukrainian government. This television network broadcast the comedian’s speech before Poroshenko’s address (Grochot, 2019).

Presidential Election in 2019 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a candidate from outside the political class, won the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine. In the first round of the election, in which 39 candidates participated, Zelenskyy was supported by 30.24% of eligible voters, while Petro Poroshenko won 15.95% of the votes. Thus, the actor won almost twice as many votes as the incumbent President Poroshenko, who came in the second place. In the second round, Zelenskyy received 73.2% of the votes and Poroshenko—25.3%. Zelenskyy’s candidacy was supported by such an overwhelming majority that no predecessor had ever achieved (Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019). Such a result came as a shock to the country’s political class (Gorchinskaya, 2019). For observers, this was astonishing due to the fact that the winning candidate had no political background, no programme, also no traditional election campaign. The victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the presidential election was the result of several interconnected factors. The first was the huge distrust of the Ukrainian society towards the political class and state institutions. The support for Zelenskyy was a loud protest against the organization and functioning of the Ukrainian state, despite the passage of five years 2019). The 2004 revolusince the Revolution of Dignity (Kononczuk, ´ tion aroused high public expectations for a fundamental change of the state, a new quality of governance, and the empowerment of the society (Dabrowski et al., 2020; Euromaidan, 2020; Terzyan, 2020). However, the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections led to only a minor replacement of the political elite. The reforms that took place during the first years after the revolution did not produce the expected results; in fact, they deepened the critical attitudes among the public towards the political class. Just before the 2019 presidential election, only 23% of

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respondents trusted the president, 12% trusted the Verkhovna Rada, 19% trusted the government, 12% trusted the courts, and 15% trusted the prosecutor’s office (research by the Razumkov Center in Kiev) (Iwanski, ´ 2019a). Therefore, Ukrainians had high expectations about the quality and the results of the 2019 election (Ukrainian Election, 2021). Zelenskyy’s victory was due to the fact that he was seen as a person who had not been a member of the political class. The distrust of the state and politicians resulted in a search for “new faces,” people who were not discredited, were not members of the establishment, and 2019a). Zelencould meet various expectations of the public (Iwanski, ´ skyy’s campaign was founded on an opposition to the existing elites and his victory resulted from the great disillusionment with the government of Poroshenko and his party (Polish Lennon, 2019; Radio, 2022; Rohozinska & Shpak, 2019). According to polls, for 40% of the voters, a vote for Zelenskyy was a protest against the political class existing at 2019a). Zelenskyy managed to convince voters from that time (Iwanski, ´ all age groups and regions. He won the votes of both supporters of more radical reforms who were disillusioned with the stagnation of the process of modernization of the state and the pro-welfare state and relatively proRussian voters who were tired of the costs of the post-Maidan transition 2019b). (Iwanski, ´ The most important cause of Zelenskyy’s success was his recognition and popularity, which he owed to his appearances in films, television series, and satirical programmes. Additionally, his productions dealt with current politics; the Kvartal 95 comedy show ridiculed the political situation, those in power, and the reforms they were implementing. The “Servant of the People” series in which Zelenskyy, as president, successfully fought against oligarchs and corrupt politicians in defence of the interests of ordinary people, increased the popularity of Zelenskyy himself, but also accustomed his audience to the political role of the protagonist. Moreover, in the eyes of many people, he was a great commentator of 2019a). People loved him for the role and began political life (Iwanski, ´ to identify his traits with those of this character. Thus, it can be concluded that in 2019 Ukrainians voted equally for Zelenskyy and his alter ego in the series (Potocki, 2020a), as they believed that the actor would be able 2019). to reform the state in reality (Kononczuk, ´ Zelenskyy did not run a traditional election campaign. He limited his activities to social media and direct interaction with voters at comedy shows, which reinforced his image as a candidate from the outside of

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the system (Drach, 2020). He intentionally avoided traditional media and journalists. Zelenskyy exuded naturalness and spontaneity, which contrasted with the standard campaigns of the other candidates (Potocki, 2020a). The actor was favoured by the 1+1 television network; as calculated by the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, the network’s news coverage contained “no critical reports or information” about candidate Zelenskyy, but was very critical of his main rival, Petro Poroshenko (Drach, 2020). Moreover, the actor ran a positive campaign and his messages were optimistic, which clearly distinguished him from the other candidates (Drach, 2020). Lacking a detailed electoral programme, he invited his supporters to write it together and offered them joint action, which allowed him to create the impression of voter empowerment and reduced 2019a). On Facebook, he their distance from the government (Iwanski, ´ wrote “politicians follow a simple rule: ask nothing, promise a lot. I’ll do it the other way around. Together with you, I will write my program” (Drach, 2020). This approach enabled him to attract groups of voters with very different expectations (Potocki, 2020a). Zelenskyy’s political views on many issues remained unclear. During the election campaign, he did not promise further fundamental changes, but limited his propositions to populist slogans about the need to fight corruption and raise living standards (Gorchinskaya, 2019). In terms of foreign policy, Zelenskyy expressed his support for NATO membership as a guarantee of Ukraine’s security and indicated Ukraine’s aspiration for EU membership. On the other hand, his scepticism towards Western structures was visible: in one interview he said that “no one is waiting for Ukraine in the EU” (Grochot, 2019). His main objective in the international arena was to bring about a real ceasefire in the Donbass region, which was to be served by expanding the so-called Normandy format 2019b). He also talked about to include the USA and the UK (Iwanski, ´ recapturing Crimea, which had been occupied by Russia (Grochot, 2019). The election campaign, sparing in words and promises, created an image of Zelenskyy as a man from outside the political world and without a clear view on key issues and allowed him to effectively reach out to various social groups. Regardless of their differing political views, his voters shared a dislike of the political clique that has ruled the country 2019a). for years, the political instability, and the failed reforms (Iwanski, ´

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A large group of the voters saw Zelenskyy as the ideal middle-of-theroad candidate: young, modern, not involved in corruption scandals, not ideologized, and a better promise of change than the old political class. The other candidates’ allegations against Zelenskyy were his primarily political ignorance, ties to Russia, and relations with the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. However, the criticism did not affect Zelenskyy’s campaign; his promise of change was enough to capture the imagination of voters and to secure his victory (Drach, 2020). The nature of Zelenskyy’s relationship with Ihor Kolomoisky remained unclear. His political opponents and most commentators saw Zelenskyy as an incompetent “oligarch’s puppet” who bowed to Russia (Drach, 2020). The oligarch was considered Zelenskyy’s sponsor in the election. The actor himself denied this, claiming that he paid for the campaign-related expenses himself and with the help of his friends (Grochot, 2019). The relationship was rather mutually beneficial as the show featuring Zelenskyy was the most popular programme broadcast by the 1+1 network owned by Kolomoisky. Zelenskyy himself downplayed the accusations, claiming that he was merely Kolomoisky’s partner in the television ´ 2019b). business (Gorchinskaya, 2019; Iwanski, Zelenskyy was also criticized for making fun of Ukrainians and showing his good attitude towards Russia in his shows. It was pointed out to him that he spoke Russian on a daily basis and learned Ukrainian only as an adult. As a presidential candidate, he argued that language should not be a factor that divides a nation (Grochot, 2019). In his public statements, Zelenskyy increasingly used Ukrainian, although he did not speak the language fluently. He advocated maintaining Ukrainian as the sole official language while having a more liberal policy on the use of Russian 2019b). in public life (Iwanski, ´ After the presidential election, commentators predicted that Zelenskyy would be a weak politician, would not live up to expectations, and would quickly lose public support (Polish Radio, 2022). The Kiev and Lviv intellectual elites expressed their regret and made fun of the “morons” who elected the clown Zelenskyy to Russia’s advantage (Potocki, 2020b). Olena Babakova, a Ukrainian historian and columnist, stated that Zelenskyy was the first example of a president of the Uber and Tinder era who responded to public needs and emotions at the right time (Potocki, 2020b). Another commentator, Oleksiy Radinsky, wrote that Zelenskyy “gives the impression of a model embodiment of all the sins of postmodern politics. The super-wealthy Ukrainians, uniting in opposition to

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Poroshenko (most notably the owner of the 1+1 television network, oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky), began to see Zelenskyy as a figure well suited to play in the new political reality marked by Trump’s presidency” (Radinsky, 2022).

Pre-War Leadership Already during his inaugural speech, Zelenskyy announced his decision to dissolve the parliament, which was a big surprise to his political opponents and commentators around the world. In the early election of July 21, 2019, his party, Servant of the People, became the first party in the history of Ukraine to win 248 out of 450 seats in the parliament, which gave it an independent majority. The electoral lists of the hitherto virtual party were hastily put together and included the president’s former associates and colleagues, people recommended by Ihor Kolomoisky, and “young and talented people who were selected in a one-of-a-kind casting” (Potocki, 2020b). Thanks to the unqualified, double—in the presidential and parliamentary elections—victory, Zelenskyy quickly gained full power. He ran the country with the help of the Office of the President and its head Andriy Bohdan, formerly Kolomoisky’s lawyer, and the speaker of the parliament Dmytro Razumkov. He appointed a young management specialist, Oleksiy Honcharuk, as the prime minister (Gorchinskaya, 2019). The change of the president and government in Ukraine in 2019 was assessed as having been conducted at a high level of institutional and social maturity (Gorchinskaya, 2019). The strategy adopted by the government run by apolitical specialists, which involved lightning-fast passage of bills through the parliament and informal diplomacy, initially brought some success. Partial organizational changes were made in the prosecutor’s office and courts; the constitution was amended regarding the rights of the members of the parliament and the president (depriving the MOPs of their immunity and introducing an impeachment procedure for the president). A new electoral law for the Verkhovna Rada (a proportional system, multi-member constituencies) was passed, a key reform in the gas sector—the so-called unbundling of Naftohaz—was completed, and in March 2020 a landmark law was passed on the legalization of land trade, which had been the subject of political dispute for almost two decades (Iwanski ´ et al., 2020).

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But just after a year in power, conflicts of interests within the Servant of the People party became visible, showing the weaknesses of Zelenskyy’s team: its ideological incoherence, lack of a clear vision of action, and most importantly lack of a professional political and administrative staff. The oligarchs also continued to exert overwhelming influence on the country, which caused such problems as a slowdown in the work on important laws and in obstruction of Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF (Potocki, 2020a). The scope of power that the president had gained, thanks to the implemented slogan of ousting the “old” politicians had at the same time become a source of his weakness: low efficiency of his government. The government, composed of professionals from outside politics but without much experience in administration and lacking a political background, acted with little efficiency. In March 2020, the president appointed an experienced manager, Denys Shmyhal, as Prime Minister, and his cabinet included both professionals and politicians; as a result, it was a combination of “old” and “new” (Iwanski ´ et al., 2020). Zelenskyy needed acceptance in the West, which could be achieved by appropriate staffing of the diplomatic corps and the post of deputy prime minister for EuroAtlantic integration, so he relied on diplomats experienced and known in the West (Potocki, 2020a). The president failed to complete the reforms of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, the institutions responsible for the fight against corruption, which were initiated in 2014. Their completion was hampered by various interest groups within the government. It was also impossible to boost privatization and improve the investment climate in Ukraine, and no steps were taken to “de-oligarchize” (demonopolize) the Ukrainian economy. Zelenskyy’s success was the adoption, with great difficulty, of the socalled banking law, which prevented the previous owners from recovering the banks nationalized in 2014–2016 (financial compensation, no return in kind). Its enactment was a condition for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (Ukraine, 2021). At the same time, however, that law was detrimental to the interests of Ihor Kolomoisky, who was trying to regain Privatbank, which he once owned. The open violation of the interests of Zelenskyy’s existing patron meant that the president needed to find a new one. This role was assumed by Rinat Akhmetov, which resulted in Denys Shmyhal, a former manager of Akhmetov’s companies, becoming the prime minister and the consideration of the oligarch’s interests in the energy sector (Iwanski ´ et al., 2020).

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Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who gained power as the anti-political antithesis of Petro Poroshenko, restored the old customs of the system after a little more than a year in power. Although he was ambitious and sincerely desired to make a big change, he failed to break the rules that governed Ukrainian politics (Iwanski ´ et al., 2020). The first year of Zelenskyy’s presidency was considered a time of hard learning how politics works in practice (Iwanski ´ et al., 2020). According to the head of the Kyiv Institute for World Policy, Yevhen Mahda, this was a year of missed opportunities due to the lack of significant, real changes (Expert, 2020). Zelenskyy continued to enjoy high public support. According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Center, 57% of Ukrainians trusted the president (37% did not), more than 39% would vote for Zelenskyy again, one in three respondents considered the first year of Zelenskyy’s presidency as excellent or good, almost 40%—as satisfactory, and about one-third—as unsatisfactory or very bad (Expert, 2020). According to experts, Zelenskyy was “helped” by the coronavirus pandemic. They found that in the conditions prevailing during the pandemic, citizens relied more on government and did not rationally evaluate the president’s actions (Expert, 2020). Zelenskyy’s most important election slogan was “End the war in Donbass.” After taking office, he was able to lead official and unofficial consultations with Russia on ending the conflict. Also, prisoner of war exchange was carried out and Normandy-format meetings at the level of national leaders were held in December 2019 in Paris (Ukraine, 2020). Zelenskyy sought new initiatives to break the ongoing deadlock in the process of settling of the conflict in Donbass, but these produced only local achievements, such as the reconstruction of the bridge at the Stanitsa Luganskaya crossing. Commentators expressed the opinion that the reason for the failure to achieve the promised breakthrough on the Donbass issue was Russia’s lack of interest in settling its relations with Ukraine (Potocki, 2020a). Expert Yevhen Mahda stated that “Russia does not need any president of Ukraine who is able to play his own game” (Expert, 2020). Vladimir Putin, who called the collapse of the USSR the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, remembered Zbigniew Brzezinski’s words that without Ukraine, Russia would not form a Eurasian empire (Inozemtsev, 2019). Kremlin’s propaganda sought to discredit the Ukraine’s democratization process and its existence as a state, and questioned the national identity of Ukrainians. Ukraine was accused

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of spreading Nazism and preparing terrorist attacks (Ukrainian Election, 2021). Before the presidential election, Russian propaganda claimed that the voters should choose between Poroshenko’s “war party” and Yuri Boyko’s “peace party” (Lennon, 2019).

Image and Political Personality Zelenskyy was usually portrayed as a comedian who suddenly and unexpectedly, a little by accident, became the president. He built an image of a successful man—an efficient businessman, a good actor and dancer, and a man with a sense of humour who has a happy family. Zelenskyy successfully found his place in the realities of the war. Even in the first days of the war, he proved to be a man of action, a courageous leader, and a true hero. He skilfully faced an extremely difficult situation. He showed that he had the aptitude to be a wartime leader. He stayed in Kiev and showed courage, confidence, and faith in the nation, the army, and victory. Zelenskyy motivated Ukrainians to fight and conveyed his energy to the people. Zelenskyy is a leader who understands today’s world, the power of the media, and the importance of attitude, not just the position held and ´ 2022). Since the the power that comes with it (Karczewski & Swidrak, beginning of his career, he has been active in the media as an actor, a producer, a television executive, and a director. He has mastered the art of moving and being proficient in the world of media, and reaching out to a mass audience. He knows that the message should reach as wide a group of citizens as possible so that everyone knows it. He is aware of the power of public opinion and how it influences the decisions of people in power. As a man who has worked in the media all his life, he has used them for communication extremely effectively (Zakharchenko et al., 2019). The words he speaks strike the right notes and he addresses everyone instead of specific individuals. Zelenskyy and his entourage make sure that all conversations or recordings are presented to the public and are publicly available. He speaks out about what is happening in Ukraine so that everyone can witness the drama. There is a lot of premeditation and planning involved, but it makes people support Ukraine. Everyone takes part in this show as a member of the audience and everyone cheers for him, as if they were watching a

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movie. Zelenskyy is like a protagonist in a Hollywood movie who singlehandedly fights an evil invader. Viewers usually root for someone like that and now a hero like this exists in the real world. According to W. Karczewski, Zelenskyy practises two types of leadership: charismatic and authentic (Karczewski, 2022). A charismatic leader is able to present a vision of the future (e.g. a vision of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO and winning the war against Russia), energizes people, inspires trust, and is empathetic. Authentic leadership, on the other hand, is based on values. Authentic leaders are honest; their actions match their words. They share information with the public and have an open communication style. A fundamental feature of such leadership is mutual trust.

Conclusions In just a few years, Volodymyr Zelenskyy transformed from a “servant of the people” into a true leader and a steadfast statesman. Thanks to his charisma, sense of humour, and openness, he won Ukrainians over. His uncompromising stance and firm attitude towards Russia changed his image and contributed to the great acclaim he enjoys both at home and abroad. In a poll conducted by the “Rating” group in Ukraine on February 26–27, 2022, as many as 91% of respondents declared their support for the president (Polish Radio, 2022). Foreign media regularly praise Zelenskyy for his patriotic, courageous, and uncompromising attitude. The American news television network CNN described the Ukrainian head of state as follows: “Volodymyr Zelenskyy went from an actor playing president on TV to defiant wartime leader” (Polish Radio, 2022). Paradoxically, the war revealed Zelenskyy’s phenomenon. As a candidate in the election, he was perceived as a comedian and later, while holding the office of the president during peacetime, he struggled with the systemic failings of the Ukrainian state. During the war, the best personality traits of the president were revealed, which resulted in his steadfast attitude and then his immense popularity in the world. Today Zelenskyy is making his own and Ukraine’s history; in fact, he has already made history, fighting on the right side.

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References Antoszewski A. (2007). Przywództwo polityczne. In B. Szmulik & M. ˙ Zmigrodzki (Eds.), Wprowadzenie do nauki o panstwie ´ i polityce. UMCS Lublin. Dabrowski, M., Domínguez-Jiménez M., & Zachmann, G. (2020). Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Reforms and challenges ahead (Policy Contribution No 14). Bruegel. Drach, M. (2020). How social media shaped Zelenskyy’s victory in Ukraine. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/202008/RISJ_F inal%20Report_Maryana%20Drach_2020_Final%202%20%289%29.pdf Easton, D. (1997). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science, 5(4). Clark, J., & Jason, S. (2005). Elections, revolution and democracy in Ukraine: reflections on a country’s turn to democracy, free elections and the modern world. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE309.pdf Euromaidan: Reforms and Challenges Ahead, Policy Contribution 2020/14, Bruegel. Expert. (2020). Rok prezydentury Zełenskiego okresem niewykorzystanych mo˙zliwo´sci. https://forsal.pl/artykuly/1477899,ukraina-rok-prezydentury-zel enskiego-okresem-niewykorzystanych-mozliwosci.html Gorchinskaya, K. (2019). Ukraine’s 2019 elections and the rise of a new political guard. Brief ( 6). https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/uipublications/2019/ui-brief-no.-6-2019.pdf Grochot, A. (2019). Wołodymyr Zełenski wygrywa wybory na prezydenta Ukrainy. https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/news-wolodymyr-zelenski-wygrywa-wybory-naprezydenta-ukrainy,nId,2949812 Inozemtsev, V. (2019). Kremlin—Linked forces in Ukraine’s elections. On the brink of revenge? (Russie. Nei. Report, 25). https://www.ifri.org/sites/def ault/files/atoms/files/inozemtsev_ukraine_elections_2019.pdf Iwanski, ´ T. (2019a). Zełenski – anatomia sukcesu. Komentarze OSW. https:// www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2019a-04-03/zelenski-ana tomia-sukcesu Iwanski, ´ T. (2019b, April 21). Wielki eksperyment: Zełenski nowym prezydentem Ukrainy, Analizy OSW . https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ana lizy/2019-04-21/wielki-eksperyment-zelenski-nowym-prezydentem-ukrainy ˙ Iwanski, ´ T., Matuszak, S., Nieczypor, K., & Zochowski, P. (2020). Ani cud, ani katastrofa – rok prezydentury Zełenskiego. Komentarze OSW. https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/202005-20/ani-cud-ani-katastrofa-rok-prezydentury-zelenskiego ´ Karczewski, W., & Swidrak, K (2022). Dlaczego tak nas fascynuje Wołodymyr Zełenski? Ekspert: jest jak filmowy bohater, który walczy ze złem. https://www. medonet.pl/psyche/psychologia%2Czelenski-nas-fascynuje--ekspert--jest-jakfilmowy-bohater--ktory-walczy-ze-zlem%2Cartykul%2C86599191.html

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Kononczuk, ´ W. (2019, April 1). Prezydent Zełenski? Tygodnik Powszechny. https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/prezydent-zelenski-158218?gclid=EAI aIQobChMItMmcm8X99gIVr0WRBR01Kg1xEAAYAyAAEgJLpPD_BwE Konstytucja Ukrainy, Journal of Laws of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine], 1996, no. 30, item 141. Lennon, O. (2019). Six reasons the “opposition platform” won in Eastern Ukraine. Kennan Cable, 45. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/ files/media/documents/publication/ki_191106_cable_45_v2.pdf Polish Radio. (2022). Wołodymyr. https://www.polskieradio.pl/39/156/Art ykul/2910651%2CWolodymyr-Zelenski-Od-komika-do-superbohatera-imeza-stanu Potocki, M. (2020a). Czy Zełenski przegra z systemem? Michał Potocki o pi˛etrz˛acych si˛e trudno´sciach prezydenta Ukrainy. https://klubjagiellonski.pl/ 2020a/08/01/czy-zelenski-przegra-z-systemem/ Potocki, M. (2020b). Wołodymyr Zełenski. Prezydentura w czasach kryzysu. https://magazynpismo.pl/rzeczywistosc/portret/wolodymyr-zelenski-prezyd ent-ery-tindera-ukraina/?seo=pw&gclid=EAIaIQobChMItMmcm8X99gIV r0WRBR01Kg1xEAAYAiAAEgJeOfD_BwE Radinsky, O. (2022). Zełenski, czyli zemsta na Ukrainie. https://krytykapolit yczna.pl/felietony/oleksij-radynski/zelenski-czyli-zemsta-na-ukrainie/?gclid= EAIaIQobChMItMmcm8X99gIVr0WRBR01Kg1xEAAYASAAEgL9rvD_ BwE Rohozinska, J., & Shpak, V. (2019). The rise of an “outsider” president. Journal of Democracy, 30(3). https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ Rise-of-an-Outsider-President-Rohozinska-Shpak.pdf Tarzyan, A. (2020). Towards democratic consolidation? Ukraine after the revolution of dignity. Open Political Science, 3. https://www.degruyter.com/doc ument/doi/10.1515/openps-2020-0015/pdf Ukraine. 2021. Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy Updated October 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/ row/R45008.pdf Ukrainian Election. (2021). Task force foreign interference in Ukraine’s democracy. Report MAY 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/upl oads/2019/05/Foreign_Interference_in_Ukraines_Election.pdf Zakharchenko, A., Maksimtsova, Y., Iurchenko, V., & Shevchenko, S. (2019). Under the conditions of non-agenda ownership: Social media users in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential elections campaign. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909. 01681 ˙ ´ Zukiewicz, P. (2013). Przywództwo prezydenckie w panstwach ´ Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej po 1989 roku. Analiza. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

CHAPTER 12

The Need for Knowledge and the Fear of War: Ukrainian Students and Lecturers in the Face of War Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk , Joanna Marszałek-Kawa , and Yaryna Turchyn

Introduction The Russian aggression against Ukraine began in 2014. However, the aggravation of the conflict on 24 February 2022 is a military activity that has had no precedence in Europe for several decades. The Russian

T. Astramowicz-Leyk (B) University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland e-mail: [email protected] J. Marszałek-Kawa Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, ´ Poland e-mail: [email protected] Y. Turchyn Lviv Polytechnic National University, Lviv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5_12

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occupier’s invasion, homicides and crimes against the civilian population, and attacks on critical infrastructure are leaving a permanent mental mark on Ukrainians and their daily life, heightening the fear of war and shortages in providing for the basic needs of the inhabitants of Ukraine. After all, the experience of genocide and cruelties of World War II and the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes in Europe were supposed to be a thing of the past. This wish was enshrined in the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941 and the Declaration by the United Nations in Washington. The former document included the following statements referring to human rights: “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live” and people’s right “to live out their lives in freedom from fear and want” (Ku´zniar, 2004, pp. 58–59). The Atlantic Charter, in which it was enshrined that the post-war order and global security would ensure fundamental human values, i.e., the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom from poverty and want, and the freedom from the aggression of another country, was signed by the USA and Great Britain but it had an open character. Therefore, the Soviet Union also signed it on 24 September 1941 (Astramowicz-Leyk, 2009, p. 13). The Charter was proclaimed on 1 January 1942 by signing the Declaration of United Nations. On 30 October 1943 in Moscow, the representatives of the governments of the USA, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China signed a declaration of the establishment of an international organization for preserving peace and security, based on the sovereign equality of all states (Astramowicz-Leyk, 2009, pp. 13–14). The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, said: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure (…) that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest” (Charter of the United Nations 1945). Alas, Russia, by attacking peaceful Ukraine, violated the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations not only in

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this respect.1 In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948, it was enshrined, among others, that the highest aspiration of the common people is the advent of a world “in which human beings shall enjoy the freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Human rights, which developed within the framework of the UN and the systems of regional protection, were to be the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and were to guarantee that individuals would be free of fear and poverty. The full-scale war in Ukraine began on 24 February 2022. It was already on the following day that the Ministry of Education and Science issued a recommendation that the teaching process should be stopped at all levels of education and announced a two-week holiday. At that time, a part of Ukraine’s territory was temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation and a number of cities in the east became the arena of RussianUkrainian fighting. As a result, more than 10 million Ukrainians had to flee their homes. This included 6.5 million people moving within the country’s borders and 3.9 million citizens who left the country (Hazapenko et al., 2022). In places where it was possible, the educational process was resumed. The decision on how to do it was left to oblast governments and university authorities (Hazapenko et al., 2022). Remote teaching was reintroduced. This gave pupils and students who had left Ukraine an opportunity to continue learning. From the first days of March, the evacuation of academic centres from the areas covered by the war to those considered relatively safe began. One of the first studies of Ukraine’s experience of wartime education was conducted by Ukrainian scholars (Lavrysh et al., 2022). According to them, “to prevent brain drain, it is necessary to enhance internationalization processes and engage teachers in international research projects. In this way, we outlined the key issues that a university should address: the behaviour of staff and students, the subjectivity of teachers and students, a student-centred teaching process, flexible syllabuses and curricula, internationalization and the mental and physical safety of teachers and students” (Lavrysh et al., 2022). Their study findings show that what plays an important role in education during the war is the support from

1 The scope of this paper does not allow us to analyse this issue in more detail.

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abroad, owing to which a number of Ukrainian teachers carried on their work and research. The war in Ukraine led to the resettlement of children, youths and their teachers, as well as of whole schools and universities. It heightens the fear of life and safety not only among those who directly take part in the war, but also among the civilian population, including students and lecturers (see, e.g., Hazapenko et al., 2022; Kalaitzaki et al., 2022; Kurapov et al., 2022; Lavrysh et al., 2022; Shevlin et al., 2022; Stadnik et al., 2022). Military operations intensify trauma, dread and mental stress, which result in apathy and reluctance to take up daily duties.2

Methodology The full-scale war started by Russia in Ukraine has radically changed the functioning of the Ukrainian society. Despite ongoing military operations and the emotions evoked by them, the people of Ukraine are trying to fulfil their duties, which includes running the educational process on all its levels. It is interesting to find out about the experience of war and the feeling of dread of the two entities participating in university education— students and lecturers. The aim of this paper is to show whether the need for knowledge is stronger than the dread of war and economic poverty and how the war inspires fear among Ukrainian students and academic teachers. The study presented in the article is of a unique character as it is difficult to carry out research in wartime conditions, also because of the lack of electricity and no Internet connection on the side of respondents. The findings are thus original, with no precedence in the existing body of literature. We have adopted the following research hypothesis: in Ukraine, the fear of war began to appear more strongly in the academic environment (among students and lecturers) after the intensification of the Russian aggression on 24 February 2022 and has a destructive effect on the educational process. The research problems are reflected in the following questions: what main fears occurred in this process before and after 24 February 2022?; what has changed in the process after this date?; do Ukrainian universities take steps to reduce the fear that their students and employees have felt since the beginning of the Russian invasion and 2 For more details on the consequences of teaching in wartime conditions, see: O’Malley (2009).

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if so, what are they?; what measures—according to the respondents— should the state and local authorities of all levels (including the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science) take to properly organize the educational process in the conditions of a full-scale war?; do international partners help to eliminate problems occurring in field of education?; what actions of foreign partners are missing to organize the process of education in wartime conditions; have the respondents considered leaving Ukraine to flee the war and taking up studies or academic teacher’s job at a university abroad? The principal research method we used was a structured written interview, and the research tool was a survey questionnaire. The study was conducted with the use of docs.google platform.

The Findings 105 students and 66 lecturers participated in the study. Among the students, there were 49.5% women and the same number of men; one person ticked the box “other” in the question about gender. Among the academic teachers taking part in the research, 72.7% were women, while men accounted for 27.3%. Most students (73.3%) live in a city, while the others come from rural areas. More than a half of the respondents (54.3%) are in the freshman year of Bachelor studies, 25.7% study in the second year of the same level, 8.6% have just started Master studies, while the others represent the third and fourth years of Bachelor studies. The lecturers under survey are aged 20–39 (27.3%), 40–60 (65.2%) and over 60 (7.6%). As regards the type of school, only 1% of the examined students attend a private university, while the others all study at public institutions. All the lecturers under survey work at public universities. In response to the first question concerning the main fears in the educational process before the full-scale Russian aggression, the students predominantly answered that they had not felt frightened at all. Those few who had felt some anxiety specified they had struggled with online learning due to the pandemic; they had been afraid they would fail the high school examination, that their studies would not be financed from the budget, or that they would not pass university exams. Most lecturers also denied having had any fears. Those who had had them associated them with online teaching and the protection of health in relation to COVID-19 pandemic. There were single responses which

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concerned the fear of not obtaining accreditation or the insufficient number of new enrolments to a university. The second research question was related to the main fears in the educational process after the Russian Federation started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, i.e., 24 February 2022. The students answered that they had been afraid of death, their own and of their relatives. Other fears concerned the suspension of the educational process due to missile attacks or the lack of electricity and Internet connection. Young people were afraid of a missile attack during classes; they thought that sooner or later they would have to dig out from rubble the people you studied with (some students still attended classes in the buildings of their universities) or, in a better scenario, they would have to shift to remote learning, which they found less efficient. There were also fears of having to look for shelter in other countries to continue education. Some students were afraid of losing their relatives and a sense of security, or having their home bombed. They often indicated that they would not be able to prepare for classes because of power cuts. They stressed that it was impossible to learn anything under attack or during alarms. They wrote about the lack of sleep as they had been forced to stay in a cellar or a shelter, or about stress caused by not having enough time to learn. In wintertime, they stopped dealing with problems related to education because they were kept awake at night because of cold. Some of the respondents were afraid of losing classes cancelled during bomb alarms. Instead of them, they had to work on the material on their own. Young Ukrainians doubt whether their life will ever be the same as before Russia’s full-scale aggression. They also express fears related to fighting the enemy and the deterioration of their family’s financial situation. Some of them were afraid they would not be able to handle stress caused by the war and that they would drop out of college. Responding to the same question, the lecturers wrote that they had been afraid they would not be able to continue teaching at all because of the ruined energy infrastructure. They had also been worried about the safety of their students during classes as a missile could reach the university any time. Thus, after Russia’s full-scale aggression, when online learning began, teachers were concerned about the safety and health of their students rather than the educational process. They were afraid that their colleagues and students could die in the war. The teachers were worried about the mental state of students, especially those whose parents fought in the frontline or those who had lost their parents in the war.

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There were also fears that young people would either leave abroad or die in battle. The lecturers were afraid that whole Ukraine might be occupied, that critical infrastructure would be ruined, leading to the deterioration of the living standard, and that students and specialists from different fields would flee the country. What was another cause of concern was the unpredictable situation in Ukraine, which led to difficulties in the educational process. Some students stayed abroad, others lived near the frontline or in the occupied areas. A number of the respondents expressed fears about the complete closure of the educational system, which would deprive them of the source of income. Some lecturers were afraid that the level of students would drop as they would become passive and demotivated. Despite the war and having to work under extremely difficult conditions, Ukrainian university teachers are still subject to performance evaluation and, apart from giving lectures, they have to complete internships and publish papers in prestigious journals. That is why they expressed their concern about receiving negative assessment, emphasizing that—because of the lack of electricity, Internet connection, cold and their life being threatened—they could not take care of their academic development to the same extent as before the war. The teachers’ responses also revealed that the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, in spite of earlier signals, took university authorities aback. There were cases that on 24 February 2022, in spite of shock caused by the Russian aggression, students had to attend online classes and they did not get any message of support from the university authorities. To conclude the presentation of responses to this question, let us quote one of them, which shows the strength of spirit of Ukrainian teachers: “After remote learning introduced due to the COVID-19 pandemic and after the full-scale invasion of our country, there is no concern of the educational process. Everything will work out; there are only challenges that we are successfully coping with together with our students. The lack of light and Internet connection is obviously an obstacle but we can manage.” Another question asked in our study concerned changes in the educational process after 24 February 2022. Most students emphasized that due to the full-scale war, they had had to shift to online learning and that there were fewer classes as teachers had been instructed to cancel lectures if there was a risk of a missile attack. The respondents indicated that those attacks caused fears, which significantly distracted their attention. It was more difficult for them to learn in wartime conditions. The news from the frontline made them lose the motivation to study. What is

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more, it was impossible to plan learning because of power cuts. According to students, it was hard to learn when a family member was in the frontline or had to undergo medical treatment because of post-traumatic stress disorder. And yet they were not specially treated and had to log in for classes, at the same time staying in touch with their family members. Bomb alarms and the lack of electricity make it difficult to master the study material. Students also have to constantly overcome fears of their life and health, as well as of the life and health of their families and friends. Some of them believe that not all lecturers show empathy to them and they have to work individually to a larger degree. Thus, the quality of teaching dropped, although it is not the university’s fault. There were also comments that fewer people could attend classes due to the war, some of them lost touch with classmates and teachers, and learning came down to carrying out tasks given by lecturers. Teamwork also suffered because no one could predict how many students would attend the next class. Some of the respondents pointed out that the Russian aggression of whole Ukraine (not only the previously attacked eastern part of the country) had strengthened the national spirit and that common suffering and threat had unified Ukrainians. Responding to the same question, the teachers also stressed that after 24 November 2022 and in connection with missile attacks, the destruction of critical infrastructure, the lack of electricity and Internet connection and the necessity of shifting to online learning, the educational process had been destabilized. They are upset that they have to interrupt or cancel their classes due to missile attacks or power cuts. They emphasize, however, that because of the war, the class schedule and the approach to teaching has become more flexible. Students are more independent in their work now. The moment of remembrance was introduced in schools at 9 a.m. every day and teachers discuss with students their emotional states after missile attacks. The respondents also pointed out that the educational process had had to be quickly adapted to constant changes and threats, which put the concern about one’s own life, and of the life of family members, friends and defenders of the country first. It is difficult for university teachers to meet the requirements of academic development if they have to cope with fears of the safety of their country, families, students and their own on a daily basis. Another obstacle is the lack of Internet connection and no access to library collections. Lecturers and universities take enormous efforts to minimize the effect of the war on the education of young Ukrainians.

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The war inspires fears of the life and health of the population of Ukraine. Therefore, it was important to ask the respondents whether they thought that universities took adequate steps to reduce such fears among the participants of the educational process and, if so, what had been done in this respect at the respondent’s university, and if not, what had not been done? Responding to this question, most students (basing on their own experience) answered that Ukrainian universities were taking such steps. For example, they organize safe places in cellars and bomb shelters in university buildings. They are used not only as shelters, but also as classrooms during missile attacks, although their level of equipment is insufficient. Students cannot get over the humidity of these places, not suited to such large numbers of learners and teachers at the same time. Another problem is the lack of toilets and the insufficient number of places to sit. There is no Internet connection, either. One of the respondents suggested that physical education classes should be replaced by military training to prepare students for defending themselves and coping with war-related critical situations. Those students who were not covered by online learning stressed that it was a wrong decision by university authorities. They argued that the possibility of learning at home during bomb alarms and missile attacks had a calming effect on them. On the other hand, some of the students covered by classroom teaching stressed that— in case of power cuts—their university was not prepared to conducting classes or examinations. There were also comments that one was left on their own with their fears because the university was not willing to help them. Those students who believed that Ukrainian universities did not take any steps to reduce students’ concerns wrote about the lack of shelters at their universities and, in some cases, the lack of online learning. These voices were far less frequent, though. In response to the same question, almost all teachers agreed that Ukrainian higher education institutions helped to reduce fears incited by the Russian aggression. Shelters in university buildings and dormitories have been established. Universities have taken measures to ensure the highest possible quality of teaching and have adopted instructions on how to behave during attacks and alarms. Students and lecturers are taking part in psychological practice in adapting to wartime conditions. The respondents emphasized that universities in the west of the country were dealing with fears in a different way than those in the east. That is why they pointed out that the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and fixing

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critical infrastructure, including electricity and Internet networks, played a more important role than the decisions of university authorities. It is not only Ukrainian students that stay abroad and participate in remote courses. One of the lecturers described her situation in more detail. As she had been granted a scholarship abroad, she could not go back to teaching when her university resumed the classroom mode of education. She was given two days’ notice to return to Ukraine, which was impossible to do and the university terminated her employment. In our study, we also intended to find out what actions on the part of state and local authorities (including the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine) were missing to properly organize the educational process under the conditions of a full-scale war. Some of the students under survey stressed that there were not enough online learning possibilities as a large number of Ukrainian students had to attend classes in a regular mode (for example, at the Lviv Polytechnic National University, there was no remote teaching in the first year of Bachelor and the first year of Master studies). Because the educational process has been disorganized not only by missile attacks, but also by the destruction of critical infrastructure, some students suggest that universities should be equipped with power generators and shelters. One of the respondents asked what they should do if there was no electricity, water and Internet connection for the whole day. How to plan learning in such a situation? How to pass examinations if there are no basic conditions for studying? Some students pointed out in their responses that the authorities, including the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, were doing their best to ensure that classes were held in any form. They praised the idea of recording and sharing classes to students who had not been able to log in for them in real time. There were also comments that in wartime conditions, the requirements that students have to meet should be lowered and that lecturers should show more empathy to young people, who find it difficult to find themselves in a new situation (even if they had had to cope with the threats related to the COVID-19 pandemic). Some of the respondents proposed that the above requirements should be reduced until Ukraine won the war, that the examination session should be replaced by credits on the basis of tasks performed or at least exam deadlines should be extended. One student suggested that the students who had been admitted to foreign universities should get a permission to leave Ukraine. The analysis of the answers to this question shows

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that Ukrainian students, despite a threat of war, attacks, the lack of electricity and Internet connection, are ready to participate in the educational process. The examined lecturers also pointed out that academic centres should be equipped with power generators and shelters, and that the Internet access was indispensable. In this study group, the respondents more frequently indicated that the Ukrainian authorities were doing their best to ensure the highest possible level of teaching, but the unprecedented attacks of Russian armed forces on the civilian population and critical infrastructure were the main obstacle to it. The teachers were more likely than the students to propose that more support was needed for evacuated universities and their employees. In their responses, the surveyed lecturers stressed the need to reduce the bureaucratic burden associated with the reporting process and to give greater autonomy to universities and directly to lecturers. They also suggested that the requirements regarding the number of publications of papers or monographs and scientific internships should be reduced because it is difficult to meet them in wartime conditions. Some of them pointed out that those lecturers who had found shelter abroad together with their families should be permitted to stay there. According to them, they should have the possibility of working in a safe place. The lecturers participating in the research are worried about the mass departure of young people outside Ukraine. To stop this trend, they call for the elimination of barriers to admission to Ukrainian universities and changes in the high school final examinations (ZNO) so that parents would not have to spend money on tutors for their children. It was emphasized, however, that this proposal concerned not only wartime, but it should also refer to the times after the war. The next question was about whether foreign partners helped to eliminate problems in the organization of the educational process and if so, what had been done. Most students answered that they were not aware of any help from abroad. However, those who did feel support indicated help offered to the Ukrainian army. They believe that the supply of weapons to the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the best kind of support because it stops the Russian invasion, which enables “peaceful” study to a degree. The respondents also stressed that students from the occupied parts of Ukraine received material help. Some of them were the beneficiaries of that aid as they could study abroad free of charge. Only a few of them wrote that foreign partners helped them in the educational process by way of the “double

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degree” programme.3 What is more, this cooperation is not confined to the teaching process itself, but it also involves other forms of assistance to Ukrainian students. The respondents appreciate the support of European and American universities regarding the organization of the educational process, remote studies, conferences and seminars in which Ukrainian students can take part, and the participation in the ERASMUS+ programme. Some of them emphasize that other countries have helped Ukraine financially and that millions of refugees from Ukraine found shelter there, often in the private homes of their citizens. The lecturers were also more likely than the students to indicate the specific forms of support from international partners. In response to this question, they also stress that the assistance of foreign partners primarily involves the supply of weapons to the Ukrainian armed forces, which has an influence on the functioning of Ukrainian academic centres. It can help the defenders of Ukraine defeat the occupiers more quickly so that productive teaching can be resumed. They realize, however, that foreign partners assist in employing lecturers-refugees and arrange accommodation for them. They help those who stayed in Ukraine to obtain grants for scientific research, also in the sphere of preservation of cultural goods; they organize scientific internships, extend mobility in students and lecturers’ exchange and fund scholarships for them. The lecturers participating in the study are grateful to foreign partners for free access to databases and the opportunity to publish in international scientific journals. They also appreciate the fact that they can work as visiting professors at foreign universities and supervise degree theses. In response to the question regarding other steps that international partners should take to help organize the educational process in wartime conditions, the students often answered that they did not have any knowledge in this respect. A few of them wrote, however, that Ukraine needed arms, including nuclear weapons. One of the respondents put it bluntly: “Give us more weapons and do not be afraid of the Russian Federation.” Students expect military aid to eliminate Russian missiles and prevent the attacks on critical infrastructure and they want the intensification of political activity to stop Russia. They also want assistance in building shelters, or even “a lot of shelters”, and call for closing the airspace over Ukraine. 3 Both the Lviv Polytechnic National University and the National University of Ostroh Academy (where most of the respondents from both groups studied or worked) implement “double degree” contracts with the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn.

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They need the help of the international community to stop the Russian aggression and they demand the recognition of Russia as the aggressor and the perpetrator of genocide at the international level. The respondents also expect foreign partners to supply Ukraine with power generators and telecommunications devices to make it possible for academic centres to organize the teaching process smoothly and for students to have contact with their families. There were also demands for financial support for the educational process in Ukraine, participation in international exchange programmes, increasing access to scientific databases, providing opportunities for financing research projects (grants), admission to studies in foreign research centres, the reform of the educational process in Ukraine and assisting lecturers in adopting modern teaching methods and modern syllabuses. What they indicated the most pressing need, however, was moral and military support to Ukraine so that it could defeat the aggressor. The lecturers under survey also put emphasis on the supply of weapons to the Ukrainian army and the need to close the airspace over Ukraine and to impose more sanctions on the Russian Federation. They also want the enemy to be prosecuted for the crimes of genocide committed by the Russian Federation every day. They ask for power generators for universities and for telecommunications devices which could facilitate online learning. In the research field, academic teachers expect free scientific internships, better access to prestigious and free scientific journals, higher mobility in the exchange of academic staff, joint grants, and the extension of the scope of international cooperation. There were also comments that foreign partners provided sufficient support. In the context of the full-scale war in Ukraine, it was interesting to find out whether the respondents considered the possibility of leaving the country and beginning studies or taking up a teaching job in a foreign university. In the group of students, more than a half of the respondents (56 people – 53%) did not take such an option into account. They justified it with their faith in the victory of Ukraine and love and devotion to their home country. They claimed that life and development in their homeland was the priority and that their future was inseparably linked with Ukraine. One of the students does not want to leave Ukraine because she has always dreamt of studying at a Ukrainian university although her parents have begged her to go to study abroad. Others explained that they did not wish to leave Ukraine because of the lack of knowledge of foreign languages (except for English), unwillingness to go abroad

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or the feeling that they should support Ukraine and the fear of leaving their family behind. Some argued that it was Russians who should leave Ukraine. One of the respondents wrote straightforwardly that she had never considered leaving the country as no one would need her abroad, while if she stayed in Ukraine she would be able to help the country by doing what she had always done. The students who had never thought of going to study abroad stressed the high level of academic education in Ukraine and were convicted that it would give them qualifications, so they did not want to give it up. One of the respondents in this group wrote that she had not considered going to study abroad because many friends and family stayed in the occupied territories, and by being here (implicitly in western Ukraine) she had the opportunity to help them. Those students who took studies abroad into account justified it with security considerations. As many as 59 out of 66 (89%) lecturers definitely rejected the idea of leaving Ukraine. Some added that they had such an opportunity as they had been granted a scholarship, but they decided to stay in their homeland and work in and for their Ukraine, believing in the victory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Others wrote that they would not leave their homeland, their university and their family in a such a difficult time, and that everything that was near and dear was here, in Ukraine. They stressed that every Ukrainian person should stay in the country in the time of war. Some even said that abandoning the country is a betrayal of the homeland, although they did accept such a possibility after the end of the war. Those who worked in Lviv expressed a belief that their city was safe in comparison to other regions of Ukraine and that they would not leave the country unless the situation changed. One person (1.5% of the respondents), who had not considered emigrating, said that she could change her decision if a threat to her family increased. She added that she had three children and she was constantly concerned about the safety of them. Another respondent in this group (1.5% of the whole) considered going abroad only for a short time, up to two months, in order to conduct scientific research. The decision to stay in Ukraine was also justified with professional obligations, which require presence in the country. One of the surveyed lecturers said that Ukrainians needed educational services on the territory of their home country and the enemy could not deprive them of the right to education. Another person wrote: “The Ukrainian army is our children and grandchildren. They protect us and our country. Who will they protect if we all leave?” One of the people under survey (1.5%), who stayed and worked abroad, informed that she was working in

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the remote mode for her Ukrainian university but she would welcome the opportunity to hold internship abroad. Those who declared their readiness to leave Ukraine did not justify their answer in detail. One of the people in this group admitted that it was quite unlikely for Ukrainian lecturers to find a job at foreign universities. The last question in the survey was whether the respondents intended to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine. If so, how did they plan to do it? If not, why? Among the students’ group, only two people (1.9%) answered that they were not going to take part in the reconstruction of their country, while another two (1.9%) had not thought about it yet. The other students expressed their intention of participating in the reconstruction of Ukraine. Some of them declared financial aid, while others thought they could use competencies acquired at university (students of architecture believed they could help in rebuilding infrastructure). Others planned to contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine by paying taxes to the state. The students often simply wrote that they would help rebuild their homeland with all their strength, also as volunteers. One of the people under survey said that her educational background predestined her to work in state offices. Another person declared that if a situation required he would retrain and help in the reconstruction of Ukraine. A psychology student from a foreign university declared her professional support to people coping with traumas after the war, but she wanted to do it online as she was not sure whether she would return to Ukraine. Some of the surveyed students intend to become diplomats and continue cooperation with international organizations in rebuilding the ruined country. They want to seek assistance and support to Ukraine from foreign partners. Young people also want to help as the designers of public space. Only one (1.5%) of the lecturers participating in our survey answered that they had not considered this question, and there was one person (1.5%), sacked from her Ukrainian university after having stayed abroad, who said that she would take part in the reconstruction of Ukraine, but she did not know when it would be possible. She added that she would have to seek a scholarship abroad as “I am no longer needed by my country.” The other surveyed academic teachers declared their participation in rebuilding Ukraine. They plan to continue employment at universities to educate the successive young generations of Ukrainians. They also want to help as experts in state and civil society institutions, promoting Ukraine’s education with Europe. Others see their role in

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preparing high-quality scientific papers, the high level of teaching, establishing cooperation between Ukrainian and foreign academic centres, diligent work and paying taxes. One of the lecturers intends to assist in managing military heritage and educating young people in the field of war prevention tactics. Some have already got involved in the reconstruction projects of their regions, while others plan to give lectures in the academic centres based on the temporarily occupied territories, where there is a shortage of teachers. The respondents emphasized that they want to participate in the reconstruction of their country in all spheres—physically, materially and intellectually.

Conclusions The responses obtained in the study allowed us to positively verify the research hypothesis that the fear of war in the Ukrainian academic circles (among students and lecturers) intensified after the Russian aggression of 24 February 2022. Universities in Ukraine have been severely affected by the war, which has a destructive influence on the educational process. It can be clearly seen that both students and academic teachers in Ukraine suffer from the war. They are constantly afraid ofwhether they or their families will survive a day, but they somehow got accustomed to fear and tried to adapt to wartime conditions. They need support from international partners, especially in the supply of weapons, the closure of the airspace over Ukraine, defeating the aggressor and the international court for the Russian Federation for unprecedented military aggression and ongoing genocide. In order to reduce the suffering of Ukrainian students and lecturers (as well as of the whole Ukrainian nation, so deeply affected by the war they did not start), the international community should supply weapons to Ukraine so that it can defeat the enemy, preserving its critical infrastructure necessary for securing the daily functioning of millions of Ukrainians who decided to stay in their country. The foreign partners of Ukrainian universities face significant challenges as those heroic lecturers and students, working under extremely difficult wartime conditions, need a lot of support to maintain the highest possible level of education. Our study shows that young people are more likely than their teachers to consider emigration. Lecturers generally declare that they want to stay in their country. It must be stressed that the respondents from both groups intend to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

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References Astramowicz-Leyk, T. (2009). Mi˛edzynarodowe systemy ochrony praw i wolno´sci człowieka. OSW. Hazapenko, I., Kogyt, I., & Kepbobkina, T. (2022). Ocvita i viuna v Ukpa|ni (24 lotogo–1 kvitnR 2022). https://cedos.org.ua/researches/osvita-i-vijnav-ukrayini-24-lyutogo-1-kvitnya-2022/ Kalaitzaki, A. E., Tamiolaki, A., & Vintila, M. (2022). The compounding effect of COVID-19 and war in Ukraine on mental health: A global time bomb soon to explode? Journal of Loss and Trauma. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15325024.2022.2114654 Karta Narodów Zjednoczonych. (1945). http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/ onz/1945.html Kurapov, A., Pavlenko, V., Drozdov, A., Bezliudna, V., Reznik, A., & Isralowitz, R. (2022). Toward an understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian War impact on university students and personnel. Journal of Loss and Trauma. https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15325024.2022.2084838 Ku´zniar, R. (2004). Prawa człowieka. Prawo, instytucje, stosunki mi˛edzynarodowe. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Lavrysh, Y., Lytovchenko, I., Lukianenko, V., & Golub, T. (2022). Teaching during the wartime: Experience from Ukraine. Educational Philosophy and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2022.2098714 O’Malley, B. (2009). Education under attack, 2007: A global study on targeted political and military violence against education staff, students, teachers, union and government officials, and institutions. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/ 48223/pf0000150548 Powszechna Deklaracja Praw Człowieka. (1948). http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/ txt/onz/1948.html. Shevlin, M., Hyland, P., & Karatzias, T. (2022). The psychological consequences of the Ukraine War: What we know, and what we have to learn. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 146(2), 105–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/acps. 13466 Stadnik, A. V., Melnyk, Y. B., Babak, S. A., Vashchenko, I. V., & Krut, P. P. (2022). Psychological distress among students and cadets of universities in the war conditions. International Journal of Science Annals, 5(1–2), 20–29. https://doi.org/10.26697/ijsa.2022.1-2.0

Conclusion

The goal pursued in creation of the work was achieved by the authors, who shared their knowledge and research results on the conditions and the current course of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Thanks to the consolidation of researchers representing various disciplines of social sciences, it was possible to present various faces of war and its spheres of influence. The extraordinariness of the war attracts media attention. Since the war in Afghanistan, the stages and ways of reporting on armed conflicts by traditional media have been studied and named, but the development of new media has created a new reality. The reality in which the media become a virtual participant in conflicts thanks to advanced technologies, and at the same time manage human emotions. Conspiracy theories would not have a chance to reach a wide audience if it were not for the way they are distributed via the Internet. The relations between the media and emotions in the conditions of armed conflict assume specific vectors. Agnieszka Kasinska-Metryka ´ and Karolina Pałka-Suchojad state that traditional media report conflicts in accordance with their logic, i.e. from the phase of very intense interest, through gradual reduction of information, to its marginalization. The use of a wide range of available media is permanently inscribed in the DNA of modern armed conflicts. The Russian Federation has been building its information potential for years, but the conflict in Ukraine quickly verified it. As argued by Adam R. Bartnicki, Elzbieta ˙ Kuzelewska ˙ © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5

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and Michał Ozóg, ˙ the Russian narrative legitimizing the start of the war did not hit fertile ground, even the threat of escalating the war or “freezing Europe”, fuelled by Russian narratives, was not a victory. However, in Russia and the countries of the Global South, ideological newspeak based on disinformation still finds fertile ground. In these directions, Russian disinformation is successful. A strong factor shaping the information space in many moments of crisis are conspiracy theories, which are also a generator of affective emotions. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa and Natalia St˛epien-Lampa ´ state that despite numerous groups propagating conspiracy theories discrediting Ukrainians (both those fighting and those who fled the war, e.g. to Poland), on February 24, 2022, in the Polish media, there is more sympathy than dislike for Ukrainians on social media, and the majority narrative condemns the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The richness of contemporary media means that on the information battlefield, more and more new instruments are used, building information advantage. Monika Góra and Natalia Moczoł, analysing war memes, come to the conclusion that it is an extremely interesting way of expressing emotions in crisis situations, which are undoubtedly wars. As in the case of the conclusions from the first chapter about war “fatigue” in media messages, the researchers notice a similar trend in the fluctuation of the subject of war in memes. The charismatic leadership of Volodymyr Zelenski has permanently been recorded in the pages of history. Russian aggression against Ukraine turned out to be a factor that influenced the “coming out of the shadows” of the First Lady Olena Zelenska. Yuliana Palagnyuk and Monika Kornacka-Grzonka note that the image of the president’s wife, the First Lady, has evolved into a strong and intelligent personality, a patriot and a politician. The war in Ukraine turns out to be a factor that transforms not only societies and individuals, but also has a strong potential to cause functional and structural changes in online media in Ukraine. Maryana Prokop notes that, against the background of online media available on the Ukrainian market, it was after the outbreak of the war that Telegram gained a significant advantage, becoming the undisputed leader among other media by creating chats enabling the transmission of the most important and up-to-date information. Moreover, the conflict made the Internet media particularly popular, accelerating the process initiated several years before the war.

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“Emotions that are released during war must previously exist dormant in the nations”, these words of Carl von Clausewitz take on a special meaning during the war taking place on the borders of united Europe. In such conditions, it is extremely important to identify the relationship between information and emotions and the feedback between these two phenomena. Zuzanna Sielska notes that a high level of conflict can have a positive impact on building social networks. At the same time, they see the inclination that high-intensity conflicts also affect the polarization and division into “us” versus “them” groups, which can also be seen in the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine created a special perspective for the analysis of civic and patriotic behaviour within Ukrainian society. The Russian hybrid war waged against Ukraine since 2014, followed by a full-scale invasion in 2022, were factors that stimulated a significant increase in patriotic sentiment. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Antonina Kozyrska and Danuta Plecka outline the generators and limits of this progress. They indicate that there is also the effect of propaganda activities, including those undertaken by state authorities, institutions and Ukrainian mass media, the purpose of which is to maintain the fighting spirit in the nation. Emotions are not only a strong stimulant of action, as evidenced by the Ukrainian nation, but also the “flywheel” of the mobilization mechanisms of the international community, both on a macro and wet scale. Danuta Plecka and Agnieszka Szpak identify the sources of help for Ukrainians fleeing the war from neighbouring countries. The first factor is emotions, mainly sympathy, fear, anxiety and concern about the escalation of the war. At the same time, these emotions were closely related to political knowledge based on the historical experience of individual societies that were satellite states of the USSR. The war in Ukraine shows that a man under the influence of danger can liberate and discover the most noble and human faces. In this context, Bozena ˙ Dziemidok-Olszewska and Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło outline the evolution of the image of Volodymyr Zełenski, who transformed from a “servant of the people”, a comedian and an actor into a true leader and steadfast statesman. The Russian invasion acted as a catalyst for the process of shaping his image “at an accelerated pace”. War generates strong emotions, from hatred to concern and fear for loved ones, and these feelings accompany everyone, regardless of social group. Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk, Joanna Marszałek-Kawa and Yaryna Turchyn, analysing the population of students/students and teachers/

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lecturers, point out that they need huge support to maintain the highest possible level of education, which is difficult due to the damaged infrastructure. That is why the mobilization and solidarity of the international community is so important. In our work, we tried to show how strong the relationship between the media and emotions is in conditions of threatened security. The division of the book into two parts illustrates the principle of connected vessels. At the same time, it was possible to present the so-called human factor, i.e. specific heroes of war events—both politicians and ordinary people, in this case young people. While maintaining scientific reliability and impartiality, we did not omit difficult topics, e.g. entertainment function, which is carried out in the media even in relation to the drama of war. Memes about the conflict, but also war themes in stand-ups are also a fragment of reality that generates emotions.

Index of Names

A Akhmetov, R., 33, 198 Andreev, S., 52

G Gerasimov, V., 27 Gubareva, K., 34

B Babakova, O., 196 Bandera, S., 48, 162 Bissell, K., 113 Bohdan, A., 197 Boyko, Y., 200 Braun, G., 65, 66 Brzezinski, Z., 199 Brzoza, K., 113 Butler, J.E., 113

H Honcharuk, O., 197

K Kaczynski, ´ J., 66 Karczewski, W., 200, 201 Kiselov, D., 31 Kluczynska, ´ U., 113 Kolomoisky, I., 192, 193, 196–198 Kozak, T., 33 Kuchma, L., 33, 162

D Duda, A., 61, 66 Durov, P., 101

L Loizeau, P.-M., 112

E Erickson, K.V., 111, 112, 115, 125

M Mahda, Y., 199

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5

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Medvedchuk, V., 33 Miedwienczuk, ´ V., 33 Morawiecki, M., 66 Mortensen, T., 113 Musk, E., 34 N Niedzielski, A., 66 Nye, B., 112 O O’Connor, K., 112 P Perreault, G., 113 Peskov, D., 31 Petrovych Holoborodko, V., 192 Pinchuk, V., 33 Poroshenko, P., 100, 106, 162, 193, 195, 199 Putin, V., 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 36, 43, 184, 199 R Radinsky, O., 196, 197

Razumkov, D., 197 S Saakashvili, M., 25 Scharrer, E., 113 Secler, B., 113 Shoigu, S., 30 Sulfaro, V., 112, 113 T Thomson, S., 111, 112, 115, 125 V Van Assendelft, L., 112 Y Yanukovych, V., 28, 29, 33 Z Zeldes, G.A., 112, 113 Zelenska, O., 2, 4, 113–125, 224 Zelenskyy, V., 6, 113, 123, 125, 126, 189, 191–201

Subject Index

A academic development, 211, 212 academic teachers, 6, 208, 209, 217, 219, 220 accessibility of information, 101 armed conflict, 1–3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12–15, 17, 18, 22, 86, 135–137, 141, 142, 144, 158, 174, 179, 183, 223 arrested war, 79, 80

B Banderites, 32, 48, 49, 62, 66 broadcast war, 79

C Censor.net, 116, 119–122 chauvinism, 155 compassion, 12, 184 compassion Fatigue, 4, 77, 80, 82, 89 conditions, 1, 3–5, 11, 15, 17, 18, 26, 35, 36, 84, 97, 98, 137, 153, 155, 157, 168, 177, 191, 198,

199, 206, 208, 209, 211, 213–216, 220, 223, 225, 226 conspiracy beliefs, 46 conspiracy theories, 1, 2, 4, 44–48, 50, 52, 61, 66, 67, 69, 223, 224 Constitution of Ukraine, 190, 191 content aggregators, 78, 82 content analysis, 4, 81, 115 COVID-19, 44, 52, 55, 59, 68, 209, 211, 214 Crimean Peninsula, 28, 174 cyberspace, 3, 22, 27, 96, 140 D democracy, 35, 77, 151, 175, 178 demotivators, 77, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89 diffused war, 79 diplomacy, 28, 111, 125, 197 disinformation, 2, 4, 13, 17, 27–29, 35, 36, 38, 47, 84, 96, 99, 161, 224 Donbass, 10, 30, 182, 195, 199 Donetsk, 28, 100, 174

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Turska-Kawa et al. (eds.), War in Ukraine. Media and Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37608-5

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E echo chambers, 46, 67–69 educational process, 6, 207–217, 220 emotions, 1–6, 9, 14, 18, 24, 31, 80, 86, 118, 120, 133–136, 138–145, 154, 168, 173–180, 184, 196, 208, 223–226 emotions negative, 45, 86, 134, 136, 139, 144, 156, 174–176, 185 emotions positive, 134, 136, 139, 143, 144, 156, 176, 184 equality, 123, 155, 157 European Union (EU), 66, 125, 169, 184, 201

F Facebook, 34, 44, 76, 79, 96, 101, 103–108, 114, 118, 139, 142, 195 fake news, 13, 17, 27, 36, 47, 84, 102, 144 Fakt, 116–119 fanaticism, 155 fear, 1, 3, 6, 35, 37, 75, 134–136, 138, 140–144, 175, 176, 180, 184, 206–213, 218, 220, 225 fear of war, 35, 206, 208, 220 First Lady, 2, 5, 111–114, 116–126, 224 focus, 3, 9, 16, 30, 44, 46, 76, 79, 85, 88, 118, 125, 180 foreign policy, 112, 125, 190, 195 freedom, 5, 45, 89, 151, 153, 155, 156, 160, 162, 163, 168, 175, 206, 207 freedom from aggression, 206 freedom from poverty, 206 freedom of religion, 206 freedom of speech, 206, 207

G Gazeta Wyborcza, 116–119 gender roles, 123 Gerasimov Doctrine, 27

H headline, 115, 117, 118, 120, 124 homeland, 5, 26, 142, 143, 153–155, 157, 162, 163, 168, 217–219 human values, 206 hybrid warfare, 3, 95, 225

I identity, 5, 46, 135, 136, 141, 142, 145, 155–158, 163, 166, 176, 177, 199 ideology, 143, 156 independence, 5, 26, 36, 43, 89, 152, 158, 159, 185, 189, 190 information, 1–3, 17, 24, 138, 142 information operations, 30 Information Security Doctrine, 25, 26 information war, 2, 22, 24–28, 30, 33, 37 Instagram, 34, 96, 103, 104, 106, 107, 114, 118, 139, 142 integration, 141, 155, 161, 198 internationalization, 30, 207 Internet, 1, 2, 11–13, 24, 29, 34, 36, 44, 45, 68, 76–78, 80–84, 86–88, 100, 102, 103, 139, 157, 169, 173, 208, 210–215, 223, 224

J journalist, 11, 14, 36, 61, 65, 76, 78, 84, 87, 88, 113, 117–119, 121, 195 justice, 48, 66, 151, 155, 157, 206, 207

SUBJECT INDEX

K Kherson region, 34 Kremlin propaganda, 29 Kremlin’s policy, 24

L Levada Center, 31 loyalty, 153, 154, 168

M media, 1–4, 6, 9–18, 23–25, 27–31, 33–35, 52, 75–81, 84–86, 88, 89, 95–99, 101–105, 108, 112, 115, 120–126, 138–140, 142, 144, 145, 159, 162, 168, 169, 174, 175, 180, 192, 194, 200, 201, 223–226 media content, 77, 83 media coverage, 3, 4, 9, 11, 14–16, 80, 111–113, 115, 125 mediatization, 11, 12, 78, 79 mediatization of war, 4, 78, 79 memes, 2, 4, 12, 76–78, 81–90, 224, 226 mental and physical safety, 207 mother, 44, 112, 113, 116, 119, 121, 124 motivation to study, 211

N nation, 3, 112, 124, 141, 142, 151, 153, 155, 160–163, 168, 169, 184, 190, 196, 200, 220, 225 nationalism, 155, 168 National Security Strategy, 26 network, 3, 24, 27, 33, 34, 47, 79, 97, 100–103, 112, 140, 144, 145, 177, 193, 195–197, 201, 214, 225

231

news, 12, 14, 16, 23, 30, 31, 34, 47, 77, 79, 87–89, 96, 100–103, 105, 114, 144, 173, 195, 201, 211 newspaper, 29, 80, 116, 117, 124, 190 non-military actions, 27

O Obozrevatel, 116, 120–122 Odnoklassniki, 106 online media, 2, 16, 101, 102, 107, 108, 119–121, 224 open military conflict, 28

P pandemic, 2, 43–45, 52, 55, 59, 65, 66, 68, 69, 76, 199, 209, 211, 214 participatory journalism, 76, 77 patriotism, 11, 121, 151–160, 162–169 Poland, 1, 4, 12–14, 22, 29, 32, 43, 44, 47–49, 52, 62, 65, 66, 75, 76, 81, 82, 84, 89, 106, 115, 116, 118, 119, 139, 144 political knowledge, 3, 5, 174–180, 184, 185, 225 political leadership, 6, 29, 31, 190 politician, 2, 4, 9, 28, 29, 66, 75, 79, 87, 114, 116, 117, 121–123, 125, 126, 139, 175, 176, 189, 192, 194–196, 198, 224, 226 positive campaign, 195 president, 6, 32, 66, 83, 113, 117, 120, 122, 125, 142, 143, 162, 190, 191, 194, 197–201 presidential election, 6, 190, 192, 193, 196, 200 president’s wife, 122

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President of Ukraine, 83, 113, 114, 120–123, 126, 162, 168, 181, 184, 190–192, 199 psychological operations, 24, 140

Q quality of teaching, 212, 213

R radio, 12, 29, 33, 96, 97, 101–103, 108, 144 respect, 13, 34, 107, 117, 153, 157, 158, 160–164, 167, 168, 189, 206, 207, 213, 216 responsibility, 46, 98, 165, 182 Russia, 1–3, 5, 15, 16, 22–30, 32–38, 43, 75, 76, 84, 85, 88, 89, 96, 99, 100, 106, 115, 116, 120, 122, 123, 141, 143, 161, 162, 166, 168, 169, 174, 180–184, 189, 191, 195, 196, 199, 201, 206, 210, 216, 223, 224 Russian aggression, 2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 16, 36, 76, 95, 96, 101, 102, 108, 133, 182, 192, 205, 208, 209, 211–213, 217, 220, 224 Russian disinformation, 2, 33–36, 38, 224 Russian disinformation rhetoric, 32 Russian doctrine, 24 Russian military doctrine, 24 Russian military operations, 25 Russian propaganda, 16, 31, 32, 35–38, 55, 99, 100, 102, 200 Russian sphere of influence, 25 Russian troops, 34, 36, 37, 183 Russia-Ukraine conflict, 81 Russia-Ukraine War, 4, 208 Russkiy mir—Russian World, 29

S security, 2, 4, 18, 22, 25–27, 37, 38, 43, 99, 136, 137, 140, 152, 155, 162, 182, 190, 195, 206, 210, 218, 226 self-determination, 152, 164 self-identification, 158–160 Servant of the People, 3, 192, 194, 197, 198, 201, 225 social behaviour, 2 social emotions, 133, 134, 138 social media, 2, 4, 14, 15, 17, 18, 33, 36, 44, 46, 69, 76, 79, 80, 84, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101–103, 105–108, 113, 114, 118, 121, 138, 139 social mobilizations, 5, 160, 176–178, 180, 184 sources of information, 107, 108 sovereign equality, 206 sovereignty, 26, 27, 160, 168, 189 student-centred teaching process, 207 Studio Kvartal 95, 192 Super Express, 116–119 T Telegram, 2, 34, 96, 99, 101, 103, 104, 106–108, 114, 224 Tiktok, 103–105, 107 trust in media, 13, 102 trust of information, 100, 102 Twitter, 4, 44–47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 58, 59, 61, 64, 67–69, 76, 87, 96, 103–107, 113, 139, 142 U Ukraine, 1–3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14–18, 22, 23, 28–30, 32–38, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 65, 66, 69, 75–77, 81–85, 88, 95–106, 108, 112–116, 119–123, 125,

SUBJECT INDEX

141–144, 152, 158–163, 165, 168, 169, 173, 174, 180–184, 189–193, 195, 197–201, 205–208, 210–220, 223, 224 Ukrainian armed forces, 22, 34, 215, 216 Ukrainska Pravda, 116, 119, 120 Ukropolin, 48, 49, 66, 67 United News, 99 United States of America (USA), 13, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 81, 112, 122, 125, 184, 195, 206 V values, 5, 135, 137, 152, 154–160, 162–165, 175, 178, 201 Viber, 96, 103–105, 107 VKontakte (VK), 101 Vogue, 119, 123 W war, 1–5, 10–18, 22–28, 30–32, 34–37, 43, 48, 49, 52, 54, 65,

233

69, 75, 76, 79–81, 83–89, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 108, 114–116, 118–126, 133–137, 141–144, 152, 157–163, 166, 168, 169, 180, 200, 201, 206–215, 219, 220, 223–226 war crimes, 17, 34, 38, 180–183 War Doctrine, 25–27 war in Ukraine, 2–4, 6, 10–12, 16, 17, 23, 28–31, 44, 47, 48, 50, 55, 61, 66–68, 77, 79, 81–83, 85–89, 107, 114, 119, 123, 125, 133, 144, 145, 173–175, 177, 180, 184, 207, 208, 211, 217, 224, 225 wartime education, 207 Web 2.0 philosophy, 77 woman, 52, 65, 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 121, 124

Y YouTube, 34, 35, 44, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106–108