Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920 9780773563407

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Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920

It has been argued that for the critical period from 1916 to 1920, Walter Long was the most powerful single voice on Irish affairs in the British government. As the leader most committed to a federalist approach to constitutional reform in Ireland, he was a central figure in maintaining a firm stance on Ireland as an integral part of the union before World War I and in determining the eventual shape of the union after the war. Chief Secretary for Ireland in the last months of the Balfour government in 1905, a Unionist leader with many friends and supporters in southern Ireland, and a politician who held ministerial office in the wartime Coalition governments, Long was of great importance in establishing attitudes toward Ireland. John Kendle shows that whatever hopes Irish Unionists cherished of combatting the home rule movement and preserving their own status within the empire depended in great part on the support of individuals such as Long. Covering the fifteen years during which Long was closely caught up in Irish affairs, Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 19051920 provides an analysis of Long's attitudes and actions and underlines his contribution to the resolution of the political and constitutional dilemma confronting the United Kingdom. Kendle concludes that Long, by advocating a federal solution to AngloIrish problems, was a principal architect of the partition of the United Kingdom and of the post-1922 constitutional map of the British Isles. JOHN KENDLE is a professor in the Department of History of the University of Manitoba.

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Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920 JOHN KENDLE

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1992 ISBN 0-7735-0908-9 Legal deposit third quarter 1992 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and with a grant from the Dean of Arts, University of Manitoba.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Kendle, John, 1937Walter Long, Ireland and the Union, 1905-1920 Included bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-0908-9

i. Long, Walter Hume Long, ist Viscount, 18541924. 2. Statesmen - Great Britain - Biography. 3. Great Britain - Politics and government 1901-1936. I. Title. DA566-9-L65K45 1992 94i.o82'3'o92 C92-o9O2o8-i

This book was typeset by Typo Litho composition inc. in 10/12 Palatino.

Published simultaneously in Ireland by Glendale Publishing Ltd.

For Judy, John, Andrew, and Nancy

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Contents

Preface

ix

1 Early Career, 1854-1904 3 2 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles 23 3 The Union in Danger 53 4 Countering Lloyd George 90 5 A Federal Solution? 132 6 "Devolution in a Federal Form" 172 Conclusion 197 Notes 203 A Note on Sources 237 Index 241

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Preface

Walter Long sat in the House of Commons as a Conservative and Unionist MP from 1880 to 1921. He was a cabinet minister for sixteen of those years, serving as president of the board of agriculture (18951900), president of the local government board (1900-1905 and 191516), chief secretary for Ireland (1905), colonial secretary (1916-19), and first lord of the admiralty (1919-21). He was highly regarded for his administrative and parliamentary skills, acknowledged as a powerful figure in Unionist circles both at Westminster and in the counties, and intimately involved in the formulation of both Unionist and coalition government policies, particularly as they affected Ireland. In fact, it has recently been suggested for the crucial period 1916-20 (during which he chaired the two cabinet committees asked to draft home rule legislation and acted as the liaison between the government in London and the Irish executive in Dublin) that Walter Long "was probably the most powerful single voice in Irish affairs in British government circles."1 Despite his obvious importance at a transitional time in the life of his party and his country, Long has received relatively little sustained attention from historians. In part, this is due to the paucity of private and public material for important phases of his career. Also, Long himself was frustraringly unrevealing in his own memoirs, and his biographer Sir Charles Petrie, writing in the 19305, faithfully preserved the silence. Long was especially quiet about his involvement with Ireland, and Petrie provided little additional knowledge and no comment. More recent writers have acknowledged Long's importance in Irish affairs, but few have devoted more than occasional paragraphs or pages to an analysis of his role. It would take a particularly assiduous reader to ferret out and patch together the published contributions; and having done so, the reader

x Preface

would have neither a complete nor an integrated analysis of Long's impact on Ireland either as a leading English Unionist or as a cabinet minister. Only two writers have thus far attempted a full-scale assessment of Long. Roderick Clifford explored Long's political career in his 1970 Johns Hopkins doctoral thesis, but he was hampered by the lack, at that time, of any personal papers on which to base his study. By contrast, the late Richard Murphy's 1985 Bristol Ph.D. thesis is a valuable pioneering work. It is firmly anchored in the Long Papers and offers a rounded analysis of Long's political life from 1905 until his death. Murphy's treatment of Long's Irish involvement, both in his thesis and in two subsequent articles, is an important contribution to the historical literature, but relying on them alone or on a composite drawn from a variety of sources would still provide an incomplete picture. After all, Dr Murphy's purpose in his thesis was to appraise all aspects of Long's career, and he did not intend to provide a fully detailed study of Long's Irish interests. Moreover, in his articles he did not explore the impact of Long's "federal" arguments on either the formulation of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 or the constitutional map of the British Isles. This was a crucial dimension of Long's contribution that must be closely examined in any assessment of his role in the formulation of the British government's Irish policy during a critical period in Irish, British, and imperial history. On the English Unionist side of the Irish equation we now have available major studies of such key figures as Bonar Law, Arthur Balfour, Sir Edward Carson, and Austen Chamberlain. It is only fitting that Walter Long's role, arguably the most important at significant moments, should be explored. This, then, is the first fulllength study of Walter Long's involvement with Ireland and of his efforts to preserve the union during the years 1905-20. It analyses his attitudes and actions and underlines his contribution to the resolution of the political and constitutional dilemma that confronted the United Kingdom. It concludes that, by advocating a federal solution to the problem, Long was as much an architect of partition and thus of the post-1922 constitutional map of the British Isles as were Lloyd George, Sir Edward Carson, Arthur Balfour, or Bonar Law. In addition, despite a few individual studies and the occasional article or chapter, there has been remarkably little attention paid to the English Unionists and Ireland. Irish Unionists, both north and south, have received considerable analysis, and the Liberals, especially Lloyd George, have always attracted historians, but it is clear

xi

Preface

that neither the policies of the Liberals and Lloyd George nor the response of the Ulster and southern Unionists can be fully understood unless one recognizes the degree to which they were affected by English Unionist opinion and argument. This book, therefore, also contributes to a fuller understanding of the English Unionists as they grappled with the perplexing and wrenching problems that confronted the union. In preparing this book I have accumulated many debts. I am particularly grateful to the staff of the following institutions: the Wiltshire County Record Office; the Durham County Record Office; the Kent County Record Office; the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland; the Public Record Office; the House of Lords Record Office; the Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum; the Archives of Churchill College, Cambridge; the British Library; the Bodleian Library; Cambridge University Library; Birmingham University Library; Sheffield University Library; the Institute of Historical Research; Manitoba Provincial Library; the University of Manitoba Library; and St John's College Library, University of Manitoba. This project has been generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which by awarding me a time release stipend and a two-year research grant enabled me to secure the necessary time for research and writing. I am grateful to the editors of McGill-Queen's University Press for their excellent editorial work and to Lynn Kopeschny of Winnipeg for so rapidly and efficiently typing my drafts. A special thanks to Judy for her advice and understanding.

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Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920

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CHAPTER ONE

Early Career, 1854-1904

Walter Hume Long was born at Bath on 13 July 1854. His father was Richard Penruddocke Long, the son of Walter Long who was MP for North Wilts 1832-65. His mother, Charlotte Anna, was the fourth daughter of Wentworth Fitzwilliam Dick of Humewood, County Wicklow, MP for Wicklow 1852-80. The Longs were a well-established Wiltshire family who had taken a leading part in the life of the county for some four hundred years and had represented it in Parliament since the days of Henry V. Long's father became MP for Chippenham in 1859 and held the seat until 1865 when he was elected to succeed his father in North Wilts. Although illness forced Richard Long to relinquish his seat in the early 18705, Walter grew up in a family with a lengthy tradition of public service and a natural inclination to parliamentary life, and in an environment where politics and political personalities were continually and openly discussed. Although born in Bath, Walter Long spent the first twelve and a half years of his life at Dolforgan, Montgomeryshire, on property owned by his grandfather. These years in Wales were fondly recalled by Walter in his memoirs. The ten children, five boys and five girls, were allowed considerable freedom and, as he put it, "lived a thoroughly country life."1 Walter particularly enjoyed the opportunity to ride whenever he wanted: "The ponies for which Wales is so famous were provided for us in great numbers. They all ran loose in the park, and we were allowed the full enjoyment of them, on the clear understanding that we caught them ourselves, saddled, bridled and looked after them when we came in, and turned them out in the park again. The result of this was that we learnt to ride all kinds of animals, some of them very young, and we learnt also how to look after them."2 These experiences instilled in Long not

4 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

only a passion for horses and the hunt but also a punctiliousness which later in life some of his colleagues found grating. The idyllic years at Dolforgan came to an end in 1867 when, with the death of Walter's grandfather, his father succeeded to the family estate at Rood Ashton in Wiltshire. As a youngster, Walter suffered severely from asthma and it was doubted that he would ever be strong enough to attend school on a regular basis. He had had a tutor in Wales, and this pattern continued after moving to Wiltshire. Walter was sent to a Mr Tait (later Canon Tait), a friend of his father who lived in the village of Hilperton not far from Rood Ashton. Although Mr Tait had a bad temper, an injudicious tongue, and a habit of meting out heavy doses of corporal punishment, Walter grew rather fond of him and kept in touch until the old gentleman's death. Walter believed he owed him much "for sound and helpful grounding in both the classics and mathematics and in life in general."3 From Hilperton, Walter went to a private school run by Edwin Meyrick in Amesbury, a village on Salisbury Plain. An example of the idiosyncratic way the English have allowed their children to be taught by anyone with the capital to start up a school, it was run by a well-meaning individual with a fondness for archery and, of course, the use of the cane. His wife had little love of archery but a considerable penchant for administering regular doses of medicine, which Walter likened to "Mr Squeers' brimstone and treacle." It was not an unhappy two years, but all that Walter could recall of the school's advantages was that it rid him permanently of the crippling attacks of asthma that had wracked him to that point. By now it was clear that Walter was not a particularly strong student, but he had obviously been placed at a disadvantage by the intermittent nature of his early schooling. A year after Walter's arrival at Amesbury, Edwin Meyrick acknowledged that the boy's translations were not what they might be for someone aged fourteen; but, as he reminded Walter's father, "It must be considered that he began to construe his first Latin book only 21/. years ago. I think his progress in the time very creditable."4 From Amesbury Walter went to Harrow, which the Longs had traditionally attended and which rivalled Eton as the top public school in England. Walter spent five of the happiest years of his life at Harrow, and in his memoirs he recalled those years and the masters and staff with great affection. He remained a devoted supporter of the public schools, particularly Harrow, and after his retirement from active politics he became chairman of the school's

5 Early Career

board of governors. Not surprisingly, Walter's memories of those "glorious" years are mostly sporting. He captained his house football team and made the school's cricket and football elevens, and he tasted "complete happiness" when Harrow beat Eton at Lord's for the first time in six years. As he put it, during his time at Harrow the "cares were slight and soon passed away, and the joys were very great." Long was popular at Harrow but he was not a particularly good or industrious student. For example, in June 1870, shortly before his sixteenth birthday, his tutor found him "lazy and inert of late; means well, but has not much moral stamina I fear," to which the headmaster, H.E. Hutton, added, "I find him a very warm-hearted amiable boy; but fear his popularity may prevent his exerting himself steadily. He is capable of effort, but is he capable of a sustained one?"5 By 9 July he sat twenty-eighth in a form of thirty-four and the master described him as "very inert." This prompted Hutton to write directly to Walter's father: The enclosed report represents all I have to say against your boy. He is very amiable and gentlemanly, must be a great favourite with everybody I am sure. And this is probably just his snare; as he probably has so many friends in his room, or is so much in theirs, that work is put rather hastily into a corner. I have in consequence been obliged to make him come & do his work in pupil room again, not thinking him strong enough to stand altogether alone. He is not deficient in ability, and ought certainly to be higher, though he rather professes to be diligent, and I do not say that he is positively very idle. In house he has given no trouble, and I hope I have succeeded in enlisting him rather on the side of order.6

Hutton's ministrations undoubtedly worked, for while Walter never became anything more than an average student, his masters wrote positively of him on the eve of his departure from Harrow. In July 1873, the pupil room report described him "as steady and regular as ever, in spite of cricket," and his house report was: "Excellent. It would be impossible to part with a pupil with more regret. His influence in the House is invaluable, & I really believe always on the right side. It will be long before we see his like again." His master only hoped that Long would not think the examination for admission to Christ Church, Oxford, too easy: "He can quite well pass it, but should make sure of getting through what he takes up."7 Walter clearly took this advice to heart, for he was soon settled in Christ Church. In later life he acknowledged the "indelible impres-

6 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

sion" that Harrow had had on him and claimed he owed the school "absolutely and entirely anything I may have done in my subsequent life which my countrymen may deem well done."8 Long's years at Oxford coincided with a stressful period in his family's life which no doubt partially accounted for his willingness to be distracted from his studies for the more relaxing ambience of boxing and cricket and the rigours of the hunt. Long's father had suffered a breakdown in health shortly after the family had moved from Wales to Rood Ashton. He never fully recovered, and during his last years he spent each winter in the south of France, where he died in February 1875 at the age of forty-nine. Walter, not quite twenty-one, inherited the estate, and because his mother's health was now tenuous he was also obliged to act more or less as guardian to his younger brothers and sisters. He found the assumption of responsibility for the estate an onerous burden which he attempted to fulfil as best he could. Nevertheless, he admitted in his memoirs to being overwhelmed with the responsibilities of managing the estate at so young an age, and he recommended that a law should be passed providing for an interregnum in such cases where the inheritor was either too young or too inexperienced to assume such a task. His lot was made that much more difficult by his mother's eventual complete breakdown, which resulted in her taking a house in Oxford to which Walter was often summoned from Christ Church in order to comfort her. These developments placed a severe strain on the young man and it is not surprising that he tended to be easily distracted from his studies. From the start he took an active part in the sporting life of the college, and he soon demonstrated those administrative skills which would later earn him advancement in the political world. While remaining every bit as popular as he had been at Harrow, he also revealed a punctilious side to his nature which could seem selfrighteous, even priggish, and which some already found irritating. He apparently played a prominent part in limiting the tradition of "wines" in rooms and of gambling among the undergraduates, as well as serving as an intermediary with college authorities in curbing the more boisterous spirits among the hunting set. Walter had always liked to box and while at Oxford took regular lessons which ultimately proved useful in one of the last of the more physical set-tos between town and gown. He also played college cricket, but he refused to practise on the bumpy and, to his mind, inadequate university grounds and thus cut himself off from any possibility of earning his "blue," a decision he later attributed to blind obstinacy and which he clearly regretted. His primary pas-

7 Early Career

sions, however, were riding and hunting, and he took every opportunity to hunt with the neighbouring packs - the Bicester, the Heythrops, the South Oxfordshire, and the Drag (of which he became master). Walter was still a relatively inexperienced huntsman when he was at Oxford and he and his companions transgressed the etiquette of the sport more than once, but he must have been both a good huntsman and a recognizably gifted organizer, for he was asked while still an undergraduate to offer himself for the upcoming vacancy of Master of the Vale of White Horse, a tempting opportunity which he refused. Clearly, Long was enraptured by the world of horses, particularly the hunt. It was a passion that stayed with him throughout his life. Only those who have embraced a sport in their teens and early twenties can understand the lengths one is prepared to go and the sacrifices one is ready to make in order to experience the thrill of competition, the euphoria of the chase, and the camaraderie of shared experiences with good friends. Long exulted in these moments more than most. Given the pressures in his personal life and his lack of attachment to the vigours and disciplines of scholarly pursuits, sport in all its forms was his way of handling tension and, for brief moments, of escaping the pressures and responsibilities that beset him. His mother was a particular trial. Having absolutely no selfdiscipline in money matters, she squandered shamelessly and her self-indulgence could not be curbed. Again and again H. Medlicott, Long's estate manager, pleaded with him not to advance money to his mother or to pay her debts: "Your lending your mother money is enough to make your father's voice cry out to you to hold your hand... It can only lead to one end which is your own embarrassment and further sales of Rood Ashton farms and lands - further reckless headlong extravagance in whimsical nonentities on your mother's part - and discredit and damage to your name and family." A deal was worked out with Walter's maternal grandfather, who covered his daughter's debts and provided an allowance. But this he did for the last time. Walter was urged to "be firm, and hard & severe even if necessary, to save yourself your good name & family & property from such disgrace in your time ..." His mother had spent more than £10,000 in 1876 and had lived freely off Walter, which amounted to another four or five thousand. Medlicott was convinced that if she was given £10,000 per year she would spend £20,000. As for Walter, Medlicott urged him not to go ahead "as fast as 'rumours' say": "So long as you keep clear of racing, I hope you won't come to serious grief ... The quieter and the more economically you can live, depend upon it, the more you will be esteemed and thought well of by those

8 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

whose opinion is worth having & the less chance you give to malicious or idle gossips to invent lies!" Long's problems continued, however. Since 1875 he had spent £15,000 more than his income. He had to sell land and property to raise the money. In Medlicott's opinion, if such expenses continued for ten years, Long would not be able to live at Rood Ashton. It was imperative that his lifestyle and his generosity to his mother, and to an irresponsible debt-ridden younger brother, should cease. Medlicott's pleas fell not on deaf ears but on those of a young man who felt a great sense of responsibility in the aftermath of his father's death. He could not, despite his better instincts, refuse his mother or fail to cover his brother's self-indulgent spending habits. By the spring of 1878, he had had to arrange yet another mortgage on some of his lands, amounting to £30,000. Medlicott was by now in despair, convinced that the estate would be ruined. By the end of the 18703, Long had brought matters under some degree of control. By then he was married, which no doubt steadied him, and his brother had matured. Nevertheless, the estate had been severely affected, and the agricultural difficulties of the late nineteenth century, together with the changes in taxation of the early twentieth, obliged Long to sell most of his estate by 1914. By the late teens, he and his wife could no longer afford to live at Rood Ashton and it gradually fell into ruins. After many centuries it was a sad end, for which Long was partly responsible.9 Long came down from Oxford in 1877 at the age of twenty-three. He spent much of the next year and a half hunting and coaching, establishing himself in the King's Arms, Bicester, and hunting with the Bicester, of which Lord Valentia was master. Long did not have a large income from the estate and he had many family commitments to meet, so he prided himself on buying inexpensive horses, for both hunting and coaching, which performed well and allowed him to enjoy the hard rides across country as well as the more leisurely but no less enticing coaching outings. Long estimated that he could buy four good coaching horses for about £200 in the late seventies, and if they were combined with another foursome, he and a companion could journey twenty or thirty miles out and back. These days of ease and pleasure more or less ended in 1878 with Long's marriage to Lady Dorothy (Doreen) Boyle, the fourth daughter of Lord and Lady Cork, and his adoption as Conservative candidate in North Wilts. TO THIS POINT IN HIS LIFE, Long had not been active in politics nor had he taken a serious interest in the various political clubs at

9 Early Career

Oxford. But given his family's background of parliamentary involvement, it was not surprising either that he should be approached to become a candidate or that he considered it natural to agree. In 1878, at the age of twenty-four, Long was asked to become the Conservative parliamentary candidate for Marlborough. Although this was a traditional Liberal seat, he agreed, on the understanding that if a vacancy occurred in Wiltshire he would be permitted to transfer his candidacy. On being approached by Marlborough, Long had consulted party leaders in North Wilts, who made it clear that the sitting member was not expected to stand again. If he resigned, they planned to recommend Long as their standard-bearer. It was only with this assurance that Long agreed to campaign in Marlborough. When, as expected, Sir George Jenkinson did resign, Long was immediately adopted as the Conservative candidate in North Wilts by "half a dozen country gentlemen."10 The 1880 election was the last to be fought under the more limited franchise (labourers and artisans outside boroughs had no vote), and the meetings were therefore infrequent and most were held during the day. The campaign in North Wilts was a harder fight than expected because of a good Liberal candidate. This meant that Long had to do a great deal more speaking and hand shaking than had been anticipated. In his address to the electors of North Wilts, he reminded them that both his father and grandfather had represented them in previous years and had done their best to serve them faithfully. Long offered himself "as a firm and conscientious supporter of Lord Beaconsfield's government, believing that the policy they have pursued has been the wisest and best for the interests of the country, inasmuch as they have maintained the honour and integrity of our vast Empire to its fullest and greatest extent." He said that he was a firm supporter of the union of church and state; that he considered further educational schemes unnecessary and undesirable, though he strongly favoured the Bible being "fully and fairly taught in all Schools"; and that he took a deep interest in all questions relating to the land and profoundly regretted the depression that currently affected agricultural interests. He pledged himself to local taxation relief and firmly stated that while he was interested in sobriety and moderation, he did not believe they should be obtained as a result of licensing laws that affected individual liberty. He ended his speech by promising to serve the constituency "faithfully and zealously."11 Long was elected top of the poll in the twomember constituency by some 2000 votes. Long was twenty-six when elected. His victory can be attributed to the family's links with the constituency and to his own affable manner and straightforwardness. He now found himself a member

io Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

of a party that had just been routed at the polls. The Conservatives had 137 fewer seats than the Liberals and W.E. Gladstone had returned as prime minister. When Lord Beaconsfield died on 19 Apri 1881, the party leadership was divided. Sir Stafford Northcote led the opposition in the Commons, and Lord Salisbury in the Lords. Neither man had the authority of Beaconsfield, and the party was poorly led until Salisbury asserted his authority in the mid-i88os. Long did not regret finding himself in opposition. Although a political enthusiast, he was a novitiate in the ways of Parliament. He found that the opposition benches allowed him time to observe and learn, and he later attributed his understanding of the ways of the House to his years watching the Liberals under Gladstone deal with some of the most pressing and dramatic foreign and domestic issue in recent memory. Long's recollections of that first Parliament are revealing: The House of Commons of 1880 was the last to contain the "Country Gentlemen Party," as it had existed for many decades. Although the character and general tone of this ancient and splendid assembly have not altered materially, in many respects it is a very different body from that which I first joined over forty years ago. The average country gentleman entered the House of Commons in much the same way that I did, performing what he regarded as his duty, without any particular ambition to do more than serve his county and his country and the agriculturist interests to the best of his ability. As a rule he made few speeches and did not desire to take part in debate. He was content to be present in the afternoon, and, when required, after dinner; to record his vote if there was a division, but otherwise to take no active part in the proceedings, except as a member of the various committees which did then, and still do, a great deal of the work of Parliament. The consequence was that any of the younger men who were prepared to devote themselves to the daily work of the House and were able to take part in its debates, found themselves given opportunities which are not enjoyed by their successors. In those days it was the exception, not the rule, for Members to dine in the House. They were expected to be present up to the dinner hour and to return in good time for the later part of the sitting. The House met at four o'clock, and by a common understanding the speakers were divided into the big men and the small. The former occupied all the time up to, say, seven o'clock, and from 10:30 till the rising of the House at i or 2 in the morning. There was no eleven o'clock rule, no fixed day for Supply, no closure and none of the existing customs which have given the Government of the day a much larger measure of control over the business and time of the House.

ii Early Career The smaller men were expected to speak during the dinner hour, according to the convenience of the Front Benchers and the important Back Benchers. I remember very well my experience when I first addressed the House ... In response to an invitation by the Whip, I undertook to be in my place, and to take part in the dinner hour. I rose somewhere about 8:30, and as a new Member was duly called. The audience consisted of the Speaker, a junior Member of the Government, a junior Member of the Opposition Front Bench, some of the officers of the House and a friend of mine who was there to support me. The next night my friend and I reversed our respective roles, and I was there to support him. I suppose there were also present some half-dozen private Members on both sides who were waiting to speak. Apart from the strangers in the galleries and the messengers there were not more than twenty people in the House on those occasions ... My first Parliament was a remarkable one. Mr Gladstone's powerful Government was badly shaken in their very first days by the trouble in which they found themselves in what is known as the "Bradlaugh Incident." They also got into deep water over their difficulties in Egypt, and the Government Whips had to appeal to our Party and obtain their support in order to keep the Government in office. Our Party was divided from various internal causes, and it was a fact known to all that we were not in a position to turn the Government out. The only course open to us was to support them against the more extreme Members of their own Party. To do this we divided ourselves into "watches" and undertook to be present to support the Government when they were in difficulties. I was getting such hunting as I could at the time with the Beaufort Hounds, and therefore I selected as my time, midnight until, if necessary, eight in the morning. There were no motor-cars and none of the fast trains which run nowadays for the convenience of the public. I used to leave London at 5:30 in the morning, providing the House was up, take the train down to Chippenham, have my hunt, and get back to London by the train leaving Chippenham about 7:30, getting my food as best I could. I was at the House at midnight and I would stay there till it rose.12 Long made his first speech in the House on 26 July 1880 during the third-reading debate of the compensation for disturbances (Ireland) bill. It was fitting that he should make his first speech on an Irish topic, for he was to devote much of his parliamentary career and political life to grappling with the problems that bedevilled the Anglo-Irish relationship. Long had had close contact with Ireland since his childhood. His grandfather had succeeded to the estate at Humewood in County Wicklow in 1866, and the Longs had visited frequently. Walter's father had always been interested in Irish affairs and had taken every opportunity, when in Ireland, to take his son

12 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

about the country visiting various estates and commenting on all they saw. Walter had also indulged his passion for hunting while in Ireland and over the years had developed a particular fondness for the glorious grass country in Meath and Kildare to the north of Wicklow. As he grew older, he had increasingly been drawn into the discussions at Humewood and other ascendancy estates about Ireland's long-term relationship with Great Britain and the fate of the landlord in the increasingly tense tussle with tenants over land. He had watched with keen interest the debates generated by Isaac Butt's Irish Home Rule League and the consolidation of a phalanx of Irish Nationalist MPS in the House of Commons under the leadership first of Butt and then, more formidably, of Charles Stewart Parnell. Long's natural instincts were offended by their obstructionist tactics, and his abhorrence of any breach of accepted codes of conduct was confirmed. At this early stage in his career, Long clung naturally to the form as well as the spirit of past usage and was thus a typical English Conservative. It was only with experience and altered circumstances that he gradually shifted his position. Forced to reappraise his fundamental beliefs, he later proved more adaptable than many of his Conservative contemporaries. He came to believe that what was worth preserving was the spirit inherent in traditions and institutions and not the form. If the spirit, the essential intent, could be preserved by adapting the form of political conduct and constitutional relations, then so be it. Over the years, Long, the seemingly quintessential Tory squire, proved to be the bell-wether of the Unionist party. His personal confrontation with the changing exigencies of the Anglo-Irish relationship reflected the shifts demanded of Conservative Unionism at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, at the start of his career, Long was a traditional Unionist, as befitted his family ties, and like so many of his contemporaries he held the Catholic Irish in contempt, thinking of them as clearly inferior to the English, both racially and culturally. His instinctive reactions to the Irish were confirmed by the "rabble-rousing" tactics in the House of Commons, the "intimidation" of AngloIrish landowners, and the seemingly pervasive contempt for the law. Long never developed any sympathy for those who transgressed the law in order to change it, nor was he ever able to accept Irish nationalism on its own terms. This stance was not unique to him, of course. Most Englishmen, particularly those in high office, considered Ireland theirs by right of conquest. To accept the existence of a national alternative would be to impugn English sovereignty. The majority found this unthinkable, and Long was no exception.

13 Early Career

His attitudes were readily discernible in his maiden speech to a sparsely attended House. Long stated that he did not believe there was sufficient reason to justify the introduction of such an exceptional measure as the compensation for disturbances bill. He yielded to no man, he said, in his sympathy for distress in Ireland, but he believed this had been much exaggerated and greatly misrepresented; it did not warrant the legislation before the House, which he characterized as "Radical Land Reform." He was also convinced that demoralization could result from the distribution of relief in the form of meal and seed. He urged "the necessity of guarding against deception and abuse in dealing with alleged suffering in the sister country." He argued that the bill created a joint property in the soil; it would therefore affect not only bad landlords but good ones. He urged the House to consider the position of the landlords of Ireland: They had heard much of the state of the tenant farmers. He knew it to be very bad; but the greater portion of the landlords of Ireland had got by no means a full share of representation in that House, and in Ireland there were many small landlords who lived upon their properties and had done the best they could for their tenants ... The Bill was a dangerous one, and, so far from promoting that happiness and universal content ... it would ... create discontent and ill-feeling between landlords and tenants, and, so far from doing away with absenteeism, would promote it; for what landlords who would be affected by the measure would be content to live on their properties? Moving pictures had been drawn by the Chief Secretary and the Prime Minister of the poor people turned away from their homes and their land. But had nobody in the House any sympathy for the landlords who would be driven away from theirs? ... He was convinced that this Bill was bad in its principle and would be bad in its working, and that it would be subversive of all those just rights of property which ought to receive the sanction and support of the House.13

In this speech, Long not only indicated his stance towards Ireland but clearly identified himself as one who would put the case for the landlord interest in Parliament. Thus, in his very first speech he was already tackling the issues that were to preoccupy much of his political life. Often in the future the land issue was to be the bridge for Long's involvement with Irish affairs. Over the next four and a half years, Long was content to observe and fulfil his designated part as a member of the "Country Gentleman Party," and true to its traditions his comments in the House were infrequent.14 The government was eventually defeated over the budget in mid-iSS^ but managed to win the December election

14 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

despite the startling revelation that Gladstone now wanted to give Ireland home rule. This news did not have much impact in Wiltshire, where Long contested the eastern division. In that primarily agricultural county, the electors were understandably engrossed in the depression that held them in its grip. It was a hard-fought election, for there was a good deal of fear about the implications of the Conservatives' "fair trade" policy for the agricultural community, particularly the farm workers. Despite considerable anger in the constituency over Conservative policy, Long won by ninety-seven votes. On reflection, he believed the overall results of the 1885 election were considerably affected by the fact that many who were voting for the first time still had vivid memories of the sufferings of the early nineteenth century. The first six months of 1886 were taken up with public discussion and eventually with parliamentary debate over Gladstone's home rule bill. The bill was finally rejected by the Commons in early June and another election was called. Long spoke only once during debate, but that was on the first day, 8 April, and he made his views very clear. Referring to the outburst of criticism of the bill by Protestant Ulster, he argued that the great majority of English MPS, and Englishmen in general, "would be inclined to use as strong, if not much stronger, language if they had been subjected to the same trials and troubles as the Ulstermen had experienced of late." Long said he did not believe that the English people had much understanding of the present state of affairs in Ireland; he was convinced that home rule would not protect the minority; rather, it would lead to the severance of the union between England and Ireland. His own constituents believed that nothing should be done to weaken the union. In his opinion, Gladstone's scheme would lead to the dismemberment of the empire.15 Long's remarks were thoroughly in keeping with Conservative opinion of the time and touched upon all the Unionist principles to which he was to remain faithful until circumstances twenty years later forced a rethinking. With the defeat of the home rule bill, Parliament was dissolved, and in the ensuing election the Conservatives, now formally under Salisbury's leadership, won a commanding majority and formed a tentative working relationship with the dissident Liberal Unionists. Long easily won his seat by a majority of 1726. He was now thirtytwo and although a respected younger member of the party, it still came as a surprise to him to be invited to become parliamentary secretary to the local government board, whose minister was C.T. Ritchie. Long's appointment was a testimony to his unswerving

±5 Early Career

back-bench support, to his considerable administrative potential, his straightforward and honest manner, and, above all, his strong connections with the agricultural community. The next six years were to prove an invaluable experience for Long and he noticeably matured with the responsibilities directed his way. The local government board was primarily an administrative rather than a political ministry, so Long quickly had to master considerable technical detail on a bewildering number of issues. He proved to have an excellent memory and a crisp, logical, no-nonsense approach to problems - attributes that were ideally suited to his job. Ritchie handed him all the poor law work, and this alone provided Long with invaluable administrative experience and a profound grasp of the local government system. During these years the board also dealt with the reform of slum areas, the provision of better housing for the working class, and reform of London County Council. Long developed a lifelong interest in the former issues but was not involved in the development of the London County Council bill. Nevertheless, he was often deputed to make reassuring speeches in the House and on the public platform about government intent. On these occasions, he relied upon information provided by Ritchie and the board's civil servants. Long's greatest contribution during his six years as parliamentary secretary was to help with the preparation and framing of a revolutionary piece of legislation, the Local Government Act of 1888. The official files are not very revealing about his involvement in the preparation of the legislation, but he later recalled that he concentrated on the county side, since Ritchie was better prepared to handle town matters. Owing to Ritchie's illness and protracted absences from the House, it fell to Long to see the bill through the committee stage, and in doing so he demonstrated a sound grasp of its details and essentials. He also spoke in various public settings explaining the bill's provisions and the ideas behind the government's initiative. Overall, it was an admirable performance which did not go unnoticed by the party elders. Long worked hard during these years, but he did manage to get away periodically from departmental pressures. His most extensive trip was to Canada, where in 1888 he spent two months travelling across the dominion examining the potential for investment and settlement. He spent a good deal of time in Manitoba and eventually purchased property in Winnipeg. While in the country, he familiarized himself with the Canadian federal system, and he was able to draw on this knowledge to advantage later in his career.l6 Long also made numerous visits to Ireland to visit family and friends, to

16 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

hunt, and generally to relax. It is clear that by the early 18908 he had innumerable contacts in the ascendancy class and was much respected by the Irish Unionists.17 It is not surprising, therefore, that when he spoke on extradepartmental matters, it tended to be on issues affecting either the landlords or Ireland. For example, on 9 February 1887 he rose in the House during the debate on the speech from the throne to argue that the "Plan of Campaign, as he understood it, as a layman, and not a lawyer, meant a deliberate attempt to interfere between landlord and tenant, and to take money which belonged unquestionably to the landlord." While he had no sympathy for bad landlords, he was "far from saying that because they did not do their duty therefore they were to be denied the protection of the law." Long found the demand for home rule distasteful, and he was outspoken in his opposition to legislative independence for Ireland. He feared that "behind this demand for Home Rule there were looming further demands which would lead to complete independence."18 Long was worried about Gladstone's continuing commitment to home rule, and in the weeks before the 1892 election he went out of his way to tackle the issue. He was particularly fearful that it would be necessary to use force to ensure the full implementation of an Irish parliament. He knew only too well how deep-rooted the animosity of Irish Unionists was to any such parliament. The possibility of civil strife horrified him and he bluntly asked his constituents if they favoured the use of force; if they did not, they should repudiate home rule.19 Long was equally scornful of the details of Gladstone's second home rule scheme, particularly the proposal to retain Irish members at Westminster. Long found this "preposterous and ridiculous": To retain the Irish members at St Stephen's would be ten times worse than not to retain them. Irish electors would be able not only to exercise control over Ireland, but to exercise control over English, Scotch and Welsh questions also. If they gave Home Rule to Ireland they could not refuse it to Scotland, Wales, Lancashire and Cornwall, because these portions of the country were as populous and their interests as different from the rest of the Empire as those of Ireland were. If in spite of the warnings they received from Ulster a Home Rule Parliament was established civil war would follow ... Ulster had warned them that they would not take part in a Home Rule Parliament controlled by the bishops and priests; that they would not respect it; that they would not obey its laws or pay it taxes; and they said that if they were compelled to obey it they would resist by force.

17 Early Career

Interestingly, in this and similar speeches Long was not critical of the Ulster Unionists' potential threat to law and order, although he was always quick to castigate the slightest transgression by tenants and Irish nationalists.20 In mid-June he reiterated his forecast. He claimed that the people of Ulster would never submit to an independent Irish parliament. They would resist it constitutionally and then by force: "There were some things which Parliament had no right to do, and it had no right to transfer the government of the loyalists of Ireland to a Home Rule Parliament."21 This was to be central to Long's position down to 1914. The 1892 election was held in July and the campaign was again, to use Long's words, "violent and vengeful," for the Liberals succeeded in instilling the agricultural labourers on the Downs with the fear that bread prices would rise and wages fall if Long and the Conservatives were returned.22 This, coupled with overconfidence among Long's supporters and bad weather on polling day, resulted in Long's defeat by some 138 votes. To make matters worse, Gladstone and the Liberals were returned to office by a small majority. Long was hurt by the defeat. He believed he had served his constituents and the agricultural interests well, so to find himself rebuffed was a blow. Fortunately, he had little time for second thoughts, since a vacancy occurred almost immediately in the West Derby Division of Liverpool. Long was interviewed and then narrowly selected ahead of his former minister, C.T. Ritchie, who had also been defeated in July. Since there could be no election until the Speaker declared the seat vacant, the by-election was not held until early 1893, at which time Long, after running on an anti-home rule platform, defeated the Liberal candidate by 1357 votes.23 During the next three years, Long was given the responsibility of handling in the Commons all matters relating to his former department, particularly the Liberals' local government legislation of 1894. This involved a continual command of considerable detail, but all the hours of hard work Long had put in as a parliamentary secretary at the local government board now paid off, and Arthur Balfour, the House leader, soon left him to handle the opposition's tactics and strategy. It was during this period that Long consolidated his reputation. His administrative skills and his dedicated hard work had been much in evidence at the local government board, but he had not previously had protracted responsibility for a piece of major legislation in the House. Now he could display his command of parliamentary procedures, his understanding of the intricacies of all that related to local government, and his steady, persistent habits.

i8 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Long flourished in the spotlight and handled the pressure well. He later testified to the importance of the experience to his own personal development and to the strengthening of his position within the party hierarchy.24 As usual, Long also spoke out regularly on issues affecting the landlords, and he remained a staunch supporter of their interests so much so, that when the Liberals created a Royal Commission on Agriculture they appointed Long to it, a testimony to his standing in the agricultural community generally and among the country gentlemen in particular. Long also took every opportunity to link the experiences of the tenants and landlords in Ireland with the more general problem in the United Kingdom, but he spoke less often on specific Irish subjects and not at all during the 1893 debate on Gladstone's second home rule bill. He nevertheless made his position abundantly clear in a speech to Wiltshire's Conservatives at a meeting in Trowbridge on 18 January 1893. In his opinion, the consideration by the House of Commons of the question of Home Rule was one of the greatest and most responsible duties which had yet devolved upon that House. It might be that they would be able to accept a measure of Home Rule which would do no injury to the Empire but would simply mean an extension of the privileges of local government to the Irish people; and if that were so, then he took it that no Unionist would throw any difficulty in the way of making that measure a complete and satisfactory one. If, however, it meant the termination of the Legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland, then the members of the Unionist party would have no doubt or difficulty as to the course they would pursue. They would offer it a most strenuous and determined opposition, as they did in 1886; and they would do all they could to defeat that measure in the House of Commons.

If the bill did pass the House, Long hoped the Lords would "do its duty" and give the people an opportunity to pronounce.25 The Conservative-dominated Lords did, of course, "do its duty" on 8 September 1893, resoundingly defeating the bill on second reading by 419 to 41. After this, there was little mention of home rule by the Liberals and thus no reason for Long or his colleagues to devote time and energy to countering it. This remained the case for more than a decade because after the Liberals were defeated in the House in June 1895, the Unionists won an overwhelming victory in the July election and they were returned again in the khaki election of 1900. With the Unionists firmly entrenched, neither home rule for Ireland nor its broader variant, home rule all round, had any hope of success.

19 Early Career

The change of government brought a boost to Long's career. He was invited by Salisbury to join the cabinet as president of the board of agriculture, a new department created in 1889. The promotion was a recognition of Long's administrative skills and his standing in the agricultural community. His first weeks in the job were not without controversy, however, and underlined a dimension of his personality that the party leaders would have to accustom themselves to if they wished to draw on his talents and contacts. Not surprisingly, the context was Ireland and home rule. Shortly after the election, Long had addressed the question of whether or not the Unionists would consider introducing home rule legislation. As had become his habit in such circumstances, his language was inflammatory, even brutal, and he was severely criticized in the press and by Irish leaders. As usual, he was remorseful after the event, realizing that he had put the government in an unnecessarily awkward position. He wrote to Jack Sandars, Balfour's private secretary, explaining the context of his remarks: "I went on to point out that this could only happen in one of two ways (i) By a cowardly surrender on our part (2) By the Irish abandoning Home Rule and taking Local Government 'because like whipped hounds they could get nothing else.' The underlined phrase was a stupid one to use and must have escaped me unawares, but I am afraid it may lead Healy & Co. to make a row. I am very sorry to add to the Chief's labours and worries but I feel I ought to put him in possession of the facts and act as he decides."26 The episode passed quickly but was revealing of Long's choleric, intemperate side and his disdain for Irish nationalism. The most controversial episode in Long's five-year tenure of the agricultural portfolio was the department's decision to introduce muzzling in order to try and eliminate rabies. It earned him widespread opprobrium and notoriety - years later on a trip to North America, the newspapers heralded the arrival of "the Muzzier." Dog lovers, ranging from lap-dog owners to masters of the hunt, castigated him, and a huge 8o,ooo-signature petition was presented, calling for his removal from office. Many of his colleagues feared the uproar would result in the defeat of the government, but Long later claimed that no by-elections were lost as a result of his policy. In fact, he had only to be steady and determined, and since he never lacked for resolution, this did not prove difficult. The primary onus lay with his departmental officials, who had to deal directly with the public on a day-to-day basis, but Long still must be given credit for coordinating a massive, nationwide, and highly efficient program.27 In the long run, Long's actions were proven correct: rabies was effectively eliminated in the United Kingdom by 1900. No doubt

2o Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

other ministers would have been obliged to act in a very similar fashion, but by adhering rigidly to the policies and lending undeviating support to his officials, Long underlined his strength of character and his integrity. For much of his last year at the board of agriculture, Long was caught up in a dispute with his West Derby constituents over the church discipline bill, which had been sponsored, in part, by the Laymen's League, a Liverpool organization, and was designed to curb the ritualistic aspects of Protestant church services. Although Long was Low Church and was interested in reform, he did not believe that the bill was adequate or that the appropriate time had arrived for such legislation. He therefore did not vote for it on second reading and was censured by his executive, who indicated that they did not wish him to be their candidate in the next election. Long was subsequently adopted by the South Division of Bristol, where in the October 1900 election he was returned by 611 votes. In November, Salisbury then asked him to become minister of the local government board with a seat in the cabinet.28 Thus far in his career, Long had not taken a leading part in the formulation of party policy. He was not a member of the inner group of Conservative/Unionist leaders. Moreover, he was not the type of reflective or philosophic person who would naturally ponder nuance and the weighty issues of government in a time of considerable domestic change. Rather, he was a practical, pragmatic politician who in dealing with day-to-day issues and listening to his constituents and to the delegations that came to lobby him, developed a sensitivity to the wider needs in society and intuitively knew that adaptation was essential. He was and always would be a devoted supporter of the Unionist party, and he was instinctively a Conservative; but in order to preserve what he considered best in society and in its relationships, he realized that the state would have to play a larger role than it had done. So although he was far from being a socialist and did not espouse government handouts, he did believe in the state helping its citizens to help themselves. Consequently, from the late 18905, he began to comment more extensively on matters such as poor relief, housing, pensions, and unemployment, and he also began to contribute modestly to cabinet discussion by preparing memoranda, usually quite short, on specific topics. Also, by this stage he had developed a considerable parliamentary and extraparliamentary network that he could draw upon for support, information, and advice. It reached deep into the world of the country gentleman, into the ranks of back-benchers, and, as time would

21 Early Career

reveal, into well-connected areas of Irish county and political life. These connections, combined with a marked capacity for hard work and demonstrable administrative skills, made him an increasingly important figure in the party and, perhaps more significantly, a man who was difficult to ignore. To offset these gathering strengths, Long was becoming increasingly short-tempered and stubborn. He had always had an impatient, somewhat choleric temperament which, combined with a taut rectitude and a strong adherence to the letter of the law, had often made him a difficult man to talk or deal with. He was also inclined to act spontaneously when angered and to utter or write biting and searing comments which he subsequently regretted but whose impact it was difficult to rectify. This disposition was now intensified by a gradual breakdown in health. He began to be plagued by neuralgia and arthritis and to be susceptible to colds and flu. He was often in considerable pain, which he bore with grace and without self-pity, but this added to the waspish edge of his tongue. If he had not been so generous-hearted and been seen to be basically a fair man, he would not have been tolerated by his colleagues. To add to all this, he was not a particularly good speaker; he was inclined to be clear, logical, and straightforward but not charismatic. He was not probing or analytic like Balfour and he would never stir the House, but his honest, no-nonsense manner gradually earned him a reputation and a following in the Commons, and he was able to draw upon its support in the years ahead. The local government board was essentially an administrative portfolio. Long's talents were well suited to its demands and he enjoyed being back in its familiar surroundings and dealing with its challenges. His major contribution to the legislative record over the next four years was his unification of the London water supply. This was a contentious issue involving eight competing jurisdictions and it required a good deal of negotiation and general shepherding of egos and interests before success was achieved. Long also involved himself more and more in debates over general policy. In the aftermath of Chamberlain's tariff reform pronouncement, he identified himself as a moderate tariff reformer interested in preserving party unity rather than enforcing a split over the issue, and he was therefore identified as a potential bridge between the hierarchy and more committed elements within the party.29 He also began to speak more often on behalf of the party in a variety of settings other than his own constituency. He had by now developed an aggressive style that was often used to berate and criticize Liberal policies and atti-

22 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

hides. He became one of the main workhorses of the party before 1914, and the added stress no doubt contributed to his health problems. A mark of Long's growing stature in the government was the suggestion in early 1905 that he should become first lord of the admiralty in place of Lord Selborne, who was going to South Africa as governor general. While flattered, Long turned down the offer and was instrumental in having Lord Cawdor appointed. Long had always wanted to be first lord, but on this occasion he believed he still had important work to accomplish at the local government board and, for the time being, he chose to remain there. Not too many days passed, however, before he faced another decision. Balfour, now prime minister, was facing a major crisis over his government's Irish policy and had been obliged to accept the resignation of George Wyndham, the chief secretary. After ineffectual soundings elsewhere, he asked Long to replace him. In early March 1905, Long reluctantly agreed. For the rest of his political career, Ireland was to be a primary preoccupation.

CHAPTER TWO

Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

Ireland had not been fully integrated into the United Kingdom by the Act of Union of 1800. Unlike Scotland and Wales, it was administered separately, much in the manner of an outlying province or distant colony. The head of government was a lord lieutenant, while administration was the responsibility of a chief secretary. Throughout the century the lord lieutenant's authority became increasingly attenuated and the practical day-to-day power shifted to the chief secretary. By the time George Wyndham assumed office in 1900, the chief secretary was clearly the political head of the Irish administration. Wyndham was initially without a seat in the cabinet, but with the formation of the Balfour government in July 1902, this anomaly was rectified. While a cabinet post certainly reflected his true authority, it also posed some difficulties, for it meant that he would have to spend a considerable amount of time in London, thus leaving the ongoing administration of Ireland to his undersecretary. This would not necessarily have resulted in any insuperable problems if a career civil servant had occupied that post, but in October 1902 Wyndham appointed Anthony MacDonnell to the position. MacDonnell was a Roman Catholic from County Mayo who had had an outstanding career in the Indian civil service, having finished his years there as lieutenant-governor of the North West Provinces. He had been strongly recommended to Wyndham by Lord Lansdowne, a leading Unionist, and despite Arthur Balfour's concerns about MacDonnell's background and his supposed "home rule" inclinations, he was offered the post because Wyndham wanted an experienced administrator. MacDonnell, however, had not been particularly easy to convince. He had every reason to expect further involvement with Indian affairs and it was not necessarily in his best interests to take up a

24 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

lesser position in the Irish administration. He made it clear to Wyndham, in writing, that if he took the job he wanted an opportunity to influence the policy and actions of the Irish administration, subject to the chief secretary's overall executive mandate. In effect, MacDonnell requested powers equivalent to those of a permanent secretary in the British civil service, powers for which there had been no precedent in Ireland since the union. Wyndham, unknown to most of his cabinet colleagues, accepted MacDonnell's condition and the two men proceeded to work amicably together, particularly on the vexed issue of land reform. MacDonnell played an important role in the preparations leading to the Land Act of 1903 and in doing so had much to do with a group of moderate Irish Unionist landlords led by Lord Dunraven. It was, therefore, not altogether surprising when in the late summer and early autumn of 1904 he extensively discussed with Lord Dunraven a Revolutionary scheme for Ireland. Believing that he had the support of Wyndham, with whom he had often discussed various economic and political reforms, MacDonnell also helped Dunraven draft a specific proposal that was published in September 1904. Wyndham immediately dissociated himself from the scheme and refuted any interest in it. This did not satisfy the Ulster Unionists, who over the next few months engaged in a concerted attack on the proposals, and particularly on Wyndham, who they believed had not only countenanced but had encouraged the formulation of the proposal, thus betraying both them and his party. MacDonnell did not escape this barrage of criticism. The Irish Unionists had never approved of his appointment. As a Roman Catholic, he was suspected of being sympathetic to home rule and of holding ideas which might have been suitable during his years as a senior administrator in India but which were unsuited for Ireland. These criticisms reached a crescendo in late February 1905 in a debate in the House, during which the special privileges granted MacDonnell for an input into policy formation were revealed. The attacks on Wyndham became scathing and he submitted his resignation on 2 March. Balfour initially refused to accept it but quickly realized he had no choice. In order to appease the hard-line Irish Unionists, he replaced Wyndham with Walter Long. The affair ended Wyndham's political career and ushered Walter Long to the front of the Anglo-Irish political stage, where he was to remain for the next sixteen years.1 Long had not been Balfour's first choice. Although Balfour had thought of Long for the position in January 1905 while considering a cabinet shuffle, he had not pursued the idea; and when he had been obliged to accept Wyndham's resignation, he had initially ap-

25 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

preached Edward Carson and then John Atkinson, the Irish attorney general.2 He had also been under pressure from Horace Plunkett to appoint his own brother, Gerald Balfour, who would have been inclined to continue Wyndham's moderate reform policies.3 In the circumstances, such an appointment would not have been tolerated by the Irish Unionists, so Long, a devout Unionist and a man already much respected by loyalists, was asked to take the job. Long was reluctant to do so. He liked his role at the local government board and he had already turned down an opportunity to become first lord of the admiralty, a position he had long coveted, so that he might remain at that ministry.4 But Balfour's arguments were persuasive. So, partly because he was flattered but also out of a sense of duty and in the belief that he could arrest the slide from Unionist first principles, Long accepted. He, of course, had always been a devoted Unionist and had spoken out since the i88os on Irish issues and the need to preserve the union. He had numerous contacts in both northern and southern Ireland and a deep sympathy for the landowners in their continuing tussle with the tenants. He had opposed home rule, had helped undermine all attempts to settle the university question, and had been deeply sceptical about Wyndham's reform policies. The revelations about MacDonnell's role in the formulation of Dunraven's devolution proposals, the degree of freedom in policy initiatives that MacDonnell had sought and received when appointed in 1902, and Wyndham's apparent collusion in the abandonment of basic Unionist principles frustrated and angered Long. He went to Ireland in mid-March 1905 determined to halt the drift and to reaffirm fundamental Unionist precepts. He had little sympathy or time for the Nationalists, no tolerance for those who broke the law in pursuit of their beliefs, and was convinced that both the numbers and the morale of the Royal Irish Constabulary had to be strengthened. His nine months in office were to be one of the shortest terms for a chief secretary, but they were to be decisive in reaffirming the commitment of the Unionists to a firm law-andorder, maintenance-of-the-union policy and for providing a benchmark by which Unionist policies and attitudes were established and assessed in the crucial prewar years. While Long carefully attended to administrative details - as he had to - the political implications of his brief tenure of office were far more important.5 Long knew that he faced grave problems and was well aware that the Nationalists were disappointed to lose Wyndham as chief secretary and certainly would not welcome a known hard-line Unionist as a replacement. However, as he later recalled, "I made up my mind that I would do my best to administer the government with

26 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

justice and impartiality to all creeds and classes, first bearing in mind my duty to my Sovereign and my country, and secondly, the fact that I must endeavour to govern in accordance with the fundamental principles and accepted policy of the Unionist Party."6 As he had told Jack Sandars, Balfour's private secretary and principal confidant, "If the Chief wants me I am ready - don't let us talk of sacrifice that is all d—d rot! It is a great honour to be thought worthy. All I want is that the Chief should have the best team he can to back him."7 Long arrived in Dublin on 15 March to find considerable "bitterness of feeling" among Irish Unionists, who felt they had been betrayed by the government. Long could not allow such feelings of hostility to continue, and that night at dinner he began the task of mollifying and reassuring his fellow Unionists. He was equally struck by the degree of support that existed for Sir Anthony MacDonnell and realized that neither he nor the government would gain anything by a quick dismissal. He thus determined to proceed with some caution. Ever the pragmatist, he believed he could still preserve the union, restore law and order, and work cooperatively with Sir Anthony, provided the air was properly cleared and provided Sir Anthony understood Long's goals. He summed up his initial reactions in a letter to Sandars: All has so far gone well. Things are not so bad as some thought tho' there is a great deal of deep seated dissatisfaction, but I am quite certain if we were to part with Sir A.M. it wd. cause profound dissatisfaction in many quarters and would most assuredly cause a great deal of trouble in this country, everybody would believe he was being sacked because he is a R.C. - I feel sure I can get on with him. I am certain he will be thoroughly loyal -1 believe we can put things right by a firm application of the existing law - and this can, I am satisfied, be secured by almost imperceptible changes in administration. What the country wants now is rest and peace, steady quiet but firm administration, wholesome food & drink. She has had too much quack medicine lately!... I am convinced patience and firmness will put things right. On all sides the respect for Sir A. M. is deep and real.8

Long had met briefly with MacDonnell on the fifteenth. The following day he received a letter from the undersecretary which laid out in detail the agreement MacDonnell had reached with Wyndham when he had been appointed. MacDonnell pointed out that while the agreement still existed, it did not infringe upon Long's duties but simply protected his own. He concluded by arguing that he should not be driven from office under duress and for reasons based

27 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

on prejudice and ignorance; if that were to happen, the lesson drawn would be that "no independent Roman Catholic Irishman howsoever well qualified, blameless and loyal he may be, can hope to serve his King in his own country without molestation."9 Long immediately met again with MacDonnell and had a full discussion with him about their respective positions and points of view. Long remained convinced that Sir Anthony would be loyal, that he could work with him, and that to bow to the howls of the Ulster Unionists would not only be unfair to Sir Anthony but would jeopardize any prospect he and the government might have of firmly adhering to Unionist principles. Long made his position clear in a memorandum to his cabinet colleagues dated 31 March 1905.10 He pointed out that the two conditions Sir Anthony had prescribed on appointment - the right to be consulted on all matters of policy and administration, and freedom of executive action within the limits of policy laid down by and subject to the control of his parliamentary chief - were normal for permanent heads but should not have been granted to an Irish undersecretary. He felt that Wyndham had allowed Sir Anthony "undue latitude and approved of his actions." Nevertheless, Long's general views were: "i. there is nothing in the so-called terms which would make my position difficult; 2. I have found Sir Anthony MacDonnell loyal and able; 3. I have no reason to believe I could not work with him efficiently; 4. to part with him would mean much misrepresentation in Ireland." On the other hand, Long was obliged to point out: "To retain Sir Anthony MacDonnell will expose our friends in Ireland to great difficulties, and ourselves to the active hostility of our Irish Unionist friends, aided by some English Unionists. This condition of affairs may produce a serious political situation." He concluded: "I realize the difficulty of our Irish Unionist friends, but I am also strictly averse from removing a permanent Head unless the case is very strong." Three days later, Long wrote again to his cabinet colleagues, saying that he feared he had failed to make clear two points: "a) I am clearly of opinion that there is no ground on which to justify dismissal, b) a contract was clearly made when Sir Anthony MacDonnell accepted the appointment, which we are bound in honour to maintain; but we should clearly define it; and not exceed it by our letter."11 The cabinet agreed with Long, and Sir Anthony stayed in his position. But Long did take the precaution of making it clear to his undersecretary that before any decision was arrived at he wished to see all files, along with Sir Anthony's minutes, which dealt with

28 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

serious agrarian and non-agrarian crime, with important matters affecting the police, discipline of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and any other matters of importance.12 In the weeks that followed, Long and MacDonnell got on reasonably well, although they differed on almost every issue. Long allowed MacDonnell to offer advice, but he rarely followed it, preferring to listen to the counsel of his private secretaries. How their relationship would have survived this sort of rebuff was never resolved because Sir Anthony fell seriously ill during the summer and was unable to play any effective part in either policy or administration for the remainder of Long's tenure of office. Long had been subjected to severe pressure by the Irish Unionists, particularly by those from Ulster, for whom Sir Anthony was anathema, but he had not bent to their will. He was well aware that this position had cost him many friends. As he wryly told his colleagues at the end of March, he had only been in office three weeks and already the Ulster Unionists were demanding his resignation.13 But Long did not budge. He confided to Sir William Bull, his parliamentary secretary, "The Ulster men can do as they like, I know the situation better now & can defy them, & what is more, I can meet them in open field."14 Long was not renowned for his tact, but he had considerable common sense. He had summed up the situation accurately. To have dismissed Sir Anthony would have accomplished little and would have lost both him and the government much: better to leave the undersecretary where he was with the semblance but not the substance of power. Long had also acted fairly. While harbouring many anti-Catholic and anti-Nationalist prejudices, he adhered to a rigid ethical code. After reviewing the circumstances, he had concluded that to dismiss Sir Anthony for doing no more than his brief allowed, or for doing no more than his superior seemingly permitted, would be patently unjust. So Sir Anthony stayed, and Long eventually appeased the Irish Unionists. Long won the support of the Unionists by returning to the principles which he claimed Wyndham had abandoned. He refused to allow land sales to continue in areas where he believed intimidation had occurred, he made every effort to restore the morale and increase the numbers of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and he took every opportunity to ensure that Unionists were appointed to positions at all levels of the civil and judicial services. Convinced as he was that appointments according to party affiliation should apply, he was particularly tenacious in the matter of patronage. He went to inordinate lengths to try to obtain the Irish solicitor generalship for

29 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

William Moore, a Unionist extremist, and he was instrumental in securing John Atkinson the important position of lord of appeal. The fact that both Moore and Atkinson had been two of the most outspoken critics of the administration and that they had irritatingly continued to call for MacDonnell's dismissal demonstrated that Long was skilled in the art of accommodation. At the prospect of promotion, both men became surprisingly quiet, even supportive, and Atkinson became one of Long's most important sources of information and advice on Ireland in the years that followed. But Long's aim was not only to silence criticism where he could but to ensure that Unionists rather than Nationalists were given jobs. To his mind, Wyndham had been all too responsive to Nationalist and Roman Catholic demands. During his nine months in office, Long took an active role in patronage matters, and this eventually led to a major constitutional dispute with Lord Dudley, the lord lieutenant, which Balfour had to resolve.15 Perhaps most important, Long continually sought the advice of Irish Unionists. It quickly became clear that although he was determined to be fair in all matters of public issue, he favoured law and order over compromise and advocated a return to "a firm application of the existing law."16 "Patience and firmness" was his motto, and the Irish Unionists (particularly the Ulsterites) were soon won over. Edward Saunderson, the long-time leader of the Ulster Unionists and a member of the Orange Order, became a close confidant whose advice Long would go out of his way to obtain and which he would invariably pass on to his superiors in London.17 But Long also knew that it was necessary to reassure the larger mass of Irish Unionists, and this could only be done by face-to-face meetings and public speeches. He made three tours of Ireland during his brief tenure of office, taking every opportunity to reassure local officials and community leaders of his firm adherence to the maintenance of the union. His first major statement of his policy and attitudes was made in Belfast on 20 April. He went straight to the point: The Government [he said] were determined to preserve inviolate and secure the Union, which they believed was inseparable from the prosperity and happiness of the people and the Empire as a whole. That being so, it was the duty of the Unionist Chief Secretary to countenance nothing on the part of those serving under him which would tend in the smallest degree to weaken the foundations on which the Union rested. Peace and contentment in the country could only exist if the law was maintained and order enforced, but the government should be administered justly, impartially, and fairly as between all creeds.18

30 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

This clear, firm statement earned Long a strong and supportive editorial leader from the Irish Times. With the support of this powerful Unionist newspaper, his good relations with the Irish Unionist community was assured. Land sales were, of course, a crucial issue, but the Land Act of 1903 was not working well in all areas, especially the South and West. Money was scarce and landlords obdurate. Tenants became frustrated and resorted to boycotting and cattle driving. Long had absolutely no sympathy for the frustration of the tenants. In his view, boycotting and cattle driving were nothing but intimidation and would not be tolerated. He emphatically rejected MacDonnell's advice that a compromise might be worked out to ease the situation. He certainly did not believe sales should be expedited by what he called "illegal methods": The stronger the probability that there will be discontent and readiness to accept and follow wild and lawless advice, the more necessary it is to adopt every legitimate means which is calculated to stop such proceedings ... Surely it is a matter of common sense that, if agitation and intimidation are practised on an estate and a sale takes place, the inevitable inference follows that the intimidation and agitation have succeeded, and the example thus set is sure to be followed elsewhere and the area of difficulty constantly extended until it becomes impossible to deal with it except by employing most severe coercion measures.19

Long made a similar statement in a speech to Dublin Unionists on 20 May, emphasizing his belief that the maintenance of the union was "inseparably connected with the happiness and prosperity of Ireland and with the strength and stability of the British Empire." His first aim, therefore, he said, was "the maintenance of the law in all parts of the country, so that every man, whatever his class, creed, or profession, shall be permitted so long as he obeys the law to go about his business in such a way as seems to him most conducive to his interests." His second aim was to introduce necessary reforms into Irish administration, but he held that "no reforms in administration, no attempts to develop industries will be of the slightest permanent value unless there is first secured the only solid foundation on which the prosperity of the nation can rest - obedience to the law, maintenance of the rights of the individual, and the protection of property." Long assured his audience that this could be done "by quiet, firm, straightforward administration," but to do it he required the support of Irish Unionists.20

31 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

In the main, Long obtained that support by the end of May. But by then he was becoming embroiled in disagreements with Dudley, the lord lieutenant, which dragged on until late August. Long did not have much respect for Dudley. The lord lieutenant had allowed MacDonnell to discuss reform proposals with Dunraven and, in fact, had clearly been in sympathy with the Reform Association's suggestions. Long believed that Dudley's attitudes could potentially undermine his position, so in the midst of his private and public campaign to reassure the Irish Unionists, he wrote to Dudley and bluntly raised the matter. In informing Dudley of his recent visit to the West, Long referred to the demand there for grasslands. He believed that the issue should be dealt with cautiously; the hopes of the peasants should not be raised unfairly; and he added: "If it is sought to force the graziers out by intimidation and boycotting I am determined that the full strength of the law shall be employed to stop anything of the kind and that the law shall be supported by the administrative policy of all branches of the Executive." With his opening established, Long then criticized Dudley for publicly saying in 1902 that the opinion of the government was "that the only way to govern Ireland properly was to govern it in accordance with Irish ideas." This statement had been repeatedly flogged in the House of Commons, applauded by Nationalists and derided by Unionists, and it had caused great difficulties. Long reminded Dudley that "as you and I exist as Ministers by Unionist Votes, it is of course an impossible policy to use language of the kind." He held firmly that "Ministers ought not when they are speaking in their Ministerial capacity, and therefore for their colleagues as well as themselves, to hold out hopes which they do not believe can be realised," and he stated that as he and Dudley had to work together in the discharge of a very difficult task, he had "taken the opportunity which your letter has afforded me to express myself frankly as I always believe in plain dealing."21 The two men soon clashed again over patronage. Dudley was inclined to retain the existing balance in political and religious appointments while Long, of course, wished to strengthen Unionist influence whenever and wherever he could. Long believed that, as the cabinet representative, his view should prevail. Dudley disagreed, arguing that the prerogative was the lord lieutenant's. The dispute, occasioned by the need to appoint replacements to the Board of National Education and to the Royal University, reached a climax in August and both men appealed to Balfour. While perhaps of some importance in the Irish context, this jurisdictional-cum-

32 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

constitutional dispute was relatively small beer given the enormous problems currently besetting the Unionist government. Balfour was already enmeshed in the Curzon-Kitchener dispute in India and in the South African "Chinese slavery" issue. He was not at all impressed by the failure of his Irish administrators to resolve their problem themselves. Long and Dudley had met to discuss the matter in early August and Dudley had departed feeling reassured.22 He was soon disabused. Long wrote to him that he was glad the meeting had helped "but, while I am at all times ready to discuss questions of all kinds with you, I cannot undertake, for obvious reasons, to write to you before I come to a decision when you are absent from London. It is also impossible for me to subordinate my views when deliberately arrived at, to anybody save the Prime Minister or the Cabinet ... When it comes to the adoption of a principle I cannot assent to your proposal that your opinion should be paramount." Long believed that Dudley should act on his advice in patronage matters unless he could show that another individual would be better.23 He claimed that if the chief secretary was in the cabinet and the lord lieutenant was not, then the former was the one responsible for the government of Ireland; the lord lieutenant thus had no option but to accept advice; the precedents were clear.24 On receiving this missive, Dudley wrote to Balfour asking him to clarify the relationship between the two offices.25 Long was so outraged by all this that he indulged in one of his excessive impulses and threatened to resign unless Balfour upheld his position. He was particularly anxious because he had shown his letter to Balfour before sending it to Dudley. He need not have worried. In what Long was later to describe as a model state paper, Balfour pointed out that the increased importance of the House of Commons, the tightening up of the doctrine of cabinet responsibility, and the telegraph had "now transferred the real headship of the Irish Government to the Minister who happens to be both in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons." If, therefore, Dudley was asking him "whether, in case of difference, the views of the Chief Secretary should prevail, I can only answer yes. There can be but one head of the Irish administration." Nevertheless, this did not mean that the lord lieutenant was nothing more than an undersecretary; he much more resembled "a constitutional monarch."26 Long was pleased with Balfour's decision and Dudley had no choice but to comply. For the remainder of their time in Ireland, Long had his way over patronage which, of course, helped him

33 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

cement his ties with the Irish Unionists and contributed to the ongoing support for his firm policies. However, the incident had been revealing of Long's impatience and lack of judgment. He had allowed the disagreement to mushroom out of all proportion in his mind and he had been guilty of putting the government in a difficult position. Sandars had written to Long on 15 August "begging him to avoid an Irish crisis, as an Indian one was quite enough for our present needs." While Long had promised not to be difficult, he wanted the issue resolved promptly. Sandars subsequently wrote to Balfour, "You know Walter is one of those men who can only think of one thing at a time, and then not always in the spirit of the best judgement."27 By September 1905 it was clear that the government was in difficulty. It had been defeated on a minor issue in the House in July, and it had lost twenty seats at by-elections since 1900, seven in 1905 alone. The party was divided over tariff reform and was reeling from misguided policies in South Africa. Balfour was under considerable pressure to resign and force an election. When Long heard of this possibility he was deeply concerned. He firmly believed that he needed much more time to consolidate his policies and to cement his ties with all branches of Irish Unionism. If it was necessary to resign, he wanted Balfour to wait until 1906 to do so. Not only did he fear the loss of his own seat in South Bristol, where criticism of the Unionist government was running high, but he was sure the government would lose. The "radicals" would then undo all his efforts to stabilize the Irish situation and would once again pander to the Nationalists. Long wrote to Balfour on 6 September, "I cannot say with what profound regret and dismay I should regard a decision in favour of an election ... I firmly believe the Unionists in this country would not recover from the shock for a generation."28 Five days later he followed up with a more detailed set of reasons. He believed the party would lose both South and West Bristol if a dissolution was called without good parliamentary cause; their supporters would be so disgusted by the surrender of the Unionist position that they would not fight with any vigour or enthusiasm. Again, it was well known, claimed Long, that Joseph Chamberlain was trying to force an election; if Balfour succumbed, the more violent free traders who had thus far supported him would turn to the Liberals, while those who had protectionist leanings but who supported the Irish party would either give up altogether or turn to Chamberlain. "I should look upon this as an unmitigated disaster both for the Country and

34 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the Party. Could there be a worse time than this Autumn? The tide is running against us, our organisations are only beginning to recover from the shock of the fiscal bombshell ... In this Country [Ireland] it is not too much to say it would be looked upon as a crime and I firmly believe it would lead many of our friends to leave the Party either to abstain altogether, or join the other side, because they would feel that in a moment of great peril of which the Government were fully aware, they had been deserted and handed over to the other side." Long believed that the government was "bound in honour" to stick to its guns "so long as we have a majority in Parliament and can carry on the business"; otherwise, they would be hopelessly beaten.29 Nine days later, at Balfour's request, he forwarded a lengthy memorandum stating why he thought a general election in November was inadvisable. Long went over the state of affairs in Ireland and entreated Balfour "not to strain the loyalty and devotion of your own followers as you would undoubtedly do if you dissolve now." A victory by a "Radical Ministry" would "undo all the good already achieved in Ireland and will be an unmitigated disaster to the well-being of this unfortunate country."30 Balfour received similar advice from other colleagues, particularly from Selborne in South Africa, and for the moment he put off thoughts of an election.31 Meanwhile, Long convinced himself, despite contrary advice from Sir William Bull, that home rule was still a danger, and he decided to make it the main burden of his public speeches in the weeks ahead.32 Throughout November, as the rumours of a dissolution built once again, Long received numerous letters from leading Irish Unionists opposing it. They praised Long's policies and urged him to press for more time to see them fully established.33 Long passed this advice on to Balfour on 30 November and added his own unchanged view: "Resignation now means disaster to Ireland and ruin to the Unionist cause."34 Long's pleas were unavailing and Balfour resigned on 4 December 1905. Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader, was asked to form a government. Having done so, he dissolved Parliament and called a general election for January 1906. From the start of the campaign, Long made the issue of home rule his central theme. He was virtually alone among the party hierarchy in doing so, but he realized that Irish Unionists were relying on the Unionist party to defend their interests. To a considerable degree, Long had succeeded in repairing the ties between the English and Irish Unionists that had been so severely strained by the Wyndham reforms and particularly by the "devolution crisis." Calm had seemingly returned to Irish life, and Long was given credit

35 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

for this. He was being widely acclaimed by Irish Unionists for his "honesty, fairness and firmness," and was heralded as the best chief secretary since Arthur Balfour.35 For him to have avoided any direct mention of home rule would have seemed a betrayal, and he deliberately made defence of the union his primary electoral message. Typical of Long's stance was his speech at Rugby on 8 December. He pointed out to his audience that there was no guarantee that if the Liberals gained power they would not adopt home rule. This would be especially true if they had only a narrow majority. That, asserted Long, would mean "not merely the separation of Ireland from England, but the shaking of the foundations upon which the Empire rested." Home rule would lead to the fragmentation of the empire.36 Moreover, home rule, even devolution - which he referred to as "home rule by sap and mine" - would endanger the civil and religious rights of Irish Unionists. This could not be countenanced.37 Long hammered away at this theme in all his speeches of December 1905 and January 1906. Despite his pugnacious stand, Long was sick of heart and body. He had been taken ill in early December and he dragged himself through his commitments in the following weeks. His weakened condition undoubtedly depressed him, but having his advice ignored by the prime minister and being plunged into an election over the holiday season did nothing for his morale. He had warned Balfour that the Liberals would benefit from a prolonged election, and by the end of the year all available evidence supported him. Long admitted to Lady Londonderry, "I am sick, sore and terribly disillusioned - confidence, once destroyed, does not easily grow again."38 Long's fears were confirmed. The Liberal-Unionists and the Conservatives suffered a disastrous defeat, losing 215 seats, and they returned to the House with a mere 157 seats against a Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist total of 513. As Long had expected, he was defeated in South Bristol, losing by 2692 votes. But since the election lasted for two weeks, he was able to rebound quickly. He was offered the Unionist nomination in South County Dublin. Buoyed by this show of confidence, he campaigned vigorously in the few days left and was returned with a 1343-vote majority. This was the only Unionist victory in Ireland, outside Ulster, and it was a splendid affirmation of Long's standing in the Irish Unionist community. It meant that he was well positioned to keep the defence of the union at the centre of his party's agenda and to counter any hint of devolution or home rule emanating from the new Liberal government. For the next four years, Long was the primary defender

36 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

and promoter of both Unionist first principles and of stronger ties between English and Irish Unionists. Insofar as Ireland was concerned, his platform became the party's. THE OVERWHELMING LIBERAL VICTORY shoved home Rile to the

back of the political stage. Over the next four years, the Liberals concentrated primarily on their socio-economic agenda, leaving the Unionists divided over tariff reform and without "The Union in Danger" as a natural rallying cry. Balfour's leadership also became an issue. Long had been particularly critical of the decision to resign and he did not easily forgive Balfour for making the party's lot harder than, in his estimation, it might have been. As the months passed, Long became increasingly critical of Balfour's lack of authority and his failure to provide the party with a clear sense of direction.39 Long's anxiety was heightened by a flow of letters from Irish Unionists expressing concern that their interests were being overlooked. They wanted assurance that the Unionist party would adhere to its faith and remain vigilant in its defence of the union. Many believed that Balfour was soft on reform and was likely to accommodate devolutionary suggestions. Others were concerned that the Irish Unionist Alliance under the leadership of Edward Saunderson was less vigorous and alert than it ought to be. In early February, J. Mackay Wilson went so far as to express the hope to Long that "the Irish Unionist members will make you the chairman of their Party instead of E. Saunderson, who, though a great friend of mine, is absolutely devoid of business capacity."40 Long did not take up this suggestion but contented himself for the first half of the year with speeches affirming his commitment to the union and his complete opposition to any proposal, including devolution, that smacked of home rule or a step towards it.41 He also pursued through letter and conversation the attitudes and feelings of Irish Unionists. By August, Long was convinced that it would be necessary to take bold action to restore the Irish Unionists' faith in their English colleagues and to ensure his party's public and undeviating adherence to the maintenance of the union. He was by now well aware that Irish Unionists still believed that Balfour was primarily responsible for the devolution crisis and that the former prime minister had been sympathetic to the home rule ideas of MacDonnell and Wyndham. A rumour was circulating to the effect that Long had not dismissed MacDonnell for fear that letters incriminating Balfour would be released. Long, of course, knew that this was not so. Angered by the smears, anxious to protect his own reputation as a

37 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

committed Unionist, and desirous of restoring Irish Unionist confidence in his party's commitment, he took the opportunity at the annual meeting of the Irish Unionist Alliance in Dublin on 29 August to meet the rumours head on. As he must have expected, this led to a major soul searching amongst the Unionist leadership which exacerbated rather than eased existing animosities. Nevertheless, it also led to a public affirmation of Unionist principles and firmly established Long as the party's weather-vane on the Anglo-Irish relationship.42 Long spoke at a time when most Irish Unionists, sensitive to the presence of a Liberal government in London and the continuing influence of MacDonnell in Dublin Castle, firmly believed that it would not be long before they would have to face the issue of home rule again. Long picked up on these concerns and referred to recent statements about devolution. He agreed with his audience that devolution would lead to home rule and he assured them he would oppose it. Moreover, another current suggestion, that Ulster should be dealt with separately, appalled Long. What would happen to the Unionists in the South and West, he asked? To his mind, "the suggestion about Home Rule for three-quarters of Ireland, with a separate administration for Ulster, was the most unworthy and the most cowardly of them all, and was made in the greatest ignorance of the real condition of affairs." Having nailed his colours firmly to the Irish Unionist masthead, Long turned to the rumours circulating in Ireland: "It has come to my notice within the last few weeks that it has been confidently stated in Ireland that when I came over as Chief Secretary I was unable to make changes in the personnel of the Irish administration because the then Prime Minister ... was afraid to allow me to make those changes owing to some correspondence or letters which were said to be in the possession of certain people." There was not, said Long, "the slightest shadow of foundation for the statement." If any blame had to be laid, it should be directed at him, for he had full responsibility; in fact, he believed his actions were right at the time; they had not been made out of fear of any letters but in the interests of public service. But, he went on, "I say if people have got those letters, let them produce them instead of taking refuge in charges and threats. Let them produce them in public, and let us know exactly what they mean." This was blunt enough, but Long was not finished: "I believe there is great justification for Irish Unionists to look back on some part of the immediate past with profound dissatisfaction and grave mistrust, and that there is abundant reason for many Irish Unionists

38 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

to ask in tones of bitter indignation, Why were those things done in the name of the Unionist cause? Why were they done by men sent over to govern Ireland according to Unionist ideas? Why, when the Unionist flag was flying, were principles adopted which were not consonant with Unionist principles?"43 MacDonnell responded immediately, but he chose to do so through the columns of the Times. Annoyed, Long followed suit, and thus from the outset the dispute was followed avidly by the press. Long was no doubt pleased that MacDonnell had adopted such a tactic. The greater the publicity, the more pressure there would be on his fellow English Unionists to confirm the strength of the ties with their Irish colleagues. MacDonnell pointed out that the agreement he had made was not with Wyndham but with the British government. Long disputed this, saying he would never have been able to regard MacDonnell as a colleague. As far as he was concerned, the agreement had ceased to exist the moment he had replaced Wyndham. How could MacDonnell claim that it had continued? Long insisted that the correspondence be published in order to clarify the situation.44 By now it was clear that Long had opened a can of worms, but he stood his ground. In thanking Lady Londonderry for her kind remarks about his Dublin speech, he confided, "It has landed me very absurdly in a correspondence with Sir A.M. ... I am afraid I shall also have a correspondence with G. W. judging by a telegram I rec'd today. I am sorry for this but it was inevitable & if he challenges me I shall certainly not mince matters."45 Wyndham's letter duly arrived. The former chief secretary was particularly concerned about Long's seeming approval of Irish Unionist concerns. Wyndham felt entitled to ask three questions: "(i), What were the 'things done' to which you refer? (2), Do you include me in the 'men sent over to govern Ireland' who did these things? (3), What were the 'principles adopted' - by me, if your reference was to me - 'which were not consonant with Unionist principles?'"46 While awaiting Long's reply, Wyndham reread the correspondence he had had with MacDonnell in 1902. He wrote reassuringly to Balfour that while MacDonnell had come to Ireland not as an ordinary undersecretary but in a higher and undefined capacity, there was nothing in the correspondence "which supports either the theory that Sir Anthony was in an extra-constitutional position, or that you or Lansdowne or I, had any leaning towards Devolution."47 Long's reply was dated 2 September. He went straight to the point: yes, he had been referring to Wyndham's administration and spe-

39 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

cifically to the method of Wyndham's appointment of Sir Anthony MacDonnell; he was appalled that Sir Anthony was accepted "rather as a colleague than as a subordinate, a startling, and so far as I know, an unprecedented course to adopt in the appointment of a permanent official," an action unknown to most of Wyndham's colleagues; moreover, Wyndham had departed from Unionist principles by not properly enforcing law and order and by appearing to take a favourable view of MacDonnell's and Dunraven's devolutionary ideas. Long assured Wyndham that he had spoken as he did at Dublin with "profound" regret: "The crisis with which we are confronted is a grave one. The Unionist ranks must be closed up, and this end cannot be attained unless there is a frank recognition of mistakes made in the past, and that there shall be no repetition of them in future."48 In the same vein, Long urged Balfour to publish all relevant correspondence between Wyndham and himself and to persuade MacDonnell to do the same. If this were to be done, all the mystery and doubt could be cleared up. Long found it intolerable that the present state of affairs should continue: "For the life of me I can't see why the truth cannot be plainly told."49 Balfour asked Long on 5 September, "What exactly are the letters that you want published? Could you send me copies? I find it very difficult to understand what all the row is about, or what it is that wants clearing up." He said that he had stated many times in the House what Sir Anthony's position was in the administrative hierarchy; as for the suspicions about his, Balfour's, views on Irish administration, they were contemptible. "The documents," he claimed, "are nonexistent; and my own instinct would be to treat the whole affair with contempt."50 Balfour adhered to this position throughout the next seven weeks, but one does sense that he was stalling and was not willing to subject Wyndham to any more pressure or distress. In his disdainful, dismissive manner, he confided to Wyndham, "I do not deny that I am greatly bored at this foolish revival of a foolish controversy. I am afraid it will do some harm, and, contemptible as I think the charges and insinuations, ... I would gladly bring them to an end if I saw my way to doing so. I ask myself (as you do) whether it is possible to publish the whole of the correspondence, both that of 1902 and that of 1904, and whether anything short of this will do any good. In a letter to Walter Long I have asked him specifically what are the letters he wants published. This may bring the matter to a head. I think we are all very ill-used at having to deal with this silly and sordid controversy when we are not being paid £5000 a year for our labours."51 Wyndham was encouraged by this reply

40 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

and said he hoped that "now the temperature has dropped it is possible some of our friends may recover their equanimity. I shall try to do nothing to disturb it. Tho' Walter Long's controversial style is sententious & provocative."52 If anything, Balfour's attitude revealed all too clearly the lack of sensitivity to the concerns of the Irish Unionists of which they had been complaining. Long, of course, did not know of Balfour's private mutterings, but he knew his leader. Long did not let him off the hook. On 7 September he made it crystal clear that the letters he wanted published were those that had passed between MacDonnell and Wyndham at the time of Sir Anthony's appointment, as well as the one in which Balfour had foretold the dangers and risks of the appointment, and also the letter from Sir Anthony about home rule. The last two, Long claimed, "wd put a totally different complexion upon the case both as it affects you & George." He wrote again some two weeks later urging publication in the interests of the party.53 Nevertheless, Balfour was every bit as obdurate as Long; backed by Wyndham and Sandars, he decided that he would try to resolve the problem by preparing a letter on the matter.54 Long, concerned that such a letter might not give his own administration and its underlying principles its proper due, attempted, for the last time, to persuade Balfour to publish. "We cannot close our eyes," he argued, "to the fact that very grave doubt and mistrust have existed as to the actual position of affairs in the minds of thousands of our most loyal and intelligent supporters on both sides of the channel... Unless some effective steps are taken to lay this feeling ... the results to the Party must be disastrous."55 When Long saw Balfour's draft letter, all his fears were realized. Written with scorn, it was contemptuous of the Irish Unionists and to Long seemed little better than a defence of Wyndham's policies and administration and thus, by inference, a rejection of his own.56 Long found it "deplorable" and promptly told Balfour that since he believed the actions and concerns of the Irish Unionists were justified, he could not be a party to an attack on them.57 Long shared his concern with Austen Chamberlain, with whom he had been in close touch about the whole affair.58 Chamberlain agreed with Long. Both he and Lansdowne had been shown the draft and, like Long, were critical of it. Chamberlain's advice to Balfour echoed Long's. Chamberlain claimed that Balfour did not realize the depth of feeling on the issue; there was "widespread misgiving and uncertainty producing not merely indignation on the part of the Irish Unionists but disastrous hesitation in the ranks of the Unionist Party generally."

41 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

These misgivings, said Chamberlain, were not altogether without cause; the situation was grave and would have to be dealt with boldly; Balfour's letter would not remove distrust or allay suspicion; it rebuked rather than soothed Irish Unionists and would clearly provoke them.59 Although Balfour still did not believe that there was any justification for the actions and anxieties of the Irish Unionists, he reluctantly accepted that a letter would not resolve the dilemma.60 After further hesitation, he finally spoke out on the subject on 22 October in Manchester. He categorically rejected that he or his colleagues "ever tolerated for an instant" the idea of devolution or home rule. He insisted that no compromising letters existed - but said that if they did, whoever had them should produce them. The charges, he claimed, were false from beginning to end; he had spent the best part of his political life fighting against home rule and everything that savoured of home rule or could lead to home rule. Balfour left the indelible impression that he and the Unionist party would never deviate from that credo.61 Long wrote to him immediately, congratulating and thanking him for his remarks: "Nothing could possibly be better."62 Most Irish Unionists were inclined to agree, and so the affair ended. What is one to make of this incident? Those close to Balfour Wyndham and Sandars in particular - thought that Long was nothing but a dupe of the Irish Unionists. Sandars was most explicit, saying he did not think that apart from "a parcel of Ulstermen ... a respectable politician cares a damn about the ashes of the 1904 controversy."63 He thought Long was "quite unwittingly" the "convenient instrument" of the Irish Unionists,64 and he explored this vein further with Balfour on 7 October: "I have reason - good reason to think that all this trouble is engineered by a malevolent cabal ... Walter is honest & simple as the day, but he is a tool in the hands of these people who flatter him assiduously, and who have found it not difficult to enlist his alliance in a matter where his vanity and his hopes are concerned."65 Not surprisingly, Wyndham thought much the same: "To my mind the whole of this business is really engineered to discredit what the Ulster Unionists call 'conciliation/ It is a continuation of the attacks from that quarter on Gerald, Horace Plunkett & myself. W. Long, & others in England, are unconscious of this. But that is because they are unsuspicious & rather ingenuous."66 How much truth was there in the assertions of Sandars and Wyndham? This was not the last time that Long was to be dubbed a "dupe," a well-meaning man who was easily manipulated. It is, of

42 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

course, not surprising that the Irish Unionists would do all in their power to protect their interests and that they would turn to those English Unionists whom they thought most open to suasion. Long was certainly one of these, but he was not unaware of what was happening. He was fully conscious of the issues at stake, and he knew exactly where he stood on the question of the Unionist party's stance towards Ireland and the union. He was convinced that Balfour was not on top of his Irish brief and that the party had to be brought quickly to its senses and back to first principles. Long may have been a "hearty," but he was not a fool. He was an experienced administrator and an adept parliamentarian. He had a hard political head and was not easily persuaded to chase shadows. After much reflection, he had concluded that the party leadership had to be jarred loose from its assumptions, dramatically if need be, in order to halt the drift in relations between Irish and English Unionists. Long was not alone in thinking that Balfour's views were wrong or were held for the wrong reasons. Austen Chamberlain might not have welcomed Long's methods, but he supported him on the issue of publication. Chamberlain repeatedly indicated that he wanted the correspondence to be published in order to prove that the Unionists did not have devolution in mind when appointing MacDonnell and nor did Long when retaining him.67 Even when Long admitted that it was "a sorry business" and that the consequences might be serious for him, Chamberlain was reassuring: "Do not, I beg, be too susceptible as to your own position. You are and must remain our spokesman on Irish affairs. No one dreams of throwing you over or questioning your authority. Our futures are bound up with yours not with Wyndham's - in this matter ... We must not allow Arthur to ruin the party in the effort to shield a friend."68 Long appreciated the support and reiterated his primary reason for acting as he did: "In this matter I know the facts. I represent the whole body of Unionists in Ireland & I will be no party to any attack upon views I share, or to the surrender of one jot of the principle to which I am unalterably attached." Long believed it all boiled down to going straight for what one believed to be right, "unmindful of what men may say."69 There is a good deal of special pleading in all this and certainly Long was attempting to protect his own record.70 Nevertheless, it is also clear that Balfour did not understand or care much about the Irish Unionists. He had no sympathy for them and therefore could not see the force of Long's argument. What is not in dispute is that the episode cemented Long's standing in the Irish Unionist community. It left Long ever-wary of Balfour, Balfour far more sensitive

43 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

to Long's Irish interests, and Long firmly entrenched as the primary bridge between the Irish and English Unionists. THE RESPECT WITH WHICH LONG was regarded by Irish Unionists was underlined almost immediately. On the death of Edward Saunderson in October, Long was chosen chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance. He was the natural and logical choice, and he took his responsibilities seriously. He made it his primary goal "to bring about closer co-operation, if not complete union between the Unionist parties in the north and south." He did succeed in having the Joint Committee of Unionist Associations of Ireland formed in December 1907, which led to them working together more frequently and, in his opinion, "increased the influence they exercised upon Irish affairs and politics in general." His opportunities for promoting joint endeavours had also been enhanced in January 1907 when he was elected chairman of the Ulster Unionist Council, a choice applauded by the pro-Unionist Times of London: "By no other means could the Unionists of Ulster have achieved more effectively that genuine association with the south, which is an absolute necessity if we are to fight the coming battle with any prospects of success. As member for S. Dublin, leader of the Irish Unionist Party in Parliament, and Chairman of the Ulster Unionist Council, Long now finds himself at the head of a body of Irish Unionism more truly united and incorporate than Irish Unionism has been at any time in the last dozen years."71 In the formal sense this was undoubtedly so, but relations between northern and southern Unionism remained strained, and as the home rule crisis deepened in the years ahead Long was to find it increasingly difficult to locate common ground between the associations. Long had embarked on another major undertaking in late 1906. He had been concerned since the election that the Unionists were giving insufficient attention to the home rule issue at the constituency level, with the result that many English Unionists, particularly the younger ones, were inadequately informed about the Liberal policy of "sap and mine." It seemed to Long that the party would be ill-prepared when a crisis occurred. He was also well aware that Sir Anthony MacDonnell had already begun to prepare devolutionary proposals for the Liberal administration. It seemed to Long only a matter of time before one of these was acted upon. He therefore concluded that it was necessary to establish an organization to educate the public about the home rule issue and to fight Liberal policies affecting the union, and by early November 1906 he was writing

44 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union to potential Unionist supporters about the formation of a Union Defence League. The response was mixed. Many indicated general support because Long was involved, but they wanted more details.72 Others were less supportive. The Duke of Devonshire saw "a good many objections and little advantage in the formation of the proposed League at the present time. It has somewhat the appearance of panic and of suggesting that the cause of the Union is so weak that it cannot bear the discussion of any possible reform of Irish Government." What, he asked, was the need for a special union defence organization? Presumably, the Unionist party existed for the defence of the union. It had defeated Gladstone twice. Why could it not be trusted to do so again? He also thought the split in the party over tariff reform would make the job of the Union Defence League difficult.73 Lord Jersey was equally cautious. Until he had seen the promised Liberal bill he felt unable to respond to Long's appeal.74 While not as negative, Lord Milner chose not to join: "I am dead against Home Rule in every shape or form, & what I can do I will do to assist you and others in resisting it. But I should greatly prefer not to join another League or association of any kind." He was already a member of too many.75 Lord Goschen wanted more information and also wanted to know Balfour's and Wyndham's attitudes.76 This might have been difficult for Long to supply, given the tension and suspicion that existed between these two men and himself over Irish affairs. Balfour of Burleigh took a slightly different tack. While he said he was "as absolutely opposed to any tampering with the Union as I ever was/' he was anxious not to be committed to what he described as "the extreme 'Orange' position," and he was not prepared to say that "no change in the status quo is wanted or that any reform is to be opposed for fear of its leading to Home Rule & Separation." He had, for example, been sympathetic to some of Wyndham's actions.77 In early February 1907 he reiterated his position: "I cannot take an absolute non possumus attitude in principle against any change." He was favourably inclined to devolution: "I am afraid of finding myself committed to opposing things for Ireland when I would take them for my own country [Scotland] and would be in an impossible position as far as Scotland is concerned."78 St Aldwyn replied in a similar vein.79 These responses undoubtedly frustrated Long if they did not depress him. But his spirits would have been buoyed by Alfred Lyttelton's unqualified support - "I shall be delighted to row in any

45 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

boat with you at the helm"80 - and by the following endorsation from Earl Cadogan: I am so glad that you are undertaking to manage the campaign against Home Rule. It could not be in better hands. Between ourselves the Irish Unionist Alliance and the Ulster Unionist Council are not to be relied upon. Of course they are sound as regards the Union but if they cannot get everything they want, they turn and abuse their friends and I have seen serious evil resulting from these actions in many cases. I hope therefore that your organisation will become the strong one, and they will I trust not play for their own hands solely, as is their want ... I have watched your career with the highest interest and pleasure - and so many of us look most to you in these days when we are weak in Leaders as well as in the rank and file of our Party.81

Such effusions led Long to write confidently in January 1907 to Lady Londonderry: "I am doing my best & am working very hard. My League is doing very well indeed - people seem really pleased."82 Long, of course, was glossing the truth. Nevertheless, the executive committee of the Union Defence League met for the first time in February 1907. Arrangements were made to undertake "missionary and propaganda work" in selected constituencies and to prepare for a parliamentary critique of an Irish council bill that the Liberals now planned to introduce in May. The bill was devolutionary in nature, but when Augustine Birrell, the chief secretary for Ireland, introduced it on 7 May, he did admit that it might pave the way for home rule. A protracted debate on such a bill would have provided the Union Defence League with an ideal launching pad for its "missionary" work, but this opportunity disappeared in June when Campbell-Bannerman withdrew the bill in the face of Nationalist hostility. This left the league with a less well defined target, and for the remainder of the year and throughout 1908 and 1909 it had to be content with "a steady - though not extensive - propaganda and educational campaign." Even these efforts were often thwarted by fellow Unionists who did not welcome the raising of the home rule issue in constituencies where they were hoping to gain Nationalist support for the party's tariff reform and education proposals. Once the budget crisis broke late in 1909 there was a considerable slackening in the league's activities, and it did not begin to play a direct and prominent role until late 1911.83 Long, of course, was disappointed by these developments. One of his primary reasons for creating the league had been to counter

46 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the attenuated Unionist stance on Irish affairs. He had certainly been active during the brief flurry surrounding the Irish council bill, speaking in Preston, Belfast, Dublin, Portadown, and at a major protest meeting in the Queen's Hall, London, organized by the league. As usual, he spoke out vigorously for the maintenance of law and order, the protection of property, and the sanctity of the union. He had also written an introduction for Iwan-Miiller's proUnionist book, Ireland: Today and Tomorrow, in which he defended the Unionist record and asserted that "devolution would produce chaos in government, would weaken the bond which binds Ireland to Great Britain, [and] would undoubtedly pave the way for Home Rule."84 He had also reiterated his belief, stated forcefully in Belfast earlier in the year, that it was most necessary to fight devolution and Home Rule not so much from the Irish point of view, nor from the view that Home rule meant injustice and loss to the loyalist minority, nor that it would be regarded by the minority as a gross act of injustice and wrong, they must fight it from the larger standpoint - from the Imperial standpoint. They were entitled to ask their fellow citizens as citizens of the Empire, to stand by the loyalists of Ireland because Home Rule meant the removal of one of the most important corner stones of the fabric of the British Empire ... It was monstrous that Home Rule should be in the mouth of any citizen of the United Kingdom.

Imperial unity and home rule for Ireland were incompatible, claimed Long. Unionists must think of the empire as a whole and not just of the impact of Liberal policies in Ireland. He claimed that "in serving the Empire they served Ireland; in protecting the Empire they protected Ireland; in opposing separation schemes they showed that they loved the Empire and were determined to maintain it."85 Long was also critical of various references by Liberals to "colonial models." What did the Liberals have in mind? If it was that of the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, then it would be "absolutely impossible to set that up in Ireland unless they did the same thing in England and Scotland and federated them with a Federal Parliament." This was a very early reference by Long to a federal system for the United Kingdom. It clearly did not appeal to him in 1907.86 With the withdrawal of the Irish council bill, the question of home rule tended to fade from most minds. The Unionist party was preoccupied with the division within its ranks over tariff reform, while many of its members were increasingly frustrated by Balfour's failure to provide strong, clear leadership. Party organization had become

47 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

an issue, and Long was prevailed upon to raise with Balfour the possibility of the appointment of a small committee of former cabinet ministers to provide him with advice and assistance. Long had little success on this front but was still viewed as an important linchpin between disparate party forces, so the Unionist free traders, anxious to remain in the party, also asked Long to approach Balfour to see if he could be persuaded to indicate that the party's umbrella was large enough to shelter people of varying beliefs on the fiscal question. Long was a moderate tariff reformer who believed that such a policy would be of advantage to the British people and that it would help consolidate the empire. But he was also well aware that it would be electorally unwise for the Unionist party to nail its colours too firmly or openly to that particular masthead. He therefore attempted for much of late 1907 and early 1908 to persuade Sandars and Balfour of the merits of retaining the Unionist free traders within the party. This stance only drew Long into an imbroglio with Austen Chamberlain and added to his frustration with Balfour's leadership. During late 1907, Long also became concerned about socialism, and his speeches increasingly included references to its supposed perils. He admitted that it was a force to be reckoned with and that it should be dealt with by practical methods rather than intimidation.87 A parallel concern was the future of the landowners. This had been a continual interest for Long since the i88os, so it was not surprising that he helped organize and became president of the Landholders' Central Association in July 1907. Its aim was to devise methods to counter Liberal proposals and to propose constructive alternatives.88 By this time, Long was maintaining a punishing schedule that eventually led to a breakdown in health. He began to suffer severely from sciatica in September 1907 and over the following weeks was advised to slacken his pace. He found it hard to do so since he was much in demand and the Unionist hierarchy had come to rely upon him as one of their primary workhorses. So, for the time being, he continued to speak all over the country, often more than twice a week in widely separated locations. Despite the variety of his other interests, Long always made Irish affairs his primary concern. In early October he voiced his dismay at the "intimidation" that seemed to be rife in the south and west of Ireland,89 and a month later he was moved to write: The Nationalists openly preach defiance of the law and pour contempt ... upon Birrell and all his works. The people, quick to see when the arm of Govt is feeble, do as they like, cattle-driving is becoming a new National

48 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union sport. The police are helpless, they are not properly backed up by Government ... Strong action, genuine support to the Police, clear orders that these things must be stopped, proclamation of disturbed districts, use of the powers conferred by the Crimes Act - these are the measures which are required, and without them I am convinced that things will go from bad to worse and we shall have a rebellion in the country, in fact it is very little short of it now. It is cruelly hard upon law-abiding Loyalists who are quite unable to protect themselves.90

In the same vein, he complained to Lady Londonderry: The Police are helpless ... they are afraid that if they do their utmost they will get into trouble & be accused of being too zealous. Magistrates and juries will not convict, even on the clearest evidence & Gov do nothing ... The people know the Gov are not in earnest ... I know cases of widows & small owners who must be irretrievably ruined if this cattle driving goes on much longer. And this is all done in the name of "freedom" & "the rights of the People"! What wicked prostitution of words! And then Birrell blames the magistrates for not doing their duty!... I am afraid this is a long & dismal story but I love Ireland, I have known the Country and lived in it for more than 40 years & it makes my blood boil to see a Government allowing so much wrong doing & sowing such an awful crop which the unfortunate people will have to gather.91

Two weeks later, he turned his thoughts from the fiscal question and the fate of the Unionist free traders and told Bonar Law, "For the moment, I think the question of the condition of Ireland and the maintenance of the Union, press more than anything else. Ireland is gradually slipping into a state of complete anarchy and lawlessness, and people in this country are getting tired of the everlasting Irish question; and if we do not take care we shall have a serious rebellion in Ireland, and the Union will be allowed to go through the boredom of our people."92 By November, Long was quite ill with sciatica and associated ailments, and he was instructed to cancel all his major engagements to the end of the year. This was the beginning of a protracted period of ill health which obliged him to rethink his commitments so that he could make best use of his energies. After three weeks on the continent in early 1908, he still did not feel up to chairing the annual meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council in Belfast on 23 January and he did not attend. This did not sit well with many Ulster Unionists, but it was one of the first indications that Long was going to cut back on some of his more formal commitments. A few days later,

49 Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

on 2 February, he resigned as chairman of the Irish Unionist party and began actively searching for a seat in the London area from which he could safely wage the fight for the union while playing his part in Westminster politics. Long knew that South County Dublin was a marginal seat for the Unionists. If he stood for it again there was a grave risk he would be beaten. It seemed pointless to him and to many of his friends to run that risk. Thus, in early June, after much back-room negotiation, Long was adopted as the candidate for the Strand, a safe London seat. He wrote immediately to the South Dublin association informing its members of the decision and giving his assurance that the change of constituency would not affect his attitudes towards Ireland or his level of support for the principles of Irish Unionism. In turn, South Dublin gave its blessing and commended Long for his zeal and conscientious pursuit of Unionist interests.93 By detaching himself from an Irish constituency and from the leadership of the Irish Unionist party, Long made it more difficult for him to control both the pace and direction, as well as to remain on top of the nuance, of Irish Unionist policy. Although London was the centre of power, it was a poor sounding board of Irish opinion, and Long now had to rely more than ever for information on his vast network of correspondents in both North and South. While his decision may have puzzled many of his colleagues, it is clear that he acted of his own volition. He was not pushed out. In fact, the Irish Unionists were aghast at his decision. They valued his support, his connections, and his advice. They would have preferred things to remain as they were. Long, however, had little choice. His workload was crippling his health and he needed to cut back. Also, he had never been fond of constituency work and he recoiled at what would have been involved in nurturing South Dublin. He wanted a safe seat that required a minimal amount of attention, thereby freeing him to attend closely to his various political interests, particularly his Irish interests. He got what he wanted, but his decision did enable others to gain a more pivotal influence in the Irish Unionist organizations, especially the Ulster Unionist organizations. By July 1908 it was clearer than ever that neither home rule nor "The Union in Danger" were popular rallying cries either among the populace or within the Unionist hierarchy. Balfour continued to treat Long coldly and to favour the advice of Sandars and Wyndham. Long found this particularly frustrating, especially as the Union Defence League was having difficulty finding a forum. Constituency associations, agents, and the candidates themselves were all reluc-

50 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

tant to have any mention of home rule for fear that it would jeopardize support on the education question. Long was disturbed by this and advised Balfour that he did not think it was a good line to take. Long wanted home rule tackled at every opportunity: Unionists could not afford to be quiet on the issue when Nationalists were not. 94 Later that month and again in August, Long spoke in favour of imperial federation. In his estimation, the Unionist party had to face the changes necessary to ensure the continued strength of the mother country and the empire. He personally favoured "a great council of the Empire in London."95 But he distinguished between imperial federation and a looser scheme of "Imperial Home Rule." As he put it to Ashtown, "I would rather never sit again in Parliament for one day than vote for any Home Rule scheme of any kind."96 Long spoke much in the same vein in Dublin on 2 October at a large Unionist demonstration which, in part, was a farewell to him. During a rousing Liberal-bashing speech, he emphatically declared that he had never been responsible nor would he ever be responsible for any policy that would weaken the union.97 For Long, Ireland could not be given home rule because of its strategic location. Thus, home rule on "the colonial model" was "entirely inapplicable to Ireland."98 Throughout these speeches, Long never strayed far from his preoccupation with law and order. His attitudes were best summed up in an address to Unionists in Newport, Monmouth, on 20 November. He compared the life of many of His Majesty's subjects in Ireland as that of the leper, with this difference, that where the leper was compelled to live separate from his fellows he was not exposed to attacks upon his life and person. The cry for Home Rule was a silly cry, which ought not to be listened to; but whatever desires people might have with regard to Ireland the first duty was to demand that the Government should restore order and law and that citizens of the King, whether they lived in Galway or in Monmouth, should have the same freedom and the same privileges and rights and the same opportunity to do their best for themselves so long as they kept within the law. 99

This was to be Long's last speech for some time. By now he was ill with gout and overwork. He had never fully recovered from his illness of late 1907 and early 1908. His doctor made him cancel all engagements as of early December, and in the New Year he decided to take a prolonged rest and arranged to travel to southern Africa. Long left England on 16 January and did not return until 5 June. He

5i Holding Firm to Unionist Principles

spent most of his time in South Africa with a few weeks in Rhodesia. He arrived in South Africa at an exciting time. A convention had recently canvassed the possibility of uniting the four colonies and, after surveying both federal and unitary systems, had opted for the latter with devolved powers to local legislatures. Negotiations were still going on while Long was there. He found it all endlessly fascinating and had ample opportunity to discuss the basic issues with Lord Selborne, Sir Leander Starr Jameson, and others involved in the debate. He also met General Smuts and some of Lord Milner's "kindergarten" who were active in the Closer Union movement. Long's South African experience made an indelible impression on him, and he was in future to be a strong advocate of a convention as a means of resolving the problem of Irish home rule.100 Long returned to London to find the country riveted by Lloyd George's budget recommendations. Within days of his arrival he was asked to become the president of the recently formed Budget Protest League. He immediately plunged into his new responsibilities with all his former energy and commitment, and until November concentrated on countering a budget that, in his estimation, would ruin "the Landed Classes."101 Despite the drain of the anti-budget campaign on his time, Long never lost sight of his commitment to the Irish Unionists or to any effort, real or imagined, to distance him from a leading role in Irish affairs. In September he clashed with Alexander Acland-Hood, the chief whip and a longtime foe, over Acland-Hood's choice of Edward Carson to move the rejection of the Irish land bill and of Wyndham to wind up debate. This seemed to Long a deliberate slap in the face to him personally and to Irish Unionists generally. He could have had little quarrel with Carson's credentials, but Wyndham was anathema. He was outraged and indicated as much to Balfour: "This case brings to a crisis a position which I have long regarded as well nigh intolerable and which is due to the extraordinary powers which Hood appears to possess ... I do not see how I can possibly return to the Front bench."102 He confided to Lady Londonderry: "At present I really don't see how I can go back to the Irish bench: it makes life impossible if even in Irish affairs Hood is to lead and decide everything."103 Balfour knew that he could not afford to alienate Long, who was not only one of the most popular men in the party but the unquestioned champion of Irish Unionist interests. With an election threatening, Balfour needed Long onside. He therefore made every effort to mollify him: "I have just received your note: and with the utmost dismay. I will of course look into the matter: and, till I have done

52 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

so, will make no comments. But this much, I must say & now. Under no conceivable, or inconceivable, cirs must you be allowed to sit, Achilles-like, in your tent. We cannot do without you - and the country cannot do without MS. Ergo you must, whether you like it or not, resume your proper place as one of the most trusted leaders of the party."104 This effusion appears to have worked and, by October, Long and Lansdowne, the Unionist leader in the Lords, were consulting over tactics to be used with respect to the Irish bill.10^ Neither Long nor anyone else in the party was to have much time to ponder the appropriate methods of reaffirming Unionist principles. Necessity dictated immediate and dramatic endorsation. The House of Commons passed the Lloyd George budget on 4 November, but it was defeated by the Unionist-dominated House of Lords on 30 November. Parliament was prorogued on 3 December and dissolved on the fifteenth. An election was called for January 1910. The election marked the beginning of one of the most dramatic periods in Anglo-Irish relations. As befitted his standing as an archdefender of Unionist principles and a leading spokesman for the Irish Unionists, Long played an important role.

CHAPTER THREE

The Union in Danger

After the 1906 election the issue of the Union had not bulked large in most people's minds, and it had been a struggle for the Irish Unionists to keep the matter alive among politicians, let alone among the public at large. The Irish council bill of 1907 had not brought the issue to the fore because it was a very limited proposal that posed no real threat to the union and was quickly rejected by the Nationalists. Long had worked hard to counter the general indifference, but even he found it difficult to defend a union that did not seem endangered. The atmosphere quickly changed with the January 1910 election. The Unionists decided to make a firm stand in defence of the union and against home rule, as well as to conduct a fierce attack against the Lloyd George budget and the Liberal threat to the powers of the House of Lords. In Long's speeches during the campaign, which stretched through December and January, he staunchly defended the union and asserted that the Unionist party would offer strenuous opposition to home rule. On one occasion he went so far as to say that if Ireland was given home rule it would be necessary to conquer Ireland in twenty years.1 As far as Long was concerned, the relationship between Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom had been settled more than a hundred years ago. The union was the cornerstone of the British Empire and was therefore sacrosanct.2 He elaborated on this theme in early January in Belfast when he presided over the fourth annual meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council and the Ulster Union of Constitutional Associations. "Home Rule for Ireland," he asserted, "would mean the loss of individual liberty, the absolute insecurity of property, and the negation of everything they cared for affecting the welfare of the country." What further extensions of self-government could be granted except ed-

54 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

ucation and the police? Personally, he did not think the police should be handed over to the Nationalists. To Long, home rule meant separation: "The green flag with the harp and without the Crown." This, of course, posed a threat to Ulster, and Long addressed that problem head on in a speech at the Ulster Hall before a massive overflow crowd. He reminded his audience of Randoph Churchill's dramatic words of 1886: "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right." These [said Long] were awful words. They meant, if they meant anything, civil war. Civil war might be necessary, it might be justified by the circumstances, it might be forced on a people in order to protect the lives and liberties of the people and their successes; but it was an awful thing to contemplate ... It might be that the future might have for them a choice as terrible as that. With all his heart he prayed that God might avert anything so terrible from their land, but God helped those who helped themselves, and if they were going to avert that terrible possibility from their land and their children it would only be by rallying now as one man to the standard of union, by working as one man for the cause in which they believed.3

Long exulted in the occasion, and wrote euphorically to Lady Londonderry: "A magnificent demonstration last night... They say there were 25,000 in the streets! I am off to Dublin tomorrow and then on to England. Ulster is awake!"4 Long spoke at Rathmines the next night, 6 January, in support of Captain Cooper, his successor as the Unionist candidate for South Dublin. He had come to say farewell and to pledge himself to "the maintenance and preservation of the Empire, which to his mind was largely dependent on the Union which he and they were determined to preserve." He brought greetings from Belfast, where the northern Unionists were resolutely against home rule: "Nothing more absurd could be done than in the name of peace to grant home rule to Ireland. It was not a concession to Irish feeling, but a base and cowardly surrender to those who intimated that unless they got their way they would vote against the government in some coming division."5 The following day, after an overnight crossing, he spoke to the electors of the Strand division in Soho and referred to his speeches in Belfast and Dublin. He said the loyalists of Ireland asked not to be betrayed; nothing should be done to break the bond that united the two countries.6 Four days later he carried his message to Stockport, in the north of England, where he spoke out against the idea of home rule all round: "It was suggested that our great Parliament should be altered in its character, that we should have Parliaments

55 The Union in Danger

in England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, and for aught he knew in Lancashire, in order that those things which were mysteriously called local affairs should be settled according to local feeling ... What were local affairs? The issue was ... only confused by the suggestion of an all-round Home Rule scheme." He went on to say that the same rights should not be given to Ireland that had recently been given to South Africa - power over all but foreign affairs. That was too dangerous for a place so close.7 The next day, 12 January, he was back in the south at Maidstone, where he pointed out that although Asquith had committed the Liberals to home rule in his Albert Hall speech of late 1909, he had not provided any detail. It was, said Long, necessary to know such details; Asquith had no right to go to the country and ask for a decision on home rule without saying what he had in mind. On behalf of the Irish Unionists, Long asked for the same rights and privileges and the same share in British citizenship that Englishmen claimed for themselves.8 Long continued to speak in this vein and to maintain the same punishing pace throughout the campaign. He was clearly in his element. It was much easier now to arouse audience interest in his message and to alert the public to the variety of dangers implicit in home rule. He appealed to the sensitivities of Englishmen, long paranoid about an Ireland free on their flank to act independent of Westminster, while presenting himself as the voice of the North to the South and of both to the English. He was also convinced that his firm stance towards the union and against home rule was the only policy the Unionist party could follow if it was to have any hope of an electoral victory. He was not afraid to address the most difficult questions, and it was no accident that he had raised the spectre of civil war and touched on the seductive alternative of home rule all round. Over the next four years, Long and his fellow Unionists would have to explore and ultimately take a stand on both possibilities. The January election ended with Long winning overwhelmingly in the Strand, but there was very much a hung jury across the rest of the country. The Liberals won 275 seats; the Unionists 273; the Irish Nationalists 82; and Labour 40. This appeared to leave the Irish Nationalists holding the balance of power. It certainly heralded a period of acute anxiety and soul searching for the Unionists. It was clear that the Lloyd George budget would pass and that the Liberals, with Irish Nationalist support, would move to curb the powers of the House of Lords. Unquestionably, a home rule bill would follow. The United Kingdom was on the brink of a major crisis. Long sensed

56 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

this but worried that neither Balfour nor the party's organization was ready.9 In early March he urged Balfour to "put our house in order ... we are doomed to fail unless our organisation is up to date."10 At the end of the month he complained to Selborne, "There is chaos in the House while outside A. Hood & Jack Sandars do exactly as they like. It is demoralizing & heartbreaking."11 Long, of course, continued to hammer away at every opportunity. On 29 March, at Portadown, before a crowd of 30,000, he unveiled a statue to Edward Saunderson, his predecessor as leader of the Irish Unionists, and reminded his audience that Saunderson had believed in the union as the base of a strong empire.12 With this inspiring occasion fresh in his mind, Long wrote once more to Balfour asking him to meet the Irish Unionist MPS at dinner and thus reaffirm the ties between English and Irish Unionists: The Irish Unionist Party came wonderfully well out of the General Election, we increased our number, we won several seats, we did not lose one, apart from this five years ago the Party was disorganised and not exactly loyal; they devoted most of their time to trailing their coats before the Nationalists; all this is changed, the Party are now thoroughly loyal, the same description applies to the rank and file in Ireland; the members devote themselves, as they of course ought to do, to ordinary Unionist work in the House and many of them have done some very useful work.13

It is unclear if Balfour met with the Irish Unionist MPS, but given his long-standing disdain for Irish Unionist rhetoric, it is unlikely. This would in part account for Long's continued criticism of Balfour's leadership over the following months. Balfour, however, did not have an easy row to hoe. He was beset with conflicting advice about policy and tactics on a variety of key issues and was fearful of putting a foot wrong and alienating some of his own party or sectors of the public at large. The pressure became more intense when a parliament bill eliminating the Lords' veto power was given first reading on 14 April. The Liberals followed it with the introduction of Lloyd George's budget on 18 April. The Unionist-dominated Lords passed the budget without much demur on 28 April, but it was evident that they would be far less tolerant of the parliament bill. They knew only too well that once the parliament bill passed, a home rule bill would quickly be introduced. A constitutional crisis clearly loomed. Then suddenly, on 6 May, King Edward VII died. The Liberals and Unionists immediately agreed to confer to see whether they could resolve the differences dividing them and the country. The first meeting of the constitu-

57 The Union in Danger

tional conference was held on 17 June and, with a break for the summer recess, the sessions lasted until mid-November. Any opportunity Long might have been given to join the Unionist leaders in negotiation with the Liberals was dashed by a protracted bout of ill health. As usual, he had been stretching his physical resources beyond their limit. He had barely returned from a sixmonth recuperative period in South Africa before he had plunged into a hectic round of anti-budget meetings in late 1909, and then during the election he had kept up an exhausting pace. By early May he was bedridden with neuritis and admitted to having had "a poor time." Later that month he agreed to a new treatment, "a special form of electrical application," but it had little effect. He wrote despairingly to Lady Londonderry, "I am still a complete cripple and feel thoroughly tired of life. Certainly this neuritis is a most depressing malady."14 His condition snowed no real improvement over the next two months and was compounded in August when he had to have an emergency operation for appendicitis. After spending weeks at Rood Ashton, he left for a cruise around the south coast aboard the yacht Amethyst on 16 September. Although feeling a little better by early October, he confessed that it was slow work: "I can't get rid of the pain and find it very difficult to get my strength back." He decided to remain on the yacht for another two weeks and did not return to London and active politics until 27 October.15 Throughout his months of illness, Long had been forced to the political sidelines and had taken no part in formulating the Unionist response to Liberal suggestions. He had not been completely out of touch, however, for he had one of the best networks of any British politician. He had received a stream of letters from all levels of the party and from all over the country, and he had continued to read the newspapers and periodicals as avidly as ever. He was not always pleased by what he learned. He bemoaned "the want of discipline & organization in our Party, no Huntsman or Whips, each hound hunting his own particular quarry." By September, almost beside himself with worry and frustration, he complained bitterly to Lady Londonderry, "I get any number of letters from members of our Party. I never knew so much discontent. But what can we do? I am in despair. We want a big strong policy & and really efficient organisation - & we have got neither!" Long blamed Balfour's indecision for the party's plight. What was needed was "a strong hand on the helm" and a thorough reorganization of the party machinery, but he saw no hope for any of that. He was "sick of the whole thing," and "like all my correspondents & friends, in despair."16 In early

58 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

October, Long urged Balfour to make "a sharp clear speech" about Unionist policies in order to quell the grumbling within the party.17 One suggestion which had surfaced while he was ill, and which particularly exercised him as he prepared to return to the political fray, was that the home rule crisis might be resolved by the adoption of home rule all round or federalism for the United Kingdom. Under such a scheme, local parliaments would be created for England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, modelled after those in the Canadian provinces or the Australian states, and a central parliament similar to that in Ottawa or Canberra would handle national and international issues. Whether the system would be truly federal, with a division of sovereignty, a written constitution, and a supreme court, as in Canada and Australia, or whether it would simply be devolutionary, as in South Africa, was a matter of considerable debate and confusion. Either way, it did not appeal to Long, who had dismissed a similar idea in 1907. To him, the division of parliamentary sovereignty was unthinkable, and home rule all round (or federal devolution as it was called by some) seemed little more than a step towards Irish separation and the disintegration of the union. The idea had first been advocated in a sustained fashion after the January election when it had become obvious that home rule had returned to the top of the political agenda. A number of Unionist sympathizers, among them Earl Grey, the governor general of Canada, and Thomas Brassey, who like Grey was an ardent champion of imperial federation, had undertaken a systematic campaign to persuade the Unionist hierarchy of the wisdom of adopting devolution as an alternative to the Liberal program of parliamentary reform and home rule. Long had been one of the first to receive a copy of Grey's widely distributed letter of appeal, and in early April Brassey had written urging Long to view home rule all round favourably. It would, he argued, relieve the congestion in the House of Commons by removing questions of a purely domestic interest from Westminister and transferring them to subordinate legislatures, and, most important, it would solve the Irish question while preserving the union.18 Even Lord Milner, a staunch defender of the union, reluctantly admitted in April that it might be necessary to accept some form of "provincial home rule."19 The Unionist interest in a federal solution mounted through the summer and autumn as it became clear that the constitutional conference had reached an impasse over Irish home rule. The Unionists wanted bills of constitutional and organic significance, such as a home rule bill, to be treated as a special category of legislation. The Liberals would not agree to this. Since some way out of the impasse

59 The Union in Danger

needed to be found, federalism became the focus of considerable public discussion and private lobbying. Balfour was inundated with advice, and even Sandars suggested that he consider devolution seriously. The principal and most passionate advocates were F. S. Oliver, a Unionist confidant and a long-time supporter of imperial union, who campaigned on two fronts - in the columns of the Times as "Pacificus" and behind the scenes by letter and conversation; and J. L. Garvin, the famous editor of the Observer, who conducted a public campaign in his columns throughout October while privately bombarding Balfour with lengthy letters and memoranda beseeching him to support a settlement on federal lines. It was at this juncture that Long returned to the political arena. During his last days of recuperation, he had not had access to the British papers and he devoured them with mounting consternation on his return to London. Hurried conversations with colleagues convinced him that Balfour and Lansdowne might be prepared to bow to the intense pressure and link the Unionist party to some form of devolution. Long wasted little time in publicly reaffirming his continued adherence to Unionist principles. In a letter in the Times on 29 October, he admitted: "If some great scheme of Imperial Federation, to include the Mother Country and her Dependencies across the seas, were asked for as a substitute for Home Rule, I would be the last to express any hasty opinion in regards to it." But such was not the case, he said. Unionists were "called upon to admit as possible some vague scheme of self-government for Ireland." He wanted everyone to know that Unionists were serious about no home rule in any form; it would not only be a danger to the empire but would be "a cowardly betrayal of fellow-subjects." He claimed he would not recede from his defence of the union.20 Long's full-blooded stand was well received by those in the party who were disturbed about the possibility of a Unionist shift on the issue of the union. One of them, A.V. Dicey, a leading expert on the constitution who had been vigorously defending the union since the i88os, congratulated Long. Long's letter, he wrote, had given great satisfaction to thousands of Unionists who believe as they all did in 1886 that Unionism means, on the one hand, the maintenance of the political Union between Great Britain and Ireland and on the other the unhesitating refusal to give to Ireland an Irish executive appointed by an Irish Parliament. That Unionism means today what it meant in 1886 is a fact on wh. no Unionist leader ought to allow for a moment to be doubtful. That any man should change his opinions, because he believes them to have been proved erroneous, is

60 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union of course no disgrace. But there is something shocking to common sense and to political morality in any statesman trying to persuade himself that he can remain a Unionist while adopting Home Rule under the alias of Federalism.21

In late 1910, Long found nothing to quarrel with in this letter. If anything, it strengthened him in his convictions. As it happened, however, he need not have doubted Balfour on this issue. The Unionist leader had remained as critical of federal and devolutionary ideas on this occasion as he had been in the 18903. He had not been persuaded by either Oliver or Garvin and, in fact, had sent Garvin a devastating critique of the federal solution. In essence, he believed, as did Long in 1910, that "federalism in the United Kingdom would be a step from unification towards separation," and he refused to have anything to do with the idea.22 There, for the time being, the matter rested. The constitutional conference broke up on 10 November having settled nothing. Asquith immediately requested both a dissolution and a guarantee that the King would create sufficient peers to ensure the passage of a parliament bill. On receiving this assurance, he opened the election campaign on 25 November. Long's stand on federalism in 1910 was not surprising. He had been a firm defender of the union since his entry into politics, and since 1904 he had emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of any form of devolution. The situation had not yet developed where Long was obliged to re-examine first principles. On the eve of an election, there was no reason to believe that home rule was axiomatic. Long had little sensitivity for Irish nationalism or for similar Welsh and Scottish demands for some form of self-government. He obdurately believed that if the Union was fractured, the state would be weakened. He did not yet consider that continued strength might lie in an adaptation of constitutional forms. So deep-rooted was his conviction that he readily accepted the suggestion that all the recent talk about "home rule devolution" was "a cunning trap set by Radical wirepullers in preparation for the breakdown of the Conference, into which Editors, MPS and writers have fallen headlong and which has resulted in splitting our Party and so of course weakening our ranks."23 "Home Rule All round & Payment of Members," he scoffed to Lady Londonderry. "The new cry for our Party! It is amazing." He refused to have anything to do with such a policy.24 It would be some years before he shifted his ground. Long plunged eagerly into the election campaign at his usual frantic pace. He spoke in Dublin on 26 November, in Belfast on the twenty-eighth, and at the Albert Hall in London on the twenty-

61 The Union in Danger

ninth. He told the southern Unionists that home rule would subject them to a majority that would not give them fair play or justice, and he reminded the northern Unionists that there was no halting place between union and separation. He alerted the northerners to the Liberal tactic of assuring English audiences that "federal home rule" was popular in Ireland, and he made it clear that he rejected the idea. At the Albert Hall, Long brought a succinct message from the Irish Unionists: home rule would bring Ireland not peace but the sword. For neither the Ulster nor southern Unionists would acknowledge the authority of an Irish parliament; they would neither obey its laws nor pay its taxes.25 A week later Long won easily in the Strand. The results overall, however, were disappointing. There was virtually no change from January. The Liberals won 272; the Unionists 272; the Irish Nationalists 84; and Labour 42. The Liberals therefore remained in power and, with the support of the Irish Nationalists, quickly moved to implement their mandate. The parliament bill was introduced on 21 February 1911, and until it finally passed through the House of Lords on 10 August it dominated political discussion. While Long was to play his part in that discussion, he was preoccupied during the early months of the year with the development of proposals for the reorganization of the party. He had been convinced since 1905 that many of the problems the Unionists had in Ireland and elsewhere lay in a poorly led and managed party. He had easily been the most scathing critic of the chief whips, Aretas Akers-Douglas and Alexander Acland-Hood, and also of Balfour whose languid style and indecisiveness frustrated him. Shortly before the election, he had complained to Theresa Londonderry, his favourite sounding-board: "Never before have things been so bad. It is not only a case of sheep without a shepherd, there isn't even a sheepdog! Yes. We could do with a Dizzy now."26 Once the election was over, Long raised the matter with Balfour. Why, he asked, had the party been beaten despite the sterling efforts of the leadership? "Chiefly," he argued, "because in the great majority of constituencies the organisation - for which, after all, the Central Office must be in the main responsible - was either nonexistent or deplorable." The realization that the organization was bad and that nothing was being done to correct it was driving the membership to despair, he said; there was a widespread and vehement demand for a thorough investigation and for root-andbranch reorganization. Long implored Balfour to take immediate action so that the party's position would be safeguarded in the future.27 Early in the New Year he forwarded a petition signed by

62 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

numerous Unionist peers and MPS urging Balfour to appoint a small committee to inquire into party organization and recommend changes. This was similar to Long's advice after the January 1910 election.28 On this occasion, Balfour appeared to bow to the pressure. Although he thought the central office had been unjustly attacked, he admitted that a system that had remained unchanged for twentyfive years did need overhauling. More important, the widespread feeling in the party that something was wrong had to be countered by a thorough examination. By early February, he had appointed a small committee, with Long as a member, to undertake a full-scale review. "Depend on it," he warned Akers-Douglas, "there must be a change of organisation to meet the change of circumstances."29 Balfour had been pushed to this conclusion after receiving an informed and telling memorandum from Long, who had pointed out that political life in the House and in the country at large had cjianged significantly over the past twenty years. The leader now found it more difficult to consult all colleagues before taking an important decision. Long particularly resented the fact that he had not been consulted over the party's proposed use of the referendum on the issue of tariff reform, whereas Austen Chamberlain had been. The consultative system needed to be improved, he said. Similarly, far too many key decisions were being made by Acland-Hood, the chief whip, and by Sandars, Balfour's private secretary, which should never have fallen to them. In addition, there had to be a revamping of the links between the party's central office and the constituencies. Long also had in mind the need for a clearer focus on the questions of House of Lords reform and home rule, and a more sensitive approach to the needs of the Irish Unionists.30 Long was initially encouraged by Balfour's apparent support, and he entered into the work of the committee with enthusiasm.31 After 43 meetings, the hearing of 108 witnesses, and the reading of 289 submissions, the committee forwarded its report to Balfour by Easter, recommending an extensive overhaul of personnel and procedure. For Long, the three most important suggestions were those calling for a party manager of cabinet rank and appropriate authority; the division of Great Britain into provincial areas, each with a whip; and the encouragement of new men to handle revamped responsibilities. To his dismay, Balfour did not comply "in any degree" with these crucial suggestions. Needless to say, Long was outraged, and his relations with his party leader deteriorated and abruptly dropped to an unprecedented low.32

63 The Union in Danger

What particularly offended Long was the appointment of Arthur Steel-Maitland to the key post of party manager. Steel-Maitland, while "clever, a very nice fellow & a most excellent speaker/' had no experience or training in organization, had been in the House only two years, and clearly was not of cabinet rank. Particularly galling to Long was the fact that Steel-Maitland sat for a Birmingham seat and was private secretary to Austen Chamberlain, the leader of the tariff reform wing of the party. It seemed to Long that Balfour was handing over control of the party to the Liberal Unionists, and he could not stomach this. As usual, he vented his spleen to Theresa Londonderry. To him the whole affair was a further example of Balfour's penchant for procrastination and "avoidance of difficulties." " AJB is impossible," he wrote, "and it is no use trying to conceal the truth any longer ... I have come to the end of my tether, this ... has destroyed my confidence in him ... I don't want to make a split, or cause trouble, but I can't & won't follow a man who is capable of such conduct toward his friends."33 Long's reaction underlined the extent to which the Unionist party was divided and the degree to which it suffered from Balfour's offhand leadership. By July, pressure was building for Balfour's resignation. Not surprisingly, given Long's popularity and the nature of his convictions, he was widely canvassed as a possible successor. If it came to that, his rival would undoubtedly be Austen Chamberlain. Another issue that reflected the divisions in the party was the reaction to the parliament bill, which had been introduced in late February. An interesting and revealing aspect of Long's stance was his pragmatism. He had no sympathy for Lord Willoughby de Broke and the "last ditchers" of the Halsbury Club. The knowledge that Austen Chamberlain supported Willoughby de Broke only added to his conviction. Long did not, of course, support the parliament bill and he spoke out against it often, both in the House and from the public platform. But unlike the "die-hard" group of Unionists, he believed that it would be a tactical mistake for the Lords to reject the bill. If they did, it would result in either an election or the creation of new peers. If the former, the Liberals would win and have five years to implement their program; if the latter, this would also ensure the passage of legislation and it would have a disastrous effect on the party. Long recommended that "in the interests of the country and of the Party we ought not to force either a Dissolution or the Creation of Peers." He advised Lansdowne and the Unionist peers to walk out of the House of Lords and allow the bill to pass. He was convinced that they would be able to defeat the government in two

64 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union years, "but even if I am wrong, my plan gives us time and a chance, whereas if the fight is persisted in we must be overturned at once." Long wanted the party to survive to fight another day. It could use tactics without sacrificing principles.34 As he explained to his brother, his tactics aimed at the "ultimate defeat" of both the parliament bill and home rule.35 By late July, the party was badly divided between the "White Flaggers and the Last Ditchers. The Blue funkers and the Blue Blooders - or The Hedgers & Ditchers."36 Long and his secretary, Sir William Bull, were unashamed "Hedgers," and Long publicly argued his point in the Times on 27 July. On the other hand, F. E. Smith, Sir Edward Carson, and Austen Chamberlain were "Ditchers" who gave unremitting support to Lord Halsbury and the "diehards." In the face of this grave division, Balfour kept on "shilly shallying around. First for giving in - then for fighting."37 Long pressed him to adopt the moderate, pragmatic approach, but he refused.38 As usual, Long found Balfour's vacillation frustrating: "Oh for a Leader who knows his own mind or would at all events lead."™ The result in the Lords was in the balance up to the last moment, but finally on 10 August the parliament bill passed 131 to 114, with 29 Unionist peers voting with the government. Predictably, the "Ditchers" were furious and bitter. Long watched developments with mounting concern. Although he was one of Balfour's most severe critics in private, he had always remained loyal publicly. By August, however, he doubted that Balfour would be able to last much longer unless he took a firm stand on a range of policy issues, particularly home rule. "I am sure," he wrote to Theresa Londonderry, "if Arthur does not strike, & strike hard & soon, it will be impossible to save him. My correspondence is very painful reading."40 Sir William Bull privately summed up the situation: "Balfour is by far & away the most brilliant debater and Parliamentarian in the House of Commons. He towers over Asquith, Lloyd George & everybody else but he is the worst leader we ever had & he is getting worse. He is mentally idle ... He does not lead. He is like a sleepy lion who has to be poked up to roar occasionally. There is a growing feeling that though Walter Long has none of his brilliancy he would make a better leader - & the party is growing in revolt."41 By late September, Long could not contain his frustration any longer. High-strung and overtired, he found it increasingly difficult to rein in his volatile temper. On 29 September he wrote a harsh, unrelenting letter to Balfour which effectively asked him to resign for the sake of the party. Balfour found the letter "brutal" and it

65 The Union in Danger

shook him severely. Long subsequently regretted sending it and wished he had not made such "an egregious ass" of himself. Harsh though it was, the letter did accurately reflect Long's concerns and it echoed similar complaints from throughout the party. Long was convinced the party was in grave difficulty with the ever-present split over tariff reform, the mishandling of reorganization, and now the bitter gulf between the "Ditchers" and "Hedgers." He told Balfour that as party leader he had to bear much of the responsibility for the party's plight and that the situation required "a complete change in policy and tactics on your own part." Balfour must "take the Party by the head" and provide "decided, courageous leadership." "The Government," argued Long, "must be attacked all along the line, no quarter must be shown," and a clear alternative policy must be agreed upon. Long was particularly annoyed that he had not been taken into Balfour's confidence about home rule. He was not prepared to have his position undermined and said that unless there was a change, he was prepared "to leave the Front Bench and fight my own battle in my own way." But, even more important, he said that Balfour was confusing his followers on the important home rule issue. For example, the reference in a recent letter sent out to MPS by Arthur Steel-Maitland has caused, to my certain knowledge, great searching of heart among the best of your supporters. You indicate that Home Rule must be opposed so long as we are entitled to assume that it is Gladstonian Home Rule. Now, is it not inevitable that the inference drawn from this must be that there is one form of Home Rule to which you, as leader of the Party, would not offer relentless opposition? The majority of your supporters are opposed to Home Rule in any form: all your supporters hate the "splitting of straws": the bulk of your followers in the country (the electors) have not the time or the knowledge sufficient to enable them to discriminate between one kind of Home Rule or another: and what they all ask for - and I speak of what I know - is clear, distinct guidance: a plain policy and straightforward statements appeal to the people and will win, but qualifications and doubts, "ifs and ands" mystify and make them ask in their agony - for no other word describes it - for a clear indication of what the leaders of the Party mean to do.

Long begged Balfour "to take prompt and decisive action," saying that unless he did so, not only would he find himself with very few followers, "but our Party will, as a result of your leadership, be hopelessly broken up and cease to be the great instrument for public

66 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

good which it has always hitherto been, and which it must continue to be if the safety of the country is to be secured."42 Those who saw the letter variously dubbed it "offensive" and "brutal and cruel," and its impact on Balfour was considerable.43 On reading it, he turned to Sandars and observed, "Now this comes from my oldest colleague, my professed friend and upholder. Nothing of the Die-Hards could be compared with this for what is called disloyalty. The letter, in fact, is a bold and a brutal invitation for me to retire." Balfour was understandably hurt and resentful but, better than anyone, he knew that he was incapable of providing what Long and others wanted. He admitted to Sandars, "Long asks me to change, and I cannot change."44 Balfour wrestled with the inevitable throughout October but finally took the only possible course open to him. His resignation was made public on 8 November. Initially, there were two candidates for the leadership, Walter Long and Austen Chamberlain. They had been sparring for years over tariff reform, and Long was particularly upset that the party might fall under the control of Birmingham and the ardent tariff reformers. He believed that this would be a mistake and would lose the party much support. He preferred a more middle-of-the-road approach. Long allowed himself to get considerably worked up over this issue, and much like the pugilist he had been in his youth, he developed, for a time, intense animosity towards Chamberlain. Soundings by their supporters indicated that the leadership contest would be a close one. Long had considerable Irish and back-bench support while Chamberlain had the support of the whips and many in the party hierarchy. Long's choleric disposition, his chronic ill health, and his lack of flair were against him. Nevertheless, many at the time thought that Long would have won if it had come to a vote. Either way, it would not have resolved the split in the party. Both Long and Chamberlain realized this, and it was to their credit that they readily agreed to step aside and support a third, compromise candidate, the Canadian-born Andrew Bonar Law, a successful businessman from Scotland who had risen steadily in the estimation of his colleagues since entering the House in 1900. Bonar Law became leader of the Unionist party on 13 November 1911. He was to remain leader for the rest of Long's active political life. Long was not displeased by the turn of events. Everyone had wanted to avoid a widening and deepening of "the old split," so although it had been "a very difficult and rather a trying time," he was sure they had "done the right thing and got the best man." "Everybody is pleased now," Long told Lady Londonderry, "I am sure it is worth a great deal to us to get a real businessman at our

67 The Union in Danger

head: we have wanted this badly." Long had also had to accept that his health simply would not have stood the strain of leadership. The worry of the previous six weeks had brought back the severe headaches that riad broken him in 1908 and 1909, and he became convinced that the leadership would have killed him inside two years.45 He wrote immediately to Bonar Law promising his "wholehearted and most loyal support."46 To the degree that he was disappointed, he consoled himself in the knowledge that Bonar Law's Ulster Protestant roots made him an unqualified supporter of the union. THE PASSAGE OF THE PARLIAMENT BILL ensured that a home rule bill would soon follow. In fact, the Liberals had begun serious deliberations in February 1911, and after canvassing at length the possibilities of some form of a federal or devolutionary scheme, they finally opted in January 1912 for an exclusively Irish home rule bill on Gladstonian lines. Asquith introduced the bill on 11 April 1912. The debate over this bill and its impact upon Ulster and the fabric of the British state increasingly riveted the nation's attention, the more so as the bill moved inexorably towards its inevitable passage in the summer of 1914. The bill posed particular problems for the Unionists. It had been easy to present a united front in opposition to any form of home rule or devolution as long as there was no immediate threat, but once it was obvious that legislation disruptive of the union would pass, the Unionists were divided among themselves as to a response. Willoughby de Broke and his "die-hards" remained staunchly uncompromising and opposed the bill to the bitter end. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson practised their harsh, defiant rhetoric, laid the groundwork for a provisional government, and seemed prepared for civil war over the issue of Ulster exclusion, yet they negotiated with the Liberals. Others, such as Austen Chamberlain and Lord Selborne, were horrified by the prospect of civil war and seriously wondered if home rule all round or some form of federalism should not be the Unionists' counter argument. As for Long, he remained defiantly protective of both the northern and southern Unionists but was appalled by the thought of civil war. He was obliged to reexamine his basic principles and to consider a variety of tactical responses.47 Despite the distractions of party reorganization and the party leadership, Long had continued to make the Irish question his first priority throughout 1911. In February he had taken pains in the House to rebut the idea that a federal home rule bill could be intro-

68 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

duced "on South African lines." He pointed out that the South Africans had created a unitary not a federal state and that to attempt home rule all round or federalism in the United Kingdom would be a disintegrative not an integrative step. In June he publicly challenged those advocating "federal home rule" to follow the South African precedent in its entirety and summon a convention. "Then," said Long, "we shall see if they can be as successful in smashing, as the South Africans were in creating, a United Parliament." Personally, Long was as resolutely opposed to home rule as he had ever been. He believed that any measure of federal home rule "would be disastrous to the heart of the Empire and fatally injurious to Ireland." In July he sent a letter to the Dublin Orangemen, assuring them that he would be "heart and soul with them" in their resistance to any measure that would bring disaster to Ireland and lead to a breakup of the British Empire.48 Long was also involved in reactivating the Union Defence League. In March 1911 he wrote on behalf of its executive committee to both the Irish Unionist Alliance and the Ulster Unionist Council, suggesting a meeting to coordinate the opposition to home rule. Representatives of the three organizations met in April at Londonderry House under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Carson, who had succeeded Long as leader of the Irish Unionist parliamentary party. The result of the conference was an agreement to avoid overlapping activities. The Irish Unionist Alliance and the Ulster Unionist Council were to carry out their own work in Ireland, while in Great Britain, under the name of the Unionist Associations of Ireland Joint Committee, they were to join with the Union Defence League (UDL) in the campaign against home rule.49 In July, Long attempted to obtain £10,000 for the UDL from Unionist party coffers but was rebuffed by Steel-Maitland, who pleaded lack of funds. The link with the party was subsequently secured by adding Steel-Maitland and John Boraston, the party's principal agent, to the executive committee.50 The UDL campaign began in a serious fashion in the autumn of 1911 after passage of the parliament bill. From the start, it included such novel features as a travelling photographic exhibit, poster and motor-van campaigns, and an early use of cinematography, as well as lantern slides. From time to time, loyalist farmers were brought to England to speak on market days about their experiences under boycott. The momentum of the campaign was given a boost on 23 September 1911 when James Craig organized a massive demonstration of the Ulster Unionist Council at Craigavon, where Sir Edward Carson spoke publicly for the first time to his Ulster supporters. Two days later, the council made preliminary plans to frame

69 The Union in Danger

a constitution for a provisional government in Ulster. Long was closely associated with these developments and throughout October spoke at a variety of meetings in England about the mood in Ulster. He warned his audiences that there existed in northern Ireland a great body of men "who were determined that they would not sell their rights, liberties and privileges without a struggle." All honour, said Long, "to the man who put himself in the front of that great army."51 Long, of course, had Carson and not himself in mind, and in February 1912 he assured Carson that he would "do anything" he wished.52 One thing Long continued to do, and do well, was to remind audiences throughout the country of the dangers inherent in home rule. What particularly bothered him was the lack of precision in the Liberals' utterances, their disregard of Ireland's strategic importance, the false analogies they drew with the colonies of white settlement, and their failure to appreciate the position of Irish Unionists, who were not bluffing and would not weaken. Long feared that the Liberals "would produce a condition of things very nearly akin to civil war" if they persisted in ignoring or failed to appreciate the strength and bitterness of the feeling of Irish Unionists.53 In order to find out if the Ulsterites' determination remained as deeply rooted as he was painting it, Long visited Ulster in early April, only a few days before the introduction of the third home rule bill. On being reassured of the implacable opposition of the loyalists to any form of home rule, he returned to London prepared to do all he could to make the passage of the legislation as difficult as possible.54 The home rule bill introduced by Asquith on 11 April 1912 proposed an Irish parliament of two houses: an elected House of Commons of 164 members and a Senate with 40. Ireland was to continue to have members at Westminster, which would remain the supreme authority in the Anglo-Irish relationship, with sovereign powers over such key matters as defence, foreign affairs, treaties, peace and war, trade with any place outside Ireland, and a host of economic and technical matters, including customs and excise. The Irish parliament was to have limited responsibility, especially in the collection of duties, which it was empowered to raise and lower only on a narrow range of goods and within definite limits. Land purchase and the collection of taxes were to be permanently left to the United Kingdom parliament. In essence, the bill provided for only a restricted form of devolution, and while Asquith referred to it as "the first step, and only the first step, in a larger and more comprehensive policy," no direct mention was made of Wales or Scotland and no hint was given of how Irish home rule might eventually be adapted

jo Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

to any such policy. The bill had been modelled on those of 1886 and 1893, and one of its most dubious and complicated features owed a good deal to Gladstone's ideas of 1886. In order to provide for the future revision of the financial clauses, the Liberals recommended that members of the Irish House of Commons be summoned to Westminster in sufficient numbers such that, in combination with the forty-two Irish MPS, they would provide Ireland with representation proportional to Great Britain's. This was an extraordinary suggestion, which in effect would have created a third parliament to deal with a specific issue. What would happen if the government at Westminster was defeated as a consequence of the extra Irish members was not dealt with by Asquith. Even his agile legal mind had undoubtedly frozen at the prospect of untangling the repercussions. Such an innovation was a result of trying to build a constitutional solution by a forced marriage of colonial and federal models. What made the situation worse, certainly as far as Long and the Unionists were concerned, was that the Liberals had made no significant effort to deal with the concerns of Irish Unionists and had completely ignored Ulster.55 It was easy enough for the Unionists to criticize the bill, for it was full of inconsistencies and its financial clauses were particularly perplexing. Dicey found them so difficult to understand that he wanted Long to arrange for an accountant to draw up a statement outlining their implications.56 While Long did explore some of the bill's financial conundrums in his speech on 16 April, he concentrated his attack on the key issues of loyalty and federalism. For him, the most offensive aspect of the whole exercise was the Liberals' claim that they were going to secure peace and happiness between Ireland and Great Britain by giving the Irish home rule. Admittedly, an improvement in relations would be welcome, but not by the extraordinary step of "propitiating those who have been the enemies of British governments - who have been the enemies of British rule who have poured contempt upon the flag and everything that represents the British Empire ... [and] by alienating, trampling upon, and insulting those who have ... ever been loyal to the Crown and the flag." The loyal minority in Ireland asked no more, Long reminded the Liberals, than "to be allowed to continue under the same form of government which you live under, to enjoy the same privileges which you enjoy, and to have the same rights which you claim." The "stupidity and unworkable character of the scheme" insulted and betrayed the Unionists in Ireland. Long knew what they felt, how determined they were, and how deep-seated were their fears and anxieties, and he pledged to do all he could to defend

71 The Union in Danger

their interests: "I wish with all my heart I could do more than I can to help them in the difficult times which lie before them. This I believe for those with whom it is my privilege to work, and this I say for myself, that no soft words delivered at the last moment will control us, no threats will disturb us. We believe that the path of duty lies clear before us. To our Unionist friends who have laboured with us and for us, who have done so much to make the Empire what it is, I say today that we will be to them true to the end whenever it may come." Long had equally tough words for the suggestion that the home rule bill would be a preliminary step towards a federal United Kingdom. He saw no need to repeat all the arguments against a federal solution made by Balfour a few days earlier, but he too poured scorn on the idea that a piecemeal approach via an Irish home rule bill would yield a favourable result even if it proved desirable. He pointed out that in referring to the recent constitutional developments in South Africa as a precedent for their own actions, the Liberals were forgetting that a union, not a federation, had been the result and that it had been arrived at after a number of conferences representative of various shades of opinion in the four colonies. The current home rule bill was not federal in intent, nor was there any evidence to suggest that such an idea would be acceptable. The current bill fell between two stools. In trying to give Ireland selfgovernment, the Liberals had only succeeded in crippling self-government there and materially interfering with central government at Westminster.57 Long reiterated these arguments two weeks later in moving the rejection of the bill on second reading. Again, he made it clear that the bill was no more than a cynical attempt to preserve the Liberals in office; it betrayed loyalist interests and played on nationalist dreams. It was a measure that had no real support in the country at large, he said, and the Unionists would resist to the end legislation "so grave, so unjust."58 Long carried this message to the public platform, and in one particularly notable outburst in Dulwich he declaimed, "Ireland never was a nation, and certainly never would be now. If Home Rule were given to the Irish, some day or other we should have to reconquer them and withdraw the self-government." To avoid any such eventuality, the Ulster Unionists would resist.59 Throughout the early months of 1912, Long had been undeviating in his support for the union and his criticism of home rule. While he was as sensitive as anyone (and more so than many) to the special needs and fears of Ulster, he had not seriously entertained any of

72 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the ideas designed to accommodate Ulster that were being sounded in the newspapers and the quarterlies and debated guardedly in clubland. He had continued to resist both federalism and home rule all round because, as he said, he fervently believed "in my heart and my bones that we can win and I at least mean to spend and be spent in the cause."60 But by the spring of 1912 he could no longer ignore the fact that the logic of his own position necessitated thinking about partition if Ulster was to be protected. He might have to sacrifice the union or at the least consider ways by which it could be preserved while giving increased autonomy to certain areas, such as southern Ireland. Long was obliged to confront this critical issue for the first time on June 1912 when Thomas Agar-Robartes, the Liberal member for St Austell, moved for the exclusion of the counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry from the home rule bill. This brought the question of partition into the glare of the public arena, and Long's initial reaction was predictable. On 4 June he wrote to Bonar Law that he hoped "the Ulster men will not be caught by the very open trap set for them by Agar-Robartes' amendment. If they are it will mean that for the first time in the history of the Home Rule question our Party will be divided. As an Englishman I cannot assent to Home Rule in any form, and as one connected by the closest ties with the Provinces of Leinster and Munster I cannot sacrifice my friends there." Three days later he wrote again in the knowledge that some rank-and-file Ulster Unionists were attracted by the amendment. He was still adamant in his advice to Bonar Law: "Whatever they ultimately decide to do I am quite clear that we must refuse to entertain the idea. If we waver and try 'clever' tactics we shall disgust our friends in the rest of Ireland and seriously weaken our own position in Gt. Br. ... If we stick to our guns and adhere to a plain straightforward policy I firmly believe we shall beat them before very long."61 This initial reaction was offered while Long was out of the country for health reasons, but as soon as he returned in mid-June he recognized that it was possible to continue support for the union while offering necessary backing to Ulster. For the first time, he decided to compromise his implacable beliefs to the extent of supporting the Agar-Robartes motion on the grounds that if home rule came to pass, Ulsterites would be better off outside rather than inside. He was quick to assure his friends and supporters in Ireland that this decision in no way undermined either his or the Unionist party's first principles. Unionists opposed the overall bill with or without the amendment and would never desert the loyalists in Leinster, Munster, and Connaught.62

73 The Union in Danger

As it happened, the amendment was easily defeated because neither the Liberals nor the Nationalists found it attractive, so the immediate problem quickly passed. Nevertheless, it had been an instructive episode for both the Unionist party and Walter Long. Increasingly, the party identified Ulster as the key problem, and Bonar Law pulled no punches in declaring that if the Liberals persisted in their effort to deprive Ulsterites "of their birthright, they would be justified in resisting by all means in their power, including force." He emphasized this by saying, "If the attempt be made under present conditions I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall not be ready to support them."63 At this juncture, Long was not ready to identify so exclusively with Ulster, for he still believed deeply in preserving the overall union and protecting his southern Unionist colleagues. Nevertheless, he had temporized and in the following months and years this tendency for pragmatism and compromise would be constantly challenged. Long led the Unionist onslaught against the bill throughout June and July as it moved through the committee stage, and he continued to speak out publicly, particularly at a national protest meeting at the Albert Hall which he chaired for the Union Defence League; but increasingly his thoughts turned to a ten-week trip to Canada, planned for the autumn recess. The trip had a threefold purpose. It was primarily designed to provide Long with another muchneeded change of scene. He had been in poor health for almost a year and had been obliged to take a ten-day sea trip to Marseilles in early January and a sojourn in early June at a spa in Switzerland, where in an effort to relieve persistent neuralgia he resorted to a long-standing but questionable medical technique. On 4 June he wrote to Lady Londonderry, "I am decidedly better. Drs yesterday put leeches on my head, a remedy I had not tried since I was a boy. I don't like the brutes but they have certainly done good."64 In somewhat better spirits because, or in spite, of such drastic treatment, Long looked forward to the other aims of his visit to Canada: first, to check on his property in Fort William and Winnipeg while investigating the possibility of purchasing more; second, to carry the anti-home rule message to Canada, where sentiment ran high both for and against the bill. Long and his fellow Unionists had always resented the ease with which the Irish Nationalists raised funds in North America, and he hoped to persuade his listeners of the merits of the Unionist case and the dangers to the empire that were implicit in a sundering of the union. Together with his wife Doreen, Sir George Armstrong (a friend and business associate), and an acting private secretary, Major Morrison-Bell, Long left Liverpool on 8 August and did not return until

74 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

19 October.65 After landing in New York, he travelled to Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa, where he visited friends in the region, conferred with Canadian businessmen and politicians, and discussed with his son Toby, who was ADC to the governor general, financial matters connected with land and property in Winnipeg. He then travelled by train to the West Coast, stopping in Winnipeg, where he gave his first speech and investigated business opportunities, and in Saskatoon, Edmonton, Banff, Vancouver, and Victoria, speaking to Canadian and Empire Club meetings as he went. On his return, he stopped again in Winnipeg before moving on to Toronto, where he spoke to an overflow crowd of some 3500 at Massey Hall on the eve of Ulster Day and the signing of the Covenant in Belfast. From the start of his trip, Long attracted a good deal of attention from the press, and he was quick to take advantage of this, pointing out the shortcomings of the home rule bill, particularly its specious federal base, and insisting that Canadians take the Ulster protest more seriously: it was not a movement to be treated with derision, as many in Canada appeared to do. "Let me tell you," said Long to one reporter, "that those who so speak of it never made a bigger mistake in their lives. It is anything but a movement to stir to laughter."66 This was the essence of his message throughout his stay and it formed a basis for his first major speech, delivered to a crowded Canadian Club luncheon meeting in Winnipeg on 27 August. Long appealed directly to the love of empire, which he said he knew existed in Winnipeg and which he sensed in the room: I am more than half an Irishman, and I love the land of Ireland, and if I thought that by the concession of home rule the Empire would be benefited I would withdraw my opposition, and I would say ... that if we have to make sacrifices let us make them in the interests of the Empire. It is because I know in my heart and soul that a measure of this kind would not strengthen, but weaken; would not help, but hinder the Empire. That is why I maintain my position. Don't you think it must have a good foundation when you remember that men like the late Duke of Devonshire, and Mr Chamberlain, the greatest colonial minister we ever had made great sacrifices ... rather than take a hand in a policy which we believed would end, not in strengthening, but in weakening and destroying the British Empire.67

Long's speech was frequently punctuated by applause and it was much the same wherever he appeared, but the most dramatic moment of his tour occurred in Toronto on 27 September. By then his arguments had been honed and distilled, but still the essence would

75 The Union in Danger

have been familiar to anyone who had heard him speak in the United Kingdom in recent years. To grant home rule to Ireland would, Long argued, betray those who had been loyal. It would be dishonourable. It would mean disruption, possibly leading to civil war and the breakup of the empire. "Ulster stops the way," shouted Long to the "deafening" applause of over 3500 voices, "because she believes that home rule means the desecration of the Union Jack. If Canada with one voice declared itself in favour of home rule, those in Ulster would still oppose it, because they are in deadly earnest, and on that account you will never be able to force home rule, because it means the loss of British liberty and freedom." Long's emphatic declaration that Ulster was not bluffing was greeted with rapture by thousands in Massey Hall and in Victoria Hall, where he addressed an overflow crowd, and by the thousands more lining the surrounding streets waving miniature Union Jacks and listening to the Orange Young Britons' band playing "The Protestant Boys." Long was delighted with the response, and so he should have been, but the scene had been deliberately set to coincide with a massive demonstration at the Ulster Hall in Belfast on the eve of the signing of the Ulster Covenant. The Orange mood in Toronto was therefore euphoric, and there had been no difficulty in getting unanimous consent for a resolution condemning home rule. This was immediately telegrammed to Carson and seemed to support Long's earlier, somewhat disingenuous message that Canada was "rapidly realizing that Irish Home Rule means separation and dismemberment of the Empire, to which all Canadians are resolutely opposed."68 Although Long spoke in Ottawa and Montreal before leaving for home, the Toronto performance was the highlight of the tour. It confirmed his own image of himself as a successful imperial missionary. He landed in Liverpool feeling mentally and physically fitter than he had in months and anxious to throw himself once more into the home rule fray.69 Carson, for one, was glad to have Long back in the fight. When Long had expressed some concern about being branded a shirker for being out of the country at a critical moment, Carson had been quick to reassure him: "I do not think the word 'shirking' could ever enter into the mind of anyone but a lunatic in connection with you, and I do earnestly trust that no zeal for helping the cause will for a moment induce you into beginning work before you are quite recovered. You have many devoted friends ... who very often mourn the cause of your absence from us."7° Carson knew that Long was a staunch ally and, when in good health, a formidable friend of Irish Unionism. He was also well aware that it would be necessary to

76 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

ensure that Long was kept abreast of developments so that the antihome rule forces could continue to present a common front. By the time of Long's return, this was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. Despite the massive outpouring of support in Ulster for the Covenant, there had been no shift in Asquith's stance. The home rule bill continued its passage through Parliament unaltered by the Liberals. This obduracy forced Carson and his colleagues to consider how both Ulster and the southern Unionists might be best protected. Federal ideas floated in Dundee by Winston Churchill in September held no inherent appeal; but increasingly, albeit reluctantly, Unionists, Carson among them, began to pay more attention to proposals for devolution, for home rule all round, and even for federalism. Carson took pains to familiarize himself with the various schemes, but like Long, he continued to resist them. The most he would do was accept the line of argument used at the time of the Agar-Robartes amendment that Ulster outside a home rule parliament would be in the best position to protect both its own interests and those of the southern Unionists. This analysis was backed by the Ulster Unionist Council, and on i January 1913 Carson moved an amendment excluding all nine counties of Ulster from the bill. The amendment was easily defeated, as Carson surely knew it would be. Perhaps it was no more than a tactic - to throw the onus of gathering crisis fully on the Liberals. Certainly, Carson had repeatedly proclaimed his belief in the union and an undivided Ireland. Nevertheless, for the first time Unionists left the impression that they, as a party, might be prepared to accept home rule for Leinster, Munster, and Connaught if Ulster was left out. The fate of Ulster was to dominate all discussions surrounding home rule throughout the next eighteen months.71 Long returned to the fray to find this process of re-evaluation well under way. He was not by this stage opposed to following up on the precedent established at the time of the Agar-Robartes amendment, and he gave his backing to Carson's suggestion that Ulster should be excluded from the bill. There was no doubt that he saw this as no more than a tactic and not as an abandonment of the principle of union. He was not yet prepared to consider any of the devolutionary or federal schemes as viable alternatives to the maintenance of the union. In his contributions to the committee stage of the bill and in his public speeches throughout the late autumn and early winter, Long made it clear that as far as he was concerned, home rule meant separation and he would not countenance this; and he left the further impression that he would not tolerate home rule even if Ulster was left out, because such a solution would still

77 The Union in Danger

lead to a separate Ireland and a weaker empire.72 Nevertheless, he was not averse to a conference to discuss the relationship of Great Britain and Ireland, provided the current bill was withdrawn and all interested parties had a place at the negotiating table. He knew, of course, that this would never happen and he raised the point only to add to the pressure on the Liberals.73 By the end of 1912 many Unionist supporters were publicly espousing a federal solution, and one of the most prominent, Lord Hythe, the former Thomas Brassey, wrote to Long arguing that the Unionist party had not the faintest chance of winning an election unless it received a fair measure of support from Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, and that it would not get this until home rule was settled on federal lines. Hythe believed that the interests of the party, the country, and the empire were being sacrificed by the party's loyalty to the Irish Unionists, and to Ulstermen in particular. He was convinced that many in Ulster would support a solution on federal lines, and he was certain that Long with his influence in Ireland could do much to set leading people thinking.74 Long agreed that the party could not be negative forever but he thought: It would be most unwise for the Unionist Party to complicate the situation by going in for a policy of Federation at the present time. It is possible, no doubt, that as time goes on it may become inevitable that some system of Devolution should be adopted which can be applied to the whole country; and if Home Rule were defeated I should not despair of the power of the Unionist Party to propose and carry legislation of this kind, but it would be on very different lines to any of the Home Rule proposals which have ever been made in this country ... I have never found ... any demand anywhere for Federation. The talk about the overcharging of the House of Commons with business and the necessity for devolution is very vague and has very slender foundations. Of course, the adoption of anything of the kind necessitates the replacing of our unwritten Constitution by a written one - a very serious step for us to take - and there are many difficulties both of principle and of detail.75

So, while polite and seemingly open to further discussion, Long distanced himself at this time from both the devolutionists and the federalists. In fact, he was still not convinced that the Unionists should start to work for a protected Ulster and thus a divided Ireland.76 The pressure on the Unionists mounted throughout 1913 as the home rule bill moved closer to the final stages of its parliamentary passage. Federalism, conference by consent, and Ulster exclusion

78 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

were variously canvassed and pressed upon the Unionists by both friend and foe. Some wavered and mulled over the choices before them. Others hardened their position, thereby adding to the tension and underlining the conviction of many that the United Kingdom was drifting rudderless towards civil war. In January 1913 the Ulster Volunteer Force was formed, and recruitment and drilling were widespread throughout the year. In late March the inveterate "diehard," Lord Willoughby de Broke, founded the British League for the support of Ulster and the Union, and he soon had the direct support of 100 peers and 120 MPS. Increasingly, the British League and the Ulster Volunteer Force worked in concert to strengthen their organizations and provide a forbidding alternative to more moderate inclinations.77 Long observed these developments with concern and mounting frustration; frustration because illness once more robbed him of the opportunity to play a day-to-day part in the intense discussions that went on within the party and among Irish Unionists. Blood poisoning felled him for much of early 1913; a recurrence of neuritis kept him bedridden or at a spa in Switzerland for much of the spring and early summer; two small operations in July sidelined him again; and then he was prevented by his doctors from participating in active politics in the House or on the public platform until early 1914. Although his relative isolation did not prevent him from reading widely, corresponding incessantly, and sending advice to his colleagues, he was not able to fulfil the wishes of moderates such as Lord Dunraven, who hoped Long would play the role of "skilled foreman" and work to persuade Carson of the need to compromise. It seemed to Dunraven that everything depended on Carson. "Is it to be civil war or an attempt at an arrangement?" he asked in March 1913. "Home Rule may be bluffed off for the present," he argued, "but I think Carson must know that some measure is inevitable - Reconstruction of the constitution. Imperial consolidation is impossible without it." Dunraven recognized that Carson could not change his attitude abruptly, but he believed that if "the only alternative to civil war or at least the terrible rioting is to be found in an agreed settlement it would be very valuable to have some sort of idea of the terms the Ulstermen might accept not because they liked them but in preference to taking up arms against the King or refusing to pay Imperial taxes. A federal scheme, a bill of rights, a federal court, appointments by independent civil service commissioners, proportional representation, a limited franchise, a strong upper house. Surely, there is material out of which a compromise might be'constructed."78

79 The Union in Danger

These were intriguing ideas with which Long would be obliged to wrestle in years to come, but at this juncture they held limited appeal. Long shared Dunraven's dread of civil war, and the hardline tactics of Willoughby de Broke and his friends angered him ("These extremists are going to smash our Party if they are not careful," he declaimed angrily to Lady Londonderry, "Lansdowne and B.L. ought to interfere & stop their most improper tactics"),79 but at this stage, Long was still convinced that an election should be called on the issue so that the people could decide. The farthest he was prepared to go in the summer of 1913 was to state that if the Liberals insisted on continuing to force the issue over the heads of the people, he would continue to give Ulster his sympathy and support in its resistance to home rule.80 Long preferred to keep pressing the Liberals so that they would be forced into a position from which the Unionists could profit. At the end of June he outlined his strategy to Bonar Law. Long believed the Unionists could drive the government to dissolve by promising the public that if they were elected they would repeal home rule, Welsh disestablishment, and the parliament act; and that they would introduce land reform and housing legislation, submit the issue of universal service to a referendum, and appoint a strong committee to make proposals for the amendment of the insurance act. He proposed that these ideas should be outlined at a series of meetings "in the United Kingdom" and addressed by men of cabinet rank. In addition, instructions should be given to the party's central office to tell agents and others "to arrange that every Radical Speaker shall be asked at every meeting large or small, 'Whether he is prepared to support a Government in shooting down men fighting under the Union Jack. If not, how does he propose to force Home Rule upon Ulster?' This would alarm Members and Candidates. It is what they did to our men with such fatal effect over food taxes, and I know they marvel that we let them off so easily." In forwarding his ideas to Bonar Law, Long indicated he really believed "that if we adopt a policy somewhat on these lines, and pursue it boldly and relentlessly from end of say, September, till next February, we shall with the aid of bye elections, which must come, make the retention of Office impossible. At all events we shall have done our best."81 These were not the suggestions of an intransigent Unionist. This was tough, hard-headed political advice, but not that of an obdurate Tory prepared to take up arms in a gesture of defiance. Long may have been a fanatic about riding to hounds, but unlike Willoughby de Broke, he was not inclined to lead a cavalry charge down Whitehall and into the House of Commons to kidnap Asquith. Long

8o Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

never belonged to the Willoughby de Broke wing of the Unionist party. His preferred method was to try and defeat the Liberals within the accepted boundaries of parliamentary and political conduct. He abhorred the idea of civil war and what it would do to the country. But by the time he made his suggestions, Bonar Law was caught up in another agenda. The home rule bill received third reading for the second time on 7 July and was again rejected by the Lords a week later. Parliament was postponed and did not meet again until 1914. In the interim, pressure mounted from the King and from Liberals such as Lord Loreburn for a conference to settle the crisis. Ironically, the Unionists had left themselves vulnerable on the issue of Ulster exclusion. Their early tactical voting over the Agar-Robartes amendment and the subsequent Carson amendment had suggested that they were prepared to accept home rule for Ireland provided either Ulster or critical counties in it were excluded. If the Liberals ever made such an offer, the Unionists would be faced with a dilemma. To accept would mean abandoning not only first principles but the southern Unionists. To reject such a proposal would mean losing their primary electoral tactic. Bonar Law was well aware of all the nuances and was sensitive to the reservations of Carson and the "die-hards." Nevertheless, he was not unsympathetic to the idea of exclusion and he realized that Carson might be more moderate than he appeared. He decided that at the least it would be wise to appear open to suggestion. He therefore accepted Asquith's invitation to discuss the possibility of an interparty agreement. The two men met privately three times, 14 October, 6 November, and 9 December.82 Lord Lansdowne, the leader of the Unionists in the Lords, did not share Bonar Law's willingness to consider exclusion and he passed on his fears to Long: "Every one is talking wildly about settlement by consent, but so far as I can make out the materials for such a settlement are, for the present at all events, not discernible. What I am most afraid of is an attempt to manoeuvre us into a position in which we might be made to appear destructive & unreasonable - we might find ourselves in such a position if we were to be offered the exclusion of Ulster, subject to our acceptance of the Bill as it stands."83 Lansdowne's letter nourished Long's own concerns. Shortly after receiving it, he wrote to Bonar Law pointing out that he did not believe in a conference "except after an Election, or on conditions that the Bill is withdrawn."84 He followed Bonar Law's conversations with Asquith with trepidation. In turn, Bonar Law was at pains to keep Long informed and to reassure him. It was important for the

8i The Union in Danger

Unionists not to lose any electoral advantage inherent in the Ulster crisis, but at the same time they could not afford to appear unreasonable to the public. "So far/' wrote Law reassuringly on 8 November, "we are committed to nothing, and every step must be taken with the utmost caution."85 Long could not have agreed more. His own extensive soundings among "many of our most reliable men" had revealed the "unanimous opinion ... that if Asquith makes any overtures & we accept them the result would be absolutely fatal to our Party." Long assured Law: "Whatever decision Lansdowne & you arrive at I shall support whether I have been consulted or not & whether I approve or not. But I can't hide from myself the fact that if we come to any arrangement with the Govt we shall run grave risks of splitting, even of smashing our Party." Long still believed the best tactic would be to make business in the House impossible and so force the Liberals to call an election.86 Later in November, Long sent Law a memorandum outlining his own position. It reflected the turmoil he felt. He dreaded the possibility of a split in the party and he loathed "the suggestion that we should have any share in handing over the Protestants of the three Southern Provinces to the tender mercies of Devlin & Co." Nevertheless, he was obliged to confront the brute realities facing them: The exclusion of Ulster ... has no attractions for me: it is a clumsy expedient at the best, but, obviously if it is frankly offered it could not be refused without the gravest consideration ... I do not think we could accept anything less than the exclusion of Ulster for all time, subject of course to her own wishes, and the application of Home Rule to the other three Provinces alone. But even this places us in a very serious difficulty. It will be held that we are surrendering all our loyalist friends and supporters in those three Provinces to the tender mercies of the Nationalist majority; and notwithstanding Mr Redmond's honeyed words, those of us who remember the past and who know what the present condition of things in Ireland is, have no doubt that the lot of the Protestants and Loyalists in many parts of Ireland will be a bitter one indeed if they are placed under the heel of an Irish Parliament. However, it may be necessary to sacrifice them in order to escape from Civil War.87

This final admission must have been difficult for Long to make, but again it underlines his ultimate willingness to compromise. Naturally, he did not want to do so and he would do all he could to avoid it by raising the odds as high as possible. Nevertheless, it was clear by late November 1913 that Long would in the end have ad-

82 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

vocated compromise for the sake of the party and the country. Law agreed with Long's analysis but was quick to reassure him. He doubted if the Nationalists would accept Ulster exclusion and he expected that all would end in an election.88 Law met Asquith once more, on 9 December, but the two leaders made no further progress and on 15 January 1914 Law announced that the talks had broken down. When Long heard the news, he confessed he was "very glad."89 He and the party had been saved, at least for the time being, from a painful and bitter choice. Long had agonized over his principles in late 1913 as he had not had to do for years. Despite his often pugnacious public stance, he was not an unthinking or unbending Tory. He was prepared to make a difficult sacrifice for what he perceived to be the greater good. Needless to say, such pragmatism was neither easily reached nor easily endured. Understandably, with the breakdown of the talks, Long felt as if a massive weight had been lifted from his conscience. Released, he plunged into the formal stage of the battle against the home rule bill. Long's role over the next six months was a difficult one. He remained both in public and private a faithful supporter of the Ulster cause and was at pains in the House and on the public platform to underline the loyalty of the people of Ulster. All they wanted, heargued, was their right to be governed as they wished and not to be forced into a position where they must either succumb to a faulty constitutional arrangement or resist at the risk of their lives. It genuinely angered Long that Ulster's interests were being dogmatically ignored by the Liberals; he could not have been clearer in his opposition to Liberal tactics and goals. He, more than any other member of Law's advisory group, was prepared to push the Liberals to the brink of civil war, because he did not, could not, believe that they would ever risk such a division in the country. He was convinced that a dissolution would result and that an election would be held. Only this deeply rooted conviction allowed him to play such a dangerous and seemingly intransigent part in the early months of 1914. Thus, Long appeared to many to be as obdurate as Willoughby de Broke. And it is true that he supported Milner in his liaison with de Broke and lent the organizational and propaganda skills of the Union Defence League to the British Covenanters. But it is also clear that privately Long was more pragmatic and was prepared to face realities. In essence, his position shifted relatively little after his heart searching of late 1913. Soon after the breakdown of the talks between Bonar Law and Asquith, Long left for Belfast, where on 19 January he gave the

83 The Union in Danger

principal speech at the annual meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council at the Ulster Hall. He assured Ulster of the continuing support of the Unionist party, and while he refused to believe that the British army would be used against Ulster, he urged Ulsterites to go on preparing their army which, he claimed, "would prove in personnel, training, and equipment to be in no way inferior to the best army any country could put into the field."90 This inflammatory yet highly ambiguous speech was an indication of the public line that Long was to follow over the next few months. Carson chose to interpret it as unqualified support and was delighted to welcome Long back to Ulster: "We greatly appreciate your invaluable help."91 Long soon became caught up in other hard-line developments. For some weeks Willoughby de Broke had been working vigorously to persuade Unionist peers to oppose any compromise and to force a general election. On 5 February Long, in company with Lansdowne, Carson, Londonderry, and Austen Chamberlain, advised Bonar Law that a concession would have to be made to the "diehards" in the interests of party unity. Long was therefore deputed, as the party's leading spokesman on Irish affairs, to move an amendment to the King's speech, obliging the government to call an election on the issue of home rule.92 Long took the opportunity to raise the spectre of civil war, arguing that it would be the inexorable outcome of the Liberals' seeming determination to force up to onethird of Ireland's population to abandon legislative union with Great Britain against their will. Within a few days of his speech in the House, Long had agreed to place the staff of the Union Defence League (UDL) at Milner's disposal so that the former proconsul could systematically organize British opinion in defence of Ulster. A declaration known as the British Covenant was quickly drawn up and then widely distributed by the UDL. Launched on 3 May 1914, the campaign soon gathered thousands of signatures to a document that at one and the same time called for an election before the passage of a home rule bill and threatened resistance if the people of Ulster were denied their rights as citizens. The Covenant did not commit anyone to take any action of which his conscience and judgment did not approve, so there was an "out" for both the individual signatory and for those Unionists like Long who might otherwise have been accused of fomenting rebellion. Nevertheless, it was part and parcel of the public campaign to give, as Long later put it, "the Government timely warning of the consequences which must result from persistence in its policy."93 Pressure was maintained with the formation on 7 April of the League of British Covenanters. Long chaired the meeting and was subse-

84 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

quently elected chairman of the league's executive committee. The following day, a large demonstration took place in Hyde Park, and comparable meetings were held throughout the country.94 The decision to organize more extensively and thus broaden as well as add to the pressure on the Liberals was partly due to the conviction that, finally, Asquith and his colleagues were showing signs of weakening. On moving second reading of the home rule bill on 9 March, Asquith had referred specifically to the possibility of civil war and the need for compromise. He had then outlined an amendment allowing for exclusion on a county option basis for a six-year period. Neither Long nor any of the Unionist hierarchy were much impressed by Asquith's last-minute effort. When Carson had first heard of it, he had written immediately to Long expressing his opposition: "For my part I am not inclined to have anything to do with it, and if the proposal is as I have stated, I shall say so in the House of Commons without the slightest hesitation. It would be a ridiculous idea apart from all other objections to keep a standing army in Ulster until the time came for again asserting ourselves. My own view is that we had better finish it once and for all this time, even if we are scrapped in the effort. I myself prefer to be a prisoner rather than a funk."95 His response to Asquith was unequivocal: "Ulster wants this question settled now and for ever. We do not want a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years."96 Long applauded Carson's action, for he too had found the proposal "wholly impossible." Nevertheless, there were signs even on this occasion that Long was prepared to compromise by sacrificing the southern Unionists. As he pointed out to Carson, Asquith's proposal meant "no security for Ulster; but even if there were some element of safety in it, how is it going to be carried out? Imagine the hopeless confusion if counties side by side are to be under different forms of Government. You must have a considerable area, and I cannot imagine anything else than the six counties would offer a practical solution."97 Long had always been concerned about the southern Unionists and had staunchly defended their interests, but in recent weeks he had been receiving advice from the south and west of Ireland that gave him pause. While southern Unionists still thought home rule would be a disaster from every point of view and thus should be resisted to the utmost, many now argued that "if it really be inevitable, then any reasonable compromise which would avert civil war and give Ulster independence would be preferable to the passing of the Bill and far better for the Southern loyalists."98 Clearly, as the parliamentary clock ticked relentlessly on, Long was increasingly persuaded by such advice.

85 The Union in Danger

Long was both appalled and delighted by the so-called "Mutiny at the Curragh" at the end of March - appalled by the evidence of the apparent plans both to arrest himself and Carson and to launch an assault on Ulster, and delighted at the discomfiture of the Liberals in the aftermath of the refusal of many in the army to be involved in the scheme. He wrote vengefully to Law: "I am certain they had planned a real coup, (i) To arrest the Political Leaders. (2) To make an assault upon Ulster. As regards (i) Their own craven hearts failed them. As regards (2) the Soldiers led by the gallant Gough destroyed them. Now it remains for us to expose them - not easy, but possible. "99 Unionist opinion hardened in the aftermath of the Curragh incident. As Long put it to Carson, "The number of funkers and 'Constitutionalists' was steadily decreasing."100 Long worked hard in cooperation with Milner to ensure a sympathetic coverage from the national press, and he took every opportunity to vilify Liberal tactics. On one such occasion, he spoke to a mass demonstration in Hyde Park and thundered, "If the Government use our troops to force this measure on Ulster and bloodshed is the result, they will go to their graves with the mark of Cain on their foreheads."101 But like most others, he was stunned by the bold and brilliantly organized gun running at the Larne by the Ulster Volunteer Force on 24-25 April. He had not been told of this in advance, and while admiring the skill and audacity involved, he wondered at the consequences. "Will the Gov. do nothing?" he asked Bonar Law.102 Asquith did, in fact, reopen negotiations with Carson on 5 May. Carson was prepared to accept that if a home rule government proved a success, it might be in the best interests of Ulster "to move towards that Government and come in under it and form one unit in relation to Ireland." He claimed to have no personal aversion to a federal solution for the problems bedevilling Ireland, but he made it clear that he wanted the six-year time limit removed.103 Carson's attitude reflected the fierce lobbying that was currently going on, particularly by the Round Table movement, in favour of a federal solution to the Ulster crisis.104 It was not a stance which Long approved and he did his best to dissuade Carson. It is true that in December 1913 Long had briefly wavered in his opposition to federalism and had written to Law agreeing with many in the party "that no possible compromise, save perhaps real Federalism, will endure." But he had been driven to this conclusion in the depths of despair over Law's talks with Asquith. After their breakdown, Long had reverted to his earlier position and had referred to both federalism and "Home Rule within-Home Rule" as "a

86 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

very vain delusion."105 He was of the same opinion in May, particularly as the Unionists seemed to have Asquith on the run and prepared to give way. Long wanted Carson to maintain the pressure, and on 9 May he wrote to the Ulster leader urging him in the interests of their cause not to relent: "I am greatly alarmed about this movement for federalism, and the conversations - a very bad effect is being created. I find it in my collection of funds very severely and I am sure that it is doing us great harm in the constituencies. People say, 'Redmond is the only strong man who knows his own mind and won't budge/"106 Long elaborated on his position later in the month in a letter to the Morning Post. By then he had been instructed by his doctors to withdraw from the hurly-burly of day-to-day politics, so he wrote from the relatively calm perspective of a Swiss spa. Referring specifically to the suggestion that a solution to the Ulster problem might be found in the federal system, he wrote: I regard this as the most misleading and most dangerous suggestion that has yet been made - first, because federalism is no solution; and secondly, because if a policy of federalism were to be approved by the country, and therefore adopted by Parliament, before any step could be taken in this direction the present Home Rule Bill would have to be withdrawn, as it is in itself a fatal obstacle to a federal system. Personally, I have given a great deal of careful consideration to this phase of the question, and I have satisfied myself that federalism is not a policy which would suit the United Kingdom. In South Africa, where a new Constitution has been framed, they came to the same conclusion, and decided in favour of a Union Government. If there is to be devolution - if the country having had the policy put plainly before it, adopts this course, then it should take a form resembling that of South Africa.107

Long need not have worried about federalism. By the time he wrote, its advocates had been rebuffed, the talks between Carson and Asquith had collapsed, and Asquith had declared his intention of securing passage of the home rule bill through the House by Whitsun and introducing an amending bill in the Lords. On the very day Long's letter was published, 25 May 1914, the home rule bill passed the Commons. This posed yet another dilemma for Long. What should the Lords do with the amending bill? Long doubted "the wisdom of rejecting the Amendment Bill if it is accepted by Ulster." As he pointed out to Lord Midleton, the leader of the southern Unionists, "I want to force an Election, but I still more want to win the Election. Failure would be fatal to the Unionists of the three Provinces. As things stand I

87 The Union in Danger

believe we should win handsomely owing to the dread and hatred of Civil War. But if the Lords reject a Bill which Ulster accepts I am afraid the tables will be turned, and we shall be defeated on the cry 'The Lords, not the Government have forced Civil War.' If we could all agree to unite on the exclusion of the whole Province of Ulster, without time limit, I believe the Government will never grant this, must dissolve, and that we should be supported by the country."108 Long pressed his analysis on Lord Lansdowne, who was responsible for the Unionist strategy in the Lords. Long firmly believed that Ulster could be relied on to "take nothing less than exclusion of the whole Province without a time limit." In this case, he said, their course was simple: "I feel sure Asquith will not make this concession, and by the adoption of a clear position on these lines at once we shall avoid all differences and I believe win the Election. This would of course involve no more conversations as our terms would be understood and anything less would not be worth discussing."10^ Long was playing a dangerous game in that he was prepared to force Asquith and the Liberals to the very brink of a choice between dissolution and a possible civil war. But it was a game that others also believed in, for when on 23 June the Liberals finally introduced an amendment that was no more than had been proposed in March,110 Lansdowne and his colleagues were quick to take advantage. On 14 July the Lords supported Lansdowne's amendment, which permanently eliminated the nine counties of Ulster from the home rule bill. Gone was the six-year time limit and the county option. Long was delighted that Lansdowne had followed the advice tendered by Midleton and himself. The Lords' action was fully in accord with his desire to give Asquith no excuse for prolonging Parliament.111 It was understandable, therefore, that Long recoiled in anxiety when, at the King's behest, a conference was scheduled at Buckingham Palace for 21 July to see if all parties to the crisis could find some common ground. Long feared that Asquith and the Liberals might be let off the hook. Once again, he appealed directly to Lansdowne in an effort to strengthen his resolve. He pointed out that: i The Conference will be very unpopular with all our friends, and if it transpires that our Leaders have not received their commands straight from His Majesty there will be great discontent. Is it too late for you to ask for an audience and put our case before H.M.? I am sure this would help us enormously. I must say I wish you would do this.

88 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union 2 "The Clean Cut" would of course be accepted by our men as they recognise the compulsion but there would be no enthusiasm, quite the contrary. 3 Anything less will not be accepted, will be regarded as a betrayal, and will almost certainly lead to the resignation of their Seats by some of our best workers in the country ... Our men believe, and I share their view, that if we stand firm an Election must follow. If you were to see H.M. could you not ask that if we are to come to the rescue of the Government in order to avert Civil War there should be promise of an Election before Bill is signed? To sum up. Our men do not believe in the reality of any arrangement save the Clean Cut. The say "The Party have supported Ulster with votes, speeches and money and should not now at the last moment be sacrificed. The Government are in a hole, must face Civil War or an Election, therefore they will choose the latter unless we give in. If we stand firm there can be no settlement. Conference cannot last more than one day." Do let me implore you to save our Party from disruption. If we are to split up what must be the fate of the Country?112

As Long hoped, Law, Lansdowne, Carson, and Amery did "stand firm." After three days of negotiation, the Buckingham Palace conference broke up over the issue of Ulster exclusion. Redmond and Dillon would not budge on the time limit; Asquith and Lloyd George could do nothing without Nationalist permission; and the Unionists remained implacable. As Long had desired, Asquith was now forced into an even tighter corner. Would he gamble that nothing more than a street brawl would erupt in Belfast if Protestant Ulster's concerns were left unsatisfied? Or would he accept the danger of such a gamble and dissolve Parliament and run the risk of losing the election to the rejuvenated Unionists? How Asquith might have resolved the dilemma remains a mystery, for with the outbreak of war in Europe a political truce was immediately agreed and all parties turned their attention to the grim reality of a wider conflagration. It is difficult, therefore, to assess the merits of Long's position. His decision to push Asquith to the brink might have resulted in a dissolution and a long-sought electoral victory, in which case his hard-line public stance would have been applauded. But if Asquith had stood his ground and civil war or even widespread rioting had resulted, Long would have had a lot to answer for. It was a very dangerous line to pursue, but Long was confident that the tactics he recommended would result in a dissolution. As late as 27 June, he sent Lansdowne a memorandum outlining what Unionist policy should be after they had won the election.113 At the same time, he was applauded by the Ulster Unionist Council for his invaluable

89 The Union in Danger

services to the union and to the loyalists of Ulster; his unselfish and earnest support had been especially appreciated "since the crisis became so acute."114 Few, except his closest colleagues, realized that if Long himself had been driven to the brink, he would have been prepared to compromise by sacrificing the southern Unionists. Even more astonishing would have been the knowledge that if an election had been held and the Unionists had won, Long would have been prepared to give consideration to "some scheme of devolution" for the United Kingdom which would involve Ireland.115 Clearly, by the summer of 1914 there was more to Long's Unionism than appeared on the surface.

CHAPTER FOUR

Countering Lloyd George

From the moment war broke out in Europe, Long was caught up in the emotional response. He supported Bonar Law's offer to Asquith of a political truce and he quickly became an ardent supporter of conscription for both military and industrial purposes. As the weeks and months passed, Ireland preoccupied him less and less, and like the majority of his countrymen he allowed the complexities of the Anglo-Irish relationship and the cruel dilemma facing the Ulster and English Unionists to be shifted to a secondary level of concern. Initially, of course, he was as angry and frustrated as other frontbench Unionists with Asquith's mystifying manoeuvres over the fate of the home rule bill. When it was suggested that Asquith might prorogue Parliament, thereby allowing the bill automatic royal assent, he raised with Bonar Law the possibility of mounting a filibuster to prevent prorogation. * When the government finally placed the bill on the statute book on 18 September, along with legislation suspending the operation of the Home Rule Act until the end of the war, Long sputtered in concert with his fellow Unionists. He thought Asquith's conduct "criminal," and he predicted that home rule "carried by fraud and popular violence will never come into real being."2 At the end of the year, he applauded the decision of the Irish government "to deal at last with the seditious newspapers" and restated his conviction that in Ireland one thing and one thing alone succeeds, namely, a strong unflinching attitude towards those who are openly disloyal. It is the only form of Government which the Irish understand. They are very quick, and when they see that disloyalty not only goes unpunished but is sometimes even rewarded they naturally do not hesitate to indulge in their own tastes. It is not because they really want to do mischief so much as, like naughty children, they think it is amusing to give way to their inclinations.

91 Countering Lloyd George The Irish Government has not had such an opportunity as they enjoy now for a very great many years, and I firmly believe that if drastic treatment were meted out to all those who are disloyal more could be done to remove the National danger than has been possible at any previous time in our history.3

Long was to adhere to these hard-line, law-and-order views throughout the war, but by early 1915 he was speaking and writing less frequently about Ireland. Most of his time was devoted to criticizing the government's handling of the war, pushing it for more information about army and navy questions, and advocating compulsory national service. Once again he overdid things and in March was forced to slacken his pace. By May he was ill again and therefore missed the day-to-day negotiations that led to the formation of a coalition government under Asquith's leadership. Long had a mixed reaction to coalition. In January he had favoured dropping party politics so that the war could be conducted more efficiently, and in mid-May he still believed that "the formation of a National Government, not a Coalition, would be the best thing."4 What particularly annoyed him was the degree to which the party truce clearly favoured the government. The Unionists had been reduced to the role of "patriotic opposition" and were in danger of losing any future election. Long's detailed criticisms of this unwanted role earned considerable support among the Unionist leadership and in part led to renewed pressure on the Liberals for a greater say in the determination of policy.5 Long advised Bonar Law to approach negotiations cautiously, pointing out that the allocation of offices was critically important in the formation of a new government, even more important than the selection of men. He told Bonar Law, "If we agree to form a combined Ministry we are making all the sacrifices and helping the Government out of a mess into which they have got in face of all our warnings." And he confessed to Sir William Bull, "I am very uneasy - as always because I believe these brutes will best us, take the kernel, give us the husks, plus the responsibility. Feeling as strongly as I do I can't contemplate a coalition without grave anxiety."6 A coalition government was at length formed on 26 May 1915, consisting of twelve Liberals, eight Unionists, one Labourite, and Lord Kitchener. Long returned to the local government board with special responsibility for a registration bill and subsequently for military service legislation. These were important responsibilities, but Long would have preferred the home office, a position for which Austen Chamberlain thought him particularly well suited. Unfortunately, this proved impossible. In fact, Bonar Law and Asquith at

92 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

first thought Long was so ill that he would be unavailable for office. Once this misunderstanding had been corrected, Bonar Law was quick to advise Asquith that Long could not be left out. Austen Chamberlain had reminded him of how popular and influential Long was; if Long was outside and discontented, he could be dangerous, and Chamberlain had urged Bonar Law to tell Asquith "that he must content Long."7 At first, Long was content. The first cabinet meeting went well and he was hopeful.8 He plunged into his new responsibilities with all his old enthusiasm and efficiency, and was soon awash in the minutiae of office and in the debates surrounding the formulation of policy. But as the months passed, the nagging doubts returned. He disliked the fact that the Unionists were a minority in the coalition, given their numbers in the House, and that Asquith had retained an undue share of important posts for the Liberals. To Long's mind this was not only unfair but it resulted in the Unionists being reduced to silent partners in the furtherance of often misguided policies. His unease deepened with the knowledge that the Irish Unionists were unhappy that they had not been given more seats in the administration and that they had lost control of patronage to the Nationalists. Long shared their concern that "the good government of Ireland" was being prejudiced as a result.9 By the end of 1915, he had made arrangements for James Mackay Wilson, a leading southern Unionist, to send him regular reports on conditions and attitudes in Ireland.10 Throughout the early months of 1916, the tenor of the advice from those using Wilson as a conduit to Long was the need for firm government. This simply confirmed Long's doubts about the merits of the coalition government and its Irish policy, both of which came under severe scrutiny from him and the southern Unionists as a result of the dramatic developments in Dublin during Easter week. JOHN REDMOND'S DECISION IN SEPTEMBER 1914 to commit nationalist Ireland unconditionally to the allies had resulted in nine-tenths of the Irish Volunteers transforming themselves into the National Volunteers and joining the war effort. This bold and patriotic action on Redmond's part had been much appreciated by the English Unionists and the government, and both had allowed themselves to be lulled into a false sense of security about Ireland. This was a mistake and reflected the incapacity of most Englishmen, of whom Long was a prime example, to engage with and appreciate the depth of feeling embodied in the surge of cultural and romantic nationalism

93 Countering Lloyd George

in Ireland since the 18905. It was also a grave misreading of the determination of the more militant young nationalists, who were inflamed and emboldened by both a sense of injustice and the goal of independence. Unknown to the government (and, in fact, to most Irish leaders), members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) had succeeded in infiltrating the leadership of those Irish Volunteers who had refused to follow Redmond's lead. By late 1915, in conjunction with the small workers' militia, the Irish Citizen Army, the IRB was planning a major revolutionary act for Easter 1916. Although the intelligence wing of the British Admiralty learned of these plans, it did not inform the administration at Dublin Castle or any key ministry at Whitehall. Not surprisingly, therefore, the British were taken off guard when on Easter Monday, 24 April 1916, a small force of Irish Volunteers and members of the Irish Citizen Army occupied strategic buildings in central Dublin and when the leader of the volunteers, Padraic Pearse, proclaimed an Irish republic. Initially shocked, the British were quick to recover, and six days later, after considerable devastation and loss of life, Pearse and his supporters were forced to surrender. General Maxwell had the leaders tried at summary court martials and fifteen were executed between 3 May and 12 May. This ill-thought action turned the majority of the Irish into an angry and hostile citizenry, readily persuaded to support the anti-British cause. Asquith faced a dilemma. It was clear that the Dublin Castle system of government had failed to preserve British control and to forewarn London of potential threats to its rule. Sir Augustine Birrell, the chief secretary for Ireland, accepted full responsibility for the errors and oversights and, with some relief, resigned on i May. Two days later, the undersecretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, followed suit. Lord Wimborne, the viceroy, was then recalled. Asquith's initial problem, therefore, was either to replace these men or to establish a new governmental structure. Sir Robert Chalmers, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, who Asquith had sent to Dublin to oversee the civil administration, advised the prime minister on 9 May that a new chief secretary should be appointed as soon as possible. After considering and rejecting a number of Liberal and Unionist colleagues, including Walter Long, Asquith decided to go to Ireland himself in order to obtain first-hand information and to gain a sense of both Unionist and Nationalist opinion. He left for Dublin on 11 May and did not return to London until the nineteenth. By then he had concluded that the Dublin Castle system of government must be replaced and that grounds for a broader settlement existed. He reported his findings to the cabinet on 21 May.

94 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Long had not been directly involved with Irish affairs during the early months of 1916. Preoccupied with his duties at the local government board and with preparation of the military service bill, which he finally introduced on 27 April in the midst of the Easter Rising, he had been as surprised and shocked as most others at developments in Dublin. But it did not take him long to assert himself. On 2 May, before Asquith went to Dublin, Long had written to Bonar Law asking that neither the duration of martial law in Ireland nor the reconstitution of the Irish executive be settled until he was allowed to have his say: "I am in a rather peculiar position as regards Ireland & I could not remain a member of the Gov. if these questions are settled in a manner which I could not support and without my being allowed to air my views."11 Two days later Long wrote to Asquith in the conviction that the whole future of Ireland depended on the restoration of confidence in the executive. In his opinion, the government should be reconstituted in order to restore confidence.12 When Long learned that, among others, Harold Tennant and Joseph Pease had been suggested as possible chief secretaries, he was shocked. On 11 May he again wrote to Bonar Law: "No - our duty is plain and simple - we must get the best available man and I believe that Duke is by far the best man outside of those who are not in Parliament, and nearly, if not quite, as good as anybody there is. The situation is very grave: if we assent to the appointment of an inferior man 'because Redmond will not have a Unionist' then we shall in my opinion deserve the fate we shall surely bring upon ourselves."13 On 19 May, the day of Asquith's return from Ireland, Long circulated a memorandum to the cabinet embodying views expressed to him orally and in writing "by people of knowledge and experience in Ireland irrespective of creed or party."14 It appeared that the detective staff of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Military Police had been discouraged since 1906 by the Irish executive in their duties as secret agents. The special branch had been operated inefficiently and as a consequence had had no inkling of the rising. It seemed to Long that "our immediate duty is to restore confidence in the minds of the officials, particularly among the R.I.C. and the D.M.P., and to make it clear to them that it is their duty to give information respecting seditious movements, and that it will be acted upon, and that efficient and zealous officials will be supported by their superiors in their actions." When told of a connection between Sinn Fein and German-Irish organizations in the United States, Long argued: "We shall have to do a good deal if we are to bring Ireland back again to peace and security. I am convinced that a considerable

95 Countering Lloyd George

portion of the population is with us; but we have to measure the danger, not only by the numbers, but also by the activity and resources of those who are opposed to us; and we cannot expect the support of the majority until they are convinced that we mean business." Long had also been informed about the difficulty of obtaining verdicts, a situation compounded "by the action of the Executive in releasing prisoners, or, reducing their sentences, when a jury has convicted." There had also been many unsuitable appointments as justices of the peace. He had also been told that Sinn Fein had penetrated the civil service, the teaching profession, and the younger priesthood. Long doubted if anyone really knew the extent of the Sinn Fein organization, but he thought they should order an immediate enquiry into its ramifications, and especially as to its relations, official and unofficial, with, and its influence among, the members of such organisations as the United Irish League; the Ancient Order of Hibernians, both the Board of Erin and the Irish-American branch; the Gaelic Athletic Association; the Gaelic League, and the secret societies which are known to exist in the western counties; and, of course, the relations of Sinn Fein with the German-Irish organisation in the United States. I press this enquiry, because I am by no means convinced that if the Casement landing had succeeded we should not have had many of the western counties - Kerry, for example - in full insurrection.

Long was also concerned about the possession of arms and the status of the volunteers. He believed that the Peace Preservation Act should be re-enacted, though he admitted that the task of disarming all Ireland would pose great difficulty. He therefore did not recommend arbitrary action against arms owners in Ulster. He doubted that the Ulster Volunteers would part with their arms unless they were satisfied that a scheme of universal disarmament would be effected. Instead, he recommended the following plan: ^ All Volunteers to take the oath of allegiance; to be placed under military control; and to be subject to the G.O.C. in Ireland. 2 All arms and ammunition to be kept in armouries or storehouses under lock and key. 3 The Peace Preservation Act to be reviewed; nobody to be allowed to possess arms without a licence. In this way alone can the concurrence of the loyal portion of the population and the obedience of the remainder be secured. Nothing less will bring any project of internal peace to Ireland.14

96 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Long ended by reminding his cabinet colleagues that it would be foolish to regard the danger as over. It was clear when Long settled into his chair at the cabinet meeting on 21 May that while he was anxious to be consulted on all aspects of Irish policy and to have an opportunity to express his opinions, he had paid more attention to restoring a stable and firm government to Ireland than to any larger settlement. He therefore must have been taken slightly off guard on reading Asquith's memorandum outlining his views following his visit to Dublin, Cork, and Belfast. Asquith dealt at some length with the problem of the "independent and irresponsible armed forces - the Ulster Volunteers, the Na tional Volunteers, the Irish Volunteers, and the Citizen Army" that had been allowed to develop in Ireland in recent years.15 How many armed men remained was uncertain, he said, but it had been made clear to him that recruitment for the British army had virtually dried up in Ulster out of fear of invasion from the south. While he found this fear extravagant, it was evident that the view was widely held in Ulster, and disarmament would therefore be difficult. In consultation with "representative Ulster leaders," Asquith had found some of them repeating "the old formulae as to stable and resolute government, but the large majority were clearly of opinion that the only way of escape was by prompt settlement of the whole problem." Asquith admitted they had not discussed details, "but what they said clearly pointed to such an amendment of the Home Rule Act as would adequately safeguard the future of the co-religionists." Asquith said he had received similar advice from Campbell, the attorney general, and from a variety of Nationalists; he had therefore concluded that the arms question could not be satisfactorily or effectively handled except as part of a general settlement: "The last attempt at such a settlement, two years ago, broke down through difficulties arising from the geographical distribution of the adherents of the two creeds in certain parts of Ulster. I am by no means sure that the Nationalists (except the O'Brienites) would now be disposed to prefer the total exclusion (for the time at any rate) of Ulster." In light of this, it appeared to Asquith "to be the immediate duty of the Government to do everything in their power to force a general settlement." He continued by arguing that it was clear that the Home Rule Act, however amended, could not come into operation until the end of the war. In the meantime, provision had to be made for the executive government of Ireland. In his opinion, "no successor ought to be appointed to the Lord Lieutenant," for the viceroyalty had become "a costly and futile anachronism"; the Irish need for ritual and dis-

97 Countering Lloyd George

play could be met "far more effectively ... by periodical and systematic visits of the Sovereign." He was pleased to report that "His Majesty wholeheartedly accepts the necessity of the change, and is prepared and anxious to arrange for an annual residence of himself, the Queen, and the Court in Ireland." Asquith believed that with the disappearance of the viceroyalty, "the fiction of a Chief Secretary" would also disappear. There had to be "a single Minister controlling and responsible for Irish administration." The possibility of an advisory council to assist the new minister had been raised, but Asquith doubted the usefulness of such a body. In any event, he now sought the advice of his cabinet colleagues. What was then said and agreed soon became a matter of dispute, but it is clear that the cabinet did agree to the abolition of the lord lieutenancy and, according to Long, also agreed that "a strong Chief Secretary without a Lord Lieutenant could and would restore confidence and order in Ireland." Later on, Long and Lansdowne were both emphatic that the cabinet had not said that the government of Ireland had broken down completely or that home rule should be instituted immediately. The fact the cabinet approved the appointment of a chief secretary would seem to support the Unionists' recollections.16 Having received cabinet approval for the appointment of a chief secretary, Asquith offered the job to Lloyd George, the minister of munitions, but after some reflection Lloyd George refused on the grounds that it would unduly distract him from his war work. He did, however, undertake to conduct negotiations in an endeavour to find a basis for a settlement acceptable to all parties. Again, the intent behind this offer was not made as clear as it might have been. Certainly, Long understood that Lloyd George would be seeking a settlement "which would be accepted by all parties in Ireland, not as a surrender of their views in regard to Home Rule for or against, but as a compromise made possible by the grave conditions of the moment."17 As far as he was concerned, "It was never suggested, and I certainly never realised that we were asked to agree to the final acceptance of any proposals without consulting English Unionists, or for that matter English Home Rulers, and obtaining their views upon the proposals."18 In fact, Long understood that Lloyd George's negotiations would be confidential and that he would report to the cabinet the results of his inquiries. Long's assumption on which he was subsequently emphatic - was that Lloyd George had not been empowered to act without reference to his colleagues and that he certainly had not been given permission to suggest the setting up of a home rule parliament during the war. Long left the

98 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

cabinet meeting in the belief that negotiations would be conducted by Lloyd George with both Nationalist and Unionist leaders, but not for a moment thinking that a home rule parliament was in the offing. Long's position is clear from a letter he sent to Asquith on 24 May In remarking on the proposed negotiations, he told Asquith that it would "not be easy to secure acceptance for the Amended Home R Bill" but he believed it could be done if it was "made clear that it is part of a general scheme which includes drastic measures to cope with the present situation," such as the continuance of martial law, the replacement of trial by jury by a court of three judges, and replacement of the ordinary Court of Summary Jurisdiction by two resident magistrates. Such action, Long assured Asquith, would "do more to create confidence in the Law among all classes than anything else you can do." At this stage he was pleased with the appointment of Lloyd George and called his selection "a most happy inspiration" which "should help immensely."19 What Long did not know was that Asquith had written to Lloyd George on 22 May urging him "to take up Ireland: at any rate for a short time. It is a unique opportunity, and there is no one else who could do so much to bring about a permanent solution."20 Lloyd George may well have interpreted "permanent" to mean a mandate to proceed quickly and alone. Long would have baulked at the use of the word. On 25 May, Asquith reported to the House of Commons on his trip to Ireland. He told the members he had been left with two dominant impressions: the first was the breakdown of the existing machinery of Irish government; the second was the strength and depth of the feeling in Ireland that a unique opportunity existed for "a new departure, for the settlement of outstanding problems." He hoped it would now be possible to find a solution that had been unobtainable before the war. He then revealed that "at the unanimous request of his colleagues," Lloyd George had agreed to seek an agreement between the different interests and parties in Ireland.21 Over the next two days, Lloyd George began discussions with Sir Edward Carson and James Craig on the Unionist side and with John Redmond, T.P. O'Connor, Joseph Devlin, and John Dillon of the Nationalists. He immediately found himself in a quandary, for Redmond insisted on home rule during the war and would not could not - budge from that stance. Redmond's position was understandable, given the way the mood of the Irish populace was rapidly changing in light of General Maxwell's draconian actions. To maintain any credibility, Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary party had to be seen to be able to achieve results. Otherwise, the

99 Countering Lloyd George

field would be lost to Sinn Fein, which was reaping the benefits of the post-rebellion swing in attitudes. This admittedly placed Lloyd George in a difficult position, because he had not been given home rule during the war as an option with which to bargain. Ever the wily tactician, he proceeded anyway, confident that his colleagues would willingly endorse any such settlement. He therefore persuaded Carson that the cabinet, including its Unionist members, accepted the need for immediate home rule with the exclusion of a six-county Ulster. Carson, of course, insisted that the exclusion be permanent, and Lloyd George agreed in writing that this should be so, despite the fact that he had led Redmond to believe that any such exclusion would be temporary. Thus, by late May the seeds of future discord had been sown: Lloyd George had acted without reference to his cabinet colleagues, and he had deceived first Redmond about the nature of exclusion and then Carson about the attitudes of the Unionists in the cabinet. Moreover, he had ignored the southern Unionists, recklessly assuming that they were not a force to be reckoned with in the negotiations. This was a grave error of judgment on his part and in the long run was to prove the undoing of the scheme. He had forgotten, or overlooked, the fact that both Long and Lansdowne had deep attachments to the southern Unionists and would not readily countenance his disregard of their concerns or his duplicitous tactics in the pursuit of his ends. Lloyd George should have known better, for on 25 May the Unionist peers and MPS from outside Ulster met and decided that they did not like the opening of the "vexed question of Home Rule which would involve the disregard of the party truce while the Country is engaged in war and they deprecate any permanent change being made as a result of recent events without the prior consent of the Electors of Great Britain and Ireland." They hoped that in any discussions for the purpose of mediation between the various parties in Ireland, some representatives of the southern Unionists would be included. These resolutions were forwarded to Lloyd George on 26 May by Lord Midleton, the leader of the southern Unionists, who added in his covering letter that all the information he received from outside Ulster underlined these sentiments.22 It was clear that the southern Unionists did not favour the rewarding of rebellion, but it was also evident that they feared their lot in a home rule Ireland in which Sinn Fein had the dominant hand. Lloyd George acted quickly in response to Midleton's letter and met with him, Lord Desart, and George Stewart, the vice-chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance, on 29 May.23 Midleton kept detailed notes.24 Lloyd George began by introducing a new line of argument.

ioo Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

He asserted that "an Irish settlement had become absolutely necessary owing to the conditions in America." According to his information, up to the eve of the rebellion, 75 per cent of Irish-Americans sided with the Allies. Now, he claimed, "the whole of the IrishAmericans were pro-German." Lloyd George did not reveal how he knew this, but he was confident it would have a twofold effect: "First; the uniting of the Irish and German vote in America would prevent the return of any President who was pro-ally, and Roosevelt was for this reason most anxious for the settlement of Home Rule"; second, Lloyd George believed it would "almost certainly" end in a stoppage of the supply of munitions from the United States. "We could," he said, "afford to do without America after 5 or 6 months, Russia could never afford it." It was therefore necessary to settle the Irish question if the Allies were to win the war. Proceeding from this highly questionable line of argument, Lloyd George then appealed to the patriotism of the southern Unionists to assist in a settlement. He made the following specific suggestions: 1 A Government of a purely provisional character to be set up during the war. 2 The Home Rule Bill to be considered as having passed, and the Parliament to be convoked under it, with the powers in the original Bill. 3 Ulster to be satisfied by the inclusion of whatever counties were necessary. 4 The Southern Unionists to have special representation in the Senate and in the executive. For this purpose, a Cabinet of seven was suggested, of which 2 should be Unionist. 5 The only change to be made in the existing Bill was: A. That there should be an appeal from the Law Courts and a Supreme Court in London. B. That whatever was to be subsequently the Law in Ireland should be re-enacted after the conclusion of the war. 6 Martial Law to be continued for the present.

Lloyd George concluded by pointing out that the state of Ireland was "very threatening" and that a further raid and rising might be expected. In response, Midleton and his colleagues argued that Redmond's position was so tenuous that he could not make a bargain. It was unclear what support he might have in an election. Lloyd George said there was no intention of holding an election at present because of the attendant dangers; the existing members would continue to sit in the new House. As for Redmond, Lloyd George said he was well aware of his weakness and did not intend to proceed with an agreement unless both Devlin and Dillon agreed to enter a new

ioi Countering Lloyd George

government. Lloyd George then laid great stress on the provisional nature of the arrangement, though Midleton astutely pointed out that "a parliament once given could not be taken away." The southern Unionists also noted that the amending bill had not passed and that Lloyd George had based his whole plan on the original home rule bill. Midleton's notes of the meeting record that Lloyd George "stated that this was the price the Irish Unionists must pay to the Empire for the War, that he was convinced Dillon, if he accepted the arrangement would help stamp out the Sinn Fein, and that it was the only way to retain him and his friends on the side of order." Lloyd George asked for complete secrecy and wished to have an answer in three days, added Midleton, "as until our decision was known, he could not go further with Redmond and Dillon." Midleton ended his notes of the meeting pessimistically: "The project did not appear to us at all hopeful." Midleton had every right to be cautious. It was clear to him that Lloyd George was anxious to assuage the fears of the southern Unionists but that he was also prepared to play on those fears. The scheme, as written by Lloyd George, offered the southern Unionists very little in the way of legal or constitutional comfort. Moreover, they suspected that Lloyd George had already gone farther in his negotiations with Redmond and Carson than he had revealed to them. This was so, of course, but they would have been horrified to learn that on the very day Lloyd George had spoken with them he had written to Carson saying, "We must make it clear that at the end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, merge in the rest of Ireland."25 While Walter Long had not been directly involved in Lloyd George's activities, he had paid close attention to developments and had particularly been in touch with Midleton. He knew of Midleton's letter to Lloyd George and of the proposed meeting on 29 May. When George Stewart arrived in London from Dublin, and Lord Barrymore fell ill, Long wrote to Lloyd George suggesting that Stewart replace Barrymore at the meeting, and he took the opportunity to comment on the substance of the negotiations.26 Long said that as far as he had been able to determine, the progress of the negotiations was "all that we could desire" but that there was "one word of caution which I desire to utter." He then reminded Lloyd George that there had always been a cleavage between the Unionists in the South and those in Ulster, "the former holding strongly that they have not been sufficiently represented or protected by the Ulster people." This feeling had been accentuated by Lloyd George's discussions with Carson and Redmond, said Long, and he advised

1O2 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Lloyd George not to authorize any statements "which would appear to indicate that anything approaching a settlement has yet been arrived at," for it would be more difficult for Lloyd George to negotiate with the southern Unionists if they thought "that some arrangement had been arrived at between the Government and the Ulster people and the Nationalists behind their backs." Long advised Lloyd George not to rely on Carson to reflect the views of the southern Unionists; instead, Lloyd George should canvass those views, if not by going to Dublin, at least by seeing appropriate people in London. The interview Lloyd George had with Midleton, Desart, and Stewart served as the first stage in this process, but as Long had feared it raised more questions than it answered. Nevertheless, Lloyd George now realized that he also had to keep Long, always a key figure in any Irish equation, abreast of developments, and he asked Long to meet him at the Ministry of Munitions at 10:30 AM on Tuesday, 30 May.27 On arriving, Long was handed a "rough memorandum" which Lloyd George said contained the proposed scheme he had already shown to Carson, Craig, Redmond, Dillon, Devlin, Midleton, Desart, and Stewart. On glancing at the proposal, Long's attention was immediately caught by what he regarded as two new developments: "i) The immediate setting up of a Parliament in Ireland, which was contrary to what I understood to be the intention of the Government; and 2) The suggestion that the exclusion of Ulster was to be subject to revision at the end of the war." Long told Lloyd George that no "Irish Unionists, or any English Unionists for that matter" would consent to either proposal. Lloyd George disagreed, saying that on the whole it had been met with a favourable reception by the Nationalists and by both the northern and the southern Unionists. Given Midleton's reaction, this was, at the least, disingenuous on Lloyd George's part. Long was not deceived, but before he could pursue the matter further, the interview was cut short by the arrival of Redmond. Long left the Ministry of Munitions without a copy of the proposal and with only a few hastily scribbled notes. Alarmed by what he had seen and heard, Long immediately sought out Lord Lansdowne, who had already spoken with Midleton. The two men discussed the matter at some length and found themselves "in absolute agreement" about the dangers to the Unionist position, particularly the southern Unionist position, inherent in the draft proposal. Lansdowne arranged to meet Lloyd George at 6:00 PM that same day. He conveyed to the minister his and Long's concerns. In fact, Lansdowne stated emphatically, "The scheme was

1O3 Countering Lloyd George

not one I could accept."28 Both men were dismayed that Lloyd George had suggested setting up a home rule parliament during the war. This had not been approved by cabinet and Lloyd George had not been sanctioned to use it as a bargaining ploy. Unfortunately, at this juncture, both men thought that any such proposal would have to come before the cabinet for approval, and both assumed that Lloyd George would not bind the government until he had such approval. In this, these two senior and experienced politicians were naive. Their failure at this point either to alert the cabinet at large, and their Unionist colleagues in particular, or to raise their concerns with Carson resulted in a major cabinet crisis and a harrowing experience for the Unionist party. Long, especially, had subsequent cause to regret his inaction. To be fair, Long was not entirely negligent. He met George Stewart again on 31 May and told him that Lloyd George thought that neither Stewart nor the southern Unionists generally were altogether hostile to the proposals. Stewart "strongly repudiated" this version and in such adamant terms that Long asked him to put his views in writing. Stewart did so immediately. He stated flatly that he considered the proposals outlined by Lloyd George "unworkable." They "would be utterly repugnant to all Unionist feelings" and would satisfy the Nationalists for only a brief period. Stewart's "strongest objection" was "to the fact that the proposed change in the government of Ireland would practically justify the recent Sinn Fein Rebellion."29 The next day, i June, a small cabinet committee consisting of Asquith, Lloyd George, Lord Crewe, Lansdowne, and Long met to discuss the negotiations. Long took the opportunity to distribute among the commitee Stewart's statement, countersigned by Lord Barrymore.30 There is no evidence that it was given any particular attention other than to underline Long's and Lansdowne's earlier objections to Lloyd George's proposal, objections which Lansdowne repeated "with great force" for the benefit of Asquith and Crewe. Lloyd George then, for the first time to Long's knowledge, "mentioned the question of America and the necessity of an immediate settlement if we were to continue to get munitions from that country." Long "at once emphatically dissented from this view, and reminded the Committee that the Government had arrived at no decision on this question, and that several members of the Cabinet, including Lord Robert Cecil, held views totally differing from those expressed by Lloyd George." But Long went even further: I put it to the Prime Minister that even if the U.S.A. difficulty were a real one it could not be publicly given as a justification for any proposals that

104 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union might be made. To this view the Prime Minister assented, and when I asked what would be the reason given to the country for the great departure proposed by Mr Lloyd George, I was told that "it would be the desire to obtain a peaceful settlement in Ireland and to avoid further strife and agitation." I pointed out that I did not believe that this reason would be accepted as a sufficient justification by Irish Unionists, and I stated that no settlement arrived at between Ulster and the Nationalists could be regarded as complete, but that it would be necessary, in conformity with the decision of the Government, to obtain also the assent of the Unionists of the three Southern Provinces, not of course to the abandonment of their opposition to Home Rule, but to their willingness to accept a scheme which appeared to them to have some prospect of successful operation.31

Long and Lansdowne were clearly beginning to dig in their heels. The next day, 2 June, Lansdowne kept the pressure on by sending Asquith a lengthy memorandum on the Lloyd George proposals, which he found "profoundly alarming."32 He stated that even if Lloyd George succeeded in patching up a truce, he doubted if it would last. There was far more to "a complete and enduring disposal of the Home Rule question [than] the settlement of a few outstanding details"; any settlement would have to be acceptable to both Ulster and the Nationalists and would have to include "some features intended to reassure, so far as possible, the loyal minority outside the excluded area." Lloyd George's scheme would not fulfil these conditions, Lansdowne maintained; it was based on "the old, and I think much discredited, plan of proceeding by exclusion." The objections to any such plan were "notorious," he said, and it was unnecessary to repeat them. There remained as alternatives "Home Rule within Home Rule" and a general scheme of devolution for the United Kingdom, neither of which held out much immediate promise. The first seemed to imply the subordination of Belfast to Dublin and would not therefore prove attractive in the North, while the second was "a gigantic enterprise which no sane politician would desire to approach at a moment when all our efforts are concentrated on the prosecution of the war." Lansdowne did not believe the moment had come "for imposing upon the country, in the guise of an interim arrangement, a bold and startling scheme which at once concedes in principle all that the most extreme Nationalists have been demanding, viz. the disappearance of Castle government and the establishment of an Irish Parliament with an Irish Executive responsible to it. The triumph of lawlessness and disloyalty would be complete." He did not think such a capitulation could be justified either by the serious difficulties

105 Countering Lloyd George

that persisted in Ireland or the potential complications with the United States. "We shall disgust our friends/' he wrote, "without conciliating our enemies if, in consequence of the rebellion, we make a surrender which would not have been tolerated before the rebellion took place." Lansdowne said he did not want to leave Asquith with the impression that nothing should be done, and he suggested an interim arrangement involving the abolition of the lord lieutenancy, the promise of a royal residence and occasional visits from the sovereign, and the appointment of a chief secretary for Ireland who would be assisted by an Irish council. These steps might then be accompanied by the promise of an inquiry into the whole question of devolution. Lansdowne admitted that such an offer would fall far short of what was expected by "the extremists," but it would receive support from the moderates. He added that whatever one thought of his ideas, there was no doubt in his mind that "the announcement of the scheme favoured by the Minister of Munitions at the present moment would provoke a storm of antagonism in many quarters, and would lead to grave political difficulties." Lansdowne sent a copy of this memorandum to Long who, much to his annoyance, had just been confined to bed at Rood Ashton with a severe attack of neuritis. Long was pleased with the document and hoped Lansdowne would circulate it widely.33 Musing from his sickbed, Long found Ireland "one immense moving bog" with no confidence existing anywhere: "Our friends are in a state of grave anxiety and I think are much divided, and in these circumstances it seems to me more than probable that a settlement arrived at in London may easily fail to secure acceptance in Ireland, and this would indeed be a lamentable conclusion of our labours. The leaders would have annoyed their friends on both sides, confidence on both sides would have been destroyed, and no practical result arrived at." Long planned to convey these views to Asquith and, apparently, had "already laid them before LI. G." What worried him as much as anything, however, was that Balfour seemed "out of touch with Irish affairs and Bonar Law dependent on Carson for information." This did not bode well for either the southern Unionists or the Unionist party. By early June, Lloyd George's final version of his draft scheme had been conveyed to Carson and Redmond, and both men returned to Ireland to discuss it with their colleagues. The scheme called for the Government of Ireland Act to come into operation as soon as possible. It was not to apply to the six northeastern countries of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone or

106 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

to the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast, Londonderry, and Newry. The number of Irish MPS in the British House of Commons was to remain at 103, while the Irish House of Commons was to be made up of those MPS who sat in the British House for the non-excluded twenty-six counties. The Irish senators were to be nominated by the lord lieutenant. Just before Carson left for Belfast, Lloyd George told him (probably as a result of the pressure from Long, Lansdowne, and Midleton) that it was important that "the Unionist minority should be adequately represented in the provisional Parliament at Dublin as well as in the Executive," and he suggested that during the provisional period there should be only one Irish chamber and that it should include some twenty or thirty government nominees, representative of the Unionist minority. In addition, there should be "at least two Protestant Unionists" in the executive. Lloyd George assured Carson that this could all be readjusted when it came time to consider the permanent settlement. Whether or not he also conveyed these suggestions to Redmond is unclear. It is important to note, however, that although Lloyd George wrote frankly to Carson about "a permanent settlement," this was not made explicit in the draft proposal. There, it was simply stated that exclusion was to be for the duration of the war or until such time as a final decision was made. The possibility of an imperial conference being called to help reach such a decision was also included.34 Carson presented Lloyd George's proposal to the Ulster Unionist Council in Belfast on 6 June. He knew it would not be popular, especially with the representatives of the counties to be excluded Monaghan, Donegal, and Cavan - but, as he pointed out, they had little choice. Six counties, "a refuge and haven," had been offered by the government and with the backing of their "hitherto most trusted leaders." In the circumstances, it would not be wise to fight for more, he said. They would be "clean and free" with this proposal and they should accept it.35 It was evident from Carson's speech that in recommending as he did, he had been persuaded by two points, both of which he had been led to by Lloyd George: first, "that the Cabinet was unanimously of opinion that the Imperial necessities connected with the prosecution of the war, especially in relation to the U.S.A., demanded an immediate settlement"; second, "that the scheme put forward involving the immediate setting up of Home Rule in Ireland had the express approval of the Government." Unfortunately, there was no justification for either assumption. As Walter Long later, and bluntly, put it to his cabinet colleagues, "Both of them are false."36

107 Countering Lloyd George

Long had good reason for his caustic reaction. The day after Carson's speech, he received the following letter from H. A. Gwynne, the editor of the ardently Unionist Morning Post and a long-time friend and correspondent: "You used to be my ideal champion of Unionism and of Unionist principles. Today you are helping to betray those same Unionists in the south and west of Ireland who have so blindly in the past given you their trust."37 Long was shocked, hurt, and ultimately furious. He found GWynne's accusations "offensive," "absolutely false," and "wholly inexcusable," and he roundly rebuked the editor for not finding out the facts before "coolly, deliberately, and in a carefully considered type-written letter" accusing him of abandoning his trust.38 But as Long quickly discovered, Gwynne was not the only one to jump to the conclusion that Long and his Unionist colleagues in the cabinet had cynically abandoned not only the southern Unionists but the union at large. In the face of these charges and assumptions, Long determined to undermine the Lloyd George scheme. Over the next seven weeks he worked incessantly to that end. LONG WENT ABOUT HIS TASK in a number of ways. He stepped up his inquiries about the state of affairs in Ireland and the United States; he continued to lobby Asquith and Lloyd George; and, perhaps most important, he quickly prepared a number of memoranda laying out the sequence of events since Asquith's return from Ireland on 19 May, the nature of cabinet commitments, and his understanding of Lloyd George's mandate. He distributed these to his Unionist colleagues in the cabinet and to other senior Unionists. They stimulated others to follow suit and became the basis for the position taken by the Unionists in subsequent cabinet discussions. Ironically, on the very day that Carson had commended the Lloyd George settlement to the Ulster Unionist Council, Long had written to Asquith about the "bad accounts from Ireland" that had been reaching him. There was apparently a considerable growth of disaffection in the countryside, and Long felt that this was "not the time to try experiments."39 Two days later, he passed on to the prime minister a copy of a letter he had received from Sydney Brooks, who had just returned from the United States and did not believe there was the slightest chance of an American embargo being placed on munitions. It confirmed Long's view that the Americans would "never sacrifice their pockets to their politics." Surely, he told Asquith, one thing was clear: "Hasty action can do no good and may result in disaster." Long was vexed that he was temporarily

io8 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

laid up and unable to be in London.40 He would have been encouraged if he had known that Lloyd George now thought the prospects for a settlement were not particularly favourable. The minister of munitions admitted to Dillon that the southern Unionists were working hard and skilfully against it. He predicted a "deadly struggle" in the cabinet: "Lansdowne has sent us a strong memorandum. I am certain he will go. Long is sulky: that is ominous, but I do not mind that in the least."41 Perhaps he should have minded, for both Long and Lansdowne were to prove most tenacious in their defence of Unionist principles. If Long ever doubted his chosen course of action - and there is no evidence he did - he would have been emboldened on receiving a frank, despairing letter from his old friend John Campbell, the attorney general for Ireland.42 Campbell was "dreadfully depressed" over the new situation caused by Lloyd George's proposal. For some time after the rebellion, public opinion had been against the rebels, but now "all their friends and sympathisers [were] proclaiming that they have brought the Government to their knees," and the situation was just as bad as before the rebellion "with the difference that they now say the government by their actions are not only condoning but justifying the rebellion." Campbell thought Lloyd George's scheme "hopeless & futile." It would never satisfy the hard-line Nationalists and would eventually furnish a starting point for more active sedition. "Believe me," he told Long, "if they now rush LI. G.'s scheme & force it on us, it will end in grave disaster & produce chaos here." Long was grateful for the letter, the more so because "our friends in Dublin charge me with betraying their interests, a most unfair charge to make considering that they don't know apparently all the facts." Long assured Campbell that he had never contemplated that any scheme of the kind proposed by Lloyd George "could be forced upon the Unionists of the three Southern Provinces if they were determined to resist it, merely because they have not the numbers or the money or, let me add, the will to start a revolution." The sole intention of the government, he said, had been to explore the situation in order to determine if some form of temporary solution was possible. But it was clear to him from all the information he was receiving that there was no such prospect: "On the contrary, it seems to me that any drastic change in the Government of Ireland would be regarded as a triumph for the Sinn Feiners and the rebellion, that Redmond and his friends don't represent the bulk of the so-called Nationalist Party in Ireland, including the Sinn Feiners, and that if any Government of the kind were to be established it would lead to further trouble and possibly even disaster. I have already com-

109 Countering Lloyd George

municated my views to the P.M. and L.G. and am doing so again in most emphatic fashion."43 Long wrote to Lloyd George later that day, 11 June, assuring him that his opinion on the Irish question had been reached only "after long and anxious consideration."44 He told the minister of munitions that he had received information from England and from northern and southern Ireland "that there is no disposition to come to a settlement, that the line taken by leading Unionists, as the result of their interviews in London, is that the Unionist Party in Ireland are being driven by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Munitions into accepting a situation which they know to be morally wrong and wrong politically, that the Nationalist Party are sullen and hostile and have no intention of abandoning their policy and programme whatever may be the decision of their Leaders." At the same time, Long said, he had heard the gravest accounts of conditions in Ireland. Even if only one half were true, it seemed to him "to be quite clear" that this was "not the moment to embark upon any political experiment." Long found the situation "far graver and more serious" than he had understood it to be when they had first discussed the issue. Therefore, unless he was wholly misinformed, he said,"I don't think it would be possible for me to give my assent to any agreement including the adoption of Home Rule." Lloyd George was probably not surprised by Long's position, for he had been aware for some days that trouble was brewing. Nevertheless, he characteristically chose not to back away, preferring to put pressure on Long. His reply bordered on moral blackmail: "It would have been fairer to a colleague who was undertaking a risky & a thankless task had you expressed the views now embodied in your memo at the time I was chosen to negotiate. Had you done so even when I consulted you some days ago it was not too late to avert irretrievable committal. Now things have gone so far they cannot be put right except by my resignation and in face of your letter I have written to the P.M. withdrawing from the negotiations and from the Government. The task is a difficult one - without loyal support it is impossible."45 Long knew Lloyd George too well to take his threats at face value. Anyway, Long's own integrity had now been challenged. He responded by calling Lloyd George's bluff.46 I am really amazed at your letter. You accuse me of treating you unfairly and of want of loyalty to a colleague! Upon what grounds? You say I should have objected when you first undertook the task - how could I when no mention was made of any scheme? You go on to say I

no

Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

should have raised the difficulties to which I have now referred when I saw you at your Office. Surely this is most unreasonable. I only had a rough idea of your proposals which you told me you had already communicated to various Irish leaders & others, so before I could express an opinion it was necessary for me to consult those whom I was supposed to represent. Lord Lansdowne communicated our views later in the day and sent a memo to the P.M. No charge of unfairness or disloyalty lies at my door & I cannot believe that you seriously intend to base your resignation upon this excuse. I need hardly say that I regret extremely that you should even contemplate leaving the Government of which you are so distinguished a Member.

Long clearly knew posturing when he saw it. Lloyd George did draft a letter of resignation on 12 June, but it was never submitted to Asquith.47 While Long had been corresponding with colleagues and drafting memoranda on recent developments, the Irish Parliamentary party had held a meeting on Saturday, 10 June, at the Mansion House in Dublin to discuss Lloyd George's proposal.48 The official report of the meeting was published in the London papers on Monday, 12 June. When Long read it he was more than ever convinced that Lloyd George had not been entirely truthful in his negotiations with either the Nationalists or the Unionists. What particularly annoyed him were Redmond's assertions, during the course of his address to the party, that, first, Asquith had returned to England in May "profoundly convinced that the system known as 'Castle Government' had completely broken down," and, second, that Lloyd George had formulated a proposal "which we may fairly regard as the proposal of the Government." The report made Lloyd George's scheme public for the first time. Long immediately fired off a telegram of protest to Asquith, pointing out that the cabinet had never discussed Lloyd George's proposal, let alone approved it. He urged Asquith to issue a definite statement clarifying matters.49 He followed up with a letter, drafted three days earlier, in which he criticized Lloyd George's methods and stated that he could not support any arrangement contemplated by him; home rule would be seen as justification of the rebellion and would be the "thin-edge of the wedge." Presumably, Long meant that once home rule was granted, an independent Ireland and a gradual fragmentation of the empire would not be far off. 5° Apparently, Asquith had been consulted by Lloyd George about his scheme and had given Lloyd George permission to discuss it with the Irish leaders, but it is doubtful if Asquith had been aware

in Countering Lloyd George

that Lloyd George would lead Redmond to believe that exclusion would be temporary while assuring Carson that it would be permanent.51 Unfortunately for both Asquith and Lloyd George, Redmond had indicated to his colleagues on 10 June that the exclusion of the six northeastern counties would only be temporary. This public remark immediately raised concerns in Unionist circles, concerns which were not met by Asquith's reference at Ladybank on 14 Jun to "a provisional settlement" being desirable in Ireland. This was not the "clarifying statement" expected by Long and it did nothing to appease either Unionist or Nationalist concerns.52 By mid-June, Long had finished drafting a series of memoranda, and he circulated them to his Unionist colleagues. They arrived at an opportune moment. Midleton had already alerted many senior Unionists to the dangers inherent in Lloyd George's activities, and Redmond's revelation had added to the gathering alarm. Long's memoranda, which provided the first comprehensive information, confirmed all their fears and led to a crisis in the cabinet and the Unionist party.53 Long was emphatic about two things. First, Redmond's statements about the complete breakdown of Castle government and the extent of cabinet support for Lloyd George's proposal had absolutely no justification. In fact, they filled Long with amazement. Second, he said that Lloyd George, in his negotiations with the Irish leaders, "seems to me to have misunderstood his position from beginning to end, to have committed the Cabinet to wholesale and drastic changes and to definite statements which are not in agreement with the facts."54 Long then took his colleagues through the developments of the past month. He explained that in light of Asquith's memorandum of 21 May, the cabinet had authorized Lloyd George to undertake negotiations with a view to seeing if a basis of settlement could be arrived at under which a measure of home rule could be brought in without bloodshed " after the War." Long assured his colleagues that the cabinet had "had no scheme before them, but the understanding was that Mr Ll.G. should report negotiations to them for approval, revision or rejection." When Long had seen Lloyd George's rough proposal on 30 May, he had told him "that no Unionist, Irish or British, would accept Home Rule during the War." This point had been reiterated by Lord Lansdowne in a further interview with Lloyd George and in a subsequent memorandum. Despite these cautions, Lloyd George had put a definite scheme to the Ulster leaders, who had accepted it on the grounds "that the Cabinet had approved the scheme, and that the Cabinet had authorized Mr Lloyd George to say that national emergency and especially the fear of

112 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

complications with America rendered necessary an immediate grant of Home rule." These grounds, asserted Long, were "without foundation." For example, the American suggestion had never been before the cabinet. He himself had first heard of it on i June at a subcommittee meeting. He had objected to the idea at the time and, in fact, did not accept the truth of that line of argument. As for the scheme, it had never been seen or discussed by cabinet. Unfortunately, it would seem that "the scheme, as put before Ulster and the Nationalists, apparently differed in at least one material point. According to Ulster the proposal they accepted included permanent exclusion while the Nationalists agreed on the ground that exclusion was to be temporary." Long's information indicated that the situation in Ireland had become "very grave" and that the talk of home rule had made the position more difficult. Long claimed that Ireland at the time was unfit for home rule. The effect of the scheme would be to encourage and, in fact, to reward Sinn Fein. Long was particularly aggrieved that he and his colleagues were assumed to have betrayed Unionist interests when patently they had not. He informed his colleagues that he would find it difficult to remain a member of the government if Lloyd George's statements and actions were accepted. Long's revelations took many of his colleagues by surprise. They were amazed by Lloyd George's transgressions. Lansdowne, who to this point knew more than most, was pleased that Long had put his views in writing. He assured him that he did not stand alone, saying he "did not understand that we gave [Lloyd George] a blank cheque to patch up any kind of truce which he liked, or that we undertook, to force such a truce upon the parties."55 Understandably, Carson was "astounded" at the news that Lloyd George had been acting without the consent of the cabinet when he had put forward his proposals. He admitted to Long that he had been surprised when Asquith had publicly claimed that the cabinet unanimously agreed that this was an opportune time to settle the Irish question. Personally, he had believed it would be the end of the Unionist party. Carson was angry to learn that he had been used by Lloyd George and that he had not been kept properly informed by his colleagues. He asked Long: Am I to take it that all this [the negotiations] was without the knowledge or consent of the Cabinet? I never received one line or hint from any of my late colleagues in the Cabinet that I was not acting as they had according to the P.M. agreed. Surely it is now more than hard on me that statements shd be made which must be most disastrous to the whole leading of the Ulster Movement.

ii3 Countering Lloyd George Have you done anything to set the matter right? And do you think it fair or just that I shd be allowed to be placed in this position & when I have carried out what the nominee of the Cabinet has asked me, criticism shd be made to my supporters that I have been under a delusion & have in fact been deceived. I shall ask Bonar Law when he returns to call a meeting of the party as I feel I have been disgracefully treated.56

Long must have winced on receiving Carson's letter for, with the benefit of hindsight, both he and Lansdowne had been guilty of extraordinary naivete in assuming that Lloyd George would report to the cabinet before committing the government. Long shared Carson's concerns. As he told Lansdowne, "In my deliberate opinion LI. G. has sold us and unless the situation is cleared up the Unionist party must be riven from head to heel." Long had therefore asked Curzon to summon a meeting of the Unionist members of the cabinet for Saturday, 17 June. In the meantime, he hoped to discuss the situation with Asquith: "I shall of course deliver no ultimatum, but, shall express my views and say I am consulting my friends."57 One friend Long spoke to was Selborne, who was flummoxed by what he heard. He immediately wrote to Asquith, pointing out that not only had he never agreed to the proposal put by Lloyd George to Redmond and Carson but "I have never had it made to me, nor have I ever heard it discussed." Selborne was frank with Asquith, stating that he was "absolutely uncommitted to the acceptance of any such scheme" and that unless there was a public repudiation of the statement that the cabinet had agreed to Lloyd George's proposal, he would have no alternative but to resign from the government.58 The Unionist members of the cabinet met at Curzon's house on Saturday, 17 June, to discuss Long's memoranda. Curzon and Robert Cecil then met with Asquith and pointed out to the prime minister that all members of the cabinet, but particularly the Unionists, were placed in a most unsatisfactory position by Lloyd George's proposal. Before Curzon could continue, Asquith interrupted and admitted "there was of course no authority for making proposals on behalf of the Government, since the Cabinet had never considered any proposals." Asquith agreed with the Unionists that Lloyd George "had only been charged to enquire whether there was any possibility of agreement between the Nationalists and the Ulstermen, and to report to the Cabinet upon what terms, if any, such agreement could be secured." Curzon then suggested that the prime minister should make a statement either in the House or in the press to correct the wrong impressions; but Asquith, while regretting the incident, said

114 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

he wanted to see Lloyd George before making any public remarks. He concluded the interview by assuring his visitors that "there was no difference of opinion between him and his Unionist colleagues as to what the real facts were."59 It is clear from Asquith's correspondence with Lloyd George that the prime minister was being honest with the Unionists. He recalled the May cabinet discussion exactly as they did. But it is equally clear that he had not known the full extent of Lloyd George's commitments until Long and the Unionists had revealed them.60 Unfortunately, this newly acquired knowledge did not prompt the prime minister to halt the process that had been set in motion, and no public repudiation was made. Carson now found himself in a difficult position. The Ulster leader did not see how he could back away from the permanent exclusion of a six-county Ulster after having been primarily responsible for persuading the Ulster Unionist Council to accept it. Nor could Carson have been much reassured by being told by Selborne, "I could not possibly warn you because I did not even know that Lloyd George had formulated such a scheme," and then, hearing from Long that his Unionist colleagues were surprised that Carson "did not consult them before putting before the Unionist Council a statement which has naturally and inevitably brought down upon them and especially upon myself the gravest possible condemnation."61 In fact, Long was hoping there would be a general meeting of the party so that he could clear himself of the undeserved charge. Bonar Law returned from France in the midst of these developments to discover, much to his surprise, "that the position in regard to Ireland is very serious from a political point of view."62 Long wasted little time before bringing the Unionist leader up to date and underlining the severity of the situation. Long apologized for "causing trouble or failing to act as you wish," but explained, "I cannot be a party to the setting up of any form of Home Rule during the War."63 Over the next week, the Unionists increasingly divided into two camps with Bonar Law, Balfour, and F. E. Smith on Carson's side, and Long, Lansdowne, Selborne, Salisbury, and Robert Cecil supporting the southern Unionists in particular, and the union and Unionist party in general.64 To this point Long had been ill. Although he had come up to London after hearing of Redmond's speech, he had still not been fully up to par. Lansdowne had also been out of town, holidaying in Kerry, but he at length returned to the capital on Monday, 19 June. From then on, he and an increasingly healthy Long were highly active, drafting memoranda, arranging meetings, and lob-

ii5 Countering Lloyd George

bying hard. Lloyd George watched these activities with dismay and disdain, blaming Long for the problems that had suddenly arisen. He confided to Dillon: A number of the Unionist Members of the Cabinet threaten to secede from the Government if the Home Rule Act is brought into operation under the suggested conditions. They are all in it except Balfour, Bonar Law and F.E. Long has behaved in a specially treacherous manner. He has actually been engaged clandestinely in trying to undermine the influence of Carson in Ulster and in representing to the Ulster leaders that they were induced to assent to the agreement under false pretences. He told them there was no war urgency, no prospect of trouble with America and that Carson's reasons for coming to terms were false. I could not think it possible that any man, least of all one with such pretensions of being an English gentleman, could have acted in such a way. However, he met with a large measure of success and Carson will have a very difficult time, but Carson stands firm.65

This was most disingenuous letter. It is clear that Lloyd George had presented the proposal to both Carson and the Nationalists "under false pretences." The cabinet had not given its approval to the scheme and Lloyd George had led the Ulsterites to believe that exclusion would be permanent while assuring Dillon and the other Nationalist leaders that it would be temporary. If anyone had behaved "in a specially treacherous manner," it was Lloyd George himself. Understandably, he would admit to no error in tactics and he worked hard to convince Bonar Law and Carson of the merits of the proposal. He found Bonar Law "frightened and timid, but willing to stand by Carson" while Carson admitted he had little alternative but to "stand by the agreement." He was "very angry with Long."66 At a cabinet meeting on 21 June, Long, Lansdowne, Cecil, and Selborne said they could not accept responsibility for Lloyd George's proposals. Even Austen Chamberlain, who until then had been inclined to side with Carson, began to waver. He found the whole business deeply regrettable. He thought it would never have happened "if the matter had been properly or discreetly handled by the P.M.," but Asquith "had allowed decisive steps to be taken without any consultation with the Cabinet & we are all faced with fails accomplis which earlier consultation might have modified or avoided."67 Chamberlain pointed out to Asquith that Lloyd George's actions had placed the Unionists in a bad position.68 How bad, he made clear to Balfour: "I cannot yet see a way out of the situation which [Asquith's] failure to consult the Cabinet has produced. If

n6 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Cecil & Lansdowne go as well as Long and Selborne, I don't think I can stop in."69 As of 21 June, it seemed not only that the Unionist party was in danger of splitting but that the government might fall; it would be unlikely to survive up to five Unionist resignations. Another cabinet meeting was set for 27 June. Before then, Long and Lansdowne drafted memoranda designed to convince their Liberal colleagues of the merits of their position and the depth of their concern. Lansdowne reminded the cabinet of Asquith's memorandum of 21 May, saying there was nothing in it "suggestive of the idea that we were at once to bring the Home Rule Act into operation. The contrary [was] indeed, stated explicitly." Lansdowne also pointed out what until then had been ignored: that Asquith had suggested that "an arrangement should be made for the annual residence of the Sovereign and his Court in Ireland; and that there should be a single Minister controlling, and responsible for the Irish Administration." Asquith had subsequently offered the post of chief secretary to Lloyd George, stated Lansdowne. Surely, all this was proof that home rule during the war had not been contemplated; Lloyd George had clearly strayed far from his brief and had offered a specific proposal to the Irish leaders as if it had the approval of the whole cabinet. Lansdowne believed "the misunderstanding," if misunderstanding it was, ought to have been cleared up immediately. This, he regretted, had not been done out of deference to Carson's strong objection. If the current proposal was to be proceeded with, Lansdowne insisted that those Unionists in the cabinet who had doubts must be free to reserve their decision until the final scheme was laid before them and until they could consider how the new system would be received in an increasingly unsettled Ireland, in which Redmond was rapidly losing all support and Sinn Fein was on the rise. Finally, Lansdowne reiterated that he did not like proceeding "upon the old and as I think much discredited, plan of ... exclusion," nor did he think the potential difficulties with the United States were as formidable as many supposed.70 Long's memorandum was supportive of Lansdowne's. After providing a detailed survey of developments since mid-May, he concluded that, first, Lloyd George had been asked only to attempt to secure a settlement between parties in Ireland; second, that the cabinet had never authorized the setting up of "any form of Home Rule" during the war; third, that the cabinet had not endorsed the view that relations with the United States made it necessary that some form of home rule should be set up immediately; and, fourth, that the situation in Ireland rendered "impossible the contemplation of any settlement which would involve putting the Home Rule Act into operation at the present time."71

117 Countering Lloyd George

Long's memorandum, while firm and to the point, was constrained in tone. Privately, he was raging. He complained to Selborne, "There has been some odd work." Why had all reference to the sovereign and Ireland been "suppressed"? From whom had Lloyd George derived his authority for "H R now"? Why did Carson refuse to have questions put? Long said he had seen some of Carson's most trusted advisers and most ardent and devoted supporters, and they regarded home rule as "sheer madness." He was convinced that the scheme was as "dead as Queen Anne" but felt it was essential to have "all this unsavoury business cleared up." "Whom can we trust?" Long asked. He also revealed how close he had come to resigning. Apparently, he had drafted a letter of resignation and had only withheld it at Lansdowne's request.72 Long's queries, and the reminder about Asquith's memorandum of 21 May, further shattered Selborne's confidence. To his mind, there could "be no possible justification of the P.M.'s conduct to us ... The cause is slackness not dishonesty; but the result is the same."73 He was now more than ever convinced that he had no honourable option but to resign. Austen Chamberlain was also confused and distressed. He accepted, perhaps too readily, that there had been no "intention to mislead" but, as he pointed out to Asquith, the cabinet had not given Lloyd George the authority either to conduct extensive negotiations or to submit definite proposals. Chamberlain was clear that the cabinet should have been consulted. "You must permit me to say," wrote Chamberlain, that I think this was very unfair to your Unionist colleagues. Our position in a coalition Government is in any case an extremely difficult one. To make it at all possible we are obliged to ask, and I think we have a right to expect a somewhat fuller consultation than the Prime Minister might ordinarily think necessary in a homogeneous government. As it is we have been exposed to the utmost misconception by our friends and supporters. It will be at any time difficult, and is for the moment impossible, for us to offer any explanation of our position; and more serious than any of these matters (though they are not without public importance) we are now faced with a situation which has been gravely prejudiced by the public steps taken without our knowledge. And we no longer have the same freedom of decision as we should have possessed if we had been consulted at the proper time.74

This was a most telling criticism, and it put the Unionist dilemma in a nutshell. Robert Cecil, for one, found it compelling, particularly Chamberlain's account of the "instructions" to Lloyd George.75 Not surprisingly, Lloyd George did not agree with "Austen's protest."

n8 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

He reminded Asquith that both Long and Lansdowne had been consulted and that Long had been shown the draft terms. Neither had suggested a cabinet meeting to discuss the proposals, he said, and it was "idle therefore to talk as if we had ignored our Unionist colleagues."76 Again, Lloyd George was being disingenuous. He was side-stepping the point about cabinet approval and consultation, ignoring the fact he had offered the Ulsterites one thing and the Nationalists another, and concealing the fact that Long had had only a few minutes to look over the draft terms and take but a few rough notes. This could not be construed as consultation. The final submission to the cabinet of 27 June was a memorandum by Balfour.77 His opinion differed dramatically from that of his Unionist colleagues. He was not so much concerned about what had or had not happened in the past, but he was concerned only with the future. And, unlike his fellow Unionists, he did not believe the establishment of a home rule parliament during the war would be either inexpedient or dangerous. His view was: "If we must have Home Rule let us at least exclude from its operation as much of Unionist Ireland as is possible. Were Lloyd George's scheme carried through, the six Ulster counties would have permanently secured to them - by consent and without bloodshed - their place in the United Kingdom." Will anybody, he asked, "assert that, if the settlement of their fate be deferred till peace is declared, terms equally good could be obtained without a dangerous struggle?" He said the arguments would have to be very strong to "induce one to run the hazard of civil war, when we have offered us voluntarily all that successful civil war could give." He did not believe the government's capacity to bring the war in Europe to a successful end would be weakened if there was a government set up in Dublin for the south and west of Ireland. For such a government to cooperate with the Germans would be suicidal and would "drag down the whole policy of Home Rule with it." A Dublin parliament would have the means to preserve life and property, and it would be in its interests to do so if it ever wanted to achieve a united Ireland. Balfour was convinced "that the war supplies no sufficient justification for neglecting the unique opportunity now offered us for settling peaceably and permanently the problem of Ulster." Balfour was clearly prepared to accept immediate partition. Long, Lansdowne, and Selborne were not, and all three hovered on the brink of resignation. Selborne was the first to make a decision. Asquith had had Selborne's letter of resignation in his possession since 16 May, and Selborne now asked him to act upon it, stating, "I am quite certain in my own judgement that to bring Home Rule into

ii9 Countering Lloyd George

operation during the war involves more peril to the fortunes of the British Empire than any other course open to us. I will, therefore, take no responsibility for it."78 Asquith announced Selborne's resignation to the press on 26 June. The following day, Selborne explained his actions to the House of Lords.79 Both Long and Lansdowne chose, in the end, to await the results of the cabinet meeting before deciding. Lansdowne, for one, thought Selborne had acted precipitously. As he told Long, he "might just as well have held his hand."80 Lansdowne probably knew how close Long had come to joining Selborne. Long was the English Unionist most closely identified with Irish affairs, and it had long been assumed by both Ulster and southern Unionists that he would always protect their interests. He was considered the one man who could not be silenced when the union was at stake. But the rapid developments of the past two months had initially caught him napping, and he had made a serious error in not informing his cabinet colleagues and the Irish Unionists about Lloyd George's intentions. This had quickly led to the assumption that Long was a party to the abandonment of the southern Unionists, and many now branded him a traitor to the Unionist cause. Long was distressed to find himself in this position. He was annoyed with himself and angry with Lloyd George. Like Selborne, he thought he might have no honourable choice but to resign. In fact, he drafted a letter of resignation, but he withheld it and turned for advice to a long-time friend, Lord Desart, and to F. L. Turner, his principal private secretary at the local government board. In the days leading up to the cabinet meeting of 27 June, Long discussed and pondered their advice. Both men thought it would be unwise for Long to resign.81 Taylor was most emphatic. He argued that resignation would be a useless sacrifice. For one thing, it would not stop the violence; but, more important, if home rule was likely to come about, then it was all the more necessary for Long to stay, in order to secure the best terms. Moreover, Long's resignation would be harmful. It would weaken the government in face of the enemy at a most critical time in the war and would leave the Irish Unionists without their chief defender in the cabinet, "the one who has the greatest knowledge and is absolutely trusted." Taylor argued that Long should not hold himself responsible for what Lloyd George had said to the Nationalists and Unionists, since he had nothing to do with it. No one doubted his honour. Was it necessary "to defend it by resignation which will have disastrous effect on the Country, on the Unionist Party, & may deprive the Irish Unionists of one of their

12O Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Chief Protectors?" These arguments were obviously designed to appeal to Long's deep sense of loyalty and patriotism. Coincidently, he also received a conciliatory letter from Carson, who wrote, on 24 June: "I am unhappy to think there still is any chance of unfriendly feelings between you & myself. If I have said or done anything which has appeared hurtful to you I am sincerely sorry & I hope we may remain always on the same affectionate terms. No one knows or appreciates more than I do all the splendid and willing help you have always given us in the Home Rule fight & believe me all Irish Loyalists are very grateful."82 In light of this last-minute pat on the back, Long, much to Lansdowne's delight, decided to wait. If necessary, the two men would resign together after the cabinet meeting.^ The cabinet met in the morning and evening of 27 June, and throughout its lengthy deliberations Long proved the most stubborn defender of the union and the interests of the southern Unionists.84 Both he and Lansdowne made it clear at the start that they would regard the acceptance of Lloyd George's proposals as a concession to rebellion. Neither man would accept any responsibility for them. Long went so far as to doubt that there was any genuine acceptance of the proposals by the Nationalists themselves, for they were opposed by the O'Brienites and the Roman Catholic church. Cecil differed somewhat from his colleagues, since he chose to look at the matter from an English, rather than Irish, point of view: "To him the whole question was what effect would the adoption of the proposals have on the success of the war. He was prepared to sacrifice his Unionist convictions, provided he was satisfied that the proposed scheme would not be injurious to the prosecution of the war." Cecil suggested that his fears would be stilled if home rule could be accompanied by a condition that the Irish executive's powers would be suspended until the end of the war. Not surprisingly, Bonar Law and Balfour broke completely with Long and Lansdowne. Bonar Law believed that the rejection of immediate home rule would "drive the whole of Nationalist Ireland, Redmonites and Sinn Feiners, into one hostile camp." If the interests of the southern Unionists could be safeguarded, he was prepared to recommend that the Unionist party accept the proposal. Balfour, in Asquith's view, made the most effective speech. He dissociated himself entirely from Lansdowne and Long and was not persuaded that immediate home rule could properly be regarded as a concession to rebellion. On the contrary, it might far more fairly be viewed as a Unionist triumph. After all, he said, the exclusion of the six Unionist counties had been the maximum demand of the Unionist leaders

121 Countering Lloyd George

at the Buckingham Palace conference before the war, and now it had been accepted by the Nationalists of both North and South. Rather than being forced from them by rebellion, it was the realization of a long-existent goal. He then repeated the arguments of his memorandum that, to his mind, a home rule parliament posed no threat to the British war effort. He laid stress on the importance of not alienating American opinion and declared himself a wholehearted supporter of Carson and Law. Curzon was the one other Unionist to side, at least initially, with Long and Lansdowne. He doubted the possibility of preserving order and preventing fresh outbreaks of rebellion in Ireland, but he seemed mollified after General Maxwell had reassured the cabinet that the military situation was under control. Noting the division in Unionist ranks, Lloyd George seized on the openings provided by Cecil and Law to point out that if the resignation of Unionist members of the cabinet could be averted by a further consideration of possible safeguards for the maintenance of imperial naval and military control during the war, he would do his best to secure such an arrangement. He then suggested that a small cabinet committee should be appointed at once to discuss the issue. Long was not impressed by this suggestion and remained recalcitrant. But when Curzon, Chamberlain, and Lansdowne suggested they might well go along with it, Asquith seized the initiative: "He told his colleagues frankly that in his opinion at this critical conjunction in the war, a series of resignations and a consequent possible dissolution of the Government wd be not only a national calamity but a national crime." Asquith appealed to the cabinet to avert such a catastrophe. Picking up Lloyd George's cue, he agreed that bringing home rule into effect during the war would require "special safeguards for the maintenance of an effective and undisputed Imperial control of all Naval and Military conditions in Ireland and elsewhere." Asquith then proposed that a committee consisting of himself, Lloyd George, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir George Cave should immediately consider and formulate whatever additions to the Home Rule Act seemed necessary for the purpose. All members of the cabinet except Long accepted this proposal and all the Unionists, including a highly reluctant Long, agreed to withhold their resignations until the committee had at least reported. Long's opinion had not been changed by the cabinet's decision. Perhaps he was suspicious of how quickly Lloyd George and Asquith had combined to scupper the Unionists. As he told Selborne, "I have only stayed on at Lansdowne's urgent request in order to help him."85 Something of Long's mood, his prevailing attitudes, and

122 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the pressures to which he had been subjected can be gleaned from a letter to Campbell, the attorney general for Ireland, two days after the cabinet meeting: It has been very hard work fighting Carson and all his Ulster Colleagues. Fancy James Craig spending y4 hour here trying to persuade me, with tears in his eyes, to vote for Home Rule I ... I regard this scheme as involving a breach of two solemn pledges. 1 No controversial Legislation during the war. 2 No H. R. till end of war. Then as regards this precious scheme itself. It is a gross betrayal of our friends and many "foes" i.e., (moderate substantial men who are Nationalists). It is a bad scheme, the worst of any that has ever been proposed. The state of the Country makes it impossible to try so dangerous an experiment at this time ... If you could see all the Cabinet papers etc., you would understand the whole position and would appreciate the extent of our betrayal. I am utterly puzzled by the line adopted by B.L., A.J.B. and Carson. There must be some reasons operating with them which I know nothing about. The feeling in our Party is intense, they realize the acceptance of the scheme means the absolute destruction of our Party, to begin with the name disappears. But the combined and fervid appeals of those I have named with Chamberlain added, all ranged against me, even though I should have been backed as I undoubtedly should have been, by some of the best men in our ranks in spirit and action, and by the vast majority in their hearts, would of course secure a majority for the Government. I trust nobody a bit now outside this office.86

That same day, 29 June, Long expressed the fear to Selborne that the Unionists in the cabinet were being misrepresented. He assured his colleague that he would "insist upon telling the whole truth." If necessary, Long was still determined to resign.87 Over the next week, discussion within Unionist ranks focused on the recommendations of the cabinet committee, and particularly on suggestions put forward by Cecil and backed by George Cave. Cecil's ideas were forwarded to Lansdowne, Asquith, Lloyd George, and Bonar Law in early July and were then shown to Redmond. Cecil sent Long a copy on 3 July.88 Cecil stated clearly in his opening paragraph: "Our opinions as to the desirability of attempting to set up Home Rule during the War are unchanged. We believe it to be an unfortunate experiment, very unlikely to succeed. It is only because we believe that the breaking-off of negotiations which have been carried further than we intended might involve a grave political crisis at a most inopportune moment and might interfere with the

123 Countering Lloyd George

successful prosecution of the War that we can contemplate any terms on which we should remain members of the Government under existing circumstances."89 Long was probably reassured by Cecil's frankness, and the detailed suggestions must also have appealed to him. Apparently, Asquith and Lloyd George were now prepared to accept as part of their proposal the insertion of provisions into the amending bill "making it clear that the paramount force of all legislation of the Imperial Parliament as to matters rising from a state of war or as to the Defence of the Realm including all emergency legislation and the Defence of the Realm regulations, is to be clearly recognised, and obedience to any such legislation is to be absolutely enforced, not withstanding that it may conflict with any Irish law or any executive action of the Irish Government." This was crucial to the Unionist position and in keeping with the cabinet discussions. Other subsidiary proposals dealt with the suspensory powers of the lord lieutenant, the censorship of mail, access of the lord lieutenant's office to Dublin Metropolitan Police reports, and the appointment of secret agents by the lord lieutenant in order to maintain order. Finally, the lord lieutenant and the chief secretary were to be men "acceptable to the Unionist members of the Cabinet" and were to be appointed "after consultation with them." It would also be necessary, argued Cecil, "to insert in the Bill special provisions for the protection of the Unionist minority outside the six Excluded Counties." Moreover, if the Home Rule Act was to apply to only a part of Ireland, several important amendments would be required. Cecil reminded his readers that the future actions of the Unionist members of the cabinet would be dependent on the support of the Unionist party at large. "Subject to this," he concluded, "we are content that negotiations for a settlement may proceed, and if possible a Bill be drawn up. But we must reserve our liberty of action when we see the Bill and are able to consider more fully its probable effect on the future government of Ireland." Lansdowne, more so than Long, was prepared to support these proposals, but he knew that if they were to have any chance of success it was essential to have Long onside and working in concert with himself and Cecil. On 3 July he appealed directly to his colleague. He agreed that the position they found themselves in was "horrible" but said that "upon the whole" he had come to the following conclusion: The defection of the Unionist members of the cabinet, involving, as I believe it would, the break up of the coalition government as well as that of the Unionist party, followed by a general election, and probably accompanied

124 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union by serious trouble in Ireland, is the worst thing that could happen at this moment. I am fully alive to the consequences of a settlement on the lines laid down by Lloyd George: they may, and probably will be deplorable; but I do not see why we should not, to some extent at any rate mitigate them by the kind of safeguards for which Bob Cecil and I are fighting at this moment. Your assistance in the effort would be invaluable - we are at any rate justified in holding our hand for the present, and we can reconsider our position when a Bill has been drafted.

Lansdowne assured Long "with absolute sincerity" that nothing Long had said during the discussions would leave him open to adverse criticism if he supported Cecil's proposals.90 Long must have appreciated Lansdowne's appeal although, as he confessed to Cecil, he found it "very difficult to grasp the real effect of the 'concessions.'" Apparently, Redmond thought they were already in the Home Rule Act and therefore did not make any real difference. Long also knew that what had been agreed to so far related only to the preservation of law and order. Safeguards for the southern Unionists had yet to be negotiated.91 On the eve of the crucial cabinet meeting of 5 July, Long was publicly identified as the only "real difficulty" remaining in the way of the settlement of the Irish issue. The Times revealed that he had adopted a more determined attitude towards the proposed solution than any of his Unionist colleagues in the cabinet. Knowing this to be the case, a delegation of sixty-four Unionist MPS and six peers met with Long at the local government board on 4 July and pressed him not to resign.92 It was therefore with mixed emotions and under considerable pressure from all quarters of the Unionist party that Long entered the cabinet meeting on 5 July. During the discussion, Lansdowne made it clear that he still had many reservations about the proposal, but "subject to the condition that imperial control of matters relating to the war and public order was during the war secured," he had concluded that it was his duty not to resign at that moment. Long then described his position as a cruel one. He was convinced that if he were to resign now he would carry with him a considerable section of the Unionist party, but he recognized that this might seriously weaken the government at a critical time in the war. Therefore, "very reluctantly," he too felt compelled to withdraw his resignation. Asquith was generous in response, thanking the two men for their display of "patriotism and public spirit." He assured them that their decision would "not be construed as fettering their future freedom of action." Privately, in his letter to the King describing the

125 Countering Lloyd George

cabinet meeting, Asquith said that the result was "very satisfactory, Lord Selborne's being the only resignation, and amply justifies the delay wh has obviated premature and precipitate decisions."93 Two days later, the Unionist party supported the decision of Long and Lansdowne, and the negotiations proceeded. Both men, however, expressed their continuing reservations about the whole process. As Long put it, he refused to be bound by a situation he had not created. He strongly believed that home rule was a danger to the empire, and he made a point of reminding his party that home rule was "an imperial question, not simply a domestic one."94 Asquith made the settlement proposals public in a statement to the Commons on 10 July.95 In the course of his speech, during which he made a generous reference to the dissident Unionists, he pointed out that the arrangement was provisional in that the period for which the amending bill was to remain in force would be extended by order-in-council until a permanent agreement was reached. However, he then seemed to suggest that his ultimate goal was the unity of Ireland, though he recognized that "such union can never be brought about without the free will and assent of the excluded area." Long was initially pleased and commented to Lansdowne that "the Prime Minister behaved very well to us,"96 but he soon had reason for second thoughts when Lansdowne raised concerns about the meaning of the term "provisional." Both men, of course, had staked their reputation on the "permanent" exclusion of the six counties as well as on the protection of the southern Unionists. They agreed that they had no alternative but to renew their demands. The first step in this process came during a speech by Lansdowne in the Lords on 11 July.97 Lansdowne was commenting on both the proposed settlement and the recently issued report of the Hardinge Commission which had been set up to investigate the rising in Dublin. The report was a scathing indictment of Dublin Castle administration and it underlined, at least in Lansdowne's and Long's minds, the need for the continued maintenance of stability in Ireland. Asquith had not paid much attention to this aspect of the settlement, and Lansdowne therefore went out of his way to inform the House that the Defence of the Realm Act would remain in force and would, if necessary, be strengthened. Sir John Maxwell would be given whatever support he needed in order to maintain the peace. Moreover, in an effort to secure convictions, trials before resident magistrates would replace trial by jury in the most unsettled parts of the county. Most Nationalists would have been filled with alarm simply by these announcements, but they must have uniformly recoiled when Lansdowne indicated that the amending bill, currently being pre-

ia6 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

pared by Samuel, would make structural changes to the 1914 Home Rule Act that would be "permanent and enduring." What, they asked, did Lansdowne mean? The "permanent" exclusion of the six counties? The answer, of course, was yes. Both Long and Lansdowne were "very suspicious" that a strong effort would be made "to produce a Bill which will set up a framework which will enable the Irish Parliament to meet as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent leaving all the work due to the exclusion of Ulster and the other consequential changes to be done by Orders in Council, or even by a subsequent measure." As Long stated, "To any procedure of this kind Lansdowne and I are determined to offer our most resolute opposition."98 It did not take the Nationalists long to respond. Within hours, Redmond issued a statement referring to Lansdowne's speech as "a gross insult to Ireland."99 It amounted, he said "to a declaration of war on the Irish people and to the announcement of a policy of coercion." If the speech represented the attitude of the government, it would mean the end of all hope of a settlement. Redmond shrewdly pointed out that the speech seemed to have been made "with the deliberate object of wrecking the negotiations for a settlement." He fastened particularly on Lansdowne's suggestion that structural alterations to the Home Rule Act of 1914 would be "permanent and enduring," insisting that the amending bill should be "in all its provisions and details strictly temporary and provisional." Anything else would bring the negotiations to an end. Lansdowne, knowing he had the backing of an increasing number of Unionists, replied immediately. In an open letter printed in the Times on 14 July, he said he did not believe he had gone any further in his remarks than either the intended policy of the government or Asquith's declaration to the House of Commons, which was "that the union of the six counties with the rest of Ireland 'could only be brought about with, and can never be brought about without, the free will and assent of the excluded area.'"100 This was not an exact rendering of Asquith's words, but Lansdowne was determined to keep up the pressure. Both he and Long feared that Asquith would "whittle down our policy," and Lansdowne, in particular, was "profoundly suspicious of the proposed procedure by O in C."101 Long and Lansdowne were ceaseless in their plotting and in their determination. Long was especially insistent that Asquith be left in no doubt about their seriousness. In light of Redmond's reply and the attitude of "the radical press," it seemed to Long "absolutely necessary that Bonar Law shld formally inform Asquith, before he makes any statement on Monday, that you have the support of all your

127 Countering Lloyd George

Unionist Colleagues and that any attempt to whittle down your language will lead to the most serious consequences/'102 It was evident to Long that both Carson and Redmond were prepared to accept Samuel's bill as satisfactory. Long found this suspicious and was anxious that the Unionists should react properly. But, as he asked Lansdowne, How far can we rely upon our Colleagues? It was I think quite clear at our Conference on Thursday [13 July] that Balfour and B. Law would have much preferred to leave matters alone. Balfour does not care what happens to us in Ireland; B. Law is in Carson's pocket as regards Ireland & in Lloyd George's as regards all other affairs of Government, & has besides entirely lost his nerve. As the boys say "he is in a blue funk." He moaned to me after our Conference that "this means a breakup of the Government & what is to happen then?" I asked him if he was prepared to make a stand for anything?!

As for Asquith, he was "playing his old hopeless game, talking strongly, acting weakly." If they were not careful, Long warned Lansdowne, they would be "let down again." Lansdowne agreed to follow Long's advice, but he admitted to feeling very anxious: "For I am sure that this sudden production of the Bill indicates a desire to rush us."103 For much of the previous ten days there had also been a good deal of discussion about the chief secretaryship. Long's name had once again been prominently mentioned, and it is clear that he was initially attracted by the idea. But the rapid completion of a draft amending bill by Samuel and the consequent need for vigilance caused him to abandon any thoughts he might have had. As he explained to Lansdowne, I could not even consider the Irish Office now. I don't agree with Balfour, I believe the H. o C. is impotent, but it is vital that whoever goes there should have the absolute confidence of the Cabinet and it is quite clear to me that I should not enjoy this. The sacrifice to me would be tremendous, involving termination of all my War Work in which I am intensely interested and which I know is very important, and I could not consent unless it were made clear that it is my duty to go and that I should be given a free hand and be backed by the whole Cabinet, whereas I know the results would be very different.

Long thought Dr Jameson of South Africa would be the best man, and he really did not see how Redmond could object to him. It is

128 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

hard to know how seriously Long took the idea of Jameson, but he had a clear appreciation of his own acceptance. Even in the best of times, he would have had difficulty garnering support from the Nationalists; given his recent and current activities, it was a vain hope. Long continued to be suspicious of Asquith and Lloyd George, and once more reminded Lansdowne, "Both Carson and Redmond have seen the Bill and both are satisfied!! Why? There must be some secret understanding."I04 Private and public support continued to gather for the stand taken by Long and Lansdowne. Campbell wrote from Dublin urging them to remain firm, to resist the blandishments and trickery of Asquith and Lloyd George, and to "burst the whole thing."105 The executive of the Irish Unionist Alliance drew up a list of "domestic" suggestions for the amending bill and crossed over to London on Sunday, 16 July, in order to discuss them with Long and Lansdowne.106 On the evening of Monday, 17 July, the Imperial Unionist Association, representing seventy-six members of the House of Lords and ninetyeight MPS, met to endorse the stand taken by Lansdowne and to announce that it considered the establishment of a home rule parliament during the war "a serious danger to the peace of Ireland and the Imperial interest."107 On Tuesday, 18 July, Robert Cecil circulated a memorandum to the cabinet urging his colleagues to recognize "the impossibility of proceeding with the experiment of settlement." He was convinced that the Unionist party would never consent to the bill in anything like its current form. He recommended that no controversial legislation be introduced during the war.lo8 Encouraged by these developments, Long and Lansdowne both prepared memoranda for the cabinet meeting on 19 July.109 Lansdowne reminded his colleagues that while the amending bill made exclusion of the six counties seem provisional, it was well known that the Ulster Unionists had accepted the settlement on the assumption that they would be permanently excluded. He had only agreed to stay in the government in the belief, first, that the exclusion of the six counties was permanent "in the sense that it would continue until the Ulster loyalists desired to terminate the arrangement," and, second, that steps would be taken to deal effectively with the unstable conditions in Ireland. Lansdowne claimed it was a misuse of words to describe such steps as a policy of coercion, as Redmond had done. As far as he was concerned, the bill bristled with difficulties and he agreed with Cecil that the whole matter should be postponed. Long supported Lansdowne and offered reasons for further delay. He did not think the cabinet should make up its mind about the

129 Countering Lloyd George

amending bill until it had had reports from the attorney general for Ireland and from Sir Henry Robinson, the vice-president of the local government board, as to the detailed affect of the bill on the Government of Ireland Act of 1914, on the national board of education, on the Local Government Act of 1898, and on finance, customs, the post office, cable stations, and civil servants. Like Lansdowne, he was unhappy that the draft bill excluded the six counties temporarily and provisionally rather than definitely and permanently. To him, the only way to reassure the Ulster Unionists was to do as Lansdowne had suggested and effect a structural change in the Home Rule Act by excluding those counties. He, too, thought the cabinet should adhere to Cecil's advice. Long's suggestion that the cabinet refer to Campbell and Robinson for advice probably astonished the Liberals. It could have been no secret that both men were ardent supporters of the Union. On the very day Long drafted his memorandum, Robinson had written to him in the most effusive terms: I cannot refrain from writing to assure you that among the Unionists who have watched day by day with breathless suspense your splendid fight against [the settlement] and who have been hoping and praying that you might succeed, there is not one of them so far as I can find out who is not thanking God that when you found out you were overborne, you did not resign, and that you are still there in the Cabinet to be reckoned with when any proposal to sacrifice the loyal people of the country comes up. The truth is the Unionists have had a bad shock over the way Bonar Law Carson etc have chucked them and you are the only man who in their eyes upholds the honour and promises of the Tory party, and if you were to let yourself be elbowed out of the Cabinet their case would be utterly lost.110

While Long and Lansdowne had been stepping up the Unionist pressure, Redmond was finding his position extraordinarily difficult. He knew that if those two were given their way, he and the Irish Parliamentary party would have no hope of maintaining any credibility in Ireland. Perhaps he was told the gist of the Unionist memoranda, perhaps he only guessed, but in any event he made one last effort to appeal to Asquith. He pointed out that the long delay in making public a text of the amending bill, coupled with "the uncertainty and irritation" caused by Lansdowne's speech, had created a serious situation in Ireland. "In our opinion," he warned, "any further delay whatever in producing and proceeding with the Bill will make a settlement on the lines laid down in the terms submitted by Mr Lloyd George quite impossible." Moreover, any

130 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

departure from "the strictly temporary and provisional character of ALL the sections of the Bill" would result in the end of the proposal. 1J1 As Redmond had feared, Long and Lansdowne succeeded in convincing their colleagues at the cabinet meeting on 19 July that the exclusion of the six counties should be permanent and, even more galling for the Nationalists, that the Irish representation at Westminister should be reduced.112 When Lloyd George and Samuel informed him of these decisions on 22 July, Redmond wrote immediately to Asquith rejecting them. "I wish," he wrote angrily, "to take the earliest opportunity of informing you that any bill framed upon these lines will meet with the vehement opposition at all its stages of the Irish Party."113 Faced with implacable attitudes in both Unionist and Nationalist camps, Asquith and Lloyd George backed down. The amending bill was not introduced and negotiations along the lines initiated by Lloyd George in May ceased. Long and Lansdowne had won.114 Not all praise, of course, was owed to Long and Lansdowne, but the campaign they waged had been unrelenting and astute. They were able to work Lloyd George's earlier deceptions to their own advantage and to strip Asquith and the minister of munitions of room to manoeuvre. They were also able to convince the majority - in the end all - of their Unionist colleagues in the cabinet that the amending bill had to be resisted. Long's motives were many. His pride and integrity had been insulted by Lloyd George's actions; he felt guilty that he had not warned his colleagues at the first suggestion of trouble; he sincerely believed that if a home rule parliament was put in place so soon after a rebellion, it would serve as a precedent for other dissident groups and would become the first step in the disintegration of the empire and perhaps of the United Kingdom; and, finally, he was particularly concerned to maintain the unity of his party. He knew that it might fall apart if Balfour and Bonar Law were permitted to have their way, and he was determined to resist this. He also knew that if the coalition broke up, the Unionists would probably fare very badly in any subsequent wartime general election. The public simply would not take kindly to politicians and a party that had weakened the government in face of the enemy. Although Long had ample reason and motivation for his actions, it is doubtful that he could have succeeded alone; but in partnership with Lansdowne, the Unionist leader in the Lords, and Robert Cecil, a widely respected man, his resolve was formidable. Even so, Long did not delight in his success. The stand he had taken on principle

131 Countering Lloyd George

had made it virtually impossible for Redmond to manoeuvre. Inexorably, support for the Irish Parliamentary party seeped away to the more determined Nationalists. Long may have been instrumental in preventing a division within his own party, but in doing so he had made life more difficult for the moderates in Ireland. He knew only too well that the issues of home rule and partition would continue to inflame various elements in British and Irish political life and would demand resolution. By the end of July 1916, he was arguing that an alternative policy had to be found in order to resolve the Irish problem.115 Others had already made tentative soundings in new directions. Long would eventually join them.

CHAPTER FIVE

A Federal Solution?

The crisis of June-July 1916 and the successful countering of Lloyd George firmly established Walter Long as a primary force in Irish affairs. For the next four years, but especially from the spring of 1918 to late 1920, he was to be closely involved with the formulation of the government's Irish policy. This was particularly so after Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916. Lloyd George now realized that Long had formidable back-bench support in the House and numerous influential contacts, as well as widespread popularity in Unionist Ireland. It would clearly be essential to have him onside in any future negotiations. Lloyd George therefore included Long in his cabinet in December 1916 and eventually established him as both the liaison between Dublin Castle and Westminister and the chairman of two key cabinet committees charged with drafting home rule bills. These actions of Lloyd George constituted an attempt not only to keep Long onside - by taking advantage of his pronounced loyalty and patriotism - but also to deflect his energies into containable byways. To some extent this strategy worked, but it did mean that Long had the opportunity to explore alternatives that he might not otherwise have had. One of these alternatives was federalism. Before July 1914, Long had been one of the most trenchant critics of a federal solution to the disintegrating Anglo-Irish relationship. He had viewed it as the first step in the breakup of the United Kingdom and thus of the empire. To him, it had smacked of home rule under another guise. In his desperation to preserve the union, he had not immediately realized that in fact federalism might offer the very solution he was looking for. It was a system of government that could accommodate diversity while preserving unity, as it did in the United States, Can-

133 A Federal Solution?

ada, and Australia. Just before war broke out in 1914, Long had admitted that a solution to the problems bedevilling the United Kingdom might lie in federalism and he had argued that the next Unionist government should explore that option. The dramatic developments of the spring and summer of 1916 reinforced his earlier conclusions. By August 1916, he was convinced that an alternative to home rule for southern Ireland would have to be found if the union and thus the fabric of the empire were to be preserved intact. He paid close attention to the arguments in favour of devolution, home rule all round, and federalism that were being debated with increasing intensity in private and public forums during the winter of 1916-17. By the spring of 1917, he had decided that a federal solution was the only logical answer. From then until his departure from effective politics in late 1920, Walter Long was federalism's most steadfast champion in the coalition government. His advocacy was to leave its mark on the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and thus on the overall government of the British Isles. IN THE FIRST WEEKS AND MONTHS following the collapse of the Lloyd George scheme, Long kept a vigilant watch on the government's Irish policy while sending out feelers of his own to determine the attitudes in both Nationalist and Unionist Ireland. His principal concern was the reaction of the Asquith government. With the death of the Lloyd George proposal, the problem now facing Asquith was the manner of governing Ireland until the end of the war. Long realized the importance of this more than most, and on 26 July he urged Lansdowne to accompany him on a visit to the prime minister in order to discuss both the office of chief secretary and future government policy. He suggested to his colleague, "There should be no further delay ... It seems to me that the policy is still to be one of drift and waiting upon events."1 Before Lansdowne could respond, Long took the initiative and wrote directly to Asquith, explaining that he was anxious about the tack the prime minister proposed to take in the debate in the House: "If the line on Monday is not a firm one, maintenance of the law and suppression of sedition, then I think the position of all the Unionist members of the Cabinet must become impossible." He continued: The Rebellion has made it clear that firm courageous Govt is absolutely necessary, and I believe if I may venture to say so, that this is the real difficulty and risk which you have to face.

±34 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union If the Government do not make it clear that they mean to govern I am confident they will have to reckon with the determined opposition of the Unionist Party. On the other hand how can Redmond maintain his opposition? It is to his interest as much as ours that Sinn Fein and sedition should be put down and if he and his friends persist in factious opposition I am quite certain that if you see fit to send for him and tell him plainly what you mean to do and that if he tries to make your work impossible you will dissolve, he will at once accept the inevitable and behave reasonably. Believe me the last thing he wants is an Election; if he thinks a little Govt baiting will obtain concessions of course he will persist, but if he knows it will mean a dissolution he will stop the mischief at once.2

Three days later Long wrote again, urging Asquith not to lay too much stress on the peaceful condition of Ireland. Long warned that the country was in a dangerous state despite the surface peace; sedition was suppressed but rampant, and Sinn Fein was growing apace. "The Nationalists/' he argued, "must and will support you, do not I pray you alienate the Unionists, the great majority of whom also desire to support your Govt."3 In his speech to the House on 31 July, Asquith announced that Dublin Castle administration would be restored. It was not, he said, the time for "ambitious experiments." He appointed Henry Edward Duke, the Unionist member for Exeter, as chief secretary with a seat in the cabinet. Duke was sixty-one, had never held a ministerial post, and was unfamiliar with Ireland. A few days later Lord Wimborne was reappointed lord lieutenant. These were not auspicious appointments. It is true that Wimborne had been cleared by the Hardinge Commission and that Duke had had a distinguished career at the bar, but neither man inspired widespread respect. The best that could be said was that neither was particularly controversial and, in the circumstances, that was a blessing.4 Earlier in the year, Long had been prepared to consider Duke as a possible chief secretary, referring to him in a rather back-handed way as "by far the best man outside of those who are not in Parliament, and nearly, though not quite, as good as anybody there is."5 Now, however, Long clearly wondered about Duke's grasp of essentials, for only a week after the appointment he wrote to Duke reminding him that he had not been sent to Ireland to bring about a settlement. The government did not want a repeat of the Lloyd George incident.6 Long was also quick to take advantage of Wimborne's request for advice, and on 10 August, after expressing his views about the condition of Ireland and the role of a lord lieutenant,

135 A Federal Solution?

he recommended his friend and confidant Sir Henry Robinson as undersecretary.7 Clearly, Long hoped to be able to influence policy in Dublin Castle, but he was thwarted on this occasion when the post went to a Roman Catholic Englishman, Sir William Byrne. Long was also particularly sensitive to the manner in which home rule negotiations might be resurrected, especially at a time when it was essential to obtain additional army recruits from Ireland. In early August he had heard rumours of further negotiations, and though he could "hardly think anybody will care to burn his fingers so soon,"8 this had accounted for his quick response when it seemed that Duke had announced he had been sent to Ireland to find a settlement. By late September, Long himself was at work trying to lay the groundwork for further negotiations. He suggested to Monsignor Burke, a Nationalist sympathizer, that W.A.S. Hewins, the Unionist MP for Hereford, who was a former director of the London School of Economics and Long's associate on the Unionist Business Committee, would be acceptable to all parties as a negotiator; Burke and Hewins subsequently discussed the preparation of a memorandum to serve as a basis of discussion with Redmond and Devlin.9 This venture had not proceeded very far when the issue of recruitment triggered further rumours about home rule. Recruits in Ireland had fallen off dramatically since the Easter Rising, and by the autumn of 1916 the Irish divisions were in desperate need of replenishment. Many observers were advocating conscription while others, Duke seemingly among them, thought the situation would ease if the government announced that Ireland would be given home rule once the war was over. Long found this alarming: "It appears to me that Duke is wrong both in his general view of the situation in Ireland and in his conclusions."10 He elaborated in a memorandum to his colleagues: "I am very apprehensive that unless we are both vigilant and active we shall be rushed into a mess similar to the one in which we found ourselves in the earlier negotiations. Duke seems to think that the present feeling of soreness against England is due to the fact that the Home Rule Act is on the Statute Book and that when negotiations were entered into it they were broken down by the bad faith of the English Government. Of course all this is pure nonsense." It seemed to Long "impossible to contemplate anything in the shape of a proclamation or declaration by Parliament such as Duke appears to have in his mind." He accepted that it would not be wise or possible to attempt conscription in Ireland, but at the same time, given the Irish hostility to recruitment, it would be unwise to announce that Ireland would receive home rule once the war was over. Not only would recruiting continue to

136 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

lag under such conditions, but Long believed that "if Ireland will not do her share in the War she cannot expect to have Home Rule granted to her as soon as the War is over."11 By the late autumn, after mulling over Selborne's recent public affirmation of devolution, Long admitted that he was attracted by a provincial councils scheme that would provide a measure of home rule to constituent portions of the United Kingdom while still leaving the way open for a general federation of the empire after the war. In the short term, however, he knew it was necessary to settle the Irish question first in order to help resolve the problems of manpower for the army and for industry. If the Irish question was to be settled in a businesslike fashion, the Home Rule Act would have to serve as the basis of discussion. Long was prepared to meet Redmond and Devlin to discuss possibilities;12 but before he had a chance to explore this avenue, there were dramatic changes on the domestic political scene that altered his status and opened up additional opportunities for influence. Asquith and his government had been under increasing pressure and criticism for some months over their conduct of the war, but it still came as a surprise to the public, if not to insiders, when in early December Lloyd George replaced Asquith at the head of a revamped coalition government. A new cabinet system and a secretariat were put in place and a streamlining of decision making was planned. Lloyd George included a number of Unionists in his administration, one of the first of whom was Walter Long as colonial secretary. Although Long was not appointed to the select war cabinet, his inclusion in the government had been viewed as critical to the success of the whole changeover and Lloyd George had made sure that he was approached early in the negotiations. The new prime minister had learned his lessons well. There would be no repeat of the summer of 1916. Long was too important and too influential in the counties, on the back benches, and in Unionist Ireland to ignore. He had to be contained.13 While Long was happy to be included in Lloyd George's cabinet, he was not particularly pleased at being excluded from the new and smaller war cabinet.14 In many ways, he would have preferred to stay at his beloved local government board if a shift to the colonial office brought with it no necessary increase in power and influence. But on being reassured that his voice would be heard and his talents used, he accepted the job and, predictably, took it very seriously. For much of 1917, Long pushed himself at a punishing pace, working seven days a week - usually twelve to fourteen hours a day - and rarely attended the House.15 His compulsive work habits

137 A Federal Solution?

during these early months of the new administration owed much to his efforts to overcome the death in January 1917 of his eldest son, Brigadier-General Walter "Toby" Long, who had been killed in action. Father and son had been very close and Long was shattered. Friends later doubted if he ever fully recovered from his loss. At the time, Long admitted to Lady Londonderry that it was "an awful blow," adding, "But we have his dear memory and we must see to it that his great sacrifice was not in vain." Nevertheless, he found it hard despite his best efforts: "I am doing my best to 'carry on/ but it is very difficult and the surest help my friends can give me is to leave me alone for the present."16 One area of policy which Long did continue to monitor closely was Ireland. The first Irish issue to confront the new government was the release of interned prisoners. By the autumn of 1916, about one thousand men had been released, but almost six hundred were still in detention in December. Many observers, including an anxious John Redmond, believed it would be wiser to release the men than to continue to hold them; otherwise, the militants would continue to gather favour in the countryside. Duke sympathized with this argument and on his recommendation the cabinet agreed on 21 December to release the remaining prisoners. Long did not support this decision and was quick to let Duke know his views: "I regard the wholesale release of the Rebels with grave anxiety. The Irish are bad people to run away from/ is a very old and very true saying. I can't help thinking the R.I.C. will share my view."17 Two weeks later he was still steaming and in a letter to Bonar Law confessed, "I don't understand Duke's policy, the release of some of the worst Sinn Feiners is deplorable, and for what use? No recruits and according to last paper from Robinson more soldiers required to keep Ireland quiet!"18 Duke had also suggested to Redmond in mid-December that a statutory commission of some five Irishmen might be appointed to put the Home Rule Act into operation for "all Ireland" as soon as possible. He had assured the Nationalist leader that conscription would not be mixed up with the plan.19 Duke's suggestions did not go far, primarily because Lloyd George had not given the Irish problem any sustained thought since late July 1916. The prime minister had been badly scarred by his experience of the previous summer, and he was not anxious to plunge back into the "quagmire of distrust" that bedevilled Anglo-Irish relations.20 He was also sensitive to the calls for conscription that were building in England. Recruitment in Ireland was almost nonexistent, and the English who were losing their sons resented Ireland's recalcitrance. Lloyd George was

138 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

not persuaded, as Duke seemed to be, that partition could be dispensed with, for he was convinced that the Ulster Unionists would never accept a policy that contained a parliament for a united Ireland. Moreover, he believed that Long was as hostile as ever, and this also disturbed him.21 By now, Long was increasingly of the opinion that the responsibility for finding a settlement should be thrown on the Irish themselves, and in mid-February he suggested this in cabinet. This prompted L.S. Amery, a staunch Unionist who was a convert to federalism and was a member of the new cabinet secretariat, to send a memorandum to Long in which he advocated a federal solution to the problem and suggested that any constitutional convention should contain outside experts who were familiar with the conventions in South Africa that had led to its union in 1-910.22 Long did not have a high opinion of Amery and was inclined to think of him as a relentless meddler, but some of Amery's ideas made sense. Soon afterwards, Long wrote to Lloyd George, saying that he did not believe the time was particularly opportune for a conference, especially if Sinn Fein were to be excluded, for then nothing would come of it; but if there was to be a conference, then he thought the chairman "ought to be a well-known Englishman of high position and standing who [had] been favourable to the federal system - such as Lord Grey." Long had been toying with the federal idea since late 1916, but this was the first time he had broached the idea at the highest level. Obviously, he thought it was still possible to find a solution that would involve Ireland in some form of continuing relationship with England. As he put it to Lloyd George, "I am not of opinion that the whole cause of Ireland's trouble is her connection with England. I think it is very largely due to her inability ever to be content with anything." He said that despite the socio-economic changes for the better in Ireland since 1881, "her discontent and hostility to England are probably stronger than they have ever been"; nevertheless, he now believed that a federal constitution for the United Kingdom would resolve the problem. It would give both Irelands what they wanted: extended self-government for the South and West, and the continued protection of union in the North.23 On 2 March, Lloyd George urged Carson of the need for a move towards a settlement, given the parlous state of the Nationalists and the surging Sinn Fein. He suggested something along the lines of a royal commission or a convention, a suggestion which had now been made by Amery, Long, and W.G.S. Adams, a member of his private secretariat, the infamous "Garden Suburb." Like Amery and Long, Adams had suggested "federal devolution" as a possible solution to Ulster's fears.24 After pondering the proposal, Carson rejected the

139 A Federal Solution?

idea of a commission or convention. He was sure it would be misconstrued in the North and would undermine his credibility there. He preferred to leave matters alone for the time being. Long had an intensive conversation about Ireland with Hewins on 6 March. Hewins had met with Devlin the previous day. Both men had doubted the government's capacity or will to resolve the dilemma but they were also aware that the Ulster Unionists, especially Carson, were the stumbling block.25 Long clearly found the whole matter frustrating. In a private note to Buxton, the governor general of South Africa, he confided, "The Irish question still remains unsettled. The position of the Irish is really a very unfair and unreasonable one. They were offered Home Rule for those who wished it; they have admitted themselves that you cannot coerce Ulster; and yet they demand a settlement in face of the fact that the whole of Ireland, with one consent, has repudiated the idea of dividing the country."26 In a crucial Commons debate on 7 March, Lloyd George made it clear that the government was prepared to give self-government to the South and West but did not wish to force the North into an untenable position. This was totally unsatisfactory to the Nationalists, who believed they were always being called upon to make sacrifices. Redmond was particularly suspicious of entering into negotiations, given his experiences of 1916, and he rebuffed Lloyd George's appeal. He underlined the depth of his feeling by leading his party out of the House in protest.27 Long had some sympathy with Redmond's position, and he admitted to Lloyd George that Redmond's patriotism throughout the war meant recognizing an honourable obligation which should take the form "of an attempt to establish a workable form of self-government in Ireland."28 Nevertheless, he doubted that any such attempt could succeed unless there was substantial agreement among all the Irish parties, including the Ulstermen. "In any case," he said, "I do not think that the attempt should be made until after the war. If it fails it will increase the present bitterness, as the last attempt did." Long believed that an effort just then would almost certainly fail "because of the strong feeling against large changes in time of war, and because there is still a considerable section ... of Unionists which would now resent and fear a concession to the Irish, who as a nation have done so little in the war. Later on, this feeling might be disregarded, but it would be unwise to affront it at present."29 Despite Long's pessimism, Carson was not entirely obdurate, although understandably he always sought to protect Ulster interests. Taking as his starting point the assumption that Ulster would never be coerced into a home rule Ireland, he now proposed to Lloyd

140 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

George the establishment of a consultative assembly made up of the members of a new Irish parliament and the MPS from the six northeastern counties who sat at Westminster. He suggested that such an arrangement might lead to reconciliation.30 It was therefore not entirely surprising that at its meeting on 22 March the war cabinet decided to explore the possibility of a commission, preferably one containing representatives of the dominions. Its brief would be to determine how the Home Rule Act could be amended so that it could be implemented as soon as possible. Long was asked to establish if the dominion prime ministers would be willing to serve.31 Later that day he approached Sir Robert Borden, William Massey, and General Smuts, but all three told him they did not wish to be asked to serve for two reasons: first, the length of time involved to deal with a subject with which each was unacquainted; second, the difficult questions it might well raise for each of them at home.32 Lloyd George was now in a quandary with all options seemingly at an end. After the Easter recess, on 16 April, the war cabinet decided to prepare a draft bill as a way of initiating discussion between the Irish parties. A small subcommittee consisting of Curzon, Duke, and Addison was given the task, and over the next few weeks they produced a working document. During the cabinet discussions, Carson had resisted county option in the North and had insisted on a clean cut, and this was what the draft proposed. Unfortunately, it also included other features, which seemed to cater too openly to northern Unionist interests. Redmond, O'Connor, Dillon, and Devlin were unenthusiastic.33 Long had not been directly involved in these decisions and negotiations, but he had been kept informed and he did not hesitate to advise Lloyd George. He urged the prime minister not to lose heart: I am sure any scheme of Partition is foredoomed to failure, and I pray of you not to risk the breakdown of your proposals, the disastrous effects of this would not be confined to Ireland or even the U.K. Better far to postpone again and again rather than have failure. The R.C. Church will wreck any scheme of the kind. I believe they are out against Home Rule. They fear Anti-Clericalism and they are formidable opponents. Believe me, I don't write as a Unionist, I will support any fair workable measure which will be accepted by Ireland, even though at first there has to be some compulsion, but Partition they won't have.34

Long, was now absolutely convinced that "federation" was "the only chance of success." He admitted to his long-time correspondent, the

141 A Federal Solution?

inveterate federalist Moreton Frewen, "I don't like your idea of a Committee of outsiders; there is very strong feeling here, which I share myself, to the effect that we should be left to settle our own internal and domestic difficulties as we think right, and to bring in foreigners is to run a very grave risk for the future. But if some federal scheme were suggested and then referred to a strong Committee representing the United Kingdom, under the chairmanship of a man like Starr Jameson, and the Act of 1914 also referred to this Committee, I cannot help thinking that a working scheme might come out of it."35 On 15 May, Lloyd George asked Long to attend the war cabinet meeting the next morning to go over a new offer that he intended to make to Redmond. Long was frank in reply. He agreed to attend but made it clear that he regretted "being called in only when the trouble has become acute, even critical." Lloyd George had not spelled out the proposal in detail but he did tell Long that it included the offer of an Irish convention which both Unionists and Nationalists, including Redmond, were prepared to accept. Long was encouraged, for he had long believed the Irish should try and settle the problem themselves. He urged Lloyd George to go ahead: "I am satisfied that you are on the edge of the precipice as regards Ireland. It is the moment for a bold policy: and I believe a solution can be found ... Ireland will never accept a scheme devised on this side."36 With Long's backing,37 Lloyd George was able to gain the support of the war cabinet for his proposal, and on 16 May he wrote to Redmond offering him either a home rule bill modelled on the draft prepared by Curzon, Duke, and Addison or a convention. Redmond replied the next day rejecting the bill but accepting the convention.38 Lloyd George made the matter official with an announcement in the House of Commons on 21 May. At last, the way seemed open for a possible reconciliation. Long was certainly pleased.39 He had been intrigued by the idea of a convention since his visit to South Africa in 1909 and had raised the idea with Lloyd George as recently as February. Over the next few days, he attempted to secure the appointment to the convention of men known to be sympathetic to a federal solution, such as Moreton Frewen and Lord Dunraven, but only Dunraven was selected.40 Long had also hoped that someone sympathetic to federalism would be chosen as chairman but he was satisfied when the task was given to Sir Horace Plunkett.41 LONG WAS NOT CLOSELY INVOLVED with the convention proceedings. Like other English Unionists, he could do little but watch from

142 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the sidelines as the delegates grappled with a variety of complex issues. His activist instincts were also undermined by another bout of poor health that dragged on into the early months of 1918. He fell ill with neuritis in July and had still not shaken it off by early September. By the end of that month he was again suffering from severe headaches, a lingering result of a hunting accident some five years earlier when he had almost broken his neck. When it seemed as if he would soon be able to resume full-time duties, he hurt his leg and he was on crutches for much of November. Then, like so many others, he caught flu early in the new year and he was marooned at Rood Ashton for days at a time. He was not fully himself again until mid-April 1918. Long's tenuous health did not prevent him from meeting most of his governmental responsibilities, but he admitted in early October that he was not consulted about most decisions. He had never been comfortable with the small war cabinet, which he referred scathingly to as a "Council of Six," operating as "an autocracy." But although he resented being excluded, this did not stop him from passing on his views whenever he thought it necessary.42 Some of his frustration surfaced in a letter he wrote to Lloyd George on 23 October criticizing a number of government strategies. Referring to Irish policy, Long argued: We are proceeding on wrong lines. Drastic changes of Government and Administration are required, and I believe that if they are boldly and sympathetically made, the moment has arrived when we can carry the work of the Convention to a satisfactory conclusion, and secure a real settlement of Irish difficulties. This may sound optimistic, but I believe it to be true, and I know that my views are shared by many others. In this connection, may I venture to remind you that the Convention was proposed by me, and you will remember the difficulty that you had in securing its adoption by the Cabinet: is it not fair to ask where should we be today if the Convention had not been set up? Surely this is a question in which other than the War Cabinet should be consulted? It affects the future of the United Kingdom, and as regards the prosecution of the War, if serious trouble occurs in Ireland in the course of the next few months, our hands will be immensely weakened.43

Long continued to exercise a watching brief into the new year and wrote unhesitatingly and frankly to Lloyd George about various policy matters.44 By 17 January 1918, the situation in the convention had reached a crisis, with the Nationalists divided in their support

143 A Federal Solution?

of a southern Unionist motion to approve home rule but to leave the levying of customs duties with the Westminster parliament. Redmond had been prepared to cooperate with the southern Unionists but had not been backed by many of his colleagues, including Devlin. He therefore refused to move a motion in support of Midleton's ideas. Walter Long got wind of these developments but misinterpreted them. He thought Redmond was holding the British government to ransom by insisting on a fully empowered parliament. Consequently, Long sent a brusque memorandum to the prime minister. This memorandum is revealing of Long's deeprooted prejudices and his all-too-easily reached apocalyptic conclusions.45 He told Lloyd George that as a result of "thoroughly reliable" information, he was convinced that the convention would break up in "hopeless confusion" unless immediate steps were taken, for the belief had spread in Ireland that Redmond had recently changed his mind about supporting a convention-inspired solution and had become more insistent in his demands. Long continued: The danger of this attitude on his part is extreme. It means that the Convention will not make a recommendation except by a small majority or even if the Southern Unionists come in, which I can hardly believe to be possible, it will be in support of a scheme which cannot find acceptance amongst the bulk of English Members of Parliament and People. So far the United Kingdom aspect of the case has been kept carefully on one side, but if it is proposed to give to Ireland the status of Canada or Australia, including fiscal autonomy, the opposition in the House of Commons and in the country here will, I am convinced, be overwhelming, and I do not myself believe that it would be possible to carry such a scheme through Parliament ... Now I believe that the only way to secure a reconsideration of his position is to instruct the Chief Secretary today, and with as little delay as possible, to send for Redmond and tell him quite plainly that if he withdraws from the position he has hitherto taken up, and insists upon Dominion Home Rule, plus fiscal autonomy, there is not the smallest prospect of the proposals being adopted by the Government. In dealing with Irishmen, believe me, it is essential to be clear, distinct, and to make them understand that your mind is made up, and that they are not going to induce you to change it. Never was it so necessary to adopt this line of action in Ireland as it is today. All the old Irish Parties are split up; there is immense confusion of thought, and hopeless indecision of action; and it is the psychological moment for the strong hand of the British Government to intervene and produce, as I believe is possible, order out of chaos. But time is everything. If the present reactionary movement is allowed to go on for the next forty-

144 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union eight hours, I believe the Convention will be destroyed, the resistance of Ulster will be justified, and the difficulties which will follow upon this ending of the Convention requires no description by me. I therefore venture to urge upon you the course which I have indicated above.

The convention did not, of course, fail immediately, but it was clearly in difficulty and Long was right to be concerned. He carried his arguments against the possible transfer of customs to Irish control into the war cabinet. On 13 February 1918, he stated "that he felt convinced that the majority of those who thought with him in Parliament would never agree to the handing over of Customs to an Irish Parliament... Mr Long added that any offer at this stage by the Government of the Customs, would be regarded by the Nationalists as a political victory which would make the position of the Unionists almost, if not quite, impossible."46 Long was also convinced that much of the discussion about home rule was taking place on the basis of the 1914 act, a basis which he now thought "illusory."47 Circumstances and attitudes had shifted considerably since 1914, and in Long's view something far different would be required. Ever since the summer of 1916, Lloyd George had taken Long's opinions seriously even if he did not always share them, and at the end of February he asked Long to replace Duke as chief secretary of Ireland with full powers of government. As an alternative, Lloyd George offered to make him a minister without portfolio with a seat in the war cabinet. For "purely domestic reasons," Long refused the Irish post and advised Lloyd George that he would prefer to remain at the colonial office rather than become a minister without portfolio. Long believed he could still be of use in solving "the troublesome problem of Irish Government" by offering suggestions and recommendations. He made it clear that he did not think the war cabinet should be asked to devote any of its time to fashioning an Irish constitution.48 Long had appreciated the compliment paid to him and understandably had hesitated, but as he confided to his diary, "I finally decided to refuse PM'S offer. I am sure I am right but it is a difficult decision."49 This was the second time in less than two years that Long had been offered the chief secretaryship. Why did he refuse? The reasons were complex, but undoubtedly he believed that he could still help effect a solution to the Irish difficulties while continuing his war work, which he valued and found absorbing. Also, he probably appreciated that he would have more room for manoeuvre and thus for influence if he managed to retain the greatest degree of flexibility.

145 A Federal Solution?

To have accepted the chief secretaryship would have bound him more closely than he wanted to the day-to-day pressures of Irish administration and, perhaps more important, would probably have compromised any possibility of a solution owing to his close identification with the Unionists. It was better by far that his role should be less obvious. He was already giving some thought to how he might achieve maximum influence with minimum penalty. Three days later, as requested, Long sent Lloyd George his suggestions for dealing with Ireland. He was convinced that it was essential to change the Irish government from top to bottom. He recommended the appointment of Londonderry as lord lieutenant and Ian Macpherson as chief secretary. Long said he believed Londonderry had been particularly successful in the convention and "would bring firmness, courage and conciliation to bear on the discharge of his duties."50 He then turned to a more general but, in many ways, a more radical suggestion: It seems to me to be very wrong that the War Cabt should be called upon to give any portion of their time or thoughts to these domestic questions: I believe the plan you adopted in connection with oil administration should be more generally adopted. You put me at the head of all the Departments concerned to represent the Cabinet and I am happy to say that this has worked admirably. You have loyally supported me and the Cabt has not been troubled. If you see fit to give me a similar position as regards Ireland I feel very confident the arrangement would work well and I really believe that in 6 months you could have Ireland quiet and be able to carry a measure of self-government with the assent of the great majority of Irishmen. I would go to Ireland occasionally and thereby obviate any need for the futile expedient of bringing the Irish Govt over here.

Lloyd George did not respond immediately to this suggestion, and in mid-March Long once again fell ill with flu. He was not able to resume his full duties until mid-April. In the meantime, much happened both to alter and to accelerate decisions. On 21 March the Germans launched a major offensive and the Allies were soon reeling before the onslaught. As the brunt of the attack fell on the British army, the need for reinforcements became acute. Virtually overnight, Lloyd George and the war cabinet decided to extend conscription to Ireland. This decision did not meet with the approval of Carson or any of the senior Irish officials. They believed conscription would lead not only to widespread unrest and resentment in Ireland but also to the complete undermining of the Irish convention. In an effort to appease the Irish and save the

146 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

convention, Lloyd George decided that a home rule bill based on the convention report would be introduced simultaneously with a military manpower bill. To facilitate this, the recall of Parliament was delayed until 9 April (the convention report was expected by 4 April).51 Long was not a party to the decision to introduce a new manpower bill, but writing from his sickbed to Lloyd George on i April, he made it clear that he supported the extension of compulsory service to Ireland. Long had always favoured conscription of manpower for both military and domestic needs, so his support of a further bill was not surprising. As for its application to Ireland, he said he thought "the shock of the present crisis" would enable Lloyd George to carry it. Moreover, if Ireland was excluded, the Irish Nationalists would not lessen their opposition to conscription on principle, but "a heavy blow would be struck at Irish Unionists." It would also be undesirable on imperial grounds, Long argued. "Would not this be a most unfortunate admission to make to our Oversea Dominions that we on our own responsibility are not prepared to place the same reliance on Ireland as we do on the rest of the United Kingdom and what would be the effect produced by such an admission?" In closing, Long indicated that although he wanted the bill to include Ireland, he would be prepared to accept a decision "on tactical grounds" that it would not do so.52 Long's reaction to the news that Lloyd George planned to marry conscription for Ireland with a home rule bill was much less enthusiastic. He distrusted the war cabinet, which was inclined to "hesitate, chop and change," and he held that to read Smuts on Ireland was "eno' to make the angels weep!"53 He disagreed with Balfour's argument that a bargain could be struck by the linking of home rule and conscription; it would mean a row and would yield no satisfaction. Long much preferred to deal with the two issues separately. He was convinced that there had to be conscription in Ireland if there was to be any hope of tightening up recruiting in Great Britain, "be the row what it may"; but, as he put it to Hewins: "To ask Parlt to assent to a hotch-potch of H.R. & Conscription is, I think, the greatest folly. But then I am not one of the great men."54 By this time, Long was completely frustrated at being confined to Rood Ashton, but he was under strict orders not to go up to London until mid-April. "I hate being away," he raged. But his isolation did not stop him from firing off letters and memoranda to all and sundry. He had kept in touch with developments in the convention, and while he knew that the Ulster Unionists refused to be associated with any home rule recommendations, he took solace from the fact

±47 A Federal Solution?

there had been considerable agreement between the Nationalists and the southern Unionists and that there had been "much cross voting and consequent breaking down of old concrete foundations."55 He must also have been aware that a considerable ground swell of support had developed within the Unionist party for a federal solution to the Irish problem. Federal ideas had been debated with increasing intensity since August 1916 when Selborne had publicly called for some form of devolution as a means of resolving the difficulties in the United Kingdom. Letters, memoranda, and pamphlets had been circulated and exchanged with increasing frequency, particularly by Selborne, F.S. Oliver, and L.S. Amery, and by early 1918 Carson and Austen Chamberlain were known to be sympathetic to the idea. So was Lloyd George; in late February he had written to Hugh Barrie, the chairman of the Ulster delegation to the convention, urging him to make the convention recommendations "compatible with the realisation of a federal system of the United Kingdom."56 No doubt with this in mind, Long suggested to Bonar Law on 7 April that a small committee should be appointed with the authority to draw up a scheme based both on the findings of the convention and on Lloyd George's letter to Barrie which would then be submitted to Parliament.57 Two days later, on 9 April, Lloyd George introduced the new military service bill which empowered the government to extend conscription to Ireland by order-in-council. He also announced to the House his intention of introducing "a measure for self-government in Ireland." Long quickly congratulated the prime minister on his speech: "Believe me I know Ireland, you scored a greater triumph there even than in the H of C. The Irish will talk, shout, perhaps get up a fight or two, but they know they are beaten & if we sit tight, make no concessions, you will soon have 200 to 300,000 fine fighting Irishmen in the ranks."58 At this moment, Long still appears to have thought the idea of a home rule bill in conjunction with conscription "absurd." He tended to think only of recruitment. As he explained to Hewins, "If Gov. go straight ahead and make no concessions there will be no real trouble in I. If they give way at all it will be regarded as surrender. If you give an Irishman an inch, he does not take an ell, but a thousand ells! You are right, the Irish are insincere, they are beaten before they start. 'Firm. Firm. Firm/ and you will very soon have 200 to 300,000 first rate soldiers from Ireland who will fight like devils."59 Long was soon obliged to change his thinking about the joining of home rule with conscription. On 11 April the war cabinet asked Lloyd George to appoint a committee to draw up the details of a

148 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

home rule bill for introducton in the House as soon as possible.60 Ironically, this was very similar to Long's earlier suggestion, but he was very surprised when Lloyd George telephoned him at Rood Ashton and asked him to chair the committee. This placed Long in a dilemma. He did not believe that conscription and home rule should be linked, but if the government was determined to proceed, it made sense to be intimately involved with the shaping of a bill. Given his unrelenting criticism of Lloyd George's procedures in 1916 and his often-stated willingness to help resolve the Irish difficulty, Long really had little alternative. His diary entry registers his surprise and his conclusion: "P.M. teld asking me to preside over Comt to draw Home Rule Bill!! I can't refuse."61 Over the next few days, Lloyd George put together a committee of nine. Three - Curzon, Duke, and Christopher Addison - had been members of the small committee established in the spring of 1917 to draft a home rule bill, while a fourth, Austen Chamberlain, had joined the government on 10 April on condition that any home rule scheme that emerged should be compatible with a federal plan for the United Kingdom. There were three Liberals on the committee, Herbert Fisher, the president of the board of education, Sir George Hewart, the solicitor general, and Addison, the minister of reconstruction; five Unionists, Chamberlain, Curzon, Duke, Long, and George Cave, the secretary of state for home affairs; one Labourite, George Barnes; and one outsider, General Smuts, whose opinion on Ireland Long had little respect for but who had grappled with a variety of perplexing constitutional problems in South Africa before the establishment of the union in 1910. Curzon, Barnes, Smuts, and Chamberlain were all members of the war cabinet. W.G.S. Adams of Lloyd George's "Garden Suburb" was appointed secretary. The committee met for the first time on 15 April. A few days before that initial meeting, Walter Long had drafted a memorandum for the prime minister in which he outlined the aims, attitudes, and assumptions that were whirling in his mind.62 He began by assuring Lloyd George that though the situation in Ireland was undoubtedly difficult, "even possibly perilous," there was still hope, and he was confident that if it was dealt with "in a spirit of broad statesmanship and firmness," it was capable of being settled "in such a manner as to bring not only peace to Ireland, but really increased strength to the United Kingdom and the Empire." To his mind, there were two conditions that were essential to the success of any measure. First, it would be absolutely necessary to see that Sir Edward Carson was not only not placed in a difficult position but that his path was made as easy as possible. Long re-

149 A Federal Solution?

minded Lloyd George that Carson was held in deep affection in Ulster and that it had been Carson more than any other man who by his inspired leadership had prevented a rising in Ulster before the war. Long therefore urged that in putting forward any plan involving the granting of self-government to Ireland, everything should be done to make Carson's position "thoroughly satisfactory." He pointed out, perhaps with the 1916 negotiations in mind, that "if the people of Ulster thought that [Carson] had been unfairly treated, or that the policy of the Government was one which tended to flout or ignore him, very bitter hostility would be at once aroused, which would make the passing of any measure very difficult, and the working of it later on impossible." Secondly, Long believed it was essential that "the most careful enquiries" be made in order to establish the feelings of the workingmen of Belfast: "If the introduction of what they would call bluntly a Home Rule or Rome Rule measure were to be followed by general strikes, I need not point out how serious the position would be from the point of view of the war." If the policy Long intended to propose commended itself to the prime minister and the government, then Long said he thought steps should be taken "to spread amongst the working classes of Belfast the main facts which would, I think, give them ground, if not for immediate support, at all events for careful consideration and discussion among themselves before any hostile actions were decided upon." Long then outlined his proposal, and although he did not use the term, it is clear he had a federal solution in mind. He began by asking how a home rule scheme could best be proposed to Parliament and made acceptable to both Nationalists and Unionists. He believed there was only one way: the question would have to be dealt with "as part, and a leading part of, the great Imperial resettlement to which we are all looking forward" after the war. Although the precise nature of that change could neither be defined nor foreseen at present, it was "essential," said Long, that "the United Kingdom should set her house in order" and that "we begin with Ireland, because there the controversy has raged with greater vigour, and it may even be said, fury, than anywhere else." Long then suggested that they offer to Ireland a form of Government which will be so framed as to give her great liberty for purely domestic or local matters, while reserving to the Parliament63 of the United Kingdom, the supreme powers which can only be exercised by a central authority. And above all we retain fiscal power in the central government, the reason for this being that we intend to unite

150 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union the Empire from what may be called the commercial point of view, more closely than she has ever been united before, and in this fiscal change we desire that Ireland should benefit to the fullest possible extent, and therefore by securing fiscal control in the hands of the central government, we shall be able to give Ireland not only those special advantages which are essential to her if her prosperity is to be assured, but also her full share in those Imperial advantages which we hope will be one of the results of the changes which we have in contemplation.

It is obvious that Long had imperial federation in mind as a future goal and that an appropriate step therefore would be a federal United Kingdom with Ireland as an integral part. He apologized for the vagueness of the idea, but he was confident "that if we can switch the attention of Irishmen off from the old controversy between Unionists and Nationalists, between Protestants and Roman Catholics, and get them to look at the question from the Empire point of view, and above all from the fiscal point of view, we shall make things easier for the Unionists in the North, and I believe shall attract an immense amount of support from the Nationalists, and strike an absolutely fatal blow at the Sinn Fein movement." This memorandum is an extraordinary document, for it reveals that mixture of hard-headed understanding of Ireland which Long possessed in abundance and the romantic, self-delusory imaginings which all too often sidetracked him. It is impossible to understand how he could have thought that "the Empire point of view" would have any hope of prevailing in an Ireland where Sinn Fein was now openly demanding independence. Perhaps those passages had been drafted when his flu-induced fever had been particularly intense. What the memorandum did clearly reveal, however, was Long's desire to appease the Ulster Unionists, to conciliate the Nationalists, to preserve the Union, and to retain the cohesion of the empire. He was convinced that federalism was the only possible way to meet these various needs. Long knew by now that Selborne and Austen Chamberlain were firm advocates of a federal solution and that others in the Unionist hierarchy such as Carson and Midleton were at least sympathetic, while even a staunch Tory like Salisbury admitted, "If driven to it I would prefer a settlement consistent with the Federal principle to a settlement inconsistent with it."64 Long was also aware of the ground swell of support for the federal idea that had recently developed in the ranks of Unionist MPS and more generally throughout the country. There is no evidence to suggest that he had been drawn into the propaganda activities of Oliver and Amery, but he had seen

151 A Federal Solution?

some of their material and his close friend, Moreton Frewen, a longtime federalist, had constantly reminded him of the attractions of the idea for the solution of the twin United Kingdom problems of Ireland and parliamentary congestion. Long had also toyed with the idea before the war as a possible compromise to the difficulties of that time, and since the collapse of the 1916 negotiations he had become convinced that a federal solution was the only viable alternative. His full-scale commitment to federalism in 1918 was therefore not as surprising as it must have seemed to many of his colleagues. Moreover, the convention had fully revealed how hopeless it was to try and bring Nationalists, southern Unionists, and Ulstermen together on conventional home rule lines. Would it not be better, he asked, to "devise a scheme which could if necessary be adopted as a basis for Federation of United Kingdom and fight it on these lines" ? If this was the case, it would be essential for his committee to discuss and decide what the main principles of any such measure would be.65 This was the line of argument he pursued in the opening meetings of the Irish committee. During the first session on 15 April, it soon became clear that the members of the committee had so many other important responsibilities that frequent meetings would be impossible. The war cabinet therefore instructed Long to draw up a bill himself and only consult the committee on points of difference. Long was to use the Irish convention's report as a framework but, perhaps because that report was so inconclusive, he was given complete latitude to devise a bill that would be considered fair both by British and American opinion and by all parties concerned.66 On conveying this decision to the committee at its second meeting on 16 April, Long argued that it was no use attempting to placate either Ulster or the Nationalists, for no solution acceptable to one group would please the other. In his opinion, the bill should be "based on the federal principle." In fact, he went further and stated that he was "against presenting any Home Rule measure which was inconsistent with federalism." He then sought advice on the position of the Ulster minority, the financial arrangements, and the form of Irish representation in the Westminster parliament. Curzon, Smuts, and Hewart were absent, but all the others agreed with Chamberlain when, in response to Long's remarks, he said that the "proper test to apply in framing a Home Rule Bill for Ireland was that provided by a federal reconstruction of the United Kingdom." No dissenting voice was raised against the federal ideal at this meeting. Long clearly had a mandate to devise a bill compatible with federalism. The members of the committee did differ on points

152 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

of detail, however, and there was no immediate consensus on the three questions raised by Long. At his suggestion, a small subcommittee composed of himself, Chamberlain, and Fisher was given the task of sorting out the financial proposals.67 The subcommittee met on 17 and 18 April and discussed excise, customs, the imperial contribution, land, and the post office. The committee was helped formally by Duke and by Long's friend W.A.S. He wins (who attended the first meeting) and informally by Lionel Curtis of the Round Table movement, an acknowledged expert on federation, who conferred with Fisher about "Irish finance" three times during the two days.68 These discussions went so well that Long wrote enthusiastically to Lloyd George about progress being "more rapid than I should have expected": I think I am justified in saying that the further we go, the more clear it becomes that if we could make a commencement towards the establishment of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, we should make the passage of the Bill much easier in the House of Commons, make it far more acceptable to the mass of people in Great Britain, and I believe, make it easier for Nationalist Ireland to accept provisions which, if intended solely for an Irish Parliament, might seem to them not to be sufficient for the purpose, and certainly it would make the position of Ulster infinitely easier.

If such a policy could be agreed upon, Long believed it would be possible to devise a title for the bill which would get rid of the words "Home Rule for Ireland." This might seem a small thing, he argued, but it would be of immense importance to all the opponents of home rule, especially in Ulster. Long assured Lloyd George that he was not suggesting that they should proceed right away to set up parliaments in the rest of the United Kingdom, but he thought they could appoint a commission or a strong committee, limited in numbers, and "charge them with the duty of preparing schemes for England, Wales, and Scotland." So far as he could judge from correspondence in the press and reports reaching him from the House of Commons, the government's adoption of such a policy would be very popular. Long said he was backed by Chamberlain and that both of them thought the issue should be considered by the cabinet early in the following week. "There is no doubt," he concluded, "that opinion among members of the Committee has hardened in the direction of a Federal system, and the further one goes in the preparation of the Bill, the more evident it is that once you adopt the Federal system, the drafting of the Bill becomes much easier."69 It was clear from this that Long had committed himself fully to a

153 A Federal Solution?

federal United Kingdom into which Ireland could be made to fit. That this was not a solution that would have much appeal to Irish Nationalists did not seem to dissuade him. He was not unaware of Sinn Fein's position, but so anxious was he to preserve the union that he allowed himself to be carried away by the logic of the argument rather than the reality of the situation. He had, of course, a good deal of support from the committed federalists such as Oliver, Amery, and Brassey who lobbied and pleaded with whoever would listen to them or read their letters and memoranda.70 Even so, Long could still not quite believe the situation in which he found himself. As he confided to his diary on 19 April, "Make great progress on the H R Bill. What an occupation for me!"71 Long's letter to Lloyd George of 18 April was distributed to the war cabinet, and it initiated a major discussion on 23 April over the issue of federation for the United Kingdom and the relationship to it of a home rule bill for Ireland.72 Long argued that there was "considerable and increasing evidence to show that, if a beginning could be made with the establishment of a Federal system for the United Kingdom it would be much easier to pass the Government of Ireland Amendment Bill through the House of Commons." He claimed he was daily receiving many representations from Liberals and Unionists in favour of a federal solution. Long did not believe that it would be possible to pass a home rule bill "unless it could be shown that it was not inconsistent with Federalism." Further, he thought that, given "the immense burden of post-war legislation which would rest upon Parliament, some Federal plan was inevitable. Such a solution would greatly help to make Home Rule tolerable to Unionists, to the Ulster people, and more acceptable even to the Nationalists. It would be very difficult for Irishmen to oppose measures which it was intended to make applicable to each of the four parts of the United Kingdom." He suggested that a "resolution could be moved from one side of the House and seconded from the other in support of the Federal principle, and of the appointment of a Committee to consider its application to England, Scotland, and Wales; while in the preamble to the Home Rule Bill, and also in some of its clauses, there could be references to the Government's intention to set up national legislatures, not only in Ireland, but in England, Scotland, and Wales." Lloyd George suggested that "the cabinet could lay it down as a principle that the Irish Bill must be compatible with a Federal scheme, and provision could be made for setting up a Commission on the lines of the Speaker's Conference." He said he had always found that the Ulster representatives objected to being treated dif-

154 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

ferently from the United Kingdom, but if a scheme was projected in which Ireland appeared as much an integral part of the United Kingdom as England, Scotland, and Wales, that would go a long way to placating Ulster. As for Wales, Lloyd George said there were several problems which the Welsh would like to handle themselves because the imperial parliament never found adequate time. Had Wales enjoyed home rule, Lloyd George believed greater progress would have been made, especially with education. He was assured that the Scots had similar feelings about the congestion of Parliament and that "there was a growing desire that Scottish affairs should be managed by Scotsmen." Nevertheless, despite clearly favouring the federal idea, Lloyd George said he would not make the passage of the home rule bill dependent on the acceptance of a general scheme of federalism. Chamberlain spoke strongly in support of Long. He thought it "essential to obtain a decision from Parliament in favour of the Federal principle": first, because it would be impossible otherwise to obtain sufficient Unionist support for the Irish bill; second, because of the congestion of business after the war and the strain that would be thrown on the imperial parliament; and third, because federalism provided a solution for problems such as customs which were otherwise extraordinarily difficult. He therefore "wished it to appear plainly on the face of the Irish Bill that it was the first instalment of a Federal scheme for the United Kingdom." Neither Barnes nor Smuts was as supportive as Chamberlain, both preferring a delay, until after the war, of consideration of the difficult issue of customs and excise, but the most telling criticism came from two of Long's colleagues, Balfour and Curzon. Balfour had always been opposed to considering home rule during the war, but he had now concluded that it had to be dealt with as a war measure since both the dominions and the United States were interested in it. While he was prepared to shift his ground this far, he made it clear that he was "most reluctant to be committed beyond that position and to acceptance of a Federal system." It might be true, he said, that there was a growing body of opinion in favour of federalism, but he thought the question had received a very imperfect consideration. The federal solution had been found admirable in large countries as an integrating force binding widely scattered regions into a unity, but in a small country like the United Kingdom there were, in his opinion, neither historical nor geographical reasons for introducing the federal plan. England formed by far the largest part of the United Kingdom, and Balfour thought that an English parliament and a federal parliament in London would be unworkable. Moreover, he

155 A Federal Solution?

believed that adoption of a federal solution would plunge the country into acute controversy over constitutional issues at a time when reconstruction problems should be grappled with. He was prepared to support a home rule bill during the war but did not want to be committed to a federal scheme. For his part, Curzon pointed out that the cabinet was being asked to agree to a novel constitutional procedure. He agreed with Balfour that "it would be extraordinarily difficult to adjust the spheres and duties of an Imperial Parliament and an English Parliament." He felt the cabinet was being asked to support federalism in order to extricate itself from Irish difficulties, and he did not think this was the appropriate solution. In his opinion, "the prompt passage of the Irish Bill was ... of supreme importance at this juncture." He was prepared to omit from such a bill all that was inconsistent with federalism and he was not opposed to a commission of inquiry, but he did not think it was necessary to insert federalism into the preamble of the bill. Addison and Fisher were inclined to agree with Curzon. They were anxious to avoid any delay in the introduction of a home rule bill. Addison, for example, was prepared to make the Irish bill as consistent as possible with federalism and was prepared to support the appointment of a commission of inquiry into a federal scheme for England, Scotland, and Wales, but he urged that nothing should be done at that moment to kindle a big controversy over federalism. Bonar Law offered a way out of the impasse. He was inclined to agree with Balfour on the issue of federalism, but he accepted Long's argument that it was essential to find a means of placating Ulster. On his suggestion, it was agreed to adjourn discussion until the cabinet had a draft bill before it with a preamble on the lines Long had indicated. Long agreed to produce the draft but warned his colleagues that he "might be unable to support the Bill in the shape in which it finally emerged." This had been a revealing discussion. It demonstrated once more a serious division in Unionist ranks. It appeared that Balfour and perhaps Curzon had accepted the inevitability of partition and had therefore abandoned any commitment to the union. Long and Chamberlain were ranged on the other side, while Bonar Law, ever ineffectual in situations like this, hovered on the sidelines of both camps. As for Lloyd George, his heart clearly favoured federalism but his head told him that it would be impossible to proceed with conscription until home rule had been dealt with. He therefore decided that it was essential to deal promptly with the Irish question and to delay consideration of the larger issue of federalism.73

156 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union Over the next two weeks, Long dutifully worked at the Irish bill, but as he explained to Bonar Law, "My difficulty is to answer the question, 'Why touch H.R. now?' It is not appeasing Nationalists. It is enraging Ulster."74 Clearly, Long believed the cabinet had made a mistake in pursuing a purely Irish bill rather than a more inclusive federal one. Also, Long continued to be frustrated by the coupling of home rule and conscription which he believed had unnecessarily inflamed opinion on all sides. He told Cave frankly, "The two questions should not have been mixed up."75 He did not think the government should wait to extend conscription to Ireland until a home rule bill was passed. As he put it, somewhat angrily, to Hewins, "The men must be forthcoming."76 He asked Cave at the end of April, "Can I go on with Comtt in these circumstances?"77 On 2 May, Long decided, "I cd not support HR policy on present information,"78 but by 7 May he had changed his mind. In explaining his decision to Lloyd George, he reminded the prime minister that he had been unable to attend the early discussions on conscription because of his illness, but that if he had been present he would have done his best to dissuade Lloyd George from adopting the dual policy. He still thought the dual policy unwise but, given the great complexity of the situation, had decided to support it. Nevertheless, said Long, he wished to make it clear "that in no possible circumstances could I share in the responsibility of attempting to coerce Ulster at any time," and he reiterated his commitment to a federal solution and his opposition to partition: If we can boldly adopt the Federal principle for the United Kingdom we shall I am sure get the support of the Dominions and the U.S.A., possibly even of Ulster, and the Finance may divide the Nationalist Forces, though of this I am not so hopeful, but we shall be pursuing a statesmanlike, sober policy, which we can defend. 'Divorce at haste and repent at leisure' may well be our warning ... I at least believe this is the only way in which we can carry our policy. Any other tactics must, I think, result in failure and the ignominious defeat of the Govt, amid a melancholy chorus of "I told you so."79 In late April and early May, Long sought advice from F.S. Oliver, the tireless advocate of federalism who had been a long-time confidant of Carson and Chamberlain and who had, with Selborne, recently prepared a preliminary federal bill. Long wanted suggestions that could be used in a memorandum on federalism that he was preparing for his committee. Oliver was supportive: "I have been turning over your proposed memorandum in my mind; and

157 A Federal Solution?

the more I think of it the more convincing it seems as a reply to those who wish to do the right thing but don't quite see their way." Long had argued that federalism was the best way to forestall, first, the Irish Nationalist demand for dominion status and, second, the congestion in domestic government. Oliver suggested it would also prevent congestion at the imperial level: The very people on the Conservative side who at present are the strongest opponents of Federalism, are those who have made the loudest complaints in previous times of the frivolous & ill proportioned view taken by the British people of matters of national importance. We are always being told - & quite true - that some spicy little matter of domestic interest or prejudice would overlay & obscure the highest imperial issues at an election. And it will always remain so until the domestic issues are dealt with by legislatures elected for that purpose & imperial issues are relegated to a Parliament elected for that quite different purpose.80

On receiving a copy of Long's memorandum, Oliver was complimentary: "I should like just to say that I think your statement is to my mind most admirable in every respect. It has the great merit that it takes Federalism out of the high & dry academic region & brings it down to the practical test of the experience of statesmen who have had to deal with the affairs wh we others have only speculated about."81 Long's memorandum was sent to Lloyd George on 8 May, the day before the third meeting of the Irish Committee.82 Long began by saying he had always opposed federalism for the United Kingdom, mainly on the grounds that the country was too small geographically for more than one parliament. He had preferred a scheme of devolution, which would have involved granting further powers to county councils, grouping county councils in certain areas, and then setting up a central representative council of the area, empowered to levy taxation within certain defined limits and to pass legislation dealing with specific subjects. Long said he still believed that if such a reform had been adopted twenty years earlier, it would have avoided the need for home rule in any form, but he realized that events had "marched far too rapidly recently to offer the least prospect of such a proposal finding favour anywhere today." Therefore, he said, "It appears to me that Federalism is the only way in which the pressure on Parliament can be relieved." Long argued that federalism would help relieve congestion at Westminister, where matters of imperial importance were often shunted to one side while parochial questions dominated the leg-

158 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

islative calendar; it was essential for the future of the empire that this issue should be faced and resolved. Long then used Oliver's comments almost word for word to reinforce his point about the need, after the war, to concentrate on the pressing issues of foreign affairs, defence, finance, trade, and communications, without the distraction of purely domestic matters. Long concluded, "If we are really to do for the Empire what she needs, and at the same time to meet the legitimate requirements of our people at home, the only possible way in which the huge task can be accomplished, is by a system of devolution to local Legislatures, and if I had my way, I would decide that the Federal system must be adopted, and I would make this declaration when bringing in the Irish Bill." On turning to the particular question of a parliament for Ireland, Long was emphatic: "I cannot exaggerate the importance to be attached to the adoption of the Federal plan." It would appeal to the dominions and the United States, he said, and it "would undoubtedly materially alter the position of Ulster. It would no longer be possible for her people to say that they demand but are not going to receive similar treatment with the rest of the United Kingdom." Long assured his colleagues that he was aware of the argument that such a vast constitutional change ought not to be contemplated during the war. But, he asked, would that argument really hold? He pointed out that they were legislating every day in connection with many of the country's most contentious questions. If it was legitimate to do this during the war, could "it really be justly held that we are to be forbidden to make an attempt to solve a problem the reality of which no man can doubt, and if in this solution of the general problem we find an easier path for very many of our friends in the United Kingdom in connection with Irish self-government, is not the advantage so great that we ought to make up our minds and adopt the plan which I venture to advocate?" Long believed the idea would receive strong support in the House of Commons. Federalism would once and for all resolve both the bedevilling question of the position of the Irish MPS in the parliament of the United Kingdom and the issue of control of customs and excise. What he would like to do, he explained, would be to make the Irish Bill, not merely as it is now, consistent with the Federal plan, but actually in words a part of a Federal plan. I would like to set up English, Scottish, and Welsh Committees, not to enquire into Federalism ... but to prepare the particular constitutional system suited to their various ideas and respective countries; for the powers which the subordinate legislature are to exercise will have been settled by the Government of

159 A Federal Solution? Ireland Act. They will be the same for England, Scotland and Wales as they are for Ireland. I believe that well-selected Committees would do this work with very great celerity and without any serious difficulty, and I cannot help thinking that even those who are most doubtful about Federalism today would welcome the change when they found that by it it became possible to meet our Imperial obligations, and at the same time satisfy the demands of our people at home.83

Long's memorandum reflected the difficulties that he, Cave, Chamberlain, and Fisher were having in devising an Irish bill that would be satisfactory to all parties, particularly the Ulsterites. When their initial draft was discussed by the Irish committee on 9 May, the discussion highlighted the problems, especially those associated with finance and the creation of an Ulster committee. Long concluded that the draft bill would not receive any support in Ireland, given the unsettled conditions there. Since a new Irish executive was about to be appointed, he suggested letting it settle in and restore order. A bill might then be received more favourably. "Let's go on quietly getting the Bill into shape and give the Irish Government time," he advised. Edward Shortt, the new chief secretary, Addison, and Curzon were inclined to agree, but Smuts did not think a home rule bill should be introduced at all during the war. It was almost certain to fail, he argued, and that would lead to the downfall of the government. As far as he was concerned, the existence of the United Kingdom and the empire were far more important considerations for the moment. Barnes tended to side with Smuts: if the Irish, of whatever persuasion, were unlikely to support the bill, then it should be dropped. In the end, the committee decided to postpone the introduction of a bill but to continue working on a draft. All the members must have left the meeting in a despondent mood.84 All, that is, except Chamberlain and Long. When Chamberlain wrote two days later congratulating him on his memorandum, Long was delighted: "I am very glad you approve my Memo on Federalism: I believe it is our only chance of salvation."85 Over the next few weeks, federalism, devolution, and home rule all round received considerable attention in the press, and a variety of political and nonpolitical bodies came out in support of the idea. Chamberlain himself spoke in favour of a federal solution at the Central Hall, Westminister, on 14 May, and later that month, after consultation with Long, F.S. Oliver wrote two articles for the Times on "federal precedents in the United Kingdom."86 Long himself was preoccupied for a time with his new, and additional, responsibilities as the

160 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

liaison between the war cabinet and the new Irish executive, which involved a trip to Ireland in late May. This gave him an opportunity to reassess the situation. He concluded that the conditions in Ireland made it impossible to attempt either conscription or home rule. He doubted if a conventional home rule bill would ever be acceptable, but he was more than ever convinced that a federal scheme applicable to all the United Kingdom would pass in about six months' time once the country was restored to order.8? By early June, Long was discussing with Selborne the details of a federal bill.88 Both men wished to see a commission appointed to explore the possibilities. Long's committee met for a fourth time on 4 June.89 It met without Cave, who was absent in the Hague and had asked to resign because he thought the committee was "ploughing the sands." (Although Long understood Cave's position, it was a blow for him: "I think you & I agree, and I shall not go on if I am not satisfied, even if I am in a minority of one. Meantime it is sheer nonsense to talk of a H.R. Bill for six months at least.")90 Long opened discussion by giving the committee the result of his impressions gleaned from his recent visit to Ireland. He had concluded that it was impossible at present to proceed with conscription for Ireland and that no measure of home rule on which all members of the committee were likely to agree would be acceptable to any section of Irish opinion. Shortt agreed, but although Barnes, Curzon, and Smuts were not opposed, they thought the government would find itself in an awkward position if it simply renounced the policies. They preferred postponement on the grounds of continuing deliberation and the fact that the Irish government had endorsed voluntary recruiting. Neither Curzon nor Smuts wanted to be rushed into a federal solution. Chamberlain realized the difficulty of proceeding with the dual policy, and he agreed that the first thing to do was to re-establish the authority of the Irish government. That would take time. Unlike Curzon and Smuts, he believed it would also go some way to meet criticism if the government decided to consider the federal solution. He said that the difficulty of dealing with Ireland alone when drafting a home rule bill was prodigious, and the House of Commons should be told that. Both he and Addison favoured a parliamentary body to explore a solution along federal lines. Addison, in fact, argued that "some federal solution was inevitable from the point of view of the efficient discharge of Government business." Nevertheless, he thought the committee should complete the preparation of a draft home rule bill. All finally agreed to seek advice from the war cabinet, and Long was instructed to prepare a report for that body.

161 A Federal Solution?

Long immediately set to this task, but something of his thinking can be discerned from a letter to Buxton, the governor general of South Africa: It is impossible to pursue this dual policy at present. The country is full of contempt for the law: there is no crime such as assassination or murder of the old kind, but there is deliberate disregard of the law, marching, drilling, raiding for arms, storing explosives, etc. and all this has got to be put down and the country restored to a state of order before we can attempt to proceed with any policy either of conscription or of Reform of the Constitution. The undoubted fact is that the announcement of Home Rule has made Conscription impossible, and the announcement of Conscription has made Home Rule impossible.91

Long still clearly believed the dual policy had been a fundamental error. Long conferred with his committee on 10 June about his report to the cabinet.92 This was a drafting session, which resulted in the insertion of qualifying sentences, and was not a session on substance. Nevertheless, Long pointed out that according to his latest information, any Irish bill proposed now would be more vigorously opposed than ever in Ulster, as well as by the southern Unionists: "Lord Midleton would not now have a single follower. Meanwhile the Nationalists are hopelessly divided into three or four parties. The only chance would be to produce a Bill applicable to the whole of the Kingdom, and of which Ireland would have to take its share." Long informed the war cabinet of the committee's conclusion that it was impossible, given the state of affairs in Ireland, to implement the dual policy. The committee also believed it was useless to proceed with the drafting of the bill until the cabinet as a whole had considered the general question. Long emphasized that the committee strongly believed that a definite statement ought to be made in Parliament as soon as possible but that it was "essential to define clearly the immediate and future policy of the Government." There were, said Long, two courses open. First, the committee could resume consideration of a draft bill so that the government would be able to show it had a bill on the stocks. Alternatively: "Some of our number are of opinion that the question cannot be satisfactorily solved, and indeed that the Draft Bill cannot be effectively proceeded with, except by considering the case of Irish government as part of the wider problem of a Federal constitution for the United Kingdom as a whole; and they would prefer that the case of Ireland

162 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

and an Irish Bill should be postponed for the present, but only on the understanding that a Commission be set up to investigate the Federal solution in its possible application to every part of the United Kingdom." The committee asked for cabinet instruction and guidance.93 Privately, Long told Shortt that he wanted to continue drafting but that the war cabinet would have to make up its mind definitely whether the form was "to be strictly federal or not." He was strongly of the opinion that the proper policy was to go on steadfastly with the voluntary recruiting scheme and to make Ireland law abiding so that the troops might be spared to fight in France. He thought it inconsistent to say that the country needed drastic measures but was in a fit state for constitutional reform.94 The war cabinet met on 19 June to consider Long's report. It also had before it a cogently argued memorandum by Chamberlain, entitled "The Irish Question and Federalism."95 Curzon began by pointing out that the House of Lords would discuss Ireland the next day and that he should therefore be in a position to explain why the government's dual policy of conscription and home rule had not been carried out. He should also be able to say whether the policies were in temporary abeyance or had been dropped indefinitely. Discussion revealed that all were in favour of delay but not abandonment of the dual policy, and Chamberlain in particular made a strong plea for a federal bill. Lloyd George pointed out that he was about to receive an all-party deputation on the subject of federalism and said he therefore preferred to wait until he had heard its views and determined its support before deciding "whether, in the interval, while voluntary recruiting was being tried, a Committee of the House of Commons, or a Joint Committee of both Houses, might not consider the problem of Federalism." The war cabinet therefore instructed Curzon to indicate in the Lords that while the dual policy had not been abandoned, the government had to be the judge of the time and method of application. It was also decided to adjourn the consideration of federalism until after Lloyd George had received the deputation. Privately, Lloyd George told Long that "he meant to declare himself a life long Federalist when he receives the Dept." This prompted Long to ask Adams, the secretary of the Irish committee, to get the prime minister "to really give a lead on the subject ... The Federal plan is the only one."96 Adams responded quickly and prepared two memoranda on "the case for federalism" which he passed on to Lloyd George before he met the deputation, led by Brassey, on 26 June.97 It is unclear whether the prime minister did more than

163 A Federal Solution?

glance at these memoranda, but it probably would not have made much difference. While he was sympathetic to the deputation's plea, he had clearly decided not to rush the issue. As he pointed out to Brassey and his colleagues, there would need to be overwhelming support throughout the United Kingdom and particularly in England, the largest constituent area, before federalism could be considered seriously. While there was definitely growing support among informed and interested political groups, the general mass support required simply did not exist.98 Long accompanied Lloyd George but did not speak. He must have been disappointed by the outcome. Certainly, Brassey was. He confessed to Long afterwards, "I am a bit gloomy as to the immediate prospects for our Federal ideas. "99 Lloyd George's response spelt the end of federalist hopes in 1918. F.S. Oliver was quick to sense the futility of continued lobbying and abandoned his advocacy. Long was less willing to let go so quickly, and for the remainder of the autumn he was the most consistent champion of a federal solution within government circles. But, of course, it was to no avail. On 29 July the war cabinet decided not to strike a committee to consider federalism for the United Kingdom. 10° A motion favouring federalism had been tabled for a twoday debate in July, but the debate was postponed until October and then put off until 1919. Long regretted these decisions because he was deeply convinced that only federalism could resolve the problems bedevilling domestic life in Great Britain and Ireland, and provide the framework for continued imperial unity.101 In October he went so far as to contemplate organizing a federal party in Ireland to appeal to both Nationalists and Unionists. If such a party could win twenty or twenty-five seats, Long believed it would make a tremendous difference, and if the new parliament at Westminster "contained some 50 men of moderate views in favour of a Federal plan and of Irish devolution it would be a splendid start for the future of the Empire as well as of Ireland." Long assured Frewen that he was prepared to help finance such a party. Fortunately for Long's already overstretched pocketbook, the dream came to nothing.102 By the end of the war, Long knew that neither federation nor devolution would solve all the government's problems in Ireland, but it was equally clear to him that only a federal scheme could preserve the Union. As he told Dicey, My own belief is that until you federalize the United Kingdom, have local Parliaments for domestic affairs, reserving her central Parliament for great Imperial questions, you will not be able to deal with more than a fraction

164 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union of the problems which present themselves for solution ... As regards Ireland under a Federal plan, if the three Southern provinces declined to adopt it, the only alternative that I can see would be to include Ulster and govern the other three provinces on some different plan and this I believe will be forced upon us so long as Sinn Fein controls the majority of the people as it does at present.103

This was a perceptive analysis, and was a pointer to Long's activities in 1919 and 1920. LONG'S DETERMINED PURSUIT OF A federal solution to the difficulties confronting the United Kingdom was by no means his only involvement with Irish affairs in 1918. In April he was given the unique responsibility of being the liaison between the war cabinet and the Irish administration in Dublin. He had raised an idea very much like this with Lloyd George in March, and with the replacement of Duke by Edward Shortt as chief secretary and the appointment of Lord French as lord lieutenant, the time seemed ideal to implement such an arrangement. As Long explained to Buxton, the primary reason was that French, the former commander-in-chief of the home forces, was a soldier not a politician and that Shortt, a Liberal MP, had no previous ministerial experience. Long was now "responsible for Irish administration to the Cabinet" and all the initial appeals for approval of policy changes went first to him before being seen by the cabinet. "French and Shortt," he explained,"spend by far the greater part of their time in Ireland. If they are in doubt about any question they appeal to me. I have a telephone in my room which communicates with the Castle, which can be used by nobody else, so it is quite easy to carry on conversation and in this way I am kept in constant and close touch with all that is going on in Ireland and with the administration."104 This new arrangement made Long the most influential member of the government on Irish affairs. French and Long had much in common. They were both proconscriptionists and also shared a conviction that Ireland should be brought under firm control before home rule was granted. They therefore tended initially to exaggerate the degree of pro-German activity in the country and to underemphasize the overall influence of Sinn Fein. They argued that if the Sinn Fein leaders were imprisoned and if Sinn Fein were proscribed, this would bring a quick end to active and widespread hostility. That this was an inaccurate reading only gradually dawned on Long, but when it did it only

165 A Federal Solution?

confirmed him in his opinion that a federal United Kingdom was the best answer to the political and constitutional difficulties. French also believed in the federal panacea, but this too was a misreading of Nationalist aims and deep-rooted desires. All too often, then, Long and French reinforced each other in a misreading of Irish society. Long, with his greater experience and knowledge of Ireland, should have been more alert, but he was blinded by his desire to preserve the union and the integrity of the empire at all costs. Lloyd George had made sure that Long's opinion had been asked before replacing Duke, and Long had in effect vetted Shortt on 25 April, by which time his own novel role as a liaison officer had been agreed to by Lloyd George.105 There was some initial talk of Shortt running the Irish Office and of replacing the lord lieutenancy with a commission of three lord justices, one of whom, Lord French, would be in charge of military matters while the other two would be responsible for political issues. Although this scheme was soon abandoned, French was given considerably enhanced powers. It was a break with precedent, for since 1905 the chief secretary's role had been superior. It is interesting that Long went along with this, because he had been a strong critic of the office of lord lieutenant during and after his own stint as chief secretary. It is possible that he saw himself being able to fulfil part of the traditional job of a chief secretary through his own influence in cabinet, and he certainly was sympathetic to French's strong military predilections, but a more fundamental reason was the death of the dual policy as a realistic approach to the Irish problem. By the time French assumed office in May, the Irish opposition to the dual policy had become crystal clear.lo6 Long had not been slow to realize how difficult this would make the implementation of home rule. He therefore favoured strong government and a strong figure at the head of it. This is presumably why he supported French and his enhanced powers. As he explained to Cave, "It seems to me that things have certainly changed since the Gov came to their decision. The Hierarchy of the R.C. Church have declared war against H.M.G. How can we proceed to set up a Gov in I which will be largely subject to R.C. Church? The Gov of I shd: be radically changed & new Gov shd be charged to restore respect for the law and laws shd be enforced."107 The direction that government policy should take became the first test of Long's new status. On 2 May he and French talked about conditions in Ireland, and he told French he did not believe the war cabinet "properly realized the dangerous state of things in Ireland. Especially the prevalence of German intrigue."108 The next day he also informed Austen Chamberlain that he had information from

166 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

the Irish attorney general about German influence on Sinn Fein. Chamberlain was inclined to treat this seriously and immediately informed Lloyd George.109 When French and Shortt were in place, he argued, "it is of the first consequence that they should proceed against the German conspiracy at once. This is the first necessary step in our policy. Long is right in this and will be as you saw enormously influenced by a clear statement that this is what you will do." Long himself wrote to Lloyd George on 7 May making the same point. He felt their primary responsibility was to deal with the German menace in the three southern provinces of Ireland: "I cannot conceal from myself that the first duty of the Government is to deal with this sedition and treason with an unsparing hand."110 He knew that both French and Shortt supported him, so when on 10 May Lloyd George requested war cabinet approval for Long's new liaison role, Long emphasized "that he could not accept the responsibility ... of acting for the War Cabinet, unless it was clearly understood that the most drastic steps should be taken to stamp out pro-German intrigues." The war cabinet quickly approved Long's new role and "accepted the condition made by Mr L."111 Long expanded his argument in a second cabinet meeting later that day. He informed his colleagues that "the whole of the evidence from Ireland had led him to the conclusion that it would be folly to attempt to carry out at this stage either conscription or home rule." It would be criminal to introduce a new constitution in a country that was in open revolt against the law. It was important to obtain some time during which a new atmosphere might be produced in Ireland. The government must restore respect for the law and put down "with a stern hand" the Irish-German conspiracy which appeared to be widespread in Ireland. Long argued that the real difficulty about proceeding with the home rule bill was not the difference between home rulers and Unionists but the present state of Ireland.112 The cabinet reaffirmed its support for the suppression of the Irish-German conspiracy but still dragged its heels on formally postponing the dual policy. Nevertheless, Long's arguments had won the day on the most pressing issue and overall had significantly influenced the direction of government policy. In mid-May Long worked to accomplish two things: to define his relationship with French and Shortt, and to have a formal proclamation of Sinn Fein agreed to by the cabinet. As for the first, Long explained it to French: "Full power and authority rest with the Irish Gov. of which I am not a member. I merely represent the Cabinet with power to act on their behalf. I hope in all big questions when

167 A Federal Solution?

it is possible and convenient that I may be consulted, if this be impossible, then informed in advance or as soon as practicable." It was, said Long, "so easy to take a false step in Ireland, so difficult, almost impossible to retrace your steps." If French's policy was "marked by firmness accompanied by prudence," he should be all right. Long assured French that he would give help and support and would "stand and fall" with French and Shortt.113 Long's second goal was a firm policy against Sinn Fein, which he suspected of conspiring with the Germans to undermine British authority in Ireland. Long's harsh attitude towards Sinn Fein was fully revealed in an early letter to French: "I gather there is already a healthy feeling of alarm among the adherents of S.F. It was one thing to talk of fighting & dying, it is quite another to be 'called up,' lose your job & your wages, & have to face British soldiers!"114 Despite Lloyd George's instinct that harsh methods might not be the best tactic, Long finally persuaded a "reluctant" war cabinet on 15 May to support the Irish executive in its determination to tackle Sinn Fein head on. On the night of 17/18 May, Sinn Fein leaders, with the important exceptions of Michael Collins and Cathal Brugha, were arrested.115 Long was pleased with the results. "The haul," he informed Hewins, "has been a good one. I also hope the evidence is strong eno' to convict, but if it isn't I shall support the Irish Gov. in deporting these people on suspicion, better intern a dozen innocent people than leave one active unscrupulous pro-German at large."116 Unfortunately, the evidence was not forthcoming. The links between Sinn Fein and the Germans were tenuous and certainly not at the level of seditious activity assumed by Long. Within days many inside the government were considering back-tracking in face of the outraged opinion in Ireland. Once again, Long confided in He wins: "If these traitors are let loose I shall be free also. I expect there may be a tussle but I am quite decided ... We seem to have done well in the raid. My object has been to put an end to German intrigue, clear Ireland of German gold, and, incidentally get the Govt, the Nationalists and the Hierarchy out of the respective bogs into wh. they had each got. An ambitious programme you will say - but simpler than it looks; it does not however seem that I am likely to get much support from my friends."117 Long decided to go to Ireland to confer with French and Shortt and to assess the situation for himself. He left on 23 May and returned on the twenty-eighth. A day after getting back, he relayed his findings to the war cabinet.118 Long had found the general condition of the country unsatisfactory. Farmers and traders appeared

168 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

prosperous but they feared a Sinn Fein rising. There were many unoccupied men, and rebel armies were openly drilling and marching. Nevertheless, Long concluded that conscription would now be difficult; the church was actively encouraging the people against it: "With a population as superstitious and subservient to the Priests as are the mass of the Irish people this state of things means that it is impossible for the moment to attempt Conscription without most certainly meeting violent resistance." Similarly, he concluded it would be impossible to introduce a conventional home rule bill at present; it would be rejected, for varying reasons, by all parties. He believed the government was paying the price for gross mismanagement of Ireland over the previous ten years. The release of the prisoners in 1916 had been "a terrible mistake," he held, and had only encouraged "the criminals." Sinn Fein was well organized, and although it would be difficult for the government, he believed "it must now be the duty to establish the law in Ireland." He favoured delaying home rule and conscription some four to six months until conditions were more favourable. He was also convinced that a federal scheme applicable to all the United Kingdom would pass in six months provided the country was restored to order. Long did not succeed on this occasion in persuading the war cabinet to abandon the dual policy. He confided, somewhat bitterly, to French: "We were not very successful at the Cabinet this morning, they do not appreciate the situation in Ireland, or realise that they are responsible for the existing situation, stark, criminal negligence in enforcing the law, a foolish and unworkable bargain, to please English Radicals, all this has created a situation of extreme difficulty, out of which your Excellency and the Chief Secretary are trying to extricate them."119 Long returned to London, however, with a positive assessment of Shortt and French which he quickly passed on to Lloyd George: "I think you may care to know that I honestly believe Shortt to be the most promising Ch. Sec. we have had in Ireland for many years. He is courageous clearheaded & determined & has already got a wonderful grasp of his work. The Ld. Lt. & Ch. Sec. make a most admirable combination, if they are trusted and supported over here I am very sanguine they will produce great wealth in Ireland. But they must have time."120 This was clearly an effort on Long's part to persuade the prime minister that the dual policy was wrong and that Shortt and French could be entrusted to pacify Ireland. It was, therefore, not so much an endorsement of French and Shortt as an effort to obtain Long's own ends. He followed this up with another memorandum to the cabinet, recommending vigorous enforcement of the law and reconsideration of its overall program.121

169 A Federal Solution?

By early June, Long had prepared his memorandum on federalism, which met with French's approval. The lord lieutenant had been persuaded. "Federalism is the true solution, I feel quite sure," he wrote to Long.122 Long pressed home the point: I am glad that you agree that the Federal system is the right way out of our difficulties. The one fact I want to keep ever present in your Excellency's mind is that, under the pledge given by the Prime Minister and by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we are bound, if we proceed with Conscription, to proceed simultaneously with Home Rule, and I believe that any Irish administration that sought to introduce an ordinary Home Rule Bill in the present condition of the country would bring upon itself, and deservedly, not only the contempt of all thinking people in the country, but deep indignation.123

A week later, Long argued that the only way out of the difficulty was "to be prepared with all the machinery for the enforcing of conscription and to advocate the Federal system of Govt all round. "124 Ironically, by late June, French and Shortt were divided over proclaiming Sinn Fein. French supported proclamation but thought it silly to proclaim and then do nothing about it. Long agreed but reminded French of the importance of carrying the chief secretary in all he did, because Shortt had to defend French's policy in the House of Commons.125 At the same time, Long told Shortt that they needed to be "strong and firm" against Sinn Fein in order to restore the credibility of the British and Irish governments.126 As he told Midleton, "From the first I have been in favour of proclaiming this treasonable organisation. I have pressed it as a question of principle upon the Irish Government. But surely you will agree that a proclamation without effective action afterwards would be a fatal mistake ... I am a little doubtful about advising proclamation until I can see my way to attaining a result which would alone be a sign of power to the Irish people."127 French assured Long that he liked Shortt very much and that there was no problem between them.128 In the event, Sinn Fein, the Irish Volunteers, Cumann na m Ban, and the Gaelic League were banned on 4 July 1918, and Ireland did become publicly calmer. Of course, this did not spell the end of separatist activities; they simply continued surreptitiously. During July, Long was not particularly well but he continued to lobby for a federal scheme. He pushed for the holding of a two-day debate in the House on federalism;129 he advocated the scheme in correspondence;130 and he advised French that the only way to deal with home rule and "to avoid a breach with the Labour party or

170 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

anything which would tend to damp down the enthusiasm of the USA in their share in the War" was to adopt "the Federal plan." Long wanted to get the unqualified support of the Irish government for "the adoption of the Federal plan as the only Home Rule solution possible at the present time." It would then be possible to get the consent of the government as a whole to proceed along those lines. Long's own impression was that the Irish government "would, if this policy were adopted, succeed as no other Irish Govt has succeeded for thirty years, not only in pacifying Ireland, but in making it a real partner of the Empire."131 Long was ill for much of August and September, but in midSeptember he congratulated French on his new advisory council.132 By this time, Long was also prepared to admit that Shortt had made "some bad mistakes" - he was inclined to "talk too much Home Rule and too little conscription."133 Long reassured French that he was the master and that his view would prevail.134 "As to HR," Long remained convinced "the country is not fit for it & if we cd pass any Bill it wd mean rule by Sinn Fein. If we must introduce a Bill then ... I should include Ulster ... As to conscription, I think we must have it, the only question being when."1!5 The difference of opinion between French and Shortt came to a head in October, and Long responded with a memorandum for the war cabinet.136 He began by stating that he was not in complete agreement with either man: I do not share the Chief Secretary's opinion that Home Rule is desirable or that Conscription will cause great bloodshed, and I think that his anticipation of the attitude of the Police is mistaken. But, on the other hand, I cannot share the view widely held as to the opposition to Conscription, for while I agree that it will not be prolonged, and that it can be put down comparatively easily by force of arms, I believe that priests and women will in the early stages lead the opposition, and I am very doubtful whether Parliament would allow any Government to continue repressive measures after one or two priests and a few women have been shot by the soldiers. I think it is also worthy of consideration whether the soldiers we have got in Ireland, who are either of the territorial class, or raw recruits, could be relied upon to take part in what would be really a form of civil war, and I cannot imagine anything more deplorable, or more injurious to the successful prosecution of the War, and to the good of the United Kingdom as a whole, than to commence a campaign of Conscription and then have to abandon it. Looking at it solely from the point of view of the Government of Ireland, or from the wider standpoint from which I have already approached it, I should say that the best course would be to attempt neither

171 A Federal Solution? Home Rule nor Conscription, but to instruct the Lord Lieutenant to continue the assertion of the law, and to restore Ireland to a condition of obedience to the law and peaceful progress before attempting anything else. But there is this very serious consideration. The Government announced their determination to introduce Conscription to Ireland. On the faith of this pledge they obtained the extra powers which the Minister of National Service is now enforcing in the rest of the United Kingdom. Their decrees were defied by the Irish Hierarchy and this must have a very serious and unfortunate effect upon the stability and prestige of Government in Ireland. Therefore, the course that I recommend on the whole is that an opportunity should be taken by the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, and by the Leaders in Parliament, to announce that Conscription, is still the policy of the Government, is held in reserve, but cannot be enforced because the prior duty obtains of making the law effective in that country, and it would not be difficult to show that the moment is not one when it is desirable to run the risk of grave local disturbances in order to get men who may not be required.

Long urged the government to make up its mind on the broad lines of policy because, until it did, the Irish government could not act "with any decision or any prospect of success." Personally, Long was of the opinion that any attempt to introduce a home rule bill at that juncture would lead to civil war because the Irish government could not stand by and watch "the Sinn Feiners adopt what would be pure revolutionary tactics." The government would have to act and the consequences would be grave. He admitted that, when an election was held, Sinn Fein would win some sixty to seventy-five seats and then the consequences would have to be faced, "but better to do so when you have the full weight of the Government in London, which can be brought to bear on the Sinn Fein movement, than to set up an Irish Parliament which in itself, from the outset would be ruined by the Sinn Feiners." As for "Dominion Home Rule," that would be impossible to grant, for the dangers of a separate Ireland would be "very great indeed" during wartime. "I can see nothing for it," wrote Long, " except to endeavour to restore Ireland to a condition of peace and prosperity in the hope that we may in the meantime find a solution suitable for application the moment Ireland is ready."137 The solution Long had in mind, of course, was a federal one. These thoughts proved to be Long's last wartime contribution to the debate over the British government's Irish policies. Much to everyone's surprise, hostilities suddenly ceased on 11 November. Within a few days, Lloyd George had called a general election. The results were to change the parameters of the debate dramatically.

CHAPTER SIX

"Devolution in a Federal Form

The armistice of 11 November 1918 brought an abrupt end to the protracted debate over conscription and home rule for Ireland. Lloyd George called a December election, and his coalition government was returned with the overwhelming support of Unionists. Long won easily in St George's but was not consulted about the formation of the new government and apparently had no discussions with Lloyd George about his own future; so it came somewhat as a surprise to him to learn that the prime minister had submitted his name to the King as first lord of the admiralty. Long thought the post should have been offered to a younger man, and certainly he would have preferred to stay at the colonial office or return to the local government board. In the circumstances, however, he had little alternative but to accept the new responsibility. It was at first unclear whether he would continue as the liaison between the Irish executive in Dublin and the cabinet, but after French approached Lloyd George the arrangement continued as before. French was delighted because he had found Long's help "invaluable" in the past and was certain he would do so in the troublesome times that doubtless lay ahead. * These troublesome times were quick in coming. In the general election, Sinn Fein supporters had won seventy-three seats in the south of Ireland, but they refused to take their place at Westminster. Long was predictably disparaging of their actions and assumed that they would soon cross the Irish Sea in order to pick up their salaries once they realized they could do nothing in Ireland.2 But, once again, Long underestimated Irish nationalist resolve, for on 21 January the seventy-three MPS met in Dublin as the first Dail of the Irish Republic. Earlier that day, at Soloheadbeg in County Tipperary, Dan Breen, Sean Treacy, Sean Hogan, Seamus Robinson, and a small band of Irish Volunteers killed two policeman and made off with a

173 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

cartload of explosives. For almost three years Anglo-Irish relations reverberated with the shock waves of these two actions. Though clearly distinct and uncoordinated, they soon became inextricably entwined; and the demand for dominion home rule or, better still, independence ran in concert with an accelerating guerrilla war. Long was no more than an observer for many months, but he was gradually drawn into one final effort to find a political-cum-constitutional solution. His impact on the final document and thus on Ireland's future was to be considerable.3 There was a major change in the Irish executive in January when Shortt was replaced by Ian Macpherson as chief secretary. Macpherson had little personal knowledge of Ireland, so Long's opinion remained important in cabinet. Early evidence of this came on 5 February when Long and Macpherson differed over the release of Irish prisoners. Macpherson contended that they should be let go immediately. On the contrary, argued Long; it might have been wise to release the prisoners early in the New Year and it might even be wise to release them in a month, but to release them right away "would be a great and grave danger." Long said he greatly feared the effect in Great Britain, when everybody was expecting the Government to use firmness in dealing with the industrial unrest in England and Scotland, and were all asking what the Government was going to do. It would have a marked effect for good if it were known that the Government was going to act with decision, and it was necessary to show that the Government were determined to stop the Bolshevist movement. On the other hand, if the Sinn Feiners were released, for some unknown reason which the Cabinet had not before them, the moral effect on this country would be disastrous.

The cabinet unanimously supported Long against the chief secretary.4 A month later, following Long's suggestion, the cabinet decided that it would gradually release the Sinn Fein prisoners interned in England.5 This did not prevent Long from agreeing with French that "we have got to fight Sinn Fein to the death."6 During these early months of 1919, Long was preoccupied with his new duties as first lord of the admiralty, and his direct involvement in Irish affairs was minimal. An indication of the pressures of his new job was his decision in early May to resign from the Ulster Unionist Council, a body with which he had been closely associated since 1905. The council was horrified to think it might lose continual contact with one of the most important Unionists in England, and the members unanimously asked Long to reconsider; he had done

174 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

so much for Ulster in the past and surely he would do so again if necessary. Long gave in and thus remained an important linchpin between the cabinet and both the northern Unionists and the executive in Dublin.7 Throughout the first six months of 1919 Long wrote regularly to Lloyd George, who was in Paris at the peace negotiations, keeping him abreast of domestic developments. These letters contain little mention of Ireland or Irish affairs, but on 8 May Long did comment on the visit of the American Commission on Irish Independence: "There is also great trouble over the visit of these American-Irish to Ireland. Of course nobody doubts that they were simply allowed to go as private people to see the country; but they have represented themselves as coming with a special introduction from you - with your blessing, as it were - and needless to say the mischief-makers have done their best to cause trouble. However, this like other things will blow over."8 Long's first significant involvement with Irish affairs came in late May when he paid a visit to Ireland. He reported to Lloyd George that he was glad he had gone, for he had been able to put in "extremely useful work." In particular, he had had lengthy talks with French and Macpherson. He thought the new chief secretary was doing splendid work. It was "impossible to speak too highly of him." He was cool, determined, and courageous. Long was much less satisfied about the condition of Ireland. The temper of the people was sullen and he had no doubt that Sinn Fein was well organized. Long especially resented the need for an armed escort - a car with five detectives in front and another with soldiers and rifles behind - when he made a trip out to the Curragh. He saw it as symbolic of the "appalling state of things" in Ireland. He was also unimpressed with Colonel Byrne, the head of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and with the Special Crimes Branch which wanted overhauling "from top to bottom."9 The Irish Unionist Alliance was meeting in Dublin during Long's visit and its members welcomed the first lord. In thanking them, Long promised to do everything in his power "to protect the Loyalists of Ireland against the anti-British movement."10 Despite this assurance and the conviction that conditions in Ireland were "very unsatisfactory," Long did not favour proscribing Sinn Fein at that moment. As far as he was concerned, it would be useless unless "drastic action" could be taken following a proclamation." Thus far the issue of home rule had not surfaced as a major governmental concern, but during the first half of 1919 two major debates on devolution and federalism took place, one in the Lords on

175 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

5 March on a motion introduced by Lord Brassey, and the second in the House of Commons on 3-4 June on a motion by Edward Wood, which "without any prejudice to any proposals it may have to make with regard to Ireland/' called upon the government to appoint "a Parliamentary body to consider and report upon a measure of Federal Devolution applicable to England, Scotland, and Ireland" and possibly Wales.12 Long spoke on 3 June. He began by informing his colleagues that the government had no formal position on the matter and members were free to speak for or against the motion. As a declared "supporter of the Federal system," he said he found the motion puzzling; he was anxious to see the appointment of a parliamentary body "to inquire into and make recommendations upon a system of subordinate Parliaments for the United Kingdom," but he thought it contradictory to say that any such action should not prejudice in any way action regarding Ireland: One of the reasons why I am a strong Federalist is because I have always maintained that if you find it necessary to alter your Parliamentary system by some devolution of business, whatever may be your governing reasons, you should treat the United Kingdom as a whole, on the same terms and in the same way, and that you should give to all members of the United Kingdom the same privileges and the same Parliamentary rights and the same Parliamentary powers, and if it is suggested that in setting up a Federal system there is to be, because there is an Irish Act on the Statute Book, some separate treatment for Ireland, I could not vote for the Resolution.

Long made it clear that he was in the House "to support a Federal system - that is to say, a system under which you will give to subordinate Parliaments some of the duties which are now performed by the central Parliament alone." He was particularly anxious to relieve Parliament of the congestion to which it had increasingly been subject over the previous thirty years. He wanted to set up "subordinate" parliaments and to "devolve" some of the work upon them. He refused "to approach this question as one of different nations." It was clear from this that Long was not advocating pure federalism but was interested only in devolution with a retention of sovereign powers at Westminster. He was not averse to regional parliaments or to an American-style supreme court for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes. He believed the time had come "when it is necessary in the interests of the United Kingdom and of the Empire to set up Federal Parliaments, and to leave this great Parliament here to deal with those wider questions which I believe in the im-

176 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

mediate future it must consider, and the solution of which I believe is bound up not only with our own prosperity here, but with the very existence of our Empire."13 Later that day, Long wrote to Lloyd George informing him that he had supported the resolution "because it contained the principle of devolution in a federal form." Long believed that there was a majority in the House "for some parliamentary examination of the question with a view to finding a scheme on the lines of the conference on the franchise." Although he did not urge Lloyd George to take immediate action, it was clear that he favoured it.14 The prime minister found himself under similar pressure from other quarters, so he finally relented and appointed James Lowther, the Speaker, to preside over a conference on devolution. Terms of reference were drafted in August, thirty-two members, sixteen from each House, were in place by late September, the public announcement was made after the recess, and the conference met for the first time on 23 October.15 Long was also under some pressure from Unionist interests. On 6 June he heard from John Atkinson, now lord of appeal in ordinary, who argued that neither the 1914 Home Rule Act nor home rule all round would work. He favoured a scheme that would place Ulster on a par with other provinces within a federal system that "would be government by her own Provincial Government plus the Imperial Parliament and Executive, not plus an Irish Central Parliament and an Irish Executive dependent upon it." "It is this Central Irish Government," Atkinson reminded Long, "that Irish Protestants fear."16 Long reflected on the problem throughout the summer and in early July gave serious thought to having the Union Defence League actively engage in the promotion of a federal solution.17 Three weeks later Wickham Steed of the Times sent Long, in confidence, a copy of a federal scheme which the paper proposed to promote as a solution to the Irish problem. The scheme, which had also been sent to Lloyd George, called for two provincial parliaments and an All Ireland Council.l8 Long summed up his own position on 26 July in a speech at Trowbridge near his home in Wiltshire.19 He tackled head-on the shift in his own opinions since prewar days, stating that he certainly did not regret the stand he had taken over Ireland before 1914, but "the war has altered this, as it has altered other questions, and it is our duty to look dispassionately, fairly, and, above all, intelligently at any suggestions which are made to us for the solution of this difficult question." Long said that there were three governing principles that would guide him. First, in any change made in the relations between dif-

177 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

ferent parts of the United Kingdom, nothing should be done that would weaken the control and government of the central imperial parliament and prevent that parliament from defending the United Kingdom and the empire. Second, nothing should be done "which would be unjust or disloyal to those loyal men, whether they be in the north or south of Ireland, who have stood by us in all these years and have fought with us, in company with many gallant Nationalists, in this dreadful war." And third, Long did not believe that congestion of business in Parliament could be dealt with by mere reform of parliamentary procedure. "I believe," he told his audience, "that the proper solution of our legislative difficulties is the adoption of the Federal system. I believe that you ought to devolve on minor Parliaments a great deal of the work which you now ask the Imperial Parliament to do, and you should leave the time of the Imperial Parliament free for those great questions which concern the Empire as well as ourselves, and for those greater domestic questions which ought to be dealt with by the central Parliament. Therefore, in any suggestions which are made with regard to the government of Ireland, I for one shall look at all of them from the point of view of the Federal system, and shall only support any scheme which I believe would fit into such a system as I have described." The next stage in Long's campaign for a federal solution to the Irish dilemma came in September when he once again visited Ireland. On his return, he drafted a memorandum summarizing his findings and sketching out a proposed solution.20 Long said be had found a lot of bad feeling in Ireland, but he thought the lord lieutenant and the chief secretary were doing "splendid work." He was convinced Sinn Fein was in a bad way and that the government must continue to be firm. It could not tolerate existing levels of crime and lawlessness. He also believed that home rule on the 1914 model would be used to set up a republic, and this, he concluded, would mean civil war. By this time, however, Long said he did not share the Unionist party's belief that all that was required was "a firm administration of the law." That was fine as far as it went, but it ignored the demand in Ireland for self-government; it was essential to find "a happy medium." Long therefore intended to recommend, first, that the lord lieutenant be publicly given the backing of the government for a firm policy and, second, that the federal system be adopted for the United Kingdom with such parliaments for Ireland as might be thought necessary. He personally believed that there should be two: one for Ulster and one for the three southern provinces. He said that, as he saw it, "if the Federal system be

178 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

adopted, England, who doesn't care about it, will loyally accept and make the best of it; Scotland and Wales will do the same; and it is more popular in those two countries. Ulster will accept and make a success of it." It was possible that the three southern provinces would either decline to adopt the federal plan or adopt it as a means of obtaining a republic. To cover this eventuality, Long suggested that the government "should now state frankly and deliberately that should this condition of things arise they will be compelled to govern that part of the United Kingdom, which refuses to accept a measure of self-government which is being granted equally all round, as if it were a Crown Colony." This was an interesting document because while it continued to underline Long's deep-rooted law-and-order instincts and his inherent incapacity to empathize with nationalism, it did reflect a distancing from traditional Unionist tactics and a willingness to follow a more pragmatic path, though admittedly one that in the overall preserved the union. Thus, he was still deeply conservative in his attitude to Irish problems but was now more willing to break with traditional tenets about methods than many of his Unionist cohorts were. Unlike Balfour, however, he was not prepared to countenance partition and he was prepared to tolerate the unequivocal use of state power to preserve the union. Over the next six days, Long discussed his ideas with friends and modified part of his memorandum. The revised version was distributed to the cabinet and was the centrepiece of a discussion on Ireland on 25 September.21 Long pointed out that since the Irish government might be compelled to adopt the most stringent measures to maintain order, "it is most desirable that everybody in Ireland should be made to understand that the Irish Government have behind them the whole support and might of the British Government." To that end, Long suggested that an "early and definite declaration" should make it clear that it was the intention of the government neither to tolerate existing crime and lawlessness nor to have any dealings with Sinn Fein. As for home rule, Long argued that while the act of 1914 was no longer satisfactory, it was not within the range of practical politics for the government to repeal it. What, therefore, was to be done? It seemed to Long that successive British governments had refused to recognize obvious facts in Ireland and had tried to comfort themselves with the belief that their own particular policy, if adopted, would save the country. For example: Home Rulers believe with a touching confidence that if only we would grant a full measure of Home Rule, all would be well. They ignore the fact that

179 "Devolution in a Federal Form" an Irish parliament on Dominion lines - and none other would be accepted by the Home Rule Party in Ireland - would be immediately used, as I have indicated, to set up a Republic, and would be manned by those who are largely responsible for the present state of lawlessness. Opponents of Home Rule believe with equal confidence that all measures of self-government should be denied, and that all that is required is a firm administration of the law. They, in their turn, ignore the fact that in a considerable part of Ireland there is an irrepressible desire for some form of Home Government, and that this demand is strongly supported in our Dominions and in the United States of America.

Was it not possible, asked Long, to find a middle policy? If it could be done, he believed "that many existing difficulties would disappear, and that gradually and slowly, but surely, the condition of Ireland would vastly improve." He pointed out that the country was very prosperous and that there was "a growing feeling on the part of a great mass of the population, that they would be foolish if they were to give power to the idle, thriftless and mischievous, to play ducks and drakes with the prosperity of the country and the property of others." Long then recommended, first, that the government should publicly provide assurance and support to the Dublin executive and, second, that on adoption of a federal scheme for the United Kingdom, Ireland should receive such parliaments as were considered necessary; he thought there should be at least two, one for Ulster and another for the three southern provinces, but it was possible that the South could be further divided. No doubt, added Long, it would be argued that these proposals would not satisfy Sinn Fein. "But nothing short of the setting up of a Republic will satisfy Sinn Fein. Therefore why not recognise the fact and say so frankly?" Long then repeated his advice about ruling any part of the United Kingdom as if it were a crown colony if it refused to adopt the federal scheme or perverted its aims. In conclusion, he said he realized that his plan was not without difficulty, but he was convinced it had "the enormous advantage of clearing up the situation and giving a definite prospect of moderate selfgovernment in the future." After discussing Long's proposals, the war cabinet agreed that it was impossible simply to repeal the Government of Ireland Act of 1914. Therefore, steps would have to be taken to prevent it from coming automatically into operation on the ratification of peace, since it was not acceptable to any of the interests concerned, and some of its provisions, notably the financial clauses, were no longer applicable. Moreover, given the dangerous situation in Ireland and the possibility of an early ratification of the peace treaties, the matter

180 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

would have to be dealt with as early in the forthcoming parliamentary session as possible. The cabinet postponed the final formulation of its plans until there had been time for reflection. The crucial decisions were made on 7 October 1919.22 Again, the cabinet had Long's memorandum before it and also a joint memorandum by French and Macpherson which supported Long's analysis of the situation in Ireland. Lord Curzon's draft bill of 1917, Long's draft bill of 1918, and the draft of a federal bill prepared by Long's committee in 1918 were also distributed. The cabinet realized that some declaration of policy would be expected early in the session, but counsels were divided as to what that policy should be. One view was that the circumstances in Ireland were wholly unfavourable to any settlement at that time. It was argued that it would be a mistake to adopt any policy merely in response to popular clamour and that, in consequence, the only feasible plan was to make a frank announcement that the time was not yet ripe for a settlement. Legislation could then be introduced postponing the operation of the 1914 Home Rule Act. Against this line of argument, it was urged that there would be no resurgence of steady and sane opinion in Ireland until a home rule act was passed and put into operation. The cabinet finally decided to appoint a committee, to be chaired by Long, to "examine and report on the probable effect on Ireland, on Great Britain, and on opinion abroad of each of the possible alternative Irish policies," and to "advise the Cabinet as to the policy they recommend for adoption." The committee was instructed to consider in particular: (i) What would happen in the event of a Home Rule Bill being passed and put into operation, (i) If the Irish people refused to touch it. (ii) If a sufficient number of moderate Nationalists were prepared to accept it and form a Parliament, (iii) If the Sinn Fein Party accepted the Irish Parliament set up under the proposed Act, and used it in every possible way to thwart the British Government. (2) The financial position of Ireland in relation to Great Britain, particularly in regard to the collection of Customs duties, Irish indebtedness on account of the Land Purchase Act, and the Irish contribution to the cost of the War. (3) The effects of a further postponement of the Home Rule Act, 1914. (4) Whether, in the event of the Home Rule Scheme being decided on, power should be given to His Majesty, by Order in Council, to postpone the operation of the new Scheme by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

The committee was free to consider "a general Federal Scheme for the United Kingdom"; and in order to ensure that all members were

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aware of the issues, the memoranda on federalism prepared by Long and Chamberlain in 1918 were to be circulated, along with the earlier draft bills. The committee was instructed to present its recommendations in the form of a draft bill.23 Long was a natural choice to chair the new constitutional committee. Ever since he had adamantly and successfully opposed Lloyd George's Irish overtures in 1916, Lloyd George had been highly sensitive to Long's standing in the Unionist party and to his opinions on the Irish question. In forming his coalition government in December 1916, Lloyd George had gone out of his way to ensure that Long was supportive. By then he knew that Long had more influence among Unionist back-benchers than any other member of the Unionist hierarchy, and he simply could not afford to ignore him. Similarly, Lloyd George had recognized that any future initiative to resolve the Irish dilemma would have to involve Long, for he was clearly the key to any successful venture. No other English Unionist had his connections on both sides of the Irish Sea. Moreover, Long was a man of strict integrity, respected for his open manner (if not always for his abrupt ways), and a richly experienced parliamentarian. Since 1916 he had been more closely involved with Irish affairs than any other British minister, and during that time Lloyd George had come to respect his honesty and even his no-nonsense approach to problems. For his part, Long had appreciated Lloyd George's trust, and he had grudgingly come to respect the Liberal leader. To Lloyd George it was obvious that if he hoped to carry Unionists with him, Long should be asked to chair this most vital of cabinet committees. Long and his committee worked hard over the next few weeks and were able to take their first major report to cabinet on 4 November. During this time, Long had continued to press the federalist case whenever possible. In fact, the Morning Post ran a feature interview with him on the subject the day before the cabinet meeting. On such occasions, Long often found himself criticized for having changed his views since 1912. He was angered by such accusations, which had been increasingly frequent since 1916. He did not regard them as either well informed or particularly honest. As he put it to a friend, Of course I have changed my views. I am in favour of Federalism for the whole country, whereas then I was dealing with a so-called "Devolution Plan" which was to be applied to Ireland only. At that time I was of opinion that it would be possible to deal with our burden of legislation in the Imperial Parliament, if adequate changes were made in our procedure. But those changes have been made - they have hopelessly failed - and we are now

182 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union face to face with the undoubted fact that we cannot get through our work ... I think the result of Federalism would be to transfer from Westminster to the Local Parliaments questions which take up at present far too much of our time, and which are very difficult to deal with because the conditions in the three countries - England, Ireland and Scotland - are totally different. Different legislation is required - and therefore if we want to deal with the licensing laws, with education, with local government, we have to deal separately with each country, involving three different acts of Parliament; and the Members for the three countries have little or no knowledge of the conditions obtaining in the countries other than their own. I do not believe there would be any multiplication of offices and officers, or any greater restrictions on our liberties. It would of course involve that many of the offices and officials now employed in London would be transferred to the local Parliaments; and I think it must be true that the control of the electors over their local Parliaments would be far greater than in their control over their Members in the central Parliament. At present, the Imperial Parliament is so far removed from the ken of the ordinary elector that he feels lost in the maze of subjects which come before him, and it happens too often that instead of public attention at a General Election being concentrated on great Imperial questions - how to develop and draw closer the Empire; how to secure an Imperial Navy and Army adequate for defence of the Empire, and one for which we can afford to pay - these and other great questions are pushed on one side, and the Election turns on some questions of purely domestic interest - and the greater work of the Empire is consequently hampered and delayed.24 There is no reason to doubt Long's sincerity about congestion, but he was being disingenuous to the degree that he did not admit openly that a primary motivation for him was a desire to preserve the union and to protect Ulster from the Nationalist southern provinces. He certainly did not disguise his intent during his committee's deliberation, and its recommendations reflected his recent ideas. The committee quickly agreed that there should be two parliaments, "one for the north and another for the south of Ireland with a Common Council with certain powers for the whole of Ireland." Such a scheme was "not to be inconsistent with a Federal system for the United Kingdom."25 Thus, by the middle of October, Long's view had prevailed insofar as a separate parliament for Ulster, consistent with a federal scheme, was concerned. The idea of a "Common" or "Irish Council" was then adopted from Curzon's and Long's earlier draft bills as a way of bridging the two Irish parliaments and providing a potential nucleus for future unity. The committee's first submission to the cabinet on 4 November was simply an elaboration of the reasoning by which it had reached

183 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

this conclusion. The report was well drafted and led the cabinet inexorably to the conclusion that Long and his committee were right: that it was not politically feasible to have a separate parliament for the whole of Ireland, with either county option or an Ulster committee as a means of protecting northern Unionist interests. The only chance of preserving the overall unity of the empire and protecting the interests of Ulster lay in establishing "one Parliament for the three Southern provinces and a second parliament for Ulster, together with a Council of Ireland composed of members of the two Irish Parliaments, to discharge certain immediate functions, but mainly to promote as rapidly as possible, and without further reference to the Imperial Parliament the union of the whole of Ireland under a single legislature." The committee also considered it crucial that the two Irish parliaments should be given far-reaching constituent powers so that without reference to the imperial parliament they could, first, transfer to the control of the Council of Ireland any of the temporarily reserved services such as agriculture, technical education, transportation, old-age pensions, health and unemployment insurance, and labour exchanges; and, second, revise the constitution of the Council of Ireland itself in any way they thought fit, so that it might, if both parliaments agreed, become "a Parliament elected by electors for the whole of Ireland, either on a unitary or a federal basis, controlling all or any of the temporarily reserved services, and all or any of the powers originally allotted to the North and South Ireland Parliaments." The imperial parliament would continue to control such matters as peace and war, the defence forces, treaties, and foreign affairs, and at the outset would continue to control customs and excise, income tax, and internal postal services. If the north and south of Ireland did eventually agree to establish a single legislature for Ireland, then the latter powers could be transferred, "thereby setting Ireland up on the same basis as a Dominion except in the sphere of defence." In summary, the committee proposed "to follow the Peace Conference by respecting the principle both of responsible government and of self-determination and to give to the two parts of Ireland immediately state rights together with a link between them, and to give them also the power to achieve Irish unity on any basis ranging from federal unity for the United Kingdom to a qualified Dominion status which they can agree upon among themselves."26 This was a remarkable proposal and its intent was clear. Long wanted to preserve the union while removing an overweening British presence from Irish affairs, and he believed a federal scheme for the United Kingdom would do that, but he also thought a quasifederal structure for Ireland would resolve problems there. How he

184 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

squared federation of the United Kingdom with the possible grant of customs and excise to an Irish parliament is not clear, but given the hard battle he subsequently fought against such a transfer, he probably went along with the argument at this point in order not to lose the larger goal. Overall, the document reflected a grave misreading of the aims and ideals of Nationalist Ireland, to say nothing of a purblind disregard of Unionist fears; consequently, it had a number of unfortunate implications for the future structure of both the Irish and British states. Long was not, of course, entirely responsible for the report, nor was his the only voice in cabinet; but he had enormous influence in Irish affairs, and the framework, if not all the details, of the future Government of Ireland Act were considerably determined by his views and persistence. Over the next month, Long's committee and the cabinet pored over the proposed bill. From the start, two issues dominated discussion; first, the form and timing of the transfer of powers; second, the size of the area to fall under the control of a northern parliament. Considerable pressure was exerted by the Ulster Unionists on both issues. Sir James Craig made it clear that he opposed the inclusion of the whole of Ulster. He believed that the Protestant representation in the Ulster parliament would be strengthened and that the unit would be easier to govern if a six-county rather than a nine-county province was created. Similarly, he was dissatisfied with the delay proposed for the transfer of powers. He preferred to avoid future acrimony and administrative confusion by having powers immediately transferred to the respective parliaments.27 Craig's primary support in cabinet came from Balfour, who objected to the assumption implicit in Long's report that Ireland should ultimately be organized as a single, undivided political unit. Balfour was adamant that a six-county Ulster should remain an integral part of the United Kingdom and that the South and West should be granted dominion status.28 Long's committee was sensitive to these arguments, and its final report of 2 December reflected them.29 The committee had been particularly impressed by the objection that not enough powers had been conferred upon the two parliaments at the outset, and by the further point that if government departments could be "bandied about between various authorities one by one and at different times, and irrespective of taxing powers for a number of years," it would upset and dislocate Irish life and administration. Therefore, the committee recommended a large increase in the powers conferred at the outset upon the two parliaments; these were to include local government and public health, housing, transportation, agriculture and

185 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

technical instruction, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and employment exchanges. It was also recommended that the two parliaments could transfer any or all of these services to the control of the Council of Ireland at any time. If a single Irish parliament eventually replaced the Irish council, such powers as the post office, the appointment of higher judges, and income tax were to be transferred en bloc. Significantly, customs and excise were not mentioned, so full independence was not contemplated. Long's role in drafting the particulars of the final report is unclear, but its overall intent was in keeping with his convictions. An earlier and more complete transfer of powers to the two regional parliaments and the ultimate transfer of such matters as the income tax to an all-Ireland parliament were in keeping with his federalist principles - as, of course, was the retention of customs and excise at the imperial centre, Westminster. One matter on which Long did insist was a nine-county Ulster, and the cabinet initially supported him rather than Balfour on this, but by 15 December it was clear that the Ulster Unionists were so vehemently opposed that both Long and the cabinet would probably, sooner rather than later, have to back down.30 The debate on this matter continued in cabinet right up to the eve of the introduction of the bill on 25 February 1920.31 Long was pleased with the way things had gone so far and was admittedly proud that he might have found the key to solving the Irish problem; but, as he cautioned Sir William Bull, "It does not do to be premature."32 This was certainly so, especially in light of increased IRA activity at the end of 1919 and throughout the early weeks of 1920. This cast a pall over discussions about self-government. Long himself was outraged by the murders and general unrest, and insisted from the public platform that "such crimes" had to be put down with "a firm hand." Unless they were, he said, it would be "idle to talk of giving the Irish people self-government."33 He was even more explicit when confiding privately to Lord French, "There is a conspiracy to defeat the ends of Justice and to terrorise the peaceful future of the community by murders of the most brutal and cold-blooded kind ... These vile criminals must be exterminated ... You will have the cordial support of the Government ... in any steps you may think it necessary to take in order to put an end to their campaign of crime and outrage." Long remained a convinced proponent of a firm law-and-order policy, and throughout 1920 he backed every effort to destroy Sinn Fein. He never shifted from his belief that order had to be restored before a better form of government could be secured. This did not in any way weaken his parallel conviction, strongly held since 1916,

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that every effort should be made to devise, as quickly as possible, an acceptable form of self-government. As he told French, "I believe an opportunity offers for all who believe in Peace and good government to unite for the good of Ireland."34 He asked French for help in securing the support of the moderate Nationalists and the Unionists for the draft bill, but it was clear that he was losing patience with his long-time Irish Unionist colleagues: "I profoundly regret the attitude of Irish Unionists, which consists of crying for the moon, and appealing to us here to protect them from their own local enemies. It is a policy which does not appeal to the English people, and which is doing them a great deal of harm ... There is a great feeling of dissatisfaction ... for the action of men who refuse to face patent facts and continue crying like spoilt children for that which they cannot get."35 From January 1920, Long began to run into further bouts of ill health, which became increasingly more severe throughout the year and eventually caused his retirement from the government and active public life in early 1921. His worries and depression over his failing health were compounded by the death of his daughter in March 1920. He had never fully recovered from the loss of his son in 1917, and this unexpected bereavement deeply saddened him. His illness and his personal loss caused him to spend many weeks at Rood Ashton, and he was often unavailable for important cabinet and committee meetings. Nevertheless, he insisted on shepherding the Government of Ireland bill through the House, and he played a key role in arranging for the support of the Ulster Unionists throughout the crucial debates. Early in 1920, Long went to Ireland in order to get a sense for himself of prevailing attitudes and opinions. He visited Belfast and Dublin, and travelled briefly outside both cities to smaller surrounding communities. In Ulster he interviewed large numbers of people: MPS, aldermen, councillors, pressmen, businessmen, officials of the Unionist party, leaders of the Orange Order, and many workingmen. He was surprised to find little interest in the government's home rule proposals. It appeared that Ulster was more interested in what the boundaries of the new province would be: "People in the inner circles hold the view that the new province should consist of the six counties, the idea being that the inclusion of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan would provide such an access of strength to the Roman Catholic Party, that the supremacy of the Unionists would be seriously threatened." On the other hand, the Roman Catholics favoured the exclusion of nine counties. Long's overall impression was that while Ulster might try to amend the bill, it

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would not resist it: "Because the Unionist Party realise that if a settlement can be obtained now, they will secure infinitely better terms than they could hope for from a new Parliament, in which, in all probability the Labour Party would have much stronger representation."36 During his trip, Long was again subjected to bitter criticism from Unionists in both North and South about his seeming abandonment of Unionist principles. He was not surprised. He understood their anxieties. But he rather resented the implication that he was fickle. As he told Sir John Ross, "Whether my friends believe it or not, I am as honestly and determinedly anxious to save Ireland now as I ever was." But what had to be realized was that the act of 1914 was on the statute book: It is no good crying over spilt milk ... It would be impossible to secure the repeal of the Act of 1914, unless at the same time other proposals for setting up self-government in Ireland were produced. In these circumstances, what course could we, who have always been opposed to Home Rule, adopt other than the one we have adopted, namely, to set ourselves to draw the fairest and best proposals we would devise? This, I think, we have done. If our friends tell us - as some of mine do rather offensively! - that we ought to resign, and that we have only passed these Bills in order to retain our offices, they are talking simple nonsense ... What good would come from our resignation? The break-up of the Government and the formation of another Government, either Liberal or Labour, from whom most certainly the Unionists of Ireland would have received much worse treatment.37

Throughout this time, Long also remained faithful to the "federal" idea. He told an audience in Trowbridge that no suggestion would satisfy all Irish interests, but he believed the current proposal was the best compromise. "Our scheme for Ireland is so constructed that it is absolutely consistent in every detail with a federal system, and when we come to federal legislation for England and Scotland the scheme will fit exactly into the federal proposal. It gives the Irish people the opportunity if they choose to come together and form a single Parliament. If they prefer two Parliaments they have that opportunity ... I do really believe that the time has come when you must run this question along the lines of devolution."38 Despite Long's positive comments, problems still remained with the bill, and in the run-up to its formal introduction there were several last-minute changes. The most pressing issue was the area of the northern Irish province. Would it be a six- or nine-county

188 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

Ulster? Another matter that had to be confronted was customs and excise. Would they be transferred to the two Irish parliaments or not? It also gradually became clear that the Ulster Unionists did not want an all-Ireland judiciary and were prepared to wreck the bill unless Ulster received a separate judiciary. Long's committee, with Bonar Law in the chair, met on 17 February to thrash out these and other problems.39 Long was most vocal on the question of customs and excise. He asked what parliamentary advantage would be gained in transferring customs and excise; Ulster did not want the powers and its opposition to the bill would not be lessened by being offered them; and it was equally clear that Sinn Fein's hostility would not be reduced by such an offer either. Long declared that if he were a private member, he would fight the bill to the bitter end on the issue "because by handing over Customs and Excise the Federal idea was being destroyed." The committee divided on the question and left it to be settled by the cabinet. As for the size of Ulster, Long reminded his colleagues of the force of the Ulster Unionist case for a six-county province, but the committee adhered to its original proposal and recommended a nine-county Ulster on the grounds that this would facilitate ultimate reunion, whereas a six-county Ulster was more likely to be able to go it alone. The day after this meeting, on 18 February, Long learned that the Ulster Unionists were so opposed to a single Irish judiciary that they were prepared to vote against the overall bill unless they received their own judiciary. He hastily assembled his committee which, in light of the threats, unanimously agreed to break up the Irish judiciary. Since drafting the new clauses would take some time, Long informed the cabinet that the introduction of the bill would have to be delayed a few days.40 Long was also involved in last-minute negotiations with the Ulster leaders over the proposed size of Ulster and over the sanctity of its boundaries. It had been obvious since the previous November that the Ulster Unionists wanted a six- not a nine-county Ulster. They were not interested in the argument that a nine-county Ulster would lead to a united Ireland. That was anathema to them, something they had resisted since the i88os. They wanted an Ulster they could hold on to, one in which Protestants would have a clear-cut majority, and this had to be a six-county Ulster whose boundaries would be inviolate. While Long understood this argument and had always been sympathetic to it, he reasoned that a nine-county Ulster would provide a more likely launching pad for a united Ireland and thus for a federal United Kingdom. He was naturally reluctant to open

189 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

the door for a permanent partition. Nevertheless, he recognized that he had little choice if he wanted the Government of Ireland bill to pass. He therefore talked at length with Ulster leaders and, in his own words, "gave countless pledges" that a six-county Ulster would endure and would be maintained by the government.41 With Long leading the way, the cabinet agreed on 24 February 1920 that the area of Northern Ireland would consist of the counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone, plus the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry. Also in line with Long's arguments, the cabinet decided that customs and excise would not be transferred to the two parliaments. If union did eventually occur, the matter would be dealt with then.42 The bill received first reading on 25 February, the day after these crucial decisions, and on 31 March, after a three-day debate, it was carried at second reading by 348 to 94. At his own suggestion, Long was then made chair of a small committee to shepherd the bill through the committee stage.43 Long's health began to give him trouble again in April, and he went on board the Admiralty yacht Enchantress for a few days in order "to get a short change." By early May he was bedridden at Rood Ashton with the flu. During this time, the government had delayed further action on the bill, even resorting to Long's ill-health as an excuse. Understandably, this led to the accusation that the government was not serious about the bill, and it was finally obliged to act; the first day of the committee stage was set for 10 May, and long struggled up from Wiltshire in order to assume his role as the government's principal spokesman.44 Long was anxious to take charge of the bill, first, because he had chaired the committee that had framed it, but, more important, because he had been singled out for "very bitter attack." As a longtime supporter of the Irish Unionists, particularly the southern Unionists, he was now seen as a traitor, and he was anxious to state his case, which he believed to be a strong one.45 As he put it to Lord Derby, "It is not a very pleasant task ... to be in charge of a Home Rule Bill, but there it is and I am quite sure we are right."46 Debate on the committee stage of the bill lasted until October. Long's defence of the underlying principles of the bill was made during the early stages of the debate. He advised the House that in composing the bill the government had tried to follow, as closely as possible, "the federal analogy" that was to be found in the dominions, particularly in the British North America Act of 1867 and in the Australian constitution; the government was setting up two separate parliaments with a considerable range of "local powers."

190 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

When Long was asked whether by "federal plan" he meant one having a central parliament in London, or in Ireland, he was quick to say that he and the government "meant a federal plan of which Great Britain and Ireland should be part, and a Central Parliament which would be here [Westminster]." Long pointed out that the government was confronted with profound difficulties in Ireland, and he was convinced they would never settle them or the problems of congestion until they had "a federal system for the United Kingdom." The current bill had therefore been drawn up to fit in with a federal scheme. The only way self-government in Ireland could be achieved was by "boldly facing the facts and dividing Ireland into two parts," each with its own parliament and powers, but with an opportunity available "to come together into one Parliament." Long said he firmly believed this was the best "practical" solution which, in the long run, the country would accept; having searched the past and the present for insight and suggestions, he viewed it as the only possible proposal. He said he deeply believed in the "federal plan" and had no objection "to the building of the Irish wing first so long as you could complete the rest of the building." Nevertheless, he admitted that it was "extraordinary that the outcome of all our Home Rule battles and controversies is to be that self-government is to be established in Ulster, which desires more than anything else to remain an undivided part of the United Kingdom."47 One issue that surfaced early in the debate was the creation of a second chamber, or senate, to protect the interests of the minorities, particularly the southern Unionists. Because Long seemed to pour cold water on the idea, he was taken to task privately by Lord Midleton, the leader of the southern Unionists. He was quick to reply in the hope of making amends,48 assuring Midleton that he and the government were anxious to do all they could to lessen the risks and dangers to which the southern Unionists would be exposed under any new legislative system. He told Midleton he believed that the best protection would be provided by the imperial or central parliament, whose powers were complete, rather than in the creation of a second chamber for a local parliament; nevertheless, if the southern Unionists were convinced that a second chamber would effectively protect their interests, the government would not press its views. Long promised to take the matter up with his colleagues, and the question of a second chamber to protect minority interests remained a discussion point within the government until October. It quickly became clear to Long that little interest was being taken in the bill and that there was a danger that it might not pass. Very few Conservative members bothered to attend the debates, and the

191 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

Labour and Liberal members were conspicuous in their absence. At one point, Long estimated that no more than 100 to 120 members regularly attended during the committee stage. The fear of losing the bill prompted him to undertake an extraordinary series of secret negotiations with the Ulster Unionist leadership, during which he proposed that in return for the solid and consistent support of the Ulster MPS and their associates in the House, the government would guarantee the sanctity of the boundaries of a six-county Ulster. The story is best told in Long's own words: The Ulster people stood coldly aloof, they did not want the Bill and they were not inclined to provide the only active support the Bill was likely to get. I then had conversations with Carson and Craig and I came to the conclusion that it would be possible to arrange some plan with the Ulster Members on one condition and one alone, and that was they should receive a definite pledge from me on behalf of the Cabinet to the effect that if they agreed to accept the Bill and to try to work it when passed, it would be on the clear understanding that the Six Counties, as settled after the negotiations, should be theirs for good and all and there should be no interference with the boundaries or anything else, excepting such slight adjustments as might be necessary to get rid of projecting bits, etc. I brought this before the Cabinet and explained the situation. I told them that if they could not come to some arrangement with Ulster they had better withdraw the Bill, as it was a perfect farce to go on with a Bill for Ireland which had no support there among the Unionists and was opposed by the Nationalists and further had no support from any political party in England. On the other hand I thought it a great pity to lose all the work that had been done and therefore recommended them to authorize me to give this definite promise, which on their agreeing unanimously, I did.49

Long was able to tell Bonar Law on 21 May 1920 that he had "a long talk with Ulster MPS today. They want the Bill and will do all they can to help us."5° By early June, Long was hopeful that the most difficult parts of the bill had been dealt with, though he confided to Hamar Greenwood, who had replaced Macpherson as chief secretary in March, "We are between two fires, the extremists who would grant no measure of Home Rule at all, on the one side, and those on the other who would give everything, including the Navy and the Army!"51 He was convinced that the government had to continue its "double-barrelled policy of firm repression of crime and constitutional reform." The adoption of new and firmer methods over the next three or four months would, he was sure, "see a very real check

192 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

imposed upon the activities of Sinn Fein." If, simultaneously with such an attempt "to restore respect for the law," a bill was passed which gave Ireland "real powers of self-government which she can take and use for her own benefit, if she is only prepared to abandon murder and outrages," the prospects for the moderates would be much better. Long fully believed that "people are beginning to realise, not only that the Bill is going to pass, but that it is a practical, workable measure, which will give Ireland all for which she can legitimately ask."52 When it seemed as if Lloyd George was weakening in his support of a firm policy, Long protested: "I am sure if it is abandoned it will strengthen the view already prevalent in Ireland that we are not in earnest in our campaign against the Sinn Feiners." He continued: To weaken now would, I am sure, be a mistake. The Irishman is easily dealt with if you stand up to him; but he is the worst man in the world from whom to run away. If you give way; if, having announced your policy, you weaken on it, he immediately thinks that you are afraid, that you have lost confidence in yourself and in your policy - and he presumes accordingly. If we steadfastly adhere to the policy which we have pursued during the last few weeks - the double-barrelled policy of firm and effective dealing with the Sinn Feiners, murderers, and other scoundrels, and at the same time pursue our policy of reform by passing our measure through Parliament with as little delay as possible ... I am satisfied that we shall win through. It is a stubborn fight, but it can be won, and will be won, if we stick to our own policy. But if we allow ourselves to be deflected, and chop and change - then I shall regard the situation as hopeless.53

In response to this plea, on 25 June Lloyd George struck a small cabinet committee, with Long as chairman, to meet periodically to review the state of affairs in Ireland and make suggestions to cabinet and the Irish government. The committee, composed of Balfour, the Earl of Birkenhead, Winston Churchill, H.A.L. Fisher, and Sir James Craig, was experienced and powerful. It met regularly at least once a week for lunch throughout the summer and autumn, and was of considerable influence in shaping government policy.54 The first casualty of its activities was the power of the lord lieutenant. Since French had assumed that post in the spring of 1918, he had been given precedence over the chief secretary. This was now to be reversed. As Long explained to French, "The Committee feel that the Chief Secretary, being in the House of Commons, where the policy of the Government has really to be defended, must be regarded as the responsible Minister." French could, of course, continue to ex-

193 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

press his views to either the chief secretary or the committee, but only if the chief secretary agreed.55 For Long, the committee was a means of maintaining the so-called double-barrelled policy of firmness and constitutional reform, and he steered his colleagues in that direction. As he reminded French, "I have always been in favour of declaring martial law - and I do not believe that we shall defeat S.F. until we take up the challenge which they have thrown down, and go to war with them in earnest."56 By 22 July, he was able to report that the committee "felt strongly" that the moment had arrived "for the Government actively to assume the offensive in its Irish policy; and to come to grips with Sinn Fein"; the world at large should be shown that the government was in earnest in its assertion that the republican movement in Ireland should be destroyed and that the authority of the imperial government could not be flouted with impunity. The committee favoured the immediate introduction of martial law.57 This brought the issue to a head, and the government's Irish policy was subjected to a full-scale review at the cabinet meeting on 23 July.58 The cabinet had asked the advice of William Wylie, the law adviser to the Irish government, and General Tudor, chief of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Both men argued that the Royal Irish Constabulary could not last much more than two months as an effective police force. There appeared to be only two options, either martial law or a settlement with Sinn Fein. Wylie favoured negotiating with Sinn Fein while Tudor recommended martial law. Wylie was supported by Sir John Anderson, the joint undersecretary to the lord lieutenant, and Alfred Cope, assistant undersecretary for Ireland.59 Long was pleased to have Tudor's support, but he did not look kindly on Wylie's suggestion, for he was strongly opposed to the "blather" about "Dominion H.R." or Irish independence.60 Birkenhead and Churchill argued for "ardent coercion, trusting to force the Sinn Feiners into a frame of mind favourable to settlement." Curzon pointed out that such a policy would take months to carry out and would unreasonably delay the Government of Ireland bill. He was inclined to agree with Wylie and "explore the grounds on which a pact could be concluded" with Sinn Fein; the current bill could then be remodelled in light of the meetings. Balfour, like Long, favoured fighting the prevailing disorder and going on with the bill. Long vehemently opposed dealing with Sinn Fein. He doubted it would get them anywhere. As he pointed out, "if the Sinn Fein leaders began negotiating they would be shot by the extremists."61 The meeting ended with no clear decision having been reached. Almost by default, the double-barrelled policy advocated by Long,

194 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

and now by Balfour, continued. Certainly, Long did all he could to ensure that the essentials of government policy did not shift. On 26 July he reassured Midleton: "We have no intention of entering into negotiations with S.F., nor could we even if we wished, which we do not, adopt Dom Home Rule. It is quite incompatible with our present scheme - and even if it were not so, you may rely upon it that we could not bargain with men who have been guilty of those awful murders. The thing is unthinkable."62 On 11 August, Long's "Irish Situation Committee" agreed that no one in Dublin Castle should have any dealings with Sinn Fein and that government policy should continue to be the suppression of crime and the passage of the Government of Ireland bill.63 Long was in fact prepared to go further than many of his colleagues in order to ensure acceptance of the bill; he was willing "to see all the powers given at once which are now reserved." Although this would mean recognizing the two parliaments, he had no objection to going so far. In mid-August he simply doubted "whether the Irishmen who demand [a] Dominion will agree to it."64 A month later, after soundings in Ireland and an intensive scrutiny of the overall situation, he was more than ever convinced that this was the route to go. He put his case directly to Lloyd George.65 Long did not believe that dominion home rule could be seriously regarded, because the government would have to be prepared to accept practical if not legal independence. He doubted if England would ever concede dominion status. Therefore, he suggested: The only course to be adopted is to abolish the provisions in the Bill which reserve certain services until North and South are united, and definitely give to each Parliament control of all Irish administration, including finance; reserving only the general provision in regard to the Crown and dignities, provision of naval and military forces, control of harbours so far as is necessary for naval purposes, foreign treaties etc. The objection to this course is that it might tend to perpetuate the division between North and South. Does this present a real difficulty? I think not, because I believe that many years must elapse before such a complete change takes place in Southern Ireland as would alone justify the North in uniting with them and forming a single parliament. If and when this time comes, the Irish will be able to pass their own "Act of Union"; and there is no probability of the Parliament at Westminster offering opposition to such legislation. This, therefore, is the course which I recommend.

In follow-up memoranda to the cabinet on the same lines, Long argued: "We can secure a wider acceptance of the measure by giving

195 "Devolution in a Federal Form"

the two Irish parliaments complete control of finance"; he said that while he realized that such a policy seemed to lean "to the absolute perpetuation of the dual system," he knew of "no way in which further power can be given to the two Parliaments which will not be attended by this risk."66 Long's proposal was considered by the cabinet on 13 October 1920.67 It was given considerable support by three Liberals, Addison, Fisher, and Montagu, who were concerned about the heightened state of public opposition in Ireland to British policies. They argued that the government needed all the support possible if it was to have any hope of "breaking up the murder gang"; the government should frankly and openly state that "this new solution was put forward in the belief that it would settle the question, that no further concession could possibly be made, and that the giving of complete financial autonomy to both parliaments was the government's limit in the way of concession." The strongest objections came from Lloyd George, and his argument carried the day. He pointed out that by giving up customs, excise, and income tax, the government would get nothing in return; in fact, it would mean delivering the key to Irish separation, for the scheme was not compatible with Ireland remaining an integral part of the United Kingdom. Moreover, he said, it would mean the end of any overall federal reform; the retention of customs was essential to a federal system. Lloyd George also made it clear that he intended to use the control of customs, excise, and income tax to put pressure on the South once the Government of Ireland bill had passed. If the government retained control of the various taxes, the Sinn Feiners would be "at our mercy," he said. Long and his supporters had little with which to counter such remorseless logic and realpolitik, and the cabinet agreed that no changes should be made to the financial clauses.68 By the end of the month, Long was confined to bed with arthritis of the spine and was unable to take part in the final stages of the bill. Since he could not actively assist, he chose not to press any of his views.69 The bill therefore completed its passage through committee almost unsullied. It received third reading in the Commons on 9 November, passed quickly through the Lords, and was given royal assent as the Government of Ireland Act on 23 December 1920. Thirteen days earlier, martial law was proclaimed in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary. Long's "double-barrelled policy" had prevailed. The act established two parliaments in Ireland, one for the six northeastern counties and one for the twenty-six in the South and West, and an Irish council composed of twenty members from each

196 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

parliament. The council was provided with limited powers and was to receive additional ones only with the mutual consent of the two parliaments. Powers were divided much as Long's committee had suggested in November 1919. Those transferred were primarily administrative, and those reserved or temporarily held back were in the predictable areas of defence and the crucial realm of finance. The Westminster parliament was unquestionably sovereign, though provision was made for the transfer of some of these critical powers if union of the two Irelands was agreed upon in the future. The act was definitely not a federal one but could be best described in the language of the time, and as Long had often done, as "devolution in a federal form." Only time would reveal whether it would help bridge the chasm separating the various aspirations of Sinn Fein, the Ulster Unionists, and the British government, and whether it would serve as a launching pad for a truly federal United Kingdom.

Conclusion

The Government of Ireland Act came into effect on 3 May 1921. Within a month it was clear the act was a failure. It had not managed to bridge the gaps separating the Irish from each other, and it obviously would never become the basis of a federal constitution for the United Kingdom. Sinn Fein candidates had been unopposed in the elections in the South and West, and all had refused to attend the initial meetings of the southern parliament. The British government therefore abandoned its effort to create a legislature in Dublin and concentrated on establishing one in Belfast. This legislature met for the first time on 7 June. Soon afterwards negotiations opened between Sinn Fein and Westminster, culminating in the signing of a treaty on 6 December which led to the twenty-six counties of the South and West being ushered onto the imperial stage in 1922 as a new dominion, the Irish Free State. The six northeastern counties were left behind, attached to Great Britain, with a parliament they never sought whose powers were inadequate to its tasks. The union which Long had fought so tenaciously to preserve had been sundered. Long watched these developments unfold from the sidelines of political life. Bedridden and in acute pain from spinal arthritis, he had resigned from the government in February 1921. For the rest of the year he recuperated at Rood Ashton with only brief forays away from Wiltshire. It was not until December that he was strong enough to venture abroad for sun and rest on the Mediterranean. He had by then concluded that whatever arrangement was struck with the Sinn Fein negotiators, Ulster should not be coerced. It should be allowed to stand out.* Predictably, Long did not find the December agreement attractive, and he worried that the government would not adhere to its promise to the Ulster Unionists over the boundary.

198 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

By February 1922 he was completely exasperated; he confided to his son, Eric, "Ireland is hopeless. I am very unhappy about the political situation." He could not believe that the government would give in to Michael Collins on the boundary question: "It wd be a complete betrayal of Ulster & a serious breach of Parliamentary promises. I shd back Craig if I were at home & mean to write & tell Chamberlain my views."2 He wrote to Chamberlain from Sicily expressing his unease: I read the various declarations to mean that the Commission would only have power to make small adjustments, to give them more surely means that [Arthur] Griffith's men will demand half Ulster, Craig's men will resist and it will then rest with one man, the President, to decide and he may undo the Act of 1920! How could I support this? I was chairman of the Irish Committee, it devised the plan and prepared the Bill, and I gave countless pledges to Ulster members when in charge of the Bill that so far as the County area was concerned the proposals in the Bill were to endure and would be maintained by the Government.3

The issue of the boundary and the integrity of his pledges to the Ulster Unionists continued to be of concern to Long. Only a few days before his death in September 1924, he sent his old colleague Lord Selborne a detailed account of his negotiations over the boundary question in 1920 which had led to the cabinet assuring Carson and Craig that the six counties "should be theirs for good and all and there should be no interference with boundaries."4 Selborne released this statement to the press shortly after Long's death and on the eve of the reassembling of Parliament to discuss the Irish boundary bill. It seemed only fitting that to the very end of his life, and beyond, Long should be battling to uphold what remained of the union. Long had been wedded to that cause for forty years and had been its most ardent champion since 1905. He had grown into adulthood at a time when the British Empire was the dominant power in the world, and he had accepted without question that its continued strength lay in the preservation of the union at home; to allow a splintering of the United Kingdom would open the way to disintegration of the empire. By the time Long entered Parliament in 1880, he was one of a diminishing group of country gentlemen whose role as a permanent force in British political life was nearing an end. While he fought hard to protect the interests of the landlords and while he bemoaned the advent of socialism, he was neither a political dinosaur nor a fox-hunting backwoodsman. He was a Conservative,

199 Conclusion

but for him Conservatism was not "a stubborn persistence in an outworn method"; it was a preparedness "to dispense with what is obsolete and what is hindering." In guarding "the spirit of our institutions," a Conservative, by Long's definition, would "not endanger that spirit out of a slavish adherence to form."5 Long was more adaptable than many of his Unionist colleagues in key areas of policy. He was one of the few to advocate a change in the social policies of the party, and he played a key role in initiating electoral reform. He was also one of the fiercest critics of Unionist party organization and leadership before 1914. While his frustration and naturally impatient temperament led him to act injudiciously on occasion, there is no denying that he gave voice to widespread dissatisfaction in the party over inefficiency and languorous leadership. Long knew that these deficiencies were hampering the party's capacity to respond to the various new pressures in society, particularly the needs of the Irish Unionists; so, not altogether readily but certainly aggressively, he led the charge for a change in the party's leadership and organizational structure. Where his Willingness to adapt "form" in order to guard the "spirit" of institutions was most in evidence was over the union of Great Britain and Ireland. Believing this link to be sacrosanct, he was tenacious in its defence, but when old methods no longer proved workable, as they certainly did not by July 1914, Long adapted. He took up the cause of federalism and by 1918 was its most persistent advocate in government circles. The years during which Long was an active politician were ones of fundamental change in British economic, social, and political life. The pillars that had supported his family's way of life for more than four hundred years were rotting by the late nineteenth century. Established ways of doing things and the long-accepted hierarchies were under siege. Moreover, Britain itself was no longer pre-eminent in the international arena. Although still powerful, it found itself in a fierce competition on all fronts - economic, military, naval - with younger, more aggressive rivals. The empire that Long's class took for granted was increasingly challenged from within and without. These tumultuous developments forced Englishmen, particularly Conservatives, to come to grips with the pace and the demands of change at a transitional moment in the history of Britain and its empire. Only gradually did Long and others recognize (although they may never have fully understood) the depth of nationalist desires throughout the British Empire. Although Ireland took the most violent path, it was not alone. Egypt, India, even the dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, were, in their

200 Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union

own ways, demanding a severing of the bonds of empire and greater sovereignty. Long did not quickly or easily adjust to Irish demands. Brought up in a world of country houses, servants and tenants, and sheltered from the day-to-day grind of earning a living, he was rarely obliged to question the assumptions of natural authority that surrounded him. He resented challenges to his authority, particularly when they were accompanied by threats or the wilful breaking of the law to make a point. He allowed his inveterate personal distaste for such tactics to blind him to whatever merits opposing arguments might have. This trait was not peculiar to Long, but it did make it virtually impossible for him to appreciate the forces behind the changes in Ireland. Long shared the upper-class Englishman's disdain for the Irish nationalists. He was literally shocked when he heard talk of an Irish "nation." What could they mean? His propensity for easy dismissal of Irish arguments in favour of home rule was only reinforced by the aggressive tactics adopted by the Land League and backed by Parnell. Long had heartily endorsed Balfour's firm handling of Ireland in the years 1887-91, and he remained forever convinced that the Irish, like an unruly hound, would respond only to a firm hand. Even in 1920 he assumed that the Government of Ireland Act should only come into effect when Ireland was "stable." Long found it difficult to distance himself from the basic instincts of the landlord class: change was only countenanced and assured if it was change on the ruler's terms; paternalism and its obverse, deference, were still assumed to be the natural order. It is because Long was so representative of a class that was being ushered to the sidelines of British economic and political life that his efforts to preserve and adapt are so interesting. He was reluctant to change, but he came to accept that change was inevitable and that the Conservative party would have to adapt if it was to have a future as a governing party. Even so, he could not contemplate complete, irrevocable, cataclysmic change. He wanted to preserve continuity with past traditions and with the well-established order. Above all, he wanted to preserve the unity of the empire and thus the international prestige of the British. Fundamental to this was the continued unity of the United Kingdom. When he reluctantly recognized that it was no longer possible to deny the Irish nationalists their demand for some form of self-government, he did all in his power to fashion a constitutional option that would allow this while preserving the union. If it took an adaptation of "form" to preserve the essential "spirit" of the constitution, then adapt one must. It was better to have federalism and the retention of the union than no union at all.

201 Conclusion

By advocating a change of form - federalism - that would preserve the union, Long was true to both his Conservative upbringing and his party's ideological underpinnings, but in recommending such a change he not only underlined how far he had shifted since the i88os but also indicated the extent to which English conservatism would have to adapt if it wished to have a role both at home and abroad in the decades to come. Since he was, by 1916, the most powerful voice on Irish affairs in the government, he had a considerable impact on the formulation of policy. His determined advocacy of a federal solution ensured that the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was drafted with a federal structure for the United Kingdom in mind. But despite all his efforts to adapt the forms of political discourse, Long could not shake himself loose from an inherent opposition to the substance of Irish nationalism. He convinced himself that the quasi-federal features of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 would allow for a future reunion of the North with the South and West, and would serve as a stepping stone to a larger federal relationship in the British Isles. This was delusory. The South and West refused to play, and the North reluctantly took what it did not want: a statelet restricted and hampered within its hybrid colonial and federal form. Thus, in the end, Long's efforts at adaptation had a fundamental impact on the United Kingdom's constitution - not that any ideas or actions of his could have avoided some form of partition. In this respect, Balfour's early fatalistic conclusion that partition was inevitable was undoubtedly correct. What Long's championing of federalism led to, however, was a unique arrangement in northeastern Ireland that was unlike anything else in the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland was given a legislature with devolved powers. Admittedly, they were truncated powers, but they were sufficient to ensure the dominance of Protestants over Roman Catholics after 1921 in a way that would probably not have been possible if those six counties of Northern Ireland had simply been left as part of the overall United Kingdom on the same footing as other regions and counties. Long would not necessarily have foreseen this result, but unquestionably his championing of a federal solution to the constitutional difficulties confronting the United Kingdom led directly to partition in a particular form and left an indelible mark on the constitutional map of the British Isles.

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Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

ACP Austen Chamberlain Papers BLP Bonar Law Papers BL British Library ccc Churchill College, Cambridge DCRO Durham County Record Office FP French Papers HLRO House of Lords Record Office HRC Humanities Research Center, Austin, Texas IWM Imperial War Museum KRO Kent Record Office LGP Lloyd George Papers LP Long Papers PRO Public Record Office PRONI Public Record Office of Northern Ireland UBL University of Birmingham Library USL University of Sheffield Library WRO Wiltshire Record Office PREFACE i D.G. Boyce and Cameron Hazlehurst, "The Unknown Chief Secretary: H.E. Duke and Ireland, 1916-18," Irish Historical Studies 20, no. 79 (March 1977) 1286-311. CHAPTER ONE

i Walter Long, Memories (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1923), 4.

204 Notes to pages 3-18 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., 28. 4 Edwin Meyrick to R.P. Long, 7 August 1868, Long Papers (LP), Wiltshire Record Office (WRO), 947/2053/1. There is some evidence that Walter did somewhat better, at least initially, in English and mathematics. See Walter Long to his "Darling Papa," 17 June 1867, 947/2O53/ 2, ibid. 5 Harrow School Report of 4 June 1870, 947/2053/3, ibid. 6 Harrow School Report of 9 July 1870; and H.E. Hutton to R.P. Long, 11 July [1870], ibid. 7 Harrow School Report of July 1873, Long Papers (LP), British Library (BL), Add. Ms. 62408. 8 Long, Memories, 25-6. 9 See, particularly, Medlicott to Long, 16 and 20 February 1877, * anc* 20 March 1877, 28 August 1877, 31 December 1877, and 26 March 1878, LP, WRO, 947/1062. 10 Long, Memories, 71. 11 Sir Charles Petrie, Walter Long and His Times (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1936), 31-2. 12 Long, Memories, 80-3. 13 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 254, 26 July 1880, cols. 1388-90. 14 See, for example, 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 255, 11 August 1880, col. 936; 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 262, 16 June 1881, cols. 713-6; and 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 294, 24 February 1885, cols. 1210-2. 15 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 304, 8 April 1886, cols. 1102-3. 16 For Long's diary of his Canadian trip in 1888, see LP, WRO, 947/8, and for his notes concerning settlement in Manitoba, see 947/9, ibid. 17 For example, see Long to Akers-Douglas, 16 October 1891, AkersDouglas Papers, Kent Record Office (KRO), vol. 564, €346/4. 18 3 Hansard (H of C), vol. 310, 9 February 1887, cols. 1022-4. 19 Times, 9 May 1892. 20 See the Times, 4 and 6 June 1892. 21 Times, 13 June 1892. 22 Times, 13 July 1892. 23 For Long's reaction to his defeat, see Long to Akers-Douglas, 11 July 1892, Akers-Douglas Papers, KRO, vol. 564, 0346/8. 24 Long developed a considerable respect for Balfour during this episode. See Long to Balfour [January 1894], Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng. Hist. €725:114-5. Long had earlier singled out Balfour as Salisbury's natural heir to the leadership. See Long to AkersDouglas, 14 October 1891, Akers-Douglas Papers, KRO, vol. 564, 0346/4. 25 Times, 19 January 1893.

205 Notes to pages 19-26 26 Long to Sandars, 3 August 1895, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:1-5. 27 For extensive treatment of this episode, see Long's Memories, 114-33. 28 For the dispute over the church discipline bill, see G.I.T. Machin, Politics and Churches in Great Britain 1869 to 1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987). 29 See Long to Sandars, 5 June 1903, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng. Hist. 0739:67-70; and Sandars to Balfour, 29 October 1903, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49761:187-91. CHAPTER TWO

1 For this crucial episode, see Blanche E.G. Dugdale, "The WyndhamMacDonnell Imbroglio," Quarterly Review (January i932):i5-39; F.S.L. Lyons, "The Irish Unionist Party and the Devolution Crisis of 1904-5," Irish Historical Studies (March 1948): 1-22; Andrew Gailey, Ireland and the Death of Kindness: The Experience of Constructive Unionism 1890-1905 (Cork: Cork University Press 1987), 235-91; Eunan O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union: British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1987), 24-51; Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884-1911 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989), 243-83; and John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1989), 86-103. 2 O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union, 53; also Balfour to Sandars, 4 January 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49763:10-15. 3 Jackson, The Ulster Party, 276. 4 Walter Long, Memories (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1923), 140-2. 5 Long had been upset to learn the details of MacDonnell's appointment and was no less flummoxed to find out that Dudley, the lord lieutenant, had not only known of MacDonnell's discussions with Dunraven but had been sympathetic. What particularly annoyed Long was Wyndham's failure to inform the cabinet about Dudley's attitude. Long made his position clear in a typically blunt note to Balfour written shortly after the key Commons debate of 21 February 1905: "\ think we ought to have been consulted before he [George Wyndham] appointed Sir A. M. in the way he did and that he ought to have told us about Dudley at the first Cabinet after he learned the news." Long thought Wyndham should resign. See Long to Balfour, 21 February 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:46-7; also H.O. ArnoldForster diary, i March 1905, Arnold-Forster Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 503456 Long, Memories, 145.

206 206 Notes Notes to to pages pages 26-33 26-33 77 Long Long to to Sandars, Sandars, 22 March March 1905, 1905, Sandars Sandars Papers, Papers, Bodleian, Bodleian, Ms. Ms. Eng Eng Hist. Hist. €749:70-1. €749:70-1. 88 Long Long to to Sandars, Sandars, 15 15 March March 1905, 1905, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49776:52-5. 49776:52-5. 99 MacDonnell MacDonnell to to Long, Long, 16 16 March March 1905, 1905, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/68. 947/68. 10 10 W. W. Long, Long, "Sir "Sir A.P. A.P. MacDonnell, MacDonnell, Under-Secretary Under-Secretary for for Ireland," Ireland," ConfiConfidential, dential, 31 31 March March 1905, 1905, Cab. Cab. 37/75/55, 37/75/55, PRO. PRO. 11 11 W.H.L., W.H.L., "Sir "Sir Anthony Anthony MacDonnell, MacDonnell, Under-Secretary Under-Secretary for for Ireland," Ireland," ConConfidential, fidential, 33 April April 1905, 1905, Cab. Cab. 37/75/60, 37/75/60, ibid. ibid. See See also also W. W. Long, Long, "Memo"Memorandum randum on on Sir Sir Anthony Anthony MacDonnell," MacDonnell," 28 28 April April 1905, 1905, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL, Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49776:56-67. 49776:56-67. 12 12 See See Long Long to to MacDonnell, MacDonnell, 27 27 March March and and 33 April April 1905, 1905, copies, copies, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/70. 947/70. 13 13 W. W. Long, Long, "Sir "Sir Anthony Anthony MacDonnell, MacDonnell, Under-Secretary Under-Secretary for for Ireland," Ireland," 31 31 March March 1905, 1905, Cab. Cab. 37/75/55, 37/75/55, PRO. PRO. 14 14 Long Long to to Bull, Bull, 14 14 April April 1905, 1905, Bull Bull Papers, Papers, Churchill Churchill College, College, Cambridge Cambridge (ccc), (ccc), Bull Bull 3/12. 3/12. 15 15 See See O'Halpin, O'Halpin, The The Decline Decline of of the the Union, Union, 52-66; 52-66; Jackson, Jackson, The The Ulster Ulster Party, Party, 276-81; 276-81; R. R. Murphy, Murphy, "Walter "Walter Long Long and and the the Conservative Conservative Party, Party, an 1905-21" d 1905-21" (Ph.D., (Ph.D., University University of of Bristol, Bristol, 1985), 1985), 19-43; 19-43; an d W. W. Long, Long, Memories, Memories, 146-74. 146-74. 16 16 Long Long to to Sandars, Sandars, 15 15 March March 1905, 1905, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49776:52-5. 49776:52-5. See See also also on on this this Long Long to to Dudley, Dudley, 18 18 August August 1905, 1905, copy, copy, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/65. 947/65. 17 17 Jackson, Jackson, The The Ulster Ulster Party, Party, 277-78. 277-78. 18 18 Irish Irish Times, Times, 21 21 April April 1905. 1905. 19 19 Long Long to to MacDonnell, MacDonnell, 25 25 April April 1905, 1905, copy, copy, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/72. 947/72. 20 20 Irish Irish Times, Times, 22 22 May May 1905. 1905. 21 21 Long Long to to Dudley, Dudley, 11 11 May May 1905, 1905, Confidential, Confidential, copy, copy, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/65. 947/65. This This issue, issue, in in fact, fact, was was raised raised again again in in the the House House on on 25 25 May May 1905. 1905. See See 44 Hansard Hansard (H (H of of C), C), vol. vol. 146, 146, 25 25 May May 1905, 1905, cols. cols. 1497-1503. 1497-1503. 22 22 Dudley Dudley to to Long, Long, 29 29 July July 1905 1905 and and n.d., n.d., LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/65. 947/65. 23 23 Long Long to to Dudley, Dudley, 77 August, August, ibid. ibid. 24 24 Long Long to to Dudley Dudley [c.8 [c.8 or or 9! 9! August August 1905, 1905, ibid. ibid. 25 25 Dudley Dudley to to Long, Long, n n August August 1905, 1905, ibid. ibid. 26 26 See See Long Long to to Sandars, Sandars, 15 15 August August 1905, 1905, and and Balfour Balfour to to Dudley, Dudley, 15 15 AuAugust gust 1905, 1905, copies, copies, ibid. ibid. 27 27 Sandars Sandars to to Balfour, Balfour, 15, 15, 16, 16, and and 24 24 August August 1905, 1905, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL, Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49763:147, 49763:147, 150-6, 150-6, and and 162-8; 162-8; also also Long Long to to Sandars, Sandars, 21 21 AuAugust gust 1905, 1905, Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49776:82-3, 49776:82-3, ibid. ibid. On On ii September September 1905, 1905, Sir Sir West West Ridgeway, Ridgeway, in in aa letter letter to to the the Times, Times, referred referred to to Long's Long's "courage, "courage, frankfrankness, ness, and and determination" determination" but but also also to to his his "Hibernian "Hibernian impetuosity, impetuosity, vevehemence hemence and and exaggeration exaggeration in in moments moments of of anger." anger."

207 Notes to pages 33-8 28 Long to Balfour, 6 September 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:97-8. 29 Long to Balfour, 11 September 1905, ibid., 99-104. 30 Long to Balfour, 20 September 1905, ibid., 105-6; and W. Long to Balfour, 20 September 1905: [Memorandum on the Date of the General Election], Cab. 37/79/158, PRO, and LP, WRO, 947/61. 31 Balfour to Selborne, 21 September 1905, copy, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49708:92-3. 32 See Bull diary, 13 October 1905, Bull Papers, ccc. 33 See the letters from Lords Westmeath, Clanbrock, and Drogheda, and from Richard Bagwell, John Atkinson, and others in LP, WRO, 947/ 116; and particularly Edward Saunderson to Long, 11 November 1905, and Abercorn to Long, 7 November 1905, LP, BL, ADD. Ms. 62409. 34 Long to Balfour, 30 November 1905, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:153-4. 35 John Ross to Long, i December 1905, and Edward Saunderson to Long, 11 and 24 November 1905, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62409; also Outlook, 9 December 1905. 36 Times, 9 December 1905. 37 Bristol Times and Mirror, 14, 15, and 20 December 1905. 38 Long to Lady Londonderry, 22 December 1905, Lady Londonderry Papers, Durham County Record Office (DCRO), D/Lo/c666(i). 39 For Long's reactions at this time, see Long to Bull, 6 February 1906, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 3/13; Long to Selborne, 8 April 1906, Selborne Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 79:16-9; and Sir Charles Petrie, Walter Long and His Times (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1936), 109-117. Add. Ms. 62410 in the Long Papers at the British Library contains a number of letters written to Long critical of the party leadership and party organization. Many were especially scathing about Acland-Hood, the chief whip. See, particularly, Gordon to Long, 23 June 1906, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62410. 40 J. Mackay Wilson to Long, 2 February 1906, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62410. 41 See, especially, his speech to the South County Dublin Unionist Registration Association on 6 March 1906, Times, 8 March 1906. 42 For this episode and an overview of Unionist thinking at this time, see J. R. Fanning, "The Unionist Party and Ireland, 1906-10," Irish Historical Studies 16, no. 58 (September I966):i47~7i. 43 Times, 30 August 1906. 44 See the Times, 31 August and i and 4 September 1906. 45 Long to Lady Londonderry, 31 August 1906, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/C666(4). 46 Wyndham to Long, 30 August 1906, LP, WRO, 947/126/15. 47 Wyndham did acknowledge that both Lansdowne and Balfour had

2o8 Notes to pages 39-42

48

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

warned him that the appointment might get him into trouble. Wyndham to Balfour, i September 1906, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49805:120-6. Long to Wyndham, 2 September 1906, copy; also Wyndham to Long, 3 September 1906, and Long to Wyndham, 4 September copy, LP, WRO, 947/126/15. Long to Balfour, 3 September 1906, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:166-8. Balfour to Long, 5 September 1906, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62403. Balfour to Wyndham, 5 September 1906, copy, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49805:135. Wyndham to Balfour, 6 September 1906, ibid., 137-8. Long to Balfour, 7 and 25 September 1906, Add. Ms. 49776:169-71 and 177-8, ibid. Balfour to Long, i October 1906, ibid., 179-80. Long to Balfour, 2 October 1906, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:181-6. For Balfour's draft, see Blanche B.C. Dugdale, "The WyndhamMacDonnell Imbroglio," Quarterly Review (January i932):i5-39Long to Balfour, 7 October 1906, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:189-91. See AC/7/4/2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 13, but particularly Long to A. Chamberlain, 7 October 1906, Austen Chamberlain Papers (ACP), University of Birmingham Library (UBL), AC/7/4/14See A. Chamberlain to Balfour, 7 October 1906, and "Memorandum" by A.C., Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49735:220-9. See Balfour to A. Chamberlain, 8 October 1906, copy, ibid., 232-6. Times, 23 October 1906. Long to Balfour, 23 October 1906, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49776:193. Sandars to Shortt, 9 September 1906, copy, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49764:218-19. Sandars to Shortt, 5 October 1906, copy, ibid., 224-5. Sandars to Balfour, 7 October 1906, ibid., 226-9. Wyndham to Balfour, 16 September 1906, ibid., Add. Ms. 49805:1747. Gerald Balfour thought Long "impulsive" and the MacDonnell business "needlessly revived"; G. Balfour to A. Chamberlain, 2 October 1906, ACP, UBL, AC/7/4/1O.

67 See A. Chamberlain to Long, 23, 26, and 27 September and i, 5, and 8 October 1906, LP, WRO, 947/126/2; and Long to A. Chamberlain, 21, 25, 28, and 29 September and 7 and 10 October 1906, ACP, UBL, Ac/7/4/2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 14, and 22. 68 A. Chamberlain to Long, 5 October 1906, copy, AC/7/4/13, ibid.

209 Notes to pages 42-9 69 Long to A. Chamberlain, 7 October 1906, AC/y/4/14, ibid. 70 See especially Long to Lady Londonderry, 7 October 1906, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/Lo/c666(5). 71 Long, Memories, 172; and Times, i February 1907. 72 For much of this correspondence, see Add. Ms. 62411, LP, BL, and for Long's general attitude at this time, see his introduction, dated 27 April 1907, to the Outlook's publication, Nationalist Organisations in Ireland: Their Origin, Development and Aims (London 1907). 73 Devonshire to Long, 9 November 1906, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62410. 74 Jersey to Long, 30 December 1906, ibid. 75 Milner to Long, 20 January 1907, Add. Ms. 62411, ibid. 76 Goschen to Long, 24 January 1907, ibid. 77 Balfour of Burleigh to Long, 23 January 1907, ibid. 78 Balfour of Burleigh to Long, 2 February 1907, ibid. 79 St Aldwyn to Long, 30 January 1907, ibid. 80 Lyttelton to Long, 15 January 1906, ibid. 81 Cadogan to Long, 4 January 1907, ibid. 82 Long to Lady Londonderry, 15 January 1907, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/C666(6). 83 For the early years of the Union Defence League, see Long, Memories, 194-7. 84 See E.B. Iwan-Miiller, Ireland: Today and Tomorrow (London 1907), xiixxviii. This introduction was reprinted as an article in the Fortnightly Review 87 (May 1907) 1767-72. See also the Times, 13 and 25 May 1907 and i and 5 June 1907; and a Union Defence League publication, Irish Facts and British Platforms, vol. i, re the speech at Queen's Hall, London, on 13 June 1907. 85 Times, 31 January 1907; also, 25, 26, and 30 January and 2 and 8 February 1907. See also 4 Hansard (H of C), vol. 169, 13 February 1906, cols 184-96. It was at this time that Lloyd George referred to Long as "an amiable Wiltshire Orangeman"; see Northern Whig, 9 February 1907. 86 Times, 5 June 1907. 87 Times, 19 October 1907. 88 Times, 4 July 1907. 89 Times, 8 October 1907. 90 Long to Lady Cadogan, 20 November 1907, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62412. 91 Long to Lady Londonderry, 20 November 1907, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/c666(22). 92 Long to Bonar Law, 5 December 1907, LP, BL, copy, Add. Ms. 62404. 93 See Bull diary, 6 April 1908, Bull papers, ccc, Bull 3/17, and Long to Bull, 8 and [10] April 1908, ibid., Bull 3/13; Long to Acland-Hood, 14 April 1908, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62413; and Times, 2, 3, and 4 June 1908.

2io Notes to pages 50-6 94 Long to Balfour, 17 July 1908, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49777:79. See also Long to Balfour, 16 and 19 September and 9 October 1908, and Balfour to Long, 18 September 1908, copies, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng. Hist. €757:26-36 and 138-41; and Sandars to Balfour, 20 September 1908, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49765:175-8. 95 Times, 18 July and 4 August 1908. 96 Long to Ashtown, 16 September 1908, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62413. 97 Times, 3 October 1908 98 Times, 14 November 1908. 99 Times, 21 November 1908. 100 Long spoke in favour of the South Africa bill after his return. See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 9, 16 and 19 August 1909, 1050-3 and 1658-9. 101 Long to Lady Londonderry, 19 June 1909, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/Lo/c666(89); Long to Sandars, 25 June 1909, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng.Hist. 0758:252; and Times, 14 June 1909. 102 Long to Balfour, 17 September 1909, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62403, enclosing Long to Acland-Hood, 17 September 1909, copy, ibid. 103 Long to Lady Londonderry, 19 September 1909, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/0666(98). 104 Balfour to Long [September 1909], LP, BL Add. Ms. 62403. 105 Lansdowne to Sandars, 27 October 1909, copy, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49730:5-6. CHAPTER THREE

1 Times, 15 and 22 December 1909. 2 See the Times, 17 and 31 December 1909. 3 Times, 5 January 1910. 4 Long to Lady Londonderry, 5 January 1910, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/C666(1O4). 5 Times, 7 January 1910. 6 Times, 8 January 1910. 7 Times, 12 January 1910. 8 Times, 13 January 1910. 9 He confided his fears to Lady Londonderry: "I wish I could think AJB would make some changes in his system & not let js run the show so much. There is more dissatisfaction among the Party about it, than there ever was ... but how to alter it is another thing"; Long to Lady Londonderry, 4 February 1910, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/c666(io8). Selborne, now governor general in South Africa, was even more skittish. He feared "Home Rule, disestablishment, and chaos. They simply will be paving the way for the triumph of Socialism, & a republic." Selborne to Long, 29 January 1910, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62415.

211 211 Notes Notes to to pages pages 56-61 56-61 10 10 Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 33 March March 1910, 1910, copy, copy, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/449/4. 947/449/4. 11 11 Long Long to to Selborne, Selborne, March March 1910, 1910, Bodleian, Bodleian, Ms. Ms. Selborne Selborne 74:17-24; 74:17-24; also also Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 26 26 March March 1910, 1910, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL, Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49777:61-4. 49777:61-4. 12 12 Times, Times, 30 30 March March 1910. 1910. 13 13 Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 33 April April 1910, 1910, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49777:6549777:657714 14 Long Long to to Lady Lady Londonderry, Londonderry, 24 24 and and 27 27 May May 1910, 1910, Lady Lady Londonderry Londonderry Papers, Papers, DCRO, DCRO, D/Lo/c666 D/Lo/c666 (119 (119 and and 120). 120). 15 15 Long Long to to Lady Lady Londonderry, Londonderry, 33 October October 1910, 1910, ibid., ibid., D/LO/c666(i27). D/LO/c666(i27). Long Long was was also also depressed depressed by by the the need need to to sell sell some some of of his his Wiltshire Wiltshire esestates. tates. See See Long Long to to Jesse Jesse Collings, Collings, 15 15 September September 1910, 1910, Lady Lady LondonLondonderry derry Papers, Papers, DCRO, DCRO, copy, copy, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/438; 947/438; and and Times, Times, 24 24 September September and and 30 30 December December 1910. 1910. 16 16 See See Long Long to to Lady Lady Londonderry, Londonderry, 25 25 August, August, 99 September, September, and and 77 OctoOctober ber 1910, 1910, Lady Lady Londonderry Londonderry Papers, Papers, DCRO, DCRO, D/Lo/c666 D/Lo/c666(124, (124, 125, 125, and and 128). 17 17 See See Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 33 October October 1910, 1910, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49777:68-71; 49777:68-71; also also Sandars Sandars to to Balfour, Balfour, 14 14 September September 1910, 1910, Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49766:254-6, 49766:254-6, ibid., ibid., in in which which Sandars Sandars drew drew Balfour's Balfour's attention attention to to Long's Long's correspondence correspondence with with Acland-Hood, Acland-Hood, the the chief chief whip, whip, in in which which Long Long had had launched launched aa "violent "violent attack attack upon upon the the present present organisation organisation of of the the Party." Party." 18 18 Brassey Brassey to to Long, Long, 44 April April 1910, 1910, LP, LP, WRO, WRO, 947/460. 947/460. Long Long also also received received copies copies of of letters letters that that Grey Grey had had written written to to Brassey Brassey and and A. A. W. W. Jarvis. Jarvis. See See A. A. W. W. Jarvis Jarvis to to Long, Long, 77 April April 1910, 1910, encl. encl. Grey Grey to to Jarvis Jarvis [n.d.], [n.d.], 947/ 947/ 130; 130; and and Grey Grey to to Brassey, Brassey, 55 March March 1910, 1910, copy, copy, 947/129, 947/129, ibid. ibid. 19 19 Milner Milner to to Balfour, Balfour, 17 17 April April 1910, 1910, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49697:153-64. 49697:153-64. For For aa detailed detailed examination examination of of the the federalist federalist campaign campaign in in 1910, 1910, see see John John Kendle, Kendle, Ireland Ireland and and the the Federal Federal Solution: Solution: The The Debate Debate over over the the United United Kingdom Kingdom Constitution, Constitution, 1870-1921 1870-1921 (Kingston (Kingston and and Montreal: Montreal: McGill-Queen's McGill-Queen's University University Press Press 1989), 1989), 104-27. 104-27. 20 20 Times, Times, 29 29 October October 1910. 1910. 21 21 A. A. V. V. Dicey Dicey to to Long, Long, 29 29 October October 1910, 1910, LP, LP, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 62406. 62406. 22 22 See See Balfour Balfour to to Garvin, Garvin, 22 22 October October 1910, 1910, Garvin Garvin Papers, Papers, Humanities Humanities Research Research Center Center (HRC), (HRC), Austin, Austin, Texas. Texas. 23 23 Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 13 13 November November 1910, 1910, Balfour Balfour Papers, Papers, BL, BL,Add. Add. Ms. Ms. 49777:72-4. 49777:72-4. 24 24 Long Long to to Lady Lady Londonderry, Londonderry, 44 and and 13 13 November November 1910, 1910, Lady Lady LondonLondonderry derry Papers, Papers, DCRO, DCRO, D/LO/c666(i32 D/LO/c666(i32 and and 134). 134). 25 25 See See the the Times, Times, 28, 28, 29, 29, and and 30 30 November November 1910. 1910. 26 26 Long Long to to Lady Lady Londonderry, Londonderry, 44 November November 1910, 1910, Lady Lady Londonderry Londonderry PaPapers, pers, DCRO, DCRO, D/LO/C666(132). D/LO/C666(132). 27 27 Long Long to to Balfour, Balfour, 22 22 December December 1910, 1910, encl. encl. W.H.L., W.H.L., "Organisation "Organisation of of

212 Notes to pages 62-6 the Party/' 22 December 1910, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng. Hist. €752:194-5. 28 Long to Balfour, 3 January 1911, encl. petition, ibid., Ms. Eng. Hist. €763:14-17. See also Balfour to Long, 26 December 1910, LP, WRO, 947/449/4; and Long to Balfour, 29 December 1910, copy, ibid., 947/ 445/329 See Balfour to Akers-Douglas, 17 and 28 January 1911, Akers-Douglas Papers, KRO, vol. 564, €22/21 and 22. 30 See Long to Balfour, 20 January 1911, encl. W.L. "Memorandum" of 20 January 1911, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49777:79-89; and undated memorandum by Long on party reorganization in LP, WRO, 949/449/4; also Long to Lady Londonderry, 21 January 1911, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/Lo/c666(i4o). 31 For the committee's activities, see LP, WRO, 947/449/1-62, and for its final report, see ibid., 947/450/16. 32 For Long's reaction, see his comments on the final report dated 7 July 1911, ibid., 947/450/17. 33 See Balfour to Long [31 May 1910] and 2 and 28 June; and Long to Balfour, i and 7 June and [July] 1911, copies, ibid., 947/449/4. See also Long to Bull, 17 June 1911, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/3; and Long to Lady Londonderry, 12 and 16 June 1911, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/c666(i45 and 146). 34 See Long to Lansdowne, 22 June 1911, copy, LP, WRO, 947/448/7, and Long to the Duke of Northumberland, 30 June 1911, ibid., 947/448/8. Long had urged a moderate position as early as March 1910. He suggested that the peers should elect a certain number of themselves to sit in the House of Lords for life; the remainder of the peers would be elected. See two memoranda re House of Lords reform, dated 3 and 9 March 1910 in ibid., 947/447. 35 Long to R.G.W. Chaloner, 10 July 1911, copy, ibid., 947/448/11. 36 Sir William Bull diary, 24 July 1911, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/4. 37 Ibid. 38 See [J. Sandars], "A Diary of Events and Transactions in connection with the passage of the Parliament Bill of 1911 through the House of Lords," [n.d. but c. Sept. 1911], Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49767:184-228. 39 Long to Lady Londonderry, 30 July 1911, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/C666(15O).

40 Long to Lady Londonderry, 26 August 1911, ibid., D/LO/€666(157). 41 Sir William Bull diary, 16 July 1911, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/4. 42 Long to Balfour, 29 September 1911, Confidential, copy, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Eng. Hist. €764:128-37. Long knew when he sent the letter that it was "very strong." He soon had second thoughts

213 Notes to pages 66-9 about its phrasing and acknowledged that it would severely damage his relationship with Balfour. See Long to Lady Londonderry, 29 September, 3 October, and 6, 8, 11, 15, and 29 December 1911, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, 0/1,0/0666(164, 165, 177, 178, 179, 180, and 184). Long was still wracked by guilt over a year later. On 20 January 1913 he wrote to Balfour: "I know I was guilty of an unpardonable act in saying what I did during those difficult times in 1911 ... I do desire to say that as long as I live I shall profoundly regret that I failed my leader at a most critical moment"; Long to Balfour, 20 January 1913, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49777. 43 See Shortt to Sandars, 18 October 1911; Chelston to Sandars [October 1911]; and Bal [Balcarres] to Sandars, 9 October 1911, Sandars Papers, Bodleian, Ms Eng. Hist. €764:126, 138, and 140. 44 Jack Sandars, "A Note on the Events Leading to Mr Balfour's Resignation 8 November 1911," Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49767:280-317. 45 For Long's reaction to the choice of Bonar Law, see Long to Lady Londonderry, 12, 14, and 19 November 1911, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/c666(i73, 174, and 175). 46 Long to Bonar Law, 10 November 1911, Bonar Law Papers (BLP), House of Lords Record Office (HLRO), 61724/1/3. 47 See Richard Murphy, "Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis, 1912-14," History 71, no. 232 (June 1986) ^22-34; William S. Rodner, "Leaguers, Covenanters, Moderates: British Support for Ulster, 1913-1914," Eire-Ireland, 17, no. 3 (Fall i982):68-85; and Gregory D. Phillips, "Lord Willoughby de Broke and the Politics of Radical Toryism, 1909-1914," Journal of British Studies 20, no. i (Fall i98o):2O5~24. 48 See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 21, 7 and 15 February 1911, cols. 201-10 and 1107-15; and vol. 24, 24 April 1911, cols. 1424-9. See also the Times, 17 March, 6, 13, and 28 June, and 17 July 1911. Long received strong anti-federal advice from A.V. Dicey at this time: Dicey to Long, 4 July 1911, Private, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62406. 49 For the Londonderry House agreement of 6 April 1911, see P. Buckland, Irish Unionism -1885-1923: A Documentary History (Belfast: HMSO 1973), 318-21; also W. Long, Memories (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1923), 197. 50 See Long to Steel-Maitland, 21 July 1911, copy; and Steel-Maitland to Long, 21 and 29 July 1911, LP, WRO, 947/449/58; and Long, Memories, 198. 51 See the Times, 4, 10, 13, and 21 October 1911. 52 Long to Lady Londonderry, 3 February 1912, Lady Londonderry Papers, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), 02846/1/4/2. 53 See, particularly, Long's speech at Preston on 22 January 1912, Times,

214 Notes to pages 69-74

54 55

56 57 58 59

60 61 62

63 64

65

66 67

23 January 1912. Long presided at a major Unionist rally at the Albert Hall on 26 January 1912. See Long's speech at Newtownards on 8 April 1912, Times, 9 April 1912. For Asquith's speech, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 36, 11 April 1912, cols. 1399-1426. For the bill itself, see "Government of Ireland Bill/' 16 April 1912, in Parl. Pap. (1912-13), vol. 2, 505-82; also Geoffrey J. Hand, "The Parliament Contemplated by the Irish Home Rule Act of 1914," in Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions (London 1968), 371-88. A.V. Dicey to Long, 24 April 1922, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62406. For Long's speech, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 37, 16 April 1912, cols. 194-211. See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 37, 30 April 1912, cols. 1722-43. Times, 23 April 1912. See also the Times, 10 May 1912, for a letter in which Long, as chairman of the UDL, outlined the Unionists' main objections to the bill. Long to Lady Londonderry, 12 April 1912, Lady Londonderry Papers, PRONI, 0.2846/1/4/6. Long to Bonar Law, 4 and 7 June 1912, BLP, HLRO, BL/26/4/7 and 12. Long to the editor, Times, 20 June 1912. On 18 June 1912, Long told J. M. Wilson that the Unionists had voted for the Agar-Robartes motion because they thought that if home rule passed, the loyalists of Ulster would be in a stronger position to stand up for their brethren in the South and West if they were outside an Irish parliament than if they were a "miserable minority" in it; Union Defence League, Irish Facts for British Platforms 6, no. 2 (June 1912):39See Times, 29 July and i August 1912, for Bonar Law's Blenheim speech. Long to Lady Londonderry, 4 June 1912, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/0666(204). For Long's Albert Hall speech, see the Times, 15 June 1912, and for his contributions to the committee stage of the bill, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 39, 11 June 1912, cols. 717-22; 18 June 1912, cols. 1614-15; and 19 June 1912, cols. 1718-20; vol. 40, i July 1912, cols. 775-81; and 3 July 1912, cols. 1168-74. For the tour, see Sir A.C. Morrison-Bell, "A Journal with Maps: A Back-Bencher's Story," chaps. 11 and 12, Morrison-Bell His. Col. 193, HLRO; and Walter Long's diary of his Canadian tour, 8 August 19 October 1912, LP, WRO,947/473. Long also kept a collection of newspaper clippings highlighting his tour; see ibid., 947/474. Toronto Star, 24 August 1912. See the Manitoba Free Press, 27 August 1912; Winnipeg Tribune, 27 August 1912; and Winnipeg Telegram, 28 August 1912.

215 Notes to pages 75-81 68 For Long's Toronto speeches and the reaction, see the Toronto News, 28 September 1912; Globe, 28 September 1912; Daily Star, 28 September 1912; Mail and Empire, 28 September 1912; and Times, 28 September 1912. 69 See the Morning Post, 19 October 1912; see also Long to Lady Londonderry, 29 September 1912, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/ 0666(216). 70 Carson to Long, 20 September and 17 October 1912, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62416. 71 Carson maintained a clipping file on home rule all round and federalism. See Carson Papers, PRONI, 015077A/3/i8. 72 For Long's contributions to the committee stage, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 42, 22 and 24 October 1912, cols. 2004-8 and 2493-9; VOL 43/ 29 October 1912, cols. 373-8, and 5 November 1912, cols. 1091-3; vol. 44, 20 and 21 November 1912, cols. 326-37 and 553-6, and 3 December 1912, cols. 2129-31; and Times, 14 and 20 November 1912. 73 See Walter Long, "The Dunraven Manifesto: Why a Home Rule Conference Would Fail," in Union Defence League, Irish Facts for British Platforms 6, no. 5 (November i9i2):27i-6. 74 Hythe to Long, 30 December 1912, LP, WRO, 947/446/27. 75 Long to Hythe, 2 January 1913, ibid., 947/446/27. 76 For the contemporary discussion of federalism and devolution, see John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution, 155-60. 77 See Gregory Phillips, "Lord Willoughby de Broke and the Politics of Radical Toryism, 1909-1914," Journal of British Studies 20, no. i (Fall 1980)1205-24; and William S. Rodner, "Leaguers, Covenanters, Moderates: British Support for Ulster, 1913-1914," Eire-Ireland 17, no. 3 (Fall 1981)-.68-85. 78 Dunraven to Long, 23 March 1913, Private, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62416. 79 Long to Lady Londonderry, 17 April 1913, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO/C666(241).

80 See the Morning Post, 7 June 1913; Times, 7 June 1913; and 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 53, 9 June 1913, cols. 1336-46. 81 Long to Bonar Law, 28 June 1913, enclosing his memorandum dated 27 June, BLP, HLRO, BL/29/5/57-

82 These meetings have been fully dealt with by many writers, but for Bonar Law's reactions, see Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1955), 153-72. 83 Lansdowne to Long, 3 October 1913, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62403. 84 Long to Bonar Law, 5 October 1913, BLP, HLRO. 85 Bonar Law to Long, 7 and 8 November 1913, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62404.

216 Notes to pages 81-6 86 Long to Bonar Law, 7 and 9 November 1913, BLP, HLRO, BL/3o/4/n and 18; also Long to Carson, 26 and 30 November 1913, quoted in Ian Colvin, Carson: The Statesman (New York: Macmillan 1935), 234-5 and 272-3. 87 Long to Bonar Law, 20 November 1913, Confidential, BLP, HLRO, BL/ 30/4/46. 88 Law to Long, 21 November 1913, ibid., BL33/6/9989 Long to Law, 13 January 1914, ibid., BL/31/2/37. 90 Times, 20 January 1914. 91 Carson to Long, 21 January 1914, telegram, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62417. 92 For a summary of the various opinions within the Unionist party at this time, see Richard Murphy, "Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis, 1912-14," History 71, no. 232 (June 1986)122234. For Long's speech, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol 58, 10 February 1914, cols. 59-71. 93 For Long's treatment of this episode, see Long, Memories, 200-6. 94 See undated circular re the formation of local committees of convenanters signed by Long and Milner in Milner Papers, Bodleian, Ms. Milner dep. 41:268-9. It is also clear that Long helped Milner raise money for the Ulster cause by contacting friends and colleagues. Some of this money was channelled to James Craig and used by the UVF. See Long to Milner, 24 February 1914, ibid., Ms. Eng. Hist. €689:38-40; and Long to Milner, n.d., forwarding a list of subscribers to the Ulster cause, Mss. Milner, dep. 157:1-5. 95 Carson to Long, 7 March 1914, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62417. 96 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 59, 9 March 1914, cols. 933-6. 97 Long to Carson, 6 March 1914, quoted in Colvin, Carson, 290-1. 98 Long to Bonar Law, 27 February 1914, BLP, HLRO, BL/31/3/44. 99 Long to Bonar Law, 23 March 1914, ibid., BL/32/1/53100 Long to Carson, 26 March 1914, quoted in Colvin, Carson, 352-4. 101 Times, 6 April 1914. On 31 March, Long had moved in the House of Commons to postpone second reading of the home rule bill for six months. See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 60, 31 March 1914, cols. 1038-54; also Long to H. A. Gwynne, 18 April 1914, Bodleian, Ms. Gwynne 20. 102 The best treatment of the Larne incident is in A.T.Q. Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London: Faber 1967). 103 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 61, cols. 1750-1. 104 For a detailed treatment of this episode, see Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution, 167-76. 105 Long to Bonar Law, 29 December 1913, Confidential, BLP, HLRO, BL/ 31/1/62; Long to Lady Londonderry, 30 January 1914, Lady London-

217 Notes to pages 86-91 derry Papers, PRONI, 02846/1/4/11; and 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 58, cols. 59-71. 106 Long to Carson, 9 May 1914, quoted in Colvin, Carson, 386. Long wrote in a similar vein to Bonar Law. See Long to Law, 9 May 1914, BLP, HLRO, BL/32/3/2O.

107 108 109 no

Morning Post, 25 May 1914. Long to Midleton, 29 May 1914, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62417. Long to Lansdowne, 29 May 1914, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62403. Redmond, the Irish Nationalist leader, had given as much as he could. To agree to no time limit was too much to ask of him and he had refused, in Long to Midleton, 10 June 1914, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62417. 112 Long to Lansdowne, 19 July 1914, copy, ibid., Add. Ms. 62418. 113 Long to Lansdowne, 27 June 1914, copy, ibid., Add. Ms. 62403. 114 For the appreciation, see ibid., Add. Ms. 62417. Long spoke at a giant Unionist rally in south London on 4 July 1914, inspected the ist Battalion North Antrim Regiment of the UVF in Ballymena on 11 July, and spoke to large Orange Order demonstrations at Garvagh and Portrush in mid-July. See the Times, 13, 14, and 15 July 1914. 115 Long to Lansdowne, 27 June 1914, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62418. CHAPTER FOUR

1 Long to Law, 9 August 1914, BLP, HLRO, BL/34/3/28. 2 Long to H.A. Gwynne, 5 September 1914, Bodleian, Ms. Gwynne 20. For a detailed analysis of interparty negotiations leading to the passage of the Home Rule Act, see Patricia Jalland and John Stubbs, "The Irish Question after the Outbreak of War in 1914: Some Unfinished Party Business," English Historical Review 96, no. 381 (October 1981) 1778-807. A recent and valuable analysis of the impact the Irish problem had on the Unionist party during World War I can be found in John O. Stubbs, "The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-18," Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990) 1867-93. 3 Long to Sir Matthew Nathan, 10 and 18 December 1914, Bodleian, Ms. Nathan 455. 4 Memorandum by Long dated 27 January 1915, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62419 and Long to Gwynne, 13 May 1915, Bodleian, Ms. Gwynne 20. 5 See particularly Long to Bonar Law, 27 January 1915, BLP, HLRO, BL/ 36/2/46; Curzon to Bonar law [n.d.], copy, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 93:33-5; Bonar Law to Balfour and Curzon, 29 January 1915, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49693:186-9; and Balfour to Bonar Law, 30 January 1915, ibid., 201-4. The memoranda by Long and Curzon and

218 Notes to pages 91-7

6 7

8 9 10 11

12 13

14 15

16

17 18

Law's reply to Curzon are reprinted in George Boyce, ed., The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord Selborne's Domestic Political Papers, 1885-1922 (London: The Historians' Press 1987), 119-27. See Long to Bonar law, 19 May 1915, BLP, HLRO, BL/ii7/i/n, and Long to Bull, 19 May 1915, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/11. See Austen Chamberlain to Law, 17 May 1915, BLP, HLRO, BL/37/2/ 37; also Bull diary, 21 May to 25 May 1915, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/ 11. Long to Bonar Law, 30 May 1915, BLP, HLRO, BL/5O/3/69; and Long to Selborne, 30 May 1915, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 81:11-2. Long to Bonar Law, 20 December 1915, BLP, HLRO, BL/52/1/46. These reports were supplied from December 1915 to September 1916 and can be found in LP, WRO, 947/388/iand 2. Long to Bonar Law, 2 May 1916, BLP, HLRO, BL/53/2/3- The Irish crisis of 1916 has been examined by David W. Savage, "The Attempted Home Rule Settlement of 1916," Eire-Ireland 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1967): 132-45; George Boyce, "How to Settle the Irish Question: Lloyd George and Ireland 1916-21," in A.J.P. Taylor, Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (New York: Atheneum 1971), 137-64; Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: One. The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland 1885-1922 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1972, chap. 3; David G. Boyce, "British Opinion, Ireland, and the War, 1916-1918," Historical Journal 17, no. 3 (i974):575~93; John D. Fair, British Interparty Conferences: A Study of the Procedure of Conciliation in British Politics, 1867-1921 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980), chap. 6; and Stubbs, "The Unionists and Ireland," 876-84. The latter is particularly useful as it sets the 1916 crisis in the wider context of Unionist party policy. Long to Asquith, 4 May 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/144. Long to Bonar Law, 11 May 1916, copy, ibid., 947/272. On the same date Long wrote to Lady Londonderry and stated, "No Ch. Sec. will be selected yet: all these rumours are baseless; it is difficult to find the right man"; Long to Lady Londonderry, 11 May 1916, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/Lo/c666(288). Walter Long, "Ireland," 19 May 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 44:123-5: Parts i and 2 of Asquith's memoranda on Ireland of 19 and 21 May 1916 are reproduced in appendix 5 of John Fair's, British Interparty Conferences, 294-8. See W. Long, "The Irish Scheme.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only ," 13 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/6; and Lansdowne, "The Proposed Irish Settlement," 21 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/11, PRO. W. Long, "The Irish Difficulty." Confidential, 23 June 1916, Cab. 37/ 150/15, PRO. Long, "The Irish Scheme," 13 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/6.

219 Notes to pages 98-108 19 Long to Asquith, 24 May 1916,, ibid., copy, 947/144. 20 Asquith to Lloyd George, 22 May 1916, Lloyd George Papers (LGP), HLRO, 0/14/1/5. 21 Times, 26 May 1916. 22 Midleton to Lloyd George, 26 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/1/26 and 26A. 23 Lloyd George to Midleton, 26 May 1916, Midleton Papers, PRO ^ol6jl 3i24 See "Memorandum of Interview Monday May 29, 1916 between Lloyd George'and Midleton," ibid., PRO 30/67/31. 25 Lloyd George to Carson, 29 May 1916, quoted in Ian Colvin, The Life of Lord Carson, 3 vols. (London: Gollancz 1936), 3:166. 26 Long to Lloyd George, 29 May 1916, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/1/37. 27 For the meeting, see W. Long, "The Irish Scheme.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only," 13 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/6; W. Long, "'Irish Negotiations.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only ," 15 June 1916, ACP, UBL, AC 14/5/14; W. Long, "Aidememoire," 21 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/403/1; and W. Long, "The Irish Difficulty," 23 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/15, PRO. 28 In addition to the above memoranda, see Lord Lansdowne, "The Proposed Irish Settlement," 21 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/11, PRO. 29 Stewart to Long, 31 May 1916, LP, WRO, 947/362. 30 For the subcommittee meeting and the background to the Stewart statement, see W. Long, "The Irish Difficulty," 23 June 1916, Cab. 37/ 150/15, PRO; W. Long, "The Irish Scheme.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only ," 13 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/6; and W. Long, "'Irish Negotiations.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only ," 15 June 1916, ACP, UBL, Ac/14/5/14. 31 Long, "The Irish Difficulty," 23 June 1916 Cab. 37/150/15, PRO. 32 Untitled memorandum by Lansdowne, 2 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/4O2/ 10. 33 Long to Lansdowne, 3 June 1916, ibid., 947/268. 34 Colvin, Lord Carson, 3:166-7, and Dennis Gwynn, The life of John Redmond (London G.G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 1932), 506. 35 For excerpts from Carson's speech, see Colvin, Lord Carson, 3:168-9; see also "Minutes of Meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council," Belfast, 6 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Curtis 89:1-3. 36 W. Long, "The Irish Difficulty," 23 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/15, PRO. 37 Gwynne to Long, 7 June 1916, copy, Bodleian, Ms. Gwynne 20. 38 Long to Gwynne, 11 and 17 June 1916, ibid. 39 Long to Asquith, 6 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/144. 40 See Sydney Brooks to Long, 7 June 1916, 947/165, ibid.; and Long to Asquith, 8 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 16:185-6. Lansdowne

220 Notes to pages 108-11 shared Long's opinion about the United States. He believed: "We are much too ready to let ourselves be driven off course by these American vapourings. The Americans are out to make money and that is the consideration that will always prevail with them in the end." Lansdowne, incidentally, wondered whether Long's mail was being opened by the post office. See Lansdowne to Long, 10 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268.

41 Lloyd George to Dillon, 10 June 1916, copy, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/2/24. 42 Campbell to Long, 10 June, 1916, Confidential, LP, WRO, 947/173. 43 Long to Campbell, 11 June 1916, Confidential, copy, ibid., 947/173. Campbell was relieved to hear Long's views so firmly stated and agreed that "if it was possible to start a scheme which would meet with universal opposition in Ireland, Lloyd George has succeeded in doing it"; Campbell to Long, 16 June 1916, ibid. 44 Long to Lloyd George, 11 June 1916, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/2/28. 45 Lloyd George to Long, 12 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/283. 46 Long to Lloyd George, 12 June 1916, copy, ibid. 47 Lloyd George to Asquith, 12 June 1916, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/2/29. The letter is marked "Not Sent." 48 See reprint in the Times, 12 June 1916. 49 Long to Asquith, 12 June 1916, telegram, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 16:191. 50 See Long to Asquith, 12 and 13 June 1916, Ms. Asquith 16:193-7, ibid. Long had earlier sent Bonar Law copies of his letters to Lloyd George and Asquith. In his covering note, he confessed, "I cannot see that any other course is open to me"; Long to Bonar Law, 11 June 1916, BLP, HLRO, BL/63/C/11.

51 See Lloyd George to Asquith, 12 June 1916, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/2/30. 52 For Asquith's Ladybank speech, see the Times, 15 June 1916. Ironically, also on 12 June, the Ulster Unionist Council had reluctantly agreed to the exclusion of the six counties from the operation of the Home Rule Act. 53 Midleton had written to Selborne urging him not to be "a party to this fiasco." Selborne had replied, "Lloyd George is acting according to his customary methods. He has made no proposal to us and we are wholly uncommitted"; Midleton to Selborne, 10 June 1916, and Selborne to Midleton, 14 June 1916, copy, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 3:1369. See also Lansdowne to Midleton, 11 June 1916, Midleton Papers, PRO 30/67/31. In the aftermath of Redmond's speech, Lord Salisbury sent a short memorandum to the Unionist members of the cabinet opposing Lloyd George's policy. See [Salisbury], "Memo on Ireland for the Unionist members of the Cabinet," [c.i2 June 1916], Confidential, AC, UBL, AC/14/5/15-

221 Notes to pages 111-6 54 For Long's views at this time, see W. Long "'The Irish Scheme.' Secret . For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only," 13 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/6; W. Long, "'Irish Negotiations.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only," 15 June 1916, ACP, UBL, AC/-14/5/14.7; W. Long, '"The Irish Situation.' Secret. For Unionist Members of the Cabinet Only," 15 June 1916, AC/14}5/13, ibid.; undated memorandum by Long on Lloyd George settlement negotiations and proposed scheme, c. 12 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/18; and undated memorandum by Long re his opposition to the Irish proposals, c. 12 June 1916, ibid., 947/402/2, 55 Lansdowne to Long, 13, 16, and 17 June 1916, ibid., 947/268. 56 Carson to Long, 16 June 1916, ibid., 947/1175. 57 Long to Lansdowne, 15 June 1916, ibid., 947/268. 58 Selborne to Asquith, 16 June 1916, Ms. Asquith 16, Bodleian, 198-201. See also Curzon to Selborne, 16 June 1916, ibid., Ms. Selborne 10:17980, in which Curzon wrote, "I ... think we have been tricked." 59 R. Cecil, "Memorandum of an Interview Held 17 June 1916 between Asquith and Lords Curzon and Cecil about the Irish Settlement Negotiations," 17 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/3. 60 Asquith to Selborne, 17 June 1916, Confidential, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 80:200; and Asquith to Lloyd George, 17 June 1916, LGP, HLRO, D/14/ 3/9. 61 Selborne to Carson, 17 June 1916, Private, Carson Papers, PRONI, D15O7/A/17/2O; and Long to Carson, 17 June 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/175. 62 M. Bonham-Carter, "Account of Cabinet Crisis 1916," Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 41:156-68. 63 Long to Bonar Law, 19 June 1916, BLP, HLRO, BL/54/3/2. 64 Fair, British Interparty Conferences, 134. 65 Lloyd George to Dillon, 20 June 1916, copy, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/3/22. 66 Lloyd George to Asquith, 20 June 1916, copy, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/3/21. 67 A. Chamberlain to Selborne, 21 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 80:244-5. 68 A. Chamberlain to Asquith, 22 June 1916, copy, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49736:229-32. 69 A Chamberlain to Balfour, 22 June 1916, ibid., Add. Ms. 49736:228. 70 Lord Lansdowne, "The Proposed Irish Settlement," 21 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/11, PRO. 71 W. Long, "The Irish Difficulty," 23 June 1916, Cab. 37/150/15, ibid. Lansdowne thought Long's memorandum "excellent" and "a very valuable reinforcement" to his own. What he objected to was "a H. R. Parl now . If they can amongst them thrash out a plan for an agreed amending Bill to corne into operation after the war, I am ready to con-

222 Notes to pages 117-24

72 73 74 75

sider it with an open mind." Lansdowne to Long, 23 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268. Long to Selborne, 22 June 1916, Private, Bodleian Ms. Selborne 80:20910. Selborne to Long, 23 June 1916, ibid., Ms. Selborne 80:211-12. A. Chamberlain to Asquith, 22 June 1916, Confidential, ibid., Ms. Asquith 37:60-3. R. Cecil to Asquith, 22 June 1916, ibid., Ms. Asquith 37:58-9; and R. Cecil, "Memorandum on Ireland," 26 June 1916, BLP, HLRO, BL/63/ C/62.

76 Lloyd George to Asquith, 23 June 1916, copy, LGP, HLRO, 0/14/3/34. 77 A. J. Balfour, "Ulster and the Irish Crisis," 24 June 1916, ACP, UBL, AC/14/5/3O. 78 Selborne to Asquith, 25 June 1916, copy, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 80:221. 79 For Selborne's statement in the Lords, see the Times, 28 June 1916. See also Lord Selborne, "Memorandum on the Crisis in Irish Affairs which Caused My Resignation from the Cabinet June 1916," 30 June 1916, Confidential, ibid., Ms. Selborne 80:226-34. This is reprinted in George Boyce, ed., The Crisis of British Unionism, 180-5. 80 Long to Selborne, 25 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms Selborne 80:222-3; and Lansdowne to Long, 26 and 27 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268. 81 See Lord Desart, "Outlines of Present Position," 22 June 1916, ibid., 947/403/2; and F.L. Turner, untitled and undated memorandum, ibid., 947/403/2. 82 Carson to Long, 24 June 1916, LP, BL, Add.Ms. 62421. 83 Lansdowne to Long, 26 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268. Both men were also aware that on 23 June 1916 Ulster Nationalists had met in Belfast and had agreed to accept the Lloyd George proposals believing they offered the best means of carrying on the fight for a united self-governing Ireland. See "Official Report of the Conference of Representative Nationalists of the 6 Counties Held on Friday June 23, 1916 at St Mary's Hall, Belfast," Bodleian, Ms. Curtis 89:4-5. 84 See Asquith's cabinet letter to the King, 27 June 1916, copy, ibid., Ms. Asquith 81:171-8. See also Cab. 37/150/23, PRO. 85 Long to Selborne, 29 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 80:224-5. 86 Long to Campbell, 29 June 1916, LP, WRO, 947/173. 87 Long to Selborne, 29 June 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 80:224-5. 88 See J. Locock to Long, 3 July 1916, and R. Cecil to Lansdowne, 4 July 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/179. 89 R. Cecil, untitled memorandum, 30 June 1916, ibid., 947/179. 90 Lansdowne to Long, 3 July 1916, ibid., 947/268. Austen Chamberlain

223 Notes to pages 124-8

91 92 93 94

would have been relieved to hear of Lansdowne's commitment for, as he tried to persuade Asquith, Lansdowne was the "pivotal person" in the Lords. He urged Asquith to use his influence to secure acceptance of "the Cecil-Cave amending clause" and to make the strongest possible appeal to Lansdowne's patriotism and public spirit; Lansdowne was sacrificing a lot and it was worth doing the utmost to retain him in the cabinet. See A. Chamberlain to Asquith, i July 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 37:79-80. If Long had known of it, he would have been suspicious of Chamberlain's direct overture to Asquith. See R. Cecil to Long, 4 July 1916, encl. Cecil to Lansdowne, 4 July 1916, and Long to R. Cecil, 4 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/179. Times, 5 July 1916. Asquith's cabinet letter to the King, 5 July 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 8:179-81; also Cab. 37/151/8, PRO. "The Irish Settlement Meeting of the Unionist Party," Carl ton Club, 7 July 1916, BLP, HLRO, BL/63/C/64- For a lengthy exposition of Long's views at this time, see Long to Campbell, 12 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/

!735 Hansard (H of C), vol. 84, 10 July 1916, cols. 57-62. Long to Lansdowne, 11 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268. 5 Hansard (H of L), vol. 22, 11 July 1916, cols. 645-52. Long to Campbell, 12 July 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/173. Long also wrote to General Maxwell urging him to forward his views on Irish government so that he and Lansdowne would know how to orchestrate their criticism. Long to Maxwell, 12 July 1916, Secret & Personal, copy, ibid., 947/307. 99 Times, 13 July 1916. 100 Times, 14 July 1916. 101 Lansdowne to Long, 14 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/268. 102 Long to Lansdowne, 15 July 1916, copy, ibid. 103 Lansdowne to Long, 15 July 1916, ibid. 104 Long to Lansdowne, 16 July 1916, copy, ibid. Lansdowne had recommended Long to Asquith for the position of chief secretary. He argued that such an appointment would reassure the great body of Unionists and that Long also possessed an unrivalled knowledge of Ireland; he had a distinguished record and was popular with both Unionists and Nationalists; undated memorandum by Lansdowne [c. July 1916], Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 37:98-100. 105 Campbell to Long, 16 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/173. 106 G.F. Stewart to Long, 15 July 1916, ibid., 947/363. 107 Times, 18 July 1916. 108 R. Cecil, "Ireland," 17 July 1916, Cab. 37/151/37, PRO. 95 96 97 98

224 Notes to pages 128-36 109 W. Long, "The Government of Ireland Amendment Bill/' 18 July 1916, Cab. 37/151/42; and Lansdowne, "The Irish Situation," 17 July 1916, Cab. 37/151/38, ibid. no Sir H. A. Robinson to Long, 18 July 1916, Bodleian, Private, LP, WRO, 947/331. in Redmond to Asquith, 18 July 1916, Ms. Asquith 45:20-1. 112 John Fair, British Interparty Conferences, 138. 113 Redmond to Asquith, 23 July 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 37:107-8. 114 On 27 July, G.F. Stewart, the chairman of the executive committee of the Irish Unionist Council, thanked Long and Lansdowne for all their help in killing the bill; Stewart to Long, 27 July 1916, LP, WRO, 947/362. The same day Robinson wrote, "It is quite extraordinary how little excitement has been caused over here by the collapse of the Partition Bill"; Robinson to Long, 27 July 1916, Private, ibid., 947/ 331. 115 Long to Stewart, 30 July 1916, Confidential, ibid., 947/362. For the divisive state of the Unionist Party as of the autumn of 1916, see Stubbs, "The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-1918," 883-4. CHAPTER FIVE

1 Long to Lansdowne, 26 July 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/268. 2 Long to Asquith, 26 July 1916, Confidential, copy, ibid., 947/144. 3 Long to Asquith, 29 July 1916, Bodleian, Ms. Asquith 16: 221. 4 For Duke's chief secretaryship, see D.G. Boyce and Cameron Hazlehurst, "The Unknown Chief Secretary: H. E. Duke and Ireland, 191618", Irish Historical Studies, 20, no. 79 (March i977):286-3ii; and Eunan O'Halpin, "H. E. Duke and the Irish Administration, 1916-18," Irish Historical Studies, 22, no. 88 (September 1981) ^62-76. For both men, see Eunan O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union: British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1987), 118-56. 5 Long to Bonar Law, n May 1916, copy, LP, WRO, 947/272. 6 Long to Duke, 8 August 1916, copy; also Duke to Long, 8 August 1916, ibid., 947/208. 7 Long to Wimborne, 10 August 1916, ibid., copy, 947/394. 8 Long to Lady Londondery, 2 August 1916, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/LO//C666(29O).

9 W.A.S. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of Empire Policy, 2 vols. (London: Constable & Co. 1929), 2:88-9. 10 Memorandum by Long, 8 October 1916, LP, WRO, 947/402/27. n As he explained to Wimborne, "I don't share the view as to the gravity of the trouble which would arise if compulsion were adopted but of course the latter course is impossible, indeed unthinkable, till every

225 Notes to pages 136-40

12

13

14 15

other effort has been exhausted as in Great Britain.' Long to Wimborne, 9 October 1916, copy, ibid., 947/394. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, 2:91-2. Selborne outlined his ideas on devolution in the Morning Post on 8 and 18 August 1916. Soon plans were afoot to draft a federal bill. See Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1989), 181-3. See Richard Murphy, "Walter Long, the Unionist Ministers, and the Formation of Lloyd George's Government in December 1916," Historical Journal, 29, no. 3 (September i986):735~45. Long to Lloyd George, 7 December 1916, LGP, HLRO, F/32/4/i. See also Long to H. F. Clutterbuck, 8 January 1917, LP, WRO 947/541. For his difficulties, see Long to Lloyd George, 8 February 1917, L G P , H L R O , F/32/4/37-

16 Long to Lady Londonderry, 30 January and 7 February 1917, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, D/Lo/c666(294 and 295). 17 Long to Duke, 29 December 1916, Confidential, copy, LP, WRO, 947/ 409. 18 Long to Bonar Law, 16 January 1917, BLP, HLRO, BL/8i/2/i6. 19 Denis Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond (London 1932), G.G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 1932), 535. 20 Ibid., 535. 21 Ibid., 536. 22 Amery to Long, 18 and 27 February 1917, LP, WRO, 947/409. 23 Long to Lloyd George, 26 February 1917, copy, ibid., 947/409. 24 For this episode and what follows see Colvin, The Life of Lord Carson, 3 vols. (London: Gollancz 1936), 3:238-41; and John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980) 8792. 25 Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, 2:127-8. 26 Long to Buxton, 7 March 1917, copy, LP, WRO, 947/601. 27 See Gwynn, Redmond, 541-2; and Colvin, Lord Carson, 3:240-1. 28 Long to Lloyd George, 10 March 1917, Confidential, copy, LP. WRO, 947/409. 29 Ibid. 30 Colvin, Lord Carson, 3:243-6. 31 Minutes of war cabinet, 22 March 1917, Cab. 23/2, PRO. 32 Long to Lloyd George, 22 March 1917, Confidential, LGP, HLRO, F/32/4/ 5433 For this episode, see minutes of war cabinet, 16 April 1917, Cab. 23/2, PRO; R.B. McDowell, The Irish Convention 1917-18 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1970), 73-5; C. Addison, Politics from Within 1911-1918,

226 Notes to pages 140-2

34 35 36 37

38 39

40

41

42 43 44

2 vols. (London: H. Jenkins Ltd. 1924), 2:180-8; and Turner, Secretariat, 92-3. See also "Draft of a Bill for the Government of Ireland prepared by Lord Curzon's Committee May 1917," G.T. 8238, Cab.24/89, 243-261, PRO. Long to Lloyd George, 11 May 1917, copy, LP, WRO, 947/568. Long to Frewen, 14 May 1917, copy, ibid., 947/552. Long to Lloyd George, 15 May 1917, LGP, HLRO, F/32/4/75. Hewins noted in his diary for 18 and 22 May 1917 that it was Long "who had got the Cabinet to put the alternative of an Irish Convention in the Irish proposals... He had great difficulty in inducing his colleagues to agree"; Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, 2:148. For Lloyd George's letter and Redmond's reply, see Gwynn, Redmond, 547-50. Just two days before Lloyd George's speech, Long had urged the prime minister to keep his remarks "brief and very simple": "State that Governments have tried and failed. Now you ask Ireland to frame their own Constitution: meet, discuss and try honestly and fairly to agree and then your Gov. will try to give effect to decision"; Long to Lloyd George, 19 May 1917, LGP, HLRO, F/32/4/76. See Long to Lloyd George, 17 May 1917, copy, LP, WRO, 947/409; Frewen to Long, 23 May 1917, and Long to Frewen, 25 May 1917, copy, ibid., 947/409; and Long to Lloyd George, 25 May 1917, copy, ibid., 947/410. At this time, in the context of reform of the Lords, Amery suggested to Long the possible devolution of powers to national governments in England, Scotland, and, possibly, Wales. Amery believed reform of the second chamber was tied up with the establishment of a federal system for the United Kingdom. Long admitted he was "strongly in favour of this Federal plan" but he did not think Lloyd George would accept the idea at present. Moreover, while Long wanted "to see the question of a Federal system investigated," he did not want to bring it in at the same time as reform of the Lords because it would delay the work of the conference on the Upper House; Amery to Long, 25 May 1917, and Long to Amery, 26 May 1917, copy, ibid., 947/675. Long to Bull, 26 July 1917, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/16. See also John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., The Leo Amery Diaries. Vol. i. 1896-1929 (London: Hutchinson 1980), 157, the entry for 23 May 1917 detailing Long's efforts to influence the manner of choosing a Convention secretary and delegates. For Long's comments on the war cabinet, see Long to Prothero, 3 October 1917, copy, LP, WRO, 947/585. Long to Lloyd George, 23 October 1917, copy, ibid., 947/568. See, particularly, Long to Lloyd George, 26 November 1917, copy, ibid., 947/568.

227 Notes to pages 143-8 45 46 47 48

49 50

51 52

53 54

55 56

Long to Lloyd George, 17 January 1918, copy, ibid., 947/411/96. War Cabinet 345, minutes of 13 February 1918, Cab.23/5, PRO. War Cabinet 351, minutes of 21 February 1918, Cab. 23/5, ibid. See Lloyd George to Long, 28 February 1918, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62423; and Long to Lloyd George, i and 4 March 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/9 and 10. Long diary, i March 1918, LP, WRO, 947/952. Long to Lloyd George, 4 March 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/io. His second choice was Lord Decies and Ian Macpherson, and his third, Lord Abercorn and H.A.L. Fisher. For this episode, see Alan J. Ward, "Lloyd George and the 1918 Irish Conscription Crisis," Historical Journal 17, no. i (1974) 1107-29. Long to Lloyd George, i April 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/ig, and undated memorandum by Long on conscription, LP, WRO, 947/402/14. There is some evidence that Long continued to lobby and confer throughout this period of illness. See F.S. Oliver to A. Chamberlain, 3 March 1918, ACP, UBL, AC/14/6/77; and A. Chamberlain to Selborne, 22 March 1918, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 84:81-2. Long to Hewins, 3 April 1918, University of Sheffield Library (USL), Hewins Mss. 68/6. Long to Bonar Law, 4 April 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/563; and Long to Hewins, 4 April 1918, USL, Hewins Mss. 68/21. To Lady Londonderry, he wrote: "I can't believe the W. Cab. will really funk conscription for I: in my deliberate opinion they can't get the men they require without it"; Long to Lady Londonderry, 6 April 1918, Lady Londonderry Papers, DCRO, o/Lo/666(3oi). Long to Hewins, 4 April 1918, USL, Hewins Mss. 68/21. Lloyd George's letter to Barrie is quoted in Colvin, Lord Carson, 3:3289. For the more general discussion of federal ideas at this time, see Kendle Ireland and the Federal Solution, chap. 8. On surveying the Unionist party in early April, Frederick Guest estimated that the 'Tory Federalists' numbered about 100; F. Guest to Lloyd George, 5 April 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/21/2/16.

57 Long to Bonar Law, 7 April 1918, BLP, HLRO, BL/83/2/7. Long would also have been impressed by a letter from John Walsh, the honorary secretary of the Southern Unionist Committee, who re-emphasized the opposition in the South and West to the idea "of abandoning the Union in the midst of all the pro-Germanism, sedition, and anarchy at present rampant in this country." Walsh to Long, 5 April 1918, LP, WRO, 947/382.

58 59 60 61

Long to Lloyd George, 10 April 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/2O. Long to Hewins, 10 April 1918, USL, Hewins Mss. 68/52. War Cabinet 389, minutes, 11 April 1918, Cab. 23/6, PRO. W. Long diary, 13 April 1918, LP, WRO, 947/952.

228 Notes to pages 148-56 62 See undated memorandum, c. mid-April 1918, ibid., 947/4ii/9d. 63 Here Long scratched out the clause "which we hope will ultimately be the Federal Parliament." 64 See Austen Chamberlain to Hugh Cecil, 10 April 1918, ACP, UBL, AC/ 18/2/9; Midleton to Selborne, 12 April 1918, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 3:156; and Salisbury to Selborne, 11 April 1918, ibid., Ms. Selborne 7:11-4. For Selborne's views, see D.G. Boyce and J.O. Stubbs, "F.S. Oliver, Lord Selborne and Federalism," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 5, no.i (October i976):53-8i. 65 See untitled typed note by Long dated 14 April 1918, Balfour Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 49777,198. 66 See "Minutes of First Meeting. Committee on Government of Ireland Amendment Bill," 15 April 1918, Cab. 27/46; and War Cabinet 392, "Minutes of a Meeting," 16 April 1918, Cab. 23/6, PRO. 67 See "Minutes of the Second Meeting. Committee on Government of Ireland Amendment Bill," 16 April 1918, ibid., Cab.27/46. 68 See H.A.L. Fisher diary, 17 and 18 April 1918, Bodleian, Ms. Fisher 10. 69 Long to Lloyd George, 18 April 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/23. On 19 April Long wrote to Bonar Law, "I am convinced that if we can make a definite move in the direction of Federalism it will make your task infinitely easier, not only with the bulk of your followers, but especially with Ulster"; Long to Bonar Law, 19 April 1918, BLP, HLRO, BL/83/2/21.

70 See particularly Long to Milner, 20 April 1918, and Milner to Long, 21 April 1918, Milner Papers, Bodleian, Mss. Eng. Hist. 0696/1:182-4, Brassey to Long, 21 April 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/162; and Dunraven to Long, 23 April 1918, ibid., 947/210. 71 Long diary, 19 April 1918, ibid., 947/952. Plunkett, however, was not impressed by Long's committee: "I met a Committee of the Govt. W. Long, A. Chamberlain ... Sir G. Cave, the Secty and Duke ... to discuss the Irish Govt Bill. A very stupid body I thought! I told them that the state of Ireland made it very doubtful whether any Bill would be looked at in that country. They seemed shocked!" Plunkett diary, 19 April 1918, Plunkett Papers, Plunkett House, Oxford. 72 War Cabinet 397, minutes of 23 April 1918, Cab. 23/6, PRO. 73 Later that day, Balfour reiterated to Fisher that "he can't accept allround Federalism." H.A.L. Fisher diary, 23 April 1918, Bodleian, Ms. Fisher 10. 74 Long to Bonar Law, 26 April 1918, copy, Confidential, LP, WRO, 947/274. 75 Long to Cave, 26 April 1918, Copy, Confidential, ibid., 947/177. 76 Long to Hewins, 26 April 1918, USL, Hewins Mss 123/66-67. 77 Long to Cave, 27 April 1918, Cave Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 62462; also Cave to Long, 26 April 1918, LP, WRO, 947/177.

229 Notes to pages 156-62 78 79 80 81 82 83

84

85 86

87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

W. Long diary, 2 May 1918, ibid., 947/952. Long to Lloyd George, 7 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/31. F.S. Oliver to Long, 7 May 1918, LP, WRO, 947/322. Ibid. See W. Long, "Federalism," G.T. 4486, Cab. 24/50, PRO. Waldorf Astor of the "Garden Suburb" wrote to Lloyd George on 9 May making many of the same arguments. See Astor to Lloyd George, 9 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/83/i/i8. See "Minutes of Meeting. Committee on Irish Bill, 9 May 1918," Cab. 27/46, PRO; T. Jones, Whitehall Diary. Vol. 3. Ireland 1918-1925 (London: Oxford University Press 1971), 7-9; and Smuts to Lloyd George, 9 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, 7/45/9/16. Long to A. Chamberlain, 11 May 1918, LP, WRO, copy, 947/180. See the Times, 15, 21, and 23 May 1918; and Oliver to Long, 14 May 1918, copy, and Long to Oliver, 15 May 1918, ibid., 947/322. Oliver also arranged to have his three earlier articles on Ulster and a Federal Settlement reprinted in pamphlet form. W. Long, "Ireland," 29 May 1918, G.T. 4689, Cab.24/53, PRO - See also Long to Brassey, 31 May 1918, LP, WRO copy, 947/162. One who was not persuaded of the merits of federalism for the United Kingdom was James Bryce. He told Plunkett, "The talk about a Federal system is unfortunate, for a Bill on Federal lines would, I should fear, be rejected by the Nationalists, as not going far enough, and the difficulty of framing a proper Federal scheme is far greater than people who talk glibly about it have realised. Such a scheme could not be drafted to be workable except after months of careful study, and it would be absurd to try to pass it in the middle of the war. However, the idea has been laid hold of both by people who believe in it, ignorant of its difficulties, and by those who think, some that it will mitigate, some, that it will defeat or postpone Home rule"; Bryce to Plunkett, 9 May 1918, Plunkett Papers, Plunket House, Oxford, Bryce 42, Box 2. Selborne to Long, 31 May 1918, and Long to Selborne, 3 June 1918, LP, WRO, copy, 947/351. "Minutes of Meeting. Committee in Irish Bill," 4 June 1918, Cab. 27/ 46, PRO. Cave to Long, 3 June 1918, Personal, LP, WRO, 947/177; and Long to Cave, 3 June 1918, Cave Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 62463. Long to Buxton, 7 June 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/604. "Minutes of a Meeting. Committee on Irish Bill," 10 June 1918, Cab. 27/46, PRO. W. Long, "Committee on Government of Ireland Bill. Interim Report," 14 June 1918, G.T. 4839, Cab. 27/46, ibid. Long to Shortt, 14 June 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/354. War Cabinet 433, minutes of 19 June 1918, Cab. 23/6, PRO; and

230 Notes to pages 162-7 A. Chamberlain, "The Irish Question and Federalism," 17 June 1918, 0212, Cab. 24/5, ibid. 96 Long to Adams, 20 June 1918, copy, LGP, HLRO, F/67/1/24.. 97 See W.G.S. Adams, "The Case for Federalism," n.d., and W.G.S. Adams, "Federal Settlement," n.d., LGP, HLRO, F/68/32 & 33. 98 Times, 27 June and i July 1918. 99 Brassey to Long, 26 June 1918, LP, WRO, 947/162. Both men would presumably have been appalled if they had read Edward Cecil's comments to Selborne. Cecil was opposed to federation: "I personally should like to see England governed by and for the English and these parasitic races [presumably the Irish, Welsh, and Scots] sent back to their mountains and their bogs"; E. Cecil to Selborne, 23 June 1918, Bodleian, Ms. Selborne 94:25. 100 War Cabinet 453, 29 July 1918, Cab. 23/7, PRO. During this meeting, Lloyd George admitted he had not looked at the draft bill prepared by Long's committee. 101 See, for example, Long to Lloyd George 20 July 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/33/i/n. 102 Long to Frewen, 4 October 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/234. Long to Midleton, 4 October 1918, copy, ibid., 947/308. Midleton put a damper on the idea. Ulster was oppressed and "no Southern Unionists will listen to a Federal solution if it involves two Parliaments"; Midleton to Long, 6 October 1918, Confidential, ibid. 103 Long to Dicey, 29 November 1918, copy, ibid., 947/207. 104 Long to Buxton, 3 July 1918, copy, ibid., 947/604. 105 See Long to Lloyd George, 25 and 29 April 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/ 25, 26, and 28. 106 For the details of French's first year as lord lieutenant, see Eunan O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union, chap. 6. For Long's strong determination to press on with conscription if necessary, see Long to Hewins, 26 April 1918, USL, Hewins Ms. 123/66-7. 107 Long to Cave, 27 April 1918, Cave Papers, BL, Add. Ms. 62462. See also Long to Bonar Law, 27 April 1918, BLP, HLRO, BL/83/2/32. 108 See French diary 1918-1920, French Papers (FP), Imperial War Museum (IWM). 109 A. Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 3 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/7/2/n. no Long to Lloyd George, 7 May 1918, ibid., 3/32/5/31. 111 War Cabinet 408, minutes of 10 May 1918, Cab 23/6, PRO. 112 War Cabinet 4o8A, minutes of 10 May 1918, Cab 23/14, ibid. 113 See Long to French, n and 20 May 1918, FP, IWM, Box 75/46/13. 114 Long to French, n.d., ibid., Box 75/46/13. 115 For the war cabinet of 5 May, see War Cabinet 412, minutes of 15 May 1918, Cab. 23/6, PRO; see also Long to French, 15 May 1918,

231 Notes to pages 167-71 copy, LP, WRO, 947/229. When it appeared that Lloyd George might back away at the last minute from the firm policy advocated by Long, Chamberlain pointed out to the prime minister that the policy could not be changed without consulting Long; he would resign otherwise, and so, said Chamberlain, would he. See A. Chamberlain to Hilda, May 1918, ACP, UBL, AC/5/i/8i. 116 Long to Hewins, 19 May 1918, USL, Hewins Ms. 68/248-9; see also Long to E. Saunderson, 19 June 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/547 in which Long stated, "We only just acted in time when we interned the Sinn Fein leaders; another fortnight and there would most undoubtedly have been a rising of some kind in Ireland." 117 Long to Hewins, 21 May 1918, USL, Hewins Mss. 68/255-6. 118 See W. Long, "Ireland," 29 May 1918, G.T. 4689, Cab. 24/53, PRO 119 Long to French, 29 May 1918, FP, IWM, Box 75/46/13; see also Long to Colonel John Henry Rivett-Carnac, 29 May 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/588. 120 Long to Lloyd George, 29 May 1918, LGP, HLRO, F/32/5/44. 121 W. Long, "Ireland," i June 1918, G.T. 4728, ACP, UBL, AC/3i/i/i5. Austen Chamberlain found Long's argument persuasive; A. Chamberlain to Long, 3 June 1918, copy, ibid., AC/3i/i/i9. 122 French to Long, 17 June 1918, LP, WRO, 947/229. 123 Long to French, 19 June 1918, FP, IWM, Box 7546/13; see also Long to Shortt, 14 June 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/354. 124 Long to French, 26 June 1918, copy, ibid., 947/229. 125 Long to French, 26 and 27 June 1918, copies, ibid., 947/229. 126 Long to Shortt, 27 June 1918, copy, ibid., 947/354. 127 Long to Midleton, 26 June 1918, Midleton Papers, PRO 30/67/39:23212.

128 129 130 131

132 133 134 135 136 137

French to Long, 28 June 1918, LP, WRO, 947/229. Long to Lloyd George, 14 July 1918, copy, ibid., 947/569. Long to Colonel Cosby, 23 July 1918 copy, ibid., 947/189. Long to French, 23 July 1918, FP, IWM Box 75/46/13. Four days earlier, Long had told French he thought the dual policy was wrong, but it stood, and if it was abandoned the government would face a breach with the Labour party and considerable trouble in the United States; Long to French, 19 July 1918, copy, LP WRO, 947/230. Long to French, 11 September 1918, copy, ibid., 947/230. Long to Lloyd George, 30 August 1918, copy, ibid., 947/569. Long to A. Chamberlain, 20 September 1918, ACP, UBL, AC/3i/i/ 24. Ibid. W. Long, 'Ireland', 9 October 1918, G.T. 5926, Cab. 24/66, PRO. Long to Reading, 24 October 1918, copy, LP, WRO, 947/330.

232 Notes to pages 172-6 CHAPTER SIX

1 For the above, see Long to French, 10 and 12 January 1919, copies; French to Long, 14 January 1919; and French to Lloyd George, 14 January 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/231; Long to Bull, 12 January 1919, copy, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 4/19; Lloyd George to Long, 9 January 1919, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62424; Long to Lloyd George, 10 January 1919, LP, WRO, copy, 947/701; Long to Hewins, 11 January 1919, copy, ibid., 947/5567, and Long to Sir George Younger, 16 January 1919, ibid., 947/5992 Long to French, 16 January 1919, FP, IWM, Box 75/46/13. 3 Long's inability to understand the Irish Nationalists and the passions and convictions moving them was again tellingly revealed in a letter to French commenting on the initial meeting of the Dail on 21 January 1919: "It is a most extraordinary thing that the Irish, who have such a strong sense of humour, are quite unable to appreciate the humorous side of the proceedings in Dublin on Tuesday last"; Long to French, 24 January 1919, ibid. 4 War Cabinet 527, minutes of meeting, 5 February 1919, Cab. 23/9, PRO. 5 War Cabinet 541, minutes of meeting 4 March 1919, Cab. 23/9, ibid. 6 Long to French, 13 April 1919, FP, IWM, Box 75/46/13. 7 See Colonel W. J. Allen et al. to Long, 2 May 1919, and Long to R. Dawson Bates, 15 May 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/153. 8 Long to Lloyd George, 8 May 1910, copy, ibid., 947/746, ibid. For this episode, see P.M. Carroll, ed., The American Commission on Irish Independence 1919: The Diary, Correspondence and Report (Dublin: Irish Manuscripts Commission 1985). 9 Long to Lloyd George, 21 May 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/292. 10 Times, 24 May 1919. 11 Long to Bonar Law, 21 May 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/744. 12 For the debate, see 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 116, 3 June 1919, cols. 1873-974; and 4 June 1919, cols. 2063-129. 13 For Long's speech, see ibid., 3 June 1919, cols. 1904-16. 14 Long to Lloyd George, 3 June 1919, LGP, HLRO, F/33/2/4915 For a lucid treatment of the proceedings of the conference on devolution, see J. Fair, British Interparty Conferences: A Study of the Procedure of Conciliation in British Politics, 1867-1921 (Oxford: Clarendon 1980), chap. 11. 16 Atkinson to Long, 6 June 1919, LP, WRO, 947/145. 17 Long to Philip Cambray, secretary of the UDL, 3 July 1919, copy, ibid., 947/169. 18 Steed to Long, 22 July 1919, Private, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62424.

233 Notes to pages 176-86 19 Times, 28 July 1919. 20 W. Long, "Draft Memorandum on Ireland/' 18 September 1919, LP, WRO, 947/293. 21 W. Long, "Situation in Ireland," Secret, 24 September 1919, G.x.8215, Cab. 24/89; and War Cabinet 624, minutes of 25 September 1919, Cab. 23/12, PRO. 22 War Cabinet 628, minutes of 7 October 1919, Cab. 23/12, ibid. 23 In addition to Long, the committee was composed of French and Macpherson, ex officio, Fisher, Birkenhead, Shortt, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Home, Roberts, Worthington Evans, Hewart, and Kellaway with Philip Kerr and Captain L.F. Burgis as joint secretaries. 24 Long to the Countess Bathurst, 5 November 1919, copy, Adm. n6/ 3623, PRO. In his article "Walter Long and the Making of the Government of Ireland Act, 1919-20," Irish Historical Studies 25, no. 97 (May 1986) 182-96, Richard Murphy underemphasizes Long's federal preoccupation. 25 "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Committee on Ireland," 15 October 1919, Cab. 27/68, ibid. 26 See "First Report of Cabinet Committee on the Irish Question," 4 November 1919, C.P. 56, Cab. 27/68, ibid. 27 See "Minutes of gth Meeting of Committee on Ireland," 13 November 1919, Cab. 27/68, ibid. 28 See A. J. Balfour, "The Irish Question," 25 November 1919, Secret, C.P 193, Cab. 24/93, ^id. 29 See "Fourth Report of the Committee on Ireland," 2 December 1919, Very Secret, C.P. 247, Cab. 27/68, ibid. 30 See "Cabinet Conclusions," 10 and 15 December 1919, Cab. 23/18, ibid. 31 There is evidence that Long was influential in persuading Lloyd George to delay the introduction of the bill until after the recess, so that it could be "gone over very carefully and in detail by each member of the Committee and the Irish administration"; Long to J.I. Macpherson, 12 December 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/211. 32 Long to Bull, 2 January 1920, Bull Papers, ccc, Bull 5/1; Long's chairmanship was praised by Philip Kerr, who hoped "that this time we shall really settle the question"; Kerr to Long, 23 December 1919, LP, BL, Add. Ms.62424. 33 Excerpts from a speech at Bedford on i December 1919, Times, 2 December 1919; see also Long to Sir Basil Thomson, 20 December 1919, copy, LP, WRO, 947/374. 34 Long to French, 26 December 1919, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62424. 35 Long to French, 28 December 1919 and 8 January 1920, copies, LP, WRO, 947/232.

234 Notes to pages 187-93 36 W. Long, "Report on Visit to Ireland, January 1920," LGP, HLRO, F/34/ 1/6; see also W. Long, "Self Government for Ireland," i January 1920, c.i. 46, Cab. 27/69, PRO. 37 Long to Sir John Ross, 10 February 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/334; see also Long to Riversdale Colthurst, 19 February 1920, copy, ibid., 947/ 185. 38 Long at Trowbridge, 30 January 1920, Times, 31 January 1920. 39 See "Minutes of the 15th Meeting of the Committee on Ireland," 17 February 1920, Secret, Cab. 27/68; and "Report by Bonar Law. Cabinet Committee on Ireland," 17 February 1920, C.P. 664, Cab. 27/68, PRO. 40 Long to Bonar Law, 20 February 1920, BLP, HLRO, 61798/7/11. 41 W. Long to A. Chamberlain, 19 February 1922, copy, LP, WRO, 947/ 825. 42 See "Cabinet conclusions," 24 February 1920, Cab. 23/20, PRO. 43 See Long to Bonar Law, 8 April 1920, BLP, HLRO, BL/io3/5/i. 44 See Long to Law, 16 April and 5 and 6 May 1920, ibid., BL/98/9/23, BL/1O2/5/H, and 81/103/5/4. 45 Long to Law, 8 May 1920, ibid., 81/102/5/16. 46 Long to Derby, 8 May 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/203. 47 Long's ideas must be pieced together from a number of speeches. See, in particular, 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 129, 10 May 1920, cols. 140-2, 197-201; 18 May 1920, cols. 1265-9, 1286-9, 133°~4/ and 19 May 1920, cols. 1532-6; and vol. 130, cols. 2043-4. Although Long used the terms "federal" and "federalism" whenever he referred to the Government of Ireland bill, he did admit that until the two parliaments united, the council would be working with "devolved" powers. See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 130, 14 June 1920, cols. 1042-5. 48 See 5 Hansard (H of C), vol. 129, 10 May 1920, cols. 197-201; and Long to Midleton, 13 May 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/309. 49 Long recalled this arrangement in 1924 when discussions were under way about the Irish boundaries. See Long to Selborne, 18 September 1924, copy, ibid., 947/352; also Long to Londondery, 28 August 1924, copy, ibid., 947/290, ibid, in which he told essentially the same story. 50 Long to Law, 21 May 1920, BLP, HLRO, BL/1O3/5/6. 51 Long to Greenwood, 9 June 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/240. 52 Long to James Ashe, 16 June 1920, copy, ibid., 947/140. 53 Long to Lloyd George, 18 June 1920, copy, ibid., 947/240. 54 For its formation and responsibilities, see Long to all members of the committee, 25 June 1920, copy, ibid., 947/424; Long to Greenwood, 25 June, copy, ibid., 947/240; and Long to Hankey, 26 June 1920, copy, ibid., 947/424. 55 Long to French, 6 July 1920, copy, ibid., 947/232. 56 Long to French, 2 July 1920, copy, ibid., 947/232.

235 Notes to pages 193-9 57 "Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Irish Situation Committee/' 22 July 1920, C.P. 1672, Cab. 27/107; and "Note by Walter Long on the Fourth Meeting of the Irish Situation Committee Held on 22 July 1920," 22 July 1920, Cab. 24/109, PRO. 58 See Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary. Vol. 3. Ireland 1918-1925, edited by Keith Middlemass (London: Oxford University Press 1971), 25-31. 59 "The Situation in Ireland: Notes of a Conference with the Officers of the Irish Government Held at 10 Downing St. Friday, 23 July 1920," C.P. 1693, Cab. 24/109, PRO. 60 Long to Greenwood, 25 June 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/240. 61 In addition, to Jones, Whitehall Diary, and "The Situation in Ireland," C.P. 1693, also see Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978), 101-3, for the cabinet discussion of 23 July 1920. 62 Long to Midleton, 26 July 1920, Midleton Papers, PRO 30/67/43:2474. 63 "Conclusion of the Seventh Meeting of the Irish Situation Committee," 11 August 1920, Cab. 27/107, PRO. 64 Long to Dunraven, 17 August 1920, copy, LP, WRO, 947/214. 65 Long to Lloyd George, n.d. [September 1920], LGP, HLRO, F/34/1/46. 66 W. Long, "Memorandum," 10 September 1920, Secret, c.i. 83, Cab. 27/70; and W. Long, "Memorandum," 29 September 1920, c.i. 87, Cab. 27/70, PRO. 67 "Minutes of Conference of Ministers," 13 October 1920, Cab. 23/23, ibid. 68 Bonar Law had written earlier to Long suggesting, "The fewer concessions we make now the better for whatever we give at present would not be looked upon as final but would be regarded as a jumping off ground for further concessions." Long had agreed. See Law to Long, 30 September 1920, copy, BLP, HLRO, BL/1O3/5/9, and Long to Law, 3 October 1920, ibid., BL/io3/5/io. 69 See Long to L.F. Burgis, secretary of the Irish Situation Committee, 30 October 1920, c.i. 98, Cab. 27/70, PRO.

CONCLUSION

1 Long to Derby, 22 November 1921, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms. 62405. 2 Long to Eric, 5 and 8 February 1922, copies, LP, WRO, 947/1952. 3 Long to A. Chamberlain, 19 February 1922, copy, ibid., 947/825. 4 Long to Selborne, 18 September 1924, copy, ibid., 947/352. 5 Long's views on Conservatism were summarized in an article in the Morning Post, 3 November 1919.

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A Note on Sources

The basic primary sources for this study were the papers of Walter Long housed in the Wiltshire County Record Office, Trowbridge, and in the British Library, London. The Wiltshire collection is the larger and more useful of the two, containing considerable manuscript and printed material, particularly for the years after 1905. The Irish portions of the collection vary in value. There is almost nothing for the pre-i9O5 period and relatively little for 1906-13. The bulk of the Irish papers cover the years 1914-20, and it would be difficult to reconstruct the activities and attitudes of the English Unionists generally and of Long in particular without consulting them. The small collection of letters to and from Long housed in the British Library contains much of value and elucidates many of the puzzles left by the gaps at Wiltshire. The cache of letters from Long to Lady Londonderry housed in the Durham County Record Office is invaluable for an understanding of Long. The letters are not only delightfully frank about policy and people but often starkly revealing of Long's inner tensions and private concerns. While Long's papers are a most useful beginning, a full-scale analysis of his involvement with Irish affairs and with his fellow Unionists would not have been possible without consulting other key collections. The British Library has the papers of Arthur Balfour, a fundamentally important source, as well as those of Robert Cecil, George Cave, and H.O. Arnold-Forster, and the Bodleian in Oxford houses the papers of Asquith, Selborne, Milner, J. Sandars, Lionel Curtis, H.A.L. Fisher, and H.A. Gwynne. The House of Lords Record Office contains the Lloyd George and Bonar Law collections, both crucial to this study. The Austen Chamberlain papers are at the University of Birmingham Library, and those of W.A.S. He wins at the Library of the University of Sheffield; Midleton's are at the Public Record Office in London, Carson's at the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, General French's at the Imperial War Museum, and those of Akers-Douglas at the Kent Record Office. The papers of Long's secretary and friend, Sir William

238 A Note on Sources Bull, are now at Churchill College, Cambridge, while a second collection of Lady Londonderry material is in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland. The Chamberlain and French collections are particularly important for an understanding of both English Unionist attitudes and government action at critical moments. Manuscripts are, of course, vital to a book such as this, but Hansard the record of parliamentary debate - and the cabinet minutes and memoranda have also been indispensable. They help the writer to probe more deeply and to encapsulate mood, attitude, and opinion more readily. In addition, the excellent collection of newspapers from all over the United Kingdom and the empire housed at Colindale in north London provides important information and necessary context. Given the richness and variety of sources available, one would expect a more extensive literature than in fact exists on the English Unionists and key figures such as Walter Long. There is no monograph on their role to set beside Patrick Buckland's two-volume treatment of the northern and southern unionists: Irish Unionism. Vol. i, The Anglo Irish and the New Ireland 1885 to 1922 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1972) and Irish Unionism Vol. 2, Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland 1886 to 1922 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1973), and there is only a scattering of biographies, articles, and theses. Walter Long's own memoirs, Memories (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1923), and a biographical study of him by Sir Charles Petrie, Walter Long and His Times (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1936), conceal more than they reveal about both Long and his involvement with Ireland. Richard Murphy's pioneering doctoral thesis, "Walter Long and the Conservative Party, 190521" (Ph.D., University of Bristol, 1985) is of great value for an understanding of Long, but since Dr Murphy was attempting to grapple with all facets of Long's post-1905 career, he was not able to explore Long's Irish role fully. Other leading Unionists have been better served, but there is still a need for more political biography. Of particular value to this study were Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1955); David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (Bolton: Ross Anderson Publications 1985); Catherine B. Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press 1988); and Ian Colvin's third volume of The Life of Lord Carson (London: Gollancz 1936). George Boyce's collection of Lord Selborne's domestic papers, The Crisis of British Unionism: The Domestic Political Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1885-1922 (London: The Historians' Press 1987) and his important introduction are not only indispensable to an understanding of Unionist thinking and concerns but are an indication of the richness of the material awaiting the individual who is willing to tackle this admittedly complex but nevertheless exciting topic.

239 A Note on Sources There is an extensive monographic and article literature dealing with varying aspects of the Anglo-Irish relationship for the years covered by this book. I have read extensively in that literature and have profited enormously from it, but since all printed materials used in this study receive a full citation in the notes, this comment is confined to those secondary sources I found particularly valuable. Andrew Gailey's recent book, Ireland and the Death of Kindness: The Experience of Constructive Unionism (Cork: Cork University Press 1987), provides a sophisticated analysis of the circumstances surrounding the devolution crisis of 1904-5, and Eunan O'Halpin's The Decline of the Union: British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1987) is full of insight and shrewd assessment. The first sustained analysis of Irish Unionist parliamentary and constituency activity is provided in Alvin Jackson's The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884-1911 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989), while John Fair's British Interparty Conferences: A Study of the Procedure of Conciliation in British Politics 1867-1921 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980) contains a number of important analyses of the Anglo-Irish imbroglio; Fair's elucidation of the role of English Unionists is of particular value. John Turner's Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980) is the best treatment of the contribution of the "Garden Suburb" to the Irish negotiations of 1917-18. My own book, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution 1870-1921 (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1989), places the activities and ideas of Long and the English Unionists in a broader context. George Boyce has written extensively on this period. His monograph, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-22 (London: Jonathan Cape 1972), is still essential for an understanding of the later years, but of particular value for this book were the following articles by him: "British Conservative Opinion, the Ulster Question, and the Partition of Ireland, 1912-21," Irish Historical Studies (March I97o):89-ii2; "How to Settle the Irish Question: Lloyd George and Ireland 1916-21," in Lloyd George: Twelve Essays, edited by A.J.P. Taylor (New York: Atheneum 1971), 137-64; and "British Opinion, Ireland, and the War, 1916-18," Historical Journal 17, 3(1974):575-93- Boyce has also coauthored with John Stubbs, "F.S. Oliver, Lord Selborne and Federalism," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (October i976):53-8i, which, when read in conjunction with my "Federalism and the Irish Problem in 1918," History 56, no. 187 (June 1971) 1207-30, provides a background to Long's activities for 1918-20. Also of value were D.G. Boyce and Cameron Hazlehurst, "The Unknown Chief Secretary: H.E. Duke and Ireland, 191618," Irish Historical Studies 20, no. 79 (March i977):286-3ii; Eunan O'Halpin,

240 A Note on Sources "Historical Revision 20: H.E. Duke and Irish Administration, 1916-18," Irish Historical Studies 22, no. 88 (September 1981) 1362-76; J.R. Fanning, "The Unionist Party and Ireland, 1906-10," Irish Historical Studies 16, no. 58 (September 1966) 1147-71; Richard Murphy, "Walter Long and the Making of the Government of Ireland Act, 1919-20," Irish Historical Studies 25, no. 97 (May 1986)182-96; Richard Murphy, "Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis, 1912-14," History 71, no. 232 (June 1986) ^22-34; and David W. Savage, "The Attempted Home Rule Settlement of 1916," EireIreland 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1967) 1132-45. In addition to Richard Murphy's thesis, three others were especially useful: Roderick Clifford, "Long of Wraxall: The Political Career of Walter Long, 1854-1921" (Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1970); Jane Ridley, "Leadership and Management in the Conservative Party in Parliament 1906-14" (D. Phil., Oxford University, 1985); and John Stubbs, "The Conservative Party and the Politics of War, 1914-16" (D. Phil., Oxford University, 1973).

Index

Acland-Hood, Alexander, 56, 61, 62, 21111.17 Adams, W.G.S., 138, 148, 162-3 Addison, Lord, 140-1, 148, 155, 159, 195 Agar-Robartes, Thomas, 72-3, 76, 80 Akers-Douglas, Aretas, 61-2 American Commission on Irish Independence, 174 Amery, L.S., 88, 138, 147, 150, 153, 226n.40 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 95 Anderson, Sir John, 193 Armstrong, Sir George, 73 Asquith, H.H., 55, 60, 64, 79, 81, 127; and home rule bill (1912), 67, 6970, 76, 84, 90, 133-4; and Bonar Law, 80, 82; and Ulster, 84-9 passim; and Buckingham Palace Conference, 88; and political truce, 90; and coalition government (1915), 91-2; and the Easter Rising (1916), 93; recommends negotiations, 96-7; and the Lloyd George home

rule scheme (1916), 97130 passim, 222-3^90; and restoration of Castle administration, 134 Atkinson, John, 25, 29, 176 Balfour, Arthur, 17, 19, 21, 23, 44, 105, 115, 127, 194, 200, 201, 2i3n_42; and Long's chief secretaryship, 22, 24-5, 32-4; his leadership questioned, 36, 42-3, 46, 56, 61-6 passim, 2ion.9, 2iin.i7; and Long, 36-43, 4952, 56, 58, 61-7 passim; attitude to Ireland, 36, 40, 56; and party organization, 46-7, 56, 58, 61-3, 2ion-9, 2iin.i7; and federalism, 59, 154-5, 228n_73; resigns as leader of the Unionist party, 66; supports partition, 114, 118, 120i, 155, 184, 201; and Lloyd George home rule scheme (1916), 115, 118, 120-1; and conscription and home rule, 146; and Government of Ireland Act (1920), 184, 185; and

Irish situation committee (1920), 192; and coercion, 193 Balfour, Gerald, 25, 2o8n.66 Balfour of Burleigh, Lord, 44 Barnes, George, 148, 154, 160 Barrie, Hugh, 147 Barrymore, Lord, 101, 103 Beaconsfield, Lord, 9, 10 Birrell, Augustine, 45, 47, 48, 93 Board of agriculture, 19-20 Board of Erin, 95 Boraston, John, 68 Borden, Sir Robert, 140 Brassey, Thomas, 58, 77, 153, 162-3, 175 Breen, Dan, 172 British Covenant, 83 British League for the support of Ulster and the Union, 78 Broke, Willoughby de, 63, 67, 78-83 passim Brooks, Sydney, 107 Brugha, Cathal, 167 Bryce, James, 229^87 Buckingham Palace conference, 87-8 Budget Protest League, 51 Bull, Sir William, 28, 34, 64, 91, 185

242 Index Burke, Monsignor, 135 Butt, Isaac, 12 Buxton, Lord, 139, 161 Byrne, Colonel, 174 Byrne, Sir William, 135 Cadogan, Earl, 45 Campbell, John, 108, 122, 128-9 Campbell-Bannerman, Henry, 34, 45 Carson, Edward, 25, 51, 64, 80, 83, 107, 115-17, 127, 148-9, 156; and home rule bill (1912), 67, 76; and Long, 68-9, 75-6, 83-5, 112-13; and Ulster, 76-89 passim, 139-40; and federalism, 76, 85, 147, 150; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 98114 passim; rejects convention idea, 138-9; suggests commission, 140; insists on clean cut, 140; and conscription and home rule, 145; and Government of Ireland Act (1920), 191 Casement, Sir Roger, 95 Cave, Sir George, 121-2, 148, 156, 159-60, 223^90, 228n.7i Cawdor, Lord, 22 Cecil, Edward, 230^99 Cecil, Lord Robert, 103, 121, 124, 130; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 115, 117, 120, 122-3, 12$/ 223n_9o Chalmers, Sir Robert, 93 Chamberlain, Austen, 63, 83, 156, 198; supports Long, 40-2, 92; and tariff reform, 47; and parliament bill (1911), 634; and federalism, 67, 147, 150-64 passim; and Lloyd George's

home rule scheme (1916), 115-30 passim, 222~3n.9o; and home rule committee (1918), 148, 151-64 passim, 228n.7i; and German threat, 165-6 Chamberlain, Joseph, 21, 33, 74 Christ Church, 5-6 Church Discipline bill, 20 Churchill, Randolph, 54 Churchill, Winston, 76, 192, 193 Collins, Michael, 167, 198 Constitutional crisis (1910), 55-60 Cooper, Captain, 54 Cope, Alfred, 193 Craig, James, 68, 98, 102, 198, 2i6n_94; and Government of Ireland Act (1920), 184, 191; and Irish situation committee, 192 Crewe, Lord, 103 Cumann na m Ban, 169 Curragh: "Mutiny" at, 85 Curtis, Lionel, 152 Curzon, Lord, 32, 162; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 113-30 passim; and draft home rule bill (1917), 140-1; and home rule committee (1918), 148, 151, 159, 160; and federalism, 155, 160; and partition, 155; and coercion, 193 Desart, Lord, 99, 102, 119 Devlin, Joseph, 98, 100, 102, 136, 139, 140, 143 Devonshire, Duke of, 44, 74 Dicey, A.V., 59-60, 70, 163 Dick, Wentworth Fitzwilliam, 3 Dillon, John, 88, 98, 100, 101, 102, 115, 140

Dudley, Lord, 29, 31-2, 205n.5 Duke, H.E., 94, 134-8 passim, 140-1, 144, 148, 152, 164, 165, 228n_7i Dunraven, Lord, 24-5, 78-9, 141 Easter Rising, 93, 133 Federalism, 15, 46, 58-60, 67-8, 70-89 passim, 132-3, 140-1, 147-96 passim, 199-201, 226n.4o, 234n_47 Fisher, Herbert, 148, 152, 155, 159, 192, 195, 228n_73 French, Lord, 164-71, 174, 180, 186, 192-3 Frewen, Moreton, 141, 151, 163 Gaelic Athletic Association, 95 Gaelic League, 95, 169 Garvin, J.L., 59, 60 George, David Lloyd, 64, 116, 132, 171, 176; his budget, 51-2, 53, 55, 56; and Buckingham Palace Conference, 88; and his home rule scheme (1916), 97-131 passim, 133; his dubious tactics, 99, 100, 101, 102-3, 110-12, 113, 115, 117-18; and Long, 101-30 passim, 132, 136, 138, 140, 142-96 passim; threatens resignation, 109-10; becomes prime minister, 136; wary of Ireland, 137-8; recognizes need for a settlement, 138-9; and Irish convention, 141-5; and conscription and home rule, 145-7; and federalism, 147, 153-4, 155/ 162-3; ar>d

243 Index Government of Ireland Act (1920), 195 Gladstone, W.E., 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 44, 70 Goschen, Lord, 44 Government of Ireland Act (1914), 90, 176, 178-9, 180 Government of Ireland Act (1920), 133, 180-96 passim, 197 Greenwood, Hamar, 191 Grey, Earl, 58, 138 Griffith, Arthur, 198 Gwynne, H.A., 107 Halsbury Club, 63 Hardinge Commission, 125, 134 Harrow, 4-6 Hewart, Sir George, 148, 151 Hewins, W.A.S., 135, 139, 146, 147, 152, 156, 167 Hogan, Sean, 172 Home rule bill (1912), 6789 passim Humewood, 11, 12 Hutton, H.E., 5 Imperial Unionist Association, 128 Irish Citizen Army, 93, 96 Irish committee (1918), 147-64 passim Irish committee (1919-20), 180-96 passim Irish council bill (1907), 45-6, 53 Irish Free State, 197 Irish Home Rule League, 12

Irish Republican Army, 185 Irish Republican Brotherhood, 93 Irish Situation committee (1920), 192-3 Irish Unionist Alliance, 37, 43, 45, 68, 99, 128, 174

Irish Volunteers, 92, 93, 96, 169, 172 Jameson, Sir Leander Starr, 51, 127, 128, 141 Jenkinson, Sir George, 9 Jersey, Lord, 44 Joint Committee of Unionist Associations of Ireland, 43 Kitchener, Lord, 32, 91 Land Act (1903), 24, 30 Land League, 200 Landholders' Central Association, 47 Lansdowne, Lord, 38, 52, 79; recommends MacDonnell, 23; and federation, 59; and parliament bill (1911), 63; and Long, 52, 80-9 passim, 102-30 passim, 133; and home rule bill (1912), 80-9 passim; and Ulster, 80-9 passim; and Asquith's proposal (1916), 97; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 102-30 passim, 2223n_9o; and failure to alert cabinet and Unionist colleagues, 103; contemplates resignation, 118-19, 124 Law, Andrew Bonar, 48, 79, 90, 105, 113, 115, 121, 127, 137, 147, 156; chosen leader of the Unionist party, 66-7; and home rule bill (1912), 67, 72-3; and Ulster, 72-3, 80-9 passim; and Long, 80-9 passim, 91-2, 94, 114; and coalition government, 91-2; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 114-30 passim; and federalism,

155; and Irish committee (1919-20), 188, 191 League of the British Covenanters, 82, 83-4 Local government board: and Long, 14-15, 1718, 20-2, 172 Londonderry, Lady: Long's confidant and sounding-board, 35, 38, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 73, 79, 137, 2ion.9 Londonderry, Lord, 83 Long, Charlotte Anna, 3, 6-8 Long, Lady Dorothy (nee Boyle), 8, 73 Long, Eric, 198 Long, Richard Penruddocke, 3, 6, 11-12 Long, Walter, 3, 4, 7, 11 Long, Walter (Toby), 74, 137 Long, Walter Hume: early life, 3-4; health problems, 4, 21-2, 47, 48-9, 50, 57, 72, 73, 78, 86, 91-2, 105, 114, 142, 145, 170, 186, 189, 195, 197; personality of, 4, 6, 9, 15, 17-18, 19, 21, 28, 33, 2o6n.27, 2o8n.66; schooling, 4-6; and Oxford, 6-8; and sport, 5-8, 11, 12, 16; inherits estate, 6; and mother, 6-8; administrative skills, 6, 15, 1718; and marriage, 8; MP for North Wilts, 8-9; introduction to political life, 8-14; and the country gentlemen, 10, 13, 20; and early knowledge of Ireland, 11-17; and the nature of his Conservatism, 12, 14, 82, 198-201; bell-wether of the Unionist party, 12, 37; and his attitudes to the

244 Index Irish, 12-14, i8-i9/ 2&, 60, 90-1, 137, 143, 1645, 199-200; and tenants and landlords, 13, 1617, 18, 25, 30; MP for East Wilts, 14, 17; and Gladstone's home rule bills/ 14, i6> 18; and the local government board, 14-15, 17-18, 20-2, 25, 91; and trip to Canada (1888), 15; and federalism, 15, 46, 51, 58-60, 67-8, 70-2, 76-89 passim, 138, 140-1, 147, 149-201 passim, 226n_4o, 234n_47; and contacts in Ireland, 16, 21, 25, 92; and law and order, 16-17, 25/ 29-3°> 46, 47-8, 90-1, 94-6, 98, 133-4, !65-7i passim, 174, 177-8, 185-6, 1912, 193, 200; and civil war, 16, 67, 79, 80, 83, 84, 87-8; and Ulster, 16-17, 37, 69, 71-89 passim, 149, 152, 187-9, 197-8; MP for West Derby division of Liverpool, 17, 20; president of the board of agriculture, 19-20; and rabies, 19-20; inflammatory speaker, 19, 21-2; and Irish nationalism, 19, 25, 60, 71, 92-3, 172, 184, 200, 232n_3; and Church Discipline bill, 20; MP for Bristol (South), 20, 33-5; and rising status/stature in the Unionist party, 202; and tariff reform, 21, 47-8; appointed chief secretary, 22, 24-5; opposes home rule, 1617, 25, 34-5, 37, 46, 50, 52, 53-89 passim, 1356; and Wyndham, 25, 28, 2O5n_5; and Mac-

Donnell, 25-8, 30, 2O5n.5; and chief secretaryship, 25-34; and Irish Unionists, 26, 29, 34, 56, 75, 92, 119, 186, 187; and patronage, 289, 31-3; and Lord Dudley, 29, 31-2, 205n_5; and Edward Saunderson, 29; and Balfour, 32-4, 36-43' 49~52' 56' 58-67 passim, 2ion.9, 2i3n_42; opposes Unionist resignation (1905), 33-5; MP for Dublin (South), 35, 49; and the WyndhamMacDonnell imbroglio, 36-43, 2O5n_5; and leadership of the Irish Unionists, 36; as a "dupe" of the Irish Unionists, 41-2; and Austen Chamberlain, 40-2, 63, 159; chosen chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance, 43; and Joint Committee of Irish Unionist Associations of Ireland, 43; elected chairman of Ulster Unionist Council, 43, 173-4;leader of the Irish Unionist party in Parliament, 43; and Union Defence League, 43-5, 68, 176; and imperial union and Ireland, 46, 54, 136; and colonial models, 46, 69; and party organization, 46-7, 51, 56-8, 61-3, 2ion.9, 2iin.i7; and socialism, 47; president of Landholders' Central Association, 47; resigns as leader of the Irish Unionist party in Parliament, 49; and imperial federation, 50, 59, 136; and trip to South

Africa, 50-1; president of Budget Protest League, 51; and AclandHood, 51, 61; and Lansdowne, 52, 79, 80, 87-8, 102-30 passim, 133, 22on.4o; and 1910 elections, 52-5, 60-1; MP for the Strand, 49, 55; and Akers-Douglas, 61; and the parliament bill (1911), 63-4; and Willoughby de Broke, 63, 79; and leadership of the Unionist party, 66-7; and Bonar Law, 67, 72, 79-89 passim, 91-2, 94; and home rule bill (1912), 67-89 passim; and Carson, 6 9> 75-6, 83, 84-5, 86, 112-13, 12°/ 127~8, 1489; and Agar-Robartes, 72-3, 76; compromises his beliefs, 72-3, 84, 89; and trip to Canada (1912), 73-5; favours election, 79-89 passim; and southern Unionists, 80, 92-131 passim; and British Covenant, 82-4; and the Curragh "Mutiny," 85; his dangerous game, 87-9; and Buckingham Palace Conference, 87-8; supports conscription, 90, 135-6; and Asquith, 90130 passim, 133-4; and Easter Rising (1916), 94-6; and German threat, 94-5, 164-7; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 97131 passim; and Midleton, 101; and failure to alert cabinet and Unionist colleagues, 103, 113, 119, 120, 130; rejects American influence, 103-4, 106, 107-8,

245 111-12, 22on.4o; accused of betraying southern Unionists, 107, 108, 119, 189; provides the basis for Unionist position, 107, 111-12; and party unity, 113-30 passim; contemplates resignation, 118-20, 121, 122, 123-4; rejects chief secretaryship, 127-8, 144-5, 223n.io4; accepts need for an alternative solution, 131, 133, 136; included in Lloyd George cabinet, 132, 136; and H.E. Duke, 134-5, 137; and death of son, 137; and release of prisoners, 137, 173; recommends a conference, 138; advises Lloyd George, 140-96 passim; and Irish convention, 141-5, 146-7; liaison between cabinet and Dublin Castle, 145, 159-60, 164-96 passim; and conscription and home rule, 146-7, 156, 160-1, 168-71; and Irish committee (1918), 14764 passim, 228n.7i; and Sinn Fein, 150, 153, 164-71, 172-3, 174, 1789, 23in.n6; seeks Oliver's advice, 156-7; and Lord French, 164-71; and Edward Shortt, 166-71; MP for St George's, 172; appointed first lord of the admiralty, 172; and Ian Macpherson, 173, 174; "devolution in a federal form," 175-6; and Government of Ireland Act (1914), 176, 178-9; and Irish committee (191920), 180-96 passim; and

Index

Government of Ireland Act (1920), 180-96 passim; and death of daughter, 186; gains support of Ulster Unionists, 186, 188-9, 191; and betrayal of Unionist principles, 187, 189; and the boundary, 191, 197-8; and Irish situation committee (1920), 192; opposes dominion home rule, 193, 194; opposes coercion of Ulster, 1978; and impact on United Kingdom constitution, 201 Loreburn, Lord, 80 Lowther, James, 176 Lyttelton, Alfred, 44 MacDonnell, Anthony, 23-4, 25-8, 29, 30-1, 36-43, 205n.5 Macpherson, Ian, 145, 173, 180, 191 Massey, William, 140 Maxwell, General, 93, 98, 121, 125 Medlicott, H., 7-8 Meyrick, Edwin, 4 Midleton, Lord, 86, 99102, 106, 143, 150, 161, 169, 190, 194, 22on_53 Milner, Lord, 44, 58, 82, 83, 85, 2i6n_94 Milner's "kindergarten," 5i Montagu, Sir Edwin, 195 Moore, William, 29 Morrison-Bell, Major, 73 Nathan, Sir Matthew, 93 National Volunteers, 92 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 10

O'Connor, T.P., 98, 140 Oliver, F.S., 59, 60, 147, 150, 153, 156-7, 159, 163

"Pacificus," 59 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 12, 200 Pearse, Padraic, 93 Pease, Joseph, 94 Plunkett, Sir Horace, 25, 141, 228n_7i, 229n.87 Redmond, John, 88, 92, 93, 94, 101, 127, 128, 131, 134, 136, 137, 141; and Lloyd George's home rule scheme (1916), 98-9, 100, 102, 105, no, in, 126, 12930; rejects offer of selfgovernment for the South and West, 139; rejects draft home rule bill (1917), 140; and Irish convention, 141, 143 Ridgeway, Sir West, 2o6n.27 Ritchie, C.T., 14, 15, 17 Robinson, Sir Henry, 129, 135/ 137 Robinson, Seamus, 172 Rood Ashton estate, 4, 6-8 Round Table movement, 85, 152 Royal Irish Constabulary, 25, 28, 94, 174, 193 St Aldwyn, Lord, 44 Salisbury, 3rd marquess of, 10, 19, 20 Salisbury, 4th marquess of, 114, 150 Samuel, Herbert, 126, 127 Sandars, Jack, 19, 33, 40i, 47, 49, 56, 59, 62, 66, 2iin.i7 Saunderson, Edward, 29, 36, 43' 56 Selborne, 2nd earl of, 22, 34, 51, 56, 67, 113-19, J21, 122, 124, 136, 147,

156, 160, 198, 2ion.9, 22on_53

246 Index Shortt, Edward, 159, 160, 162, 164-71, 173 Sinn Fein, 94-5, 99, 101, 103, 108, 112, 116, 134, 138, 150, 164, 166-7, 172-3, 197 Smith. F.E. (Lord Birkenhead), 64, 114, 192, 193 Smuts, General, 51, 140, 148, 151, 154, 159, 160 Soloheadbeg, 172 Southern Unionist Committee, 227^57 Special Crimes Branch, 174

Steed, Wickham, 176 Steel-Maitland, Arthur, 63, 68 Stewart, George, 99, 101, 102, 103

Tait, Canon, 4 Tariff reform, 21, 33, 36, 46-7, 48 Tennant, Harold, 94 Treacy, Sean, 172 Tudor, General, 193 Turner, F.L., 119-20 Ulster Unionist Council, 43, 45, 48, 53, 68-9, ?6, 83, 88-9, lo6' W7> 173-4 Ulster Union of Constitutional Associations, 53 Ulster Volunteer Force, 78, 85, 95, 96, 2i6n_94 Union Defence League, 43-5, 49, 68, 73, 82, 83, 176

Unionist Associations of Ireland Joint Committee, 68 United Irish League, 95 Valentia, Lord, 8 Walsh, John, 227^57 Wilson, J. Mackay, 36 Wimborne, Lord, 93, 134 Winnipeg, 15, 73-4 Wood, Edward, 175 Wylie, William, 193 Wyndham, George, 23-5, 28, 34, 36-43, 44, 49, 51, 205n.5