Vorster's Foreign Policy [1 ed.]

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D R. GAIL-MARYSE COCK R A M , Lt..M., PH,D., Barrister at Law of,

Grays Inn, is an international lawyer who has been resident in South Africa since 1963. She has written on legal aspects of emigration in the Commonwealth, the United Nations and on the mandate for South West Africa, She was educated at St. Paul's Girls

School, London; Canberra Hi@ School, Australia; the Australian National University (Commonwealth Scholar); and the London School of Economics (Rockefeller student in international relations). In her subse-

quent career she became Bryce Exhibitor of the Univeristy of London and Scholar of Grays Inn. She spent her childhood in South Africa during World War II, and in the United States, the United kingdom and Australia.

Dust jttcket design by Eric Cartlidge

Vorster's Foreign Policy Gail-Maryse Cockram L L.M.~ PH.D., BARR I S T E R A T

LA W

O F G R A Y S INN

A CA D E M I C A P RETO R I A

C A PE T O W N

197 0

Cayyright O by G. M, Codutun First yubhshed in present form in 1970 by H dx R-Academics(PLy.) Ltd., 235 Pxetarius Sxeet, Pxetorin; State House, Rase Street, Caye Town

Foreword Introduction Chapter 1.

S outh Africa, South-West Africa, and the United Nations

19

Chapter 2.

South Africa and Israel

Chapter 3.

The Defenceof the Cape Sea Route

Chapter 4.

South Africa and Latin America

Chapter 5.

Immigration

Chapter 6.

South Africa and Gold

Chapter 7.

The Manufactureof Weayons by South AAica 107

Chapter 8.

South Africa and the Neighbouring States

Chapter 9.

South Africa and Malawi - the Devil's Disciple 133

116

Chapter 10. T errorists — the Racehorses of the Apocalypse

147

Chayter 11. South Africa and Portugal

160

Chayter 12. South Africa and Rhodesia

173

Chapter 13. S outh Africa and the United States of America 1 8 7 Chapter 14.

Unfair Play —the Olympics

195

Conclusion

210

Notes

Foreword > have great pleasure m introducing to the public this book, which I believe Slls a long-felt want. Although it has been suggested that the title is misleading inasmuch as important parts of the Repubhc's policy have been contributed by»eld-Marshal Smuts, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Dr. Eric Louw and «course by South Africa's present Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, it is chiefly during the premiership of Mr. John Vorster that the outward policy has developed in its present form. The contents of this book appeared originally as a series of articles in the coniidentisl newsletter Backgroundpubhshed by the South Africa Foundation for its members and it is a credit to the pubhshers, Messrs. Academica, that they will now be available to the general public. Apart from oScial publications, there is a serious dearth of factual and authoritative material on South Africa's foreign policy which is generally misunderstood and which has olten been and still is wilfully misrepresented. objective and authoritative study by Dr. Gaii Cockram will be welcomed both by the general reader and the serious student. Gen. Sir Eranns de Gumgand I 'ravid'ent of the South Afriettn I'op

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been created by the British withdrawal of forces east of Suez. Unless this vacuum in the Indian Ocean was Sled by the joint eS'orts of the free world, he warned that it would be SHed by Russia, and South Africans should now have to ask themselves whether the time had not come to yhy a bigger role in the southern hemisphere in cooperation with friendly nations. In October 1968, Mr. Botha announced that South Africa's Srst missile base, for experimental tests and launchings, was to be established on the Zululand Coast. The strip of land 10 mHes wide by 30 miles long, as weH as a paraHel belt of the ocean of an undisclosed width, includes St. Lucia Lake, one of the largest salt water estuaries in the world. The announcement received the full support of the Opposition United Party, whose spokesman on defence matters, Mr. Vause Raw, said that his yarty welcomed any step which would make the Republic less dependent on other countries for arms, and "we regard the news of the missile base as a matter of congratulation for the technical people involved. It is pleasing to know they have reached a stage in the development of missiles when they neel a 5eld test range." Mr. Botha also revealed that a Decca radar screen was being erected around the coastline to give South Africa protective covering, for 200 miles or more, out to sea. The creation of the missile base was a natural coroHary of such a radar screen, and was an indication of the importance which the Republic attached to the defence of the Cape sea route against attack. It also served as a counter-measure to the threatening attitude of certain African states. As Mr. Uorster had said„one of the main reasons that the missile site would be established in Zululand was because any threat to South Africa would come from the east coast, not the west. President Kaunda of Zambia had already attempted in July 1968 to obtain the Rapier suyersonic missile systems from Britain, on the ground that South Africa's arms build-up was "assuming alarming proportions." He warned that "if Britain withholds its missiles from us, the eastern countries will step in." This had already occurred in Tanzania, which announced, in February 1968, that with Chinese communist aid it was to become the Srst African state with a ground-to-air missile complex, to permit of retaliation against alleged South African violation of its territory by re:onnaissance Sights. In Ayril 1969, the Government %hite Payer on Defence reve@ed that Defence Force armaments since 1960 had cost R660,325,000, 113

and that DefenceForce assets and equipment amounted to R2,000 million. R102 million had been spent on radio, radar, sonar, and navigational equipment. In addition, R1,647million would be spent on defencein the Republic over the next fi ve years.This expenditure would include a R14.4 million submarine base at Simonstown, and the establishment of a R12 million radio communications centre at Cape Town. This project — codwnamed "Advokaat" — would take three years to complete, and would be the most sophisticated and largest installation of its kind in the Free World outside the United States, and its coverage would include the whole of the Southern hemisphere. As regardsthe domestic manufacture of armaments, Mr. Botha disclosed that the Munitions Production Board alone had 1,000 contractors, and that payments made by the board to concerns inside South Africa had risen from R23 million in 1966-7, to R45 million in 1968-9. He said that it was gratifying to see that many concerns from

friendly countries were still interested in undertaking the manufacture: of certain important munitions in South Africa: "To them I wish to say that South Africa attaches importance to the know-how which they are prepared to bring, as well as the technicians who will be involved." He warned, however, that "South Africa does not need capital, and they will have to accept that... it will be a condition that financial and technical control must be in the hands of South Africa."~ * The Republic, he said,had now reached such a degree of mihtary preparedness that an embargo might be placed on imports of cern arms and ammunition, and the country could think seriously of exporting arms to approved" countries. An example which he gave of South Africa's new intention of breaking into the international armaments market was the 'Cactus' ground-to-air missile system. This would be the most advanced and effective defence in existence against fast, low-Sying air as k s . The Republic had developed it in co-operation with the French Government and a French electronics firm. The projecthad also been partly fi nanced by the French Government in "a happy example of fruitful international co-operation." Mr. Botha continued that "developments are now reaching the production stage and the Armaments Board is already engaged in the task of setting up in South Africa the necessary production facilities... Endeavours are being made to recoup a portion of the

research and development expenditure by sale to other countries. The interest shown is encouraging."~ Mr. Botha also revealed that a second, purely South Africandeveloped guided missile, had recently been tested at the St. Lucia missile range, which was proving to be "an invaluable asset" for South African missile research. Mr. Botha has not disclosed whether the missiles which South Africa has developed could carry a nuclear warhead, but the Republic, which has the largest economically exploitable reserves of uranium in the Western world, inaugurated its own first nuclear reactor, Safari I, as long ago as August 1965, at a cost of R7.5 million, and Mr. Botha said in 1967 that whereas a few years ago a mere R29,000 had been made availablefor weapon research in the Republic, R10 miihon had been allocated for 1967, which would assist the Defence Foro: and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in their research into rockets and guided missiles, which he considered to be "an absolute necessity" in the defence of South Africa. In May, 1968, South Africa's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Botha, told the General Assembly that the Republic, a major producer of uranium, would not consider itself bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He said that while South Africa noted the offer of the United Kingdom, United States, and Russia to assure non-nuclear states, through the United Nations, of aid if they were subjected to nuclear attack, this offer, though valuable, "is neither a guarantee, nor does it represent a firm assurance, that the security of a particular country subject to a nuclear threat or nuclear attack will be preserved."

Chapter 8 South Africa and the Neighbouring States "I beheve that the one thing that roly counts in internatiozud relationshiys is common economicinterests." Dr. Verwoerd.

In 1945 the then Prime Minister, General Smuts, said that "the whole of my striving has been to ensure the knitting together of the parts of... Southern Africa... parts that must necessarily work together for a stable future on the continent of Africa."t A similar view was expressed by his successor, Dr. Malan, in 1948: "Vfe in South Africa, as one of the countries of Africa, cannot dissociate ourselves from the destinies of those countries... %e wish to have close co-operation with these temtories." In Dr. Malan's time, however, there were no independent states in Africa other than Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt. The rest of Africa was under British, French, Portuguese, Italian, or Belgian rule. By 1957, however, as a result of the obtaining of independence from colonial rule of Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Ghana and the Sudan, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Strijdom, could say that "the whole position has changed in Africa... in the course of events, as these countries develop, it will have to come about that... there will have to be contact between us and countries south of the Sahara... with a view to economic and other matters... In the course of time there will have to be ordinary relations and even diplomatic relations."s Mr. Louw, then Minister of External Alfairs, explained to the House of Assembly that the policy he intended to follow would be to maintain contact with other states in Africa whether they were European or African controlled. The newly-independent African states, however, showed little desire for friendship with South Africa. In 1962 Dr. Verwoerd told the House of Assembly' that "when South Africa has to deal with the African states today, it must be under most inauspicious conditions. It is not very easy to develop goodwill, even when you wish to do your utmost for them without any advantage to yourself. It is very dificult to get in touch with them and to aid them. Therefore v'e have to take up this standpoint that we cannot concentrate today on trying

ordinary

to achieve direct contact and make trade or other agreements, or burden them against their weal with the many forms of aid, that we would be prepared to give. We cannot force that upon them.. . We must remain preparedto give aid whenever they change their mind and their attitude... If th ere are African states which would like to establish friendly personal contacts with us, we would like to establish friendly contacts with them. If they depart from the present attitude of enmity and give an indication of a desire for friendship, then it would be possible for us — at Srst not on an ambassadorial basis but through direct contact from time to time — to build up goodwill and co-operation. The form of contact would move further and further ahead as friendships grew." In November 1963 Mr. I,ouw repeated that, despite failures, and however frustrating the present outlook append, South Africa should continue to strive to develop good relations with the African states. He said that, for his part, he had consistently tried to build up relations with these states, in spite of their hostile attitude to South Africa at the United Nations and elsewhere. The lack of ofBcial diplomatic relations and the hostility towards South Africa were creating a feeling of frustration, but whatever the position was, the Republic should continue with its elforts to restore those broken relations. He felt that thh was a passing phase and improvement would come in time. The change would come, he predicted, when the African states reahsed the economic and technical assistance they could get from the Republic. In his view, as he had written in 1958, South Africa had a particular duty towards Africa: "South Africa stiN cherishes her links of ancestry, culture and friendship with Europe ... But as a sovereign independent state, forming an integral and inseparable unit of the African continent, South Africa is also fully conscious of its responsibilities and is... striving for an orderly and peaceful development of the continent, south of the Sahara." Dr. Muller, who in 1963 suexeded Mr. Louw as Foreign Minister, has said, in words which Mr.l.ouw might himselfhave used, that "we occupy a unique position in Africa which distinguishes us from other African states. Although we are in Africa and of Africa, we also have roots in Europe... Furthermore, we occupy a unique position in Africa, because in many 6elds we are the highest developoi country in Africa, and we are ahead of most of the other African states in practically every Seld... We have at our disposal valuable know117

ledge and valuable experience and also many resources, which we are prepared to share with others. But this special position also carries great obhgations and responsibilities towards the developing states of Africa."4 The erst break-through in South Africa's relations with African states came when the British territories of Basutoland, Swaziland» and Bechuanalandattuned independent South Africa had had a close interest in these territories ever since s.151 of the South Africa Act of 1909 had made provision for their future transfer by the British Government and incorporation in South Africa. In 1935 General Hertzog had pressed the United Kingdom to hand over the protectorates and only the outbreak of World War Il had ended the long drawn-out discussions which followed this request. General Smuts returned to the attack as soon as the war ended. In March 1945 he assured the Assembly that the territories "are destined to become a part of South Africa " Once again protracted discussions followed. Economically, South Africa has such close links with these territories that Dr. Verwoerd was able to say in 1959 that they really had "not one guardian only, but two," Britain was the guardian in the governmental sphere, but South Africa was "the greater guardian • • - the cxonomic guardian." This situation was fortunate for the territories, since, as late as 1964, Sir John Maud, the last U.K. High Commissioner in South Africa, criticised the fact that in the thirteen years following World War Il, the U.K. had spent only 114 million on them as compared with the K78 million which South Africa was then proposing to spend over Sve years in South-West Africa. Prince Makhosini Dhlamini, later Prime Minister of Swaziland, said in 1967, before his country attained independent, that "we will be only too happy to see the last of the British. They have left us naked and uneducated." Swaziland had the world's highest ilhteracy rate — 74% of all Swazi adults. South Africa has aided the territories by accepting a large number of their surplus workers into her own labour force; almost 40/ of males of working age from Basutoland (now Lesotho), 10/ from Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and had, according to the report of the Tomlinson Commission in 1956, provided the means of subsistence for one-third of the Swazi population. In 1968 the Deputy e Minister, Mr. Sukati, told the Swazi House of Assembly that 118

morethan 5,000 Swazis — one in 80 of the total population — worked in South Africa's mines, and between July 1967 and June 1968 had sentR334,000 back to Swaziland. By 1965 Mr. Haak, then Minister of Mines and Planning, could point out that the degree of economic co-operation between South Akica and the Territories was probably already far in advance of that achieved in the European Common Market: "The High Commission Territories do not only form a customs union with South A&ica, but also a monetary union and we use the same monetary unit. These territories derive bene6t from the internal and external monetary stabiTity which the Republic maintains as custodian of the monetaxy area, and thus their economic development has been singularly free from bahnce of payments difhculties which so often hamper the advance of small-sized developing economies... (They) also enjoy the bene6t of an ahnost free Sow of capital within the monetary area, while the Republic provides employment for a large portion of their labour force, as also a ready market for their produce." Their products are to a very large extent marketed as an inte~ p a r t o f t hose of South Africa, for example, the South African Citrus Exchange handles the citrus crop of Swaziland as part of the South African crop and markets it under the trademark "Outspan," and slaughter stock from Swaziland are exported to controlled markets in South Africa and enjoy the advantage of the axed prices for grade and weight which the South African Meat Board guarantees. "At present these territories produce for the South African market and not merely for their own internal markets. Directly and indirectly they share in the South African infrastructure such as transport, which they otherwise would have had to establish at great cost... The Republic also extends a wide range of technical assistance (since)... on account of the great similarities in the climate and agricultural conditions in the countries concerned, South Africa is in a favourable position to make a substantial contribution towards solving some of the problems which they have to face.'" While economically there were close links between South Africa and the Protectorates, politically the position remained as conRsed as ever. The United Kingdom Government, which was accelerating

the process of gating independence to her colonial empire, could not, consistently with this, simply hand the territories over to South

Africa. The inhabitants had to be asked for their views, and what if they opposed the transfer? South Africa not unreasonably pointed out that this had been done before the creation of the Central African Federation, that the Africans had opposed it, but that the Federation had nevertheless been created. Was this not a precedent for a future transfer of the protectorates to South Africa? The British Government were not prepared to face the criticism which transfer would have involved and the development of the Bantustan policy made it illogical for the South African Government to continue to press for it. In 1964 Dr. Verwoerd explained. that the South African Government "has adopted the realistic attitude that South Africa no longer claims the incorporation of those territories... our attitude is that they are neighbouring states with which we want to have the best possible relations for the sake of our common safety and economic interests." South Africa's poHcy towards the Protectorates would be "one of friendship and co-operation, of recognising their independence when they obtain it.. . We will attempt to establish economic and other relations with them on the best possible terms by negotiating with (their)... governments when they are established and if they desire it. That is a clear and unoluivocal objective, of creating bonds of friendship with neighbouring states." He predicted that South Africa's future relationship with the Protectorates would be a very good one. By February 1965,when it had become apparent that Britain would soon grant independence to all three territories, Dr. Verwoerd welcomed the prospect. In his opinion the United Kingdom Government had directed its policy not so much in the interests of the Territories, but in such a way as to retain British friendship with other black African states, and with the black Commonwealth countries. "Once Britain is out of these Protectorates, together with the British interests there, and these peoples' own governments are faced with the demands of survival... then they will judge their actions and their relationship with the Republic of South Africa in terras of their economic interests... I beHeve that the one thing that really counts in international relationships is common economic interests. So far as the governments of these Protectorates are concerned, political interests will be dominated by their economic interests."8 It was this possibility that the Territories would become increasingly friendly with South Africa which led the United Nations Special Conunittee on Coloniahsrn to call for the despatch of U.N. 120

observation teams to "prevent their annexation by South Africa," a call which led Mrs. Eirene White, then the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies to comment, in July 1965,' that "I have stressed political independence, because we must be quite frank about this. Not one of these territories is economically independent, or likely to be, for quite a while to come." Mrs. White was not exaggerating. Two-thirds of Sech~ ad i s~ pie d by the Kalahari Desert, and a drought-the worst in the present generation — had begun in 1960, and was still continuinglive years later, bywhich time much of the rest of the territory had also become a gigantic dustbowl, nearly one-third of the cattle were dead, and one-Sth of the population were being fed by the Government. Basutoland was in an even worse state: less than one-Swath of the land was arable, and the soil of even this small portion had been eroded by excessive cultivation; the remaining four4ifths consists of rugged and almost inaccessible mountains. Mrs. White later commented, aAer visiting the territory, that "I' ve seen a good deal of various parts of Africa, but I' ve seldom seen anywhere more diScult to develop economically. ... One can Sy for mile aher mile over very, very steep, pointed mountains with the most appalling soil erosion, wW impossible communications...One is inclined to say that the only future industry you can see there is pony trekking. I may be sounding pessimistic, but kankly, it's better, I think, to be honest about these matters." She continued that "it is quite useless to suggest, as for example, several United Nations resolutions have suggested, that the three territories should be made independent of the Repubhc of South Africa... To ask us to do that would be to ask us to lift the territories physically and put them in another part of the world. You cannot overcome the sheer hard facts of geography, and all the political leaders with whom I spoke in the territories recognised that they have to work out some scheme of coexistence." Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, Swaziland is surrounded save for a 70 mile border with Mozambique, and Botswana has South Africa on its northern, western, southern and southeastern borders, and Rhodesia on the north east, and South Africa too realised fully the importance of such coexistence with them. In 1965 Dr. Muller predicted that the test of the Republic's relations with other Akican states would lie in the nature of her relations with the High Connnission Territories when they became independent. .

121

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The Srst of the Territories with which South Africa established friendly relations was Basutoland. In June 1965 Dr. Verwoerd had receiveda direct appeal from Chief Leabua Jonathan, the newlyelected Prime Minister, for food to be sent from South Africa because of the drought. The Government immediately sent a donation of 100,000bags of grain. Chief Jonathan thanked Dr. Verwoerd "for this sympathetic act in our hour of need." On 2nd September 1966, on theeve of Basutoland's independence, Chief Jonathan came in yerson to South Africa to arrange for the transit through the Republic of the distinguished visitors who were coming to attend the celebrations. He took advantage of his visit to meet Dr. Verwoerd. The two leaders afterwards issued a joint statement that the yurpose of this meeting had been "to get acquainted"; they had talked on a wide range of subjects of mutual interest, but the opening of any negotiations would have to await Basutoland's formal independeno:. It was, however, "quite dear that there is no desire between our states to interfere in one another's domestic affairs but that friendly relations between these two independent neighbouring states will be preserved." Chief Jonathan said on his return to Basutoland that Africa's slogan should be "realism and not internationalism" This new slogan could be attached to his meeting with Dr. Verwoerd, "and Ws is where realism must be given top priority." He later revealed, some~hat sadly, that "I would have been quite willing to accept any offer of aid by South Africa but I am afraid that South Africa has been scared away by the British themselves, because of the irresponsible statements made in the Commons by some Labour Party members, and also at the United Nations, to the effect that South Africa was trying to impose its Bantustan pohcy on us, and that I was going to sell out to South Afri . When I went to see Dr. Verwoerd and asked him whether he would consider coming to our aid SnancMy, he said: 'We just would not think of it because it would prove the aHegations... that you were going to sell out to us.' " On September 6th, four days after his meeting with Chief Jonathan, Dr. Verwoerd was assassinated. Mr. Vorster then became Prime Minister, and at once made it clear that he would continue with his predecessor's policy towards the rest of Africa. Dr. Verwoerd had said earlier that year that "South Africa does not attempt to buy friendship, because friendship can never be bought. Friendship is given when it is realised that one does not desire to interfere. The

basic principle of the Republic's policy in respect of Africa is one of non-interference.'~o Mr. Vorster used much the same terms when he told the House of Assembly in September I966 that "we seek friendship with all the other temtories in the knowledge that the only lasting friendship is that which is not bought, and the only real assistance that can be given is assistance that does not impair the honour of the receiver." Mr. Vorster said that so far as the Territories were concerned,"we want nothing from them except the common elementary goodwill that.. . should exist between neighbouring states." He added that, "I have every reason to presume that the relations between us and the Protectorates, as they become independent, will be very good." He went on to pronuse that if they should need assistance from South Africa, it would be given in the correct manner, so as to help them to help themselves and so that their selfrespect would not be hurt." On 30th September Bechuanaland became the independent state of Botswana. Sir Seretse Khama, the new Prime Minister, said that "we fully appreciate that it is ~holly in our interests to preserve neighbourly relations with the Republic of South Africa. Our economic links with South Africa are virtually indissoluble. %'e are tied directly to South Africa — for communications, for markets, for our beef,for labour in the mines, and in many other respects." On 3rd October Basutoland became the independent state of Lesotho. ChiefJonathan said at his 5rst press conference after independence that his meeting with Dr. Verwoerd had "marked the bey'nning, I believe, of a new relationship between our two countries. It is my earnest and sincere hope that Mr. Vorster and I will be able to continue this relationship, and to build on it in the future. I have no reason to think that this could be otherwise. South Africa and Lesotho have much to gain from peaceful coexistence, provided this is based on natural respect for our respective national policies. No country is an island unto itself, and no country can grow and prosper in isolation. Our actions will be based on one platform only — what is best for our country and our people." Dr. Muller, who had attended the independence celebrations in both countries, commented that he was "more convinced than ever" that South Africa could maintain its friendship with her newly-independent neighbouring states. An example of the growing co-operation was the new weekly service by South African Airways to Botswana, South Africa's Srst air-link with

an independent African state. A similar service between Lesotho and the Republic began in October 1967. Mr. Vorster soon showed himself ready to increase contacts with African states. In November he said that in dealing with heads of other African states he would act on the basis of their equality as heads of state, and their colour should be purely coincidental.is In January 1967 a meeting took place between him and Chief Jonathan in Cape Town. It was the Srst occasion on which a South African prime minister had been host to the leader of an independent black African state, and a joint communique noted that "the Government will as soon as possible investigate proposals for economic aid and technical assistance to Lesotho." Mr. Vorster later informed the House of Assembly that he had told Chief Jonathan "that as regards the assistance South Africa had to oS'er, we would not sunply hand out money to people, because in principle we did not believe in that and because we did not have the superluous money available, but that we would help them to help themselves. The Prime Minister of Lesotho told me that he fully agreed with that attitude and that point of view... I have overed him technical assistant, which he accepted, I have o8'ered him advice, which he gladly accepted."'s Chief Jonathan said on his return to Lesotho that all South Africa "asks of Lesotho is goodwill and nothing more," He believed that his visits to Dr. Verwoerd and later to Mr. Vorster had broken the "race relations curtain" in the south, and peaceful coexistence had been put into practice. He had found Mr. Vorster "a bit more realistic and practical" than Dr. Verwoerd, who had been "a bit diScult, indeed very dificult." Dr. Verwoerd was a philosopher, "and philosophers want you to accept their philosophy." Mr. Vorster was more reasonable, "perhapsbecause he is a lawyer,and they are more amenable." When the State President, Mr. Swart, opened the South African Parliament later in January, he said that as a result of "the successful meeting" between the two Prime Ministers, "it. can be expected that further contact with other independent African states to the advantage of all concerned will follow." That same month Dr. Muller told the Assembly" that "the Government's approach to our relations with the states in Africa is one of cordial readiness to help... South Afric's task on the continent of Africa is not to dictate condescendingly to others in Africa what they should do and how they should manage their affairs. On the contrary we must avoid that attitude at

ail costs, bemuse it is in conllict with the principle of non-interference, a principle which we support very strongly. The object of the Government s pohcy m respect of Afflca 18 to assist the nations of Africa and to help them to stand on their own feet, to work out their own salvation and to so:ure their own future, and to do so without losing their self-respect." Although large-scale Snancial assistance had been given to African states by foreign powers, "we neither want to nor can compete with the major powers in respect of assistance in the form of enormous Snancial contributions. ln the Srst place, we cannot doso because we lack the means, and because we have very heavy commitments asregards the development of our own nonwhite citizens in the Republic. And in the second place, we do not want to do that because we are convinced that it oFers no lasting solution to the problems of Africa. In our view the solution to those problems is rather to be found in co-operation and assistance aimed at helping people to help themselves. %e do that on one condition, however, and that is that the recipients of such assistance should be prepared themselves to put a shoulder to the wheel, and that they should throw in their full weight." In March Mr. Vorster commented that "we have a duty to Africa and to the world to make available to Africa the knowledge and experience we have built up over the years," and Mr. Haak, the Minister of Economic A6'airs, pointed out that South Africa's extensive knowledge and experience in relation to agriculture, mining and industrial problems under African conditions made it eminently suitable for the task of assisting other African states in developing their own economies. In implementation of this pohcy, senior oScials from South Africa held talks in Mbabane, Swaziland, on the co-operative use of water. Almost all of Swaziland's major rivers, such as the Usutu and its tributaries rise in the Eastern Transvaal, and if Swaziland could make full use of these waters, she could increase the extent of her arable land from 65,000 to 250,000 acres. At the same time Mr. ILLak suggested the possibility of harnessing the waters of the Usutu for the generation of hydro-electric power. This Usutu Basin scheme, estimated to cost RSS a@lion, would be economically feasible for Swaziland because of the Republic's readiness to be a customer for the surplus power. It would irrigate 250,000 acres in Swaziland and produce 145,000 kilowatts of power. Similarly, representatives from South Africa's water planning commission went to I.esotho to

investigate the yroposed Oxbow hydro-electric dam scheme. The commission's chairman, Dr. du Toit Viljoen, said that the scheme could supply South Africa with 312 milhon gaHons of water daily. As a result of these investigations Chief Jonathan told the Lesotho Parharnent in February 1968 that the "green light" had been given to the Oxbow scheme. In South Africa, Mr. Vorster said that yreliminary technical studies indicated that the yroject would be e:onomicaHy feasible: "The implementation of the project wHl be dependent on further technical studies, which wiH now unmediately beauthoflsed, and on the availability of the n~s a ry funds." The scheme is estimated to cost about R30 million, and to take between Sve and ten years to complete. South Africa would be the only customer for an estimated 100,000 miHion gallons of water and 550 million kilowatt hours of electricity annuaHy. By June 1967 Dr. Muller was able to inform the Houseof Assembly that "we are busy entering a new yhase in connection with our relations with Africa... During the past decade our relations with the rest of Africa were certainly not satisfactory... AH the African states who erst received their independence were situated many thousands of miles from South Africa. (They). .. condemned us according to their own experiences of the white man under colonial rule... Our immediate neighbours, who know us, have only gained their indeyendence in the past year." He later said that "although our policy in giving aid to our neighbours and in co-operating in matters of common interest is not new, it is being given new purpose and «ection in that we are now able to deal with indeyendent states which are in full control of their own destinies."» Because of this new development, and the friendly relations which South Africa had succeeded in establishing with her neighbours, Mr. Vorster told the Assembly that same month that in South Africa's relations with the outside world the time had come for a united outward movement, the foundations for which had been laid down by his predecessors. It was not his intention to try to build Rome in a day, but slowly and systemaHcaHy to establish good relations with neighbouring states in Southern Africa and further to the north as saner attitudes prevailed." Mr. Vorster's statement caused considerable interest. In Zambia, Dr. Kaunda commented that "apartheid is on the o8'ensive... The Boer trek is still on." I n South Africa Die Burger noted that Mr. Vorster was the leader who had contributed so much to make the

South African laager strong against subversion and invasion, but that the laager, which had gained its fame during the Great Trek of Boer farmers from the Cape to the Transvaal, "was a mobile, prefabricated fortress, in essence related to the modern military tank, not to the Maginot line. It was never intended for permanent shelter, rather to provide a point of strength against attacks and thereafter as a basis for sorties. It was utilised as a hard spearpoint for a mighty adventure into the gnat unknown." Mr. Vorster was now showing that the laager formation was no end in itself for him: "It was necessary preparation for the actual task; breaking into the sphere where the Sght must be won decisively... It means nothing less than that we are being required to ful61 our historical vocation. The choice is either that — or retreat, shrinking, and isolation." In March 1968 Dr. Diederichs, presenting the budget to Parliament, said that RS mi%on of the surplus for that 6aancial year would be transferred to a loan fund to promote economic co-operation, and to grant direct assistance by loans at low interest rates for sound development projects to well-disposed developing countries, particularly those in Africa Dr. Muller later explained that over the years South Africa had contributed millions of rands in aid to international organisations. She had now reassessed her foreign aid programme and instead of giving such large contributions, she would direct a considerable proportion of this money to the loan lund, which could be used to the direct benefit of Southern Africa as a whole: "It is in the interests of all of us that Africa should be a prosperous continent. After all, it is better to have a prosperous man for a neighbour than a beggar. You cannot trade with a beggar. . . ( f n addition) it is in South Africa's direct interests to have the Southern Alrican continent prosperous and stable, to enable it to withstand communism.'~' By this time the third and last of the British Territories, Swaziland, was becoming restive for independence. Prince Makhosini Dlamini said that the Swazi people were "losing patience" with Britain. "We see our sister territories becoming independent, and we ask — what about Swaziland 7 Our patience is being tried. I shudder to think that we might be tempted to declare U.D.I. like Mr. Ian Smith." He had earlier describ& in 1966 the foreign policy guidelines, which his country would follow when it became independent, as including the cultivation of "healthy understanding" with neighbouring states and

non-interference in their internal a8'airs, and the maintenance of economic ties with South Africa, in recogmtion of the "economic and geographical facts," to change which "would result in economic chaos." Opponents of the Republic were so convinced that good and close relations based on common economic interests would be estabhstux between the Reyublic and an independent Swaziland, that the United Nations Special Committee on Coloniahsm had resolved in May 1968 that the United Kingdom should "p rot'" Swazilandfrom the "interventionist policies of South Africa," a resolution which the United States delegate described as "unrealistic" because, as>ritam had pointed out, after independence the Swaziland government alone would be responsible for the protection of its own territorial integrity. In M babane Prince Dlamini commented that it would be "downright unrealistic" to expect Swaziland to adopt a hostile attitude, as some people thought she should, towards South Africa without whom she could not live. In followmg this policy, Swazila was in fact acting on the advice of Dr. Robert Gardiner, the executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. who had told Swazi leaders in Mbabane, in 1967, that Swaziland's most important objective, as an independent country, would have « be to survive, and not to provoke stronger nations, Cordial relations between South Africa and Swaziland therefore continued. In South Africa Mr. Uys, the Minister of Agriculture stressed that it was essential that the Republic should live in the greatest yossible friendship with Swaziland. June saw the start «a yooled air service between the two countries. In July a team of medical specialists from Johannesburg began making their service available free of charge to the Swazis at Mbabane hospital. That same month Senator Polycarp Dlamini, the Swazi Minister of N or Power and Communications, suggested the possibility of a rail hnk between the Repubhc and Swaziland. Swaziland's rail service was then hmited to a single line from the rich Swazi iron ore mine at Kadake, near Mbabane,to Goba, near the Mozambique border where it connected with the Portuguese line to Lourenqo Marques. This serrice was operated with the help of the Mozambique raHwaJ's The yroyosed new rail hnk of 93 miles, estimated to cost R10 milhon would run from I.othair in the Eastern Transvaal, the terminus of the Johannesburg-Ermelo 5ne, to Mbabane, where it would connect with

»

the Kadake-Lourenqo Marques line. This rail hnk would provide a signi6cant boost to trade between South Africa and Swaziland, since at the moment the bulk of the goods exchanged between them is carried by road. It would give Swaziland access to the port of Durban for numerous exports; it would greatly add to the potential of the Usutu Basin Scheme; and, so far as South Africa is concerned, it would fil l t h e dream of the old Transvaal Republic of a direct rail link through Swaziland to Lourenqo Marques. The rail link would, in fact, serve to connect still closer the Repubhc, Swaziland, and the

Portuguese territory of Mozambique.

On September 6th 1968 Swaziland, one of the four remaining

Africanstates to be ruled by a monarch, King Sobhuza II,became the smallest but one independent state in Africa Lord Caradon, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, commented that Swazi independence was of partindar signi5cance since it represented "the close of a chapter in British history — the end of the British colonial era in Africa." Mr. Steyn, the South African Stxretary for Commerce said, when he formaHy opened the South African pavilion at the Swazi independence exhibition at Manzini, that it was the South African Government's sincere desire to continue and to strengthen friendly arrangements for technical and scientiSc co-operation with Swaziland after it had attained independence, and that South Africa's participation in the exhibition was not merely intended to pay homage to the Swazi nation on the eve of independence, but also reSected its desire to co-operate as closely as possible with the new nation. The Swazi Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Sukati, said at the independence celebrations, which Dr. Muller attended, that "South Africa is most important to us and we realise that without its help and co-operation we would be in a diScult position — independence or noindependence."Prince Dlamini himself said on Independence Day that "Swaziland must be constrained by its geographic and economic circumstances to follow a policy of enlightened self-interest, relyingupon a meum of acumen and a ~um of heroics." Swaziland, he added, was in no position to enter the lists of international power politics in a spirit of medieval crusade. It therefore appeared as if Swaziland, hke Lesotho and Botswana, would serve as a moderating inSuence in the British Commonwealth to which it had been admitted, at the United Nations, of which it was to be the 125th member, and in the Organisation for African Unity.

By November 1968 Mr. Vorster was able to comment that the best « relations existed between South Africa and its neighbours. South Africa got along better with the former protectorates than when they were under British control: "I am not saying this behind Britain' s back — I have said so to them myself."He promised that South Africa was prepared to give technical and other aid to African states, "without any strings attached," partly from self-interest, because she realised that her own prosperity was, to a certain extent, tied to the prosperity of the remaining states in A&ica, but also because "providence has been very good to us in Afri and we want to return to Africa something of this... We must train leaders for the sake of the continent of Africa."" South Africa's oS'er of assistance was readily accepted. ln May 1969, Dr. Muller said that traEc between South Africa and its neighbours had never been so busy, and this traSc largely involved technical aid. Professor Horwood, principal of Natal University. had been appointed Snancial advisor to Chief Jonathan himself, and Dr. Anton Rupert, the South African industriahst, had been appointed honorary industrial advisor to the Lesotho Government. Dr. Rupert had also inaugurated a medical shuttle service from the Republic to aid the understaSed medical services of Lesotho. Chief Jonathan described this help as "evidence of the best kind of assistance which South Africans may... give to the less favoured and less experienced peoples in the new states of Southern Afric . . . I ndeed perhaps the most important aid we require is expert and honest assistance of the practical kind, as to how we may best help ourselves." South Africa also loaned Lesotho a chief justice (Mr. Justice Jacobs), and an Attorney~ n eral (Mr. Geldenhuys). In November 1967 the South African Wool Board gave Lesotho R169,000 over Sve years to assist with the breeding of stock, the management of their llocks, and the marketing of their wool, which is the country' s largest export. It included the establishment and extension of a merino stud and the sending of technical oScers from the Board to help train Lesotho's technical oScers. Similarly, Swaziland will bene6t from an agreement with the Republic under which South Africa wiH recruit, pay and equip

South Africans to work in Swaziland's local administration. What will be the ultimate outcome of this co-operation in Southern Africa 7 Mr. Vorster has said that his outward-looking policy is "not

a new policy; it is a continuation of the policy of my predecessors.It is constructed on the foundations laid down by my predecessors.'