Violent Resistance: From the Baltics to Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe 1944-1956 3506703048, 9783506703040

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Violent Resistance

Michael Gehler, David Schriffl (eds.)

Violent Resistance From the Baltics to Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe 1944–1956

Ferdinand Schöningh

Cover Illustration: Vladas Jurgaitis (alias Dagilis) (left) and Povilas Kauneckas (alias Kirvis), partisans of Žalioji Corps (/ Brigade). Vladas Jurgaitis, participant of the 1941 uprising, was arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned in Kaunas. Anti-soviet partisan since 1944; member of the headquarters of the Žalioji Corps. In 1948 arrested by the Soviets, sentenced for 25 years and deported to hard labour camps of Siberia. – The Museum of Occupation and Freedom Fights, Vilnius – photo PF2609. The identity of the second person is disputed. Some sources within the resistance movement claim it was Kazys Česnakas (alias Pavasaris). Cartography: Ivo Offenthaler, Maps: Relief: public domain (ESRI Hillshade [Sources: Esri, Airbus DS, USGS, NGA, NASA, CGIAR, N Robinson, NCEAS, NLS, OS, NMA, Geodatastyrelsen, Rijkswaterstaat, GSA, Geoland, FEMA, Intermap and the GIS user community]) | placenames: CC_BY_SA (OpenStreetMap user community) | waterbodies: public domain (Natural Earth) | forest cover: free use for research, education, and other non-profit use. (EC [EEA global land cover 2000])

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk sowie einzelne Teile desselben sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenen Fällen ist ohne vorherige schriftliche Zustimmung des Verlags nicht zulässig. © 2020 Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, ein Imprint der Brill-Gruppe (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Niederlande; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Deutschland) Internet: www.schoeningh.de Einbandgestaltung: Evelyn Ziegler, München Herstellung: Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn ISBN 978-3-506-70304-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-3-657-70304-3 (e-book)

Contents Foreword  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Overview of Maps included in the Volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1

Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 David Schriffl

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Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Today  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Keith D. Dickson

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The Armed Anti-Soviet Resistance in Estonia after 1944  . . . . . . . . . 28 Olaf Mertelsmann

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A History of the Lithuanian Partisan Underground State (1944–1953)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Vykintas Vaitkevičius

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Seeking a Path to Independence: Belarusian Anti-Soviet Activity from 1944–1953  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Aleksandra Pomiecko

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Armed Anti-Communist Resistance in Poland, 1944–1956  . . . . . . . 90 Rafał Wnuk

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Between Ideology and War Reality: Forming the Relations and Principles of Co-existence between the UPA and Red Army from Spring to Autumn 1944  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Olesia Isaiuk

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The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists as the Leader of a Unique Fascist Armed Resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Alexander Statiev

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The Volhynian Czechs against Communism: An Example of Anti-communist Resistance in Czechoslovakia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Adam Zítek

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Armed Anti-communist Resistance in Slovakia in the Postwar Years, 1948–1953. The Cases of Augustín Lednický and Ján Rešetko  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Beata Katrebova Blehova

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The Anti-communist Resistance in Czechoslovakia in a Pedagogical Perspective  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Karina Hoření/Vojtěch Ripka

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From Non-violent Resistance to Uprising by Force: The Case of Hungary 1945–1956  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Michael Gehler/Ibolya Murber

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The Armed Anti-communist Resistance in North-Western Romania. Causes, Evolution, Consequences, and the Role of Families and Local Communities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 Cosmin Budeancă

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Spectres of Fascism: Anti-communist Resistance and the Legacy of the Legion of the Archangel Michael in 1940s Romania  . . . . . . . 309 Roland Clark

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Women in the Armed Anti-communist Romanian Resistance, between Loyalty, Support and Betrayal. Case Studies: The Banat and Nucșoara Areas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 Ioana Ursu

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Communist Action, the Perception by the Serbian Urban Elite and Anti-communist Resistance in Serbia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Dejan N. Zec

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Tito’s Chetnik Hunters: The Dynamics of Asymmetric Warfare in Yugoslavia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 Stevan Bozanich

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The Goryani Movement against the Communist Regime in Bulgaria (1944–1956): Prerequisites, Resistance, Consequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 Valentin Voskresenski

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Armed Albanian Resistance to the Hoxha Regime in Albania 1948–1953  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426 Marenglen Kasmi Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446

Foreword In March 2017 the Institute for Modern and Contemporary Historical Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Arenberg Foundation organised a seminar on “Armed Resistance in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1956” at the Karl von Vogelsang Institute in Vienna. In my view this was the first time that so many researchers from so many countries of the former so called Eastern Bloc had lectured together on this subject. The conference provided the Republic of Austria with yet another opportunity to play its traditional role as a bridge. Thanks to the exemplary commitment of Professor Michael Gehler and Dr. David Schriffl we have now succeeded, after three years of hard work, in producing an anthology of almost all the contributions to the seminar. The result is a book with 471 printed pages and 16 maps. This publication documents the dramatic fate of the resistance movements in Eastern Europe. In the West, 1945 signified the end of a terrible global conflict, which caused at least sixty million deaths. In the East, 1945 signified the beginning of armed resistance against Soviet oppression, wherever such resistance was possible. In the Ukraine, the vast forests, the looting of Soviet weapons during the retreat of the Red Army in 1941 and the support of the Germans enabled Ukrainian nationalists to deploy immediately and continue their bloody struggle, which only came to an end with the arrest of the final partisans in 1960. Poland was home to the “cursed soldiers”, who continued their hopeless fight against Soviet supremacy into the 1960s. In the Baltic Countries and, in particular, Latvia, many Balts fought alongside the Germans and were integrated into such units as the Latvian Division of the Waffen SS. After the capitulation of the Courland Pocket on 8th May 1945, the nationalists refused to give up the fight and hid in the huge forests, where they waged a terrible and merciless partisan war with unbelievable courage to the bitter end, initially in larger units and then, from the 1950s, in smaller groups of five to ten men. August Sabbe, who was probably the final Estonian Forest Brother, died during an attempt by two KGB agents to arrest him on 27th September 1978.

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In Romania, the anti-communist partisans primarily holed themselves up in the Carpathians, where the final resistance fighter was reportedly only shot dead in 1976. In Bulgaria, the Goryani hid and fought in the Balkan and the Rhodope Mountains. The most important questions that we asked ourselves were the following: – How was it possible that so many Western Europeans had absolutely no idea of what was happening behind the Iron Curtain after the Second World War? – Was the Iron Curtain responsible for this lack of knowledge? – Or was it simply a lack of interest in our Central and Eastern European cousins or, worse still, in human fate? – How was it possible for these freedom fighters/terrorists/rebels/heroes to hold out for so long against Soviet superiority without help from the Free World? – How did the logistics work? – How and why did they get support from the civil population for this long and hopeless struggle? – And last but not least, what is the reason for the Arenberg Foundation’s interest in this tragic chapter in the history of Central and Eastern Europe? In the early 1990s I was travelling with an acquaintance in the City of Vilnius when we saw a large number of people in uniform standing in front of a building. Our curiosity had been awakened and we hurried inside. We established that the building, which had just been opened to the public, was a former KGB facility. To our astonishment we discovered lots of plastic bags containing torn up documents, a horrendous prison cell and a torture chamber with bloodspattered walls and many photographs. These photographs attested to the fate suffered by the ‘Forest Brethren’ who fell into the hands of the henchmen of the KGB. Until the late 1950s, the partisans were hunted like game, shot and tortured. On top of this, their corpses were sometimes mutilated and photographed with pride, like hunting trophies. At that moment I promised to myself that I would document the fate of these individuals and contribute to correcting the lack of knowledge in Western Europe about this episode. Almost thirty years later this wish has become reality thanks to the excellent cooperation with the Institute for Modern and Contemporary Historical Research in Vienna. In this respect I am extremely grateful to Dr. Schriffl, who has brought this splendid project to a successful conclusion.

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The Arenberg Foundation www.arenbergfoundation.eu is a completely independent foundation that stands for the promotion of history and culture, in a European spirit, in line with the maxim ‘they, who know nothing, must believe everything’. In my opinion there are many more projects that we could realise together in order to offer Western Central and Eastern Europeans the opportunity to become better informed about, and to better appreciate, their respective histories, and each other. Duke of Arenberg Pully, 20th February 2020

Overview of Maps included in the Volume

Chapter 1

Introduction David Schriffl The ends of wars tend often to make us think of them as clear watersheds: Defeated and victors; a new order imposed by the latter; and an end to the horrible violence every war brings with it. WWII was especially unprecedented in terms of the violence against civilians and the number of casualties across a truly global arena. Nevertheless, the signing of capitulations by the Wehrmacht, commemorations such as ‘V-days’ and ‘Victory in Europe’, or even the basic dates that are taught in school do not show the whole picture. In reality the ‘Great Wars’ are the culmination of large-scale conflicts that continue previous smaller conflicts and are followed again by more regional or local conflicts. What was true for WWI (the Russian civil war, the Polish-Soviet war, the Hungarian Civil War etc.) is even more apposite for WWII. The Cold War as an almost immediate (some even say parallel) subsequent conflict of WWII is the normal view. Nevertheless, a global perspective often lets us forget about the regional conflicts following major wars. After military successes over main foreign adversaries, the political will of the victors has to be enforced in the newlyconquered areas of influence. The advance of the Soviet Army in Central and Eastern Europe, after immense bloodshed, changed the tide of the war, following the fall of Stalingrad. It was clear that the heavy burden the Soviet Union had to shoulder in the allied war effort against the Wehrmacht would have to be paid for. The West more or less accepted, with few exceptions (including Austria), that the areas Stalin’s Army had occupied should fall under the broad sphere of influence of the Kremlin. That included the installation of the Soviet communist system. Even though the former Allies engaged themselves almost immediately in the global struggle so famously called the Cold War, it was soon clear that a direct military intervention in the newly won territories in Eastern Europe would not occur. The Stalinist years brought the incorporation of some former independent states into the Soviet Union proper and the remodelling of others into more or less reliable partners in the Soviet ‘satellite system’. Even though Western propaganda stirred up unrest with vague promises of an imminent collapse of the Soviet regime or a new war, the resistance within the limits of Soviet rule

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_002

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was basically on its own. The death of Stalin on March 5th 1953 and the subsequent period of thaw in international relations gave the Kremlin a friendlier face, but did not prevent it from crushing open rebellion by military means, as in Hungary in autumn 1956. It is astonishing how slowly the fact that the Soviet post-war order in Central, East and South-Eastern Europe after 1945 was met with heavy resistance – often in violent forms – entered public consciousness about post-war Europe. These events were ignored or neglected for decades by contemporary historical research. Many reasons led to this situation. Firstly, for decades the necessary sources of information about violent resistance behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ were missing.1 Furthermore, anti-Soviet resistance was seen by some as a kind of continued collaboration with the Soviet-Union’s former enemy, Germany. The mixture of anti-communist, patriotic, nationalistic and liberal motives for fighting the new Soviet power made it difficult to assess the nature of these movements. Furthermore, there were, of course, big differences between the various countries who lost their factual national sovereignty to the Kremlin: Some were annexed, some became satellites in the orbit of the red sun in Moscow. The fate of the Polish Home Army in Warsaw, when Stalin stopped his forces before the Vistula and let the Germans destroy the Polish non-communist military potential in 1944, was a clear sign that, after the war, only one power was acceptable for the Kremlin: its own forces, or those loyal to them. Only after the fall of Communism, in 1989/91, was more attention given to the conflicts that still existed after 1944, such as when the Soviet Army made a massive advance towards the West in May 1945. To a certain extent, there has almost been a continuum of violence in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe for the whole of the first half of the 20th century. For this book, we tried to gather case studies for every affected country, which we almost completely achieved. It comprises one or more article per country, starting from the very North in the Baltics to the South, ending with Albania. Not in every case it made sense to create a map for the respective article. Informations provided by the authors have been used to present them in a unified manner. These maps show the main centres of resistance or sites mentioned in the respective article. Furthermore, a short bibliography follows every article to enable the interested reader to dig deeper into the topic. Even 1  In reality, it was not as dense and insurmountable as supposed. See David Schriffl, Tote Grenze oder lebendige Nachbarschaft. Österreichisch-Slowakische Beziehungen 1945–1968 (= Zentraleuropastudien 17, Wien: Verlag der ÖAW, 2012).

1. Introduction

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though the conference was held in Vienna, the volume is printed in English to make sure that its contents can be received and adopted by as many international scholars as possible. This is especially essential since the arena for the plot is incredibly diverse in languages and cultures, even though the 20th century changed the population in many areas, more or less completely. Reflecting this diversity is a summary of every article in English and in the language of the respective country. It should be emphasized that a scholarly work like this volume is not only designed to reach the academic community but, ideally, should also have repercussions on the way that these extremely contested aspects of history are reflected and perceived in this broad belt of former Soviet power. The result of this work is clearly shown in the importance that national narratives in Eastern Europe now give to the anti-communist resistance as a focal point of self-identification. This role of the resistance makes it difficult for politics and public to allow a differentiated picture of these actions to emerge. Atrocities committed in the name of anti-Communist or Anti-Soviet resistance sometimes are exculpated, or at least ignored, since it is believed that their acceptance could damage the ‘heroic’ image of the fight for freedom or independence, or even endanger the perception of the respective nation as a whole. Of course, the Ukraine and Poland come to mind when considering these problematic aspects. Countries like the Czech Republic and others also have their disputes about the rightfulness of some actions that have been taken in the name of resistance. Besides that, many of the active fighters in the early post-war period were former members of units accepted or even created by the Germans in their war effort against Moscow. This burden is addressed in the articles. 1944 was the year when the front rolled over many who wanted to secure independence; firstly under German auspices and afterwards against Soviet repression. This volume tries to give an overview of the complex and diverse forms of violent resistance in Eastern Europe. Of course, it does not claim to show a comprehensive picture of all the events and processes taking place in these areas at the time. But it wants to provide insight into the topic as a whole and the actual research going on to link scholars and to inform a wider public. The Arenberg Foundation and the Institute for Modern and Contemporary Historical Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences tried to add some weight to this important area of research and organised a two-day conference in Vienna in March 2017. Scholars from Europe and North America gathered to assess the various conflicts and to find similarities and differences of the various efforts in the physical fight against Soviet domination of their respective

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countries. Their different backgrounds add to the differentiated view this book tries to develop. It is a part of the task of this book to also ask fundamental questions about the nature of violent resistance in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. To make them comparable, to a certain extent, we also wanted to look at military aspects. Guidelines for this comparison are the thoughts of Keith Dickson on asymmetric warfare. The possibilities of inferior groups to challenge an enemy with almost indefinite resources lead to certain forms and phases of conflict, which Dickson’s article defines and the authors of the case studies try to apply. One of the many important things touched by this chapter is legitimacy. Besides using the inherent strengths of a weaker opponent, it is always his goal to delegitimize the factual dominance or sheer presence of a foreign intruder or an ideology seen as the enemy. This corresponds to another central statement in this chapter on principles: that, ‘The meanings that the population attach to these events and activities become as potent (or more so) as the actions themselves.’ They are important at the time they are performed, and I would argue that, in many cases, they become even more important long after the asymmetric conflict is over. This is especially the case in those countries where the resistance became a vital part of self-definition in political or national terms. This works both ways: Resistance is used as a means of strengthening collective identities and constructing a certain narrative looking back in history, but, as Keith Dickson points out, the formation of a collective identity by sharing motives, beliefs or perceptions, for example, is also one of the prerequisites or phases of the emergence of violent or armed resistance. Looking at the big picture after the turbulent early years, the major part of the population accepted the situation and had to arrange itself within it. The end of decades of Communist domination in 1989 brought a new narrative and ‘a societal need to discover heroes during a period, when state and society were subdued by the USSR without much resistance’ as Olaf Mertelsmann puts it in his chapter on Estonia. Even though big differences in the anti-Soviet struggle exist, the Baltic countries share a few aspects regarding their history of anti-Soviet resistance. They had already fought wars of independence after World War I and became victims of the German-Soviet so-called ‘non-aggression pact’ which was an accord of 1939 against them, and its secret additional protocols lost them their independence formally in 1940. In Estonia the war of independence had already brought partisan warfare with it, and the state – similar to Lithuania – organised paramilitary forces. The question: whether forces who fought with the Germans against the Soviets and remained active after 1944/45 were

1. Introduction

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‘remnants of Nazi occupation’, is answered in this section on Estonia with a clear ‘no’. The so called ‘forest-brothers’ were a local reaction to local realities and Soviet measures. In this case it is interesting that, due to geographic reasons (low population density and natural obstacles like forests and swamps), a part of those hiding in the woods were able to switch between a legal and illegal existence. Participation and the death toll could vary wildly: from between a handful in Czechoslovakia to tens of thousands in Lithuania. In Estonia, four percent of the population were killed in the struggle. In the Czech Republic, there are even discussions as to whether the prominently displayed and celebrated Mašin-brothers can be glorified as ‘heroes’. Atrocities have been committed on both sides also against civilians and peasants. Beleaguered adherents often felt more robbed and plundered than freely supporting patriotic fighters. One main force keeping the participants in resistance-activities was the expectation of an imminent end of Soviet rule, brought either by a collapse of the still unstable post-war system on the outskirts of the Kremlin’s power or by an expected Third World War. Western media and especially radio programmes like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America stirred up those hopes for Western military assistance. Finally, with the uncontested crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, these hopes were shattered. Combined with rising living standards and more subtle forms of persecution, open rebellion lost its basis and ended. In some cases, purely the change in the composition of the population due to deportation and resettlement, as in Estonia, made the population more supportive overall and less resistant. In Lithuania the death toll between July 1944 and September 1953 reached 20,000 from a population of 2.9 million (in 1939). Here, also, a paramilitary service had been installed in the interwar period and here, also, forest-brothers hid and fought taking advantage of the geography of the country. In his article Vykintas Vaitkevičius presents a detailed insight into the leading figures of the underground state. These parallel institutions had complex ranks and display a highly organised structure, also comprised of many veterans of the Lithuanian army. Thus, the military and political structures imitate a statehood in hiding, with contacts to foreign powers. The planning was also designed for a Third World War, in which the underground would retake control. An insight into the fate of the main actors is given and we hear of the operations that caused the death of some of them in combat, and the trial and execution of the ‘president’ of the underground state in 1954 in Moscow. The Belarusian case specifically shows us the problems of a difficult archival situation but also, on the ground, the change from self-organised fighters or, at least, people in hiding to individuals closely working together with

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Western secret services. In the beginning the Belarusians – due to a less developed national self-conscious – also had to try to distinguish themselves from other national groups within the anti-Soviet struggle. The centre of decision changes here from the contested area – the battlefield in a broader sense – to the centres of political and military decision-making of the West. The US interest in Belarus was triggered by the possibility of connecting Lithuanian and Ukrainian resistance in the event of a larger conflict. Therefore, small-scale covert operations were undertaken, but stopped in the 1950s due also to a lack of émigrés ready to be parachuted into the Soviet Union. In the Polish case, the anti-communist resistance had quite different ‘ancestors’ than in many other countries. Its origin lay in the anti-German underground organisations. This was the reason, why in the early stages, when the Red Army entered Poland, there was a military cooperation between the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) as the military arm of the government in exile and the Soviet troops. Stalin famously betrayed the AK at Warsaw. Rafał Wnuk shows us the complex political divisions within the numerous Polish underground organisations around the end of the war that even led to violent clashes between those factions. The active units did not wage open war against the Soviet forces or the infrastructure, but limited themselves to self-defence, reducing the influence of the communist administration and eliminating agents of the security forces and communist activists in order to force the authorities to change their policies. A section wanted to target the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrajinska Powstanska Armija, UPA) by attacking Ukrainian civilians and Belarusians. In this case, the conflict of periphery against centre, of different national groups of resistance against the Kremlin and its local lieutenants changed into a fight over the shape of a future neither of the opponents was able to define. For a short time in 1945 and 1946 the underground controlled parts of the country and put the security forces on the defensive, illustrated by the fact that in Poland the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, NKVD) had more troops stationed there than in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. When the Soviets changed tactics from large operations to smaller permanent antipartisan groups they were able to hunt down most of them. After 1953, only a few were still hiding in the forests. Being a taboo subject during the communist years, the fate of the ‘cursed soldiers’ has been redirected against today’s Russia and is strongly used by post-communist and actual Polish politics to create a certain narrative. Perhaps even more than Poland, the Ukraine is very present in the political debate. Certain elements displayed in Alexander Statiev’s article are still present. For example: the conflict between the Ukraine and Moscow. Some

1. Introduction

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sections of Ukrainian politics that were militarily involved, nowadays talk of the UPA as the biggest anti-Soviet resistance organisation. The central figure of the movement, Stepan Bandera (even though imprisoned between 1941 and 1944), was awarded the title ‘Hero of the Ukraine’ in 2010. The use of history for other obvious purposes is therefore a topic in Ukraine, too. The article of Olesia Isaiuk presents us with a special phase from 1944, when the UPA first wanted to create some kind of coexistence with the Red Army, assuming a need for the Soviet Army to avoid asymmetric warfare with the UPA – like the Ukrainian nationalists – had to avoid open battles with the her. But, more importantly, the reason for this attempt at coexistence was the fact that many Red Army soldiers were Ukrainians and the UPA did not want to alienate fellow nationals. But the ‘inevitable war’ between the nationalists and the Soviet Army soon began with attacks on isolated Soviet units. Alexander Statiev defines the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) clearly as ‘fascists’ and describes its beginnings and political turns in detail: for example, the later alleged shift towards a democratic agenda. Like a limited cross-section of the Polish underground, the UPA fought a war on ethnical grounds. The mass killings of Poles, Jews and others are not hidden here, either. Counting the people taking part in this fight in some form or other (1944: 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters), he assumes that several hundred thousand people can be seen as the ‘greatest resistance challenge the Soviet regime ever met’. And even though they were that great in size, these activities were confined to the West of the Ukraine. But, in this case, one has to question if the main effort was, at the very least, to the same extent directed against other ethnicities as much as towards regaining of independence and the end of communist rule in the area. Adam Zítek’s case study, again, changes the point of view. Although, in most other cases, the parts of the population who opposed the new regime left or had to leave the country, the Volhynian Czechs did it the other way round. Having settled in the Russian Empire in the 19th century, they returned after the Second World War to different parts of Czechoslovakia as settlers, and brought with them stories of their grim experiences with the Soviet authorities. In Czechoslovakia they opposed the Communist Party and, from 1948 onwards, the Communist regime. Acts of disobedience were carried out against several government measures, such collectivisation. But, besides occasional brawls, open violence was not the method they used because the country was more oriented to the left and Moscow, even without any pressure from the Soviet Union, and even though weapons would have been at hand, according to Zitek. To have a contribution dealing especially with Slovakia is compelling, due to its history. It was embedded into the Czechoslovak Republic again in 1945

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but formed a sovereign state during the second World War, and the political landscape and motives have to be looked at distinctively. Beata Blehova writes about the resistance there that it also had a nationalistic tone, but like the Czech part of the country this did not result in numerous violent actions (even though such plans were made) but mostly in propaganda activities and contact with Western secret services via the nearby border with Austria. Besides that, Slovakia in 1947 was also the arena of large scale military and police action against members of the UPA, who wanted to reach the West via Austria.2 The history of violent or armed resistance is contested in the countries were it occurred. This is also the case in the Czech Republic. Karina Hoření and Vojtěch Ripka describe how they use different cases of resistance to work through Czech history and provide alternatives to dichotomic views of the past. They describe two of them: a demonstration in Dobruška; and the group around the Mašin brothers – the latter being the most contested example, where questions are raised as to whether they were heroes or murderers, killing three employees during raids on police stations and post offices to gather weapons. Later the group fled to the West, but was partly arrested and executed. The Czech(oslovak) history labelled the anti-Communist resistance as the ‘third resistance’ after the earlier ones against Habsburg Austrian rule and Nazi-German occupation. This denomination is quite absurd, comparing two totalitarian systems with a legal state securing civil rights, but as the authors correctly point out: ‘The name itself creates a story of Czech history’. Michael Gehler and Ibolya Murber’s piece on Hungary sets out a detailed periodization between 1945 and 1956. These years have not been chosen merely by coincidence to define the era this volume deals with. The last hopes for a Western intervention in the Soviet bloc, to make those countless dreams of freedom and independence come true, disappeared at last with the end of the Hungarian attempt to leave the bloc. The authors argue that a lack of tradition in using violence as a political means prevented the Hungarians from violently fighting the regime until 1956. But, before this, unrest was visible. Losing the soccer world championship to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 led to three days of riots in Budapest. De-Stalinization made the system unstable and, in October 1956, the Hungarian rebellion began; also incited by Western radio propaganda. Up to 3,000 people died, and many fled, via the Austrian border, to the West. In contrast, in Romania, many small independent groups hid and fought in the mountains and forests prominently in the North West of Romania between 1944 and 1962, as Cosmin Budeancă illustrates. The militia or the all-too-famous 2  Schriffl, Tote Grenze oder lebendige Nachbarschaft, S. 254-257.

1. Introduction

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Securitate were created to fight those opposing the regime. Even though exact figures are hard to obtain, the number of fighters seem to count in hundreds, the supporters in thousands. This much smaller number of combatants shows the diversity of forms and the amount of violent resistance in the area. Four groups are displayed here as examples. Even though small in numbers the Romanian groups survived for a comparably long time, often relying on family or local bonds, some until the early 1960s. Due to their small numbers, they were mainly on the defensive, fighting for survival rather than openly fighting the authorities. Here, as well, a hope for a large-scale war between East and West was their often motivation to carry on. The second contribution on Romania, by Roland Clark, focuses on the effect that the legacy of the fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael had on the anti-communist resistance in providing an ideological base and attracting opponents of Communism. In Romania, many of those who later fought against the Soviets initially fled to the forests, fearing they could be arrested for their political alignments or their fascist past. Ioana Ursu closes the Romanian section with a very important, and yet too often neglected, part of the story: the roles of women in the anti-communist resistance, concluding that these mostly meant suffering. The next two chapters bring us to former Yugoslavia, where Dejan Zec concentrates on a special social strata: the Serbian urban elite and its perceptions of communist measures against their adversaries. Here also, 1944 marked the year when Communists – in this case Tito’s partisans – took over effective power. The main resistance force: Serbian nationalist Draza Mihailovic’s royalist Czetniks, fought for survival in the mountains at this point, and their leader himself was caught and executed in 1946 after he lost support from Britain, which allied itself to the victorious Tito-partisans. Remnants of those forces existed until 1956. Stevan Bozanich goes deeper into the military fight and the means by which they hunted down the last Chetnici. OZNa, UDBa and KNOJ were those who killed tens of thousands of real or alleged adversaries of the state. But those forces also fought with fascist fighters operating partly out of Austria; who was neither allowed nor able to control her borders effectively. Ustasha forces wanted to infiltrate Yugoslavia in 1947/48 to overthrow the government. The security forces knew the plans from their radio transmissions, lured about 100 men over the border and killed them.3 Yugoslavia saw a 3  On the other side of the border reports from that very time show another tactic of the Yugoslav security forces. They sometimes tricked anti-Communist fighters over the border and, after killing them, they buried them directly on the borderline in the woods, as a warning for others.

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­mixture of anti-Communist or anti-governmental resistance. Shortly after the war there were Croat Ustasha as well as Mihailovics Chetniks. But, after the split between Tito and Stalin in 1948, the security forces also monitored anyone regarded as sympathizers of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria changed sides in the Second World war in September 1944 and soon a Communist government was in power, backed by Moscow. In the armed resistance against the regime about 3,000 so-called ‘goryani’ – forest people – and over 10,000 helpers took part in the struggle in the years 1944 to 1956, as Valentin Voskresenski explains. A certain amount of central organisation and territorial organisation can be inferred here, with their own command structures. Also the support by civilians was secured by establishing small, specialised organizations in villages in the areas of operations. The groups’ numbers consisted of a few, up to about seventy fighters. But the state, in form of the security forces, gained an upper hand by means of the forced resettlements of family members of underground groups. The resistance was liquidated by the end of the 1950s. In Albania, the process had two phases, as Marenglen Kasmi depicts. In an early phase, beginning in 1945, the first armed resistance against a Communist takeover took place, especially in the North and North East of the country. These activities were brought to an end by the security forces in 1946 and 1947. Interestingly, between 1949 and 1954, US and British secret services trained Albanians outside the country and parachuted them back in to form paramilitary forces to overthrow the government. But all these efforts remained unsuccessful and received little to no help from the population. The high quality of the scholars assembled here is borne out by the fact that they have published important and widely accepted works on their respective topics, and their work in this volume has benefitted from these connections between cases and countries, as one easily can trace in the footnotes and bibliographies. The forms and backgrounds of violent resistance in Eastern Europe were extremely diverse. Not even the common enemy was able to provoke or produce any effective coordination. Every country, every society fought its own battles. However, bloody battles were fought between some of them and atrocities against civilians were committed. The volume displays aspects of these similarities and differences to promote a wider understanding about these processes and actions, to encourage further research, and to maybe learn lessons for the future.

Chapter 2

Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Today Keith D. Dickson Introduction As we examine resistance movements in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, it is important to understand that there is a lack of clarity on what constitutes a resistance movement. Within a number of countries in Eastern Europe, resistance movements are characterized in two ways: as courageous actions of individuals and groups fighting for freedom from Communist oppression, or as inconsequential acts of criminals and hooligans. Those who support the former seek to recognize these heroes as part of national identity; those who support the latter want to minimize the memory of these activities and those who participated in them. Resistance movements require some definition. I will use a contemporary source from the 1950s to offer some clarity. The Central Intelligence Agency provided three categories to describe resistance movements, specifically as they related to the Warsaw Pact states. Resistance was defined as ‘dissidence translated into action’ Organized resistance was ‘carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose,’ and had a common leadership and communications structure. Unorganized resistance tended to form spontaneously, either through individuals or loosely organized groups with ‘limited objectives, without an overall plan or strategy.’ Active resistance included violent or nonviolent acts directed against the government from intelligence collection and sabotage, to open defiance and guerrilla operations. Passive resistance involved the ‘deliberate nonperformance or malperformance’ of individual daily duties, or ‘deliberate nonconformity’ with the standards of conduct expected by the regime.1 Taking these definitions into consideration, for the U.S. intelligence community it is clear that perceptions of what constituted resistance and how it manifested itself were quite broad. Limited information on events and 1  Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate 10-58: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 4 March 1958, 2.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_003

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activities within Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe were often hard to analyze to provide a clear demarcation of whether the event or activity even constituted resistance, or what category of resistance it represented. So, just as intelligence professionals approached the concept of resistance movements with caution, so should we. Carefully judging what constitutes resistance, examining the unique dynamics that sustain a movement, and identifying trends and activities over time will validate the assessment and allow a clearer picture to emerge. This chapter offers an approach for understanding these three factors of a resistance movement under the rubric of what I call asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare is considered a subset of social conflict involving value commitments (related to prescriptive norms and beliefs) related to a change in relative power between actors or groups based on the mobilization of a collective identity. I also define warfare in its broadest sense, as a contest, armed or otherwise, for political purposes to restructure political, economic, and social environments, while also shaping individual and collective actions.2

Understanding the Nature of Resistance: Asymmetries and Asymmetric Warfare

At its heart, resistance is based on asymmetry. Asymmetry in its most basic form relates to variances, dissimilarities, or inequalities between adversaries. Asymmetry is often understood as a condition in which one actor is significantly stronger than another. Put another way, asymmetry is ‘the absence of a common basis of comparison’ between a dominant and weaker actor’s capabilities, interests, and commitment.3 These dichotomies between actors that resist comparison can lead to the weaker actor initiating asymmetric warfare against the dominant actor, an operational method employed by a weaker actor to engage in a level of resistance intended to prevent a dominant actor from gaining its goals by increasing the level of cost for the dominant actor to an unacceptable level, leading 2  Stathis N. Kalyvas, Warfare in Civil Wars, in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 88-91, passim. 3  David L. Buffaloe, Defining Asymmetric Warfare (= The Land Warfare Papers 58, Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2006), 3. Buffaloe reviews the difficulty the U.S. military had in applying the term and concludes that ‘due to a lack of concrete understanding, the term became meaningless.’ Quote from General Montgomery Meigs, page 11. Patricia L. Sullivan, War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars, in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, June (2007) 3, 509.

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to equilibrium, where the dominant actor accepts a far more limited outcome that conforms to the weaker actor’s interests. In the conduct of asymmetric warfare, the weaker actor seeks to gain freedom of action by acting, organizing, and operating differently; by varying techniques, methods, and approaches in order to negate the strengths of the more powerful opponent. As the weaker actor seeks to evade or undermine those strengths, it simultaneously seeks to maximize its own relative strengths to take advantage of the opponent’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities.4 Asymmetries between actors exist in many forms, all of which are a means to an end and play an important role in shaping the course of asymmetric warfare. These categories of asymmetries include asymmetries of power, asymmetries of interests at stake, asymmetries of ideals and culture, asymmetries of organization, and asymmetries of will related to commitment, resolve, and timescale. In every case the weaker actor seeks to exploit the stronger actor’s capabilities in these categories. The weaker actor seeks to apply its own asymmetric advantages in sequence or in combination to counter the stronger actor’s ability and will to achieve its goals. To survive the weaker actor must have an understanding of the dominant actor’s capabilities, motivations, and means in order to take advantage of the various asymmetries that are being pitted against each other. Identifying the asymmetries that exist between the actors is critically important in determining both offensive and defensive approaches. An important aspect of asymmetric warfare is the degree to which each actor values the issues at stake in the conflict, especially in determining each side’s cost tolerance attached to those values.5 Surprise is one of the manifestations of successful asymmetric action against a stronger opponent. If the dominant actor overestimates its own strengths and minimizes or ignores the inherent strengths of a weaker actor, the weaker actor can display a dramatic capability in its ability to resist. This often takes the form of group mobilizations, which is organized and supported through existing institutions, networks of individuals, or through formal and informal social structures. This type of mobilization and collective action can be of a short or a long duration and can take on a number of violent or non-violent

4  Raymond W. Mack/Richard C. Snyder, The Analysis of Social Conflict – Toward an Overview and Synthesis, in: Conflict Resolution 1, June (1957) 2, 217-220, passim. Josef Schroefl/ Stuart J. Kaufman, Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War, in: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37 (2014) 10, 865. 5  J.G. Eaton, The Beauty of Asymmetry: An Examination of the Context and Practice of Asymmetric and Unconventional Warfare From a Western/Centrist Perspective, in: Defence Studies 2, Spring (2002) 1, 53, 67.

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forms, emerging sequentially or simultaneously, with both psychological and physical dimensions.6 In asymmetric warfare, the weaker actor leverages organization, will, and collective identity against a stronger opponent using a combination of violent and non-violent approaches to exploit favorable circumstances. These circumstances arise when the weaker actor takes actions that the dominant actor least expects, employing surprise, and presenting additional complications in such a way that an opponent’s will to continue the conflict is continuously worn down over time. Asymmetric warfare can unfold in varying degrees and at varying times as part popular movement, part paramilitary activity, and part political action, in which the weaker actor seeks to establish its effectiveness against the stronger opponent and gain freedom of action to seize and maintain the initiative. Asymmetric warfare is characterized by mutually opposed actions and counteractions employed in an attempt to acquire or exercise power. For each requirement that is necessary for the stronger actor to exercise power, the weaker opponent employs an asymmetric approach to negate or frustrate that requirement. For example, the stronger actor must establish legitimacy in its exercise of power; the asymmetric opponent seeks to decay that legitimacy over time, through continuous pressure and dynamic actions to disrupt the administrative structure and demonstrate the stronger actor’s incompetence or inability to hold or exercise power. The stronger actor seeks to minimize the asymmetric opponent’s freedom of action; the asymmetric opponent demonstrates the inability of the stronger actor to impose its will, while achieving popular recognition and influence. The stronger actor attempts to establish a position of strength; the asymmetric opponent avoids these strengths and uses surprise to exploit weaknesses. The stronger actor seeks to solidify popular support; the asymmetric opponent seeks to negate the stronger actor’s ability to provide security to the population.7 The purpose of asymmetric warfare is to deter, dissuade, discourage, or defeat the efforts of the dominant actor in order to deny the opponent from achieving its goals. The methods employed are often unorthodox and unexpected and are focused on the stronger opponent’s weaknesses to exploit them, and thereby gain an advantage by raising the risk and cost of the conflict and imposing a disproportionate effect on the stronger opponent’s morale and 6  Michael G. Findley/Scott Edwards, Accounting for the Unaccounted: Weak-Actor Structure in Asymmetric Wars, in: International Studies Quarterly 51, September (2007) 3, 583-584. 7  Clinton J. Ancker/Michael D. Burke, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, Military Review 83, July-August (2003) 4, 18.

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will, forcing the opponent to function in an unfavorable environment where the stronger adversary’s advantages become liabilities. This environment exists when the stronger adversary loses the initiative and expends more and more resources in self-protection as both the security situation deteriorates and the dominant actor’s political will and cohesion drain away. This leads the dominant actor to face a decision either to accept a much more limited goal than originally planned, or abandon the original goals altogether. Asymmetric warfare’s beginnings arise organically within groups of weaker actors when confronted with common threats and fears, based on value systems, mindsets, and perceptions, as well as commonly held ideas and patterns of behavior that relate to collective identity. The circumstances and conditions created by the dominant actor generate grievances and hostility at every level and shape the nature of the weaker actor’s asymmetric approach, intended to create a level of confusion, surprise, and uncertainty for the dominant actor. Initial resistance is often informal, ambiguous, and fluid as groups seek a position to gain an advantage. Participants can include criminals and outlaws, identity driven or ideologically motivated social groups, overt and covert organizations, instrumentalist leaders, as well as legitimate businesses, families, and church leaders. The pulsations of violence that result vary in intensity; are multiple and complex, and interflow with state, local, and national political contests, presenting multiple challenges to the dominant actor that defy definition. Although there is no coherent plan or central direction, the violence will be most often concentrated in areas where political actors are most vulnerable. The violence takes two forms: in its demonstrative form, violence is employed to demonstrate will and capability and to gain support and increase the level of mobilization within the collective identity; in its terroristic form it is employed to deter or prevent political actors from supporting the enemy.8 This is warfare of action, employing tactics that are both violent and non-violent applied within a strategic logic and employing symbol, propaganda, and ideas, all sustained by collective identity that involves a ruthless determination to gain a level of control and influence at the expense of the stronger opponent, usually through marginalization and intimidation of supporters and key political actors. If the weaker actor gains the advantage in this contest of wills, the stronger opponent will have difficulty using its superior capabilities to any strategic advantage and the will of the government and its security forces to continue the fight will drain away. The result is that the existing political structure in 8  Kalyvas, Warfare in Civil Wars, 96.

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the eyes of the population is de-legitimized, opening the way for some form of compromise and equilibrium to exist that will bring about a new political order favourable to the weaker actor. Asymmetric warfare depends on a long-term view. By its nature, asymmetric warfare cannot achieve outright victory. Unlike traditional war, asymmetric warfare is about means over ends. Ironically, the weaker actor can never attain its ends without the consent of the more powerful adversary. This disparity between means and ends is what allows the weaker actor to employ asymmetric warfare as the means to wear down the stronger opponent until some level of mutual consent can be achieved. The goal of asymmetric warfare is to create conditions for negotiation to establish a favorable mutual outcome based on achieving a political equilibrium.

The Four Phases of Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare has four distinct phases shaped by mobilization of groups through a collective identity, competing group priorities, the level of public involvement and interest, and leadership. These phases represent an evolutionary response and adaptation to existing conditions and the actions and counteractions taken to gain and maintain an advantage in order to exploit the circumstances that emerge in the contest between the weaker and dominant actor. Both timing and time itself are critical factors, influenced by the often shifting conditions that shape the political, social, economic, and psychological environment of the conflict. Phase I is Sources and Preconditions for Asymmetric Warfare. This phase emerges from an imbalance or ambiguity of power relations and the incompatibility of social-political goals between the dominant actor and the weaker actor. A new power relationship often is the trigger, as it establishes the comparative strength of the actors. When one actor is placed at a distinct disadvantage to the other, and the more powerful actor threatens to cripple or eliminate the other actor’s ability to influence events, the relative weaknesses that are established as a result of this new relationship prevent the weaker actor from having a vested interest in maintaining a stable transition or accepting the new status quo. This reaction to the imbalance generally begins with non-violent conflict, such as political agitation or public protest; if conditions of imbalance persist, an active resistance emerges, often employing armed violence. The conditions of asymmetric warfare emerge as the weaker actor demonstrates a high level of interest and resolve to initiate and sustain action, while maintaining a low vulnerability to efforts at suppression by the dominant actor.

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Phase II is Identity-based Classification, Distinction, and Mobilization. This phase marks collective identity formation or manifestation, fostered by interests in reasserting or regaining power. Collective identity is mobilized and demonstrated through commonalities of shared motives, needs, values, attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions. Collective identity gives individuals a sense of place, purpose, and direction and a measure of psychological security. This security is integral to the construction and maintenance of identity. Collective identities are manifest in many ways, through symbols, language, values, history, and a set of cognitive beliefs, understandings, and norms.9 Attachments and commitments are made through a narrative – that collects ideas, representations, and emotions into a mental image that serves to explain the group’s past and present, as well as the status and condition of the group as a means of collective identification. These narratives are central to collective identity.10 When identities are linked to a political purpose, they become fixed and formidable. When this happens, individuals will subsume their own identities within the collective identity and see a threat to the group as a personal threat. Linked by personal and social relationships with other members of the group, strong bonds are formed. When social and political conditions force individuals to choose one identity over another, they will react to protect and secure their threatened identity, often reacting violently in pursuit of collective interests or defense of values.11 Individuals mobilize identity within specific political, economic, or social contexts by supporting or creating organizations, ‘channeled through existing state and social structures, processes, and institutions.’12 Once mobilized in protection of that identity, the group will view itself as distinct, separate, and unique, coalescing around what defines the collective identity, while also identifying the characteristics and markers of difference of those who do not share that identity. This is the out-group, considered the threat to the survival of collective identity. Once the structures and process are in place for mobilizing identity, the group seeks to gain the psychological initiative, supporting their 9  Thomas C. Davis, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity, in: Political Psychology 20, March (1999) 1, 25-26, 31. 10  Kay Deaux/Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality, in: Psychological Bulletin 130, (2004) 1, 82-83, 96. 11  Errol A. Henderson, Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989, in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, October (1997) 5, 657. 12  Kenneth D. Bush/E. Fuat Keyman, Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World Global Governance 3, September-December (1997) 3, 317, 312-315, 318-319, 325-326.

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cause under any circumstances to present an image of strength and credible power. At this point, collective identity is consolidated, the polarization between groups heightens, and conflict becomes inevitable.13 Thus, in asymmetric warfare security and identity merge in reaction to real or perceived threats and involves mobilized actors of distinct identities pursuing interests through violent confrontation. It is this mobilization that contributes to asymmetry of wills and interest and gives the weaker actor a distinct advantage.14 Once mobilized, the weaker actor seeks to gain some level of advantage over the dominant group to demonstrate its effectiveness and begins to take action, in both violent and non-violent modes. In Phase II, distinct identities and interests are manifested in terms of three actor subsets: the participants (those engaging in non-violent activity, grouped around a collective identity in which friends and enemies are clearly delineated); perpetrators (those engaged in violent activity as part of an organized group or as individuals who usually, but not always, share the same collective identity as the participants); and targets (those identified as the out-group, based on specific attributes such as race, political identity, or regional affiliation).15 In Phase II, with group identity fully mobilized, a threshold occurs as more individuals are willing to take action on behalf of the group in the belief that they can make a difference through their participation. In this phase of asymmetric warfare, violence is the operational instrument that entails the threat of, or actual use of, physical force to protest, resist, influence, or change the environment that favors the dominant actor. Because this rising tide of violence is unpredictable and is both social and asocial, it reflects an unorthodox approach essential to asymmetric warfare as it has numerous modes, representing a number of independent and collective actors, whose purposes and intents are layered and distributed and create a sense of ­disorder.16 Freelance violence with political overtones usually emerges. Local violence serves higher 13  Christine Flesher Fominaya, Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates, Sociology Compass 4, (2010) 6, 394-395, 397-398. 14  Kalyvas, The Ontology of Political Violence: Actions and Identities in Civil Wars, in: Perspectives on Politics 1, September (2003) 3, 475, 479, 486-487. 15  Ibd., 480. 16  S.J. Ball-Rokeach, Normative and Deviant Violence from a Conflict Perspective, in: Social Problems 28, October (1980) 1, 47. Ball-Rokeach defines the two terms: ‘Violence from ‘normal’ social and personal processes may be called social violence to distinguish it from ‘asocial’ violence caused by ‘abnormal’ or deficit states.’ In the voluminous testimonies given regarding violence in the Southern states during Reconstruction, these terms work well to ascribe accounts of whippings and beatings as examples of social violence and murder, rape, and assassination as examples of asocial violence. The perpetrators of

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political ends, whether or not the violence is actually related to those political ends. The growing level of violence, though not centrally controlled, demonstrates the inability of the government to take effective counteraction and thus encourage more members of the mobilized collective identity to cross the threshold from passive to active support. In general, violence tends to decline when the weaker actor has gained a level of initiative that allows political action to become the dominant mode of influencing the environment. The efforts of the weaker actor are intended to create uncertainty to a point where the security forces and judicial authorities of the dominant actor are neutralized by an environment of instability, confusion, fear, and psycho-­ social tensions related to election cycles or particular events that are political in nature. The meanings that the population attach to these events and activities become as potent (or more so) as the actions themselves. Also, political groups can ally with local actors to guide or direct violence to intimidate, neutralize, or eliminate political opponents or sympathizers. The community level is the decisive battlefield at this stage. Local actions create a blend of stability and instability and are largely disaggregated and decentralized from the higher political level. Phase III is the Dislocation of the Dominant Actor. This phase is characterized by psychological dominance over the dominant actor and political freedom of action through the demonstration of highly organized paramilitary capabilities in support of political activities. In this phase, local actions become largely centralized and aggregated at the higher political level. Leaders emerge to challenge the dominant actor for power as the dominant actor reconciles to the now unattainable political-social goals it originally pursued and accepts the attainment of lesser goals. Violence can still exist, in the form of bulldozer tactics, but at this stage it is the threat of violence directed at targets that has a more important effect, neutralizing and demoralizing opposition and demonstrating to all observers that the dominant actor has no capability to resist. The shifting the power relationship from asymmetric to equilibrium begins, as modes of resolution emerge along with new norms that recognize the new status of the weaker actor. Phase IV is Equilibrium and Reconciliation. The conflict ends with the establishment of a political equilibrium – a consensual framework satisfactory to both sides. An acceptable political alternative is established once the formerly dominant group recognizes that it lacks the will and means to achieve its violence in Phase II of asymmetric warfare in the South may not have perceived a distinction, depending on their particular perception of the utility of the violence.

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original goals. The factors that initiated asymmetric warfare are resolved and the new political and social environment is characterized by functional and stable relations within a desired range of change acceptable to both actors that leads to reconciliation and the path to peaceful relations.17

The Difference Between Asymmetric Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare, and Insurgency

The preceding outline indicates that asymmetric warfare is not guerrilla warfare, insurgency, or terrorism, although it is often a common practice to use these terms synonymously with asymmetric warfare. Guerrilla warfare and insurgency share the same technique of using armed force in a protracted struggle to overthrow the state and replace it with a completely new political order. In an insurgency and in guerrilla warfare, the focus of effort is armed resistance, where military actions are subordinate to strategic political objectives. Guerrillas operate in small formations organized along military lines and use unconventional tactics to attack the lines of supply and communication of conventional military forces to render those forces unable to prevent the final overthrow of the state. Insurgents target security forces and use subversion and violence to challenge political control as they seek to gain popular support to destabilize or overthrow a government. The focus of both groups is on the military defeat of an enemy’s conventional force by avoiding direct battle whenever possible by employing hit-and-run tactics while seeking to gain support of the population and turn them to their cause. Although guerrillas and insurgents may use terrorism as a method, they themselves are not terrorists. This study’s approach to asymmetric warfare differs from the separate categories of guerrilla warfare and insurgency in that the goals and actions of asymmetric warfare are significantly different in purpose, nature, and scope from the goals and actions of guerrillas or insurgents. Asymmetric warfare differs from guerilla warfare and insurgency in that the sources of mobilization are tied to issues of identity. Conventional military forces are not the target in asymmetric warfare and, unlike guerrilla warfare and insurgency, the overthrow of the state through military victory is not the objective. Asymmetric warfare is multi-levelled, and functions effectively at the local level, where secret societies, bandits, and paramilitary organizations can proliferate. In asymmetric warfare there is little need to propagandize and win the hearts and 17  Kalyvas, The Ontology of Political Violence, 230-232, 234, 242, 244. C.R. Mitchell, Evaluating Conflict, in: Journal of Peace Research 17 (1980) 1, 65.

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minds of the population, because a significant part of the population already is either actively or passively engaged. All are mobilized and sustained to one degree or another through a collective identity that provides the asymmetries of will and time that are essential to a successful outcome. Asymmetric warfare is not terrorism, although terrorism is used both as a means of propaganda and as a symbolic attack on the state. Terrorists, however, do not seek the support of the people or change the government; instead terrorists seek the people’s acceptance of their agenda.18 Unlike terrorism, the violence in asymmetric warfare is decentralized, often focused at the individual, group, or even regional level, and the intended outcomes of this violence are intangible and often difficult to identify, but the violence does serve its intended effect of demonstrating the power of the weaker actor to counter the dominant actor’s strengths and impose increasingly higher costs to wear down the dominant actor’s resolve and will. In turn, the effective employment of violence advances the weaker actor’s sense of purpose and belonging, and strengthens the collective identity to continue the resistance.19 Asymmetric warfare can be considered an intermediate state between war and what came to be considered peace. In asymmetric warfare, there is a battle for a critical threshold of support. Whoever wins this battle, dominates the psychological and political landscape. The weaker actor attempts to overcome the dominant actor’s advantage of popular support by delegitimizing the government and dissuading or deterring the stronger actor’s supporters from sustaining their interest and willingness to continue their support. This is accomplished in any number of ways: threats and intimidation, assassination, highly visible attacks on prominent leaders, attacks on symbols of power, and even random violence to spread fear and insecurity, all supported by an information campaign that seeks to supersede the dominant actor’s image of order, control, and legitimacy. The weaker actor in asymmetric warfare seeks to attain its goals to prevent the dominant actor from being able to muster its power effectively and forcing 18  Ekaterina Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research report no. 23 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 12-13, 25. The violence employed in asymmetric warfare is not terrorism – ‘a performance that involves the use or threat to use violence against civilians, but which is staged specifically for someone else to watch’ (page 13). Although layered violence in asymmetric warfare certainly can involve terrorist tactics, ‘the fact that a group uses terrorist means in the name of a political goal does not necessarily delegitimize the goal itself’ (page 12). In the 19th century, terrorist means were used by radical left-wing ideologies, and strictly speaking, violence in the South during the Reconstruction period would not have been considered terrorism. 19  Mitchell, Evaluating Conflict, 66.

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the dominant actor to seek a compromise that allows a political equilibrium to arise, that, in turn, leads to reconciliation and peace.

Resistance Movements in Europe within the Context of Asymmetric Warfare

Using this outline of asymmetric warfare as a model, we can examine resistance movements in Eastern Europe in the early period of the Cold War. Guerrilla movements and insurgent groups did exist. In the Baltic States armed groups known as the Forest Brotherhood fought NKVD forces between 1945 and 1947. From 1946 to 1947, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – about 7,000 insurgents led by Stepan Bandera – held out against Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak forces in the Carpathian Mountains until finally overwhelmed by two divisions of Soviet security troops backed by tanks. In Poland and Romania as well, armed groups operated against the Communist state and the Soviets, requiring a counterinsurgency campaign. As I have defined these resistance movements as residing outside of my definition of asymmetric warfare, we can use this model to examine the more ambiguous examples of resistance and examine them as components of asymmetric warfare. What we can readily see is that Phase I conditions for asymmetric warfare existed in every state under Soviet domination between 1944 and 1956. The Communist takeover of the state and the forms of the institutional repression touched every part of that state’s economic, political, religious, economic, and intellectual life. In Romania, for example, refusal to join agricultural cooperatives, resisting confiscation of farmland, animals, or equipment, evading compulsory quotas or refusing to cooperate with authorities was common in rural areas. Open confrontations with security forces, printing and distributing antiCommunist and anti-Soviet handbills, and vandalism, were also widespread.20 In general, other countries, like Poland, already had a long-standing nationalist antipathy to the Russians and their Polish Communist agents. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany shared a similar assortment of resentments against collectivization, labor discipline and production quotas, ideological conformity, and hostility to religion imposed by the Soviet-sponsored regimes. Ethnic, regional and religious nationalism was a significant factor in binding people together in ways that were hard for the regimes to discern. A certain level of asymmetry existed as the new regimes were not completely 20  Monica Ciobanu, Reconstructing the History of Early Communism and Armed Resistance in Romania, in: Europe-Asia Studies 66, November (2014) 9, 1460.

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secure or stable. With only a small Communist cadre controlling the state, many regimes felt vulnerable and feared large-scale uprisings. Some areas, especially in the remote countryside, or those areas closest to the border with the West, were not completely under government control. This asymmetry of will and consolidation of identity revealed itself in Phase I Phase II activities of asymmetric warfare in Plzen, Czechoslovakia, with strikes and demonstrations calling for government change and freedom at the beginning of June 1953, and was followed less than two weeks later in East Germany with widespread strikes and demands for reform and eradication of the Communist leadership. One of the more interesting factors in moving groups from Phase I to Phase II of asymmetric warfare was radio’s status as an essential tool of mobilization. International broadcasting, especially radio stations such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio France had become an active participant in the political and cultural life of millions of Europeans behind the Iron Curtain as they eagerly absorbed the news and information brought to them that countered state media messaging.21 People developed a sense that popular uprisings would bring the U.S. to their aid and assistance. In Plzen, Czechoslovakia, southwest of Prague, was a region that had marginal support for the Communists. The local leaders were fearful of losing control. In June, what began as a worker protest against a currency exchange program that would devastate the working-class and pensioners, rapidly escalated into large-scale open resistance. It was described as ‘one of the most spectacular acts of working-class protest during the early socialist years.’22 Rioters, most of them young men, surged through the streets and attacked the city hall. The Communist leadership was paralyzed. Protestors called for free elections and a new government. ‘Long Live Free Europe,’ they chanted.23 As a spontaneous effort to consolidate a collective identity, people began to gather at the ‘Beneš Cross’, which had been donated by President Edvard Beneš in memory of American soldiers who died liberating western Bohemia from the Nazis. A wreath had been placed at the cross in a demonstration of a strong connection to the U.S. and freedom. The crowd was dispersed by military forces and a number of people were arrested.24

21  Ibd., 1466; Alban Webb, Cold War Radio and the Hungarian Uprising, 1956, in: Cold War History 13 (2013) 2, 222, 234. 22  Kevin McDermott, Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia: The Plzen Uprising, June 1953, in: Contemporary European History, 19 (2010) 4, 287. 23  Radio Free Europe Report on the Strikes in Plzen during Early June 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Radio Free Europe Records, September 8, 1953. 24  McDermott, Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia, 292.

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In East Berlin about 5,000 workers began demonstrating at about noon on 16th June and by the next day the demonstrations had spread throughout the major cities of East Germany. In Berlin on 17th June, over 17,000 demonstrators became violent and by evening an estimated 100,000 people were involved. Officers in the Soviet general staff in Berlin reported to Moscow that they were witnessing ‘a major planned uprising covering the whole territory of the German Democratic Republic and aimed at making a coup d’etat and simultaneously replacing the government in the German Democratic Republic.’25 The Soviet leadership responded quickly and decisively. Martial law was declared and elements of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment cleared the Berlin streets with tanks and armored personnel carriers, backed by East German troops. Both the Soviet and East German press declared that ‘agents of foreign powers, fascists and other reactionary elements’ had started the demonstrations.26 In the two examples cited, the weaker actor could draw on asymmetries of ideals and culture, asymmetries of organization, and asymmetries of will. Phase I revealed itself in public demonstrations over unpopular policies that moved to violence and open demands for a change in government. If the dominant actor could not respond effectively to these disruptions it risked losing control as the energy of the resistance activity would lead to Phase II as people began to coalesce around a collective identity and crossed the threshold from passive support to active resistance. If these state Communist regimes had stood alone, there was the chance that Phase II of asymmetric warfare would have been strong enough to move to Phase III to challenge the power of the state directly by establishing a level of resistance intended to increase the level of cost for the dominant actor to an unacceptable level. As these two examples indicate, however, asymmetric warfare could never move much beyond Phase I because the dominant actor – the Soviet Union – possessed far greater asymmetries of power, of interests at stake, and was fully committed to maintain control over eastern Europe and its population without regard to cost. Thus, as demonstrated in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the weaker actor sought to gain freedom of action by varying techniques, methods, and approaches in order to negate the strengths of the Communist governments. Potent symbols of national identity or patriotism, or connections to the West, were used as symbols to build a collective identity and begin to mobilize the population. The weaker actor sought to evade or undermine those strengths 25  Central Intelligence Agency, Report from V. Sokolovskii and L. Govorov in Berlin to N.A. Bulganin, June 17, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 26  Central Intelligence Agency, Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly, July 10, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central Intelligence Agency.

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by taking advantage of the opponent’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities, while maximizing its own strengths. But in both these examples, it became clear that the weaker actor could not sustain any level of mobilization. The crackdown came swiftly and effectively with disproportionate levels of force that prevented any collective identity mobilization. People would not move toward the threshold from passive support to active resistance. The personal cost was too great. The results of these events had a great effect on the population when Hungary moved almost completely into Phase II before Soviet forces restored the Communists to power. The Phase II active resistance could not sustain itself, largely because the populations of East Germany and Czechoslovakia would not follow the lead, having experienced failure a few years earlier. The dominant actor had proven its asymmetric advantages sufficiently to be able to deal with single events. Although the employment of the dominant actor’s asymmetric advantages held Eastern Europe under nominal control for over 50 years, the end of the Cold War came about precisely because the people of the Baltic States and the other states of Eastern Europe recognized the opportunity to take advantage of the asymmetries they had possessed since the beginning of Soviet domination. The asymmetries of will, ideas, culture, and organization came to dominate the Communist states and the Soviet Union neither of which was willing to bear the cost of suppression. This imbalance allowed the populations of Eastern Europe to cross the mobilization threshold and build popular momentum through largely nonviolent means to create a new political equilibrium and accommodation that led to the emergence of a new Europe. So an understanding of the concepts of asymmetric warfare as demonstrated through two examples from the early Cold War will help scholars of this period to assess and understand resistance movements and examine the reasons for their success or failure. Bibliography Ancker Clinton J., III/Michael D. Burke, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, in: Military Review 83, July-August (2003) 4, 18-25. Ball-Rokeach, S.J., Normative and Deviant Violence from a Conflict Perspective, in: Social Problems 28, October (1980) 1, 45-62. Buffaloe, David L., Defining Asymmetric Warfare (= The Land Warfare Papers 58, Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2006)

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Bush, Kenneth D./E. Fuat Keyman, Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World Global Governance 3, September-December (1997) 3, 311-328. Ciobanu, Monica, Reconstructing the History of Early Communism and Armed Resistance in Romania, in: Europe-Asia Studies 66, November (2014) 9, 1452-1481. Davis, Thomas C., Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity, in: Political Psychology 20, March (1999) 1, 25-47. Deaux, Kay/Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality, in: Psychological Bulletin 130, (2004) 1, 80-114. Eaton, J.G., The Beauty of Asymmetry: An Examination of the Context and Practice of Asymmetric and Unconventional Warfare From a Western/Centrist Perspective, in: Defence Studies 2, Spring (2002) 1, 51-82. Findley, Michael G./Scott Edwards, Accounting for the Unaccounted: Weak-Actor Structure in Asymmetric Wars, in: International Studies Quarterly 51, September (2007) 3, 583-606. Flesher Fominaya, Christine, Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates, Sociology Compass 4, (2010) 6, 393-404. Henderson, Errol A., Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989, in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, October (1997) 5, 649-668. Kalyvas, Stathis N., Warfare in Civil Wars, in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War (New York: Frank Cass, 2005) 88-91, passim. Kalyvas, Stathis N., The Ontology of Political Violence: Actions and Identities in Civil Wars, in: Perspectives on Politics 1, September (2003) 3, 475-494. Mack, Raymond W./Richard C. Snyder, The Analysis of Social Conflict – Toward an Overview and Synthesis, in: Conflict Resolution 1, June (1957) 2, 212-248. McDermott, Kevin, Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia: The Plzen Uprising, June 1953, in: Contemporary European History, 19 (2010) 4, 287-307. Mitchell, C.R., Evaluating Conflict, in: Journal of Peace Research 17 (1980) 1, 61-75. Pfaff, Steven, Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989, in: Social Forces 75, September (1996) 1, 91-117. Schroefl, Josef/Stuart J. Kaufman, Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War, in: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37 (2014) 10, 862-860. Stepanova, Ekaterina, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research report no. 23 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Sullivan, Patricia L., War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars, in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, June (2007) 3, 496-524. U.S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate 10-58: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 4 March 1958.

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U.S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, Report from V. Sokolovskii and L. Govorov in Berlin to N.A. Bulganin, June 17, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. U.S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly, July 10, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central Intelligence Agency. U.S. Government, Radio Free Europe Report on the Strikes in Plzen during Early June 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Radio Free Europe Records, September 08, 1953. U.S. Government, National Intelligence Estimate Number 10-58 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 4 March 1958. U.S. Government, National Intelligence Estimate Number 10-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 12 April 1955. U.S. Government, Summary of the 151st Meeting of the National Security Council. 25 June 1953. History and Public Policy Digital Archive, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, 1953–1961. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 111924 (last accessed November 8, 2017). U.S. Government, National Security Council, U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, NSC 5608, 3 July 1956. U.S. Government, National Security Council Report, United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States, NSC 158, 19 June 1953. Alban Webb, Cold War Radio and the Hungarian Uprising, 1956, in: Cold War History 13 (2013) 2, 221-238.

Chapter 3

The Armed Anti-Soviet Resistance in Estonia after 1944 Olaf Mertelsmann Introduction1 Estonia is the smallest and most northern of the three Baltic states. The country is slightly larger in area than the Netherlands or Denmark but possessed only 1.1 million inhabitants in the 1930s. Estonia had been part of the Russian Empire since Peter the Great and was turned into an independent democracy – the Republic of Estonia – after World War I and a War of Independence in 1918–20 against Soviet Russia. In this small-scale conflict, partisan warfare was also used. The developmental stage of nation and state building was passed successfully following independence and, although Estonia was mainly an agricultural country (with more than half of the population being peasants), the interwar period was mostly prosperous, apart from a postwar crisis in the early 1920s and the Great Depression, which hit Northeastern Europe, too. Since 1919 a radical land reform decreased inequality in the countryside, a compromise with the ethnic minorities was found and an expansion of education led to one of the highest secondary school and university enrolment rates in Europe. In 1934, Konstantin Päts, one of the founding fathers of the republic, established an authoritarian regime and ended democracy. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the project of Estonian independence failed in this period. The vast majority of the population lived better than ever in history, the state apparatus became more efficient and future prospectives – even under authoritarian rule – were still positive. Preconditions for partisan warfare in Estonia were quite good. The country was not densely inhabited, large forests, swamps and single farmsteads in the middle of nowhere offered opportunities to hide for long periods. Even today, people can get lost in the forest and are sometimes found dead, months later. 1  This contribution is an updated version of on earlier paper. Olaf Mertelsmann, Resistance and Accommodation in the Postwar Baltic Republics: The Case of Estonia, in: Thomas Wegener Friis/Michael F. Scholz (eds.), Ostsee: Kriegsschauplatz und Handelsregion: Festschrift für Robert Bohn (Visby: Gotland University Press, 2013), 149-170.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_004

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The peasants could provide food and other help for those hiding. There was already experience with partisan warfare during the war of independence and it was written about the experience in Estonian military publications. Since late 1918 paramilitary forces existed, later being organized into the Estonian Defense League (Eesti Kaitseliit). This was a state sponsored organization intended to be an additional mobilization reserve for the regular army, to help in the case of a Communist uprising and to continually train reservists. Members would normally keep their weapons at home. Of course, Estonia also possessed regular armed forces based on compulsory military service for all young male citizens. Furthermore, Estonia was, and is, a good place for hunting. All this meant there were enough trained men and sufficient weapons and ammunition out there to fight a partisan war. One should add that during the Russian Civil War and in the first years of Soviet history partisans were a widespread phenomenon in the Eastern part of Europe. According to the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression and the secret protocol of August 1939 – the Molotov-Ribbentrop or the Hitler-Stalin Pact – Estonia fell into the Soviet sphere of interest. Just one month later, Joseph Stalin intimidated Baltic politicians into acceptance of the stationing of Soviet troops in the Baltic states outnumbering their national armies but promising not to interfere in their internal affairs. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had become de facto Soviet protectorates indicated by the fact that planes starting from Estonian airfields were attacking Finland during the Winter War. In June 1940, while the eyes of the world were directed at Hitler’s campaign in France, Stalin issued a second ultimatum: The amount of stationed troops was to be increased and Soviet friendly governments installed. This was a military occupation of the Baltic states.2 The Anti-Soviet armed resistance seems to be an important topic in research on Stalinism in the Baltic states. Because of the ‘archival revolution’ and efforts to collect oral history accounts it became possible to study this topic in depth. Side by side with Stalinist repression3 and the political history of the 2  Enn Tarvel/Tõnu Tannberg, Documents on the Soviet Military Occupation of Estonia in 1940, in: Trames (2006) 10, 81-95. 3  Mart Arold (ed.), Sortside saladused, 12 vols. (Tartu: Tungal, 1993–2001); Aigi Rahi, 1949. aasta märtsiküüditamine Tartu linnas ja maakonnas (Tartu: Kleio, 1998); Leo Õispuu (comp.), Political Arrests in Estonia under Soviet Occupation, 3 vols. (Tallinn: Eesti Represseeritute Registri Büroo, 1996–2005); Leo Õispuu (comp.), Deportation from Estonia to Russia, 3 vols. (Tallinn: Eesti Represseeritute Registri Büroo, 1999–2003); Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Teise maailmasõja järgsed massirepressioonid Eestis: Allikad ja uurimisseis (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2004); Vello Salo (ed.), The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991 (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopedia Publishers, 2005); Kristi Kukk/Toivo Raun (eds.), Soviet Deportations in Estonia: Impact and Legacy; Articles and Life Histories (Tartu:

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Sovietization period, resistance to Soviet rule turned out to be among the most relevant and contentious themes among historians researching Stalinism. Obviously, there is also a societal need to discover heroes during a period when state and society were subdued by the USSR without much resistance. Several books and countless papers have been published on the subject.4 The most prominent Estonian expert, two-time prime minister, Mart Laar,5 addresses the topic with a nationalist undertone. Russian historians such as Elena Tartu University Press, 2007); Leo Õispuu (comp.), Crimes of Soviet Occupation in Estonia: Deported, Arrested, Murdered 1940–1990 (Tallinn: Eesti Represseeritute Registri Büroo, 2007); Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Nõukogude repressioonide uurimisest Eestis, in: Tõnu Tannberg (ed.), Eesti NSV aastatel 1940–1953: Sovetiseerimise mehhanismid ja tagajärjed Nõukogude Liidu ja Ida-Euroopa arengute kontekstis (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2007), 30-64; Olaf Mertelsmann/ Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Cleansing and Compromise: The Estonian SSR in 1944–1945, in: Cahiers du Monde russe (2008) 49, 319-340; Olaf Mertelsmann/Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Stalinist Mass Violence in Estonia Revisited, in: Journal of Genocide Research (2009) 11, 307-322, Olaf Mertelsmann/Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Estland während des Stalinismus 1940–1953: Gewalt und Säuberungen im Namen der Umgestaltung einer Gesellschaft, in: Jahrbuch für Internationale Kommunismusforschung 2012, 99-112; Meelis Saueauk, Propaganda ja terror: Nõukogude julgeolekuorganid ja Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei Eesti sovetiseerimisel 1944–1953 (Tallinn: SE&JS, 2015). 4  Evald Laasi (ed.), Vastupanuliikumine Eestis 1944–49: Dokumentide kogu (Tallinn: Nõmm & Co, 1992); Ülo Jõgi, “Erna” legendid ja tegelikkus (Tallinn: JMR, 1996); Eerik-Niiles Kross (ed.), Pro Patria. II: Auraamat langenud ja hukkunud metsavendadele 1944–1978 (Tartu: Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon, 1998); Peeter Väljas, Hävitusagendid: Mõningatest julgeolekuorganite operatiiv-agentuurtöö meetoditest metsavendadevastases võitluses sõjajärgsel perioodil, in: Tiit Noormets (ed.), Luuramisi: Salateenistuste tegevusest Eestis XX sajandil (Tallinn: Umara, 1999), 123-172; Arvydas Anušauskas (ed.), The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: Du Ka; Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 1999); Tõnu Tannberg, Relvastatud vastupanuliikumine Eestis aastal 1944–1953 julgeolekuorganite statistika peeglis, in: Tuna 2 (1999), 1, 24-30; Tiit Noormets (ed.), Metsavennad Suvesõjas 1941: Eesti relvastatud vastupanuliikumine Omakaitse dokumentides (Tallinn Riigiarhiiv, 2003); Tõnu Tannberg, Julgeolekuorganite tegevusest metsavendluse mahasuurumisel 1953. aasta esimestel kuudel, in: Akadeemia 17 (2005), 554-572; Tiit Noormets, ‘Kättemaksu tund läheneb – hangunud verele ülesklopsitud röövriik hävib!’ Vastupanuliikumise salatrükikoda ‘Punker Tiiu’ Kambja vallas 1947–1948. aastal, in: Tuna 9 (2006), 2, 112-116; Tiit Noormets/Valdur Ohmann (eds.), Hävitajad: Nõukogude hävituspataljonid Eestis 1944–1954: Dokumentide kogumik (Tallinn: Riigiarhiiv, 2006); Pearu Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud Eesti vastupanuliikumisega: Banditismivastase Võitluse Osakond aastatel 1944–1947 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2007); Tiit Noormets (ed.), Eesti metsavennad 1944–1957: Dokumentide kogumik (Tartu: Rahvusarhiiv, 2014). 5  Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival, 1944–1956 (Washington, DC: Compass Press, 1992); idem, Metsavennad (Tallinn: Helmet Raja & Co., 1993); idem, Suurim armastus: Metsavennad (Stockholm: Välis-Eesti & EMP, 1994), idem, The Forgotten War: Armed Resistance Movement in Estonia in 1944–1956 (Tallinn: Grenader, 2005); idem, Metsavennad: Relvastatud vastupanu Eestis Teise maailmasõja järel (Tallinn: Read, 2013).

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Zubkova6 or Alexander Statiev7 attempt a more balanced approach but, due to their limited knowledge of Baltic languages, they cannot use many relevant publications and rely on Russian language archival material. Although there already exists a vast body of literature, many sources in the archives – especially Russian archives – have yet to be found by researchers. Already under Soviet rule, former employees of state security published memoirs about their struggle against resistance,8 while former partisans started to issue their own memoirs after Estonia again regained independence.9 Nowadays, the resistance to Soviet rule seems to have become part of Estonian identity, especially the ‘forest brethren’ (metsavennad), which hid in the forest – hence the nickname – and partly fought against the Soviets. Even CDs were released with forest brother songs, and one can spend a holiday on a ‘forest brother farm’ offering tourists the chance to re-enact the resistance struggle, to sleep in a rebuilt dugout like those hiding in the forests in the 1940s or to drink self-made moonshine like the partisans. In this contribution I will not outline the entire history of the resistance movement in Estonia and will also stress the relation between resistance and accommodation of society to the Soviet regime. This could help explain why the resistance of the anti-Soviet partisans ended after a few years. Naturally, Soviet politics also played an important role. This paper is based mainly on literature, but also on my own archival research and some oral history sources. The level of resistance in Estonia was much lower than in Lithuania or in western Ukraine. The peak of armed resistance in Estonia was in 1945–46 and ended in the mid-1950s, when the Soviet policy to quell resistance succeeded, and the majority of society accommodated to Soviet rule. Of course, to better understand the historical context of the 1940s and 1950s one has to look into the relevant literature.10 6  Elena Zubkova, “Lesnye brat’ia” v Pribaltike: voina posle voiny, in: Otechestvennaia istoriia (2007) 51, 2, 74-90, and 3, 14-30; idem, Pribaltika i Kreml’ 1940–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008), 191-256. 7  Alexander Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 1944–1950, PhD thesis, University of Calgary, 2004; idem, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 8  Kompromiss on välistatud: Lugusid Eesti tšekistidest (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1984). 9  For example: Alfred Käärmann, Surmavaenlase vastu: Eesti lõunapiiri metsavenna mälestusi (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 1998); Udo Josia (ed.), Saatusekaaslased: Eesti noored vabadusvõitluses 1944–1954 (Tallinn/Tartu: Endiste Õpilasvabadusvõitlejate Liit, 2004). 10  For a historical overview, see Eesti riik ja rahvas Teises maailmasõjas, 10 vols. (Stockholm: EMP, 1954–1962); Aleksander Kaelas, Das sowjetisch besetzte Estland (Stockholm: Estnischer Nationalfond, 1958); Eesti saatusaastad, 1945–1960, 6 vols. (Stockholm: EMP, 1963–1972); Tönu Parming/Elmar Järvesoo (eds.), A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The

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The Impact of the First Soviet Year

During the six weeks after Soviet occupation, mock elections took place in the Baltic states and a puppet parliament applied for the incorporation into the Soviet Union. The countries were duly annexed by Stalin in early August 1940. In the moment when the Soviets took power, the Estonian Communist Party (ECP(b)) had less than 150 members, so the new regime lacked a local support base. Resistance was only low-level.11 The Sovietization-process did not proceed swiftly, living conditions declined dramatically, and the low standard of living became the Estonians’ main complaint, according to reports on the sentiment of the population.12 Civil society was demolished, step-by-step. The Estonian SSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); Juhan Kahk (ed.), World War II and Soviet Occupation in Estonia: A Damages Report (Tallinn: Perioodika, 1991); Romuald Misiunas/Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1990 (London: Hurst, 1993); Jüri Ant, Eesti 1939–1941: rahvast, valitsemisest, saatusest (Tallinn, 1999); Anu Mai Kõll (ed.), The Baltic Countries under Occupation: Soviet and Nazi Rule 1939–1991 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003); Olaf Mertelsmann (ed.), The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956 (Tartu: Kleio, 2003); idem (ed.), Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zu Stalins Tod: Estland 1939–1953 (Hamburg: Bibliotheca Baltica, 2005); Ago Pajur and Tõnu Tannberg (eds.), Eesti ajalugu VI: Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2005); Toomas Hiio/Meelis Maripuu/Indrek Paavle (eds.), Estonia 1940–1945: Reports of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (Tallinn: Inimsusevastaste Kuritegude Uurimise Eesti Sihtasutus, 2006); Olaf Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland: Von der Markt- zur Kommandowirtschaft (= Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa 14. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2006); Tannberg (ed.), Eesti NSV aastatel 1940–1953; David Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum: Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Dorfes 1944–1953 (= Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 40. Cologne-Vienna-Weimar: Böhlau, 2007); Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’; Tynu [Tõnu] Tannberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944– 1956): Issledovaniia i dokumenty (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2008); Toomas Hiio/Meelis Maripuu/Indrek Paavle (eds.), Estonia since 1944: Reports of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (Tallinn: Inimsusevastaste Kuritegude Uurimise Eesti Sihtasutus, 2009), Meelis Maripuu (ed.), Sõja ja rahu vahel II: Esimene punane aasta (Tallinn: S-Keskus, 2010); Olaf Mertelsmann, Everyday Life in Stalinist Estonia (= Tartu Historical Studies 2. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012); Anu Mai Kõll, The Village and the Class War: Anti-kulak Campaign in Estonia (= Historical Studies in Eastern Europe and Eurasia 2. Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 2013); Tõnu Tannberg (ed.), Behind the Iron Curtain: Estonia during the Cold War (= Tartu Historical Studies 5. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2015) Olaf Mertelsmann (ed.), The Baltic States under Stalinist Rule (= Das Baltikum in Geschichte und Gegenwart 4. Cologne/Vienna/ Weimar: Böhlau, 2016). 11  On unarmed resistance in 1940–1941, see Viktor Niitsoo, Relvastamata vastupanu aastail 1940–41, in: Tuna (2001) 4, 1, 22–33; 2, 31–38; 3, 48–56; 4, 32–37, and (2002) 5, 1, 86–94. 12  Reports on the sentiment of the population 1940–1941, Rahvusarhiiv, Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal (National Archives, Branch of the Estonian State Archives; RA, ERAF) 1-1-45-1-1-59.

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Defense League was dissolved and weapons collected. Political arrests had already started in June 1940, but they went mostly unnoticed by the wider public. This situation changed with a mass deportation of approximately 10,000 on June 14th 1941. The majority of the population lost any illusions about the new regime. When the Germans attacked on June 22nd 1941, terror became widespread. The retreating Soviets tortured and killed prisoners, ‘destroyer battalions’, formed by local sympathizers, ran wild in the countryside, and buildings and infrastructure were destroyed.13 All this provoked armed resistance. Because of the disarmament of the population in June 1940, weapons were initially scarce, but some members of the Defense League had hidden arms.14 Alongside German units, forest brothers did fight in the ‘Summer War’ and several locations were liberated by Estonians eager to restore their state and local administration.15 The anti-Soviet partisans also took revenge on real or alleged communists and sympathizers.16 In summer 1941, approximately 12,000 anti-Soviet partisans fought the Red Army; 561 were killed or went missing in action.17 The advancing Germans quickly built up Estonian Self-Defense units (Omakaitse), which was a common policy all over Eastern Europe, in order to recruit additional forces. The activities of Estonian partisans were later exploited by German propaganda in Estonia, and the myth of the successful partisan struggle of 1941 was created, leading to the liberation of Estonia by Germans and Estonians. This myth later influenced many people to take arms against the Soviets because of the ‘imagined’ success of summer 1941.

The German Occupation 1941–44

In comparison with other parts of the USSR, the German occupation was relatively mild. About 8,000 inhabitants of Estonia were murdered, among them nearly all remaining Jews and much of the Roma population, but the majority 13  More than 2,000 victims killed in captivity or by destruction battalions have been identified to date. Meelis Maripuu/Argo Kuusik, Political Arrests and Court Cases from August 1940 to September 1941, Hiio/Maripuu/Paavle (eds.), Estonia 1940–1945, 319-362, here 327. 14  Kaupo Deemant, Relvade peitmisest 1940. aastal, Tuna (1999) 2, 4, 40-46. 15  Meelis Maripuu, Omavalitsuseta omavalitsused: Halduskorraldus Eestis Saksa okupatsiooni ajal 1941–1944 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2012), 138-153. 16  Argo Kuusik, Die deutsche Vernichtungspolitik in Estland, Mertelsmann (ed.), Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, 130-150, here 136. 17  Tiit Noormets, Vastupanuliikumine Eestis, idem (ed.), Metsavennad Suvesõjas, 11-84, here 51.

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of this number were alleged or real communists and sympathizers.18 Because of the lower level of repression under Nazi than under Soviet rule (and this level declined over time), and the fact that Estonians were better treated than other Eastern Europeans, German rule was viewed as a lesser evil by the population, at least in comparison to Stalinism.19 There was virtually no armed resistance against the Germans, despite Soviet efforts to send in parachutists and to bring Soviet partisans through the front line.20 The pragmatic cooperation and collaboration of the population with the Germans worked comparatively well. Approximately seven percent of Estonia’s inhabitants fought on the German side as members of police battalions, the Wehrmacht, Border Defense and the Waffen SS. In addition, males not serving in the troops were mobilized into the Self-Defense for example for guarding duties or the prevention of partisan activity. They were only part-time active, had a regular job and kept their weapons often at home. Even in the security police, the heart of the German repressive apparatus, Estonians formed an overwhelming majority.21 The Germans retreated in fall 1944 with ‘Operation Aster’, after eight months of fighting and a stalemate in northeastern Estonia; in some places rather chaotically. About 70,000 Estonians fled by sea to the West.22 During the German retreat, individual Estonian units fought small skirmishes with them, and a

18  On the German occupation, see Seppo Myllyniemi, Die Neuordnung der baltischen Länder 1941–1944: Zum nationalsozialistischen Inhalt der deutschen Besatzungspolitik (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1973); Alvin Isberg, Zu den Bedingungen des Befreiers: Kollaboration und Freiheitsstreben in dem von Deutschland besetzten Estland 1941 bis 1944 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1992); Indrek Paavle (ed.), Population Losses in Estonia. II/1: German Occupation 1941–1944 (Tartu: Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon, 2002); Hiio/Maripuu/Paavle (eds.), Estonia 1940–1945; Ruth Bettina Birn, Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland, 1941–1944: Eine Studie zur Kollaboration im Osten (= Sammlung Schöningh zur Geschichte und Gegenwart. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust (= Religion, Theology and the Holocaust. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009). 19  Olaf Mertelsmann, ‘Das “kleinere Übel”? Das Generalkommissariat Estland im estnischen Vergangenheitsdiskurs’, Sebastian Lehmann/Robert Bohn/Uwe Danker (eds.), Reichskommissariat Ostland: Tatort und Erinnerungsobjekt (= Zeitalter der Weltkriege 8. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012), 349-366. 20  The documents of the Soviet Central Staff of the Partisan Movement concerning Estonia confirm the failure to establish Soviet partisans there. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, RGASPI) f. 69, o. 1. 21  Birn, Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland. 22  Kaja Kumer-Haukanõmm/Tiit Rosenberg/Tiit Tammaru (eds.), Suur põgenemine 1944: Eestlaste lahkumine läände ning selle mõjud (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2006).

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short-lived provisional Estonian government was established in Tallinn.23 After the general mobilization under the Germans in February 1944, some people did hide in the woods to escape being drafted into the Estonian units of the Waffen SS. With the arrival of Soviet forces, more Estonians hid to avoid fighting or out of fear of being arrested. Others were avoiding being drafted into the Red Army. Individual groups continued to fight the Soviets. There was some temporary Finnish support and more substantial German assistance to build up some small partisan and intelligence units. However, preparations to establish an underground network as a backbone of future resistance to the Soviets could not be completed before the German retreat.24 Nevertheless, partisan activity was more modest in 1944 than in the following two years, according to a statistical overview compiled by the Ministry of the Interior of the Estonian SSR.25

The Postwar Period

With the re-arrival of the Soviets the largest wave of cleansing during Stalinism started,26 Sovietization continued, and the Soviet army behaved as being on enemy territory. According to the Estonian People’s Commissariat of the Interior, soldiers were responsible for the majority of reported crimes.27 Even local party organs complained in Tallinn about widespread theft, robbery and rape.28 Immediately younger males were mobilized into the Soviet army, which prompted many men to hide. In one case only one-tenth of those called to arms showed up.29 All this triggered armed resistance in the years to come. 23  Andres Parmas (ed.), Otto Tief ja 1944 a. vahevalitsus (Tartu: Korporatsioon Rotalia, 2006); Mart Laar, September 1944: Otto Tiefi valitsus (Tallinn: Varrak, 2007). 24  Mart Laar, Vastupanuliikumine, in: Pajur/Tannberg (eds.), Eesti ajalugu VI, 320-337, here 320. 25  Sekretnaia spravka 4-go otdela Ministerstva vnutrennikh del Estonskoi SSR o deistviiakh organov bezopasnosti po podavleniiu dvizheniia soprotivleniia v 1944–1945 gg., June 8, 1953, Tannberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii, 289-290. 26  Mertelsmann/Rahi-Tamm, Cleansing and Compromise. 27  See Tiit Noormets, Pagunitega kurjategijad: Nõukogude sõjaväelaste kriminaalkuritegevus Eestis sõjajärgsetel aastatel, Tuna (2005) 8, 1, 93-100; Olaf Mertelsmann, ‘Die Sowjetisierung des estnischen Alltags während des Stalinismus’, Norbert Angermann/ Michael Garleff/Wilhelm Lenz (eds.), Ostseeprovinzen, Baltische Staaten und das Nationale: Festschrift für Gert von Pistohlkors zum 70. Geburtstag (Schriften der Baltischen Historischen Kommission 14. Münster: LIT, 2005), 591-610, here 600. 28  Olaf Mertelsmann, How the Russians Turned into the Image of the “National Enemy” of the Estonians, Pro Ethnologia (2005) 13, no. 19, 43-58, here 51. 29  Laar, War in the Woods, 61.

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While the Soviets gained control in the towns comparatively quickly, it took them much longer to do so in the countryside, due to a lack of cadres and of local support and due to the low population density. People had many opportunities to hide somewhere in dugouts in the forest, abandoned farms, or in secret places on an operating farm. Firstly, another land reform was conducted. In 1946–47, food provision, partly as a result of famine in western parts of the USSR, declined and malnutrition became widespread.30 After 1947, agricultural taxes increased more than threefold, and the process of de-kulakization held the villages in its grip.31 In March 1949, the Soviets conducted a second mass deportation with roughly 20,000 victims, to prepare for the collectivization of agriculture, to ‘cleanse’ the countryside of ‘nationalists’ and ‘collaborators with the Germans’, and to weed out peasant support for forest brothers.32 At that point Moscow basically saw three groups of enemies in the Baltic republics: ‘bandits,’ kulaks and ‘nationalists.’33 After forced collectivization, it became very difficult to support the anti-Soviet partisans, because the peasants were impoverished and could barely secure their own survival, much less offer food and temporary shelter to forest brothers. Thus the partisans were forced to steal from the civilian population and the kolkhozes and to rob village stores; understandably, this was, of course, extremely unpopular among the peasantry. Resistance dried up due to state persecution, declining support and the Stalinist regime’s move toward conciliation, offering amnesties to those hiding in the woods if they provided information about other partisans. In the postwar period there were an estimated 30,000 forest brothers, including women and children. Roughly one-third of them fought actively.34 This 30  Olaf Mertelsmann, Creating Malnutrition in an Agricultural Surplus Area: Stalinist Food Policy in Newly Acquired Territory, in: Matthias Midell/Felix Wemheuer (eds.), Hunger and Scarcity under State-Socialism (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag und AVA, 2012), 225-251. 31  Kõll, The Village and the Class War. 32  On collectivization of agriculture, see Rein Taagepera, Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Taxation Phase, in: Journal of Baltic Studies (1979) 10, 263-282; idem, Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase, in: Soviet Studies (1980) 32, 379-397; Anu Mai Kõll, Tender Wolves: Identification and Persecution of Kulaks in Viljandimaa, 1940–1949, in: Mertelsmann (ed.), The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 127-149; Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau, 167-202; Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum; Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 165-190; Kõll, The Village and the Class War. An eyewitness account written in 1960 was published posthumously: Paul Hinnov, Kui need talud tapeti: Lehekülgi ühe küla ajaloost (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 1999). 33  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 181. 34  Laar, ‘Vastupanuliikumine’, Pajur/Tannberg (eds.), Eesti ajalugu VI, 320-337, here 321.

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is claimed to be the total for the entire period, but the number still seems too high; thus perhaps as many as 1,000 or 1,200 men might have been fighting the Soviets at one time, while the vast majority simply hid. There were no major clashes with the authorities; nor was there central organization.35 Moreover, a huge turnover took place, and many people spent only a short time in the forests. Most of the anti-Soviet partisans were ethnic Estonians, individual German soldiers in hiding or POWs; ethnic Russians also joined them.36 An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 died on both sides, including the summer of 1941. In addition to the 561 partisans who died or went missing in 1941, a June 1953 report to Khrushchev mentions 1,425 ‘members of gangs of the nationalist underground’ being killed between 1944 and 1953 in Estonia.37 According to Soviet sources, 887 militsiia men, employees of security organs, ‘activists’ and civilians died between 1944 and 1952 as a result of partisan actions in Estonia.38 Another estimate by the Ministry of the Interior of the Estonian SSR mentions 1,009 casualties.39 There is a very severe source problem. Different sources offer different numbers, several measures were not documented, and a proper total is impossible to compile. According to a report by the minister of the interior of the Estonian SSR, Mikhail Krassman, the fight against resistance from 1944 until June 1st 1953, could be illustrated with the following statistical figures: 9,310 small military operations were conducted with 94,000 men participating. They killed 1,495 members of ‘terrorist gangs’ and the ‘nationalist underground.’ ‘Armed bandits’ were responsible for 1,825 incidents, mainly robbery and theft directed at enterprises, kolkhozes and rural citizens, and ‘acts of terror.’ A total of 662 ‘gangs’ and 336 ‘nationalist organizations and groups’ were ‘liquidated’. The majority of the partisans’ victims were civilians. In all, 5,242 persons were ‘legalized’ after giving themselves up and cooperating with the authorities. A second report by the Fourth Department of the Ministry mentioned the arrest of 5,742 ‘bandits’ and 1,853 ‘supporters.’40 Of course, we cannot know how accurately the security organs kept their books and whether the participants were 35  Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 115. 36  Laar, War in the Woods, 131. 37  Dokladnaia zapiska zaveduiushchego otdelom partiinykh, profsoiuznikh i komsomol’skikh organov TsK KPSS E. Gromova N. Khrushchevu, June 20, 1953, Tannberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii, 317. 38  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 256. 39  Tiit Noormets/Valdur Ohmann, Saateks, Noormets/Ohmann (eds.), Hävitajad, 11-60, here 49. 40  Spravka ministra vnutrennikh del Estonskoi SSR M. Krassmana o natsional’nykh kadrakh i o rezul’tatakh bor’by s dvizheniem soprotivleniia v 1944–1953 gg., June 4, 1953, Tannberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii, 287; Sekretnaia spravka 4-go otdela Ministerstva

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correctly labelled.41 If the estimate of 30,000 forest brothers is realistic, then the majority were able to conceal the fact that they were temporarily in hiding. Actually, more than one of the contemporaries who recorded their life stories mentioned secretly staying in the forest for at least a short while.42 Obviously, the vast majority of arrested or killed partisans fought actively, while the amnesties and legalization were aimed mainly at non-combatant forest brothers; for example, draft dodgers. It also seems possible that the security organs inflated numbers of partisan groups and underground organizations, or alleged that innocent people constituted an illegal organization. Security organs often exaggerated the potential danger of harmless groups, such as those merely distributing leaflets. In this way, state security could justify its existence and budget, and individual employees could receive a bonus for successful work. Certain factors influenced partisan activity, particularly the availability of weaponry and ammunition and the organizational structure. Those were also the main reasons why there was less postwar resistance in Estonia than in Latvia and Lithuania, where larger, better-organized units with more weapons existed at the time of the German withdrawal, and more German support could be offered through the front lines. In addition, during the German occupation there were already well-established partisan units (for example, in western Ukraine) that were opposed to both sides: the Nazis and the Soviets.43 Resistance in Estonia possessed the least amount of central organization. When the Germans withdrew, many high-ranking Estonians fled to the West, and the Germans left their archival files on the national resistance movement in Estonia. The Soviets went happily through those files44 and thus were easily able to detain potential resistance leaders. Additionally, the Soviets took into preventive custody approximately 1,000 leading figures of the Self-Defense, the militia that existed during the German occupation.45 vnutrennikh del Estonskoi SSR o deistviiakh organov bezopasnosti po podavleniiu dvizheniia soprotivleniia v 1944–1945 gg., June 8, 1953, Ibd., 292. 41  For example, the number of people killed by partisans in Estonia in 1944–1946 is said by one source to be 534, while a second one gives a total of 637. This data was intended to be read in Moscow: Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, 114; Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 243-244. 42  The author worked through a large collection of life stories, Eesti Kirjandusmuuseum – Eesti Kultuurilooline Arhiiv (Estonian Literature Museum – Estonian Cultural Archive, KM-EKLA) f. 350. 43  For a comparison of the situation, see Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 35-138; Arvydas Anušauskas, A Comparison of the Armed Struggles for Independence in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine, idem (ed.), The Anti-Soviet Resistance, 63-70. 44  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 221. 45  Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, 94.

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It would be a mistake to assume a close connection between German support and the anti-Soviet partisan movement in the Baltic republics. Of course, weapons and ammunition from the Germans played a role, but starting in the spring of 1945, even Soviet sources spoke of a ‘nationalist underground’ and not about ‘remnants of Nazi occupation.’46 Armed resistance was mainly an independent and local development and a reaction to local realities and Soviet political measures. The existence of partisans depended on geographical conditions, too. Areas with a low population density, large forests and swamps with few passable roads made it possible to hide in the woods for years. In a region like northeast Estonia, a major battleground during the war, the partisans were able to find weapons and ammunition more easily.47 Still, the harsh climate in winter and the absence of medical treatment made living in dugouts a challenge that usually required the support of local peasants. In summer, the partisans could live in tents or haystacks. Boredom posed a threat to morale. Many partisans were caught while ‘organizing’ moonshine or meeting women. Only individual forest brothers could grow their own food and steal whatever else they needed.48 Soviet power was extremely weak and unpopular in the Estonian countryside. A lack of reliable cadres, as well as a degree of chaos, misuse of power and corruption, initially hindered the establishment of effective control.49 Peasants feared collectivization, a second land reform and high procurement norms already burdened most of them. In 1947, the state established the first model kolkhozes. Additionally, one should not underestimate the effects of Soviet violence in the countryside.50 Nevertheless, it was a typical Soviet simplification that mainly better-off peasants – the so-called kulaks – supported resistance.51 Resisters and their supporters came from all strata of society, and those, such as the kulaks, who had experience of the new regime saw them as potential enemies, making them behave even more cautiously. Thus forest brothers received food and other support from local farms or their relatives and friends. Usually they were locals, too. The partisans normally hid in the forests and lived in dugouts, but they would sometimes work temporarily to earn some income. Several forest brothers were able to wander back and forth 46  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 235, 239. 47  From April 20 to November 1, 1945, more than 350,000 mines and approximately 1 million grenades, bombs, and other explosives were deactivated in the region alone. Meeting of Virumaa party committee, April 26, 1946, RA, ERAF 1-1/4-106, l. 252. 48  See Laar, War in the Woods, 129, 132-138. 49  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 145-153, 204-205. 50  David Feest, Terror und Gewalt auf dem estnischen Dorf, in: Osteuropa (2000) 50, 656-671. 51  Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 99-100; Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 200.

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between a legal and an illegal existence. They knew the landscape and the people personally, including some of their opponents. To understand better how thousands of men and women could hide in the forest, sometimes for years, one has to look at the network of their supporters. At times the network was quite large. The literature scholar and teacher, Jaan Roos, though not himself a forest brother, nevertheless escaped arrest from 1945 to 1954 by hiding in more than 100 different places across Estonia.52 Roos kept a diary that was preserved and later published. Among his supporters were relatives, old schoolmates, friends, his fraternity brothers, colleagues and former students. His network shrank after collectivization. Of course, partisans could not use such a large network but, as Roos’s diary confirms, forest brothers would sometimes know in advance of his arrival and would welcome him to a village, while the state could not arrest him. The effective communication system of resistance and peasants also included some contacts inside the Soviet administration.53 Hopes for the outbreak of a third world war or a Western intervention, prompted by a misunderstanding of Western radio propaganda,54 encouraged some Estonians to continue resistance. In addition, the very existence of the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, led to the misconception that the US and the UK really had an interest in the restoration of Baltic independence and were willing to fight for it.55 Rumors of a coming war between the Western Allies and the USSR circulated, for example, in 1946 and during the Berlin crisis in 1948.56 Johannes, born in 1926, remembers: ‘When Voice of America and Radio Vatican started to broadcast in Estonian, I always listened to them. If you used a detector radio, the jamming was not so bad. Because I went into hiding until 1953, foreign broadcasts were very important to me, and I passed the information on to everybody I communicated with. Those programs were optimistic. Voice of America said in the early 1950s that communism would soon collapse …’57 Koidu, born in 1932, recalls: “After the war … you could find people who hoped that the West – the United States 52  H. Karro, Saateks, in: Jaan Roos, Läbi punase öö, vol. 1 (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts; Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 1997), 7-11, here 9-10. 53  Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum, 50. 54  Hiljar Tammela, ‘Waiting for the White Ship: The Expectation of World War III among the Population of Soviet Estonia’, Mertelsmann (ed.), The Baltic States under Stalinist Rule, 189-208. 55  The Atlantic Charter was known in Estonia and encouraged forest brothers to keep up resistance. See Laar, War in the Woods, 23. 56  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 205-206. 57  Eesti Rahva Muuseum – Korrespondentide Vastuste Arhiiv (Estonian National Museum – Archive of the Answers of the Correspondents, ERM-KV) 1039, l. 67.

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and the United Kingdom – would come to liberate us from the communists. They were called people waiting for the ‘white ship.’ This white ship was promised by Voice of America and other Western radio stations – people listened to them and believed.”58 The Soviet system seemed to be unstable and unlikely to last long. When the Cold War began, émigré organizations and Western intelligence tried to support the forest brothers, which usually ended in failure, because Soviet security had already infiltrated the resistance with its own agents.59 In addition, there were leaks in Western intelligence, as in the case of Kim Philby. Even when Estonians were fighting on both sides of the partisan conflict I would call it not a civil war, but a struggle against the Soviet state, its institutions and representatives. A leaflet from April 1945 illustrates the narrative used by partisan units to recruit new members: Death to the Bolsheviks and to cruel Red Army Soldiers!  General call. Estonians! You who are real Estonians, don’t be so passive! Don’t let the Bolsheviks deport and arrest you! Try to escape! Men! Those who truly love our small homeland, go into the forests to establish defense against the robber Bolsheviks! Forest brothers! Keep contact with each other to enable the defense of our homeland at the right moment! Long live the soon-to-be liberated Estonia! Published by the Green Legion.60

Who were the forest brothers in reality? Again, we face a serious source problem. Both major types of sources – reports by Soviet security and oral history accounts – are not very reliable. The situation for the partisan activities in 1941 is better, since they were later documented by the Estonian Omakaitse, which grew partly out of the partisan movement serving as a militia during German occupation.61 The circumstances were complicated by the fact that, aside from partisans and people simply hiding in the woods, other groups also came onto the scene, especially in the postwar years, such as Red Army deserters, escaped POWs, marauders and gangs of bandits. In general, Soviet sources called everyone in the woods a ‘bandit.’ In many cases the sources do not reveal who did 58  Ibd. 1036, l. 348. 59  Indrek Jürjo, Operations of Western Intelligence Services and Estonian Refugees in Post-War Estonia and the Tactics of KGB Counterintelligence, in: Anušauskas (ed.), The Anti-Soviet Resistance, 242-268. 60  Quotation from Eerik-Niiles Kross, Metsavendlus Eestis pärast Teist maailmasõda, idem (ed.), Pro Patria II, 5-24, here 9. 61  See the source publication by Noormets (ed.), Metsavennad Suvesõjas 1941.

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what. For example, when the family of a communist activist was murdered, were the perpetrators partisans, marauders or bandits? Forest brothers often hid because they feared arrest, POW status as a veteran of the German army, or mobilization into the Soviet army. Others wanted to take revenge on the Soviets or hoped to restore Estonian independence. Among them were war criminals and fascists, those who favoured an authoritarian regime as in the late 1930s, idealists, and democrats. The forest brothers included women, children and the elderly. Their social background was mixed, but the vast majority came from the peasantry, who found it easier to survive under the harsh conditions than middle- or upper-class urbanites did. The difference between a ‘bandit’ and a forest brother was not always clear-cut. According to the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, there were 110 groups related to the ‘nationalist underground’ and 45 ‘criminal gangs’ active in Estonia in 1946.62 Atrocities were committed by both the state and the partisans. Sometimes the side somebody ended up on was due simply to fate.63 For example, some members of local destroyers’ battalions hunting the partisans had a similar background as the forest brothers and had little motivation to fight them. Thus, some in this conflict did switch sides. Moreover, the enemy was sometimes informed about planned measures, as in Lithuania, for example.64 Individual soldiers of the Estonian Rifle Corps, a unit of the Red Army, deserted and joined the partisans or supported them with weapons.65 The forest brothers could not live without help from the rural population, but in some cases, local attitudes toward the partisans turned sour. Koidu recalls: At that time many forest brothers hid in the woods, and they robbed stores… . The surviving forest brothers now call themselves freedom fighters. I don’t remember that anybody called them freedom fighters then. They were men hiding from arrest in the forest. They fought for their personal freedom when they were being pursued. This was no fight for the freedom of Estonia. Is it possible to call the killing of a parish party organizer, his wife and children and the robbing of shops a fight for freedom? When an amnesty was proclaimed, the majority came out of the woods. Did they then receive the freedom to quit the fight? Some men turned wild and brutal during their time in hiding, and the people even feared them.66 62  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 207-210. 63   Many oral history accounts stress this. See also Rutt Hinrikus, Estnische Lebens­ beschreibungen 1939–1953: Erzählte Realität, Mertelsmann (ed.), Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, 183-210, here 197. 64  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 228-230. 65  Laar, War in the Woods, 61. 66   E RM–KV 1036, l. 358-359.

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The story of resistance is inherently connected with that of accommodation to the Soviet order. Active or passive resistance to the Soviets was one extreme choice, while open collaboration and participation in Soviet crimes was another. Most of the population had a clearly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitude67 but remained in a state of silent non-consent during the 1940s and early 1950s. The longer the Soviets ruled and their regime stabilized and the more the hopes for intervention from abroad dwindled, the more the population started to come to terms with the new order and choose a sort of pragmatic cooperation. As long as the peasants were still independent, they could support partisans, but when they were collectivized they no longer possessed the means and had to come to terms with the state somehow. The Stalinist regime made use not only of repressive methods but also of promises. In the postwar years, culture and education expanded, offering opportunities for those with an ‘acceptable’ social and political background. Of course, education and propaganda were also expected to help spread the regime’s ideological values. In addition, enormous career opportunities existed because so much of the previous elite was gone.68 Upward social mobility was clearly attractive for the poorer strata of society. Those willing to cooperate with the Stalinist regime could hope to gain some material advantages and privileges, too, since in an ‘economy of shortages’ (to use János Kornai’s phrase) the state was the most important distributor of goods. The regime tried to win over parts of the population with measures like the land reforms or the cancellation of old agricultural credits and loans. Undoubtedly, some support could be bought in this way, but the newly established farmsteads were too small to be economically viable. They received only a bit of state assistance and, after a short period of tax exemption, they were subject to increasing taxation and forced procurement.69 One factor speeding up the accommodation of the population was its changing composition. Approximately 200,000 people – nearly one-fifth of the population – was permanently lost due to war, political repression and mass exodus. Young males were obviously over-represented among those losses.70 The decline in population was offset by immigration from the ‘old’ Soviet republics. While certainly not all immigrants were pro-Soviet, and not all those who fled the country or were victimized by the Stalinist regime were anti-Soviet, 67  Olaf Mertelsmann, How the Russians Turned, 43-58. 68  Olaf Mertelsmann, Die Expansion von Kultur und Bildung als Stütze des sowjetischen Systems in Estland, in: idem (ed.), Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, 251-265. 69  Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum, 321-324; Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau, 60-61. 70  Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau, 116-118.

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the population’s changing composition eventually led to more support for the state and less resistance. In addition, large detachments of Soviet troops were based in the Baltic republics, and they did not appear in the official population statistics. In Estonia’s case we have statistics for example for January 1947, when 97,400 stationed soldiers were recorded.71 This was about one tenth of the population. Party membership was another indicator of accommodation. In 1945 the Estonian Communist Party had 2,409 members and candidates; by 1950 it already had 17,639, and six years later 22,524. Russian-speakers constituted the majority during the entire period, and most of them were immigrants, but party membership among ethnic Estonians clearly increased.72 The development of mass organizations like the Communist Youth indicates a similar tendency; the regime was gaining ground. The impact of Stalinist repression on the accommodation process appears to be mixed. The scale is staggering: more than one-tenth of the population was arrested, deported or spent time in a Soviet camp, and four percent died as a result.73 On the one hand, repression triggered resistance, as occurred with the two mass deportations in 1941 and 1949. On the other hand, fear of arrest and intimidation could, and did, reduce support for partisans. The arrests and deportations overwhelmingly hit innocent people, but they also thinned the ranks of potential forest brothers. Family members of known partisans were detained, too. This policy proved quite efficient.74 Most repressive measures were targeted not at resistance but at ‘cleansing’ society; still, they helped to enforce grumbling obedience to the orders of the regime. The events in Hungary in 1956 sparked some demonstrations in Estonia,75 but they confirmed that Soviet rule would last for a long time and that there would be no Western intervention. De-Stalinization since 1953,76 the resulting 71  Sazonov, Secretary of the ECP(b) Central Committee, to Pozdniak, Administration for the Examination of Party Organs at the Central Committee of the VKP(b), January 1947, RA, ERAF 1-5-76, l. 120. 72  A.K. Pankseev (ed.), Kommunisticheskaia partija Estonii v tsifrakh, 1920–1940: Sbornik statei (Tallinn, 1983), pp. 108-110. 73  See Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Human Losses, Salo (ed.), The White Book, 25-46, here 38-39. 74  Laar, War in the Woods, 162. 75  Amir Weiner, The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics, in: Journal of Modern History (2006) 78, 333-376, here 356-359, 364. 76  Tõnu Tannberg, Die Pläne Moskaus für Estland im Sommer 1953, in: Mertelsmann (ed.), Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, 282-295; idem, Die unbekannte Amnestie: Berijas Rehabilitierungspläne 1953 am Beispiel der Estnischen SSR, in: Olaf Mertelsmann (ed.), Estland und Russland: Aspekte der Beziehungen beider Länder (= Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa 11. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2005), 249-273; Tõnu

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release of prisoners and deportees, and the end of open terror were responsible, too, for a slow change in public sentiment. So was Khrushchev’s new agricultural policy in the mid-1950s, increasing procurement prices and thus improving the lot of the peasants, which had been impoverished by collectivization. Beginning in the late 1940s, the living standard of the non-agrarian population did rise steadily.77 One might interpret the Stalinist era as a kind of transition phase in which society was restructured by force and life seemed unstable. Stability returned with the ‘Thaw’ and de-Stalinization, when Soviet ways of life had taken root.78 During the late 1950s the Baltic republics turned step-by-step into model Soviet republics, especially Estonia and Latvia, leaving no room for armed resistance. Passive resistance and dissidence appeared and isolated incidents might have alarmed the authorities, but they were no threat to the regime. Only the Gorbachev years and the ‘Singing Revolution’ marked an end to the accommodation of the existing order.79

Soviet Policy

One might argue that Soviet policy triggered the resistance movement. Without economic deprivation, open terror and violence, the partisan movement would not have reached such a scale. On the other hand, the Soviets favoured a kind of de-escalation policy; in dealing with partisans they were more sophisticated than the Germans in occupied Eastern Europe or, later, the Americans in Vietnam. Of course, some captured forest brothers were tortured and killed, and their bodies displayed to the local population as a warning, but relatively few reprisal actions against civilians took place in Estonia.80 According to the rules of war, the Soviets could have acted much more harshly and imposed the death penalty more often on partisans. They also could have punished entire villages, but they were aware that excessive reprisals would only fuel the resistance movement with new recruits. Indeed, several amnesties were declared Tannberg, 1956 god i problemy Baltii v Kremle, in: idem, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii, 143-176. 77  On the standard of living, see Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau, 135-165. 78  Olaf Mertelsmann, The Private Sphere in Estonia during Stalinism, in: Problemy istorii, filologii, kul’tury 2007, Vypusk XVIII, 58-81, here 75. 79  On the regaining of independence, see Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1993). 80  Mart Laar mentions the case of the village of Kose, where on September 22, 1944, all male inhabitants were executed in reaction to the fierce resistance of individual partisans. Laar, War in the Woods, 28-29.

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for people in hiding in the forest. Georgii Perov, head of the Estonian Bureau of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), saw amnesties in June 1946 as a way to ‘return to legal existence people who hide in the forests fearing reprisals for service in the German Army, evading conscription into the Red Army and other similar offenses.’ In all, the government of the Estonian SSR granted five amnesties between 1944 and 1955.81 Some of those amnestied were later arrested anyway,82 and a second group would end up on the deportation list,83 but others remained untouched. Out of 5,255 amnestied forest brothers in Estonia, more than 4,000 would still be free persons by 1953.84 Arresting amnestied forest brothers was actually against Soviet official policy if no additional evidence was found or if the forest brothers did not continue their anti-Soviet activities. Nikolai Karotamm, first secretary of the ECP(b), made his position clear in a meeting with local party organizers: A murderer is a murderer, a deserter is a deserter, but a person on guard duty at a bridge or a haystack – this is something different. I want to say, from my side, from the party and the government, there is a directive that not a single person should be arrested who comes out of the woods and is not a bandit. If you hear of any incident in which a person was legalized, came out of the forests and was arrested by local authorities, please let me know about it so that I can intervene and restore order.85

Approximately 5,300 forest brothers were legalized; agents and informants were recruited from among them. Those who had fought actively and killed Soviet officials or civilians could at least expect not to lose their life when they surrendered.86 The amnesties were definitely a key tool in silencing resistance. In addition, not all veterans of the German army were imprisoned or became POWs; others served only in labor battalions or as regular soldiers of the Red Army, or were not touched at all. There might have been individual cases of former forest brothers being mobilized into the Soviet army. So despite the major postwar cleansing, there were some elements of compromise. In fact, in a May 1945 report to Stalin, the Estonian Bureau of the Politburo declared

81  Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, 196-197; idem, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 199. 82  Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 247. 83  Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, 208. 84  Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 204. 85  Meeting with parish partorgs, August 9-11, 1946, RA, ERAF 1-4-374, l. 73. 86  Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency, 200-201.

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cleansing to be the main aim of Soviet policy but also described the success of an amnesty.87 Most of the struggle against the partisans was carried out by the Department of the Anti-Banditry Fight, which was a department of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior subordinated to an institution with the same name of the People’s Commissariat for State Security of the Estonian SSR. The latter was renamed a Central Administration at the end of 1944.88 The department involved the militsiia (Soviet police), the counterintelligence agency SMERSH (an abbreviation of smert’ shpionam, literally ‘death to spies’), special armed forces of the Ministry of the Interior, and border guards in their activities.89 As of July 1st 1947, there were thirty-five residents, 252 agents and 1,443 informers registered in the fight against the resistance movement. That sounds like a powerful network, but its efficiency and reliability was not so impressive.90 One problem of Soviet security was that many Russian employees lacked knowledge of the Estonian language and local conditions. Aside from special security units, ‘killer agents’ (agent boevik), assigned to murder individual partisan leaders,91 or informers, the local destroyer battalions92 could serve as additional forces, but also as a matter of deescalation. Thus the struggle with the partisans should not conjure up images of Russians hunting Estonians in the forest. Created in fall 1944, the destroyer battalions were originally headed by Estonia’s first party secretary, Nikolai Karotamm, and were dissolved only by 1954. They were a kind of militia consisting mainly of peasants; they had 6,755 members in 1947. Approximately one-third of the volunteers came from the ranks of the party or the Komsomol. In fact, they were more a low-value auxiliary force than a fighting unit and arrested more criminals than forest brothers during their existence. Those who joined were promised additional rations or a reduction of their work norms.93

87  Report on the work of the Estonian Bureau January 1-May 1, 1945, RGASPI f. 598, o. 1, d. 2., l. 2-3, 5-6. 88  Kuusk, Nõukogude võimu lahingud, 8. 89  Ibd., 11. 90  Ibd., 117-118, 151. 91  Väljas, Hävitusagendid. 92  On those units, see Noormets/Ohmann (eds.), Hävitajad. 93  Noormets, Ohmann, ‘Saateks’, Noormets/Ohmann (eds.), Hävitajad, 11-61, here 11, 17, 29, 34, 36, 38-39, 44.

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The mass deportation in 1949 and the collectivization could also be seen as part of the de-escalation policy.94 The Germans would have killed people suspected of supporting partisans; the Soviets ‘only’ deported or arrested them. Of course, the majority of deportees were innocent, but ‘families of partisans’ and ‘supporters of partisans’ were deported, too. This measure, aside from the brutality, would discourage forest brothers and their potential helpers. After 1946 the Soviets were generally able to reduce their efforts against the partisans. Immediately after the second mass deportation and the forced collectivization of agriculture, the forest brothers’ activities increased for a while and declined again later. The last major campaign against resistance was launched at the beginning of 1953 and slowed down after the death of Stalin. In February and March, 43 partisans were killed by the Soviets.95 Active measures of the regime, the de-escalation policy, a slow change in the attitude of the population, a loss of faith among the resistance fighters and the increasing food problems they encountered – all these factors combined led to a decline in armed resistance. Alexander Statiev sums up the tactics of the Soviet pacification policy in the newly-acquired territories thus: the regime’s policy was centralized to ensure coherence. Land reform and social mobility were intended to increase local support for the Soviets. Pre-emptive arrests and deportations were aimed at reducing the social base of the partisans. Amnesties and propaganda were designed to deprive the forest brothers of potential participants. Special agents were supposed to kill the leaders of the resistance, while security, informers, destroyer battalions and special units were aimed at ‘liquidating’ groups of partisans. Threats of arrest and intimidation were to keep civilians from supporting the partisans.96 Were the forest brothers, thus, engaged in a ‘quixotic guerilla campaign’?97 For contemporaries it was not always clear that the struggle was hopeless. Diaries and reports on the sentiment of the population reveal that in the early postwar years, the belief in a coming Soviet withdrawal was quite widespread.98 The longer fighting continued, the more people realized that this was doomed to failure. We know that the realities of life in the countryside depended largely on the local rulers. For example, there were different levels of repression in 94  On the deportation, see the excellent study by Aigi Rahi, 1949. aasta märtsiküüditamine. 95  Tannberg, Julgeolekuorganite tegevusest metsavendluse mahasuurumisel. 96  Statiev, Social Conflict and Counterinsurgency, 301. 97  Hank Johnston/Aili Aarelaid-Tart, Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobi­ lization: The Estonian National Movement, 1940–1991, in: Sociological Perspectives (2000) 43, 671-698, here 694. 98  Svodka no. 5, July 26, 1946, RA, ERAF 1-1/4-276, l. 32; entry in Jaan Roos’s diary, October 14, 1947, Jaan Roos, Läbi punase öö, vol. 2 (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts, 2000), 167.

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similar parishes.99 Thus, active resistance slowed down the Sovietization process in the countryside. Fear of forest brothers could and did influence local authorities to restrain themselves; otherwise party members or activists even risked being killed. In hindsight, of course, armed resistance against the Soviets was a quixotic fight against a much larger force, and most of the victims on both sides died for no reason. Many forest brothers became victims of Western Cold War propaganda, misreading the international situation and entertaining naive hopes. After armed resistance ended, other forms like passive resistance and, later, dissidence continued.100 Conclusion The history of armed resistance in Estonia is connected to the story of accommodation to Soviet rule. In the long run, the Soviet persecution and de-escalation policy proved to be successful. The forest brothers lost their economic base and their supporters. In general, the struggle was not an heroic story; nevertheless, it was an important aspect of the violent Sovietization during the period of Stalinism. Compared to Lithuania or Western Ukraine, in Estonia the conflict involved much less violence and fewer victims. Some people continued to hide in the forest; hundreds legalized their existence only after the death of Stalin. One of the last forest brothers drowned during an attempt to arrest him in 1978. Another was found dead in 1980.101 In recent years, the Estonian judicial system has punished individual ‘killer agents.’ Using the model of asymmetric warfare by Keith D. Dickson one might clearly state that the Estonian armed anti-Soviet resistance serves as a good example for asymmetric warfare. But resistance could only locally reach the second phase after the war. Only in summer 1941, did forest brethren successfully participate side by side with the German army in the overthrow of a hated regime. After 1944 this was not possible anymore, the partisans could act only on a local level never really threatening the Stalinist order.

99  Kõll, Tender Wolves, 141-144. In oral history accounts it is stressed, too, that some local authorities were harsh, while others better understood the needs of the population and behaved with restraint. 100  Viktor Niitsoo, Vastupanu, 1955–1985 (Tartu, 1997). 101  Kross, Metsavendlus Eestis, 5-24, here 20.

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Short Bibliography

Document Collections



Secondary Literature

Laasi, Evald (ed.), Vastupanuliikumine Eestis 1944-49: Dokumentide kogu (Tallinn: Nõmm & Co, 1992). Noormets, Tiit (ed.), Eesti metsavennad 1944–1957: Dokumentide kogumik (Tartu: Rahvusarhiiv, 2014). Noormets, Tiit (ed.), Metsavennad Suvesõjas 1941: Eesti relvastatud vastupanuliikumine Omakaitse dokumentides (Tallinn Riigiarhiiv, 2003). Noormets, Tiit/Valdur Ohmann (eds.), Hävitajad: Nõukogude hävituspataljonid Eestis 1944–1954: Dokumentide kogumik (Tallinn: Riigiarhiiv, 2006).

Anušauskas, Arvydas (ed.), The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: Du Ka; Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 1999). Kuusk, Pearu, Nõukogude võimu lahingud Eesti vastupanuliikumisega: Banditismivastase Võitluse Osakond aastatel 1944–1947 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2007). Laar, Mart, Metsavennad: Relvastatud vastupanu Eestis Teise maailmasõja järel (Tallinn: Read, 2013). Laar, Mart, War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival, 1944–1956 (Washington, DC: Compass Press, 1992). Statiev, Alexander, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Zubkova, Elena, “Lesnye brat’ia” v Pribaltike: voina posle voiny, in: Otechestvennaia istoriia (2007) 51, 2, 74-90, and 3, 14-30. Zubkova, Elena, Pribaltika i Kreml’ 1940–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008), 191-256.

Summary After a brief historical introduction the paper deals with the impact of the first year of Soviet rule 1940–1941, the armed resistance of summer 1941 and the German occupation of 1941–1944. The focus is, however, the post-war period. Sovietisation, economic exploitation and the politics of repression and outright terror led to armed resistance. Most of those who were labelled as ‘forest brethren’ simply went into hiding to avoid possible arrest or mobilisation into the Soviet army. Only a minority actively participated in armed resistance. The paper discusses the connection between the progressive reconciliation of the population with the Soviet regime and the decline of resistance as well as the way in which hopes of Western intervention or the breakdown of the Soviet

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order in Estonia proved to be unfounded. The paper analyses Soviet strategies in the eventually successful fight against the partisans. These ranged from amnesties and the legalisation of the forest brethren to the deportation of potential supporters and the use of informers and assassins. In any event, the forced collectivisation of 1949 made it much harder for peasants to support the forest brethren.

Summary in Estonian

Nõukogudevastane relvastatud vastupanu Eestis pärast 1944. aastat Pärast ajaloolist sissejuhatust käsitletakse artiklis nõukogude võimu esimese aasta mõjusid 1940–1941, relvastatud vastupanu 1941. aasta suvel ja Saksa okupatsiooni aastatel 1941–1944. Tähelepanu keskpunktis on aga sõjajärgne aeg. Nõukogude sovetiseerimise, majandusliku kurnamise, rõhumise ja terrori poliitika kutsusid esile relvastatud vastupanu. Enamik inimesi, keda loeti metsavendadeks, olid aga lihtsalt põranda alla läinud, et pääseda võimalikust arreteerimisest või Punaarmeesse värbamisest. Ainult väike osa neist osales aktiivses, relvastatud vastupanus. Artiklis selgitatakse seoseid rahvastiku järkjärgulise nõukogude režiimiga kohanemise ja vastupanu hääbumise vahel. Lisaks osutusid lääne sekkumise või isegi nõukogude korra kokkuvarisemisega seotud lootused Eestis petlikeks. Peale selle uuritakse ka nõukogude strateegiat partisanidega võitlemisel, mis osutus viimaks ka edukaks. Edu tõid amnestiad, metsavendade legaliseerimine, aga ka võimalike toetajate küüditamised ning informantide ja hävitusagentide kasutamine. Pärast sundkollektiviseerimist aastal 1949 muutus metsavendade abistamine talupoegade poolt nagunii oluliselt raskemaks.

Chapter 4

A History of the Lithuanian Partisan Underground State (1944–1953) Vykintas Vaitkevičius Translated by Laima Servaitė On the eve of the Second World War, Lithuania was ruled by President Antanas Smetona (1874–1944). The post had been offered to him by officers who were amongst the organisers of the coup of 1926. During the second decade of independence, from 1928 to 1938, the Republic of Lithuania annually spent 17.526.7% of the state budget on the army and the defence of the country. In 1939, the Ministry of National Defence was allocated 85.9 million Litas (24.1 %) of the budget1. At the time, Lithuania had a population of 2.9 million; 125,433 men were ready for mobilisation and the number of reserve troops amounted to 198,697.2 Moreover, about 88,000 members of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, a paramilitary organisation, were also subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the army.3 Lithuania was delivered ultimatums by Hitler’s Germany in March 1939 and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the last sitting of the Government on 14th June 1940. The President handed over his duties to the Prime Minister and, on the following day, units of the Red Army were marching through Lithuania and the occupation of the country had begun. Lithuania was incorporated into the USSR on August 3rd of the same year. The first 12,331 Lithuanian citizens were deported between 14th and 18th June 1941 and a further 3,915 “enemies of the people” were sent to Gulag labour camps.4 Soon after this, Germany declared war on the Soviet Union and entered Lithuanian territory. At the same time, an armed uprising began, the leaders of which declared the restoration of statehood within 24 hours. 1  Vytautas Jokubauskas, “Mažųjų kariuomenių” galia ir paramilitarizmas. Tarpukario Lietuvos atvejis [The Power and Paramilitarism of “Small Armies”: a Case of Interwar Lithuania] (Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universiteto leidykla, 2014), 115. 2  Ibd., 568. 3  Ibd., 388. 4  Birutė Burauskaitė (ed.), Lietuvos gyventojų genocidas 1 [The Genocide of Lithuania’s Resi­ dents, Vol. 1] (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 1999), 52.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_005

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The Provisional Government began its work on June 24th but suspended its activities six weeks later on August 5th – as did the commandant’s offices in many cities and counties, the headquarters of the defence forces and insurgent groups – in protest against German policies in the occupied land.5 By autumn 1941, most insurgents were already involved in the units of auxiliary police or local self-defence units. On 16th February 1944, General Povilas Plechavičius invited young Lithuanians to join the Lithuanian Territorial Defence Force, a move that reflected a secret hope for the restoration of the Lithuanian Army. Between 15th and 21st May of the same year, disagreements with the Nazi military command led Plechavičius to place 19,500 soldiers of the Defence Force in German uniforms with Lithuanian insignia on indefinite leave. The Red Army won the battle for Vilnius on 13th July 1944 and the port of Klaipėda was occupied on 28th January 1944. The second Soviet occupation of Lithuania had begun. Around 120,000 residents of Lithuania (and another 140,000 from the Klaipėda Region) fled to the West to escape,6 while the organisations seeking the restoration of independence waged partisan warfare. Between July 1944 and the death in an ambush of the last of their leaders, the Commander of the Kęstutis District Jonas Vilčinskas-Algirdas, on 19th Sep­tember 1953, around 20,000 partisans fell fighting the occupiers, with the same number being taken prisoner. In addition to this, 26,588 partisan liaison agents and supporters and members of unarmed (mainly young people’s) underground organisations were reported to have been arrested during the same period.7 Since the restoration of independence in 1990, the Lithuanian partisan struggle of 1944–1953 has enjoyed a number of labels such as ‘the partisan movement’ and ‘anti-Soviet’ or ‘armed resistance’. The concept of Lithuanian partisan warfare against the Soviet Union has become established over the past decade. During the war it became clear to partisans that, in order to have an independent and democratic state, they had to express their position and take up arms. When reconsidering and expanding Carl Schmitt’s theory of partisan

5  For more information about the context and historical narratives, see Dainius Noreika, The Intersection of Different Narratives: the Holocaust, the June Uprising and the Partisan War, in: Vygantas Vareikis (ed.), Holokaustas nacių okupuotose Rytų ir Vakarų Europos valstybėse: tyrimai ir atmintis [The Holocaust in the Eastern and Western European States Occupied by the Nazis: Studies and Memory] (Kaunas: Kauno IX forto muziejus, 2017), 240-249. 6  Arvydas Anušauskas, Teroras 1940–1958 [Terror 1940–1958] (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2013), 280. 7  Ibd., 282-284.

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irregularity, mobility, political activity and tellurianism,8 Bernardas Gailius argued that, “The partisan is the citizen at war. Such is the central thesis of another theory of the partisan. The European concept of the partisan is deeply rooted in European republicanism. Thus, the partisan and the citizen are two sides of the same coin”.9 Partisan warfare in Lithuania (as in Poland and Ukraine) is considered an extreme expression of public spirit: as the unconditional and unrestricted armed defence of the Homeland.10 The only truly unique feature of Eastern European partisans was the desire to give the resistance an emphatically military form: unlike in Western Europe they wore uniforms, had military ranks and established duties and drafted statutes and a number of other documents. However, Gailius did not confine himself to the conclusion that, in compliance with international law and customs, Lithuanian partisans were to be considered as an army of volunteers, a legitimate state defence institution.11 He also proposed the original idea of an underground state that was further developed by Aistė Petrauskienė, who argued that the Lithuanian underground partisan state was characterised and legitimated by: the partisans’ right to govern, their statutes, social policy, military organisation and administration, the financial system, the communications network, the underground press and proclamations and diplomatic relations with foreign states. The author concluded that “in the years of the partisan war, the democratic state of Lithuania could have been, and was, everywhere where there were people willing to have and to defend it”.12 It is in this sense – from the viewpoint of the underground state and the united partisan political and military organisation – that this paper first introduces the history of Lithuanian partisan warfare between 1944 and 1953.

The Lithuanian Liberation Army (LLA)

The LLA was one of several Lithuanian resistance organisations founded during the Second World War. In some cases LLA members became the first 8  Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan. A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political (Michigan State University Press 2004), 9-14. 9  Bernardas Gailius, Another Theory of Partisan, in: Horyzonty Polityki (2016), 7, 153. 10   Bernardas Gailius, 1944–1953 m. partizanų karas šiuolaikinėje Lietuvos istorinėje, politinėje ir teisinėje kultūroje [Partisan Warfare 1944–1953 in Contemporary Lithuanian Historical, Political and Legal Culture] (Vilnius: PhD Thesis Vilnius University, 2009), 235. 11  Ibd., 272. 12  Aistė Petrauskienė, Lietuvos partizanų pogrindžio valstybės bruožai [Features of the Lithuanian Partisan Underground State], in: Tautosakos darbai (2017) 53, 171.

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commanders and members of partisan units. Kazys Veverskis-Senis (1913–44), a graduate of the War School of Kaunas and a law student with Christian leanings, secretly crossed the Nemunas to Germany following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania before returning home on foot in August 1941 and writing a programme for a new secret organisation, which began with the following words: “The Lithuanian Liberation Army is a Lithuanian national, military and political organisation … The Lithuanian Liberation Army considers armed military forces to be the most reliable means of regaining and maintaining independence”.13 The LLA was established by adopting the hierarchical, territorial and functional principles of the Lithuanian Army and then discovering new forms of action. LLA members operated in groups of three and mostly lived illegally or semi-legally with the help of the organisation’s supporters (who paid a monthly 10 Mark fee).14 On July 1st 1944, the approximately 10,000 members of the LLA were placed on alert, with those able to use weapons being ordered to join the teams of vanagai [hawks] in forests chosen for the purpose. However, this only occurred in four of the five LLA Districts due to the fact that the Klaipėda District organisation had never become more than a paper proposal.15 Between 1944 and 1946 – and in individual cases even longer – former soldiers of the Lithuanian Army, members of the Riflemen’s Union and participants in the June 1941 uprising, most of whom were members of the LLA, formed the nuclei of the partisan units. Between December 1944 and July 1945, for example, the company led by Mykolas Kazanas-Siaubas in Northeastern Lithuania boasted no fewer than 354 partisans, including 140 (40%) former members of paramilitary self-defence units. 61 partisans had belonged to the Riflemen’s Union, 112 had participated in the June uprising and subsequent defence units and 64 had experience of working in the police (public and auxiliary) and police battalions during the German occupation. As many as 20 out of the 23 commanders had been Riflemen, members of the self-defence units or policemen. In later years, younger partisans who had not belonged to the earlier paramilitary self-defence formations gained an increasingly important role. In some cases, the determination to fight was fuelled by patriotism while others had been threatened by repression because of family members who had

13  Dalia Kuodytė, Algis Kašėta (eds.), Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais [Struggle for Freedom in 1944–1953] (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga, 1996), 53. 14  Kęstutis Kasparas, Lietuvos Laisvės Armija [The Lithuanian Liberation Army] (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga, 2002), 64, 66. 15  Ibd., 86-87.

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become partisans or served in the occupying forces (the first mobilisation to the Red Army was announced as early as August 1944).16 In August 1945, Motiejus Pečiulionis (1888–1960) was co-opted onto the Lithuanian Defence Committee and given responsibility for the LLA’s political programme. Pečiulionis was an authority and a symbol, the only general in the Lithuanian Army to have fought in the partisan ranks. According to unpublished data collected by Darius Juodis just over 100 Lithuanian Army officers fought with the partisans for some period, long or short. As a comparison, over 1,000 officers who had escaped both Bolshevik and Nazi repression retreated to the West in the summer of 1944.

The United Democratic Resistance Movement (Lith. BDPS)

The Constitutive Act of the BDPS, a political and fighting movement, was written in the West and was the subject of political disputes among Lithuanian émigrés. The commanders of the partisans in Southern Lithuania accepted the proposals of the émigré representatives Jonas Deksnys and Vytautas Staneika and the Constitutive Act was signed on 6th June 1946.17 The supreme political body of the nation – the Supreme Committee for the Restoration of Lithuania (VLAK) – was set up on June 10th 1946 and the act was signed on behalf of the committee the following day.18 However, in line with the old principle of representing the various political parties, the partisans did not see any point in uniting the forces of freedom. Hence, VLAK failed to be recognised abroad, where the influential Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK)19 was active. It was Juozas Markulis-Erelis (1913–1987), a reserve junior lieutenant with the Lithuanian Army and a member of the LLA, who initially benefited the most from this situation in his other role as an agent of the Soviet State Security Agency. Alleging that there was widescale passive resistance in both organisations, Markulis took every opportunity to propose the demobilisation of partisans and then, without awakening suspicion, watched them, collected

16  Dainius Noreika, Šauliai, Birželio sukilimas ir partizaninis karas [The Riflemen. The June Uprising and Partisan Warfare], in: Lituanistica (2015) 61, 3, 228, 229. 17  Dalia Kuodytė, Algis Kašėta (eds.), Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais [Struggle for Freedom in 1944–1953], 254-255. 18  Ibd., 256-258. 19  Kęstutis K. Girnius, Partizanų kovos Lietuvoje [Partisan Fight in Lithuania], (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1990), 333-335.

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information about their relationships and slandered and split the partisan leadership. This activity continued until he was exposed in December 1946. Indirectly, Markulis’ activity was beneficial to the partisans because his encouragement of their leaders and authorised agents to move freely around Lithuania created numerous occasions for meetings, as recalled by Juozas Lukša-Daumantas.20 On the other hand, as the most influential security agent, Markulis contributed to the deaths of at least 18 partisans and to the arrests of 178 participants in the liberation struggle.21 On 15th-16th January 1947, a meeting of Lithuanian partisan leaders took place in the village of Juodupiai near Pilviškiai (Vilkaviškis District) at the invitation of the leadership of Tauras District. They discussed the future activities of the BDPS and the possibility of forging and maintaining relationships abroad. Upon isolating themselves from the Markulis-controlled BDPS they decided to set up another organisation with a different composition but essentially the same goals and powers, which would unite all the underground forces and contact all Lithuanian committees operating abroad. These committees should in turn ask the British and Americans to provide assistance, and, upon the outbreak of the Third World War, to take control of Lithuania.22 Only Tauras and Dainava Districts were represented at the Juodupiai meeting. Juozas Kasperavičius-Visvydas (1912–1947), the Commander of the United Kęstutis District, failed to attend due to the short notice. However, his appeal to the participants effectively provided a programme for the liberation movement: Freedom fighters across the country were required to declare “their determination, as conscious, honest and nationally aware Lithuanians to fight for the freedom and independence of Lithuania, regardless of differences of religion, education, social status, gender, personal welfare, health and any danger to their life … (for) there are hardly any essential ideological differences”.23 It should be emphasised that both Kasperavičius and his successor Jonas Žemaitis-Lukas firmly believed that the leadership of freedom fighters should not be divided between political and military roles: Partisans were simultaneously armed fighters, citizens and politicians. 20  Liūtas Mockūnas, Pavargęs herojus: Jonas Deksnys trijų žvalgybų tarnyboje [A Tired Hero: Jonas Deksnys in Three Intelligence Services] (Vilnius: Baltos Lankos, 1996), 231. 21   Antanas Bulotas, Išdavystėmis įsiamžinęs saugumo agentas partizaniniame kare [A Security Agent Perpetuated by Treason in the Partisan Warfare], in: Darbai ir dienos (2000) 21, 213. 22  Bonifacas Ulevičius, Vadu gimstama [Leaders are Born], in: Laisvės kovų archyvas (1998) 23, 27. 23  Juozas Daumantas, Partizanai [Partisans] (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga; Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimo centras, 2005), 229-230.

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In May 1947, Juozas Lukša-Kęstutis and Jurgis Krikščiūnas-Rimvydas, two specially authorised agents of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Lith. VGPŠ), successfully crossed the Iron Curtain – the border with Poland – and handed a letter and a large pile of partisan documents and publications to Stasys Lozoraitis, the Head of Lithuania’s Foreign Service. The Tauras District decided to turn to foreign states and wrote (presumably) to the Commander of Žemaičiai District in a letter dated October 6th 1947: “… One institution cannot be simultaneously political and military as this may not be recognised by foreign countries … the British advised us through our authorised representative to introduce such a distinction. The BDPS must represent the true government of Lithuania in the way that the VGPŠ and its merely military staff cannot; Western countries have already de facto recognised our BDPS as an established structure; the BDPS has the right to and must write memoranda and notes to the governments of other states in its role as the true government of Lithuania, as recognised and accepted by foreign governments … ; foreign governments will not allow the formation of a Lithuanian government in exile with the argument that a true government has already been formed in Lithuania in the shape of the BDPS; the BDPS has the right to adopt laws, make decisions and draft plans for the future, etc.”.24 The Commander of Tauras District, the teacher, policeman and reserve junior lieutenant of the Lithuanian Army Antanas Baltūsis-Žvejas (1915–1948) was elected Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Another five district representatives were expected to join the General Staff. However, no officer could be found to accept the post of Commander of the Armed Forces. The task of forming the BDPS was initially entrusted to Alfonsas VabalasGediminas (1909–1948), the Head of the Political Division of the Tauras District, and subsequently passed on to Vincas Seliokas-Gintautas (1904–1997), an engineer and Interim Chairman of the BDPS Presidium. It was intended that the post of Chairman should be occupied by a high-ranking military officer but, for various reasons, Viktoras Giedrys (1894–1955), a brigadier general of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army, Mykolas Mačiokas (1899–1950), a lieutenant colonel of the General Staff and, later, Colonel Domas Steponaitis (1897–1986) all rejected the position. On 28th May 1947, a meeting of the BDPS Presidium appears to have taken place at either a secret address in Kaunas or on the farm of a partisan supporter outside the city. Precise information about the gathering has never been found. However, the resolutions and provisions adopted that day were reflected in a political declaration that, it is generally assumed, were to have been 24  Ibd., 87-88.

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discussed and signed by the participants of the joint meeting of the BDPS and VGPŠ in Kaunas on June 12th-15th. In addition to the declaration, a special address of the BDPS Presidium to the Lithuanian nation to mark the seventh anniversary of the first Bolshevik occupation was also prepared.25 However, the Head of the VGPŠ may have been misled by the Security Agency, because the alleged Commander of the Žemaitija partisans, who arrived in Kaunas on June 12th, was nothing more than a provocateur. Moreover, the military operations held by the partisans of the Birutė Unit of Tauras Military District in and around Kaunas failed to meet the high political aspirations.26 Despite the dangers and difficulties, the members of the BDPS Presidium (or, according to the memoirs written by Seliokas after his return from the Gulag, the “Information Centre”) kept working in Kaunas throughout the summer of 1947. Using all possible means they collected, analysed and disseminated information on international politics and domestic affairs in every language.27 In addition to Vabalas and Seliokas the Centre consisted of another six intellectuals who were residing legally or semi-legally in Kaunas: the captain in the Lithuanian Army Edmundas Akelis-Aklys (1910–1950), the teacher and translator Vincas Bazilevičius-Taučius (1914–1998), the engineer and reserve junior lieutenant Jonas Boruta-Linonis (1915–1996), the opera soloist and reserve major Antanas Kučingis-Kalvaitis (1899–1983), the poet, publicist and translator Antanas Miškinis-Kaukas (1905–1983) and the priest, notary of the Kaunas Archdiocese Curia and Dean of Kaunas Juozas Stankūnas-Stonis (1908–1968), all of whom were assisted by journalist and translator Vytautas Boleslovas Kauneckas (1908–1993). Following his arrest on 22nd September 1947, Seliokas’ duties seem to have been taken over by Boruta. The incomplete BDPS Presidium coordinated and translated into foreign languages the BDPS memoranda that were addressed to the United Nations and the Big Four Conference as well as a letter to Pope Pius XII and a proclamation of the Lithuanian nation appealing to the conscience of the free world. These and other documents were taken to the West across the Iron Curtain – the border with Eastern Prussia – by partisans led by Lukša in December 1947. Baltūsis’ death on 2nd February 1948 was soon followed by the arrest of all of the remaining members of the BDPS Presidium with the exception of Vabalas. However, the work of the Centre ceased and the Security Agency pursued 25  Bonifacas Ulevičius, Vadu gimstama [Leaders are Born], 70-72. 26  For more information see Mindaugas Pocius. Antisovietinis pasipriešinimas Kaune 1946– 1947 [Anti-Soviet Resistance in Kaunas in 1946–1947], in: Genocidas ir rezistencija (2011) 2, 68-69. 27  Vincas Seliokas, Atsiminimai [Memoirs] (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimo centras, 2001) 284-290.

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Vabalas until his death on June 26th. The overall leadership of the partisans moved to the Kęstutis District in Western Lithuania. On 19th June 1948, the commanders of the Western Lithuanian Region and Districts took the decision to continue developing a united partisan leadership and to adopt the ideas expressed in Kasperavičius-Visvydas’ above-mentioned address of 15th-16th January 1947 as its ideological basis. The Regional Commander Jonas Žemaitis (1909–1954) was elected Provisional Chairman of the Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom. As if to demonstrate his authority and power his first order to the organisation’s members was signed with the name Grand Duke Vytautas. Jonas Žemaitis graduated from the War School in Kaunas in 1929 before serving in an artillery regiment. Promoted to captain in 1937 he went to France to train at the Fontainebleau Artillery School. Having joined the Red Army (the 29th Corps of Riflemen, which was formed from the Lithuanian Army) in 1940 he was captured by the Germans in June 1941. After he returned to his home near Šiluva (Raseiniai District), where he worked in a cooperative. He became a battalion commander of the Lithuanian Territorial Defence Force in March 1944 and then, after a period in hiding, entered the forest as Commander of the Žebenkštis Unit Staff on 2nd June 1946.28

The Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom (Lith. LLKS)

On the night of July 26th to 27th 1948, Žemaitis arrived in Duktas Forest, which covered parts of the rural administrative districts of Šiauliai, Padubysis and Radviliškis. Petras Bartkus-Mažrimas (1925–1949), Commander of Prisikėlimas District and a partisan who was both close and loyal to Žemaitis, had already established bunkers in the farms of partisan supporters. The location chosen for the Supreme Partisan Leadership also met other important requirements: It was only 10 kilometres from the city of Šiauliai, where the partisans expected to find the assistance and material support of the city’s intellectuals and members of the anti-Soviet underground and only five kilometres from Šilėnai railway station, from where trains left in all (six) directions to serve the whole of Lithuania.29 28  Nijolė Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, Žuvusiųjų prezidentas [The President of the Perished] (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2005) 16-74. 29  Aistė Petrauskienė, Vykintas Vaitkevičius, Kelyje į 1949 metų partizanų vadų susitikimą [On the Way to the Meeting of Partisan Commanders in 1949], Lietuvos istorijos studijos (2014) 34, 106-110.

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At the same time, the partisans of the Eastern Lithuanian Region were formulating their view of the Supreme Leadership: “This cannot be a political or military organisation, merely the body that leads the nation to independence and complete freedom”. They also elected two representatives to that leadership. In the second half of October, the Regional Commander Jonas Kimštas-Žalgiris (1911–1974) and Chief of Staff of the Didžioji Kova District Juozas Šibaila-Diedukas (1905–1953) reached Duktas Forest and met Žemaitis. A historic meeting of the partisan leadership took place in an open camp in Duktas Forest on 11th-12th November. They approved the name of the BDPS and, with minor revisions, temporarily adopted its statutes and leadership structure. Jonas Žemaitis was elected Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and temporarily appointed to the chairmanship of the BDPS Presidium, a post that was permanently offered, in a letter, to Colonel Steponaitis of the Lithuanian Army, who resided in Tauragė City. The restored “Minimal Presidium of the BDPS” also included the Secretary of the Presidium Bartkus, the Chief of the VGPŠ Kimštas and the Head of the Public Division (which replaced the Political Division) Šibaila.30 During the same period, a parcel from Žemaitis (containing documents and letters from spring and summer 1948) finally reached the Commander of Dainava District, the teacher and reserve junior lieutenant of the Lithuanian Army Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas (1918–1957), who was an authorised representative of the Southern Lithuanian Region. He immediately left to meet Žemaitis, taking with him the Commander of Tauras District, the teacher Aleksandras Grybinas-Faustas (1920–1949), and an authorised representative of the Western Lithuanian Region, the accountant and local defence unit volunteer Vytautas Gužas-Kardas (1920–1949). After covering 250 kilometres in 11 weeks on foot, in a cart and on a sleigh the commanders of the Lithuanian partisans and their representatives met on the farm of Kazimieras Kemeklis in the now deserted village of Daujočiai near Radviliškis on 1st February 1949. After some initial distrust resulting from the fact that the partisans from the Southern Lithuanian Region were total strangers, they started talking. In a meeting on 10th February 1949 at the headquarters of Prisikėlimas District on the farm of Mikniai in the village of Minaičiai (Radviliškis District) the United Democratic Resistance Movement was renamed (as a precaution) the Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom. A comparison of the organisations of the BDPS and LLKS reveals that, although the individual names may be different, their structures are identical. However, it should also 30  Dalia Kuodytė, Algis Kašėta (eds.), Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais [Freedom Fights in 1944–1953], 289-291.

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be emphasised that, from the very beginning of the attempts to establish the supreme leadership of the resistance movement it always consisted solely of partisans – of armed fighters for the freedom of Lithuania.31 Having been elected Chairman of the Presidium, Žemaitis-Vytautas spoke to the meeting of the LLKS Council that started on February 11th about the movement’s tactics. It was necessary “to organise, protect and prepare the nation for the decisive liberation, the moment of the fight. This has to be coordinated with the possibility of war. Vain acts should be avoided. We should focus on the essential.” He advised them to be content “with the natural joining of new partisans without seeking to increase their number. People should be recruited when specialist personnel are needed. Otherwise, we should attempt to maintain the partisan nuclei – tėvūnija (a fighting unit the size of the company – V.V.). Corresponding social activities should be developed so that the replenishment of partisans at the crucial moment for our nation is ensured.”32 The centrepiece of the meeting was undoubtedly the political declaration of the LLKS Council, which was adopted on 16th February 1949 (in a clear reference to the proclamation of the Act of Independence by the Council of Lithuania on 16th February 1918, see Fig. 4). However, the parallels between the most important document of the Lithuanian partisans and the Act of Independence arose from not only the date but also the provision that, as soon as the occupation ended, free and democratic elections to the Seimas were to be held. Before a new constitution could be adopted the State of Lithuania was to be restored on the basis of the Declaration of 16th February 1949 and the Constitution of 1922.33 The Law adopted by the Seimas on 12th January 1999 recognised the Declaration of the LLKS Council of 16th February 1949 as a legal act of the Republic of Lithuania and underlined its significance for the continuity of the statehood of the country. And, as lawyers have emphasised, the Declaration is considered as having become a legal act not in 1999 but on the day of its adoption in 1949.34 31  Cf. Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Apybraiža apie pogrindžio organizaciją nuo BDPS sužlugimo iki pastarojo meto [An Essay on Underground Organisation from the UDRM Collapse to the Present], in: Laisvės kovų archyvas (1993) 7, 77. 32  Ibd., 299, 301-302. 33  Bernardas Gailius, Partizanų vadovybės įgaliojimų pripažinimo teisiniai pagrindai ir padariniai [Legal Bases and Consequences of the Recognition of Powers of the Partisan Leadership], in: Genocidas ir rezistencija (2006) 2, 149-164. 34  Vytautas Sinkevičius, Įstatymo dėl Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio Tarybos 1949 m. vasario 16 d. Deklaracijos vaidmuo ir vieta Lietuvos teisės sistemoje[The Law on the

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An examination of Declaration No.2 of the BDPS Presidium of (probably) 15th June 1947, which was drafted but not adopted, and the Declaration of the LLKS Council, which was signed on 16th February 1949, reveals no significant differences between the two documents. Thus, as first suggested by Juodis, the text of the partisans’ most important legal document was drafted by none other than Alfonsas Vabalas-Gediminas (1909–1948), Doctor of Law, alumnus of the Sorbonne and member of the BDPS Presidium. According to unpublished information recorded by Raimondas, the son of Alfonsas Vabalas, in 1928–1934, the future partisan commander studied law at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. In the autumn of 1939, he started work as a correspondent of the Lithuanian News Service in Paris, where he soon completed his PhD.35 Vabalas returned to occupied Lithuania in the autumn of 1940 and, on 1st January 1941, joined the People’s Commissariat for Justice of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in Kaunas, where he translated the legal code of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into Lithuanian After the cessation of hostilities in Lithuania, Vabalas worked as a lecturer at the Institute for Adults. He later became Director of Legal Courses of the Lithuanian SSR but was discharged at his own request on 1st February 1945. He went into hiding that summer, and, having established contact with the leadership of Tauras District, joined the partisan ranks.

The Fate of the Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom

The Supreme Leadership of the LLKS represented three regions of the fighting country: Western, Eastern and Southern Lithuania. Having shared out areas of responsibility, members of the leadership basically performed the duties of the Seimas (parliament) and the Government. Thirteen members of the Council of the LLKS established a bulletin that contained ideas, opinions and criticism of the LLKS’ activities while partisan commanders voted for certain proposals personally. Following the meeting of partisan commanders from across Lithuania in February 1949, the Presidium of the LLKS Council (Chairman Žemaitis and Secretary Bartkus) and the Heads of the Public Division Šibaila and National Declaration of the Council of the Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom of 16 February 1949: its Role and Place in the Lithuanian Legal System], in: Parlamentinės studijos (2004) 1, 15-27. 35  Alfonsas Vabalas, Les conflits de lois interprovinciaux dans le Droit Privé Lituanien (Paris: Les éditions Domat-Montchrestien, 1939).

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Division Bronius Liesis-Naktis, (1922–1949) were based close to each other in Prisikėlimas District in Western Lithuania and cooperated intensely. The Public Division was to be transferred to Eastern Lithuania, but the transfer was prevented by a battle in Užpelkiai Forest in which Bartkus and Liesis were killed. On October 11th 1949, Kazimieras Pyplys-Audronis, who had returned to Lithuania from the West six months earlier with news of international politics, was appointed an authorised international representative of the LLKS (although he was killed at that time already); Lukša, who was still in the West, had the same role. Žemaitis and Šibaila’s contacts with the Commander of the Defence Forces Adolfas Ramanauskas, who had returned to the Southern Lithuanian Region, were sporadic. The Headquarters of the Defence Forces (under the leadership of Kimštas) should have settled in Eastern Lithuania but, when this proved impossible, began operating in Southern Lithuania alongside Ramanauskas. It was envisaged that, in the event of being unable to make contact with the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS Council, the Commander of the Defence Forces (Sector 1), the Chief of the Staff of those forces (Sector 3) and the Head of the Public Division (Sector 2), were to become “independent units” and coordinate their activities with the leaderships of the regions in which they were operating.36 The lack of continuous contact made LLKS operations more difficult, but they did not stop. Disaster struck, however, on the night of 8th December 1951 when Žemaitis, the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS Council, suffered a stroke in his bunker in Šimkaičiai Forest (Jurbarkas District) that left the left side of his body paralysed. On 29th January 1952, Žemaitis appointed Sergijus Staniškis-Viltis (1900– 1953), the Commander of the Southern Lithuanian Region and a hussar captain in the Lithuanian Army, as his second deputy, and Antanas Bakšys-Germantas (1923–1953), the Commander of the Western Lithuanian Region and a teacher and volunteer in the local unit as his third deputy.37 On January 30th, Žemaitis wrote in an official document with his own hand: “Today I ceased discharging my duties due to illness” and instructed Bakšys to write immediately (or in early February) to the Commanders of the Eastern and Southern Lithuanian Regions to inform them about his illness and offered his support to Ramanauskas’ candidacy for the chairmanship of the Presidium of the LLKS 36  Aistė Petrauskienė, Gediminas Petrauskas, Vykintas Vaitkevičius, Partizanų bunkeris Daugėliškių miške [A Partisan Bunker in the Daugėliškiai Forest]. (Vilnius: Petro ofsetas, 2017), 156. Cf.: Dalia Kuodytė, Algis Kašėta (eds.), Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais, 345. 37  Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Apybraiža apie pogrindžio organizaciją nuo BDPS sužlugimo iki pastarojo meto [An Essay on Underground Organisation from the UDRM Collapse to the Present], 66.

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Council. Bakšys wrote corresponding letters to Kimštas on March 20th and Staniškis on May 20th. The former questioned the proposal, together with other partisan commanders in Aukštaitija, but confirmed that they were ready to support Ramanauskas if he was approved by 2/3 of the members of the LLKS Council. Staniškis, however, categorically opposed the candidacy of Ramanauskas, criticising his performance as Commander of the Defence Forces, pointed out that Ramanauskas had lived with his wife – and added that “the proposal of just one candidate in an election is a Bolshevik method. Such a way of holding elections is unacceptable”.38 On 20th May 1952, Bakšys wrote a report addressed to Ramanauskas: “On the instructions of the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS Council Vytautas I inform you that due to the illness (paralysis) that struck him he has resigned his post and entrusted it to you”.39 On May 25th he added a letter to the report and mentioned, among other things, that he had received no information about Žemaitis’ state of health of since February and feared that he could have committed suicide. Žemaitis’ health was, however, improving under the care of the nurse Marijona Žilūtė-Eglė (1906–1994), albeit slowly. Unfortunately we know nothing about the organisational activities that he carried out during that period (any documents have either yet to be found or were destroyed by the Security Agency). The contemporary evaluation of the situation in the LLKS after 30th January 1952 is that it was undergoing a leadership crisis. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Council had ceased to discharge his duties due to illness while his first deputy, who should have replaced him, knew nothing of this commission. Under the difficult conditions of occupation, the democratic path pursued by the Supreme Partisan Leadership was hard and slow. On the other hand, the Public Division of the LLKS operated i­ndependently, as envisaged, in 1952 and 1953. Šibaila, the Acting Head of Sector 2, later – of the 3rd, died on 11th February 1953 while Kimštas Commander of the Eastern Lithuanian Region performed his duties until around 16th August 1952. He was later arrested and recruited by the Security Agency. The entire leadership of the Western Lithuanian Region died on 17th January 1953, followed by Staniškis, Commander of the Southern Lithuanian Region, on February 3rd. 38  Ibd., 310. (It is possible that Staniškis’ letter only reached Žemaitis in May 1953, i.e. a year later – V.V.). 39  Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas, Apybraiža apie pogrindžio organizaciją nuo BDPS sužlugimo iki pastarojo meto [An Essay on Underground Organisation from the UDRM Collapse to the Present], 67.

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On May 30th Žemaitis was sedated in his bunker by grenades charged with sleeping gas and detained. Žemaitis was flown to Moscow on June 23rd. Two days later, “The Head of the Lithuanian Armed Nationalist Underground” or “The President of the Underground”, as he was also known, was interrogated by the Interior Minister of the USSR Lavrentiy Beria.40 Due to the fact that Beria was arrested and charged with high treason and betrayal of the motherland the very next day, Žemaitis was then forgotten for some time. However, his arrest was sanctioned on July 13th and he was returned to Vilnius for further interrogation on September 5th. Žemaitis’ trial took place in the Baltic Military Tribunal between 1st and 7th June 1954 and his closing words were as follows: “I consider all the actions directed against Soviet power by the underground, of which I was a participant, as legitimate and not as criminal acts. I want to emphasise that as long as I led Lithuanian fighters in the fight for freedom, I sought to ensure that the fight was aligned with the principles of humanism. I did not allow any atrocity. I know what the sentence of the court will be. I still believe that the fight I have been leading for nine years shall have its results.” He was sentenced to death and executed in Butyrka Prison in Moscow on 26th November 1954. His body was burnt in the prison crematorium. In 1952, Bronius Krivickas-Vilnius (1919–1952), a member of the Eastern Lithuanian partisan leadership and one of the most talented freedom fighters – as well as a writer, translator and critic – was considering the prospects for the future: “In what position will the LLKS be at the very end of the occupation? It is possible that, due to its destruction by the enemy, it will be completely destroyed from the organisational point of view. However, even in such a case, its operation should not stop. The idea of the movement, its great principles of struggle for the unity of the nation, for faith, justice and other national values – all of this is too much alive in the country to be effectively destroyed. All that remains, however damaged, will come together in the future, almost spontaneously, and find some organisational expression”. Krivickas then asked himself if these ideas had not arisen too soon and replied with the memorable words: “Let us remember that each great thought matures slowly. The second thing: the future must not catch us unawares”.41 The hopes of numerous partisans and this prophesy of Krivickas came true. In the late 1960s and 1970s members of the ethno-cultural movement and ecclesiastical underground were active in Lithuania. A new generation was creating a special social network or, to quote Ainė Ramonaitė, a parallel society under 40  Nijolė Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, Žuvusiųjų prezidentas [The President of the Perished], 359-366. 41  Virginijus Gasiliūnas (ed.), Broniaus Krivicko raštai [Writings by Bronius Krivickas] (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos centras, 1999), 536-537.

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the Soviet occupation.42 It was also largely influenced – directly or indirectly – by thousands of political prisoners and deportees (often intermarried) who returned to Lithuania after Stalin’s death. It should be noted that, despite being far away from their home, these had managed to avoid the effects of Soviet brainwashing – the relentless waves of propaganda – and, unlike most of the rest of the society, had never doubted the partisan ideals or the meaning of the fight for freedom and its need for great sacrifice.43 On 14th June 1988, during the commemoration of the day of the first Soviet occupation and the deportations of exactly a year later, it was none other than Leonas Laurinskas-Liūtas (1926–2013), a partisan of the Kęstutis District and a political prisoner, who was the first to hoist the tricolour of the Republic of Lithuania. Sewn the day before (Fig. 6), this awakened and again led the Lithuanian nation on the path to independence.

Archives and Documents

Files and folders (collections of documents) are kept in the Lithuanian Special Archives in Vilnius. These include documents from the State Security Committee of the Lithuanian SSR (Lith. KGB), the files of individuals sentenced for their political convictions and many other documents related to the Soviet regime. The archives of the Lithuanian partisans, which were discovered underground following the restoration of independence in 1990, are also stored in the Special Archives. Selected Bibliography

Primary Sources

Bagušauskas, Juozapas Romualdas (ed.), Lietuvos partizanų Dainavos apygarda (1945– 1953 m.): dokumentų rinkinys (Vilnius: Lietuvos archyvų departamentas, 2003). Grigoraitis, Vidas et al. (eds.), Lietuvos partizanų Žemaičių apygarda: 1945–1953 m. dokumentų rinkinys (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2010).

42  Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė, Ainė Ramonaitė (eds.), Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant. Nepaklusniųjų tinklaveikos galia [Searching for the Origins of Sąjūdis: the Power of Networking of the Disobedient]. (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2011), 33-58. 43  Bernardas Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien [Partisans Then and Today] (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2006), 196-218.

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Kuodytė, Dalia/Algis Kašėta (eds.), Laisvės kovos 1944–1953 metais. Dokumentų rinkinys (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga, 1996). La guerre après la guerre. La résistance armée antisoviétique en Lituanie en 1944–1953. Exhibition Catalogue (Vilnius: Museum of the Victims of Genocide, 2009). Lukša, Juozas, Forest brothers: the account of an anti-Soviet Lithuanian freedom fighter, 1944–1948 (Budapest; New York: CEU Press, 2009). Maslauskienė, Nijolė (ed.), Lietuvos partizanų Tauro apygarda (1945–1953 m.): dokumentų rinkinys (Vilnius: Lietuvos archyvų departamentas, 2000). Remeika, Kęstutis (ed.), Lietuvos partizanų Vytauto apygardos Tigro rinktinė (1945–1950 m.): dokumentų rinkinys (Vilnius: Lietuvos archyvų departamentas, 2003). The diary of a partisan: a year in the life of the post-war Lithuanian resistance fighter Dzūkas/Lionginas Baliukevičius (Vilnius: Pasauliui apie mus, 2008).



Additional Research

Damušis, Adolfas, Lithuania against Soviet and Nazi Aggression (The American Foundation for Lithuanian Research, Inc., 1998). Gaškaitė, Nijolė, Pasipriešinimo istorija 1944–1953 metai (Vilnius: Aidai, 1996). Gaškaitė, Nijolė et al., Lietuvos partizanai 1944–1953 m. (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga, 1996). Girnius, Kęstutis K., Partizanų kovos Lietuvoje (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1990). Kasparas, Kęstutis, Lietuvos karas (Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga, 1999). Kuodytė, Dalia, Rokas Tracevskis, The unknown war: armed anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania in 1944–1953 (Vilnius: Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 2013). Petrauskienė, Aistė, Gediminas Petrauskas, and Vykintas Vaitkevičius. Partizanų bunkeris Daugėliškių miške: kompleksinių tyrimų studija ir šaltiniai (Vilnius: Petro ofsetas, 2017). Vitkus, Gediminas (ed.), Wars of Lithuania: a systemic quantitative analysis of Lithuania’s wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2014).

Summary This article is the first to present the history of the Partisan War in Lithuania between 1944 and 1953 from the point of view of the underground state, the united political and military organisation of the partisans. The Lithuanian Liberation Army (Lith. LAA) was established on the basis of hierarchical, territorial and functional principles adopted from the Lithuanian

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Army and adapted to new forms of action. The political programme of the partisans emerged from the establishment and the later activities of the United Democratic Resistance Movement (Lith. BDPS). Declaration No.2 of the BDPS Presidium of June 1947 was drafted by Alfonsas Vabalas, Doctor of Law, and formed the basis of the political declaration of the Council of the Movement for the Struggle for Lithuanian Freedom (Lith. LLKS), which was signed on 16th February 1949. A comparison of the organisation of the BDPS and the LLKS shows that while names were different the structures were very similar. The Supreme Leadership of the LLKS represented three regions, Western, Eastern and Southern Lithuania, and basically performed the duties of the Seimas and the Government. This underground state was characterised and legitimised by the partisans’ right to rule, codes, social approach, military organisation and local support, financial system, network of contacts, underground press and diplomacy. While communication difficulties made it harder for the LLKS to carry out its activities these did not stop. Disaster struck on the night of the 8th December 1951 when Žemaitis, the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS Council, who was also known as the President by both the partisans and the Security Agency, was paralysed by a stroke. On 30th January 1953, Žemaitis wrote in an official document with his own hand: “Today I ceased discharging my duties due to illness” and instructed Antanas Bakšys, the Secretary of the Presidium, to inform the Commanders of the Eastern and Southern Lithuanian Regions of his illness and proposed to support the candidacy of Adolfas Ramanauskas, Commander of the Defence Forces, for the chairmanship of the Presidium of the LLKS Council. Members of the LLKS Council reacted differently to Ramanauskas’ candidacy: Partisan commanders in Aukštaitija were ready to support it while Staniškis was categorically opposed. In this situation two of the three sectors of the Presidium of the LLKS Council effectively became independent units and coordinated their activities with the leaderships of the regions of Lithuania in which they were operating. In addition to this, Southern Lithuania had contacts with Western European countries. On 16th August 1952, Kimštas, the Commander of the Eastern Lithuanian Region was arrested and recruited by the Security Agency. The entire leadership of the Western Lithuanian Region died on 17th January 1953, followed by Staniškis, the Commander of the Southern Lithuanian Region, on February 3rd. Žemaitis was sedated in his bunker by grenades filled with sleeping gas and arrested on May 30th. He was condemned to death on 7th June and executed in Butyrka Prison in Moscow on 26th November 1954.

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Summary in Lithuanian

1944–1953 m. Lietuvos partizaninio karo istorija straipsnyje pirmą kartą nuosek­ liai pasakojama žvelgiant iš pogrindžio valstybės – partizanų įkurtos vieningos politinės ir karinės organizacijos žiūros taško. Hierarchiniu, teritoriniu ir funkciniu principu paremta Lietuvos laisvės armijos (LLA) organizacija perėmė ir plėtojo Lietuvos Respublikos kariuomenės patirtį. Politinės partizanų programos atsiradimas susijęs su Bendro demokratinio pasipriešinimo sąjūdžio (BDPS) įkūrimu ir veikla. 1947 m. birželio mėn. BDPS deklaracija Nr. 2 parengta, manoma, teisės mokslų daktaro Alfonso Vabalo-Gedimino (1909–1948), tapo reikšmingiausio partizanų dokumento – 1949 m. vasario 16 d. Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio (LLKS) Tarybos politinės deklaracijos pagrindu. LLKS perėmė ir BDPS struktūrą, nežymiai ją supaprastindamas ir pakeisdamas kai kurių dalių pavadinimus. LLKS Tarybos prezidiumas – vyriausioji vadovybė – atstovavo visoms trims partizanų sritims ir atliko Seimo ir Vyriausybės darbą. Šią pogrindinę Lietuvos partizanų valstybę apibūdina ir legitimuoja: partizanų teisė valdyti, jų statutai, socialinė politika, karinė organizacija ir administracija, finansų sistema, ryšių tinklas, pogrindžio spauda ir atsišaukimai, diplomatiniai ryšiai su užsieniu. Nuolat trūkinėjantys ryšiai apsunkino vyriausios partizanų vadovybės darbą, tačiau jo nenutraukė. Nelaimė ištiko 1951 m. gruodžio 8 d., kuomet buvo paralyžuotas LLKS Tarybos prezidiumo pirmininkas Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas (1909– 1954), kitaip dar partizanų ir saugumo darbuotojų vadintas prezidentu. 1952 m. sausio 30 d. J. Žemaitis nustojo eiti pareigas, pasiūlydamas į jas savo pirmąjį pavaduotoją, LLKS Gynybos pajėgų vadą Adolfą Ramanauską-Vanagą (1918– 1957). Dėl šios kandidatūros LLKS Tarybos narių nuomonės išsiskyrė; nėra duomenų apie tai, kad pats A. Ramanauskas, tuo metu jau gyvenęs su šeima, šį pavedimą būtų priėmęs. Susidarius tokiai padėčiai, dvi iš trijų LLKS Tarybos prezidiumo sekcijų veikė savarankiškai, derindamos veiksmus su Vakarų ir Rytų sričių vadovybėmis. Be to, Pietų Lietuva turėjo ryšį su Vakarų sritimi. 1952 m. rugpjūtį buvo suimtas ir užverbuotas Rytų Lietuvos srities vadas Jonas Kimštas-Žalgiris (1911–1974), 1953 m. sausį žuvo Vakarų Lietuvos srities vadovybė, o vasarį – Pietų Lietuvos srities vadas Sergijus Staniškis-Viltis (g. 1900 m.). Tų pačių metų gegužės 30 d. savo bunkeryje migdomosiomis dujomis buvo užmigdytas ir sulaikytas J. Žemaitis. Mirties nuosprendis jam paskelbtas birželio 7 d., o įvykdytas Maskvoje, 1954 m. lapkričio 26 d.

Fig. 4.1

The organisational sectors of the Lithuanian underground

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Chapter 5

Seeking a Path to Independence: Belarusian Anti-Soviet Activity from 1944–1953 Aleksandra Pomiecko Introduction The subject of Belarusian, anti-Soviet resistance is something that has rested primarily within the confines of Belarusian and Polish historiography. Often overshadowed by more numerous works focusing on other national cases, the progression of its scholarship also suffers from difficulties in accessing archival information that remains largely unavailable in Belarus. To obtain information pertaining to Belarusian armed resistance one must often venture outside of the very country of study. This paper has benefited largely from material gathered in Belarus, but also in Lithuania, Poland, and the United States.1 It has also relied on important secondary works published by scholars, whose contribution to the topic is valuable and insightful.2 This article focuses specifically on a particular network of anti-Soviet, Belarusian nationalists during the Second World War and in the postwar era.3 During the German occupation of Belarus between 1941 and 1944, these Belarusians collaborated with the Germans, by serving in armed formations and in administrative positions. When fighting, their primary goal was fighting Soviet partisans in auxiliary police units or in regional Belarusian self-defense and home-guard groups, and were participants in the murder of Jews and other locals. After the war, many of these individuals managed to escape initially to 1  Between 2005 and 2007 the CIA declassified and a total of more than 1,100 files. This work benefits tremendously from these documents. See: Breitman, Richard/Norman J.W. Goda. Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War criminals, U.S. intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2010), 2. 2  Some of these include those by Jerzy Grzybowski, Jerzy Turonak, Oleg Valakhanovich, Aleksei Litvin, Grzegorz Motyka, Rafał Wnuk, Leonid Rein, and Martin Dean. 3  This paper utilizes Library of Congress transliteration formatting. In Belarus, the spellings and sometimes even names of places changed between Russian, Belarusian, German, and Polish (not in that order). I adopt the spelling of places depending on how they were at the time of this analysis. During the German occupation of Belarus, spellings and names were typically written out in Belarusian and German. In the postwar period, the spellings included Belarusian and Russian. As a result, I have chosen to include the Belarusian spellings throughout. © Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_006

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western Europe and some permanently relocated to North and South America and Australia. In the postwar period a handful of these individuals maintained close ties and continued their anti-Soviet struggle with the help of western intelligence services. The focus here rests primarily on higher-ranking members of this Belarusian network, who left archival footprints and memoirs from which this article draws. As a result, this discussion is by no means a comprehensive or exhaustive historical account, but rather, offers a narrower focus to explore several questions. How did anti-Soviet activity manifest itself during German-occupied Belarus and then evolve with the Americans in the post-war period? How did these Belarusians understand and engage in this anti-Soviet fight? In order to provide historical context to the topic of focus, this article will begin with a very brief historical account of Belarus in the early to midtwentieth century. It will discuss some of the Belarusian nationalist underpinnings that inspired the main actors of these article and will introduce some of the major historiographical debates concerning Belarusian nationalists. Afterwards, I will offer some understandings of terminology and phrases used throughout the work. Following this explanation, the crux of the analytical piece will begin, starting with the period of Belarusian-German collaboration, followed by the postwar Belarusian-American collusion.

Belarus in the Twentieth Century and Historiographical Debates

To better understand the context in which this group operated, a brief introduction to the history of Belarus in the early to mid-twentieth century is necessary. Prior to 1914, Belarusian territory formed part of the Russian Empire’s Pale of Settlement. The majority of the population was composed of peasants of different ethnic, national, and religious backgrounds. The First World War ushered in the occupation of various armies and states, making the region ‘one of the epicenters of the global, war conflict’.4 These processes of ‘deterritorialization’, resulting from mass population shifts and geographic transformations, significantly altered the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of this region.5 In addition, the war years witnessed anti-Jewish pogroms, which 4  M.M. Smol’iannov, Belarus’ v pervoi mirovoi voine 1914–1918 gg (Moscow: Fond Istoricheskaia pamiat’, 2017), 3. For a closer examination of the German occupation of Belarus during the First World War, see: Lizaveta Kasmach, “Forgotten Occupation: Germans and Belarusians in the lands of Ober Ost,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 58, no. 4 (2016): 321-340. 5  Klaus Richter, “Go with the Hare’s Ticket” Mobility and Territorial Policies in Ober Ost (1915– 1918), in: First World War Studies 6, (2015) 2, 152.

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significantly impacted Belarusian towns and villages.6 Locals would take years to recover from violence brought on by the war, mass displacement of people, diseases, and scorched-earth policies that destroyed their livelihoods.7 After the First World War the territory which forms part of Belarus today was divided into two states: the Second Polish Republic and the Soviet Union. Policies in both states, during particular times, affected ethnic Belarusians, or those labeled as such. In Poland, there were around three million Belarusians residing in the country, primarily in the northeastern regions of the Second Republic.8 Beginning in the mid 1920s, the Polish state pursued an assimilation policy that sought to ‘polonize’ the country’s ethnic and national minorities. These measures included the closure of non-Polish schools, newspapers, and cultural centers.9 Such measures affected the lives of many future Belarusian nationalists and fighters who were restrained in their efforts to attend universities or study the Belarusian language openly. Some of them were refused higher education in Poland and served in the army, whereas others went abroad to other countries with Belarusian émigrés, where they pursued their education and became involved in cultural and political circles. To the East of Poland, the situation for ethnic Belarusians was initially better. Soviet korenizatsiia, or ‘indigenization’, policies in the mid to late 1920s encouraged the educational, linguistic, and cultural development of its respective national and ethnic populations. In Soviet Belarus, this prompted the publication of all official texts in Yiddish, Russian, Belarusian, and Polish.10 The state opened more schools and cultural centers as well as the first Belarusian Academy of Sciences.11 Some proponents of Belarusian nationalism even

6   Stanislaŭ Rudovich, Belarus’ u chas pershaĭ susvetnaĭ vaĭny: nekatoryia aspekty ėtnapalitychnaĭ historyi, in: Białoruś w XX Stuleciu, ed. Dorota Michaluk (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2007), 103. 7  For more a more in depth understanding of the impact of the First World War on Belarusian and neighboring territories, see: Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking – Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 8  Determining who was ethnically Belarusian is problematic. If Roman Catholic, some Belarusians would be identified as “Polish”. Others in the region identified as ‘tutejszy’, or ‘locals’, rather than select a national identity. Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), ‘Białoruska Włościańsko-Robotnicza Hromada. Centralny Sekretariat w Wilnie, 1926–1927,’ Sygn. 172/ II, p. 4; CAW, ‘Instytut Historii Partii i Rewolucji Październikowej przy Komitecie Centralnym Komunistycznej Partii (bolszewików) Białorusi,’ Sygn. VIII.804.17.4, p. 9  Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Białoruś- Historia Państw Świata w XX Wieku (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 1999), 85. 10  Per Anders Rudling, Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906–1931 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 134-141. 11  Aleksandra Bergman, Sprawy Białoruskie w II Rzeczypospolitej (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984), 17.

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moved to Soviet Belarus because of these promising cultural and educational developments. For many of them, this decision would prove disastrous. Soviet korenizatsiia policies were overturned in the late 1920s. Dekulakization policies were enacted in addition to efforts to remove any ideological and foreign threats in the state. Minorities living in Soviet Belarus, including Poles, Jews, Latvians, and Germans, suffered significantly at the hands of the state.12 Party purges trickled down from leaders to rank-and-file members, all of which heightened in 1937. Those deemed to be nationalist, bourgeois, or both, were arrested, deported, and many times killed.13 This process of repression affected those who were considered to be Belarusian nationalists, regardless of their ideological inclination. In terms of the development of nationalism, the Belarusian case came relatively late. As most scholars would argue, the level of Belarusian national awareness was underdeveloped, especially when compared to its Polish and Ukrainian counterparts.14 Small groups dedicated to the Belarusian nationalist cause would gain some momentum during the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, with the creation of Belarusian political committees and gatherings.15 The later revolutions, paired with the First World War, also pushed the development of Belarusian armed groups, which were organized to protect locals when regular armies were unable to do so.16 In both interwar Poland and Soviet Belarus, Belarusian nationalists faced challenges in the pursuit of their goals. However, it is important to keep in mind that individuals dedicated to the Belarusian nationalist cause were in the minority. Furthermore, even within Belarusian 12  Considering the Soviet Union more broadly, Russians composed the highest number of victims, followed by Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Belarusians, and Jews. Lynne Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial: Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 24. 13  Tatiana Prot’ko, Stanovlene sovetskoi totalitarnoi sistemy v Belarusi 1917–1941 (Minsk: Tesei, 2002), 337; Uladzimir Adamushka, Palitychnyia rėprėsii 20-50 hadoŭ na Belarusi (Minsk: ‘Belarus’, 2004), 43-44. 14  Most scholars draw from Miroslav Hroch’s three phase model of national building. He is also one of the few scholars who includes some discussion of Belarus in his conceptualization. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparatie Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations, trans. by Ben Fowkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 184. 15  Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybės Archyvas (LCVA), “Baltarusių draugijos”, f. 361, ap. 2, b. 10, p. 9; Zakhar Szybeka, Narys Historyi Belarusi 1795–2002 (Minsk: Ėntsyklapedyks, 2003), 138-143; Iurka Listapad, “Uz’bilisia na svoĭ shliakh 1921 h.,” in: Slutski zbroĭny chyn 1920-u dakumentakh I ŭspaminakh, ed. U. Liakhoŭski, U. Mikhniuk/A. Hes’ (Minsk: Belaruski Histarychny Ahliad, 2006), 156. 16   Jochen Böhler, Generals and Warlords, Revolutionaries and Nation State Builders, in: Jochen Böhler/Włodzimierz Borodziej/Joachim von Puttkamer (eds.), Legacies of Violence: Eastern Europe’s First World War (Münich: Oldenbourg, 2014), 55-56.

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nationalist circles, there were different understandings of the Belarusian nation and what form of a state it should take – ranging from complete national independence to autonomy within a federation.17 At the onset of the Second World War, those dedicated to the Belarusian cause began looking to a promising future for a potential non-Soviet Belarusian state. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 and occupation until 1944 ushered in a new period for Belarusian nationalists. Within the German-controlled puppet government of the Reichskommissariat Weißruthenien, Belarusians obtained certain administrative privileges over other national groups and joined auxiliary police battalions. Regardless, the war would prove to be devastating for locals, who suffered at the hands of fighting armies and local partisan groups of different backgrounds. Belarusian nationalists who collaborated with the Germans, were active in anti-partisan operations and in the murder of Jews and other locals. After the war, Belarusian territory came to include the former northeastern provinces of the Second Polish Republic, now in Soviet Republic of Belarus. Belarusian collaborators who managed to evade the Red Army fled westward, many of whom lived out the rest of their lives in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia. Some of these individuals would continue the antiSoviet struggle with the help of western intelligence services. These individuals who escaped also evaded any punishment or justice for the crimes they had committed. During the Soviet period, historical scholarship regarding these particular Belarusians described them negatively. Soviet historians asserted that these individuals were ‘Belarusian-fascist bourgeois nationalists’ who composed but a small minority of those residing in Belarus.18 The large majority of the population was, according to Soviet historiography, very supportive of Soviet partisans during the Second World War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some historians began to have access to relevant archival documents, though this accessibility was again limited in the mid-1990s.19 Even so, this brief thaw period was critical in challenging traditional Soviet historiography. 17  In his work, historian Per Anders Rudling identifies these various strands of Belarusian nationalism and shows that there were six declarations of Belarusian statehood, all before 1923. See: Per Anders Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism 1906–1931 (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015). 18  Lavrenti Tsanava, Vsenarodnaia partizanskiya voina v Belorussii protiv fashistskikh zakhvachikov (Minsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo BSSR, 1951), 642-836. 19  One of the most important works on anti-Soviet activity in Belarus, by multiple national groups, is that of Igor Valakhanovich. What makes it so vital is its use of Soviet Belarusian security documents, presently located in the KGB Archive in Minsk, though access is

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Currently, scholarship pertaining to this group of wartime Belarusian nationalists reflects political and societal divisions. Some popular historians elevate the impact of these Belarusians to the status of freedom fighters, whereas others treat them more cautiously and compare them to neighboring nationalists. Émigré literature tends to view them more positively than academic work. What further drives these differences is the lack of sufficient evidence to either support or discount certain features of these narratives. Scholars are left with memoirs of such individuals, which then have to be studied carefully and corroborated with more concrete evidence. Often, to research contentious issues regarding Belarusian history, scholars must travel outside of the region to gain more accessible and reliable information.

Periodization and Terminology

By focusing on a specific network of individuals through an extended period of time, this paper highlights the nuances and continuities within anti-Soviet, active resistance. Here I understand resistance as ‘active’, drawing from the CIA’s 1958 definition that defines active resistance as, ‘organized or unorganized … It may or may not involve violence and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.’20 This article understands ‘anti-Soviet’ as not only an ideological position but as a space that offered opportunities for potential advancement. In the case of the Belarusians, the identifying anti-Soviet label allotted them opportunities for collaboration with Germans and Americans, in the hopes of propelling the Belarusian cause forward. This paper examines some of these sites by looking at the activity of particular individuals who collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War, participating in auxiliary police battalions, other armed formations, and eventually establishing the Belarusian Home Guard (Belaruskaia Kraevaia Abarona, BKA).21 The chronological period of examination begins with the creation of the BKA in February 1944, restricted to most individuals. Igor Valakhanovich, Antisovetskoe podpol’e, 1944–1953 (Minsk: BGU, 2002). 20   Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate 10-58: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 4 March 1958, 1-2. 21  The BKA was seen as a continuation of preceding armed formations that had been organized throughout the occupation period, including the Belarusian Auxiliary Police and the Belarusian Self-Defense Corps.

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the highest point for Belarusian nationalist armed formations during the war, and extends into the early 1950s, when the individuals in question participated in American-sponsored covert operations into the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR). Though the term ‘anti-Soviet’ was used by the Belarusians under both German and American support, the understanding of this term changed. It began as a means to delineate the Belarusian anti-Soviet contribution from that of other national groups. Later under the Americans, it became a more inclusive label, indicating a collective desire to resist the Soviets along with other national émigré groups. In both periods, nevertheless, this identifying label was utilized as a tool to garner certain tangible benefits from more power states. Ultimately, attempts at fomenting consistent anti-Soviet resistance slowly dwindled into the postwar period. Though this piece focuses on the anti-Soviet resistance work of these individuals, it does not, by any means, undermine nor diminish the fact that these Belarusians were active participants in violence and in the killing of Jews and other locals. Their participation in the Holocaust in Belarus and the postwar lack of justice are important contexts for studying their anti-Soviet activity.

The Period of Belarusian-German Collaboration

During the period of German-occupied Belarus, the manifestation of armed Belarusian groups came in the form of auxiliary police, the Belarusian SelfDefense Corps (Belaruski Korpus Samaakhovy, BKS), and Belarusian Home Guard (Belaruskaia Kraevaia Abarona, BKA) battalion. The Germans o­ fficially announced the creation of the Belarusian Home Guard 27 February 1944, naming Frantsishak Kushal’ as commander of the BKA.22 This moment become 22  Frantsishak Kushal’: born on 16 February 1895 in Piarshaiakh (today in the Minsk voblast). Between 1915 and 1917 he served in the tsarist army. From 1919 to 1920 he was a member of the Belarusian military commission, which strove to assemble a Belarusian military unit within the Polish army. Between 1924 and 1939 he was an officer of the Polish army, after which he was captured by the Red Army in Lviv. He spent some time in Katyn and Lubianka, after which he was released in June 1941. During the German occupation, he organized training courses for the Belarusian police, Belarusian Self-Defense, and Belarusian Home Guard. After the war, he lived some time in Munich, later emigrating to the United States in 1950. In New York he organized the Association for Belarusian Veterans and continued to be active in the Belarusian émigré community until his death in Rochester, New York on 25 May 1968.    Aleh Hardzienka, Belaruskaia Tsentral’naia Rada BTsR: stvaren’ne, dzieĭnasts’, zaniapad, 1943–1995 (Minsk: “Knihazbor”, 2016), 109. There is some speculation that the 23 of

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extremely important for Belarusian nationalists, as it marked the high­ est point of Belarusian armed formations, even though still subordinate to the Germans. The number of volunteers surpassed expectations by both Belarusians and Germans, reaching around 40,000. The number of individuals that were ultimately accepted reached around 29,000, who were organized into a total of 50 battalions.23 The obligations of the BKA protecting civilians, usually through anti-partisan operations. The oath taken by the recruits only mentioned the Germans in as much as they would fight together for the protection of the Belarusian homeland.24 In exchange for their work, the Belarusians were able to organize camps for the purpose of military training and general education, which included ‘belarusifying’ soldiers through pedagogical exercises. Belarusian nationalist leaders saw this as an opportunity to not only create a Belarusian army but also to develop a Belarusian national consciousness. By the middle of March 1944, the Belarusian leadership organized the first of such training schools. Kushal’ was the commander of the BKA and closely involved in the organization of the training program. He viewed collaboration with the Germans as an ‘involuntary necessity’ for the creation of a true Belarusian army.25 This perception was reiterated by other prominent Belarusians, such as Father Vintsent Hadleŭski, who at the onset of the German occupation expressed, ‘we must utilize this opportunity that has opened up, and bravely embark on a path of cooperation with the Germans as well as personally participate in the struggle against the Soviet Union, to allow ourselves the right to an “independent life”…’26 The Belarusian leadership hoped February was chosen on purpose to overshadow the already existing February 23rd anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. However, no concrete evidence has been found to corroborate this claim. 23  The reason for accepting fewer individuals than those who had volunteered is indicated, in Belarusian memoirs, to have resulted from German uneasiness to organize such a large non-German armed group that could potentially turn on them. Natsyianal’ny Arkhiŭ Rėspubliki Belarus’ (NARB) f. 383, v. 1, s. 9, p. 27. 24   N ARB f. 382, v. 1, s. 4, p. 134. 25  Frants Kushal, Sproby stvaren’nia belaruskaha voiska (Minsk: Belaruski Histarychny Ahliad, 1999), 34. 26  Father Vintsent Hadleŭski was born in November 1898 in the Hrodna region. He attended seminary school in Vilnius and promoted the interpretation and dissemination of Catholic liturgy in Belarusian. He attended the First Belarusian Congress and later was one of the founders of the Belarusian National Republic. During WWII, he worked closely with the Germans, but secretly co-organized the Belarusian Independence Party. His participation in this clandestine work cost him his life at the hand of the Germans, who arrested and shot him on 24 December 1942, in Maly Trastsianiets. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas (LYA) F. K-1, ap. 58, delo 46997/3, Sokolova-Lekant, Elena, p. 64.

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to utilize its participation in anti-Soviet activity to benefit from training camps which could educate and prepare Belarusian soldiers. There were two challenges to this feat. The first being that the composition of volunteers in the BKA was not uniformly Belarusian and included Russians as well as some Poles and, to a much smaller extent, Ukrainians.27 Secondly, even when looking at the soldiers who identified as Belarusians, it was clear that they did not fully grasp what that meant. Naturally, the Belarusian leadership saw this as a problem that needed to be remedied. The weak state of Belarusian national self-awareness predated the existence of the Home Guard, as it was known that the existence of an actual Belarusian identity had been questioned by foreign powers. It was therefore particularly important for the Belarusian leadership to distinguish the BKA as truly Belarusian and distinct within the larger anti-Soviet struggle. Correspondence between various leaders pertaining to the BKA and its training camps focus extensively on this pedagogical aspect. The emphasis on developing Belarusian national awareness stemmed from a history that witnessed a lack of such a push within Belarus. Participating in anti-Soviet activity served as a way of mobilizing this Belarusian identity. Some individuals had markedly anti-Soviet sentiments that stemmed from personal experience, such as Kushal’ who himself had been incarcerated by the Soviets. However, this attitude was not necessarily based in an inherent dislike of the Soviets but was also seen as a means to garner support from the Germans in the hopes of eventually affording Belarus more autonomy and perhaps even independence. In an appeal to Belarusian elites, Hadleŭski remarked, ‘Belarus finds itself between Germany and Russia … we must find ourselves in a union with someone … For Belarusians, relations with Germany are beneficial, because Belarus finds itself on the road to Russia, with whom she has collided. In this way, Germany supports us and will provide support in the creation of an “Independent Belarus”.’28 As noted by Hadleŭski , as Soviet partisans became more problematic for the Germans, the Belarusians realized that their assistance in the anti-Soviet effort became increasingly more pressing for the Germans.29 Kushal’ noted that such participation would allow the Belarusians to acquire weapons, the means to create a Belarusian armed force, and would put them in a better negotiating 27   Non-Belarusians were particularly accepted if they had some former military experience, which was much needed at this point. See: Hardzienka, Belaruskaia Tsentral’naia Rada BTsR, 110-111. 28   LYA, F. K-1, ap. 58, delo 46997/3, “Sokolova-Lekant, Elena”, 64. 29  Kushal, Sproby stvaren’nia belaruskaha voiska, 34.

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position to request amenities.30 For example, Kushal’s power came from his position as commander of the BKA, which allowed him to oversee the larger recruitment and training practices, while still being in touch with what the Germans’ expectations were. Kushal’ and others, including regional BKA commander Barys Rahulia, could oftentimes travel between regions more easily, whether on official or unofficial meetings with other BKA members, or under the auspices of going to find more recruits.31 One young officer, Iazėp Sazhych, recalls that Kushal’ even organized clandestine meetings with the intention to acquire more weapons, without permission from the Germans.32 From the perspective of the Belarusian leaders, the process of constructing a Belarusian armed force also required delineating oneself from other national groups participating in anti-Soviet activity. This desire was emphasized particularly when compared to Belarus’s neighbors. A report by the Belarusian political leadership noted that for the 12 million Belarusian population, there were only 200 officers, whereas there were 3000 Estonian officers for a population of one and a half million.33 Belarusian figures were also overshadowed by their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts. Furthermore, soldiers from the latter countries were paid higher wages than Belarusians, and also Ukrainians.34 Frustration also arose when non-Belarusians were brought into formations, as in one case when Kushal’ recalls being reinforced with 200 Estonians who spoke only Russian. He notes this pattern continuing when it came to promoting individuals to higher positions, from which Belarusians were typically excluded.35 From the summer 1944 until the end of the war, an estimated 10 to 15 thousand BKA soldiers escaped westward, along with other Belarusian armed formations. The German and Belarusian leadership subsequently reorganized

30  Ibd., 37. 31  Barys Rahulia was born in January 1920 in Turets (today in the Hrodna voblast). He was briefly involved in the Polish-German fighting in 1939 and was later released by the Germans. Afterwards he worked as a teacher in a Soviet school, but was arrested by the NKVD from which he later escaped. During the German occupation of Belarus he studied at a seminary in Navahrudak, worked as a translator, and organized a Belarusian squadron in 1943. He emigrated westwards in July 1944, later moving to Belgium in 1948 and eventually to Canada in 1954, where he died on 21 October 2005. 32  Liavon Iurėvich, Zhyts’tsio pad ahniom: Partrėt belaruskaha voenachal’nika i palitychnaha dzeiacha Barysa Rahuli na fone iaho ėpokhi (Minsk: Arche, 1999), 239-240. 33   N ARB f. 383, v. 1, s. 11a, 52. 34  Leonid Rein, “The Belarusian Auxiliary Police,” in The Waffen-SS: A European History, edited by Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 187-188. 35  Kushal’, Sproby stvaren’nia belaruskaha voiska, 55.

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these units.36 Some Belarusians formed part of a Belarusian Legion, whereas others were mobilized into the German units. Another group was trained and eventually sent back to Belarus, now controlled by the Soviets, in the hopes of fomenting anti-Soviet partisan activity. With the end of the Second World War, came the end of German-sponsored Belarusians operations.37

Belarusian-American Collaboration and Covert Operations

Even before the conclusion of the Second World War, western intelligence services began recruiting former Nazis and collaborators as agents for a new, anti-Soviet struggle. Belarusian-American collaboration involved the organization of covert missions and the promotion of Belarusian culture through periodicals and cultural centers. This this section will only discuss the covert operations.38 The goal of American-sponsored operations was to infiltrate the BSSR, make contact with existing underground groups – possibly expand them – and to collect information about life in Belarus to be transmitted to the CIA.39 Individuals parachuted into the BSSR were expected to remain there in hiding until the expected outbreak of a US-Soviet War.40 For the Americans, having an anti-Soviet underground presence in Belarus was particularly crucial,

36  ‘Memorandum for the Record, Frantisek Kushal’; 14 October 1952; Kushel, Francis; Series: Second Release of Name Files Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government; RG 263; NACP; 3. 37  Grzegorz Motyka, Rafał Wnuk, Tomasz Stryjek, and Adam F. Baran, Wojna po wojnie: antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1953 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowy Scholar, Instytut Studiów Politycznych, Muzeum II Wojny Światowej, 2012), 124. 38  The Belarusians obtained American financial support for the Munich-based émigré paper, Batskaŭshchyna, or the ‘Fatherland’. It was intended to promote Belarusian culture and language while also being a voice for émigrés. In July 1951, the newspaper’s circulation was estimated at 2000. Some individuals also managed to smuggle several issues of the paper into the BSSR, although it is uncertain to what extent these were successfully circulated. ‘AEQUOR/Transmittal of ‘Cambista II: New Proposals’; 6 July 1951; AEQUOR vol. 1; NACP; 3; ‘REDWOOD AEQUOR’; 30 June 1958; AEQUOR vol. 3; Second Release CIA; RG 263; NACP; 5. 39  In ideal situations, they hoped to acquire photographs of industrial and military installations. ‘Area of Operations and Headquarters- 2 July 1951’; AEQUOR 1; NACP; 2. 40  Only a handful of individuals knew that these operations were sponsored by the United States, including Rahulia and Kushal’. Candidates were only told until it was certain they would be participants in an operation.

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as they hoped it would connect the respective Lithuanian and Ukrainian networks.41 The earliest-known CIA recruitment case of a Belarusian came in 1948, though it was not until August 1951 that these covert operations took on a more structured role.42 The training, undertaken in Germany, involved both political and military instruction.43 The Belarusians were in charge of the ‘political indoctrination of agents’.44 The course load included traditional lectures on Belarusian history, language, literature, as well as US History. It also involved instruction on Marxism-Leninism, the Stalin constitution in theory and practice, Bolshevist propaganda, and methods of combatting it. The military training demanded studying the organization of both the Soviet and US Army, topography, partisan tactics, first aid, as well as a course on ‘life in the forest’.45 The CIA supported this training financially and also provided some instructors. Similar to the arrangement that was agreed upon with the Germans during the Second World War, Belarusian liaisons and leaders would scout potential candidates and be involved in the educational and military training process. In the postwar period, Barys Rahulia was primarily in charge of this, rather than Frantsishak Kushal’. After recruitment, the Americans vetted the potential candidates and ultimately decided who to keep. Declassified CIA documents reveal that the Americans and Belarusians successfully organized and dispatched two covert operations into the BSSR. The first involved one man, Ianka Filistovich.46 He had some military experience having served in the BKA during the war and successfully completed the necessary training for his mission. Filistovich, under the cryptonym Camposanto 1, was dispatched to the BSSR in September 1951.47 He managed to mobilize a 41  ‘CSOB/Bi-Weekly Report #1’; 9 July 1951; AEQUOR vol. 1; Second Release CIA; Record Group 263; National Archives in College Park (NACP), 1. 42  Kushal’ had previously been involved in the dispatch of two other individuals into the BSSR, but they were ot part of an official US-sanctioned program. “Subject: Project AEQUOR”; 30 August 1951; AEQUOR vol. 1; Second Release CIA; RG 263; NACP, 1. 43  Other than the education pertaining to Belarusian studies in other places, such as at the University of Louvain. 44  ‘Project Outline: Joint OSO/OPC Project’; 8 August 1951; AEQUOR vol. 1; NACP, 6. 45  ‘Attachment B: Proposal for the Implementation of Plan “Cadre”’;15 July 1952; Ragula, Boris; Second Release CIA; RG 263; NACP, 1. 46  Ianka Filistovich was born in 1926 in Paniatsishy (Minsk region). The Soviets arrested his father in 1939 though he was released two years later. During the war, Filistovich worked as a delivery person for the Germans and in 1943 he served in the 13th Belarusian Police Battalion stationed in Vialeĭka. After the war, he escaped westward. He attended university in Paris and joined the Belarusian Independent Youth Organization where he met other émigrés. It is likely he was recruited at this time by other higher-up Belarusians. 47  ‘Summary of Beylorussian Project’; 8 October 1951; AEQUOR, vol. 1; NACP; 1.

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handful of people, but as the months went by, resources ran out, and he relied more frequently on his local contacts for support, including his family. In September of the following year, he was injured during a scuffle and was forced to seek medical treatment in the home of an acquaintance. It appears that this individual revealed Filistovich’s whereabouts to Soviet security forces, who subsequently arrested him. Soviet officials also arrested around 40 people who were connected to Filistovich and had allegedly helped him in hiding.48 There was also a typewriter found hidden amongst the group’s position, along with illegal underground pamphlets.49 Filistovich was tried and executed in 1953.50 The second known dispatched mission involved a group of four men, parachuted into the Baranavichi area in late August 1952, just a few weeks after Filistovich’s capture. A few days after their arrival in the BSSR, they were involved in an armed confrontation with Soviet security forces, resulting in the death of one of the group’s members. From this point onward, there was much debate between the Belarusian émigré leaders and the CIA as to whether or not the entire group had been compromised and were being controlled by the Soviets. Though there was some communication via wireless telegraphy (w/t), American intelligence officers were suspicious of the messages and information they received.51 Confirmation of the group’s situation came in December 1956 with the publication of an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda, identifying four American spies who came into Belarus and whom the Soviet state successfully apprehended.52 However, according to Soviet archival sources, the group was actually discovered and disbanded shortly after their arrival into the BSSR in late 1952, four years before the publication in Komsomolskaya Pravda.53 The postwar phase for the Belarusian, anti-Soviet struggle came with different opportunities, as well as setbacks. Belarusian nationalists did not have to participate in anti-partisan operations or repress locals. However, there was geographic distance to consider and with that, what it meant to be antiSoviet, or even patriotic, as an émigré. Belarusian émigré leaders struggled to keep younger generations interested or to encourage them to continue the anti-Soviet struggle. This difficulty became increasingly problematic into the 1950s when many of those living abroad were assimilating to western life. Another source of concern stemmed from Belarusian leaders, who feared 48  ‘Minutes of Meeting with AECAMBISTA’; 4-7 February 1957; AEQUOR vol. 3, NACP, 3. 49  Igor Valakhanovich, Antisovetskoe podpol’e, 1944–1953 (Minsk: BGU, 2002), 43. 50  Aliaksandar Lukashuk, Filistovisch: Viartan’ne natsyianalista (Miensk: Nasha Niva, 1997), 7. 51  “AEQUOR/FI, Extension of”; 27 September 1955’ AEQUOR vol. 2; Second Release CIA; RG 263; NACP; 2. 52  “Soviet Capture of AEQUOR Team II”; 22 January 1957; AEQUOR vol. 2; NACP; 1-3. 53  Valakhanovich, Antisovetskoe podpol’e, 37.

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they were being used by the Americans as pawns, without receiving the concessions they wanted. This doubt and questioning put a lot of strain on the Belarusian-American relationship. One case officer’s comment swiftly summarizes the CIA’s attitude regarding operations in Belarus: ‘Little is perhaps known about the true strength of Belorussian nationalism, but even if it is not the strong force found in the Ukraine, it would appear that the republic is a sufficiently strategic area to make cultivation of this nationalism worthwhile.’54 The changing nature of the Belarusian-American relationship also altered the former’s use of anti-Soviet resistance. With the Germans, they sought to separate themselves from other national groups to show their importance in the struggle. However, with the Americans, Belarusian leaders wanted to show their contribution to a collective, anti-Soviet struggle among other national groups. A progress report from September 1951 notes that, ‘He [Rahulia] favours cooperation among all Russian minority groups and the pooling of all resources, providing everyone concerned recognize the Belorussian state as a political entity which now exists within the USSR.’55 Furthermore, Rahulia demonstrated his intentions to contribute to a collective front by assuring the CIA that Belarusian newspapers would not be ‘anti-Russian or antagonistic towards local Russian groups.’56 Collaboration with the Americans necessitated an effort to be part of the collective, anti-Soviet resistance, rather than a contributing, delineating element as it had been during the Second World War. In both cases, however, being ‘anti-Soviet’ was seen as a means to garner financial or logistical benefits. Although the Belarusian-American relationship began relatively optimistically, it eventually soured due in part to a lack of viable recruits and, from the American perspective, lack of efficiency and dedication by the Belarusians. Although Rahulia frequently recommended new candidates for training, few of them were approved and even less managed to complete the full training program.57 Problems in the Belarusian-American relationship also stemmed from the perception that the other side was not fulfilling its responsibilities. This distrust is reflected through issues between case officers and some of the Belarusians in charge. Rahulia was frustrated with how the CIA stalled and postponed plans for training and dispatching individuals into the BSSR. There are several instances during which Rahulia presents what he deems to be 54  “Review of CSOB Joint Projects- 9 July 1951”; AEQUOR, NACP, 1-2. 55  ‘AEQUOR: Progress Report’; 20 September 1951; AEQUOR, vol. 1; NACP; 3. 56  ‘AEQUOR/Transmittal of ‘Cambista II: New Proposals’; 6 July 1951; AEQUOR vol. 1; NACP; 3. 57  ‘REDSOX/AEQUOR- Progress Report, period 15 Oct. 1951–16 Feb. 1952’; AEQUOR v. 1; NACP; 1.

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viable candidates, begins training them, and then must relieve them because the Americans had changed their minds at the last minute. On the opposite side, what were once CIA accolades for Rahulia later became descriptions of ‘his impatience, temperament, and inability to grasp the need for a clandestine mentality.’58 From the CIA’s perspective, Rahulia was becoming increasingly preoccupied with his political and personal matters, rather than with his paid job with the CIA. He was also becoming careless with security measures, which could potentially jeopardize these projects.59 The relationship dwindled and Rahulia was ultimately relieved of his responsibilities. The last known operational contact made between Rahulia and the CIA was in 1956.60 These issues affected the continued American-support of Belarusian covert operations. Eventually, Belarusian anti-Soviet resistance dwindled in its armed aspirations. Continued American-Belarusian collaboration, within the antiSoviet space, continued for a few more years in the way of a Belarusian broadcasting radio station in Madrid, a Polish-Belarusian paper called Niva, as well as plans for the construction of a Belarusian cultural center in New York City.61 Conclusion Ultimately, Belarusian alignment with the anti-Soviet struggle offered spaces of opportunities during the war and afterward. Under the Germans, being antiSoviet allowed Belarusian leaders to create armed groups and training camps with the goal of ‘belarusifying’ soldiers. Later under the Americans, training camps served as a means to educate younger generations of Belarusians and instill a sense that war was imminent. The Belarusian nationalists’ reputations were at stake during both times, whether for internal political support within the Belarusians émigré community, or in comparison with other national groups. To be labeled anti-Soviet was a means to access resources and opportunities from more powerful actors, for the potential end goal of independence. By the 1950s, however, this goal became more of a distant dream, and the incentives of being part of the ‘anti-Soviet’ struggle were more materialistic. To be ‘anti-Soviet’ was a sentiment, a way of identification, and also a tool to be 58  ‘Review of AEQUOR KUFIRE collaboration with AECAMBISTA’; 1-15 February 1954; AEQUOR vol. 2; NACP, 2. 59  ‘Review of AEQUOR KUFIRE collaboration with AECAMBISTA’; 1-15 February 1954; AEQUOR vol. 2; NACP; 2. 60  ‘AECAMBISTA/2,C-16821’; 5 October 1960; Ragula, Boris; NACP; 1. 61  ‘Project AEQUOR’; 6 February 1958; AEQUOR vol. 3; NACP; p. 10; “Project AEQUOR for Fiscal 1960”; 13 November 1959; AEQUOR vol. 3; NACP; 1.

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used for multiple aims. Examining this facet of the Belarusian nationalist narrative highlights that though they were used as pawns by larger and more powerful states, they too exerted some form of agency. Selected Bibliography Baranova, Olga, Nationalism, Anti-Bolshevism or the Will to Survive? Forms of Belarusian Interaction with the German Occupation Authorities, 1941–1944 (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). Breitman, Richard/Norman J.W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War criminals, U.S. intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2010). Chiari, Bernhard, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissussland 1941–1944 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998). Dziarnovich, Aleh (ed.), Antysavetskiia Rukhi ŭ Belarusi 1944–1956. Davednik. (Minsk: Archiŭ Naĭnoŭshae Historyĭ, 1999). Gelogaev, Aleksandr, “Belaruskie vooruzhennye formirovania v General’nom okruge “Belarus’” v 1941–1944gg.” From Dedy: daidzhest publikatsii o belaruskoi istorii. Edited by Anatolii Taras. Volume 7 (Minsk: Kharvest, 2011). Gerlach, Christian, Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirstchafts-und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999). Grzybowski, Jerzy, Pogoń między Orłem Białym, swastyką i Czerwoną Gwiazdą: białoruski ruch niepodległościowy w latach 1939–1956 (Warszawa: BEL Studio, 2011). Litvin, Aliaksei, Akupatsyia Belarusi 1941–1944 (Minsk: Belaruski knihazbor, 2000). Mironowicz, Eugeniusz, Wojna wszystkich ze wszystkimi: Białoruś 1941–1944 (Kraków: Avalon, 2015). Motyka Grzegorz/Rafał Wnuk/Tomasz Stryjek/Adam F. Baran, Wojna po wojnie: antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1953 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowy Scholar, Instytut Studiów Politycznych, Muzeum II Wojny Światowej, 2012). Rein, Leonid, The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia durign World War II. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011). Turonek, Jerzy, Białoruś pod okupacją niemiecką. (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1993). Valakhanovich, Igor, Antisovetskoe podpol’e, 1944–1953 (Minsk: BGU, 2002).

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Summary This article addresses the activity of a particular network of Belarusians, active during the Second World War and in the postwar period. It explores their involvement in anti-Soviet activity, first through their collaboration with the Germans and later with the Americans. The setting for this activity is Belarus proper, as well as Germany, Belgium, and the United States. While the numbers of those involved is difficult to ascertain, the network spanned various countries. Ultimately, this article highlights the way in which these individuals utilized their participation in anti-Soviet activity as a means of acquiring certain benefits and how they continued to strive for the creation of an independent Belarus.

Summary in Belarusian

Aртыкул разглядае дзейнасць сеткі беларускіх актывістаў падчас Другой сусветнай вайны і ў пасляваенны перыяд. Даследуецца іх удзел у антысавецкай барацьбе, спачатку праз іх супрацоўніцтва з немцамі, а потым з амерыканцамі. Месцам дзеяння была як уласна Беларусь, так і Германія, Бельгія і Злучаныя Штаты. Антысавецкая дзейнасць уключала змаганне ў складзе ўзброеных фарміраванняў, ажыццяўленне таемных аперацый, збор разведвальнай інфармацыі. Хоць колькасць удзельнікаў вызначыць цяжка, але варта адзначыць геаграфічнае пашырэнне сеткі задзейнічаных асобаў. Артыкул засяроджвае ўвагу на тым, як гэтыя асобы выкарыстоўвалі свой удзел у антысавецкай дзейнасці дзеля дасягнення уласнай карысці, а таксама падтрымання надзеі на стварэнне незалежнай Беларусі.

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Chapter 6

Armed Anti-Communist Resistance in Poland, 1944–1956 Rafał Wnuk

Polish Resistance during the Second World War

Anti-communist resistance in post-war Poland largely constituted a direct structural and ideological continuation of the underground movement of the war years. The main resistance force in Nazi-occupied Poland was the Polish Underground State (Polskie Państwo Podziemne, PPP), which was viewed as a legal extension of the pre-war Republic of Poland. From 1940, the headquarters of the PPP was based in London and approximately 100,000 people worked in its civilian structures (underground administration, political and social organisations, courts, etc.). From 1942, the PPP also fielded its own military forces, known as the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK). Both the Polish Government in exile and its Western Allies recognised the legal status of the AK’s soldiers as identical with that of the regular Allied units fighting the Germans. In 1944, the AK numbered 340,000-360,000 members, the vast majority of whom were living perfectly legitimate lives. By spring of the same year, its permanent partisan units comprised 60,000 members. The PPP was a complex socio-political structure based on an agreement among various political forces in Poland at the time – ranging from the socialists and the agrarian party (ludowcy) to the right-wing nationalists (narodowcy) – all of whom acknowledged it as a continuation of the Second Polish Republic. The other significant underground forces active under the Nazi occupation during the last phase of the war included the communists of the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR), which had its own military force – the People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, AL) –, and the far-right National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ). The leaders of neither group recognised the Government in exile; rather, they distanced themselves from the PPP and strove for a ‘revolution’ that would allow them to seize absolute power and create a one-party dictatorship.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_007

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Between Germany and the Soviets

When the Soviet Army marched into the territory of pre-war Poland in 1944, the AK launched Operation Tempest, which targeted the retreating Wehrmacht troops. As a result, the AK liberated and took control of numerous locations, either singlehandedly or together with the Soviet Army. The administration of the PPP assumed the explicit role of host of the country liberated by the advancing Soviets, whom it treated as an ally in the struggle against the Germans, rather than as a liberator. Operation Tempest culminated in the Warsaw Uprising, which started on August 1st 1944. During the early stages of the Uprising the insurrectionists took over a large part of the city, but the Red Army halted on the banks of the Vistula, just short of Warsaw, and failed to provide any effective aid to the Uprising, which the Germans quelled after two months of fighting. Then, in the territories cleared of their German occupants, the NKVD and the counterintelligence officers of the Red Army’s SMERSH unit began persecuting AK soldiers and incarcerating PPP leaders, whom they labelled ‘reactionaries’ and ‘fascists’. This clearly demonstrated the Soviet leadership’s lack of tolerance for non-communist or independent Polish organisations. On July 22nd 1944, Moscow Radio announced the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN). The Soviet authorities recognised the PKWN and its representatives as the legitimate administrators of Poland on an international level. In January 1945, the Red Army resumed the offensive after a six-month break and, by mid-January, had completely ousted the Germans from the territory of prewar Poland. The AK – established to fight the German occupants – had lost its main raison d’être. Subsequently, on January 19th 1945, its Commander-in-Chief ordered the disbanding of the networks that were subordinate to him. Although all of pre-war Poland was then under Soviet control, the conditions in which clandestine activities were conducted varied from region to region. The new Polish-Soviet border, established on July 26th 1944 by representatives of the PKWN and the USSR, separated the AK units still active on the territories of the Soviet Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania from their headquarters in Poland.1 Polish resistance, though continuing to operate under harsher conditions than it had in the immediate post-war Polish state, persisted until the early 1950s. (However, the history of the Polish underground on the territories incorporated into the USSR goes beyond the remit of this paper). 1  More than 40% of the territory of pre-war Poland was incorporated into the USSR.

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Between July 1944 and January 1945, the AK operated under particularly difficult conditions in the area between Poland’s modern Eastern border and its war-time front line due to both the presence of 2,000,000 Soviet Army soldiers and the purges perpetrated by the NKVD and the Security Department of the PKWN. In the summer and early autumn of 1944, the Soviets interned 12,000-15,000 AK soldiers from this area, before deporting them to the USSR.2 According to (incomplete) data, the number of soldiers arrested by the Ministry of Public Security is estimated at 12,000-14,000, of whom 4,0005,000 were later passed on to the Soviets.3 It can be estimated that, by the end of 1944, approximately 20,000-25,000 people suspected of collaborating with the Polish Underground between the Vistula and Bug rivers had fallen into the hands of the NKVD and the Ministry of Public Security. When resistance soldiers received the order to disband in January 1945, most AK commanders and soldiers considered this a tactical move and did not cease their resistance activities. The Red Army troops that followed the retreating Wehrmacht forces had crossed the territories of pre-war Poland west of the Vistula River in no time. As the AK soldiers in those areas had had no negative experiences with the Soviet troops, they generally followed the order to disband, unlike their brothers-inarms in Central and Eastern Poland. Not that this spared them the repressions of the Soviet and Polish Communist authorities. Numerous former AK soldiers were removed from social and public life, as a result of which many returned underground. However, these newly-resumed clandestine networks were considerably weaker than they had been during the war. In February 1945, General Ivan Serov invited the leaders of the AK and the PPP to a meeting, with the aim of establishing mutual relations. Despite initial hesitation, both parties accepted the offer. All sixteen of the invited leaders were subsequently arrested on March 28th and 29th and deported to Moscow. In June, they all faced a staged trial in a Soviet court and were given lengthy prison terms. Hopes that the Soviets would treat the members of the Polish 2  Ciesielski Stanislaw/Materski Wojciech/Paczkowski Andrzej, Represje wobec Polaków i obywateli polskich [Repression of the Poles and Polish citizens] (Warsaw: Karta, 2000), 18-20. 3  According to data from: Pietrzak Leszek/Poleszak Sławomir/Wnuk Rafał/ Zajączkowski Mariusz (eds.), Rok pierwszy. Powstanie i działalność aparatu bezpieczeństwa publicznego na Lubelszczyźnie (lipiec 1944–czerwiec 1945) [The first year. Establishment and activity of the public security apparatus in the Lublin region, July 1944-June 1945] (Warsaw: IPN, 2004); Sprawozdanie WUBP w Lublinie za okres do 31 XII 1944 r. [Report of the WUBP in Lublin for the period to December 31, 1944], 156-162; Nawrocki Zbigniew Zamiast wolności. UB na Rzeszowszczyźnie 1944–1949 [Instead of freedom. UB in the Rzeszów region 1944–1949] (Rzeszów: Instytut Europejskich Studiów Społecznych, 1998), 92-93.

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anti-German underground as allies were dashed.4 However, rather than causing a breakdown in Polish opposition, the arrest of the underground leaders contributed to its further evolution, from a centralised into a decentralised organisation.

Searching for a New Model of Resistance

In May 1945, in order to reverse the dismantling of the post-AK underground, General Władysław Anders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in exile, ordered the formation of the Armed Forces Delegation for Poland (Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj, DSZ).5 This was only to operate within the new Polish borders.6 A Poland-wide organisation based on the AK, the DSZ, was placed under the command of Colonel Jan Rzepecki, a follower of an independence-oriented, left-wing fraction and member of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS). Deeply convinced of the need to continue clandestine operations, the new commander of the DSZ and his closest associates found the hopes of imminent conflict between the Soviets and the British illusory and armed resistance pointless. Instead, they believed it necessary to shift to actions of a political nature. In their opinion, the international position of the Government in exile was rapidly losing its significance and its members could not comprehend the new circumstances in Poland. Hence, the DSZ leadership deemed it necessary to form an underground centre in Poland that would assume full responsibility for managing further covert activities. The leadership of the post-AK underground decided to back the actions of the former Prime Minister of the Polish Government in exile – the leader of the agrarian Polish People’s Party, Stanisław Mikołajczyk. With the support of Winston Churchill, Mikołajczyk initiated talks with the Communists, who subsequently made him Deputy Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, TRJN), which was 4  Strzembosz Tomasz, Rzeczpospolita podziemna. Społeczeństwo polskie a państwo podziemne 1939–1945 [Underground Poland. Polish society and the underground state 1939–1945] (Warsaw: Krupski i S-ka, 2000), 347-358. 5  May 7th, 1945 – General Władysław Anders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in exile, orders formation of the DSZ. The order reached Poland only on May 15th, 1945. 6   Chmielarz Andrzej, “Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj” [Delegation for Poland], in: K. Komorowski (ed.), Armia Krajowa: dramatyczny epilog [The Home Army: a dramatic epilogue] (Warsaw: Bellona, 1994), 12-31.

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established in June 1945 and dominated by the Communists. That government was recognised by the USSR, the USA and the UK, who in turn deprived the Government in exile of its mandate in the international arena. Consequently, all underground organisations operating on Polish territory lost their international legitimacy. Poland’s underground leaders realised that the existing resistance model was incompatible with this new state of affairs. Hence, at the end of July, they dissolved the remaining branches of the PPP, including the DSZ. However, this decision did not amount to the abandonment of their underground activities. On September 2nd 1945, Colonel Rzepecki and his associates established the Resistance Movement without War and Diversion, better known as the Freedom and Independence Association (Wolność i Niezawisłość, WiN). Its founders believed that the forthcoming struggle should be carried out politically and that only those who remained in Poland could lead it. Particularly important in this context was their belief that Poland could only regain her independence by following the Yalta Agreement, and that the Polish cause should be settled peacefully, in consultation with the USSR, the USA and the UK. They assumed that the WiN would support all democratic political parties in their efforts to build an independent, democratic Poland.7 The WiN took over the DSZ’s budget, networks and, most importantly, members. Its military nomenclature was replaced with a civilian one and the partisan units were set to be disbanded. However, the leadership’s efforts did not reflect the attitudes prevalent in the lower ranks of the organisation.8 A civic-political model of resistance was successfully implemented in the southern part of the country (the Southern district of the WiN)9. Despite orders, the organisation still retained its military character in Eastern Poland (Białystok 7  Kwestionariusz programowy ruchu “WiN” (program na okres jawnej działalności); Wytyczne dla delegacji [Program questionnaire for the ‘WiN’ movement (program for the period of open activity); Guidelines for the delegation], in Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u [Historical Booklets of the ‘Freedom and Independence’ Association] 1995, no. 7, 131. 8  Krajewski Kazimierz, Skala i metody działań partyzanckich i konspiracyjnych w Polsce po 1944 r. [The Scale and methods of partisan and underground activities in Poland after 1944], in: Piotr Niwiński (ed.), Aparat represji a opór społeczny wobec systemu komunistycznego w Polsce i na Litwie w Latach 1944–1956 (Warsaw: IPN, 2005), 38. 9  Monographs on the history of the WiN in the Southern District: Zblewski Z., Okręg Zrzeszenia “Wolność i Niezawisłość” Geneza, struktury, działalność [District of the ‘Freedom and Independence’ Association. Genesis, structure, activity] (Cracow: Societas Vistulana, 2005); Balubs Tomasz, O Polskę Wolną i Niezawisłą (1945–1948). WiN w południowo-zachodniej Polsce (geneza – struktury – działalność – likwidacja – represje) [For Poland’s Freedom and Independence (1945–1948). WiN in south-Western Poland (Genesis – structure – activities – liquidation – repression)] (Cracow/Wrocław 2004).

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and Lublin districts, Podlasie, Northern and Eastern Masovia).10 In the west and north of the country, including the former German territories, no unified territorial structures were created by the WiN and existing WiN cells strove for either the civilian or the military model, depending on the regional centre with which they were linked. As long as it continued to exist, the WiN had 60,000-70,000 members and an extensive network, covering large parts of postwar Poland. The WiN leadership accepted the provisions for the change of the Eastern border, while emphasising that Poland’s place was among the Western European democracies. The WiN’s vision of a political system was based on a liberal-democratic model that leaned, in its social-economic aspects, towards the social democratic tradition and Catholic social teaching. Polish nationalists chose their own path. During the German occupation, most had joined the PPP and fought in the AK. In November 1944, after the collapse of the Warsaw Uprising, the leaders of the underground National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN), the main party of the Polish nationalists, decided to withdraw their members from the AK and establish their own military force – the National Military Union (Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe, NZW). The SN’s leaders believed that defeating Germany would not stabilise the international situation and that conflict between the West and the Soviets was just a matter of time. However, they also saw this confrontation as a chance for Poland to regain its independence.11 The leaders of the NZW, unlike those of the WiN, worked to expand their forest-based units. The SN’s ideologists defined ‘nation’ as a community of a historical, cultural and linguistic nature, while leaving out both racial and liberal concepts that described nation as a political community of citizens. They postulated the 10  Monographs on the history of WiN in the Central District: Jarosław Kopiński, Konspiracja akowska i poakowska na terenie Inspektoratu Rejonowego AK-WiN “Radzyń Podlaski” w latach 1944–1956 [The AK and post-AK underground on the territory of the AK-WiN ‘Radzyń Podlaski’ Inspectorate in 1944–1956] (Biała Podlaska: 1998); Sławomir Poleszak, Podziemie antykomunistyczne w Łomżyńskiem i Grajewskiem w latach (1945–1957) [The anti-communist underground in the Łomża and Grajewskie region in the years (1945–1957)] (Warsaw: Volumen, 2004); Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, Podziemie poakowskie na Kielecczyźnie 1945–1948 [The Post-AK underground in the Kielce region] (Cracow: Societas Vistulana, 2002); Rafał Wnuk, Lubelski Okręg AK-DSZ-WiN 1944–1947 [The Lublin district AK-DSZ-WiN 1944–1947] (Warsaw: Volumen, 2000). 11  Already on July 15, 1944 the magazine Chrobry Szlak of the SN in Kielce published an article which claimed that a war between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets was inevitable. That thesis was repeated many times. (Kiedy trzecia wojna światowa? [When will WWIII break out?], Chrobry Szlak,15 VII 1944, 1-2). For more information: Krzysztof Komorowski, Polityka i walka. Konspiracja zbrojna ruchu narodowego 1939–1945 [Politics and struggle. The armed resistance of the national movement, 1939–1945] (Warsaw: Rytm, 2000), 533-534.

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assimilation of national and ethnic Slav minorities living in Poland. Germans – as the perpetrators of the Second World War and disloyal citizens – would be expelled. The same applied to Jews, who were negatively perceived by the SN as a “particularly cohesive group with no will to assimilate” and, hence, were to be pushed to the margins of economic and political life in future Poland. The nationalists in SN circles did not accept the shifting of the pre-war Eastern border. They believed that the whole of East Prussia (with Królewiec), Lusatia and the island of Rügen should be incorporated into Poland. In their vision, Poland would be a hegemon in the planned ‘Central European Union of States’. The SN programme envisaged Poland as a parliamentary-corporate hybrid, with a strong central executive authority.12 Amongst far-right organisations there was an underground group that stemmed from the pre-war ABC National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny ABC, ONR-ABC). Towards the end of the German occupation, the ONR-ABC had operated as part of the National Armed Forces – Polish Organisation (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne – Organizacja Polska, NSZ-OP). During the war, the nationalist radicals had consistently remained separate from the PPP’s structures and did not submit to the AK. In January 1945, the leadership of the largest NSZ-OP grouping, the Świętokrzyska Brigade, agreed with the Germans to retreat to Moravia under the protection of the special forces of the Third Reich. In this way they ended up in the American occupied zone of Germany after the end of the war.13 Weakened by the withdrawal of its main grouping and many of its commanders, the underground resistance network consisted of just several thousand people. The NSZ-OP’s programme assumed the implementation of a ‘national revolution’, which it understood as the seizing of absolute power by radical nationalists in an armed coup d’état. They planned to forcefully banish 12  Wytyczne programowe ruchu narodowego w Polsce. Program Stronnictwa Narodowego [Program guidelines for the national movement in Poland. National Party program] in Lucyna Kulińska/Mirosław Orłowski/Rafał Sierchuła (eds.), Narodowcy. Myśl polityczna i społeczna obozu narodowego w Polsce w latach 1944–1947 [The Nationalists. Political and social thought of the national camp in Poland 1944–1947] (Warsaw/Cracow: PWN, 2001), 43, 51-60. 13  Czesław Brzoza, Od Miechowa do Coburga. Brygada Świętokrzyska Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych w marszu na zachód [From Miechów to Coburg. The Świętokrzyska Brigade of the National Armed Forces marching west] in Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 5, 221-270; Jiri Friedl, Żołnierze banici. Brygada Świętokrzyska Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych w Czechach w 1945 roku [Outlawed soldiers. The Świętokrzyska Brigade of the National Armed Forces in the Czech Republic in 1945] (Gdańsk: Muzeum II Wojny Światowej, 2016), 21-123.

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or assimilate national minorities14 and were particularly hostile towards Jews15. The NSZ-OP’s leaders intended to establish a one-party dictatorship in the shape of a fascist state, which would lead a national Catholic empire stretching all the way from Poland’s pre-war eastern borders to the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse rivers.16 In 1944, they assumed that a third world war would give them the chance to topple the communist authorities. They tried to maintain their guerrilla operations, but by July 1945 realised that their assumption was wrong and that a new war would not break out. Thus, they ordered their subordinates to dissolve their armed forces and come out into the open. Many members of the dissolved units then joined the NZW17: It is estimated that 30,000-40,000 people joined the national underground (the NZW and NSZ-OP).18 In addition to the countrywide clandestine structures described above there were also several regional or supra-regional organisations that emerged from the disbanding of the AK but did not subordinate themselves to the Main Board of the WiN for reasons of either ideology or disrupted communications. In Greater Poland, the local commander of the AK Poznań District, Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Rzewuski, opposed the idea of transforming the existing underground structures into a political organisation. Thus, his network functioned after May 1945 as the Independent Volunteer Group (Wielkopolska Samodzielna Grupa Ochotnicza “Warta”), which he tried to turn into an apolitical underground unit of the Polish Army, subordinate to the Polish Government in exile19. In April 1945, in Łódź and Upper Silesia Districts, Captain Stanisław ‘Warszyc’ Sojczyński formed an organisation, known initially as the Manoeuver 14  Zbigniew S. Siemaszko, Narodowe Siły Zbrojne [National Armed Forces] (London: Odnowa, 1982), 69-89; Stanisław Bębenek, Wizja przyszłej Polski w programie “Grupy Szańca” [Vision of a future Poland in the ‘Szaniec’ Group], in: Przegląd Historyczny (1973) 1, 43-46. 15  Rafał Sierchuła, Wizja Polski w koncepcjach ideologów Organizacji Polskiej w latach 1944– 1947 [The vision of Poland in the ideologies of the Polish Organization in 1944–1947], in: Lucyna Kulińska/Mirosław Orłowski/Rafał Sierchuła, Narodowcy … [The Nationalists… .], 134. 16  Juliusz Sas-Wisłocki, Wizja Wielkiej Polski. (Fragmenty ustrojowe) [The Vision of Great Poland. (Fragments of the system)]) (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze Młodych Prawników i Ekonomistów, 1934), 9. 17  Lucyna Kulińska, Narodowcy. Z dziejów obozu narodowego w Polsce w latach 1944–1947 [The Nationalists….] (Warsaw/Cracow: PWN, 1999), 135-141. 18  Sławomir Poleszak/Rafał Wnuk, Zarys dziejów polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944–1956 [Outline of the history of the Polish independence underground 1944–1956], in: Atlas polskiego podziemna niepodległościowego 1944–1956 [The Polish Underground Atlas of Independence 1944–1956] (Warsaw/Lublin: IPN, 2007), XXXIII. 19   Agnieszka Łuczak, Rozpracowanie Wielkopolskiej Samodzielnej Grupy Ochotniczej “Warta” przez Wojewódzki Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Poznaniu [Development

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Group and later as the Underground Polish Army (Konspiracyjne Wojsko Polskie/ KWP), which was based on AK cadres. The KWP’s commanders considered themselves to be a Polish underground army and had no ambition to develop their own political programme. The KWP saw its key task as providing self-defence until such a fundamental change in the country occurred as an outbreak of armed conflict between East and West or the victory of the PSL [Polish People’s Party] in parliamentary elections.20 The Resistance Movement of the AK (Ruch Oporu Armii Krajowej, ROAK) was formed in Masovia and mostly active in the northern and western parts of the region. While the KWP had a centralised structure, the ROAK was a federation of equal, regional (powiat) structures, without a supreme command. Independent of the WiN, its work was continued by some of the AK staff in Vilnius, who had been evacuated from the areas incorporated into the Soviet Union under the banner of the Extraterritorial Vilnius District of the AK (Eksterytorialny Okręg Wileński AK).21 All of the organisations mentioned above possessed an extensive field network and had their own partisan units. In addition to all the above there were also some local independence militias, armed groups and various forces, who were often unrelated to any of the main groups. Among the best-known of these was a partisan grouping under Major Józef ‘Ogień’ Kuraś,22 which numbered over five hundred soldiers, and the Independent Operational Battalion of Captain Antoni ‘Zuch’ Żubryd,23 with two hundred members. All of the above-mentioned institutions and groups can be categorised as either ‘organised resistance’ or ‘active resistance’, as defined by modern CIA analytics and applied by Keith D. Dickson. The resistance they offered was of the ‘Warta’ Greater Poland Independent Volunteer Group by the Voivodship Office of Public Security in Poznan], in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 5, 61-63. 20  Tomasz Toborek, Likwidacja Konspiracyjnego Wojska Polskiego w Łódzkiem w latach 1945–1951 [The Liquidation of the Polish Underground Army in Lodz in 1945–1951], in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, (2004) 3/1, 82-84. 21  Piotr Niwiński, Okręg Wileński AK w latach 1944–1948 [The Vilnus district of the AK, 1944– 1948] (Warsaw: Volumen, 1999). 22  Bolesław Dereń, Józef Kuraś “Ogień” – partyzant Podhala [ Józef ‘Ogień’ Kuraś – the partisan of the Podhale region], Warsaw 2000; Maciej Korkuć, Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce … Niepodległościowe oddziały partyzanckie w Krakowskiem (1944–1947) [Stay true to Poland only … Independence guerrilla units in Cracow (1944–1947)] (Warszawa: Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2000), 516-587. 23  Andrzej Romaniak, Powstanie, działalność i likwidacja antykomunistycznego oddziału partyzanckiego NSZ pod dowództwem Antoniego Żubryda [Establishment, operation and liquidation of the anti-communist partisan unit of the NSZ under the command of Antoni Żubryd], in: Powiat sanocki w latach 1944–1956 [Sanok poviat, 1944–1956] (Rzeszów-Sanok: Wydawnictwa MH, 2007), 273-368.

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undoubtedly organised in nature as it was “carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose”, and had a common leadership and communications structure.24 At the same time, it was active resistance that engaged in “violent or nonviolent acts directed against the government, from intelligence collection and sabotage to open defiance and guerrilla operations”.25 None of these resistance groups considered liberating Poland by organising a general uprising or waiting until the Communists were exhausted by guerrilla warfare. Their goals were to survive persecution and retain their potential for use at a more opportune moment.26 In practical terms, this meant that they limited their armed activities to self-defence, reducing the influence of the communist administration and harassing party activists and the officers and agents of the communists’ security apparatus. No offensive actions were to be taken, except for acts of self-defence, the freeing of prisoners and attacking MO (Milicja Obywatelska, Citizens’ Militia) stations. The majority of clashes occurred in response to provocations by the security apparatus or raids and operations by the UB [Ministry of Public Security], the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, KBW),27 the NKVD and the Polish Army (Wojsko Polskie, WP), and were not initiated by the resistance groups and militias themselves. The difference between the partisans’ operations under the German occupation and after the war is considerable. The sabotage of economic and communications infrastructure – such operations as destroying railway tracks, bridges, water towers, fuel depots and grain stores, etc., which were so common in 1943–1944 – effectively ceased. In short, the armed activities of the underground were not designed to harm the economic capacities of the state, an approach probably explained by the underground’s perception of the wider situation. Its prevailing goal was not to fight the state as such but, rather, the apparatus of power. The resistance movement was striving not for a military victory, but to compel the authorities to change their policies and adopt the 24  See Keith D. Dicksons article, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric warfare: Lessons for Today in this volume, 11–27. 25  Ibd. 26  Maciej Korkuć, Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce …, [Stay true… .], 608. 27  The Internal Security Corps was a military unit formed in April 1945 and subordinated to the Ministry of Public Security with the aim of fighting the “internal enemy”. In 1945–1946 it numbered 30,000 soldiers and was focused on combating the armed underground. For more information on the subject, see: Lech Kowalski, Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego a żołnierze wyklęci [The Internal Security Corps and the soldiers are cursed] (Poznań: Zysk i ska, 2016).

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values represented by the underground. To use Keith Dickson’s definition, the actions of the resistance had the traits of asymmetric warfare. Differences between their objectives and assessments of the international situation combined with a struggle for influence over the population led to a rivalry between the AK-WiN and the nationalist undergrounds that sometimes turned into open conflict and, on occasions, mutual liquidations.28 A real acid test that demonstrated the ideological differences between the two main underground groups was their approach to national minorities. The leadership of both the NSZ and NZW believed that there was no room for negotiation in Polish-Ukrainian relations and that it was necessary to defeat the Ukrainian underground (Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA) using any method necessary. This tactic resulted in NSZ and NZW units massacring several villages inhabited by Ukrainians.29 The leadership of the AK-DSZ-WiN, on the other hand, represented the view that, in the face of the common enemy of the USSR and communism, everyone should strive to put an end to infighting and focus on working out the principles of peaceful coexistence. As a result, in May 1945, the places in which the AK-DSZ-WiN held more sway were relatively peaceful,

28  Poleszak, Podziemie antykomunistyczne … [Anti-communist underground …], 333-355; Wnuk, Lubelski Okręg … [The Lublin district …], 151-161. 29  The troops of Second Lieutenant Józef Zadzierski, aka ‘Wołyniak’, murdered approximately 100 inhabitants of Piskorowice on April 18th 1945, while the troops of Captain Mieczysław Pazderski, aka ‘Szary’, slaughtered 196 inhabitants of Wierzchowiny village on June 6th 1945. See: Irena Kozimala, Żołnierze wyklęci. Z dziejów partyzantki antykomunistycznej w powiecie przeworskim [Cursed soldiers. From the history of anti-communist guerrillas in the Przeworsk poviat] (Przeworsk: Regionalne Towarzystwo Naukowe, 2015), 253; Tomasz Bereza, Wokół Piskorowic. Przyczynek do dziejów konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego na Zasaniu w latach 1939–1945 [Around Piskorowice. A contribution to the history of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Zasanie in 1939–1945], (Rzeszów: IPN, 2013), 222-224; Mariusz Zajączkowski, Spór o Wierzchowiny. Działalność oddziałów Akcji Specjalnej (Pogotowia Akcji Specjalnej) NSZ w powiatach Chełm, Hrubieszów Krasnystaw i Lubartów na tle konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego (sierpień 1944 r.–czerwiec 1945 r.) [Dispute over Wierzchowiny. Activities of the NSZ Special Action troops (Special Action Emergency) in the poviats of Chełm, Hrubieszów Krasnystaw and Lubartów against the background of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict], in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2006) 1/9, 265-308; Mariusz Bechta/Wojciech J. Muszyński, Przeciwko pax Sovietica, Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe i struktury polityczne ruchu narodowego wobec reżimu komunistycznego 1944–1956 [Against pax Sovietica, National Military Union and political structures of the national movement against the communist regime 1944–1956], (Warsaw: IPN 2017), 331-338.

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whereas those strongly influenced by the nationalist underground saw the murders of hundreds of Poles and Ukrainians, most of whom were civilians.30 Actions against Belarusians also mirrored the attitude of the nationalist underground towards minorities. The NZW III Wilno Brigade, which operated in the Podlasie Region under the command of Captain Romuald ‘Bury’ Rajs, murdered several dozen Belarusians.31 According to [the Polish historian] Grzegorz Motyka: “The actions directed by some nationalist underground groups against national minorities seem not so much isolated incidents by defiant commanders, but rather attempts to implement the nationalist political programme.”32 Historians who demonstrate an apologetic attitude towards the NSZ and NZW reject the thesis that nationalist underground activities actually have a nationalist background. They merely associate the murders of unarmed Belarusian and Ukrainian civilians (including children and the elderly) with the “active support of the local population for the communist regime”. They consider the ethnic-religious conflict as “alleged” and the activities of the NSZ and NZW as justified “retaliation for treason” against Soviet “acolytes” and the “settlement of long-standing wrongs”.33 However, they do admit that this “retaliation” “was often characterised by unnecessary cruelty”. It should be added that partisan units of organisations unrelated to the nationalist movement also perpetrated murders of Ukrainians,34 Jews, Germans and even the Roma 30  Grzegorz Motyka/Rafał Wnuk, “Pany” i “rezuny”. Współpraca AK-DSZ-WiN i UPA w latach 1945–1947 [‘Lords’ and ‘murderers’. The cooperation between the AK-DSZ-WiN and UPA in 1945–1947] (Warsaw: Volumen, 1997); Rafał Wnuk, Stosunek polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego i legalnej opozycji do mniejszości ukraińskiej w latach 1944–1947, in: Jan Pisuliński (ed.), Akcja “Wisła”, [The attitude of the Polish underground of independence and legal opposition to the Ukrainian minority in 1944–1947 in the ‘Wisła’ Action] (Warsaw 2003), 91-108. 31  Jerzy Kułak, Rozstrzelany oddział. Monografia 3 Wileńskiej Brygady NZW – Białostocczyzna 1945–1946 [A unit shot dead. A monograph on the 3rd Vilnius NZW Brigade – Bialystok region 1945–1946] (Białystok: Jerzy Kułak, 2007), 231-259. 32  Grzegorz Motyka, Na białych Polaków obława”, Wojska NKWD w walce z polskim podziemiem 1944–1953 [‘A roundup of white Poles’, the NKVD Army in the fight against the Polish Underground 1944–1953] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2014), 265. 33  Bechta/Muszyński, “Przeciwko pax Sovietica … [Against Pax Sovietica], 269-270. Similar arguments are used by: Kazimierz Krajewski/Wąskowski Grzegorz, Kpt. Romuald Rajs “Bury” a Białorusini [Capt. Romuald ‘Bury’ Rajs and the Belorussians], in: Glaukopis, (2016) 33, 102-105. 34  The bloodiest operation of the armed underground stemming from the AK directed against the Ukrainian civilians was the murder of the 200-300 inhabitants of Pawłokoma village by a troop led by Józef Biss, aka ‘Wacław’, on March 3rd 1945. See: Z. Konieczny, Był taki czas. U źródeł akcji odwetowej w Pawłokomie [There was a time. At the source of retaliation

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population.35 However, these mass murders did not have the traits of planned ethnic cleansing demonstrated by some of the NZS or NZW actions. Subperiods Any analysis of anti-communist armed resistance groups in the period between 1944 and 1956 should distinguish several subperiods. The repercussions of Operation Tempest for the soldiers of the AK and underground activists and the enormous presence of the Soviet forces in frontline areas created an extremely unfavourable situation for underground activities, especially for guerrilla warfare. The paralysing ubiquity of Red Army forces (who were occupying every habitable building near to the frontline) and the lateness of the season offered a great advantage to the Soviet and Polish security officers. The leafless autumn and winter forests offered little shelter to any hiding partisans and the cold prevented them from staying long. Only 30 partisan units remained between the new Eastern border and the frontline, operating in regions far to the east of the front. In early 1945, the westward advance of the main Soviet forces in January and the arrival of spring changed the state of affairs. In the areas to the east of the Vistula, resistance activity increased rapidly and the commanding officers of the AK and Polish underground reassembled. And while the command of the disbanded AK tried to extinguish partisan activity, communist repressions forced more and more people underground and the increased numbers of people hiding in the forests between the Vistula and the Bug rivers in May 1945 turned local partisan meetings into mass gatherings. Local commanding officers attempted to ensure the security of their underground units and networks by destroying the stations of the Citizen’s Militia, whose officers acted openly against the underground, by clearing their areas of communist activists and by physically annihilating the officers and employees of the State Security Office

in Pawłokomie] (Przemyśl: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Oddział w Przemyślu, 2005), 55-62; Eugeniusz Misiło, Pawłokoma 3 III 1945 r. (Warsaw: UKAR, 2006), 27-43. 35  According to the NKVD report Polish forces slaughtered Roma people, including women and children, on September 13th 1944 in the vicinity of Groczki pod Radunią (Grodzieńszczyzna). That crime was attributed to the partisans of Lieutenant Jan Borysewicz, aka ‘Krysia’. See: Motyka, Na białych Polaków obława … [‘A roundup of white Poles’…], 152.

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(Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB). Between at least April and June 1945, the security apparatus in Poland was on the defensive. Over 300 partisan units with around 15,000 members were operating throughout the country. In many regions, the cities were controlled by the state while the countryside was ruled by the partisans – the ‘forest people’. The German capitulation in June 1945 led to a sudden drop in guerrilla operations but not – as expected by the underground – a conflict between the Western Allies and the USSR. Hopes for a peaceful return to political sovereignty were reignited by the return of Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who joined the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, TRJN). In this new political climate, the Soviets declared an amnesty in August 1945. 30,217 people appeared before the Amnesty Committees but handed in a mere 2,000 weapons.36 Between June and September 1945, most AK-DSZ and NSZ units were dissolved and numerous local partisan groups came out into the open. Only the NZW and such regional structures as the ‘Ogień’ group from Podhale Region37 or the KWP in Łódź District38 tried to maintain their numbers. In 1945, partisan units had between 13,000 and 17,400 members. Following the amnesty and the decision of the AK-DSZ leadership to switch to civil resistance, the number of armed groups dropped abruptly and, by 1946, only 7,0009,000 partisans were still active. This decline reflected a decrease in both the number of partisan units and their membership. While each unit averaged 38-51 members in 1945, the number in 1946 had fallen to a mere 26-35.39

36  Andrzej Paczkowski, Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944–1956. Taktyka, strategia metody działania, vol. 1: Lata 1945–1947 [The security apparatus in 1944–1956. Tactics, method strategy, part 1: 1945–1947] (Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1994), 32, 39 (Sprawozdanie z odprawy kierowników WUBP 30 XI i 1 XII 1945 r.) [Report on the briefing of WUBP managers on November 30th and December 1st 1945)]. 37  Korkuć, Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce …, [Stay true… .], 516-518. 38  Toborek, Likwidacja Konspiracyjnego Wojska Polskiego …, [Liquidation of], 82-84. 39  See Table 6.1. The numbers given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are based on thorough research conducted to prepare the second, extended and corrected edition of Atlasu polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944–1956 (Atlas of Polish independence underground 1944–1956). To be printed in 2019.

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Table 6.1 The number and strength of partisan units in Poland, 1944–1956

Units

After July 1944

Jan–Dec 1945

Jan 1946– April 1947

April 1947– Jan 1951– Dec 1950 Dec 1956

AK-DSZ-WiN

25a 2,4492,723b 5 126-130

129 6,4068,505 78 2,6763,650 13 495-648

57 1,6832,196 53 1,3901,916 30 1,0571,378 17 282-372 4 97-110 2 61-109 35 1,1851,638 5 147-163 59 1,0621,333 262 6,9649,215 26-35

26 194-380

16 60-118

46 470-643

11 68-123

9 72-97

3 9

–

–

–

–

3 71-119 14 125-181

1 5-10 4 21-32

4 54-69 28 239-393

4 31-48 10 65-82

130 1,2251,882 9-14

49 259-422

NSZ, NZW

KWP

–

ROAK

–

WSGO ‘Warta’

–

VI Vilnus AK Brigade Post-AK

–

Local organisations Undetermined provenance or unaffiliated Total

–

Average strength of each unit

–

–

30 2,5752,853 85-95

11 175-269 8 273-283 – 46 1,4962,078 3 120-130 53 1,4031,834 341 13,04417,397 38-51

a  Number of partisan units. b  Strength/size of partisan units.

5-9

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Białystok District, which had remained under Soviet occupation between 1939 and 1941, stood out on the map of anti-communist resistance for its particularly powerful guerrilla forces. Military resistance in other Voivodships (administrative regions) in Eastern Poland – in Lublin, Rzeszów and the eastern part of the Warsaw Voivodship – was slightly weaker. These poorly urbanised areas, in which the Red Army had been stationed between July 1944 and January 1945 and which were occupied by the PKWN, were still home to the insurrectionary tradition of the 19th century, which was favourable to armed resistance. In 1945 and 1946, the communist authorities in these areas often controlled only the towns and cities, while the countryside was ruled by the ‘forest people’. In Kielce, Cracow and Żywiec Regions and in parts of Łódź Region and Western Masovia, the armed underground only began intensifying its activities in 1945 and reached its peak in the spring and summer of 1946. During this time, these periods of dual power often lasted for several months. In Greater Poland, Pomerania and Silesia (pre-war Western Poland), armed operations were conducted on a much smaller scale. Partisan units, who rarely appeared in the former German territories, lacked the necessary support from their field networks and the rare clashes and actions in which they were engaged were no threat to the functioning of the local authorities. Only the cells operated by the WiN in Warmia and Masuria (East Prussia) and by the NZW in Białystok Region had more impact.40 During the period of their greatest activity, the partisans were able to considerably reduce the influence of the local communist administration by killing or intimidating party activists or attacking Citizen’s Militia (MO) stations. By April 1947, underground forces had destroyed over 1,300 such stations.41

The Actions of the Communist Security Apparatus against the Polish Underground

In 1944 and 1945, Soviet forces focused their attention on fighting the armed underground. NKVD units began pacification, ‘purifying’ operations, in which they sent pursuit groups into different areas and established detention centres and filtration camps in Poland. The military counterintelligence officers of 40  See Table 2. 41  Sławomir Poleszak/Rafał Wnuk, Zarys dziejów polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944–1956 [Outline of the history of the Polish independence underground 1944–1956], in: Atlas polskiego podziemna niepodległościowego 1944–1956 [Atlas of Polish independence underground 1944–1956] (Warsaw/Lublin 2007), XXVIII.

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Table 6.2 The number of units and people in units of the independence underground in particular regions of Poland from 1944 to 1956

Region

Po VII 1944

I–XII 1945

I 1946– IV 1947

IV 1947– XII 1950

I 1951– XII 1956

Białystok

–

Gdańsk

–

46 1,137-2,385 15 437-503 14 533-838 45 1,562-1,993 38 1,432-2,184 49 1,913-2,467 29 890-1,080 –

28 488-874 16 304-341 16 575-698 17 314-428 23 1,066-1,505 27 1,001-1,111 40 1,163-1,461 3 43-55 37 625-685 14 622-878 –

23 147-293 3 49 4 35-60 8 60-101 13 114-164 21 202-245 12 112-132 2 7-14 9 53-67 4 67-223 1 12 28 353-501 1 2-9 130 1,225-1,882

8 26-80 –

Katowice – – Kielce – Kraków

–

Lublin Łódź

8 283-343 –

Olsztyn

–

Poznań

–

Rzeszów

17 2,214-2,382 –

Szczecin Warsaw Wrocław Total

31 815-863 40 3,667-3,926 –

33 628-1,128 1 30 30 341 2,575-22,853 13,044-17,397 5 78-162 –

38 741-1,150 3 22-29 262 6,964-9,215

1 2-9 1 2-9 4 21-32 17 103-141 5 25-27 1 8 1 4 2 12 – 8 54-91 1 2-9 49 259-422

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the Red Army’s SMERSH agency developed a network of intelligence agents and conducted numerous operational activities.42 By late 1945, all successful operations conducted against the partisans were either NKVD actions or joint actions carried out by the NKVD together with the UB and the KBW in which the NKVD always had the upper hand. By mid-1945, 15 regiments of Internal Troops of the NKVD (Wojska Wewnętrzne NKVD) were stationed in ‘free’ Poland. These numbered about 35,000 soldiers, accounting for 43% of all NKVD forces in Central Europe. In comparison, only 10 WW NKVD regiments were stationed in the Soviet-occupied zone in Germany.43 The Polish communist security apparatus, which was created by Soviet experts, gradually assumed the tasks of the NKVD. It began to report its own successes in early 1946 and was operating with some independence by the second half of the year. In June 1946, operational groups of the security apparatus initiated actions resulting in the killing or arrest of several leading guerrilla commanders as well as the arrest of many partisans and their supporters. By changing their tactics for dealing with underground forces the communists had managed to gain the offensive. The key element of this new strategy was the replacement of large-scale search-and-destroy operations with several dozen permanent operational groups, armed mainly with machine guns. Each group was given the task of tracking down a specified partisan unit, regardless of the circumstances. Ceasing to do so was considered a crime. These groups had radios and remained in constant contact with the units of the Polish Army (Wojsko Polskie, WP) and the UB stationed in their area. They worked closely with the UB and had access to local Citizen’s Militia forces.44 On top of all this, the network of agents working for the State Security Office was becoming increasingly more effective. They provided UB officers with valuable information that enabled them to inflict precise and lethal strikes on partisan units. In July and August 1946, for example, the persistent activities of the KWP led to the physical and mental exhaustion of the members of the NSZ partisan 42  Andrzej Paczkowski, Aparat bezpieczeństwa w walce z podziemiem w Polsce w latach 1944–1956. Struktury organizacyjne i kierunki działań [The security apparatus in the fight against the underground in Poland in 1944–1956. Organisational structures and directions of its activities], in: Aparat represji a opór społeczny …, [The apparatus of repression and social resistance], 61-62. 43  Andrzej Chmielarz, Działania 64 Dywizji Wojsk Wewnętrznych NKWD przeciwko polskiemu podziemiu …, [Activities of the 64th Division of Internal Forces of the NKVD against the Polish underground], in: Wojna domowa [Civil war …], 72-76. 44  Archives of the National Institute of Memory, catalogue no. MBP 49 a, Order no. 70, 23rd July 1946, k. 15.

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group led by Henryk ‘Bartek’ Flame in the Żywiec Region. Once it had been worn down, the unit was contacted by an envoy – who was actually an undercover UB officer from the fictitious command of the NSZ Opole District – with an offer to transfer the partisans to the West. Subsequently, in September, the ‘transferring’ partisans – who numbered between 167 and 200 – fell into the hands of the UB and were killed without trial.45 The partisans operating in the Bieszczady Mountains under the leadership of Captain Antoni ‘Zuch’ Żubryd were broken down by operational groups of the UB-KBW, who received information from an agent who had infiltrated the unit and, eventually, even shot Żubryd and his wife dead.46 A further example is the elimination of ‘Ogień’, the largest guerrilla group operating in Podhale, in February 1947, and the death of its commander, both of which resulted from a combination of relentless pursuit and the infiltration of the unit by an undercover UB agent.47 At this time, the state security apparatus was working its way through the field network of the underground and its command staff at all levels, eliminating them as it went. Other units that were crushed included two WiN General Boards (Commands).48 Arrests decimated the leadership of the NZW and NSZ-OP.49 National commanders lost contact with many of their provincial staff who, in turn, were often unable to effectively control their local networks and partisan units. By the end of 1946, the anti-communist underground was in deep crisis. The parliamentary elections held on January 19th 1947 were rigged by the communists but this electoral fraud failed to lead to international repercussions. The underground activists’ most pessimistic scenario had come true and continued armed resistance had now lost its meaning. On February 22nd 1947, the newly-formed communist government, which contained neither the PSL nor Stanisław Mikołajczyk, announced an amnesty. This led to 53,517 people 45  Tomasz Kurpierz, Likwidacja zgrupowania Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych Henryka Flamego “Bartka” w 1946 roku – próba rekonstrukcji działań aparatu bezpieczeństwa [Liquidation of Henryk ‘Bartek’ Flame’s group of National Armed Forces in 1946 – an attempt to reconstruct the actions of the security apparatus], in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 1/5, 107-132. 46  Andrzej Zagórski, Biogram Antoniego Żubryda ps. “Orłowski”, “Zuch” [A biography of Antoni Żubryda aka ‘Orłowski’, ‘Zuch’], in: Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u (1994) 5, 214-215. 47  Korkuć, Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce …, [Stay true …], 597-600. 48  Janusz Kurtyka, Na szlaku AK (NIE, DSZ, WiN) [On the AK path. (NIE, DSZ, WiN)], in: Zeszyty Historyczne (1990) 94, 36-38. Colonel Franciszek Niepokólczycki, Leader of the 2nd Board of the WiN, was arrested on October 22nd 1946 and Second Lieutenant Wincenty Kwieciński, Chairman of the 3rd Board of the WiN, on January 5th 1947. 49  Komorowski, Polityka i walka …, [Politics and struggle …], 515-517, 530; Ryszard Terlecki, Dyktatura zdrady [The Dictatorship of Treason], (Cracow: Arka, 1991), 35, 43.

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emerging from the underground and 23,257 being released from prisons and detention centres – a total of 76,774 people, who included both members of underground organisations and partisan fighters such as deserters from the WP and the MO. The Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, MBP) estimated that more than 90% of WiN members and about 60%50 of national underground members came out of hiding at this time. In late April 1947, the amnesty came to an end, as did the widespread, influential underground. A little over 1,000 insurgents remained in the forests, but these posed no real threat to the authorities. After the amnesty, the security forces had the apparently easy task of eliminating these small partisan groups, but this proved more difficult than initially assumed. The remaining underground commanders and soldiers were among the most active and experienced and, hence, expected no mercy from the communists. Faced with the choice between a death sentence, long-term imprisonment and a further, hopeless fight with no prospect of victory, they chose the latter and stayed in the forests. Operating with the support of their most trusted confidants, UB officers and KBW soldiers were forced to wage war with an experienced and disillusioned enemy who, while relatively small in number, was difficult to penetrate. A wide range of actions were taken against these ‘last armed’, ranging from regular pursuit groups and provocateurs, to the creation by the UB of fake underground commands and communications with Polish communities in Western Europe. The largest-scale operations included the establishment of the provocative 5th Command of the WiN and the so-called Berg scandal.51 The Fourth Management Board (Headquarters) of the WiN was dispersed in November and December 1947, marking the failure of the final objective of the Polish underground: the aspiration to lead a nationwide movement. Having succeeded in recruiting an arrested member of the Board, UB officers released him quickly so that the remaining resistance activists wouldn’t learn about his detention. He first brought about the arrest of WiN members who could jeopardise his position and then helped Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, MBP) officers and agents to infiltrate the organisation. In this way, the ‘5th WiN Command’ was used to penetrate intelligence networks and spread disinformation amongst Polish émigré communities and 50  A  parat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944–1956…, cz. 1 [The security apparatus, 1944–1956], 102 (Protokół z odprawy szefów WUBP, 28 IV 1947 r.) [Report on the briefing of the WUBP heads, 28th April 1947]. 51  The term ‘Berg scandal’ stems from the name of the Bavarian town of Berg, in which a communication centre for members of the SN and the Political Council abroad was based. It was led by SN members and financed and coordinated by the CIA.

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CIA cells in Poland as well as to eliminate the final remaining partisan units.52 The Berg scandal, on the other hand, involved the penetration and then interception of the lines of communication with dexiled members of the National Party by the communist secret service at the end of 1947.53 UB officers eliminated the final supra-regional underground networks54 in 1948 while the last local networks and partisan units with a clear organisational structure and command were broken down in 1953. After this, only partisans hiding alone or in groups of 2 to 3 fighters remained in the forest and these only carried out armed actions in exceptional cases. Finally, systematically, even these were killed or caught. The few who managed to survive until the autumn of 1956 took advantage of the changes in Poland and left the underground. After 1956, only six partisans remained in the forest. The last of these, Sergeant Józef Franczak, aka ‘Laluś’, or ‘Lalek’, died in October 1963.55

Some Figures and Estimates

Up to 1,800 partisans belonged to resistance units between 1947 and 1950 while 250-400 continued armed resistance after 1950. At the same time, it is estimated that just over 20,000 partisans belonged to permanent forest units between 52  Frazik Wojciech, Operacja “Cezary” – przegląd wątków krajowych, in: Kazimierz Krajewski/ Tomasz Łabuszewski (eds.), “Zwyczajny” resort. Studia o aparacie bezpieczeństwa 1944– 1956 [Operation ‘Cezary’ – an overview of national issues at the ‘Ordinary’ resort. Studies on the 1944–1956 security camera] (Warsaw: IPN, 2005), 400-436. 53  The network initially served the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Government in exile, but in late 1945 it was taken over by the SN; see Rafał Wnuk, Dwie prowokacje – piąta komenda Zrzeszenia “WiN” i Berg [Two provocations – the fifth command of ‘WiN’ and the Berg associations], in: Zeszyty Historyczne (2002) 141, 71-112. 54  In 1948, the network of the Extraterritorial Vilnius District of the AK, and the previously ‘frozen’ network of the Extraterritorial Lviv Area were both liquidated. See Piotr Niwiński, Działania operacyjne Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego wobec środowiska wileńskiego do 1956 r. [Operational activities of the Office of Public Security against the Vilnius group until 1956], in: “Zwyczajny” resort …, [‘Ordinary’ resort], 262-285; Tomasz Balbus, Sprawa kryptonim “Radwan”. Urząd Bezpieczeństwa wobec kadry Okręgu Lwowskiego AK-WiN i środowisk lwowskich (1947–1956) [Code name ‘Radwan’. The Office of Security against the staff of the Lviv region AK-WiN and Lviv circles (1947–1956)], in: Kazimierz Krajewski/ Tomasz Łabuszewski (eds.) “Zwyczajny” resort. Studia o aparacie bezpieczeństwa 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), 286-311. 55  Sławomir Poleszak, Kryptonim “Pożar”. Rozpracowanie i likwidacja ostatniego żołnierza polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego Józefa Franczaka “Lalka”, “Lalusia” (1956– 1963), [Codename ‘Fire’. Development and liquidation of the last soldier of the Polish independence underground – Józef Franczak, aka ‘Lalka’, ‘Lalus’ (1956–1963)], in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, (2005) 8/2, 347-376.

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1944 and 1956. The numbers of people killed as a result of underground actions quoted by pre-1989 historiography cannot be verified to this day. According to communist researchers, these fatalities included nearly 12,000 uniformed Poles (including soldiers of the UB, KBW, MO, WP and ORMO), 1,000 Red Army soldiers and NKVD officers and 10,000 civilians. This final category includes party activists, UB and NKVD agents and people killed either accidently or as victims of the pacification of villages inhabited by ‘foreign’ civilians by Polish and Ukrainian underground groups.56 The above figure of 12,000 soldiers and security officers refers to the total of all fatalities in that category, without breaking these down into those killed by the Polish underground, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) or common bandits or as a result of the frequent accidents caused by drunkenness or the careless handling of weapons. The literature on this subject records 8,668 underground activists killed in combat and 79,000 incarcerated for collaborating with the various resistance groups.57 Among the fatalities were over a thousand members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów, OUN) and the UPA, who were killed in combat between 1944 and 1947. The percentage of those arrested for political reasons who were members of nonPolish underground networks is not known. Between 1944 and 1954, around 5,000 people were sentenced to death for political reasons and more than half of these sentences were carried out. According to the above data it can be estimated that 10,000-11,000 underground activists were either killed in fighting or executed but it is not known how many of these were members of partisan units.

The Myth of the ‘Cursed Soldiers’

During the period of the Polish People’s Republic, the anti-communist armed resistance was a taboo subject that only selected party historians were 56  Tadeusz Walichnowski (ed.), W obronie władzy ludowej 1944–1952 [In defence of the people’s authorities in 1944–1952] (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza RSW, 1985), 18. Władysław Góra gives different numbers: he claims 12,000 civilians and 10,000 uniformed soldiers were killed. See Władysław Góra, Walki klasowe w Polsce i zmiany układzie sił politycznych w latach 1944–1948 [Class struggle in Poland and changes in the political forces in 1944–1948], in: Władysław Góra/Ryszard Halaba, O utrwalenie władzy ludowej w Polsce 1944–1948 [For the consolidation of people’s power in Poland in 1944–1948] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza, 1982), 29. 57  Maria Turlejska, Te pokolenia żałobami czarne … Skazani na śmierć i ich sędziowie, [These generations black from mourning … Condemned to death and their judges] (London: Aneks, 1989), 75.

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permitted to address. Party propaganda presented anti-communist guerrillas as a marginal, criminal movement with a fascist ideology. After Poland regained its sovereignty in 1989, both academic and social interest in the post-war underground gradually increased. A number of academic studies were conducted and written, some reliable, some apologist and some a mixture of the two. In February 2011, the Polish Parliament designated March 1st as National Remembrance Day of the Cursed Soldiers58 and, following the success of the Law and Justice Party in the 2015 election, the ruling camp recognised the anti-communist underground as the cornerstone of national historical policy. Marches, demonstrations, rallies, competitions and various events have taken place on March 1st across the country with the participation of the highest state officials. Many monuments to anti-communist conspirators have been erected in recent years and the best-known figures have become patrons of the brigades of Poland’s modern Territorial Defence Forces. The importance attached to this subject by the current authorities is demonstrated by the fact that the official website of the President of the Republic of Poland has only one history-related tab – ‘Cursed soldiers’ –, which is constantly being extended. On March 1st 2017, for example, a letter written by President Andrzej Duda was published on the website. This included the following lines: “The heroic struggle of the Cursed Soldiers was yet another act in the historical and dramatic struggle for a free Poland. (…) What we Poles value more than our own lives is freedom and honour, solidarity with our neighbours and dedication to the national cause. I am convinced that the memory of the Cursed Soldiers strengthens in us, the Poles, the will to stand by these imponderables. Today, as the President of the Republic of Poland, I pay homage to the heroes of the anti-communist uprising.”59 This exalted style is typical of the official narrative about the anti-communist underground. The above quotation refers to the anti-communist uprising that supposedly took place in Poland between 1944 and 1956. This thesis – to which some academics object – is disseminated by the Institute of National Remembrance, which is probably the most significant institution working in the official politics of memory today.60 58  ‘Cursed soldiers’ (żołnierze wyklęci) is a notion used by right-wing columnists, some historians and politicians to define the anti-communist underground of 1944–1956. 59  The letter by the President of the Republic of Poland to the organisers and participants of the ceremony commemorating the “heroes of the anti-communist uprising” published on the occasion of the ‘National Day of the Cursed Soldiers’ March 1 2017: http://www. prezydent.pl/kancelaria/zolnierze-wykleci/list/ last accessed March 1 2019. 60  Tomasz Łabuszewski, Polskie powstanie antykomunistyczne [Polish anti-communist uprising], in: Bulletin of the Institute of National Memory (2017) 11, 120-127. Differing opinions in the approach to the notion of ‘anti-communist uprising’ were well addressed in

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The myth of the ‘cursed soldiers’ is constructed with the support of state organs. It is based on simplified, black-and-white concepts, rejects nuance and does not accept facts that fail to fit the required picture. Hence, no mention is made of the crimes perpetrated by the guerrillas, of the anti-Semitic and chauvinistic content strongly present in the plans, press and activities of the nationalist conspiracy movement, or of the divisions and diversity within the underground itself. The picture created in this way conflicts with the personal experience of some Polish residents and with the intergenerational transfer of memory. This idealised figure of the ‘cursed soldier’ has also turned out to be unacceptable to Belarusians, Ukrainians, Jews and Slovaks as well as many Poles. Consequently, many new studies have appeared with the aim of creating a balanced, polemical narrative to oppose these existing, almost hagiographic narratives.61 A radical reaction to the myth of the ‘cursed soldiers’ is the anti-myth of the ‘deplorable soldiers’. This is also the name of a website, whose content almost exclusively consists of information on crimes committed by the anticommunist underground.62 In this view, the ‘cursed’ were either fascists or murderers, thieves and sadists, who were completely deprived of the support of the local population. The nicknames of the various underground groups, military uniforms and nomenclature served only to camouflage their purely criminal activity. However, the myth of the ‘deplorable soldiers’ is based on patterns spread by communist propaganda exemplified by the way in which it reduces anti-communist resistance to actions taken for the lowest of motives. In some cases, it is also linked to the rehabilitation of Soviet-dependent communist Poland, which is presented as a sovereign state of law that protects the life and property of its citizens. In fact, the opposing myths of the ‘cursed’ and ‘deplorable’ soldiers are interrelated. The ideas of the past that they create replace reliable historical knowledge with simplified and emotional sloganeering. Historical policy constructed in this manner becomes history at the service of politics. History ‘on duty’ is no longer an academic discipline, but simply propaganda.

the following discussion: Tomasz Łabuszewski/Rafał Wnuk/Andrzej Friszke/Zbigniew Nosowski, “Żołnierze wyklęci” – między historią, popkulturą a polityką. Dyskusja [‘Cursed soldiers’ between history, pop-culture and politics. Discussions], in: Więź (2016) 3, 7-27. 61  The best known publication of that kind is: Piotr Zychowicz, Skazy na pancerzach. Czarne karty epopei Żołnierzy Wyklętych [Blemishes on the armour. Black cards in the story of the Cursed Soldiers] (Poznań: Rebis, 2018). 62  Website “Żołnierze przeklęci” (“Deplorable soldiers”) https://zolnierzeprzekleci.wordpress. com, last accessed March 1 2019.

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Bibliography Balbus, Tomasz, Sprawa kryptonim “Radwan”. Urząd Bezpieczeństwa wobec kadry Okręgu Lwowskiego AK-WiN i środowisk lwowskich (1947–1956), in: Kazimierz Krajewski/Tomasz Łabuszewski (eds.), “Zwyczajny” resort. Studia o aparacie bezpieczeństwa 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), 286-311. Balbus, Tomasz, O Polskę Wolną i Niezawisłą (1945–1948). WiN w południowo-zachodniej Polsce (geneza – struktury – działalność – likwidacja – represje) (Kraków/Wrocław: Societas Vistulana, 2004). Bechta, Mariusz/Wojciech J. Muszyński, Przeciwko Pax Sovietica. Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe i struktury polityczne ruchu narodowego wobec reżimu komunistycznego 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2017). Bereza, Tomasz, Wokół Piskorowic. Przyczynek do dziejów konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego na Zasaniu w latach 1939–1945 (Rzeszów: IPN, 2013). Bębenek, Stanisław, Wizja przyszłej Polski w programie “Grupy Szaniec”, in: Przegląd Historyczny (1973) 64/1, 117-131. Bolesław, Dereń, Józef Kuraś “Ogień” – partyzant Podhala (Warszawa: Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2000). Chmielarz, Andrzej, Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj, in: Krzysztof Komorowski (ed.), Armia Krajowa: dramatyczny epilog (Warszawa: Bellona, 1994). Chmielarz, Andrzej, Działania 64 Dywizji Wojsk Wewnętrznych NKWD ­przeciwko polskiemu podziemiu, in: Andrzej Ajnenkiel (ed.), Wojna domowa czy nowa okupacja. Polska po roku 1944 (Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków: Rytm, 1998), 85-95. Ciesielski, Stanisław/Materski Wojciech/Paczkowski Andrzej, Represje sowieckie wobec Polaków i obywateli polskich (Warszawa: Karta, 2000). Czesław, Brzoza, Od Miechowa do Coburga. Brygada Świętokrzyska Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych w marszu na zachód, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 5, 221-270. Dickson, Keith D., Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric warfare: Lessons for Today, typescript. Friedl, Jiri, Żołnierze banici. Brygada Świętokrzyska Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych w Czechach w 1945 roku (Gdańsk: Muzeum II Wojny Światowej, 2016). Halaba, Ryszard (ed.), O utrwalenie władzy ludowej w Polsce 1944–1948 (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1982). Komorowski, Krzysztof, Polityka i walka. Konspiracja zbrojna ruchu narodowego 1939– 1945 (Warszawa: Rytm, 2000). Konieczny, Zdzisław, Był taki czas. U źródeł akcji odwetowej w Pawłokomie (Przemyśl: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Oddział w Przemyślu, 2005). Kopiński, Jarosław, Konspiracja akowska i poakowska na terenie Inspektoratu Rejonowego AK-WiN “Radzyń Podlaski” w latach 1944–1956 (Biała Podlaska: 1998).

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Korkuć, Maciej, Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce … Niepodległościowe oddziały partyzanckie w Krakowskiem (1944–1947) (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2002). Kowalski, Lech, Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego a żołnierze wyklęci (Poznań: Zysk i ska, 2016). Kozimala, Irena, Żołnierze wyklęci. Z dziejów partyzantki antykomunistycznej w powiecie przeworskim (Przeworsk: Regionalne Towarzystwo Naukowe, 2015). Krajewski, Kazimierz, Skala i metody działań partyzanckich i konspiracyjnych w Polsce po 1944 r., in: Piotr Niwiński (ed.), Aparat represji a opór społeczny wobec systemu komunistycznego w Polsce i na Litwie w Latach 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005). Krajewski, Kazimierz/Łabuszewski Tomasz, Białostocki Okręg AK-AKO VII 1944–VIII 1945 (Warszawa: Volumen, 1997). Krajewski, Kazimierz, Grzegorz Wąsowski, Kpt. Romuald Rajs “Bury” a Białorusini – fakty i mity, in: Glaukopis (2016), 33, 93-115. Kulińska, Lucyna, Narodowcy. Z dziejów obozu narodowego w Polsce w latach 1944–1947 (Warszawa/Kraków: PWN, 1999). Kulińska, Lucyna/Orłowski, Mirosław/Sierchuła, Rafał, Narodowcy. Myśl polityczna i społeczna obozu narodowego w Polsce w latach 1944–1947 (Warszawa/Kraków: PWN, 2001). Kułak, Jerzy, Rozstrzelany oddział. Monografia 3 Wileńskiej Brygady NZW – Białostocczyzna 1945–1946 (Białystok: Jerzy Kułak, 2007). Kurpierz, Tomasz, Likwidacja zgrupowania Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych Henryka Flamego “Bartka” w 1946 roku – próba rekonstrukcji działań aparatu bezpieczeństwa, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004), 5, 107-132. Kurtyka, Janusz, Na szlaku AK (NIE, DSZ, WiN), in: Zeszyty Historyczne (1990), 94, 14-48 List Prezydenta RP do organizatorów i uczestników uroczystości upamiętniających “bohaterów powstania antykomunistycznego” wydany z okazji “Narodowego Dnia Pamięci Żołnierzy Wyklętych” 1 marca 2017 r., http://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/ zolnierze-wykleci/list/ Łabuszewski, Tomasz, Polskie powstanie antykomunistyczne, in: Biuletyn IPN, (2017) 11, 120-127. Łabuszewski, Tomasz, Wnuk, Rafał, Friszke, Andrzej, Nosowski Zbigniew, “Żołnierze wyklęci” – między historią, popkulturą a polityką. Dyskusja, in: Więź, (2016) 3, 7-27. Łuczak, Agnieszka, Rozpracowanie Wielkopolskiej Samodzielnej Grupy Ochotniczej “Warta” przez Wojewódzki Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Poznaniu, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 5, 61-80. Misiło, Eugeniusz, Pawłokoma 3 III 1945 r. (Warszawa: UKAR, 2006). Motyka, Grzegorz, “Na białych Polaków obława”. Wojska NKWD w walce z polskim podziemiem 1944–1953 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2014).

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Motyka, Grzegorz, Wnuk Rafał, “Pany” i “rezuny”. Współpraca AK-DSZ-WiN i UPA w latach 1945–1947 (Warszawa: Volumen, 1997). Nawrocki, Zbigniew, Zamiast wolności. UB na Rzeszowszczyźnie 1944–1949 (Rzeszów: Instytut Europejskich Studiów Społecznych, 1998). Niwiński, Piotr, Działania operacyjne Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego wobec środowiska wileńskiego do 1956 r., in: Kazimierz Krajewski/Tomasz Łabuszewski (eds.), “Zwyczajny” resort. Studia o aparacie bezpieczeństwa 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), 262-285. Niwiński, Piotr, Okręg Wileński AK w latach 1944–1948 (Warszawa: Volumen, 1999). Ostasz Grzegorz, Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawisłość. Okręg Rzeszów (Rzeszów: Libri Ressovienses, 2000). Paczkowski, Andrzej, Aparat bezpieczeństwa w walce z podziemiem w Polsce w latach 1944–1956. Struktury organizacyjne i kierunki działań, in: Piotr Niwiński (ed.), Aparat represji a opór społeczny wobec systemu komunistycznego w Polsce i na Litwie w Latach 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), 57-68. Paczkowski, Andrzej, Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944–1956. Taktyka, strategia metody działania, vol. 1: Lata 1945–1947 (Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1994). Pietrzak, Leszek/Poleszak, Sławomir/Wnuk, Rafał/Zajączkowski, Mariusz (eds.), Rok pierwszy. Powstanie i działalność Aparatu Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego na Lubelszczyźnie (lipiec 1944–czerwiec 1945) (Warszawa: IPN, 2004). Poleszak, Sławomir, Podziemie antykomunistyczne w Łomżyńskiem i Grajewskiem w latach (1945–1957) (Warszawa: Volumen, 2004). Poleszak, Sławomir, Kryptonim “Pożar”. Rozpracowanie i likwidacja ostatniego żołnierza polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego Józefa Franczaka “Lalka”, “Lalusia” (1956–1963), in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, (2005) 8, 347-376. Romaniak, Andrzej, ‘Powstanie, działalność i likwidacja antykomunistycznego oddziału partyzanckiego NSZ pod dowództwem Antoniego Żubryda’, in: Krzysztof Kaczmarski/Andrzej Romaniak (eds.), Powiat sanocki w latach 1944–1956 (Rzeszów/ Sanok: Wydawnictwa MH, 2007). Sas-Wisłocki, Juliusz, Wizja Wielkiej Polski. Fragmenty ustrojowe (Warszawa: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze Młodych Prawników i Ekonomistów, 1934). Siemaszko, Zbigniew S., Narodowe Siły Zbrojne (Londyn: Odnowa, 1982). Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, Ryszard, Podziemie poakowskie na Kielecczyźnie 1945–1948 (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2002). Strzembosz, Tomasz, Rzeczpospolita podziemna. Społeczeństwo polskie a państwo podziemne 1939–1945 (Warszawa: Krupski i S-ka, 2000). Terlecki, R., Dyktatura zdrady (Kraków: Arka, 1991). Toborek, Tomasz, Likwidacja Konspiracyjnego Wojska Polskiego w Łódzkiem w latach 1945–1951, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2004) 5, 81-106.

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Turlejska, Maria, Te pokolenia żałobami czarne … Skazani na śmierć i ich sędziowie (Londyn: Aneks, 1989). Walichnowski, Tadeusz (ed.), W obronie władzy ludowej 1944–1952 (Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza RSW, 1985). Wnuk, Rafał, Stosunek polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego i legalnej opozycji do mniejszości ukraińskiej w latach 1944–1947, in: Jan Pisuliński (ed.), Akcja “Wisła” (Warszawa 2003), 91-108. Wnuk, Rafał, Lubelski Okręg AK-DSZ-WiN 1944–1947 (Warszawa: Volumen, 2000). Wnuk, Rafał/Poleszak Sławomir/Jaczyńska Agnieszka/Śladecka Magdalena (eds.), Atlas polskiego podziemna niepodległościowego 1944–1956 (Warszawa/Lublin: IPN, 2007). Wojciech, Frazik, Operacja “Cezary” – przegląd wątków krajowych, in: Kazimierz Krajewski/Tomasz Łabuszewski (eds.), “Zwyczajny” resort. Studia o aparacie bezpieczeństwa 1944–1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2005), 400-436. Zagórski, Andrzej, Biogram Antoniego Żubryda ps. “Orłowski”, “Zuch”, in: Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u, (1994), 5, 213-216. Zajączkowski Mariusz, Spór o Wierzchowiny. Działalność oddziałów Akcji Specjalnej (Pogotowia Akcji Specjalnej) NSZ w powiatach Chełm, Hrubieszów Krasnystaw i Lubartów na tle konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego (sierpień 1944 r.–czerwiec 1945 r.), in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość (2006) 9, 265-308. Zblewski, Zdzisław, Okręg Zrzeszenia “Wolność i Niezawisłość” Geneza, struktury, działalność (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2005). Zychowicz, Piotr, Skazy na pancerzach. Czarne karty epopei Żołnierzy Wyklętych (Poznań: Rebis, 2018). Żołnierze przeklęci, https://zolnierzepąrzekleci.wordpress.com

Summary The anti-communist resistance in post-war Poland was a direct structural and ideological continuation of the underground movement of the pre-war period. The largest organisation was Freedom and Independence (WiN), whose founders sought to build unarmed political resistance and whose leaders assumed that their organisation would support all democratic political parties in their efforts to build an independent, democratic Poland. The second underground power was the National Military Union (NZW), whose leaders believed that defeating Germany would not stabilise the international situation and that conflict between the Western world and the Soviets was inevitable. They saw this confrontation, however, as an opportunity for Poland to

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regain its independence. The leaders of the NZW, unlike those of the WiN, worked to expand their forest-based guerrilla units. They did not accept the new Polish Eastern border. The political concept of the NZW envisaged Poland as a parliamentary-corporate hybrid with a strong central executive authority. To the far-right of both organisations was the National Armed Forces – Polish Organisation (NSZ-OP), whose leaders intended to establish a one-party dictatorship inspired by the idea of a fascist state. In addition to the above there were also several regional or supra-regional organisations that did not subordinate to the WiN, NZW or NSZ-OP central commands. Between 1945 and 1953 the membership of all these organisations and underground groups totalled 120,000-180,000. Half of these fighters had previously belonged to the Home Army and later operated within the framework of WiN and the DSZ. One quarter were connected with the national underground, mainly with the NZW. The others belonged to various local organisations. In 1945 13,000-17,000 people were hiding in forests. In 1946 this number was 7,000-9,000 and there were still 1,200-1,800 partisans between 1947 and 1950. After 1950 the armed fight was still continued by a group of 250-400 people but, with a few exceptions, these were unable to form a partisan group after 1953. During the entire period considered in this paper over 20,000 partisans belonged to permanent forest units. The last Polish anti-communist partisan, Józef Franczak ‘Lalek’, was killed in October 1963 in a manhunt organised by the Polish Security Police.

Summary in Polish

Polskie powojenne podziemie antykomunistyczne było bezpośrednią kontynuacją organizacyjną i ideową konspiracji okresu II wojny światowej. Największą organizacją było Zrzeszenie “Wolność i Niezawisłość” (WiN). Jego twórcy starali się stworzyć ruch oporu o politycznym charakterze i odrzucali walkę zbrojną. Liderzy WiN zakładali, iż kierowane przez nich zrzeszenie będzie wspierało wszystkie demokratyczne stronnictwa polityczne w wysiłkach prowadzących do budowy niezawisłej, demokratycznej Polski. Drugą co do wielkości siłą podziemia było Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe (NZW). Jego przywódcy uznali, iż pokonanie Niemiec nie ustabilizuje sytuacji międzynarodowej, a konflikt pomiędzy światem zachodnim a Sowietami jest jedynie kwestią czasu. W konfrontacji tej upatrywali szansy na odzyskanie przez Polskę niepodległości. Sowietami. Przywódcy NZW, odwrotnie niż WiN, dążyli do rozbudowania oddziałów leśnych. Nie akceptowali też oni nowych granic wschodnich Polski. Program polityczny NZW zakładał, iż panujący w Polsce

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ustrój będzie hybrydą parlamentarno-korporacyjną z silną centralną władzą wykonawczą. Na skrajnej prawicy sytuowały się Narodowe Siły Zbrojne – Organizacja Polska (NSZ-OP). Liderzy organizacji zamierzali stworzyć wpisującą się w faszystowski model państwa monopartyjną, nacjonalistyczną dyktaturę. Obok wymienionych wyżej ogólnopolskich struktur podziemnych istniało też kilka regionalnych lub ponadregionalnych organizacji, które podporządkowały się dowództwu WiN, NZW czy NSZ. Między 1945 a 1953 r. przez wszystkie te organizacje przewinęło się 120 000-180 000 ludzi. Co drugi z nich był członkiem WiN należącym wcześniej do Armii Krajowej i Delegatury Sił Zbrojnych. Co czwarty związał się z podziemiem narodowym, najczęściej z NZW. Pozostali należeli do różnych lokalnych siatek konspiracyjnych. W 1945 r. w szeregach oddziałach leśnych wszystkich organizacji walczyło 13 000-17 000 partyzantów, w 1946 r. 7000-9000, w latach 1947–1950 działalność kontynuowało 1200-1800 z nich. Po 1950 r. ukrywało się wciąż 250-400 ludzi, lecz po 1953 r., z wyjątkiem kilku wyj.atków nie tworzyli oni już grup partyzantckich. W całym omawianym okresie przez stało oddziały partyzanckie przewinęło się ponad 20 000 ludzi. Ostatni partyzant podziemia antykomunistycznego Józef Franczak ‘Lalek’ został zabity w październiku 1963 r. w obławie zorganizowanej przez funkcjonariuszy polskiego aparatu bezpieczeństwa.

Fig. 6.1 Poland

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Fig. 6.2 Poland

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Chapter 7

Between Ideology and War Reality: Forming the Relations and Principles of Co-existence between the UPA and Red Army from Spring to Autumn 1944 Olesia Isaiuk In spring, 1944, the military and political situation in the Western Ukraine began to change radically. After the Kurska Duga battle, the Red Army started its offensive on the rest of Ukrainian territory. In November 6th 1944, the Soviets took Kyiv back. In February 1944, the first Soviet units had emerged in Volhynia, and, in spring, in West Podillya: the ethnographical region which comprises of both Ternopil and Khmelnytsky. The mentioned territories were the scene of anti-Nazi resistance organized by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and personalized by UPA. The Red Army’s return to the Western Ukraine was no surprise for the UPA’s Chief Command. It was clear that Wehrmacht defence was weakening and would end quickly. However, the Red Army’s presence generated new challenges and political possibilities.

Theoretic Foundations, Based on the Political Situation

In Europe, militarized resitance was mainly part of the activities of an illegal or underground political government; usually of its ‘military branch’. After the liberation of occupied territories, they just reunited with their own army. This was not the same with the UPA. It didn’t plan any similar steps, and so what was the effect of both the UPA’s self-positioning and actual situation? The UPA was, according to the classic (and slightly pathetic) definition: ‘an army with­ out a state’1. What is more, the Red Army was not the main target for the national underground. The main target was to fight the Soviet Union, which seemed to be an unavoidable condition for renewing Ukrainian independence. The conflict arose at the moment of the occupation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1  Roman Petrenko, Slidamy armii bez derzhavy (Kyjiv/Toronto: Doslidnyy Instytut “Studium”, 2004).

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_008

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1920 by the Soviet Union2. The Red Army became part of this conflict, because it was the state army, which fought against nationalists. The latter saw the Red Army, as the instrument of Soviet imperialist politics and, at the same time, soldiers of the Red Army were treated as victims of their own totalitarian state. Finally, the Red Army, as a purely military formation, was pitted against UPA, as a consequence of the political situation and the strategic interests of both sides. In any case, one of the main tasks for the UPA was to create the principles of co-existence with the Red Army, in the face of forthcoming radical changes. It had been demonstrated, that they were the rules for the postwar period too, until the resistance had finished. The theoretical foundation for this was a document, known as ‘Tactics and behavioural instructions for the UPA’s units under the new circumstances’, distributed by the UPA’s commander-in-chief, Taras Chuprynka in December, 1943. According to these instructions, it was not allowed to attack the Red Army’s troops, even to get weapons3. Aggressive actions were allowed only in case of a counter-strike against the Red Army units’ actions of the same kind4. The instruction, dated January, 1944, directed the UPA’s soldiers and members of Ukrainian underground as follows: … Do not attack the Red Army units. Do not organise ceremonial greetings for the Red Army as liberators. In case of meeting of a RA soldier, act politely and friendly to gain his sympathy. Take special care with wounded soldiers and officers. Use the transition of the Red Army for our propaganda purposes: prepare sets of leaflets and of other materials; write our slogans on palisades and walls along the RA route; special attention must be paid to wounded soldiers in hospitals to give them our printed materials.5

These principles were repeated in later documents, too. For example, one of the orders of the UPA’s Chief Command dated by April, 6th 1944 read:

2  Wasyl Weryha, Wyzwol’na borot’ba w Ukrajini. 1914–1923. T. 1 (L’viv: Centr Doslidzhen’ Vyzvolnogo Rukhu, 2005); Petro Mirchuk, Narys istorii OUN. T. 1 (1920–1939) (Muenich/ London/New York, 1968); Ivan Patrylak, Wstan’ i borys’… Sluchaj i vir… Ukrajins’ke naciona­ listyczne pidpillia na povstans’kyj rukh. 1939–1960 rr. (L’viv: Centr Doslidzhen’ Vyzvolnogo Rukhu, 2012). 3  Security service of Ukraine state archive (Galuzevyj Derzhavnyj archiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrajiny, HDA SBU), f. 13, spr. 376, t. 60, spr. 53, 219. 4  H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, spr. 53, 219. 5  H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, t . 60, s.

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Olesia Isaiuk As for the Red Army: a brotherly attitude is obligatory. Having captured a RA soldier, we must explain him the purpose of our struggle and set him free. They may go back home or to the Red Army ranks. But it is prohibited to accept them to our units.

In September, 1944, more distinct instructions were announced: the UPA could start fighting with the Red Army, but only in cases of ultimate necessity6. It’s clear, that, unlike the Wehrmacht, the Red Army was not a mortal enemy in the eyes of the Ukrainian nationalistic military underground. It seems characteristic that the UPA’s Chief Command considered the Red Army as a potential ally, as opposed to the Wehrmacht or Polish Armia Krajowa. But it was a theoretical construction only, which needed to be checked by reality. This check started in March, 1944, when the Red Army had appeared in the Ternopil region. In April 1944, ‘the Reds’ took control over the most of Ternopil region and started their offensive on the Lviv region. During the next months, main military activities focused on the Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, which had become the arenas for long and gruelling battles. That was the reason for the Red Army to stay in these areas for quite a long time. What’s more, Lviv was an administrative center of the region and therefore a zone of special attention. After Lviv had been taken by the Soviets, it became clear that they were going to play by their own rules. This was the time for the creation of a socalled modus vivendi between the two military powers, determined by the current situation and by the military needs of both sides. Therefore, my interest is focused on how relations between the Red Army and nationalistic underground were formed in the early period of the Soviet occupation of Galicia, that is; between April and August, 1944. Lastly, the Red Army was already present in Galicia for almost half a year, and therefore the relations between two armies were an important part of everyday reality. But it is still unknown as to what were actual the mechanismes and motivations that formed the relations between the both armies. There are disputable proportions of political and purely military factors, which impacted on these relations. For these reasons, the main goal of this text is to clarify 1) the ways relations formed between the Red Army and the UPA, and 2) what role political and military factors played in this process. This article’s purpose is not to completely consider all factors and specifics. It is written to describe the situation as a whole, including the motivations of the both sides. 6  Litopys UPA, Nowa serija, T. 12. (Kyjiv: Litopys UPA, 2009), 91.

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Analyzing the issue of motivation requires two levels of analysis: institutional and personal. The institutional level provides an analysis of the political goals and the motivations based on them. The personal level provides analysis of motivations through human contact. The two most popular concepts regarding relations betweem the Red Army and the UPA stand on opposing foundations. The first, represented by the researchers of Ukrainian diaspora school, claimed a complete understanding between the UPA and the Red Army, and even mutual help, including an alliance against the NKVD7. The second, formed by the Soviet historical school with its strong political impact, presented the UPA and Red Army as deadly enemies, mostly for social reasons. According to this concept, the UPA represented ‘bourgeois nationalism’, the Red Army, in its turn, represented ‘the working class’; these circumstances made any compromise impossible. Although both viewpoints were politically engaged, the researchers of the last generation didn’t consider this theme as something separate. However this very theme gave birth to some profound work, for example, the works of Ivan Patryliak, Vladyslav Verstiuk, Ivan Kapas8.

Examination by Reality of War

Despite a theoretical background and good intentions, the situation hid many objective circumstances which had to be accepted by both sides. Firstly, it was obvious, that the Red Army itself was a special case. From a purely military point of view, it was a stronger threat for the UPA, than any other army. Therefore the UPA had no chance to fight back on the battlefield. Military logistics prompted an avoidance of open battles against a stronger enemy and the use of partisan methods, instead. The Red Army, in its turn, had no possibility to fight successfully against a partisan army, which the UPA was. The UPA had a way to divide into smaller groups to scatter around forests and to strike unexpectedly. Finally, from a military point of view, there was a chance for a strange kind of balance between these two forces to be struck.

7  For example: Petro Mirchuk, UPA. Dokumenty i materialy (Lviv, 1992); Lew Shankovsky, Ukrajins’ka Povstans’ka armija, in: Istorija ukraijins’koho vijs’ka, Lviv (2001) 2. 8  Ivan Patryliak, Vstan’ i borys’. Sluchaj i vir: ukraijins’ke nacionalistychne pidpillya ta povstans’kyj rukh. 1939–1960 (Lviv: Centr doslidzhen’ vyzvolnogo rukhu, 2012); Anatolij Rusnachenko, Narod zburenyj: nacionalno-vyzvol’nyj ruch v Ukrajini j nacionalni ruchy oporu v Bilorusii, Lytvi, Latvii, Estonii v 1940–1950ch rokach (Kyjiv: Pulsary, 2002); Ivan Kapas’, Radians’kyj rukh oporu v Ukrajini: organizacija, memorializacija, legitymacija (Kyjiv: K.I.S., 2016).

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However, the UPA really was a threat for Soviet civil authorities and the Red Army was the force which could protect the regime. This, and the fact that the Western Ukraine was the nearest area to the Western front, necessitated a permanent presence of the Red Army in the region, and turned it in the only real authority until the war’s end9. But the military aspect wasn’t the only one. And, maybe, it wasn’t the most important. The Red Army’s presence in the region created a moral problem for the UPA Chief Command as well. Many of the Red Army’s soldiers and officers were ethnic Ukrainians.10 This fact suggests a situation where Ukrainians had to fight against Ukrainians. What’s more, many of the Red Army’s soldiers and officers were, themselves, the victims of the Soviet regime, which was the number one enemy for the UPA. Having analyzed the birth dates of the majority of Soviet soldiers by Ukrainian origin, it becomes clear that they survived the Great Famine (Golodomor), mass shootings, and repressions by the use of national characteristics. Moreover, the generation of their parents was the generation, which witnessed or took part in the mass peasant resistance against Soviet authorities in the Central Ukraine in the 1920s. At the same time, the struggle in question had created an opportunity for Ukrainian nationalists to apply some of their ideological methods, which were the inevitable result of nationalistic ideology as a whole. OUN had a vision of the Ukrainian nation as a unique organism with its own mission to break free from foreign invasion. The concrete expression of this mission was formulated through the ideas of the so-called ‘sobornist’ (unity) and national liberation. Thus, the Red Army was an object of a special interest for the UPA’s plans and propaganda. The Red Army’s soldiers were considered to be the victims of inhuman Communism, recognized as a threat to the very existence of Ukrainians as a nation. Therefore, these soldiers were seen as natural allies of the UPA. Based on this idea, a plan was created to start an anti-Soviet uprising with the help of propaganda spread among the RA soldiers. Soecial attention in these plans was paid to the soldiers of Ukrianian origin. According to the Ukrianian resistance’s ideology, Eastern Ukrainans were slaves and victims of Stalin’s regime, just waiting for a chance to get their freedom back; therefore it was the UPA which had to free them.

9  Vladyslav Hrynevych, Pidvodna chastyna ajsberga.Rol’ Chervonoji armiji u borot’bi z ukrajins’kym povstans’kym rukhom, in: Ukraina Moderna, (2006) 10, 107-139, 110. 10  Hrynevych, op. cit.

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The First Scene: A War of Leaflets

The first attempts of the Ukrainian nationalistic underground to contact the Red Army troops took place with the help of leaflets. The earliest one was printed in December, 1943, under the title ‘Ukrainians, soldiers and officers of the Red Army!’11. Its text presents their authors’ slightly idealized vision of a Soviet soldier. Later on the leaflets’ texts were rewritten, taking into account the actual situation and ethnic origin of the Soviet soldiers of the Red Army troops, dislocated to the Western Ukraine. The texts started by praising the bloody and heroic fight of the Red Army soldiers against the Nazis. The general rhetoric resembled that of Soviet officials, especially when it talked about recent war events. Supposedly, it was used as the means to obtain the sympathies of a common Red Army soldier, brought up under a Soviet tradition. The main part of the leaflet’s text talks about the possible future of Ukrainians in the post-war USSR, based on prewar experiences. It’s charasteristic that almost all the cases of respessive and anti-Ukrainian politics by Stalin’s regime mentioned in leaflets were based upon what Central Ukraine had been put through: the Great Famine (Golodomor), mass shootings, deaths of Skrypnyk, Kotsiubynsky and other Central Ukrainian Communist leaders. Next, the leaflet’s authors compared Hitler and Stalin, basied upon their political treatment of Ukraine. Finally, a proposition was put forward, either to fight together against the Bolsheviks, or, at least, to stay neutral in battles with the UPA. In January 1944, the next leaflet was published, this time in Russian12. This leaflet was a statistical compendium, comprising the instances of Soviet special troops destroying Ukrainian villages. Most probably the author of this text wanted to accentuate the defencelessness of Ukrainian civilians against Soviet violence, for most of the Red Army soldiers were, themselves, peasants or the inhabitants of little towns. The leaflets mentioned real cases of elimination and real victims. In this case, the Ukrainian underground’s propaganda acquired some characteristics of educational work. Even in the leaflets addresed to Ukrianians, UPA propagandists avoided segregation by ethnic origin, instead paying special attention to social and political issues. As ‘an evil side of the world’, ‘Bolshevic imperialism’13 and ‘Nazi butchers’14 were mentioned in leaflets. The issues of Stalin’s real motivations and the fate of Red Army soldiers’ relatives and native homes were often raised as well. 11   H DA SBU f. 13, spr. 376, T. 64, 31. 12   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T.64, 32. 13   H DA SBU f. 13, spr. 376, T. 64, S. 30, 31, 34. 14  Ibd., 30-34.

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The later leaflets, like that dated January 25th 194415, revealed a distinct intention to demonstrate the falseness of the Communist party leadership’s counter-underground propaganda. It asserted that the real enemy of the Ukrainian underground was the NKVD and Communist party, not the Red Army. Leaflets dated May 1944 concentrated on the futility of keeping on moving westwards from the viewpoint of a common soldier and the needs of Ukrainians. They also tried to persuade readers that it was not the victory over Nazis that Stalin was interested in, but in taking control over new territories16. However, these leaflets contain phrases like ‘Western capitalists’ and ‘people’s power’, which were the copies of Soviet propaganda cliches. The real impact of the so-called ‘palisade propaganda’ was doubtful. It did not cause a Red Army soldiers’ mass joining of the UPA but, instead, most of them stayed loyal to their commanders. On the other hand, the Ukrainian resistance propaganda based upon the information about the real life in the Soviet Union, real situations and stories was successful, to some extent. Maybe it was expected to prompt the RA soldiers to more decisive actions. However, it was just an expectation and nothing more, because the Red Army kept on moving westwards quite quickly. Despite these circumstances, the Soviet command and political authorities took underground propaganda as a serious threat. Nationalistic propaganda became one of the main themes in reports even before the Red Army’s invasion of Galicia and Podillya, in January 194417. It was described in underground reports how the Red Army’s officers eliminated every material piece of nationalist propaganda with unequivocal aggression. From time to time it could finish tragically. For example, in the Ternopil region, on August 25th 1944, a group of the Red Army’s soldiers saw a ‘counter-revolution’ poster and plucked it off the wall. A grenade was discovered there, which could kill or seriously injure anybody, who would try to remove the poster18.

Observations and Estimates: A Test for Underground Foresight in the Case of the Red Army

At the same time, the Ukrainian underground observed the appearances and behaviour of the Red Army’s soldiers. It still remained the army of an enemy state which was followed by Soviet respessive organisations, such as NKVD. 15   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 64, 42. 16   H DA SBU f. 13, spr. 376, T. 64, 42. 17  Patryliak, op.cit., 462. 18   H DA SBU, spr. 71, 21.

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And the results of any observation could considerably improve the view of an enemy, which was going to become a basis for theoretical rules, prepared as the ‘manual guide’ for contact with the Red Army. The first impression was paradoxical. Observers from the Ukrainian underground had noticed a good weaponary but very bad material situation of the Reds. An unknown observer wrote in his report, that … outer look is horrible: soldiers are hungry, dirty, rumbled and barefoot …19‘. This estimate was repeated in some reports from other locations, for examples, Zolochiv (south of Lviv region) , Chortkiv (east of Ternopil region) etc. The moral condition of the Red Army was estimated by underground report-makers to be low. In a short time the reported cases of robbery, rapes, alcoholism, stealing etc. among ‘the Reds’ became more and more numerous20. It’s interesting, that OUN noted crimes not only against Ukrainian civilians, but also against the Polish. The reports also mentioned hatred between the Red Army’s officers and soldiers21. This hatred was based upon national differences: Ukrainians, as Red soldiers found for themselves, hated Russians as those guilty for repressions, and Russians regarded Ukrianians as traitors. The opinion of Russians was based upon the experiences from 1941, when Soviet troops in Ukraine were taken captives by Germans22. The intention of the soldiers of the Red Army to keep on fighting under such moral conditions was the fruit of painful experiences from the Nazis’ ocupation on one hand, and the practice of the so-called ‘zagryadotryady’, barrier units, on the other hand. ‘The war spirit is supported by both pistol and machinegun’23, one of the reports’ authors wrote. Another report informs that ‘soldiers are tired of war. Desertion is often’24. The Ukrainian underground observed a national differentiation, where the most of privates were Ukrainians and oficers were mostly Russians and (according to a few reports) Jews25. The whole Red Army, reports read, was divided into three groups. The first one comprised of true Communists, whose main purpose was the idea of victory over Germans and ‘facists’ as well as spreading the impact of Soviet Union to the rest of the world. The second one was represented by mobilised peasants from different regions of the USSR who waited for the end of the war. The third group, the smallest, was comprised of all those aware of their Ukrainian origin

19   H DA SBU, F. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 166. 20  Ibd., 167. 21   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 166. 22   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 191. 23   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 190. 24  Ibd., S. 236. 25   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 166.

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and those, as one of the reports informed, who ‘don’t want to fight for Stalin’26. This last group included mainly mobilized soldiers from the eastern district of the Western Ukraine. The representatives of this group, as it was made clear by the report texts, were the main informers for the Ukrainian underground inside the Red Army27. The soldiers of the Red Army were informed about the so-called ‘bander­ ivtsi’. Local peasants informed Ukrainian partisans, that the soldiers said that before they had entered Western Ukraine, they were informed about another serious enemy, and this new enemy was named ‘banderivtsi’28. The soldiers were warned about unexpected attacks, they were instructed to avoid going alone anywhere, and to be extra careful when eating or drinking, especially alcohol etc.29. It’s interesting, that one of the sources of this, and similar, information was the Red Army private, Wolodymyr Nesterk30. It became clear from the first days, that most of soldiers and, especially, officers, didn’t understand the Ukrainian underground’s goals, didn’t have a distinct knowledge about ‘banderivtsi’ and demonstrated aggression towards everything that could be a sign of the underground’s activity. For example, underground observers often mentioned cases of destruction of the underground’s leaflets and ‘palisade propaganda’31. Aggression towards all that could be connected with ‘banderivtsi’ was an expected result of distrust spread by Soviet propaganda. A relative exception were the soldiers of Ukrainian and Caucasian origins32, although it remains unclear how underground observers indentified their ethnicity. At the same time, underground activists noted that arrests and violent actions toward local civil population were made by the NKVD33.

Chronicles of Inevitable War

By this time reports from both sides were overfilled with messages about the impossibility of avoiding skirmishes and even clashes between the Red Army and UPA units, and that it was an everyday reality34. The most popular situation was 26   H DA SBU, Ibd., 166. 27   H DA SBU, F. 13, spr. 376, T.71, 189. 28   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 166. 29   H DA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, T. 71, 192. 30  Ibd., 192. It’s highly possible mistake in surname writing. The real surname might be Nesteruk, Nesterak or similar–O. I. 31   H DA SBU, f.13, spr. 376, T. 71, 193. 32  Ibd., 193. 33  Ibd., 194. 34   H DA SBU, f.13, spr. 376, T.75, 59; Patryliak, Rusnachenko.

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an attack on a separate Red Army unit to obtain weapons. According to one of operative reports about the situation in the Ternopil region, dated April, 1944, on April 7th a UPA unit (100 men) attacked two Red Army transports and got a gun and two cars35. The next action took place on April 14th when another UPA unit attacked that of the Red Army near Moskalivka village (Ternopil region). The insurgents killed three soldiers and got a mortar and a gun36. The UPA planned operations for weapon and munition requisition. After an intelligence report from the 1st Ukrainian Front Headquarters, the UPA unit planned and prepared an attack on an army storehouse with ammunition near Ternopil. The Red Army’s officers, in their turn, took this kind of threat very seriously, and therefore they engaged a local NKVD office to prevent the planned insurgents’ attack37. On April 18th 1944 near Gorodnytsia village, Ternopil region, a UPA unit attacked the 1st Guard Tank Army’s unit, took three trucks and captured six soldiers38. That was an exceptional case – usually UPA soldiers tried to take an enemy’s weapon right after every skirmish or battle. The second reason for the UPA’s attacks was to break communication channels. As a partisan army, the UPA tried to destroy the communications of the enemy and the Red Army still remained an army under enemy command. One more possible reason could be the intention to make the Red Army’s soldiers angry against war conditions and their own commanders. It’s fair to mention that some of the UPA’s operations focused on destroying the communication lines. On June 10th 1944, an unknown UPA unit attacked the Red Army communication unit near Bychkivtsi village (Terebovlya district, Ternopil region)39. At the end of June 1944, in Novosiltsi district (Ternopil region), a UPA unit opened fire on the Red Army’s intelligence (SMERSh) and local airport40. On August, 17th 1944, near Monastyryska, an army car was attacked by grenades, two soldiers were killed and the car destroyed41. Kidnappings of soldiers took place often. One is described in detail in a SMERSh report. On April 24th 1944, two soldiers who took part in trench construction work were taken to forest by an unknown UPA unit near Skala (Ternopil region)42. According to their own accounts, the soldiers were taken to a local commander of UPA, interrogated about Soviet units and, after 35   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 55, 7. 36  Ibd., 7. 37  Ibd., 86. 38  Ibd., 3. 39   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 110, 111. 40  Ibd., spr. 110, 159. 41  Ibd., spr. 108, 15. 42   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 110, 37.

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a few hours, set free. In the next days there were a few more attacks on the Red Army units, some Soviet soldiers were captured again but then set free by insurgents43. But it didn’t mean that similar stories ended so happily for some captured. On July 5th 1944, a group of seven Red Army soldiers (four men and three women) stayed for a night in a peasant house in Molotkovo village (Lanivtsi district, Ternopil region)44. That night, the house was attacked by a group of the UPA combatants. All ‘red’ soldiers were captured, the women were beaten and left in the field. In the morning one of those women, Anastasiya Sysoyeva, went to some village and called for help45. One of those captured, lieutenant Ivan Kil’, returned and reported more facts concerning the capturing and disarming of a few more soldiers46. Cases of kidnapping and, often, killing the soldiers became common in a short time. On May 13th 1944, in Treskovtsi village (Ternopil region), a UPA unit opened fire on the units of the 40th Infantry Division, with one Red Army soldier being killed47. On May 21st 1944, in Korshynove village, five Red Army officers and six soldiers were shot dead by a UPA unit48. On June 1st 1944, UPA men took two Red Army soldiers49. At the end of August 1944, near Velyky Glubochok, a Red Army lieutnant and sergeant were killed by UPA soldiers from a unit under ‘Roman”s command50. On August 2nd 1944, four soldiers of the Red Army were captured by a UPA unit and shot dead.51. On May 1st 1944, near Budaniv (Ternopil region), a unit of the Red Army was attacked in the night by a UPA unit, two ‘reds’ were killed52. On August 18th 1944, a group of Soviet troops and internal troops of the NKVD were shot by a UPA unit53. On August 29th 1944, a UPA unit shot down a U-2 airplane that belonged to the 8th Air Force Army near Drogobych. A pilot and an unnamed colonel were killed54. On September 6th 1944, two officers of the Red Army were killed in Komarno district55. On September 16th 1944, four soldiers of the Red Army 43  Ibd., 37. 44  Ibd., spr. 110, 223. 45  Ibd., 224. 46  Ibd., 224. 47  Ibd., f. 2, spr. 110, 12. 48  Ibd., 12. 49  Ibd., spr. 55, 53. 50  Ibd., 44. 51  Ibd., 309. 52   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 109. 40. 53  Ibd., spr. 110, 169. 54   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 120, 5. 55  Ibd., 23.

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were attacked by UPA unit in Mykolaiv district56. A Soviet operative report, dated the second half of August,1944, described the whole situation in these words: ‘OUN and UPA bands are continuing their activity, … attacking small groups of soldiers and transport units … disrupting the mobilization to the Red Army ranks’.57. On the other hand, the Red Army didn’t stay passive. Alongside active defence in the cases of attacks, local Red Army commanders initiated and organized attacks on Ukrainian partisans’ positions after getting the information about ‘bands’. For example, on May 13th 1944, near Probizhna, an unknown UPA unit was discovered. Red Army Lieutnant Gorobov organized istrebitelny batallion (an extermination batallion) of 32 soldiers and undertook a counteraction58. According to the report, the lieutnant was killed during the skirmish, the rest of the batallion ran away59. The same kind of decision in the same situation was made up by Colonel Shabanov, the officer of the 4th Ukrainian Front’s rear guard, on August 24th 1944. He initiated and organised an operation to encircle a large UPA unit. However, this unit broke free and marched to the forests in Borschiv district60. In the middle of August 1944, near Laduchivtsi village, a group of officers of the 1st Air Force Division attacked a UPA unit after a phone call from local civil authorities about a ‘bandit threat’. They were defeated, mostly shot dead. In a few days, another Soviet unit, this time from the 4th Cavalry Regiment, heard the sounds of shooting near Laduchivtsi and went towards the village. They had manged to edge out a UPA unit, but found there 18 dead Soviet soldiers and one wounded officer, Nieustroyev61. The source of information for the Red Army units was military intelligence as well. The intelligence service of the 4th Ukrainian Front was especially active in further counter-insurgent actions and operations in the last days of August 194462. On August 27th, a UPA unit was newly founded in Ulashkitsi forest. A battle took place near Rosohach village, two of the Red Army’s soldiers were killed63. Alongside the organisation of defence actions, the Red Army’s units took an active part in counter-partisan operations prepared by the NKVD. On May 15th 56  Ibd., 24. 57  Ibd., spr. 71, 18. 58  Ibd., 68. 59  Ibd., 145. 60  Ibd., 21. 61  Ibd., spr. 110, 197. 62  Idibem.  50. 63   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 110, 27.

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1944, near Dederkaly (Ternopil region), a Red Army unit took part in the operation to eliminate a local UPA unit under ‘Morozenko’s command64. Ten UPA soldiers were killed and eight captured. Two days later, on May 17th, a joint batallion of Border Guard and an artillery unit was sent against the UPA. It had some losses but eventually fought back65. On May 18th 1944, the commander of the 1st Guard Army sent 700 men with an artillery battery to liquidate the ‘band’ in Dederkaly district66. By the end of May 1944, two operations were carried out against UPA with the help from the Red Army, the first one in Dederkaly district67, the second one in Zbarazh district68. At the same time, two tank groups defeated two unknown UPA units in Kremenets region69. In the middle of June 1944, the commands of the 1st Guard Army and the 4th Tank Army sent their soldiers to participate in a counter-partisan operation in Grymayliv district70. On June 15th 1944, these troops participated in a counter-partisan operation in Dederkaly and Wyshnewets districts (Ternopil region)71. In the same place, 33 units of Red Army were sent to backup the NKVD in joint operations72. In July 1944, NKVD troops in Lviv region were strengthened by two motorized regiments and a cavalry regiment of the Red Army73. In the beginning of September 1944, a regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front took part in another counter-partisan operation in Mykolaiv district (Lviv region)74. In mid-September it took part in the same kind of operation in Drogonych district75. From the autumn of 1944 up to the next year, 1945, this practice was spread over all search operations. The Red Army troops took part in counter-actions against Ukrainian resistance even as late as 1946, including the so-called ‘Great Blockade’76. It’s a question as to how effective the RA soldiers were in these operations. The Ukrainian nationalistic underground’s reports indicated their inactivity 64  Ibd., 97. 65  Ibd., 3. 66  Ibd., 4. 67   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 61, 53. 68   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 61, 67. 69   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 61, 79. 70  Ibd., 111. 71  Ibd., 106. 72   H BA SBU, f.2, spr. 59, 28, 29. 73   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 64, 19. 74  Ibd., 22. 75  Ibd., 23. 76  After data, presented in research by I. Patryliak, Soviet authorities mobilised for ‘Great Blockade’ near 109,000 Red Army soldiers (Patryliak, op.cit., 500-501).

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which was even characterized as passive help during the operations. This version is testified to by the NKVD commanders’ confessions complaining about the Army’s unwillingness to take part in actions against the Ukrainian resistance movement. As the authors of reports thought, the regular Red Army troops were not trained at all to fight against partisans, and that might be the real reason for their ineffectiveness77.

The War for Human Resources

The Reds needed safe rears and new recruits. The only way for the latter was a mobilization campaign among the Western Ukraine civilians. Meanwhile, Red Army headquarters had no hope that Ukrainian partisans would stop their activity, so it started the so-called cleansing operations in order to protect themselves and military communications from unexpected attacks. For example, the Red Army’s units cleansed its rears in Shumsk district (the Ternopil region’s northern part) between the 5th and 14th of May 1944. 364 people were arrested78. But the battles were not as much a threat for Ukrainian partisans as mobilization. If the battles against the NKVD and Red Army were normal, mobilization was quite a risk for partisants to lose their own human reserves. An unknown UIkrainian resistance member, in his report dated the end of July 1944, describes systematic counter-actions against mobilization79. The similar reports from districts confirm, that mobilization became one of the main reasons for the UPA to attacks the Soviets. The authors of a report, dated early August 1944, remarked that Ukrainian resistance underground acted against mobilization systematically – the targets of the UPA troops were mobilization commissions and the RA transports carrying those mobilized to the nearest town80. Critics of mobilization were one of the main themes of underground propaganda by that time81. The attacks on mobilization officers followed by dismissing the groups of mobilized young men took place throughout the whole Western Ukraine. One of these attacks took place on April 22nd 1945, near the village of Tataryntsi (Ternopil region)82, another one on July 30th 1945, near the ­village of Univ in the Lviv region83, one more on July 26th 1945, near the village 77   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 236, 17. 78   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 61, 38. 79   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 64, 5. 80   H DA SBU, f.2, spr. 64, 5. 81  Ibd., 6. 82   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 63, 24. 83  Ibd., 121.

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of Spasove (Radekhiv district, Lviv region)84. On August 22nd the Red Army’s recruit base in Krasne village (Zboriv district) was attacked by the UPA unit, six Red Army soldiers werekilled85. Earlier the previous year, on July 31st 1944, a UPA group dispersed a group mobilized to the Red Army in Spasiv village (Sokal district, Lviv region)86. The operative report dated May 1944, reads that ‘UPA bands try to stop the activity of Soviet authorities in countryside … do not admit youth to the Red Army.’87

Humanity as Normality? The Problem of Friendly Unofficial Contact between UPA and Red Army Soldiers

In fact, despite regular skirmishes and the transformation of the Red Army into part of a repression mechanism aimed at the UPA, it’s possible to note cases of human behaviour according to the laws of war. In Ternopil region, as the authors of a report dated May 15th 1944 related, a commander of some UPA unit set a lieutenant of the Red Army free88. A month and a half later, an even more interesting case took place in the Lviv region. After a skirmish between UPA and RA groups, five RA soldiers were captured. The UPA group’s commander set them free. A few days later, a battle took place in the same region. A commander of the Red Army’s troop taking part in the battle, released some arrested peasants who had collaborated with Ukrainian underground resistance89. Then five more soldiers of the RA were released by some UPA unit in July 11th 194490. It’s possible to note cases, when the RA soldiers informed partisans about NKVD plans for anti-partisan actions. Such cases became more common in winter and spring, 1945. Subsequently, an enormous occurence happened, according to partisan war standards. During the great anti-partisan action in the Dominican forests near Lviv, in late winter 1945, partisans retreated. One of the partisans suffered from heart failure and, thus, couldn’t escape. But the RA soldier who captured him spoke some unexpected words: ‘Don’t be afraid, I’ll not kill you, because I’m a Ukrainian too’.91 84  Ibd., 122. 85  Ibd., 44. 86  Ibd., spr. 71, 9. 87   H DA SBU, F. 2, spr. 107, 2. 88   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 65, 61. 89   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 69, 32. 90   H DA SBU, f. 2, spr. 69, 33. 91  Litopys, UPA, T. 31, 41.

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Although researcher Lew Shankowskyj affirms that similar cases were popular practice, we have no affirmation among sources that it was really so. The more common outcome was sabotage, which originated in hatred towards the NKVD from the army, and worked objectively for UPA gain. And it’s often observed that similar cases of humanity or collaboration were possible in special circumstances, for example, in a period of great religious celebration or through a keen feeling of identity. The similar cases are mentioned mostly in memoirs. Their authors even write about some cases, when the Red Army’s soldiers saved the UPA soldiers during round-ups. This circumstance creates two meritoric problems. The first one is the conflict of narratives. As the Ukrainian underground’s reports and authors of memoirs describe the attacks of NKVD, they remark on the quite polite relations between the UPA’s and RA’s troops on a personal level. Instead, Soviet reports tell only about the UPA’s attacks on the RA troops. On the one hand, this manner of narration was typical for NKVD, when no difference was made between the NKVD and RA troops who were brought together to fight against the Ukrainian underground. On the other hand, there’s a great possibility that describing the scenes of mutual understanding between the Red soldiers and partisans, the authors of reports were unwilling retranslators of ideological patterns of ‘the unity of Ukraininans’, forgetting that, despite the painful experience of the Soviet regime, the soldiers of the Red Army were the product of Soviet social system and they couldn’t automatically accept the whole ideological vision which the underground offered them. There is also a problem that Ukrainian insurgents had never mentioned in their documents the units they fought against. They just called all of them ‘Bolshevics’, no matter if it were the NKVD or RA troops. Anyway, it’s quite a tough task to itemize when the UPA troops were attacked by NKVD and when by the Red Army. That’s the reason why the real picture and statistics of battles between the UPA and RA troops remains unclear and imprecise, despite the fact that researchers have access to the whole bulk of information about these battles. The only thing is clear, that battles or clashes between the UPA and RA troops were quite normal. Finally, the view of the subject looks seriously deformed for a researcher. However, one must keep in mind that friendly contacts with ‘Ukrainian bourgeous nationalists’ could cost 10 years of imprisonment in GULAG, so it’s no wonder that information about such a kind of contacts was (or could be) carefully hidden by the Red Army soldiers from their commanders. No ideological system from either side of the conflict became the foundation for daily rules between the UPA and the Red Army in the Western Ukraine. Neither the Soviet model of ‘class battle’, nor nationalistic concept of ‘national

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liberation’ could win. Soviet authorities kept control of soldiers, partly through playing on their hatred against Nazis, partly by violence and repression. The underground’s plans to organize a mutiny among Soviet soldiers crashed completely, although propaganda had a partial success because it touched on the soldiers’ real problems and painful experiences under a Soviet regime. Despite it all, nationalistic propaganda couldn’t break the fully-formed, negative image of the UPA in the eyes of Soviet soldiers. Technical and organizational facilities of Ukrainian underground couldn’t compare in any way to those of Soviet propaganda and punitive apparat. And formulating their own plans towards Ukrainians as a target category, the underground’s ideologists didn’t take into account that Ukrainians were mainly privates or minor officers and that the organisational structure of the Soviet Army and the dynamics of its promotions made it impossible to organize a common rebellion within it. Conclusions Finally, during the first stage of contact between the UPA and Red Army, a mixed situation began to form. It was the kind of situation which was morally complicated from every side. The presence of a great number of Ukrainians in the Red Army created a situation of: ‘Ukrainians against Ukrainians’ automatically. The main factor determining the relations between both armies, were current military aspects. One of them was that the Red Army, though not having enough skills and the competency to fight against Ukrainian partisans, needed safe rears; therefore skirmishes between the UPA and RA troops were a natural consequence of the rear-cleansing operations. The second sticking point was mobilization which, in fact, had become a fight for human resources. But it only happened as an exception that the Red Army soldiers even helped the UPA – not because of sympathy but often because of their hatred for NKVD. As a rule, it was the sabotage of NKVD’s search operations. On the other hand, the Red Army still remained an enemy army for the UPA, the Reds remained enemies in the eyes of the UPA soldiers and vice versa. There was another paradox caused by the contacts between the Red Army and UPA. As one of the UPA’s targets was NKVD’s officers and soldiers responsible for repressions against civilians, these were also hated by the Red Army soldiers for the same reason. But these similar situations were possible on a personal level and it was only the case when national origins played a really important role. The main consequences of all the abovementioned processes was the forming of relations in a way that remained so during the next years of resistance,

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until 1954. In any case, the Red Army has left the important trace in war between UPA and the Soviet Union punishment system, due to military and human resources. Notwithstanding that, a double role was still preserved. On the one hand, nationalists had continued in their own attempts to organize unrest among soldiers and attack officers, on the other, the practice of using the Red Army in anti-partisan operations has continued. But the real effectiveness of such a practice remains an issue for discussion, illustrated by the example of the biggest anti-partisan operation, known as the ‘Great Blockade’. This blockade covered the whole territory of the Western Ukraine from January to June 1946. The results of the action can be illustrated with the help of the situation of a special mobile military group in villages and small towns. The main task of these groups was looking for insurgents and blocking entrances to settled places for partisan units operating out of settled territories. It meant deprivation of partisans from the possibility to rest, to reill resources, to get actual information with the help of peasants and to cure their own wounded soldiers. It was one of the most effective ways to fight against the underground. The total number of Blockade participants was 229,000 persons, 109,000 of them were soldiers and officers of the Red Army92. But these soldiers and officers were chosen from the mass due to their own political sympathies, and more than 20 per cent of them were members of Communist party and Comsomol. Nonetheless, it became clear in a short time that military units are partially useless in an anti-partisan fight. Soldiers demonstrated no desire to act against partisans and the commander of the 38th Army put in his reports that soldiers were passive and arrogant to their seniors93. Although the authors of the report passed off the situation as being the effect of bad training and the poor preparation of soldiers, such an explanation seens unconvincing because the Red Army was an army with war experience, and it seems impossible that its soldiers were unfamiliar with the methods of preparing observation points. At the same time, UPA retained the tactics of separation between RA soldiers and officers and NKVD. It’s possible that this tactic had given rise to the passivity of the RA soldiers in an anti-partisan fight and caused the situation described later by the dissident, Levko Lukjanenko. According to his memoirs, the train with the RA soldiers who came back from Austria, was going through the Western Ukraine at high speed, as a precaution against partisan attack or any possible soldiers’ transition to ‘forest brothers’94.

92  Patrylak; op.cit. 501. 93   H DA SBU f. 2, spr. 236. 94  Levko Lukjanenko, Spovidj u kameri smertnykiv (Kyiv: Vitchyzna, 1991), 13.

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But from 1947 the fight against UPA was totally concentrated in the hands of special services and the Red Army drifted into the role of observer and occasional co-participants of greater operations. Chief command of MVD had decided to concentrate on small mobile groups of specially-skilled workers of repressive organs and intelligence, and provocative operations. Sources and Bibliography HDA SBU, f. 2, descr. 1, spr. 55, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 107, 109, 110, 236. Hrynevych, Vladyslav, Pidvodna chastyna ajsberga.Rol’ Chervonoji armiji u borot’bi z ukrajins’kym povstans’kym rukhom, in: Ukraina Moderna, (2006) 10, 107-139. Kapas’, Ivan, Radians’kyj rukh oporu v Ukrajini: organizacija, memorializacija, legitymacija (Kyjiv: K.I.S., 2016). Litopys UPA, Nowa serija, T. 12. (Kyjiv: 2009). Lukjanenko, Levko, Spovidj u kameri smertnykiv (Kyiv: 1991). Mirchuk, Petro, Narys istorii OUN. T. 1 (1920–1939) (Muenich/London/New York: 1968). Patryliak, Ivan, Vstan’ i borys’. Sluchaj i vir: ukraijins’ke nacionalistychne pidpillya ta povstans’kyj rukh. 1939–1960 (Lviv: Centr doslidzhen’ vyzvolnogo rukhu, 2012). Petrenko, Roman, Slidamy armii bez derzhavy (Kyjiv/Toronto: Doslidnyy Instytut “Studium”, 2004). Rusnachenko, Anatolij, Narod zburenyj: nacionalno-vyzvol’nyj ruch v Ukrajini j nacionalni ruchy oporu v Bilorusii, Lytvi, Latvii, Estonii v 1940–1950ch rokach (Kyjiv: Pulsary, 2002). Shankovsky, Lew, Ukrajins’ka Povstans’ka armija, in: Istorija ukraijins’koho vijs’ka, Lviv (2001) 2. Weryha, Wasyl, Wyzwol’na borot’ba w Ukrajini. 1914–1923. T. 1 (L’viv: 2005).

Summary The article deals with ideological settings, ways and means of establishing rules of mutual coexistence between the Red Army and the UPA. The main problem is the balance between the ideological setups of the parties and the pragmatic requirements of reality. Both sides were forced to balance between plans and past representations based on ideological foundations and, ultimately, to adjust their behavior under the influence of the realities of the situation. Transformation took place at two levels simultaneously: the institutional, expressed in the correction of officially defined tactics and personal, which manifested itself at the level of personal, often casual contacts between

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representatives of both parties. The chronological framework of the study covers the spring–summer period of 1944, and territorially Lviv and Ternopil regions. The choice of territorial and chronological boundaries is due to the understanding that the region was particularly important in administrative terms and became an arena of protracted battles, which provoked the Red Army continued occupation of in this area.

Summary in Ukrainian

У статті розглядаються ідеологічні установки, шляхи та способи встановлення правил взаємного співіснування між Червоною армією та УПА. Основною проблемою є баланс між ідеологічними установками сторін та прагматичними вимогами реальності. Обидві сторони були змушені балансувати між планами та попередніми уявленнями, базованими на ідеологічних засновках і, зрештою, коригувати свою поведінку під впливом реалій ситуації. Трансформація відбувалася на двох рівнях одночасно: інституційному, що виражалося у корекції офіційно визначеної тактики та персональному, який проявлявся на рівні особистих, часто випадкових контактів між представниками обох сторін. Хронологічні рамки дослідження охоплюють весну–літо 1944 року, а територіальні–Львівську та Тернопільську області. Вибір територіальних та хронологічних меж зумовлений розумінням, що зазначений регіон мав особливо велику вагу у адміністративному відношенні та став ареною затяжних боїв, що спровокувало тривале перебування Червоної армії на цій території.

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Chapter 8

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists as the Leader of a Unique Fascist Armed Resistance Alexander Statiev The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) emerged in 1929 in Galicia, a region in Eastern Poland with a predominantly Ukrainian population, before extending its influence to most other Polish provinces dominated by Ukrainians. It was a radical clandestine group that attracted Ukrainians frustrated with the inability of conventional political parties to defend the interests of the Ukrainian community. The Polish Sanacja regime treated ethnic minorities as inferiors and sought to assimilate them over the long term, while providing privileges to ethnic Poles. Such discrimination, together with the ensuing economic and social inequalities, provoked severe social strain. The OUN engaged in terrorism against Polish officials in order to provoke political turmoil and incite Ukrainians to rise up against the Polish state and gain independence for Ukraine. When the Soviet Union annexed Eastern Poland in autumn 1939, in line with the provisions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and incorporated the annexed territories populated by Ukrainians into the rest of Ukraine, the OUN continued to pursue independence for Ukraine and engaged in armed resistance against the Soviet state. In 1940, the OUN split into two hostile factions: the larger and more radical OUN-B headed by Stepan Bandera and the opportunistic OUN-M led by Andrii Mel’nyk. Both factions collaborated with Germany when it attacked the USSR in June 1941 but OUN-M met its demise with the expulsion of the Wehrmacht from Ukraine, while OUN-B raised a guerrilla force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought the Soviet regime until the early 1950s. The UPA’s numerical strength reached its peak in 1944, when it had between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters.1 Given the UPA’s high rate of attrition but fairly steady numbers in 1944, it can be assumed that, in total, hundreds of thousands of men and women participated in the antiSoviet resistance and its civilian infrastructure. This fight for an independent Ukraine was the greatest resistance challenge that the Soviet regime ever faced. Interpretations of the OUN’s political affiliation fall into three categories. Some authors, predominantly from Ukraine or the Ukrainian diaspora in 1  Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960 (Warsaw: RYTM, 2015), 424.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_009

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North America, either avoid any discussion of the OUN’s political identity or deny its fascist nature, even though some of them admit that the OUN was a revolutionary, xenophobic and anti-Semitic party that sought to build an authoritarian state that was intolerant to any other political groups. These denials are usually unsubstantiated; their authors generally refer to each other’s writings rather than primary documents to back their claims.2 Other scholars point to strong ideological and practical similarities between the OUN and fascists elsewhere but stop short of labelling the OUN as fascist.3 Finally, the third group unequivocally identifies the OUN as fascist on the basis of thorough analysis.4 The enormous number of collections of relevant documents published recently is increasingly tilting the interpretative balance towards the last group.5 This article, based on documents issued by the top OUN-B agencies, 2  Taras Hunczak, Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations, in: Yuri Boshyk, (ed.), Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986), 39-57, here 42-45; Zenon Kohut, Ukraїns’ki natsionalizm, in: Tarik Amar/Ihor Balyns’kyi/Iaroslav Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu (Kyїv: Hrani-T, 2010), 145-146; Alexander Motyl, Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera, in: Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, 10/05 (March 2010); http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Alexander_J_Motyl_UKRAINE_ EUROPE_AND_BANDERA.pdf, here 3-5. 3  John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990), 212; Alexander Prusin, Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Ukraine, in: Steven Vardy and Hunt Tooley, (eds.), Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 517-535, here 519; Jared McBride, Peasants into Perpetrators: The OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943–1944, in: Slavic Review 75/3 (Fall 2016), 630-654; George Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 1914–1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 95; Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929–1956 (Yale University Press, 2015), 44. 4  Per Rudling, The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths, in: The Carl Beck Papers (2107), 2-7; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement, in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12/1 (Winter 2011), 83-114, here 85, 87; Sol Littman, Pure Soldiers of Sinister Legion (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2003), 16, 17; Viktor Polishchuk, Pravovaia i politicheskaia otsenka OUN i UPA, in: Politeks 2/3 (2006), 25-63, here 37; Tadeusz Piotrowski, Ukrainskie natsionalisticheskie organizatsii i ikh sotrudnichestvo s natsistskoi Germaniei, in: Bereginia.777.Sova: Obshchestvo, politika, ekonomika 3/26 (2015), 123-145; O. Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi mizhvoennoї Evropy, in: Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 1 (2012), 89-101, here 96; Timothy Snyder, Fashysts’kyi heroi u demokratychnomu Kyevi in Amar/Balyns’kyi/Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu, 165-174, here 166, 172; Ivan-Pavlo Khimka, Chy ukraїnis’ki studii povynni zakhishchaty spadshchinu OUN-UPA?, ibid., 147-154, here 148, 149; Deivid Marplz, Stepan Bandera: heroi Ukraїny, ibid., 129-139, here 131. 5  Sokhan’, et al., (eds.), Litopys UPA, Nova Seriia (Kyiv, Toronto: Natsional’na Akademiia Nauk Ukrainy, 1995- 2017); Volodymyr Serhiichuk, (ed.), OUN-UPA v roky viiny (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1996); Volodymyr Serhiichuk, (ed.), Desiat’ buremnykh lit (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1998); Sergìj Bogunov, et al., Polacy i Ukraińcy pomiędzy dwoma systemami totalitarnymi 1942–1945 (Warszawa: Instytut

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provides these agencies with a forum to explain their ideas in their own words. It also examines the strategies stemming from these ideas.6 OUN ideology and objectives and the methods employed to attain these objectives prove that the party belonged to the national-socialist version of fascism. The following analysis contributes to earlier interpretations of the OUN as a fascist party by presenting evidence about the OUN’s structure and the features of the ideal state that it pursued; it also expands the investigation of OUN ideology and challenges the thesis that the OUN shifted to a democratic agenda in 1943, pointing instead to the continuity of the OUN’s philosophy, structure, policies and actions from its foundation in 1929 until its demise as a political actor.

Ukrainian Fascism between 1929 and 1943

The first two of the OUN’s programmes display the typical features of fascism. The Resolutions of the First Congress in 1929 include vague political statements and speculations about the symbiosis of nation and state7 selected by Dmytro Dontsov, the most prominent ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism, from Mein Kampf, La dottrina del fascismo and works by Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Francisco Franco, François de La Rocque and Antonio Salazar that he translated into Ukrainian.8 Dontsov also adopted from these writings and introduced into OUN ideology such Social Darwinist notions as “the law of eternal competition among races” and “the eternal desire of the Pamięci Narodowej; Kijów: Państwowe Archiwum Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy, 2005); V.I. Adamushko et al., OUN-UPA v Belarusi (Minsk: Vysheishaia shkola, 2012). 6  Most documents on which this article is based belong to an unpublished document collection assembled by Volodymyr Viatrovych and Lubomyr Luciuk under the tentative title Enemy Archives: The Ideals and Deeds of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement (hereafter EA). This collection refers to the files of the State Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service [Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Slyzhby bezbeky Ukrainy (hereafter HDA SBU)]. The first mention of a document in this text contains a full reference to the collection with the document title, number and the exact page number in the collection and also to the respective archival file with its entire page span. Subsequently, the same document is referred to by its number, its abbreviated title and the exact page number in the collection. I am grateful to Lubomyr Lucuik for the opportunity to explore this document collection. My conclusions in no way reflect the views of the authors of this collection. 7  Resolutions of the First Congress of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, in: Boshyk, (ed.), Ukraine during World War II, 166-171. 8  M. Gorelov, Dmytro Dontsov: shtrykhy do politychnogo portretu, in: Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 6 (1994), 89-97, here 92, 93; Per A. Rudling, The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust, 3. See similar speculation in Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), 392-398.

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nations to expand.” He came to a conclusion that Ukrainians were “made of the clay God used to create a chosen people” and stated that “violence, brutal ruthlessness and war were the methods used by the chosen nations on their way to progress”. History taught us, he wrote, that “superior races gradually but steadily suppress inferior races in a struggle for survival all over the globe”; “the desire to secure the grandeur of your own country equals your desire for the decay of your neighbours”. Inevitable conflicts had to be solved by “struggle in which aggressive and predatory standards are a must”. Only “those moral values that facilitate the struggle for survival are relevant.”9 According to Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobrianskyi, a moderate nationalist, Dontsov’s speculations “legitimised the amoral political methods used by our nation, … woke up a monster in the Ukrainian human being” and, thus, “had a grave impact of the young generation of West Ukrainians.”10 Another Ukrainian observer commented that “Many little Mussolinis and little Hitlers have been spawned by the reading of Dontsov.”11 As long as fascism was on the rise in Europe, the OUN’s ideologists did not shy away from admitting their proximity to fascism. Dontsov, and the OUN representative in Rome Evhen Onats’kyi, who was, in the words of a Ukrainian historian, “the most vocal propagandist of the fascist experiment,” regarded Ukrainian nationalism as a form of fascism; Mykola Stsibors’kyi, an OUN leader and author of the essay Natsiokratiia, believed that “the fascist system could become a roadmap for the oppressed nations;”12 while Iaroslav Orshan, another OUN ideologist, wrote that “Fascism, National Socialism, Ukrainian nationalism, etc., are different national expressions of the same spirit”.13 Stepan Okhrymovych, a regional OUN leader, called Mein Kampf “a work of global importance invaluable for every politician or public person,” while another nationalist author, probably Yaroslav Stets’ko, the OUN’s ideological advisor, regarded fascism in Italy, National-Socialism in Germany and Ukrainian nationalism as components of the same nationalist revolution destined to create a new global order. Even Evhen Konovalets, the OUN’s founder, wondered about the “foolish raptures over Hitlerism … widespread among our rank and file”.14

9  Viktor Polishchuk, Problemy etiki v doktrine D. Dontsova, in: Politeks 5/1 (2009), 232-254, here 236, 237, 241, 245, 248; Viktor Polishchuk, Poniatie ukrainskogo integral’nogo natsionalizma, in: Politeks 2/2 (2006), 58-76, here 63. 10  Polishchuk, Problemy etiki, 252, 253. 11  Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 44. 12  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 90-92. 13   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 71, 79, 110, 111. 14  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 92, 93.

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When OUN-B finally articulated its ideology at the Second Grand Assembly in April 1941, it offered few original thoughts but borrowed much from those fascist mentors popularised by Dontsov and also from Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, a pre-OUN founder of Ukrainian political ultra-nationalism.15 In tune with any party intending to build a totalitarian state system, the OUN had one Supreme Leader, Stepan Bandera, who was called by his disciples not just the “Leader of the OUN” but the “Leader of the Ukrainian Nation” – with a capital L.16 The Leader stood well above other leaders in the party hierarchy. The OUN embraced the “leadership principle”,17 which it borrowed directly from the Nazi Führerprinzip; it involved a hierarchy of functionaries appointed from above rather than elected through a bottom-up process. These functionaries carried absolute responsibility within their domain and demanded absolute obedience from their subordinates, whom they had personally appointed. Since the Grand Assembly – the OUN’s supreme ruling body, whose members were nominated by the Leader rather than elected – gathered only once every five years, actual power was formally in the hands of a Grand Council, an analogue of the Italian Grand Council of Fascism. In practice, however, power belonged to the OUN’s Central Leadership, an analogue of the Italian gerarchi. In line with the Italian fascist model, members of the Central Leadership were also members of the Grand Council.18 It was the Central Leadership – a small committee – rather than the Grand Assembly or the Grand Council that determined OUN policy. This committee viewed the system of government in the future Ukrainian state as “the political and military dictatorship of the OUN”, which would allegedly be established for the initial period of the state’s existence.19 The OUN explained that “the multiparty political system … has already harmed Ukraine and other states,”20 and its Second Grand Assembly stated that it viewed the OUN as “the sole political organisation” that would operate in the future Ukraine and, by making no reference to a transitional 15  See a survey of Mikhnovs’kyi’s ideas in Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera: the Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014), 56. 16   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (April 1941), 15-42/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4, ark.23-49; Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 96, 97. 17   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days of the Organisation of State Life (April 1941), 105/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.6, ark.26. 18   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 37-39. 19   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 105. 20   Hai-Nyzhnyk, Til’ky vpovni Suverenna Ukraїns’ka Derzhava mozhe zabezpechyty ukraїns’komu narodovi svobidne zhyttia in: Hileia: naukovyi visnyk 97 (2015), 61-71, here 66.

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period,21 hinted that this would be a permanent arrangement. Clause 1 of the draft constitution written by the OUN in 1939 stated that “Ukraine is a sovereign, authoritarian, totalitarian and corporate state”.22 Donstov argued that “aggression and intolerance to the opinions of others … and bitter hatred of everything that impedes progress” towards the chosen objective “characterise the profile of every revolutionary and fanatic.”23 Such fanatics were to “impose [their] views, the only correct ones, … while ruthlessly destroying any sceptics”.24 The OUN was a party of such revolutionary fanatics. It would not tolerate any other nationalist Ukrainian political parties, which were branded as “petty-bourgeois” and “traitors and saboteurs”.25 Oleksandr Zaitsev writes that Stsibors’kyi, in 1930, “compiled a plan that presumed a stepby-step undermining and destruction of Ukrainian parties, so that after the national revolution only one leading political force remained: the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists”.26 According to one OUN leader, “An internal enemy, who … promotes another ideology, must face as [intense] hatred and ruthlessness as the historical enemy.”27 The OUN planned to concentrate in its hands “all the leading functions of individual spheres of life [sic]”.28 In 1941, The OUN began assassinating “fellow travellers and opportunists” who did not share their agenda.29 Rephrasing Rudolf Hess’ speech at the 1934 Nazi Congress, its propaganda warriors stated: “The Ukrainian Nation is the OUN – the OUN is the Ukrainian Nation!”30 Intolerance of political actors with even slightly different views of nationalism was a feature of fascism. Besides a party-state system, the OUN also preached collectivism as opposed to individualism and “the linkage” of “citizens’ free, creative initiative, labour and property – with the state’s initiative, planned nature, organised 21   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 18. 22  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 96. 23  Polishchuk, Problemy etiki, 246. 24  Polishchuk, Poniatie ukrainskogo integral’nogo natsionalizma, 61. 25   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 25, 31, 33; EA, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference of the OUN Leadership (April 1942), 127/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4, ark.55-60. 26  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 96. 27  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 97. 28   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 105. 29  Interrogation of M.D. Stepaniak (20-30 August 1944). Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f.9478, op.1, d.136, l.87; Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 67, 68; Anatolii Rusnachenko, Narod zburenyi (Kyiv: Pul’sary, 2002), 87, 88. 30   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 187. Hess’ original phrase was “Die Partei ist Hitler, Hitler aber ist Deutschland, wie Deutschland Hitler ist,” Leni Riefenstahl, Triumph des Willens, (1935).

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nature and control [sic] – into a single indivisible whole.”31 This was in fact the concept of Volksgemeinschaft borrowed from the Nazis, who had earlier plagiarised it from the social democrats. Like other fascists, the OUN was a revolutionary party that planned to build a society that had never existed in Ukraine; revolutionary rhetoric is a permanent feature of OUN documents. OUN functionaries consistently divided Ukrainian society into a “leading caste” and the “submissive, indifferent and wavering masses,” in the way that fascists always did.32 The masses had to experience a cultural revolution organised by the OUN, which presumed the “re-education of the entire Ukrainian people”, “the elimination of foreign corruptive influences” and the promotion of “new, heroic content of Ukrainian culture”.33 In short, as the OUN wrote, it planned to take over “the task of controlling Ukrainian political thought … and the upbringing of the whole nation.”34 The cultural revolution, replicating fascist methods of human engineering, was supposed to produce a new individual worthy of living in an independent Ukraine who, as the OUN programme of military education adopted in 1935 explained, would “not hesitate to kill his father, brother or best friend if he gets such an order”.35 The leaders of the OUN matched the author of Mein Kampf in the emphasis they gave to propaganda;36 they also believed that people had to be subject to indoctrination from childhood. As they stated, “raising youth in general and training its leaders must belong indissolubly to the OUN. … The same goes for women’s departments”,37 which were tasked with producing “a new type of Ukrainian woman, a citizen-revolutionary and mother of fighters for Ukraine”.38 Nationalists planned to organise “OUN Youth”, a single youth league promoting 31   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 19. 32   Polishchuk, Poniatie ukrainskogo integral’nogo natsionalizma, 60; EA, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (August 1943), 59/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4, ark.62-70; EA, Document no. 6, Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (July 1944), 67/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.5. ark.1-2v; EA, Document no. 9, Declaration of the OUN Leadership (May 1945), 82/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4, ark.83-90; EA, Document no. 10, Clarification and Addenda to the Decisions of the Third Extraordinary Assembly of the OUN (June 1950), 98/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4, ark.121-123. 33   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 20; Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 189. 34   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 188. 35  Per A. Rudling, The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust, 5. 36   E A, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 129. 37   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 116. 38   E A, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 124.

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the party agenda and modelled upon the German Hitlerjugend, Italian Gioventù Italiana del Littorio, Spanish Flechas and Croat Ustaška Mladež.39 Persistent indoctrination was to change Ukrainians from people with “souls of slaves to people with souls of masters, and from people with souls of defenders to people with souls of aggressors”.40 A set of rituals, an important component of fascist culture, was to facilitate this process. The OUN’s Second Grand Assembly adopted a fascist salute described as “extending the right arm at a right angle above the head,”41 and it borrowed from the Nazis the “One nation, one party, one leader” slogan that indeed reflected OUN philosophy.42 Eventually, the ideal Ukrainian nation would consist only of “fighters and fanatics.”43 As Mykhailo Kolodzins’kyi, a prominent OUN author, wrote, “we will become the most militant nation in the world.”44 As in most other fascist states, the judiciary was to operate outside the law, at least in the initial period of an independent Ukraine. Another borrowing from Nazi (and Soviet) judicial phraseology and practice was the hunt for “social wreckers” to be tried by “people’s courts” that followed the axiom “the [legal] code is one’s own conscience” and issued irreversible death sentences. As the OUN frankly admitted, it planned to use the methods of Stalinist terror to build a happy Ukrainian state: “Since the existing [legal] code is constructed from the standpoint of … the national extermination of Ukrainians, it will be possible at least to switch definitions and apply all that, all those shootings and the Cheka, to the enemies for everything that is harming Ukraine [sic],”45 with the OUN being the sole judge of what exactly was harming Ukraine. Like their fascist colleagues in other countries, the OUN viewed the trade unions as an administrative tool of the ruling party rather than as an agency meant to promote the interests of workers. In order to acquire control over trade unions, the OUN would “liquidate [the] agents of Moscow, the old management” and “convoke a new administration by means of free voting and subordinate it to us”. Led by “reliable, reputable Ukrainian[s],” either elected or appointed, the trade unions would transfer “all forces capable of creativity to the disposition of the government”.46

39   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 116. 40   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 112. 41   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 32. 42   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 40, 177. 43   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 189. 44  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 97. 45   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 115. 46   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 111.

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Like other fascists, the OUN consistently talked about “freedom for nations and individuals”.47 Their programme explained how they interpreted the notion of personal liberty: “Freedom of expression is permitted to the degree that it is judicious from the standpoint of the good of the nation.” Only media with “nationalistic content” may exist; “public gatherings at which non-nationalistic ideas and slogans would be disseminated are prohibited.”48 The OUN promised to support the freedom of religion, but only for those denominations “that are not detrimental to the moral fibre of the nation and the interests of the Ukrainian State,” and, in any case, the OUN would maintain “the necessary supervision of church organisations”, thus prohibiting “unhealthy sectarianism”. The OUN would also secure the “Ukrainianisation” of all religious denominations.49 Volodymyr Martynets, a member of the OUN leadership, bluntly explained the transition to freedom in the future independent Ukraine: “One dictatorship must be replaced with another that would gradually transform itself into a democracy while the masses are educated by this dictatorship. … Only a stick can turn a slave into a human being. This unhappy nation must be whipped for its own good, because otherwise it would never wake up and leave its yoke. … Terror and violence applied to our own nation will bring it freedom”.50 So, in its view on individual liberties, the state planned by the OUN hardly differed from Nazi Germany. As for the freedom of nations, the OUN borrowed Nazi phraseology: “We are bringing a new order to Eastern Europe and Muscovite-ruled Asia.”51 They explained the ethnic-policy aspects of this new order: Ukraine had to be a nation state with no place for multiculturalism,52 despite the fact that a quarter of the population of Soviet Ukraine in 1939 and an even greater proportion of the population of Western Ukraine were non-Ukrainian.53 The OUN identified its friends and enemies on a purely ethnic basis rather than analysing 47   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 21; EA, Document no. 5, What the UPA is Fighting for (August 1943), 69/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.60, ark.1, 1v; EA, Document no. 9, Declaration of the OUN Leadership (May 1945), 91; EA, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 121. 48   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 115. 49  Resolutions of the First Congress, 171, 172; EA, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 20; EA, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 125. 50  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 95. 51   E A Document no.  2, Manifesto of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (December 1940), 12/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.4. ark.17, 18; EA, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 108. 52   E A, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 50. 53  Iu. Poliakov et al., (eds.), Vsesoiuznaia perepis´ naseleniia 1939 goda (Moscow, Nauka, 1992), 57, 68.

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the actions of individuals belonging to various ethnic groups. Its programmes and other official documents stated bluntly: “Ukraine for Ukrainians!”54 – a derivative of Deutschland für die Deutschen!, a slogan of early-twentiethcentury German völkisch ideologists55 adopted by the Nazis and applied first to Ukraine by Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi.56 This principle meant that the concept of “equal rights and obligations of all Ukrainians vis-à-vis the nation and the state” would only be valid for ethnic Ukrainians. The OUN’s promise to follow the paths of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Symon Petliura,57 who had led the bloodiest anti-Jewish pogroms in pre-1939 European history, must have horrified the Jewish community. The OUN’s clarification on this matter – “the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists is struggling against the Jews as props of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime, at the same time making the popular masses aware that Moscow is the main enemy”58 – classified the Jews as a secondary but still a major target. Inspired by Dontsov, the OUN formulated its ethnic policy within a Social-Darwinist framework of a struggle for the survival of the Ukrainian race among other ethnic groups living side-by-side with Ukrainians. It divided the non-Ukrainian population into “hostile” minorities – Russians, Poles and Jews, joined later by the Transcarpathian Rusins,59 most of whom, admittedly, hated the OUN – and unspecified “friendly” minorities. The OUN sought to “return” the “friendly” minorities “to their fatherland”; as for the “hostile” minorities, the nationalists replicated Nazi recipes for handling Eastern European Untermenschen. The “Guidelines for the First Days of the Organisation of the State” reveal OUN intentions towards the “hostile minorities” better than any interpretation by historians. In particular, the OUN planned “the destruction in the struggle particularly of those who will defend the [Soviet] regime: resettlement in their lands; the destruction mainly of the intelligentsia, … and in general we hamper the production of the intelligentsia – that is, access to schools, etc. … So-called Polish peasants are to be assimilated. … Leaders are to be destroyed. Jews are to be isolated, dismissed from positions in order to avoid sabotage; all the more so, Muscovites 54   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 19. 55  Heinrich Pudor, Deutschland für die Deutschen! (Munich: Hans Sachs-Verlag, 1912). 56   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 56. 57   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 20; EA, Document no. 7, Universal of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (July 1944), 71/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.5, ark.3, 3v. 58   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 25. 59   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 123: EA, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 123. It was probably Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi who first identified these ethnic groups as hostile minorities; he also added Hungarians and Romanians to this blacklist, Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 56.

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and Poles. If there would be an unavoidable need to leave a Jew – e.g., in the economic apparatus – place one of our militia men over him and liquidate for the slightest infraction. Only Ukrainians may be heads of individual branches of life, [sic] not foreigners who are enemies. … Assimilation of the Jews is excluded. … Our government must be fearsome to its opponents”.60 This was a blueprint for ethnic genocide copied from Nazi practice. Only the most notorious fascist parties – such as the Nazis, the Ustaše and the Arrow Cross – embraced such virulent xenophobia. Like these parties, the OUN adopted a radical, racial rather than religion-based, anti-Semitism. Stets’ko, Bandera’s deputy, who called himself the Premier of the Ukrainian Government after he had proclaimed independence on 30 June 1941, referred to Jews as “parasites,” “swindlers, materialists and egotists,” who were determined “to corrupt the heroic culture of warrior nations”.61 Other OUN ideologists endlessly discussed “the Jewish problem” and the need for an urgent solution, referring to the Nuremberg Laws as a proper first step. According to the OUN Security Service the logical conclusion of this policy was the outright extermination of “Jews, as individuals as well as a national group” because they were, allegedly, “the main pillar of the NKVD and Soviet authority”.62 On the eve of the Second World War Kolodzins’kyi wrote: “No doubt, the Ukrainian people will be boiling with rage particularly against Jews. … The more Jews that die during the insurrection, the better. All other minorities who survive the uprising will be denationalised.”63 Ivan Klymiv, the OUN regional leader in Volyn, expressed the general sentiment of the OUN Central Leadership: “Death to the Muscovites, Poles, Jews and other enemies of Ukraine.”64 Such views prompted the OUN to act accordingly. As soon as OUN functionaries entered Western Ukraine during the German invasion, Stets’ko reported to Bandera: “We are raising a militia that will assist in the extermination of Jews.” As he explained, “I am of the opinion that the Jews should be annihilated by applying the German methods of extermination in Ukraine”.65 In keeping with their “Guidelines”, the OUN initiated dozens of horrific pogroms during the first month of their presence on Soviet soil, during which they killed 60   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 116, 117. 61   John-Paul Himka, The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd, in: Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. LIII, 2-3-4 (June-SeptemberDecember 2011), 209-243, here 222. 62   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 80, 81, 107, 108, 184, 185, 218. 63  Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 97. 64  McBride, Peasants into Perpetrators, 636. 65  Aleksandr Diukov, Vtorostepennyi vrag: OUN, UPA i reshenie “evreiskogo voprosa” (Moscow: Regnum, 2008), 44, 45.

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or helped the SS to kill at least 13,000 Jews and hundreds of Poles.66 Given the OUN’s consistent and virulent anti-Semitism as manifested in numerous publications and direct orders of ethnic cleansing, Taras Hunczak’s claim that this “violence was more likely a response to a situation – the aftermath of the Soviet rule – than to OUN’s political resolution”67 is absurd. Anti-Semitism was a feature displayed by most fascist parties; the OUN was among the minority of fellow fascists who put this ideology into deadly practice. One of the OUN’s basic ideological tenets was “Free nation states on the ethnographic territories of individual peoples”. The nationalists called it “the most progressive idea of the modern era”.68 In line with the decisions of its First Congress, which stated that “the nation numerically increases its inventory of biological and physical strength with the simultaneous expansion of its territorial base,” the OUN declared that it planned to gain control over “all Ukrainian lands and … foreign territories populated by Ukrainians” from “the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Tisza”.69 These plans, inspired by the Nazi Lebensraum idea, did not define the level of the Ukrainian population in a foreign land that would justify Ukrainian expansion. The OUN literally viewed all Ukraine’s neighbours – Poland, Hungary, Belarus, Romania and the Russian Federation – as well as “other [Soviet] republics”, as occupiers of Ukrainian territory, although neither Belarus nor any province of Russia or any other Soviet republic had a Ukrainian majority.70 The OUN ignored the fact that, if this concept of “ethnographic territory” were followed to the letter, Ukraine would have to cede Lviv, Odesa, Izmail, Chernivtsi, Stalino and possibly several other towns in Eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainians were a minority. The alternative

66  A.I. Bakanov, Rassledovanie zlochevskogo pogroma na L’vovshchine, in: Vestnik arkhivista 1 (2011), 140-149; A.I. Bakanov, Po prizyvu Ivana Klimova, in: Rodina 3 (2011), 99-100; Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 119; Diukov, Vtorostepennyi vrag, 14, 24, 47, 51, 52, 55, 57. Rudling, The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust, 8; Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 212, 214, 219, 220. 67  Hunczak, Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 41. 68   E A, Document no. 6, Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, 70, Document no. 15. 69  Resolutions of the First Congress, 165, 172; OUN Leaflet (1 March 1943). Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads’kykh ob’ednan’ Ukraїny, f.57, op.4, spr.353, ark. 106. See the map of “ethnographic borders of Ukraine”, which includes all lands claimed by OUN beyond the Ukrainian frontier, in Mykola Lebed’, UPA: Ukrains’ka povastans’ka armiia (Suchasnist’, 1987). 70   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 15, 16, 25, EA, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 107; Poliakov, Vsesoiuznaia perepis´ naseleniia, 59-68, 70, 71.

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eventually chosen by the OUN was the expulsion or extermination of their populations. Hence, the ideology and the desired social system of the Ukrainian nationalists and the strategy and actions prescribed to attain such a system show that the OUN displayed the basic features of a fascist party. But what type of fascism did the OUN embrace? Alongside the mainstream fascist ideology adopted by the OUN from its German, Italian, French and Croat counterparts, the secondary set of ideas that the OUN advanced, but never enforced in practice, was related to the social and economic policies developed by socialists in the Russian Empire before the Bolshevik Revolution. Like these socialists, the OUN resented free-market capitalism and “the liberal capitalist order” and promised trade protectionism, “limited state regulation” in agriculture, the allocation of land to peasants that would ensure self-sufficient farming without hired labour, the prohibition of land speculation and the promotion of agrarian cooperatives, the nationalisation of heavy industry, the participation of workers in the management of factories and the distribution of profit, an eight-hour working day and a minimum wage, a state monopoly on wholesale trade and cooperative retail trade, limits on profits, paid vacations, free healthcare, female equality and maternity benefits and mandatory school education.71 These socialist aspects of the OUN programme coexisted with xenophobia and ideology-based favouritism: The land would belong to ethnic Ukrainians alone rather than to all residents of Ukraine, the state would assign the lands of dissolved collective farms only to “Ukrainian patriots” rather than to Ukrainian farmers in general and the managers of factories and cooperatives would only be government-appointed “Ukrainian patriots”. In short, stated the OUN “Guidelines”: “Eliminate unreliable elements … try everywhere to place Ukrainians, reliable people and patriots.” The future Ukrainian state would have no unemployment – not because the government would guarantee a job for everyone but because, after the OUN had expelled all “foreigners” from Ukraine, “there will be a lack not of workshops but of labourers”72 – a statement indicating the scale of the planned ethnic cleansing. This chauvinism, coupled with a formal adherence to several socialist principles, suggests that the OUN embraced the national-socialist version of fascism. Both OUN factions and other Ukrainian nationalists agreed with this definition in the early 1940s. Andrii Mel’nyk claimed that the OUN was “related in world outlook to 71  Resolutions of the First Congress, 166-170; EA, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 19, 20; EA, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 52, 53. 72   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 110.

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the same type of movements in Europe, in particular to National Socialism in Germany and fascism in Italy;”73 OUN-B leaders also viewed the “nationalist socialist order” as ideal for the future Ukrainian state.74 The Nazis referred to the OUN as “national-socialists” and elaborated that the OUN could “best be compared to the Croatian Ustashi group.”75 Taras Borovets, a moderate fellow nationalist, observed that the OUN pursued the “fascist idea of total dictatorship,”76 whereas Kost’ Pan’kivs’kyi, another moderate nationalist, called the OUN “people who … were ideologically linked with fascism and Nazism, who in word and in print and in deed had for years been preaching totalitarianism and an orientation to Berlin and Rome.”77

The Alleged Shift from a Fascist to a Democratic Agenda in 1943

Even authors sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists cannot deny that the OUN had an authoritarian agenda during the interwar period and the first years of the Second World War and intended to use the entire scope of measures conducive to this end. In 1943, however, the story goes, the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly ratified the switch to a “democratic course” and, as OUN leaders wrote in 1950, “the entire spirit of the Programmatic Resolutions clearly demonstrated that the OUN is fighting for a democratic order in the future Ukrainian Independent United State” and has adopted a “nationally inclusive programme”.78 In order to investigate this boast and find out whether the decisions of August 1943 were a genuine watershed in the OUN agenda, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the OUN’s ideology, leadership structure, attitude to fellow nationalists with different views on an independent Ukraine and ethnic policies and, most importantly, the essence of its actions evolved in the period between this adoption of a “democratic course” in August 1943 and the virtual end of the group in the early 1950s. The OUN’s Third Grand Assembly, in August 1943, was its last and, hence, presented the OUN programme in a final form. At the time, after the fiasco of Operation Citadel had made it clear that the Axis powers were losing the war, any formal adherence to fascist ideology became an embarrassment and 73  Himka, The Lviv Pogrom, 222. 74   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 18. 75  Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia (London: Macmillan & Co., 1981), 115, 116. 76  Taras Bulba-Borovets, Armiia bez derzhavy (Winnipeg: Volyn, 1981), 50, 271. 77  Himka, The Lviv Pogrom of 1941, 222. 78   E A, Document no. 10, Clarification and Addenda, 99; Motyl, Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera, 7.

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the OUN made the first attempt to disassociate itself from fascism. Its leaders adjusted their rhetoric to the values of those who were expected to be the opponents of the Soviet Union in any new world war, the Western democracies, and introduced several clauses into their programme designed to appeal to these potential enemies of the Soviets. These included free trade unions, “freedom of the press, speech, thought, conviction, faith and world perception” and even the “equality of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality [i.e., ethnicity]”, although they eschewed the despised word “democracy”. The same programme, however, confirmed that the OUN preserved its intolerance to any dissent by stating that the OUN was “the sole … leader of the Ukrainian people’s revolutionary liberation struggle” and by scorning “the opportunist camp” that misdirected this struggle.79 Only in mid-1945, after the total collapse of fascism, did OUN leaders start talking about “the democratisation of all social, political and economic life”,80 in order to make their agenda more attractive to their new potential sponsors. Later, they even introduced minor corrections, such as the replacement of the phrase “new state order”, borrowed from the Nazis, with “democratic state order”.81 In order to mask their intention to monopolise Ukrainian nationalism, the OUN organised the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), in July 1944, as “the highest ruling body of the Ukrainian people in the period of the revolutionary struggle”.82 The UHVR promised to unite “all Ukrainian leading political elements independently of their ideological world perception”, and to safeguard “the popular-democratic method of defining the political order”.83 However, as UHVR’s statement explained, this new agency sought “the unification of all independent Ukrainian revolutionary forces under a single leadership”,84 which, as the UHVR frankly admitted, was the OUN’s leadership: “The struggle of the broad popular masses” was subject to “the supreme political leadership of the UHVR, with the leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the Ukrainian lands taking the most active part”.85 OUN leaders took key positions in the UHVR hierarchy. Roman Shukhevych, the UPA Commander-in-Chief, was Secretary for Military Affairs, 79   E A, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 54-59. 80   E A, Document no. 16, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (AugustNovember 1945), 151/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.28, ark.139-143. 81   E A, Document no. 10, Clarification and Addenda, 102. 82   E A, Document no. 7, Universal, 72. 83   E A, Document no. 6, Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, 69. 84   E A, Document no. 7, Universal, 72. 85   E A, Document no. 106, On the Combat Actions of the UPA (November 1949), 656/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.35, ark.100, 101.

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Rostyslav Voloshyn, Shukhevych’s deputy, Secretary for Internal Affairs, and Mykola Lebed, the organiser of the Security Service called Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB), Secretary for Foreign Affairs.86 Thus, the only reason for the creation of the UHVR was the intention to subjugate all groups pursuing nationalist agendas to the OUN and to present this new body as an inclusive, and hence legitimate, agency to the new potential sponsors. The UHVR’s organisational structure mirrored that of the OUN. The Grand Assembly was the supreme body, the Presidium functioned like the OUN’s Grand Council and the General Secretariat operated as the Central Leadership.87 The OUN absolutely dominated the UHVR, which played no independent political role, and the claim that the UHVR represented the Ukrainian nation was unfounded, given that most Ukrainians loathed the nationalists. The UHVR was merely the OUN in disguise. The OUN’s hierarchal structure remained unchanged. It preserved the ritualistic worship of its Supreme Leader, Bandera, “the flag of the revolutionary struggle against the USSR”, until the end of the resistance.88 In fact, the only role played by Bandera, who was later described by Erwin Stolze, head of the Abwehr in Berlin, as “careerist, fanatic and a bandit” and by the CIA as “a wellknown sadist and collaborator with the Germans,”89 was to contribute to splitting the OUN into two factions and formulating the totalitarian framework of the future Ukrainian state and the methods – headed by ethnic cleansing – for attaining such a state system. He also directed the collaboration of his faction with the Germans during the first two weeks of Operation Barbarossa. He was irrelevant to nationalist resistance after that time. He last stepped on Ukrainian soil in 1935, and the lack of any regular communication with his disciples in the country prevented him from influencing the resistance from Poland or from Germany, where he lived after 1940. Yet there could only be one Führer, Duce, Poglavnik, Capitanul, Vezér, Caudillo or Holova Providu, whatever his actual role, and the OUN continued eulogising this sterile fetish until its end. 86   E A, Document no. 146, Report on the Result of the Struggle against the Nationalist Underground (January 1948) 956/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.72, ark.270-275. 87   E A, Document no. 8, The Temporary Configuration of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (July 1944), 75-79/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.5, ark.5-8. 88   E A, Document no. 16, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (AugustNovember 1945), 149; EA, Document no. 121, Jews – Citizens of Ukraine (March 1950), 809/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.65, ark.283-295. 89  Rudling, The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust, 18; Diukov, Vtorostepennyi vrag, 124. The CIA used OUN’s remnants mainly for intelligence collection but the USA did not support their bid for independent Ukraine.

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The OUN’s allegiance to the Führerprinzip remained unchanged and it scorned democratic decision-making. UPA assurances that “the National Government of Ukraine will not expend time, energy and funds on creating an apparatus of oppression”90 sounded hollow while the SB was operating in full swing, killing all those who questioned OUN values. In May 1943, Dmytro Kliachkivsky, the UPA’s then commander-in-chief, identified merely belonging “to an organisation that operates to the detriment and against the interests of the Ukrainian people” as a crime punishable by death.91 The OUN was to be the sole judge of whether an organisation was detrimental to the interests of the Ukrainian people. In September 1943, a month after the OUN allegedly turned to democracy, its armed bands attacked the headquarters of the original UPA, which was led by Taras Borovets, a moderate nationalist, killing several of his commanders and strangling his wife.92 In June 1948, the OUN identified its enemies among Ukrainian nationalists as “all the émigrés who oppose the UHVR, seek to tarnish the glorious name of the UPA and spread slander against the OUN led by S. Bandera”.93 This shows that the OUN retained its earlier intolerance of all deviation from its views on nationalism until the very end. How did these cosmetic changes in phraseology affect OUN policy towards those whom it had identified in April 1941 as “hostile” ethnic minorities? In April 1942, ten months after the pogroms marking “the restoration of Ukrainian statehood”, the Second Conference of the Central Leadership confirmed that Jews were “a tool of Moscovite-Bolshevik imperialism” but stated that nationalists ought not to “take part in anti-Jewish action at the present moment94 in the international situation”, thus letting its members know that the moment of “reckoning” would come in the near future. The undated brochure entitled “The Nation as a Species”, issued in 1943 or later, perpetuated Dontsov’s Social Darwinist ideas and, especially, his concern with ethnic purity – a concept ridiculed by Benito Mussolini95 but taken seriously by the OUN. Its authors maintained that such purity – a bizarre notion at this crossroads of Eastern 90   E A, Document no. 5, What the UPA is Fighting for, 63. 91   E A, Document no. 40, Directive of the UPA Commander Dmytro Kliachkivsky (15 May 1943), 390, 391/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.1-3. 92  Interrogation of A.A. Iarosh (23 January 1944). GARF, f.9478, op.1, d.133, l. 23; BulbaBorovets, Armiia bez derzhavy, 256, 272; Document no.55 in Sokhan’, et al., (eds.), Litopys UPA, Nova Seriia (Kyiv, Toronto: Natsional’na Akademiia Nauk Ukraїny, 1995–2003), 2:131. 93   E A, Document no. 20, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (June 1948), 211/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.29, ark.230-241. 94   E A, Document no. 13, Resolutions of the Second Conference, 126. The emphasis is mine. 95  Nicholas Farrell, Mussolini (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003), 219, 241, 306.

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Europe – had to be protected by law and that intermarriage had to be forbidden. They also cited the German racial laws as an example to be followed.96 Other documents provide ample evidence of the UPA’s deadly, purely ethnically-based violence in 1943 and beyond, long after the Third Grand Assembly had granted equality to “all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality”,97 and many Jews, and those hiding them, lost their lives.98 In 1944, the SB was still issuing orders about the “immediate liquidation of communists and Jews”, and Dontsov continued to insist, in the same year, that “the struggle against Jews is in the interests and in the traditions of the Ukrainian nation”.99 In 1950, OUN issued a curious leaflet addressed to the Jews. It attributed the grim record of anti-Semitism in Ukraine to “the loss of a healthy way of thinking on the part of the Jews” and maintained that “it was not difficult to provoke the Ukrainians, considering the behaviour of the Jews in the past”. The authors wondered “why history taught future Jewish generations so little” and claimed that, during the German occupation, “many Jews found refuge in the ranks of the UPA”,100 conveniently forgetting to mention an internal UPA instruction issued in November 1943, four months after the adoption of the programme promising equal rights to minorities. This had stated that “all nonprofessional Jews [serving in the UPA] should be secretly eliminated”.101 The OUN reminded the Jews of the pogroms during the Khmelnytsky Uprising in the mid-seventeenth century during which, according to the authors, 200,000 Jews were killed as a result of the “stance of the Jews toward the Ukrainian people”. They warned the Jews that “the moment when the times of Khmelnytsky will be repeated is no longer far away” and that “it is in your own interest to live in complete accord” with Ukraine’s “lawful masters, the Ukrainians”.102 The leaflet made clear the plight awaiting the Jews in an OUN-ruled independent Ukraine. However, the Jewish victims of the OUN represented only a fraction of the Ukrainian Jews who lost their lives during the Second World War, because the Nazis and the Ukrainian auxiliary police, that also included many OUN members, surpassed the OUN in this respect. Since few Russians lived in Western Ukraine, the nationalists focused on the largest “hostile ethnic minority”, 96   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 268; Zaitsev, OUN i avtorytano-natsionalistychni rukhi, 98. 97   E A, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 55. 98  Diukov, Vtorostepennyi vrag, 72-79, 82, 84. 99  Diukov, Vtorostepennyi vrag, 82, 84. 100   E A, Document no. 121, Jews – Citizens of Ukraine, 807. 101  Document no. 44 in Sokhan’, Litopys UPA, Nova Seriia, 4:126. 102   E A, Document no. 121, Jews – Citizens of Ukraine, 804, 809.

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the Poles. After the pogroms in the summer of 1941, relations between the Ukrainian and Polish communities remained strained but did not explode into large-scale violence until early 1943, when the OUN began an ethnic cleansing stipulated by the decisions of the Second Grand Assembly and the “Guidelines for the First Days of the Organisation of the State”. Modelled after the Nazi “Final Solution”, the OUN’s strategy pursued the total expulsion or extermination of the Polish population in Western Ukraine. As Alexander Prusin notes, the “murderous practices of the OUN-UPA were completely in tune with the racial war Nazi Germany waged in the East”.103 This observation is valid for the OUN’s actions even after it had incorporated phraseology on democratic values. Numerous UPA reports stating triumphantly that it had killed hundreds of Poles, “including women” while suffering no casualties itself, and repeated remarks that “there was no resistance at all,”104 show that this was a slaughter of civilians. In August 1943, after the UPA had killed between 10,000 and 11,000 Poles in the previous month alone,105 the new OUN programme stated that the future Ukrainian government would have no “predatory goals … and oppressed peoples within its state”.106 In the same month, the UPA issued a decree about the distribution of the lands of killed and expelled Poles,107 which revealed that xenophobia was the major reason behind the ethnic cleansing and that greed was a major cause for its popularity among UPA fighters and Ukrainian peasants.108 On 29 and 30 August, soon after the alleged shift to democratic values, the UPA attacked the Polish villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska, killing between 500 and 600 people in each

103  Prusin, Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing, 535. 104   E A, Document no. 73, Information about Relations between the UPA Unit Commanded by Maksym Skorupsky ‘Maks’ and the Germans (14 March 1944), 492/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.38; EA, Document no.78, Report on Combat Actions (July 1943), 502, 503/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.66, ark.3; EA, Document no. 81, Report of the Anti-Polish Action in the Village of Hanachiv (9 February 1944), 508/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.34, ark.107; EA, Document no. 83, Report of the Anti-Polish Action in the Stanislaviv Region (April 1944), 513/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.34, ark.108; EA, Document no. 84, Report of the Anti-Polish Action in the Rava Ruska Area (April 1944), 516, 517/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.34, ark.110. 105  Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka, 329-341. 106   E A, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 52. 107   E A, Document no. 41, Directive of the Supreme Command of the UPA (15 August 1943), 393/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.6, ark.122. 108  Prusin, Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing, 529. Jared McBride developed a persuasive argument that Ukrainian civilians, who did not necessarily share fascist ideology, made up a large component of the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, McBride, Peasants into Perpetrators, 653, 654.

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as well as between 100 and 200 Poles in each of half a dozen other villages.109 The horrific ethnic cleansing continued until the second half of 1944,110 while the OUN repeatedly issued guarantees of “equality of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality”.111 As boasted by the OUN report, “Anti-Polish action has been carried out in the entire territory in the form of ultimatums obliging the Poles to depart from the ZUZ [Western Ukrainian Lands] by a certain deadline. … This caused terrible panic among the Poles, and they began departing westward en masse.”112 This was a centralised, well-planned and methodical extermination and expulsion conducted by the UPA on the orders of the top OUN leaders. In fact, OUN violence against Jews was never as coordinated or murderous as its campaign against Poles. Polish sources estimate that Ukrainian nationalists killed about 50,000 Poles in Volyn and between 20,000 and 30,000 in Galicia in 1943–44. In all, about 350,000 Poles were forced to flee Western Ukraine.113 The OUN referred to the USSR as a “prison of nations” – an expression it borrowed from the discourse of Russian socialists about the tsarist regime.114 OUN ethnic policy demonstrated, however, that the state that the nationalists were trying to build would be not a prison but a graveyard of nations. The OUN preserved its original expansionist agenda, as is made clear by its instructions of 1946. These stated that the OUN did “not recognise any claims of our state neighbours (Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Russians) to any part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory”.115 In June 1946, the OUN’s conference passed “Tactical Guidelines during the Period of War against the USSR”, which stated that “elements hostile to the Ukrainian liberation movement [i.e., the OUN] are to be indiscriminately destroyed”, although certain discretion had 109  Grzegorz Motyka, Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011), 146, 147. 110   E A, Document no. 73, Information about Relations, EA, Document no. 75, Announcement about a German Action against the UPA (May 1944), 496/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.44; EA, Document no. 87, Political Report from the Lviv Region (4 July 1944), 525/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.71, ark.224, 225. 111   E A, Document no. 4, Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly, 55; EA, Document no. 7, Universal, 73. 112   E A, Document no. 87, Political Report from the Lviv Region, 525. 113  Timothy Snyder, The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943, in: Past and Present 179 (May 2003), 197-234, here 202; Rusnachenko, Narod zburenyi, 176; Prusin, Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing, 534. See the detailed account of extermination methods in an excellent case study, McBride, Peasants into Perpetrators, 643-647. 114   E A, Document no. 3, Resolutions of the Second Grand Assembly, 30. 115   E A, Document no. 17, Declaration of the OUN Leadership (June 1946), 176/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.28, ark.159-174.

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to be used in the handling of Ukrainian civil servants, “as well as some nonRussians”.116 The “Tactical Guidelines” document was merely a version of the OUN’s instructions of April 1941,117 which had been written in anticipation of Operation Barbarossa and identified friends and enemies on an ethnic basis. In 1948, when the OUN reluctantly admitted that “it is reasonable to draw a dividing line” between the Russian people and “Russian-Bolshevik imperialism”, it also observed that “in Ukraine, the Russians are mainly a source of support for Bolshevik policies. … We must wage a merciless struggle against those kinds of Russians as against enemies.”118 In 1949, the Central Leadership continued to talk about “action[s] against the Russians” as a matter of policy.119 The documents issued by the top OUN agencies thus disprove the thesis that the nationalists converted to democratic values after 1943. On the contrary, their worship of a Leader irrelevant to the resistance, the consistent adherence to the Führerprinzip, continued expansionist aspirations, intolerance to alternative views on nationalism, suppression of any dissent and, most of all, a persistent xenophobia that was manifested in grisly ethnic violence show that the OUN changed only its rhetoric and not its ideology during its degradation from a mass party, popular in Western Ukraine, to a battered network of tiny terrorist cells. The UPA as a Tool of the OUN The UPA was not a replica of the OUN. These agencies had different social compositions and their personnel were driven by different motivations. Many OUN members were urban and well-enough educated to be motivated by ideology, whereas the typical UPA fighter was a peasant with, at best, four years of primary school education.120 Although most of these fighters were volunteers, many were conscripts121 and some were draft dodgers escaping German or Soviet conscription, who found themselves in the UPA by chance or out of desperation. The UPA was considerably larger than the OUN. Few of the UPA 116   E A, Document no. 17, Declaration of the OUN Leadership, 175. 117   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 116. 118   E A, Document no. 20, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (June 1948), 218. 119   E A, Document no. 21, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (August 1949), 236/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.7, ark.403-412. 120  Document no. 59 in Sokhan’, Litopys UPA, Nova Seriia, 5:284. 121   E A, Document no. 27, Order of the UPA Command in Volyn (30 August 1943), 271/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.60, ark.206.

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rank-and-file were committed nationalists and most had only a vague notion of an independent Ukrainian state, resented various aspects of Soviet policies and basically wanted to be left alone by the authorities. They also wanted to expel the Poles and divide their lands and other property. However, the attempt to divorce the UPA from the OUN made by some Ukrainian scholars122 in the hope of whitewashing the UPA’s gruesome image contradicts the historical evidence. The OUN absolutely dominated the UPA and ensured that the UPA was an obedient tool of the nationalists. UPA senior commanders were OUN members, whereas medium- and lower-ranked commanders were subordinate to the OUN territorial leaders of the corresponding rank, who constantly monitored UPA units.123 UPA political commissars were OUN members, each of whom was expected to be “a leader and father” of soldiers124 – a cliché borrowed by the OUN from Soviet references to Stalin. OUN commissars engaged primarily in indoctrination. They believed that any lies could serve propaganda ends, such as those about the “Bolshevik barbarians” who were allegedly enslaving all the nations as far as the Indian Ocean and seeking to destroy the Ukrainians by spreading “infectious bacteria” and involving them in drinking alcohol.125 The commissars explained to their soldiers that the UPA existed “entirely for the needs of the political leadership”.126 UPA fighters swore allegiance to the OUN-dominated “Supreme Political Leadership of the Ukrainian people”.127 Political leaders imposed SB sections, analogous to the Soviet SMERSh and the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst, on the UPA and gave these sweeping powers. The OUN officially sanctioned torture during

122  Zenon Kohut, Chy ukraїnis’ki studii povynni zakhishchaty spadshchinu OUN-UPA?, in: Amar/Balyns’kyi/Hrytsak, Strasti za Banderoiu, 154, 155. 123   E A, Document no. 54, Order of the OUN Carpathian Krai Leader Yaroslav Melnyk (2 November 1945), 439, 440/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.56; EA, Document no. 55, Order Concerning the Establishment of Relations between UPA Units and the OUN Network (3 December 1945), 441/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.62, ark.80v. 124   E A, Document no. 23, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (June 1950), 247/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.7, ark.413-420. 125   E A, Document no. 14, The Partisan Movement and Our Attitude to It (October 1942), 131, 132/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.60, ark.94, 95; EA, Document no. 45, Order Concerning the Ban on the Use of Alcohol (15 April 1945), 406/HDA SBU f.13, op.372, spr.48, ark.2; EA, Document no. 123, Appeal of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (1953), 817/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.5, ark.44-48; EA, Document no. 125, Appeal Issued by Vasyl Kuk (1952), 835/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.198-205. 126   E A, Document no. 36, Instruction Concerning Political Training (1 November 1944), 302/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.63, ark.15-20. 127   E A, Document no. 34, Order of the Supreme Military Headquarters (19 July 1944), 293/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.60, ark.232.

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interrogation and public executions,128 both of which were conducted by the SB. Like their Soviet and Nazi counterparts, SB officers were supposed to be people with “clean hands, a cool head and a warm heart”, but, in practice, they were often corrupted by these sweeping powers and tended to “cultivate a sense of their own sickly superiority over all workers”.129 Hence the UPA, few of whose members were committed nationalists, still served as a reliable tool of its fascist superiors who embraced xenophobia as the major tenet of their ideology. The resistance waged by the UPA against the Soviet regime in 1939–41 and after 1944 was, no doubt, heroic. Relying mostly on local resources, the nationalists raised a mass guerrilla army, dedicated to the OUN agenda. With its strict discipline, sophisticated logistics, competent intelligence service, shrewd propaganda department, effective command and control system and enormous civilian infrastructure, this force fought courageously and doggedly against heavy odds until 1950. However, UPA resistance was confined only to Western Ukraine, and even there support was patchy. The UPA could never establish a foothold in Transcarpathia nor win a popular majority in Bukovina and Polissia (see the map at the end of the article). All attempts to expand the resistance to pre-1939 Ukraine failed because most Ukrainians living there abhorred the fascists. The resistance was unable to attain any of its objectives, despite killing over 100,000 people, the majority of whom were Polish anti-communist and anti-Russian civilians, followed by Ukrainian and Jewish civilians and, finally, Soviet security forces, who lost fewer personnel than any of these other groups.130 The resistance had no impact on the prospects for Ukrainian independence. When Ukraine finally gained this in 1990, it was due to the collapse of the USSR, in which the sentiments of Ukrainians, unremarkable for their nationalism, played no role.

128   E A, Document no. 44, Guidelines for the Activities of the OUN Security Service (16 December 1944), 404/ HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.49; EA, Document no. 52, Instructions Concerning the Organisation of the UPA’s Military Field Gendarmerie (1944), 433/HDA SBU f.13, op.376, spr.61, ark.4-7. 129   E A, Document no. 20, Decisions of the Conference of the OUN Leadership (June 1948), 223. 130  Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.

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Conclusion Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe defines fascism as the label that can be given to revolutionary parties that planned the “radical political and cultural regeneration of a nation,” “adopted the Führerprinzip, practised the cult of ethnic and political violence, regarded mass violence as an extension of politics and were … undemocratic, anti-Marxist, anti-liberal, anti-conservative, totalitarian, ultranationalist, populist, racist, anti-Semitic and militarist”.131 Both factions of the OUN fit each of these criteria. The core documents produced by OUN leaders outline the social system that they planned to build “during battle periods” and immediately after the victory,132 but they did not specify how long this social system would last: months, years, decades or centuries. In this unidentified timeframe – and beyond, as implied by the programme adopted by the Second Grand Assembly – the social system was to be the dictatorship of a single leader supported by a revolutionary party with strict discipline, messianic goals and fanatical faith. This dictatorship would be legitimised by nothing other than an ideology that was chauvinistic and intolerant to the slightest dissent or any competing authority. The party elite would follow the only correct set of ideas and lead the masses to the objectives determined by ideology, which would take the form of a secular religion. Built on the basis of the Führerprinzip, the party-state administration would impose direct control over all national institutions, including the armed forces, legislature, judiciary, media, trade unions and the church. The OUN would also control most aspects of people’s lives, including their religious beliefs, and would force its views on society by silencing dissidents. It would undertake a concerted effort to win the masses for the cause through pervasive populist propaganda. The single youth league – merely an OUN offshoot – would indoctrinate men and women from their early teens in the absence of alternative media. Relentless human engineering would transform the traditional Ukrainian culture into a new one and create a type of individual worthy of populating the future Ukrainian state – a collectivist society in which the rights of individuals would be negligible in comparison with the rights of the state and even small misdemeanours would be punished by death. This would be a nation-state in which the dominance of Ukrainians over all ethnic minorities would be granted by law. The method of negative integration employed by all totalitarian regimes – consistently pointing to the ethnic or social groups identified as enemies of the nation – would help to unify the masses under the banner of nationalism. 131   Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 33. 132   E A, Document no. 11, Guidelines for the First Days, 105.

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Once such unification was attained and the ethnic minorities subjugated to Ukrainians deported or exterminated, the Ukrainian nation would engage in a long crusade against all its neighbours in an attempt to incorporate the regions populated by Ukrainians, which, in turn, were also to be cleansed of all non-Ukrainians. This militant expansionism alone would inevitably ensure that independent Ukraine would live in permanent instability, requiring the extension of the dictatorship for the foreseeable future. The misleading concept of “integral nationalism” used by today’s OUN sympathisers as a euphemism for fascism should therefore be discarded and the OUN should be unequivocally identified as a fascist party. This was not a marginal case such as Croix de Feu in France, the Cuzists in Romania, the Szeged Movement in Hungary or União Nacional in Portugal; rather, it was a clear-cut instance of fascism. This term applies to the OUN not as a propaganda cliché but as an accurate definition of its political affiliation. OUN members continued to think and act like fascists until the very end. The struggle for Ukrainian independence waged by the OUN was thus a unique case of fascist-led resistance. The Nazis, Italian black shirts, Ustaše, Arrow Cross and Parti populaire français were swept into the dustbin of history as soon as their respective countries had been overrun by their enemies, whereas OUN resistance lasted for six years after the Red Army reconquered Western Ukraine in 1944. And it took the Soviet security forces several more years to eradicate the remaining OUN cells. After the collapse of communism in the USSR, the nations in the post-Soviet space began fervently searching their pasts for national symbols that would replace those imposed upon them by the communists. These new beacons of national identity, promoted by opportunist politicians, are often as notorious as the communist heroes, and many members of the new nations reject them. In Moscow, Russian Cossacks established a monument to such Nazi collaborators as SS Gruppenführer Andrei Shkuro and Ataman Petr Krasnov and also to Helmuth von Pannwitz, a Nazi war criminal; this did not last long. Every 16 March, Latvian SS veterans organise marches to the Freedom Monument in Riga as if their fight on the side of those who planned to destroy their nation had advanced Latvia’s freedom; most Latvians deplore this show.133 In the same vein, in January 2010, Viktor Iushchenko, who had won the presidential election 133  The EU Parliament refers explicitly to Latvia in a resolution stating that it “strongly condemns and deplores … marches by neo-fascist and neo-Nazi organisations that have taken place in various EU Member States”, European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2018 on the rise of neo-fascist violence in Europe (2018/2869(RSP)), http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FNONSGML+TA+P8-TA-20180428+0+DOC+PDF+V0%2F%2FEN, accessed 10 January 2019.

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on the wave of the Orange Revolution, funded by the U.S.,134 awarded Bandera and Shukhevych the title of Hero of Ukraine. This action outraged most politically active Ukrainians135 but gave an additional boost to native neo-fascists who viewed the OUN as their predecessor.136 In 2011, after Iushchenko had lost the next election with a dismal 5% of the popular vote, a Ukrainian court stripped these individuals of their Hero titles and the current administration has made no attempt to restore them. Neo-fascists became a small but extremely violent component of the “Euromaidan,” and some researchers argue persuasively that they were responsible for most of the fatalities that occurred during the clashes with the police in November and December 2013.137 The neofascists are popular in several Western Ukrainian provinces, the same provinces in which the OUN had operated, but remain a marginal political force in the overall Ukrainian context. The largest neo-fascist party – Svoboda – won only 2.15% of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections of 2019.138 Yet monuments commemorating Ukrainian fascists, who secured their place in the history of genocide but failed to advance Ukraine an inch on the path to independence, continue to be built by those who subscribe to their system of values and to be demolished by those who reject them in present-day Ukraine.

134  Ian Traynor, US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev, in: The Guardian (26 November 2004); Mark Almond, The Price of People Power, in: The Guardian (7 December 2004); Matt Kelley, U.S. Money Helped Opposition in Ukraine, in: Associated Press (11 December 2004); Timothy Garton Ash, The $65m question, in: The Guardian (16 December 2004). 135  In 2013, 14% and 19% of Ukrainians had a positive opinion of the OUN and Bandera, respectively, and 35% and 36%, respectively, had a negative opinion; the rest were indifferent, Ivan Katchanovski, Terrorists or national heroes? Politics and perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine, in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015), 217228, here 223. 136  The main neo-fascist Svoboda party won 10.45% of the popular vote in the 2012 elections, a great surge from 0.76% of the popular vote in the 2007 elections, https://ukraineelections.com.ua/election_data/vybory_result/parlament/2012-10-28 (last accessed 10 January 2019). 137  Ivan Katchanovski, The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Government Investigations, in: ASN World Convention (4 May 2017, Session III). After a cursory investigation of the Euromaidan clashes in Kiev, the Estonian foreign minister Urmas Paet told Cathy Ashton, the EU Representative or Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: “There is a stronger and stronger understanding that behind snipers it was not Yanukovych; it was somebody from the new coalition,” Ewen MacAskill, Ukraine Crisis: Bugged Call Reveals Conspiracy Theory about Kiev Snipers, in: The Guardian (5 March 2014). 138  https://www.unian.info/politics/10639731-ukraine-s-cec-announces-official-results-ofparliamentary-elections.html (last accessed 14 September 2019).

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Selected Bibliography Adamushko, V.I. et al., OUN-UPA v Belarusi (Minsk: Vysheishaia shkola, 2012). Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism (Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990). Bogunov, Sergìj et al., Polacy i Ukraińcy pomiędzy dwoma systemami totalitarnymi 1942– 1945 (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej; Kijów: Państwowe Archiwum Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy, 2005). Boshyk, Yuri (ed.), Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986). Liber, George, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 1914–1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). Littman, Sol, Pure Soldiers of Sinister Legion (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2003). Motyka, Grzegorz, Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960 (Warsaw: RYTM, 2015). Motyl, Alexander, Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera, in: Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, 10/05 (March 2010). Prusin, Alexander, Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Ukraine, in: Steven Vardy/Hunt Tooley, (eds.), Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 517-535. Shkandrij, Myroslav, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929–1956 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2015).

Abstract Founded in 1929 in Poland as a party pursuing an independent Ukraine, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) engaged in armed anti-Soviet resistance as soon as the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Poland in 1939. This article, based on documents issued by the top OUN agencies, discusses the political affiliation of Ukrainian nationalists. It concludes that the OUN’s ideology, structure, objectives and practice identify it as a national-socialist version of a fascist party. From OUN’s inception and until its very end, its members continued to think and act as fascists. Unlike the OUN, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was not a fascist agency, but it nevertheless served as a reliable tool of its fascist OUN superiors. Fascists elsewhere met their demise as soon as their respective countries had been overrun by their enemies, whereas OUN resistance lasted for six years after the Red Army had reconquered Western Ukraine in 1944. The struggle for Ukrainian independence waged by the OUN was thus a unique case of fascist-led resistance. Fascists survived longer in Western Ukraine than elsewhere in Europe, with the exception of Spain, but in the end they suffered a total defeat.

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Резюме Основанная в Польше в 1929 г., Организация Украинских Националистов (ОУН) ставила своей целью образование независимого украинского государства. Сразу после аннексии восточной Польши Советским Союзом в 1939 г., ОУН вступила в вооруженную борьбу против советской власти. Это исследование, основанное на документах, изданных верховными органами ОУН, анализирует политическую принадлежность украинских националистов. Идеология, структура, цели и методы ОУН свидетельствуют о том, что эта партия принадлежала к национал-социалистической разновидности фашизма. С момента основания ОУН и до ее конца, ее члены планировали свои действия в рамках фашистской идеологии. В отличие от ОУН, Украинская повстанческая армия не была фашистской организацией, но была послушным орудием в руках ОУН. Фашисты в других странах Европы оказались в “мусорной корзине истории”, как только их страны были завоеваны, но ОУН продолжала бороться с советской властью шесть лет после победы Красной армии в Западной Украине в 1944 г. Борьба ОУН за независимое украинское тоталитарное государство, таким образом, представляет собой уникальный пример повстанчества под руководством фашистов. Фашизм как политическая сила просуществовал в Западной Украине дольше, чем где-либо еще, за исключением Испании, и возродился в наши дни – опять как популярное политическое движение в том же регионе, но маргинальное в общеукраинском контексте.

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Fig. 8.1 Ukraine

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Chapter 9

The Volhynian Czechs against Communism: An Example of Anti-communist Resistance in Czechoslovakia Adam Zítek Czechoslovak society was notably left-wing after the Second World War and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) enjoyed much more support than in the 1930s. The main reasons for this were the traumatic experience of the Munich Agreement and earlier economic crisis, which had enabled the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of war. Lacking trust in both the capitalist economy and their western allies the people saw an alliance with the USSR and a planned economy as guarantors of peace and stability. The warning voices raised against this alliance and policy were drowned out by the masses who believed that this way offered a better future. One group that, unlike most of Czechoslovak society, already had experience of the “workers’ paradise” – as the USSR was described – were the Czechs of Volhynia in Ukraine. Around 40,000 Volhynian Czechs decided to return to Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. From the very beginning of their resettlement they expressed their negative attitude towards communism, which occasionally spilled over into organised resistance against the communist regime.

The History of Volhynia

The history of the Czech minority in Volhynia can be traced back to the 19th century.1 The Volhynian Czechs first fought in the First World War when Czech compatriots formed the basis of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia.2 1  Czechs emigrated to Tsarist Russia because land was very cheap and the Russian authorities supported the incoming colonists. The strong tradition of Pan-Slavism and Russophilia in the Czech lands also played an important role in the emigration process. Many Czech villages were created and Czech farmers soon belonged to the upper social class due to their good farming experience and knowledge of modern techniques. 2  The basis for the Czechoslovak Legion was the “Czech Companions” unit founded in Russia in 1914. According to some sources, about 1,584 Volhynian Czechs served in the Legion. Jiří

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_010

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However, the end of the war brought not peace but the outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik conflict. This offered the Czech colonists their first direct experience of a ‘red revolution’ and they later welcomed the Polish Army with great relief. Following the Peace of Riga, which divided Volhynia between Bolshevik Russia and Poland, the Czech settlers found themselves in two different worlds: practically free Poland and totalitarian Bolshevik Russia. The distinctive character of the Czech minority in Volhynia lay in its relationship with the homeland. It had retained not only its language but also cultural and economic contacts with the Czechoslovak republic. Even more than a century after the wave of emigration this relationship remained strong, largely due to organisations and schools founded and run by Volhynian Czechs. With an uncritical approach bordering on idealisation they looked up to interwar Czechoslovakia and saw its first president, T.G. Masaryk as a figure of authority. Years of peace and prosperity came to an end with the outbreak of war. In the Polish part of Volhynia, Czechs were mobilised into the Polish Army. It was impossible to avert defeat by Nazi Germany, especially after Eastern Poland was also occupied by the Soviet Union on 17th of September 1939. In this unfortunate manner the former governorate of Volhynia was reunited. In the following years the inhabitants of Western Volhynia suffered under communist policies that led to the destruction of their previously rich cultural life, the collectivisation of agriculture and the expropriation of industry and trade. The inhabitants of Eastern Volhynia had experienced the same earlier.3 And while it was spared some of the features of Soviet repression aimed at Ukrainians and Poles, the Czech minority also suffered. Soviet rule in Volhynia was ended by the attack by Nazi Germany. Some Czechs were involved fighting for the retreating Red Army, but most inhabitants of Volhynia welcomed the German troops as liberators from Soviet oppression. However, it was soon clear that one totalitarian regime was simply being replaced by another. The German occupation tragically harmed the coexistence of Volhynia’s nationalities, leading in particularly to an inexplicable spiral of violence between Poles and Ukrainians. As witnesses of these Hofman/Václav Širc/Jaroslav Vaculík, Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, I. díl – na frontách, (Praha: Český svaz bojovníků za svobodu, 2004), 16. 3  Probably the biggest trial, which involved 37 Volhynian Czech teachers accused of espionage, took place in Charkhov in June 1931. 40-60 Czech teachers were arrested. Jan Dvořák, Antonín Vodseďálek a proces s českými učiteli na Ukrajině, in Paměť a dějiny (2013) 4, 102105. Volhynian Czechs were also deported from Eastern Volhynia to Kazakhstan and Siberia in the 1930s and from Western Volhynia in the early 1940s. Another deportation planned for June 1941 was thwarted by the German attack on the USSR. Jaroslav Vaculík, Dějiny volyňských Čechů. Díl II. (1914–1945), (Praha: Sdružení Čechů z Volyně a jejich přátel, 1998), 68.

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atrocities, the Czechs tried to remain neutral. This was also a central goal of their underground organisation. Blaník This organisation, which was named after a mythical hill in Bohemia, was founded by Czech teachers in summer 1941 and its activities intensified two years later as the frontline approached. While it had started humbly as a linear series of small groups, Blaník later developed into a large underground network. Its basic organisational units were the cells that were established in many Czech villages and divided into districts. The organisation was led by staff arranged in a series of specialised departments. Members of Blaník received a leaflet Hlasatel (announcer), which informed its readers about the current situation on the frontline and in the Protectorate of Bohmen and Mahren and, occasionally, carried news of broadcasts from Moscow or London. After the 18th November 1943, the members of Blaník had the following goals: 1) preparing Czechs for mobilisation into the Czechoslovak Independent Brigade, which was advancing alongside the Red Army, 2) carrying out small acts of sabotage against Germans, 3) remaining neutral in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and 4) openly fighting against the Germans in the ranks of the Czechoslovak Army.4 These goals were only partly accomplished, especially in terms of providing active, anti-German resistance. Blaník only focused on establishing armed groups (so called domobrana) following the Nazi massacre in the Czech village of Český Malín on 13th July 1943. Despite the intention that these groups would protect Czech villages, they never confronted the Germans. One serious problem for such groups was clearly a lack of weapons and, although some could be obtained from Hungarian soldiers, these were never enough.5 Given that Nazi reprisals could involve the extermination of entire villages, one can conclude that the reserved approach of the resistance was based on a concern about its own fate.

4  Blaník called for the collection of weapons, food, clothes and other equipment, the limiting of supplies to the Germans and the building of bunkers. Care was to be taken when the frontline arrived but there was to be no thought of evacuation. Opis Nařízení pro B, 18. 9. 1943, Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ABS), Hlavní správa vojenské kontrarozvědky (302), sign. 302-594-3. 5  For example, the domobrana in the village of Huleč was relatively well armed with one heavy and six light machine guns, 27 assorted rifles, 15 handguns and about 200 grenades. The domobrana in the village of Mirotín had a similar arsenal. Akce Blaník, ABS, Historický fond Státní bezpečnosti (H), sign. H-140.

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Czechs in Volhynia also faced a clear threat from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Українська повстанська армія, UPA). Not only did the UPA organise occasional attacks against Czech targets6 but the Ukrainian nationalists also tried to force Volhynian Czechs to join their ranks. While Blaník sought to remain neutral and prevent the Czech minority from joining the UPA, it also worked to maintain good relations with the Ukrainians, underlining that “nothing could force us to bleed for their freedom and suffer for their sins”.7 The fact that the Volhynian Czechs had witnessed this partisan war played an important role in the future. The Volhynian Czechs had experience of not only the UPA but also other underground organisations. A fear of the brutality of the UPA combined with close relationships with Polish neighbours led some Czechs to join or cooperate with Polish underground organisations such as, principally, the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK). Some Czechs made contact with Soviet partisans operating in Volhynia,8 which shows that the Volhynian Czechs were capable of fighting with them against the Nazis. The resistance activities of Blaník and other underground organisations or individuals were not directed against the Soviets. On the contrary, the very existence of these formations was related to the arrival of the Red Army and, particularly, the 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade.

With the Czechoslovak Army to the Old Homeland

Even if one has to admit that Blaník failed to meet some of its objectives, its main task was completed perfectly. In February 1944 the Czechoslovak Brigade came to Volhynia and began conscription immediately. According to Ludvík Svoboda, a later commander of the Czechoslovak Army Corps, which was set up at this time, “We were up to our ears in work, managing the onrush of conscriptions”.9 Although most Volhynian Czechs wanted to serve in the Czechoslovak Army there were also some cases of desertion or refusal to serve. 6  Grzegorz Motyka offers the example of the murder of a Czech family in the village of Cholupice. Grzegorz Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do Akcji “Wisła”: konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943–1947, (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011), 175. According to some sources, Ukrainian nationalists killed about 376 Czechs. J. Hofman/V. Širc/J. Vaculík, Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, I. díl – na frontách, 316. 7  Opis Nařízení pro B, 18. 9. 1943, ABS, 302, sign. 302-594-3. 8  Jaroslav Vaculík, Dějiny volyňských Čechů III. (1945–1948), (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2000), 111. 9  Ludvík Svoboda, Z Buzuluku do Prahy, (Praha: Naše vojsko, 1961), 234-236.

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This is also documented by the request to the NKVD from the command of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR concerning “all Czech deserters, who are hiding at home or do not commence work”.10 For many Czechs, mobilisation into the Czechoslovak Army represented their escape from GULAG or internment camps. Despite the decision to place Czechs in the Czechoslovak Army, some were also conscripted into the Red Army, while others joined Polish military forces (in the USSR or the West).11 Younger Volhynian Czechs were also forced to serve in the so-called Destruction Battalions (истребительный батаилон) organised by the NKVD, whose main tasks were to protect strategic buildings and communist party functionaries and fight with the Ukrainian underground. Czechs who served in this unit recall that the combat value of “Czech Destruction Battalions” was minimal,12 but it is significant that some young Czechs had experience with such formations. Volhynian Czechs fought in many battles in the ranks of the Czechoslovak Army and many died.13 The soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps 10  Nachalnik Komendatury Chekhoslovackogo Armeyskogo Korputsa v SSSR ppor. Stranski nachalniku NKVD Rovenskoj oblasti, 14. 12. 1944, Vojenský historický archiv (VHA), 1. čs. armádní sbor v SSSR (SSSR-IV), sign. E/2/4, inv. č. 332. 11  According to existing documents, Czechs serving in the Red Army tried to join the Czechoslovak Army Corps. Komendatura – Volyňští Češi – žádosti o převedení z RA k čs. jednotce v SSSR, 1944–1945, VHA, 1SSSR-IV, sign. L/13/8, inv. č. 730. 12  One of the Destruction Battalions, containing around 32 young men, was established in the Czech village of České Noviny. The situation there is shown by the words of members of the unit, “they [Czechs – A. Z.] carefully shot in the air and Banderits did the same”. So there were no victims on the Czech side. J. Hofman/V. Širc/J. Vaculík, Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, I. díl – na frontách, 330-331. The Czech population wasn’t hostile to the Ukrainian nationalists, despite the fact that they had to supply them with food. When the Czechoslovak Army arrived in Volhynia there were demands for protection against the “troops” but it is not specified if this meant the UPA. Komendatura, Žádosti obcí o vojenskou ochranu proti “banderovcům”, 1945–1946, VHA, SSSR-IV, sign. L/2/5, inv. č. 719. 13  According to probably the latest research, 1,480 Volhynian Czechs (or 14.06 % of all Volhynian conscripts) died serving in the Czechoslovak Army. J. Hofman/V. Širc/J. Vaculík, Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, I. díl – na frontách, 206. Due to these terrible losses some Volhynian Czechs still think that the very poorly prepared Dukla operation was planned by the Soviets as a way of eliminating a problematic minority in Czechoslovakia. Author’s interview of František Beneš, 10th October 2016, Cvrčovice, Czech Republic. There is a lack of documentary confirmation of this opinion but a similar point of view was common among soldiers from Western Ukraine who served in the Red Army and were sent to the frontline without appropriate training. Many thought that the terrible losses were a Soviet way of getting rid of them. Grzegorz Motyka/Rafał Wnuk/Tomasz Stryjek/ Adam F. Baran, Wojna po wojnie. Antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1945 (Gdańsk/Warszawa: Instytutu Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2012), 194.

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marched solemnly into Prague under the eyes of President Edvard Beneš on 17th May 1945. The war was over, but life in the future Czechoslovakia was not the life that many were dreaming of.

The Ascension of One Party Rule

As the fighting ended, the soldiers from Volhynia were gathered together in Žatec Region in Northwest Bohemia. This part of Czechoslovakia was chosen as their new home so that they could replace its German population. The departure of the Germans and arrival of the Czechs from Volhynia was told as a nationalist tale of “lost sons” returning to their motherland to help free it from the “German yoke”.14 But this re-emigration was also very pragmatic, because the expulsion of the Germans left a need for a labour force to help rebuild the state.15 The Volhynian Czechs who settled in this border country faced a range of problems from the very beginning, especially in terms of property. The former German homes had often been occupied by native Czechs and the farms had been damaged by revolutionary guards, Red Army soldiers and other looters. Descriptions of properties in fertile hop-growing regions proved to be exaggerated. On the other hand, the expectations of the re-emigrants could also be exaggerated, as confirmed by a report from the Ministry of Social Care.16 Following protracted negotiations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR, the first transport from Volhynia was welcomed on 3rd February 1947 in Košice in Slovakia. As noted by a representative of the Czechoslovak government: “All [re-emigrants – A. Z.] expressed that they are looking forward to working in Czechoslovakia”.17 Their enthusiasm upon arriving in Czechoslovakia was soon replaced by sober reality. The political situation in the country diverged widely from the vision of Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia cherished by the Volhynian. Much of society supported the KSČ and saw the USSR as a true ally and liberator. 14  Matěj Spruný, Nejsou jako my. Česká společnost a menšiny v pohraničí (1945–1960) (Praha: Antikomplex, 2011), 287. 15  The Volhynian Czechs were the most numerous group of re-emigrants after the Second World War. According to data from the Central Planning Office, Czechs from the USSR, including Volhynia, numbered 43,532 compared with the 40,050 from Volhynia. Zpráva o reemigraci, 15. 4. 1948, Národní archiv (NA), Státní úřad plánovací I (SÚP I), karton 90. 16  Zpráva ministra sociální péče o průběhu, zbývajících úkolem a skončení reemigrační akce s návrhem na usnesení předsednictva Ústředního výboru KSČ, 21. 3. 1949, NA, Ministerstvo vnitra II – Noskův archiv (MV II-N), čj. 257/49, karton 61. 17  Přivítání prvního transportu volyňských Čechů v Košicích dne 3. 2. 1947, NA, Úřad předsednictva vlády – běžná spisovna (ÚPV-b), inv. č. 541, sign. 47/14, karton 432.

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For the Volhynian Czechs, the red flags in Czech streets were an unpleasant surprise. It was still a year before the communists took over power completely, but the first clashes already occurred well before the communist coup d’état. The security bodies, which were under communist control even before February 1948, carefully observed all acts of hostility towards the Communist Party, its ideology and the USSR. With regards to the first transport in February 1947, The Bureau of State Security (Státní bezpečnost, StB) in Poprad noted the following comments about the USSR: “Here in Czechoslovakia people say that everything is good in the Soviet Union. So we [Volhynian – A. Z.] would like to offer people who talk like that first-hand experience of this Russian paradise so that they can convince themselves, like we did.”18 Similar comments about the USSR were not exceptional. For example, one women from the transport explained to a nurse at the station that “we have some clothes and food, but when the transports come from the Soviet part of Volhynia, then they will see”.19 Czechoslovak society responded by rejecting this information about “the best ally”. Years later, one Volhynian Czech recalled that, “they were all communists; they believed that communism was the salvation of humankind”.20 This first-hand experience of the Volhynian Czechs collided with the uncritical view of most Czechoslovaks, who regarded such tales more as hysterical reaction than as real stories about the USSR.21 Despite this, however, state bodies took steps to prevent these “rumours” from spreading. The Slovak Commission of the Interior, for example, took action, “to preclude re-emigrants like these [who showed hostility towards communism – A. Z.] from contacting citizens as they travelled through Slovakia”.22 Not only were the Czechoslovak security agencies interested in the Volhynian Czechs. The Soviet NKVD and counterintelligence agency SMERSH “visited” some Czechs to try to force them to return to the USSR, coupling this with the threat that they would otherwise “see Siberia”.23 The Czechoslovak authorities took a negative attitude towards such moves by the Soviet security bodies which, fortunately, were only threats. For 18  Volyňskí Češi, presidlování z SSSR – získané poznatky, 12. 2. 1947, ABS, Ústředna Státní bezpečnosti (305), sign. 305-354-3. 19  Voliňskí Češí, presídlenie do ČSR – zpráva, 19. 2. 1947, Ibid. 20  Memory of Nation, Josef Holec, (February 2017; http://www.pametnaroda.cz/witness/ index/id/368/#cs_368, last accessed 5 February 2017). 21  The state authorities demanded the more careful choice of re-emigrants. M. Spurný, Nejsou jako my, 312. 22  Optanti Volyňskí Češi – rozšiřovanie nepravdivých zpráv o SSSR, 16. 4. 1947, ABS, 305, sign. 305-354-3. 23  Ivana Ebelová/Petr Holodňák (eds.), Žatec (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2004), 384-385.

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those Czechs, however, who had escaped from the “paradise of workers and farmers” it was a clear signal that even in the Czechoslovakia of which they had dreamed they were not so safe. Most political parties were involved in the settlement programme after the Second World War. Besides the KSČ, which saw settlement as a way of gaining votes,24 these included the Czechoslovak People’s Party (Československá strana lidová, ČSL) and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (Československá strana národně socialistická, ČSNS). Only the national socialists enjoyed strong support from the Volhynian re-emigrants,25 while the opposition communists had to face uncomfortable opposition. This situation was accurately described by the District Secretary of the KSČ in the North Bohemian town of Chomutov: “The reactionaries in our region received a large boost from the arriving Volhynian Czechs, who tell absurd rumours everywhere about conditions in the USSR, while most were soldiers in Svoboda’s army, so they have weapons. Their self-confident, provocative and cheeky behaviour generates fear (…). I know that it is important to deal with these people and try to patiently guide them. But with some of them this is absolutely impossible. All our efforts are useless and for them there is no alternative to hard punishment.” The writer of this report envisaged the following solution: “I would only ask you [Jindřich Veselý, later Head of the StB – A. Z.] to ensure that the Ministry of Interior uses all possible means to deport these people who incite our borderlands, but I do not know where to deport them to. (…) We could manage this situation if I had permission to do so.”26 The self-confidence of the Volhynian Czechs and their open anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitude truly generated fear amongst members of the KSČ. Communists resigned their positions on national committees and reduced their agitation after some confrontations.27 This rejection by the Volhynian 24  Conflicts between Volhynian re-emigrants and native Czechs caused serious problems for the KSČ because this affected the communist strategy of buying votes in the upcoming elections. A report to the General Secretary Rudolf Slánský from the Head of Department IX of the Ministry of Agriculture clearly states that “if nothing of this ‘Promised Land’ remains for the native population this could have negative consequences in the elections”. Dopis Ing. Koťátka Rudolfu Slánskému, 11. 8. 1945, NA, Komunistická strana Československa – Ústřední výbor 1945–1989 (KSČ-ÚV), Klement Gottwald (100/24), a. j. 852, sv. 45. 25  There is no connection between the national socialists in Czechoslovakia and National Socialism in Nazi Germany or elsewhere. The Czechoslovak National Socialists had been a democratic party since the first days of Czechoslovakia. After the Second World War they were the loudest critics of the KSČ and its policies. 26  Dopis J. Stiboříka ÚV KSČ, 3. 7. 1947, ABS, 302, sign. 305-354-3. 27  M. Spurný, Nejsou jako my, 322.

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Czechs concerned not only the Communist Party but also other organisations under their control such as the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship (Svaz československo-sovětského přátelství, SČSP).28 The belligerent attitude of the Volhynian Czechs was also opposed by their own central body, the Union of Czechs from Volhynia (Svaz Čechů z Volyně, SČV). However, levels of anger soon subsided and, no more serious incidents happened – or at least none of which we have any evidence. The position of the KSČ changed radically after the communists took advantage of a government crisis to assume power in February 1948. Most political parties, central or local administrative state bodies and other organisations established so-called action committees (akční výbor, AV), whose task was to free society of the communists’ opponents and other “unreliable” persons. The SČV was no exception. It declared “that it is necessary to act uncompromisingly against these Volhynian Czechs, who express hostility towards the USSR as our ally”.29 According to correspondence from the AV of the SČV there were more cases of illicit contact with Germans than of anti-state activity, although these were also registered.

Volhynian Czechs in the Anti-communist Resistance

The first “resistance” group in which Volhynian Czechs were apparently involved was the organisation Sever (The North). This was in fact a provocation by the StB and the Military Defence Intelligence (Obranné zpravodajství, OBZ) known as the “Most Spy Affair”.30 Another illegal organisation allegedly formed by Volhynian Czechs was known as Vladimír Volyňský and was said to have been established in the army garrison in Žatec in 1947. In truth, this story was also only a fiction of the security bodies.31 Genuine resistance groups arose after February 1948, but most of these were infiltrated and even provoked by the security agencies. 28  One good example is the founding meeting of the SČSP in the town of Horšovský Týn, which ended when the Volhynian Czechs alleged that “life was better during the Tsar’s rule” and now there is only “hunger and poverty”. Hlášení místopředsedy ONV v Horšovském Týně, 15. 7. 1947, ABS, 302, sign. 305-354-3. 29  Schůze akčního výboru 1948, NA, Svaz Čechů z Volyně, SČzV Žatec (1870) 1946–1958, inv. č. 87, karton 69. 30  The main goal of this provocation was to prove a link between the national socialists and an illegal underground organisation. The case was named after one of the towns where the conspirators apparently had a unit. Due to the Justice Minister’s intervention an investigation was set up and the communist goal not achieved. 31  J. Vaculík, Dějiny volyňských Čechů III, 76.

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According to a report from the StB in Most dated February 1947, “95% of Volhynians [are – A. Z.] strongly hostile to the current people’s democratic regime, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and even the Soviet Union.” The report continues with the following statement: “Regarding the anti-state activities of Volhynian Czechs we are convinced that more than half of them – excluding the small percentage who really are good and reliable members of the KSČ – are willing to take part in anti-state activities”.32 Research carried out to date into resistance in Czechoslovakia clearly shows that the statements of the StB were exaggerated. Of course Volhynian Czechs were involved in anticommunist resistance groups, but not in a large-scale or organised way. They mostly took part as individuals and most members of these groups were native Czechs – largely former members of opposition political parties, but also of the KSČ.33 The horrible truth about the USSR presented by the Volhynian re-emigrants did not attract mass support. The organisational structures of resistance groups varied widely. Czechoslovakia did not have the central countrywide underground organisation that could have linked, coordinated and led the activities of smaller groups, although some were very close to achieving this and aspired to operate at the superregional scale. The overwhelming majority of resistance groups were relevant at the regional and local level. But while this tells us that the methods and organisation of resistance groups were not uniform, there were similarities in the way in which they were led. There was nothing different about resistance groups involving Volhynian Czechs, despite the fact that some of them had experience of conspiracy in the Blaník underground organisation. One of these resistance groups was founded in Nový Jičín in Eastern Moravia in 1951 under the leadership of Václav Dubec, a veteran of the Eastern Front. Although the group was called Blaník, it had no link with the former Volhynian organisation.34 On the other hand, it also used some conspiracy techniques.35 One of main tasks of the group around Václav Dubec was to resist the collectivisation of agriculture. The establishment of United Agricultural 32  Volyňští Češi na Žatecku – závady, 12. 2. 1949, ABS, 302, sign. 302-532-2. 33  Former members of the ČSNS and ČSL were very active but many members of the KSČ also decided to actively work against their own party. Václav Veber, Třetí odboj v ČSR v letech 1948–1953 (Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, 2014), 198. 34  Václav Dubec later said that his group was also named by Milada Horáková, who was sentenced to death. Memory of nation, Václav Dubec (February 2017; http://www. pametnaroda.cz/witness/index/id/311/#cs_311, last accessed 18 February 2017). 35  According to the StB investigation the members of this group used code names, took an oath and mentioned ideals of democracy and T.G. Masaryk. Dokument č. 3, 26. 3. 1955, ABS, Vyšetřovací spisy – Ostrava (OV-V), vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-778 OV.

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Cooperatives (Jednotné zemědělské družstvo, JZD), whose role was to replace private farming in the same way as the Soviet kolkhoz, gave an important boost to the resistance against communist rule. The Volhynian Czechs, who had bitter experience of such a process, were worried about the application of this policy in Czechoslovakia. This is confirmed by an StB report that notes that re-emigrants from Volhynia “are not interested in bigger homesteads and only demand smaller farms that are big enough to meet the needs of family members, without serving the central economy”.36 This resistance to collectivisation was spontaneous in character, as was also reflected in the organisational structure of each group. Far from being large underground organisations these were smaller groups of farmers who were trying to defend (sometimes with arms) their properties and the values in which they believed. The methods employed during the fight against the totalitarian machinery included disturbing meetings of the JZD, spreading leaflets and, in several cases, physical attacks on over-active agitators or even more radical steps such as organised arson attacks on haystacks. On the other hand we have to take into account in research of collectivization, that there was aim of the apparatus of repression to criminalise any act of resistance, very often by provocations. People, who denied enter the JZD – like Volhynian Czechs – were very often victims of these provocations.37 Probably the most important and certainly the largest group with a predominantly Volhynian Czech membership was the anti-communist resistance organisation JOPO (Judexova odbojová protikomunistická organizace).38 This group, which operated around Žatec in Northwest Bohemia, was founded by the former partisan and KSČ sympathiser Alfons Kotous. Established in the spring of 1948 the group, paradoxically, adopted communist operational

36  Pobočka oblastní úřadovny StB v Krnově, Reemigranti z Volyně – šetření, 30. 7. 1947, ABS, 305, sign. 305-354-4. 37  The resistance of the Volhynian Czechs to the collectivisation of agriculture was very annoying to the communists. Security bodies used provocation to break resistance to the creation of the Czechoslovak version of the Soviet kolkhoz. M. Spurný, Nejsou jako my, 315; Adam Zítek, Protikomunistická rezistence na Žatecku. Diplomová práce (Třtice: Univerzita J.E. Purkyně, 2015), 158-185. 38  The organisation took its name from the French film Judex (1916) whose hero, a judge ( judex) punished injustice. Adam Zítek, Judexova odbojová protikomunistická organizace. Případ vystoupení volyňských Čechů proti komunistickému režimu, in: Jaroslav Rokoský/Martin Veselý (eds.), Za svojí ideou, za svým cílem (1939–1989) (Brno: Doplněk, 2017), 292.

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methods.39 The basic organisational units were so-called cells, small groups with 3-5 members. Each cell had a commander and a deputy while couriers provided the connection between the cells and their leadership. These cells were set up in the home villages of JOPO members. Around five cells were created altogether. It is not easy to distinguish between full members of the group and those who only played a passive role. Relationships between Volhynian Czechs and the fact that they often knew each other played an important role in the formation of the organisation. JOPO employed relatively advanced underground methods. It used code names and collected money in order to purchase weapons or help families affected by the regime. Although these methods were inspired by the communists, we should also remember the experience of the Volhynian Czechs during the war when some were also members of Blaník, which also had a cellular organisation.

Guns that Never Shot

Anti-communist resistance in Czechoslovakia was predominantly non-violent. This can be explained by the fact that society had been less brutalised during the Second World War and experienced less dramatic change than, for example, Poland.40 Furthermore, the Communist Party was not perceived as an agent of Moscow and the USSR was not perceived as the enemy. This significantly influenced the approach of society, as did the fact that the KSČ had won the first and (largely) free post-war elections in 1946. Hence, rather than feeling like foreign elements installed by Moscow, communists were neighbours, work colleagues or even fellow former members of the anti-Nazi resistance. It is also necessary to point out here that many active or former members of the communist party were also, paradoxically, involved in anti-communist resistance. For example, some members of Václav Dubec’s group had relations with the KSČ.41 This is not to say that there were no attacks on communists or members of the security forces. However, research suggests that such actions were rare 39  Alfons Kotous’ stepfather was a member of the KSČ between the wars. Kotous later used his notes about the organisation of underground operations in his work against the Communist Party. Ibid. 40  Marcin Zaremba, Wielka Trwoga. Polska 1944–1947. Ludowa reakcja na kryzys (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012). 41  One member of Václav Dubec’s group was an active member of the KSČ and two others were former members. ABS, Praha, OV-V, vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-778 OV.

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and small in scale. In some cases, the “offenders” responsible for physical attacks on KSČ supporters were also Czechs from Volhynia, especially soon after their arrival in Czechoslovakia. One relatively well-known incident occurred in June 1947 in the village of Zálezly, where a group of young Volhynian Czechs, fortified with alcohol, announced their intention to “shoot communists”. Their conduct ended with a skirmish, gunfire and the wounding of a member of the KSČ.42 Further such incidents generally ended in kicks and punches.43 However, despite the fact that such acts resulted from the discontent of Volhynian Czechs, the security apparatus saw the re-emigrants as a real threat, as confirmed in another StB report: “In each operation we must remember that we are facing an enemy with experience of illegal underground operations who will not hesitate to use violence”.44 There were probably occasions on which plans were drawn up to use force against communists, but such ideas were rarely more than theoretical.45 Questions can also be asked about the responsibility of the Volhynian Czechs in such incidents.46 As claimed by Václav Dubec during the trial, members of the resistance were generally satisfied with “the denunciation of some communist functionaries”.47 The main activity of resistance groups was to prepare for the expected war between West and East during which they would fight against the communist regime. Their basic task was to gather the weapons that would be necessary in an open fight. In Czechoslovakia, the task of finding suitable weapons was not so easy. Resistance groups had struggled to find weapons during the Second World War and, although the end of the war meant that weapons became available, the fact that the communist dictatorship was not established until 1948 42  Solodujev Evžen a spol. – pokus vraždy, § 335 proti bezpečnosti života atd., 23. 5. 1948, ABS, 305, sign. 305-543-3. 43  Another incident took place in a small village on the Czech-Polish border in June 1946. A group of Volhynian Czechs attacked a farmer and member of the KSČ. The incident began because he was working in his fields on a Sunday. Reemigranti z Volyně – šetření, 24. 4. 1948, ABS, 305, sign. 305-354-3. 44  Porada krajských velitelů StB, 1952, ABS, H., sign. H-255. 45  In the protocols of the organisation JOPO we can also read about plans for attacks on overly active communists. These also mention the activities of the UPA in Volhynia as an example. It is hard to say if these plans had a real chance of success or if there was any willingness to carry them out. A. Zítek, Judexova odbojová protikomunistická organizace, in: J. Rokoský/M. Veselý (eds.), Za svojí ideou, za svým cílem (1939–1989). 46  In an StB report from the Karlovy Vary region we read that “attacks on members of the KSČ were perpetrated by as yet unidentified Volhynian Czechs (sic)”. Volyňští Češi – situační zpráva, 5. 4. 1952, ABS, H., sign. H-255/4. 47  According to Václav Dubec’s court testimony they wanted to intimidate the communists to reduce the pressure on farmers to join the JZD. Protokol o hlavním líčení, sp. zn. T 16/55 KS Ostrava, 21.-22. 4. 1955, ABS, V-OV, vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-779 OV.

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meant that there had been little reason to gather arms in the meantime. As army veterans, many Volhynian Czechs had weapons, including not just trophy pieces but also rifles and, in some cases, machine guns and even grenades.48 Although security and military agencies worked to disarm them, they still held on to some of these weapons for themselves. After February 1948, the problem of how to extend these humble arsenals could be solved by purchasing weapons or assaulting weapon stores.49 Generally, however, resistance groups were inadequately armed in terms of not only the quantity but also the quality of weapons, especially given the range of types of guns and ammunition. The onset of the Cold War led to other activities with an intelligence character. Countless resistance groups in Czechoslovakia tried to contact exile organisations in the West in order to pass on information. The Volhynian native Václav Hrdlička told of his own contacts with western intelligence services, reporting that he had been sent to Eastern Ukraine in 1951 in order to contact the Ukrainian underground.50 The information activities of most resistance groups also involved the spreading of leaflets. The contents of these varied. Some provided information about the current political situation in Czechoslovakia or the wider world and some called openly for resistance to

48  Military bodies acted to prevent the improper behaviour of Volhynian Czechs in June 1946 in Žatec Region. During this action the army also confiscated weapons kept by former soldiers from Volhynia. They secured 38 military rifles, 7 submachines, 26 9 mm and 27 7.65 mm guns, 10 hunting rifles and several grenades. Volyňští Čechové – odebrání zbraní – hlášení, 2. 4. 1946, ABS, 302, sign. 302-532-2. 49  Members of the JOPO bought some weapons but the poor state of their arsenal would have been changed by an attack on a weapons depot of the Union of Military Ability (Svaz brannosti – a paramilitary organisation that prepared compulsory military service). Two attempts were unsuccessful. A. Zítek, Judexova odbojová protikomunistická organizace, in: J. Rokoský/M. Veselý (eds.), Za svojí ideou, za svým cílem (1939–1989), 300-302. 50  Václav Hrdlička fought in the Czechoslovak Army Corps and was wounded in the battle of Dukla. According to his memoirs he was then sent back to Volhynia to convalesce where he was forced by the NKVD to serve in Destruction Battalions and fight against the formation of the UPA. Returning to Czechoslovakia, he illegally helped people across the border but was detained by East German frontier guards. Later, he apparently again made contact with western intelligence and was sent to Western Ukraine with the task of contacting the UPA. There is confirmation of his arrest by the Soviets for illegally crossing the border in 1951 after which he was sent to Siberia in 1952 and released during Beria’s amnesty in 1953. It is impossible to confirm Hrdlička’s cooperation with western intelligence from the available archive material, but his story suggests the possibility of such cooperation by the Volhynian Czechs due to their origins and knowledge. Memory of nation, Václav Hrdlička (April 2017; http://www.pametnaroda.cz/story/hrdlicka-vaclav-1926-1458, last accessed 28 April 2017); ABS, Vyšetřovací spisy – Hradec Králové (HK-V), vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-816 HK.

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the communist regime while another informed about overly active members of the KSČ, SNB or StB.51 The wide range of motives for resistance activity is exemplified by the bitter experience with the Soviet regime in Volhynia. The deep-rooted anticommunism of many Volhynian Czechs was related to their religious beliefs. Others, however, were motivated by such very pragmatic reasons as a fear of collectivisation or, put otherwise, the desire to protect their property. They were certainly not driven by sophisticated political programmes or the desire for deep change in the machinery of state, etc. The resistance activities of the Volhynian Czechs were a reaction to communist policy – which was a very common explanation of resistance in Czechoslovakia.

Under the Control of State Security

The increased attention paid by the StB to Volhynian Czechs, which started as soon as they began to settle in Czechoslovakia, didn’t decrease. Rather, it developed the paranoid character so symptomatic to totalitarian regimes. One example of this was the theory that Blaník had been restored in Czechoslovakia, a theory triggered by the efforts that were being made to document the history of the organisation.52 This alleged reactivation of Blaník led to the more detailed undercover observation of Volhynian Czechs, some of whom were later even arrested on suspicion of anti-state activity. No such activities against the “people’s democracy” were ever proved. Another favourite focus of the StB was the supposed connection between Volhynian Czechs and the Ukrainian nationalist underground. Between 1945 and 1947 UPA troops had fought with Czechoslovak forces while trying to cross Czechoslovakia and reach US-occupied Germany. This added to the suspicion that members of the OUN-UPA were hidden amongst the re-emigrants from Volhynia. However, despite the fact that Ukrainians were indeed found amongst the re-emigrants and automatically suspected to be Ukrainian nationalists, it appears that the Czechs neither helped nor even cooperated with the OUN-UPA.53 Although the security bodies failed to provide evidence 51  V. Veber, Třetí odboj. ČSR v letech 1948–1953, 136. 52  This confirms the StB report that states that “this organisation [Blaník – A. Z.] has not ended its activity. On the contrary, people who were involved there should have registered leaders of cells and sent them materials”. Organizace B – rozpracování, 25. 7. 1951, ABS, H., sign. H-255, sign. H-255/13. 53  Another example is the story of Vladimír Divíšek, who was arrested in 1949. His real name was Mikhail Ostapovich Furmanec and, according to official testimony, he commanded

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of large-scale anti-state activity, close attention continued to be paid to the Volhynian Czechs. This is also confirmed by the establishment of a special section dedicated to the Volhynian Czechs in the regional command of the 1st Department (Eastern) of the StB.54 Conclusion The anti-communist resistance of the Volhynian Czechs can be divided into three phases. In the first, which coincided with their settlement in Czechoslovakia, they were openly hostile to the communists. Despite the fact that most of Czechoslovak society was positively inclined towards the Soviet Union and communism, documents show that the open criticism of the regime by Volhynian Czechs influenced the rest of society, mainly during the 1946 elections.55 As the re-emigrants became settled and, probably, adapted to the political situation in the country, spontaneous acts of resistance abated. In the next phase, which began with the communist takeover of power, some reemigrants from Volhynia were involved in organised resistance. The rich history of the Volhynian Czechs – their nature as a coherent minority and their experience of anti-communism, of opposition to the Soviet regime, of resistance and of warfare as members of the army or paramilitary organisations – suggests a certain potential for organising advanced resistance.56 However, the failure to identify anti-communist resistance groups formed by Volhynian Czechs suggests that they were not a source of large-scale organised resistance.57 The examples above show that, while individuals took part in resistance activities, only in such rare cases as JOPO did they form entire organisations. One the OUN-UPA unit. Ministrstvo Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti USSR, Protokol opoznaniya, Alexandra Markovna Gnatjuk, Trostenec, 20. 3. 1959, ABS, Vyšetřovací spisy – Plzeň (PL-V), vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-2137 PL. 54  Besides the Volhynian Czechs the attention of the security bodies was focused on Russian emigrants and, of course, Ukrainian nationalists. Rozkaz velitele státní bezpečnosti č. 49, ABS, Velitelství StB (310), sign. 310-7-15. 55  One regional secretary wrote to the Central Committee of the KSČ that, due to the threats and negative attitude to communism of Volhynian Czechs, “people were worried to vote for the communists, of being shot or threatened in other ways”. Soudruhu Slánskému, volby, NA, KSČ-ÚV (1945–1989), Generální sekretariát (100/1), a. j. 337, sv. 45. 56  The borderland community after the Second World War was practically anonymous except for the Volhynian re-emigrants, who constituted “islands of communities”. M. Spurný, Nejsou jako my, 288. This confirms the description of JOPO as consisting of people who mostly knew each other already from Volhynia. 57  M. Spurný, Nejsou jako my, 320.

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essential feature for even the partial success of resistance activities – the acquisition of a critical mass – was not achieved.58 Faced with the repression that they had already experienced from the Soviets their resistance declined. In a final phase, the communists successfully infiltrated the Volhynian Czech community, controlled and involved them in party and state organisations, and totally eliminated any remaining resistance.59 Bibliography Bártek, Tomáš/Tereza Ničová (eds.), Návrat do vlasti : sborník příspěvků z konference konané k 65. výročí reemigrace volyňských Čechů (Praha: Sdružení Čechů z Volyně a jejich přátel, 2013). Hofman, Jiří /Václav Širc/Jaroslav Vaculík, Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, I. díl – na frontách (Praha: Český svaz bojovníků za svobodu, 2004). Nosková, Jana, Reemigrace a usidlování volyňských Čechů v interpretacích aktérů a odborné literatury (Brno: Ústav evropské etnologie, 2007). Vaculík, Jaroslav, Dějiny volyňských Čechů I. (1868–1918) (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 1997). Vaculík, Jaroslav, Dějiny volyňských Čechů. Díl II. (1914–1945) (Praha: Sdružení Čechů z Volyně a jejich přátel, 1998). Vaculík, Jaroslav, Dějiny volyňských Čechů III. (1945–1948) (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2000). Zítek, Adam, Judexova odbojová protikomunistická organizace. Případ vystoupení volyňských Čechů proti komunistickému režimu, in: Jaroslav Rokoský/Martin Veselý (eds.), Za svojí ideou, za svým cílem (1939–1989) (Brno: Doplněk, 2017), 281-338.



Archival Sources

Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Historický fond Státní bezpečnosti, sign. H-140. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Historický fond Státní bezpečnosti, sign. H-255. 58  E.g. the rebellions of farmers in the USSR, which were only successful thanks to the support of external allies (urban intelligentsia, army members or foreign allies). Jason Cambell Sharman, Repression and resistance in communist Europe (New York/London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 47. 59  The communist strategy against the re-emigrants was to penetrate them gradually via, for example, social and other organisations. The successful approach to the collectivisation of agriculture was to start with the smaller farmers and workers by changing their [kulaks – A. Z.] attitude towards the JZD and later raising the level of the JZD [there were four levels of the JZD defined by some joint activity and the complete economy of collective farms – A. Z.]”. Informační zpráva o Volyňských Češích žijících v ČSR – (zpráva MV a ÚV KSČ, závadové poznatky na Jaroslava Kozáka), 1954, NA, KSČ-ÚV (1945–1989), Antonín Novotný-tajné, inv. č. 88, karton 25.

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Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Hlavní správa Vojenské kontrarozvědky, sign. 302-532-2. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Hlavní správa Vojenské kontrarozvědky, sign. 302-594-3. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Různé bezpečnostní spisy po roce 1945, sign. 304-215-16. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Ústředna Státní bezpečnosti, sign. 305-254-3. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Ústředna Státní bezpečnosti, sign. 305-354-3. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Ústředna Státní bezpečnosti, sign. 305-354-4. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Velitelství Státní bezpečnosti, sign. 310-7-15. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Vyšetřovací spisy-Ústí nad Labem, vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-3131 ÚL. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Vyšetřovací spisy-Hradec Králové, vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-816 HK. Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Vyšetřovací spisy-Ostrava, vyšetřovací spis a. č. V-778 OV. Národní archiv, Komunistická strana Československa – Ústřední výbor (1945–1989), Antonín Novotný-tajné, MV – agenturní zprávy, inv. č. 88, karton 25. Národní archiv, Komunistická strana Československa – Ústřední výbor (1945–1989), Generální sekretariát, a. j. 337, sv. 45. Národní archiv, Komunistická strana Československa – Ústřední výbor (1945–1989), Klement Gottwald, a. j. 852, sv. 45. Národní archiv, Ministerstvo vnitra II – Noskův archiv, čj. 257/49, karton 61. Národní archiv, Úřad předsednictva vlády – běžná spisovna, inv. č. 541, sign. 47/14, karton 432. Národní archiv, Státní úřad plánovací I, karton 90. Národní archiv, Svaz Čechů z Volyně. Vojenský historický archiv, 1. československý armádní sbor v SSSR, sign. E/2/4, inv. č. 332. Vojenský historický archiv, 1. československý armádní sbor v SSSR, sign. L/13/8, inv. č. 730. Vojenský historický archiv, 1. československý armádní sbor v SSSR, sign. L/2/5, inv. č. 719.

Summary The history of the Czech minority in Volhynia can be traced back to the late 19th century. The Czech emigrants who lived there for decades suffered not only during two world wars but also under the Soviet system and as a result of communist policies. They returned to their homeland after the Second World War, but in left-wing-orientated Czechoslovakia their stories of life in the USSR were given little credence. Their open hostility to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia soon escalated into a conflict. When the communists took

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over power completely in February 1948 some Volhynian Czechs participated in the organised opposition to one-party rule. However, despite their experience and fighting tradition and some evidence of potential open opposition, especially before the coup d’état of February 1948, this never developed into large-scale resistance.

Summary in Czech

Historie české menšiny na Volyni sahá do 19. století. Češi, kteří zde po dlouhá desetiletí žili nejenže prošli dvěma světovými válkami, ale získali rovněž trpkou zkušenost se sovětským systémem a aplikovanou komunistickou politikou. Po druhé světové válce se vrátili do staré vlasti. V levicově orientovaném Československu jim ale málokdo pravdu o Sovětském svazu uvěřil. Svým nepokrytým odporem proti komunismu se brzy dostali do konfliktu s agitátory Komunistické strany Československa. Po absolutním převzetí moci komunisty v únoru 1948 se někteří z nich zapojili do organizovaného odporu proti vládě jedné strany. Navzdory svým zkušenostem a určité bojové tradici ale k masovému odporu mezi nimi nedošlo. Některé skutečnosti ale naznačují, že především v předúnorovém období jejich otevřený odpor určitý potenciál měl.

Chapter 10

Armed Anti-communist Resistance in Slovakia in the Postwar Years, 1948–1953 The Cases of Augustín Lednický and Ján Rešetko Beata Katrebova Blehova

Status of Research and Sources

The topic of armed anti-Communist resistance in Slovakia in the opening years of the Communist regime during the late 1940s and the early 1950s has only been researched rudimentarily up to today. Moreover, the work published to date has not delved into the difference between armed, i.e. active, and unarmed resistance. The result has been that the phenomenon dealt with most is the highly heterogeneous anti-Communist movement of the ‘White Legion’, whose foundations were formulated by the Slovak expatriate Jozef Vicen in Vienna in July 1948 and which represented a non-organized form of passive resistance on the part of broad sections of the population.1 As is generally known, the state security service had their sights on the alleged or real protagonists of

1  For the phenomenon of the White Legion, cf.: Beata Katrebova Blehova, ‘An beiden Ufern der March. Der antikommunistische Widerstand der Weissen Legion’, in: Stefan Karner/ Michal Stehlik (eds.): Österreich. Tschechien. Geteilt – getrennt – vereint (Beitragsband und Katalog der Niederösterreichischen Landesausstellung, Schallaburg 2009), 252-255. Cf. also Beata Katrebova Blehova, ‘Das slowakische politische Exil in Österreich, 1945–1955’, in: Emilia Hrabovec/Beata Katrebova Blehova (eds.), Slowakei und Österreich im 20. Jh. Eine Nachbarschaft in historisch-literarischer Perspektive (Vienna: LIT 2008), 173-213. A monograph on the subject was written by Vladimír Varinský, Jozef Vicen a Biela légia (Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2003), 122 pages. Further works have considered specific aspects of this movement: Vladimír Varinský, “Biela légia” a jej pôsobenie na Slovensku, in: Zborník ­katedry histórie Fakulty humanitných vied Univerzity Mateja Bela 1 (1997) 4, 95-114 Idem.: “Biela légia” a jej pôsobenie na strednom Slovensku (1949–1952), in: Historický časopis, 51 (2003) 3, 435-446; Miroslav Vilhan, Biela légia na Slovensku z pohľadu štátnobezpečnostných zložiek a jej pôsobenie na Slovensku, in: Politické vedy 5(2002) 1-2, 130-134. A series of popular scientific studies have introduced the subject to a broader readership: Radoslav Maskaľ, Skupina Bielej légie Jána Rešetka, in: Kultúra, 13(2010) 20, 12; Idem., Vznik a počiatky Bielej légie v súvislosti s činnosťou miestnej skupiny v obci Dvorianky, in: Svedectvo 20 (2007) 5, 12-14; Idem., Správa o likvidácii skupín Bielej légie v Čiernom Balogu a Hronci, in: Svedectvo 18 (2008) 11, 11; Idem., Okolnosti odhalenia skupiny Bielej légie Jána Minárika, in: Svedectvo, 19 (2009) 6, 7.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_011

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the ‘White Legion’, so the sources are relatively broad.2 In May 1957, Jozef Vicen was kidnapped in Austria by the Czechoslovak state security service, interrogated for months and finally sentenced to many years in gaol. This has yielded a wealth of archival sources, the interrogation records alone covering a thousand pages.3 A portion of the sources on the ‘White Legion’ (e.g. the archival files on Ján Rešetko) can be found in the so-called records on persons of special interest (Evidencia záujmových osôb, EZO), which were kept by the Ministry of the Interior and later by the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Prague as an aid for instructions to be given to members of the secret service.4 It is a different case with research on armed resistance, which in most cases was offered by ex-soldiers of the Slovak Army, the partisans involved in the National Uprising of autumn 1944 or deserters after February 1948. Here, there is hardly any research, a few exceptions being the ground-breaking works by the Czech military historian Ivo Pejčoch, who compiled a series of biographical studies on soldiers condemned to death for political reasons.5 The majority of sources is formed by the interrogation records, which can be found as personnel files in the former archives of the security services in Prague and Bratislava. In Slovakia, there were also cases of armed resistance with a non-military background, such as the activities of the group around Jozef Panáč, who funded their illegal partisan war in the mountains of Kysuce in the north of Slovakia at the beginning of the 1950s by robbing mail vans. This concrete case, which later served for the training of secret service personnel, requires closer scrutiny.6 This study will deal with the armed resistance with a military background that was either planned or conducted by specific persons, usually ex-soldiers, in the years between 1948 and 1953. In geographical terms, their activities can be confined to central and eastern Slovakia. In western Slovakia, there was hardly any opportunity to present resistance, usually in the form of partisan warfare, due to the lack of suitable topographical conditions (mountains, thick woods). A further issue concerns the true motives for presenting anti-Communist resistance, which, in the case of Augustín Lednický under investigation, also had 2  Archív ministerstva vnútra Slovenskej republiky (A MV SR), Nitrianska Streda, F. P 10/3, inventory no. 16: Summary report on the organization and activities of the nationwide illegal organization White Legion; Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (A ÚPN) 2/2, inventory no. 21, 24, 31, 50. 3  A ÚPN, F. Jozef Vicen, A 509. 4  Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ABS), H-435/SU, H-434/SU, H-258. 5  Cf. especially Ivo Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti. Vojenské osobnosti popravené v Československu z politických nebo kriminálních důvodů v období 1949–1985 (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2011); Ivo Pejčoch/ Prokop Tomek, Agenti – chodci na popravišti. Kurýři západních spravodajských služeb popravení v rocech 1949–1958 (Cheb 2010). 6  The file can be found in A ÚPN, Krajská správa Zboru národnej bezpečnosti, štátna bezpečnosť (KS ZNB ŠtB), Banská Bystrica, BB-V 486, Jozef Panáč and co.

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a nationalist background. As regards Slovakia, it is hardly possible to separate primarily anti-Communist resistance from the nationalist component. As is generally known, Slovakia lost its independence in 1945, and the restoration of Czechoslovakia meant a step backwards for broad sections of the population. But there is no research on the issue as to what percentage of the population of Slovakia really welcomed and supported the restoration of the centralized state. So, the fundamental motive for offering resistance was not primarily rejection of Communist ideology and the concrete Communist regime, but was also linked to the question of Slovak statehood. The idea of statehood was advocated particularly by the representatives of the first wave of émigrés from Slovakia in 1945 (about five to ten thousand persons, most of them intellectuals) and later formed the programme of the first Slovak exile organizations in Western European countries, the USA, Canada, South America and Australia. In the aftermath of the war, the programme of independence was also adopted by the largest fraternalist organization of the American Slovaks in the USA, the Slovak League in America (Slovenská liga v Amerike), numbering about 600,000 Slovaks resident in the USA. The refugees from Slovakia in 1945 and then following the coup d’état in February 1948 received material and intellectual aid from these organizations and were usually acquainted with their programme of an anti-Communist struggle and national independence.7

Introductory Remarks on the Situation in Slovakia, 1945–1948, with Reference to Austria

Beneš’ concept of a homogeneous centralist state gradually gained acceptance following Great Britain’s recognition of the Czechoslovak government in exile on 9 July 1940, the nullification of the Munich Agreement and, above all, the commitment on the part of the Soviets to restore Czechoslovakia with its preMunich borders.8 The violations of fundamental civil rights and f­reedoms 7  Cf. Beáta Katrebová Blehová: ‘Idea štátnosti v politike a programe slovenského povojnového exiliu.’ In: Ján Bobák et alii: Slovenské štátoprávne snahy v dvadsiatom storočí. Martin: Matica slovenská 2018, 329-359 and Beáta Katrebová Blehová: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku v rokoch 1945 – 1950. Bratislava – Roma: Slovenský historický ústav v Ríme 2019. There were also exile organizations propagating Czechoslovak statehood and usually formed by former senior politicians from the ranks of the Democratic Party, such as Jozef Lettrich or Rudolf Fraštacký, who went into exile after 1948. The majority of Slovak politicians in exile and the Slovaks living abroad prior to 1945 and above all the US Slovaks suported the programme of Slovak statehood. 8  Cf. Jan Rychlík, Genéza vzťahu mocností k možnosti samostatného Slovenska či obnovy Československa, in: Valerián Bystrický/ Štefan Fano (eds.), Slovensko na konci druhej svetovej vojny (Bratislava 1994), 114-124. See also Valentina V. Marjina, Vosstanovlenie čechoslovackogo

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a­ ccompanying the implementation of the principles of the Košice government programme in political life,9 the hegemony of Communist agencies, the retribution legislation and the people’s courts, the curtailment of religious liberty and the introduction of strict censorship caused dismay in Slovakia, largely contributing towards a rejection of the new regime.10 A report to the Minister of the Interior, Václav Kopecký, of 22 January 1946 illustrates these facts: ‘If we view the situation in Slovakia today realistically, we can see that eighty percent of the population (corresponding to the religious portion) [are] in passive resistance.’11 The Catholic Youth was obtaining sufficient support for its opposition in Catholic parishes, almost every parish had become a bastion for followers of the Tiso regime, and the Slovak Catholic priests were seizing every opportunity to maintain this base of support among the broad masses. And the report went on to relate: ‘The work of the office for the interior is extremely difficult in this situation because so much activity against the state must be reckoned upon with every step …’12 The parliamentary elections of May 1946, which brought about a defeat for the Communists in Slovakia, may clearly be viewed as a symbol of resistance to the so-called popular democratic regime. A section of the Austrian press interpreted the election results in Slovakia as the victory of the Catholics.13 The Democratic Party, which won the elections with a majority of 60%, was viewed as a centrist party of the Catholics despite the fact that Slovak Protestants gosudarstva: meždunarodnyje aspekty 1939–1945, in: E.G. Zagorožňuk/ Valentina V. Marjina (eds.), Čechija i Slovakija v XX. veke. Očerki istorii (Moskva 2005, Vol. 2), 390-427. 9  Cf. František Vnuk, Stopäťdesiat rokov v živote národa. Slovensko v rokoch 1843–1993 (= Libri historiae slovaciae Monographiae, Vol. II, Bratislava 2004), 229. 10  Cf. Róbert Letz, Slovensko v rokoch 1945–1948 na ceste ku komunistickej totalite (Bratislava 1994). See especially the third chapter of the book: The violation of human and civil rights in the years 1945–1948, 73-128. 11   A MV SRR, 13831, Summary report on the political situation in Slovakia, 22 Jan. 1946. 12  Ibd. In a report to the Ministry of Defence, it is mentioned in the context of preparations for a commemoration of the uprising of autumn 1944 in Nitra that the flags, banners and symbols of the Slovak State were still being used. A statement by the chairman of the town committee of Nitra, Ján Schulz, caused general consternation when he expressed the opinion that Slovaks had the same status in the state as Czechs and that the state flag should be adapted according to this principle. He asked why the Slovaks had only been given one blue corner on the state flag. SNA, MZV, 1945-47, box 1154, The situation in Nitra – report, 24 Aug. 1945. The traditional congress of the Catholic Youth on the feast day of Saints Cyril and Metodius, which had been planned in Nitra for July 1946, was banned, as such a meeting would disturb public order in the general excitement after the elections. SNA, PV, bezp. odbor, III/3, 1946, box 453, Catholic Youth in Nitra – Permit. 13  Die Furche wrote verbatim: ‘And the great winner is not the Communist Party, but the Slovak Democratic Party, which has been able to take over a key position of decisive significance.’ The matter in question was a three-fifths’ majority for every constitutional law’. Die Furche, 8 June 1946, 2-3.

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formed the majority in the leading ranks. Unlike the Bohemian lands, where repressive measures were only employed against the Catholic Church in the context of the expulsion of the roughly three million Sudeten Germans,14 the Catholic Church in Slovakia already experienced open persecution and discrimination immediately after the end of the war. The immediate nationalization of the church school system, from preschools to academies and academy boarding homes, was interpreted as the most severe encroachment on the rights of both the Catholic and Protestant churches. As one of the first measures by the insurgent Slovak National Council, this nationalization was already decreed on 6 September 1944,15 and the freedom of religion anchored in the Košice government programme of April 1945 changed nothing about these steps. The nationalization of church property also began prior to the February Putsch in 1948 as part of the land reform planned by the Communists.16 The first arrests of Catholic bishops – the Bishop of Spiš, Ján Vojtaššák, was sometimes detained and sometimes interned from May to November and the former Military Bishop, Michal Buzalka, from April to June 1945 – were initiated by the commissioner for the interior at the time, Gustáv Husák, who was also responsible for the dissolution of church societies and the ban on religious ­literature.17 On the whole, the spearhead of Communist ideology was aimed against the Catholic faith, which traditionally represented the bedrock of Slovak national identity, and against the Catholic Church, which was openly or subtly denounced as being ‘fascist’ or ‘anti-popular’.18

The Situation in Slovakia after the Communist Seizure of Power in February 1948

Following the communist seizure of power in February 1948, the Slovaks suffered from two forms of suppression; from the dictatorship of the Communist Party, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the ideology of unitarianism and state centralism, which branded all autonomy efforts on the part of the 14  See Emilia Hrabovec, The Catholic Church and Deportations of Ethnic Germans from the Czech Lands, in: The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16 (2000)1-2, 64-82. 15  Letz, Slovensko, 96. 16  Letz, Slovensko, 99-100. 17  Róbert Letz, Postoj Gustáva Husáka ku katolíckej cirkvi v rokoch 1944–1950, in: Branislav Kinčok (ed)., Gustáv Husák a jeho doba, (Bratislava 2015), 137-138. 18  Emilia Hrabovec, Der Heilige Stuhl, das östliche Europa und die Anfänge des Kalten Krieges, in: Željko Tanjić (ed.), Cardinal Stepinac. A Witness to the Truth. Kardinal Stepinac. Svjedok Istine, (Zagreb 2009), 116.

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Slovaks as separatism and rigorously persecuted them. The achievements of the Košice government programme, the principle of the equality between Czechs and Slovaks especially, were successively abolished between 1945 and 1948 and the Slovak regional bodies degraded to executive agencies of the central government in Prague.19 The negative stance on the part of the Slovaks towards the people’s democratic regime did not remain concealed from the Austrian consulate general, which resided in Bratislava after 1947.20 As early as in May 1948, Consul General Karl Nedwed conjectured in a report to the foreign minister the existence of ‘white’ partisans in the mountains of northern Slovakia, expressing the opinion that “a kind of cell formation [is] in progress, on which, as soon as the international situation no longer makes action seem pointless from the outset, an organized resistance movement might be built up quickly”.21 It can be assumed that Consul General Nedwed, who was already isolated, received this kind of information from Karl Rajnoch, the press attaché with good connections to church circles. As an Austrian socialized in Slovakia, Karl Rajnoch had an excellent command of the Slovak language and had grown up as the son of an Austrian employee of Siemens partly in Bratislava and partly in Nitra. Hence, he was well informed about the situation in the country. He later conceded that he was the author of almost 90 percent of all reports.22 Although the Austrian foreign ministry doubted the truth of the rumours concerning the white partisans, suspecting the intentions of Slovak émigrés,23 this is hitherto the only document from the legacy of the consulate general that mentions the existence of armed resistance in Slovakia. It may be presumed that during the years under investigation here, the period between 1948 and 1953, the Slovak aversion to the regime and to the violation of 19  Similar comments were also made by a member of the Austrian embassy in Prague in a report of 18 January 1952 to the Austrian minister of foreign affairs. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), BMAA, II-Pol, Prague 1952. Zl. 13-P/52. 20  After the end of the war and the renewal of the state of Austria, an Austrian representation, the office of the Austrian commissioner for Slovakia, was set up in Bratislava. The Austrian government assigned the office and later the consulate general a certain significance, entrusting it with tasks going far beyond the consular agenda. The office was an information-collecting centre, existing independently of the embassy in Prague and communicating directly with Vienna. See Emília Hrabovec, Tajná aketa o slovenskej štátnosti v roku 1950, in: Historický zborník, 26 (2016) 2, 85-86. 21  ÖStA, AdR, AA, II-pol 1948, political reports, box 57, 11 May 1948: White partisans, 14/Pol/48. 22  Hrabovec, Tajná aketa, 86. 23  The following hand-written comments can be found on the reverse of the political report ‘[…] initially to be taken with great scepticism. Intentions of this kind on the part of the first emigration (F. Ďurčanský) and the second emigration of April 1948 (Lettrich) are not improbable.’ Ibd.

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the right to national sovereignty is an incontestable fact. The Austrian consulate general plays a major role in underlining this assumption. In February 1950, the Marian Congregation of University Students,24 working undercover, conducted a clandestine survey of about 200 persons. Of the eight social groups polled (clerics, farmers, workers, tradesmen, civil servants, self-employed persons, students, adolescents), with the exception of workers and sometimes adolescents, who were indifferent, more than 90% of the other respondents were against the regime and in favour of an independent state. Endorsement of statehood should be emphasized here, for an added column also enquired as to autonomy within the ČSR, which was rejected.25 As this information was rated convincing by the foreign office in Vienna, the Austrian diplomatic missions behind the Iron Curtain, i.e. those in Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade, Warsaw and Moscow, were informed about the covert survey. Despite this unambivalent rejection of the regime and – which was much more serious – of the common state, the consulate general did not assume that an organized resistance movement existed. What was known concerned individual, uncoordinated acts against the security forces, usually sabotage, which were the order of the day, and the many deserters roaming through the woods, not knowing what to do and usually compelled sooner or later to beat their way westwards, which they generally managed to do thanks to support by the population.26

The Case of Augustín Lednický

The case of Augustín Lednický represented a so-called classic example for the Czechoslovak state security service, as the group’s activity was classified exclusively as terrorist. It is the interesting and, at the same time, tragic story of a young man, soldier and insurgent, who later became both a resolute resistance fighter and a supporter of Slovak statehood. The case may also be termed exemplary because the degree of punishment meted out by the tribunal in Bratislava on 14 July 1950 was completely disproportional to the true level of guilt. Lednický 24  The clandestine survey was organized by the Jesuit father Aurelius Zavarský, who headed the Marian Congregation, and Karl Rajnoch. Zavarský had contacts to Rajnoch and via Rajnoch the highly-heeded survey found its way to the Federal Ministry of Forein Affairs. See David Schriffl, Tote Grenze oder lebendige Nachbarschaft? Österreichisch-Slowakische Beziehungen von 1945 bis 1948., (= Zentraleuropastudien 17, Wien: Verlag der ÖAW, 2012), 228-234. 25  ÖStA, AdR, Sektion II-Pol 1950, political reports, box 130, 22 March 1950, public opinion, 11/Pol/50. See Table. 26  ÖStA, AdR, Sektion II-Pol 1950, political reports, box 130, 8 March 1950, resistance movement, 9/Pol/50.

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received the death penalty, and his accomplices were sentenced either to lifetime or long prison terms.27 Simultaneously, it is evidence that from the outset the Communist regime caused determined partisans to emerge, namely in those very social classes that should have formed the pillars of the regime due to their ‘proletarian origins’. The state party expected the highest loyalty from workers, peasant farmers and soldiers especially. Lednický’s peasant origins demonstrate that, as the most numerous social group in Slovakia after the war, peasant farmers were considered supporters of the past statehood and felt most threatened by the nationalization of the land. This factor also played a certain role in Lednický’s evolution into a resistance combatant after 1948. A close historiographical study of this specific case would make a major addition to the sparse existing knowledge about armed resistance in Slovakia. Augustín Lednický was born to a peasant family in the village of Malé Lednice in western Slovakia on 1 August 1924. In his birthplace, he attended eight forms of primary school, before moving to the apprentice-training institution of a textile factory in Považská Bystrica. He had to leave the apprentice institution prematurely, as he was needed as a temporary help in the family business. During the war, he worked in an arms factory in Považská Bystrica, was not active politically and did not become a member either of the Hlinkas People’s Party or of the Hlinkas Youth, a youth organization. When the uprising broke out in the autumn of 1944, which was aimed against the authoritarian regime of the Slovak Republic, which was strongly aligned with the Third Reich, he fought with the partisans against the German Wehrmacht in the mountains of central Slovakia near Strečno, Vrútky and, at the time Turčiansky sv. Martin. Once the partisan group had been disbanded, he returned to the arms factory. During the people’s democratic regime of 1945–1948, he became a member of the local branch of the anti-Communist Democratic Party in his home town, but was not particularly active politically, as is evidenced by his own words: After the liberation of the ČSR, I joined the local branch of the Democratic Party in Malé Lednice, partly out of conviction and partly to follow the example of other fellow townsfolk. I did not take part in the political life of the Democratic Party and when I reported for military service in Žilina [1 October 1945], I had no contacts to the representatives of the Democratic Party, nor did I seek any. Similarly, I did not contact any church circles28 or societies.29

27  Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 166. 28  Lednický was a baptized Roman Catholic. 29  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009 (Augustín Lednický), f. 01, 27 Oct. 1949: Minutebook, p. 2.

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Lednický’s positive cadre profile was heightened by the fact that none of his relatives were condemned in the course of retribution. Nor could it be proved that he was related to Anton Lednický, the lieutenant colonel in the army religious service who emigrated in the autumn of 1947 as he feared arrest during the persecution of democratic politicians in Slovakia.30 On completing his military service, in July 1947 Lednický became a professional NCO with the rank of brigadier. At the beginning of March 1948, he was recruited by the Communist Party of Slovakia. This occurred without any inner conviction, as he admitted according to the records compiled a few days after his arrest in October 1949. He joined a political party with whose materialistic ideology he could never identify as a devout Catholic. ‘I only joined the Communist Party of Slovakia because everyone was recruited, because all professional NCOs joined. I did not join out of conviction, I was advised by the education officer and my friends, I did not participate in party life, nor did I take part in the meetings.’31 However, the question arises as to the credibility of a protocol written down by an investigating officer. At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, torture was customary during interrogations, and, although there is no evidence of it in the case of Lednický, it cannot be precluded. As a result of an injury he had sustained from a militiaman in the course of his arrest in October 1949, Lednický evidently had one asset, as he had to receive medical treatment. The officer heading the inquiry noted four days after the arrest that Lednický was very self-confident, tried to trivialize the interrogation and had the advantage that his leg was in a plaster.32

Evolution of a Resistance Fighter

The both heroic and tragic story of this young, only 24-year-old soldier began with his reluctant joining of the Communist Party. It was a fate that seems to have been typical of many young people in the founding years of Socialism. Lednický did not conceal his anti-Communist sentiments from his comrades in the army and soon came into conflict with his superiors. He commenced cultivating friendships with like-minded soldiers, above all with Brigadier Vincent Štadáni. Together with Štadáni, he planned to escape to the West, 30  For the person of Anton Lednický, see Václav Vondrášek/Jan Pešek, Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity 1945 – 1970. Mýty a realita (Bratislava: Veda 2011), 311, footnote 731. 31  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27.10.1949, Kroměříž: Terrorist groups posted in Czechoslovakia – search. 32  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 6, 18.10.1949, Lednický Augustín, terrorist, detention.

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intending to join the alleged Slovak army in exile, as they were convinced of its existence.33 From the records, we can assume that Lednický had no precise knowledge about the activities of Slovak politicians in exile. But it is quite conceivable that he knew about the activities of the former Slovak Foreign Minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský, who went into exile in the spring of 1945, founding the first exile organization with the programme of independence in Rome in December 1945. However, he had a particularly naïve and imprecise idea of the criminal consequences involved in an illegal border crossing. The only thing he knew exactly was that he had to reach the American occupation zone either in partitioned Germany or in occupied Austria. After his failed attempt to cross the Czechoslovak-Austrian border at the end of January 1949, on 16 February Lednický went across the Czechoslovak-German frontier in the vicinity of Cheb and Tirschenreuth in Bavaria.34 His escape was successful despite the fact that Department V of the main staff of the Ministry of Defence (Obranné spravodajstvo, OBZ) had already notified its subordinate offices in military intelligence on 23 January about Lednický’s and his friend Štadáni’s possible escape.35 On 23 January 1949, Lednický did not report for duty, beginning his desertion towards one o’ clock in the afternoon. The telegram was dispatched very promptly by Department V, and this very rapid response shows that desertions and subsequent emigrations by officers of the Czechoslovak Army were commonplace after the putsch of February 1948. Military intelligence did everything they could to stop them.36 He crossed the state border in uniform and armed with a pistol, but it is not known whether he intended to use the weapon. On crossing the border, he was stopped by an American border patrol in the vicinity of Tirschenreuth. 33  In exile, the Union of Slovak Combatants was already founded by the ex-Slovak Minister of Defence Štefan Haššík in Kirchberg on 15 September 1945. The Union was to unite all ex-soldiers of the Slovak Army in exile and understood itself to be an anti-Communist and anti-Czechoslovak military organization. After 1953, Haššík published the journal Domobrana (the Home Guard). However, the organization can hardly be regarded as an army in exile. Nor is it known whether Lednický knew about the existence of the Union of Combatants. Miloslav Púčik, ‘Počiatky činnosti Únie slovenských kombatantov v exile’, in: František Cséfalvay/ Miroslav Púčik (eds.), Slovensko a druhá svetová vojna (Bratislava 2000), 401-408. See also SNA, personnel file Štefan Haššík, box 1,2. 34  In the proceedings of 27 October 1949, there was incorrect mention of the town of Schärding, which is, however, located in western Austria. In the transcription elaborated earlier, Lednický indicated that he was stopped by the American patrol in the vicinity of the town of ‘Kirschenroit’ (Tirschenreuth, Bavaria). 35  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 23 Jan.1949 Telegram, MNO, Hl. Štáb, 5. odd. 36  See František Hanzlík: Vojenské obranné zpravodajství v zápasu o politickou moc 1945–1950. Praha: Úřad dokumentace a vyšetřování zločinů komunizmu, 2003, 208-209.

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He was taken to the command post in Tirschenreuth, where the first interrogation took place with the aid of an American interpreter of eastern Slovak descent. The next day, he was taken to the Counter Intelligence Corps in Weiden. In Weiden, Lednický was thoroughly grilled with the assistance of a civilian employee of the CIC, very likely of Polish descent, who spoke broken Czech. Intelligence-relevant questions were asked. The Polish interpreter was familiar with the secret number of the infantry regiment Lednický had been in prior to his desertion.37 As regards intelligence subtleties, what interested the CIC particularly was questions concerning equipment, the strength of the army, the morale and political sympathies of the troops, the airbase in Žilina etc … Probably in keeping with his conscience, Lednický claimed the reasons for him deserting were his rejection of the Communist regime and his reluctance to be politically active as a soldier. In addition, he admitted that Communist terror was reigning in Czechoslovakia. From the intelligence viewpoint, his statements were of little value because he could not answer many questions. The reason for his escape from the ČSR was clearly a political one – resistance to the regime, for which he no longer wished to commit himself as a soldier.

Lednický as a Political Refugee

On 18 February, Lednický was taken to the Assembly Center International Refugee Organization (IRO)38 in Amberg. Refugees from the whole of Central and Eastern Europe were concentrated in this camp. According to the rules of the International Refugee Organization valid at the time, Lednický was obliged 37  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009 (Augustín Lednický), f. 01, protocol, 9. 38  The reception centre of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). After the autumn of 1947, Jozef Kirschbaum, the ex-Slovak chargé d’affaires to Switzerland, was recognized by the head office of the IRO in Geneva as the official delegate of the Slovak League in America. After his recognition, Slovaks were considered ‘eligible’, i.e. the organization offered Slovaks its protection, an essential prerequisite for successful emigration. Kirschbaum was in regular touch with the head office in Geneva and was the first contact for all refugees in need of material aid and support on their outward passage. So, Slovaks were placed on the same level as other nations, but it was necessary for them to submit to a screening procedure in the refugee camps so that they could obtain a protection mandate under the IRO constitution. This practice was also continued after 1948, also affecting the wave of refugees after February 1948. See Jozef M. Kirschbaum, Keď Paríž a Washington chceli uzanť slovenský exil (K začiatkom činnosti slovenského politického exilu), no. doc. 6: 10 February 1949, Správa zástupcu Slovenskej ligy v Amerike pri medzinárodnej organizácii IRO v Ženeve o jeho činnosti od 15. októbra 1947 do 10. februára 1949, in: Historický zborník, 12( 2002) 1-2, 103-105.

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to undergo precise screening in Amberg so as to obtain the mandate of the organization and the legal status of a political refugee. Lednický took the screening on 21 February, and he was questioned by a prominent Czech émigré called Velen Fanderlík.39 Essentially, it was a matter of finding out whether Lednický wanted to emigrate for political reasons. Lednický was accorded the status of a political refugee, he received an IRO identity card and was to move to Canada in the near future.40 But he only stayed in Amberg until 4 March, then, together with another 72 refugees from the ČSR, he was transferred to a regular camp for Czech and Slovak refugees in Lechfeld near Munich. In the camp, there prevailed a tense and hostile atmosphere among the Slovak and Czech refugees, resulting from the preferential treatment given to the Czech inmates over the Slovak ones. The Czechs housed there were offered, for instance, better employment opportunities and frequently also better food. The second cause of the conflicts breaking out on an almost daily basis was the different views on statehood. Whereas the Czechs favoured the renewal of unitary Czechoslovakia within the pre-Munich borders, the majority of the Slovaks, including Lednický, advocated an autonomous Slovak state.41 The differences in opinion were so profound that a riot had taken place with a camp guard being injured. As a result, Lednický was sentenced to two months in prison by the American military tribunal, which he served in the gaol in Friedberg near Augsburg until 9 July. In this context, it should be remarked, however, that such incidents between Czechs and Slovaks, resulting from mutual hostility, were by no means seldom.42 When, in the summer of 1948, the Capuchin father Rev. Florian C. Billy, the secretary general of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America43 and a US citizen of Slovak descent, was instructed by the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) and the IRO to inspect the camps in Europe with refugees from the ČSR, he witnessed some emigrants abusing welfare benefits from international organizations. In the refugee camps in West 39  Velen Fanderlík (1907–1985), a descendant of the Dutch aristocracy, the founder of the Skauting in Brno, after the war he was the Czechoslovak representative on the Commission for War Crimes. In the autumn of 1948, he emigrated to the American zone in Germany. In exile, he was the chairman of the Czech Skautingu. 40  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 27.10.1949, protocol, 9. 41  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 6, 23.11.1949, report on the liquidation of the terrorist group, 4. 42  Lednický mentions a number of such cases in the comprehensive transcript written in the military hospital in Bratislava on 27 October 1947. A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27 Oct.1949, protocol, 15. 43  The Slovak Catholic Federation of America was a strictly apolitical organization with primarily religious and charitable duties. It was part of the Catholic Action proclaimed by Pope Pius XII and subordinated to the American episcopate.

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Germany especially, he frequently faced a situation in which only supporters of the Czech political programme were arbitrarily appointed to the camp selfadministration, i.e. without any democratic election.44 Jozef Kirschbaum, the Slovak representative at the IRO, endeavoured to remedy the situation by establishing separate refugee camps only for Slovaks. But he failed.45 In Lechfeld, Lednický probably encountered the Slovak exile press for the first time in his life.46 According to the interrogation records, newspapers were posted to the camp, such as Slovenská Republika, published by Ďurčanský in Buenos Aires.47 The USA delivered the journal Slovák v Amerike, propagating the activist programme of Ďurčanský’s Slovak Liberation Committee, and in Ludwigsburg in West Germany one of the best-known exile papers Slobodné Slovensko was published by Jozef Paučo,48 the former editor-in-chief of the organ of the Hlinka’s People’s Party. Lednický admitted that one of the editors of the exile paper Slobodné Slovensko had personally visited the camp, but he could not remember his name. All the exile periodicals mentioned propagated the programme of anti-Communist resistance and state autonomy, which certainly exercised an influence on Lednický’s political thinking. In the refugee camp in Murnau on the Staffelsee south of Munich, at the foot of the Bavarian Alps, Lednický converted from being a partisan and member of the KSS to becoming a supporter of the exile organization championing the independence of Slovakia. Under the influence of Jozef Bitala, likewise an emigrant who headed the local branch of the Slovak Liberation Committee and regularly corresponded with Ďurčanský, Lednický joined this concrete exile organization with the programme of state autonomy for Slovakia. Bitala claimed to be a captain in the Czechoslovak Army, but in reality he was a 44  A ÚPN, Jozef Vicen 509-4-, 19 September 1948, Vienna, Rev. Billy – his visit to Europe. Jozef Vicen wrote this report for the requirements of the CIC in Vienna. 45  Kirschbaum, Keď Paríž a Washington, no. doc. 6: 10 February 1949, Report of the representative of the Slovak League in America to the International Organization, IRO in Geneva on his activities since 15 October 1947 to 10 February 1949, 105. 46  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f.6, 23.11.1949, report on the liquidation of the terrorist group, 5. 47  In the summer of 1947, Ďurčanský emigrated from Italy to Argentina, where he continued his exile activity and leading the exile organization Slovenský akčný výbor (The Slovak Action Committee SAV) and Slovenský oslobodzovací výbor (The Slovak Liberation Committee SOV). In 1952, he moved to Munich, where he lived until his death in 1974. 48  Jozef Paučo worked in exile in Munich after the spring of 1946, heading the Slovak Revolutionary Resistance Movement (Slovenský revolučný odboj, SRO) and publishing a number of exile periodicals and papers. After the foundation of the Slovak National Council Abroad (Slovenská národná rada v zahraničí, SNRvZ), he became the chairman of the West German branch until the beginning of 1950, when he emigrated to Canada.

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brigadier candidate (i.e. more junior in rank than Lednický).49 He also introduced himself as the head of the military department of the local branch of the Liberation Committee and as commander of the so-called Slovak Army Abroad in West Germany. Hence, as the ‘commander’ of an army, which did not really exist, and with the rank of ‘captain’, he had the right to appoint his ‘subordinate’ soldiers to more senior positions. Lednický’s promotion to the rank of lieutenant probably had a positive psychological effect on him.50

The Organization of Armed Resistance

In mid-June 1949, the Communist power apparatus in the ČSR launched the so-called Catholic Action, with the goal of forcing a separation between Rome and the Roman and Greek Catholic Churches. The anti-church and anti-Rome measures taken by the government provoked a particularly vehement storm of protest among the ranks of the faithful in Slovakia, who rallied behind their priests and bishops faithful to Rome.51 Riots broke out in 59 towns and communities, and 467 alleged rebels were condemned. In this context, Bitala suggested ‘dispatching armed groups to Slovakia to organize the insurgents against the Catholic Action and instruct them in activity against the regime’.52 49  Ivo Pejčoch, Augustín Lednický. Www.ustr.cz. 50  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f.6, 23.11.1949, report on the liquidation of the terrorist group, 6. 51  The founding congress of the schismatic so-called Catholic Action organized by the regime took place in Prague on 10 June 1949 and was quite successful. Five days later, the Slovak and Czech bishops responded with a pastoral letter that was read out in almost all Roman and Greek Catholic churches. The bishops’ letter with the impressive heading ‘In the hour of a grave ordeal’ triggered a violent reaction on the part of the population against the Communist regime. The regime’s attempt to bring about a de facto schism was condemned by the Holy See in an excommunication decree of 20 June 1949. When around 107 priests were arrested in measures to prevent the reading out of the pastoral letter, the faithful defended their priests, and 59 local disturbances occurred until the end of July. 467 persons were sentenced for taking part in these riots. The failure of the so-called Catholic Action forced the regime to alter its proceeding against the church. Július Bartl/ Viliam Čičaj/ Mária Kohútova et alii, Lexikón slovenských dejín (Bratislava: Slovenské pedagogické vydavateľstvo 1997), 230-231. As for the concrete course of the pro regime Catholic Action and the resistance against it see Jozef Haľko, Rozbiť Cirkev: Rozkoľnícka Katolícka akcia. Pokus o vytvorenie “národnej cirkvi” v Česko-Slovensku 1949 (Bratislava: Lúč 2004), 165-177. Detailed information on the unrest in 37 communities can be found in the Fund of the Officer for Justice, SNA, k. 558 and 559. One of the most important riots took place in Levoča and Čadca, where workers went on strike for religious reasons on 23 June. A total of between 20 and 25,000 persons were involved in the unrest. 52  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27.10.1949, protocol, 16.

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This decision provided the reason for Lednický’s later, alleged ‘terrorist’ activities. The groups sent to Slovakia were to carry out raids on the posts of the Corps for National Security (Zbor národnej bezpečnosti, ZNB), the secretariats of the KSS and the people’s militias and appropriate a large quantity of weapons. The violent actions were to galvanize the home population into offering active resistance with the aim of removing the hated regime. The young and relatively inexperienced Bitala was the real author of this hardly feasible plan, for we know today that the machinery of power downright provoked such activities in order to sentence their protagonists as enemies of the state in sensational show trials. It is interesting in this context that Ďurčanský, who informed Lednický about the plan in writing, did not agree with it, vehemently warning against such an action, as he did not want to put the lives of the young people at risk. However, Lednický interpreted Ďurčanský’s negative attitude as reflecting the latter’s ignorance about the situation in Slovakia and did not relinquish his plan of becoming the leader of an armed resistance group.53 When we consider the situation prevailing in Slovakia in the summer of 1949, when uprisings against the Communist regime were taking place in almost 60 towns and communities and involving 20 to 25,000 persons, the vision of a ‘revolution’ in Slovakia, which Lednický had in mind, was perhaps not so exaggerated after all. Lednický was convinced he could obtain large quantities of arms and a number of supporters within a short time, so that he would be in a position to seize whole towns and liberate them from Communists.54 It can also be assumed that, had his group been dropped in Slovakia at the end of June 1949, when resistance against the so-called Catholic Action was strongest, there might have been hope that his mission would be successful. On 16 August, he received from Bitala an accreditation decree, appointing him the leader of the ‘resistance group in Slovakia’. He was to build up relations to the supposed local resistance movement and contact Bitala in the course of a fortnight.55 Lednický’s group had four more members. On 19 August, in Bitala’s presence they swore an oath reminiscent of the one taken by troops of the Slovak Army in 1939 and travelled by train to the Ukrainian refugee camp in Mittenwald. In Mittenwald, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Українска Повстанська Армія) provided them with five firearms, 90 rounds of ammunition, winter coats and enough provisions for the lengthy and dangerous journey over the state border into Slovakia. Moreover, Lednický received a sum of 53  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27.10.1949, protocol, 17. 54  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27.10.1949, protocol, 18. 55  The decree is preserved as a negative in the Lednický fund. A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 6, 16.8.1949, decree.

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money from Bitala, he took along his IRO identity card and the accreditation decree, but he did not have any forged documents.56 This latter fact proves that he and his accomplices hardly knew anything about the methods used in a conspiratorial war against the regime and were not prepared for one. The accreditation decree and the IRO identity card could easily incriminate him in the event of his arrest. His group underwent no intelligence or terrorist training.57 On 23 August, Lednický crossed the German-Czechoslovak state border in the area of Bayerisch Eisenstein (Železná Ruda) without any obstruction or assistance and he did so alone, as his comrades had got lost during the march to the border.

Finale: Preparations for Armed Action in Slovakia

On arriving in Slovakia at the beginning of September 1949, Lednický went to his parents in Malé Lednice. During the journey and contrary to his expectations, he was confronted with the relative tranquillity prevailing in the country. He understood only too well that the activity planned against the regime was practically impossible under such circumstances. He went into hiding on his parents’ farm until a second group arrived from the refugee camp in Murnau. On a postcard, he sent to Murnau a short report with the conspiratorial content that he expected the arrival of a second group at the railway station in Považská Bystrica on 9 September. According to the protocol of the interrogation of a young worker by the name of Štefan Erlach, who escaped to the American zone in West Germany in April 1949 and met Lednický in Murnau, the second group only arrived on 22 September. The meeting with Lednický took place on the afternoon of the same day in the uninhabited house of his friend Vladimír Milučký, at which the two men met regularly.58 The second group, also consisting of Slovak refugees from Murnau, was made up of four young men, mainly workers or peasant farmers, i.e. not soldiers.59 The reason 56  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 27.10.1949, memorandum 13. 57  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f.6, 23.11.1949, report on the liquidation of the terrorist group, 10. 58  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 28.10.1949, Krajské veliteľstvo ŠtB, Bratislava, minute of the statement with Štefan Erlach, 11. 59  The second group Bitala sent to Slovakia on 10 September 1949 consisted of refugees coming to Murnau either prior to Lednický’s arrival or shortly after his departure. They were: Štefan Erlach, Anton Petrek, Jozef Štolc, Ján Ganišin and Alojz Milučký – brother to Vladimír Milučký, who was a member of the first group. They were almost all young workers and peasants, i.e. non-soldiers.

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for dispatching them derived from the strongly exaggerated rumours concerning alleged revolts in Slovakia circulating in the camp in Murnau that the five men considered to be so credible that they returned to the ČSR without any money or equipment. These exaggerated camp reports were augmented by a decided lie on the part of Bitala that Lednický had managed to assemble a 200-man paramilitary unit with the objective of presenting armed resistance.60 Until Lednický‘s arrest on 14 October 1949, the entire group hid in the woods in north-western Slovakia in the region of the communities of Rajecké Teplice, Čičmany and Malé Lednice.61 Over these three weeks, they did not undertake any armed operations, and their thoughts concerning future activities proceeded from spending the winter in their hideout and awaiting reinforcements from Murnau in the spring. They used the time for acquiring arms and ammunition. As regards equipment, foodstuff and money, they were supported by some voluntary sympathizers, above all by Pavol Kaprálik, a shopkeeper from Veľké Rovné, whose brother had emigrated at the beginning of 1949 and become acquainted with Lednický at the camp in Murnau. According to the protocol of the district headquarters of the ŠtB in Žilina, taken down after the search of Kaprálik’s house and his arrest at the end of October, a not unsubstantial quantity of arms and ammunition was indeed discovered in his house: a Russian automatic pistol, two magazines with live ammunition, two magazines for a German automatic pistol with live ammunition, a hunting rifle with cartridges and different spare parts for a light machine gun.62 Considerable assistance was also provided by the innkeeper Imrich Čupák from Veľké Rovné, who welcomed the anti-regime activity of the resistance group.63 Superficially, family relatives also gave help, for which some of them received long-term prison sentences for only minimal assistance, such as Fabián Lednický, Lednický’s brother. A portion of the arms was also discovered in a bunker. When Jozef Štolc, a member of the Lednický group, after the latter’s arrest went into hiding in his native town near Poprad, together with Vladimír Milučký he built a bunker in the mountains where he intended to spend the winter and also concealed arms. According to the register corpora delicti, which the district 60  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 5, protocol with Jozef Štolc, 6. Following his arrival in Slovakia, Lednický sent Bitala a conspiratorial letter from Rajec on 26 August, but he did not mention any information of similar content. 61  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 27.10.1949, protocol with Augustín Lednický, 18. 62  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 24.10.1949, Krajské veliteľstvo ŠtB, Žilina, protocol. 63  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 25.10.1949, Krajské veliteľstvo ŠtB, Žilina, criminal charge.

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headquarters of the ŠtB in Košice compiled after a search of the bunker, three rifles, cartridges, a barrel, a pistol and winter clothing were found.64 Štolc was caught by the state security service on 16 November 1949, and his accomplice Milučký committed suicide.65

Arrest, Trial, Death Sentence

Lednický’s arrest took place under dramatic circumstances. In mid-October, his group (Lednický, Erlach and Milučký) decided to relocate to Kysuce in northern Slovakia, as they presumed in the region many mountain cabins where they intended to spend the winter. In the early hours of the morning of 14 October, they took the train from Rajec to Žilina. But let us allow Lednický himself to relate the dramatic events surrounding his arrest, which took place immediately on arrival at the station in Žilina, and are astonishingly reminiscent of a whodunit. When I was standing [at the main station in Žilina] with Erlach at about half past seven, the member of the Corps for National Security came up to us in uniform and called on us to prove our identity. Erlach showed his ID from the Škoda factory in Dubnica [nad Váhom], where he had worked before we escaped abroad, and I pretended to look for my ID in all my pockets. The member of the ZNB was not happy with Erlach’s ID and demanded an extra one. Erlach made up the excuse that he had left it in the factory. Then, the gendarme took me aside and asked me if I knew the person I was talking to. He probably did so to ask Erlach the same question later. When I replied that I did not know Erlach, he called Erlach over to us and asked him if he knew me. Erlach said yes and also said my name. This contradiction aroused the gendarme’s suspicion, of course, and he called on us to follow him to the police station. […] We followed his summons, but while he was opening the door to the police station, I seized the brief opportunity to run away. […] I ran to the square in front of the railway station and then in the direction of the railway viaduct, below which the road went to Čadca. The gendarme began running after me, shouting to passers-by to stop me. Nobody did so except a railway employee who was riding past on a motorbike. The railwayman shouted to me to stop, but I did not do so. He rode up to the gendarme who was chasing me, then turned around and raced after me. The moment he turned around, I fired my pistol at the gendarme, but high above his head, and ran on. I did not intend to shoot him dead, I only wanted to intimidate him. With this shot, I gained some ground, but when the motorbike rider began to catch up with me, I fired into the air once more. After that shot, 64  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 23.11.1949, Krajské veliteľstvo Košice, Corpora delicti. 65  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 5, protocol with Jozef Štolc, 12.

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the railwayman on the motorbike stopped, I stopped running and the two men followed me more slowly. When I came to the viaduct, the railwayman overtook me and rode to the nearby factory, where he alarmed the People’s Militia. About 15 militiamen came out of the factory. In the meantime, I was approaching the factory at walking pace, but when I saw the militiamen, I began running again, this time in the direction of the River Váh. One of the militiamen fired his pistol after me several times, but I could no longer fire, as my weapon had jammed. As a bus with its engine running was standing in the vicinity of the factory, I wanted to take the opportunity to escape the pursuit and jumped onto the steps of the bus. But the bus did not drive off, and the time I was standing on the steps was enough to be caught up with by my pursuers. The first to reach me was the militiaman who had fired at me. When I jumped down from the steps, as it was not possible to get into the bus because of the crowd, he fired into my left knee from short range. At the same time, a second militiaman attacked me from behind, they threw me to the ground and handed me over to the officers of the national security service. Then, an ambulance took me to the hospital in Žilina, where I received medical treatment.66

After being treated, Lednický was initially questioned by the military authorities and later escorted to the military hospital in Bratislava. It is characteristic of the Lednický case that the interrogation records describe the group only as a ‘terrorist’ one. However, due to the circumstances mentioned above the truly ‘terrorist’ activity of the group was strongly limited above all by their lack of equipment, ideological preparation and the relevant training. The members, who were branded as ostensible terrorists, were condemned for crimes they had not committed, but the sentence was unusually severe all the same. In the case of Lednický, who was sentenced to death by the state court in Bratislava and executed on 10 October 1950, it may be assumed that the regime committed judicial murder. The number of accused and condemned persons is also very high. On 22 May 1950, the state procurator indicted a total of 24 persons, many of them merely because they had given one of the members of the Lednický group an overnight bed or clothing. Lednický was even accused on eight grounds, and he received the death sentence for state treason and espionage pursuant to the feared Act on the Protection of the Republic No. 231/48 Zb. [Zbierka zákonov, Codex].67 He was also accused 66  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 1, 27.10.1949, protocol with Lednický, 27. 67  The construct of the Act on the Protection of the Republic, which was passed as a completely new law in October 1948 after the seizure of power by the KSČ, was that the ‘people’ were to judge over ostensible anti-state groups seeking to restore capitalism with the aid of foreign aggression. According to this Act 231/1948, a total of about 26,079 persons were convicted between 1948 and 1989, 5,118 of them in Slovakia. See Ondrej Podolec, ‘Vývoj trestnoprávnej legislatívy ako nástroja komunistického režimu’, in: Pamäť národa, 13(2017)1, 3-16.

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of attempted murder, although it was clear from his statement that he had fired high above the gendarme and had not intended to kill him.68 The other alleged terrorists Milan Biščo,69 Štefan Erlach, Jozef Štolc, Anton Petrek and Ján Ganišin received either lifelong sentences or penalties of 15 to 25 years. The final act of this tragedy concerned the fate of Alojz Milučký, Vladimír Milučký’s brother, who committed suicide during his arrest. Alojz was able to escape, lay in hiding in the mountains of northern Slovakia for a long time and rebelled against the regime on his own. But he finally paid for his resistance with his life; he was hanged on the prison yard in Prague-Pankrác on 20 January 1954.70

The Case of Ján Rešetko71

The case of Ján Rešetko is once more the case of an ex-soldier of the Slovak Army, who fought on the Eastern Front in 1941, deserted in autumn 1944 and went over to the pro-Soviet partisans. As a former partisan, it was easy for him to join the renewed Czechoslovak Army, which he soon quitted, and, as a reserve first lieutenant, ended up working in civilian life as the administrator of a textile company and the head of a restoration firm in Spišská Nová Ves in Zips.72 His case shows that, despite enjoying a relatively secure life, he gave preference to dangerous and illegal resistance against a regime he had to despise profoundly from his own experiences.

68  A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 3, 22 May 1950, State Prosecutor’s Office, Bratislava. The indictment of Lednický et al. 69  Milan Michal Biščo, born in Hlohovec on 8 April 1928, was an electrical mechanic. He was arrested in May 1948 because of his attempt to escape and later worked at the labour camp in Nováky (Tábor nútených prác, TNP). At the beginning of January 1949, he emigrated to Germany and was interrogated by the CIC in Amberg. In the refugee camp in Lechfeld, he met Lednický in March 1949 and in the refugee camp in Murnau he joined the society of Catholic Youth, but did not join the Slovak Liberation Committee (SOV). He intended to emigrate to the USA, where his father was living. On 17 September, he returned to the ČSR together with Štefan Erlach’s group. On crossing the border, he went to Carlsbad, where he separated from the others, remaining in Carlsbad. Later, he returned to his relatives in Slovakia, but he no longer joined Lednický’s group. On 19 November, he was arrested by the Corps for National Security in Piešťany. A ÚPN, KS ZNB, ŠtB, BA-V, no. doc. 1009, f. 2, 22 Nov. 1949, Krajské veliteľstvo ŠtB, Bratislava, protocol with Milan Michal Biščo. 70  Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 171. 71  The files on Ján Rešetko (4 August 1917–21 April 1953) can be found in the records on persons of special interest (EZO). ABS, H-435/SU, H-434/SU, H-258. 72  Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 280.

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His group developed partly as a response to the programmes by the antiCommunist radio station ‘White Legion’ (Biela légia), which began broadcasting from Ried im Innkreis in Upper Austria in April 1950 with the benevolent support of the American occupation authorities.73 Their emergence and activity were partly also provoked by the state secret service. Within a relatively short time, Ján Rešetko managed to set up two partly equipped groups in the region around Košice and Prešov in eastern Slovakia. They planned terrorist activity that was fully to develop following the outbreak of war expected by the resistance members. In particular, supplies from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia were to be stopped by destroying major railway lines. In some villages in eastern Slovakia, Rešetko arranged meetings at which he recruited new members for the White Legion, distributed White Legion proofs of identity and arms and allegedly threatened to have those seeking to inform on him shot. All the same, he was able to gain many supporters, especially among the ranks of peasant farmers, who had been dispossessed by the enforced collectivization and were also disgusted by the corruption of local Communist officials. His activity focused primarily on intimidating specific persons sympathizing with the regime, sometimes just simple people who had joined the Communist Party for different reasons. In September 1951, Rešetko got in touch with the officer Bohumil Grúber, who provided him with arms: light machine guns, automatic pistols, firearms, ammunition, hand grenades and flare pistols. Grúber suggested that he assume the leadership of the branches of the ‘White Legion’ on the outbreak of war. The group had about 150 members and organized meetings that founded illegal committees with the objective of taking over local power after the expected upheaval.74 On the basis of later information from the days of the Prague Spring, when many politically condemned persons were rehabilitated in the course of the liberalization of the regime, it can be stated that Rešetko’s group was infiltrated by the state security service from the outset. The ŠtB sought to provoke violent action against the regime. Some of its members were simultaneously ŠtB agents, supplying their superiors with regular reports. In this light, the secret service was precisely informed about the activities of the ‘terrorists’ and was able to step in any time.75 Following Rešetko’s arrest, his group was integrated into the large regime-hostile unit ‘White Legion 8’. A total of 234 people belonged to the unit, on whom intelligence files were compiled.76 The political 73  Katrebova Blehova, An beiden Ufern der March, 252-255. 74  Maskaľ, Skupina Bielej légie Jána Rešetka, 12. 75  Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 281. 76  Vilhan, Biela légia na Slovensku, 134.

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show trial took place at the penal court in Bratislava at the end of September and beginning of October 1952. The address held by the notorious representative of the state procurator, Ján Feješ,77 indicated that the court would exercise no leniency about the real or alleged subversive activities of the accused: ‘Your verdict must be understood as a warning to all the enemies of the Republic, whether they be in the country or abroad, that we will have no pity with anyone trying to thwart the felicitous construction of our homeland by espionage, terror, murder and mutiny’.78 Together with three other accomplices, Ján Rešetko was sentenced to death and hanged on the prison yard in Prague-Pankrác on 21 April 1953.79 Conclusion The two concrete cases presented of resistance fighters who lost their lives because of their subversive activities were chosen due to their specific military backgrounds, as anti-Communist insurgents can most likely be presumed amongst soldiers. After 1948, the army suffered severe purges, and research has shown that by 1952 about two-thirds of all ranks had been eliminated.80 During the Stalinist era in the ČSR, a total of 54 soldiers were sentenced to death for political reasons and hanged, about eight of them Slovaks, including Vladimír Clementis, the Czechoslovak foreign minister.81 The precise historiographical elaboration and contextualization of these cases has still to be performed. The second common characteristic is a certain relationship to the postwar Slovak exile organizations and their direct involvement in the anti-Communist resistance, which is very clear in the case of Lednický. So, Lednický was a member of the group of so-called courier agents who crossed the state border 77  Ján Feješ was one of the prosecutors in the trial of Jozef Tiso, Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Alexander Mach, which took place from 2 December 1946 until 15. April 1947. 78  Maskaľ, Skupina Bielej légie Jána Rešetka, 12. 79  After 1953, death sentences on Czechoslovak citizens of Slovak nationality were only carried out in Prague and not, as had been usual previously, in the prison of the state court in Bratislava, the co-called Palace of Justice. 80  Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 5. 81  Soldier Vladimír Clementis, hanged on 29 April 1952; Lieutenant Bohumil Grúber, hanged on 21 April 1953; Lieutenant Tomáš Chovan, hanged on 8 Nov. 1951; Corporal Vojtech Lacko, hanged on 7 Oct. 1950; Brigadier Augustín Lednický, hanged on 10 Oct. 1950; Corporal Ladislav Prieložný, hanged on 4 Jan. 1950; First Lieutenant Ján Rešetko, hanged on 21 April 1953; Major Viliam Žingor, hanged on 18 Dec. 1950. See Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 382-383.

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and, usually in occupied Germany or Austria, established contact to foreign secret services, which was considered a particularly aggravating factor at the later trial. There were a number of such courier agents, who were frequently sentenced to death later, and their role in the anti-Communist resistance has hardly been researched.82 In the case of Rešetko, the effects of Slovak exile organizations can only be seen indirectly. He listened to the broadcasts by the Slovak resistance station ‘White Legion’, but the purpose of the antiCommunist activity of this organization consisted of passive resistance and of exposing Communist terror measures and protecting the population from them. The radio station never called on its listeners to carry out armed acts, which, in the case of Rešetko, can rather be attributed to the workings of the ŠtB in the background. The coupling of the resistance movement at home to Slovak politicians in exile, which had already existed since 1945, is a fact that can be related to Slovakia in particular. Maybe this circumstance applies more to Slovakia than to the Central and Eastern European countries of the emerging Eastern Bloc in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Here, reference should be made to the expectation common among some exile politicians that war would soon break out between the USA and the Soviet Union, which was the true driving force behind the efforts to shake off Soviet hegemony. In this expectation of an approaching armed conflict between the erstwhile allies, Ďurčanský, one of the leading personalities in exile, already formulated the main objective of the resistance at home in June 1946: the renewal of statehood and the casting off of both Czech and Soviet hegemony.83 In émigré circles centring on the ­former Slovak ambassador to the Holy See, Karol Sidor, they did not believe in a war, and the 82  Colonel Tomáš Chovan deserted from the army in May 1948 and then escaped to Austria and later France, where he got in touch with Slovak political émigrés, above all with Alexander Matúš, who collaborated with the French secret service, preparing couriers to be dispatched to Slovakia in conjunction with the Slovak Revolutionary Resistance. On completing an intelligence course with the French counter-espionage service, Chovan was sent to Slovakia several times with intelligence assignments, arrested by the ŠtB on 31 March 1950 and hanged on 8 November 1951. See Pejčoch, Vojáci na popravišti, 109-114. One of the first so-called courier agents was, undoubtedly, Rudolf Komandera, who was already active as a courier of the Slovak Revolutionary Resistance, an exile organization founded by intelligence officers supporting the Slovak State between 1945 and 1947. By contrast, František Paňko was one of the most successful couriers, organizing roughly 50 trips to Slovakia until autumn 1948 and helping countless politically condemned persons to cross the border. From crossing the March so often, he became paralyzed. Cf. Rudolf Komandera. Denník 1945–1947. Ján Bobák (ed.), (Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa 2012), 12. 83  ‘We must shake off Czech imperialism ourselves; the whole world will help us to get rid of the Soviet one […] There can be no doubt that war will break out soon, it is just unclear when this will happen.’ General Guidelines for activity at home within the Slovak

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objectives aimed rather at achieving a future federalization of Europe.84 After 1948, the idea of an anti-Bolshevik struggle came much more to the fore. For the protagonists of the ‘White Legion’ in exile in Austria, the idea of restoring independence was no longer relevant. Nevertheless, politicians in exile remained splintered until the foundation of the Slovak World Congress in June 1970, and it only became possible to put the Slovak issue in the focus of the world public in the 1980s. Bibliography Hrabovec, Emília, Tajná aketa o slovenskej štátnosti v roku 1950, in: Historický zborník, 26 (2016) 2, 85-94. Katrebová Blehová, Beáta, An beiden Ufern der March. Der antikommunistische Widerstand der Weissen Legion, in: Stefan Karner/Michal Stehlik (eds.): Österreich. Tschechien. Geteilt – getrennt – vereint (= Beitragsband und Katalog der Niederösterreichischen Landesausstellung, Schallaburg, 2009), 252-255. Katrebová Blehová, Beáta, Das slowakische politische Exil in Österreich, 1945–1955, in: Emilia Hrabovec/Beata Katrebova Blehova (eds.), Slowakei und Österreich im 20. Jh. Eine Nachbarschaft in historisch-literarischer Perspektive (Vienna: LIT, 2008), 173-213. Katrebová Blehová, Beáta, Počiatky slovenskej politickej emigrácie po roku 1945 a medzinárodno-politické súvislosti, in: Peter Mulík et al., Prelom dejín. Rok 1945 v slovenských a európskych dejinách (Martin: Matica slovenská, 2016), 106-127. Katrebová Blehová, Beáta, Idea štátnosti v politike a programe slovenského povojnového exiliu, in: Ján Bobák et al., Slovenské štátoprávne snahy v dvadsiatom storočí (Martin: Matica slovenská, 2018), 329-359. Varinský, Vladimír, Jozef Vicen a Biela légia (Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2003). Varinský, Vladimír, Biela légia’ a jej pôsobenie na strednom Slovensku (1949–1952), in: Historický časopis, 51 (2003) 3, 435-446.

Revolutionary Resistance, Paris 24 June 1946. A ÚPN, KS ZNB S-ŠtB, fond starých písomností, a.č. S-280, box 9. 84  Cf. Beata Katrebova Blehova, ‘Počiatky slovenskej politickej emigrácie po roku 1945 a medzinárodno-politické súvislosti’, in: Peter Mulík et alii, Prelom dejín. Rok 1945 v slovenských a európskych dejinách (Martin: Matica slovenská 2016), 106-127.

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Vilhan, Miroslav, Biela légia na Slovensku z pohľadu štátnobezpečnostných zložiek a jej pôsobenie na Slovensku, in: Politické vedy 5 (2002) 1-2, 130-134. Pejčoch, Ivo, Vojáci na popravišti. Vojenské osobnosti popravené v Československu z politických nebo kriminálních důvodů v období 1949–1985 (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2011). Pejčoch, Ivo/Prokop Tomek, Agenti – chodci na popravišti. Kurýři západních spravodajských služeb popravení v rocech 1949–1958 (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2010). Schriffl, David, Tote Grenze oder lebendige Nachbarschaft? Österreichisch-slowakische Beziehungen 1945–1968 (Wien: Verlag der ÖAW, 2012). Vondrášek, Václav/Jan Pešek, Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity 1945–1970. Mýty a realita (Bratislava: Veda, 2011).

Summary With few exceptions, the historiographical presentation of the subject of armed anti-Communist resistance in Slovakia in the first years after the war represents a scientific desideratum. It is the best-known chapter in Slovak postwar history and made up of the anti-Communist ‘White Legion’ movement with all its aspects, including its abuse by the State Security Service. The ‘White Legion’ movement was founded as a self-help organization by broad sections of the population as a means of protection against Communist terror and was, generally characterized by passive resistance. Under the specific conditions of the initial years after the communist dictatorship had been established, the movement also had an armed nature, particularly in eastern Slovakia. It should be noted, however, that the more general signs of resistance to the coming regime had already emerged in the trial against the former President of the Slovak Republic, Jozef Tiso, and after his death sentence had been passed in April 1947. This not only did not consolidate the unity of the state, but the Slovaks also remained permanently disaffected, and their confidence in state institutions was severely undermined. In 1949, popular uprisings broke out against the pro-regime Catholic Action, which aimed at separating the church and the state. These were the largest manifestations of anti-Communist resistance. A characteristic feature of the anti-Communist resistance in Slovakia is also its link to the activities of Slovak politicians in exile, who had been seeking to form a strong resistance movement since 1945. The essential goal of exile organizations after 1945 was to restore Slovak statehood and to eliminate the Communist regime and Soviet hegemony. These were the causes for which former members of the Slovak Army as well as former participants in the Uprising of autumn 1944 and former members of the Czechoslovak army were willing to risk their lives.

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Summary in Slovak

Historiografické spracovanie tematiky ozbrojeného protikomunistického odporu na Slovensku v prvej povojnovej dekáde predstavuje až na pár výnimiek vedecké deziderátum. Najviac spracovanou sa dodnes javí pomerne známa kapitola v slovenských povojnových dejinách, ktorú tvorí protikomunistické hnutie “Biele légia” so všetkými aspektmi, ktorú toto pomerne široké hnutie reprezentovalo, nevynímajúc pri tom zneužitie zo strany Štátnej bezpečnosti. Hnutie “Biela légia” bolo pri tom koncipované ako svojpomocné hnutie širokých vrstiev obyvateľstva ako ochrany proti komunistickému teroru, ktoré sa všeobecne charakterizovalo ako pasívna rezistencia. V špecifických podmienkach prvých rokov po nastolení komunistickej diktatúry však hnutie najmä na východnom Slovensku malo aj ozbrojený charakter. Popri tom je ale nutné konštatovať, že všeobecné známky odporu proti nastávajúcemu režimu sa začali črtať už v súvislosti s procesom proti bývalému prezidentovi Slovenskej republiky Jozefovi Tisovi a po vynesení a vykonaní rozsudku trestu smrti sa nielen že neupevnila štátna jednota, ale naopak vzťah medzi Čechmi a Slovákmi zostal natrvalo narušený a dôvera v štátne inštitúcie bola najmä na Slovensku hlboko otrasená. V roku 1949 boli ľudové vzbury proti prorežimnej Katolíckej akcii, cieľom ktorej bolo vyvolať rozkol medzi Cirkvou a štátom, najväčším prejavom protikomunistického odporu. Charakteristickou črtou protikomunistického odporu na Slovensku je jeho prepojenie na činnosť slovenského politického exilu, ktorého časť sa už od roku 1945 usilovala o vybudovanie silného hnutia odporu. Nosnou myšlienkou exilových organizácií po roku 1945 bolo obnovenie slovenskej štátnosti, odstránenie komunistického režimu a sovietskej hegemónie. To boli myšlienky, pre ktoré boli bývalí príslušníci Slovenskej armády, ale aj bývalí účastníci Povstania a bývalí príslušníci Československej armády ochotní riskovať svoje životy.

Fig. 10.1

Slovakia – operational areas of the groups described in the article

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Chapter 11

The Anti-communist Resistance in Czechoslovakia in a Pedagogical Perspective Karina Hoření/Vojtěch Ripka Introduction In this chapter, we focus on the way that the anti-communist resistance might be effectively used in history (and citizenship) education, paying special attention to the issue of the pedagogical goals that it might cover. The first section of our text gives an overview of the state of research on the armed anti-communist resistance. We discuss the available findings on the extent and general form of the violent resistance (or, respectively, the lack thereof) and identify the major challenges that this research faces. In order to give the reader leverage into this rather contested terrain, we offer a theoretical framework based in the social scientific insights into the concept of resistance and its different uses, from Rachel Einwohner and Jocelyn Hollander. The section on the memory of the anti-communist resistence, then, will also elucidate the social, cultural and legal context of the anti-communist resistance. This is not only closely associated with academic research, but it is also helpful in understanding the pedagogical approach introduced in the following section. Finally, discussions of the two pedagogically applied cases are followed by concluding remarks. For the purpose of this publication, we survey mostly armed resistance (or resistance aiming to become armed) between 1948 and 1953 in Czechoslovakia. The period covers Stalinism and is largely consistent with the major occurrence of violent resistance. Though cases turn up throughout the late 1950s and individual cases even took place in the 1970s and 1980s (such as Hučín case and other, isolated and individual activities),1 the year 1953 is generally accepted in historiography as a dividing line. This text is a selection of a larger educational project called The Third Resistance From a Pedagogical Perspective. The project itself is mostly run in Czech and aimed at Czech schools and the Czech (non-)academic public. After years of refining our approach and piloting some of our methods in the field, a book accompanied by online sets of teaching material will fully survey the 1  Cuhra Jaroslav, Trestní represe odpůrců režimu v letech 1969–1972, (= Sešity Ústavu pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR 29, Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1997), 8. © Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_012

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field, from pedagogical theory, methods of historiography, and other social science, to case studies and their pedagogical applications.2 Due to limited space here, we only offer a glimpse of two different case studies, along with some thoughts on the use of both pedagogical as well as methodological insights.

The Extent, Location and State of Research

General accounts of the shape, extent, and geographic occurance of the Czech violent anti-communist resistance are rare. As we shall see below, the dominant form of the case study does not allow for a complete picture. Even the pieces of research that strive for a broader view are not specific in describing the full extent. In this regard, there are two books that aim at becoming authoritative accounts of this phenomenon: Václav Veber’s The Third Resistance: Czechoslovakia in the Years 1948–19533 and Ivo Pejčoch’s Anti-Communist Putsches.4 While Veber attempts to give a first complete review of the whole anti-communist resistance and includes the violent episodes as part of it, Pejčoch focuses solely on violent attempts at takeovers. Surprisingly, neither of the books gives even rough estimates. Building on individual cases described by Veber in the respective chapters of his book, we arrive at the figure of up to 4000 members of armed resistence groups or groups that were planning to arm themselves. Still, as even Veber admits, these are largely estimates from the Secret police, thus referring to incidents defined as resistance by the authorities at the time and not necessarily intended as such by the protesters themselves. This crucial conceptual distinction is addressed in the next section on conceptualizing resistance. Another figure that is even more problematic comes from the Ministry of Defence, where 232 of the 1439 people awarded for anti-communist resistance received the status of war veteran as of September 2017. That literally means that the Ministry has acknowledged an active and armed resistance after a vetting procedure prescribed by the law (for the law on anti-commmunist resistance, see section 3 of this chapter). There is a similar scarcity regarding any authoritative statements on the geographical distribution of the resistant activities. Again, building on Veber’s account, the foci of the incidents were concentrated in Moravian regions and in the borderlands of Bohemia. 2  Pinkas Jaroslav et al., Třetí odboj v didaktické perspektivě (=Po válce, Praha: Ústav pro ­studium totalitních režimů and Lidové noviny, 2020). 3  Veber Václav, Třetí odboj ČSR v letech 1948–1953, (Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, Fakulta filozofická, 2014). 4  Pejčoch Ivo, Protikomunistické Puče: Historie pokusů o vojenské svržení komunistického režimu v Československu 1948–1958, (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2011).

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Conceptualizing Resistance

The myriad of dissimilar conceptualizations and definitions of resistance and its types and varieties, often not followed by a reflective approach, causes great confusion in social scientific as well as historical research, as Jocelyn Hollander and Rachel Einwohner noted in their seminal review of the conceptualizations of resistance.5 Part of the confusion stems from the shared, but neither theoretically nor empirically founded conviction that resistance is a pro-social activity aimed against the domination of the wrongly oppressed. It is obvious, however, that resistant behavior (conscious action in opposition to something or someone) might not fulfill this normatively desirable criteria. Moreover, there is profound disagreement surrounding the recognition of resistant behavior and its intent. Hollander and Einwohner therefore offer a tool to discriminate between different levels of recognition and intent, based on a nexus that combines the three general actors involved in resistance: protesters, the targets, and third parties (mostly the state or the general public). The resulting nexus, captured in table 11.1. not only has a heuristic value for our two cases, but is also useful for the following review of the existing literature on armed resistance. Table 11.1 Types of resistance

Overt resistance Covert resistance Unwitting resistance Target-defined resistance Externally defined resistance Missed resistance Attempted resistance Not resistance

Is act intended as resistance by actor?

Is act recognized as resistance by target?

observer?

Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No

Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No

Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No

5  Rachel Einwohner/Jocelyn Hollander, Conceptualizing Resistance, in: Sociological Forum 19 (2004) 4, 533-554.

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How does this typology relate to Keith Dickson’s definitions and the dynamic model of resistance in this volume? The dynamic model of three stages similarly defines the target and the participants (‘weak actors’). Armed, especially violent resistance can be either organized or unorganized, but by definition, it has to be active rather than be passive, and his distinction is not a matter of Hollander and Einwohner’s typology. However, the added value of the typology is the inclusion of the actors’ perspective. It is essential to note that the definition of resistance does not only lie in the hands of resistors; it is profoundly interactional. This feature of resistance might even make us include the aspect of time, and the researcher as a fourth actor, as we shall see later on.6 The Czechoslovak anti-communist resistance cannot be firmly grasped without acknowledging the difference between an overt resistance, a targetdefined resistance, an unwitting resistence, and an externally defined resistance. The other categories should not be missed either, because they tend to be (perhaps with the exception of no resistance) overlooked in any research on the topic, regardless of time period and region.

Research on the Czech Violent Anti-communist Resistance

Armed and/or violent anti-communist resistance before 1968 in Czechoslovakia is virtually a non-existent issue in academic research outside of the Czech Republic. Outside of a few exceptions,7 including Keith Dickson8 as referenced in this volume, questions are instead raised on the ‘fact’ of its non-occurence. Bradley F. Abrahams tries to understand the general reasons for the practical non-existence of a notable anti-communist movement soon after the communist putsch in February 1948,9 while Kevin McDermott warns that ‘the overall question of the nature and scale of popular resistance in communist Czechoslovakia in the 1950s is not resolvable with any certitude and conclusions must be weighed judiciously,’ and largely stops there. Muriel Blaive has 6  In our treatment of methodology applied to research of resistance in modern history, we have completed this step (see forthcoming J. Pinkas (ed.), Třetí odboj v didaktické perspektivě, (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů a Lidové noviny, 2020). 7  Pollack Detlef/Wielgohs Jan, Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), McDermott Kevin, Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia: The Plzeň Uprising, June 1953, Contemporary European History 19 (2010), 287-307. 8  McDermott, Kevin/Matthew Stibbe, Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule, (Oxford: Berg, 2006). 9  Abrams Bradley F., Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture And the Rise of Communism, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 279.

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even written a whole book questioning the unrest in 1956 in Czechoslovakia, where unlike Hungary, Poland and the GDR, it became a non-event.10 One of the discussion points of these works is the extent to which the ideological underpinning of the resistance groups played a larger or weaker role visa-vis socio-economic motivations. This modesty, cautiousness, and even hesitation contrasts sharply with the extent and tone of the domestic research programme.

Czech Research

The Czech research programme is relatively large, with an institutionalized and diversified academic and journalistic basis. It mostly consists of case studies that benefit from relatively easy access to existing archival material in the state apparatus. Thanks to a liberal archival law from 2004 and an exception from the otherwise strict protections of personal information in recent historical records, access is limited by only few minimal rules: sensitive personal information, such as medical records, are not available. Besides the theoretical approach, a specialized archival institution aimed at integrating the particular archives of the security apparatus of communist Czechoslovakia was established in 2008, making practical access easier. These case studies touch on broader issues only occasionally, and even though they approach the anti-communist resistance from different angles, they not only lack a shared definition of resistance, but also even mostly lack any definition apart from an inherent, intuitive one. Petr Blažek termed the relationship of this research community towards theory ‘a startling disregard’.11 Matěj Kotalík urged against its conceptually oversimplified approach,12 and Vítězslav Sommer identified moral rage and an anti-theoretical approach as its defining features. Despite these recurring calls, a change in this regard does not seem to be coming and as a result, the representative overviews of the Czechoslovak anti-communist resistance lack the tools to distinguish between target-defined and unwitting resistance on the one hand, and overt and covert resistance on the other. Distinguishing between what the state security 10  Blaive, Muriel, Promarněná příležitost: Československo a rok 1956 (Prague: Prostor, 2001). 11  Petr Blažek (ed.), Opozice a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu 1968–1989 (Prague: Ústav českých dějin FF UK : Dokořán, 2005), 10. 12  Matěj Kotalík, “Páskové” a “chuligáni” proti režimu? Na okraj tradičních konceptů odboje a rezistence, in: Odboj a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu a ve Střední Evropě: sborník k mezinárodní konferenci (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2010), 225-232.

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apparatus defined as anti-communist resistance and resistance according to a protestor‘s intent is essential, and while some researchers struggle to corroborate their work with additional sources, the most representative book on the anti-communist resistance admits that it does not distinguish overt, covert, and target-defined resistance in most cases, since it primarily uses records from the state court and State secret police investigation files.13 An intense social embeddedness on the part of the research means that a large proportion of the researchers use normative language like ‘heroes’ or a ‘desired social acknowledgement’, praising the legal acknowledgement of the anti-communist resistance. Normative language might not inevitably mean that the research does not meet academic standards. However, Veber’s account of the intents of violent and armed resistance in the 1950s14 or Kalous’ assertion about the resistors‘ moral profile15 are not rare. These are highly morally charged and clearly non-academic arguments that lack evidence. Veber also stresses out the pro-democratic and anti-communist programme in cases where there is no evidence, or where socio-economic reasons are more likely (as supported by empirical research). The state of ‘primary research’ on the anti-communist resistance does not easily allow for pedagogical applications, as one might deduce. That is why we have made a review of methodologies of approaching resistence that are more generally inspiring. Out of these theories, a short selection is presented here, while the full review constitutes a chapter in our forthcoming book (The Third Resistance From a Pedagogical Perspective).

Anti-communist Resistance as a Controversial Topic in the Public Debate

The anti-communist resistance movement isn’t a topic confined only to academia in the Czech Republic. As in other countries in the region, historical 13  Veber Václav, Třetí odboj ČSR v letech 1948–1953 (Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, Fakulta filozofická, 2014). 14  ‘Their acivities were doubtlessly altruistic and fully devoted‘ in Veber, Václav, Třetí odboj ČSR v letech 1948–1953(Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, Fakulta filozofická, 2014), 127. 15  “Where to look for the members of the third resistance? Among virtous, morally strong people with stamina, who deserve our acknowledgement and esteem.” Jan Kalous, Státní bezpečnost a třetí odboj v letech 1948–1951, in: Třetí odboj: kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století (Plzeň : Praha: Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk ; Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů : Metropolitní univerzita Praha, 2010). 274-286.

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research is part of a broader process of constructing the collective memory of the era, which enters into a dialogue with other genres, like mass media, literature, or popular culture. One can therefore come across various narratives communicated through diverse channels in the public space. As we have demonstrated in the previous section of this text, historical accounts are part of the public debate that we are reconstructing in the following section.

The Third Resistance Movement: Creating a Story

Academic theories are inevitably set in certain cultural and political contexts, and as such, they always construct specific visions and interpretations of the world. For example, in the West of the 1950s, totalitarianism was, on one hand, a theory attempting to describe the political system in the Soviet bloc, and on the other, an interpretation that evaluated this system. Totalitarianism was also a theory available to the Czech historians who began researching the anti-communist resistance in the 1990s, when this topic became open for public discussion after the fall of the communist regimes in Central Europe. The perspective of conflict between the communist ‘party’ and ‘the people’ became dominant in creating the collective memory of the communist regimes in Central and East Europe. Victims and resistance fighters (with these categories often merging) became symbols of this interpretation. Many scholars interested in the creation of collective memory of the communist regimes use the concept of collective trauma.16 According to Jeffrey Alexander: ‘Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel that they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.’17 The dominant narrative about the communist past emphasised the tragic aspects. Even the resistance is a part of a traumatic narrative, when the suffering of resistance fighters in labour camps or prisons is a dominant part of their stories. Collective trauma is not traumatic per se, but it is created in a trauma process; various actors promote their versions of the past using media, justice, 16  Mihai Stelian Rusu, Battling over Romanian Red Past. The Memory of Communism between Elitist Cultural Trauma and Popular Collective Nostalgia, in: Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (2015) 1, 24-48; Radim Marada, Paměť, trauma, generace, in: Sociální studia/Social Studies 4 (2016) 1-2, 79-95. 17  Alexander Jeffery C., Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma in Alexander, Jeffrey C (ed.), Cultural trauma and collective identity, (Berkeley:Univ of California Press, 2004), 1.

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or education.18 The resistance movement and its various interpretations also became part of both official and unofficial memory politics. According to Jiří Suk, post-communist anticommunism is a phenomenon that shaped public life in Czech Republic from 1990 onwards, and it can be traced in the actions and discourses of many different groups and also in written, oral, and visual sources. Its spokesmen rejected historical compromise and demanded historical justice. Their ideological starting point can be expressed in a nutshell: ‘if we don’t come to terms with the communist party, our democratic transformation can’t be succesful’.19 The dynamic of post-communist anticommunism was complicated. In the first year after the so-called Velvet Revolution, it was promoted by groups of victims or fringe political groups. Top ranking politicians only partially supported their demands, and all of the rehabilitation laws only passed after long debates.20 Only after the year 2000 did anti-communism become actively enforced by dominant center right parties, through a series of legal and commemorative acts.21 A major step in this process was the issuance of the Act on the Participants in Anti- communist Opposition and Resistance (262/2011), a law defining the status of the participants in the resistance and specifying both symbolic and financial rewards for them. It is a difficult task to draw a line between resistance and other kinds of behaviour in the past that are necessarily more complicated. Debates about the law and the individuals that applied for the status made divergent opinions about the resistance movement visible (which also merely revealed the different interpretations of the past as a whole). In the process of memory making, the term ‘third resistance movement’ was established for the anti-communist resistance. Czech historiography use the term ‘Third Resistance Movement‘ for the scattered category of anticommunist resistance during the whole period of the communist regime. The label ‘third resistance’ connects it with the anti-Austrian resistance during WWI and the anti-Nazi resistance during WWII. The name itself creates a story of Czech history that is articulated around the values of democracy and the fight against authoritative regimes. 18  Ibd.  10. 19  Suk Jiří, Politické hry s “nedokončenou revolucí”. Účtování s komunismem v čase občanského fóra a po jeho rozpadu, in: Adéla Gjuričová (ed.). Rozděleni minulostíVytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989, (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2012), 25. 20  Ibd. 21  Adéla Gjuričová, Poněkud tradiční rozchod s minulostí. Občanská demokratická strana, in: Adéla Gjuričová (ed.) Rozděleni minulostí- Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989, (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2012), 115.

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Resistance movements are not a topic that many people would have direct experience with or strong personal opinions about, especially in comparison with topics such as everyday life during communism and membership in the communist party. But there are actors (such as the contemporary Communist Party or various army remembrance groups) who try to promote different images of the anti-communist resistance in the public space. For example, in 2016, on the 55th anniversary of the death of police officer Jaroslav Honzátko, who was killed by the Mašíni brothers resistance group that we address later in this text, two commemorative actions took place. The local Communist Party branch organised a commemorative act in Čelákovice, at the building of the former communist police station. Organisers placed a copy of a memorial plaque on the building, which was originally placed there in 1975 and removed in 1994. At the same time at a nearby cemetery, a second commemorative act took place. It was organised by the Union of Security Forces (Unie bezpečnostních složek). Their representatives granted an award to officer Honzátko in memoriam – they wanted to distinguish this act from the event organised by the Communist Party, but they also presented it as a protest against the official recognition of the Mašíni brothers, who were granted awards from the prime minister (2008) and the minister of defence (2011).22 However, the intepretation that rejects anti-communist resistance fighters is still marginal; it is not reflected in academia, education, or popular culture, but it is still circulated informally, which means that students can run into it within their families. This example is the most visible evidence of the divergent interpretations of the anti-communist resistence, where different understandings of the whole historical era manifest themselves. Besides the media, politics, and popular culture, historians and their knowledge are used in the debate. The Anti-communist Movement as a Controversial Topic in Education Robert Stradling states that each European nation has a controversial issue in its history23 and that these issues are mostly connected with the totalitarian 22  Robert Sattler, “Uctění mašínovy oběti. Honzátko dostal medaili i pamětní desku”, (1 October 2016, https://www.lidovky.cz/ucteni-masinovy-obeti-honzatko-dostal-medaili-ipametni-desku-p68-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160930_143846_ln_domov_rsa, last accessed 1 November 2017). 23  Robert Stradling, Teaching 20th-century European history (Council of Europe, 2001).

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regimes of the 20th century. As we have demonstrated above for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the contested past surrounding the communist regimes and resistance movements is a topic that embodies these difficulties. The conflict-laden nature of these topics might be one reason why the curriculum as well as individual teachers might prefer to skip over this topic in the classroom. An overview of the textbooks and other materials available for teachers indicate that there is a discrepancy between the public discussion about the anti- communist resistance and its place in the classroom. Textbooks dedicate only a small amount of space to the anti-communist resistence, particularly in the 1950s. For example, one of the textbooks of modern history for gymnázium (academically-oriented upper secondary school) states that repression from the communist government prevented an organised anticommunist resistance movement from existing in Czechoslovakia and mentioned exile as the center of dissent against communism. The major focus is on the show trials and repression against non-communist parties or the church, and political or legal changes after the establishment of the communist ­regime.24 A textbook for vocational schools by the same publisher leaves out the anti-communist resistance entirely.25 The extent and exact way in which textbooks are used in the classroom is not clear (despite the fact that teachers use them often). Topics left out of textbooks can be substituted with teaching materials, mostly available online, provided by various NGOs or other teachers. The only domestic case of online material that includes not only primary sources and historical commentary by an expert, but also pedagogical content on its use in the classroom, is a set on the Mašíni brothers.26 The problems with teaching materials about the anti-communist resistance are connected to the problems with this topic in the public and academic debate, and teachers might be hesitant to add this topic to their instruction. They might not share the heroic narrative about the movement, or, more often, their students and the students‘ families don’t share it. We encourage teachers to bring this topic up in the classroom, but also to be open about the controversies and debates that are connected with it. We provide them with materials relying on a selection cases and primary sources that help them discuss the topic in a more complex way, rooted in the political and economical reality of 24   Jan Kuklík/Jan Kuklík jr, Dějepis pro gymnázia a střední školy 4- Nejnovější dějiny, (Prague:Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 2005). 25  Petr Čornej, Dějepis pro střední odborné školy (Prague: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 2010). 26  Michal Biháry, Moderní-Dějiny.cz/Odbojová Skupina Bratří Mašínů (http://www.modernidejiny.cz/clanek/odbojova-skupina-bratri-masinu/, last accessed 12 March 2017).

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the period and also opening more abstract topics such as loyalty, motivation, and heroism. We follow Diana Hess’ conception of using controversial issues in the classroom. She gives a definition of controversial issues in the classroom and also lays out the potential and dangers connected with them,27 and we have applied these principles to the topic of the anti-communist resistance. The anti-communist movement is a topic that is significant on both a social and an individual level. These are stories of people who had to make a decision under very specific political and social conditions. Their decisions and choices have a moral dimension too, and they still have an impact on contemporary societies. The anti-communist resistance movement is a topic that is part of the real life world and is stimulating on both an intellectual and an emotional level. The stories of the anti-communist movement are part of a history that is still available to students through their families and communities. This relationship creates motivation that leads to students’ individual efforts to learn more. These stories create the potential for students to build up their own evaluation of the events, based on critical thinking about the sources and oral histories. The anti-communist resistance is an ideal topic for enquiry based learning: the stories are engaging, and therefore students are motivated to uncover them on their own. The role of the teacher is to provide materials and help students navigate, rather than to give authoritative interpretations. Personal engagement is connected with this topic’s ethical dimension. Anti-communist resistance fighters resolved moral dilemmas. While studying their actions, students are also encouraged to develop attitudes toward these dilemmas and, as such, they develop their own moral standards too. However, cases of anti-communist resistance were complicated, and the moral lessons they give are seldom straightforward. Cases of anti-communist resistance are multilayered, and may only be understood taking multiple perspectives into account. The Multiperspectivity of the stories can be demonstrated with various primary and secondary sources that are available for each of the cases. Archival documents provide the highly ideological interpretation of the state bodies, but these can be complemented with personal documents or oral histories. Popular representations, such as contemporary feature films, also help students to understand the symbolical roles that the anti-communist resistance played in different political regimes. 27  D  iana E. Hess, Controversy in the classroom: The democratic power of discussion, (London: Routledge, 2009).

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Teaching about controversial issues also has its challenges. The teacher shouldn’t hide his or her personal involvement with the topic, but should instead be able to reflect on it in the classroom and discuss it with his or her students. That is a precondition to building up the classroom as an environment where all opinions are valued but can also be criticised. The role of the teacher is to set rules for discussion, because a safe environment is necessary for students to be able to present their own opinions and discuss them with their classmates. The decision to bring up the topic of anti-communist resistance should therefore be based on the teacher’s knowledge of the class, but we provide teachers with sets of materials and tasks that help them to moderate the learning process and the debate. The anti-communist resistance is a much-discussed topic in the public space, and teachers therefore shouldn’t avoid it in the classroom. While integrating the principles of critical historical education, they can include motivating and fascinating stories of anti-communist resistance. While studying them, students will acquire skills necessary for informed participation in the ongoing debate about the Czech and European past.

Case Studies

We now present two out of five case studies that we chose as the basis for the teaching sets for the teachers in our Czech project. We chose the cases to cover both various forms of resistance and various sources. Each lecture uses the historical specifics of each case to concentrate on different educational goals and aspects of the controversial issues. For this text we have chosen two cases that represent different sides of the spectrum of anti-communist resistance. The actions of the Mašín brothers’ resistance group are unprecedented in their violence in the context of Czechoslovakia and are, therefore, highly controversial. This case is not representative, but is the most widely known case in the general public, and therefore students will come across its story. The second example focuses on a peasant demonstration in Dobruška, which was an isolated act of resistance among a number of scattered protests against the agricultural policies of the communist regime. It represents the attitudes of a larger group of people and of sentiments that were widespread. It is also an example where the political interpretation of the act was only created by the state during the investigation. In this lecture, students concentrate on reconstructing the positions of various individuals and groups in the village community.

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The Mašín Brothers Case

The so-called Mašín brothers case is undoubtedly the most prominent story of the armed resistance against the communist regime in the 1950s. The reason to pay attention to this story in school is straightforward: it is not only the most researched and popularly-known story, but it is also a focal point for the memory of the anti-communist resistance, and it remains highly controversial. As the grasp of historical culture is one of the key goals of our approach to history education, one can rarely find richer and more controversial material. However, we also must take the serious disadvantages of this case into account: it is a rather misleading proxy of the anti-communist resistance in Czechoslovakia. Unlike the general character of the mostly non-violent, unarmed, relatively weak, and even (partially) state-controlled or even provoked resistance, the case of the Mašín brothers remains far from representative. The basic facts are well established and available in a number of different accounts of the story28 and its cultural significance.29 The story in brief: The Mašín brothers case encompasses the activities of a group led by Josef (born 1932) and Ctirad (1930–2011) Mašínovi. The group’s inner circle consisted of only five people, though the authorities interrogated up to 127 people who they assumed played a role in the activities of this small group. The roots of the Mašín brothers’ activities are traced back as a rich heritage from their father, an army officer during the interwar period. The elder Josef Mašín became one of the leaders of the Czech (non-communist) resistance to the Nazi occupation during World War II. Captured by the Nazis, he was imprisoned and executed in 1942. His sons Josef and Ctirad became active in resistance activities at an early age during the last two years of WWII, putting together smaller sabotage activities against the occupational forces in the Czech lands. The family did not straightforwardly condemn the rise of the Communist Party to power after WWII at first (their mother joined the Communist Party between 1948–1949). However, following the communist takeover, the group, which included close friends of the two brothers and their uncle, began to react 28  Barbara Masin, Gauntlet: Five Friends, 20,000 Enemy Troops, and the Secret That Could Have Changed the Course of the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, 2006); Čvančara, Jaroslav, ‘We Serve Our Nation …’, Behind the Iron Curtain (3), 162-79 or Blažek Petr/Jaroslav Čvančara, From War to War – The Adolescence of Brothers Ctirad and Josef Mašín in Recollections and Photographs, Behind the Iron Curtain (3), 140-53. 29  Švéda Josef, Czech Communist and Post-Communist Heroes in the Twentieth Century, in: Arnold Suppan/Maximilian Graf (eds.), From the Austrian Empire to Communist East Central Europe, (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010).

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to early the Stalinist terror with sabotage and by gathering arms. Mostly, the sabotage consisted of bales of hay set on fire as a proclaimed protest against the agriculture policies of collectivisation. Arms and finances were gathered by individual raids of police and post offices from 1949 to 1951. These activities left three casualties and were partially uncovered by the authorities, and part of the group was then sentenced to prison. The group’s aim consisted mainly of the attempted overthrow of the communist regime and shift of the country’s geopolitical orientation to the West. Still, the final goal, i.e. the desired sociopolitical system that would replace the communist regime, remained vague. After the members regrouped following the release of those who had been imprisoned, they planned to change tactics and join Western armed forces abroad to become part of the invading forces as the communist states were ­attacked. The execution of the escape (from Czechoslovakia through the GDR to West Berlin) became spectacular: one of the biggest military events of the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe, involving over 20,000 troops of the GDR armed forces chasing the group. Two members of the group were captured and later executed in Czechoslovakia, along with other collaborators. The final destination of the group was the USA, where all the remaining members entered the armed forces. By the late 1950s, as it became clear that no open invasion in CEE region would take place, they all left the army. The Mašín brothers case is undoubtedly a case of overt resistance, as defined by Hollander and Einwohner. It also is a case of an organized resistance, though at least a segment of society continuously assesses it not as resistance, but rather as pure criminal activity. Clashes of these interpretations on a symbolic level were described in section 3. In Dickson’s terms, most researchers would consider the activities of the group as not passing the first phase of active resistance. However, such a judgement is not generally shared, and it’s possible to find references to characteristics of phase two in the argumentation of some Czech historians.30 In the classrooms the case became a symbol of the discussions on early Stalinism and the public discussions are often distilled into a seemingly essential historical question: Killers or heroes? However, from the pedagogical point of view, the cultural memory aspect that makes the Mašín brothers case a distinct figure in the remembrance of Stalinism goes back to two leading societal elements: society as an innocent victim, and the increased social mobility of 30  Bursík Tomáš,Diskuse nad třetím odbojem: pokus o stručný nástin problému, in: Ondřej Šanca/Cóilín O’Connor (eds.), Odboj a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu a ve Střední Evropě: sborník k mezinárodní konference, (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2010), 17-26.

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constructive enthusiasm. The case also demonstrates the limits of sole historiography, as it is a complicated situation that requires expertise in a lot of different areas (political science and international law so as to evaluate the legitimacy of the violence and legitimacy of the régime, etc.). In pedagogical sense, it also pushes itself towards the constructivist approach, since a single, authoritarian interpretation transferred from the teacher as prepared knowledge may not work well with a controversial issue like this. Last, but not least, we might argue in favour of using this case in the classroom due to the richness in the variety of sources. If we call the set of primary sources for the Dobruška demonstration (covered in the next section) ‘rich’, it is because of a comparison with the ‘normal’ misery of limited scope and the type of primary documents and accounts in other cases of anti-communist resistance. Still, the ‘richness’ of sources on the Mašín brothers case is far greater: from written accounts and enormously detailed sets of oral history, to the (mis)use of the plots in literature and pop culture, including TV series produced both before and after 1989, as well as iconic photographs. Though the degree of controversy is limited and emotional engagement or even direct involvement of, for instance, family members is extremely unlikely, it is still one of the issues with more potential to create controversy due to its enduring symbolic role. That is why we have drawn some inspiration from pedagogical insights on the way to work with controversial issues in the history classroom from Northern Ireland, particularly from Barton and McCully.31 The strategies proposed by Hess are described in a general sense in the ‘Memory’ section. The safeness of the environment could not, according to Hess, be achieved by forcing students to make such strict and final judgements. In this case, it might mean shifting the focus of questioning on the Mašín story from the crudest interperation of the ‘heroes or villains’ questions to more refined, detailed question looking at motives behind the behavior of the group’s members, the alternatives of their behavior, the ways their story has been told, the goals behind particular ways that the story is told, etc. That means refocusing from the story alone to careful work with its conflicting potential, using analytical tools; in other words, a shift from from the ‘what’ is conveyed to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ is it conveyed.32 The refinement of the analytical process should not lead to the demise of values and evaluation in historical education. In this regard, we part with the 31  Keith Barton/Alan McCully, Teaching controversial issues …, where controversial issues really matter, in: Teaching history 127 (2007), 13. 32  Robert Thorp, Uses of History in History Education, 2016 (http://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:958123, last accessed 24 October 2017), 19.

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revised Bloom’s taxonomy of learning objectives, where evaluation, including judgement, is among the high-order learning objectives.33 That said, students need be well-trained and master lower-order learning skills, such as understanding and analyzing, in order for the evaluation to be meaningful. That is why we have constructed two lesson plans: one dealing with different life strategies in early 1950’s Czechoslovakia,34 one on the legitimacy of political violence,35 and another on the way the Mašín brothers are remembered.36 The ultimate learning objectives of these three lesson plans are understanding the difference between facts, interpretations, and positions, and understanding values and life strategies and their role in approaching the balance between individual rights and the state monopoly on violence. Finally, students are meant to learn about the relationship between different sets of values and historical interpretations.

The Demonstration in Dobruška- Forced Agricultural Collectivisation in the Region

We included the case of a single demonstration in a small town as an example of the unarmed, civil resistance that actually might be more widespread in comparison with organised and armed forms of resistance. We propose studying the armed resistance in the context of other forms of resistence, because it enables students to discuss the potentials and motivations of different social groups to resist an oppressive political regime. This case doesn’t represent a ‘tip of an iceberg’ sort of armed resistance, but, instead, represents a phenomena that was under the surface: the criticism of the communist regime that exploded from time to time (for instance, in local demonstrations). Still, armed resistance grew out of these sentiments and got support from these environments.37 33  Lorin W. Anderson/David R. Krathwohl/Benjamin Samuel Bloom, A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001). 34  Pluralita Postojů Vůči Režimu v 50. Letech 20. Století – Dějepis v 21. Století (http:// www.dejepis21.cz/pluralita-postoju-vuci-rezimu-v-50-letech-20-stoleti, last accessed 30 October 2017). 35  Legitimita Politického Násilí a Případ Bratří Mašínů – Dějepis v 21. Století (http:// www.dejepis21.cz/legitimita-politickeho-nasili-na-prikladu-bratri-masinu, last accessed 30 October 2017) 36  Vzpomínání Na Mašíny. – Dějepis v 21. Století, (http://www.dejepis21.cz/vzpominani-namasiny, last accessed 30 October 2017). 37  James C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

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It is therefore easier for students to compare this case with situations faced in their families and communities.

The Peasant Demonstration in Dobruška – A Short Overview

The forced collectivisation of private farms was among the harshest policies promoted by the communist regime established in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Farmers were encouraged to join collective farms in their villages, and those who opposed, were forced to join using bureaucratic pressure and also violence. Communist politicians learned that in the summer and fall of 1949, during the first wave of the collectivisation campaign, most of the farmers were sceptical or openly against the JZDs ( jednotné zemědělské družstvo, unified agricultural cooperatives).38 In the regions where the rate of farmers organised in JZDs was low, special pressure policies, including the checking of crops in individual farms, were established. Private farmers had to deliver the declared amount of their product directly to the state in return for fixed prices. Farmers were accused of hiding the crops, and inspections on the farms were another form of humiliation carried out by the local authorities. In the villages around the town Dobruška, inspections started in December 1949, and a number of problems accompanied them. Gatherings of local people took place during these inspections, with various forms of vocal criticism. The peak of the growing frustration with the situation was an arrest of three young men, who were driving their motorcycles around the villages to warn the farmers before the actual inspectors came. As a reaction to the arrests, several local farmers gathered in the eve of the demonstration to plan it and then spread the announcement by word of mouth.

38  The organisations that arose under the title JZD in the 1950s had nothing whatsoever to do with the most basic principles of the cooperative system, such as voluntary organisation, member participation in responsibility, and self-administration. Socialist enterprises in the form of JZDs were modelled on Soviet kolkhozes and were run by the state and depended on it for their existence. They were subjected to a bureaucratic system of organisation and central command planning. See Rychlík, Jan. Collectivization in Czechoslovakia in comparative perspective, 1949–1960. In Iordachi, Constantin / Bauerkämper Arnd, eds. The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: comparison and entanglements (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2014), 181-210, esp. 189-192.

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On December 12th, in the beginning about 30 people gathered in the villages of Pohoří and Pulice and marched to the district centre of Dobruška to express their disagreement with the compulsory deliveries and inspections to district representatives. During this march, more people joined them and once they reached the District National Committee (ONV as Okresní Národní Výbor) building, there were around three hundred of them. Representatives for the protesters demanded the release of the three youths and a discussion about the rules for private farms and forms of control. Local authorities had detailed information from agents of the Secret state police present at the demonstration, and an investigation started immediately. The construction of an extensive ‘treasonous group’ of farmers, branded as ‘kulaks’,39 from the Dobruška district was an important part of the investigation from day one. Whether a particular farmer was directly engaged in preparations for the protest or was active in the protest was unimportant; ‘class profile’ remained the decisive factor. Communist politicians were worried about all kinds of open criticism directed towards the régime, and it was decided that a trial would be used as an threatening example and as a demonstration of power. The public trial at the State Court against the ‘illegal group of Kareš Josef and Co.’ began on Tuesday the 22nd and continued until Thursday the 24th of August, 1950. In the end twenty people (three of them women) were sentenced to prison time, with sentences ranging from a few months up to twenty years. The families of those sentenced were often included in the secret operation of forced eviction, which began in November of 1951 as another tool of forced collectivisation. The experience of forced eviction might be more typical for women. While their husbands, fathers, or sons were in prison, they had to stay at their family farms and cope with all the bureaucratic and political obstacles. If they were evicted – usually to a remote place – they continued with hard work on state farms, usually under mistrust from their new neighbours. Many of them pursued active efforts to resist their situation, such as complaints to the authorities, demands for releasing their family members, etc. These too are instruments of resistance available for women in their situation, but we also have to keep in 39  When a farmer appeared on a ‘kulak list’, for the most part along with further designations such as ‘non-fulfiller’, ‘saboteur’ or ‘enemy’, or if such a list was posted on a municipal notice board or published in the regional press, he was presented as not being part of village society and marginalised in a demagogic manner. This iniquity was followed by ostracism and persecution. Compare Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ascribing class: the construction of social identity in Soviet Russia, Journal of Modern History 65 (1993) 12, 745-770.

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mind that they got in conflict with the regime due to their family ties rather than by their own choice. Only few sentenced in the trial lives to see full restitution in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the communist regime. Let us point out once again that the Dobruška peasants’ demonstration was a protest against the impossibility of fulfilling the agricultural deliveries and the imposition of ‘class-based’ procurement, and broader political goals were imposed upon this action only later by the investigators.40 According to Hollander and Einwohner’s conceptualisation, the demonstration in Dobruška was an act recognised as resistance by state institutions both during the communist regime and by contemporary official bodies, but the motivations of the participants might be very different, ranging from direct criticism of the regime to participation based on ties of kinship and community.

The Pedagogical Perspective

Given the specific character of the demonstration described above, this case is useful for educational purposes. It brings the wider context of the political and social development of Czechoslovakia after the establishment of the communist regime into the classroom. Rather than concentrating on individual stories of armed resistance, this case opens up the question of wider support for the resistance, the sentiments of larger groups of inhabitants, and the social conditions and relationship necessary for open protests. Cases of armed anticommunist resistence, on the other hand, yield the topic of extreme situations and choices. They are therefore controversial, but when the teacher feels that the environment of the classroom is not ready for controversial debate, she can choose this less controversial case to discuss the opportunities citizens had to resist the oppressive regime. In the case of Dobruška, decisions taken by individuals were less borderline, and they involve various levels of engagement. 40  For a comparison of strategy and scope for resistance against delivery quotas in the countryside in Romania see Michael Stewart/Razvan Stan, Collectivization and resistance in the shepherding village of Poiana Sibiului (Sibiu region, in: Constantin Iordachi/Dorin Dobrincu (eds.), Transforming peasants, property and power: the collectivization of agriculture in Romania, 1949–1962 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 261265, Cristoloveanu, Catalin, Conflict in the Countryside: Peasants, Resistance and the Romanian Communist State during Collectivization, 1949–1953. in: Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe: zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie (Bratislava, Ústav pamäti národa 2012) 564-597; Dariusz Jarosz/Grzegorz Miernik, “Zhańbiona” wieś Okół: opowieści o buncie (Warszawa/Kielce: Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk – Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach, 2016).

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The demonstration’s main actor is the whole community, and the social structure of the community plays an important role in its organisation. This case is also suitable for educational purposes because it enables us to open up the topic of the resistance of women. Only a few women participated in armed resistance. The reason might be that participation in such a movement didn’t fit into their expected roles of women and thus was not encouraged. However, in the Dobruška case, women actively participated in the demonstration, but within the boundaries of the roles that they hold in rural communities. The proposed educational activities are concentrated on unfolding relationships among various actors in the community and reconstructing their social in addition to cultural backgrounds. The case of the demonstration was also chosen for the richness of the primary sources available. Students confront ideological language in the official investigation documents, where the motivations of the actors were based in their social and cultural capital, and they therefore learn to critically evaluate the ideological documents. Oral histories of the last victims that were published in 200041 are a different type of source. On the one hand, these offer ‘authentic’ recollections of the event, but on the other, they bear the typical features of the trauma process taking place in the 1990s. Students therefore also learn to understand how personal recollections are also shaped by the historical and political context. Other type of resources employed in the teaching set are aerial maps from the early 1950s and contemporary ones, where the impact of collectivisation policies are visible (before the JZDs, land was scattered into small private fields, while fields are much bigger even nowadays). This helps the student understand the political development in a larger context and understand the way that the policies of the 1950s also shaped the landscape. It also allows them to assess its impact on social and economic relationship and how it influenced the rural environment in the Czech Republic even today. The character of the demonstration and its context is more suitable for comparisons with the situations of students’ families and communities than cases of armed resistance are. Skills learned through an examination of the primary and secondary sources on the Dobruška case can be used for a critical examination of the history of one‘s own region. The collectivisation of agriculture is a process that influenced a large share of Czech families, and students who learned basic information about the process through the case of the demonstration will be ready to give informed questions to witnesses 41  Věra Vlčková, Horizonty nesvobody: Političtí vězni v okrese Náchod 1948–1989 (Náchod: Konfederace politických vězňů, okresní pobočka Náchod, 2000).

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and understand their positions. To understand what the reasons were behind various standpoints in the past and how these influence communities even today is one of the main goals of learning about the Dobruška demonstration in 1949. Conclusion There are only few issues from the Czech past that are as controversial and as deeply associated with political and social identity as the anti-communist resistance. That feature qualifies it in our opinion as both an attractive and a suitable subject for history education. However, as we have seen in this chapter, there are number of obstacles and challenges that educators have to face here. We have also attempted to identify some conditions and methods to ensure its efficient and successful use in the classroom. Let us briefly summarize both the challenges and the potential cures here. The indisputably controversial nature of the violent anti-communist resistance as such is a sign of the multiple competing perspectives on the legitimacy of the communist regime as such, but also at a protest and its repertoire. Unlike some other aspects of the communist regime, such as the (nonviolent) dissident movement, research into violent anti-communist resistance lacks a methodological basis and conceptual tools. That does not help the public discussion to use arguments grounded in the findings of primary research findings. Moreover, conceptual deficiencies of the research tend to lead to confusion rather than clarifying the forms and types of resistance. The problems of the primary research, such as the lack of information about the scale of resistance or the number of participants, contrasts with the strong moral judgements on resistance movement or its participant that are given by historians. One of the visible examples is the difference between an overt resistance and a target-defined resistance, or, in other words, between active protestors and victimized non-protesters. The understandable cause of de-legitimizing the communist regime cannot override unbiased research, nor can it form a solid basis for history or civic education. What is more, the controversial nature of the issue makes the memory of it and the way the issue is currently treated in the public debate a material through which students can become more aware of the ways historical issues are dealt with, used, and misused in political and academic debate. Most researchers focusing on protest and resistence, including Hollander and Einwohner, come to the conclusion that these phenomena cannot be studied as isolated processes. Resistance tends to be fluid, sometimes

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contradictory, and it definitely does not come only in the pure form of a rightful, pro-democratic struggle against fully illegitimate dominance. The aforementioned difference between the active resisters and régime-constructed resisters is difficult to distinguish, for example, based on limited primary sources or witnesses’ accounts. For history education, but also for research, this should lead to openness in studying a whole range of the different forms of resistance (and loyalty), without romanticizing it. Violent forms of resistance cannot be understood without non-violent forms and even non-politically driven protests, as we show in our example of the Dobruška peasant protest. A precondition to using controversial issues such as the anti-communist resistance is an open, safe environment. The work of preparing such settings goes well beyond this issue, but there are techniques to support openness, such as posing questions aimed at motives, analyzing and interpreting primary sources, and leaving a space for students to become valued as partners in the endeavour of making the past meaningful. The purpose of this chapter is not only to describe the situation in the Czech Republic, but also to propose particular solutions to improve the conception and and the debate on the violent anti-communist resistance in Czechoslovakia, starting with schools. Bibliography Abrams, Bradley F., Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture And the Rise of Communism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). Alexander, Jeffery C., Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma in Alexander, in: Jeffrey C (ed.), Cultural trauma and collective identity (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 2004). Anderson, Lorin W./David R. Krathwohl/Benjamin Samuel Bloom, A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001). Barton, Keith/McCully Alan, Teaching controversial issues …, where controversial issues really matter, in: Teaching history 127 (2007). Biháry, Michal, ‘Moderní-Dějiny.cz/Odbojová Skupina Bratří Mašínů’ (http://www. moderni-dejiny.cz/clanek/odbojova-skupina-bratri-masinu/, last accessed 12 March 2017). Blaive, Muriel, Promarněná příležitost: Československo a rok 1956 (Prague: Prostor, 2001). Blažek, Petr (ed.), Opozice a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu 1968– 1989 (Prague: Ústav českých dějin FF UK: Dokořán, 2005).

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Blažek, Petr/Jaroslav Čvančara, From War to War – The Adolescence of Brothers Ctirad and Josef Mašín in Recollections and Photographs, in: Behind the Iron Curtain (3), 140-53. Bursík, Tomáš, Diskuse nad třetím odbojem: pokus o stručný nástin problému, in: Ondřej Šanca/Cóilín O’Connor (eds.), Odboj a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu a ve Střední Evropě : sborník k mezinárodní konference (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2010). Cristoloveanu, Catalin, Conflict in the Countryside: Peasants, Resistance and the Romanian Communist State during Collectivization, 1949–1953. in: Herausgeber, Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe: zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie (Bratislava, Ústav pamäti národa 2012) 564-597. Cuhra, Jaroslav, Trestní represe odpůrců režimu v letech 1969–1972 (= Sešity Ústavu pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR 29, Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1997). Čornej, Petr, Dějepis pro střední odborné školy (Prague: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 2010). Čvančara, Jaroslav, ‘We Serve Our Nation …’, in: Behind the Iron Curtain (3), 162-79. Einwohner Rachel/Hollander Jocelyn, Conceptualizing Resistance, in: Sociological Forum 19 (2004) 4, 533-554. Fitzpatrick, Sheila, Ascribing class: the construction of social identity in Soviet Russia, in: Journal of Modern History 65 (1993) 12, 745-770. Gjuričová, Adéla, Poněkud tradiční rozchod s minulostí. Občanská demokratická strana, in: Adéla Gjuričová (ed.), Rozděleni minulostí- Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2012). Hess, Diana E., Controversy in the classroom: The democratic power of discussion (London: Routledge, 2009). Jarosz, Dariusz/Miernik, Grzegorz, “Zhańbiona” wieś Okół: opowieści o buncie (Warszawa/Kielce: Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk – Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach, 2016). Kalous, Jan, Státní bezpečnost a třetí odboj v letech 1948–1951, in: Třetí odboj: kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století (Plzeň/Praha: Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk; Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů: Metropolitní univerzita Praha, 2010), 274-286. Kotalík, Matěj, “Páskové” a “chuligáni” proti režimu? Na okraj tradičních konceptů odboje a rezistence, in: Odboj a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu a ve Střední Evropě: sborník k mezinárodní konferenci (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2010), 225-232. Kuklík Jan/Kuklík Jan jr., Dějepis pro gymnázia a střední školy 4- Nejnovější dějiny (Prague: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 2005). Legitimita Politického Násilí a Případ Bratří Mašínů – Dějepis v 21. Století (http://www. dejepis21.cz/legitimita-politickeho-nasili-na-prikladu-bratri-masinu, last accessed 30 October 2017).

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Marada, Radim, Paměť, trauma, generace, in: Sociální studia/Social Studies 4 (2016) 1-2, 79-95. Masin, Barbara, Gauntlet: Five Friends, 20,000 Enemy Troops, and the Secret That Could Have Changed the Course of the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, 2006). McDermott, Kevin, Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia: The Plzeň Uprising, June 1953, in: Contemporary European History 19 (2010), 287-307. McDermott, Kevin/Matthew Stibbe, Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule (Oxford: Berg, 2006). Pejčoch, Ivo, Protikomunistické Puče: Historie pokusů o vojenské svržení komunistického režimu v Československu 1948–1958 (Cheb: Svět křídel, 2011). Pinkas, Jaroslav (ed.), Třetí odboj v didaktické perspektivě (Praha: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů a Lidové noviny, 2020). Pluralita Postojů Vůči Režimu v 50. Letech 20. Století – Dějepis v 21. Století (http:// www.dejepis21.cz/pluralita-postoju-vuci-rezimu-v-50-letech-20-stoleti, last accessed 30 October 2017). Pollack Detlef/Wielgohs Jan, Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2004). Sattler, Robert, “Uctění mašínovy oběti. Honzátko dostal medaili i pamětní desku”, (1.10.2016,https://www.lidovky.cz/ucteni-masinovy-obeti-honzatko-dostal-medaili-ipametni-desku-p68-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160930_143846_ln_domov_rsa, last accessed 1 November 2017). Rusu, Mihai Stelian, Battling over Romanian Red Past. The Memory of Communism between Elitist Cultural Trauma and Popular Collective Nostalgia, in: Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (2015) 1, 24-48. Rychlík, Jan, Collectivization in Czechoslovakia in comparative perspective, 1949–1960, in: Iordachi, Constantin/Bauerkämper Arnd (eds.), The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: comparison and entanglements (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2014). Scott, James C., Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Stewart, Michael/Stan, Razvan, Collectivization and resistance in the shepherding village of Poiana Sibiului, in: Iordachi, Constantin/Dobrincu, Dorin (eds.), Transforming peasants, property and power: the collectivization of agriculture in Romania, 1949–1962 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 261-265. Stradling, Robert, Teaching 20th-century European history (Council of Europe, 2001). Suk, Jiří, Politické hry s “nedokončenou revolucí”. Účtování s komunismem v čase občanského fóra a po jeho rozpadu, in: Adéla Gjuričová (ed.), Rozděleni minulostí-Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2012).

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Švéda, Josef, Czech Communist and Post-:Communist Heroes in the Twentieth Century, in Arnold Suppan/Maximilian Graf (eds.), From the Austrian Empire to Communist East Central Europe (Münster: LIT, 2010). Thorp, Robert, Uses of History in History Education, (2016 http://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:958123, last accessed 24 October 2017). Veber, Václav, Třetí odboj ČSR v letech 1948–1953 (Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, Fakulta filozofická, 2014). Věra Vlčková, Horizonty nesvobody: Političtí vězni v okrese Náchod 1948–1989 (Náchod: Konfederace politických vězňů, okresní pobočka Náchod, 2000).

Summary In this chapter, we draw on a project called ‘The third resistance in a pedagogical perspective’. We pay attention to the armed anti-communist resistance in Stalinist Czechoslovakia from 1948–1953. A review of available literature finds the topic to be of only marginal interest to international academia. In the case of domestic research, we find a number of deficiencies, especially when concentrating on single case studies: a low level of attention to the conceptual grip of the topic, and often an uncritical acceptance of the way anti-communist resistance was ‘co-created’ by the political police. We propose more precision in the conceptual grip based on the approach of Einwohner and Hollander. Their approach systematically uses a nexus defined by a trio of the actors’ intent and recognition of the resistant behaviour by its target and audience. We further enhance this approach by adding a time layer. In our view, the controversy around anti-communist resistance is productive material from a pedagogical point of view. That is why we investigate the phases and shapes of the production of cultural memory in this regard, taking the birth of the term ‘third resistance’ as one example. Our analysis shows an incongruence between the widely accepted notion of collective trauma present in post-communist societies representing the memory of victims and the memory of active anti-communist resistance. The dynamic of the phenomenon after 1989 is illustrated by the legal acknowledgement of the anticommunist resistance coming only after 2010. The section of the chapter that deals with the educational application of anti-communist resistance uses the methodology of teaching using controversial approaches developed by Diana Hess and Alan McCully. Its basic principles are applied in the two subsequent case studies and include inquiry-based learning using primary and secondary sources, multi-perspective approach,

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uncovering moral dilemmas in historical context and leaving controversial and incongruent aspects unsmooth (not romanticising the stories). The case studies deal with the so-called Masin brothers’ case and an unarmed protest against the collectivisation of agriculture in the small Czech town of Dobruška. Both studies start with a short overview of the story and develop further using the pedagogical goals and methods associated with these pieces of material in education. Perhaps the best-known case of armed resistance by the Masin brothers is complemented by a completely different story of the non-violent protest of farmers of the Dobruška region in 1949, against violent collectivisation. While the political motives of the armed protest of the Masin brothers are unquestionable and the form of resistance was overt, in the case of Dobruška, political motives were largely ascribed to the protesters in retrospect. The reasons behind this selection are twofold: they might allow for different educational goals, and show us that violent resistance is only one type of resistant behaviour; in Czechoslovak history, in particular, rather a rare one.

Summary in Czech

V kapitole vycházíme z rozsáhlejšího projektu Třetí odboj v didaktické perspektivě. Zaměřujeme se zde na ozbrojený protikomunistický odboj ve stalinistickém Československu. Úvodní přehled výzkumu k tématu konstatuje jen okrajový zájem zahraničních autorů. V případě domácího výzkumu pak ukazujeme jeho problematické aspekty zejména časté soustředění se na jednotlivé případy, nízkou míru pozornosti ke konceptuálnímu uchopení a často jen málo kritické převzetí toho, jak protikomunistický odboj “spolu-vytvářela” tehdejší politická policie. Navrhujeme proto zaměřit větší pozornost ke konceptualizaci protikomunistické rezistence podle vzoru Hollanderové a Einwohnerové založené na trojici záměr aktéra, rozeznání ze strany cíle rezistence a pozorovatele s vlastním rozšířením o časovou perspektivu. Protože společenskou kontroverzi kolem protikomunistického odboje považujeme za didakticky produktivní, a navíc pomáhá vysvětlit podobu domácího výzkumu, podnikáme proto dále exkurz do různých fází vytváření kolektivní paměti protikomunistického odboje například analýzou postupně ustavovaného pojmu “třetí odboj”. Naznačujeme nesoulad mezi “kolektivním traumatem” obětí a aktivní povahou protikomunistické rezistence, a ukazujeme tak v souvislosti s právním řešením společenského uznání protikomunistických odbojářů značnou dynamiku tohoto fenoménu po roce 1989.

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Část týkající se samotné didaktické aplikace uvádí inspirační zdroje pro výuku kontroverzních témat, tedy především díla Diany Hess a Alana McCullyho. Základními principy dvou následujících případových studií didaktického využití případů třetího odboje ve výuce jsou práce s primárními prameny, multiperspektivita, obnažení morálních dilemat v dobovém kontextu, nevyhlazování kontroverzních a nesoudržných (či nepochopitelných) aspektů příběhů a neromantizování. Představené případové studie se týkají činnosti takzvané skupiny bratří Mašínů a neozbrojeného případu protikolektivizační demonstrace zemědělců v malém českém městě Dobruška. Obě studie přinášejí krátké shrnutí příběhu a dále se věnujeme didaktické stránce, tedy vzdělávacím cílům a metodám, které s případy a jejich využitím ve výuce spojujeme. Případ nejznámějšího příběhu ozbrojeného oboje bratrů Mašínů doplňujeme zcela rozdílným, nenásilným a donedávna poměrně neznámým protestem zemědělců proti násilné kolektivizaci z roku 1949. Zatímco politické motivy ozbrojeného protestu skupiny bratří Mašínů včetně změny režimu jsou nepochybné a jednalo se o “otevřenou” formu rezistence, v případě Dobrušské demonstrace byly politické motivy spíše zpětně připsané. Důvodem výběru jsou právě rozdílné vzdělávací cíle, ale též poukaz na pochopení různých forem rezistentního chování, přičemž ozbrojený odpor je jen jedním, zvláštním typem, který se navíc v československé historii vyskytuje relativně zřídka.

Chapter 12

From Non-violent Resistance to Uprising by Force: The Case of Hungary 1945–1956 Michael Gehler/Ibolya Murber

Preliminary Remarks

This article pursues seven goals concerning the issues of this anthology on violent resistance offered behind the Iron Curtain in the first post-war decade. Its scale must primarily be understood as the outcome of a history of suppression,1 which can be seen in the example of Hungary. Firstly, this article provides an introduction to existing literature and its status of research. Secondly, it deals with data and figures from the perspective of the Hungarian state suppression apparatus, thirdly with an attempt to periodize the development from the end of the war to the uprising, fourthly with the role of the churches, including the Catholic and Lutheran ones, fifthly with the harbingers of, and sixthly with the climax of the Hungarian popular uprising and the motives underlying it, and lastly with the specific function of the Austro-Hungarian border in the crisis year 1956.

Status of Research

At the beginning of the 21st century, the prevalent views on Hungarian history after 1945, practically do not report about social resistance in Hungary.2 An anthology by Hungarian historians about the history of Hungary mentions state terror through the intimidation of society, including the political trials and their victims, which are substantiated by figures, but does not deal with the social opposition behind it, its backgrounds, or structures. What is thematized here, are the politically instrumentalized show trials, which were able 1  See the standard work by Anne Applebaum, Der Eiserne Vorhang. Die Unterdrückung Osteuropas 1944–1956 (Munich: Siedler, 2013). 2  For Hungarian social history in the second half of the 20th century, see Tibor Valuch, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a 20. század második felében, (Budapest: Osiris, 2001) and for a history of Hungary in the 20th century, Ignác Romsics, Magyarország története a 20. században (Budapest: Osiris, 2003).

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_013

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to suppress possible opposition or resistance as deterrents.3 Recent (overall) presentations of the Hungarian Stalinist dictatorship up to 19564 and of the Hungarian Uprising in 19565 do address the fact that no decisive social opposition with grave consequences for the regime took place in Hungary once the Communist dictatorship had been established. Unfortunately, the authors do not address the social causes or intend to place this lack of or inadequate history of Hungarian resistance in an overall (Eastern) European context either. After the turn of the century, individual research work commenced on the topic of ‘everyday resistance’ (James C. Scott)6 in Hungarian society post-1945, but an overall view of Hungarian anti-Communist resistance has not been provided yet. However, the publications by Mark Pittaway have offered a new perspective on the measures of suppression by the Communist dictatorship.7 The topic of possible forms of resistance by rural and peasant strata after 1945 was taken up by Gyöngyi Farkas over the last decade.8 In several studies, the Hungarian historian Tamás Meszerics treated the possible reasons for the lack of anti-Communist resistance, also from the perspective of the secret service.9 3  István György Tóth, Geschichte Ungarns (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 724.; for general information, see Wolfgang Maderthaner /Hans Schafranek /Berthold Unfried (eds.), “Ich habe den Tod verdient.” Schauprozesse und politische Verfolgung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 1945–1956 (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1991). 4  Monograph by the head of the Hungarian State Security Archives, György Gyarmati, A Rákosi-korszak. Rendszerváltó fordulatok évtizede Magyarországon 1945–1956 (Budapest: Rubicon-ház, 2011). 5  János M. Rainer, Az 1956-os magyar forradalom (Budapest: Osiris, 2016). 6  A reference to the concept ‘Everyday forms of resistance’ by James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 7  A highly readable monograph about the early Hungarian Communist dictatorship by the British historian, who tragically died young: Mark Pittaway, The Workers’ State: Industrial Labor and the Making of Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 8  In her many studies employing case study analysis, Gyöngyi Farkas, a Hungarian historian, dealt with the forms of resistance by the peasant population against the enforced collectivization of agriculture. In her dissertation, she investigated peasant demonstrations against collectivization, Gyöngyi Farkas, Hatalom és falusi társadalom az 1950-es években. Tűntetések a kollektivizálás ellen. (phil. Diss., Eötvös – Loránd – Universität Budapest 2010). Her recently published monograph: Gyöngyi Farkas, Lázadó falvak. Kollektivizálás elleni tüntetések a vidéki Magyarországon, 1951–1961 (Budapest: Korall, 2017). 9  Tamás Meszerics, Politikai ellenállás 1945-56, in: Beszélő (2000)9-10, 74-45. (online, but without pagination http://beszelo.c3.hu/00/0910/20meszerics.htm#Jegyzetek, last accessed 9 March 2019); Further literature by Idem, ‘Independence Before All Else: Hungarian Anti-Communist Resistance in the East European Context, 1945–1956’, in: East European quarterly 41(2007) 1, 39-59. As well as Idem, ‘Undermine, or Bring them Over: SOE and OSS Plans for Hungary, in 1943’, in: Journal of Contemporary History 43 (2008), 2, 195-216. also Tamás Meszerics, ‘The Security Policy of Hungary’ in: Tomas Valasek/Olga Gyarfasova (eds.)

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Accordingly, in Hungary there was no mass opposition to the establishment and consolidation of a Communist dictatorship comparable, for instance, with that in the Baltic states, in Romania, or in Ukraine. Very early, already at the beginning of 1956, on 5 January, at the behest of the military counter-espionage department (‘G’) of the US Army, Georgetown University compiled all the information available on the activities and potential of the Hungarian resistance, publishing a report. The researchers had access to dissidents and émigrés. They prepared the material in the course of interviews and profiting from documents from the American foreign secret service organization Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military counter-espionage. The findings of the research were not ambivalent. There was no evidence that any armed partisan activity in Hungary, in terms of effective resistance units against the Rákosi regime, was developing, let alone consolidating.10 Meszerics pursued the question as to why there was no armed resistance or rebellion prior to that autumn. His reasoning refers to Hungary’s topography in particular. In his opinion, the latter made it impossible for insurgents with arms or even possible ‘partisan’ units to live or assemble at a safe distance to state authority and in suitably uninhabited refuges, such as strongly wooded or rugged areas. It was in appropriate mountainous regions like Transdanubia, the Bakony Forest, and the northern Hungarian uplands north of the lowlands that the military centers were located e.g. in Veszprém, Pápa and Tapolca, because of their specific topography.

The Data Available

All the same, the US report mentioned earlier established more than 15 organizations formed after 1945 and conducting anti-Communist activities. But all of them were disbanded over the period up to 1956 or ‘kept under strict operational observation’. Only little is known about the leaders, the membership structure, and the political orientation of these resistance organizations.11

 Easternization of Europe’s Security Policy. (Brussels: Institute for Public Affairs Bratislava and Center for Defence Information, 2004), 22-31. 10  ’Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials’ in: Csaba Bekes/ Malcolm Byrne/ Janos Rainer (eds.): The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents. National Security Archive Cold War Readers. (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2002) Online: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc1.pdf (last accessed 15 January 2018). 11  Ibd.

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Based on the Soviet model, the Hungarian state security service had an elaborate apparatus. 45,521 agents worked for the Államvédelmi Hatóság (State Security Agency) until 1953. With Imre Nagy’s reform course, their number dropped to about 10,000 persons. That was a much larger apparatus than the one in East Germany prior to 1961.12 In self-justification, the state security personnel frequently described ‘bogus enemies’ in their files, also providing exaggerated information about possible threats from society. Proceeding from these precepts, the concepts of the enemy of the Communist dictatorship were colorful, largely correlating to Moscow’s views. The major foe of Communist propaganda were the old political elites, like the networks of the erstwhile Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy,13who, however, was already in exile in Portugal, and the former Fascist ‘Arrow Cross’ supporters.14 In its official explanation of the ‘counter-revolution of 1956’, the Kádár administration availed itself of the formula of a ‘conspiracy by Horthy’s reactionaries with foreign and imperialist support’. Other groups hostile to Communism and its economic policy of agricultural collectivization were the wealthy ‘kulaks’, but frequently also the poorer rural population. At the onset of the 1950s, the rural population was identified as the ‘internal enemy’ and accused of delaying or even trying to obstruct the Socialist transformation. When we look for peasant ‘anti-Communist’ organizations and their alleged activities, material can be found in the archives of the state security service. However, their antiCommunist resistance must be interpreted as being cautious and restrained. Members of the opposition and regime critics were concerned with ‘everyday resistance’ (James C. Scott) rather than with undermining the Communist dictatorship. The goal of these minor offences consisted of ensuring one’s own and the family’s chances of surviving. Hence, the regime only managed to adduce official state evidence of active resistance in theory and in the form of show trials. The latter ended with roughly 200 verdicts, 15 of them were death sentences.15 It seems to be substantiated that resistance organizations were headed by local leaders of the democratic 12  Árpád von Klimó, Ungarn seit 1945 (Göttingen: Vadenhoeck- Ruprecht, 2006), 35. 13   See, Peter Gosztonyi, Miklós von Horthy. Admiral und Reichsverweser. Biographie (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1973); Catherine Horel, L’amiral Horthy. Régent de Hongrie (Paris: Perrin, 2014). 14  It was, however, all the more surprising that a large number of right-wing radical Arrow Cross supporters, who had not left the country at the end of the war, joined the Communist Party after 1945. For more, see Károly Ignác, Politikai és választói magatartás 1939-ben és 1945-ben – a nyilas–kommunista folytonosság mítosza, in: Múltunk. Politikatörténeti folyóirat (2016)1, 19-44. 15  Stefano Bottoni, A várva várt nyugat. Kelet-Európa története 1944-tȍl napjainkig. (=Magyar Történelmi Emlékek Értekezések, Budapest, 2014: MTA BTK), 113.

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and anti-Communist parties, still existing in the years from 1945 to 1947 (e.g. Christian Democrats, Democratic People’s Party, Independent Smallholders).16 But the communal and regional reorganization of these parties did not suffice. Their activities lasted only a short time until their representatives either had to depart into exile or into domestic illegality. As in the case of other Central and Eastern European resistance groups, the objectives of these covert organizations consisted of the very specific desire for national independence and a more general, undefinable anti-Communist mentality. Therefore, caution should be exercised in making clearly negative imputations during the establishment of the Communist dictatorship in Hungary between 1945 and 1947. In comparison with the pronounced social inequality of the Horthy system in the 1920s–1940s or the disastrous experiences of the Second World War, a possible democratic new beginning in 1945 seemed to the majority of the populace to be an almost tangible chance of a better future. In 1945, people flocked into the newly established parties, but many of them only for the time being and merely ‘on paper’. The turnout in the first democratic parliamentary elections in November 1945 came to almost 100% of the electorate. Despite the presence of the Red Army in Hungary, the transitional phase from the just established Western democracy with a multi-party system to the Communist dictatorship took several years. The political and social achievements and promises between 1945 and 1947 constituted a strong attraction to broad sections of the population. It also justified the hope, which continued to exist after 1945, that the Communist dictatorship would only be a temporary development. In his recent monograph on the Hungarian Uprising, János M. Rainer concedes that ‘the mass resistance of Hungarian society in the transitional phase is a legend’.17 According to the Hungarian historian, for a substantial section of the population Stalinism seemed to be a thoroughly acceptable offer concerning the real problems and challenges in Hungarian society. The election results of 1945 and 1947 were not only the consequences of ballot rigging, although external coercion could not be denied.18 A different view of the anti-Communist traditions in Hungary is held by László Borhi. This Hungarian historian points out that in Hungary anti-Communist thinking was associated with a long anti-Russian tradition. Consequently, the Sovietization

16  Meszerics, Politikai ellenállás, 77. 17  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 20. 18  Ibd.  21.

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of Hungary was a result of Moscow’s political will and lack of support from the Western Allies.19 On the whole, hardly any comprehensive and reliable data is available for assessing the scale of anti-Communist resistance in Hungary prior to 1956. On the one hand, the illegal nature of resistance implied that it was organized in secret against the ruling system and practically without any ‘records being made’. On the other, the state security service was tasked with observing operations inimical to the regime, forestalling and preventing them. These files of the Hungarian state security service are the most important and often sole sources for researching resistance. Nevertheless, as has already been stated, attentive source criticism is necessary. Most statistics in the state security service files were manipulated at some point and ‘cooked’ for the show trials in order to provide the material ‘desired’ by the state. Accordingly, state security bodies arrested 2,096 persons in 1951, 3,228 the following year, and another 1,871 persons until 1 August 1953 on the grounds of differing political offences. These included people accused of the most severe political offences, such as ‘diversion’, ‘terror’, ‘espionage’, ‘sabotage’, and ‘conspiracy’. For these offences, 450 were arrested in 1951, 1,053 in 1952, and 681 until 1 August 1953. These are people recorded in the files of the state security service. Most likely there were many more. The Hungarian Minister of the Interior László Piros reported in 1954 that ‘operational work’ had been instituted by the state security service against 28 ‘counter-revolutionary’ organizations and 87 hostile groupings.20 Between 1945 and 1956, 43,000 people were condemned in Hungary, apart from war criminals, including 500 to death. Again, caution is called for when interpreting these figures. People were also sentenced to prison terms for illegal border crossings or making political jokes in local pubs. Rainer concludes that about 4,000-5,000 people actively rebelled against the regime prior to 1956. However, the state security service was observing a much larger segment of the population.21 In July 1956 Mátyás Rákosi, the secretary general of the MDP still in office, who sought to demolish the democratic opposition with his infamous ‘salami tactics’, told the Political Committee that the state security service was exposing an average of two counter-revolutionary plots per month.22 This statement sought, on the one hand, to demonstrate the strength of the state security 19  Lászó Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 53. 20  Gyarmati, Rákosi-korszak. 21  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 72. 22  László Borhi, ‘Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? US Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s’, in: Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (1999). 3, 67-110, here 88.

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service and, on the other, reflected a certain perception of the ‘process of fermentation’ among the population.

Stages in the Political Development of Different Forms of Resistance

During the transitional stage from a limited multi-party democracy to a Communist dictatorship between 1945 and 1948, there was no appreciably organized and effective anti-Communist resistance in Hungary. The new, post1945 political leadership did not want any restoration of the conditions prior to 1945, and all the important parties rejected the socio-economic structures prevailing in the inter-war years. The Smallholders’s Party achieved an absolute majority (57%) at the elections in 1945, which was due to its party programme. This collective party advocated the freedom of the nation, but no explicit antiCommunism. Despite great expectations and the support of the Red Army, the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt hereafter MKP) received only 17% of the vote. At any rate, in 1945 the Hungarian population did not have such pronounced resentment against the Soviet Union as was the case in Poland or the Baltic states. At the last democratic elections in 1947, the Communist Party achieved 22%, but the opposition had already been successfully fragmented by Communist agitation. The opposition was essentially constituted within the still legal political framework of forming party coalitions. The notorious ‘salami tactics’ of the Communists were that successful in Hungary because until 1947 the opposition parties had proceeded from the assumption that the MKP of the time with its Stalinist practices would shrink after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947 and with the withdrawal of the Soviet Army and could be beaten by legal means. The Communist Party and its dominance were reckoned to be merely a temporary episode. The democratic parties opted against illegality, which in Hungary, unlike in the Baltic states and Poland, had no social or historical traditions. The opposition largely renounced violence and armed resistance.23 Political violence and armed resistance had no appreciable traditions in Hungary,24 except the years of civil war 1918/19. In the interwar period, the state possessed a monopoly on the use of force, which, however, was not directed against the population. It served to maintain the authoritarian Horthy system. During the economic crisis of the 1930s, there were a few strikes, which 23  Meszerics, Politikai ellenállás, 80. 24  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 71.

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could be quelled immediately with death sentences. Yet, the enforcement of anti-Semitic legislation, the ghettoization, and deportation of the Hungarian Jews between 1944 and 1945 did not necessitate any great effort on the part of the state authority. The Hungarian Jews were subservient to authority and ‘good Hungarians’ to boot. There was no active resistance to the German occupation of Hungary, unlike in Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. In November 1944, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, a Hungarian journalist and antiSemite, founded the ‘Hungarian National Liberation Committee’. It was a nationalist and anti-Fascist resistance organization, intending to oppose the Arrow Cross dictatorship and the German occupation. Nevertheless, their activities were exposed the same month by the Arrow Cross and its leaders were executed before the end of the war.25 At any rate, a political culture of armed resistance did not exist in Hungary. So, the political opposition did not resort to this means after 1945. The first illegal organizations were formed in the period between 1947 and 1950, usually under the leadership of former local radical opposition politicians who had been ousted from legal political life and forced to go underground. Common to them all were animosity towards the Communist regime of Mátyás Rákosi and the desire for national independence. These opposition groups were quickly detected by the state security service and often dissolved before any action could take place. After 1949/50, the forced collectivization of agriculture was intensified, linked to the permanent persecution of the church and its faithful, thus driving a considerable number of peasants into the arms of these resistance groups or making them into passive sympathizers of the same. These opposition groups only emerged in the course of years, encouraged by the Communist state terror and unfavorable economic policies, especially as the rural classes had earlier tended to be politically inactive or passive during the establishment of the Stalinist system. This rural environment nurtured a new working class, occasioned particularly by enforced industrialization. Still relatively young workers moving from rural areas to industrial towns took with them their gloomy memories of these measures, their negative experiences of the ‘persecution of kulaks’, and their recollections of suppression by earlier rulers. These people must have formed the backbone of the uprisings and the protagonists of the armed conflict in autumn 1956. The détente between the Superpowers, gradually commencing after Stalin’s death, and the correlating reform course during Imre Nagy’s first tenure as 25  T  arján M. Tamás, 1944. december 24. | Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre meggyilkolása. (Rubiconline http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/1944_december_24_bajcsy_zsilinszky_endre_ meggyilkolasa, last accessed 9 March 2019).

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prime minister between 1953 and 1955 aroused hopes of possible improvements among broad sections of the population. The partial and temporary Communist restoration at the beginning of 1955 intensified the wish for a change of the system, provoking a radicalization those in power sought to oppose. In 1955/56, the Communist system in Hungary showed many signs of breaking up: the political elite was divided, and public discourse was becoming louder and more critical. The active oppositional intelligentsia, which had long been believed to have been silenced and eliminated, was coming more and more to the fore. A general awareness of change was spreading, whilst the party apparatus was paralyzed by the fear of change. So, in the summer of 1956, the collapse of Communism seemed to be nearing in Hungary, although the opposition was neither uniformly organized nor acted in united fashion. Against this backdrop, October 1956 in Hungary was a revolution, initiated first by students, then supported by the masses, and by no means a simple conspiracy. ‘Everyday resistance’, according to the term by James C. Scott26 , was much more common than politically organized resistance in the Stalinist days of the dictatorship in Hungary prior to 1956. There were spontaneous and unorganized acts by individuals or small groups with the objective of ‘surviving’. They did not intend to overthrow the system, but merely survive the difficulties caused by the system. These incidents consisted of minor individual offences and acts of sabotage with which the protagonists sought to expand their scope of action, which was minutely controlled by the state, to the point of becoming ‘tolerable’, and above all to ensure their own livelihood and that of their families. However, the state security service regarded these ‘acts’ as being resistance widespread among the population, this form of ‘everyday resistance’ allows an explanation as to why merely a small section of the people participated actively and in armed fashion in the uprising of 1956. The majority of the population may have shown solidarity with the diffuse objectives of the insurgents in the late autumn of 1956, but most of them were just passive onlookers or expressed their dissatisfaction by emigrating, a form of ‘everyday resistance’ that suddenly appeared. György Gyarmati also points out that the coerced collectivization of agriculture, associated with repression and persecution, and the enforced industrialization generated self-protection responses in society. The latter often led to a ‘passive solidarity of interests’.27 Reference is also made to the fact that 26  J ames C. Scott holds the view that impotent social classes throughout the world, regardless of the social system and culture, evince remarkably similar self-protection mechanisms and methods of self-defence. See, Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 27  Gyarmati, A Rákosi-korszak, 193.

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the Socialist reorganization of industrial workers in the norm decree and a Hungarian takeover of the Stakhanovite movement had failed.28 Gyarmati sees the reasons for the ‘acts of sabotage’, as they were called by the authorities, in the poorly organized work system, in a misguided ‘cadre policy’ and in the dearth of skilled employees.29 In this, Mark Pittaway identifies a form of ‘everyday resistance’, such as the miners in the ‘Socialist mining town’ of Komló, who attempted to safeguard their livelihood and income with minor acts of sabotage.30 This form of ‘everyday resistance’ could afford both the workers and the rural population a certain, yet highly restricted ‘independence’ from political power. So, these people were not merely ‘passive victims’ of the Communist dictatorship. They sought actively to shape their lives themselves within diminishing scopes for action and even to expand them. In her dissertation, using case studies, Gyöngyi Farkas describes how peasants feigned their willingness and consent to the collectivization, but worked against its efficacy in the background. Within their narrow scope for action, they chose forms of ‘latent’ resistance, such as the illegal slaughtering of animals or hiding compulsory levies,31 or they even abandoned their work in agriculture and moved to the towns.32 There is no comprehensive study of peasant resistance in Hungary, but a documentation of interviews with contemporary witnesses and secret service personnel and court records allows peasant resistance against collectivization in the south-eastern region of the lowland plain around Szeged, Orosháza, and Hódmezővásárhely to be emphasized. In this small, agricultural, and overpopulated region ‘Viharsarok’ (’stormy corner’) in county Békés, there had already been agriculturally motivated and well-organized strikes at the end of the 19th century. Here, a peculiar settlement pattern was especially striking, i.e. a broad plain with agriculturally productive land as well as a few larger villages 28  Ibd., 205-206. 29  Ibd., 206. 30  For a reinterpretation of the social limits to state control in terms of a workers’ history and anthropology of industrial workers and the Socialist dictatorship in Hungary, see Mark Pittaway, ‘Az állami ellenőrzés társadalmi korlátainak újraértékelése: az ipari dolgozók és a szocialista diktatúra Magyarországon 1948–1953’, in: Sándor Horváth/László Pethő/ Eszter Zsófia Tóth (eds.), Munkástörténet – munkásantropológia. Tanulmányok (Budapest: Napvilág, 2002) 71-82; Idem., ‘Retreat from Collective Protest: Household, Gender, Work and Popular Opposition in Stalinist Hungary’, in: Jan Kok (ed.), Rebellious Families: Household Strategies and Collective Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2002). 31  Farkas, Lázadó falvak. 32  As was the case with the grandfather on the mother’s side of the co-author of this study.

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with small farms dispersed far away from one another, often at distances of several 10 kilometers. From time immemorial, these little farmsteads had symbolized freedom from the state, thus expressing independence. The rural populace of this region was traditionally regarded as particularly wild, disobedient, and refractory. Ultimately, the Communist dictatorship aimed at eliminating these hardly controllable settlement patterns in the course of collectivization. At the same time as the collectivization of agriculture in this region in 1949, informal, small and autonomous resistance groups formed that detested compulsory levies and the persecution of the kulaks familiar from Russia. They called themselves Fehér Gárda (‘White Guard’), Fehér Rózsa (‘White Rose’), Fehér Farkas (‘White Wolf’), Kard és Kereszt (‘Sabre and Cross’) and carried out minor acts of sabotage, expressing their opposition this way. They no longer complied with paying compulsory levies immediately, started fires or deliberately listened to and circulated programmes by the prohibited ‘Voice of America’. One of the indictments against them was ‘collaboration with Horthy’s gendarmerie’. The members of the ‘White Guard’, numbering about 30 persons, were condemned after a show trial. Of the suspects, two were executed, four sentenced to lifelong prison terms, whilst others received long (20 years) and short (4 years) periods of imprisonment. Arms were also impounded.33 Summarizing, research clearly demonstrates that both during the establishment and the maintenance of the Communist dictatorship in Hungary there were regionally confined and temporally limited forms of resistance, e.g. by the Fehér Gárda, the so-called ‘White Guard’ and the Kard és Kereszt Szövetség, the ‘Sabre and Cross Unit’. In 1950 and 1953, show trials took place against their members, frequently ending with death sentences. Reference can also be made to resistance on the part of the church and the country populace against compulsory expropriations. However, due to the enormous quantities of state security service files for the show trials, their scholarly treatment and assessment is seen as being difficult to impossible, as practically no distinction can be made between bogus charges and real activities in the trial records. Therefore, the true resistance cannot really be reconstructed.34 However, statistical data is available on the victims of the show trials, allowing certain conclusions as to the quantity of persons suspect or even dangerous to the Hungarian Communist system. Between the beginning of 1951 and July 1953, about 7,200 persons were arrested for political offences. On average, 33  For the Hungarian peasant ballad and the White Guard in the southern lowland plain, see Sándorné Őze, Magyar parasztballada. Fehérgárda a Dél-Alföldön (Hódmezővásárhely: Hódmezővásárhely Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzat 2005), 211-212. 34  Gyarmati, A Rákosi-korszak, 271-272.

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that was eight per day. With 2,166, about 30% fell into the category of ‘organization against the security of the state’ (diversion, conspiracy, espionage, sabotage and terror). Based on this information, 2.4 new subversive acts had occurred every day.35

The Role of the Churches

On the relationship between the church and resistance, it can be said in general that it was much less pronounced in Hungary than in Poland. In individual cases, potential opposition and resistance may have derived from the church, but in no way did the latter provide incitement to armed resistance. However, it must be conceded that there has been little literature on this subject to the present date.36 Margit Balogh, a Hungarian historian, has published several works on the topic of Communism and resistance by the Catholic Church in Hungary.37 By 1948/49 at the latest, with the exception of the church, all the forms and structures of bourgeois society related to property, society, ideology, culture, and politics had been abolished. But the church was only able to forestall complete elimination and total subjugation to a very limited degree. The confessional situation in Hungary differed from that in other countries in Eastern Central Europe. Two-thirds of the population were Catholic and a third Protestant. The Communist Party saw a strategic asset in this confessional diversity. The Party exploited the confessional divide to preclude possible co-operation between the churches. Due to their confinement to the national state, the two major Protestant Churches (Lutheran and Calvinist) were inclined to come to an arrangement with the Communist leadership.38 In the autumn of 1947, their representatives signed ‘agreements’ with the state, promising loyalty and support for the Communist government, exept for the Catholic Church who did not take this course. For this reason, it faced the severest confrontation with the state authority and corresponding persecution in Hungary, as everywhere else in the so-called ‘Eastern Bloc’.39 35  Ibd., 272-273. 36  An early work by the current director general of the Hungarian State Archives deals with Communist repression of the Catholic Church. Csaba Szabó, Die katholische Kirche Ungarns und der Staat 1945–1965 (Munich: Verlag Ungarisches Institut, 2003). 37  She focuses above all on the work of József Mindszenty in the context of the Catholic Church after 1945. She has recently summarized her findings in two volumes: Margit Balogh, Mindszenty József (1892–1975) (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2015). 38  Klimó, Ungarn, 193. 39  Bottoni, várva várt nyugat, 93.

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In the aftermath of the war, the Christian churches were the last intact institutions in Hungary for a few months. They epitomized an institutional continuity with pre-1945 bourgeois Hungary and an antithesis to the Communist ideology. In 1945, the Holy See promoted the ‘pugnacious’ József Mindszenty40 to become the highest dignitary of the Catholic Church. The Communist leadership terminated the concordat of the inter-war years with the Vatican. The main victim of the land reforms of March 194541 was the Catholic Church in Hungary. The dispossessions undermined their financial independence, the nationalization of schools, and the abolition of Catholic organizations almost completely destroyed the social and cultural influence of the churches. Even the feisty Cardinal József Mindszenty was unable to counter this loss in status.42 Many show trials were held against church dignitaries and members of orders until 1953, including against Cardinal Mindszenty43 and József Grősz, the Archbishop of Kalocsa. However, until the early 1950s, the Catholic Church remained the sole political opponent to Communism. As ‘clerical reactionaries’, the church and the faithful were considered the ‘general reservoir for all those impeding the construction of Socialism’.44 In their reports to Moscow, even Soviet observers described the Catholic Church as the most reactionary force in Hungary.45 Nevertheless, Árpád von Klimó concedes that ‘the vast majority of the Catholic faithful persevered in ‘passive silence’, for the authoritarian and hierarchical upbringing by the Catholic institutions in Hungary had not exactly fostered moral courage or autonomous acting’. Unlike in Poland or Ireland, there was no tradition of a Catholic and nationalist independence movement’.46 Classical examples were the major show trials against Cardinal József Mindszenty47 and Bishop József Grősz in order to demonstrate the power of the communist party to the population.

40  Between December 1944 and the end of the war, Mindszenty was incarcerated because of his criticism of the Arrow Cross dictatorship. 41  Intended were the expropriations of large estates and their distribution among the rural population. 42  In December 1948 Mindszenty was captured und remained in prison until October 1956. 43  József Kardinal Mindszenty, Erinnerungen, (Frankfurt a.M./Berlin/Wien: Propyläen 1974). 44  Margit Balogh, ‘Kommunizmus und egyházi ellenállás Magyarországon’, in: Levente Püski/Tibor Valuch (eds.), Mérlegen a XX. századi magyar történelem. Értelmezések és értekezések (Debrecen: 1956-os Intézet, 2000) 277. 45  Árpád von Klimó, Nation, Konfession, Geschichte. Zur nationalen Geschichtskultur Ungarns im europäischen Kontext (1860–1948) (Munich: Oldenburg, 2003), 369. 46  Klimó, Ungarn, 198. 47  József Kardinal Mindszenty, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt/Main – Berlin – Vienna 1974.

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The Hungarian government was not only focused on high representatives of the Roman Catholic Church but also concentrated her efforts against other Christian confessions: On the situation of the churches in Hungary, the Austrian embassy reported from Budapest in January 1956: ‘With its half a million faithful, the Protestant Church is the third-largest in Hungary after the Roman Catholic and Reformed Churches. Its situation is similar to that of the Reformed Church: in 1948, it concluded an agreement with the state ensuring the exercise of church life and the freedom of internal administration. It also obtained a state subsidy for maintaining pastors and churches, in return for which it decided to make a statement of loyalty towards the state and eschewed running its own confessional schools, with the exception of the institutions for training clerics. […]’ Hungarian Lutherans were represented abroad by Lajos Vető, a bishop willing to co-operate with the Communist leadership. He had participated in the ecumenical discussions in Evanstone/Illinois, USA, and in the meetings at the Lutheran World Congress in Vienna in January 1955. The arrangement between the Protestant Church and the Communist dictatorship was reflected in his words when he appeared at the party congress of the East Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in East Germany in the autumn of 1955. He spoke about ‘the build-up of the church in Hungary’.48 A detailed report by the Austrian ambassador in Budapest, Karl Braunias, states that the Catholic Church in Hungary, albeit strongly thrust onto the defence and deprived of almost all funds, was a final non-Communist refuge, yet without any real chance of active resistance. ‘The foundations for this church life are agreements between the Hungarian government and the Christian churches. Whilst the Protestant, Reformed and Unitarian Churches years ago accepted government proposals for an agreement, ensuring them a certain autonomy, the Catholic Church has been reluctant to do so and chosen the course of conflict, in which Cardinal Mindszenty and other bishops have become martyrs. The remaining bishops faced the decision either to expose themselves and the entire church to destruction or to seek a modus vivendi with the state that they knew would not be recognized by the Vatican, but that might show a way to save what could still be saved. What cannot be rescued any more is the rich landed estates of the church, what cannot be saved is the Catholic school, the daily press and the books, what cannot be saved is the dissolved monasteries and orders, but 48  Report by the Austrian embassy in Budapest, Karl Braunias to Leopold Figl, Zl. 61-pol/56, ‘The situation of the Protestant Church in Hungary’, 18 Feb. 1956. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), AdR, II-pol, Ungarn 4 (GZl. 512.164-pol/56).

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the soul can still be saved. So, the bishops swore an oath of loyalty to the state and accepted humiliation just in order to ensure a subsistence minimum for the church. They surrendered the material life of the church to the state to secure the liberty of spiritual life. The state church office dispatches lay persons to all episcopal ordinariates to control all the bishops’ business, to read their correspondence and to monitor their finances etc. The state is also endeavouring to gain influence on the filling of vacancies in the diocesan chapters, but the issue as to the appointment of new diocesan bishops has not cropped up yet.’49 Despite all the negative aspects, Braunias identified ‘a growing intensification of Catholic life […], externally visible alone by the fact that women are no longer alone in church, but also men. Indeed, even men from leading circles of the Popular Front’. Despite the persistent oppression and the years of persecution, the Austrian observer still noticed certain latitudes appearing in 1956. ‘Church life in Hungary, the Catholic one especially, is confined into narrow limits and inhibited everywhere, if it is viewed from the standards of the free world. But if it is compared with conditions in other people’s democracies, it must be termed as being almost free.’50 With the thaw setting in with the crisis of Stalinism, the first relaxation in the relationship between the church and the state commenced in 1956. Bishops were released from prison and sometimes rehabilitated, like József Grősz. An international ecumenical conference could take place in Budapest in the summer of 1956.51 This détente reached a climax during the Uprising in late autumn, when Cardinal Mindszenty was freed and the politically compromised Communist bishops were removed.

The Harbingers of the Popular Uprising – The Riots Following Defeat at the Soccer World Cup Final in 1954

As show trial records show, isolated strikes or ‘acts of sabotage’ occurred, probably affecting only a few groups of people. This ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott) concerned wage demands and displays of discontent with the low standards of 49  Report by the Austrian embassy in Budapest Zl. 110-Pol/55, ‘The situation of the churches in Hungary’, Karl Braunias to Leopold Figl, 16 June 1955. ÖStA, AdR, II-pol, Ungarn 4 (GZl. 323.028-pol/55); Report by the Austrian embassy in Budapest Zl. 273-Pol/55, ‘State and Catholic Church’, Karl Braunias to Leopold Figl, 15 October 1955, received 20 October 1955. ÖStA, AdR, II-pol, Ungarn 4 (GZl. 323.028-pol/55). 50  Ibd. 51  Klimó, Ungarn, 199.

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living. However, these occasional manifestations of social ‘disobedience’ could usually be stopped rapidly by the state police. On a much larger scale, already mass protests happened after the defeat of the highly favorized Hungarian national team by West Germany in the final of the Soccer World Cup in Switzerland in 1954. Many Hungarians were able to follow the match ‘live’ on the radio and were thus directly involved. After the return of the losing team, riots broke out in Budapest. Furious fans broke the windows of the state betting office and of the apartment of the trainer, Gusztáv Sebes. Angry demonstrators tried to occupy the state radio station. About 15,000 persons are said to have expressed their dissatisfaction. The demonstrations took place throughout the country. Frustration at the sporting defeat quickly turned into protest against the Communist regime, its corruption and its maladministration. According to Britta Lenz, they were the first publicly displayed political protests in Budapest since 1945. Many Hungarians felt cheated of the World Cup title. The targets of the protests were party officials, politicians, and players. Accusations of bribery and rumours of a win sold to the West made the rounds. According to Lenz, the defeat against the Germans expressed ‘the profound mistrust on the part of the population towards the political elites’ that had been accustomed to selling sporting successes as their own and now had to deal with the opposite. The affinity of many sportsmen to politics also contributed to their loss in image. A novel sports elite had disengaged from social reality. The riots and unrest hit the Communist regime somewhat unexpectedly. Initially, it responded with moderation and restraint. The security forces were uncertain and did not intervene, so the wave of protest could erupt completely and spread.52 The riots lasted three days. The state security service was surprised at first, but then intervened. Demonstrators were arrested and condemned, but no death sentences were passed. Comparably broad social turmoil had not existed in Hungary up to then. For the first time, the broader protest potential was seen that was to be expressed on a more massive scale and more comprehensively in the autumn of 1956. It was again in front of the broadcasting building that demonstrations were to take place, this time violently. 52   Britta Lenz, “Sozialistischer Fußball” auf Erfolgskurs. Der ungarische Fußball im Spannungsfeld der Politik von 1948–1954, in: Dittmar Dahlmann/Anke Hilbrenner/Britta Lenz (eds.), Überall ist der Ball rund. Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des Fußballs in Ostund Südosteuropa (Essen: Klartext, 2006), 275-298., here 292-293; see also Miklós Hadas, ‘Fußball im sozialen Kontext: Ungarn 1890–1990’, in: Michael Fanizadeh/Gerald Hödl/ Wolfram Manzenreiter (eds.), Global Players. Kultur, Ökonomie und Politik des Fußballs (Frankfurt a.M./Vienna: Brandes & Apsel, Südwind, 2002), 95-116, here 108.

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Just how much a nationalist atmosphere could spread and quickly take on broad forms in the urban and even in Communist areas is shown in a further report by the Austrian embassy of July 1956, when an event held by the Petőfi Circle in commemoration of its eponymous freedom writer on 29 June exploded in the form of a spontaneous mass protest. ‘These people were not inapt. First, they scanned the terrain, did their tests and created in the Petőfi Circle of the Workers’ Youth a forum enjoying respect and finding resonance throughout the country. They levelled their criticism first along the lines of the government, first with single shots and then slowly intensified them into a concentric drumfire against the hated man himself. Their spokespersons were only party folk and victims of Stalinism and Rákosizism. They did it so skilfully that even the main organ of the Party fell for them and gave them backing. On 24 June, the Szabad Nép acknowledged the criticism by the Petőfi Circle in highly benevolent words in a lengthy article, but it also stated that, as could not be expected otherwise, exaggerated and incorrect views were also expressed in these debates and that immature and unsympathetic statements had been made. But, all in all the Party organ described the criticism as positive, necessary and useful, even making fun of the fact that the bureaucracy was annoyed by these debates and criticism. It termed these evening debates by writers, journalists and intellectuals as necessary in order to finally eliminate rigid dogmatism and false prestige from ideological life and to remove, once and for all, from scientific life the practice of hicks, whose only principle was that of subordination. The Party organ gave the members of the Petőfi Circle the explicit testimonial that they represented responsible public opinion for the cause of the people and the Party, which was no longer the public opinion of passive onlookers and yes-men, but the public opinion of the intellectuals, who had learnt from the grave mistakes of the past and wanted to learn from them, who do not merely accept the policies of the Party and the government, but desire to participate in them and who do not want to be the thumb suckers of history, but players, who think with their own brains and express their own views. The opposition does not need any more. Meanwhile, a new element was the profound disappointment that Tito had not brought along the hated man’s head in his gift basket from Moscow. So, the opposition prepared for the great offensive on 29 June. 200 invitations were sent out to a new evening debate by the Petőfi Circle at 19:00h on 29 June. Topic of the debate: ‘On press freedom and the methods of the intelligence services in the people’s democracies.’ At half past four, the run to the officers’ mess, where the evening debate was taking place, had to be stopped by the police because around 6,000 persons had already gathered on the premises and in the courtyards of the building. Loudspeaker connections were hastily made to

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the individual rooms and courtyards. No kind of obstruction of the assembly occurred whatsoever on the part of the police. A total of 15 people spoke, and 71 were still earmarked to speak at three o’ clock in the morning.’53 An analysis shows that it was above all the disappointed reform-oriented nationalist Communists and left-wing intellectuals that formed the protest. ‘In assessing the whole thing, it might be of interest that all the speakers were genuine Communists and the audience only consisted of party members. A bourgeois opposition did not appear at all – fortunately. The members of the earlier ruling classes were much too scared to take part in such a demonstration. The recurrent theme in all the addresses was that those men who are the representatives of what the 20th Congress condemned are not in a position and unable to carry out these resolutions. So, those newspapers interpreting matters as an explosion against the regime are completely wrong. It was merely an explosion by the nationalist groups in the party against the Rákosi regime. The event was not in any way related to the occurrences in Poznan.’54 The Austrian ambassador endeavoured to offer a specific social analysis that was of some merit. “That it was here the writers and intellectuals who placed themselves at the head of the opposition and not the workers, despite the general feeling of dissatisfaction, has its reason in the special conditions of this country, which has come to this regime from feudalism, whose middle class is too narrow and too insignificant and too intimidated to appear as opposition and whose working class was not brought up in that active fighting spirit that was the case in Poland and where it is still effective today. So, nobody here believes that more explosive demonstrations against the Rákosi regime will take place than this manifestation of Hungarian Togliatism was.”55 Therefore, an abrupt and spontaneous armed uprising was not expected. Consequently, it was all the more astonishing both in Hungary and abroad when events exploded at the end of October and beginning of November.

53  Report by the Austrian embassy in Budapest Zl. 104-Pol/56 ‘The opposition against Rákosi – 29 June’, 9 July 1956. ÖStA, AdR, II-pol, Ungarn 1956. 54  Ibd. 55  Ibd.

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The Explosion of Revolutionary Violence: Causes and Progress of the Uprising

In 1956, Stalinism was in a crisis not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Hungary, which ultimately led to the insurrection. Thanks to the very moderate reform course during Imre Nagy’s tenure as prime minister between 1953 and 1955, among the population hopes appeared of possible improvements to the Stalinist system. However, this weak internal fermentation process alone would not have sufficed to generate a nation-wide rebellion. It required further international causes to provide the dynamite.56 A ‘thaw’ had already set in after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953. But the year 1955 was decisive. A semi-détente between the Superpowers was in the offing. Negotiations on West Germany’s accession to NATO were running at full speed. On 15 May 1955, the State Treaty was signed by the foreign ministers of the Allies and Austria in Belvedere Palace in Vienna. On 14 May the signature of the founding treaty in Warsaw meant Hungary’s inevitable accession to the Soviet military organization. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, the Warsaw Pact legitimized the continued presence of the Soviet Army in Hungary and Romania. On 26 May 1955, Khrushchev travelled to Belgrade to announce the reconciliation with Tito. Meanwhile, the leadership in Moscow publicly acknowledged the Yugoslav thesis that other roads might also lead to the expansion of Socialism apart from the Soviet model several times.57 On 14 December 1955, Hungary and Austria and several other nations joined the UN. These international events awakened hopes of possible changes in Budapest and other Hungarian cities. The ‘Destalinization’ reached its provisional climax with Khrushchev’s address at the XX Party Congress of the CPSU in Moscow on 25 February 1956. As a consequence, Rákosi had to resign from the party leadership in Hungary in the summer of 1956. The crisis of the Stalinist model escalated not only in 56  For the international context of the Hungarian Uprising, see the articles by Csaba Békés, Magyarország és a nemzetközi politika az ötvenes évek közepén (Budapest: Gondolat, 2007)., Idem, ‘Cold War, Détente and the Soviet Bloc.: The evolution of intra-bloc foreign policy coordination, 1953–1975’, in: Mark Kramer, Vit Smetana (Eds.), Imposing, maintaining and tearing open the iron curtain: the Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014), 247-278. 57  During the Uprising in 1956, the reform Communist Imre Nagy regarded the Yugoslav path to Socialism as a pattern, but in the Austrian model (signing of State Treaty, achievement of sovereignty, declaration of neutrality and withdrawal of foreign troops) he saw a precedent-setting foreign political status for Hungary. But Austria was neither in a position nor willing to recommend its ‘model’, see Michael Gehler, The Hungarian Crisis and Austria 1953-58: A Foiled Model Case?, in: Contemporary Austrian Studies (2001) 9, 160-213.

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Hungary. In the summer of 1956, workers and students rebelled against the old, Stalinist government in Poznan, Poland as well. News about the political changes under the leadership of Władysław Gomułka in Poland had effects on Hungary and provided the crucial trigger. On 23 October, students of the Budapest Technical University organized a peaceful demonstration of solidarity with the developments in Poland and announced their demands,58 including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of speech and of the press, free elections, independence from the USSR, re-appointment of the reform Communist prime minister Imre Nagy59 as the head of government, and the punishment of those responsible for the Rákosi system.60 The workers in Budapest, returning from work in the afternoon joined in, and together they marched to the parliament where they demanded that Imre Nagy would be restored as prime minister. Nagy epitomized the ever-growing hopes of the demonstrators for change. However, his speech aimed at moderation disappointed the crowd. They moved on to Deployment Square and toppled the symbol of tyranny, the 25-metre statue of Stalin. Another group of still peaceful demonstrators gathered in front of the broadcasting building. The first exchange of fire on the evening of 23 October came as a response to the armed defence of the broadcasting building by the secret police. In the night of 23/24 October , Ernő Gerő, the Stalinist party secretary still in office, requested the Soviet Army to intervene, describing the demonstrations as a ‘counter-revolution’, which aggravated the indignation. At the party headquarters on 24 October, Gerő and the head of the government, András Hegedűs, were removed from office and Nagy reinstated as prime minister.61

58  As early as on 16 October, students at the university in Szeged founded a student organization independent of the Communist Party. 59  Imre Nagy, Politisches Testament (Munich: Kindler, 1959); János M. Rainer, Imre Nagy. Vom Parteisoldaten zum Märtyrer des ungarischen Volksaufstandes. Eine politische Biographie 1896–1958 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2006). 60  The first German-language version of the students’ demands in: Der Volksaufstand in Ungarn. Bericht des Sonderausschusses der Vereinigten Nationen. Untersuchungen, Dokumente, Schlußfolgerungen (Frankfurt a. M.: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, 1957). 61  Confidential file ‘Ungarischer Aufstand, Situationsbericht LS Dr. Liksch vom 30. Oktober’, Vienna, 19 Nov. 1956. ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 A, Akt Zl. 520.736-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56); János M. Rainer, ‘Demokratievorstellungen in der Ungarischen Revolution 1956’, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 2 (1991) 4, 118125, here 122.

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The uprising in October and November was all the more astonishing, on the one hand,62 as a result of built-up frustration with Communist rule, which had been accepted for years with apathy, indifference, fatalism, and resignation, but, on the other, all the more understandable, but here the influence exerted on the revolutionaries externally by the American radio station ‘Radio Free Europe’ and its US propaganda message of ‘roll-back policy’ should not be underrated.63 Nagy’s first calls to end the fighting and his assurances of an amnesty if arms were laid down did not stop the uprising from spreading to other towns in Hungary. A nation-wide general strike followed. The first independent publications were printed. Workers’ councils and armed militias were formed spontaneously throughout the country. Violence spread on the streets of Budapest. By contrast, it remained relatively peaceful and less violent in the countryside. However, veritable street battles broke out in the capital between Soviet military units and the state security service, on the one side, and the extremely heterogenous groups of insurgents, on the other. On 25 October, state security men fired on demonstrators in front of the parliament. The number of deaths is still unclear today, but there were at least 70. On 28 October, Imre Nagy announced a ceasefire, adding that the government would accept a large portion of the revolutionary demands. After the Soviet military intervention on 24 October, the uprising against the Stalinist dictatorship in Hungary had turned into a struggle for national liberation against ‘the Russians’. Nagy addressed the public on the radio, negotiations commenced on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the state security service was disbanded. Revolutionary violence reached a peak on 30 October. Following the official disbanding of the state security service by Nagy’s government the day before, an outraged crowd stormed the party headquarters at Köztársaság-tér (Republic square), exerting vigilante justice and committing lynchings. The executions of state security personnel and defenders of the party headquarters were classical examples of the spontaneous excesses of irate simple people seeking ‘those responsible’ for their precarious social and economic situation. About twenty state security service men and party officials were killed.64 Mainly foreign reporters sent photographs of the brutally mutilated bodies around the world. After 1956, even the Kádár government referred to these lynchings to show 62  Paul Kecskemeti, The unexpected Revolution. Social forces in the Hungarian uprising (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). 63  Johanna Granville, “Caught with Jam on Our Fingers”. Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, in: Diplomatic History 29 (2005) 5, 811-839. 64  Bottoni, várva várt nyugat, 128.

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how violent the ‘counter-revolution’ had been. The attribution of these atrocities to the insurgents during the uprising is still a stain on their reputation today. 37 persons lost their lives in these cases of vigilante justice.65 For the revolutionaries in Hungary, the Suez Crisis came at the worst possible time, distracting the attention of the world public to the Middle East, which now filled the media. Even the decisions in Moscow regarding a second military intervention on 30 October were affected by the events on the Suez Canal. But the atrocities and lynchings at Köztársaság-tér the same day played no role. Much more significance was assigned to a student unrest in Romania and Slovakia out of solidarity with the Hungarian uprising.66 On 30 October, Nagy announced an end to the one-party system and set up a new government with politicians from the recently founded democratic parties. The Communist Party dissolved itself and on 31 October re-organized itself under the name of ‘Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’. On the same day, Nagy informed the Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov that Hungary was terminating its membership of the Warsaw Pact in protest against renewed Soviet troop movements, was declaring its neutrality according to the Austrian model, and was requesting the UN to recognize it. After talks on the situation in Hungary in Moscow, Khrushchev held deliberations with party leaders in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Tito also agreed to János Kádár’s appointment as the new head of the Hungarian government. The Soviet general offensive against Budapest began in the early hours of 4 November. The armed resistance groups resumed the fighting without waiting for Nagy’s orders to do so. An extraordinary meeting of the UN condemned the bloody suppression of the new revolts by the Soviets. The fighting in Budapest lasted for days and in some places for several weeks. During the uprising, more than 2,500 people were killed, including about 2,000 in Budapest, and more than 20,000 were injured. The figure of workers among the casualties comes to more than 80%. The Soviets suffered 620 killed and 2,200 injured.67 Concerning the issue of anti-Semitism during the uprising of 1956, opinions are still divided today. In a study, Béla Rásky, the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Institute in Vienna, quotes the memoirs of prominent Hungarian Jews on their experiences during the uprising. Accordingly, anti-Semitism is

65  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 105. 66  Bottoni, várva várt nyugat, 130. 67  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 104-105.

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said to have played ‘hardly any role’.68 However, in the official Communist interpretation after 1956, the Kádár regime placed anti-Semitism at the centre of events. After the turnaround in 1988/89, a more differentiated picture emerged. In her study, Éva Standeisky could substantiate anti-Semitic abuse with sources. But the Hungarian historian also established that it was the workers’ councils and national committees created by the revolutionaries in particular that stopped this ‘anti-Semitism of the mob’.69 In his study, Attila Szakolczai writes that anti-Jewish excesses tended to occur in the countryside. He argues the lack of anti-Semitism with the only brief power vacuum during the uprising. In his view, with their moderation both the insurgents and the general population endeavoured to project a positive image to the outside world.70 At any rate, it is a statistical fact that almost 10% of the Hungarians who left their homeland in the direction of Austria during the uprising were of Jewish descent.71 These Jewish-Hungarian refugees left Austria quite rapidly, like the majority of Hungarians. A small quantity settled in Israel and the majority in the United States. So, their emigration wishes fit in with the pattern of the majority of Hungarian emigrants.72 When we look at photographs of revolutionaries, it becomes clear that women were also involved in the demonstrations and fights. There was a major protest march by them on 4 December 1956. Additionaly, women among those were condemned and six of them were executed. They provided auxiliary services during the uprising and tended the injured. The Social Democrat Anna Kéthly was a member of Nagy’s government. Showing that, not just men were active participants in the rising. Women were also relatively strongly represented among the emigrants. Hungarian statistics proceed from a ratio of men to women of 70-30%, and the Austrian ones of 60-40%. Of the 38,737 married 68  Béla Rásky, Ein ungeschriebenes Kapitel. Jüdische Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956, in: Danielle Spera/Werner Hanak-Lettner (eds.), Displaced in Österreich. Jüdische Flüchtlinge seit 1945 (Innsbruck/Vienna/Bolzano: Studienverlag, 2016), 114-123. Here 115. 69  Éva Standeisky, ‘Antisemitismus az 1956-os forradalomban’, in: Rüdiger Kipke (ed.), Ungarn 1956. Zur Geschichte einer gescheiterten Volkserhebung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 97-115. 70   Attila Szakolczai, Antiszemita bűncselekmények az 1956-os forradalomban. At the website of the “Zentrum der Gesellschaftskonflikte” 2010. http://konfliktuskutato.hu/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=149:-antiszemita-bncselekmenyekaz-1956-os-forradalomban-&catid=15:tanulmanyok (last accessed 12 March 2017). 71  Eduard Stanek, Verfolgt, Verjagt, Vertrieben. Flüchtlinge in Österreich (Vienna/Zürich: Europaverlag, 1985), 70., Rásky, ungeschriebenes Kapitel, 116. 72  Ibolya Murber, Flucht in den Westen 1956. Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich (Vorarlberg) und Liechtenstein. Schriftenreihe der Rheticus- Gesellschaft 41. Feldkirch. 2002. 127-128.

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women refugees registered in Austria, 1,503 left Hungary without their husbands, but 45% took their children with them.73 The economic exploitation of the country by the Soviet Union, the extremely low standard of living, years of terror by the state police, the bullying of workers by a system of slave drivers, the deployment of Soviet troops for the unforeseeable future, the enforced displacement of the peasantry, the unscrupulous class struggle, and the relaxed publishing activity by the Hungarian intelligentsia after the onset of destalinization were the reasons for the uprising, as Austrian observers identified the motives of the insurgents. The latter included students, school children, and even the proletarian youth. Workers joined in on the very first day and then carried on the nation-wide general strike. Donations of foodstuffs were given to the revolutionaries by the rural population sympathizing with them. Supplies of provisions arrived from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) abroad, and the Austrian embassy was also very committed in this respect. Army units handed over arms and ammunition, but initially behaved passively. At the end of October, a considerable segment of the army defected to the side of the insurgents, such as the troops in the Kilian Barracks, not far away from the hotly contested Corvin-Köz, under the command of Pál Maléter, the later minister of defence in Imre Nagy’s final government. The majority of the population crowded the streets and demonstrated, but did not actively take part in the fighting. Between 23 and 24 October, only a few hundred people fought the state security service men and Soviet troops with weapons in their hands. In the course of the uprising, their number increased to between 5,000 and 6,000.74 However, as has already been mentioned, the dark side of the spontaneous use of arms by enraged people included the cases of vigilante justice and the lynching of party officials and state security service members. As Peter Gosztonyi once worded it: a nation was defending itself against Soviet dictatorship.75 János M. Rainer summarized the situation in his masterly narrative about the Hungarian Uprising as follows: 1956 was the abortive attempt by an oppressed society to break out, but not an outbreak of nationalism, as the contemporary international press assumed76 and as is represented in today’s nationalist and conservative mainstream narratives.

73  Ibd., 117-118. 74  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 94. 75  Peter Gosztonyi, Der Volksaufstand in Ungarn 1956. Eine Nation wehrt sich gegen die sowjetische Diktatur, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 37-38 (1996), 3-14. 76  Rainer, 1956-os magyar forradalom, 15.

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Between 1956 and 1959, police inquiries were instituted against 35,000 persons for political offences. 22,000 people were condemned for participating in the uprising. 13,000 people were then sentenced to terms in prison. Between December 1956 and the summer of 1961, 225 persons were executed for participating in the uprising, including Imre Nagy on 16 June 1958.77

The Porousness of the Austro-Hungarian Border to Channel Resistance and as a Gateway to the West

The porousness of the Austro-Hungarian border correlated to the state of the Communist power centre in Budapest. Whenever the latter was somewhat stable, as between 1949 and 1955 and between 1957 and 1962, the technical border obstructions were expanded and crossings were either completely forbidden or strictly controlled to protect the Communist system. The internal power weakness, which was ultimately due to economic causes in State Socialist Hungary, was manifested in the dismantling of technical border barriers in the spring of 1956 and at the same time of year in 1989, which mobilized the tensions that had built up within society, leading to major streams of refugees (1956/57: Hungarian refugees, 1988/89: citizens of East Germany). These masses of refugees, tens or hundreds of thousands of people, served as an outlet, on the one hand, whilst, on the other, the Communist leadership used the flight of the renegades to get rid of opponents and secure its own power over and beyond the crisis. The porousness of Hungary’s borders along the Iron Curtain was not selfevident in the tense years of the Cold War in the 1950s. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Moscow’s foreign political intentions suggested international détente. The new Soviet course of ‘active foreign policy’, proclaimed in 1945, paid more attention to the neutral countries in Europe. For Budapest, it opened up hitherto unknown, freer foreign political latitude, yet one still directly and very deliberately guided by Moscow. For Hungary, it led to an improvement in the bilateral relations with Austria, but also with Yugoslavia. The post-Stalinist paradigm shift enabled a rapprochement between Hungary, Austria, and Yugoslavia in 1954–1956. In line with Soviet expectations, Imre Nagy’s first government (1954–1955) sent out diplomatic signals to Vienna to improve mutual relations. The affirmative response from the Ballhausplatz and the willingness existing on the part of both Vienna and Budapest indeed enabled a gradual rapprochement and normalization of Austro-Hungarian relations within one and a half to two years. Apart from the opening of reciprocal diplomatic 77  Ibd., 56.

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representations and negotiations on trade relations, the number of incidents on the Austro-Hungarian border, the Iron Curtain, dropped significantly. For Hungary, the Austrian border had always been considered the ‘gateway to the West’, as an imaginary start to a better life. This magnetism gained in attractiveness from the fact that, de facto after the beginning of the Cold War, de jure only after 1955, Hungary’s western border was the only one to a capitalist and democratic nation. The ‘period of occupation’ in Austria came to an end with the signing of the State Treaty and the passing of the Neutrality Act by the Austrian National Parliament (Nationalrat) in 1955. As a consequence, Hungary now had a 354 kilometers long border to a democratic, sovereign, neutral, and proWestern nation. The political and diplomatic détente of recent years had also become tangible to the border population by the spring of 1956. At this time, the Communist Party took the decision to dismantle the obsolete technical border obstacles (mine belts and barbed wire) on Hungary’s western and southern borders. But what was planned was not ‘open borders’, but above all the necessary modernization of border protection, for which, however, there was too little time until the uprising. The weakening of the Hungarian Communist Party, starting after Stalin’s death, caused growing porousness on Hungary’s western border as well as a kind of open ‘green border’ in the late autumn of 1956.78 The situation at the Iron Curtain already being dismantled in the directions of Austria and Yugoslavia was exploited for escape attempts even prior to the uprising. Illegal border crossings already increased following the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. When the deconstruction was finished in May 1956, more and more people fled to Austria (May 1956: 127; June: 203; July: 201; August: 375).79 In the late autumn of 1956, almost 200,000 Hungarians used the weakness of the Communist dictatorship to seize the opportunity to emigrate. Almost 2% of the total population of Hungary left their homeland as a result of the uprising. The majority, about 180,000 Hungarians, fled to Austria, which took a special interest in events in its eastern neighbouring country and was able to present itself as a humanitarian helper in time of need.80 The Hungarian 78  Ibolya Murber, ‘Österreich und die Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956’. In: Richard Lein (ed.), Jahrbuch für Mitteleuropäische Studien 2015/2016. (Vienna: New Academic Press,2017), 1943. Here 19-20. 79   Lajos Gecsényi, Gegeneinander oder nebeneinander? Ungarisch-österreichische Beziehungen 1945–1965, in: Ibolya Murber/Gerhard Wanner (Hg.), Europäische Aspekte zur ungarischen Revolution 1956, (Feldkirch: Rheticus, 2006), 34. 80  Michael Gehler, ‘The Hungarian Crisis and Austria 1953–58’, in: Erwin A. Schmidl (ed.), Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 2002). 160-213; Ibolya

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refugee crisis of 1956 was the first trial of strength for recent Austrian neutrality. Austria was on the border of a bipolar world. In the light of the geopolitical and global situation, it proved to be necessary to cultivate good and constructive relations with both Superpowers. As Hungary’s neighbour and a neutral state, whose population, however, stood behind the Hungarian revolutionaries with complete support and solidarity, Austria had to act and also sought to do so. It granted the Hungarians in need political asylum. About 20,000 Hungarians also chose the escape route via Yugoslavia.81 However, most refugees moved on to countries overseas (USA, Canada, Australia) and Western Europe. Only a very small portion, far under 8%, remained in the initial reception countries Austria and Yugoslavia.82 Hungarian border security was entrusted to the state security service, and conscripts also did their military service on the border. During the uprising between 23 October and 4 November 1956 and in the uncertain situation after it had been quelled, complete chaos prevailed for a few months on the Austro-Hungarian border. Controls and crossings at individual border sections were dependent on the local border guard commanders. But why did the new Communist Kádár government allow its citizens to emigrate first over the Austrian border until the late spring of 1957 and then more and more over the Yugoslav border after 1957? The internal consolidation and the renewed expansion of the Communist dictatorship took at least up to mid-1957. Kádár’s administration only managed to close Hungary’s western border at the beginning of January 1957. Then, the Austrian minister of the interior also declared the closure of the border on the part of Austria on 14 January 1957. This step implied theoretically that from now on it would only Murber/Zoltán Fónagy (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006); Andreas Gémes, Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Between Solidarity and Neutrality (=CLIOHRES.net Doctoral Dissertations III, Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2008), Ibolya Murber: ‘Die österreichische Bundesregierung: Maßnahmen zur ungarischen Revolution und Flüchtlingsfrage 1956’, in: Ibolya Murber/Gerhard Wanner (eds.), Europäische Aspekte zur ungarischen Revolution 1956. (Feldkirch: Rheticus, 2006), 51-79. 81  On the flight of Hiungarians via Yugoslavia, up to today there has been much less literature than on Austria: Ibolya Murber, ‘Az 1956-os magyar menekültek Jugoszláviában’. [The Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia in 1956], in: Limes (2006) 3. 71-82. Recently a monograph on the Hungarians who escaped via Slovenia: Attila Kovács (ed.), “Kam gremo prijatelji? V svet!” Slovenija in madžarski begunci v leith 1956 in 195. (Ljubljana-Lendva: Institut for Ethnic Studies, 2016). 82  Friedrich Kern, Österreich. Offene Grenze der Menschlichkeit. Die Bewältigung des ungarischen Flüchtlingsproblems im Geiste internationaler Solidarität (Vienna: Verl. des Bundesministeriums für Inneres, 1959), 68.

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be possible to cross the Austro-Hungarian border with valid travelling documents. All the same, almost 4,500 people left their homeland in the direction of Austria up to May 1957.83 After 1957, the emigration route went via Yugoslavia. It can be assumed that Kádár’s government would have been in a position to close Hungary’s southern border, too, after the spring of 1957. In March 1958, at a meeting in the town of Karađorđevo in Serbia, Tito personally inquired from Kádár why he had left Hungary’s borders open for so long.84 It can further be assumed that the ‘­release of the critical and dissatisfied host’ contributed more to the long-term safeguarding of power by the Communist dictatorship than a premature closing of the borders could have done. So, the new Communist regime in Hungary used emigration as an ‘outlet’ for its future consolidation of power. Conclusion The Hungarian literature on social resistance after 1948/49 suggests that the tendency towards collectively organized and armed resistance was not par­ ticularly pronounced in Hungary. If this indifference and passivity did exist, then why were these attitudes present? Was it insight into impotence (although the uprising in the autumn of 1956 speaks against this), was it an acquired belief in authority and a specific form of paternalism formed by feudalism, the lack of a tradition of social self-organization against state authority or simply pure opportunism and the absence of solidarity? A look back at Hungarian history and its political culture may provide more insight. Revolts never started primarily from internal motives. The stimulus for rebellions setting substantial masses of people in motion always came from outside. Examples are 1848, 1918, 1919, 1956, and 1989. Hungarians rebelled whenever others did so, too. There was no political culture of active and armed resistance in Hungary. Political opposition and passive resistance by withdrawing from the rulership and the state had tradition. The broad mass of the rural population, which made up more than 50%, could not really be mobilized for political goals. In the early 1950s, people’s self-protection response to the state sanctions by the Communist dictatorship was expressed in ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott). The rural population and workers availed themselves of different forms of ‘everyday resistance’, which were reflected in the files of 83  Report of UFHD (Hungarian Refugee Aid Service) Vorarlberger Landesarchiv (VLA) Vorarlberger Landesregierung (VLR) Abteilung (Abt) Ia. Karton 106. Zl. 5/2-12. 84  Kovács, “Kam gremo prijatelji? 24.

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the state security service under the generic term of ‘sabotage’. After 1948/49, the population reacted to the raising of norms, nationalization and enforced collectivization only with minor sabotage and not with active or even armed and violent resistance. These trivial acts of civil disobedience could not lead to the overthrow of the Communist regime, as everyone knew. They were more concerned with survival and securing their own existence. Nonetheless, the Hungarian system of justice passed roughly 400,000 ‘administrative sentences’ and the ‘people’s tribunals’ a further 24,000 guilty verdicts prior to 1956.85 In answering the question as to why there was not more resistance, the social prerequisites for active and armed resistance should be taken into account. The factors here include one or several potential leadership personalities and possible solidarity on the part of a largely intact society. However, the Communist dictatorship gradually eliminated the possible leaders of active resistance. The contemplable politicians of the opposition parties or the church had already been forced into exile or locked away in prison. The political and economic elite of before 1945 had successively been replaced and disempowered. After the reform course between 1953 and 1955, however, the convinced Communist Imre Nagy personified potential hope for broad sections of the population.86 With regards to social cohesion in Hungary, there can be no mention of an intact society with a strong sense of solidarity in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Society was fragmented.87 Charles Tilly, a US historian, noted that there was a lack of ‘social connections’ in Hungary at the beginning of the 1950s. In such a social situation, communication and resistance imply a major effort, but controlling such a society also demands a great deal from the political leadership.88 However, this lack of internal social cohesion might have been remedied by foreign financial aid and the shortcomings could have been mitigated. Despite the ‘roll-back’ propaganda of the Eisenhower/Dulles administration in the United States, broadcast by Radio Free Europe, it was ultimately not in the 85  Bottoni, várva várt nyugat, 113. 86   For more about Imre Nagy’s development, see János M. Rainer, Imre Nagy. Vom Parteisoldaten zum Märtyrer des ungarischen Volksaufstandes. Eine politische Biographie 1896–1958, Paderborn 2006. 87  The most important ruptures in Hungarian society in the 1940s: the laws pertaining to the Jews and the persecution of the Jews, the situation of the country at the front, rapid transformations of the system in 1945 and 1948 with losers and new winners, the enforced change in property ownership, the formation of new Communist elites, swift social mobility upwards, but also downwards etc. 88  Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 57.

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interests of the USA to instigate and effectively support a rebellion within the block of the ideological opponent. About 2,500 to 3,000 people were killed and roughly 13,000 injured during the fighting of autumn 1956. About 2,600 victims were under 30 years of age. It was a rebellion by workers and young people. Roughly 20,000 prison sentences were passed and 230 executions carried out. The majority of the disaffected, about 200,000 people, chose the path of passive resistance, left their homeland and emigrated abroad. Among them, young workers were over-represented. This was the class given precedence by the Communists. Workers fled the ‘promised land’ of Socialism. Belief in the changeability of the Communist dictatorship ended with the suppression of the uprising in the autumn of 1956. The Hungarian population rebelled in vain. The hoped-for assistance from outside, from the West, did not arrive. After 1956, the Hungarian population retreated once more, largely isolating itself from politics. This political apathy and lack of faith in changeability characterized the political thinking of the population throughout the period of State Socialism and has existed in Hungary up to today. It is true that bitterness on the part of broad sections of the population combined with the pent-up potential for violence resulting from a sense of impotence and the insight that a hardly bearable situation would be hard to remedy made major contributions towards the spontaneous uprisings and temporary violent excesses. The social ‘bow of frustration’ had been bent to breaking point, without a domestic solution becoming discernible. Many individual expectations had been dashed by ignoble living conditions. The enforced collectivization, the exaggerated industrialization, and the economic dependence on the Soviet Union also played substantial roles. The uprising required fuel from abroad. It came from Poland in the summer of 1956. Wladyslaw Gomułka’s success aroused the impression that the Soviet Union would yield if resolution were firm and resistance tough enough. The Hungarian Uprising was an early and heroic attempt to escape the Eastern Bloc, which was doomed by the real power relations in Europe and the world. The Hungarian Uprising had developed from the crisis of Socialism on the Stalinist model. As a longterm outcome, János Kádár’s leadership produced one of the most viable and reformed versions of Soviet Socialism in Hungary. So, the uprising had its good effects, even prior to 1989.

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Murber, Ibolya, Flucht in den Westen 1956. Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich (Vorarlberg) und Liechtenstein (Feldkirch: Rheticus 2002). Murber, Ibolya/Fónagy Zoltán (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006). Murber, Ibolya, Die österreichische Bundesregierung: Maßnahmen zur ungarischen Revolution und Flüchtlingsfrage 1956, in: Ibolya Murber/Gerhard Wanner (eds.), Euro­ päische Aspekte zur ungarischen Revolution 1956. (Feldkirch: Rheticus, 2006), 51-79. Murber, Ibolya, Az 1956-os magyar menekültek Jugoszláviában [The Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia in 1956], in: Limes (2006) 3. 71-82. Murber, Ibolya, Österreich und die Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956, in: Richard Lein (ed.), Jahrbuch für Mitteleuropäische Studien 2015/2016 (Vienna: New Academic Press, 2017), 19-43. Nagy, Imre, Politisches Testament (Munich: Kindler, 1959). Őze, Sándorné, Magyar parasztballada. Fehérgárda a Dél-Alföldön (Hódmezővásárhely: Hódmezővásárhely Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzat 2005). Pittaway, Mark, The Workers’ State: Industrial Labor and the Making of Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). Pittaway, Mark, Az állami ellenőrzés társadalmi korlátainak újraértékelése: az ipari dolgozók és a szocialista diktatúra Magyarországon 1948–1953, in: Sándor Horváth/ László Pethő/Eszter Zsófia Tóth (eds.), Munkástörténet – munkásantropológia. Tanulmányok (Budapest: Napvilág, 2002) 71-82. Pittaway, Mark, Retreat from Collective Protest: Household, Gender, Work and Popular Opposition un Stalinist Hungary, in: Jan Kok (ed.), Rebellious Families: Household Strategies and Collective Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2002). Rainer, János M., Az 1956-os magyar forradalom (Budapest: Osiris, 2016). Rainer, János M., Imre Nagy. Vom Parteisoldaten zum Märtyrer des ungarischen Volksaufstandes. Eine politische Biographie 1896–1958 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2006). Rainer, János M., Demokratievorstellungen in der Ungarischen Revolution 1956, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 2 (1991)4, 118-125. Rásky, Béla, Ein ungeschriebenes Kapitel. Jüdische Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956, in: Danielle Spera/Werner Hanak-Lettner (eds.), Displaced in Österreich. Jüdische Flüchtlinge seit 1945 (Innsbruck/Vienna/Bolzano: Studienverlag, 2016), 114-123. Romsics, Ignác, Magyarország története a 20. században (Budapest: Osiris, 2003). Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Standeisky, Éva, Antisemitismus az 1956-os forradalomban, in: Rüdiger Kipke (ed.), Ungarn 1956. Zur Geschichte einer gescheiterten Volkserhebung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 97-115.

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Summary The years after 1945 in Hungary were characterised by indifference and passivity towards the communist system rather than any strong expression of collectively organised and armed resistance. A review of the history of the country and its political culture shows that revolts never primarily started for internal reasons. Rebellions involving mass popular movements were always triggered from outside, as exemplified by 1848, 1918, 1919, 1956 and 1989, years in which Hungarians were not the only ones to rebel. Hence, the Hungarian tradition of opposition involved not active and armed resistance but political opposition and the passive removal of support from the rulers and the state. The rural masses, who made up more than 50% of the population, could not be mobilised for political goals. Even after 1948/49 and the imposition of new norms, nationalisation and collectivisation there was no active armed and violent resistance. Even the sporadic, minor acts of sabotage and civil disobedience did not lead to the overthrow of the Communist regime and were more the actions of people concerned with survival and their very existence. According to James C. Scott, such self-protective responses to the actions of the Communist

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dictatorship in the early 1950s were expressed by the rural population and workers through various forms of “everyday resistance” that were recorded in the files of the state security service under the generic term “sabotage”. The Hungarian justice system passed roughly 400,000 “administrative sentences”, while the “people’s tribunals” recorded a further 24,000 guilty verdicts prior to 1956. At all events, the Communist dictatorship gradually eliminated all possible leaders of any active resistance, forcing into exile or imprisoning all potential candidates from the opposition parties or the church. The political and economic elite of the years before 1945 had successively been replaced and disempowered. However, with the reform course that he set between 1953 and 1955, the convinced Communist Imre Nagy personified a sense of hope for broad sections of the population. With regards to social cohesion in Hungary in the late 1940s and early 1950s, society was fragmented and there was no strong sense of solidarity. Due to the ‘roll-back’ propaganda of the Eisenhower/Dulles administration in the US that was broadcast by Radio Free Europe, people in Budapest then started an uprising, which also involved the use of violence. Between 2,500 and 3,000 were killed and roughly 13,000 injured during the fighting in autumn 1956. This was a rebellion by workers and young people and around 2,600 victims were under 30. Roughly 20,000 prison sentences were passed and 230 executions carried out. The majority of the disaffected – about 200,000 people, many of whom were young workers – chose the path of passive resistance and emigrated. The belief that the Communist dictatorship could be forced to change ended with the suppression of the uprising in the autumn of 1956.

Summary in Hungarian

Magyarországon 1945 után a lakosság nem mutatott hajlandóságot a csoportos és szervezett fegyveres ellenállásra. Felmerül a kérdés, hogy miért ez a hozzáállás volt jellemző: a választ történelmi múltban és a politikai kultúrában kell keresnünk. A felkelések, forradalmak elsősorban nem belső okok eredőjeként törtek ki. A nagyobb tömegeket magával ragadó megmozdulásokat külső impulzusok váltották ki, ahogy történt ez példának okáért 1848-ban, 1918-ban, 1919-ben, 1956-ban és 1989-ben is. A magyarok akkor keltek fel, amikor ezt mások is megtették. Magyarországra nem volt jellemző az aktív és felfegyverzett ellenállás politikai kultúrája. Hagyománya inkább a politikai ellenzéknek és passzív ellenállásnak, a hatalomtól, államtól való magánszférába való visszavonulásnak volt. A mezőgazdaságban foglalkoztatottak, akik 1945 után is még a lakosság több mint 50%-át tették ki, politikai célok érdekében tömegesen nem voltak mobilizálhatók. Az 1950-es évek elején a kommunista diktatúra állami

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kényszereivel szemben a rejtett hétköznapi ellenállásban (Scott) nyilvánult meg az emberek önvédelmi reflexe. Ez a vidéki mezőgazdasági dolgozókra és a munkásságra is egyaránt jellemző védekezési mechanizmus az állambiztonsági iratokban a “szabotázs” gyűjtőfogalom alatt érhető tetten. 1848/49 után a lakosság többsége a normaemelésekre, az államosításra és az erőszakos kollektivizálásra csupán kisebb szabotázs-akciókkal és passzív, de semmi esetre sem felfegyverzett, erőszakos ellenállással reagált. A polgári engedetlenség ilyen kisebb akciói nem voltak alkalmasak a kommunista vezetés megingatására vagy megdöntésére, ezzel a résztvevők is tisztában voltak. Ezek elsősorban a túlélésről és az egyéni egzisztencia biztosításáról szóltak. Ennek ellenére 1956 előtt a magyar igazságszolgáltatás közel 400,000 “adminisztratív ítéletet” hozott és a népbiztosok is további 24,000 személy esetében hoztak bűnösséget kimondó ítéletet. Az 1956-os felkelés leverésével a kommunista diktatúra megváltoztathatóságába vetett hit véget ért. A felkelés hiába való volt, a külső, nyugatról várt segítség nem érkezett meg. Az amerikai Eisenhower-Dulles adminisztráció Szabad Európa Rádión keresztül sugárzott “roll back”-propagandájának nem állt érdekében egy szovjet blokkon belüli felkelésre való bújtogatás és így a katonai segítségnyújtás sem. 1956 őszén 2,500-3,000 ember halt meg, és a harcok során megközelítőleg 13,000 ember sebesült meg, közel 2,600 halálos áldozat 30 évnél fiatalabb volt. A magyar 1956 a munkások és a fiatalok felkelése volt. A felkelés leverése után 20,000 embert ítéltek szabadságvesztésre és 230 személyt végeztek ki. Az elégedetlenek többsége, több mint 200,000 ember azonban a passzív ellenállás útját választotta, elhagyta hazáját és külföldre emigrált. Közöttük is a fiatal munkások voltak túlreprezentálva. Éppen a kommunizmus állítólagos haszonélvező osztálya, a munkások hagyták el oly nagy számban a szocialista ígéret földjét. 1956 után a magyar lakosság ismét visszahúzódott a privát szférába és távol tartotta magát a politikától. A politikai kérdések iránti érdektelenség és a megváltoztathatatlanságba vetett hit rányomta a bélyegét az egész államszocialista időszak politikai (köz)gondolkodására és ez részben még ma is tetten érhető.

Fig. 12.1

Hungary – relief map with all places that appear in the text and the few areas of retreat for armed resistance. Source: Dr. Gábor Kovács, Dept. of Geography, ELTE BDPK, Budapest-Szombathely

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Chapter 13

The Armed Anti-communist Resistance in North-Western Romania Causes, Evolution, Consequences, and the Role of Families and Local Communities Cosmin Budeancă In Romania after the Second World War, as in other countries in Europe, communism was imposed gradually, having Soviet Army power behind it. There were several main stages of evolution in the changes in Romanian society: during August 1944 to March 1945, communists reached the top of the hierarchy, alongside other democratic parties; on August 31st the Red Army occupied Bucharest, the Capital; on 12th September 1944, the governments in Bucharest and Moscow signed an armistice that gave the Kremlin the ability to control the political and economic evolution of Romania; on 6th March 1945, under the direct supervision of the Soviet Union, the new Romanian government of Dr. Petru Groza was set up, dominated by the communists. A new election took place on 19th November 1946 and, in a rigged election, the communists won. Democratic forces were liquidated, the leaders of the democrats being arrested for treason. On 30th December 1947 King Mihai I was forced to abdicate and the Republic was proclaimed. The Soviet pattern was followed, with the ruin of the ‘capitalist’ economy, nationalisation and then the so-called ‘sharing system’ being introduced. Villagers were forced into collectivisation; the Romanian Academy became a ‘Bolshevic’ one; the Orthodox Church became almost a communist tool; while the Greek-Catholic Church was forbidden in 1948 and many priests arrested. So, in a short time, during 1944–49, the Communist Party, having the great support of the Soviet Union, succeeded in destroying an entire political, economic and social system deeply-rooted in Romania, and replacing it with a Soviet one. The new regime imposed by Moscow along with its new rules led, as a consequence, to deep dissatisfaction among the people. The next step was the appearance of different forms of resistance, the resistance in the mountains being one of the most important, thanks to its extent and its acts. *  This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-TE-2014-4-0090.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_014

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The period from 1944 to 1962 saw dozens of anti-Communist groups, as well as isolated fugitives. The groups mostly consisted of about 10 members, most of them young men but also women, with or without political feelings, but decidedly against the communist system. These groups did not have close relationships with one another, being rather spontaneous endeavours. Authorities reacted with increasing terror and oppression and new institutions were created: the Securitate (1948), the Militia (1949) and the Prosecutor’s Department. The efforts of these three new institutions complemented one another, especially during 1948–53 and 1957–60. The consequences were dramatic, with many dead and imprisoned, including lifetime sentences or hard labour. Many families were separated, causing traumas that have remained to the present day. The resistance groups operated all over the country, especially in the mountains and forests, since the terrain offered them a better chance of survival, and they were harder for the Securitate and Militia to reach. There were groups which organised resistance in the hills or lowlands, but not as many. Most of the groups did not act having a clear plan, aside from hoping that a new conflict between Russia and Western Europe would erupt and make things easier. Besides this, other people went to the mountains to escape from communist oppression but remained isolated, without joining any of these groups. The topic received the attention of researchers after the demise of the regime in 1989, when former members of these groups were available for interviews and, afterwards, when the files of the former Securitate also became available. So many studies have been published, but the exact number of partisans and refugees has not yet been established. There are estimated to have been hundreds of people, with thousands of supporters, involved in the groups. One of the most relevant areas for such anti-Communist groups was the North-West of Romania. Some of the more important groups fighting in this part of the country, and which I will be presenting in this article, were ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, ‘Cruce și Spadă’ (‘Cross and Sword’), ‘Garda Albă/Liga Național Creștină’ (‘The White Guard/National Christian League’). The article aims to present the causes which led to the formation of these anti-Communist groups, their political and social composition, their activities and the retaliation of the authorities, the involvement of the families and communities in these movements and the short- and long-term effects of their actions. The article relies on documents from the Securitate archives, 23 oral history interviews with surviving members of these groups or their family members, as well as scientific studies dealing with the topic at hand.

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‘Teodor Șușman’ Group1

This group was active during 1948–1958 in the region of the Vlădeasa and Bihor Mountains. As in the case of other anti-Communist resistance groups, the ‘Teodor Șușman’ group was created as a reaction to concrete actions of the communist authorities during the Stalinisation of Romania after the Second World War. Teodor Șușman, Sr. (b. 1894), the leader of the group, was the mayor of the Răchițele commune (Cluj county) in 1922–28, 1930–34 and 1939–45, serving as an independent.2 After the installation of communism, he showed himself to be an opponent of the new regime from the beginning, refusing to join the Romanian Communist Party and producing propaganda for the National Peasant Party (PNŢ).3 The communists were, at that time, enacting a series of measures to eliminate the ‘bourgeoisie’. Aside from his political position, Teodor Șușman belonged to this social class, his family being one of the most affluent in the region. He also enjoyed further prestige throughout the region due to numerous undertakings in support of the rights and well-being of the locals. All of this transformed Teodor Șușman into a ‘class enemy’ who needed to be n ­ eutralized.4 In 1945, he 1  For more details about this group see Cornel Jurju/Cosmin Budeancă, “Suferința nu se dă la frați”. Mărturia Lucreției Jurj despre rezistența anticomunistă din Munții Apuseni (1948–1958) [‘You Never Pass Your Sufferance Over to Your Bothers …’ Lucreția Jurj’s Testimony on the Anti-communist Resistance in Apuseni Mountains (1948–1958)] (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002); Denisa Bodeanu/Cosmin Budeancă (eds.), Rezistența armată anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Teodor Șușman’ (1948–1958). Mărturii [The Romanian Armed Anticommunist Resistance. The ‘Teodor Șușman’ Group (1948–1958). Testimonials] (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2004); Doru Radosav et al., Rezistența armată anticomunistă din Apuseni. Grupurile ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Studii de istorie orală (The Armed Anti-communist Resistance in the Apuseni. The ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ and ‘Cross and Sword’ Groups. The Oral History Studies) (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut Publishing), 2003; Dorin Dobrincu, Tragedii personale și colective în rezistenţa armată anticomunistă din Munţii Apuseni. Grupul Teodor Şuşman (1948–1957) [Personal and Collective Tragedies Inside of the Armed Anticommunist Resistance in the Apuseni Mountains. Teodor Şuşman Group (1948–1957)], in Revista de Istorie Socială (Journal of Social History), X-XII (2005–2007), 299-329. 2  Arhivele Naționale ale României, Serviciul Județean Cluj (Romanian National Archive, Department of Cluj County, thereafter RNADCC), Police Inspectorate from Cluj Fund (thereafter PICF), file no. 68/1951, f. 417. 3  R NADCC, PICF, file no. 42/1951, f. 8. 4  Cornel Jurju/Cosmin Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’ Grupul ‘Teodor Șușman’ (‘Because they thought differently …’ ‘Teodor Șușman’ Group), in Bodeanu/Budeancă (eds.), Grupul ‘Teodor Șușman’ …, 19; Nicolae Șteiu, Protopopul Aurel Munteanu erou and martir al neamului (Dean Aurel Munteanu, Hero and Martyr of the People) (Cluj-Napoca, 1998), 76-78; Arhiva Institutului de Istorie Orală din Cluj-Napoca (Institute for Oral History from

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was relieved of his function as mayor, and two years later his shop was closed after it was robbed, apparently with the complicity of the new communist mayor, Suciu Pașcu.5 His lumber depot was confiscated and all goods seized by the same new mayor. Suciu Pașcu further took many actions intended to portray Teodor Șușman in an unfavourable light to the new regime.6 In this case, the simplest method to eliminate him was to arrest him.7 This attempt failed, however, as he fled to the mountains with three of his sons. He was later joined by other locals, who had their own problems with the authorities, either independently of Șușman or as a result of having helped him. Thus, in autumn 1948, at the beginning of the group’s existence (referred to by the authorities as ‘a purely political band’), it consisted of nine people8, and their number slowly diminished over the next few years. In 1950, the Military Tribunal in Cluj judged and convicted the fugitives in absentia. Teodor Șușman was sentenced to 15 years of hard labour, 10 years of official demotion and confiscation of all his property, being accused of conspiring against the social order, robbery, illegal firearm ownership, and membership in a ‘band of armed insurgents’9. His sons Teodor, Jr. and Avisalon, and one other member, Ioan Bortoș, received 12 years of hard labour.10 His property was quickly seized and his homestead was made the local post for the Militia and Securitate.11 As mentioned, Șușman had been an independent mayor in the interwar period, and after the war he had supported the National Peasant Party (PNȚ), which democratically opposed the communists. Other group members likewise had anti-Communist positions that had determined them to flee into the woods. For instance, Ioan Popa (nicknamed ‘Ciota’) was a member of PNȚ and often demonstrated publicly against the regime, shouted anti-Communist slogans and distributed manifestos.12 From a social point of view, in Militia documents, Șușman was named a minor ‘manufacturer and seller of wood,’ as he had two sawmills and a depot, and he worked at selling lumber. He also had a village store, 7-8 hectares  Cluj-Napoca Archive – thereafter IOHA), interviews with Vasile Moldovan, Traian Șușman, Nicolae Neag, Catrina Giurgiu. 5  IOHA, interviews with Nicolae Neag, Nicolae Giurgiu, Catrina Giurgiu. 6  R NADCC, PICF, file no. 42/1951, ff. 3, 5. Jurju/Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’, 19. 7  Jurju/Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’, 20; IOHA, interviews with Vasile Moldovan, Teodor Suciu. 8  Jurju/Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’, 21. 9  RNADCC, PICF, file no. 42/1951, ff. 8-11, IOHA, PF, file no. III, f. 34. 10   R NADCC, PICF, file no. 42/1951, ff. 8-11. 11   I OHA, interviews with Traian Șușman, Teodor Suciu. 12   R NADCC, file no. 35/1953, f. 20; IOHA, interview with Maria Popa.

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of land, two cows, two steers, a horse and around 30 sheep. He had a wellorganised homestead which also employed two workers.13 Other members of the group also had a strong financial background. For instance, Mihai and Lucreția Jurj, together with his parents, were using three sawmills. Ioan Popa, aside from land, owned a pub in Călata, and Gheorghe Mihuț owned one sawmill.14 The group was mostly a defensive one, its members waiting for the eruption of new conflicts between the western powers and the Soviet Union, which would have offered them the chance to pursue other types of actions.15 Most of the time, their main activities were connected to survival, i.e., procuring food and maintaining their shelters (or finding hosts for winter time), or obtaining information. They rarely attempted to procure arms. There were, however, several concrete actions, such as, in September 1950, the confiscation of some goods and small sums of money from a group of communists; the robbery of a Cooperative (state-run store) in the village Giurcuța de Sus; and the robbery of the forestry service in the village Beliș in September 1951.16 Following these actions, similar acts or various infractions by unknown perpetrators were attributed by the authorities to the group. The goal was their discredit and isolation from local village communities, without whose aid they could not survive.17 The actions of the authorities towards eliminating the group were much greater in number. Besides those previously mentioned, numerous locals were arrested, investigated, convicted or pressured to offer information on the members of the group. Likewise, there were many practical actions towards capturing and annihilating the group. In some cases there were casualties on one side or the other, collateral victims (locals) or arrests of the group members. Thus, in December 1948, Traian Șușman was arrested, the youngest son

13  RNADCC, file no. 42/1951, f. 8; IOHA, Photocopies Fund (thereafter PF), file no. III, f. 16; IOHA, interviews with Vasile Moldovan, Nicolae Neag, Traian Șușman. 14  IOHA, interviews with Maria Popa, Sofia Sârzia, Ioan Mihuț, Lucreția Jurj. 15  Cornel Jurju, Mitul ‘venirii americanilor’. Studiu de caz: rezistența anticomunistă de la Huedin (The Myth of ‘the Coming of the Americans’. Case Study: Anticommunist Resistance from Huedin’s Area), in AIO – Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală (AIO – The Institute for Oral History Yearbook), III (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2002), 175-194. 16   R NADCC, PICF, file no. 70/1951, ff. 2, 30; IOHA, PF, file no. I, f. 72; IOHA, interview with Vasile Moldovan; RNADCC, PICF, file no. 28/1950, ff. 16-17, 26; RNADCC, PICF, file no. 28/1950, f. 143. 17  Jurju/Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’, 28-29.

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of the group leader18; on 6th july 1952 Ioan Popa was fatally shot19; several days later Gheorghe Mihuț was seriously wounded and later interrogated by the Securitate finally dying in hospital20; on 28th July 1954 Oneț Roman and Lucreția and Mihai Jurj were captured21; on 2th February 1958 the last two members of the group, Teodor, Jr. and Avisalon Șușman were burned alive in a shed in a confrontation with the authorities. With regard to the role of families in the anti-Communist resistance movement, we can see that this is a typical case, Teodor Șușman’s group being initially based on a part of his own family: him and three of his sons. Further, some people close to the family and some of the group’s supporters became, in their turn, members of the group to escape the repressive measures of the authorities. This was the case of Ioan Bortoș, Teodor Suciu, Gheorghe Mihuț, and Mihai and Lucreția Jurj. The extraordinary support lent to the group by families and locals consisted of food, clothing, weapons, information and shelter in the winter or whenever necessary. Without this help their survival for almost 10 years would have been impossible, as the authorities were intensely focused both logistically and personnel-wise on the elimination of the group. The choice to oppose the communist authorities had dramatic effects both for the group’s members and for their families. In the interest of space, I will only briefly mention the fates of those directly involved in this group. Teodor Șușman, the leader, committed suicide on 15th December 1951. He made this decision because, apparently, he could no longer stand the situation he was in, but also due to feelings of guilt over the fates of his own family and numerous fellow villagers, persecuted by the Securitate because of him.22 Sons Teodor, Jr. and Avisalon Șușman were burnt alive in a confrontation with authorities. Son Traian Șușman was arrested in 1948 and convicted. On his release from prison in 1954, he was subjected to forced domicile. Daughter Romulica Șușman was arrested and sentenced to two years of prison (1951–53). Son Emilian Șușman was arrested and sentenced to one and a half years of prison (1951–53). None of the surviving children of the Șușman family returned to their home town before the fall of communism in 1989. Catrina, Teodor’s wife died in unknown circumstances, after being investigated many times by the Securitate.

18  RNADCC, PICF, file no. 28/1950, ff. 258-259; IOHA, interview with Traian Șușman. 19   R NADCC, PICF, file no. 50/1951, f. 20; file no. 68/1951, f. 264; file no. 70/1951, f. 29. 20  Jurju/Budeancă, ‘Pentru că nu au gândit ca ei …’, 43-44. 21  Jurju/Budeancă, Suferința, 146-149. 22   I OHA, interview with Lucreția Jurj.

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Of the members of the group, it was mentioned that several lost their lives either fighting or later from their wounds (Ioan Popa, Gheorghe Mihuț). Others disappeared under conditions that remain unclear (Ioan Bortoș). Oneț Roman was sentenced to death and executed. Mihai Jurj was wounded and arrested, and died shortly from his wounds. Teodor Suciu was arrested in 1951 and sentenced to seven years of prison, and executed six years later. Lucreția Jurj was arrested in 1954 and sentenced to hard labour for life. She was released after 10 years, with serious health problems.23 Dozens of supporters of the group, or locals who knew of the group but did not share information with the authorities, and even people who had no connection with the group were sentenced to many years of prison. The community in Răchițele is still divided today between those on the side of the anti-Communist fighters and those on the side of the authorities, or who suffered due to the events of the time and blame the Șușman family. From 21st-24th June 2010, the Center for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes in Romania (CICCR) undertook a project in which Teodor Șușman’s remains were exhumed, examined by legal doctors and prosecutors and reinterred. Two similar projects took place 6th-7th July 2011 and 18th August 2014 to find the remains of Teodor, Jr. and Avisalon, but without success. These were carried out by CICCR and the Institute for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile. ‘Capotă – Dejeu’ Group24 This group was active during 1946–57 in area of Huedin town and Valea Drăganului village, Cluj County. The nucleus was composed by Iosif Capotă, veterinary, (b. 1912) and Alexandru Dejeu, physician (b. 1923). The group was 23  About Lucreția Jurj involved in the activity of the group and her destiny see: Jurju/ Budeancă, Suferința, passim; Cosmin Budeancă, Aspecte privind implicarea femeilor în rezistența anticomunistă din munții României. Cazul Lucreției Jurj (Grupul Șușman) [Aspects Regarding the Involvement of Women in the Anti-communist Resistance in the Romanian Mountains. The Case of Lucreția Jurj (The Șușman Group)], in Ghizela Cosma/ Virgiliu Țârău (eds.), Condiția femeii în România în secolul XX. Studii de caz (The Woman’s Condition in Romania of XXth Century) (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2003), 161-177. 24   For more details about this group see Denisa Bodeanu/Cosmin Budeancă (eds.), Rezistența anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ (1947–1957). Mărturii [The Anti-communist Resistance in Romania. The ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ Group (1947–1957) Testimonials] (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006); Cornel Jurju, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ (The ‘Capota Dejeu’ Group), in Radosav et. al., Rezistența, 75-92.

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also known as ‘The Iuliu Maniu25 National Christian Front. The Group for Liberty, Homeland and Cross’, a name given by Iosif Capotă in 1949.26 The two future members of the group met during the period before the general elections of 19 November 1946, when, semi-illegally, they were involved in electoral campaigns.27 Iosif Capotă was candidate for Parliament and was third on a mutual list for National Peasant Party (PNȚ) and the National Liberal Party (PNL).28 Alexandru Dejeu was a PNȚ delegate in the polling place in Valea Drăganului. The elections were won, fraudulently, by the communists, and the pair’s problems began shortly after. Doctor Capotă was physically attacked during the counting of the votes, in a polling station in the Huedin town, by a communist agitator. He was harassed more and more intensely in the following period. In March 1947, Iosif Capotă was arrested for 10 days for planning an ‘instigation’ against the regime. He was released, but kept under strict ‘observation,’ even being threatened with assassination or re-arrest. He then left Huedin and went into hiding.29 As far as Alexandru Dejeu, his involvement in elections brought him to the attention of the repressive institutions in the area and he was held briefly by the police in Huedin.30

25  I uliu Maniu (1873–1953), statesman, deputy of Transylvania in the Budapest Parliament. He played a major role in the union of Transylvania with Romania in 1918. Prime minister of Romania on several occasions, president of the National Party and the National Peasant Party. After the Second World War, he was the leader of the political anticommunist resistance. He was arrested by the communists in 1947 and sentenced to life in prison. He died in Sighet prison in 1953. 26  Oana Ionel/Dragoș Marcu, Mesagerul stării de spirit din Munții Apuseni. Cazul Iosif Capotă (The Messenger of Mood in the Apuseni Mountains. Iosif Capota’s Case), in Dosarele istoriei (History Files), (2002), no. 12 (76), 58; IOHA, interview with Petru Costișor. 27   Cornel Jurju/Denisa Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ (‘Capotă-Dejeu’ Group), in Bodeanu/Budeancă (eds.), Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’…, 15. 28   Națiunea Română (Romanian Nation), 20./3.11.1946, 5; IOHA, interview with Ioan Gordan. 29  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 15-16; Arhiva Consiliului Național pentru Stud­ ierea Arhivelor Securității (Archive of The National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives, thereafter ANCSSA), Penal Fund, file no. 86, vol. 5, f. 38, apud Oana Ionel/Dragoș Marcu, Rezistența împotriva comunismului prin difuzarea de manifeste. Cazul Iosif Capotă (Resistance against communism through the dissemination of manifesto. Iosif Capota’s Case), in Gheorghe Onișoru (coord.), Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România, 1944–1962 (The Armed Anticommunist Movement in Romania, 1944–1962) (București: Kullusys, 2003), 115; Pr. Gheorghe-Dragoș Braica, Medicul Iosif Capotă (The Physician Iosif Capotă), in Renașterea (Renaissance), July-August 2000, 10. 30  Interviu cu Gavril Dejeu (Interview with Gavril Dejeu) in 22 (4./27.01–2.02.1998), 10; IOHA, interview with Florica Moldovan.

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As mentioned, the two main group members were politically anticommunist, being active in the National Peasant Party. The other supporters of the group, likewise, had similar political sympathies. Socially, according to their professions (veterinary doctor and medical doctor), the two held important positions in their communities. There were also influential people among their supporters: priest, shopkeeper, former reserve officer, well-to-do people. Unlike other anti-Communist resistance groups, the ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ group did not have a paramilitary structure (although some members owned arms) or open conflicts with the regime’s repressive structures. The group’s actions were mainly, ‘the analysis of the state of mind of the population around Huedin within a true program of anticommunist resistance’ through the drafting and distribution, from 1949–54, of approximately 5,000 manifestos with ‘content hostile to the regime’31. Alexandru Dejeu also attempted to create such a manifesto, in the name of the ‘Christian National Liberation Union,’ a fictitious organisation, but he destroyed it so it would not be found on him. From 1947 until 7th December 1957, when he was arrested, Iosif Capotă remained in hiding with relatives, different families of supporters, and even in his parents’ homestead in the village of Mărgău.32 After Alexandru Dejeu’s arrest in 1946, he received less attention from the Securitate. He continued to practice his trade, but was very active, supporting Iosif Capotă with money and food and maintaining ties with other group members.33 Beginning in September 1957, he was again noticed by the Securitate and they opened an informative dossier for him, as he was considered ‘suspicious.’ He was even recruited as an informer for the political police.34 On the bases of his files from the Securitate archives, historian Oana Ionel considers Alexandru Dejeu an extraordinary case among opponents of the communist regime, as he played ‘a double role, rather dangerous, and he accepted it, most 31  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 23; Ionel/Marcu, Mesagerul, 60; IOHA, interview with Gavril Dejeu. 32  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 16-25; Pr. Gheorghe-Dragoș Braica, Mărgău. Pagini de istorie (Mărgău. History pages) (Cluj-Napoca: Provita, 2004), 183. 33  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 21-28. 34  ANCSSA, Informative Fund, file no. 3223, f. 3, 5, 136, apud Oana Ionel, Alexandru Dejeu și Securitatea (Alexandru Dejeu and Securitatea), in Ilie Popa (ed. și coord.), ‘Experimentul Pitești’. Comunicări prezentate la Simpozionul ‘Experimentul Pitești – reeducarea prin tortură’. Opresiunea țărănimii române în timpul dictaturii comuniste ediția a IV-a, Pitești, 24-26 septembrie 2004 (‘Pitești Experiment. Papers presented to Symposium ‘Pitești Experiment – Re-education through Torture’. The Oppression of the Romanian Peasantry during Communist Dictatorship, 4th Edition, Pitești, September 24-26, 2004) (Pitești: “Memoria” Cultural Foundation – Argeș Branch, 2005), 420.

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likely, because he had no choice, and further, he considered that, using his intelligence, he could control the Securitate officer with whom he had contact and prevent Iosif Capotă’s arrest and the implicit exposure of his own connection to the fugitive and the ‘network’ of sympathisers.’35 After Stalin’s death, and especially after the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, Iosif Capotă and Alexandru Dejeu extended their group of collaborators and met with them regularly to establish their strategy for distributing the anticommunist manifestos drafted and reproduced by Capotă. There were also attempts at collaboration with the members of the ‘Teodor Șușman’ group, solidified in 1957 when Iosif Capotă sold Teodor, Jr. and Avisalon Șușman a radio. Unfortunately for them, the intermediary was arrested and later helped to identify the hiding place of the brothers, the last two members of the Șușman group. As far as the attitudes of the authorities, there were several attempts to capture the group members. Informers were employed (blackmailed or paid), arrests and investigations were made among those suspected of having connections with the group, and Securitate officers infiltrated communities to obtain information. Gradually, the efforts of the authorities to destabilize the group began to pay off and, just one day after the arrest of Iosif Capotă, Alexandru Dejeu was also arrested, together with his wife. Another group of collaborators was also shortly arrested.36 In the case of this anti-Communist resistance group, too, families and communities contributed greatly to maintaining activities. Their support consisted of shelter, food, money, weapons and other materials necessary for the realisation of manifestos. This help can be explained by familial relation and a general anti-Communist attitude among the population, as well as the respect and prestige enjoyed by the two in the area (for example, before 1946, Iosif Capotă managed to stop the spread of the rabies virus, which had affected many of the locals’ animals). The wave of arrests in autumn 1957 continued and expanded in February 1958. Besides the two leaders of the groups, their family members and supporters were also arrested.37 Harsh interrogations followed, in which the accused were forced to confess. When he learned that all who had helped him had been arrested and had told all they knew, Alexandru Dejeu also agreed to make a complete confession. He stated that ‘I have decided to tell the whole truth, 35  Ionel, Alexandru Dejeu, 420. 36  IOHA, interview with Teofil Crețu, Valer Borțig, Veronica Iancu. 37  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul “Capotă-Dejeu”, 26-29.

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convinced that further denial is futile. I would not do this were I not convinced of the above facts and, I also mention that the reason for my previous denial was not to diminish my own responsibility, but to limit the arrests. I mean their number. I would like to show from the beginning that I do not regret what I have done and, if history were to repeat, I would do basically the same, though I would deeply change the form’38, in the sense of doing everything possible not to be caught by the Securitate.39 After all information was gathered, the trial took place in May-June 1958 at the Military Tribunal of the 3rd Military Region in Cluj. Approximately 50 people were tried in three groups. Family members of the defendants attended the trial, as well as local authorities, who needed to see how ‘enemies of the regime’ were to be punished.40 During the trial, Capotă requested immunity for the people incriminated in the dossier41, and Dejeu delivered a scathing indictment of the communist regime.42 The sentences were much more severe than the impact the group had ever had, but the regime wished to make them an example of what happens to those who resist. Capotă and Dejeu were sentenced to death and shot at the penitentiary in Gherla on 2nd September 1958.43 The other defendants, accused of complicity and failure to report a crime, received sentences from hard labour for life to 8 years of prison, and total or partial confiscation of their property. Those who had not died in prison were released in 1964.44 But, as in the cases of other detainees, they remained under surveillance and were subjected to numerous pressures and abuses, their social status being deeply affected by this dramatic biographical ‘episode.’ In 1998, the Supreme Court of Justice annulled Alexandru Dejeu’s conviction, after a retrial, although the dramas of the 1950s can never be forgotten on an individual or community level.45

38  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 86, vol. 8, f. 5. 39  Ionel, Alexandru Dejeu, 425. 40  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 30. 41   I OHA, interview with Ianc Onuț. 42  IOHA, interview with Petru Costișor. 43   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 86, vol. 8A, f. 28, apud Ionel/Marcu, Rezistența împotriva comunismului …, 128. 44  Jurju/Bodeanu, Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, 31. 45   Ibd..

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‘Cross and Sword’ Team46

This group had a short period of activity, 1948–1949, and their range was in the area of the villages of Săcuieu, Zam, Sâncrai, and Poieni and the Huedin town in Cluj county. The group was founded on the initiative of Gheorghe Gheorghiu (b. 1918), nicknamed ‘Mărășești’47: a former member of the Legionnaire Movement48, sentenced to 7 years of prison for participation in the Legionnaire Rebellion of January 194149 and released in 1942 to be sent to the front.50 On returning from the front, he resumed his political activities, illegally, until 1948, when the political upheavals in Romania imposed a change of strategy on political organisations and people who did not accept the new communist regime.51 Together with another legionnaire, Gavrilă Forțu, in spring 1948 they launched the organisation ‘The Cross and Sword Team’ and chose to withdraw into the mountains and organise a resistance to await the eruption of a new conflict between the western powers and the Soviet Union.52 According to the sentence, the group was created thus: Gheorghe Gheorghiu formed ‘the nucleus of the organisation, recruiting Alexandru Covaci, Traian Mereu, Nicolae Negoiță, Mircea Oprescu, Nicu Boiangiu, Nicolae Pițuru and 46  D  enisa Bodeanu/Cosmin Budeancă/Valentin Orga (eds.), Mișcarea de rezistență anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Mărturii (The Anti-communist Resistance Movement in Romania. The ‘Cross and Sword’ Group. Testimonials, second edition, added) (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2009); Valentin Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’ (The ‘Cross and Sword’ Organization) in Radosav et. al., Rezistența, 93-118. 47  Mărășești is a locality in which, from 6-16 August 1917, during the First World War, the most important military operation of the Romanian Army took place, facing the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. 48  The Legionnaire Movement was a far-right political organisation in Romania, founded in 1927. In September 1940 a government was formed led by General Ion Antonescu, in which Legionnaire Movement members played the primary role. A series of assassinations and abuses led to a failed coup in January 1941. The Legionnaire Movement was subsequently dissolved. Still, it continued to function in exile, and some members remained in the country, attempting to run the structure underground. 49  The attempted coup in January 1941 is known as the ‘Legionnaire Rebellion,’ and many of those involved were arrested and convicted. 50  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, in Bodeanu/Budeancă/Orga (eds.), Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XV; See Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, Florica Dobre (coord.), Bande, bandiți, eroi. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1948–1968) [‘Bands, bandits and heroes.’ Groups of Resistance and Securitatea (1948–1968)] (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2003), 58. 51  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XV. 52  IOHA, PF, Notă informativă asupra bandelor din munți (Informative note regarding the gangs in the mountains), f. 131; Bande, bandiți, eroi …, 64.

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Aurel Ciurcel, also contacting the accused Ionel Iordan. The organisation further recruited accused Traian Pașca, acquaintance of accused Gavrilă Forțu, as well as Ion Torcea, sergeant retired.’53 Gheorghiu was considering several possible areas for action. Ion Torcea even made a series of recruitments of members from Moldova, a region of the country.54 Another targeted area was around the village Săcuieu, near the Apuseni Mountains. Here Forțu, Traian Mereu, Traian Pașca and Aurel Potra handled organisation.55 Finally, at the end of September 1948, they were joined by Gheorghe Gheorghiu and Ion Torcea. Besides the two members mentioned as having affiliations with the Legionnaire Movement, others shared their views, such as Traian Mereu and Valer Pănican, which leads historian Valentin Orga to consider that: ‘the main impetus is in this direction’56. But beyond their sympathies, the leaders understood that ideological agreement didn’t represent a large advantage, as the attitudes of the people were much more diverse. This vision is presented in one of the manifestos: ‘We call ourselves neither legionnaires nor Manists (followers of Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasant Party – m.n. C.B.) but seeing the scoundrels of today and the threats to our country, we are reminded that, above all, we are Romanians.’57 The group was socio-professionally diverse, made up of intellectuals, former military, students, small business owners, labourers and agriculturists.58 Gheorghe Gheorghiu did not have a profession. From Săcuieu, Gavrilă Forțu had been a sergeant major and owned a window store in Bucharest. Traian Mereu was also occupied with windows in Bucharest. Aurel Potra, from Săcuieu, had been a cavalry officer. Wounded in Hungary in the Second World War, he was demobilised, returned to his village, and worked as a professor of mathematics at the school in Săcuieu.59 He was part of an affluent family, his father being the curator of the church and owner of a mill and a sawmill.60 Gheorghiu and Potra apparently knew each other from the eastern front, which explains how Gheorghiu became familiar with the area of Săcuieu. It is worth mentioning that Potra was considered second-in-command after Gheorghiu.61 53  Bodeanu/Budeancă/Orga (eds.), Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, 245-246. 54  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XX. 55  Ibd. 56  Ibd., XXI. 57  Ibd. 58  Ibd. 59  One of the largest and most prestigious middle schools in the area, with a large faculty and approximately 150 students. After 1948 the former faculty from University of Cluj taught here as well, having lost their positions. IOHA, interview with Dorian Mereu. 60  IOHA, interview with Gheorghe Briciu 61  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XXV.

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One of the locals who allied themselves with the group after they moved to the Săcuieu area was Ioan Gordan, director of the school in Bologa and former colleague and friend of Aurel Potra. At the beginning, besides attracting new members, several manifestos signed ‘E.C.S’ (Cross and Spade Team) were drafted and distributed around Bucharest. Very shortly after the group members arrived in the Săcuieu area, the first anti-Communist manifestoes, likewise signed ‘E.C.S.’62, began to appear in the Bologa commune, and the recruitment of members continued. The first large-scale action, which attracted the attention of the authorities to the group, was carried out halfway through October 1948, when the deposits of ‘Romcereal’ in the Zam-Sâncrai commune – where cereals grown by the locals were gathered to meet their mandatory quota – were attacked. The security guards were disarmed, the deposit was partially burned and a message was left that if the cereals were not distributed to the people, the entire deposit would be burned.63 Gheorghiu, Traian Mereu, Gavrilă Forțu, and Ion Torcea participated in the attack.64 Soon an explosion was planned at the lumber factory in the village Poieni, but it was abandoned as it was too well-guarded.65 They turned, however, to a different target, the Forest and Transport Office (IFET) of Poieni, where they broke into an office and took the registers with records of delivery of wood materials by Sovromlemn66. The group also intended to blow up the railroad bridges, but, finally, they limited themselves to the distribution of manifestoes.67 In winter of 1948–49, according to several interviewed locals, the members of the group remained in hiding in the area. Securitate documents maintain, however, that they went to Bucharest, from whence they returned in the middle of March 1949.68 One thing that is certain is that the leaders intended to expand and consolidate the organisation. On 9th April 1949, through the intermediation of the group from Săcuieu, Gheorghiu-Mărășești organised a demonstration in which, according to Ioan Gordan, ‘around 35-40 people participated.’ Gheorghiu gave 62  Securitate’ documents mention the drafting and reproduction of a manifesto addressed specifically to inhabitants of the Apuseni Mountains. See Bande, bandiți, eroi …, 64. 63  IOHA, PF, Informative note …, f.132; IOHA, interviews with Ioan Gordan, Traian Pașca, Dorian Mereu. 64  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XXIX. 65   I OHA, PF, Informative note …, 132. 66  Sovromlemn was one of 16 mixed Romanian-Soviet societies founded in 1945 and officially were to oversee the recuperation of the Soviet Union’s debts to Romania, but were also instrumental in the exploitation of natural resources and the Romanian economy until 1956. 67  IOHA, PF, Informative note …, 132; IOHA, interview with Ioan Gordan. 68  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XXXI-XXXII.

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a speech against the regime, in which legionnaire ideas also appeared. In the end, the participants agreed to support the group with money and food, on the condition that they not rob nor harm the persons or possessions of locals. Those present took an oath on a flag that they would not betray.69 On Monday, 11th April, a fair day in Huedin, when many peasants from surrounding villages came, the group was to receive new members (eight from Moldova and four from Bucharest70). Two locals, Traian Mereu and Valer Pănican, left for Bucharest, from where they were to return with the 12. The organisation was, however, drawing the attention of the authorities, who could not remain passive towards the actions already undertaken, and this was considered the right moment for the annihilation of the group. On 7th April, In Bucharest, eight people were arrested, and during interrogation it was learned that they planned to leave for Huedin. The Securitate in Cluj was alerted and a major operation was organised to capture the group members around Săcuieu. At the meeting that was to take place in Huedin, Securitate officers arrived instead of the new members who were supposed to come from Bucharest. There was a firefight and an attempt to escape the ambush, during which Ion Torcea was shot.71 The other members, in hiding in the mountains, were soon arrested, as well as most of the participants from the meeting of 9th April.72 A Securitate report tells that 22 people were arrested and another 15 followed.73 Some who escaped either fled or were not mentioned by those who were interrogated. Worth mention among those who fled are Traian Pașca, Matiș Costan and the teacher Traian Pașcalău.74 They remained in hiding in the woods on their personal homesteads, or left for other parts of the country to evade the authorities. They were, however, still arrested relatively quickly, except for Traian Pașca, who was arrested only on 21st September 1951.75 After the arrests followed investigations and a trial, held at the Military Tribunal in Cluj. The sentence was handed down on 23rd September and was very harsh. Gheorghiu, Potra, Pițuru and Forțu received the maximum sentence 69  IOHA, interviews with Ioan Gordan, Gheorghe Pașca, Anica Mereu. 70  Arhiva de Istorie Orală a Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului și Memoria Exilului Românesc (Oral History Archive of The Institute for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, interview with Alexandrina Lupu). 71  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XXXVI. 72  Ibd., XXXVII; IOHA, PF, Informative note …, f. 131. 73  IOHA, PF, Informative note …, p.132. 74   I OHA, interviews with Traian Pașca, Gheorghe Pașca; IOHA, PF, Biografia lui Ioan Pașcalău (Ioan Pașcalău Biography), ff. 1-2. 75  IOHA, interviews with Traian Pașca, Gheorghe Pașca, Anuța Mereu.

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(25 years), and the rest between five and 15 years. Although the leaders had received harsh sentences, the authorities considered this insufficient. To give an example of what happens to those who oppose the regime, shortly after the trial, on 7th October 1949, Gheorghiu, Potra, Pițuru and Forțu were taken from their Securitate cells in Cluj and, under the pretext of a re-enactment, an escape attempt was staged and they were executed near the depository in Zam-Sâncrai. The bodies were left untouched for three to four days before being buried in a common grave.76 Even though it was active only a short time, it can be said that the ‘Cross and Sword’ group benefitted from consistent dedication, from both family members and locals. This dedication can be seen in both the large number of attendees at the meeting in the mountains on 9th April 1949 and the large number of arrests and convictions for aiding them and failure to report them. In the following years, some of those convicted died in prison, as did others shortly after being released, due to health problems contracted during their imprisonment.77 In the case of this anti-Communist resistance group, again, the authorities considered it necessary to punish not only those directly involved, but their families as well. The effects were, again, dramatic. Gheorghe Gheorghiu’s younger sister and the wife of priest Mereu were banned from education. The son of the latter was hindered in graduating, and after he still managed to pass his final exam, he was banned from further education. In the following years, Mereu’s daughter and son-in-law had various difficulties and were often denounced for his history as a political prisoner.78 Traian Pașca’s brother, Gheorghe, and a nephew of Mereu were unable to pursue military careers, due to the ‘dossier’ on their brother and uncle. Mereu’s brother, Crăciun, was expelled from the education system.79 Costan Matiș’s daughter Nastasia was interrogated and beaten for allegedly providing food to the fugitives in the mountains. She did not confess and escaped conviction, but she was persecuted and had to leave the village together with her family.80 The memories of those killed and imprisoned for joining or aiding this group remained alive in the area. After 1990, attempts were made to find the common graves in which those executed were buried, but without success. The attempt drew the attention of the police and prosecutors, and those performing 76  NU magazine (Cluj); IOHA, interview with Dorian Mereu. 77  Orga, Organizația ‘Cruce şi Spadă’, XLIX. 78  Ibd., XLVIII-XLIX; IOHA, interview with Elvira Buș. 79   I OHA, interview with Anica Mereu. 80   I OHA, interview with Gheorghe Pașca.

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the research were discreetly reminded that it is not good ‘to go digging up the dead’81.

The National Christian League/The White Guard82

This group was active during 1948–49 in the area of the villages Rebra, Parva and Rebrișoara, in Bistrița-Năsăud County. The name given to the organisation by its leader, Leonida Bodiu, was ‘National Christian League’, but the Securitate also referred to it as Garda Albă (‘The White Guard’). Historian Oana Ionel considers that there are certain signs of the presence of a group called Garda Albă in the area, planted by the authorities to mislead the locals and attract the disenchanted (the name was carved into trees in the forest and several manifestos were distributed in the organisation’s name) in order to entrap and prosecute them.83 The organisation’s leader, Leonida Bodiu (b. 1918 in Poiana Ilvei, BistrițaNăsăud county) was a former cavalry officer in the royal army. While fighting in the Soviet Union he was taken prisoner and, in the Kuybyshev labour camp, he participated in the founding and organisation of the ‘Tudor Vladimirescu’ Division84, with which he would later fight against Germany in Czechoslovakia. He was captured and sentenced to death for his involvement in the ‘Tudor 81   I OHA, interview with Dorian Mereu. 82  For more details about this group see Dorin Dobrincu, ‘Garda Albă’ – o formaţiune de rezistenţă anticomunistă din estul Transilvaniei (1948–1949) [‘Garda Albă’ – an Anticommunist Resistance group in Eastern Transylvania (1948–1949)], in Pontes. Review of South East European Studies (Chişinău, vol. II, 2005), 125-135; Vasile Rus (coord.), Martirii din Dealul Crucii. Studii, articole și documente (The Martyrs from Cross Hill. Studies, articles and documents) (Bistrița: George Coșbuc, 2013); Ioan Olari, Leonida Bodiu. Destin și profil de erou (Leonida Bodiu. Destiny and the Profile of a Hero) (Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2016). 83  Oana Ionel, Anihilarea organizaţiei ‘Garda Albă’ de către Securitate (1949) [Anihilation of the ‘White Guard’ Organization by the Securitate (1949)], in Cosmin Budeancă/Florentin Olteanu/Iulia Pop (eds.), Rezistenţa anticomunistă – cercetare ştiinţifică și valorificare muzeală (Anti-Communist Resistance – Scientific Research and Valuation in Museums), vol. I (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006), 142. 84  One of the two divisions of Romanian volunteers assembled in the Soviet Union in 1943 on Stalin’s request, mainly from Romanian prisoners of war, given the choice between remaining prisoner and joining the Allies (which was considered high treason). The division participated in the war as part of the Soviet Army, as far as the Tatra Mountains. It had a propagandistic purpose, to prepare for the installation of communism in Romania. Nicolae Fuiorea, Divizia stalinistă ‘Tudor Vladimirescu’ în umbra steagului roșu (The Stalinist ‘Tudor Vladimirescu’ Division in the Shadow of the Red Flag) (Bucharest: Pan Arcadia Press, 1992), passim.

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Vladimirescu’ Division, but his punishment was commuted and he was held at a camp in Ebensee, from which he was liberated by American forces in 1945. He returned to Romania and was arrested in Oradea on 18th June 1946. He was later court-marshalled and sentenced to 25 years of hard labour for desertion as well as contempt of court (although he was never notified to appear in court).85 When he learned of his conviction, he did not surrender, but preferred to hide among relatives and friends in his native region.86 At the beginning of September 1948, Leonida Bodiu agreed to lay the foundation for a resistance group, after being encouraged to do so by two locals. He took on Dumitru Toader, former mayor of the village Rebra, and Toader’s brother-in-law Ioan Rus, as trusted accomplices, as well as other locals with anti-Communist sentiments, fuelled by fear of the kolkhoz (a Soviet collective farm) and the difficulties of the mandatory quotas, or by the threats of the representatives of the new authorities.87 Bodiu agreed to lead the organisation in hopes that a new world war would break out, as the mass media was saying all through that period, especially in the context of the deterioration of international relations and the imposition of the blockade in Berlin.88 The stated objectives were: ‘(1) the defence of the Christian faith, through spiritual resistance to any ideological attacks on it; (2) the defence and respect of each person’s family, against the attempts to undermine family; (3) the defence and respect of each person’s property, against the attacks that would be perpetrated upon the outbreak of a worldwide conflict; (4) on the termination of such worldwide conflict, according to the will of the people, support for the return of the king.’89 Besides Leonida Bodiu, other important local figures got involved, in various ways: priests, notaries, public employees, gendarmes, and members of the Romanian Workers’ Party (PMR). For example, Ioan Șt. Burdeț (b. 1905 in Rebrișoara), bar owner, one of Bodiu’s hosts and supporters and PMR member;90 Toader Dumitru (b. 1914 in Welland, Ontario, Canada), former mayor of Rebra; and Vasile Citrea, sergeant in the Gendarmerie in Rebrișoara village. 85   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 13, ff. 481-482, apud Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea lui Teohar Mihadaş și Constant Tonegaru în Organizaţia de rezistenţă ‘Garda Albă’ în contextul instaurării regimului comunist (Involvement of Teohar Mihadaş and Constant Tonegaru in the ‘Garda Albă’ Resistance Organization in the Context of the Establishment of the Communist Regime) în Cosmin Budeancă/Florentin Olteanu/Iulia Pop (eds.), Rezistenţa, 132; Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 143. 86  Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 132; Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 144. 87  Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 133; Oana Ionel, Anihilarea,, 144. 88  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 13, f. 485, apud Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 134. 89  Ibd. 90   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 8, f. 4, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 144.

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The members of the organisation held a series of meetings to discuss international political events, in expectation of the outbreak of a new conflict. To protect the organisation, Bodiu required all members and supporters to take a vow.91 Local interest in the organisation grew a great deal and, to escape discovery, Bodiu reluctantly agreed to make contact with groups of dissatisfied locals from Rebra and Parva.92 But, as this overgrowth of the organisation risked compromising its goals and principles, shortly after it was founded, in January 1949, Bodiu decided to dissolve it. He intended to leave the country or, lacking the means to do so, leave the region. It is quite possible that he made this decision considering that, on 12th January 1949, capital punishment was introduced for treason and economic sabotage, and opposing the regime could easily be considered such an infraction.93 And in this case, the support of families was decisive, without this, authorities could have finished destruction and annihilation of the organization much faster. The authorities monitored the local population’s state of mind, and information about the organisation was gathered gradually. According to historian Raluca Spiridon, the Securitate was more interested in the ‘connections’ of the members of the group than the activity of the group itself.94 Besides catalysing the dissatisfaction of the people through the invention of the ‘White Guard’ and its actions, mentioned previously, the authorities undertook other actions: gendarmes were called from the town of Năsăud95; an information network was organised in the area, including collaborators with the Information Services of the Army and Securitate96; supporters were spied on; and a proposal was made to increase the active gendarme posts in the region and arm them with automatic weapons97; The Minister of National Defence himself, Emil Bodnăraș, suggested ‘the infiltration of ‘relocated’ officers into the organisation.’ They would be presented as ‘fugitives’ followed by the authorities and interested in fighting the regime.98 This operation was not very successful as the members of the group knew each other and were very

91  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 13, f. 490 apud Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 137. 92  Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 134. 93  Ibd.; Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 150. 94  Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 134. 95   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 8, f. 55, 133, 134, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 147. 96   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 8, f. 126, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 145. 97  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 299, vol. 1, f. 369, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 145. 98  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 299, vol. 1, ff. 380, 383, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 145.

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suspicious.99 There were, however, a few members who ‘played a double role.’ For instance, Ilie Bejenaru, head of the Gendarme post in Rebrișoara, both supported the organisation and informed the authorities of the fugitives’ actions.100 Similarly, there are signs that one of the people planted in the organisation, Toma Penteker, sowed discord and created tension between Bodiu and other members101, and Bodiu’s brother believed that he reported the entire organisation to the Securitate.102 What is known is that a major sting occurred the night of 12th-13th February 1949 (involving 126 people from the Florești Battalion of the Securitate and 30 from the Securitate in Cluj). The result was the arrest of 22 locals, but not the leaders. Investigations and interrogations followed, and, on 5th June, another 76 of the 156 supposed members were arrested.103 Leonida Bodiu evaded arrest in February and went into hiding in the commune Sângeorz-Băi, where his maternal grandfather lived. To put a stop to the arrests, he decided to surrender, but those around him convinced him not to.104 In Sângeorz-Băi he was supported by another relative, Alexandru Moraru, head of the Năsăud Sector of Gendarmes. Moraru was found out by the Securitate and blackmailed that he would lose his job and freedom if he didn’t help to capture Bodiu.105 He then infiltrated the organisation as a ‘member’ and on the night of 21st March helped the Securitate to capture Bodiu.106 After several interrogations, on 24th June 1949, Leonida Bodiu, Toader Dumitru and Ioan Burdeț were taken to Dealul Crucii (Hill of the Cross), between the communes of Rebra and Nepos. According to the Securitate, in January 1949 these three made a deposit of weapons and declared under interrogation that they could not specify the location, but they could identify it on 99  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 8, f. 126, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 145. 100   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 9, f. 21, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 146. 101   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 7, f. 455; vol. 13, f. 496; ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 299, vol. 1, f. 124; Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 138; Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 150. 102  Viorel Bodiu, Fratele meu, ostaş în divizia ‘Tudor Vladimirescu’, împuşcat ca anticomunist pe Dealu Crucii (My Brother, Soldier in the ‘Tudor Vladimirescu’ Division, Shot as an Anticommunist on Cross Hill), in Memoria (no. 22, 1997), 123. 103   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 299, vol. 1, f. 168; file no. 103, vol. 8, ff. 285, 308-309, 336, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 151-152; Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 138. 104   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 13, f. 502, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 153. 105  Viorel Bodiu, Fratele, 126; ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 235, vol. 1, ff. 11, 45, apud Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 146. 106   A NCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 235, vol. 1, f. 11. Alexandru Moraru was reinstated in all his rights, and on 23 August 1949 he was decorated with the ‘Steaua Republicii’ Order 5th class, he was administratively interned in a labor unit (1950–1951), arrested again in 1951 and sentenced to 1 year and 6 months of prison for other activities during the war. Ibd., vol. 1-2, Oana Ionel, Anihilarea, 156.

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the scene. Once they arrived in the area, the three were shot by the Securitate officers accompanying them. These officers later declared that they acted in self-defence, that the three attempted to attack them and escape107, but these kinds of demonstrative executions were used frequently by the Securitate, to frighten the people and show them what happens to ‘enemies of the people’. In November 1949, the Cluj Military Tribunal sentenced 66 people to between 8 months and 15 years of hard labour, including the three who had already been executed.108 During 27th-28th April 2009, the remains of the three were exhumed by a team of the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania, and later reinterred with military honours in the Bistrița town cemetery. Conclusions The significance of these anti-Communist groups can be seen by the authorities’ attempts to dismantle them. The full force of the political police and informants, as well as the army and other types of pressure were used on families and acquaintances. All over the country, thousands were detained, tortured and convicted. The members of these groups either died fighting the authorities or they were apprehended and executed or sentenced to death. Only a fraction of them were sentenced to many years in prison and survived the harsh conditions in the prisons and labour camps in which they served their sentence. Although this study presents only four groups, I consider them fairly representative of the anti-Communist resistance in Romania. And even if the effects of their actions were not very widely felt, we can include them in what could be called ‘active resistance’. The four groups have many distinguishing characteristics, but also common elements. They were conceived for different reasons and carried out different types of operations. As far as common elements, we can mention their clear anti-Communist positions; members belonging to different social classes; support from their families and communities; the encouragement of an anti-communist attitude among the populace; the violent means by which their operations came to an end; the dramatic short-term consequences on the communities and numerous individuals, many with minimal or only 107  ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 8, f. 103, Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 140. 108  Raluca Spiridon, Implicarea, 140; ANCSSA, Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 4, ff. 260-279; vol. 8, f. 509, apud Oana, Anihilarea, 157.

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tangential participation in activities; the long-term consequences, represented by the pressures to which those arrested and their families were subjected right up until the fall of the communist regime, and the rifts that appeared in the communities between the supporters of communism and its opponents. What must be emphasized, however, is that the four groups presented in this study, as well as the others that operated in Romania, sent a clear signal that the communist regime was not wanted and was accepted with great difficulty by the people. After the fall of communism, interest in the anti-Communist resistance was relatively high. Scientific studies were published, as well as books and press articles, documentary and artistic films were created, commemorative monuments were erected and actions were undertaken to find and identify the remains of those executed. But today still more information and new aspects of this subject are waiting to be uncovered by historians in the years to come. Bibliography Books

Bodeanu, Denisa/Budeancă, Cosmin (eds.), Rezistența anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ (1947–1957). Mărturii [The Anti-communist Resistance in Romania. The ‘Capotă – Dejeu’ Group (1947–1957) Testimonials] (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006). Bodeanu, Denisa/Budeancă, Cosmin (eds.), Rezistența armată anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Teodor Șușman’ (1948–958). Mărturii [The Romanian Armed Anticommunist Resistance. The ‘Teodor Șușman’ Group (1948–1958). Testimonials] (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2004). Bodeanu, Denisa/Budeancă, Cosmin/Orga, Valentin (eds.), Mișcarea de rezistență anticomunistă din România. Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Mărturii (The Anti-communist Resistance Movement in Romania. The ‘Cross and Sword’ Group. Testimonials, second edition, added) (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2009). Budeancă, Cosmin/Olteanu, Florentin/Pop, Iulia (eds.), Rezistenţa anticomunistă – cercetare ştiinţifică și valorificare muzeală (Anti-Communist Resistance – Scientific Research and Valuation in Museums), vol. I-II, (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006). Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, Florica Dobre (coord.), Bande, bandiți, eroi. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1948–1968) [‘Bands, bandits and heroes.’ Groups of Resistance and Securitatea (1948–1968)] (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2003). Jurju, Cornel/Budeancă, Cosmin ‘Suferința nu se dă la frați’. Mărturia Lucreției Jurj despre rezistența anticomunistă din Munții Apuseni (1948–1958) [‘You Never Pass Your

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Sufferance Over to Your Bothers …’ Lucreția Jurj’s Testimony on the Anti-communist Resistance in Apuseni Mountains (1948–1958)] (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002). Olari, Ioan, Leonida Bodiu. Destin și profil de erou (Leonida Bodiu. Destiny and the Profile of a Hero) (Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2016). Onișoru, Gheorghe (coord.), Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România, 1944–1962 (The Armed Anticommunist Movement in Romania, 1944–1962) (București: Kullusys, 2003). Popa, Ilie (ed. și coord.), Experimentul Pitești. Comunicări prezentate la Simpozionul ‘Experimentul Pitești – reeducarea prin tortură’. Opresiunea țărănimii române în timpul dictaturii comuniste”, editia a IV-a, Pitești, 24-26 septembrie 2004 (Pitești Experiment. Papers presented to Symposium ‘Pitești Experiment – Re-education through Torture’. The Oppression of the Romanian Peasantry during Communist Dictatorship”, 4th Edition, Pitești, September 24-26, 2004) (Pitești: ‘Memoria’ Cultural Foundation – Argeș Branch, 2005). Radosav, Doru/Țentea, Almira/Jurju, Cornel/Orga, Valentin/Cioșan, Florin/Budeancă, Cosmin, Rezistența armată anticomunistă din Apuseni. Grupurile ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Studii de istorie orală (The Armed Anti-communist Resistance in the Apuseni. The ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ and ‘Cross and Sword’ Groups. The Oral History Studies) (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut Publishing), 2003. Rus, Vasile (coord.), Martirii din Dealul Crucii. Studii, articole și documente (The Martyrs from Cross Hill. Studies, articles and documents) (Bistrița: George Coșbuc, 2013). Tismăneanu, Vladimir/Dobrincu, Dorin/Vasile, Cristian (eds.), Raport final (București: Humanitas, 2007). .

Articles

Budeancă, Cosmin, Aspecte privind implicarea femeilor în rezistența anticomunistă din munții României. Cazul Lucreției Jurj (Grupul Șușman) [Aspects Regarding the Involvement of Women in the Anti-communist Resistance in the Romanian Mountains. The Case of Lucreția Jurj (The Șușman Group)], in Ghizela Cosma/ Virgiliu Țârău (eds.), Condiția femeii în România în secolul XX. Studii de caz (The Woman’s Condition in Romania of XXth Century) (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2003). Dobrincu, Dorin, ‘Garda Albă’ – o formaţiune de rezistenţă anticomunistă din estul Transilvaniei (1948–1949) [‘Garda Albă’ – an Anticommunist Resistance group in Eastern Transylvania (1948–1949)”], in Pontes. Review of South East European Studies (Chişinău, vol. II, 2005), 125-135. Dobrincu, Dorin, Tragedii personale și colective în rezistenţa armată anticomunistă din Munţii Apuseni. Grupul Teodor Şuşman (1948–1957) [Personal and Collective Tragedies Inside of the Armed Anticommunist Resistance in the Apuseni Mountains.

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Teodor Şuşman Group (1948–1957)], in Revista de Istorie Socială ( Journal of Social History), X-XII (2005–2007). Ionel, Oana/Marcu, Dragoș, Mesagerul stării de spirit din Munții Apuseni. Cazul Iosif Capotă (The Messenger of Mood in the Apuseni Mountains. Iosif Capota’s Case), in Dosarele istoriei (History Files), (2002), no. 12 (76). Jurju, Cornel, Mitul ‘venirii americanilor’. Studiu de caz: rezistența anticomunistă de la Huedin (The Myth of ‘the Coming of the Americans’. Case Study: Anticommunist Resistance from Huedin’s Area), in AIO – Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală (AIO – The Institute for Oral History Yearbook), III (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2002).



Primary Sources

Arhiva Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (Archive of The National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives – ANCSSA): – Informative Fund, file no. 4725; file no. 256757, vol. 1-11; – Penal Fund, file no. 103, vol. 1-13; file no. 299, vol. 1; file no. 86, vol. 1-8; file no. 1002, vol. 1-12; file no. 1027, vol. 1. Arhivele Naționale ale României, Direcția Județeană Cluj (Romanian National Archive, Department of Cluj County -RNADCC), Police Inspectorate from Cluj Fund, files no. 28/1950; 42/1951, 50/1951, 68/1951, 70/1951, 35/1953. Oral History Archive of The Institute for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, interview with Alexandrina Lupu. Arhiva Institutului de Istorie Orală din Cluj-Napoca (Institute for Oral History from Cluj-Napoca Archive – IOHA), – Photocopies Fund, file no. I-III.\ – Interviews with Valer Borțig, Gheorghe Briciu, Elvira Buș, Petre Costișor, Teofil Crețu, Catrina Giurgiu, Nicolae Giurgiu, Ioan Gordan, Veronica Iancu, Lucreția Jurj, Anica Mereu, Dorian Mereu, Ioan Mihuț, Florica Moldovan, Vasile Moldovan, Nicolae Neag, Ianc Onuț, Gheorghe Pașca, Traian Pașca, Maria Popa, Sofia Sârzia, Teodor Suciu, Traian Șușman.

Summary In Romania, the period from 1944 to 1960 saw tens of anti-Communist groups and isolated fugitives. The topic fell under the scrutiny of researchers after the demise of the regime, when former members of these groups were available for interviews, and afterwards, when the files of the former Securitate also became available.

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Most of these anti-Communist groups fought in the mountains, since the terrain offered them a better chance of survival. There were groups which organized resistance in hills or lowlands, but not as many. The reasons for the emergence of these groups are manifold, mostly relating to the people’s opposition to the new political regime controlled by Soviet armies, the dissolution of the Greek-Catholic Church, the repression of the opposition and its potential leaders, the economic changes (especially the collectivization of agriculture), and the possibility of a new war between the West and the USSR. One of the most relevant areas for such anti-Communist groups was the north-west of Romania. Some of the more important groups fighting in this part of the country, and which I will be presenting in this paper, were ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, ‘Cruce și Spadă’ (‘Cross and Sword’), and ‘Garda Albă / Liga Național Creștină’ (‘The White Guard / National Christian League’). The significance of these groups is revealed by the authorities’ attempts to dismantle them. The full force of the political police and its informants, of the army and other types of pressure on families and acquaintances was used. Thousands were detained, tortured and convicted. The members of these groups either died fighting the authorities or they were apprehended and executed or sentenced to death. Only a fraction of them were sentenced to many years in prison and survived the harsh conditions in the prisons and labour camps were they served their sentence. The paper aims to present the causes which led to the formation of these anti-Communist groups, their political and social composition, their activities and the retaliation of the authorities, the involvement of the families and communities in these movements and the short- and long-term effects of their actions. The paper relies on documents from the Securitate archives, oral history interviews with surviving members of these groups or their family members, as well as scientific studies dealing with the topic at hand.

Summary in Romanian

În perioada 1944–1962 în România au activat zeci de grupuri și organizații de rezistență anticomunistă și numeroși fugari izolați. După căderea regimului comunist, tema a intrat în atenția cercetătorilor, într-o primă fază utilizându-se preponderent interviuri cu foști membri ai acestor grupuri sau susținători ai acestora, iar ulterior documente ale fostei Securități, când acestea au devenit disponibile.

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Majoritatea acestor grupuri anticomuniste au activat în zone montane, unde terenul accidentat le-a oferit condiții mai bune de supraviețuire. Au existat, însă, grupuri și în zone de dealuri sau de câmpie, dar numărul lor a fost mai redus. Motivele apariției grupurilor sunt multiple și au legătură mai ales cu: opoziția populației față de noul regim politic impus de armatele sovietice, desființarea Bisericii Greco-Catolice, represiunea împotriva opoziției și a potențialilor lideri, schimbările economice (în special colectivizarea agriculturii) și posibilitatea izbucnirii unui nou război între Occident și URSS. Una dintre zonele cele mai active ale rezistenței anticomuniste a fost nord-vestul României. Patru dintre cele mai importante grupări care au acționat aici, și pe care le prezentăm în acest studiu au fost: ‘Teodor Șușman’, ‘Capotă-Dejeu’, ‘Cruce și Spadă’, ‘Garda Albă / Liga Națională Creștină’. Importanța acestora este dată și de încercările autorităților de a le destructura. Pentru aceasta au fost folosite toate mijloacele și metodele Securității, informatori, armata, s-au exercitat presiuni asupra familiilor și a cunoștințelor. Mii de persoane au fost reținute, torturate și condamnate. Membrii grupurilor au murit în luptă cu structurile statului, au fost arestați, condamnați la moarte și executați. Doar o mică parte dintre ei au fost condamnați la mulți ani de închisoare și au supraviețuit condițiilor dure de detenție. Studiul prezintă cauzele care au condus la apariția acestor grupuri anticomuniste, componența lor politică și socială, activitățile lor și ale autorităților, implicarea familiilor și a comunităților în evenimente, efectele pe termen lung ale acțiunilor lor. Lucrarea se bazează pe documente din arhivele Securității, 23 de interviuri de istorie orală cu membri supraviețuitori ai acestor grupuri sau reprezentanți ai familiilor acestora, precum și pe lucrări științifice care au analizat subiectul.

Fig. 13.1

Romania – most relevant operational areas of resistance groups as described in the article

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Chapter 14

Spectres of Fascism: Anti-communist Resistance and the Legacy of the Legion of the Archangel Michael in 1940s Romania Roland Clark The Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român, PCR) that gradually assumed power after the coup of 23rd August 1944 ended Ion Antonescu’s military dictatorship. Allied with Adolf Hitler, Antonescu had led his country in an invasion of the Soviet Union that produced roughly 624,000 Romanian casualties (dead, captured, missing or wounded) and during which between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews and over 11,000 Roma were murdered.1 For the first five months Antonescu had ruled together with the fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail), also known as the Iron Guard (Garda de Fier). While in power, legionaries brutally murdered Jews, communists, and other anti-fascists while enriching themselves. Antonescu suppressed some legionaries during the war, but between 1946 and 1958 the Securitate (secret police) carried out an intense anti-legionary campaign, arresting or murdering individuals who had been associated with the movement. Some legionaries fled to the mountains where they formed or joined armed resistance groups. The most prominent groups involving former legionaries could be found in the Apuseni, Babadag, and Făgăraş Mountains, but small, short-lived groups existed throughout the country. Relatively few anti-communist resisters were legionaries or former legionaries. Dorin Dobrincu notes that of the 804 partisans arrested early in 1949, 56 percent had no political affiliations, and only 11 percent were legionaries or legionary sympathizers.2 It was also frequently difficult to distinguish between partisan groups with political goals and regular bandits as both groups stole from locals in order to survive.3 Nonetheless, legionaries have played a 1  Alesandru Duțu, Armata Română în Război (1941–1945) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica, 2016), 9; Elie Wiesel, Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, and Mihail E. Ionescu, Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004), 179. I am grateful to Grant Harward for pointing me to Duțu’s figures on Romanian war dead. 2  Dorin Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă din România (1944-începutul anilor ’60) (phil. diss. Universitatea “Al. I. Cuza” Iaşi, 2006), 833. 3  Ibd., 230, 248.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_015

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disproportionately large role in memory-making about the resistance because (i) the Securitate consistently portrayed all of their opponents as ‘fascists’, (ii) misinformed historians overemphasized the role of the legionary resistance during the Cold War, and (iii) nationalist groups have sought to revive the legacy of the Legion under post-Socialism by portraying legionaries as anticommunist partisans and as martyrs in the gulags.4 This chapter examines former legionaries involved in armed resistance against communism, asking why they joined and what impact their political backgrounds had on the resistance. It argues that former legionaries were more often armed fugitives than resistance fighters, that they struggled to form alliances with other partisans who refused to collaborate with legionaries, and that young people who identified themselves with the Legion as an anti-communist force in the late 1940s followed an idea rather than an organization. Partisans came from a variety of backgrounds and fought for different reasons and in different ways. Many had fought on the Eastern Front during the war, and some were even trained in guerrilla warfare by Romanian and German troops before the war’s end.5 Partisan groups in Bukovina during 1944 had explicitly military targets, but only a handful of any anti-communist groups carried out offensive actions. Some even explicitly limited their use of weapons to self-defence.6 British and American secret services attempted to support armed resistance efforts in Romania, but usually with little success.7 As Monica Ciobanu argues, ‘there is no single master narrative of repression and resistance to Soviet occupation and communization. Instead, we are led to distinguish individual or small group responses and coping strategies to the newly emerging post-World War II political reality’.8 For this reason, Keith Dickson’s notion of ‘asymmetric warfare’ is not quite appropriate to the Romanian case as it assumes that the partisans were waging an offensive war. Dickson argues that ‘the purpose of asymmetric warfare is to deter, dissuade, discourage, or 4  Monica Ciobanu, Reconstructing the History of Early Communism and Armed Resistance in Romania, Europe-Asia Studies, 66 (2014) 9, 1463; Dorin Dobrincu, Historicizing a Disputed Theme: Anti-Communist Armed Resistance in Romania, in: Vladimir Tismăneanu (ed.), Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 308. 5  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 30, 33, 35, 39, 195, 323, 545, 593-594, 600, 703. 6  Ibd., 54, 400, 441, 472, 555-556. 7  Andrei Miroiu, Romanian Counterinsurgency and its Global Context, 1944–1962 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 39-40; Dennis Deletant, Romania 1945-89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent, in: Matthew Stibbe and Kevin McDermott (eds.), Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 83-84. 8  Monica Ciobanu, Remembering the Romanian Anti-Communist Armed Resistance: An Analysis of Local Lived Experience, in: Eurostudia (2015) 10/1, 118.

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defeat the efforts of the dominant actor in order to deny the opponent from achieving its goals’.9 Some of the Romanian partisan groups did aim to ‘resist’, but many, especially former legionaries, just wanted to stay alive.

The Myth of the Legion

Given that the Legion no longer existed as an effective political force in 1946, legionaries, their allies, and their enemies engaged with it more as an idea than as a movement. As an idea, the Legion evoked a twenty-five year struggle for power between a fascist social movement led by the charismatic Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and a corrupt political establishment. When violent antisemitic student protests broke out in December 1922, the students drew their inspiration from a similar movement in Germany and romanticized their actions through symbols, speeches, songs, and newspaper articles that portrayed them as national heroes. They allied themselves with the right-wing National Christian Defence League (Liga Apărării Naţional Creştine, LANC), and, lest the students’ enthusiasm begin to wane, some of their leaders revived interest in the cause through high-publicity murder trials. When some of these students broke away from LANC in 1927 to form the Legion of the Archangel Michael, their leaders were associated in the public imagination with a 1923 conspiracy to assassinate prominent politicians and business leaders: Ion Moţa’s 1924 trial for murdering one of their co-conspirators who had betrayed the plot to the police, Codreanu’s 1925 trial for the murder of a police prefect, and Nicolae Totu’s 1927 trial for shooting a Jewish schoolboy. The accused were clearly guilty in every case but were acquitted each time because they had apparently acted with ‘patriotic’ motives.10 The founding manifestos of the Legion connected it not with violence, however, but with ‘religion’. They accused LANC of ‘politicianism’, and Ion Moţa wrote that ‘we do not do politics, and we have never done it for a single day in our lives. We have a religion, we are slaves to a faith’.11 In 1927, legionary propaganda portrayed it as a movement defined by a youthful zeal for the nation expressed through a willingness to break the boundaries of convention and to step outside the law, sacrificing oneself for nationalist and antisemitic causes. 9  See Keith D. Dickson, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric warfare: Lessons for Today in this volume, page 14. 10  Roland Clark, Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 28-62. 11  Ion Moţa, La icoană!, in: Pământul strămoşesc, 1.8.1927, 9-10.

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In a political culture characterized by corruption, nepotism, and entrenched party networks, the legionaries’ message sounded fresh, idealistic, and honest. Over the next few years legionaries expanded their support-base by winning over the rest of the antisemitic students to their cause, staging intensive campaigns in rural areas by marching from village to village on foot and targeting workers during the Depression with claims that Jews were taking their jobs. The Legion contested two by-elections in 1930–1931 and won five seats in the national elections of 1932, after which it formed paramilitary units with the intention of contesting the 1933 elections through violent clashes with police. Legionaries staged publicity stunts such as erecting a cross honouring the Unknown Soldier in a park in Bucharest and building a levee in a Muntenian village prone to flooding. Both projects had been explicitly forbidden by the authorities beforehand and resulted in police repression. These incidents, together with Codreanu’s support for an Aromanian student who had tried to assassinate the Secretary of State in 1930, reinforced the Legion’s reputation in right-wing circles as a movement that opposed a corrupt establishment dominated by Jews, Freemasons, and ‘traitors’.12 Afraid of the Legion’s growing popularity, aware of Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, and frustrated with the legionaries’ willingness to flout the law, the government dissolved the movement and arrested leading activists just before the national elections of December 1933. In retaliation, three legionaries assassinated the Prime Minister and the legionaries had a national reputation by the time most of them had been released from prison in mid-1934. Despite occasional incidents such as threatening to murder a series of prominent politicians during the student congress at Târgu Mureş in 1936, by and large Codreanu toned down the movement’s violence between 1934 and 1937. Instead, he focused on recruiting support from village priests, running charity building projects during summer work camps, establishing legionary businesses, developing a robust ideological literature with the help of a handful of brilliant young intellectuals, and cultivating an image of legionaries who had, in the words of one of their songs, ‘iron-clad breasts and lily-white souls’.13 By the time of the national elections of December 1937, the Legion had a larger membership base than either Mussolini’s Fascists or Hitler’s Nazis before they took power.14 Two prominent legionaries, Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin, died fighting against ‘Bolshevism’ in the Spanish Civil War, and their funerals attracted 12  Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 63-103. 13  Radu Gyr and Ion Mânzatu, Sfântă tinereţe, in: Anonymous (ed.), Cântece legionare (Bucharest: I.E. Torouţiu, 1940), 37; Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 104-193. 14  Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 237.

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enormous crowds. Legionary publicists used the opportunity to encourage legionaries and sympathizers alike to vow to sacrifice themselves for the nation, using a deeply religious vocabulary that was echoed by leading churchmen and in clerical newspapers.15 Although the nature of legionary activism changed dramatically over the years that followed, it was the image of youthful purity, strength, hard work and personal sacrifice cultivated by Codreanu between 1934 and 1937 that dominated the public imagination from then on. When young people thought about the Legion after the Second World War, it was Codreanu’s Legion of 1937 that they had in mind. The government, once again, dissolved the Legion in 1938 and Codreanu was subsequently arrested and then murdered by the authorities. His followers responded by assassinating the Minister of the Interior, in turn provoking a repression during which hundreds of prominent legionaries were arrested or killed. The survivors went into hiding or fled to Germany, where they stayed until Romanian politics took a sudden shift and the Legion came to power in September 1940, ruling together with General Antonescu in what was known as the ‘National Legionary State’. The legionary regime was characterized by intensive attempts at memory-manufacturing. Newspapers published frequent hagiographies of legionaries who had died before or during 1938, printing presses reissued legionary writings from the mid-1930s, and the regime exhumed and reburied legionary ‘martyrs’, including Codreanu himself. Legionaries appointed each other to influential state jobs and used their power to steal and vandalize at will; in particular, attacking Jewish property. The relationship between Antonescu and the legionaries was repeatedly strained by legionary violence and their undermining of his efforts to ensure law and order. The power struggle came to a head in January 1941, when legionaries launched a three-day rebellion that was crushed by the military, leaving Antonescu as Romania’s sole ruler. Those legionaries who had taken part in the rebellion were arrested. Some cultivated Orthodox prayer while in prison, earning themselves a reputation as mystics, while others agitated to be released so that they could join the army and fight in the war.16

Legionaries at Large

The Legion fragmented after the Rebellion of January 1941. The two largest factions included ‘Simists’, followers of Horia Sima, who had led the movement 15  Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, 194-210. 16  Ibd., 211-235.

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after Codreanu’s death, and ‘Codreanists’, who used their personal connections to the former leader to challenge Sima’s authority. Factionalism only increased once the war was over. In addition to various exile groups claiming to be continuing the struggle outside the country, Tiberiu Tănase identifies six major groupings of legionaries inside Romania. These included: (1) the ‘opportunists’, led by prominent personalities from the legionary regime of 1940–41; (2) the Simists, led by Nicolae Petraşcu; (3) the Aromanian anti-Simists, led by Dumitru Groza; (4) the ‘moderates’, led by Radu Mironovici; (5) legionaries who joined mainstream, non-communist political parties, the most prominent being the group which followed Horaţiu Comaniciu into the National Peasantist Party; and (6) the group led by George Manu and affiliated with the so-called National Resistance Movement (Mişcarea Naţională de Rezistenţă, MNR).17 To this one might also add the less prominent but also important faction of female legionaries led by Ecaterina (Titi) Gâţa, who repeatedly refused to work with the Simists but gave occasional support to George Manu.18 With the rise of the Romanian Communist Party to power between 1944 and 1946, each faction took a different attitude towards armed resistance, making it difficult for other anti-communists to take a consistent line when it came to collaborating with legionaries.19 Horia Sima attempted to organize resistance efforts from his ‘exile’ in Germany, sending Ion Sadovanu into Romania in October 1944 to establish a network of resistance cells under Petraşcu’s formal leadership. The German military trained and equipped groups of legionaries in late 1944, parachuting them into the country to form armed resistance groups in the mountains, store up weapons, and to strengthen legionary networks. At the same time, however, Sima told them to avoid sabotaging the Soviet infrastructure because he feared bringing reprisals down on the heads of their local supporters.20 Based on archival and memoir sources, Dorin Dobrincu estimates that over 100 legionaries and former Romanian soldiers parachuted into the country in 1944–1945, including teams sent directly to mountains around Arad, Timişoara, Alba Iulia, 17  Tiberiu Tănase, Feţele monedei: Mişcarea legionară între 1941 şi 1948 (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2010), 156-174. On the legionary groups abroad, see Dinu Zamfirescu, Mişcarea legionară în ţară şi în exil: Puncte de reper (1919–1980) (Bucharest: Pro Historia, 2005). 18  Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives, (CNSAS), Fond Penal, Dosar 14005, vol. 4, f. 18; Fond Informativ, Dosar 160161, vol. 2, f. 61-62, 256-289. 19  On the rise of the Romanian Communist Party, see Dennis Deletant, Romania Under Communist Rule (Iaşi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), 41ff; Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism For All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 85-106. 20  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 50, 71, 84-85, 127.

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Sibiu, Braşov, Ciucaş, Cluj, Turda, Argestru-Tisa, Bistriţa, and Suceava. The parachutists had limited success and a military report from late 1945 claimed that all of them had been caught by Soviet troops.21 More legionaries parachuted into the country in the early 1950s, but they too were soon apprehended by the authorities.22 In the Serbian Banat, legionaries mounted an armed resistance under the leadership of Pavel Onciu during September and October 1944. Fighting alongside German policemen and local Romanian and German volunteers, they were forced to retreat in the face of the Soviet advance. Petraşcu initially supported anti-communist resistance wherever he found it, and between 1944 and 1946 his intermediaries met repeatedly with representatives of the partisan fighter, Vladimir Macoveiciuc from Bukovina, supplying him with money but failing to recruit him as a legionary. For their part, Radu Mironovici and the ‘moderate’ legionaries rebuffed German attempts to convince them to join the resistance in 1944 because they were worried about potential ­reprisals.23 Gheorghe Gheorgiu and Gavrilă Forţu, on the other hand, completely broke with the Legion in 1948 to form ‘The Cross and the Bayonet’ because they wanted the freedom to resist. Although this is commonly known as a ‘legionary’ group, of the 22 members arrested in 1949 only one was a ­legionary and two were legionary sympathizers.24 Following waves of arrests of legionaries in August and December 1944 and then again in March 1945, the Ministry of the Interior succeeded in negotiating a ‘neutrality pact’ with the Legion on 10th December 1945. The pact was signed by Nicolae Petraşcu and supported by some of the other legionary groups, although most of them immediately accused Petraşcu of ‘treason’ despite having also taken part in the negotiations. Under the terms of the pact, legionaries would cease anti-communist activities and would surrender their weapons. In return the government promised to allow them to return to civilian life by issuing them with new identity cards.25 Many ‘moderates’ took advantage of the pact, but Titi Gâţa’s group refused to have anything to do with it and the Aromanians used it to actively undermine Petraşcu’s leadership claims.26 21  Ibd., 86-90, 96. 22  Traian Golea, Procesul legionarilor paraşutaţi în România, 9-12 octombrie 1953 (Constanţa, Ex Ponto, 2001), 21. 23  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 50, 54, 71, 117. 24  Ibd., 461-464; Denisa Bodeanu, Cosmin Budeancă, Valentin Orga (eds.), Mişcarea de reprezintă anticomunistă din România II: Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Mărturii (Cluj-Napocă: Argonaut, 2009). 25  Ilarion Ţiu, Mişcarea legionară după Corneliu Codreanu (Bucharest: Vremea, 2007), 55-74, 89-95. 26  Ibd., 108-110; CNSAS, Fond Informativ, Dosar 160161, vol. 6, f. 251-252.

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Even before signing the pact, Petraşcu had been emphasizing that legionaries ‘should be peaceful and well behaved’, ‘maintaining a position of respect and honesty together the state’. In doing so, he framed the Legion not as an activist political group intent on overthrowing communism, but as an organization committed to ‘awakening that which is best in each and every person, so that through the practice of Christian virtues it much offer the nation a new man and the state an upright citizen’.27 Not all legionaries were even capable of fighting. Legionaries at the Orthodox Theological Academy in Arad complained amongst themselves in May 1948 that ‘We are not prepared for armed resistance. We have no guns, we don’t know how to use them, we have no plan. We would just be a burden to those legionaries who are already in the mountains’.28 The most vocal opponent of the neutrality pact was a physicist by the name of George Manu, who had joined the Legion in 1937 but kept a low profile until after the war. Between July 1945 and February 1946 he wrote three pamphlets describing the political and military situation in Romania, which were smuggled out of the country and published in the United States as Cold War propaganda.29 According to various confessions from 1948, most probably obtained under torture, Manu broke with Petraşcu in December 1945 and set about organizing his own resistance movement. Those legionaries who joined him did so because of their friendships with Manu and not because they saw him as a representative of the Legion.30 Manu formed wide-ranging ties with opposition figures across the political spectrum. In particular, Manu met with General Aurel Aldea, who the Securitate claimed was the head of a countrywide terrorist network known as the National Resistance Movement (MNR). It seems likely that Aldea and Manu were genuinely involved in resistance activities, but certainly not on the scale assumed by the secret police, who used MNR as an umbrella term under which they incorporated anyone they wished to arrest.31 Petraşcu tried using Manu to build connections with MNR, but the latter refused to cooperate and Petraşcu’s circle had no formal relationship

27  Nicolae Petraşcu, ‘Circulară’, 1 August 1945, in: Petre Baicu and Alexandru Salcă, Rezistenţa în munţi şi în oraşul Braşov, 1944–1948 (Braşov: Editura Transilvania Expres, 1997), 107-109. 28  Quoted in Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 506. 29  Testis Dacicus George Manu], În spatele Cortinei de Fier – România sub ocupaţie rusească (Bucharest: Editura Kullusys, 2004); CNSAS, Fond Informativ, Dosar 160161, vol. 4, f. 51-52. 30   C NSAS, Fond Informativ, Dosar 160161, vol. 2, f. 61-62, 102-106, 256-289. 31  Ibd., vol. 4, f. 9-12. Raluca Nicoleta Spiridon, Consideraţii generale asupra unei legende: ‘Mişcarea Naţională de Rezistenţă, in: Gheorghe Onişoru (ed.), Mişcarea armată de rezistenţă anticomunistă din România: 1944–1962 (Bucharest: Kullusys, 2003), 335-365.

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with MNR.32 Moreover, Manu’s association with the Legion alienated potential collaborators such as a Captain Enculescu and the Greek-Catholic bishop Ioan Suciu, who explicitly cited the Legion’s reputation for violence as a reason for not working with Manu.33 General Aldea, for his part, was a well-known opponent of the Legion, having criticized Antonescu in 1941 for failing to control legionary violence more strictly.34 The spectre of the Legion sometimes alienated other resistance fighters. Anti-Soviet partisan groups, established in Bukovina during spring 1944, prohibited former legionaries from participating.35 Radu Ionescu said of his partner Ionel Robu, who led the National Peasantist resistance in Alba County in 1948, that ‘he saw black whenever anyone mentioned the legionaries’ and excluded anyone from his group who collaborated with them.36 On the other hand, the legionary Petre Baicu reports that representatives of most major political parties in Braşov County were willing to cooperate with his resistance efforts to a certain extent, but that it was men who had fought with him on the Eastern Front who promised him the most support. Their loyalty to Baicu was personal and not based on any political affiliations.37 Similarly, the legionary, Ion (Dudău) Lazăr, played a leading role in ‘The Guards of Decebal’, a movement formed by Gheorghe Vasilache in 1948. Not particular about his politics, at various times Vasilache had represented the Liberal Party, A.C. Cuza, King Carol II’s National Renaissance Front (Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale, FNR), and Antonescu, so it is not surprising that he was also willing to collaborate with former legionaries such as Lazăr.38 Other legionaries, such as Liviu Emilian Vuc, joined the National Peasantists in 1946 only to reassert their legionary identities once they became partisans.39 The relationship of partisans in the Făgăraş Mountains (known as ‘the group from Nucşoara’) with the Legion was complicated. After six days of discussions between a groups of legionaries led by Dumitru Apostol and other partisans under the leadership of Gheorghe Arsenescu they decided that they could not work together. Apostol collaborated with legionaries in Bucharest and in the 32   C NSAS, Fond Informativ, Dosar 160161, vol. 2, f. 135; vol. 4, f. 12-15. 33  Ibd., vol. 5, f. 149-159. On Bishop Suciu’s resistance activities, see Cristian Vasile, Episcopul Ioan Suciu, contestatar al regimului communist (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 2000). 34  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 184. 35  Ibd., 26. 36  Quoted in Liviu Pleşa, Organizaţia de rezistenţă condusă de maiorul Nicolae Dabija (1948–1949) (Bucharest: Editura CNSAS, 2009), 20. 37  Baicu and Salcă, Rezistenţa în munţi, 24, 28, 35-36. 38  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 285-286. 39  Ibd., 593.

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Arnota mountains before being executed by the Securitate. Arsenescu, on the other hand, had fought against legionaries during the Rebellion of January 1941, and past conflicts made life difficult even in the mountains.40 He was nonetheless willing to work with other former legionaries once his colleagues spoke on their behalf, especially once their situation became more dire.41 Arsenescu embraced them as individuals and fugitives, not as legionaries. Describing a meeting between one of the group’s leaders, Gheorghe Arsenescu, and several other potential partisans in January 1949, Iosif Vişoianu told his interrogators 10 years later that ‘everyone present [at the meeting] was being followed by the authorities for economic crimes or sabotage’.42 Even those who were not personally fleeing the Securitate were worried about their loved ones. Arsenescu claimed that: ‘the priest Ion Drăgoi … told me that he and others decided to form a group of fugitives. He explained that he was interested in this activity in the first instance because of his son, Cornel Drăgoi, then a student and wanted by the authorities for subversive activities in the university, and in the second instance for his own safety; he said that he would join us in the mountains if the authorities began searching for him’.43 The ‘Arnota’ group led by Gheorghe Pele, Ion Martin, and Ion Opriţescu was one of the most explicitly legionary of the partisan groups of the late 1940s. Its leaders began organizing in Bucharest during spring 1948 as an attempt to re-establish the Legionary Workers’ Corps of the interwar period, but from the beginning the student Ion Jijie had begun making preparations for an armed struggle in the Arnota mountains, where they were supported by monks from the nearby monasteries. The group withdrew to the mountains in February 1949, when Securitate raids made staying in Bucharest impossible. They nonetheless retained connections with legionaries in the city and it was while trying to meet with new recruits from Bucharest that they were captured. One of the survivors, Gheorghe Gherbezean, later emphasized that the group embodied Codreanu’s ideals: ‘We were convinced that we were doing our duty. … We were completely united as brothers. … There was true humanity and great camaraderie. We lived prayerfully, obviously during the quiet times, convinced that we were protected by a divine power’.44

40  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 703, 706, 757-761. 41  Interrogation of Gheorghe Arsenescu, 9 December 1960, in: Ioana-Raluca Voicu-Arnăuţoiu (ed.), Luptătorii din munţi: Toma Arnăuţoiu, Grupul de la Nucşoara: Documente ale anchetei, procesului, detenţiei (Bucharest: Vremea, 2009), 59. 42  Interrogation of Iosif Vişoianu, 19 July 1959, in: Ibd., 43. 43  Interrogation of Gheorghe Arsenescu, 9 December 1960, in: Ibd., 57. 44  Quoted in Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 616.

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Legionary and non-legionary groups alike drew on a common vocabulary uniting God, nation, sacrifice, loyalty, and justice. In Vrancea County the Liberals and Peasantists who followed the legionary Ion Paragină into the forests in 1948 spoke of themselves as ‘outlaws’ (haiduci), and peasants in village of Bârseşti rang the church bells and armed themselves ‘as for an uprising (răscoala)’.45 Both groups drew on a common language of peasant rebellion. Those who joined the group from Nucşoara took an oath on a pistol and a cross, expressing clearly the religious language of Romanian nationalism: In the name of God the Almighty and on the holy cross, I [Name] Swear to become an outlaw (haiduc), of my own free will and without pressure from anyone, to fight for the salvation and liberation of Fatherland and nation, from the claws of the Communist-Bolshevik beasts and under the heavy Russian yoke. Swear faith in His Majesty King Mihai I, King of all Romanians; Swear faith in the free Government of the Fatherland; Swear submission and obedience, without complaining or hesitating, the leader of the outlaws; Swear to kill without mercy all foreigners and knaves who have betrayed and sold the Fatherland and nation and brought disaster upon the country; Swear not to abandon my brothers in the struggle until the final victory; May I and my whole family be killed should I betray or break this oath. So help me God, SS/Arsenescu [1949]46



The Securitate Creates Outlaws

Many former legionaries who became outlaws felt that they had no choice in the matter. In addition to the waves of arrests of legionaries in 1944 and 1945, the Securitate pursued individuals with legionary pasts again in May 1948, driving those who escaped into hiding.47 As soon as legionaries learned that the Securitate was hunting them they immediately tried to join resistance groups in the mountains, often being arrested before they managed to do so.48 The Securitate’s definition of ‘legionary’ was notoriously vague, and frequently partisans were labelled as legionaries despite never having had any affiliation

45  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 323-325, 346-347. 46   Voicu-Arnăuţoiu (ed.), Luptătorii din munţi, 81. Cf. other oaths mentioned in Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 422-423, 574. 47  Ţiu, Istoria mişcării legionare, 173-177. 48  Ion Constantin, Istorie trăită (Ploieşti: Editura Printeuro, 1999), 209.

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with the movement.49 As the theologian Teodor M. Popescu told his interrogators, ‘you’re a legionary because you’re a theologian, and being a theologian you’re anti-communist, and to be anti-communist means to be a legionary’. Popescu had opposed the Legion throughout his career but nonetheless ended up in Aiud prison as a ‘legionary’.50 Frequently partisan groups were betrayed by Securitate agents who had infiltrated their ranks.51 In 1949 Alexandru Georgescu, who had joined the Legion briefly in 1940, met two old friends for a drink. They provoked him to speak negatively about the Romanian army’s performance during the Second World War and he soon found himself under arrest.52 Two years earlier Nicolae Robu, a former ally of the antisemitic politician A.C. Cuza, had established an armed resistance movement known as The Salvation of the People (Salvarea Neamului), which relied on secret oaths and promises to murder traitors in rituals reminiscent of the interwar rightwing paramilitary groups. One of the earliest individuals Robu recruited was a Securitate informer known by the code name ‘Sixt’. Sixt helped Robu recruit at least 28 others, including important former cuzists and legionaries, then betrayed all of them to the authorities.53 Some former legionaries became fugitives after escaping from prison. The resistance fighter Radu Avram took to the mountains around Braşov in late 1944 after a local priest helped him escape from prison. He hid temporarily in his mother’s barn before fleeing to the mountains together with other escapees. They built themselves two large shelters and obtained a radio, which they used to transmit information about their fight and conditions in prison. Avram and his colleagues quickly established communication with nearby villages, and became a focus of resistance efforts in the region, being joined not only by former legionaries concerned about being arrested, but also by resistance fighters parachuted into the country by the CIA and by local Saxons who were under surveillance because they had aided German soldiers during the war.54 Similarly, Ioan Lupeş had joined a Blood Brotherhood while a high school student in 1940 and then reconnected with the Legion in 1947, organizing a Blood 49  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 139, 171, 173, 198-199, 232, 307, 338-339, 361, 466, 580. 50  Quoted in George Enache and Adrian Nicolae Petcu, Biserica Ortodoxă Română şi Securitatea. Note de lectură, in: Gheorghe Onişorul (ed.), Totalitarism şi rezistenţă, teroare şi represiune în România comunistă (Bucharest: Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, 2001), 112. 51  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 193, 196, 320. 52   C NSAS, Fond Penal, Dosar 14083, vol. 2, f. 248-266. 53   C NSAS, Fond Penal, Dosar 324, vol. 1, f. 3-10; vol. 7, f. 1-3, 31-33. 54  Baicu and Salcă, Rezistenţa în munţi, 30-32, 52.

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Brotherhood in Târgu Ocnă. Arrested in 1948, he escaped in 1950, hiding in the Tărcu Mountains for four years and surviving on food he stole from nearby villages or on aid from his family. In 1954 he shot a policeman who asked to see his identity card, triggering an investigation that ended not only in his arrest but with the closure of a large convent which had given him aid.55 For his part, the student Mircea Dobre joined a legionary group at university in 1946 and took to the Ţibleş Mountains when the Securitate began searching for him two years later. Dobre did not think of the Legion in terms of ‘spirituality’ and eventually broke from the rest of his partisan group because the erotic poetry he wrote about the group’s only female member offended their leader, Nicolae Pop. He survived the following winter alone and very cold before being captured in 1952.56 The communist repression of legionaries was less comprehensive in rural areas, and in Mehedinți County former legionaries Ion Tâmbăluță, the brothers Ilie and Nicolae Ceadir, and others continued holding legionary meetings well into 1946, when they threw stones at a voting booth and assaulted people who voted for the Communist Party. According to their police files, all three were also well-known as thieves and thugs. The Ceadir brothers were arrested after shooting a Communist Party member with whom they had a personal feud. The Securitate began searching for Tâmbăluță in 1950, but he remained at large for four more years hiding in a tunnel under his barn.57 Vasile Corduneanu, Ioan Acatrinei and Neculai Aioanei from a village near Târgu Neamţ fled to the mountains after the Securitate decimated legionary groups in their region and they narrowly escaped arrest. They apparently made no attempt to attack the communist regime.58 Legionary peasants from Caraș-Severin County attacked a rural gendarmerie post in 1949 before fleeing to the mountains in the face of brutal repression.59 Despite their strong anti-communist sentiments, none of these men thought of their struggle in military terms; after initial acts of resistance they dedicated most of their energies just to staying alive. One of the most successful fugitive groups were the ‘Outlaws of Dobruja’ (Haiducii Dobrogei) in the Babadag Mountains. The Legion was particularly strong among Aromanian migrants in Durostor County during the 1930s. After Romania ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria in 1940 they resettled as privileged refugees in Northern Dobruja as well as in parts of Moldavia, but 55   C NSAS, Fond Penal, Dosar 160, vol. 1, f. 1-27, 82-85. 56  Liviu Ţărănu and Theodor Bărbulescu (eds.), Jurnale de Rezistenţa anticomunistă: Vasile Motrescu, Mircea Dobre, 1952–1953 (Bucharest: Nemira, 2006), 215-216. 57   C NSAS, Fond Informativ, Dosar 257541, vol. 1, f. 6-11, 32-35, 45-49. 58  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 317-318. 59  Ibd., 555-569.

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felt that the National Legionary State had failed to give them the rights they deserved.60 Hardened legionaries such as Nicolae Ciolacu, who had already survived the persecutions of 1933 and 1938 and were used to a clandestine lifestyle, began organizing illegal legionary cells immediately after the Rebellion of January 1941. Close-knit Aromanian communities made it much easier for them to escape discovery by Romanian policemen, who were viewed with suspicion by Aromanians because of frequent abuses during the 1920s and 1930s and following the mismanaged resettlement of 1940. Ciolacu was nonetheless captured in 1942 and spent most of the war in prison, only being released in May 1945. As soon as he was a free man he joined a resistance group of former legionaries organized by the Aromanian student Gheorghe Costea. They were joined by other former legionaries over the next three years, all men, including Sicu Costea, Gogu Puiu, Stere Mişa, and the brothers Dumitru and Nicolae Fudulea, many of whom had military experience fighting on the Eastern front. The group styled themselves the ‘Outlaws of Dobruja’, taking inspiration from the Aromanian outlaws of nineteenth century Macedonia whose stories had become well entrenched within the community’s mythology by this time.61 Drawing on an image of legionaries as religious crusaders, Nicolae Fudulea told the group in December 1948 that ‘not only because we are Romanians and legionaries, but also because we are Christians, we have the duty to fight against Godless, atheistic communism’.62 Eager to memorialize their own struggle, they wrote ballads about their exploits: From the Danube to the sea, From Măcin to Babadag, He passes like a vision, Blood enflamed, a restless spirit. Black eyes below his brows, Like those of a frenzied Armatol Sweep the hot Dobrujan horizon, Like two hawks circling above.

60  Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), 95-115; Roland Clark, Claiming Ethnic Privilege: Aromanian Immigrants and Romanian Fascist Politics, in: Contemporary European History 24 (2015) 1, 37-58. 61  Nicolae Ciolacu, Haiducii dobrogei (Constanţa: Editura Muntenia, 1998), 98-151; Constantin S. Constante, Haiducii Pîndului (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice “Olimpul”, 1937). 62  Ciolacu, Haiducii Dobrogei, 155.

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The absurd and merciless times Incite him like a goad To take a gun in his hand And cold grenades at his hips. He sets off to fill the trenches With his feverish blood, For his people suffering in chains, For his nation enslaved.63

Ciolacu writes that partisan activity was punishable by death in Dobruja during 1949–1951, and the group moved frequently, relying on sympathetic Aromanian locals and taking advantage of the widespread rural violence against communist attempts at collectivization.64 They attacked and captured a group of gendarmes who had harassed their families, disarmed and threatened woodsmen who tried to capture them, and stockpiled weapons for a future uprising, but most of their efforts were focused on remaining alive, not on taking the battle to the communists.65 In 1949 the Securitate began torturing and killing individuals suspected of harbouring the partisans, and disease took its toll on the group’s ability to survive the bitterly cold winters. One by one key members of the group were arrested or killed until they were completely wiped out by 1952.66

Blood Brothers

The mythology of Codreanu’s Legion proved to be particularly powerful from 1946 onwards. People who had been too young to have known Codreanu now affiliated themselves with the Legion, engaging in minor acts of sabotage before their almost inevitable arrests. Some, who had been involved in Blood Brotherhoods during the National Legionary State, now turned to the

63  ‘Balada haiducului din codrii Babadagului’ in: Ibd., 156. 64   Ibd., 161ff; Constantin Iordachi, “Constanţa, the First Collectivized Region:” Soviet Geo-Political Interests and National and Regional Factors in the Collectivization of Dobrogea (1949–1962) in: Constantin Iordachi and Dorin Dobrincu (eds.), Transforming Peasants, Property and Power: The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1949–1962 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 103-140. 65  Ciolacu, Haiducii Dobrogei, 164-167, 181-182, 185-194; Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 794, 798-800. 66  Ciolacu, Haiducii Dobrogei, 222-307.

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Legion as an anti-communist movement.67 High school students from Focşani, Panciu, and Tecuci formed their own groups in 1947, passing information on to other partisan groups and readying themselves to fight in the forests when the time came.68 The resistance in Bacău County during 1948 led by the students Petru C. Baciu and Gheorghe Unguraşu recruited heavily from among former Blood Brothers, but organized independently and maintained only tenuous connections with legionaries in Bucharest.69 Blood Brotherhoods (Frăţie de cruce) were the Legion’s youth sections during the interwar period and were organized primarily through schools. Members were aged between 14 and 20 years-old, and were required to study legionary writings, to vow to serve the movement, and to undertake tasks on behalf of the Legion.70 Whereas under Codreanu the Blood Brotherhoods had recruited clandestinely, during the National Legionary State they had had the support of the schools and were able to introduce young people to the Legion’s pantheon of heroes and virtues while also promising them lucrative careers if they joined the Legion when they graduated.71 The movement’s leadership lost contact with most Blood Brotherhoods during 1943, but their first priorities once the war was over were (1) organizing armed resistance in the mountains and (2) establishing new Blood Brotherhoods in the schools. Activists took young people for walks through the countryside and to museums, while also talking about their duties to their families and the nation. Whenever they were able they tried to send members of the Blood Brotherhoods to join armed groups in the mountains, but desisted after two boys died of illness in the mountains near Sibiu.72 One arrested legionary, the teacher Simion Toma, told police in 1948 that organizers were focusing on schools because these were logistically easier places to recruit when the Legion had a limited number of activists.73 It is also possible that school children who had been too young to have witnessed legionary crimes of the 1930s were more easily impressed by the movement’s rhetoric about purity, faith, and patriotism. Students who had been Blood Brothers in 1940–41 wrote speeches and pamphlets and circulated them at the Polytechnic University in Iaşi during 1947 67  Fond Informativ, Dosar 160, vol. 1, f. 8-9, 12; Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 508. 68  Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 328-329. 69  Ibd., 319-320. 70  Gheorghe Gh. Istrate, Frăţia de cruce (Bucharest: Fundaţiei Culturale “Buna Vestire,” 2005). 71  Valeriu Anania, Memorii (Bucharest: Polirom, 2008), 26. 72   C NSAS, Fond Penal, Dosar 14005, vol. 1, f. 109; Baicu and Salcă, Rezistenţa în munţi, 39. 73   C NSAS, Fond Penal, Dosar 14005, vol. 1, f. 50.

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trying to create a ‘legionary spirit’ of the type they had learned about as teenagers. They collected subscriptions from each other and ran their meetings according to legionary patterns.74 In the words of the legionary Petre Baicu, ‘the links among students who were former Blood Brothers had one thing in common: that the [legionary] virtues must be continually cultivated both individually and collectively’.75 Another legionary partisan from this period later wrote that the Blood Brotherhoods of 1946–48 ‘did not participate in political activities because … [their] goal was patriotic education, Christian moral development, and internalizing knowledge learned in school to the highest possible extent’.76 The legionary Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu, who had been a Blood Brother during his high school days and became a national organizer for the Brotherhoods in March 1947, writes that ‘the basis of the Brotherhood’s education was belief in God and Christian morality. It was a duty to go to church every Sunday’.77 He claims that when he was invited to become an organizer, he refused because he did not feel ‘spiritually prepared’ to live as a fitting example for his younger colleagues.78 Gavrilă claims that more than half of the members of the anti-communist organization that sprung up in Cluj in the immediate aftermath of the 1946 elections had been Blood Brothers in the past, but not all young anticommunists were legionaries.79 In her oral history interviews with members of twelve anti-communist groups comprised primarily of high school students between 1947 and 1959, Lăcrămioara Stoenescu did not find one person who had been influenced by the Legion. These students mobilized around Liberal or Peasantist politics, out of fear of their privileged class backgrounds, or out of hatred for the Soviets. One of Stoenescu’s informants mentioned that all the Blood Brothers from his school were already in prison by the time he became an activist in 1947.80 Similarly, the students arrested in association with the young poet Nicolae Labiş in 1956 were inspired by the uprising in Hungary, not by an indigenous Romanian tradition.81 74  Ibd., vol. 2, f. 262-273, 392; vol. 3, f. 364-368. 75  Petre Baicu, in: Baicu and Salcă, Rezistenţa în munţi, 39. 76  Alexandru Salcă, in: Ibd., 72-73. 77  Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu, Brazii se frâng, dar nu se îndoiesc: Rezistenţa anticomunistă în Munţii Făgăraşului, vol. 1 (Baia Mare: Marist, 2009), 29. 78  Ibd., 51. 79  Ibd., 45. 80  Lăcrămioara Stoenescu, De pe băncile şcolii în închisorile comuniste (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2010), 30-31. 81  Stela Covaci, Persecuţia: Mişcarea studenţească anticomunistă: Bucureşti, Iaşi (1956–1958): Nume de cod “Frăţia Paleolitică”: Documente din Arhiva Securităţii (Bucharest: Vremea, 2006).

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Nonetheless, Blood Brothers played a prominent role in Gavrilă’s experience of the resistance. He learned in the summer of 1947 that Blood Brotherhoods had been stockpiling weapons and had formed connections with other resistance groups, including with Petraşcu’s legionary faction. The Securitate wiped out the Blood Brotherhoods in northern Moldavia in spring 1948 then attempted to arrest Gavrilă in Cluj that May. He fled south and found a job as a security guard on Saxon farms near Braşov. Narrowly avoiding capture once again, he and other fugitives established a camp in the Făgăraş Mountains, where they held out for the next seven years, becoming one of the most celebrated partisan groups of the era. Some of the high school students took their textbooks with them and studied them while in hiding, others dreamed about future careers as teachers or mechanics, while Haşiu Baciu spent his time grafting trees that he found in the forest. Based on Gavrilă’s extensive memoirs, it seems that few of them thought of themselves as ‘soldiers’. Gavrilă’s group was also willing to receive assistance from Jews, who provided them with medicine, clothes, and food. Ideology had given way to survival for most of them.82

The Legion through Cold War Optics

The idea of ‘active resistance’ was crucial to legionaries living outside the country, who insisted that they, too, were resisting communism through their writings and actions and that anti-communism had always the core legionary value.83 Celebrating legionary participation in armed resistance allowed them to assert their belonging within an exile community that was sometimes hostile to former legionaries and to situate themselves on the American side of the Cold War.84 A similar rewriting of history was taking place inside Romania, as young people upset with communism selectively appropriated the Legion as a vehicle through which they could channel their anger. For those who had been involved in the Legion before 1944, and especially for those who continued to maintain legionary networks once the communists were in power, the past 82  Ogoranu, Brazii se frâng, 56-58, 61-63, 74, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109-110, 148. On Gavrilă’s group, see also Dobrincu, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă, 643-701. 83  Faust Brădescu, Mişcarea legionară în studii şi articole, vol. 3 (Bucharest: Majadahonda, 2000), esp. 40-43; Traian Popescu and Flor Strejnicu, Din lupta exilului românesc din Spania împotriva comunismului (Sibiu: Imago, 1994); Traian Golea, Amintiri şi acţiuni din exil (Norcross, GA: Criterion, 2005), esp. 94-101. 84  Horia Sima, Antologie legionară, vol. 1 (Miami Beach, FL: Colecţia Omul Nou, 1994), 131; Faust Brădescu, Opinii: Un deceniu de lupta în exil în slujbă neamului şi legiunii (1978–1988) (Bucharest: Majadahonda, 1997), 45-55.

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was a ghost that pursued them into the forests, where it determined which other partisan groups they were able to collaborate with and who they could rely on for support.

Archival Access and State of Research

The richest archives for information on anti-communist resistance movements are the archives of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS). The Romanian government made the archives of the communist-era secret police – known as the Securitate – available to researchers in 1999. Access to the CNSAS archives follows a stringent accreditation process because of the sensitive information these archives contain about people who still play an active role in public life. The archive contains ‘Documentary’ files, which are collections on thematic topics, as well as personal files from court cases or surveillance. To request a personal file you need to know that person’s full name, date and place of birth, and parents’ names. Sometimes the Securitate may simply not have been interested in specific individuals, but researchers might also not receive files they request if they contain information that is still considered classified, or that the archivists are unable to locate. Researching in the CSNAS archives often takes several months between requesting accreditation and receiving files, so researchers might also prefer to work in the National Archives in Bucharest. These contain files from the Romanian Communist Party, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of War, the gendarmerie and the police. One can also supplement the National Archives by consulting regional archives held in forty-two locations around the country. Regional archives contain records from city councils and from local gendarmerie and police units. The Military Archives in Piteşti might also be consulted but these have been greatly under-utilized to date. Outside of the archives, researchers of the anti-communist resistance in Romania have access to a significant number of memoir accounts written by resistance fighters. Most were published by minor publishing houses in small print runs during the 1990s and can be hard to track down because the major research libraries in Bucharest did not always buy them. A persistent researcher can nonetheless find them by looking through regional libraries or second-hand bookstores. There are also a large number of secondary studies of individual resistance groups. Although the majority of these studies fail to develop broad arguments about the nature of the resistance, they are, nonetheless, often meticulously researched and frequently reproduce unedited archival sources in their entirety. In contrast to the majority of micro-histories of

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individual groups, Dorin Dobrincu’s unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to the University of Iaşi in 2006 represents an unequalled synthetic treatment of armed resistance in Romania between 1944 and the early 1960s. In over 800 pages Dobrincu analyses almost all of the known resistance movements, providing critical readings of the sources and incorporating the stories of individual groups into an overall treatment of the phenomenon. Any future research on the Romanian case needs to take Dobrincu’s findings as its logical starting point. Bibliography Baicu, Petre/Salcă Alexandru, Rezistenţa în munţi şi în oraşul Braşov, 1944–1948 (Braşov: Editura Transilvania Expres, 1997). Bodeanu, Denisa/Budeancă Cosmin/Orga Valentin (eds.), Mişcarea de reprezintă anticomunistă din România II: Grupul ‘Cruce şi Spadă’. Mărturii (Cluj-Napocă: Argonaut, 2009). Ciobanu, Monica, Reconstructing the History of Early Communism and Armed Resistance in Romania, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 66 (2014) 9, 1452-1481. Ciolacu, Nicolae, Haiducii dobrogei (Constanţa: Editura Muntenia, 1998). Covaci, Stela, Persecuţia: Mişcarea studenţească anticomunistă: Bucureşti, Iaşi (1956– 1958): Nume de cod “Frăţia Paleolitică”: Documente din Arhiva Securităţii (Bucharest: Vremea, 2006). Dacicus, Testis [Manu George], În spatele Cortinei de Fier – România sub ocupaţie rusească (Bucharest: Editura Kullusys, 2004). Deletant, Dennis, Romania Under Communist Rule (Iaşi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999). Deletant, Dennis, Romania 1945–89: Resistance, Protest and Dissent, in: Matthew Stibbe and Kevin McDermott (eds.), Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 81-100. Dobrincu, Dorin, Rezistenţa armată anticomunistă din România (1944-începutul anilor ’60) (phil. diss. Universitatea “Al. I. Cuza” Iaşi, 2006). Dobrincu, Dorin, Historicizing a Disputed Theme: Anti-Communist Armed Resistance in Romania, in: Vladimir Tismăneanu (ed.), Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 305-344. Golea, Traian, Procesul legionarilor paraşutaţi în România, 9-12 octombrie 1953 (Constanţa, Ex Ponto, 2001). Miroiu, Andrei, Romanian Counterinsurgency and its Global Context, 1944–1962 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

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Ogoranu, Ion Gavrilă, Brazii se frâng, dar nu se îndoiesc: Rezistenţa anticomunistă în Munţii Făgăraşului (Baia Mare: Marist, 2009). Onişorul, Gheorghe (ed.), Totalitarism şi rezistenţă, teroare şi represiune în România comunistă (Bucharest: Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, 2001). Onişoru, Gheorghe (ed.), Mişcarea armată de rezistenţă anticomunistă din România: 1944–1962 (Bucharest: Kullusys, 2003). Pleşa, Liviu, Organizaţia de rezistenţă condusă de maiorul Nicolae Dabija (1948–1949) (Bucharest: Editura CNSAS, 2009). Stoenescu, Lăcrămioara, De pe băncile şcolii în închisorile comuniste (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2010). Tănase, Tiberiu, Feţele monedei: Mişcarea legionară între 1941 şi 1948 (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2010). Ţărănu, Liviu/Bărbulescu Theodor (eds.), Jurnale de Rezistenţa anticomunistă: Vasile Motrescu, Mircea Dobre, 1952–1953 (Bucharest: Nemira, 2006). Tismăneanu, Vladimir, Stalinism For All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Ţiu, Ilarion, Mişcarea legionară după Corneliu Codreanu (Bucharest: Vremea, 2007). Vasile, Cristian, Episcopul Ioan Suciu, contestatar al regimului communist (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 2000). Voicu-Arnăuţoiu, Ioana-Raluca (ed.), Luptătorii din munţi: Toma Arnăuţoiu, Grupul de la Nucşoara: Documente ale anchetei, procesului, detenţiei (Bucharest: Vremea, 2009).

Summary Scores of armed resistance groups formed in the wake of General Ion Antonescu’s resignation as the ruler of Romania on 23 August 1944 and the gradual establishment of Communist rule. Although the most famous of these groups were tightly coordinated bands firmly ensconced in the mountains under the leadership of charismatic individuals such as Ion Gavrilă-Ogoranu and Toma Arnăuțoiu, the majority were small, loosely-organized networks of people who took up arms for a variety of reasons, including out of fear that they would be targeted by the communists because of their fascist pasts. National Liberals and Peasantists were reluctant to join forces with former legionaries even though they were happy to cooperate with antisemites who had been affiliated with other extremist right-wing parties such as the National Christian Party. For others, being a legionary was the epitome of what it meant to be anti-communist. This chapter examines how the myth of the Legion shaped

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armed resistance to the Romanian Communist Party during the late 1940s and early 1950s. It argues that reframing memories of the Legion for a Cold War audience shaped armed resistance in significant ways, from alienating potential collaborators to forcing people into resistance out of fear of reprisals for their past affiliations and motiving young people who needed an ideology they could appropriate.

Summary in Romanian

Zeci de grupări de rezistenţă armată s-au format în preajma demisiei Generalului Ion Antonescu în calitate de conducator al României în data de 23 august 1944 şi a întemeierii graduale a orânduirii Comuniste. Deşi majoritatea acestor grupări erau strâns coordonate de găşti refugiate în munţi sub conducerea unor indivizi caristmatici precum Ion Gavrilă-Ogoranu şi Toma Arnăuțoiu, majoritatea erau reţele mici de oameni superficial organizate care s-au ridicat la arme din diverse motive, inclusiv de frică că ar putea fi ţinta comuiştilor din cauza trecutului lor fascist. Naţional Liberalii şi Ţaraniştii erau reticenţi să-şi unească forţele cu foştii legionari chiar dacă erau bucuroşi să coopereze cu antisemiţii, care la rândul lor fuseseră afiliaţi cu alte partide de extremă dreapta ca şi Partidul Naţional Creştin. Pentru alţii, a fi legionar întruchipa chintesenţa a ceea ce înseamna să fi anti-comunist. Acest capitol examinează în ce fel mitul Legiunii a format rezistenţa armată împotriva Partidului Comunist Român spre sfârşitul anilor ’40 şi începutul anilor ’50. Capitolul argumentează că reîncadrarea memorillor despre Legiune într-o mentalitate a războiului rece a format rezistenţa armată în diverse feluri semnificative, de la alienarea potenţialilor colaboratori până la a forţa oamenii în rezistenţă de frica represaliilor din cauza apartenenţelor lor trecute şi până la a motiva tineretul care avea nevoie de o ideologie de care să se ataşeze.

Fig. 14.1

Romania – centres of resistance groups as described in the article

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Chapter 15

Women in the Armed Anti-communist Romanian Resistance, between Loyalty, Support and Betrayal Case Studies: The Banat and Nucșoara Areas Ioana Ursu

An Overview of the Romanian Armed Resistance

The Romanian society’s response to the instauration of communism registered a diverse spectrum of reactions, which varied from submission and compromise to violent forms of armed resistance. Opponents of communism came from all social levels; from intellectuals with democratic values to militaries with a strong national identity, and to peasants who treasured land property, religion, labour and self-worth. One the toughest and most tragic expressions of Romanian anti-communist opposition was the armed resistance.1 Chronologically, the Romanian resistance extended, largely, from 1944 to 1962 and could be divided into two distinct periods: 1944–482 (from the entrance of the Soviet Army in Romania up to the official instauration of the communist regime) and 1948–62 (from the beginnings of the communist regime until the arrest and imprisonment of the final partisans and the annihilation of the last remnants of armed resistance). Initially, the resistance was explicitly anti-Soviet and began with units of military and civilians that had the purpose of stopping Soviet infiltrations, collecting information and organizing diversions.3 After the 23rd August 1944 1  Florian Banu, Silviu Moldovan, Introductory study to ‘Bande, bandiți și eroi’. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1949–1968) (edited by the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives), București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, 7. 2  The years between 1944–48 can be considered a period of transition towards the communist regime. In internal politics, they are marked by a growing influence of the Romanian Communist Party (1945 registers Romania’s first communist Prime Minister), which gradually outgrew the other democratic parties, and who also directed the beginnings of repression. The acknowledgment of the growing communist influence led to resistance among the population, either civilians or former militaries. An effervescence of anti-communist organizations and groups was registered, some of them even initiated by high school students. 3  During March 1944 – August 1944, as the Soviet troops invaded through north of the country, in Bucovina, the General Headquarters of the Army organized so-called ‘regional, fix battalions’ (in regions Neamț, Vrancea and Bucovina) composed of militaries and civilians; once

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coup d’état (followed by Romania switching to the side of the Allies) until the autumn of 1945, the armed resistance was synonymous to the unities of anti-Soviet resistance parachuted from Germany and Austria to Romania, mostly composed of former legionaries who had sought foreign refuge after the annihilation of the Legionary Movement by Ion Antonescu. The parachutists were supposed to fight behind the Romanian-Soviet lines with the purpose of throwing out the political regime installed after 23rd August, and of retransforming Romania into a German ally. Between 6th March 1945 and 10th December 1945, more than 17 groups of parachutists activated throughout the country, each of them counting from 30 to 50 fighters. Finally, the period between December 1945 and December 1947 registered the activity of the ‘Sumanele Negre’ Division, an organization initiated in Transylvania but which expanded throughout the country. Formed of militaries, officers and civilian volunteers without a specific political orientation, it had a strong national character directed against the Sovietization promoted by the pro-communist government; its smallest divisions counted from 50 to 100 fighters, while the largest ones went up to 2000 combatants.4 The period between 1948 to 1962, however, registered the largest and most complex manifestation of armed resistance – with an anti-communist orientation, which disseminated geographically along most of the areas of the country; it developed within a massively communized and Sovietized political internal context. A general overview offers us the image of numerically reduced, isolated groups, retreating to various mountain regions. A count indicates the existence of almost 70 groups,5 most of them organized. Despite several group leaders envisioning the connections between partisan groups and their with the advance of the Soviet troops, these battalions regrouped and transformed, since May 1944, into groups of partisans destined for self-defense against the thefts, rapes and crimes of the Soviet occupation army. The most famous battalion was the one in Bucovina, counting more than 1300 combatants who afterwards divided into smaller groups of partisans, varying from 15 to 120 members. Doru Radosav, Istoria din memorie: încercări de istorie orală, Cluj-Napoca, Gatineau: Argonaut, Symphologic Publishing, 2016, 231-232. 4  Ibd., 232. 5  Distributed in 10 regions, each encompassing several groups: 11 groups in Bucovina, 12 groups in Banat, 1 in Brașov, 6 in Vrancea, 5 in Sibiu, 6 in Maramureș, 12 groups in the Apuseni Mountains, 5 groups in Arad, 3 groups in Dobrogea, 2 groups in Bacău, 2 groups in Muscel and 2 in Făgăraș. Their strategies of action aimed for clandestinity; in most of the cases, the partisans acted around rural locations, where they could maintain connections with the ones in the mountains. Their mountain locations included: storages for ammunition, shelters (different ones depending on the season), roads of access or refugee in case of danger. Their fighting arsenal was made of light armament: submachine guns, automatic pistols, rifles and revolvers. Ibd., 232-236.

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unification into a national resistance movement, such plans would eventually fail. Although occasionally some groups managed to communicate to one another, unification plans could not succeed due to several factors, among which were: the geographical circumstances, the need for secrecy, and the constant tracking of the political police. Most of the leaders of the resistance groups settled for the solution of numerically-reduced and well-organized groups, an option that could better guarantee the protection and safety of the partisans compared to any attempts of unification and large-scale uprisings. The number of partisans in the larger groups could vary from a dozen to more than a hundred; among these, the largest groups living in the mountains numbered a maximum of 30-40 members; during their operative actions or confrontations with the army or the Securitate, they would regroup into smaller formations of 3 to 5 fighters, specifically for guerrilla combat.6 The motivations for adopting the decision to initiate or to adhere to resistance groups were extremely varied (corresponding to various political orientations, different education and formation experiences of the resistance combatants), but the supposed catalyst was the imminence of their arrest.7 Another cause, as stated explicitly by testimonies of former combatants, was their idealism and their ideological values which made it impossible for them to accept the ideological constraints and demands of the new regime. Also, a highly relevant impulse towards the aggregation of several nucleuses of resistance was given by the socio-economic constraints, namely the nationalisation, the excessive quotas and the collectivisation of agriculture.8 Finally, the firm belief in the imminence of an American intervention against communism fed the hopes of the fighters from the beginning until the last remnants of resistance.9 The general purpose of all the resistance groups was the removal of the communist regime.10 Most of the partisans were, however, conscious of the impossibility of attaining this through isolated grouping. Consequently, most of the groups sought to maintain the freedom of their members, to gather and 6  Ibd., 236. 7  Florian Banu, Mișcarea de rezistență armată anticomunistă din România – între negare și hiperbolizare, in Cosmin Budeancă; Iulia Pop; Florentin Olteanu (eds.), Rezistența anticomunistă: cercetare științifică și valorificare muzeală, vol. I, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006, 307. 8  Ibd. 9  The collective mentality projecting the arrival of a saviour transposed into the myth of ‘the arrival of the Americans’. Doru Radosav, Istoria din memorie, 237-238. For other myths and symbols of the Romanian resistance, see Paula Ivan, Mituri și simboluri în rezistența comunistă in Anuarul de Istorie Orală, X (2008), 119-155. 10  Banu, Mișcarea de rezistență, 309.

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store armaments and ammunition and to ensure a network of support in their surrounding areas11. Contact with the supporting communities as well as with the other groups would sometimes be ensured through encoded messages; also, they had to strategically and logistically plan even for providing food from the villages or towns near the mountains.12 Fulfilling all their immediate objectives would have ensured the future guerrilla combat in the eventuality of a military conflict between the USSR and the Westerns. Among their secondary objectives were: maintaining distrust in the Communist Party, minor acts of sabotage as well as harassing local party activists.13 Only a small part of these objectives were attained, but the main impact of the armed resistance shaped the collective mentality: for several years, the partisans managed to maintain the hope that the communist regime was not irreversible and to constantly assert its illegitimacy.14 The repression exerted onto the armed resistance varied in forms. First, the Securitate arrested members from the partisans’ networks of support and persecuted the partisans’ families. A very common tactic was to infiltrate military or civilian agents among the partisans or to recruit informants from the partisans’ family members. A few extreme repressive situations occurred through the public display of the captured, dead partisans’ bodies (in Banat).15 The Securitate also instituted monetary ‘awards’ to catch the partisans,16 or gave consistent bribery to those who betrayed the partisans.17 However, the investment of resources made by the Securitate was completely disproportionate to the numbers of partisans existent in the mountains, corresponding to the asymmetric warfare referred to by Keith Dickson18. The emphasis falls especially on asymmetries in power and organization: often, the Securitate deployed absurdly large numbers of agents or informants into the local communities and attempted to infiltrate them into the partisans’ 11  Ibd. 12  Doru Radosav, La resistance anticommuniste en Roumanie 1944–1989 in Communisme, no. 91-92 – 2007, 62. 13  Particularly those who had committed abuses or injustice at the expense of other villagers. 14  Banu, Mișcarea de rezistență, 309-310. Collective memory also registered a birth of a folklore of the resistance, consisting in ballads or popular poems dedicated to the partisans. Such folklore was collected in the volume: Cornelia Călin-Bodea, Folclorul rezistenței anticomuniste, Târgu Lăpuș: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2010. 15  Doru Radosav, Istorie și memorie, 239. 16  Such was the case in the Vrancea resistance. 17  In Banat, one of those who sold the partisans managed to buy 60 sheep with the money he received. 18  Keith Dickson, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Today, speech delivered 16th March 2017, Vienna.

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support networks to gain intelligence.19 The Securitate operative troops assigned to capturing the partisans were also numerous; however, their lack of professionalism (signaled by Securitate upper management themselves), their amateurism and brutality impacted mostly on the partisans’ family members and supporters.20 The asymmetric confrontation lasted in some cases for more than a decade; ironically, based on the extensive documentary material, researchers concluded that professionalism was not among the reasons for the Securitate’s final triumph in its confrontation with the armed resistance.21

Sources and Methodology

Reconstituting the stories of the Romanian armed resistance highlights the importance of the survivors’ narratives. The fall of the communist regime opened the way not only to political freedom, but also to the recovery of Romania’s recent past in both history and memory. The fervour of the early 1990s directed the public interest towards the survivors of the regime. The first to find themselves at the centre of attention were, thus, victims of the communist repression, former political prisoners, members of the anti-communist armed resistance, survivors, dissidents and so on: their stories primed over the former master narrative of the regime. Oral history was, at the time, one of the most important means of recovering the voices and stories of those who were previously silenced.22 My research focuses on two resistance groups originating in the Banat region (south-west of Romania) and the Nucșoara, Argeș region (also known as Muscel, in the south of Romania). The reason for choosing these two groups lies within the availability of the documentary sources concerning them, both as archive documents and as oral testimonies. Whereas the historical reconstruction of the activity of other armed resistance groups has been based exclusively on either documentary sources (such as the Bucovina group,23 the 19  “Bande, bandiți și eroi”, document 31, 188-197. 20  Paula Ivan, Formele de represiune a rezistenței anticomuniste (I) in Revista Arhivelor/ Archives Review, LXXXVI (2009), no.1, 219-245. 21  Florian Banu; Silviu B. Moldovan, Studiu introductiv in ‘Bande, bandiți și eroi’. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1949–1968), 15. 22  Consequently, the 1990s registered several private and institutional initiatives of oral history campaigns destined to collecting memories and stories about armed resistance, political detention, deportation etc. 23  Extensively documented by researcher Adrian Brișcă, Rezistența armată din Bucovina: 1944–1950 (vol. I) & Rezistența armată din Bucovina: 1950–1952 (vol.II), Bucharest: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 1998.

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Oltenia group) or interviews (the Apuseni resistance such as the ‘Capotă-Dejeu’ or ‘Cruce și Spadă’ groups), Banat and Nucșoara benefit from both edited documents from the archive of the former political police (the Securitate)24 and oral history interviews.25 I also correlated the available information with relevant studies and analyses from secondary literature.26 The documentary sources from the archive of the Securitate vary in type, form and content; different categories of the documents also highlight slight differences in semantics, subscribing in general to the ideological view proposed by communism, which divided the world into us and them, opposing the defenders of the social order (the entire repressive apparatus) to the fighters against the social order (the partisans and their supporters, labelled as ‘bandits’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘murderers’). The oral sources enrich the stories of the partisans and of their supporters with a warmer, human dimension. Apart from being narratives about the anticommunist armed resistance, the oral history interviews illustrate the richness of human drama and tragedy, the interweaving of support and betrayal, and the nuanced landscape of suffering, both inside the groups of partisans and among their network of supporters. The stories delivered by the interviewees document the issue of the resistance adding an essential element: the human dimension of suffering in its various forms: deriving from either abuse, mistreatment and injustice, or disillusion, compromise and betrayal. 24  Published by researchers in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. These are: Miodrag Milin, Rezistența din Banat în documente; Adrian Brișcă, Rezistența armată din Banat 1945–1949, vol. I, București: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2004. Ioana-Raluca Voicu-Arnăuțoiu, Luptătorii din munți. Toma Arnăuțoiu. Grupul de la Nucșoara: documente ale anchetei, procesului, detenției, București: Vremea, 1997. 25  The current research is based on the results of two oral history campaigns led by the Oral History Institute in Cluj-Napoca during 1997–1999, encompassing in total more than 50 interviews that documented the armed resistance in the areas. The tapes and transcripts belong to the archive of the institute. The references quote their archive, although a relatively recent volume containing the transcripts has also been published: Mișcarea de rezistență anticomunistă din România. Banatul montan: Mărturii, edited by the Oral History Institute, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2016. Also, on the issue of Banat, we recall Athanasie Berzescu’s and Miodrag Milin’s early collections of testimonies gathered from survivors and village witnesses. 26  The most notable being: Aurora Liiceanu, Rănile memoriei: Nucșoara și rezistența din munți, Iași: Polirom, 2003, as well as the collection of studies of the researchers from the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS), Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România 1944–1962, București: Kullusys, 2003. Other valuable studies are found in the proceedings volume of a 2006 international symposium dedicated to armed resistance, its study and museification: Cosmin Budeancă; Florentin Olteanu; Iulia Pop (eds.), Rezistența anticomunistă. Cercetare științifică și valorificare muzeală, 2 vols, Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006.

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As a working method, I chose to explore the stories of women (not necessarily their own narratives) and their connection to the resistance groups. Deriving from the women’s attitudes of support, loyalty or betrayal, some possible typologies were established: the supporter, the partisan and the traitor. The women’s stories from both areas, Banat and Nucșoara, were then organized using these general categories. What resulted may be defined as a collection of individual stories which emphasize humanity both in its forms of resistance and defeat, cowardice and bravery, highlighting also the great suffering and costs experienced by the women who were involved in the support of the armed resistance groups.

Women and the Resistance: Typologies, Life Stories, Costs and Consequences

The Armed Resistance Groups from Banat and Nucșoara As mentioned before, the Romanian resistance consisted in isolated groups. Due to the constant repression exerted by the political police, some of the groups had rather short periods of activity and were soon caught. Remaining members would regroup and soon afterwards other groups would take their place, thus portraying an effervescence in the resistance groups’ activity. This was the case for Banat, a geographical region situated in the south-west of Romania, where the group lead by colonel Ioan Uță activated during 1947–49; after an emergency intervention made by the political police, in 1949, most of the groups in Banat were caught and their leaders were executed. Some of the members managed to flee unscathed and furtherly reunited under the command of other leaders, constituting what the Securitate named ‘the remnants of the Uță group’: several formations lead by brothers Duicu, by Dumitru Mutașcu and Dumitru Ișfănuț.27 In the Argeș region (south of Romania), the villages belonging to the historical area of Muscel28 produced a long-lived and well-organized resistance group known as Haiducii Muscelului’,29 initially lead by Gheorghe Arsenescu and 27  Dorin Dobrincu, ‘Rămășițele grupului Ion Uță’: Formațiunile de rezistență din Banat conduse de frații Duicu, Dumitru Mutașcu și Dumitru Ișfănuț (1949–1954) in Annales Universitas Apulensis, Series Historica, 9/I, 2005, 193-215. 28  The area comprises villages: Stănești, Domnești, Poenărei, Corbi, Sboghițești, Nucșoara. Nowadays most often known as the Nucșoara area after the name of its northest village, famous for the lasting armed resistance developed here. The women supporting this armed resistance group were publicised as ‘the heroes from Nucșoara’. 29  ‘Haiduc’ meaning outlaw, in a Robin Hood-ish sense.

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Toma Arnăuțoiu; dissensions between the two leaders’ views lead to a split.30 After a confrontation with the Securitate troops which lead to the capturing of most of his group members, Arsenescu ran away and hid in the mountains, finally being caught in 1960.31 Toma Arnăuțoiu and the others lasted from 1949 until 1958 when they were captured, arrested, sentenced and most of them executed. Women’s Typologies: The Partisan Despite possessing a predominantly masculine image, the resistance not only registered males, but also female partisans. Some of them did not last long in the mountains due to the harsh living conditions, while others endured hardship until the capture of the groups by the authorities. Anișoara Horescu was a second-year student in history and geography at the University in Cluj. Not only did she get involved in the students’ protest movements, but also helped the parachutists in the mountains as their guide. Her father was a legionary, her brother-in-law – leader of one of the resistance groups in Banat, Spiru Blănaru – was a legionary as well; she was a legionary sympathizer herself. While staying with her sister, Maria Blănaru, at their parents’ home, the Securitate came to arrest her in the middle of the night. The girls lied about her identity, passing Anișoara as a fellow student and friend of Maria’s. Anișoara claimed she needed to get dressed, so she entered a different room. Until the police realized their mistake, Anișoara had already escaped through the back garden, barefoot and only wearing her night gown. She initially ran to her brother-in-law. ‘I can picture myself making my way to the shelter. There were thorns all over. My father and Spiru wrapped my feet in handkerchiefs. The villagers brought us clothes for the night. It was cold. They were protecting me as if I were a child. I was the only woman there. I used to stay behind them, especially when confrontations between them and the militaries would take place.’32 30  Arsenescu envisioned a large-dimensioned organization involving as many people as possible. He pleaded for a numerous presence in the mountains and desired large-scale actions against the communist authorities. Toma Arnăuțoiu, however, opted for discretion and for a numerically-reduced group which would possess more mobility and secrecy; his pragmatic view sought to protect the small comunities around Nucșoara from the wrath of the Securitate. Constantin Vasilescu, Rezistența armată: o istorie în imagini, Pitești: Manuscris, 2016, 95-119. 31  “Bande, bandiți și eroi”. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1949–1968), document 51, 309-316. 32  Valentin Orga, The Women’s Attitudes during the Anticommunist Resistance Movement in Anuarul de Istorie Orală, III (2002), 259.

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Afterwards, she and her father hid together along a smaller group of partisans until 1952. After Spiru Blănaru was arrested and executed, Anișoara Horescu and her father decided to give in and were imprisoned: ‘My father and I surrendered. What was the point of tormenting the other people in the village?’33 Her sister, Maria Blănaru, recounts: ‘What impressed me in Anișoara, oh, well … that she left with them. Can you imagine a 20-year old girl in the middle of the mountains, in the middle of the forest, among men? Oh, well, everyone was … they all treated her as a child. Like she always said, she would carry their guns and their bags when they moved from one place to another. They had a shelter (…) where the partisans would eat and sleep; it also had a room for food storage – that’s where Anișoara slept.’34 After surrendering, Anișoara Horescu was sentenced to 7 years of prison. She was 22 at the time.35 At Nucșoara, Maria Jubleanu, mother of five, followed her husband and her eldest son into the mountains since 1949; an armed confrontation with the Securitate troops36 led to Maria Jubleanu’s death (she was shot while trying to cover the retreat of two younger partisans37); her husband was forced by the Securitate to bury her on the spot38, and was arrested immediately afterwards:39 ‘Titu Jubleanu told me. When he saw the boys escaped and that his wife was shot, he lifted his hands and surrendered. They made him dig a bit of a tomb with his nails, his fingers, with a bit of wood. Quickly, quickly! He dug about 10 inches and they said: enough! “After I kissed her, I layed on her sand and stones, and that was it …” They took him to the Securitate.’40 The most famous story of female resistance was the partisanship of Maria Plop, who followed Toma Arnăuțoiu into the mountains. She spent 9 years with the partisans, and gave birth to her and Arnăuțoiu’s daughter in 1956; she managed to survive along the men despite the harsh living conditions. When the group was betrayed and captured in 1958, Maria Plop was arrested and her daughter sent to orphanage. She died in prison after three years of detention, due to poor health and severe conditions of detention.41 33  Ibd., 260. 34  Interview with Maria Blănaru, Timișoara, 12th December 1998. Archive of the Oral History Institute Cluj-Napoca, tapes 114, 115. 35  Orga, The Women’s Attitudes, 260. 36  Bande, bandiți, eroi, document 51. 37  Vasilescu, Rezistența armată, 106. 38  http://www.eroinenucsoara.ro/maria-jubleanu-ro.php, 10th July 2017. 39  Vasilescu, Rezistența armată, 106. 40  Povestea Elisabetei Rizea din Nucșoara; mărturia lui Cornel Drăgoi, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993, 139. 41  http://www.eroinenucsoara.ro/maria-plop-ro.php, 10th July 2017. Maria Plop and Toma Arnăuțoiu’s daughter, Ioana-Raluca Voicu Arnăuțoiu, had an essential contribution in

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The Supporter Women supporters were, most of the times, relatives of the partisans; to some of them, the issue of supporting the resistance primarily translated into loyalty towards familial bonds and fidelity towards their fellow villagers, whose judgement and attitude they trusted. Lenuța Fiat was an early, young supporter of the Banat partisans. She was 16 at the time and was sent by her elders to help the partisans. Her father was initially friend to the partisans, but after a while he cut his ties with them and apparently sought to betray them. Agreeing to her grandmother (who supported the resistance), and without her father knowing, Lenuța Fiat kept feeding the partisans. She was arrested (but she never found out who turned her in), and because she was badly beaten she consented to persuade the partisans to surrender. While doing so, she didn’t know she was followed by the Securitate; there were shootings, but the partisans managed to escape. She was once again investigated by the Securitate, but seeing how she was tricked, she refused to give any kind of information. After her release, she endured stigma from the villagers, who accused her of being a mistress of the partisans, while on the other hand, other partisans wanted to kill her and her father; however, the main partisan whom she fed and hid, Nicolae Ciurică, diverted the others’ attention and saved her. She suffered from the stigma her entire life.42 ‘Had they imprisoned me, it would’ve been better: I suffered more than some of those who were in prison … Also, the villagers laughed at me. They gibed me … saying that even the Militia abused me and the partisans, too … and that I’m deformed, hear that!’43 Marta Vădraru, wife of partisan Pavel Vădraru, helped her husband and another partisan with food and cooking, in the beginning of the 1950s; the men hid inside a two-metre hole dug up inside a supporter’s barn, but they were betrayed and arrested along with Vădraru’s wife.44 Marina Chirca was one of the most loyal supporters of the Nucșoara group, from the beginnings until their capture in 1958. She bought them food, was a member of contact between the group members and their families; she research and editing of the documents of the Nucșoara partisans’ trials, as well as in popularizing the dramas of the women in the Nucșoara resistance. For reference, Ioana-Raluca Voicu-Arnăuțoiu, Luptătorii din munți: Grupul de la Nucșoara, documente ale procesului, anchetei, detenției, Bucharest: Vremea, 1997. 42  Interview with Elena Armas, Luncavița, 10th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 143, side B. 43  During this fragment of the interview, Elena Fiat cried. Our supposition is that, also due to her stigma, she wasn’t able to marry well. During the interview, she mentioned that her husband (Armas) was a drunkard, and much older than her. 44  Dobrincu, Rămășițele grupului “Ion Uță”, 199.

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delivered the partisans messages and guns, kept them aware of the Securitate’s every move inside the village and was the partisans’ most trusted contact45. She helped maintain the secrecy of the resistance group for a decade and even managed to deceive the Militia closely several times: once, her son bought cigarettes from the local store in large numbers; the vender notified the police, and the teen was brought to interrogation; however, she taught him to lie to the Militia, which he did, declaring that, as a teenager he smoked but had to hide his smoking habits from his mother.46 When the partisans were arrested in 1958, she went into hiding along with her sister, Ana Simion. She was only caught in 1963 and imprisoned until 1964, when decrees of pardon were issued for most of the political prisoners throughout the country. Elisabeta Rizea was another emblematic figure among the supporters of the resistance. Her oral testimony was highly publicized in the early 1990s;47 not only did this bring forth stories of the Nucșoara resistance, but it also highlighted conflicts of memory between the villagers’ regarding the importance and relevant activity of the different members from the local network of support.48 Rizea and her husband helped the partisans with food and clothing; they were caught and Elisabeta Rizea was initially imprisoned between 1950 and 1951; however, after returning to the village, she continued to aid the partisans by delivering messages, information, clothing and food and, in the end, was arrested for a second time in 1958 along the rest of the group.49 Her story was famous, among others, for the horrid tortures the investigators subjected her to, as well as for her stubborn refusal to co-operate with the police or to give any information that could lead to the capture of the partisans. More than anything, Elisabeta Rizea’s name stands as a symbol for commitment and bravery while defending both people and ideals. The Traitor Ironically, the vast resources invested by the Securitate in their asymmetric warfare with the resistance (including a large network of local informants and carefully infiltrated agents) would have been less successful hadn’t it been for 45  Aurora Liiceanu, Rănile memoriei: Nucșoara și rezistența din munți, Iași: Polirom, 1998, 101-102. 46  Interview with Gheorghe Chirca, Nucșoara, 10th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 173, side A. 47  Her oral testimony was recorded and published as soon as 1993. Povestea Elisabetei Rizea, 15-104. 48  Aurora Liiceanu performed an extensive analysis of these memorial conflicts in Rănile memoriei. 49  http://www.eroinenucsoara.ro/elisabeta-rizea-ro.php, 10th July 2017.

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previous supporters or even partisans who went astray and decided to collaborate with their enemies. Their various motivations behind their acts of betrayal (expressed as collaboration with the political police or the Militia through offering information on the partisans or through revealing their hiding places, their tactics or their plans) is one gripping factor which filled the landscape of armed resistance with more drama. Some betrayed for money (the Securitate had instated well-paid man-hunts for the partisans), others for fear of the authorities, others due to deceit. A couple of female portraits tragically intertwine love stories with informative collaboration to Securitate officers. The most-known case in Banat, referenced in several memories, was the story of Anastasia Benghia from Domașnea. Also referred to as Lenuța Stașa, or Nastasia, she was the wife of Ghiță Urdăreanu, a partisan who had died in earlier confrontations with the authorities. She was trusted by the partisans and delivered them food, but at the same time had romantic relations with Securitate officers and surrendered the partisans to the Securitate in November 1950. One of the partisans, Nicolae Ciurică, recalls: ‘The first betrayal that I remember of … was in 1950, November 1st, it was Tuesday to Wednesday. I can still see that night: it was autumn, it was raining, and I was sold in Domașnea. We had gone to get some food from a young man, and this woman who we confided in … she was the wife of a fighter who had died in the forests – except that when he ran away they were already separated. (…) So we, as well as the wife of Ișfănuț Dumitru confided in her50… Ișfănuț’s wife trusted her and repeatedly sent her with food, information, and things like that. (…) Briefly put, we had to meet her but she said: I can’t come, I’m tracked by the Securitate, there’s a lot of army officers around here. (…) So, she came the next evening, and started to cry when she saw me, tried to convince me to get my shoes off51. Luckily, I didn’t get to unshoe, otherwise I would’ve had to run barefoot … After 15 minutes at most, she left and then we heard a single gun shoot (probably the signal to begin the attack), and then a blast of a machine gun through the window, straight into the lamp.”52 However, the partisans managed to escape, and then caught her, tortured53 her and then killed her54 (some say that she was shot after the torture, others that she died because of the wounds). It’s important to mention that although 50  Another one of the leading partisans. 51  Pretending to want to treat Ciurică’s feet which were very hurt due to wearing wet wooden socks for a long time. 52  Interview with Nicolae Ciurică, Teregova, 8th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tapes 116, 117. 53  Interview with Ion Bica, 9th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 4.1. 54  Interview with Maria Blănaru, Timișoara, 12th December 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tapes 114, 115.

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these groups from Banat had made an oath to punish those who would betray them, the partisans were only particularly cruel to this woman. Nicolae Ciurică, one of the partisans who were betrayed, explains: ‘We could have had traitors among out own, therefore … within our organization, among others, we had an oath … the punishment of a betrayer is death, irrespective of who he is. (…) So even if one of us proved to be guilty (of betrayal), he would be shot. (…) We did punish some betrayers – if we hadn’t punished them, they would’ve multiplied. This woman sold us and took money for it.’55 Ghimboașa Maria, daughter of Ghimboașa Iancu, a partisan, was mistress to a Securitate officer (Ștefănică) and convinced her father, who was a partisan, to betray his fellow partisans. Ghimboașa Iancu disarmed notary Gheorghe Ionescu, one of the notable partisans in the group and surrendered willingly, also forcing Ionescu to surrender. Ionescu was executed and Ghimboașa, after long years of prison, lived. A: How on earth did she sell her father? B: I don’t know … that’s her conscience … A: Hm. B: I don’t know what to say.56

Elena Dragomir, former Elena Caraiman, wife of one the partisans. Her husband was the first among the partisans to be shot by the Securitate57. Her memories of him are connected to suffering and resentment. While he had been in the woods with the partisans, she and her mother-in-law were arrested, and Caraiman’s nine-month old baby was left alone. A: They might have been important to themselves, but to me … Where they met, where they wandered, God knows … but what they did was wrong. B: Why? A: Because they ruined us!58

Other than the suffering inflicted on her by her status as a partisan’s wife (the communists stole all the construction materials she and her husband had saved for building a house, she was left a widow, alone and in misery) Elena Dragomir (former Caraiman) didn’t seem to remember many details in her interview (or chose not to). A decade after her first husband’s death, she remarried. During 55  Interview with Nicolae Ciurică, Teregova, 8th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tapes 116, 117. 56  Interview with Ilie Smultea, Teregova, 11th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 141. 57  He was part of Spiru Blănaru’s group. Adrian Brișcă, Rezistența armată din Banat, 31-32. 58  Interview with Elena Dragomir, Feneș, 12th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 145, side B.

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her interview, she avoided discussing many issues and tended to be rather vague on certain topics – partially perhaps because, as a fellow villager stated, it was rumoured that either her or her father, were the ones who ‘sold’ her husband to the authorities59. ‘My first husband was both handsome and intelligent. I wouldn’t have traded him for anyone in this whole village … but the misery was great, too.’60 Some of the traitors were punished through executions by the partisans in Banat. Such were Călina Munteanu from Verendin, who betrayed Colonel Uță’s group or Elena Popa, who betrayed the Duicu brothers in January 1950; Popa was afterwards caught by the remaining partisans and shot in the forest.61 Maria Gosa from Lăpușnicu Mare,62 a mistress of a Securitate officer, also decided to aid the political police and ended up executed by the partisans.63 The fine line between potential betrayal and betrayal itself was nowhere as dramatic as in Ana Simion’s case. Sister of Marina Chirca and supporter of the Nucșoara partisans, Ana was the target of one of the Securitate’s operations. The political police had attempted for a long time to infiltrate informants around the supporters of the Nucșoara group; they re-directed their attention towards Marina Chirca and managed to introduce covertly an informative agent into the village, as the new vendor at the local shop64. As Marina Chirca purchased food in larger quantities, it was easy for the informant to keep track of her actions. An unexpected facilitation of the operation came from Ana Simion: her solitude and desire for affection paved the agent’s way into gaining her trust and feelings. Recognizing Ana Simion’s rather precarious psychological state (aggravated by the tension of abetting the partisans and by the fact that she had already been convicted once due to her implication in the resistance), the political police decided to exploit the opportunity by attempting to emancipate from her sister’s influence (naturally, under the agent’s influence). The elaborate plan devised by the Securitate went insofar as to assert the agent’s intention of building a family with Ana Simion; this reason offered the circumstances for a pretexted arrest of the two, especially premeditated by the political police to raise the psychological pressure felt by Ana Simion and 59  Interview with Magdalena Boieru, Feneș, 13th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 142. 60  Interview with Elena Dragomir, Feneș, 12th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 145, side B. 61  Dorin Dobrincu, Rămășițele grupului “Ion Uță”, 198. 62  Adrian Brișcă, Rezistența armată din Banat, 45-47. 63  Executions due to betrayals were not limited to women alone. During the 15 years of the Banat resistance, researcher Adrian Brișcă identified 9 executions, out of which 3 were women. Ibd., 45. In total, he also identified 43 situations of betrayals, out of which 8 denounces to the authorities were made by women. Ibd., 45-46. 64  Moreover, gifting him with a believable cover.

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to trick her into confessing her connections to the partisans. Scared by the turn of events, Ana Simion confided to her ‘fiancé’, the agent, about involvement with the resistance. The entire episode left a powerful impact on her psyche at that time; she soon fell ill with depression; not long after, she approached her sister and the two ran away together and hid from the Securitate for years in a fellow villager’s barn attic; they were caught and arrested in 1963, 5 years after the trials and sentencing of the partisans and of their supporters.65 Costs and Consequences Having connections to the armed resistance had great costs for women. They were often arrested or at least investigated along their husbands, in the political police’s attempt to gain more information about the partisans. Some of them were subjected to cruel physical torture. Others were blackmailed or pressured into giving declarations by using threats towards their children (mostly, the threat of orphanage internment). Some of the women had more than one relative arrested in connection to the resistance. Most of them were left alone and often had to supply for themselves after their prison release, bearing the same stigma of connection to the ‘bandits’ or ‘terrorists’ of the resistance. Ana Colțan’s husband (from Teregova, Banat) was arrested for supplying the partisans with food. When partisans would come by, she’d feed them as well. One night, her husband was forcibly taken by the Securitate to indicate the partisans’ hiding place. ‘Don’t worry, he’ll come back soon’, a Securitate officer told her. Except he didn’t. He was imprisoned for eight years. He was the first of the group to be arrested; six weeks later, the other partisans were caught too. A year later, Ana Colțan’s father-in-law was also arrested; she wasn’t sure if the 60-year-old man did or did not have connections to the resistance. The consequences she mentions render an image of a divided village: on one side, the local activists and authorities who abused the families of the imprisoned (Ana Colțan, her mother-in-law and one brother-in-law of hers worked severely to fulfil the mandatory quotas and to manage to send food packages to the imprisoned; they were labelled as ‘chiaburi’66 and forced to take all kinds of public work for the village) and the villagers who didn’t help, but didn’t hinder either, each one minding their own business.67

65  Liiceanu, Rănile memoriei, 99-111. 66  The Romanian equivalent for “kulak”. 67  Interview with Ana Colțan, Teregova, 9th July 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tape 138, side B.

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Marta Vădraru, wife of partisan Pavel Vădraru, was arrested along with her husband and tortured by the Securitate for more than a month to give information about the partisans, but she was set free after they couldn’t get any information from her. A year and a half later, she was pressured to divorce her husband, ‘the bandit’, and to leave her child in the orphanage.68 In October 1949, after the arrest and execution of her husband, Maria Blănaru and the rest of her family (grandparents, in-laws and her child), along with two other families of partisans from Teregova were deported to the Dunăre-Black Sea Canal. Once they arrived there, it being obvious that they couldn’t work, they were relocated to Poarta Albă village where they were forced to labour at the collective farms, having to spend an entire summer in a 40-people barrack. Afterwards Maria Blănaru and her family were relocated to the stone quarry in Cuza-Vodă, where she fell ill; luckily, a doctor took pity and decided to operate on her in secrecy (she wasn’t allowed to benefit from such medical care due to her political status as widow of a ‘terrorist’). Seven years later her family was released from mandatory domicile and could resume their lives in their home village of Domașnea.69 Victoria (Năstase) Arnăuțoiu, wife of Petre Arnăuţoiu from ‘Haiducii Muscelului’, was forced to leave her two children, aged three and a year and half, respectively, when she was arrested. Released after six years of detention, she was re-imprisoned in 1958 and her children were put in an orphanage until their legal age.70 Elena (Lina) Chirca from the Nucșoara group initially headed towards the mountains along with her husband and eldest son (1949). Due to the harsh conditions, she retreated to the village Slatina and tried to remain in hiding but was soon caught. During arrest, she was blackmailed with the ‘temporary institutionalization’ of her four children (aged 14, 10, seven and five) in orphan homes71. Guilty of not denouncing her husband and children, she was sentenced to five years and died imprisoned shortly afterwards. 68  Dorin Dobrincu, Rămășițele grupului “Ion Uță”, 199. 69  This time, however, the villagers helped them recover by donating their individual quotas for plums, wheat and maize. Interview with Maria Blănaru, Timișoara, 12th December 1998. OHI Archive Cluj, tapes 114, 115. 70  http://www.eroinenucsoara.ro/victoria-arnautoiu-ro.php, last accessed 10 July 2017. 71  A sample of the Securitate’s ‘humanitarianism’ emerges from the address of the General Direction of the People’s Securitate in Pitești directed to the Provisional Committee of Argeș County, the Work and Social Regulations Sector: ‘It has come to our attention that Ion P. Chirca and his wife Elena from village Nucșoara-Muscel abandoned their home without a known address since April 1949; having left their children to their fate, starving, undressed and having to beg on the streets (italics belong to us, I.U.); we therefore request

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Daughter of priest Ion Constantinescu from Poenărei village, Iuliana Preduț came from a family who had lastingly supported the partisans. She, herself, as a young girl, had helped with delivering food to them. However, the capturing of the partisans in 1958 led to her arrest along with dozens of other supporters; by then, she had already married and was pregnant, but her condition didn’t ease her sentence or in-prison treatment at all. As a ‘bandit’ who had helped the partisans, she was held in promiscuous conditions, hungered and humiliated; she gave birth imprisoned and was reunited with her daughter only after her prison release.72

Women and the Resistance: A Few Conclusions

Throughout the country, women were involved in most resistance groups, sometimes as partisans themselves, but more often as members of the networks of support. The regime’s political actions against the resistance groups express an ‘asymmetric warfare’, if we consider not only the vast resources invested by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in this issue, (disproportionate in comparison with the actual number of partisans), but also the asymmetry defined in the high repressive costs paid by the partisans and by the women supporting them – as shown by the stories above. While discussing the Romanian resistance, the paper attempted to bring forth the stories of individuals, female figures who participated in the partisanship of Banat and Nucșoara. They are, overwhelmingly, stories of suffering, as involvement in the resistance came with great costs for everyone, from the direct participants up to their descendants. We also believe that the indicated typologies are not always set in stone, and that their permeability is linked to the various colours and shades of the humane. The use of oral history allowed to vividly illustrate the landscape of suffering, gifting the image of the resistance, as well as its historiographic narrative, with a human dimension.

the temporary internment of the four children in the temporary orphan homes in Pitești.’ http://www.eroinenucsoara.ro/elena-chirca-ro.php, last accessed 4 November 2016. 72  Ioana Ursu, Memories of Motherhood Imprisoned inside the Romanian Gulag in Histories (Un)Spoken. Survival and Social-Professional Integration Strategies in Communist Political Prisoners’ Families in Central and Eastern Europe in the ’50s and ’60s, Râmnicu Sărat 22-25 iunie 2016 international conference proceedings’ volume, 2017 (due to be published).

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Bibliography Brișcă, Adrian, Rezistența armată din Banat 1945–1949, vol. I (Bucharest: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2004). Brișcă, Adrian, Rezistența armată din Bucovina: 1944–1950 (vol. I) & Rezistența armată din Bucovina: 1950–1952 (vol. II) (Bucharest: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 1998). Budeancă, Cosmin, Pop, Iulia, Olteanu, Florentin (eds.), Rezistența anticomunistă: cercetare științifică și valorificare muzeală, vol. I-II (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2006). Dobrincu, Dorin, Bucovineni contra sovietici. Rezistența armată antisovieticăanticomunistă din Bucovina, in: AIO – Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală, V (2004), 96-129. Dobrincu, Dorin, “Rămășițele grupului Ion Uță”: Formațiunile de rezistență din Banat conduse de frații Duicu, Dumitru Mutașcu și Dumitru Ișfănuț (1949–1954), in: Annales Universitas Apulensis, Series Historica, 9/I (2005), 193-215. Ivan, Paula, Mituri și simboluri în memoria colectivă privind rezistența anticomunistă în AIO – Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală, X (2008), 119-155. Liiceanu, Aurora, Rănile memoriei: Nucșoara și rezistența din munți (Iași: Polirom, 2003). Milin, Miodrag, Rezistența din Banat în documente (București: Fundația Academia Civică, 2000). National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives Florica Dobre (coord.), “Bande, bandiți și eroi”. Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1949–1968) (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2003). National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives Gheorghe Onişoru (coord.), Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România 1944–1962) (București: Kullusys, 2003). Nicolau, Irina, Theodor Nițu (eds.), Povestea Elisabetei Rizea din Nucșoara urmată de mărturia lui Cornel Drăgoi (București: Humanitas, 1993). Orga, Valentin, The Women’s Attitudes during the Anticommunist Resistance Movement in AIO – Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală, III (2002), pages. Radosav, Doru, Istoria din memorie: încercări de istorie orală, (Cluj-Napoca, Gatineau: Argonaut, Symphologic Publishing, 2016). Vasilescu, Constantin, Rezistența armată: o istorie în imagini (Pitești: Manuscris, 2016). Voicu-Arnăuțoiu, Ioana-Raluca, Luptătorii din munți. Toma Arnăuțoiu. Grupul de la Nucșoara: documente ale anchetei, procesului, detenției (București: Vremea, 1997).

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Summary Anti-communist armed resistance in Romania consisted of more than 60 groups spread across the country, most of which retreated to the mountains to actively fight against the regime and hide from the Secret Police. Two of the groups that developed armed resistance were based in the Banat and the Făgăraș Mountains in Southwestern and Central Romania, respectively. The stories of these two groups present both similarities and differences, related to the ability of their members to act, the ultimate objective and method of their resistance and their recipe for survival. Both groups were provided with food and clothing by relatives (wives and sisters) and, in some exceptional cases, women even followed their men into the mountains. However, the rift between the resistance fighters and their neighbours in the local villages caused by their views on communism and their attitude to the authorities ultimately led to acts of betrayal, even between relatives and friends. Hence, the history of anti-communist resistance is one of two opposing communities that co-existed in Romanian mountain villages between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s: one that disapproved of communism and fought against it by supporting the armed resistance and one that actively sought to capture resistance fighters and deliver them to the Secret Police. Both the archives and oral history interviews show that the Securitate invested large resources in capturing members of the anti-communist resistance. Not only did they blackmail villagers but they also bought their support by promising favours in exchange for information or betrayal. Members of the resistance were, eventually, captured, imprisoned and, mostly, executed. Their wives were also arrested, leading to family traumas and deep divisions. The schism that was created between villagers – between supporters and opponents of the resistance – remained for many years. Upon their release from prison, former supporters of the resistance returned to a home that no longer wanted them and was populated by neighbours who had betrayed them. On the basis of interviews from the archive of the Oral History Institute in Cluj-Napoca as well as documents from the Securitate archives, this paper examines the role of women in supporting the anti-communist resistance by comparing the Banat and Făgăraș groups. It will then go on to highlight the objectives and motives of the resistance.

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Summary in Romanian

Rezistența armată anticomunistă în România a cuprins peste 50 de grupuri răspândite pe teritoriul țării, majoritatea retrăgându-se în munți pentru a se lupta împotriva regimului, dar și pentru a se ascunde de poliția politică. Povestea noastră se referă la două din grupurile care au rezistat armat, unul localizat în Munții Banatului, iar altul în Munții Făgăraș. Poveștile celor două grupuri au atât asemănări cât și diferențe, care reies din capacitatea de a acționa a oamenilor (agency), scopul ultim pentru care ei rezistau, precum și soluțiile lor de supraviețuire și rezistență. În ambele cazuri, rudele celor plecați în munți (soții, surori) au fost cele care i-au ajutat, de cele mai multe ori, cu mâncare și îmbrăcăminte. În unele cazuri excepționale, femeile chiar și-au urmat bărbații în munți. Cu toate acestea, ruptura dintre luptătorii din rezistență și vecinii lor din sat, în ceea ce privea viziunea lor despre comunism sau atitudinea față de autorități, a dus în cele din urmă la trădarea lor, chiar de către rude sau prieteni. Povestea rezistenței anti-comuniste ilustrează, astfel, două lumi opuse care coexistau la sfârșitul anilor ‘40 – începutul anilor ‘50 în satele românești de la munte: o lume care nu aproba comunismul și care lupta activ împotriva lui prin susținerea celor plecați în munți, și o lume ce căuta să-i captureze pe cei din rezistență și să îi livreze Securității. Așa cum demonstrează atât arhivele cât și interviurile de istorie orală, Securitatea a investit numeroase resurse pentru capturarea membrilor rezistenței anti-comuniste, nu doar șantajând ­oamenii din sat ci și cumpărându-i și promițându-le favoruri în schimbul trădării sau oferirii de informații. Luptătorii din munți au fost, în cele din urmă, capturați, întemnițați și cei mai mulți dintre ei executați. Soțiile lor au fost de asemenea arestate, producându-se fracturi incredibile și traume familiale. Prăpastia creată între membrii satului, între susținătorii celor din rezistență și oponenții lor, s-a ­transpus chiar și la mulți ani după evenimente. După ieșirea din închisoare, foștii susținători ai celor din rezistență au fost nevoiți să se întoarcă la o casă care nu-i mai voia, plină de vecini care îi trădaseră. Apelând la interviuri de istorie orală provenite din arhiva Institutului de Istorie Orală din Cluj-Napoca, precum și la documente din arhiva Securității, articolul își propune să examineze rolul avut de femei în susținerea rezistenței anti-comuniste, prin comparația a două grupuri de rezistență anticomunistă, unul din Banat și altul din Făgăraș. Vor fi, de asemenea, ilustrate, scopul și motivele celor care au participat la rezistența armată.

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Ioana Ursu

Resistance in South-Western Romania

Chapter 16

Communist Action, the Perception by the Serbian Urban Elite and Anti-communist Resistance in Serbia Dejan N. Zec

Introduction: Goals, Frameworks, Sources and Literature

This chapter focuses on the perception of the communists and their actions by the Serbian urban elite during the Second World War in Yugoslavia (1941–1945) and during the immediate post-war period (1945–1948), an issue that researchers often find ambiguous and difficult to comprehend. Attempting to capture moods, perceptions or something that could even be labelled as a Zeitgeist, especially within a certain social, economic or political group, is always a difficult task, and any researcher seeking to do so must be very clear about the limitations. Moods and perceptions can only be treated as elaborations of a narrative, which have a greater or lesser degree of accuracy, and not as absolute truth or solid facts. When examining people’s lives during wartime, especially their ‘everyday’ lives, far from the great battles and historic political decisions, one realises the extent to which people focus on the circumstances of their life and their hopes and fears of what the future could bring. It is particularly clear that members of the same social group tend to share similar views on those issues and that these individual views can be, somehow, distilled into a position that could be understood to represent the voice of an entire group. Due to not only the fact that a civil war took place in Yugoslavia during the Second World War between the communists (communist partisans) and royalists (Chetniks) but also the possibility that the defeat of Nazism could be followed by a communist revolution, the Serbian urban elite spent a lot of time contemplating communist rule. Who were the communists, what were their goals and aims, what actions did they undertake during the war and what kind of life would they impose? These thoughts, along with real developments on Yugoslavia’s battlegrounds and the complex geopolitical situation in post-war Europe had a profound effect on the dynamics of Serbia’s anti-communist resistance in the years following the Second World War.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_017

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This chapter is, to a certain extent, constrained within specific temporal, geographical and theoretical frameworks. In terms of timeframe, the research is restricted to the period between the start of the war and the communist partisan uprising in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1941 and the confrontation between the Yugoslavian communists under Josip Broz Tito and the Soviets and the leader of the USSR Joseph Stalin in 1948, when the focus of communist oppression in Yugoslavia switched from the bourgeoisie to Soviet sympathisers. At that moment, the conflict between the communists and the bourgeoisie was far from over, but the communists had clearly established full control and dominance on the ground. Regarding geographical boundaries, several facts must be taken into account. Firstly, the Serbian population of Yugoslavia was not limited to the physical region of Serbia, especially due to the fact that Serbia had not existed as an administrative unit between the wars. The Serbian population was scattered across the country, with significant communities living in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. During the Second World War, however, Yugoslavia was broken up by the Axis powers and Serbia was re-established in its pre-1914 form and placed under the rule of the German military.1 After the War, this territory comprised the heart of today’s Republic of Serbia. The academically soundest geographical approach in this chapter would be to use the borders established by the communists after the Second World War, excluding Kosovo and Metohija, due to the fact that developments there were very different. As for the theoretical framework, this work is mostly influenced by the definition and characteristics of resistance provided by Professor Keith D. Dickson of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. Professor Dickson describes resistance as “dissidence translated into action”, and, depending upon the organisation and intensity, classifies it as either organised or unorganised or as active or passive.2 This chapter will investigate and seek to explain some of the reasons why the resistance to communist oppression in Serbia in the period after the Second World War was essentially weak, unarmed and unorganised. It will focus on the evolution of the Serbian urban elite’s perception of the communists and their actions, the complexity and versatility of the relationship between these groups and other particular aspects of the Second World War in Yugoslavia.

1  Peter Calvocoressi/Guy Wint, Total War. The Story of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 155. 2  See Keith D. Dicksons article, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric warfare: Lessons for Today in this volume, 11–27.

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The historical sources used in this research – diaries, memoirs, interviews, personal letters, literary works and similar material – are mostly narrative and not always historically accurate. Although it is hard to work with such historical sources this is also essential if one is seeking to understand someone’s ideas and worldview. A particularly interesting aspect of working with such material is the fact that it is largely recently discovered and new to researchers due to the obvious fact that it was hidden away throughout the period of communist rule. Recent years have also brought significant breakthroughs in research into previously hidden archival material, mostly related to the Yugoslavian security agencies, special units of the Yugoslavian Army, the OZNA (Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda – Department for People’s Protection) and other institutions that were responsible for enforcing the new political system in the post-war years and for combating political dissent. Some of this material has become available to researchers, albeit under restricted conditions.3 Furthermore, as the political climate in Serbia changed during the 1990s and 2000s, it became possible for those who had been prosecuted as “enemies of the people” to be rehabilitated. Finally, in 2009, the Serbian Ministry of Justice created a special investigative body, the State Committee for Discovering and Marking Secret Graves. Despite some controversies, this body has conducted very valuable work in collecting information and publishing the results of its research. Thanks to the efforts of researchers engaged by the Committee, much more information about communist oppression in the immediate post-war period is now available.

The Serbian Urban Elite

The first important task is undoubtedly to identify the membership and the collective characteristics of the Serbian urban elite in the period before and during the Second World War and the occupation and in the immediate post-war years. This research refers to the elite because it would be inaccurate to use the term bourgeoisie here for two main reasons. Firstly, the term bourgeoisie was heavily politicised in the post-war years by the communists, who used it as a stereotyped label of treachery for most enemies of the new communist order.4 Secondly, any application of the Marxist definition of the 3  Since 2004, the Serbian Archives in Belgrade have received more than 80,000 personal files and a range of documents containing around 400,000 pages from the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency, the successor of the former State Security Service and Department for People’s Protection. Most of these are available to researchers. 4   Milan Kangrga, Fenomenologija ideološko-političkog nastupanja jugoslavenske srednje klase, in: Praxis 3-4 (1971), 428.

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bourgeoisie – the ruling class in a liberal-democratic society which has all the money and political influence – to Yugoslavia would have to include a large number of rich and politically influential peasants, given the fact that peasants still represented the vast majority of Yugoslavia’s interwar population.5 Hence, what do we really mean by the term “Serbian urban elite”? The Serbian urban elite was a small minority (ca. 5-6 %) of the Yugoslavian population made up of people living in Serbia’s cities with backgrounds ranging from very rich to lower middle class.6 It included industrialists and bankers, stockholders, politicians, white-collar professionals, traders, entrepreneurs, liberal professionals (doctors, architects, lawyers, etc.), members of the clergy, the intellectual elite, professors and teachers, civil servants, artists and private and public sector clerks. It did not, however, include manual or industrial labourers, artisans, unskilled workers, the urban poor or anyone who could be considered part of the proletariat. The Serbian urban elite was part of the wider Yugoslavian urban elite, but it had a distinct identity and quite different attitudes from the Croatian or Slovenian urban elites.7 It was well educated, financially dominant, politically powerful and influential. It was also ethnically diverse, with many non-Serbs – the Jewish and Aromanian communities, Russian refugees, German and Czech entrepreneurs, investors and professionals and Croatian and Slovenian intellectuals, experts, politicians and clerks – being integral to the group before the Second World War. Politically, the Serbian urban elite was generally divided into two camps. Its members were either conservative or liberal and thus supported different political parties (mostly, the conservative and pro-government Radicals or liberal opposition Democrats) but both groups generally shared the same values, favouring liberal democracy, the rule of law and an alliance with such Western powers as France and the United Kingdom.8 Only a small minority of the members of the Serbian urban elite supported political extremism, although support for left-wing ideas grew in the second half of the 1930s, especially amongst students and intellectuals, due to the Spanish Civil War and the political pressure on Yugoslavia coming from fascist Italy. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which had been very popular immediately after the First World War amongst not just the working class but also many intellectuals and members of the bourgeoisie, was brutally oppressed 5  Ivo Vinski, Klasna podjela stanovništva i nacionalnog dohotka Jugoslavije u 1938. godini (Zagreb: Ekonomski institut, 1970). 6  Nataša Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: INIS, 2009), 28-29. 7  Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), 80. 8  Jacob Hoptner, Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941 (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1972), 253-254.

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by the authorities after some party sympathisers had engaged in terrorist acts in the early 1920s. The party was outlawed and heavily persecuted by the state and, as long as this continued, support for the communists fell steeply. In the second half of the 1930s, however, both support and membership increased. Despite still being illegal, the Communist Party and the Alliance of Communist Youth had around 7,000 and 17,800 members in 1940, respectively, which represented a 100% increase in a period of just four years.9

The Second World War and the Communist Uprising

The Second World War changed everything. Yugoslavia, a country in which the Serbian urban elite had invested so much, was destroyed. This group itself was devastated. Many Serbs were either killed in the short April War of 1941 or taken to Germany as prisoners. Jews were deported and killed, while Russians aligned themselves with the occupiers and most Croats and Slovenians returned to their places of origin. Because of their economic priorities, the German occupying forces favoured industrial workers and peasants.10 In order to protect their interests, the richer members of the urban elite colluded with the occupiers, becoming part of the apparatus of occupation and effectively betraying the group to which they belonged and its ideological principles. In these circumstances, the vast majority of the Serbian urban elite became passive. They secretly listened to Radio London and supported the Allies, hoping that they would eventually liberate the country and restore the old order.11 However, the communist uprising of summer 1941 stirred things up. The Yugoslavian communists, who had been persecuted throughout the interwar period, were not very strong in numbers, but they were experienced in undercover and illicit activities. Their leaders had been trained in subversion and combat during the Spanish Civil War, in which about 1,900 Yugoslavian citizens, mostly communists, had taken part, around 500 of whom had managed to return to Yugoslavia after the republican defeat.12 The popularity of the communists had grown in the years before the war due to their vocal opposition to fascism. The general climate after the defeat of the Yugoslavian Army by the 9  Janko Pleterski et al., Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Komunist/Narodna knjiga/Rad, 1985), 165. 10  Dragan Aleksić, Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: INIS, 2002), 325. 11  Nataša Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: INIS, 2009), 50-61. 12  Avgust Lešnik, Jugoslawen in Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, in: Jahrbuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 1-3 (2006) I, 37-51.

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Axis powers in the spring of 1941 was very favourable to the uprising due to the widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the war had been fought. In summer of the same year both communist partisans and royalist Chetniks instigated an uprising in rural Western Serbia and their actions were initially quite successful.13 The problem, however, was that their ideas of fighting – and their ultimate goals – were completely different. The royalist (nationalist) Chetniks, who were mostly Serbian peasants or members of the Yugoslavian Army who hadn’t surrendered to the Germans in April 1941, decided to take the passive approach of hiding in the woods, gathering weapons, establishing a parallel infrastructure of power and governance and waiting for Allied forces to land in Yugoslavia.14 This approach largely resulted from the heavy defeats and casualties suffered by the rebels, both the communist partisans and the royalist Chetniks, in the winter of 1941/42, and from the brutal reprisals against the civilian population by the German armed forces. In political terms, the royalist Chetniks wanted to restore the old order from before the Second World War, although they did demand such reforms as a new system of government that would favour the Serbs and emphasise the Serbian ethnic factor in the country. The communists, on the other hand, wanted to pursue an active approach. They formed small guerrilla groups and attacked German soldiers and their Serbian collaborators. By autumn 1941 the communist partisans had liberated large parts of Western Serbia and proclaimed the free “Republic of Užice” in which they installed a civilian government.15 In terms of their politics, the communists argued that there was “no going back to the old order” and that the armed struggle against the occupiers also represented an armed social and political revolution. This inevitably led to the outbreak of civil war between the two sides.

Perceptions of Communists and the Communist Uprising

The Serbian urban elite’s perception of the communists and their actions during the occupation was fluid. This changed throughout the period in the light of global political and military events and also the effect of communist actions upon the wider population of Serbia. Another important issue was propaganda. 13  Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 181-183. 14  Kosta Nikolić, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 1941–1945. Knjiga druga (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2014), 519-520. 15  Venceslav Glišić, Užička republika (Belgrade: Nolit, 1986), 45-47.

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The people of occupied Serbia were exposed to a cacophony of partial information, lies and rumours emanating from all the actors in the conflict. They were influenced by the propaganda of the Nazis and their collaborators, but also by propaganda spread by the British and the Soviets.16 In the very early days of communist partisan activity, which began just days after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the general mood of the Serbian people was one of cautious optimism. Despite German reports of victories on the Eastern Front and of the rapid advance of their armies, the vast majority of the Serbian elite believed that the invasion of the USSR represented a turning point in the war and that the military alliance between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would reverse the situation on the frontline and eventually prove victorious. Communists and other Soviet sympathisers encouraged such belief with an optimism that sometimes appears ridiculous, even from today’s perspective. This was exemplified by the suggestion that Soviet troops would immediately launch a counteroffensive and reach Yugoslavia within weeks.17 In light of this widespread optimism, the communist uprising in rural Western Serbia in July 1941 was generally regarded as a step in the right direction and an act of patriotism. At the same time, royalist Chetniks were also spreading their influence and it was felt that it was necessary to have armed insurgents on the ground in order to greet the British and Soviet armies. As one Serbian literary critic wrote in his memoirs, people were even having private Russian language lessons in order to be able to properly welcome the Soviets.18 In the late summer and early autumn of 1941, by which time it was clear that neither the Soviets nor the British would be coming soon, the situation changed dramatically. Sporadic confrontations between communist partisans and royalist Chetniks exploded into almost full-scale civil war with reports of communists destroying court archives, confiscating private property and molesting and killing wealthy and influential members of the elite. At the same time, Nazi reprisals against the uprising became brutal. It is estimated that around 40,000 people were killed in reprisals in Serbia in late 1941 and early 1942 alone.19 This development transformed the popular perception of 16  Aleksandar Stojanović (ed.), Kolaboracionistička štampa u Srbiji 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2015), 11-12. 17  Kosta Nikolić, Ratni ciljevi Komunističke partije Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu, in: Dragan Aleksić (ed.), Srbi i rat u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine (Belgrade/Moscow: INIS/Muzej žrtava genocida/Institut za slavistiku Ruske akademije nauka, 2013), 477. 18  Milan Đoković, Onaj stari Beograd (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1994), 582-583. 19  Out of the estimated 40,000 people who were killed, around 20,000 were executed as hostages by German troops. See: Venceslav Glišić, Teror i zločini nacističke Nemačke u Srbiji 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Rad/Prosveta, 1970), 78-80.

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the insurgents. Having viewed the communist partisans as romantic patriots, the majority of the Serbian urban elite rapidly came to see them as dangerous fanatics. Interestingly, this firmly-held opinion, which more or less prevailed until the end of the war, varied little amongst the very different sections of the elite. Supporters of the collaborating regime, royalists and those who were merely trying to stay on the right side of events often regarded communists as reckless, dangerous, brutal, anti-Serbian, anti-democratic, lying and immoral. They were seen as reckless and dangerous because they had continued their activities despite the reprisals and all the casualties that their actions had triggered. They were seen as brutal because they were prepared to confront and fight anyone who did not support their cause. They were seen as anti-Serbian because they opposed the Serbian royalist Chetnik forces and the Yugoslavian Government in exile and because there appeared to be no Serbs amongst their leadership. They were seen as anti-democratic because they wanted to destroy the pre-war order and establish a new one based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin. They were considered to be liars because they allegedly lured desperate people to join their fight by presenting it as a struggle against occupation whereas, in truth, they only cared about their revolution. And, finally, they were seen as immoral due to the belief that free love and free sexual behaviour was encouraged in the communist units.20 In 1943 and 1944 the communist partisans became the dominant force on the ground. Although they had been defeated and expelled from Serbia in 1941, they managed to reorganise and hold ground in rural parts of Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro, where the communist movement was fuelled by an influx of desperate people fleeing the persecution and reprisals of the Nazis and Croatian fascists. In 1943, the surrender of Italy provided the communist cause with an enormous boost – in terms of both confidence and captured weapons. At about the same time, the communists started to receive active Allied support from not only the Soviets but also the British and the Americans, who realised that the communist partisans were much more active than the royalist

20  Dragutin Ranković, Svakodnevni život pod okupacijom 1941–1944. Iskustvo jednog Beograđanina (Belgrade: INIS, 2011), 624-625; 628-629; 643; 645; 664-665; 671-675; Branko Lazarević, Dnevnik jednoga nikoga. Prvi deo (1942–1946) (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2006), 74; 128-136; Hrvoje Magazinović, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće (Valjevo: Društvo Hilandar, 2009), 175-176; Ariton Mihailović, Uspomene iz okupacije (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga/Alfa, 2004), 41; 148-149; Dejan Zec, Inquiries on Homosexuals in Serbia During the Second World War, in: Acta Historiae Medicinae Stomatologiae Pharmaciae Medicinae Veterinariae 1 (2016), 81-85.

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Chetniks in their opposition to the Axis powers.21 By 1944, the Allies had effectively forced Yugoslavia’s Government in exile to accept the communists as the only legitimate fighting force in the country and, hence, to turn their back on the Chetniks. This effectively decided the outcome of the civil war. The communist partisans, strengthened by defections from the royalists, entered Serbia in mid-1944 as Soviet forces approached from the east. By the end of 1944, Serbia had been liberated and was under communist control.22 The Post-war Period: Communist Consolidation and Reprisals The change of power had profound consequences for the Serbian urban elite. The communists had made it clear that they would tolerate no opposition. The severity and brutality of the retribution against their political enemies was predictable in light of their behaviour during the war. The armed confrontations between communist partisans and royalist Chetniks, which began in Serbia in the late autumn of 1941 and continued in Montenegro and Bosnia in the following years, were hideously brutal on both sides. The Chetniks did not hesitate to harass, torture and kill both certain and alleged communists and members of their families, including women and children, while communist partisans were quite open about their intention to enforce a political and social revolution by killing real and imaginary enemies: not only those who actively opposed them but also those simply labelled as “enemies of the revolution”, who were generally rich and respected citizens.23 The communist oppression in Serbia reached its peak in the final stages of the Second World War, during the liberation from the Nazis and the second half of 1944 and in early 1945. Ad hoc military tribunals staged trials of “enemies of the people”, although many were also simply killed without trial. This wave of violence and retribution brought the persecution of not only real Nazi collaborators but also many who simply opposed communism or were seen as potential “class enemies”. It is hard to estimate how many people were killed in Serbia during this period and even harder to establish how 21  Frederick William Deakin, The Embattled Mountain (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 242. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), 418-419. 22  Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 632-641. 23  Srđan Cvetković, Portreti disidenata (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju/Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija/Istraživačko-izdavački centar Demokratske stranke, 2007), 38-39; Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 307-309.

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many were persecuted, interrogated and imprisoned, but some estimates suggest that between 50,000 and 60,000 people lost their lives in communist reprisals in 1944 and 1945, excluding the Germans and Hungarians persecuted in Vojvodina and the Albanians oppressed in Kosovo.24 Statistically, the majority of executed people were peasants, usually from well-off families, but a substantial number of members of the urban elite – mostly former officers and civil servants, industrialists, merchants, bankers, intellectuals, artists and journalists – were also persecuted and killed. The main reasons for their elimination included their involvement in the Nazi-collaborationist regime of Milan Nedić, their royalist and Chetnik sympathies, their open anti-communism and the political, social and economic influence that they had enjoyed before and during the war. The early months of communist rule were marked by not only a campaign of terror and strong propaganda but also by certain signs of communist willingness to accept the members of the urban elite as stakeholders in the new system, as long as they accepted that wealth and influence were no longer in their hands. This was important to the communists who, needing legitimisation for their actions, sought to conduct the formal transition to political monism gradually and with the collaboration of certain members of the urban elite and their political organisations.25 Those who helped the communists in this transitional period were rewarded with a place in the new system. This “carrot and stick” approach proved relatively successful although it led to huge divisions amongst the Serbian urban elite that not only recalled the divisions amongst the same elite during the German occupation but could also be traced back to the same cause: collaboration, albeit this time with the communists. This led to moral, ethical and even psychological struggles within both the elite as a whole and its individual members. Roughly speaking, the members of the Serbian urban elite in the post-war period can be divided into three groups: those who decided to accept the new situation and become part of the new communist system, those who decided to remain passive, as they had been during the Second World War, and those who chose to oppose the system.26 Most of the elite chose to accept communist rule. This acceptance was gradual rather than immediate but it required complete obedience to the new political and economic system. The general circumstances favoured such 24  Srđan Cvetković, Politička represija u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji 1945–1985, in: Istorija 20. veka 2 (2008), 298-301. 25  Vojislav Koštunica/Kosta Čavoški, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam. Društveni pokreti i politički sistem u Jugoslaviji 1944–1949 (Ljubljana: UK ZSMS, 1987), 6-11. 26  Nataša Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: INIS, 2009), 592-597.

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a development. Unlike their comrades in most of the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Yugoslavian communists had not simply been put in power by Soviet tanks. They were a formidable force who enjoyed substantial popular support and the legitimacy granted by their struggle against the occupiers.27 And they also had the full support of the Allies. Finally, although extensive pressure had been required, the communists had entered into an agreement with the Yugoslavian Government in exile while the activities of the communist-led antifascist coalition enjoyed the vocal support of the exiled King Peter II. Importantly, the communists were willing to allow the elite to participate in the new government. During 1944 and 1945, tens of thousands of mostly young members of the Serbian elite were conscripted into the communist National Liberation Army, which made them stakeholders in the ultimate communist victory.28 Also, the communists were keen to accept all defectors, as long as they were willing to renounce their previouslyheld values.29 This opportunity to join the winning side proved tempting and many members of the elite took advantage of it, especially those members of the middle class who stood to lose only prestige and influence and not wealth and property. The second of the above-mentioned groups is that part of the elite that initially chose to remain passive and avoid any form of engagement as long as the communists remained in power. Refusing to be part of the governmental, political and economic system, they sought to keep a low profile. In the long run, however, this approach was unsustainable. When it became clear that the communists had taken full control and, after 1948 in particular, when Tito’s opposition to Stalin had transformed the Yugoslavian communists into a rogue Western ally against the Soviet Bloc, this group slowly begun to disperse. Most accepted reality – and communist rule – while a minority chose to pursue more active forms of opposition. It is interesting, however, to observe the internal dilemmas faced by members of the elite as they finally came to terms with communist rule. In some ways, their experience can be illustrated with the help of the Kübler-Ross model, which is used in psychology to describe the series of emotions experienced by terminally ill patients widely known as the “five stages of grief”.30 27  John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 218-226. 28  Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 647. 29  Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 437. 30  Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969).

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This can clearly be observed when reading diaries and memoirs. The first emotion was denial, characterised by the refusal to accept the mere possibility of communists ever seizing power. This was followed by anger, expressed by lamentation over historical injustices inflicted upon the Serbian people and their suffering and inability to avoid destructive historical processes. The next stage was bargaining, where members of the elite acknowledge the fact that, even if communist dictatorship could be avoided, radical social, economic and political reforms were necessary. Next came depression, expressed by a lack of willingness to oppose communism resulting from the futile ineffectiveness of any individual and unorganised form of opposition. The final stage was acceptance in which one concluded that life must continue regardless and that a nation had to adapt to its new circumstances.31 Milan Đoković, an influential pre-war literary critic and, undoubtedly, a prominent member of the elite summed this process up in his memoirs: “You don’t need to like a totalitarian regime; you might as well hate it, but when it grabs you and holds you in its poisonous bosom, you can only be obedient or die”.32

Opposition and Resistance

The third part of the elite is that which chose to oppose the communists with opposition that was almost exclusively non-violent. Conditions in Serbia after 1945 meant that the idea of armed uprising was fanciful. Some small groups of Chetniks were still operating, mostly in distant and inaccessible mountain regions, but their actions had no political significance, especially after the capture and execution of the Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović in 1946. These groups of bandits were merely fighting for their survival, with some actually managing to evade capturing until the mid-1950s.33 They failed to carry out 31  This model is supported by hundreds of entries in diaries, recollections and memoirs by various members of the Serbian urban elite, some of whom have already been quoted in this work, including Ariton Mihailović, Dragutin Ranković, Milan Đoković and Branko Lazarević. Interestingly, all those mentioned sooner or later adapted to communist rule and even advanced in their professional lives – Ariton Mihailović became Director of the Bibliographical Institute of Serbia, Milan Đoković became Superintendent of the National Theatre and Branko Lazarević, poet and diplomat, whose son was killed fighting the communists in 1944, advised the communist security services on whom to arrest and whom to leave alone. See: Milan Trešnjić, O, slobodo, koliko je zločina počinjeno u tvoje ime?, in: Hereticus 1 (2007), 316. 32  Milan Đoković, Onaj stari Beograd (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1994), 582. 33  Bojan Dimitrijević, Građanski rat u miru. Uloga armije i službe bezbednosti u obračunu sa političkim protivnicima Titovog režima 1944–1954 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2003), 91-93.

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any major acts of sabotage or other relevant offensive activities and had no contacts abroad. The only effect of their action was psychological insomuch as people were aware that bandits still roamed the woods and that the communists still did not enjoy complete control.34 Non-violent opposition was mostly conducted by young people from the ranks of the urban elite. Their actions consisted of debating, reading, writing and distributing anti-communist material, creating secret political organisations, which could point to pompous names but little in terms of deeds, distributing leaflets and other propaganda material, arranging for people to emigrate to the West and other similar activities.35 There was also the personal form of opposition, in which people would consciously do all the things that the communists disliked or condemned. For example: As communists considered religion to be the ‘opium for the masses’ and sought to suppress its influence, many members of the opposition deliberately started attending religious services and celebrating religious holidays, even if they were not particularly devout. Harmless as they seemed, such forms of opposition were considered very dangerous in the immediate post-war period and the communists reacted quite severely. In 1949, for instance, Borislav Pekić, who was later to become one Serbia’s leading writers, was arrested and convicted to 15 years imprisonment and hard labour for belonging to the organisation the Alliance of Democratic Youth of Yugoslavia. This organisation’s membership of around 20 consisted mostly of students and high school pupils whose biggest crime was to steal a typewriter and write a manifesto, which stated that it was the duty of all freethinking people to oppose the communists by all means.36 In the immediate post-war period more than a dozen such organisations were discovered and persecuted by the authorities.37 By the mid-1950s the persecution became less vigilant but this only reflected the fact that the opposition had considerably weakened. While the above-mentioned characteristics ascribed by the urban elite to the communists during the occupation (being reckless, dangerous, brutal, 34  A very interesting account of these outlawed activities can be found in: Aleksa Tepavčević, Borba za slobodu. Sećanje na četničku borbu 1941–1950 (Hamilton: A. Tepavčević, 1987). 35  Srđan Cvetković, Portreti disidenata (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju/Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija/Istraživačko-izdavački centar Demokratske stranke, 2007), 144-147. 36  Srđan Cvetković, Portreti disidenata (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju/Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija/Istraživačko-izdavački centar Demokratske stranke, 2007), 148-153. 37  Srđan Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića. Represija u Srbiji 1944–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 408.

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anti-Serbian, anti-democratic, lying and immoral, etc.) persisted to a large extent into the post-war period, the experience of living under the new communist system created some new ones. Nearly everyone who had contact with communists on a daily basis described them as fanatics who were completely obsessed with their ideology. Their blind obeisance was such that they were compared with religious fanatics, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with a religious cult and its leaders with apostles. Another important conclusion that arose soon after the liberation was that the communists were incompetent at almost everything except violence and oppression. This conclusion was drawn in particular from the economy, given the disastrous nature of communist economic policies in the immediate post-war period. Some myths created during the war, such as the myth of communist diffidence and asceticism, were also completely shattered. In contrast with their earlier image they were now seen as greedy and motivated by envy. And finally, it is interesting to note that members of the urban elite did not only come to oppose the communist position in the political and ethical arena. Some opposition elements, particularly the young, turned to their appearance and also judged them aesthetically. They found communists uptight, rude and unaware of how to behave properly on certain occasions. They criticised them for wearing ugly clothes and workers’ flat caps, reading boring books, watching terrible movies, listening to lousy music and, basically, not knowing how to have fun.38 Conclusion Considering all the different factors, both internal and external, that influenced the development of the political and military situation in Yugoslavia and Serbia at the end of the Second World War and in the immediate post-war years it is no surprise that anti-communist resistance among Serbs was quite weak and that the communist authorities faced almost no armed resistance. The sporadic clashes between the Yugoslavian security forces and the remains of small groups of Chetnik bandits, which took place occasionally up until the early 1950s in remote and mountainous areas of Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, Western Montenegro and Southwestern Serbia, represented no real threat to the communist establishment. Isolated, cut-off from any real material and political support and abandoned by not only the majority of the Serbian population but even those who did not support the communist regime, their fate 38  Borislav Pekić, Godine koje su pojeli skakavci. Uspomene iz zatvora ili antropopeja (1948– 1954) I (Belgrade/Priština: BIGZ/Jedinstvo, 1991), 51-82.

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was sealed and, by the mid-1950s, their resistance crushed. Their willingness to fight was fuelled by sturdy anti-communism, Serbian nationalism and, most importantly, their unwillingness to surrender in the knowledge that communists would give no mercy. Taking a broader historical perspective, it is clear that any chance of organised and efficient anti-communist military action had passed by mid-1944. By that time, communist partisans had established a clear and overwhelming dominance on the ground and were advancing and liberating Serbia together with the Soviet troops who were approaching from the east. In addition to this, the Allies recognised the communist partisans as the dominant political and military force in Yugoslavia and their willingness to do political deals with the communists left the royalist Chetniks devoid of support. Discouraged by these developments, the vast majority of Chetniks surrendered, joined the communist partisans or decided to escape the country along with members of collaborationist military forces. The willingness of the communists to accept the defectors as long as they hadn’t committed war crimes was probably a central reason for the effective collapse of the Chetniks in 1944 and their inability to organise any meaningful resistance. Opposing political and anti-communist sentiments continued to exist among Serbs, both in the country and among members of the Serbian diaspora but, by the late 1940s, the communist regime was firmly established and very efficient at crushing any resistance, often by cruel and violent means. Hopes that things would change as soon as the global geopolitical situation deteriorated and that Serbian anti-communists would get help from the West as soon as a confrontation between the West and the Soviet Bloc became imminent were laid to rest by the open split between Tito and Stalin in 1948. Realising that Yugoslavia had become a potential ally against Moscow, the West resolved to help and support the Yugoslavian communist regime, despite sharp political and ideological differences. Ultimately, anti-communist dissidence in Serbia continued to exist, but it did not represent a real threat to the regime until the mid and late 1980s. Bibliography Aleksić, Dragan, Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: INIS, 2002). Calvocoressi, Peter/Wint Guy, Total War. The Story of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). Cvetković, Srđan, Između srpa i čekića. Represija u Srbiji 1944–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006). Cvetković, Srđan, Politička represija u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji 1945–1985, in: Istorija 20. veka, 2 (2008), 272-314.

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Cvetković, Srđan, Portreti disidenata (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju/Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija/Istraživačko-izdavački centar Demokratske stranke, 2007). Deakin, William Frederick, The Embattled Mountain (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). Dickson, D. Keith, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Today (unpublished conference paper, Violent Resistance. From the Baltics to Central and South Eastern Europe 1945–1956, Vienna, 2017). Dimitrijević, Bojan, Građanski rat u miru. Uloga armije i službe bezbednosti u obračunu sa političkim protivnicima Titovog režima 1944–1954 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2003). Đoković, Milan, Onaj stari Beograd (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1994). Glišić, Venceslav, Teror i zločini nacističke Nemačke u Srbiji 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Rad/ Prosveta, 1970). Glišić, Venceslav, Užička republika (Belgrade: Nolit, 1986). Hoptner, Jacob, Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941 (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1972). Kangrga, Milan, Fenomenologija ideološko-političkog nastupanja jugoslavenske srednje klase, in: Praxis, 3-4 (1971), 425-446. Koštunica, Vojislav/Čavoški Kosta, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam. Društveni pokreti i politički sistem u Jugoslaviji 1944–1949 (Ljubljana: UK ZSMS, 1987). Kübler-Ross, Elisabeth, On Death and Dying (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969). Lampe, R. John, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Lazarević, Branko, Dnevnik jednoga nikoga. Prvi deo (1942–1946) (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2006). Lešnik, Avgust, Jugoslawen in Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, in: Jahrbuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, 1-3 (2006) I, 37-51. Maclean, Fitzroy, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949). Magazinović, Hrvoje, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće (Valjevo: Društvo Hilandar, 2009). Mihailović, Ariton, Uspomene iz okupacije (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga/Alfa, 2004). Milićević, Nataša, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: INIS, 2009). Nikolić, Kosta, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 1941–1945. Knjiga druga (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2014). Nikolić, Kosta, Ratni ciljevi Komunističke partije Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu, in: Aleksić Dragan (ed.), Srbi i rat u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine (Belgrade/Moscow: INIS/ Muzej žrtava genocida/Institut za slavistiku Ruske akademije nauka, 2013), 477-498. Pekić, Borislav, Godine koje su pojeli skakavci. Uspomene iz zatvora ili antropopeja (1948– 1954) I (Belgrade/Priština: BIGZ/Jedinstvo, 1991). Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije 1 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988).

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Petranović, Branko, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992). Pleterski, Janko et al., Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Komunist/ Narodna knjiga/Rad, 1985). Ranković, Dragutin, Svakodnevni život pod okupacijom 1941–1944. Iskustvo jednog Beograđanina (Belgrade: INIS, 2011). Stojanović, Aleksandar (ed.), Kolaboracionistička štampa u Srbiji 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2015). Tepavčević, Aleksa, Borba za slobodu. Sećanje na četničku borbu 1941–1950 (Hamilton: A. Tepavčević, 1987). Tomasevich, Jozo, The Chetniks. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975). Trešnjić, Milan, O, slobodo, koliko je zločina počinjeno u tvoje ime?, in: Hereticus, 1 (2007), 315-324. Vinski, Ivo, Klasna podjela stanovništva i nacionalnog dohotka Jugoslavije u 1938. godini (Zagreb: Ekonomski institut, 1970). Zec, Dejan, Inquiries on Homosexuals in Serbia During the Second World War, in: Acta Historiae Medicinae Stomatologiae Pharmaciae Medicinae Veterinariae, 1 (2016), 74-95.

Summary The end of the Second World War brought profound changes to the Yugoslavian political, economic and social systems and marked the beginning of communist rule, which lasted for 45 years. Certain individuals, organisations and social groups in all the nations of Yugoslavia displayed discontent with communist rule, for a range of reasons. Some were most concerned about personal and political liberty; some were unhappy with communist economic policies, the loss of their dominant economic position and the seizure of their private property and others were upset, rightly or wrongly, with the solution that had been found to the national question in restored communist Yugoslavia. Today, the public in all of Yugoslavia’s successor states – and also some academics – argue about and compete to prove who suffered the most during communism, very often turning serious issues and potentially fruitful debates into a circus that downplays and obstructs the very difficult and necessary process of reexamining the past. Serbia, the part of the country that was described by some of the leading communists of the time as Yugoslavia’s Vendée, due to its alleged allegiance to the Crown and the royalist cause, experienced heavy purges and oppressions, especially in the immediate post-war years of 1944 and 1945. It is

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estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 people – active Nazi supporters and many alleged political, ideological and class enemies – were killed in Serbia by the communists during those two years. The exact number of people who were subjected to other forms of mistreatment in those years and afterwards is impossible to determine, but one can certainly speak of hundreds of thousands. Given that it is difficult for historians to capture the general mood of a nation in a certain historical period it would be wrong to claim that Serbs were predominantly anti-communist during the post-war years, but it would be correct to state that such sentiment existed and was very strong among certain people and within certain social groups. However, despite the very strong anti-communist mood, the opposition to the communists was weak, disorganised and mostly expressed at an individual level. Opponents of the communist regime generally decided to remain passive. There were no armed actions, except by small groups of bandits, usually members of royalist (Chetnik) forces who refused to surrender and failed to escape from the country. There are several explanations of this lack of action but the most important is the fact that armed action against the communists had already taken place during the Second World War and that the communists had won. The armed resistance of the post-war period can be seen as the dying embers of the civil war that was effectively over by the end of 1944. Facing severe oppression from the new communist regime and with no hope of outside help due to the wider geopolitical situation, any armed opposition seemed doomed from the outset. However, there is another issue regarding anti-communist resistance in Serbia that can be regarded as very important and which this chapter will examine more thoroughly. The perception of the communists and their actions by two of the largest and most important Serbian social groups – the peasantry and the urban elite – was fluid, shifting during and after the war depending upon the actions of the communists and in line with both the changing context mentioned above and the willingness of the communists to accept these social groups and to include them as part of the newly established system.

Summary in Serbian

Завршетак Другог светског рата донео је далекосежне промене у југословенском политичком, економском и друштвеном систему и означио почетак комунистичке владавине која је трајала 45 година. Појединци, организације и друштвене групе међу свим југословенским народима исказивали су незадовољствo комунистичком владавином, из различитих разлога – некима су личне и политичке слободе биле од највећег значаја, други су били незадовољни комунистичком економском политиком,

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губитком сопствене доминантне економске позиције и одузимањем приватне имовине, док су многи били узнемирени, са разлогом или без разлога, тиме како је у обновљеној Југославији решавано национално питање. Данас су у јавности свих држава које су настале распадом Југославије, али н у појединим научним круговима, веома живе н актуелне расправе, па чак и својеврсна надметања, око тога ко је највише пропатио под комунизмом, што веома често доводи до тога да се озбиљне дебате и питања претварају у спектакл, што унижава и опструише иначе веома тежак и неопходан процес поновног испитивања прошлости. Србија, део државе који је од стране појединих истакнутих комуниста називан и југословенском Вандејом, због наводне оданости круни и ројалистичким циљевима, искусила је велике прогоне и чистке, посебно у непосредним послератним годинама, током 1944. и 1945. Процењује се да је између 50,000 и 60,000 људи убијено у Србији од стране комуниста током ове две године, не само људи који су током рата активно подржавали окупаторе већ и многи који су сматрани политичким, идеолошким и класним непријатељима. Тачан број људи који је био подвргнут другим облицима прогона током тих и каснијих година је немогуће утврдити, али је исправно говорити о стотинама хиљада случајева. За историчара је тешко да ухвати опште расположење једне нације у одређеним историјским моментима, тако да би било погрешно рећи да је антикомунистички сентимент преовладавао код Срба у послератним годинама, али би свакако било исправно рећи да је такав сентимент постојао и да је био веома јак међу појединцима и одређеним друштвеним групама. Међутим, упркос веома јаком антикомунистичком расположењу, супротстављање комунистима је било слабо, неорганизовано и углавном индивидуално. Противници режима су углавном бирали да остану пасивни. Није било оружаних акција, осим од стране малих група одметника, углавном припадника четничких одреда који су одбили да се предају или нису успели да се повуку из земље. Постоји неколико објашњења оваквог развоја ситуације а најважнији су они који потенцирају чињеницу да се оружана акција против комуниста већ одиграла током рата и да су у том оружаном сукобу комунисти победили. Уз то, због изузетно јаке комунистичке репресије и због опште геополитичке ситуације, сваки оружани отпор се чинио осуђеним на пропаст од самог старта. Међутим, још једна околност је била веома битна и овај рад се труди да ју детаљније испита. Перцепција комуниста и њихових акција од стране две највеће и најзначајније српске друштвене групе, сељаштва и грађанске елите, је била флуидна и мењала се током рата и у послератном периоду, зависећи како од самих комунистичких акција и свих претходно поменутих околности, тако и од

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воље комуниста да прихвате ове друштвене групе и укључе их у систем који је био у изградњи.

Chapter 17

Tito’s Chetnik Hunters: The Dynamics of Asymmetric Warfare in Yugoslavia Stevan Bozanich Introduction A sensationalist headline from a Washington Post article dated 1944 reads ‘Mihailovic Flees Tito in His Undies.’1 When Josip Broz Tito and his Yugoslav Partisans were closing in on Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, the wartime leader of the Serbian nationalist Chetniks was apparently in such disarray that he left his trousers ‘hanging on a chair’. It would not be until March 1946 that Tito’s security apparatus the OZNa (Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda or the Department for the People’s Protection) finally captured Mihailović, with support from its military wing the KNOJ (Korpus narodne odbrane Jugoslavije or People’s Defence Corps of Yugoslavia). Despite the dramatic Washington Post article of two years earlier, the spring and summer of 1946 were not far away, i.e. the events surrounding Mihailović’s capture, trial and execution. The Yugoslav example provides a curious case study. Following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Yugoslav army was defeated and the country was divided into German, Italian and Croatian zones, the latter of which was the so-called Independent State of Croatia or NDH (Nezavisna Dražava Hrvatska). Two resistance movements emerged from the ashes. The first was the Chetniks, who were largely made up of professional Yugoslav soldiers and officers, led by Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović. The Chetniks enjoyed the full backing of the Royal Yugoslav government in exile, located in London, as well as the Western Allies. The second group was the Communist Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito. Before long, the two resistance groups were fighting each other at least as much as they were resisting the invaders. In the course of time, the Serbian nationalist stance of the Chetniks meant that they failed to attract non-ethnic Serbs. Increasing evidence of collaboration with the Italian Fascist and Nazi invaders against the Partisans eventually swayed the Allies

1  Mihailovic Flees Tito in His Undies, in: The Washington Post, 17 Nov.1944, sec. 2.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_018

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to support Tito and the Partisans in 1943.2 Hence, it was only with the support of the Western Allies and a change in the fortunes of war in 1944 that the Partisans could justify founding a security branch of their army, the OZNa. As of 1944, the main Partisan army could focus on defeating the occupying powers, whilst the OZNa could concentrate on consolidating power in the liberated territories by eliminating enemies and traitors. The OZNa was also supported by its military wing, the KNOJ, which could target the Chetniks specifically, leaving the bulk of the Partisan army to fight the occupiers. The combination of these factors turned the Partisans from being a secondary resistance movement into the dominant one, whilst the Chetniks lost the state infrastructure to the Nazis in 1941, Allied aid and support from the government in exile to the Partisans in 1943, the war in 1945, and the last vestiges of their resistance had disappeared by 1947. Triggered off by the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, and with the majority of wartime resistance quelled, the Partisans had to turn their attention to finding and arresting ‘Cominformists’, or those who supported the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia. This change in the geopolitical situation is what I call the dynamics of asymmetric warfare.3 The dynamics of asymmetric warfare can explain how resistance movements change in character, some becoming weaker whilst others become stronger. Strong actors must constantly be aware of, and perhaps even create, enemies to deal with. Between 1944 and 1952, Yugoslavia was a place where the dynamics of asymmetry could be seen on full display.

Preconditions for Resistance

Bounded by the Dinaric Alps in the Dalmatian littoral, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Montenegro, as well as the forested regions of Šumadija, Bosnia, and eastern Croatia, Yugoslavia was geographically primed for guerrilla warfare. Since 2  However, the Partisans can also be considered to have collaborated with the Nazis and Italians against the Chetniks, if collaboration is understood in the broad sense of the word. The Partisans signed clandestine ceasefires with the occupiers so that they could wage a concerted campaign against the Chetniks. The Chetniks were also accused and found guilty of making tacit agreements with the occupiers in postwar trials. However, this does not detract from the fact that the Chetniks murdered Muslim Yugoslavs in Bosnia and the Sandžak of Novi Pazar on the basis of ethno-religious identity, nor that a number of Chetnik units put themselves under Nazi and Italian command, something which the Partisans never did. 3  Deriving from Dickson’s idea that asymmetric warfare is inherently part of resistance, the dynamics of asymmetry address ‘how’ resistance movements move from dominance to subordination and vice versa. See Keith D. Dickson’s article, Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric warfare: Lessons for Today in this volume.

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at least the nineteenth century, armed bands resisting the Ottoman Empire used the rugged karst terrain and forested regions to effectively conduct guerrilla resistance. Adopting many of the same methods and tactics, the Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav Partisans resisted the Nazi and Italian invasions. When negotiations to combine efforts between the two resistance movements broke down early in Yugoslavia’s war, a civil war also ensued between the Chetniks and the Partisans. As Allied support shifted from the Chetniks to the Partisans in 1943, and when the Yugoslav government in exile formed a new government with the Partisans in mid-1944, the Chetniks’ fate was all but sealed. In this way the Yugoslav civil war fits the dynamic of asymmetric warfare. The Chetniks now fought against the Yugoslav government which was supported by the king they once purported to protect.

The Partisans Create OZNa

The OZNa was led by Aleksandar Ranković, whose nom de guerre was ‘Marko’. Ranković was a staunch party member who ‘was unconditionally devoted to Tito, sentimentally and idolatrously’ and thus enjoyed Tito’s full and tacit support .4 Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) were assigned tasks ‘as need arose’ and according to ‘personal inclinations and previous experience’.5 Thus, Ranković’s ‘personal inclination’ to stay calm under pressure, and his experiences in organizing protests, recruiting party members, and making ‘illegal connections’ prior to the war meant that intelligence and investigation came naturally to him.6 The name OZNa was inspired by the Soviet Cheka with the intention that ‘names should be memorable, suggestive, and – for such organizations [as the OZNa] – mysterious’.7 So, Tito’s aim that a machine like the OZNa should ‘strike terror into the bones’ of Yugoslavia’s enemies was incorporated in the name of the organization.8 The same can be said of the UDBa, the successor to the OZNa after 1946. Structurally, the OZNa was part of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA) until 1952, when

4  Milovan Djilas, Wartime, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 362. 5  Ibd. 6  Ibd. 7  Ibd., 250. 8  Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 15.

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the UDBa assumed a largely civilian character.9 Although Ranković was the head of the department, Tito was the commander-in-chief and all military and political organizations were ultimately answerable to him.10 Nevertheless, Tito’s support for and trust in Ranković meant that the latter became increasingly independent to run the OZNa-UDBa as he saw fit. Although it falls outside the timeframe of this article, it is worth noting that Ranković’s autonomy would ultimately lead to his undoing in 1966.11 Nevertheless, the military wing of the OZNa, the KNOJ, was to ‘fight against anti-national institutions … and to liquidate the Chetniks, Ustasha [Croatian Fascists], belogardisti [Slovenian Homeguard] and other anti-national gangs on the liberated territory of Yugoslavia’.12 The relationship between the KNOJ and the OZNa can best be illustrated by the capture of Mihailović in 1946.

Hunting Mihailović

After years of losing men to the Partisans in both combat and desertions, Chetnik manpower was greatly reduced in 1944. Once King Peter II, the head of the Yugoslav government in exile, had announced his support for the Partisans in September 1944, Mihailović fled to northeastern Bosnia with a few hundred men. By February 1945, after three years of Chetnik resistance to Fascism and Communism, a total of between 12,000 and 16,000 persons had joined Mihailović, including Serbs escaping from Serbia with the Germans, another contingent of Chetniks commanded by Pavle Djurišić, Montenegrin Chetniks and refugees.13 This was a far cry from the ostensible 200,000 Chetniks in 1942, when they were described as ‘a light touch on a dark picture’.14 To add 9  Marko Milivojević, ‘The Role of the Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Community’, in: John B. Allcock, John J. Horton, and Marko Milivojević (eds.), Yugoslavia in Transition (New York, Oxford: BERG, 1992), 199-237, here 205. 10  Ibd., 204. 11  For a better understanding of the background to Ranković’s downfall, see Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 184-191. For an account of the record of the OZNa-UDBa’s after the period discussed, see Milivojević, ‘Yugoslav Intelligence’, 199-237. 12  Quoted in Michael Portmann, ‘Violence in the State and Society Building Process of Communist Yugoslavia (1944–1946)’, in: Represija I Zločini Komunističkog Režima U Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2012), 159-168, here 164-165. 13  Jozo Tomasevich, ‘Yugoslavia During the Second World War’, in: Wayne S. Vucinich and Jozo Tomasevich (eds.), Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 59-118, here 107. 14  William Humphreys, ‘Gen. Draja Mihailovic, Yugoslav Robin Hood, Leads Chetnik Band Against Armies of Axis’, in: The Washington Post, 1 March 1942, sec. B2. For the late war

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insult to injury, some time around late 1945 or early 1946, the KNOJ captured Mihailović’s signallers and handed them over to the OZNa.15 These signallers ‘gave away the code and agreed to send spurious messages’ to Mihailović.16 The OZNa intended the operation to last several months with the objective of ‘lulling’ the Chetniks into a false sense of security.17 So, Ranković conceived the plan to lure Mihailović to Serbia by depicting the situation there as favourable for a Chetnik uprising, something for which Mihailović had been waiting. One of Tito’s key aides, Milovan Djilas, helped to compose the false messages.18 Due to a disagreement between Mihailović and Djurišić, the latter headed west towards the Ljubljana Gap in March 1945.19 To get there, Djurišić had to go through enemy lines, and he and roughly three-quarters of his group were killed by the Ustasha.20 In this light, Mihailović was reassured by the fake OZNa messages. Mihailović was caught in a pocket of Nazi-held territory, whilst the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was to the west of Mihailović’s position in Bosnia and the Partisans were to the south and north. He was surrounded and needed an escape route. Only the east, in Partisan-controlled Serbia, seemed to provide the possibility of escape thanks to the bogus messages. All movements required detailed and coordinated planning. Mihailović headed west first, perhaps to make the KNOJ believe he was attempting to link up with the Allies, then south, southeast and then east to the Drina River, the border to Serbia. There, he waited several days before crossing it. The journey was roughly 280 kilometres, the least direct route to Serbia and certainly the most arduous one. Mihailović and his men were constantly harassed by the KNOJ in an effort to obstruct, but not stop, his movement; they wanted him alive. All the time, he was still receiving messages from the OZNa agents urging him to continue his march. On 10 May, the Chetniks were attacked by a concentrated force as they were entering a gorge. They lost all their heavy equipment, all their period and the ‘melting away’ of Mihailović’s soldiers, see Borivoje M. Karapandžić, U Srbiji 1941–1945 (Cleveland, Ohio and Belgrade, 1993), 385-400. Karapandžić also estimates that at its height Mihailović’s support came to between 55,000 and 57,000 people. See, Ibd. 15  The handover of prisoners was mandated by the KNOJ’s founding charter. See Portmann, ‘State and Society Building’, 165. 16  Djilas, Wartime, 447. 17  Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (United States: Stanford University Press, 1975), 439. 18  Djilas, Wartime, 447. 19  The exact nature of this conflict is unknown, although Tomasevich’s account is the most probable of possible scenarios. See Tomasevich, Chetniks, 446-447. Also, 447-449 in Ibd. for Djurišić’s fate. 20  The other quarter met many different fates, all of which are detailed in Karapandžić, Gradjanski Rat, 354-367.

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radios, all the horses and many men, but Mihailović managed to escape. Two days later, the KNOJ attacked again. For the next few weeks, Mihailović and his forces were mauled this way and their numbers diminished increasingly. Over a three-week period, one Communist report estimates that the number of Chetniks killed and captured came to around 9,235, including 300 officers.21 Commenting on the Communist reactions to the extent of the slaughter wreaked by the Partisans, Djilas said ‘no-one liked to speak of this particular experience – not even those who made a show of their revolutionary spirit – as if it were only a horrible dream’.22 Eventually, Mihailović gave up trying to get to Serbia and remained in eastern Bosnia. After losing his radio equipment on 10 May, he lost touch with the OZNa-planted agent and with it the motivation to go to Serbia.23 Mihailović held out until March 1946 when he was betrayed by one of his own men, a recently recruited OZNa agent. Mihailović was arrested hiding in a bunker and guarded by four of his men. While Tito was on his way to Poland, Ranković simply cabled ‘the plan has succeeded’.24 Mihailović was put on trial and executed in the late summer of 1946. On the day of Mihailović’s execution, Ranković announced to the new Communist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that ‘[the Chetniks] will not menace our peaceful villages and inhabitants anymore’.25 Though evidence of Chetnik resistance exists as late as 1956, all serious armed Chetnik activity in Yugoslavia died with Mihailović.26 The OZNa-UDBa Learns from Experience Even after the war and Chetnik resistance, the KNOJ committed extrajudicial killings, executions and reprisals.27 An example of 1947/48 provides the basis for this claim, whilst also showing that even though the OZNa failed to capture Mihailović using a radio operator, the OZNa employed similar tactics after the war. ‘Operation Guardian’ was organized and commanded from Austria 21  Quoted in Tomasevich, Chetniks, 456. 22  Djilas, Wartime, 448. 23  The entire account of Mihailović’s journey and the fates of several of his main commanders can be found in Tomasevich, Chetniks, 453-458. 24  Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), 255. 25  Tomasevich, Chetniks, 460. 26  See, Max Bergholz, ‘When All Could No Longer Be Equal in Death: A Local Community’s Struggle to Remember Its Fallen Soldiers in the Shadow of Serbia’s Civil War, 1955–1956’, in: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 2008 (November 2010): 1-58. 27  Milivojević, ‘Yugoslav Intelligence’, 208.

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by the Ustasha Major Božidar Kavran. The plan was to infiltrate Yugoslavia, overthrow the Communist government and install a Croatian Fascist one instead. Sadly for the Ustasha, they transmitted in the clear and, being so close to Yugoslav territory, were overheard by UDBa agents, the successors to the OZNa. Between 22 July 1947 and 3 July 1948, 18 groups of Ustasha, or 98 men, were lured into Yugoslavia by the UDBa. They were captured and executed without causing any suspicion on the part of the Ustasha in Austria. Those in Austria were continuously informed about the increasingly favourable environment in Yugoslavia for an anti-Communist insurrection. This disinformation was so effective, Tomasevich notes, ‘that the mastermind of the whole project, Kavran, came in at the end as well’.28 Needless to say, Kavran met much the same fate as those who had entered Yugoslavia before him and those enemies of the state who had remained in the country.

Making New Enemies

The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 occurred almost simultaneously. Even during the war, the Partisans, and Tito especially, had been concerned with keeping the Soviets at a friendly distance.29 Whereas the Red Army liberated countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea, Yugoslavia was largely liberated by the Partisans. This was only possible due to a concerted effort by Tito and his direct allies to keep the Red Army out of Yugoslav territory. With the events of 1948, which saw Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform, a new enemy emerged.30 Ever fearful of Soviet influence, Tito turned the OZNa’s attention, called the UDBa after 1946, towards detecting and arresting those who continued to support the Soviet Union after 1948, who were dubbed ‘Cominformists’, i.e. essentially those supporting the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. The UDBa meticulously tracked Yugoslav citizens and foreign visitors. Nevertheless, by 1949 there were as many as 200 Soviet secret police agents (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del or NKVD) operating in Yugoslavia.31 Ranković himself estimated that roughly 13,700 ‘Cominformists’ were arrested 28  Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 766. 29  To understand the Partisan-Soviet relationship fully, see Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1990). 30  The Cominform was an abbreviated version of the Communist Information Bureau and was the successor to the Comintern, or Communist International. 31  Jerca Vodušek Starić, ‘The Concurrence of Allied and Yugoslav Intelligence Aims and Activities’, in: Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (2005): 29-44, here 44.

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and/or imprisoned between 1948 and 1952. As Milivojević notes, this is probably an underestimation.32 All the same, the number of ‘Cominformists’ who fell victim to the UDBa cannot be calculated accurately, although one estimate has roughly 100,000 people expelled, arrested and/or imprisoned by the UDBa. This is the equivalent of roughly 20% of the members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1950.33

History Catches Up

However, by 1951 the activity of the UDBa had come under increasing scrutiny. The organization needed to take judicial routes to quell dissent, rather than the ‘arbitrary’ punishment it had meted out in the 1944–1951 period. So, the activities of the organization came under ‘stricter control’, the criminal code was updated, and police and judges were expected to respect human rights.34 As a result, violence became selective and exceptional. Two further factors added to the transformation of the UDBa. First, the UDBa increasingly took on civilian roles, losing its affiliation to the Yugoslav People’s Army. This first happened in 1946 when its name was changed from the OZNa to the UDBa, then after 1952 when it became a ‘purely’ civilian agency.35 Secondly, the relationship between the Soviet NKVD and the UDBa was probably amongst the first to be normalized between the two countries.36 With Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviets looked to repair relations within the Eastern Bloc, and the threat of Yugoslavia being invaded was dispelled. So, just as the UDBa was losing its justification with local collaborators, Fascists and anti-Communists having been eliminated, the thaw in relations between the Soviets and Yugoslavs meant that the organization was again at risk of losing its raison d’être.37 As the 1950s came to a close, and as the UDBa sought relevance, it turned its attention to ‘hostile émigrés’, the ex-Yugoslavs who ‘do not like this kind of Yugoslavia’.38 32  Milivojević, ‘Yugoslav Intelligence’, 207. 33  Ibd. 34  Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 64. 35  Milivojević, ‘Yugoslav Intelligence’, 205. It is worth noting that the KNOJ was disbanded in 1951, also as part of the modernizing process of the UDBa. 36  Vodušek Starić, ‘Allied and Yugoslav Intelligence’, 44. 37  For a brief overview of the anti-Communist groups operating during the war, see Mark Wheeler, ‘White Eagles and White Guards: British Perceptions of Anti-Communist Insurgency in Yugoslavia in 1945’, in: Slavonic and East European Review 66, no. 3 (1988): 446-61. 38  Tito, quoted in Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 15.

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This article has made it clear that the OZNa-UDBa employed tactics which they developed under wartime conditions for the Chetniks and employed them to other groups and ‘enemies of the people’ in the immediate postwar years. Although the official end of the war in Yugoslavia was recognised as being on 15 May 1945, there were a number of anti-Communist groups operating in and around Yugoslav territory.39 From around the end of the war, it has been estimated that roughly 20,000 people were executed on the territory of Yugoslavia ‘where [each group] had been taken prisoner’.40 Djilas recounts that many years after the war so many bodies emerged from shallow graves and underground rivers that ‘the very ground seemed to breathe’.41 The annihilation of enemies evidently fulfills practical purposes. However, the Partisans believed that it also provided a process of catharsis for the Yugoslav experience of the war. Since so many ethnic Serbs had been murdered by the Ustasha terror, affording the survivors the opportunity to see the perpetrators liquidated provided a sense of retribution. Likewise, killing Chetniks gave the same feeling of revenge to the Croatian and Muslim survivors of Chetnik massacres. This, the Partisans believed, would help rebuild the postwar country in the ethnically-transcended vision of the Partisans and begin the process of healing ethnic tensions brought about by the war. Therefore, ‘the Partisans inaugurated a policy of the destruction of all armed formations of their domestic opponents on whom they could lay their hands’.42 The Partisans were going to achieve ethnic harmony through much carnage, but, in many instances, Partisan violence did just the opposite. Whereas Chetnik supporters in the diaspora retreated to an attitude of impotent rage, many Ustasha supporters and Croatian nationalists took active measures to discredit and destroy the Communist regime in Yugoslavia. The hijacking of TWA Flight 355 to bring attention to Croatia’s attempts at independence in the 1970s is an example.43 The assassinations of several dozen émigrés, especially ethnic-Croats, in North America, Western Europe, Australia and even South Africa between the end of the war and the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990, in turn, are examples of the Communist regime’s attempts to stamp out dissent abroad.44 The number of 39  Wheeler, ‘White Eagles and White Guards’. 40  Djilas, Wartime, 447. 41  Ibd. 42  Tomasevich, Yugoslavia During the Second World War, 112. 43  Daniel E. Slotnik, Zvonko Busic, 67, ‘Croatian Hijacker, Dies’, in: The New York Times, (5.9.2013, sec. Europe, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/europe/zvonko-busic67-croatian-hijacker-dies.html, last accessed 26 June 2017). 44   ‘Murder in Tito’s Name: German Journalists Investigate Liquidations by Yugoslav Secret Police’, in: Balkanist, (5 Jan 2015, http://balkanist.net/murder-titos-name-

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the victims of the OZNa-UDBa is not known, although estimates put the number of assassinated in the diaspora at under 100 people. A thorough study of the total number of victims, including wartime dead, the number killed in the immediate postwar years, and the quantity of assassinations, should be undertaken to reach a better understanding of OZNa-UDBa actions.45 This is to say nothing about the concentration camps, such as the one on the island of Goli Otok, and the lives lost there.46 Undertaking such a study would be difficult german-journalists-investigate-liquidations-yugoslav-secret-police/#, last accessed 26 June 2017). 45  It has been estimated that roughly 65,000 war criminals, traitors, and ‘people’s enemies’ were arrested and tried, though it is unknown from this study how many were executed. See Katrin Boeckh, ‘Allies Are Forever (Until They Are No More): Yugoslavia’s Multivectoral Foreign Policy During Titoism’, in: Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 24. Another study estimates that between 1945 and 1953 roughly 50,000 supporters, suspected collaborators and civilians were executed by the OZNa-UDBa. See Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, ‘Introduction’, in: Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds.), Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Tito’s Yugoslavia, Stories Untold, vol. 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3. For the experiences in Croatia, see Zdenko Radelić, ‘The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-Party System: The Case of Croatia’, in: Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds.) Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Tito’s Yugoslavia, Stories Untold, vol. 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 13-48. For a British perspective on the OZNa in Croatia, see Sebastian Ritchie, Our Man in Yugoslavia: The Story of a Secret Service Operative (London and New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 139. For wartime experiences in Slovenia, with a good account of the Partisans targeting their British ‘allies’, see Ljubo Sirc, Between Hitler and Tito: Nazi Occupation and Communist Oppression (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1989). The OZNa-UDBa were also tasked with crushing dissent from the respective religious denominations in Yugoslavia. For a brief example of their action against the Catholic Church, see Stevan K. Pavlowitch, ‘The Legacy of Two World Wars: A Historical Essay’, in: State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 75-88. It should be noted that the Serbian Orthodox Church was also targeted, though not to the same extent. A thorough study of the OZNa-UDBa’s action against Islam is still urgently needed. For an example of measures taken against Kosovo Albanians and events in the forests of Slovenia, see John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), beginning at 228. For Kosovo’s Albanian population throughout the Communist period, see Aleksandar Petrović and Djordje Stefanović, ‘Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland,” in: Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 7 (2010): 1073-1106. Other ethnic minorities targeted included ethnic Hungarians. See Krisztián Ungváry, ‘Vojvodina Under Hungarian Rule’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet and Ola Listhaug (eds.), Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 70-89, here 80. 46  Nora Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939–84 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1985), 135. Beloff suggests that ‘nearly’ one million people went through Partisan camps between 1944 and 1948, to say nothing of the later period.

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since much of the information is still under lock and key and split between the seven Yugoslav successor states, many of which are loath to reveal such (still) sensitive information. Nevertheless, the Partisan-Chetnik wartime experience shows the dynamic of asymmetric warfare, while the immediate postwar experiences of the OZNa-UDBa show that state reconstruction and power consolidation go hand in hand.47 In creating a unified Communist Yugoslavia, the state-building process produced many victims of OZNa-UDBa terror, not all of whom were guilty. The state tried to counter power with power and violence with violence. In trying to maintain its prominent position, the OZNa-UDBa extended the Second World War in Yugoslavia well past its end; it helped to generate dissent, sowed distrust and aggravated the loathing that anti-Communist Yugoslavs felt for the country, its ideology and its leadership. Thus, as Djilas notes, ‘If war could leave unscarred the memory of its participants, hatred and revenge would not become the most profound passions’.48 The greed of the OZNa-UDBa was so enormous that it would ally itself with almost any group, even those opposed to Communism, if it meant the organization could continue to harness power. When the Yugoslav Wars of Succession began in Croatia in 1991, the ethnicSerbs rebelling against the breakaway Croatian regime were clandestinely supported by the power-hungry Yugoslav secret service. The organization which ostensibly defended Yugoslav Communism for half a century brought about its demise, and ethnic nationalism was the weapon it wielded. The Slavic population of the former Yugoslavia speak an intelligible language which, during the Communist period, was variously known as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. There are regional and dialect variations of the language that remain mutually intelligible. Since the Yugoslav Wars of Succession of 1991–1999, the successor states have begun to call the language as they see fit. Thus, in Croatia the language is Croatian; in Serbia, it is Serbian. One exception to this is Bosnia, ethno-religiously divided and at a crossroads as to what to call the language that ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims speak. Only Slovenian is markedly different to the language formerly known as Serbo-Croatian.

47  Darko Suvin, ‘Splendours and Miseries of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1945–74)’, in: Socialism and Democracy 27, no. 1 (2013): 161-89, doi:10.1080/08854300.2012.754213, here 174. 48  Djilas, Wartime, 98.

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Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1990. Djilas, Milovan. Wartime. Translated by Michael B. Petrovich. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. Humphreys, William. ‘Gen. Draja Mihailovic, Yugoslav Robin Hood, Leads Chetnik Band Against Armies of Axis’. The Washington Post, March 1, 1942, sec. B2. ‘Mihailovic Flees Tito in His Undies’. The Washington Post, November 17, 1944, sec. 2. ‘Murder in Tito’s Name: German Journalists Investigate Liquidations by Yugoslav Secret Police’. Balkanist, January 5, 2015. http://balkanist.net/murder-titos-name-germanjournalists-investigate-liquidations-yugoslav-secret-police/#. Slotnik, Daniel E. ‘Zvonko Busic, 67, Croatian Hijacker, Dies’. The New York Times, September 5, 2013, sec. Europe. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/europe/ zvonko-busic-67-croatian-hijacker-dies.html. The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic: Stenographic Record and Documents from the Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic. Belgrade, 1946.

Beloff, Nora, Tito’s Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939–84 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1985). Bergholz, Max, When All Could No Longer Be Equal in Death: A Local Community’s Struggle to Remember Its Fallen Soldiers in the Shadow of Serbia’s Civil War, 1955– 1956, in: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. Number 2008 (November 2010): 1-58. Boeckh, Katrin, Allies Are Forever (Until They Are No More): Yugoslavia’s Multivectoral Foreign Policy During Titoism, in: The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe, edited by Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953). Dickson, Keith D., Understanding Resistance Movements as Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Today. Keynote. Karl von Vogelsang-Institut, Vienna, 2017. Karapandžić, Borivoje M., Gradjanski Rat U Srbiji 1941–1945 (Cleveland, Ohio/Belgrade, 1993). Lampe, John R., Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Milivojević, Marko, The Role of the Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Community. In: John B. Allcock/John J. Horton/Marko Milivojević (eds.), Yugoslavia in Transition, 199-237 (New York/Oxford: BERG, 1992).

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Ognjenović, Gorana/Jasna Jozelić, Introduction, in: Gorana Ognjenović/Jasna Jozelić (eds.), Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Tito’s Yugoslavia, Stories Untold, , 1:1-12 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Pavlowitch, Stevan K., The Legacy of Two World Wars: A Historical Essay, In: State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 75-88. Petrović, Aleksandar/Djordje Stefanović, Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland.’, in: Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 7 (2010): 1073-1106. Portmann, Michael, Violence in the State and Society Building Process of Communist Yugoslavia (1944–1946), in: Represija I Zločini Komunističkog Režima U Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2012), 159-158. Radelić, Zdenko, The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-Party System: The Case of Croatia, in: Gorana Ognjenović/Jasna Jozelić (eds.), Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Tito’s Yugoslavia, Stories Untold (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 1:13-48. Ritchie, Sebastian, Our Man in Yugoslavia: The Story of a Secret Service Operative. London and New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, 1941–1945. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973. Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977. Sirc, Ljubo, Between Hitler and Tito: Nazi Occupation and Communist Oppression. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1989. Suvin, Darko, Splendours and Miseries of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1945–74), in: Socialism and Democracy 27, no. 1 (2013): 161-89. doi:10.1080/08854300.2012.754213. Tomasevich, Jozo, The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. United States: Stanford University Press, 1975. Tomasevich, Jozo, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, CA, United States: Stanford University Press, 2002. Tomasevich, Jozo, Yugoslavia During the Second World War, in: Wayne S. Vucinich/Jozo Tomasevich (eds.), Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 59-118. Ungváry, Krisztián, Vojvodina Under Hungarian Rule, in: Sabrina P. Ramet/Ola Listhaug (eds.), Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 70-89. Vodušek Starić, Jerca, The Concurrence of Allied and Yugoslav Intelligence Aims and Activities, in: Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (2005): 29-44. Wheeler, Mark, White Eagles and White Guards: British Perceptions of Anti-Communist Insurgency in Yugoslavia in 1945, in: Slavonic and East European Review 66, no. 3 (1988): 446-61.

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Summary This article discusses the creation of the Yugoslav state security OZNa-UDBa by the Communist Partisans of Josip Broz ‘Tito’. Gaining the upper hand in the Yugoslav civil war of 1941–1945, OZNa-UDBa learned from its wartime experiences to successfully function well into the postwar period. The organisation was so successful that it needed to conjure up enemies of the state in order to remain viable. Eventually, the hubris adopted by the agents of OZNa-UDBa caught up to the security agency and killed it along with the state it protected.

Summary in Serbian

Ovaj članak rasmatra stvaranje jugoslovenske državne bezbednosti OZNa-UDBa od strane komunističkih Partizana Josipa Broza Tita. Dobijajući prednost u jugoslovenskom gradjanskom ratu 1941–1945, OZNa-UDBa je naučila iz svojih ratnih iskustava da uspešno funkcioniše u poslijeratnom periodu. Organizacija je bila toliko uspješna da je trebala stvoriti neprijatelje države kako bi ostalo održiva. Na kraju, okolnost koju su usvojili agenti OZNa-UDBa uhvatila je sigurnosnu agenciju i ubila ga zajedno sa državom koju je štitila.

Fig. 17.1

The capture of the two main Chetnik forces of Mihailović in 1946 and Djurišić in 1945.

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Chapter 18

The Goryani Movement against the Communist Regime in Bulgaria (1944–1956): Prerequisites, Resistance, Consequences Valentin Voskresenski Resistance during the communist regime in Bulgaria emerged as a reaction against various forms of coercion, constraints and repression on the part of the state, which sought to control all spheres of social and cultural life. Disapproval of the regime was expressed through individual, collective, spontaneous or organized forms of protest. Engaging in armed resistance was only an extreme expression of discontent, it was not always the result of organized activity and in many cases was spontaneous. Although it is accepted that the armed resistance in Bulgaria took place in the period between 1944 and 1956, disobedience, riots, strikes and terrorism accompanied the regime until its end in 1989.1 Indeed, the largest-scale armed resistance and attempt to oppose the regime is known as the so-called goryani movement, which emerged shortly after the communist coup in September 1944 and lasted until the late 1950s. Taking its 1  To confirm this, I will enumerate several telling examples: in 1957, a conspiratorial organization called Independent Macedonia was founded in Pirin Macedonia by former members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vatreshna makedonska revolyutsionna organizatiya, VMRO). Underground groups named Ilinden and Macedono-Pirin Communist Party were set up against the “re-Bulgarization” and second change of passports in Pirin Macedonia. In 1962, an attempt to create an underground group of seven anarchists was thwarted in the town of Kazanlak. During the name-changing campaign against Muslim Bulgarians in 1964, the residents of the village of Ribnovo rebelled against the regime and blocked the village. In 1969, there was a revolt of political prisoners in the Stara Zagora prison. On 28 March 1973, after an unsuccessful attempt to change the names of the local residents of the village of Kornitsa, the authorities sent 6,000 military, border police, mounted police officers, and volunteers from the neighbouring villages, as a result of which five people were killed, eighty were wounded, twelve were sent to prison, and another 300 were sent into internal exile. In the 1984–1987 period, dozens of illegal pro-Turkish organizations were set up as a reaction to the so-called Revival Process. Dozens were killed when one of them, called Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria, conducted terrorist and bomb attacks at the Varna airport, the Plovdiv Central Railway Station, the Bunovo Railway Station, and the Sliven Hotel. From 1952 to 1985, a total of 478 death sentences were issued for anti-popular and enemy activities: AVMR, f. 13, op. 3, a. e. 796, cited in Stefan Tsanev, Balgarski hroniki [Bulgarian chronicles], vol. 4 (Plovdiv: Zhanet 45, 2010), 284.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_019

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name from the hiding places of fighters in the forest (“gora” in Bulgarian), the goryani movement included opponents of the communist regime with diverse political profiles and biographical backgrounds – mostly agrarians, who opposed land collectivization, but also former army officers, anarchists, members of patriotic and nationalist unions, social democrats, etc. The subject of the goryani movement is still under-researched in Bulgarian historiography. In the last two decades, a number of documentary editions of testimonies, autobiographies and scientific studies on this subject have been published. Information about the trials, the reports of officers of the State Security Service (Darzhavna sigurnost, DS), and minutes of interrogations have become accessible to the public. This type of documents are kept at the Archive of the Ministry of Interior (Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na vatreshnite raboti, AMVR), the Central Military Archive (Tsentralen voenen arhiv, TsVA), and the Central State Archive (Tsentralen darzhaven arhiv, TsDA). An important step in revealing this page of history was the adoption of various policies of “decommunization” and “retributive and retroactive justice”2 in Bulgaria.3 Another moment in this process was the declassification of the DS archives. Valuable primary source materials from those archives have been published in two volumes by the Archives State Agency.4 Other important primary source materials are kept at the regional archives – for example, the personal papers of the anarchist Vesel Momchev at State Archive – Veliko Tarnovo. The archival documents of the Internal and Border Troops have also been accessible to researchers since 2006. The first comprehensive studies on the goryani movement were

2  For more on these topics, see Ana Luleva/Evgenia Troeva/Petar Petrov, Prinuditelniyat trud v Balgariya (1941–1962): Spomeni na svideteli (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov”, 2012)/Zwangsarbeit in Bulgarien (1941–1962): Erinnerungen von Zeitzeugen (Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Akademie-Verlag, 2012). 3  Among those measures are the 1991 Political and Civil Vindication Act for Individuals Who Have Undergone Repressive Actions, the 2000 Act Declaring the Criminal Nature of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria, the National Assembly’s 18 September 2008 resolution to support the Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism, as well as its 2009 resolution to support Resolution 1481 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the 2010 Act on Access to and Disclosure of the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens with the State Security Service and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Army, etc. 4  Nedyalka Grozeva et al. (eds.), Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti. Tom I (1944–1949) [The goryani: A collection of documents. Volume 1 (1944–1949)] (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na arhivite pri Ministerskiya savet, 2001); Nedyalka Grozeva/Elena Bugarcheva (eds.), Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti. Tom II (1949–1956) [The goryani: A collection of documents. Volume 2 (1949–1956)] (Sofia: Darzhavna agentsiya “Arhivi”, 2010).

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produced by Dinyu Sharlanov5 and Nikolai Iliev.6 Another part of the studies on the goryani (sing. goryanin) examine their activities in separate regions of Bulgaria: in the Eastern Balkan Mountains,7 the Varna and Dobrich regions,8 Pirin Macedonia,9 the Ruse area,10 the area of the village of Pavel Banya,11 the 5  Dinyu Sharlanov, Goryanite. Koi sa te? Iz strogo sekretnite arhivi na Direktsiya na darzhavna sigurnost [The goryani. Who are they? From the top-secret archives of the State Security Directorate] (Sofia: Prostranstvo & Forma, 1999); Sharlanov, Istoriya na komunizma v Balgariya [A history of communism in Bulgaria], vol. 2 (Sofia: Ciela, 2009). 6  Nikolai Iliev, Boyan Popov – vodach na goryanite v Transko [Boyan Popov: leader of the goryani in the Tran area] (Sofia: Balgari, 2004); Iliev, Nikola Yordanov – Gudzho i goryanskoto dvizhenie v Transko-breznishkiya rayon [Nikola “Gudzho” Yordanov and the goryani movement in the Tran-Breznik area] (Sofia: Balgari, 2004); Iliev, Vaorazhenata borba protiv komunizma [The armed struggle against communism] (Sofia: Balgari, 2011). 7  Veselina Yanakieva, Goryanskoto dvizhenie v Slivenskiya kray 1950–1951 g. [The goryani movement in the Sliven area 1950–1951], in: Stoyan Pintev/Georgi Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya i organiziranata saprotiva v Balgariya 1944–1954 g. Materiali ot nauchnata konferentsiya v Sliven, yuni 2000 g. [The Bulgarian opposition and organized resistance in Bulgaria 1944–1954. Proceedings of the scientific conference in Sliven, June 2000] (Sliven: Zhazhda, 2000), 22-45; Radostina Georgieva, Goryanite v Iztochniya Balkan. Dokumenti, materiali, spomeni, komentari [The goryani in the Eastern Balkan Mountains. Documents, materials, recollections, commentaries] (Sofia: Es print, 2012). 8  Boris Mitev, Saprotivata sreshtu balgarskiya komunizam. Goryanite ot Varnenska i Dobrichka oblast (1946–1960) [Resistance against Bulgarian communism. The goryani from Varna and Dobrich regions (1946–1960)] (Varna: IK Steno, 2012). 9  Veselin Angelov, Saprotivata sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya (1944–1948 g.) [The resistance against the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia (1944– 1948)], in: Pintev/Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya, 95-113; Angelov, Otlichen balgarin s imeto Gerasim. Stranitsi ot vaorazhenata saprotiva sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya (1947–1948 g.) [An excellent Bulgarian named Gerasim. Pages from the armed resistance against the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia (1947–1948)] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2001); Angelov, Vik v sanya: materiali za saprotivata na Vladimir Poptomov sreshtu makedonizatsiyata v Pirinskiya kray (1944–1949) [Screaming in a dream: materials on Vladimir Poptomov’s resistance against Macedonization in the Pirin area (1944–1949)] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2005); Mihail Gruev, Mezhdu petolachkata i polumesetsa: Balgarite myusyulmani i politicheskiyat rezhim (1944–1959) [Between the fivepointed star and the crescent: Muslim Bulgarians and the political regime (1944–1959)] (Stara Zagora: Kota, 2003); Gruev et al. (eds.), Nasilie, politika i pamet: komunisticheskiyat rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya – refleksii na savremennika i izsledovatelya [Violence, politics and memory: the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia – reflections of the contemporary and researcher] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 2011). 10  Krum Horozov, Goryanskoto dvizhenie v Rusensko 1949–1952 [The goryani movement in the Ruse area 1949–1952] (Ruse: Avangard print, 2004). 11  Plamen Stefanov, Goryanite anarhisti v Pavelbanskiya rayon 1952–1954 g. [Goryanianarchists in the Pavel Banya area 1952–1954], in: Pintev/Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya, 193–199; Lora Doncheva, Za grupata anarhisti-emigranti, deystvala v rayona na s. Pavel banya, Kazanlashko, prez 1953–1954 g. (po dokumenti ot DA – V. Tarnovo) [On

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Tran area,12 the Western Rhodope Mountains.13 There are also studies on separate armed operations of the DS against the goryani.14 Another type of sources on the subject are the memoirs, recollections and accounts of participants in the events,15 the history of the political party Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (Balgarski zemedelski naroden sayuz, BZNS)16 or of the anarchist movement in Bulgaria,17 etc. Despite the available sources and studies, there are still many unresolved research questions related to the role of foreign intelligence services in the resistance, the goryani movement in the context of the other countries of the Eastern Bloc, the construction of post-socialist memory about the resistance, etc.18 the group of immigrant anarchists that operated in the area of the village of Pavel Banya, Kazanlak district, in 1953–1954 (according to documents from the State Archive – Veliko Tarnovo], in: Epohi 21 (2013) 2, 83-104. 12  Iliev, Nikola Yordanov. 13  Sergei Vuchkov, Nelegalni myusyulmanski grupi v Zapadnite Rodopi prez vtorata polovina na 40-te godini na XX vek [Illegal Muslim groups in the Western Rhodopes in the second half of the 1940s], in: Balkanistic Forum (2011) 1, 269-322. 14  Anka Ignatova, Znakovi aktsii sreshtu goryanite (po dokumenti ot arhivnite fondove na Vatreshni i Granichni voyski v Darzhavniya voennoistoricheski arhiv [Landmark operations against the goryani (according to documents from the archival holdings of the Internal and Border Troops at the State Military-Historical Archive], in: Lachezar Stoyanov/Zhivko Lefterov (eds.), Saprotivata sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Balgariya 1944–1989 g.). Sbornik materiali ot natsionalna nauchna konferentsiya, NBU, 23-24 mart 2011 g. [Resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1989). Proceedings of a national scientific conference, New Bulgarian University, 23-24 March 2011] (Sofia: NBU, 2012), 122-137, http://ebox.nbu.bg/anti/ (last accessed 12 February 2019). 15  Petko Ogoyski, Zapiski po balgarskite stradaniya 1944–1989 g. [Notes on the Bulgarian sufferings 1944–1989], 4th ed. (Sofia: Skala print, 2015); Atanas Darmonski, Tova ostana v pametta mi (1945–1999) [This is what I remember (1945–1999)] (no place, publisher or date); Ivan Angelov, Goryani. 1945…1967. Az i Urovene [Goryani. 1945…1967. I and Urovene] (no place, publisher or date). 16  Todor Kavaldzhiev, Almanah na Balgarskiya zemedelski naroden sayuz i negovite zhertvi (1900–2010) [Almanac of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and its sacrifices 1900– 2010)] (Sofia: Chernat, 2011); Kavaldzhiev, Kratka istoriya na Zemedelskoto mladezhko dvizhenie v Balgariya [A brief history of the Agrarian youth movement in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Chernat, 2012). 17  Doncho Daskalov, Anarhizmat v Balgariya [Anarchism in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 1995). 18  For more, see Nikolai Vukov, Monumentalni reprezentatsii v propagandata na komunisticheskya rezhim v Balgariya (1944–1989) [Monumental representations in the propaganda of the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1989)], in: Ivaylo Znepolski (ed.), Istoriya na Narodna Republika Balgariya. Rezhimat i obshtestvoto [A history of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. The regime and society] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/ Ciela, 2009), 595-614; Ivaylo Ditchev, Institutsii na zabravata. Otmashtenie, spravedlivost, proshka, amnistiya [Institutions of forgetting. Vengeance, justice, forgiveness, amnesty],

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This article will analyze several key topics related to armed resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1956). It will examine the domestic and foreign political factors that led to the emergence of the goryani movement. The study will describe, on the one hand, the goals, composition, structure, activities and tactics of conducting an armed struggle of the illegal organizations and their armed groups; on the other, it will examine the counter-resistance against them through the prism of the state institutions, DS agent apparatus, armed operations, and trials. In this way, the article aims to shed light on the role of the two belligerent parties and to outline the understanding of the conflict as an asymmetric struggle that laid the beginning of a difficult-to-overcome division in Bulgarian society.

Prerequisites for the Armed Struggle against the Communist Regime in Bulgaria

The exact number of the participants in the armed resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria remains unclear because the main source of information, the DS reports, give contradictory figures. There are also discrepancies in the available historiography. According to some sources, the g­ oryani (the armed participants in the resistance) numbered 3,000 persons, and their helpers (pomagachi) and accomplices (yatatsi) approximately 10,000 persons. A DS report for the period from 1 January to 28 February 1951 mentions that, at the time of writing, 3,133 “illegal political criminals” had been identified in Bulgaria, of whom 2,010 were placed on the national wanted list and 220 had been captured or liquidated.19 According to an annual report on instances of “political banditry” in Plovdiv province20 alone in 1948, that year 720 persons had been arrested; of them, 295 were referred to the prosecution authorities, 142 were sent to the so-called “labour-educational communes” in: Ivaylo Znepolski/Heinz Wismann (eds.), Pol Rikyor. Filosofiyata pred predizvikatelstvata na promenite [Paul Ricoeur. Philosophy facing the challenges of changes] (Sofia: Dom na naukite za choveka i obshtestvoto, 1998), 180-192; Liliana Deyanova, Ochertaniya na malchanieto. Istoricheska sotsiologiya na kolektivnata pamet [Lineaments of silence. Historical sociology of collective memory] (Sofia: Kritika i humanizam, 2009); Nikolai Prodanov, Antikomunisticheskata saprotiva v Balgariya sled 1944 g.: belezhki po dosegashnite izsledvaniya, tematikata i osnovnite problemni vaprosi [Anticommunist resistance in Bulgaria after 1944: notes on the current research and main topics], in: Epohi 21 (2013) 2, 70-82. 19   A MVR, f. 13, a. e. 892, l. 20. 20  In 1945 Bulgaria was divided into nine regions (oblast); in 1949 its territorial administration included fourteen provinces (okrag) with a total of 101 districts (okoliya).

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(trudovo-vazpitatelni obshtezhitiya, TVO – forced labour camps), 212 were released, but many of them were recruited as DS informers or agents, and fortytwo were sent into internal exile. Based on data from the Interior Ministry and DS archives, another source notes that from April 1950 to August 1953, a total of 23,898 persons were arrested; of them, 13,179 were sent to camps, 6,300 were convicted, and 241 were sentenced to death.21 On the basis of DS documents, historian Dinyu Sharlanov has estimated that the number of goryani was 170 in 1945, 480 in 1947, 780 in 1948, 1,520 in 1950, 3,130 in 1951–1952, and 270 in 1955.22 In the years of armed resistance in Bulgaria, most of the people who joined the goryani movement were from the “enemy contingent” (i.e., individuals hostile to the communist regime) which, according to DS documents, numbered approximately 384,000 persons at the end of 1953.23 The reasons for the struggle against the communist regime were the result of various domestic and foreign political factors. Part of the illegal organizations and armed groups were formed by people who had suffered from the “red terror” after 9 September 1944 and the subsequent political trials.24 Another part of the participants were discontented with the Sovietization of Bulgaria and the elimination of the legal political opposition. Dissent was caused also by the nationalization of private property, the “Macedonization” in Pirin Macedonia, and the “Revival Process”.25 In their reports, DS officers duly described also a series of other reasons for popular discontent, among which: poorly executed directives and orders to civil servants, denial of employment to former “profascist elements”, arbitrary acts and violations on the part of the administrative bodies, high taxes, bad attitude of the border troops towards the local population, militia violence, mass recruitment of people as DS informers and agents, beatings and murders during the 1946 elections, etc.26 The mass resistance against the communist regime, however, emerged as a reaction against the collectivization which led to changes in the centuries-long relationship between peasants and land. The internal conflict was additionally aggravated by foreign political factors – by the deterioration of the relations between Tito and Stalin 21  Georgieva, Goryanite, 16. 22  Sharlanov, Istoriya, 540. 23  Tsanev, Balgarski hroniki, 277. 24  The total number of political trials in Sofia and the Sofia area alone in the period from 1945 to 1988 was 4,995 (Sharlanov, Goryanite, 11). 25  From the late 1950s onwards, the communist state began to conduct policies of assimilation of the Muslim Bulgarian and Turkish population in Bulgaria, which consisted of various measures, including change of religious practices, prohibition of traditional dress, and forcible change of Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian ones. 26  See Grozeva/Bugarcheva, Goryanite, 9-36.

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in 1948, as well as by the escalation of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. After 1953 there was a period of calm, which was due to the improvement of US-Soviet relations after Stalin’s death and to the Geneva Conference of 1954. The first underground armed groups in Bulgaria were formed as a reaction to the terror after 9 September 1944. In the scientific literature there are different opinions on the number of those who “disappeared without a trace” in the aftermath of the communist coup.27 The wave of violence affected a large part of Bulgaria’s population, giving rise to hostility towards the regime. For example, one of the members of the group of Ivan Vanev from the village of Stryama, Petar Krastev Lalev, was “hostile towards the Fatherland Front government” because his father had “a brother and a brother-in-law [who had been] liquidated by the Partisans.”28 The other member, Stoichko Rangelov Vanev, was a brother of the killed Stefan Rangelov Vanev,29 while Ivan Vanev himself had friends and relatives from the village who had been “liquidated” after 9 September 1944. Another motive for going underground was the so-called People’s Court,30 which handed down 9,155 sentences, 2,730 of which were death sentences. Fearing punishment, some of those sentenced by the People’s Court went underground or joined already formed armed groups. Among them were: Petar Iliev Stoychev from the village of Yunatsite (Pazardzhik area), who joined an underground group in Pazardzhik district after being sentenced to death in absentia; former high-ranking military officer Stoycho Ivanov from the village of Palamartsi (Popovo area) who, after serving his sentence, became an active member of BZNS – Nikola Petkov and organized an underground group in 1947. Royal military officer Nikola Mutafchiev and retired Air Force lieutenant Manyu Koev Popov also served their sentences and emigrated to Greece, where they founded an organization called Bulgarian Anti-Bolshevik Legion (Balgarski protivobolshevishki legion).31 27  Estimates of their number vary between 7,000 and 30,000. For more details, see Aleksandar Vezenkov, 9 septemvri 1944 g. [9 September 1944] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/Ciela, 2014), 364-369. 28   A MVR, II sl. d. 102, p. 1, l. 24, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva/Bugarcheva, Goryanite, 430. 29  Nadezhda Lyubenova, Stryama. Vtoriyat Batak – 1944 g. [Stryama. The second Batak – 1944] (Plovdiv: Makros, 2009), 69. 30  Established pursuant to the Statutory Ordinance on Trial by a People’s Court of the Culprits for the Embroilment of Bulgaria in the World War against the Allied Nations and for the Atrocities Related to the Said War, adopted on 30 September 1944. 31  This organization was supported by the Bulgarian National Front (Balgarski natsionalen front, BNF), founded in 1947 by émigrés Ivan Dochev and Georgi Paprikov. In 1932 Ivan Dochev founded in Bulgaria the pro-fascist organization Union of Youth National Legions

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One of the best-known goryani sentenced to death by the People’s Court was Nikola “Gudzho” Yordanov Georgiev, who escaped from the firing squad and went on to found the Illegal Patriotic Organization (Nelegalna patriotichna organizatsiya, NPO) in Tran district. Conditions for mass participation in the underground armed struggle were created in 1947 after the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) [Balgarska rabotnicheska partiya (komunisti), BRP(k)] eliminated all opposition political forces and took total control over state power. The first political organizations to be outlawed by the Fatherland Front (Otechestven front, OF) were the “profascist” ones,32 which were banned by a special statutory ordinance as early as 1944. Their supporters became part of the main contingent of the resistance in the first years of the communist regime, creating organizations fashioned after them – such as the Fatherland Bloc (Otechestven blok) in Varna, the National Front (Natsionalen front) in Gorna Dzhumaya, and the National Revolutionary Front (Natsionalen revolyutsionen front) in Sofia. In 1945 the National Patriotic Group (Natsionalna patriotichna grupa, NPG) was created by former members of the youth organization Brannik (Defender), and in 1948 two underground groups were set up by former Legionnaires Iliya Mitev Radev and Ivan Kostov Kovachev. The Secret Anticommunist, Nationalist, Terrorist Organization (Tayna antikomunisticheska, natsionalisticheska, teroristichna organizatsiya, TANTO) was also headed by a former Legionnaire, Nikolai Georgiev Presolski. A report of the Directorate of the People’s Militia to the interior minister, dated 2 April 1945, notes that “illegal fascist organizations [have been detected] in Ruse region, in the areas of Varna, Pleven, Plovdiv, in Sofia and elsewhere.”33 In the first months after 9 September 1944, more than 100 underground groups were detected in Bulgaria; by May 1945, sixty groups were broken up.34 The number of participants in the underground armed struggle grew after a purge (Sayuz na mladezhkite natsionalni legioni, SMNL), later renamed to Union of Bulgarian National Legions (Sayuz na balgarskite natsionalni legioni, SBNL). Its aim was to counter the dissemination of communist ideas among young people. In his political views Ivan Dochev was an adherent of Nazism. He personally met Adolf Hitler. Several days before 9 September 1944, he left Bulgaria with his wife on a German military plane specially provided for the purpose. After 9 September 1944, his father was killed, one of his two sons was sentenced to death and the other died in a camp. DS called Ivan Dochev “the Bulgarian führer”. Georgi Paprikov was a former SBNL member who received two death sentences in absentia after 9 September 1944. 32  Among those banned were the SBNL , which had approximately 15,000 members (known as “Legionnaires”) at the time of the communist coup, Ratnik (Warrior), with approximately 4,000 members, and Otets Paisiy (Father Paisiy). 33   A MVR, f. 1, op. 1, a. e. 8, l. 37. 34  Sharlanov, Istoriya, 10.

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was conducted in the army. On 2 July 1946 the National Assembly adopted, on the motion of Georgi Dimitrov, an Army Command and Control Act under which some 2,000 army officers were discharged. In 1946 again, several trials were conducted against a large number of army officers accused of attempting to topple the regime through a military coup. The first trial was against Lieutenant-Colonel Anton Krastev, leader of Tsar Krum, a secret military organization. The next trials were against the army officers’ organizations Military League (Voenen sayuz) and Neutral Officer (Neutralen ofitser). The participants in the Military League were accused of preparing a military coup, incited by the leader of the legal opposition, Nikola Petkov. The final elimination of the opposition parties took place in August 1947, when an Act to Ban and Disband the Bulgarian Agrarian Union – N. Petkov and All Its Units and Sections was adopted. That was also the time of the trial against opposition leader Nikola Petkov, who was hanged in the Sofia Central Prison on 23 September 1947. This drove part of the supporters of the outlawed parties to join the underground armed struggle. An additional motive for doing so was the subsequent new wave of repressions at the end of 1947, when some 720 persons, most of them supporters of BZNS – Nikola Petkov, were sent to forced labour camps. In the following years the state conducted trials also against the leaders of the Bulgarian Workers’ Social Democratic Party (Balgarska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partiya, BRSDP), BZNS – Vrabcha 1, and other parties. Since the main opposition force until 1947 was BZNS – Nikola Petkov, most of the goryani were former members of that party.35 BZNS – Nikola Petkov supporters made up the majority of members of the Peasant Army of Freedom (Selska armiya na svobodata, SAS), Regional Agrarian Centre No. 1 (Oblasten zemedelski tsentar № 1), Orange Party (Oranzheva partiya), Secret Anticommunist National Organization (Tayna antikomunisticheska natsionalna organizatsiya, TANO),36 Bulgarian Liberation Movement (Balgarsko osvoboditelno dvizhenie, BOD), People’s Voice (Naroden glas), First Sredna Gora Green Guard “Nikola Petkov” (Parva srednogorska zelena gvardiya “Nikola Petkov”) and the armed band of Ivan “Goran” Tosev that was formed by the latter, the Popovo band, the Committee of the Resistance in Sliven district, the goryani bands of Boyan Popov in the Tran area, etc. The 35  The party is estimated to have had approximately 400,000 members at that time. 36  This organization consisted mostly of youths operating on the territory of Sofia and was headed by Kostadin Georgiev (see AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 372, l. 2-3, 10, copy, typewritten). This underground group was different from the Secret Anti-Bolshevik National Organization (Tayna antibolshevishka natsionalna organizatsiya, TANO), which operated in the area of Kyustendil district and consisted of former members of the SBNL, Ratnik and Otets Paisiy (see Sharlanov, Istoriya, 145).

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purge of the state also targeted the “enemy with a party ticket”.37 It is no coincidence that in some of the illegal organizations there were people who were BRP(k) members. A DS report notes that among the accomplices of an armed group of four men, which operated in the villages of Kamenik, Vukovo, Mali and Golemi Varbovnik, and in the area of Dupnik in 1947, there were seven BRP(k) members. Another report mentions that five of the men in the band of Stoycho Hristov Karadzhov were BRP(k) members, including the mayor of the village of Stargel. One of the members of the National Christian Cross (Natsional-hristianski krast) was the secretary of the local chapter of the BRP(k) in the village of Skobelevo; among the members of the band of Shukri Dervishev from the village of Barutin was the former chairman of the council in Dospat, who had completed a one-year Party school. As a whole, the BRP(k) repression against the opposition parties, as well as against some of its own members, led to the consolidation of the illegal opposition. This is evidenced by the diversity of its members. A DS report on the composition of the National Christian Cross shows that it was comprised of twenty members of the BRP(k), twenty-six of BZNS – OF, four of the Workers’ Youth League (Rabotnicheski mladezhki sayuz, RMS), eight of the Agrarian Youth Union (Zemedelski mladezhki sayuz, ZMS), ten of the BRSDP, seven of the Zveno [Link] National Union, forty-three of BZNS – Nikola Petkov, thirteen of ZMS – Sarbinski, eight Legionnaires, one Tsankovist, and seventytwo non-party members.38 Similarly, the Union of Free Warriors (Sayuz na

37  In 1948, a split occurred between the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the leaderships of the communist parties in the so-called Cominform. Siding with the Bolshevik party, in 1948 the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) adopted a resolution to purge its ranks of “alien and careerist elements” and of “enemies with a party ticket”. The most striking example of repression within the party was the trial against Traicho Kostov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Government Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs. Sentenced to death in 1949, Traicho Kostov was hanged in the Sofia Central Prison on the night of 16/17 December of that year. His supporters, defined as “Traichokostovists”, were dismissed from all state and party structures and put on trial. The repressions within the party were fuelled further by tensions between the party cadres who had operated underground in Bulgaria before 9 September 1944 and those who had returned from emigration in the Soviet Union after 9 September 1944, as well as by the conflicts between the younger and the older generation in the communist party. For more, see Lyubomir Ognyanov, Borbi i chistki v BKP (1948–1953): Dokumenti i materiali [In-fighting and purges in the BKP (1948–1953): Documents and materials] (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na arhivite pri Ministerskiya savet, 2001). 38   A MVR, f. 2, op. 1, a. e. 1410.

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svobodnite voyni, SSV) was made up of members of BZNS – Nikola Petkov, BZNS – Sarbinski, VMRO – Ivan Mihailov, non-party members, criminals, etc. In Pirin Macedonia and the Western Rhodope Mountains illegal organizations and armed groups were formed in reaction to the communist government’s assimilation policies against the local religious and ethnic minorities. Part of them emerged as a result of the “Macedonization” of the local population and the banning of VMRO – Ivan Mihailov. Some of those organizations consisted mostly of former members of VMRO – Ivan Mihailov. Among them were the Internal Bulgarian Revolutionary Organization (Vatreshna balgarska revolyutsionna organizatsiya, VBRO), Illegal Liberation Macedonian Organization (Nelegalna osvoboditelna makedonska organizatsiya, NOMO), the bands of Ivan Davkov, Andon Nikolov, Borislav Ivanov, and Asen Trahanarov. The socalled Sixth Pirin Detachment (Shesti pirinski otryad) led by Gerasim Todorov is considered to have been the largest armed group in Pirin Macedonia. A new stage in the development of the resistance in this part of the country began in 1948, when the Bulgarian government stopped supporting the idea of ceding Pirin Macedonia to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav security services (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDB – State Security Administration) responded by creating and assisting illegal organizations which propagated “Yugomacedonism”. Such were the groups from the town of Sandanski and the village of Klyuch, which were captured in 1957, as well as the Organization for Unification of Macedonia (Organizatsiya za obedinenieto na Makedoniya, OOM), TTO – Cherna raka YuS, etc. Gerasim Todorov and the Illegal Patriotic Organization (NPO) also received support from the UDB.39 Armed groups were also formed in reaction to the deprivation of rights of the Muslim population. The first forcible measures of the communist government against the Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks) and Bulgarian Turks were taken in 1948, with the beginning of the gradual resettlement of the Muslim population from Bulgaria’s southern border as a result of which some 10,000 Pomaks changed their place of residence. In 1950–1951 some 154,000 people were deported to the Republic of Turkey. In the 1950s the communist state also began to change the religious practices, dress and Turkish-Arabic names of Muslims. Historian Mihail Gruev notes that an additional motive for going underground was the Muslim population’s deep-rooted abhorrence of the regime and the Bulgarian state as a whole.40 Among the better known underground armed 39  Iliev, Nikola Yordanov, 23. 40  Gruev et al., Nasilie, 84. There were attempts to convert the Muslims to Christianity and change their Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian ones as early as 1912, when the local Muslim population in the Rhodope Mountains was subjected to violence by the

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groups of Muslim Bulgarians were those of Ali Riza Kehayov from the village of Chavdar (Dospat area), Syuleyman “Parcho” Ademov Parov from the village of Godeshevo,41 the band of Fayk Aliev Gaziev from the village of Ablanitsa (Blagoevgrad region), and the group of Atem Yakupov Guygov – Captain Atem. The most powerful catalyst of anti-totalitarian sentiments and reason for large-scale armed resistance was the process of land collectivization in the Bulgarian countryside. In 1947 the state began to nationalize the large private enterprises and banks, while the following year, 1948, saw the beginning of land collectivization and establishment of the so-called labour-cooperative farms (trudovo-kooperativno zamedelsko stopanstvo, TKZS). The abolition of private property destroyed the centuries-long tradition connecting Bulgarian peasants to the land and led to mass discontent. In this period, the number of peasants who joined the armed resistance grew to 70% of all participants.42 Initially, dissent against land collectivization was expressed solely in the form of open protests and disobedience. For example, upon the establishment of the tracts of the local TKZS in the village of Gyurgich (Belogradchik area) in 1949, some eighty or ninety men and women from the village came out several times and protested against the ploughing up of the tracts. An even bigger wave of protests swept across the Bulgarian countryside during the second “massification” in 1950, when peasant riots broke out in the areas of Plovdiv, Pleven, Asenovgrad, Kula, Vidin, Oryahovo, and elsewhere. On 3 July 1950 the peasants from the village of Bardarski Geran refused to carry out the communist party’s order that threshing be done on common threshing floors, which led to clashes as a result of which twenty people were arrested and seven guilty verdicts were issued. The Catholic parish priest, Asen Chonkov, was blamed as the main instigator of the riot, for which he was tried and sentenced by the Vratsa Provincial Court to fifteen years in prison.43 In the same way, on 18 July 1950 advancing Bulgarian troops and the volunteer detachments of the neighbouring Christian villages. Policies of forcible conversion to Christianity were also conducted by the Rodina (Motherland) Society, founded in 1937 (for more, see Gruev et al., Nasilie). 41  Syuleyman “Parcho” Ademov Parov is also called in some historiographical works and archival sources Syuleyman Ademov Palov. 42  For more on collectivization in the Bulgarian countryside, see Mihail Gruev, Preorani slogove. Kolektivizatsiya i sotsialna promyana v balgarskiya Severozapad 40-te – 50-te godini na XX vek [Reploughed boundaries. Collectivization and social change in the Bulgarian Northwest in the 1940s and 1950s] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/Ciela, 2009); Yana Yancheva, Kolektivizatsiyata v balgarskoto selo (1948–1970). Kolektivna pamet i vsekidnevna kultura [Collectivization in the Bulgarian village (1948–1970). Collective memory and everyday culture] (Sofia: IK Gutenberg, 2015). 43  This trial marked the beginning of the repressions against the Catholic Church in Bulgaria, against which a total of eight trials were conducted during the communist regime. The

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some 500 or 600 women protested against the establishment of the local TKZS in the village of Kozloduy. Upon failure to make compulsory deliveries to the state, peasants were arrested and interned in camps or TVO.44 In just nine months in 1950, a total of 7,820 persons were sentenced and sent to camps or TVO for failure to make compulsory deliveries to the state.45 In this context, one of the main goals of the armed groups was to oppose land collectivization and the creation of TKZS. This was the goal of the Union of Free Warriors created in the Pazardzhik area in 1949, and of the anticommunists from the G.M. Dimitrov Detachment (village of Parvenets).46 One of the members of the goryani band from the village of Parvenets motivated his participation as largest legal proceedings against Catholic clergy took place in 1952. In them forty people, of whom twenty-eight Catholic priests and one nun, were arrested and accused of espionage, anti-state activities and founding a clandestine Catholic organization in Bulgaria. One of the arrested persons, Father Fortunat Bakalski, died in custody from abuse. Four of the accused – Bishop Evgeniy Bosilkov, and the priests Kamen Vichev, Yosafat Shishkov and Pavel Dzhidzhov – were sentenced to death. Two others were sentenced to twenty years in prison, six to fifteen years, two to fourteen years, eleven to twelve years, nine to ten years, and four other Catholic clergymen to eight, six, five and three years, respectively. According to DS data, in the 1950–1953 period more than one-third of the Catholic clergy in Bulgaria were repressed. The individual prison sentences of the Catholic clergymen convicted in the eight trials added up to 540 years. For more, see Stefan Ivanov, Katolicheskite machenitsi na Balgariya [Bulgaria’s Catholic martyrs] (Sofia: Zhanet 45, 2018). 44  See Kalin Yosifov, Totalitarnoto nasilie v balgarskoto selo (1944–1951) i posleditsite za Balgariya [Totalitarian violence in the Bulgarian village (1944–1951) and the consequences for Bulgaria] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 2003). 45  Sharlanov, Istoriya, 20. 46  Georgi Mihov Dimitrov (known as Gemeto, “The G.M.”) was a years-long leader of the BZNS. During the Second World War, with the help of Britain, he attempted to carry out a coup d’état in order to prevent the Kingdom of Bulgaria from joining the Axis Powers. The coup attempt failed and G.M. Dimitrov was forced to emigrate to Britain, while his accomplices were convicted and received harsh sentences, including the death penalty. After 9 September 1944, G.M. Dimitrov returned to Bulgaria and took part in the Fatherland Front. He attempted to turn the BZNS into a leading party proved to be unsuccessful. A warrant for his arrest was issued on 28 April 1945 and he was placed under house arrest. On 24 May he managed to escape from house arrest and was given asylum in the residence of the American representative in Sofia, Maynard Barnes. After diplomatic negotiations between Washington and Moscow, G.M. Dimitrov received permission to leave the country, but in 1946 he was tried in absentia, along with another seventeen BZNS supporters. On 12 July 1946 he was sentenced in absentia to close confinement for life for treason. In 1948 G.M. Dimitrov reactivated in Washington the émigré organization Bulgarian National Committee, which is founded in Israel in 1941 as a centrein-exile of the BZNS. This association became one of the most influential organizations among Bulgarian émigrés, openly supporting the struggle against the communist regime in Bulgaria. Subcommittees were established in France, Turkey, West Germany, Greece,

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follows: “The striving to have at one’s own disposal the goods and the means to satisfy one’s needs, and to be free, i.e., not to depend on others to give one [such goods and means].”47 Among the important foreign political factors influencing the creation of illegal organizations, Bulgarian émigré communities had an important place. According to DS data, in 1951 the Bulgarian émigrés numbered approximately 4,600 in all. They set up various émigré organizations, such as the Union of Bulgarian Anarchists Abroad (Sayuz na balgarskite bezvlastnitsi v chuzhbina, SBBCh), Bulgarian Liberation Movement (Balgarsko osvoboditelno dvizhenie), Bulgarian Human Rights League (Balgarska liga za pravata na choveka), Bulgarian Organization “Tsar Simeon”, etc. Because of their different political views, however, they ultimately failed to unite in a common struggle against the communist regime. The first attempt at armed resistance was made by Bulgarian émigrés in Vienna, where on 15 September 1944 Prof. Aleksandar Tsankov established the Bulgarian National Government-in-exile, which was loyal to Nazi Germany. During its existence (1944–1945), it recruited participants in the Bulgarian Volunteer Corps, whose aim was to counter the advancing Soviet troops in Central Europe. The Corps was stationed at the Döllersheim military facility in Northwestern Austria, and in 1945 numbered between 800 and 1,500 men.48 The government-in-exile also had fifty-five persons trained for intelligence-gathering and clandestine operations. Whereas the Volunteer Corps could hardly be defined as goryani, part of the armed groups crossing into Bulgaria from neighbouring countries were precisely such. According to DS data, from 1945 to 1955 a total of fifty-two armed groups, whose task was to organize mass armed resistance against the regime, crossed into Bulgaria from Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Although they were made up of émigrés, only part of them were inspired by the Bulgarian émigré community; another part were the product of foreign intelligence services.49 A direct role in creating an armed resistance against the communist regime in the country was played by the Bulgarian National Committee (Balgarski natsionalen komitet, BNK) and the Bulgarian National Front (Balgarski natsionalen front, BNF).50 In 1949 the Austria, Belgium, Canada and other countries. The BNK was financed by the American National Committee for a Free Europe. 47  Darmonski, Tova ostana, 6. 48  For more, see Nikola Altankov, Koy pobedi? Natsionalnoto pravitelstvo vav Viena, septemvri 1944–april 1945 [Who won? The national government in Vienna, September 1944– April 1945] (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2009). 49  Sharlanov, Goryanite, 12. 50  Originally established in Vienna (Austria) in 1947 as Bulgarian Anti-Bolshevik Union, the Bulgarian National Front was renamed as such in 1948 – see Marian Gyaurski,

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BNK helped form Bulgarian Volunteer Company 4093 in NATO, which was joined over the years by a total of more than 2,500 Bulgarian émigrés. For its part, the BNK sent armed bands from Turkey to Haskovo, Yambol and Stara Zagora provinces, and facilitated the formation of the armed group of Boyan Popov in the area of Tran, as well as of the Bulgarian Resistance Movement (Balgarsko saprotivitelno dvizhenie) headed by university student Stefan Stefanov Hadzhinikolov.51 The BNF, in its turn, supported the activities of the Bulgarian Anti-Bolshevik Legion of National Salvation, founded at the Lavrion camp (Greece), whose bands repeatedly crossed the Bulgarian-Greek border. Bulgarian émigrés also supported the bands of Borislav Ivanov Atanasov and the illegal organization NOMO, which were trained at the Hadji Kyriakos camp near Piraeus (Greece) and then transferred to Nevrokop district. The Bulgarian-Greek border was repeatedly crossed by the bands of Spas Beluhov, Georgi Migdalov, Andon Nikolov, and Asen Trahanov. Some of them were created or supported by foreign intelligence services. For example, part of the members of the Illegal Patriotic Organization (NPO) went through training courses at the Prince George Villa near Niš.52 Such was the case with anarchist Hristo Nestorov who, together with D. Karaivanov and M. Ivanov, completed six-month training courses at the American intelligence service and were parachuted into the area near the village of Pavel Banya in 1953. DS reports claim that the goryani Spas Beluhov and Arif Tahirov were likewise supported by foreign intelligence services. A report sent by Army Headquarters Unit 9510 to the minister of war in September 1945 says that an illegal organization called Peminari, founded at the border with Greece, engaged in espionage in Bulgaria and helped the Greek government fight against EAM (the Greek National Liberation Front).

Die Unversöhnlichen – Widerstand gegen den Kommunismus in Bulgarien, in: Texte zum Kommunismus in Bulgarien (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 26 November 2014), https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d299d679-c3f7-42c9-7246507ca60c3da8&groupId=252038 (last accessed 28 February 2019). It was headed by Ivan Dochev, former leader of the Union of Bulgarian National Legions. The BNF was joined by the Committee for Assisting Bulgarian Émigrés in Rome, chaired by Father Yosif Gagov, Professor at the Pontifical Theological Faculty of Saint Bonaventure (the Seraphicum) in Rome, which received funding from the Vatican, Queen Joanna of Bulgaria, various international church organizations, and helped 10,000 Bulgarian émigrés until the beginning of 1952 (see AMVR, f. 2, оп. 1, a. e. 1109, l. 33, cited in Sharlanov, Istoriya, 241). The BNF had chapters in Turkey, Italy, West Germany, Canada, Austria, the US and other countries. 51  Kavaldzhiev, Kratka istoriya, 349; Iliev, Boyan Popov, 25-36. 52  Iliev, Boyan Popov, 66.

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As the reasons for creating illegal organizations and armed groups in Bulgaria were different, the anticommunist resistance had specific temporal, regional and ideological characteristics. It emerged as a result of the domestic and foreign political situation, and was the product simultaneously of the discontent of ordinary people, the anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria, and the policies of foreign intelligence services. On the other hand, going underground was conducive to blurring the specific differences and to consolidating the participants around the common idea of fighting against the regime. Yet although they were united by a common goal, they remained divided. This heterogeneity accounts for the differences and similarities in the goals, tasks and ways of conducting the struggle of the illegal organizations and their armed groups. Lack of coordination was one of the main reasons for their defeat by the DS in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria.

Underground Armed Groups in Bulgaria: Organizational Structure and Recruitment

The conflict was asymmetric because of disproportions in the number, strength, stakes, organization and will of the two parties involved in it: the illegal organizations and the armed groups created by them, on one side, and the state and its institutions fighting with “political banditry” on the other. This originary inequality drove the illegal organizations and armed groups to use tactical and asymmetric warfare. Unlike terrorist attacks and partisan war, where the goal is to achieve victory through open warfare or a military coup, asymmetric warfare seeks to undermine the enemy’s foundations. For this reason, the illegal organizations and armed groups sought to incite anti-totalitarian sentiments that would weaken the regime from within and deprive it of popular support. The struggle was conducted by conspiratorial organizations and armed groups set up by them, which differed by composition, structure, goals, tactic. Part of them did not have written rules, and the fulfillment of their tasks was the result of mutual negotiation. Others ran their internal affairs and defined their goals by convening meetings, conducting conferences, electing responsible persons. Some of the groups had a military structure, which was due to the military experience of part of their members. For example, the Illegal Patriotic Organization in the Tran area was structured as a military organization, it was divided into three operational zones, each with its own commander, and the persons in charge had the following tasks: liaising with other commanders, procuring arms, working with youths, producing badges and seals, recruiting new members, spreading propaganda materials, liaising with other

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commanders, collecting membership fees and aid.53 The illegal organizations in Pirin Macedonia revived the old structures of VMRO – Ivan Mihailov. Modelled after the latter, the group of the goryanin Gerasim Todorov consisted of a commander, a voevode, an assistant voevode, couriers, a secretary and an undersecretary. The armed group of the National Christian Cross, whose members held several meetings and elected a command of the organization, had a different structure. Angel Stefanov was elected leader, the other members being: chief of staff, adjutant, chief of provisioning, chief of transportation, chiefs of reconnaissance. In other cases, the structure of the illegal organization reproduced that of its legal analogue. This was the case in some organizations of former members of BZNS – Nikola Petkov. For example, the illegal Regional Agrarian Centre No. 1, founded in Ruse in 1950, elected its chairman, organizational secretary and control committee, and appointed persons in charge of financing and of membership fee collection. Initiation and oath-taking were important moments in the internal life of the organizations. Thus, in 1947 the members of the National Christian Cross took an oath in front of a flag, pistol, dagger and cross shortly before they formed the so-called Flying Band54 and Band of Death. The members of Regional Agrarian Centre No. 1 also took an oath in March 1951 at a conference near the village of Pisanets: “I promise before the whole Bulgarian people to fight for its liberation so that freedom and democracy will triumph. I know that any arbitrariness and betrayal shall be punished by death! I have sworn!”55 The main goals formulated in the statutes of the organizations included fighting against the Sovietization of Bulgaria, opposing collectivization, and restoring political rights. The Statutes of the military organization Tsar Krum provided that its members were to fight against “Russian slavery and communist terror, for restoration of political rights within the possible framework of our national culture, restoration of the Tarnovo Constitution.”56 To achieve their goals, the organizations recruited supporters; drew up rules; procured food and equipment, arms and ammunition, printing presses and mimeographs, invisible inks; collected evidence and information about the domestic political situation; committed sabotages and assassinations; thwarted the measures of the BRP(k); established illegal border-crossing channels; collected aid for arrested fellows; spread anticommunist leaflets and slogans, and rumours about 53  Iliev, Nikola Yordanov, 34. 54  Modelled after the “Flying Band” (Hvarkovata cheta), i.e., the mounted detachment of Georgi Benkovski, commander of the Fourth Revolutionary District during the April 1876 Uprising. 55   A MVR, f. 1, op. 1, a. e. 914, l. 1-3, cited in Sharlanov, Istoriya, 190. 56   A MVR, II sad 718/46 g., l. 76, cited in Ibd., 64.

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a forthcoming war, etc. To facilitate the achievement of their goals, the illegal organizations formed groups of armed fighters, the so-called goryani. The first and most important activity of the organizations began with the recruitment of local accomplices, helpers and supporters. The Union of Free Warriors (SSV), founded in 1949, was joined by some 280 persons (including goryani, accomplices and helpers). The Kyustendil illegal organization consisted of almost 300 people. The organizations were usually made up of close, trusted people, members of friendly circles, relatives and people with similar political views. An important moment in the creation of the organizations was the personal life story of members, which served as a guarantee for commitment to the cause and proof of the social and class status of the “enemies of the people”. Often underground groups were created by schoolmates, workers, labour servicemen, deserted soldiers, criminals. For example, Nikola “Gudzho” Yordanov Georgiev hid for a long time among friends and acquaintances before creating the Illegal Patriotic Organization (NPO) in 1948. Part of the members of this organization were recruited on the basis of Gudzho’s restored contacts, which he had had as a cattle trader in the villages in the areas of Tran and Breznik before 9 September 1944. Of primary importance to almost all organizations was their network of supporters. Building such a network and recruiting new members in different settlements was the main task of Georgi Teoharov Spirov, leader of the illegal counter-revolutionary organization BOV.57 Of key importance to Gerasim Todorov’s group was the creation of small organizations in the villages of Gradevo, Vlahi, Brezhane, Senokos, Mechkul, Gara Pirin, Gradeshnitsa, Oshtava, Belitsa, Ploski, etc. The Varna organization headed by Petar Dimitrov Doykov and Slavi Bozhkov also set up thirty-four underground groups in the Varna, Dobrich, General Toshevo and Balchik districts. The Orange Party created groups in twenty-one villages in Yambol region, while the Committee of the Resistance in Sliven district had supporters in nineteen villages. In this way, the organizations secured broad support among the local population and a reliable source of material assistance and shelter. Trusted supporters guaranteed the goryani legitimacy among the local population and sympathy for their views. For this reason, fighting for support from the local population was a priority of all illegal organizations. They did so by 57  Mitev, Saprotivata, 37. The DS case file on the operation codenamed “Dunav” (Danube) on the underground group operating in the area of Varna district does not specify what the acronym BOV stands for; it only notes that this is an “illegal counter-revolutionary organization” headed by Georgi Teoharov Spirov. For more on the activities of this organization, see AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 337, l. 3-8, original, typewritten.

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explaining their ideas and attracting new supporters, and by opposing the agitation and measures of the BRP(k) (renamed in December 1948 to Bulgarian Communist Party – Balgarska komunisticheska partiya, BKP). To this end, they spread leaflets, slogans, humorous and satirical newspapers. A report of an agent of DS – Section I at the secret directorate of DS, Plovdiv, on instances of “political banditry” in Plovdiv province in 1948, defines “hostile propaganda” as “killing faith in the strength of the people’s government and the conviction that it [hostile propaganda] is based on killing faith in the might of the USSR, as well as sabotaging government measures on construction, production, transport, and on the collection of compulsory state deliveries in villages.”58 The leaflets kindled expectations of a forthcoming war and motivated the opposition-minded part of the population to go underground. The messages reflected the ideology of the organization that spread them. For example, in 1950 slogans propagating “Yugomacedonism” appeared on the walls of the toilets in the Rila Factory: “Comrades, fight bravely against the fascist government of V[alko] Chervenkov,59 which obstructed [the creation of] the much-desired federation. Glory to Tito.”60 Other leaflets aimed to arouse the feeling of national identity. For example, one of the leaflets of the Union of Free Warriors, seized during a search of Spas Asenov Ivanov’s home in 1950, read: “We are confident that the blood of Botev and Levski is still pulsing in your veins, that you remember the thousands of victims, know their idols too, and will not fall so low as to disgrace their honour – the honour of your fathers.”61 Some of the groups won broad popularity among the local population and were perceived as national heroes. For example, Georgi “Tarpana” Stoyanov, the leader of the Second Sliven Band, was referred to as “Georgi Benkovski”.62 Fayk Aliev from the village of Ablanitsa and his group became so popular among the local population that he was glorified in a folk song. The DS reports show that the detection of goryani depended on the support of the local population. The DS had difficulties in capturing the group of Arif Tahirov not just because of the mountainous terrain but also because of 58   A MVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 342, l. 2, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 65. 59  Between 1954 and 1956, Valko Velyov Chervenkov was prime minister of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. For more on him, see Borislav Gardev, Pamet za Valko Chervenkov [A memory of Valko Chervenkov], in: LiterNet (23 October 2010) 10 (131), https://liternet. bg/publish4/bgyrdev/istoria/vylko-chervenkov.htm (last accessed 28 February 2019). 60   A MVR, f. 1, op. 8, a. e. 215, l. 111-120, copy, typewritten, in: Grozeva/Bugarcheva, Goryanite, 16. 61   A MVR, II sad. d. 50, t. 1, copy, typewritten, in: Ibd., 45-46. 62  Georgi Benkovski was a Bulgarian revolutionary and participant in the Fourth Revo­ lutionary District during the April 1876 Uprising. He was commander of the famous mounted “Flying Band”.

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the “hostility of the population”.63 Referring to the activities of Mustafa Aliev from the village of Osikovo, a report of an agent of DS – Section I at the secret directorate of DS, Gorna Dzhumaya, notes that “it is difficult to liquidate the bandits because the area in which they are operating is populated by a strongly fanaticized Pomak element and it is difficult to make the latter give up its coreligionist.”64 The prestige of and trust in the authorities largely depended also on their ability to cope with the illegal organizations. For example, the group of Andon Stoyanov Velichkov, which operated in the villages of Kamenik, Vukovo, Mali and Golemi Varbovnik (Dupnik area) in 1947, had managed to awe the local population so much that a DS report notes that the group’s audacious acts had created “a conviction among the people from the above villages that the authorities were incapable of coping with them, and they [the people] helped the group by providing food, lodgings and other things. Among the group there were also members of the BRP(k), who served as accomplices ‘out of fear of revenge’.”65 The same report says that “the liquidation of the band dealt a big blow to the reactionary elements in the district and, on the other hand, boosted the morale of party members and honest OF members.” A message of 1949 from Assistant Minister Ivan Raikov to Prime Minister Vasil Kolarov also shows that there was a danger that the goryani might win members of local party organizations over to their side. In it Raikov reports that in the Belogradchik area there was a group for “political banditry” whose members had “instilled respect among the peasants and widely use their family connections. The local party organization has also fallen to a large extent under their influence.”66 In the course of their existence, the illegal organizations and armed groups made attempts to establish and maintain contacts among themselves. The National Christian Cross established contacts with officers from Plovdiv and opposition-minded persons in Sofia. The Sveti Vrach group maintained contacts with the British and American diplomatic representations in Sofia and the UDB (Yugoslavia). The Illegal Patriotic Organization was in contact with the central clandestine leadership of BZNS – Nikola Petkov in Sofia, the illegal district organization of the same party in the Tran area, the leadership of the Bulgarian emigrants in Yugoslavia, Branko Kostić from the UDB, and the Bulgarian National Committee in Paris.67 The Samokov Illegal Organization, founded in 1950, also established contact with members of BZNS – Nikola 63   A MVR, f. 1, op. 8, l. 2-4, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 69. 64   A MVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 335, l. 1-5, original, typewritten, in: Ibd., 74. 65   A MVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 344, l. 13-15, original, typewritten, in: Ibd., 93. 66   A MVR, f. 1. a. e. 1140, l. 20-21, copy, typewritten, in: Ibd., 120. 67  Iliev, Nikola Yordanov, 23.

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Petkov in Sofia and an illegal channel for crossing into Turkey. The Bulgarian Union for Democracy (Balgarski sayuz za demokratsiya, BSD), headed by Petar Peychev, Blagoi Zlatanski and Borislav Yordanov, maintained contacts with the Secret National Patriotic Forces (Tayni natsionalni patriotichni sili, TNPS), the organization Goryanin and, from 1951 onwards, also with organizations from Gorna Dzhumaya and Dupnitsa.68 The underground groups often attempted to establish contacts also with foreign intelligence services, which would supply them with the necessary provisions. On the whole, however, contacts with other organizations were avoided out of fear of infiltration by DS agents. Internal conflicts had a negative impact on the activity of illegal organizations and could easily lead to the breakup of their armed groups. The First Sliven Band was broken up because of internal disagreements and conflicts. Differences of opinion arose also between members of the National Christian Cross, who were arguing about the way the struggle should be waged. The leader, Angel Stefanov, insisted that the organization should not engage in armed combat; it should wait for the outbreak of a war between the US and the Soviet Union. Dimitar Primov disagreed, insisting on immediate punitive actions. This led to the formation of two bands, which operated independently for some time before uniting. The armed band under the Goryani Organization of the Resistance Movement in Bulgaria (Organizatsiya na saprotivitelnoto dvizhenie v Balgariya, OSDB) also split into two because of differences of opinion. One group was against punitive actions, while the other was in favour of terror. Despite their division, the goryani continued to coordinate their actions with each other. In the history of the armed anticommunist resistance in Bulgaria, there were also attempts at consolidating illegal organizations. Such were the First and Second Legionary Centres, whose detection in 1946 led to hundreds of ­arrests.69 In 1948, a clandestine Standing Committee of BZNS – Nikola Petkov was established, its aim being to replace the central leadership of the outlawed BZNS – Nikola Petkov. It sought to help various illegal organizations, but its activities were detected in 1950–1951. Another attempt at centralizing the activities of the illegal organizations was made by the radio stations Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), and Goryanin. Already before the end of the Second World War, Radio Donau had called on the Bulgarians to flee to the mountains and fight against the communists. One of the significant 68  Nikolai Iliev, Nashata borba protiv bolshevizma [Our struggle against Bolshevism] (Sofia: Balgarski natsionalen front, Ink., 1998), 49. 69  During the trial against the Second Legionary Centre, almost 850 people were arrested; sixty-eight of them were tried in court and thirteen were sentenced to death.

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attempts at mobilizing the goryani was made by G.M. Dimitrov, who read an “Appeal to the Bulgarian People” and an instruction “To the leaders of the resistance movement in the country” on Radio Free Europe on 28 January 1950. His statement included concrete instructions on how to set up clandestine groups and fight against the regime. The radio station Goryanin, which broadcast in Bulgarian from April 1951 to November 1962 from a US radio station to the north of Athens, also had an impact on the illegal organizations in Bulgaria.70

Tactics and Activities

Armed groups (bands – sing. cheta, pl. cheti) played an important role in achieving the subversive goals of the illegal organizations and protecting their members. According to the number of participants in them, the armed groups can be classified as small, with up to ten participants; medium-sized, with between ten and thirty participants; and large, with over thirty participants. Small groups were prevalent in the history of the goryani movement in Bulgaria, as they were more efficient and less likely to be detected. Although the Union of Free Warriors (SSV) from the Pazardzhik and Plovdiv districts numbered 280 members, supporters and accomplices, the armed band it created consisted of just twelve members. Small groups were preferred also in the border areas. For example, in order to cross the border with Greece more easily, the group of Fayk Aliev split into smaller groups of five or six persons. The armed groups of the Bulgarian Anti-Bolshevik Legion, sent from Greece, also numbered between five and eight persons. The largest armed group is considered to have been the Sliven band named after G.M. Dimitrov, which consisted of seventytwo goryani. In most cases, the move towards armed resistance was made by a special decision. For example, in 1946 the Starosel underground group held a meeting in the Kantarev Brest locality, at which a decision was taken to pick up arms. Similarly, the Committee of the Resistance in Sliven district conducted a conference in the Mravunyaka locality in 1950, at which a decision was taken to form an armed band. In other cases, armed bands were formed because of the danger that the conspiracy would be exposed. Such was the case with the armed group formed in Sapareva Banya in 1951, which went underground out of fear of detection. The members of the illegal organization of BZNS – Nikola Petkov in Stara Zagora, which was revived in 1950, were in a similar situation. Part of the activities of the armed groups were actions against the agitation and measures of the BRP(k): sabotages, attacks, robberies, and other actions 70  For more, see Sharlanov, Istoriya, 282-298.

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lowering the prestige of the authorities. For example, in the night before 9 September 1951 the bands of Boyan Popov scattered anticommunist leaflets in various settlements in the Tran area, including in front of the district directorate of the Interior Ministry.71 To sabotage the activity of the OF, Georgi Teoharov Spirov initiated the spreading of leaflets in the name of BOV, and ordered the placing of iron rods in the sheaves during threshing.72 One of the actions against the regime was carried out by anarchist Georgi Konstantinov, who blew up Stalin’s monument in the Borisova Gradina Park (Sofia) on 3 March 1953. The armed groups also carried out actions to intimidate or assassinate communist party functionaries. For example, on 15 January 1947 Syuleyman “Parcho” Parov and his group entered the village of Tuhovishte, beat up the lieutenant mayor and took his weapon. The Illegal Patriotic Organization also conducted assassinations of “arrogant local party functionaries and officials of the Interior Ministry – Breznik.”73 The Georgi Benkovski Band formed by the Committee for the Resistance planned to “carry out actions, with propaganda purposes, to kill responsible communists, set fire to wheat, sheaves, etc.”74 The military organization Tsar Krum aimed to attack and even assassinate eminent members of the government and of the Central Committee of the BRP(k). The illegal organizations also used anonymous letters as a means to intimidate the enemy. Such letters were intercepted by the DS services in 1949, when fifty-one investigations were opened into such cases. The largest number of anonymous letters, sixteen, was intercepted in Plovdiv, followed by thirteen in Plovdiv district, nine in Pazardzhik, six in Panagyurishte, four each in Parvomai and Asenovgrad, and one each in Peshtera and Smolyan. In other cases, the illegal organizations directly addressed their “enemies”. The leader of the Sveti Vrach band, Gerasim Todorov, warned the “Vlahi communists”75 as follows: … you have begun to terrorize and harass my completely innocent family in all sorts of ways, pardonable and unpardonable … I have not left as a bandit but as someone who is displeased with your way of governance which, thanks to people like you, has by far surpassed the fascist regime … But I have always expected to see how far your arbitrary acts would go; however, there’s no end to yours, and I will not lie like you do but declare in a gentlemanly fashion that I will no longer hand out mercy, I will measure you by the measure you measure with, i.e., if you 71  Iliev, Boyan Popov, 44-45. 72  Mitev, Saprotivata, 37. 73  Iliev, Nikola Yordanov, 64. 74   DVIA, f. 2255, op. 1, a. e. 97, l. 547, cited in Ignatova, Znakovi aktsii, 125. 75   That is, members of the Bulgarian Communist Party from the village of Vlahi (Southwestern Bulgaria).

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touch my family, I will deal with families … Look for me in houses, barns and huts, you will not find me. A young wife must not be taken to the marketplace and a rebel does not stay in a building – he meets people but does not stay with them [in their homes].76

In addition to one-off actions and agitation, the goryani also carried out largerscale armed actions meant to demonstrate their strength. Such was the action of 9 November 1947, when the group of Syuleyman “Parcho” Palov united with Paroka and blocked border post No. 17 at the Nevrokop border checkpoint in the area of the village of Zhibevo, helping a large part of its residents to flee and driving some 270 goats and 170 sheep across the border. An action against another border post was carried out in 1951 by the band of Ivan Monov, which neutralized the military along the border with the village of Rayanovtsi (Vidin area). For its part, the Illegal Patriotic Organization headed by Boyan Popov carried out an act of sabotage in the Zlata Mine at the village of Erul.77 Dimitar Primov of the National Christian Cross was thinking about attacking the military unit in Smolyan, from where his band would supply itself with weapons and clothes, and recruit soldiers. In other cases, people were forced to go underground and take to arms because they had committed an act of violence or terror. For example, Milko Milkov Demirev (Deli Marko) went underground after attempting to kill the village commandant, Georgi Delev. In 1946 Yordan Ruychev from the village of Ploski killed the secretary of the communist party in his native village and became a goryanin, co-leading an armed group with Gerasim Todorov. Similarly, Dzhemal Mehmedov Yanuzov (Lyashnika) went underground after 9 September 1944 and joined the armed group in the area of the village of Ribnovo because of his participation in the murder of Partisan Aneshti Uzunov in 1943.78 Despite those violent acts, the armed groups rarely resorted to arbitrary violence because it conflicted with their main goal. In some cases, deliberate acts of terror made the local population withdraw its support for the goryani, which led to their quick detection. This was the case with the armed band of the Union of Free Warriors, which in 1950 committed several audacious acts: killing the guard of the wheat crop, attacking the village council in the village of Akandzhievo (Pazardzhik area) and wounding two employees there. Soon afterwards, the local population stopped supporting the group

76   A MVR, f. 2, lichno delo № 11502, l. 21. 77  Iliev, Boyan Popov, 39. 78  See AMVR, f. 13, op. 3, a. e. 806, l. 18-26, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 560.

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and facilitated its detection.79 Similar was the fate of the members of the Kyustendil band named after G.M. Dimitrov, which included participants from the Secret Anti-Bolshevik National Organization (TANO). In 1945 they killed four youths in a RMS camp in Osogovo and two soldiers, as a result of which the underground group lost the support and trust of the local population.80 Not all organizations formed armed groups, some used alternative methods to fight against the communist regime. For example, an organization called Resistance Movement in Bulgaria (Saprotivitelno dvizhenie v Balgariya, SDB) was founded in the Knyazhevo quarter (Sofia) in 1947 by former Legionnaires and members of Otets Paisiy,81 most of whom had graduated from a French college. They contacted the Paris-based Free and Independent Bulgaria Committee, a branch of G.M. Dimitrov’s Washington-based Bulgarian National Committee, and started sendind it information related to the adoption of new state decrees, ordinances, orders, hostile proclamations, jokes, the mood of workers, peasants, the military and students, as well as to the state of supplies and provisions. Other unarmed attempts at fighting against the regime were made by Yordan Kostadinov’s Macedono-Pirin Communist Party, which in 1974 sent a memorandum to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, describing “the plight of the Macedonian minority in the P[eople’s]R[epublic of] B[ulgaria].” A similar initiative was taken in the autumn of 1986 by dissident Grigor Simov who sent, together with several former political prisoners, an Open Letter-Appeal to the Vienna Conference reviewing the implementation of the Helsinki Accords.82 The DS and the Fight against “Banditry” The dominant party in the conflict were the state security structures. They established various departments for fighting the illegal organizations and armed groups. Immediately after 9 September 1944, the task of fighting against the ­goryani was assigned to the Directorate of the People’s Militia, which in 1947 was restructured into a General Directorate of the People’s Militia comprising two directorates: State Security Directorate and People’s Militia Directorate. The State Security (DS) Directorate had four departments. Department I, in charge of fighting the counter-revolution, had three divisions. Division A 79  Grozeva/Bugarcheva, Goryanite, 43-90. 80  Sharlanov, Istoriya, 146. 81  See footnote 32. 82  Iliev, Vaorazhenata borba, 112-123.

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was tasked with fighting counter-revolutionary elements within the political parties of the Fatherland Front (except the communist party) and the opposition parties: BZNS – Nikola Petkov and the Workers’ Social Democratic Party (United) [Rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partiya (obedinena), RSDP(o)]. Divi­sion B was tasked with fighting the disbanded “fascist organizations”, former police and military officers, Trotskyists, anarchists, etc. Division C was tasked with fighting counter-revolutionary elements among the youth, intelligentsia, clergy, state apparatus, etc.83 In order to increase the efficiency of the fight against opposition groups, in 1948 special militia units were created for “successfully fighting banditry, the armed terrorist acts of the enemies, and for guarding the most important state institutions and other sites.” They numbered 4,000 persons. In addition to the State Security Directorate, a special department for “fighting banditry” was established at the Interior Ministry in 1950/1951, Department XII, whose task was to train “special agents for infiltration into the centres abroad, the bandit and terrorist groups, as well as into the circles they rely on.”84 In 1952 a division for fighting the counterrevolution, Division III, was also created. Additional help in fighting the illegal organizations and armed groups was provided by the Voluntary Organization for Defence Assistance (Dobrovolna organizatsiya za sadeystvie na otbranata, DOSO), established in 1951. An important role in crushing the first underground groups was played by the three intelligence departments (ID – 1; ID – 2; ID – 3) at the Army Headquarters under the Ministry of War. One of their most important operations, codenamed Х–11, was the recruitment of former Legionnaires, who cooperated with the Fatherland Front in detecting existing or deliberately created Legionary conspiracies in Bulgaria and abroad.85 The DS operational instructions note that agents are the main weapon for fighting against “political banditry” and that all other measures are complementary. The success rate of DS agents was even higher because of their social origin. A report of Department XII of the DS, dated 11 January 1951, shows that the department had a total of 695 secret collaborators. The majority of them came from the so-called “enemy contingent”: “117 from the bourgeoisie, 305 from the petty bourgeoisie, fifty from the bourgeois intelligentsia, six k­ ulaks, sixty-two medium peasants, seventy-eight workers, seventy-seven poor peasants.”86 The recruitment itself was done by applying various forms of 83  TsDA, f. 1B, op. 64, a. e. 13, l. 1-3, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 24. 84   A MVR, f. 1, op. 1, a. e. 1247, l. 35, cited in Sharlanov, Istoriya, 118. 85  It was thanks to the intelligence departments at the Army Headquarters that the illegal organization Tsar Krum was detected; their operations also led to the trials against the First and Second Legionary Centre in 1946. 86   A MVR, Istoricheska spravka kam f. 13, op. 1, l. 12, cited in Sharlanov, Goryanite, 192.

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pressure – threats, violence, remission of punishments, or by granting benefits and privileges. The case files on the recruitment operations codenamed Petel (Rooster) and Trion (Saw) tell us that the agents who contributed the most to the liquidation of the goryanin Gudzho and the Illegal Patriotic Organization were recruited by the DS after remission of a punishment for murder (in the case of the agent codenamed Probiv [Breakthrough]), through compromising material (the agent codenamed Shmaizer [Submachine Gun]), or threats of punishment for involvement with the “fascist regime” (the agent codenamed Roza [Rose]). Recruitment from the circles of the opponent led to weaknesses in the DS’s network of agents, some of whom were prone to treachery and to joining the resistance. The above-mentioned report of Department XII of the DS, dated 11 January 1951, also shows that 316 of its secret collaborators were expelled in 1950 “for unfitness [for the job] or treachery”. In this case, the fate of the “politically suspect” ones was “re-recruitment”, internment in TVO or camps, or deprivation of their civil rights, including deprivation of the civil rights of their families. Despite the weaknesses, the DS’s agent apparatus grew and improved. In a report of November 1953, the interior minister points out that “the agent apparatus numbers more than 55,000 collaborators of all types.”87 The first and most important task for the activity of the DS departments was the compilation of card indexes and lists of all persons implicated in banditry. This category included: “active and liquidated bandits, implicated helpers/ accomplices, families of active bandits and families of liquidated bandits.”88 Once the targets of an operation were identified, the methods of operation were selected. One of the most widely used methods was to set up an agent network encompassing the accomplices of the underground armed groups. For example, in the operation that broke up the National Christian Cross, the DS sent six experienced agents who recruited another twelve agents, fifteen residents and 104 informers in a total of thirty-five villages. Applying the same method to break up the group of Georgi Teoharov Spirov, the DS established an agent network of 110 informers in the Varna area. Another method of operation was to recruit an agent from the underground group itself or to infiltrate an agent into it. In such cases, the infiltrated agents carried out various pre-planned tactics to prepare “the realization of the operation”. They reported the exact location of the group and its contacts. For example, the breakup of the band of Petko Kitikov was due to the fact that an agent codenamed Pirin

87  Sharlanov, Istoriya, 130. 88   A MVR, f. 2, op. 1, a. e. 4, l. 1-4, copy, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 26-30.

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reported the location of the barn in which the goryani were hiding, after which the militia surrounded and neutralized them. Infiltrated agents aimed to stage internal conflicts. For example, one of the leaders of the Sliven band, Penyu Hristov Mihov, wanted to form a second band of anarchists, but for this reason was killed on the orders of an agent infiltrated into the group, Kosta Deykov. In other cases, the infiltrated agents followed pre-planned scenarios. For example, the agent codenamed Pirin, who was infiltrated into the group of Georgi Komitov, succeeded in persuading the latter that they should meet and unite with another underground armed group. Thus, on 1 October 1951 almost twenty persons were liquidated in the environs of the village of Turiya. The chief of Department XII of the DS, Lieutenant-Colonel Veselin Raikov, wrote the following about this successful case: “With regard to this band, the best principle of agent infiltration was applied, as the band was headed by an agent of ours who moved it to a definite location, deactivated it, and enabled our combat group, encoded as bandits, to annihilate it.”89 Another scenario of the infiltrated agents was to transfer the armed group to another area. In this way, after the failure to destroy the Second Sliven Band by force, agents codenamed Zhan, Ivanka, Virus and several others were infiltrated into it and spread the lie that there was another armed group operating in the Rhodope Mountains. The agents arranged for the goryani to be transferred by truck to the village of Parvenets, the town of Chirpan and the city of Stara Zagora, where they were captured and imprisoned. A similar scenario was applied in the capture of goryani in an operation codenamed Lalugeri (Hamsters). Infiltration was a dangerous mission for the agents. For example, Dimitar Parov was infiltrated into the group of Gerasim Todorov, his task being to kill the voevode, but he was soon found out and executed. In the same way, the goryani from the Ruse group killed two of their own, whom they suspected of being DS agents. When it was impossible to break up the group from within, the DS resorted to armed operations that could escalate into open battles and last for days on end. In these operations the difference in the correlation of forces was huge. For example, in the operation to capture the Sveti Vrach group, the authorities mobilized the entire militia from Gorna Dzhumaya region, the areas of Dupnitsa, Kyustendil, Pernik and Sofia, and military units from Southwestern Bulgaria. After a fortnight-long blockade of all approaches to Mount Pirin, on 31 March 1948 part of the band was surrounded in the Vachkovtsi neighbourhood in the village of Vlahi, where the group’s leader, Gerasim Todorov, and his fellows killed themselves. The voevode’s body was laid out in the square of the 89  See AMVR, f. 13, op. 3, a. e. 891, l. 29, cited in Sharlanov, Goryanite, 181.

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village of Gara Pirin for desecration and as a lesson to the local population.90 A report of a collaborator of DS – Section I at the secret directorate of DS, Gorna Dzhumaya, notes that as a result of this operation, forty-two persons were liquidated and forty-one were captured. A total of 140 “bandits” and accomplices were detained, of whom 106 were punished: twenty-eight were sent to TVO, eleven were sentenced to death, and another sixty-seven received various other sentences.91 The largest operation against goryani and their accomplices was conducted by the DS on 29 April 1951, when hundreds were arrested on Easter Day itself. According to the Archive of the Minister of Interior Georgi Tsankov on the state and activities of the Ministry of Interior organs, in that same year, 1951, a total of 6,600 persons were detained, of whom 2,360 were sentenced (seventynine to death), 2,167 were sent to TVO, and 1,789 were released.92 The largest armed operation against the goryani movement is considered to be the one conducted against the Second Sliven Band on 2 June 1951. On that day, almost six thousand soldiers and militiamen were sent against the armed group of seventy-two persons.93 Another large-scale operation was the one conducted on 25 and 26 March 1953, when the Second and Third Operational Regiments of the Internal Troops, numbering a total of 1,676 servicemen, of whom 108 officers, were mobilized to capture three anarchists parachuted into the area of the village of Pavel Banya. Another similar operation was the liquidation of two “traitors of the Motherland” who were hiding in the mountains near the town of Aitos. To this end, on 4 July 1953 a total of eighty officers, 104 soldiers, ninety-eight militiamen and thirty-five civilians from the so-called “groups for assistance” were sent against them.94 In addition to the agent apparatus and armed forces, the state also used other means to prevent defection and the establishment of underground groups in the border areas. One such means was forced resettlement of the families of members of such groups. In this way, the goryani movement was deprived of its informational, concealing and supplying network.95 In a report of 1949 to Interior Minister Anton Yugov, Major General Panev, Commander 90  Angelov, Otlichen balgarin, 13. 91   A MVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 335, l. 1-5, original, typewritten, in: Grozeva et al., Goryanite, 70-76. 92  TsDA, f. 1b, op. 64, a. e. 185, l. 11-87, original, typewritten, in: Veselin Angelov (ed.), Strogo sekretno! Dokumenti za deynostta na Darzhavna sigurnost 1944–1989 [Top secret! Documents about the activities of State Security 1944–1989] (Sofia: Simolini, 2007), 230-238. 93  Georgieva, Goryanite, 14. 94  Ignatova, Znakovi aktsii, 128. 95  Gruev, Preorani slogove, 86.

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of the Border Troops, reports that 1,153 families with 6,734 members from the Nevrokop, Devin, Smolyan, Zlatograd, Momchilgrad and Krumovgrad districts were designated for resettlement. He notes that the first of the designated groups, that of “the families, close ones, accomplices and helpers of the bandits who had fled to Greek territory and placed themselves at the service of enemy intelligence agencies” had already been resettled and consisted of a total of 415 families with 2,376 members. The second designated group was of “hostile and opposition elements”, while the third was of “those living in the one-kilometer border line.”96 To prevent the creation of new underground groups, in 1953 the Ministry of Interior issued a new order, taking additional measures to control members of the families of “traitors”. In the amendments to the Penal Code approved by the National Assembly, articles 72a and 72b provided the death penalty for those who had left the country without permission; for members of their families, these articles provided placement in TVO, Interior Ministry labour school for minors, school or resettlement. If any member of the family were to commit treason against the Motherland (defection), “all able-bodied members of the traitor’s family who are living with him or are supported by him, and all lineal relatives, although they may have no relation to his treason, are to be sent to TVO for five to seven years, and their entire property is to be confiscated through the courts.”97 The last step taken by the state to crush the resistance were the subsequent trials at which a significant number of death sentences, life imprisonment and lesser sentences were handed down. Many of the convicted persons were sent to camps and TVO. For example, the members of the Orange Party in Yambol region were captured and many of them were sent to TVO, while others were released. Unlike them, however, twenty members of the Sliven illegal organization were sentenced to death. The trial against members of the Bulgarian Union for Democracy (BSD), which was conducted by the Sofia Military Court, sentenced three of the BSD leaders to death by firing squad, and the other twelve youths to imprisonment for terms ranging from three to twenty years. The fate of the members of the Union of Free Warriors, which was liquidated in 1951, was similar. From the beginning of the communist regime, the state made efforts to build an orderly institutional system for fighting “political banditry”. The main means of fighting the underground enemies were infiltrated agents, open battles, repression against the families of participants in the underground resistance and their helpers, as well as trials with severe punishments. In this 96  TsVA, f. 1391, op. 1, a. e. 154, l. 6-8, original, typewritten. 97  Otechestven front, 12 February 1953, No. 2626, 3.

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way the DS structures, which vastly outnumbered their opponent, managed to improve all their means of fighting the illegal organizations and to finally liquidate the armed resistance in Bulgaria at the end of the 1950s. Conclusion The armed resistance against the totalitarian regime in Bulgaria (1944–1989) was the result of domestic and foreign political factors. It emerged as a reaction to the elimination of the political opposition in Bulgaria, and grew because of the discontent with land collectivization. By its structure, the anticommunist resistance had specific temporal, regional and ideological characteristics, which hindered the consolidation of the participants in it and did not allow it to acquire a mass character, therefore the underground groups remained isolated from one another and confined to their respective geographic areas. In the 1944–1956 period, the resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria included groups of different political persuasions. Despite this, they faced one and the same, superior opponent, and this made them use similar tactics of underground struggle. Winning the support of the local population and thwarting the measures of the BRP(k) were the main goals of all organizations, and taking to arms and forming goryani bands were the means of achieving them. Placed in the conditions of underground struggle, the illegal organizations followed certain patterns that did not go unnoticed and which were soon used by agents in their well-planned scenarios. Conversely, the DS structures managed to improve their potential and capacities against their opponent, creating in the course of almost ten years a reliable agent apparatus for fighting the underground resistance, which vastly outnumbered the latter. Just like the goryani, the DS structures also sought to win over those who were discontented with the regime, but unlike the goryani, they resorted to forms of repression – threats of punishments, accompanied by promises of benefits and privileges. The consequences of the improvement of the methods of totalitarian rule should also be perceived as part of the concepts for the creation of the New Person embodying communist morality and behaviour, and as a facet of the “socialist way of life”.98 The crushing of the resistance against the totalitarian regime was one of the stages in changing 98  For more on the concept for the creation of the New Person in socialist Bulgaria, see Ulf Brunnbauer, Sotsialisticheskiyat nachin na zhivot. Ideologiya, obshtestvo, semeystvo i politika v Balgariya (1944–1989) [The socialist way of life. Ideology, society, family and politics in Bulgaria (1944–1989)] (Ruse: MD Elias Kaneti, 2010).

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Bulgarian society, which confirmed the maxim that in a totalitarian society individuals actually turn out to be prepared to fit “equally well … the role of executioner and the role of victim”.99 Thus, the socialist state created a social stratum which, albeit at the price of moral compromise, became the foundation of the emerging socialist society. Bibliography Altankov, Nikola, Koy pobedi? Natsionalnoto pravitelstvo vav Viena, septemvri 1944–april 1945 [Who won? The national government in Vienna, September 1944–April 1945] (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2009). Angelov, Ivan, Goryani. 1945…1967. Az i Urovene [Goryani. 1945…1967. I and Urovene] (No place, publisher or date). Angelov, Veselin, Saprotivata sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya (1944–1948 g.) [The resistance against the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia (1944–1948 g.)], in: Stoyan Pintev/Georgi Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya i organiziranata saprotiva v Balgariya 1944–1954 g. Materiali ot nauchnata konferentsiya v Sliven, yuni 2000 g. [The Bulgarian opposition and organized resistance in Bulgaria 1944–1954. Proceedings of the scientific conference in Sliven, June 2000] (Sliven: Zhazhda, 2000), 95-113. Angelov, Veselin, Otlichen balgarin s imeto Gerasim. Stranitsi ot vaorazhenata saprotiva sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya (1947–1948 g.) [An excellent Bulgarian named Gerasim. Pages from the armed resistance against the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia (1947–1948)] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2001). Angelov, Veselin, Vik v sanya: materiali za saprotivata na Vladimir Poptomov sreshtu makedonizatsiyata v Pirinskiya kray (1944–1949) [Screaming in a dream: materials on Vladimir Poptomov’s resistance against Macedonization in the Pirin area (1944– 1949)] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2005). Angelov, Veselin (ed.), Strogo sekretno! Dokumenti za deynostta na Darzhavna sigurnost 1944–1989 [Top secret! Documents about the activities State Security 1944–1989] (Sofia: Simolini, 2007). Arendt, Hannah, Totalitarianism, in: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. New edition with added prefaces (San Diego/New York/London: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), 305-479.

99  Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, in: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new edition with added prefaces (San Diego/New York/London: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), 305-479, here 468.

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Brunnbauer, Ulf, Sotsialisticheskiyat nachin na zhivot. Ideologiya, obshtestvo, semeystvo i politika v Balgariya (1944–1989) [The socialist way of life. Ideology, society, family and politics in Bulgaria (1944–1989)] (Ruse: MD Elias Kaneti, 2010). Darmonski, Atanas, Tova ostana v pametta mi (1945–1999) [This is what I remember (1945–1999)] (No place, publisher or date). Daskalov, Doncho, Anarhizmat v Balgariya [Anarchism in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Uni­ versitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 1995). Deyanova, Liliana, Ochertaniya na malchanieto. Istoricheska sotsiologiya na kolektivnata pamet [Lineaments of silence. Historical sociology of collective memory] (Sofia: Kritika i humanizam, 2009). Ditchev, Ivaylo, Institutsii na zabravata. Otmashtenie, spravedlivost, proshka, amnistiya [Institutions of forgetting. Vengeance, justice, forgiveness, amnesty], in: Ivaylo Znepolski/Heinz Wismann (eds.), Pol Rikyor. Filosofiyata pred predizvikatelstvata na promenite [Paul Ricoeur. Philosophy facing the challenges of changes] (Sofia: Dom na naukite za choveka i obshtestvoto, 1998), 180-192. Doncheva, Lora, Za grupata anarhisti-emigranti, deystvala v rayona na s. Pavel banya, Kazanlashko, prez 1953–1954 g. (po dokumenti ot DA – V. Tarnovo) [On the group of immigrant anarchists that operated in the area of the village of Pavel Banya, Kazanlak district, in 1953–1954 (according to documents from the State Archive – Veliko Tarnovo], in: Epohi 21 (2013) 2, 83-104. Gardev, Borislav, Pamet za Valko Chervenkov [A memory of Valko Chervenkov], in: LiterNet (23 October 2010) 10 (131). https://liternet.bg/publish4/bgyrdev/istoria/ vylko-chervenkov.htm, (last accessed 28 February 2019). Georgieva, Radostina, Goryanite v Iztochniya Balkan. Dokumenti, materiali, spomeni, komentari [The goryani in the Eastern Balkan Mountains. Documents, materials, recollections, commentaries] (Sofia: Es print, 2012). Grozeva, Nedyalka, et al. (eds.), Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti. Tom I (1944–1949) [The goryani: A collection of documents. Volume 1 (1944–1949)] (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na arhivite pri Ministerskiya savet, 2001). Grozeva, Nedyalka/Bugarcheva, Elena (eds.), Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti. Tom II (1949–1956) [The goryani: A collection of documents. Volume 2 (1949–1956)] (Sofia: Darzhavna agentsiya “Arhivi”, 2010). Gruev, Mihail, Mezhdu petolachkata i polumesetsa: Balgarite myusyulmani i poli­ ticheskiyat rezhim (1944–1959) [Between the five-pointed star and the crescent: Muslim Bulgarians and the political regime (1944–1959)] (Stara Zagora: Kota, 2003). Gruev, Mihail, Preorani slogove. Kolektivizatsiya i sotsialna promyana v balgarskiya Severozapad 40-te – 50-te godini na XX vek [Reploughed boundaries. Collectivization and social change in the Bulgarian Northwest in the 1940s and 1950s] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/Ciela, 2009).

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Gruev, Mihail, et al. (eds.), Nasilie, politika i pamet: komunisticheskiyat rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniya – refleksii na savremennika i izsledovatelya [Violence, politics and memory: the communist regime in Pirin Macedonia – reflections of the contemporary and researcher] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 2011). Gyaurski, Marian, Die Unversöhnlichen – Widerstand gegen den Kommunismus in Bulgarien, in: Texte zum Kommunismus in Bulgarien. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 26 November 2014. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d299d679c3f7-42c9-7246-507ca60c3da8&groupId=252038 (last accessed 28 February 2019). Horozov, Krum, Goryanskoto dvizhenie v Rusensko 1949–1952 [The goryani movement in the Ruse area 1949–1952] (Ruse: Avangard print, 2004). Ignatova, Anka, Znakovi aktsii sreshtu goryanite (po dokumenti ot arhivnite fondove na Vatreshni i Granichni voyski v Darzhavniya voennoistoricheski arhiv [Landmark operations against the goryani (according to documents from the archival holdings of the Internal and Border Troops at the State Military-Historical Archive], in: Lachezar Stoyanov/Zhivko Lefterov (eds.), Saprotivata sreshtu komunisticheskiya rezhim v Balgariya 1944–1989 g.). Sbornik materiali ot natsionalna nauchna konferentsiya, NBU, 23-24 mart 2011 g. [Resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1989). Proceedings of a national scientific conference, New Bulgarian University, 23-24 March 2011] (Sofia: NBU, 2012), 122-137. http://ebox.nbu.bg/anti/ (last accessed 12 February 2019). Iliev, Nikolai, Nashata borba protiv bolshevizma [Our struggle against Bolshevism] (Sofia: Balgarski natsionalen front, Ink., 1998). Iliev, Nikolai, Boyan Popov – vodach na goryanite v Transko [Boyan Popov: leader of the goryani in the Tran area] (Sofia: Balgari, 2004). Iliev, Nikolai, Nikola Yordanov – Gudzho i goryanskoto dvizhenie v Transko-breznishkiya rayon [Nikola “Gudzho” Yordanov and the goryani movement in the Tran-Breznik area] (Sofia: Balgari, 2004). Iliev, Nikolai, Vaorazhenata borba protiv komunizma [The armed struggle against communism] (Sofia: Balgari, 2011). Ivanov, Stefan, Katolicheskite machenitsi na Balgariya [Bulgaria’s Catholic martyrs] (Sofia: Zhanet 45, 2018). Kavaldzhiev, Todor, Almanah na Balgarskiya zemedelski naroden sayuz i negovite zhertvi (1900–2010) [Almanac of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and its sacrifices 1900–2010)] (Sofia: Chernat, 2011). Kavaldzhiev, Todor, Kratka istoriya na Zemedelskoto mladezhko dvizhenie v Balgariya [A brief history of the Agrarian youth movement in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Chernat, 2012). Luleva, Ana/Troeva, Evgenia/Petrov, Petar, Prinuditelniyat trud v Balgariya (1941–1962): Spomeni na svideteli. Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov”, 2012/ Zwangsarbeit in Bulgarien (1941–1962): Erinnerungen von Zeitzeugen (Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Akademie-Verlag, 2012).

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Lyubenova, Nadezhda, Stryama. Vtoriyat Batak – 1944 g. [Stryama. The second Batak – 1944] (Plovdiv: Makros, 2009). Mitev, Boris, Saprotivata sreshtu balgarskiya komunizam. Goryanite ot Varnenska i Dobrichka oblast (1946–1960) [Resistance against Bulgarian communism. The ­goryani from Varna and Dobrich regions (1946–1960)] (Varna: IK Steno, 2012). Ognyanov, Lyubomir (ed), Borbi i chistki v BKP (1948–1953): Dokumenti i materiali [In-fighting and purges in the BKP (1948–1953): Documents and materials] (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na arhivite pri Ministerskiya savet, 2001). Ogoyski, Petko, Zapiski po balgarskite stradaniya 1944–1989 g. [Notes on the Bulgarian sufferings 1944–1989] 4th ed. (Sofia: Skala print, 2015). Prodanov, Nikolai, Antikomunisticheskata saprotiva v Balgariya sled 1944 g.: belezhki po dosegashnite izsledvaniya, tematikata i osnovnite problemni vaprosi [Anticommunist resistance in Bulgaria after 1944: notes on the current research and main topics], in: Epohi 21 (2013) 2, 70-82. Sharlanov, Dinyu, Goryanite. Koi sa te? Iz strogo sekretnite arhivi na Direktsiya na darzhavna sigurnost [The goryani. Who are they? From the top-secret archives of the State Security Directorate] (Sofia: Prostranstvo & Forma, 1999). Sharlanov, Dinyu, Istoriya na komunizma v Balgariya [A history of communism in Bulgaria] Vol. 2. (Sofia: Ciela, 2009). Stefanov, Plamen, Goryanite anarhisti v Pavelbanskiya rayon 1952–1954 g. [Goryanianarchists in the Pavel Banya area 1952–1954]. In: Stoyan Pintev/Georgi Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya i organiziranata saprotiva v Balgariya 1944–1954 g. Materiali ot nauchnata konferentsiya v Sliven, yuni 2000 g. [The Bulgarian opposition and organized resistance in Bulgaria 1944–1954. Proceedings of the scientific conference in Sliven, June 2000] (Sliven: Zhazhda, 2000), 193-199. Tsanev, Stefan, Balgarski hroniki [Bulgarian chronicles] Vol. 4. (Plovdiv: Zhanet 45, 2010). Tsvetkov, Zhoro, Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri [The trials of the opposition leaders] (Sofia: Kupesa, 1991). Vezenkov, Aleksandar, 9 septemvri 1944 g. [9 September 1944] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/Ciela, 2014). Vuchkov, Sergei, Nelegalni myusyulmanski grupi v Zapadnite Rodopi prez vtorata polovina na 40-te godini na XX vek [Illegal Muslim groups in the Western Rhodopes in the second half of the 1940s], in: Balkanistic Forum (2011) 1, 269-322. Vukov, Nikolai, Monumentalni reprezentatsii v propagandata na komunisticheskya rezhim v Balgariya (1944–1989) [Monumental representations in the propaganda of the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1989)], in: Ivaylo Znepolski (ed.), Istoriya na Narodna Republika Balgariya. Rezhimat i obshtestvoto [A history of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. The regime and society] (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo/Ciela, 2009), 595-614.

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Yanakieva, Veselina, Goryanskoto dvizhenie v Slivenskiya kray 1950–1951 g. [The goryani movement in the Sliven area 1950–1951], in: Stoyan Pintev/Georgi Kyupchukov (eds.), Balgarskata opozitsiya i organiziranata saprotiva v Balgariya 1944–1954 g. Materiali ot nauchnata konferentsiya v Sliven, yuni 2000 g. [The Bulgarian opposition and organized resistance in Bulgaria 1944–1954. Proceedings of the scientific conference in Sliven, June 2000] (Sliven: Zhazhda, 2000), 22-45. Yancheva, Yana, Kolektivizatsiyata v balgarskoto selo (1948–1970). Kolektivna pamet i vsekidnevna kultura [Collectivization in the Bulgarian village (1948–1970). Collective memory and everyday culture] (Sofia: IK Gutenberg, 2015). Yosifov, Kalin, Totalitarnoto nasilie v balgarskoto selo (1944–1951) i posleditsite za Balgariya [Totalitarian violence in the Bulgarian village (1944–1951) and the consequences for Bulgaria] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski”, 2003).

Summary After initially remaining neutral and refusing to participate in the military conflict that had broken out in Europe, in March 1941 the Kingdom of Bulgaria entered the Second World War on the side of the Axis Powers. In the course of the military operations, the Bulgarian state established its own administration in Vardar Macedonia and Aegean Thrace. On 4 September 1944, the Kingdom of Bulgaria terminated its alliance with Nazi Germany and began to disarm the German troops on Bulgarian territory. On 5 September, the Soviet Union declared war on the Kingdom of Bulgaria, after which units of the Red Army’s 3rd Ukrainian Front entered Northeastern and Southeastern Bulgaria. On 9 September 1944, a coup d’état brought to power the Fatherland Front, a communist-dominated coalition. The following years saw the establishment of a totalitarian regime governed by the Bulgarian Communist Party, based on the class-party principle and accompanied by a repressive model characteristic of the whole period of socialism (1944–1989). The article deals with several main topics related to armed resistance against the communist regime in Bulgaria (1944–1956). More than 3,000 goryani and over 10,000 helpers of theirs took part in the conflict against a vastly superior opponent. The article offers a detailed review of the domestic and foreign political factors that provoked the armed conflict. A series of examples are used to illustrate the characteristics of the two belligerent parties. The composition, structure, number and tactics of the participants in the armed resistance are described, as well as the means employed by the state institutions to fight against “political banditry”.

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Summary in Bulgarian

След временно спазване на неутралитет и отказ от участие в избухналия военен конфликт в Европа, през месец март 1941 г. Царство България се включва във Втората световна война на страната на Тристранния пакт. В хода на военните действия българската държава установява своя администрация във Вардарска Македония и Беломорска Тракия. На 4 септември 1944 г. Царство България прекратява съюзническите си отношения с Нацистка Германия и започва разоръжаване на германските военни части, които се намират на българска територия. На 5 септември Съветският съюз обявява война на Царство България, след което подразделенията на Третия украински фронт на Червената армия навлизат в Североизточна и Югоизточна България. На 9 септември 1944 г. в страната е извършен държавен преврат и на власт се установява доминираната от комунистите коалиция Отечествен фронт (ОФ). През следващите години в страната се утвърждава тоталитарен режим на управление, ръководен от Българската комунистическа партия (БКП), основан върху класово-партиен принцип и съпътстван от репресивен модел, характерен за целия период на социализма (1944–1989). В статията са представени няколко основни теми, свързани с въоръжената съпротива срещу комунистическия режим в България (1944–1956). В конфликта участват повече от 3000 горяни и над 10 000 техни помагачи, борещи се срещу многократно превъзхождащ ги противник. Текстът предлага детайлен обзор върху вътрешно и външнополитическите фактори, предизвикали въоръжения конфликт. В статията са използвани примери, с които се онагледяват характеристиките на двете воюващи страни. Описани са както структурата, численият състав и тактиките на участниците във въоръжената съпротива, така и средствата на държавните институции за борба с „политическия бандитизъм“.

Fig. 18.1

Bulgaria – the main areas of resistance during the two distinguishable phases 1944–1949 and 1949–1956

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Chapter 19

Armed Albanian Resistance to the Hoxha Regime in Albania 1948–1953 Marenglen Kasmi The establishment of the communist regime in Albania after the Second World War was a consequence of the struggle of the National Army of Liberation under the leadership of the Communist Party against the Italian and German occupying forces. A further factor that facilitated the takeover of power by the communists was the failure of nationalist organisations during the war to become worthy candidates for the assumption of power once the war was over. The nationalists’ collaboration with the occupiers had not only discredited them in the eyes of the population but also, even before the war was over, “legitimised” the destruction of these organisations on the grounds of this collaboration. Equally decisive for the communist future of Albania was the fact that, during the war, the Allies had already accepted that Albania’s fate was closely linked with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The important role played by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the establishment of both the Communist Party of Albania and the Albanian National Resistance Army meant that Tito had little intention of loosening the reins once the war was over.1 The first five years following the end of the Second World War were not only the hardest but also the most significant for the establishment of Enver Hoxha’s regime – in terms of both internal and external politics. When Albania regained its status as an independent country it did so under Yugoslavian tutelage, a fact that merely reinforced the widely-held conviction that it was destined to progressively become Yugoslavia’s seventh republic. For example, in the years between 1945 and 1948 Albania was variously described as a “satellite”, “sub-satellite”, “colony”, “protectorate” and “following on in Tito’s wake”, etc.2 However, Yugoslavia’s expulsion from Cominform as a result of the Bucharest Declaration of 28th June 1948 enabled Hoxha to cleanse his government of 1  Cf. Michael Schmidt-Neke: Innenpolitik, in: Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.): Albanien, Südosteuropa Handbuch, Volume VII (Göttingen: 1993), 57. 2  Cf. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen: Aussenpolitik, in: Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.): Albanien, Südosteuropa Handbuch, Volume VII, (Göttingen: 1993), 103.

© Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783657703043_020

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supporters of Yugoslavia and switch course in the direction of Stalin’s Soviet Union. As it sought to implement the international policy objectives of the US Government towards the end of the 1940s, which also included the overthrow of the Soviet Government and communist regimes in a large number of Eastern European countries, the CIA assumed that, by training Albanians with anti-communist sentiments who were living in the West and prepared to fight against the regime of Enver Hoxha, they would free Albania from communism. Following the failure of the armed internal resistance to Enver Hoxha’s regime in the years between 1945 and 1948, particularly in Northern and Northeastern Albania, the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) between 1948 and 1953 represent the first example of Western secret services training paramilitary groups, which they then deployed in their homeland within the Soviet Bloc with the objective of overthrowing the communist regime. In keeping with the logic of the Cold War the leadership of the CIA had absolutely no doubt that the peoples of Eastern Europe – including Albania – were simply waiting for the first spark that would ignite the fire of rebellion with which they would then rise up against the communist regimes and the Soviet dominance of the countries of the region. The struggle against “political banditry” – the description given at the time to the fight against the armed bands that came to Albania, largely with the support of the American and British secret services – was addressed extensively in communist historiography. Prior to 1991, this struggle against political banditry was regarded as an Albanian success in the face of reactionary forces that had sought to overthrow the Hoxha government with “imperialist-revisionist support”. Despite the difficulty of maintaining the appropriate level of scholarly objectivity during the Hoxha era some of these studies are still valid today. It is, however, necessary to appraise the indoctrinated communist language with care. It was only after 1991 and the fall of the communist regime that a number of articles appeared, mostly in newspapers and magazines, which evaluated these events from another perspective – in terms of not only language and the use of such terms as “political banditry”, “criminal bands”, “bandits” and “subversives”, etc., but also content. Despite the opening up of the archives, in which enough sources of such information can be found, Albanian historians have failed to address this area intensively since the fall of the Iron Curtain. This could be explained by the intense politicisation of Albanian historiography over the course of the past 26 years and the related phenomenon of

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historical revisionism. Put simply, this means that every form of organised activity against the Communist Government is seen today in a positive light. The first foreign publication on this subject appeared in London in 1984 in the form of Nicholas Bethell’s book “The great Betrayal. The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s biggest coup”. Based on British and American sources this is the first description of the highly secret operations of the British and American secret services, whose aim was to overthrow the Hoxha regime and destabilise the political situation across the socialist region. According to Bethell these unofficial operations were carried out on the authority of the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Bethell also reports that it was even acknowledged internally that these operations constituted “a violation of international law”.3

“Political Banditry”

The first signs of armed resistance against the communist takeover of power in Albania appeared in early 1945. Armed anti-communist groups emerged, particularly in Northern and Northeastern Albania. The leaders of these groups had already declared their opposition to the Communist Party during the war. Their objective was to overthrow the communist regime. The uprising in Postriba on 9th September 19464 created widespread concern and alarm amongst the leadership of the Communist Party. In order to prevent further rebellions, Hoxha’s first step was to turn his attention to those intellectuals whom he regarded as opponents to the regime.5 Such action was designed to inhibit their eventual cooperation with the anti-communist forces that were principally active in the mountain regions. The uprising was immediately followed by a campaign of arrests and punishment. Following the trial, which resulted in tough sentences being handed out to the group of engineers accused of having sabotaged the drying out of the Maliq marsh on the orders of the US Embassy, attention turned to opposition members of parliament such as Riza Dani, Shefqet Beja, Sheh Karbunara, Kol Kuqali and Selaudin Toto.

3  Cf. Nicholas Bethell: Tradhëtia e Madhe, Tirana 1993, 13. 4  On 9th September 1946 an armed anti-communist group led by Jup Kazazi and Osman Haxhia attacked the northwestern city of Shkodra. Their objectives were to free political prisoners, steal arms from the army barracks and incite opposition to the communist regime amongst the people of Shkodra and across Northern Albania. The act of resistance proved unsuccessful and was effortlessly put down by the army. 5  Cf. Hamit Kaba, Ethem Çeku, Shqipëria dhe Kosova në Arkivat Ruse 1946–1962, Pristina 2011, 35.

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The parliamentarians were accused of having founded the illegal “National-Democratic” Organisation in Tirana in February 1945 and of then overseeing the establishment of further committees in a number of cities across Albania between February and April of the same year. According to the reports of the Sigurimi [the state security service] the organisation also worked together with Balli Kombëtar [The National Front]. The Sigurimi stated that the objective of the organisation was to seize power through the use of force and with the help of their British and American allies. The members of parliament were also accused of having stirred up and even organised the uprising in Postriba. During the investigation they were subject to psychological and physical violence. Riza Dani and Kostandin Boshnjaku admitted to nothing while others such as Shefqet Beja told the court that any confessions they had made during interrogation were the result of this psychological and physical pressure.6 According to the prosecution they had established an illegal group in February 1945 and, soon afterwards, a Central Committee under the leadership of Shefqet Beja. Furthermore, the group was said to have attempted to contact war criminals and other felons who had fled abroad with the objective of working together to organise an uprising and, eventually, the overthrow of the “Popular Regime”. In addition to this, the group was accused of instigating and organising the uprising in Postriba and demanding the introduction of the Western model of democracy, etc.7 The regime took speedy and brutal measures to destroy this movement. On 16th March 1948 Enver Hoxha reported to the Soviet ambassador that there are currently around 150-160 armed bandits in Albania, in comparison with the 500-600 who were present at the beginning of 1947. There are no longer any armed bands in the country that are powerful enough to lead a political 6  Cf. Arkivi i Ministrisë së Punëve të Brendshme [Archive of the Interior Ministry – abbreviated below as AMB], Fondi 1, Dosjet hetimore-gjyqësore, Viti. 1946, D. 2224, 17, statements by Shefqet Beja during the court proceedings against the National Democratic Organisation on 4 September 1947. See also: Akte gjyqësore politike gjatë komunizmit në Shqipëri, vëllimi 1, 2 dhe 3, Tirana 2016. 7  Cf. AMB, Fondi 1, Dosjet hetimore-gjyqësore, V. 1946, D. 2224, 1, minutes of the court proceedings against Shefqet Beja, Enver Sazani, Sheh Ibrahim Karbunara, Selaudin Toto, Irfan Majuni, Tefik Delliallisi, Hysen Shehu, Salim Kokalari, Sulo Konjari, Ramazan Tabaku, Gjovalin Vlashi, Rustem Sharra, Xhevat Xhafa, Rram Marku, Beqir Çela, Riza Alizoti, Sulo Klosi, Saggioti Paolo, Foto Bala, Abdyl Kokoshi, Shefki Minarolli, Pertef Karagjozi, Mehmet Prishtina and Agathokli Xhitoni on 4 September 1947; and AMB, Fondi 1, Dosjet hetimore-gjyqësore, V. 1946, D. 1393, 3, minutes of the court proceedings against Konstandin Boshnjaku, Riza Dani, Faik Shehu, Islam Radovicka, Uran Filipi, Isuf Hysenbegasi, Surja Selfo, Demir Kallarati, Hilmi Hysi, Bexhet Shehu, Adem Beli, Hivzi Kokalari, Mestan Ujaniku, Halit Gjelena, Kamber Backa, Ibrahim Hasani, Arif Gjyli, Nexhmi Ballka and Hasan Reçi, on 31 December 1947.

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Marenglen Kasmi struggle against the popular authorities. Most of those hiding in the mountains of Northern and, partly, Central Albania are normal criminals, that is to say murderers and thieves, while political criminals can be counted on the fingers of one hand and are completely isolated from the rest of the population.8

In his attempt to describe this resistance as crudely criminal, Enver Hoxha also reports incorrect numbers because, in the estimation of Sigurimi – the secret state police – around 150 armed groups with a total of 1,370 members were active across Albania in 1949.9 According to the reports of the Sigurimi, The bandits started carrying out acts of sabotage, diversion and terror. They sabotaged the sawmills in Puka, blew up the cooperative in Librazhdi, burned down the school in Morina and began carrying out acts of terror such as the murder of party activists and representatives of the government. They killed the secretary of the party committee in Mirdita in an ambush, the member of the National Assembly Bardhok Biba and the four heroines of Mirdita, etc. The band of Ram Habili in Durres killed many party activists while the bands based in the region around Kruja openly carried out acts of terror in many villages. The aim of such actions was to dissuade the population from cooperating with the Sigurimi.10

In the years between 1949 and 1954 these armed groups murdered around 134 members of the Communist Party and members of the public with communist sympathies and were also responsible for 68 cases of injury and 26 cases of diversion and arson as well as 137 robberies.11 Even disregarding the fact that these reports are written from the perspective of communist historiography there are former members of these counterrevolutionary groups who have themselves admitted that any positive results of these acts of murder and terror were more than outweighed by the damage they caused. Government propaganda against such activity intensified and the pursuit of these armed bands received more and more public support. As a result of this, many of these anti-communist groups crossed the border and left Albania. In their debriefings they all reported upon the difficulties of operating in the country, the shortage of food and the low level of support from the population.12 It became clear to them that the struggle against the Hoxha Government would not be successful unless foreign countries turned their attention to the issue of Albania. 8  Quoted from: Islam Lauka; Eshref Ymeri: Shqipëria ne dokumentet e arkivave ruse, Tirana 2006, 161. 9  Cf. Themi Bare: Historia e Armës së Sigurimit të Shtetit, Pjesa e tretë, 1948–1955, 314. 10  Quoted from: Ibd. 11  Cf. AMPB, Fondi i Bandave te Armatosura, Dosja 166, viti 1962, 19. 12  See also Vehbi Bajrami: Shqiptarët e Amerikës, New York 2003, 563-564.

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Why Albania?

Albania was ideally suited for carrying out such an experiment: It was a small country, which was both poor and geographically distant from the other Soviet satellites. Besides this, a significant number of opponents to the regime who were living in refugee camps in Italy had expressed their willingness to support such operations. A further important reason for overthrowing the Hoxha regime was the fact that Hoxha had aligned Albania with the Soviet Union following the country’s break with Yugoslavia in 1948. The Soviets had begun to build military bases in Albania such as the navy base in Pash Aliman in Vlora, as a result of which they had gained a strategic advantage in the struggle for the control of the Strait of Otranto. A number of important events that occurred in the Eastern Bloc in 1949 led to a further intensification of the Cold War between East and West. Now, Stalin wanted to build a harbour in “his new Gibraltar”. This would allow the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence beyond Romania and Bulgaria to the warmer waters of Albania.13 The failure of the August Provocations of 194914 was a crucial moment that played a major part in the decision to change the strategy for overthrowing the communist regime in Albania. In the Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi from 1950, as approved by the Interior Minister, Mehmet Shehu, we read that before the August Provocations, propaganda from foreign espionage organisations gave the impression that the ‘liberation of Albania from the communists’ was exclusively a matter for foreign intervention; following the provocations these same organisations started a broad campaign of propaganda, the objective of which was to awaken the belief amongst Albanian reactionary forces that they themselves were in a position to transform the situation in Albania (naturally with foreign help).15

13  Cf. Nicholas Bethell: Tradhëtia e Madhe, Tirana 1993, 117. 14  After the Second World War, Greece became enmeshed in the Civil War of 1946–1949 between left-wing forces led by the Greek Communist Party and the Greek Democratic Army and right-wing forces supported by the USA and Great Britain. In summer 1949 a number of battles took place between these forces on Mount Gramoz on the Albanian border. The Royal Greek Army, which was supported by the USA and Great Britain, entered Albanian territory on the premise of pursuing the communist forces, but they were met by resistance from Albanian border units. 15  Quoted from: The Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi, 1950. Presented by Colonel Mihallaq Ziçishti, Deputy Interior Minister, to the annual meeting of the leadership of the Sigurimi on 17th May 1951, in: Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit Shqiptar [Albanian

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The opinion of the Sigurimi at the time – an opinion that was consequently reflected in Enver Hoxha’s policies – was that, following the cessation of hostilities with Greek forces in 1949, the greatest threat to the communist regime was posed not by a frontal attack by a neighbouring military power but by an attempt by Hoxha’s political opponents, who were known at the time as “the Albanian Reaction”, to overthrow the regime. Hence, there was no need for the sort of war between nation states that would lead to a “general state of war” because such a war would lead to the intervention of the Soviet Union. Any overthrow of the communist regime should come from within, triggered by an internal anti-communist revolution. The main role in the organisation of such a general uprising would have to be played by small groups of exiled Albanian political opponents, who should enter the country by land, sea and air with the help of the American, British, Italian, Greek and Yugoslavian secret services. As part of this change in strategy designed to overthrow the communist regime, the infiltration of anti-communist subversives into Albania intensified during the course of the 1950s.

BGFIEND and the “4000th Labor Service Company”

On 22nd June 1949 the CIA approved and commenced implementation of the Albanian operation code-named BGFIEND16, whose ultimate objective was the overthrow of the Hoxha Government. BGFIEND was the first paramilitary operation in the history of the CIA, whose activities had previously been limited to the collection and analysis of information on behalf of the US Government. With the help of the CIA, contact was made with the organisation representing the political émigré community and this was followed in July 1949 by the establishment in Rome of the “Committee for Free Albania”. The objective of the committee was to work with the American and British secret services to mobilise Albanian volunteers who were prepared to return to their homeland in order to create the conditions for the overthrow of the Hoxha Government. The Committee for Free Albania had to operate like an Albanian government in exile, which was ready to assume power following the removal of the Central Archive – abbreviated below as AQSh], Fondi i Komitetit Qendror të PPSH, Dokumente të Sigurimit të Shtetit, Kutia 1 (1946–1957), Dosja 2, viti 1950, 6. 16  Cf. OBOPUS BG FIEND: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/OBOPUS% 20BG%20FIEND%20%20%20VOL.%201%20%28COUNTRY%20PLAN%20ALBANIA %29_0022.pdf, last accessed on 30 January 2018.

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communist regime. The establishment of the committee triggered a dispute between the monarchist supporters of the former King Zog and the republican representatives of the National Front. This dispute largely focussed upon the choice of the political leadership of this counter revolution. While Great Britain supported the monarchist wing on the recommendation of the former British liaison officers who had been deployed in Albania during the Second World War the Americans favoured the supporters of the Republic. The Department of State saw this as a way of ensuring the “democratic attributes”17 of the counter revolution while also distancing itself from the autocratic regime, which had been represented by King Zog between 1928 and 1939. During this period, the Albanian political émigré community was organised in a number of parties and political associations. Most of these, however, coalesced around the Committee for Free Albania. This was initially led by Mit’hat Frashëri, one of the most important leaders of the “Balli Kombetar” that had been created in Tirana in November 1942. The principal objective of the committee was to overthrow the communist regime with the help of its British and American allies. The establishment of the Committee for Free Albania should be assessed on two levels: Firstly, the interest of the American and British secret services in organising the Albanian political émigré community in connection with the execution of Operation BG FIEND; and secondly, the hope of overthrowing Enver Hoxha and frustrating the establishment of the Soviet military presence in the Balkans that had been made possible by the end of Albano-Yugoslavian relations and the subsequent rapprochement between Albania and the Soviet Union. The notable features of the activities of the committee were the total lack of dependence of its leadership upon the British and American secret services and the growing divergence of opinions regarding the strategy that it should follow. Such divergence was often no more than a continuation of disagreements between the two political camps that could be traced back to the Second World War.18 In a certain sense, these divergences and disagreements within the political émigré community, which intensified after the death of Mit’hat Frashëris and the election of Hasan Dostis as Chairman of the Committee, benefitted the Americans. This is because they encouraged the rival groups19 within the committee to intensify their efforts to 17  Cf. Kim Philby: Lufta ime e heshtur. Autobiografia e një spiuni, Tirana 2004, 166. 18  Cf. Kol Bib Mirakaj: Vetvrasja e një kombi, Shkodër 2014, 27-54. 19  These groups were: The National Front, Legality, The Independent Block and The North Epirotic Committee. There were also further secondary organisations such as Seit Kryeziu’s Agricultural Party, The Second League of Prizren and the Albanian Patriotic Movement in France.

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recruit Albanian volunteers who would be ready to be sent to Albania following their training in camps established for the purpose. In this way the committee hoped to gain the support of the Americans and to compete with Balli Kombetar, which could count on the support of a greater number – 216 – of volunteers.20 From a more general perspective, the Albanian émigré community was shaped by these deep conflicts not only between but also within the rival groups. Equally problematic were both the rivalry between the British and the American secret services as each sought to influence the émigré community and, finally, the open competition between these political groups as they strived to win the support of as many anti-communist fighters as possible. The committee was to a certain extent successful: not only in recruiting anti-communist volunteers but also in preparing the ground in Albania, where its representatives were already living and still had support. In 1950 alone the Committee for Free Albania trained around 11 armed groups that it sent to the country and which carried out around 89 operations. In the same year, 194 anticommunist fighters were killed by the Sigurimi and Defence Ministry forces.21 In line with this approach the Americans worked with Albanian volunteers to establish the “4000th Labor Service Company”, whose members were selected by the Committee for Free Albania. The company, which grew to consist of 250-300 soldiers, was structured like a working company and was initially accommodated in barracks in Karlsfeld, 15 kilometres outside Munich. Two months later it was redeployed to a different barracks in Hohenbrunn. The company was led by Thomas Mangelly, an American captain with Albanian roots. In an interview after the end of the Cold War he reported on a meeting with high-level CIA officials in July 1950 regarding the planned operations in the Balkans. “Only then was I told that my role was to train Albanian subversives in Germany prior to their dispatch to Albania by plane,” Mangelly recalled.22 Bethell takes the same view, writing that the American and British governments had approved a secret operation designed to separate off an Eastern European country from the Eastern Bloc.23 The official role of the company was to perform sentry duties. In reality, the volunteers received instruction in firearms and shooting and hand-to-hand combat as well as the use of maps and compasses, etc. This was the first phase of the preparation, the second phase of which was scheduled to be carried out at a guerrilla training school near Heidelberg. However, this training proved 20  Cf. The Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi, 1950, 15. 21  Cf. The Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi, 1950, 28. 22  Quoted from: Vehbi Bajrami: Shqiptarwt e Amerikës, New York 2003, 562. 23  Cf. Nicholas Bethell: Tradhëtia e Madhe, 11.

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inadequate due to security measures that meant that it was impossible for the volunteers to be given proper instruction in parachute jumping. Three weeks later the first group was flown to Athens from where they were sent to parachute into Albania in a plane with Polish pilots and without US markings. The results were catastrophic: They often landed in the wrong place and many were killed or taken prisoner. The British had already prepared a similar training camp for the Albanian resistance fighters in Malta. In order to do this they had reactivated the former British liaison officers who had been deployed in Albania during the Second World War. As already mentioned, some of these volunteers were organised into small groups and sent into Albania between 1949 and 1953 with the task of stirring up anti-communist sentiment amongst their compatriots and carrying out the groundwork for the organisation of a popular uprising against the Hoxha regime. In addition to this they also had the roles of distributing propaganda material, gathering political, commercial and military intelligence, carrying out acts of sabotage and murder against the government and high-level Communist Party officials and recruiting new members. The next phase would involve reinforcing these groups with further personnel and material in order to allow them to become centres of resistance against the regime.24 Despite the setbacks, the training of Albanian volunteers in Malta and Germany continued. At the same time, the Americans continued to fight in Korea. The final group of volunteers parachuted into Albania in early May 1953. They were led by the best-known anti-communist Hamit Matjani, who had seen action in Albania on a number of occasions. He couldn’t have known that the Sigurimi had captured two of his colleagues, Zenel Shehu and Xhaferr Mema, and provided false information by radio as part of a Sigurimi-led deception code-named “Vaikalsee”.25 According to the reports of the Sigurimi around 1,650 agents or subversives crossed the Albanian border between 1949 and 1953. Of these, 253 were killed in action and 417 were captured by the army and Sigurimi forces while a further 390 surrendered. In total, only 570 of these 1,650 men were able to escape back across the Albanian border.26

24  Cf. William Blum, CIA dhe ushtria amerikane. Ndërhyrjet ne vende te ndryshme te botes qe prej Luftës se Dyte Botërore (Tirana: 2005), 82. 25  Cf. Themi Bare, Historia e Armës sw Sigurimit tw Shtetit, Pjesa e tretw, 1948–1955, 448-473. Also see Vehbi Bajrami, Shqiptarwt e Amerikës, 562. 26  Cf. AMPB, Fondi i Bandave te Armatosura, Dosja 166, viti 1962, 19.

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BGFIEND remained the CIA’s most important paramilitary operation for almost a year. Then, sometime around the middle of 1950, the CIA set aside the operation’s ultimate objective of overthrowing the communist regime and chose to continue the struggle with a greater focus on the psychological and economic areas and the use of propaganda and espionage. In 1953, however, this original operational objective was resumed and the CIA drew up plans to carry out a coup in Albania starting on 1st July 1954. This plan, however, remained on paper because the agency decided instead to undertake similar operations in Iran and Guatemala during the same period, believing that these offered a greater chance of success than the Albanian venture. The geopolitical changes ushered in by Khrushchev’s assumption of power in the Soviet Union, combined with the large numbers of agents killed or imprisoned by the Sigurimi, led to the suspension of the Albanian campaign in 1954. In 1959, the CIA took the final decision to end Operation BGFIEND.

The Nature of the Resistance

With regards to the classification of the form of resistance against the communist regime, the engagement of the Albanian political émigré community, which was principally concentrated in the nations of Western Europe as well as in the neighbouring country of Greece, was ‘active’ in character. This refers to both the political organisation of this resistance and the military approach, which saw recruits being trained by the Americans and British in special camps in Germany and Malta, respectively, before being dispatched to Albania. While the active internal resistance by anti-communists who hadn’t left the country in November 1944 was concentrated in mountainous regions, principally in Northern and North­eastern Albania, the armed groups that came from abroad between 1949 and 1953 were active across virtually the entire country. Such groups were classified by the Sigurimi as “foreign spies”, while the domestic opponents of the regime were described as “internal reactionaries”. In 1950, the Sigurimi correctly noted that there were serious contradictions in how the methods for overthrowing the communist regime employed by these different groups were perceived. According to the Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi for 1950: While the foreign enemies and their agents have developed an entire political strategy, which aims to convince both internal and external reactionaries (reactionary émigrés) that, with help from the West, they would be in a position to “free” Albania, these internal reactionaries are merely hoping for an intervention from abroad […] and plan to flee the country.27 27  Quoted from: The Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi, 1950, 11.

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This provided a clear indication that the internal resistance was, in truth, poorly organised and lacked a concrete political and organisational platform. As previously mentioned, the elimination of anti-communist groups between 1945 and 1947 had ensured that the regime was no longer under threat. This means that the internal resistance can be classified as ‘unorganised and spontaneous’. From an organisational point of view this resistance can be seen as a “linear structure”, which could mostly be found in rural areas where “subversives, bandits and enemies have contacts with their relatives and acquaintances who then, in turn, have contacts with their own relatives and acquaintances”28 and as “structures of three or five members” or so-called “Komitees”, which were adopted from the Greek model of espionage. Hence, spontaneous resistance consisted of ensuring that the anti-communist groups were supported in terms of accommodation and places to hide.

The Reasons for Failure

It was soon clear that both the British and the Americans were completely unaware of the real situation inside Albania. The British officers, who had been deployed in the country during the war as liaison officers, taught the Albanian paramilitary groups to behave in the Albanian mountains in exactly the same way in which they themselves had behaved during the war, although the situation was now completely different. For example, during the war the British had charged the batteries of their radios using an extremely noisy pedal-powered charger. Now, however, this same tactic often led to the groups being discovered because, although they were hidden high in the mountains, the noise travelled over long distances. As a result of a number of the reforms that were successfully implemented by the Hoxha Government – such as agricultural reform, the expansion of state institutions and the fight against illiteracy, etc. – a large section of the Albanian population, which wasn’t directly affected by and yet still benefitted from these reforms, had yet to see the true face of the regime. This meant that there was widespread popular support for the Hoxha regime during this period. In addition to this, most of these guerrilla fighters had worked with the Italian and German occupying forces during the war, or had at least served the Albanian political émigré community or representative organisations such as the National Front or King Zog’s Legality, which had already been discredited during wartime by communist propaganda and were thus regarded by many Albanians as organs of collaboration. 28  Quoted from: The Annual Report on the Activities of the Sigurimi, 1950, 12.

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After the war, Albanians were euphoric and had yet to experience the severity of a dictatorship such as the one that was emerging. The overthrow of the communist regime in Albania by the triggering of a coup, which was designed to act as a signal for the start of an uprising against Soviet dominance across the Eastern Bloc, proved unattainable. Between August 1948 and July 1953 383 border violations or provocations were registered along the entire Albano-Yugoslavian border, incidents that were emphasised in notes of protest submitted by the Albanian Government. The majority of the armed groups that crossed the Albanian border between 1948 and 1953 were immediately shot or captured by the state security forces and border guards. A further reason for the failure of these operations was the special nature of the political regime in Albania. Albania was a satellite of the Soviet Union and yet it was very different from the other countries of the Eastern Bloc.29 Albania had freed itself from its German occupiers through its own efforts. Its population wasn’t Slav and its communist regime had been introduced without the direct participation of the Red Army. As a result of this, the hatred of the Soviet Union that was a feature of other Eastern Bloc countries was absent in Albania. Quite the opposite, in fact. Thanks to propaganda, particularly after the split with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was specifically seen as the great saviour, who also had the role of protecting Albania from the West. According to this propaganda it was precisely the West that was seeking to use political banditry to return those former collaborators of the fascist and Nazi occupiers to the country as a means of overthrowing the democratic popular regime. And, as mentioned above, the Albanians had not yet recognised the challenges that they were going to have to face. One of the leading figures of the political émigré community, Abaz Ermenji, expressed his disappointment about the failure of these operations. His opinion was that the strategy had been wrong: […] The method chosen by the British and Americans could never have worked. It was no good sending in four or five people to look for local leaders capable of starting a revolution. All such people had already been destroyed by the communists. We should have sent thousands in and created areas of opposition to the regime.30

The operations also suffered in equal measure from the incompetence and the lack of attention of and the breaches of security guidelines committed by the CIA officers who ran them from Athens in Greece. The reports of the Sigurimi 29  Cf. Nicholas Bethell: Tradhëtia e Madhe, 5. 30  Quoted from: ibid, 68.

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lead one to the conclusion that Tirana was informed about virtually all the activities that took place in the training camps.31 Court proceedings against the guerrilla fighters were held in public and led, in most cases, to the passing of the death sentence. Those who provided the guerrillas with accommodation were also punished. This was one of the reasons why such groups remained isolated and without support. The most notorious trial of members of these groups took place in 1954 and was broadcast on the radio and shown in cinemas. When they took the stand the guerrillas admitted to having been trained by the British SIS and American CIA in camps in Malta, Heidelberg and Munich and to having been deployed in Albania with the objective of violently overthrowing the Hoxha regime. This was the point at which the American and British secret services abandoned such initiatives. In addition to the failure of the American and British secret services, who were repeatedly and unsuspectingly supplied with false information by their Albanian counterparts, it also became clear that it is impossible to overthrow a dictatorship by paramilitary means alone if the internal political situation of a country is not conducive to such action. This fundamental principle was confirmed by the Invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961. The prevailing view for many years was that a major role in this failure was played by the treachery of the SIS agent Kim Philby, who worked for the Soviets and provided Tirana with reports on the operations. The recent declassification of the relevant CIA files has, however, shown that such a conclusion exaggerates Philby’s role in the failure of the operations. When he was working in Washington as a representative of the British secret service Philby undoubtedly had access to information about political and strategic aspects of the operations. However, he knew nothing of the tactical plans or the locations where the agents were due to land, etc. Furthermore, the greatest losses occurred after he had already left Washington. This clearly proves that the information came not from Philby but from agents or sympathisers with the Hoxha Government, who had infiltrated the political émigré community. This community had never succeeded in presenting a united front. Rivalries between the various exiled anti-communist fractions were strong and, just like earlier during the war, these were unable to come together to form a common anticommunist front. Such an atmosphere of confrontation even enabled Sigurimi agents to infiltrate the ranks of the émigrés, right up to the highest levels of leadership.

31  See AMPB: Drejtoria e Sigurimit të Shtetit, Fondi i bandave, Dosjet 8 (1948), 24 (1950), 38 (1951), 74 (1954), 92 (1954), 93 (1954), 96 (1954), 100 (1955).

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Following Stalin’s death in 1953 Albania began to isolate itself from the patronage of the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, Hoxha successfully completed something that the CIA had singularly failed to achieve when he removed Albania completely from the Soviet orbit. There is no doubt that Enver Hoxha can be regarded as the victor against these operations, which were organised by two major powers. The struggle against “political banditry” only served to strengthen his position. As set out above, the Hoxha-controlled radio and newspapers comprehensively reported the trials of the subversives, describing them as enemies of the state and the Albanian population and as reactionaries and criminals who were seeking to overthrow the “power of the people” and divide Albania up amongst its neighbours. Some of these claims sounded particularly convincing because, during their interrogation and trials, the prisoners admitted that not only the United States and Great Britain but also Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia had participated in the actions against Hoxha. This adventure or experiment was labelled as “one of the first fiascos of the CIA after the Second World War”. Many freedom fighters were killed or captured and the Hoxha Government took revenge on their relatives, who were interned, imprisoned or otherwise punished.32 Rehabilitation did not come until 1990 and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Sources This subject was widely addressed by communist historiography. And despite the difficulty of retaining the proper scholarly objectivity during the Hoxha era several of these studies remain valid today. It is necessary, however, to carefully evaluate the indoctrinated communist language. A number of articles addressing these events from another perspective only appeared, mostly in newspapers and magazines, following the fall of the communist regime in 1991. Despite the opening of the archives, which contain enough sources of material on these events, Albanian historians have paid little attention to the subject in the years since 1991. The reasons for this could include the intense politicisation of Albanian historiography in the last 28 years and the related 32  See also: CIA report on the “Tepelena Concentration Camp”, 29th May 1953, in: https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A001300330001-0.pdf, last accessed on 30 January 2018.

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phenomenon of historical revisionism. The first and, still, only foreign study on the subject appeared in London in 1984 in the form of Nicholas Bethell’s book “The great Betrayal. The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s biggest coup”. This uses British and American sources as the basis for the first description of the highly secret operations with which the British and American secret services sought to topple the Hoxha regime and destabilise the political situation in all socialist countries. The Albanian archives and, especially, the archives of the Interior Ministry and the Sigurimi authorities are a rich source for those seeking to address this subject. A good approach to the question is also provided by the online documents of the Central Intelligence Agency that have been published in recent years. However, it is often apparent that the CIA reports did not always correspond with the reality of the situation in Albania. This information sometimes came from foreign-based Albanian anti-communists, who often had no overview of the situation or had simply been fed false information by the Sigurimi. Bibliography

Archival Sources

AMPB, Fondi 1, Dosjet hetimore-gjyqësore, Viti. 1946, D. 2224. AMPB, Fondi 1, Dosjet hetimore-gjyqësore, V. 1946, D. 1393. AMPB, Fondi i Bandave te Armatosura, Dosja 166, viti 1962, p. 19. AMPB, Fondi i Bandave te Armatosura, Dosja 166, viti 1962, p. 19. AMPB: Drejtoria e Sigurimit të Shtetit, Fondi i bandave, Dosjet 8 (1948), 24 (1950), 38 (1951), 74 (1954), 92 (1954), 93 (1954), 96 (1954), 100 (1955). Annual Report on the Activity of the Sigurimi, 1950. Presented by Colonel Mihallaq Ziçishti, Deputy Interior Minister, at the annual meeting of the leadership of the Sigurimi, 17th May 1951, in: Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit Shqiptar [Albanian Central Archive – abbreviated below as AQSh], Fondi i Komitetit Qendror të PPSH, Dokumente të Sigurimit të Shtetit, Kutia 1 (1946–1957), Dosja 2, viti 1950. OBOPUS BG FIEND: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/OBOPUS%20 BG%20FIEND%20%20%20VOL.%201%20%28COUNTRY%20PLAN%20 ALBANIA%29_0022.pdf, retrieved on 30.01.2018. CIA Report on “Tepelena Concentration Camp” 29th May 1953, in: https://www.cia. gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A001300330001-0.pdf, retrieved on 30.01.2018.

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Literature

Akte gjyqësore politike gjatë komunizmit në Shqipëri, vëllimi 1, 2 dhe 3, Tirana 2016. Bajrami, Vehbi: Shqiptarët e Amerikës, New York 2003, pp. 563-564. Bare, Themi: Historia e Armës së Sigurimit të Shtetit, Pjesa e tretë, 1948–1955. Bethell, Nicholas: Tradhëtia e Madhe, Tirana 1993. Blum, William: CIA dhe ushtria amerikane. Ndërhyrjet ne vende te ndryshme te botes qe prej Luftës se Dyte Botërore, Tirana 2005. Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev: Aussenpolitik, in: Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.): Albanien, Südosteuropa Handbuch, Volume VII, Göttingen 1993. Kim Philby: Lufta ime e heshtur. Autobiografia e një spiuni, Tirana 2004. Kaba, Hamit, Ethem Çeku, Shqipëria dhe Kosova në Arkivat Ruse 1946–1962, Pristina 2011. Lauka, Islam; Eshref Ymeri: Shqipëria ne dokumentet e arkivave ruse, Tirana 2006. Mirakaj, Kol Bib: Vetvrasja e një kombi, Shkodër 2014. Schmidt-Neke, Michael: Innenpolitik, in: Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.): Albanien, Südosteuropa Handbuch, Volume VII, Göttingen 1993.

Summary As it sought to realise the external policy objectives of the US Government during these years – objectives that included the overthrow of the Soviet Government and the communist regimes in many Eastern European countries – the CIA believed that by training Albanians living in Western countries, who openly declared themselves to be anti-communist and ready to fight against the regime of Enver Hoxha, and by sending these exiles to Albania it would be possible to put an end to communist rule in the country. The first signs of an (attempted) uprising and armed struggle against the installation of a communist regime in Albania were recognisable in early 1945. Armed anti-communist groups were formed, particularly in Northern and Northeastern Albania. Their objective was to overthrow the communist authorities and create the right conditions for an intervention in the country by Anglo-American forces. The communist regime reacted speedily and brutally in putting down such attempts. Several illegal political organisations were also active in Albania alongside these armed groups. In 1946 and 1947 state security forces got wind of the activities of such organisations. Many members were arrested and sentenced to death. The operations against the regime of Enver Hoxha organised by the American CIA and the British secret service in Albania between 1949 and 1954 are amongst the most notable examples of an organised military attempt to

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overthrow a communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe, but they also represent one of the first cases of Western secret services training armed groups and then sending them into their home countries with the task of overthrowing a Soviet Bloc communist regime with the help of paramilitary forces. According to this concept, Albanians who had left home during the war were to return to Albania and organise themselves into small armed groups. Their role was to whip up anti-communist emotions in their regions and provoke a popular uprising as a means of organising nationwide opposition to Hoxha’s regime. Experience shows, however, that a communist regime cannot be overthrown from outside unless this is favoured by the internal circumstances. One of the main reasons that the operation failed was the fact that most Albanians were not yet aware of the inhumanity of the regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania.

Summary in Albanian

Ne kuader te zbatimit te objektivave te politikes se jashtme te qeverise amerikane te ketyre viteve, ku nje nder keta objektive ishte edhe permbysja e qeverise sovjetike dhe regjimeve komuniste ne shume vende te Europes Lindore, CIA vleresonte se, nepermjet stervitjes dhe dergimit ne Shqiperi te shqiptareve qe ndodheshin ne Perendim te Europes, te deklaruar hapur si antikomuniste dhe qe ishin te gatshem te luftonin kunder regjimit te Enver Hoxhes, ishte e mundur qe te rrezohej pushteti komunist ne Shqiperi. Qysh ne fillimvitin 1945 u shfaqen shenjat e para të kryengritjeve dhe luftës së armatosur kundër instalimit të regjimit komunist në Shqiperi. Sidomos në Veri dhe Verilindje te Shqipërise ishin krijuar grupe të armatosura antikomuniste. Qëllimi i tyre ishte përmbysja e pushtetit komunist dhe krijimi i kushteve për ndërhyrjen e forcave anglo-amerikane në Shqiperi. Regjimi komunist mori masa të shpejta dhe brutale, duke i asgjesuar këto lëvizje. Në Shqipëri vepronin krahas këtyre grupeve të armatosura edhe disa organizats politike ilegale. Por, ne vitet 1946–1947 Sigurimi i Shtetit e zbuloi veprimtarinë e këtyre organizatave. Shume prej anetareve te ketyre organizatave u denuan me vdekje. Operacionet e organizuara nga CIA amerikane dhe SIS britanik (British Secret Intelligence Service) kundër regjimit të Enver Hoxhës në Shqipëri në vitet 1949–1954 përben një nga rastet jo vetem më të veçantë në luftën e organizuar për përmbysjen e regjimeve komuniste në Europen Lindore e Qendrore, por po ashtu edhe nje nga rastet e para kur, sherbimet e fshehta perendimore stërviten dhe dërguan në atdheun e tyre grupe vendase të armatosur, për të

444

Marenglen Kasmi

permbysur me grupe paraushtarake një regjim komunist brenda kampit sovjetik. Sipas këtij koncepti, shqiptaret që ishin larguar nga Shqipëria gjatë luftës, duhej të ktheheshin në Shqipëri me mbështetjen e tyre dhe të organizuar në grupe të vogla të armatosura. Ata duhej të nxisnin në krahinat e tyre ndjenjat dhe te provokonin kësisoj revolta të mirëfillta popullore, me qellim organizimin e një kryengritje të përgjithshme popullore kundër regjimit te Hoxhes. Përvoja tregoi se një regjim komunist nuk mund të rrëzohej me shtysë nga jashtë, nëse nuk situata e brendhsme nuk e favorizonte atë. Përpos shumë arsyeve që çuan në dështimin e këtyre operacioneve, një ndër arsyet kryesore ishte se shumica e shqiptarëve ende nuk e kishin njohur egërsinë e regjimit të Enver Hoxhës që po instalohej në Shqipëri.

19. Armed Albanian Resistance

Fig. 19.1

Albania – main area of resistance

445

Index Ablanitsa 399, 406 Abrahams, Bradley F. 221 Acatrinei, Ioan 321 Acheson, Dean 428 Aioanei, Neculai 321 Aiud 320 Akandzhievo 411 Akelis, Edmundas 59 Alba, Iuliu 314, 317 Albania 2, 10 Aldea, Aurel 316 Alexander, Jeffrey 224 Aliev, Mustafa 407 Amberg 201-202, 210 Anders, Władysław 93 Andropov, Yuri 266 Antonescu, Ion 293, 309, 313, 329, 330, 333 Apostol, Dumitru 317 Apuseni Mountains 294, 295, 309, 333, 337 Arad 314, 316 Argestru-Tisa 315 Armas, Elena 341 Arnăuțoiu (Năstase), Victoria 347 Arnăuțoiu, Petre 347 Arnăuţoiu, Toma 329-330, 339, 340 Arnota Mountains 318 Arsenescu, Gheorghe 317-319, 338 Asenovgrad 399, 410 Asymmetric Warfare 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22-24 Asymmetric Warfare Phases 16 Atanasov, Borislav Ivanov 402 Augsburg 202 Australia 381 Austria 1, 8, 9, 378, 379, 401, 402 Avram, Radu 320 Babadag Mountains 309, 321-322 Bacău 324 Baciu, Haşiu 326 Baicu, Petru 317, 324-325 Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Endre 252 Bakalski, Fortunat 400 Bakšys, Antanas 64, 65 Balbus, Tomasz 94, 110, 114

Balchik 405 Baltics 2, 4, 379 Baltūsis, Antanas 58, 59 Banat 315, 333, 336, 337, 338, 341, 343, 348 Bandera, Stepan 7, 143, 147, 158, 159, 168 Baranavichi 84 Bardarski Geran 399 Barnes, Maynard 400 Bârseşti 319 Bartkus, Petras 60, 61, 63, 64 Barutin 397 Bavaria 109 Bayerisch Eisenstein 206 Bazilevičius, Vincas 59 Bębenek, Stanisław 97, 114 Bechta, Mariusz 100, 114 Beja, Shefqet 428, 429 Bejenaru, Ilie 301 Belarus 5, 6, 91 Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic 78, 82, 84 Belgium 401 Belgrade 197 Beliș (village) 286 Belitsa 402 Beluhov, Spas 402 Beneš, Edvard 177, 193 Benghia, Anastasia (also Stașa, Lenuța, Nastasia) 343 Benkovski, Georgi 404, 406, 410 Bereza, Tomasz 100, 114 Berg 109, 110 Beria, Laverntiy 185 Berlin 231, 299 Bethel, Nicholas 428, 441 Bevin, Ernest 428 Białystok District 94, 105 Białystok (region) 106 Biba, Bardhok 430 Bica, Ion 343 Bieszczady Montains 108 Bihor Mountains 284 Billy, Florian C. 202-203 Biščo, Milan M. 210 Biss, Józef ‘Wacław’ 101

Index Bistriţa 315 Bitala, Jozef 203-206, 207 Black Sea 379 Blaive, Muriel 221-222 Blănaru, Maria 339, 340, 343, 347 Blănaru, Spiru 339, 340 Blažek, Petr 222 Bloom, Benjamin S. 233 Bodiu, Leonida 298, 299, 300, 301 Bodnăraș, Emil 300 Bohemia 174, 177, 179, 182, 219 Boiangiu, Nicu 293 Bologa (village) 295 Borovets, Taras 156, 159 Borshiv, Ternopil (region) 133 Bortoș Ioan 285, 287, 288 Boruta, Jonas 59 Borysewicz, Jan ‘Krysia’ 103 Boshnjaku, Kostandin 429 Bosilkov, Evgeniy 400 Bosnia-Hercegovina/Bosnia and Herzegovina 354, 360, 361, 366, 374, 376, 378 Botev 406 Bozhkov, Slavi 405 Braşov 315, 317, 320, 326, 333 Bratislava 192, 196, 209 Braunias, Karl 258, 259 Brezhane 405 Breznik 410 Britain 9, 400 Brno 202 Broz, Josip 354, 363, 367 Brzoza, Czesław 96 Bucharest 197, 282, 294, 295, 296, 318, 324, 327 Bucovina 332, 336 Budaniv, Ternopil (region) 132 Budapest 8, 197, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 289 Bukovina 165, 310, 315 Bulgaria 10, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 400, 401, 402, 403, 408, 415, 418 Bunovo 388 Bunovo Railway Station 388 Burdeț, Ioan Șt. 299, 301 Buzalka, Michal 195 Bychkivtsi (village) Ternopil (region) 131

447 Călata (village) 286 Canada 401, 402 Capotă, Iosif 288, 289, 290, 291, 292 Capotă-Dejeu (group) 283, 288, 290, 337 Caraş-Severin 321 Carlsbad 210 Ceadir, Ilie 321 Ceadir, Nicolae 321 Central Europe 363 Central Intelligence Agency 11, 12 Charkov 173 Chavdar 399 Cheb 200 Chervenkov, Valko 406 Chirca, Elena (Lina) 347 Chirca, Gheorghe 342 Chirca, Marina 341, 345 Chirpan 415 Chmielarz Andrzej 93, 107, 114 Cholupice 175 Chomutov 179 Chonkov, Asen 399 Chortkiv 129 Chovan, Tomáš 212-213 Chuprynka, Taras (Roman Shukhevych) 123 Churchill, Winston 40, 93 Ciesielski, Stanisław 92, 114 Ciolacu, Nicolae 322-323 Citrea, Vasile 300 Ciucaş Mountains 315 Ciurcel, Aurel 293 Ciurică, Nicolae 341, 343 Clementis, Vladimír 212 Cluj (Cluj-Napoca) 285, 291, 292, 296, 297, 301, 302, 315, 326 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea 311-314, 318, 323-324 Collective identity 17 Colțan, Ana 346 Comaniciu, Horaţiu 314 Constantinescu, Ion 348 Corbi 338 Corduneanu, Vasile 321 Costea, Gheorghe 322 Costea, Sicu 322 Covaci, Alexandru 293 Cracow (region) 105

448 Croatia 354, 360, 383 Cross and Sword Team (group) 283, 293, 295, 297 Cruce și Spadă (group) 337 Cruce și Spadă (Cross and Sword) (group)  283, 293, 295, 297 Cuza-Vodă 347 Czech Republic 3, 5, 8, 221, 223, 225, 236, 239 Czechoslovakia 5, 7, 23, 172, 173, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 218, 221-222, 229, 231, 233, 234, 236, 239 Čadca 204, 208 České Noviny 176 Český Malín 174 Čičmany 207 Čierny Balog 191 Dalmatia 374 Dani, Riza 428, 429 Danube River 322, 405 Danube-Black Sea Canal (Dunăre-Marea Neagră Canal) 347 Daujočiai 61 Davkov, Ivan 398 Dederkaly, Ternopil (region) 134 Dejeu Alexandru 288, 289, 290, 291, 292 Deksnys, Jonas 56 Delev, Georgi 411 Demirev, Milko Milkov 411 Demkovych-Dobrianskyi, Mykhailo 146 Dereń, Bolesław 98 Dervishev, Shukri 397 Devin 417 Deykov, Kosta 415 Dickson, Keith D. 4, 18, 25, 49, 63, 98, 100, 112, 221, 225, 231, 235, 245, 324, 349, 368 Dimitrov, G.M. 400, 409, 412 Dimitrov, Georgi 396 Djilas, Milovan 377, 381, 383 Djurišić, Pavle 376, 377 Dobre, Mircea 321 Dobrich 390, 405 Dobrogea 333 Dobruja 321-323 Dobruška 8, 229, 232, 233-238 Dochev, Ivan 394, 402 Đoković, Milan 364

Index Döllersheim military facility 401 Domașnea 343, 347 Domnești 338 Dontsov, Dmytro 145, 146, 148, 152, 159, 160 Dospat 397 Doykov, Petar Dimitrov 405 Drăgoi, Cornel 318 Drăgoi, Ion 318 Dragomir (Caraiman), Elena 344 Drina River 377 Drogobych, Lviv (region) 132, 134 Dubec, Václav 181, 182, 183, 184 Dubnica nad Váhom 208 Duda, Andrzej 112 Duicu, the brothers 338 Dukla 185 Duktas 60, 61 Dulles, John Foster 273, 279, 280 Dumitru, Toader 299, 300, 301 Dupnik Area 397, 407 Dupnitsa 408, 415, Durostor 321 Dvorianky 191 Dzhidzhov, Pavel 400 Ďurčanský, Ferdinand 196, 200, 203, 205, 212-213 East Berlin 24 East Prussia 96, 105 Eastern Balkan Mountains 390 Eastern Europe 363 Eastern Front 310, 322 Ebensee (camp) 299 Einwohner, Rachel 218, 220-221, 231, 236, 238 Eisenhower, Dwight David 273, 274, 280 Enculescu, Captain 317 Erlach, Štefan 206, 208, 210 Erul 411 Estonia 4, 5 Europe 3 Făgăraș 333 Făgăraş Mountains 309, 317, 326 Fanderlík, Velen 202 Federal Republic of Germany 8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 378, 379, 381, 383

Index Feješ, Ján 212 Feneș 345 Fiat, Elena (Lenuța) 341 Filistovich, Ianka 83-84 Flame Henryk ‘Bartek’ 108 Florești (village) 301 Focşani 324 Forțu Gavrilă 293, 294, 295, 297, 315 France 400 Franczak Józef ‘Lalek’, ‘Laluś’ 110 Frashëri, Mit’hat 433 Fraštacký, Rudolf 193 Frazik, Wojciech 110, 114 Friedberg 202 Friedl, Jiri 96 Friszke, Andrzej 113 Fudulea, Dumitru 322 Fudulea, Gheorghe 322 Furmanec, Ostapovich Mikhail (Divíšek, Vladimír) 186 Gagov, Yosif 402 Gailius, Bernardas 54 Galicia 124, 128, 143, 162 Ganišin, Ján 206, 210 Gara, Pirin 405, 416 Garda Albă/Liga Național Creștină (The White Guard/National Christian League) (group) 298 Gâţa, Ecaterina (Titi) 314-315 Gavrilă-Ogoranu, Ion 325-326, 329-330 Gaziev, Fayk Aliev 399, 406, 409 Gdańsk (region) 106 Geneva 201, 203 Georgescu, Alexandru 320 Georgiev, Kostadin 396 Georgiev, Nikola “Gudzho” Yordanov 395, 405 German Democratic Republic 223, 231 Germany 2, 95, 96, 173, 179, 185, 186 Gerő, Ernő 264 Gheorghiu Gheorghe (nicknamed ‘Mărășești’) 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 315 Gherbezean, Gheorghe 318 Gherla (prison) 292 Ghimboașa, Iancu 343 Ghimboașa, Maria 343 Giedrys, Viktoras 58

449 Giurcuța de Sus (village) 286 Godeshevo 399 Golemi Varbovnik 397, 407 Goli Otok 382 Gomułka, Władysław 264, 274 Góra, Władysław 111, 114 Gorbachev, Mikhail 45 Gordan, Ioan 295, 296 Gorna Dzhumaya 395, 407, 408, 415, 416 Gorobov, RA leutnant 133 Gorodnytsia, village in Ternopil (region) 131 Gosa, Maria 345 Gradeshnitsa 405 Gradevo 405 Greater Poland (Wiekopolska) 105 Greece 394, 400, 401, 402, 409 Groczki 102 Grodzieńszczyzna 103 Grősz, József 257 Groza, Petru 282 Groza, Dumitru 314 Grúber, Bohumil 211-212 Grybinas, Aleksandras 61 Grymajliv 134 Guerrilla Warfare 20-21 Guygov, Atem Yakupov 399 Gužas, Vytautas 61 Gyurgich 399 Habili, Ram 430 Hadleŭski, Vintsent 79-80 Hadzhinikolov, Stefan Stefanov 402 Haiducii Muscelului (group) 338, 347 Halaba, Ryszard 111, 114 Haskovo 402 Haššík, Štefan 200 Hegedűs, András 264 Hess, Diana 227, 232 Hitler, Adolf 127, 309, 395 Hlohovec 210 Hódmezővásárhely 254 Hollander, Jocelyn 218, 220-221, 231, 236, 238 Honzátko, Jaroslav 226 Horáková, Milada 181 Horescu, Anișoara 339, 340 Horšovský Týn 180 Horthy, Miklós 248, 249, 251, 255 Hoxha, Enver 427, 429, 430, 432, 437, 440

450 Hrdlička, Václav 185 Hronec 191 Hrynevych, Vladyslav 126 Hučín, Vladimír 218 Huedin (town) 288, 289, 290, 293, 296 Huleč 174 Hungary 2, 5, 8, 222 Husák, Gustáv 195 Iaşi 324 Independent State of Croatia (NDH, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) 373, 377 Insurgency 20-21 Ionescu, Gheorghe 343 Ionescu, Radu 317 Iordan, Ionel 293 Ișfănuț, Dumitru 338, 343 Italy 402 Ivano, Frankivsk 124 Ivanov, Borislav 398 Ivanov, M. 402 Ivanov, Spas Asenov 406 Jijie, Ion 318 Joanna, Queen 402 Johannes (born in 1926) 40 Jubleanu, Maria 340 Jubleanu, Titu 340 Juodis, Darius 56 Juodupiai 57 Jurbarkas 64 Jurj, Lucreția 286, 287, 288 Jurj, Mihai 286, 287, 288 Kádár, János 248, 265, 266, 267, 271, 272, 274 Kalocsa 257 Kalous, Jan 223 Kamenik 397, 407 Kantarev Brest 409 Kapas, Ivan 125 Kaprálik, Pavol 207 Karađorđević, Peter II 363 Karadzhov, Stoycho Hristov 397 Karaivanov, D. 402 Karbunara, Sheh 428 Kareš, Josef 235 Karlovy Vary 184 Karotamm, Nikolai 46, 47

Index Kasperavičius, Juozas 57, 60 Katowice (region) 106 Kaunas 55, 59, 63 Kauneckas, Vytautas Boleslovas 59 Kavran, Božidar 379 Kazakhstan 173 Kazanas, Mykolas 55 Kazanlak 388 Kehayov, Ali Riza 399 Kemeklis, Kazimieras 61 Kéthly, Anna 267 Khmelnytsky, Bohdan 122, 152, 160 Khrushchev, Nikita 45, 263, 266 Kielce 95 Kielce (region) 105, 106 Kil, Ivan 132 Kimštas, Jonas 61, 65, 69, 70 King Mihai I 282 King Peter II 376 King Zog 437 Kirchberg 200 Kirschbaum Jozef 201, 203 Kitikov, Petko 414 Klaipėda 53, 55 Kliachkivsky, Dmytro 159 Klymiv, Ivan 153 Klyuch 398 Koidu (born in 1932) 40, 42 Kolarov, Vasil 407 Kolodzins’ky, Mykhailo 150, 153 Komandera, Rudolf 213 Komarno, Lviv (region) 132 Komitov, Georgi 415 Komló 254 Komorowski, Krzysztof 93, 95, 108, 114 Konieczny, Zdzisław 101, 114 Konovalets, Evhen 146 Konstantinov, Georgi 410 Kopecký, Václav 194 Kopiński, Jarosław 95, 114 Korkuć Maciej 98, 99, 103, 108, 115 Kornai, János 43 Kornitsa 388 Korshynove (village) Ternopil (region) 132 Košice 177, 194-196, 208, 211 Kosovo and Metohija 354, 362 Kostadinov, Yordan 412 Kostić, Branko 407

451

Index Kotalík, Matěj 222 Kotous, Alfons 182, 183 Kotsubyns’kyj, Jurij 127 Kovachev, Ivan Kostov 395 Kowalski, Lech 99, 115 Kozimala, Irena 100, 115 Kozloduy 400 Krajewski, Kazimierz 94, 101, 110, 115 Kraków (region) 106 Krasne 136 Krastev, Anton 396 Kremenets 134 Krikščiūnas, Jurgis 58 Krivickas, Bronius 66 Królewiec 96 Krumovgrad 417 Kučingis, Antanas 59 Kula 399 Kułak Jerzy 101, 115 Kulińska, Lucyna 96, 115 Kuqali, Kol 428 Kuraś, Józef ‘Ogień’ 98, 108 Kurpierz Tomasz 108, 115 Kurska Duga 122 Kurtyka, Janusz 108, 115 Kushal’, Frantsishak 78-80, 83 Kuybyshev (labour camp) 298 Kwieciński, Wincenty 108 Kyiv 122 Kyriakos, Hadji 402 Kysuce 192 Kyustendil 396, 405, 415 Laar, Mart 30 Labiş, Nicolae 325 Lacko, Vojtech 212 Laduchivtsi (village) 133 Lalev, Petar Krastev 394 Lăpușnicu Mare 343 Laurinskas, Leonas 67 Lavrion camp 402 Lazăr, Ion (Dudău) 317 Lebed, Mykola 158 Lechfeld 202, 210 Lednický, Anton 199 Lednický, Augustín 191-192, 197-210, 212 Lednický, Fabián 207 Lettrich, Jozef 193, 196

Levoča 204 Levski 406 Liesis, Bronius 64 Lithuania 4, 5, 6, 91 London 174, 357, 373 Lozoraitis, Stasys 58 Lublin (region) 106 Lublin Voivodship 105 Lukša, Juozas 57, 58, 59 Luncavița 341 Lupeş, Ioan 320 Lusatia 96 Lusatian Neisse river 97 Lviv 124 Łabuszewski, Tomasz 110, 112, 115 Łódź District 97, 103 Łódź (region) 105 Łuczak Agnieszka 97, 115 Macedonia 322, 354, 388, 390 Mach, Alexander 212 Măcin 322 Mačiokas, Mykolas 58 Macoveiciuc, Vladimir 315 Malé Lednice 198, 206, 207 Maléter, Pál 268 Mali Varbovnik 397, 407 Mangelly, Thomas 434 Maniu Iuliu 289, 294 Manu, George 314, 316-317 Maramureș 333 Mărășești 293 Mărgău (village) 290 Marin, Vasile 312 Markulis, Juozas 56 Martin, Ion 318 Martynets, Volodymyr 151 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue 173, 177, 181 Mašíni Ctirad, Josef 226, 227, 229, 230-233 Masovia 95, 98 Masuria 105 Materski, Wojciech 92, 114 Matiș, Costan 296, 297 Matiș, Nastasia 297 Matúš, Alexander 213 McCully, Alan 232 McDermott, Kevin 221 Mechkul 405

452 Mehedinţi 321 Mel’nyk, Andrii 143, 155 Mereu [Ioan] 297 Mereu Crăciun 297 Mereu, Traian 293, 294, 295, 296 Migdalov, Georgi 402 Mihailov, Ivan 398, 404 Mihailović, Dragoljub 364 Mihailović, Dragoljub-Draža 373, 376-378 Mihov, Penyu Hristov 415 Mihuț Gheorghe 286, 287, 288 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola 146, 152 Miknius, Stanislovas 61 Mikołajczyk Stanisław 93, 103, 108 Milučký, Vladimír 206-208, 210 Milučký, Alojz 206, 210 Minaičiai 61 Mindszenty, József 256, 257, 258, 259 Mironovici, Radu 314-315 Mirotín 174 Mişa, Stere 322 Misiło, Eugeniusz 102, 115 Miškinis, Antanas 59 Mittenwald 205 Moldavia 321, 326 Molotkovo (village) Ternopil (region) 132 Momchev, Vesel 389 Momchilgrad 417 Monastyryska (village) Ternopil (region) 131 Monov, Ivan 411 Montenegro 354, 360, 361, 366, 374 Moraru, Alexandru 301 Moravia 181, 219, 96 Moscow 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 66, 69, 174, 183, 197, 282, 367, 400 Moskalivka (village) Ternopil (region) 131 Most 180, 181 Moţa, Ion 311-312 Motyka Grzegorz 101, 103, 115, 175 Mount Pirin 415 Munich 172, 193, 202, 203 Munteanu, Călina 345 Murnau 203, 206-207, 210 Muscel 333, 336 Mussolini, Benito 159, 312 Muszyński, Wojciech J. 100, 101, 114 Mutafchiev, Nikola 394

Index Mutașcu, Dumitru 338 Mykolaiv, Lviv (region) 133, 134 Nagy, Imre 248, 252, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 273, 277, 279 Năsăud (town) 300 Nawrocki, Zbigniew 92, 15, 116 Nazi Germany 401 Neamț 332 Nedić, Milan 362 Nedwed, Karl 196 Negoiță, Nicolae 293 Nemunas 55 Nepos 301 Nesterk, Volodymyr 130 Nestorov, Hristo 402 Nevrokop 402, 411, 416 Niepokulczycki Franciszek 108 Nieustrojev, RA officer 133 Nikolov, Andon 398, 402 Niš 402 Nitra 194, 196 Nitrianska, Streda 192 Niwiński, Piotr 94, 110, 116 North America 3 Nosowski, Zbigniew 113 Nováky 210 Novosiltsim (village) Ternopil (region) 131 Nový Jičín 181 Nucșoara, Argeș 317, 319, 336, 337, 338, 340, 348 Oana, Ionel 290, 298 Oder riever 97 Okhrymovych, Stepan 146 Olsztyn (region) 106 Oltenia 337 Onats’kyi, Evhen 146 Onciu, Pavel 315 Oneț, Roman 287, 288 Oprescu, Mircea 293 Opriţescu, Ion 318 Oradea 299 Orga, Valentin 294 Orłowski Mirosław 96 Orosháza 254 Orshan, Iaroslav 146

Index Oryahovo 399 Oshtava 405 Osikovo 407 Ostasz, Grzegorz 116 Ostrivky 161 Otets Paisiy 395, 396 Ottoman Empire 375 Paczkowski, Andrzej 92, 103, 107, 116 Padubysis 60 Palamartsi (Popovo area) 394 Palov, Syuleyman “Parcho” 411 Pan’kivs’ky, Kost’ 156 Panáč, Jozef 192 Panagyurishte 410 Panciu 324 Panev 416 Pănican Valer 294, 296 Paňko, František 213 Pápa 247 Paprikov, Georgi 394, 395 Paragină, Ion 319 Paris 214 Parov, Dimitar 415 Parov, Syuleyman “Parcho” Ademov 399, 410 Parva (village) 298, 300 Parvenets 400, 415 Parvomai 410 Pașca, Gheorghe 297 Pașca, Traian 294, 296, 297 Pașcalău, Traian 296 Patryliak, Ivan 125 Päts, Konstantin 28 Paučo, Jozef 203 Pavel Banya 390, 402, 416 Pawłokoma 101 Pazardzhik 394, 400, 409, 410 Pazderski, Mieczysław ‘Szary’ 100 Pečiulionis, Motiejus 56 Pejčoch, Ivo 219 Pekić, Borislav 365 Pele, Gheorghe 318 Penteker, Toma 301 Pernik 415 Perov, Georgii 46 Peshtera 410

453 Petkov, Nikola 396, 398, 404 Petliura, Symon 152 Petőfi, Sándor 261, Petraşcu, Nicolae 314-316 Petrauskienė, Aistė 54 Petrek, Anton 206, 210 Peychev, Petar 408 Philby, Kim 439 Piešťany 210 Pietrzak, Leszek 92, 116 Pilviškiai 57 Piraeus 402 Pirin Macedonia 388, 393, 398, 404 Piros, László 250 Piskorowice 100 Pisuliński Jan 101 Piteşti 327 Pițuru, Nicolae 293, 297 Pius XII 59 Plechavičius, Povilas 53 Pleven 395, 399 Plop, Maria 340 Ploski 405, 411 Plovdiv 388, 392, 395, 399, 406, 407, 409, 410 Plovdiv Central Railway Station 388 Poarta Albă 347 Podhale (region) 104, 108 Podlasie 95 Podlasie (region) 101 Poenărei 338 Pohoří 234 Poiana Ilvei (village) 298 Poieni (village) 293, 295 Poland 3, 6, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 107, 110, 112, 173, 183, 222, 378 Poleszak, Sławomir 92, 95, 97, 100, 105, 110, 116 Polissia 165 Pomerania 105 Pop, Nicolae 321 Popa Ioan (nicknamed ‘Ciota’) 285, 286, 287, 288 Popa, Elena 345 Popescu, Teodor M. 320 Popov, Boyan 396, 402, 410, 411 Popov, Manyu Koev 394

454 Popovo 396 Poprad 178, 207 Poptomov, Vladimir 390 Potra, Aure 294, 295, 297 Považská Bystrica 198, 206 Poznań (region) 106 Prague 177, 192, 195-196, 204 Preduț (Constantinescu), Iuliana 348 Presolski, Nikolai Georgiev 395 Prešov 211 Prieložný, Ladislav 212 Primov, Dimitar 408, 411 Prince George Villa 402 Probizhna, Ternopil (region) 133 Protectorate Bohmen (Böhmen) und Mahren (Mähren) 174 Puiu, Gogu 322 Pulice 234 Răchițele (village) 284, 288 Radekhiv 136 Radev, Iliya Mitev 395 Radunia 103 Radviliškis 60, 61 Rahulia, Barys 81, 83, 85-86 Raikov, Ivan 407 Raikov, Veselin 415 Rajec 207-208 Rajnoch, Karl 196-197 Rákosi, Mátyás 246, 247, 250, 252, 262, 263, 264 Ramanauskas, Adolfas 61, 64, 65, 69, 70 Ramonaitė, Ainė 66 Ranković, Aleksandar ‘Marko’ 375-376, 378, 379 Rayanovtsi 411 Rebra (village) 298, 299, 300, 301 Rebrișoara (village) 298, 299, 300, 301 Rešetko, Ján 191-192, 210-213 Rhodope Mountains 398, 415 Ribnovo 388, 411 Ried im Innkreis 211 Riga 173 Rizea, Elisabeta 342 Robu, Ionel 317 Robu, Nicolae 320 Romania 8, 9 Romaniak, Andrzej 98, 116

Index Rome 204, 402 Romuald Rajs ‘Bury’ 101 Roos, Jaan 40 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 40 Rosochach (village) 133 Rügen 96 Rus, Ioan 299 Ruse 390, 395, 415 Rusnachenko, Anatolij 125 Russia 6, 172, 173, 178 Russian Empire 7 Ruychev, Yordan 411 Rzepecki, Jan 93, 94 Rzeszów (region) 106 Rzeszów Voivodship 105 Rzewuski, Andrzej 97 Săcuieu (village) 293, 294, 295, 296 Sadovanu, Ion 314 Sancraiu (village) 293, 295, 297 Sandanski 398 Sangeorz-Băi (town) 301 Sapareva Banya 409 Sas-Wisłocki, Juliusz 97, 116 Sboghițești 338 Schärding 200 Schmitt, Carl 53 Schulz, Ján 194 Sebes, Gusztáv 260 Securitate 334, 335, 336, 337 Seliokas, Vincas 58, 59 Senokos 405 Serbia 354, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 364, 365, 366, 367, 374, 376, 377, 378 Shabanov, RA colonel 133 Shankowskyj, Lew 137 Shishkov, Yosafat 400 Shukhevych, Roman 157, 168 Shumsk, Ternopil (region) 135 Siberia 173, 178, 185 Sibiu 315, 324, 333 Sidor, Karol 213 Siemaszko, Zbigniew S. 97, 116 Sierchuła, Rafał 96, 97, Sighet/Sighetu Marmației [prison] 303 Silesia 105 Sima, Horia 313-314 Simion, Ana 342, 345, 346

455

Index Simov, Grigor 412 Skala, Ternopil (region) 131 Skobelevo 397 Skrypnyk, Mykola 127 Slánský, Rudolf 179 Slatina 347 Sliven 388, 396, 405, 409, 415, 416, 417 Sliven Hotel 388 Slovakia 7, 8, 177, 178 Smetona, Antanas 52 Smolyan 410, 411, 417 Smultea, Ilie 343 Sofia 197, 395, 400, 407, 410, 415, 417 Sofia Central Prison 396 Sojczyński, Stanisław ‘Warszyc’ 97 Sommer, Vítězslav 222 South Africa 381 Southeastern Europe 363 Soviet Union 1, 4, 6, 10, 122, 128, 379, 380, 394, 408 Spasiv 136 Spiridon Raluca 300 Spirov, Georgi Teoharov 405, 410, 414 Spišská Nová Ves 210 Stalin, Joseph W. [Iosif Vissarionovici] 2, 6, 29, 32, 127, 130, 252, 263, 264, 269, 270, 298, 354, 363, 367, 393, 394 Stalingrad 1 Staneika, Vytautas 56 Stănești 338 Staniškis, Sergijus 64, 65, 69, 70 Stankūnas, Juozas 59 Stara Zagora 388, 402, 409, 415 Stargel 397 Statiev, Alexander 31, 48 Stefanov, Angel 404, 408 Steponaitis, Domas 58, 61 Stets’ko, Yaroslav 146, 153 Stolze, Erwin 158 Stormy Corner 254 Stoyanov, Georgi “Tarpana” 406 Stoychev, Petar Iliev 394 Stradling, Robert 226 Strečno 198 Stryama 394 Strzembosz, Tomasz 93, 116 Stsibors’kyi, Mykola 146, 148 Suceava 315

Suciu Pașcu 285 Suciu, Teodor 287, 288 Suciu, Ioan 317 Suk, Jiří 225 Sumanele Negre Division 333 Sveti Vrach 407, 410, 415 Svoboda, Ludvík 175, 179 Sysoeva, Anastasia 132 Szczecin (region) 106 Szeged 254, 264 Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki Ryszard 9, 116 Šiauliai 60 Šibaila, Juozas 61, 63, 64, 65 Šilėnai 60 Šimkaičiai 64 Štadáni, Vincent 199-200 Štolc, Jozef 206-208, 210 Șușman Avisalon 285, 287, 288, 291 Șușman Catrina 287 Șușman Emilian 287 Șușman Romulica 287 Șușman Teodor, Jr. 285, 287, 288, 291 Șușman Teodor, Sr. 284, 285, 287, 288 Șușman Traian 286, 287 Tadeusz Walichnowski 111 Tahirov, Arif 402, 406 Tămbăluţă, Ion 321 Tapolca 247 Tărcu Mountains 321 Târgu Mureş 312 Târgu Neamţ 321 Târgu Ocnă 321 Tataryntsi 135 Tatra Mountains 298 Tauragė 61 Tecuci 324 Teodor Șușman (group) 283, 284, 287, 291 Teregova 343, 346 Terlecki, Ryszard 108, 116 Ternopil 122, 124, 128, 131 Ţibleş Mountains 321 Timişoara 314 Tirschenreuth 200 Tiso, Jozef 212, 215-216 Tito, Josip Broz 263, 266, 272, 373, 374, 375, 378, 379, 393, 406 Toborek, Tomasz 98, 103, 116

456 Todorov, Gerasim 398, 404, 405, 410, 411, 415 Toma, Simion 324 Torcea, Ion 294, 295, 296 Tosev, Ivan “Goran” 396 Toshevo General 405 Toto, Selaudin 428 Totu, Nicolae 311 Trahanarov, Asen 398, 402 Tran 391, 395, 396, 402, 403, 405, 407, 410 Transcarpathia 165 Transylvania 333 Trskovtsi (village) Twrnopil (region) 132 Tsankov, Aleksandar 401 Tsankov, Georgi 416 Tuhovishte 401 Turčiansky svätý, Martin 198 Turda 315 Turiya 415 Turkey 400, 401, 402, 408 Turlejska, Maria 111, 116 Ukraine 3, 6, 7, 91, 172, 173, 176, 185 Ulashkivtsi forest 133 Unguraşu, Gheorghe 324 United Kingdom 359 United States of America 231 Univ 135 Upper Silesia District 97 Urdăreanu, Gheorghe (Ghiță) 343 Urovene 391 US 394, 408 USSR 100, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 187, 359, 406 Uță, Ioan 338 Užice 358 Užpelkiai 64 Uzunov, Aneshti 411 Vabalas, Alfonsas 58, 59, 60, 63, 69, 70 Vabalas, Raimondas 63 Vădraru, Marta 341, 347 Vădraru, Pavel 341, 347 Valea Drăganului (village) 288, 289 Vanev, Ivan 394 Vanev, Stoichko Rangelov 394 Varna 388, 395, 405 Varna airport 388 Vasilache, Gheorghe 317

Index Vatican 402 Veber, Václav 219, 223 Velichkov, Andon Stoyanov 407 Veliko Tarnovo 389 Veľké Rovné 207 Velykyj Glubochok 132 Verendin (Verindin) 343 Verstiuk, Vladyslav 125 Veselý, Jindřich 179 Veszprém 247 Vető, Lajos 258 Veverskis, Kazys 55 Vicen, Jozef 191-192, 203 Vichev, Kamen 400 Vidin 399, 411 Vienna 3, 196-197, 203 Vilčinskas, Jonas 53 Vilnius 53, 66, 67, 98 Vişoianu, Iosef 318 Vistula (river) 92 Vistula 2 Vlădeasa Mountains 284 Vlahi 405, 410, 415 Vnuk, František 194 Vojtaššák, Ján 195 Vojvodina 362 Volhynia 7, 122, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179, 182, 184, 185, 186 Volia, Ostrovetska 161 Voloshyn, Rostyslav 158 Volyn 162 Vrancea 319, 332, 333 Vratsa 399 Vrútky 198 Vukovo 397, 407 Vytautas 60 Warmia 105 Warsaw 2, 6, 91, 197 Warsaw (region) 106 Warsaw Voivodship 105 Washington 400 Wąsowski, Grzegorz 101 Weiden 201 Welland 300 Weryha, Wasyl 123 West Germany 400, 402 West Podillya 122, 128

Index Western Europe 109 Western Rhodope Mountains 391, 398 Western Ukraine 122, 127 Wierzchowiny 100 Wnuk, Rafał 90, 92, 95, 97, 100, 101, 105, 110, 117 Wyshnevets 134 Yalta 94 Yambol 402, 405, 417 Yanuzov, Dzhemal Mehmedov 411 Yordanov, Borislav 408 Yugoslavia 9, 354, 356, 359, 366, 373, 398, 401, 407 Yugov, Anton 416 Yunatsite 394 Zadzierski Józef ‘Wołyniak’ 100 Zagórski, Andrzej 108, 117 Zajączkowski, Mariusz 92, 100, 117

457 Zálezly 184 Zam 293, 295, 297 Zavarský, Aurelius 197 Zbarazh, Ternopil (region) 134 Zblewski, Zbigniew 94, 117 Zhibevo 411 Zlatanski, Blagoi 408 Zlatograd 417 Zolochiv 129 Zubkova, Elena 30-31 Zychowicz, Piotr 113, 117 Żubryd, Antoni ‘Orłowski’, ‘Zuch’ 98, 108 Żywiec (region) 108 Žatec 177, 180, 182, 185 Železná, Ruda 206 Žemaitis, Jonas 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70 Žilina 198, 201, 207-208 Žiliūtė, Marijona 65 Žingor, Viliam 212