Verifiability of Value 9780231899208

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V E R I F I A B I L I T Y OF V A L U E NUMBER 7 OF THE COLUMBIA STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY EDITED UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

VERIFIABILITY of VALUE By RAY LEPLEY

COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK - 1 9 4 4«

PRESS

COPYRIGHT COLUMBIA FOREIGN

AGENT:

UNIVERSITY OXFORD

1944 PRESS,

UNIVERSITY

NEW

PRESS,

YORK Humphrey

Milford, Amen House, London, E.C. 4, England, AND Β. I. Building, Nicol Road, Bombay, India M A N U F A C T U R E D I N THF. U N I T E D STATES OF AMERICA

TO MY PARENTS

FOREWORD torn by total war needs no reminder that it suffers deeply from conflicts arising from diverse systems of valuation and from inadequate procedures for resolving those conflicts. Yet, despite obstructions and regressions, a spirit of open inquiry and experimental formulation and testing has emerged and is being gradually extended in many human affairs, as, for example, in industry, public health, education, legal procedure, and even in international relations. To develop and examine the implications of this spirit for certain basic issues in value theory and social action is the purpose of the present study. The central problem is the nature and extent of the verification possible in value matters. A

WORLD

This book is a "study," in both the scientific and the artistic meanings of the term. It seeks to examine actual cases of human adjustment, both valuative and factual, as these occur in the everyday activities of science, art, religion, and other social enterprises; and it seeks to let the subject matters suggest their own conclusions as far as possible. It is in these respects scientific in aim and spirit. Nevertheless, such an attempt is itself the expression of a point of view which has inescapably affected the selection, interpretation, and treatment of problems. The study is thus a portrayal of the author's present interests and perspectives, much as is a work of art. It is hoped, however, that the viewpoint has not distorted the subject matter or led to unjustified conclusions, and that further inquiry conducted in similar spirit will confirm or correct the present formulations. The attempt to deal as empirically and accurately as possible with problems presented by actual conflicts in value theory and practice has had some effects on content and style likely to be displeasing both to the value specialist and to the general philosophic or scientific reader. The specialist may feel that many points emphasized or considered might better have been assumed. The general reader, on the other hand, may be disposed to object that the language is often abstract and technical. In response to the

FOREWORD

viii

plea for "plain English" the author must confess his difficulties in finding language adequate to the issues and concepts involved; he can only affirm the need and propriety here, as in other fields of investigation, of specialized vocabulary and phraseology. T h e specialist or anyone else who wishes to ascertain briefly the general approach and main "argument" of the study m a y be advised to read Chapters I - I V , X , and X I I . Students concerned especially with questions regarding the relations of knowing and valuation, the quantitative and the qualitative, the descriptive and the normative, the factual and the creative, or the objective and the subjective, or regarding the ultimate metaphysical status of values, may find the chapters devoted to these topics (Chapters V I X and X I ) of interest even apart from their contributions to the study as a whole. T h e reader should be cautioned, however, that the chapters are interdependent, each presenting but a part of the total thought, even with respect to special topics. Of course no claim is made to completeness. Indeed, this inquiry leads into many further perplexities, especially those of a semeiotic, or sign-using, character. In another study now under w a y the present writer plans to deal more explicitly and fully with semeiotic issues in value theory. M o r e attention will be given, for example, to the translatability into factual terms of statements denoting intrinsic values as compared with those referring to instrumental values, and of statements denoting cause-effect relations as compared with those referring to means-end relations. B u t comments received on manuscripts embodying parts of the projected study indicate that the approach made in Verifiability

of Value is a help-

ful and perhaps indispensable preparation for consideration of such further issues. T h e author wishes to acknowledge encouragement and suggestions received from other students of value theory: John D e w e y

Professors

(Emeritus, Columbia University), C . W .

Morris

(University of C h i c a g o ) , A . E . M u r p h y (University of Illinois), R . B . P e r r y ( H a r v a r d University), and W . M . Urban ( Y a l e Univ e r s i t y ) . Sincere thanks are extended to authors who have liberally granted requests to quote from their writings; to publishers and

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FOREWORD

other holders of copyrights for similar favors, as acknowledged in footnotes; and to the editors of Ethics (formerly The International Journal of Ethics), of The Journal of Philosophy, and of The Philosophical Review, and to the publishers of Philosophy of Science, for permission to quote from these sources. The editors of The Journal of Philosophy and of The Philosophical Review and the publishers of Philosophy of Science have kindly allowed the use, especially in Chapters I, III, VI, and X, of materials from the author's articles listed in the Bibliography. The Columbia University Press has given helpful counsel and made available a wealth of editorial experience. Maud Alverda Lepley, wife of the author, has assisted in many ways, not the least of which have been her companionship and appraisals. R. L. Bradley Polytechnic Peoria, Illinois January, 1944

Institute

CONTENTS

I.

VALUES AND T H E P R E S E N T SITUATION

1

II.

T H E N A T U R E OF V A L U E VERIFICATION

19

III.

E M P I R I C A L ANALYSIS OF VERIFIABILITY

43

IV.

LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF VERIFIABILITY

68

K N O W I N G AND VALUATION

88

V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII.

T H E QUANTITATIVE AND T H E QUALITATIVE

108

T H E D E S C R I P T I V E AND T H E NORMATIVE

127

T H E FACTUAL AND T H E CREATIVE

157

T H E O B J E C T I V E AND T H E S U B J E C T I V E

181

E X I S T E N C E AND V A L U E

197

IDEALISM AND NATURALISM

226

TOWARD T H E F U T U R E

239

BIBLIOGRAPHY

255

INDEX

263

CHAPTER O N E : V A L U E S A N D PRESENT

THE

SITUATION

T H E PROBLEM of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life." 1

Widespread cynicism and indirection result from lack of clarity regarding the nature and status of values. In matters of fact a viewpoint and procedure have been attained which have produced extensive scientific and technological advances and certainties. But in matters of personal and social ends and means we are divided among and within ourselves. Many seek refuge in a fixed scale of values believed to rest securely on religious, logical, or metaphysical grounds. Others, enlightened of such "superstitions," find the only basis of valuation and values in social customs or agreements or in individual preference. The fundamental problem of our human defense against cynicism and for more constant motivation and direction in the construction of an ever new and freer world is the problem of values. But it is by no means easy, if indeed it is now possible, to achieve a significant degree of "integration and cooperation between beliefs about the world" and "beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct conduct." The wide divergence of viewpoints, even among specialists in value theory, attests the difficulties involved.2 These difficulties are due basically to the complexity of the matters to be taken into account. But they result in part also from traditional habits of thought and action and from confusions in the use of terms. Before considering further the possibility of achieving a more adequate approach to value problems it may be well to note three meanings of the terms "value" and "value 1

Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 255 ; by permission of the author. See the Bibliography for a sampling of recent writings on value. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, and Urban, "Value Theory and Aesthetics," in Philosophy Today, give references to important earlier value literature.

2

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

2

theory." These meanings are associated with somewhat distinct historical developments and current interests. When employed in their least inclusive meanings, "value" and "value theory" refer to an interest which developed early in human thought. F o r in this sense the terms are synonymous with " m o r a l , " or "ethical," and with "morals," "ethics," or "ethical theory." T h e study of value is in this sense as old as philosophy itself. T h e contributions of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill are but a few in the long and continuous development of moral value theory. The contemporary tendency to reinterpret ethics in terms of "value" has increased the usage of these terms as equivalents. A second and more inclusive meaning arises from a distinction between facts and values and between judgments of fact and judgments of value. This difference was in effect noted early, for instance, by Aristotle, but has been sharpened and brought to clearer recognition with the development of modern science. In philosophy it has been increasingly marked since K a n t and definitely formulated since Lotze and Ritschl. T h e third and most inclusive meaning of "value" and "value, theory" has resulted from increased attention to the similarities, differences, and interrelations of interests such as truth, beauty, and goodness and of activities such as business, science, art, politics, and religion. M a n y of the problems here involved were pondered early in philosophy, particularly by Plato, but they have coipe to constitute a special phase of inquiry—called "general theory of value"—only in recent times, especially since the pioneering work of the "Austrian school," notably Meinong and von Ehrenfels. 3 In order to distinguish these three meanings we shall, when necessary for clarity, refer to the last or most inclusive as "value( 1 ) , " to the second as " v a l u e ( 2 ) , " and to the most restricted as "value(3)."

Thus v a l u e ( l )

will denote all goods and

evils,

whether economic, scientific, artistic, aesthetic, moral, religious, recreational, or otherwise. Truths ( f a c t s ) as well as beauty and moral goodness are in this sense values. " V a l u e ( l ) " theory will 3 A brief history of value theory is given by Urban in the Encyclopcedia For the Austrian school see Eaton, The Austrian Philosophy of Value.

Britannica.

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

3

mean the general theory of the nature and relations of these several goods and evils. "Value(2)" will refer to what is preferred, approved, or chosen in contrast with what is judged to exist or not to exist. Thus, in science, art, morals, and other interests values(2) are the subject matter or products of "value judgments," in contrast with facts, which are the subject matter or outcomes of "descriptive judgments." "Value(3)" will be used to denote the ethical as distinguished from other interests or goods (and evils), such as the scientific or the aesthetic. When used without a number, these terms will hereafter have the widest possible meaning consistent with the context. For instance, when contrasted with "facts" or "factual" (as they commonly will be), "value" and "valuative" will be used in the sense of value(2); but "value theory" will generally mean "value(l) theory." Such distinction and stabilization of the meanings of terms is of help in clarifying issues of value theory and procedure, but the basic causes of conflict and confusion are not thereby removed. The inherent sources of difficulty, the actual complexities and intricacies of the problems, are not diminished. Of course the inherent complexities cannot be reduced if the problems are to be faced frankly and realistically. Nor can any viewpoint avoid being selective and in this sense "partial." It might be possible, however, to make an approach to the problems or to achieve a perspective which would assist in clarifying issues in dispute. This possibility is suggested partly by the fact that theory of knowledge, which in modern thought started with a similar state of conflict and confusion, has made conspicuous advances. In the early modern period sensationalisms and empiricisms arrayed themselves against rationalisms and intuitionisms of various complexions. Numerous forms of realism dueled incessantly with an even larger number of idealisms and subjectivisms. Yet with the growth of modern science, exploration, invention, and business there has been a profound change in the conception of the source and nature of knowledge. It has become apparent that the earlier opposed theories expressed but partial truths. Each emphasized but a facet of the methodology by which it is now generally ad-

4

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

mitted that knowledge, in the most distinctive meaning of this term, is discovered or achieved. A more inclusive experimental theory of knowledge has incorporated and yet transcended the partial truths of earlier antagonistic views.4 The practice and theory of scientific knowing, as they have thus emerged, are experimental in three respects, which when considered collectively may be called "experimental (1)." In the first place they are experimental, "experimental(2)," in contrast with theories and procedures which may be characterized as "absolutistic." Formulations made in science are increasingly recognized as relative, or "experimental," rather than final, complete, or necessarily universal. Facts and laws are, in the most strict sense, only relatively verified hypotheses. In the second usage, "experimental(3)," the term is employed to emphasize the fact that the operations involved in scientific knowing are essentially "trial and error" in character. They are not regarded as wholly or essentially determined by formal or a priori elements or laws of the understanding. In the third sense, "experimental(4)," the term is used to denote the careful search for data, the control of variables in a situation, the use of "objective" methods of measurement and calculation, and the testing of suggestions by critical thought and by carefully planned and scrutinized action. These operations are conspicuous features of "the experimental" sciences. They clearly include, within a more dynamic yet rigorous and fruitful methodology, the processes so singly and unduly exalted or belittled by earlier theories. Both the source and the nature of knowledge—especially in science—are increasingly conceived as experimental in all three respects, in short, as experimental(l). 5 Certain tendencies in value theory itself suggest that a similar experimental outlook and methodology may perhaps be extended to matters of value. The first tendency is the persistent attempt of 4

This is not, of course, to assert that all issues with regard to scientific methodology have been settled. Though the experimental viewpoint is here largely an accomplished fact, n e w problems constantly arise. For recent issues see, for instance, Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, and Margenau, "Critical Points in Modern Physical Theory," Philosophy of Science, IV, 337-370. 5 So far as possible the term "experimental" will henceforth be used without numerals attached and will then have its widest denotation.

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

5

value theorists to find common elements or basic similarities among scientific, aesthetic, moral, and other kinds of facts and values. This attempt, so inherent in the endeavor to develop a general value theory, carries with it the assumption of the existence of some sort, or sorts, of similarity or relationship. In the face of increasing evidence that scientific facts or values are essentially experimental in character, the interest in developing a general theory naturally generates the proposal to extend the same conception and procedure to all values. The fact that science and scientific methodology are regarded as a part of the subject matter for value theory thus tends to suggest that the experimental viewpoint may help to clarify and unify theory and practice in other human quests. This possibility is supported, in the second place, by the fact that aesthetic theory has recently 6 been undergoing a reconstruction akin to that of scientific theory. It has become apparent that in artistic creation and in aesthetic appreciation and criticism there is an intimate interplay of inner and outer energies. It is now clear that perception, thought, and more overt action operate together in the artistic expressions which are most truly artistic and expressive. And it is likewise increasingly pvident that the operations performed and the aesthetic values generated in art are experimental (2,3), and in a certain sense or degree experimental(4), in character. The fact that a more inclusive experimental approach is thus already in some measure achieved in artistic and aesthetic practice and theory suggests that it may be extended to other nonscientific interests as well. A final tendency indicating this possibility is the gradual emergence of a more experimental attitude in recent ethical and value theory.7 It is present, though often only implicitly, in the thought of representative leaders of each of the major philosophic "schools": idealism, realism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism. 6

This is especially true since the work of B. Croce. See, for example, Carritt, The Theory of Beauty (4th ed.), ΡΡ· 215-217, 287-295 ; D e w e y , Art as Experience, chaps, i v - v and pp. 167-169; Hoffman, Heads and Tales, chap, ii; Parker, Principles of Aesthetics, chaps, i v - v , vii; Pepper, Aesthetic Quality; and Schoen, Art and Beauty, chaps, iii-v. 7 This fact and some implications of the viewpoint were discussed briefly in m y "The D a w n of Value Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 365-373.

6

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

Perhaps it is most explicit in the writings oí Dewey, who has shown that in practical choices, or "judgments of practice," internal and external aspects of situations interact dynamically to affect the values placed upon the various matters under consideration and to determine or to direct the operations constituting choice itself.8 Dewey has stressed quite explicitly what we have here called the inclusive experimental(3,4) character of the interactions which occur in dealing with matters of value as well as with matters of fact. 9 He has repeatedly emphasized the experimental(2), or nonabsolutistic, character of both facts and values. His viewpoint is briefly summed up in such statements as these: Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior. 10 Operational thinking needs to be applied to the judgment of values just as it has now finally been applied in conceptions of physical objects. Experimental empiricism in the field of ideas of good and bad is demanded to meet the conditions of the present situation. 11

The experimental outlook is less clearly present in the thought of the "realists" G. E. Moore and R. B. Perry. Although Moore's advocacy of the idea that value is, like yellow, an ultimate quality or datum may appear to be a static or absolutistic view, this certainly is not the intent, as may be inferred from the following: T o ask what kind of actions we ought to perform, or what kind of conduct is right, is to ask what kind of effects such action and conduct will produce. 12 It is plain that no moral law is self-evident. . . . 13 It will, however, be a useful task if [Practical] Ethics can determine which among alternatives likely to occur will produce the greatest total 8 See Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 349-389; and "Judgments of Practice," The Journal of Philosophy, XII (1915), 505-523. 9 See especially The Quest for Certainty, chap. x. 10 11 Ibid., p. 259; by permission of the author. Ibid., p. 258. 12 Principia ethica (1929 impression), p. 146; by permission of the Macmillan Company, publishers, U.S., on behalf of Cambridge University Press, England. 13 Ibid., p. 148.

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

7

value. For, though this alternative cannot be proved to be the best possible, yet it may be better than any course of action which we should otherwise adopt. 14

It seems clear from these statements that Moore does not believe in intuitively self-evident moral goods or laws, but rather believes that these must be determined, so far as they can be, through experience and reflective consideration in each situation of choice. The experimental character and intimate interplay of internal and external factors necessary for intelligent choice appear to be implied, though not made explicit. Perry conceives values as any object of any interest. 15 The nonabsolutistic character of his viewpoint is attested not only by the emphasis placed upon the dynamic interrelation of the subject and the object of interest and the developmental character of personalities and cultures 16 but also by the following explicit statement. It does not follow from the general fact of comparative value that there is any absolutely best, or absolutely worst. . . . It would be quite unsafe to assume that there is any perfect object, than which nothing could be better, or even to assume that perfection in this sense means anything at all.17

Perry's attempt to find definite principles of evaluation 18 does not pretend to avoid the assumption that these are to be used in each situation of choice. It may appear that he places too much emphasis upon a purely theoretical and quantitative treatment of interests as if they might be given a fixed unchanging order of worths, an order determinable by thought alone. But the recognition of a "principle of correctness" 19 and the stress laid on the "principle of inclusiveness" 20 both seem to assume an interaction in which external and internal factors assist in a progressive discovery of the relative worths of various objects for human interest and of interests in relation to each other. Here, again, a more inclusive experimental viewpoint is more implicit than explicit. 14 16 17 18

Ibid., Ibid.., Ibid., Ibid.,

15 p. ISO. General Theory of Value, chap. v. pp. 180-184, 383-385, 460-471, S20. pp. 600-601 ; by permission of Longmans, Green and Co., publishers. 19 2 chaps, xx-xxii. Ibid., pp. 611 f. ° Ibid., pp. 615 f., 645-658.

8

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

Among the vanguard of those who approach value theory from an idealistic viewpoint are Urban and Parker. It is true that Urban finds in value experiences evidences that norms possess at certain points a unique type of objectivity. 21 He also concludes "that the logical presupposition of all valuation must be a single incontestable and unconditional value, follows from the logical unity of the value judgment, and from the claims of the value judgment to objectivity." 22 Yet there is throughout his treatment of value a tenacious adherence to a genetic point of view, with emphasis on the dependence of the normative upon the descriptive 23 and of the ideal upon the empirical. Religious and aesthetic experiences have axiological validity, and are not merely empty mysticism, only in so far as they retain as their content and indispensable presuppositions, the meanings acquired in personal participation.24 But that these values are acquired, that the distinctions between the different groups of worth objects is not ultimate, is apparent in the breakdown—at the limits—of the so-called law of preference.25 While it is in the nature of ideals to transcend experience, in that they are not completely convertible into factual and truth judgments, nevertheless they are real, and control experience only in so far as they are well-founded anticipations of experience.26

Parker is at many points avowedly experimental in his outlook. He defines value as the satisfaction of desire or interest. 27 He finds that systems of interest develop and make demands for satisfaction, but that there is no single primordial value (interest) unless it be the unity of the self with its various levels of desire systems.28 Supposedly self-evident principles are, he concludes, either analytic or tautologous, but are in any case empirical or definitional in 21

Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, pp. 17-18, 390-395, 400-401. Ibid.., p. 381 ; by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, U.S., on behalf of George Allen and Unwin, England. See also Urban's essay in Contemporary Idealism in America. 23 Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, pp. 6-9, 11, 19. 24 Ibid., p. 349; by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, U.S., on behalf of George Allen and Unwin, England. 25 28 Ibid., p. 379. Ibid., pp. 420-421. 27 28 Parker, Human Values, pp. 17-40, 409-411. Ibid., pp. 40-58. 22

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

9

29

origin. Principles arise within, and must be used experimentally for meeting, the situations presented by an uncertain world. The experimental quality of his thought is apparent in such statements as these: There is no principle by means of which the existence of some high value can be weighed against untoward consequences to other values. The balance must always be adjusted experimentally in each case as it arises.30 To maintain the absoluteness of any system of ethical laws is tantamount to denying the creative character of human experiences. In life as in science, if law determines experiment, so likewise experiment determines law.31 Of the logical positivists, or logical empiricists, the late Moritz Schlick has given perhaps most attention to value problems. He rejected absolute values as meaningless 32 and stressed the need for testing all ethical formulations by reference to "experience." 3 3 This viewpoint is succinctly expressed by Herbert Feigl. Says he: The acceptance of an absolute authority or extra-mundane sanction for morality, like the belief in an absolute source of factual truth, manifests a not fully liberated; pre-scientific type of mind. A completely grown-up mankind will have to shoulder the responsibility for its outlook and conduct; and in the spirit of an empirical and naturalistic humanism it will acknowledge no other procedure than the experimental and no other standards than those prescribed by human nature and by our own insights in the possibilities of improving human nature. 34 The same tendency to approach problems of value from a more experimental standpoint is apparent in the writings of other present theorists whose names are less closely associated with particular 29

Ibid.., pp. 106-122. Ibid., pp. 104-10S; by permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers. 31 Ibid., p. 122. 32 Problems of Ethics, chap. v. 33 Ibid.; for example, pp. 184-186, 190, 194. 34 "Logical Empiricism," in Twentieth Century Philosophy, p. 404 ; by permission of the author and the editor. Rudolf Carnap, another prominent member of this school of thought, indicates in recent correspondence that he is in complete agreement with Feigl's formulation and regards it as the most representative formulation of the views of logical empiricism today. 30

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philosophic schools.35 The need for this point of view is quite explicitly and confidently expressed, for example, by Mayer. The choice, in short, of an inclusive and harmonious set of interests should be regarded as a tentative and progressive process. Its conformity with nature is experimentally verified through action, which in turn may serve to modify the grouping of interests and provide for further experiment and verification. Hypothesis, experiment, and verification must come to be regarded as just as truly applicable to human behavior, in efforts to achieve the 'highest good,' as they have long since come to be regarded as essential to progress in physical and biological science.36

The purpose of these rather lengthy citations is to call attention to the fact that a more inclusive experimental outlook is present, at least potentially, within various current philosophic systems and viewpoints and also to suggest that the rise of this outlook may mark the beginning of a reconstruction in ethical and value theory similar to, and indeed continuous with, that which has already occurred most fully in science and is now clearly under way in art and aesthetics. The purpose is not to show that all the authors referred to are "experimentalists" in any special philosophic sense of this term. There is no intent to propose a merger or to assume the unwelcome role of peacemaker among traditional "enemies." Nor is the object to prove that the theories are in perfect or even major agreement. Quotations could be given from the same and other sources to show how diverse and divergent prevailing viewpoints are, especially in ethical and general value theory. 37 Indeed, 35

See, for instance, the articles by Mayer and by Srinivasienger cited in the Bibliography. 36 "Comparative Value and Human Behavior," The Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), 492. 37 For instance, in a recent address before a joint meeting of the American Philosophical Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (delivered at Philadelphia, December 28, 1940, and published as "Science and Value," in Ethics, LI [April, 1941], 291-306), Urban called for a "decentralization of the sciences"—for recognition that the methodology of valuation or of the normative sciences is essentially different from that of fact finding in the strict sense—and charged that the experimental view begs the whole question of the nature and status of values. In commenting on this address, however, Professor Harlow Shapley countercharged that those who advocate decentralizing the sciences seek to escape scientific criteria and the labor of attaining further scientific unification. But whether or not this is true in all cases, or was true in this instance, it may at least be doubted whether an attempt has yet been made, as carefully and persistently as in most of

VALUES A N D T H E P R E S E N T SITUATION

11

as will soon be noted, it is precisely the conflicts among current theories and practices which raise issues for the experimental viewpoint now gradually dawning on the value horizon. The most obvious ground for questioning the fruitfulness of the experimental approach in matters of value(2,3) is the fact that whereas this viewpoint has already become dominant in science it has not made such conspicuous advances in aesthetics and especially in moral and social theory and practice. This may indicate that there are certain inherent differences which make the experimental attitude less fruitful in aesthetic and moral matters. Of course, if there are factors other than possible inherent differences, say factors of a historical character, which account for the relative tardiness in the extension of the experimental viewpoint to matters of value(2,3), this objection may lose its force. Two factors may thus have operated. In the first place, the distinctions traditionally made between the material and the spiritual, the physical and the mental, the empirical and the rational, the practical and the theoretical, and other kindred separations in thought have been more firmly established with respect to aesthetic and moral matters. Modern scientific thought and inquiry were finally allowed to develop more freely and independently, due to a kind of gentlemen's agreement that the moral, aesthetic, and religious would not be thereby disturbed. The widespread current theory that these are separate realms quite distinct and unaffected by findings in the physical sphere is but an indication of the actual restrictions and inhibitions still operating upon thought and inquiry with regard to value matters. Cherished beliefs and associations nourished by traditional institutions and practices have commonly fostered divisions in thought and action that are inimical to the development of a more experimental point of view in religion, art, and morals. In the second place, large social changes and interactions have in the main followed rather than preceded scientifico-technological the special sciences, to develop the experimental approach and viewpoint in value matters. Certainly such attempts must be made before this viewpoint can be justly said to have begged or obscured basic issues.

12

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

and economic changes. Modern scientific advances have, it is true, affected vitally the subject matter, techniques, and modes of thought and feeling which are coming to flower in current art and morals. But attention has been given chiefly to scientific and commercial matters. As a consequence, aesthetic and especially ethical theory have lagged behind scientific methodology. Only in scattered instances and limited areas have human ends and means been conceived as hypotheses and carefully tested and revised in further thought and action. A more critical and inclusive experimental methodology has not become so dramatic in aesthetic and particularly in social affairs. In so far as these factors account for the tardiness in the development of experimental treatment of values, it is unnecessary to presuppose the existence of inherent differences in purpose, subject matter, or methodology which make the extension of such treatment impossible or less fruitful in aesthetic and moral matters than in scientific matters. On the other hand, the fact that these retarding factors have operated is in no sense a proof or even an evidence that there are not inherent differences which make this development impossible, unsound, or of limited significance. Indeed, there are conspicuous differences, actual and alleged, inherent or not, between scientific and nonscientific enterprises, between matters of fact and matters of value. It is precisely the existence of differences and the allegations concerning them which present in peculiarly acute form the problem of the further practicability and fruitfulness of the experimental approach in value matters. The issue now coming to sharpest focus involves what appears to be the central implication of the experimental viewpoint itself. As already noted, it is clear that in science suggestions which spring up during attempts to solve problems are to be treated as hypotheses subject to testing or verification through further operations of thought and action. Only in so far as hypotheses are verified are they relatively established as knowledge or truth. Now a like viewpoint with regard to moral values and values in general would indicate that goods (objects, desires, satisfactions, acts, and ar-

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

13

rangements) become or are known to be values, in the most distinctive sense, only when and in so far as they are critically tested, or verified. But it is at this point that the crucial issue arises : Is any significant verification possible in matters of value(2,3)? What is the nature of such verification, testing, or confirmation as may be possible here? How is it related to or different from—in kind or extent—the verification of facts, scientific and otherwise? The problem here presented has, it is clear, two aspects. On one side it concerns the character of the psychological and logical processes and content involved in valuation as compared with knowing, of the processes and content in more "factual" interests, such as the sciences, as compared with those in more "valuative" interests, such as art and morals. Are there or are there not such differences that verification is impossible in matters of value, or less possible than in matters of fact—impossible in art or morals, or less possible than in science? And if any verification of values is possible, does it or does it not differ in kind from more factual verification, especially from that which occurs in science? But viewed from the other side, the problem of verification and verifiability is one of the locus and "ultimate" status of values as compared with facts. Are there any aesthetic or moral values as objective and demonstrable as scientific facts? Is there "really" any cosmic, ontological, psychological, or logical basis, other than "mere" personal preference or social agreement, for aesthetic and moral judgments of value? Of course the issues which thus come to focus in the problem of verification and verifiability are ancient and perennial ones. They have been considered in many forms and from many points of view by almost every major philosopher from Democritus and Plato to Hume and Kant, and even in conflicts of more recent vintage. Their very antiquity and traditional associations make it difficult to integrate, with a more adequate perspective and with judicious balance, the elements of truth emphasized in past and present antagonistic views. But that the problem of verification is peculiarly

14

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a focal point of present conflicts, theoretical and practical, becomes apparent upon examination of both current value literature and the contemporary social scene. This problem is thrust most directly into prominence by the divergence of opinion regarding verifiability. Some theorists 3 8 assert or assume that values are in a significant sense and degree verifiable, but others 3 0 hold, on various grounds, that values are unverifiable. The difference of viewpoint is here often more apparent than real. All will probably agree that little or no ultimate or unquestionable verification is possible. But granting this, the views expressed vary widely as to whether any genuine verification can be effected. Those who agree that some verification is possible differ about how much and how significant it can be. It is frequently asserted that, values and value judgments are essentially subjective, qualitative, creative, or normative in character and consequently unverifiable. A second circumstance which brings this problem to explicit formulation and makes it of pressing importance is the fact that some social theorists 4 0 hope to effect improvements, possibly a "Copernican revolution," by applying the experimental method and attitude to the formation and testing of social ends and means. But others 4 1 apparently regard human nature and behavior as so irrational and unpredictable that knowledge such as the social sciFor example, Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 386, also The Quest for Certainty, chap, x ; Mayer, op. cit., pp. 4 9 1 - 4 9 2 ; Stallknecht, "The Place of Verification in Ethical Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 150-156; and Urban, "Value Propositions and Verifiability," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 589-602. 3 9 For example, Carnap, philosophy and Logical Syntax, pp. 24—25; Krusé, "Cognition and Value Reexamined," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 2 2 5 - 2 3 4 ; Osborne, Foundations of the Philosophy of Value, pp. 7 6 - 7 7 ; Charner M. Perry, "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The International Journal of Ethics, X L I I I (1932-1933), 127-144; Russell, Religion and Science, p. 249; and Schlick, Problems of Ethics, chap. ii. 4 0 For example, Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, chap, xi ; and Hook, Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. 4 1 For example, Charner M. Perry, "Knowledge as a Basis for Social Reform," The International Journal of Ethics, X L V (1934-1935), 2 5 3 - 2 8 1 ; and Knight, "Social Science and Social Action," The International Journal of Ethics, X L V I (1935-1936), 1-33, and "Pragmatism and Social Action," The International Journal of Ethics, X L V I (1935-1936), 229-236. 38

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

IS

enees can give is of very limited value in directing human affairs. The latter group seem to feel that between the subject matter of the experimental sciences and human phenomena there is a great gulf ; between facts and values a difference of kind, not of degree ; between experimentation in science and experimentation in art, politics, business, or personal relations a crucial difference, which we sentimentally overlook if deluded by the dream of extending the experimental, scientific method beyond its legitimate sphere. The possibility of verification in matters of value, indeed the possible fruitfulness for value theory of the entire experimental approach, is thus both prophesied and called into question. Although the problem of verification is brought to most explicit and conscious theoretical formulation as a result of the conflicts just mentioned, a survey of recent value discussion 42 discloses the fact that a preponderance of attention has been and is being given to issues which are integrally or intimately related to this problem, either on its psychological and logical or on its more metaphysical side. Some of the questions are these: In what, if any, sense are values objective? In what, if any, sense are they authoritative? What is the relation of cognition and valuation? Of perception of facts and choice of ends? Is truth a value in the same sense as are beauty and moral goodness? What is the relation of physical events to social events, of the subject matter of the physical and that of the social sciences? What, if any, role does the quantitative play in comparative valuation? What is the relation of interest and value? Are there any objective standards of valuation? Is there danger of factualism in ethics? Can ethics be made scientific? What role does or may intelligence play in value determination and in the guidance of action? Is the methodology of value deliberation different from that of scientific fact finding? What is the ontological status of values? The underlying issues common to much of this recent discussion, issues in which current value conflicts in large measure center, may be grouped under and suggested by such contrasting headings as "knowing and valuation," "the qualitative and the quantitative," 42

See the Bibliography.

16

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

"the descriptive and the normative," "the subjective and the objective," "existence and value." It will be noted that involved in these contrasts are the chief points of difference between facts and values and between scientific and nonscientific interests which are commonly alleged to render values unverifiable, or less verifiable than facts. Consequently, the considerable, attention being given to these issues but serves to accentuate, on the side of theory, the present importance of the problem of verification. The situation suggests that a further clarification of these issues may be possible only when a more adequate conception of the more inclusive problem is achieved and that any such conception is to be tested largely by its ability to clarify these related questions. The final source of the present urgency concerning the problem of verification, and perhaps also the root source of the aforementioned conflicts in theory, is the widespread contrast experienced in all aspects of current social life—the contrast between the certainties of science and technology, on the one hand, and the uncertainties of human goals and policies, on the other. The presence of this conflict need not be emphasized ; it is felt by everyone who is in any degree alive both to the marvels and to the maelstroms of our age. Improved means for intercommunication and for social conflict and propaganda have, even apart from increased knowledge of the evolution of cultures, made us dramatically aware of the multiplicity of the ends men choose and of the patterns of life they pursue. International and industrial conflict, crime and poverty amid potential creativity and plenty, carnage and destruction displacing cooperation and peace—all combine to heighten the present contrast between scientifico-technological certainties and human uncertainties. Widespread and pervasive conflicts in public and private life present in new and vivid form the problem of the nature and validity of judgments of right and wrong, of good and bad, of the more and the less valuable. On the one hand, then, the present scientifico-technological situation and certain tendencies in theory make dramatically clear the character of a more inclusive experimental conception of the origin and nature of knowledge and suggest that the further extension or

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

17

development of this viewpoint may help to effect a similar clarification and integration in value theory in general. On the other hand, differences between facts and values, between matters of fact and matters of value, and between knowing and valuation are vividly emphasized both by certain conflicts in theory and by the contrasts between scientific and nonscientific interests and procedures. These two groups of present conditions and tendencies converge and conflict crucially with respect to the possibility of and the character of value verification. The central implication of the developing experimental viewpoint is that values—moral values as well as scientific facts—are suggestions relatively verified and therefore in some sense and degree verifiable. B u t it is precisely this implication and its significance which conflicts in theory and contrasts in social conditions and practices call sharply into question. Stated more broadly, the convergence and conflict of these two groups of conditions and tendencies constitutes a crucial test of the experimental point of view. The problem presented by the present situation is peculiarly one of the applicability of the experimental outlook and method, so fruitful in the arts and sciences, to the determining and testing of personal and social ends and means. Or, even more generally, it is the problem of the relation and interrelation of "fact finding" and "valuation" to and among all our human quests. Is the experimental approach and viewpoint capable of extension to all human interests and their interrelations? In short, can it assist significantly in the further development of a theory of value which is truly general, a value theory which may help in attaining more adequate unity and direction in personal and social affairs as well as in the other arts and sciences? Of course, if it be true that an inclusive experimental approach is necessary for the most adequate conception of and guidance in all our human quests, a maximum "integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his.conduct" cannot be achieved in theory apart from action. T h e experimental viewpoint itself implies that a maximum of fruitful development

18

VALUES AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

and unification of value theory will be accomplished only when thought and action operate together to direct and test each other, only when thought and action become critical and creative aspects of experimental processes of adjustment in all quests. More purely theoretical formulations and abstract discussions can be of little help except as they serve to suggest new approaches or perspectives, to suggest further clarifications, integrations, or developments. The present study does not undertake a complete or comprehensive treatment of all the problems posed for the experimental viewpoint by the conflicts in prevailing conditions and tendencies. These problems are legion. It can be at best but a beginning or continuation in the examination and discussion of one central issue, namely, the problem of the verification and verifiability of various kinds of values, with special attention to aesthetic and moral values as compared with scientific values. It is accordingly a study in rather than of the experimental theory of value. Yet despite this delimitation and restriction, issues are intimately interrelated. To some extent they must therefore be considered together. Moreover, the entire experimental viewpoint may be tested by its ability to assist in clarifying, integrating, or extending theory with respect to any single issue. In this sense the present work is also a study of the experimental theory of value as a whole.

CHAPTER TWO: T H E N A T U R E VALUE

OF

VERIFICATION

when the impulse is being appeased through the verification of the objective in the activity which it proposes." 1 \ ^ L U E EXISTS

"The contributory worth of past determinations of value is dependent upon the extent in which they were critically made. . . . In other words, the presumptive force of a past value in present judgment depends upon the pains taken with its verification." 2 Whether any significant verification is possible in matters of value is confused, in part, by two variables: "values" and "verification." In this chapter we are interested in "value" in all the meanings distinguished at the outset. Is there a general method of verification common to science, art, and morals, that is, common to value in its widest extension ( v a l u e [ l ] ) ? In other words, are personal and social, or moral, values (value [ 3 ] ) verified through basically the same processes as are the "goods" of science (truth) and of art (beauty) ? And, considering all quests or subject matters together, is the verification of value judgments (of values[2]) the same, so far as verification may here be possible, as that of existential or descriptive judgments (of "facts") ? The term "verification" will be used liberally rather than in the sense of final and demonstrable proof. I t will be employed to denote any testing or confirmation, of whatever kind and degree. To discover the nature of verification and to what extent it is possible in matters of value, especially in value(2) and value(3), is precisely our problem in this chapter and subsequent chapters. As previously noted, the more inclusive experimental pattern of knowing which, it is now generally admitted, operates in science and is increasingly recognized as the general pattern of artistic creation and appreciation seems to imply, if it may properly be extended to 1

Parker, Human Values, p. 409. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Chicago Press, publishers. 2

Logic, p. 386 ; by permission of The University of

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THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

personal and social ( " m o r a l " ) matters, that suggested goods (ends, means, impulses, interests, satisfactions, acts) are known to be or are relatively established as values—at least for this situation and perhaps for similar situations—only when these suggested or hypothetical "values" are carried into action and when the consequences are carefully and critically considered. From this conception it seems to follow that all values are verified, so far as they may be, through a methodology with the same general structure, whether the values be those of truth, beauty, or goodness, whether the suggested hypotheses be the formulations of value judgments or of descriptive judgments. If this viewpoint is correct, an analysis of the general pattern of verification in one human interest should apply, at least in the main, to other interests as well. And since the various processes of scientific investigation are most dramatically apparent, it may be best to ask at the outset : What is the nature of verification in science? But as soon as this question is raised, the answer may be predetermined by prior assumptions about the proper usage of the term "verification." For it is not uncommon to restrict this term to the testing of hypotheses empirically in action. The tendency to make this restriction rises from a well-grounded desire to indicate that objective " f a c t s " or events have a stubborn way of being what they are and that ideas about them are often incorrect. In many cases such correctness or incorrectness becomes painfully apparent when the "hard facts" are consulted—either by observation or experimentation. The test which ideas thus receive is dramatically impressive. Hence in both popular and scientific usage ideas are commonly said to be verified when tested by their consequences in action—"action" meaning overt or empirical operations. This usage is also strengthened by a not uncommon tendency in logical analysis to identify verification with the fifth or last step in a unit of reflective thinking.3 Such restriction of the term "verification" is of course justifiable so long as it does not obscure the fact that not all scientific con3 See, for example, Burtt, Principles and Problems oj Right Thinking (1931 ed.), pp. 58-59, 112-117, and Dewey, How We Think (1933 ed.), pp. 113-115.

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

21

firmation or testing occurs through empirical observation or experimentation. When the process of inquiry is viewed more broadly, it becomes apparent that the entire process, in so far as it is critical, is permeated by operations which contribute to the testing or verification of suggested solutions. If the term "verification" is to be restricted to empirical operations of testing, we seem to require some more inclusive term to embrace also such testing and confirmation as is secured through critical reflective thinking, mathematical analysis, social discussion, and the like—processes which by themselves are admittedly seldom final, yet are integrally related and indispensable processes in the elaboration and critical examination of suggestions. Accordingly the present writer prefers, as indicated previously, to use the word "verification" in a broader sense in order to have a term which includes all the processes of "testing," whether of thought or of overt action, whether individual or social, to whatever extent these processes may yield "evidence," "confirmation," "reasonable presumption," "established knowledge," or "proof." This usage is of course as arbitrary as any other. The usage of a term is strictly a personal matter so long as it does not blind us to relevant facts. The facts which need to be recognized, at least with reference to scientific verification, seem to be as follows : testing is not confined to empirical operations; verification (in the present usage) permeates all the processes of critical and creative inquiry; these processes are integrally interrelated; and more overt and less overt operations commonly assist each other—directly or indirectly, to establish verification, in the most complete as well as the most inclusive meaning of the term. Or, stated more briefly, verification in science occurs through the interrelated processes of social discussion, individual thinking, and interaction with overt or external events. Suggestions arise within and are in varying degrees tested through the consequences disclosed or created by these various modes of interaction. Some ideas are tested, with positive or negative results, largely by inference; others chiefly by overt operations, such as "direct" observation or the use of instruments; but

22

T H E N A T U R E OF V A L U E V E R I F I C A T I O N

in most cases overt and nonovert operations, past or present, assist each other in the creation and further verification of suggestions. But does this inclusive and experimental conception of verification hold true 'for art and morals, as well as for science, and therefore for v a l u e ( l ) ? Or, if it be recognized that there are value problems in science as well as in art and morals, and factual problems in art and morals as well as in science, does the same kind or pattern of verification operate in matters of value as in matters of fact? It should be noted here that when applied to values, especially to matters of art and of morals, the term "verification" has a decided limitation, due to its etymological connotations. It suggests exclusive interest in truth or correctness, which obviously is not the sole or predominant interest in either art or morals. Often it may better be said that artistic and moral expressions or formulations are adequate rather than true or correct. 4 A better word for the testing which occurs in such cases might be "adequation" rather than "verification." 5 But for convenience and also in keeping with a rather common usage in value theory, the term "verification" will be applied to matters of value as well as to facts, to art and morals as well as to science. Accordingly, it is to be remembered that as here used "verification" means any kind of testing which occurs, whether chiefly with respect to truth or correctness or with regard to relative adequacy, fruitfulness, or ability to lead on to other significant experiences. Keeping this usage in mind, we return to the question: Is the same general pattern of verification present in art and morals (value[3] ) and in science, with regards to matters of value(2) and facts, and, finally, in the verification of all goods and evils (value[ 1 ] ), so far as verification may be possible? Now this question may with a certain presumption of correctness be answered in the 4

This point is well emphasized by Raup, "Limitations of the Scientific Method," Teachers College Record, X X X (1928), 212-226. 5 Urban suggests the term "authentication" and regards this as a distinct kind of verification or validation. See his article "Value Propositions and Verifiability," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 589-602, and his book Language and RealityPP· 213 ff. We shall consider this viewpoint in chap. vii.

T H E NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

23

affirmative, if it be granted that the common denominator of the activities constituting science, art, and morals, whether with regard to factual matters or valuative matters, is problem-solving adjustment, and if it be further granted that the psychological analysis of problem solving, say the analysis made by Dewey, holds true for all instances of problem solving. It would then follow that in moving from an unsettled to a settled state the same general functions or acts are performed, no matter what the subject matter. As stated in a logically ordered sequence of acts, these functions are said to be " ( i ) a felt difficulty, (ii) its location and definition, (iii) suggestion of possible solution, (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of this suggestion, and (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection." 6 Of course we should expect to find that the subject matter dealt with and possibly the methodology employed do actually differ somewhat in problems of science, art, and morals and in problems of fact and problems of value. But if such an analysis of problem solving is truly general, the main phases or functions in adjustment should in any case be the same. Yet to assume from such an analysis that the inclusive experimental conception of verification holds for valuation as well as for fact finding would be to ground our position upon only a presumption. For, though the analysis is based upon the study of actual problems, they were not selected especially to test the present issue. In order to do this it would seem necessary to take a factual problem and a valuative problem from each of the three representative interests (science, art, and morals) and to consider what operations of inquiry and testing are needed and possible in each instance. It is also apparent that simple problems which are most purely factual, on the one hand, and most purely valuative, on the other, may yield clearest and most valid analysis. To such analysis, then, we must turn to see whether or not the inclusive experimental conception of verification may properly be applied to value(2,3) problems and therefore to all value problems. e

How We Think (1910 ed.), p. 72; by permission of D. C. Heath and Company, publishers.

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T H E N A T U R E OF VALUE VERIFICATION

Here again we are confronted with a difficulty. For are there any purely factual problems involving no "valuation" or any purely valuative problems involving no fact finding? Are there any genuine grounds, other than traditional usage, for this distinction? If so, what are they? This is a real difficulty, and later 7 the relations and differences of the factual and the valuative must be considered more closely. Perhaps it will suffice here to say that in each act of attention or interest there is apparently a certain polarity, or at least that there are many interests. There is both interest in and interest of, or perhaps better, there is interest in the nature of events (things, acts, relations, or arrangements) as such and interest in events as means, either to other extrinsic events or to events of or as intrinsic satisfaction. For the present, then, we shall assume that factual and valuative problems may be, at least in some instances, significantly distinguished. W e shall suppose that problems are factual in which the interest is solely or chiefly in knowing the nature of events as such and that those are valuative in which the interest is mainly in events as means to other events, extrinsic or intrinsic. Extremely simple factual and valuative problems in science are suggested b y these questions, such as may occur when a chemist examines the condition of some newly acquired apparatus: "Will this Bunsen burner light?" and "Will it burn well?" Each of these questions is easily given a definitive answer. T h e operations needed to move from a state of uncertainty to one of certainty in solving the first or factual problem will appear to an onlooker to be largely overt. B u t the complex nature of the sensory-perceptualreflective processes, of which for most part even the chemist is not aware, may be surmised b y any student of psychology. T h e acts performed in looking at and perceiving the burner and raising this question, as well as "thinking" of the burner and connecting it to a gas line, getting a flame or match, turning on the gas and applying the flame, and finally judging the result: " I t lights!" or " T h e thing won't light ! "—these acts are in fact extremely complex inter7

Chaps, iv, vii, and x.

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

25

actions, involving an interplay of energies both internal and external. In such a simple concrete matter as this appears to be, the simplicity results of course both from the relatively small number of the things to be observed and manipulated and their direct accessibility and also from the fact that a chemist will have built up habits of thought and action which make it possible for the responses to proceed smoothly and rapidly without much random trial and error, verbalization, or conscious formulation. The suggestion which arises and is verified by the operations of connecting, lighting, and noting, will perhaps not be clearly and consciously stated by the chemist. It may be verbalized thus : " I can find out by trying to light it" or " I f gas is attached and a flame applied, the burner will or will not light." The whole process of adjustment may be portrayed, if a bit artificially, in terms of the problemsolving procedure: felt difficulty ("Will this burner light?"); defining problem ( " W h a t can be done to see whether this burner will light?"); suggestion ("Light it and s e e " ) ; elaboration of suggestion ( " I f attached to gas and a light applied, it will either burn or not b u r n " ) ; trying out and noting consequences ( " I t burns all right"). Even in making this last judgment there is evidently a very complex process. The "judgment," if made explicit, might be stated thus: " I f a 'thing' looks so and so and so, it is a flame. This case meets these requirements and is therefore a flame, which means that this burner lights." Such judgments do not, of course, exist in some subconscious place; they or similar meanings are assumed in the habits of response built up through past experiences. But the valuative question ("Will the burner burn well?") appears to introduce another factor—well for or with reference to what? In most cases of this kind the purposes for which the Bunsen burner are to be used are well known to the chemist; they function as expectations in his behavior. When these purposes are assumed, the operations needed to answer this value question become almost identical with those required for answering the question "Will it burn?" But there are also other processes by which the character

26

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

of the flame is noted and judged against or by aid of the background of additional meanings or expectations which, like the meanings which assisted in answering the first question, have been built up through previous experiences. The purposes themselves have risen in and have been tested by previous interactions and may be further tested and modified by subsequent interactions. Doubtless the purposes will be for most part assumed in this instance, but they assist, in relation to expectations, in evaluating the way in which the burner burns. The suggestion to be verified might be expressed thus: "Whether this burner burns well can be discovered by lighting it and noting how it burns," or " I f it is attached, lighted, and examined, I can decide whether or not it burns as a burner usually does or 'should.' " The total adjustment may also be schematized as an instance of problem solving: felt difficulty ("Will this burner burn w e l l ? " ) ; defining problem ("How can I test the way it burns?") ; suggestion ("Light it and see if it is so and s o " ) ; elaboration of suggestion ("Must attach, light, and note so and so") ; trying out and noting consequences ( " I t burns so and so as useful burners must" or " I t burns as well as any other burner I have used"). This conclusion may be checked now or later by trying the burner again. Thus the actual verification, whether of purposes or of suggestions, is in the present valuative adjustment a matter of total interactions which are equally as complex as those in the factual problem, possibly more complex, since there is here more evidently a reference to purpose. It may be objected that this problem and other problems here to be treated as valuative are not really valuative, for they may be translated more or less completely into factual problems. For example, the question "Will the burner burn well?" may be changed into " I s it a burner which burns clearly with a perfectly round flame, and so forth?" In this form it appears to be as purely factual as the question "Will it light?" Thus it may be insisted that a truly valuative problem is one in which there are competing desires or alternatives among which choice must be made. Of such problems, these may be said to be typical: " I s this experiment likely to be worth doing?" "Should I go into scientific research as a vocation?"

T H E N A T U R E OF VALUE VERIFICATION

27

But these questions yield to the same sort of translation. They become: "What result is the experiment likely to produce, and will it extend knowledge at this point?" Or, "Will this procedure yield the data needed for impartial and complete solution?" And, "If I go into science, what will the effects be for my other interests, such as making a satisfactory income, following various intellectual and aesthetic interests, and so forth?" The answers to these more complex factual questions are more difficult to determine than is that to the question "Will this burner light," but the questions are equally factual, for the aim is to determine what the facts are or will be. If it be true that value problems of all degrees of complexity are thus translatable into factual problems, the objection that the simple problems here being considered as examples of value problems are not actually value problems would seem to be invalid. But the fact of translatability would appear to indicate either that this objection itself overlooks some distinction or distinctions existing between factual and valuative problems, possibly in the character of their subject matter, functions, or procedures, or that the distinction between the two may be and perhaps should be discarded as meaningless and confusing. In either case the matter calls for clarification. If there are basic distinctions, they should be laid bare; and if there are none, this should be clearly shown. In either case there is need for careful study of the relations of the valuative to the factual. In pursuit of this purpose we shall later 8 see that it is precisely the tendency to identify valuative problems too exclusively with relatively complex situations, of choice which helps to confuse the relation of fact finding and valuation—of facts and values. But first it is necessary to proceed with the study of the nature of inquiry and testing such as occurs in problems supposedly factual and valuative, dealing first with the simple. Factual and valuative problems in art, problems perhaps as simple as those considered in science, may occur, for example, in painting a picture. Suppose a tube of paint has lost its label. The question arises: "Is this a tube of red paint?" Here again the solus

See chaps, iv and v.

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THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

tion may be effected so quickly and easily that the complex responses actually required are hidden. Were these responses made explicit, the problem solving might run like this: felt difficulty ( " I s this a tube of red paint?") ; defining problem ( " W h a t can be done to determine whether this is a tube of red p a i n t ? " ) ; suggestion ("Open the tube and l o o k " ) ; elaboration of suggestion ("If a paint looks so and so, it is red; if this paint looks so and so, it is r e d " ) ; trying out and noting effects ( " T h i s paint looks so and so and therefore is or is not red paint"). The complex operational and interactive character of the process of inquiry and testing is so apparent that it requires little comment. T h e outcome may differ among various individuals—with regard to closely similar hues of color or if a subject is color-blind. 9 But the verification is in any case a matter of experimental operations involving the complex interplay of both external and internal energies. Previous experiences have built up a fund of meanings, habits, and expectations which now operate in acts of attending, perceiving, and judging, and often in checking by manipulating and looking again. These habits and meanings assist the rise of suggestions and help to determine which suggestions shall survive in competition with the others. A closely related valuative problem may arise. Suppose the artist recalls that he recently bought some paint which was not smooth and consistent; it was somewhat granular and incohesive when thinly spread. The question occurs: "Is this a tube of good paint?" Here again the solution "obviously" is to spread some of the paint and carefully attend, note, and judge whether the paint has the properties of "good" paint. Again, a purpose lies in the background. And again the somewhat unconscious problem-solving steps may be surmised: felt difficulty ("Is,this a tube of good paint?") ; defining the problem ( " W h a t can be done to test the quality of this p a i n t ? " ) ; suggestion ("Spread some out and examine i t " ) ; elab9 Perhaps scientific apparatus and operations can yield a more objective and definitive answer to questions about color hues, but whether this is true of science generally as compared with art or morals is a problem of relative verifiability, not of the methodology of such verification as may be possible. This point will be considered further in chap. iii.

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

29

oration of suggestion ("If a paint is smooth and of even consistency, it will be better than if lumpy and incohesive ; if it is spread out thinly, I should be able to tell") ; trying out and noting results ( " T h i s is not good paint; it is lumpy—it will not produce the effect I wish"). Again there is a background of funded experiences which when interacting with or as elements in the present perceptual operations lead to judgments. T h e judgments arise from or are attended by feelings of consistency or inconsistency, agreement or disagreement, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and the like. Again operations of inclusive interaction test each other. Conditions are perceived and judged. Suggestions arise which are in some measure verified by present "mental" and overt operations, and they may be tested even further if the paint is actually used and studied. Before proceeding to moral problems a possible misunderstanding may be avoided by indicating more explicitly the meaning of the term "morals" as used in this discussion. In a most inclusive and adequate sense of the terms it perhaps may be said that every object or situation can be viewed "scientifically," "aesthetically," "morally," and so forth. T o view a situation scientifically is to study it as a texture of spacial-temporal-causal relations or events. T o view it aesthetically is to regard it especially in terms of the perceptual and feeling qualities experienced. T o view it. morally is to consider it in terms of its effects, actual or potential, upon personal and social welfare (including "happiness"). Y e t to a certain extent science, art, and morals—particularly science and art — a r e specialized lines of interest with somewhat restricted subject matters and somewhat specialized techniques and methods. B y "science" we mean the physical, biological, psychological, and social sciences. B y " a r t " is meant particularly the fine arts, such as painting, music, sculpture, poetry, and so forth. B y "morals" is meant in the main the unspecialized, nonprofessional matters which relate to health and happiness and to felt or recognized obligations in relation to family, community, and national or international affairs. Specialized economic, political, educational, and religious activities or interests are not included, although there may arise within or in relation to them problems which cause

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us to view these activities "morally," that is, in their bearings upon personal or social welfare. The matters here denoted are perhaps better described by the phrase "personal and social affairs," but this is often extremely awkward. "Morals" will in most cases be used instead. Relatively simple factual and valuative problems in a common personal ("moral") situation may arise in arranging the furniture of a study: "How long is this desk?" and "Where should the desk be located?" Here as in the simple problems rising in scientific and artistic matters, the problematic and complex character of the adjustments made are obscured by the ease with which solutions are reached, especially in determining the length of the desk. But the complexity of the operations is brought out when we note the steps likely to be required: felt difficulty ("How long is this desk?"); defining the problem ("How can the length of the desk be measured?"); suggestion ("Use a yardstick or ruler"); elaboration ("Get the one usually in the closet") ; trying out and noting results ("The yardstick is not here") ; another suggestion ("There may be a ruler in the desk") ; elaboration of this suggestion ("Go and see, and if so use in measuring the desk") ; trying out and noting effects ("Here is a ruler! The desk is fifty inches long"). The answer to the more obviously valuative question "Where should the desk be located?" will depend in part upon the purposes operating and in part upon the structure of the room and the other furniture to be used. If the dominant purpose is to get a maximum of sunshine and convenience with a minimum of eyestrain, the alternatives may be very definitely limited to a few—in some cases to one. The steps in the adjustment might be verbalized thus: felt difficulty ("Where should the desk be located?"); defining the problem ("Where can I get a maximum of light without eyestrain and inconvenience?"); suggestion ("Here in the corner between the windows") ; elaboration ("If here, light will come chiefly from the right—not so good") ; another suggestion ("Here between the windows, but facing the center of the room") ; elaboration of this suggestion, attended by many acts of "looking" ("The light will not shine in my eyes—more light will come from the left—the

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bookcase will fit into the corner and be convenient—there will be room to walk around the desk—this seems to be b e s t " ) ; trying out and experiencing effects in various locations, possibly for several months ( " T h i s place has proved to be the b e s t " or " T h i s is better in summer, but that is better in winter" or " T h i s is best for study, but it is inconvenient when cleaning the r o o m " ) . Although this solution is less final and definitive than chat regarding the length of the desk, such verification as occurs is in both cases a matter of interactions which are more or less "experimental." Funded experiences function in present processes to test the rise and fate of suggestions. Now that we have examined rather tediously, yet very generally, these six adjustments, one factual and one valuative in each of the three interests, science, art, and morals, a number of points may be noted, partly by way of summary and partly as further development of implications of the analysis. T h e first and most obvious conclusion is that each of these problems, whether of fact or of value, whether in science, in art, or in morals, is a and that its solution is a process,

problem

involving very complex interac-

tions of energies both internal and external, both overt and nonovert. In each case sensitivity to the problem, the rise of suggestions, the choice of a tentative solution, the operations performed through overt acts, and the meanings derived from and given to the outcomes of this action are all conditioned in some measure upon the possession of meanings and other habits acquired from past experiences. T h i s background of funded meanings may be modified by present and future interactions, but meaning given or received is always in some measure a complex process of interaction between subject (the person or group) and the object or situation. T h e various phases of interaction are thus permeated by elements which make both for uncertainty and for some degree of testing. In so far as present events are new their nature is uncertain, and if past experiences have been limited or narrow the person may be ignorant or biased. Both novelty of situation and the personal equation introduce elements of uncertainty into even simple instances of problem solving. Y e t to the extent that

flexible

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habits of critical examination and other forms of testing have become established, there are elements of verification permeating each phase of inquiry, whether in locating problems, generating suggestions, formulating tentative solutions, carrying the supposed solutions into effect, or noting and appraising outcomes in overt action. Clearly we may not hastily conclude from a study of these scattered and simple instances that all problems—whether factual or valuative, whether in science, art, or personal-social affairs—are problems in which verification (that is, inquiry and testing) is of this total interactive and experimental character. However, if this is true with regard to the simplest and most purely factual and most purely valuative problems, the presumption seems reasonable that the same is true, so far as verification is possible, in more complex situations as well. Whether values are as verifiable as facts and whether all kinds of values(l) are equally verifiable are matters which call for further consideration.10 In the second place, as we look over the factual and the valuative problems it becomes clear that each event (object, act, or arrangement), whether the Bunsen burner, the tube of paint, or the desk, is experienced both as fact and as value—both as an existent and as something having worth "intrinsically" or in relation to human purposes or desires. The burner, for instance, is experienced, judged, and tested as an existent, as being something which does or does not "possess" certain properties or capacities supposedly quite apart from human knowledge or desire. But it is also experienced, judged, and tested as capable or not capable of meeting needs or of satisfying interests other than that of knowing the nature of the event. Moreover, when objects are compared, there are evidently degrees in which various properties and worths may be said to "exist." Thus it is suggested that the experience of the existent as such and of worth are correlative, that perhaps all events are, or may be experienced as, both "fact" and "value." The correctness of this suggestion must be considered later. A third point which may be noted is that verification was in all 10

In chaps, iii and iv.

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the adjustments, whether factual or valuative, mediated through or constituted of operations. These operations are acts. They are doings, which are found efficacious or not, satisfactory or unsatisfactory. But they are known in the fullest intellectualized and verified sense only in terms of or as formulations regarding the effects of operations performed. The effects are themselves operations produced by interaction of and with the objects considered. The consideration is at least a matter of certain overt or nonovert operations. But whether or not it be true that formulations are nothing more than operations as Bridgman appears to suggest,11 it is at least true that facts and values are here actually formulations and that these are in some degree established or confirmed through complex interactive operations of and among logical, psychological, physiological, and physical events. If we are sufficiently critical, formulations are treated as suggestions—suggestions which correctly or adequately express or relate to fact or value in the degree that they are verified by careful inquiry and testing. If this conclusion may safely be extended to all scientific, artistic, and moral problems, no matter how complex or intangible the subject matter, all values may be defined as, or as the referents of, relatively verified formulations about the existence and worth of events—including in the term "events" all overtly and nonovertly experienced things, relations, institutions, arrangements, and acts, or modes of action. Briefly, values are or are experienced as verified suggestions regarding existence or worth. In Parker's terms: "Value exists when the impulse [whether to truth, beauty, or other interest] is being appeased through the verification of the objective in the activity which it proposes.12 Conversely, it follows that value verification is the critical creation and testing of formulations about existence or worth. A fourth and concluding point stems rather directly from the others. If facts and values are in the strictest and most accurate sense relatively verified formulations or the referents thereof, and 11

The Logic of Modern Physics, p. 5. Human Values, p. 409. It is evident that Parker uses "value" in its most inclusive meaning ( v a l u e [ l ] ) . See especially p. vii and chap. xii. 12

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if events are always in some degree changing and novel, it will be true for facts as well as for values that, as Dewey has put it, "the presumptive force of a past value in present judgment depends upon the pains taken with its verification." Indeed in so far as events are novel and operations of inquiry are limited and indeterminant, past determinations must be admitted as having but a presumptive significance for present situations, whether the determinations were of fact or of value. But the correctness of this suggestion depends upon the nature of events and the relative verifiability of facts and values and the consideration of it will therefore be postponed until the following chapter. Nevertheless, the nature of the situation disclosed in even the simplest fact and value problems certainly justifies the extension of Dewey's statement "The contributory worth of past determinations of value depends upon the extent in which they were critically made" so that it will apply to value ( 1 ) as well as to value ( 2 or 3 ), to facts as well as to other values. The statement will then be: The contributory correctness and worth of past determinations of value depends upon the extent in which they were critically made. In other words, the presumptive force of a past fact or other value in present judgment depends upon the pains taken with its verification. While derived from the consideration of extremely simple problems, assumed to be largely or entirely factual and valuative, the correctness of these four conclusions in the case of more complex problems, which often involve rather obviously both factual and valuative elements, becomes apparent upon examination. Consider briefly the following problems or adjustments. For science: "Does the mass of an electron increase in direct ratio to its velocity?" and "Is this line of experimentation on the problem of the relation of mass to velocity worth undertaking?" Or "Is cancer hereditary?" and "Is it worth while to investigate the inheritability of cancer in white rats?" For art: "Did Matisse paint this picture?" and "Is this among the 'best' of his paintings?" Or "What principles for evaluating aesthetic quality or 'beauty' are most commonly proposed by artists, aestheticians, and critics?" and "Which of these principles

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

35

are (from any given point of view) most consistent, useful, or adequate?" For morals: "How much money have we for this budget?" and "For what should the money be spent and how much on each item?" Or "What will be the respective effects of tax A and tax Β upon those who are to pay them?" and "Will the effects of tax A be better or worse, on the whole, than the effects of tax B ? " The four conclusions drawn from the analysis of simple adjustments will be seen to hold also for these more complex matters. First, the verification (inquiry and testing), so far as any may be possible, is evidently in each case a process of complex interactions among physical, social, biological, psychological, and meaning events or energies. The process is in each case inclusive, depending upon or being composed of both nonovert and (indirectly, if not directly) overt interactions. I t is experimental(4) in the degree that it is carefully and impartially or honestly performed. Secondly, each of the matters presenting a problem is, or may be, experienced both as existent and as worth. Thirdly, facts and values are here also evidently "imaginative" creations in some degree verifiable; and verification is the critical creation and testing of formulations about events as existences or as ends or means to ends. Finally, the correctness or fruitfulness of expressed or formulated facts or values and their presumptive force for subsequent situations is most cautiously, yet perhaps most adequately, conceived as proportional to the care exercised throughout their expression and further testing. The facts and values are, so far as is known, experiences of existence and worth undergoing expression and test. These processes of formulation and testing constitute verification, especially in so far as they are both creative and critical. The foregoing analysis has thus led to the view that the same general method of verification operates, in varying degrees of excellence, in matters of value as in matters of fact, in art and morals as in science. But the treatment has been very general and structural, attempting neither a detailed analysis of the nature of the purposes, subject matter, or operations of inquiry and testing in these three somewhat diverse interests nor a more minute analysis

36

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of the nature of facts and values. It may therefore be objected on various grounds that we have overlooked significant crucial differences between facts and values, between fact finding and value creation, or valuation. There are a number of current viewpoints which appear, at least on first consideration, to be opposed to the view that the same general methodology operates in art and morals as in matters of scientific fact. Some of these positions have held that verification in matters of value is essentially different from that in matters of fact ; others that no genuine or theoretically significant value verification is possible. Brief consideration of some of the more general objections should at this point serve both as a preliminary test of the foregoing conclusions and as a preparation for discussion of verifiability. The point of view expressed by Osborne raises two related objections : When a large number of percipients are simultaneously observing the same objective situation, and a large majority of them obtain similar percepts, while a few obtain dissimilar and incompatible percepts, it is assumed that the majority are right. „But the assumption does not rest upon an a priori probability that the majority must be right. It is justified by the verifiable supposition that there is an assignable cause for the incompatible percepts of the few (e. g. malformation of the sensory organs, etc.). Much of our perceptual experience may also be verified by its ability to arouse expectation which is not subsequently disappointed. That test is unavailable for intuition of value. Nor can the former test be applied. Emotion or passion might prevent individuals from exercising their faculty of value-intuition in particular cases, or this faculty might in some individuals be undeveloped; but if an individual is intuiting value, passion or impulse cannot conceivably account for erroneous functioning of this faculty. The errors of the few cannot be traced to abnormality in any respect other than that they are unusual in their value-intuitions.13 These objections may be briefly stated: ( a ) errors of perception can be corrected, but differences in value intuitions cannot thus be corrected or assigned to causes for which due allowance may be made ; Foundations of the philosophy of Value, p. 16 ; by permission of The Macmillan Company, U.S., on behalf of Cambridge University Press, England. See also Schlick, Problems of Ethics, p. 107. 13

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

37

and (b) valuation, unlike much perceptual experience, cannot be verified by its ability to arouse expectation which is not subsequently disappointed. Let us examine the second point first. Osborne apparently grants that some perceptual experience is not verified or verifiable by its ability to arouse expectations which are not subsequently disappointed. Now certainly a proponent of the experimental viewpoint will grant this much for all values, including perceptually derived facts. But must the conclusion be drawn, either from these admissions or from actual personal and social experiences, that no significant verification occurs in matters of value(2,3) ? If it be granted that often in these matters expectations aroused are subsequently disappointed, it must be asked whether this is always true. The counter argument may be given that it is a matter of daily experience that expectations regarding such values are not disappointed. When needs of hunger, thirst, rest, recreation, disease, and so forth recur, the objects (things, relations, acts) which have proved useful, satisfying, and healthful are commonly found to be enduringly valuable. It may be contended that in so far as different individuals have common needs and interests their relatively verified values are in agreement at many points. Some substances, arrangements, and types of action are of value to all persons, others are of worth only locally or individually. There is evidently sufficient constancy in objects and needs to make it possible for man, with varying degrees of success to prize some ends and to strive to avert others, possible for many expectations to be aroused and dependably fulfilled. Of course these considerations do not determine in a definitive way how much truth there is in the view that values unlike perceptions (of fact) are unverifiable, but at least they seem to indicate that some kind and degree of verification does occur (and might possibly occur better) in matters of value, even in personal and social affairs. To the objection that definite causes can be assigned and allowance made for errors of factual perception, whereas value intuitions are not assignable to any abnormality other than that they are unusual, it may be answered that even in science sensory perception does not account for all knowledge. In some relatively sim-

38

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pie and accessible matters it is possible to make definite corrections for differences of perception, but in more complicated matters and relations which are only indirectly perceptible, there are vast differences of "perception" even regarding facts. Were Newton and his followers more abnormal than Einstein and his disciples? If it be replied that even in the more complicated physical matters operations can be performed in which correctable perception is at some points a factor and that therefore there is reasonable hope for advance in scientific verification, the same must in some degree be granted for personal and social affairs as well. Some allowance is successfully made even by the individual for possible errors in personal-social matters in so far as he is aware of susceptibility to error and in so far as he desires to avoid what endangers personal or public health and happiness. In order to avoid errors that may result from routine habit, blind impulse, or leaping in the dark, he investigates beforehand, deliberates, discusses, acts, and notes the consequences of action. Values, like facts, are thus verified, in so far as they are verified, through interactions, the more overt and the less overt phases assisting each other; but in neither matters of fact nor matters of value are needed corrections always apparent or definitely determinable. In both cases verification is a complex interactive process. A third objection to the inclusive experimental conception of value verification is raised by those who, like Carnap and Russell, reduce value judgments to imperatives and then deny that an imperative asserts anything more than the wish or volition of the person who asserts. Thus it is held that value propositions are neither true nor false, that they state nothing that can be proved or disproved. Says Carnap: From the statement "Killing is evil" we cannot deduce any proposition about future experiences. Thus this statement is not verifiable and has no theoretical sense, and the same is true of all other value statements. Perhaps somebody will contend in opposition that the following proposition is deductible: "If a person kills anybody he will have feelings of remorse." But this proposition is in no way deductible from the proposition "Killing is an evil." It is deductible only from psychological

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

39

propositions about the character and the emotional reactions of the person. These propositions are indeed verifiable and not without sense. They belong to psychology, not to philosophy; to psychological ethics (if one wishes to use this word), not to philosophical or normative ethics. The propositions of normative ethics, whether they have the form of rules or the form of value statements, have no theoretical sense, are not scientific propositions (taking the word scientific to mean any assertive proposition). 14 Says Russell in like vein: When a man says, "This is good in itself," he seems to be making a statement just as much as if he said, "This is square" or "This is sweet." I believe this to be a mistake. I think that what the man really means is: "I wish everybody to desire this," or rather, "Would that everybody desired this." If what he says is interpreted as a statement, it is merely an affirmation of his own personal wish; if, on the other hand, it is interpreted in a general way, it states nothing, but merely desires something. 15 If, now, a philosopher says, "Beauty is good," I may interpret him as meaning either, "Would that everybody loved the beautiful" . . . or, " I wish that everybody loved the beautiful." . . . The first of these makes no assertion but expresses a wish; since it affirms nothing, it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsity. 16 But are value statements adequately conceived, except for the restricted purposes of certain types of logical analysis, 1 7 as asserting nothing except wish or volition? If so, are wish and volition to be treated as self-contained phenomena? In such value adjustments as we considered earlier it is clear that although values are conditioned upon purposes—for example, to have smooth paint for a 14 Philosophy and Logical Syntax, pp 24-25 ; by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, U.S., on behalf of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., England. See also Schlick, Problems of Ethics, pp. 110 f. In view of further explanations made by Carnap in granting permission for this and later quotations, it appears that his viewpoint is now more nearly like that of the present study than the earlier discussion in Philosophy and Logical Syntax seemed to indicate. For his explanations, see p. 137«, below. 15 Religion and Science, p. 247 ; by permission of Henry Holt and Company, publishers. 18 Ibid., p. 248. 17 The more strictly logical aspects of this objection will be considered further in chap. iv. See also chap. vii.

40

THE NATURE OF VALUE VERIFICATION

picture or proper light for one's desk, they are also conditioned upon the nature of other objects, events, and relations. Thus, unless the normative and imperative are to be treated either as isolated occurrences or as possessing supernatural or peculiarly universal authority, wishes and purposes will be regarded as rising within, affording suggestions to, and being relatively tested by the interactions of both internal and external events or processes. A final objection to the more inclusive experimental conception of value verification arises from the view that only thought and discussion enter into the discovery of value. This view may be presented in the words of Knight: A political problem is an intellectual problem, but in a sense very different from that of the problems of natural science. It involves cognition and understanding, but its character is as remote as possible from that of discovering "invariants" in the environment, whether the natural environment of the race or the human environment of an individual or limited group, the parties to the "scientific" interchange. In this field the things to be discovered are values, ends of action, in contrast with the instrumental character which all natural existent things have for knowledge. The process of discovery, moreover, is purely intellectual, involving no manipulation of material by the body-machine of the investigator. It is like scientific work in being a concurrent cooperative activity of the minds concerned ("verification"), though in a much higher degree, and even in being normative (there can be no science of physics if physicists have no moral integrity!), but in the quest of values minds work internally to an ideal world as subject matter. Such activity must be distinguished equally from that of investigation in objective science and from creative play of individual fancy. 18 This statement seems to mean that in matters of value there is no significant interaction between the inner and the outer phases of situations, that the inner world of thought exists as something cut off from physical, social, and physiological conditions and effects, that these are not effective factors in the rise and testing of suggested goods. " I n the quest for values minds work internally to an ideal world as subject matter." The process of the discovery of "Social Science and Social Action," The International Journal of Ethics, X L V I (1935-1936), 20-21. See also "Pragmatism and Social Action," The International Journal of Ethics, X L V I (1935-1936), 234-235. 18

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values "is purely intellectual, involving no manipulation of material by the body-machine." This, if it be the intended meaning, creates a definite dualism between the physical and the mental, between thought and action, between fact and value. I n the simple value problems examined earlier it was evident that purpose and judgment in relation to purpose were important factors. And in problems of social relations, say the political, this is strikingly apparent. Knight is certainly justified in stressing the role which the "intellectual" does play in these problems. Nor is there here such exclusive concern with "invariant" physical relations as stich. But if the political problem be conceived as one of making compromises or integrations among the wishes of various groups, are wishes to be treated as self-contained phenomena, as subject to no critical evaluation by considering the effects which actions will produce? Do not social policies when carried into action, let us say with regard to public health or taxation, often "kick back" to change conceptions of facts and values? Is it not possible to distinguish the political process "equally from that of investigation in objective science and from creative play of individual fancy" without denying, or appearing to deny, the total interactive processes which give rise and test to social goals and policies? Are not even political adjustments truly intellectual only in the degree that they are the result of careful study of conditions and effects, both as they are and as they may feasibly become? Indeed, is not the treatment of political problems often inept precisely because needs and possibilities are conceived too narrowly, due both to the inherent difficulties in achieving knowledge of conditions and fuller potentialities and to failure to recognize even in theory the need for formulating policies after careful study of conditions and then for treating ends and means as hypotheses whose effects in action are in fact taken as data for revision and further construction? As seen from a more inclusive experimental point of view the foregoing objections appear to spring from a common root. Each viewpoint has in its own way fragmentized the actual and potential continuities of interaction. Perception, cognition, intuition, judg-

42

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ment, wish, the normative, or the volitional tend to be treated as entities rather than as modes or properties of interaction. T h e y are cut off from the conditions in relation to which they come into being and from the effects to which they lead. Consequently there is failure to see that as interrelated elements or acts within total adjustments, the perceptual, judgmental, normative, and so forth, modify and give to each other such degree of test as does occur in each particular act of problem solving, and, moreover, that such modification and testing is an intermittently continuous process which is both social and individual in character, whether in science, art, or morals. U p to this point, however, we have examined only the general structure or outlines of the more inclusive experimental viewpoint and discussed only certain general objections which seem most directly to affect the conclusion that verification or testing does occur through total interactions. Consideration of simple problematic adjustments in some detail and of complex situations briefly has indicated that the same general pattern of verification is present, to an extent yet to be determined, in morals as well as in science and art, in matters of value as well as in matters of fact. But whether this viewpoint can stand will depend also upon its ability to integrate and to clarify the relations of such specific processes and properties as occur in factual and valuative adjustments, such processes and properties as are commonly referred to as cognition, fact finding, valuation, descriptive judgment, normative or value judgment, will, creative imagination, the qualitative, the quantitative, the objective, and the subjective. In other words, when the processes of adjustment which occur in science, art, and morals are examined in greater detail, are the differences in the adjustment processes differences of kind as well as of degree? If there are no differences of kind, are there such marked differences of degree as to virtually constitute differences of kind? Further consideration of these problems will be facilitated b y first giving attention to the factors which affect verifiability and the degree thereof.

CHAPTER THREE: E M P I R I C A L OF

ANALYSIS

VERIFIABILITY

that facts and values are verified, so far as possible, through much the same general experimental pattern of complex interactions will have little positive worth for value theory if values(2,3) are not verifiable in some significant degree. That such verification does occur has been assumed in the previous discussion and incidentally supported by the examination of simple value problems. But there are, we have noted, 1 sharp conflicts of current opinion as to whether values are verifiable in any significant sense or degree. These differences were seen to spring from and to affect vitally both theory and practice. Upon more careful examination, then, how much value verification does or may occur? If both factual and valuative formulations, in morals as in art and science, receive some kind and degree of testing and confirmation, why does this occur? Why are interactions with their overt and nonovert phases ever able in even the slightest degree to create and test formulations—for example, "This burner lights" or "This burner burns well"? Apparently the answer is that these interactions are with and of events—physical, physiological, and semeiotic, or sign-using, events which have somewhat definite properties disclosed or evidenced by the processes of interaction. Interactions indicate with reference to objects, arrangements, and « acts certain consistencies of structure and behavior which are taken as uniformities of existence or worth. The Bunsen burner, for instance, is experienced as relatively the same in structure and functioning from day to day. It is taken as a definite entity about which formulations of existence or worth may be made and tested by further interactions. Such verification as is possible is thus evidently to be attributed to the somewhat uniform or individual "isness" of events as experienced in and of interactions, whether these be viewed exterT H E CONCLUSION

1

Page 14.

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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VERIFIABILITY

nally or internally. Both "physical" empirical conditions and relations and "mental" logical and alogical processes, individual and social, give whatever degree of test formulations receive and are capable of receiving. The empirical and the logical are at some points and in some cases but aspects of total interactions of organism and environment. At other points and in other instances they are relatively independent, being interdependent only so far as affected by habits or meanings carried along from previous responses. We shall, then, consider verifiability first externally or "empirically" in terms of the nature of events as they affect the performability of operations of inquiry and testing, and then internally or "logically" in terms of the references and relations of the meaning structures which function in valuative matters as compared with factual matters. It is to be remembered, however, that in the two analyses we are considering the same events of total adjustment from two points of view—whether any particular adjustment be a practical or an intellectual one. In order to make an inductive and systematic approach to the problem of the relative verifiability of facts and values it would appear helpful first to list a considerable number of formulations (problems or proposed conclusions) currently but critically entertained in matters of fact and matters of value, selecting formulations from science, art, and morals in order to get a more representative sampling and keeping the fact and value items separate. Each set of items should then, if possible, be distributed on a scale extending from "rather definitely verifiable," say at the left, to "probably unverifiable" at the right, still keeping fact and value items separate. Then an attempt should be made to see as clearly as possible what factor or factors determine degree of verifiability, and whether the same factors operate in determining degree among the facts as among the value items. Finally an attempt should be made to see how the two sets of items fall on a scale of frequency distributions with respect to degree of verifiability. Obviously these operations can be performed only crudely. The selection of items, their ranking as to degree of verifiability, the

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45

analysis of factors determining degree, and especially the estimate of proper location of the modes of distribution will in any case be directed through and easily "skewed" by individual preconceptions and desires. The remainder of this chapter will, however, make critical assay at these steps. The first two steps may be foreshortened by omitting the list of items originally made by the writer. Having drawn a scale to represent all degrees of verifiability from the "rather definitely verifiable" to the "probably unverifiable," it will be sufficient for present purposes to list both fact and value formulations at the extremes and at representative intermediate points on the scale. Even prior to this attempt there are three considerations which suggest that such formulations do indeed vary from the rather definitely, though perhaps never finally, verifiable to the probably unverifiable. In the first place, it may be emphasized, as it is by Urban, that the "truly magnanimous" philosophers of the past have agreed in identifying or relating value and reality and that in this "Great Tradition" no philosophy "has been without the conception of different orders of being and degrees of reality." 2 A second support for such variation of verifiability is the growing current agreement among logicians and scientists that all general propositions about matters of fact—general in the sense of dealing with large numbers of a certain kind—are propositions of probability only, though there are admittedly orders, or degrees, of probability. 3 The third consideration suggesting such verifiability variation is that in our previous study of verification it was found that while it is possible to select simple problems in which rather definite and determinate solutions can be reached, there are more complex problems in which it is much more difficult to achieve such solutions, if indeed it is possible. These three considerations all 2

The Intelligible World, p. 77. This point is emphasized by John D e w e y in private correspondence. See also Bridgman, Logic of Modern Physics, chap, ii; Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Philosophy of Science, III (1936), 421-422, 426; Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, pp. 215-219, 391-394; and Schlick, Problems of Ethics, p. 206. 3

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point toward, but do not test specifically, the possibility that both facts and values vary from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. We return, then, to the proposed scale of verifiability. With the understanding that "verifiable" is being used in the inclusive sense indicated in Chapter II, we may note examples of formulations which seem properly to fall at various points on the suggested scale. The formulations will here be expressed as propositions, but these may be translated into problems subject to inquiry and testing. First let us note examples at three different points: "rather definitely verifiable"; "long-time verifiable"; and "probably unverifiable." At the left may be placed the following items as "rather definitely verifiable"—two from each of the three interests in each case. FACTS

In science: This burner will burn. This water is chemically pure. In art: This is a tube of red paint. This space at the left of the picture is two inches long. In morals: This desk is fifty inches long. This is a location in which the light to this desk comes from the left. VALUES

In science: This burner does not burn well. This water is a good solvent for this salt. In art: This is not a good paint for this purpose. This line is too long to balance the other in this picture. In morals: This wall-space is too short for this desk. This is the best location for this desk. With respect to such formulations it is possible, as we have already seen,4 to perform operations which yield rather definite conclusions. The operations can be easily and convincingly checked. This is true even of the value items, although there is here clearly a relation to purposes with reference to which judgment is to be rendered. The effect of purpose upon verifiability must be consid* Chap. ii.

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47

ered in the third step of the present analysis, but the conclusion would seem to stand that so far as purpose is given and constant the value of intermediate ends and means is, at least in some simpler matters, very definitely determinable. Let us now turn to the other extreme of the scale and list as "probably unverifiable" the following items. FACTS

In science: The universe is running down ("entropy"). Consciousness is merely complex neuro-muscular functioning. In art: Beauty is delightful perception. Man enjoys tragedy for its catharsis effect. In morals: There is no ultimate cosmic purpose for life. All significant human values are conserved. VALUES

In science: The theory that space is curved and finite is more adequate than the theory that space is unbounded and infinite. The events or "states" to which the formulations of physics refer are better conceived as subjective than as objective. In art: Not all forms of art are equally adequate modes of expression. All proposed principles for evaluating aesthetic quality or "beauty" are equally an expression of individual preference. In morals: The right, let us say in international affairs, is in the last analysis the will of the stronger in force and foresight. The view that the good is a matter of individual taste is ultimately in conflict with the idea that some value verification is possible. In all these matters the difficulty—perhaps ultimate impossibility—of performing operations whose effects will be open to careful public or even private inspection seems obvious. Of course individual thinkers may perform mental operations which involve some degree or a certain restricted type of verification. But present alignments with respect to these issues suggest that the verification is largely relative to viewpoints which bias or predetermine the operations. Under an intermediate head, let us say at a point about two-

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thirds of the distance from the left end toward the right end of the scale, may be listed the following formulations, which require a lifetime or longer for their full verification or in the very nature of the case can be acted upon only by excluding other possibilities, which therefore cannot be tried out for comparison with those accepted. FACTS

In science: The researches started by Terman regarding children of superior IQ will, if carried over a few generations, determine the degree of relationship between superior native intelligence and adult success. Further researches will completely unravel what now appear to be hopelessly intricate principles of human inheritance. In art: Motion pictures will continue to help stimulate interest in the little theater movement. Grant Wood's techniques will have a permanent place in the development of American painting. In morals: The League of Nations will decline in influence during the twentieth century. This investment in U.S. Government bonds will be secure during the lifetime of my children. VALUES

In science: The procedures being used in Terman's studies of gifted children are adequate and crucial. It is worth while to spend a lifetime investigating the inheritance of susceptibility to cancer in white rats. In art: Wood is not the greatest American painter. Pepper's Aesthetic Quality will prove to have been one of the most significant contributions to aesthetics in the first half of the present century. In morals: I can live a more useful and successful life as a teacher than as a physician. Conditions being what they are, we should buy a house in this city this year. With regard to these formulations some operations can now be performed to test, let us say, Terman's procedures or the investment probabilities, but for most part they refer to matters which

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require a longer span of time. The situation makes it impossible to try out empirically and in short order the alternative possibilities which suggest themselves. In most cases the events whose nature or worth is in question do not yet exist, or if they do exist (for example, present American painters), it may be virtually impossible to see them in as correct or as adequate perspective as may be possible after a few years or decades. Now that these two extremes and an intermediate point have been marked on the scale, a further random listing discloses that many formulations may perhaps most properly be located somewhere between the extreme left (definitely verifiable) end and the intermediate point (long-time verifiable). In these formulations alternative hypotheses can be tried out in thought and action in relatively short spans of time, with varying degrees of verification. FACTS

In science: The resonance-volley theory of sound sensation is correct. Present experiments on infantile paralysis will be successful. In art: This paint will here appear darker than that one. This musical composition will get more than usual response from the audience. In morals: Tax A will produce more revenue than tax B. This picnic will require about three hours. VALUES

In science: This experiment on auditory sensation will be a crucial and significant one. It is worth while to make these statistical correlations. In art: This color is too bright for most unified effect. This gallery setting will be better than that for showing this picture to best advantage. In morals: The social effects of tax Β will be better than those of tax A. I should go on this picnic. Examination of these items indicates that in each case operations can be performed which try out, mentally and often in short-

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time overt action, not merely one but many alternative suggestions. But in most cases the situation is never quite the same for various trials. It is apparent that in most instances the verification is not so definite as for items at the left of the scale or so uncertain as for those further to the right. In attempting thus to list fact and value formulations at various points on a scale of verifiability, it becomes clear that the line of demarcation between the factual and the valuative is indeed a thin one. Some of the items were at first thought to be factual, but were then changed to the valuative, and vice versa. But if it be granted that in each list there is even one formulation which is chiefly factual and one chiefly valuative, our immediate purpose is served: to test the possibility of listing both kinds of items at the extremes and at some intermediate points on the scale. The operations already performed seem to give definite confirmation to this possibility, which evidently means that both facts and values vary in degree of verifiability from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. Of course this conclusion, if correct, does not mean that facts and values are equally verifiable. It means that both vary in verifiability, that taken en masse examples of perhaps all degrees of verifiability may be found, whether the formulations are regarded as factual or as valuative. It may still be true that on a curve of frequencies more factual items will cluster toward the left, or definitely verifiable, end of the scale and more value items will fall toward the right or unverifiable end. If this proves to be the case, values are on the whole less verifiable than facts. But this matter can be judged only after examining in some detail the factors which affect verifiability. The extent to which these factors have the same or different influence on factual as compared with valuative verification will determine the degree in which facts and values are alike or different in verifiability. What factors affect verifiability? When the formulations listed above are examined in terms of the total situations—physical, social, and personal—in which they arise and are in varying degrees tested, it becomes clear that basically, or inclusively, the degree of

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verifiability is determined b y the character of events of interaction. All external factors or events of a situation, as well as the make-up and internal functionings of the organism or person, may be conceived as the ingression or interaction of myriads of energies sustaining or constituting varied patterns of structure and history. Also, the adjustment or problem-solving process may be conceived in terms of complex interactions between and among both internal and external energy systems or events. T h e degree in which any particular formulation of fact or value is or is not verifiable is therefore dependent upon the character of events. It is dependent both upon the nature of the events to which the formulation refers, whether as subject or as object, and upon the interactions which consequently occur between subject and object. More concretely, the nature of the matter to be formulated and tested, the habits and present interests of the formulator-tester (person or group), and the acts of inquiry, creation, and testing 5 all affect the degree of verifiability. These factors may for convenience be considered under three heads: (a) nature of the subject matter of inquiry; ( b ) purpose; and (c) frame of reference. T h e aim is to determine the character of each factor and the effect which each factor has upon the verifiability of scientific as compared with nonscientific facts and values. T h e findings of the special sciences point to the conclusion not only that our world and we are composed of or are (at least for abstraction) divisible into events but also that the dimensions and traits of these events vary by degrees so that they constitute one or more existential, as well as experiential, continua. T h e extremes of this continuum, or cluster of continua, are suggested by contrasts such as simple-complex, accessible-inaccessible, constantinconstant, separable-inseparable, quantifiable-unquantifiable, and controllable-uncontrollable. T h e second term (and even the first) of each of these contrasts may be only apparent, due to human 5 It is important to recognize that the scientist, artist, and person dealing with a moral matter are each a creator as well as a discoverer or "fact finder." Suggestions are a creative product of interaction and properly subject to further testing. Scientist, artist, and other reflective doer is at once inquirer, creator, and tester.

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ignorance or lack of ingenuity, but for human experience they represent at least genuine differences of degree. These contrasting traits are not strictly correlative—for instance, a complex present event may be more accessible than a past or future simple one; but in general a genuine increase in one is attended by increase in the others also. The physical-chemical continuum extending from simplest electron-proton organization or from the simplest chemical element to the most complex is perhaps the most striking illustration. With increased complexity goes, even for science, increase in flux and greater difficulty in separating, quantifying, and controlling events as the subject matter of inquiry. But critical study of other kinds of subject matter discloses the same general situation: events vary from the relatively simple, accessible, controllable, and so forth, to the extremely complex, inaccessible, uncontrollable, and so forth, whether the events be commonly called physical, biological, social, psychological, or semeiotic. Increases in complexity, inaccessibility, and inconstancy and in difficulty of separation, quantification, and control of course increase the difficulty of performing operations needed to "get the facts" or to appraise and to check appraisals. Although a total situation is always composed of many events—especially in the physical universe of discourse, situations also vary from the relatively simple to the complex, from the relatively trivial to the crucially important, and from those in which there is time for adequate inquiry and testing to the urgently compelling. But when problems are correctly or adequately formulated, when suggestions are carefully sought and tested mentally and overtly, the traits of the events constituting the subject matter affect vitally the degree of verification possible at any given time or span of time for any given individual or group. But is this equally, less, or more true in matters of value than in matter of fact? If we grant the point noted previously,® that any given event is or may be experienced (if experienceable) both as existent and as interest, both as "fact" and as "value," it follows 6

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that if all possible fact and value formulations referring to all possible events are compared, the two sets of items (fact and value) must, so far as the effect of the nature of subject matter is concerned, be equally verifiable or unverifiable. Three objections arise, however. In the first place, is it not the nature or function of a value inquiry to consider and weigh together two or more elements in a situation, whereas a factual solution is commonly the result of having restricted inquiry to the nature of one relatively isolated matter? For instance, in deciding whether to go on a picnic all other considerations may be excluded while a factual judgment is being made regarding the amount of time required; whereas many elements, including the time element, must be weighed together ("evaluated") in order to decide whether to go despite other wishes. But there are not merely two problems or formulations possible, one factual and one valuative, in reference to the same event or situation. In the illustration just given we appear to be using a double standard. The situation of inquiry, that is, the events or aspects of events receiving consideration, changes when we restrict attention to the factual problem. With relation to the factual question "How long will it take?", a value problem more nearly alike in complexity would be "Is the distance—or the particular group, or the time of day—a factor likely to be important in determining the amount of time this picnic will require?" Here the number of factors to be considered is perhaps the same or less than it is in deciding how long the picnic will actually take. And corresponding to the valuative question "Should I go?", would be the factual question "Have I now considered all the relevant factors?" We might argue further that in such simple judgments as "I like this apple" or "I feel elated" no more items are involved than in the simplest judgment of fact. There may be doubt, however, whether these are value judgments, though in some contexts and for some purposes they evidently are. But at any rate there are relatively simple value problems involving only two alternatives —for example, choice of this or that apple, this or that road—and

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there are also factual problems—for example, the ultimate nature of the universe or of consciousness—which are perhaps as complex as any valuative problem. Since problems of both kinds vary so greatly from the simple to the complex, it cannot justifiably be objected that the subject matter of value problems is inherently more complex than that of factual problems. Yet, in the second place, is not wish or preference the chief subject matter of value judgments, for instance, various wishes with reference to going or not going on the picnic, whereas in factual problems all wishes, except that for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, are excluded? This, at least on the surface, is an alluring idea and might appear to consign values to the unverifiable end of the scale. But we must not confuse "wish" as subject matter with "wish" as a factor in the final determination of choice. A wish is not only an intrinsic propulsion or present or anticipated satisfaction but also an event which if given right of way will produce effects—effects which may be found and judged now or later as either detrimental or beneficial, good or bad, in terms of or because of other wishes for long-run successes and approvals. In the degree that persons become maturely wise they wish to view wish effects as objectively and realistically as possible, to inform choice wishes in the light of inquired-into-and-tested-wishes. The affect of wishes as direct determiners of choice in valuative adjustments compared with their affect in factual adjustments belongs later in the present discussion. It is also to be noted here that each choice, however "wishfully" or critically it may occur, is an "event." As such, formulations of fact as well as of value may be made with reference to it. Only habits built up through preoccupation with more external or empirical events, whether in the special sciences (even in psychology) or in practical action, conceal the fact that wishes are in each specific instance events which may be studied as existents as well as means instrumental to other events—both of intrinsic and of extrinsic effects. Events of wish, like all other events, are equally simple or complex, accessible or inaccessible, controllable or uncontrollable, and so forth—in whatever degree they are so in par-

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ticular cases—whether they are subject matter of factual or of valuative statements. It thus follows that factual and valuative formulations, in so far as they are affected by the nature of events as subject matter of inquiry, are or can be correlative and that they are or can be distributed equally on a scale of verifiability. But if this be granted, do we not find, in the third place, that personal-social events are on the whole more complex, inaccessible, changing, or uncontrollable than, let us say, the events of the physical or biological sciences and that perhaps art joins morals in this respect? Were we interested in defending the view that the physical and biological events are as complex as those of social affairs, we might remind ourselves of the amazing intricacies disclosed by recent researches of physics and astronomy and of the fact that biology has a welter of complexity and inaccessibility, for instance, concerning hormones and heredity. But are not human beings a complex of nearly all the simpler forms of physiochemical and biological events, and as a consequence is not human behavior extremely complex and unpredictable—or at least more so on the whole than are physical and biological matters? In the degree that we are truly philosophic in our approach to this problem (or to other problems), we are of course concerned as far as possible to avoid arguing for one view rather than another and to free ourselves from what Whitehead has called "current abstractions." In behalf of the second concern, but possibly subtly in violation of the first, the question may perhaps be raised whether we do not tend to be dominated by physical conceptions. If events are conceived in less abstract and sophisticated terms, it may justifiably be maintained that social events also vary, much as do physical and biological events, from the very simple to the extremely complex, but that the number of atoms involved has little or nothing to do with social or personal simplicity or complexity. The dancing of friends may be no more remote from and no more complicated for social inquiry and testing than is the "behavior" of atoms for physical inquiry—even though the friends are composed of trillions of atoms. Human dance steps may be more easily known and tested for some purposes than the "dance" of the atoms

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themselves. We know better many facts and values about familiar gross events, for example, potatoes, drama, music, lamps, automobiles, and elections, than we know or may perhaps hope to know about all the constituent physical or biological phenomena involved. Of course such considerations do not prove that the facts and values of personal and social affairs are no less verifiable than those of physics, biology, logic, or mathematics; but they do suggest that we may be too easily duped by certain current abstractions into assuming that in human affairs verification is less accurate or adequate. The ultimate controllability or directability of personal-social adjustments is now very uncertain, due in part to lack of confidence in ability to gain or to increase guidance through adequate inquiry and testing. Any theory that it is possible to increase such direction will of course receive its fullest test only when such confidence characterizes social action itself. But success in isolated cases and groups—in improving child care and education, in improving marital and family relations, in decreasing crime, and in enriching community life—points to unrealized possibilities for verification through careful study and experimentation in human matters. It is by no means apparent, so far as subject matter is concerned, that moral values are en masse less verifiable than are other kinds of values. But whether or not this is the case, the equal verifiability of values and facts as a whole is still supported, on the side of subject matter, by the recognition that every event may be experienced and denoted both as existent and as interest. Two considerations suggest, however, that the relative verifiability of values(2) may be adversely affected by the presence or character of purpose. In the first place, we have noted in the study of simple fact and value problems that the value of the burner, of the paint, and of the location of the study desk depends upon the nature of the external objects or arrangements with relation to a person or persons having purposes, assumed or stated. Fact has appeared to be unaffected by purpose; value, to be determined vitally by purpose. In the second place, some writers 7 have ex7

For example, Burtt, Principles and Problems of Right Thinking

(1931 ed.), pp.

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pressed the view that the factual or descriptive judgment deals with the existent or the existentially determinate, whereas the aim of a value judgment is to make a choice for practical action, a choice which is a somewhat arbitrary commitment, since various elements in the situation are weighed and given value with relation to dominant needs, wishes, or purposes therein. Thus it may be maintained that dependence upon purpose makes value formulations ultimately or highly unverifiable or that any "verification" in matters of value is of very different order and degree from that in matters of fact, especially from that in the "precision sciences." However, when the various formulations previously listed are viewed as constituting a scale from the relatively simple verifiable to the complex unverifiable and their verification is conceived as occurring through complex interactions in physical, social, and personal settings, a number of significant points may be noted, points which are as true of the factual as of the valuative, of the scientific as of the aesthetic or the moral. The first is that no problematic adjustment would occur were there no motivating desire or purpose. There is desire for adjustment—for one or many reasons, whether practical or theoretical. In this sense purpose is present even in dealing with the most factual question, for example, "Will this burner burn?" or "Is this a tube of red paint?" Secondly, purposes are also in each case yet to be defined. What is the problem? What steps will have to be taken to solve it? The general end of inquiry and the intermediate ends and means have to be defined and mapped out. These all become instrumental to the overarching desire to solve the problem, to reach a satisfactory adjustment. In the third place, with increasing complexity of events—desire events included—it is increasingly difficult to entertain freely yet objectively all the genuine possibilities, wishborn or otherwise, and to see clearly all the effects which promise to follow and do fo^ow in action. It is increasinglv difficult to define, to pursue, and perchance to correct or modify both remote 364-369; Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 335-340, 358-363; and Charner M. Perry, "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The International Journal of Ethics, XLIII (1932-1933), 127-144.

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and immediate purposes. Fourthly, there are choices—more or less arbitrary—in almost every adjustment, but particularly in the more complex ones. Delimitation of problem and determination of techniques and procedures, even in scientific experimentation, are in each case matters of selection with reference to the most promising results. Each creative act is a somewhat arbitrary adventure, a commitment of fortune to the lap of the future. Choice of some order is indispensable to inquiry-creation-testing, but it is not the end of the matter. For, finally, choices are in no case either unconditioned or unaffected by other elements in this and other adjustment situations. Purposes and "choice-wishes" are in varying degrees formed, informed, and reformed by critical reflection, social criticism, and the effects experienced in overt action. Purposes arise within and affect the direction of activities, whether of science, of art, or of morals ; and the purposes undergo tests and reconstruction within the activities themselves. Viewed thus as suggested goods undergoing verification in total courses of adjustment, facts and values will be equally verifiable so far as purpose or wish is a factor. All thinking is "wishful"—pervaded by wishes. It is true, as was previously noted, that in value problems wishes are more largely the subject matter of inquiry and test than in problems of fact that are not devoted primarily to the study of wishes. So there are in value problems, especially in problems of personal-social value, unusually strong tendencies toward "wishful" thinking in a bad sense of the term. But this depends upon individual habits, which are included in the next factor to be considered—frame of reference. As subject matters for inquiry, purposes have much the same effect upon verifiability as do other events: with an increase in the complexity there is in general a correlative increase in the difficulty of making formulations which prove fruitful of relatively tested truth, beauty, or goodness. Purposes are themselves subject to experimental expression, statement, and testing and vary widely from the highly definite and determinable to the extremely indefinite and indeterminable. With respect to the nature and role of purposes, various kinds of values(l) must be equally affected, except in so far

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as the processes of critical inquiry and testing in matters of value(2) as compared with those in matters of fact are or may be adversely affected by uncritically "wishful" thinking. This treatment of purpose may appear, however, to be an evasion of the two considerations with which the discussion started. How does it recognize that values are determined, at least in part, by a relationship sustained with purpose or purposes? The answer is that purposes, whether as products of funded habits and meanings or as products of present interactions, express themselves as expectations, as criteria, as what is wanted in or from the subject matter of inquiry. In the simple value problems considered previously, burner, paint, and location of desk were required to fulfill or to make it possible to fulfill certain expectations or wishes. But the wishes did not fully determine the conditions of their own satisfaction. Along with other objects, wishes were subject matter (and motive) of inquiry. Thus wishes in interaction with other scrutinized events give rise to "suggestions" and assist in directing and in appraising the outcomes of further action. When intellectualized and critically examined and compared, they more obviously afford subject matter and suggestions for inquiry. Whether in matters of fact or in matters of value, in science, art, or morals, the correctness or error, adequacy or inadequacy, of suggested ends and means is in varying degrees discoverable through the cooperation of overt and nonovert phases of interaction. As for the view that factual or descriptive judgments deal with existents and value judgments with ends or purposes, apparently the difficulty is partly due to a common tendency to abstract descriptive and valuative (or normative) judgments from their total settings and partly to the equally common practice of taking as typical of value judgments those dealing with total situations of practical action and as typical of descriptive or factual judgments those dealing with matters which can be clearly isolated or restricted and which lie toward the more definitely determinable end of the scale of verifiability. A distorted perspective results. Fact finding is made to appear determinate, valuation to appear essentially and inherently indeterminate or less determinate ; facts as in

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high degree verifiable, values as unverifiable or as verifiable only in low order and degree. When suggestions are viewed in their total settings, it is apparent that none of them, whether born of descriptive or of valuative judgment, carries a certificate guaranteeing its own legitimacy. Every judgment made is a suggestion properly open to further testing. Moreover, when formulations (judgments) of purposes and of instrumentalities are seen to vary from the highly definite and determinable to the extremely indefinite and indeterminable, it is clear that they, as well as formulations with reference to other events and relations, vary from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. Purpose, then, is an important factor in the motivation and direction of all our various quests and in the rise and selection of suggestions in both factual and valuative adjustments. Further examination of the items on the scale of verifiability suggests that purpose also affects the character of the verification sought and therefore the meaning of verifiability itself. The items falling at the left of the center of the scale seem to express for the most part conditions, processes, objects, or relationships which have existed or are capable of existing as demonstrable facts. As we move toward the right, however, the items tend to take on the character of tentative, proposed solutions to problems which require experimental operations largely or entirely nonovert. Such suggestions seem to be compatible with scientific observations, yet they are generally recognized as extremely hypothetical. They are genuinely possible solutions, whose chief function it is to satisfy the intellectual-emotional need for integration, unity, completion, or "advance." To insist that many aesthetic and moral formulations are not verifiable because it is not possible to perform, with respect to them and with scientific precision, such operations as are necessary to disclose minute quantitative or cause-effect relationships is to overlook the relative character of verifiability—the dependence of the validity, worth, or truth of a formulation upon its purpose.8 It would, moreover, fail to recognize the fact, just noted, that sci8

See p. 22.

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entific formulations themselves vary thus in function, some purporting primarily to express existential relationships of a quantitative or causal nature, others serving chiefly as directions to further operations or as a summary expression of possible interpretations. The verifiability of the latter directive and interpretative scientific formulations would also appear to be in large part relative to their function, to be tested, that is, by their ability to give helpful direction or interpretation in further inquiry. Verifiability is thus relative to the major purposes of science, art and morals and also to the functions or purposes of particular formulations. Within each of the three interests formulations vary from those highly verifiable only in relation to particular existential objects to those verifiable only in terms of the integration or direction which they afford. That frame of reference is an important factor affecting verifiability is increasingly evident even with reference to the special sciences. It has now become clear not only that a personal equation may affect the most exact observations and that problems and experiments are abstractions made with relation to the interests of the investigator but also that the facts themselves are different when viewed in different frames of reference. All these considerations have led to the insistence that viewpoint as well as observations be carefully stated. Frame of reference is an important factor because the inquirercreator-tester, whether in science, art, or morals, is a finite being or group, having in every case the limitations of particular time and place. With respect to subject matter the difficulties are proportionate to the varied complexities, inaccessibilities, and other related traits, which, as already seen, characterize all kinds of events. Complexities and uncertainties of wishes, purposes, and meanings, as well as of more external subject matters, augment the difficulties of clear vision and wise decision and also create certain actual differences in the facts for different perspectives. Both external and internal factors make for an element of indeterminancy which, though allowance may be made statistically or otherwise, perhaps cannot be wholly or certainly escaped.

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With respect to the inquirer-creator-tester, "frame of reference" denotes particularly the personal factors, both generic and specific, which affect verifiability. At present, scientific verification usually excels that in other pursuits with regard to the care taken in building up and fostering the growth of sensitivities, habits, attitudes, and other personal elements which give shape to total dynamic viewpoint. These elements of outlook and patterns of overt responsiveness determine or create the modes of operation which function in specific situations of thought and of action. But that such excellence is not—at least not potentially—the exclusive possession of science is indicated by the fact that there are varying degrees of competency in the pursuit of all interests, science included. The wisely good man, the accomplished artist or critic, and the eminent among scientists commonly excel precisely because they bring to each situation sensitivities, habits, interests, curiosities, modes of affective and reflective response, and powers of or persistence in inference which make possible such analysis and appraisal as are finely discriminative and widely sympathetic. The generic traits of outlook and other elements of procedure demonstrated by these exceptional individuals may be abstractly described as flexibility, creativity, and critical-mindedness. These qualities are, of course, the opposites of dogmatic fixity, routine conventionality, and unfounded credulity. In other words, the ability to perform operations essential for an optimum of verification is in proportion, with regard to the general frame of reference, to the ability to maintain a genuinely experimental approach and a procedure which avoids both fixity and fadism—a methodology which is at once objective and cautious, conserving and contriving, courageous and humble. The present high degree of success of scientists, even by the host of those of lesser repute, in maintaining such an experimental attitude is not, as we have seen before, due to inherent differences in subject matter—if this is adequately conceived as the whole gamut of events (past, present, and future). It is due rather to the fact that having started with relatively isolated matters the sciences have gradually and with great difficulty succeeded in build-

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ing up an environment which in widening if restricted areas stimulates and nurtures experimental care and creativity. Something similar is slowly taking place in art and in personal and social affairs in so far as there is increased exchange of data concerning problems and techniques and increased attention to the economic, political, and other educational factors which condition our personal and associated life. These tendencies are as yet in a very nascent and precarious state—not so much due to lack of individual excellence in many quarters as to lack of nourishing soil and favorable climate. It is necessary to give too much attention to getting and holding material necessities to make it possible to bring to full flower the formulation and diffusion of a more genuinely experimental theory of values, especially with respect to moral values. The present situation results in more careful and thorough verification of scientific facts and values, at least in certain limited areas, than of aesthetic and moral facts and values. It also results, so far as general methodology or frame is a factor, in greater present verifiability of scientific matters in those areas. The conditions do not yet exist which may in time make it possible to test more carefully and extensively rather than merely to "idealize impractically" about personal and social relations, for example, with regard to economic production and distribution, political administration, and international relations. But the fact that many—though by no means all—scientific formulations are more thoroughly verified and for the present more practicably verifiable does not justify the conclusion that values(2,3) are inherently and forever less verifiable. At some future date the cumulative effects of present nascent tendencies, if not destroyed by other sinister competing social forces, may have equalized, with regard to quality of methodology, what is the then practicable verifiability of facts and values. When attention is given to more specific individual differences, however, the possibility for value verification, especially in moral matters, appears very limited or even impossible. For it is a wellknown fact that different individuals and groups make essentially different evaluations of life and its affairs. Not only are facts and

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values seen differently by different groups, but at least some of the facts and values are different for various persons. A picnic is a positive value for most persons at some times, but not at all times or for all persons at any one time. Some foods are good for some persons, but not for all persons. At four o'clock the picnic may be for you a good, but for me a bad ; at seven it may be a good for me and for you an evil—depending in each case upon our respective physiological states, interests, or social responsibilities. The same situation obviously holds for aesthetic goods as well. How, then, can there be any verification in art or in morals? The difficulty arises here from unwarranted assumptions about both science and verification. Science is erroneously conceived as restricted to the finding of invariant relations or general averages and uniformities in relatively unchanging subject matters, and verification is treated as just such disclosed and tested invariancy. Viewed in the more adequate perspective of the whole gamut of events which are subject matter for both fact and value formulations, it becomes apparent that personal choices as made and social responsibilities as responded to are no less events ("facts") than are atoms or automobiles. The irreconcilable differences in choice and in principles of choice arise from the unique traits of each situation of choice—traits both personal and environmental, both external and internal. Despite this fact, or possibly due to it, there is sufficient constancy among events to make some uniformities discoverable and sufficient constancy within many situations to make possible their individual diagnosis and treatment. It does not follow, however, that all events of choice, all enjoyments, all acts performed, all hypotheses entertained are equally correct or valuable. While some facts in each situation are dependent upon individual needs and interests, it is also true that both the external and the internal factors of the situation are what they are and that they may be misjudged. This holds even though we maintain that "determinate desires and interests are not a part of a person's native equipment, and are not fixed forces which combine to produce judgments of value," that "each animal organism con-

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tains the potentiality of an infinite number of equally consistent personalities." 9 For there is some determinateness in native biological needs and equipment and in the organism's relations to physical and social conditions. There is determinateness in personalities and cultures to the extent to which they have developed definite traits and modes of procedure. There is thus some degree of determinateness relative to each individual and group in each specific situation, even if there is no universal psychological, social, or cosmic frame of reference which predetermines truth, beauty, or goodness. Nor should it be forgotten that individuals and groups are notoriously fallible and shortsighted in the perception of their own actual needs and wider possibilities. Having or experiencing good is "verification" only as an immediate satisfaction or interest. If any advance is to be made toward verification in its fuller and more distinctive meaning, there is yet need for further testing through critical reflection, discussion, and possibly overt action. A maximum of the experimental attitude is as essential for optimum inquiry and testing in individual cases as for the discovery or the creation of general uniformities, whether in science, art, or morals. Thus have we considered in terms of their nature as events the three main factors which affect verifiability by affecting the performability of operations of inquiry and testing: subject matter, purpose, and frame of reference. How, now, should fact and value formulations be represented as falling on curves of frequency when each set of items is considered en masse? If the point be granted that both fact and value formulations (problems and suggested solutions) range all the way from the "rather definitely verifiable" to the "probably unverifiable," the bases of the curves of distribution for each set of items will constitute a single scale representing these variations. If it then be assumed that with a sufficiently large and unselected sampling of possible formulations each of the curves to be erected on this base 9

Charner M. Perry, "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The tional Journal of Ethics, XLIII (1932-1933), 137.

Interna-

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will approximate a smooth curve of single mode, where will the value mode fall with relation to the fact mode? Will the two modes coincide, or will one fall farther to the right or to the left? Appraisal of the verifiability of the two sets of items en masse will be affected, as is the admission that there is any degree of verifiability,

b y our presumptions as to what constitutes verification

and the highest degree thereof. If we are exclusively enamored of the exactitude of the stricter quantitative procedures of science and b y this love are blinded to the fact that in science herself, as well as in art and in morals, there are many instances in which other kinds of acts, procedures, and arrangements are well tested with respect to correctness or adequacy, we shall certainly draw the curves of distribution in such wise as to place more of the fact items, especially those of science, farther left on the scale than we place the value items, particularly those of art and of morals. Or if we are infatuated by the desire for expression and integration, for heightened and directed experience, for full and harmonious integration of life, the curves will perhaps be drawn in the reverse order, with the artistic and moral items farther to the left. I f , however, we are forced b y "the logic of the f a c t s " (as we see it) to admit that verifiability is relative to the functions of the three somewhat distinct interests and indeed to the functions of particular formulations made within each of these interests, the situation is not so clear. Analysis of the factors which affect the verifiability of values ( 1 ) in this last sense of the term has shown these factors to be rather evenly balanced in their effects, with the exception of the third (frame of reference). T h e events which constitute the possible subject matter of inquiry and testing were found to be the same for both fact and value formulations. " E v e n t , " "simplicity," and the like were seen to function in somewhat different dimensions of discourse in physical, biological, and social matters. T h e purposes of inquiry and testing were found to v a r y from the definite and feasible to their opposites in both fact and value problems, whether in science, art, or morals. Wishes were found to constitute a much larger part of the subject matter in art and morals than in science,

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but properly they play no larger part in intellectualized inquiry and testing in the former than in science. With respect to the quality of personal outlook, attitude, and method of attack on problems, science was adjudged to be now superior to art and morals, particularly to morals. But since this may be due to the slower development of the general social conditions that foster the formulation and the widespread acceptance and habituation of an experimental outlook and methodology, the relative verifiability of aesthetic and moral goods may not be permanently affected. Empirical analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the modes of distribution for fact and value formulations will perhaps coincide, if viewed with relation to their several functions and potentialities. This means that when the separate groups of formulations are compared each en masse, facts and values are potentially equal in verifiability. It would follow also, if science, art, and morals are properly representative of all human interests, that all types of value range from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable and are to be conceived as distributed in degree of verifiability in much the same manner. Viewed in terms of the degree of verification which is immediately practicable, moral facts and values are less verifiable than scientific facts and values, due to general inadequacy of outlook, deficiencies of method, and lack of opportunities and facilities for attack on human problems. Thus facts and values en masse are perhaps at present equally verifiable, though moral facts and values are probably less verifiable than scientific facts and values. All types of values appear to be potentially equal in verifiability and unverifiability when each type is compared as a total group of possible statements. But will analysis from the standpoint of logic support these conclusions? Or will it force or suggest their abandonment?

CHAPTER FOUR: L O G I C A L OF

ANALYSIS

VERIFIABILITY

F R O M what we have called the empirical standpoint the performability of operations of inquiry and testing has been viewed as affected by the nature of events as such. But it is also possible to view these operations in more strictly logical terms. The "logical" is of course conceived somewhat differently from various philosophical viewpoints. In the narrowest or strictest sense it concerns the character and formal relationships of terms and propositions without reference to their truth. In what is perhaps the widest sense "the logical" includes all experienced events and relations when viewed with respect to their nature and interconnections in terms of meaning structures. This wide usage includes symbolic events (thinking and logical analysis) viewed as terms and relations, but it also includes all other events as translated into symbolic events or as being or possessing structures,. functions, or relations that may be so taken or translated. Between these narrow and broad usages is the conception of logic as a study of actual or potential language structures or forms in terms of valid compossibilities, with or without reference to their truth. We shall here use "logical" in the second or widest meaning, which if not restricted to isolated instances of adjustment will include the other meanings of the term as well.

Our present problem is: when viewed logically, what factors affect the ability to perform operations of inquiry and testing, and are these factors the same or different in kind and amount of affect upon or in determining degree of verifiability (a) in matters of fact and in matters of value and (b) in science and in art and morals. In terms of th§ various meanings of "value" distinguished at the outset, are values(3) as verifiable as nonmoral facts and values, are all values(2) as verifiable as facts, and therefore are all types of values(l) equally verifiable when each general type, such as the scientific, the artistic, or the moral, is compared en masse with any other type?

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The ability to list both fact and value formulations on a scale from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable indicates that "logic" does not prevent some degree of verification in matters of value as well as in those of fact, and it might be taken to signify positively that logic assists verification. Indeed, to the extent to which the procedures of inquiry and testing, whether overt or reflective, are "logical" rather than "illogical" we may expect to find capacity for such inquiry and testing as give correct or adequate formulation—capacity for operations which produce or constitute verification in various degrees. But if verifiability of some order and degree be granted, it may still be true that, logically conceived, values, considered en masse, are less verifiable than are facts. The basic conditions for valid inference are doubtless in a certain sense the same in all judgments. It is evidently true, as Urban has said in discussing the multiplicity of current logical theories, that "all logicians are at one in the idea that the fundamental laws of logic are the most universal truths—that is, are the conditions that every judgment which makes a truth claim must meet." 1 The general conditions which hold or must be fulfilled for valid inference regarding any subject matter have traditionally been called "the laws of thought." They are the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, which mean, respectively, that for validity in any given course of inference (a) if anything is A it is A, or if any proposition is true it is true, (b) nothing can be both A and B, or no proposition can be both true and false, and (c) anything must be either A or not A, or any proposition must be either true or false. These logical "laws" or conditions may be conceived as resulting from or expressing the most general nature of things and thus as somehow bound up in man's native structures or modes of experience or as habits acquired in a world with some definiteness, isness, and constancy. Or they may be conceived as rules necessary for the use of language or for valid manipulation in the medium of 1 The Intelligible lishers.

World, p. 101 ; by permission of The Macmillan Company, pub-

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signs and symbols. However conceived, such general conditions are necessarily operative or fulfilled in any valid inference in valuative acts or subject matters no less than in factual, in art and morals no less than in science. Yet as Urban goes on to say in the same connection, "There is also agreement in the idea that these conditions are not sufficient but merely necessary." There are clearly other factors which affect the validity of thought, factors which affect the fruitfulness of inquiry and testing (verifiability). Much the same conclusions follow if it be held that the formal conditions or laws of traditional logic are inadequate for modern modes of thought. If with Bogoslovsky 2 we find that we must assume continuity in all processes, that A may be both in some degree Β and non-B at the same time, and that for valid thinking continuities must be made explicit, but that amounts of similarity and difference or continuity and discontinuity must be carefully indicated (by "quantitative indices"), these general conditions will also doubtless hold for values as well as for facts, in art and morals no less than in science. And it will also be true that these rules or conditions are "not sufficient but merely necessary." Factors other than formal laws or conditions affect the possibility and degree of verifiability. Indeed, voices in many different languages almost unanimously declare in the name of logic—doubtless due to these other factors affecting verifiability—that values are unverifiable or less verifiable than are descriptive judgments. To the suggestion that values are in any significant sense and degree verifiable it may be objected on logical grounds that "Values and facts are independent types of meaning, and their relationship should not be over-simplified." 3 As Charner M. Perry puts it: Deliberation as to choice of conduct is of itself essentially indeterminate. A man who set himself the task of surveying all the possibilities of action open to him, of tracing each possibility into the future, and of considering its consequences to him and to other people, would have a task which could never be finished. Moreover, granting that this task were by a 2

The Technique of Controversy. Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to Ethics, p. 51. See especially the articles by Stevenson. 3

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miracle accomplished while there were yet time to act, he would still be faced with the problem of finding some principle of selection to apply to the various possibilities; and any practical principle would have to be derived from other principles. Not even a miracle could find a logical ending for the endless chain which would result from the attempt to find a logical beginning for his judgment.4

Or again it may be held 5 that the logical status of general principles or primary valuations, 0 which function as major premises in all particular evaluations, 7 presents problems of peculiar and baffling complexity, for these primitive valuations are properly conceived neither as hypotheses, generalizations, theorems, or postulates, but as "more analogous to the undefined notions and undemonstrated propositions of a deductive system." 8 The logical objections thus raised to the verifiability of values must each be considered in due course. But, first, what are the factors other than or together with the strictly logical or formal conditions of valid inference which affect the ability to perform operations of inquiry and testing, which, in more logical terms, affect the ability to secure evidence of truth or to make formally valid inferences ; and what are the effects of these factors upon the verifiability of facts and values, respectively? When factual and valuative adjustments are viewed as structures of meanings and signs, and when the meanings and signs are in turn seen in their larger settings and sequential interrelations as functions within total adjustments, it appears that the factors affecting verifiability must in a broad sense be the same as when the operations of inquiry and testing are viewed more empirically or in terms of events as such. But viewed logically the same situations and operations of inquiry are expressed as terms, relations, propositions, inferences, judgments, and so forth. Subject and object, the matter of inquiry and the inquirer, with their several traits and modes of 4

"The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The International Journal of Ethics, XLIII (1932-1933), 139. 5 See, for example, Castell, A College Logic, pp. 315-327. 6 For instance, "All A's which make for the greatest happiness of the greatest number are good." . 7 For example, "This is an act which will make for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, therefore this is a good act." 8

Castell, A College

Logic,

p. 324.

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interaction, are both the necessary and the sufficient conditions for fallacy as well as for validity, for truth as well as for error. These factors may again, in keeping with the more empirical analysis, be treated under the captions (a) nature of the subject matter of inquiry, (b) purpose, and (c) frame of reference. The effect of these three factors upon the situation of inquiry and testing as viewed logically is seen most clearly when the formulations listed in Chapter I I I are again conceived as placed upon a scale of verifiability stretching from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably un verifiable. I t then becomes apparent with respect to subject matter not only that terms and relations are vitally affected by such traits as simplicity-complexity, accessibilityinaccessibility, quantifiability-unquantifiability, separability-inseparability, and controllability-uncontrollability but also that the subject matters expressed by or referred to in terms, relations, propositions, judgments, and the like vary from the relatively simple, accessible, quantifiable, separable, and controllable to their opposites. I t is also clear that although these traits of subject matter do not always occur together, for instance complexity with inaccessibility or with uncontrollability, they are in general correlative. The cumulative effect of these variations in subject matter is to produce a scale of difficulty in achieving valid inference. In the main, the matters, for instance, a Bunsen burner, the consistency of a paint, and the arrangement of furniture in a room, in which operations of relatively direct interaction are possible and in which the language employed or employable is clear and simple lend themselves most readily to rigorous and verifiable inference. At the other extreme are those less accessible and more intricately intertwined matters—for example, the total universe, physiological and mental processes, and experiences of truth, beauty, and goodness—which when expressed in the clearest language yet attained are for most part confoundingly complex, involved, and unverifiable. The subject matter is with varying ease or difficulty accurately or adequately expressed. Relevant matters are in varying degrees of success distinguishable from the irrelevant, the necessary in in-

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ference from the superficially analogous or associated, the crucial for testing from the insignificant or inconsequential. Associated with and in part a product or aspect of such variation in subject matter are similar variations in purpose and in control of the various acts of judgment which occur intermittently throughout the processes of inquiry and testing. Before proceeding to the effects of purpose and the factors constituting or providing "frame of reference," two points of interest may here be noted. First, no matter how clear and explicit terms, statements, and inferences are, they never express correctly or adequately all that might be expressed even with reference to the simplest, most accessible subject matter. This is true whether the terms and propositions are the symbols of concrete, or "physical," subject matters or of abstract, or "mental," meanings. This fact has become increasingly apparent in modern science and logic, and it is often expressed by saying that symbols are abstractive. Bergson's protests against the falsifying effect of intellect suggests a remedy— retreat (or advance?) to the intuitive grasp of whole situations or of duration as continuous and total process. Since he himself recognizes,9 as do psychologists generally, that intimate familiarity, involving many acts both of analytic judgment and of synthetic judgment, may prepare the soil for the full flowering of quick and perhaps profound and elevating perception, the solution, so far as there is one, for this our human predicament, whether in science, art, or morals, is not to seek escape but to push forward our quests, multiplying, refining, simplifying, elaborating, and integrating our formulations as far as this may be consistent with the results of these operations themselves. A t any rate, this situation makes it clear that for valid inference or for the adequate understanding thereof we must either interpret the logical laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, as has recently been suggested,10 as holding for the subject matters referred to only at the particular instant of time at which and for 9

Introduction

10

to Metaphysics, pp. 90-92.

For example, Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,

pp. 183-185.

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the particular point of view from which judgment is made, or we must reformulate the general conditions for valid inference, perhaps much as Bogoslovsky has done, 1 1 so that it will be possible to keep more constantly in mind both the fact that subject matters are or refer to total processes which m a y be either continuous or discontinuous in various w a y s and degrees and the fact that these processes are often related and unrelated at the same time. Otherwise we fall into errors precisely when and because we are most strictly logical. For though use of signs frees and empowers us b y introducing thought into a medium not encumbered b y the multiplicity of concrete details or b y the need for adherence to the ever changing isness of nonsymbolistic events, it is also selective and restrictive. Such are the limitations of symbolic formulations and of their manipulation according to strictest formal conditions and rules. A second point worthy of note is that subject matters of all kinds v a r y in degree of determinateness or determinableness. Actual examination of the formulations listed according to the scale described in the preceding chapter discloses no peculiar relations expressed when these formulations are interpreted and related as propositions, whether regarding matters of fact or matters of value, in science, art, and morals. W h e n the formulations are stated in strict propositional form the relations expressed are the usual ones : inclusion and exclusion, symmetrical and asymmetrical, transitive and intransitive. T h e main inference involved in supporting or opposing the simple factual formulations m a y be schematized as follows : All A's (burners which light, paints which look so and so, or desks which require certain operations with a ruler) are B's (burners which burn when properly attached, paints which are red, or desks which are fifty inches long) ; This C (burner, paint, or desk) is an A; Therefore this C is a B. A n d the valuative inferences thus : 11

In The Technique

of

Controversy.

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75

All A's (burners which burn so and so, paints smooth and of even texture, desks placed thus with respect to sources of light) are B's (burners which burn well, paints good for this purpose, or desks so located as to get proper illumination) ; This C (burner, paint, or location of desk) is an A; Therefore this C is a B. Quite obviously the formulations at all other points on the scale may be treated with equal formal validity. But when we consider the evidence which supports the major and minor premises in any given case, it becomes clear that there is variation from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. T h e variation, however, is apparently not due to any differences inherent in the logical processes as such, but results from the nature of the subject matter of inquiry, which in both factual and valuative problems varies from the simple to the complex, from the accessible to the inaccessible, and so forth. Before noting the consequences of this conclusion for the claim that the predicates of value judgments are essentially indeterminate or are undemonstrable primitive notions, it is well to consider purpose and frame of reference as factors affecting the performability of operations of inquiry and testing as viewed from a logical standpoint. With respect to purpose, the variation in subject matter produces, as was indicated in the empirical analysis, a like variation in definiteness and feasibility. This variation affects similarly the degree of definiteness of terms and the determinateness or determinability of relations predicated. This is so obvious that it requires no elaboration. But the effect of purpose upon the relation of factual and valuative problems, propositions, and judgments is a matter which goes to the heart of some of the most vital issues in value theory. At a number of points we have found a close relationship between factual and valuative formulations. Valuative problems were seen to be at least partially translatable into factual ones. Each event, such as burner, paint, location of desk, taxes, aesthetic or moral principles, and so forth, was seen to be experienceable both as an event or existent and as an object sustaining relations to human

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purposes or interests. The classification of formulations on the scale of verifiability was found to be at some points obviously arbitrary—apparently a matter of the context in which the particular formulation came into existence and with reference to which it was to be tested. The empirical analysis indicated that interests give rise, direction, and often bias, to both factual and valuative inquiries and that purposes vary—in both kinds of problem—from the definite and feasible to the indefinite and often impracticable. These observations have all pointed toward the close and intimate relationship of the factual and the valuative, a conclusion which has, as Urban says, 12 become rather generally recognized with the development of value theory in recent years. Indeed, the conviction has grown that perhaps all judgment involves both factual and valuative elements. It is obvious, therefore, that before the question of the relative determinancy or indeterminancy of facts and values and of the logical status of fact and value judgments can be decided a clear understanding must be reached regarding the relation of the factual to the valuative. If in considering this relationship we start with the fact that each experienced event is experienceable both as an existent and as an interest, the relation appears clear-cut and definite. Judgments may be made, for example, about paint, both as an existent, as a something which has its particular determinate spacial-temporalcausal relations without dependence upon an experiencing subiect. and also about it as a something which has or may have relations to human purposes or interests. Viewed thus, "factual" (descriptive) judgments are those about existence as such, and "valuative" (normative) judgments are those concerning objects in their relations with, as in some degree negatively or positively valuable for, a subject (usually a person or persons). So much seems clear until we note further that factual judgments satisfy human interests, even when the interest is purely one of curiosity or the desire to understand, and until we note also that any actual or possible relationship of an object to a purpose or desire or any iudqment made about such a relationship is an event capable of factual formulal i "Value Theory and Aesthetics," in philosophy Today, pp. 62-63.

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tion. The distinction just made between factual and valuative judgments may still be held in theory, but it is very difficult to maintain in practice—even in the practice of giving illustrations of factual and valuative problems or formulations. For at one instant we may view a judgment about an existent as factual, and at another instant, view the same judgment as sustaining a relation to human interests, even when the interest is primarily or "purely" to know about the event as such. The closeness of the relationship of the factual to the valuative is again emphasized, but perhaps basically clarified, by noting further that in every judgment, whether factual or valuative in the sense indicated above, there is a certain polarity: there is attention to (or in quest of) an object of interest by a subject of interest. Hence there is inextricably bound up in the complex interactions which every act of judgment is, both "factual" and "valuative" elements. Judgment is in any case directed by interests generated within and controlling intricate interactions of subject and object, whether the object be external or internal, actual or imaginative, present or sought. Thus the distinction between "the factual" and "the valuative," whether with respect to judgments, formulations, or problems, must perhaps always remain (consciously or unconsciously) dependent upon the primary interest, function, or purpose operative at the time-span under consideration. At the split second when a particular isolated short-span judgment is made, the judgment is factual if attention is being given chiefly to an event as an event, and valuative if interest is chiefly in objects with relation to purposes, to ends, or means to ends. But in a longer span of "judgment," in which two or more judgments are made in order to make possible or to justify a later one, the whole span may be said to be chiefly factual, even though one or more intermediate judgments were from a short-span viewpoint valuative; or the whole course of judgment may be called valuative if its main interest has been in ends or means to ends, even though some judgments involved were "factual" from a short-span point of view. Whether a formulation or problem is one of fact or of value will

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be similarly determined by the context of purpose in which it occurs or is conceived as occurring. "This burner lights" may seem most naturally to be a factual formulation ; but if it arises and functions in some contexts, say a situation in which a burner is needed quickly if an experiment is not to be spoiled, the statement "This one burns" obviously takes on valuative import. "This Bunsen burner is good for heating crucibles" may seem to be a valuative formulation, yet if used in an explanation to an uninitiated person or group, the statement may be "purely" factual. Likewise, a factual problem is one in which the chief concern is in knowing the nature of events as such, and a valuative problem is one in which the chief interest is in discovering the worth of things, acts, or arrangements as ends or means to ends, as instrumental to human enjoyments or other purposes. What appears as a factual problem in a short time span may be but a part within a problem which in larger context is properly regarded as in the main a valuative problem, and vice versa. Indeed, as we shall have occasion to note at a later point, 13 both "factual," or descriptive, and "valuative," or normative, judgments are intimately and complexly associated in the prosecution of every problem, which in the present connection means that the verifiability of each type of judgment vitally affects that of both factual and valuative formulations when and as these formulations become problems for further inquiry and testing. Viewed from the logical standpoint, the factors of individuality and of outlook, attitudes, and other modes of procedure which together constitute the frame of reference of any given person or group play an important role in determining the degree of verification which is possible in any given situation at any given time. For these affect vitally the data collected or taken as relevant and the inferences which are made therewith. In both factual and valuative matters, whether in science, art, or morals, method is, in Dewey's phrase, 14 "supreme." Method cannot entirely overcome the limitations of individual time, space, or experience or the intrinsic complexity and the relative inaccessibility, inseparability, or uncontrollability of many subject matters. But it either hinders or assists 13

Chap. vii.

14

The Quest for Certainty, chap, ix.

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observation and definition, the collecting and analyzing of crucial cases, and the making of inferences for and from more overt action. In all such processes a cautious experimental attitude is the general condition for the greatest correctness and fruitfulness. T h e ability to perform operations that translate the various possible and actual overt and nonovert operations of inquiry and testing into a medium of symbolic terms and relations is a sine qua non of critical method. The full possibilities of such translation are never achieved or necessary. Perhaps an infinite structure of symbolic transmutations and elaborations is possible upon the basis of even the simplest experience. But for purposes of practical action or for satisfactory theoretical continuity only a limited extension of such symbolization is necessary. Y e t this degree of explicit continuity is itself an ideal seldom more than partially realized. Only occasionally does time or interest permit the elaboration of symbolic representations of complete courses of adjustment in their total settings to the point where the possibilities are so fully stated and tested that there results a thoroughly coherent set of symbolized operations which support each other and can with critical confidence be adjudged to "correspond" at all points with "the facts" or to offer most probability of producing anticipated consequences in further action. The role played by critical and constructive symbolic operations in the simple fact and value problems examined in Chapter II suggests (a) that the logical processes are the same or of similar character in both factual and valuative problems and (b) that the potentialities for symbolization and logical testing are as great in valuative as in factual matters. When the various factors in such problematic situations are most fully symbolized and viewed in terms of the functions performed by the symbols, it is apparent that the various meanings as expressed formally in terms, propositions, syllogisms, and chains of inference must be at least operational. Apparently this much is the necessary condition both for causal continuity among events (including the events of subjectobject interaction and of symbolization and logical testing) and also for logical validity. Unless the operational character of meaning

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can be assumed, there is apparently no possibility of such a physical or logical structure of somewhat definite continuities and discontinuities, relatedness and unrelatedness, as both overt and internal experiences lead us to postulate as indispensable conditions for physical occurrence and logical inference. Without some degree of definiteness or determinateness of meanings and their relations it would be impossible to make formulations which possess any degree of validity or truth. It would be impossible to employ significant symbols (terms and relations) regarding either existence or worth. It would not be possible to devise relevant suggestions in the workshop of free creative "mental" experimentation and to give to these any degree of testing in further internal and overt action. Any degree of success achieved in developing coherence and constancy in the solution of a particular problem or in reconsidering the solution points to the causal continuity of events and to the operational character of terms and relations and their potential continuity in valid inference. But that logical operations are only potentially valid or correct is indicated by the ever-present possibility and frequent occurrence of "fallacies," both material and formal. This is painfully evident in the whole gamut of factual as well as of valuative affairs. The presence of such fallacies and the possibility of uprooting and avoiding them even in moral matters was indicated as earlv as Socrates. But Socrates commonly dealt with such general and ultimate issues that his results appear more often than not to have been more destructive of customary beliefs than constructive of suggestions for testing in further thought and action. The role played by critical and constructive symbolization in the simplest factual and valuative problems, moral and artistic as well as scientific, suggests a similar potential fruitfulness for all types of value of whatever order of complexity. That this potentiality has not been as fully recognized and actualized in art and morals is perhaps due, as noted before, 15 to accidental and temporary circumstances rather than to inherent and permanent factors. That such potentiality is perhaps of the same order for valuative and for factual adjust15

Chap. iii.

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81

ments is obvious, however, only when we keep clearly in mind the fact that the whole gamut of events is subject matter for both factual and valuative judgments, that purposes vary widely in definiteness and feasibility in both kinds of problem solving, and that both factual and valuative meanings and judgments are operations which rise within and are subject to testing by other operations both overt and nonovert. The foregoing considerations with respect to subject matter, purpose, and frame of reference suggest the replies which must be made to the logical or semeiotic arguments which were indicated earlier to the effect that value judgments are less verifiable than factual ones. Briefly, the arguments were (a) that facts and values are "independent" types of meaning, (b) that value judgments are essentially indeterminate, (c) that there is no logical beginning for principles of choice, and (d) that particular value judgments rest upon undemonstrable primitive notions. There is an element of truth in each of these contentions which makes plausible the idea that valuative judgments are less verifiable than are factual judgments. The contention that facts and values are different types of meaning is correct in that statements commonly taken as typically factual differ, relatively, in their usual references and functions from statements taken as typically valuative. But this does not justify the conclusion, let us say, that valuative statements are essentially and "irreducibly" expressive or emotive and factual statements essentially descriptive. 16 Both factual and valuative statements are commonly employed, especially in nonscientific usage, with expressive and emotive intents and effects. Yet both may also be used more descriptively to affirm relations which either do or do not hold true. When statements, whether more factual or more valuative in form, are purely expressive or emotive in intent or effect, they have, as the logical positivists have stressed, no "theoretical sense" and no "verification" in the most restricted meanings 18

This appears to be the position of, for example, Feigl, Morris, and Stevenson in their writings cited in the Bibliography. The difference in type of meaning emphasized by Wheelwright ( A Critical Introduction to Ethics, p. 51) is that between descriptive and normative propositions, and will be considered in chap. vii.

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of these terms. But in so far as used descriptively or denotively, statements affirm actual or possible relations and are subject to testing through experimental interaction. T h e tendency to contrast some valuative statements which commonly have a high degree of emotive stimulus-capacity with factual statements which ordinarily have a high degree of descriptive stimulus-capacity and then to regard this difference as an "inherent" or "irreducible" difference between factual and valuative statements shows failure to recognize that all events and relations may be subject matter for both factual and valuative statements and that in different contexts and with different intents each form of statement varies from the completely descriptive in reference and function to the completely expressive and/or emotive in reference and function. T h e view that value judgments are essentially indeterminate is a plausible generalization precisely because there is such a large element of indeterminateness or indeterminability in human choices. But we will maintain this sweeping characterization of value judgments in contrast with judgments of fact only if we ignore the crucial truth that both factual and valuative formulations may be distributed all along a scale of verifiability and also the further fact that both "types" of judgment are closely related and only arbitrarily or relatively distinguishable, being mutually dependent in the solution of any problem which arises with reference to existence or worth. T o maintain that all value judgments are indeterminate despite these facts would be to close the right eye to factual matters in which verification is very difficult or impossible and the left eye to value matters in which rather definite verification is practicable in so far as both subject matter and purpose are constant and methodology is experimental and stable. Thus, by unfairly selecting instances, we should make factual judgments appear definite and determinàte, valuative ones indefinite and indeterminate. Y e t this is but half of a half-truth. T h e full truth is that there are both fact and value judgments all the way along the scale from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. T h e assertion that deliberation as to choice of conduct and therefore with respect to all value matters is essentially indeterminate

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on the ground that there is no logical beginning or ending for the endless chain which results from an attempt to trace all possibilities into the future and to find a principle of selection among the possible consequences thus disclosed, is strictly true. It is true with respect to choices of point of view, concepts, problems, and procedures in science as well as in art and morals. Only by recognizing this ultimate and essential indeterminateness in all inquiry and action, theoretical and practical, can we appreciate adequately our human predicament. But to assign all indeterminateness to art or morals would be a gross oversight with respect to other affairs. And to suppose that logical principles are valid only when they rest upon other more general ones is to overlook the actual origins and functions of meanings, the fact that symbolizations, however general, are properly regarded as hypotheses for testing by the careful administration of strictest logical processes, but aided also by the intimate cooperation of overt action. The view that all particular valuations have an uncertain logical status because the most general major premises which would be necessary to support them are undemonstrable notions is apparently the result of such unfair sampling as was mentioned above plus the failure to grasp adequately the mediate and hypothetical character of all meaning. To suppose that particular judgments of value are no more certain than the most general assumptions which might be made in order to validate them is to overlook the fact that many factual and valuative formulations arise and are tested with relation to definite purposes in specific situations. It is evident, for instance, that the judgment "This is a good location for the desk" is no more dependent for logical status and correctness upon the general proposition "All which makes for the greatest happiness of the greatest number is good" than is the judgment "This desk is fifty inches long" dependent for its correctness upon such propositions as "All measurements are made in terms of merely conventional units and operations" or "The length of the desk is a matter which is determined only in relation to some interest." In each case the more general propositions are open to question and may seem to introduce a large element of ultimate inde-

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terminancy, but this fact does not invalidate the more particular propositions which arise within and are relatively tested by specific operations in particular situations. To question the worthiness of the purpose for having an arrangement that gives conditions favorable for the health and convenience of the organism is here as unnecessary and unjustifiable—and as irrelevant to the correctness of the particular judgment—as it would be if we were to question the worthiness of knowing how long the desk is and to suppose that this is a factor which completely determines the actual length of the desk. The various ways of locating the desk produce different actual effects with respect to the amount and character of light, arrangement of other furniture, and so forth. The arrangements are not all equally good for purposes assumed, nor are purposes which may be assumed equally important as judged in terms of the effects to which they may lead. In specific situations relative values, whether ends or means, are, like facts, determined or discovered through experimental operations of inquiry and testing. Each has the logical status of a suggestion, and its validity is to be discovered through further interactions. Thus many particular facts and values in the arts and sciences are well established prior to the most general laws, which may or may not be formulated and verified later. Through more restricted, but no less genuine and significant experiences, many facts even in physics and biology are known, although no one has yet discovered the ultimate nature and laws of atoms, electricity, light, or life. To argue from the fact that the widest generalizations about values have not been and probably cannot be verified would not justify us in giving to all value judgments and to all values the same uncertain logical status. We should again be victims of a distorted perspective which maximizes and generalizes our admitted predicaments with respect to some values and minimizes our equally numerous, but thus neglected, uncertainties with respect to some facts. The foregoing logical analysis of the factors which affect verifiability has supported or been compatible with the previous empirical analysis. The present discussion has considered and found untenable a number of positions which on various grounds claim for facts

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a higher order or degree of verification than is possible in matters of value. More constructively, the performability of operations of inquiry and testing has been found, when considered in logical terms, to be affected by subject matter, purpose, and frame of reference in such wise that in both factual and valuative matters there is variation from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. The logical analysis thus supports the conclusion, reached on empirical grounds, that fact and value(2) formulations are equally verifiable in so far as each varies from the rather definitely verifiable toward the probably unverifiable. The logical analysis has not attempted to examine the location of facts and values on a scale of distribution, but no logical grounds have appeared incompatible with the further empirical conclusion that since the whole gamut of events (wishes included) is subject to both factual and valuative formulation, all types of value in science, art, and morals are potentially equal in verifiability when the various types are compared en masse, although aesthetic and particularly moral facts and values are at present less verifiable due to deficiencies in outlook, methodology, and social climate. When both fact and value formulations are seen in their total settings as stretching from the highly verifiable to the probably unverifiable and as potentially equal in distribution with respect to degree of verifiability, it must be apparent that two common tendencies have frequently confused and perverted value theory: first, the tendency to take as typical of factual problems, formulations, or judgments the relatively simple and determinable, neglecting those which lie toward the right or unverifiable end of the scale, and at the same time to take as typical of valuative problems, formulations, and judgments those which are complex and perhaps ultimately undeterminable, neglecting those toward the left or rather definitely verifiable end of the scale; second, the tendency to abstract valuative judgments from their total settings and to treat them in isolation from factual judgments and from the conditions and operations which generate and test them. Although the prevalence of these tendencies is doubtless due in part to our human need for simplification—resulting in the present

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instance in over-simplification and distortion, they are each in large part explicable in the light of modern history. Both result chiefly from a lag of theory and practice behind scientific and social changes. Judgments of fact (especially in science) are no longer conceived as separate from other modes of action. Theory of knowledge has evolved from exclusive concern with "the understanding," "judgment," and "knowing" as subjective and sui generis, to the conception of knowledge as the product of complex interactions in which suggestions arise and are variously tested. But in theory of values(2,3) a similar mutual dependence and aid among overt and nonovert modes of action has not yet become strikingly dramatic in personal and social affairs. Aesthetic and moral judgments are thus frequently conceived as cut off from the conditions in which they arise and from the consequences which may assist in their testing and reconstruction. The tendency to take the relatively determinate and determinable as typical of factual formulations and the less determinate and determinable as typical of the valuative arises largely from the same general situation in scientific as contrasted with more personal and social affairs. Science has dealt for the most part with the relatively simple, constant, and controllable aspects of subject matter, hoping thus to be able in time to discover and to unravel the relationships of the more complex and changeful. The successes of science with relatively simple matters has been dramatic. On the other hand, the needs of actual life force us, in aesthetic and particularly in personal and social ("moral") matters, to deal with the more complex and less determinable facts and values. In these ranges of experience the uncertainties of our formulations are conspicuous. The certainties of scientific facts are thus set in sharp contrast to the uncertainties of human tastes, goals, and policies. The uncertainties still facing science—many of which have scarcely been touched and some of which, perhaps, cannot be touched—are overlooked. The uncertainties in valuative matters are so glaring as almost completely to eclipse from view the relative certainties and securities therein. The cumulative effect of the general social situation and of these

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tendencies, which are partly effect and partly cause of the situation itself, is to confuse vision with respect to the relative verifiability of facts and values. As will be seen in the following chapters, it also perpetuates other unnecessary dualisms in theory and practice.

CHAPTER FIVE: K N O W I N G

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VALUATION THE EXAMINATION of factual and valuative adjustments in science, art, and morals led 1 to the conception of facts and other values as verified goods and of fact and value verification as occurring through the mediation of complex interactions of internal and external factors. It was recognized, however, that more detailed comparison of the interactions constituting factual and valuative adjustments may disclose important differences either of kind or of degree and that these differences may or may not make untenable the view that values are verified in basically the same manner and degree as are facts, the view that verification occurs or may occur as significantly in art and morals as in science. Accordingly, the problem which now confronts us in the immediately succeeding chapters 2 is : When the interactions constituting factual and valuative adjustments are examined in greater detail, do important differences appear which make it necessary to abandon the position that facts and values are verified in much the same w a y and degree? Or does the recognition of these differences, if there be such, possibly suggest further significant developments of this viewpoint itself? In short, can the conception of verification as complex experimental interaction continue to verify itself by its ability to clarify, extend, and integrate our conceptions of the processes involved in matters of fact and matters of value, in science, art, and morals—processes the nature and relations of which occasion perennial conflicts and confusions? T h e processes most frequently contrasted in connection with valuative and factual adjustments are those called "knowing" and "valuation." Moreover, since knowing is so exclusively the aim and interest of science and valuation so prominently an objective and function of aesthetic appreciation and of moral deliberation, there is a tendency to identify knowing, or fact finding, with science and 1

In chap. ii.

2

Chaps, v-ix.

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valuation with art and morals. That this identification is not strictly justifiable is evident from the fact that there are, as has already been seen,3 both factual and valuative problems in science, art, and morals alike. Yet apparently fact finding as such—largely as an end in itself—is predominantly the aim of science, and likewise valuation is a major aim in problems of art and morals, particularly of morals. Any differences which exist betweei) knowing and valuation may therefore constitute differences among these three interests or between the subprocesses of valuative as compared with factual problem-solving courses. Upon what, if any, grounds may it be asserted that knowing and valuation differ in character either basically or in some degree? If "knowing" and "valuation" are interpreted in what are perhaps their most prevalent meanings, the differences which readily suggest themselves are that the processes involved in knowing, or fact finding, are objective, quantitative, and impersonal, deriving definite character from the "isness" of particular existent events, whereas valuation is subjective and qualitative—largely a matter of personal desires and culturally conditioned tastes. In short, fact finding probably will be conceived as largely a matter of observation, of making ourselves iwô-servient in order to dis-cover what exists alike for all normal observers—what indeed exists as it is or is becoming whether perceived correctly or at all. Valuation on the contrary may be regarded as a matter of preference, a matter of human needs and wishes, many of which change rapidly for individuals and for cultures. Thus conceived, knowing and valuation stand at opposite poles, with little in common. It is interesting and possibly instructive, however, to recall that historically there have been a number of shifts in the prevailing conceptions of knowledge. With the development of sophistry and cynicism among the early Greeks, knowledge came to be regarded as "subjective," as merely a matter of individual judgment. In Socrates and Plato it remained subjective (rational or "reflective") in process, but was supposed to be objective (universal) in rational disclosure. With Aristotle knowledge regained more of its primi3

In chap. ii.

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tive objectivity—a kind of scientific faith in the dependability of observation and inference. In early modern thought knowing was again conceived largely as subjective, a matter of "the understanding," "judgment," and "the mind." More recently, under the tutelage of scientific achievement and methodology, knowing again appears objective, though critically and experimentally so. From something largely inner, subjective, qualitative, and indeterminate it emerges as stubbornly objective, quantitative, and determinate. ' Such large and somewhat inaccurate historical brush strokes prove nothing, but they suggest that the present prevailing conception of valuation can no more be taken credulously as fixed in the nature of things or in the nature of psychological or logical processes than can that of knowing. Conceptions of this order have been largely conventional. At least we must be on our guard lest we take conceptions as final which may be but a reflection of current social conditions. This danger is especially ominous with respect to the conception of valuation, which has as yet been less directly affected by the spirit of experimental inquiry and testing. Both the history of thought and the study of typical factual and valuative adjustments indicate that meanings of three different "widths." or degrees of inclusiveness, may be attached to each of the terms "knowing" and "valuation." Historically, knowing has been conceived as sense perception, as rational or mystical disclosure, as coherence among ideas, as whatever works in action, and as the rise and testing of suggestions through the combined effects of interactions variously labeled psychologically as "sensory," "perceptual," "rational," "affective," and "motor." In the narrowest sense knowing has been conceived as clear sensory perception, as self-evident ideas, and as mystical feelings or inspiration. These meanings are narrow in that they single out one mode of experience as preëminently the source or channel of knowledge. The second width of meaning is that in which two or more paths to knowledge are recognized, such as sensory perception, reason, intuition, and practice, but in which these various paths are conceived as separate sources of significant experience and truth. The third width of meaning recognizes some distinctness among various

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kinds and sources of "knowledge," but conceives knowledge in the most trustworthy and significant sense as resulting from the combined effects of complex interactions in which suggestions arise and are relatively tested. These complex interactions are in and of total physical, physiological, psychological, and often social energies. Their various constituent phases and elements can be but abstractly and somewhat "subjectively" labeled as overt and nonovert, as thought and action, as perception, judgment, preference, and the like. Study of the factual adjustments considered in Chapter II, let us say the simple problem "Is this a tube of red paint?" also indicates that "knowing" may be taken in either of these three widths of meaning. It may be maintained that one can really know the answer to this question only by seeing the actual paint, that it is the direct observation which yields knowledge in the true sense of the word. Or it may be held, if the second width of meaning is employed, that not only sensory perception but also judgments made possible by the relation of ideas derived from past and present experiences contribute their respective bits of knowledge. Both sensory, rational, and possibly feeling elements will in this practical situation contribute to knowing. And these elements may be known (that is, be "content" of awareness or consciousness) with considerable distinctness even apart from each other and apart from such situations. Each is a form of knowing. But used in the third and widest, yet perhaps strictest, meaning knowing designates, not the sensory perceptions or the rational processes viewed separately or merely all awareness taken indiscriminately, but the total process of defining a problem and of giving birth to and testing suggestions. Knowing will in this sense be conceived as occurring through the cooperative effects of complex interactions, some aspects and movements of which may be designated as sensory, as reflective, as affective, as motor, and the like. If before considering the matter historically we examine valuative adjustments, for example, the simple ones used as illustrations in Chapter II, somewhat similar differences in meaning possible for "valuation" may be distinguished. The term may be used in a very

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restricted sense to denote only the final judgment, preference, or act of choice. In the cases referred to valuation in the narrowest sense will be conceived as occurring only after the qualities and properties of the flame, of the paint, or of a particular location of the desk have been scrutinized and tested either mentally or overtly. The valuation is the final response which expresses liking or disliking, whether crudely or discriminately, the way the burner burns, the texture of the paint, or the relation of the desk to sources of light and to other furniture. In a second, less restricted, meaning "valuation" may signify all the intellectual acts of inquiry into possibilities and effects as well as weighing them, comparing them, and indicating the final preference or choice. Investigating and considering the probable or actual effects, let us say of this paint for this particular purpose, as well as the final or concurrent liking, disliking, or felt uncertainty are included within valuation in this wider sense. But in both the first and the second meanings valuation is largely a nonovert process, which may occur before, along with, or after overt action. In the third and most inclusive meaning, however, valuation may denote either all the interplays of energy and meaning constituting the total adjustment, or at least those phases of interaction, overt as well as nonovert, which contribute to the study of conditions, the suggestion of solutions, and the perception and appraisal of probable and actual effects. As when valuation is conceived in the second degree of extension it may be maintained that mere wish or preference devoid of critical examination and careful "feeling out" of the situation is not worthy of being called "valuation," so when the third, most inclusive, meaning is accepted it may be held that valuation is merely speculative or subjective except as it relates to and eventuates in overt acts which help to direct and test the nonovert processes—that in "practical" situations directly and in intellectual problems indirectly there is an intimate interplay of inner and outer, of the overt and the nonovert. In theory, and indeed in practice, "valuation" has been historically and currently employed chiefly in the narrower meanings. Some theories have treated valuation largely or solely as an expres-

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sion of personal interest or preference. Others have stressed the need for critical appraisal. Few indeed have with respect to valuation attached any special importance to the cooperative effects of interest, thought, and overt action or to these processes as phases of complex interaction in total physical, social, and personal settings. For reasons indicated earlier,4 popular usage and theory have with respect to value less than with respect to knowledge been stimulated to reinterpret concepts in the light of actual scientific and social advances. Without repeating the previous discussion, it may simply be said here that science has made so dramatic the cooperation of thought and action, of desire and the careful use of means to satisfy desire, that knowing has come more generally to be conceived in the third or widest and most distinctive sense. But in social practice relatively little intelligent effort has yet been expended to discover actual and potential human needs, to suggest critically and wisely the means by which they may be fulfilled or developed, and to use these suggestions as hypotheses to be tested and revised by carefully administered programs of action. Social conditions have not yet made widespread and long-time experimentation of this kind possible. Consequently the meaning of "valuation," which is associated chiefly with moral matters and the more subjective acts of preference and appraisal which occur in economic, scientific, artistic, and other specialized activities, has been and is less vitally affected by tendencies which already have led to a more inclusive and experimental conception of knowing. Yet the general modern and contemporary trend of practice and theory in science, and also in at least sporadic instances in art and morals, suggests, as does the analysis of actual adjustments in these interests, that valuation like knowing may be most adequately and significantly conceived in its most inclusive meaning. But if the meaning of "valuation" is extended to include all the perceptions, judgments, and overt acts, as well as the feelings, desires, and preferences, which occur in or constitute complete valuative adjustments, is not the distinction between knowing and valuation lost or blurred? In thus allowing "contact" with "space-time 4

In chap. i.

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reality," do we not, as Krusé warns, 5 turn all valuation into cognition? Or is it possible by considering both knowing and valuation from the more inclusive experimental point of view to recognize both similarities and differences in such wise as at once to clarify, extend, and integrate our understanding of these terms and the processes which they may helpfully denote? If knowing, or fact finding, and valuation are to be identified with total factual and valuative adjustments, or problem-solving movements, we have already noted their general similarities in previous chapters. In this sense valuation as well as knowing involves or is constituted by a felt difficulty encountered and the attempts made (by "trial and error" until success) to define or to locate the problem, to find suggestions, to elaborate and test these candidate solutions mentally, to act appropriately, and to note and profit from the effects of so acting. In both cases suggestions, whether born chiefly from perception or from desire, are only candidates for status of facthood or valuehood. The candidates properly attain such status only when they are inspected, felt out, and critically considered in terms of their correspondence with "the facts," their coherence with other ideas (or wishes), and the consequences to which they promise to lead and do lead. In the end suggestions may be selected and integrated to form a more correct or adequate solution. Carried into action, the effects of the proposed solution may be observed and noted. Knowing and valuation are each constituted by or furthered by cooperation of the numerous and complex processes or interactions involved in such complete adjustment courses. If valuation is viewed thus, we are clearly justified in concluding that it is, as stated by Dewey, 6 " a critical process of inquiry for the determination of a good precisely similar to that which is undertaken in science in the determination of the nature of an event." B u t it is equally clear that "precisely similar" need not mean "exactly alike." There may yet be differences, significant or "Cognition and Value Reexamined," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 233. 6 Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 353. 5

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not, between knowing and valuation, due either to purpose, subject matter, or methodology. We go, perhaps, to the heart of the differences between what are commonly regarded as typical instances of knowing and valuation in their wider as well as in their more restricted meanings when we recognize 7 that in fact finding—especially in scientific procedures—all desires are (ideally) excluded, except the master desire for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; whereas in valuation, if suggestion is to be fruitful and decision adequate and far-seeing, all relevant desires must be brought into the arena of deliberation and given free play with relation to each other. In fact finding bias and inadequacy are decreased by rigorous restriction of both inquiry and the part played by wish and preference ; in valuation bias and inadequacy are avoided by multiplying wishes and letting them interplay toward a resultant, which follows—all things considered—from the thus freely yet critically expressed desires and preferences of the person or persons concerned. Moreover, the decision about fact hinges entirely or predominantly upon perception (sensory or mental) of what is; but the decision regarding the valuable or the right course of action is ultimately determined wholly or more largely by the wish, preference, or purpose which wins in competition with other desires. Perception or conception of existential objects or processes is predominant in fact finding; preference, made critical by the interplay of both long-visioned and immediate perceptions and desires, is in the last analysis predominant in valuation. Difference in the roles played by perception and by wish or preference is indeed to be noted from the simplest acts of attention and judgment to the most complex problem-solving adjustments, whether in science, art, or morals. As was seen previously, 8 attention is bipolar, embracing interest both of a subject and in an object or objective. When concerned with the perception and the correctness of the perception of events as such, attention and judgment 7

See R a u p , "Limitations of the Scientific M e t h o d , " Teachers ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 212-226. 8 Chap. iv.

College

Record,

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may be said to be factual; when concern is with the interest and its worthiness, attention and judgment are valuative. Likewise, formulations and problems, however simple or complex, may be roughly, though often rather arbitrarily, classified as factual or valuative, depending upon the predominant direction of interest—toward determination of the nature of events as such, or toward the determination of ends and means. The analysis of the crucial differences between knowing and valuation leads to the same basic distinction and thus adds force to and receives additional confirmation from the previous analyses. Certain significant consequences are suggested by the differences between the role of perception and that of wish in knowing and in valuation. But before noting them it may be well to recognize a number of dangers which result when these differences are overemphasized. In the first place, the idea that factual inquiry is restricted, that it is a method by which some item is taken aside from the vital processes of the interplay of desire in deliberating toward a decision in order to test its accuracy, may easily give the impression that as compared with valuative inquiry there is in all factual inquiry less vital and complex deliberation, fewer elements involved, and greater consequent determinateness in subject matter and procedure. Such a position we have already found untenable. 9 Factual problems, as well as valuative ones, vary from the rather simple and determinable to the extremely complex and indeterminable. The attempt to work out a value solution may indeed lead to a simpler or even to a more complex factual problem. But it may also be true that in the solution of a factual problem one or more simpler or still more complex "valuations" (in the narrower meanings of this term) may be suggested and tried out in critical thought and action. Of course it is out of the crucible of desire—often conflicting desires—that action springs. But the desire may be to have knowledge for its own sake, for the intrinsic satisfaction its possession or pursuit affords, as well as for more extrinsic purposes. Once "taken aside," the factual problem may prove less restricted than was the initial deliberative process from which it sprang. 9

See chap. iii.

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Secondly, it is also dangerous to suppose that some acts, judgments, or adjustments are purely perceptual and others purely emotive or preferential. This is probably contrary to fact, however simple or pure any given reaction may appear. There can be no act of attention without some degree of direction by stimulating conditions. From the simplest acts of simplest organisms to the most complex judgments and total adjustments of most complex persons, "affective" and "perceptive" elements are probably in various degrees present. 10 There is no perception without interest or attraction-aversion of some order; and preferring can occur, intelligently or otherwise, only as objects are held up to view by and for some order of perception. 11 Both knowing and valuation are pervaded by desires and perceptions, relevant and irrelevant. It is only by the careful interplay of these and other processes that suggestions of whatever source can be in any degree appraised and tested. Finally, there is danger of overemphasizing the place of perception in knowing as contrasted with that of wish in valuation by confusing knowing with perception, awareness, or factual judgment and confusing valuation with valuing (desiring or prizing), with value deliberation, or with value decision. Complete identification of knowing with perception or cognition and of valuation with valuing or preferring would overlook the fact, just mentioned, that particular perceptions, impulses, or judgments have at their inception only a hypothetical status. Knowing is preeminently perceptive, and valuation is preeminently preferential; but perception is not the whole of knowing, nor is wish or preference the whole of valuation in the most distinctive sense of the terms "knowing" and "valuation." Vice versa, not all perception is knowing or all wishing valuation. In both knowing and valuation, suggestions—whether largely wish-born or otherwise—must be both scrutinized and appraised. Their effects are to be considered in relation to other rela10 See, for instance, Dashiell, Fundamentals of General Psychology, pp. 28-37. For emphasis on the essential role of feeling in the rise and careers of judgments see Rignano, The Psychology of Reasoning, pp. 91-96, 289-290, 388-389; and Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 391-416. 11 See Dewey and Tufts, Ethics (rev. ed., 1932), pp. 200-205, 295-304.

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tively established facts and values. Intelligent scrutiny and appraisal, before, with, and after overt action are essential for both knowing and valuation in their broadest meaning. Intelligent scrutiny is largely perceptual, but it involves preference for the relevant and the correct rather than the irrelevant and erroneous ; and intelligent appraisal quite clearly has both perceptual and affective or preferential aspects or qualities. Perception and preference are intimately associated in the interactions constituting both knowing and valuation, both in their overt and in their strictly intellectual occurrences. B u t mere perception, awareness, judgment, desiring, interplay of desires, and decisions that flow from unexamined impulse, routine habits, or conventions are not to be identified either as knowing or as valuation. It is possible to avoid the dangers just noted by recognizing that the difference between the role played by perception and that played by preference in knowing and valuation is in any case a relative difference. The relativity of the difference—that viewed in the gross the difference is wholly or largely one of degree—has the important consequence of calling attention to the fact that both knowing and valuation are interests, the critical expression of interests. F a c t finding, whether "for its own sake" or for more extrinsic ends, constitutes or springs from one of many human interests. It is in the interest of the fact finding interest to exclude, countermand, or make allowance for all biasing interests. It is often in the interest of nonscientific interests to give free play to each interest—however "biased" it may appear from the standpoint of other interests — i n order to create or to consummate further interests. Interests and interest systems are numerous, and one of them is fact finding in its strictest and most disinterested (but not uninterested) expressions, namely, the special sciences. Y e t in any case interest can be critical only when conditions and possibilities are both perceived and appraised. Because of the difference rather than of its relativity two further points are indicated. First, in valuation the quest is often not primarily for correctness, but for adequacy—for the practically use-

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ful, particularly for the expressive, the expansive, or the integrative. Facts enter or are sought, not as ends in themselves, but as means for the pursuit, possession, or perpetuation of significant experience. This is not so true (legitimately) in the pursuit of strictly scientific interests as it is in morals and particularly in art. It is, of course, not wholly or always true even in the quest for enjoyable perception or for quality and security in the ends and means of personal and social life. But the difference marks, and also springs from, divergent scientific, moral, and aesthetic interests. The major aim of scientific knowing and valuation is for accuracy and completeness in perception, understanding, and statement of fact ; the central aim of moral knowing and valuation is the determination of the most worthy means to the most worthy ends ; and the intrinsic aim of aesthetic knowing and valuation is for experience as such, for significant experience so clearly perceived and adequately expressed as to heighten, unify, or otherwise enhance experience itself. The aim of valuation, especially in nonscientific interests, is predominantly creative rather than factual. The second point indicated by the fact that the role of perception and wish in knowing differs from that in valuation is that intelligent problem solving in artistic creation and in personal and social relations requires in larger degree the frank and full expression and consideration of the desires of "the whole self" and of all persons affected. The situation in such creations and relations is analogous to that in the complex problems of science. There are numerous factors and possibilities to be considered. For fruitful suggestion and wise choice all these various elements of the situation need to be taken into account and used as data or subject matter. Yet the situation may be in a crucial sense different, for in many aesthetic and human problems especially, wishes and preferences, as important elements of subject matter, undergo reconstruction in the light of their total interplay and of the facts and values established by careful scrutiny of the situation and its demands, limitations, and possibilities. The aim is, not to exclude wishes or preferences, but to cultivate, prune, and direct their growth in view of their own

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needs and potentialities and in view of the total situation in which they push toward expression and fruition. 1 2 W e have found that "knowing" and "valuation" may be used with three different degrees of extension. Their more inclusive meanings—especially the third, which involves overt action—show striking similarities in knowing and valuation. B u t in the predominance and respective roles of certain factors (for instance perception and preference) there may be important relative differences. Recognition of these differences, however, has in no wise shown cause for abandonment of the conception of valuation as total adjustment, including more overt as well as less overt interactions. Indeed we may now note certain advantages which would accrue from the development and general acceptance of this conception. Negatively, the advantages of the inclusive experimental conception of valuation are indicated by the consequences of failure to achieve and maintain it. In the first place, when valuation is not treated as total interaction—or at least in terms of an organic relationship with total interaction, dualisms arise and confuse value theory. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which historically this consequence has resulted from failure to rise to a more comprehensive and dynamic conception of both knowing and valuation. T h a t theory of knowledge was for centuries confused and led into blind alleys by exclusive emphasis on sense perception, intuition, selfevident truths, and the like, is now so evident that no review of the facts is required. B u t examination makes it equally clear that countless confusions in value theory have resulted from treating ends, rights, duties, standards, and the like, as isolated or isolatable matters which, if once determined through pure or practical reason, intuition, conscience, group custom or opinion, or personal taste or preference, would form the basis of a sound system of ethical or aesthetic theory. W e have only to call the roll of such great historic theories of the good, the right, or the beautiful as are associated with the names of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Thomas, Kant, Bentham, Nietzsche, and a host of others to recognize that rational insight, conscience, practical reason, will, self-evident truth, pleas12

These two points and related topics will be discussed further in chap. viii.

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ures, and consequences have for the most part been taken as having existence and determinate value apart from experimental interactions in total situations, situations which are at once physical, social, and personal. Valuation, even more than knowing, has been treated as something sui generis, as cut off in existence and potency from the complex interactions through which probably all desires and ideas have their direct or indirect rise and testing. Dualisms thus created have made difficult, if not entirely impossible, the perception of the intimate interdependencies of thought and overt action and of the various constituent processes or aspects thereof. T h a t contemporary value theory has not wholly escaped such dualisms is apparent when we consider the current viewpoints 13 which separate perception from inference, isolate value intuitions and propositions from the various processes of inquiry and testing, and treat valuation as purely intellectual and as something apart from "action by the body machine." Current discussion commonly treats valuation, especially moral valuation, as a matter of judgment. And there is a tendency then to conceive judgment as an entity or occurrence whose nature and principles of procedure may be studied almost wholly apart from their conditions and effects. Because of its direct bearing upon the question of verification and verifiability there may be noted here a current viewpoint which while it emphasizes a close connection between "cognition" and "valuation," and indeed recognizes the "coöperativeness of knowing and valuing person with reality," so separates valuation from "space-time reality" that verification in a "strict" sense is held to be impossible. T o quote: Are there counterparts for verification in valuation? More specifically, what in valuation is the analogue to verified prediction, which to Max Plank and many others is the heart of scientific method? One could, perhaps by some straining, attempt to find both prediction and verification in efforts to predict what in fact humans in a given situation would regard as good or beautiful. But since this would deal with prediction and verification of fact, for all its apparent involvement with value, it would be a cognitive and not a valuational undertaking. We would here seem 13

See pages 36-40.

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to have come upon an important difference rather than upon a resemblance between cognition and valuation. Prediction-verification, as science understands it, is not applicable to valuation. . . . Prediction and verification, as understood in science, can have no meaning apart from the space-time continuum. Should values be not of this world of the spacetime continuum, we should not expect prediction and verification, in the strict sense, to apply to them. . . . If others should question the validity of the claim made for certain valuations, the analogue in valuation for the invitation to repeat the experiment would be the appeal to "taste and see how good the Lord is." But this repetition of experience in science as in valuation would not be so much conducive to validation as to conversion. This conclusion may seem unsatisfactory to those to whom nothing is real but what science finds to be existent in space-time. But the alternative would be, if valuation is to be allowed any contact with reality, to turn all valuation into cognition. . . . T o summarize. . . . In the further search for a criterion it was discovered that truth and valuation shared the demand for consistency, order, and harmony, but that prediction-verification, so central for scientific truth, was, as such, not applicable to other forms of value. It was suggested that this inapplicability may rest upon prediction-verification requiring space-time existence, and the reality to which values correspond might be of a different order than that of space-time existence. This order of reality, accessible to human experience, would exercise the control over valuation that existence exercises over scientific truth. 14 T h e r e appears to persist here the view that valuation is a process which occurs apart f r o m contact with "space-time reality," that to give valuation any contact with this reality is to turn all valuation into cognition, and that cognition and valuation can be differentiated only if such contact is denied. Indeed, in an attempt to avoid reducing valuation to cognition and y e t to give valuation a basis for standards of discrimination—some basis for the recognized demand for consistency, order, and harmony in valuation as well as in " c o g n i t i o n " — i t is suggested that some order of reality other than that of space-time existence exercises control over values and valuation. T h e difficulties here presented largely or completely disappear w h e n we conceive k n o w i n g and valuation as, or in terms of, total Kruse, "Cognition and Value Reëxamined," The Journal of Philosophy, (1937), 232-233.

14

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adjustments which differ from each other only in the character of their dominant interests 15 and in the proportion in which such elements as perception and preference are present. It then becomes clear that the "contact" with reality, space-time or any other reality, whether in knowing or in valuation, is indirect and mediate. It is seen that whatever tests suggestions receive or may receive result from the cooperative effects of many interacting processes both personal and social, though no suggestion is validated by perception, social agreement, coherence of ideas, or any other "process" taken singly or in isolation from other intermittently continuous processes. But failure to achieve such a point of view may have the distorting effect, as in the position just quoted, of maintaining a barrier between valuation and the world of familiar events and of generating a gratuitous dualism between space-time and some other order of reality. A second consequence of failure to grasp the more inclusive experimental conception of valuation is that the failure tends to perpetuate in practice the conditions which are taken as data in support of the theory that careful experimentation in human affairs is either impossible or too dangerous. The advances of science and technology have made dramatic the integral interrelation and interdependence of thought and overt action, of the nonovert and the overt phases of problem solving. But in art and other personal and social affairs only feeble beginnings in certain restricted areas have given dim hope that in these matters the same general methods of inquiry and testing may be effectively employed in the suggestion and the reconstruction of both ends and means. Using the present state of aesthetic and social conflicts and confusion as data, it is frequently argued that there is such a marked difference between physical and social events and therefore between fact finding and technology, on the one hand, and valuation and social "control," on the other, that no social planning and social "engineering" are possible. But the data used in this argument are apparently adversely affected by the fact that in the past man has acted upon precisely 15

See pp. 77-78.

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this dualism which discourages careful experimentation in the values of human ends and means. It may be noted that if all the potential scientists and explorers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had argued that there were insuperable obstacles to inquiry and judgment about matters of fact, the effect would have been to throttle such inquiries and thus to preserve the conditions which gave rise to the viewpoint. Similarly, one consequence of holding and acting upon the theory that there is an inherent dualism between matters of (scientific) fact and matters of value, between fact finding (knowing) and valuation, is to keep in existence the conditions which give this viewpoint whatever plausibility it has. A faulty theory of valuation thus operates to perpetuate the existence of conditions, especially in art and morals that complete the circle by perpetuating the theory itself. The historical and current situation suggests that the way of escape from the vitiating dualisms that exist both in theory and practice is to develop a viewpoint which is at once more inclusive and more experimental. Indeed, if the importance of this conception of valuation is emphasized by the consequences which result from the failure to employ it, its advantages are seen even more positively when the constructive effects of its adoption are considered. Briefly stated, the more inclusive experimental conception gives promise of a perspective that may help to unify vision, stimulate theoretical advance, and afford motivation and guidance for action in art and human affairs, as well as in science. The general social effects of the growth of this viewpoint will be considered later. 16 Its significance for theory of value may be suggested here. When it is not only admitted but also emphasized that in knowing and valuation (in its wider meanings) there commonly are marked differences of degree between the roles of perception and those of preference, between cognition and "valuation" (in its narrow meanings), there is seen to be no need or justification for conceiving valuation (in any meaning) as cut off from the conditions and effects of total adjustment. Indeed, there is no more ground for this than for restricting knowing to nonovert aspects of inter18

Chap. xii.

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action (such as conscious awareness, perception, cognition, or judgment) or for identifying knowing solely with overt phases of observation and experimentation artificially abstracted from their indispensable nonovert aspects. It becomes apparent that to cut off either knowing or valuation from nonovert phases of interaction is to pervert both theory of knowledge and theory of value(2,3), in short, all value(l) theory. The positive advances possible in value theory when valuation is approached from the inclusive experimental point of view are of the same order as those which have already accrued to theory of knowledge. Sense perception, cognition, reason, doubt, and practical action were each given rather exclusive emphasis by such earlier conceptions of knowledge as empiricism, rationalism, skepticism, naïve realism, idealistic subjectivism, and certain popular varieties of pragmatism. But with the development of science, invention, commerce, and discovery it has become increasingly apparent that knowing is effected, so far as it may be in its most distinctive sense, by the continuous and intimate intercourse of complex interactions in which sensation, perception, reasoning, criticism, and overt action are indispensable aspects or elements. The resulting theory of knowledge thus not only conserves the elements emphasized by earlier theories but also raises these elements to new vitality and significance. No single element is given absolute or isolated value, but each is seen to be a necessary factor in the birth and testing of suggestions, in establishing relatively verified conclusions. Knowledge is composed of such conclusions, and knowing is the process of such inquiry and testing, the process of verification. The same approach to valuation results in a like clarification and extension of value(2) theory and consequently advances the unification of value(l) theory by disclosing the fact that the general methodology of fact finding and valuation are "precisely similar," even if relatively and significantly different. For when seen in the perspective of total adjustments serially and socially related to each other, it becomes evident that in valuative as well as in fact-finding adjustments such processes as perception, cognition, feeling, desire, judgment, purpose, inference, preference, and overt action are inti-

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mately interdependent and equally indispensable for the birth and (relative) testing of suggestions which arise as candidates for status of valuehood. In valuation, as in knowing, these several elements of interaction are both conserved and given new vitality and importance. They are recognized as essential phases or acts whose cooperation actualizes a fruitfulness of procedure impossible when they occur singly or separately. Any suggestion of an integrated conception of all value theory may be confronted by an objection. Does this mean that the experimental methodology of valuation in aesthetic or moral matters is identical with that in the "precision sciences?" Does it mean that we can test values(2,3) or verify nonscientific goods scientifically? Any such objection would apparently arise, however, from prior assumptions regarding the meaning of "experimental" or of "scientifically," possibly of both. To recognize the inclusively experimental character of valuation as opposed to an isolated, cynical, or absolutistic conception is not to deny significant differences between adjustments commonly distinguished as factual and valuative and as scientific, aesthetic, and moral. Indeed, from the inclusive experimental standpoint it appears that there are in each instance both differences and basic similarities. The experimental is not exhausted by the scientific in the less liberal meanings of this term. In their own chàracteristic ways, art and morals may be as significantly experimental as science.17 When viewed as total adjustment courses and indeed as interrelated series of such courses, both knowing (fact finding) and valuation involve complex movements with various constituent acts and properties of acts. In each case the various movements, acts, and properties may be correctly described by such contrasting terms as "the overt" and "the nonovert," "the perceptive" and "the emotive" or "the affective," "the qualitative" and "the quantitative," "the descriptive" and "the normative," "the assertive" ("willing") and "the acceptive," "the creative" and "the factual," "the subjective" and "the objective." If the terms "knowing" and "valuation" are employed in their narrower meanings, it must be 17

This point will be considered further in chap. viii.

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recognized—if the full significance of the inclusive and experimental approach is to be grasped and utilized in value theory— that knowing and valuation are acts or phases of acts which pervade every intelligent adjustment from simplest attention or interest to the most complex adjustments in science, art, and personal-social affairs. But regardless of the meanings which may be attached to knowing and valuation, it is evident that any more detailed analysis and possible clarification of the processes involved in value verification must proceed, at least in part, by means of a more thorough examination and comparison of the other acts and properties—for instance, the qualitative and the quantitative, the descriptive and the normative, the creative and the factual, the subjective and the objective—which constitute and yet give characteristic and somewhat differentiating color to the adjustments of science, art, and morals. It will be necessary with respect to these constituent acts, as it is with respect to knowing and valuation, to explore the possible similarities and differences which may account for this distinguishing coloration. The adjustments constituting science, art, and morals need to be taken apart, so to speak, and the various parts or functions compared more carefully, though avoiding as far as possible the errors which piece-meal abstraction may so easily entail.

CHAPTER

SIX:

THE QUANTITATIVE

AND THE QUALITATIVE THE RELATIONSHIP of the acts and experiences designated by the terms "the qualitative" and "the quantitative," whatever these may be found properly to mean, promises a peculiarly pertinent and crucial test for the thesis that values are verified by much the same processes and in much the same degree as are facts. It also presents a definite challenge for the development of a value theory which will clarify perennial and present issues. For although it is generally admitted that the qualitative is in the main prior—both historically and psychologically—to the quantitative, the successes of science have been conspicuously associated with the advances made in the quantitative treatment of its problems and data. M a n y of the great advances in modern astronomy, physics, biology, psychology, and sociology have resulted from or with the development and use of stricter and more highly specialized mathematical procedures. Extensions and applications of algebra, analytic geometry, calculus, and statistical correlations, for example, have introduced techniques of inquiry and analysis which have at once greatly extended scientific knowledge and made it in many respects more exact. In science the quantitative processes have come to play an ever-increasing role, the qualitative to be depreciated and avoided as irrelevant and confusing. On the other hand, in matters aesthetic and moral the qualitative is commonly recognized as essential and inescapable. Attempts have indeed been made by such theorists as Beccaria, Bentham, and more recent writers, for instance R. B. Perry, 1 to develop a rigorously quantitative calculus or treatment of values. But these attempts have been found for the most part unsatisfactory. For J. S. Mill a purely quantitative treatment was insufficient; he stressed the need for qualitative distinction. Similarly, Mayer crit1

General Theory of Value, chaps, xx-xxi.

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icizes 2 Perry's recent quantitative treatment as formal and inadequate, reasserting after Hobson 3 the dominance of the qualitative in "comparative valuation." What is perhaps the most generally accepted current view is expressed clearly by Reid: The concept of a scientific quantity, such as unit of length, is defined by public operations that can be standardized; it has a precise logical structure that is relational and communicable, having attained an exact social status in scientific discourse. But our direct, immediate experience of values is a very different sort of affair. It is private, emotional, ineffable. We can talk about values, but the essential meaning of our discourse is given only in a kind of direct, affectively qualified intuition. Thus in the case of values, the logical conditions of universality (even of the pragmatic kind possessed by scientific concepts) cannot be fulfilled.4

Thus it is that the quantitative is associated with and commonly held to be characteristic of science to a greater extent than of art and morals and that the qualitative is taken as peculiarly related to and characteristic of matters aesthetic and human. And since facts, fact finding, and the factual are preeminently identified with science, the quantitative has come to be attached in marked degree with these also. Likewise, the qualitative is generally linked with values, with valuation, and with the valuative through a common relationship with aesthetic and moral matters. The associations may be expected to have some actual basis, especially since they are emphasized by such historical and current trends and views as those to which we have just referred. It must be clear, therefore, that comparison of the quantitative and qualitative acts involved in the adjustments of science, art, and morals offers a crucial test for the conclusion that facts and values are verified in much the same manner and degree, and also that the present situation issues a challenge for such an extension of value theory as may help to clarify these several relationships. Examination of both factual and valuative adjustments in 2

"Comparative Value and Human Behavior," The Philosophical (1936), 473^96, especially 48S-486, 495-496. 3 Work and Wealth, pp. 320-361. 4 "Naturalistic Standards," The International Journal of Ethics, 1936), 178.

Review,

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science, art, and morals indicates that each is pervaded by elements or operations which may be differentiated roughly, though often rather arbitrarily, as qualitative and quantitative. This is perhaps most apparent in problems which are somewhat complex, yet are capable of rather immediate or short-time treatment. As examples of factual problems, scientific, artistic, and moral, we may take the following: Is the resonance-volley theory of sound sensation correct? Will this color be lighter or darker here than that one? Will tax A produce more revenue than tax Β ? It requires no very special technical knowledge to recognize that the solution of each of these problems demands both quantitative and qualitative procedures or acts. With respect to the theory of sound, certain definite correlations must be found to exist or not to exist between wave length of sounds and the length of fibers composing the tympanic membrane of the inner ear, possibly other correlations between rate of neural responses and the wave length of sounds not corresponding to the length of the fibers, or some multiple correspondence between air waves and the vibration rate of fibers and neurone responses. In this case the mathematical computations are obviously somewhat specialized technical procedures. Less specialized quantitative elements are involved in perceptions and judgments regarding such matters as the correspondence of various data with theory or the presence of unexplained phenomena. Perceptions or judgments concerning too much or too little, more or less, or inclusion and exclusion are among the less specialized, though more quantitative, responses. But intimately conjoined are also more qualitative acts or elements, such as feelings of consistency, adequacy, completeness, and harmony of relations. In the other two problems the situation is much the same, although the particular quantitative and qualitative acts or elements will in each case be in some respects uniquely different, depending upon the specific conditions of the various factors, both internal and external, which enter into and constitute the various interactions involved in each complete adjustment course. With respect to the colors, differences in brightness may appear as largely

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qualitative, but experiences of these differences also involve experiences of more and less and of slight or large degree. The thickness and area covered may also be found to be factors. Acts of noting amounts and extents are closely related with those of appraisal in terms of "total" qualitative setting.5 In the matter of predicting the respective revenues produced by taxes A and B, the need for quantitative treatment is again striking. But such acts as feeling and judging that all relevant factors have been considered and that the procedures are consistent must also be present. These should certainly be classified as affective or qualitative elements. A similar co-presence of the quantitative and the qualitative is found also in more valuative adjustments. Let us consider the following examples. Is it worth while to make these statistical correlations? Will this color be too bright for most unified effect? Will the social outcomes of tax A be better than those of tax B? Even the attempt to foresee the effects of the correlations, of using the color, or of the taxes, must involve the employment of conceptions and judgments which are more or less definitely quantitative. It is clear that the results of the correlation or of the taxes, whether predicted or actually tried out, can be crucially determined only by use of definitely quantitative and definitely qualitative acts. Various amounts must be estimated and compared. The relative importance of various factors must be considered and appraised. The judgment of the color is less obviously quantitative, but any final estimate of brightness as being more or less or as being appropriate or inappropriate will involve at least elementary quantitative acts or elements along with perhaps more conspicuously qualitative responses to the color as affected by its total setting among other volumes and shades. Although the qualitative and especially the quantitative elements in both factual and valuative adjustments stand out most conspicuously in somewhat complex matters, it seems probable, if not indeed apparent, both on logical and on metaphysical and epistemologica! grounds that the same situation exists in all problem-solving 5

More highly specialized quantitative procedures in the affairs of art are raised by such questions as "How is this musical time to be counted here?" or "Are these spaces which appear equal really (quantitatively) equal?"

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courses which are in any degree intelligent or reflective, no matter how simple or complex they may be. For in every reflective adjustment there are one or more—usually many—acts of judgment. And it is the commonplace yet basic finding of logical analysis that every proposition and every act of judgment have both qualitative and quantitative aspects or elements. The terms employed in each case refer to all or to some members of a class, and are accordingly considered as distributed or undistributed. Relations expressed are commonly those of inclusion or exclusion with respect to wholes or parts of classes. Yet every judgment has also either an affirmative or a negative quality. Propositions formulated and inferences made are also felt and judged as justifiable or not, as consistent or inconsistent, as valid or invalid, as true or false—or as possessing these various qualities in varying amounts or degrees. These familiar yet fundamental findings of logical analysis show clearly the intimate and pervasive presence of both qualitative and quantitative elements in every act of problem solving which involves any kind of judgment. Somewhat less formal and possibly less restricted evidence pointing to the same conclusion is indicated by the fact that some psychologists and logicians 6 have found it necessary, in accounting for the facts of recall, association, predication, the given, and numerous other psychological and logical processes, to propose and support the hypothesis that a pervasive qualitative factor gives direction— though it is for most part felt only as background—in making adjustments to or performing operations upon reflective or more overt matters. It is thus cogently maintained by those attempting to grasp and express the more dynamic as well as the more formal facts of reflective adjustment that pervasive qualitative elements operate in all thinking and that quantitative acts of varying degrees of specialization arise in the attempt accurately or adequately to determine conditions, relations, ends, or means in specific situations. 6

For example, James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, chap, xxii; Rignano, The Psychology of Reasoning, pp. 64-70 et passim; and Dewey, "Qualitative Thought," The Symposium, I (1930), 1-32, and The Quest for Certainty, pp. 155— 156.

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The indispensable character of the intimate pervasiveness of the qualitative and the quantitative must be apparent when attention is turned to more metaphysical and epistemological considerations. The root of the matter doubtless is the fact that space and time are either aspects of a single continuum or are at least inescapably copresent as constituents of all events—physical, social, and personal. Add to this fact the further one that the live (human) creature is finite, yet a feeling, perceiving, impulsed, curious, reflective organism which has been able to rise and survive because it is characterized by modes of response sufficiently "realistic" to deal with a space-time world that is continuous yet multiple and disparate in its cause-effect processes. From these facts it follows that there must be more quantitative responses to part and whole, more and less, continuity and difference, inclusion and exclusion, relatedness and unrelatedness. There must also be more qualitative responses to the satisfactory and the unsatisfactory, the adequate and the inadequate, the too hot and the too cold, the too much and the too little, the pleasant and the unpleasant, the good and the bad, and so forth. There must be at least a functional interdependence among what have been abstractly called primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities, if the vital organism, with its own rhythms of need, its own spatial, temporal, physiological, and psychological traits and demands, is to exist—as it does—by reciprocal interactions and adjustments with other physical and social events characterized by their respective properties, attributes, and conditions. Events, internal and external, can be grasped and directed only as quantitative and qualitative traits of both environment and organism call into being both qualitative and quantitative sensitivities and acts. It is not surprising, therefore, that qualitative and quantitative elements pervade the interactions constituting all adjustments, whether factual or valuative, and every judgment, proposition, and term which arises in the making of adjustments. Indeed, it becomes obvious that one of the chief needs, if there is to be more adequate decision and action in scientific, artistic, and personal-social affairs alike, is for more and better quantitative data, for more discriminating quantitative and qualitative judgment. Although this need is

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ever present in the endeavors of science and art, it is now especially striking in human, or moral, affairs. It may be objected, however, that the collection and study of quantitative data is really a factual, not a valuative, process. It may be urged that the quantitative procedures which occur—as they must even in artistic and moral matters—within the total movement from an unsettled, confused state to a settled, organized state are not valuations or parts thereof but determinations of fact, and that valuation occurs only after the facts are in and is not quantitative in any genuine or precise sense even when it involves the use of or response to exact quantitative findings. Such an objection is likely to spring both from conflict with certain customary habits and from the confused perception of certain facts. The habits center especially in the meanings attached to the terms "quantitative" and "qualitative," on the one hand, and to "factual" and "valuative," or fact finding and valuation, on the other. As has been previously noted, it is not uncommon to conceive fact finding and valuation as basically different types of process and the factual and the valuative as independent types of meaning 9,nd judgment. The common result is to set up dualisms which make difficult the perception of the actual and the potential relations between the methodology employed in valuative as compared with factual matters, and in art and morals as compared with science. At present there is a tendency to conceive fact finding largely in terms of external or empirical acts of observation and experimentation, and it is almost universal to identify Valuation with acts of appraisal, particularly with the expression of interest and preference viewed largely as subjective or self-contained processes isolated from the effects of overt action. Rather extreme instances of fact finding and of valuation, and the more conspicuous traits of these instances, are regarded as typical. Continuities thus are overlooked. The larger structural similarities of valuation and fact finding as instances and series of experimental interactions with both overt and nono vert aspects tend to be disregarded. A somewhat similar situation exists with respect to the meanings attached to a number of pairs of terms which denote acts and

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IIS

properties related to or included in knowing and valuation. Extreme manifestations and traits of the qualitative and the quantitative, the descriptive and the normative, the subjective and the objective, and the like are taken as typical and are so magnified that they obscure actual and potential continuities. The quantitative tends to be conceived rather exclusively in terms of highly specialized acts of measurement and computation or calculation such as are commonly involved in problems dealing with external objects or relations or with mathematical matters. The qualitative tends to be conceived largely as conspicuous acts of choice or preference, especially in the complex and uncertain instances of choice in aesthetic and moral problems. Thus there has risen and persisted a rather sharp separation, amounting practically to a dualism, between the quantitative and the qualitative, and, as there will be occasion to note later, also between other movements and properties in adjustment. It is not, of course, to be denied that the advances of modern science have been made in large part by applying and developing quantitative techniques for recording and analyzing empirically derived data. Indeed, some advance in more theoretical or philosophic inquiry has been marked by the increasing use of quantitative as contrasted with qualitative concepts. This was strikingly the case, for instance, from Thaïes to Democritus among the early Greeks. It is also to be admitted that for more adequate appraisal and choice, more and better quantitative data are needed in many personal and social matters. Decisions are here too often based upon snap judgments, wishful thinking, and untested impulses rather than upon caçeful collection and study of relevant data. The need for decision is often immediate and pressing, and habits gear most men for overt action. Either from force of circumstance or from nature of subject matter and aim, the qualitative now occupies a proportionately larger place in aesthetic and moral matters, the quantitative a larger place in science. Their relative differences in aim and in the preponderance of perceptual as compared with preferential elements 7 will doubtless make it true that 7

See pp. 96-97.

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"typical" factual adjustments are in higher degree quantitative and "typical" valuative adjustments more qualitative. But as long as it is clearly recognized that factual and valuative problems of all kinds vary from the simple, accessible, and easily quantifiable to the extremely complex, inaccessible, and unquantifiable and also that every adjustment is pervaded by certain fundamental quantitative and qualitative sensitivities and acts, we shall not fall into the confusion of supposing that science is wholly quantitative, art and morals wholly qualitative—fact finding quantitative, and valuation qualitative. If there are actual or ultimate differences, they are differences of degree not of kind. Indeed, not in all factual adjustments is there even a preponderance of quantitative over qualitative elements, or in all valuative ones a preponderance of qualitative over quantitative elements. Moreover, as long as quantitative and qualitative sensitivities and acts are seen as elements within and as indispensable for movements from the unsettled to the settled in total physical-social-personal situations, it must be clear that if there are relative differences in the specialization and proportions of these elements, they do not constitute an essential difference between the verification of facts and the verification of values. In each case verification occurs through the combined effects of intermittently continuous interactions, permeated alike by more or less specialized qualitative and quantitative sensitivities and acts. But if it be true that valuative adjustments are en masse relatively less quantitative and more qualitative, does this not affect the degree of verifiability? Are not values therefore less verifiable than facts? An affirmative answer can be given only if verifiability is necessarily dependent upon quantifiability and quantitative treatment. That quantitative treatment has greatly increased the precision and range of inquiry, especially in science, is unquestionable. Many matters have been demonstrably verified to a high degree since the glorious beginnings by Kepler, Galileo, and their less celebrated predecessors and contemporaries. Without the quantitative determination and treatment of data, their work would have been impossible. The subsequent achievements con-

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stitute a series of eulogies on the reduction of problems to quantitative terms and the use of mathematically precise measurement and analysis. Yet quantitative treatment does not guarantee demonstrable certainty. Statistical analysis, for instance, is notoriously beset with dangers, both in procedure and in interpretation. Precision in collecting and analyzing worthless data does not give value to the data. Moreover, many significant data can be collected and some cases can be successfully diagnosed and treated with little or no specialized quantitative procedure. This is true, for instance, in some particular chemical analyses, biological classifications and comparisons, and social and psychological case histories. Of course, in each such instance further problems could be raised which would necessitate more exact measurement and statistical analysis. For some cases and for some purposes such diagnosis and treatment are indispensable. But instances may be cited in which for the scientific purposes involved there is equally conclusive verification without the use of specialized quantitative techniques. Science uses with profit many procedures of ordinary observation, description, interpretation, and experimentation, which are but slightly specialized on the quantitative side. It may not, therefore, be justifiably concluded that verifiability is wholly or necessarily dependent upon degree of quantification or quantifiability. Taken by itself, the degree of quantitative treatment does not determine the relative verifiability of facts and values. Indeed, it might perhaps with some justice be argued that science has not been faultless, particularly with regard to qualitative matters. Scientists have frequently been insensitive to the arbitrary and unjustifiable nature of their assumptions, both in general point of view and in the definition and treatment of their problems. Artists and moralists have frequently excelled in depth and breadth of insight largely because of their more humane and continuous employment of qualitative sensitivities. The more recent experiences of scientific upheaval have done much to loosen encrusted abstractions and to develop a more truly experimental openness to diversity of hypotheses. Historically there have been in the main two opposed tendencies

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with respect to the qualitative. Each has expressed some truth, yet has been inadequate for the facts of experience as viewed more inclusively. The first tendency has been to regard the qualitative as springing from a fixed, inherent scale of values or moral laws definitely determined by the nature of things, natural or supernatural. The other has been to treat the qualitative as resident merely in the organism or its reactions. The first position 8 apparently claims for moral or aesthetic knowledge or experience a special channel and universality which no informed person is likely now to claim even for mathematics or scientific method. It also overlooks the fact that what is good for an individual or a group depends at least in part· upon the needs and conditions therein at any given time. At one moment sleeping may be most worth while, at another reflective inquiry; now relaxation, now strenuous physical or mental effort; at one time wood carving, at another statistical analysis; now solitude, now social interaction. At most, the human value of any object or act can be estimated and tested only in relation to the needs and potentialities of specific individuals and groups and in terms of lines of interest which conduce to enduring or recurring satisfaction, growth, and social advance. But if verification is in any degree possible, the first position is right in insisting that value is not merely arbitrary or subjective— that the "quality" of objects, acts, or institutions is affected by their actual properties. It is this fact which is overlooked or minimized by those 9 who have regarded the qualitative as ultimately a subjective or arbitrary personal reaction. They neglect the facts that existence and experience are interactions of and among physical, social, physiological, and psychological events and that these events possess properties which influence their effects upon each other. Under certain conditions steel is better for some human purposes than are 8 The names Plato, Kant, and Spinoza come readily to mind, but the view has been and is widely current in various forms, especially among certain religious groups. 9 For example, the Greek Sophists, David Hume, and more recently Charner M. Perry, in "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The International Journal of Ethics, XLIII (1932-1933), 127-144. This view is also common in current popular cynicisms.

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other materials. The same is true of a multitude of substances, activities, and arrangements. Wishes and interests are not selfcontained phenomena. They do not confer value upon their objects, they create or disclose value in interactions with their objects. The object of interest affects the worth of the interest as truly as does the subject, though the worth at any given time is often extremely difficult to discover. The truth in this second viewpoint is that value is, with relation to the subject, relative to the organism's individual and constantly changing needs, and also that in many instances of choice a number of possibilities lie open, and no one may appear to be better in its effects than others. Certainly some choices have no important consequences and are merely matters of taste or of arbitrary decision for the sake of action. But this does not disprove the fact that in other cases actual personal and social consequences will follow which a person who is in any sense and degree interested in the welfare of himself and others wishes to consider. Persons who are thus interested make decisions and experience outcomes. The outcomes may be instructive in proportion to the care with which choices are made and followed as "experiments" in social or personal adjustment. Though relative to the individual (and hence, perhaps, arbitrary from a universal or absolute point of view), choices are informed, as far as they may be, through critically experimental interaction— past, present, and future. The worthful is discovered, if at all, not merely by giving way to interests as such in their present relative intensities or by comparing them, but more basically by considering, with the aid of funded experience, the probable effects of possible lines of action and by committing oneself with due care to courses of conduct which may lead to anticipated or to unforeseen consequences. Thus do thought and action in some measure jointly assist the discovery of what one really desires, of what is worthy of desire. 10 The qualitative, then, is not a fixed scale of values among acts, 10

See Stallknecht, "The Place of Verification in Ethical Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 1SO-156.

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objects, or conditions, or the expression of merely personal whims or commitments. Quality, or worth, is determined by the attributes both of the object and of the subject. As experienced and observed in behavior, the qualitative may be described as responsiveness to acts, objects, and relations that are or are not pleasant, worthy, fitting, good, satisfactory, desirable, trustworthy, beneficial, and the like—a responsiveness which manifests itself complexly and pervasively in all our attempts to select or to construct ends and means in life's on-pressing course. This responsiveness is discernible both as pervasive sensitivity and as acts of rejection or acceptance, of aversion or attraction, of felt discord or felt harmony. The qualitative is both an intrinsic aspect of all experience and an instrumentality which is indispensable in analyzing and adjusting situations. The facts thus seem to indicate that even though we humbly grant in morals, as we do in scientific matters, the possibility that our knowledge is ultimately relative, we may with some reasonable degree of confidence move forward on the hypothesis that there are often, possibly always, significant bases for qualitative distinctions in personal and social matters. Experience in the sciences also instructs us to move forward hypothetically, depending upon experimental interaction to disclose likewise those characters of events which are more easily quantifiable. Advances and discrepancies in results achieved indicate that the quantitative, like the qualitative, is affected by both object and subject. Events are doubtless what they are at any given moment and are characterized in some sense by properties which give rise to experiences that are of a quantitative nature, as well as a qualitative. In each instance these properties affect the correctness of the judgments made regarding the existent and the possible, though the correctness may be perhaps but approximated in some undetermined degree. Such characters of events as the spacial, the temporal, and the causal occasion interactions which are experienced as the quantitative. Those, who, like Bentham, have tried to devise a definite calculus of values have at least assumed that the proposed quantitative pro-

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cedures are tools for dealing with specific situations. They have not laid down a fixed catalogue of goods supposed to correspond to unchanging needs of human nature; but they have generally erred in treating the quantitative as a set unvarying procedure which is able to displace or to reduce the need for qualitative operations. The quantitative and qualitative aspects and operations of inquiry, conceived as they actually do function in valuation, arise in response to a particular situation. Their sequence, character, and extent are determined by developing needs and interests in and of that situation. The quantitative, like the qualitative, is both pervasive sensitivity and specialized acts. It is pervasive sensitivity to relations such as more and less, larger and smaller, whole and part, too much and too little, equality and inequality, continuity and difference, inclusion and exclusion. It is also such special operations as enumerating, estimating amounts, counting costs, comparing percentages, or computing correlations. The quantitative "qualities" experienced and the quantitative acts performed are intimate products of the interaction of both internal (organic and psychological) and external (physical and social) factors. They do not constitute a fixed arithmetic or calculus of values ; rather, they are flexible operations which together with the qualitative aspects of thought rise and function in experiencing and handling situations, each of which is in some degree unique. In view of the functions which the qualitative and the quantitative are called into being to perform, it is of interest to note that Bentham's calculus of values erred not only in being a rather inflexible formula but more particularly in restricting attention almost entirely to the relative intensity, duration, propinquity, certainty, fecundity, and purity of pleasures conceived in terms of psychological states or processes. Consideration is to be given to the number of people affected, but the calculation proposed is solely in terms of the amount and purity of the psychological states called pleasure and pain. For example, the fecundity of a pleasure or a pain is defined as "the chance it has of being followed by sensations

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of the same kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure; pains, if it be a pain." 11 Though he did not say so, Bentham may have assumed the need for both quantitative and qualitative procedures and the fact that they need to be used in careful and experimental study of the physical, social, and personal conditions required for extending and improving the number, quality, and security of goods and of their effects upon personal character and disposition. Bentham's practice was, of course, generally better than his expressed theory. J . S. Mill sought,12 as will be recalled, to correct Bentham's neglect of qualitative distinctions. "It would be absurd," says Mill, "that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." Yet Mill himself seems to rest, finally, upon a quantitative principle: the majority opinion of good men, those whose capacities for nobler as well as lower feelings enable them to prefer the former. In so far as such judgment "must be admitted as final," there seems to exist in Mill's case, as in the case of Bentham, a failure to see the flexible nature and experimental roles of the qualitative and the quantitative as elements in total adjustment wherein judgments may be in varying degrees tested and reconstructed in further and serially related action. The possibility of such testing appears to be implied, however, in the statement that expert judgment is final with respect to the worth of a pleasure "apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences." But are moral attributes and consequences to be judged by "expert" opinion and thereafter taken as final? Expert opinion is not the only recourse in science. Must it be so in art and morals, or may thought and action here also assist each other in experimental inquiry and testing? The conceptions of the roles of the qualitative and the quantitative proposed by Bentham and Mill are thus inadequate precisely because a more inclusive experimental approach and perspective was not employed, if indeed it was then intellectually possible. 11

12

An Introduction

to the Principles

Utilitarianism, chap. ii.

oj Morals

and Legislation

( 1 8 2 3 ed.) chap. iv.

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In more recent value theory sharply opposed positions have been taken regarding the relation of the qualitative to the quantitative. On one hand, it is thought advisable 13 to hold fast to the conception of value as interest and seek strictly quantitative comparisons of interests in various dimensions of correctness, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. On the other hand, this approach has been attacked 14 as disclosing only formal and superficial relationships. Interests are found to be unique wholes which are largely unquantifiable and incommensurable. Consequently, valuation is regarded as chiefly a qualitative response, a choice between interests or interest groups as unique totalities or patterns. And since these responses are affected largely by the individual's general pattern of habits, emphasis is laid on the choice of an inclusive and harmonious system of interests to be habituated until they dominate the personality. 15 From the present viewpoint it is evident that these two theories are diametrically opposed with respect to the importance of the quantitative and the qualitative precisely because each fails to make sufficiently explicit the more inclusive experimental conception of values as relatively verified goods. Perry attaches, or gives the appearance of attaching, exclusive importance to the quantitative, because he conceives values in terms of interests, however unverified they may be, and wishes to find strictly objective criteria for the comparison of interests. 16 Interests, he finds, differ, and therefore may be compared with respect to the amount of difference in intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. 17 But since interests are conceived as a relationship of a subject to an object, they are certainly in many instances influenced, as Perry himself emphasizes at various points, 18 by the properties of existential things and conditions. The comparison (valuation) of interests would thus appear to require in such cases the careful examination of the con13 For example, R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, chaps, xx and xxi, especially pp. 599-601. 14 For example, Mayer, "Comparative Value and Human Behavior," The Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), 473-496. 15 10 Ibid., pp. 491-492. General Theory of Value, p. 599. 17 18 Ibid., pp. 615 f. Ibid., pp. 180-184, 383-385, 460-471, 520.

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ditions for and the consequences of acts. Indeed, the principle of inclusiveness does attribute value to objects in proportion to the number of interests which they satisfy, 1 9 the number of persons who are or may be interested, 2 0 and the length of life to which they conduce. 2 1 And the principle of correctness recognizes that judgments of the worth of interests ("judgments of value") are subject to change or correction, evidently in the light of further experiences. 2 2 But the insistence that "it is the interest which confers value on the object, and it must also be interest which confers the amount of the value" 2 3 makes it appear uncertain whether objective social and personal conditions and consequences are conceived as capable of playing any very vital role in the formation and reconstruction of judgments regarding the worth of interests. The first theory thus subjects itself, justly or not, to the criticisms that its comparisons of interests are merely descriptive or psychological 2 4 and that they are formal and of slight significance. 2 5 At any rate, it certainly does not make explicit the fact that interactions in actual personal and social situations operate not only in the formation of interests but also in the making and testing of value formulations. It thus confines valuation too exclusively to judgment, overlooks the vital contributions made by qualitative operations, and restricts unduly the role of even the quantitative. Although Mayer makes explicit reference 2 6 to the need for verification through overt interaction, he apparently conceives this as applying only to the testing and reconstructing of general patterns of interests, not to the process through which individual values come into being or come to be recognized as truly valuable. Accepting Perry's conception of the role of the quantitative, Mayer recognizes the barrenness of such formal estimates as he finds implied. H e sees that behavior is dynamic and "experimental," that 2 0 Ibid., pp. 646-650. 2 1 Ibid., pp. 650-651. Ibid., pp. 617 f. 2 3 Ibid., p. 599. Ibid., p. 612. 2 4 For example, Dubs, "Value as Interest—a Criticism," The International Journal of Ethics, X L (1929-1930), 474-489. 2 5 Mayer, "Comparative Value and Human Behavior," The Philosophical Review, X L V (1936), 485-486, 495M96. 26 Ibid., p. 492. 19 22

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12S

human responses are largely qualitative. But by accepting Perry's conception of interests as values he fails to achieve, or at least to express, a thoroughly experimental conception of value, and by accepting Perry's view of the function of quantitative procedures in valuation he also fails to indicate the larger and more dynamic role of the quantitative. The contrasting deficiencies of these two positions point to the need for a more inclusive experimental theory of values. Although all interests are in a broad, loose sense values (positive or negative), this must not blind us to these further facts: that interests are not merely intrinsic, or ends in themselves, but are also instrumental to other effects, more or less important, that the truth and worth of interests are to be considered, that is, "verified" or "tested," also in terms of these effects, and that such consideration occurs, poorly or well, through the organically interrelated and recurrent processes of discussion, individual thinking, and interaction with other existential events. Whether in science, art, morals, or other human quests, interests (attractions and aversions) are properly regarded as suggestions or hypotheses to be tested, as far as they may be, by means of further thought, feeling, and overt action. In the degree that suggestions are tested they become established as values in the most distinctive meaning of the term. The qualitative and the quantitative are acts and properties operating throughout the processes in which interests arise and are relatively tested. Diverse as are the foregoing historical and current theories, they have one fault in common: each fails to view the qualitative and the quantitative as indispensable functions within an ever-moving and relatively changing experience. They distort perspective— unintentionally of course—by exclusive emphasis either upon the quantitative or upon the qualitative or by setting up a scale of values, pleasures, or interests whose respective worths are conceived as determined or determinable by their own character apart from the conditions under which they arise and the effects to which they may or do lead. But this, even with respect to aesthetic and moral facts and values, is analogous to supposing that the truth of scientific facts and values is determined and determinable by

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measuring the intensity, duration, or purity of ideas or suggested solutions taken merely as psychological phenomena. The deficiencies common to the several theories thus point to the need for a more inclusively experimental viewpoint as alone able to avoid their defects by conserving their partial truths.

CHAPTER SEVEN: T H E AND T H E

DESCRIPTIVE

NORMATIVE

T H E THIRD test and challenge of the hypothesis that facts and values are verified in much the same experimental manner and degree is presented by issues which center in the nature of the normative, of the ought in contrast with the is, of the ideal as over against or beyond the actual. Indeed, this view encounters direct opposition on the ground that values, since they are normative, are either verified in a different way or are unverifiable. Says Urban: I think it can be shown . . . that when we say that a thing is good, what we mean is that it ought to be rather than not, and that when we say that one thing is better than another, it ought to be rather than the other. In other words, "ought to b e " is part of the meaning of a value predicate. . . . T h e meaning of a value assertion is sufficiently different from that of a factual assertion to make the way of verification—if there is verification in any sense, significantly different. 1

Says Wheelwright: Descriptive propositions are statements about fact, and are theoretically verifiable by any competent observer as either true, false, or having a certain degree of probability. Normative propositions are assertions of value: their truth or falsity m a y therefore legitimately vary for different individuals. 2

As has already been noted 3 in quotations from Carnap and Russell, the position may be taken that as a proposition of "normative ethics" the statement "killing is evil" "is not verifiable and has no theoretical sense, and the same is true of all other value statements." Moreover, it is maintained

4

on the one hand that " o u g h t " — a t

"Value Propositions and Verihability," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 59. 2 A Critical Introduction to Ethics, p. 4 9 ; by permission of The Odyssey Press, the present publishers. 3 Pages 38-39. See also Schlick, Problems of Ethics, pp. 110-119, 183-184. 4 F o r example, Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (3d ed.), pp. 57, 64, 91.

1

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least "the moral ought"—is superior to or more than desire and emotion, because it springs from perceptive and rational judgment, and on the other that "ought" is "a cognitively innocent feeling," "a peculiar kind of compulsion" to do what is believed to be or is found upon inquiry to be best.5 In some instances it is assumed that all kinds of oughts spring from or are expressions of a single source, say human wishes, natural or supernatural la^s, the relations in which persons stand in groups, or the interplay of desires with the conditions which make their satisfaction possible; but in other instances it is asserted 6 that there is an essential difference of kind between logical or prudential oughts and morally imperative oughts. It is held 7 that on one hand norms and the normative ride but loosely upon existence, with little or no determinate base, and that on the other 8 certain types of norms or the normative possess a special kind of objectivity or universality. Again, there have been and are those who insist that the methodology of art and morals is and must remain essentially different from that of science, whereas others 9 regret "the tragic split" in modern life, "the oscillation" "between a normative, rationalistic logic in matters of morals and the empirical, purely descriptive method in concrete matters of fact." Although the issues here raised are diverse, they each hinge, as do the objections just noted, upon a common crucial question: What is the nature of the descriptive and the normative, the nature and relationship of the experience or determination of "is" to that of "ought"? Upon the answer to this question and upon the relative presence or absence of the descriptive and the normative in our See also Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age, chaps, iv and ix, for a recent emphasis on the inadequacy of "sensate" ethics and the need for "ideational" ethics. s Bertocci, "The Authority of Ethical Ideals," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I I I (1936), 269-274. 6 For example, Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to Ethics, p. 12. 7 For example, Charner M. Perry, "The Relation between Ethics and Political Science," The International Journal of Ethics, XLVII (1936-1937), 163-179. 8 For example, Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, pp. 17-18, 390-395, 400-401 ; and Osborne, Foundations of the Philosophy of Value, p. 106 and p. 10S», also pp. 119, 130-131. 9 For example, Dewey, in the article on "Logic," in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IX, 602.

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various quests must depend in large part the solutions of the problems of the nature of "oughtness," the relation of different kinds of oughts, the possible existence and nature of scales of value or of relative oughts, the objectivity of norms and their relation to existence, the relation of the methodology of the descriptive and the normative sciences, and finally the relation of the verification and verifiability of values as compared with various kinds of facts. It is clear, therefore, that if the emerging experimental value theory is to achieve a clarification of such issues it must first face the problem of the nature of the descriptive and the normative. As soon as the question arises as to what meaning should or "ought to be" attached to the terms "the descriptive" and "the normative," we are brought face to face with the problem of the relation of the normative to the descriptive. Doubtless these terms may be used with somewhat different meanings for different purposes and contexts. Yet it must also be true that the meanings are not wholly arbitrary and that not all possible usages are equally justifiable if we wish to refer accurately to movements or experiences which occur in actual human adjustments. Examination of the simple problem-solving adjustments considered in Chapter II discloses the presence of acts and properties which may perhaps be sorted out into two groups and labeled as "descriptive" and "normative," respectively. The difference between the two groups of elements or acts is brought out most sharply by the verbs and the modifiers in statements used to express them. Descriptive predicates are .in italics: This is a tube; has no label; looks like what is called red; may be longer than; equals; in this position there will not be; it can be; it is possible to. These verbs point to existents or to possible existences. But the following verbs, adverbs, and adjectives express normative acts and properties: For this purpose it is neccessary; a good burner will, should, or ought to, may be expected to ; it will be easier to . . . than to; are dependable; are sufficient; is too granular; is not cohesive enough; requires; this can be done by; faces too much light; is better than that location; will best satisfy the needs. Here the chief references are not to existents as such, but to the de-

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termination of ends and means as appropriate or inappropriate for the satisfaction or achievement of desires or purposes. In short, the descriptive are those acts or elements of adjustment which occur as attempts to find what is—to make correct interpretations of conditions, objects, or relations as they have existed, do now exist, or are capable of being made to exist. The normative acts, on the other hand, arise within, or constitute efforts to discover, what is wanted and what is needed to satisfy assumed or reflectively determined purposes and desires, sometimes experienced as what ought to be in contrast with or beyond what already exists. When actual adjustments, whether simple or complex, are viewed in their larger physical-social-personal settings, the inescapable need for the rise and ministrations of both descriptive and normative acts must be apparent, regardless of how closely associated or ultimately indistinguishable we shall presently find the descriptive and the normative to be. For in this setting the normative acts of formulating, appraising, and critically constructing and reconstructing ends and means are seen to be the natural expression of the needs and desires of complex and selective organisms seeking to direct their private and public courses in a world which offers many allurements and possibilities, yet exacts careful inquiry and control as the price of successful achievement. Descriptive acts are precisely the attempts to discover physical, social, and personal conditions and relations as they are or may feasibly become and to discern the effects which promise actually to eventuate or which have eventuated from possible lines of action. The inherent nature of the total situation, in both internal and external aspects, makes indispensable the performance of both normative and descriptive functions in every adjustment course. But if the actual conditions imposed by the nature of subjects and their situations make necessary both descriptive and normative functions, this fact also emphasizes the co-presence of the acts which perform these functions. As differentiated into two groups, the statements expressing descriptive acts may appear to be sharply separated from those expressing normative acts. One group

DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE of judgments m a y seem purely descriptive—the

131

other purely

normative. Further examination, however, discloses the thinness, if not, indeed, the final arbitrariness or artificiality of the division into descriptive and normative. E v e n in reaching the "decision" that "this is a tube of red paint" there are a further implied judgment and further assumed meanings: " I f an object has such and such characteristics, it is a tube of red paint." In short, experiences of objects, acts, and relations funded from past interactions now operate as standards, criteria, or expectations in terms of which particular sensations and perceptions are judged. A s expressed in more obviously normative terms: " I f one wishes to know whether an object is or ought to be called a tube of paint, look for such and such form, substances, and other qualities of experience." Normative elements of wish and of oughtness thus function with or are assumed b y more descriptive judgment. T h a t the converse relationship holds is even more apparent. Judgments such as " T h i s burner burns well," " T h i s is a good paint for m y present purpose," and " T h i s is the best location for the d e s k " evidently presuppose judgments or assumptions about the existence and nature of the burner's flame and what it will do, about the paint and the effects of its use, and about the desk and the results which will actually follow from a particular location. Such assumptions are commonly unverbalized, but they operate as background and data. Without them judgments of liking or disliking, approval or criticism, would not arise. T h u s , when we go below the surface the "purely descriptive" and "purely normative" turn out to be intimately related, perhaps never pure in the sense of having existential distinctness except as abstracted and expressed in symbols. Indeed, even an abstract statement does not in all propositions conceal the intimate presence of both descriptive and normative elements. T h e presence of descriptive elements is most apparent in those normative propositions which use some form of the verb " t o be," such as " T h i s is good paint" and " T h i s is the best location." Y e t their presence is also shown b y any verb which expresses the existence of a partie-

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ular action or relation, such as "This burner burns (or is burning) well." In both cases there is expressed the existence of something and the existence of this something for or in relation to some purpose or expectation. The expectation constitutes or sets up the standard or requirement which the existent is experienced as meeting or not meeting or as meeting in some respect or degree. Even in its most purely descriptive form, such as "This is a burner," verbalization merely covers up the normative character of the expectations and demands which result from the interplay of funded meanings and other habits interacting with present perceptions, purposes, and needs. As we have already seen, the prime facts which make both descriptive and normative functions necessary for each adjustment are the situation which is, on one hand, and the live creature with selective wants, on the other. The recognition of these facts and their inescapable interrelationship makes clear the indispensable character of the two functions. But if stated in this way, the general metaphysical-epistemological situation is greatly oversimplified. A more detailed analysis of total adjustments indicates not only why there is need for both descriptive and normative acts but also the reason for their intimate interrelationship. It is true that the external situation exists and must be carefully studied and described if satisfactory adjustment is to be achieved. True it is also that the subject (person or persons) has many complex needs and wants amid which selection and reconstruction must be made, well or ill, blindly or with some degree of foresight. But the subject and its interests are also existents, "ises," which are subject to description as well as to appraisal and choice. Life is at least a complex interplay of energies within organisms and with their physical and social environments. If a maximum of satisfactory adjustment is to be effected, conditions within and without must be understood (described) as they are and as they may be made to become. Purposes must take shape and direction from actual conditions and must operate to make possible wise discrimination in planning and administering both the ends and the means of action. And purposes and preferences may themselves

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be described—in fact they must in some degree be judged descriptively in the formulation of both ends and means. Here description, as expression and denotation of the "is," is at many points indistinguishable from and is an indispensable element in, the operations of setting up and using norms, or standards. Moreover, the external as well as the internal factors of the adjustment situation are both complex and in process of becoming. As a consequence, what " i s " can often be expressed only in terms of what will be (should or ought to be) if the existent is correctly conceived, that is, it can be expressed only in terms of what may be expected on the basis of previous or present occurrences as interpreted by the subject. Here the " i s " can be stated with greatest accuracy only in terms of norms or standard expectations. These complexities of organic and organic-inorganic interaction and the subtleties of attendant or integrally related intellectual reactions are further complicated—and the relationship of the descriptive and the normative correspondingly merged or confused — b y the human capacity for describing normative formulations or appraisals, together with the standards used therein, and for appraising descriptions b y use of norms or standards which may be also both described and appraised. This fact points again to the underlying polarity and duplicity of even the simplest acts of attention, perception, and wishing. As noted in other connections, 10 each event of interest, or "interest-event," involves directly or indirectly both an object or objective of interest and a subject (person or persons) who "takes" or "has" or "is party to" the interest. Hence it is possible to view many, if not all, such acts or events both with respect to objective reference and as interests of or for a subject. Indeed, their classification as factual or valuative, descriptive or normative, is thus seen to be in many instances wholly arbitrary. A t most it is but the application of these respective labels to the opposite poles of a reaction or experience or to relatively undifferentiated or unobtrusive elements therein. In all other cases the existential justification for such classification is the 10

Chaps, ii and iv.

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direction or degree of interest. When interest centers upon or is absorbed in an object or objective, the reaction may be said to be "descriptive," but when it centers upon what is wanted or had as immediate experience, it may be said to be "normative." Moreover, capacity for retention, recall, and abstraction make it possible for such interest-events, regardless of their duplicity or evident direction of interest, to become objects of description and appraisal, and for such attention, recall, or reflection to become in turn the objects of yet further interest-events. All these metaphysical and epistemologica! complications taken together serve to explain at once the pervasive presence of descriptive and normative functions and acts and their confused intermingling and blending, if not indeed their ultimate inseparability. When taken in connection with the earlier conclusions regarding verification and verifiability, the conception of the descriptive and the normative as mutually indispensable and pervasively cooperating elements of adjustment will be seen to have certain consequences for the objections and issues noted at the beginning of the present chapter. Examination of these may help to bring out certain points implicit in the foregoing discussion and may also serve as a further test of the present conception of the descriptive and the normative, as well as of the previous conclusions regarding verification and verifiability. First may be considered the verifiability of normative as compared with descriptive statements or formulations. On the one hand it is held that normative propositions are inherently unverifiable optatives or expressions of wish and that norms ride but "loosely" upon "more proper forms of existence." Now if this is the actual situation, and if the normative occupies a proportionately larger place in valuative than in factual adjustments, the thesis that both facts and values are suggested goods experimentally verifiable in much the same degree must certainly be recognized as false. Carnap's argument may be taken as typical of the position that normative propositions or value statements are unverifiable expressions of wish. It is held that:

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The rule, "Do not kill," has grammatically the imperative form and will therefore not be regarded as an assertion. But the value statement, "Killing is evil," although, like the rule, it is merely an expression of a certain wish, has the grammatical form of an assertive proposition. Most philosophers have been deceived by this form into thinking that a value statement is really an assertive proposition, and must be either true or false. Therefore they give reasons for their own value statements and try to disprove those of their opponents. But actually a value statement is nothing else than a command in a misleading grammatical form. It may have effects upon the actions of men, and these effects may either be in accordance with our wishes or not; but it is neither true nor false. It does not assert anything and can neither be proved nor disproved.11

The correctness of this argument clearly turns, in the first place, upon a question of fact: Are all value statements merely expressions of wish? Our previous analyses make this appear unlikely. It was seen that valuation in its more distinctive meanings utilizes preceptive and judgmental, as well as affective and preferential, elements. It was found that every act of judgment is both an act of perception and an expression of interest, both "of" or "for" some object or objective and "by" a subject. Indeed, the analysis of single propositions as well as the consideration of the actual contexts in which they arise and function indicated that many, if not all, statements are the expression and embodiment of both "factual" and "valuative," or descriptive and normative, movements or elements. If it be objected that all expressions of wish are by definition value statements, whereas all expressions of perception or judgment of what is, are factual, descriptive, or scientific statements, it must be replied that no definition is justifiable which distorts or confuses the subject matter which it is designed to help clarify. By excess (and deficiency) of logical analysis some statements may be treated as merely expressions of wish, and others doubtless as merely expressions of perception or cognition. But there are indications that such purity and isolation exist only for abstraction—not even for the language itself. Once the abstraction 11

philosophy and Logical Syntax, p. 24 ; by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company. See also footnote 14 below.

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is made, however, it m a y operate to obscure the actual and potential relations of valuative judgments to factual judgments. A second point to be noted is that, as Carnap himself says, a value statement " m a y have effects upon the actions of men, and these effects m a y be either in accordance with our wishes or not." Indeed, a or the distinctive function of valuation is to determine what is really wanted, to foresee which candidate desire we most wish to unleash into a c t i o n — a l l things considered. Doubtless in this process many of the judgments are predominantly descriptive, but they assist in forming, informing, and reforming wishes. It certainly cannot correctly be said that a statement that actual or probable effects are or are not in accord with desires—our own or those of others—does not assert anything and cannot be proved or disproved. And if it be insisted that b y definition this is a factual or descriptive, not a valuative or normative, judgment, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that such judgment assists in performing a function essential to all intelligent a d j u s t m e n t — t h e function which we have called "normative." F r o m the viewpoint under consideration, logical analysis of single propositions m a y have operated to conceal this f u n c t i o n — a function which can be performed only with the cooperation of a number of processes and acts, some or all of which m a y or m a y not be stated. I t m a y be noted in the third place that although Carnap recognizes the possibility and importance of inquiry regarding value statements and acts of valuation, he seems not to recognize it as the vital function of informing action. N o r does he apparently see the full significance of action and interaction for the formation and correction of judgments. H e does recognize, at least for morals, a part of what we have called the normative function, though he prefers to call it empirical or scientific ethics. The word "Ethics" is used in two different senses. Sometimes a certain empirical investigation is called "Ethics," viz. psychological and sociological investigations about the actions of human beings, especially regarding the origin of these actions from feelings and volitions and their effects upon other people. Ethics in this sense is an empirical scientific investigation; it belongs to empirical science rather than to philosophy.

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Fundamentally different from this is ethics in the second sense, as the philosophy of moral values or moral norms, which one can designate normative ethics. This is not an investigation of facts, but a pretended investigation of what is good and what is evil, what is right to do and what is wrong to do.12 But that empirical ethics is restricted to a study of what has already occurred seems obvious from the following: To avoid misunderstanding it must be said that we do not at all deny the possibility and importance of a scientific investigation of value statements as well as of acts of valuation. Both of these are acts of individuals and are, like all other kinds of acts, possible objects of empirical investigation. Historians, psychologists, and sociologists may give analyses and causal explanations of them, and such historical and psychological propositions about acts of valuation and about value statements are indeed meaningful scientific propositions which belong to ethics in the first sense of this word. But the value statements themselves are here only objects of investigation ; they are not propositions in these theories, and have here as elsewhere, no theoretical sense. Therefore we assign them to the realm of metaphysics.13 According to this view, science is apparently a study of what has already occurred. Philosophy, or inclusive and critical inquiry and reflection, gives us no assistance in criticising assumptions or in envisaging wider horizons. Neither thinking nor overt action is given a constructive or reconstructive role in the formation of facts and values. The logical empiricists might conceivably admit all three points just stressed: that value statements are not merely expressions of wish, that desires are appraised and reformed by consideration of the conditions and effects of action, and that thought and action may assist each other in such consideration. 14 But they or others may still insist that in the case of factual verification there is 12

13 Ibid., p. 23. Ibid,, pp. 25-26. See also footnote 14 below. These points appear to be largely granted by Carnap in the following note, dated M a y 9, 1943, which is gladly reproduced at his request: "I should like to add a f e w remarks to m y earlier formulations on ethics in philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935), in order to clarify my position. "Moral value statements are meant by some philosophers as statements concerning the probable consequences of the acts in question. T o call a kind of behavior good or bad is meant here as saying that it is a suitable or unsuitable w a y to a certain aim. 14

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reference to something substantial, something which is as it is regardless of the wishes or other reactions of the knower, whereas valuative "verification" always rests finally upon wishes, no matter how well informed these may be. So, as Charner M. Perry has put it, norms or the normative ride but loosely upon existence. The implication in both cases is that factual formulations do or can correspond more closely and exactly to existence. There is, of course, a sense in which it is true that normative propositions and formulations of "ought" do not and cannot "correspond" so closely to "more proper forms of existence," such as the actual physical, social, or physiological state of affairs. For it is the very nature and function of wish to go beyond or to set itself over against previous, present, or probable non-wish existentials —even to go beyond previous wishes themselves. Such reaction is what wishing is. If an existing state of affairs were wholly satisfactory or secure, there would probably be no rise of desire and no expression of preference among desires. The function of a normative formulation is not merely to express what already exists independent of the desiring subject's desires, but to express and to appraise desires themselves. Such formulations are, then, to be regarded as verified in the degree that they direct further action For instance, "killing is evil" may be meant as saying: 'killing is not a suitable way to further a harmonious community life.' On the basis of any interpretation of this kind, e.g. in terms of instrumental function or of human interests or the like, a value statement has obviously factual, cognitive content. "On the other hand, suppose a philosopher refuses to give to his value statements any interpretation which makes them either analytic or subject to test by empirical evidence; perhaps he says explicitly that a certain act is good not because of any consequences it may have but merely by its intrinsic nature. Value statements of this kind may be called absolute, in contrast to those mentioned before which are relative to certain aims. The critical judgment of logical empiricism is directed only against absolute value judgments, such as occur frequently in works of European philosophers, not against the relative ones, which prevail in philosophical discussions in this country. "Since the word 'meaning' is often used in a wider sense, I wish to emphasize that the kind of meaning which we deny for absolute value statements is only cognitive (theoretical, assertive) meaning. These statements certainly have expressive, especially emotive and motivative, meaning; this fact is of great importance for their social effectiveness." See also Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in Twentieth Century philosophy.

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prosperously or satisfactorily, not merely in terms of their exact correspondence with nondesire events. But desires are not disembodied entities or acts. They are at least complex interplays of complex personal or internal energies maintaining themselves by interaction with complex environmental or external forces. These energies and forces, these interplays and interactions, are what they are or are becoming. They set limits to the feasibility of the desires which they are or occasion. They are the physical, social, and personal conditions which must be met and adjusted. Formulations of desires and oughts are therefore subject to some measure of testing with respect to their correspondence both with particular desires and with many desires operating complexly together, both with short or narrow visioned desires and with long and wide visioned desires. This may also be granted, but it may be objected that such testing is not really verification, that the degree of normative testing is slight as compared with descriptive verification, and that it ends in setting up desires against each other, desires which are ultimately arbitrary and cannot in any proper sense be validated. Three points are to be noted, however. The first is that both descriptive and normative formulations are formulations. Each is the product of complex mediation. Errors and illusions occur in even the simplest sensory perception. The classic example concerning the certainty of seeing aright the "bent" stick protruding from the water is but a striking instance of the falsification which in the nature of the case doubtless occurs in some respects and to some degree in all perception. And if it be that the whole of existence is composed of myriads of events and relations and that all of them are in process of change and interaction and no two exactly alike, how much more subject to probability must be all generic propositions, even those denoting perceptions of meanings and relations of symbols. These considerations do not disparage description and descriptive verification, but they do emphasize both the need for and the relative character of experimental verification in the case of all descriptive as well as all normative formulations.

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The second point to be noted is that not only do normative formulations, including formulations of oughts, constitute (as do descriptive formulations) a kind of running scale of correspondence with that which they purport to express, but that what they express also constitutes such a scale. In other words, not only do normative perceptions, conceptions, judgments, and statements vary in the degree of adequacy or correctness with which they formulate actual conditions and wishes, but the wishes which arise and which are thus expressed and formulated vary in the degree of their necessary correspondence to or interdependence with the matters in connection with which they arise. Or put less precisely, though possibly more pointedly, experienced and determinable "oughts" vary in degree of dependence upon and correspondence with "ises." At one end of the scale there is necessarily a close relationship between "is" and "ought," between actual conditions to be met and what must be done if desired effects are to be produced and if desired effects are to prove desirable. This is equally true in science, art, morals, and other human quests. In many cases if a definite chemical or electrical reaction is to be produced, certain very definite and uniform conditions must be fulfilled. If paints or musical instruments are to serve certain specific purposes and if these purposes are to be "proper" ones with relation to a more inclusive or remote purpose, they must have certain very definite structures and resulting properties which are often extremely difficult to discover and to reproduce. In matters of personal and public health, both physical and mental, the "ought" is also at many points closely related to the "ises" of organic structure and function and to the "ises" of the general social conditions essential for wholesome and integrated personality. At the other extreme of the scale are other matters or other aspects of all matters in which there is greater freedom for creative contrivance. Which among many possible scientific problems or possible arrangements in scientific apparatus, among possible subjects and treatments in artistic experience or expression, or among possible social affiliations or recreations "ought" to be selected or pursued is of course not unconditioned by complexly related "ises"

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—personal, social, and nonhuman. At least some adjustment "ought" to be made for the physical and mental health or development of individual or group. Yet it is also clear that the more specific "oughts" which may be experienced here are very complexly conditioned and may be somewhat different for the same person at different moments and for different persons at the same time. Indeed, a number of possible courses may be equally effective and approvable. Doubtless much of the apparent freedom or lack of "oughtness" in such matters is due to human ignorance regarding actual conditions and effects. Granting this, it is probably also true that the complex novelty of persons and their environments often makes possible a wide freedom and creativity in judgment and action. A number of very different courses may be equally desirable, upon almost any principle of choice. The fact that there is such a scale of relationship with other events indicates that normative formulations, including those with respect to "oughts," vary in the degree to which they may be inquired into and tested in terms of their correspondence to actual or potential objects or conditions. From this fact follow the corollaries, first, that normative formulations are subject to or capable of a certain amount of empirical verification and, second, that these formulations vary in the degree of such verifiability. That descriptive formulations are similarly to be subjected to verification follows from the fact that all formulations are mediate in character. That they likewise vary in degree of verifiability follows from the fact that all kinds of events vary widely in complexity, accessibility, controllability, and other traits. 15 The nature of the verification, as well as the relative verifiability of normative as compared with descriptive formulations, will be considered presently. It should now be apparent that the charge that normative expressions and appraisals are dependent upon desires which are arbitrary and without any proper validation is not wholly correct. Formulations of ends , and means can in varying degrees be tested by inquiry into the conditions necessary for effective action and into 15

See chap. iii.

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probable and actual consequences. Desires are thus properly held to be wise or unwise, to correspond closely or not to real or enduring needs as contrasted with myopic impulses and infatuations, to be conducive or not to lines of action which are reflectively approvable. But there still remains the crucial query: Do we not of necessity end by setting up desires against each other, desires which are in the last analysis arbitrary commitments incapable of any ultimate validation? The third point to be noted is, in part, that with the qualifications just stated this question may be—possibly must be—answered in the affirmative. It will be recalled that much of man's philosophic effort has been expended in attempting to escape the relativity of knowledge, to find a sure basis for judgment. Historically there has been an almost unbroken succession of persons who have emphasized the ultimate relativity of truth, beauty, and moral goodness—the final dependence of one or more of these values upon custom, opinion, or desire. Likewise, others have repeatedly sought and "found" ways of escape from such ultimate relativities, especially from the final dependence of moral good, right, and ought upon desire. In morals, attempts have been made to ground judgment securely upon eternal essences or unchanging laws—cosmic, divine, social, psychological, or logical. A valid base for good, right, and duty has been sought in the possession of a special moral sense, intuition, reason, conscience, or will—each conceived as in some way universal. But none of these attempts, it must be confessed, has won general assent upon critical inquiry. In fact, their use as a universal validating base for moral judgment has been in each case rendered untenable or extremely dubious by the findings of the physical, biological, psychological, and social sciences. Yet much the same situation has prevailed with respect to aesthetic and general epistemological theory. Valid bases for aesthetic standards and judgments have been sought in metaphysical forms, in a special aesthetic sense, in intuition, in the harmonious or inharmonious functioning of perceptive faculties, in the will, and in other psychological facts or laws. Grounds for

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unchanging truth have been sought in similar realms or laws, in the universality of intuitive or rational disclosures, in the clearness of sensory perception or of ideas, in common sense, in the laws of logic, and in the modes or categories of experience. But in each case the result is found to be the same: failure to disclose any final ground which wins the intellectual assent of a majority of the most competent critics, even of those eager for such a ground. The persistency of the attempts and the consistency of the failure to find a universal validating base—a kind of alchemy or philosopher's stone for all judgments—are in sharp contrast with the continuing achievements of the arts and sciences, which have become increasingly experimental. The contrast indicates unwillingness or inability to recognize the actual or probable human predicament. In an effort to find a firm foundation for judgment or belief, some aspect of experience which seemed to yield certainty has been seized upon and given almost exclusive emphasis ; it has been apotheosized to a position of final authority. Consciously or unconsciously, the net result in each instance has been a flight from reality, a reality which when faced and intelligently administered yields useful and reasonably satisfactory probabilities. The diverse attempts to find a universal validating ground for judgment, descriptive as well as normative, stand in sharp contrast to views which have held that judgments, particularly normative or valuative ones, have no possible final validation. Nevertheless, the two contrasting positions have one thing in common: they each treat perception, desire, will, intuition, reason, and the like as processes or entities which do or do not constitute separately and in themselves an ultimate ground for or vehicle of universally valid judgment or belief. Both agree in failure to discern the significance of action and interaction. They alike fail to recognize that even though it may be that no ultimate or absolute certainties are possible, these several processes and aspects of experience do yield, when employed experimentally in dealing with actual situations, a relative security, in normative as well as in descriptive judgments, in matters of value as well as in matters of fact, in art and morals as well as in science.

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The fuller statement of the third point in reply to the charge that values are unverifiable because wishes have no ultimate validation is, then, that not only are normative propositions "ultimately" unverifiable, but that the same is true of descriptive propositions as well. Probably neither the worth nor the actual possibility of truth, beauty, or goodness can be demonstrated at large or in the gross. Although man's attempts at adjustment may in some sense assume such possibility and worth, the actualization or verification of particular truths, beauties, and other goods is achieved in more or less convincing and satisfying degrees only in specific situations and instances. With respect to the source, nature, and authority of "ises" and "oughts," of descriptive and normative formulations of various kinds, it may be noted that although all attempts to find a universal validating base for judgment have proven unsatisfactory, each attempt has pointed to factors which operate complexly together in such relative determination and testing as may be possible. The view that values have some sort of cosmic existence or subsistence may or may not be correct. But at any rate the emphasis is sound in that it gives recognition to the fact that values (even moral values) and the measure thereof are not merely anthropocentric. The "ought," as well as the "is," is in many cases defined by the nature of the larger physical, social, and personal aspects of the adjustment situation as well as by personal or social needs or wishes. For effective adjustment actual conditions must be met, that is, correctly interpreted and utilized. Likewise, although the theories which have exalted intuition, will, and reason, respectively, as the sole or authoritative source of scientific, aesthetic, or moral "ises" and "oughts" have made faulty psychological assumptions, they each point to factors which contribute both singly and cooperatively to the experience and the determination of "ises" and "oughts." In all experience there is in fact "spontaneous" getting and giving of meaning, spontaneous enjoyment and dislike, spontaneous approval and disapproval. These responses constitute what may with some propriety be called direct intuition of what exists

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and what is good, of what is and what ought not to be. They are the immediate source and form of suggestions and of approval, disapproval, or experienced uncertainty, both before and after suggestions are tested by reflection and more overt forms of action. Reason may not be the source of self-evident and universally acknowledged truths or duties, but it is the process by which spontaneous perceptions and valuings may be examined and appraised. It is the process of entertaining suggestions, of devising plans, and of presenting a wider panorama of conditions and effects for preview by the interest systems of self or group. Not least among the contributions of cool logical reasoning to the objectivity and steady persistence of reflectively determined values is the recognition—born of the failures and the successes of previous adjustments—of the need for inclusiveness and impartiality if decisions are to be correct or beneficial. In the degree that ends and means are chosen by careful reflective consideration in view of actual conditions of situation and self, they take on directive force and stability. Even though there may be no special unitary faculty or power of will which responds to a universal moral law or to the underlying reality of things, a special faculty which guarantees freedom of choice or persistence in right action, "will" may yet properly denote the demands made by or as habits and interests. Habits of language, of meaning, of skill, and of purpose and procedure do in fact operate as demands in the experiences of scientists, artists, and ordinary citizens throughout each adjustment course. These habits function as the "ises" and the "oughts" of funded experience in interaction with present conditions and purposes. They set up expectations and enter into the determination of interpretations of what the situation is and what is next possible and of worth. Interests are organic or acquired tendencies to activity. Some of these become so organized toward particular objects and objectives that they are at once persistent lures and compulsive drives. Even when generated, modified, corrected, or reconstructed by reflection and more overt action, habits and interests operate as specific and general demands. They then also enter into the distinctive deter-

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mination of "is" and "ought" that results only from inclusive inquiry and testing. Some "ises" and "oughts" are thus experienced as having their immediate source and seat in existential conditions, in spontaneous attractions or aversions, in conformity with habits and interests operating as expectations and demands, or in what is perceived or approved as a result of inclusive and possibly repeated reflective consideration. Yet clearly it would be a mistake to conceive these processes and demands as arising wholly apart from each other and apart from a larger situation of adjustment. Indeed the "ises" and "oughts" experienced from these sources in relative isolation are only raw materials and means for the more distinctive determination of what is and what ought to be. Such determination occurs through the cooperation of intuitive, volitional, and reflective processes in interaction with more obviously existential aspects of adjustment situations. If in fact "ises" and "oughts" derive their most distinctive determinations and effective authorities from such experimental interaction, it must be even more true, a fortiori, that not all "ises" and "oughts" experienced in any particular situation can be experimentally^) determined in a most direct and careful sense. Some things must be accepted as facts or values, that is, as fairly well established by previous or present experiences. But they may be taken thus only as long as some discrepancy does not call them into question. Points at which uncertainty appears are properly subjected to more direct inquiry. This fact in itself should make evident the tentative and experimental(2) as opposed to the universal or absolute nature of all experienced "ises" and "oughts." It points also to the conclusion that they properly possess authority only by virtue of experimental (4) interaction. Their authority is justifiably established only in so far as their suggested formulations are verified through careful interaction. "Ises" and "oughts" are inescapably "experimental" in source and nature; they are most justifiably authoritative only as a result of truly experimental determination. There are, then, certain elements both of truth and of error in

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the positions which hold that "oughts," or ideals, spring not merely from desire but also from perceptive, cognitive, or rational judgments and positions which insist that "ought" is experienced as and gets its force from a "cognitively innocent" feeling or compulsion to action. They each possess truth in so far as they recognize factors which actually operate in the experience and determination of "oughts"; they are each in error in so far as these factors are taken as the sole source of "oughtness" or of its objective character and validation. The error lies, not in emphasis upon the possible impartiality of perceptive, cognitive, or rational disclosure on the one hand or upon the compulsive and persistent nature of habits and desires on the other, but in neglecting the fact that all these processes cooperate with more overt action in the experimental rise and testing of suggestions. The further error may then follow of supposing that "oughts" have a special, peculiar source or authority different from that of "ises" or that these sources operate in moral matters, but not in art or science. Or the neglect of action and interaction may lead to the supposition that the sole test of "oughts" is the "coherent systematization" of desires. Distinctive determination or verification of "oughts," as of "ises," of normative formulations, as of descriptive formulations, is thus effected through processes of complex interaction which may become in some degree experimental in character. But upon closer examination, are there essential differences? Says W. M. Urban: "I believe and shall attempt to show that there is a way of verifying value propositions; but since their meaning is so different from those of matter of fact, the way of verification is different.16 This difference is seen to be due to the nature of value predicates as expressed by "ought to be": " Ought to be' is part of the meaning of a value predicate. . . . The meaning of a value assertion is sufficiently different from that of a factual assertion to make the way of verification—if there is verification in any sense, significantly different." 17 The difference between factual and valuative 16

"Value Propositions and Verifiability," The Journal of philosophy, 592. 17 Ibid., p. 598.

X X X I V (1937),

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judgments is indicated more precisely in discussing the correction of errors in the latter: It may be said, of course, that the correction here is not of a judgment of value, but of a judgment of fact, that if I wrongly call an act proud when it is really not, it is of the same type of error as when I call an object red when it is really green. But closer inspection will show that this is not the case. To call an act proud, whether correctly or incorrectly, implies that I must apprehend or intuit the quality "proud" and that can be done only by an emotional intuition which is quite different from the sensuous observation of a fact, or, if there be such, introspection of psychological matter of fact. 18

Due, then, to the essential difference between sensuous observation, or intuition of sensa, and emotional or value intuition, facts can be "pointed to," but values may only be "shown forth" by a kind of indirect or inferential process which may correct judgment and elicit acknowledgment even when feeling is not changed. For example : A cynical sensualist asserts, let us say, that the only goods are mastication and sex. We can not perhaps correct his feeling in the matter, but we can correct his assertion. . . . He assumes at least that his assertion is true and that, for some reason or other, a true assertion is better than a false one. Otherwise he would not make the assertion. It can therefore be pointed out to him that there is at least one other good other than those of mastication and sex and that in his very assertion, he has actually acknowledged that fact. 19

Urban therefore holds that "values can be shown forth and when shown forth can be experienced and acknowledged. They are not sensuously observable, but they are nevertheless experienced or erlebt."

It will doubtless appear that this position is essentially in opposition to the view we are herein proposing. But further statements made and data presented by Urban himself suggest that the conflict is more apparent than real. At one point there is clearly agreement: that it is possible to verify some value or normative propositions. The sharpest difference may seem to lie in the conception of the nature of verification and perhaps in a resulting differ18

Ibid., pp. 593-S94 (italics added).

10

Ibid., p. 594.

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enee in the degree of verifiability. Since Urban holds that facts are sensuously observable, whereas values can only be shown forth as experienced, or erlebt, it may appear to follow that values are therefore less verifiable than facts. But with respect to the emotional intuition by which values are experienced Urban says, "I believe that such intuition is as certain as the intuition of sense data." 20 With respect to the nature of verification, it will be recalled that our own analyses have also led to the conclusion that there is a preponderance of perceptual elements in fact finding and of emotional or preferential elements in valuation, 21 that indeed "factual," or descriptive, propositions are those which express a "purely" or predominantly object-centered interest or attention, whereas "valuative," or normative, propositions are those which are "purely" or chiefly the expression of wishes, ends-means, or appraisals. We have held, however, that neither emotional intuitions nor the most directly observable sensory data are certain simply because of their apparent clearness or directness. Indeed Urban himself says: In the realm of perception illusions, as perceptions, cannot be directly corrected. It is only judgment that can be corrected. Thus we see the stick in the water bent and no amount of reflection can make us see it other than as bent, but we can correct the judgment that it is bent. 22

Also the need for critical examination of value intuitions seems to be implied by the fact that they are to be "shown forth" by the use of examples and by logical reasoning which elicits at least intellectual acknowledgment. We maintain, therefore, as we have done previously, that even the clearest sensory perceptions as well as the most convincingly authentic value intuitions are to be subjected, as far as is possible or as may become necessary, to experimental testing for the fullest and most dependable verification. We have also seen that even in matters of fact there are few if any instances in which it is possible to "point to" all the "facts" as being directly observable in sensory 20

Ibid., p. 600. 21 Chap. v. "Value Propositions and Verifiability," The Journal (1937), 597.

22

of Philosophy,

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experience. 23 Many facts can only be inferred. And what appears to be direct observation is always selective and complexly mediated. Moreover, in many instances it is possible to point also to the characteristics of objects (things, arrangements, and acts) which make them valuable, or more valuable than other objects, for certain purposes. But whether more directly or less directly mediated, supposed or proposed facts or values are always properly subject to the testing of more inclusive interaction. A final point of agreement and difference is important. Although Urban at first states that the process of value "authentication" or verification is so different from factual verification "that it can not, perhaps, properly be called a way of verification," 24 he later indicates a preference for a wider use of the term. The locus of verification, if I may use that phrase, is not in the immediately given experience, whether a sense perception or an erlebniss of value, but in the moment of confirmation by mutual acknowledgment. There is no such thing as solipsistic verification. Verification—of any kind that takes place in meaningful discourse—is mutual acknowledgment of communicating subjects. When this essential character of all verification is realized, there seems to be no good reason for denying the name to those processes which we have characterized as authentication.25

Whereas our own analyses have indicated the close interrelation of individual thinking, social discussion, interaction with the obviously existential aspects of situations, Urban seems in this statement to restrict verification almost wholly to social agreement or mutual acknowledgment. Elsewhere, however, he indicates that the correction of the cynical sensualist's judgment regarding the existence of values other than mastication and sex "does not consist in pointing out that others recognize and acknowledge other values, but that he actually does and must." 26 Here the process is social, but the emphasis falls upon individual thinking and acknowledgment therein. At another point the need for existential interaction is perhaps implied, though not stated: 23

See pp. 37-38. "Value Propositions and Verifiability," The Journal (1937), p. S99. 25 26 Ibid., p. 600. Ibid., p. 594. 24

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Propositions such as, this is a good motor, or, this is a good textbook, are meaningful and verifiable on any theory of meaning. With regard to such instrumental values, the existence of error and the possibility of its correction are not in dispute. A large part of our life, both individual and social, consists in making such errors and in painfully correcting them. . . . In this case arguments about values, although not solely arguments about matter of fact, are largely so. This point must be emphasized. They are not wholly so.27

Although the verification of the so-called "instrumental values" just mentioned would seem definitely to require inquiry into obviously existential things and relations, Urban was here primarily interested in the possibility of correcting or verifying judgments regarding necessary "intrinsic values." But in the examples given to prove that such correction is possible, he goes no further than to show the logical necessity for the acknowledgment of values other than sensory satisfactions or pleasures and of the existence of a scale of values. 28 Now, to win assent to propositions regarding intrinsic values, such as truth, beauty, and other goods, is important and may have been sufficient for Urban's purpose. But this must certainly appear to be a rather hollow, formal victory if we are not also to recognize that the chief problem is usually to discover what the true, the beautiful, the right, or the just is in particular instances. Apparently any theory which is to meet this need must also stress inquiry in specific situations. And if this inquiry is to be most effective, whether in science, art, or personal and social affairs, it must employ cooperatively the best resources of individual thinking, social discussion, and other existential interaction. Such an extension and integration of theory to include action as well as rigorous thinking and social criticism is by no means a denial of the difference which Urban has so clearly emphasized. There doubtless is a predominance of descriptive acts or elements in all "typically" factual judgments and adjustments, especially in those of science, and of normative acts or elements in "typically" valuative judgments and adjustments, particularly in art and morals. Although it is clear, even viewing the problem generally, 27

Ibid., pp. 592-593.

Ibid., pp. 594-596.

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that many valuations are made in science and that standards, norms, and principles of procedure arise and operate intimately in the choice and the investigation of scientific problems, it seems equally clear that science primarily restricts interest to the description of what has been, is, or will be. Its findings, methodology, and further problems are largely, though by no means wholly, descriptive. Similarly, though it is equally clear that many factual problems arise in art and morals, it must also be true that interest centers in larger degree than in science upon the satisfactory and approvable expression of personal and social needs and desires. The accumulated heritage, subject matter, and methodology are in these quests largely, though never entirely, normative. Now, from these differences it follows that values are less verifiable than facts, if normative formulations are less verifiable or if normative acts or elements make for less verifiability. It follows that facts are less verifiable than values, if descriptive formulations are less verifiable than normative or if descriptive acts or elements make for less verifiability. So far as constituent elements are concerned, distinctively descriptive and distinctively normative acts have in common reflective deliberation, discussion, and overt processes. They differ in that they do not have the same proportion of perceptive and preferential or affective elements. But each of the acts taken in itself provides data for inquiry. Each helps to make possible the experience of facts and values, yet neither is in itself a guarantor or a preventive of verification. When the descriptive and the normative are viewed as less distinctive or more generic processes which are necessary for every reflective adjustment, it is absurd to suppose that any one of these elements contributes more or less to verification or verifiability. The descriptive and the normative operate together. Neither can exist without the other, and both are sine qua non for intelligent adjustment. Verification is a joint product of complex interactions within which the descriptive and the normative are component functions, acts, and elements. But with respect to the relative verifiability of more descriptivè as compared with more normative formulations the situation is less clear. The fact that there is a running scale in closeness of

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correspondence between "ises" and "oughts," or between relatively verifiable descriptive and normative functions, indicates that the latter are not wholly unverifiable even in the empirical sense of correspondence with what does exist or can be made to exist. Yet this fact also implies that not all normative formulations are verifiable in terms of direct or immediate correspondence with the existential. Of course their difference from the descriptive is softened somewhat by the fact that descriptive formulations also vary in degree of determinable correspondence with the existential, whether past, present, or future. The multiplicity and temporal character of events produce complexities, inaccessibilities, and other traits that make impossible the complete verification of many or any descriptive formulations. But when this is granted, it is apparently true from the very nature of their respective functions that en masse normative formulations correspond less closely and possibly in a somewhat different manner to particular existent events, though perhaps not less closely to possible events. Viewed in relation to the total situation in which they arise and operate, the function of all formulations is to promote adjustment, intellectual or overt. Verifiability from this point of view is relative to the performance of this function. But seen in terms of the special contributions which they make to adjustment, descriptive and normative functions have certain general differences. Their respective verifiabilities must in fairness be considered in terms of their respective functions as elements equally indispensable for adjustments. The verifiability of descriptive formulations must, then, be considered primarily in terms of correspondence with what has existed, does exist, or actually will exist. For instance, the judgments "This is the paint I used last week," "This is red paint," and "This paint will retain its vividness," may each be tested by acts which do or do not lead to consequences anticipated by the statement, that is, to evidence of a correspondence of formulation with what is "found" to have existed, now to be existing, or to exist at some future time. The verifiability of normative formulations, on the other hand, must be considered chiefly in terms of their ability

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not only to indicate what is necessary to attain prescribed ends but also to indicate ends which are found so to direct action that they receive continuing critical approval. T h e relevance of normative judgments to interests or purposes is perhaps most conspicuous in such formulations as these: "Scientific operations should be made explicit and held open to critical reëxamination" ; " A work of art should have unity and simplicity with variety and richness"; and " T o increase social security and wholesome growth, mutual sharing and consideration should be fostered." These statements or their equivalents have arisen from long experience in scientific, artistic, and human or moral matters. T h e y have increasingly received—with notable exceptions—reflective acceptance, both in theory and in practice. T h e consequences of neglecting them can be clearly pointed to. B u t the test might perhaps here be better expressed, not as correspondence with what exists—past, present, or f u t u r e — b u t as fruitfulness in action that approves itself critically b y further pursuit of this particular interest with relation to itself and to other interests. Or expressed in terms of correspondence, the test of normative formulations is not wholly correspondence with what exists externally or apart from human interest as a constitutive factor in the existence, but with desires and satisfactory means of fulfillment which come into existence and continue to exist as a result of critically and constructively reflective action. W h e n the two functions are thus contrasted at the moments or in the instances of their most distinctive and obtrusive (or familiar) occurrence, it must be true that statements which are normative are not wholly, if at all, verifiable in terms of the descriptive funct i o n — i n terms of what exists apart from human desires. Normative formulation and formulations m a y be described, and the descriptive statements m a y be tested b y careful sociological and psychological inquiry, and thus it m a y be inferred that they correspond or do not correspond to what does occur or exist in behavior and experience. B u t the normative statements are not themselves verified normatively b y the discovery of correspondence or lack of correspondence with what exists. For such verification normative statements have

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to be tested by study of their correspondence to ends and means which are approved through critical reflective examination along with intermittently continuous action. Likewise, descriptive formulations are not wholly, if at all, verifiable in terms of the normative function—in terms, that is, of what continues to be desired and approved, all things considered. Normative statements may be made about description and particular descriptions, and these normative statements may be tested by critical examination of their correspondence to what have been, are, and continue to be critically approved human interests. But the descriptions are not descriptively verified by the relations sustained with recurring or continuing desires. For the verification of descriptive statements from the standpoint of the'descriptive function, evidence must be sought regarding their correspondence with what exists (past, present, or future) unaffected by desires other than that for the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Any fair appraisal of the relative verifiability of descriptive as compared with normative formulations is made even more difficult by other facts, barely touched upon heretofore and only summarized here. First is the fact that normative formulations vary, as do descriptive formulations, in the closeness with which they correspond to what exists apart from desires. Then there is the fact that closeness of correspondence, whether of descriptive or of normative statements, can be determined only experimentally and by complex interactions. Again, descriptive and normative functions and formulations are only relatively distinguishable from each other even in their most distinct occurrences, and they probably never exist in existential separateness except possibly for abstraction. Normative formulation and formulations may be described, and description and descriptions may be appraised in relation to interests. Finally, some descriptive formulations are made to express what actually has existed or now exists, but others are made to express what probably has existed, does exist, or may exist in the future. Descriptive formulations dealing with probabilities, especially concerning the future, may legitimately possess as great a latitude of creativity as do many normative formulations.

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F r o m these various considerations it m a y , perhaps, justly be inferred that there is no difference between descriptive and normative formulations with regard to the nature of the correspondence, but that the difference lies in that to which there is correspondence. T h e r e is a difference in that to which they are expected to correspond, but the processes through which evidence for that correspondence is sought are of the same general character, namely, inclusive interaction in which individual and social perception, thought, feeling, and overt action properly are cooperating elements. Although descriptive formulations are not strictly verifiable from the standpoint of the normative function and normative formulations are not strictly verifiable from the standpoint of the descriptive function, there is such a close interrelation between descriptive and normative acts and functions that each kind of formulation is somewhat verifiable from both points of view, just as every formulation is a resultant of both kinds of act. F r o m either standpoint the other " k i n d " of formulation is less verifiable. A n d from the standpoint of total adjustment within which both kinds of act and formulation are indispensably present, each kind is seen as arising within and being relatively tested b y continuing thought and action, as containing mingled elements of dependability and uncertainty and as varying from the very definitely verifiable and verified to the unverified and probably unverifiable. Accordingly it is seen that so far as descriptive and normative processes are concerned the general character and possibility of verification are the same, or at least significantly similar, whether in factual or valuative adjustments, whether in science, art, or morals.

CHAPTER EIGHT: T H E F A C T U A L THE

AND

CREATIVE

• A FOURTH marked contrast among and within the adjustments of science, art, and morals may be referred to as the factual and the creative. As a result of this contrast, the existence of which certainly is not to be denied, it may be felt that values are less verifiable than facts or that the nature of value verification, if there may properly be said to be any such verification, is different. Historically and currently this view has expressed itself in various forms, often amounting to a sharp separation, both in theory and in practice. It is held, first, that there is a creative element in normative as contrasted with descriptive judgment and that this element adversely affects the subject matter and character, and therefore the verification and verifiability, of normative judgment; second, that art (and perhaps in lesser degree morals) is creative in aim, is creative activity pursued for its own sake and that therefore in these interests truth and verification are largely or strictly irrelevant; and, third, that due to the complexly unstable, unpredictable, and creative character of human behavior and due to the essentially rationalistic functions of judgments of value intelligence is unable to play as constructive a role in human affairs as it plays in scientific and technological matters. Clearly these positions raise issues which present opportunity for further testing of the hypothesis that both facts and values are relatively verified goods, goods relatively verifiable by much the same experimental processes. T h e y present a further challenge for the development of a perspective that may help to clarify value theory without denying any genuine differences which have given rise to such separations. Examination of adjustment courses in personal, social, and physical settings suggests an intimate pervasiveness of what may be called, very broadly, both "the factual" and "the creative." On one hand operations of interaction are experienced as given, fixed, repetitive, reproductive, denotive, conformative to, or pre-

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dictive of the existential; on the other, elements and operations are qualified as constructive, expressive, integrative, connotive, and in general oriented toward the making or shaping of ends and means which are more uniquely individual and novel. This contrast, it is clear, is not primarily one of separate or distinct acts or elements of interaction, but rather a difference which pervades or qualifies many or all acts or movements. Whether total adjustments are analyzed in terms of the various problem-solving steps or functions, in terms of reactions such as perceiving, feeling, imagining, judging, or motor acting, or in terms of contrasts such as those which may be drawn between knowing and valuation, the qualitative and the quantitative, or the descriptive and the normative, it is possible to discern in each step, process, and element of contrast the presence of both more factual and more creative elements, or qualities. Moreover, it may be noted that both descriptive and normative judgments vary in degree of factuality-creativity, and for much the same reasons. There are on one hand the many varieties of subject matter to be judged, and on the other the particularized individuality of the judge. As subject matter increases in complexity, the difficulty of making adequate descriptions, as well as appraisals, also increases. Often many trial operations of formulation and testing must be performed before perchance one is made or improved which can be finally accepted with some degree of confidence as correct, authentic, or adequate. The "creativity" in judgment is thus a function of subject matter as well as of the limitations and needs of the organism or subject. Or, more strictly, it is a function of the interaction of particular individuals in and of a world of complexly varied events. But though this be granted, are there not factors which make for a greater degree of creativity in normative than in descriptive judgment—factors of difference either in subject matter, in function or purpose, or in procedure? Of course, when the whole gamut of events and all their aspects are regarded as the potential subject matter for both descriptive and normative judgments, there can be no differential effect produced, so far as subject matter alone is

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a factor, upon possible descriptive and normative judgments compared en masse. Yet some selective effect may result from either the function or the purpose of normative, as compared with descriptive, judgment or from the manner in which these respective judgments are made. In consequence, some subject matters or aspects thereof may be given more attention by descriptive judgment, others by normative judgment. Purpose or procedure may thus affect the character of judgment, either by a selective effect upon subject matter, by introducing differences in treatment of subject matter, or by both. It may be that the predominant purposes and methodology of, let us say, art and morals as compared with science produce marked differences in the factual-creative character of the judgments as well as of the other elements of adjustment which constitute these several quests. Let us consider first the effects of the distinctive purposes and procedures which characterize descriptive and normative judgments in general. As was seen in the preceding chapter, the essential function of descriptive judgment is to state what has existed, does exist, or will exist, whereas that of normative judgment is to express what is desired, what needs to be done to achieve desired ends, and what is "really" desired or is worth doing. It may seem, therefore, that the very function of normative judgment tends to maximize the creative, to move beyond nonwish existentials in the direction of and amid the tensions experienced as desires. Although attention is perforce given to conditions, effects, and wishes as they are or may actually become, the role played by truly normative judgment is commonly expressive, integrative, and suggestive, as well as critical, judicial, and avertive. Of course, to some extent the same must be acknowledged for descriptive judgment, but the degree is perhaps relatively less when descriptive and normative judgments are compared en masse—especially the judgments commonly made, rather than those which are potential. Because of the preeminent function of normative judgment it is apparently more concerned with wish events, though properly in careful relation to the conditions of their rise and satisfaction. The procedures of the two kinds of judgment vary not so much,

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if at all, with regard to their nature as judgments, as in their sources of data, their enshrouding or pervading atmosphere, and what may be called their intermediate and final terminal responses. In so far as judgment is judgment—clear discernment of relationships that follow from clearly and carefully apprehended "facts," meanings, or premises—normative judgments in no wise differ in procedure from descriptive judgments. But in so far as normative judgments are made regarding wishes and interests, they are—no matter how coldly impartial the judge may be—encompassed by a crowd of witnesses, a gallery of hopes, fears, biases, attractions, and aversions. It would of course be a gross mistake to suppose that descriptive judgment can wholly escape from the effects of individual presupposition, prejudice, ambition, and frame of reference. The discarded theories and conclusions which strew the path of scientific development bear dismal testimony to descriptive failure. But as the subject matter of normative judgment is —directly or indirectly—more often a wish or an "ought" or a number of conflicting wishes or "oughts," the difficulty of judging impartially is here augmented by affective elements or responses which threaten to engulf or to pervert deliberation and decision. In larger degree the responses of attraction and aversion which operate to direct and to terminate the numerous constituent responses in acts of apprehending, of considerating data, and of reaching a conclusion are affected, when not entirely determined, by a background of personal presuppositions, hopes, and aspirations. Though never wholly separated, either with regard to source or in operation, perceptive or cognitive elements are in larger degree predominant in the direction and final determination of distinctly descriptive judgment, whereas affective or preferential elements are more determinative in "purely" normative judgment. This is doubtless true, even though much of what passes for judgment, particularly for normative judgment, is merely "wishful" rationalization or assertion of bias, merely a declaration of what is believed, esteemed, or desired, not an act of critical inquiry and appraisal. Now, if examination discloses a scale of variation with respect to the degree in which the acts and formulations of descriptive and

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normative judgment are obviously the creative contrivance of interaction, does not an adequate recognition of the differences in function and procedure indicate that normative judgments are creative in a fundamentally different sense: not only, or so much, in the sense (which we may call "creative [3 ] ") 1 of being inventive of new and more accurate formulations but also in the sense (creative [4] ) of making somewhat arbitrary or artlike constructs whose chief role or function is to please, to satisfy the desires of the judge, who in the normative role is really not a judge of truth, but essentially or finally an architect of dreams, a confectioner of satisfactions? Is not descriptive judgment, in other words, referred to and based upon the perceptible, which is what it is, whereas normative judgment refers to or finally rests upon the shifting sands of needs, wishes, or feelings? Before attempting to answer these questions with respect to normative and descriptive judgments in general, it may be well to consider the effects of purpose and methodology upon the judgments and other elements of interaction which together constitute the adjustments of science, art, and morals, for it is here that the differences between the cognitive and the affective, between the rigorously factual(3,4) and the freely creative (4), are writ large in most conspicuous and challenging form. As suggested by the second of the positions noted at the outset, the sharpest contrast between the factual and the creative is presented by adjustments which are made most directly in the interests of achieving the major purposes of scientific fact finding, on the one hand, and of artistic expression or appreciation, on the other. 1

As will appear in the subsequent discussion there are at least four meanings of "factual" and "creative" when used as contrasting terms. These meanings will perhaps be evident from the contexts; but may be summarized here. "Factual(l)" and "creativity(l)" are used to include all the other meanings. "Factual(2)" denotes the fixity or constancy of events in contrast with the "creative(2)," or the changing and novel, characters of events as subject matters or as factors in adjustments. "Factual(3)" indicates the "stative," or reproductive, as contrasted with the "creative(3)," or constructive, character of formulations or judgments, whether or not such formulations correspond or relate in detail to the existential. "Factual (4) " and "creative (4)" refer, respectively, to interest directed toward and formulations tested by reference to the existential and to interest directed toward and tested by immediate or continuously approvable satisfactions. When employed as contrasting terms without numbers attached, "the factual" and "the creative" may be construed equally well in any of these various meanings.

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For although artist and appreciator use or respond to factual materials and situations whose actual nature affects operations of interaction, there is, as Parker notes,2 perhaps half the truth about art in Plato's description of painting as "a waking dream." Man's interest is not essentially—even for the most realistic schools of art—to reproduce anything and everything exactly as it exists, but to express, either as immediate experience or as embodiment in a work of art, some experience significantly felt or felt as significant. Expression is selective and therefore is, consciously or unconsciously, in large part a work of "creative imagination," a bodying-forth of things hitherto unknown as well as known. "What the artist actually does is to portray things not as they are, but as he would like to have them be, so that he may secure, in the imagination, a more perfect satisfaction of his desires concerning them." 3 On the other hand, however inescapable may be the fact that science is "an art" which uses materials (things, apparatus, and symbols) to achieve ends, the primary aim of science is to arrive at or state the truth. And as Parker says further, Under its ordinary or "real" form, truth is conformity to fact, that is, the evidence for a [scientific] proposition lies in real perceptual objects. But clearly, a work of art, as the product of imagination, cannot confront the mind with real objects; it can only offer it imaginary objects; hence the evidence for any proposition expressed in art must consist in imaginary objects which, though imaginary, are accepted "as if" real.4 However much of the sphere of truth art may contain, it can never be, on its own ground, more than supposition, hypothesis, faith. For the evidence it presents is imaginary evidence, therefore cannot stand the test of rigorous verification or withstand a hard-headed scepticism. It remains, after all, in the world of make-believe . . ,5

Moreover, if the most distinctly scientific and artistic adjustments may be regarded as standing at opposite extremes as to concern with and reference to the factual and the creative (3), 2 3 4

Human Values, p. 319. Ibid., p. 342 ; by permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers. 6 Ibid., pp. 345-346. Ibid., pp. 347-348.

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adjustments which are most distinctly moral may be said to stand between those of science and art, though perhaps in the final analysis nearer to art than to science. For such adjustments in or of moral matters are properly concerned with careful inquiry into and recognition of actual personal and social conditions and interdependencies. Yet they are often freely creative(3) of ends and means which may bring into existence new or changed conditions, and their final justification may be the immediate or continuing satisfactions which these conditions afford. Morally chosen and directed conduct is less freely or completely creative(4) than art, less concerned than science with facts for their own sake. It is more concerned with inventing conditions and with extending and making them secure than in merely stating accurately what exists —more concerned with the effects and worthiness of action than with action for the experience of its own intrinsic qualities. But in the last analysis, is not judgment of moral worthiness a matter of personal or group preference, and therefore, like the formulations of artistic expression and of aesthetic experience, unable to stand the test of rigorous verification or to withstand a hard-headed skepticism? Regardless of the selective effect of purpose upon subject matter and hence upon the character and ultimate rigor of judgment and verification, it is to be noted that in art and morals, as well as in science, there is constant interest in such testing as serves operative purposes. Artistic expression or appreciation is never a pure and wholly uncontrolled or untested dream. The eye of the artist moves (even when merely in imagination) from heaven to earth and from earth to heaven in search for what will adequately express and embody experience which is significantly felt and perceived as significant. Experimental study of the processes involved in creative production by one hundred professional and nonprofessional artists has led one psychologist to conclude that there are four chief stages in painting, as well as in the writing of poetry, namely, "preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification." 6 6

Patrick, "Creative Thought in Artists," The Journal 3S-73.

of Psychology,

IV

(1937),

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Likewise, the person considering (morally) what he shall or ought to do, for example, about accepting a speaking engagement or about voting on a proposed city tax increase, is not seeking for just any chance suggestion. He is searching for one which will, after all the contending personal and social demands have been considered and as far as possible "satisfied," so direct action that regrets will be minimized and approved effects maximized. In both art and morals there is constant testing for purposes in hand. To the question whether aesthetic and moral formulations are able to stand the test of rigorous verification or withstand a hardheaded skepticism it might with some show of justice be replied that skepticism sufficiently "hardheaded" has often questioned and continues to question much if not all scientific truth and the final rigor of even the most rigorous scientific verification. Certainly with complete relevance and justice it can be shown that though both factual and valuative adjustments are somewhat restricted and affected by the major interests which they serve in science, art, and morals, respectively, there yet is in each of these quests wide variation among both adjustments and judgments as to degree of effective concern with rigorous pursuit of truth and with impartial or adequately inclusive and critical consideration of worth. There is also wide variation from strict adherence to the existent to freely constructive contrivance of novel statements of fact or value. In short, the differences of function and of factualitycreativity(3,4) among science, art, and morals are but relative differences. In each quest some acts of adjustment are largely repetitive or exactly denotive, others are freely inventive and expressive or emotive. In art and morals much inquiry and appraisal is for the purpose of accurate determination of facts; in science much is for the intrinsic satisfactions which their pursuit or possession affords. These points must be kept in mind if the continuities between fact verification and value verification, whether in science, art, or morals, are not to fall from sight. But these considerations will probably not be regarded as a complete reply—at least when "rigor" and "verification" are viewed from a "strict" scientific

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standpoint. Yet in so far as verification is properly regarded as relative to functions performed, the scientific, moral, and artistic variations as to degree of rigor of testing are strictly, if not wholly, incommensurable and incomparable. Perhaps more important than a precise and final appraisal of actual or potential equality of rigorousness, however, are the facts that in each quest there is almost constant concern for testing and that at least for the purposes of that particular quest there is some measure of success in such testing as is needed and possible. More important than general appraisals for many theoretical and practical purposes is an adequate appreciation of the character of thé verification which with sufficient persistence and care may be possible, the extent of which can be most accurately ascertained only experimentally in and for particular instances and kinds of adjustment. It is nowhere more evident than in respect to the factual(4) and the creative(4) that the term "verification," if it is to be used broadly enough to include all the significant testing of normative judgments as well as that of descriptive judgments, in art and morals as well as in science, must refer to testings which have two somewhat divergent interests. On one hand there is testing with respect to the existential, on the other, testing with respect to the satisfying; on one hand the testing is in large degree perceptive and cognitive, on the other, more largely perceptive and affective or qualitative. But it is equally clear that even at the extremes of divergence the accuracy with which the existent is or is not expressed is satisfying or annoying, and the completeness of the satisfactory is related to significant precisions of form or pattern. If "verification(l)" may be used to include both kinds of testing, "verification(2)" to denote factual(4) testing, and "verificat i o n ^ ) " creative(4) testing, then "verifiability( 1 )," "verifiability(2)," and "verifiability(3)" will refer to the possibility of performing tests of the corresponding inclusiveness and kinds. From the previous considerations it follows that the testing of any kind of judgment, indeed, of any particular judgment, whether descriptive or normative, varies rather widely from very factual (4) verification (verification[2] ) to very creative(4) verification

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(verification[3]). Despite this wide variation it is probably true that the testing which occurs within and with reference to normative judgments—at least of those most commonly made—is more creative(4) in character than is the testing in and of descriptive judgments. This is perhaps to be granted, even though the major functions and the predominant elements of procedure in science, art, and morals, respectively, have a marked effect upon the character of the judgments and the adjustments in those interests. I t also follows that although there is proportionately more verificat i o n ^ ) in science and more verification(3) in morals and especially in art, there is considerable variation in respect to the presence of the two kinds of testing within the adjustments of each of these enterprises. In fact, it becomes increasingly evident upon examination of representative adjustments and judgments that the two emphases of interest and the corresponding differences in procedure are intimately related, the divergence in any particular case being only one of degree. The differences stand out sharply when the most distinctive adjustments of science and art are compared. T h e contrast is also marked when the extreme or distinctive instances of normative judgment are compared with descriptive ones. But in every judgment and in every adjustment factual (4) and creative(4) elements or qualities are intermingled and are only relatively differentiated from each other. Comparison of the relative verifiability of facts and values of various kinds is considerably complicated by the relative variations in the presence of factual(4) and creative(4) functions and elements or qualities of interaction. In a broad sense verifia b i l i t y ^ ) and verifiability(3) are quite incommensurable and incomparable in so far as they denote capacity for testing, which has sharply divergent interests and relatively different methodologies. The best verified(2) scientific facts and the best verified^) aesthetic values are strictly sui generis. In a certain sense they lie in different dimensions of experience. They satisfy or serve different human needs and interests. Yet within each "sphere" or phase of activity there is clearly considerable variation of testa-

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bility in relation to the purposes of that particular quest. Moreover, there is much in common among all quests, due to the fact that they are pursued by the same or similar organisms, in the "same" world, using much the same materials, making many of the same sorts of interactive response, and always initiating and directing action in ways affected by purposes and habits. And within and among adjustments of all kinds there is also much disparity as to degree of success and failure in effecting movement from the unsettled to the satisfactorily settled. Such commonness of elements doubtless goes far toward explaining attempts to compare not only facts with facts and values with values but also values with facts in respect to degree of verifiability and the degree in which verification has occurred in particular instances. Due to these common elements of subject matter, methodology, and relevance to function, comparisons of this kind are not wholly meaningless or groundless. Indeed the commonness makes it possible to apply the same general criteria to all facts and values and to their varied kinds and degrees of verifiability. Says Parker: In estimating the comparative worth of works of art the same principles are applicable as hold for the criticism of other types of value—the principle of success [in performing for the whole personality the unique function or functions of a work of art], of cooperation of elements within a whole, of adequacy to the total self. 7

But the commonness may appear to break down or to become insignificant due to the degree of disparity between success and failure, at least when actual uncertainties and failures in human affairs are contrasted with the conspicuous achievements of the arts and sciences. In the face of the complexly unstable, unpredictable, or creative character of human behavior and the essentially wishful and rationalistic function of value judgment, is intelligence able to play as constructive a role in personal-social affairs (morals) as in achieving the essential ends of these other interests? This position, the third mentioned at the outset, clearly depends 7 Human Values, p. 338 ; by permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers. For Parker's explanation of these principles, see ibid., pp. 88 f.

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upon two points: the nature of value judgment and the capacity of human behavior to direct itself, or to be directed, intelligently. These two points must accordingly be considered in turn. Value judgments may be held to be essentially indeterminate, because "the purpose of judgments of value is not to describe but to make a selection among possible courses of action." 8 And "if the problem of value is to find reasons for choice, and if the finding of such reasons is dependent upon the existence of certain beliefs and purposes, then it is evident that what constitutes a good reason for one person to choose might be irrelevant to the choice of another person." 9 It seems here to be assumed that the function of value judgments is to find reasons for choice and that the finding of reasons is essentially dependent upon the existence of certain beliefs and purposes. There is certainly much truth in these contentions. It is true that value judgments do not aim primarily to describe. Furthermore, value judgments do often, though perhaps not always, arise in an attempt to make a selection among possible courses of action. Whether this is always the case will depend upon how "value judgment" is defined. If value judgment may be properly conceived as the entire span of careful and open inquiry concerning the actual conditions and effects of possible lines of action or even as the decision which follows from or upon such inquiry, it must be clear that the beliefs and purposes operative in a situation will, in the degree that such inquiry occurs, undergo testing and possibly reformulation. Also, in the degree that such inquiry occurs the reasons settled upon for choice are more than the expression of previous or present beliefs or purposes. Perception or conception of actual interdependencies among conditions and effects enter into the more specific determination of ends and means, often leading, indeed, to their radical reconstruction. This is true whether value judgment is defined broadly enough to include such perception and conception or is restricted to final comparisons or choices which follow upon the heels of more descriptive judgments. 8

Charner M. Perry, "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," The tional Journal of Ethics, XLIII (1932-1933), 133. 9 Ibid., pp. 133-134.

Interna-

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In any case, it may be granted that in so far as decision or action is merely a giving way to impulses or desires uncontrolled by wider perspective, no judgment has occurred. "Judgments of practice" are not value judgments in so far as they are "decisions" resulting from unexamined impulses. In fact such decisions are not even judgments. Of course, all judgments, however carefully considered, involve leaping in the dark, and without some impulse there is no leap. But certainly there is a difference between a leap prompted by an open quest for genuine truth or enduring satisfaction and one prompted by the urge to find a reason for giving way to the desires themselves. There is a difference between frank and open inquiry into the conditions and effects of acts, letting desires and impulses be generated by such perceived relations, and giving way to impulse or seeking justification for a desired choice in disregard of those relations. The recognition that choice may be more than wishful does not deny that individual beliefs and purposes differ. The "facts" of the total situation of choice—both the internal and the external facts or conditions—differ for different persons and even for the same persons at different times. But this does not condemn inquiry and decision as being inherently and essentially indeterminate. In so far as the total situation is the same for different persons, open and honest inquiry will doubtless lead to similar choice and to similar reasons therefor. Yet in so far as all situations are in some measure novel, equally careful inquiry and deliberation will result in different descriptions, appraisals, and choices. Yet in no case in which such inquiry becomes effective is the finding of reasons for choice wholly and inescapably dependent upon beliefs and purposes which are not themselves a product of intimate interaction within a total situation. Or stated positively, it is possible through the cooperation of careful inquiry, deliberation, and overt action to make and in some instances and in varying degrees to improve valuative, as well as factual, formulations. Though it be granted that this is in some measure true, are not value formulations and testing more wishful and more creative(4) than are fact formulations and testing, especially in personal

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and social affairs? Does not the essentially unstable, unpredictable, and creative(2) character of human behavior make intelligent direction in this respect impossible or less possible? Certain considerations already indicated in previous chapters seem to point to a negative answer.10 Here it may be further noted that art affords crucial evidence that the presence of a higher proportion of the creative(4) as compared with the factual(4) or with the creative(3) does not affect adversely the intelligent directability of human affairs. For if in art we find the creative(4) present in the highest degree and if it be granted that intelligence operates to produce formulations which are variously testable in relation to the purposes of art, it must also be granted that the creative (4) does not in itself make formulation and testing in human affairs impossible or less possible than in art or in science. Yet the full force of the difficulty with regard to the factual and the creative is at no point more patent and perplexing than it is in respect to distinctly social matters. Although it must be acknowledged that there is wide variation with respect to stability and change, simplicity and complexity, predictability and unpredictability, verifiability and unverifiability in science, art, and morals alike, the position may with some justice be maintained that human affairs, when strictly defined as matters involving directly the purposes and conditions of persons, are always, or at least usually, more complex, changeful, and unpredictable than are the subject matters of either science or art. Although all events are perhaps unique and in some respects different, are not social and personal needs, desires, and acts doubly—indeed almost infinitely—more variable and more creative(2)? , It may be argued contrawise that the apparently greater complexity in personal-social matters results from certain habits of thinking rather than from the actual state of affairs. The common habit is to think of behavior as reducible to physiological functions and these in turn to chemical-electrical processes and these again to supposedly simpler, though extremely complex, electron-proton phenomena. But this habit of reduction leads us to overlook the 10

See especially pp. SS—56, 62-63, 86.

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fact that many biological and particularly physical-chemicalelectrical phenomena 11 are much more inclusive and complex than are the logical and the psychological, even from the standpoint of the number and the intricacy of relations of the electronproton elements involved. In short, adequate perspective may greatly alter or even reverse the common impressions and conceptions regarding the relative simplicities and complexities, the relative constancies and creativities, involved in human affairs as compared with those confronting even the physical scientists. Yet, even if it be recognized that the massed subject matters of science and of art are possibly no less changeful and complex than the whole gamut of moral matters, there remains a further difference and difficulty. It is more often possible in science and art to isolate and to a certain extent to stabilize the problems and subject matters of inquiry-creation-testing. One individual, or a selected small group, is able to define and to redefine its purposes and procedures with comparative ease. But in social matters and even in personal ones the welfare and possibilities of each individual and group is increasingly interwoven with the conditions of many or all members of a group or of many groups or all groups. The main problem is therefore not merely inquiry-creation-testing by a single individual or selected group by use of a restricted and stabilized subject matter, but to secure such agreements and arrangements as will make possible cooperative functioning of all persons within a dynamic life process. The most distinctively social problem is to effect an ordered direction of activities that will maximize the development and satisfaction of needs and interests in ways continuously or sufficiently approved by the critical reflection of the participants. It is the problem of living critically and artistically in continuing interaction. Hence the problem of human, or moral, adjustment is not merely creative(4) in the often simpler artistic sense of possessing wide latitude for possible lines of action and in being tested chiefly by the satisfactions which the activities and ar11

For instance, the biological concourse of life in its continuity from generation to generation and the physical universe in its larger astronomical aspects.

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rangements themselves afford. It is also highly creative(2) in the sense that the subject matter (the vital human needs or interests and the action and interaction involved) are in process of change and yet are factual(2,3) in that acts, arrangements, and institutions must conform in some measure—often in very specific ways —to actual organic and psychological needs. If by intelligence, or intelligent action, we may properly mean interaction that produces perception by a vital organism of conditions and relations and the resourceful use of such perceptions in initiating and directing further responses which effect critically approved adjustments, it may be said that the distinctive human problem is to secure not only individual but also group intelligence. The problem is to secure agreements which effect such centralization or integration of leadership and such solidarity of supporting cooperation as to make possible the performance of the functions which perpetuate an effective authority of leaders and a sufficient confidence and habituation of the group. The problem is to secure agreements by means of coercions or the development of common social habits and interests. It is a problem of "education" in a broad sense—not the education of leaders only, but of all who are to be effective tools of leadership or effective participants in the determination of social direction and control. It will be noted that those who assert that the greater creativities of human affairs affect adversely the intelligent directability of such affairs are not arguing, as have many thinkers in the past, that human nature is too fixed, rigid, or deterministically instinctive to permit even a gradual change from the primitive and customary to more civilized, reflective, and intelligent adjustment. Their argument is rather that human problems are ever too novel and complex and that wise direction and agreement is too difficult of achievement. Yet the very antithesis in which these two positions stand may reasonably raise a question: Are they not each too extreme to express the truth, which may be a golden mean somewhere between them? Perhaps at no time in history has this been more forcefully suggested than by the present world situation. For despite all the failures, alleged and actual, of education to

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educate, of disarmament to disarm, of international agreements to prevent nationalistic self-aggrandizements, and of governments to govern for the commonweal, at no time have such diverse social philosophies so successfully achieved such different yet "effective" agreements. Although nations and blocks of nations in many respects stand in dangerous conflict or competition, some nations and blocks are unified by interests, ideologies, and emotional sets sufficiently similar to make concerted action possible. The very diversity of outlook, aim, and methodology, whether of so-called communistic, cooperative, democratic, or fascist social patterns, emphasizes, as has indeed the vast diversity of historical cultures, the artlike creativity of social adjustments; yet the actual commonness of human traits and interests which make such effective patterning of outlook and action possible bears equally striking testimony to the capacity of human nature to be shaped and molded and at the same time to make such difficult demands as constantly to tax the ingenuity of leadership to effect a sufficiently satisfactory integration or compromise amid ever-contending pressures exerted by complexly interrelated constituent groups. We see thus writ large in the world scene the flexible educability and constant creativity(2) of much human nature. We see the creative(3) character of personal, as well as of social, aims, practices, and arrangements. We see the essentially creative(4) yet factual(4) character of distinctively human problems. And we see the complex artlike and yet sciencelike character of the adjustments which must be made amid contending conditions and interests if sufficient integration and direction are to be secured and maintained. In so far as intelligence is operative or possible in such affairs, it functions as the perception of the diverse conditions, demands, and probabilities of a changing situation. It is the rise of integrations or compromises amid the conditions thus perceived, and it is the testing of selected suggestions by yet further responses of feeling, thought, and action. The present apparent and actual chaos among and within prevailing social systems, as well as among and within individual lives, is perhaps the chief factor which fosters belief in the complete

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arbitrariness of moral decisions. It likewise generates craving for certainties essentially different from and superior to those desired for either art or science. It operates, together with many traditional beliefs, to foster beyond otherwise normal needs a "cosmic yearning," as Otto has expressed it, 12 for a sense of the absolute character and conservation of moral values. When in attempts to effect satisfactory adjustments patient perception and resourceful guidance are not perpetually blocked, attention centers primarily within the process of adjustment itself and finds therein both instrumental and intrinsic worth, as is so conspicuously the case in the more successful moments of science and art. The present prevalent conflicts and confusions tend to produce either an overweaning craving for complete moral certainties or a dismal despair concerning the intelligent directability of human affairs. The effect of the two attitudes thus generated is the same: each operates to prevent or to retard the giving of careful and persistent attention to the actual conditions and potentialities of personal and social situations. Though any increase in the intelligent study and direction of human affairs is made difficult and often impossible by present patterns of outlook and procedure, the very diversity of these patterns indicates the flexibility of human nature and of the procedures through which satisfactory and stably moving social adjustments may be secured. And though the constantly changing, or creative(2), character of the subject matter of human adjustment makes it necessary or desirable to carry on continuous inquiry and testing, and though the great interdependence of social events possibly results in greater difficulties than there are in many scientific and artistic problems, there is a certain advantage as well as difficulty in the character of human subject matter, for it is potentially most capable of participating in the promotion of its own adjustments. If man's complex and ever-changing needs and interests make his conduct less constant and predictable than is that of the lower animals and of inorganic phenomena, it is, of course, largely this 12

Things and Ideals, chap. xiii.

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same complexity and flexibility which make it possible for him to profit from experience and to become in some instances and to some extent more intelligent, that is, more sensitively and resourcefully responsive to the actual conditions and varied potentialities of subsequent situations. It is only by virtue of the interaction and the cooperation of such somewhat intelligent individuals that human practices, ideals, and institutions have in any measure risen above the merely animal level. Only through the cooperative treatment of problems in which interested persons are themselves important elements of subject matter is it possible to have such social enterprises as, let us say, postal systems, hospitals, schools, and mass production, distribution, and consumption of economic, recreational, and educational goods. That human creativity of all the various kinds increases the complex difficulties of moral problems and even multiplies the problems themselves is apparent. That the human subject matter possesses great potential advantages is suggested by the fruitfulness of sympathetic yet careful inquiry and cooperation when and in so far as they have been achieved in human affairs. The fuller potentialities are commonly overlooked, due to the fact that whereas the increase in the number and complexity of moral problems has been general and conspicuous, the capacity for intelligent cooperative action has been actualized only sporadically and partially in isolated instances and restricted areas. Whatever final advantage may accrue to moral adjustment in consequence of the actualization of intelligent cooperation, the advantage can be, of course, only relative. In science and art such cooperation is often conspicuously necessary, and when effective it produces results not otherwise possible. Striking instances in art are the symphony orchestra, the ballet, and the drama. In science similar instances are seen in long-time genetic studies of animal and human development, the statistical study of large groups from whom information must be secured, and inquiries demanding not only objective observation and measurement but also the introspective reports of trained subjects. Not only do artists and scientists often find it necessary or advantageous to cooperate

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among themselves but also they are in some cases aided as well as frequently baffled by the cooperation of the human subject matter with which they are dealing. The greater bafflement and the greater assistance in morals as compared with art and science can be therefore only matters of degree. The fact that potentialities for social direction and cooperative construction have been explored only in limited loci makes any final appraisal of relative verifiability impossible or highly speculative. What the potentialities actually are or may become can in the very nature of the case be more fully ascertained only experimentally by repeated attempts at intelligent social action. Such experimentation can become more common in human affairs only when many conditioning factors become—by "chance," by "drift," and by social demand and direction—more favorable to foster it. For further experimentation (4) there must be action which moves forward confidently upon the assumption that despite the inherent difficulties patient and persistent inquiry, discussion, and socially considerate agreement are, as they are in art and science, the only sound basis for personal and social decision. Without other sustaining conditions, confidence in the intelligent directability of human affairs is of course not sufficient. Faith without significant and enduringly satisfying achievements tends to atrophy. But confidence is a necessary condition, and if sufficiently strong and in line with increasing needs it may overcome mountainous difficulties in the creation and the extension of beginnings whose influence may then cumulatively augment the growing use of intelligence in social action. Such confidence may originate in many sources, of which perhaps the most constantly impelling and continuously beneficial is a clear perspective regarding (a) the relations of the whole gamut of moral, scientific, and artistic adjustments, (b) the flexibility of human nature, and particularly (c) the enrichment of personal and social life that results when action becomes truly intelligent, that is, genuinely responsive to the fuller possibilities for growth and mutual sharing inherent in each situation and series of situations. Consideration of the conditions needed in order to ascertain more

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fully man's potentialities for intelligent direction thus leads, as does the discussion of the other issues centering in the presence and character of the factual and the creative, to the conclusion, not that the presence of creative elements constitutes sharp or absolute differences of kind in the nature and possibility of verification, but that further significant extension and clarification of value theory is possible with respect to the issues here raised only when there is success in the difficult task of making a critically inclusive and truly experimental approach to both theoretical and practical problems. In so far as the inclusive experimental approach and viewpoint disclose the complexities and interrelations which do actually exist between the factual and the creative in and among various kinds of judgments and adjustments, it may be said to verify itself, despite the intrinsic difficulties of grasping the situation which it discloses. But there are other values—and dangers— involved in the experimental viewpoint which result largely from certain current habits of thought. Brief mention of these in conclusion may prevent possible misunderstandings and also serve to sum up some of the preceding points. One danger arises from the facts that science is so conspicuously experimental and that scientific conclusions are so obviously relatively tested or verified formulations that "experimental" and "verification" may be conceived exclusively in a scientific sense. The present approach and viewpoint may then be criticized as an attempt to build up a body of proven values analogous to scientific facts and laws, an attempt which would, if it could be accomplished, squeeze the vital, creative processes and experiences of art and human relations through the "coolers" of science. It may be charged that the conception of an experimental methodology common to science, art, and morals is the result of an attempt to make moral and aesthetic values scientific. These charges may appear to receive their chief support from the fact that the present conception of values as relatively verified goods 13 emphasizes the presence of and the need for testing as 13

See chap. ii.

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requisite for the emergence of value in a distinctive sense. The "vital" experiences of spontaneous enjoyments may thus seem to be made secondary. But this interpretation is far from the truth. T h e present study has sought to describe the actual aims and procedures of science, art, and morals and to discern in past and present practices only such potentialities for improvement as may affect relative verifiabilities. It has found that testing is used in each of the three endeavors and that the testing does not diminish unique qualities, but rather is performed in the interest of a maximum heightening of most significant aesthetic and moral, as well as scientific, experiences. In short, these quests and the testing contributing thereto are found, at least in their present developments, to result from sharply divergent interests and, though in each case experimental, to differ in methodology. 14 Due to the tendency in much current thought to conceive the "experimental" and the "verified" almost solely in terms of socalled "strict" science, the correction of perspective made possible by the present approach may possess a certain value for the conception of science itself, as well as of art and morals. It warns against so much "strictness" in the scientific attitude that it will cramp creativity of thought and feeling even in affairs of science. It indicates that the general conditions for creativity are common to all quests: the need for intimate, yet freely imaginative, interaction with subject matter and the need for creative and courageous formulation, as well as for cautious testing. In short, the present approach emphasizes the need in science—as have the frequent revolutions in science itself—for free expression of and careful attention to feelings, rather than for repression or exclusion of feelings. There is need for more attention to incongruities and suggestions felt in the free play of observation and reflection if there is to be a maximum of frank hypothesis formation. Even in the affairs of science, perception and feeling, thought and action, must interact freely for the greatest creativity and caution. On the other hand, emphasis upon the fact that in art and morals 1 4 More ultimate potentialities in the relations of different quests will be considered in chap. xii.

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there is greater predominance of creativity(4), or activity which is in large part its own intrinsic excuse for being and whose test is its own immediacies, as well as its continuity and approvability, is both valuable and dangerous with relation to current conceptions. The advantage is that morals, as well as art, are freed from excessive restriction to past and present existentials and from an overweening concern to predict what is "inevitable" apart from human desire and direction. Recognition of the predominantly creative(4) character of art and morals shifts the center of gravity from undue "realism," "intellectualism," and "moralism" to the appreciation of the intrinsic traits and potential values (positive and negative) of all interests, feelings, and emotions. Not all desires are desirable or undesirable, but they are the stuff from which emerge values. By freely expressing and considering desires and wishes, conditions are produced that are favorable for contriving solutions which yield fuller immediate and more continuously approvable satisfactions, solutions which afford release for further creative effort as well as stand the tests of critical scrutiny and practical action. The danger in emphasizing the creative(4) character of the aims and procedures of art and morals is that this emphasis may be misinterpreted as lending strength to the forms of current "experimental" "freedom" and "creativity" which throw caution to the winds and neglect the actual and potential conditions and effects of action. As seen from the present standpoint, such current views, while rightly exalting the potentialities for novelty made possible by the characters and relations of physical, social, and personal events, are neither experimental(4) nor productive of the most significant or distinctive freedom and creativity. Although they burst the bonds of convention, cults of freedom, quite as commonly as static "conservatives," fail to fulfill other conditions which maximize the possibilities of significant discovery and creation. They fail to recognize and utilize the elements of methodology that are common to creative art and morals as well as to careful scientific inquiry and testing. The results of ignoring actual interconnections between conditions and effects are perhaps at

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present most conspicuously exemplified in crime and in general moral laxness, but they are more fundamentally present in the tragedies of wasted human and physical resources and in the lack of intelligent participation in direction and action that would promise to enrich and to beautify social life. The dangers and values of the more inclusive experimental viewpoint which result from the limitations of common modes of thought but serve to emphasize further the genuine, yet relative, character of the differences between the creativity(2,3) of science and the creativity (2,4) of art, morals more often being creative(l). In sum, they emphasize the importance of fully recognizing the fact that with relation to the primary function of each of these quests there is need for testing, and that this testing is essentially experimental(2,3) and potentially experimental(4) in character—that science, art, and morals have in common an experimental methodology which differs only in direction of interest and in the minutiae of constituent elements of interaction, that is, only in relative preponderance of verification(2) and verification (3), of verifiability(2) and verifiability(3).

CHAPTER N I N E : T H E AND

THE

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SUBJECTIVE

T H E FIFTH and final contrast characteristic of the adjustments of

science, art, and morals, and a point of difference commonly alleged to render values(2,3) unverifiable or less verifiable, is that between the subjective and the objective. Are valuative adjustments, valuations, value judgments, and values essentially, ultimately, and unescapably the expressions of personal feeling, opinion, or "taste," as may appear to be the logical inference from prevailing sociological and psychological relativisms? Or, as others 1 hold, do values possess an objectivity as unique and compelling as that of scientific facts or truths? The present importance of the issue thus raised by the conflict of relativism and absolutism or logical objectivism in theory is heightened by, if the issue itself is not, indeed, largely generated by, the widespread existence and conflict of popular relativistic cynicisms, on the one hand, and of aggressive religious and political authoritarianisms, on the other. Without reëxamining in detail the factual and valuative adjustment courses of various kinds portrayed in the preceding chapters,2 we may recall that in all instances there were found complex interactions, some aspects and phases of which were more overt, or "objective," and others more internal, or "subjective." There were perceptions of external conditions, for example, of burner, paint, sources of light in the study, the conditions affecting tax returns, and so forth. More reflective, or "mental," operations were seen to occur with and to be interspersed among more overt processes of observing and manipulating. Plans of action were suggested, 1

For example, Hartmann, Ethics; Osborne, Foundations of the philosophy of Value, pp. 105», 119, 130-131; Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, and System, der Philosophie; Ross, The Right and the Good, p. IS; and Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, pp. 17-18, 390-395, 400, 401. For a summary and discussion of absolute and relative viewpoints see Savery, "Relativity versus Absolutism in ValueTheory," The Journal of Philosophy, XXXVIII (1941), 155-163. 2 See chap. ii.

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examined, rejected, and reconstructed, until perchance one stood the test of these combined operations. More valuative, as well as more factual, formulations arose and were tested by interactions within total personal-social situations, interactions of both external and internal character. In fact the separation into internal and external, subjective and objective, in various concrete cases were seen to be largely artificial and arbitrary. But, admitting this, is not final judgment in valuative adjustments essentially subjective? An affirmative answer may appear to be indicated, not only because of familiar habits of thinking about valuation as contrasted with knowing 3 but also because a difference is recognized between the interest predominant in verification ( 3 ) as compared with that in verification(2). 4 Valuation is commonly conceived as a terminal response, as a choice or preference which ends deliberation and determines a course of action. When so conceived, attention is focused so exclusively upon the immediate act of choice that we lose sight not only of the processes which may have provided data which makes the choice itself more than subjective but also of the processes of testing which may follow as effects of the actions which flow from choice. These common habits of partiality in perception and conception may, by concealing the inclusive character of valuation, make it appear wholly or essentially subjective. These habits may be caused to operate, or may be reinforced by, the recognition of the fact that in verification(3) suggestions are tested primarily with reference to the satisfaction of interests or qualitative demands. Emphasis upon this fact may easily divert attention from the interdependence of verification(2) and verification(3) and from the more inclusive character of testing (verification [ 1] ) in valuative, as well as in factual, adjustments—in art and morals, as well as in science. But when the inclusive experimental character of verification is held in steady panoramic perspective, it is evident that choices are complexly related, both as effects and as causes, in a larger 3 4

See chap. v. See chap. viii.

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context of related adjustments and that prior and subsequent effects can often, if properly utilized, serve as data and tests for choice. When viewed from this standpoint the discovery-creationtesting of values, as well as of facts, is seen to be objective or to be in varying degrees capable of becoming objective in a number of significant and interrelated respects. If "subjective(l)" and " o b j e c t i v e ( l ) " are used to include all the various significant contrasts which may be distinguished, it may be noted that not only is there interaction between the more external ("objective[2]") and more internal ("subjective[2]") phases of a situation viewed in relation to what is internal and external to the particular subject, organism, or "mind," but also that both facts and values are formulations which in the degree that they are bodied forth even for imagination or conception become—somewhat after the usage of William of Occam—"objective" (objective[3] ), as contrasted with what is unexpressed or vague (subjective[3] ). Both facts and values as projected formulations become "objective" factors which affect further thought and action. They have objective ( 3 ) character, whether true or false, adequate or not, whether helpful guides to further thought and action or inflexible fixations, delusions, or hallucinations which prevent open inquiry and appraisal. In a more significant sense "facts" become facts, and "values," values, only in the degree that formulations are treated as hypotheses and are tested by the effects of further overt and nonovert interaction. Facts and values may be said to be subjective(5) in so far as they are not yet confirmed or established by operations experimentally(4) performed, and objective(5) in so far as they are thus verified. Formulations which at first are objective(3) are from this point of view "subjective" (subjective[S] ) except in so far as they are experimentally(4) verified. Moreover, operations of formulation and testing may be said to be subjective ( 4 ) in so far as they are merely random trial and error or experiment a l ^ ) in character. Thought and action become objective(4) in so far as they are intelligently intended, controlled, directed, inter-

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preted, and utilized in further inquiry which is similarly experimental (4). As thus seen from the inclusive experimental viewpoint, both objective(2) and subjective(2) aspects of adjustment situations or interactions operate together to objectify(3) suggested values; and in so far as the interactions are objective(4), the possibility that these suggestions will become objective(S), or values in the distinctive sense, is maximized, though by no means guaranteed. Whether the possibility of attaining some degree of objectivity (S) indicates that values—especially aesthetic and moral values —are essentially relative to particular human personalities or cultures and in this sense "subjective(6)" or whether they are in some other manner "cosmically secure" or "conserved" in a world pervaded or affected by value properties, structures, or purposes, and thus "objective(6)" is a metaphysical issue to be considered later. 5 Viewed from a more inclusive experimental standpoint it appears that the varieties of subjectivism and objectivism referred to above arise from the perception of important facts, yet contain also certain errors which result in or contribute to the conflict between the two positions. The more relativistic subjectivisms (subjectively 2,6] ) have the merit of recognizing that the adequacy of all value formulations is affected by the multiplicity and novelty of both personal, social, and physical events. Sociological and psychological studies have disclosed the vast individual differences among and within groups and cultures. They have increasingly emphasized the fact that personal and social factors affect, if they do not indeed wholly determine, nonscientific judgments of value. Similarly, advances of the physical sciences make it clear that the indeterminate and probable character of even the most "exact" factual formulation and testing result not only from personal equations and frames but also from the dynamic, changeful, and possibly essentially novel nature of all physical processes. These scientific disclosures have converged to strengthen relativisms of both the personal-social and the ultimate ontological varieties. So far as these disclosures yield a fair sample of the actual state of affairs, B

In chap. xi.

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they in fact support and are correctly expressed by relativistic subjectivisms(2) in value theory and subjectivisms(6) from the metaphysical standpoint. Perhaps the chief error which leads to subjective(2) relativism is failure to recognize that values, as well as facts, are products of the interaction of subject and object and that in this process there is, directly or indirectly, an interplay of obviously objective(2) and physically existential elements with more subjective(2) and creative(2,3) elements of valuative situations. When this interplay is admitted, the tendency of the thoroughgoing relativistic position or mood is to assert that nevertheless the factors which actually determine valuation and final choice are here essentially or basically subjective ( 2 ) whereas the factors involved in factual inquiry and decision are basically and finally objective(2) in reference and process. In the mood of "absolute" relativist we thus slip into the further errors of myopic and divided vision with respect to the scale of verifiability 6 and of failure to see the inclusive experimental character of valuative, as well as of factual, inquiry and testing. The precise determination of some facts and the obviously "arbitrary" or personal character of some values become magnified so that they obscure the definiteness of other values and the indefiniteness of other facts. This results in failure to see that often valuative choices not only can be made on the basis of careful inquiry but also may be so formulated and acted upon that the choices themselves receive further testing. Superficially, positions which claim for values a unique objectivity may appear to be compensatory reactions in the face of uncertainties, retreats to authority or assertions of conviction whose strengths are likely to be in direct proportion to their blindness. Doubtless many absolutistic claims of objectivity must be thus condemned; and the large number and contradictory character of the claimants counsel caution. Yet there seems to be a certain basic truth in the emphasis of the emergence theory upon the qualitative distinctiveness and uniqueness of functions and dimensions of experience which arise with new structural organiβ

See chap. iii.

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zations and complexities. These facts lend scientific sanction and support to the position that the objectivity(3,6) and the authority of value judgments and norms are not adversely affected by the subjectivity(2) of their origins and apparent status. Indeed these facts have inspired the hope that "under the hypothesis of emergent evolution, freedom of moral choice ('free will') and the principle of moral responsibility can find a firm and rational basis. Thus the conception of emergent evolution may become the 'declaration of independence,' not only of biology and psychology, but of ethics as well." 7 The objectivity(3,6) of meaning, as being more than physical event, and of values, as being universal essence, structure, or subsistence, has been and is urged alike from such divergent philosophic positions as critical realism and metaphysical idealism. Whether or not it be agreed that as the physical processes of "the order of universal nature" participate in man's bodily life, "so its regulative order is further discovered and expressed in his activities of reason, appreciation, evaluation," 8 there is certainly some point in insisting that if thought and valuation were only occurrences in nature they could be judged in no other way than as natural occurrences, that is, as existing or not existing, and that to a physical event as such no test of validity or of moral quality is applicable. " I t would be as meaningless to ascribe truth to a judgment as to the fall of a meteor if both are wholly the outcome of matter-of-fact occurrence." 9 Essentially the same conclusion is reached, with or without general metaphysical extensions or assumptions, by a more "phenomenological" analysis, which correctly observes that "we m a y form subjective values, which we then consequently take for absolute and independent values and which therefore become the absolute ideals for our thinking, i. e., we have to distinguish between the meaning of value for us and the genetic development of 7 Bagley, Education, Crime and Social Progress, p. 121 ; by permission of the author and The Macmillan Company, publishers. 8 Barrett, ed., Contemporary Idealism in America, p. 18. 9 Ibid., p. 17.

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our values according to our nature and cultural environment." 1 0 Indeed, in some genuine sense all experience and judgment of events is doubtless an emergent which has at least objective(3) existence and possibly its own unique laws or principles. Emergentists, realists, idealists, intuitionists, and phenomenologists alike have sought adequately to recognize the facts and to explore the character of these distinctive phenomena, avoiding so far as possible a merely material mode of conception and discourse. Without considering here the metaphysical issues raised by conflicts among these several theories, it is certainly clear that values(2,3) do become objective(3) and possibly even objective(2). When thus objectified values exercise " a demand, the acknowledgment of which is the condition, the presupposition, of further appreciation, or subjective feelings." 11 Yet it is both unjustifiable and dangerous to treat such objectifying(3,2) as a law unto itself and such objectifications as being ipso facto values. T h e first error into which those tend to fall who defend the objectivity(3,6) of values(2,3) as unique emergents or acknowledgments which may come to elicit absolute allegiance and sacrifice is failure to see that objectification(3) is ä process which occurs with respect to, and a status which is attained by, descriptive, as well as normative, formulations with respect to and by even scientific facts as well as values(2,3). This isolation of the character of ends, aspirations, and standards from factual or descriptive processes and formulations then makes easier the occurrence of the second error, namely, failure to recognize not only that the former processes and formulations like the latter rise within total adjustments and serve an equally indispensable function therein but also t h a t they are in need of and can be subjected to much the same kind of inclusive experimental testing. There is failure to see that loyalty to loyalty (for example) is blind if unguided and unselected by critical and sympathetic study of conditions and consequences. T h e r e is a dangerous failure to recognize that the ends, ideals, and 10

Saenger, in a book review, The Journal of Philosophy, also Stace, The Nature of the World. 11 Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, p. 17.

X X X V (1938), 27. See

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policies which have been and are frequently erected into inflexible absolutes are actually multitudinous and often antagonistic and that in order to avoid or to minimize blind inflexibilities and conflicts, both personal and social, there is need for a maximum of experimental(4) verification, both in the formation of ends and means and in the study of their effects as these are experienced through interactions of objective(2), as well as of subjective(2), elements of situations. A philosophical position according to which values are essentially subjective ( 2 ), without significant or determinate basis in physical, social, or personal conditions and effects, is diametrically opposed to one which claims for values a unique kind of objectivity, yet the two agree, as they do upon other crucial points, in failing to recognize the possible and even the probable experimental(2,3) character of the most clear, sure, "obviously" universal, or compelling intuitions, feelings, and convictions and also the constructive potentialities for the experimental(4) creation-testing-discovery of values as well as of facts. By making all valuation appear purely or essentially arbitrary or conventional, on one hand, or invested with its own inherent worth and validity, on the other, both relativisms and absolutisms have the effect of diverting attention from the conditions needed for the most distinctive objectification of facts and values. Both operate to obscure the basic continuity or sameness of the processes through which the objectivity (S) of values, as well as of facts, is achieved and thus also to conceal the continuity or basic sameness of the character and status of said objectivity(5). For, seen from any more inclusive experimental viewpoint it must be clear that by the objectivity of facts and values we do not mean that they are "out there" (objective[2]), even in the case of the most obvious or best verified empirical or existential facts. Of course it is in many (possibly all) cases postulated or assumed that there are existential states, events, processes, or relations to which the statements or formulations (facts and values) refer. The reference is thus often, if not always, objective (2)—that is, toward some existent external or internal to the subject or center

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of judgment. But, more basically and distinctively, the status of objectivity is that of a relation sustained between prediction and consequences—a consistency and non-incompatibility among the consequences of operations which are (directly or indirectly) both objective(2) and subjective(2). It is a consistency and nonincompatibility which in so far as it is generated and sustained by processes which are objective (4) is worthy of being called "objective (5)." In short, objective(5), or objectivity(5), is a quality or status which facts and values take on, or are recognized as being properly predicated to possess, by means of experimental(4) processes of interactive thought, feeling, and overt action. In this sense the objectivity of values has fundamentally the same character and status as the objectivity of facts. 12 But even if the fundamental continuity in potentiality for and method of achieving or establishing objectivity(5) is thus recognized, the proportion or nature of subjective(2) and objective(2) elements of interaction in the creation-testing-discovery of values may differ from that in the creation-testing-discovery of facts, and as a result the character, status, or degree of the objectivity(l) of values may differ from that of facts. Do relative differences exist? And if there are such differences, do they have significant consequences for an adequate conception of the verification or verifiability of values as compared with facts? The first question is, perhaps, to be answered in the affirmative. When the tendency to treat valuation as merely subjective(2) and as cut off from processes of total interaction is carefully avoided, it becomes clear that value(2,3) creation-testing-discovery is no more subjective(2) than it is objective(2), or at least that valuative adjustments are quantitatively no more subjective(2) than are factual adjustments, scientific adjustments no more objective(2) than are aesthetic and moral adjustments. For instance, in determining whether a Bunsen burner will burn, the amount of objective(2) reaction on the part of a chemist is not necessarily greater than in noting and checking carefully whether it burns well. 12 See also Lang, In Quest of Morals, pp. 146-151, 156, and Dewey, "Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality," The Journal of Philosophy, X L (1943), 309-317.

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In each case there are complex interactions of and between internal and external processes and phases of processes. While engaged in these processes the scientist is likely to be chiefly attentive to the actual conditions and effects of the objective(2) aspects of the situation. But when the two adjustments are compared, either by the scientist, introspectively or retrospectively, or by an analytical "observer," a certain difference may be noted. In the more factual adjustment, interest is directed toward and is tested more completely or "finally" by a result or consistency of operations which is predicated of existent objective(2) conditions or events. In the more valuative adjustment, formulations are made primarily with reference to and are tested more conspicuously by a result or consistency of operations which is predicated of the existent objective(2) conditions in relation to or for interests which are themselves resultants of the interaction of both objective(2) and subjective(2) factors of past, present, and potential situations. This difference may be expressed more generally by saying that when the direction of interest, reference in testing, and more immediately or conspicuously determinative elements of interaction are compared there is, as has been previously recognized, 13 relatively more verification(2) in factual adjustment and descriptive judgment and more verification(3) in valuative and normative ones. This does not render it less true that formulations or judgments of each kind become objective(5) only by the pervasive and intimate interplay of some testings with reference to events as such and of other testings with respect to the interactions of these events with ends or interests, that is, by the pervasive interplay of processes constituting or effecting both verification(2) and verification(3). Although there is, perhaps, in each kind of adjustment and judgment an equal amount of objective(2) and subject i v e ^ ) processes and interactions, the reference of interest and testing is more objective(2) in factual adjustments and descriptive judgments and more subjective(2), or at least more conspicuously related to interests or purposes, in valuative adjustments and normative judgments. " Pages 165-166.

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Further analysis of this difference in reference indicates that it also results in, or has as constituent elements, certain relative differences in the character of objectivity(3,4,5). In factual adjustment and descriptive judgment the formation (objectification[3] ) of objects-as-experienced is in larger degree controlled by attention to such representation or statement of existential events, processes, causes, or relations as is mechanically, statistically, or functionally faithful or exact. But in valuative adjustment and normative judgment the formation of objects(3) is in larger degree controlled by what affords satisfactions and results in approvals which are both immediate and enduring. There is little or no concern for exact reproduction for its own sake, although such reproductive or descriptive accuracy may be sought for the purpose of making normative judgments. Objectifying(3) is more freely creative(4), that is, more freely constructive of ends and means which satisfy interests or needs. The effect of the difference in reference and of the consequent difference in objectivity(3) is not necessarily or unescapably to render thought and action less objective(4) in valuative adjustment. The effect may be to give greater freedom to the expression and interplay of desires and feelings in valuative matters as contrasted with their relative exclusion from or restriction in more factual matters. The difference in this respect, however, is largely a difference in subject matter rather than in methodology, for in the degree that the process of valuation becomes critical and carefully controlled in view of actual conditions and potentialities, feelings and desires undergo an intellectualization and a careful elaboration and scrutiny which makes objectification(3) and judgments regarding objectivity(5) more than a resultant of, or among, the contending forces of unexamined desires. In so far as such intellectualization and critical control characterize valuation, it is not less objective(4) than more strictly factual inquiry, though the predominant subject matter and constituent elements of interaction are commonly more affective and creative(4). 1 4 Similarly, it follows, not that value formulations are less objec14

See also pp. 98-100 and 159-176.

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tive(S) than are carefully framed and tested facts, but rather that the character of objectivity(5) is relatively different. In both cases objectivity(S) results from and is experienced as a consistency or nonincompatibility among operations, individual and social, obj e c t i v e ^ ) and subjective(2). In factual adjustment and descriptive judgment the consistency is more largely among operations in which feeling and desire are excluded or restricted in order to render perception and conception veridically and exactly reproductive or denotive of actual conditions, causes, or other relations, however concealed or obvious may be the fact that the operations are selective by virtue of purpose and frame. But in valuative adjustments and normative judgments the consistency constituting or indicating objectivity(S) is in larger degree one in which a conspicuous and often predominant role is played by feelings and judgments concerning the satisfactoriness and unsatisfactoriness of effects produced. These effects involve in marked degree the interrelation of interests and their mutual and continuing satisfactions, although objective(2) operations, such as placing paints on a canvas or arranging furniture in a room, may give rise to suggestions and be reperformed and varied as indispensable aids in further testing. When these differences in reference and in the character of objectification are recognized, does it not also follow, or is it not presupposed, that factual formulations are grounded upon existential conditions, states, or relations and therefore not subject or less subject to individual or social (subjective[2,6]) purpose or whim? This question leads finally to the problem of the ontological status of "existents" as compared with interests, and as such it belongs in the next chapter. Yet from a more psychological and logical standpoint it may be observed that, although an affirmative answer may at first seem "obvious," a more inclusive experimental conception of the origins, character, variety, and status of the content and processes of experiences and predication warns us not to overlook the facts ( a ) that the relation of subjects to "existents" as well as to interests is complexly mediate, and that careful experimental testing is necessary both for knowing and for valuation; (b)

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that the subject matters of factual, as well as valuative, formulations vary from the stable and constant to the extremely changeful and uncertain; and (c) that the inclusive character of valuative, as well as of factual, adjustment courses makes it possible, by virtue of the interaction of cooperating processes serially and socially related, to secure effects and consistencies significant for the purposes which more normative, as well as more descriptive, judgments serve in our several quests. These considerations might not safely be neglected even should it be true that valuative formulation and testing are en masse and unescapably more subject to the "biasing" effects of purpose, presupposition, and desire—a conclusion by no means certain and perhaps not necessary. Indeed, in the perspective afforded by the viewpoint from which these facts are discernible it becomes apparent that to the question whether the differences in the character of the objectivity in valuative as compared with that in factual adjustments affects the verifiability and verification of values as compared with facts, the answer, although in part significantly affirmative, is to some extent significantly negative. It is affirmative because in factual adjustments and descriptive judgments the predominant reference and testing is verification^ ), and the capacity therefor is chiefly verifiability (2) ; whereas in valuative adjustments and normative judgments the predominant reference and testing is verification(3) and the capacity therefor is largely verifiability(3). But the answer is also negative, because the operations and the properties properly designated as subjective and objective, respectively, are, despite the differences in reference and procedure, basically, or in general character and structure, the same. As has already been indicated, valuative adjustments, as well as factual ones, are effected through interactions which are both overt and nonovert, subjective(2) and objective(2). These interactions produce not only objective(3) formulations of percepts, concepts, feelings, plans, and proposals but also mutual control. In the degree that this control is careful, critical, and resourceful, that is, experim e n t a l ^ ) , it becomes objective(4). It may thus establish a status of tested security and authority in relation to specific situations

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and needs and in relation to other formulations, a status to which may be applied the adjective "objective ( S ) " and the substantive "objectivity (5)." In short, the answer is negative because the verification of facts and the verification of values are both subj e c t i v e ^ ) and objective(l), and in fundamentally the same respects. The recognition of the differences in the subjectivity(l)objectivity ( 1 ) of the processes and status of valuative as compared with those of factual verification and consequently, from a more psychological and logical point of view, of values as compared with facts is significant, in the first place, for any more complete grasp or portrayal of the actual processes through which verification is or may be affected and therefore of the nature and status of verification and verifiability and of facts and values(2,3). But for such a grasp and portrayal it is also necessary to recognize the fundamental similarities in the processes and status of the verification of values as compared with the verification of facts. Sameness and difference need to be adequately discerned, both independently and in relation to each other. Such discernment makes it possible, in the second place, to recognize the difference between the "subjectivity" of values and the "objectivity" of facts, a difference the overemphasis of which not infrequently results in the assertion that the verification and status of values are essentially different from the verification and status of facts. From the present viewpoint a difference in purpose and reference can be recognized without failing to see that verification occurs, in both instances, through complex adjustments in physicalsocial-personal settings, that subjective(2) and objective(2) aspects of situations operate together, and that therefore no processes, whether perceptual or preferential, descriptive or normative, quantitative or qualitative, factual or creative, "outwardly directed" or "inwardly referred," are always or necessarily more "final" than all these processes and properties when they cooperate in further intelligent action. More positively, the recognition of this inclusive and pervasive continuity, despite differences, indicates that the objectivity and

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the subjectivity, whether of facts or of values, are not external or inherent properties. They are qualities generated in making adjustments in total situations. T h e y arise with the formation (objectific a t i o n [ 3 ] ) and further testing of objects of experience. Only in the degree that such formation and testing is open, cautious, and confidently resourceful, that is, objective ( 4 ) , do suggested or supposed facts and values become distinctly objective(5) or verified, and therefore facts and values in the fullest sense. The cooperative interaction of the "existential," or objective(2), phases of situations and acts with the more subjective(2) phases and processes emphasizes also the fact that the degree in which any supposed or suggested solution is truly a value rather than only subjective—a mere wish or opinion corresponding to or expressing no genuine conditions, connections, needs, or possibilities, is something to be discovered through experimental operations. Theoretically this recognition helps to define, at least from a psychological and logical point of view, the character and status of facts, as well as of values. E a c h is in a certain sense a product of creative imagination. Y e t in another sense it is equally true that neither is merely fictitious.

T h e y are also discoveries. Both facts and values are

products of inquiry and testing which disclose—if so we may properly infer from relations sustained between predictions and consequences—objective(5),

often

objective(2),

and

objective(6), conditions and interdependencies of and

possibly among

physical, social, and personal events and processes. And this means, practically, that existing conditions must provide the materials with which to conceive and to actualize novel and possibly better conditions, in short, materials for the creationdiscovery of new facts and values. W h a t to many at first appears purely s u b j e c t i v e ( l ) , may become objective(2,5)

through the

arts of intelligent action or may prove to be totally or in some degree s u b j e c t i v e ( l ) . The conditions and limits of the capacity to create and to test new facts and values and thus to render them in some degree objective(5) or subjective(5) can in the nature of the case be determined only by inclusive experimentation in and among specific lines of interest.

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In Chapters V - I X more detailed analyses of factual and valuative adjustments and judgments in science, art, and morals have in each instance indicated the pervasive presence of contrasting processes and properties of interaction. These analyses strengthen rather than weaken the conclusion that values are tested in much the same manner as are facts. They indicate that there are perhaps no absolute differences in verification and verifiability. Estimates regarding the relation of constituent elements in various kinds of adjustment are beset with difficulties and much uncertainty. Often it appears that typically or distinctively factual adjustments are perceptive, quantitative, descriptive, and denotive, and that typically or distinctively valuative adjustments are preferential, qualitative, normative, and expressive or emotive. But could the whole gamut of actual and possible factual and valuative adjustments be compared, with correct perspective, it is possible that the differences would be found to be, as they clearly are in case of the subj e c t i v e ^ ) and the objective(2), not in the amount of the contrasting elements, but in the purpose and consequently in the predominant direction of attention in formulation and testing.

CHAPTER T E N : AND

EXISTENCE VALUE

if it be granted that so far as affected by the character of the total adjustment courses by means of which they arise or are recognized, facts and values(2) are verified and verifiable in much the same manner and degree, further questions present themselves when the situation is viewed from a more metaphysical standpoint. Do facts and values have the same ontological status, the same relation to or as existence or reality? Do any differences in ontological grounds or reference affect the nature and degree of the respective verifications and verifiabilities of values as compared with facts? And, incidentally, can the inclusive experimental approach further verify itself by helping to clarify issues which persistently center in the nature of values(l) in their relation to existence? There are at present two circumstances which make these questions particularly pressing. The first is the wide divergence—called by Urban "the Great Divide" in modern value theory—regarding the essential nature and ontological locus or status of value or values, the locus and status of that to which value statements refer, their referents. On the one hand values, particularly values(2,3), are conceived as essentially psychological characters, or experiences, such as feeling, desire, or interest; on the other hand, they are held to exist in or as the properties or relations of objects, events, or situations themselves. By others they are conceived or located, not in or as psychological characters or in or as the properties or relations of objects, but in or as a relation of the two or in or as a relation of experiences or of total experienced situations to each other. By a fourth group, who find all the foregoing alternatives unsatisfactory, values(2) are regarded as subsistences, universale, "objectives," or indefinable predicates which "exist" or "hold true," as the laws and facts of logic, mathematics, and physical EVEN

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science may be said to do, whether or not anybody recognizes or experiences them. The second circumstance which now makes the more metaphysical questions urgent is the growing recognition that value and existence are intimately conjoined, being in some respects indistinguishable, whereas in other respects they are apparently distinct. Some value students reject the fundamental thesis of the axiologists that value is an ultimate character or condition of existence and of our knowledge of existence.1 While some maintain that there can be no existence without value and no value without "existence," that indeed we do not have even a conception of existence as "value free," 2 others hold that were man removed from the world the values imputed to objects would be swept away.3 Some find that values reduce ultimately to facts, others that facts are but values in disguise, and still others that values may be transmuted into facts and facts into values. Yet, despite the persistence of these differences, it appears that in all schools of thought the number of persons who agree that "value and reality are not identical but . . . they are also inseparable" is increasing.4 This tendency, as well as the divergencies noted, presents even more pointedly the problems of the nature of various kinds of values and of their respective relations to or as existence. This problem has two distinguishable, though not wholly separate, phases. The first concerns the nature and locus or status of facts and values in particular instances or situations, the second, that of their locus or status in relation to being and reality in toto, universally, and sub species eternitatis. Although these two phases of the problem are perhaps finally, or at least from some standpoints, interdependent or even identical, they may for convenience and clarity be distinguished and studied separately. This chapter 1 Urban, "Value, Logic, and Reality," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 293. 2 Parker, "Value and Existence," Ethics, X L VII (1937-1938), 475-486. 3 Sellars, "A Naturalistic Approach to Valuations," printed in the program of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, 1938, pp. 37-48. 4 Urban, "Value, Logic, and Reality," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, pp. 293-299.

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will consider chiefly the first phase, the following chapter, the second. Against the background of an inclusive experimental viewpoint, the current theories of the nature and locus of values are each seen to emphasize certain important facts which may not be neglected in any adequate conception, yet also to be characterized by certain limitations, if not indeed by positive errors. The view that value is essentially psychological in character and locus was early expressed by Meinong: Value . . . is dependent on valuing, that is, on the feeling connected with our knowledge (actual or assumed) of the existence or nonexistence of what we call the value-object. . . . Moreover, when we inquire what determines the amount of values we can find no other explanation of this than the strength of the feeling aroused in subjects of normal intellectual and emotional capacity. 5

R. B. Perry more recently reaches essentially the same conclusion in saying that "it is the interest which confers value on the object, and it must also be interest which confers the amount of the value." G To much the same effect Parker says: "Value is the experience known as fulfillment of desire, or satisfaction." 7 Without entering into the relative merits of these and other affective or affective-volitional theories of value, it may be noted that they have each arisen to express, in somewhat different terms, certain evident and important facts. It is clear that objects are valued by some persons but not by others. Objects are under some circumstances and at some times values or valuable, but under other circumstances and at other times not valued or valuable even for the same individual. Thus, in some sense, or in some instances, value is apparently conferred by and varies with the feeling toward, the desire for, or the interest in an object. Moreover, even though it should prove that value is not, at least in some cases, solely or essentially a matter of feeling, desire, or interest, it must nonetheless be recognized that there is no experience of fact or 5 6 7

"Über W e r t h a l t u n g und W e r t , " Archiv für Systematische Philosophie, I (1895), 328. General Theory of Value, p. 599. See also Schlick, Problems of Ethics, p. 142. Human Values, p. 409. See also his Experience and Substance, chap. xv.

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value of any kind without some subject who has interest, in the inclusive sense of "attraction toward" or "aversion from," that is, "attending to," some actual or imagined object. The error in all such theories, in so far as they make feeling, desire, or interest the whole or essence of value, is that upon careful consideration and action not all feelings, desires, or interests prove to be valuable in what is for both theoretical and practical purposes perhaps the most significant meaning of "valuable." The fact that immediate feelings, desires, and attractions-aversions, as well as the ends and means which are suggested thereby, often change into their oppósites or undergo modifications as a result of more careful inquiry, indicates that there are other and perhaps even more basic factors which affect or determine values. The same conclusion is indicated by the fact that at least in some instances feeling, desire, and interest increase or diminish, while value is recognized as independently constant. For instance, oxygen and vitamins were in a significant sense values for human life long before anyone took an interest in or desired them, and they are still valuable in this sense, whether or not there is feeling, desire, or interest with reference to them. Indeed, the common recognition by those who have defined value as interest that judgments may be made regarding the correctness of interest 8 and the tendency of others to extend the meaning of "desire" to include judgment of the capacity of the object to satisfy desire 9 are both admissions that value in a distinctive, or nongeneric, sense is, or is constitutively conditioned by, the character or property of something other than desires or interests themselves. Thus, though it be true that no value can be experienced or judged without interest in the widest sense, it does not follow 8

For example, R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 512. For example, Parker, Human Values, p. 409, by permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers: "Value is the experience known as fulfillment of desire, or satisfaction. Desire itself is complex, containing normally the following factors; impulse; a proposition defining the goal or objective of impulse; a concept or image of an object or objects, upon which desire is directed; anticipation, the imaginative foretaste of the realization of the goal. . . . When there is an idea of an object, there exists, implicitly or explicitly, a judgment regarding the object to the effect that it is capable of serving desire. The object then receives the predicate 'valuable,' or is said to 'have value.' " 9

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therefrom that all value, the whole of value, or the essence of value is interest. It does not follow that value is conferred upon objects by interest or that amount of value is determined by the intensity, the duration, or even the inclusiveness of interest—whether inclusiveness be taken to mean the number of interests an object serves or the number of people who are interested in it. Other or further factors appear to determine or to affect some or all values and to constitute a ground of valuation which is somewhat or wholly independent of feeling, desire, or interest. The remaining theories agree in recognizing this independence, but they differ as to its character. In the more naïve realist and the metaphysical idealist conceptions that value is a property, or properties, possessed by actual objects and their relations and in the critical realist view that value is a quality attached to existences in the same way that "natural" qualities, such as sense qualia, are attached to objects, the important truth is that value is determined or affected by the nature of events and their inter dependencies. The experimental interactions of science, as well as of art and ordinary experience, seem to justify some kind of realist assumption of actual events whose properties are what they are, whether known or not. Even epistemologica! idealists and positivists commonly admit as much. Nor is it necessary to labor the point that structural differences affect or determine the properties and interrelations of events of various kinds and complexities. Physical, biological, psychological, and social events are what they are both as individual occurrences and as tendencies toward uniformity and difference among occurrences. Were this not the case, there would perhaps be no events at all. If life can exist only because oxygen, vitamins, and other "substances" have their particular properties or modes of interaction, it is equally true that oxygen, and so forth, can exist only because of the actual properties and interactions of electrons, protons, and possibly more elemental energies. Likewise, the more complex or higher order events of attention, perception, feeling, desire, judgment, and purpose arise only in organisms and in relation to other physical, social, and physiological events, whose various structural

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and functional characters make the occurrence and culmination of these "psychological" events possible. Things, acts, and arrangements are verifiably true, beautiful, or otherwise good or bad, t h a t is, as being or possessing value, because objects are what they are and therefore sustain the relations which they do or can with and for similarly determinate events, including interacting subjects. T h e properties or conditions essential to the occurrence of events m a y thus, in a most inclusive sense, be said to be "values" or to possess value with reference to those events. I t will then be seen t h a t the actual characters and interdependencies of events give or constitute an independent status to or of much recognizable or predicable value which satisfies no human desire or interest other than the disinterested interest in knowing what the values are. For the same reason there is ground for postulating the existence or potentiality of values per se (as of existences) which are unknown or unexperienced or possibly even in some instances unexperienceable. T h e characters of events and their mutual dependencies constitute likewise a or the independent or more inclusive factor which determines or affects the comparative value of different ways of generating and satisfying the events of desire and interest. Thus, characters prescribe the conditions which must be studied and utilized for the fulfillment or prosecution of interests, and they likewise produce or condition the consequences, approvable or not, which follow therefrom. N o t all substances, arrangements, or acts will produce particular events, nor are all productions equally effective. D u e to the complete or partial constancy of the character of events and of their interdependencies, conditions and consequences often not only need to be but also can be investigated, appraised, and controlled. If value(2) is properly to be distinguished f r o m the actual existence (or verified statements about the existence) of the properties and interdependencies of events as such (as " f a c t s " ) , it m a y be said to be these same properties and interdependencies—or verified statements thereof—in their actual or potential efficacies for the production of events, including, but not restricted to, the events of desire-achieving-satisfaction or of interest. But whether

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this distinction be legitimate or whether further examination will show that ultimately fact and value are, at least in some instances, merely two modes of expressing the same properties and interrelations of events—it must be clear that, as certain realist and metaphysical idealist positions have held, both facts and values have an independent status as, or basis in, the characters of events themselves. Although the experience of gradually achieving various degrees of verification through experimental interaction implies this essential truth in the positions just mentioned, it also indicates that proponents of these positions tend to fall into certain errors. The first is to regard value as a unique property or quality which can neither be "identified with, nor analyzed into, any of the other properties of the object." 10 Of course, in a sense this is true, whether "object" be taken to mean actual, existential events and relations or what is cognized or experienced—the "cognitive object." In the former case value, especially value(2) as contrasted with factual statements of conditions and relations, is not merely such characters or properties as length, density, elasticity, weight, motion, attraction, repulsion, and so forth, taken—if they can be —in and of themselves. Value is not primarily, if at all, a single property or set of properties, but a potentiality which results therefrom—the potentiality for producing or sustaining (positively or negatively) an event or events. In this sense it is not these other properties. In an inclusive generic, or nondistinctive, sense value is these properties in their actual and potential interrelationships. If hydrogen and oxygen were not what they are, "having" or "being" their particular properties or modes of action and interaction, water could not come into (or out of) being and persist—they could not be values with reference to water. The same is true of the relation of water, oxygen, vitamins, and so forth, to organic life and of the relation of a particular sunset, picture, or musical composition to or with experiencing subjects. The relationship sustained is dependent upon actual properties of events and their 10 Clarke, A Study in the Logic of Value, p. 50 (italics added). This is essentially the position of G. E. Moore, Principia ethica.

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interactions, yet it is, perhaps, never these properties taken in isolation. Value is not an existential property distinct from or other than such properties, but a relationship which has existed, does exist, or can exist among or because of such properties. Or perhaps, more cautiously, it is the verified statement which predicates this relationship. Similarly, if "object" be considered in the epistemological rather than in the metaphysical or existential sense, value again is different from and unanalyzable into other experienced qualities, such as the spacial, temporal, olfactory, tactual, visual, auditory, kinesthetic, or affective. As G. E. Moore has emphasized, good is experienced as what it is, just as are yellow, hardness, weight, inclusion, and the like. Each moment and quality of experience is uniquely what it is. Truth, beauty, good, and right, error, ugly, evil, and wrong, are each in a sense elemental or primitive experiences and notions, just as are black and white, hard and soft, slow and rapid, large and small. But the experience of advance from the mere "having" or "giveness" of these qualities to the experience of them as more securely settled or established values(l) is no less genuine. In fact the pervasiveness of illusion and delusion makes us careful, in so far as we are maturely sensitive to this pervasiveness, to distinguish between the apparent and the true nature of things, between given goods and distinctive values. A second common error in both naïve and critical realist theories concerns precisely this point. Immediately given "values" are treated either as actual existential properties or relations or as final unqualifiable qualities or elements of experience. Both theories thus overlook or neglect the complexly mediate character of even the simplest and clearest perceptions and insights. Both fail to recognize the need for and the significance of experimental(4) verification, a process which does not dim the uniqueness of qualities already "had" but may generate further qualities of insight and security—a process which postulates, and yet treats as hypothetical, the existence or validity of events and relationships with

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reference to which various qualities may be correctly or falsely predicated. A final error common to the view of value as a property of objects is to conceive objects too narrowly. There is a tendency to regard objects either as existential events in a purely or predominantly physical sense or as cognitive experiences or qualities. In either case there is an undue emphasis, which excludes or neglects other important facts. When objects are conceived with a kind of naturalistic bias in a physical or external sense, there is a tendency to ignore the fact that organic and more distinctively human needs and interests are also existential events which arise and seek expression or fulfillment amid and partly by means of or in interaction with other existential events. The essential truths emphasized by the first position considered are thus overlooked, namely, (a) that some values are, or are the potentiality for, the experience and satisfaction of feeling, desire, or interest and ( b ) that all human experience of fact and value involves interest of a subject as well as in an object or objective. Because of neglecting these facts the conception under consideration is partial, despite its merit in recognizing that the existence or potentiality for much value(l) may be significantly predicated, whether experienced or not. When, at the other extreme, objects are conceived in a subjective(2) or cognitive sense, they are often regarded as unconditioned and universal. The attempt may be made to isolate value qualities and to judge them "intuitively" as intrinsically true or false, good or bad, supposedly apart from consideration of consequences. For instance, aesthetic experiences and human intercourse may thus be judged as intrinsically more excellent than other values. 11 Now, much may be said for such an approach and appraisal. There is need for the greatest possible clarity about the worth, intrinsic and relative, of various ends and means, as well as about general laws and particular facts. Any procedure which can assist rigorous testing is of great value. Yet such isolation as is here advocated 11

For instance, G. E. Moore, Principia ethica, pp. 188 ff.

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may easily ignore not only the vast variations in excellence even among the goods of aesthetic appreciation and human intercourse but also the intrinsic qualities of any enjoyed or approved activity. The actual situation, in its moral aspects, is cogently expressed by Dewey and Tufts: In a general way, of course, we can safely point out that certain goods are ideal in character: those of art, science, culture, interchange of knowledge and ideas, etc. But that is because past experience has shown that they are the kind of values which are likely to be approved upon searching reflection. Hence a presumption exists in their favor, but in concrete cases only a presumption. To suppose that the higher ideal value inheres in them per se would result in fostering the life of a dilettante and mere esthete, and would relegate all goods experienced in the natural course of life to a non-moral or anti-moral plane. There is in fact a place and time—that is, there are relationships—in which the satisfactions of the normal appetites, usually called physical and sensuous, have an ideal quality. Were it not so, some form of asceticism would be the only moral course. The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for all, as, for instance, making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical order of higher and lower. It needs to be done, and done over and over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise.12 In a world pervaded by change, as well as by continuities and constancies, this statement is as true of scientific and aesthetic as of moral situations and formulations. T o fix attention too exclusively either upon purely physical events in isolation from the complex processes of being humanly experienced and "used" or upon cognitive objects or qualities in isolation from their conditions and effects in particular situations is to fall victim to partiality and error. While both of the foregoing positions generally assume or even stress the fact that there is interaction between subject and object, each finds the locus of value in, or its essential nature to be best expressed as, either the feelings, desires, or interests of the subject or in or as the properties of objects, existential or cognitive. E x ponents of the first position and many of the more critical adherents 12

Ethics (1932 ed.), p. 230; by permission of Henry Holt and Company, publishers.

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to the second treat value as in effect an addendum, as something conferred or projected upon an object or objects by a subject or subjects, whereas the more "naïve" regard values as somehow inherent in events themselves even when unknown or misjudged. The limitations and errors of the two positions, as well as the difference between them, thus appear to spring in no small measure from a bifurcation, at least in emphasis, between subject and object. Proponents of the third position would avoid these limitations and errors not only by emphasizing the interaction of subject and object but also by asserting that value lies in, or is, a relation of subject and object or of total experienced situations, commonly including both internal and external aspects. For instance, Alexander has conceived of value, not as a mere affection of the subject or quality of the object, as such, but as a subject-object determination: "It is this totality of knower and known, of subject and object, which is true or good or beautiful." 13 To somewhat similar effect Brogan holds that value is a relation, a relation of betterness, and that: the logically most simple examples of value relata may be found in the relation between two actual experiences. I look at a flat landscape and find it boring, then I look at a mountain view and find it thrilling, and the second experience seems to me to be better or more valuable than the first. So it may be suggested that the better relation does not hold between the objects contemplated, and it does not hold between my feelings alone, but it holds between the actual complex totalities of my experiencing in certain ways those specific landscapes. Of course, the landscapes are included in the value relata as they are experienced, not as they might be in some allegedly different extra-experiential status. Similarly my feelings and activities are included in the value relata, not as they would be according to this or that metaphysical theory, but simply as they are experienced. 14

In saying that "to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience," Dewey emphasizes the vital part played by subject 13 Space, Time and Deity, II, 238. See also Prall, "A Study in the Theory of Value," in University of California Studies in Philosophy, III, p. 254 et passim. 14 "The Implications of Meliorism concerning the Relation between Value and Existence," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 310 (italics not in the original) ; by permission of Longmans, Green and Co., publishers.

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as well as object. 15 But he rejects the view that values are addenda projected by subjects into or upon objects, even in the case of aesthetic values. The misconception of what takes place in what is called projection is, in short, wholly dependent upon failure to see that self, organism, subject, mind—whatever term is used—denotes a factor which interacts causally with environing things to produce an experience. . . . The painting as a picture is itself a total effect brought about by the interaction of external and organic causes. The external causal factor is vibrations of light from pigments on canvas variously reflected and refracted. It is ultimately that which physical science discovers—atoms, electrons, protons. The picture is the integral outcome of their interaction with what the mind through the organism contributes. Its "beauty," which . . . is simply a short term for certain valued qualities, in being an intrinsic part of the total effect, belongs to the picture just as much as do the rest of its properties.16

The correctness of the view that both facts and values are created or discovered through complex interactions of subject and object is indicated by the analysis of concrete adjustment courses. The present study has been occupied in large part with the various processes or elements of interaction involved in valuative as compared with factual adjustments. 17 The fact of interaction is beyond doubt, but it poses, rather than answers, the further question concerning the essential nature and "locus" of values ( 1 ). Even though complex interaction be granted, values may be conceived as or in the feelings, desires, interests, motives, or judgments of subjects (first position), as or in existential or cognitive objects or their properties (second position), or as or in the relation of subject and object or in the relation of total units of subject-object interactions or experiences (third position). One positive merit of the third view is that it recognizes the effect of the properties of both subject and object upon the existence of some values and upon the experience of all values. If values are regarded as formulations of experience, they are, as noted at 15 19 17

Art as Experience, p. 54. Ibid., pp. 250-251 (italics added in the last sentence) ; by permission of the author. Especially in chaps, ii, v-ix.

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numerous points before, products of both subject and object. Facts —no matter how objectively(2,5) observed or formulated—are made, created. "To perceive, a beholder must create his own experience." This means that facts, as well as values, are affected, at least with regard to their selection and expression, by the interests, purposes, knowledge, and frame of reference of the subject. And values(2), however subjectively(2,5) expressed, are of a subject or subjects with reference to some objects or objectives, whose actual or imagined properties affect the character of the formulations made. If, on the other hand, values(l) are thought of as the referents of formulations, it will be equally clear that these referents are objects, events, or relations which may be either external or internal to a subject or subjects and are in some cases relations with a subject or among subjects. Another important truth which can be recognized when value is conceived as a product of total subject-object interaction is that there is a wide variation in the degree of the effect which each of these two variables has upon the existence and experience of both fact and value. At one extreme the effect of the subject is almost, if not quite, eliminated, that of the object almost complete. Here facts and values are known as they are so constantly or demonstrably that interest or frame appears to have little or no constitutive effect. To insist upon the selective and possibly even biasing effect of interest or perspective in such cases will seem to all except the most skeptical or critical as mere hairsplitting and quibbling. At the other extreme the wishes, interests, acts, or ideas of the subject(s) are almost, though perhaps never entirely, the sole factor generating facts and values and formulations thereof. The "objects" reacted to even in dreams and autistic thinking probably affect their causes and character. In deciding on the place for a picnic or how much paint to lay on a particular point in making a picture, the various objects or fields of objects considered will be seen to have somewhat more determinative effect. Illustrations might be given of many other intermediate degrees of variation in the relative effects of subjects and of objects upon the existence and experience of both facts and values.

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But despite its merits in stressing these points, the third conception of value has two notable defects. The first is failure to recognize that some values(l)—at least when they are conceived as referents, not merely as formulations or statements—are not constituted by a relation of subject and object. Unless we are prepared to say that there are no interdependencies constituting facts and values(2) as referents which hold true regarding the properties and relations of inorganic or organic events even when unknown or misjudged by some experiencing subject, it must be admitted that these interdependencies quite as truly as those existing or potential with reference to "higher order" events of interest and of enduring approvals are properly regarded as values ( 1 ). But when the actual existence of interdependencies among nonexperienced events is admitted, it is clear that unless the meaning of "subject" be extended to include any event or relation as a frame of reference with respect to which other events and relations are to be imagined as experienceable and appraisable the conception of value as a relation of subject and object is partial, incomplete. Certainly such an extension is contrary to all popular and technical usage and is evidently not envisaged by the exponents of the third viewpoint. A second defect of this view is that in a strict, unqualified sense it makes no distinction among the qualities of subject-object relations. Indeed, some who support the third position seem to consider all relations of subject and object, or of experienced betterness or goodness in the relations of total situations, as in themselves values. Even these proponents of the theory may admit, as they appear to assume 18 and as actual experiences clearly indicate, that careful inquiry and testing are generally needed to discover which objects really serve interests effectively and approvably and which interests in which objects are wise and approvable, enduringly or in any particular instance. If this admission is made, the second objection need not be raised, but if the admission is made 18 For example, Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, II, 238, and Brogan, "The Implications of Meliorism concerning the Relation between Value and Existence," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 310.

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—as it certainly must be if the facts are to be faced—the position is thereby qualified: not all relations of subject and object or of experienced subject-object interactions are values; only those relations are values which are or could be to some extent verified. Here again, value is seen to be, or to be conditioned by, a factor or factors which are frequently, possibly always, of very determinate, though often creative, character. If it be granted that the conception of values as a subject-object relation is true as far as it goes and that the conception of value as a character or condition among events independent of the interests of sentient subjects expresses another phase or ground of what is legitimately called "value," what more precisely is the nature and "locus" of values? Adherents of the fourth conception or group of conceptions answer that values are indefinable predicates, universals, or objectives which subsist or hold true—are "the case" or are valid, but are not existents in any proper meaning of the term. The essential truths of this viewpoint are patent. As has already been noted, all elements of experience are what they are. The experiences of value are no exception. As primitive qualities and "notions" they defy exhaustive definition, indeed any definition of the sort which describes "the real nature of the object or notion mentioned by a word and which does not merely tell us what the word is used to mean." Moreover, at least some values of each of the various kinds are experienced as peculiarly persistent and often widely pervasive. Some values are evidently what they are even when undiscovered or misjudged for centuries. In these instances they appear timeless and placeless even when experienced in particular instances. Finally, values are expressed qualities or relationships or are expressions thereof. As expressions, they doubtless have an existential reality as physiological and psychological processes and they have reference to actual objects and situations, but they are experienced primarily as, or in the medium of meanings and symbols. Consequently, like all meanings they have the peculiar status of "being" yet not "existing." They hold true, are valid, and are in a sense "subsistences"; they are not concrete tangible objects which can be pointed to or handled.

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B u t the limitations and errors of this conception are equally obvious. Values, like people, may become very mysterious by virtue of isolation. B y abstraction, qualities and relations expressed as values or as valuable are made to appear unique indefinables which are merely to be prized as possessions or must be acquiesced in as unalterable. T h e y are not recognized as being—like all elements of experience, meaning, and symbol—cues or signs whose primary roles are played in personal and social adjustment and to which the enjoyment of the qualities of objects and meanings makes important, but by no means sole, contribution. Conceived without relation to the psychological and logical operations which generate and test them, propositions and their predicates appear to possess strange properties of truth and validity. The persistence and universality of facts and values are peculiar apart from the individuality of the uniformities and differences among the actual structures, functions, and efficacies of those situations and operations. Once separated and generalized, qualities and relations may be regarded as more real than the particular situations from which they rose, indeed from all actual or possible concrete instances. T h e y are easily given a universality and concreteness which conceals their symbolic construct character. But when we recognize the multiplicity of proposed competing constructs, even in the sciences and in mathematics, and how frequently the error is made of supposing they are self-evidently universal, the need for treating all such generalizations and insights as hypothetical and subject to further testing must be apparent, though in both theory and practice it is extremely difficult to substitute critical tolerance and open inquiry for dogmatism and a merely unanalytical mysticism. There is ever danger that facts and values shall be divorced from their conditions and effects and hypostatized into a realm fixed and eternal instead of being recognized as intimately pervasive of or conditioned upon the qualities and interrelations of things and experiences and thus as determinate, while at the same time ever creatively and potentially in the making. The conception of v a l u e ( l ) which thus accrues from consideration of the foregoing four positions is that it has a status which is,

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or results from, the actual properties of events. Value(2), as well as fact, has its independent and determinate yet creative character in, as, or from the interaction of energies in their actual and potential characters and relations. 19 These determinate and creative interdependencies include, but are not restricted to or in all cases dependent upon, subject-object interactions or interrelations. I n the distinctive sense, value as experienced, whether fact or value(2), is or is accompanied by, as Dewey has seen, a plus quality which issues " f r o m conduct directed by insight into relations." 20 The new value, dependent upon judgment, is when it comes, as immediate a good as anything can be. But it is also an immediate "value" of a plus sort. The prior judgment has affected the new good, not merely as its casual condition, but by entering into its quality. The new good has an added dimension of value—a crude, undeveloped person and a man of cultivated taste may both derive an immediate "value" from a picture. But they hardly have the same in actual quality.21

Just as conceptual formulations of fact are in some instances established through experimental inquiry and testing as possessing a distinctly objective(5) status, so also enjoyments and interests which issue "from conduct directed by insight into relations have a meaning and a validity due to the way in which they are experienced. . . . Even in the midst of direct enjoyment, there is a sense of validity, of authorization, which intensifies the enjoyment." 22 But this added enjoyment in itself is not the value. "There is solicitude for perpetuation of the object having value which is radically different from mere anxiety to perpetuate the feeling of enjoyment." 2 3 T o identify this plus appreciation, or enjoyment of meanings and insights (into relations)—an experience of value—with value or to identify value with it, is ultimately to involve ourselves in the same subjectivistic fallacy into which 19

A conclusion reached also by Lanz, In Quest of Morals, pp. 94-98. The Quest for Certainty, p. 267. 21 Dewey, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," The philosophical Review, X X X I (1922), 328-329 (quotation marks are added to indicate that the present writer finds this usage of "value" ambiguous). 22 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 267; by permission of the author. 23 Ibid. 20

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pragmatism and positivism, as well as epistemological idealism, have often fallen with respect to truth, namely, to conclude that "experiences" constitute value. This would be to deny, or to give the appearance of denying, the independent character of the factors which condition the experience of value. Value postulated as being or holding true even apart from—indeed, often contrary to—the experience of qualities and meanings is actual as contrasted with supposed efficacy or efficiency in the production and perpetuation (positive and negative) of events. Some of, but by no means all, these events are need, desire, interest, inquiry and appraisal, and approval and disapproval. Experiences of success and failure in various degrees in making and discovering actual, as contrasted with supposed, efficacies in the occurrence and relations of all kinds of events suggests the determinate, yet creative, character of value(l) in or of the relations of all events to each other, including, but not restricted to, the events of human need and interest. To trace thus the mingled constancy and creativity, the stubborn "isness" and wide variance of both facts and values(2) to the characters and interdependencies of the whole gamut of events is to indicate that fact and value are (as referents), or are expressions of (as formulations), the same actualities or existences with their several potentialities, whether singly or in relation with one another. But if this be true, are facts and values as referents the same or different properties or relations of events? As formulations, are they essentially different kinds of statements, or only relatively different modes of expression? And if facts and values are, or refer to, precisely the same subject matters, why does the distinction between them arise and persist? If there is any proper distinction between fact and value, it appears, in view of the previous discussion, to be the distinction between the existence and the statement of events or their properties, interrelations, and potentialities as such, on one hand, and, on the other, of events in their actual and potential efficiencies for the production of other events, including the production of the events of interest and their satisfactory and approvable pursuit and ful-

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fillment. But if values(2) are the efficacies, actual and potential, of events for the production and perpetuation of other events with reference to which they are said to be values, it is clear that these efficacies are what they are due to the properties of each event considered singly and of all the events (which are involved in any given valueL2] relationship) in their interdependencies. The values are wnat they are because the events and their interdependencies are what they are. Hence, to state correctly the value is to state correctly the actual interrelations, the actual conditions which give rise to an event, and the effects produced thereby. To state value(2) aright is therefore to state aright the facts regarding the efficiencies or the effects of events. Likewise, events are—science makes it increasingly evident— systems of energies which are, or "have," particular properties largely or wholly by virtue of interrelations with each other. The indications are that even local, "individual" phenomena are mutually dependent upon the milieu, or medium, of environing events in or with which they have existence. If this be true, there are in a strict sense no single or wholly separate properties of events. All such so-called properties are really efficiencies or potentialities— and hence values(2) as referents—for the production of interactions with other events. However this may be, it is clear that so far as these properties can be experienced and stated they involve interactions with events which constitute experiencer and experiences. To express and test any single property of the most "isolated" event is to find and state an efficacy or efficiency of that event in producing and sustaining certain relations with a knower or knowers as various operations are performed in interaction with the event. The same holds true, of course, of all knowing, however complex the subject matter. All formulations of fact are therefore expressions of, or attempts to express, the capacity of an event or events to produce and sustain certain specific relations with other events, including the events of knowers in knowing. Facts, in so far as they are facts, thus are, or are statements of, value(2). That as referents values(2) are facts and facts values(2), that as formulations the two are actually but different modes of ex-

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pressing the same properties, or interdependencies, of the same events, is confirmed if all factual formulations are translatable, or in so far as they are translatable, without remainder, into valuative ones and all valuative statements into factual ones. This translatability may at first appear incredible or very improbable, though it seems to be recognized by some students of value theory. 24 It may be questioned, not only because of established habits of thinking about facts and values but also upon the much more important ground that an exhaustive semeiotic, or sign-usage, analysis will disclose certain basic differences between factual and valuative statements in their component elements of reference and function. It may be held that a value statement, for instance, "Water is good to drink," has not only an empirical reference to the fact that water is such and such a substance and produces certain effects but also an element of reference to the needs, interests, or preferences of sentient organisms and that when the empirical, or factual, reference is subtracted there is still a residuum of distinctively affective, or valuative, and possibly pragmatic, reference. 25 Perhaps a definitive answer to the question of the possibility of complete translation must await the further development of the science of semeiosis, or sign-functioning. Yet even "cruder" analysis seems to make clear that it is the intent of factual statements—at least in some cases—to express what exists without reference to use, desire, or other personal or organic factors and that many 24 For example, Sheldon, The Strife of Systems and Productive Duality, chap, vi, and Urban, The Intelligible World, pp. 165-167. It seems to be at least partially recognized in Schlick's insistence (Problems of Ethics) that ethics is essentially a factual science and in Hook's remark (Reason, Social Myths and Democracy, p. 38) that factual and valuative statements are not reducible to each other "simply." See also Carnap, p. 137«, above; Parker, Human Values, p. 413; and Rice, " 'Objectivity' in Value Judgments," The Journal of Philosophy, X L (1943), 12. 25 For an introductory discussion of semeiology see Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Conversations with Morris seem to indicate that he questions the translatability of valuative into factual statements on the grounds just mentioned. Page 58 of the work here cited seems also to maintain this view, but the fact emphasized by Morris—that, although languages arise and function for different purposes, in no case is any dimension (apparently the empirical, the affective, and the pragmatic) of semeiosis, or signfunctioning, absent—may indicate the possibility of translation rather than the opposite. Note also the considerations mentioned above, pp. 81-82.

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valuative statements do express the relations of desires or interests to the conditions and effects of their satisfaction. But it also appears that to analyze single sentences out of relation to their total adjustment contexts is to lose sight of the fact that these sentences are but elliptical or shorthand expressions of conclusions and expectations which have arisen through, and which always imply, a larger interactive process. This fact, as well as the probable completeness of translatability, becomes clearer from examination of concrete instances. The obvious intent of "Water is H 2 0 " is to state what water actually is quite apart from anyone's wishes or merely personal opinions. Yet this sentence is but a short, convenient way of expressing a much more complex situation, which when made more explicit is seen to constitute a valuative statement, such as: "When carefully controlled operations of chemical analysis are performed and reperformed with the substance called water, the events generated, the effects produced, gives rise to and sustain the formulation that it is H 2 0." What will, perhaps, appear to be a more valuative mode of expression is: "For the scientific purpose of exact statement of chemical constituency, it is correct to say that water is H 2 0 . " Or even in more obviously value(2) terms: "For this scientific purpose H 2 0 is a good (or the best, or the right) formulation of what water is." When translated into these valuative forms, nothing is added to the meaning necessarily implied in the statement "Water is Η,Ο." The fuller meaning is merely made more explicit by stating more of the context in which this short formulation arises and receives objective(5) status. What appears to be a more factual formulation is thus translatable without significant addition or loss into a more valuative formulation. Similarly, "Water is good to drink" may be expressed in factual terms; for instance, "Under some circumstances organisms like to drink water" or "When water is assimilated in certain proportions and under certain circumstances, it contributes to certain specific and general organic processes essential to the health or growth of single cells and tissues and to the maintenance of life" or "When organisms are thirsty, they drink water and make other

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reactions which indicate enjoyment, satisfaction, and continued approval—even in the light of most careful scientific inquiry—of effects produced." More precise factual statement would have to be much more extensive and specific than any of the statements here given, but in no case will anything have to be added or subtracted from the meanings intended in using the short sentence "Water is good to drink." But if factual and valuative statements—facts and values as formulations—are thus mutually and completely translatable, if they are but two modes of expression in which the same events, properties, and interrelations are or can be denoted, why do these two modes arise, tend to persist, and thereby generate a host of problems regarding the "relations" of facts and values? The answer is suggested by examination of the modes of expression and translation themselves. Water, for instance, is what it is—wet, heavy, liquid, H 2 0 , and so forth; it is or has these properties as, in a sense, an independent object. Yet, so far as we know, it also is or has these properties only in relation to certain purposes or interests of experiencing subjects. What water is can be stated with or without reference to the fact that the formulation is a product of subject-object interaction in which interests or purposes of subjects are selective and often—possibly always, as Kant insisted— in part or wholly constituitive of the experience of what is. The two modes of expression actually have the same meaning and are therefore mutually and completely translatable. When interested predominantly in what water is, the shortest and most convenient mode is, for instance, "Water is H 2 0 . " In this case reference to interaction of subject and object and to the efficacy of these interactions in generating and sustaining this formulation is suppressed. Likewise, water is good for drinking— it affords immediate qualities of experience and is also seen to be essential for certain other effects, such as the existence and health of organisms. I t is good for subjects who drink and also it is good for drinking—the relations sustained, the effects produced, are what they are. The "goodness for" also can be expressed with or without reference to the fact that the formulation is a product of

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subject-object interaction in which the actual natures or potentialities of both water and organism, with its various needs, habits, and interests, determine the experienced and stated efficiency of water in producing enjoyment and other effects, including events of critical approval. The two modes of expression have, again, actually the same meaning and can for this reason be translated into each other without addition or subtraction of meaning. When interest centers in the qualities of experience or in the approvability of these effects and other effects produced by the drinking of water, the most direct mode of expression is what has come to be known as the valuative, for example, "Water is good to drink." Here the "isness," or factual character, of both water and organism and of particular events and effects of interaction are merely implied. Generalized, the reason why fact and value modes of expression arise, are distinguished, and persist is that man is a part, but only a part, of nature or existence. As a vital organism, self, or "mind," he experiences events, including himself and his acts, as being what they are per se. He also experiences events as constituting the conditions and effects of the occurrence of other events, including the rise and satisfaction of his own needs and interests. In short every experienced event and relation in the whole gamut of events and relations—however objective(2), subjective(2), or interactive—is experienced, consciously or not, both as an existent (past, present, or potential) and as an interest. As has been previouslv noted, 26 there is in every act of attention a polar interaction of subject and object or objective ; there is interest of and interest in In some cases—due to need for control or due to curiosity, scientific or otherwise—interest centers predominantly in what the object is "in itself," its actual existential nature and relations. In other situations or at other moments attention centers chieflv upon the creation-discovery of purpose and means, the relation of condi tions to interests, or the probable or actual effects and approvabil ity of impulses, ideas, or acts. In the first instance this "natural" or more usual mode of expression is in more factual terms, in the sec26

Page 77.

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ond instance the more valuative mode is the " n a t u r a l " one. B u t in b o t h instances formulations arise to express w h a t is seen, when stated more explicitly, to be an inclusive interaction and interdependence which can be expressed either in f a c t u a l or valuative t e r m s with complete translatability in b o t h directions. W h e n the situation is viewed thus, it will be seen t h a t values a r e not reduced to facts, or f a c t s to values. B o t h as referents, or the referents of both as formulations, are actually a n d potentially the same properties and interdependencies of a n y and all events. B u t each is or characterizes a relatively different mode of expression whose somewhat unique traits result in p a r t f r o m the p r e d o m i n a n t direction or character of interest and o f t e n in p a r t f r o m the subjects' own habits of thought and sign usage. N o r , even though the referents of both fact and value statements are the actual properties and interdependencies of events, is either f a c t or value as a relatively verified s t a t e m e n t thus reduced to or e q u a t e d with existence per se. E a c h has or is the status which particular statements of f a c t or value m a y t a k e on in virtue of inclusive experimental ( 4 ) verification. I t is the s t a t u s which these s t a t e m e n t s are p r o p e r l y predicated as possessing in relation to their referents. T h e conclusion indicated is t h a t facts and values, both as relatively verified referents and as relatively verified s t a t e m e n t s thereof, h a v e the same ontological status, the same relation to and as existence or reality. Ontological status is not, therefore, a factor which affects the verification or the verifiability of values as comp a r e d with facts. T h e i r m u t u a l a n d complete translatability as statements m e a n s t h a t verification of the one is verification of t h e other. And since, whether s t a t e m e n t is m a d e in more factual or more valuative mode, the verifiability in a n y p a r t i c u l a r case will be affected b y precisely the same factors of simplicity-complexity and other traits of subject m a t t e r , purpose, and f r a m e of reference, it also follows t h a t all possible facts and values are, if comp a r e d en masse, equally verifiable. F r o m this equality of verifiability it results as corollary t h a t each kind of value is as verifiable as the same kind of fact. Scientific values are as verifiable as their corresponding scientific facts,

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aesthetic values as verifiable as aesthetic facts, moral values as verifiable as moral facts, and so forth. But it does not follow that different kinds of facts-values are equally verifiable. Unless it is true that different kinds of facts and values can be always and completely translated into each other kind, it may not be concluded on the ground of translatability en masse or within each separate kind that, for instance, moral or aesthetic facts and values are as verifiable as scientific facts and values. Yet if different kinds of facts-values are nontranslatable, it will not necessarily follow therefrom that they are unequal in verifiability. In the event of such nontranslatability, relative verifiabilities will still have to be considered more empirically, including a comparison of the ontologica! character of the referents of the several kinds of formulations. Before reaching any further conclusions regarding the relative verifiabilities of various kinds of facts and values, we are thus faced by the further problems of their relative status and translatability. As already found from random sampling and empirical comparison, scientific, aesthetic, and moral formulations vary from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable. The subject matters and purposes involved in each of the different kinds of adjustment vary from the simple to the complex, from the controllable to the uncontrollable, and so forth. Moreover, the degrees of variation and the proportions of the several traits probably do not, if the situation is viewed in adequate perspective, affect more adversely the verifiability of aesthetic and moral formulations than that of scientific ones. It may still be true, however, that there are differences in the character of scientific, aesthetic, and moral referents, that they have a different status with relation to and as existents, and that these kinds of formulations therefore vary in the character and the degree of verification. In the common usage of the terms there are probably relative differences in the character of the referents of "scientific," "aesthetic," and "moral" statements. In this sense scientific statements generally refer predominantly to nonorganic and noninterest events and relations; aesthetic and moral statements refer largely to

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events and relations of and among organisms (commonly humans), their needs, and their interests. But when it is recognized that all events and relations, even organic, personal, and social, are potential subject matters for scientific statement and that each situation may be viewed and expressed "morally" and "aesthetically," as well as "scientifically," 27 it appears that there may be a more intimate and pervasive relationship of the referents of scientific, aesthetic, and moral judgments than is commonly supposed. Indeed, when viewed from the standpoint of total adjustment courses in which the numerous phases of any given situation may be stated in various terms or "languages," the suggestion arises that like fact and value statements, the scientific, aesthetic, and moral may be but different modes of expression whose somewhat unique qualities result from the predominant direction of attention in each case, but whose peculiar and pervasive co-presence possibly result from the fact that they refer to precisely the same events and relations. However improbable this suggestion may seem to us because of our common habits of thinking, nonetheless it is apparently confirmed by examination of the transposability of these various kinds of statement. For instance, the scientific statement "Water is Η,Ο" can without loss or addition of essential meaning be translated into aesthetic language, such as "For harmony of terms and referents and for harmony among the various terms in this given system of chemical signs and their meanings, water is properly expressed as H 2 0 , " and into moral terms, such as "One who would express correctly in this sign system the chemical constituency of water must (or ought to) say that it is H 2 0 . " The referents (water and the specified relations sustained with experiencing subjects) are the same in each form of expression. Each mode of statement is elliptical, indicating explicitly only a part of a total system of sustained inter dependencies. The same would be true if any other scientific statement were used. For example, "Bodies attract each other in direct proportion to the square of their masses and in inverse proportions to the square of the distance between them" may 27

See page 29.

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become " F o r harmony or unity between terms and referents and among the terms of this sign system it is necessary to say that bodies . . ." or " F o r accurate statement one must or ought to . . ." Similarly, such an aesthetic expression as " T h i s is a beautiful sunset" may be transposed into scientific language, such as " T h i s (or these) person(s) are receiving or having such and such perceptual-affective-conceptual experiences in this given situation," or into moral terms, such as " A n y o n e who is having these particular experiences should say, if he is to be honest in his statement, that this is, or is experienced as, a beautiful sunset." And a moral judgment, such as "Promises ought (generally) to be k e p t , " may be stated in scientific signs, such as " T h e keeping of promises produces effects which upon careful and continued examination of consequences are felt ( b y those who make this judgment) to be very important," and into aesthetic terms, such as " F o r harmonious or satisfactory social relations it is necessary that promises be kept." E a c h kind of statement—whether scientific, aesthetic, or moral — c a n then be made in more factual or in more valuative terms and in any case transposed without alteration of essential reference and meaning into either of the other forms. Such transposability of one kind of fact or value to another, as well as of fact and value forms, is made possible b y the identity of referents and the elliptical character of the several modes of statement. All experienced and experienceable events and relations in the whole gamut of events and relations, if our conclusion is correct, can be experienced and expressed without alteration of essential meaning as both facts and values, in scientific, aesthetic, and moral modes alike. A n d since the same factors will affect verifiability, regardless of modes of expression, the various kinds of fact and value are, each en masse, equally verifiable, as are all facts and values similarly compared. This conclusion, it will be noted, goes even beyond that reached in the previous chapters which made no assumptions about the translatability and relative ontological status of the various kinds

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of fact and value. Fact and value statements and problems were there selected at random and studied in relation to a scale of verifiability suggested by empirical examination of cases. The various steps and component elements in more valuative adjustments of the representative kinds were compared with those in more factual adjustments. The conclusion drawn was that facts and values, whether scientific, aesthetic, or moral, are verifiable in much the same manner and degree, though possibly with relative differences with regard to the intent and the character of verification—depending upon which interactive elements are preponderant. The present findings that facts and values of the various kinds are but different modes of expression which are mutually and completely translatable and that therefore each are en masse equally verifiable in precisely the same manner indicate that even the relative differences which frequently appeared in the previous analyses resulted perhaps from unfair sampling and from the influence of habits. The random sampling may have failed to secure formulations, problems, and adjustments which were actually in all respects comparable. They would have been strictly comparable had we selected factual and valuative forms of statements used to denote precisely the same referents. Also, the traditional and often convenient habits of regarding fact finding and valuation and science, art, and morals as sharply distinct, with essential differences in the presence of such processes as the perceptive and the preferential, the quantitative and the qualitative, and so forth, may have caused us to give more attention to some processes in supposedly factual adjustments and more attention to other processes in supposedly valuative adjustments and then to mistake differences resulting from this selection for differences in the total interactions and interdependencies which operate in large measure unconsciously in all courses of adjustment. Y e t even if these selective biases have operated, the foregoing chapters have the advantage of having studied the relations of adjustments and formulations which are " f a c t u a l " and "valuative," "scientific," "aesthetic," and " m o r a l " in the more conspicuous and common conceptions of these terms. For even had mutual trans-

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latability been recognized from the outset, there would have remained the problem of the similarity or difference of verification and verifiability of formulations and problems which are commonly called "valuative" as compared with the "factual," and "moral," or "aesthetic," as compared with the "scientific." The procedure adopted makes it possible to conclude that both "facts" and "values," even as commonly distinguished, vary in degree of verifiability from the rather definitely verifiable to the probably unverifiable and that the verification—including the presence and roles of the perceptual and preferential, the qualitative and the quantitative, the descriptive and the normative, the stative and the creative, the subjective and the objective—is at least much and basically the same. This—which in itself has important theoretical and practical consequences—will certainly have to be admitted, quite apart from the translatability of forms and kinds of statement. 28 But the present findings go even further. Both facts and values, and the various kinds of fact and value, have determinate yet creative character from reference to the same properties, or interdependencies, of the same events. Also, when most inclusively developed and compared, factual and valuative statements are seen to be mutually and completely translatable modes of expressing those properties, or interdependencies. These findings indicate that fundamentally facts and values en masse, and indeed the several kinds thereof are verifiable not only in basically, but in precisely, the same manner and degree. 28 It should also be noted that even though the relation of facts and values, and of the various kinds of facts and values, may ultimately be a "relation" of identity, the adjustments and judgments more commonly—and for some purposes very helpfully —distinguished as "factual" and "valuative," "scientific" and "aesthetic," and so forth, stand in what may be called "contrast" and "parallel" relations. This point is discussed further in my "Three Relations of Facts and Values," The Philosophical Review, LII (1943), 499-504.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: I D E A L I S M

AND

NATURALISM phase of the more metaphysical problem of the relation of facts and of values, and of their various kinds, to or as existence and the effects of these relations upon verification and verifiability, is the question of their respective loci and characters in relation to being or reality in toto or ultimately. What is the status and significance of value(l) in the world as a whole? Does the status of values(2) as compared with facts and of moral, or aesthetic, facts and values, as compared with scientific facts and values affect their relative verifiability? From the standpoint of the previous chapters it seems clear that the latter question is to be answered in the negative. When facts and values of the various kinds are conceived as essentially different yet as formulations capable of varying degrees of verification because of their reference to events and relations which vary from the simple, accessible, and controllable to the extremely complex, inaccessible, and uncontrollable, they must be recognized as having much the same status with relation to and as elements of existence, or reality, as a whole. Moreover, when facts and values are regarded as different but mutually translatable forms of statements and various kinds of facts and values are regarded as different but mutually translatable modes of statement, it follows that en masse each form and mode has precisely the same status, whatever that status may be. Although the discussion in the preceding chapter has certain implications regarding the status of values(l) with relation to existence as a whole, no attempt was made to express this status explicitly. The importance of making such an attempt is indicated by the familiar fact that historically and currently there have been two opposed positions regarding the final metaphysical status and significance of values, namely, idealism and naturalism. Contemporary idealists, in keeping with what they proudly call

T H E SECOND

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"the Great Tradition" in philosophy, are in general agreement that value and existence are correlative and that value is a discovery rather than, or as well as, a creation. All experience and all existence are conceived as interfused with value, while facts are not uncommonly regarded as abstractions which are but static colorless silhouettes of the fullness of reality. On the other hand, naturalists, particularly since Darwin, commonly hold that values have emerged at a relatively recent date, with the appearance of organisms characterized by needs and interests, and that if organisms —particularly man—should perish, all values will cease to exist. Fact, being identified with the actual nature of existence, was prior to and will continue after man ceases to be; but value will perish with his demise.1 Idealists and naturalists are at opposite poles with respect to the significance, as well as the status, of values. Although the former have come more and more to accept the scientific picture of an evolved and evolving world,2 they generally agree that the experience of value indicates that reality is at its core mental and purposive, that only thus can evolution, causality, and other more existential concepts, as well as the pervasiveness and universality of value, be adequately interpreted. But naturalists feel that all phenomena are both more faithfully and more fruitfully conceived as purely "natural" events and relations. Valuing and valuation and indeed values themselves arise with and occur in or as the attempts of organisms to express and to satisfy needs and interests, but all other existences are, so far as man can see, devoid of values, that is, are "value free." Idealists commonly charge that naturalists deny the uniqueness of the categories of human experience, debase not only soul, reason, and conscience but also the character of the world at large, and ultimately destroy objective standards of judgment and the grounds for decisive action. Naturalists counter that it is intellectually more honest to accept simpler more parsimonious conceptions and to 1

For example, Sellars, "A Naturalistic Approach to Valuations," printed in the program of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, 1938, pp. 37-48. 2 For example, the essays in Contemporary Idealism, in America, ed. by Barrett.

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avoid the anthropocentric error of projecting human experiences into existence as a whole. The issues raised by these conflicting conceptions may perhaps for clarity be formulated as three questions: (a) Is value confined to events and relations involving organisms? Are other events and relations "value free"? (b) Does the fullest possible "naturalization" of values remove all significant or "ultimate" grounds for discriminating quality or degree of value? (c) Which interpretations of and attitudes toward the ultimate or "final" nature of existence or reality are most justifiable and fruitful? The conflicts centering in these questions afford at once a final test and challenge for the experimental approach and for certain of its implications suggested in previous chapters. With reference to the first question, when value is conceived as relatively verified formulations concerning existence and worth the naturalist is obviously correct in his contention that apart from interest, even human interest, there is no value, for apparently only humans make statements and seek to verify them. Yet equally clearly this conception implies that formulations are made with reference to the whole gamut of experienceable events and relations, not all of which are necessarily dependent upon interests or even related to interests except, perhaps, the interest in making significant statements. In short, existence and worth—the characters or mutual dependencies of events and relations—are predicated by statements and, strictly speaking, are known most distinctly only as statements in so far as they are verified. But the existence and the worth are not thereby assumed to be necessarily or always dependent upon or determined by a relation to or of interest or desire. Many facts and values, as actual or possible referents, may be postulated as existing or "holding," whether or not they serve any noncognitive interest or are even known or experienced. The idealist is therefore justified in inferring that existence and value are correlative if not, indeed, identical. But the tendency of idealists to regard facts as abstractions while conceiving value as intimately related to or pervasive of existence has no more basis

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than has the naturalists' identification of facts with existence and their assumption that values are late emergents, relative merely to human desires or preferences. Both facts and values as referents are the actual characters and interdependencies of any and all events and relations, actual and potential, past, present, and future. V a l u e s ( l ) as the postulated properties " a n d " interdependencies of the whole gamut of events and relations are not all late emergents. T h e y are coextensive not only with the evolution of sentient organisms and minds or personalities but also with cosmic evolution or existential duration in the most inclusive sense. F r o m one standpoint this conception m a y appear to be an "idealization" of existence, but from another it is equally a naturalization of values. W h e n the characters and interdependencies of all events and relations are regarded as values, or as the possible referents of value statements, it is easier to recognize that organic desires and fulfillments—even human interests and appraisals—are natural events in which values exist or hold exactly as they do with respect to or in all other events of nature. Along the whole gamut of existence facts and values are matters of the actual or potential interdependence within and among events. For the simplest "physi c a l " occurrence, let us say the falling of rain, to be a fact means that there are actual interplays of energies such that if there were other interplays involving a percipient, the occurrences could be known or could become a fact in what is from the percipient's viewpoint the most distinctive meaning of " f a c t . " For rain to be a value for grass means that certain interplays occur which result in the growth or health of grass. T h i s dependency of grass on rain can possibly be discovered b y interacting percipients and known as a value in the distinctive, verified sense. A n d in the same way, for a theory to be true, an object to be beautiful, and a mode of action to be good for a percipient

is for events of interaction to occur

which give rise to experiences and formulations which are sustained and continued b y any and all further interactions, even those of most critical inquiry and testing. Perceptions, cognitions, desires, interests, appraisals, approvals, and disapprovals are all natural events and relations which do or do not arise and persist in

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such ways as to justify the predication of facthood or valuehood to them or to statements about them. Valuing, valuation, and value are thus all "naturalized." That is, they are seen to be one with the characters and interdependencies of the whole gamut of events and relations. All phenomena are thus also more fully unified for both theory and action and in a very significant sense recognized as possessing or being ideal qualities or potentialities. It will be noted, in answer to the second question, that the actual identity or correlativeness of value and existence does not remove the grounds for comparative human valuations. Not all facts and values, either as referents or as statements, are equally important or valuable from our human frame of reference, and it may be that they are not equally facts or values from any frame of reference. Human needs and interests are themselves relatively distinct events, supported or not over varying spans of space and time by the actual properties and relations of physical, physiological, personal, and social events. But from the standpoint of human needs, interests, and approvals not all events—even the events of need, interest, and approval themselves—are equally facts or values in a more distinctly verified sense. Degree of reality and worth of materials, arrangements, and acts is somewhat relative to human interests, whether the interests are more affective, sensory, or cognitive. Not all statements regarding either fact or value(2) are equally correct or otherwise adequate. From the standpoint of our human needs, interests, and limitations there is continuous need for verification, and the determinate character of events and interdependencies makes creation and testing possible in various degrees. The distinctness of human events and the continual need for verification also make it clear that the identity or co-presence of value(l) and existence does not invest the latter—at least from the human standpoint—with an aura of mystic significance and inscrutability. From the standpoint of interested organisms many facts and values are positive evils, that is, negative values. The actual and potential characters and interdependencies of events are what they are and as such may in some cases be discovered for

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what they are—commonly including relations to human desires, interests, and appraisals. Some nonhuman and even human events and tendencies are fraught with dangers and disasters, just as others are capable of generating positive facts and values of undreamed excellence and fruitfulness for our various human purposes; many of these purposes, facts, and values are not yet actualized or even in process of becoming. Values(l) prevent, as well as make possible, what from the human viewpoint are or might be further idealizations of existence. But if in regard to the third question the corelativeness of existence and value does not necessarily imply a kind of indiscriminate pantheistic metaphysical interpretation, neither does this further naturalization of values necessarily imply a materialistic or even an ultimately naturalistic interpretation. There is a prevalent conception, current even in certain philosophical circles, that the discovery of natural order and its scientific description, for instance, with reference to the continuities of biological, psychological, and social evolution, "clearly imply" an ultimately or essentially "naturalistic" metaphysics which makes "religious," "idealistic," or "purposivistic" interpretations "obsolete." It has repeatedly been felt that because scientific discoveries and descriptions of astronomical, biological, and psychological phenomena have conflicted with prevailing religious and metaphysical presuppositions they invalidate idealistic interpretations. Yet the fact that the same scientific descriptions have in other quarters come to be used as evidence of the pervasiveness of intelligent design or lawfulness or of the existence of cosmic purpose indicates that although more adequate descriptions may invalidate previous preconceptions—whether idealistic or materialistic—they do not settle the issue regarding ultimate interpretation. The further naturalization of values—that is, a description which recognizes more fully the actual continuities within and among human and nonhuman phenomena of value—merely presents, as have previous naturalizations, a more continuous picture of existence as it has been, is, and can be. It leaves open the question of ultimate metaphysical interpretation, although any realistic attempt to formulate

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a satisfactory or fruitful attitude toward this question must certainly take into account the fact that at least from a human standpoint not all existencies are the best possible or are equally true, beautiful, or otherwise good. And it must also recognize that existence has, as implied by past and present attainments or advances, potentialities for value perhaps far beyond what are commonly surmised—that the creation and verification of value is both necessary and, to a degree yet to be determined, also possible. Whether, indeed, the universe is ultimately or even potentially a universe, and whether it is deterministic or indeterministic and purposive or merely mechanistic seems now more uncertain than in perhaps any previous century. Determinacy and indeterminacy, order and lack of order, intelligibility and unintelligibility, absoluteness and relativity, and a host of other alternatives are defended in all fields of scientific theory, and each of the contrasting positions is cited as ground both for more idealistic and for more naturalistic conceptions of reality as a whole. In the face of such conflicting claims it must be increasingly apparent that at no point are either religious or scientific dogmatisms intellectually tenable, least of all in matters ultimate. Indeed, all the disputants will probably admit, if pushed to it, that no demonstrative or final proof of ultimate interpretations is possible. Yet despite this final uncertainty—or possibly partly due to it—the proponents of both the idealistic and the naturalistic positions often seem to be persistently motivated by an ardor and a zeal born of the conviction that their particular viewpoint has superior merits for the further advances of science or for the general welfare of mankind. When tempted to argue thus from merely moral grounds or from the pressure of a personal feeling that either an idealistic or a naturalistic metaphysic is superior, it is perhaps well to remind ourselves that both conceptions have had and continue to have very diverse effects. Whether idealism or naturalism benefits any particular individual or group depends largely upon the historical backgrounds, disillusionments, or successes and even the general metabolic and glandular condition and balance of that individual or

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group. Those whose early childhood experiences have conditioned them to the satisfactions of a secure religious idealism, but whose later disillusionments at the hands of science make such faith and satisfactions no longer possible may become confirmed and often cynical naturalists, or they may finally turn with renewed hope to some form of idealism based upon scientific descriptions which seem to shatter the older mechanistic conceptions. If there truly were at the heart of nature something akin to us, a conserver and increaser of values, and if we could not only know this and act upon it, but actually feel it, life would suddenly become radiant. For no longer should we be alien accidents in an indifferent world, uncharacteristic by-products of the blind whirling atoms; and no longer would the things which matter most be at the mercy of the things that matter least.3

But those who fail to find for such an idealism a basis which they can accept or espouse with a sense of intellectual honesty remain in the slough of their ungraced naturalism, which is likely to be devastating and paralyzing in the degree that they were formerly dependent upon an idealism now felt to be outmoded. On the other hand, it is not to be denied that idealisms themselves have been and are frequently little more than escapes from reality, flights into a fantasy of speculative security or emotional satisfaction which from the standpoint of a realistic and effective facing of personal and social problems have been as devastating and paralyzing as the most crass and cynical naturalisms. Nor is it to be forgotten that some persons, having wandered long and fruitlessly in the vagaries and sentimentalities of mystical beliefs, find in a deterministic naturalism an integrating faith and confidence in the efforts which man himself can make to attain satisfactory adjustment. Others achieve an idealism which is neither dogmatic nor felt to be in conflict with the picture of the world presented by science—an idealism which is a continuing source of confidence 3 Montague, Belief Unbound, p. 7 ; by permission of Yale University Press, publishers. In granting permission for this quotation, Montague makes the following acknowledgment, which is gladly reproduced: "I think I remember either reading or hearing William James define Materialism as a belief that what matters most is at the mercy of what matters least, and I ought not to have been oblivious to his authorship of this phrase at the times when I adopted and adapted it."

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and satisfaction even in the face of apparent failures. What the effect of idealism or of naturalism is thus seems to depend, in the final analysis, upon the background, the "tough-mindedness" or "tender mindedness," and the general social and physical adjustment of particular individuals in particular groups and at particular periods of their development. Each conception of the ultimate nature of existence may demoralize or integrate, paralyze or invigorate. While these considerations must warn us against merely moralistic reasons for accepting either idealism or naturalism, they do not properly disparage attempts to make final interpretations, however speculative and tentative they may be. The problem of ultimate interpretation remains, and doubtless the world is what it is. It actually is or can be a world characterized throughout or in some (possibly increasing) degree by intelligence, purpose, or creative order, or it is a world without any ultimate directing sources and ends. It is a world of "mere" matter in motion, however complex, or a world of more than physical, organic, and human interests and resources. Indeed, the considerations just noted may suggest, more positively, that it is possible to attain an attitude toward the problem of the ultimate nature of the world, whether finally idealistic or naturalistic in character, which is both scientific and humanly fruitful. The trait most conspicuously common to idealisms and naturalisms which afford at once helpful integration, confidence, and incentive even in the face of obstacles and failures, is a deep-seated faith, generally justified by intimate experience and wide reflection. It is faith that with sufficient patience and persistence the processes of our world and of life can be further understood and controlled for ends which have intrinsic worth because they emerge within and constitute or relate to the deepest meaning of existence itself. Idealisms and naturalisms of this variety are qualitatively different from those which serve largely as escapes from the difficulties of facing reality, whether by excessive idealization or by excessive despair or disdain of the present state of existence. Although they differ radically among themselves, idealisms and naturalisms of the

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first mentioned variety are increasingly tentative regarding the ultimate nature of reality, but they agree in maintaining an active confidence in its fuller potentialities—a confidence which is essentially experimental in character. J u s t as there is gradually arising a more inclusive experimental conception of knowing and of value in general, so there appears also to be emerging, even less explicitly and consciously, a more experimental conception of the status of values. Such an attitude toward the problem of ultimate interpretation is, perhaps, but a more realistic recognition of the situation as it actually confronts us. It is ever clearer that the uncertainties of final metaphysical theories or hypotheses are commensurate with the magnitude of their subject matter. It is not apparent that all cosmic forces are working toward an end or ends. Least of all do many physical, biological, and social events and tendencies seem to aid human purposes or human welfare. Reality may appear to be in many respects a universe or at least a multiverse of intertangled chains of somewhat interinfluencing events. But whether there is an organic intercontrol and concern or a final and radical tychism and contingency among its energy sequences or systems is by no means apparent, and it may be that no final proof is or will be possible. Y e t it is at least known that much advance has already been made and is being made along many lines in increasing understanding and direction among the energies which constitute existence— much advance in discovering and creating facts and values. Existence must make these discoveries and creations possible. And what the ultimate character of nature and human nature is or may become can perhaps be ascertained more fully in the degree that v a l u e s ( l ) can be both envisaged and attained through further patient and intelligent effort. In view of the actual uncertainties, it is not proper, perhaps, to prejudge this larger cosmic question. We certainly may not reasonably assume that values—even moral values—are "ultimately" man-made, time-bound, and relative. Nor may we be sure that the status and fate of values is secure in an eternal, unchang-

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ing, absolute reality, wherein all truth, beauty, and goodness repose untarnished by opinion and action and independent of human effort. We may not safely assume that the nature of man and his world guarantees the continuation of desire for growth or perfectionward striving and an ultimately unlimited capacity therefor. To close the issue by any such presumptions is to prejudice and distort the very situation which is then used as datum with which to appraise the nature of man and his world. Not even the most hardheaded "naturalist" will—if he is honest —object to finding our world and human nature capable of further creative achievement. The matter can be put to the test, of course, not by inactivity, whether born of puerile hypercritical pessimism or of soft gullible optimism, but by unflagging efforts at resourceful, intelligent experimentation. Indeed, it is possible that by failing to act upon the hypothesis that our world and we are capable of yet further advance, we but perpetuate conditions which now give plausibility to the common theory that careful experimentation is either impossible or too dangerous. If the naturalist is to be truly scientific, he dare not overlook the genuine possibilities in this hypothesis and the danger which lurks in an assumption that the real is fully revealed in the present actual. On the other hand, if the idealist will look closely he can discern herein the means which may prove most effective in strengthening his own position: by treating man and his world as a creative process whose full possibilities are yet to be discovered through further creativity. This more experimental attitude toward the ultimate metaphysical problem thus tends to emerge from both naturalism and idealism when they become most adequately responsive to the character of the world as it actually discovers itself to us and through us. The same attitude, quite clearly, is suggested by the conceptions of value, of valuation, of verification, and of verifiability as formulated in previous chapters. For these indicate that we can discover further the ultimate character and cosmic status—whether object i v e ^ ) or subjective(6)—of values only in so far as they are achieved in the further development of such human interests as science, art, philosophy, education, religion, government, and in-

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dustry. The character of value as relatively verified suggestions and the wide variation of verifiability indicate both the general attitude and the method which should maximize insight into more ultimate metaphysical problems. The experimental viewpoint, in its emphasis upon realistic and patient recognition and study of all phases of existence—whether they afford positive or negative facts and values—is preeminently naturalistic. In its confidence in the potentialities for further creative discoveries which may have intrinsically human and even nonhuman significance, it is essentially idealistic. The final metaphysical position, so far as any position seems to be justified, may perhaps be described as "idealistic naturalism" or as "naturalistic idealism." But the important points to be recognized and acted upon are, first, that, in view of the actual uncertainties involved and the contradictory character of the data, interpretations regarding ultimate metaphysical matters may most properly be treated as tentative and subject to further testing, and, second, that only the hypothesis that our world and we are capable of fuller significant discovery and creation avoids distorting the data with which further and possibly more final appraisals may be made. There are, of course, difficulties and dangers in this viewpoint, just as in the more traditional or "purer" forms of idealism and naturalism. It may all-too-easily degenerate into or be misinterpreted as an excuse for not making any attempt to study systematically the more metaphysical problems, both theoretically and practically. It may revert to complacent drifting, just as with adequate grasp it lends dynamic and direction to both thought and action. It is difficult to maintain a balanced perspective by which we may recognize adequately both the certainties and the uncertainties involved. In moments when a certain mood predominates, one attitude—an ultimate naturalism or an ultimate idealism —may seem most convincing. Indeed, perhaps each person will in the final analysis choose the one of these viewpoints which he feels is more likely to be correct and will in some measure be encouraged or discouraged by the overtones of his ultimate metaphysical opinions and feelings.

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B u t these dangers and difficulties are not, as we have seen, peculiar to the experimental attitude. A n y position will in the nature of the case probably be partial and from other viewpoints biased. T h e most justifiable attitude would seem to be to recognize as fully as possible the complexity and diversity, as well as the simplicity and unity, of the situation in which as individual finite beings we find ourselves. W e need to recognize our own proneness to unjustifiable simplification, anthropomorphism, and projection, as well as to excessive complication, abstraction, and concretion. I t is, perhaps, not surprising that it is difficult to develop both personally and socially a more objectively experimental attitude toward the actual and ultimate nature of reality. Y e t , this attitude, like attitudes toward more specific situations, has been and can be more generally acquired. It can become a settled habit which contributes to positive direction and buoyance. T h e need to cultivate such an attitude, even with respect to the nature of the world and of ourselves, is proportionate to the difficulties which the subject matter and our own limitations impose upon us. In summary, the experimental approach to the problem of the ultimate ontological, cosmic, or o b j e c t i v e ( 6 ) status of values makes it clear that both facts and values as statements are correlative with, and as referents are identical with, the properties and other interdependencies of all e v e n t s — i n short, with existence (past, present, and potential) as a whole. I t makes clear also that statements and verifications of or as facts and values have determinate bases in the actual characters of events, o b j e c t i v e ( 2 ) , s u b j e c t i v e ( 2 ) , and interactive, however changing or constant these events and relations have been, are, or m a y become. And, finally, it expresses most explicitly the attitude which, in view of the mingled orders and disorders, supports and obstacles, successes and failures which have already been encountered in nature, including human n a t u r e — i s becoming more general and m a y perhaps most justifiably and fruitfully be held, toward the problem of the ultimate meaningfulness or meaninglessness of existence. I t is the attitude of courageous and humble confidence that the nature of the universe will disclose itself more fully in the degree that it generates, extends, and sustains further significant values.

CHAPTER TWELVE: T O W A R D

THE

FUTURE IT is a hypothesis rather than a settled fact that extension and transfer of experimental method is generally possible. But like other hypotheses it is to be tried in action, and the future history of mankind is at stake in the trial." 1 The experimental outlook and procedure have already become operative in the lives of at least a few scattered individuals and groups, and certain features of it are widespread and pervasive in all phases of human affairs. Long-established beliefs and habits have been widely broken up or shaken by the ferment of exploration, commerce, scientific inquiry and invention, industrial revolutions, population movements, and conflicting ideologies. The tentative experimental(2) 2 character of formulations and arrangements in all fields of experience and endeavor has become increasingly evident, even in morals, religion, and mathematics. Likewise, the desire to understand and control such matters as health, shelter, transportation, education, business, and government has enforced attention to the conditions through which these ends may be attained. Repeated and persistent efforts have been and are being made to achieve more experimental(4) procedures. But despite these significant shifts in outlook and methodology a more distinctively experimental viewpoint has been attained in only scattered instances and limited areas. Even the specialists in science, industry, art, education, law, government, and religion who have most often achieved this viewpoint in dealing with a restricted range of problems have not always extended it to all phases of their specialties and have frequently failed to be experimental in their approach to problems outside their own particular fields of interest. The views and behavior of the great masses of mankind have been 1

Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 194 ; by permission of the author. For the various meanings of "experimental" signified by numbers attached, see p. 4. 2

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affected, when at all, only superficially and often in ways not strictly justifiable. The widespread indirection, cynicism, arbitrary domination, and conflict which operate in all our quests, both domestic and international, attest alike the opportunities for and the difficulties of further development and extension of the experimental viewpoint. To recognize frankly the tremendous difficulties and uncertainties which now beset mankind and yet to hold that further extension of experimental attitudes and procedures will probably be achieved is neither to abjure reason nor to apotheosize intelligence.3 The prime drives of life, and possibly of existence as a whole, are nonintellectual. Intelligence is at least a kind of adaptive and directive behavior. It may on occasion become an end in itself. But to hold that it may play a role—possibly an even larger role—in human adjustments is not to set intelligence up as the sole value or as the final arbiter of values. It is not to assert rationalism by denying irrationalism. It is rather to recognize that the forces of life and existence afford constant and recurrent dynamic for attempts to make satisfactory adjustments. In these attempts intelligence and reason are increasingly needed. They are and will be effective, so far as they can be, in the degree that they operate as elements within an inclusive experimental procedure. The precise character of the extension of the experimental viewpoint which may next occur in and among such interests as science, industry, art, education, religion, and government can perhaps be more full described only when the extension has actually been achieved. But from the developments which have already taken place and from the findings of the previous chapters it is possible to surmise some of the changes which will certainly come in outlook and procedure, and in the character and relations of our several human enterprises, in so far as there is further growth of the experimental approach. And it may be that the surmises that are now possible may assist in affecting the changes. Indeed, the experi3

As is charged, for instance, by Reid, "The Apotheosis of Intelligence," The Journal of philosophy, XXXII ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 3 7 S - 3 8 S ; and by Urban, "Science and Value," Ethics, LI (1940-1941), 291-306.

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mental outlook and procedure can be developed and extended in fullest degree only if there are continuous efforts to envisage and achieve them. In view of the conditions which produce and maximize value creation and verification it seems clear that five chief consequences will constitute or attend further developments. These consequences indicate general possibilities and imperatives for the direction of action. In the first place, authoritarianisms and individualisms of the types now prevalent will be increasingly displaced. Despite the growth of more experimental attitudes and procedures in all phases of modern life, the dominant outlook is still authoritarian. This is particularly true in religious, moral, and political matters, but it is also frequently the case in education, art, business, and even in science. "The world is bleeding now with the deeds of such an [fascist] authoritarianism." 4 And its bleeding has been made possible, and largely occasioned, by excessive political, economic, and social individualisms. Prevailing authoritarian and individualistic doctrines and practices are both commonly defended as "self-evident" or as "common-sense," "natural," "realistic," or "necessary." The human origins and character of these doctrines and attitudes are seldom recognized. They are accepted and used as justifications for action. Or if their sources and nature are recognized, the common result is to regard formulations of values(2) as wholly arbitrary or as purely matters of individual taste or judgment. Thus, in either case, whether the position taken is authoritarian or individualistic, the result is largely the same : prevailing conceptions and practices are rationalized and condoned. Both positions constitute a kind of inoculation against open and critical inquiry and testing. Of course, there will of necessity continue to be reliance upon authority and individual judgment. Generalizations of fact and policy have to be made and accepted for purposes of further action. They cannot all be investigated in every course of adjustment. But in the degree that outlook and procedure become experimental, 4

Sforza, The Totalitarian

War and After, p. 117.

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authority and individual judgment take on new meaning. All formulations or judgments are seen to be worthy of acceptance, that is, to "have" authority, in proportion to the care with which they have been made and the success with which they are verified in further inquiry and action. Individual judgments are obviously indispensable elements in experimental processes of adjustment, but they are not "the be all and end all" of value creation and testing. In view of the extent to which ends and means in economic, educational, political, moral, and religious affairs are now determined either on the basis of traditional or rationalized assumptions or on the basis of highly arbitrary personal opinions or preferences, a maximum development of experimental outlook in all these fields will certainly entail changes little short of revolutionary. Problems must be opened for inquiry which are now seldom recognized or are at present "solved" in customary and dogmatic fashion. Open and concerted experimentations may be expected to produce an increasing accumulation of findings which will guide subsequent endeavor more fruitfully. Yet the changes and the effects may be somewhat less dramatic than might be supposed. For, despite prevalent restrictions and handicaps, much significant experimentation has already occurred and is occurring in these several interests. Also, many of the situations to be investigated and controlled present great difficulties which tax, and possibly in some cases surpass, even most careful and extensive human efforts. As a second consequence of further extension and development of the experimental outlook and procedure, more attention will be given to following through and studying the outcomes of policies and hypotheses which are carried into action. There is now widespread willingness and disposition to "experiment" in social affairs. "Let's experiment" and "Let's try it and see" have become prevalent attitudes in nearly all phases of contemporary life, but there is seldom sufficient testing by thought and observation prior to action and especially during and after action. Even under the most ideal conditions of social outlook and procedure, continuity in inquiry would be rendered difficult and imperfect by the inherent

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complexity and obstreperousness of the situations to be studied and controlled. But present conditions are obviously far from ideal. Attitudes and procedures are prevalent which further augment discontinuity. They have come to most conspicuous expression in the democratic and dictatorial societies. In both modes of social life formulations of ends and means are frequently calculated to keep or to win leadership or control rather than to secure a maximum of fruitful adjustment and advance. Moreover, although frequent "democratic" changes in leadership or social function give opportunity for new ideas to be formed and carried into action, such shifts operate to disrupt continuity in more inclusive testing. Although dictatorial control may secure continuity of leadership and policy, the desire to suppress oppositions and to "save face" operate to reduce free creativity and critical examination. Present conditions generate ideas and programs for action, but they also result in widespread neglect of consequences, whereas their careful and continued study is necessary for maximum testing. While such obstructive attitudes and practices now are most strikingly expressed in national and international affairs, they pervade and color the outlook and procedure in education, religion, art, industry, and other interests as well. In practically all cases inclusive testing is greatly restricted by desire for perpetuation or increase of personal or partisan power, by "democratic" shifts in administration, and by indifferent toleration, if not active suppression, of opposing views. Present conditions thus make it difficult to recognize the possibility and importance in these affairs of such care and continuity as are needed to convert experimentation(3) into experimentation (4) ; and they make it even more difficult actually to effect such care and continuity. Yet at the same time other social forces operate to counteract and transform these obstructing conditions. Demand for control and security in all phases of social life grows apace. There is mounting desire for procedures which will increase understanding and stabilize opportunity for fruitful adjustment and endeavor. There is also growing recognition that such understanding and security have come and can come chiefly from more critical and penetrating

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observation coupled with continued creativity and testing. Basic needs of life and increasing theoretical and practical insight work together to produce experimentation(3) and to convert it into experimentation (4). Attitudes and arrangements which now hinder care and continuity cannot, of course, be wholly eliminated or completely transmuted into instrumentalities of intelligent action. The interactions of myriads of events, constituting extremely complex personalities and cultures and an extremely complex world, produce genuine oppositions and difficulties. Breaks and shifts are sometimes needed to make possible new beginnings which are more sensitive to new conditions and problems. But in the degree that procedure becomes genuinely experimental ( 1 ) it is increasingly open and responsive. Formulations and arrangements are more continuously reconstructed in the light of more careful scrutiny of probable and actual effects. There is less need for catastrophic changes with their resulting disruption of creative inquiry and testing. Indeed, increased care and objectivity in the recording of operations performed and effects produced help to reduce the evils and to accentuate the benefits of change itself. A third consequence will be a more general recognition that the experimental procedure affords the only alternative to blind or traditional drifting, to mere muddling through, to opportunism, and to dictatorial domination. These behaviors result, basically, from the difficulties encountered by complex and limited organisms attempting to make satisfactory adjustments and achievements in a very complex world. In considerable measure men are like puppets controlled by forces over which they have, and in many instances can have, no control. The very multiplicity of difficulties and opportunities makes it inevitable that every person and group shall with respect to many matters drift or merely muddle along. Some accidental good fortunes present themselves or afford opportunities which have only to be seized by the forelock, and others pass us by before we have the wit or energy to act. Moreover, in the face of actual complexities and difficulties it is generally easier and often more expeditious to follow the leader than to make one's own

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analyses and decisions; and a leader with certain ends to attain commonly feels that this can be done most effectively b y imposing his will directly or indirectly upon others. In no quest m a y we hope wholly to escape from drifting, muddling, opportunism, and arbitrary regulation. B u t in so far as it is possible to do so, it must obviously be achieved through the ability to examine competing impulses reflectively, to consider suggestions and their effects, and to utilize further thought and action as tests and as possible sources of more suggestions. In short, the only escape is through the rise and performance of processes which become inclusively experimental. A s a fourth consequence of the extension and development of this approach it will become clearer (a) that widely varying degrees of understanding, prediction, and control are possible and are to be expected in all our quests; ( b ) that as much care is needed and perhaps can be taken in matters of value as in matters of fact, in nonscientific as in scientific interests; and ( c ) that there is in no instance justification either for easy optimism or for easy pessimism. T h e grounds for these conclusions, so far as science, art, and morals are concerned, were indicated in previous chapters. These interests were selected as representative of our various human quests. Random samplings of more factual and more valuative problems and statements were compared as to operations needed for testing and as to the degree of verification possible. T h e general conclusions reached b y this method have just been stated. T h e same conclusions were strengthened and even carried further b y finding through more semeiotic and linguistic analysis

5

that kinds

of statements (at least the scientific, aesthetic, and moral), as well as forms of statements (factual and valuative), are mutually translatable or at least coextensive. D u e to the fact that such defects as were noted above continue to characterize outlook and procedure in art and especially in personal-social relations more than in science, the findings of the present study constitute a correction of perspective regarding the nature 5

Pages 215-219, 221-223.

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and degree of verification possible in these three quests. And so far as these interests are actually representative, the findings also call for a correction of perspective regarding the nature and degree of verification possible in other nonscientific interests as well. Current failure to treat personal and social situations—especially the more "valuative" problems thereof—experimentally has allowed states of chaos to accumulate and to continue. This condition is commonly taken to signify that intelligent understanding and direction are intrinsically less possible in value matters than in matters of fact. In so far as the actual and potential character of valuative as compared with factual problem-solving and of nonscientific as compared with scientific problem-solving are correctly described and envisaged in the present study, it follows that in the degree that personal and social affairs become genuinely experimental conditions will be created which will support rather than hinder clearer perspective. That science, art, and morals are indeed representative of our several human interests is also indicated by both empirical and semeiotic considerations. Random samplings of problems, statements, and procedures in such pursuits as the economic, governmental, educational, and religious disclose a wide variation in accessibility, complexity, and controllability of subject matters and in verifiability-unverifiability. They indicate the presence—when these interests are most fruitful—of inclusive experimental procedure. That this is the case with respect to economic, governmental, and educational affairs will perhaps be readily recognized. But it may be questioned with regard to religion, until it is recalled that religion—whether conceived essentially as fear or love of and dependence on some nonhuman or nonphysical agency or as appreciative respect for and careful cooperation with the physical, social, and personal conditions which make possible a maximization and extension of distinctive qualities of experience—includes a wide range of personal-social activities. Within these activities many means are tested very concretely by their effects in relation to definitely definable sub-ends, and these ends are evaluated and

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often revised in relation to more remote ends. And general ends (even conceptions of God, immortality, and love of neighbors) are formulated and reformulated in terms of consequences for other moral and physical or metaphysical conceptions. Viewed as a vital practical attempt to make a satisfactory adjustment, integration, and transvaluation in and among all phases of life, religion is no exception to, but rather a striking example of, the existence of wide variation in accessibility, complexity, and controllability of subject matter and in verifiability-univerifiability and of the presence (and absence) of inclusive experimental methodology. That science, art, and morals represent fairly our several human interests is indicated also by semeiotic considerations. Statements most characteristic of economic, governmental, educational, and religious affairs appear to be quite different and ultimately "irreducible," or nontranslatable. But further examination of the situations in which these statements arise and function discloses that, as in the case of scientific, aesthetic, and moral matters, there are in each instance complex interactions and interdependencies which can be expressed in various degrees of fullness and from numerous standpoints of purpose, interest, or frame of reference. Involved in each instance of the experience and expression of meaning are the objects or objectives of reference and the subject or subjects whose processes of perception and symbolization produce satisfactory or unsatisfactory adjustments. There are such relations among objects, among objects and subjects, and among the meanings attached to or constituting signs employed as to make demands upon anyone who tries to express correctly any condition or relation in any given language system. Different signs and statements supply with varying degrees of efficiency the various demands thus involved. The several energies and elements of meaning must be so integrated as to satisfy, or to effect a working harmony or compromise among, competing needs or interests. In each formulation or use of statement there is acquisition of a new mode of response or the exercise (further learning) of previously learned reactions. And finally there is in each instance faith or confidence in the

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constancy of nature (at least in some significant degree) and dependence upon the several interacting factors which constitute the particular situation. When in making and using statements, even with reference to the same aspect of the same event or relation, attention centers upon the "properties" of objects as indicated by interactions sustained, the statements are generally in what have come to be regarded as scientific terms; when attention shifts to the harmony or unity which characterizes an object or relation, statements are likely to be in aesthetic terms ; and when it is given chiefly to the requiredness, or necessity, which the character of the object in its relations and of the terms as related in a language system impose upon subjects for correct or adequate denotation, statement is more likely to be made in moral terms. Similarly, when in expressing the same aspect of the same interactive processes and interdependencies, attention is directed to the efficiency with which a possible formulation produces the satisfaction of the various demands of subject, object, and language, the terminology commonly becomes more economic; when it is concerned with the integration of the various competing interests into a satisfactory formulation, statement takes on characteristics which distinguish the political or governmental; when it is occupied with the acquisition or further learning of adequate modes of response, the language becomes more educational; and when it is given to the dependability of the dependence upon the various factors involved, more religious modes of speech result. If considerable space were to be taken, illustrative instances could be cited, as has already been done with respect to scientific, aesthetic, and moral statements, 6 to indicate the grounds for the conclusion that even the most distinctively economic, governmental, educational, and religious modes of statement are mutually transposable or translatable. But the grounds for this position and the objections which may be urged against it are here the same as in the case of the scientific, aesthetic, and moral. As suggested above, the essential ground for concluding that 6

Pages 221-223.

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statements can be made in different modes, which are then transposable or translatable, is that each event, relation, or property referred to is composed of and involves a complex interplay and interdependency of energies or meanings. In making or employing any particular statement in any particular mode it may appear that somewhat different aspects of the same situation or interaction receives most explicit attention and formulation. Yet as a result of the actual complexity of even the simplest meaning responses and the multiplicity of frames from which statements are made, any particular meaning can be expressed not only in different forms (factual and valuative) but also in different modes or languages without change of what, from the standpoint of the more inclusive interdependencies involved, is the essential or fuller meaning of any particular statement. Or, in other words, the interdependencies which constitute or justify any meaning can be expressed in many —possibly in an infinite number of—terms and statements, which when they signify or express the same interdependencies may be said to have the same meaning, to be interchangeable or transposable, or to be mutually and completely translatable. Against this view it may be urged that although in each experience there is a complex interaction and interdependency, the referents of factual and valuative forms and of the several modes of statement are basically and essentially different—that each form and kind of statement refers to and must refer to different aspects of any given interaction or interdependency. Whether this is or is not the case cannot perhaps be clearly demonstrated. The full force of the considerations pointing to mutual transposability or translatability can be experienced only as the presumption of "irreducibili ty," or essential difference, established by customary distinctions between the terms "factual" and "valuative" and among "scientific," "moral," "economic," "religious," and so forth, is questioned and as the traits of each act of attention or experience and the potentialities for statement thereof and therein are carefully scrutinized. But even if these operations are performed, it may still be judged or felt that forms and modes of statement are not essentially or ultimately transposable or completely trans-

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latable. And even if all persons who honestly perform them were to agree that translation is possible, the issues are so involved and subjective in character that all might easily be in error. Yet if it be true that statement in different modes cannot be mutually transposed or completely translated, semeiotic analysis indicates at least the presence in each meaning response of traits which when made explicit give rise to economic, governmental, educational, and religious, as well as scientific, aesthetic, and moral, terminology. Whether or not the concept of mutual transposition or complete translation is correct, scientific, aesthetic, and moral modes of statement appear to represent other modes of discourse fairly. If such transposition or translation is possible, or in so far as it is possible, it will be clear that it holds for the economic, governmental, educational, and religious, as well as for the scientific, aesthetic, and moral. And if transposition or translation is not ultimately or completely possible, the former, as well as the latter, modes are nonetheless disclosed as intimately related kinds of language in which each and every experienced event and relation can be stated or expressed. Both empirical and semeiotic considerations thus indicate that science, art, and morals represent fairly our several human quests. From this fact it follows for other interests, such as business, politics, education, and religion, as well as for these three, that widely varying degrees of understanding, prediction, and control are possible and are to be expected ; that as much care needs to be taken and perhaps can be taken in matters of value as in matters of fact, in nonscientific as in scientific interests; and that there is in no instance justification for either undue optimism or undue pessimism. Since as in aesthetic and moral matters the state of affairs which has prevailed and still prevails in other nonscientific enterprises constitutes a barrier to perception of the degree of tested creativity which is possible through more persistent and careful experimental procedure, it follows also that as this procedure comes into more effective operation there will be such increases in social direction and advance as will clarify vision and thereby provide dynamic for further endeavors.

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The fifth and final consequence of extension and development of the experimental viewpoint in all our human enterprises is that while interests will continue to expand and become more diversified, they will also become more unified. This unification will result in part from expansions and further specializations of inquiry and endeavor that will continue to fill in the gaps among existing sciences and among scientific and nonscientific interests. But sense of unity will be heightened especially by familiar use of a common methodology and by fuller recognition of the complex continuities, as well as the discontinuities, which run through all interests. It will be strengthened by the fruitful interchange of findings and attitudes among scientific and nonscientific quests. It will be deepened by a growing perception of the more basic and ultimate relations of our several enterprises. The development of experimental outlook and procedure in all phases of modern life has already produced some measure of unification and its recognition. A few individuals, impressed by the fruitfulness of the experimental method in the sciences, have envisaged and urged its extension to social problems generally. The rise and international consolidation of the Unity of Science Movement, with special organs of publication 7 and a growing popular and technical concern with "semantics," or semeiosis,8 and even with the relations of sign-using phenomena in art and morals as compared with science,9 all indicate an accumulating sense of the need for and the possibility of further unifications. The findings of the present study emphasize the extent to which unification may be effected in both practice and theory. Random samplings studied in relation to a scale of verifiability and at points suggested by current conflicts in value theory have disclosed a gen7

International Encyclopedia of Unified Science and The Journal of Unified Science. For technical developments see Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," and Bloomfield, "Linguistic Aspects of Science" in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Each gives a selected bibliography of recent and current literature. 9 For example, Morris, "Esthetics and the Theory of Signs," The Journal of Unified Science, VIII (1939), 131-150, and "Science, Art, and Technology," The Kenyon Review, I (1939), 409-423; Ransom, "The Pragmatics of Art," The Kenyon Review, II (1940), 76-87; and Wheelwright, "On the Semantics of Poetry," The Kenyon Review, II (1940), 263-283. 8

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eral parallelism in character of subject matter and of operations needed for testing and in degree of verification possible. Semeiotic analysis has indicated that each and every experience is expressible in both factual and valuative form and in scientific, aesthetic, moral, educational, religious, and other modes of sign usage. It has also suggested that when referring to precisely the same interdependencies different forms and different modes are mutually and completely transposable or translatable. Such translation, if it is indeed possible or in so far as it is possible, means that suggestions which arise in any one quest can be expressed in or translated into the languages characteristic of other interests and in either factual or valuative forms. This, of course, does not indicate that science, art, morals, government, and other interests, as they now exist, are one and the same or that they are likely ever to be so. It means that if all the experiences and suggestions generated in any one of these quests were to be stated in terms most characteristic of that interest, those statements could be translated into the languages most characteristic of any or all the other. Hence, if all the experiences of all the interests were formulated and if the formulations were mutually transposed, there would result at least a verbal or linguistic unification among them. Moreover, the fact that each and every experience can be stated in all these different modes signifies that if scientific, aesthetic, moral, educational, religious, and other kinds or aspects of experience and endeavor were to be extended and developed to their maxima, science, art, morals, education, religion, and so forth would become one or would approach identity or at least would become coextensive enterprises whose possible linguistic formulations would have, en masse, the same referents and require for verification the same operations. But even should translation never be complete, the semeiotic fact that each and every experienced event or relations and each and very aspect thereof can be expressed or referred to in both factual and valuative forms and in various modes, will still indicate the pervasive co-presence and coextensiveness of at least the potentialities for factual and valuative experiences and statements and

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for scientific, aesthetic, moral, religious, governmental, and other interests. It signifies that if these several forms and modes of experience and enterprise were to be extended to their utmost, their subject matters would be congruent and their operations of testing would—at least so far as affected by the subject matter—be equally performable. It therefore indicates that in the degree that various forms and modes of experience and enterprise are extended toward their maxima, they will become more nearly unified or more intimately and extensively related to each other. The intimacy of the more basic relations, actual and potential, of our several human quests as thus suggested both by the empirical and by the semeiotic findings of the present study is in some measure corroborated by the growing recognition that further advances in any one specialty is increasingly dependent upon utilization of the procedures and results of other specialties. For instance, it becomes ever clearer that moral advances must utilize the findings of sociological, medical, and psychological inquiry and that more extensive and careful experimentations 10 are needed which will constitute or condition advances in science and morals alike. Similarly, it is increasingly evident that science can continue at a maximum only as certain human relations of free speech, free assemblage, and unrestricted communication and certain attitudes of honesty, courage, tolerance, fairness, and human disinterestedness are maintained. In short, science must utilize, and even extend, moral attitudes and procedures which are inherent in its own nature and which condition not only its fullest advances but even its very existence. Likewise, those who discern most clearly and intimately the conditions necessary for the continuance and further advancement of art, of education, of religion, and of government reçognize increasingly the mutual dependence of these with science, morals, and each other. From these insights, arising because of the practical pressure of the needs of our several enterprises themselves and from more theoretical discernments now possible, it becomes more and more For example, regarding preparation for marriage, legislation concerning divorce, court procedures, and the effects of various methods of moral education. 10

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apparent that social life is (or can be) at the same time religious, moral, scientific, aesthetic, educational, and governmental—that the shared quest for the good life is or can become at one and the same time all of them and that they are standpoints from which this life, as it attains distinctively experimental outlook and procedure, can be viewed. In the most inclusive sense this life, so characterized, is science, art, morals, government, education, and religion. Yet it can also be recognized that somewhat specialized developments conveniently called science, art, education, and so forth have arisen within and make distinctive contributions to this larger, more inclusive life, and that in the degree that these specialties are extended and developed toward their maxima they become increasingly interdependent and ever more unified in subject matter, purpose, and procedure. Potentialities for further extensions and developments of the experimental approach thus have far-reaching implications for the unification of our contemporary philosophy of life and for the guidance and motivation of next steps to be taken in and among our several quests. The details of this unification and of the next steps must be worked out cooperatively and patiently as advances are striven for. But their general traits are already apparent. The steps will entail substitution of positive experimental procedure for arbitrary authoritarianisms and cynical individualisms now prevalent. There will be greater care and more continuity in the study of the consequences of ideas in relation to one another and to conditions and effects noted before and after overt action. Perspective and procedure will, so far as may prove possible, transcend mere trial and error, drifting, opportunism, and dictatorial domination. There will be increasing recognition of both the difficulties and the possibilities of such substitution and transcendence and of the basic unities, actual and potential, between matters of fact and matters of value in and among our several human quests.

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Chambers, L. P. "Plato's Objective Standard of Value," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I I I (1936), 596-605. Clark, G. H., and T. V. Smith. Readings in Ethics. New York, Crofts, 1931. Clarke, M. E. A Study in the Logic of Value. London, University of London Press, 1929. Cohen, M. R., and E. Nagel. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934. Dashiell, J. F. Fundamentals of General Psychology. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1937. Dewey, John. Art as Experience, New York, Minton, Balch, 1934. Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916. How We Think. New York, Heath, 1910 and rev. ed., 1933. "Judgments of Practice," The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, X I I (1915), 505-523. "Qualitative Thought," The Symposium, I (1930), 1-32. The Quest for Certainty. New York, Minton, Balch, 1929. "Theory of Valuation," in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939, Vol. II, No. 4. "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," The Philosophical Review, X X X I (1922), 325-351. Valuation Judgments and "Immediate Quality," The Journal of Philosophy, X L (1943), 309-317. Dewey, John, and J. H. Tufts. Ethics. Rev. ed. New York, Holt, 1932. Dubs, H. H. "Value as Interest—a Criticism," The International Journal of Ethics, X L (1929-1930), 474-489. Eaton, H. O. The Austrian Philosophy of Value. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1930. Everett, W. G. Moral Values. New York, Holt, 1918. Feigl, Herbert. "Logical Empiricism," in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. by D . D . Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1943, pp. 373-416. Fitch, R. E. "The Two Methods of Ethics," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I I I (1936), 318-324. Garnett, A. C. Reality and Value ; an Introduction to Metaphysics and an Essay on the Theory of Value. London, Allen and Unwin, 1937. Geiger, G. R. "On the Meaning of Objective in Ethics," The Journal of Philosophy, X X X I V (1937), 292-301. Towards an Objective Ethics. Yellow Springs (Ohio), The Antioch Press, 1938. Goblet, Edmond. La Logique des Jugements de valeur, théorie et applications. Paris, Colin, 1927.

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INDEX Absolutism, 181, 185 ff., 188 Adequacy, quest for, in valuation, 98 f. "Adequation," 22 Adjustment courses, quantitative and qualitative in, 109 f.; descriptive and normative in, 129 f.; factual and creative in, 157 f.; objective and subjective in, 181 f. Adjustments, 23 ff., 34 f., 51, 57, 79, 88, 95 ff., 103, 105 f., 109 ff., 113, 116, 130 ff.; valuative, 25 ff., 191 ff., 196; personal-social, controllability of, 55 f., 169-76; factual, descriptive elements in, 151 ff.; factual and creative, 157 f., 162 ff., 174, 189 ff., 193, 196 Aesthetic theory, 5, 10 ff. Alexander, Samuel, 207 Algebra, 108 Analytic geometry, 108 Aristotle, 2, 89 Art, problems, 27 f., 34; defined, 29, 162 Astronomy, 55, 108 Austrian school, 2 Authentication, 2In, 150 Authoritarian doctrine, 241 Authoritarianism, 181, 241 Authority, of descriptive and of nominative judgments, 146 f. ; in social experimentation, 241 f. Axiologists, 198

on normative propositions, quoted, 134 f. ; on empirical ethics, quoted, 136-37; quoted, 137-38» Chemistry, 117 Cognition, 94, 97, 101 f., 105, 147, 160; see Knowing Conception, 182 Cooperation, intelligent, 175 ff. Copernican revolution, 14 Cosmic purpose, 231 Creative, 157-80, 191, 194 f. Creative order, 234 Creative process, 236 Creativity in normative judgments, 157 ff. Cynicism, 89; relativistic, 181

Beccaria, Marquess di, 108 Behavior, human, 168 ff. Being, 198 Bentham, Jeremy, 108; his calculus of values, 120 ff. Bergson, H. L., 73 Biology, 55 f., 108, 117 Bogoslovsky, B. B., 70, 74 Bridgman, P. W., 33 Brogan, A. P., on value as a relation, quoted, 207

Ehrenfels, von, 2 Einstein, Albert, 39 Emergentists, 187 Empirical analysis of verifiability, 43-67, 72 ff., 84 f. Empirical aspect of verification, 44 ff. Empirical observation, in scientific method; see Methodology; Verification in science Empiricism, 3, 5 f., 9 Epistemological idealism, 201, 204, 214 Epistemological theory, 142 Epistemology, 111, 113, 132 Ethical issues, in verification of values, 15 f. Ethical theory, 2, 5 ff., 11 f.

Calculus of values, Bentham's, 120 ff. Carnap, Rudolf, 9; on value judgments, quoted, 38 f. ; his view discussed, 39 f. ; on normative aspect of values, 127;

Darwin, Charles, 227 Democratic societies, conditions in, 243 Democritus, 13, 115 Descriptive, 127-56, 157 ff., 192 ff.; defined, 130 Design, intelligent, 231 Desire, 229 ff.; and value, discussed, 199 ff. Desires, see Wishes Dewey, John, 23, 34, 45«, 78, 94, 207; on experimental character of values, 6 ; quoted, 206, 208, 213 Dictatorial societies, conditions in, 243 Dogmatism, 242 ; religious and scientific, discussed, 232 ff.

264

INDEX

Ethics, 2, S S.; empirical, 136 Events, 43 f., SI fi., 64, 66, 77, 81 f., 89, 133; Variation of, SI ff. ; and values, discussed, 202 ff., 213 ff., 226 ff.; as experienced, 219 Evolution, 231 ; emergent, hypothesis of, 186 Existence, and value, 197-225, 226ff.; meaning of, 234 f. ; see Facts and Values Existents, 192 Experimental, 4, 183,188,193 ; discussion of conceptions of, 177 ff. Experimental approach to cosmic problem, 236 f. Experimental attitude, in science, 62 f. Experimental conception of valuation, 92 ff., 103 ff. ; see Valuation Experimental conception of verification, 21 ff.; see Verification of values, nature of Experimental interactions, and the quantitative and the qualitative, 118-21; and the descriptive and the normative, 131-33; and the objective and the subjective, 181-84, 188-89 Experimental method, future of, 239 ff. Experimental methodology, 4 ff., 14 ff., 20 ff. Experimental nature of descriptive, 146 f. Experimental nature of normative, 146 f. Experimental procedure, future, in social and political spheres, 243 ff., 253 f. Experimental theory of knowledge, 4 Experimental theory of value, 18, 125, 129 Experimentation, 176; social, 242 Facts, formulations of, 46 ff., 52, 57, 69 Facts and values, as relatively verified formulations, 33 f. ; theory of, as different types of meaning, 70,81 f. ; ontological nature and locus of, 198 ff., 214 ff., 226 ff. Factual, 157-80, 194, 196 Faith, 234 f. Fascism, 241 Feigl, Herbert, 81»; on experimental character of values, 9 Formulations, scientific, experimental nature of, 4 ; factual and valuative, operational conception of, 33 ; valuative,

46 f., 76 ff., 183 f., 190 ff.; factual, 46 f., 76 ff., 183 f., 192 f.; scientific, varying functions of, 61; fact and value, on curves of frequency, 65 f., 85 ; factual and valuative, relations of, 75 ff., 216 ff., 225»; normative, verifiability of, 134ff., 152 ff.; normative and descriptive, 138 ff., 152 ff., 187 ; scale of correspondence of, 140 f., 152 f.; value and fact, effect of creative on, 169 ff. Frame of reference, 51, 58 ff., 72, 78, 81, 85, 209 f. Frequency curves, distribution of fact and value formulations on, 65 f., 85 Galileo, 116 Hobson, J . Α., 109 Hook, Sidney, 216» H u m a n nature, ultimate character of, 235 Hume, David, 13, 118» Idealism, 3, 5, 8 f. ; metaphysical, 186, 201, 226-35; epistemologica!, 201, 204, 214; naturalistic, 237 Idealist conceptions of value, discussed, 201 ff. Idealistic naturalism, 237 Idealists, 187; on value and existence, 226 f . ; their views discussed, 228 ff. Imagination, creative, 195 Individualisme, 241 Individualistic doctrine, 241 Inference, 69, 71 ff., 79, 101, 105, 150 Intellectualism, 179 Intelligence, 172 ff., 234, 240; defined, 172; see Cooperation Interactions and intelligence, 172 Interactions of subjects and objects, in creation of facts and values, 31, 195, 206 ff. Interactions, experimental, and the qualitative, 118 ff.; and the quantitative, 120 ff. ; and the descriptive and the normative, 131-33; and the objective and the subjective, 181-84, 188 f. Interest, 132 ff., 154 f., 160,192, 209 ; and value, 199 ff., 228 ff. Interest-events, 134 Intuition, 73, 144 ff., 148 f. Intuitionism, 3

INDEX Intuitionists, 187 Intuitions, value, 101 James, William, 233» Judgments, factual, defined, 76 f. ; valuative, defined, 76 f. ; descriptive elements in, 1S1 fi. ; creative element in, 157 ff. ; testing of, 163 ff.; nature of, 168 ff.; normative, 190, 192 f. ; descriptive, 192 f.; see Factual, Creative Kant, Immanuel, 2, 13, 118«, 218 Kepler, Johannes, 116 Knight, F. H., on value problems, quoted, 40 ; his view discussed, 40 f. Knowing, 114 ff., 182, 192; scientific, practice and theory of, 4, 19 ; and valuation, 88-107 ; definitions of, 90 f. Knowledge, 209 ; theory of, 3 f., 16 f., 86, 89 f., 100, IOS ; relativity of, 142 ff. Krusé, Cornelius, 94; quoted, 101-2 "Laws of thought," 69, 73 ff. Logic, 56, 68-87, 111 f.; laws of, 69, 73 ff. Logical analysis of verifiability, 68-87 Lotze, Hermann, 2 Mathematics, 56, 108, 118 Materialism, 233« Matisse, Henri, 34 Mayer, Joseph, 108, 124f.; on experimental character of values, 10 Meaning, facts and values as types of, discussed, 70, 81 f. Meinong, Α., 2 ; quoted, 199 Metaphysical issues, in verification of values, 15 Metaphysical problem, experimental approach to, 236 f. Metaphysical problems, in relation to values, 197 ff. Metaphysics, 111, 113, 132, 185 ff.; idealistic, 201, 226 f.; naturalistic, 231 Method, critical, 78 ff. Method of verification, 19 if. Methodology, 62 f., 159, 161 ; experimental, 4 ff., 14 ff., 20 ff., 82, 105 f.; scientific, 12 ; experimental, future of, 239 ff. Mill, J . S., 2, 108; on the quantitative and qualitative, 122 Montague, W. P., quoted, 233 and η

265

Moore, G. E., 6 f., 204 Moralism, 179 Morals, defined, 29 Morris, C. W., 81», 216» Multiverse, 235 Naturalism, metaphysical, 226-35; idealistic, 237 Naturalistic idealism, 237 Naturalistic metaphysics, 231 Naturalists, on value and existence, 227 ff.; their views discussed, 228 ff. Naturalization of values, 229 ff. Natural order, discovery of, 231 Nature, ultimate character of, 235 Newton, Sir Isaac, 39 Normative, 127-56, 157 ff., 166, 190, 192 ff.; defined, 130 Objective, 181-96 Objectivism, logical, 181 Objectivity, relative differences in character of, 191 Ontological status of facts and values, 220 ff. Ontology, IS, 197 Organisms, values not confined to events and relations involving, 201 ff., 228 ff. Osborne, Harold, on verification of facts and values, quoted, 36; his views discussed, 37 Otto, M. C., 174 Parker, D. H., on experimental character of values, 8 f . ; quoted, 162, 167, 199, 200«

Perception, 95 ff., 103 ff., 110, 135, 147, 149, 160, 182, 194 Perry, Charner M., 118», 138; quoted, 70-71 Perry, R. B., 6 f., 108 f., 123 ff.; quoted, 199 Phenomenologists, 187 Physical-chemical continuum, S2 Physics, SS f., 108 Plato, 2, 13, 89,118» Positivism, 9, 81, 201, 214 Pragmatism, 5, 214 Probability, propositions of, 45 Problem-solving, 23 ff., SI, 81, 94 ff., I l l , 129, 158

266

INDEX

Psychological character of value, views of, 197, 199; discussed, 199 ff. Psychological issues, in verification of values, IS Psychology, 108, 112, 117 Purpose, 51, 56 ff., 72 f., 75 ff., 81 f., 85, 95, 105, 132, 154, 159, 209, 234; cosmic, 231 Qualitative, 108-26, 194; historical tendencies with respect to, 117 ff. Quantitative, 108-26, 194 Rationalism, 3 Realism, 3, 5 f., 179, 186 Realist conceptions of value, discussed, 201 ff. Realists, 187 Reality, 198 Reason, 240; as process, 145 f. Reference, frame of, see Frame of reference Reid, J . R., quoted, 109 Relativism, 181, 184 f., 188 Relativity of knowledge, 142 ff. Religion, 246 f. Ritsehl, Albrecht, 2 Russell, B. A. W., on value judgments, quoted, 39 ; his view discussed, 39 f. ; on normative aspect of values, 127 Scale of correspondence between descriptive and normative functions, 152 ff. Scale of correspondence, of normative and descriptive formulations, 140 f., 152 f. Scale of variation between descriptive and normative judgments, 160 f. Scale of verifiability, 44 ff., 57, 60, 69, 72, 74 f., 82, 85, 251 Schlick, Moritz, 9, 216» Scientific method, in verification, see Methodology Semantics, 251 Semeiosis, 216», 251 Semeiotic analysis, 216, 252 f. Sensationalism, 3 Sensory-perceptual-reflective processes, 24 Shapley, Harlow, 10» Social experimentation, 55 f., 169-76, 242 ff.

Sociology, 108 Socrates, 80, 89 Sophistry, 89 Sophists, Greek, 118» Space-time reality, 93, 101 ff., 113 Spinoza, Benedict, 118» Statistical correlations, 108 Status of values, experimental conception of, 235 Stevenson, C. L., 81» Subjective, 181-96 Subjectivism, 3, 185 Subject matter of inquiry, nature of, 51 ff., 72 ff., 81 f., 85 Suggestion, 21, 33, 97 Symbols, 79 f. Testing, of creative and factual judgments, 163 ff. Testing, scientific, see Method; Methodology; Verification, in science Thaïes, 115 "Thought, laws of," 69, 73 ff. Traditionalism, 242 Translatability, of factual and valuative problems, 27; of factual and valuative statements, 216-20; of scientific, aesthetic, and moral statements, 222 f . ; of other modes of statement, 247-50 Transposability, see Translatability Truth, and verification, 22; in science, in art, and in morals, 162 Tufts, J . H., quoted, 206 Unity of Science Movement, 251 Universe, 232, 235 Urban, W . M., 10», 22», 45, 70, 76, 151, 197 ; on experimental character of values, 8 ; on normative aspect of values, 127; on value verification, quoted, 147 ff. Valuation, 114 ff., 135 f., 149, 182, 188 ff., 191 f . ; and knowing, 88-107; defined, 91 ff.; experimental concept of, 92 ff., 102 ff. Value and existence, 197-225 Value as relation of subject and object, discussed, 203 ff. Value creation, 195, 241 Value judgments, nature of, 168 ff.

INDEX Value theory, 1 ff., 17, 22, 43, 76, 86, 100, 104 f., 108, 157, 18S, 197, 251; experimental, 18, 63, 125, 129; in relation to the quantitative and qualitative, 120 ff. Values, as relatively verified formulations, 33 f. ; formulations of, 46 ff., 52, 57, 60, 69; theory of, as type of meaning, 70, 81 f. ; differing conceptions of, 197 f.; and facts, nature and locus of, 198 ff., 214 ff., 226 ff.; as affective or affective-volitional, discussed, 199 f. ; as not confined to events involving organisms, 201 ff., 228ff.; as the potentialities and efficacies for events, 203 f., 212-15, 2 2 8 f . ; as subject-object relations, discussed, 207 ff. ; as indefinable predicates, discussed, 211 f.; as experience, criticized, 213 f.; naturalization of, 229 ff.; status of, experimental conception of, 235 Verifiability, empirical analysis of, 43-67, 72 ff., 84 f.; scale of, 44 ff., 57, 60, 69, 72, 74 f., 82, 85, 251 ; relative character of, 60; logical analysis of, 68-87; as

267

affected by quantitative and qualitative, 1 1 6 f . ; as affected by descriptive and normative, 152-56; as affected by objective and subjective, 193 f. ; equality of, of facts and values, 220ff.; as affected by ontological status, 220 f., 225 Verification, in science, art, and morals, 20 f., 24-35, 161-66; definition of term, 22, 165; experimental character of, 22 ff., 32, 35, 182 f.; discussion of conceptions of, 177 ff. Verification of values, problem of, discussed, 13 ff.; nature of, 19-43, 165 f. Wheelwright, Philip, on values and facts as independent types of meaning, 70; on normative aspect of values, 127 Whitehead, A. N., 55 Will, 145 f. Wishes, 89, 94 ff., 103 ff., 131, 135 f., 138 ff., 159 f., 194; in value judgments, 38 ff., 54, 57 ff., 66, 85