Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security: Emerging Perspectives (India Studies in Business and Economics) 9811675929, 9789811675928

Citation preview

India Studies in Business and Economics

Anshuman Behera Sitakanta Mishra   Editors

Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security Emerging Perspectives

India Studies in Business and Economics

The Indian economy is one of the fastest growing economies of the world with India being an important G-20 member. Ever since the Indian economy made its presence felt on the global platform, the research community is now even more interested in studying and analyzing what India has to offer. This series aims to bring forth the latest studies and research about India from the areas of economics, business, and management science, with strong social science linkages. The titles featured in this series present rigorous empirical research, often accompanied by policy recommendations, evoke and evaluate various aspects of the economy and the business and management landscape in India, with a special focus on India’s relationship with the world in terms of business and trade. The series also tracks research on India’s position on social issues, on health, on politics, on agriculture, on rights, and many such topics which directly or indirectly affect sustainable growth of the country. Review Process The proposal for each volume undergoes at least two double blind peer review where a detailed concept note along with extended chapter abstracts and a sample chapter is peer reviewed by experienced academics. The reviews can be more detailed if recommended by reviewers. Ethical Compliance The series follows the Ethics Statement found in the Springer standard guidelines here. https://www.springer.com/us/authors-editors/journal-author/journal-aut hor-helpdesk/before-you-start/before-you-start/1330#c14214

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/11234

Anshuman Behera · Sitakanta Mishra Editors

Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security Emerging Perspectives

Editors Anshuman Behera Conflict Resolution and Peace Research Programme National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

Sitakanta Mishra School of Liberal Studies Pandit Deendayal Energy University Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India

ISSN 2198-0012 ISSN 2198-0020 (electronic) India Studies in Business and Economics ISBN 978-981-16-7592-8 ISBN 978-981-16-7593-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

In the process of completing this volume, we have received enormous support from many for which we sincerely thank each one of them. The idea of this book was conceived following a two-day conference on ‘India’s National Security: Challenges and Option’, jointly organised by the School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru and School of Liberal Studies (SLS), Pandit Deendayal Energy University (PDEU), Gandhinagar, in March 2020. The collaborative efforts by our respective institutes motivated us to enlarge the scope of the topic and plan for a volume. Accordingly, we would like to thank Dr. Shailesh Nayak, Director of NIAS and Professor Nigam Dave, Director, School of Liberal Studies, PDEU, for their support and guidance in the completion of this volume. We would also like to thank Dr. Prashant Chandra Panda for spearheading the conference. We owe a sense of gratitude to all the faculty members and students of both institutes for their support. The comments and suggestions we received from the anonymous reviewers have immensely enriched the content and the scope of this volume. We cannot thank enough for their valuable contribution. We also thank Ms. Nupoor Singh, Editor, Springer India, and her team for their constant and patient support in the publication process.

v

Contents

Part I 1

Introduction

India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anshuman Behera and Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

Part II

3

State-Centric Security Concerns

2

India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges . . . . . . . Rajiv Nayan

19

3

India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy . . . . . Ashok Behuria

35

4

‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance . . . . . Sitakanta Mishra

47

5

India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms and the Way Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arun Vishwanathan

6

India’s Cyber Security Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sameer Patil

7

Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security and India’s National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Haans J. Freddy and Adarsh Vijay

61 75

91

8

India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options . . . . . . . . . 107 Mathew Sinu Simon

9

Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India via Myanmar: A Case Study of Manipur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Ningthoujam Koiremba Singh

vii

viii

Contents

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Rudra Narayan Mohanty Part III Human-Centric Security Issues 11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects . . . . . . 153 Bikash Ranjan Mishra and Lopamudra D. Satpathy 12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Hippu Salk Kristle Nathan 13 Climate Change and Human Security in India Evidence, Opportunities, and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Chandra Sekhar Bahinipati and Unmesh Patnaik 14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements . . . . . . . . . . 215 Swati Narayan 15 Corruption and National Security: Insights from the Indian Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Niranjan Sahoo 16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security . . . . . . 249 Amit Mukherjee

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Anshuman Behera is Associate Professor in Conflict Resolution and Peace Research Programme at National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru. Prior to joining NIAS, Dr. Behera worked in Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. Dr. Behera earned his Ph.D. from University of Hyderabad. He is Co-Editor of ‘Reasoning Indian Politics: Philosopher Politicians to Politicians Seeking Philosophy’, Routledge, 2018, and Co-Author of ‘Militant Groups in South Asia’, IDSA, 2014. Dr. Behera’s research areas include socio-political conflicts, political violence, political theory, and South Asian Politics. His academic writings have featured in both international and national journals. Apart from his extensive writing on Maoist conflict and religious fundamentalism and terrorism in India, he also writes on political process and change in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Sitakanta Mishra is Associate Professor at School of Liberal Studies (SLS) of Pandit Deendayal Energy University (PDPU), Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India). Previously, Dr Mishra was Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. He was also Visiting Research Scholar at Cooperative Monitoring Centre, USA. He has authored three books, two monographs, many chapters, and research papers related to India’s neighborhood policy, Indo-Pak relations, India’s foreign policy, and nuclear policy and security.

Contributors Chandra Sekhar Bahinipati Indian Institute of Technology Tirupati, Yerpedu, Tirupati, India

ix

x

Editors and Contributors

Anshuman Behera National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bengaluru, India Ashok Behuria Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MPIDSA), New Delhi, India Haans J. Freddy Department of Political Science at the Madras, Christian College, Chennai, India Bikash Ranjan Mishra NIT, Rourkela, India Sitakanta Mishra School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Energy University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India Rudra Narayan Mohanty Kelton Tech, Hyderabad, India Amit Mukherjee National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India Swati Narayan Inequality and Human Development Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India Hippu Salk Kristle Nathan Institute of Rural Management Anand, Anand, India Rajiv Nayan Nuclear Issues and Arms Control, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India Sameer Patil Gateway House, Mumbai, India Unmesh Patnaik Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India Niranjan Sahoo ORF, New Delhi, India Lopamudra D. Satpathy Sushilavati Government Women’s College, Rourkela, India Mathew Sinu Simon Law and Political Science at Presidency University, Bengaluru, India Ningthoujam Koiremba Singh Sikkim University, Gangtok, India Adarsh Vijay Department of Political Science at the Madras, Christian College, Chennai, India Arun Vishwanathan Centre for Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India

Acronyms

AEC AEZ AFSPA AIM AIP API APMC ASEAN ATS BCIS BJP BRI CAP CAPF CBLO CCS CDR CDS CENJOWS CISC CMC COAS COIN CPI CPI-Maoist CPI-ML CTBT CVC CWC DCGS-A DFEC

Atomic Energy Commission Agri Export Zones Armed Forces Special Powers Act Atal Innovation Mission Air Independent Propulsion Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Agricultural Produce Market Committee Association of South-East Asian Nations Amphetamine-type Stimulants Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies Bhartiya Janata Party Belt and Road Initiative Civic Action Program Central Armed Police Force Collateralized Borrowing and lending operations Cabinet Committee on Security Consumption Discount Rate Chief of Defence Staff Centre for Joint Warfare Studies Chairman of the Chief of the Staff Committee Central Military Commission Chief of Army Staff Counter insurgency Consumer Price Index Communist Party of India-Maoist Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Central Vigilance Commission Central Water Commission Distributed Common Ground System—Army Duty-Free Export Credit xi

xii

DIME DMA DoP&T DPC DRDO EEZ EU EUNAVFOR EVD FARC FCI FCS FD FDF FDI FII FMS FOB FPS FRBM FTA GATT GDP GIS GML GoM GOSL GST HADR HDI HLC HM IAP ICDS ICESCR ICT IDU IED IGCAR IMF IMO IMS INDC IOR IPCC

Acronyms

Diplomacy-Intelligence-Military and Economy Department of Military Affairs Department of Personnel and Training Defence Planning Committee Defence Research and Development Extensive Economic Zones European Union EU Naval Task Force Ebola virus disease Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Food Corporation of India Future Combat Systems Fiscal Deficit Finished Dosage Formulation Foreign Direct Investment Foreign institutional investments Focus Market Scheme Forward Operating Base Focus Product Scheme Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act Free Trade Agreements General Agreement of the Traffic and the Trade Gross Domestic Product Geographic Information System Geography Markup Language Group of Ministers Government of Sri Lanka Goods and Services Tax Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations Human Development Index High-Level Committee Hizb-ul Mujahedeen Integrated Action Plan Integrated Child Development Services International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Information and Communication Technology Injecting Drug Users Improvised Explosive Devices Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization Indian Medical Service Intended National Determined Contribution Indian Ocean Region Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Acronyms

IR ISI ISIS IT ITBP ITU JeM J-GES JKLF JMSDF JRY KRC KSM L&D L&T LAF LBA LeT LMIC LoC LOSC LTTE LWE MAC MALSINDO MCCI MDM MEIS MGNREGA MHA MIA MIGA MMC MNC MOHFW MoSDE MSC MSP NATO NCA NCB NCIIPC NCSC NDA NFFWP

xiii

International Relations Inter-Services Intelligence Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Information Technology Indo-Tibetan Border Police International Telecom Union Jaish-e-Mohammad Joint-Geospatial Enterprise Service Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force Jawahar Rozgar Yojana Kargil Review Committee Key Standing Materials Loss and damage Larson & Toubro Liquidity adjustment facility Land Boundary Agreement Lashkar-e-Taiba Low- and middle-income country Line of Control Convention on the Law of the Sea Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Left-Wing Extremism Multi Agency Centre Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia Maoist Communist Centre of India Mid-Day Meals Merchandise Exports from India Scheme Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Ministry of Home Affairs Multiple Indicator approach Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Maharashtra-Madhya Pradesh-Chhattisgarh Multi-national Companies Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship Maritime Safety Committee Minimum Support Prices North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nuclear Command Authority Narcotics Control Bureau National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre National Cyber Security Coordinator National Democratic Alliance National Food for Work Programme

xiv

NFSA NIA NKM NMP NPCIL NPT NRHM NSA NSAB NSC NSCN-IM NSS NTRO OCHA OGC OGL ONGC ONOR OROP OSINT PC-COSC PDS PLA PLAN PMGKAY PMKVY POCA PPP PREPAK PRTP PSU PWG QDR RAN RBI RIN ROKN RTI SAGAR SAIL SASA SATP SCA SCADA SEBI

Acronyms

National Food Security Act National Investigation Agency Nuclear Knowledge Management National Manufacturing Policy Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Rural Health Mission National Security Advisor National Security Advisory Board National Security Council National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) Nuclear Security Summits National Technical Research Organisation UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Open-Source Geospatial Consortium Open General List Oil and Natural Gas Corporation One National One Ration One-Rank, One-Pension Open-Source Intelligence Technology Permanent Chairman-Chief of Staff Committee Public Distribution System People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana Prevention of Corruption Act Public-Private-Partnership People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak Pure Time Preference Rate Public Sector Unit People’s War Group Quadrennial Defense Review Royal Australian Navy Reserve Bank of India Royal Indian Navy Republic of Korea Navy Right to Information Security and Growth for All in the Region Steel Authority of India Limited Strategic Armament Safety Authority South Asia Terrorism Portal Special Central Assistance Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Securities Exchange Board of India

Acronyms

SEIS SETU SEZ SFC SHADE SHQ SIB SIL SLOC SMAC SPG SRE SUI TCG TCOC TI TOR TRF UCP UK ULFA UNDP UNFCCC UNGGE UNLF UNODC UPA UPI US USI USOF UWSA VPN WFS WHO WHR WTO

xv

Service Exports From India Scheme Self-Employment and Talent Utilization Special Economic Zones Strategic Forces Command Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Service Head Quarters State Intelligence Bureaus Special Import Licence Sea Lines of Communication State Multi Agency Centre Strategic Policy Group Security-Related Expenditure Stand-up India Technical Coordination Group Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign Transparency International The Onion Router The Resistance Front Unified Command Plan United Kingdom United Liberation Front of Asom United Nations Development Programme United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Group of Governmental Experts United Liberation Front United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Progressive Alliance Unified Payments Interface United States United Services Institute Universal Services Obligation Fund United Wa State Army Virtual Private Network Web Feature Service World Health Organization World Health Report World Trade Organisation

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction Anshuman Behera and Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam

Introduction Considering the porous scope of the discipline, the discourse of security is rather obscure in nature. Buzan’s (1983, 1984) thesis attributes this obscurity to the polarized attempt made to engage with the security discourse. To Buzan, security has been obscured by the realists who focus on power and the idealists who dwell on peace. Arguably, the discourse of ‘national security’ is not free from such obscurity. However, despite this obscurity, thanks to the polarization between the pursuit of ‘power’ and ‘peace’, there seems to be some certainty in terms of stressing upon the state-centric security that has a dominance in the national security discourse. Engaging with the national security discourse, one would observe that it has gone through multiple changes in terms of widening its scope. The post-World War era witnessed the engagement of the national security discourse through the prism of foreign policy and national interest. The stress on the robust foreign policy frameworks for furthering national interests articulated national security interchangeably with the interests of respective nation-states. While, in a broader perspective, one might not have a convincing criticism on ‘national interest as national security’, the attempts made to see the national interests through a dominant ‘economic interest’ paradigm certainly narrows the scope. However, economic interests as national interests through the prism of ‘welfare of people’ convey a wider meaning to the discourse. Talking of the national security discourse, one can observe three dominant narratives: state security, human security, and comprehensive security. The state-centric

A. Behera National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bengaluru, India A. A. Moazzam (B) Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_1

3

4

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

narratives basically come from a classical formulation of security discourse. Accordingly, security revolves around how the states use their power (read force) to manage threats, primarily, to safeguard their territorial integrity, autonomy, and domestic political order from external aggressions (Bajpai, 2003). This classical formulation of security shifts its focus from the welfare of the people to secure the state from external aggression. Arguably, such a shift of focus can be attributed to as an impact of the Cold War and the threat perception of the proliferation of external aggression during this period. The classical formulations of security, however, overlooks social reforms and internal threat perceptions and other human-centric issues such as national security. Not as a contrarian position, but the formulations of human security narratives make a case for safeguarding more humane issues that should be regarded as universal agenda for the national security domain (Singh, 2004). A much desired, rather agreed upon, at least in the academic and popular discourse, national security through the prism of human-centric approach is seen as easier, more humane, and less costly to deal with (Haq, 1999). If we can add a judgement to this, engagement with the human security issues also has the potential to minimize the threat perception emerging from the external aggression. A comprehensive narrative tries to strike a balance between the human as well as the state-centric security issues to offer a holistic understanding of the national security discourse. Accordingly, the security concerns relating to the territorial integrity of a state can interact with more humane issues like economic development, climate change, food security, and so on. From these multiple narratives, it can be safely argued that the discourse of national security is normative in nature. Accordingly, it is not merely what the discourse is, rather, it is more about what the discourse ought to be. It would hardly be wrong to mention that the multiple perspectives on national security discourse invariably point towards specific goals that a nation-state should achieve and to this extent it is prescriptive in nature. Hence, we can argue that the scope of national security is ever expanding. The word ‘security’, as Arnold Wolfers, would articulate ‘covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security’ (Wolfers, 1952). However, Arnold Wolfers would also term the national security discourse as an ambiguous symbol. Does the ever-expanding scope of national security discourse contribute to its ambiguity? The answer, to us, is no. It is because the ever-expanding scope of the national security discourse allows the scholars and the policy makers alike to bring together security issues concerning the state and the people, which otherwise are engaged in isolation. Hence, security concerns might be dependent on the priorities and values that each state might assign. Accordingly, as some scholars argue, ‘security is a value of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measures’ (Wolfers, 1952). Such a position on ‘security as a value’ offers a wider meaning to the national security discourse. An interesting observation on this aspect is being offered by Arnold Wolfers. According to him, ‘nations like individuals or groups may value things not because they consider them as good or less evil than their alternatives; they may value them because they satisfy their pride, heighten their sense of selfesteem or reduce their fears’ (Ibid). If we can add to this, the states might select some issues as security priority and engage them as national security objectives that

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

5

have the potentials to address the public grievances in terms of securing their health, food, education, economy, and political stability which in effect enhance the human capabilities. We have examples of some of the South Asian states like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka that prioritize domestic political stability and fighting violent internal conflict as national security issues. In the states like India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan we have the combination of external as well as internal issues that find their place in priority of national security concerns. In addition to ‘security as a value’ some scholars have also offered a ‘national security approach’. The national security approach acknowledges that power plays a key role in the behaviour of nations and the functioning of the international system (Leffler, 1990). This approach believes that a nation’s power depends on its political stability, social cohesion, and economic productivity as well as its military strength (Ibid). Accordingly, this can be argued that national power can be understood as national security. In fact, such an approach offers a comprehensive understanding to the extent that it considers the social, political, economic, internal as well as external issues for national security. To further investigate the national security discourse (read India’s national security discourse), this chapter has three major sections. The first section critically engages with the theoretical and conceptual aspects of national security. It does so by situating the issue of national security within the larger platform of international relations. The subsequent section reflects on the national security scenario in India. The third section highlights the major themes of this volume.

National Security Discourse: Conceptual Engagement National security is a profusely used concept in the domain of International Relations Studies (IRS). The pertinent questions that need contemplation in regard to any discussion on security are: What constitutes national security? What ensures security for a state? In an international system that is mostly considered as ‘anarchic’ or without a central authority, how can security of a state be ensured? An attempt is made to answer these questions in this chapter within the domain of mainstream IR theories. The chapter also traces the genesis of the concept of national security and how national security has transformed from dealing with ‘hard’ aspects of military security to ‘soft’ aspects of human security. Security, be it individual or collective, has been recognized as the motivating factor information of a state/civil society in political philosophy. Thomas Hobbes stated in his book, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil, that without security ‘there is no place for industry… no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes & Oakeshott, 1946). The most popular arguments about the ‘state of nature’ recognize that a state is formed when an individual agrees to forgo some of her liberties for the sake of common interests and, most importantly, because she wants to overcome her sense

6

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

of insecurity that is prevalent when in the struggle for survival, there is ‘war of all against all’. In short, it can be said that a state comes into being to provide security within the state of nature paradigm. And in return for giving up certain liberties, individual hopes to receive security of life and property along with liberty to pursue opportunities that the state provides. In order to provide security, the state maintains and manages the military and other armed forces. Traditionally, the state was expected to provide security from invasions and aggressions from other states in order to protect a state’s physical borders, which would in turn ensure protection from rampage of life, property, land, resources, traditions, and culture. Historically, the majority of the wars in Europe and the rest of the world have been due to religious and ideological reasons. Hence, follows the argument that security from the imposition of values, religions, culture, and notions of other states was fundamental to the question of national security. This will be dealt with in detail later in the chapter but what needs emphasis is that traditionally national security entailed physical territorial protection from foreign invasion. And this explains the preoccupation with military in any analysis of national security. Feeling of security is psychological, whether it is for an individual or a collective, like a state. In order to feel secure, both an individual or a collective would require feeling a sense of being unaffected and undisturbed by either fear or danger of any kind. Some scholars like Richard Ullman (1983) have also argued that it is the decrease in vulnerability that constitutes security. Danger or threat could be from, but not limited to, other human beings (other citizens or foreigners), human nature, other states, international system among other perceptions of threats. Also, diverse states experience threats differently depending upon their economic, political, and ecological environment, especially due to their geographical locations. Security may also include in contemporary analyses protection from starvation, identity theft, devastation from wars and natural disasters, poverty, and impact of climate change and environmental degradation. A comprehensive definition of security is captured by Hedley Bull when he states, ‘Security in international politics means no more than safety: either objective safety, meaning safety which actually exists, or subjective safety, meaning safety which is felt or experienced’ (Bull, 1995). Safety or security in IR is consequently a prerequisite for human relations. Security has connotation of order, predictability, and familiarity or maintaining a safe/secure status quo.

How Mainstream Theories of IR Understand National Security? It is the environment or the setting that gives a sense of security to an individual and also the state. The international system with a lack of central authority hardly succeeds to offer security to states. Accordingly, security is then ‘each state for itself’ (read it as a version of the realists). National security for the realists (a theory of IR

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

7

that maintains that it reflects the realities and changes in the world) is states that ultimately rely on ‘self-help as a guarantee for their security’. In The Prince (1532), Machiavelli stressed that ‘a leader’s primary concern is to promote national security’ (Antunes & Camisao, 2017: 16). And the tools available for managing insecurity are ‘the balance of power and deterrence. The balance of power relies on strategic, flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat (or the use) of significant force’ (Ibid: 19). On the contrary to the realists, the liberalists argue that an international order can be improved to include peace and progress and it could be a guarantee against the lawlessness in the international system (Meiser, 2017). The English School asserts that a form of society of states, an ‘Anarchical Society’ of sorts, exists at the international level which is governed by shared norms and behaviour (Stivachits, 2017). Social constructivists point out that the states and their social relations which are based on shared interests and values create the environment that is prevalent on the international scene (Theys, 2017). ‘“Anarchy” is what the states make of it’, Alexander Wendt famously formulated. Feminist theory brings to the fore the ‘soft’ issues of security, which are protection of women from rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, and forced prostitution as a contradiction to ‘hard’ issues of military security. The securitization theorists determined five sectors in understanding security, namely the economic, societal, military, political, and environmental sectors (Eroukhmanoff, 2017: 105). Hence, from these arise the questions— if security is being surrounded by like-minded friends? or belonging to a group of states subscribing to similar ideology? or having relations with the powerful states? Or ensuring security for women and security for individuals from hunger and sense of danger to their dignity and life? Any sense of insecurity has to be recognized as the potential to guide a state behaviour in the international system. A state tends to amass armaments when it feels threatened by its surrounding states or any powerful state that does not share its values. A state improves relations with powerful states by signing bi-lateral/tri-lateral agreements in order to secure its interests. A state also joins regional and international organizations in order to secure and enhance its interests. It is in this context that it becomes pertinent that an account of various approaches and theories of international relations is taken for a comprehensive understanding of national security.

Reasoning Importance of National Security Security is often ensured by states’ shared set of acceptable values, norms, and international laws. It is one of the reasons why the discipline is called International Relations as the relations between states (whether political, economic, trade, and so on) are based on certain values, norms, and laws that shape those relations. Moreover, any study that focuses on these relations falls within the gambit of international relations.

8

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

National security is integral to nation-states. In fact, it is so crucial that it was the number one priority for the United States, along with economic prosperity and promotion of democracy abroad, on Bill Clinton’s National Security Strategy for the twenty-first century (A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998). National Security ‘has thus come to refer to all those public policies through which the nation state ensures its survival as a separate and sovereign community and, in so doing, the safety and prosperity of its citizens’. It is the capability of a state to safeguard its core values, argued Lippmann (1943). National security is a concept that has been used to justify ‘maintenance of armies, the development of new weapons systems, and manufacture of armaments’. Almost a fourth of the United States and Soviet Union’s federal taxes have been used for National Security during the Cold War (Brown, 1986). National security integrates all elements of national power: ‘diplomacy, information, military and economics’ (Deptula, 2007). The discourse on national security revolved around ‘coordination across instruments of power’, leadership, and improving capabilities related to nontraditional warfare, disruptive threats, and catastrophic attacks during the war on terror (Davis, 2010). For a comprehensive understanding of the concept of national security, there is a need to trace its genealogy: how the concept developed. In the next section, an attempt will be made to trace the concept as early as the seventeenth century to contemporary times.

Development of National Security Discourse National security as a concept emerged in the seventeenth century. The Thirty Years War of Europe along with the Civil Wars of England gave way to the need to regard a nation-state as sovereign and disregard wars and slaughtering of adversaries on the basis of religion (or any other universal principles). The need to recognize the sovereignty of a state in all matters external and internal developed after the Peace of Westphalia. The notion that an international system be based on equilibrium of states that respected sovereignty and self-defence started gaining acceptance until Immanuel Kant offered the ideas of a more secular and enlightened world order inspired by Enlightenment in his famous 1795-piece, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. The liberal institutionalism and internationalism notions of supernational institution with the power to govern international affairs globally, partly reflected in the manifestation of United Nations comes from Kant’s ideas that emphasized nationstates’ subordination of national interests to the Common Good and International Law (Holmes, 2015). After World War II, national security gained ‘an overwhelmingly military character, rooted in the assumption that the principal threat to security comes from other nations’ (Brown, 1986). The focus on military threats surpassed the imminent threats with which even the military could not cope (Ibid). National security as a concept gained currency in the second half of the twentieth century. Neocleous (2006) argues

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

9

that it is ‘relatively new’. He observes, in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, that the term national security had no entry. By 1968, however, when the title of this same work was known as the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, there was not only an entry for this term but also the suggestion that the concept had long been used by politicians and military leaders (Mercurio and Logan, 2012: 315). Most researchers of IR acknowledge that both the fields of IR and International Security have evolved; from revolving around understanding and explaining war, peace, and the international system, where the survival of states, their security, and their shared power dynamics held the centre-stage, the studies have expanded to include non-traditional security concerns like human security, cyber security, food security, etc. along with issues of climate, environment, terrorism, poverty, migration, and even organized crime. Some scholarship identified the rise of human security paradigm at work after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations where emphasis on human rights and humanitarian law started taking centre stage. Yet, there are others who trace the philosophical moorings of human security in Immanuel Kant who emphasized moral priority to humans and draws attention to international laws that are based on human values that have always been prevalent without employment of the term, human security. It is with the end of the Cold War that a debate over what constitutes security in IR arose between ‘narrowers’ and ‘wideners’. The narrowers focused on analysing the military and political stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Discontent with such an analysis, the wideners attempted to include other types of threats that were not military in nature and that affected people rather than states. This included human security and regional security, together with ideas of culture and identity. Consequently, the end of the Cold War indicated that security was an essentially contested concept—‘a concept that generates debates that cannot be resolved by reference to empirical evidence because the concept contains a clear ideological or moral element and defies precise, generally accepted definition’ (Fierke: 35). Critical approaches to the security point to the contested nature of the theme by arguing that ‘security is not necessarily positive or universal, but context and subject dependent and even negative at times’ (Eroukhmanoff, 2017: 104–105).

Approaches to Study of National Security National security can be understood within two broad categories: traditional, and nontraditional. National security traditionally referred to the protection of a state against a military attack. But with development in science and technology and changing global dynamics including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new centres of state power and the rise of non-state groups with strategic capabilities national security was altered in its priorities and structures. Deptula (2007) identified globalization, knowledge economy, and advancement in information technology as the

10

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

reasons behind the transformation in all aspects of society, including national security. National security has come to include non-military aspects of security including cyber security, women security, human security, economic security, energy security, food security, environmental security, security from violent non-state actors, like terrorism, narcotics, among others, and technology-enabled threats that include risks from misuse of GPS.1 Holmes (2015) identifies two schools of thought on national security, namely NeoKantian, dedicated to United Nations and International Governance, and realists who stress supremacy of nation-state. Even the strategies used by states changed as was captured by Caudle (2009), who argues that ‘a fundamental change is taking place in how countries view, approach, and implement strategies to protect their national security’. The strategies of national security in the past were directed towards threats that could be tackled by diplomatic and military means, but national security has come to have a broader and nuanced connotation that focuses on preserving that, which makes a country unique, including the intangibles like culture and what physically lies within its borders. National security as a concept began transforming when scholars began focusing on newer aspects. A very good illustration would be Brown’s insistence on environmental security even during the Cold War period. As early as 1986, Lester R. Brown argued that it was the environment security that should be the focus of the superpowers, namely the United States and the USSR. The dangers of oil depletion, soil erosion, land degradation, shrinking forests, deteriorating grasslands, and climate alteration had the potential to threaten not only the national, economic, and political security but also the international economy. After the end of Cold War and the emergence of discourse on War on Terror, scholars began identifying novel aspects of security, including psychosocial security. To cope with terrorism as a threat to society, scholars have gone so far as to develop a ‘national strategy for enhancing psychosocial security’. Claude and Chemtob (2005) argues that the ‘proposes to redefine’ the concept of national security policy to go beyond the traditional military aspects of defense to include establishing psychological countermeasures that define maintaining psychological safety as a key marker of the defense against terrorism. Hence, over the period of time, both traditional and non-traditional security threats have been part of the national security discourse. Moreover, within the non-traditional security concerns, more human security issues are increasingly engaged in the national security discourse. As mentioned before, this volume adopts a comprehensive approach to the extent of including the traditional, non-traditional, and human security issues in the national security discourse in India. Before we reflect upon the major themes of the volume, the next section briefly introduces the national security discourse in India. 1

A paper on National Security Assessment on Semantic Scholar argues, ‘Although GPS can support U.S. and allied military activities, it can at the same time create a dependency. Furthermore, enemy uses of GPS can threaten U.S. forces and broader security interests. This dual aspect of GPS—its utility in American and allied hands, along with the risks of dependency and enemy use—highlights a fundamental dilemma for decisionmakers seeking to maximize the benefits of GPS technology while minimizing its risks’.

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

11

National Security Discourse in India The discourse of India’s national security, at least the statist version, has evolved through multiple phases. The major task of the post-colonial Indian state, in terms of its national security discourse, was to Indianize the colonial-era armed force and the intelligence system (Joshi, 2014). In the following decades, as Manoj Joshi (Ibid) very aptly articulates, the national security discourse of India was mainly around the issues of modernizing the armed forces which were necessarily guided by the changing geo-political realities that the Indian state witnessed. The set of challenges appeared in terms of formation of alliances between neighbouring Pakistan with the United States and subsequently numerous wars that the country fought China in 1962 (Ganguly, 2015) and Pakistan. The striking feature of the national security discourse mostly remained around the external threat perception to the Indian state. However, the Kargil War in 1999 with Pakistan brought in the issues of non-traditional security threats like the cross-border incursion and terrorism to the national security discourse. The issue of terrorism as a crucial aspect of India’s national security discourse was even more strongly realized, especially after the terrorist attack in 2008 and in the following years. There have been multiple committees formed by successive governments with objectives to bring about reforms for effectively dealing with the national security threats. The latest National Security Task Force 2011, popularly known as the Naresh Chandra Committee (NCC), came up with a set of recommendations: Appointment of a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), Integration of Service HQ and Ministry of Defence by allowing more cross-postings, shifting the focus of India’s national security strategy from Pakistan to China, better intelligence coordination between all agencies (Gokhale, 2012). This task force also stressed on India’s internal security, cyber security, securing strategic resources, and infrastructures. A closer and critical analysis of the evolution of India’s national security discourse highlights the primacy of state security and somehow inadequately, if not completely, addresses multiple issues related to human security. It is also important to mention that such an understanding of the national security discourse is more or less a commonality across the countries. However, one can observe changes, if not complete shift, in India’s engagement with national security issues. While the state-centric issues continue to dominate, numerous human-centric issues have emerged to be engaged by scholars and policy makers as national security concerns. For example, in the process of dealing with the internal security issues that are perceived to have direct threat perceptions to the Indian state, the security aspects of the individuals in terms of their economic development, social cohesion, and political (in)equality are also being engaged (Hwang, 2010). A report by an expert group (2008) to the erstwhile Planning Commission of India highlighted the rationale of dealing with the sociopolitical and economic issues in Indian state’s response to counter the threats of extremism. Drawing from these developments in the national security discourse in India, this volume has brought together some of the important issues on this subject. Stepping

12

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

away from any polarized school of thought, this book, as mentioned earlier, follows a comprehensive approach of taking in account state and human security issues in its endeavour to discuss varying dimensions of India’s national security. We would also like to highlight that the purpose of structural allotment of certain issues under a category is not intended towards creating a binary but for academic convenience. The next section of this chapter highlights the major themes of the book.

Major Themes of the Book Following the introduction, the next chapter highlights the challenges and scope of national security narrative in India. This chapter argues that at any given time, the national security narrative of a country has to consider international and regional security concerns. India has witnessed changes in the global security framework, yet it confronts some of its security challenges ever since its independence. India is also facing external and internal challenges besides what is being called ‘Non-Traditional Security’. The chapter maps India’s security issues and challenges which the country is facing. The next chapter is on ‘India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy’. Most of India’s endemic security threats originate from the neighbourhood and arise out of the complex and complicated historical legacy issues that continue to bedevil the region. The diversity of security challenges for India, and the internal– external threat continuum that characterizes them, make it complicated for India to frame the right kind of foreign and security policy/approach towards its neighbours. The complexities involved need to be deconstructed and reinterpreted for a better appreciation of India’s security vulnerabilities and its approach to addressing them. This paper outlines the security challenges for India emanating from the neighbourhood. ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s nuclear governance is the theme of the subsequent chapter. This chapter argues that any attempt to fathom the exact contour of India’s nuclear inventory would be futile as India adheres to a great deal of ‘secrecy’ as a security strategy. ‘Secrecy’, as the chapter argues, has been a constant factor ever since India intended to develop ‘operational nuclear forces under the gaze of a hostile nonproliferation regime’ and its lead enforcer, the United States. In addition to little effort to ensure deterrence while maximizing nuclear security, India’s selfimposed NFU posture necessitates ‘opacity and ambiguity’ which can be viewed as a stabilizing factor in nuclear South Asia. This chapter delves into the rationale and necessity of secretive strategy in India’s nuclear discourse while putting forward, at the end, a list of policy prescriptions for concerned authorities to think for bringing in some controlled and calculated transparency measures. The theme of India’s higher defence organization is discussed in the following chapter. Given this regional security environment, India’s military and national security preparedness must be ready to face security threats in a very short notice. These go to the issue of civil–military relations, security strategy, and better synergy and

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

13

jointness among the three military services. The present government has taken steps in strengthening India’s higher defence setup with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This essay highlights these developments and compares them with other similar efforts in other countries. It also reasons the implications of the CDS on India’s higher defence management and on the military’s involvement in the national security decision-making process. India’s cyber security landscape is the theme of the next chapter. With the secondlargest internet user base and leading information and communications technology industry, India has quickly adopted digital technologies to emerge as a major actor in global cyberspace. This thrust on digital and information technologies is accompanied by a rapid expansion of cyber threats. While there has been no major disruptive cyber-attack, India has faced multiple attacks from China and Pakistan—two countries with which it is locked in protracted border disputes. These two sources of threat are joined by non-state actors which have used cyberspace to target Indian interests. This chapter broadly examines the sources and nature of India’s cyber threats. It also reviews the government’s policy measures to counter these threats. In doing so, it is argued that in tackling these threats, India maintains a precarious balance between its commitment to a liberal multi-stakeholder order in cyberspace and the pressure to protect its national security interests. The following theme of the book is on India’s maritime security. This chapter critically focuses to assess the concept of maritime security in both traditional and non-traditional security in the context of India’s national security. It is in the context of India’s national security and more particularly in the context of maritime security that the concepts of competition, cooperation, and convergence would be used to explain the challenges and opportunities as it presents itself for India. The chapter concludes with an assessment for India’s future maritime and naval imperatives. India’s internal security concerns are discussed in the following chapter. A dominant understanding of internal security issues in India has been around four major threats—the Maoist conflict, the ethnic and identity conflicts in the northeastern states, terrorism in hinterland, and separatist violence in Jammu and Kashmir. This chapter reorients the internal security understanding within the larger national security discourse in India. The chapter offers critical insights into each of the issues by highlighting the main issues around which the conflicts play out, the spread and the threat perceptions emerging from them. An important but overlooked area of drug trafficking and dumping of Chinese goods in India’s northeastern states is the theme of the next chapter. The preservation of the state from external threat is not enough to explain the present-day discourse of national security. The issue of dumping is primarily international price discrimination, where the exporting firm benefits in a foreign market and the demand for the good is more elastic than the demand in the company’s home market. On the other hand, drug trafficking is considered a global crime with serious implications of national security. This chapter explores the security implications emerging from drug trafficking and dumping of Chinese goods in India’s northeast, especially in Manipur.

14

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

In order to make sense of the national security discourse in terms of popular perception and the role of media in shaping the discourse, the next chapter reflects on the role of media in understanding national security. The subject of national security has branched out so much into the public domain that gradually the security of the citizens is becoming synonymous with the security of the country and its territory. These developments have paved the way for an independent media to play a much larger role in the arena of national security in a liberal democracy. The chapter emphasizes that though the world has devised many means and methods of safeguarding national security, a free media is still the only guarantee for free speech, and it alone can provide a platform for a meaningful interface between the government and the citizens about national security. The next set of themes covered in this book can be put under the larger heading of human security. This section begins with the theme of India’s economic security. This chapter analyses the various possible dimensions of modern-version-based economic security, including social welfare, fiscal prudence, monetary security, industrial, business, entrepreneurial security, and external security, including international trade and investment. Limiting the analysis to only the last 20 years and specific key policy schemes as reform measures, our objective is to assess the current status of India’s economy critically, its strength, and security promise therein. It also highlights the possible impediments and challenges that government intervention strategies face while addressing them and the way forward. Following the economic security, the next chapter is on the energy security of India. It addresses two main challenges with respect to India’s energy security. Firstly, energy security needs to have a framework that can assess energy security at both the levels of micro (household) and macro (societal). Accordingly, it proposes one such energy security assessment framework, which is a composite measure of energy availability, affordability, and acceptability. Secondly, the chapter discusses the tradeoffs between renewable and non-renewable energy resources. The chapter concludes with three policy trade-offs to steer through these dilemmas to ensure energy security both at household and country levels. Climate change as a major human security challenge in India is the theme of the next chapter. This chapter reflects upon the impact of climate change and extreme events on the different dimensions of human security. In doing so, this discusses the impact of climate change on agriculture, and across the studies, negative coefficients of climate variables on the yield of several crops are observed; therefore, it is time to address the adaptation deficit persisting in the agricultural sector in India. Further, it also summarizes the impact of floods on public infrastructure in India, and an increasing trend is observed and warrants for disaster-resilient infrastructure. The chapter also outlines the major challenges persisting with mitigation and adaptation. Following the economy, energy, and climate change, the next theme of the book is on the food security of India. One of every four of the world’s undernourished population resides in India. From the legacy of famines in British India to the continued reports of starvation deaths, malnutrition continues to plague India. Further, for decades, children from marginalized sections have been the most stunted. However, since most food security measures are not universal and relief measures inadequate,

1 India’s National Security Discourse: A Conceptual Introduction

15

vulnerable communities continue to be excluded and severely deprived. This chapter argues that the time is ripe for the universal expansion of a range of food security entitlements—from the public distribution system and community kitchens to school meals and employment guarantees. The following chapter of the section is on the theme of corruption and national security. Arguably the most insidious threat to national security arises from corruption. India knows this phenomenon so intimately. High value corruption and bigticket scams have taken the limelight in the country for too long, at times bringing down governments. However, less is known how national security is deeply linked to corruption in India. This chapter uncovers some of the close links between the graft and various dimensions of security threats to the nation and what measures India has taken to curb the dangerous trends of increasing graft and institutional decay. The chapter argues that national security imperatives demand comprehensive political reforms involving political and radical reform of justice apart from making institutional innovations like Lokpal and RTI to attack corruption from its roots. Having discussed the major themes relating to India’s national security (both state-centric and human-centric), the last theme of the book is on introducing the geographic information system (GIS) as an interesting tool to analyse and address the national security challenges. GIS plays a crucial role in collecting, collating, analysing, distributing information that can better process the mechanisms of any earthly process or cycle. Its use in national security too is omnipresent. The significance of location and location-based information for security purposes, traditional and non-traditional, find efficient manoeuvring of processes and information for meeting desired goals. The development of GIS and related advancement has led to a stage where conventional aspects and information of national security can be integrated and addressed.

References Antunes, S., & Camisao, I. (2017). In M. G. Ste‘phen et al. (Eds), International relations theory (pp. 15–21). Bristol, E. International Relations Publishing. Bajpai, K. (2003). The idea of human security. International Studies., 40(3), 195–228. Brown, L., & R. (1986). Redefining national security. Challenge, 29(3), 25–32. Bull, H. (1995). The anarchical society (2nd ed.). Macmillan. Buzan, B. (1983). People, states, and fear: The national security problem in international relations. Wheatsheaf books. Buzan, B. (1984). Peace, power, and security: Contending concepts in the study of international relations. Journal of Peace Research., 21(2), 109–125. Caudle, S. (2009) National security strategies: Security from what, for whom, and by what means. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1). Chemtob, C. M., & Claude, M. (2005). Finding the gift in the horror. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 10(3–4), 721–727. Davis, P. K. (2010). Military transformation? Which transformation, and what lies ahead? Potomac Books. Deptula, D. (2007). Toward restructuring national security. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 1(2), 5–17.

16

A. Behera and A. A. Moazzam

Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas. (2008). Report of an Expert Group to Planning Commission. Government of India, New Delhi. Eroukhmanoff, C. (2017). Securitization theory. In M. G., Stephen et al. (Eds.), International relations theory (pp. 104–109). Bristol, E. International Relations Publishing. Ganguly, S. (2015). India’s national security In D. M. Malone et al. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy. Oxford. Gokhale, N. (2012). Naresh Chandra Task Force’s Report on National Security: An appraisal. Vivekananda International Foundation. https://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/16/naresh-cha ndra-task-force-s-report-onnational-security-an-appraisal. Retrieved Jan 15, 2021. Haq, M. U. (1999). Reflections on human development. Oxford University Press. Hobbes, T., & Oakeshott, M. (1946). Leviathan. Holmes, K. R. (2015). What is national security? Index of U S military strength. The Heritage Foundation. Hwang, K. (2010). Measuring geopolitical power in India: A review of the national security index (NSI). GIGA Working paper No. 136. Joshi, M. (2014). The unending quest to reform India’s national security system. Policy Report. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/09/PR140301_The_Unending_Quest_to_Reform_India_National_Security_System.pdf. Retrieved Jan 15, 2021. Leffler, M. P. (1990). National security. The Journal of American History., 77(1), 143–152. Lippmann, W. (1943). U.S. Foreign policy: Shield of the Republic. Brown and Company. Meiser, J. W. (2017). Liberalism. In S. McGlinchey et al. (Eds.). International relations theory (pp. 22–27). Bristol. E. International Relations Publishing. Mercurio, A., Logan, M. (2012). National security: An integration. In K. Malley-Morrison et al. International handbook of war, torture, and terrorism. Springer. National Security Strategy for a New Century by United States Executive Office of the President, White House. (1998). https://books.google.co.in/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WCIxr91Ol-sC&oi= fnd&pg=PP7&dq=National+security+initiatives&ots=5-M-ojmJyH&sig=4tdC4sBAaAgtas0 EE26xFWycgVU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=National%20security%20initiatives&f=false. Retrieved Aug 25, 2020. Neocleous, M. (2006). From social to national security: On the fabrication of economic order. Security Dialogue, 37(3), 363–384. Singh, B. (2004). India’s security concerns: National regional and global. The Indian Journal of Political Science., 65(3), 345–364. Stivachits, Y. A. (2017). The english school. In S. McGlinchey et al. (Eds.), International relations theory (pp. 28–35). Bristol. E. International Relations Publishing. Theys, S. (2017). Constructivism. In S. McGlinchey et al. (Eds.), International relations theory (pp. 36–41). Bristol. E. International Relations Publishing. Ullman, R. H. (1983). Redefining security. International Security., 8(1), 129–153. Wolfers, A. (1952). “National security” as an ambiguous symbol. Political Science Quarterly., 67(4), 481–502.

Part II

State-Centric Security Concerns

Chapter 2

India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges Rajiv Nayan

‘Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence’. —Barry Buzan

Introduction The narrative of national security is diverse and dynamic. It differs from one country to another. Even in a country, it differs at different points in time. However, some elements of continuity also continue. The nineteenth-century security narrative of a country could be different in the twenty-first century. At the same time, some common adversaries and common security issues could be common over a while. The task of storytellers or security analysts becomes challenging as they must construct narratives in a nuanced way to recognise the threats and their policy responses. Evidence and information are the principal building blocks of a narrative, but manipulation in arranging the evidence and information, at times, leads to a distorted narrative. At any given time, the national security narrative of a country should consider international security and regional security. Some countries sign pacts or treaties with other countries under which an attack on one country is considered an attack on all the countries which sign the pact or treaty. The phenomenon is known as collective security. This principle is now extended to the functioning of the United Nations (UN), though in principle, for the UN it has been challenging to implement the principle. Quite often, the countries strive to work out common security and cooperative security with other countries facing or expected to face the same security R. Nayan (B) Nuclear Issues and Arms Control, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_2

19

20

R. Nayan

threats. Presently, the national security narrative encompasses not only external and internal security but also non-traditional and human security. India is in a challenging geographical landscape, which becomes further complicated because of advanced and military relating to technological developments. The advent of the nuclear age, directly and indirectly, affected India’s security. The United States, the first nuclear weapons country, was soon followed by some nuclear weapons countries. The nuclearization in the early years of post-World War II or the first two decades of the Cold War happened by both the military blocs. The massive accumulation of nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons-grade materials, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles had brought the entire world under the nuclear shadow. However, for India, the nuclearization of China with which it had fought a war in 1962 became a real and direct security challenge. At present, the world has nine nuclear weapons countries, including India. India has witnessed changes in the global security framework, yet it confronts some of its security challenges ever since its independence. The country was partitioned but the partition did not bring about peace. Pakistan has continued its belligerent policy towards India and is unwilling to settle for what the principle/criteria under which the partition plan was agreed upon. It is still in the occupation of the Indian territory. China is another country, which has been posing serious security problems for India. It has also occupied the Indian territory. India is also facing external and internal challenges besides what is being called ‘Non-Traditional Security’. The chapter maps India’s security issues and challenges which the country is facing.

External Security and Border Management If an adversary’s military adversely affects the existence or survival of the country, these risks destabilise the country and disrupt the normal way of life or activities. India must manage security problems, which emanate from outside the country. Some of these security issues, which India manages, are universal in nature. These external security issues range from global risks to military threats. Some of the risks may be new but most of the risks are existing for a long period. However, some of the older risks such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, small arms, and light weapons and terrorism are taking new dimensions. The annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence notes: ‘A complex and increasingly unpredictable interplay of regional and global developments characterise India’s security environment. Guided by the principles of strategic autonomy and mutually beneficial cooperation, India continues to address the wide spectrum of conventional and non-conventional security challenges by pursuing constructive engagement with partner countries at the bilateral, regional, and global levels’ (Ministry of Defence, 2018; 19). Indeed, India has a neighbourhood that is in turmoil for a variety of reasons. The most important factor is the growing radicalisation in

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

21

the neighbourhood. Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have Islamic radicalisation, religious extremism, and terrorist organisations. The growing interconnectedness of the world and new means of communication are further adding complexity to the external security environment of India. Now the Indian security environment has what is known as ‘long-distance airpower, especially drones’, which involves new players such as private security suppliers and non-state actors. China has emerged as an important drone supplier in the region. However, the proliferation network transacting missile and nuclear items exists clandestinely but drone transactions are made in open. Pakistan also enters into an agreement with China for the supply of conventional weapons. It is also trying to procure weapons from Russia. The China–Pakistan proliferation network is well assisted by the networks of drug syndicates and traffickers, money launderers, criminal groups, human traffickers, and so on. Maritime security is another dimension of Indian external security. It is multimission in character. India has declared that it intends to fight ‘piracy and armed robbery against ship in Asia’ (Ministry of Defence, 2018). The 26/11 incidents highlighted the threat of maritime terrorism for which India is to remain prepared. It promotes the idea of maritime neighbours in which information is shared. It has also furthered Maritime Domain Awareness. India must ensure freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. For a long period, it has kept protecting sea lanes of communication and trade in the Indian Ocean. The increasing connectivity through the sea has made the country undertake all the preparations for the twenty-first century that it acknowledges will be the ‘Century of the Seas’ (Indian Navy, 2015). International terrorism, manifesting itself in various forms, is also one of the principal external security threats to India. Al Qaeda and its sleeper cells are serious security threats to the country. These terror groups are arming themselves with advanced and sophisticated weapons and work with globally dispersed organisations providing information and other requirements to attack India inside and its assets abroad. The international community is worried about the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism as well. India has been working in different international forums to counter this terrorism. Cyber-attacks are also becoming a prominent security problem for the world as for India. Some international relations theorists and writers strongly believe that borders give identity to a country as a nation in the international order (Albert et al., 2001: 10). By protecting its borders, a nation-state protects its identity as a nation. Even if territoriality is considered a Westphalian phenomenon, yet it is the most dominant form of the structure of the international system. Many scholars dispute that territoriality is a product of post-Westphalia order. The battle of territoriality starts from the ancient period. The border is supposed to ensure ‘separability and differentiation’ and at the same time, it confirms ‘sovereignty-based territorial pattern of Segmentation’ (Albert et al., 2001: 24). Despite the emergence of the ideas such as the ‘world without borders’ and what Yosef Lapid describes ‘a fundamental shift in the balance of territorial, semiterritorial, and nonterritorial vectors that shape the intricate texture of contemporary world politics’ (Lapid, 2018: 25), it is correctly diagnosed that state sovereignty and security

22 Table 2.1 Length of the border between India and its neighbours

R. Nayan Name of the country

Length of the border (in km)

Bangladesh

4,096.7

China

3,488.0

Pakistan

3,323.0

Nepal

1,751.0

Myanmar

1,643.0

Bhutan

699.0

Afghanistan

106.0

Total

15,106.7

Source https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_ English_01102019.pdf

have grown in a synergetic way. Although new security institutions or agencies are emerging to manage new security challenges emanating from outside yet defending the border or securing the nation-state remains the principal function of a country. India too should defend its territory manifested in borders and boundaries. The country must defend 15,106.7 km of its land border and a coastline of 7,516.6 km including island territories (Ministry of Home Affairs, ). India shares the longest boundary with Bangladesh and the shortest with Afghanistan (see Table 2.1). Once Bangladesh borders had serious problems of skirmishes and the influx of illegal Bangladeshi refugees, after several agreements and initiatives, the situation has improved. Although the management of the border is an issue with all the neighbouring countries, yet the borders with Pakistan and of late, with China, have been most problematic, which see the confrontation of different degrees. The international boundary between India and China has been contested by China. It claims nearly 90,000 square kilometres of Arunachal Pradesh in India’s Eastern sector and about 38,000 square kilometres in the Union Territory of Ladakh. China is also in illegal possession of 5,180 square kilometres of the Indian area through the so-called 2 March 1963 China–Pakistan ‘Boundary Agreement’. Besides, Pakistan has occupied roughly 78,000 square kilometres of area in the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. Moreover, India and China do not have ‘commonly delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC)’, which has been leading to different perceptions of the boundary. This in turn has led to frequent transgressions and incursions. The 2020 crisis of the Ladakh border is primarily because of this problem. Although India and China have created several structures such as ‘border personnel meetings, flag meetings, meetings of Working for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs and diplomatic channels’ to address the problems arising at the border areas of the two countries, yet in recent years, the aggressive behaviour of China is leading to a stand-off between the two countries. China is overlooking the bilateral agreements for supporting peace and tranquillity in the India–China border area.

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

23

Table 2.2 Status of border fencing Border fence sanctioned (in km)

Border fence completed (in km)

Border fence in progress (in km)

Time limit

2069.046

2004.666

64.38

March 2020

Source http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/171/AU2565.pdf

India is facing a proxy war for a long period. Continuous infiltration through the LOC has been a major challenge. Pakistan has been the principal culprit. The cross-border infiltration fluctuates, yet India has ‘a policy of zero tolerance towards cross-border infiltration’ (Lok Sabha, 2019a). For this purpose, the government has a diverse method to control cross-border infiltration. The Indian government lists ‘multi-tiered deployment along the International Border/Line of Control, border fencing, improved intelligence and operational coordination, equipping Security Forces with improved technological weapons and taking pro-active action against infiltrators’ (Lok Sabha, 2019a) as some of the measures. Table 2.2 shows the progress in border fencing along the Pakistani border. The Indian government has also pressed for a technical fix like Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (Lok Sabha, 2019b) in the highly susceptible border zones. In India, primarily, border management is the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry has adopted the norm of ‘One border, One Border— Guarding Force’ (MHA, 2018, 2019b: 35). Different Central Police Forces are deployed on the borders with different countries. On the Bangladesh and Pakistan borders, Border Security Force is deployed and on the China border, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). However, the Indian army is positioned on the Pakistani and the Chinese border to support the Central Police Forces. When the situation becomes extremely serious, the Indian army takes over. Nepal and Bhutan borders have Sashastra Seema Bal as the border guards and the Myanmar border Assam Rifles. Maritime security encompassing coastal and offshore security is assigned to the Indian navy. The Indian Coast Guard and Coastal police look after India’s coastal security in its territorial waters.

Internal Security Internal security is another component of India’s national security. Generally, internal security is contrasted with external security. If external security is concerned with border and boundary-related issues, internal security’s concern is the protection of internal cohesion and system. However, there is no internationally accepted definition for either internal or external security. Even international law does not distinguish between external and internal security. As a result, the term is interpreted differently in international relations and the international community. A country like the United States prefers the term—homeland security. It is getting increasingly diversified. But

24 Table 2.3 Terror incidents in the hinterland of the country

R. Nayan Year

No. of terrorist attacks

No. of civilians killed

No. of security personnel killed

2014

03

04

–

2015

01

03

04

2016

01

01

07

2017

–

-

–

2018

01

03

–

Source https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1575578

by and large, it is considered a subject matter of law enforcement officials. Proxy war and newer and older weapons such as drones and combat helicopters are erasing the traditional boundary between internal and external security. The global security community discusses several issues under internal or homeland security. However, the Indian government has compartmentalised internal security in four major sections: ‘(i) Terrorism in the hinterland of the country. (ii) Left Wing Extremism in certain areas. (iii) Security situation in Jammu & Kashmir. (iv) Insurgency in the Northeastern States’ (MHA, 2018, 2019b: 6). Although these are broad issues, some issues, which are considered under internal security, are addressed by the Indian government under these four categories. Admittedly, some issues are not covered under these four categories but are significant for internal security management. Possibly, some of these may be covered later by the Indian government. Already security of religious shrines and places and vital installations are discussed by the Ministry of Home Affairs under internal security, even though it does not figure in the above-mentioned four broad categories. The first issue is terrorism in the hinterland of the country. Till a decade back, it was a major problem in India. The country witnessed a series of bomb blasts. However, over the years, the incidents of terrorism have come down in the country. The government has been confidently asserting that ‘no major terrorist incident occurred in the hinterland of the country’ (PIB, 2020a). Table 2.3 indicates a drastic reduction in terror incidents. This decline has become possible basically because of the proactive policy of the Indian government, not because of the changed policy of the country which is sponsoring terrorism. In India, the law and order is a state subject but because of the complex nature of terrorism, including foreign sponsorship, the State and the Centre have been coordinating well. The intelligence and security agencies seemingly have also worked satisfactorily. The multi-agency centre (MAC) is admirably assisting the efforts of the Centre–State coordination. Security forces of the state are being properly trained and the Central Police Forces are stationed to assist the law and order machinery of the state government. The National Investigating Agency, constituted in 2008, is also effectively doing investigation and prosecution of terror offences. The government maintains a dynamic list of terrorist organisations, which are striking or conspiring to strike in India. Besides, the Indian government also joins working groups on counterterrorism with about 20 countries.

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

25

The second major internal security issue is left-wing extremism (LWE) in certain areas. Like terror incidents in the hinterland, LWE has also declined in recent years. The Indian government notes that between 2014 and 2019 LWE-related incidents have been diminished by over 38% (Rajya Sabha, 2020). Besides, Table 2.4 shows that there is a perceptible shift in the epicentre of LWE. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are no longer the major centres of LWE. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are witnessing the maximum number of LWE-related incidents. Of the two, Chhattisgarh has been witnessing the highest number of incidents in the last five years. Even the Corona has not deterred the Naxal groups to attack security forces. Bihar, Maharashtra, and Odisha are other top three states where LWE-related incidents are taking place. The declining trend is also witnessed in the number of districts affected by LWE in the last few years (MHA, 2018, 2019b) (Table 2.5). The Indian government has adopted a multi-pronged integrated strategy to fight the Naxal menace. The 1995 National Policy and Action Plan has combined law and order measures with local developmental plans. The local community is also being mobilised to implement the plan. Better inter-state coordination is encouraged. The government is building the capacity of security forces by imparting special training. An effective presence of the Security Forces with a good operational strategy in the Naxal affected states is making the difference. The government is using modern technology, including drones to fight Naxalism. The induction of modern technology is part of the modernisation of police forces. The security situation in Jammu & Kashmir is another broad but serious internal security issue in India. The state, now a union territory, has been facing terrorist and secessionist violence for more than three decades. From 1990 to March 2019, the Ministry of Home Affairs records killings of 14,024 Civilians and 5273 Security Force personnel (MHA, 2018, 2019b). All the terrorist groups, operating in Jammu and Kashmir, are sponsored and trained in Pakistan. Terrorist groups after getting training infiltrate through International Border and LOC. On 5 August 2020, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 divided the erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir state into two union territories. The situation was brought under control after the division by taking some special measures. To contain cross-border infiltration, which is the principal factor of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, the government has fortified the border. Border fencing and improved technological surveillance are key tools to counter cross-border terrorism. The government is also providing institutional support to security agencies fighting terrorism. The National Investigating Agency and the Enforcement Directorate also target secessionist organisations. The security forces target those people who are ‘hand-in-glove with the terrorist forces’, which disturb not only peace in Jammu & Kashmir but also the territorial integrity of the country. Surgical strikes and airstrikes to combat terror were also used to destroy terror training camps existing outside the country in recent years. Insurgency in the north-eastern states is the fourth major internal security issue. Eight states—Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,

17

129

395

323

12

73

86

7

0

0

6

1048

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Madhya Pradesh

Maharashtra

Odisha

Telangana

Uttar Pradesh

West Bengal

Other

Total

65

0

0

0

0

3

3

0

9

38

12

0

SFs killed

908

1

0

0

5

81

69

3

251

373

99

26

Incidents

2017

75

0

0

0

0

8

3

0

3

60

0

1

SFs killed

833

0

0

0

11

75

75

4

205

392

59

12

Incidents

2018

67

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

9

55

2

0

SFs killed

670

3

0

0

8

45

66

5

200

263

62

18

Incidents

2019

52

0

0

0

0

1

16

0

12

22

1

0

SFs killed

Source Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Naxal Attacks”, Rajya Sabha, Starred Question No. 184, March 11, 2020

Incidents

State

2016

Table 2.4 LWE-related incidents

84

1

0

0

0

11

4

2

23

39

4

0

Incidents

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

SFs killed

2020 (up to 15 February 2020)

26 R. Nayan

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

27

Table 2.5 Incidents and deaths in three top LWE affected states: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha State

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Year

Incidents

Deaths

Incidents

Deaths

Incidents

Odisha Deaths

2005

385

168

312

119

42

14

2006

715

388

310

124

44

9

2007

582

369

482

157

67

17

2008

620

242

484

207

103

101

2009

529

290

742

208

266

67

2010

625

343

501

157

218

79

2011

465

204

517

182

192

53

2012

370

109

480

163

171

45

2013

355

111

387

152

101

35

2014

328

112

384

103

103

26

2015

466

101

310

56

92

28

2016

395

107

323

85

86

27

2017

373

130

251

56

81

29

2018

392

153

205

43

75

12

2019

263

77

200

54

45

11

2020 (up to 29 Feb 2020)

63

17

34

05

13

04

Source Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Decrease in Incidents of Left-Wing Extremism”, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 2749, March 18, 2020

Sikkim, and Tripura—constitute north-eastern states. For several years, the northeastern region has been facing an insurgency. Quite significantly, this region, too, has witnessed a sharp decline in the incidents of insurgency over the years as shown by Table 2.6. It is obvious from the table that the violent cases or incidents have not completely disappeared. But interestingly, two states—Tripura and Mizoram—are Table 2.6 Incidents in Kashmir Year

Incidents

Security forces killed

Civilians killed

Terrorists killed

2014

222

47

28

110

2015

208

39

17

108

2016

322

82

15

150

2017

342

80

40

213

2018

614

91

39

257

2019 (up to 31 March 2019

116

59

09

62

Source https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf

28

R. Nayan

Table 2.7 Incidents of insurgency in the north-eastern states Security situation in northeast region Years Incidents Extremist Extremist Arms Security Civilians Extremist Persons arrested killed recovered Forces killed surrendered kidnapped surrendered killed 2012

1025

2145

222

1856

14

97

1195

329

2013

732

1712

138

1596

18

107

640

307

2014

824

1934

181

1255

20

212

965

369

2015

574

1900

149

897

46

46

143

267

2016

484

1202

87

698

17

48

267

168

2017

308

995

57

432

12

37

130

102

2018

252

804

34

478

14

23

161

117

2019

61

188

2

71

–

4

11

32

Source https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_/, https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/ AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf, p. 21

not witnessing insurgency for several years. About 50% of the insurgency-related incidents are coming from Manipur (Table 2.7). Some states like Arunachal Pradesh do not have any indigenous insurgent groups but the groups of the neighbouring states operate and take insurgency-related activities. Some insurgent groups are split into different splinter groups. The multi-pronged strategy is in operation in the region. Suspension of Operations and Memorandum of Settlements are two dominant tools in practice in the region to manage insurgency. In Nagaland, the government has signed a ceasefire agreement with an insurgent group. The government also has a system for ‘surrender-cum-Rehabilitation’ of rebels. The government uses force wherever required. For this purpose, the Centre works with the States.

Dominant Non-Traditional Security The dominant discourse on security studies, for a long period, has prevented the entry of the ideas which are now constituting non-traditional security. The debate and discussions on security have led to the opening of a new vista. Gradually, new nontraditional security issues started entering security discourse and becoming security concerns for the nation-state and the world. However, as with any other concern or issue of social sciences, defining and determining non-traditional security have been difficult and subjective. As a result, the scope and the issue areas vary in the world and within a nation-state. Even in non-traditional security, some old areas such as environment and energy security have been leading, but new issues such as cyber-security and health security have made serious inroads. In security literature, non-traditional security issues are also covered under human security.

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

29

India has been confronting a combination of new and old non-traditional security issues. Non-traditional security after meeting the parameters of securitisation means survival issues or freedom from the existential threat, and promoted through speech act of the strategic community, including the Indian government, is considered part of India’s security perception. Energy security is the most defining feature of India’s non-traditional security. The Indian government identifies it in terms of ‘energy affordability to the poorest of the poor, efficiency in energy use, energy sustainability for combating climate change as a responsible global citizen and energy security for mitigating global uncertainties’ (PIB, 2020b). Smuggling of drugs, arms, gold, currency, cattle, wildlife species, and so on has been one of the major concerns of the Government of India. The smuggling not only hurts India’s economy but also cultural heritage, meaning the very identity of the nation. This also seriously affects internal security in traditional terms. The government has taken institutional mechanisms like the Anti-Smuggling Unit of Central Board of Excise and Customs and new surveillance technology to fight the menace. Piracy has been another dominant non-traditional security issue, though many consider it a theme of maritime security. The security of the high seas is deliberated as the most important issue in this regard. India has been securing not only its own merchant vessel and its citizens but also the life and goods of other countries. Irregular migration also puts India under pressure. Earlier illegal migrants from Bangladesh were a major security concern. The illegal flow from Bangladesh pushed the crime graph of the country high. Now, the Rohingya issue is haunting the country. India also encourages its citizens to take care before shifting to another country. The government has set up e-portals along with activating security agencies on the border. Environmental security, including climate change, has been one of the oldest nontraditional security issues of India. The country is harping back on its ancient wisdom and philosophy to protect and preserve the environment. It is also reorienting its economic model through a modern technological solution, though the task is tough. It is trying to balance it with economic growth. India has joined international efforts in strengthening environmental security. Food and health security are other major issues in non-traditional security. Now, India does not have to rely on imports to feed its people, yet the availability of nutritious food for its own people, especially for those below or just above the poverty line is a task. Similarly, disease control through ‘disease surveillance, monitoring of health status, educating the public, providing evidence for public health action and enforcing public health regulation’ (PIB, 2018) is an important task for health security. Rural health is an important focus of India’s health security.

30

R. Nayan

Emerging Challenges of India’s National Security An aggressive neighbourhood is the biggest security challenge India is facing today. For a long period, India confronted only a live Pakistani border through which terrorists were entering into the Indian territory and waging a proxy war. Now China has joined Pakistan and has started intrusions and frequent clashes with the Indian troops at the border. In 2013 and 2017, Chinese troops created border tension in Ladakh and Doklam. The April 2020 intrusion is merely a continuity of its new aggressive behaviour not only against India but also its entire neighbourhood. China has also increased its maritime hostilities in the South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean. India has stakes in the entire Indo-Pacific region. China is directly militarily confronting countries in the South China Sea region and has started making forays in the Indian Ocean. India has joined global efforts in urging China to respect freedom of navigation in the region. As Indian interests are going to be affected because of the Chinese aggression, India may have to confront China alone or with the countries affected by the Chinese moves. This requires a very advanced defence preparedness by India. India’s military modernisation is the foremost challenge for India’s security. Military modernisation is dependent on several factors ranging from induction or incorporation of modern/emerging/futuristic technology to the economic strength to timely weapons procurement. The Indian strategic community, including armed forces, has been demanding military modernisation for a long period. India once, and to a great extent, even today, relies on foreign countries, and their vendors for arms supplies. The problem of procurement has been hitting the task of military modernisation. Although in recent days, India has expedited the procurement process and purchased some modern weapons such as Rafale aircraft and helicopters, yet each order takes years of negotiations, finalisation, and finally, delivery of weapons. New and modern technologies, known as emerging technology, are changing the battlefield scenario. China, India’s one of the security concerns, is heavily spending on these technologies and is considered to have achieved great success. Admittedly, there is a debate in the strategic community on overcoming the technological gap with the United States, yet whatever success it has achieved will act as a force multiplier. India has also invested in these areas and the Defence Research and Development (DRDO) has marked 20% of its budget for futuristic technologies. The biggest challenge will be to bridge the gap at least with the Chinese in the new technologies. In the absence of modern technologies, especially sensors, communication, and computation, India’s defence modernisation move shall be seriously affected. In such a situation, India may have to look towards foreign countries for the procurement of advanced technologies. Despite all the steps for procuring advanced technology, it is a well-known phenomenon that no country transfers its frontline technology or weapons system. This challenge will continue to worry about India. The successive governments have been trying to streamline the process of procurement or acquisition through the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The DPP, which is ‘a dynamic and an evolving document’ (PIB, 2018), has undergone several

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

31

revisions. The 1992 Defence Procurement Management Structures and Systems gave way to DPP in 1992. In the subsequent years, it incorporated several items not only to smoothen the procurement process but also through provisions such as offset it tries to strengthen the defence industrial base of the country. However, many of the provisions are not giving desired results despite the involvement of the stakeholders in revising the system. The availability of an appropriate defence budget is another challenge for India’s national security. Although the government states that for security budget will not be a constraint and India has, in fact, raised its defence budget, yet defence industry and armed forces have been facing budgetary constraints for years. The Covid-19 is going to further complicate the economic situation. The general understanding is that India needs to spend between 2.5 and 3% of its gross domestic product on defence if it wants to catch up with the combined military might of China and Pakistan or must prepare to fight a war at two and a half fronts. Indigenisation of defence products (Puri, 2014) is necessary for properly managing national security. It is necessary for cutting the cost of a weapon as well as the vulnerability of the supply line. At the time of war, the indigenous industry could be a reliable source of weapons supply. India has achieved a great deal of success in strategic weapons but almost all the major conventional weapons are being imported from outside. Some major systems are developed but because of the problem of quality, armed forces are unwilling to induct them. Although gradually the defence industry has started manufacturing quality products, somehow a very systematic production line is yet to come. The government is taking necessary measures to promote indigenisation. In the DPP, a provision like the first preference to the indigenously designed, developed, and manufactured item has been incorporated in 2016, but the category, apparently, is not very successful even after so many years of adoption. Since May 2001, the private defence industry sector was allowed to participate in the defence sector to encourage innovation and efficiency in the sector. However, the private sector can make a very limited contribution to defence production. Its true potential is yet to be realised. Industry clamours for the flow of continuous order from the armed forces for its sustenance. Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, in an address in August 2020 observed ‘…when India became independent, it had a great potential and ecosystem for defence production in India but for decades no serious efforts were made’ (PIB, 2020c). He also underlined the need for ‘technology up-gradation for self-sufficiency in modern equipment’. He promised to continue reforms and pointed out bringing about ‘improvement in licensing process, creating level playing field, simplification of export process’. He wanted to use the framework of ‘reform-perform-transform’ for the indigenisation of the defence sector. However, the most important step in this regard in recent months was the issuing of a negative list of 101 items, which will be procured by armed forces only from the indigenous sources. Cyber-security is one of the much talked about security challenges of the world. India, well and fast networked to the world, cannot escape cyber challenges. Considering the increasing number of people relying on the internet, it is going to be a

32

R. Nayan

serious challenge. The increasing use of smartphones has further increased cyber vulnerability. Till June 2019, in India, 560,000,000 persons used the internet. Cyberattacks were witnessed prominently in India. Incidents of defacing of governmental and non-governmental sites were reported. Media reports inform that the hackers based in the South Asian countries basically hacked the websites of their rival or enemy countries, though most of the reports are not authenticated. Computer emergency response and computer incidence response teams and centres are coming up. Yet, writings on the subject inform us that the country lacks rudimentary cyber-security defence to the national critical information infrastructure. One of the reports of Data Security Council of India notes: ‘With rapid digitization comes the challenges of the risks posed by technology. The most recent attacks targeted our critical infrastructure sectors—nuclear plant and space agency and these attacks have exposed India’s preparedness in Cybersecurity’ (Data Security Council of India, 2020). The same report highlights 21 areas that are required for a ‘safe, secure, trusted, resilient, and vibrant cyberspace.’ For a couple of decades, the Indian government has actively engaged its diaspora. Over the years, the engagement, by and large, has been confined in cultural reminiscences and limited economic interactions. India has avoided raising the engagement to the political level, though gradually, the political factor is sneaking into the engagement framework. The members of the Indian diaspora have entered the power structure in some of their host lands. In some countries, they are prevented from coming to power or are overthrown. The pressure is mounted on the Indian government to intervene, but the Indian government has so far restrained itself. Tomorrow, the Indian diaspora may mount intense pressure for a security payback for its contribution to the Indian economy and science and technology. In the future, the Indian government may be under pressure to protect the scattered Indian community, including the diaspora.

Conclusion India’s national security involves the management of both traditional and nontraditional threats. The traditional threats like the border problem are persisting for a long period. The persistence of the security problem has led to an added complexity. The complexity in turn has made the solution of the problem almost unachievable. India’s territory, under foreign occupation, remains so because of the failure of the dialogue process applied to solve the problem. Worse, the Indian land is being ceded to another country making India watch helplessly. The situation may change in the future as India has realised that the traditional method is not yielding results, so it needs to innovate. Innovation is taking shape in developing a new institutional framework and military modernisation. Traditional threats in the realm of internal security may have mixed results. Like the border problem, some internal security issues persist but others disappear. LWE may appear continuing but as the data shows, it has almost disappeared or has been

2 India’s National Security Narratives: Scope and Challenges

33

diminished in some states but is active in others. Terrorism has been wiped out from most parts of the country but is continuing in Jammu & Kashmir in the form of either terrorism or insurgency. Similarly, the insurgency has drastically come down in the north-eastern part of India. In this part, too, some states have not witnessed any incident for the last many years. As for security mechanisms, too, no single mechanism is responsible; multiple options have brought successful results. Non-traditional threats are highly dynamic and new security challenges enter this category at a regular interval. For sure, the issue of non-traditional security is expanding the scope of national security. Survival, the mantra, securitisation is taking place in many new areas. Some of these non-traditional security threats do disappear but some continue to exist in the original or, at times, in a changed shape. India is managing or confronting these challenges inside the country or in the sea. Nontraditional security like cybersecurity, which has borderless existence, complicates the fight or security measures. The government must work with foreign countries as well as non-governmental organisations and civil society. India’s security environment indeed is dynamic. However, the aggressive behaviour of China and the rogue character of Pakistan are the two most dominant security factors haunting Indian security now. For years, India has been vocal about the terror activities of Pakistan, but in recent years, it has been forced to acknowledge that China poses a security threat to it. Before India was restrained in its pronouncement. Even the strategic community was modest in its pronunciation and in the worst situation, called it a competitor or a challenge. The Chinese intrusion and aggression seem to have forced India to reshape its security narrative which is going to be different in the coming years.

References Albert, M. et al. (Eds.). (2001). Identities, borders, orders: Rethinking international relations theory. Borderlines, 18 University of Minnesota Press. Data Security Council of India. (2020). National cyber security strategy 2020. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/documents/resource_centre/National%20C yber%20Security%20Strategy%202020%20DSCI%20submission.pdf. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2018–2019). Annual Report-2018–2019. Retrieved June 18, 2020, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_/, https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2018–2019). Annual Report-2018–2019. Retrieved June 21, 2020, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_/, https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf. Indian Navy, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2015). Ensuring secure seas: Indian maritime security strategy. Naval Strategic Publication (NSP), 1(2). Retrieved May 12, 2020, from https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Doc ument_25Jan16.pdf. Lapid, Y. (2018). Rethinking the ‘International’: IBO Clues for Post-Westphalian Mazes. In A. Mathias et al. (Ed.), Identities, borders, orders: Rethinking international relations theory, Borderlines, 18, University of Minnesota Press.

34

R. Nayan

Lok Sabha, Government of India. (2019a) Cross border infiltration. Starred question No.2565. Retrieved June 15, 2020, from http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/171/AU2565.pdf. Lok Sabha, Government of India. (2019b). Infiltration of Illegal Immigrants. Starred question No. 150. Retrieved June 15, 2020, from http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/171/AS150. pdf. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2018). Annual Report 2017–2018. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR1718.pdf. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2018–19). Annual Report 2018–2019. Retrieved May 10, 2021, from https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf. Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India. (2018–2019). Annual Report-2018–2019. Retrieved June 15, 2020, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_/, https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2018–2019). Annual Report-2018–2019. Retrieved June 16, 2020, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_/, https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2018–2019). Annual Report-2018–2019. Retrieved June 20, 2020, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201223084215if_, https://www. mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_English_01102019.pdf. Press Information Bureau (PIB). (2020a). No Major Terrorist incident occurred in the hinterland of the country after repeal of Article 370: Shri G. Kishan Reddy. Retrieved June 18, 2020, from https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1606745. Press Information Bureau. (2020b). Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. Come, Innovate in India, Shri Dharmendra Pradhan appeals to Indian students from across the globe. Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1638110. Press Information Bureau (2020c). PM Modi addresses seminar on Atmanirbhar Bharat in Defence manufacturing. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID= 1649031. Press Information Bureau. (2018). Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Smt. Anupriya Patel reviews the activities of National Centre for Disease Control. Retrieved January 18, 2018, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1517108. Puri, R. (2014). Imperatives of defence modernisation and indigenisation. Vivek, Issues & Options, September–October. Retrieved June 28 2020, from https://www.vifindia.org/article/2014/dec ember/03/imperatives-of-defence-modernisation-and-indigenisation. Rajya Sabha, Government of India. (2020). Decrease in Incidents of Left-Wing Extremism. Unstarred Question No. 2749.

Chapter 3

India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy Ashok Behuria

We are establishing deep relations based on security, development and trust with our neighboring countries whether connected by sea or land. India has been making continuous efforts to deepen its decades-old cultural, economic, and social ties with its neighboring countries. —Narendra Modi (2020a, 2020b) Some of our toughest challenges lie in our immediate neighbourhood. The fact is that we cannot realise our growth ambitions unless we ensure peace and stability in South Asia. —Manmohan Singh (2010) We are not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the carving out of spheres of influence and the erections of cordon sanitaires. We are not interested in exporting ideologies…. Our first concern has been to prevent any erosion of our independence. Therefore, we could not be camp followers of any power, howsoever rich and strong. —Indira Gandhi (1972: 68)

Introduction There is a continuity in India’s approach towards its neighbours despite periodic recalibration of India’s policy in view of the changing regional and global geopolitical dynamics. India’s overall approach to the neighbourhood has been admittedly nonreciprocal, non-mercantilist and non-predatory. While in the Cold War period, India was perceived as a regional hegemon, because of its willingness to use its military might to shape the regional environment on some occasions, during the post Cold A. Behuria (B) Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_3

35

36

A. Behuria

War phase, it has adopted a remarkably non-interventionist and hands-off approach in regional affairs. Looking at India’s behaviour, certain scholars have called India, a “reluctant hegemon” and expressed their astonishment at the ingratitude displayed by India’s neighbours despite its disinclination to establish “full blown regional hegemony” in view of its disproportionate power-preponderance in the region. The neighbours view India uncharitably and base their estimations on instances where India has “cracked the whip”, rather than “refrained” from doing so. They say that “generations of diplomats of other South Asian countries have complained in private to outsiders that their Indian counterparts act as if they were the inheritors of the British raj” (Schaffer & Schaffer, 1998: 109–21). The main cause of their suspicion and fear is India’s size and lack of trust in the way in which the Indian leadership has, quite naturally, articulated its security concerns forcefully about threats emanating from the immediate region from time to time and taken measures to manage them. For example, in one of the most important addresses that the Indian Prime Minister delivers on the occasion of India’s Independence Day (15 August) every year, in 2020, Prime Minister Modi clearly stated that his government’s priority was to ensure the security of the country. As he said, “My dear citizens, India has as much commitment to make its security apparatus & armies strong as it has for establishing peace & harmony” (Modi, 2020a, 2020b). In recent years, incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attack, attacks on Pathankot airbase, Uri military camp and a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel in Pulwama point to continuing threats emanating from the immediate neighbourhood. Similarly, the rise in religious radicalism in the Af-Pak region as well as the incident of Easter Attacks in Sri Lanka signal the continuing threat of terrorism in the neighbourhood posing a critical challenge to the security of almost all states in the region. All this adds to the complexities defining India’s security predicaments which, in turn, influence its foreign and neighbourhood policy. In the following paragraphs, an attempt is being made to focus on how security has emerged as a primary factor in determining India’s approach towards the neighbourhood.

Foreign/Neighbourhood Policy The main objectives of Indian foreign policy have been identified by the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, through his speeches, as “supporting India’s economic transformation”, “seeking a peaceful and stable neighbourhood” and “fulfilling [India’s] international responsibilities to steering a more stable, sustainable and secure future for the world” (Modi, 2016). As regards India’s immediate neighbourhood, Modi has articulated a more robust policy, which is known as “Neighbourhood First”, which seeks to re-emphasize the import India attaches to its neighbourhood and at the same time recalibrate the existing policy to reassure the neighbours of India’s best intents to build a relationship of mutual cooperation, trust and development which is aptly evoked by the phrase he has coined (respect), “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas” based on the principles of

3 India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy

37

(dialogue), (cooperation), (peace) and (prosperity) (Modi, 2018). The principles outlining such reinvigorated foreign/neighbourhood policy aim at creating an enabling environment of trust and cooperation, which will ensure India’s core security interest. As a country accounting for roughly around 70% of the GDP, territory and defence expenditure in the South Asian region, India’s neighbourhood policy has been recognized by various commentators as being remarkably non-hegemonistic and accommodative. However, even if it is a truism to assert that foreign policies of states are designed to enhance their security and serve their long-term national interests, there is considerably less appreciation of the fact at the scholarly level that such generosity displayed by India towards its neighbours is predicated by its overarching concern for its security.

The Nature of Threats to India’s Security The threats to security faced by India have their roots in the socio-historical and political context, in which the country is embedded. The complexities of various threats and interconnections among them as well as the persistence of the effect of neighbourhood realities on India’s security calculus make it expedient for the Indian state to prioritize its foreign and security approaches to its neighbours all the time. India’s approach has been to undertake a continuous scan of the strategic environment, invest its superior diplomatic and intelligence capital in the neighbourhood and engage with the neighbours in a proactive manner. The main threats to Indian security can be divided into two categories, i.e., external and internal. These threats are not isolated and unconnected. In many cases, internal threats have external coordinates, mostly located in the neighbourhood. Therefore, India is faced with a complex set of security challenges that naturally influence its policy towards the neighbourhood.

External Threats As far as external threats are concerned, the threat-perceptions of the colonial administration arose out of their concerns vis-à-vis bigger and powerful neighbours like China and Russia and countries in Western Asia, as well as on the maritime front vis-à-vis the countries across the Indo-Pacific region, coupled with anxiety about the presence of foreign powers in the immediate strategic neighbourhood. Such threat perceptions were transferred, in a systemic manner, of course in a modified form, to the new dispensation, managed by Indian leaders who were in the driver’s seat following independence. The ruling Congress Party, which essentially started as a political movement, had started deliberating over India’s foreign and security policies since the 1940s

38

A. Behuria

in anticipation of independence, largely inherited the British Indian government’s external threat perception, despite its distaste for colonial choices made by the latter in most areas of governance and its resolve to replace them with people-friendly initiatives, suited to India’s own needs and aspirations. At the regional level, with the formation of Pakistan, on the western front, the colonial anxieties about Afghanistan and Russia were replaced by concerns about Pakistan, because of the hostilities arising out of tribal Lashkar invasion of Kashmir abetted by the Government of Pakistan, exactly 68 days after India achieved independence. Because of the persistence of such hostilities ever since, Pakistan posed a security challenge not only on the western front but also on the eastern front as well. East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, was very much a part of Pakistan till 1971 and was ruled by an elite that had a visceral antipathy towards India. The effect of a communal holocaust that enveloped the subcontinent in the immediate aftermath of partition, as well as the war in Kashmir, the protracted bilateral discussions over the issue of refugee rehabilitation, and the sharing of Indus Waters embittered the relationship further. Both countries have fought three fullscale wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971, and one localized armed confrontation in 1999 (in Kargil). Analysts from Pakistan have held Pakistan responsible for initiating all the attacks against India which resulted in war (Khan, 2017). On the maritime front, India cautiously built its potential to retain its supremacy over the Indian Ocean and its relations with countries in the south-eastern Asian region were given due emphasis. At the external level, concerns about China remained, which made Indian leadership negotiate friendship agreements with Nepal and Bhutan built upon previous agreements that these countries had with the colonial government on the one hand and seeking peace and friendship through Panchsheel (Five Principles) with China on the other. However, China’s “persistent but futile efforts to promote internal subversion” as well as its “systematic support” to Pakistan against India prompted Indian leadership to believe that “the border dispute” [that besets Sino-Indian relations] is merely “an outcome of more complex policy which [is] aimed at undermining India’s stability and at obstructing her rapid and orderly progress” (Gandhi, 1972: 72–73). The threat from China has become more pronounced in recent years, with intrusions of Chinese forces along the Line of Actual Control that notionally marks out the positions held by India and China along an unsettled border in the recent years, the most recent being the intrusion at Galwan and the skirmishes resulting in the death of about 20 Indian and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. These intrusions have intensified over the years and because of climatic conditions in the high-altitude terrain such intrusions often coincide with Pakistani bids to infiltrate terrorists into Kashmir from across the Line of Control (LoC) in the west. The Indian sense of insecurity has only grown in magnitude over the last decade with many security analysts and strategic experts referring more frequently now, than ever before, to a “twofront” situation India is confronted with. Most recently, such a view was expressed by the incumbent Army Chief of India General M.M. Naravane while interacting with media on the eve of Army Day celebrations in Delhi. He said, “We must not lose sight from where collusion between China and Pakistan can take place. We need

3 India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy

39

to hold it. Though it can take place at any level, Siachen and Shaksgam Valley are the places where territory of these two countries meet. Threat of collusivity is maximum in the strategically important glacier which forces us to keep our possession” (Sagar, 2020). As far as the neighbourhood is concerned, India has always been sensitive to the presence of extra-regional powers in the region and held it prejudicial to its security interests. Even if Mrs. Gandhi had stated clearly that India was not interested in “carving out…spheres of influence [erecting] cordon sanitaires”, astute observers of India’s security concerns vis-à-vis the neighbours prompted them to say that “[a]s the predominant power in the region, India regards South Asia as her security zone and conceives herself as the security manager of the region” (Rao, 1989: 88–100). India’s sensitivity to external powers gaining a toehold in the region was also spelt out in a small comment written by a leading commentator, Bhabani Sen Gupta, titled “The Indian Doctrine”, which was cited by many serious scholars who paraded it mistakenly as official Indian position. He had written that an Indian doctrine of regional security was spawned in the wake of the carnage (killing of Tamils) in Sri Lanka, in response to rumours of the government in Colombo seeking military help from four foreign countries to crush the rebellion in the north. The then foreign minister of India, P. V. Narasimha Rao had even confronted his visiting counterparts from Bangladesh and Pakistan over the issue and obtained their assurances that they would not get involved in the internal Sinhala-Tamil issue in Sri Lanka. Later, the USA and the UK came out with similar assurances. India’s role as a security manager/provider had received tacit recognition during the time. Based on all this, Sengupta outlined the contours of India’s regional security doctrine in the following words: India has no intention of intervening in internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any other country in the internal affairs of any other. India will not tolerate external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-India implication. No South Asian government must therefore ask for external military assistance with an anti-India bias from any country (Gupta, 1983).

The US naval presence in Diego Garcia during the Cold War years and the American attempt to set up monitoring stations/listening posts in neighbouring countries in South Asia were deeply resented by India. After the end of the Cold War, this anxiety has remained even if India’s relationship with the USA has undergone a dramatic transformation and the two countries have struck a strong strategic partnership. The new actor in the region threatening the power equations in the region is China, seeking to enhance its influence and power potential in the South Asian region, particularly in the Indian Ocean. India has viewed Chinese moves to build and operate ports and, in some cases, acquire large tracts of land on lease, apparently for commercial/economic purposes, around those ports as a deliberate attempt by China to weaken India’s natural preponderance in the region and tilt the power balance in a manner, unfavourable to India’s strategic interests. The unwillingness of China to engage India in a dialogue or discussion on its growing activities in the region together with its new-found zeal to get involved in internal politics of neighbouring

40

A. Behuria

countries point to motives, not very assuring from the Indian standpoint. The assertion of regional countries in the recent decades, perceived as defiance by Indian strategic analysts and commentators, adds to Indian suspicion of the Chinese intentions.

Internal Threats The internal threats can be enumerated as terrorism often with cross-border linkages, ethnic and separatist insurgency/militancy, inter-communal disharmony leading to conflict and violence, religious radicalization, left-wing extremism, drugs and human trafficking, and operation of trans-national criminal gangs. Some of these threats pose critical existential challenges to the Indian state. India has experienced separatist insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and various northeastern states right since independence. Pakistan’s role in abetting such insurgency is well-known. In the 1950s and 1960s, even China had a role to play in the insurgencies in the northeastern states of India. With the establishment of Bangladesh during the first four years of the Awami League government led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the sub-regional security dynamics in northeastern India changed for the better, but soon after his assassination in 1975, the various military dictators ruling Bangladesh during 1975–1991, there was a reported nexus between the secret agencies of Bangladesh and Pakistan leading to insurgents in the northeast seeking refuge in Bangladesh. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, the nexus continued to bother Indian security agencies until the election of Sheikh Hasina as Prime Minister in 2008, when her government took a conscious decision to cooperate with Indian security agencies and go after Indian insurgents hiding inside Bangladesh. The impact of this on India’s approach to Bangladesh will be discussed later. The left-wing extremism or Maoist/Naxalite violence continuing in different shapes and intensities across India, often explained officially as an internal issue having socio-economic roots, has also had external connections. Connections between the Maoists in India and those in the neighbouring countries have been discovered in the past necessitating closer watch by security agencies on the linkages which have influenced India’s approach towards the neighbourhood. Similarly, the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka and its inevitable impact on the politics and security of the Tamil-majority southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu prompted India’s policy towards Sri Lanka during the late 1970s and 1980s. Added to this, the stubbornness of the then Lankan government to disregard India’s security concerns, the rumours of the Lankan government allowing the USA to set up transmitters in northern Sri Lanka and considering American request to provide basing facility in Trincomalee, an important naval base during World War II, and the move by then President Jayawardena to acquire weapons from foreign countries spiked Indian concerns prompting India to resort to both coercive as well as asymmetric strategy to bring

3 India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy

41

the Lankan leadership in line with Indian thinking. India’s decision to send a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka, in July 1987, was taken to reinforce its preponderance as a security provider in the region. As far as terrorism is concerned, India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism right since independence. Over the years, terror activities have grown in intensity and in terms of their horizontal spread. Rather than remaining focused in the erstwhile Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, it has spread to other regions in the last two decades. Be it in the shape of serial blasts in Mumbai, Surat, Delhi, Hyderabad or terror activities in other areas in southern India, the hand of Pakistan is suspected by the agencies in most of these cases. This has been borne out by analysts that “Pakistani officials have allowed numerous substate groups, particularly Islamist ones, to work with al-Qaeda with regard to Kashmir and Afghanistan” (Byman, 2005–6: 117–44, 125). Moreover, they would aver that “the logistics of the global jihad are often run out of Pakistan”. Pakistan, because of its long involvement in Afghan jihad and its brazen patronage of the Taliban, has emerged as a breeding ground for terror. Pakistan’s strategy of using terror as an instrument of its security and foreign policy towards other countries in general and towards India and Afghanistan, in particular, is well-known.

Socio-Historical Explanation of Importance of the Neighbourhood It is a fact of history that India is a country of continental proportions, and it is the only country that shares borders, either land or maritime, with most of the countries in the neighbourhood. Because of lack of co-terminality of “nation” and “state” and plurality and diversity in terms of language, ethnicity, culture and religion in the region, India shares strong linkages with all the neighbouring countries. As it was admitted by ex-President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, in the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit on 22 November 2008, four days before the Mumbai Terror attack, borrowing a quote from his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, that there’s a “little bit of India in every Pakistani and a little bit of Pakistan” in every Indian and went on to say “I do not know whether it is the Indian or the Pakistani in me that is talking to you today” (Hindustan Times, 2008). India’s linguistic, historical and geo-cultural contiguity with other countries also makes it uniquely vulnerable in terms of security in the sense that India is incessantly drawn into the vicissitudes of internal political dynamics of most of the neighbouring countries. India has been drawn into internal political conflicts as well as contestations for power, and in the bargain, earned the wrath of the power elites in most of these countries who would eternally suspect India of enabling their competitors against them for ensuring goodwill and loyalty. Therefore, whipping up of anti-India sentiments remains a favourite pastime of the elites competing for power. Over the years, vested interest groups have developed in the neighbourhood, who make a

42

A. Behuria

calling out of their efforts to generate and spread anti-India sentiments among their people and forge it into their electoral power game. For example, come elections, in most of the countries be it Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, it becomes an open season for the show of determination and courage among the leaders in different countries to stand up to the Indian might. Leaders with links to India are often caricatured as weak-kneed who would succumb to Indian pressures and sell out their country’s interests for personal benefits. Thus, Nawaz Sharif is ridiculed as “Modi ka yaar, gaddar gaddar” which means Nawaz Sharif is Modi’s friend and hence he is a traitor to Pakistan (in the elections in Pakistan in 2018) and Oli of Nepal would bait on his ability to stand up to Indian blackmail (over the issue of Kalapani in 2019–2020). Such adverse propaganda against India does create a context for the rise of constituencies avowedly anti-India in their orientation prompting India to take countermeasures, and thus complicating the regional security situation. Historically, all big countries with small neighbours have to deal with similar antipathies mainly borne out of a natural sense of insecurity that small countries have vis-à-vis their big neighbours. Paradoxically, the closer their historical and cultural proximity, the greater is the suspicion of interference and fear of losing independence and autonomy by the smaller countries vis-à-vis the big neighbour. Whether it is the case of the USA and its neighbours in the American continents, Turkey and its neighbours in the Middle East, Russia in its near abroad and China and its neighbours in the Far East, Central Asia and South East Asia, the smaller countries always feel overwhelmed by the strategic behaviour of big countries. While pursuing their grandiose security interests, they are perceived to be oblivious of the interests of the smaller neighbours and often step on their interests. The reflexive response of smaller counties comes in the shape of balancing, band-wagoning, and hedging or a mixture of these strategies. In South Asia, in the post Cold War years, India’s neighbours have allowed external powers to balance out India’s preponderant influence on them more openly than in the past. Such balance of influence, in concrete terms, has resulted in China’s emergence as a powerful influence-wielder, coming as it does with deep pockets and the ability to build and deliver developmental and infrastructure projects that help domestic power elites to deliver the goods to their people, enhance their political influence and expand their constituency on the one hand and take care of their reflexive security worries vis-à-vis India on the other. The issue of unsettled borders adds yet another layer of complexity to India’s bilateral relations with its neighbours. India has a 4156 km long border with Bangladesh, 3488 km long border with China, 3323 km with Pakistan, 1751 km with Nepal, 1643 km with Myanmar, 699 km with Bhutan and 106 km with Afghanistan (because Gilgit–Baltistan is legally within Indian territory). Such long borders are not neatly drawn, and, in many cases, they are disputed and porous. Disputes have led to either overt military engagements or covert/cold wars among intelligence agencies and subversive asymmetric warfare. India, after long years of negotiations, has been able to settle its borders with Bangladesh by means of the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) (Banerjee et al., 2017) which resulted in the exchange of adverse possessions and enclaves (Chhitmahals) between the two countries.

3 India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy

43

While settling the land boundary issues with Bangladesh, India hoped that it “helps on issues of security concern, including security cooperation and denial of sanctuary to elements inimical to India” (MEA, 6). India’s unsettled border with China remains a continuous source of anxiety with China intensifying its border intrusions in recent years. The incidents of Dokalam and Galwan indicate that security anxieties emanating from such border encounters between the troops of the two countries will continue. The maximalist stance taken by China with scant regard for the Indian point of view remains the main stumbling block in the way of reconciliation of mutually exclusive positions taken by both countries. Over the last two years, Nepal has started raising the issue of Kalapani and has even gone to the extent of redrawing its map to stake its claim over the area, which has affected the relationship between the two countries in adverse ways.

Contours of India’s Neighbourhood (First) Policy It is a truism to say that most countries accord primacy to their neighbourhood and seek to establish harmonious relations with their neighbours; as the saying goes, “you cannot choose your neighbors”. India is no exception to this rule. In fact, compared to most other countries, with a power potential that is more than the sum of the potentials of all the other neighbours, India has sought to cultivate its neighbours with equanimity and a genuine spirit of accommodation. During the post-colonial days, when most countries in the region were shaking off the yoke of colonial rule and getting into the rough and tumble of inter-state politics, zealously guarding their sovereignty and equality as Westphalian- and nation-states, it was natural for India to find it difficult to expect these states to be overawed by India’s natural preponderance (70% of the territory, more than 70% of defence expenditure) and surrender their autonomy entirely to serve India’s strategic calculus and interests. The inertia of fear for the British Indian imperial government underwent a transformation in this post-colonial setting. While the smaller neighbours acknowledged India’s pre-eminence, they sought to re-negotiate their near-vassal status (that they had with the British) with India and extract more privileges than they used to get vis-à-vis the imperial administration, visited as they were by the impulses of emancipation. Such unequal relationship continued, with real-politic inducing a sense of distrust and insecurity dictating their policies towards India in a manner that posed security challenges to India. India’s approach towards the neighbours has thus been very proactive and at times condescending reinforcing the architecture of distrust that has even affected the process of regional integration and development of a regional security architecture. Interestingly, India features as a major factor in the bilateral relations between most other South Asian states except perhaps between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The India–Pakistan enduring rivalry has bedevilled regional cooperation efforts in a major way and Pakistan’s eternal search for parity with India has added a peculiar twist to the regional power equation with Pakistan’s nuclear capability nearly balancing out India’s vastly superior conventional might. Pakistan

44

A. Behuria

is perhaps the only country in the region that has tried all along to pose a challenge to Indian hegemony (in a non-pejorative sense), and in informal discussions among members of strategic community from various states in the region, there is a tendency to congratulate Pakistan for displaying its nerve and mettle vis-à-vis India. Despite all this, India embarked on the diplomatic path of cautious bilateralism in the post-independence period with exaggerated importance accorded to the neighbouring countries. Over the years, Indian leadership has appointed the most efficient career diplomats as its ambassadors in the neighbourhood and fielded experienced career intelligence and security officials to its embassies to constantly evaluate the security approaches of its neighbours as well as the evolving regional security environment from their security standpoint. India adopted a policy of stick and carrot, to begin with and during the Cold War years, to ensure that the neighbours do not act against its core security interests. However, in the post Cold War years, the change in the character of domestic politics in India threw up coalition politics and a new breed of leadership who were more pragmatic and non-reciprocal in their approach towards the neighbours. One of them, Inder Kumar Gujral, who served both as foreign and prime minister during 1996–1998, came out with five key principles that would guide India’s approach towards its smaller neighbours. The quintessence of these principles was giving unilateral concessions to the neighbours in a non-reciprocal manner. In his address to the Chatham House, London, in September 1996, he enumerated the five principles, thus: “First, with the neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. These five principles, scrupulously observed, will, I am sure, recast South Asia’s regional relationship, including the tormented relationship between India and Pakistan, in a friendly, cooperative mould” (Gujral as cited in Murthy, 1999).

He reiterated it in another address at Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo in January 1997. This was termed “Gujral doctrine” by noted Indian journalist Bhabani Sen Gupta in his article, “India in the Twenty First Century”, in the same year (Gupta, 1997: 308–9). The critics of Gujral say that his attempt to transform India’s approach to the neighbourhood was half-hearted because it did not include Pakistan. A. G. Noorani, an astute observer of sub-continental politics, called this approach “cosmetic” and “deceptive” (Noorani, 2002). There is also a view that Gujral was unable to either induce/coerce or convert the foreign office bureaucracy, firmly wedded to the principles of security, national interests and major power status at the global level. It was also alleged that the foreign office was more comfortable with the language of “hegemonic power” than “Gujral’s language of friendship and détente”.

3 India’s Quest for Security Through Its Neighbourhood Policy

45

Interestingly, however, as much as the doctrine was ridiculed by foreign office mandarins in India, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1998– 2004) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the United Progressive Alliance government (2004–2014) led by Manmohan Singh continued with a policy that retained the principles identified by Gujral and laid emphasis on the need to have “a peaceful, stable and constructive environment in India’s neighbourhood” which was regarded as “vital for the goals of accelerated development for India and the region”.

Current Phase In the current phase of Indian politics with the assumption of power by a right-wing nationalist government, India has leveraged these principles and sought to accelerate its diplomatic engagement with the neighbourhood. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is now being termed as Neighbourhood First Policy. However, as the theme of this paper suggests, the Modi government’s re-prioritization of neighbourhood policy even in his second term does not disguise India’s overall concern for security and its sensitivity towards external powers seeking to change the power balance against India. After assuming power in 2014, Modi invited all heads of governments in the neighbourhood to attend his swearing-in ceremony and led high-level delegations to almost all countries except two countries, Pakistan and Maldives, whose leaders were not ready to honour India’s security sensitivities. That Modi visited the Maldives in his second term in office after elections in 2019, only after a government favourable to India assumed power there, proves the point that India’s concern for security remains one of the most important drivers of India’s policy towards its neighbours. In conclusion, it can be said that today’s India, with its sustained economic prowess and global acceptability as a rising democratic power, has its eyes set on playing a greater role at the global stage as a responsible norm-setter. Therefore, there is a growing realization of the need to take the neighbourhood along as its power and stature grow. There is a view that the first stepping-stone to success for India in this journey to the international stage as a leading power is to make its leadership agreeable to its smaller neighbours. A sense of responsibility and filiality guides India’s non-reciprocal developmental and defence/security engagements with its neighbours today than ever before. The phenomenon of one or many external power/s trying to weaken India’s influence in the region remains a critical challenge for India. For example, the flow of easy loans from countries like China in the guise of developmental assistance is viewed by Indian analysts as a ploy to recolonize parts of South Asia through creating pockets of EEZs and running ports built with Chinese loans. In the long run, such dependence would threaten Indian and regional security. Therefore, the next step in India’s Neighbourhood First Policy seems to factor in security even more seriously than ever before.

46

A. Behuria

References Asghar Khan in an interview with Mazhar Abbas on ARY TV. (2017). Retrieved December 25, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWq_LJPxv5E. Banerjee, S., Anasua, B. R. C., & Ambalika, G. (2017). The 2015 India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement: Identifying constraints and exploring possibilities in Cooch Behar. Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-2015-india-bangladesh-landboundary-agreement-identifying-constraints-and-exploring-possibilities-in-cooch-behar/. Byman, D. (2005–06). Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. Survival, 47(4), Winter. Gandhi, I. (1972). India and the world. Foreign Affairs. Gupta, B. S. (1983). Regional security: The Indian doctrine. India Today. Gupta, B. S. (1997). India in the Twenty first century. International Affairs, 73(2). Hindustan Times. (2008). There is a bit of India in every Pakistani: Zardari’. Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/there-is-a-bit-of-india-in-every-pak istani-zardari/story-gB4zET8PlhmNHGZOxYYugP.html. MEA. India & Bangladesh: Land boundary agreement. Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https:// www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/24529_LBA_MEA_Booklet_final.pdf. Modi, N. (2016). Select Speeches on Foreign Policy, 2014–2015, Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved December 22, 2020, from http://mea.gov.in/PM_SpeechBook_2014-25/?page=14. Modi, N. (2020a). PM’s address to the Nation from the ramparts of the Red Fort. Retrieved December 20, 2020, from https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-to-the-nation-fromthe-ramparts-of-the-red-fort/?comment=disable. Modi, N. (2020b). ‘PM’s address to the nation from the ramparts of the Red Fort’. Retrieved December 20, 2020, from https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-to-the-nat ion-from-the-ramparts-of-the-red-fort/?comment=disable. Murthy, P. (1999). The Gujral doctrine and beyond. Strategic Analysis., 23(4), 639–652. Narendra Modi’s tweet on 1 June 2018 (8.44 PM). Retrieved December 25 2020, from https://twi tter.com/narendramodi/status/1002569048914198528?lang=en. Noorani, A. G. (2002). The Truth about the Lahore Summit, Frontline, 19(4). Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1904/19040850.htm. Rao, P. V. (1989). Foreign involvement in Sri Lanka. The Round Table, 78(309). Sagar, P. (2020). How will India handle a two-front war? Army chief General Naravane explains. The Week. Retrieved December 28, 2020, from https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/01/11/ how-will-india-handle-a-two-front-war-army-chief-general-naravane-explains.html. Schaffer, T. C., & Howard, B. S. (1998). Better Neighbors? India and South Asian Regional Politics. SAIS Review, 18(1). Singh, M. (2010). Excerpts from the address delivered by Manmohan Singh, former PM, at the Combined Commanders’ Conference’ in New Delhi. Retrieved December 20 2020, from https:// archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=926.

Chapter 4

‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance Sitakanta Mishra

Introduction The strategy of “secrecy” has been integral to India’s nuclear program ever since it started its nuclear journey. One can get a glimpse of this as early as (1946) when India sharply reacted to “The Baruch Plan” that proposed to retain “managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy”. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru directed India’s representative to the UN, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, to withhold approval of the Plan for the fear that India may lose its sovereign right to explore and use its abundant natural resources like thorium (Mishra, 2015: 201). Hence, India’s reaction to the Baruch proposals was delayed until other countries’ views were available for being considered by all member states (Chakma, 2005). Ever since, important nuclear energy-related decisions by India have been primarily unwritten and still shrouded in mystery. In India, from the very beginning, “nuclear secrecy is a home truth. Nuclear power is still an exclusively government affair” (Mahapatra, 2020). The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 that governs the Indian nuclear energy domain “allows nuclear establishments not to share information as well as keeps the establishment completely out of bounds for people, except for the few chosen ones” (Mahapatra, 2020). Given the sensitivities of nuclear technology and global discourse around it, the Act restricts the general public access to information relating to nuclear power plant design, evaluation or internal reviews, and their credibility as well. Moreover, given the mixed nature of India’s nuclear energy and strategic program until 2005, the 1962 Act necessitated a blanket ban on information regarding India’s nuclear program. However, it is not that the secrecy issue was not debated or raised in the country. When Jawaharlal Nehru tabled the 1962 Atomic Energy Bill in the Parliament, the S. Mishra (B) School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Energy University, Raisan, Gandhinagar, Gujarat 382007, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_4

47

48

S. Mishra

secrecy aspect that the bill guaranteed was vehemently opposed. When Member of Parliament Krishnamurthy Rao asked, “Does the proposed bill cover the peaceful (nuclear) purposes?”, Nehru replied, “I do not know how to distinguish the two (peaceful and defence purposes)” (Gopal, 1982: 426). In subsequent decades as India’s nuclear program marched ahead, reportedly the USA’s intelligence surveillance of the Indian test site at Pokhran (Rajasthan) was increased. Some declassified documents have brought to light how the USA’s reconnaissance satellite caught India’s preparations for a nuclear test in 1995 for which the then US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner “warned the Prime Minister’s Office that such a move would backfire” (Economic Times, 2013). As a result, India had to pull back the planned test. It is an open secret now that India maintained stringent secrecy to defy US surveillance, learning from the 1995 experience, to conduct the second round of nuclear tests in 1998. Immediately after the tests in 1998, India proclaimed itself as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and formulated its nuclear use strategy (doctrine) within a year. “Secrecy” as a policy is also infused into the governing structure of its nuclear assets for obvious reasons. “As India considers nuclear weapons as ‘political’ weapons, not for war initiating but for retaliation, ‘survivability’ of its nuclear assets is crucial” (Mishra, 2019). As second-strike posture necessitates to withstand a first strike, survivability of assets required for the second strike is crucial; to ensure survivability of nuclear assets against first strike, sophisticated physical security, secrecy, and dispersal techniques are normally adopted; generally, ambiguous and opaque nuclear weapons strategy is believed to strengthen survivability of assets best, and also viewed stabilizing in a certain context. India seems to have subscribed to all these techniques. Therefore, “the culture of secrecy has deep, historical roots…and secrecy is a passive measure to maximise survivability”, opines Sethi (2009: 185). Moreover, “Since the entire organizational structure places a premium on extreme secrecy…potential adversary has to reckon with the prospect that there could always be some further strategic capabilities or technical resources held in reserve…”, says Ashley Tellis (2001: 422). Probably that is why “India has not made any official statement regarding the detailed status and implementation of the draft nuclear doctrine, except the proclamation that it has been accepted by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on 04 January 2003” (Mishra, 2019). Even after declaring itself as NWS, “there is little information in the public domain on the command and control of nuclear weapons in India. There has been a history of secrecy surrounding all nuclear matters in the country” (Ramana, 2009: 41–47). “The level of opacity surrounding India’s nuclear posture is extraordinary and held tightly by just a handful of senior civilian officials, scientists, and officers in a dedicated Strategic Forces Command” (Narang, 2013: 143). It is a known secret that India’s nuclear forces are manned and operationally managed by the armed forces, but military leaders make no statements whatsoever about the specific capacities of the arsenal they are responsible for. As Verghese Koithara observes: “All analyses and commentary in the media about the current and future capabilities for the country’s nuclear arsenal are based snippets of information from the DAE and DRDO scientists… Because of the indiscriminate opacity that shrouds all strategic technology matters

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

49

in India, analysts and commentators have no means to examine the veracity of these claims through cross checking. What should cause serious concern about this pattern of singlesource flow of information is that it not only drives public narratives and analyses, but also forms the dominant basis for top leadership decisions regarding policy and management of nuclear forces” (Koithara, 2012: 3).

Besides the oral decision-making tradition in nuclear matters, the scientific establishment has always been tight-lipped, and opacity is pervasive till date. During the run-up to the first nuclear test in 1974, “former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Raja Ramanna elaborated on how the planners of the test took extra care not to put any decisions on paper so as to avoid leaks. Similar measures were apparently adopted during the 1998 tests as well, and on both occasions only a few select individuals were informed of the decision to test” (Ramana, 2009: 43). The preparation to Pokhran-II has been vividly narrated and the degree of secrecy that the establishment adhered to has largely helped to unleash to upheaval task in 1998. Anil Kakodkar and Gangotra in their co-authored book Fire and Fury narrate his responsibilities in detail where he mentions how he worked without leaving a trail. He says: “My work required me to travel without leaving a trail. All relevant information was restricted and even Meckoni, to whom I was supposed to be reporting, did not know about my whereabouts, to his credit, Meckoni himself told me that I should not tell him anything. But others in my division at Trombay were not so charitable and were resentful. I told never anyone what I was working on to begin with, and now I would disappear for days or weeks without telling anybody. I would never travel directly to any destination. It would always be a circuitous route to avoid leaving clues or being tracked. I would usually travel under different aliases” (Kakodkar & Gangotra, 2019: 71).

Besides the strategic program where the policy of secrecy is understandable, India’s civilian program is also marked with absolute opacity. Often the “DAE’s history of secrecy and refusal to be transparent” has been constantly criticized (Ramana, 2012: xxxiv). M. V. Ramana, in his book Power of Promise (2012) narrates the dearth of data on India’s breeder reactor (PFBR) and “how much electricity from the PFBR might cost. …Apart from an estimate of the construction cost of the PFBR, there was no economic data”. His request for information through Right to Information (RTI) on “the cost of fabricating each fuel pin for core and blanket fuel assemblies”, the “cost of reprocessing spent fuel (per unit quantity)”, and the “cost of removing americium from plutonium before fuel fabrication (per unit quantity)” were denied, “using Sect. 4.8(I)(a) of the RTI Act, on the grounds that the disclosure of such information would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign States or lead to incitement of an offence” (Ramana, 2012: xxiii). Upon further appeal to the Central Information Commission, Ramana writes, to provide such information, “the members of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and BHAVINI argued that information regarding the cost concerning the fuel cycle would reveal the type of technology which was being used, and which was of vital strategic and scientific value and, therefore, could not be disclosed” (Ramana, 2012). Even though any information on the cost of fuel is an issue in the public interest, “the disclosure of this information can have unforeseen

50

S. Mishra

ramifications because of the sensitivity in the nature of the project on which the information is sought” (Ramana, 2012). The fact of the matter is the intermingled strategic and civilian nuclear program in India. However, Ramana on another occasion views that though there is always a cover over India’s nuclear activities, “the practice of secrecy by the nuclear establishment has been somewhat selective and irregular” (Ramana, 2009: 41). As far as the strategic program is concerned, “a degree of opacity undoubtedly strengthens India’s nuclear deterrent, but a complete lack of transparency is argued to lead to serious misperceptions and miscalculation” (Chari, 2004: 35). Owing to the “low levels of transparency” on nuclear materials and material security, India has been criticized and ranked low in the NTI Nuclear Material Security Index (2020). Rightly says Manpreet Sethi, “As India’s deterrent [triad] is still in the making, any transparency initiative will have to be limited” (quoted in Mishra & Ahmed, 2014: 35) and “certainly will have an impact on the reliability and survivability of its own capabilities. If India’s status upgrades from de facto to de jure nuclear weapon state, which is unlikely, or it achieves greater international acceptance owing to its increasing global clout and confidence, can India afford more nuclear transparency? Or will the future nuclear weapons decisions of a ‘rising India’ remain inexplicable as usual?” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 62).

The Security Framework Nuclear secrecy is undoubtedly a widely discussed topic. The ISSF Article Review 28 compiles a review of important literature works on this issue area by Jayita Sarkar and responses of respective authors. Sarkar examines scholarly works of M. V. Ramana, Itty Abraham, and Gaurav Kampani, by enquiring at length their analyses on internal “secrecy” aspects in India’s nuclear complex and its consequences. As Sarkar (2014) writes, while Ramana (2013: 41–47) in his book Power of Promise (2013) examines the nature of pervasive secrecy in India’s nuclear establishment, particularly the civil nuclear program, Itty Abraham in an article on “India’s Strategic Enclave” (1992) investigates this phenomenon with respect to military/defense science and civilian scientists. On the other hand, Gaurav Kampani in an article on “New Delhi’s Long Nuclear Journey” (2014a, 2014b: 79–114) brings to the fore the negative impacts of secrecy on organizational efficiency and management during India’s weaponization phase. According to him, it was internal secrecy that prevented India’s swift acquisition of operational nuclear capability. Kampani further underlines that the “hoarding and compartmentalization of information not only prevented India from coordinating the weapons development and weaponization programs efficiently, but also encouraged sequential decisionmaking” (Sarkar, 2014). “This monocausal explanation by Kampani of a complex process in a large country like India” argues Sarkar, “is counterintuitive and probably incomplete”. Sarkar points to missing of two other reasons, by the authors, why India’s nuclear program delayed: “first, India is a developing country with high resource constraints, which may have retarded progress in the

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

51

weaponization process, and second, India’s technological capacity, especially in the context of the sanctions imposed after New Delhi’s 1974 test, could have a role to play in the slow process of weaponization” (Sarkar, 2014). Criticisms apart, to understand the source and motives of secretive policy and how it is built into the Indian nuclear complex, one needs to understand the entirety of the discourse, not in an isolated, segmental manner. Even though secrecy has in many ways handicapped India’s nuclear status, the control of nuclear complex is sacrosanct. Firmly based on the “principles of democratic accountability and civilian control of the security sector to the specific area of nuclear weapons” (Born et al. 2010: viii), India’s political governance framework and democratic accountability enable “assertive” political control of its strategic assets which acts as a strong deterrent against misappropriation of its nuclear assets. India’s draft nuclear doctrine categorically mentions that “Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)” (MEA, 1999). Given the stringent security system in place and secretive policy framework adhered, India’s nuclear weapons setup seems to have become an “inaccessible fortress”; until 1998, even the Indian military had no big role in nuclear decision-making in the country (Mishra, 2019). The Indo-US civil nuclear deal and the separation of India’s civil and strategic nuclear program seem to have streamlined India’s nuclear discourse in the world. However, the details on the governance framework of India’s strategic assets are not known for obvious reasons. The 2014 MEA document says that for physical security of the strategic nuclear plants a “Separate institutions and operating procedures exist for nuclear security at India’s strategic facilities” (MEA, 2014). According to Shyam Saran, the Strategic Armament Safety Authority (SASA) that functions directly under the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is “responsible for all matters relating to the safety and security of India’s nuclear and delivery assets at all locations” (Saran, ). This setup (SASA) is assigned “to review and to update storage and transfer procedures for nuclear armaments, including the submarine-based component” (Saran, ). Besides, as widely known, the administrative control of Indian nuclear assets is vested in the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), and probably, “the physical security of warheads and components is maintained by a specialized force drawn from the Indian Army” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 61). The third leg of India’s nuclear triad, the sea-based assets, is under development. In general, sea-based assets may be vulnerable to unauthorized launch as they are always on the move. “India has not yet explained how it intends to retain active civilian control over its SLBM arsenal” (Wueger, 2015: 9). “For a sea-based asset, where deterrence is primarily achieved by long-term radio silence, and launching control is delegated to seniority on board the vessel, the existing command, and control model is not applicable. … As a designated second-strike capacity asset, India’s NCA is viewed not effectively and credibly implement fail-safe measures” on assets onboard the vessel (Saksena, 2015). Questions have been raised regarding the command-and-control provisions with the Arihant, the nuclear submarine SSBN, with the ready nuclear system available with the commander. “Whose finger is on

52

S. Mishra

the nuclear trigger at sea?” (Sidhu, 2013). Has India adjusted or custom-designed command-and-control structure for the third leg of its triad? As the sea-based assets are always on the move and delivery vehicles and warheads are kept in the same platform away from the ground control, it requires a specific command and control arrangement. It is expected that India might have resolved this issue by applying technological measures like the USA which has “replaced its ‘two-man rule’, or following the British principle of ‘beyond the grave’ pre-planned instructions to their submarine commanders. If not, it would be interesting to know if India has incorporated any other state-of-the-art system to govern the third leg of its nuclear triad, and how politically ‘assertive’ its command and control are” (Mishra, 2019). Moreover, the provision of an alternate NCA (ANCA) or alternate chain of command as mentioned in India’s draft nuclear doctrine is less debated. As per the doctrine, the case of the Political Council of the NCA is obliterated due to the first strike by an adversary; an alternate, pre-decided council is in place to fulfill the NCA’s mission. The MEA document 2003 only reveals that the CCS reviewed the operationalization of India’s nuclear doctrine on January 4, 2003 and “approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities” (MEA, 2003). Understandably for security reasons, no further information is revealed on “the contours of India’s ANCA and chains of succession that would best fit India’s political and strategic imperatives” (Mishra, 2019). One can argue that “while announcing details about NCA, the CCS prudently attempted to strike a balance between transparency—assuring the world of civilian primacy and public accountability; and secrecy—protecting alternative chains of command and, thereby, strengthening nuclear deterrence” (Pai, 2009). Besides, India’s self-imposed NFU posture and “a small nuclear arsenal has required a great deal of secrecy and ambiguity” in steps it takes to ensure nuclear deterrence, which is viewed as stabilizing for South Asia while opening space for considerable speculation. Effectiveness of the Indian deterrent rests undoubtedly on the capability to survive the first strike and retaliate with massive force to cause “damage unacceptable to the aggressor” (MEA, 1999).

The Link Between Doctrine and Strategy In totality, the central principle and core element of India’s nuclear weapons governance system is “the ‘nuclear doctrine’ which broadly determines India’s ‘nuclear posture’; the nuclear posture, in turn, determines the nature and substance of the ‘command and control’ system. Therefore, there is a strong linkage between India’s nuclear doctrine, posture / strategy, and its governance. If India’s nuclear doctrine undergoes a revision, what would be its impact on the overall nuclear governance structure in place is a matter of speculation” (Mishra, 2019). It is argued that any shift in nuclear force structure and posture in a region like South Asia that harbors two nuclear-armed neighbors and first-use policy adhered by one (Pakistan) would

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

53

make nuclear safety, security, and control more complicated. Therefore, the secrecy of posture and strategy may have stabilizing effects in the region. With the change in government in New Delhi in 2014, the aptness of India’s current nuclear posture (no first use) has emerged as the Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA coalition pledged in its election manifesto to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times” (BJP, 2014). The BJP leader and former defense minister of the NDA government, Manohar Parrikar, had also questioned why India should not say “we are a responsible nuclear power, and I will not use it irresponsibly” instead of affirming an NFU policy (PTI). The current Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh has recently said, though “till today, our nuclear policy is ‘no first use’, what happens in future depends on the circumstances” (Roche, 2019). It seems the political/popular mood in India is evolving in favor of nuclear doctrine revision and tests the aptness of NFU in the regional context. If India revisits its nuclear posture and adopts a “flexible response” or first-use strategy instead of NFU, it will necessitate many adaptations in its nuclear governance structure in particular, and far-reaching implications on regional security discourse in general.

Is India’s Case Exceptional? In a democracy, exercising governance on security apparatus has always been a uniquely fraught issue for convincing reasons. While democratic practice requires transparency, accountability on all matters, national security management often warrants secrecy and swift executive decisions. Therefore, in pursuit of national security and vital national interests, democratic states practice exceptionalism in general. However, governance of the nuclear bomb, in particular, requires extraordinary and unprecedented security and secrecy measures that are antithetic to the norms and values of a democratic political setup. India seems to have successfully combined the policy of secrecy in its nuclear governance system while nurturing liberal political practice in its national governance.

Private Players Participation Ever since the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, India has planned an ambitious nuclear energy expansion program. It has also initiated to diversify its nuclear energy program by inviting private (domestic and global) and other government enterprises or industrial houses. But the involvement of multiple players and diversification may have implications on the practice of secrecy. First, “by mobilizing both domestic and international stakeholders, India plans to strengthen its technological and human resource base and acquire more nuclear material and technology. India aspires to participate in international nuclear commerce as

54

S. Mishra

a supplier by becoming a member of NSG” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 23). In the long term, “India has plans to diversify its nuclear industry, involving such domestic and international private industrial houses as Larson & Toubro (L&T), Tata, Reliance, Punj Lloyd, Westinghouse, Areva, GE, MTAR, and Sandpit” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 23). A handful of domestic private industrial houses like L&T, MTAR, etc. are already involved in contracts related to nuclear power projects and it is expected that more private players would join the supply chain in the future. Hopefully, “this crop of nuclear companies in India is set to grow rapidly, as private players wake up to the vast potential in the industry” (Tikkavarapu, 2014). Second, to reduce the burden on the two existing PSUs in charge of civil nuclear activities—Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) and BHAVINI—India is also preparing to share the operational and managerial responsibilities with other PSUs. The amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 in 2015 has opened ways for NPCIL to collaborate with other PSUs and government sector companies (WNA, 2014). “While the Indian government has not yet drawn out a clear set of rules or a road map for closer involvement of private players in the nuclear industry, looking at the way it has handed over the responsibility of planning and setting up large coal and gas-based power plants, it seems inevitable that the nuclear power sector will follow suit” (Tikkavarapu, 2014). Though needed, diversification of India’s civil nuclear program would necessitate sharing of know-how, operational responsibilities, and governance system with sister agencies which might stress the safety-security framework in place. More private players in the components and material supply chain would also bring additional challenges to secrecy as a security strategy. Therefore, in a phased manner, information sharing and collaboration modalities have to be worked out gradually. “While private sector participation must be encouraged, it must also be ensured that the culture of nuclear security gets ingrained in the organisational culture of these private sector actors as well. In the eagerness to create business opportunities, security must not be compromised” (Rajagopalan, 2016).

Security of Nuclear Scientists and Engineers Given the sensitivities involved, detailed information is unavailable in the public domain regarding the security of scientists/engineers of the Department of Atomic Energy at the workplace and in departmental residential colonies except for the blanket assurance by the government that security arrangements are in place and is audited regularly by the Ministry of Home Affairs. One can easily find that the top scientists get Z+ security, but the prevailing security norm is based on the belief that the more anonymous the scientists, the more secured he/she is. The obvious question arises: is the practice of secrecy and anonymity an appropriate and sufficient security strategy? Any threat to nuclear personnel is in fact a threat to the nuclear program as a whole. When there is a worldwide awakening on the security of nuclear assets, thanks to the Nuclear Security Submit initiated by US President Barack Obama, scanty attention is paid to the security of nuclear

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

55

personnel who is the brain behind, and instrumental in, the evolution and manifestation of nuclear technology. They are the real nuclear assets whose replacement would hamper the entire nuclear program. In India, there have been many reported “unnatural deaths” of Indian nuclear scientists during the last few decades. Even questions have been raised in the Indian Parliament leading to “detailed analysis of death of scientists and research fellows…and nothing unusual was unearthed” (Lok Sabha, 2015). Although the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist in particular, and other such attempts elsewhere in general, cannot be extrapolated to the Indian nuclear security discourse, targeted killings of nuclear scientists and engineers raise many unique policy questions: Does the security of scientists and engineers (nuclear personnel), integral to the security framework of nuclear assets in a country? Are the nuclear scientists and engineers considered as nuclear assets, and given appropriate weightage in the nuclear security framework of a country? How robust is the security given to nuclear scientists, especially in a country like India that aims to scale up its civil nuclear program?

A Contemplation It is believed that India’s nuclear warheads, except the sea-based assets, are not on hair-trigger alert as its doctrine prescribes for NFU and second strike; rather they are kept partially disassembled and de-mated. “In the second-strike capability, the most important thing is how fast we can react. We are working on cannisterised systems that can launch from anywhere at anytime”, said by the former chief of the DRDO Avinash Chander (Aroor, 2013). In years ahead one would expect that India would canister more its inventory which also requires special safety-security arrangements. Given India’s doctrinal posture of the second strike, details on canisterization and the safety-security system in place will not be in the public domain as well. This is not to argue that unavailability of information or absolute secrecy involving nuclear assets does not mean any compromise in, or absence of, security-safety arrangements. Except for individual speculations and private reports, there is no authentic account available on India’s nuclear weapons inventory and the system in place for their safe-keep. The rationale for such secretive policy is understandable; “but how long India will pursue an ambiguous nuclear strategy when it aspires to become a ‘major power’ of the world? As India has emerged as a powerful nation at the world stage, it should be confident about its nuclear weapons capability and not resort any longer to secretive governance structure” (Mishra, 2019). It is a fact that “No-FirstUse is not sacrosanct” and to a large extent the self-imposed NFU posture does not allow India to bring outright transparency and becomes “a strategic burden” (Kumar, 2019). As argued earlier, as India adheres to the second-strike nuclear posture that relies on “secrecy”, it has to keep inventory information away from public scrutiny, mainly to ensure survivability of its assets; but in case of a disaster, some public

56

S. Mishra

knowledge on the safety-security arrangement in place would be helpful for effective crisis management in the public domain. Even after suitably accommodated in the global nuclear high tables, thanks to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and NSG waiver, India seems still cautious to adopt swiping measures of transparency. In fact, a long practice of secrecy has given rise to many baseless apprehensions for which many nuclear projects are vehemently opposed by the public. Some transparency, as per its comfort level, would effectively nullify such apprehensions and enhance social acceptance of nuclear energy in India. More importantly, there is an imperative for “developing a system for a wholesome nuclear knowledge Management” (NKM) system (Grover & Puri, 2013: 1051–64) which would enhance public confidence in, and acceptance of, India’s nuclear security strategy and new nuclear projects. Annette Schaper (2004) in a study identifies several motives for secrecy in nuclear matters by countries, such as nonproliferation, national security, status, democratic deficiencies, historic tradition, and conservative inertia and minimizing diplomatic pressure from NPT (Schaper, 2004: 6, 43–44). In the case of India, except for the first motive that is the nonproliferation angle, the validity of all other motives can be examined. The most appropriate and strongly justified motive behind India’s secretive nuclear path is national security. Within the second-strike posture, says Annette Schaper (2004), “to ensure the survivability of the arsenal for deterrence, maintaining uncertainty about intentions and capabilities, hiding technological weaknesses or protecting technological superiority” India’s nuclear opaqueness is logical (Schaper, 2004: I). The third motive, i.e., status seems equally apt in the case of India. Given India’s complex strategic situation with the possibility of a two-front war, certain ambiguity on its inventory and capability, especially in relation to a superior China, is understandable. Critics often highlight reasons for excessive secrecy in India may be to ward-off deficiencies in the sector. India had to rely on indigenous sources without outside cooperation owing to sanctions imposed on it since 1974. With much difficulty India’s long nuclear journey has matured but not without errors. Secrecy may have served as a cover for mismanagement, lacuna, and public scrutiny. Even after India proclaiming itself a nuclear weapon state and accommodated in the global regimes, India still adheres to secrecy as a policy; reason could be the secretive historic traditions and conservative inertia inherited by the system during last few decades. Finally, it is true that India has overcome with much difficulty the diplomatic pressure from the nonproliferation regime by not revealing details about its nuclear weapon program. The policy of secrecy has helped India to sustain its nuclear weapons program and defy multilateral pressure and more binding commitments. However, after India allowed to trade nuclear resources owing to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and India-specific waiver by IAEA, certain transparency in its nuclear posture, policy, and inventory is expected. It may take a few more years as its nuclear tried is still evolving. A gradual effort should be undertaken to remove the secretive tag. India can learn the motives and criteria in favor of transparency taking a clue from the strategy of “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile” (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

57

Policy Prescriptions In a speech on March 30, 2011, the then Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh expressed his government’s policy “to enhance accountability and transparency in the functioning of India’s nuclear power plants” (Bagla, 2011). He declared that “the people of India have to be convinced about the safety and security of our own nuclear power plants. We should bring greater openness and transparency in the decisionmaking processes relating to our nuclear energy program”. Specifically, Dr. Singh advocated to strengthen the regulatory body (AERB) and “make it a truly autonomous and independent” (Bagla, 2011). The debate over “secrecy” and “transparency” in Indian nuclear discourse is inconclusive. While the nuclear establishment itself, and a few in intelligentsia are supportive of the current state of affairs, many others, especially many in academia, the strategic community comprising retired officials and activists suggest more transparency in nuclear matters to enhance public scrutiny of nuclear projects. Besides, it is the public money spent on such projects. To that extent, “a group of over 25 scientists, bureaucrats and activists had released a statement on 19 April 2011, demanding transparency in India’s nuclear power programme” (Kandhari and Paliwal, 2011). Nuclear issues are delicate mainly for national security reasons and also difficult for common many to understand. But nuclear energy cannot have a bright future if the public is not convinced about its contribution. Nevertheless, the world is moving toward an era where citizens are increasingly taking interest in national governance; therefore, the government cannot escape without taking the public along. Especially in the case of India, gone are the days when India was worried about and had to succumb to external pressure. Today, India is a confident nuclear power with a global presence. Controlled or calculated transparency more than what it has been so far would be helpful not only for the world to establish trust in India’s nuclear credentials but also it will smoothen public acceptance of its nuclear projects at home. In this direction, following are some of the measures for the Indian authorities to consider. First, a country-wide debate should be initiated to examine the pros and cons of moving toward an opaque nuclear policy. A few questions, as raised by Annette Schaper (2004), need to be debated: “India is a democratic country too, but its nuclear complex is shrouded in secrecy. Which role is played by traditions and by power structures of the bureaucracies? Do the nuclear weapon development complexes have an influence? Which political motives and driving forces of classification and declassification policies? Can a difference in attitude be observed between nuclear weapon physicists, politicians, and bureaucrats? How is secrecy be influenced by the perception of the own security? And finally, what are the conditions under which more transparency favorable for arms control could be expected?” (Schaper, 2004: 43-44).

Second, it would be fair to argue that as per its comfort level “India should demonstrate more confidence and clarity in the essential elements of its nuclear security practices and make ‘transparency’ a key feature of its nuclear safety-security culture. There is a subtle attitudinal change that has taken root in India during the last few years: there is today a greater willingness by the establishment itself to showcase

58

S. Mishra

its nuclear security arrangements before the public. Though India’s regulatory body (AERB) is de facto independent, its complete autonomy from the promoting agency should be ensured through appropriate legislation” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 9–10). Third, it would be most appropriate to “develop a comprehensive white paper on security and safety measures aimed at the domestic and international audience and stakeholders” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 70). There are numerous documents and information supplied by nuclear establishments from time to time on various aspects of the nuclear industry, but an authoritative account from the government would help allay all apprehensions, which in turn would facilitate greater public acceptance of the nuclear projects at home. Fourth, after separating India’s strategic and civilian nuclear program, it would be prudent to “create an agency to oversee and regulate strategic nuclear facilities” (Mishra & Jacob, 2020: 70). Till now, absolute secrecy is maintained on the oversight system and process in place involving Indian strategic facilities. Lastly, it is not to argue that secrecy as a security strategy is wrong or has no benefits. In the beginning, secretive strategy has undoubtedly warded off India’s nascent nuclear program from vested interest groups who did not like India to acquire such scientific capability. It also gave authorities the freedom to expedite infrastructure and capability buildup, avoiding unnecessary public scrutiny and external intervention. One can find many other utilities of secretive strategy and India has undoubtedly been benefitted by adhering to such strategy. But as a confident nation, and a rising power, India must now showcase its strengths, project its genuineness, and build confidence among public about its resolves for safekeeping nuclear assets without fear. Sometimes, the policy of secrecy is misinterpreted as defensiveness, fearfulness, or having an ulterior motive. Would it not be prudent to infuse the culture of openness or more transparency to India’s nuclear governance system in vogue?

References Abraham, I. (1992). India’s ‘strategic enclave’: Civilian scientists and military technologies. Armed Forces & Society., 18(2), 231–252. Aroor, S. (2013). New chief of India’s military research complex reveals brave new mandate. India Today. Retrieved May 16, 2020, from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indias-nuclear-cou nterstrike-response-time-to-be-in-minutes-drdo-chief-169019-2013-07-03. Bagla, P. (2011). India’s prime minister seeks more nuclear transparency. Science. Retrieved May 16, 2021, from https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/03/indias-prime-minister-seeks-morenuclear-transparency. BJP. (2014). Manifesto 2014. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from http://cdn.narendramodi.in/wp-con tent/uploads/2014/04/Manifesto2014highlights.pdf. Born, H., Gill, B., & Hänggi, H. (Eds.). (2010). Governing the bomb: Civilian control and democratic accountability of nuclear weapons. OUP. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://www.sipri. org/sites/default/files/2018-10/sipri10gtb.pdf. Chakma, B. (2005). Toward Pokhran II: explaining India’s nuclearisation process. Modern Asian Studies CUP, 39(1), 189–236.

4 ‘Secrecy as Security Strategy’ in India’s Nuclear Governance

59

Chari, P. R. (2004). Nuclear restraint, nuclear risk reduction, and the security–insecurity paradox in South Asia. In M. Krepon (Ed.), Nuclear risk reduction in South Asia. Palgrave. Retrieved May 07, 2020, from https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/NRRMChari.pdf. Gopal, S. (1982). Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru. 2nd series. Orient Longman. Government of India Lok Sabha. (2015). Unstarred question No. 544. Deaths of nuclear scientists’. Retrieved May 11, 2021, from https://dae.gov.in/writereaddata/parl/winter2015/lsus544.pdf. Grover, R. B., & Puri, R. R. (2013). Development of human resources for Indian nuclear power programme. Sadhana. 38(5), 1051–1064. Retrieved May 16, 2020 from https://www.ias.ac.in/art icle/fulltext/sadh/038/05/1051-1064). Kakodkar, A., & Gangotra, S. (2019). Fire and fury: transforming India’s strategic identity. Rupa. Kampani, G. (2014). Teaching the leviathan secrecy ignorance & nuclear proliferation. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1427/8c0abf669a93225e22b52a5c86dd52 c0823e.pdf. Kampani, G. (2014). New Delhi’s long nuclear journey: How secrecy and institutional roadblocks delayed India’s weaponization. International Security., 38(4), 79–114. Kandhari, R., & Ankur, P. (2011). What about nuclear transparency?, Retrived 16 May, 2021, from https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/what-about-nuclear-transparency-33410. Koithara, V. (2012). Making of India’s nuclear forces. Routledge. Kumar, V. A. (2019). No first use’ is not sacrosanct: Need a theatre-specific posture for flexible options. IDSA. Rerieved 16 May, 2020, from https://idsa.in/issuebrief/no-first-use-is-not-sacros anct-avkumar-270819. Mahapatra, R. (2020). Nuclear secrecy is a matter of concern. Retrieved May 12, 2021, from https:// www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/nuclear-secrecy-is-a-matter-of-concern--33212. MEA. (1999). Draft report of national security advisory board on Indian nuclear doctrine. Government of India. Retrieved May 25, 2020, from https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/ Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine. MEA. (2003). The cabinet committee on security reviews perationalization of India’s nuclear doctrine. Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved May 11, 2021, from https://www.mea.gov. in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security+Reviews+perationaliz ation+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine. MEA. (2014). Nuclear security in India. Government of India. Retrived 28 May, 2020, from https:// www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?23091/Nuclear+Security+in+India. Mishra, S. (2015) Parmanu politics: Indian political parties and nuclear weapons. Kalpaj. Mishra, S., & Ahmed, M. (2014). Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak agreement on reducing risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons’. SANDIA REPORT (SAND2014– 2607). Retrieved Aug 09, 2020, from https://www.sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_ assets/documents/sand2014-2607.pdf. Mishra, S., & Jacob, H. (2020). Nuclear security Governance in India: institutions, instruments, and culture (2019). SANDIA REPORT (SAND2020–10916). Retrieved Aug 10, 2020, from https:// www.osti.gov/biblio/1678824. Mishra, S. (2019) Secrecy as security strategy’ in India’s nuclear governance. Retrieved Aug 10, 2020, from http://www.kiips.in/research/secrecy-as-security-strategy-in-indias-nuclear-gov ernance/. Narang, V. (2013). Five myths about India’s nuclear posture. The Washington Quarterly, 36(3), 143–157. Retrieved July 12, 2020, from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-pub lic/legacy_files/files/publication/TWQ_13Summer_Narang.pdf. NTI. (2020). Nuclear Security Index India. Retrieved May 12, 2020 from https://www.ntiindex.org/ wp-content/uploads/2020/06/India.pdf. Pai, N. (2009). The lines of nuclear succession. Livemint. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/chrIFJKeoja7YzlLnrdwXM/The-lines-of-nuclear-suc cession.html, (accessed). PTI. (2013). US detected Indian nuclear test buildup at Pokhran in 1995. The Economic Times. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nat

60

S. Mishra

ion/us-detected-indian-nuclear-test-buildup-at-pokhran-in-1995/articleshow/18636491.cms?fro m=mdr. PTI. (2015). Why bind ourselves to ‘no first use policy’: Parrikar on India’s nuke doctrine’. PTI News. Retrieved May 15, 2020, from http://www.ptinews.com/news/8064236_Why-bind-oursel ves-to--no-first-use-policy---nbsp-Parrikar-on-India-s-nuke-doctrine.html. PTI. (2015). 11 Nuclear scientists died in mysterious circumstances in 4 years. Retrieved May 11, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/11-nuclear-scientists-died-in-mysteriouscircumstances-in-4-years/articleshow/49272275.cms. Rajagopalan, R. P. (2016). Nuclear security in India. Observer Research Foundation. Ramana, M. V. (2009). India’s nuclear enclave and the practice of secrecy. In I . Abraham (Ed.), Nuclear power and atomic publics: Society and culture in India and Pakistan. Indiana University Press. Ramana, M. V. (2012). The power of promise: Examining nuclear energy in India. Viking/Penguin. Ramana, M. V. (2013). The power of promise: Examining nuclear energy in India. Viking. Roche, E. (2019). Rajnath Singh sparks debate on no-first-use nuclear doctrine. Livemint. Retrieved May 15, 2020, from https://www.livemint.com/news/india/rajnath-singh-sparks-debate-on-nofirst-use-nuclear-doctrine-1565978545173.html. Saksena, A. R. (2015). Can India accommodate the INS Arihant?’. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/can-india-accommodate-the-ins-arihant/. Saran, S. (2013). Is India’s nuclear deterrent credible?’. India habitat centre. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-DeterrentCredible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf. Saran, S. (2013). India’s nuclear weapons not for national pride,. The Tribune. Retrieved Aug 29, 2021, from http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/tribune-9may%202013.pdf. Sarkar, J. (2014) ISSF Article Review, 28. Retrieved Aug 06, 2020, from https://networks.h-net.org/ node/28443/discussions/47299/issf-article-review-28-new-delhi%E2%80%99s-long-nuclearjourney-how-secrecy. Schaper, A. (2004). Looking for a demarcation—Between nuclear transparency and nuclear secrecy. Peace Research Institute. Retrieved May 20, 2020, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28862/prifrep68. pdf. Sethi, M. (2009). Nuclear strategy: India’s march towards credible deterrence. KW Publishers. Sidhu, W. P. S. (2013). Whose finger on the nuclear trigger at sea?. Livemint. Retrieved May 12, 2020, from, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/FesGy5sItj3WTJywQdfiKO/Whose-fingeron-the-nuclear-trigger-at-sea.html. Tellis, A. (2001). India’s emerging nuclear posture: Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal. Santa Monica. The Baruch Plan (1946). Retrieved Aug 30, 2021, from, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/ documents/deterrence/baruch-plan.html. Tikkavarapu, A. (2014). Private business involvement in India’s nuclear industry. Retrieved May 11, 2021, from http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2014/ph241/tikkavarapu2/. U.S. Department of State. (2014). Transparency in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Retrieved Aug 29, 2021, from https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/225343.htm. Wueger, D. B. (2015). Deterring war or courting disaster: An Analysis of Nuclear Weapons in the Indian Ocean. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey. Retrieved Aug 09, 2020, https://calhoun. nps.edu/handle/10945/45278.

Chapter 5

India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms and the Way Ahead Arun Vishwanathan

Introduction Higher defence management in a country of India’s size, geographic location, faced with a multiplicity of national security challenges is a critical issue. While reforming the higher defence organisation has been an issue of constant debate, action has come in fits and starts. India is one of the few post-colonial states, where the military has remained completely under civilian control. While this is one of India’s success stories, it has also come at an “artificial” cost of keeping the military away from the higher decision-making apparatus. Many a time this separation is unnecessary and counterproductive given that it eliminates direct military inputs into defence planning and military procurement. As the subsequent sections will underline, a major rejig of the higher defence management took place immediately after India’s independence with the recommendation of Lord Mountbatten and his Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay. Subsequently, while there was a lot of discussions, precious little took place. The next substantial reform of higher defence and the national security apparatus took place after the Kargil conflict as a result of the Kargil Review Committee headed by K. Subrahmanyam and the Group of Ministers’ report led by Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister, L. K. Advani. The current Indian government led by Shri Narendra Modi is making several important changes to the Indian higher defence organisation, beginning with the strengthening of the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA), to the creation and appointment of the first Chief of Defence Staff and the establishment of a new Department of Military Affairs (DMA) within the Ministry of Defence. As the essay A. Vishwanathan (B) Centre for Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_5

61

62

A. Vishwanathan

will point out, all of these are landmark decisions, which will go a long way in strengthening India’s defence and military preparedness and the country’s ability to respond to multiple national security challenges it faces.

India’s Higher Defence Organisation Most of the debate and literature about higher defence management in India has been focused on the post-independence period. However, it is important to appreciate and recognise the fact that higher defence management was an issue of debate much prior to independence. As Brigadier Rajeev Bhutani points out, in a very interesting monograph published by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), the Mauryan empire under the King Chandragupta Maurya, over two millennia ago, had adopted the concept of “Chief of Defence Staff” given that it had a single Commanderin-Chief for the army and naval arms of the military (Bhutani, 2016: 4, 39). Similarly, during the British rule of India, there was a famous dispute between Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener and the then Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon. The dispute was over the office of the Military Member who was the link between the C-in-C, Lord Kitchener and the Viceroy Lord Curzon. However, what began as a bureaucratic tussle escalated into a major power struggle and resulted in the resignation of Lord Curzon as the Viceroy of India (Cohen, 1968: 337–38). Lord Kitchener of Khartoum argued that as the Military member was a Major General officer and was junior in rank to the C-in-C, the office of the Military member was “detrimental to military efficiency”. He proposed the “unification of the offices of the Military member and the commander-in-Chief into one position” (Bhutani, 2016: 5). The differences led to the possible first major reorganisation of the higher defence in British times. The office of the Military member was abolished, and the C-inC became the member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. Additionally, an Army Secretary was appointed, under the C-in-C, to head the department of the Army along with the creation of the office of the Chief of General Staff which remained in operation till India’s independence in 1947. Post-independence, the Indian government took immediate cognizance of the higher defence in India when Lord Mountbatten and his Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay was asked to recommend a system of higher defence management for the country (Prakash, 2007: 19). Mountbatten and Ismay recommended the system of Commander in Chief (C-in-C) for the three services with a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) for central coordination. Subsequently, in 1955, the Commander in Chiefs of the three services were rechristened as Chiefs of Staff. As SK Sinha points out, the change in the nomenclature did not amount to much as the service chiefs continued to function as C-in-Cs rather than as Chiefs of Staff (Sinha, 2007: 134). This was because of the fact that the three services HQs were designated as “Attached Offices”, which placed the service headquarters outside the Ministry of Defence and left the service chiefs with little power.

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

63

The situation was only rectified following the Kargil conflict, which resulted in the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the Group of Ministers (GoM) to oversee and take forward the recommendations made in the KRC. Thus, it was only in 2001 that the GoM Report on “Reforming the National Security System” recommended renaming the service HQs as integrated HQs of the Ministry of Defence. This was to be accompanied by decentralisation of decision-making and delegation of powers (Advani et al., 2001: 97, 99). However, this re-designation has not translated into greater powers for the service HQs and service chiefs. As SK Sinha and Arun Prakash writing in the Journal of Defence Studies argue, there was little change in the functioning of the service headquarters or their equation with the MoD (Prakash, 2007: 26; Sinha, 2007: 135).

Recent Changes in India’s Higher Defence Organisation Establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff The need for appointing a Chief of Defence Staff has been advocated by many since the 1950s. As stated by former Governor-General Mountbatten in a letter to Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber, Prime Minister Nehru had in principle agreed to appoint a CDS soon after independence. In fact, Mountbatten states that Nehru had even given thought to appointing General Thimayya as the first CDS prior to the Chinese invasion in 1962. However, he did not do so and cited the opposition from the then Defence Minister and close confidant, Krishna Menon (Malik & Mukherjee, 2011; Mountbatten, 1977). Since then the proposal to appoint a CDS has come up for discussion several times. In fact, following the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the then government decided to designate General Manekshaw as the first CDS. However, this was not continued due to, inter alia, the opposition to the appointment from the other services. In June 1982, the then Chief of Army Staff Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao raised the issue of appointing a CDS to strengthen the inter-service relationship and for faster decisions during crises. This suggestion was brushed aside by the then Defence Minister R. Venkataraman stating that the current system need not be modified as it was functioning satisfactorily (Elkin & Ritezel, 1984: 1077–78). The 2001 GoM report also recommended the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff. Unfortunately, the then NDA government deferred the appointment of a CDS given opposition from the services (Cherian, 2001). The Chief of Defence Staff as fleshed out in the 2001 GoM report was to be a four-star officer from one of the three services in rotation. The CDS was to function as the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The CDS was envisioned to provide single-point military advice to the government. He was to administer the Strategic Forces, bring greater efficiency into the planning process by intra- and inter-service prioritisation and bring “jointness” to the Armed Forces (Advani et al., 2001: 100–3).

64

A. Vishwanathan

Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the Independence Day speech from the Red Fort on 15 August 2019 announced the decision to set up a CDS. This is one of the most significant reforms of higher defence that have taken place since the changes carried out because of the KRC and the subsequent GoM report on national security. Interestingly, while the 2009 manifesto of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) had mentioned “military reforms”, the 2014 manifesto of the party did not mention any such point. Despite this, this is a most welcome step given its wider ramifications on India’s civil–military relations and all aspects of defence planning and military readiness. Speaking from the Red Fort on the 73rd Independence Day, Prime Minister Modi stated. “There indeed is coordination between our Navy, Army and Air Force … Our entire military power will have to work in unison and move forward. Things cannot move smoothly if anyone from the Navy, Army and Air Force is a step ahead from the other two forces, while the other two are lagging. All the three should move simultaneously at the same pace. There should be good coordination and it should be relevant with the hope and aspirations of our people. It should be in line with the changing war and security environment in the world and today I want to announce an important decision from Red Fort. The subject experts on the issue have been demanding this for a long time. Today we have decided that we will now have a Chief of Defence Staff- CDS and after formation of this post all the three forces will get effective leadership at the top level. The CDS System is a very important and compelling task in our dream to reform the strategic pace of Hindustan in the world” (Modi, 2019).

In his Independence Day address, the Prime Minister alluded to the several commissions and reports which had been set up and submitted their reports on the issue. He mentioned that all of them had suggested the establishment of an office like that of the Chief of Defence Staff. Most importantly, he stressed greater jointness and synergy in the Indian military and between the three services, especially given the changing nature of war (Modi, 2019). After decades of waiting, numerous reports and discussions, the Indian government established the office of the CDS by way of a Gazette Notification on 30 December 2019. Former Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat was appointed as the first Indian CDS. It is important to note that the CDS will wear multiple hats and play multiple roles. In addition to occupying the role of principal military advisor to the Defence Minister on tri-service issues, the CDS will also don the role of Permanent Chairman-Chief of Staff Committee (PC-COSC) and will form the very crucial link between the Commander, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), and the government. As PC-COSC, he will also be a member of the NSA-headed Defence Planning Committee in addition to heading the newly established Department of Military Affairs in the Ministry of Defence. The CDS is also likely to be part of the Cabinet Committee on Security as well as the National Security Council. Given these multiple roles, the CDS will fill an important gap and ensure that the civilian and political leadership have a direct channel to exchange views and the civilian leadership has a single point of contact to receive the advice of the military leadership, instead of going through the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence (Hasnain, 2019; Menon, 2019).

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

65

In addition to establishing the CDS, the government also established a new department within the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Military Affairs (Sainya Karya Vibhag) with the CDS being the head of this new department. The Gazette notification issued by the Cabinet Secretariat modified the Government of India, Allocation of Business Rules, First and Second Schedule, 1961 (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019c; Cabinet Secretariat, 2019a). The main tasks allotted to the newly created Department of Military Affairs headed by the Chief of Defence Staff as per the Allocation of Business Rules (Second Schedule) are as follows (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019b: 46): • “The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force; • Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters; • The Territorial Army; • Works related to the Army, Navy and Air Force; • Procurement exclusive to the Services except capital acquisitions, as per prevalent rules and procedures; • Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the Services through joint planning and integration of their requirements; • Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands; • Promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services”. However, it is very interesting to note that civilian supremacy in civil–military relations in India exists despite the creation of the new Department of Military Affairs headed by the Chief of Defence Staff. This is highlighted by the fact that as per the revised Allocation of Business Rules (Second Schedule), the Department of Defence headed by the Defence Secretary continues to have the responsibility of “Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy and preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilization” (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019b: 44). Another important responsibility that the civilian leadership has kept under the ambit of the Department of Defence is the “Capital Acquisitions exclusive to the Defence Services” with the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) having the responsibility of “Procurement exclusive to the Services except capital acquisitions, as per prevalent rules and procedures” (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019b: 45–6, 2019a). This in turn restricts the involvement of the Chief of Defence Staff and the military in the capital acquisition by the three services. As Anit Mukherjee points out, one of the major issues that the CDS will have to work on during his tenure will be ironing out the relationship between the Department of Military Affairs, the Services, and the Defence Ministry’s bureaucrats led by the Defence Secretary (Mukherjee, 2020). Though the military leadership has got a seat at the high table and would formally be part of the national security decision-making through the CDS, the civilian bureaucrats would likely be on their guard to protect any further perceived “erosion” of their turf.

66

A. Vishwanathan

Another important point that the CDS and the civilian and political leadership will have to work on if this important reform has to succeed is the cross-posting of military officers in the Defence Ministry. This is a low-hanging fruit that has partially been achieved with serving military officers joining the DMA in senior positions. Staffing of the CDS is another important aspect highlighted by Anit Mukherjee who points out that the CDS General Bipin Rawat will have to work on working out the staffing and tenures of the officers posted at the Department of Military Affairs to tune them to the career progression timelines and trajectories in the military (Mukherjee, 2020). It is necessary to ensure that the officers working in the DMA are posted there for a minimum of three years to ensure that they can become familiar with the processes and functioning of the defence ministry and thereafter contribute to the DMA’s working. Therefore, the Indian government has gone the whole nine yards and has taken a momentous decision in creating the post of the CDS and appointing the first CDS in General Bipin Rawat. The creation of a new Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence will give the CDS a platform to work with the civilian bureaucracy, and as head of the DMA, the CDS will also find a seat at the apex decisionmaking bodies like the Defence Planning Committee, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, among others. However, as pointed above, there remain multiple challenges before the civilian and military leadership to ensure that this bold new restructuring exercise achieves traction and functions smoothly in the months and years to come.

Setting up of the Defence Planning Committee The Indian government has taken a very important effort in restructuring India’s higher defence organisation which has been the establishment of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) chaired by the National Security Advisor. The Indian Government through a notification issued on 18 April 2018, created this new body, which comprised the Chairman-Chiefs of Staff Committee (now PC-COSC, after the establishment of the CDS), three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Secretary (Expenditure) from Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 1). The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman of the Chief of the Staff Committee (CISC) will be the Member-Secretary of the DPC, with the headquarter, Integrated Defence Staff acting as the DPC’s Secretariat. With the establishment of the CDS, it is likely that this body will also form a unique platform for fostering jointness between the services from the apex level, strengthening civil–military relations and better long-term and medium-term planning in defence procurement keeping in mind available resources, country’s and military’s strategies and doctrines (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 1; Sen, 2018). The ambit of responsibilities of the Defence Planning Committee are quite broad and at the same time important. The Defence Ministry’s website citing the government notification establishing the DPC states:

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

67

“The DPC would analyse and evaluate all the relevant inputs relating to Defence Planning, inter-alia, national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, operational directives and associated requirements, relevant strategic and security related doctrines, defence acquisition and infrastructure development plans, defence technology, development of the Indian Defence industry and global technological advancement” (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 1).

Regarding the functioning of the DPC, it is reported that the Committee would function through at least four sub-committees in the initial period which will look at (1) policy and strategy, (2) planning and capability development, (3) defence diplomacy, and (4) defence manufacturing ecosystem (Katoch, 2018: 5; Special Correspondent, 2019). The main functions or duties of the DPC would be to “prepare, for consideration by the Raksha Mantri/ Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) drafts of National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence review and doctrines, international defence engagement strategy, roadmap to build defence manufacturing ecosystem, strategy to boost defence export and prioritised capability development plans for the armed forces over different time frames in consonance with the overall priorities, strategies and likely resource flows” (Ministry of Defence, 2018: 1). Given the membership of the DPC and the fact that it is chaired by the NSA, it is likely that the body will provide a “whole of government” outlook and approach on any matter which comes before it for consideration (Pubby, 2019). Secondly, it is likely to foster better jointness between the services, especially when it comes to matters of procurement and avoiding duplication given the limited resources available to decision-makers. Thirdly, given its charter and ambit of responsibilities, it is likely that the DPC will also work on giving shape to India’s National Security Strategy (Gupta, 2019). Such a document will put in place a road map for the country’s actions on foreign policy, defence policy, defence procurement, force structure, and modernisation. However, the DPC is unlikely to be a long-term solution, and P. S. Raghavan describes it as “a band-aid, not a cure” to the long-standing issues in higher defence management. The creation of the CDS and the Dept. of Military Affairs as part of the Ministry of Defence will go a long way in dealing with many of the important challenges in the civil–military relations in India (Raghavan, 2019: 47).

Reforming India’s Higher Defence Organisation Establishment of a Specialised Defence, National Security Cadre of Bureaucrats Speaking at the United Services Institute (USI), New Delhi at the National Security Lecture, retired senior Indian civil servant and one of the few bureaucrats to hold the post of both Defence Secretary and Home Secretary, Shri N. N. Vohra, had underlined

68

A. Vishwanathan

the importance of a dedicated cadre of specialist bureaucrats dealing with national security issues. Shri Vohra stated: “In so far as the tenures of civilians working in Ministry of Defence are concerned, I have been urging, for many years now, the establishment of a dedicated security administration cadre by drawing in the best available talent from the Civil Services, Defence Services, DRDO, S&T, Information and Communication Technology, Broadcasting and Media, et al. I had proposed that officers of this dedicated cadre should enjoy open ended tenures and those found fit should be enabled to develop specialisation in dealing with security related matters and be deployed in the Home Ministry, Intelligence Bureau, National Security Council Secretariat, Defence Ministry, R&AW and other security management related areas for their entire careers” (Vohra, 2013).

Additionally, he stated that his recommendation was included in the Report of the Task Force on Internal Security (2000) and was accepted by the GoM report. The GoM report states: “The Department of Personnel and Training (DoP&T) may work out a scheme, in consultation with the MHA, MoD and other security agencies, for establishment of a pool of officers, core cadre, drawn from all services, for manning posts at all levels in the MHA, MoD, NSCS etc.” (Advani et al., 2001, para. 4.105). The absence of a specialised defence or national security cadre of civil servants is one of the most important challenges that face the Indian national security decisionmaking. Given the limited tenure of posting of the Indian civil servant, generally around three years, by the time the bureaucrat at the position of Deputy Secretary or above, gets a handle on the ropes, (s)he is in the final leg of her posting in the office. It is, therefore, important that a separate cadre of bureaucrats be created who work in ministries or departments which deal with defence, national security issues like the Defence Ministry, Home Ministry, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Security Council Secretariat, various intelligence agencies, among others. The issue of the absence of specialised bureaucrats becomes more acute due to the reason that there is no cross-posting of civilian and military officials, and the service headquarters till the creation of the Department of Military Affairs were not fully integrated into the Ministry of Defence. Prior to 2002, the three service headquarters (SHQs) of the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force were “attached offices”, meaning they were not seen as part of the Ministry of Defence. In 2002, though SHQs were renamed as “Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence”, this did not result in any substantial changes in the way the Ministry of Defence dealt with these offices and translate into many actual (Joseph, 2002). Till the creation of the Department of Military Affairs, the SHQs could only approach the Department of Defence in the Defence Ministry through files and this affected greater civil– military integration and also adversely impacted the administrative effectiveness of the Service Chiefs. Though “cross-posting” of civilian officers in service headquarters and military officers in the Defence Ministry was low-hanging fruit, it has not seen any movement for many years. Positions of Director and above—where decision-making inputs are provided from within the government—were reserved solely for civilian officers. A similar story repeats in the case of civilian officers in the service headquarters.

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

69

Hopefully, this will change with the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs which hopefully will be staffed with a mix of civilian and military officers, thereby creating a camaraderie between the two and building a foundation for better understanding between the two sides. As stated above, given the fact that the politicians are rarely interested in military or defence issues until they are very urgent or such actions shore up the veteran vote bank, the day-to-day workings of the higher defence are largely left in the hands of the civilian officers. As the military leadership—till the establishment of the CDS—were not in the decision-making loop, the politicians would solely work on the brief and information provided to them by the civilian bureaucrats. The political leadership, it has been noticed, becomes interested in the defence or military issues only if there is a crisis that requires immediate attention or if tackling such issues will translate into votes at the polls. The One-Rank, One-Pension (OROP) issue is an issue where the political leadership became interested due to the large veteran population and how any action on this issue will have a direct impact at the polls. Just before the 2014 national elections, the then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram announced that the OROP scheme would be implemented from 2014 to 2015. After years of dithering on the issue, the timing of the announcement in February 2014, and subsequently in July 2018 in the run-up to the general elections, was largely perceived as an attempt to win over the defence community of over 14 lakh serving and over 25 lakh retired military personnel and their families (Pubby, 2018; Rajat, 2014). Given the lack of interest on the part of the political leadership, the decisions on military and defence issues are largely in the hands of the Ministry of Defence bureaucrats. To add to this, these officers have short tenures of about three years, and they do not have any prior training and by the time they build the requisite expertise, it is almost the end of their posting in the ministry. As Shri N. N. Vohra states speaking at the USI National Security Lecture, this creates a “disjoint between the military imperatives and policy” (Vohra, 2013). Former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General V P Malik while sharing his experience of leading the Army during the Kargil War states, “…only in the times of crisis is there a direct contact between the military and the political leadership, otherwise the military is kept at an arm’s length through bureaucrats” (Chauhan, 2014, p. 6). This is largely due to the fact that the civilian bureaucracy acts as a gatekeeper to the political leadership, controlling and preventing direct access to the military leadership thereby resulting in miscommunication, suspicion, and mistrust.

Strengthening and Statutory Recognition of the Office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) The second area of reform or strengthening of the national security architecture or higher defence management relates to the office of the National Security Advisor.

70

A. Vishwanathan

In August 1990, the VP Singh government had established the National Security Council (NSC) system. However, the experiment was not much of a success and was a short-lived one. It was in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict and the intelligence failures therein that the Indian government undertook a major overhaul of the national security apparatus. As part of this, in April 1999, the National Security Council system was formalised through a resolution of the Cabinet Secretariat which was notified in the Gazette of India. The National Security Council was comprised of the Prime Minister as the Chairman, the Home Minister, Defence Minister, External Affairs Minister, Minister of Finance, and Dy. Chairman of Planning Commission. However, as P. S. Raghavan, current Chairman, National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) notes, the Vice Chairman of the Niti Ayog, successor to the Planning Commission was made a member of the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), not the NSC (Raghavan, 2019: 43). The Cabinet Secretariat resolution stated that the NSC would deal with the following broad subject areas, namely. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

“The external security environment and threat scenario; security threats involving atomic energy, space and high technology; trends in the world economy and economic security threats in the areas of energy, foreign trade, food, finance and ecology; internal security, including counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism and counterintelligence; patterns of alienation emerging in the country, especially those with a social, communal and regional dimension; security threats posed by trans-border crimes such as smuggling and traffic in arms, drugs and narcotics; and co-ordination in intelligence collection, and tasking of intelligence agencies so as to ensure that intelligence is focussed on areas of concern for the nation” (Cabinet Secretariat, 1999).

The resolution put in place the NSC system that comprised the NSAB, the SPG, the NSA to the Prime Minister, and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The April 1999 gazette notification, however, did not specify the role, functions, and responsibilities of the NSA. However, over the years, as the NSC system evolved, it became apparent that the National Security Advisor was the pivot around which the NSC system functioned. The NSA wears multiple hats and plays very important roles in national security decision-making. In addition to being the Prime Minister’s advisor on national security issues, the NSA is also the Chair of the DPC (Katoch, 2018; Kumar, 2014; Special Correspondent, 2019). In addition, the NSA also is a crucial link between the chiefs of the intelligence agencies and the Prime Minister. The NSA also heads the National Intelligence Board (NIB), the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), and the Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) (IDSA Task Force, 2012: 89–90). Two additional roles that the NSA fulfils are the Special Representative on Border Talks with China. Additionally, the NSA also plays a very crucial role in the Indian nuclear command and control structure with his position as the Chairman of the

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

71

Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and being the link between the Executive and the Political Council. As the Cabinet Secretariat resolution did not flesh out the role and functions of the NSA, it has resulted in a situation where the role, functions, and powers of the NSA have largely been influenced by the proximity and personality of the individual occupying the office of the NSA and his/her equation with the Prime Minister. Ajit Kumar Doval, who is the current NSA, is known to be a very good officer in his earlier avatar in the Intelligence Bureau (Kumar, 2014). He is also perceived to be very close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As a result of this, he has quite a hold over any national security decisions taking place in the Modi government (Pubby, 2019). However, given the equation of a future NSA with the then Prime Minister, the roles and functions of the NSA could change in the future. As is clear from the above roles that the NSA assumes, each one of them has a very critical responsibility in the national security apparatus and decision-making set-up of the country. In addition to there being a degree of overlap between the various responsibilities, many of the talks like that of the Permanent Representative to the Border negotiations and the chairman of the Defence Planning Committee are time-consuming responsibilities. To assist and strengthen the NSA and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), the Modi government has taken several steps. Firstly, it has expanded the number of Deputy National Security Advisors (Dy. NSA) in the NSCS. From one Dy. NSA, there are currently three Deputy NSAs with a Military Advisor who is also the rank of Deputy NSA. Additionally, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has been subsumed into the NSCS with the NSCS being re-organised into “verticals”, namely, internal security, external affairs, and science and technology (Gokhale, 2018). Additionally, from writing intelligence assessments, the NSCS is coordinating with different ministries on security issues and providing input to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. In order to further strengthen and give statutory recognition to the NSA, it is important to pass an act in the Indian Parliament and define the role, functions, and organisation of the office of the National Security Advisor, the NSCS as well as the Deputy NSAs. This will enable them to function more effectively, provide a whole of government view, coordinate with various ministries, and develop a cogent national strategy towards multiple national security challenges. An important first step towards giving teeth to the NSCS has been its inclusion in the recently modified Allocation of Business rules.

Conclusion A major reform of India’s higher defence set-up is currently underway under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Several moves which will have longstanding ramifications on India’s national security and higher defence apparatus have been carried out by the Modi government.

72

A. Vishwanathan

The most important of them has been the appointment of the CDS along with the creation of a new department in the Defence Ministry, the Department of Military Affairs, which will be headed by the CDS. Another important step has been to create a Defence Planning Committee headed by the NSA as well as strengthening the office of the NSA and the NSCS which assists the NSA and the National Security Council. These important higher defence reforms will go a long way to strengthening civil– military interaction and ensure that the political leadership receives advice on military and defence issues from the Chief of Defence Staff who will act as the representative of the three arms of the military. In addition, these reforms will ensure that India is able to foster greater jointness within the military, coordinate between the different arms of the government, and is able to respond more effectively to existing and future national security challenges.

References Advani, L. K., Fernandes, G., Singh, J., & Sinha, Y. (2001). Report of the group of ministers on national security. Government of India. Bhutani, R. (2016). Reforming and restructuring: Higher defence organization of India. Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). Cabinet Secretariat. (1999). Cabinet Secretariat Resolution No. 281/29/6/98/TS. Gazette of India. https://ia600601.us.archive.org/13/items/in.gazette.e.1999.383/E_94_2013_050.pdf. Retrieved May, 12 2020. Cabinet Secretariat. (2019a). Allocation of business rules: First schedule. https://cabsec.gov.in/bus inessrules/allocationofbusinessrules/. Retrieved May 15, 2020. Cabinet Secretariat. (2019b). Allocation of business rules: Second schedule. Cabinet Secretariat. https://cabsec.gov.in/businessrules/allocationofbusinessrules/secondschedule/. Retrieved May 15, 2020. Cabinet Secretariat. (2019c). The gazette of India, Cabinet Secretariat notification No. 4208. Government of India. Chauhan, S. (2014). Revisiting higher defence management in India (Working Paper No. 2; ISSSP Working Paper). National Institute of Advanced Studies. http://isssp.in/revisiting-higher-defencemanagement-in-india/. Retrieved May 15 2020. Cherian, J. (2001). In defence of changes. Frontline, 18(19). http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1819/ 18190250.htm. Retrieved May 18, 2020. Cohen, S. P. (1968). Issue, role, and personality: The kitchener-curzon dispute. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10(3), 337–355. Elkin, J. F., & Ritezel, W. A. (1984). The debate on restructuring India’s higher defence organization. Asian Survey, XXIV (10), 1069–85. Gokhale, N. (2018). How revamped NSCS is helping shape coherent national security policy. Bharat Shakti. https://bharatshakti.in/how-revamped-nscs-is-helping-shape-coherent-national-securitypolicy/. Retrieved May 18, 2020. Gupta, S. (2019). National security adviser Ajit Doval ready with India’s new military doctrine. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-military-doctrine-to-be-sub mitted-in-october/story-S0payhw9CgFs5FfeMqAMyI.html. Retrieved May 18, 2020. Hasnain, A. (2019). CDS: There’s more work to do. DNA India. https://www.dnaindia.com/ana lysis/column-cds-there-s-more-work-to-do-2782397. Retrieved May 18, 2020.

5 India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Recent Reforms …

73

IDSA Task Force. (2012). A case for intelligence reforms in India: IDSA task force report [Task Force Report]. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. http://www.idsa.in/book/ACaseforI ntelligenceReformsinIndia. Retrieved May 18, 2020. Joseph, J. (2002). Service headquarters renamed as integrated headquarters of defence. Refiff.Com. https://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jun/29josy.htm. Retrieved May 18, 2020. Katoch, P. C. (2018). Establishment of the defence planning committee in India under the NSA. SP Land Forces, 15(3), 5–9. Kumar, D. (2014). Former intelligence Bureau Chief Ajit Doval appointed as national security advisor. NDTV. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/former-intelligence-bureau-chief-ajit-dovalappointed-as-national-security-advisor-564725. Retrieved May 20, 2020. Malik, V. P., Mukherjee, A. (2011). Jawaharlal Nehru and the Chief of Defence Staff (IDSA Issue Brief). Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. Menon, P. (2019). CDS was needed. But Modi govt also creating department of military affairs is a big bonus. The Print. https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-govt-creating-department-of-military-aff airs-with-cds-a-big-bonus/340495/. Retrieved May 20, 2020. Ministry of Defence. (2018). Major activities of department of defence for month of April, 2018. Ministry of Defence. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/majoractapril18.pdf. Retrieved May 22, 2020. Modi, N. (2019). PM’s address to the Nation from the ramparts of the Red Fort on the 73rd independence day. Prime Minister of India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-addressto-the-nation-from-the-ramparts-of-the-red-fort-on-the-73rd-independence-day/. Retrieved May 22, 2020. Mountbatten, Lord. (1977). Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Major General Chibber. http://idsa. in/issuebrief/JawaharlalNehruandtheChiefofDefenceStaff. Retrieved May 22, 2020. Mukherjee, A. (2020). Three pitfalls of CDS, dept of military affairs and why it should make us sceptical. The Print. https://theprint.in/opinion/three-pitfalls-of-cds-dept-of-military-affairs-andwhy-it-should-make-us-sceptical/376468/. Retrieved May 25, 2020. Prakash, A. (2007). India’s higher defence organisation: Implications for national security and jointness. Journal of Defence Studies, 1(1), 13–31. Pubby, M. (2018). Modi government announces OROP; says cost to exchequer estimated at Rs 8,000–10,000 crore. Economic times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ modi-government-announces-orop-says-cost-to-exchequer-estimated-at-rs-8000-10000-crore/ articleshow/48835603.cms. Retrieved May 25, 2020. Pubby, M. (2019). Cabinet secretariat raps MoD, MEA for not involving NSA. Econmic times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/cabinet-secretariat-rapsmod-mea-for-not-involving-nsa/articleshow/70776972.cms. Retrieved May 22, 2020. Raghavan, P. S. (2019). The evolution of India’s national security architecture. Journal of Defence Studies, 13(3), 22–52. Rajat, P. (2014). Govt announces one rank, one pension for military personnel in budget. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Govt-announces-one-rankone-pension-for-military-personnel-in-budget/articleshow/30575525.cms. Retrieved May 25, 2020. Sen, G. (2018). Defence planning committee (DPC) and beyond. Indian Defence Review. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/defence-planning-committee-dpc-andbeyond/. Retrieved May 25, 2020. Sinha, S. K. (2007). The chief of defence staff. Journal of Defence Studies, 1(1), 133–137. Special Correspondent. (2019). NSA-headed committee for higher defence management. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-headed-committee-for-higherdefence-management/article23599248.ece. Retrieved May 25, 2020. Vohra, N.N. (2013). USI national security lecture – 2013 on civil military relations: Opportunities and challenges [Lecture]. USI National Security Lecture, United Service Institution of India. https://idsa.in/resources/speech/CivilMilitaryRelations_NNVohra. Retrieved May 25, 2020.

Chapter 6

India’s Cyber Security Landscape Sameer Patil

Introduction As the most advanced and newest of the ‘Global Commons’, cyberspace is characterised by anarchy—the absence of a formal comprehensive governance framework. The interconnectedness offered by this virtual space has brought new opportunities for economic development, symbolised by the catch-all term ‘digital economy’. However, the tremendous growth of information and communication technology (ICT) enabled by the decreasing costs of computing has also spawned new challenges, while amplifying some of the existing vulnerabilities. This evolution of technology has also allowed wide dissemination of tools, necessary to carry out cyber-attacks. For India, cyberspace has brought new economic opportunities, brought by the growth of Information Technology (IT)-enabled services, which have made India an IT and software hub. The government has also appreciated the benefits of getting on the digital bandwagon, and therefore has taken many initiatives to expand the use of computers, Internet and ICT in India. This growth of Indian cyberspace, however, has also brought extension of India’s security challenges as the country has been at the receiving end of many attacks, emanating from its traditional adversaries as well as new sources. This has compelled the Indian policymakers to accord priority to the issue of cyber security. This chapter broadly examines the sources and nature of India’s cyberthreats. It also reviews the government’s policy measures to counter these threats.

S. Patil (B) Gateway House, Mumbai, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_6

75

76

S. Patil

Global Cyber Security Canvas In the last two decades, as more and more states have acquired cyber capabilities, cyberspace has emerged as an area of geopolitical contestation. Cyber power has also acted as great equaliser—states, which previously with their limited conventional military capabilities could not take on their more powerful adversaries, can now do so with offensive cyber capabilities—at much lower cost and at the same time maintaining plausible deniability. With growing interdependence and interconnectedness, it has become possible for states to exploit their adversaries’ vulnerabilities and launch penetrating cyber-attacks to fulfil their geopolitical objectives. Such attacks: (a) breach-sensitive computer networks; (b) gain access to confidential and proprietary data; (c) disrupt critical national infrastructure operations and (d) theoretically can cause kinetic damage. Given the ability to cause such wide-spread damage, it is no wonder that today many states have established dedicated units for offensive cyber operations. This has emerged as a great challenge to the traditional notions of deterrence. In April 2007, Estonia, which had been involved in a long-running dispute with Russia over a World War II-era war memorial, was subjected to wide-ranging cyberattacks on its computer networks by Russia-based hackers. These attacks disrupted functioning of its government, banks and news services, but no physical damage occurred (McGuinness, 2017). This virtual assault demonstrated for the first time how geopolitical rivalries can entwine with cyberwarfare. The lower barriers to entry also mean that state actors are joined by the non-state actors such as organised criminal gangs, drug cartels, terrorist groups and hackers’ syndicates, which have used cyberspace for (a) engaging in criminal activities; (b) committing financial frauds and (c) executing attacks on behalf of states. For instance, Lazarus Group is a hackers’ syndicate supported by the North Korean government, which has engaged for many years in wide-ranging attacks targeting government (South Korea), critical infrastructure (WannaCry ransomware attack), banks (Bangladesh Central Bank) and businesses (Sony Pictures data breach) (Department of Justice, 2018). This group demonstrates how state actors use non-state actors as proxies to target their adversaries. Cyber-attacks usually are routed through multiple servers based in different countries, which makes it challenging to pinpoint the responsible for an attack. This peculiarity knows as the ‘problem of attribution’ in the cyber security lexicon has acted as a critical enabler for many state-sponsored attacks on their adversaries. In recent years, however, as these attacks have surged some states applying their technical skills and forensic capabilities, they have begun to ‘name and shame’ perpetrators of cyber-attacks. The United States, for example, has charged the ‘Lazarus group’ as being responsible for many attacks. Yet this ‘naming and shaming’ has not really affected the frequency of offensive cyber operations. As against this conflict and competition, attempts to create norms for a responsible state behaviour in the cyberspace have not gained much traction because states have benefitted from the absence of clearly defined rules-based order. The most prominent

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

77

of the efforts to evolve cyber norms, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) faltered, after showing promise in its initial days. Currently the process to evolve norms is polarised along the U.S. and Russian and Chinese visions of the cyberspace. Russia has emphasised the capacity of states to manage cyberspace, whereas the United States has focused on a multi-stakeholder model, bringing in civil society, academia and businesses to regulate cyberspace. In this global context, India has positioned itself as an emerging economy with a sophisticated technology industry. It is executing an ambitious vision to digitise its economy along with using ICT to deliver citizen-centric government services through the flagship programme of ‘Digital India’. Additionally, several new innovations such as the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), IndiaStack and the identity-based AadhaarEnabled Payment Systems are creating a new framework for digital payments and financial inclusion. This digitisation has been rapid and is overhauling the delivery of basic services from banking to subsidies, healthcare to education and taxes. Like the global scenario, this new digital infrastructure is too vulnerable to risk.

Sources and Nature of India’s Cyberthreats Internet in India was introduced in 1986, under a United Nations Development Programme funded project, called as the Education and Research Network project (Ramani, 2011, pp. 47–62). The project linked different Indian educational institutions. In the 1990s, this project was expanded to common citizens, who now got Internet access through dial-up connections. By this time, the economic reforms introduced in 1991 had also begun to have its impact and the Indian software industry and the IT companies had begun to emerge. This fuelled Internet usage in India, even as average Internet speed remained painfully slow, across the country. Internet allowed the ordinary citizens an opportunity to connect with the outside world, just at a time when globalisation and the post-Cold War era liberal economic order was at its peak. Early on, however, there were efforts by many states, primarily in the West, to regulate this emerging virtual information superhighway. These efforts manifested through the International Telecom Union (ITU), which emerged as the first international organisation to deliberate on the implications of this emerging technology (ITU, 1999). Despite the rapidly expanding Internet usage, however, Indian policymakers were comprehending meaning and implications of this new technology which was evident from the country’s low profile in the multilateral forums such as the ITU and the World Summit on the Information Society, an emerging forum for governmental consultations on IT, cyber and digital issues (Bhardwaj, 2013, pp. 219–221). This, however, did not stop the policymakers from enacting a domestic legislation to regulate matters such as electronic communications, posting of objectionable content on Internet, etc. through the Information Technology Act 2000 (IT Act 2000) (Naren, 2020; UNI, 2000). By this time, the IT companies had made India a software giant and business process outsourcing hub. As a matter of fact, Bengaluru-based Infosys

78

S. Patil

company earned 23% of its revenue, from resolving glitches related to the Y2K bug (Rajaraman, 2012). Riding on the wave of contracts coming from the United States and the fears of the Y2K bug, the IT companies logged an impressive growth: from earning 1.7 billion in 1997 to $ 50 billion in 2010 (Balasubramanian, 2013; Rajaraman, 2012). In 2000s, the debut of global social media platforms such as Myspace, hi5 and Orkut added another dimension to India’s story of digital transformation. Today, with approximately 700 million users—many of them first generation, India has the second-largest Internet user base in the world, after China. This rapidly expanding Internet user base also brought with it the challenge of rising cybercrimes. In the early days, many Indians fell prey to social engineering attacks and online advance-fee scams, leading to many cases of economic frauds. This was particularly evident in the Nigerian phishing emails, which sought to entice their victims in making advance payment to the scamsters, with a false promise of larger payments in return. First time Internet users, who had no awareness of how to protect themselves in the cyberspace, became easy targets of this scam. This made India one of the top five growing markets for such fraud, with Indians losing money to the tune of $870 million to this fraud (Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations, 2013). In August 2003, first complaint related to the Nigerian phishing scam was registered in Kolkata under the IT Act 2000, though many Indians had been victims of the scam much before this case (DQI Bureau, 2003). However, parallel to this was also the emergence of cyberthreats from Pakistan and China—the two countries with whom India is locked in protracted border disputes. From Pakistan, the major threat in the initial days was the hacking and defacing of the Indian websites; a task made easier by the fact that many of the hacked Indian websites had been running on unpatched or outdated software and opensource programmes, which made them vulnerable to these attacks. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, Indian and Pakistani hackers engaged in a series of retaliatory attacks defacing prominent websites, mostly government: a trend which has continued ever since (Baezner, 2018). With the passage of time, however, this nuisance value attacks have evolved to become far more penetrating and advanced. However, it is from China that the country faces the most insidious cyber risk. In recent years, attacks from China have become more penetrating as the security competition and border stand-offs between the two countries have escalated. China-based hackers have been linked to multiple attacks targeting Indian computer networks. In one of the most significant operations, a China-based hacker group (most likely state-sponsored) successfully breached several Indian computers, harvesting information on the India–China border dispute, Indian naval activity in the South China Sea and India’s relations with its South Asian neighbours. This operation, codenamed APT30 by American cyber security firm, FireEye, ran for a decade and was detected in 2015. More importantly, the espionage operation utilised the same tools, tactics and infrastructure for 10 years, exposing a major vulnerability in critical computer networks. Apart from espionage/data-harvesting operations, Chinese hackers have also targeted critical infrastructure in India as was seen in March 2021, when a report from Recorded Future, an American cyber security firm revealed that a China-linked hacker group RedEcho had targeted Indian power sector by deploying

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

79

malware, even as both the countries were locked in a border standoff in eastern Ladakh (Insikt Group, 2021). In addition, China-based hackers had also targeted Indian Covid vaccine makers—Bharat Biotech and Serum Institute of India—who have played an important role in India’s vaccine diplomacy (Reuters, 2021). Apart from Pakistan and China, India has also been at the receiving end of other state-sponsored operations such as the United States’ National Security Agencies’ PRISM surveillance programme; several media reports have also pointed that India was the fifth-most spied-on country by this programme (Greenwald & Saxena, 2013). Similarly, North Korea-backed Lazarus group has been linked to the malware attack on Cosmos Bank in 2018 (United Nations Security Council, 2019). Technical and anecdotal evidence may have pointed out involvement of statebacked hackers in carrying out these attacks, however, India has not publicly attributed them to any state actor. The closest it came to was when Maharashtra’s Energy Minister had hinted out the possible role of Chinese malware in disrupting the electricity supply when Mumbai city’s power supply had got disrupted for many hours together in October 2020, which had a cascading effect on other sectors such as the suburban railway system (PTI, 2020b). However, in the face of mounting frequency and intensity of attacks from adversarial state actors, India may have to revisit its position. Another significant aspect of India’s cyber security canvas is cyber-terrorism. Anti-India terrorist groups, based in Pakistan such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba have assiduously used social media platforms for radicalisation, propaganda and recruitment (Rao, 2016). With the emergence of the Daesh (also known as the Islamic State) terrorist group, this challenge has amplified since the group has focused on mobilising ‘lone wolves’ to launch terrorist attacks. Besides, at the height of its brutal violent campaign between 2014 and 2017, the group through its propaganda successfully lured Indian youth to join the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. Countering the extremist propaganda in the cyberspace has therefore emerged as a significant challenge for India’s counter-terrorism apparatus. A related subject to the issue of extremist propaganda is fake news and disinformation campaigns—another phenomenon which Indian security establishment has had to tackle with the proliferation of social media. Particularly on disinformation, Pakistan and Iran have emerged as serious sources of threat. In August 2019, following India’s decision to withdraw special status of J&K and bifurcate the state, Pakistani establishment had used social media platforms to propagate a false narrative against India (Patil, 2019b). For this, it utilised fake profiles, cyber trolls, journalists besides some Pakistani diplomats and focused on themes such as alleged human rights violations in the Kashmir Valley and alleged plight of ordinary Kashmiris, etc. Indian establishment has fervently sought to control such disinformation campaigns but has found it difficult to keep pace with the evolution of the phenomenon. The next few sections will discuss in detail three cyber security challenges for India: critical infrastructure protection, securing digital payment systems and tackling the threat of digital black markets.

80

S. Patil

Critical Infrastructure Protection Critical infrastructure protection as a principal cyber security concern emerged for India only after the Stuxnet virus infected the country’s computer networks in 2010. The virus allegedly designed by the United States and Israel to target the Iranian nuclear programme, also infected computer networks of several critical infrastructure facilities worldwide (Kushner, 2013). In India, the infections were minor, infecting computers running the electricity grids in Gujarat and Haryana as well as an Oil and Natural Gas Corporation offshore oil rig (Fitter, 2012). Nonetheless, these infections made India the third largest victim of the Stuxnet virus, after Iran and Indonesia. Its impact—even if minor—brought to fore multiple concerns for Indian security establishment: i.

ii.

iii.

While for years, cyber security researchers and policymakers had speculated and debated about the potential damage and disruption of critical infrastructure, Stuxnet showed for the first time the practical way in which a malware can be deployed to achieve such an outcome (Kushner, 2013). Secondly, by exploiting the same vulnerabilities in computers from other countries as it did in Iran, the malware infected computer networks of several critical infrastructure facilities worldwide which ran on similar systems. This showed that countries and their critical infrastructure can get entangled— mostly as collateral damage—in state/non-state actor-sponsored offensive cyber operations. By spreading rapidly in the Indian computer network, it also revealed vulnerabilities of the industrial control systems and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are used to manage the operations of critical infrastructure.

In fact, since the Stuxnet incident, SCADA systems’ cyber security has been a focus worldwide since there is growing technical and anecdotal evidence to suggest that they are the weakest link in protecting critical infrastructure—telecommunication networks, air traffic, signal management, nuclear reactors, power plants, oil pipelines—which are required to be always functional. For critical infrastructure, India uses the term Critical Information Infrastructure which means the ‘computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety’. Many of the SCADA systems in India were installed decades ago, much before the onset of Internet and web-based applications and therefore not designed to resist network-based threats or cyber-attacks (Patil, 2014). However, not just the legacy systems but also the recently installed SCADA systems in a networked environment are vulnerable to cyber-attacks since they have limited computational power to implement security protocols. Moreover, information on how to breach SCADA systems is widely available on the Internet. Confidential data from Computer Emergency Response Team-India has revealed multiple attacks targeting India’s critical infrastructure occurring annually. Anecdotal

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

81

evidence suggests that their scale, frequency and penetration has increased over the years. In response to the Stuxnet infections, the government set up the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), under the umbrella of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) in 2014. The centre works with the public and private sectors for plugging gaps in their critical infrastructure systems. However, it has proved to be easier said than done. Private sector is unwilling to talk about security gaps in their SCADA systems for fear of exposing themselves and losing a competitive edge over rivals. As a result, they have been plugging the gaps as and when they emerge. On the other hand, government complains that the private sector’s focus on merely plugging the SCADA vulnerabilities is a tactical, short-term specific response, which may overlook the potential of a concerted cyber campaign against India.

Securing Digital Payment Systems A key dimension of India’s digital transformation is its adoption of the cashless or digital payment systems. This adoption is anchored on several domestic initiatives. A flagship initiative is JAM trinity (the Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana initiative to make basic financial services available to all, linkage of Aadhaar national identity cards to government subsidy payments and promotion of mobile payment systems) (Patil & Chakraborty, 2019). Besides, several innovations such as the IndiaStack software layer platform and the UPI-enabled immediate payment system have revolutionised the payment space. In 2012, India also launched its own brand for retail electronic payments, Rupay, managed by National Payments Corporation of India, a quasi-government body (National Payments Corporation of India, 2020b). The Indian payment industry has also experimented with multiple fintech products like mobile wallets, QR codes and Near-field communication technology. All these initiatives have contributed to the growth of digital payments. In fact, the UPI initiative has garnered global interest including from the Bank of International Settlements, which is looking to replicate it for other countries to expand access to financial services (Reserve Bank of India, n.d.). This impressive growth notwithstanding, India’s digital payment space lacks resilience with frequent instances of data breach, financial frauds and cyber-attacks on payment systems. A review of major attacks on Indian computer networks since 2010 shows that financial sector including banks remain the most sought after target of hackers and cybercriminals—by hacking into the centralised payment systems as well as targeting individual users and banking professionals to gain access to payment servers (Patil & Chakraborty, 2019). The most serious cyber incident involving the Indian financial sector was the malware attack on India-based servers of Hitachi Payment Services in 2016 (Hitachi, 2017). The attack compromised a vast amount of Indian debit-card data leading to losses totalling Rs. 1.3 crore and forced 19 Indian banks to replace more than 30 lakh debit cards (National Payments Corporation of India, 2020a). In another serious incident, in 2016 a social engineering-enabled

82

S. Patil

malware attack allowed hackers to access to the payment systems of the Union Bank of India’s foreign-exchange accounts and execute wire transfers to the tune of $170 million. Fortunately, the breach was detected in time, which allowed the bank to prevent the fraudulent transaction (Gopakumar & D’Monte, 2017). While the Union Bank was able to retrieve the stolen money, in many other cases, the money was lost without trace, as was the case with Cosmos Bank, which lost Rs. 94 crores in a malware attack linked to the North Korea-backed Lazarus group (Cosmos Bank, n.d.; FireEye, n.d., p. 5; United Nations Security Council, 2019). One of the major challenges for Indian payment industry is deficient cyber hygiene, which leads to many cases of social engineering attacks, where cybercriminals trick customers and staff into divulging their personal and financial details, causing numerous cases of economic frauds besides entry into the restricted computer networks. For example, the Union Bank malware attack materialised because a bank employee mistakenly responded to a phishing email that then installed the malware in the bank’s servers (Patil & Chakraborty, 2019). The example of Union Bank also reveals that hackers and cybercriminals are creating specific malware to target bank employees, which can expand the threat exponentially if the bank employees are not trained in cyber security practices. So, expanding the cyber security awareness and cyber hygiene initiatives is a major task for the government. In response, the Indian banking regulator, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has regularly pushed the payments industry to mandatorily adopt cyber security frameworks to ensure data protection, protect mobile banking and secure financial infrastructure. The RBI has issued multiple guidelines, advisories and technical frameworks for banks and other payment-system operators. It has also mandated banks to set up a Security Operations Centre to detect cyber security incidents and report them to the Indian Banks-Center for Analysis of Risks and Threats which acts as the information-sharing mechanism on threats (Reserve Bank of India, 2016). Unfortunately, while the payments industry has shown remarkable enthusiasm in adopting the latest technology to cater to an expanding customer base, it is playing a catch-up game with the expanding threat canvas. In many cases, cyber security awareness of banks and payment processors meets the hard reality of organisational budget and lack of cyber security expertise in senior management. This can lead to ad-hoc approach to cyber security (Reserve Bank of India, n.d., p. 107). In some cases, cyber security compliance is treated as a mere formality by many smaller banks, which leads to quick-fix attitude and compliance window-dressing, instead of taking a holistic look at the threats. Besides, many organisations presume that a cyber incident which can imperil their business is rare and unlikely. They, therefore, tend to excessively rely on cyber insurance, to cover such eventuality (Patil & Chakraborty, 2019). However, global experience from many cyber incidents has revealed that there is significant loss of proprietary data, future business opportunities, market value and reputation, besides exposure to potential legal liabilities.

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

83

Tackling the Threat of Digital Black Markets An emerging concern on this cyberthreat canvas is that of the digital black markets, hosted on the deep web—the anonymous Internet, beyond the open traffic of the regular Internet. Parts of the deep web can be accessed through an encrypted browser, based on The Onion Router (TOR) technology—originally developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory for confidential communications. The technology was opened for public use in 2003 (Dingledine et al., 2004). It conceals the users’ location data and Internet traffic, by hiding their Internet Protocol addresses. This feature allows users to remain anonymous in any online activity. As a result, it is favoured by political and human rights activists as well as investigative journalists and whistleblowers to evade surveillance. It is also used by the security agencies, to disguise their activities. However, it is also misused by cybercriminals and organised crime syndicates. This has metamorphosed deep web into dark net—as a hub of illegal online activity, contributing to the growth in cybercrimes across the world. Using other technologies such as the Virtual Private Network (VPN) and encrypted communication tools along with the TOR, cyber saboteurs have created thriving digital black markets. These marketplaces trade prohibited goods such as drugs, firearms, stolen personal and financial data, counterfeit items, malware and computer viruses. They also cater to the extreme perversions of humanity such as contract killing, snuff movies and child pornography. Some of these marketplaces sell legal goods that were procured illegally, such as prescription drugs and consumer electronics (Patil, 2019a, p. 2). Pertinently, clandestine online markets have existed since the advent of Internet; however, TOR technology with its anonymity has acted as a force-multiplier for these illegal activities, making them hubs of illicit activity. The most infamous darknet marketplace till date is the Silk Road, which debuted in 2011 selling contraband. The United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation shut it down in 2013. However, before its closure, it had generated revenues worth $1.2 billion (Department of Justice, 2013). According to the anecdotal evidence For India, 70% of online traffic is on the deep web. Law enforcement agencies have noticed use of TOR-enabled browsers and growing activity of India-based users on the digital black markets. Many of these sites have made available stolen and counterfeit identification documents such as Permanent Account Number cards, passports, Aadhaar cards, voter registration cards as well as credit card details for sale. One prominent instance of this was the reported availability of data of nearly 10 crore credit and debit card holders, from the payment processor company, Juspay. The data for sale included card holders’ names, their contact details as well as first and last digits of their cards (Chakravarti, 2021). In other instances, these marketplaces also offer exotic and rare items from India such as stolen idols and sandalwood (Economic Times, 2019). Given the kind of activities taking place on these sites, it won’t be a mistake to link it to the growing cybercrimes in India—though figuring out the precise linkage remains a difficult proposition due to the clandestine nature of these activities.

84

S. Patil

However, the most important threat posed by these is by their sale of drugs and other narcotic substances. Digital black markets offer drug users and the peddlers a convenient platform to engage in their activities. Market places such as The Majestic Garden, Neptune Market and Empire have India-based vendors, offering Indian opium, Ketamine, hashish and prescription pills, to customers in India and abroad. This online drug sale is the most pernicious aspect of digital black markets for India because it complements the well-entrenched offline smuggling syndicates that operate in India’s border regions such as Punjab and the North-east—‘the golden triangle’ and ‘the golden crescent’ (Patil, 2018a). The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), a central government agency in-charge of drug-law enforcement, has intercepted only a fraction of these illicit activities. In one such successful interdiction of smaller shipments, the NCB arrested a Delhi-based darknet vendor in February 2020, who used to disguise drug parcels while shipping sex stimulation medicines and fitness supplements (Sinha, 2020). Adding to this threat of online drug sales and cybercrimes is the use of darknet by the terrorist groups, primarily for propaganda purposes. After repeated deplatforming from mainstream social media sites, terrorist groups such as the Daesh or the Islamic State have made extensive use of darknet to spread their propaganda. In some instances, this propaganda has yielded results as evident from host of Indian youth joining the group. Taking inspiration, Kashmir valley-based terrorist groups, such as the Hizbul Mujahideen and the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar Ghazwatul Hind, have used darknet for communications along with the VPN and to evade security forces’ surveillance.

Cyber Security as a Policy Priority Faced with this expanded threat canvas, India has made cyber security a policy priority. Following the IT Act 2000 (and its amendments in 2008), the government brought in the National Cyber Security Policy in 2013, which provided the overarching framework to manage cyber security issues domestically. Taking forward this focus, the government created the post of the National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC) in 2015 within the National Security Council Secretariat. Reporting directly to the NSA, the NCSC’s post was intended to coordinate between various government departments and agencies dealing with the technical, security and legal dimensions. However, in the absence of a dedicated cyber security institution, the NCSC continued to operate out of the NSCS, precenting the optimum utilisation of the newly created post. Moreover, turf battles between various bureaucracies also impeded his task. When it comes to cyber, there are four key ministries which tackle various dimensions of the issue. These include. • Termed as the ‘line ministry’, Ministry of Electronics and IT handles all policy matters relating to information technology. The ministry also has under it the

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

85

Unique Identification Authority of India, which collects and manages the Aadhar data. • Ministry of Finance, under which comes the RBI, the principal regulator for digital payment systems. In 2017, the RBI established the Reserve Bank Information Technology Private Limited to focus on cyber security, conduct research and audit and assess the RBI-regulated entities. • Ministry of Home Affairs, which operates the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre—the lead agency for tackling cybercrimes in India (Ministry of Home Affairs, n.d.). • Ministry of Defence, which recently made the Defence Cyber Agency operational (Press Information Bureau, 2019). While there is not much information available about the agency in the public domain, some reports have noted that it will be put in charge of offensive cyber operations—something which has picked up pace in recent months with repeated targeting of Pakistani and Chinese computer networks. Besides, India seems to have also adopted the practice of using proxies for its offensive cyber operations (Hegel, 2021; Leyden, 2021; Scott-Railton et al., 2020). Besides these four ministries, the government has also created some stand-alone institutions such as the NCIIPC to perform specific cyber security-related functions. In addition, the two intelligence agencies—Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing too cover some functions of cyber, particularly in terms of espionage and propaganda operations directed against the Indian interests and cyberspace. At the state level, each of, now, the state governments have setup dedicated units to deal with cyber security, particularly cybercrimes. Besides, some states have also specifically focused on darknet phenomenon. However, the capacity to investigate instances of cyber fraud and crimes varies across states as in many cases critical forensic investigation capabilities remain inadequate. Moreover, in case of cybercrimes, getting hands on data, located on servers abroad, remains a difficult task. Besides the above-mentioned measures, one tool which has been widely used by the authorities in response to cyber-terrorism, or more specifically the use of Internet by terrorists in J&K, is Internet shutdowns. This was most prominently on display after the revocation of special status of the state of J&K and its bifurcation in August 2019 (Government of Jammu & Kashmir, 2020; Shah & Kaul, 2020). As a matter of fact, that Internet shutdown constituted the longest Internet shutdown in the world (Software Freedom Law Centre, n.d.). This prompted the Supreme Court to declare access to Internet as a fundamental right (PTI, 2020a). Since then, the tool of Internet shutdown has been used by other state governments too to deal with law-and-order situations.

86

S. Patil

India’s Cyber Diplomacy Since its independence, India has actively participated in multilateral bodies and regional forums, keen to contribute to the evolving world order spanning many critical issues. One key dimension of its multilateral diplomacy has been its contribution to global debate on arms control and disarmament. As an ardent supporter of disarmament, India cast its approach to the issue of nuclear weapons as one which had grave implications for international security. While nuclear powers did not agree with this approach and emphasised on non-proliferation, India remained steadfast in its approach. Similar approach was evident in its treatment of emerging technologies including cyber and digital, with implications for international security. The UNGGE process provided India with the opportunity to be part of the group shaping the norms for state behaviour in the cyberspace. It used this opportunity to highlight the necessity of developing a common understanding on responsible state behaviour, including on matters of attribution and cyber-terrorism, drawing from its experience of violence perpetrated by Pakistan-sponsored anti-India terrorist groups (Basu, 2019). Moreover, faced with relentless offensive Chinese cyber operations, it supported the ‘right to self-defence’ against state-sponsored cyber-attacks (Ebert, 2020). India’s enthusiastic approach to multilateralism to shape cyber norms notwithstanding, it has also asserted its exceptionalism on certain other issues. Its approach to data governance and e-commerce are two such examples, where it has sought to distance itself from global consensus. Its position on data governance underlines the imperative of national sovereignty—that states should have the exclusive privilege to manage and regulate their citizens’ data (Basu, 2019). It therefore stayed out of the Osaka Track for Data Governance at the G20 Summit in 2019 as well as continues to oppose the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Similarly on e-commerce, India has refused to be part of the negotiations at the World Trade Organization. These diverging positions at the multilateral level are essentially reflection of the ‘pull’ of economic development (beneficiary of the free flow of data) and the ‘pressure’ of national security (concern with ever-increasing cyber-attacks) (Patil, 2018b). Besides cyber norms, another area where India has been an enthusiastic votary of global and regional cooperation is capacity building with like-minded countries. As part of this, India has also sought to share its learning from domestic initiatives such as IndiaStack and Aadhar national ID project, with other countries which are on similar path of digital growth. India is a founding member of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, which enables its engagement with other developing countries for capacity-building, sharing of best practices and regular exchange on cyber security issues (Hohmann et al., 2017, p. 30). Besides, in recent years, India has helped countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa, through bilateral cyber dialogues, setting up Centres of Excellence and Institutes of Technology and training programmes as part of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme.

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

87

As part of broader security partnership, India has also engaged in cyber cooperation with many countries. Prominent among these is the cyber security partnership with the United States, where in 2016 India signed first-of-its kind ‘Framework for India-US Cyber Relationship for enhanced cooperation in the field of ICT and Cyber Security’. This framework enabled greater bilateral exchange on cyberthreats, intelligence sharing and synced in approach at the multilateral forums such as Internet governance. Pertinently, just a year before, in 2015 India had announced its explicit support to the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance championed by the United States as part of the management of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, responsible for the global Internet infrastructure (ICANN, 2015). This Indian support was a shift from an earlier position where it had initially supported a state-centric approach to deal with Internet governance issues—a proposition advocated by Russia and China. Besides the United States, India envisions similar cyber engagement with France, Japan and Australia where it seeks to leverage each country’s expertise: France (quantum computing), Japan (5G technology) and Australia (robotics).

Conclusion The above overview of India’s cyber security suggests that as an emerging economy with a large IT industry and a well-established technological base, India’s cyber security posture reflects two contrasting trends. Its commitment is to a liberal multistakeholder order in the cyberspace as reflected in its cyber diplomacy initiatives. It has situated itself in between the developed and developing world seeking to play a greater role in shaping global cyber norms while concomitantly reflecting position of the developing world with a focus on using information and communication technologies for national socio-economic developments. At the same time, faced with relentless cyber-attacks, India has endured the pressure of protecting its national security interests—which is evident from the frequent use of Internet shutdowns and its foray in offensive cyber operations. These two trends are increasingly going to define India’s cyber security trajectory in coming years, as the country straddles the anarchic cyberspace.

References Baezner, M. (2018). Regional rivalry between India Pakistan: Tit-for-tat in cyberspace. Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Marie-Baezner/publication/326866504_Regional_rivalry_between_India-Pakistan_titfor-tat_in_cyberspace/links/5b6985fd299bf14c6d950724/Regional-rivalry-between-India-Pak istan-tit-for-tat-in-cyberspace.pdf. Balasubramanian, D. (2013). Sixty years of IT in India. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/scitech/science/sixty-years-of-it-in-india/article4435223.ece.

88

S. Patil

Basu, A. (2019). India’s role in global cyber policy formulation. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog. com/indias-role-global-cyber-policy-formulation. Bhardwaj, S. (2013). Security in cyberspace: India’s multilateral efforts. In W. P. S. Sidhu, Pr. B. Mehta, & B. Jones (Eds.), Shaping the emerging world: India and the multilateral order (pp. 217–236). Brookings Institution Press. Chakravarti, A. (2021). Data of 100 million credit, debit cardholders leaked on dark web. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/-data-of-100-million-creditdebit-cardholders-leaked-on-dark-web-1755570-2021-01-04. Cosmos Bank. (n.d.). Official press release regarding the unfortunate attack on the Indian banking sector. Retrieved Sep 20, 2018, from https://www.cosmosbank.com/press-release/. Department of Justice. (2013). Criminal complaint against Ross William Ulbricht. https://www.cs. columbia.edu/~smb/UlbrichtCriminalComplaint.pdf. Department of Justice. (2018). North Korean regime-backed programmer charged with conspiracy to conduct multiple cyber attacks and intrusions. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-koreanregime-backed-programmer-charged-conspiracy-conduct-multiple-cyber-attacks-and. Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004). Tor: The second-generation onion router. SSYM’04: Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium 13. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedings/sec04/tech/full_papers/din gledine/dingledine.pdf. DQI Bureau. (2003). India’s first ‘Nigeria 419’ case registered. Dataquest. https://www.dqindia. com/india-s-first-nigeria-419-case-registered/. Ebert, H. (2020). Hacked IT superpower: How India secures its cyberspace as a rising digital democracy. India Review, 19(4), 376–413. Economic Times. (2019). Tracing dark web crimes a big challenge for Kerala police. Economic Times. https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/secure-india/tracing-dark-webcrimes-a-big-challenge-for-kerala-police/71258534. FireEye. (n.d.). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved May 21, 2019, from https://content.fireeye. com/apt/rpt-apt38. Fitter, P. (2012). Stuxnet attack wakes India up to threat to critical infrastructure. India Today. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/stuxnet-cyber-war-critical-infrastructure-of-india-ntro/ 1/216107.html. Gopakumar, G., & D’Monte, L. (2017). How Union Bank was hacked and got its money back. LiveMint. https://www.livemint.com/Industry/xuBJNapRGBrtl05iEAvsYO/How-UnionBank-was-hacked-and-got-its-money-back.html. Government of Jammu and Kashmir. (2020). Temporary suspension of Telecom Services-directions reg. http://jkhome.nic.in/28(TSTS)of2020.pdf. Greenwald, G., & Saxena, S. (2013). India among top targets of spying by NSA. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-among-top-targets-of-spying-by-nsa/ article5157526.ece. Hegel, T. (2021). A global perspective of the sidewinder APT. https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/ labs-research/a-global-perspective-of-the-sidewinder-apt. Hitachi. (2017). Hitachi, final investigation report completed; Hitachi payment services suffered breach due to sophisticated malware attack in mid-2016. https://www.hitachi-payments.com/src/ HPY%20Press%20Release_V9.pdf. Hohmann, M., Pirang, A., & Benner, T. (2017). Advancing cybersecurity capacity building: Implementing a principle-based approach. Global Public Policy Institute. https://www.gppi.net/media/ Hohmann__Pirang__Benner__2017__Advancing_Cybersecurity_Capacity_Building.pdf. ICANN. (2015). Indian government declares support for multistakeholder model of internet governance at ICANN53. https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2015-06-22-en. Insikt Group. (2021). China-linked group RedEcho targets the Indian power sector amid heightened border tensions. https://www.recordedfuture.com/redecho-targeting-indian-power-sector/. ITU. (1999). Consultations get under way for world summit on information society. ITU News, 4. http://www.itu.int/itunews/issue/1999/04/index.html.

6 India’s Cyber Security Landscape

89

Kushner, D. (2013). The real story of Stuxnet. IEEE Spectrum. https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/ security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. Leyden, J. (2021). Indian cyber-espionage activity rising amid growing rivalry with China, Pakistan. https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/indian-cyber-espionage-activity-rising-amid-gro wing-rivalry-with-china-pakistan. McGuinness, D. (2017). How a cyber attack transformed Estonia. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/ 39655415. Ministry of Home Affairs. (n.d.). Details about Indian cybercrime coordination centre (I4C) Scheme. Retrieved August 19, 2020, from https://www.mha.gov.in/division_of_mha/cyber-andinformation-security-cis-division/Details-about-Indian-Cybercrime-Coordination-Centre-I4CScheme. Naren, N. (2020). Two decades of the information technology act, 2000: Way forward. The Daily Guardian. https://thedailyguardian.com/two-decades-of-the-information-technology-act2000-way-forward/. National Payments Corporation of India. (2020a). Statement pertaining to press reports on debit card compromise. https://www.npci.org.in/PDF/npci/press-releases/2016/Statementpertainingto pressreportsondebitcardcompromise.pdf. National Payments Corporation of India. (2020b). RuPay product overview. RuPay Product Overview. https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/rupay/product-overview. Patil, S. (2014). India’s vulnerable SCADA systems. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-vulner able-scada-systems/. Patil, S. (2018a). Punjab’s unshakable drug smuggling networks. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/pun jabs-drug-smuggling/. Patil, S. (2018b). India’s lead on cyber space governance. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-cyberspace-governance/. Patil, S. (2019a). Partnering for prosperity: India-Canada collaboration to curb digital black markets (No. 2; Canada-India Track 1.5 Dialogue). https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/Canada-India-Paper-no-2_0.pdf. Patil, S. (2019b). Pakistan’s cyber propaganda: Fake news and social media. Patil, S., & Chakraborty, S. (2019). A cybersecurity agenda for India’s digital payment systems (No. 20). https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Digital-Payments_FINAL.pdf. Press Information Bureau. (2019). Raksha Mantri Reviews Defence Cooperation Mechanism. https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1573610. PTI. (2020a). Access to internet is a fundamental right, rules Supreme Court. The Hindu. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/right-to-access-internet-is-a-fundamentalright-rules-supreme-court/article30531490.ece. PTI. (2020b). Sabotage suspected in Mumbai power outage: Nitin Raut, energy minister. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sabotage-suspected-in-mum bai-power-outage-nitin-raut-energy-minister/articleshow/78656392.cms. Rajaraman, V. (2012). History of computing in India (1955–2010). IEEE Computer Society. Ramani, S. (2011). Bringing the Internet to India. In M. Rao & O. Manzar (Eds.), NetCh@kra: 15 years of internet in India, retrospect and roadmaps (pp. 47–62). Digital Empowerment Foundation. Rao, P. (2016). Online radicalisation: The example of Burhan Wani. Manohar Parrikar institute for defence studies and analyses. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/online-radicalisation-burhan-wani_prao_ 160716. Reserve Bank of India. (n.d.). Payment and settlement systems in India: Journey in the second decade of the millennium. Retrieved Feb 27, 2021, from https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publicati ons/PDFs/PSSBOOKLET93D3AEFDEAF14044BC1BB36662C41A8C.PDF. Reserve Bank of India. (2016). Cyber security framework in banks. https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/ BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx?Id=10435. Reuters. (2021, March 1). Chinese hackers target India’s serum institute, Bharat Biotech: Report. NDTV.

90

S. Patil

Scott-Railton, J., Hulcoop, A., Bahr, A. R., Marczak, B., Anstis, S., & Deibert, R. (2020). Dark Basin: Uncovering a massive hack-for-hire operation. Citizen Lab. https://citizenlab.ca/2020/06/ dark-basin-uncovering-a-massive-hack-for-hire-operation/. Shah, K., & Kaul, A. (2020). Indian government’s 2G restrictions in Kashmir fail to curb online extremism. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indian-govern ments-2g-restrictions-in-kashmir-fail-to-curb-online-extremism-66861/. Sinha, J. (2020). Delhi: 21-year-old drug dealer operating through the ‘dark web’ arrested. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/21-yr-old-drug-dealer-operat ing-through-the-dark-web-arrested-6259629/. Software Freedom Law Centre. (n.d.). Longest Shutdowns. Retrieved Feb 27, 2021, from https://int ernetshutdowns.in/. Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations. (2013). 419 Advance fee fraud statistics 2013. https:// www.ultrascan-agi.com/public_html/html/pdf_files/Pre-Release-419_Advance_Fee_Fraud_Sta tistics_2013-July-10-2014-NOT-FINAL-1.pdf. UNI. (2000, August 9). IT Act to come into force from Aug 15. Refiff.Com. https://www.rediff.com/ business/2000/aug/09itact.htm. United Nations Security Council. (2019). Report of the panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 1874. https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/171.

Chapter 7

Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security and India’s National Security Haans J. Freddy and Adarsh Vijay

Introduction One of the important terms that has become a buzzword in the study of international relations has been maritime security. Over the past decade major policy-makers, actors in ocean governance and international security have included maritime security in their mandate. Ambitious maritime strategies were launched by the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union and the African Union. For example, the United States (US) in 2004 encouraged the inclusion of the 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy by the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty to include maritime security as one of its objectives (Bueger, 2015: 159). The recent and many works on maritime security have brought with it a reasonable level of clarity in terms of what is maritime security and how we define it. In general, there may be agreement that states wish to maximize their national security while not being clear what method must be used for achieving it. Similarly, maritime security suffers from both ambiguity and ubiquity. It was during the Cold War that terms such as naval power, naval diplomacy or sea power were commonly used. In contemporary times, the term naval forces have become prominent or central to any discussion in the maritime domain. It is under these assumptions that any definition of maritime security must include ‘Diplomacy’, ‘Intelligence’, ‘Military’ and Economy (DIME). Maritime security has come to include many more aspects such as the environmental and cultural factors beyond the DIME. Additionally, maritime safety and maritime security which developed separately have become intertwined and the distinction between ocean policy and ocean law have also become unclear (Kraska & Raul, 2013: 5). In this regard, there was also the inclusion of maritime security in its list of tasks by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Maritime security points H. J. Freddy (B) · A. Vijay Department of Political Science at the Madras, Christian College, Chennai, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_7

91

92

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

to the various threats that emerge in the maritime domain. Maritime security often points to the threats that appear as inter-state maritime disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics or drugs, people, smuggling, arms proliferation, illegal fishing environmental crimes, maritime accidents and disasters. Thus, the absence of these threats may be defined as maritime security in general (Bueger, 2015: 159; Kraska & Raul, 2013: 1). The maritime realm which covers over 139,768,200 square miles and most of it which lies beyond the jurisdiction of the state has not only become an area that is anarchic in nature but is also conducive to threats that are different from the classical military aggression or conflicts that occur within the limits of the concept of sovereignty. These over the horizon expanse of water that are often linked with territorial waters, estuaries and riverine systems are poorly monitored, and according to international jurisprudence are viewed as distinct and independent entities. Put together, these characteristics and practices have made the vast expanse of the oceans as an entity that is synonymous with Hobbes’s claim in his Leviathan, an unpredictability and lawless system—‘…life is nasty, brutish and short…’ (Chalk, 2008: 2). Maritime security issues appear in four important domains: (i) national security, (ii) marine environment, (iii) economic development and (iv) human security. National security concerns that appear in the maritime domain points towards those traditional aspects of power that include sea power and disputes between states and naval competition. It also covers issues such as maritime terrorism or arms proliferation. Security issues that emerge in the context of marine environment is concerned with the preservation of marine environment, resources, illegal fishing, pollution and those challenges that arise as a consequence of climate change. Marine environmental concerns and economic development are closely related since it considers the economy and economic security as vital for global trade and the sustainable management of those resources that are available in the sea. In the realm of maritime security, the human security aspect points to those issues that relate to piracy, human trafficking and the negative effects that illegal fishing and marine pollution may have on humanity (Bueger et al., 2019: 973–974). Maritime security issues in contemporary times can also be identified using four distinguishing characteristics—(i) interconnectedness, (ii) liminal, (iii) transnational and (iv) cross-jurisdictional. In the context of interconnectedness, maritime security could refer to the interdependent nature of problems that exist in the sea. In other words, one maritime security problem may have a domino effect on other maritime domains (ibid: 974). For example, De Sombre (2019) succinctly puts it that illegal fishing can have pathological impacts on fishing stocks, biodiversity and coastal communities that have a dependency on each other (De Sombre, 2019: 1022). The liminal aspect of maritime security points towards the fact that maritime security issues is not limited to the sea but has its effects on the land as well. This can be explained because, for example, piracy or terrorism may happen at sea but finds its sustenance in land or it may be due to the fact that land base root causes such as exclusion, development or dislocation are linked to these activities that happen in the sea. Among the most common security issues that is present in terms of maritime security is transnational challenges that has its effect on national borders and places an emphasis on issues of sovereignty where shared sovereignty which

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

93

is present in the sea is given consideration. Finally, cross-jurisdictional maritime security appears in an extended form where multiple sovereign territories engage and multiple actors are involved such as institutions, organizational actors, navies of different countries, coastguards, port authorities, courts, and prisons. Thus, maritime security has become an increasingly interlinked security complex that has global, regional and national significance (Bueger et al., 2019: 974). What has happened as a consequence is that there have been a series of important developments in terms of maritime security governance at sea as nations across the world have begun to adapt and respond to what has been called as ‘the turbulence of maritime politics’ (Ryan, 2019: 1056). For those who are involved in terrorism and piracy, the maritime domain that has predominantly been in international waters has served those who are involved in insurgency against great powers. For example, the USS Cole in 2000 and the M/V Limburg in 2002 were attacked with speed boats laden with explosives. These acts of terrorism only showed to the world that terrorist organizations had begun to use the international waters and carry out attacks in the maritime domain. The US identified that the Al-Qaeda had with it 15 freighters that were being used for generating profit and terrorist activities. In the year 2004, three American servicemen lost their lives during an interdiction operation, while trying to prevent an attack on one of the Iraqi offshore oil terminals in the Persian Gulf. In addition, piracy reached an all-time high in the year 2000 when it recorded a total 469 actual and attempted attacks and more particularly in southeast Asian region (Raymond & Morrien, 2008: 3). While these kinds of threats point towards the traditional aspect of security in the maritime domain, there are various forms of non-traditional maritime security threats. Maritime security can thus be broadly distinguished between traditional and non-traditional security. These security threats are present in the IOR and has a significant impact on the national security interests of India. This article therefore examines the traditional and non-traditional security threats that are present in the IOR and how these challenges are significant to the national security interests of India. The following pages of the article would investigate three important aspects ‘Competition’, ‘Cooperation’ and ‘Convergence’ in the IOR while considering the strategic importance the IOR has for India. The IOR has great significance for India’s national security while also being significant at the global level. Maritime security of the IOR has three important aspects: (i) its significance at the global level, (ii) its significance at the regional level and (iii) its importance in terms of India’s national security. Additionally, maritime security of the IOR must be examined in terms of both traditional and non-traditional perspectives of security.

Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region Comprising about twenty percent of the total area of water in the world and the only ocean named after a state, the Indian Ocean includes the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea,

94

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

the Andaman Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and its waters reach the shores of Antarctica, Africa and countries in the southeast Asian region. The Indian Ocean also serves as an easy linking sea route to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans thus making it important in terms of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) for countries in Asia and Africa. Sea routes in the Indian ocean region not only enables transportation of crucial energy resources but it also shortens and provides an economical route that connects the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The western region of the Indian Ocean includes the Suez Canal that connects the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. On the eastern side, the straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, Lambok and Ombai-Wetar connect with the Pacific Ocean (Roy-Chaudhury, 1996: 1).

Traditional Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region While considering the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), one must include both the littoral, island, hinterland and landlocked states of east Africa and South Asia whose dependence is on the India Ocean for trade and natural resources. By considering such an approach towards the IOR, it fulfils the broad principles that are outlined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). Articles 69, 125 & 140 of the LOSC provides that landlocked states have the right to be engaged in the management of marine affairs of the IOR. It is on this basis that there are 46 independent states that have a stake in the Indian Ocean. In addition to these independent states there are also a number of littoral and non-littoral states such as (i) France (Reunion, St. Paul, Amsterdam, Kerguelen, and Crozet Islands), (ii) the United Kingdom (the British Indian Ocean Territory—the Chagos Archipelago), (iii) Australia (Cocos, Christmas, Heard, and Macdonald Islands), (iv) India (Andaman, Nicobar, and Lakshadweep Islands), (v) South Africa (Prince Edward Island) and (vi) Yemen (Socotra), all having offshore territoriesy in the Indian Ocean thus creating Extensive Economic Zones (EEZs). Apart from these non-littoral states that have a stake in the Indian Ocean, there are global powers such as the United States, European Union, Japan, China, Russia that claim to have their interests in the matters that concern the Indian Ocean in terms of shipping and trade (Bateman & Bergin, 1996: 236–237). When looking at the spectrum of security threats that are present in the Indian Ocean, we distinguished between traditional and non-traditional aspects that have significance for the IOR. In assessing this twofold security debate one can identify three overall trends (i) the exponential increase in states’ vulnerability to non-state actors and to a large number of transnational threats that have emerged because of the growth in terms of globalized networks, (ii) the development of new technologies in weaponry that has resulted in new threats has brought states closer while integrating them both regionally and globally and (iii) the availability of information at the global level have impacted international law that have consequently required solutions for these new threats both globally and regionally (Prabhakar, 2016: 26–27). The IOR is

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

95

a region that is inherently insecure and its perennial proclivity to crises has a profound effect on the region. The IOR is highly unstable and is often referred to as the ‘arc of crisis’. While the IOR is witness to high intensity state competition on the one hand, there have also been an increasing incidence and pressure from non-state actors, and it has had its impact on states and regional concerns over insecurity. Traditional and non-traditional security threats and challenges are caused by an interplay of causes and factors in the IOR. Thus, terrorism, piracy, threats to SLOC and naval competition that could result in the shift in balance of power could be classified as traditional security threats in the maritime domain. Traditional security threats can also appear in the form of inter-state conflicts, maritime asymmetric threats, failed states or failing states and through the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles (ibid: 27; Iyer, 2017: 3). In the context of traditional maritime security threats in the IOR, we suggest that while there are historical factors that would be important to discuss here, it is the geo-strategic maritime security aspect that captures our interest and how it has its significance in terms of India’s national security concerns. The geopolitical scenario that is pertinent in the IOR can be narrowed down to the strategic competition that has emerged in the Indian Ocean. From a perspective of India, the Indian Ocean has been important in terms of maritime security but that its recognition came too late. K. M. Pannikar one of India’s prominent strategic thinkers elucidated that the conditions under which the Indian navy had to develop itself firstly was through the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), secondly to develop itself as a force to cater to the needs of coastal affairs and thirdly to create a naval tradition. Additionally, scholars who have contested these three factors of historical narrative state that history is an inexact indicator when it is seen from the perspective of the future, complex, influential and interactive. Despite an agreement that can be found in terms of these four aspects, yet the historical aspects have contributed significantly to the growth of maritime thinking beginning from the Royal Naval Traditions to the emergence of Indian maritime thinking that steered it from coastal preponderance to a blue water navy. Such a narrative only highlights the break from a continental perspective that had been largely driven by the diminishing British power that subsequently resulted in the reduction of the maritime security blanket that was provided by the British in the post-World War II period and one that allowed the entry of other great powers into the IOR (Parmar, 2014: 49–50). In the post-war period, the British realizing their decreasing influence in the region introduced the United States to engage in the IOR despite its limited interests in the region. However, the Cold War ensured that the Indian Ocean was one of the areas where US–Soviet rivalry carried the characteristics of inter-state contest in the Indian Ocean. Subsequently following the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean turned relatively calm and peaceful with other powers of the world beginning to play a significant role in the Indian Ocean. With the arrival of new powers in the Indian Ocean, a new set of dynamics that came into play included trade, economics and freedom of navigation that came to be threatened by ongoing tensions in other seas such as the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, that could have spill over effects in the region (ibid: 50).

96

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

Strategic competition in the Indian Ocean can be identified as twofold (i) the US– China competition and (ii) Sino–Indian Competition, where other powers are also involved. These three players—India, China and the United States are posited as the major players in present times where other countries such as Japan and Australia, for example, are playing a significant role in the Indian Ocean. During the close of the year 2011, China set up its new military base in Seychelles that would enable its navy for resupply and recuperate its facilities for its navy. Seychelles defended its decision to allow China to set up its base by saying that it had allowed China to set up its base in order to tackle piracy while China stated that it was standard global practice for naval fleets to resupply from the nearest port during long distance missions (Pant, 2014: 187–188). Many commentators have argued that China has become more aggressive in expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean and this seems to be creating a security dilemma for India which could lead to a naval rivalry and arms race in the region. Many also see China as an important factor in the strategic balance that is cutting across the strategic ambitions of India in the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2014: 133). Chinese interests in the IOR can be traced back to the 1960s when it began engaging with Afro-Asian countries by providing financial aid and military support. Although one can note that its engagement in the region did not see much progress during the time of the cultural revolution in China, it, however, in recent years has got Beijing to renew its interests primarily because of the economic stakes which amounted to at least $300 billion in the year 2008 (Khurana, 2008: 1). China’s energy imports from the west Asian states and Africa have become significant in terms of the security of these oil and energy transporting ships, most of which is transported through the Indian Ocean. These transports amounted to at least 77% of its oil imports and besides these, the IOR is a resource-rich region that includes availability of copper, uranium, aluminium and other raw materials. China has become aware of the fact that it will have to vie for markets in the IOR and therefore it is no surprise that it has begun to view the region through the strategic lens and has also laid its interests in the Persian Gulf which is important for its westward strategic frontier (ibid: 2). Gurpreet Khurana also notes that since the 1990s China’s military-strategic intent in the Indian Ocean was mainly engendered by its assistance to Myanmar through arms sales and building of military infrastructure. Additionally, there were reports that Chinese naval vessels regularly visited the Indian Ocean, and the General Logistics Department’s Top-Secret Memorandum of 1993 detailed the strategic plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to consolidate control of the Indian Ocean under its doctrine of High-Sea Defense (ibid: 2). China’s out of area operations can be traced from the beginning of the 1980s when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) which until that time had been engaged exclusively with its coastal management and near sea operations. However, the Chinese navy began making port calls in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from the mid-1990s. In the aftermath of the Somalian crisis in 1991, when a Chinese commercial vessel had to be employed to evacuate Chinese citizens, it became apparent that China was ill equipped to manage such crisis even if it was non-combat operations that were far from its shores. It was President Hu Jintao who broadened the scope of China’s naval ambitions in his speech to the Central Military Commission in the year 2004, that emphasized on

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

97

expanding China’s national interests and safeguarding world peace. Although the PLAN was more focussed on near sea operations, it, however, in its 2006 and 2008 defense whitepaper noted the rise of security issues that were related to energy and international shipping routes. It also pointed towards the rising global competition for available resources and also indicated the need for the PLAN to develop its capabilities to conduct cooperation in distant waters (White, 2020: 3). Though the Chinese have at many occasions stressed upon the fact that it did not seek to establish overseas bases, the recent establishment of a base at Djibouti in 2017 and Seychelles in 2011 have been justified as catering to the needs of peacekeeping operations, antipiracy and protection for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) related investments (ibid: 4). The PLA while developing its military arsenal and as part of its modernization has been developing a number of platforms that is likely to be utilized in the IOR in terms of defensive and endurance capabilities. These initiatives include the commissioning in 2012, China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning and its ongoing indigenous carrier program. However, the PLAN’s major out of area capabilities appears in the form of surface combatants of which many have been deployed in the IOR. The Chinese have deployed guided-missile cruisers (Type 055), destroyers (Type 052C/D) and frigates (Type 054A), six large amphibious transport docks (Type 071) that has a capacity of four air-cushioned landing craft and four helicopters and is developing a fleet of even larger amphibious assault ships (Type 075) that can hold two dozen helicopters. In addition to these, the PLAN is also making its efforts to expand its fleet in terms of replenishment and auxiliary vessels, including oilers, salvage and rescue ships, hospital ships, and transport vessels that would enable the PLAN to undertake sustained missions in the IOR (ibid: 4). While the PLAN’s submarine fleet is geared towards anti-surface and land attack missions, both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines have made patrols in the Indian Ocean and has also made friendly port calls with friendly states in the IOR—these port visits have been in the Pakistani port of Gwadar and Karachi, for example (ibid: 4). What should be noted here is that the deployment of PLAN submarines in the Indian Ocean must not be seen as an act of provocation. It must also be noted that nations have the right to utilize common spaces in the oceans which would serve their national interests. However, what is critical is that these deployments cannot be overlooked and must be understood as China’s growing capabilities in terms of its commitment, confidence and operation capabilities in distant oceanic spaces and also in terms of conducting long-range missions (Singh, 2015). These missions that the Chinese have conducted indicate that the PLAN has incrementally increased the complexity of its deployments. When a Song-class submarine accompanied by a tender ship with essential supplies for conventional submarines docked at Colombo port and the Yuan-335 class submarine equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) that has longer undersea endurance visited Karachi, it also indicates that the PLAN has been gradually perfecting submarine operations, fine-tuning standard operating procedures, while gaining hydrological and bathymetric data to maintain its presence undersea in the IOR. The Yuan-335 class submarine that docked in Karachi must raise eyebrows as the Arabian sea is also vital for India’s security, because

98

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

when Indian attention was diverted to the Bay of Bengal following infrastructure development in Bangladesh and Myanmar in terms of critical operational attention, the docking of the PLAN submarine in Karachi only reveals the vulnerability of the Arabian sea to Chinese incursions as it is in the western side of the Indian Ocean. These incidents also show that China is more than willing to use Pakistan as a springboard for its IOR plans. The Yuan-335 class submarine visit to Karachi is significant since it comes at a time when the Gwadar port was taken over by the Chinese management for infrastructure development and it would not be wrong to assume that the Pakistan Navy was given a preview of the Yuan-335 class submarine which China has promised to sell eight of these submarines to Pakistan (ibid). In sum what do these actions of China in the maritime domain mean? Krupakar (2017) has identified four key components of China’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean. First, China has been seeking to channel its naval reinforcements to secure its trade and economic interests while strengthening its Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Secondly, China has been making every effort to develop its far sea operational capabilities and preparedness in terms of maritime combat and non-combat situations. Thirdly, Chinese ambitions are towards undermining Indian geo-strategic influence in the IOR and finally to reduce the US’ naval dominance in the IOR. What ultimately seems here is that Beijing’s efforts point towards achieving its objective of becoming a global maritime power (Krupakar, 2017: 207). While these issues do raise important question as to what and how must India respond to these challenges, the Sino–US Competition in the IOR must also be considered before trying to answer these questions. China’s Indian Ocean operation seems to be modelled on the US navy’s global framework of maritime operations, where theatre access and area dominance in littoral spaces are imperative for operation in the sea. In March 2015, the US released its maritime strategy that outlined the need to preserve access in the global commons. This remains central to the US’ maritime operation in Asia. China’s ever-growing economic and military capabilities in the Indian Ocean has caused anxiety and concern among powers of the west and in India. While the US has increasingly stepped up its efforts to warn the world about China through the so-called debt-trap diplomacy, by citing cases such as the Hambantota port lease in Sri Lanka as evidence to its claim (ibid: 2). Since the beginning and the end of the Cold War, the US has remained as the dominant global naval power and in the post-Cold War period the IOR for the US has emerged as a region where the US has expanded its maritime interests. The pivotal change, however, in the post-Cold War period has been to take a broader approach to cover the larger IOR rather than concentrating on the Persian Gulf as it did during the Cold War. Other changes in terms of the US’ policy towards the IOR has been to develop cooperation with a few countries in which India has been an important nation for the US in this context (Mishra, 2017: 73). For the US, India seems to be complementing the US’ policy in terms of the Indian Ocean. Cooperation between India and the US in the maritime domain began in the year 1991 which resulted in the formation of the Indo-US naval steering committee. This began with the diplomatic push that was given by the Kicklighter Proposals in 1991 after which

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

99

the Malabar naval exercises between both navies began. These initiatives coincide with the US’ desire to sustain its global dominance in the Indian Ocean with the Indian navy’s regional goals in the Indian Ocean. Thus, such convergences have resulted in increasing defense ties between India and the US (ibid: 73). The US and its allies relate to each other on a long list of security issues that are present in the Indian Ocean that has been produced through strategic research and writing. The issues that has caught the attention of these countries relate to the transit of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to east Asia, the fragile states along the littorals, competition over sea bed resources, climate change that has its effects on island and low lying littorals, north–south conflicts over India’s claims to an EEZ covering 1.37 square miles, piracy, terrorism and the danger of sea denial, proliferation, great power competition, trafficking of persons and drugs (Green & Shearer, 2012: 176). For the US to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean littoral, it is pertinent to identify its interests, and developing a strategy to pursue those interests for the region. The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010, the National Security Review and the latest Unified Command Plan (UCP) all point towards the centrality that the Indian Ocean has received in the US’ strategic planning. The Indian Ocean has been considered by many US strategic thinkers as its geopolitical backwaters; in recent years it has received importance even though there is a lack in an explicit strategy (Erickson et al., 2010: 214–215). Even though the Indian Ocean remains as one of the important regions in the US’ strategic engagements, the rise of China both in terms of the economy and the military has driven the US to find a suitable power in order to preserve the balance of power in the region and that power the US sees with India. India is the only country that has the capability to counter Chinese might in terms of military, economy and has a very rich civilizational history vis-à-vis the Chinese. Coupled with these are the border disputes, the tilt in maritime balance in favour of China that has resulted in the need to identify a balancer not only for the US but also for India as well. Ever since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean has seen the growing closeness of India with the US and the US’ allies from the Asia–Pacific such as Australia and Japan. This has resulted in China developing ties with Pakistan and has recently seen the bonhomie with Russia. This if it develops might emerge into two triads that are opposed to each other in the Indian Ocean where the US– India–Japan (and recently Australia) axis will pit itself against the China–Pakistan– Russia axis. Such a formation would result in division of the Asian region as it was never. However, it must be noted that the emergence of China–Pakistan–Russia triangular power relationship could become a reality and India would have very limited influence in the Indian Ocean because Chinese investments in the Gwadar port, and the increasing presence of Chinese submarines in the region. While India has displayed its willingness to grow closer to the US, there has been a Russia– Pakistan bonhomie that saw war games being conducted between the two countries’ militaries thus resulting in the emergence of counter axis as retaliatory moves in the IOR. However, what India must be cautious about is the fact that the US has with it a double-edged strategy where it seeks closer ties with India while keeping Pakistan in its strategic considerations (Mishra, 2017: 77).

100

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

While these issues present itself as traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean, there are non-traditional security threats that are present and needs to be examined before looking into the effects of the threats in the context of India’s national security.

Non-Traditional Security Threats in the Indian Ocean Region Threats to security is not only posed by states but also by non-state actors that add to the existing state-centric traditional challenges. Such a differentiation is made to categorize those threats that do not fall under the realm of traditional security threats that often fails to address issues such as the struggle for natural resources that contribute to a nation’s energy demands, degradation of the environment, forced migration, international terrorism, drugs, arms and human trafficking, climate change, illegal migration and natural disasters. Although threats are classified as non-military in nature, these challenges are also neither completely transnational nor completely domestic. These challenges cannot be completely prevented and therefore coping mechanisms necessitates collective regional and multilateral action (Chatterjee, 2014: 78). Lehr (2013) in his research on piracy states that both piracy and fisheries have emerged as real rather than as imagined problems. Since the year 2005 onwards, there has been a wave of Somali piracy in the high seas of the Indian Ocean that threatened vessels in international voyages in the Gulf of Aden and the so-called Somali Basin. These attacks were reported even near the Lakshwadeep islands that is 1500 nautical miles away from Somalia. The threat of piracy has thus triggered a series of responses that brought warships of NATO, European Union (EU), Russia, China, Japan, South Korea and other nations with the objective of countering the threat. However, this was not supported by India very enthusiastically since it considered the Indian Ocean as its own ocean. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver while speaking about the criminal phenomenon of piracy brought it into the security discourse that elevated piracy as a threat not only to the rim states of the Somali Basin but also considered it as a national security threat for nations that depended on trade through the sea (Lehr, 2013: 104). Piracy in the Indian Ocean was since the colonial period when the spice trade between Asia and Europe was lucrative. Piracy was controlled during the colonial period when the Royal Navy (RN) began to assert its command over the sea. However, piracy in the post-colonial period in the Indian Ocean was primarily due to poverty and stagnant economic development. Maritime globalization served as a catalyst for piracy to gain momentum as there was a phenomenal increase in maritime traffic that shipped merchandise, raw materials, oil and natural gas. Often these ships had to pass through narrow choke points such as the Straits of Malacca, the strait of Babel-Mandeb, the strait of Hormuz where slow moving traffic created ideal conditions for piracy in the region (Prabhakar, 2016: 35). India’s response to piracy in the Indian Ocean has been through the operation deployment of either a destroyer or

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

101

frigate in constant patrol. It has also engaged in capacity building by providing naval vessels and naval aircraft to smaller island states in the Indian Ocean like Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles that could help in maritime surveillance and capabilities. India has also deployed its navy and coast guard vessels and aircraft to patrol the Maldivian, Mauritian and Seychellean territorial waters (ibid: 36). In addition to these the formation of Combined Maritime Forces in the Combined Task Force 150, 151 with the involvement of the NATO and the US along with the EU Naval Task Force (EUNAVFOR) has resulted in the multilateral maritime engagement in the region. Further, the EU Naval Task Force has also been able to extend its out-of-area operations into the Indian Ocean with the support of the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN). These initiatives by the EU Naval Task Force have resulted in immense benefits that come in the form of interoperability. The many bilateral exercises in which the Indian navy and other littoral navies have been participating in have reaped the benefits of those value additions that was received through maritime domain awareness, enhanced maritime surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities and the greater resilience in terms of operations in the warm waters of the Indian ocean– Arabian sea (ibid: 36). India on the other hand has been involved in escort services in the Gulf of Aden and has been evolving its own ideas on Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) despite not being part of the multi-national Combined Task Force 150, 151. India’s efforts towards sharing intelligence, and surveillance have been robust and has resulted in closer cooperation between the Indian Navy and the NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and the EU’s Operation Atlanta and the Coalition of Maritime Forces that are presently operating in the region (ibid: 37). In terms of maritime terrorism three successful terrorist campaigns have been conducted thus far in the Indian Ocean. There may be agreement that all three campaigns were failed attempts by the terrorist organizations, yet they achieved noticeable tactical success. The attacks by Al-Qaeda on enemy targets in the Arabian Peninsula and one navy ship, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that had a well-organized naval unit for its land-based insurgency against the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s attacks in Mumbai, India’s commercial capital are evidence that point towards maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean (Murphy, 2012: 178). In terms of non-traditional maritime security challenges in the Indian ocean region there have been major security challenges that appear through climate change and poses serious challenges to low lying littorals in the Indian Ocean such as Maldives and Bangladesh. These countries are affected by rising sea levels that cause internal displacement of its coastal population while the Indian Ocean has been a hotbed of competition over natural resources in the maritime domain of the IOR (Aswani, 2020: 2). Protection of the marine environment remains a top agenda since the ‘green theory’ began questioning the classical maritime thinking. The reports of the United Nations Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change, based in Geneva, are indicative of the disastrous consequences of global warming, particularly, the impact on the sea temperatures of the equatorial areas of the Indian Ocean (IPCC, 2007: 400).

102

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

This has immediate ramifications for the South Asian climate system that could upset the monsoon patterns leading to massive droughts in the region. Traces of frequent dynamics in the weather events, such as occurrences of storms with simultaneous effects on wind speed and precipitation, speak volumes of the possible coastal damage and massive flooding in South Asia and South East Asia (IPCC, 2007: 46). Needless to mention the most known problem of sea-level rise and its catastrophic effects around the globe. As far as the impact of climate change on the IOR is concerned, Asia will be the most affected continent (Cruz et al., 2007: 472). Forecasts put the estimate that over a billion people will be adversely affected by the 2050s (Cruz et al., 2007: 471). The resilience of the coastal population at the trans-continental level depends on the degree of cooperation the state actors in the IOR would be able to realise. By the mid of this century, humanitarian and disaster relief operations might turn out to be a routine venture in the IOR. A collective action would include questions that relate to what can reduce, if not prevent, the mass deaths, property loss and trans-migration. While there are other non-traditional security challenges in the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean such as human trafficking and narcotics trade that offer high profits, small arms and light weapons trafficking have disturbed the social and economic stability of the India Ocean Region states. The trafficking of these small and light weapons has complemented insurgencies in India such as the Naxalites and the Maoists. These networks of arms smuggling have been routed thorough the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Some of these weapons include anti-aircraft guns, anti-personnel mines, anti-tank guided missiles assault rifles, C-4 plastic explosives, hand grenades, handguns, sniper rifles and other ammunition (Bansal, 2010: 5).

India’s Maritime Security and National Security Having examined these threats as it presents itself in the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean the crucial question of this article is how these challenges affect the national security of India and how must India respond to these challenges. While there is strategic competition that appears in the form of Chinese engagement and its power projection in the Indian Ocean Region that is significant in terms of power balance, its cooperation with the Pakistani Navy presents itself as a challenge to India’s national security. The enemy imaging of India by Pakistan has indeed been a catalyst for China to engage with Pakistan both militarily and in economic terms. Chinese assistance in terms of nuclear capabilities to Pakistan has also been of concern for India. Overall, the presence of China in the Indian ocean region presents itself as a strategic competitor for India. India although seems to be growing closer to the US, has not been able to substantially counter the Chinese aggression in the Indian Ocean Region where the relationship between India has been marked by suspicion and cautious engagement, the recent Himalayan standoff and the bloody brawl that resulted in 20 Indian soldiers being killed and the Chinese admitting that four of its soldiers were killed in the incident, has had negative effects and has resulted in the

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

103

downward spin in terms of its relationship with each other. India on the other hand despite its growing proximity with the US does not have with it a relationship that could be reliable. How could India address the strategic competition that appears from the maritime domain. It is in this regard that maritime multilateralism could possibly be one of the areas where there could be avenues for countries in the region to engage in regional maritime cooperation despite the rising strategic competition which is inducing instability in the region. Maritime multilateralism may help in developing sectoral approaches towards security, economic, trade and commercial partnerships with countries in the region. It is in this context that the Indian Ocean Region Association now known as the Indian Ocean Region Association of Regional Cooperation has received credibility. In addition, the Milan Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia (MALSINDO) and the Malacca Straits Coordinated patrols have all receive significance sin the year 2001.

Conclusion The Grotian theory of Mare Liberum (free sea) undoubtedly governs the twenty-first century maritime politics. Its underlying assumption that sea is an international territory and the call for unfettered access for seaborne trade among states renders the Indian Ocean a unique position in the maritime cartography. Notwithstanding the strategic competition that accentuates uncertainties in the Indian Ocean, the region is abundant with potential areas of cooperation and convergence in the maritime domain. In fact, cooperation is a strategy that helps mitigate shared threats emanating out of any intensifying competition at the international sphere. With IOR’s significance exponentially growing, due to its maritime character, cooperative security occupies a vital berth in the narrative of regional stability. As an aspiring ‘net security provider’ in the region, New Delhi needs to reimagine such possibilities by leveraging an unconventional interface by ‘blueing’ the Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) capitals in this maritime common. The very diversity of the region has remained a deterrent in building the Indian Ocean as an integrated geopolitical entity, resulting in being a fragmented collection of sub-regional expressions (Bateman & Bergin, 2010: 9). The unresolved maritime border disputes and pending delimitations leave many national jurisdictions and EEZs unclear with overlapping claims. Hence, crafting a unified Indian Ocean identity based on undivided interests is a precondition for a stable maritime order. There is no dubiety on the fact that it’s the ‘waters’ that can bind the region together. Perhaps, the one and only dimension that facilitates the opportunity for cooperation in security of Indian Ocean is the predominant maritime nature of the region. Besides, the security of Indian Ocean transcends national interests. For South Asia the Indian Ocean is a repository of their history, identity and culture. By exhausting the potential fears of the regional and extra-regional stakeholders, India could assume the ‘geo-situational’ leadership in a bid to become a ‘net

104

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

consensus provider’. New Delhi’s evolving security calculus promises a recalibration of the national maritime policy by discarding the historical continentalism. The idea of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), unveiled in 2015, provides the doctrinal backing for the contemporary Indian maritime thought. Channelising maritime assets, including the Indian Navy, and their synchronised application in securing peace and prosperity of the IOR, is the sine qua non of SAGAR. Moreover, its basic philosophy underscores the importance of multilateral cooperation for a rule-based maritime order in the region. The Indian rationale of maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean has been evidently centred around an anti-China enterprise given the latter’s growing footprint in the region. Beijing’s chequebook diplomacy and the rising naval presence bypassing the ‘tyranny of geography’ remain a cause of apprehension for the Indian strategic establishment. The ongoing debate over the ‘Naval Quad’ centres around the idea of being an anti-China arrangement. Though such claims were dubbed as baseless by the Indian naval circles, the emerging narrative posits a paradox, including the participation of India with other Quad members in the upcoming France-led ‘La Pérouse’ naval drill in the Bay of Bengal (Pandit, 2021). However, recontextualising the China factor is the need of the hour. Scholarly forecasts have been consistent on the hypothesis that Beijing’s bid with the Indian Ocean can hardly be complete without a rapprochement with New Delhi. Particularly, the Chinese concerns over the protection of the SLOCs in the IOR necessitates a cooperative framework with India in the long run. Though the People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti (China’s first overseas military base) may be regarded as a force multiplier for Chinese engagements in IOR, the scope of operations is mostly limited to anti-piracy missions, other than the ‘routine’ activities like intelligence gathering, peacekeeping and more in the region. On the military front, no Forward Operating Base (FOB) of any extra-regional player in the Indian Ocean is match for littoral navies for operational reasons. It is not surprising too that the Indian Navy enjoys a superiority in the IOR as a ‘go-to’ entity on maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Thanks to the eroding ‘sea-blindness’, efforts to rescue the Indian Navy from being a ‘Cinderella service’ has been on an ascendency. Rise in the application of naval assets as tools of power projection, joint exercises, and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations (HADR) has been a symbolism of the emerging naval diplomacy initiatives. Indian Navy undertakes a large array of joint exercises and coordinated patrols with foreign navies to enhance interoperability and understanding, and share best practices with each other. In conclusion, some maritime and naval imperatives would be pertinent in terms of enhancing India’s power, influence and capabilities which would subsequently stabilize the IOR and contribute significantly to the national security of India. India must elucidate its grand strategic thinking that may contribute towards the rise of India. Given the fact that there are a host of maritime asymmetric threats and challenges that presents itself as hindrances to India’s strategic interests, it is vital for India to secure its interest in the IOR and island territories and must be of priority of the Indian Navy. India must engage in fostering regional economic cooperation

7 Competitive, Cooperative and Convergent Maritime Security …

105

and stabilizing its economic growth. This has become significant as Chinese investments in the smaller states of the IOR has provided it with a capacity to reduce Indian Influence in the IOR. The Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and other littoral states in the IOR are evidence for the growing footprint of China in the IOR. Developing and equipping the Indian naval infrastructure is pertinent as it would allow the Indian navy to effectively conduct maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions which are vital to its security. India must invest in research and development of naval technology and production that would greatly enhance its security. Finally, India should develop multilateral institutions that would enhance economic cooperation and interdependence in the IOR. Thus, what can be seen is that there is a mixture of competition, cooperation and convergence where traditional power rivalries would continue, and these would have immediate, medium-term and long-term consequences in terms of power balance in the region and also for India’s national security.

References Aswani, R. S. (2020). Non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean region: Policy alternatives. Journal of Public Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2456.Accessed:03.04.2021 Bansal, A. (2010). Maritime threat perceptions: Non-state actors in the Indian Ocean region. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 6(1), 10–27. Bateman, S., & Bergin, A. (1996). Building blocks for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Ocean Development & International Law, 27(3), 235–254. Bateman, S., & Bergin, A. (2010). Indian Ocean-CENTER stage for the 21st century. Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean. Australia Strategic Policy Institute. Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy, 53(1), 159–164. Bueger, C., Edmunds, T., & Ryan, B. J. (2019). Maritime security: The uncharted politics of the global sea. International Affairs, 95(5), 971–978. Brewster, D. (2014). Beyond the string of pearls: Is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 10(2), 133–149. Chalk, Peter (2008) The maritime dimension of international security: Terrorism, piracy and challenges for the United States. Washington D.C: RAND Corporation. Chatterjee, A. (2014). Non-traditional maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean region. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 10(2), 77–95. Cruz, R. V. et al (2007) Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and Vulnerability. In M. L. Parry et al. (Ed.), Contribution of working group II to the 4th assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (p. 472). Retrieved 31 March, 2021, from https://www.ipcc.ch/site/ass ets/uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf. De Sombr, E. (2019). The security implications of fisheries. International Affairs, 95(5), 1019–1035. Erickson, A. S., Walter, I. I. I., Ladwig, C., & Mikolay, J. D. (2010). Diego Garcia and the United States. Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy’, Asian Security, 6(3), 214–237. Green, M. J., & Shearer, A. (2012). Defining US Indian Ocean strategy. The Washington Quarterly, 35(2), 175–189. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/DecipheringChinasSubmarineDeploymentsintheIndianOceanR egion_asingh_080715. Retrieved 02 April, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_chinas_indian_ocean_ ambitions_white-1.pdf. Retrieved 02 April, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04177.6. Retrieved 31 March, 2021.

106

H. J. Freddy and A. Vijay

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). Climate change 2007: Physical science basis. Retrieved 31 March, 2021, from https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/ar4_ wg1_full_report-1.pdf. Iyer, Gayathri (2017) ‘Common responses to maritime security threats in the Bay of Bengal. ORF Issue Brief , (208). Retrieved 30 March, 2021, from https://www.orfonline.org/wo-content/upl oads/2017/11/orf/_IssueBrief_208_BIMSTEC-Maritime.pdf. Khurana, G. (2008). China’s string of pearls in the Indian Ocean and its security implications. Strategic Analysis, 32(1), 1–39. Kraska, J., & Raul, P. (2013). International maritime security law. Martinus-Nijhoff Publishers. Krupakar, J. (2017). ‘China’s naval base(s) in the Indian Ocean: Signs of a maritime grand strategy? Strategic Analysis, 41(3), 207–222. Lehr, P. (2013). Piracy and maritime governance in the Indian Ocean region. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 9(1), 104–119. Mishra, V. (2017). Indo-US security cooperation: Implications for the Indian Ocean. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 13(1), 73–89. Murphy, M. (2012). The abundant sea: Prospects for maritime non-state violence in the Indian Ocean. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 8(2), 173–187. Pant, H. V. (2014). Sino-Indian maritime ambitions collide in the Indian Ocean. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1(2), 187–201. Parmar, S. S. (2014). Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: An Indian perspective. Journal of Defence Studies, 8(1), 49–63. Prabhakar, L. W. (2016). Growth of naval power in the Indian Ocean: Dynamics and transformation. National Maritime Foundation. Pandit, R. (2021). India set for quad plus navy drill as US Defence Secretary begins Asia tour. Times of India. Retrieved 02 April, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-set-forquad-plus-navy-drill-as-us-defence-secretary-begins-asia-tour/articleshow/81502359.cms. Raymond, C. Z., & Morrien, A. (2008). Security in the maritime domain and its evolution since 9/11. In R. Herbert-Burns, S. Bateman, & P. Lehr (Eds.), Lloyd’s MIU handbook of maritime security (pp. 3–11). CRC Press. Roy-Chaudhury, R. (1996). Maritime security in the Indian Ocean region. Maritime Studies, 1996(90), 1–11. Ryan, B. J. (2019). The disciplined sea: A history of maritime security and zonation. International Affairs, 95(5), 1055–1073. Singh, A. (2015). Deciphering China’s submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean region. White, J. T. (2020). China’s Indian Ocean ambitions: Investment, influence and military advantage.

Chapter 8

India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options Mathew Sinu Simon

Introduction The discourse on national security in India is broadly based on two elements— external and internal security. External security pertains to threats that emanate from India’s immediate neighbourhood, especially an unsettled boundary dispute with China, illegal migrants from Bangladesh and, more importantly, the ongoing crossborder terrorism perpetrated by organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaishe-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (Sharma & Behera, 2014). These terrorist organizations are mostly supported by Pakistan state machinery, InterServices Intelligence (ISI). Apart from these, India also faces threats of global terror groups—Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) who recruit and radicalize individuals from India to fight jihadist war. On the other hand, internal security is concerned with threats and challenges emanating from within the country, which has the potential to destabilize public order and threaten the integrity and sovereignty of the Indian state. The internal security of India, as it is widely understood, mainly pertains to four major zones of conflict where insurgencies and violent movements have taken place within the boundaries of the country. They are: left-wing extremism (LWE) (Maoist Conflict), ethnic and identity-based conflict in the Northeastern states, separatist violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and terrorism in hinterland. Considering the grave threat that these insurgencies and the violent movements pose to the very existence of the Indian state and its territorial integrity (Goswami, 2013), it is imperative that internal security concerns in addressing requisite grievances ought to occupy a centre stage in the framework of national security discourse. It is often the case that a security threat emerging from terrorism is hardly considered an internal security concern given that terrorism is supported and funded by external actors (read Pakistan state). There have also been instances when the M. S. Simon (B) Law and Political Science at Presidency University, Bengaluru, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_8

107

108

M. S. Simon

dominant public discourse of national security pays more attention to external security. A daily newspaper reading bears testimony in terms of lesser prominence and low coverage of internal security events. A Maoist attack or surrender, extortion racket of militants from some of the Northeastern states, National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrest of ISIS militants in Southern states appears hidden in the media coverage. Security analysts and security agencies do acknowledge that groups and individuals that pose a threat to internal security have external linkages and receive support in the forms of finances, arms and ammunition. So, the aspects of external and internal security are deeply, inextricably intertwined and overlapping. In other words, there is a blurring distinction between external and internal security narratives. To contextualize the discourse, it is important to observe that the words ‘internal security’ does not figure in the Constitution of India. The founding fathers of the Constitution were keen to preserve the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Accordingly, the constitutional provisions share the responsibilities pertaining to various aspects of security between the state and the Union Governments. Security issues such as policing, maintaining public law and order are under the states’ responsibility (Article 352) and the Union government has the responsibility of protecting the state from external aggression and internal disturbances threatening the territorial integrity. However, while there seems to be clarity, the division of responsibility between the state and the Union government often leads to major confusions. For example, the Maoist insurgency in India, for a long time, used to be considered as merely a law-and-order issue. Hence, it is used to be left to the respective state governments to deal with the issue. As these insurgencies and militancy, in various forms and shades, consolidated their position in terms of spreading their tentacles and carrying out violent activities, there has been a change in responding to the security threats emanating from them. Over the last one decade or so, the Union governments, irrespective of the party, have shown interest in dealing with the internal security issues effectively. The formulation of the Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy at the central level is a good testimony of this change. On this line, recently, the defence minister, Rajnath Singh, outlined a threepronged approach to address the challenges of internal security (Economic Times, 2020a, b). This three-pronged approach includes initiatives towards the development of the areas affected by militancy and ensuring justice to the aggrieved; negotiations and political settlement with the militant and dissatisfied groups; and the willingness to change the status quo to dilute the risk of exploitation and offer good governance to the citizens. Furthermore, Union Government has developed a blueprint to confront the internal security challenges (Pillai, 2018) to protect India’s territory and sovereignty from both internal and external threats. In the next section, the paper offers a critical analysis of India’s internal security concerns—left-wing extremism, Northeast conflicts, violence in Jammu and Kashmir and terrorism in hinterland—through the prism of national security. The origins, causes, main issues and concerns centred on internal security problems, as mentioned above, are highlighted. The threat perceptions as posed by internal security concerns are examined.

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

109

Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) The violent movement led by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), widely known as the Maoists, as the former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh once states, poses ‘single biggest internal security threat’ to the state of India. The Maoists, influenced by the political thoughts of Mao-Tse Tung, believe in armed struggle against the Indian state with an objective to seize political power to herald a ‘New Democracy’. While in the present scenario, the presence and the activities of the Maoists have come down substantially, the very idea of an armed insurgency against the democratic ethos and governance system of India by the Maoists poses a serious threat. Going by the information provided by the LWE division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the government has been able to contain the Maoists to a great extent in terms of reducing the number of violent incidents and fatalities (MHA, Annual Report 2019–2020) caused by the Maoist ultras. However, despite the successful response against the Maoists, the threat perception continues to be there. Considering the seriousness of this threat, it is important to reflect upon the evolution and the functioning of the Maoists in India.

Evolution of the Maoist Conflict The Maoists of India are also known as the Naxalites, at least in the popular discourse. The Maoists have evolved through various forms and shades (Behera, 2018). Arguably, the beginning Maoist movement in its pre-organizational form can be traced back to the Telangana in the late 1940s. An organized wave of Maoist insurgency was observed in Naxalbari area of West Bengal where a faction of CPI (Marxist) led by Charu Majumdar incited sharecroppers and agricultural labourers to undertake violent activities in 1967. Thus, movement survives primarily on the grievances of poor landless, peasants, tribal villagers, dissatisfied and other marginalized sections of the masses. As far as activities and organization of the Maoist movement were concerned, serious differences within the party cropped up along strategic and tactical lines. As a result, the party was split into various factions for almost two decades (1970s–1980s). 1990s witnessed several rounds of talks between various factions to initiate the process of unification. It was in September 2004, two major factions of the Maoists-the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) along with other fringe Maoist groups came together to form the CPI-Maoist. Once the various factions of the Maoists were merged in 2004 and the CPI-Maoist was formed, the Maoists were able to carry out their violent activities in a coordinated manner and spread to the new areas.

110

M. S. Simon

Left-Wing Extremism: Cause, Spread and Activities Maoist insurgency was initially viewed as a law-and-order problem and likewise dealt with an iron fist by the Police as evident with Operation Steeplechase in 1970s. Socio-economic maladies like evictions of land tillers by landlords leading to displacement, commercialization of agriculture, failure of land reforms, economic disparities, depriving the rights of sharecroppers, alienation of tribal lands, exploitation of oppressed classes by money lenders, to name a few factors, were the causes for Maoist insurgency to thrive, mobilize the movement that then found support from the educated middle-class youth. So, the Maoist ideological appeal was able to cut across the various sections of the society. Apart from ideological appeal, Maoist movement, by late 2000s geographically, spread and its areas of influence were from ‘Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh to Pashupati in Nepal’. Such a conception of the Maoists spread was more of a statist and popular perception to link the Maoists of Nepal and India with a motive to highlight the ‘revolutionary’ linkages between the two. This was also done so to dilute the unaddressed grievances of the local people, which was one of the factors of Maoists’ support base, and second, to highlight the grave threat to the Indian state. The concept of ‘red corridor’ is similarly hyped to oversimplify the nature of Maoist threat. The critically affected areas of Maoist influence primarily fall in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. If one goes by the recent evaluation by the MHA, the active presence of the Maoists has drastically come down to 90 districts from 110 districts. Similarly, the MHA has also declared 30 worst-hit districts of the Maoist violence. While there are reports suggesting the Maoist presence in states like Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, there seems to be the absence of credible evidence to support this. The Maoist violence against the state machinery and the so-called class enemies have always been in the form of guerrilla warfare. Arguably, the Indian Maoists have mastered the art of guerrilla warfare in terms of carrying out surprise attacks against the security forces. The Maoists terrorize the civilians with a motive to forcibly garner their support and to eliminate the ‘class enemy’. As mentioned before, at present situation, the Maoists do not have the same strength in terms of carrying out a large number of attacks in different places. The effective security-centric approach of the Indian state (Behera, 2021) has eliminated several Maoist leaders and cadres, surrender and arrest of the Maoist cadres are the main reasons for the loss of strength. Accordingly, the Maoist organization seems to be facing a serious leadership crisis for last few years. However, a close analysis of the Maoist activities reveals that there is a noticeable change in the modus operandi of the Maoists. Behera (2020) observes that there is a critical shift in the Maoist mode of thought that instils new military tactics into the fresher recruits and legitimize the “revolutionary causes” via violent activities devoid of any ideological luggage. Further, Maoist violent activities has taken form of a crime syndicate involved in extortion, kidnapping, abductions and poppy cultivation by various splinter groups of Maoist party especially in the state of Jharkhand (Hindustan Times, 2016).

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

111

State Response State response to Maoist insurgency was swift and tough in terms of security and neutralizing militants causing havoc and fear in Central and Southern India. During the peak of Maoist insurgency in 2000s as observed in erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh, state response was regarded as more security centric than development oriented in containing Maoist menace in the country. Nevertheless, Union Government bought out a blueprint of security measures to tackle the emerging threat posed by Maoists in 2006. The 14-point policy emphasized non-conduct of peace talks by States with Maoist groups unless and until they give up arms and violence. The Status Paper on Naxal problem calls upon the States to adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to the Maoist violence. Accordingly, the state response to the Maoist violence used to be three-pronged: a strong security response; development and good governance in the Maoist-affected areas and a robust surrender and rehabilitation policy. However, with the change of guard in 2014 that brought the Bhartiya Janata Party led NDA-2 government at the centre, there has been a substantial change in responding to the Maoist violence. The National Policy and Action Plan of 2015 adopted a multidimensional strategy to deal with the Maoists. While this policy continues with the above-mentioned responses, it adds to ensure the rights and entitlements of the local people to make it more people centric. Along with this overarching policy framework of the Union Government, the state governments have also initiated measures against the Maoists specific to their states. In the following paragraphs, I reflect upon some of the important policy responses by the Indian state against the Maoists. Modernization of Police Forces—State governments have emphasized strengthening and improving the quality of policing in Maoist-affected areas. In this regard, substantial sums of funds from the Centre were given to states with the objective to modernize and upgrade their police forces in terms of acquiring modern weaponry, communication equipment, mobility and infrastructure. However, it is often the case after a brutal Maoist encounter with security forces, there are several questions raised whether state police have made effective use of such modern technologies and equipment. Strengthening Intelligence Networks—It is vital to strengthen and upgrade the capabilities and capacities of intelligence agencies. There are intelligence apparatuses set up at Centre and State levels that share and coordinate real-time intelligence on the operations of Maoist groups. Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and State Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) provide vital inputs to police parties at ground level. Information is sourced from Maoist surrenders and local informants and their networks. Emphasis is placed on gathering of technical and human intelligence at the ground level and a seamless coordination of such activities amongst States Intelligence Bureaus are ensured for countering Maoist false propaganda and disinformation in Maoist affected. Joint Command and Control Centres are set up at Maoist hotbeds in Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh and Gaya, Bihar to gather and execute information received on the movement of key functionaries of Maoist leaders.

112

M. S. Simon

Assistance to States via SRE mode—Union Government aid in form of aid for security-related purposes. Union Government reimburses expenditures to State Governments of 10 LWE-affected States in 70 districts. There is a laid down criterion for inclusion of States under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme. States receive assistance from Centre on basis of proven existence of and activities by Maoist outfits and its affiliation, inadequate development in affected areas due to hindrances created by Maoist activities. Security-related expenditure includes transportation, communication, hiring of vehicles, stipend to surrendered Maoists, training and operational needs of security forces, construction of infrastructure for SFs etc. SAMADHAN—This was a new strategy against Maoists announced by former Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh on May 8, 2017, in a review meeting of LWE-affected states. Samadhan strategy is to provide for smart leadership, execute aggressive strategy against Maoists, train and motivate security forces, cultivate an ecosystem of actionable intelligence, harness technology, implement action plan in Maoist-affected areas and deny access to financing of terrorism. Some of the key highlights of SAMADHAN were to use trackers and biometric ids in weapons, deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for CRPF battalions, fast-tracking infrastructural projects in LWE-affected areas. Development Programmes—Winning hearts and minds of the local populace afflicted by Maoism is a way forward to address development concerns. Installation of mobile towers, improving road connectivity, enhancing skill development of youth and local entrepreneurship enable conducive environment for healthy governance. A Special Central Assistance Scheme (SCA) of the Union Government fills the critical gaps in public infrastructure and services in 30 left-wing-affected districts. Electrification of villages, setting up of Kendriya Vidyalayas, provision of girl’s hostels is a slew of other administrative measures to bring a semblance of governance and development in LWE-affected areas. It is imperative to also recognize the rights and entitlements of Adivasis through their access to forest resources and self-governance. This was made possible with the passage of Forest Dwellers Act in 2006. A Civic Action Programme (CAP) is implemented by Union Government to bridge the gaps between security forces and local people. This scheme was launched to bring forth a human face of security forces through their interaction with local populace by conducting an array of welfare centric activities. While these measures in terms of responding to the Maoist violence have yielded success in terms of containing the level of violence and the spread of the Maoists, the successive governments have not really been successful in managing the public perception. The absence of the state in terms of lack of good governance and indifference towards the genuine grievances of people often goes in favour of the Maoists. In the present scenario, the Maoists have been cornered into few pockets. However, it continues to be a major internal security threat to the Indian state. The next section of the paper is on the internal security threats emanating from Northeastern states.

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

113

Ethnic Conflicts and Insurgency in Northeastern State The long-standing insurgency movements and armed ethnic conflicts in some states of Northeast pose serious threats to Indian state. While some of the armed groups have laid down their arms and engaged in dialogue with Union Government, other militant groups continue to carry out their violent activities on various scales as they seek safe sanctuaries from the neighbouring countries. This is a peculiar problem of insurgency wherein internal and external aspects of security get overlapped and blurred. Observers interpret the conflicts in the Northeast region as ‘freedom struggle’ by ethnic minorities against the ‘homogenizing state’ (Sahni, 2002). Tribal, sub-tribal or tribal-outsider rivalries and antagonism over control of or access to limited resources were underlying motives and ideologies that caused fissiparous, contentious concerns causing disruptions and turmoil in Northeast region. According to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2018), insurgencies in Northeast are of three types: separatism seeking independence; sub-regional aspirations seeking autonomy and intra-ethnic group conflicts.

Causes of Northeast Insurgency As mentioned above, the aspirations for independence, autonomy and for dominance by the ethnic groups leading to the existence of multiple insurgencies in different states in the Northeastern region can be attributed to multiple factors. The factors range from socio-political and historical to the economic deprivation and strong perceptions of being subjugated by others. One of the major reasons for such a sense of alienation from the so-called mainland India can be traced back to the precolonial and colonial years as its origin. The absence of any effort to integrate the people of Northeastern states with the ‘mainland India’ also among themselves continues to contribute to the perception of alienation, even in the present context. This deeprooted perception of alienation, arguably, continues to be a source of legitimacy of violent movements by several groups. A second factor could be the lack of economic opportunities in terms of income generation activities, which contributes to the sustenance of insurgencies in this region. The role of neighbouring countries in terms of providing sanctuary to various insurgent groups has been an important factor in this regard. Until 2009, when Sheikh Hasina came to power, Bangladesh used to provide a safe haven to the Indian Insurgent groups. Arguably, it is Sheikh Hasina’s crackdown on the insurgent groups (Behera, 2013) that contributed to the arrest of several militant leaders, and several insurgent groups were forced to get into a peace process with the governments. On contrary, some of the militant groups continue to operate as they are provided with sanctuary in countries like Myanmar.

114

M. S. Simon

Talking about the strong perception of alienation, the presence of the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) has been one of the most contentious issues. Often accused of a source of extra-legal killing by the ‘state’, the violent activities by some of the militant groups in the Northeastern states are often seen as counter-violence activities. While the AFSPA has been revoked from many of the Northeastern states, its operation in some other states continues to fuel discontent among the people. The last but not least, the majoritarian desire (Behera, 2017) to claim dominance over others has been a major factor for the intra-ethnic violence in some of the states of Northeast India. Such desire to have a dominance position explains the multiple factions among the ethnic militant groups. While these factors contribute to the sustenance of militancy in the Northeastern states, the overall security situation in the region has improved substantially. The states like Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya hardly report any militancy-related violent incidents for the last several years. Similarly, in the states like Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, various factions of the militant groups have signed peace processes with the governments. As the negotiations have been going on between the government and the insurgent groups, some of the insurgent groups continue to carry out their activities posing security threats to the Indian state. This process reflects upon some of the issues and concerns in the region.

Issues and Concerns in Northeast Insurgency Inconclusive Peace Talks Union government has been engaging with militant groups in the region through talks and negotiations. Several rounds of talks have taken place with key stakeholders in the peace talks including the civil society, NGOs and churches. The outcome of such deliberations and talks has proven to be inconclusive and indeterminate in nature. Government of India, on the one hand, have provided assurances/guarantees within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The armed groups in the region on the other hand were demanding a share of autonomy and integration of Naga inhabited areas. It is important to mention that the NSCN(IM) dropped these demands, which paved the way for the signing of the Framework Agreement in 2015 (Economic Times, 2015). The agreement has stalled reportedly due to demand put forth by NSC(IM) for a separate flag and constitution. By October 31, 2019, the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, served an ultimatum to conclude the peace talks. The representatives of NSCN(IM) claimed that all outstanding issues were resolved barring only a few technicalities before the final agreement are to be signed. On this, the Union Government declared that the final settlement would arrive following due consultation with all the parties involved from the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh (PIB, 2019). As the peace talks were getting delayed reaching to an amicable outcome, there were rumours to

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

115

the effect that Nagas were reverting to insurgent tactics. The reports of NSCN(IM) former Commander-in-Chief Phunting Shimrang travelling to Yunnan, China raised an alarm and speculation in the media. The peace talks with Assam-based insurgent group—ULFA(PT)—have also met with a similar fate. The Government’s initiatives to provide Schedule Tribe (ST) status, one of the outstanding demands by some of the ethnic groups in Assam, to six ethnic communities—Tai Ahom, Koch Rajbongshi, Chutiya, Moran, Muttock and Tea tribes—has been resisted by the other tribal and the non-tribal groups alike. As mentioned before, the competition among the various ethnic groups to have dominance over others continues to derail the peace process. The apprehensions among the groups to lose their share over socio-political status and economic resources explain such resistance (East Mojo, 2019).

Militant Groups’ Indulgence in Criminal Activities When a final settlement of peace talks appears like a distant dream for insurgent groups, frustration and insecurities set in. Coupled with an ineffective surrender and rehabilitation policy that does not timely disburse funds to surrendered cadres, many of the insurgent cadres are reported to be indulging in criminal activities such as extortion, illicit drug business and human trafficking as major sources of their income (Rajya Sabha Committee, 2018). The Governor of Nagaland RN Ravi went to the extent of stating that such armed gangs engaged in criminal activities of extortion and kidnapping run a parallel government thereby challenging the legitimacy of state government (Hindu, 2020).

Poor Implementation of Ceasefire Agreements When Ceasefire Agreements are not abided in letter and spirit by concerned parties, be it Government or insurgent group, a basic element of trust gets diluted. Shoddy implementation of agreement leads to numerous turf wars and armed rivalries between insurgent groups. We have had instances of NSCN(IM) running a kidnapping and extortion racket while being under a ceasefire agreement with the Government. Armed rivalries between insurgent groups were reported in the states of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. According to the available reports, the factional fighting among various factions of Naga militant groups has killed over 1800 militants between 1997 and 2013. Such factional violence is not only limited to the Naga militant groups. We have instances of such factionalism among the militant groups in Assam and Manipur (Hindu, 2014).

116

M. S. Simon

Active Insurgent Groups in Myanmar There have been active insurgent cadres currently around 2,000–3,000, belonging to ULFA-I and Meitei separatist outfits seeking safe sanctuaries in Myanmar (Irawaddy, 2018). Some terror outfits like United Liberation Front (UNLF) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) provide logistical support to Arakan Army in Myanmar. These terror outfits are allowed to build training camps in Rakhine and Chin states with the support of Arakan Army. Such outfits run their economy through cross-border smuggling and extortion activities and therefore become less dependent on the Army. This is a cause of concern for national security as external forces are supporting insurgent groups in terms of logistics and increasingly external and internal aspects of security get blurred. It was also reported that Paresh Baruah of ULFA-I enjoys Chinese hospitality in Ruili (Hindustan Times, 2014).

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir The Article 370, a special constitutional status that was offered to the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), was revoked in August 2019. At the same time, the Article 35 A was abrogated thereby disallowing state to define the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the state. There was hue and cry raised in the parliament at tabling of Bills and in-camera deliberations at United Nations regarding security situation in J&K after August 5, 2019. Supporting the move to abrogate Article 370 and the Article 35 A, the BJP-led NDA government argued that such a decision was taken to fulfil the future aspirations of the citizens living in the state of J&K (Pant, 2020). Some scholars were also of the point of view that removing the special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir would further exacerbate the negative perceptions of insecurity and alienation among the people towards Union Government (Shah & Iyer, 2020). Most security experts and policy-makers believed the Article 370 was the root cause of radicalism and terrorism in the state of J&K. Such a position was also corroborated by the Union Home Minister while he was defending the move in the parliament. He argued at the floor of Rajya Sabha (the lower house of parliament) that because of Article 370, democracy had not reached at the grassroot level and corruption was at its peak. He brushed aside fears of violence as was evident with authorities able to control militant activities in the valley. Riyaz Naikoo of Hizb-ul Mujahedeen (HM) and other key militants were killed by security forces (Irfan, 2020). According to media report, in the course of 2020, 47 top commanders belonging to various terror outfits were killed (NDTV, 2020). The official data also indicate the reduction of stone-pelting incidents as Kashmir saw only 255 such incidents in 2020, compared with 1,999 in 2019, 1,458 in 2018 and 1,412 in 2017 (Economic Times 2020a, 2020b and NDTV, 2020).

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

117

Militants in South Kashmir are on a backfoot and left to rethink their strategies and often at times compelled to shuffle bases to evade the eyes of security forces. It is no surprise then to observe that Central Kashmir, especially Srinagar to prop up as a base of militancy. The media reports suggested that around 225 terrorists that included 37 foreign terrorists (read from Pakistan) were neutralized in various security operations in Kashmir valley and Pir-Pinjal Range (News 18, 2020). J&K Police chief attributed leadership crises within militant outfits due to successful anti-militancy operations in 2020. Cross-border terrorism is an important concern wherein internal and external dimension of security gets blurred. In the national security discourse, Parliament attack in 2001 and Mumbai terror attack at Taj Hotel in 2008 evoke poignant memories that cause more grounds for security forces to check infiltrations across the border. Sustained vigil at borders has reduced the presence of foreign terrorists in the region, In the year 2019, 130 infiltrations were recorded across the Line of Control (LOC); only 30 have managed to cross the LOC. 245 weapons were recovered from 176 counter militancy operations conducted by security forces from January to October 2020 (Shah, 2020). Militants are facing a shortage of weapons and ammunitions to such an extent that they have resorted to using drones to drop weapons along LOC (Khajuria, 2020). The Union Government has undertaken measures time and again to combat militancy. There was a ban imposed on funeral rallies when it was realized by security agencies that terror organizations were using such emotionally charged occasions to recruit youngsters in the valley (Philip, 2020). It was felt that there ought to be a regulation of internet as it was a channel used by terror recruiters to spread disinformation and radical content (Sharma, 2020). Surrender and Rehabilitation policy appears to be effective with the surrender of eight militants during encounters and more than 50 who surrendered quietly in 2020 (DNA, 2020). However, the question remains if such security measures and policies have had the effect of arresting militancy in the region. If there appears to be dissatisfaction among the people of Kashmir on issues related to temples, new domicile rules, statehood, misuse of power by police, insurgency is still a simmering problem. We cannot discount the role of Pakistan looming at large in creating internal disruptions in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s military doctrine of bleeding India with a thousand cuts has always been met with proportional response from India (Outlook, 2018). Pakistan time and again have sought to find ways to bring instability in Kashmir. This is evident with the revival of Al Badr, a long-defunct terror group with 17 fresh recruits in July and August 2020. It was also reported that Pakistan was instrumental in establishing The Resistance Front (TRF) along the lines of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) after the abrogation of Article 370 with the objective of fomenting further disturbances in the Kashmir valley (Bhat, 2020).

118

M. S. Simon

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The problems faced in internal security are primarily on violence perpetrated by armed groups and individuals against state machinery. People-oriented development is the way forward to combat armed insurgencies in the country. Peace talks and dialogue initiated by the Government with militants need to bear fruit and outcome in the interest of the country. As mentioned below are a set of policy recommendations for the conflict zones in the Maoist-affected areas, Northeast insurgency and Jammu & Kashmir, respectively. Left-Wing Extremism: Complimentarily, security and development approaches must go hand in hand in dealing with Maoist insurgency. Greyhound model of Andhra Pradesh in terms of tackling LWE needs not necessarily be successful in other LWEaffected states. States has a peculiar set of factors that perpetuates Maoist conflict and hence differ from one state to another. So, remedies in terms of governance and security in States require differential treatment as well. Sensitivities to tribal grievances and their due entitlements in terms of right to forest and forest produce need to duly acknowledged and addressed by concerned Government machinery at grassroots level. Effective local, tribal and regional counter-narratives in local dialects against Maoist propaganda need to be conceptualized, framed and spread by local representatives and tribal youth. Speedy and time-bound delivery of justice is need of the hour for those adivasis who are wrongly construed as Maoists. It is necessary to have a robust surrender and rehabilitation policy that is ensuring security for the beneficiaries, timely disposal of benefits to beneficiaries and ensuring the scheme is reviewed to check the administrative lapses if any. Northeast insurgency: A sense of alienation and deprivation by Northeast towards the mainland needs to be addressed and integrationist policies, schemes and initiatives need to be bought in more by Union and State Governments. Time-bound completion of connectivity projects based on roads, infrastructure and information technology in Northeast region. Checking extortion racket and its spread in the Northeast by bringing in transparency and accountability in Government departments are the ways forward. Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: According to experts, the foremost challenge for New Delhi after revocation of special status of J&K and abrogation of Article 370 is rebuilding trust (Wani, 2020). It is argued that this decision not only delegitimized the pro-establishment class in Kashmir but also resulted in the people of Kashmir having more sympathy for separatists. The Union Government must do away with PSA in order to rebuild the trust deficit and to win over the confidence of the Kashmiris. The issues, challenges and options in internal security are complex in nature. One size fits all approach to the armed insurgency problems is not the answer as each form of insurgency is peculiar and different from the other. People-centric development and public perception management in addressing the issues and concerns of armed

8 India’s Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options

119

insurgencies in India are required without diluting the objective of securing integrity, territory of nation and safety of its citizens.

References Behera, A. (2020). Maoist mayhem under new leadership. The Pioneer. Retrieved April 3, 2021, from https://www.dailypioneer.com/2020/sunday-edition/maoist-mayhem-under-new-lea dership.html. Behera, A. (2017). The Majoritarian Way to Democracy: The Bodoland Conflict in Assam. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 42(3):135–145. Behera, A. (2018). From Mao to Maoism: The Indian Path. In P. Narendar & B. Anshuman (Eds.) Reasoning Indian Politics: Philosopher Politicians to Politicians Seeking Philosophy (pp. 182– 204). London: Routledge. Behera, A. (2021). India’s Security Response to the Maoist Insurgency. Indian Studies Review., 2(1), 1–16. Bhat, T. (2020). Kashmir faces new threat in form of TRF: A new group or Lashkar in disguise. The Week. Retrieved April 3, 2021, from https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/06/09/ kahsmir-faces-new-threat-in-face-of-trf-a-new-group-or-lashkar-in-disguise.html#:~:text=dis guise%20%2D%20The%20Week-,Kashmir%20faces%20new%20threat%20in%20form% 20of%20TRF%3A%20A,group%20or%20Lashkar%20in%20disguise&text=Last%20year% 2C%20when%20Article%20370,for%20more%20than%20two%20months. Doley, K. (2019). ST status to 6 Assam communities: Not everyone has tribal instinct. EastMojo. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from https://www.eastmojo.com/opinion/2019/02/18/st-status-to6-assam-communities-not-everyone-has-tribal-instinct/. Economic Times. (2015). Historic framework agreement signed with government: NSCN-IM. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nat ion/historic-framework-agreement-signed-with-government-nscn-im/articleshow/48335021. cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Economic Times. (2020a). 1,999 stone-pelting incidents in 2019 in J-K, 1,193 post abrogation of Article 370. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/pol itics-and-nation/1999-stone-pelting-incidents-in-2019-in-j-k-1193-post-abrogation-of-article370/articleshow/73129411.cms?from=mdr. Economic Times. (2020b). India adopting three-pronged approach to address internal security challenges: Rajnath Singh. Retrieved March 27, 2021, from https://economictimes.indiatimes. com/news/defence/india-adopting-three-pronged-approach-to-address-internal-security-challe nges-rajnath-singh/articleshow/79065038.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium= text&utm_campaign=cppst. Goswami, N. (2013). India’s internal security situation: present realities and future pathways. MPIDSA Monograph Series, 23, 1–140. Irfan, H. (2020). Riyaz Naikoo’s encounter, successor and militancy in Kashmir. The Economic Times. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ riyaz-naikoos-encounter-successor-and-militancy-in-kashmir/articleshow/75715239.cms?fro m=mdr. Khajuria, R. (2020) Forces recover arms, ammunition dropped by Pak drone in Jammu’s Akhnoor. Hindustan Times. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/forcesrecover-arms-ammunition-dropped-by-pak-drone-in-jammu-s-akhnoor/story-DSIf6KrJRhQC 9nTC98AXEM.html. Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). (2019–2020). Annual report (2019–2020), pp. 1–372. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_19_20.pdf.

120

M. S. Simon

NDTV. (2020). 225 Terrorists Killed in Jammu and Kashmir in 2020: State Police Chief (2020, December 31), NDTV. December 31, 2020. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from https://www. ndtv.com/india-news/225-terrorists-killed-in-jammu-and-kashmir-in-2020-police-chief-dilbagsingh-2346164. Pant, H. V. (2020). Article 370: Ushering in the new normal. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved April 19, 2021, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/article-370-usheringnew-normal/. Philip, S. A. (2020). Modi govt’s planning a new burial process for terrorists in Kashmir, The Print, June 28, 2020. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from https://theprint.in/india/modi-govts-planning-anew-burial-process-for-terrorists-in-kashmir/255638/. Pillai, G. K. (2018) Inherent structural constraints challenging India’s internal security. Journal of Defence Studies, 12(2), 9–11. Press Information Bureau (PIB), Govt. of India. (2019). A clarification on Naga settlement issue (Press release). Retrieved March 15, 2021, from https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID= 1589863. Sahni, A. (2002). Survey of Conflicts and Resolution in India’s Northeast, Faultlines (Vol. 12). South Asia Terrorism Portal and Institute for Conflict Management. Shah, K., & Iyer, P. (2020). Decoding the new domicile law of Jammu and Kashmir. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved April 26, 2021, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ decoding-new-domicile-law-jammu-kashmir-68777/. Shah, K. (2020). Kashmir’s militancy: Weapon-less but far from the end. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/kashmirs-milita ncy-weapon-less-but-far-from-the-end/. Sharma, N. (2020). 2G Enough For E-Learning: Centre Defends Throttled Internet in Kashmir. NDTV. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/centre-defends-thrott led-internet-in-kashmir-2g-enough-for-e-learning-2298365. Sharma, S. K., & Behera, A. (2014). Militant Groups in South Asia. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. The Outlook. (2018). Pakistan Wants to Bleed India with Thousand Cuts’, Says Army Chief General Bipin Rawat. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://www.outlookindia.com/web site/story/pakistan-wants-to-bleed-india-with-thousand-cuts-says-army-chief-general-bipinrawat/317041. Wani, A. (2020) Life in Kashmir After Article 370. ORF Special Report No. 99. Observer Research Foundation. Zaw, A. (2018). Myanmar’s Return of Indian Rebels: Act of Friendship or Strategic Trade-Off? The Irrawaddy. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commen tary/myanmars-return-indian-rebels-act-friendship-strategic-trade-off.html.

Chapter 9

Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India via Myanmar: A Case Study of Manipur Ningthoujam Koiremba Singh

Introduction Ever since the inception of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline, theories are often concentrating only on one dimension, i.e., ‘power’. As Morgenthau (1948) defines, ‘power’ may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man and (it) covers all social relationship that serves that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind control the other. In the twenty-first century, the focal point of IR is still ‘power’, which is essentially state-centric in its conception. Besides, the positioning of the states in international affairs is determined by two characteristics: first, ‘wealth’ of the state which presents the states’ material possessions; second is ‘power’ of the state which lies in its ability to control the actions of others (Wolfers, 2011). However, in an increasingly interdependent world, several other challenges have emerged in the field of ‘national power’ and consequently in the domain of ‘national security’ with far-reaching ramifications in international politics; therefore, questions have been raised about the traditional conception of ‘power’ and ‘security’. The realist school, however, still cherish the primacy of territorial sovereignty, national interest, military force, etc. in its approach. With the end of the Cold War, most aspects of international relations have gradually transformed; global interdependence and globalisation question the myopic outlook of international relations is enough to understand the present-day crisis like hunger, disease, and repression in international relations (Edwards, 2009). For instance, security threat dynamics are becoming intricate, and consequently threatening the stability, well-being, and viability of the state in more complex ways. As a result of conceptual, empirical, and normative difficulties and challenges of security in international relations, analysing the security environment of a state has N. K. Singh (B) Sikkim University, Gangtok, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_9

121

122

N. K. Singh

become quite challenging (Bhagat, 1976. The problem becomes even more complicated due to the presence of conflicting and competing for theoretical paradigms or epistemes. Scholars have been unable to produce a comprehensive understanding of the vital factors and forces that make up security issues due to the highly differentiated social histories and levels of development, as well as the types of political development, civil society characteristics, and state structure that differ among states. Barry Buzan, in his book, People, States and Fear (1991), analyses and redefined the concept of security to encompass not only military security but political, economic, social, and ecological security as well. Because of the changes in the policy environment that governments face, these sectors needed to be included in the security narrative. Importantly, Buzan also discussed the individual as the ‘irreducible base unit’ for discussion on security. Moreover, the fast-changing scenario of security in international relations has prompted a rethinking of, and call for, ‘broadening’ or ‘updating’ of the concept of ‘security’. This tuned the national security narrative focus towards ‘non-traditional security’ threats. Security is no longer merely the preservation of the state against external threats but also the protection of the state from internal threats such as diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political turmoil, and the effects of environmental degradation (UNDP, 1995). Although these threats may be called with different names, they have many common characteristics. Founded on modern communication, transportation, and information technologies, they all take place within a global network that involves transnational, non-state actors, including sophisticated transnational networks of people and organisations (Mathew & Shambaugh, 1998: 163–75). On the flip side, the growth of world trade, integration of financial markets along with online transaction of funds that has minimised transport costs, etc. have also facilitated the growth of transnational organised crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism, etc. In this globalised world, considering the magnitude and the transnational nature of these activities, a state is highly vulnerable to newer forms of threats that would impact its political, military, economic, and social fabric. This new security threat directly impacts day-to-day human life and in turn endangers the stability and security of the concerned states, both internally as well as externally. An evolutionary metaphor defines and legitimises contemporary complexity: the present must be more complex than the past. On the other hand, the relationship between international trade and national security has a long history, especially from the genesis of the General Agreement of the Traffic and the Trade (GATT) in 1947. Besides, national security conception has acquired new dimensions after the attack on the twin towers on 11 September 2001. Many researchers have studied trade sections, which are imposed for national security purposes. In the early 1980s Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott published a seminal work on whether the method of trade sanction is effective. It undertakes a comprehensive analysis of national security issues in international trade law, focusing on whether certain trade sanction is justified under the FATT/WTO rules. But it has paid less attention to policy aspects that help to fulfil both trade liberalisation and national security objectives.

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

123

Certain trade practices have been used by nations as an instrument to harm the adversary’s economy. Many countries across the Afro-Asian region have become the dumping ground of Chinese products which has destroyed economic sustainability leading to their existential crisis. India has been a victim of such unfair trade practices; many toy industries in India have been closed for the influx and dumping of Chinese products. This has adversely affected the economic sustainability of many which have ramifications on other aspects like social security, economic security, and even national security. In addition, drug trafficking is another biggest international crime. The menace is also connected to other categories of transnational crime that include money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism. Illicit drugs are produced, processed, transported, and distributed by drug cartels operating across national borders. Drug trafficking has a complex transnational structure with causes and effects that transcend national boundaries, sometimes eroding the power and authority of nationstates. Weapons and drug trafficking, along with organised crime, are among the problems that have posed serious threats to national security. In this study, the contours of two grave malpractices seriously affecting India have been explored: illicit drug trafficking and dumping. The sections that follow explore one of the most affected areas of Northeast India, Manipur, where the problem of illicit drug trafficking and dumping symbiotically thrive and slowly cripple the state economy, as well as its sociopolitical fabric.

Dumping of Chinese Goods in India Often Indian newspapers are flooded with headlines like ‘25 Chinese items may face an extension of dumping duty’ (Jayaswal, 2020); ‘India may extend anti-dumping duty on carbon black used in rubber industry’ (Indian Express, 2020); ‘Anti-dumping duty imposed on 90 Chinese items’ (The Economics Times, 2020); and ‘India initiates anti-dumping probe into imports of polyester yarn from 4 countries’ (Financial Express, 2020). Such type of incidents is not happening in India; this is prevalent around the world. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), when a company/institution exports/sells its products in a foreign market at a cheaper price than its domestic market, it is called dumping (WTO, 2020). There is no set of regulations that WTO advocates against dumping; however, the international organisation does facilitate the stage on how governments can or cannot react to dumping. Anti-dumping actions are primarily of two types: subsidies and countervailing measures. These measures are only applicable when dumping has a significant impact on the domestic market. The anti-dumping investigation will end (a) if the margin of dumping is less than 2% of the export price of the product; (b) if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product; (c) if, in multiple countries, each supply is less than 3% but together accounts more than 7%, the investigation will continue.

124

N. K. Singh

As ‘boycotting China’ has been a new trend in Indian social media, history tells a different story altogether. Trade with China constitutes more than 40% of India’s global trade and almost one-sixth of all its total imports (145 Parliamentary Report on the Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). India’s export to China has risen significantly by 25.64% in 2018–2019, amounting to $16.75 billion compared to the previous year and India’s import of Chinese products has reduced by 7.94% with $70.32 billion in 2018–2019. Though there is a rise in export and a decline in imports, the trade deficit between India and China is still high, $53.57 billion (Department of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, 2020). Chinese goods control almost every industrial sector in India, more prominently the telecom and power sector. However, the most affected are the labour-intensive industries, which are traditionally the large employment generators (e.g., textile, solar energy). The MSMEs are the worst affected sector by the dumping of Chinese goods, as many of them had to close down. Manufacturers of steel grades of the 200 series can be the best example. Poor-quality Chinese goods are common in almost every Indian household, either agrochemical which impacts the environment or poor-quality toys, colours, firecrackers, religious idols having health hazards. According to a parliamentary report on the impact of Chinese goods on Indian industries, Chinese non-alloy steels are being imported by declaring it as alloy steel which is value-added and expensive. The same report also highlights that 200,000 Indians could lose their jobs to the dumping of solar panels in the industry (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). There are no mandatory quality standards for toys in the Indian market and it is flooded with substandard Chinese toys, many of which contain harmful chemicals and materials. The parliamentary committee brought to notice that around 50–70% of light bulbs that are spurious and substandard flooded the Indian market largely due to dumping by China (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). Though India is called the ‘pharmacy of the world’ for its Finished Dosage Formulation (FDF), two key ingredients like Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) and Key Standing Materials (KSM), are imported as much as 90% from China against which the Indian APIs are quite negligible. The solar energy sector which is getting a boost from the national solar mission is also dominated by imports from China, accounting for nearly 90% of the market share directly or indirectly. Around 84% of solar components like solar cells and modules are imported from China, valuing $2.05 billion in 2015–16, $1.71 billion in 2016–17, and $2.24 billion in 2017–18. The Chinese dumping of solar equipment in India is serious as they are sold far cheaper in India in comparison to what it sells in Japan, the USA, and the EU (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). In the textile sector, dumping has resulted in the closure of 35% of power looms in Surat and Bhiwandi. As of September 2017, the share of Chinese products constitutes 85–90% of the Indian toy market. Chinese toys made in-road with falsely branded handicrafts of Channapatna craft park is one example of such moves (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). Chinese firecracker dumping not only impacts Indian domestic industry but also impacts the environment and

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

125

health hazards as it contains potassium chlorate, a highly explosive material that is banned in India. Chinese firecrackers are illegally imported goods; still, they find their way into the Indian market. India is the second-largest manufacturer of bicycles; however, the Indian market has witnessed an increase in imports of Chinese products. Bicycle import increased 58% in 2017 compared to 2016 and Chinese producers enjoyed 63.3% of total bicycle import in the second and third quarter of 2017. Cheap imports from China are flooding the Indian market and wiping out domestic industries, which is a serious concern. However, under-invoicing of Chinese products, dumping of cheap goods, entry of prohibited goods through misdeclaration, and smuggling also raise many eyebrows. Between 2014 and 2018 Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs recorded 4133 cases of seizure of smuggled Chinese goods worth $182.15 billion (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). It is also to be noted that in the fiscal year 2017–18, almost $167 million was collected as anti-dumping duty and $105 million alone from China, which is almost 62.8% of the total anti-dumping duty collected. The Government of India levies these anti-dumping duties to protect the domestic market; however, these restrictions have to be relaxed according to WTO guidelines (Directorate General of Trade Remedies, 2020). Looking at India’s market behaviour, low-priced products attract Indian consumers more irrespective of the safety hazards inherent in such products. Dumping remains the biggest problem for the Indian market as the majority of Indians depend on unorganised retail, where the price matters more than quality.

Dumping of Chinese Goods in Manipur via Myanmar In the Indo-Burma border, trade is largely taking place between Moreh town in Manipur (India) and the Namphalong Sagging division of Myanmar. As a gateway to South, Southeast, and ASEAN economies, the region holds a special significance. India and Myanmar have signed the first Border Trade agreement to exchange goods produced locally by people living along 25 km on both sides of the border in January 1994 (Roy, 2010. A major component of Moreh-Tamu Border Town’s trade activity is Border Trade (BT) via barter, free exchange of goods without an export and import (EXIM) licence, and trading using free convertible currencies. India–Myanmar border trade statistics (Million USD) Year

Myanmar export

Myanmar import

Total trade

2005–2006

11.28

4.13

15.41

2006–2007

11.02

4.75

15.77

2007–2008

10.91

3.92

14.83

2008–2009

5.49

4.43

9.92 (continued)

126

N. K. Singh

(continued) India–Myanmar border trade statistics (Million USD) Year

Myanmar export

Myanmar import 5.95

Total trade

2009–2010

7.79

13.74

2010–2011

8.3

4.5

12.8

2011–2012

8.87

6.54

15.41

2012–2013

26.96

11.67

38.63

2013–2014

30.92

17.71

48.63

Source Embassy of India, Yangon, Myanmar

The third-party imported goods may be small in volume per country, but it gives rise to a serious concern of informal trade practice. A major consumer of third-party imported goods in India is its northeastern states. Northeastern India shares only 2% of its boundary with mainland India and the rest 98% is shared with the international border (Das, 2016). Indo-Myanmar border trade through Moreh, Manipur (Millions USD) Year

India’s export to Myanmar

1995–96

10.45

5.39

15.84

5.06

1996–97

31.71

15.18

46.89

16.53

1997–98

22.45

35.08

57.53

12.63

1998–99

5.06

3.74

8.8

1.32

1999–00

3.26

3.68

6.94

0.42

2000–01

5.29

0.19

5.48

5.1

2001–02

1.25

8.3

9.55

7.05

2002–03

3.66

12.15

15.81

8.49

2003–04

8.74

8.3

17.04

0.44

2004–05

5.64

5.01

10.65

0.63

2005–06

4.09

3.3

7.39

0.79

2006–07

62.13

1.78

63.91

60.35

2007–08

6.01

16.29

22.3

10.28

2008–09

1.6

0.76

2.36

0.84

2009–10

21.5

8.31

29.81

13.19

3.8

4.06

3.54

2010–11

0.26

India’s import from Myanmar

Total

Trade balance

2011–12

1.49

1.36

2.85

0.13

2012–13

27.24

20.55

47.79

6.69

2013–14

14.52

48.47

62.99

33.95

Source Enhancing India-Myanmar border trade policy and implementation measures

Moreh-Tamu border trade is a multimillion-dollar trade business corridor that transacts a huge sum every day, if not disturbed by law-and-order situations. From

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

127

April 1995 to March 1996, about US$ 1.80 million worth of goods were traded at the Moreh LCS. Out of US$ 1.80 million, only US$ 0.14 million worth of goods were exported against the import value of US$ 1.66 million that resulted in a border trade balance of negative US$ 1.52 million (Marchang, 2005). The exports remain lower than the imports due to high road transportation costs and ‘little export from Manipur’ (ESM, 2009). The total value of border trade is low and fluctuates frequently. On average, every year over US$ six million worth of goods (possibly including normal trade goods) have been exported and imported at Moreh LCS since the beginning of border trade in 1995/96. This is against the average value of total trade (export plus import) between India and Myanmar at US$ 588.31 million per year from 1996/97 to 2011/12 (Marchang, 2015). It indicates that India’s imports are much greater than its exports through Moreh. However, thousands of people enter the Namphalong market from India every day because the goods there are relatively cheaper than in the Moreh market (Marchang, 2015). Insurgents impose illegal taxes on Moreh goods, and Indian customs and security officials bribe the insurgents to increase prices. However, India is not able to compete with the cheap products made in China or Thailand that dominate the Namphalong market. The porous border between India and Myanmar becomes fertile ground for illegal goods movement as well as third-party dumping. Two demarcated sectors, (a) Lohit sub-sector of Arunachal Pradesh (136 km) and (b) Kabaw valley in Manipur (35 km), as well as Free Movement Regime (FMR) (where the fencing work by border management has been stopped between Boundary Pillar No. 79 to 81 due to local protests), have turned into gateways for smuggling of goods. If we compare total trade data provided by the Embassy of India, Yangon, Myanmar, and Land Custom Station in Moreh, Manipur, the difference is almost 20%. In 2012–13, the total trade between India and Myanmar was $38.63 million and $47.79 million, according to the Embassy of India (Myanmar) and Land Custom Station (Moreh), respectively (Marchang, 2015). Similarly, in 2013–14, according to the Embassy of India (Myanmar) and Land Custom Station (Moreh), the total trade between the nations was $48.63 million and $62.99 million, respectively (Das, 2016). Myanmar imports heavily from China and then many of these imported goods find their way into India as Myanmar exports them without adhering to ‘rules of origin’ requirements. Many third-party imported goods from China like electronic goods, household items such as crockeries, appliances, precious stones, etc. imported into India’s northeastern markets from across the border with misdeclaration at the customs checkpoints (Das, 2016). Other neighbours also provide safe passages for Chinese products to India, e.g., Bangladesh imports linen fabrics from China, convert them to garments and subsequently ship them to India, avoiding anti-dumping duty in India. Yarn and fibres imported from China are also converted into fabrics in Bangladesh and exported to India with zero duty under the bilateral agreement (145 Parliamentary Report on Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). Most of the Chinese companies which dominate exports are governmentcontrolled enterprises. China has been accused of many unfair trade practices, like

128

N. K. Singh

manipulating its currency and export subsidies. China accounts for the maximum number of anti-dumping duty investigations in the world (145 Parliamentary Report on the Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry, 2018). The parliamentary committee report also found that the Chinese government provides rebates up to 17% on exports. Apart from the central government, the provincial government competes to attract industries in the region by extending incentives and a low tax structure. In this whole process of border trade between India and Myanmar, China dumps its cheap goods through legal and illegal means. The products that influx in Manipur via Myanmar is cheaper without any guarantee on environmental hazards. However, every household in Manipur is exclusively using cheap products, ranging from daily use small items to solar energy devices due to affordability. On the other hand, most of the goods that are exported to India via Myanmar are Chinese and are affecting both states as well as the whole of India. According to The Economic Political Weekly 2000, between 1990 and 2000, several illegal Chinese immigrants have taken over the local business in northern Myanmar. It causes resentment among the local population of northern Myanmar. As per Asia Report (2009), it is estimated that 60% of Myanmar’s economy is in Chinese hands, including both the ethnic Burmese Chinese and recent immigrants. In this regard, the small business and entrepreneurs of small states like Manipur are dysfunctional and it is a common phenomenon in entire northeast India. Another notable factor that crippled the Manipur economy is the lack of all-weathered connectivity with mainland India even after 70 years of independence, Manipur as well as many states in the northeastern state does not have proper transportation, which results in price hike of finished goods and raw material from India. This in turn leads to the domination of relatively cheaper Chinese products in this region. Conversely, a small-time manufacturing unit is dysfunctional and has no scope for sustainable economic development at the same time. Therefore, the economic condition of Manipur is deteriorating day by day which warrants urgent attention. India is required to revisit its anti-dumping policy to deal with the grey areas which facilitate dumping to thrive still. Today in Manipur many small industries are being uprooted due to the dumping of cheap Chinese products which culminates in an acute unemployment problem. The registered unemployment in the state was 7,49,935 by the end of February 2021. The state’s literacy rate is 79.85%, which is higher than the national average of 74.04%. This is alarming considering Manipur has a population of 27,21,756 only, according to the 2011 census (Business Standard, 2016). The unemployed youth are prone to drug abuse, human trafficking, and corruption.

Drug Trafficking Apart from the military and traditional security, organised crime has the potential to create an existential threat to many sovereign states in the world. They can be Frankensteins to dismantle the central authority of sovereign states directly. According to

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

129

Roseanu (1990), the growth of non-state actors especially organised crime organisations has the potential to destroy or challenge the sovereign state. On the same line, Cusimano (2000) pointed out that transnational organised crime creates several problems for sovereign states and cannot tackle among themselves and if not, they are going to lose their sovereign status. On the other hand, points out that organised crime creates a cloud of disaster where states are unable or unwilling to perform their function, as usual, giving more emphasis to market or private actors to resolve any issue. Today, transnational organised crime is transformed into a strong Frankensteins which has the capacity to erode all forms of security in several domains: economy, health, environment, and even human existence. Among them, illicit drug trafficking is the worst and lethal in the world of organised crime. It has nexus with all forms of transnational Crome, including human trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, etc. (Castel, 1997). It has been estimated that about US$400 billion worth of illicit drugs were transected in a year. According to UNODC 200 million use illicit drugs worldwide (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2003, 86). Among all other illegal political economy drug trafficking is in the prime spot and the volume of the market is estimated between $45 and $280 billion (Thoumi, 2003). Internationally organised crime is inflicted precisely in three levels of security: international security, national security, and in the level of human security, where retreater requires a comprehensive and multidimensional approach even for the explanation. At the international level, it defies all conventions and international law which challenge the norms of the international system; national-level security dismantles the internal cohesion of the state and destroys the basic integrity of the sovereign status of the state, leading to a failing state. Last but not least at the human level, it paralyses all activities due to the nature of threats, especially the youth across the world. In regards to unearth transnational organised crime, especially illicit drug trafficking requires a comprehensive and multidimensional approach due to numerous stockholders such as the transnational base of operation, including production, laboratory, supply chain of drugs. It has a very complex structure comprising innocent farmers, distributors, wholesalers, smugglers, bureaucrats, politicians, and smalltime drug peddlers. Lastly, laundering money through accountants, lawyers, bankers, and other actors (Castel, 1997). Today, drug trafficking is having symbiotic relations with other transnational organised crime: money laundering, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and even transnational terrorism. Today, the nexus between narcotics and terrorism along with other organised crime seriously threatens the existence of any nation, and it will be very difficult to find any country which is free from such threats. However, such issues were never in the major area of concern in traditional international relations. Even many scholars termed it as ‘grey area phenomena’, or ‘low-intensity conflicts’. However, in the post-Cold War era, especially due to globalisation, everything is amplified and potentially pose threats to the state and society (Cusimano, 2000). According to Giorgio Giacomelli, the Executive Director of the United Nations International Drug Control Program: ‘The drug phenomenon is unique in the number of aspects of people’s lives which it affects—the health of the individual, political

130

N. K. Singh

and economic development, the safety of the streets and the stability of governments’ (Schaeffer, 1997). Disease, terrorism, internal political instability, poverty, inflation, and hampering in the democratic process are common phenomena in many Latin American states due to the problem of drug trafficking (MacDonald, 1988). It is quite obvious that the Southeast-Asian state is catching Latin America: Myanmar is a major manufacturer of opium in the world, Laos and Thailand are producers and consumers of illicit drugs; in relation with that Cambodia is becoming a money-laundering hub and arms, drugs, and human trafficking centre of Asia. India, on the other side, is catching up with all the problems emanating from illicit drug trafficking, consumption, and collateral damages particularly in the northeastern region which share long porous borders with Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, and China.

Drug Trafficking Issues in Manipur Manipur, a tiny state, lies in the extreme east part of India bordering with Myanmar, which is one of the problematic regions for drug trafficking called the Golden triangle, the world largest producing region of heroin and opium, involving Thailand, Laos, and Yunnan—part of China. In many resources, Myanmar military government along with internationally band organisations like WUSA collaborate in drug trafficking. This is very unfortunate for a state like Manipur of India bordering with such a region which can lead to collateral damage in any form. Ever since strong affords and effective measures of Southeast-Asian countries, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, it is very difficult for smuggling in this region. In response to the strike rule on the other side, smugglers destined to Manipur via Myanmar become a safe haven for illicit drug trafficking in the 1970s and 1980s. The border state Manipur is becoming a safe haven of drug trafficking, including new synthetic drugs and becoming the trajectory state of Southeast and East Asia. The number was 12,15,273 tablets in 2018 and 180,007 in 2017 (Deccan Herald, 2019). A total of 386 persons including 68 women, allegedly involved in drug smuggling, were arrested in Manipur in 2019, according to the Manipur Police report. During the period from January 1 to December 30, 2019, police had registered 282 cases of smuggling of drugs. According to the report, a total of 706 kg of brown sugar, 16.8 kg of heroin, 61.2 kg of marijuana, 229 kg of opium, 50 kg of cough syrup bottles, 4 kg of methaqualone, 73 kg of crystal methamphetamine, 2.2 kg of ketamine and 20 kg of methamphetamine were seized. Police also seized 69,686 Spasmo Proxivon capsules, 65,60,531 World is Yours (WY) tablets (107 kgs), 13,100 numbers of Nitrosun-10 tablets, 90,990 numbers of Tramadol Hydrochloride and 5494 Pseudo-ephedrine tablets. Altogether, 3015 acres of poppy plants and 19.51 acres of cannabis plantations were destroyed in the drive carried out at 29 different locations by law-enforcing agencies of Manipur police. During the same period, 664 litres of morphine solution of brown sugar, 2295 bottles of cough syrup, and

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

131

10,755 bottles of ketamine were also seized from different smugglers, the report said (Nagaland Times, 2020). The intensity of drug trafficking has worsened even during the Covid-19 pandemic; several drug seizures are happening irrespective of countrywide lockdown and complete disconnection with border areas. The road of illicit drug production and trafficking in the small state of Manipur is alarming, even with the heavy crackdown on opium plantations. The district of Manipur: Chandel and Ukhrul border with Myanmar has extensively involved in the cultivation of opium. Crops are Benn smuggled from these small villages across the border and finished chemically extracted heroin locally call number 4 is sent back to India. Under the Act of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1985 cultivation of counter banned drugs like poppy, Ganja (marijuana) are prohibited; however, it is strongly evident that many farmers, especially in hill region adjoining district of the border area, are highly involved in the cultivation of such band crops due to high price of the substance. In many drives with the Government of Manipur and Narcotics Department, 2210 acres in 2017, 1506 acres in 2018, and 446 acres in 2019 were destroyed (Chingkheinganba, 2019). Apart from this Manipur Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB) Under war on drugs 3,716 acres of illegal poppy plantation and 5.51 acres of marijuana worth 260 were dismantled. Drive was more or less a joint venture comprising Manipur Police, Assam Rifles, and Narcotics Department and at times various civil society organisations, student unions, etc. (Government of India, 2019). Like Latin American drug cartels, in Manipur, the list of involvement is extensive, ranging from the common citizen, bureaucrats, politician, army, and many more. In some cases, high-rank army officers involved in illicit drug trafficking (Kalita, 2013) and some officers of the Moreh unit commando were arrested in February 2013 and May 2013, respectively, with regard to drug smuggling cases (The Hindu, 2013). There are two important drug-producing regions in Asia: The Golden Crescent and the Golden triangle, which are somehow connected to India, where the Golden triangle comprises Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. Due to the porous border and geographical condition many counterfeit objects are being smuggled from Myanmar to India through the border town of Moreh, including drugs, chines made weapons, and many more (Kalita, 2013). On the other hand, Tamu Myanmar side of the border town also has much evidence of smuggling Chinese goods to India legally and illegally (Lama, 2001, 249). Moreover, the maximum amount of heroin transit through the Moreh border to India is from northeastern Burma, from the Shan, Wa, and Kokang growing areas, as well as from the Kachin area (Beyrer et al., 2000). It is quite evident as Kurlantzick (2002), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an ethnic militia situated in that northeastern Myanmar is supported by the Myanmar army government, to expand its methamphetamine production. Moreover, UWSA is having its own military and liberated zone is involved in armed and illicit drug trafficking in the world. Being a transit area, Manipur is a victim of both import and export of illicit drug trafficking. At present, drug trafficking is not only confined to heroin but also expands

132

N. K. Singh

to many synthetic drugs. Pharmaceutical drugs like ephedrine and pseudoephedrinebased anti-cold medicines are smuggled rooted from North India via Manipur to an international border. All these substances will return to India as methamphetamine variants through Porus international border. An example of these variants and extensively consumed by the youth of northeast is WA or ‘world is yours’. However, none of the states knows what the volume of trade of WA is in the Southeast Asia region. However, it is overmuch grey to conclude but has some indication of illicit trade at Namphalong (Bose, 2018). Alongside illicit drug trafficking from Burma, the cultivation of poppies in the region poses serious internal threats in the border states of India (Chingkheinganba, 2019). Not only the heroin many synthetic drugs influx in Manipur through the international border, and in many incidences the processing units of synthetic are funded in Manipur. On February 6, 2020, Assam Rifles busted the manufacturing and processing unit in Thoubal district, Manipur, where they recover the drugs including heroin and brown sugar worth 120 cr. Following the crackdown of Thoubal, police seized the disabled amount of 2,30,000 ‘World is yours’ locally called WY tablets from an Assam Rifles man in Thoubal district (Sharma, 2020). By looking at all the incidences and the condition of drug-related crime and abuses, the Governor of Manipur proposed more intensive research on the field of cultivation and consumption of drugs in all eight states of northeastern states of India for a comprehensive solution for the same. Further, she exhorts UNODC to establish a South Asia Regional Intelligence Sharing mechanism, in addition to integrated border management mechanisms to counter illicit trafficking. The Government of India surveyed the drug use problem in India between December 2017 to October 2018. Manipur is very diverse in the form of drugs across the age groups and substances being used include Pain, cigarettes, ganja (marijuana), alcohol, opium, spasmo proxivon (SP), methamphetamine (WY), codeine, pseudo-ephedrine, etc. (Government of India, 2019). Precisely, two neighbouring states of northeast India, Manipur and Nagaland, have the highest number of drug abuse, especially IDUS in a very unsafe fashion, leading to HIV/AIDS pandemic in the region. In the 1990s, Manipur became one of the highest AIDS-infected zones in Asia, followed by Nagaland. Moreover, in recent cases the IDUS is not confined to heroin use but also pharmaceutical drugs, thus threatening many lives of the youth of the region. In connection to this mode of consumption, many life-threatening diseases like Hepatitis-C shot up due to IDU. Irrespective of the availability of antiretroviral therapy (ART) the mortality rates are not decreasing due to non-affordable treatment. The first HIV infection in IDU in Manipur was detected in 1989 ever since the relation between HIV/AIDS and drug users, especially IDU brought an alarming growth in the state. Around 76% of HIV positive in Manipur is due to drug use, especially IDU (Binalakshmi, 2007). It is an alarming situation in Manipur, where 90% out of 50,000 drug users are infected by HIV positive and considered to be one of the highest in the world. More or less 2000 fresh cases acknowledge every year. The UNODC estimated that the infection rate in the youth between 16 and 25 has shot up from nil to 56% in 1989 and 75% by 2003 (UNODC, 2004).

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

133

The small state of Manipur is among the six top HIV/AIDS listed in India. According to Manipur Aids Control Society, the state has 40,000.69 HIV positive cases. Moreover, 1.3% of HIV positive is found in pregnant women. Drug abuse escalates the issues of social crime across the northeast region, especially in Manipur. Mahendra P. Lama points out that the problem of insurgency has less impact than the drug abuse problem in northeast India (Lama, 2001: 253). Moreover, he argues that it has economic implications too to great extent leading to perennial impoverishment in the region. It is very much evident that drug abuse dismantles the main determinant of society, especially the youth along with artificial inflation of the economy. On the other hand, it indirectly impacts the agriculture and environmental aspect as the arable land for the excessive cultivation of counterfeits crops like poppies and marijuana. Conversely, it will also lead to a backlash in the tourism industry due to the problem of drug abuse and its related social crime (Lama, 2001). According to the Nandan foundation, the excessive drug abuse in the region is due to the youth entrapment with multidimensional issues such as liberal and western free lifestyle, unemployment, and insurgency in the region (Nedan Foundation, 2010: 9–10). Drug trafficking is extensively posing threats in the transit and sensitive areas of the northeast region of India due to the escalation of local drug abuse leading to multiplication of HIV infection; many of the local is involved in drug trafficking due to the money involved in it—in many incidences, military and paramilitary arrested in drug trafficking crimes in this region. Today the northeastern region is the breeding ground of organised crime inclusive of all, ranging from drug paddlers, bureaucrats, and politicians, and the list is never-ending. Even the nexus between crime and terror is evident in this region.

Conclusion Illicit drug trafficking and dumping are affecting the security of the Indian state in a collateral manner: economic breakdown by dumping via Myanmar has led to the acute trade deficit between India and China; spillover effect on the impoverished tribal population coupled with high unemployment, especially among the youths is destroying sustainable development of the entire north-eastern region. China is involved in many unfair trade practices like manipulating its currency and export subsidies, which indirectly affects small states like Manipur. Its spillover effect is visible in the form of illicit drug trafficking, drug abuse, corruption, and disease like AIDS, which is alarming. Several policy programmes have been undertaken but an amicable solution is still far away. One of the main reasons for the policy failure is the lack of clarity in understanding and identifying the problem, and more importantly, its nexus with vested interests, for which the state-centric approach to deal with them does not bring desired changes. It is pertinent to understand that the nature of the threat is transnational, and this phenomenon is an excruciating path to devastation and would give rise to existential threats to the state of Manipur. In the process to address such a

134

N. K. Singh

situation, it is needed to develop a clear understanding of such non-traditional issues and their entanglement with the socio-economic fabric of the state and then apply a multi-pronged approach to deal with and address it. When India is planning to strengthen its connection with East Asia through the Northeast, unless addressed early, this threat will pose serious challenges to fructify India’s ‘Act East’ policy.

References Asia Report. (2009). China’s Myanmar Dilemma. International Crisis Group: Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide. Asia Report No 177. Beyrer, C., Razak, M. H., Lisam, K., Chen, J., Lui, W., Yu, X. F. (2000). Overland heroin trafficking routes and HIV-1 spread in south and south-east Asia. AIDS, 14(1), 75–83. Retrieved August 15, 2020, from http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Overland_Heroin_Trafficking_Routes_and_ HIV1_Spread_in_South_and_South-East_Asia.pdf. Bhagat, K. (1976). Social change, charisma and international behaviour: Toward a theory of foreign policy-making in the Third World, Leiden. Bhagat, O. (2003). Patterns of ethnic conflict in the North-east. Economic and Political Weekly, 2031. Binalakshmi, N. M. (2007). Armed Conflict, Small Arms Proliferation and Women’s responses to armed violence in India’s Northeast (Working Paper No. 33). Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics. Retrieved August 15, 2020, from http://www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de/ SAPOL/HPSACP.html. Bose, P. R. (2018). Business Line. Retrieved July 21, 2020, from https://www.thehindubusinessline. com/news/at-moreh-trade-with-myanmar-borders-on-informal/article25478894.ece. Business Standard. (2016). Retrieved August 16, 2020, from https://www.business-standard.com/ article/news-ians/rising-unemployment-corruption-driving-youth-out-of-manipur-116031900 309_1.html. Buzan, B. (1991). People, States & Fear. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Castel, A. (1997). Transnational organized crime and international security. Vancouver, 9, 15–16. Chingkheinganba, P. (2019). Pratidin Times. Retrieved July 26, 2020, from https://www.pratidint ime.com/manipur-cross-border-drug-trafficking-on-the-rise/. Cusimano, M. (Ed.) (2000). Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Boston, MA: Bedford Press. Das, R. U. (2016). Enhancing India-Myanmar Border Trade Policy and Implementation Measures. New Delhi: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. Deccan Herald. (2019). Retrieved August 21, 2020, from https://www.deccanherald.com/internati onal/cross-border-drug-smuggling-on-the-rise-in-manipur-755588.html. Department of Commerce, Ministry of Finance. (2020). Retrieved June 20, 2020, from https://com merce-app.gov.in/eidb/default.asp. Directorate General of Trade Remedies. (2020). Retrieved June 13, 2020, from http://www.dgtr. gov.in/current-case-wise-and-officer-wise-allocation?field_io_value=&field_g_title_value. Edwards, A. (2009). Human security and the rights of refugees: transcending territorial and disciplinary border. Michigan Journal of International Law, 30(3), 763–807. ESM (Economic Survey Manipur) (2009). Directorate of Economics & Statistics. Imphal: Government of Manipur. EPW (2000). Looking East. Economic and Political Weekly, 35(47), 4069-4070. Financial Express. (2020, May 27). Retrieved June 13, 2020, from https://www.financialexpress. com/economy/india-initiates-anti-dumping-probe-into-imports-of-polyester-yarn-from-4-cou ntries/1972532/.

9 Illicit Drug Trafficking and Dumping of Chinese Goods in India …

135

Government of India. (2019). Retrieved August 27, 2020, from https://blog.mygov.in/nisha-thadok lasi-manipur-govt-declares-war-on-drugs/. Indian Express. (2020). Retrieved June 14, 2020, from https://www.newindianexpress.com/bus iness/2020/may/21/india-may-extend-anti-dumping-duty-on-carbon-black-used-in-rubber-ind ustry-2146262.html. Jayaswal, R. (2020). Hindustan Times. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from https://www.hindustantimes. com/business-news/25-chinese-items-may-face-extension-of-dumping-duty/story-PnqYBtPG5 TUQdewoX9AMSO.html. Kalita, P. (2013). Moreh Mini Columbia: Army Officer. Times of India. Retrieved September 28, 2020, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/Moreh-mini-Columbia-Army-off icer/articleshow/18722107.cms. Kurlantzick, J. (2002). Can Burma reform? Foreign Affairs., 81(6), 133–146. Lama, M. P. (2001). India’s North-east states Narcotics, small arms and misgovernance. Ethnic Studies Report, XIX(2), 233. MacDonald, S. (1988). Dancing on a volcano. New York: Praeger. Marchang, R. (2015). Moreh-Namphalong Borders Trade. Working Paper No.346, ISEC, Bangalore, pp. 1–17. Mathew, R., & Shambaugh, G. (1998). Sex, drugs and heavy metal: Transnational threats and national vulnerabilities. Security Dialogue, 29(2), 163–175. Morgathau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Nagaland Times. (2020). Retrieved September 24, 2020, from https://nagalandtoday.in/northeast/ 2020/01/manipur-386-drug-smugglers-arrested-in-2019/. Nedan Foundation. (2010). Trafficking & HIV/AIDS, North East Report (pp. 9–10). Imphal, Manipur: Office of the Manipur AIDS Control Society. www.nedan.in Parliamentary Report on the Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry-145. (2018). Government of India. New Delhi: Rajya Sabha. Rosenau, J. (1990). Turbulence in World Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Roy, M. (2010). India and Her Sub-Continent Neighbours: New Pattern of Relationships. Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication. Schaeffer, R. (1997). Understanding globalization: Social consequences of political, economic, and environment change. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Sharma, K. S. (2020). Drugs worth Rs 120 crore seized in Manipur factory raid. Times of India. Retrieved August 05, 2020, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/imphal/drugs-worthrs-120-crore-seized-in-manipur-factory-raid/articleshow/74040765.cms. The Economics Times. (2020). Anti-dumping duty imposed on 90 Chinese items. Retrieved June 23, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/antidumping-duty-imposed-on-90-chinese-items/articleshow/74006602.cms?from=mdr. The Hindu. (2013). Manipur drug case going to CBI. Retrieved August 15, 2020, from https://www. thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/manipur-drug-case-going-to-cbi/article4706931.ece. Thoumi, F. (2003). The Numbers’ Game: Let’s All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drugs Industry!. Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute. UNODC. (2004). HIV prevention among young injecting drug users. Retrieved April 12, 2021, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/publications/HIV_Prevention_among_Y oung_Injecting_Drug_Users.pdf. UNDP. (1995). Redefining security: The human dimension. Current History, 94(592), 229–233. World Trade Organisation. (2020). Retrieved June 12, 2020, from https://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm#:~:text=If%20a%20company%20exports%20a,companies%20enga ged%20in%20%E2%80%9Cdumping%E2%80%9D. Wolfers, A. (2011). National security as an ambiguous symbol. In C. W. Hughes & L. Y. Meng, Security Studies a Reader (pp. 252–264). Abingdon: Rutledge.

Chapter 10

National Security and the Role of Media in India Rudra Narayan Mohanty

Introduction “The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers and be capable of reading them,” declared Thomas Jefferson way back in 1787, and went down the history as one of the iconic symbols of free press and democracy (Jafferson, 1787). But few centuries after Jafferson regaled the Americans and the rest of the world because of this undiluted love for free press, his compatriot Michael J O’ Neill, former president of the Association of American Newspaper Editors, sounds much less sanguine on the issue of free press and national security when he says, “it is well known that media are more devoted to conflict than to tranquillity, and that war is routinely defined as news, while peace is not. What is good for the world, in other words, is not necessarily good for the news business” (Kapila, 2002). According to Neill, the electronic media is more to blame with their attempts to encapsulate complex national security issues into thirty second sound “bites.” His disenchantment with the media had run so deep that he questioned the very credibility of those who work in media. To him, chances of any reforms in media are quite remote because “like diplomats, the journalists are notoriously resistant to change. Superficial, poorly informed, and essentially reactive, he carries on”. The same Jafferson, who once eulogised free press, almost compared it to a monster when he exasperatedly said, “nothing is can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle.”

R. N. Mohanty (B) Kelton Tech, Hyderabad, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_10

137

138

R. N. Mohanty

Nobel laureate Albert Camus said, “A free press can be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom a press will never be anything but bad.” Notwithstanding the strong views from Jafferson, Camus and O Neal, it is impossible for any liberal democracy to function without a free press in contemporary world. This is because the biggest thing democracy as a form of government can offer to its citizens is freedom of speech, in other words the right to dissent in case of grave injustice, if at all there is any. In a modern democracy, media acts as an intermediary between the government and its people. Thus, the need for a free press has basically emerged under a democratic government. Media performs the role of a watchdog in a democracy in the sense that a free and independent media alone can develop the wherewithal to defend the rights of individual through its incisive coverage and careful exposure. It can raise an effective voice against potential policies or draconian laws that might jeopardise the rights of the citizens. But the rider is, to fulfil this responsibility, media should stick to its grid lines, its core values. It cannot afford to act in a partisan and biased manner and still become the undisputed champion of citizens’ rights and liberty. Worldwide, among democracies, the subject of national security is gradually turning multi-dimensional, bringing new areas of citizen’s well-being under its domain. Hence, it is becoming more citizen-centric and now covers a much broader spectrum. We have come a long way from the extremely compact and succinct definition of national security given by Hans Morgenthau back in the 40s. According to him, national security basically meant integrity of territory and its institutions (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1948). In today’s world, this narrow definition does not capture the gamut of the subject. The subject of national security has branched out so much into public domain that gradually the security of the citizens is becoming synonymous with the security of the country and its territory. Now things like ideology, political system, society, and its people occupy centre-stage in scheme of things. Increasingly, both government and citizens are being considered as two important constituents of national security. Fundamental goals of a democratic society like liberty, equality in all spheres, societal identity, economic development, and a free media have all come to be included under the umbrella of national security. These developments have paved the way for an independent media to play a much larger role in the arena of national security in a liberal democracy. Former Union Defence Minister George Fernandes, during his lecture on Dr. Malekar Memorial (1998), also stressed upon the role of media in national security. The minister was basically giving a rich tribute to Dr. Malekar and held the view that the latter both as an editor and reporter had made significant contributions to the cause of national security. The union minister makes a strong reference to Malekar’s book titled The Guilty men of 1962. The book talks about the blunders committed by India while pursuing its foreign policies vis-à-vis China. It talks about the humiliation meted out to India in the hands of China during Indo-China war in 1962 which has ended on a disastrous note for India. He refers to the preface of the book where Malekar has gone on to say, “In a democracy, the people have the right to know about the why and wherefore of a national disaster. The government is accountable to the people. When a government

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

139

fails, a publicist should step in to fulfil its duty.” Dr. Malekar has clearly indicated that in a liberal democracy, the media has to play a proactive role when it comes to national security, or else goof-ups by the government would become a recurring affair. And that would severely harm the interest of the nation in the long run (Fernandes, 1998). Indo-China war of 1962 exposes severe loopholes in Indian foreign policy that went on to jeopardise Indian security interests. The government of the day came under the scanner which eventually led to the resignation of Union defence minister Krishna Menon. There was a lot of hue and cry in the media over the way government mishandled the crisis. Brigadier John Salvi’s book Himalayan Blunder gives an insider account of the great Indian bungling in the face of Chinese aggression. According to him, China had meticulously planned the attack while maintaining a completely different official posture. After the Chinese debacle which ended because of the unilateral ceasefire declared by China, both Indian diplomacy and military strategy were subjected to a lot of criticism. Even Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signing the Panchasheel treaty earlier with China gave out a feeling that the government had clearly failed to understand the ground realities and allowed itself to be thoroughly deceived by the enemy state. The book gives a first-person account of how the calculated Chinese aggression completely took an unprepared Indian army by surprise which in turn resulted in a huge disaster for the country and its security (Dalvi, 1968). The Indo-China war of 1962, in a way, created a strong ground for the media to play an extremely important role in coverage of national security and present the truth before the public. The book Himalayan Blunder was incidentally banned immediately after its publication (Dutta, 2012).

Media, National Security, and Conflict Resolution This strong meeting point between media and national security has emerged from the point of view of conflict resolution. As the concept of national security broadened, there was increasing emphasis on human and societal security apart from national defence. With the focus shifting to conflict resolution and maintenance of peace, the media was perceived as an effective tool for conflict resolution. This is because media through its coverage moulds the perceptions of the public over issues related to national security; whether it is cross-border terrorism or insurgency and separatist movement in the hinterland, the masses rely on the information from media that both educate and increases their sensitivity towards issues concerning national security. The authorities and policymakers also try to take a cue from the media reports on critical aspects of national security and decide on their future course of action. Media provides the government with useful inputs about the popular mood and feeling of the people vis-a-vis its policies and measures. But the problem is that while media can play an effective role in conflict resolution given an enabling environment, but at the same time it can foment conflicts through its coverage like it did in Rwanda and Bosnia. While pointing out this anomaly, Israeli professor Eytan Gilboa, who

140

R. N. Mohanty

specialises in international communication, airs the view that not much of focus has been accorded to media’s potential role in conflict resolution.

The CNN Effect, Now a Global Phenomenon This is called CNN effect. The American Cable TV network came up of age during the Gulf War in 1991. CNN became a trend-setter in reporting from war and conflict zones. The CNN coverage of Gulf War had such a dramatic effect on the American public that it compelled the policymaker and authorities to issue operational instructions over phone to security officials on the ground, taking cues from the CNN live coverage. This is one fine example of media becoming an integral part of statecraft when it comes to national security. The CNN effect has become a global phenomenon as across democratic nations free media works with the government in close partnership to achieve the goals and objectives of the national security with active public engagement. Given the complexity of national security, many advanced countries have started to involve the non-state players in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. During the Cold War era, media was increasingly looked upon as an effective tool for conflict resolution. In the globalised world, information has become an instrument of soft power and that has in turn enhanced the significance of media in the security sphere. The governments also need the media in their side to achieve public support for their policies (Giloba, 2009).

India Media and Its Penchant for Sensationalism Coming back to Indian media, sensationalism has at times led to major faux pas and created serious hurdles in the way of national security. Increasing competition and the rat race for success sometimes compels the media to go overboard, but every instance of media excess can also bring into the mind the yeoman service rendered by the fourth estate of our democracy on the issue of national security. During moments of crisis, the Indian media has galvanised people around national interest and supported the government to pursue the best course for ensuring national security. On the front of Jammu and Kashmir, the media has made sure the focus of the government which is to fight to end terrorism and bring back peace in the valley has not been lost in the melee. Media must be partly credited for this perennial focus on this incessant bid for peace in this conflict zone.

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

141

Media and Increasing Use of Soft Power by States During 2002 Agra Summit, ND TV’s Pranoy Roy questioned the Pakistani President General Musharraf about his country’s legitimacy over Kashmir issue. He also raised the issue of terror attacks and loss of civilian lives which distinctly put the Pakistani President in a fix. “You are a solider, you have not become a President with the will of your people, then how would you understand the will of the people of another place,” Roy had pointed out (NDTV, 2002). Sometimes, impassionate presentation of facts from the ground level can prove to be a more effective tactic compared to excessive self-restraint or unnecessary brow beating. Roy questioned the very locus standi of Pakistani President, who represented an Islamic and authoritarian regime, to lecture about popular will of the people of Kashmir. This is an example of using information as a soft power in changing scenario of diplomacy in which attraction and persuasion have replaced earlier strong-arm tactics adopted by countries to influence public opinion both at domestic and international level. No wonder, along with military, economic, and diplomatic resources, information is now being considered as the fourth element of national power in a globalised and highly interconnected world. Increasingly, nation states are resorting to the use of information to create a favourable environment both domestically and internationally while pursuing national interest. Harvard University professor Joseph Nye, in his book Bound to Lead, discusses extensively about information as a soft power following globalisation of international relations. According to him, to shape the beliefs and ideas of other countries, a country can make use of soft power by projecting a favourable picture about its culture and ideology. It must make use of communication and information to send out its message to its own people and the world at large. Because of the very nature of soft power, Media has become one of the most important stake holders in the sphere of national interest and security (Nye & Joseph, 2004).

National Security and Indian Media: A Perspective Indian Media’s outlook has been largely influenced by the main ethos of Indian constitution, sovereignty, secularism, liberty, and equality. It has played the role of a binder in a multi-racial, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious society. Here, its neutrality has mostly helped it to go up in the esteem of the public. But in a democracy, issues relating to national security usually gives rise to strong reactions among the masses. Repeated setbacks to national security occur from terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, along with the border skirmishes. At times, these repeated ceasefire breakdowns and covet terror attacks spread outrage among the public. Here, media has a highly constructive role to educate the public with its careful, yet in-depth coverage of issues related to security. The irony is that there is very little in-depth analysis on national security in Indian media. National security is a specialised subject

142

R. N. Mohanty

and to cover it requires skill and understanding that can only develop over a period. The media, in the absence of proper resources at its end, probably to circumvent this problem, ends up sensationalising while reporting on terror and other armed conflicts that pose threat to India’s security. It is true that an over enthusiastic Indian media had transgressed the sacred line while reporting about the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008. National security certainly turns a very sensitive topic if a country has hostile neighbours. Hence, the media as the most legitimate intermediary between the government and its people should exercise restraint on the issues of national security as and when the situation demands. The media must refrain from any undue adventurism on sensitive aspects of national security, both external and internal. At the same time, it must keep the surveillance on the government’s policies and ensure that things are on right track. It must curb its obsession with terror as a news commodity. The British media, which was otherwise quite fastidious and nosy, showed tremendous restraint during World War II. In sharp contrast, Indian media threw all cautions to winds while reporting on 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai (Gupta, 2009). Foreign media like BBC and The New York Times were extremely critical of Indian media’s graphic coverage of Mumbai Terror attack. Apparently, this non-stop, soap opera type coverage adversely affected the rescue operations by the government. According to a report in The Los Angeles Times, dated 18 January 2009, the news coverage of Mumbai attack came under heavy criticism because of the live coverage of a commando helicopter assault on the roof of the Nariman House Jewish Centre which detractors said eliminated the element of surprise and undercut the operation (Magnier, 2009). This is what O Neal considers to be the main bane of media, the temptation to make a TV film out of a devastating terror attack. After 26/11 attack, the foreign media accused both Indian and Pakistani media of creating war hysteria in their respective countries. Conflict is good business for prime-time TV, but it can’t be at the expense of the national interest and against the security of the citizens. In a globalised world, where nations repose more faith in use of soft power than in coercive tactics while pursuing the goals under their national security, media cannot strike a jarring note and provoke hysteria among the people in lines of war and confrontation. This is because in the changing diplomatic scenario, media is an important component of national power. As it was seen in case of 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, media from both sides flared up strong emotions and almost ended up gravely compromising with the national security of their respective countries. The 2002 Kandahar hijacking episode also brings Indian media under the scanner. Due to increasing media pressure, the Indian government hurried itself to a decision to release four terrorists. Critics felt that the media, both print and electronic, in case of Kandahar slightly missed out on the larger picture and did not allow the government to negotiate with the kidnappers effectively resulting in the hasty release of four dreaded terrorists who held a lot of threat to the country’s security (Sharma, 2002). A misguided media with excessive emphasis on commercialisation can escalate conflict instead of resolving it.

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

143

The media holds tremendous clout over public opinion in a democracy. This is a power which has elevated media to the position of fourth estate. But this power has to be exercised judiciously and a responsible media knows on a sensitive topic like a nation and people’s security, the media should depend more on facts than building provocative narratives. That apart, reticence seems to make a lot of sense when it comes to sensitive aspects of national security. So in-depth coverage of security related issues by media can help develop a right perspective among the public and provide them with the necessary information to assess their governments in a representative democracy. Instead of extensive coverage of terror attacks and terror outfits and insurgencies things that copiously contribute to the culture of information war that achieves very little in terms of diplomatic gains at the world stage, it is rather the in-depth and intelligible coverage of national security, and its main objectives would create more credibility for the government and help it achieve its goals. Indian media is not entirely unfamiliar to this role either. In 1998, when Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came up for consideration, it acted as a perfect intermediary between the government and the public. The media coverage on CTBT was highly impactful and it helped the government understand the popular mood in the country vis-à-vis CTBT. Consequently, keeping the national interest in mind, the government refused to sign the treaty. This is one instance of media charting out the right course for the government by guiding the public opinion in the right direction (Baru, 2009). However, there exists a constant bone of contention between media and the authorities. When it comes to national security, the main source of information for the media remains the government and a large chunk of information relating to national security falls into non-transparency category. The officials prefer to keep the sensitive matters as secrets as per the wisdom of the policymakers. Here, the media should realise that the citizens’ entitlement to information cannot clash with the core objectives under the national security. However, the government should also promote a culture of regular media briefing on important issues of national security to educate the public. This should help clear the air between both the sides. Most of the analytical coverage that takes place in American media is basically a result of a very rigorous partnership between journalists who specialise in the subject and the authorities. Still then, the advanced Western media chooses to tread carefully on issues of national security and avoids stoking voyeurism among the masses. Media probably has to concern itself with intent of national security strategies than their content. Leave the details to the devil for its autonomous functioning. The media must remind itself constantly that as the conscience keeper of the democracy, it has to work in partnership with the day’s government and mould public opinion over national security in the right direction.

Doing a Tight Rope Walk Between Elites and the Masses Theoretically speaking, the Indian media caters to two segments, one to the Englishspeaking population mostly living in urban areas and towns and to a larger audience

144

R. N. Mohanty

with more of a rural or provincial background who get their daily bytes from the vernacular or the local media. But the media has to do a balancing act between these two extremely diverse segments with considerable differences between their sociocultural and political values. But the globalised world at large does not concern itself with internal social or linguistic equations of a country. It tends to favour a singular message emanating from the government, public, and media when it comes to issues of integrity and security. The great gulf between the masses and the classes should not reflect in their views about national security. This is because notwithstanding the diametrical difference between their world views, together they constitute the great Indian block of political participation. So, it is the duty of the Indian media to bridge this perception gap in the field of national security. The media must weave news agenda in such a way that a more uniform truth would emerge about security needs of the country. To achieve this, media, in particular, the English media should treat these two segments as the chips of the same block and widen the base of public opinion which, in turn, would give more credence to government policies and strategies related to national security from a global point of view. After all they say what is good for the goose is also good for the gander. But the Indian media, which is visibly struggling while straddling both the worlds, should aim at bringing both the masses and the elites on the same page as far as national security is concerned. Indian society is not a monolithic entity, it has many layers of social reality. Sociologists often say there is a little India that exists along with the greater India, the pan India. The greater India is numerically much smaller than the little India but holds a lot of clout over issues like India’s foreign and security policies as an opinion maker. Here, of course we are referring to the English-speaking urban elite. Media needs to bridge this huge communication gap between both little India and great India and build a national consensus over India’s security goals by its objectivity and neutrality, without reacting and responding to their typical values and beliefs. The very coverage of national security matters as news items is not compatible with the business goals of a free and commercial media. The very nature of the content does not leave any scope for media men to add any twist to their coverage to attract public attention and expand their outreach. Hence, this overindulgence with the conflict side of the whole equation has become a popular media practice. A wider consensus over issues of national security by accommodating views and concerns of both elites and the masses can only be achieved if media desists from any kind of asymmetrical dissemination of information on the front of country’s security.

The Avalanche of Narratives and Counter Narratives, and the Role of Media in Clearing the Maze In this era of social media wherein narratives and counter narratives about national security dominate the landscape, media has now even a bigger responsibility to

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

145

separate the wheat from the chafe. Regarding internal security which is now being characterised by increasing decline in law-and-order situation, media should avoid stoking fire. Instead, it should rather clear the air by chopping down the wrong narratives that muddle the minds of many, and somehow try to build a consensus around national security sticking to the facts as much as possible. But then the so-called free media is not exactly free from its business compulsions. These compulsions with ever increasing competition may pose a great threat to its core values. The media now needs to strike a fine balance and maintain the sanity level in the space of public opinion, especially when it is pertaining to national security. And it must fulfil its role as an intermediary notwithstanding the usual constraints. The space of Indian public opinion is increasingly getting influenced by narratives and counter narratives. Prolific use of social media has given rise to a lot of floating ideas and views about issues pertaining to national security. Social media in a way has provided a grand platform for narratives and counter narratives to flourish. Most of the narratives are not just some spontaneous thoughts, they are quite well crafted and highly politically motivated. The shrewd political agenda behind these narratives constitute the real message. In competitive electoral politics, political parties try to outdo each other with their version of the truth. But this constant procession of narratives and counter narratives confuse the masses. Media may not be a party to this war of narratives, but it is unwittingly getting influenced by their tone and tenor. At the same time, the major problem with these political narratives, especially those narratives which are about sensitive issues like conflict with Pakistan, terror attacks from across the border or for that matter insurgency within India, veer off the main truth in their quest for narrow political gains. The compulsion for narrow political gains determines the theme of these political narratives. In the age of Twitter and WhatsApp, a free and independent media can alone clear the maze for the public and reveal the truth. Otherwise, an ill-informed public would subsequently fail to exercise any control over the course and outcomes of national security policies of the country. However, the media can curb down on these speculative narratives that queer the political pitch. To achieve that, first it must debug itself from the popular narratives that are being played over a period. Media may not be the originator or subscribers of these narratives and counter narratives, but when narratives are strategically played over a period, they start to affect the outlook of the media in a strange way and change its language and lexicon. This is because the avalanche of narratives especially on Pakistan and Kashmir have started affecting the very tone of public debate on national security in India. The increasing popularity of this trend is such that no mass media can afford to completely dissociate itself from the whole information war that is waging on outside its purview. The most noticeable effect of the narratives, does not matter whether the narratives are false, speculative, or for that matter jingoistic in origin, is the marked increase in decibel level in a debate over Kashmir and Pakistan and what should be the role of the government in diffusing the tensions. Rival parties’ spokespersons go ballistic at each other while deliberating on issues related to national security. The reason why media should look beyond the narratives is that the in-today’s India politicians and

146

R. N. Mohanty

opinion makers attach more importance to the political agenda behind a narrative than the core facts connected to the issue under discussion. This brings down the level of the debate to a slanging match. The decorum of public debate suffers in such a surcharged atmosphere where participants hold on to their side of the story and refuse to budge. “If thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. A bad usage can spread by tradition and imitation, even among people who should know better,” said George Orwell. According to him, political language is designed to “make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (Orwell, 1946). Similarly, a narrative no matter how far from truth it can spread like a plague after generous usage by tradition or imitation and would pervade the space of public opinion. The recent attack at Pulwama, Balakot strikes, and the Uri episode were critical phases in Indian security situation that called for a consensus on basic framework of India’s security strategy among all the stakeholders like the government, policymakers, media, and the public. But the onslaught of political narratives and counter narratives created such a smoke screen that focus quickly shifted from consensus to controversy. Narratives did influence the public opinion over Pulwama and Balakot at a subconscious level because of their persistent usage. The media seemed a little lost in the resulting cacophony. The only way it could have neutralised the effect of these suspicious narratives over public opinion was by digging holes in their claims, but to do that, it needed to scoop up startling facts from the ground, which is basically a herculean task when it comes to security issues. And in the process of attending to various sides and their takes on national security, it unwittingly legitimised the usage of these narratives among the public and widened their appeal. As George Orwell rightly cautions wrong usages over a period can gain acceptability among people through tradition and imitation. Some of these people are probably capable of exercising better reason and judgement on issues of national security. But when these narratives turn into fads because of repeated usage, they too fall prey to their enticement. Wrong narratives can affect the viewpoints of the most unlikely of people like the modern and the progressive, the rational and the intellectuals, because of its crafty structure. Imran Khan, the Pakistani Prime Minister, during his cricketing days toured India many times. He has long-standing association with some of the premier cricketers of his era like Sunny Gavaskar, Kapil Dev, and Navjot Singh Sidhu. But, according to some media reports, Imran himself confided that he knew very little about Gandhi other than the fact that he was strongly opposed to partition. “But even if half the movie about him is true, then he was a great person,” he reportedly commented while referring to Richard Attenborough’s Oscar winning movie on Gandhi. Imran an Oxford graduate with a long career of international cricket and travel, knew so little about Gandhi, who happens to be one of the most talked about personalities from the sub-continent in international media, is a bit of a surprise. But it also reveals that the narratives shape the views and outlook of people from both the sides of the border when it comes to Indo-Pak relations. No matter how suave or modern a person is, popular political narratives tend to hold their sway over the citizens. The Pakistani emphasis on Gandhi’s opposition to two-nation theory probably took the focus away

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

147

from the larger picture called Gandhi. People from Imran generation grew up on listening to a completely different narrative on Gandhi from the perspective of twonation theory and Gandhi’s historic bid to play the spoilsport. Similar narratives also have shaped the ideas and outlook of generations of Indians who too grew up listening to a narrative about Pakistan and its leaders. Media houses in both the countries have been able to do very little to curb the impact of these wrong narratives that come to take precedence over the truth following extensive use.

Ways Ahead for Indian Media In cricket, there is a popular expression which is often repeated and stressed upon. The said expression is “play to your strength, if you want to blunt your opposition.” When it comes to national security and the critical need for presenting the Indian side of the story with a view to make it appear highly convincing to the rest of the world, to the global diplomatic community, the Indian media should play to its strength. The threat to Indian national security comes from two sources: China and Pakistan. China, a much larger economic power, with its stupendous military might, poses a perennial threat to India’s territorial integrity, whereas Pakistan, despite being a smaller nation, has consistently demonstrated its ability to make India bleed with across the border terror attacks. The media as a soft power and now as an integral part of Indian statecraft, should play to its strength to offset the applecart of both. While presenting the Indian side of the story to world at large, it must focus on the ethos of India’s socio-political culture which is essentially inclusive and secular in nature in a generic sense. The Indian media when it comes to Pakistan and the contentious issue of Kashmir, must focus on the great Indian outlook which has been influenced by the Indian religious philosophy up to a great extent. Since the majority religion in Indian does not preach a doctrine, the media too should follow the essence of it in its coverage of matters related to national security and present its case forcefully while avoiding any prejudice and dogma which are usually associated with jingoism. To counter Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, it must harp on the point that a doctrine-free religion cannot prepare a strong ground for a theological state. A theological state like the one that exists in Pakistan per se requires a strong foundation in the form of well-defined doctrine to stand tall. So contrary to the fear in many quarters, prospect of a theological state in India is an extremely remote possibility. This single-point focus of media may help in presenting things in the right perspective both before the public inside the country and the wider world. If the Indian media succeeds in doing this then it would, in turn, give more credence to the claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India both internally and externally. Thus, media can play a constructive role in calling off the Pakistani bluff. Similarly, in case of China, the media can stress the fact that India as a liberal democracy remains committed to secularism and follows the principle of noninterference. It should also emphasise that unlike Communist China, India does not carry the heavy burden of ideology and provides constitutional protection to

148

R. N. Mohanty

human rights. The Indian media must come down heavily on the baneful effect of a slightly obsolete thought pattern and its incompatibility with both liberal democracy and human rights and should lay it threadbare before its target audience. The media alone can put pressure on the warring parties to develop mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity. This is how it can not only contribute to the cause of national security but also can become an agent of conflict resolution. But to effectively counter these two sources of threat to country’s security, the media must play the role of an observer instead of being a participant in the debate on national security and sidestep the narratives and counter narratives which are flying thick and fast in this era of social media. If it manages to maintain its stoicism in this regard, then its newfound credibility would enhance its appeal both before the domestic audience and the rest of the world. And this in turn would augur well for the India’s core agenda for its national security. George Bernard Shaw once famously said “As people get their opinions so largely from the newspapers they read, the corruption of the schools would not matter so much if the Press were free. But the Press is not free. As it costs at least a quarter of a million of money to establish a daily newspaper in London, the newspapers are owned by rich men. And they depend on the advertisements of other rich men. Editors and journalists who express opinions in n print that are opposed to the interests of the rich are dismissed and replaced by subservient ones” (Shaw, 1928). The great playwright in his inimitable style is certainly waxing quite eloquent here, but the fact remains a free media is still the only guarantee for free speech and probity in public life. It alone can provide a platform for a meaningful interface between the government and the citizens about national security.

References Baru, S. (2009). The growing influence of business and media on India’s foreign policy. ISAS Insights. Dalvi, J. P. (1968). Himalayan blunder: The curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Bombay, India: Thacker. Dutta, S. (2012). Himalayan blunder part II: Air chief revives China War and Kargil debates. The Telegraph. Fernandes, G. (1998). Dr. Malekar memorial lecture. Giloba, E. (2009). Media and conflict resolution: A framework for analysis. Marquette Law Review. Gupta, A. K. (2009). 26/11 yellow journalism vs. state intervention. IIPS (Delhi). Jafferson, T. (1787). Jafferson letter to Edward Carrington from Paris. Retrieved December 12, 2020 from https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0047. Kapila, S. (2002). National security and Indian media: An analysis. South Asia Analysis Group. Magnier, M. (2009). Indian news channels criticised for Mumbai coverage. Los Angeles Times. Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. (1948). The politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. NDTV Archive, Agra Summit 2002. Nye, Jr., & Joseph, S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. Orwell, G. (1946). Politics and the English language. Wikipedia. Sharma, R. (2002). Has media lost sense of perspective. The Pioneer.

10 National Security and the Role of Media in India

149

Shaw, G. B. (1928). Church, school and press. The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism, Capitalism, Sovietism and Fascism. Alma Classics, London House, UK.

Part III

Human-Centric Security Issues

Chapter 11

Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects Bikash Ranjan Mishra and Lopamudra D. Satpathy

Introduction Around seventy-four years passed since India’s independence, and it became the largest democratic country in the world with significant change brought in states, societies, and individuals. More than thirty years completed for adopting an openeconomic setup keeping globalization and liberalization at the center stage. Along with the entire world, India has also successfully witnessed the rapid transformation in innovation and technology, business, infrastructural development, sectoral growth, domestic and international relations, and a series of structural transformations, which is the result of focused and deterministic reform measures realized in the post-reform periods of the early nineties, and later it gets accentuated with the advent of the new century-cum-millennium era. The recent vicissitudes of societies in this rapidly changing and progressively more international integration have reintroduced curiosity in economic security and India’s experience. Do the structural reforms of India address well the ever aggravated and severely penetrated economic health hazards like poverty, inequality, unemployment, productivity, competitiveness, infrastructure, banking and finance, trade and investment issues? Has globalization with the world economy and India’s development paradigms met with the international standard improved or diminished economic security for countries and the public? More specifically, in the last twenty years, how does India’s acquired knowledge evaluate the tools, techniques, and objectives of regulators and the stand of national reformative measures and authoritarian responses of autonomous institutions in that implementation? Do the government-led institutional arrangements produce any significant spurge in the policy mechanism, and B. R. Mishra (B) NIT, Rourkela, India L. D. Satpathy Sushilavati Government Women’s College, Rourkela, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_11

153

154

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

how do they deal with the nation’s economic security? This current chapter revolves around these queries. Though we do not claim to provide conclusive responses, we intend to propose valued understandings to these assessments, which will be of immense importance for security studies scholars, strategic policymakers, reform analysts, and development practitioners. Before we step into seeking responses for these questions, we need to have clarity by the term economic security. Since the mid-eighties of the late century, there has been extensive discussion on what constitutes security and its redefinition with its referent and sources (Tickner, 1995; Baldwin, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998). The writings in the discipline of international relations and security studies pitched into a constricted idea of economic security. It was related to the economic repercussions of military conflict between two or more nations and their use of military force (Kolodziej, 1992). In addition, Moran (1993) had advocated for judicious employment of economic policy to maintain the international system. In response to economic events, shocks, and crises, the individuals in particular and the states, in general, became vulnerable, and the idea of ‘economic insecurity’ was concerted on this premise as per the school of thought by International Political Economy (IPE) (Scholte, 2000). Besides, researchers of public economics measured economic security in terms of the degree of safety net that the individuals cover their unexpected fall in the stream of income and consumption flows through social security supplies. On the contrary, the neoclassical school found that economic security is an inseparable part of the regular operative of a market economy characterized by risks and uncertainties (Kahler, 2004; Nesadurai, 2004). Economic issues were overlooked as genuine security issues for a long, though acknowledged as development problems (Walt, 1991). Thus, over and above the military issues, modern approaches had high priorities on the issues, directly and indirectly, affecting people and their linkage with society, economy, environment, and governance to extend the outline of security. Thus, the modern school embraces the security worries of individuals society (societal security), and the global system in addition to the (national security), (Buzan, 1991; Fierke, 2002; Krause & Williams, 1996). These advances have generated new curiosity in understanding and addressing the issue. In many countries’ national schedules, including India, concerns on economic security are placed high, especially from the mid-eighties of the twentieth century, where economic globalization brings prosperity and usher to economic volatility and uncertainty. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the various possible dimensions of modern-version-based economic security (including social welfare, fiscal prudence, monetary security, industrial, business, and entrepreneurial security, and external security, including international trade and investment). Limiting the analysis to only the last twenty years and specific key policy schemes as reform measures, our objective is to give a critical assessment of the current status of India’s economy (and strength and security therein), highlight the possible setbacks and challenges government intervention strategies to redress them, and way forward. The organization of the residual chapter is the state of Indian economic affairs in the second part, reforms

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

155

in India, and economic security in part three and followed by a conclusion in the last part.

State of India’s Economy India’s growth story can be related to a normal distribution bell-shaped pattern having a thin layer at the two ends and picked in the middle of the period, as seen from the growth rate figures. Maintaining a nearly 5% growth rate reached a maximum in 2010 and then gradually diminished. One important point to mention here is that in the entire world, when the growth rate was shrinking during the global slowdown of the post-2008 period, India attained and maintained two-digit growth rates. The overall GDP figures also show that around 100 billion USD worth of GDP is added every year, and in every five years, the national income figures consistently increased two times or comparable figures. Such a significant rise for a developing country like India drags her to move to the category of emerging countries. Over these twenty years, GDP figures increased by almost six times, and per capita GDP rose by almost five times larger than their initial periods. Moving to the structure of the economy, especially its sectoral composition, India maintained its service-led growth image showing more than 50% of GDP throughout. However, there is a slight shift in industry domination over agricultural share in the same period. The household consumption figures indicate that India remained primarily a consumption-driven economy though the share marginally decreased and significantly reduced during post-global crises. Priorities to gross savings and turned investment are more minor but still manage to capture more than a quarter of the total income. The gap between savings and investment remains a concern for policy-makers though there is a significant rise in their performance during the past two decades. The broad money constitutes almost two-thirds of India’s GDP during 2001, which increased significantly and almost covered more than three-fourths of GDP shares in the last ten years. These figures show Indian resident’s creditworthiness and prudence in the money market. The rate of inflation (mentioned by WPI), as can be noticed from Table 11.1, continuously increased in the first decade but gradually decayed down. In contrast, the average cost to an Indian customer for acquiring a basket of commodities remained pretty high, resulting in higher CPI values. As the figures suggest, domestic credit to the private sector rises significantly, confirming effective channelization of financial resources to corporations. Compared to the historical average, the overall Indian market is majorly ranged between modestly under-valued to fair-valued, as per the data of Indian stock-market capitalization suggests. The lending interest remained very high throughout, though it moved down and was a little volatile. The accessibility and depth of the Indian banking system can be visualized with a rising number of ATMs per a given number of adults and the Bank’s Z-score, which indicates the probability of defaults Indian banking system, which stayed relatively low. However, the non-performing loan to total gross loans is rising off late, which is not a good sign.

Consumption and investment

Economic structure

Economic growth

GDP and economic growth

Services, value added (% of GDP)

Services share

Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)

Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)

Manufacturing share

Household consumption

Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP)

Industry share

64.15

51.99

14.64

25.08

22.92

451.57

GDP per capita (current US$)

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)

3.03

485.44

GDP (current Billion US$)

GDP per capita growth (annual %)

4.82

2001

GDP growth (annual %)

Series name

Agriculture Share

GDP Per capita

Variables

Heads

Table 11.1 The state of the Indian Economy from 2001 to 2019

57.38

53.06

15.39

28.13

18.81

714.86

6.23

820.38

7.92

2005

54.72

54.64

14.8

27.16

18.21

1357.56

7.04

1675.62

8.5

2010

59.01

52.76

16.83

29.29

17.95

1605.61

6.8

2103.59

8

2015

60.29

54.77

15.13

27.48

17.76

2099.6

3.13

2868.93

4.18

2019

WDI

(continued)

MoSPI, GoI

MoSPI, GoI

MoSPI, GoI

MoSPI, GoI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

Source

156 B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

Money

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

Money Supply (Broad Money)

Inflation

Saving

Investment

Variables

57.74 14.32

Broad money (% of GDP)

Broad money growth (annual %)

15.6

65.55

4.25

Consumer price index 3.78 (2010 = 100)

264.62

5.62

116.95

Gross domestic savings (current Billion US$)

Wholesale price index 3.22 (2010 = 100)

24.09

Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)

32.26

312.37

129.41

Gross capital formation (current Billion US$)

695.91

2005

38.08

565.11

Households and NPISHs Final consumption expenditure (constant 2010 Billion US$)

Gross capital 26.66 formation (% of GDP)

2001

Series name

17.8

77.68

11.99

10.53

574.19

34.27

673.94

40.22

916.98

2010

10.62

78.01

5.87

2.28

642.95

30.56

675.6

32.12

1280.11

2015

10.51

76.09

7.66

2.91

794.28

27.69

851.15

29.67

1670.18

2019

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

Source

(continued)

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects 157

Terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU)

Trade and Investment Terms of trade

Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)

Stock market capitalization to GDP (%)

Stock market capitalization

Imports

Lending interest rate (%)

Lending rates

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

Bank Z-score

Z scores

Trade (% of GDP)

Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans (%)

NPA

Exports

Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)

Credit to private sector

Trade openness

Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per 100,000 adults)

ATM

Banking system access and depth

Series name

Variables

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

13.43

12.56

25.99

2.58E+11

25.61

12.08

11.75

28.62

2001

22.4

19.61

26.85

22.4

49.26

2.49E+11

−5.35E+11

42

88.56

8.33

17.28

50.56

7.24

2010

57.53

10.75

14.64

40.07

2.29

2005

22.11

19.81

41.92

−1.2E+12

70.77

10.01

16.46

5.88

51.87

19.64

2015

21.14

18.41

39.55

−1.03E+12

9.47

9.23

50.15

20.95

2019

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

(continued)

Global financial development data

WDI

Global financial development data

WDI

WDI

WDI

Source

158 B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

Series name

US $ Billion

Net official aid received (current Billion US$)

Foreign exchange reserves

Foreign aid

Personal remittances, paid (current Billion US$)

External debt stocks (% of GNI)

0.75

Personal remittances, received (current Billion US$)

Remittances

external debt

14.27

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current Billion US$)

FDI inflows

1.73

54.11

20.68

5.13

Foreign direct 1.05 investment, net outflows (BoP, current Billion US$)

0.29

2001

FDI outflows

Current Account Current account as % of GDP balance (% of GDP)

Variables

1.88

151.62

14.88

1.35

22.13

7.27

2.83

304.82

17.52

3.83

53.48

27.4

15.97

−3.25

−1.25 2.64

2010

2005

3.17

360.18

23.03

4.88

68.91

44.01

7.51

−1.07

2015

2.61

477.81

19.74

7.53

83.33

50.61

13.14

−1.04

2019

WDI

RBI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

Source

(continued)

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects 159

Labour Market

Communication and transport characteristics

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

Length of National Highways in India (in 1000 km)

Rail lines (total route-km)

Air transport, freight (million ton-km)

Road

Railway

Airline

Labor force 58.7 participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) (national estimate)

Labour force participation

406.72

Labor force, total (Million)

Labour force

515.37

63,028

58.12

Mobile cellular 0.61 subscriptions (per 100 people)

Mobile

47.22

2001

Secure Internet servers (per 1 million people)

Indian INR to US Dollar Annual Exchange Rate

Exchange Rate

Internet

Series name

Variables

57.8

449.09

774.04

63,485

65.57

7.85

44

2005

53.53

462.95

1630.96

63,974

70.93

60.94

1.67

45.65

2010

477.3

1833.85

66,030

97.99

76.41

11.69

64.11

2015

48.14

494.73

1938.23

68,155

132.5

84.27

389.2

70.38

2019

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

FRED

Source

(continued)

160 B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

51

61.56

0.6

55

45

61.39

0.6

44%

2015

Competitiveness Index

54.95

0.5

29.8

32.8

38.90%

9.04

2.44

2010

117

48.65

0.5

37.2

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of the population)

Human Development Index (UNDP)

39.9

30.10%

Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

23.90%

7.48

2.42

2005

Poverty ratio

Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15–24) (national estimate)

Youth unemployment rate

2001

Top 10% share minus Bottom 50% share

Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)

Unemployment rate

Income Inequality

Series name

Variables

Happiness Index

Globalization Index

Human Development Index

Inequality and Poverty

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

68

140

62.1

0.6

22.28

5.27

2019

(continued)

World Economic Forum

World Happiness Report

KOF Globalisation Index

HDI

WDI

WDI

World Inequality Database

WDI

WDI

Source

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects 161

75.6

28

30

Financial freedom

Source Compiled from different sources as mentioned in the right-side column

25.6 30

Investment freedom 30

50

38

77.4

68.2

Monetary freedom

Trade freedom

61.7

Labor freedom

55

55

77

Tax burden

Business freedom

29

Government integrity

50

76.3

50

Property rights

Government spending 76.5

49

Overall score

54.2

2005

2010

40

35

67.9

67.5

57.7

36.3

76.1

73.4

34

50

53.8

2001

Economic Freedom Index

Series name 28.71

Variables

Cost of Living Index

Heads

Table 11.1 (continued)

40

35

64.6

65.3

48.7

43.3

78.3

79.4

36

55

54.6

26.27

2015

40

40

72.4

72.4

41.8

57.1

77.3

79.4

47.8

57.3

55.2

24.17

2019

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

Heritage data

World Data Atlas

Source

162 B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

163

India’s external sector performances as measured by imports and exports figures indicate quite promising and strongly support India’s drive for a global open-economy as the trade captures more than 40% of India’s GDP and sometimes (during 2010) it approached almost 50% of it. However, import more than export can be easily verified from the figures, which justifies the current account deficit throughout except initial findings. The trend results in record-breaking performances in foreign exchange reserves which increased almost eight times higher than the starting period and almost hit the magical figure of 500 billion USD. India also maintained its external debt to around 20% of its gross national income. One striking feature regarding the exchange rate is that India’s currency is rapidly depreciating its value compared to its largest trading partner (USA). Personal transfers in cash or kind from non-resident households to Indian resident households significantly rise from 14.27 billion USD to 83.33 billion USD, which is gigantically higher than in reverse flow in terms of remittances paid. This suggests that Indian residents are working more in number abroad, and hence monetary inflow increases. Moving from labor flows to capital flows, one can identify the promising growth of international MNCs’ presence in India and bring forth sizable foreign capital that rose almost ten times in the past two decades. However, the internationalization of Indian MNCs cannot be overlooked as the outward FDI Flows are also rising aggressively from 1.05 billion USD to 13.14 billion USD lastly. A secured economic environment depends heavily on the mode and medium of communication and the spread of transportation facilities. As the data suggest, the mobile use habit of Indians has tremendously increased. In 2001, out of 200 people, a single person may use mobile phones, whereas more than 16 persons out of each 20 people have subscribed to cell phones in late 2019. Compared to mobile subscriptions, internet users are not that widespread, but one can easily witness internet users’ highly exponential growth rate in the past ten years. Both of them suggest that Indians have become more well-connected and informed. Moreover, as the data suggest, the road and airline infrastructure show a consistent upward trend whereas the spread of railway lines is less dense in the first decade whereas it picked up pace in the second half. It confirms that mobility becomes faster, and distance becomes smaller, making India globally competitive. The total labor force gets added in India is around a net 90 million people from 2001 to 2019, and the participation rate is also more than half of the total population ages 15 years or more. However, the same rate slightly falls and settled less than 50% in 2019, as the figure suggests. However, the unemployment rate remained stagnant at 2.4% of the total labor force in 2005 and 2010 but recently, it shoot-up and reached 5.27% of the total labor force. Interestingly, the youth unemployment rate is highly severe, revealing that Indian youths are deprived of suitable jobs. Unemployment and poverty rate are inter-connected, and as the two figures in Table 11.1 suggests that out of every three persons in India, at least one person is found to be poor. More importantly, the income distribution of India is also found to be highly skewed and biased. As the data point out, the gap between the incomes of the top 10% income holders and that of the bottom 50% is increasing from 24% in 2001 to 44% in 2015.

164

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

As the various indices associated with several dimensions of India’s growth story suggest mixed evidence, to start with, HDI And globalization index both support for improvement. The change in HDI is slow, and that of economic, social, and political globalization rise and keep a faster pace. This supports the argument that Indians are adding more human capital, which is well-connected with the international market. Contrary to these, Indians are relatively unhappy and lose their stake in international competitiveness as both the happiness index and competitiveness index suggest India’s relative rank is going down over the past twenty years. The figures in the cost of the living index indicate stability and significantly less fluctuation. India’s overall score of economic freedom index suggests that the country just managed to move up from a repressed country category to a mostly unfree category as the scores range between 49 and 55. In line with the overall score, sub-categories like property rights, business freedom, and labor freedom suggest primarily unfree. However, India’s monetary freedom, tax burden, and government spending suggest for moderately free to mostly free. Contrary to these, freedom to investment, financial market, and the government’s integrity suggest repressive economic status. Though the figures keep on changing over time, the overall picture does not change much.

Reforms in India and Economic Security: Some Selective Assessments Social Welfare The Indian government has spent decades focusing on poverty eradication, employment creation, unique identification, and guaranteeing food security for all. However, even after 75 years of independence, India’s economic security is continuously challenged by high poverty and massive unemployment rates. Moreover, to avail several transfer payments benefit announced by various governments and their agencies, there is an unwarranted requisition for a multiplicity of documentation. Therefore, being sandwiched between announcements and actual delivery mechanisms, a sizable chunk of Indians still digest the sufferings from food insecurity. Therefore, in this chapter, we are going to analyze the two flagship policies of the Govt. of India, i.e., the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and AADHAAR-linked digital PDS into the premier social welfare schemes of the county and how have they radically transformed the lives of Indians.

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

165

MGNREGA and Social Security MGNREGA was initiated by the Government of India in September 2005 to ensure livelihood security. In every financial year, guaranteed remuneration-based engagement was aimed to provide for at least 100 days to each household. Anyone adult member from the household would receive a minimum wage rate as provisioned by their respective state governments who was prepared for unskilled physical work. The core aim of the act was to augment income generation in the rural India and bring about a structural transformation in their livelihood. Optimally utilizing the natural resource base of the local community, the act planned to create long-lasting physical infrastructure in the rural areas. This included provision of durable seasoned roads, flood control mechanisms and protection works, conservation of ground water and water harvesting, drought proofing, etc. Initially, the act was implemented in 200 select districts of the country. Since its inception, MGNREGA has reached 50 million households, has included 48% women beneficiaries, and has spanned over 691 districts in the country. Being a rural plan, both implementers and beneficiaries are faced with challenges to face obstacles in politics and power (Raabe et al., 2010). The earlier studies which includes Hirway (2004), Chakraborty (2007), Imai (2007), Antonopoulos (2007, 2013), Ravallion (2008), Jha et al. (2009), Raabe et al. (2010), Mukherjee and Sinha (2011), Sharma (2013), Satish et al. (2013), and Gulati et al. (2014), they have focused on the impact of the MGNREGA on the income generation capacity of the beneficiaries, issues related to migration and wages, equality between male and female labourers, environmental convergence, leakages in the system and the role of corruption, among other issues. To sum up the major outcomes of the previous studies on MGNREGA, Chakraborty (2014) documented how organizational deficiency and bureaucratic delays affect the essential nexus between implementation and program outcomes by gram panchayats. Majorly, three significant issues facing implementation have been highlighted in the researches and they are (i) planning (ii) resource utilization, and (iii) governance. However, MGNREGA has also been an effective tool for income distribution and reduction in inequality (Basu, 2013; Mann & Pande, 2012; Ghosh, 2009). MGNREGA has sound effects on the development of rural infrastructure including connectivity issues, enhancement of purchasing power capacity and debt reduction of rural households, effective management of agricultural production, environmental conditions, and distress migration, among others (Joshi et al., 2008).

AADHAAR-Linked Digital PDS and Social Security Over the past decade, India’s Public Distribution System (PDS) has seen many technology-enabled performance improvement projects. These efforts aim to

166

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

decrease subsidized grain leakage into the open market and ensure better grain availability to legitimate recipients. The Indian government has created the Unique Identification Number (AADHAAR) as a way for citizens to plainly and uniquely authenticate their identification anywhere in the country. The UIDAI’s mandate includes determining how the number will be used in critical applications and services. One such use is the Public Distribution System, and the UIDAI has outlined the possible role of Aadhaar within the PDS. Reduced leakage in the Public Distribution System has been a prominent use case for Aadhaar. New research on the relative strengths of authentication systems in the PDS shows mixed results. When beneficiaries enroll for the PDS, biometric authentication via Aadhaar may be most successful. However, Aadhaar becomes more troublesome during the actual transaction (when the beneficiary claims their monthly amount). Due to weak internet connections, irregular electrical supply, and failing biometric-recognition software, biometric authentication can worsen beneficiary dissatisfaction (ePoS). The authentication method chosen should be determined by state-specific considerations such as internet connectivity, the availability of e-governance centers, and time and financial restrictions. Therefore, state governments should analyze their regional circumstances (Allu et al., 2019). Aadhaar integration has lowered transparency and accountability in the system and increased a sense of disempowerment in this and other ways (Khera, 2017). Aadhaar brings the remunerations of technical knowledge application to India’s social protection system. It boosted efficiency and scalability, reduced corruption and leakage, improved data systems, and brought out a portable system backed by government commitment and funding. Aadhaar addresses many delivery difficulties, but problems remain in planning social protection, its target, and definition of a recipient. These require changes that go beyond enhanced technology and authentication. The answer lies in—digital PDS-which can detect and monitor corruption, but it must be done holistically throughout the supply chain, rather than focusing on a single ‘guilty element’.

Fiscal Policies The government of an economy with the fiscal policy tools in her hand strike to balance between revenue collection and expenditure management to direct the economy of a country which includes various policies in the form of tax reforms, expenditure reforms, and reforms related to the lending and borrowing process of a country. The primary goals of such policies take in price stability, inflation control, and social stability to put the economy on the path of growth and development. Moreover, there is a need to assess fiscal reforms made in our country, especially in the past twenty years, because a well-consolidated fiscal structure will boost the economy, safeguarding its economic security. Two crucial reforms have more significant impacts on our economy than several fiscal reforms: Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM) Act,

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

167

2003 and Goods and Services Tax (GST), respectively. So, the following sections have presented these two in more detail, keeping the bull’s eye on fiscal security.

FRBM and Fiscal Security The FRBM was enacted on 26th August 2003 but became effective from 5th July 2004. This act has been made to possess fiscal responsibility in the hands of the Central Government to ensure the inter-generational equity with proper fiscal management, to achieve sufficient revenue surplus for the maintenance of macroeconomic stability for the long run, to remove financial barriers for the smooth functioning of both fiscal and monetary policy, to bring fiscal sustainability using proper debt management, to bring greater transparency in fiscal operation by limiting Central Government borrowings, debt and deficits. The above-related matters need a medium-term framework for the effective operation of fiscal policy. After implementing the act, the government cut and managed the Fiscal Deficit (FD) from 4.5% of GDP in 2003–04 to 3.1% GDP in 2007–08. However, the International Financial Crisis of 2007 caused a suspension of the implemented targets. Nevertheless, there was a temporary deviation from the fiscal consolidation resulting from Revenue Deficit (RD) and a substantial increase in Government expenditures during the Global meltdown. Although the initial expectation for FD could not meet its target as per the plan in 2011–12, in 2012, an amendment was made to the FRBM Act, 2003, as a part of Finance Bill, 2012. It was made to reduce FD and RD, and maintaining an effective RD. Then in 2015, another amendment was made to the initial act, which was made to control and achieve the prescribed rates below 3% of FD. But such target further got an extension to March 2018. So, an amendment in FRBM Act, 2003 vides Finance Act, 2018 was made to maintain the spending discipline of the government in the year 2018. Implementing the FRBM Act has helped improve fiscal performance and remove various issues related to fiscal consolidation in both the Centre and State of our country. However, the FRBM Act, 2003, is not free from limitations. Firstly, this act ignores the possible negative relationship between Fiscal Deficit and Bank Credit. Generally, in order to ensure adequate money supply, if the growth rate of bank credit declines, then fiscal deficit may need to rise, and vice versa. So, the government should take every possible step to coordinate fiscal policy and monetary policy to reduce deficit effectively. So, the government should adequately follow and implement policies by keeping the target suggested by the NK Singh Committee.

GST and Fiscal Security Goods and Services Tax or GST is considered as one of the most significant reforms made to Indian fiscal policy. It is an indirect form of tax of India that levied on the

168

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

supply of goods and services or both except on alcoholic drinks. On 29th March 2017, four sub-parts of the GST bill was passed by the Lok Sabha after the approval of GST Council. They were (i) CGST Bill, (ii) IGST Bill, (iii) UTGST Bill, (Iv) Compensation Bill. Then, after enacting various GST laws, the Bill came into effect from 1st July 2017. A series of indirect form of taxes, such as Central Excise Duty, Service Tax, Additional Customs Duty, Surcharges, State-Level Value-added tax, and Octroi which were in operation and levied on different items in different names and heads were subsumed to GST. It is considered as one Nation, one Market, and one Tax. It is meant to reshape the country’s tax structure with a federal tax system by replacing the old one having multiplicity arrangement. It has introduced four tax slabs for tax collection by the central and state government, such as (i) 5%, (ii) 12%, (iii) 18%, and (iv) 28%. The GST council governs tax rates, rules, and regulations, consisting of the Central and all the States. To benefit the overall economy, some significant actions have been undertaken for 50 specified services from the consumers’ trade, industry, and interest since GST implementation by reducing the GST rate. GST taxation has provided multiple reliefs to various sectors including agriculture and allied industries, food processing industry, financial services like banking, insurance, finance tourism, hospitality services, constructionrelated contract services, government services, social sectors covering education, training, skill development, social security activities, and transportation services. Furthermore, to make tax payment procedures more user-friendly and transparent for the taxpayers, the government has taken various measures using different technological and analytical tools. So, those taxpayers can easily track, check, and ensure their compliance, application status, and basic information online on the GST portal. The government should take more effective actions to eliminate all kinds of technological barriers in the GST operation. Further, small businesses suffer badly from the negative impacts of GST. As per the new tax law, any businesses have to register for the payment of GST with an annual turnover above INR 20 lakh. Therefore, the government should correct the tax law, which will benefit the businesses to maintain their value in customers’ eyes. Regardless of these issues, GST is still considered one of the most incredible milestones in the history of Indian reforms.

Monetary Policies The goals of the monetary authority of a country, generally the central bank (Reserve Bank of India) is to control the supply of money, balancing interest rates, exchange rates and availability of credit to maintain price stability and achieve higher economic growth with the various tools and techniques prescribed as a part of monetary policy. Since the beginning of economic planning in the 1950s, the RBI’s monetary policy strategies have been undergoing a substantial transformation (Sethi et al., 2019). We are focussing on the three critical contemporary monetary policy reforms which are adopted in the last two decades. They are (i) multiple indicator

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

169

approach—1998 to 2014, (ii) flexible inflation targeting—2015 onwards and (iii) demonetization—2016 onwards.

Multiple Indicator Approach (MIA) and Monetary Security Striking a balance between growth of money supply and inflation targeting has always been a challenging task for RBI, and in post-economic reforms during 1990s with wide penetration of non-banking financial intermediaries’ growth along with banks, the task becomes overshooting. A working group on money supply chaired by Dr. YV Reddy recommended for adoption of the multiple indicators approach (MIA) in April 1998 by the RBI (1998). MIA considered a number of quantitative indicators, such as money stock, credit availability, output growth, trade and capital flows, the rates of exchange, inflation, and interest rates. Based on a diverse set of information on these indicators, a wideranging monetary policy is framed, which has least rigidity to the conduct of monetary management (Dua, 2020). In the similar line, to manage the market liquidity on a daily basis and to passage interest rate signals to the market, the RBI introduced the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) in June 2000. RBI also introduced Collateralized Borrowing and lending operations (CBLO) as an innovative money market instrument in January 2003. Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) was also subsequently introduced to deal with enduring capital inflows. Almost for a decade since the MIA introduced, the average GDP growth rate of India improved while maintaining a moderate inflation rate (as reflected in WPI figures of 5.4% by RBI (2020)). However, the framework started losing its feet in the post-global financial crises. As the macroeconomic data revealed, the inflation rate was persistently going up with weakening GDP growth rate figures. Critics of the MIA pointed out the weaknesses in the approach and critiqued the anonymity in many indicators. Therefore, another Expert Committee of RBI in 2014 recommended substituting to inflation targeting as the solo monetary policy framework in India.

Flexible Inflation Targeting (FIT) and Monetary Security Based on the recommendations of Expert Committee’s Report to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework, the RBI modified its strategy in 2015 and adopted flexible inflation targeting (FIT) as a single most prioritised variable. The FIT aimed to keep up price stability with GDP growth. In 2011, a new consumer price index (CPI) was introduced to be a representative measure of headline inflation and the FIT aimed to fit CPI within a band of two to six per cent. As a result of this onward-looking monetary policy, RBI effectively continues inflation around its band and support growth. As an outcome, inflation has been falling successively since 2017–18 until recently, averaged below 4 per cent.

170

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

Demonetization and Monetary Security The GoI took an unanticipated change in the name of demonetization (on 8th November 2016) to take out certain higher denomination currencies out of circulation, and replaced it by renewed currency notes of same and further higher denominations (Economic Survey 2016–2017). Broadly, three major justifications had been factored in for such hasty decisions made by the government officials. They take in demonetization (i) to regulate of counterfeit notes, (ii) to clench corruption and (iii) to curb down the black money (Beyes & Bhattacharya, 2017). This was a very vivid and challenging task as majority of Indian stakeholders prefer to have cash transactions and discard the other forms of exchange. Till now, the debate has been progressing regarding the efficacy of the move. Many supporters have backed up demonetization as a dynamic move to combat corruption and black money, increase tax returns, upward demand shifting for the organized sector and rural economy, promote cash-less trading, and incentivize for saving cum investment in financial markets. In contrast, those who criticized it claimed about the detrimental impacts on India’s economy in general and large chunk of informal sectors in specific that includes agricultural farmers, agro-based industries, micro, small and medium enterprises, rural mass and poor and unemployed population (Mohindra & Mukherjee, 2018)

Industrial and Commercial Policies After independence, the economic advisors realized that massive industrialization is a way to generate home production, sustain growth for the rest of the economy, direct the economy towards economic self-sufficiency, and provide enough jobs to reduce existing poverty (Burange & Yamiini, 2011; Thakur et al., 2012). Therefore, realizing the necessity of a self-reliant industrial policy, the Government of India undertook a series of industrial policies in 1948, 1956, 1977, 1980, and the new industrial policy in 1991. However, after 1991, few other measures were also taken over time by the Government of India. All these measures were taken to add value to the Indian economic growth and development, but more or less remained unpopular like New Industrial Policy 1991 (Burange & Yamiini, 2011). However, few key policies have been established in the latter part of the 2000s to refine the 1991 policy with the principal objective of production growing and job creation in the industrial division as a development paradigm for India. Therefore, we select three important recent initiatives of GoI, which are explained vividly in the next section.

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

171

NMP and Industrial Security Visualizing the potentiality of the manufacturing sector in terms of growth, trade, and employment opportunities, the DIPP introduced the National Manufacturing Policy (NMP) on November 4, 2011. Among its several goals, the prime objective was to increase the share of manufacturing sector as a proportion of GDP to 25% and create 10 crore jobs over a decade or so (DIPP, 2011; Aggarwal, 2019). The NMP, 2011 was termed a “vintage” (Geography & You, 2019). Further, it mentioned that due to the NMP, 2011 manufacturing and employment generation were highly influenced. Similarly, this step further helped the Government of India to provide better set-up, decreasing logistics cost, skill up gradation, and adoption of advanced technology. Furthermore, this measure further helped the government simplify and liberalize the FDI policy (DIPP, 2018). However, with India’s unemployment rate at 6.1%, India was not coming under the top ten merchandise of the world. Such uncertainty in the manufacturing sector is due to the lack of a skilled and upgraded workforce (Geography & You, 2019). Finally, when the Government of India failed in achieving desired goal through the NMP, 2011, the economy realized the necessity of a compressive and multidimensional industrial policy to achieve its targets (DIPP, 2018). Keeping all these objectives, India’s Government launched the ‘Make in India’ global initiative on September 25, 2014.

MII and Business Security The ‘Make in India’ initiative was a multidimensional and complex process covering different channels, such as: ease of doing business, FDI reforms, skill development, infrastructure development, and fiscal incentives (PMINDIA, 2014; DIPP, 2017). The four pillars of this initiative are New Process, New Infrastructure, New Sectors, and New mindset. Under the process, the initiative recognizes ‘ease of doing businesses’ as the single most decisive feature of entrepreneurship development. Therefore, the policy wants to do away with all such unwarranted regulatory bottlenecks that a firm may face during its operation including license raj and others. In addition, the administration proposes to develop industrial corridors and smart cities to provide quality infrastructure. The ‘Make in India’ program has launched 25 manufacturing, infrastructure, and services activities. This also opened up massive FDI inflows into the sectors like defence production, construction, and railway infrastructure. During this first-hand approach, the government will be a facilitator and not a regulator (Puri & Mishra, 2017; Kadekodi, 2018). Under the scheme of MII initiative, the government has taken some steps such as Stand-up India (SUI) campaign, Atal Innovation Mission (AIM), and Self-Employment and Talent Utilization (SETU) programs. These schemes are absorbed to encourage innovation with start-ups and enhance workers’ skills and improve their employability.

172

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

SUI and Entrepreneurial Security The ‘Start-up India’ (SUI) program aimed to visualize the entrepreneurial potential of the people of India. The plan of this program to build a robust business system that is contributing to the advancement of start-up projects to initiate sustainable growth and produce large-scale occupational prospects. The program also targets semi-urban and rural areas (Puri & Mishra, 2017; Pande & Shukla, 2019). Although ‘Start-up India’ has given the accurate situation for a new commercial project to grow, the program faces many real problems relating to funding. Another problem is related to the registration of new bodies as per the statutory guidelines of the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), where the government ignores many most prominent VCs as they were not registered in SEBI (Pande & Shukla, 2019). Moreover, although it was assumed that the start-ups could earn profit even at an early stage to cover the tax benefit, they take time to earn profit at least more than three years. Therefore government, at a later time, has extended the tax holiday to five years for start-up entrepreneurs.

International Trade and Investment Policies Developments in the external sector are always designed at export advancement by decreasing trade distortive practices in the economy. Until the new economic policies of 1991, the Indian economy was severely protected with very tall tariffs and nontariff barriers and prohibited foreign investment. With liberalized trade and global open-economy, the Indian economy abolished barriers from almost all the sectors of the economy except a handful of sectors and achieved more enormous GDP figures. After joining the WTO, India was obliged to eradicate all quantitative restrictions on imports. The main features of the new trade policies adopted by GoI include free imports and exports, rationalization of tariff Structure, full convertibility on the current account, export-oriented scheme units (EOU) covering Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Agri Export Zones (AEZ), Service Exports From India Scheme (SEIS).

Trade Policies and External Security In order to move forward the liberalization processes the GoI has been adopting a series of Export-Import (EXIM) policies and further modified Foreign Trade Policies (FTP) since the beginning of 1990s. Broadly, the focus is on deregulations, simplification of procedural channels, removal of quantitative restrictions, identification of certain thrust areas and formulation of certain sector-specific policy initiatives, establishment of domestic corridors for foreign parties through introduction of Special

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

173

Economic Zones (SEZ), Market Access Initiatives (MAI) scheme, Duty-Free Export Credit (DFIC), identification of new markets and new products through Focus Market Scheme (FMS) and Focused Product Scheme (FPS) and building-up international integration with the rest of the world through signing different preferential trade agreements and becoming members of various free trade areas. However, post-2014, with initiatives such as “Make in India,” “Digital India,” “Skill India,” among others, the GoI introduced quite a few reformative measures (such as launching of Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) and Service Exports from India Scheme (SEIS)) to further boost export prospects and accelerates the take-up of the economy. Pointing out the significant challenges and concerns with the trade policies, India concentrated more on product and market diversification strategy, resulting in a decline in export market concentration. However, export infrastructure, particularly ports related infrastructure, remained inadequate. The regional economic integration strategies that include FTAs/RTAs/CECAs of India, they have headed towards a reversed duty structure, making Indian manufactured goods uncompetitive. Regulatory controls have been only partially effective in India.

FDI Policies External Security Almost 31 years down the line when Indian economy was severely suffering from BoP crises and striving for massive inflows of foreign currencies and capital inflows, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) appeared as the most favored mode of financial resource mobilization. Initially only through approval route of RBI, a certain percentage of foreign equity was allowed to definite industries and many layered caps were sealed over industries and a hand few were completely prohibited. Gradually, the relaxations were made and another alternative route was developed (namely automatic roué of FIPB) where the approval machinery made comfortable. To facilitate the foreign investors, India participated under Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Early 2000 onwards, the focus has been on an open door policy which includes liberal policies for international trade and investment, foreign exchange reserves and technical collaborations. Gradually, FDI was welcomed in the core and infrastructure sectors. During this period, banking, insurance, pension, NBFIs, hospital and construction and maintenance related services were receiving major FDI through mergers and acquisitions. Additional targets of employment provision and domestic manufacturing production and promotion were added after 2014. Foreign institutional investments (FII) and foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) were also encouraged in stock and primary markets. To sum it up, this overview gives an impression that FDI has been evolved as an inseparable part of external funding and contributes to India’s GDP growth considerably.

174

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

Conclusion During the past twenty years, the government has made significant progress toward implementing a sound framework through various reform measures and stable policy strategies. However, there always exists scope for further improvement. A few of them will make this chapter complete and prescribe specific deliverables for future research, policy-making, and strategic interventions, believing in participatory development. To start with, broadly, in the social protection strategies, the policy-makers may be recommended to use an existing program’s infrastructure like the lists of beneficiaries or staff to deliver new interventions. For example, increasing the value or duration of a benefit to meet the additional needs of existing recipients or enrolling more eligible households in an existing area, or changing the enrollment criteria would be additional policy responses. The allocation of government expenditures needs to be aligned with future priorities. The share of non-developmental revenue expenditure needs to be reduced, but capital expenditure, which would ultimately promote infrastructure development, institutional building, and social sector transformation, should rise significantly. This exercise should be in simultaneous move with reducing the proportion of FD and RD as a share of GDP. Expansion of tax base and reduction of scope for tax evasion should be effectively administered to generate sufficient revenue. The government should adequately follow and implement policies by keeping the target suggested by the NK Singh Committee, which was set up to review the FRBM Act’s performance and suggests some requisite changes in it. However, if all the suggestions and targets will be carried out effectively by the government, then FRBM Act can achieve tremendous success soon to develop both fiscal prudence and the economy as a whole. Moreover, the government should take practical actions to eliminate all kinds of technological barriers in the GST operation and bring some corrections in the GST law, which will benefit the businesses, especially smaller ones, to maintain their value in customers’ eyes. In the front of sectoral productivity and skill formation, the focus should be on dual pedaling in industry and services to address the vital issue of creating highproductivity, high-wage jobs for low and semi-skilled workers beyond the frontier of agricultural self-reliance. To enhance GDP growth, transport and connectivity infrastructure should be improved aggressively, addressing the physical capacity constraints well. Digital connectivity, adoption of such technologies, and sound network facilities should be made accessible to all. To bridge the gap between public resources and required investment, public–private-partnership (PPP) needs to be strengthened. To realize all these development goals, spurring the growth of science and technologies is inevitable, creating an enabling environment for innovation and entrepreneurship. Improvement in the governance and regulatory environment through reforms in civil services and electoral procedures, and public procurement system will enhance the capacity and competitiveness of India.

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

175

In front of external policies, India must reshuffle its trade bundles and investment destinations to meet the world demand and India’s best competencies. Exploring new regions as potential markets, like African, South America, and middle-east Asian nations, India should improve its export infrastructure and investment modalities. Specific administrative reforms like adapting single-window clearance and prescribing time limits for documentation will make SEZ Model more successful and multilateral trade and investment relations more fruitful. In the monetary sector, loan rates should be relaxed and the procedural facilities should be made simple and improved for obtaining easy finances and credits from different banks and other financial intermediaries. Large accumulated NPAs may be redressed through the effective implementation of IBC rules. Moreover, rethinking the government’s equity shareholding pattern of certain banks may leverage the strain on fiscal deficit targeting. During the last several years, India has been emerging as a resilient, competitive, large economy with decent growth pace that surpasses many of its global counterparts. The next couple of years in India will be challenging to subtle the uncontrollable effects of the current pandemic crises, but it throws a platform for opportunities to push further the shock-responsive policy reforms for sustained long-term inclusive growth.

References Aggarwal, R. (2019). Industrial policies in India: Did they work? (CSE Working Paper 2019–05). Allu, R., Deo, S., & Devalkar, S. (2019). Alternatives to aadhaar-based biometrics in the public distribution system. Economic & Political Weekly, 54(12), 30–37. Antonopoulos, R. (2007). The right to a job, the right types of projects employment guarantees policies from a gender perspective (Working Paper No. 516). The Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, New York, NY. Antonopoulos, R. (2013). Expanding social protection in developing countries: a gender perspective (Working Paper No. 757). The Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, New York, NY. Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. Review of International Studies, 23, 5–26. Basu, A. K. (2013). Impact of rural employment guarantee schemes on seasonal labor markets: Optimum compensation and workers’ welfare. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 11(1), 1–34. Beyes, P., & Bhattacharya, R. (2017). India’s 2016 demonetization drive: A case study on innovation in anti-corruption policies, government communications, and political integrity. In OECD Global Anti-Corruption and Integrity Forum (Vol. 1, p. 17). Burange, L. G., & Yamini, S. (2011). A review of India’s industrial policy and performance (Working Paper. No. UDE 34/1/2011). Department of Economics, University of Mumbai. Buzan, B. (1991). People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chakraborty, B. (2014). MGNREGA policy and application. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 34(3/4), 263–300. Chakraborty, P. (2007). Implementation of the NREGA in India: Spatial dimensions and fiscal implications national institute of public finance and policy. New Delhi. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, NY.

176

B. R. Mishra and L. D. Satpathy

Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP). (2011). National manufacturing policy. Government of India. https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/po-ann4.pdf. Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP). (2017). Industrial policy—2017. A Discussion Paper. Government of India. https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/Industrial_policy_2017_DP. pdf. Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP). (2018). Annual report. Government of India. https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/annualReport_English_08March2018.pdf. Dua, P. (2020). Monetary policy framework in India. Indian Economic Review, 55(1), 117–154. Fierke, K. (2002). Meaning, method and practice: assessing the changing security agenda. In S. Lawson (ed.) The New Agenda for international relations, Cambridge: Polity Press. Geography and You. (2019). National manufacturing policy. https://geographyandyou.com/nat ional-manufacturing-policy/. Ghosh, J. (2009). Equity and Inclusion through public expenditure: the potential of the NREGA. In International Conference on NREGA, Ministry of Rural Development and ICAR. Retrieved May 30, 2015, from https://www.macroscan.com/pol/jan09/pdf/NREGS.pdf. Gulati, A., Jain, S., & Satija, N. (2014). Rising farm wages in India—The ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. Journal of Land and Rural Studies, 2(2), 261–286. Hirway, I. (2004). Providing employment guarantee in India, some critical issues. Economic and Political Weekly., 39(48), 5117–5124. Imai, K. (2007). Targeting versus universalism: An evaluation of indirect effects of the employment guarantee scheme in India. Journal of Policy Modeling, 29(1), 99–113. Jha, R., Bhattacharyya, S., Gaiha, R., & Shankar, S. (2009). Capture of anti-poverty programs: An analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in India. Journal of Asian Economics, 20(4), 456–464. Joshi, V., Singh, S., & Joshi, K. N. (2008). Evaluation of NREGA in Rajasthan. Monograph, 79. Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur. Kadekodi, G. K. (2018). Make in India: Policy drives and challenges. In Issues in Indian public policies (pp. 83–105). Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7950-4_4. Kahler, M. (2004). Economic security in an era of globalization: Definition and provision. The Pacific Review, 17(4), 485–502. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951274042000326032. Khera, R. (2017). Impact of aadhaar on welfare programmes. Economic & Political Weekly, 52(50), 61–70. Kolodziej, E. A. (1992). Renaissance in security studies? Caveat lector!’. International Studies Quarterly, 36(4), 421–438. Krause, K., & Williams, M. C. (1996). Broadening the agenda of security studies: Politics and methods. International Studies Quarterly, 40(2), 229–254. Mann, N., & Pande, V. (2012). MGNREGA Sameeksha: An anthology of research studies on the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act, 2005 2006–2012. Orient Blackswan Private Limited. Mishkin, F. S. (1999). International experiences with different monetary policy regimes). Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia University or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Journal of monetary economics, 43(3), 579–605. Mohindra, K. S., & Mukherjee, S. (2018). Can short-term economic policies hurt the health of the poor? Demonetization in India. International Journal of Health Services, 48(3), 482–494. Moran, T. (1993). An economics agenda for neo-realists. International Security, 18(2), 211–215. Mukherjee, D., & Sinha, U. B. (2011). Understanding NREGA: a simple theory and some facts (Working Paper No. 196). Centre for Development Economics, New Delhi. Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2004). Introduction: Economic security, globalization and governance. The Pacific Review, 17(4), 459–484. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951274042000326023. Pande, A., & Shukla, A. (2019). Critical analysis of startup India: Challenges and opportunities. https://www.academia.edu/38475200/Critical_Analysis_of_Startup_India_docx. PMINDIA. (2014). Major initiatives: Make In India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/major_initia tives/make-in-india/.

11 Economic Security of India: Position, Policies, and Prospects

177

Puri, V. K., & Mishra, S. K. (2017). Indian economy (35th Revised ed.). Himalayan Publishing House. Raabe, K., Birner, R., Sekher, M., Gayathridevi, K.G., Shilpi, A., & Schiffer, E. (2010). Overcoming the governance challenges of implementing MGNREGA? Insight from Bihar using process influence-mapping (IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 00963). Delhi. Ravallion, M. (2008). Bailing out the world’s poorest (Policy Research Working Paper No. 4763). The World Bank, Washington, DC. Reddy, Y. V. (1998). Report of the working group on money supply: analytics and methodology of compilation. Satish, S., Milne, G., Laxman, C.S., & Lobo, C. (2013). Poverty and social impact analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in Karnataka to enable effective convergence. The World Bank (Working Paper No. 84701). Washington, DC. Scholte, J. A. (2000). Globalization: A critical introduction. St Martin’s Press. Sethi, M., Saina, B. A. B. Y., & Vandita, D. A. R. (2019). Monetary policy transmission during multiple indicator regime: A case of India. The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics, and Business, 6(3), 103–113. Sharma, N. (2013). An empirical analysis of the impact of NGOs on rural development in Himachal Pradesh. The IUP Journal of Entrepreneurship Development, 10(1), 21–49. Thakur, B., Gupta, R., & Singh, R. (2012). Changing face of India’s industrial policies: A look. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 2(12), 1–7. Tickner, J. A. (1995). Re-visioning security. In K. Booth & S. Smith (Eds.), International relations theory today (pp. 175–197). Pennsylvania State University Press. Walt, S. M. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 211–239.

Chapter 12

India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels A Novel Assessment, Dilemma Between Renewable and Non-renewable, and Possible Trade-Offs Hippu Salk Kristle Nathan

Introduction Energy resources are considered as drivers of development. Energy infrastructure and better quality of energy services are intertwined with economic development (WEO, 2004). Figure 12.1 shows the relationship between power consumption and gross domestic product (GDP) of world regions (Dale, 2012). As one can find the two most backward regions of the world, namely, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are at low per capita power consumption and GDP, whereas North America is at the other end of the spectrum. The strong correlation between power consumption and economic indicators like GDP reflects the complementarity between the two: higher electricity use would lead to more economic development, which in turn would lead to higher electricity use. Energy is also an enabler to social development; energy services are essential for basic human needs of food, water, health care, education, and shelter (Reddy, 2002; Najam & Cleveland, 2003; WEO, 2004; Nathan and Hari, 2020). Quality of life indicators other than income also show a positive relationship with energy consumption. The human development index (HDI) is a case in point. It is a composite index of health, education, and standard of living proxied by income. The energyhuman development correlations have been explored at the country level in some detail. The most encountered relationship is a plot between per capita electricity consumption and the HDI of countries (see Fig. 12.2). The relationship is linear at the initial stages of energy consumption and subsequently, it reaches a plateau. At the early stages of development, access to energy in general and electricity in particular is critical to human development (WEO, 2004). Also, analyses of longitudinal data

H. S. K. Nathan (B) Institute of Rural Management Anand, Anand, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_12

179

180

H. S. K. Nathan

Fig. 12.1 Relation between power consumption per capita and GDP for world regions. Figure Source Dale (2012)

from developed countries confirm that additional per capita electricity and energy consumption adds little to the quality of life (Mazur, 2011). It is evident from the above figure that India is at the linear part of the HDIEnergy curve, indicating an increase in power consumption results in substantial improvement in human development. This reflects that for developing economies like India energy becomes extremely critical for improvement in quality of life. Also, India has the choice of moving towards a more energy-intensive economy like South Africa or less energy-intensive economy like Germany (Raj et al., 2016). It needs to be noted here that the whole of India is not one society in terms of energy endowments. The inequalities in energy in a society are a reflection of factors like income distribution, geographical distribution of rich and poor, climatic and weather conditions, government infrastructure, provision of energy efficiency measures, etc. (Jacobson et al., 2005). There are recent studies like that of Nathan and Hari (2018) and Gupta et al. (2020), which show the distribution of energy poverty across urban and rural regions, and among different states and districts. The current study is premised on three basic assumptions. First, developing societies like India cannot use the same type and level of energy as industrialized countries in the pursuit of human development. Historically, most of the conventional energy resources have been consumed by developed economies, and given the resource and climate constraints, developing economies cannot take the same path as their developed counterparts (Wu et al., 2012). The second assumption is that developing countries like India are characterized by wide variations in both attainments

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

181

Fig. 12.2 Relation between power consumption per capita and human development index (HDI) for countries. Figure Source Dale and Ong (2012)

in human development and energy consumption patterns among different people and regions. Evidence shows that the developing countries experiencing economic progress have exacerbated the inequalities (UNDP, 2013). The third assumption is linked to the second. Unequal distribution and access to energy resources lead to unequal social dynamics, economic inequalities, and imbalanced relationships with nature (Jacobson et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2012). The ways and means of energy production and consumption affect the local and global environment which constrains/fosters the prospects of human development of rich and poor differently (Gaye, 2007). These inequalities not only exist at the inter-country level, but also at the inter- and intra-regional, societal, and household levels. Against the above backdrop, this study addresses two major challenges with respect to energy security. First, it attempts to find an answer to the question: “Can there be a framework to assess energy security that can be applicable to both macro (national) and micro (household) levels?” It proposes to conceptualize energy security as a notion of energy accessibility, which is a combination of three 3As—energy availability, energy affordability, and energy acceptability. The paper demonstrates the operationalization of the framework at smaller unit, i.e., household level and at larger units, from village to country level. Next, the chapter discusses the increasing role of renewable sources in India’s energy mix, and attempts to find answer to the

182

H. S. K. Nathan

question: "What sort of trade-offs between the renewable and non-renewable sources would lead to greater energy security at both household and national aspects of energy security?” The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 12.2 gives the novel 3A framework (availability, affordability, acceptability). The following section, i.e., Sect. 12.3 discusses its operationalization. Section 12.4 gives India’s energy scenario depicting the increasing role of renewable in the mix. Section 12.5 presents the dilemma of deployment of renewable and non-renewable sources and trade-offs at the national as well as the household levels to overcome the challenges. Section 12.6 gives the concluding remarks.

Novel Method to Assess Energy Security This paper conceptualized energy security as an “energy accessibility index”,1 which reflects the extent of utilization of desirable energy sources and appliances for different applications. The index can be decomposed into three independent dimensions, viz., energy availability, energy affordability, and energy acceptability.2 We explain the three dimensions below. (i)

(ii)

1

Energy Availability: Since accessibility indicates the final use of energy, the energy resource must be available at the user end in the first place.3 The availability score can be normalized between 0 (no availability) and 1 (fully available). For example, in the case of electricity, if electricity is available to a village for 24 hours the village would get a score of 1 for the same and if there is no supply of electricity to the village it would get a score of 0, and if electricity supply is available with some load shedding the score will be between 0 and 1 depending on the load shedding durations. For instance, if there is a daily load shedding of four hours, the availability dimension would get a score of (1–(4/24)), i.e., 5/6. Energy Affordability: Once the energy is available, the user must be able to pay for it.4 The quantum of energy requirement for any service can be normatively

“Energy accessibility index” will be a new term. A simple google search on this term hardly gives any results. We do get quite a few results on energy access index; but not energy accessibility index. The idea of Accessibility being composed of availability, affordability, and acceptability is largely used in health literature and it is relatively scarce in energy studies. 2 These three A’s has been used in the context of energy security (NESC, 2009; SADC, 2010; Hayashi et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2012; Cherp and Jewell, 2014) and sustainability (Farooqui, 2009). 3 Reddy (2015) uses energy availability in the same spirit but considers that as a discrete variable. The author uses the third component as ‘energy reliability’, which can be considered part of availability in our framework. We would not consider a resource available fully until and unless it is reliable. For instance, in case of electricity, load shedding would affect availability instead of reflecting in a separate dimension of reliability. 4 The same term is used by Reddy (2015), but it is used as additive inverse of income spent on the same resource. Here, we would go in detail in the sense, we will look into end-use for which the

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

(iii)

183

arrived at. For instance, in case of an urban household, considering 500 units of electricity as the normative requirement (assuming certain level of appliance efficiency) (IEA, 2014) the price payable for this with respect to household income would indicate the affordability. If the price falls below the normatively defined minimum proportion of MPCE (monthly per capita consumption), the concerned energy is fully affordable (affordability score = 1); if the same falls above the normatively defined maximum proportion of MPCE, the resource is not at all affordable (affordability score = 0). Any intermediate value can get a score between 0 and 1 using normalization technique such as max–min normalization. Energy Acceptability: Even if an energy in question is available and affordable, the energy would be utilized only when it is acceptable to the user. For instance, households refuse to adopt solar home lighting system as they perceive as inferior to electric systems compared to grid-electricity and refuse the adoption of such technology (Dugoua & Urpelainen, 2014; Nathan et al., 2020). Acceptability may be a discrete indicator of yes/no (1/0) type. It may be partially acceptable. For instance, charcoal-based cooking may be partially acceptable, which means it may be acceptable only for certain food items.

Operationalizing the 3A Framework To operationalize we take a cue from the 3-dimensional framework proposed by Kowsari and Zerriffi (2011), where energy choices are made around three aspects: energy carrier, device, and service. We also make use of the idea proposed in Nathan (2016) that in practical scenario carrier and devices are tightly coupled (for instance, LPG gas comes with a gas stove, kerosene comes with a kerosene stove, firewood comes with traditional chulla, etc.), and consider the simplified version as proposed in the notions of “Needs and Means” framework in Choragudi and Nathan (2020), where means are the carrier-device combinations and needs are the energy services. Figure 12.3 shows the energy security model by applying the 3A framework. The model represents that for each required energy service (need) for any unit (household or larger unit), the desirable device and career combination (mean) needs to be identified. Then, considering the 3A framework, depending on the availability, affordability, and acceptability of the mean, one can figure out the accessibility level of the same. In a similar fashion, accessibility of all desirable combinations of energy needs and means can be computed, which together can give the energy security level. The energy security computation for households and countries using the proposed model is demonstrated subsequently.

resource is going to be used and make a normative judgement on the proportion of income to be spent on that end use and accordingly find the score based on actual expenses.

184

H. S. K. Nathan

Availability

Affordability

Desirable combinaƟons of energy service (needs) and career and device (means)

Accessibility of Energy career and device (means)

Energy service (needs)

Acceptability

Fig. 12.3 Energy security model Figure Source Author’s work

Energy Security Assessment for Households The accessibility of any energy mean can be computed using the 3A framework, i.e., computing the availability, affordability, and acceptability of the same. For instance, if a solar home lighting system is considered as a desirable means of lighting, availability would assess the availability of such a system in the concerned locality, availability of maintenance facility, etc. Affordability considers the price of such a system vis-à-vis the income level of the household. Acceptability would concern whether the household is ready to accept solar home lighting system as a means of lighting. In a similar fashion, accessibility of all energy-related inputs can be computed, which can be aggregated to get the composite energy security index of the households.

Energy Security Assessment for a Country The energy security model proposed in this paper can be applicable to the country level as well. For a country level, one must note first all the desired needs and means. For any means, accessibility can be computed by considering its availability, affordability, and acceptability. For instance, if a country considers for its transportation needs petroleum fuels as the means, the availability of such fuels would depend on parameters like a reserve to production ratio, the reserve to the consumption ratio, availability of sea routes for oil imports, diversification of energy import portfolios, etc. The affordability would concern the country’s income, the share of the cost of energy supply as a part of GDP, level of foreign reserve, etc. Similarly, energy acceptability, which is more of the normative decision on energy sources considering its socio-environmental impacts, would imply whether the country is accepting petroleum-based transportation or not. Such acceptance issues are there on account

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

185

of the climate change mitigation commitments the country might like to comply with. An example of the unacceptability of a country to a particular energy means is Germany’s resentment to nuclear power (World Nuclear Association, 2004).

Demand and Supply Side Security The study proposes that one can compute the demand-side energy security by following above-mentioned approach. The supply-side energy security is nothing but the demand security of the next higher level of unit. For instance, for a household belonging to a certain village we would compute the demand side security by the above-mentioned approach. The supply-side security would be the energy security calculated in the same fashion for the village, i.e., the desirable energy needs and means combinations, the availability, affordability, and acceptability of all such means. This energy demand security would correspond to supply-side security for the households. Similarly, the aggregated energy demand security of lower level would correspond to energy supply security of higher levels. This notion of demand and supply security can be extended as one move from a smaller unit to a larger unit. The steps to compute the energy security index for the households are outlined below. (i) (ii) (iii)

Find the household activities which requires energy (needs); Determination of weights of each activity; Find Accessibility (A) for each activity: a. b.

(iv)

Find all allowable (normative) resources, device combinations (means); Find availability (AV ), affordability (AF ), and acceptability (AC ) for each of the mean;

Aggregation of Accessibility of activities to get the composite energy security (S) for the household. This gives energy demand security for the household.

Assuming a village composed of a number of households and other such units, the aggregation of demand security for all the households and other such units would give the supply security of the village. The energy demand security for the village can be computed as follows. (i) (ii) (iii)

Find the sectors and sub-sectors of the villages which requires energy (needs); Determination of weights of each sectoral needs; Find Accessibility (A) for each sector: a. b.

Find all allowable (normative) resources, device combinations (mean) for each sector and sub-sector; Find availability (AV ), affordability (AF ), and acceptability (AC ) for each of the mean;

186

H. S. K. Nathan

(iv)

Aggregation of Accessibility of sectors to get the composite energy security (S) for the village. This gives energy demand security for the village and energy supply security for the households and other units in the village.

In such a fashion, energy demand and supply security can be computed for a larger geographical society, including that of a country.

A Big Dilemma: Renewable and Non-renewable The tapping of renewable energy addresses dual-purpose energy and climate security. It supplements the depleting fossil fuels and diversifies the portfolio of the energy basket. It is also instrumental in making energy to reach to some of the remote locations where conventional energy is economically unfeasible to penetrate. Globally, the share of renewable energy sources in the total primary energy demand has increased from 0.4 to 1.0% during 1990–2011, and the same is expected to rise to 4.0% by 2035 (IEA, 2013). In terms of power generation, the share of renewable has increased from 1.0 to 2.0% during 1990–2011, and the same is expected to rise to 8.0% by 2035 (IEA, 2013).5 As a society moves towards an increasing share of renewables, with growth in overall energy there is a reduced growth in energy-induced emissions. The deployment of renewables is expected to save 4.1 giga tons of CO2 in 2035 compared to the level of generation with the same fuel mix of 2010 (IEA, 2012). Also, the renewable energy options can fuel sustainable economic growth and contribute towards the energy self-sufficiency of countries by reducing their import dependencies (IEA, 2013). Moreover, renewable energy is critical in providing access to millions of populations who are without access to modern energy (REN21, 2015). There have been efforts by countries to tap into renewable energy sources. India is playing its role in this effort. India has the distinction of having a separate ministry for renewable energy since 1992, which in May 2014 became part of the integrated ministry that includes power and coal for greater coordination and better outcomes (Inamdar, 2014; Penny & Cronshaw, 2015).6 The government of India has recently enhanced its target to have 175 GW of power from renewable by 2022, from the current level of 34.35 GW, which contributes to 7% of electricity production (GIZ, 2015; MNRE, 2015a). Of the total renewable target, solar will contribute 100 GW by 5

The estimates for future share are based on the most plausible scenario termed as “new policies scenario”. This scenario considers the existing policies and cautious implementation of announced policy intentions of government which are yet to be given effect (IEA, 2013). 6 The integration of coal, power, and renewable ministry shows the mainstreaming of renewable, which has been a concern earlier. In 1982, a separate Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (DNES) was created in the Ministry of Energy to look after all the aspects relating to new and renewable energy (MNRE, 2020a, b). The Department was upgraded into a separate Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (MNES) in 1992 and was rechristened as Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) in October, 2006 (MNRE, 2020a).

installed capacity (GW)

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

174 18 38

5 113

200 25 39

5 132

223 28 39

5 152

249 35 41

5 168

275 39 41

6 189

305

187

327

344

356 367

57

69

78

84

43

44

45

45

45

6

7

7

7

7

211

218

223

226

231

46

FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 Thermal Nuclear Hydro RES Fig. 12.4 Power installed capacity (in GW) improvement in India from 2010 to 2020. Data Source CEA (2020a)

2022 (GIZ, 2015; MNRE, 2015b), rising from the present modest level of 4.3 GW capacity (MNRE, 2015c).

Non-renewable and Renewable Share in India’s Energy Mix The energy installed capacity in the past decade has more than doubled (174–367 GW). The following figure gives the contribution of different energy sources in installed capacity (Fig. 12.4). As evident in the figure, the share of the renewable in installed capacity is on the rise. The same has been depicted in the following figure (Fig. 12.5). Because of the diluted and intermittent nature of renewable, though renewable has a substantial share in installed capacity, the share in energy generation is still low (see Figs. 12.4 and 12.6).

Falling Power Deficit The rapid capacity improvement in power generation has led to a decline in the power deficit in the country. The deficit indicates the gap in the demand and supply of power. The following figure gives the fall in peak and average power deficit from 9.8% to 0.8% and 8.5% to 0.6%, respectively (Fig. 12.7) (CEA, 2020b).

H. S. K. Nathan 25%

20% 20%

18%

15%

11%

12%

12%

25

28

10% 5%

18

14%

14%

22% 78

15%

69

100

84 80 60

57 46

40

39

35

23%

20

Installed capapcity tGWhrough renewable (GW)

Share of renewable in total installed capacity

188

-

0% FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

Share of RES (%)

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19 FY20 (Till Dec)

RES Installed Capacity (GW)

Fig. 12.5 Growth in renewable energy installed capacity (GW) and share (%). Data Source CEA (2020a)

Fig. 12.6 Share of renewable in installed capacity and energy generation in India. Figure Source CEA (2017)

It needs to be noted here the deficit does not indicate the gap between the need and supply. It only assesses the gap with respect to connected load, not the ones which are yet to be connected.

Dilemma at the National Level Depletion of fossil fuel reserve, high import dependency, and pollution call for use of more renewable energy in the future energy mix. However, lower efficiencies, higher investment costs, and seasonal and weather fluctuations have hindered the commercialization of standalone solar power generation systems. The renewable,

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

9.8%

8.5%

189

10.6% 9.0% 8.5%

8.7% 4.5% 4.7% 3.2% 4.2%

1.6%

3.6% 2.1%

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

Energy Deficit

FY16

0.7%

FY17

2.0% 0.7% FY18

0.8% 0.6% FY19

Peak Deficit

Fig. 12.7 Falling peak and average power deficit in India. Data Source CEA (2020b)

because of its dependence on nature and diluted nature of the source, cannot be used as baseload for which India is continued to depend on coal-based thermal power plants.

Low-Capacity Utilization of Thermal Power Plants The increasing share in renewable has contributed to the decline of the plant load factor (PLF) of coal-based thermal power plant (Rath, 2018). The following figure shows falling PLFs in India over the past 10 years (Fig. 12.8). A fall in PLF will make the power production costlier. Operation in low capacity utilization factor also leads to wear and tear of parts in power plants warranting more maintenance. So, there is always a dilemma whether to go for a new renewable 80

Plant load factor (%)

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 FY 2011-12 FY 2012-13 FY 2013-14 FY 2014-15 FY 2015-16 FY 2016-17 FY 2017-18 FY 2018-19 FY 2019-20

Fig. 12.8 The falling trend of plant load factor. Data Source CEA (2020c)

190

H. S. K. Nathan

energy-based plant or utilize the existing coal-based thermal plant for which the expenditures have already been made.

Lack of Manufacturing Capacity in Solar Though India is considered as a sunny country with sufficient solar insolation received over a year, still India is not self-sufficient in solar because of its large import of solar cells. India has a meagre capacity of 3 GW whereas the requirement is approximately 20 GW per year (Roy, 2020). India’s largest imports come from China, which dominates the world market with a 78% share in the solar cell manufacturing in the global market (Gombar, 2020). Lack of vertical integration, lack of industry-academia collaboration has led to such lagging for India in the case of solar (Nathan, 2015). It is not easy for India to bypass international agreements and WTO provisions, and to provide support to domestic manufacturers (Nathan and Manmeet, 2016). This lack of capacity makes India face the dilemma between coal and solar, where the major portion of the former resource is domestic, whereas larger shares of solar modules are imported.

Dilemma at the Household Level Burdening the Poor with Renewable In India, we have adopted a strategy of promoting solar in areas where conventional energy has not reached. This way renewable energy is pushed to rural remote locations which are generally inhabited by people who lack the capacity to handle such renewable systems. However, such systems were in place and in several cases, this has created a graveyard of technology in such remote rural locations. It needs to be noted that the people in such regions struggle to access basic services like education, healthcare facilities, market, etc. Therefore, it is pertinent to extend the conventional and convenient systems to rural areas rather than further burdening the populace with the role of energy management.

Ignoring the Ease of Use by Consumers In the context of energy, user convenience is critical for the success of any energy equipment. For instance, box-type solar cooker which was promoted in India in the 1970s and 80s as a clean alternative failed due to user inconvenience and time mismatch between the availability of sunlight and cooking requirements. Similar

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

191

observations were seen in case Gobar-gas-based cooking arrangement. The user inconvenience led to the failure of these systems as well. Studies show how these technologies have fallen into the valley of death because of their high cost and low scale of production (Balachandra et al., 2010). The central idea is consumers of energy need to be insulated from the energy source. For instance, a member of a household in a rural area when switches on a lighting switch he or she gets the lighting services without bothering where the energy coming is from.

Potential Trade-Offs Sufficiency, not Efficiency India, to achieve energy security, needs to follow a path driven by energy sufficiency, not simply energy efficiency. This is because the efficiency alone will not be able to deliver the energy security goals. With adoption of efficiency, the consumers tend to consume more due to “rebound effect” (Gillingham et al., 2014; Mestl et al., 2009; Roy, 2000), which indicates that “many energy efficiency improvements do not reduce energy consumption by the amount predicted by simple engineering models. Such improvements make energy services cheaper, so consumption of those services increases” (Sorrell, 2007). Had energy sufficiency dominated the discourse, the total primary consumption over time would have followed an inverted-U with income, but what it has followed more often a straight-U indicating increase in energy consumption with a simultaneous increase in efficiency (Kowsari & Zerriffi, 2011). The notion of sufficiency, on the other hand, goes beyond energy efficiency and puts the attention to limit and reduces the total resource consumption at all levels— household and higher levels (Thomas et al., 2017). Sufficiency curbs the freedom of individuals indirectly but as Spangenberg (2018) points out that concepts of freedom of choice and consumer sovereignty make sense within the space of sustainable lifestyles, the safe operating space of humankind; and outside this purview sovereignty turns into irresponsibility. Spangenberg (2018) adds, “By exhausting scarce resources, squandering them for dubious purposes like armament and war, repressing systems and luxury goods, and by over-polluting the environment on the one hand, and income polarisation on the other”, societies are turning out to be ‘irresponsibly efficient’”. Sufficiency subsumes efficiency and it discourages the citizens not to go for conspicuous consumption or aspiration for “positional goods”, which were defined by Hirsch (1976) as those goods whose value for the consumer who owns them depends more on how they compare with the goods consumed by others than on their direct utility. Incentives for energy sufficiency will be able to bring energy consumption down. So, India needs to go beyond efficiency targets as proposed in

192

H. S. K. Nathan

Paris convention and go for instruments promoting energy sufficiency, one of which can be a prohibitively large consumption tax (Frank, 2008).

Urban Institutional Rooftop Solar One of the paths for India to follow in solar applications is to promote institutional rooftop solar, particularly in urban areas. Out of the total solar power in India, the rooftop solar installations contribute to 8% with an overall installed capacity of 2.8 GW by June 30, 2020 (MNRE, 2020b). This share is low when compared to global leaders in solar. The share of roof-top PV installations in the total solar power in the USA, Germany, and China are 71%, 64%, and 32%, respectively (REN21, 2014). Rooftops are preferable over utility-scale solar as they do not require pooling of land, they utilize idle rooftops, there is minimal technical losses as power generation is at the consumption location, there is improvement in tail-end grid voltages and reduction in system congestion and pressure on the grid, and they can manage day time peak loads, which is expected to rise with more and more opting for air conditioning (Nathan, 2015). Also, given that the households in rural areas have become the victim of uncertainties of solar, it is wise to promote the rooftop systems in urban areas where there is a greater supply chain and higher human capacity to address maintenance (Nathan, 2014). It is also worth noting that compared to households, institutions are better suited for rooftop installations as institutions can plan better the rooftop space and avoid shading, can afford the capital expenditure of installations, do not suffer from the syndrome of “tragedy of commons” being a single consumer, have a timing match in energy consumption and production, and have the ecosystem in terms of capacity for maintenance and security of the system (Nathan, 2019).

Augmentation of Solar in Thermal Plants In a scenario where on the one hand there is a scarcity of fossil fuels and threats due to global warming associated with the power plant exhaust, and on the other hand, exclusive solar thermal systems are not satisfactory, there is an opportunity of combined use of coal and solar energy in the thermal power plants. There are two major ways solar augmentation can be achieved with thermal plants: (a) Solar thermal hybrid steam integration (feed-water preheating, freshwater preheating, parallel steam generation) and (b) Installation of solar PV cells for electricity generation in the area around thermal plants. The advantages of solar augmentation are—(i) Efficiency of work conversion of solar thermal energy aided in a coal-fired thermal power plant is higher than the efficiency of work conversion in a standalone solar thermal power plant (Gupta & Kaushik, 2009; Ying & Hu, 1999). (ii) Better control as only a small fraction of

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

193

power plant (typically maximum 15%) is affected and that way it eliminates the variability in power output in solo solar power systems (Pai, 1991; Ying & Hu, 1999). (iii) Less investment compared to standalone solar plant as most of the main equipment are included and shared with the conventional plant: steam turbine, cooling system, condenser system, electrical system, etc. (Sanchez & Gulati, 2011). (iv) Fuel (coal) saving, which has an equivalent impact on savings in ash generation and CO2 emissions (Alani, 1997; Pai, 1991; Suresh et al., 2010). If saving of the fuel is not the objective, then solar augmentation will lead to an increase in power. (v) Being integrated to a conventional plant, there is no need for storage, no hassle in connecting to the grid, and better performance for equipment in long term due to continuous operation of main equipment of the plant (Sanchez & Gulati, 2011). (vi) Solar augmentation through PV (i.e., option (b)) by using open space within the power plant area will be more seamless as these land areas are under the Ministry of Power and exclusively reserved for power generation, thus avoiding the extra land requirements for large standalone solar systems (Petrov et al., 2012). India, with a significant coal reserves and as a recipient of high solar insolation levels, has the suitable opportunity to use solar energy as a supplementary energy source in the existing or new coal-fired thermal power plants to reduce fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions, thus promoting sustainable energy development (Suresh et al., 2010).

Concluding Remarks India is in the process of energy transition and is faced with multiple options. While the country makes all these choices, it is useful to assess energy security both at the household and societal levels. For this purpose, in this paper, we have proposed a framework to compute energy security. The framework is based on the 3A (availability, affordability, and acceptability) model of energy accessibility. The framework is such that the same can be applicable at different levels: micro and macro. We have outlined the steps of its applications. Also, we have conceptualized the notion of supply and demand security using this framework. In the discussion on India’s energy mix coming from different sources, the paper highlighted the renewable and non-renewable divisions and dilemma. The different characteristics of these sources have also led to various challenges at the household and national levels. We highlight the issue of falling capacity utilization factor of thermal power plants and lack of solar manufacturing capacity. We suggest three strategies: focusing on sufficiency (not efficiency), implementing rapidly urban institutional rooftop solar, and augmenting solar in thermal plants for achieving greater energy security.

194

H. S. K. Nathan

References Alani, Y. (1997). CO2 mitigation through the use of hybrid solar-combined cycles. Energy Conversion and Management, 38(Supplement), S661–S667. Balachandra, P., Nathan, H. S. K., & Reddy, S. (2010). ‘Commercialization of sustainable energy technologies’, 2010. Renewable Energy, 35(8), 1842–1851. CEA. (2020a). Installed capacity including renewable share & its capacity, Monthly Reports, CEA, New Delhi. CEA. (2020b). Energy power supply position and peak power supply position, Monthly Reports, CEA, New Delhi. CEA. (2020c). Energy generation, programme, and plant load factor, Monthly Reports, CEA, New Delhi. CEA. (Central Electricity Authority). (2017). Data on installed capacity and energy generation. CEA. Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2014). The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As. Energy Policy, 75, 415–421. Dale, B. E., & Ong, R. G. (2012). Energy, wealth, and human development: Why and how biomass pretreatment research mustimprove. Biotechnology Progress, 28(4), 893–898. Dale, B. E. (2012). Energy, the wealth of nations, and human development: Why we must have renewable fuels. Presentation at UN Conference: Sustainable energy for sustainable development, Michigan State University, October 21–22. Dugoua, E., & Urpelainen, U. (2014). Relative deprivation and energy poverty: When does unequal access to electricity cause dissatisfaction? International Journal of Energy Research, 38(13), 1727–1740. Farooqui, G. H. (2009). AKRSP & ICIMOD held national planning workshop on development of sustainable energy for rangelands, Ground Report. Frank, R. H. (2008). Should public policy respond to positional externalities? Journal of Public Economics, 92(8–9), 1777–1786. Gaye, A. (2007). Access to Energy and Human Development. Occasional paper, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Human Development Report Office. Gillingham, K., Rapson, D., & Wagner, G., (2014). The rebound effect and energy efficiency policy. Discussion Paper, RFF DP 14–39, Resources for the Future. GIZ. (2015). Detailed project report for establishment of renewable energy management centres (REMC). Indo—German Energy Programme—Green Energy Corridors, May. Gombar, V. (2020) Taking on China in solar manufacturing. Business Standard. Gupta, S., Gupta, E. & Sarangi, G. K. (2020). Household Energy Poverty Index for India: An analysis of inter-state differences. Energy Policy, 144(111592). Gupta, M. K., & Kaushik, S. C. (2009). Exergetic utilization of solar energy for feed water preheating in a conventional thermal power plant. International Journal of Energy Research, 33(6), 593–604. Hayashi, M., Huges, L., & Kammen, D. M. (2013). The policy responses to the Fukushima nuclear accident and their effect on Japanese energy security. Energy Policy, 59, 86–101. Hirsch, F. (1976). Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. IEA (International Energy Agency). (2012). World energy outlook 2012. Renewable Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA IEA. (2013). World energy outlook 2013. OECD/IEA. IEA. (2014). Sustainable energy for all: Global tracking framework report. IEA and the World Bank. World Bank. Inamdar, N. (2014). Experts laud integrated coal, power renewables ministry. Business Standard. Jacobson, A., Milman, A. D., & Kammen, D. M. (2005). Letting the (energy) Gini out of the bottle: Lorenz curves of cumulative electricity consumption and Gini coefficients as metrics of energy distribution and equity. Energy Policy, 33(14), 1825–1832. Kowsari, R., & Zerriffi, H. (2011). Three-dimensional energy profile: A conceptual framework for assessing household energy use. Energy Policy, 39(12), 7505–7517.

12 India’s Energy Security at the Macro and Micro Levels

195

Liu, Y.-x, Feng, T.-t, Yang, Y.-s, & Yuan, J.-p. (2012). Study on prediction of energy security in Beijing based on scenario analysis. Journal of Convergence Information Technology, 7(23), 425–434. Mazur, A. (2011). Does increasing energy or electricity consumption improve quality of life in industrial nations? Energy Policy, 39(5), 2568–2572. MNRE. (2015b). The Indian solar power market: Well-positioned to shine. Akshya Urja, 8(6), MNRE, June. Mestl, H. E., Staff, E., & Gunnar, S. (2009). Richer and healthier, but not Greener? Choices concerning household energy use in India. Energy Policy, 37(8), 3009–3019. MNRE (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy). (2015a). Updates on solar developments in India, MNRE, Govt. of India, June 15. MNRE. (2015c). Physical progress (achievements)—Solar Power, Grid-interactive Power, Cumulative Achievements (as on 30 October 2015). Retrieved August 27, 2020, from http://mnre.gov. in/mission-and-vision-2/achievements/. MNRE. (2020a). What does the ministry do? MNRE, Govt. of India, June 15. Retrieved August 25, 2020, from https://mnre.gov.in/the-ministry/what-does-the-ministry-do/. MNRE. (2020b). Physical Progress, Programme/Scheme wise Physical Progress in 2020–21 & Cumulative upto June, 2020. Retrieved August 25, 2020, from https://mnre.gov.in/the-ministry/ physical-progress. Najam, A., & Cleveland, C. J. (2003). Energy and sustainable development at global environmental summit: An evolving agenda. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 5(1–2), 117–138. Nathan, H. S. K., & Choragudi, S. (2020). India’s energy data: Are we equipped for an inclusive policy design? Consideration at IRMA for Working paper, Institute of Rural Management, Anand. Nathan, H. S. K., & Hari, L. (2018). Measuring energy poverty: A households level analysis of India. NCDS Working paper #72, Nabakrushna Choudhury Centre for Development Studies, September. Nathan, H. S. K. & Hari, L. (2020). Towards a new approach in measuring energy poverty: Household level analysis of urban India. Energy Policy, 140(2020), 111397. Nathan, H. S. K., & Manmeet S. (2016). Undimmed: Nurturing Indian solar-power technology within the strictures of the WTO. The Caravan, 22–24. Nathan, H. S. K., Das, S. D., & Padmanabhan, A. (2020). Solar PV microgrid—‘Tragedy of commons’ or ‘wisdom of crowd’; in consideration. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning. Nathan, H. S. K. (2014). Solar energy for rural electricity in India: A misplaced emphasis. Economic and Political Weekly, XLIX(50), 60–67. Nathan, H. S. K. (2015). India’s 100GW of solar by 2022—Pragmatism or Targetitis. Economic and Political Weekly, L(50), 10–14. Nathan, H. S. K. (2016). Energy access and energy poverty: Concepts and insights on measurements. Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) Seminar Series, Tokyo. Nathan, H. S. K. (2019). Urban institutional rooftop PV electricity: Is this the answer to the solar question? RGS-IBG Annual International Conference, Royal Geographic Society (RGS) and Institute of British Geographers (IBG), London, UK. NESC (National Economic and Social Council). (2009). A blueprint for the energy sector in Mauritius. NESC. Pai, B. R. (1991). Augmentation of thermal power stations with solar energy. Sadhana, 16(1), 59–74. Penny, K. & Cronshaw, I, (2015). Coal in India, Department of Industry and Science, Australian Government, Commonwealth of Australia, June. Petrov M. P., Popa, M. V., & Fransson, T. H. (2012). Solar augmentation of conventional steam plants: from system studies to reality. Paper presented at World Renewable Energy Forum 2012, Denver CO, May 2012. Raj, B., Rethinaraj, T. S. G., & Nathan, H. S. K. (2016). Social dimension of India’s energy future. RITES Journal, 18(1), 12.1–12.20.

196

H. S. K. Nathan

Rath, B. (2018). “Plant load factor”, Thermal Watch. Retrieved August 25, 2020, from https://www. thermalwatch.org.in/resources/plant-load-factor. Reddy, S. (2015). Access to modern energy services: An economic and policy framework. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review, 47, 198–212. Reddy, A. K. N. (2002). Energy technologies and policies for rural development. In T. B. Johansson, & J. Goldemberg (Eds.), Energy for sustainable development: A policy agenda. United Nations Development Programme. REN21 (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century). (2014). Global Status Report, Renewables 2014, Paris: REN21. REN21 (2015) Global Status Report, Renewables 2015, Annual Reporting on Renewables: Ten years of excellence, Paris: REN21. Roy, J. (2000). The rebound effect: Some empirical evidence from India. Energy Policy, 28(6–7), 433–438. Roy, A. (2020). Can Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan help India’s solar manufacturing sector? Terra Nova, Observer Research Foundation. SADC. (2010). SADC regional energy access strategy and action plan 2010. SADC energy programme with the support of EUEI, Angola’. Sanchez M. M., & Gulati S. (2011). Integration in conventional coal fired power plants: The easiest and logical way for the development of concentrated solar power in India. Coal Power, Energetica India, Articles, 1–4. Sorrell, S. (2007). The rebound effect: An assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings from improved energy efficiency. Sussex Energy Group, UK Energy Research Centre, October. Spangenberg, J. (2018). Sufficiency: A pragmatic, radical visionary approach. In Sufficiency: Moving beyond the gospel of eco-efficiency, Chapter 1, (pp. 04–08). Suresh, M. V. J. J., Reddy, K. S., & Kolar, A. K. (2010). 4-E (Energy, Exergy, Environment, and Economic) analysis of solar thermal aided coal-fired power plants. Energy for Sustainable Development, 10, 267–279. Thomas, S. Thema, J. Kopatz, M., Brischke, L.-A., & Leuser, L. (2017). Energy sufficiency policy: How to limit energy consumption and per capita dwelling size in a decent way. Foundation for future energy policy, ECEEE Summer Study Proceedings. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2013). Human development report, the rise of the south: Human progress in a diverse world. UNDP. WEO (World Energy Outlook). (2004). Energy and development, Chapter 10, WEO 2014. World Nuclear Association. (2004). Nuclear power in Germany. Retrieved August 25, 2020, from https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/ germany.aspx. Wu, Q., Maslyuk, S., & Clulow, V. (2012). Energy consumption inequality and human development. In Z. Morvaj (Ed.), Energy efficiency—A bridge to low carbon economy (pp. 101–116). InTech. Ying, Y., & Hu, E. J. (1999). Thermodynamic advantages of using solar energy in the regenerative Rankine power plant. Applied Thermal Engineering, 19(11), 1173–1180.

Chapter 13

Climate Change and Human Security in India Evidence, Opportunities, and Challenges Chandra Sekhar Bahinipati and Unmesh Patnaik

Introduction Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that “warming of the climate system is now unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of an increase in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global sea level” (Solomon et al., 2007, p. 5). Climate change affects human security by negatively impacting livelihoods, culture and identity, displacement, and disrupting government agencies’ mechanisms to provide the necessary support for human security (Adger et al., 2014). According to Adger et al. (2014), “human security in the context of climate is defined as a state when people have freedom and capacity to live with dignity”. The consequences of climate change on environmental and socioeconomic systems have become the focus of a growing body of literature during the past few decades. While nations across the world have suffered the impacts on a differential scale, states in the global south have been more vulnerable to climatic aberrations and change (see Mendelsohn et al., 2006; IPCC, 2014). Moreover, the Fifth Assessment Report also envisages a more significant role for adaptation and disaster risk reduction due to the high certainty of an increasing trend in incidence and intensity of such events in the future. Climate change and climate variability pose a severe challenge to human security. The channels could be through several dimensions and processes (Adger et al., 2014). Different dimensions of human security likely to be impacted by climate change are food security, public health and wellbeing, livelihoods, and regional perspectives

C. S. Bahinipati (B) Indian Institute of Technology Tirupati, Yerpedu, Tirupati 517619, India e-mail: [email protected] U. Patnaik Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai 400088, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_13

197

198

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

(Adger et al., 2014). The causal link between climate change and human security is insignificant in some dimensions, where social and economic aspects play a significant role (Adger et al., 2014). Therefore, the increase in climatic aberrations and extremes poses additional risks to the livelihood and consumption practices of people already struggling with a high incidence of poverty and increasing economic inequality. The risks arise primarily because of: (1) the dependence of most of the population in these countries on climate-sensitive factors (agriculture and allied activities) for their livelihoods and (2) the threat to the habitat and the ecosystem (that include impacts biotic and abiotic factors like environment, infrastructure, and water). First, the idea of securing livelihood includes the notion of coping with and recovery from external stresses to maintain or enhance existing capabilities and assets (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). Second, Dercon (2002) observes that resilience is conditional upon the past and current exposure level and the socioeconomic and institutional setup witnessed by them. For instance, farmers from arid and semi-arid regions of India are concerned about water scarcity that affects their livelihoods. In contrast, farmers from the coastal areas are reporting cyclones, floods, and salinization, which are the primary concern that directly affects their livelihoods. Vulnerable households in states like Odisha, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh view migration as a coping strategy, as farmers in western Odisha (Patnaik & Das, 2017). With regards to the direct impacts from extreme events, referred to as losses and damages (L&Ds), Stern (2007) reports that the economic damages in the world were to the tune of US$ 83 billion during the 1970s and increased more than five times in the subsequent twenty years (approximately US$ 440 billion during 1990s). At the same time, the frequency of such events has increased from 29 to 74 during the corresponding period, with the potential impacts amounting to 5–20% of GDP (gross domestic product). Further, Bouwer et al. (2007) estimate that the global economic losses (inflation-adjusted) have been increased from an annual average of US$ 8.9 billion during 1977–1986 to US$ 45.1 billion between 1997 and 2006. Mendelsohn et al. (2012) find that the present global yearly damages from tropical cyclones are US$ 26 billion, which will more than double in 2100, i.e., US$ 56 billion per year—0.01% of Gross World Product. Regarding Asia, around 2,682 extreme events have arisen between 1970 and 2012. These events in total caused an economic loss of US$ 798.8 billion (adjusted at 2012 prices) and human death of 0.92 million (WMO, 2014). L&D refer to the residual impacts, which are beyond the capacity of a society to cope with or adapt to (see Warner & van der Geest 2013). Therefore, while mitigation and adaptation activities undertaken at the global and local levels are essential, society is bound to witness unavoidable losses and implications for human security. India has experienced 192 floods, 69 droughts, and 113 cyclonic events from 1970 to 2009 (Parida et al., 2018). An economic L&Ds from all the natural disasters is reported as US$ 55.62 billion between 1964 and 2012 and calculated L&D per year as US$ 1.21 billion (Bahinipati et al., 2016). It is close to 2% of India’s GDP (Padmanabhan, 2012; Government of India, 2011). Between 1980 and 2010, India witnessed around 143 thousand human casualties from several natural disasters. It impacted close to 1.5 billion people (Government of India, 2011).

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

199

India’s agrarian economy, a dominant source of employment and income to the largest segment of the rural populace, is intrinsically caught up in a crisis arising from a host of factors in recent years. One of the significant reasons for the agrarian crisis is the increasing climate risks, characterized by variability and extreme climate events (Pattanayak & Kumar, 2014; see Jayaraman & Murari, 2014). Over the years, Indian states have experienced significant variations in temperature and rainfall, exposing farmers to yield shocks. In this regard, several studies conducted across the Indian states have observed negative impacts from climate change. The findings were negative for state and crop-wise analysis (Kumar & Parikh, 2001; Kumar, 2011; Pattanayak & Kumar, 2014). While migration is generic, a few studies also observed that climatic aberrations are also significant determinants for migration (Viswanathan & Kumar, 2015). Climate change factors could lead to inequality in resources access, influencing migration (Adger et al., 2014). Although several studies considered migration as one of the coping strategies adopted by the households, it could enhance debt and vulnerability and, in turn, affects human security (Adger et al., 2014). Because of climate change, there could be conflict over the resources, inter-state disputes about the sharing water, rapid depletion of natural resources, and capable of compounding effect on human security. Because of ongoing climatic and non-climatic stressors, cities across rural and urban India are already experiencing water scarcity, and intensity is likely to increase in the decades yet to come. In this chapter, we have briefly explained the possible impact of climate change on agriculture and infrastructure, L&Ds from extreme events, the relationship between vulnerability, poverty and human development, and challenges involved in mitigation and adaptation. We have discussed all the sections from a human security perspective.

Climate Change, Agriculture, and Infrastructure The agriculture sector is affected by the potential impacts of climate change in multiple ways, particularly in India (Jayaraman and Murari, 2014; Kumar & Parikh, 2001; Kumar et al., 2011; Pattanayak & Kumar, 2014). The change in temperature and precipitation affects the timing and length of the growing yields. The reduction in water availability decreases agricultural production, and extreme climatic events like storms, cyclones, floods, and drought significantly impact agricultural production. In contrast, carbon dioxide emissions positively affect water use efficiency, leading to higher yields for certain crops. Followed by the Ricardian approach (see Mendelsohn et al., 1994), Kumar and Parikh (2001) find a decline in net revenue by 9–25% in India from climate change. Sanghi et al. (1998) also observed the negative impact of climate change on Indian agriculture. Kumar (2011) observed a negative effect of climate change on Indian agriculture after accounting spatial flow of information among the farmers. In the context of crop-wise impact, a study observes annual loss of 4.4 million tons of rice during 1969–2007 (Pattanayak & Kumar, 2014), and for wheat, the reduction of production is estimated as 5.2% from 1981 to 2009 (Gupta

200

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik 200 150 100 50

y = 1.3377x - 21.453 R² = 0.434

0 -50 Economic Value of Public Property Damaged (Rs in billion) Linear (Economic Value of Public Property Damaged (Rs in billion))

Fig. 13.1 L&Ds to public infrastructure from floods in India. Source Authors’ figure

et al., 2014). A recent study finds an overall loss of 4–8%, and this may rise till 25% by 2050 (Pingali et al., 2019). Further, climate change significantly affects infrastructure, and here we have discussed L&Ds to public infrastructure to Floods not only in India but also across the states. Figure 13.1 shows L&Ds to public infrastructure from Floods in India from 1953 to 2011, and Figs. 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4 outline the L&Ds from floods across the flood-affected Indian states. The L&Ds to public properties are increasing over the years, not only in India but also across the states. The increasing trend is visible in the states like Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Manipur, Odisha, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.

Loss and Damages from Extreme Events L&D from climate-related natural disasters is emerging as one of the key themes in research on climate change. However, their inclusion in the global climate debate was relatively recent. The concept emerged in the international climate negotiations during 1991 primarily to compensate the small island states for the consequences of sea-level rise. Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the term got first mentioned in the Bali Action Plan (COP 13) (Pielke et al., 2007; Bahinipati et al., 2015). Re-emergence was only after the publication of the fourth assessment report, which highlighted that mitigation efforts alone are insufficient to avoid all impacts of climate change. After that, in Cancun during the year 2010 (COP 16), the role of adaptation gained focus. As a result, the world program in L&D came into existence under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. On a more formal note, it was only during the Doha round of negotiations

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

201

Figures 13.2 L&Ds to public infrastructure from floods to nine Indian states. Source Authors’ figure

(COP 19) that the institutional arrangements were arrived at to address L&D under UNFCCC (Bahinipati et al., 2015). Another landmark was the publication of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). AR5 envisaged a more significant role for adaptation and disaster risk reduction due to the high certainty of an increasing trend in incidence and intensity of climatic aberration and extreme events. L&D refer to the residual impact from climate extremes, which are beyond the capacity of a society to cope with or adapt to (Warner & van der Geest, 2013). Therefore, while adaptation and mitigation activities undertaken at the global and local levels are essential. Regardless of their scale, society is bound to witness some unavoidable losses for the following reasons. First, locked-in historical emissions and consequent rise in global temperatures are likely to increase extreme events and the associated L&D. Second, non-implementation of specific adaptation measures due to tradeoff between the costs and benefits of these adaptation measures over different periods. The treatment of adaptation here also requires a more detailed introspection. The question is which activities qualify as an adaptation to climate change. It is difficult to answer as it will be almost impossible to draw a boundary and qualify interventions that fall within these as an adaptation to climate change and those outside of it. Adaptation is a function of the risk and vulnerability faced. It is always plausible that a set of activities do not directly link with adaptation to the impacts of climate

202

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

Fig. 13.3 L&Ds to public infrastructure from floods for nine Indian states. Source Authors’ figure

Fig. 13.4 L&Ds to public infrastructure from floods for eight Indian states. Source Authors’ figure

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

203

change. However, they indirectly reduce the incidence of risk and vulnerability (either through decreasing/diversifying the exposure or by building the resilience of the vulnerable). Such mechanisms depict generic adaptation measures (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2015, 2020), and examining the role of these in dealing with impacts of climate change remains neglected in the literature, barring a few studies such as (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2015, 2020). Enhancing development capacity through generic adaptation measures helps build greater resilience of the vulnerable and aids in building resilience to future impacts. Society incurs two types of costs due to the L&D. First is economic, which is the impact on goods and services traded in the market. The second is non-economic, which refers to the affected goods and services for which the market does not exist (Bahinipati, 2020). Further categorization is into direct and indirect costs. The direct depicts the immediate consequences of the disaster, mostly the damages or destruction to assets or stocks, due to the event (e.g., crop loss, houses damaged, impact on ecosystem services). The indirect refers to those motivated by the consequences of the disaster, e.g., impact on health, psychological trauma. Therefore, the total economic impact extends beyond the directly measurable ones (Bahinipati, 2020, 2021). Often, significant secondary and indirect effects are more critical in the long-run perspective. On the one hand, the damage to productive assets and public infrastructure affects societal welfare. On the other hand, the immediate requirement of spending toward recovery and reconstruction during the ex-post period is a burden for the fiscal management of the nation. Government agencies carry out ex-post disaster L&D assessments across the world; however, several economic and non-economic indicators remain unaccounted for in the process (Bahinipati, 2020). L&D from climate-related natural disasters have been exhibiting an upward trend over the past few decades on a global scale and so also is the case in developing countries and small island states. India is no exception to this pattern. The scenario is likely to continue in the foreseeable future due to climate change, as per the IPCC. India has been historically vulnerable to the incidence of extreme events, with the average annual economic loss in India due to disasters is being estimated to be approximately US$9.8 billion (Roy, 2019). A significant share (close to US$ 7 billion) of this is accountable for the incidence of floods. With this backdrop, we examine the nature and trend of reported L&D due to floods in India based on secondary data collected from the Central Water Commission (CWC) of the Government of India on several L&D indicators for the time 1953–2011. However, one general concern is regarding missing data. Some of the L&D indicators are either not reported or calculated for the events, and the reason for their non-inclusion in the data set is not very clear (Bahinipati, 2020). Many non-economic L&D indicators like migration, psycho-social stress, L&D to ecosystem and biodiversity, in general, are not reported in the post-disaster rapid assessments (Bahinipati, 2020). Most of these have an interlinkage with human security. Given these, on average, 32.43 million people in India were affected (3% of the country’s total population as per the Census of 2011), with the minimum people affected being 3.61 million and the maximum going up to approximately 70.45 million. Further, about 0.03% of the total net sown area (3.79 million ha) gets

204

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

destroyed per year due to floods. It corresponds to a monetary loss to the tune of INR (Indian Rupees) 11.15 billion. Floods killed an average of 1.65 thousand people between 1953 and 2011, with a minimum of 0.04 thousand and a maximum of 11.32 thousand (see Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). About 1.25 million houses were damaged per year, representing an economic loss of INR 5.57 billion. On average, the country suffered losses to public property to the tune of INR 18.68 billion. With regards to reported economic L&Ds, the mean value was INR 35.4 billion, with minimum and maximum damages at INR 0.07 billion and INR 325.52 billion, respectively (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). While damage to public property accounts for 53% of the total economic L&Ds, crop loss and houses damaged represent 31 and 16%, respectively (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). Disaggregating the L&D to the level of states unravels some exciting aspects. It emerges that around 17 states have experienced floods for more than forty years during the study period (1953–2011). These states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura. The states where flood occurs almost every year are Bihar (59), West Bengal (58), Assam (57), and Uttar Pradesh (56) (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). A higher number of people affected in the states were Bihar (386.94 million), Uttar Pradesh (404.01 million), West Bengal (223.6 million), Odisha (148.5 million), Andhra Pradesh (117.47 million), and Assam (163.37 million) (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). While an increasing trend exists for most, a steeper slope prevails for Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Odisha, Tripura, and Uttar Pradesh (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2020). Like the global case, L&D from floods in India is also rising at the country and disaggregated levels across states. In sum, wide variation does exist in the reported loss and damage and area affected across the states over time. Therefore, two questions emerge: (i) what the driving force for the increase in the reported L&D is and (ii) how big is the impact of these on the economy on a formal note. The overall trends are not very clear as far as India is concerned, but changes exist over time. There is evidence of a significant increase and decrease in the damage due to floods in the entire dataset. Comparison of the five most floodprone states of India, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal shows: (i) an increase in public utilities affected and total damage in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha with changes in the distribution of impacts, (ii) population affected has increased in Odisha and West Bengal while it has decreased in Uttar Pradesh, (iii) share of crop area affected has increased and so also damage to houses in West Bengal while it decreased in Uttar Pradesh, (iv) Bihar, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh reported a decrease in the value of crop affected while crop damage normalized by the cropped area has declined for the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The observed increase in L&D is driven by: (i) climate change causing an increase in the intensity and occurrence of events (risk angle) and (ii) economic development increasing the exposure (Bahinipati & Venkatachalam, 2016; Bahinipati et al., 2016). Turing over the next question that how enormous has been the scale of these direct losses the following points are noteworthy: (i) the volume of losses due to floods have exhibited a significant increase over the period 1953–2011, (ii) while we do not

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

205

find any evidence of intensification of flood events during the period, nevertheless, they have significantly eroded a small portion of the state GDP for the top five most flood-prone states of India, (iii) although no single event amounts to one percent of the state GDP, the incidence is relatively regular with wide variation existing in the percentage of area affected due to floods across the states, (iv) while numerically we observe the share of losses and damage to state gross domestic product significantly increasing over time even if the magnitude is low, and (v) no statistically significant trend observed for the percentage of flood area affected normalized by geographical area of the state and crop area affected. Thus, there is evidence that the growth trajectory of the state partly drives higher losses. At the state level, the GDP growth trend rate is approximately four percent for the entire period, with the incidence of floods turning as an insignificant coefficient in terms of impact. However, the critical finding is that the treatment effect is significant and negative across different models and functional forms. More importantly, controlling for the intensity of floods does not change the results for the treatment effect. Although small in magnitude, past flood events have negatively affected the state GDP for India’s five most flood-prone states, namely, Assam, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. In summary, due to the absence of any clear signals from the climate, the observed effects have been primarily driven by the growth story (exposure). The economic story is relatively straight: growth and development have increased elements at risk across all sectors. A notable increase in public utilities affected signifies the cumulative effect of intensification. In the similar line, Bahinipati & Venkatachalam (2016) and Bahinipati et al. (2016) reported that socio economic factors to some extent drive L&D from extreme events in Odisha and India, respectively. However, further research is required to establish the manifestation of the climate-economy interface on observed impacts and to identify the exact impact of disaster risk reduction and management interventions on the exhibited outcomes.

Vulnerability, Poverty, and Human Development It is plausible that high-income countries are less vulnerable than low-income nations, encountering an event with similar intensity (Noy, 2009). As development rises, the country devotes more significant resources for precautionary mechanisms to reduce the impact of natural disasters (Skidmore & Toya, 2013). Economic development minimizes the L&Ds from climatic extremes in two ways. First, more prosperous nations invest in disaster mitigation options, as a consequence, incur less impact (Ferreira et al., 2013; Skidmore & Toya, 2013). Second, the rise in the quality of institutions, education, and access to healthcare due to development enhances the households’ overall capacity to withstand various risks, including climatic ones (Kellenberg & Mobarak, 2008). However, not all adaptation would alleviate poverty and not all poverty reduction could reduce vulnerability (Sherman et al., 2016). Figures 13.5 and 13.6 show the relationship between poverty, HDI and vulnerability to cyclonic storms and floods in Odisha, India. An increasing trend between poverty

206

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik 0.6

Balasore Kendrapada

Vulnerability Level

Jajpur

Nabarangpur

Bhadrak 0.5 Jagatsingpur

Ganjam

Cuack

Baragarh

Dhenkanal

0.4

Nuapada Rayagada Malkangiri Gajapa Kandhamal Mayurbhanj Koraput Keonjhar Deogarh Boudh Bolangir Sonepur

Kalahandi

Puri

Nayagarh

y = 0.0003x + 0.4454 R² = 0.0105

Angul

Sundargarh Sambalpur

Khurda Jharsuguda 0.3 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Poverty HCR (%, 2010-11) Vulnerability to Cyclone and Flood (2008)

Fig. 13.5 Cross comparison between poverty and vulnerability. Source Authors’ figure based on data collected from GoO (2017: Depth and severity of poverty in rural Odisha: A district level estimation) and Bahinipati (2014) 0.6

Balasore Kendrapaday = -0.2868x + 0.6224

Vulnerability Level

Jajpur Nabarangpur Rayagada

0.5

Gajapati Kpraput

0.4

R² = 0.1928

Bhadrak Kalahandi Puri Ganjam Jagatsinghpur Mayurbhanj Keonjhar Bolangir Cuttack Boudh Sonepur Deogarh Baragarh Dhenkanal Nayagarh Angul Nuapada

Khurda Sambalpur

Sundargarh

Jharsuguda

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

HDI (2001) Vulnerability to Cyclone and Flood (2008) Linear (Vulnerability to Cyclone and Flood (2008))

Fig. 13.6 Cross comparison between HDI and vulnerability level. Source Author’s figure based on data collected from GoO (2004: Orissa human development) and Bahinipati (2014)

and vulnerability indicates that poorer districts are likely to be more vulnerable than more affluent ones, as anticipated. A declining trend exists in the context of HDI and vulnerability. Results suggest that the states with high HDI are less likely to be vulnerable. Households living in states exhibiting high human development resort to

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

207

various strategies to reduce their exposure to cyclones and floods. At the same time, the governments in these states are also likely to facilitate disaster risk reduction measures and planning. From a human security perspective, the government should promote generic development practices so that the overall development of the households increase, which ultimately reduce L&Ds to natural disasters (see Bahinipati and Patnaik, 2015, 2020).

Major Policy Challenges to Address Climate Change1 Society incurs two types of costs associated with mitigation: (i) abatement costs (e.g., switching to more expensive, cleaner fuels and re-capturing the emissions through reforestation), and (ii) social cost of carbon, e.g., potentially negative impacts on sensitive sectors such as agriculture, health, water, ecosystems (Mendelsohn, 2008). It is the responsibility of the policymakers to design a policy that is efficient in terms of minimizing present cost and maximizing households’ wellbeing of different generations. This issue was largely addressed by adopting mostly cost–benefit analysis (Nordhaus, 1993; Stern, 2007). The major controversy pertains to selecting discount rates, i.e., how the next generations are viewed by an economist—flag the issue of inter-generational or inter-temporal equity (Spash and d’Arge, 1989). As per standard principle, minimizing the present value of the abatement plus damage costs is referred as an optimal path of mitigation (Mendelsohn, 2008). Therefore, numerous studies have adopted the cost–benefit approach in solving the long-standing environmental problems but criticized it for its economic assessment, ethical, and methodological standpoint (Spash, 2002). A persisting issue is how economists discount future generations relative to the current. Which discount rate they should apply—the pure rate of time preference, the market rate of interest or consumption discount rate. Two types of discount rates are prevalent: pure time preference rate (PRTP) and consumption discount rate (CDR) or market rate on interest (Heal, 2008). In general, the future generation is being discounted because of different time periods and incomes. In doing so, it ignores the issue of intra-generational equity (Heal, 2008). Further, general equilibrium model is mostly adopted that considers world as a single entity and ignores the present inequalities (Heal, 2008). In the context of selecting a discount rate, Dasgupta (2008) has raised a wide range of questions: how should society choose the discount rate—PRTP or CDR, how are they related to the notion of inter-generational justice and equity, should they be constant over time or should they depend on date, do they reflect the opportunity cost of the capital, and if they do, how society determines what that cost is, whether the discount rate is positive or negative, and how the consumer prices future consumption with the current uncertainty. A higher discount rate has the disadvantage of allocating negligible present value to a future disastrous event, likely to cause significant damage 1

The contents of this section have been borrowed from the published GIDR working paper no. 226, titled ‘climate change economics: a review on theoretical understanding and controversies.

208

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

resulting in considerable future costs. Given the controversies, Heal (2008) supports the idea of preferring a lower discount rate, as some studies, including Stern’s review, adopted. Choosing a zero or near-zero discount rate will be more appropriate because it would give equal importance to people born in different time periods. Further, elasticity of consumption is found as another controversy in the literature. Further, the notion of uncertainty has dominated the controversy. As of now, none of studies categorically confirms the impact of climate change. For example, there is always uncertainty with respect to rise in temperature to 2 or 6 °C concerning the temporal and spatial scale. Likewise, the other parameters such as precipitation, humidity, ocean circulation, and melting of ice sheets are quite uncertain, and thus, its’ impact on societal wellbeing is not estimated with high confidence. As a result, designing policies with uncertainty are challenging task for the policymakers. The traditional economic model of decision-making under uncertainty assumes known state space, probability distribution, and an expected utility function; the characteristics of climate economics do not satisfy the conditions mentioned above. Though we know the likelihood of the impact in the future, it is insufficient to build probability distribution, and the consequences are irreversible (Heal, 2008). There is an agreement on costs of action on specific points. For example, around 3% of the world’s GDP is required to reduce emission of CO2 below 450 ppm, as per the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, and it could be less than 5.5% by 2050 (Heal, 2008). As per Stern (2007), around 1%–3% of the world’s GDP needed to concentration of CO2e less than 500–550 ppm. Estimations are available in relative terms, and the issue raised by Heal (2008) that whether the absolute value would be doubled if the GDP increase two times. An optimal carbon tax was estimated by Nordhaus as USD 30/ton in 2005, and it should be increased to USD 85/ton by the mid of the current century (Nordhaus, 2007, p.2 01). At the same time, a higher figure was calculated by Stern (2007) as USD 300/ton, i.e., ten times higher than pervious calculation. Since the onus of an economist to minimize the present value, suggesting such higher figure by Stern was criticized by Mendelsohn (2008) as whether Stern’s review is an economic analysis. Besides this, it does not estimate the present value of the sum of damages and abatement costs of its preferred policy. It does not compare it with the other alternative efficient approaches cited in the mainstream literature (Mendelsohn, 2008). In the context of the cost of inaction, much controversy also persists in the mainstream economics literature. In particular, the result depends upon the five factors: (i) assigned value to the costs of climate change, (ii) choice of discount rate, (iii) elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, (iv) non-market impacts, and (v) issue related to uncertainty (Heal, 2008, p. 20). In the climate mitigation policy debate, there are two concepts: stock and flow. Concerning the former, India’s position contrasts with developed countries, reflected through per capita emission. In the latter case, a nation like India is considered a growing economy with increasing emissions (Dubash, 2013). Following the CoP held in Copenhagen (2009), there was a discussion about climate change. The debate centered on using national space for development and not for effective climate agreement (Dubash, 2013). However, India has submitted Intended National Determined Contribution (INDC) to CoP in Paris (2015). The government has voluntarily agreed

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

209

to reduce GHGs. Several goals will follow in the coming years to reduce the emission of GHGs. Some of them are (1) to reduce emission intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35% by 2030 from 2005 level, (2) high economic growth with lesser per capita emission of GHGs, (3) around 40% of electricity should be generated from non-fossil fuel by 2030, (4) increase forest area and afforestation to enhance carbon sink.2

Major Challenges for Adaptation Adaptation bounced back as a critical issue in the climate change debate, as the world will be subjected to some impacts of climate change, even if we adopt stringent mitigation policy now (Pielke et al., 2007). Hence there are two critical aspects of climate change adaptation. Firstly, adaptation is local; hence crucially depends on local effects of climate change. Second, climate change adaptation mechanisms overlap with development goals, including poverty reduction and health improvement (Vale, 2016). In the literature, both the discourses such as impact assessment and vulnerability assessment are discussed the idea of adaptation. They ask different research questions and examine adaptive capacity differently (Bahinipati, 2011). Impact studies use a normative approach to estimate likelihood impact costs from climate change related events. The impact value is estimated after deducting adaptation (Bahinipati, 2011). The literature related to vulnerability follows a descriptive or positive approach, and it views vulnerability as the resilience capacity of an entity (Bahinipati, 2011). Economic discourse on both approaches focuses on three issues (i) cost of adaptation, (ii) financing adaptation, and (iii) households’ adaptive behavior and effectiveness of adaptation measures. In December 2007, during Bali Action Plan (CoP-13), developed nations agreed to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources to developing countries to adapt to climate change (World Bank, 2010). Therefore, many studies (both at the macro- and micro-level) estimate the price tag for adaptation to help policymakers in the global, regional, and local contexts (Bahinipati, 2011). A few studies have been carried out on a macro scale to estimate the adaptation cost for different regions and sectors separately (Agrawala & Fankhauser, 2008; Fankhauser, 2010; Parry et al., 2009; World Bank, 2010). At the micro-level, Mckinsey (2009) has identified cost-effective adaptation options using the conventional cost–benefit analysis. On similar lines, by adopting a hierarchical analytical process, Nambi et al. (2015) propose adaptation metrics to identify the most effective adaptation options in the agriculture and water sectors. Applying the joint probability distribution method, Palanisami et al. (2015) estimate the cost of farm-level adaptation measures adopted by farmers in the major river basins in India. Though there are limitations to the methods adopted by the above studies (see Bahinipati, 2011), the advantage is that they give a figure for adaptation cost, which helps policymakers in their negotiations. Nonetheless, a few philosophical questions arise: who will provide funding and how 2

http://moef.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/revised-PPT-Press-Conference-INDC-v5.pdf.

210

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

much aid each developing nation would receive. Another research issue is about the right time to invest in adaptation, i.e., whether we should invest now or wait for technological advancement, which would lower adaptation costs. Indian farmers adapt to climate change to reduce the impacts (see Viswanathan et al., 2020; Bahinipati et al., 2021). However, most studies focused on farm-level adaptations and less emphasis on other adaptation strategies like farm diversification, farm financial management, and government and civil society (Bahinipati et al., 2021). A few studies investigated climate change sensitivity, perception, and behavioral biases as the determinants of farm-level adaptation measures (Bahinipati & Patnaik, 2021). The national and state governments have taken several initiatives to promote adaptation measures across the sensitive sectors to protect human security.

Concluding Remarks This chapter briefly discussed the impact of climate change on human wellbeing, particularly from the human security perspective. Based on a broader framework of human security, it initially addressed the impacts of climate change on agriculture that provides livelihood to many households in rural India. Subsequently, the focus was on infrastructure, especially L&Ds, to public properties from floods in India. A separate section discussed L&Ds from climate change and extreme events. This chapter also discusses the significant challenges for policymakers concerning mitigation and adaptation. Following salient points have been emerged from the chapter: (i) based on the discussion in the previous paragraphs, we establish that climate change affects different dimensions of human security (Adger et al., 2014), (ii) the government should prioritize adaptation measures in the case of agriculture and build climate-resilient infrastructure in the susceptible regions; (iii) it is imperative to recognize the non-economic L&Ds from the climate change, and extreme events as the related indicators could assist policymakers to design interventions to reduce the extent of the impact on human security, (iv) it highlights different points to mitigation and adaptation. Acknowledgements This chapter has borrowed contents from the published GIDR working paper and policy brief published by TISS, Mumbai. The authors have exclusive rights to republish the contents of the working paper and policy brief. Usual disclaimers apply.

References Adger, W. N., Pulhin, J. M., Barnett, J., Dabelko, G. D., Hovelsrud, G. K., Levy, M., Oswald Spring, Ú. & Vogel, C. H. (2014). Human security. In: climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In C. B. Field,

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

211

V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, & L. L. White (Eds.), (pp. 755–791). United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Agrawala, S., & Fankhauser, S. (Eds.). (2008). Economic aspects of adaptation to climate change: Costs, benefits and policy instruments. OECD. Agrawal, A., & Perrin, N. (2009). Climate adaptation, local institutions and rural livelihoods. In: W. N. Adger, I. Lorenzoni, & K. O’Brien (Eds.), Adapting to climate change: thresholds, values, governance (pp. 350–367). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bahinipati, C. S. (2011). Economics of adaptation to climate change: learning from impact and vulnerability literature. MIDS Working Paper No. 213, Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS), Chennai, India. Bahinipati, C. S. (2020). Assessing the costs of droughts in rural India: a comparison of economic and non-economic loss and damage. Current Science, 118(11), 1832–1841. Bahinipati, C. S. (2021). Do risk management strategies prevent economic and non-economic loss and damages? Evidence from drought affected households in Western India. Environmental Quality and Management. https://doi.org/10.1002/tqem.21747. Bahinipati, C. S. & Patnaik, U. (2015). The damages from climatic extremes in India: Do disaster specific and generic adaptation measures matter? Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 17(1), 157–177. Bahinipati, C. S., & Patnaik, U. (2021). What motivates farm-level adaptation in India? A systematic review. (Chapter 4). In A. K. E. Haque et al., (Eds.), Climate change and community resilience: insights from South Asia (pp. 49–68). Springer. Bahinipati, C. S., & Venkatachalam, L. (2016). Role of climatic risks and socio-economic factors in influencing the economic impact of climatic extremes: A normalisation study in the context of Odisha, India. Regional Environmental Change, 16(1), 177–188. Bahinipati, C. S., Patnaik, U., & Viswanathan, P. K. (2016). What causes economics losses from natural disasters in India. In S. Dinda (Eds.), Handbook of research on climate change impact on health and environmental sustainability (pp. 157–175). IGI Global Publisher. Bahinipati, C. S., & Patnaik, U. (2020). Does development reduce damage risk from climate extremes? Empirical evidence for floods in India. Water Policy, 22(5), 748–767. Bahinipati, C. S., Rajasekar, U., Acharya, A., & Patel, M. (2015). Flood-induced economic loss and damage to the textile industry in Surat City, India. Asian Cities climate resilience working paper series 26, International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED), London, U.K. Bahinipati, C. S., Patnaik, U., & Viswanathan, P. K. (2016). What Causes Economics Losses from Natural Disasters in India. In S. Dinda (Eds.), Handbook of research on climate change impact on health and environmental sustainability. IGI Global Publisher. Bahinipati, C. S., Kumar, V., & Viswanathan, P. K. (2021). An Evidence based systematic review on farmers’ adaptation strategies in India. Food Security, 13(2), 399–418. Benson, C., & Clay, E. J. (2004). Understanding the economic and financial impacts of natural disasters. World Bank: Disaster Risk Management Series. Bouwer, L. M., Crompton, R. P., Faust, E., Hoppe, P., & Pielke, R. A., Jr. (2007). Confronting disaster losses. Science, 318(5851), 753. Dasgupta, P. (2008). Discounting Climate Change. SANDEE Working Paper no. 33, SANDEE. Dercon, S. (2002). Income risk, coping strategies, and safety nets. The World Bank Research Observer, 17(2), 141–166. Dubash, N. K. (2013). The politics of climate change in India: Narratives of equity and co-benefits. Wires Climate Change, 4, 191–201. Fankhauser, S. (2010). The Costs of Adaptation. Willey Interdisciplinary Reviews: climate change, 1(1): 23–30. Ferreira, S., Hamilton, K., & Vincent, J. (2013). Does development reduce fatalities from natural disasters? New evidence for floods. Environment and Development Economics, 18(6), 649–679.

212

C. S. Bahinipati and U. Patnaik

Government of India (2011). Disaster Management in India. Published by Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. Gupta, S., Sen, P., & Srinivasan, S. (2014). Impact of climate change on the Indian economy: Evidence from food grain yields. Climate Change Economics, 5(2). Heal, G. (2008). Climate economics: A meta review and some suggestions. NBER working paper 13927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. IPCC. (2014). Climate change 2014: Synthesis report. In R. K. Pachauri, & L. A. Meyer (Eds.), Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change core writing team (p. 151). IPCC. Jayaraman, T., & Murari, K. (2014). Climate change and agriculture: Current and future trends, and implications for India. Review of Agrarian Studies, 4(1), 1–49. Kellenberg, D., & Mobarak, A. (2008). Does rising income increase or decrease damage risk from natural disasters? Journal of Urban Economics, 63, 788–802. Kumar, K. S. K. (2011). Climate sensitivity of Indian agriculture: do spatial effects matter? Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 4(2): 221–235. Kumar, K. S. K., & Parikh, J. (2001). Indian agriculture and climate sensitivity. Global Environmental Change, 11, 147–154. Mckinsey. (2009). Shaping Climate Resilient Development – A Framework for Decision Making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group. Mendelsohn, R. (2008). Is the Stern review an economic analysis? Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(1), 45–60. Mendelsohn, R., Nordhaus, W. D., & Shaw, D. (1994). The impact of global warming on agriculture: A Ricardian analysis. The American Economic Review, 84(4), 753–771. Mendelsohn, R., Dinar, A., & Williams, L. (2006). The distributional impacts of climate change on rich and poor Countries. Environment and Development Economics, 11, 159–178. Mendelsohn, R., Emanuel, K., Chonabayashi, S., & Bakkensen, L. (2012). The impact of climate change on global tropical cyclone damage. Nature Climate Change, 2, 205–209. Nambi, A. A., Bahinipati, C. S., Ranjini R., & Nagendran, R. (2015). Farm household level adaptation metrics for agriculture and water sectors. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 7(1), 27–40. Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). Critical assumptions in the stern review on climate change. Science, 317, 201–202. Nordhaus, W. D. (1993). Reflections on the economics of climate change. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(4), 11–25. Padmanabhan, G. (2012). Hazard profile of India. Yojana, 56, 39–43. Palanisami, K., Kakumanu, K. R., Ranganathan, C. R. & Sekhar, N.U. (2015). Farm-level cost of adaptation and expected cost of uncertainty associated with climate change impacts in major river basins in India. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 7(1), 76–96. Parida, Y., Dash, D. P., Bhardwaj, P., & Chowdhury, J. R. (2018). Effects of drought and flood on farmer suicides in Indian States: An empirical analysis. Economics of Disaster and Climate Change, 2, 159–180. Parry, M. et al. (2009). Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change–a review of UNFCCC and Other recent studies. International Institute for Environment and Development and Grantham Institute for Climate Change, Imperial College London, U.K. Patnaik, U., & Das, P. K. (2017). Do development interventions confer adaptive capacity? Insights from Rural India, World Development, 97, 298–312. Pattanayak, A., & Kumar, K. S. K. (2014). Weather sensitivity of rice yield: evidence from India. Climate Change Economics, 5(4). Pielke, R., Jr., Prins, G., Rayner, S., & Sarewitz, D. (2007). Lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature, 455(8), 597–598. Pingali, P., Aiyar, A., Abraham, M., & Rahman, A. (2019). Transforming food systems for a rising India. Palgrave Macmillan.

13 Climate Change and Human Security in India …

213

Roy, A. (2019). Making India’s coastal infrastructure climate resilient: challenges and opportunities. ORF Occassional paper 207. Sanghi, A., Mendelsohn, R., & Dinar, A. (1998). The Climate Sensitivity of Indian Agriculture (Chapter-4). In D. C. Washington (Eds.), Measuring the impact of climate change on Indian agriculture. U.S.A: The World Bank. Sherman, M., Berrang-Ford, L., Lwasa, S., Ford, J., Namanya, D. B., Lianos-Cuentas, A., Maillet, M., & Harper, S. (2016). Drawing the line between adaptation and development: a systematic review of planned adaptation in developing countries. WIREs Climate Change, 7(5), 707–726. Skidmore, M., & Toya, H. (2013). Natural disaster impacts and fiscal decentralization. Land Economics, 89(1), 101–117. Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., & Averyt, K., et al. (2007). Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis Contributions of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Spash, C. L. (2002). Greenhouse economics: Value and ethics. London: Rutledge Publication. Spash, C. L., & d’Arge, R. C. (1989). The greenhouse effect and intergenerational transfers. Energy Policy, April, pp 88–95. Stern, N. (2007). Stern’s review on economics of climate change. London: Cambridge University Press. Vale, P. M. (2016). The changing climate of climate change economics. Ecological Economics, 121, 12–19. Viswanathan, B., Kumar, K. S. K. (2015). Weather, agriculture and rural migration: evidence from state and district level migration in India. Environment and Development Economics, 20(4), 469–492. Viswanathan, P. K., Kavya, K., & Bahinipati, C. S. (2020). Global patterns of climate resilient agriculture: a review of studies and imperatives for empirical research framework for India. Review of Development and Change, 25(2), 169–192. Warner, K., & Van der Geest, K. (2013). Loss and damage from climate change: Local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries. International Journal of Global Warming, 5(4), 367–386. World Bank. (2010). The economics of adaptation to climate change. A synthesis report, final consultation draft, August 2010. Washington: The World Bank.

Chapter 14

Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements Swati Narayan

Indian children are still among the skinniest and shortest on the planet… Angus Deaton: The Great Escape (Deaton, 2013: 163)

Nutrition Insecurity India has the largest number of undernourished citizens in the world(FAOSTAT, 2019). The country is ranked 94 out of 107 countries on the 2020 Global Hunger Index (GHI, 2020). Nearly, two of every five pre-school children are also stunted, i.e., too short for their age. Even before the pandemic, in 13 of 17 Indian states, the first round of the National Family Health Survey in 2019 has indicated that the proportion of stunted children had worsened or stagnated since 2015 (IIPS & MoHFW, 2020). In impoverished states such as Bihar, the extent of malnutrition, especially amongst marginalised communities such as the Musahars,1 at the bottom of the caste hierarchy is acute (Sabharwal, 2011). Therefore, hunger and food insecurity remain amongst the gravest concerns in the Indian nation-state. It is one of the severest of the seven threats to human security identified in the 1994 Human Development Report. After all, human security as an interdependent, people-centric concern, focuses on both ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ (UNDP, 1994:94). Therefore, as elucidated by the 2003 Commission on Human Security, the concept is complementary to and intimately linked with human rights. S. Narayan (B) Inequality and Human Development Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India e-mail: [email protected] 1

Musahars are considered to be at the lowest rung of the Dalit caste hierarchy and are referred to as rat eaters due to their diets. Their literacy rate was 22% in 2011, though their population size is 2.7 million in Bihar. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_14

215

216

S. Narayan

Human rights and human security are mutually reinforcing. Human security helps identify the rights at stake in particular situations. And human rights help answer the question: How should human security be promoted? The notion of duties and obligations (inherent in human rights) complements the recognition of the ethical and political importance of human security (UN, 2003).

Thus, human rights specify in affirmative terms the core human freedoms that human security seeks to protect. This includes both the ‘right to life’ and the ‘right to personal liberty’, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Interestingly, the Indian Supreme Court has adopted an expansive interpretation of this same constitutional guarantee in the landmark ‘right to food’ case, which has formed the bulwark of core social protection measures to prevent hunger (PUCL vs Union of India and others, Civil Writ Petition 196 of 2001) (Drèze, 2004). This justiciable legal guarantee transcends the United Nations’ Committee on World Food Security definition of food security as merely when, ‘all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their food preferences and dietary needs for an active and healthy life’. Instead, these entitlements specify the duties of the Indian nation-state to protect the right to food and the right to life with dignity of all citizens. As with all human rights, the right to food entails three forms of state obligations: to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate, sufficient, nutritious food. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of the United Nations General Assembly emphasises both the principle of non-discrimination and the necessity for the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, which include the right to food. The emphasis is on ‘enforceability’, which obligates the state to ‘take steps’, by adopting ‘legislative’ or other measures for the ‘full realisation’ of at least the ‘minimum core obligations’ of the right to food (Sinha, 2014). Further, in the wake of the pandemic, the impact of the contagion has been so severe that India is expected to contribute to half the estimated additional poor globally (Sumner et al., 2020). Two hundred and thirty million Indians may already have fallen into poverty in the first wave (APU, 2021). Further, as numerous surveys have indicated, food insecurity has worsened multi-fold, especially among vulnerable communities and families who do not have access to the government’s subsidised food grains (APU, 2020; Kulkarni, 2020; RTFC & CES, 2021; SEWA Bharat, 2020; VAF & Samboodhi, 2020). Two-thirds of the respondents on the Hunger Watch Survey across 11 states in October 2020 reported a decline in food intake, 45% had to borrow money for food and one-third admitted to skipping meals (RTFC & CES, 2021). Even before the pandemic, the Indian economy was experiencing the highest levels of unemployment in forty-five years (PTI, 2019). However, ironically, even during nationwide farmer protests, agricultural production has peaked at historic levels. The official advance estimates indicate that India’s foodgrains production in 2020–21 will be unprecedented, even after four consecutive bumper harvests (FE Bureau, 2021). Since the green revolution, in the seventies, India has largely been self-sufficient in food grain production. The per capita availability of food grains has also steadily increased, despite population growth (CEIC, 2017).

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

217

In this context, this chapter will navigate the history of food and nutrition policies in India and investigate the acute necessity for the universal expansion of welfare entitlements as human rights safeguards. The first section will explore the conceptual puzzle of ‘hunger amidst plenty’. The second section will analyse the historical commitments of successive governments, from the colonial to the post-colonial democratic regimes to the pandemic, for protecting food security both on the demand and supply side. The final section will elucidate the necessity for universal food security protections.

Hunger Amidst Plenty The South Asian nutrition enigma (Ramalingaswami et al., 1997) has puzzled nutritionists for more than two decades. India’s rapid economic growth rates have stood in contrast to its relatively high child malnutrition outcomes, which are worse than several countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Further, data from the latest National Family Health Surveys also indicate the acute severity of the malnutrition crisis in the northern Gangetic plains, compared to the relatively better outcomes in the coastal states of southern and western India (Fig. 14.1). Children belonging to marginalised castes and tribes are more likely to be underweight (IIPS & MOHFW, 2017). Further, in 2002 economists, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, have highlighted the jarring contrast in India, ‘of particular concern is the scandalous phenomenon of mounting food stocks against a backdrop of widespread hunger’ (Drèze & Sen, 2002:336). Not only is this, ‘quite extraordinary, so is the silence with which it is tolerated, not to mention the smugness with which it is sometimes dismissed’ (Sen, 2001). More than twenty years later, despite the enactment of a series of legislative entitlements, in the midst of the pandemic, unfortunately, this ignominy of ‘hunger amidst plenty’ has reemerged. The capability approach which complements both the human rights and human security frameworks aptly elucidates hunger both as a political and ethical concern. This approach which formulates ‘development as freedom’ recognizes that, ‘in each social structure, given the prevailing legal, political and economic arrangements, a person can establish command over some alternative commodity bundles…’ as ‘entitlements’ (Drèze & Sen, 1989). However, this relationship is often tenuous especially in a situation of scarcity triggered by the economic crisis, famines or pandemics, as the ability to command both individual and collective entitlements could be substantially and rapidly depleted. The UN Committee on World Food Security considers, the four pillars of food security to be availability, access, utilisation and stability. The strident national and state lockdowns have aggravated all four aspects of food insecurity by exacerbating inequalities. However, the capability approach also recognises that the institutionalisation of effective social protection mechanisms such as subsidised food rations, soup kitchens, school meals and pensions, can ameliorate food insecurity by providing, ‘social means to prevent deprivation and vulnerability’ (Ahmad et al., 1991).

218

S. Narayan

Fig. 14.1 Children under five years of age stunted due to malnutrition (%). NFHS, 2017 Source Latest available data from (IIPS & MoHFW, 2020)

Further, sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s conceptualisation of the process of ‘decommodification’ is also apt to analyse the role of public services such as state provision of subsidised food grains, school meals or community kitchens to re-distribute notional savings into household budgets. Pertinently, the world over, the pandemic has necessitated a fundamental rethink of citizen-state relations and the need for ‘radically transformative, egalitarian and inclusive’ policies (Leach et al., 2021). Natural disasters and social crises are often open unprecedented political windows of opportunity to expand welfare systems (Beresford, 2016; Hemerijck, 2011) for their inherent value as ‘automatic stabilisers’ (Ocampo & Stiglitz, 2018). Especially given the gravity of undernutrition in India,

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

219

while on the one hand, the pandemic has amplified food insecurity amongst vulnerable communities, on the other, it could also potentially herald a revolution for the expansion of social protection and universal food security.

History of Food Policies The historical trajectory of food policies in India from the colonial famine codes in the nineteenth century to the gamut of rights-based legislation for food, work and other justiciable entitlements enshrined in the new millennium has been an arduous journey. However, despite the enactment of the food law, starvation deaths continue to plague India. Though the transition from emergency relief to legal entitlements has been a political economy triumph, there remain significant challenges ahead in the next stage of the post-pandemic era for the universal expansion of food entitlements. This section will map the history of food policies in India. On the other hand, it will also outline the trajectory of agricultural policies, to highlight the lacunae in food security social protection measures that need to be bridged. Colonial India was beset with famines. Famines occurred both in the Britishadministered regions of India and the princely states. From the eighteenth to twentieth century, more than 60 million deaths occurred in India due to famines alone. However, the Great Leap Forward under Mao’s China had the most horrific toll of 24 million excess deaths (Fig. 14.2). The 1943 Bengal famine was the last one before independence. Economist Amartya Sen in his seminal work explains that famines can occur both in overall boom and slump conditions of agricultural production (Sen, 1981). But their primary cause is invariably either of four types of entitlement failures—trade-based entitlement, production-based entitlement, own-labour entitlement and inheritance and transfer entitlement—which result in affected families succumbing to mass starvation (ibid, 1981). Thus, access to social protection and food entitlements assume primary importance to stem famines and starvation, rather than an increase in the overall availability of food in the economy. However, after the emergence of the independent Indian nation-state, famines have largely been relegated to history. As astutely surmised, ‘there has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty democracy’ which has been controlled by ‘the political incentives generated by elections, multiparty politics and investigative journalism’ (Sen, 1999). Several social policies in democratic India enabled this gradual shift in the food security landscape.

Famine Codes In the 1880s, the British government developed the Famine Codes to measure the severity of food insecurity and initiate both preventive and ameliorative action (Mander, 2009). Even after independence, these codes were the primary means for

220

S. Narayan

Fig. 14.2 Famines in Asia and Excess Mortality (midpoint estimate). Source Joe Hasell and Max Roser (2013)

drought relief and famine prevention in post-colonial India. Their main focus was on the provision of public employment to build roads and canals at subsistence wages (Drèze, 1991). The codes also highlighted the importance of soup kitchens, dry ration and other emergency relief measures for destitute feeding to prevent mass impoverishment. However, they did not contain any legislative entitlements or guarantees, or safeguards.

National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 Post-independence, Article 41 of the Indian Constitution explicitly committed that ‘[T]he State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work … and to public assistance in cases of unemployment…’ Accordingly, a range of employment schemes were implemented over the decades from the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) in the eighties to the National

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

221

Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) in 2004. However, these programs did not guarantee any rights to workers. Therefore, after consistent pressure from labour unions and social movements, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was finally enacted by Parliament in 2005 (Ambasta et al., 2008; Desai et al., 2005; Drèze, 2020a; Fischer & Ali, 2019; Mehrotra, 2008; Sankaran, 2011). It was inspired by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act, 1977, which too was the product of a socio-political movement after the severe 1970– 73 drought in Maharashtra (Patel, 2006). Further, after the pandemic, the demand for an urban employment guarantee scheme has also been amplified nationwide to expand employment and food security for urban residents (Drèze, 2020b).

National Food Security Act, 2013 Since the Second World War, India’s public distribution system (PDS) was specifically designed for famine prevention. Before 1997, this well-established network of more than 1 million fair price shops (FPS), as the backbone of the country’s food security entitlements, was universally accessible to the entire population with ration cards. However, in the nineties, a targeted regime was introduced with differential pricing and entitlements (Khera, 2009). Then, for nearly a decade, the selection criteria to identify eligible families officially depended on the ‘Below the Poverty Line’ surveys, despite their significant inclusion and exclusion errors (Hirway, 2003; Khera, 2009; NCAER, 2015; Sundaram, 2003; Swaminathan & Misra, 2001). After decades of advocacy by civil society social movements for an explicit legislative guarantee for nutritious and age-appropriate ‘right to food’, the National Food Security Act (NFSA) was finally enacted by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government in 2013. Though Brazil’s Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) strategy is an inspiration, the Indian law is more modest in scope. Largely, the aim of the law was to legitimise existing legal rights and bring together food security initiatives under a single umbrella. The law provides legislative protection for subsidised food grains, children’s right to schools’ meals, supplementary nutrition in anganwadis and a maternity cash grant. Despite the legal enactment of the NFSA, the targeted approach for subsidised food grains continued albeit with a change in nomenclature and substantial expansion of eligible ‘priority’ families to include twothirds of the population. However, post-pandemic there have been renewed demands for the universalisation of the PDS and inclusion of additional nutritious foods. During the passage of the Act, the then-opposition Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Arun Jaitley on the floor of the Rajya Sabha had reprimanded the government as the law had, ‘…in fact cut down the number of people’. In Parliament, his party moved amendments to ensure universal coverage of ‘every resident of India’ and to ‘remove the provision of cash transfer and food coupons’ (Narayan, 2014). Even the 2014 BJP’s election manifesto had proclaimed its commitment to ‘universal food security’. But, when the BJP formed the government, it illegally postponed the deadline for the implementation of the law thrice. Severe budget cuts on food expenditure,

222

S. Narayan

though reversed, were also unprecedented. Further, the Shanta Kumar High-Level Committee (HLC), appointed by the government recommended the dilution of this landmark legislation, though the report was eventually shelved. The government has also pressured several union territories and states to implement ‘pilots’ to experiment with the replacement of food grains with cash. Further, with the Aadhaar updation process, hundreds of genuine beneficiaries have already been struck off the lists as ‘ghosts’ (Drèze et al., 2017). Therefore, with the perfunctory implementation of the law, in the past seven years, a series of starvation deaths have been reported nationwide. Most of these deaths would not have occurred if families had had access to ration cards. Also, predictably most of these deaths have occurred amongst families which belong to the most marginalised castes and tribes. With the impact of the pandemic, the surge of deaths and decimation of livelihoods has also indicated the urgency of the need for universal state-supported social protection of healthcare and food. Instead, through the various phases (Table 14.1) of the pandemic lockdowns, the main food security initiative of the government has been the Pradhan Mantri Table 14.1 Additional foodgrain Schemes announced in lieu of COVID-19 pandemic Lock down

Period

Phase 1

Announcement date

Scheme

Allocation

Beneficiaries

25 March 26 March 2020 2020–14 April 2020

PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana

5 kg of free foodgrain for 3 months

800 million National Food Security Act (NFSA) cardholders

Phase 2 and 3

15 April 2020–17 May 2020

–

–

–

–

Phase 4

18 May 2020–31 May 2020

13 May 2020

Atma Nirbhar Bharat

5 kg for 2 months

80 million migrants and those without ration cards

Garib Kalyan Rozgar Abhiyan

125 days of employment programme

Migrants in 125 districts in Northern India who have returned home

Phase 5

1 June 2020–30 October 2020

1 July 2020

PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana

5 kg of free foodgrain for 5 months

800 million NFSA cardholders only

Phase 6

State lockdowns in the second wave from 1 January 2021

24 April 2021

PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana

5 kg of free foodgrain for 6 months from May 2021

800 million NFSA cardholders only

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

223

Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY). The most significant feature of this package was the assurance of 5 kg of additional free food grains for 800 million existing beneficiaries of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), who already receive 5 kg of subsidised food grains from ration shops. However, families outside the ambit of the NFSA have been entirely excluded. Therefore, this targeted food policy has acutely exacerbated rather than mitigated inequalities, between families with and without ration cards. The Atma Nirbhar Bharat initiative, too, only provided a one-time provision of 10 kg of food grains to 80 million migrants without ration cards. However, despite both these schemes, millions of impoverished Indians will continue to remain excluded from the NFSA, unless it is universalised. Since the 2011 Census, the Food Ministry has not increased the entitlement quota for each state. Therefore, based on annual population growth projections, it has been estimated that in 2021, more than 40 percent of Indians are currently not included in the ambit of NFSA ration cards (Table 14.2). Invariably, most marginalised communities who are the least equipped to navigate the application red tape are likely to be excluded. In the Indian context, one of the main debates has been regarding the choice of universal or targeted food subsidies. However, especially in scenarios of mass impoverishment, such as in the aftermath of the pandemic, universal programmes are considered to be more effective for a number of reasons (Ocampo & Stiglitz, 2018). First, the equity argument assumes that justiciable rights-based legislative protections would ensure inclusivity (Drèze & Sen, 1991). Second, since universal programmes would include wealthier households, it is expected that their greater political clout will improve quality and accountability (Hirschman, 1970; Sen, 1992). Third, targeted systems are also invariably more predisposed to elite capture (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2005) and exclusion of poor households (Swaminathan & Misra, 2001). Further, ‘take-up rates by poor households increase with benefits provided to nonpoor households’ and vice versa (Kochar, 2005:233). Expansion and universalisation of the PDS adopted by several states such as Tamil Nadu (Chaudhuri et al., 2015), Odisha (Chatterjee, 2014) and Andhra Pradesh (Dutta & Ramaswamy, 2001) have also proved to be superior in terms of the inclusion of poor households and better nutrition outcomes. Further, geographical targeting to ensure universal coverage in impoverished states or districts has also proven to be a viable strategy (Rahman, 2016). However, instead of universalisation, during the pandemic, after the reverse migration exodus, the government has launched the One National One Ration (ONOR) initiative. Based on Aadhaar (unique identity number) biometric identification, the scheme aims to address the needs of portability of ration cards for migrants. However, the ground reality is that due to the pandemic several states have discontinued biometric authentication in ration shops to prevent the spread of infection from the glass sensor (Narayan, 2021). Nevertheless, Aadhaar-based biometric authentication at every transaction is also a frequently error-prone process (Chaudhuri et al., 2015; Drèze et al., 2017; Khera, 2015; Menon, 2017). Further, delivering grains to migrants from new ration shops needs advanced back-end supply chain management, which is a logistical challenge during a humanitarian crisis. Despite the hype, in May 2021,

224

S. Narayan

Table 14.2 Population in large states excluded from existing central government food schemes (%) Total population without NFSA ration cards, 2021*

Children under 6 years who do not receive food supplements from anganwadis, 2015–16**

Jharkhand

32

49

Bihar

29

66

Madhya Pradesh

44

40

Uttar Pradesh

36

70

Chhattisgarh

31

28

Rajasthan

44

68

Maharashtra

46

52

Karnataka

39

43

Odisha

29

25

Andhra Pradesh

49

31

West Bengal

39

27

Haryana

58

62

Telangana

49

45

Delhi

64

86

Tamil Nadu

52

42

Punjab

51

43

Uttarakhand

48

46

Himachal Pradesh

63

32

Kerala

57

43

All India

42

52

Source *(Narayan, 2021) **State-level data from the National Family Health Survey, 2017

the Integrated Management of Public Distribution portal indicates that only 8233 ration cards across 23 states (0.003% of total ration cards) had availed of inter-state portability.2 Further, in a federal structure, several state governments have been more proactive than the centre in terms of the implementation of their respective relief packages, this has augmented the lopsided availability of social safety nets nationwide. Some wealthier states initiated their own relief measures in the first wave of the pandemic. Kerala’s implemented a |20,000 crore package which included advance pensions, cash grants, MGNREGA employment, subsidised meals and home-delivered dry rations for quarantined adults and children. In Delhi, cooked meals were provided at night shelters. West Bengal extended six months of rations in advance. Rajasthan provided food packets even to families without ration cards. In Tamil Nadu apart from

2

http://www.impds.nic.in/portal (last checked 4 June 2021).

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

225

cash, free rice, sugar and essential commodities, facemasks were also distributed from ration shops. Odisha has even commenced an annual nutrition budget. The initial modest emergency cash transfers in Jan Dhan bank accounts of 200 million women was also provided by the government for only 3 months. Since then, families have been deprived of liquidity. Political parties have recommended payment of at least Rs. 7000 to the poorest families. The demand for cash transfers to prevent destitution has also been increasing with support from many labour unions and even corporates to boost consumer demand and the multiplier effect to revive the economy. However, in the second wave of the pandemic, the central government has yet to announce any cash relief measures.

Mid-Day Meals, Integrated Child Development Scheme, and Mission Poshan 2.0 On 28 November 2001, the Supreme Court in response to the public interest litigation (PIL) ordered state governments to introduce cooked mid-day meals (MDM) in all government primary schools (Chakraborty & Jayaraman, 2019; Drèze & Goyal, 2003). As a result, more than 120 million children receive school mid-day meals in India which is the largest nutrition initiative in the world. The meals are largely funded from a cess. In addition, some state governments with their own funds have included milk, eggs and other nutritional additions. Even earlier, in 1975, the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme was launched as a flagship programme for early childhood care and development. It targeted pre-school children, pregnant and nursing mothers to break the vicious cycle of malnutrition. It provides supplementary nutrition as in-house cooked meals or take-home rations for children and mothers from anganwadis (pre-schools). Both the MDM and ICDS, along with the PDS are included in the NFSA, as an umbrella food security legislation. Surprisingly, in the 2021 Budget, the finance minister announced that ‘we will merge the Supplementary Nutrition Programme and the Poshan Abhiyan and launch the Mission Poshan 2.0’. However, the allocation for the newer version of the nutrition programme is even less than the amount allocated for anganwadi services (erstwhile core ICDS) alone in the 2020–2021 budget. Similarly, the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana, which provides maternity entitlements guaranteed in the NFSA, has also seen a cut in real terms. Therefore, the intent of the central government to contract food security commitments at a time of mass impoverishment has been deeply disconcerting. For children under the age of six years, on 30 March 2020, the Ministry of Women and Child Development issued an order that in lieu of supplementary nutrition provided by the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) in anganwadis, enrolled children should be provided dry rations at home or compensatory food security allowance in bank accounts as per the NFSA. But despite the Supreme Court

226

S. Narayan

order of 13 December 2006 for the universalisation of ICDS anganwadis in every hamlet, the National Family Health Survey (NFHS 2014–5) reports that 52% of children under 6 years did not receive either take-home-rations or cooked supplementary nutrition meals (Table 14.2). Therefore, except in well-functioning states such as Chhattisgarh and West Bengal, in all probability during the COVID lockdown, too, most young children continued to be excluded from nutritious food for more than a year that anganwadis have been closed during the pandemic. Further, most state governments, apart from Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, have not made any provision for the home delivery of additional food items such as eggs, milk and fruits that they typically fund from their own exchequers.

History of Agricultural Policies The share of Indian agriculture to GDP has declined from 41% in 1960 to a mere 16% in 2019. Nevertheless, agriculture employs 42% of India’s workforce and remains the primary source of sustenance in rural India. Despite this inherent underemployment, agricultural productivity has kept pace with the increase in population.

Green Revolution India’s foodgrain production has more than tripled from 87 million tons in 1972 to 273 million tons in 2019–20 (Fig. 14.3). Since the seventies, the government has also procured select crops, especially cereals, from farmers at minimum support prices (MSP). This procurement enables transportation and storage in government granaries nationwide and redistribution of subsidized food grains through the PDS. Currently, these food stocks are at historic levels. In May 2021, an unprecedented 100 million tons of food grains were stored in Food Corporation of India (FCI) granaries.3 However, the offtake of food stocks for the NFSA has remained stagnant since 2013 as despite population growth NFSA ration cards lists have not been updated (Scroll, 2020). However, record agricultural production indicates that there is ample scope for an increase in procurement and universal expansion of the PDS.

Three Farm Laws The farmers’ protests have also highlighted as their main demand a legal guarantee for the provision of minimum support prices (MSP). In the midst of the pandemic, in September 2020, the BJP government enacted three farm acts which were passed 3

https://fci.gov.in/stocks.php?view=46 (last checked 4 June 2021).

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

227

Fig. 14.3 Cereal (wheat and rice) production and public distribution system (PDS) procurement, offtake and stocks (100,000 tonnes). Source Ministry of Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, Government of India. Reserve Bank of India Database on the Indian Economy, 1970–2020

by Parliament (Hale et al., 2020). While the Supreme Court in January 2021 has stayed the implementation of the laws, the negotiations with farmer unions were stalled (Jebaraj, 2021), but the laws were eventually repealed in November 2021. The primary objection of the farmers was that the laws could surreptitiously dismantle the entire infrastructure of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) mandis for procurement of farm produce at MSP in favour of unregulated private corporate multinationals and traders (Narayanan, 2020). This in turn could potentially disrupt the entire symbiotic relationship with the PDS for distribution of subsidised food grain. Further, in the past decade, seventeen states have adopted decentralised procurement (DCP) for 41% of the wheat harvest in Madhya Pradesh to 100% of the rice harvest in Telangana as per the Food Ministry (Banerjee, 2011). Local procurement of food grains from farmers to the PDS lowers the cost of transportation and storage, apart from reducing the carbon footprint of the massive procurement operations. But unfortunately, the 2021 central budget substantially reduced the DCP budget even while the overall subsidy to the FCI increased marginally.

228

S. Narayan

Fig. 14.4 Per Capita Net Availability of Foodgrains (per day) in India (grams). Source Directorate of Economics and Statistics, DAC&FW in Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2019

Interestingly, since the green revolution, with increasing commercialising of agriculture, there has been an overemphasis on water-guzzling crops such as rice and wheat, at the expense of millets and traditionally consumed ‘other cereals’. This category refers to locally grown cereals such as maize, barley, jowar, (sorghum), ragi (finger millet) and bajra (pearl millet). Unfortunately, since the green revolution, there has been a ‘steady long-term decline of the coarse cereals whose consumption has fallen by a half over the last 50 years’ (Fig. 14.4) (Deaton & Drèze, 2009). To reverse, this secular decline, the NFSA in 2013 guaranteed availability of coarse cereals at Re 1 per kilo, which is at an even lower price than wheat and rice from fair price shops. However, apart from a few states like Karnataka and Odisha, few have made the effort to stock millets despite their abundant nutritional, health, agro-climatic and ecological benefits. Thus, considering the farmer protests, decades of agrarian crisis and farmer suicides, economic and pandemic-induced contraction, a rethink of agricultural policies is essential in tandem with demand-side food policies.

Universal Food Security Since the French Revolution, food rebellions have shaped history. However, after the World Wars, the New Deal policies and the birth of the welfare state, resulted in the adoption of institutional mechanisms such as food rations, soup kitchens and public

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

229

works to provide food security to citizens (Beresford, 2016; Ocampo & Stiglitz, 2018; Skocpol, 1991). Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic may prove to be another critical juncture in the rapid expansion of food policies. World over countries has initiated generous pandemic relief packages. Britain announced a lockdown, but simultaneously promised to pay 80% of wages up to £2,500 a month for every citizen. The United States government provide $1000 to all Americans for extended periods. Australia committed 1%, Canada 3% and Portugal 4% of GDP as stimulus packages to protect citizens and the economy. Spain nationalised the healthcare system. However, the estimated expenditure of the Indian government at less than 2% of GDP has been around the lowest in the world. Instead, these populist times are a golden opportunity, with the centrality of food security for human security, for the Indian government to adopt ambitious pathways to strengthen social protection strategies and protect citizens from hunger, during mass destitution. 1.

2.

3.

4.

Universalise and Expand the Public Distribution System. One of every four of the world’s undernourished population lives in India (FAOSTAT, 2019). India is also expected to have the largest population impoverished due to the pandemic (Sumner et al., 2020). Therefore, with more than three times the buffer storage norm of food grains currently in government granaries, the time is opportune for the central government to efficiently universalise the public distribution system to ensure fulfilment of the right to food. Equally importantly, the government must expand the PDS basket of commodities. Apart from wheat and rice, the NFSA guaranteed coarse grains must be distributed nationwide. Additionally, pulses, cooking oil, eggs and perhaps even dairy, vegetables and fruits must be included in the PDS. For this, the government will need to expand rather than curtail the budgeted expenditure for food security. Re-start Children’s Meals. Since schools and anganwadis have been closed for more than a year, it is essential for the government to ensure that cooked meals or dry rations are regularly provided to all children and eligible women in their homes or neighbourhoods. In addition, nutritional additions such as eggs are also essential to compensate for the large-scale decline in family incomes. Build Community Kitchens in every Panchayat. During the lockdown, many elderly, destitute people, caregivers and patients, migrants, differently -abled and homeless people were unable to cook food daily. So, several state governments such as Kerala (Varma, 2020), Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu started community kitchens to provide low-cost meals.In the second wave, the Supreme Court has also directed all state governments to provide free cooked food from community kitchens, without any identity documentation (Thomas, 2021). This initiative needs to be expanded, with community kitchens opened in every panchayat, school and anganwadis in both urban and rural areas to provide free cooked meals. Distribute Cash Grants. Family cash grants in addition to food are necessary, especially, during a crisis as a measure of both livelihood and dignity. In the first wave, Telangana was one of the few states which has provided even

230

5.

6.

S. Narayan

migrant workers |500 in cash while Delhi has offered |5000 to auto rickshaw and truck drivers. While the Central government’s transfers to 200 million Jan Dhan women’s bank accounts in 2020 was modest, there is an urgent need to replicate these transfers and scale up their quantum, frequency, and coverage to combat the second and third waves of the pandemic. These family grants can be effectively provided to the more than 75 million households who have participated in the NREGA in the last five years (Mulye, 2021; Nahata, 2021; Srivats, 2021). Double Guaranteed Employment. The payment of wages has not kept pace with the exponential increase in demand for NREGA work. Further in 17 of 21 states, NREGA wages are less than the minimum wages. Not only it is essential for the government to augment wages, but also expands NREGA nationwide from 100 to 200 days and ensures timely payment of wages. Further, there is also a strong demand for the creation of urban employment guarantees (Drèze, 2020b), and to provide a safety net for stranded migrants. Guarantee Minimum Support Price for Cereals. The new agricultural laws could have impinged on the synergetic linkage between agricultural procurement at MSP from farmers and their re-distribution at subsidised prices through the PDS fair price shops. Therefore, after the sustained nationwide farmer protests the central government should not have only repealed the controversial farm laws, but also provided a legal guarantee to MSP at least for cereals—rice, wheat and millets—as enshrined in the NFSA. The budget for decentralised procurement should also be significantly increased to support state governments to procure from local farmers, especially at a time when the pandemic restricts inter-state movement.

In conclusion, in an unprecedented situation of widespread hunger, food insecurity and worldwide economic recession, India needs to urgently expand and universalise the PDS and other food security entitlements such as employment guarantees, cash grants, community kitchens and children’s meals and guarantee minimum support prices for farmers. To tide through this crisis, it is essential to build a permanent edifice of universal food security protections, which integrate both agricultural production and food distribution, for sustainable human and food security for both present and future generations.

References Ahmad, E., Drèze, J., Hills, J., & Sen, A. (1991). Social security in developing countries. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233008.001.0001 Ambasta, P., Shankar, P. S. V., & Shah, M. (2008). Two years of NREGA: The Road Ahead. Economic and Political Weekly, 43(8), 41–50. https://www.epw.in/journal/2008/08/insight/twoyears-nrega-road-ahead.html APU. (2020). COVID-19 livelihoods survey compilation of findings. Azim Premji University. https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Compilation-of-findingsAPU-COVID-19-Livelihoods-Survey_Final.pdf

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

231

APU. (2021). State of working India: One year of Covid-19. Centre for Sustainable Employment, Azim Premji University. https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ SWI2021_May12.pdf Banerjee, K. (2011). Decentralised procurement and universalised PDS. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(52), 19–22. https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/52/commentary/decentralised-procur ement-and-universalised-pds.html Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2005). Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries. Journal of Public Economics, 89(4), 675–704. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003. 01.001 Beresford, P. (2016). The welfare state and pressures from the war. In All our welfare: Towards participatory social policy. Bristol University Press. https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/ all-our-welfare Bhatia, R. (2018). How India’s welfare revolution is starving citizens. The New Yorker. https://www. newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-indias-welfare-revolution-is-starving-citizens CEIC. (2017). India Per Capita Net Availability: Foodgrains: Cereals, Economic Indicators, Census and Economic Information Center. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/india/memo-items-agricultureper-capita-net-availability-of-foodgrains/per-capita-net-availability-foodgrains-pulses. Chakraborty, T., & Jayaraman, R. (2019). School feeding and learning achievement: Evidence from India’s midday meal program. Journal of Development Economics, 139, 249–265. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.10.011 Chatterjee, M. (2014). An improved PDS in a “Reviving” state: Food security in Koraput, Odisha. Economic and Political Weekly, 49(45), 49–59. https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/45/special-art icles/improved-pds-reviving-state.html Chaudhuri, B., Janani, A., & Hundal, H. S. (2015). A Conundrum of efficiency and inclusion: Aadhaar and Fair Price Shops. Economic and Political Weekly, EPW Engage, 7–8. https://www. epw.in/engage/article/conundrum-efficiency-and-inclusion-aadhaar-and Damodaran, H. (2021). Explained: How rice and wheat exports hit a record high. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-how-rice-and-wheat-exports-hitrecord-high-7317880/ Deaton, A., & Drèze, J. (2009). Food and nutrition in India: Facts and interpretations. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(7), 42–65. https://www.epw.in/journal/2009/07/special-articles/foodand-nutrition-india-facts-and-interpretations.html Desai, S., Vashishtha, P., & Joshi, O. (2005). Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act: A catalyst for rural transformation. National Council of Applied Economic Research. https:// www.ncaer.org/publication_details.php?pID=256 Drèze, J., & Goyal, A. (2003). Future of mid-day meals. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(44), 4673–4683. https://www.epw.in/journal/2004/09/discussion/future-mid-day-meals.html Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (1991). Public action for social security: Foundations and strategies. In E. Ahmad, J. Drèze, J. Hills, & A. Sen (Eds.) Social Security in Developing Countries (United Nations University World Institute for Development (UNU-WIDER), pp. 1–41). Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/ 9780198233008.pdf Drèze, J., Khalid, N., Khera, R., & Somanchi, A. (2017). Aadhaar and food security in Jharkhand: Pain without gain? Economic and Political Weekly, 52(50), 50–60. https://www.epw.in/journal/ 2017/50/special-articles/aadhaar-and-food-security-jharkhand.html Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (1989). Hunger and public action. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10. 1093/0198283652.001.0001 Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (2002). India: Development and participation. Oxford University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199257492.001.0001 Drèze, J. (1991). Famine prevention in India. In J. Drèze & A. Sen (Eds.), The political economy of hunger: Volume 2: Famine prevention (pp. 13–122). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198286363.003.0002

232

S. Narayan

Drèze, J. (2004). Democracy and right to food. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(17), 1723–1731. https://www.epw.in/journal/2004/17/special-articles/democracy-and-right-food.html Drèze, J. (2020a). Budget 2020: Giving NREGA workers their due. Bloomberg Quint. https://www. bloombergquint.com/union-budget-2020/budget-2020-giving-nrega-workers-their-due-by-jeandreze Drèze, J. (2020b). Decentralised urban employment and training’ scheme: A proposal. Ideas for India. http://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/poverty-inequality/duet-a-proposal-for-an-urbanwork-programme.html Dutta, B., & Ramaswamy, B. (2001). Targeting and efficiency in the public distribution system: Case of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. Economic and Political Weekly, 36(18), 1524– 1532. https://www.epw.in/journal/2001/18/special-articles/targeting-and-efficiency-public-distri bution-system.html Esping-Andersen, G. (1989). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Polity Press. https://www. wiley.com/en-us/The+Three+Worlds+of+Welfare+Capitalism-p-9780745666754 FAOSTAT. (2019). Number of people undernourished (millions), suite of food security indicators 2018–2020. Food and Agricultural Organisation. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS FE Bureau. (2021). Food grains output in 2020–21 pegged at 303 MT. The Financial Express. https://www.financialexpress.com/market/commodities/food-grains-output-in-2020-21-peggedat-303-mt/2201314/ Fischer, H. W., & Ali, S. S. (2019). Reshaping the public domain: Decentralization, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), and trajectories of local democracy in rural India. World Development, 120, 147–158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev. 2018.09.013 GHI. (2020). 2020 global hunger index: One decade to zero hunger—linking health and sustainable food systems. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2020.pdf Hale, T., Webster, S., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., & Kira, B. (2020). The Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT). Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. https:// covidtracker.bsg.ox.ac.uk/ Hasell, J., & Max Roser, F. (2017). Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/famines. Hemerijck, A. (2011). Crisis aftershocks and European welfare state futures. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 12(2), 89–97. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/ online-edition/12-2-resilience Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Harvard University Press. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=978067427 6604 Hirway, I. (2003). Identification of bpl households for poverty alleviation programmes. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(45), 4803–4808. https://www.epw.in/journal/2003/45/discussion/identi fication-bpl-households-poverty-alleviation-programmes.html IIPS and MOHFW. (2017). National family health survey (NFHS 4): India Factsheet 2015–16. http://rchiips.org/NFHS/factsheet_NFHS-4.shtml IIPS and MoHFW. (2020). National family health survey (NFHS-5) fact-sheets: Key indicators 22 states/UTs from phase-I. http://rchiips.org/nfhs/factsheet_NFHS-5.shtml Jebaraj, P. (2021). Centre, farm unions talks on farm laws end in stalemate. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/government-farmers-talks-inconclusive-nextmeeting-on-january-8/article33492736.ece Khera, R. (2009). “Right to Food” act: Beyond cheap promises. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(29), 40–44. https://www.epw.in/journal/2009/29/insight/right-food-act-beyondcheap-promises.html Khera, R. (2015). Impact of Aadhaar on welfare Programmes. Economic and Political Weekly, 52(50), 7–8. https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/50/special-articles/impact-aadhaar-wel fare-programmes.html

14 Stunted Food Security: Time for Universal Entitlements

233

Kochar, A. (2005). Can targeted food programs improve nutrition? An empirical analysis of India’s public distribution system. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(1), 203–235. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.1086/431260 Kulkarni, S. (2020). Locked in a crisis: Concerns of rural women. Economic and Political Weekly, 55(23), 7–8. https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/23/commentary/locked-crisis.html#:~: text=With%20depleted%20and%20scarce%20public,the%20lockdown%20on%20the%20other Leach, M., MacGregor, H., Scoones, I., & Wilkinson, A. (2021). Post-pandemic transformations: How and why COVID-19 requires us to rethink development. World Development, 138, 105233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105233 Mander, H. (2009). Barefoot: Colonial legacy of famine codes. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu. com/opinion/columns/Harsh_Mander/Barefoot-Colonial-legacy-of-famine-codes/article16123 444.ece Mehrotra, S. (2008). NREGA two years on: Where do we go from here? Economic and Political Weekly, 43(31), 27–35. https://epw.in/journal/2008/31/perspectives/nreg-two-years-wheredo-we-go-here.html Menon, S. (2017). Aadhaar-based biometric authentication for PDS and food security: Observations on implementation in Jharkhand’s Ranchi District. Indian Journal of Human Development, 11(3), 387–401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703017748384 Mulye, P. (2021). Why isn’t the Modi government giving out cash to help its citizens tide over the pandemic? Quartz. https://qz.com/india/2008028/india-needs-direct-cash-transfer-to-tacklecovid-19-economic-pain/ Nahata, P. (2021). Covid-19 second wave: Food, cash transfers first line of defence. https://www. bloombergquint.com/business/covid-19-second-wave-food-cash-transfers-first-line-of-defence Narayan, S. (2014). Promises to keep. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/features/magazine/ promises-to-keep/article6136491.ece Narayan, S. (2021). Time for Universal Public Distribution System: Food Mountains and Pandemic Hunger in India. Indian Journal of Human Development. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0973703 0211049007 Narayanan, S. (2020). The three farm bills. The India Forum. https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/ three-farm-bills NCAER. (2015). Evaluation study of targeted public distribution system in selected states. National Council of Applied Economic Research for the Department of Food and Public Distribution Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India. https://dfpd. gov.in/1sGbO2W68mUlunCgKmpnLF5WHm/TPDS-140316.pdf Ocampo, J. A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2018). The welfare state revisited. Columbia University Press. Patel, S. (2006). Empowerment, co-option and domination: Politics of Maharashtra’s employment guarantee scheme. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(50), 5126–5132. PTI. (2019). Unemployment rate at 45-year high, confirms Labour Ministry data. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/unemployment-rate-at-45-year-high-con firms-labour-ministry-data/article27379174.ece Rahman, A. (2016). Universal food security program and nutritional intake: Evidence from the hunger prone KBK districts in Odisha. Food Policy, 63, 73–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol. 2016.07.003 Ramalingaswami, V., Jonsson, U., & Rohde, J. (1997). Malnutrition: A South Asian enigma. In G. Stuart (Ed.) Malnutrition in South Asia: A regional profile. https://www.popline.org/node/274083 RTFC, & CES. (2021). Hunger watch report. Right to food campaign and centre for equity studies. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bpmxHXefEGF0ggZLVHGzTgCh1oc9JSYy/view Sabharwal, N. S. (2011). Caste, religion and malnutrition linkages. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(50), 16–18. https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/50/commentary/caste-religion-and-mal nutrition-linkages.html Sankaran, K. (2011). NREGA wages: Ensuring decent work. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(7), 23–25. https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/07/commentary/nrega-wages-ensuring-decentwork.html

234

S. Narayan

Scroll. (2020). 100 million Indians fall through gaps in food safety net, economists urge rethink on Covid-19 relief . Scroll, https://scroll.in/article/959235/100-million-indians-fall-through-gaps-infood-safety-net-economists-urge-rethink-on-covid-19-relief Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198284632.001.0001 Sen, A. (1992). The political economy of targeting. In D. van de Walle & K. Nead (Eds.), Public spending and the poor. World Bank. https://scholar.harvard.edu/sen/publications/political-eco nomy-targeting Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Knopf. https://scholar.harvard.edu/sen/publications/dev elopment-freedom Sen, A. (2001). Hunger: Old torments and new blunders—2. The Little Magazine, 2(6), 8–15. http:// www.littlemag.com/hunger/aks2.html SEWA Bharat. (2020). Gendered precarity in the lockdown: What the lockdown shows us about the precarity of women workers (p. 11). SEWA Bharat: All India Federation of Self-Employed Women’s Association. https://www.sewabharatresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/05/Gendered_Precarity_SB_Lockdown-2.pdf Sinha, M. (2014). Right to food: International and national perspectives. Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 56(1), 47–61. Skocpol. (1991). Universal Appeal: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty. The Brookings Review, 9(3), 28–33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20080225. Srivats, K. R. (2021). To offset Covid impact, restart monthly cash transfers to PMJDY beneficiaries: Business correspondents’ body to FM. Hindu Business Line. https://www.thehindubusines sline.com/economy/to-offset-covid-impact-restart-monthly-cash-transfers-to-pmjdy-beneficia ries-business-correspondents-body-to-fm/article34508962.ece Sumner, A., Ortiz-Juarez, E., & Hoy, C. (2020). Precarity and the pandemic: COVID-19 and poverty incidence, intensity, and severity in developing countries (WIDER Working Paper 77/2020). UNU-WIDER. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/precarity-and-pandemic Sundaram, K. (2003). On identification of households below poverty line in BPL census 2002. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(9), 7–8. https://www.epw.in/journal/2003/09/special-articles/ identification-households-below-poverty-line-bpl-census-2002.html Swaminathan, M., & Misra, N. (2001). Errors of targeting: Public distribution of food in a Maharashtra Village, 1995–2000. Economic and Political Weekly, 36(26). https://www.epw.in/journal/ 2001/26/special-articles/errors-targeting.html Thomas, A. (2021). Provide ration, meals to migrants, Supreme Court tells states. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/provide-ration-meals-to-migrants-supremecourt-tells-states-101621889557127.html UN (2003). Human security now: Commission on human security. New York: United Nations. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006 A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf UNDP. (1994). Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York: United Nations Development Programme. http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-develo pment-report-1994. VAF, & Samboodhi. (2020). How is the hinterland unlocking? Findings from 2nd round of survey. VikasAnvesh Foundation and Samboodhi. https://www.vikasanvesh.in/covid-19-round-2/ Varma, V. (2020). Kerala’s 43 lakh-strong women self-help network power community kitchens during coronavirus lockdown. Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/kerala/ker alas-43-lakh-strong-women-self-help-network-power-community-kitchens-during-coronaviruslockdown-6334845/

Chapter 15

Corruption and National Security: Insights from the Indian Experience Niranjan Sahoo

Securing and maintaining national security is a vital aspect of safeguarding the integrity of a nation. One of the foremost means by which countries face threats to their security is through acts of aggression by foreign armed forces—it must be noted, however, that arguably the most insidious threat to national security arises from corruption. Noting its importance, the newly elected Biden administration on June 03, 2021, released the National Security Memorandum recognising the role of corruption in impinging national security. The White House memorandum highlights the impact of corruption in destabilising safety. It stated that “Corruption corrodes public trust; hobbles effective governance; distorts markets and equitable access to services; undercuts development efforts; contributes to national fragility, extremism, and migration; and provides authoritarian leaders a means to undermine democracies worldwide. When leaders steal from their nations’ citizens or oligarchs flout the rule of law, economic growth slows, inequality widens, and trust in government plummets” (The White House, 2021). The memorandum has brought to the fore the interconnectedness of corruption and national security. This is far more important in the Global South, where countries experience widespread corruption and misgovernance. India knows this phenomenon so intimately. In fact, Transparency International (TI), an organisation that was founded to monitor the wide-ranging impact of corruption on governance, has consistently ranked India very high in the global corruption index. High-value corruption and bigticket scams have taken the limelight in the country for too long, at times bringing down governments. However, less is known how national security is deeply linked to corruption in India. This chapter will uncover some of the close links between graft and various dimensions of security threats to the nation and what measures India has taken to curb the dangerous trends of increasing graft and institutional decay. N. Sahoo (B) ORF, 20 Rouse Avenue, New Delhi 110002, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_16

235

236

N. Sahoo

Exploring Corruption and National Security Linkages The impact of corruption on national security may thus be considered from various perspectives, the predominant of which are outlined in the following sections.

Corruption and Trust Analysing the relationship between corruption and trust in the European context, Kubbe (2014) found corruption is having a significant role in eroding trust in institutions as well as in interpersonal relations and mechanisms. He argued that “Corruption violates the fundamental principles of democracy such as equality, transparency, accountability and fairness and threatens regime stability. It promotes social inequality, disturbs macroeconomic and fiscal stability, strengthens the underground, erodes the rule of law and harms the reputation of trust in the state” (Ibid: 118). Whereas Jong-sung You explains the role of corruption in the mitigation of formal justice which in turn reduces collective trust in state institutions. Interestingly, he states, “there is a virtuous circle of high trust, low corruption, and low inequality (Ibid) this relationship appears to be very strong in democracies, but not in authoritarian countries”, indicating a causal relationship between trust (as mediated by levels of corruption) and forms of governance (You, 2017). How is this linked to security threats? Corruption impacts national security by undermining governments who have betrayed the trust of its citizens—prominent examples include protests in West Africa caused by governments’ corruption in handling the Ebola crisis. According to a recent study by DePinto (2016), the Ebola virus disease (EVD) crisis in 2014 has underscored the frightful human consequences an unanticipated public health emergency can bring when corruption is left to fester unchecked in a country lacking even the most basic health care infrastructure. Similarly, corruption played a pivotal role in sparking Arab Spring between 2010 and 12 (Cook, 2012). For instance, widespread corruption in Egyptian armed forces and many individuals benefitting from state plunders was seen as a key factor to trigger public disaffection. Conversely, charges of corruption from the government directed at citizens may fuel protests that threaten existing systems of governance—Alexei Navalny, a prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin was jailed under an allegation of fraud, an act that has led to international condemnation of Putin and his government (BBC, 2021). In fact, Navalny’s own Foundation for Fighting Corruption has been the target of Russian government crackdowns further underlining the role and impact of ‘corruption’ in national security.

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

237

Corruption and Economy Beyond creating a trust deficit, pervasive corruption can trigger discontent among the public when corrupt practices aggravate economic inequality and contribute to economic hardship. Corruption in the economic sphere is manifested both formally and informally: formally, corruption may be manifested in taxation policies that are biased in favour of those with vested interests, such as influential political figures. Informally, acts of corruption may take place by public and private individuals acting in collusion (such as through bribery)—a problem that becomes systemic when even simple acts require corrupt practices. India, for instance, has one of the highest rates of bribery in Asia according to Transparency International (The Tribune, 2020). Thus, corruption acts to undermine justice and legitimacy, eroding the legitimacy of the state among public consciousness. Not only corruption leads to a reduction in the overall economic welfare of the public, it also results in a reduction of state authority, thereby playing a role in undermining state apparatuses. According to an empirical study by IMF, “corruption interferes with the traditional functions of the government: allocation of resources, stabilisation of the economy, and redistribution of income” (Gupta et al., 1998). It is, therefore, pertinent to address economic disparities to tackle the problem of corruption, especially when “the rich are likely to both have greater motivation and opportunities to engage in bribery and fraud as one means to preserve and advance their status, privileges, and interests while the poor are more vulnerable to extortion at higher levels of inequality” (You & Khagram, 2004). Furthermore, international economic systems help foster a corruption-friendly environment. Switzerland, for instance, is notorious for being a tax haven for the corrupt. According to an important study by John Christensen, tax havens prove to be crucial in facilitating “illicit financial flows”, leading wealth out of countries for personal gain and resulting in reduced economic capabilities of the general populace (Christensen, 2011). In addition, high volume grafts are also associated with a rise of grey economy or black economy—that is, sections of the economy that are informal or not represented in official statistics. The primary problem with the rise of informal economic activities is that law enforcement is undermined in the sector, leading to a subversion of the rule of law. According to a major study by Baklouti and Boujelbene “increased corruption and a larger shadow economy (leads to a) decrease in economic growth (Baklouti & Boujelbene, 2020) the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on economic growth” (Baklouti & Boujelbene, 2020). The black economy impacting economic growth and accentuating economic inequality is well known (vividly brought out by Panama Papers Leak in 2016) phenomenon in India (Singh, 2016). The black money trail is endemic and massive in India. Corruption also commonly takes the form of black money, or unlawfully untaxed income. To address this unwarranted black money phenomenon posing a serious threat to the economy and security of the state, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a drastic measure (although backfired) called demonetisation in November 2016 (Alexander & Padmanabhan, 2019).

238

N. Sahoo

Corruption and Extremism While corruption can undermine democratic governments, extremism is often legitimised by the same mechanism, posing a grave threat to national security and stability. Corruption and terrorism/extremism can mutually co-exist in multiple ways. There are numerous examples to cite. Colombia, for instance, is characterised by high levels of corruption while being victim to violent extremism from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), indicating a correlative relationship between corruption and extremism. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) explain this correlation in two major ways: firstly, corruption, by undermining the formal government, provides motivational justification for extremists, helping to proselytise other individuals to subscribe to similar ideologies, secondly, corruption “indirectly increases the ability of groups to carry out attacks” since corrupt governments are poor at enforcing laws and lack the legal infrastructure to ensure that illegal activities, such as arms smuggling, are reduced. In an important study, Corruption: Violent Extremism, Kleptocracy, and the Dangers of Failing Governance, Sarah Cheyes (2016) underscores the importance of recognising the role of corruption in leading to increased extremism when she writes, “corruption fuels the scourge of terrorism too: it gives credence to the arguments of militant religious extremists such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and has helped them gain recruits or submissiveness from Afghanistan and Iraq to Pakistan, Central Asia, the Sahel, and West Africa.” Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of corruption-led extremism is that of Afghanistan—the country ranked at 177 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index 2017 of Transparency International and has one of the most unstable political systems in contemporary politics (Kugelman, 2016). President Ashraf Ghani and the Taliban are currently embroiled in a tussle for power. The poor state of national security in the country can be partly attributed to the “predatory criminality (of the formal government which) allows the Taliban, despite its brutality, to present itself as a more predictable and less corrupt ruler and gives the insurgency critical traction and resilience” (Felbab-Brown, 2017). In India, left-wing extremism gains traction, in part, due to corrupt politicians— “it is the poor execution by an inefficient and corrupt political and administrative system” that prevents effective state responses to insurgency groups that threaten national security (Panag, 2021). In addition, “corruption indulged in by politicians and the tactics of the mining mafia” (Sudhir, 2013) further invigorate extremist causes and endangers national security (Sudhir, 2013). Fundamentally, corruption stands in the way of development, which leads to public dissatisfaction and extremism. Perhaps the gravest method by which corruption can threaten national security is through cooperation between criminal syndicates and government officials. The case of a corrupt Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who supplied nuclear weapons’ technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran stands as a testament to the adverse impact of corruption on public safety (Shehzada and Chengappa, 2004).

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

239

The Indian Case Corruption remains a major public policy challenge for India. The Transparency International (TI) which prepares the annual corruption perception index, India ranks consistently high (86 out of 180 countries in 2020) within Asia (The Economic Times, 2021). While the situation is a lot better than what it was in 2013 (ranked 94), still there is no way India can claim to have achieved a major breakthrough in ending grafts. For instance, the TI survey noted that India has the highest rate of bribery and use of personal links to access services such as education and health in Asia. Among key factors that permeate endemic corruption in the world’s largest democracy, the TI survey found the slow and complicated bureaucratic process, redtapism, complex regulatory frameworks which compels ordinary citizens to access key state services through bribes or personal networks (The Hindu, 2020). For most respondents, government services such as police, courts, revenue administration, public hospitals, etc. are hotbeds of corruption. The roots of corruption in India go back to the colonial past. The British administration which excluded Indian citizens from participating in the political and decisionmaking process in many ways institutionalised corruption through the enactment of the Official Secret Act, 1923 which made it an offence for government officials to reveal state information (Xu, 2014). Post-Independence, for the most part India was roiled in corruption largely owing to heavy regulation of economic activities which resulted in what was called License Permit Raj. The policy that restricted foreign investment and stifled competition through a socialist economy gave rise to a culture of bribery for getting business from the government. An analyst sums this up as. “In the days of licence-permit regime with shortages, rationing and price controls, the scope for corruption was enormous. People had to wait for years to get things like a HMT watch, a Bajaj Chetak scooter or a Maruti 800 car, BSNL landline telephone or an LPG gas connection. Bribing to jump the queue was commonplace. Alongside, a thriving black market developed as people lucky to get the permits found it profitable to sell those coveted permits/goods to others willing to pay a premium price. Smuggling and black-marketing were rampant in the markets for foreign exchange and imported goods” (Ray, 2021).

However, with the commencement of economic reforms and liberalisation in 1991, the nature and dimensions of corruption have dramatically changed in India. After the abolition of industrial licensing and doing away with import quotas, plenty of corrupt practices have vanished. Yet, economic reform and subsequent high economic growth have created huge opportunities for corruption. This is because the rent-seeking behaviour that took different forms. While many of the old forms of corruption linked with the regime of controls were considerably reduced after liberalisation, the Licence Permit Raj continues in some manner or other in many lucrative sectors like mining and services. For instance, the discretionary allocation of coal blocks and the telecom spectrum (2G) which resulted in huge notional losses to the exchequer, clearly indicates the massiveness of post-reform corruption (Mohan, 2013). So much so, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in its second tenure (2009–14) was completely bogged down by a series of big-ticket corruption scandals paralysing

240

N. Sahoo

the governance for most of its term. Thus, while many key sectors of the economy have been reformed, this has not been accompanied by political and administrative reforms. Discretionary powers are still at large with state officials (Sridharan, 2014) leading to corruption, and brazen misuse of powers for personal profits. This in many ways structurally linked to the democratic system which requires a huge amount of money for political/election campaign activities (Kapur & Vaishnav, 2018).

How Corruption in Impinging India’s National Security Corruption as widespread and deep-rooted in India has massive negative effects. Not only has it dented the country’s international image distracting investment, but it has also escalated economic inequality, depriving the poorest and most marginalised access to critical state services, lowered trust of the state institutions and integrity in governance processes. It has given rise to oligarchy, nexus between politicianbusiness-bureaucracy, which directly impacts economic growth. Pervasive corruption and frequent unearthing of big-ticket scams have made India a sort of “a republic of mega-scandals”. However, a less talked about the consequences of pervasive corruption is its links to national security. As security analyst, Brahma Chellaney (2010) puts it succinctly, “Corruption stalls development, undermines social progress, undercuts the confidence of citizens in the fairness and impartiality of public administration, impedes good governance, erodes the rule of law, distorts competitive conditions in business transactions, discourages domestic and foreign investment, fosters a black-market economy, and raises new security threats. In sum, corruption obstructs a country from realizing its goals and undercuts national security”. This can be unpacked with some clear examples underpinning the thick connections between certain forms of corruption and national security threats. A prime example of the implications of the corruption of public servants lies in the devastating 1993 Mumbai blasts which caused hundreds of deaths and devastation of unimaginable proportions. A bench of the Supreme Court (SC) adjudicating the case found that corrupt police officers neglected their duties by allowing arms to be smuggled for a bribe worth |10,00,000. While adjudicating officers in the case, the SC bench recognised the primacy of corruption in threatening national safety, asserting that corruption—especially when undertaken by law enforcement officers—can have “frightening ramifications” on national security (Mahapatra, 2013). Given the symbiotic relationship between corrupt government officials and criminal syndicates, the famous Vohra Committee Report constituted after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts, brought to fore the “powerful nexus between the bureaucracy and politicians with the mafia gangs, smugglers and the underworld” posing a grave threat to India’s national security (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1993). Beyond the Mumbai blasts, the Vohra Committee vividly described the existence of corrupt nexus and running of a ‘parallel government’ by a crime syndicate that directly threatens the internal security of India (Choudury, 2012).

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

241

A similar but much bigger example of corruption and national security links can be traced to the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack (known as 26/11) that shook the entire country. The Mumbai event marked not only terms of its abetment but also in terms of responses to the attack—state responses were “followed by a host of controversies and charges of corruption and mismanagement surrounding the procurement process” of defense equipment (delayed purchase of modern weaponry and equipment such as speedboats for coastguards, etc.) (Machold, 2017). Incidentally, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the organisation that orchestrated the Mumbai attack, benefitted from illegal trading practices bolstered by widespread corruption (Miklian, 2009). Another major area directly linked with national security is the system of defence procurement which often hogs the limelight for mega-buck scandals (Sinha, 2018). From the infamous Bofors scam in 1987, AgustaWestland in 2013 to the ongoing controversy over the Rafale deal by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Narendra Modi, there is not a regime that is not accused of having manipulated or compromised the established procedures crucial defence purchases for windfalls (Shukla, 2014). Despite several commissions and even regular indictments by the Comptroller and Auditor General have hardly any effects in the manner in which weapons are procured from overseas arms majors. Most weapon procurements are finalised without transparency and accountability as political corruption remains at the root of such deals (Chellany, 2013). However, a corrupt and compromised defence procurement which leaves armed forces with inferior weapons that have a clear bearing on national security. Thus, when acts of corruption infiltrate defence purchases, and consequently national defence effectiveness, the security of the nation stands on highly unstable grounds.

Corruption, Governance and Internal Security Threats Governance is critical to the legitimacy of the state. However, corruption strikes at the very roots of good governance, impedes economic growth and impacts inclusionary measures of the state. And widespread corruption can become a national security problem because it can accentuate alienation among the population and can cause “trust deficit”. If not addressed comprehensively, it can lead to mass unrest and political instability as vividly witnessed during the time of the famous J.P. Movement (Kumar, 2019) in the late 1960s and India Against Corruption in 2011 led by anticorruption crusader Anna Hazare.1 Yet the most dangerous turn that widespread corruption in the political system and bureaucracy can take is it can weaken the foundation of state legitimacy and 1

In 2011, a large-scale anti-corruption movement emerged in India in response to a series of scandals during the Congress led United Progressive Alliance government that have been exposed by the media since 2010. These scandals led to a massive public agitation led by the charismatic, septuagenarian rural leader and anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare demanding the passing of a law that would institute an ombudsman to investigate corruption charges against public officials. Agitation ultimately led to passage of Lokpal Bill in 2014.

242

N. Sahoo

give space to non-state actors or extremist organisations to run a parallel administration (Manoharan, 2013). For example, the Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) or Naxalite organisations which seek to capture the political power by armed movement often spread their ideological influence and spatial hold over a large part of Central India (called Red Corridor) with the narratives of a corrupt and compromised bourgeoise state while offering at the same time Janatan Sarkar (People’s Government). Evidently, the Naxalites do this by projecting themselves as a better alternative in providing instant justice (as against a broken criminal justice system), providing education, healthcare among others in some of India’s most backward and poorest regions (Sahoo, 2015).

Democratic Politics, Money Power and Corruption Another variant of corruption having a significant bearing on governance and national security is political funding. As an integral part of democratic politics, political parties and candidates need a lot of money to run political activities and fight elections. The 2019 general election was billed as the most expensive election (nearly $7 billion) anywhere in the world (Pradhan & Kumaresan, 2019). With elections becoming more expensive, the burden of generating more finances increases for both parties and candidates. Given that the ways and means to raise small contributions are more difficult and their transactional costs being high, the role of “interested money” particularly from private businesses has emerged as the key source of political funding. With the exception of Left parties, most political parties are liberally funded by private businesses. This, coupled with the major role played by the state in regulating the economy has resulted in most of the corporate money coming through illegal and undisclosed means, which in turn has resulted in the increasing role of black money in elections and other political works. There is so much literature pointing to a quid-pro-quo business–politics relationship that has grown enormously in the era of economic liberalisation. From infamous “briefcase” politics, which saw select corporate houses generously donating to individual politicians for quid pro quo, to the disturbing trends of bankrolling an entire political campaign (Sahoo, 2017). Thus, cronyism and corruption scandals have become a common trend in India in recent years. Most of the second tenure of the UPA government led by Manmohan Singh was spent firefighting the big-ticket corruption scandals, such as the 2G auction, and the coal scam (linked to quid-pro-quo decisions, as was vividly captured in Radia Tape, Nair, 2013). Finally, the skyrocketing election expenses are also forcing parties to generate funds from any sources including tainted, criminal/mafia money compromising national security in multiple ways (Economic Times, 2019). A steady rise of wealthy elected representatives with serious crimes poses the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of democratic politics and its key institutions. Corruption remains the single biggest national security threat which often misses the attention of the public and policymakers. If left unattended, it can eat into the

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

243

vitals of the state and its key institutions, enfeebling internal security and crippling state capacity against external threats.

Key Measures to Check Corruption How has India responded to curb corruption so far? Given the various implications of corruption as well as the magnitude of corruption in India, the country has taken numerous measures to reduce, if not stamp out, the causes leading to pervasive corruption. A beginning was made in 1963, when the government of the day under Jawaharlal Nehru constituted the Santhanam Committee following the Mundhra Case (Sridharan, 2018). The Committee identified various sources of corruption within the government, including administrative over-reach and delays, excessive red-tapism, and lack of a coordinating organisation to act as a directive body to the various vigilance commissions that exist to oversee the works of ministries (Bhasin, 2016). Significantly, the committee recommended a Central Vigilance Commission as an apex anti-corruption body and suggested amendments to make the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) of 1947 more robust—specifically, “to make the possession, by a civil servant, of assets disproportionate to income criminal misconduct” (Sridharan, 2014: 7). Additionally, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, established by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971, exists to inspect the finances of government institutions, and prevent corruption that is harmful to the public exchequer. Furthermore, there exists Lokayukta or civil commissioners exist as state-level anti-corruption organisations. They work in complement to the Income Tax Department and the Anti-Corruption Bureaus to combat corruption. Lokayukta was first established following a report from the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966 (Rohit, 2011). Since then, numerous state Lokayuktas have been founded, such as the Maharashtra Lokayukta and the Andhra Pradesh Lokayukta. Notable among these is the Karnataka Lokayukta for the strength of its powers—in 2011 B.S. Yeddyurappa (former chief minister of Karnataka) was forced to step down from office following his indictment in an illegal mining case by the Lokayukta (Chatterjee, 2018). The extent of the authority of the Lokyukta, however, depends on the willingness of state governments to preserve and uplift its powers. In response to the 2011 nation-wide stir against corruption and demand to have a Lokpal (NDTV, 2011), the UPA government enacted Lokpal Bill in 2013 to fight big-ticket corruption, for a variety of reasons (Bhatnagar, 2018) the much promise Ombudsman remained headless. It was only towards the fag end of his first tenure (March 18, 2019) that the NDA appointed the Lokpal. However, since then the much-promised institution has remained largely unheard. The Right to Information (RTI) Act is yet another anti-corruption measure that has served to increase the transparency of government functions. Promulgated in 2005, the Act requires government responses to requests on information regarding government activities and recognises that “an informed citizen is better equipped to

244

N. Sahoo

keep necessary vigil on the instruments of governance”. The Act is paramount to fighting corruption. In 2008, for instance, an RTI filed by Yogacharya Anandji and Simpreet Singh led to revelations about a scam concerning Adarsh Housing, a society that was meant to be for survivors of the Kargil war. Similarly, Suresh Kalmadi’s acts of corruption with regards to the Commonwealth Games were revealed by an RTI, as was corruption in the Public Distribution System (PDS) of Assam (Firstpost, 2016). However, the transparency revolution which took the political and bureaucratic class by storm is under heavy attack now, albeit by the government in power. Not only the NDA government has attempted to curtail the powers of Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) through constitutional amendments, but it has also restricted the scope of RTI application (Acharyaulu, 2019).

Conclusion To sum up, while national security threats linked to corruption remain very much alive and on a steady rise in recent years, India’s anti-corruption measures have remained far from comprehensive and in many cases look compromised. This is largely because the key institutions tasked to fight graft and crimes lack real autonomy and necessary support from the governments of the day. Even those institutions (such as Lokpal) that enjoy relative autonomy have been rendered ineffective by the government of the day in some pretext or other. Yet, fighting corruption should not be left to these elite institutions alone. This is because while corruption and scams that happen at the top level often attract the media gaze and national outrage, a great deal of corruption which puts common citizens at the receiving ends is at the retail level (Goswami, 2017) which does not come under the radars of Lokayukta and Lokpal. While the CVC handles these complaints (covering Group C&D officials), yet CVC is a toothless body commanding little confidence. Finally, without corresponding structural reforms and urgent rationalisation and refinement of existing laws, most anti-corruption measures will remain on paper. In addition, there is an urgent need to overhaul a broken criminal justice system which in many ways acts as a mothership of corruption. Cases taking years including big-ticket scandals encourage impunity and reinforce corrupt behaviour. Similarly, it is well known that most corruption or kickbacks are linked to opaque political funding in India (Sridharan, 2014). Thus, without significant improvement in campaign finance processes including disclosures and accountability, it would be impossible to stem the corruption rots in the state and economy. In short, national security imperatives demand comprehensive political reforms involving political and radical reform of justice apart from making institutional innovations like Lokpal and RTI to attack corruption from its roots.

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

245

References Acharayulu, M. S. (2019). The right to information is dead: Here is obituary. The Wire. Available at: https://thewire.in/government/the-right-to-information-is-dead-here-is-its-obi tuary. Accessed on 19 May 2021. Alexander, S., & Padmanabhan, V. (2019). Despite hype, demonetization missed all goals. Available at: https://www.livemint.com/news/india/despite-hype-demonetization-missed-all-goals-155705 9532885.html. Accessed on 03 March 2021 Baklouti, N., & Boujelbene, Y. (2020). Shadow economy, corruption, and economic growth: an empirical analysis. The Review of Black Political Economy, 47(3). BBC, (2021). Alexei Navalny: Russia’s vociferous Putin critic. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-16057045. Accessed on 18 April 2021. Bhasin, T. M. (2016). Combating bribery and corruption. National Judicial Academy. Available at: http://nja.nic.in/Concluded_Programmes/2016-17/P-989_PPTs/6.%20TM%20Bhasin% 20Presentation.pdf. Accessed on 18 May 2021. Bhatnagar, G. V. (2018). No Lokpal appointed, act not implemented despite SC relaxing norms: Activists write to Modi. The Wire. Available at: https://thewire.in/government/no-lokpal-app ointed-act-not-implemented-despite-sc-relaxing-norms-activists-write-to-modi. Accessed on 19 May 2021 Chatterjee, S. (2018). Once unseated a CM, but the powerful Karnataka Lokayukta is now on ‘ventilator’. The News Minute. Available at: https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/once-uns eated-cm-powerful-karnataka-lokayukta-now-ventilator-75021. Accessed on 18 May 2021. Chellaney, B. (2010). National-security costs of mega-corruption. The Hindu. Available at: https://chellaney.net/2010/12/15/national-security-costs-of-mega-corruption/. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Cheyes, S. (2016). Corruption: Violent extremism, kleptocracy, and the dangers of failing governance. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment. org/2016/06/30/corruption-violent-extremism-kleptocracy-and-dangers-of-failing-governancepub-63982. Accessed on 05 March 2021. Choudhury, R. R. (2012). A mafia of the corrupt. The Businessline. Available at: https://www. thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/A-mafia-of-the-corrupt/article20542262.ece. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Christensen, J. (2011). The looting continues: Tax havens and corruption. Critical Perspectives on International Business. Cook, S. A. (2012). Lorenzo Moretti and David Rudin, corruption and Arab spring. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, XVIII: II. DePinto, J. R. (2016). Corruption and the 2014 EVD crisis in Sierra Leone: Ebola as “Total Disease”’. In M. Mustapha & J. J. Bangura (Eds.), Democratization and human security in Postwar Sierra Leone. Palgrave Macmillan. Economic Times. (2019). 83 % Lok Sabha MPs are ‘crorepatis’, 33 % have criminal cases: ADR report. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/83pc-lok-sabha-mps-are-crorepatis-33-pc-have-criminal-cases-adr-report/articleshow/68616006. cms?from=mdr. Accessed on 18 May 2021. Economic Times. (2021). India falls to 86th rank in corruption perception index 2020. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/indias-rank-slipsto-86th-in-corruption-perception-index-2020/articleshow/80512814.cms. Accessed on 04 April 2021. Felbab-Brown, W. (2017). Afghanistan’s terrorism resurgence: Al-Qaida, ISIS, and Beyond. The Brookings Institution. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans-terror ism-resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/. Accessed on 05 March 2021. Firstpost. (2016). Right to information: What 11 years of the RTI Act of 2005 have done for India. Available at: https://www.firstpost.com/india/right-to-information-what-11-years-of-the-rti-actof-2005-have-done-for-india-3047286.html. Accessed on 19 May 2021.

246

N. Sahoo

Goswami, S. (2017). Study finds India is Asia’s most corrupt country, while Japan comes in last. Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/suparnagoswami/2017/03/08/study-findsindia-is-asias-most-corrupt-country-while-japan-comes-in-last/?sh=4d4e3a1201f8. Accessed on 20 May 2021 Gupta, S. et al., (1998). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?. IMF Working Paper. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9876.pdf. Accessed on 28 Feb 2021. The Hindu (2020). India records highest rate of bribery in Asia: Survey. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-records-highest-rate-of-bribery-in-asiasurvey/article33184156.ece. Accessed on 05 April 2021. Kapur, D., & Vaishnav, M. (2018). Costs of democracy: Political finance in India. Oxford University Press. Kubbe, I. (2014). Corruption and trust: A model design. In T. Debiel & A. Gawrich (Eds.), (Dys-) Functionalities of corruption. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. Kugelman, M. (2016). Insights and analysis. Wilson Centre. Available at: https://www.wilsoncen ter.org/article/corruptions-destabilizing-effects-afghanistan. Accessed on 06 March 2021. Kumar, V. (2019). How Jayaprakash Narayan’s historic blunder paved the way for BJP’s rise. The Print. Available at: https://theprint.in/opinion/jayaprakash-narayan-historic-blunder-bjp-rsssangh-indira-gandhi-emergency/301850/. Accessed on 16 May 2021. Machold, R. (2017). Militarising Mumbai? The ‘Politics’ of response. Contexto Internacionalvol, 39(3). Mahapatra, D. (2013). Greedy customs officials allowed blasts: SC. The Times of India. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/greedy-customs-officials-allowed-blasts-sc/art icleshow/19118099.cms. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Manoharan, N. (2013). Internal security and good governance: The linkage. CLAWS Paper. Available at: https://archive.claws.in/1125/internal-security-and-good-governance-the-linkagedr-n-manoharan.html. Accessed on 17 May 2021. Miklian, J. (2009). Illicit trading in Nepal: Fueling South Asian terrorism. PRIO South Asia Briefing Paper No 3. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97442/Illicit_Trading_in_Nepal_(South_ Asia_Briefing_Paper_3).pdf. Accessed on 16 May 2021. Ministry of Home Affairs (GoI). (1993). Vohra committee report. Available at: https://adrindia.org/ sites/default/files/VOHRA%20COMMITTEE%20REPORT_0.pdf. Accessed on 15 Feb 2021. Mohan, N. C. (2013). The post-1991 corruption era. Business Standard. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/n-chandra-mohan-the-post-1991-corrup tion-era-112103000010_1.html. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Nair, H. V. (2013). Supreme court says 3Cs dominate Radia tapes—corruption, connivance and collusion. India Today. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/niira-radia-radiatapes-supreme-court-2g-scam-cbi-214654-2013-10-18. Accessed on 17 May 2021. NDTV Report (2011). What is the Jan Lokpal Bill, why it’s important. Available at: https:// www.ndtv.com/india-news/what-is-the-jan-lokpal-bill-why-its-important-452223. Accessed on 19 May 2021. Panag, H. S. (2021). How India’s Maoist counter-insurgency is being undone by a flawed security strategy. The Print. Available at: https://theprint.in/opinion/how-indias-maoist-counter-ins urgency-is-being-undone-by-a-flawed-security-strategy/640124/. Accessed on 15 April 2021. Pradhan, B., & Kumaresan, S. (2019). India’s bitterly fought election becomes the world’s most expensive. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/india-s-bitterlyfought-poll-becomes-the-world-s-most-expensive. Accessed on 17 May 2021. Ray, A. (2021). Is India less corrupt or has the nature of corruption changed? Deccan Herald. Available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/is-india-less-corrupt-or-has-thenature-of-corruption-changed-984955.html. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Sahoo, N. (2015). Dealing with Maoist threats, the development and governance conundrum. ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews. Available at: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? doi=10.1.1.819.2752&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed on 17 May 2021.

15 Corruption and National Security: Insights …

247

Sahoo, N. (2017). Towards public financing of elections and political activities in India: Lessons from global experience. ORF Occasional Paper. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/res earch/towards-public-financing-elections-political-parties-india-lessons-global-experiences/. Accessed on 17 May 2021. Shehzad, M., & Chengappa, R. (2004). Abdul Qadeer Khan: How the Pak scientist sold nuclear secrets in international market. India Today. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/ cover-story/story/20040216-abdul-qadeer-khan-how-the-pak-scientist-sold-nuclear-secrets-ininternational-market-790569-2004-02-16. Accessed on 02 April 2021. Shukla, A. (2014). Corruption in defence procurement: Blacklisting must remain an option. Business Standard. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/corruptionin-defence-procurement-blacklisting-must-remain-an-option-115072800013_1.html. Accessed on 16 May 2021. Singh, A. (2016). The 13 tax havens where rich Indians stash their money. Business Insider. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.in/panama-papers-leak-the-13-tax-havens-where-richindians-stash-their-money/articleshow/51210104.cms. Accessed on 02 March 2021. Sinha, K. (2018). Corruption high in India’s defence deals: Transparency international. Economic Times. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/corruption-high-in-ind ias-defence-deals-transparency-international/articleshow/49655141.cms. Accessed on 16 May 2021. Sridharan, E. (2014). India: Democracy and corruption. Conference Paper, Legatum Institute. Available at: https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/upiasi/India%20-%20Democracy%20and% 20Corruption.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2021. Sudhir. (2013). Chhattisgarh Naxal attack: Why political corruption is also to blame. Firstpost. Available at: https://www.firstpost.com/india/chhattisgarh-naxal-attack-why-political-cor ruption-is-also-to-blame-815813.html. Accessed on 05 April 2021. Teets, J. C., & Chenoweth, E. (2009). To bribe or to bomb: Do corruption and terrorism go together? In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), Corruption, global security, and world order. Brookings Institute Press. The Tribune. (2020). India has highest bribery rate in Asia: Transparency international. Available at: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-has-highest-bribery-rate-in-asia-transp arency-international-176149. Accessed on 20 April 2021. The White House. (2021). Memorandum on establishing the fight against corruption as a core United States National Security Interest. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/06/03/memorandum-on-establishing-the-fight-against-corrup tion-as-a-core-united-states-national-security-interest/. Accessed on 10 April 2021. Xu, B. (2014). Governance in India: Corruption, a backgrounder, council on foreign relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/governance-india-corruption. Accessed on 05 April 2021. You, J.-S., & Khagram, S. (2004). Inequality and Corruption. KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP04–001. Available at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/inequality-and-cor ruption. Accessed on 02 March 2021. You, J. S. (2017). Trust and corruption. In E. M. Uslaner (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of social and political trust. Oxford Handbooks Online.

Chapter 16

Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security Amit Mukherjee

Introduction National Security today deals with issues that transcend beyond the dimensions of traditional security. The rising challenges for meeting the prosperity and development of a society closely amalgamate with non-traditional dimensions of National Security. As such security issues related to health, food, economic, environmental, maritime, and water among others are forming to shape up the study and assessment of National Security. The study of all these aspects requires an all-encompassing technology that can help in the analysis and management for equitable distribution of resources and mitigation of events. The emergence of ubiquitously applicable and all-permeating GIS finds its role in effecting study, assessment, and analysis in various dimensions of National Security. Components of resource management, individually and as an integrated system, contribute towards the creation of a GIS system that can model non-traditional and traditional elements of National Security. Application of GIS requires data standardisation towards which the Indian National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI v2) has formalised the architecture of Geospatial data in 2019. With open-source GIS being promulgated by OGC standards, the reach of GIS for national security has increased manifolds and will continue to grow. With free data and processing of product as an initiative by the Government, the contributions from the Non-Governmental Organisations and the academics would increase the reach of the benefits accrued through the technology for GIS. Another area of application GIS finds its role is in helping in the counter-terrorism and internal violent conflict studies. India’s own satellite capability has added to the prowess of GIS in addressing some traditional aspects of National Security due to the availability of high-resolution imagery. The future

A. Mukherjee (B) National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. Behera and S. Mishra (eds.), Varying Dimensions of India’s National Security, India Studies in Business and Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7593-5_17

249

250

A. Mukherjee

development of GIS would entail its ability to deliver national security variables and help the country in securing its all-encompassing role and responsibility.

Methodology The combination of GIS for national security does not contain major pre-literature works. Though literature review is done, the construction of the paper required background knowledge to merge the components of GIS and National Security. Knowledge production within the field of GIS and National Security amalgamates an interdisciplinary approach. This makes it hard to keep up with state-of-the-art research and to be at the forefront, as well as to assess the collective evidence in a research area. Given the sensitivity that surrounds maps and GIS in the defence domain, most of the materials procured are a combination of the user based knowledge base at the conceptual level and available literature. Similarly, since there is no publicly available treatise on GIS for National Security, the design for the chapter here presented unique challenges as it was found inadequate to mould with the contents in a way that is most suited for write-ups on the conventional scope of National Security. The approaches of analysis involved in this paper are semi-systematic and integrative. The semi-systematic approach allowed the comparison of developments in the issues and challenges and the related progress as a solution in respective areas. The search criteria included all three versions where applicable systematic for available literature, semi-systematic for the technical domain and non-systematic in areas of defence and traditional security. The analysis and evaluation were qualitative especially when dealing with the application of solutions for the said problems in both traditional and non-traditional security issues (Gandhi, 2010; Gupta, 2018; Paleri, 2008).

Traditional and Non-traditional Elements of National Security The national security issues of a country like India are huge. This includes the whole process of acquisition of weapons and weapons systems to the land estate management to the disaster management techniques, to maintaining agricultural and environmental aspects. From a conventional point of view of national security, the assumption of perceived threats and defence objectives in accordance with the political objectives of the nation make the task more intricate. Most of the problems are identified in the decision-making stage of the process and as such the use of GIS comes in as a powerful tool to assist decision-making. Information-related defence planning and operation can be utilised with the help of GIS-related techniques. Such information can also be useful while defining national

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

251

security goals that could be useful in varied terrains as per the need in different geographic and climatic conditions. From a conventional point of view of national security, the main challenge facing India, viz. defence today is delay that happens in the acquisition of required arms and equipment. The inheritance of problems and issues of the Indian Defence establishment began as a legacy of the British rule where it had to start from almost nothing. The defence establishment which happened to be the largest volunteer force during World War II was a big organisation post-independence. Being the behemoth that it is, there are inherent problems related to the management of the organisation even though it has evolved from the past to become a world-class defence establishment. The biggest problem facing the armed forces of today is the delay that happens in the acquisition of required arms and equipment. A large portion of the budget remains unutilised. There are insufficient financial powers of competent financial authority and other acquisition authorities. Besides all procurement cases are required to be rooted through defence production board which causes a delay in processing and decision-making. To deal with post-contract activities, there is no single agency. Besides, with no powers to opt for the latest technology the manufacturing agencies, the ordnance factory and the defence public sector are handicapped. Understanding problems and issues becomes important for the analysis and solving of contemporary military paradigms. The realm of security has seen a shift from the traditional imperative to the nontraditional. The early 90s and the fall of the Soviet Union created the necessity to include the non-traditional dimensions that take form and shape in various avatars. This included environment, food, development, health, among others. The invariable effect of these non-traditional elements plays a crucial role in affecting the prosperity and development of a nation. Given that resource is limited and invariably lead to competition, non-traditional reasons are also leading to conflicts. Though traditional security dimensions are still dominating reasons, the increase of non-traditional areas of security gives the traditional realm continued sustenance. The global challenges to security emanate from the environment effect play a prominent role in conflicts. Robert Kaplan predicted the dilution of international borders, chaos, conflict due to environmental degradation, resource depletion and competition, and perpetual violence (Kaplan & Hakli, 2001). The UN concept of security included community security, political security and personal security to the erstwhile mention of non-traditional security areas. The human security ideas evolved to comprehensive security from the Copenhagen school (Please cite a reference here) thought. The comprehensive security dimensions consisted of five security dimensions that include military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security. These areas do not work in isolation to create insecurity. Instead, they are mutually complementary. ‘Walt, Mearshimer (2001) and Roland Paris (Kindly provide the year of his work and full reference at the end of the paper) among other leading researchers dismiss the concept of non-traditional security and consider it dilutes the conventional security because it is difficult to theorise and reach the source of the issue. According to AP Upadhyaya (2006) the narrative for most security constructs is based on developed worlds and

252

A. Mukherjee

do not consider the attempts of developing world and their aspirations of societies that are still trying to create an identity’.

Challenges to GIS for National Security Considering the dearth of a pre-existing conceptual framework amalgamating the GIS tool with National Security, this paper identifies the following challenges in this regard. a. b. c. d.

The technical amalgamation of various data from several departments has been a major challenge in unifying the GIS system for national security. The non-sharing of crucial information that GIS needs for an integrated system. The existing limitations of data integration that exist in geospatial technology. Separation of technological systems that exist in various applications of GIS.

The conceptual framework developed here by addressing the challenges identified above could potentially contribute to a robust theoretical construction for future usage.

Challenges in Integrated GIS Structure The challenge of integrating geospatial technologies from various sectors that include state establishments to district, village, and house level information does not exist in a comprehensive manner. To enable this type of data sharing and database compatibility, the NSDI is being formed. Towards this, several countries and governments have established policy guidelines that facilitate the integration of such an enterprise. The NSDI aims to bring information from several wings of the society, ranging from international, national to the local and individual levels Then there are users that directly incorporate the data for national security and defence. Here too, the integration of data with the commercial partners and private individuals needs to be incorporated. The same set of connections needs to be established with the government to non-government level offices (Koontz, 2003). The integration of GIS information requires the compliance of data models from International Standard Organisation and Open-Source Geospatial Consortium (OGC). The interoperability of data and services has been a challenge since the early days of computing. The metadata (data that describes GIS data) needs to be made available with the user, both in an online mode and must be held at the reserve and secure servers (OGC Standards, 2019). Initially, the spatial data infrastructure must be created at the state levels, known as the state spatial data infrastructure. This level must incorporate the information about all resources that exist at the lowest individual level. Depending on the requirement this information can be collected at larger scales for agriculture, land management, water resources, mining, and geology.

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

253

In India, the National Map Policy-2005 (National Map Policy, GOI, 2005) permits the use of Open-Source Maps for civilian use and the Defence Source Maps for defence purposes. There were inherent lacunae that were built in the first NSDI, (NSDI, 2006). The improvements were later incorporated to accommodate efficient interoperability through the policy of National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy implemented by the National Information Centre (NIC, 2011). The National Remote Sensing Data Sharing policy was also formulated to facilitate easier sharing of satellite data (NRSC Data Policy, 2012).

Stated Response The above-mentioned policy and guidelines were still unable to provide seamless data, make easy user distribution of data, serve interoperability and to assist in decision-making at the policy level. The updates were incorporated in the NSDI version 2 released in 2018. NSDI has five strategic goals in the domains of governance, data, access, interoperability and product space. In the domain of governance, the aim is to receive benefits from governments’ geospatial resources. The data section needs to preserve the mainstay of procuring, maintenance and dissemination of geospatial data and formulate guidelines for associated non-geospatial data. The access to government data must be readily available to authorised users. The datasets should meet interoperability requirements for various government departments. The accessibility of the data through various software and hardware should be available with the Bureau of Indian Standards compliant. The information here should be cloud compatible and open geospatial compatible to keep up with future requirements. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) has been prepared for Survey of India’s 1:50,000 scale topographic data reengineering towards the development of GIS data and provision of Web Feature Service (WFS) in Open Geospatial Consortium Compatible Geography Markup Language (GML) format (Wortman, 2013). The objectives for seamless collection, assimilation, processing, and distribution of geospatial information includes developing and maintaining a standard digital collection of metadata. The processes required to achieve this seamless operability have been provisioned through a single window access facility to all users, thus facilitating the interoperability and exchange of interagency data. To achieve higher levels of efficiency, promotion of research, training, education, and capacity building has been recommended and initiated. Participation with the international geospatial data or information community has been incorporated. For decision-making capability, data analytics needs to be facilitated with access to abundant data. NSDI is transforming the geospatial domain from a data domain to an application domain. The real-time application includes the sustenance of state and national data nodes. National data registry, 2D and 3D data life cycle management, the operational scale of GIS cloud platform, application and service delivery, training, and capacity building, along with R&D for interoperability, volunteered GI, spatial decision support system,

254

A. Mukherjee

and geo-semantic web (OGC Standards, 2019). The assimilation of national spatial data infrastructure will then be able to process and disseminate geospatial information for all aspects of comprehensive national security.

Use of GIS in Traditional Security The Geographical Information System of today has been in the strongest phase of development since the computer revolution in the nineties. They have helped in revamping the C3ISR to a true C4ISR system.1 The true capability depicts the system to have independent standalone technology. They, however, are the reasons because of which the command-control-communication-computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance have been able to be looped together as a true C4ISR system. The GIS provides for real-time net-centric and geographically related geospatial database connectivity that makes this system viable for defence security management and advanced warfare capacity. It is this advanced geospatial capacity that gives the armed forces the opportunity to relegate this technology to higher areas of application like Future Combat Systems (FCS), Battle Command services, Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), and Joint Command and Control (JC2) that require timely, and relevant accurate terrain situational awareness. A Joint-Geospatial Enterprise Service (J-GES) capability is required to enable a dynamic, tailor-able common operational picture, situation awareness, and decision aids (Coley, 2005). This enables an integrated view of the area of operations to all levels of the military task force involved in the objective at hand. It is due to this ability that reduced instruction time can be incorporated into any cycle of tactics, operations, and strategy. Future battle scenes will depend heavily on such faculties of conduct of war.

GIS Challenges in Traditional Security—Defence It must be noted that today’s military GIS contains very limited geospatial capabilities and does not completely utilise the emerging net-centric or enterprise geospatial technologies and geospatial database capabilities. No current geospatial enterprise architecture or services capability exists to optimally generate, manage, exploit, and disseminate geospatial data as required to support the full range of military operations from peacetime to crisis support and through major combat operations. Additionally, 1

C3ISR is the acronym for military standards that define the command control and communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance protocols for operational elements of traditional security. With the advent of computers this has been transformed to C4ISR where the added element of computers has been incorporated to take advantage of the IT revolution. GIS enhances this ability of computers to its full potential in planning and achieving operational effectiveness, due to its capability to integrate spatial and temporal data.

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

255

within and across the departments of the Defence Services, there are hardly any regulated and standardised protocols and concepts of operations and operational architecture to support interoperability with geospatial information. The lack of real-time GIS-enabled management system for integrating the force structures, systems, and technological capabilities to improve its effectiveness and efficiencies. But to fully use the potential of the system the need to possess a system that supports the ability to convert the data acquisition, assimilation, computation, analysis, and distribution in minutes rather than hours or days. This would be an Enterprise of GIS, which must have ‘horizontal integration at all echelons to support collaborative assessment (especially at lowest echelons) in minutes versus days to provide actionable intelligence’ (Coley, 2005). This capability will allow a dynamic, tailor-able common operational platform and tactical decision system to allow rapid analysis and situational awareness based upon best available geospatial data across the echelons (especially from Soldiers on the ground) (Ibid, 2005). The defense area applications that can be implemented through the application of Geographical Information systems for the Open-Source Intelligence Technology (OSINT) gathering system can be classified as mission area specific whereby the design of the GIS system must bracket civil area data (socio-economic, environment, demographic, and others) and must include human inputs. It must be able to categorise technical intelligence inputs about the local government’s command and control governing bodies, transportation and traffic, civil infrastructure, power grid information, among others. Once the demographic- and civil-related data is available, one can upgrade the interest to the target analysis of a specific area of interest. This would include generating detailed description and vulnerability intelligence and ability to carry out a study of time-based season-based intelligence of the natural environment and human environment of that location for carrying out strategic route planning. The detailed study of terrain, a trident part of the Geographical Information System can be carried out with OSINT for aviation and other covert and overt ground movements by both the enemy side and by the home side (Steele, 2007).

GIS Developments for Traditional Security The Geographical Information System has permeated all sections of Revolution in Military Affairs—RMA today. GIS has been incorporated into all five elements that constitute the RMA, namely firepower, mobility, protection, communications, and intelligence. Apart from the above, GIS plays a crucial role at the functional level of various sections in the armed forces. This goes right down to the deployment and targeting information for weapons and weapons systems. The amount of data has exceeded the normal computational capabilities and as such newer integrating technologies like Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Analytics, among others, are providing the bridge that enable large data acquisition, processing, and analysis from various sources. These associated technologies are being used to provide solutions

256

A. Mukherjee

from linear to complex analysis in a non-linear sequence of information. The integration of information from multiple sensors to shooters will go through a process of diffusion through multi-sensor data fusion. Several technologies are working in conjunction to produce the final desired outcome. Today all aspects of RMA, from field units to weapons to communication and intelligence instruments, their practice and the strategy and tactics and operational doctrine are all undergoing change. At the highest level of expertise is the integration of automation for all such systems. This integration through various systems of learning is trying to achieve near-human intelligence. Though this stage is still some years away learning systems are already able to perform redundant tasks that require expertise. The future of AI is evolving into a platform that has the capability to explain the reasoning behind its conclusions to users. The use of GIS entails the facility to eradicate the forms of miscommunication that takes place in wartime situations by provisioning real-time geo-centric data to the lowest level and the highest level at the same time. This would facilitate delivering information to both the military and non-military—political, bureaucratic, and civil authorities of the exact situation at the same time thus enhancing logistic balance and preparatory standards. This attempt must be made to enable a reduction in the process of setting up inquiries and forward reviews to find lacunae in case of mismanagement and misconduct at any logistical level, during a ‘sudden reaction’ defence/civil defence—mission situation. The most important factor of logistics remains the transport facility and the location-based information of locally available resource material. It is, therefore, necessary to create a general information database for the sites that are to be considered valuable national assets and sites which come under military strategic and tactical observations. The idea of mapping the entire theatre of operations for that region is eventually what is going to increase the surmised realisation of the enemy and force it to see amicable discourse as the only option, thus reducing the chances of war and its destructive effects by a mathematical proportion. This process would involve a model that should construct a functional procedure to map and derive a solution from the theatre of study. a. b.

The creation of thematic maps from base maps for the requirements. Themes to be fragmented on basis of areas of logistics. • • • • •

Transport density from the area of the source to the area of destination, Route mapping, Troop deployment data and coverage area—for proximity analysis, Transport and logistic data, Regional data.

This conceptual model encapsulates essential elements of design based on which a fully functional model may be generated. It provides a general skeletal structure that may be adopted by higher organisations for further enhancement depending on the requirements. As a result, accurate location-based markings can be carried out to produce geo-data sets that can be transmitted to authorities in real time and near real time. The advantages for such a project are the ability of the logistic section

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

257

to be able to coordinate with other branches of defence establishment and create a time-effective solution to unforeseen developments during mission-critical phases of operations.

GIS for Non-traditional Areas of Security Various application of GIS for non-traditional areas of security includes multiple civilian activities that cover the following: Land Registration and Cadastre mapping agencies: Hydrographic mapping, Remote sensing agencies and satellite companies, Natural reserve study groups like Geologists, Hydrologists, Physical Geographers and soil Scientists, Land Evaluators, Ecologists and Biogeography’s users, Meteorologists, Climatologists, and Oceanographers. The data that are collected by these agencies include topographic maps at large range of scales, satellite, and airborne scanner images and photographs, administrative boundaries; census tracts and census data; postcode areas, statistical data on people, land cover, land use again at very different ranges and levels, data from marketing surveys, data on utilities (gas, water, electricity lines, cables) and their locations. Base-mapping: From elevation mapping to land-use and land-cover change mapping and updating infrastructure information, studying population, housing typology, hazard-prone areas, watershed analysis, multi-sectoral studies, are all part of GIS modeling activities. Data on rocks, water soil, atmosphere, biological activity, natural hazards, and disaster is collected for a wide range of spatial and temporal levels of resolution. This spatial and temporal data is then processed for GIS based analysis. The following list accounts for current applications of the field of GIS that is already under implementation. Agriculture monitoring and management of farms at national levels are being done in many parts of the developed world. The case in plantation management usage of advanced land surveying equipment and technologies available today for site mapping is being used for agricultural applications. GPS/GIS mapping enables the landowner to design more efficiently and track more accurately any given area or block of a plantation. Remote sensing from high altitude aerial photography or satellite imagery coupled with accurate survey control assists in the decision-making process before, during and after the crop seasons. Archaeologists use the GIS for Site description and scenario development. ‘…archaeologists who wish to understand GIS have been faced with a number of options, none of them particularly satisfactory or convenient. They could read introductory texts derived from other fields or disciplines, such as soil science or economic geography. Alternatively, the curious could be directed towards the proprietary manual accompanying a given piece of software and then decide how best to translate this information into a specific archaeological context. Although some manuals are excellent, this leaves the archaeologist to fashion an application of GIS that is sensitive to the unique requirements of the discipline, in the process adding an

258

A. Mukherjee

extra burden to the already non-trivial task of getting to grips a complex technology’ (Wheatley & Gilling, 2002). Environmentalists monitor and model and manage land degradation to evaluate plans for rural and urban land planning, contingency for landslide evacuation and safety systems, desertification, water quality and quantity; plagues; air quality, weather and climate modeling and weather forecasting. In the field of Epidemiology and Health, they use GIS for location of disease in relation to environmental factors and geographical spread of area of influence. Forestry would want to manage and plan and optimise extraction and preplanning for deforestation and poaching. ‘Forestry involves the management of a broad range of natural resources within a forested area. In addition to timber, forests provide such resources as grazing land for animals, wildlife habitat, water resources and recreation areas. The U.S. Forest Service is responsible for the management of forest harvesting, grazing leases, recreational areas, wildlife habitat, mining activities as well as protecting endangered species. To balance the competing resource conservation and resource use all activities must be accommodated. Accessing the feasibility of these multiple uses is greatly enhanced using GIS techniques’ (Kane, 1997). Emergency services like fire extinguishing, Fire Equipment Response Distance Analysis is carried out where—‘a GIS can be used to evaluate how far (as measured via the street network) each portion of the street network is from a firehouse. This can be useful in evaluating the best location for a new firehouse or in determining how well the fire services cover areas for insurance ratings’ (Massachusetts State Bureau of GIS-2021). Police and ambulance routing, improved understanding of crime and location spread are areas of GIS implementation. ‘Buffers Areas Where Extra Penalties Apply for Drug Sale Convictions—If a convict is selling drugs within 1000 feet of a school property, special penalties apply. GIS software can readily create and display /map these buffer zones making it much easier to determine whether a specific arrest location is within the buffer zone’ (Ibid). The integration of GIS-based solutions to problems of environmental security begins with the challenge of linking the environment directly to its own unique nature of complexities. The increasing effect of global warming and the pressure to gain economic profits forces institutions to forego the relevant precautionary measure of suitability. Likewise, boundary demarcation of maritime disputes reflects the same challenges in GIS that exists in the real world. The data and information sharing procedures of different countries and institutions vary causing non-uniformity of data and distribution services adding to the repetitive work of creating multiple projects. This happens to be the case in most works. However, globally and nationally, there is a reduction of redundancy that started to set in the Geospatial services and data as this effort is now a decade old. The challenges in the environment can be analysed with GIS to settle legal issues as well as administrative elements. The large data sets are much more processable with the computing power that can be rendered to create simulation studies to analyse and predict environmental conditions. Since the local effect of a region is affected

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

259

globally, GIS enables seamless integration and assimilation of data for transregional models (Chen et al., 2011).

GIS in Infrastructure Security Indian economic growth will usher in an increased infrastructural setup. The country has one of the largest industrial bases among developing economies. This industrial base would expand manifold in the coming decades as national objectives like indigenisation and collaboration through make in India go hand in hand through developmental plans. GIS-augmented systems for infrastructure security ensure the safe and smooth functioning of lifeline facilities for a country. These include transportation network, power grid, food storage and shipment, water—distribution, reservoirs and natural catchments, government institutions, financial institutions and industrial structures, health infrastructure and of late, information infrastructure, along with security and safety of civil society en masse. As the country’s network and interconnectivity improve in the forthcoming decades the issues of maintenance, security, and emergency management shall become of prime importance. There will have to be a national strategy that will be all-encompassing for all institutional categories. This shall need to be implemented at hierarchical levels. It would entail creating a security structure for critical infrastructure connected to each other. As such security and management would have to come under a single networked grid, starting at the national level, then state level, and further down at district and village levels. GIS augmentation brings efficient management for identification, detection, and prevention for a section of the infrastructure where the problem lies, thus alienating the risk of system failure at an enterprise level. The security of an infrastructure system needs to envisage all possible challenges for its safety, from destruction to disruption. For envisaging such security measures starting at the national level, security planners need to identify key areas for each infrastructure system and then identify threat and failure cases. It must be based on their location and the unique identities of these locations. This would form a basis for preparing against any impediments that may arise in the smooth functioning of the system. GIS assists in prepping the information that may need to be disseminated to various sections of the administrative, legal, security establishment to effectively pre-empt and control a threat or mitigate damage and bring the system back on track. Such systems are based on risk assessment. Risk assessment gets a boost with GIS as it allows bringing in its domain the entire gamut of information processing from acquisition to dissemination to intelligent decision-making, as part of its design. The result of applying GIS to critical national infrastructure is to add resilience to the infrastructure’s security dimensions.

260

A. Mukherjee

Physical Infrastructure Most infrastructure security related studies in the country consider cyberinfrastructure security as the central aspect for infrastructure security and protection. This is so because there are already available local security measures on sites for physical security. This often eliminates the element of physical security from neighbourhood areas, human settlements, and natural spreads, in such studies. Since Indian infrastructure is becoming more digitally connected, cyber security and its protection as an infrastructure has taken prevalence among its interest group that includes industry, administration and government, and academia. To that extent, physical security of a location or enterprise merges with digital security. However, the aspect of traditional (physical) security is also made efficient through the GIS system. Infrastructure can be divided into sectors that can be further divided into categories. This subdivision is based on the likelihood of hazards and accidents that may come upon an infrastructure unit. The hazards may happen by accident like natural calamity, or by purposeful disruption or terror attack. These sectors that can potentially hamper national services include chemical industries, agriculture, transport, communication, finance, power and energy, water services, housing estates and offices, public utility buildings like marketplace, auditorium, etc. A sector that has both private and public sector involvement in India is telecommunication sector. The past incident of network failure and call drops have been a bane in the quality of service; however, a complete network failure could also mean disastrous security and social implications. The larger private sector industries that have IT and services are also vulnerable to large-scale systemic failures. For water storage and supplies there are about 4877 dams in India and another 300 under construction (CWC compendium, 2017). Dams are a lifeline of the country that supports primary and auxiliary services. GIS-based systems are already in use for various individual control systems at localised levels. However, GIS-based security calls for dams and reservoirs to be connected through a central system that integrates them with a centralised national geospatial centre. It should also be part of the national geospatial information system. The water supply is the most crucial of all networks as contamination and disruption in services can affect the lives of millions of people living in each geographic location. The health care industry in India is around 100 billion and could grow to 280 billion by 2020 according to the Indian Brand Equity Foundation (2020). About 70% of healthcare establishments are attributed to the private sector in urban areas and about 63% in rural areas. India as a large country already suffers from ailing symptoms of a developing nation in the health care sector (WEF, 2015), despite strides and growth in medical tourism. There are attempts to make it into a robust national facility that can cater to the country’s large populace. Health care services themselves are a sector that is dependent on other sectors like transport, medicine, nursing, and hospitals. The transportation system is the lifeline for the movement of goods and people. India’s growing 65,808 kms long rail network according to World Bank data report

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

261

2018 and 33 lakh kilometre road network is a soft spot for disruption of services according to Government of India data report 2011. The manufacturing sector has important portfolios like electric equipment, heavy machinery and metals, and transportation vehicles (Austin et al., 2015). Other than the above-mentioned, nuclear reactors and power supply from nuclear installations are the most critical infrastructure from the standpoint of security and protection. The elements of nuclear waste, radiation leaks, or plant failure like in Fukushima Japan (IAEA Report, 2016) need to envisage not just securing the facility but preparing for disaster management also. India’s safety regulation was upgraded and the bodies carrying them have recommended further evaluations of safety protocols (AERB, GOI, 2010). Despite all safety measures, there needs to be a containment plan for people, livestock, and natural elements around the region to the furthest possible extent in the event of an external event of natural origin. India is readying people with disaster management training but the number and technology at their disposal need improvement. GIS can provide data and mapping information including intelligent information for both simulated exercises to create contingencies for perceived real-time incidents. To create comprehensive location information of people and systems (for both control and processing segments, automation services, and natural spaces), one needs to create a layered observation channel. These observation channels apart from the usual instruments also need a network of ground-based location sensors. These sensors can then either automatically or manually alert an activity that would need an automated or human response.

GIS for Cyber Security All application of GIS for cyber warfare also invariably applies to counter-terror operations. There are several ways in which GIS can be constructed for dealing with cyber terror attacks. The primary among them is to use GIS as a tool facilitating past information of attacks. Then collate the extent of spatial information regarding cyber and terror attacks to see if a pattern emerges. If a pattern does exist which is the case in most cyber-attacks, then there is a scope to study the trends. Through trend analysis, one can use classification methods to determine the nature, character, source, method of the attacks thus gaining information about the properties with which then the security team can either counter or block the attacks. Finding information about the source and intent of the attack is often time taking process. This delay occurs even after the attack has been prevented. Then there are the basic questions as to why a site was attacked in the absence of obvious reason? Was the attack successful? How much was the success ratio? What was the damage volume to data or finance depending on what was stolen? The problems related to countering cyber-attack also lie within the administrative system that gets bottlenecked due to systemic lag in the processes. If there is a GIS system during the cyber security structure, then it can point out the delays in the loop. Such processes have already

262

A. Mukherjee

been successfully implemented in physical processes like courier agencies that keep a track of the delivery schedule and location of the package during its delivery cycle. To add GIS to the cyberinfrastructure program would mean receiving real-time location-based information about an imminent or ongoing attack. This would provide the experts with a common operating picture. Such a design helps in averting or responding to non-cyber-based attacks inside any system with cyberinfrastructure facility like a server room. In conventional cyber security programs, there is already some provision for location identification modules embedded in the system that detect an outside breach or attack (Bauxbam, 2014). Simulation methods provide scenarios for possible attacks on an infrastructure that can be envisaged physically and through the cyber centric approach. In both cases, GIS-based mapping allows planning and countering an intrusion. It allows coordination of efforts for various agencies located at different locations to prevent, mitigate, or foil an attack. In the failure of prevention GIS data helps in recovery efforts and carrying out a damage assessment.

Methods in Infrastructure Security The means of a natural disaster striking an infrastructural base are numerous. GIS datasets aim to map elements that may cause a disaster that also include natural phenomena like wind speed and direction, uphill or downhill gradient of land, tsunami and floods, forest fire, urban and rural housing and building accidents caused due to fire or explosion or collapse, etc. A comprehensive GIS-layered map base provides a baseline for analytical work. To achieve this, it is needed to make platforms that have situational awareness that is both real time and database stored. Since the geographic layer can serve as the base layer for any event or phenomenon on, in, over, and around a geographic location it provides an integrating framework to all other layers. The fusing of GIS with event-based data allows the analyst to derive from calculations both empirical and mathematical, the result of complex questions. This helps in detecting vulnerabilities. Once they have been discovered there are basically three methods to tighten security in case a breach is found. The first method identifies the issue and offers remedies, the second method offers network hardening through firewalls and closed systems, and encryptions systems, third is basically reacting to a compromise either physically or digitally by forced intervention. The next step in the application of GIS is for mitigation of threats and management of security concerns begins with risk assessment. Risk is calculated as a product of the value of asset and threat perception and vulnerability index. Each of these parameters can be provided with an index measure and then plotted on a GIS map to outlay the higher, middle, and lower vulnerability or threat intensity (NDMA GOI, 2016). Depending on the threat perception index value the responders and all accompanying logistical data and information can be re-arranged and plotted on a GIS system.

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

263

With the launch of IRNSS (ISRO, 2020) India’s own satellite navigation system and other satellite tracking and imagery systems, a lot of security and protection mechanisms will be boosted through its integration and accessibility to various departments. To create such an elaborate infrastructure security setup one can envisage a two-step process. First, to be able to create a real-time situational awareness that interconnects cameras and sensors on the ground to drones and satellites in an integrated observation system. Once the information is received and analysed by an automated GIS platform the dissemination of that information should also be available to all departments responsible for the mechanism through an online service. This would be an updated mechanism than that of using reports with table sheets and charts. The second advantage of using GIS is that it enables users to plan, simulate, and do scenario building and create forecasting models. The GIS system provides an assessment of socio-economic, physical damages, and other impacts due to infrastructure failure. In the pre-disaster planning phase, GIS system helps in correlating between people and an infrastructure asset that can be directly connected to each other. Such GIS system needs to be closed systems with data security and integrity protocols and agreements in place for security reasons. All member parties that need to share the relevant GIS-based information and analysis must be made a party to the product through proper security-based induction. These logistical functions for securing an infrastructure have a dependence on other infrastructure support systems like transportation, communication services, public works and engineering, firefighting, emergency management, public health and medical services, resource support, search and rescue team, agricultural bases, energy systems and resources, public safety and forecast, housing infrastructure. For all the previously mentioned sectors, use of GIS for real-time information, it is essential that a GIS database needs to be created. Most of these databases exist with various departments. However, there is rarely any intercommunication and almost always an ever-present lack of standardisation of data formats that keep the sectors as island systems. To simulate any situation for countering or predicting or mitigating an attack the data must include attribute features. These features describe the properties of an entity that is being mapped. They are then dependent on the place that is being mapped. The applicability of feature sets is dependent on the type, nature of the place. Some of the data feature sets that are applicable in Afghanistan may not be applicable in America and vice-versa. Simulations in GIS would require the mapping of spatial relations among entities. The source of this could be an aerial photo, stereo-image, and digitised network data, architecture files. Once these geospatially inter-related data are digitised into layers, training and planning of defensive operations can take place. To update real-time data during these simulations, a lot of feedback can be received through mobile devices, GPS and other sensors, live video feeds, among others. It is most important that inter-departmental jurisdictions should not become a problem. Instead, GIS should dissipate such redundancy by pre-fixing response measures and responsibilities.

264

A. Mukherjee

Conclusions and Recommendations The integration of GIS with National Security requires a two-pronged approach. There should not be any integration of data where the demarcation of non-traditional and traditional ranks exists. The critical data sets that are in the domain of military infrastructure should be kept separate from the civilian dataset collective. The national information services should have a physical separation of the database created for the civilian infrastructure and the strategic areas. Data security built into the system should not permeate to the ancillary units of the servers that facilitate civilian use of information. Centralisation of processes should be encouraged for base map and basic national-level information percolating to the smallest subsections of the administration. However, the same should not take place for critical information relating to infrastructure or related processes in traditional areas of national security. The integration of processes and data should only be to facilitate common areas of interest. Basic information of facilities, features, processes that transcend boundaries between traditional and non-traditional systems can be reposited at a centralised facility and locations. The integration of the GIS and elements of comprehensive national security should receive inputs from domain experts in various fields. A mechanism for information exchange should occur before even the comprehensive geospatial system can be based or developed. Interim arrangements can be made for ongoing platforms like Integrated geospatial information framework and spatial data infrastructure can be made public. A national-level data management system to host archival and current data can be envisaged. The specialisation works that integrate GIS with all aspects of national security should not be an independent creation for various areas as is being done in the present form. The data creation can be an independent work, but the storage processing and utilisation must be in an integrated structure. This may or may not have relevance to all areas of national security but would provide common minimum avenues for the development of a framework that can collate processes to combine the method, information, and utilisation of data for comprehensive national security.

References Austin, R. F., Disera David, P., & Brooks Talbot, J. (2015). GIS for critical infrastructure protection of India. CRC Press, Taylor and Francis. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. (2010). Government of India. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from http://www.aerb.gov.in/aerbportal/pages/English/t/publications/CODESGUIDES/ report-nov.pdf. Coley Micahel M. (2005). JGES—Research program (JGES-RP). U.S. Army Engineer Research and development Centers; Topographic Engineering Center. Alexandria USA. Chen, Z., Lin, H., Chen, M., Liu, D., Bao, Y., & Ding, Y. (2014). A framework for sharing and integrating remote sensing and GIS models based on Web service. Scientific World Journal, 2014, 354919.

16 Geographic Information System (GIS) for National Security

265

Central Water Commission of India. (2018). Government of India. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from https://www.atdamsafety.in/ecm/includes/PDFs/Conferences/3NDSC/Compendium_Tech nical_PapersIII.pdf. Gupta, A. (2018). How India manages its national security. Penguin Books. Gandhi, N. (2010). National security: Emerging dimensions and threats. Pentagon Press. Indian Brand Equity Foundation. (2020). Retrieved May 23, 2020, from https://www.ibef.org/ind ustry/healthcare-india.aspx. International Atomic Energy Agency. (2016). Retrieved May 11, 2020, from https://www.iaea.org/ newscenter/focus/fukushima. Indian Space Research Organisation. (2020). Satellite information. Retrieved June 16, 2020, from http://www.isro.gov.in/irnss-programme. Kaplan, D., & Hakli, J. (Eds) (2001). Bordering Europe and bounding states: The ‘civilizational’ roots of European national boundaries. In Borderlands and place, Rowman and Allenheld (pp. 54– 77). Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. Koontz Linda D. (2003). Geographic information systems. Challenges to effective data sharing. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, United States General Accounting Office, USA, x:1, Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.gao.gov/new. items/d03874t.pdf. Karisa, K. (1997). GIS and forestry applications. Retrieved May 12, 2020, from http://maps.uno maha.edu/Peterson/gis/Final_Projects/1997/KKane/Project.html. Massachusetts Bureau of GIS. (2021). Retrieved May 12, 2020, from https://www.mass.gov/orgs/ massgis-bureau-of-geographic-information. National Map Policy. (2005). Survey of India, Government of India. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/National%20Map%20Policy.pdf. National Spatial Data infrastructure. (2006). NSDI, Government of India. Retrieved March 14, 2020, from http://www.nsdiindia.gov.in/nsdi/nsdiportal/index.jsp. National Information Centre. (2011). NIC, Government of India. Retrieved April 22, 2020, from https://www.nic.in/. National Remote Sensing Centre—Data Policy. (2012), Government of India, NDSAP, Retrieved July 22, 2020, from https://www.nrsc.gov.in/EOP_irsdata_Policy/page_1?language_content_enti ty=en. National Disaster Management Plan. (2016). Retrieved June 16, 2020, from http://ndma.gov.in/ima ges/policyplan/dmplan/National%20Disaster%20Management%20Plan%20May%202016.pdf. OGC Standards and Resources. (2019). OGC. Wayland Massachusetts. Paleri. (2008). National security: Imperatives and challenges. Tata McGraw-Hill. Planning Commission of India. (2011). Government of India. Retrieved June 15, 2020, from http:// planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/strgrp/stgp.../11_Chapter%209.doc. Steele Robert David. (2007). Open-source intelligence—Intelligence ethics—Hand book of intelligence (p. 142). London, New York: Routledge. Upadhyaya, P, (2006). Securitization matrix in South Asia: Bangladeshi migrants as enemy alien. In M. Caballero-Anthony, M. Caballero, R. Emmers, & A. Acharya (Eds.), Non-traditional security in Asia: Dilemmas in securitization (pp. 13–39). Burlington. UK, VT: Ashgate Publishing. Wortman Kathryn, C. (2013). Developing standards for a national spatial data infrastructure. Cartography and Geographic Information Systems, 1994(3), 132–135. Wheatley, D., & Gilling, M. (2002). Spatial technology and archaeology: The archaeological applications of GIS. Published January 24, 2002. CRC Press. World Economic Forum, Report. (2015). Retrieved April 29, 2020, from https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2015/01/three-ways-to-tackle-healthcare-challenges-in-india/.